Black Sea or Black Lake?

How US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy in the wider Black Sea region.

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Abstract

This thesis asks ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected European Union policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ partly to help answer the broader question of ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ Both the United States and Russia are referred to as ‘modern’ states with ‘realist’ foreign policies, whilst the EU is described as ‘postmodern’ or ‘post-sovereign’. Now the EU extends to the Black Sea coastline there is a clash between the realism of the US and Russia, and the post-sovereign politics of the EU, whose policy is to resolve conflicts and promote a stable and peaceful European neighbourhood.

Tensions and policies are systematically analysed using methods which include interviews and documentary analysis. NATO enlargement is argued to have contributed to the war in Georgia and the hastening of the Eastern Partnership policy. Tensions over an anti-ballistic missile system, Black Sea access, energy security, territorial integrity, spheres of influence and conventional forces are also shown to have affected the implementation of EU policies, as well as causing policy changes in some instances. One change in EU direction has been from bilateral only relations with eastern partners to both bilateral and multilateral relations (partly through Black Sea Synergy) in an attempt to promote regional cooperation as well as Europeanisation.

The research concludes that US-Russian tensions, inter alia, have affected EU policy, which could point towards the triumph of realism in the Black Sea region. However, in the more recent post-Bush era, cooperation has become more visible. The thesis also argues that there is a situation of ‘balanced multipolarity’ (between Russia, the EU, Turkey and the US) in the region, which could lay the foundation for a cooperative security community to develop.
Acknowledgements

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**List of Abbreviations**

ABMS Anti-ballistic missile system

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

AU African Union

BLACKSEAFOR Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group

BSEC Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

BSS Black Sea Synergy

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DG  Directorate General
EaP  Eastern Partnership
EEAS  European External Action Service
EC  European Commission
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
ESS  European Security Strategy
EU  European Union
EUBAM  EU border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUMM  European Union Monitoring Mission
EURO-NEST PA  EU Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly
EUSR  EU Special Representative
GUAM  The GUAM (Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova) Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development
IMF  International Monetary Fund
KGB  Committee for State Security (of the USSR)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
RFE  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
UN  United Nations
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
Chapter 1

Introduction

The title of this thesis ‘Black Sea or Black Lake?’ relates to the current political perception of the Black Sea, in particular the perception of the United States (US) that, because it is a sea, there should be access for its ships, including warships, via Istanbul, which is the only route connecting this sea to the other seas of the world. Russia, on the other hand, seems to view the Black Sea as a lake which should not be navigated by the warships of non-littoral states\(^1\). Access to the Black Sea is one example of a US-Russian tension that will be examined within this thesis, which explores the region, its tensions and the policy of the European Union (EU) of promoting peace and stability in its eastern neighbourhood.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1.1 introduces the wider Black Sea region before 1.2 discusses the specific research questions of ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ and ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected EU policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ Section 1.3 details the design of the research, before section 1.4 outlines the chapters of the thesis. Finally section 1.5 makes comments on issues such as word usage and the limitations of the thesis.

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\(^1\) The Black Sea littoral states are those which have a coast line on the sea itself i.e. Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine.
1.1 The Region

Having sailed across the calm waters of the Black Sea from Yalta and Sevastopol in the Crimea to the Danube delta in Romania, I am aware of a strong sense that they constitute a sea rather than a lake, with no land in sight for much of the time. Geologically and politically this is correct and the increasingly polluted body of water called the Black Sea is precisely that even if, way back in history, it was once a completely landlocked freshwater lake.

The idea that Russia seems to regard the Black Sea as a lake is partly based on the fact that for much of history the Black Sea has either been primarily surrounded by empires or it has been the place where empires met and expansionist battles were fought. These empires include the Russian, the Ottoman, the Persian and the Byzantine. The ancient Greeks also sailed the waters of the Black Sea and knew the western coast of Georgia as Colchis or the land of the Golden Fleece. It is said that the Georgian inhabitants of that time would hang sheepskins in the rivers where they would collect tiny nuggets of gold.²

Russian perception is also heavily influenced by the fact that it harbours its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, whilst the US desire for the Black Sea to be open has been due to its strategic need for access to Georgia and Eurasia. The Russian naval base is not the only Black Sea base as the other littoral states also have bases there. The Black Sea Naval Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was set up by Turkey in 2001, and is a joint enterprise involving all littoral states.³

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³ Georgia has not fully participated since 2008.
The Black Sea versus Black Lake argument could be perceived differently if observing from the Mediterranean, as it could be posited that NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) controls the comings and goings of naval vehicles through Turkey and the Dardanelles/Bosporus entrance to the Black Sea. From this point of view the Black Sea has been called a ‘NATO-controlled lake’ by some US analysts.4 The legal situation of access to the Black Sea is still dictated by the Montreux Convention of 1936 which will be discussed in more detail within the following chapters.

From the beginning of 2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the European Union has stretched to the shores of the Black Sea, which is not a peaceful and stable region. Yet the EU regards itself as having always been a peace project, from Robert Schuman’s 9th May declaration sixty years ago5 to the Lisbon Treaty which states, ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.’6 Via its foreign policy, the EU intends to take peace and stability beyond its boundaries. My work examines if the policies of the EU are helping to achieve this aim in the Black Sea region, and also to what extent the project has been hindered by US-Russian tensions, or even blocked by US and Russian foreign policies towards the region.

Regarding tensions in general, when the Soviet Union collapsed, at the end of the Cold War, there was much fear that wars could erupt within the new states

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around the Black Sea in a similar way to those which were formerly part of Yugoslavia. Outbreaks did occur in certain regions in the early 1990s, especially a civil war in Moldova over Transnistria, war between ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region, and battles over the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The situation within the newly created Russian Federation was also severely disputed, especially in Chechnya. Later, Kosovo’s declaration of independence (2008) set a precedent for regions that wanted to break away from their current state and after the war in South Ossetia (also in 2008), Russia recognised both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. These disputes concerning territorial integrity versus self-determination are at the root of many tensions in the region.

The Black Sea at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the place where the European security arena neighbours the Eurasian area. There is a dispute as to whose neighbourhood it is and Timmins has likened this to tectonic plates meeting under the sea and metaphorically causing earthquakes and volcanoes to erupt.7

Moving on to more direct US-Russian tensions, both Vladimir Putin, whose presidency of Russia ended in 2008, and current President Dmitri Medvedev have voiced understandable concerns about NATO expansion around the Black Sea region, in particular with regard to Ukraine and Georgia. At Bucharest in April 2008, despite the US putting forward an argument for the membership of these two countries, the proposal was unsuccessful, mainly due to many EU countries not wanting to provoke Russia. Another example of a US-Russian tension has concerned the siting of part of a proposed US anti-ballistic missile system (ABMS) in Eastern

7 Discussion, June 2011.
Europe. Other examples include competition over energy resources and pipelines, influence over regional governments, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).

Russia, the EU, and the US all have influence upon the region. Another important and powerful regional state is Turkey, which has been an official ‘candidate’ for EU membership since 1999, having originally made an application to join the Community in 1987. Despite this, there is disagreement between EU members as to Turkey’s future full membership of the Union even though ‘the West’ has regarded this important country as being a vital link both to ‘the East’ in general and also to the Islamic countries of the Middle East. This delay and uncertainty over Turkey’s future membership has led to difficult relations with the EU, the US and the region at times. Nevertheless Turkey is a major player in the region and could be called the fourth pole, after Russia, the US and the EU. This multipolarity will be explored within the thesis.

With regard to US and Russian policies for the region, Russian foreign policy includes having effective security, achieving a prestigious position in the world community, forming a good-neighbour belt along its perimeter, eliminating conflicts, no new arms race, no new dividing lines in Europe, upholding the interests of Russian citizens abroad, and achieving a multipolar system in the world. US interests and policies over the last decade might seem to clash in many respects, especially the policies of NATO enlargement, missile defense installation, unipolarity, and the successful or failed attempts to send warships (possibly with nuclear weapons on board) into the Black Sea.

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1.2 The Research

This empirical research assesses how US-Russian tensions have affected European Union policy towards the region, both in terms of policy-making and the implementation of its policies. The hypothesis is that there is a correlation between US-Russian tensions and the success of EU policy in the Black Sea region in that the higher the tensions, the more likely it is that the EU’s policies will be unsuccessful. Of course, there are many other tensions that could also affect EU policy. The reason that US-Russian tensions have been selected is because there are sometimes quite strong tensions remaining as a residue of the Cold War and also because these tensions are very much within the field of realism and national interests and can be contrasted with the EU’s post-sovereign politics. So the research is set within the context of the EU ostensibly working on a soft power approach to bring democracy and stability to the area, whilst both the US and Russia seem to be more interested in their own national security (almost as an ideology) and spheres of influence, despite their rhetoric. Theoretically the thesis posits that the EU, as a body, is concerned with ‘post-sovereign’ (‘post-modern’ or ‘post-Westphalian’) politics, democracy, effective multilateralism, and extending its model of supranationality (not necessarily via enlargement), whilst the US and Russia still view the world from a more realist, ‘modern’, Westphalian point of view. Whilst the EU’s methods of achieving goals take time, especially without an enlargement ‘carrot’, realpolitik can be put into action almost at a moment’s notice as was seen in Georgia in 2008 when war broke out. There would seem to be a theoretical battle going on around the Black Sea between the traditionalist ‘modern’ countries and the ‘postmodernists’. There are

also other clashing ideological concepts in the region, including those of ‘national security’, ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘self-determination.’ The end of history\textsuperscript{10} is nowhere in sight from the middle of the Black Sea, however much one might feel lulled into a false sense of security at times by its calm waters.

The idea of this project was conceived after my previous research on Ukraine led to an interest in the Black Sea region as a whole, especially as the research coincided with the enlargement of 2007 which brought new members Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union but at the same time presented problems for Ukraine and Moldova regarding borders and trade. The tensions being caused by both EU and NATO enlargement were evident in the region and added to internal disputes within the Union.

Some pre-Lisbon Treaty (2009) debates concerned EU ‘widening versus deepening’ with member states that wanted a deeper Union being mostly against further enlargement, whilst those preferring a looser bond (along with the US) felt that enlargement was a good security policy. Questions were being asked about how far the EU could enlarge, with disagreements over the accession of Turkey as well as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. One question that needed to be asked was, ‘How can the foreign policy of the EU towards its eastern neighbours help to bring peace and stability to the region without enlargement?’ Various EU policies such as Black Sea Synergy\textsuperscript{11} and the Eastern Partnership (EaP)\textsuperscript{12} were introduced to enhance the existing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and try to resolve this dilemma. In part these policies have shown movement from an enlargement policy to a regionalisation

\textsuperscript{11} European Commission, \textit{Black Sea Synergy} (Brussels: European Commission, 2007).
\textsuperscript{12} European Commission, \textit{Eastern Partnership} (Brussels: European Commission, 2008).
policy, without necessarily ruling out future enlargement. Due to this change of policy, the main theoretical question of the research has led to another specific research question which is, ‘Can the Black Sea region develop into a “security community” and, if so, is realism’s concept of “balanced multipolarity” a necessary condition?’

My empirical study of US-Russian tensions and EU policies was initially designed to help to answer the main theoretical question of, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ Now that the EU stretches to the Black Sea shores there is a clash of ideologies between the region’s states, including Russia, which have ‘national interest’ foreign policies and the supranational EU layer in the west with its post-sovereign politics. If the Black Sea area were to shift towards EU-model regional politics (a security community) then this could point to a future world with many EU-model regions.

Like many other regions with conflicts, the wider Black Sea area has a variety of peoples and much diverse history. It also has a variety of political systems. In the twenty-first century it is at the point where the East meets the West and, in the south, the Middle East too. It is a strategic area for the world’s powers not only for traditional security reasons but for energy security as well. The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) all have some involvement in the wider Black Sea region and there have been disputes and tensions between them. For example, an anti-ballistic missile system, which was
initially to be placed in Poland and the Czech Republic by the US, provoked Russia into using threatening rhetoric and into feeling more hostile towards NATO as well as the US. There have also been disputes between EU member states about bilateral agreements with the US and disputes between actors about NATO enlargement. After August 2008, disagreements over the Russia-Georgia War could be added to the list.\textsuperscript{13} The United Nations (UN) has also been involved in conflict resolution in the region. It could be argued that none of the organisations mentioned in this paragraph is effective enough when it comes to establishing a peaceful region.

The research examines, in particular, how EU policies towards Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been affected by US-Russian tensions. All of these countries are partners within the EU’s Eastern Partnership and members of the Union’s European Neighbourhood Policy, which was introduced as the EU enlarged towards the Black Sea. The ENP programme involves EU neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. Eastern states included in the ENP and the EaP are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Initially, with regard to eastern neighbours, there was much focus on Ukraine and Moldova but in 2004, after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the EU Commission and Javier Solana (High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) were tasked with examining how the South Caucasus countries could also be included in the ENP.\textsuperscript{14} Russia refused to be involved, wanting its own separate agreement. Questions arose as to how effective a policy with only bilateral agreements and no EU membership

\textsuperscript{13} This war is still called by several names and will within the thesis be referred to as ‘the war in South Ossetia’, ‘the war in Georgia’ or the ‘Russia-Georgia War’.
perspective could be, so the EU later produced further policies. The first of these was Black Sea Synergy (2007), which focuses on cooperation between EU members and neighbours, including Turkey, in the wider Black Sea region, mainly with regard to sectoral issues such as energy, the environment and transport. The second policy was the Eastern Partnership (2008) which was initially intended to keep the possibility of future membership open for eastern neighbours. Before the Lisbon Treaty was implemented, the ENP was part of the remit of the ‘Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP’ but in 2009 this post was combined with the Enlargement Directorate General (DG) to create the Enlargement and Neighbourhood DG. These policies are the main focus of the research into EU policy in the wider Black Sea region.

The EU’s regionalisation policies could be viewed as the encouragement of the development of a security community in the Black Sea region. Building on the theories of structural realism and post-sovereign politics, this thesis argues that there is a situation of ‘balanced multipolarity’ (between Russia, the EU, Turkey and the US) in the region, which could be a necessary but not sufficient condition for a cooperative security community to develop.

1.3 The Research Design

Regarding the design of the research, one of the main research questions, as previously mentioned, is, ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected EU policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ In order to attempt to answer this question, a sample of specific tensions (independent variables) has been examined in a variety of cases (EU policy areas) along with evidence gathered i.e. specific examples, where available, of the policies being affected, both with regard to policy-making and
policy implementation. A summary of the research results is given in Table 1.1 with each tension assessed as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ in terms of its effect on EU policy. ‘High’ indicates that there has been a very high level of impact on the EU’s policy specifically due to US-Russian tensions even when there have been other tensions involved as well. ‘Medium’ indicates either that the US-Russian tensions have had a medium level effect or that they have had a high effect but other variables were also strong. Given that only observable tensions were selected within the research design, it is not surprising that there were no ‘low’ results. However, there were several ‘low/medium’ results which indicated either that US-Russian tensions were not pronounced or that other tensions were stronger.

Examples of the tensions analysed, as partly outlined earlier, include disputes over NATO enlargement, the anti-ballistic missile system, Black Sea access, conflict areas, spheres of influence and energy and pipelines. Every case study does not include every tension. Only a sample of the ones regarded as being relevant in some way to that particular aspect of the research has been explored in each case. The research did not set out to establish that all US-Russian tensions have affected all EU policies, just that there is a link in some cases.
### Table 1.1 Research Results

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU POLICY AREA</th>
<th>TENSION</th>
<th>EFFECT ON POLICY</th>
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<td>independent variable</td>
<td>outcome</td>
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<td><strong>EUROPEAN SECURITY</strong> (Chapter 4)</td>
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<td>General security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>maritime issues</td>
<td>medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy security</td>
<td>influence on Ukraine</td>
<td>medium</td>
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<td></td>
<td>influence on Baku pipelines</td>
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<td><strong>CONFLICT RESOLUTION</strong> (Chapter 5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>war</td>
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<td>territorial integrity</td>
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<td>enlargement (in general)</td>
<td>high</td>
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<td></td>
<td>divide and rule</td>
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<td></td>
<td>spheres of influence</td>
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<td>energy</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>territorial integrity</td>
<td>low / medium</td>
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<td></td>
<td>conventional forces (CFE)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEANISATION AND REGIONALISATION</strong> (Chapter 6)</td>
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<td>Europeanisation</td>
<td>democratisation</td>
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<td>enlargement (in general)</td>
<td>high</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regionalisation</td>
<td>spheres of influence</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The causal relationship between the tensions and the policy-making or effectiveness has, in most instances, been interfered with by other variables such as clashes between EU member states or tensions with other countries including Turkey.

The research is qualitative and the methods employed include analysis of raw data and the commentaries of experts and practitioners. The data have been gathered via primary sources including EU documents, interviews (some elite), EU and other websites, think tank discussions, conferences and the media, as well as secondary sources such as journals, books and newspapers. Some interviews are unattributed and some think tank discussions were under Chatham House rule which states ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.’

The broader research question concerns theory and asks, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ That is, will the Cold War, realist thinking of the US and Russia demonstrated towards the end of the Bush administration (when the research began) give way to the EU’s ‘effective multilateralism’ during the Obama administration? The question is related to the more specific one in that if there is a degree of shift from a ‘realist’ Black Sea region towards a more cooperative one then this should be reflected by the extent to which US-Russian tensions are affecting EU policies; if the policies are greatly affected by

realist tensions then the answer to the research question concerning realism and post-sovereign politics will be towards the negative end of the spectrum.

One method of answering the more theoretical question in the shorter term would be to assess whether tensions or cooperative measures are dominant between the US and Russia whilst ignoring the rhetoric used for public consumption. If the tensions are dominant then the EU’s policies of peace-making in the neighbourhood are likely to be affected whereas if cooperation is more pronounced then there should be a less negative effect, although it must be borne in mind that the US and Russia could make cooperative deals which affect other countries of the Black Sea region in a negative way.

1.4 The Chapters

The tensions described above, in particular the US-Russian tensions, are examined in detail within the following chapters. They are explored in connection with the two main research questions and conclusions are made where appropriate. Before that, Chapter 2 contains a review of appropriate literature broken down into four main categories which are ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy’, ‘The Black Sea Region’, ‘European and Black Sea Security’ and ‘Theoretical Perspectives’. It also serves as a more detailed introduction to these aspects of Black Sea research and includes a review of the literature on the theories of democratic peace theory, realism and multipolarity, security communities and post-sovereign politics. Chapter 3 examines these theories in much greater detail and applies them to the Black Sea Region.
The case studies of how US-Russian tensions are affecting EU policy begin in Chapter 4 which contains two studies within the domain of EU security policy and strategy. The first of these concentrates on traditional security matters and how EU policies on trying to keep peace and stability in the region are affected by US-Russian tensions over NATO enlargement, military and naval issues including Black Sea naval access, and anti-ballistic missile systems. The second case study looks at the EU’s energy security policy with tensions over supply and pipelines being highlighted and examined to calculate the extent to which US-Russian tensions are affecting the EU’s policy of energy diversification in addition to the other EU Black Sea policies.

Chapter 5 contains three case studies which look in detail at the regional conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, examining how US-Russian tensions have affected the EU’s policies of conflict resolution both in terms of policy-making and implementation. One clear example of tension between the two great powers is the 2008 war in South Ossetia, and although the EU was able to act to ameliorate the situation to some extent, nevertheless it must be seen as a failure of its policy to avoid conflict. Other tensions examined in this chapter include territorial integrity, spheres of influence, divide and rule, NATO enlargement and, in the case of Azerbaijan, the important issues of energy and pipelines.

The two case studies in Chapter 6 are of how the EU policies of Europeanisation and regionalisation are affected by US-Russian tensions. Although the term Europeanisation is often used in the literature to describe the relationship between the various layers of the multi-layered governance within the European Union, in the thesis it is mainly used to describe how non-EU countries may become
more administratively like EU members through the political and economic organisation of their national politics and policy-making. It is also used to describe the assimilation of non-EU countries into the EU i.e. enlargement. Regionalisation is a more recent EU policy defined by the multi-lateral aspects of Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. The US-Russian tensions that could be affecting these two policies of Europeanisation and regionalisation are those tensions which concern democratisation and enlargement in the region as well as those related to spheres of influence.

The final chapter brings together all of the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters to make overall deductions about both the effect that US-Russian tensions have had on EU policies and the extent to which realism is giving way to post-sovereign politics. In addition it focuses on the hypothesis of balanced multipolarity leading to the possibility of a security community developing in the region as well as discussing further research indicated.

1.5 Comments and Clarification

The data were mainly collected between 2007 and the autumn of 2010 which is why the main focus was initially on the Bush-Putin era and the EU before the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect. New data from Wikileaks sources have not been used, although in some instances they have served to confirm information received from original sources. With regard to EU policies, the focus is mainly on specific aspects of the policies, in particular those concerned with peace and security. Other important concepts such as democratisation are discussed within this thesis but only in a limited and focused way to enhance the theoretical or empirical arguments.
The use of names such as Kosovo (Serbian name) rather than Kosova (Albanian name), or Shusha (Azerbaijani name) rather than Shushi (Armenian name), or Nagorno-Karabakh (the de facto republic) rather than Nagorny Karabakh (the mountainous part of the Karabakh region) is primarily done on the basis of the names most recognised internationally, the longest usage or general clarification. The usage does not necessarily imply any political endorsements.

There is often a debate about which countries are ‘in’ Europe and which are not. For the purposes of this thesis all 47 countries that are members of the Council of Europe, plus Belarus, are regarded as being European. This includes all of the states described as being a part of the ‘wider Black Sea region’.

Theoretically my research contrasts realism, especially structural neorealism, drawing on the work of Adrian Hyde-Price, John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz with ‘post-sovereign’, or ‘postmodern’ politics (based on the EU model) drawing on authors including William Wallace and Robert Cooper (see Chapter 3). The theory of security communities is also examined and applied to the region in conjunction with realism’s concept of ‘balanced multipolarity’.

This thesis is an original contribution for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there has been little systematic examination of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy in the Black Sea region, which the thesis does by analysing concrete examples and making overall conclusions. Secondly it extends the literature on realism versus post-sovereign politics via a case study of the Black Sea region, and thirdly it combines the theories of realism, security communities and
supranationality to put forward a hypothesis that balanced multipolarity could be a foundation for the development of a security community.\textsuperscript{16}

It is hoped that this research will be of use to EU departments that are trying to improve their understanding of how to help the Black Sea region gain peace and stability and the forces that are blocking their progress. It will also add to the growing theoretical research on both the Black Sea region and the EU itself. In addition the thesis asks if supranationalism and the EU-model could be the way forward for the world and its mix of authoritarian states, democracies and failed states. This research could help to answer the more global and abstract questions. In particular, the conclusion that balanced multipolarity in a region can lay a good foundation for a cooperative, supranational security community is an idea that could be explored more widely.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review: EU Policy and the Black Sea Region

This chapter primarily explores the academic literature within the various themes implicit in the research questions, ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected EU policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ and ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ The literature is, at times, supported by other evidence to provide a more in-depth introduction to the main themes which have been divided into four sections: the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Region, European and Black Sea Security and Theoretical Perspectives. The section on the fourth theme of theoretical perspectives reviews the literature on democratic peace theory, realism and multipolarity, security communities and post-sovereign politics.

The main purpose of this literature review is to consider the research of previous authors on the themes involved before analysing and enlarging on their work in later chapters. The review is not exhaustive and further literature is also discussed within the relevant chapters of the thesis.

2.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy

There has been much in the academic literature on EU enlargement and democratisation in Eastern Europe, researchers of note including Judy Batt of the
University of Birmingham,¹ Heather Grabbe, former researcher at Chatham House then later employed by the EU enlargement Directorate General, Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform, Karen Henderson of the University of Leicester,² and Geoffrey Pridham of Bristol University.³ Most of the countries initially researched by these authors are now full members of the European Union, the last round of enlargement having taken place in January 2007 with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria. Countries with candidate status for future inclusion are Iceland, Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is likely that other Western Balkan countries will follow when they are ready.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been the subject of many books and academic papers since its inception in 2003. Examples of notable authors include Michael Emerson of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and his colleagues. This policy towards the neighbourhood involves bilateral relations with non-candidate states in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The wider Black Sea neighbours, which are the main focus of this thesis, are Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The ENP developed from enlargement as a foreign policy, partly because there has always been a waiting list of countries keen to join the EU and partly because there is no agreement between EU member states on how far the EU can enlarge. There is doubt about the ability of some neighbours to fulfil the accession criteria as well as doubt about the EU’s ability to assimilate more countries.

¹ Including contributions to the ‘One Europe or Several’ project launched in 1999 and funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
Turkey, an important Black Sea neighbour of the EU is not a member of the ENP as it has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999. It seems unlikely that it will accede in the near future and French President Sarkozy is amongst those who have doubted that Turkey should be granted full membership. In 2005 Grant wrote, ‘All over Europe, politicians are becoming more hostile to further EU enlargement.’ Some have viewed the ENP as a method of continuing to bring peaceful change to eastern European countries without offering them membership, a policy that will eventually offer everything but institutions. The EU recognises that stability on the borders is necessary for its security. As Cremona pointed out in 2005, ‘The recognition that it is not possible to seal off instability behind ever tighter borders has compelled the Union to make a choice: whether to export stability and security to its near neighbours, or risk importing instability from them.’

Former Commissioner for Enlargement (until 2009), Olli Rehn, has responded to talk about the Union’s ‘final borders’ by stating that he believes in continued widening of the Union as well as deepening. He wrote that this is all part of the Union’s ‘soft power’ which can succeed where military might fails and he has reminded Europe of how this soft power must be used to enhance peace. Nevertheless, obtaining membership could be more difficult in the future as it was stressed at the European Council meeting in December 2006 that new prospective

members must be ‘ready and able to fully assume the obligations of Union membership’ and also that ‘the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop’ if it takes in the new members.⁸

Gallagher is one example of an author that has analysed eastern European countries and their accession concluding that, for security and strategic purposes, Bulgaria and Romania were allowed to enter the Union at the beginning of 2007, before they were ready.⁹ The war in Kosovo was a prime reason for the entry of these countries into the EU. They were promised membership in exchange for support, according to former Commissioner Verheugen¹⁰ as well as Gallagher.¹¹ Since their accession, the EU has reached as far as the Black Sea which is a strategic region. Ambassadors from these new EU members have emphasised that they support further enlargement from the point of view of security and they would like to see both Moldova and Ukraine as members. This way Romania, in particular, would have less responsibility for border controls.¹²

Part of the reason for enlarging eastwards and also for accepting current prospective members, Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, is for reasons of security, especially the prevention of further war. Paddy Ashdown, ex-High Commissioner of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been passionate about the EU honouring the European Council agreement made to the Western Balkans at the summit

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8 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 14/15 December 2006, 16879/1/06.  
10 I. Bancroft, ‘Kosovo, the problem neighbour’, The Guardian, 17 February 2010  
meeting in 2003 at Thessaloniki. He and others think that Albania in particular could be a breeding ground for terrorists if not granted accession status. The EU was deeply shaken by the Yugoslav wars on its borders and its own fragmented opinions and failures with regard to these wars. The Union has not wanted a repetition of the Balkan wars in any of its other neighbours and yet we still experienced a war in Georgia in 2008.

The ENP followed on from enlargement but became a part of the EU’s foreign policy given that members had no clear path to accession via this route. The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) had the following to say about the ENP in 2004:

Consistent commitments will also be sought on certain essential concerns of the EU’s external action including the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation […] and efforts towards the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts as well as cooperation in justice and home affairs matters.  

Weber, Smith and Baun later analysed Europe in change, concluding that the ENP is a method of preserving the EU zone of peace whilst influencing the behaviour of non-member countries without offering them the prospect of membership. They have also attempted to assess the EU’s overall potential for promoting good governance in its near abroad without offering full EU membership or becoming a

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13 For example, he challenged President Barroso on this subject at the Hugo Young Memorial Lecture, Chatham House, 16 October 2006 (personally attended). Also see Commission Press Release 163 10229/03.
They argue that, rather than formally limiting the EU’s expansion through initiatives such as the ENP, it might be more effective to have a ‘Europe à la carte’ with varying degrees of membership. This is a form of ‘variable geometry’.¹⁷

One of Emerson’s many contributions to the literature said (in 2004) that the EU had the dilemma of either remaining true to its founding values of being open to all European democracies or of maintaining its governability. (One problem regarding the accession of eastern neighbours is that many of them have defective democracies which are not ‘consolidated’ to EU standards. This affects the issue of governability.) The ENP is an attempt to resolve the dilemma but Emerson wrote that it needs more power because it seeks commitments from partners whilst only making vague ones itself.¹⁸ On this theme Smith and Webber might agree, writing (in 2007) that the ENP process raised Georgia’s expectations in the past, especially when CSDP related operations took place there including a rule of law mission (EUJUST Themis) and the mentoring of border guards (though without active involvement). They also see the fact that the EU’s special representative to the South Caucasus had no mediation role as a specific problem.¹⁹

In 2007, Grant said that the current ENP was not really working and was inadequate, partly due to implications for Russia which opposed closer ties between the EU and Black Sea countries. He wrote that,

Some Americans, and even a few European policymakers […] see Eastern Europe as part of a geopolitical ‘great game’: they talk of rolling back

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-7.
¹⁷ Grant, 2005.
Russian influence in the region. However, as far as most EU governments are concerned, what matters in these countries is the speed and quality of political and economic reform. They believe that it does not matter whether an election-winner is pro-Moscow or pro-Western, so long as the electoral process is free and fair.\(^20\)

Grant added that neighbours such as Ukraine and Georgia are keen for full EU membership but may welcome other initiatives temporarily. One new initiative introduced in 2007 is Black Sea Synergy. According to Tassinari, a former research fellow at the influential think tank, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), in Brussels, and a proposer of ‘synergy’ in the region:

In this new initiative, the commission identifies as many as thirteen cooperation areas. It plans to draw the EU closer to the existing regional organisations, primarily the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation. And it aims to correlate region-wide developments with the resolution of the 'frozen conflicts' in Georgia, Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All this is not endowed with new financial means, but will draw on existing resources, as well as on mechanisms for joint financing with other international actors operating in the region.\(^21\)

The main purpose of Black Sea Synergy is to try to assist the countries in the wider Black Sea area in communicating with each other and is a multilateral policy as opposed to the ENP which emphasises bilateral agreements.


A second new initiative is the Eastern Partnership policy, proposed by Sweden and Poland in early 2008. It contains both bilateral and multilateral aspects and will be examined in detail within the thesis.

New literature specifically on the Black Sea region and EU regional policies such as Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership is greatly increasing and includes a volume edited by this author and Karen Henderson, which examines the region and EU policies, focusing, in particular, on clashes between the diverse agendas of EU institutions, EU members and Black Sea states.\(^{22}\)

## 2.2 The Black Sea Region

This section examines the extent of the literature on the wider Black Sea region as a whole, as well as that covering Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus countries more specifically. There was a dearth of academic literature on the ‘region’ before NATO’s interest, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and more recent events such as the enlargement of 2007 and the war in Georgia. In fact the question was sometimes asked as to whether or not the Black Sea actually existed as a ‘region’. Much academic literature has focused on EU-Russia relations and the ‘shared neighbourhood’, which could sound as though the countries concerned are joint property or as though both Russia and the EU are hegemonic towards the region.

Aydin (Kadir Has University, Istanbul) suggested in 2005 that perhaps the Black Sea is an ‘intellectually constructed region’ with a weak regional identity.\(^{23}\)

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whilst Ionescu, also writing for the NATO Defense College, put forward two viewpoints of the sea itself: firstly, the Black Sea could be seen as a ‘closed’ area belonging to its littoral states, or secondly, it could be seen as ‘open’. This idea connects to the question of whether it is a ‘Black Sea’ or a ‘Black Lake’. Ionescu also discusses soft security, in particular democratic consolidation, as being appropriate for the region.  

Aydin posits that regionalisation is seen as a useful instrument in creating regional and global stability because it leads to non-coercive attitudes and regional identity. He says the Cold War kept down regional tensions which resurfaced when it ended leading to conflicts, which have had a negative impact on development. Contested borders, ethnic conflicts and forced migration still pose risks but there are some positives too, including the Black Sea not being dominated by one power. He says that now there can be a move towards multidimensional regional cooperation especially with regard to issue based cooperation. Organisations like BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), founded in the early 1990s, might be weak but at least they facilitate some conversations, for example between Armenia and Azerbaijan or Turkey. The EU and NATO encourage reform but help is needed in solving regional conflicts. He agrees that soft security is also very important in the region, especially democratisation.

Ponsard, of the NATO Defense College, thinks that in addition to BSEC, which has twelve member countries from the wider Black Sea area, the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova Organisation for Democracy and Economic

Development (GUAM) could also be a possible factor in regional stability and security. He highlights that regional cooperation is needed to find common solutions to transnational risks and threats and to resolve the so-called frozen conflicts.26

Many believe that the European Union also needs to be more involved. Ban, from the Centre for EU Enlargement Studies in Budapest, argues that the Black Sea region was kept in the background before EU enlargement and that moving eastwards has been difficult and controversial for the EU in particular when negotiating with Russia. She adds that enlargement has meant that conflicts have appeared on Europe’s doorstep and primarily examines the role that core states such as Greece and Romania play in EU-BSEC relations, especially Romania which is enthusiastic about being a stabilising factor in the region. Bulgaria and Greece must work with Romania, she says, in order to sustain an eastern dimension in the EU’s policies.27

Meanwhile, Bryza, former US deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs and former member of the OSCE’s Minsk Group on South Caucasus conflict resolution, writes in 2006 that:

… the extended Black Sea region hangs in the strategic balance. It could emerge as a zone of strategic ‘connective tissue’, completing the democratic transformation of Europe’s East (in Georgia and Ukraine), while facilitating cooperation with key partners that may not aspire to membership in the Euroatlantic family (like Russia). Or, it might evolve into a zone of

confrontation, riven with unresolved separatist conflicts, a broad range of other transnational threats and dysfunctional energy markets.\textsuperscript{28}

Bryza also comments that the main goals for the US in the region are to encourage democracy, to expand oil and gas pipelines as well as commerce generally, and to work on security interests including separatist conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{29} This is all proving to be difficult in practice. Bryza calls objections from Turkey to a NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea ‘misunderstandings’ and also writes that ‘aggressive pursuit of democratic reform’ which the US believes is crucial to the region can lead to misperceptions that the US seeks to foment revolution.\textsuperscript{30} At one point his paper says that the US wants ‘non-exclusive’ cooperation but then continues with ‘the United States is intent on pursuing shared interests with its regional partners around the Black Sea and will not afford any country a veto over such efforts.’\textsuperscript{31} This could appear to be a threat to Russia as well as to Turkey.

Russia too would seem to be a threat to the peace of the region and according to Himmelreich, writing in the same (Asmus 2006) edited volume as Bryza, has attempted to undermine many countries that have become independent from the former USSR by supporting separatist regimes especially in the areas of Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia. Russian passports have been given to many citizens in these areas causing a creeping annexation of Moldovan and Georgian territories with forced displacement of non-Russians.\textsuperscript{32} One reason why citizens in two of these


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 38.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 40.

areas wanted Russian passports in the past is because it was often easier to access the EU with a Russian passport than with a Georgian one.

Makarychev, from the Nizhny Novgorod Civil Service Academy, would seem to agree with Himmelreich writing in addition that Russia is convinced the West’s interference in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia is about realpolitik despite its normative rhetoric of promoting democracy and civil liberties. Russia also has a realpolitik goal to keep neighbouring states ‘firmly within its geopolitical orbit’\(^33\) yet is counter-attacking on the normative plane by accusing Georgian president Saakashvili of violating the principles of democracy and human rights. Makarychev concludes that Russia will need to learn to share the Black Sea with other actors even including China.

Goncharenko, of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), in appraising the wider Black Sea region, describes it as an area that has always ‘been the field where the expansionist wars of the Persian, Ottoman and Russian empires were fought.’\(^34\) He writes, in 2005, that there are three groupings for the major actors involved in the Black Sea region which are the US and Russia, the regional powers, and international organisations. Regarding the US, he says it is a dominant actor that is looking for a corridor of influence expanding from NATO territory in Europe to Afghanistan. US military presence has greatly increased in the area since 2001 which Goncharenko feels is in the interest of countries in the region that do not have great power ambitions. The US, under the Bush regime wanted to expand

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NATO in the area, squeeze out Russia, and decrease the latter’s influence. On the other side, Russia has for centuries considered Black Sea and Caspian Sea access the most important factor in its national security. Russia has also wanted to be more active in international affairs. However, most post-Soviet countries desire independence free from Russian interference.

Goncharenko also states that the regional powers have a strong interest in maintaining stability and security in the area despite many difficulties, and that international organisations such as NATO and the EU have an interest too due to the region’s economic potential and resources and because of the Black Sea’s strategic importance. In his paper, he maintains that the wider Black Sea region will play a very important role in future NATO activities but wondered ‘how this agenda will comply with international law and the Washington Treaty.’ More dramatically, Goncharenko warns that, ‘the short sighted policy of appeasement of Russia could very easily lead to the same results as the policy of the appeasement of Nazi Germany.’

There was always some concern that the declared independence of Kosovo would set a precedent for other autonomous areas within states to follow, including the two breakaway regions in Georgia. In 2008, prior to the war in South Ossetia, Baev, of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, examined the relationship between Russia and Georgia following Kosovo’s independence. He concluded that, ‘[t]he pattern of relations between Russia and Georgia in the post-Soviet period, particularly since the Rose Revolution, has been shaped by a manipulation of

36 Ibid., p.27.
conflict, which itself has gradually transformed underlying public attitudes.’ He is saying that the Georgians blame Russia for all ills, believing that only NATO can rescue them, whilst Russia regards Georgia as a failed state and believes there should be no NATO encroachment. Baev adds:

the recognition by the United States and key EU states of Kosovar independence has not prompted Russia to grant recognition to Abkhazia and/or incorporate South Ossetia, but it has established a precedent that would allow Moscow to take action of this sort if the issue of Georgia’s accession to NATO turns into a practical proposition. A military escalation of the ensuing conflict could be contained and localized, but the damage to Russia’s relationship with the West could be profound.38

Sokov also analysed the situation with regard to whether Russia would take action in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.39 He concluded that, ‘The Kosovo precedent could yet trigger significant destabilization in the former USSR’. This could now be argued to be correct.

Another important security concern regarding the Black Sea area is that of terrorism and organised crime. Petersen, of the Atlantic Council in Washington DC, has written various articles and papers including one with Grgic that says since the enlargement of the EU to the Black Sea, ‘the so-called frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus are now part of the Union’s new neighbourhood. The defence doctrines of

38 Ibid.
almost every EU member-state stress ungoverned spaces as one of the primary security concerns of the 21st century.\textsuperscript{40}

Following on from the Russia-Georgia war there has been an increase in the literature on the South Caucasus conflict zones. One notable publication specifically on the war in Georgia was edited by Cornell and Starr in 2009.\textsuperscript{41} The chapters within this book, all written by different authors of varying nationalities including Russian, Georgian and American, are in chronological order beginning with the history of Georgia then leading up to the 2008 war and its aftermath. Many of these essays are referred to in Chapter 5 in conjunction with the case study of Georgia. At a discussion of the book in 2009,\textsuperscript{42} Cornell, one of the editors, gave insights such as how Russia could only keep its ‘peacekeepers’ in South Ossetia after the war by recognising it as an independent state. Having participated in a war with Georgia, Russia could no longer argue that it was in the region as a ‘peacekeeper’. Also, he added, the policy of annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia began many years before the war.

Regarding the region and its future, Ponsard wrote in 2005 that ‘the inclusion of the Black Sea region in the Euro-Atlantic sphere should protect us against many of the future threats to our stability. The Black Sea region represents indeed an important front line in the fight against all new problems and risks to our security – be they in the form of illegal immigrants, narcotics, or even human trafficking. If we want to preserve a wider Europe that is not only democratic and prosperous, but also

\textsuperscript{42} Chatham House, London, 2009 - personally attended.
secure, we need to follow this path.”\textsuperscript{43} This thesis asks \textit{inter alia} if this idea of including the Black Sea states into ‘the West’, especially NATO, might have caused as many problems as solutions.

\section*{2.3 European and Black Sea Security}

The issue of security in post-Soviet and post-Warsaw Pact countries has been widely studied by the academic community. For example, in 2000, Smith and Timmins argued that, ‘Neither the EU nor NATO is capable of providing adequate foundation for the prospective construction of a pan-European security order independently from each other.’\textsuperscript{44} They also argued that, for security purposes, countries that were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact needed to be members of NATO and the EU, rather than just the EU. This is what has now happened to most of these countries.

There has also been much research on the security policies of the EU, especially the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, the security of the Black Sea as a region has been less explored outside of NATO and the universities of the region.

With regard to the major security challenges of the Black Sea area, Goncharenko has written that this region has become one of the main areas where global interests clash, asserting that Russia not only plays a central role in the crisis but is also the major cause. He says that, ‘The tactics used by Russia are well known’

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\textsuperscript{44} M. A. Smith and G. Timmins, \textit{Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) p. 11.
and that ‘[a]t the beginning Russia fuels the conflict, uses it for its own purposes and then plays the role of peacemaker.’ 45

UK scholars Allison, Light and White conducted interesting research on Putin’s Russia in 2006. For example, in response to various other writers who have asserted that the type of action and rhetoric between West and East during the first years of the twenty-first century was similar to that of the Cold War and have questioned whether or not the idea of a resurgence of the Cold War might be legitimately raised, Allison et al. say that the situation could be viewed as a deepening of the ‘cold peace’ that former Russian President Yeltsin predicted would follow NATO enlargement.46 Yeltsin thought that the enlargement of NATO would cause Russians to see an anti-Moscow alliance right up against the borders of the old Soviet Union. In 1994, Time magazine quoted former President Yeltsin as saying, ‘Europe, not having yet freed itself from the heritage of the cold war, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust?’ According to Time, the ‘Russian President also accused Washington of overweening arrogance in playing the role of sole superpower.’ 47

Neither Putin nor his presidential successor Medvedev would be happy about Black Sea countries such as Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. Allison et al. add that Ukraine, in particular, has been seen as an instrument in the strategic weakening of Russia.48

45 Goncharenko, 2005, p. 28.
48 Allison et al., 2006, p. 90.
NATO has been a focal point for disagreement, not only between the US and Russia but between the US and the EU. The US has encouraged the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but seemingly only if it is within NATO i.e. a force that can be used without US participation but only with US agreement. The US has strongly believed that there should be no competition between NATO and the CSDP. Hunter writes that the United States supports CSDP, but on the basis that it is created within NATO, ‘separable but not separate’ from the Alliance, and drawing mainly on NATO's military assets.49

Nevertheless, there is some disagreement within the EU with regard to how independent the CSDP should be. Regarding Europe’s position, there is an increasing amount of literature on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP, including an all-encompassing work on European security and defence by Howorth.50 This book references most previous authors on the subject and says that the CSDP is a political and strategic project with a common body of instruments. Since 2003 various missions have been undertaken, some civilian and some military. These include missions to Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and the Moldova/Ukraine border (EUBAM).

According to Howorth, the CSDP, unlike NATO, is not a response to an existential threat. It is not about the possibility of being able to fight major wars with other great powers but is more about crisis management. Some in the US have been afraid that the CSDP is a ‘balancing’ strategy against them designed to replace or subvert NATO but, according to Howorth, the CSDP is not intended to make the EU

50 J. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the EU (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
into a superpower. In reality, it is a logical offspring from the end of the Cold War. Europe is less strategic for the US now so the latter is not so keen to defend it. NATO was originally about European protection but gradually changed into an alliance implicitly configured to deliver European commitment to US global strategy. Howorth argues that the CSDP will enhance the transatlantic alliance in a multipolar world.

Various authors and practitioners, including Grant, have suggested that the best-performing neighbours could be offered partnerships in the CSDP.\(^5\) Russia would probably not be very happy to see such countries join but would prefer it to the enlargement of NATO.

There have also been tensions between Russia and the US with regard to the US anti-ballistic missile system (ABMS) proposed for Europe by the Bush administration. Whilst such a defence system might seem wise in many ways, this depends upon its actual purpose. For example are the anti-missiles to have nuclear warheads and so be capable of offence as well as defence? Is there a link with a possible space-based program or with anti-satellite capabilities? Advisor Rebecca Johnson from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy spoke to an EU parliament subcommittee in 2007, saying that, ‘Space security is pre-eminently an issue of global security and international relations.’ Also, ‘Space has become the contested “high ground” for some military strategists, particularly in the United States, who promote the argument that whoever controls space will obtain an unassailable military and commercial dominance on Earth.’\(^5\) She believes that the

\(^5\) Grant, 2007.
\(^5\) R. Johnson, ‘Weaponisation of space and threats to European space assets supporting ESDP’, 2 May 2007,
EU needs a common position that should prohibit the weaponisation of space. However, she also says that European space assets need protecting and NATO and the US should not drive the decision-making. It would seem that this is an area where the EU should be involved through its CFSP and CSDP. There is a space dimension of the CSDP that wants to close the gap with the US and develop its own technology.\footnote{53} 

Continuing with the theme of US-Russian tensions, a paper by Marshall and Rofe has outlined a classic pattern in US-Russian relations saying that, although there are disagreements, there are often ways of finding common ground in order to solve problems.\footnote{54} In particular, there is a special relationship between Moscow and Washington which is not a particularly friendly relationship but where there can be times of close concord despite the mutual distrust. For example, after the demise of the USSR, Gorbachev did trust Bush senior and was willing to let democracy take its course, although many in the KGB (former Russian Committee for State Security) doubted the sincerity of Bush and his government. In particular, they were sceptical of Secretary Baker’s verbal promise that in return for a reunited Germany, NATO would not expand any further to the east.

In addition, Marshall and Rofe write that Russia regarded the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 as an American coup and the Iraq invasion of the same year as a hostile takeover of their oil industry just after Russia had become involved there.

\footnote{53} Western European Union, ‘The Space Dimension of the ESDP’ (Western European Union, A/1881, 2004).
This introduces another main theme of the thesis which is that energy security plays an important role in US-Russian relations and Black Sea security issues, as well as affecting EU policies.

Simes, president of the Nixon Centre, describes another source of tension between the US and Russia when writing, ‘Underlying the United States’ mishandling of Russia is the conventional wisdom in Washington, which holds that the Reagan administration won the Cold War largely on its own. But this is not what happened, and it is certainly not the way most Russians view the demise of the Soviet state.’\textsuperscript{55} He also says that there have been many opportunities for strategic cooperation but the US has ignored them.

In September 2008, Russia, not for the first time, called for a pan-European summit aimed at creating a ‘reliable collective security system’ in Europe, arguing that existing structures did not pass the strength test during the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008. At a UN General Assembly ministerial meeting Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, said that the system was needed to guarantee equal security for all states. Lavrov reminded the UN that there had been solidarity within the international community over the struggle against terrorism and added that there needed to be a pan-European security shield. Medvedev had previously called for a legally-binding European Security Treaty that would stretch from Vancouver to Vladivostok and improve relations between the East and the West.\textsuperscript{56} Schroeder and Hyde-Price might regard this as a transcendence strategy which seeks ‘to reduce security competition by establishing institutional structures and procedures for the

\textsuperscript{55} D. Simes, ‘Losing Russia: the costs of renewed confrontation’, \textit{Foreign Affairs} Vol.86 (6), 2007, p. 36.  
peaceful management of conflicts." They say that transcendence strategies are mainly used by ‘middle powers’, although dominant powers might use them to assist with their hegemonic ambitions. Also great powers in decline might try to hang on to their regional power in this way. (Realism will be discussed in more depth in the next section and in Chapter 3).

Hyde-Price adds that at the time of German reunification, the West German foreign minister (and leading NATO minister) called for an integrated replacement of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This proposal received some support in small European nations but eventually was dropped in favour of re-branding NATO.

An important concept to consider in relation to security in the context of post-Cold War Europe is that of ‘security governance’ which has been defined by Webber as ‘an international system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a majority of states (or at least the major powers) that are affected, which through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security and security-related issue areas’. Security governance involves the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, as well as both public and private actors. According to Sperling et al., ‘Security governance is the policy problem confronting the great Eurasian powers in the contemporary

international system." They also claim that the main challenge of security governance is located in the absence of and difficulty in constructing an effective system of governance encompassing the whole of Eurasia.

Other issues relevant to the concept of security governance and the European Union specifically are outlined by Kirchner and Sperling who write about the emergence of the post-Westphalian state in Europe and the disintegration of the Westphalian states on its periphery (the neighbourhood). They argue that, ‘The residual persistence of the Westphalian sovereignty norm in post-Westphalian states places a continuing barrier to cooperative outcomes in the security domain, broadly or narrowly conceived.’ Regarding the concept of security governance, they posit that the broadening of the contemporary security agenda is a central rationale for adopting the concept of governance rather than the more established frameworks and concepts in the security fields. They think that the EU, in discharging four policies which meet the challenges of security governance i.e. assurance, prevention, protection and compellence, seeks to fulfil five conditions earlier set out by Jervis (see next section) in the neighbourhood states wanting to join the EU.

2.4 Theoretical Perspectives

Theoretically, the main research context of the thesis is contained within the question, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’

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63 Ibid. p. 19.
There is much in the literature on both realism and on the supranationality of the EU and how it relates to regionalisation and globalisation. However, there is less in the literature which relates both theories to the Black Sea region, although one 2008 document by Emerson outlines different types of regionalism in the Black Sea region\(^\text{65}\) including ‘transformative regionalism’ (what the EU would like) and ‘geopolitical regionalism’ (Russia’s variety).

Within this thesis the theories of supranationality and post-sovereign politics that underline the policies and thinking of the EU, as opposed to the realism of the American and Russian outlook will be applied to the more geopolitical aspects. The constructivist theory of security communities is also of importance, whilst democratic peace theory is worth exploring initially, due to its historical importance in post-Cold War politics and its relation to ‘post-sovereign politics’.

### 2.4.1 Democratic peace theory

Democratic peace theory states that democracies do not make war with other democracies. According to democratic peace theory a country surrounded by many states with a variety of political systems could be at risk, therefore it is good to encourage the neighbours to be democratic.

In 1997, Kaldor and Vejvoda argued that, with regard to East Central Europe, democratic consolidation was feasible and that the region should not be abandoned to its fate.\(^\text{66}\) They also examined procedural minimal conditions for formal (or basic)

\(^{65}\) M. Emerson, ‘The EU’s new Black Sea policy: What kind of regionalism is this?’ CEPS working document 297, July 2008.

democracy based on the work of Dahl\textsuperscript{67} and related these to ten eastern European countries with the prospect of EU accession. The idea of ‘substantive democracy’ which is about far more than just basic democracy with free and fair elections was developed by these authors. Now that the ten countries they studied are all members of the European Union, the new neighbourhood around the Black Sea is a good example of an area with a mix of democracies (with varying levels of consolidation) and authoritarian regimes. The Black Sea region is also an area where the ‘modern’ meets the ‘postmodern’ and strategist Cooper (currently serving in the European External Action Service) argues that this mix does not co-exist well either.\textsuperscript{68}

The theories of Fukuyama\textsuperscript{69} and others discuss the idea of creating world peace via promoting liberal democracies. Critics might say that these theories are good when applied to countries ready for democratisation but it could be argued that the theories are based on rationality and do not take into consideration that many people especially those who are indoctrinated, traumatised, or living in severe poverty will not always be rational. Neither will people with no experience of democracy find it easy to fully understand that substantive democracy is about more than fair elections. So, it could be argued that the EU’s neighbours need to develop their own democracies at their own pace in order for them to be successful, rather than being pushed into democratic reforms which are not fully implemented.

Research indicates that stability is more likely in individual countries with either consolidated democracies or authoritarian regimes. Intermediate regimes

\textsuperscript{67} R. Dahl, \textit{Democracy and its Critics} (Yale University, 1989).
perhaps with unstable, weak governments are more likely to create war conditions.\textsuperscript{70}

So what does it mean for a democracy to be considered as consolidated? According to theorists such as Huntington\textsuperscript{71} there needs to be rigorous criteria. He has described a ‘two turnover test’ which says that a democracy is considered to be consolidated once there have been two changes of power in different political directions. Other theorists such as Linz and Stepan\textsuperscript{72} argue, \textit{inter alia}, that a consolidated democracy must be one that will endure to the extent that political actors accept that there is now no alternative.

Taking Ukraine as a Black Sea country example, constitutionally it has come a long way since the situation that Wolczuk called a ‘Gramscian catastrophic equilibrium’ immediately after the fall of communism\textsuperscript{73} although elements of this may remain. The director of the International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS) in Kyiv has said that Ukraine is different from other post-Soviet countries in that there is equilibrium, with no interest group subordinating another. He says the possibility for establishing open society remains as long as the equilibrium is maintained but if a leader manages to take control of everything then ‘all chances will be lost.’\textsuperscript{74} This would seem to indicate that, despite many elections and changes of both President and Prime Minister, Ukraine’s democracy is not yet fully consolidated. (And especially after Yanukovych’s presidential election victory in 2010, there are some fears of a return to authoritarianism.)

\textsuperscript{70} Based on I. Kant’s \textit{Perpetual Peace}, 1795.
\textsuperscript{71} S. Huntington, \textit{The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century} (Oklahoma Press, 1991).
\textsuperscript{74} V. Nikitin, ‘Our politicians don’t see the future – or how it differs from the past’, ICPS newsletter, 18 (365), 28 May 2007.
Civil society is often classed as another indicator of democratic consolidation. Mayhew and Copsey have commented on democratic progress in Ukraine since 2004 saying that civil society has been greatly enhanced so there could be a link between this progress and the ENP’s Action Plan. The ICPS agreed in 2007 that ‘Civil society has begun to emerge’ in Ukraine. Also the ICPS report says that the 2004 amendments to the constitution (reversed in October 2010) and the 2006 elections on a basis of proportional representation laid new foundations for the work of an opposition. Nevertheless, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have cast doubts on the ability of the EU to help with democratic consolidation in Ukraine and elsewhere without the element of conditionality that existed with the enlargement ‘carrot’.

Democratic peace theory has been argued to have been an instrument used by the US, in particular, as a reason to promote its own goals throughout the world (sometimes via non-peaceful means). Simes says that ‘the sense in the Kremlin is that the United States cares about using democracy as an instrument to embarrass and isolate Putin more than it cares about democracy itself.’ Calleo writes that ‘peace theory’ and ‘globalisation’ have provided ideological cover for US unipolarity.

For this reason, democratisation is seen as one US-Russian tension within the thesis.

75 Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, p. 67.
78 Ibid.
80 Simes, 2007, p. 46.
2.4.2 Realism and multipolarity

After World War II, the US and the USSR accrued enormous stocks of nuclear weapons so if there had been a war between them then ‘mutually assured destruction’ might well have occurred. At least in part for this reason, hostilities were avoided and the situation became known as the Cold War. Theorists, especially realists and neorealists such as Waltz\(^{82}\) and Mearsheimer\(^{83}\), believed that there was a ‘balance of power’ keeping the peace. Nevertheless, wars happened around the globe and the two powers were often involved, sometimes through financial support and the donation of weapons, sometimes in almost direct military conflict through ‘proxy wars’, which were not allowed to escalate into direct war with each other.

The realist argument says that after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 the world moved from a bipolar state to a unipolar state, thereby upsetting the balance of power. After 1989, the US dominated the world in a hegemonic fashion, to some extent triumphing over a lame USSR and Warsaw Pact that gradually fragmented. US foreign policy still seems to be realist (protecting its own national interests), which has led to the classical security dilemma.\(^{84}\) This posits that the more secure a state tries to make itself the more threatening it appears to be to other countries which feel less secure themselves and react accordingly. ‘Republican politicians in particular believe that the threat of unilateral offensive action is a necessary part of reducing the risk to America from foreign threats,’ according to Brian Jones, former UK defence analyst.\(^{85}\)

Most analysts now think that the global future will be multipolar, both in terms of economics and defence, with the US and China being the main poles, possibly followed by India, Brazil, the EU and Russia. Howorth, though, says that there are different forms of multipolarity which are neorealism, a new bipolarity, and effective multilateralism.\(^{86}\) Firstly, neorealism is a case of anarchy amongst the various poles. Balance of power logic would apply to this configuration and the EU would not often win given its lack of hard power. Secondly, a new bipolarity such as a Transatlantic grouping versus a ‘Shanghai’ grouping of China, Russia and others,\(^{87}\) or an EU / US / Russia grouping (which Russia has recently called for) versus China / India / Muslim countries.\(^{88}\) The third form is that of effective multilateralism as put forward by Solana and described in section 2.4.4 and Chapter 4. However, critics might say that multipolarity and multilateralism should not be confused, the former being about the distribution of power and the latter being about how that power should be used.

Hyde-Price also describes different forms of realism and he believes that structural realism best explains the current world situation. For him the core assumptions of realism are that (1) international systems are anarchic; (2) states are the primary international actors; (3) states are functionally similar; and (4) states are rational unitary actors.\(^{89}\) He outlines the concepts of security maximisation and power maximisation, describing the former as a form of defensive realism whilst power maximisation is related to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, which says that

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86 Howorth, 2008, p. 244.
87 O. Antonenko, ‘Shanghai Cooperation’ (Centre for European Reform, 2006).
states not only want to maximise their basic defence but also want to maximise their power.\footnote{Mearsheimer, 2001.}

Hyde-Price also relates the concept of hegemony to three different forms of polarity.\footnote{Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 41.} Firstly, he says that hegemony is not possible on a global scale even with unipolarity. However, an only superpower can have freedom of action in the international system and can choose which games to play. Nevertheless, unipolarity is not durable. Secondly, bipolarity is what the world experienced during the Cold War when the balance of power kept a stable world system where the two superpowers moderated the behaviour of their allies and clients. Lastly, multipolarity is generally less stable and predictable than bipolarity although there are two kinds - balanced and unbalanced. In a balanced system of multipolarity no power can make a bid for regional hegemony because a coalition of the other poles would be stronger. So the emphasis is on security maximisation not power maximisation. Under such a system, cooperation is possible over ‘second order interests’ such as human rights. However, with unbalanced multipolarity the situation is different as one superpower has greater power than the others and can make a bid for hegemony. This last state of affairs is primed for conflict with much fear and mistrust. Second order concerns are overridden by national security concerns and the great powers pursue power maximisation strategies. The shadow of war hangs over international politics.\footnote{Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 43.}

Realists would seem to be pessimists regarding the future of the world (and the Black Sea region) whereas liberals and constructivists are more optimistic.
2.4.3 Security communities

One constructivist theory is that of pluralistic security communities with a good example of a security community being the European Union, which consists of a community of sovereign entities, within a particular region, that do not expect war with each other. Deutsch and his co-authors, in 1957, described a security community as a group of people who believe that common social problems must and can be resolved by the process of peaceful change using appropriate institutions. The people within the security community develop a sense of community, trust and common interest which means that, in order for such a community to arise, a bottom-up approach is required as well as top-down institutionalism, according to Buzan. Constructivists Adler and Barnett added in 1998 that shared identities, values and meanings as well as direct interactions and shared long-term interests are of importance too. Constructivism is based on a belief that international relations are socially constructed on the basis of shared ideas, norms and values.

Smith and Timmins posit that, for a ‘true’ security community to come into being, ‘war must become both structurally and conceptually impossible’. In other words, not only should the states involved not be able to conceive of war with each other, they should not be capable of waging war against each other either.

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A security community is a form of ‘regional security complex’. Buzan and Wæver explain that the central idea in regional security complex theory is that, ‘since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes’. They add that the combination of sovereign, territorial states becoming the principal global players in security matters, along with the international system becoming global, leads to ‘distinct regional security subsystems’ emerging. They also say that, whilst a few very powerful states act globally by ‘projecting their power into far-flung regions’, the majority are more concerned with their near neighbours. They describe, for example, the South Caucasus countries as an example of a ‘mini security complex’. The two extremes of security complexes are total chaos (Hobbesian, enmity between all) and security communities (Kantian, amity between all). On a continuum between these extremes are other possibilities such as ‘security regimes’ where states are rivals but cooperate to try to avoid war.

The EU’s current move towards multilateral policies in the Black Sea region with the development of its Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership policies, rather than relying on bilateral relations via the ENP, could be a demonstration of the desire to build a security community there rather than to further enlarge into the region at the present time. The setting up of the Eastern Partnership’s Civil Society Forum in addition to Black Sea Synergy sectoral initiatives could represent part of the bottom-up approach referred to by Buzan.

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Jervis has addressed security governance in the current international system arguing that the western system of security governance has produced a security community contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. These are (1) national elites must believe it to be necessary to eschew wars of conquest etc. with each other at least; (2) the costs of war are believed to outweigh any benefits; (3) the best path to national prosperity is shared economies; (4) it is best to have domestic democratic governments; (5) states must be satisfied with territorial status quo. I shall argue that we need the right preconditions for these conditions to be met and that one of these preconditions is that the region must be characterised by a situation of balanced multipolarity.

The recent work of Adler and Greve asserts that ‘balance of power’ (a neorealist concept) and ‘security communities’ can overlap as regional mechanisms of security governance. They seem to have observed, in the same way as the author of this thesis that there is a link between security communities and polarity although they do not describe it as such and have a different focus. They claim that, in the IR literature, varieties of international order have been seen as mutually exclusive, sometimes with a progressive ladder that actors must climb from balance of power to security communities. Ruggie’s term ‘multiperspectival’ is used and they agree with him that vocabulary can be problematic when describing postmodern Europe. They conclude that, as practices, balance of power and security community can overlap and coexist, especially at the regional level. This thesis goes

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further by claiming that ‘balanced multipolarity’ is a necessary condition for a security community.

2.4.4 Post-sovereign politics

The EU, being more optimistic than most states, sees ‘effective multilateralism’ as the way forward.\textsuperscript{104} This is based on effective international organisations, and more assistance to poor nations as well as the possible export of the ‘EU model’ which involves supranationality and the pooling of sovereignty. This has been called ‘post-sovereign politics’\textsuperscript{105} although other terms are used such as ‘postmodernism’ or ‘post-national democracy’. According to some commentators even countries such as China have watched developments in Europe with interest and asked how countries such as Germany and France made peace so quickly after World War II.\textsuperscript{106}

The realist ‘Westphalian’ international system with the ‘nation state’ as the basic unit could seem to be breaking down and the way forward has been analysed by many authors as well as politicians. For example, German Foreign Minister Fischer said that after 1945 the European balance of power principle was rejected and there was a transfer of nation state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.\textsuperscript{107} This would seem to reverse the signing of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648 which arguably resulted in a new political order in central Europe, based upon the concept of a sovereign state ruled over by a sovereign, rather than the previous

\begin{itemize}
\item 106 For example, John O’Sullivan at the Global Policy Institute’s ‘Europe: a Break with American Strategy?’ 15 April 2008, personally attended.
\end{itemize}
system which could be called a form of supranationality. The current situation is that there is much dispute between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’, also over ‘absolute sovereignty’ and ‘pooled sovereignty’ or ‘post-sovereign politics’, as well as the future of the European Union as either a federal system or an intergovernmental organisation.

Cooper has written of how the current world is divided up into three parts – the ‘pre-modern’ world, the ‘modern’ world and the ‘postmodern’ world where the pre-modern part is in a pre-state, post-empire form of chaos, the modern is based on sovereign nation states and balance whilst the postmodern, which is also in many ways post-sovereign, is based more on openness as well as regional and international institutions. These ideas are discussed in more detail within the thesis. Meanwhile, when discussing the state, Weber’s definition of the state is arguably the most frequently cited. This definition says that the state is ‘an institution that claims a monopoly of legitimate force for a particular territory’. Cooper questions if this is the case for postmodern states.

Looking back at earlier work, Foucault argued that we needed to move away from the idea of the state which was becoming increasingly outdated. He developed the concept of ‘governmentality’ within which the power of the state is reduced so that advanced liberal democratic societies can be governed without so much need for force. Hoffman posits that this concept allows us to differentiate between government and state, writing, ‘Whereas the state claims a monopoly of legitimate

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108 Cooper, 2004, p. 29.
110 Cooper, 2004, p. 16.
force within a particular territory, government pertains to the pursuit of order within
a community.’ 112

Nevertheless, there are those who believe, in the wake of Hobbes, that the
state is positive and without it there would be the kind of anarchy where violence
reigns. The state in Iraq, for example, collapsed after the 2003 war, leaving a
condition of chaos and violence. Others argue that the state is negative and is itself
often the cause of violence, especially external violence or war.113 Liberals and
Marxists usually see the state as less important than realists.

Continuing with the examination of ‘state’, Shaw adds that global society has
a state system but that the society–state relationship is not necessarily one-to-one.114
He also says that there is much conceptual confusion between nation and state, which
are not the same thing.115 He criticises International Relations theorists for not
defining the concept of ‘nation’ adequately and often assuming that all states are
‘nation-states’. He questions if ‘national security’ is about the state or the nation
given that the terms cannot be used interchangeably. He also writes of how Giddons
gives us a model of ‘state as actor’ in international relations which says that societies
are pacified by projecting violence outwards.116

Returning to a more optimistic evaluation, Bull believed that states are
indispensable to statelessness as noted by Hoffman who also says that, ‘The
movement beyond the states system has to involve states themselves as willing

113 Ibid.
114 M. Shaw, Global Society and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994),
p.19
115 Ibid., p.25
116 Ibid., p.33
accomplices in their own transcendence.” The reason why they would do this is basically for human survival. Even if international organisations are not the only way to avoid a Hobbesian war of all against all they can be argued to be essential for ensuring that the planet is not destroyed by nuclear, environmental or other massive threats.

Meanwhile Manners, has analysed both the pooling of sovereignty and the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’ that can influence the rest of the world. He says that being a ‘normative’ ‘power’ is not a contradiction in terms and that the EU is redefining what is ‘normal’ in the world giving the example of the abolition of the death penalty.

Leonard, formerly of the Centre for European Reform and currently of the European Council on Foreign Relations, has written about how Europe will run the twenty-first century. He refers to the model of the EU being followed rather than to any kind of European superpower. In doing so he voices the opinion and the ideals of many both in and out of the European parliament who would support this. Specifically he points to regionalisation by organisations which are trying to follow in the EU’s footsteps including the African Union (AU) and Mercosur which is the South American Union. He talks of a regional domino effect and asks if eventually there might be a Union of Unions encouraged by the EU. Since then Galtung has

117 Hoffman, 1995, p.191
121 Ibid., p. 142.
referred to this idea as a ‘United Regions’ which would not have veto power for a few nations or a permanent location in a ‘very biased environment’.

So can the EU create a domino effect throughout the world where more and more nations are willing to pool their sovereignty within their region and relax their borders so that territory and nationalism are less likely to cause wars? And might this lead to a more democratic and powerful United Nations (or Regions) as is also hoped for by MEPs including Graham Watson the former leader of the Alliance of Liberal Democrats in Europe (ALDE) group who writes, ‘perhaps with time the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly could develop into something resembling a world parliament. Much depends on the developments […] which mark the twenty-first century.’

Hyde-Price, however, warns that European states can neither fall back on the optimism of an ever closer union to safeguard EU security, nor rely on the US or NATO. (This is discussed further in Chapter 3.) Wallace might seem to fundamentally disagree on part of this statement yet agree on other parts. He wrote in 1999 about the European state order which developed from the Westphalian system and questioned if Europe was still an interstate order or a post-sovereign regional system. His conclusions were that the EU was emerging into a post-sovereign regional system but one that depended on external support from the US. He observed

that the US might not be prepared for this indefinitely unless it was on their terms. Would Europe be willing to go along with that? He predicted that the EU could extend stability, prosperity and mutual trust to the Eastern European applicants of the time but that further afield it could be more problematic with or without the cooperation of the US. Ten years later this thesis addresses these questions beginning with the next chapter which discusses the case for post-sovereign politics and the continuation of EU enlargement in addition to using structural realism to analyse the current polarity of the Black Sea region.

2.5 Summary

Chapter 2 has discussed the various themes within the literature in some detail. By reviewing this literature, the conclusion is that the main areas in need of further research are (1) tensions in the wider Black Sea region; (2) EU policies including the Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership policies; (3) European security policies, including changes made within the Treaty of Lisbon; and (4) theoretical perspectives on the Black Sea region. All of these areas are significant to the two research questions of this thesis.

Whilst there had been many conferences, debates, think tank discussions and articles on the wider Black Sea region in 2007 at the beginning of the research, there had been less in the way of lengthy academic research. Most academic research was focused on EU-Russia relations and ‘the shared neighbourhood’ rather than the Black Sea as a region in its own right. This situation began to change after (1) the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union; (2) the EU published its Black Sea Synergy policy; and (3) the war between Georgia and Russia.
Nevertheless the two research questions have still needed to be asked and will add to the growing literature on the region. Although this research could possibly have some overlap with other new research, its unique contribution is its focus on how US-Russian tensions have affected the EU’s eastern neighbourhood polices, as well as the analysis of the three theories of realism, security communities and post-sovereign politics, and their application to the Black Sea region in order to test if realism is ‘winning out’ or if there is a more general move towards cooperation.
CHAPTER 3

Realism and Post-Sovereign Politics in the Black Sea Region

3.1 Introduction

In recent times, there would seem to have been a clash in the Black Sea region between realist, national and competitive thinking on the one hand and cooperative or supranational thinking on the other. These different modes of thought are not always clearly delineated with dividing lines between states, and most of the countries in the region have at one time been involved in security organisations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact or the CSTO. Many currently belong to a democratic supranational organisation (the EU) or have belonged to a communist supranational state (the USSR). All of the Black Sea countries researched in this thesis are members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, and the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The conflict between cooperative and competitive thinking has been particularly evident since the collapse of the Soviet Union and would seem to have increased in the Black Sea region since 2007 when Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union. The reason for this is that the foundation of the EU is built on cooperation, the equality of its members, and supranationality.

This thesis is particularly focused on comparing the theory of realism with the EU’s model of post-sovereign politics, then applying them to the Black Sea region. The broader research question, as outlined in previous chapters is, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ In order to attempt to
answer this question the Black Sea region is being used as a case study. Within this case study of the Black Sea region, the empirical question of how US-Russian tensions are affecting EU policy is researched. If EU policy cannot succeed because it is blocked by the realism of those two large states, then it would seem as though we are not in the process of changing.

This chapter initially outlines (in section 3.2) the theory of structural realism as discussed by Hyde-Price in his book ‘European Security in the Twenty-first Century,’¹ which draws on the work of Waltz² and Mearsheimer.³ It then explores the Black Sea area as a case study of structural realism (section 3.2.3) including a debate on the type of polarity appropriate to the region. Following on from this analysis, the theory of post-sovereign politics is outlined along with two of its associated theories i.e. security communities and democratic peace theory (section 3.3). The two approaches of structural realism and post-sovereign politics are then contrasted, compared and applied to the Black Sea region (in section 3.4) before the empirical case studies are explored in later chapters.

3.2 Structural Realism and the Black Sea Region

3.2.1 Introduction

The following section concerns structural realism and examines the theory in more detail than the overview given in the last chapter. It also includes a more in-depth analysis of the various versions of polarity and the behaviour of states when faced

with a potential hegemon. Section 3.2.3 analyses realism and polarity in the Black Sea region before conclusions are drawn in section 3.2.4.

### 3.2.2 Structural realism

Structural realism is a form of neorealism which has some basic differences from classical realism; in particular it is ‘systemic’ as opposed to ‘reductionist’ according to Hyde-Price.\(^4\) It focuses purely on the international and not the domestic, being a parsimonious theory. Realists say the domestic is hierarchical and the international is anarchical. Structural realism explains state behaviour by examining the structural distribution of relative power capabilities, how they shape the behaviour of units (i.e. states), and how systemic / structural factors influence their domestic factors.\(^5\) According to the theory, forces operate at system level not unit level.

Realism is concerned with anarchy, polarity and balance; its keywords include ‘multipolarity’, ‘bipolarity’, ‘balanced’ and ‘unbalanced.’ Hyde-Price says that realists look at ‘what is’ rather than ‘what ought to be’ \(^6\) and that their concept of security is narrow, focusing on power and military ideas of strategy rather than the broader concept of security, where the object to be secured is often the individual rather than the state.\(^7\)

Neorealism is a theory of great power politics which posits that the best way for states to guarantee their own survival is to be as powerful as possible. According to the theory, rational states will be impelled by systemic pressure to maximise

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\(^4\) Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 11.  
\(^5\) Ibid., p.12.  
\(^6\) Ibid., p. 16.  
\(^7\) Ibid., p.18
security and ultimately to maximise power.\textsuperscript{8} These theories of Waltz and Mearsheimer differ from each other in certain ways; in particular, Waltz is a ‘defensive’ realist and Mearsheimer is an ‘offensive’ realist.\textsuperscript{9} This plays out as ‘security maximization’ versus ‘power maximization’ i.e. Waltz argues that states primarily secure themselves for defence reasons, whereas Mearsheimer maintains that states are also power maximisers i.e. they are both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented.\textsuperscript{10}

Power politics or ‘realpolitik’ was always an essential part of classical realism which, unlike liberalism, set aside morality or ethics in international relations. Realpolitik builds on Machiavelli’s Prince amongst other works. Machiavelli said the foundation of any political order is a ‘judicious mix of force and authority, coercion and consent, brute strength and reasoned persuasion’\textsuperscript{11}, states being based on good laws and good arms.\textsuperscript{12}

As discussed in Chapter 2, polarity is one of realism’s main concepts within which there are four types according to Mearsheimer and Hyde-Price: (1) unipolarity as seen after 1989 when the US became the only superpower (2) bipolarity which was the situation during the Cold War prior to 1989 (3) balanced multipolarity which is less stable and predictable than bipolarity and occurs when no single power can make a bid for hegemony and (4) unbalanced multipolarity where one state has greater

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] Ibid., p. 39.
\end{footnotes}
power than the others and can make a bid for hegemony. Polarity can be seen at either a global or a regional level such as Europe or the Black Sea area.\textsuperscript{13}

The core assumptions of neorealism are (a) that international systems are anarchic; (b) that states are the primary international actors; (c) that states are functionally similar; and (d) that states are rational unitary actors.\textsuperscript{14} These assumptions can be contested as follows: (a) Liberals might say that international systems are not anarchic as they involve institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, or NATO, although there are examples of powerful states ignoring these institutions e.g. when the US acted unilaterally against Iraq in 2003. (b) Other international actors exist as well as states, for example the EU, Al Quaeda, the Taliban and large multinational corporations so states are not necessarily the most important actors any more. (c) States are not necessarily functionally similar. For example, some states are advanced democracies whereas others are ‘failing’ or ‘failed’. (d) In the case of a failed state where there is no definite government or clearly defined head of state then there may be internal anarchy and a lack of rationality. A lack of rationality could also apply where there is a strong but mentally unstable dictator.

These debates will need to be borne in mind later in the chapter when analysing the Black Sea as a case study of structural realism. For example, if examining the ‘balancers’ (the poles within a system of balanced multipolarity) of the Black Sea region can the EU be included given that it is not a state?

\textsuperscript{13} Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 30.
When faced with a potential hegemon, great powers have four main options which are balancing, buck-passing, showing aggression and bandwagoning.¹⁵ Mearsheimer explains that with ‘balancing’ the ‘threatened state accepts the burden of deterring its adversary and commits substantial resources to achieving that goal’; with ‘buck-passing’ ‘the endangered great power tries to get another state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state’;¹⁶ ‘showing aggression’ is about trying to defeat the potential hegemon in a military way;¹⁷ and ‘bandwagoning’ means aligning with the potential hegemon in order to gain influence and other benefits. Mearsheimer says it can be dangerous if the country bandwagoning is a great power. He gives the example of American neo-conservatives believing that, faced with the military might of the United States, other countries in the world would bandwagon with it thereby creating a democratic domino effect, whereas realist theory (as pointed out by both Walt and Mearsheimer) indicated that the countries would be more likely to use other strategies, especially balancing.¹⁸

Hyde-Price adds that smaller states have additional options including ‘hiding’ and ‘transcendence’. An example of the former is keeping a low-profile and declaring neutrality, whilst the latter, according to Schroeder, involves attempts to ‘surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conflictual politics’.¹⁹ Transcendence is often achieved through international institutions and regimes which aim to settle conflicts peacefully and is more ‘liberal-idealistic’ than ‘realist’ according to Hyde-Price.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 49.
¹⁸ Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 86.
¹⁹ Schroeder, 1995, p. 430.
These ideas from structural realism will be considered in relation to the Black Sea region in the next section.

3.2.3 The Black Sea region and multipolarity

According to Hyde-Price, structural realist international theory is a tool for elucidating the dynamics of security competition in Europe and elements of cooperation and governance since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{20} It examines the ‘structural dynamics underlying the ebb and flow of events’ in particular ‘balance’.\textsuperscript{21} He writes that the key independent variable for research on structural realism is the distribution of relative power capabilities, so the primary factor shaping foreign and security policy is the structural distribution of power. He adds that neorealism can only be used for a few important questions such as structural pressures in European security and cannot explain all state behaviour which is anarchic.\textsuperscript{22} By ‘structural pressures’ he implies that the behaviour of certain states (e.g. Germany) within a region (e.g. Europe) can be partly predicted by assessing its power capabilities along with the power capabilities of other states involved in the region (e.g. the US, Russia, the UK and France).

So realism need not be the global study of structural dynamics but may be regional. Hyde-Price, in applying the theory to the contemporary European security order, describes it as being characterised by ‘balanced multipolarity’, the particular states involved in keeping the balance being the US, Russia, Germany, UK and France.\textsuperscript{23} So does the Black Sea region have the same dynamics as Europe as a whole.

\textsuperscript{20} Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 4.
or might other factors apply? This region would seem to be a most suitable regional candidate for study.

If we focus on the smaller region of the Black Sea then, if there are five balancers in Europe as a whole, what is the situation here? Is it also balanced multipolarity or is it a case of unbalanced multipolarity given that the region is far more unstable? Mearsheimer has looked at how unbalanced multipolarity is particularly dangerous as compared with bipolarity or balanced multipolarity due to the lack of stability.  

He says that war is more likely with multipolarity but especially with unbalanced multipolarity where there is a potential hegemon; unbalanced multipolarity causes the most fear in the region concerned. This latter could seem to be the case in the Black Sea region where several states including Georgia and Ukraine have feared Russia as do still some Eastern European states that are now members of both the EU and NATO including Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Of course, from a Russian point of view the hegemon has been NATO or ‘the West’.

Nevertheless, this section now examines realism’s four prime typologies in more detail before continuing the task of analysing the Black Sea region in terms of structural realism and arguing that the situation in the Black Sea region is currently that of ‘balanced multipolarity’.

The Black Sea region and the four prime typologies of power configurations

(1) With regard to unipolarity, Mearsheimer’s view is that hegemony is only possible in regions made up of contiguous states so global hegemony is not possible. On the
other hand, freedom of action in the international system is relatively unconstrained.\textsuperscript{27} Waltz describes this freedom as having the ability to do the, ‘same dumb things over and over’.\textsuperscript{28}

According to structural realism, unipolarity is not durable, one theory for this being that balancing coalitions will ultimately form.\textsuperscript{29} Another theory explaining why unipolarity is only short-lived is that other great powers might emerge as rivals. At a global level, the United States became the only superpower after the end of the Soviet Union but now the world is moving in a multipolar direction, giving some credence to the theory.

With regard to the Black Sea region, unipolarity is possible as the region’s states are contiguous; the fact that throughout history this region has been engulfed many times by empires including the Ottoman and the Russian demonstrates the point. Turkey and Russia are still the most powerful states within the contiguous region, although the EU is an important actor and the US has a powerful ‘off-shore’ interest. But it can be argued that none of these actors is strong enough to dominate now if the others were to form a balancing coalition.

(2) In a bipolar global system such as the one seen during the Cold War, two superpowers balance each other out, creating a more stable situation than that under unipolarity or multipolarity. Both powers have allies and clients which they moderate.\textsuperscript{30} So can the Black Sea region be seen in a bipolar context with Russia and ‘the West’ being the two balancing poles? It is certainly quite clear that some

\textsuperscript{27} Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 42.  
\textsuperscript{28} Waltz, 1979, p. 194.  
\textsuperscript{29} Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 42.  
\textsuperscript{30} Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 41.
countries in the immediate or wider region are or have been clients of Russia (e.g. Armenia, Belarus) whilst others are or have been clients of the US (e.g. Georgia) or are now members of the EU (Romania, Bulgaria). Turkey, although a member of NATO has more recently tried to keep good relations with both Russia and the West without fully falling into the ‘sphere of influence’ of either. Ukraine has often been divided amongst both its politicians and citizens. With regard to the South Caucasus, Vasilyan claims that Armenia is a client of Russia, Georgia is a client of the US and Azerbaijan is a client of Turkey. And now that Russia has recognised the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it could be argued that these regions are also clients of Russia.

In 1993, Waltz described the European condition as being one of ‘modified bipolarity’, with Russia and ‘the West’ as poles, but in 2010 / 2011 ‘the West’ is not quite as unified as it was.

(3) Balanced multipolarity exists when there are three or more powerful states and no single power is strong enough to attempt to become a regional hegemon. This situation can be less stable and predictable than a bipolar system because there are multiple potential dyads and balancing coalitions. The emphasis within this typology is on security maximisation as described by Waltz, rather than Mearsheimer’s power maximisation.

The largest state in the Black Sea region, Russia, could be argued to be strong enough to be a possible regional hegemon, thereby ruling out the Black Sea region

being seen in terms of balanced multipolarity. However, if we include the EU and its members as a quasi-state or the US as an ‘off-shore’ balancer, or the Western coalition of NATO as an actor then balanced multipolarity could be considered to be a major possibility. Turkey too is becoming a stronger individual actor in the region. And, although Russia acted with aggression during the war in Georgia, there are indications that it is not strong enough alone to dominate the entire region and that no other pole is likely to ‘bandwagon’ with it.

(4) Unbalanced multipolarity is when one power has greater power than the others and can make a bid for hegemony. This state of affairs is primed for conflict with much fear and mistrust. ‘Second order’ concerns such as human rights are overridden by national security concerns. Great powers pursue power maximisation strategies and the possibility of war causes much fear in international politics.

As discussed in detail in the next chapter, we could theorise that by invading Georgia in August 2008, Russia has shown that it is in a position to act as a hegemon, although it has otherwise shown restraint rather than power maximisation strategies. Russia however, has maintained that it was only acting defensively. There is much fear, paranoia\(^{33}\) and nationalism in the Black Sea region as a whole.

\(^{33}\) Although the author is published on the causes of psychological projective mechanisms such as paranoia, within this thesis the definition of paranoia is used loosely to mean ‘excessive fear of persecution’. (C. Weaver, ‘An examination of the relationship between the concepts of projective identification and intersubjectivity’ British Journal of Psychotherapy Vol. 16 (2), 1999, pp. 136-45).
**Paranoia and rationality**

Whilst realism rightly discusses multipolarity and fear, to what extent does it cause paranoid behaviour in itself? Might this realism be a contributing factor to paranoia in the Black Sea region? Realist theory is basically pessimistic so if advisers to states are grounded in realism then might the states’ views be pessimistic and defensive based on paranoia? Generally speaking, this thesis adopts the premise that the behaviour of the US, Russia and various other Black Sea states or autonomous regions is realist, whereas the EU’s behaviour as a whole is based more on liberalism and post-sovereign politics. The evidence for this is in their policies and rhetoric as well as their actions; in particular the US and Russia focus on their national interests whilst the EU (but not necessarily all its member states) discusses how to take peace and stability beyond its boundaries, as previously mentioned.

One flaw in realist theory is that states are assumed to be rational actors but many states are not always rational, as evidenced by their behaviour, including paranoid behaviour. For example, there is one theory that says that the war in Georgia 2008 was caused by accident in that both sides (Georgia and Russia) were expecting the other side to make a move and one side acted pre-emptively. There is some evidence to show that the Georgian leader, in particular, was not in a calm, rational state when making decisions. (This will be discussed further in Chapter 5).

Another flaw in the theory is connected to the idea that, if states are left alone without intervention, they will ‘tend towards balance’. ³⁴ This realist theory is good in many ways especially when applied to Cold War theory, a bipolar world and ‘mutually assured destruction’ but in a multipolar world with weapons of mass

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destruction (WMD) and powerful non-state actors then this approach could be argued to be both dangerous and irrational. Realist theorists might say that they are only observing ‘what is’ and not what ‘should be’ but if realist theory is translated into practice i.e. non-interventionism with each state free to pursue its own interests because balancing coalitions will stabilise everything in the end then there must be cause for concern.

Returning to the theme of rationality, the leaders of democratic countries might behave in a way that seems rational with regard to maintaining their power through votes, but is not necessarily rational with regard to longer term security. Whilst some recent wars might have made leaders unpopular, there have been many wars that proved popular with the people. In authoritarian systems too, leaders might use conflicts to maintain their own position of power i.e. the leader’s power is maximised rather than the state’s power. This argument could be applied to the leaders of both Russia (regarding Chechnya) and Azerbaijan (regarding Nagorno-Karabakh).

A ‘balanced’ region?

One difficulty in analysing the Black Sea region is whether or not to view the EU as a state for the purposes of examining the balance in the region. States are at the centre of realism not institutions such as the UN or NATO. The EU is somewhere between a state and an institution but does not currently have state-like properties given that so far its CSDP missions are primarily civilian. Three of the powerful European balancers described by Hyde-Price i.e. Germany, France and the UK are all EU members. For these reasons, and the fact that the EU has specific policies regarding the region e.g. the Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy, this thesis regards the
EU as a single security actor or ‘balancer’ in the region whilst acknowledging the clash of divergent agendas amongst its members.

So if it were to be concluded from the earlier analysis, that the Black Sea is a region with multiple poles, that no pole is strong enough to make a bid for hegemony, and that the balancers for Europe as a whole are Russia, the US, Germany, UK and France (or Russia, the US and the EU), then can we assume that the balancers are the same for the Black Sea region? Perhaps not, given that Turkey is an important player in this region, one of the largest littoral states, and only a candidate for EU membership. It could then be concluded that there are four balancers of the region namely Russia and Turkey, which are the most powerful individual littoral states of the region, the EU which has two littoral states on the Black Sea (i.e. Romania and Bulgaria) and the US which is an off-shore balancer.

The US, Turkey and most EU members are allies through NATO and could therefore be seen as one pole against Russia’s other pole in a bipolar system similar to that of the Cold War i.e. the region could be seen as the remnants of the Cold War. Recently however there have been tensions between the NATO allies, with the US and Turkey showing signs of splits especially during the Russia-Georgia War when Turkey would, on occasions, be seen to be supporting Russia rather than the US in particular with regard to Black Sea access via Istanbul.\(^\text{35}\) Given this scenario it would be reasonable to conclude that the Black Sea region is in a condition of ‘balanced multipolarity’ in 2010 / 2011 i.e. there are multiple poles and no pole is powerful enough to make a bid for hegemony. As mentioned earlier balanced multipolarity does not necessarily imply stability and some Black Sea states are afraid that neither

\(^{35}\) See Chapter 4 for a full discussion.
the US nor the EU would support them if Russia invaded. Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer has said that according to many in Ukraine, ‘The EU does not know what to do with us, but Russia does.’ 36

The US is no longer the superpower it once was as the global situation moves from unipolar to multipolar but Hyde-Price posits that, as a power maximiser, the US will remain engaged in European affairs in order to retain influence, prevent a rival, form new allies and minimise balancing instincts. He says that the US will cooperate with particular allies on particular issues and that all European allies must decide whether to bandwagon with the US or balance against it. Since then however the Bush administration has changed to the Obama administration which is not as focused on Europe or on NATO enlargement. There has also been a global economic crisis. So it is necessary to question if the US will maintain its power maximisation policy for long into the future.

3.2.4 Conclusion

This section has examined structural realism’s concepts of polarity and balancing and then proceeded to apply them to the wider Black Sea region. The main conclusion, which has implications for the overall conclusions of this thesis, is that the version of polarity most appropriate for the region in 2010 / 2011 is ‘balanced multipolarity’ with the four main balancers being Russia, the EU, the US and Turkey.

3.3 Post-Sovereign Politics and Europe

3.3.1 Introduction

Following on from the study of structural realism, this section examines the concepts of state (3.3.2) and sovereignty (3.3.3) before analysing post-sovereign politics in detail (3.3.4 and 3.3.5). There is then a discussion of the associated theories of security communities and democratic peace theory (3.3.6). Finally there is a brief summary (3.3.7).

3.3.2 The state

There have been various definitions of the state and much debate but Weber’s definition is arguably the most frequently used with regard to the ‘modern’ state. This definition says that the state is “an institution that claims a monopoly of legitimate force for a particular territory.”\(^{37}\) Nevertheless, Cooper argues that Weber’s definition no longer fully applies to the ‘postmodern’ regions of the world.\(^{38}\)

Despite Dahl’s\(^{39}\) and others’ tendencies to equate ‘state’ with ‘government’ these two concepts are not identical. Hoffman writes that government is ‘a process which resolves differences through sanctions which fall short of the use of physical force.’\(^{40}\) Also, as previously outlined, according to Foucault we need to move away from the idea of the state and move towards ‘governmentality’ with states having reduced power, given that advanced liberal democratic societies do not need so much

force in order to be governed.\footnote{M. Foucault, ‘On Governmentality’, \textit{Ideology and Consciousness}, Vol. 6 (Autumn) 1979.} Hoffman confirms that, ‘Whereas the state claims a monopoly of legitimate force within a particular territory, government pertains to the pursuit of order within a community.’\footnote{Hoffman, 1995, p. 46.}

Governance is an associated concept which has been defined in a variety of ways. Smith and K. Weber, following on from Rosenau\footnote{J. Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order and Change in World Politics’ in J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds.) \textit{Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).} write that two of the major governance themes along with ‘rule making’ are ‘the purposeful coordination of multiple players’ and ‘the convergence of divergent preferences in ways that manage to respect the initial plurality of interests involved.’\footnote{K. Weber, M. Smith and M. Baun, \textit{Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery?} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) p. 9.} Consequently the term ‘governance’ is often used at an international or supranational level. ‘Security governance’ is a more recent term which extends the concept to include security issues as discussed in Chapter 2.

\subsection*{3.3.3 Sovereignty}

Continuing with the theme of the state and concepts, Camilleri and Falk submit that the ‘origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely related to the nature and evolution of the state, and in particular to the development of centralized authority.’\footnote{J. Camilleri, and J. Falk, \textit{The End of Sovereignty}, (Aldershot: Elgar, 1992) p. 15.} Yet regions can be autonomous without having sovereignty so what exactly does the sovereignty of a state imply? The ideas of sovereignty were first discussed in the time of Hobbes but were primarily focused inwards rather than outwards.\footnote{Brown, C., \textit{Sovereignty, Rights and Justice} (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) p. 4.} Later, Carr argued that the problem with the concept of sovereignty was
due to divisions between political, legal, economic, external and internal sovereignty. At one extreme it is argued that the concept of sovereignty should be abandoned whilst, at the other extreme, it is argued that a world based on the Westphalian system must continue.

A world made up of sovereign independent units is quite different from one made up of empires or large federal systems. It would be true to say that currently our world consists of a mixture of all of these along with failed or ‘pre-modern’ states. However, whether or not any nation state can be truly autonomous in present times with globalisation, migration and superpower hegemony is debatable. For example, whilst many states that were formerly part of the USSR or the Warsaw Pact have celebrated their sovereignty, they have also rushed to join or apply to join either the EU, NATO or both. Also, in federal systems autonomy can be claimed by both the central authority and the local ones i.e. subsidiarity applies. Does this mean there is sovereignty at both levels, at neither, or only partial or shared sovereignty? Brown would ask how absolute sovereignty has to be. Wallace writes, ‘No government in Europe remains sovereign in the sense understood by diplomats or constitutional lawyers of half a century ago.’ Cooper talks of ‘a postmodern order where state sovereignty is no longer seen as an absolute’. So we could conclude that there is dissatisfaction with the current system and attempts to improve it in a changing and globalising world.

47 As quoted in Brown, 2002, p. 11.
50 Cooper, 2004, p. 28.
3.3.4 Post-sovereign politics and the EU model

Currently the EU, the best example of a supranational system, is neither a state nor sovereign but its existence could be argued to remove the full statehood and sovereignty of its members. It could also be argued that this is an essential part of political evolution towards ‘post-sovereign politics’.

Other terms are often used for the concept of post-sovereign politics including ‘postmodernity’, especially when applied to the European Union, although the latter concept does not necessarily presuppose supranationality. Cooper describes the postmodern world as having certain characteristics including (1) the breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs; (2) mutual interference in traditional domestic affairs and mutual surveillance; (3) the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour; (4) the growing irrelevance of borders which has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites; and (5) security being based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.\(^5\)

One important principle of the EU’s treaties, including the Treaty of Lisbon, is subsidiarity which means that the EU must not take on unnecessary powers at a supranational level. The Union derives its powers from the member states and not vice versa. Power should always be used at the lowest appropriate level – local, regional, national, supranational. The commission must prove in the draft of any legislation that subsidiarity has not been breached. National governments and

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parliaments as well as elected Members of the European Parliament are entrusted with scrutiny. Localism is also encouraged. Sovereignty is not absolute at national or supranational level.

Hix asserts that the EU is a political system not a state\textsuperscript{52} and yet it has state-like properties and can sometimes act in a sovereign way.\textsuperscript{53} For example, the European Court of Justice can order member states to use coercion or their own police forces in order to enforce EU law. So the EU could seem to be weakening the monopoly of legitimate force held by its members whilst not being a state in itself.

If we further examine Weber’s definition of the state and apply it to the European Union, it is clear that the EU cannot claim to have a monopoly of force over the territory of its member states. The member states themselves would lay claim to that monopoly, although the force employed by them should not be contrary to EU or international law, so the legitimacy of force used by EU member states could be overruled in some circumstances. Also, as Hix argues, ‘by establishing transnational citizenship rights the EU has undermined the traditional nation-state.’\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, although the EU has been likened to a soft or civilian superpower including by Tony Blair in Warsaw 2000, it is not a superstate (i.e. a state composed of smaller states). At this moment in time the EU is powerful with regard to both its member states and the world but it is not in itself a state.

However, despite the fact that the European Union is based on laws and institutions rather than force and is therefore a polity ‘beyond the state’, because it is

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\item \textsuperscript{52} S. Hix, \textit{The Political System of the European Union}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005) p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 124.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Hix, 2005, p. 346.
\end{itemize}
not static then, paradoxically, there is a possibility that it could lose its momentum, set final borders, develop its own centralised military forces and become a sovereign state in a similar way to how the United States of America evolved. In order for the EU to continue progressing with its model of post-sovereign politics it could be argued that it needs to remain fluid and open to enlargement. Final borders could hinder this fluidity and possibly lead to further deepening and the creation of a 'United States of Europe'.

So currently the EU is a unique organisation, not a superstate or a weak superpower dominated organisation like the UN. The EU is primarily based on soft power rather than force but is still in the process of developing. So we could ask if, in post-Lisbon Treaty times with the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and a possible end of enlargement after the Western Balkans have been included, this development could lead towards the formation of a superstate. On the other hand, perhaps the EU can develop a stronger voice in a multi-polar twenty-first century without resorting to statehood and fully centralised hard power. If the latter, then perhaps we might eventually see other regions creating similar structures based on appropriate *acquis communautaire*\(^{55}\), especially those regions with balanced multipolarity like the EU, as well as stronger international organisations such as the UN. The hope would be that this would lead to a more peaceful and cooperative world.

Two interesting developments to consider are firstly that the Schengen agreement has created a large region within Europe where border controls are relaxed and EU citizens are even freer to travel. This demonstrates a weakening of the state’s

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\(^{55}\) This is the term used for the laws of the EU.
defences against other European states and perhaps also provides more evidence that there has been movement towards a system that is beyond the state.

Secondly, the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established after the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was signed in 1992, are to strengthen the values, interests and independence of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam also added the European Security and Defence Policy (now the CSDP), giving extra defence policy cooperation. However, whilst there are close links with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the ESDP / CSDP was not configured for territorial defence and is primarily about stabilisation and peace. Its main commitments are the Petersburg tasks i.e. peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations and military crisis management, whereas NATO is more likely to be involved in pre-emptive strikes. The CSDP may also include EU outsiders such as Turkey, Canada and Iceland, so none of the above points to the CSDP being used as a means of ‘monopolising legitimate force’ within the territory of the EU. In fact it seems as though the EU is a supranational regional organisation beyond the state that also looks beyond itself.

Bretherton and Vogler agree that the evolution of the EU places it at the centre of major contemporary debates about the relationship between sovereignty and the means of violence, then ask if the civilian identity of the EU is being challenged.

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by the CSDP. On balance they think not and if Weber’s definition of the state and its three elements of institutions, territory and a monopoly of force, is applied it is clear that the EU has a defined (though currently non-static) territory, non-violent rule-making via its institutions, and a foreign defence policy but it does not have a monopoly of law-making or a monopoly of force. In 2006, Bretherton and Vogler regarded the EU as still being primarily a civilian organisation and a non-military actor despite the CSDP. This is still the case although it could change with the development of the EEAS.

So can the EU continue to avoid becoming a state whilst having state-like properties? In other words can the post-sovereign EU model continue or will the EU either collapse into ‘modern’ states again or evolve into a state in a similar way to the evolution of the US? Weber’s definition of the state as an institution that claims a monopoly of legitimate force for a particular territory does not apply to the EU and member states can currently opt out of the system. The Treaty of Lisbon with its subsidiarity clauses also helps to protect against centralised EU statehood.

Hix says, ‘the EU shows that a highly developed political system can emerge without the full-blown apparatus of the state…’ So if organisations like the EU are the way forward in international relations then it seems as though Bull was correct in his thoughts about states being indispensable to statelessness as documented by Hoffman who also says, ‘The movement beyond the states system has to involve states themselves as willing accomplices in their own transcendence’, (as previously quoted). The reason why states would do this is for human survival. Whilst the US

57 Bretherton and Vogler, 2006.
58 Hix, 2005, p. 413.
still seems to remain state-bound in its thinking, Europe envisages ‘what could be’ beyond the state at an international level.

Returning to the argument that EU membership needs to remain open and fluid if the union is to remain a polity ‘beyond the state’, we need to consider the possibility of further enlargement into the Eastern Partnership countries of the Black Sea region. The European Union originally promised that membership would be open to all European countries that met the required criteria and according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (1992) any European state may apply to become a member of the Union. Of course, there has been much debate on which countries are European. Perhaps the Council of Europe with its forty-seven members has been pre-empting this answer. (Its membership requirement is European states which respect human rights.) There seems to be at least a majority agreement amongst EU member states that the Western Balkan countries should become members of the union when appropriate but there is disagreement beyond that, especially with regard to Turkey and the shared neighbourhood with Russia. Topolánek, whilst Czech Prime Minister and EU presidency holder, supported continued enlargement saying that stopping enlargement would be the ‘road to hell’ and might create a new iron curtain.  

With regard to the Eastern Partnership, the original draft document recognised the European identity and pro-European aspirations of the countries involved (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus) but when the December 2008 document was published this wording had been removed. According to a senior

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official connected with the programme, this was due to lack of agreement between the EU member countries.\footnote{Unattributed interview with a senior European Commission official, Brussels, December 2008.} After that there was some private discussion that countries such as Ukraine could be offered fast-track membership if they worked quickly towards change. This now seems less likely due to their lack of progress (and reversal on some issues such as gender equality), although Iceland was offered fast-track membership, demonstrating what can be done for consolidated liberal democracies when EU members agree with each other.

In addition to the argument which is that in order for post-sovereign politics to continue within the EU it is essential to keep enlargement growing, there are other reasons for offering future membership opportunity to the countries of the eastern neighbourhood. From the point of view of the EU it is important to have peaceful neighbours and the majority of the countries and citizens involved would seem to desire peace and stability for themselves. However, political freedom has seemed to be deteriorating in most of the Eastern Partnership countries. Could this reverse wave of democratisation be at least in part due to EU failures? As Grant said in 2007, ‘if the EU said “never” to countries further afield, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, how could it hope to influence their development?’\footnote{C. Grant, ‘The Strategic Implications of the EU Malaise’, Readings in European Security Vol. 4, 2007 (CEPS, IISS & Geneva Centre) p.17.} He argued that variable geometry, the idea that not every country takes part in every policy, could save enlargement.

A shift from realist, state-centred thinking to the idea of post-sovereign politics could help the countries to change if so desired, possibly setting up their own regional organisation(s) based on the EU-model. For example, it could be argued that
if all the South Caucasus countries and autonomous regions were interested in eventual EU membership and gradually adopted EU norms including open borders with each other, freedom of movement, and free trade, then perhaps what happened after WWII in Western Europe could begin to happen in the South Caucasus with nationalism and territorial wars seeming to be less inevitable. A loose federalism might help with ending territorial or ethnic wars and preventing failed states. Celac, Emerson and Tocci of CEPS\textsuperscript{63} and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan are amongst those who have proposed regional stability and cooperation pacts for the South Caucasus region based on these ideas. Of course, the great powers of the world would need to allow this to happen rather than playing their own realist games. That is the subject of later chapters but Russia has made it clear that it objects most strongly to NATO membership for the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. Objections to EU membership or greater integration between the countries are less strong.\textsuperscript{64}

3.3.5 Post-Sovereign politics at a global level

Post-sovereign politics is not necessarily only applicable to Europe. With the threatened fragmentation of more states and regions in the world, including the South Caucasus, and the ensuing rise in the number of nation states, some European politicians and analysts are asking if it is time to realise that the world’s sovereign state system cannot continue indefinitely and agree that post-sovereign politics will be the way forward at a global level.


Whilst such fragmentation has occurred throughout history, it is particularly noticeable at the beginning of the twenty-first century, especially with regard to the territory of the former single state of Yugoslavia, now occupied by six UN recognised states, as well as Kosovo which is not recognised by Russia or China and therefore not the United Nations which follows the recommendations of the Security Council. Even amongst EU members there have been dissenters with regard to recognition.

The self-determination and separation of Kosovo, a former autonomous region of Serbia, has set a precedent according to the leaders of other autonomous regions such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia (see map 3), and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan (see map 4). The nationalism that arose in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism led to demands for ethnic autonomy. This is in complete contradiction to the norms of the European Union which accepts multiculturalism and the free movement of persons as the way forward.

Taking the South Caucasus as a regional example, there are currently three states, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as three autonomous regions within the states, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has recently recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate states whilst other members of the UN Security Council have not. If all the regions were to be eventually recognised internationally as ‘independent’ states then there would be double the number of states in the South Caucasus region. In many ways this has already happened.

Great powers such as Britain often viewed the division of territory as one method of solving ethnic or religious disputes, especially when leaving colonies (for example in India). However, it must be asked if a world with constant divisions, few
reunifications and a growing number of failing states can continue to function without higher layers of supranationalism – i.e. post-sovereign politics.

One example of a system of shared sovereignty in the South Caucasus could be modelled on a federal system between the three states resulting in one state. Another example could be with six regions (the three states plus the three autonomous areas) adopting their own EU-model system with open borders. Neither of these is likely to happen in the near future given present hostilities, despite the proposed Caucasus stability and cooperation platform mentioned earlier. However, if all the states and autonomous regions were interested in the possibility of joining the EU at some future date, then EU supranationality could serve a similar purpose. This solution would rely on EU membership remaining open.

Moving towards a system of post-sovereignty does not have to mean a weakening of laws or law-enforcement bodies. The supranationality of the EU is a provider of laws at the regional level whilst upholding subsidiarity at lower levels. Equally, the establishment of a United Nations parliament with democratically elected representatives from all participating countries as well as other institutions, using the EU as a model, would not mean a world government. It would rather be a way of managing globalisation in the same way that the EU does at regional level and other regions such as South America (Mercosur), South East Asia (ASEAN) and Africa (AU) are copying in their own way. Graham Watson MEP, along with other European parliamentarians, advocates such a system.\(^\text{65}\) Meanwhile, as noted in Chapter 2,

\(^\text{65}\) Kauppi et al., 2007.
Galtung proposes that the ‘United Nations’ could become the ‘United Regions’ as the highest layer in a multi-layered global system.\(^6\)

So the question we could ask about the global level is whether we are progressing towards a global system of regionalised post-sovereign politics with multi-layered sovereignty and a more democratic UN, whilst retaining a system of nation states as the basic building blocks.

### 3.3.6 Security communities and democratic peace theory

The distinct theories of security communities and democratic peace theory (both outlined in Chapter 2) can be argued to be closer to ‘post-sovereign politics’ than to realism. This concept of post-sovereign politics which incorporates both regionalism and supranationality is mostly used as a method of describing ‘the EU model’, although regionalism and supranationality are not necessarily related to liberal democracy. The theory of pluralistic security communities was originally used to describe democratic North America including the US and Canada but the European Union is also a good example of a security community because it is a community of states, within a particular region, that do not expect war with each other. Democratic peace theory, like post-sovereign politics, is based on liberal democracy, but it is not dependent upon supranational institutions. The theory basically states that democracies do not make war with other democracies. It could be argued that there is a strong link between democratic peace theory and the theory of security communities in that if neighbouring countries become liberal democracies then a security community might well be created.

\(^6\) J. Galtung, ‘A World of Regions – and the EU role’, May 2010
As mentioned earlier, Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance has produced a security community contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. These are (1) national elites must believe it to be necessary to eschew wars of conquest etc. with each other at least; (2) the costs of war are believed to outweigh any benefits; (3) the best path to national prosperity is shared economies; (4) it is best to have domestic democratic governments; and (5) states must be satisfied with territorial status quo.\textsuperscript{67} The only one of these conditions that could be argued to exist with regard to all Black Sea states currently is condition 3 - the one based on shared economies - although the majority of the states are beginning to agree that at some point the other conditions will need to be implemented. Nevertheless, there are currently particular disputes over territorial status quo and Western-style democracy is still eschewed by some. So do we need specific conditions in order to encourage Jervis’s conditions? My argument is that it is necessary to have the right conditions for these conditions to be met and that one of them is that the region must be characterised by a situation of balanced multipolarity.

In conclusion, it is posited that the theories of post-sovereign politics, security communities and democratic peace, possibly under the ‘umbrella’ term of liberalism, are related and largely opposed to realism. Nevertheless, for analysis of some issues, all of the theories analysed, including realism, could be complementary especially with regard to the argument that balanced multipolarity is necessary for a security community to develop.

\subsection*{3.3.7 Summary}

The European Union is an organisation of member states based on laws and

\textsuperscript{67} Jervis, 2002.
institutions rather than force and is therefore not a state but a polity beyond the state (post-sovereign). However, because its fluidity depends to some extent on enlargement (widening), there is a possibility that, by ceasing to enlarge, it could lose its momentum and become a state through further deepening of the union. Final borders and the development of a large European army and European weapons of mass destruction, which could be centrally controlled and have greater force than those of the member states, would be signs of this.

Also, if the NATO alliance were to end at some point in the future, the EU would need to maintain the CSDP as a similar inter-governmental organisation if it wanted to avoid EU statehood and maintain the fluidity of its current model.

The EU model, as a postmodern example of post-sovereign politics, is contributing to the setting up of similar institutions in other regions of the world.

3.4 Post-sovereign politics and structural realism

A comparison of realism and post-sovereign politics can be employed to help to answer the question, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ The assumption within the question is that the world has been and still is, to a large extent, realist. We could say that realism is based on the ‘modern’, Westphalian state system and is in the main ‘what is’. Nevertheless the ‘postmodern’, post-Westphalian EU, as well as regional and global organisations also exist and are also ‘what is’ even if their aims are not yet fully achieved.

One difficulty in the following discussion is that structural realists talk about ‘states’ and contrast their theory with liberal ‘institutions.’ The EU is often classified
by them as an institution yet, as discussed, the EU is more than an institution whilst not being a state. The EU is *sui generis*, not merely an inter-governmental institution, yet not a state according to Weber’s definition.

As previously discussed, realism says that in times of crisis, institutions do not hold up. Liberalism and constructivism are more inclined to be optimistic and to view genuinely democratic and cooperative global institutions as the way forward if the world is to avoid destruction through wars and climate change catastrophe. Indeed, liberals and social constructivists are more likely to think beyond the state.  

Realists such as Mearsheimer and Waltz might say that institutions are dominated by the most powerful states which are quick to abandon them when they are no longer of use. Mearsheimer writes that institutions are essentially:

arenas for acting out power relationships. For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process.  

He cites NATO as an example of US domination but it is not clear how the EU institutions might be explained away as being dominated by a powerful state that might abandon them in the future. And might a supranational democratic world government oversight layer with powerful sanctions but not weapons or armies of its

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own be a way forward, or perhaps Galtung’s United Regions?⁷⁰ Either of these, in the same way as the European Union, would be more than just an institution like the current United Nations.

In defence of institutions, liberals Keohane and Martin state that they ‘mitigate fear of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so they can alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation.’⁷¹ Constructivists say that international relations are socially constructed on the basis of shared ideas, norms and values. Institutions can be upholders of these ideas, norms and values. Hyde-Price, however, suggests that liberalism is valuable at domestic level but overlooks the realities of power at the international level which is anarchic.⁷² Nevertheless, it could be posited that more powerful institutions, including a more powerful UN, could eventually work towards making the world pseudo-domestic by using the EU model. In many ways, EU members regard other EU members as domestic rather than as states which might need to be secured against. However, it is necessary to agree with Hyde-Price that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the EU model is not strong and states have been inclined to act unilaterally rather than cooperatively when dealing with security matters, as will be discussed in later chapters.

Hyde-Price also says that liberalism misunderstands the nature of power and that liberals have a normative political agenda, confusing ‘what is’ with ‘what ought to be’.⁷³ Nevertheless, it can be argued that we can distinguish between ‘what is’ and ‘what could be’ without being normative. For example, the development of democracy in neighbouring countries could be supported without supporting

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⁷⁰ Galtung, 2010.
⁷³ Ibid., p. 16.
‘democratic crusades’ which could destabilise the countries and primarily concern the maximisation of security and power.

Theoretically this thesis is analysing the tensions between ‘what is’ (realism) and ‘what could be’ (post-sovereign politics) in the Black Sea region. By looking at US-Russian tensions in the area, it will analyse which way the region is moving and if the EU might provide a useful model for other regions of the world or even for the global level.

3.5 Summary

The two main theories that have been discussed and compared in this chapter are structural realism and post-sovereign politics. The theory of security communities has also been examined with regard to the European Union. Within the chapter it was concluded that the current type of polarity in the Black Sea region is ‘balanced multipolarity’ which, it is argued, is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for a security community. The EU and its evolution have also been analysed in terms of enlargement, final borders and its possible development into a state but meanwhile, the EU is *sui generis* and fluid, making it a model for other regions of the world, possibly including the Black Sea region.

The next three chapters of this thesis will apply and contrast all of the theories and concepts described in this chapter where appropriate, whilst discussing the empirical data collected and analysing how US-Russian tensions have affected EU policies in the wider Black Sea region.
CHAPTER 4

EU Security and Energy Policy

4.1 Introduction

Since 1949, Western European security and defence has depended upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which has in the past few years been outlining its future strategic concept. However, the enlarged European Union has also been gradually building up the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aspect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has begun to have a clearer role since the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified and the European External Action Service (EEAS) came into being.

The head of the European Union Security Policy (High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) for much of the time during this research (until 2009) was Javier Solana, formerly Secretary General of NATO but, since the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect, the post of Commissioner for External Relations (latterly filled by Benita Ferrero-Waldner) has ceased to exist and a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Baroness Catherine Ashton) has taken over both roles. The new High Representative (HR) is supported by the EEAS and takes part in the work of the European Council which should meet twice every six months according to the treaty. The post-Lisbon appointed President of the European Council (Herman van Rompuy) also represents the EU on issues concerning the Common
Foreign and Security Policy ‘without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.’¹

This chapter examines particular aspects of the EU’s security and energy security policies and how they might have been affected by US-Russian tensions. Following the initial examination of the European Security Strategy and how it relates to the eastern neighbourhood, there are two case studies analysing how the tensions might have affected EU policy. The first case study is with regard to security in general whilst the second focuses on energy security in particular. Conflict resolution is analysed specifically in Chapter 5 and aspects of ‘soft’ security such as democracy and regional cooperation are dealt with in more detail within Chapter 6.

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is designated to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security and shall be put into effect by the HR and by the member states, using national and Union resources. The Common Security and Defence Policy is a part of the CFSP and ‘shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.’²

Solana outlined the European Security Strategy in 2003 in a document entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ which concluded that we inhabit a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities where the EU can make a major contribution to

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² Ibid.
a system of effective multilateralism leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.\(^3\) This document and the later report on the strategy are examined in the next section.

However, with regard to the EU, there are questions that need to be asked such as whether or not there can be security without military might. Can the EU’s soft power, along with the military forces of the member states and the nuclear capabilities of France and the UK, be enough to guarantee security? Can the EU institutions provide security in the knowledge that its members will all work together? Hyde-Price gives the realist argument that European states can neither depend on ‘the optimistic teleology’ of an ever closer union to safeguard EU security, nor rely for ever on the US or NATO. He calls institutions ‘fair-weather friends’ and writes that, ‘The time for liberal-idealist illusions in a Europe “whole and free” is past’.\(^4\) So could this mean that the realism and military assets of the US and Russia will continue to dominate the states of both the EU and the Black Sea region regardless of any EU policies?

4.2 EU Security Policies and Strategies which concern the Wider Black Sea Region

The main policies and strategies to be discussed in this section are the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the Common Security and Defence Policy as outlined in various documents including the Treaty of Lisbon. Only those parts relating to the Eastern neighbourhood will be examined in detail in preparation for the following sections which analyse how US-Russian tensions are affecting the EU’s security and

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energy policies in the Black Sea region. This documentary analysis also highlights the post-sovereign politics of the European Union.

**The European Security Strategy**

According to Solana’s 2003 European Security Strategy document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, ‘The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.’ It continues, by saying that the ‘increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor.’ Also, ‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.’ These words would seem to indicate that European countries should be working together in collective defence and not just via NATO. The document could also be considered to be an expression of the EU’s preference for ‘soft power’ and for post-sovereign politics, as well as for some kind of military cooperation.

Further texts say that globalisation has ‘increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields’ and that ‘Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe.’ Key threats are no longer large scale aggression but terrorism, WMD and missile technology proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It could

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6 Ibid., p. 1.
7 Ibid., p. 2.
8 Ibid., p. 3.
be argued that these are the types of threats which need to be dealt with at a supranational level.

Under the heading of ‘Strategic Objectives’, Solana firstly outlines the necessity to address threats and to promote stability in the neighbourhood. He says, ‘Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic.’ He writes that we need to be ready to act before a crisis occurs and that none of the threats can be dealt with by just military means and that regional conflicts need political solutions.9 Once again we can see an emphasis on ‘soft’ power.

With regard to the Black Sea region and other neighbouring territories, the second strategic objective in the document says that countries on the borders must be ‘well-governed’10 as the integration of acceding states increases security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Solana says the task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union (as well as around the Mediterranean) with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.11 (Much of this will be dealt with in Chapter 6.) One important section in the document confirms that:

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We

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9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 Ibid., p. 7.
11 Ibid., p. 8.
should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the
Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.\(^\text{12}\)

It can be argued that this was not done soon enough to prevent war.

The third strategic objective in the document is building an international order
based on ‘effective multilateralism’ with well functioning international institutions
and international law being fundamental to this. One European priority is to
strengthen the United Nations (UN) which, according to the strategy, has the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.\(^\text{13}\) Here again we
can see how post-sovereign, multi-layered, global governance applies within the EU
strategy.

The transatlantic relationship, according to the document, strengthens the
international community as a whole and NATO is an important expression of this
relationship. It is also stressed that regional organisations can strengthen global
governance, which is one of the arguments of this thesis. The OSCE and the Council
of Europe are mentioned as having particular significance for the EU, whilst ASEAN,
Mercosur and the African Union are all named as being important for a more orderly
world.\(^\text{14}\) As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the last three regional organisations in the
list are all examples of regions which to a greater or lesser extent are modelling
themselves on the EU with its post-sovereign or multi-layered politics.

The third section of the ESS is about policy implications. Within this section,
areas of particular interest for Black Sea regional studies include the development of

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 9.
military and civilian capabilities, preventive engagement (which was not successful in Georgia), the establishment of a defence agency, stronger diplomatic capability, and transforming militaries into more flexible forces. Post-Lisbon much of this is in progress. There is also recognition that, ‘In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos’ with the conclusion that, ‘We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.’

The document reveals that Solana believes EU members must act together for strength despite their difficulties. There is also a note saying that the EU ‘should continue to work for closer relations with Russia.’


In December 2008, four months after the war in Georgia, the document entitled ‘Report on the Implementation of the Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’ reinforced the 2003 European Security Strategy. It maintains that the EU remains an anchor of stability and that enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across the European continent. These achievements, it argues, are due to a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. However, it says that, in order to ensure security, the EU must be ready to shape events by becoming more strategic in its thinking and becoming more effective and visible around the world. The document also reinforces EU values with sections such as the following:

15 Ibid., p. 12.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.18

These sections highlight and emphasise earlier comments, especially those regarding strengthening the CSDP as a force, cooperating with NATO, and regarding post-sovereign global governance as having the UN at the apex with the EU supporting multilateralism. There is also the mention of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘state sovereignty’ possibly to reassure some EU members as well as eastern partners, after the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by most of the West and the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia.

18 Ibid., p. 2.
Energy is highlighted as a security factor within the document which says that, by 2030, 75 percent of oil and gas will be imported into the Union. It also acknowledges that energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations and that transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine are important aspects of neighbourhood relations. The importance of energy to EU-Black Sea region relations will be discussed throughout the thesis.19

With regard to building stability in Europe and beyond, the main points are that enlargement is still a powerful driver, that the countries on the EU’s borders should be well-governed, and that new concerns have arisen over the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ in the eastern neighbourhood. Regarding the war in Georgia it says that the EU led the international response, ‘through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support’.20 Other important points include: the necessity to prevent threats becoming conflicts; the fact that the CSDP is increasingly in demand and can act quickly; and that military missions need to be able to do more through strategic airlifts, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance. These points would indicate that the CSDP wants to move forwards with regard to EU military capabilities rather than relying on soft power alone, NATO, or member states acting on a unilateral basis.

In relation to the Eastern Partnership policy, the report says that the goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries and thus the security of the EU. The proposals include energy security and mobility of people. For lasting stability, continued effort is needed by the EU, the UN, the OSCE, the US and Russia. It also says we need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the South Caucasus and

19 Ibid., p. 5.
20 Ibid., p. 6.
Moldova, working with the US and regional players such as Turkey. With regard to Russia, the report admits that EU-Russia relations have deteriorated and that the EU expects Russia to honour its commitments.

The ‘effective multilateralism’ section of the ‘Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ report reminds us that the ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more ‘effective multilateral order’ around the world and since 2003 the EU has worked on that objective with its key partner the US. It says that the EU and the US have been a ‘formidable force for good in the world’ ‘where they have worked together’.21 It could be concluded from this that the report is not describing the US as a force for good when it has not worked with the EU, for example when invading Iraq.

Another statement under the ‘effective multilateralism’ heading is that the international system created at the end of WWII faces pressure including questions about representation in international institutions.22 It could be argued that whilst supporting the ‘crucial role of the Security Council’, the EU would prefer to be represented as a whole on a permanent basis rather than via the nuclear states of the UK and France.

One statement which has a bearing on post-sovereign politics is that, in the twenty-first century, sovereignty entails responsibility. There is a need to share responsibility to protect the nations of the world from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The overall message in the report is, ‘To build

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21 Ibid., p. 11.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.'

The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon updates previous treaties in various ways, so there will be an exploration here of which ways these changes might affect security and energy policy in the eastern neighbourhood. The treaty reiterates the need to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with UN principles, saying that the CSDP will provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets which may be used on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping and conflict prevention using capabilities provided by the member states. These types of missions are already established in the Black Sea region, for example, the EU border assistance in Moldova (EUBAM) and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia (see Chapter 5). However, one interesting development is that ‘Member States shall undertake to improve their military capabilities’ with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The treaty also states that commitments in this area shall be similar to commitments under NATO. Tasks in which the Union might be involved are not just the ‘Petersburg tasks’ (see Chapter 3) but include helping third countries fight terrorism on their territories.

There is to be the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy’ as well as EU delegations in third countries and at international organisations. This will affect the posts of EU special representatives (EUSRs) in the Black Sea region, especially those in the South Caucasus and Moldova, although a spokesperson from the EEAS

23 Ibid., p. 12.
has said that it is possible that EUSRs will become heads of delegations so that they will be better integrated into the new structures.\footnote{EAS spokesperson at ‘Wider Europe’ conference, European Parliament, Feb. 2011 (personally attended).}

Also one paragraph of particular importance for the Black Sea region is:

The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.

This paragraph could point to the desire to set up a security community in the Black Sea region which will be further enlarged upon during this chapter and Chapter 6.

\textbf{Documentation on the European Energy Policy}

The Treaty of Lisbon also has specific mention of energy policy. In particular it says that the policy shall ‘ensure security of energy supply in the Union’ and will ‘promote the interconnection of energy networks’.\footnote{Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Article 176A, Title XX Energy (p. 88).} Whilst this might be aimed in particular at Union members, it also has an affect on the neighbourhood which supplies energy to the EU.

The following section (4.3) will analyse how the above EU security policies, excluding energy security, have been affected by US-Russian tensions. Energy security and diversification will be analysed within section 4.4.
4.3 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Security in the Black Sea Region

This section will mostly be concerned with ‘hard’ security issues such as conflicts, defence, peace-keeping, military, weapons and alliances rather than energy (to be covered in the next section) or democratisation and cooperation (discussed in Chapter 6). The three main US-Russian tensions which could be argued to have affected the EU’s security policies are NATO enlargement, missile defence and Black Sea maritime issues which will be discussed in the next three sections.

4.3.1 Tension 1 – NATO enlargement

The tension of NATO enlargement is examined here in relation to how it has affected EU security policies regarding the Black Sea region. Whilst EU policy is more concerned with EU enlargement rather than NATO enlargement, there has been a post-Soviet view within the European neighbourhood that the two are almost inextricably linked, so that joining NATO is considered to be the first step to becoming an EU candidate. One researcher in Armenia maintained that this was something that all experts in the Black Sea region knew. However, some neighbourhood countries, especially Georgia, might have been more interested in joining NATO as a protection from Russia rather than as a stepping stone to EU membership. Nevertheless, the war that began in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia raised the question of whether NATO would have honoured Article 5 and become directly involved in the war if Georgia had been a member of NATO (see

26 Interview with S. Harutyunyan at Noravank Foundation, Yerevan, Armenia in November 2008.
Chapter 5). Indeed some central and eastern European countries have questioned whether being members of NATO and the EU actually protects them at all.\textsuperscript{27}

So what exactly is EU security policy regarding enlargement into the Black Sea region? The EU is keen to have democratic, peaceful and friendly countries in its neighbourhood, with the ESS, as outlined before, stating that it is not the EU’s policy to create new dividing lines in Europe. In other words it is not the policy of the EU to move the iron curtain ever further eastwards. Russia may well have been viewing the situation in this way, seeing a once mostly Soviet Black Sea ‘lake’ gradually turning into a NATO ‘lake’, not only because NATO can control the comings and goings of naval vehicles through Turkey and the Dardanelles/Bosporus entrance to the Black Sea\textsuperscript{28} but also because the six littoral states around the sea, three of which (Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania) are already members, could gradually all become members apart from Russia, although there has been some discussion about the possibility that at some time in the future Russia could also join.

So why are US-Russian tensions over NATO enlargement affecting EU policy? It would seem to be primarily due to Russia’s fears that enlargement is an encroachment onto its ‘sphere of influence’ and that it could be left in isolation.\textsuperscript{29} For many years, these fears have led to Russian suspicion of the EU as well as the US, affecting various policies such as EU enlargement and security policies in general as

\textsuperscript{27} Personal communication + B. Whitmore, ‘Biden Working To Make It All Quiet On The Eastern Front’, RFE, 27 October 2009
http://www.rferl.org/content/Biden_Working_To_Make_It_All_Quiet_On_The_Eastern_Front/1862620.html accessed 30 October 2009.

\textsuperscript{28} The legal situation of access to the Black Sea is dictated by the Montreux Convention, 1936. See section 5.3.3.

analysed below. NATO enlargement can therefore be seen as a US-Russian tension that affects EU security policy.

So how did the tensions begin? As discussed in Chapter 2, Allison et al. say that the situation in 2006 between the US and Russia could be viewed as a deepening of the ‘cold peace’ predicted by Yeltsin who thought that the enlargement of NATO would cause Russians to see an anti-Moscow alliance right up against the borders of the old Soviet Union.  

As also outlined in Chapter 2, Goncharenko wrote that in 2005 there were three groupings for the major actors involved in the Black Sea region, which were the US and Russia, the regional powers, and international organisations. He called the US a dominant actor that would like a corridor of influence expanding from NATO territory in Europe to Afghanistan. He accused the US of wanting to expand NATO in the area, squeeze out Russia and decrease the latter’s influence. On the other side, Russia had for centuries considered Black Sea and Caspian Sea access to be the most important factor in its national security.  

The EU, however, has said that it is necessary to cooperate with its eastern neighbours and help to tackle political problems including in the South Caucasus. The EU report on the ESS (2008), as detailed earlier in this chapter, stated that the EU remains ‘an anchor of stability’, given that enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across the continent of Europe. It also says that the ENP has created a

strong framework for relations with partners and the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, including in Georgia.

The same report also states that enlargement ‘is still a powerful driver’ and that it ‘is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed’. So the dilemma seems to be that whilst on the one hand EU enlargement helps to bring peace and stability to the countries involved, it infuriates Russia which sees it as NATO hegemony. Consequently, Russia might attempt to destabilise countries’ political systems or help to install more pro-Russia governments. In 2010 this could seem to be the case in Ukraine although Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gryshchenko has insisted that Ukraine wants to be a ‘balancer’ between East and West.\(^{32}\)

So one example of how US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy could be that the EU has ‘backed off’ from further enlargement into the Black Sea region. However, many other variables could be affecting this as well, such as disputes between members, and fear of both high levels of immigration and negative public reaction. As discussed in other chapters, enlargement could be said to have been one of the biggest areas of disagreement between EU members and amongst EU institutions. Nevertheless at the end of 2010, EU enlargement discussions are proceeding with regard to the Western Balkan area.

The two non-EU Black Sea countries that became the closest to receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) were Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO summit in Bucharest 2008. The US was keen that this should be agreed but too many EU members were against the prospect, in part because neither Putin nor Medvedev

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\(^{32}\) On the record discussion with Ukrainian FM Gryshchenko, 6th September 2010, Chatham House Russia Eurasia Programme (personally attended).
would welcome the idea of Ukraine joining NATO. According to Allison et al., Ukraine has been seen as an instrument in the strategic weakening of Russia (see Chapter 2.)

In 2008 and before, President Yushchenko was extremely keen that Ukraine should join the EU, almost begging a group of MEPs to assist in the matter. He also wanted Ukraine to join NATO. However, the new President Yanukovych has said that Ukraine is not ready to join NATO. He stated that ‘it is impossible for our country’ because there is not a majority in the country that want membership. So for now they want a partnership only, with Yanukovych saying that Ukraine is a large state and must cooperate with NATO. Shortly after this statement, the Ukrainian parliament approved a bill, on 3 June 2010, to remove the goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic security and NATO membership from the national security strategy. However, the strategy also commits Ukraine to a ‘non-bloc’ security policy and does not exclude EU membership or general cooperation with NATO.

During Yushchenko’s presidency, the majority of Ukrainian citizens were supportive of EU membership even though more than 50 percent did not want to join NATO. The view of the Ukrainian people on NATO membership has been mixed, with people in the west of the country more likely to favour it than Russian

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33 Allison, Light and White, 2006, p. 90.
34 Discussion with one of the MEPs involved, December 2007.
38 Razumkov Centre, ‘How would you vote if the referendum on Ukraine’s NATO accession was held the following Sunday?’ (2002-2009) http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=46 accessed 10 January 2010.
speakers in the east. Yushchenko, who favours the West, and Yanukovych, often reported as favouring the East, have each represented one side of this split.

The other country that came close to becoming a NATO member is Georgia which is still keen to join despite (or perhaps because of) this arguably being one of the reasons why there was a war with Russia (see Chapter 5). Prior to this war which began in South Ossetia, Baev (of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo) examined the relationship between Russia and Georgia following Kosovo’s independence. He stated that the Georgians blamed Russia for all ills, believing that only NATO could rescue them, whilst Russia regarded Georgia as a failed state and believed there should be no NATO encroachment.

So how has NATO enlargement and the attempt to further enlarge affected the general security situation in the Black Sea region? Primarily tensions have been caused by Russia’s fear of encroachment onto its ‘sphere of influence’ in the region and its concern about just how far this would go. It has also affected the EU’s drive for cooperation in the region as outlined in the Eastern Partnership policy. Antonenko, of the International Institute of Security Studies, writes that the progress towards regional security cooperation in the Black Sea area has been disrupted by Russia which has seen attempts towards this progress as a prelude to further NATO or EU enlargement. (Regional cooperation will be discussed further in Chapter 6).

40 O. Antonenko, ‘Towards a comprehensive regional security framework in the Black Sea region after the Russia-Georgia war’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol. 9 (3) 2009, p. 262.
4.3.2 Tension 2 – anti-ballistic missile system (ABMS)

America has gradually been siting anti-ballistic missile systems in various locations in Europe and around the world. In Europe the negotiations initially took place on a bilateral basis, rather than via the EU or NATO. Under the Bush administration, the proposed locations in Europe were Poland and the Czech Republic, with UK radar sites also being used. The overall US army system proposed was known as ‘National Missile Defense’ (NMD), although its name was later changed to ‘Ground-Based Midcourse Defense’. (Former Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld has said that the US did not want to give the impression that the system was only for the protection of the US.\(^{41}\)) This system is also installed in Alaska and California. In Europe, the long-range interceptors, designed to counter inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were to be sited in Poland with associated radar facilities in the Czech Republic.\(^ {42}\) The stated US aim of the system was to protect against missiles from Iran but, according to F. S. Larrabee, for Poland the missiles were basically in order to protect it from Russia.\(^ {43}\) He adds that Poland wants to tie the US into their own security and, when Obama decided to pull out of the original ABM system, it was necessary to agree a different deal with the country in order to save American credibility and maintain good relations. In May 2010, Patriot missiles and US troops arrived at Morag in Poland, with Klich, the Polish Minister of National Defence, saying during the welcome ceremony, that having the deployment of the Patriot battery ‘is an important step not because of the equipment as this one battery is like one swallow that does not

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43 Interview with F. S. Larrabee, July 2009, RAND Corporation, Washington DC.
make a summer, but because of the people - US troops that will operate this battery’. Klich also emphasised that the Patriots could only be used for defence not offence (unlike the earlier proposed NMD system).

The US may well want to be capable of defending itself and its allies from further nuclear proliferation as well as from existing nuclear armed states such as China, North Korea, India and Pakistan. Nevertheless there was much hostility from Russia regarding the Bush plan which created further US-Russian tensions in the Black Sea region. Given that the original missiles in Poland could possibly have been used for offence as well as defence, in retaliation Russia, in 2008, threatened to site missiles in Kaliningrad. France, Germany and many other EU and NATO members were opposed to the Bush plans.

The Obama administration dropped the missile defence system in 2009, in part because of public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic, although some notable people such as Havel, former president of the Czech Republic, supported the idea to some extent. There were also concerns about the technical capabilities of the ABMS against long-range missiles. Soon afterwards a more sophisticated but shorter range

Standard Missile-3 interceptor system was proposed for Eastern Europe with one of the sites to be in Romania from 2015. There were also discussions with Bulgaria.\(^49\) Once again the agreements were bilateral with the EU being bypassed. This system is intended to be part of a ‘global missile defence shield’ along with other US installations including Patriots in the Gulf, NMD in the US and Aegis US Navy systems.\(^50\) Components sited in Europe are to be gradually upgraded in what is called the ‘Phased Adaptive Approach’ (see further details later in this section).

Russia has seemed more willing to allow the new system as part of the general ‘reset’ with America and new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with President Obama. But why should they have been so upset about the original plan and not the new one? One reason, as previously mentioned is that the original missiles could have been used against ICBMs and possibly used as offensive weapons as well as defensive, unlike the new system in its initial stages at least. Another reason is that Russia may be more concerned about the US reducing their nuclear weapons so that there is parity between the countries. They are achieving this via START so might be willing to make some concessions on the ABMS.

Nevertheless, one general concern about the ABMS is that of the ‘sword and shield’ i.e. if a country has a good shield it might be more inclined to use the sword, making ‘mutually assured destruction’ an obsolete concept. In other words, theoretically Russia’s offensive weapons could be rendered useless with regard to defending itself from the US and Europe.\(^51\) Yet another concern is that if the whole of


Europe is shielded from attack apart from Russia then Russia is more likely to be attacked by rogue states. These issues generated many concerns in the past, bringing about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) of 1972\textsuperscript{52} signed by the US (Nixon) and the USSR (Brezhnev). President Bush pulled the US out of this treaty in 2002 on a unilateral basis in order to begin working on the NMD (known colloquially as ‘Son of Star Wars’).

More recently, talks have been taking place between NATO and Russia regarding the future involvement of both in missile defence, including sharing military technologies. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, declared at the Brussels Forum Conference (organised by the German Marshall Fund) on 27 March 2010, ‘We need a missile defense system that includes not just all countries of NATO but Russia, too. […] One security roof that we build together, that we support together, and that we operate together. One security roof that protects us all.’\textsuperscript{53} A senior NATO official has also said, ‘We need more cooperation with Russia for Afghanistan and anti-ballistic missile systems.’\textsuperscript{54} The reason for this is because of the threat of nuclear proliferation, in addition to terrorist attacks.

This type of cooperation, if put into practice, could dramatically reduce future US-Russian tensions in the Black Sea area, especially if we take into consideration that Russia currently has ABM capabilities (known as A-135) too. Also, Smirnov, the

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with a senior NATO official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, July 2009.
leader of Transnistria, reportedly offered its territory for Russian systems if required.\textsuperscript{55} The issue of ABM systems could bring about either increased cooperation in the Black Sea region or increased competition, partly depending upon the degree of trust and openness between the various parties. (This could be related to realist versus postmodern attitudes.) Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security (RUSI) on 27 May 2010, Frank Rose, US Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation said, ‘We believe that the most effective way to eliminate Russia’s concerns regarding our European missile defense deployments is for the United States, NATO, and Russia to work together against common threats.’\textsuperscript{56} He added that the US is committed to anchoring the Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense in a NATO context.\textsuperscript{57}

Regardless of the future, to what extent have US-Russian tensions concerning the ABMS affected EU security policy? Firstly, the US negotiated directly with EU members, without using EU structures such as the CFSP or even NATO originally. As discussed in previous sections, when the US or Russia negotiate bilaterally with EU members on such matters then the EU and NATO are undermined. This policy could be seen as a ‘divide and rule’ policy with regard to the EU although in this scenario it is more likely that the US was negotiating without any regard for the EU. It would seem then that members who ‘play along’ are looking to the US for their security rather than to NATO or the EU, despite the fact that in many ways the US does not want to be wholly responsible for European security. The ABMS could therefore be

\textsuperscript{56} US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC), http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/142329.htm accessed 5 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
regarded as a prime US security policy, with any countries that can be used for appropriate bases being used as clients.

Secondly, the tensions have affected the EU’s policy on securing democratic and friendly neighbours or on achieving cooperation between Black Sea countries as Russia has stood firm over its sphere of influence with regard to those countries that are not EU members. Russians have seen the ABMS (especially the Bush system) as a direct threat to their security, as demonstrated by the counter-threat to place missiles in Kaliningrad, and Russia has acted accordingly.

Most of all, if EU policy is to have no ‘new dividing lines in Europe’ (see earlier discussion) then a vertical line of missiles at US bases along the eastern borders of the EU could create precisely that with those countries on the outside being left to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’. On the one hand the US is saying that it should have less responsibility in Europe yet on the other it seems to want to have US bases in Eastern Europe. It could even be asked if there is a new kind of ‘Yalta agreement’ between the US and Russia to divide up the Black Sea region.

Sherr argues that questions about security in the Black Sea region demonstrate the return of realpolitik. He also points out that the currency of the US in the region before 9/11 was protection but now some countries are asking if having a US presence makes them more vulnerable.⁵⁸

4.3.3 Tension 3 – Black Sea maritime issues

As discussed earlier, there have been US-Russian tensions over access to the Black Sea as well as over Russia’s continued presence in Sevastopol Harbour, a fairly central location in the sea, for its Black Sea Fleet. These tensions came to a head during the Russia-Georgia War.

Also, as introduced during Chapter 1, the title of this thesis relates to whether the Black Sea is regarded as a sea which should be open to the ships of the world or whether it is a ‘lake’. Geologically and politically speaking it is a sea but is not always perceived that way. The US in particular seems to have the view that there should be access for its fleets to this body of water via Istanbul, whilst Russia, on the other hand, could be said to view the Black Sea as a lake which should not be navigated by warships other than those of the littoral states. Nevertheless, NATO warships have taken part in several exercises on the Black Sea invited by littoral states.

In 2006, Matthew Bryza, US deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs as well as a member of the OSCE’s Minsk Group on South Caucasus conflict resolution, reported that Turkey had objections to a NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea and that these were ‘misunderstandings’. He also said that the US was, ‘intent on pursuing shared interests with its regional partners around the Black Sea and will not afford any country a veto over such efforts’.\footnote{59 M. Bryza, ‘The Policy of the United States toward the Black Sea Region’ in R. Asmus (ed.) \textit{Next Steps in forging a Euroatlantic strategy for the wider Black Sea} (Washington: German Marshall Fund of the US, 2006) p. 39.} The legal situation of access to the Black Sea is dictated by the Montreux Convention of 1936, despite calls to upgrade the treaty which restricts the passage of non-civilian ships stating \textit{inter alia} that warships of non-Black Sea powers may only stay in the
Black Sea for twenty-one days. Turkey, which has military authority over the straits, is responsible for making sure there is compliance.

Another article in the document says that warships over a certain weight cannot pass through the straits. The US was not a signatory to the Convention but has normally complied. Nevertheless, there are often attempts to get around the treaty by, for example, classifying ships as ‘cruisers’ rather than ‘warships’ or ‘aircraft carriers’. Russia, in particular, has suffered with regard to passage into the Mediterranean Sea.  

Turkey has also restricted US warships, especially during the Russia-Georgia War of 2008. Russia felt particularly threatened when the US sailed a warship, the McFaul, through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus ostensibly to take humanitarian aid to Georgia during the 2008 war. Russia’s deputy military chief Nogovitsyn proclaimed that this was a serious threat to Russian security as Russia believed the warship to be carrying nuclear missiles. He emphasised that the Federation would not stand for threats against either its Black Sea fleet or Russian cities as far away as St Petersburg. There were also concerns that the ship might be further arming Georgia. Turkey did, however, prevent the passage of two US ships which exceeded the weight limit as defined in the Convention. In response to Turkey’s attitude, Larrabee has suggested that the Turks might think of the Black Sea as a ‘Turkish Lake’.

From 2009 onwards, there have been signs that the US has ‘backed off’ under the new Obama administration with discussions of joint NATO-Russia projects such as working together against piracy or Russia supporting Operation Active Endeavour,

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62 Interview with F. S. Larrabee, July 2009.
which is an anti-terrorist operation involving NATO ships patrolling the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{63} However, in early 2010, discussions were taking place with Romania regarding the siting of part of the US ABMS on Romanian territory. It remains to be seen whether this will cause further problems if access to Romania is sought via Turkish waters and the Black Sea in order to transport the missiles or, indeed, if elements of the system are to be sea-based at some point in the future.

Another tension has been over Russia’s Black Sea Fleet which is stationed in Sevastopol Harbour along the south coast of the Crimean peninsula, a central location within the Black Sea. Since the breakdown of the USSR, Russia has rented Sevastopol from Ukraine. Indeed, when approaching the harbour by sea, there is a distinctly Russian feel about it with many Russian flags flying. Nevertheless, Ukraine also has a small fleet there. The rental agreement was to expire in 2017 and renewal of this agreement was dubious under President Yushchenko who aspired to full NATO membership for his country. The Russians were afraid that the fleet could be replaced by a NATO fleet. However, soon after the accession of President Yanukovych in 2010 a new agreement with Russia was made. This ‘Kharkiv agreement’ made in April 2010 allows Russia to stay in Sevastopol until at least 2042 and many in Ukraine are deeply unhappy. The Kyiv Post stated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet cannot protect Ukraine from its only threat i.e. Russia.\textsuperscript{64} On the other hand, it could be argued that this agreement could reduce tensions between Ukraine and Russia, between NATO and Russia, and therefore between the US and Russia.

\textsuperscript{63} Interview with senior NATO official, July 2009.
As well as the Russian naval base, the other littoral states have bases on the Black Sea too and, as previously mentioned, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was set up by Turkey in 2001 as a joint enterprise involving all six littoral states. Its stated goals are search and rescue operations for humanitarian needs; cleaning sea mines; joint action for protecting the Black Sea environment; and organising good will visits amongst Black Sea countries. However there have been tensions within this organisation too, with Russia refusing to take part in naval exercises involving Georgia. This means that the ships of the latter, rather than those of the former, no longer participate.

It can be seen quite clearly from the above that there have been US-Turkey, Russia-Turkey, Russia-Ukraine and US-Russian tensions regarding Black Sea access or Sevastopol Harbour, all of which inevitably affects the EU’s policy of promoting stability in the neighbourhood and developing post-sovereign politics.

4.3.4 Discussion

In section 4.2, EU policies regarding Black Sea security were examined revealing that the policy documents state ‘close and cooperative relations’ are needed with the region as well as ‘closer relations with Russia’ in particular. They also say, ‘Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere’ and ‘We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable.’ So have these EU goals been marred by US-Russian tensions?

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Section 4.3.1 showed how NATO enlargement has also made Russia suspicious of EU enlargement. Section 4.3.2 examined several issues including how the EU and even NATO are often sidelined when the US deals with Black Sea countries. The section also develops concerns over the possibility of the US missile defence shield creating a new dividing line in Europe when the EU has stated explicitly that its policy is to avoid this. Section 4.3.3 highlighted one more tension – that of conflict over the Black Sea itself and access to it – which has affected the EU’s desire to create a peaceful and cooperative region.

All of this would seem to point to realism in the Black Sea region as well as on the Black Sea itself. Nevertheless there are some indicators that things could change, in particular the cooperative moves being made between Obama and Medvedev show how tensions could be reducing. However, there have been fears that this ‘reset’ could lead to the US allowing Russia to have its ‘sphere of influence’ although the US has denied this and the EU, from its policy statements at least, would not agree to it either. Also, the Black Sea region is not a bipolar one but a multipolar one and, with regard to Black Sea access, Turkey has power over both the US and Russia. Turkey is also increasing its power over gas pipelines which will be further discussed within the following case study.


One of the reasons why the Black Sea area has been strategic for so many countries that are not littoral states is because of its close proximity to gas and oil in the Caspian
Sea and its present and proposed pipelines originating both in the Caspian region and the Middle East. Before the break-up of the USSR the Caspian gas and oil was easily accessed by all of the Soviet countries which were dominated by Russia. After the break-up, Russia lost control of much of this energy to countries such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan so it was concerned about its energy supply as well as the exports upon which its economy depends.

Much of Eastern Europe also depended upon gas and oil from Russia and became afraid that Russia might use energy as a bargaining tool, so they became concerned about their ‘energy security’. As these countries joined the EU, the energy problem became a Union matter too, so the subject of energy diversity began to appear in EU policy, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. New pipeline routes avoiding Russia were envisaged such as the Nabucco pipeline which transits Turkey (see later section and map 2).

The US, always interested in gas and oil, partly as a large consumer but also as the home of many international oil companies, gradually became more involved in the region, so tensions over energy were not merely between Russia and the EU but between the US and Russia too. Marshall and Rofe have described how within the ‘energy game’, Eastern Europe has become a ‘grand chessboard’, with an accompanying race by both the US and Russia to gather ‘allies and clients’. 67

After a more in-depth look at EU energy policy, this section divides the tensions into two parts. The first part looks at the northern aspect of the energy

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tensions and how Russia has used energy to try to control Ukraine and affect its relationship with the EU. This has also affected the US which has seemingly, in the past, tried to convert Ukraine into a ‘US client’ rather than a ‘Russian client’.

The second tension is based on more direct competition in the south of the region regarding access to and control of Baku (Azerbaijan) pipelines from the Caspian Sea.

4.4.1 EU Energy Policy

In addition to the policies discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, An Energy Policy for Europe, published in 2007, outlines the EU’s policy on energy in general, including the ‘security of supply’ for oil and gas.\(^{68}\) It states that the EU is confident that the relationship with Russia will strengthen but, nevertheless, ‘it remains important for the EU to promote diversity with regard to source, supplier, transport route and transport method.’ Also, ‘projects should be developed to bring gas from new regions, to set up new gas hubs in central Europe and the Baltic countries, to make better use of strategic storage possibilities, and to facilitate the construction of new liquid natural gas terminals.’ However, US-Russian tensions could be affecting this policy, as outlined in the following sections (4.4.2 and 4.4.3).

4.4.2 Tension 1 – influence over Ukraine

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Allison \textit{et al.} say that Russians think Ukraine has been used by the US to weaken Russia. The Orange Revolution (2004-5), when President Yushchenko (who had recovered from being ill after reportedly being

poisoned with dioxin) won the presidential election, was perceived by Russia as a US coup. So to what extent does ‘energy’ fit into this scenario of US-Russian tensions and how is EU policy affected?

The Russian economy is very dependent on gas and oil and on several occasions Russia has been seen to have used energy as a tool against Ukraine under President Yushchenko, especially when gas was cut off by Gazprom in 2006. (Gazprom is Russia’s largest company with the government owning the controlling share.) This incident followed a dispute between Ukraine and Russia over prices and unpaid bills. The cut-off also caused several eastern EU countries that relied on gas coming via Ukraine to suffer gas shortages. Pipes across Ukraine carry about one fifth of the EU’s gas needs. It can be argued that this Ukraine-Russian tension was partly based on Russia’s perception of Ukraine as having become closer to the West, in which case it can also be classified as a US-Russian tension which affected the EU’s energy security policy. In 2009, there was a similar incident of gas supplies being cut but, after the election of President Yanukovych in 2010, agreements were made to renew the Black Sea Fleet’s lease of Sevastopol in return for cheaper gas. These agreements are known as the Kharkiv Accords.

The International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS) in Kyiv has outlined its analysis of what Ukraine’s foreign policy should be, including energy sector reforms ‘in accordance with the Brussels Declaration of 23 March 2009’, which discusses both an EU-Ukraine partnership to modernise the Ukrainian Gas Transit System and the ‘Energy Community Treaty’. This Energy Community Treaty was signed in Greece

69 BBC, ‘Russia shuts off gas to Ukraine’, 1 January 2009
70 ICPS Kyiv, ‘A new foreign policy for Ukraine: four strategic priorities’, 2010,
in 2005 and extends the Union’s common electricity and energy market to external countries. The treaty was initially signed by EU and Western Balkan countries but candidates to join the treaty include Ukraine and Moldova. On 18 December 2009, the EU announced that the Seventh Energy Community Ministerial Council approved the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Energy Community. The accession will be effective when and if these countries solve the remaining gaps to make their gas laws comply with the EU acquis requirements and complete their respective ratification procedures.\(^\text{71}\) The Eastern Partnership Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine will reinforce this energy interdependence.\(^\text{72}\)

The ICPS now sees Ukraine as being a bridge between East and West, regarding this as both an asset and a liability, because both powers try to curry favour and to dominate it. Regarding energy, the organisation believes that it is necessary for Ukraine to establish a stable energy relationship with Russia, regain credibility as a transit country and ensure its own gas supply. It also says that the country has ‘a long way to go’ in reaching these objectives and that Kyiv’s failure to ‘get its act together’ has given Russia too much leverage. The main fear is that both the EU and Russia will try to bypass Ukraine, for example via the South Stream pipeline (see next section). The recommendation is that the Ukrainian government needs to deal with the


corruption, inefficiency and lack of transparency in the gas industry in order to be respected as a partner for the EU. It also needs to diversify its own energy supplies.  

Ukraine seems to be a country that is keen on ‘balancing’. It balances between parliament and presidency. It balances between its western Ukrainian speakers and its eastern Russian speakers. And now it is balancing between Russia and the EU. Its people might not agree on everything but they do seem to agree that they want a peaceful, united country. Yet, at times, it has seemed that both Russia and the West have wanted Ukraine to take sides rather than to develop for its own benefit. Only the EU policy, for example within the Eastern Partnership, seems to be at all helpful in any way, although the EU wants peaceful neighbours as part of its own security policy. As mentioned earlier, Makarychev wrote in 2008 that Russia is convinced the West’s interference in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia is about realpolitik despite its normative rhetoric of promoting democracy and civil liberties. Also, in 2009 it was made clear that Russia regards the Black Sea region as its own sphere of influence and that Putin does not trust ‘a single Ukrainian’ (see Chapter 5).

Energy is an important issue for the Russian economy and therefore an important part of its foreign policy. Despite what happened in Ukraine in the past, it can be argued that it is just as important for Russia to be seen as a reliable supplier of energy as it is for the EU to ensure its supply. According to Pop, ‘Some 80 percent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe transit Ukraine through its pipeline system. There were two major gas supply disruptions in 2006 and 2009 following pricing rows between

73 ICPS Kyiv, 2010.
Moscow and Kiev, giving the EU a strategic interest in the former Soviet country. Ukraine therefore needs to be seen as a reliable transit country.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gryshchenko has stated that there has been too much corruption in Ukraine and that under Yanukovych this must be tackled as well as making sure that the country is financially valid. According to him, the Kharkiv agreement with Russia gives a chance for essential reforms. Regarding energy he says that Ukraine will not now enter into anything inequitable and unjust like the previous government did. Also, that there is no need for South Stream. Ukraine needs a formula which will reassure Russia that there will be no more disruptions. According to Gryshchenko, Ukraine can be the most reliable way of transporting gas to Europe. It is clear that Ukraine wants and needs to be seen as a reliable partner for both Russia and the EU with regard to energy.

So it would seem that the best EU policy could be to help Ukraine to help itself, by offering partnerships to both Ukraine and Russia. The latter has a certain amount of nervousness over its energy exports especially given new gas sources in the world and the ability to access ‘shale gas’ in countries such as Poland and the UK, as well as in America, which could at some point in the future mean diminished dependency on Russian supplies in Europe.

4.4.3 Tension 2 – influence over Baku pipelines

Other than the gas pipelines through Ukraine, there are many existing and proposed pipelines from the Black Sea region to Russia, Turkey, the EU and elsewhere.

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77 On the record discussion with Ukrainian FM Gryshchenko, 6th September 2010, Chatham House Russia Eurasia Programme (personally attended).
exporting both oil and gas from Russia and the Caspian region. Those that affect the EU or the region itself include the following:

**Existing Pipelines**

*Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC):* an oil pipeline from Baku to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast via Georgia.

*Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE):* a gas pipeline from Baku to central Anatolia via Georgia, following the BTC pipe.

*North-South Pipeline:* a pipeline from Baku, via Georgia to Russia. [should read Armenia not Baku]

*Blue Stream:* a partly undersea gas pipeline from Russia directly to Turkey jointly owned by Gazprom and Eni (of Italy).

**Proposed and Agreed Pipelines**

*Nord Stream:* an agreed direct pipeline from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea.

*Nabucco:* an agreed gas pipeline from Erzurum (see BTE) to Austria via various other EU countries (see map 2).

*White Stream:* a proposed gas pipeline from Baku to Georgia then to Romania via the Black Sea avoiding Turkey.

*South Stream:* a proposed Gazprom pipeline to compete with Nabucco.

White Stream along with Nabucco and its BTE supplier are part of what is known as the Southern Energy Corridor, the purpose of which is to diversify the EU’s gas
supply. Two of the problems associated with all of these pipelines, as well as cost, are (a) whether or not there is enough gas to supply them all without building further pipelines to Iraq, Turkmenistan, Iran or Egypt and (b) whether or not there will be a market for all the Caspian and Middle East gas if enough shale gas is developed in EU countries. A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea discusses how the proliferation of energy routes might result in redundancy due to too much capacity and not enough gas and oil.\(^\text{78}\) This in itself is likely to enhance competition and tensions between the countries involved.

As quoted by Sherr, the official ‘Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020’, written in 2003, states that Russia’s powerful energy sector is ‘an instrument for the conduct of internal and external policy’ and that the ‘role of the country in world energy markets, to a large extent, determines its geopolitical influence’. It can therefore be seen how Russia with its energy supplying economy and Gazprom, its major company, view challenges to its monopoly ‘as threats’ especially if the challenge is from the West.\(^\text{79}\) Russia and Gazprom are keen to dominate the supply of Caspian gas and oil as well as having control over pipeline routes. The problem is that, although Russia’s economy relies heavily on being an energy provider, the EU is keen to diversify supply routes from the point of view of energy security, i.e. it wants to be less dependent on Russia.

Meanwhile, Turkey is trying to consolidate its position as an energy hub, cooperating with Russia on the one hand whilst being happy to host pipelines from Azerbaijan and the Middle East to the EU. Two of the most important existing regional pipelines are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline which ends at the

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Mediterranean and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline which ends at the proposed Nabucco pipeline to the EU (see map 2). Both pipelines run through Georgia as does a further existing North-South pipeline from Baku to Russia. Projects such as the Southern Energy Corridor will decrease the EU’s dependency on Russian supplies so Russia is looking at competing with Nabucco via its proposed South Stream pipeline.

Reportedly the European Commission has followed pipeline developments with trepidation.\(^8^0\) The Nabucco pipeline, which the Commission supports along with the US, can be said to be mainly ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ because it was specifically developed to diversify supply and reduce dependency on Russia. The Russian pipelines are both political and economic. Russia is threatening competition with Nabucco not only via South Stream but also by accessing Turkmenistan gas directly so that there might be less gas to fill the Nabucco pipelines. Russian aims would seem to be to control both pipelines and sources. Another reason why Russia might be accessing gas from other countries is that Russia could be importing gas for its own markets at low costs whilst selling its own gas to the EU at a higher cost thus avoiding accusations of making huge profits by importing then exporting the same gas.

It can be seen that energy is causing tension and competition between many of the countries in the region and in particular between the four ‘poles’ of the region i.e. Russia, the EU, Turkey and the US (see Chapter 3). This could mean that there might be an effect on EU diversification policy to some extent. For example, Nabucco is at

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the heart of this diversification and is backed by the US as well as the EU. Nabucco might be in a better position than Russia to sell to EU markets if it can access enough gas. At one time there were doubts about whether or not Nabucco would go ahead. However, Richard Morningstar, the U.S. State Department Special Envoy on Energy Issues in Eurasia, said in June 2010, ‘We are confident that the Southern Corridor and Nabucco projects will be implemented.’ 81

On the other hand, South Stream is in doubt, especially with Ukraine being seen by Russia as being a more reliable transit supplier for Russian gas than it was under the previous president. Gazprom could also be one of the suppliers to Nabucco. One of the European energy companies involved in Nabucco, Germany’s RWE, has denied that Nabucco is a rival of the South Stream project. Spokesman Jeremy Ellis said, 'It all depends on the countries that are ready to fill these pipelines with gas. Nabucco is the best and shortest route to export gas to Europe. South Stream is four times more expensive than Nabucco, so gas transport by South Stream will, of course, be more expensive.' 82

So, to summarise, it seems as though the EU’s diversification policy might not be affected very much in the longer term by US-Russian tensions provided that there is enough gas to fill the pipe and that the supply is not dominated by Russia. Nevertheless tensions over energy continue to exist between all actors. For example, a second US-Russian tension is over the North-South pipeline transiting from Azerbaijan, through Georgia and on to Russia. Georgia has at various times discussed the sale of this government asset to Gazprom in return for guaranteed cheap gas. This

was concerning to Washington which persuaded Tbilisi not to sell in return for money to repair the pipe. However, in 2010 there were reports that Georgia was once again interested in selling the pipe, though not necessarily to Gazprom.83

Further tensions exist, according to the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, because Russia has been game playing and has created a divide and rule policy in the EU by favouring some members over others when it comes to supplying gas.84 However, Sherr points out that part of the problem with energy supply is due to the Iraq War and sanctions against Iran – all caused by the US not Russia.85 So, as well as there being EU-Russian tensions over energy, there are US-Russian tensions given that the US is keen to back energy diversity projects in the region such as Nabucco. There was also American hope at one time of accessing gas from Turkmenistan with the possibility of creating various east-west corridors including one transiting Afghanistan.86 This was before Baku gas at Shah Deniz was discovered. Gas from Turkmenistan is now piped to both Russia and China.

Given the European Union’s dependency on importing much of its energy and its associated vulnerability, the EU policy is for diversification. One of the less altruistic reasons for the EU wanting stability in the eastern neighbourhood is due to pipelines and energy security.

85 Sherr, 2008.
4.4.4 Discussion

This section has demonstrated that there is much competition and insecurity in the wider Black Sea region when it comes to issues of oil, gas and pipelines, with tensions between all parties which are, nevertheless, forced to cooperate. As mentioned in section 4.2, there are statements in the EU ‘Report on the Implementation of the Security Strategy’ which say that ‘Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations’ and ‘Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine.’

Energy researcher Raszewski has highlighted that the EU has hoped to create an energy security community in the wider Black and Caspian Seas region but that currently there is only a more negative type of ‘regional security complex’. He posits that this will remain the case as long as Russia, the only littoral state of both the Black and Caspian Seas, dominates the area. Nevertheless we have seen that Russia is also dependent on the purchasers of its gas and oil, as well as the transit countries such as Ukraine and Turkey. Suppliers, consumers and transit facilitators are all vulnerable where energy is concerned. Also, the economies of countries such as Russia and Azerbaijan are vulnerable if they are dependent on energy alone.

US-Russian tensions contributed to the EU gas supply being cut off in 2006. This reinforced the EU’s existing policy for diversification. The energy-related tensions have also affected the outcome of EU policies due to the ‘divide and rule’ and ‘client seeking’ behaviour of the US and Russia. In particular the EU’s policy of bringing peace and stability to the region has been affected by the tensions.

4.5 Conclusions

For many states ‘security’ is about the ability to defend against all threats whilst for others, according to Mearsheimer’s theory, it is about being able to control and dominate the world in order to avoid threats arising. However, smaller states do not normally have the luxury of either and must use tactics such as bandwagoning. For example, whilst many states that were formerly part of the USSR or the Warsaw Pact have celebrated their sovereignty, they have also rushed to join or apply to join either the EU, NATO or both, looking in particular for the US to protect them.

According to Hyde-Price, the situation existing in the region of Europe during the development of the EU (post-Cold War) has been ‘balanced multipolarity’, so perhaps we could extrapolate that this is the best condition required for other regions too. In Chapter 3 it was argued that ‘balanced multipolarity’ is the current condition in the Black Sea region, despite the fragility of its situation. Russia has been an outsider ‘great power’ and, as examined earlier, the behaviour of a great power when faced with a potential hegemon (the West) can be defensive aggression. It can also be balancing, buck-passing or bandwagoning. During 2010, Russia has appeared to be less defensive and somewhat less of an outsider. Discussions on President Medvedev’s ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ proposals or even the eventual possibility of Russia joining or working more closely with NATO and the EU show how Russia is, at least, considering the bandwagoning possibility. Also, Turkey and Russia seem to be balancing the West’s ‘encroachment’ onto former Soviet territory without necessarily bandwagoning with each other.

There could be small signs of movement towards greater cooperation on the European continent. Ukraine’s new foreign minister has warned that with the
continued rise of great powers, especially China, the whole of the European continent must cooperate without division between EU and non-EU states.\textsuperscript{88} The European Parliament rapporteur for Moldova (Graham Watson MEP) has confirmed that Ukraine has been very helpful as an intermediary between Russia and the EU over Transnistria\textsuperscript{89} (see Chapter 5).

Nevertheless, over the past few years, US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy as this chapter has shown, with both security and energy policies having been affected. The conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence are as follows:

\textit{The Case Study of Security}

\textbf{NATO enlargement}

NATO enlargement has generally been seen to be a precursor to EU enlargement, so countries such as Georgia, which have wanted to join the EU, have first tried to join NATO. This has been seen as a threat by Russia and subsequently policies such as the Eastern Partnership have also aroused suspicion, causing Russia to create disruption with regard to the EU’s policy of cooperation. Therefore the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over NATO enlargement have affected EU policy is ‘high’.

\textbf{ABMS}

US-Russian tensions have been created by the US setting up a missile shield in the Black Sea area which Russia, at times, has viewed as a direct threat to its security. EU

\textsuperscript{88} On the record discussion with Ukrainian FM Gryshchenko, 6th September 2010, Chatham House Russia Eurasia Programme (personally attended).
\textsuperscript{89} Interview with Graham Watson MEP, European Parliament, Brussels, February 2011.
policy is to aim for no new dividing lines in Europe yet these could be created by a vertical line of missiles at US bases along the eastern borders of the EU with those countries on the outside being left to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’. This would also conflict with the EU’s stated policy of creating cooperation in the region. Therefore the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over ballistic missile defence have affected EU policy is also ‘high’.

**Maritime Issues**

There have been US-Turkey, Russia-Turkey, Russia-Ukraine and US-Russian disputes and tensions regarding either Black Sea access or Sevastopol Harbour, all of which inevitably affects the EU’s policy of promoting stability in the neighbourhood and developing post-sovereign politics. So, even though US-Russian tensions over Black Sea maritime issues have been ‘high’ at times, the overall assessment is ‘medium’ due to intervening variables.

*The Case Study of Energy*

**Influence over Ukraine**

The EU’s energy policy in the region is to ensure ‘security of supply’ for oil and gas. This security has been disrupted in the past by disputes between Russia and Ukraine over Ukraine’s domestic energy prices paid to Gazprom. Russia has seen Ukraine as an instrument used by the US in the strategic weakening of Russia especially under President Yushchenko after the Orange Revolution. This mistrust of Ukraine has caused disruption to the EU’s supply of gas via transit pipes crossing that country and has therefore affected the EU’s energy security policy, especially with regard to a greater emphasis on diversification. Even though US-Russian tensions over influence
in Ukraine have been ‘high’ at times, the overall assessment of how EU policy has been affected is ‘medium’ due to intervening variables, especially tensions between Russia and the Yushchenko government.

**Influence over Baku Pipelines**

The EU’s energy policy with regard to the south of the Black Sea region is for diversity of supply. Russia’s economy, on the other hand, is dependent on oil and gas export so it would like to dominate all supply and transit pipelines in the area. The US, as well as the EU, is supporting the Nabucco project but there has, in the past, been some doubt over its viability due to Russian actions. Nevertheless now that the project has been agreed, the EU can begin to establish its diversification policy despite US-Russian tensions, although there could be a certain amount of dependency on Russia to partly supply gas to the pipeline when finished. In addition, the EU’s policy of bringing cooperation to the region has been affected by all of the tensions. So even though US-Russian tensions have had some effect on EU policy concerning South Caucasus pipelines, the overall assessment is ‘low/medium’ due to strong intervening variables and the fact that the EU’s diversification policy is making progress.

The US-Russian tensions outlined in this chapter have affected many of the EU’s policies to some degree. This includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy which, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, following on from the European Security Strategy document in which Solana wrote about effective multilateralism and the need for
well-functioning international institutions and international law. The ESS also adds that ‘Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe’. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to consider problems arising from tensions within the Union between EU members themselves. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is far from being ‘common’ although the Treaty of Lisbon and the new External Action Service are designed to help to deal with these problems.

As quoted in section 4.2, the Report on Implementation of the Security Strategy says that respect for the sovereignty of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable, and that threat or the use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues. This policy has not been effective in that we had a war in Georgia, in part due to US-Russian tensions (as argued further in Chapter 5). Also, making Kosovo an exception to the ‘territorial integrity rule’ could be seen as setting a precedent for Russia to do the same with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even when the West acts with seemingly ‘good intentions’ there are almost always unforeseen consequences.

The ESS states that none of the threats to the world can be dealt with by military means alone, and that regional conflicts need political solutions (i.e. soft power). The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy will continue with both civilian and military missions. The question needs to be asked if these missions will mostly reflect post-sovereign politics or if there will be an eventual move by the EU towards realpolitik. The EU’s present soft power policies and peace-building strategies involve working towards democratisation and regional cooperation in the Black Sea region. These aspects of Black Sea policy will be further discussed
and analysed in Chapter 6. Meanwhile Chapter 5 considers three case studies of conflict resolution.
CHAPTER 5

Conflict Resolution: Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria

5.1 Introduction

Russia has always regarded the Black and Caspian Seas as being crucial to its security so naturally it has felt increasingly threatened by the presence of the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the region since the break up of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless many former Soviet countries have become independent states and, whilst they mostly still want good relations with Russia, they do not want Russian domination. The unresolved ‘smouldering’ conflicts within the Black Sea states of Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are of particular concern to the European Union (EU), Russia and Turkey, all of which are neighbours. The US and other non-EU NATO members (Turkey, Albania, Canada, Croatia, Norway and Iceland), are also involved in discussions over the conflicts either because of the NATO aspirations of some Black Sea countries or due to membership of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In many respects the OSCE brings the relevant countries together to discuss how to deal with the conflicts. The OSCE’s Minsk Group which presides over the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations is a good example. Nevertheless there are disagreements and tensions over the conflicts, especially between the US and Russia with regard to the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as recently seen. Russia has been accused of
supporting separatist regimes in order to undermine former Soviet countries supposedly due to a fear of Western influence in those countries.¹

This chapter focuses on how US-Russian tensions have affected the EU policies on conflict resolution in the Black Sea region. Initially (in section 5.2), the EU policy documents are examined in order to evaluate the overall policy and the consistency of it over the years, particularly when new policy documents emerged from the Commission’s External Relations Directorate General. The rest of the chapter is then subdivided into three case studies, each one examining data collected on a specific conflict region and analysing the extent to which the tensions are affecting the EU’s policies towards that region both in terms of policy-making and implementation. The four conflict regions of the wider Black Sea area are Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia (section 5.3), Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan (section 5.4) and Transnistria in Moldova (section 5.5).

Of the tensions between the US and Russia outlined in Chapter 1, those which are most likely to affect EU policies on conflict resolution are within the areas of NATO enlargement and spheres of influence, as well as disagreements over the conflict regions themselves especially with regard to the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008. There have been many disputes and debates over self-determination versus territorial integrity, especially since the independence of Kosovo. Russia has accused the US and NATO of double standards when they say that Kosovo is an exception to the rule that territorial integrity should apply to UN recognised states but that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not exceptions. Russia is one of the very few

states that have recognised these autonomous regions of Georgia as independent states.

The structure of this chapter includes a thread of theoretical analysis focusing on the differences between how realists and postmodernists might view the empirical data as well as conclusions on the extent to which the success of EU policies on conflict resolution are being affected by tensions between the US and Russia. If the EU policies are beginning to be successful in this region then it might appear as though soft power and cooperation is winning out over national interests and power maximisation, giving some indication that post-sovereign politics is replacing realism.

5.2 EU Policies on Conflict Resolution in the wider Black Sea region

The documents which detail the general EU policies on conflict resolution include the European Neighbourhood Policy documents, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. These policies are examined in this section. The specific ENP Action Plans for the three countries containing the conflicts are examined later in the chapter within the specific regional sections (5.3 – 5.5) along with the earlier Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) where applicable.

*European Neighbourhood Policy*

The European Neighbourhood Policy involves bilateral relations with non-candidate states in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The neighbours in the wider Black Sea region are Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Belarus is also a member of the ENP but is not usually considered to be a part of the wider Black Sea region. The other littoral Black Sea states have different relationships with the EU; Russia has its own separate agreements; Turkey is an EU candidate; Bulgaria and Romania are members of the Union.

The ENP developed from enlargement as a foreign policy, partly because there are many more countries keen to join the EU than can currently be accommodated either due to the EU’s internal problems or because the countries themselves are not European, or because the countries will not meet the accession criteria in the near future as they do not have the internal structures enabling them to implement the *acquis* and function as EU members. The ENP could be viewed as an attempt to establish peace and stability beyond the borders of the Union or as a method of creating a security ‘buffer zone’ around the EU. The policy was first developed in 2002 when it became necessary to think ‘beyond enlargement’.

The stated aims and principles of the ENP are to promote and support reform and modernisation with the goal of mutual prosperity, stability and security. The European Commission says that Action Plans are all individual because the countries have different needs and are not equipped with the same capabilities to deal with reform. Common values and interests are promoted. These are basically about democracy, reducing poverty, market economies, modernisation, and having a joint cross-border response to migration, crime, terrorism and the environment.\(^2\) In other words, the EU is willing to give aid and promote trade in return for stability along its borders. Each country helps to develop its own individual agreement. Some of the countries involved, including Ukraine might feel compelled to adopt the *acquis* in

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2 Personal discussions with External Relations and ENP DG staff November 2006.
order to attempt full membership of the EU at a later date, although critics might say the ENP is a way of saying no to such countries whilst trying to maintain good relations. The ENP was covered by the EU’s External Relations DG (RELEX) not the Enlargement DG before the Treaty of Lisbon was implemented when these ‘Directorate Generals’ were combined to create the Enlargement and Neighbourhood DG.

Generally speaking the Union prefers to use soft power, rather than the hard power often used by the US and NATO, to influence its neighbours. It also acknowledges the necessity to work together to defend against the threats of climate change, nuclear risks and organised crime. According to the Commission, the ENP is a key EU priority. However, some critics of the ENP believe that the EU is not committed enough to the democratisation of some of its neighbours and in many cases does not reward reform adequately i.e. the EU is becoming more pragmatic and losing its values. Nevertheless the author was told by a senior member of the Commission that values are still very strong within the Commission, although there is a desire to avoid paternalism.

Although the ENP is not exclusively concerned with the eastern neighbourhood, ENP documents are examined in this section in order to seek out general discussions on conflict resolution as well as specific mention of conflicts within the wider Black Sea region.

The first document to outline the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ document published in 2003 which says that:

3 Ibid.
4 Interview with senior Commission official in July 2009.
The EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over […] Transdniestria (in support of the OSCE and other mediators). Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries. Once settlement has been reached, EU civil and crisis management capabilities could also be engaged in post-conflict internal security arrangements.

The question of to what extent there has been ‘greater EU involvement’ will be examined further in section 5.5 on Transnistria, as will the statement below from the ‘Wider Europe’ document:

Unrecognised statelets such as Transdniestria are a magnet for organised crime and can de-stabilise or throw off course the process of state-building, political consolidation and sustainable development.

The ENP strategy paper published in May 2004 also refers to conflict resolution. The extracts below are not exhaustive as several are repetitious:

‘Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the EU’s external action […] as well as abidance by international law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution.’

‘The ENP will reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution.’

“The ENP should reinforce the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts.”

“Through the ENP, the parties will strengthen their political dialogue and make it more effective. This encompasses foreign and security policy issues including regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis management and common security threats.”

The statements in this 2004 strategy paper policy would seem to exude confidence regarding the EU’s capabilities. One reference specifically to the South Caucasus is:

The EU wishes to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the development of a market economy. These common values also underlie the membership of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Council of Europe and OSCE. Increased efforts to promote the settlement of the conflicts in the region and to develop good neighbourly relations are needed. Concrete steps forward need to be made by each of the three countries to make further progress in implementing their respective Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, in particular to strengthen the rule of law, and to promote conflict settlement. The ENP should reinforce the EU’s contribution to promote these objectives.

6 Ibid., p. 4.
7 Ibid., p. 6.
8 Ibid., p. 13.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
These extracts from the ENP documents seem to clarify that: (1) Working towards the resolution of regional conflicts, specifically including the South Caucasus, is expected of ENP partners; (2) Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are expected to develop ‘good neighbourly relations.’ This presumably means with each other but does not necessarily rule out large neighbours such as Russia and Turkey. The wording also demonstrates the EU’s hopefulness regarding the movement from realism towards a more cooperative region; and (3) that the EU must contribute actively towards the settlement of regional conflicts by a variety of means including post-conflict arrangements.

The documents were later seen to have been somewhat over-confident as, despite some success in Moldova, the European Commission’s report ‘On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’ published in 2006 acknowledges that one of the main weaknesses of the policy was with regard to regional conflicts:

The ENP has achieved little in supporting the resolution of frozen or open conflicts in the region, notwithstanding certain specific achievements (e.g. in relation to border management in Moldova […]) The EU needs to be more active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or peace-keeping efforts.

The report also seems to backtrack on the EU’s level of responsibility with:

The ENP can never substitute for the regional or multilateral efforts underway to address these issues. But the EU must be prepared to play a more active role here, whether through full participation in such efforts […] Or indeed through case-by-case participation in civil or military monitoring or peacekeeping
operations. Border-management operations also have an important part to play here – the success of the EUBAM mission on the Moldovan border […] offer[s] important pointers. The commission stands ready to develop, together with the Council Secretariat, further proposals in the field of conflict resolution.

In December 2007 a document entitled ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’ was published by the European Commission with more details on conflict resolution and political dialogue. The accompanying press release stated, ‘Further efforts from the EU side are necessary to make a reality of the proposals already made to strengthen the [ENP].’ The following extracts on conflict resolution from this document give more evidence and are analysed together on the next pages:

The number of (frozen) conflicts in the neighbourhood remains high […]
The EU has a direct interest in working with partners to promote their resolution because they undermine EU efforts to promote political reform and economic development […] and because they could affect the EU’s own security […]

The EU is already active in preventing and resolving conflicts but more should be done. A number of CFSP and ESDP measures have been launched. EU special representatives have been appointed […]

These actions need to be planned and coordinated with longer-term EC policies which address the overall institutional and governance context and thus favour stabilisation. The deployment of all available tools whether first, second or third pillar, would increase EU influence and avoid the limitations
of short term crisis management. The EU can make an important contribution by working around the conflict issues, promoting similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines, to foster convergence between political, economic and legal systems, enabling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building. The example of [EUBAM] integrating EC and CFSP instruments in one approach shows how this can work.

Conflicts should be a key focus of political dialogue with ENP partners. The EU should also ensure that the conflicts remain on the agenda of dialogues with relevant international organisations and third countries.

The Commission stands ready to develop, together with the Council further proposals in the field of conflict resolution, using both Community and non-Community instruments.

From the above extracts a conclusion could be drawn that the EU believes that with the assistance of soft instruments, including CFSP and CSDP instruments, it is possible to bring about an end to the regional conflicts. One of the CFSP instruments was the appointment of an EU special representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus from 2003. This position was filled by Peter Semneby from 2006 until early 2011. He is known to have been frustrated by his lack of power. For example, Semneby was not one of the mediators at Geneva. Nevertheless he created the possibilities of dialogue so he was an ‘enabler’.¹⁰

The extracts also clearly demonstrate that ENP instruments include the promotion of institutional stability and good governance, as well as the harmonisation

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of systems on either side of boundaries. The example of EUBAM, as discussed in more detail in the Transnistria section, is given as an example.

It is also assumed that keeping dialogues open both between the EU and partners who have conflicts in their regions as well as keeping the conflicts on the agendas of ‘relevant’ international organisations and third countries will help with resolution. In the case of the Black Sea regional conflicts, the organisations would presumably include the OSCE and the UN. The ‘countries’ mentioned would need to include Russia but this is not explicit here.

Finally the Commission states that this is not enough and there is a need for further proposals. So once again it can be concluded that the EU’s confidence is waning and that it feels a measure of impotence. The analysis will examine if this is due to one or more of the following: the inherent difficulties involved in conflict resolution, lack of agreement by EU members on what the policy should be, or US-Russian tensions.

Realists might say that the EU is weak and cannot therefore compete with the interests of great powers or superpowers such as the US and Russia; it is hard to create peace when many actors want to keep the status quo. For example, according to an interviewee at NATO headquarters in Brussels, ‘Russia loves it when the world seems to be bipolar again’.11 Could the same be said of NATO?

On the other hand, supranationalists might point to Transnistria as an area where there are positive signs due to EUBAM; they might also say that soft power is

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11 Interview with senior NATO official, July 2009.
slow power and that after the Russia-Georgia War the EU did more to bring about peace than any other state or organisation.

**CFSP and CSDP**

The Common Foreign and Security Policy was established as the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht in 1992 and which came into force in 1993. Changes were introduced later in the Treaty of Amsterdam which was signed in 1977 and came into force in 1999. The main purpose of the CFSP is to ensure that the EU members act together and adopt common positions on international issues as well as promoting international cooperation.\(^\text{12}\) However, the treaty says that members of NATO will have their obligations respected. Nevertheless, members of the EU do not always take a common position, the 2003 war in Iraq being one prime example of disagreement.

The CFSP was represented by the current EU presidency and assisted by the Secretary General of the Council (Solana) who exercised the function of High Representative for the CFSP.\(^\text{13}\) This changed when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in late 2009, as previously outlined.

The Treaty of Amsterdam states that the CFSP will include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. Also the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was adopted within the framework of the CFSP. In December 2001 a declaration was made on the operational capability of the CSDP at the European Council meeting in

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\(^\text{12}\) The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 10.
\(^\text{13}\) The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 13.
Laeken.\textsuperscript{14} The external relations section of the Laeken document states that the European Council has a ‘commitment to continuing its efforts to improve development cooperation instruments, particularly in the countries affected by crisis or conflict.’ It also asks the question, ‘Does Europe not, now that is [sic] finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’\textsuperscript{15} This question highlights, once again, the EU’s drive towards post-sovereign politics, democratisation and perhaps regionalisation, both internally and externally.

The CSDP has missions throughout the world including in the Black Sea region. These include EUBAM Moldova and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia which will be discussed further in sections 5.5 and 5.3 respectively.

\textit{Black Sea Synergy}

‘Black Sea Synergy – a new regional cooperative initiative’, the first specific Black Sea policy of the European Union, was published by the Commission in April 2007. It is also the first policy that indicates a shift in EU policy from bilateralism to regionalisation and, in terms of the main research question which looks at international relations theories, might demonstrate a desire for a security community in the region.

The ‘unresolved frozen conflicts’ are mentioned within the Black Sea Synergy document in the context of the need for a regional policy. The document specifically

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 20.
says that, ‘Enhanced regional cooperation is not intended to deal directly with long-standing conflicts in the region, but it could generate more mutual confidence and, over time, could help remove some of the obstacles that stand in the way.’

EUBAM is specifically mentioned with regard to how it has contributed to conflict resolution as well as other important issues. ‘Improving border management and customs cooperation at regional level increases security and helps to fight organised cross-border crime such as trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs.’

The section on ‘frozen conflicts’ states that:

The commission advocates a more active EU role through increased political involvement in ongoing efforts to address the conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and has proposed that the EU should also look at ways of enhancing its participation e.g. in monitoring. Black Sea Synergy could offer one means of addressing the overall climate by tackling the underlying issues of governance and lack of economic development, lack of social cohesion, of security and of stability. Special attention must be paid to promoting confidence-building measures in the regions affected, including cooperation programmes specifically designed to bring the otherwise divided parties together.

With regard to cross border cooperation and the role of civil society, the programme sets out to facilitate ‘the further development of contacts between Black Sea towns and communities, universities, cultural operators and civil society organisations,

17 Ibid., p. 4.  
18 Ibid., p. 4. [Please note italics are as in the document.]
including consumer organisations.’ It adds that in conflict areas where civil society actors are especially useful for the development of cooperation the programme could play a particularly important role.¹⁹

For the first year or two after the publication of Black Sea Synergy, there was little progress but in 2009 both the Council and the Commission were keen to promote the policy mainly through three sectors of cooperation – transport, environment and energy. Romania, a country that has been particularly involved in Black Sea cooperation, was asked to facilitate the environment; Bulgaria was given the remit of energy, the most problematic; and Greece was tasked with facilitating transport.

**Eastern Partnership**

In early 2008, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was proposed by Sweden and Poland, partly in order to give a membership perspective to the six countries involved which are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. All of these states, with the possible exception of Belarus, wanted closer ties with the European Union. Later in the year, in September 2008, Sarkozy, as EU president, asked the Commission to accelerate the EaP policy after the war in Georgia.²⁰ Various drafts of the proposed policy were produced but in the final draft all mention of the desire of the countries to become EU members had been erased due to disputes between member states. According to an interviewee, the director of the programme stated in December 2008 that the EaP was not about accession causing a problem for Ukraine

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¹⁹ Ibid., p. 8.
²⁰ Group interview with a senior Commission official in December 2008.
which was hoping that the policy might give some protection from Russia.  

Nevertheless, there were behind the scenes agreements that any country that conformed to the *acquis communautaire* could at least apply for fast-track membership in the future. This was generally seen as being a way of preventing the most democratic of the countries, Ukraine, from being disheartened, especially as there had also been backtracking by European members of NATO on full membership of that organisation for Ukraine in April 2008. Despite this reassurance to Ukraine, in July 2009 the author was told that, in general, enlargement was becoming a ‘dirty word’ in the Commission.  

Some members of the European Union, especially those in the East (‘New Europe’) think that EU membership should be open to all European countries that meet the required criteria. They quote Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union that any European state may apply to become a member of the Union. ‘Old European’ members such as Germany and France were reluctant to include membership aspirations in the EaP, preferring the idea of a close alliance without institutional membership. 

The European Council asked for the EaP to be accelerated in September 2008 due to the Russia-Georgia War. It can be argued that this is one example of US-Russian tensions affecting EU policy and is discussed in greater detail later in this section. 

With regard to Black Sea conflicts, the May 7th 2009 Eastern Partnership document states that:

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21 Ibid.  
22 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
The Eastern Partnership should further promote stability and multilateral confidence building. Conflicts impede cooperation activities. Therefore the participants of the Prague summit emphasize the need for their earliest peaceful settlement on the basis of principles and norms of international law and the decisions and documents approved in this framework. Furthermore, the Eastern Partnership could help to develop closer ties among the partner countries themselves. To help with the above the European Parliament has proposed an EU Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly (EURO-NEST PA).

Initially Azerbaijan did not seem to be happy about the last part preferring the bilateral sections of EaP. Given that Azerbaijan regards itself as being still at war with Armenia, it does not think it possible to have closer ties or at least feels it needs to maintain its current position.  

The December 2008 document states that:

The closeness of main hydrocarbon transit pipelines to zones of conflict remains of concern. Instability in the Southern Caucasus can also threaten the region’s energy security itself. A very large Georgian hydroelectricity plant lies at the fringes of Abkhazia. Georgia trades electricity with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Gas supplies from Russia reach Armenia via Georgia. The main gas pipeline from the Russian Federation to the Balkans passes through the Transnistrian region of Moldova. These factors impact on investor confidence, on the prospects of sustainable energy transit through the Caucasus and on the EU’s strategy for securing new suppliers in Central Asia.

23 Unattributable source.
In addition it says:

The EaP should also promote stability and confidence-building with the goal of consolidating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of partners. It should advance political dialogue in fields of common interest and cover specific CFSP and CSDP issues, including the participation of partner countries in CSDP missions and exercises. Early-warning arrangements should be enhanced, with particular focus on conflict areas.

The proposal calls for free trade deals, closer energy ties, visa liberalisation, and financial assistance programmes as a reward for making democratic and free market reforms. These financial assistance programmes could be beneficial for small countries but there could be concerns over corruption. Also in 2009, according to Freedom House, democracy was in reverse in all of the EaP countries other than Ukraine.  

The pre-December 2008 draft of the Eastern Partnership said that the new EU policy proposed signing Association Agreements with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan within the next few years and to ‘acknowledge the European identity and aspirations of these countries.’ However, the word ‘identity’ appeared nowhere in the 2009 final version.

The Russian perception of the policy, as stated by Foreign Minister Lavrov, is that the Eastern Partnership is an attempt by the EU to enlarge its ‘sphere of influence’. The Russian government has said that the Eastern Partnership document originally contained support for ‘territorial integrity’ which would have prevented

countries like Belarus from making their own decisions about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lavrov referred to this as blackmail.\textsuperscript{25}

The following three sections examine how tensions such as these between the US, Russia and the EU are affecting EU policies with regard to conflict resolution in the states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. They focus primarily on how US-Russian tensions are affecting EU policies, whilst bearing in mind other tensions especially those between the EU and Russia and those between EU (or NATO) member states.

\section*{5.3 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Conflict Resolution in Georgia}

Despite EU policy focus on conflict resolution in the Black Sea region, at the end of the first week of August 2008, whilst PM Putin was in Beijing for the Olympic Games and President Medvedev was on holiday, news from a little known region of the world called South Ossetia (see map 3) was broadcast worldwide when the Georgian army shelled the regional capital Tskhinvali and Russian tanks rolled through the mountain tunnel from North Ossetia to augment the troops already based in South Ossetia. The signs that this might happen either in South Ossetia or the other Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia had been clear for many months with broadcasters such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE) reporting on events on a regular basis.

There has been much dispute as to who started the war. Was it President Saakashvili (often described by the media and others as being a ‘hothead’) who panicked and started to shell the capital first or did he do this because the Russians were already coming through the tunnel?

On 2 December 2008, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini was appointed, by the Council of the European Union, as Head of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. The resulting ‘Tagliavini Report’ blames Georgia for starting the war but also concludes that Russia needs to take its share of the responsibility.\(^\text{26}\) However, Larrabee of RAND Corporation, Washington DC, posits that Saakashvili will eventually emerge as being ‘not as bad as the Europeans think.’\(^\text{27}\)

One year on from the war, both conflict regions were de facto republics recognised by Russia but with internal disputes amongst political parties and accusations that President Kokoity of South Ossetia was becoming a dictator.\(^\text{28}\)

This section will examine to what extent US-Russian tensions were responsible, if at all, for the EU’s failure to resolve regional conflicts in Georgia. However, it initially examines Georgia’s ENP Action Plan and the earlier Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in order to establish specific EU policy in the country.


\(^{27}\) Interview at RAND Corporation, Washington DC, July 2009.

5.3.1 Georgia’s ENP Action Plan

According to the EU External Relations website in 2009, relations between the EU and Georgia began in 1992 after the break-up of the Soviet Union, then the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Georgia was signed in July 1999. After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the relationship intensified and the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan commenced in November 2006, after the large wave of EU enlargement in 2004.

With regard to the EU’s policy on conflict resolution in Georgia, in 1999 the PCA stated that there should be regular dialogue with a view to contributing towards the resolution of regional conflicts and tensions. Much later, in 2006 the ENP Action Plan said that the enlargement of the EU had reinforced the interdependence between the EU and Georgia and that both were “determined to make use of this occasion to enhance their relations and to promote stability, security and welfare.”

The Action Plan also emphasised that, ‘Georgia is invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.’

Respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity is also outlined within the document and there is a note to say that EU-Russia talks will include discussion on Georgia; the subject of Georgia will also be brought into the Council’s CFSP and CSDP talks.

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32 Ibid.
According to the Action Plan, the EU special representative for the South Caucasus will assist the relevant bodies in the implementation of the plan in accordance with his mandate which includes the area of conflict resolution. He is also to help with promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Bearing in mind the intentions of the EU according to the above policies, we can analyse the success or failure of these policies so far in the light of the various specific US-Russian tensions over Georgia. We can also examine the theoretical perspectives in terms of both realism and post-sovereign theory.

5.3.2 Tension 1 - war

It can be seen with hindsight that the EU’s policies failed with regard to conflict resolution, otherwise there would have been no war in August 2008. The war involved Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia directly although other interested parties included Abkhazia, the US, the EU, NATO, the UN and the OSCE. So to what extent can we attribute this failure of the EU to US-Russian tensions and sensitivities?

Firstly, the war in Georgia, although initially seeming like an internal war between Georgia and South Ossetia, could be argued to have been caused in part by US-Russian tensions, almost a throw-back to a proxy war as in the days of the Cold War when paranoia could be said to have been at its highest level on both sides. Much of the recent dispute between Georgia and Russia was due to Georgia’s NATO aspirations. In Bucharest, spring 2008, NATO promised that Ukraine and Georgia would become full members at a future date, possibly December 2008. Russia was determined to defend its post-Soviet space from this threat.33 Larrabee says that

33 Interview with F. S. Larrabee at RAND Corporation, Washington DC, July 2009.
Russia considers itself to have vital interests in this post-Soviet space, and is prepared, if necessary, to defend them with force. He also wrote with Gwertzman that ‘the invasion of Georgia last August only underscored the sensitivity that Russia feels about any further expansion of NATO; indeed in the way it was designed not simply to punish President Saakashvili of Georgia for his pro-Western orientation and desire to join NATO, but to send a broader message to the West.’ On the other hand, Sherr reports that Saakashvili felt pushed away by NATO after their Bucharest meeting in spring 2008 and that the leaders of many Black Sea countries can be impulsive and immature.

Secondly, after the end of the USSR, Russia was accused of supporting separatist and nationalist regimes in order to undermine former Soviet countries, mainly due to a fear of Western influence in those countries. This could be counted as another cause of the war in Georgia. The US too has been accused of playing the same game by the foreign minister of Abkhazia who said that if Abkhazia is a Russian protectorate then Georgia is a US one.

Thirdly, Russia tends to believe that the Rose Revolution in 2003 was assisted by the US which was interested in having a high influence over the country. Rozoff, an anti-NATO American journalist, adds that ever since 1991, but especially since the Rose Revolution, the US ‘has transformed Georgia on the Black Sea's eastern border into a private military preserve, first dispatching Green Berets, then Marines to train,

35 Chatham House Russia Eurasia Programme discussion, personally attended in 2009.
37 Group discussion with S. Cornell, Chatham House, 2009.
equip and transform the nation's armed forces for wars abroad and at home.\textsuperscript{38} He adds that ‘The revamped Georgian army was first tried out in Iraq, where with a 2,000-troop contingent it had the third largest foreign force in Iraq until last August when the US military, whose creation it was, flew the soldiers home for the war with Russia.’\textsuperscript{39} There could be an element of paranoia here yet it is easy to understand this viewpoint when relations between Saakashvili and Russia were at such a low point and Saakashvili was so eager to join NATO. Would all the NATO members have stood by Article 5\textsuperscript{40} if Georgia had been a full member thereby creating direct war between Russia and the US? According to a senior NATO official, members are split over Article 5.\textsuperscript{41}

Nevertheless, it is too soon to say categorically how the war began. Before the EU report, there were various interpretations of events including (1) that Russia planned it all along and Georgia fell into the trap; (2) that Saakashvili wanted to force NATO into assisting Georgia regain its territorial integrity; (3) that Abkhazia forced the situation in order to obtain its own independence; (4) that elements within the US provoked the situation; (5) that the whole thing was an accident that was never meant to happen.

A senior diplomat at the Commission gave his personal view that Russia was not responsible for the crisis, saying that what triggered the conflict was Saakashvili who put the EU into a deadlock position. He added that Saakashvili was certainly

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} The article states that an attack against one member is effectively an attack against them all so collective defence must apply.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with senior NATO official, July 2009.
provoked but fell into the trap. Larrabee on the other hand believes that when the full details are revealed it will be seen that Saakashvili ‘is less foolish and hot-headed than Europeans currently believe’. Larrabee says that when the president heard that Russians were coming through the tunnel between North and South Ossetia he phoned his US contacts including Bryza but they were too junior to give the advice necessary so they contacted the Department of State. However, instead of waiting for Secretary of State Rice to call, Saakashvili went ahead and gave the order. Larrabee does not know yet if this was because Saakashvili genuinely believed the Russians were coming through the tunnel and had to act quickly or because he thought, ‘Ha! Ha! Now I can get South Ossetia back!’

Regardless of who started things, according to a different senior Commission official, Russian action was disproportionate and cannot be acceptable, as Russia violated the law it was defending. The status quo was not supported. Saakashvili was probably in the wrong but the EU recognises Georgia’s territorial integrity not self-determination. He added that Russia uses Kosovo as an excuse. This diplomat also sees the regional conflict as a total failure of the US and George Bush. Vice President Cheney said he would not accept what was happening but did not help Georgia. The US lost credibility and the emergence of the EU was seen with Sarkozy being an excellent negotiator. Europe is now at the core of the conflict resolution. Sarkozy also demanded that Commission President Barroso should be at the conference along with the EU flag. Now he believes the EU is coming back to the fore in the international arena.

42 Group interview conducted with a senior Commission official in December 2008.
44 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
Member of the European Parliament, Graham Watson also says that it is remarkable how quickly the EU acted over South Ossetia even before the new External Action Service was set up. He concludes that Sarkozy was good in standing up to Russia without military backup. Sarkozy managed to mobilise European solidarity, even though it was August and everyone was on holiday and he told the Russians not to go as far as Tbilisi which they might have otherwise done, according to Watson. So here we possibly have a good example of the EU’s soft power working against hard power.

What happened after the war does appear to be a success for the EU and its policies in Georgia. Sarkozy, as EU president, helped to bring some kind of peace to the region with his diplomacy and his Peace Plan. He might not have been able to do this purely as French President but as EU President he was acting on behalf of all the EU states giving him much more power. The six points within the plan are as follows:

1. Do not resort to force.
2. Definitively cease hostilities.
3. Give free access to humanitarian aid.
4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to their usual barracks.
5. Russian military forces must withdraw to the lines occupied before the start of hostilities. Until an international mechanism is put in place, Russian peace keeping troops will implement the security measures.
6. Open international discussions over security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Point six of the agreement was the convening in Geneva of talks on security and humanitarian issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those talks are jointly mediated by the UN, the European Union, and the OSCE. The US, Russia, Georgia and representatives of the two breakaway regions are all parties. Early on, talks were unproductive but then at the beginning of 2009 the parties agreed on (non-legally binding) measures to preclude violent incidents. However, according to Radio Free Europe, Abkhaz Foreign Minister Shamba told journalists in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital, on 16 February 2009, that EU monitors would not be allowed to enter Abkhaz territory because the EU has formally ruled out recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state.\footnote{46 L. Fuller, ‘Is Geneva Agreement more important psychologically than militarily?’ RFE, February 19 2009 \url{http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_Geneva_Agreement_More_Important_Psychologically_Than_Militarily/1495964.html} accessed February 2009.} RFE also reported that Semneby had talks with de facto Abkhaz President Bagapsh who told him that Georgian hopes that the EU would provide an alternative peacekeeping force to replace the UN mission were Utopian, and there was no point in some European countries asking Russia to pressure Abkhazia to agree to any such force.\footnote{47 L. Fuller, ‘UN Security Council set to extend UNOMIG Mandate’ RFE, February 13 2009 \url{http://www.rferl.org/content/UN_Security_Council_Set_To_Extend_UNOMIG_Mandate/1492813.html} accessed February 2009.}

The Geneva talks in July 2009 were more successful and the participants agreed to meet again in September. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin told journalists that the sixth round of Geneva talks should send a signal to the Caucasus and the international community that this summer should be quiet. The talks also resulted in setting up a further meeting in Gali, Abkhazia in order to create incident prevention mechanisms with Georgia, Abkhazia and the command of the Russian troops on the ground. The meeting was held with the facilitation of the UN and the
CSDP monitoring mission (EUMM). The latter was set up in Georgia with EU special representative Pierre Morel at its head. Since the beginning of the operation, members of the mission have not been able to access the breakaway regions. Also the mandates of the OSCE and UN to the regions were repealed from summer 2009.

The EU had previously begun assisting the Georgian government with border reforms in 2005 with the EUSR for the South Caucasus having nine members of staff devoted to this task.48 This was a border management strategy (BST) and implementation plan for Georgia and was building the capacity of Georgian border guards. According to Semneby’s website, ‘The work of the BST has proved successful in moving Georgia towards best European practices and standards for integrated border management.’49

The multilateral approach is an example of EU soft power and its slow methods. Semneby quietly dealt with this. Unfortunately the outbreak of war in Georgia in 2008, to a large extent as a result of US-Russian tensions over their respective influence on the country, has hindered this type of cooperation between Georgia and its conflict regions.

This section has demonstrated that it is possible to make an argument for Georgia’s conflicts showing up the EU’s weaknesses before the war and its strengths afterwards.

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5.3.3 Tension 2 – territorial integrity

As previously mentioned, respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity is emphasised within the ENP Action Plan for Georgia, so given that the war in 2008 compromised this integrity, it can be regarded as another failure of EU policy, partly due to US-Russian tensions. Although there is little global recognition of Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent states, other than by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru (at the time of writing) Georgia’s territorial integrity now seems less secure than ever.

Since Kosovo’s independence there have been serious international disputes and debates over ‘self-determination’ versus ‘territorial integrity’. Russia accused the US and NATO of double standards when they recognised Kosovo as an independent state; the US had suggested that Kosovo was an exception to the Helsinki Accords which said that territorial integrity should apply to all OSCE member states.50 Perhaps to some extent in retaliation, Russia recognised both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states after the war in Georgia. As discussed in Chapter 2, it has also been posited that Russia had to recognise the statelets in order to keep its troops there as they could no longer be called international peacekeepers, having been involved in the war against the Georgian people.51

EU members were divided over recognising Kosovo with most of them doing so apart from Spain, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Greece. However, current EU members are unanimous over non-recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whereas the eastern partners might not be so certain. Russia has objected to the EU telling

50 The “Helsinki Accords” were adopted in 1975 by the members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which was later renamed as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
51 Discussions under Chatham House rule July 2009.
prospective eastern partners that they must ‘recognise territorial integrity’ (as discussed earlier in this chapter) so this is reportedly another part of the Eastern Partnership which has been changed. The latest wording of the EaP had been altered to recognising the ‘principles and norms of international law’. Belarus in particular is being encouraged by Russia to recognise the statelets. Whilst this has been an EU-Russian tension not a US-Russian tension, Russia increasingly views the EU as a tool used by NATO and the US. An interviewee from the European Commission said, ‘Russia is just against whoever is in their zone of influence - the EU, the US or Ukraine, for example’.

Witney, former chief executive of the European Defence Agency, suggests that the real lesson of Georgia is the need to deliver on the strategy of proactive engagement in areas of tension or crisis. The EU had the chance to take up a border-monitoring role in the disputed Georgian territories in 2005, and ‘flunked it’. Sherr adds that he is struck in his relationship with NATO employees by just how many are proud about not having a view on how to resolve territorial conflicts other than to put forth clichés such as ‘We have no position’ or ‘We support territorial integrity’. He believes that the West made territorial integrity a dogma – then violated it. Sherr also thinks that Russia now wants to stabilise the situation but does not know how to.

54 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
56 On the record Russia-Eurasia Group discussion, Chatham House, July 2009.
Another expert on Russia states that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov admits that Russia violated Georgian territory.\textsuperscript{57}

So to what extent can we attribute these statements to a confession of a certain amount of previous fears and tensions? Historian Figes says that there is a lot of memory in Russia and it does not want to be lectured at especially regarding morality and territorial sovereignty when the West (which includes the EU) has so many double standards.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{5.3.4 Tension 3 – enlargement}

NATO enlargement is not a specific policy of the European Union but EU enlargement is and on 1 January 2007 two Black Sea littoral states, Romania and Bulgaria, became full members of the EU. Whether or not further enlargement in the region is EU policy is debatable as members are seriously divided on the issue. None of the EU policies relating to Georgia states that EU membership is an actual goal, although the Eastern Partnership did originally set out to have an accession perspective as previously discussed. Nevertheless, Saakashvili has said on many occasions that Georgia is keen to join both the EU and NATO.

Russia has felt threatened by the possibility of further NATO enlargement stating that there was an agreement with Gorbachev that when the Warsaw Pact ended NATO would not enlarge. This agreement has already been broken many times and Russia has watched NATO expand ever further eastwards. The hostilities between Georgia and Russia are partly due to Georgia’s NATO ambitions and/or Russia’s opposition. According to RIA Novosti, Russia feels it is misunderstood because it has

\textsuperscript{57} Discussion under Chatham House Rule, July 2009.
\textsuperscript{58} Foreign Press Association discussion, Summer 2009.
no territorial claims on other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and is only acting defensively against NATO. Theoretically according to structural realism, it could be said that Russia regards itself as being in a state of security maximisation as opposed to the US’s power maximisation (see Chapter 3).

Prior to the Eastern Partnership development there was a tendency for Russia not to complain too much about the EU’s involvement in the Black Sea region, being more concerned about NATO enlargement. However there does seem to be more of a problem for them since the war in Georgia. According to Foreign Minister Lavrov the Eastern Partnership is an attempt by the Union to expand its sphere of influence in the quest for hydrocarbons and is more about blackmail than promoting democracy. Perhaps there is also a certain annoyance that the final EaP text (7 May 2009) did not mention Russia at all whereas the December 2008 draft stated that the Eastern Partnership should be pursued in parallel with EU-Russia relations. There has also been a Russian fear since the 2008 war in Georgia that the US is encouraging the EU to take in Ukraine and Georgia as a substitute for the promised NATO membership. This puts the EU directly at the centre of a ‘tug-of-war’ with both Russia and the US trying to influence its enlargement policies.

5.3.5 Tension 4 – divide and rule

Many historians believe that Russia has been keen to assert its former place in the world and that the ideology of nationalism arose under Putin due to Russians feeling humiliation and resentment because they had not been given their due recognition by

59 Ibid.
60 ‘Security maximisation’ (Waltz), ‘power maximisation’ (Mearsheimer).
the West despite having made so many sacrifices. In its foreign policy this attitude would seem to have been demonstrated by Russia wanting to reassert its regional interests by keeping the neighbours weak and divided, including the different groups within Georgia. One theory is that Russia has deliberately provoked small group nationalism in the post-Soviet region in order to facilitate its hegemony. However, another theory could be that of ‘vacuum of power’ where old conflicts between ethnic groups reassert themselves, after having been kept in check during times of strong rule such as that of the Soviet Union or Tito’s Yugoslavia.

To some extent, it could be argued that Russia is the biggest player in the region with a divide and rule strategy, although the US has, in the past, preferred bilateral relations with EU member states, keeping them divided. Also Russia can be seen to be talking to different people in ‘the West’ at different times – for example the US, the EU, the OSCE, NATO, Germany or France; arguably this process keeps the West divided. Nevertheless, the West can be seen to be playing the same games and sometimes to be deliberately using different fora in order to play the game that is sometimes referred to as ‘good cop, bad cop’ e.g. if Russia currently sees the US or NATO as being hostile then the EU might take a more conciliatory stance. According to a NATO spokesman this situation could reverse under the Obama administration.63

These methods of behaviour by the US and Russia can be seen as realism triumphing over the EU’s attempts to be seen as a consistent, benevolent player in the region.

63 Interview with senior NATO official, July 2009.
5.3.6 Discussion

So to what extent have tensions between the US and Russia been affecting EU policies in the case study of Georgia’s conflict zones Abkhazia and South Ossetia? The case with regard to the war in South Ossetia is a clear example of how the national interests of America and Russia have exacerbated the existing situation within Georgia and prevented the EU’s policies of conflict resolution from being implemented; nevertheless the EU could have done more to implement its policies even though in general it does not operate quickly.

The promotion of the ideal of territorial integrity and the encouragement of NATO enlargement by the US has to some extent been EU policy too. Nevertheless the double standards with regard to the recognition of Kosovo and the backtracking on the promise not to enlarge NATO after German reunification caused anger, fear and resentment within Russia as well as divisions within the EU.

Regarding the broader question of the thesis, which concerns theory, given that realism is based on states, territorial integrity and international anarchy and that war is a triumph of realpolitik over international law, the current situation with regard to conflict resolution in Georgia would indicate that realism was winning out in August 2008 and beyond. Nevertheless the EU was given credit for peacemaking afterwards despite there being a new status quo. As previously mentioned we could say that theoretically, according to structural realism, Russia was in a state of security maximisation as opposed to the power maximisation of the US, whilst the EU tried to regain its influence. Both types of defence maximisation (security and power) could be argued to be based to some extent on fear or even paranoia but particularly the former type. Power maximisation could seem to be less about defence and more about
domination and prestige. The role of paranoia in the Russia-Georgia War is not only easy to identify but it is possible to base one theory of how the war started entirely on excessive fear and tensions i.e. all sides were expecting something to happen soon and were prepared for war. One side panicked and caused the outbreak. However, that is not necessarily the conclusion of this thesis.

5.4 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Conflict Resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh

The history of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulting in the present situation regarding Karabakh is long and complicated but only a brief summary, as below, is within the scope of this thesis.64

According to Laurence Broers who is widely considered to be a regional expert, early Christians settled in the area of Karabakh (see map 4) and named it Artsakh. Later invasions of the area’s lowlands by Turks and Persians led to Muslims, including Azerbaijanis, also living in the region which was eventually subsumed by the Persian Empire. In 1813 Karabakh and the rest of the current territory of Azerbaijan was incorporated into the Russian Empire. By this time it was mostly Armenians who lived in the mountainous parts of Karabakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) apart from around the town of Shusha which was mostly occupied by Azerbaijanis. The two groups interacted and inter-married. Nevertheless, in 1905 conflict erupted between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the town of Shusha. The situation was not helped when ten years later expulsions of Armenians from Anatolia (often referred to

64 Part of this timeline is taken from L. Broers (ed.), Conciliation Resources Accord Issue 17, 2005.
as the Armenian Genocide) at the end of the Ottoman Empire and World War I led to increased numbers of Armenians in Karabakh. In 1918, when the Russian Empire collapsed, massacres of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis occurred. Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their independence but, within four years, both would become part of the USSR’s Transcaucasian Federative Republic along with Georgia.

In 1936, the Transcaucasian Federative Republic came to an end with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia each becoming Soviet Socialist Republics. Nagorno-Karabakh after some debate became part of Azerbaijan but as an autonomous oblast. From then on there were many requests by both Armenia and the Armenians within Nagorno-Karabakh for the oblast to be transferred to Armenia.

During the late 1940s Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were deported as a form of ‘demographic homogenization’. The late 1980s saw further violence and, within Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijanis moved towards Shusha and Armenians to the capital, Stepanakert. Remaining Azerbaijanis in Armenia were expelled and most Armenians in Baku felt the need to leave.

The process of the collapse of the USSR resulted in Armenia and Azerbaijan becoming independent. Nagorno-Karabakh also declared itself to be the independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991. It is not recognised by any other state, not even Armenia, although at least one Armenian opposition party in 2009 was calling for the recognition.65

http://www.armenianow.com/?action=viewArticle&AID=4165&CID=3966&IID=1257&lng=eng
The CSCE (later OSCE) Minsk Group was formed in 1992, the same year that many Azerbaijanis were massacred in Khojaly and Shusha was ‘cleansed’ by Armenian forces, after bitter fighting between the two groups. The ‘Lachin corridor’ was seized by the Armenians as a route from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, then in 1993 further land between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was occupied, eventually resulting in a total of around twenty percent of Azerbaijan being occupied. The UN passed resolutions 822, 853 and 884 calling for Armenians to withdraw but the situation remains the same today. There are regular ‘skirmishes’ along the cease-fire Line of Contact, sometimes resulting in the deaths of soldiers and civilians.

This section of the chapter will examine the ENP Action Plans of both Armenia and Azerbaijan before searching for evidence that US-Russian tensions over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are affecting the EU’s policies of conflict resolution.

5.4.1 Armenia’s ENP Action Plan

The EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Armenia entered into force in 1999 with the ENP Action Plan being adopted in 2006. The latter states that ‘Armenia is invited to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.’ Also, the EU special representative for the South Caucasus is to assist the relevant bodies in the implementation of this Action Plan in accordance with his mandate. There is to be continued strong EU commitment to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in close consultation with the OSCE and ‘The EU is ready to consider ways to

strengthen further its engagement in conflict resolution and post conflict rehabilitation."

The plan mentions specific actions for assisting with peaceful conflict resolution including increasing diplomatic efforts; political support to the OSCE Minsk Group (including the principle of self-determination of peoples); encouraging civil society; intensifying EU dialogue with the specific parties; possible help with de-mining, assisting internationally displaced persons and other humanitarian support.

5.4.2 Azerbaijan’s ENP Action Plan

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Azerbaijan entered into force in 1999 and the ENP Action Plan was adopted in 2006. These are the same years as the other South Caucasus countries, Armenia and Georgia.

Azerbaijan’s invitation to a relationship with the EU is similar to that of Armenia as are the sections relating to Nagorno-Karabakh. It is interesting to note however that whilst Armenia’s Action Plan discusses self-determination of peoples, Azerbaijan’s is more focused on the importance of territorial integrity and sovereignty. This difference could be said to demonstrate that the EU has acquiesced to the overriding concern of each state regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless it is likely that at some point in the future Nagorno-Karabakh will become a recognised autonomous region within Azerbaijan’s borders, although one of the current debates is about who gets a vote when it comes to a referendum on self-determination (see below). For example, is it just the people who live there now, or

67 As outlined in the ‘Basic Principles’ of the ongoing OSCE Minsk process negotiations.
the people who lived there before the conflict began, or should all the descendents of
the latter group be included?

Border management is another area that is highlighted in the ENP Action Plan, as is intensifying trans-border cooperation between Azerbaijan and neighbouring
countries. The relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan is also assessed as being
strongly based on energy needs and security.

5.4.3 Tension 1 – territorial integrity

US-Russian tensions over ‘self-determination’ versus ‘territorial integrity’ were
discussed earlier in the chapter with regard to Georgia. These tensions are also
relevant with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and will be at the core of any
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The 2009 situation in this mountainous region
is that the primarily Armenian population wants to be a completely independent and
recognised republic with safe and easy access to the Armenian state or what it calls
‘reunification’ with Armenia. Nevertheless the territory is within Azerbaijan, many
Azerbaijanis were killed or driven out of the region and more generally speaking, the
West has seemed to regard the concept of territorial integrity as unquestionable in
Europe, despite calling Kosovo an exception to the rule.

Many meetings of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents have taken place
with the OSCE Minsk Group negotiators from the US, Russia and France. Nevertheless the ‘frozen conflict’ situation remains despite President Aliyev of

68 Website of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ in Washington
Azerbaijan threatening war from time to time.\textsuperscript{69} The main points of agreement on how to settle the conflict are: (1) Nagorno-Karabakh should initially be an independent region within the territory of Azerbaijan but after some time there should be a referendum on its status; (2) Armenian forces should withdraw from the occupied territory around Nagorno-Karabakh; and (3) international peacekeepers should be involved.

Disagreements concern: (1) Who should vote in the referendum – just the people currently living in Nagorno-Karabakh or also the people who were expelled? And should descendants vote? (2) Who should the international peacekeepers be? Some South Caucasus residents worry that when peacekeepers come they never leave, especially if those peacekeepers are Russian;\textsuperscript{70} and (3) Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Azerbaijan and the West seem to be determined to preserve it whilst Russia is more inclined to support Armenia’s point of view that a referendum could lead to an independent republic. Nevertheless, according to one (unattributed) source, for now Russia has assured Azerbaijan that Nagorno-Karabakh is a different situation from South Ossetia and that Russia acknowledges the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

So how is this affecting the EU’s policy? The stated EU policy as outlined previously is to assist with conflict resolution but also to support territorial integrity despite being willing to accept the Minsk Group’s negotiations on self-determination if eventually agreed by all parties. Russia seems to be determined to keep its troops in Armenia and has been accused of siding with its Collective Security Treaty

\textsuperscript{69} See BBC website at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8372747.stm accessed November 2009.
\textsuperscript{70} Unattributed one-to-one interviews in Yerevan November 2008.
Organisation partner Armenia, whilst the US and the EU court Azerbaijan for its energy. Nevertheless the Azerbaijani foreign policy adviser did accuse the Minsk co-chair at the time, Matthew Bryza, of favouring Christians over Muslims.\(^71\)

The people of Azerbaijan also accuse Armenians of being more interested in expansionism and ‘Greater Armenia’ than the genuine principal of self-determination. For example, Aslanov, the head of the Political Analyses and Information Department of the presidential administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan, says:

The Armenian side simply misrepresents the principle of self-determination by insisting that separation or independence can be the only manifestation of such. The Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, just as any other citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan, can fully exercise their rights within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. At the same time, it should be noted that the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan will never become the basis for the creation of a second Armenian state.\(^72\)

Both territorial integrity and self-determination are principles that are regarded as important within the OSCE and yet we can see that they can be used to oppose each other. Both the US and Russia seem to support the idea of territorial integrity but use exceptions to suit their own national policies. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the processes of its resolution would seem to be a demonstration of realism by all parties including the EU and could be the most difficult of the Black Sea regional conflicts to

http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Karabakh_Envoy_Defends_His_Role/1732712.html accessed June 2009.
http://www.rferl.org/content/Advice_For_Armenia_On_Resolving_The_Karabakh_Dispute_/1750389.html accessed June 2009.
resolve. A supranational layer with freedom of movement between all South Caucasus countries and areas could be a way to bring peace in the longer term as could the development of a Black Sea security community. Meanwhile there could be attempts by some to keep the status quo as the best option for the time being, although this has its dangers.

**5.4.4 Tension 2 - spheres of influence**

Despite their disagreements and animosity towards each other, in informal discussions with the author, citizens from both Armenia and Azerbaijan have given their opinion that the Nagorno-Karabakh situation could be resolved almost immediately if it were not for the influence of Russia.\(^73\) Russia has military bases in Armenia and would seem to want to keep its influence over Armenia if not the whole of the South Caucasus. There is a possibility that Russia might need to withdraw from Armenia if the Nagorno-Karabakh situation were resolved thereby losing its influence.

One example of Russia’s influence over Armenia is that Armenia in May 2009 pulled out of NATO exercises in Georgia. These exercises were criticised by Russia as being provocative so it can be logically argued that as Russia’s ‘client’ Armenia withdrew. Armenia’s defence minister, Ohanyan, gave a different reason for pulling out which was that the NATO secretary general had sided with Azerbaijan by expressing his support for territorial integrity after a meeting in Brussels.\(^74\) This could be an added reason.

\(^73\) Unattributed interviews.
The European Council\textsuperscript{75} is of the opinion that confidence building measures, something that Cooper called an ‘innovation in diplomacy’\textsuperscript{76}, are needed in Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU is already involved with putting this into practice, partly through assisting civil society. There have been firm plans for the EU to visit the Karabakh region to discuss what could be done and to see the situation for themselves. One mission was arranged but needed to be postponed mainly due to Russia not being supportive given their position in Armenia. The Russians have not been helpful to the EU regarding such matters according to the Council.\textsuperscript{77}

As can be seen from the wording in the ENP Action Plans, the EU has to be careful when using its diplomacy due to the Minsk Group’s priority in this area. The Minsk Group is the negotiating platform, cleared with the UN. The objectives of the Minsk Group are to provide an appropriate framework for conflict resolution; to obtain a conclusion by the parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict; and to promote the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces. There are three co-chairmen who come from Russia, the US and France. The US chair was Matthew Bryza until summer 2009. He was also highly involved with supporting Georgia during the Bush administration, reportedly causing some tensions with Russia according to US magazine Foreign Policy.\textsuperscript{78} In 2011 he is the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan.

\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Council official, July 2009.
\textsuperscript{76} Cooper, 2004, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{77} Interview with Council official, July 2009.
With regard to spheres of influence in the South Caucasus, Russia has the most influence on Armenia and the US on Georgia whilst Azerbaijan tries to keep good relations with both.

So how do these tensions affect EU policies if at all? As previously discussed, Russia has put forward the argument that the Eastern Partnership which includes Armenia and Azerbaijan is a manifestation of the EU, or the West, wanting a sphere of influence in the wider Black Sea region. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov specifically called the Eastern Partnership an EU ‘sphere of influence’ in Brussels in March 2009. Russian analyst Karaganov is also reported to have told a conference in Germany that the ‘core of all differences between the West and Russia is the question of whose sphere of influence the Soviet successor states fall into.’ In 2009 it was made clear that Russia regards the Black Sea region as its own sphere of influence; Philip Gordon, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, confirmed this at the House of Representatives but qualified the statement by saying that there is not just one Russian view.

Many post-Soviet states fear that President Obama is now more interested in conciliations with and help from Russia than its friends in the former USSR. They are concerned that the smaller states might be sacrifices ‘on Russia’s altar’. The Baltic countries tend to rely on the US as being their main defence policy but have some concerns that the US might not help to protect them if Russia were to invade. Equally they talk of how Russia has conducted exercises on their borders in order to defend

79 A. Lobjakas, ‘Eastern Partnership -- The EU's Accidental Sphere Of Influence’, RFE, 7 May 2009
http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Partnership__The_EUs_Accidental_Sphere_Of_Influence/1622923.html accessed June 2009.
80 Ibid.
81 House of Representatives (Washington DC) meeting personally attended.
Kaliningrad should it be invaded by NATO. All of this shows that there are fears on both sides. Another fear in the past was what might happen if Russia were to become a failed state.82

It is inevitable that all of these tensions must have a negative affect on the success of the EU’s Black Sea policies. Theoretically they would seem to point to the triumph of realism over post-sovereign politics in the region.

5.4.5 Tension 3 - energy

The EU’s energy policy has already been treated as a separate case study in Chapter 4 but is especially important for the South Caucasus and Turkey regions so also needs to be regarded as one of the tensions affecting the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict region.

As Russia is one of the world’s largest energy suppliers, especially to Europe, pipelines and proposed pipelines and pipeline routes have been much on the agenda especially in the southern parts of the wider Black Sea region. Azerbaijan and Russia are suppliers whilst other countries, including Georgia and Turkey host pipelines. Russia seems to be eager to dominate the industry and control the pipeline routes partly because its economy relies heavily on being an energy provider, whilst the West is keen to diversify supply routes to include supplies from the Caspian and Middle East. Projects such as the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline would minimise the dependency on Russian supplies. Turkey is keen to maximise its power and geopolitical situation for its own objectives, with regard to both security and energy security. Armenia is in a more difficult position as it is only an energy consumer.

82 Discussion held under the Chatham House Rule in 2010.
Whilst there are EU-Russian tensions over energy there are also US-Russian tensions as the US is keen to back energy diversity projects in the region such as Nabucco. The US is also interested in the South Caucasus as a strategic area for access to Afghanistan and the Middle East. These tensions must have an effect on the EU’s energy security policy but also have an effect on the EU’s conflict resolution policies due to the negative and suspicious feelings arising between the various parties during negotiations.

5.4.6 Discussion

Turkey has put forward the idea of a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ in order to solve the tensions between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and itself. This pact would seem to be based on an earlier ‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’, proposed by Turkish President Demirel in 2000 (with Russia added to the parties), as well as the theories put forward in Emerson’s ‘Caucasus Revisited’ policy brief.\(^83\) Turkey’s Foreign Minister Babacan is reported in 2009 as saying:

> We have initiated the Caucasus Stable Tent Cooperation Platform involving five countries, namely the Russian Federation, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan -- and actually yesterday we had the third deputy minister-level meeting of the platform.\(^84\)

The European Council has also discussed the platform for Caucasus stability and cooperation saying that the Russians are acting positively as the pact does not include either the US or the EU. However a diplomat at the European Commission has told

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83 M. Emerson, ‘Caucasus Revisited’, CEPS policy brief no. 34, June 2003.
84 C. Recknagel and A. Tully, ‘Turkey Signals Opening To Armenia Must Include Nagorno-Karabakh Progress’ RFE 22 April 2009
http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Signals_Opening_To_Armenia_Must_Include_Nagorno-Karabakh_Progress/1613844.html accessed June 2009.
the author that the Union would like to be involved as it is a good initiative. Discussions took place between Turkey and the EU in late 2009 at a political directors’ meeting. However little was happening at the end of 2010.

Another Turkish initiative, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement for opening borders between the two countries was signed in 2009 by the presidents of the two countries though it had still not been ratified at the end of 2010, partly due to disputes from Armenian opposition parties and because Turkey insists upon Armenia withdrawing from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan as a condition.

However, should the pact and rapprochement be successful eventually, then we could describe this is a step forwards for post-sovereign politics. But, regarding the situation from a structural realist point of view, we could posit that this is a bid by Turkey for power maximisation, especially given its reported desire to be the most important pipeline route in the area. Russia and Turkey, the most powerful two poles actually located within the region (other than the EU) seem to be cooperating well on this matter.

Nevertheless, when there is such a history of fighting and massacre between two peoples over a piece of territory, it is difficult for individuals or governments to look to the future and not the past. Fear will always be present in any negotiations and leaders will always need to be thinking of the sensitivities of people who have lost family members and do not want them to have died in vain. Azerbaijanis fear ‘Greater Armenia’ whilst the Armenians fear being surrounded by Muslims. Both countries prefer mono-ethnic territories and nationalism as they are fearful and lacking in trust.

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85 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
These attitudes could be seen as aspects of paranoid behaviour which do not fit in well with the EU’s values.

However, another point to consider is that Azerbaijan seems to be courted by the West including the EU because of its oil and gas despite its lack of regard for human rights and other so-called ‘Western’ values. Could this be a sign of realpolitik winning out and the EU dropping its liberal values in favour of its own interests?

US-Russian tensions are strong in the South Caucasus but so are many other tensions all making the implementation of EU policy on conflict resolution extremely difficult.

5.5 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Conflict Resolution in Transnistria

Much of what was once the Principality of Moldavia is now either a part of Romania or a part of Ukraine. The land that remains is the current Moldova and includes the area to the east of the River Dniester (Transnistria). However, the latter is a breakaway unrecognised republic or so-called ‘frozen conflict’ zone (see map 5).

In the past Moldovan territory was annexed by the Russian Empire, then in 1940, under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, by the USSR, becoming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Independence was declared by Moldova in

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86 The main sources for the history in this section are the ENP County Report online at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf, the FCO country report online at: http://www.fco.gov.uk and the OSCE report online at: http://www.osce.org/moldova/13426.html
August 1991 after having debated the idea of reunification with Romania, but the Russian speaking population were alarmed by decrees that only Moldovan (Romanian) would be the official language and they formed the separatist republic of Transnistria which in fact has an ethnic mix, mainly of Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians. In 1992, a civil war took place between the government forces and the separatists (backed by Russia) with many people killed or fleeing into Ukraine. Later that year an agreement was made that Moldova would keep its territorial integrity and peacekeepers from Russia, Transnistria and Moldova would patrol the border between the two parts of Moldova (supervised by the Joint Control Commission). The Moldovan government agreed that Transnistria could have a special status. This was reflected in the Moldovan constitution of 1994, which also stipulated Moldova’s neutrality and the prohibition of foreign armed forces on its territory, despite the Russian troops still in Transnistria. This neutrality can be seen as a bid for survival given Moldova’s territorial and historic position.

The leader of the Transnistrian region in 2009 (Smirnov) only moved there from Russia in the late 1980s and has Russian citizenship like many other residents. In 1999 at Istanbul, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops and arms from Transnistria and has been doing this very gradually despite supposed blocks from the leadership in Transnistria. Nevertheless the OSCE regularly reminds Russia about its obligations.

According to Allison, the cease fire has held up well and has been contained but Russian troops have been used to influence negotiations. Moldovan and Ukrainian leaders have not just wanted a territorial settlement but have wanted troops out of

Transnistria. Since 1997 both Moldova and Transnistria have favoured Ukrainian mediation over the conflict.

The current situation is that the OSCE and mediators from both Russia and Ukraine want Transnistria to be an autonomous region within the Moldovan state. However, there is no agreement between the Moldovan government in Chisinau and Transnistria on the shape of this. In 2003, the two parties did agree to set up a federal state but differed on the form this should take. Chisinau wanted control with Transnistria having autonomy, whilst Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) wanted equality through confederalism.

Also in 2003, the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council issued a visa ban against various members of the Transnistrian leadership. In 2004, Putin and Moldova’s President Voronin agreed on a settlement but the OSCE refused to agree to it. There were also many protests by the opposition and citizens within Moldova so Voronin did not ratify the agreement.

The term ‘frozen conflict’ can be better applied to the Transnistrian region than to the breakaway regions in Georgia or to Nagorno-Karabakh, as it is the least likely to heat up again, despite occasional threats from the Transnistrian leadership. The reason for this could be put forward as being that it is not an ethnic conflict, yet at times there does seem to be a language conflict throughout Moldova between Moldovan (Romanian) speakers and Russian speakers. Reportedly, much abuse is often hurled at Russian speakers. A writer for the US diaspora of Moldovans outlines a Moldovan identity problem saying, ‘As of today, citizens of the Republic of Moldova struggle with one simple but, in the same time, complicated question: who are they? Moldovans, Romanians, Ukrainians, Jews, Russians?’ He adds that
regarding ethnicity, according to the 2004 census, 71.7 percent of about 4 million people in Moldova are of Romanian descent, 11.2 percent are of Ukrainian descent, and 9.3 percent Russian with various other minority groups.89

As previously discussed, the first document to outline the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ document published in 2003, which says that the EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the dispute over Transnistria and that greater EU involvement in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries.

Since then (in 2005) the EU was asked by the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova to help with border management between the two countries, in particular with regard to black market activity. This became the CSDP’s Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). As also mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Wider Europe document notes that unrecognised statelets such as Transnistria attract organised crime and can de-stabilise the process of state-building, political consolidation and sustainable development.

It would also seem that much of the EU’s help to other regions has an advantage for the EU itself. EUBAM, like so many CSDP missions is connected to border controls and reducing organised crime, including the trafficking of people.

This case study will firstly examine the ENP Action Plan for Moldova to judge the EU’s intentionality with regard to conflict resolution then continue by analysing any US-Russian tensions which might be affecting the EU’s ability to put its policies into action.

5.5.1 Moldova’s ENP Action Plan

The 2004 ENP Action Plan for Moldova follows on from the former PCA signed in 1994 and states quite clearly that ‘One of the key objectives […] will be to further support a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict.’ With regard to reform it adds that Moldova should ‘continue and develop political dialogue and cooperation with the EU on Transnistria, regional and international issues, including within the framework of [the] Council of Europe and OSCE’.  

Under a heading of ‘Co-operation for the settlement of the Transnistria conflict’ there are a list of points on how the EU and Moldova might try to achieve this, whilst ‘respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders, and guaranteeing respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights.’ The list of points includes (1) constructively trying to reach a settlement of the conflict; (2) consultation on post-settlement arrangements; (3) supporting the OSCE mediators; and (4) discussion with Ukraine on border issues. Another point is to ensure that Russia fulfils its Istanbul commitments which state that Russia should withdraw its troops from Moldova (by the end of 2002) and also from Georgia. In 1999 the Istanbul commitments were agreed at the same time as the

90 ENP Moldova Action Plan

91 Ibid.
Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) which was not ratified by NATO countries and has since become a US-Russian tension.

Despite the EU’s resolutions, Transnistria like Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia still remains a breakaway region and Russian troops and arms are still present. The analysis needs to examine if this is at least in part due to US-Russian tensions.

A progress report was written in 2009 on the implementation of the ENP Action Plan in Moldova during 2008. The sections regarding conflict resolution in Transnistria begin with the fact that Moldova cooperates with the EU on matters relating to Transnistria, in particular with the EUBAM and in confidence-building measures with the population of Transnistria.

The following sections will explore specific US-Russian tensions which could be interfering with the policies of the EU regarding conflict resolution in Moldova. These are ‘spheres of influence’, ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘conventional armed forces in Europe’.

**5.5.2 Tension 1 - spheres of influence**

Many Moldovan individuals still want reunification with Romania if only to become members of the EU. Many citizens possess Romanian passports which have been granted rather freely so that, whilst Russia has been accused of granting passports to Abkhaz and South Ossetians in order to use that as an excuse to have a presence in the country claiming that it is protecting its citizens, could some EU countries be guilty of

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something similar, especially if seen through Russian eyes? Nevertheless, Voronin’s Communist Party was popular with many Moldovans despite the majority desire for improved democracy, fairer elections and EU citizenship. Analyst Lavelle has explained that this was because ‘President Vladimir Voronin has pursued a balanced foreign policy, seeking to maintain simultaneously cordial relations with both Russia and the EU. Voronin may not be the most modern leader, but he understands both the realities of Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space and his countrymen’s desire for closer relations with the EU.’\(^93\) However, Lavelle has also written that many in Transnistria watched the events surrounding the elections of 2009 in Moldova with satisfaction ‘in that the unrest and violence only serve as a further reason why they should not agree, in the wake of Kosovo’s independence, to once again become a part of Moldova.’\(^94\) So could Transnistria be another domino sent toppling by the Kosovo effect?

Severin asserts that Russia ‘enjoys dabbling in the domestic politics’ of its neighbouring countries, publicly supporting its favourite politicians and ‘demonstrating its contempt for those whom it dislikes.’\(^95\) However, she claims that Russia is seldom successful and Moldova’s parliamentary elections in 2009 were a good example of this lack of success. The Communist party lost power despite being the most popular party because no other party would join in a coalition with them.\(^96\)

\(^{94}\) Ibid.  
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
As a constitutionally ‘neutral’ country, Moldova has not sought NATO membership, unlike neighbour Ukraine and some other countries of the Black Sea region. The US has been ostensibly less involved with Moldova than with many other EU neighbours. Nevertheless, it has stated its support for Moldova’s fragile sovereignty and territorial integrity, objecting to the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria.\(^\text{97}\) It has also stated that it has worked with the EU to put pressure on the leaders of Transnistria to stop blocking negotiations over a settlement.\(^\text{98}\)

The unrest and protests after the Moldovan elections of April 2009, led to some newspapers calling this another CIA / Soros\(^\text{99}\) backed colour revolution such as the Orange Revolution (Ukraine), the Rose Revolution (Georgia) or the failed revolutions in several other post-Soviet countries. Others referred to it as a ‘Twitter Revolution’ or an ‘SMS Revolution’ created by the young people of Moldova, apparently spontaneously. However, the Russian Communist Party did publish warnings of a revolution in March of that year,\(^\text{100}\) and the author of this thesis, as a European website editor, received several messages from organised activists in Moldova during the protests, with a request to pass them on to a specific MEP who had a Moldova brief during the European Parliament of that time. It was also alleged (rightly or wrongly) that most young people in Moldova could not afford mobile phones so various US-backed NGOs must have provided them.\(^\text{101}\) This may or may not be correct. It is not the place of this thesis to speculate on US, CIA, Soros or even


\(^{98}\) Ibid.

\(^{99}\) George Soros is a ‘philanthropist’ who supports many think tanks in Eastern Europe and has been linked with the CIA in some of his projects, including ‘Radio Free Europe’.


EU involvement in the ‘Moldovan Revolution’ of 2009 but it would also be naïve to think that Western bodies were not ‘taking an interest’ given their support for democracy and their desire to reduce Russian influence. Eventually, the protests led to a new election in July 2009 and to an acting pro-Western coalition government, despite the fact that Voronin’s Communist Party won almost half of the seats.

The situation by the end of 2009 was quite fragile in Moldova partly due to poverty and a desperate economic situation. The IMF would not lend money to the government whilst it was still in a state of limbo and the country was turning to China for huge loans at a low interest rate. So perhaps we must ask if there could be a Chinese ‘sphere of influence’ in the region at some point in the future.

It can be argued that to some degree there has been a battle going on between East and West over spheres of influence in Moldova, although the ‘West’ could be represented more by Romania (EU) than the US. This could interfere with the EU’s stated policies regarding conflict resolution in Transnistria.

5.5.3 Tension 2 – territorial integrity

Support for Moldova’s territorial integrity has been agreed by the West and by the OSCE, and as discussed in the last section, both the leaders in Chisinau and Tiraspol agree on the idea of an autonomous Transnistria, but not on the finer details. (This has similarities to the Nagorno-Karabakh situation.) Reduced Russian forces remain in Transnistria but the Istanbul commitments of 1999 say they should leave. Despite all of this there are those (see above) in Transnistria who would like independence or to be a part of Russia, following on from Kosovo’s independence and the South Ossetian war of 2008. Although the West usually refuses to negotiate on ‘territorial integrity’
and OSCE members are also committed to this principle, Russia may be more inclined to consider ‘self-determination’ or ‘independence’ in some instances, especially in areas where there are many Russian citizens.

Moldova is not a Black Sea littoral state and whilst the US would like to see democratic progress in the country and would certainly not want Transnistria to become part of Russia thereby surrounding Ukraine to a large extent, Moldova has not been particularly strategic in US foreign policy. Despite this, US Vice President Joe Biden, during a visit to Romania in October 2009, reportedly said that the US would like to see Moldova join NATO ‘when they are ready’.\textsuperscript{102} This kind of comment might only increase Russian fear about the desire of the US to surround it with NATO members and enhance the Russian desire to keep troops in Transnistria. Moldova, as a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, has sent troops to Iraq but the new parliament has confirmed that Moldova will keep its neutrality and not apply for NATO membership.

Graham Watson MEP is the rapporteur for Moldova in 2011, which means that his job on the Foreign Affairs committee is to follow events there and make proposals to Parliament on it. He says he is pleased about the decision of Moldova’s people to put the coalition back into office in 2010 because it has allowed some progress on trying to resolve the Transnistrian conflict. With regard to Transnistria, he says that everyone is realising that there is no point to this conflict. He feels that, given long enough, the situation could be resolved by creating conditions in the rest of Moldova which are so attractive that the Transnistrians will want to be part of it. He

also thinks that there are some indications that the Russians might allow this to happen, adding that Ukraine has been very helpful with regard to Transnistria and is acting to some extent as a go-between for Brussels and Moscow. Watson also hopes that if one Black Sea conflict can be resolved with the help of the EU and Russia then it might assist with the resolution of the other regional conflicts. Resolving the Transnistrian conflict would mean that the EU could establish a relationship of trust with Russia.\textsuperscript{103}

So taking all factors into consideration, the ‘frozen’ conflict zone of Transnistria would seem to be less of a ‘hot spot’ for US-Russian tensions than the other conflict regions of the wider Black Sea area with regard to territorial integrity. Any EU-Russian tensions over territorial integrity would not seem to be primarily due to US involvement although Russia is always afraid that if it withdraws from a region the US will move in. It might also fear that Moldova could join the EU or become ‘reunified’ with Romania, although Watson says the latter is most unlikely.

\textbf{5.5.4 Tension 3 – Conventional Armed Forces in Europe}

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) conducted within the framework of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the forerunner of the OSCE, entered into force in 1992. Its aim was to limit the number of conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and was ratified by NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. In 1999, several discrepancies were identified including that: (1) The number of Russian military in Georgia was more than the permitted level; (2) The Russian military presence in Moldova was there without the consent of the Moldovan authorities.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Graham Watson MEP, February 2011.
At the Istanbul summit that year, an adapted CFE was negotiated (CFE II) with Russia agreeing to completely withdraw its forces from Moldova by the end of 2002 and also to make an agreement with the Georgian authorities about military levels in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These ‘Istanbul Commitments’ are contained in the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration at the end of which there is a statement from Moldova renouncing the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to ‘its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces’ on its territory. The CFE treaty also established the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) which now deals with issues related to the original CFE, its adaptation and the Istanbul commitments.

Although after Istanbul the Russians withdrew to some extent, according to the OSCE website no withdrawal activities have taken place in Moldova since March 2004 and a further 20,000 tons of ammunition, as well as some remaining military equipment are still to be removed.

In 2007 President Putin decided to suspend the CFE treaty. Part of the reason for this was that the US and some NATO countries had refused to sign CFE II until Russia completely withdrew all of its troops from the conflict regions of Moldova and Georgia. Another reason was because Russia was unhappy about new US bases in Bulgaria and Romania, saying that this broke the agreements in the treaty.

Russia ‘rejected any linkage’ between the CFE treaty and the Istanbul commitments at the Vienna JCG meeting in November 2004, according to the Eurasia

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105 Ibid.
Daily Monitor in that year.\textsuperscript{106} Meanwhile, according to the article, Russia stated that the United States and its allies were using the linkage illegitimately ‘in order to promote their geopolitical interests in the post-Soviet space.’\textsuperscript{107} The Monitor asserts that the implications of this are that ‘Russia now implicitly equates keeping its forces in a perceived sphere of influence with resisting Western policies there.’\textsuperscript{108} Moreover, it says that Russia has insisted that issues related to Russian bases and troops in Georgia and Moldova are bilateral issues between Russia and each of those two countries, outside of the adapted CFE treaty’s domain and thus outside the legitimate agenda of the JCE.\textsuperscript{109}

The author of the above, analyst Socor of the Jamestown Foundation, wrote in 2006 that ‘the NATO and European Union member countries have taken the position all along that the Russia-desired ratification of the adapted CFE treaty is “linked with” (that is, conditional on) Russia’s complete fulfillment of its Istanbul Commitments’.\textsuperscript{110} However, he says that, if the relevant text in the OSCE’s 2006 year-end draft declaration were adopted, it would ‘loosen the linkage policy, relegate major elements in Russia’s Istanbul Commitments to oblivion, and bring the adapted CFE treaty’s ratification much closer.’\textsuperscript{111} Also, ‘[t]he treaty’s entry into force would in turn trigger a procedure to extend its applicability to the three Baltic states’

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} V. Socor, ‘OSCE’s year-end draft declaration yields to Russia on Istanbul Commitments’, \textit{Eurasia Daily Monitor} Vol. 3 (218) 2006.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
territories and negotiate with Russia about setting limits to any possible allied deployments there.\textsuperscript{112}

So once again the environment of hostility and suspicion does not auger well for the conflict resolution policies of the EU. It might also be necessary to ask in whose interests exactly resolution of the various Black Sea conflicts would be. Cooper argues that the CFE is an example of postmodernity with its ‘intrusive verification’ despite both Russia and the US being ‘modern’ states.\textsuperscript{113} Perhaps this can explain part of the reason for the tensions between them i.e. they both have postmodern aspects ‘trying to get out’.

\textbf{5.5.5 Discussion}

To what extent does the situation in Transnistria point to realism winning out over ‘EU values’ and post-sovereign politics? To some extent all of the great powers are interested in influencing the politics of Moldova and to some extent that influence is connected to the Black Sea region as a whole rather than Moldova as a specific country. The difficulties over the CFE treaty, the Istanbul commitments and Russia’s promised withdrawal from Transnistria are the main focus of US-Russian tensions surrounding Moldova, although influence over election outcomes and possible revolutions are other sources of tension. Yet all of this could perhaps be considered to be more of a symptom of a deeper underlying tension and the lack of trust on both the Russian and the American sides, as discussed in previous paragraphs. Russia fears, perhaps with some justification, that if it moves its troops out of any region then the US will move in, regardless of whether it is Sevastopol, Georgia or Moldova.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Cooper, 2004, pp. 26-8.
Meanwhile the EU wants to enhance trust and cooperation in the region as well as reducing organised crime on its borders but it must always battle with US-Russian tensions.

Nevertheless the EUBAM mission is considered to be a success and there are many signs of cooperation here between all the powers and Moldova, which, although very poor and despite a ‘colour revolution’, is still working towards a confederal type of solution to its divided territory. Neither the media nor academics seem to be suggesting that there could be further civil war over Transnistria in the near future, unlike the other ‘frozen conflicts’ in the wider Black Sea region. The ethnicity of the people of Moldova is mixed on both sides of the River Dniester and the government in Chisinau (whatever the colour) seems to want good relations with both Russia and the EU (especially Romania) whilst keeping Moldova as an in-tact state. These ideas would appear to be more advanced and in accordance with EU values than those in the South Caucasus.

However, it is unlikely that Russian troops will completely withdraw from Moldovan territory whilst there is any threat of NATO membership or reunification with Romania. Once again Russia has been seen to be in a state of ‘defence maximisation’, although there could be signs of progress in 2011.

5.6 Conclusions

EU policies which include conflict resolution are the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Common Security and Defence Policy, Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. Within the associated
documents there have been many words talking about the EU taking a more active role in conflict resolution, partly for the good of the neighbourhood and partly because the EU wants democratic peace-loving neighbours as well as less imported crime. The EU has achieved little in bringing about the resolution of any of the conflicts which all remain. Despite this, EUBAM and the Georgian Geneva negotiations are helping to keep the conflicts ‘frozen’ after the war in Georgia. There is also hope that the encouragement of civil society and confidence building will help with resolution, and there are signs of hope regarding Transnistria.

However, keeping the status quo of these conflicts could be in the interest of certain parties including Armenia, Russia and some of the breakaway regions themselves as well as the US in some cases. For example, it would seem to be in the interest of Russia to keep the conflicts alive and in the interest of the US to be seen to be ‘assisting’ and possibly offering NATO membership or other involvement to Black Sea states. This way both Russia and the US have an excuse to stay in the region in order to protect their national interests, which includes energy interests. So if the EU is looking for genuine conflict resolution it might need to deal with US-Russian tensions first.

Another question that could be asked is to what extent the EU also needs an excuse to be involved in the region in order to protect its interests, including energy interests. In other words it can be clearly seen that the US and Russia are acting according to realpolitik and installing much hard power in the region, whilst the EU and its nation states are mostly using soft power. Nevertheless the EU could still be accused of acting primarily in its own interests by focusing on those aspects of Black Sea policy which help with border control, crime prevention and energy security.
The main US-Russian tensions during the early years of the twenty-first century have included those of NATO enlargement, the proposed US anti-ballistic missile system, the war in Georgia and the CFE treaty as well as principles such as territorial integrity. These all hinder the EU’s stated aims for the region. A summary of specific conclusions from examining the empirical evidence follows:

*The Case Study of Georgia*

**War**

The fact that war actually occurred in 2008, partly due to US-Russian tensions, means that these tensions interfered with the effectiveness of the EU’s policy of peaceful conflict resolution. The Eastern Partnership policy was also introduced sooner than originally planned due to the war. However, it could be argued that the EU was not working effectively enough at conflict resolution. Nevertheless the overall assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over the war in Georgia have affected EU policy is ‘high’.

**Territorial Integrity**

The fact that Georgia’s territorial integrity is now threatened by the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia demonstrates that US-Russian tensions have affected the implementation of EU policy regarding Georgia. Moreover, the actual draft Eastern Partnership policy wording was altered with respect to the recognition of territorial integrity by eastern partners, following Russian complaints. Therefore the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over the territorial integrity of Georgia have affected EU policy must be ‘high’.
Enlargement

The original Eastern Partnership document was changed to delete the accession perspective after the war in Georgia. Russia’s fear of NATO enlargement has affected the EU’s enlargement policy although member states are divided themselves on this issue, not only due to appeasement of Russia or wanting to please the US. Nevertheless, the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over enlargement have affected the EU’s policy towards Georgia is ‘high’.

Divide and Rule

Russia has wanted to keep its neighbours weak and divided due to resentment of the West. This attitude has contributed to nationalism in parts of the Black Sea region including in Georgia as well as in Russia itself. The US also employs a divide and rule policy when appropriate for its national interests, including energy interests. Neither Russia nor the US has wanted to use the EU (or the OSCE) as a consistent dialogue forum and a method of moving forwards, preferring to maintain their own national interests in a game play of realpolitik. This can be argued to have affected EU policy due to causing a certain amount of the divisions between EU members over the policies. However, the EU states and eastern partners have not been passive in this process so the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy can only be ‘medium’.
The Case Study of Nagorno-Karabakh

Territorial Integrity

US-Russian tensions over the issue of territorial integrity have certainly affected the EU’s stated aims and the peace process but there are many other factors involved including the animosity and history of the peoples in the region. The EU has also been split on the issue of the territorial integrity of Kosovo, another dispute between the US and Russia. It needs to be asked if some actors (especially Russia and Armenia, but possibly the US and Azerbaijan) do not want early resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If so then the EU cannot really hope to resolve it. So the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected the EU’s policy for this region can only be ‘medium’ due to so many other issues being involved.

Spheres of Influence

Russia regards the North Atlantic area as a sphere of US influence so does not want any more neighbours to join NATO. Instead it would like to keep the EU’s neighbourhood partners under its own sphere of influence perhaps in part for balancing purposes. In particular, Russia has not been helpful with regard to EU visits to Nagorno-Karabakh and wants to retain its bases in Armenia, so it could be argued that Russia has no reason to help bring about an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (although there are signs in 2011 that this is changing). The assessment level of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected the EU’s policy of peace in the neighbourhood is ‘medium’.
Energy

Tensions over energy are not just US-Russian and are very often EU-Russian. However, these tensions can spill over into negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The assessment level of US-Russian tensions affecting EU policy on their own is therefore ‘low/medium’.

The Case Study of Moldova

Spheres of Influence

The ‘Twitter Revolution’ of 2009 showed how both the US and Russia were trying to ‘influence outcomes’ in the Moldovan elections. It can be argued that any US or Russian interference in the countries containing the ‘frozen conflicts’ has a negative effect on the EU policy of resolution even when other factors are involved. The assessment of how US-Russian tensions are affecting this EU policy is ‘medium’ due to intervening variables.

Territorial Integrity

The tension of territorial integrity is arguably the prime one affecting all of the conflict regions. The US is less directly involved with the Transnistrian conflict but Russia would like to maintain its troops in Transnistria in case Moldova should attempt to join NATO, possibly through reunification with Romania. Due to these other factors, the assessment level of how EU policy has been affected by US-Russian tensions is ‘low/medium’.
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

Russia equates keeping its forces in the Black Sea region with resisting the US and its allies so it might prefer that conflicts not be resolved given that there would then be freedom for those countries to agree to more US bases there and, more importantly, exclude Russian bases. Therefore the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy is ‘high’ even though discussions are progressing well in 2011, according to EU sources.

All of the above US-Russian tensions show how the military might of the two former poles of a bipolar world has power over the outcomes of the conflict areas. This has led to accusations that the EU has only made the smallest of efforts when it comes to its Black Sea policy of conflict resolution. Nevertheless, one could also argue that it has led to policies which could influence the peoples of the region such as Black Sea Synergy and other ventures which encourage cooperation and participation by civil society. It is sometimes argued that civil society needs to be built up before people who have been kept apart can fully cooperate with each other. So, for example, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, a case could be made for the status quo keeping Armenians and Azerbaijanis divided in order to avoid further mass bloodshed. Soft power is slow power as has been previously argued. One might still wonder however just how ‘joined-up’ EU policies are when it comes to the Black Sea region.

The broader research question of ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ assumes the EU will keep its values but this chapter
has asked if the EU might also be moving more towards realpolitik and its own interests, including the interests of energy supply and diversification. The answer from the Commission would seem to be ‘No’ but since the ratification of Lisbon it could be argued that the more pragmatic member states have obtained more power than previously in their intergovernmental meetings at the expense of the Commission. This will be discussed further in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 6

EU Policy:
From Black Sea Europeanisation to Regionalisation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the last two case studies of the thesis: firstly the EU’s policy of promoting Europeanisation, especially democratisation, in the wider Black Sea region, and secondly the more recent EU policy of regionalisation. Each of these two policy areas is examined in order to establish if it is being affected by US-Russian tensions, both in terms of policy construction and policy implementation.

European Union policies regarding the eastern neighbourhood have been changing from bilateral only (European Neighbourhood Policy) to a combination of bilateral and multilateral (Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy). It could be asserted that the reason for this is an overall change in policy from possible future enlargement to regionalisation, but can the Black Sea area develop into a distinct cooperative region of equal nations or will many of its diverse states remain fated to be the ‘clients’ of hegemonic powers? And will the West’s policy of democracy promotion in the region win out or will authoritarianism remain or be reverted to in those countries which have become more democratic in recent times? In other words, can the EU’s post-sovereign politics eventually become established in the wider Black Sea region, if not via enlargement then through regional development into a security community?
The land area around the shores of the Black Sea is very diverse with many ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions. Throughout history there have been wars in the region but empires have also been built and different peoples have traded, migrated and married. Since the break up of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, newly independent states have been created, some of which are suffering from old tensions and hostilities which may be internal, external or both. The amount of interstate trading has been more limited in recent decades as a result of the regional conflicts and visa requirements.\(^1\) Democratisation has been seen to take place in some of the countries (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) but often more in terms of rule adoption than actual implementation.

Nevertheless the area is becoming more recognised as ‘a region’, partly through the efforts of the EU, NATO and the OSCE, as well as the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and other organisations including the GUAM (Georgia Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova) Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development. However, the borders of the Black Sea region are not clearly delineated which complicates analysis.\(^2\)

As a region, the Black Sea area is currently of importance for many reasons including those already discussed such as the post-Cold War independence of various states, the conflict zones including South Ossetia where a war took place in 2008, and

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\(^2\) M. Aydin, ‘Geographical blessing versus geopolitical curse: great power security agendas for the Black Sea region and a Turkish alternative’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol. 9 (3) 2009 p. 272.
oil and gas in Azerbaijan with pipelines via various routes across the region. It has also been an area of dispute between the United States of America (US) and Russia.

Within the two following case studies, US-Russian tensions, in particular those of democratisation, enlargement and spheres of interest are analysed in order to measure their effect on EU policy. Other organisations, especially those that involve regional aspects such as BSEC will also be considered as possible intervening variables. The theories of realism, security communities, post-sovereign politics and democratic peace theory are also explored both in relation to the tensions and as a means of further analysing the research question of whether the region is moving from a position of realism to one of EU-type post-sovereign politics.

Preceding the case studies is an examination of the EU’s policies on Europeanisation, democratisation and regionalisation as well as basic definitions of these concepts.

6.2 EU Policies and Strategies which concern Black Sea

**Europeanisation and Regionalisation**

Europeanisation, democratisation and regionalisation are all methods of applying the EU’s soft power approach in attempting to establish peace and stability ‘beyond the boundaries’ as discussed in previous chapters. All of these three terms can be used in different ways so they will be clarified before progressing. The first of the concepts which is Europeanisation has caused much interest and much debate, with its definition becoming a somewhat contentious issue in the academic literature. For
example critics of the attitude of some EU leaders and officials suggest that these leaders and officials think they have the right to decide what is ‘European’ and which countries are in or out of Europe, almost equating being ‘European’ with being a member of the European Union.³

One respected definition of Europeanisation is from Radaelli, who says that Europeanisation consists of ‘formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’.⁴ Another authority on the subject, Ladrech, concentrates primarily on the Europeanisation process within the multiple layers of the EU, in particular within the EU institutions and the national states.⁵ However, in 2002 Olsen described five definitions of the term.⁶ The first of these is in relation to enlargement so that ‘Europeanisation’ basically means becoming a part of the EU. The fourth definition concerns the export of European norms. These definitions, i.e. those that concern the Europeanisation of non-EU states, describe how the term is being applied within this thesis. Other authors also use the term in a broad sense including Helen Wallace, who describes Europeanisation as being a ‘beyond the state’ process.⁷

The second concept of democratisation is about the process of becoming a democracy. The starting point is often that of an authoritarian state, especially in the

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eastern part of Europe. This process was a necessary part of the changes needed before former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet states such as Poland and Latvia could join the EU, and it is about far more than the franchise. The process also takes time before a democracy is regarded as being consolidated (see Chapter 2). Pridham writes that ‘democratic consolidation is in sight when a new democracy becomes institutionalized, its rules and procedures are being internalized, and democratic values are being disseminated through the activation of civil society and a process of “remaking” of the political culture.’ Some critics of the ENP believe that the EU is not committed enough to the democratisation of its neighbours and in many cases does not reward reform adequately.

Regionalisation, politically speaking, can have various meanings including the division of a large area into smaller regions or the grouping together of various contiguous states to form a larger region. Here the term is used to indicate the latter which is often a gradual process. However, for a region to ‘exist’ there needs to be more than regional proximity, with institutional, economic and civil society connections all playing their part in forming an identity as within the European Union. The Black Sea region has these connections, although there may not be a strong feeling of identity amongst its peoples. Also, a ‘region’ rarely has international ‘actor’ status, the EU being an exception.

Europeanisation, democratisation and regionalisation all appear in the EU neighbourhood policies although not always explicitly. The stated aims and principles

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of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) include the promotion and support of reform and modernisation with the goal of mutual prosperity, stability and security. The EU Commission acknowledges however that each country has different needs and they are not all equipped with the same capabilities to deal with reform. Values and interests are promoted which are about democracy, reducing poverty, market economies, modernisation, and having a joint cross-border response to migration, crime, terrorism and the environment.

The Commission has a ‘little by little’ approach which is not always shared by individual European states or the US.\textsuperscript{11} In fact, the declared approach of the EU is in contrast to the approaches of Russia and the US which appear to be more concerned with their own national interests, or spheres of interest, rather than the good of the region. As discussed in Chapter 2, Bryza pinpointed democracy as an important task for the US in the region but mainly because of the US interest in pipelines and its own security.\textsuperscript{12} And, as we have seen, in practice the EU also pursues its own interests such as securing its boundaries and maintaining an energy supply (see Chapter 4). There is also a dilemma about how the EU can promote democracy in the region without an enlargement perspective or large amounts of funds, as given to the central and eastern European countries now in the EU. Also, Bryza said that the ‘aggressive pursuit of democratic reform’, which the US believes is crucial to the region, can lead to misperceptions that it seeks to foment revolution. This would seem to be the crux of the matter. How can the EU promote democracy in the region in its own gradual

\textsuperscript{11} Small group discussion with External Relations and ENP DG staff, November 2006.
way if democratisation is seen by Russia as a US tool to encourage ‘colour’ revolutions?

Also, as noted in Chapter 2, Emerson argued in 2004 that the EU has the dilemma of either remaining true to its founding values of being open to all European democracies or of maintaining its governability. The European Neighbourhood Policy and its various associated policies have been attempts to resolve this dilemma but, as Emerson says, it seeks commitments from partners whilst only making vague ones itself. Makarychev, for instance, has written that Russia was convinced that the interference of the West in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia was about realpolitik despite its normative rhetoric of promoting democracy and civil liberties. But what is meant by ‘the West’ and can we regard the EU and the US as having the same policies or even the same interests in this respect? It would seem not.

Either way, the job of promoting democracy in the Black Sea region would not appear to have been particularly successful so far. In 2009, democracy was reportedly in decline in all of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries other than Ukraine and even Ukraine might be in a reversal process now since the last Presidential election and the constitutional change of October 2010. The constitutional amendments have abolished changes made in 2004 which enhanced parliamentary powers, reverting to the 1996 constitution of President Kuchma.

More general EU policies also discuss values and democracy including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was agreed in 1992 at

Maastricht. This policy states that its purpose is in part to strengthen the values, interests and independence of the EU; to strengthen the security of the EU and its member states; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) gives, as one of its strategic objectives, the statement that countries on the borders must be ‘well-governed’, with its second section stating that the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation and that the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.\textsuperscript{17}

These EU policies all touch on post-sovereign politics with their general philosophy that, ‘A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.’\textsuperscript{18} However, if the EU member states obtain more power (as seems to be the case since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force) and each state is mainly concerned with its own national interests, might the philosophy behind these strategies be forgotten, leaving regions such as the Black Sea to continue with their realpolitik?

The latest EU policies concerning the Black Sea, i.e. Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership, are not currently focused on encouraging Europeanisation via enlargement, despite enlargement being viewed as a solution to the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Instead, the policies are becoming more multilateral via Black Sea

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p.10.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p.10.
Synergy sectors and the multilateral aspects of the Eastern Partnership, including the setting up of the EaP Civil Society Forum and the Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly. Nevertheless, the bilateral aspects of the ENP and EaP, whilst becoming more pragmatic and dealing with issues such as trade and visas, still involve the adoption of many aspects of the *acquis communautaire* by the eastern partners.

So to what extent are the problems of implementing the above policies for the Black Sea region caused by US-Russian tensions? The following section asks this question in relation to the policy of Europeanisation. Section 6.4 examines the policy of regionalisation.

### 6.3 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Black Sea Europeanisation

Issues such as democratisation, enlargement and good governance are broad areas of enormous importance to the EU. They will only be discussed here in a focused way where they concern how US-Russian tensions might have affected EU policy.

#### 6.3.1 Tension 1 – democratisation

Democratisation in Eastern Europe is often perceived by Russia as a means of trying to impose Western culture and capitalism onto the region or as a way of the US encroaching onto Russia’s domain. In other words, the Euro-Atlantic community has been seen as being interested in opening the region for democratisation, free trade and access to energy supplies, all of which could lead to NATO domination in the Russian way of ‘Cold War’ thinking. Cornell *et al.* write:
Democracy and rule of law are two concepts with both theoretical and political connotations. Used and misused in the transitions following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, today they mean everything and nothing. They have even come to carry potentially negative connotations among parts of the population and policy-makers in the region.\textsuperscript{19}

Simes, as introduced in Chapter 2, is stronger on the point, saying that the sense in the Kremlin is that the United States uses democracy as an instrument to embarrass and isolate Putin.\textsuperscript{20}

Cooper says that democracy was the winner in the Cold War and that ‘post-Soviet conflicts’ are ‘Democracy’s Wars’\textsuperscript{21} so it would follow that Russia is suspicious of democratisation.

Whilst there could well be aspects of realpolitik in the behaviour of the US, EU policy regards democratisation as a form of soft security which could help the region gain stability. The Commission also wants to help to promote EU values in general in the wider region including in Russia.\textsuperscript{22}

So does being ‘democratic’ or ‘well-governed’, both aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy, have to mean joining Western institutions such as NATO or the World Trade Organisation? And can countries be ‘well-governed’ without being ‘democratic’? And do non-EU eastern European countries fully understand the meaning of democracy which concerns more than free and fair elections? Indeed,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} D. Simes, ‘Losing Russia: the costs of renewed confrontation’, \textit{Foreign Affairs} Vol.86 (6), 2007, p. 46.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
\end{itemize}
Cornell et al. concluded that the failure of the EU to produce stable democracies in the wider Black Sea countries is partly due to the neglect of state-building and the over-concentration on free and fair elections as well as civil society. They argue that electoral democracy without the right basic conditions can lead to ‘illiberal’ rather than ‘liberal’ democracies.23

Russia often seems to prefer the term ‘modernisation’ to ‘democratisation’ whilst many other Black Sea countries (especially Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine) are trying to ‘democratise’ in order to fill criteria for EU membership or, at least, trade and visa agreements. However, it often seems that whilst the principles of the EU acquis communautaire might be adopted in some countries, the implementation of reforms does not always happen and corruption, in particular, remains. For example, the 2006 Ukraine Country Report on the progress of the ENP Action Plan says:

There have been considerable steps in human rights and the rule of law but progress has been hindered by endemic corruption. This is the main challenge to Ukraine as well as the judiciary becoming truly independent.24

The situation in 2010 is largely unchanged.

Democratic peace theory

‘Democratic peace theory’ or ‘democratic security’ was discussed in Chapter 2. The theory argues that democracies do not make war with other democracies. This theory seems to have been used by the US in particular as a reason to promote democracy

23 Cornell et al., 2006, p. 28.
throughout the world, sometimes using force. However, the results of trying to promote democracy in a military way have not necessarily been positive especially in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, although there were additional reasons for wars in those countries. And whilst former Yugoslavian republics might be moving towards full democratisation, this could be more connected to the EU ‘carrot’ than the American ‘stick’.

In 1997, Kaldor and Vejvoda argued that, with regard to central European countries, most of which were former Warsaw Pact members, democratic consolidation was feasible and that the region should not be abandoned to its fate. Most of these countries, apart from those in the Western Balkans, are now full members of the EU and although it has been argued that Bulgaria and Romania were not ready for membership in 2007, partly due to endemic corruption especially in the former, they are now, ostensibly at least, working towards the consolidation of their democracies. It has also been argued that the ‘carrot’ of joining the EU was one of the major factors with regard to these countries meeting the conditions or acquis required before they could become members, and that countries without this carrot, such as those in the Eastern Partnership will not fare as well in the democratisation process. In 2005 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier cast doubts on the ability of the EU to help with democratic consolidation without the element of conditionality that exists with enlargement.

Regarding stability, research seems to indicate that stability is more likely in countries with either consolidated democracies or authoritarian regimes (see Chapter

Intermediate regimes, perhaps with unstable, weak governments, are more likely to create conditions of war. In the Black Sea region there appear to be internal battles between authoritarianism and democracy, especially in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. These battles are sometimes associated with US-Russian tensions and they could leave countries weakened and unstable.

*Governance, rule adoption and implementation*

Democratisation in the neighbourhood is the policy of EU institutions, especially the Commission, and it has been somewhat successful regarding the adoption of rules. However, Freyburg *et al.* demonstrate that the implementation of these rules is either weak or non-existent. They ask if there is evidence of democracy promotion by the EU without enlargement then probe into the ‘governance’ model of democracy promotion involving ‘transgovernmental functional cooperation’ as opposed to ‘political accession conditionality’. The idea is that democratic principles can be promoted via working together on sectoral projects such as transport and the environment (synergy sectors) as well as setting up legal standards approximating to the *acquis* which contain the basics for democratisation. The neighbourhood countries Freyburg *et al.* used as case studies are Ukraine, Moldova and Morocco due to these being the most active and liberal of the neighbours in the ENP. They highlight how Moldova, for example, is supported by the World Bank and the OECD (The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) and that this financial assistance is conditional upon the country implementing EU objectives. Also, cooperation with the EU is moderately institutionalised in both Ukraine and Moldova.

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especially regarding particular sectors such as the environment, including water management. One conclusion drawn from this study is that ‘EU impact increases with the institutional strength and density of external governance’. Also, democracy promotion does take place and there is an impact on legislation. However, the application of legislation has been almost universally absent or weak.

Cornell et al. are also concerned with issues of governance and democracy, saying that it is in Europe’s long-term interest to work at building these up in the wider Black Sea region. They write that failure will lead to ‘the continuation of instability, conflict, and poverty’. So one important aspect of both Europeanisation and democratisation is for the EU to follow up on legislation in partner countries and ensure that new laws are actually implemented.

*Example of Ukraine*

It would seem that the EU has been unable to communicate the relevance of institutions to Black Sea countries. This can be seen in the October 2010 talks between the EU and President Yanukovych’s government in Ukraine. Ukraine sees the EU as always putting difficulties in the way of progress towards free trade, visa-free travel and eventual EU membership, whilst the EU sees the new Yanukovych government as being unwilling to implement reforms. The same (unattributed) sources say that Yanukovych has to balance the different powerful forces in Ukraine but does not want to end up alone with Russia. On the other hand Russia does not believe that Ukraine can cope without its help. Neither does Russia want to have to fully support Ukraine financially.

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29 Discussions on the EU-Ukraine negotiation proceedings in October 2010 at (personally attended) meetings under Chatham House rule.
Nikitin, a former director of the International Centre for Policy Studies, Kyiv (ICPS) says there is no political elite in Ukraine which is willing to take responsibility and act on principles and values. His opinion is that the current politicians are ‘hopeless’ and cannot take responsibility for reforms because the Soviet past and the democratic present are still intertwined. He feels the educational system is the only way forward and that a system of professional development is needed that will make use of the West but be built on Ukraine’s own models. With regard to the EU, he says Ukraine seems to want to join but without taking responsibility for establishing European values. He would also like to see more debate on decentralisation and federalism within Ukraine.30

If Yanukovych decides to copy the Russian model in order to deal with reforms and conditions at home there could be severe problems because Ukraine does not have the source of wealth that Russia has i.e. energy. This could lead perhaps to some cooperation between Russia and the EU in supporting Ukraine rather than letting it collapse or become financially dependent on China which is beginning to establish itself more in the region.

According to many Ukrainians, one of the most helpful things that the EU could do would be to assist with visa free travel. However, there could be internal EU disputes over the granting of such concessions. Also, the EU wants to encourage democratic reforms and other harmonisations before granting any such privileges. One problem is that Ukraine is in severe financial difficulties and it costs a lot of money to implement much of what the EU requests, for example standardisation within the fields of agriculture and hygiene.

30 V. Nikitin, ‘Our politicians don’t see the future – or how it differs from the past’, ICPS newsletter. #18 (365), 28 May 2007.
As discussed above, democratic peace theory seems to indicate that stability is more likely in countries with either consolidated democracies or authoritarian regimes. It also helps for a country or region to be surrounded by similar ‘types’ of government. Differences seem to cause more problems. Both Ukraine and the Black Sea region in general are surrounded by a mixture of democracies and authoritarian regimes, with some theocracies in the south of the region. Also, regimes with unstable, weak governments or leaders are more likely to create war conditions. Change can be destabilising even if it seems like a change for the good. Maybe this is why many in Ukraine want a ‘strong leader’ or wish to return to Soviet times, without wanting to become part of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine is a good example when it comes to the differences of opinion on how to resolve the country’s problems. The new President Yanukovych could seem to be modelling himself on either past Ukrainian President Kuchma or even former Russian President Putin i.e. moving towards the authoritarian solution. President Yushchenko tried the more democratic solution but failed, in part due to the lack of any real enlargement ‘carrot’.

Democracy Promotion

After the end of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced the chaos of the Yeltsin era when trying to move towards a more democratic system, so long-term stability has only been achieved via a more authoritarian system. This has led to some elements of the regime becoming suspicious of the West and its offers to help with democratisation, despite its own rhetoric about the democratic future of Russia. On

the other hand, the US has only known great internal stability via its domestic democracy. These differences of experience could provide another explanation of US-Russian tensions concerning democracy.

The EU is also a democracy promoter but it does not always use the same methods as the US. Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace maintains that there are two distinct approaches to assisting democracy which are ‘political’ and ‘developmental’. The political approach is relatively narrow and is focused on elections and political liberties with a view of democrats struggling to ‘gain the upper hand in society’. Aid is directed at core political processes and institutions, especially elections and political groups at important moments in time. On the other hand the developmental approach involves a broader view of democracy and sees it as a slow process. It favours aid that pursues long-term goals in a wide range of sectors, emphasising good governance. Support for this view can be seen in the earlier work of Youngs who discusses democracy as a ‘product’ versus democracy as a ‘process’ stating that Europeans generally prefer the latter. Carothers agrees that in general the US adopts the political approach whilst Europe, despite some exceptions such as the British when supporting the US, prefers the developmental. He comments that there is room in the world for both approaches. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the former, mostly US, method is more likely to cause Russian hostility in the Black Sea region which can then actually interfere with the EU’s approach of democratisation thereby damaging democratic progress and turning ‘democracy’ into a ‘dirty word’ in the area. So how can the EU promote democracy in the region in its

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own gradual way if democratisation is seen by Russia as a US tool to encourage ‘colour’ revolutions?

6.3.2 Tension 2 - enlargement

The last section implied that the EU’s preferred slow pace of promoting democratisation was largely due to US-Russian tensions and the EU having different methods from the US. However, it could be argued that another more deliberate reason for the Union’s tardiness in the Black Sea region is because consolidated democracies could make demands for accession and for various internal reasons the EU would prefer not to enlarge too quickly. Democratisation can be seen as a precursor to EU enlargement by Black Sea countries, this being a ‘good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’ depending on whether the perceiver is ‘pro-West’ or ‘pro-East’. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia which could be described as ‘pro-democracy’ are good examples of Russia’s fears, especially as the Russians viewed these ‘revolutions’ as being Western-backed.

Another example is the ‘Twitter Revolution’ in Moldova 2009 which led to a more liberal democracy. According to Popescu in 2010, the position of the new liberal government in Moldova was that the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the EU’s policy were complementary and that Moldova has a pragmatic approach to the Eastern Partnership, which is that, as long as it helps the country to modernise and Europeanise, the exact name or dimensions of the EU initiatives are not particularly important. Moldova wants to be an EU member state and will use all available
channels of cooperation with the EU to make the country a credible potential candidate, but also understands that this is primarily a process of domestic reforms.\textsuperscript{34}

Popescu also says that, Moldova has multidimensional partnerships with Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and is willing to work on joint projects with them either bilaterally or as part of the Eastern Partnership. The Moldovan government does not think that this will slow down the EU-Moldova partnership, since the future of Moldova’s European aspirations depends on its own capacity to implement domestic reforms, rather than on particular policy frameworks.

So Moldova’s present government seems to have a good understanding that it is necessary for Black Sea countries themselves to increase their pace of reform if they want to accede in the longer term. Unless there is a shift in policy, they will not receive the help that Western Balkans countries are currently receiving or become candidates without having fully met all the acquis first. Even then there could be difficulties.

The EU has shifted from a policy of Europeanisation and bilateral relations with Black Sea countries to one of regionalisation which seems to be largely due to US-Russian tensions as well as internal fears over demands for accession.

\textbf{6.3.3 Discussion}

The European Neighbourhood Policy is a key European Union priority. However, critics of the ENP believe that EU member states are not committed enough to the Europeanisation of some neighbours, possibly due to their fear of demands for EU

\textsuperscript{34} Dr. Nicu Popescu was foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister of Moldova. The above information was given directly to the author in March 2010.
membership. Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union says that any European state that respects ‘the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ may apply to become a member of the Union. So if the EU’s ‘way of doing things’ were to make progress at a fast pace then there might be no ‘excuses’ for refusing to accept these countries as candidates. Moreover, say the critics, the EU does not adequately reward reform i.e. the EU is becoming more pragmatic and losing its values. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, according to a senior member of the Commission, values are still very strong within that institution at least, although there is a desire to avoid paternalism when it comes to issues such as democratisation.

This case study has analysed the US-Russian tension of Europeanisation which also incorporates tensions over other issues such as democracy, human rights and enlargement. The tension is in part due to Russia’s perception of the West as wanting to democratise the region in order to control it, as well as the US vision of how the world would be more peaceful and stable if every country were democratic. This is also an EU vision but the theory of democratisation, when put into practice, has been a ‘curate’s egg’ i.e. ‘good in parts’. This could be because of the differing methods of democracy promotion as previously outlined. Trying to force democracy onto countries that are not institutionally or psychologically ready could cause more harm than good and be associated with realpolitik rather than post-sovereign politics.

However, the slower methods of the EU would seem to be less threatening.

37 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
The view that the EU and NATO were largely successful in assisting the East and Central European countries in their transformation from authoritarian states into democracies might have led to an overoptimistic feeling that the task could be as ‘easy’ and as ‘speedy’ elsewhere. Another problem, as Cornell et al. have pointed out is that ‘[t]he western approach has been plagued by a confusion of aims and means. Western democratisation assistance has appeared to see democracy not only as a goal to achieve, but also as the method by which this goal achieves itself.’\textsuperscript{38} Nevertheless, regarding the longer-term future of democracy in the region, perhaps there is reason for some optimism. There are political parties, civil society groups and other democratic forces all over the Black Sea region demanding better institutions, less corruption, a freer media and human rights. It might, however, take time.

So, how precisely have US-Russian tensions affected the EU’s policy of assisting Europeanisation in the Black Sea region? One way is with regard to the pace of the EU’s democratisation assistance as argued above. In addition, this chapter began by pointing out that EU policy has been seen as changing from a Commission led bilateral ENP programme, which held out some promise of enlargement to several countries in the region, to a programme of regionalisation which is mostly multilateral and led by the member states. One reason for both of these pressures on EU policy could be argued to be because of lack of member state agreement over enlargement, in part due to US-Russian tensions. The change from Europeanisation to regionalisation is further discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{38} Cornell et al., 2006, p. 32.
6.4 How US-Russian Tensions have affected EU Policies concerning Black Sea Regionalisation

The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy in the east has shifted from the previous bilateral relations only policy towards the incorporation of multilateral relations. This can be viewed quite clearly in the Black Sea Synergy (2007) and Eastern Partnership (2008) policies which come under the ENP umbrella. The ENP, which includes not only the eastern partners but Mediterranean countries such as Morocco and Israel too, only ever had bilateral relations outlined within the original policy itself. Member countries of the ENP have all had different types of relations with the EU and gradually the Black Sea or eastern members and the Mediterranean or southern members became differentiated.

The two extensions of the ENP East policy are Black Sea Synergy which only has sectoral, multilateral relations and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) which has both unilateral and multilateral tracks. The unilateral track of the EaP deals bilaterally with countries, including creating Association Agreements where appropriate, whereas the multilateral track provides ‘a new framework where common challenges can be addressed.’ There are four multilateral platforms which are democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies; energy security; and contacts between people. The two tracks together could be described as promoting ‘Europeanisation’ without actual enlargement, although the Eastern Partnership does not rule it out and indeed the original draft acknowledged membership aspirations as discussed in earlier chapters. The multilateral track of the EaP, along with the sectoral approach of Black Sea Synergy, could be seen as a move towards regionalisation.
There are now various types of bilateral relationships between the EU and non-member Black Sea countries as well as the multilateral and sectoral relationships. Turkey is still an EU candidate despite its moving closer to Russia; Moldova under its coalition government is keen to join the EU; and there are mixed views in Ukraine, the government of which is no longer pro-NATO membership but is enthusiastic about its EU Association Agreement which could mean closer ties via free trade deals and visa free travel arrangements.

The EU could be seen as attempting to create a community in the region which is not totally dependent on the EU. Of course, the Union is not the only institution involved in trying to create a cooperative region. There have been various attempts as discussed in the two examples below:

**BSEC**

The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation was initially agreed between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, with its Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS) being established in Istanbul. Its aims were to encourage trade, interaction and peace amongst its members, which included all of the Black Sea littoral states plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova, with Serbia joining later. The BSEC Charter was adopted in 1998 and various other institutions were set up including the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) and the BSEC Business Council.

Whilst Russia is usually unwilling to participate in EU initiated cooperative measures, it does participate in BSEC. However, according to Black Sea researcher
Hajizada, despite all states in the region being members of BSEC, they are not truly interested in creating a cooperative region.\(^\text{39}\) This is partly due to the many antagonisms between the various members, for example Armenia and Azerbaijan, or Turkey and Greece, or Russia and Georgia.

**GUAM**

Another cooperative venture is GUAM which was originally called GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and was founded as an alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these five former Soviet Union republics. Later Uzbekistan left the group so it was renamed GUAM. Spânu writes that the two prime purposes of the original organisation were to discuss regional conflicts and energy security. He adds that with Ukrainian leadership those two areas should remain the most important focus of the organisation.\(^\text{40}\) All four of these Eastern Partnership countries have concerns about territorial integrity. Unfortunately the countries seen as threatening their security, Russia and Armenia, are not members of GUAM and the organisation seems to have had little effect despite Ponsard’s hope that it could be a real factor of regional stability and security.\(^\text{41}\)

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of existing regional organisations including those being put forward by the EU, it could be argued that the more

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organisational contact and conversation there is between the wider Black Sea countries, the more hope there is for future cooperation. However, there is not necessarily cooperation between the various initiatives. Whilst, according to Council officials posted in the region, Black Sea Synergy could work in conjunction with BSEC, according to the European Commission, BSEC is ‘a thorn in the side’ of Black Sea Synergy, primarily due to Russian control of the organisation.\(^\text{42}\)

One of the biggest problems for the region is that Russia has regarded most of it, as well as post-Soviet countries in general, as falling under its ‘sphere of influence’ whilst the US has tried to liberate and democratise the area, including encouraging countries such as Ukraine and Georgia to aspire to NATO membership. This US-Russian tension, as well as competition over energy, has sometimes appeared to be causing a new ‘Cold War’, especially in the Bush era, whilst more recently proposed ABMS systems could appear to be setting up a new ‘iron curtain’ further east than the original one, thereby creating a new situation of bipolarity. So we must ask if the construction of a cooperative region or security community in the region is possible.

Building on these ideas and questions, this final case study of an EU policy that might have been affected by US-Russian tensions will examine Black Sea regionalisation. Only the most important tension will be analysed here in order to avoid repetition. It is the ‘spheres of influence’ tension which has been discussed in previous chapters but not in relation to regionalisation.

\(^{42}\) Interviews with Council and Commission officials, Brussels, 2009.
6.4.1 Tension 1 – spheres of influence

Attempts at regionalising the wider Black Sea area have often met with suspicion. The regionalisation process has usually been attempted by Turkey, Russia, the EU or NATO, all of which have been seen as wanting to dominate the area or have a ‘sphere of influence’. Energy and pipelines have also been divisive factors in the wider region. There are also various theories of regionalism involved and King (Georgetown University) has described the region as having much competition between these theories. BSEC, GUAM and the EU’s Black Sea Synergy are all included in this competition.43

If a security community could be created via regionalisation this could point to post-sovereign politics winning out in the region but the Black Sea area is still steeped in the behaviour of realism. In fact, it would seem that the Black Sea region is far from becoming a cooperative security community based on the EU model. Nevertheless, Aybak comments that BSEC is a remarkable post-Cold war achievement given that former Soviet countries now have an equal footing with Russia.44 He also points out though that Russian perceptions have been that BSEC is Turkey’s bid for hegemony in the region. So here we have an example of Russian suspicion directed at Turkey rather than the US, although Turkey is also a NATO member. Other BSEC members have described Russia as dominating or disrupting the organisation, with Hajizada writing that attempts to take into account soft-security

cooperation by various BSEC members have been constantly contested by Russia and Armenia, even though they are in a minority.\footnote{Hajizada, 2010, p. 126.}

Nevertheless, since Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections, Russia and Ukraine have made an agreement to ‘enhance the effectiveness’ of BSEC, as well as continuing cooperation between their navies and the naval forces of other Black Sea states through BLACKSEAFOR which has, as members, all littoral states.\footnote{Kyiv Post, ‘Yanukovych, Medvedev sign joint statement on security in Black Sea region’, 17 May 2010 http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/66938/#ixzz0r5xd76fi accessed 2 June 2010.} However, Russia has refused to take part in naval exercises involving Georgia so the latter does not participate.\footnote{RIA Novosti, ‘Russian warship en route to Blackseafor naval drills’, 8 April 2010. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100408/158487103.html accessed 10 April 2010.}

Cichocki, programme director of the Natolin European Centre in Warsaw, writes that the regionalisation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the east is ‘an upshot of attaching greater importance than before to the geopolitical factor in security policy.’ He also believes it to be, ‘a consequence of a clear revival of political realism, noticeable in the European, Russian and American perceptions of international affairs.’\footnote{M. Cichocki, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy or Neighbourhood Policies’ in K. Henderson and C. Weaver (eds.) The Black Sea Region and EU policy: the challenge of divergent agendas (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010) p. 14.} Raszewski adds that the EU did have some hopes that its Energy Diversification Policy could have helped to create a security community in the Black and Caspian Sea regions, but he concludes that this has not happened in the area.\footnote{S. Raszewski S., ‘The EU’s External Policy of Energy Diversification in the Wider Black (and Caspian) Sea Region: regional security complex or security community?’ in K. Henderson and C. Weaver (eds.) The Black Sea Region and EU policy: the challenge of divergent agendas (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010) p. 153.}

Only a ‘regional security complex’ of a different type might exist.
As described in Chapter 2, Buzan and Wæver explain that the central idea in regional security complex theory is that because most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based security complexes adding that the combination of sovereign, territorial states becoming the principal global players in security matters, along with the international system becoming global, leads to ‘distinct regional security subsystems’ emerging. Given that there has been a recent war in the Black Sea region but there are elements of cooperation via organisations such as BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and GUAM we could conclude, as does Raszewski, that the region is currently neither a security community nor in a condition of total chaos but is somewhere in between these extremes.

As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, Antonenko believes that the progress towards regional security cooperation in the Black Sea area has been disrupted by Russia, which has seen attempts towards progress as a prelude to further NATO or EU enlargement. She posits that there is a lack of necessary drivers for creating a security community in the region at present. However, the approach of holding regional security discussions in the area under the auspices of a bigger international organisation such as the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) could be useful.

So it would seem that there has been, and still is, much competition in the region for ‘spheres of influence’ especially between Russia and the US, but also by

52 Ibid., p. 268.
the other ‘poles’ of Turkey and the EU. In fact the EU’s policies, including that of regionalisation, can be viewed as an attempt to establish its own ‘sphere of influence’. We could say then that the EU’s policy of regionalisation is affected by US-Russian tensions but to some degree is actually increasing those tensions. NATO previously had a similar problem. Nevertheless there are signs of more cooperation in the region.

6.4.2 Discussion

Without EU (or NATO) enlargement as a solution to the lack of regional stability in the Black Sea region, and without allowing Russia to form a strong ‘sphere of influence’, what can be done? Might regional integration of some kind ameliorate the situation? According to Hettne and Söderbaum, ‘Regional integration implies a security dimension which is quite essential to the dynamics of the integration process. Security regionalism refers to attempts by the states and other relevant actors in a particular geographical area […] to transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate relations into a security community with cooperative relations.’

Despite the Russia-Georgia War, there have been moves towards better cooperation between the US, Russia and NATO since the election of President Obama, with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen asserting that improved relations with Russia are one of his top priorities. And although in autumn 2010, the Secretary General said there was no need for a new security pact with Russia he announced that they would still like to work with Russia on a joint ABM system in

the Black Sea region. So a security community is one example of ‘what could be’ in the future, especially if the condition of ‘balanced multipolarity’ still applies to the region.

According to structural realism, certain conditions must exist amongst states in order for a cooperative region to develop. As previously discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, Hyde-Price says the situation existing in Europe is ‘balanced multipolarity’. In Chapter 3 it was argued that ‘balanced multipolarity’ is the current condition in the Black Sea region too, with Russia, the EU, Turkey and the US being the balancers. Russia has been defensively aggressive at times and even paranoid in its behaviour in the region which it regards as being vital to its security. However, since the war in Georgia and the extension of its lease on Sevastopol harbour, Russia has been less defensive and could be becoming less of an outsider.

The behaviour of smaller states can also be of importance when it comes to regionalisation. Their additional behaviour options within the theory of structural realism can be ‘hiding’ and ‘transcendence’ as discussed in Chapter 3. The former means that states may assume a low profile or neutrality whilst the latter means that there is an attempt to rise above the anarchy of state-centric realism normally via institutions. South Caucasus researcher Vasilyan concludes though that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia think in a realist fashion with regard to their foreign policy and that their ability to ‘transcend’ their thinking beyond survival and relative power-maximisation to EU-type positive peace is not possible at the moment. So, although

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56 Schroeder, 1995, p. 430.
the conditions for regional development are there, the will must be found amongst all
the states to work towards greater cooperation and the EU must play its part.

The EU might also need to emphasise that even if membership is what some
countries in the region are working towards in the longer term, perhaps improved
regional cooperation could be at least one step forward. The enlargement and
neighbourhood commissioner Stefan Füle has said that after the experiences of
accepting countries into the Union that were not fully ready, especially Bulgaria and
Romania, future candidates must be one hundred percent ready.58 Creating a Black
Sea regional security community would not exclude members from joining the
European Union and indeed, according to Commissioner Füle, countries need to make
greater use of regional cooperation in order to become closer to the EU whose
ultimate goal is to make borders ‘less relevant’.59

The EU policy of regionalisation is in one sense the result of a change in
policy from Europeanisation. In this chapter it has been argued that this change was in
part due to US-Russian tensions. It is also an interesting EU policy as it could be seen
to some extent as wanting to help the neighbourhood gain stability without further EU
or NATO enlargement in the very near future, whilst on the other hand be pragmatic
regarding the Union’s own interests. Silitski of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic
Studies suggests that pragmatic realism lies at the heart of the Eastern Partnership

58 Jovanovska, S., Palokaj, A., Pantelic, Z. and Pries, K., ‘EU hopefuls must be “100 percent”
ready for membership before joining’ Waz.EUobserver, 14 April 2010.
59 Pop, V., ‘EU-hopeful countries must work together, commissioner says’ EUobserver, 11
June 2010.
despite it using the language of values to justify its reluctance to proceed with further integrative measures such as enlargement or visa free travel.\(^{60}\)

This final case study of EU regionalisation, in conjunction with previous case studies, has shown how US-Russian tensions could either create a condition of bipolarity in the wider Black Sea region or help to balance the condition of multipolarity. Bipolarity would inhibit the EU’s policy of regionalisation as it could lead to the division of the area, whereas multipolarity could in the longer term help to foster the development of a cooperative community. The presence of both Russia and the US in the region prevents a situation of unipolarity, in other words a total ‘sphere of influence’. The conclusion arising from Chapter 3 and from this case study is that the version of polarity in the region in 2010 is balanced multipolarity. This is, arguably, the most likely type of polarity from which a cooperative region could develop, as discussed in Chapter 3, yet the situation in the Black Sea region remains complex.

### 6.5 Conclusions

The two case studies of the EU’s Europeanisation project and more recent Black Sea regionalisation project once again demonstrate how ‘Cold War thinking’ and sensitivities over ‘spheres of influence’, as well as other antagonisms in the region can prevent progress towards cooperative thinking. The conclusions drawn from

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\(^{60}\) V. Silitski, ‘The EU’s Eastern Partnership: why it may help democracy promotion and how the United States can help move it forward’, PONARS Eurasia policy memo 70, 2009.
examining specific US-Russian tensions affecting each of these two EU policies are as follows:

*The Case Study of Europeanisation*

**Democratisation**

The EU is sometimes accused of progressing too slowly with assistance towards Europeanisation and democratisation in eastern neighbourhood countries because of the fear of antagonising Russia. The reason why Russia would be antagonised is partly due to the more aggressive methods of the US when promoting democracy. However, the EU generally has a slow approach and prefers to use the ‘developmental’ approach to democracy promotion. Therefore the assessment of the extent to which US-Russian tensions over democratisation have affected EU policy is ‘high’.

**Enlargement**

Another reason why the EU could be making slower progress than would be optimal could be, according to some critics, down to its fear that if countries democratise quickly they might make demands for accession. Part of the reason why the EU does not want further enlargement in the region at the present time could be due to US-Russian tensions but there are also other reasons such as member state disagreement and the need to integrate Western Balkan countries first. Nevertheless, the EU’s policy of enlargement is changing to one of regionalisation so, despite intervening variables, the assessment of how EU policy is affected by US-Russian tensions must be ‘high’.
The Case Study of Regionalisation

Spheres of Influence

EU policy has been seen to be changing from a Commission-led bilateral ENP programme, which held out some promise of enlargement in the initial draft of the Eastern Partnership, to a programme of regionalisation led by those member states which would prefer not to antagonise Russia in the region it regards as its own sphere of influence. Russia is more fearful of the US than the EU having influence in the Black Sea region so this competition can hinder genuine attempts at cooperation and regionalisation. The assessment level of how US-Russian tensions are affecting EU policy is therefore ‘medium’.

Despite all the problems, there are some signs of future progress regarding regional cooperation. The question of, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective supranational regional and global organisations take precedence?’ has also been asked. Realists might say that this is ultimately not possible but perhaps regional and supranational institutions can endure for many decades if the conditions are right. However, the theory of security communities posits that in order to create a cooperative region we need a bottom-up approach (with the help of civil society) as well as top-down institutionalism. In the Black Sea region, in 2010 / 2011, realism and pragmatism are ‘what is’ yet there are theories and policies that point towards ‘what could be’. A security community is a possibility for the longer term if the condition of ‘balanced multipolarity’ remains and there is enough desire for peace and stability amongst the Black Sea nations.
It is posited within this thesis that ‘balanced multipolarity’ is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for the development of and the long-term survival of a
security community.
CHAPTER 7 Conclusions:

EU Policy and the Way Forward in the Black Sea Region

7.1 Introduction

This final chapter includes the specific research findings of the thesis, bringing together the various themes and providing an overall summary and conclusion, as well as thoughts on future research. Within the thesis I have asked ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected European Union policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ partly to help answer the broader questions of ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ A third research question has been, ‘Can the Black Sea region develop into a “security community” and, if so, is realism’s concept of “balanced multipolarity” a necessary condition?’

Both the United States and Russia are categorised as ‘modern’ states with ‘realist’ foreign policies based primarily on national interests, whilst the EU is described as ‘supranational’, ‘postmodern’, ‘post-Westphalian’ or ‘post-sovereign’. Since the EU extended to the Black Sea coastline in 2007 there has been a theoretical clash between the realism of Russian and American foreign policies and the post-sovereign politics of the EU, whose stated policy is to resolve conflicts and promote a stable and peaceful European neighbourhood. There has also been a continued clash between the East (mainly Russia) and West (mainly US, NATO and EU) with the enlargement policies and democracy promotion of the West being seen as threatening by the East. Nevertheless the methods of the US and NATO, particularly during the
Bush era, have been seen by Russia as more aggressive than those of the EU. The fourth Black Sea ‘pole’ of Turkey can also be viewed as a ‘modern’ state but one that has encouraged cooperation and balance in the Black Sea region and has been working towards EU membership for decades. It is also at times a ‘balancer’ between East and West.

Within this thesis, I have explored the wider Black Sea region and drawn conclusions as to how specific US-Russian tensions have affected the EU’s policy towards the area, especially those policies regarding security and energy security, conflict resolution, Europeanisation and regionalisation. The extent to which the implementation of EU policies in the area has been affected by the tensions has also been analysed. The broader issue of whether the region is moving from one where realism and realpolitik dominate foreign policies to one where a security community based on post-sovereign politics could eventually emerge has been linked to the empirical findings.

This qualitative research has primarily been empirical or theoretical rather than normative. Nevertheless, whilst trying to remain as objective as possible with regard to empirical research results, I would argue that a position of working towards cooperation, peace and stability in a region (via soft power) rather than chaos and anarchy is a sensible and pragmatic position to take. This is the EU’s basic foreign policy towards the Black Sea region. Research methods employed have included: analysis of raw data from primary and secondary sources (especially EU documents) in order to establish policy and strategy for the Black Sea region, one-to-one interviews with EU and NATO officials and other practitioners in order to gain an insight into the workings of the various institutions, regular participation at small
group meetings with invited speakers including deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers of relevant states and research visits to most Black Sea countries as well as Brussels and Washington. These methods were selected as being the most appropriate combination for the purpose of conducting the research for this thesis. Also, to a certain extent, I have ‘immersed’ myself into European institutions and organisations such as the European Parliament and the European Movement. This has been useful from the point of view of developing ‘a feel’ for European Union politics and the peoples of the Black Sea region. Because I am not a national of any of the countries of the latter region I can claim to have less bias or prejudice towards any of the people. I am, however, a citizen of the European Union and ‘the West’.

The research on how US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy has mostly been deductive, beginning with the hypothesis that there is a correlation between US-Russian tensions and the success of EU policy in the Black Sea region in that the higher the tensions, the more likely it is that the EU’s policies will be unsuccessful. Specific examples have been sought out in order to test this theory. The outcome of the research indicates the ‘extent’ to which the hypothesis is correct and is summarised in table 7.1 and evaluated in section 7.2. The causal relationship between the aforementioned tensions and the EU’s policy in its eastern neighbourhood is, in most cases, interfered with by intervening variables such as clashes between EU members, clashes between the EU and Russia or tensions between Turkey and other actors. These are also discussed in section 7.2.

Section 7.3 further explores the question of whether the world is in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist one, to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence. This aspect of the research has
primarily been inductive, beginning with observations which have led to new theoretical ideas. One way of assessing the question has been to evaluate which is stronger in the Black Sea region – tension or cooperation? If tensions are stronger, then the European Union’s policies of bringing peace and stability to the region are likely to be hindered even more in the future. However, although EU policy is shown to have been affected by US-Russian tensions, pointing towards realism being dominant in the region, since the Obama administration took power there has been more cooperation between the two states than in the Bush era, including over strategic arms reduction.

The thesis is original for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 1. Firstly, there has been little previous evaluation of the extent to which US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy in the Black Sea region, which the thesis does in a systematic way by analysing concrete examples and making overall conclusions. Secondly it extends the literature on realism versus post-sovereign politics via a case study of the Black Sea region, and thirdly it combines the theories of structural realism, security communities and post-sovereign politics to put forward an argument that balanced multipolarity could be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of a security community.¹

7.2 US-Russian Tensions

US-Russian tensions and their effect on EU policy have been explored in depth using a variety of methods including elite interviews. In some cases new information has been uncovered that was not necessarily in the public domain including the

difficulties for the EU of obtaining permission to visit Nagorno-Karabakh for confidence building and some of the background details regarding the war in Georgia.

Table 7.1 summarises the empirical findings from the methodical approach to the case studies in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, demonstrating how US-Russian tensions have had an effect on EU policies. Each tension is categorised as having a high, medium or low/medium effect on the specific EU policy. The table is similar to Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 but is expanded to give additional information such as ‘policy changed’ or ‘implementation affected’. This section proceeds to discuss the table in detail.

The case study of general security (Chapter 4) analysed the tensions between the US and Russia over NATO enlargement, the US anti-ballistic missile system (ABMS) and maritime issues. NATO enlargement has understandably been seen by Russia as one of the greatest threats both to its security and its self-esteem. One fear was that Ukraine would join NATO and not renew Russia’s lease on Sevastopol harbour for its Black Sea fleet. The effect of this US-Russian tension on the implementation of the EU’s policy of bringing peace and stability to the region possibly via further enlargement is therefore deemed to be ‘high’.

An even greater, more existential, threat to Russia was when the US, during the Bush presidency, began to install a ‘missile shield’ in the Black Sea region. This anti-ballistic missile system would also have had offensive capabilities. Russia threatened retaliatory action such as installing its own missiles in Kaliningrad. Therefore this US-Russian tension also had a serious effect on EU policies and is categorised as ‘high’.
Table 7.1 Summary of how US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU POLICY AREA</th>
<th>TENSION</th>
<th>EFFECT ON POLICY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>case study</td>
<td>independent variable</td>
<td>outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEAN SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chapter 4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enlargement (NATO)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-ballistic missiles</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maritime issues</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence on Ukraine</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>policy/ supply affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>influence on Baku pipelines</td>
<td>low/medium</td>
<td>some effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONFLICT RESOLUTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chapter 5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>EaP policy brought forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial integrity</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>EaP policy changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enlargement (in general)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>EaP policy changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divide and rule</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>territorial integrity</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>some effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spheres of influence</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy</td>
<td>low/medium</td>
<td>some effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spheres of influence</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial integrity</td>
<td>low/medium</td>
<td>some effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conventional forces (CFE)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPEANISATION AND REGIONALISATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chapter 6)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratisation</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>pace of policy affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enlargement (in general)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>policy changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spheres of influence</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>implementation affected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US-Russian tensions over Black Sea maritime issues have been ‘high’ at times but the overall assessment is ‘medium’ due to intervening variables such as US-Turkey, Russia-Turkey, Russia-Ukraine and US-Russian disputes and tensions regarding either Black Sea access or the leasing by Russia of Sevastopol Harbour.

All of these Russian fears of US intentions along with the sometimes aggressive rhetoric of the Bush presidency and the Bush ‘doctrine’ affected the ability of the EU to implement its policies of bringing peace and stability to the region. However, under the Obama presidency there have been signs of greater cooperation including the possibility of NATO and Russia being involved in the new missile shield which does not currently have offensive capabilities.\(^2\) There has also been reassurance for Russia from the new Ukrainian administration regarding its Black Sea fleet.

Another issue which is of great importance to Russia is energy (also analysed in Chapter 4) as its economy depends very heavily upon its oil and gas revenues. Meanwhile the EU energy policy in the region is to ensure the security of its supply and transit of oil and gas from former Soviet countries. This energy security has at times been disrupted by disputes between Russia and Ukraine over prices, resulting in the gas to pipelines supplying both Ukraine and the EU being cut off. Given that Russia has seen Ukraine as an instrument used by the US at times, the problem could be classified as one caused in part by US-Russian tensions and is therefore categorised as ‘medium’.

\(^2\)Although, according to an unattributed American source, the US will never share its technology with Russia.
The EU’s energy policy in the south of the region is characterised by diversification, which is to some extent dependent on the Nabucco project. The US supports Nabucco which will, if successful, transport gas from countries such as Azerbaijan, via pipelines across Turkey, to the European Union. Russia has proposed rival pipelines in order to compete commercially and to interfere with the EU’s diversification policy. Nevertheless there now seems to be an acknowledgement that Russia needs to be seen as a reliable supplier and the EU as a reliable customer, which has led to greater cooperation between oil and gas companies across Europe. The level of effect on the EU’s policy specifically due to US-Russian tensions is therefore set at ‘low/medium’.

Chapter 5 analysed the US-Russian tensions involving the ‘frozen’ or ‘smouldering’ conflicts of the region in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. The 2008 war in Georgia was partly due to US-Russian tensions and led to the Eastern Partnership policy being introduced sooner than originally planned, demonstrating how the tensions have affected EU policy. Georgia’s territorial integrity is now in question given the declarations of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 war, as well as the recognition of these enclaves by a few states including Russia. The early draft of the Eastern Partnership was altered with regard to the condition that the eastern partners should recognise the principal of territorial integrity, partly due to pressure from Russia. Territorial integrity is also a major issue in the conflicts of Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. The original Eastern Partnership document was also redrafted regarding enlargement with the accession perspective being deleted after the 2008 war in Georgia. Once again this was due to Russian pressures and fears about Western encroachment, although we could also question just how much the EU actually wanted to offer the prospect of enlargement
into the region. Due to the changes in EU policy created by the war in Georgia the first three of the tensions affecting conflict resolution in Georgia (war, territorial integrity and enlargement) are categorised as ‘high’. However, mainly due to intervening variables, the categories are ‘medium’ or ‘low/medium’ with regard to most of the US-Russian tensions over the other conflict regions.

Both Russia and the US have been accused of using ‘divide and rule’ techniques but Russia in particular could be argued to want to keep its neighbours weak and divided in order to try to maintain its former hegemonic influence over them. Divisions within Georgia have prevented the EU’s policy of conflict resolution from being successful. Spheres of influence have been contentious between Russia and the US with both having allies and clients in the Black Sea region. When the EU introduced its Eastern Partnership policy, Russia accused the EU of trying to establish its sphere of influence too.

Both Russia and the US have bases in the region which could complicate conflict resolution, especially as there is still a dispute between the US and Russia over the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. However, more recently the outlook for the resolution of the Transnistrian problem (where Russia has troops) is reported to be more optimistic, with the rapporteur for the European Parliament suggesting that if the EU, Russia and Ukraine can work together to help Moldova then this could also be a recipe for the future resolution of the other regional conflicts.\(^3\)

Chapter 6 analysed if US-Russian tensions over Europeanisation and regionalisation were affecting Union policy. Democratisation and in particular democracy promotion by the West was demonstrated to be a source of tension and it was suggested that the EU is sometimes accused of progressing too slowly with

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3 Interview with Graham Watson MEP, February 2011.
assistance towards Europeanisation and democratisation in eastern neighbours because of the fear of antagonising Russia. The reason why Russia would be suspicious of democratisation is partly due to the more aggressive methods of the US in promoting democracy. These latter are often viewed by Russia as a means of promoting US hegemony in the world. Democratisation is therefore viewed as a tension which highly affects the EU policy of Europeanisation in the main by slowing down the pace.

Enlargement, especially of NATO, is another source of tension between the US and Russia so another suggestion is that the EU could be deliberately ‘going slow’ on assisting Europeanisation in the Black Sea region due to fear of demands for enlargement by the eastern partners once they have met Article 49 requirements.\(^4\) Enlargement could cause further tensions with Russia, especially since there is a common belief that EU and NATO enlargement go hand-in-hand. Enlargement as a US-Russian tension affecting the EU policy of Europeanisation is also categorised as ‘high’.

Part of the manifestation of this change of pace could be argued to be a change of policy from enlargement to regionalisation i.e. from a Commission-led bilateral European neighbourhood programme, which held out some prospects of enlargement, to a programme of regionalisation led by those EU member states which would prefer not to antagonise Russia in the region that the latter regards as its own sphere of influence.

It can be seen from table 7.1 that in some cases US-Russian tensions have contributed to actual changes in EU policies such as the change of focus to

regionalisation from Europeanisation or a greater emphasis on energy diversification. In other cases the pace of the EU’s implementation of policies has been affected, sometimes slowing down and sometimes speeding up. For example, the Eastern Partnership document was brought forward and also changed several times due to the Russia-Georgia War, which can be argued to have occurred in part due to US-Russian tensions. In some of the case studies the effect of the US-Russian tensions was not as great as in others. Also, other factors (intervening variables) have affected the EU’s policy in the wider Black Sea region. These include intra-EU disputes between member states or between institutions, EU-Russia tensions, tensions within or between non-EU regional organisations, and tensions between Turkey and the other three Black Sea ‘poles’.

Member states have often disagreed on policy for the Black Sea region including the policy of enlargement. For example, Turkey’s full membership of the EU is supported by some states such as the UK but not supported by others such as France. Also, Germany and other ‘old Europe’ states have at times seemed keen on ‘appeasing’ Russia whilst Poland and other ‘new Europe’ states have been keen to cooperate with the US in order to be protected by it. There have also been intra-EU disputes over other issues such as territorial integrity. Nevertheless it has been argued within this thesis that the disagreements between member states are partly due to the past divide and rule policies of both the US and Russia in order to keep the EU weak. This has tended to lead to ‘lowest common denominator’ policy-making on the EU’s part. It could also be argued that, even if there had always been agreement between member states, US-Russian tensions would still have interfered with the implementation of policy.
Changes of government in individual member states can also be an issue when it comes to disagreements between members or to a change in EU policy direction, and there has been a general change in western EU members in particular from centre-left government to centre-right. Economic problems can also affect the willingness to enlarge or to accept immigration. These areas and how they affect eastern partners are in need of further research. Also, since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, there seems to have been a shift towards greater intergovernmentalism rather than Commission-led supranationality. This has not only led to more disputes between EU members but also to disagreements over policies such as the Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy. Despite this a Commission official says that all members are interested in assisting Black Sea countries.

All tensions between East and West cannot be solely attributed to the US or NATO on the Western side. The EU also has disputes and tensions with Russia especially regarding energy and territorial integrity. Also, the EU and NATO are not the only intergovernmental actors in the regional which can mean that at times the EU will hold back and let another organisation such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deal with issues within their remit. Nagorno-Karabakh is a good example of this, where the OSCE’s Minsk Group is responsible for the main negotiations. However, the three appointed negotiators are from the US, Russia and France so there is an opportunity for US-Russian tension there.

Turkey has become a far more important actor in its own right within the Black Sea region and although in general its leaders are attempting to have positive relations with all neighbours, there have been tensions at times between Turkey and

5 Interview with senior Commission official, July 2009.
its NATO allies, Turkey and Russia, and Turkey and Armenia, in addition to the tensions with the EU over delayed enlargement.

So it can be concluded from the above that US-Russian tensions are not the only factors affecting EU policy for the Black Sea region. Time is another factor to consider. This research has been conducted over a period of four years on a region where much has happened including a war and the threat of future wars in the South Caucasus region. One major change has been the administration of the United States with a different attitude towards the former Soviet space and to nuclear weapons. Cooperation between Russia and the US has been shown to increase with regard to strategic arms reduction (START) and other issues such as Afghanistan and anti-terrorism. Nevertheless, tensions remain over many Black Sea issues and there is a fear amongst some Black Sea states that the US would not support them against Russia should it be necessary.

In conclusion, the overall finding from the research in answer to the question of ‘To what extent have US-Russian tensions affected European Union policy in the wider Black Sea region?’ is that US-Russian tensions, *inter alia*, have affected EU policy and that this could point to the triumph of realism over post-sovereign politics in the wider Black Sea region, especially during the Bush era. It also points to the blocking of EU policy by the US and Russia, partly because both states have liked the past *status quo* – Russia when it was a bipolar superpower and the US when it was a unipolar superpower. The next section deals further with this conclusion in relation to the more theoretical part of the research, which asks the question, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’
7.3 Realism versus Post-Sovereign Politics

Hyde-Price writes that the world’s system is still best understood via realism and that the state system and the balancing of power will remain because institutions do not last (i.e. the world will basically stay ‘modern’ in the long term). This is the view of realism which is pessimistic given that this system must inevitably lead to regular wars. There is also the problem within realism of how the theory of states and ‘balancing coalitions’ can work if failed states or other non-rational actors possess WMD, especially biological weapons which, according to Brian Jones, are the easiest to acquire and therefore the ones to be most feared.\(^6\)

On the other hand, postmodernists such as Cooper and Wallace posit that the world can no longer contain states with a system of absolute sovereignty. Instead states must pool their sovereignty and cooperate in the same way as European Union members do. This could be called an optimistic or even idealistic view. Cooper writes in detail about postmodernism but acknowledges that in different regions within the world there are currently three conditions – pre-modern, modern and postmodern, so that whilst most of Europe is a postmodern continent, states such as the US and Russia are still basically ‘modern’ states even though there are postmodern aspects ‘trying to get out’.

But will the institutions of the European Union collapse and Europe revert back to a system of ‘modern’ states, or will the world stay as it is with the same mixture of competing conditions, or will there be a global movement towards post-sovereign politics? Might it even be possible that political systems as a whole will collapse globally? Within this thesis, I have only analysed the Black Sea part of the

\(^6\) Interview with Brian Jones, 2007.
world, asserting that realism is in the main ‘what is’ and a security community based on either intergovernmental or supranational institutions is ‘what could be’. However, whilst realism might be ‘what is’, the postmodern European Union also exists in one part of the Black Sea (Romania and Bulgaria) and is also ‘what is’, even if its foreign policy objectives of establishing peace and stability in the region are not yet achieved.

One difficulty in these discussions is that realists talk about ‘states’ and contrast their theory with liberal ‘institutions.’ The EU may be classified by them as an institution or a collection of institutions yet the EU is more than an institution whilst being less than (or beyond) a state. As previously discussed, realism says that in times of crisis, institutions do not hold up (and the EU is certainly being tested at this moment in time partly due to financial crises). Liberalism is more inclined to be optimistic and to view genuinely democratic and cooperative global institutions as the way forward if the world is to avoid destruction through wars or climate change catastrophe. Liberals are more likely to think beyond the state.

Hyde-Price suggests that liberalism is good at domestic level but that the international level is anarchic. Nevertheless, it has been posited within this thesis that more powerful institutions could work towards making the world pseudo-domestic by using the EU model. In many ways EU members regard other members as domestic rather than as rival states which might need to be secured against.\(^7\) Cooper agrees that the distinction between foreign and domestic breaks down in the postmodern part of the world.\(^8\) However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the EU model is not always strong and its states have been inclined to act unilaterally when dealing with

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8 Cooper, 2004, p. 29.
foreign policy and security matters. Nevertheless the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified and the European External Action Service, the first partly supranational Foreign Service, is being put into place.

Realists sometimes say that liberals have normative political agendas, confusing ‘what is’ with ‘what ought to be’. However, there is a difference between ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what could be’. The former is normative and assumes idealism whilst the latter implies a pragmatic working towards more cooperation in the world, as well as a rejection of the realist assumption that the Westphalian system will always exist. This might not be the case and there are signs that regionalisation is on the increase.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Aydin asserts that regionalisation is seen as a useful instrument in creating regional and global stability because it can lead to non-coercive attitudes and regional identity. The Cold War kept down regional tensions which resurfaced when it ended leading to conflicts, which have had a negative impact on development. Contested borders, ethnic conflicts and forced migration still pose risks but there are some positives too, including the Black Sea not being dominated by one power.

Although US-Russian tensions have blocked EU policy in many ways, both in terms of policy-making and implementation, which points towards the triumph of realism in the Black Sea area, the effect of the tensions was mostly felt during the Bush-Putin era and cooperation has become more visible since then as seen by the US-Russia START agreements, the halting of NATO expansion and US-NATO-Russia talks on ballistic missile defence.

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9 Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 16.
Earlier in the chapter it was discussed how, although US-Russian tensions have caused problems for the EU with regard to policy-making and implementation, there are also other factors affecting these policies. It cannot therefore be said that the US and Russia have full responsibility and the EU itself must take a large share of it along with other Black Sea states. Nevertheless my conclusions are that US-Russian tensions have affected most aspects of EU Black Sea policy to some extent between 2007 and 2010. The level of the extent ranges from low/medium in some cases to high in others, especially when an actual change of EU policy has occurred (see Table 7.1). It should also be remembered that the EU has a slow approach and is still active in the region both bilaterally and multilaterally and working on setting up an Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly (EuroNest) even though it must currently be without participation from Belarus.

Within this thesis, it has been argued that the present situation in the Black Sea region, based on the theory of structural realism, is one of ‘balanced multipolarity’. (See section 2.4.2). This concept does not necessarily imply stability. It only means that none of the poles would be strong enough to dominate if all of the other poles were to form a balancing coalition.

‘Balanced multipolarity’ is clearly the situation in Europe as a whole and also in the EU, which is generally accepted to be a security community where the idea of war between members is unthinkable. Extrapolating from these ideas, I have posited that ‘balanced multipolarity’ is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for a ‘true’ (not dominated by a hegemon) security community to arise. (See sections 2.4.3 and 3.3.6).

As discussed in Chapter 3, Jervis (1982) addressed security governance in the current international system arguing that the western system of security governance
has produced a security community contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions which are that national elites must believe it to be necessary to eschew wars of conquest with each other; the costs of war are believed to outweigh any benefits; the best path to national prosperity is shared economies; it is best to have domestic democratic governments; and states must be satisfied with the territorial status quo.\textsuperscript{10} My argument is that we need at least one initial condition in order for these conditions to begin to arise and that this condition is that the region must be characterised by a situation of balanced multipolarity.

From the beginning of the Obama presidency there have been signs of improved cooperation between Russia and the US, which could help with Black Sea regional cooperation. This cooperation could be said to be a sign of post-sovereign politics. However, it is essential that regional conflicts such as those in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova should be resolved. The region would benefit in general by the EU working together with Black Sea states to agree a way forward. One possible forum for this could be the BSEC parliament, despite the Commission tending to find the BSEC ‘a thorn in its side’.\textsuperscript{11}

In conclusion, although the research on the question of how US-Russian tensions have affected EU policy points to the victory of realism over postmodernism in the Black Sea region, since the Bush-Putin era the desire for cooperation between the four poles of the Black Sea (Russia, the EU, Turkey and the US) has become more visible. Therefore the research question of ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state dominated, anarchic and realist world to one where effective regional and global organisations take precedence?’ cannot be answered with a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’. My

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Commission official, Brussels, 2009.
argument, however, is that there is a situation of balanced multipolarity in the region which could begin to lay the foundation for a cooperative security community to develop. In order for this to happen, there needs to be conflict resolution, more trust and cooperation between the Black Sea states, less corruption, better rule-of-law, improved democracy and more democratic institutions with popular elections so the people of all regions can have their voices heard and civil society can be encouraged. There are calls for all of these advances but they will take time.

7.4 Final Thoughts

The purpose of writing this thesis has been twofold. One purpose was to attempt to assist European practitioners, especially those in the EU, to obtain greater insight into their own difficulties with policy-making and implementation in the wider Black Sea region. In particular it is essential for the new EEAS to be clear and direct regarding both policy and strategy for the neighbourhood. There are many opportunities for progress in the region but also many pitfalls. The present condition of balanced multipolarity needs to be recognised by all Black Sea powers and a cooperative ‘EU-type’ way of doing things established if peace and stability is desired.

The second, but at least as important, purpose was to add to the growing theoretical research on the EU and the Black Sea region, especially with regard to how soft power and post-sovereign politics are progressing. The empirical research has helped with the development of the theoretical. Within the thesis, the theory of power relations has been contrasted with the actual realities on the ground in the Union’s eastern neighbourhood, mainly during the period from 2007 - 2010. Since then there have been developments in the southern neighbourhood where multiple revolutions are taking place and people are beginning to understand ‘the power of the
powerless" through various means including the power of communication via modern technology.

So can any of the conclusions of this thesis be applied universally? Within the thesis, I have argued that, based on the theories of structural realism and security communities, regional ‘balanced multipolarity’ is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for a true security community to develop. This theory could be the main area to research further using comparative methods, especially if applied to parts of the world where there is a will to establish a security community and a ‘region’ can be argued to exist. For example, research on ASEAN and security communities has already begun but, as far as can be established, not yet with regard to balanced multipolarity.

Also, if the hypothesis (that balanced multipolarity is a necessary foundation for a security community) is correct then it would follow that if the condition of balanced multipolarity were to change then the security community would fail. This has obvious implications for the European Union itself. However, perhaps the existence of a security community helps to maintain balanced multipolarity and make it more stable than the theory predicts. This could also be an area of further research.

Taking the above ideas one step further, if balanced multipolarity is the condition for a (postmodern, post-sovereign) security community to develop and once developed, a security community helps to preserve and stabilise the balance, then could a balanced multipolar world of balanced multipolar regions be the basis for an improved United Nations?

One other area of interest to me for future research is the psychological aspect of relationships between Black Sea ‘actors’, including that of paranoia and how a

12 From a text by Václav Havel, 1978.
better understanding of these elements might be employed in the diplomacy of conflict resolution and region building. Many of the people of the region have bad memories that are hard to forget. Hanging onto these memories can be a mode of protection or defence in order to avoid being ‘ lulled into a false sense of security’. Learning to develop trust can be difficult under such conditions, especially if leaders and governments are deliberately encouraging paranoia, hatred and blame for their own purposes.

Regarding the Black Sea region in particular, more research on the effectiveness of EU policy for the area, especially policies on conflict resolution, regionalisation and democratisation is indicated, as is further research on hard security matters such as the nuclear missile shield.

The final question left to be pondered is that of whether the body of water surrounded by Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia is a Black Sea or a Black Lake. In present times it would seem to be a sea in almost all respects – geologically, geographically and politically. Nevertheless, access to the sea is still controlled by the Montreux Convention of which Turkey is the guardian and in many ways the convention, which limits passage to and from the Black Sea, could still be argued to be appropriate. Too many ships sailing through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus could increase the pollution of the waters, whilst large warships, in particular, could upset the political balance of the region. Further cooperation is essential not only for the environment but for the peace and stability of a region which increasingly ‘exists’.
Maps

Map 1: The European Union and the Eastern Partners (Joint Research Centre, European Commission)
Map 2: The Nabucco Pipeline (Courtesy of Nabucco)
Map 3: Georgia, showing Abkhazia and South Ossetia (CIA World Factbook)

Map 4: Azerbaijan, showing Nagorno-Karabakh (CIA World Factbook)
Map 5: Moldova, showing Transnistria (CIA World Factbook)
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NATO - www.nato.int/

Open Democracy - www.opendemocracy.net/

OSCE - http://www.osce.org/

US State Department - www.state.gov/

**Overseas Research Visits:**

Brussels, Belgium: regularly 2006 - 2011

Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey: Spring 2007

Bucharest, Romania: Spring 2008

Yerevan, Armenia: November 2008

Washington DC, USA: July 2009
**One-to-One Interviews:**

Various citizens in Ukraine (April 2007)

Brian Jones, Southampton University (September 2007)

Various think tanks, NGOs and citizens in Armenia including the President of the Armenian European Movement and S. Harutyunyan at Noravank Foundation, Yerevan (November 2008)

Senior Official, European Commission (July 2009)

Official, General Affairs and External Relations Council (July 2009)

Senior Official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels (July 2009)

F. S. Larrabee, RAND Corporation, Washington DC (July 2009)

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**Selected Conferences / Political Meetings:**

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British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES) annual conference, Cambridge March 2009. [Gave presentation on enlargement.]
University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) annual conference, Angers 2009. [Gave presentation on the Black Sea region.]

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