Explaining Pakistan’s Strategic Choices in the 1990s: The Role of the United States

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Abstract

This thesis explains Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s by examining the role of the United States in the shaping of Islamabad’s security goals. Drawing upon a diverse range of oral history interviews, the thesis explains the American contribution to Pakistani security objectives during the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001). By doing this it addresses a gap in the relevant literature and moves beyond the available mono-causal explanations often distorted by a mixture of intellectual obfuscation and political rhetoric.

By drawing upon the concept of the security dilemma in international politics as a lens to understand the nature of Pakistan’s India-specific security compulsions, this research investigates and explains the dynamics which drove Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, its support for the Taliban and its approach towards the indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir. In doing this, it highlights the extent to which Clinton’s foreign policy reinforced the immediate catalysts for US-Pakistan relations in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War two years later.

The primary argument of the thesis is that Clinton’s foreign policy contributed to the hardening of Islamabad’s security perspectives, creating space for the Pakistani military establishment to pursue its regional security goals; goals which were largely at variance with US global objectives in the 1990s. Secondly, it argues that US-Pakistan relations during this period were driven by a Cold War mindset, causing a fissure between US global and Pakistan’s regional security goals. The Pakistani military and civilian leadership utilized these divergent and convergent trends to protect Islamabad’s India-centric strategic interests.
This thesis is dedicated to all victims of post-Cold War terrorism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.
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I had a dream; a dream that someday I would undertake PhD research in a British University. For so many different reasons I never expected this dream to materialize. Then I met Douglas Tallack and the rest is history... and international relations. Thank you Douglas for facilitating this project in more ways than one!

It is ironic that after writing 80,000 words for my thesis I cannot find the right ones to thank my supervisors, George Lewis and Andrew Futter and of course Simon Rofe who supervised my work in my first year. He deserves a special mention because if he hadn’t traumatized me with his razor sharp insight delivered politely in bewildering packages of subtly nuanced British English I would probably have taken much longer to start this thesis.

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Introduction

This thesis seeks to understand the American role in the shaping of Pakistan’s security objectives during the 1990s. Specifically, it investigates the impact of Clinton’s foreign policy on Pakistan’s strategic choices in order to explain why and how Pakistan continued to pursue regional security goals that were at variance with post-Cold War American global objectives. In other words, it attempts to explain how and why Pakistan demonstrated, what one critic has correctly referred to as, “an ability to resist America in the case of its nuclear program, its Kashmir policy {and} its support for the Taliban,” during the Clinton era (1993-2001).

This thesis is driven by a desire to comprehend why and how Pakistan—the weaker of the two states—was able to defy the post-Cold War predominant superpower. It proceeds on the premise that unpicking the nature of Pakistan-US relations during the Clinton era — spanning the period between the end of the Cold war and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States—is fundamental to understanding Pakistan’s strategic behavior in the 1990s and why Clinton’s foreign policy failed to modify it.

As examined in Chapter 1 the available academic and journalistic literature of the 1990s does not explain Pakistan’s behavior in any comprehensive detail. Post 9/11 there is an intense scrutiny of Pakistan’s security choices in the 1990s but the literature provides a lop-sided view of history by discussing Islamabad’s pursuit of security goals primarily from the US standpoint.

This thesis aims to address the gap by highlighting the Pakistani perspective. Since Pakistani security related primary documentation is inaccessible primarily due to a culture of secrecy this research employs oral history interviews as the principal method of data generation. In this regard a wide range of interviewees has been accessed from across the Pakistani society comprising relevant military and civilian decision-makers, diplomats, journalists, intelligence officers, academics and politicians.

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From the American side fewer but relevant actors have been interviewed in view of the available US primary documents and secondary sources and also because this research is fundamentally about explaining Pakistan’s strategic objectives in the 1990s. Data generated in the course of interviews with high-ranking Pakistani and US officials, policy-makers and intelligentsia thus makes a distinct and original contribution to knowledge in the relevant field.


What makes the period looked at in this thesis of particular interest are the variations in US-Pakistan security relations. The years between 1989 and 2000 saw a growing change in the relationship as Pakistan’s nuclear program became the subject of intense Congressional scrutiny against the backdrop of declining American strategic interest in Pakistan. The Clinton administration’s focus on nuclear non-proliferation as an explicit foreign policy objective vis-à-vis Pakistan was more intense than under any other US administration in the past, and had deep implications for Islamabad’s India-centric threat perception. Concurrently, Clinton was the first US president to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan with regard to the Kashmir dispute without facing the Cold War-specific strategic compulsion to balance the triangular relationship (Discussed in Chapter 2).

As noted in Chapter 4 Clinton’s reorientation of US foreign policy from geopolitics to geo-economics brought focus on India even more intently. In contrast Pakistan offered fewer economic incentives but remained relevant to US security policies that emphasized the rise of rogue states, potential proliferation of

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2 India-Pakistan hostility is discussed in Chapter 2.
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and terrorism as threats to American national security interests. During this time Clinton's approach towards Islamabad emerged from a security-oriented perspective - nuclear non-proliferation and curtailment of terrorism - with little comparable interest in Pakistan's democratic process between 1989 and 1999.

Pakistan's threat perception in the 1990s was driven by three key security compulsions - territorial integrity vis-à-vis India in the east, territorial integrity on its western border with Afghanistan, and the pursuit of nuclear capability. The Clinton presidency saw the development of Pakistan's three core principles of security: attainment of nuclear weapons; installing a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul by bolstering the Taliban and continued manipulation of indigenous developments in Indian Kashmir by tying down substantial Indian forces in the area. The core argument developed in the course of this research is that Clinton's key foreign policy goals - preventing Pakistan from the attainment of nuclear weapons and curtailing its support for the Taliban in Kabul and militancy in Indian Kashmir - not only failed to deter Islamabad from the pursuit of its strategic choices but inadvertently played a role in the shaping of these choices. The failure

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5 Despite his doctrine of democracy enlargement Clinton's foreign policy did not contribute to Pakistan's democratic process that had brought civilian governments to power between 1989 and 1999 after eleven years of military rule.

6 The word “Taliban” is the plural of “Talib” meaning “seeker of religious knowledge”. Post 9/11 there have emerged different factions of the Taliban such as the Pakistani Taliban, the Punjabi Taliban, the Haqqani Network etc. See Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion's Tail (New York: Free Press, 2010). For the purposes of this study the term Taliban pertains to the Afghan Taliban that rose to power in 1994, installed its government in Kabul in 1996 and remained in power until 2001 when the US invasion dislodged it. The Taliban movement had its origins in the religious seminars or madrassahs in Afghanistan's southwest. Traditionally, Afghan religious students have contributed to armed resistance against any foreign intruder. They were mobilized against the Soviets as part of the Afghan resistance (Mujahedeen) backed by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Taliban returned to its madrassahs in Afghanistan and in the tribal Pashtun belt of Pakistan. Mullah Omar, a Pashtun village cleric in Sangesar, Afghanistan, and a former anti-Soviet fighter, led the Taliban to stem deteriorating law and order in Kandahar, capturing it in 1994 followed by Herat in 1995 and finally Kabul in 1996. See Ahmed Rashid Taliban; Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, My life with the Taliban (Gurgaon: Hachette India, 2010).
of Bill Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan emerged from the perpetuation of the securitized relationship of the Cold War era as examined in Chapter 2.

During the Cold War years (1945-1991) Pakistan joined the US military alliance system primarily to counter the regional power of its eastern neighbour and arch rival, India. Subsequently, from 1954 to 1962 and then in the 1980s there emerged a tight bilateral linkage in which Pakistan offered itself as a strategic asset for the larger US policy of Soviet containment. In return Pakistan received significant US military aid that enhanced its military capacity, enabling it to compete in its regional security competition with India. This in turn contributed to the empowerment of the military’s political role in Pakistan. The military and intelligence structures—especially the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI)—became stronger following a convergence of security interests between the US and Pakistan in support of the Afghan resistance or the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

The development of the Pakistani foreign policy (PFP) since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 has been tightly focused on its hostility with India manifested in the hitherto unresolved Kashmir dispute. The two states have fought three wars over the issue in 1948, 1965 and 1999 with decades of skirmishing and low-intensity conflict. Pakistan’s initial concern with territorial integrity intensified...

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after the loss of East Pakistan in December 1971. New Delhi’s active military role in exploiting Pakistan’s indigenous insurrection leading to the creation of Bangladesh and Indian nuclear tests in 1974 was crucial to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions became a source of concern for the US during the Cold War but the issue remained secondary to the periodic demands of US policy of Soviet containment. After the end of the Cold War however the subject generated intense US scrutiny thereby undermining the relationship in the 1990s. This thesis argues that instead of modifying Islamabad’s strategic behavior the US pressure in the 1990s strengthened PFP around its core principles after the end of the Cold War allowing it to demonstrate independence in the pursuit of its strategic choices.

Farzana Shaikh argues that US-Pakistan Cold War cooperation flowed from a “fundamentally flawed bilateral relationship” in which Pakistan sought to “validate geo-political parity with India through great power endorsement of its desire to assume regional status disproportional to its real capacities.” Shaikh’s argument is only partially correct; the fundamental flaw stemmed not so much from Pakistan’s afore-mentioned desire but from the triangular nature of the relationship itself. As discussed in chapter 2, US-Pakistan relations had an Indian dimension from the very outset, signifying the fundamental contradiction in the alliance: US global strategy objectives versus Pakistan’s regional goals. Periodic changes emerging from the ambivalent nature of the relationship produced opportunities for Pakistan to move towards security goals largely divergent from the US. Thus, the US-Pakistan partnership was inherently flawed because of the American desire to balance its relations with India and Pakistan.

The end of the Cold War made such constraints increasingly redundant translating into a US policy shift from partnership with Pakistan and tolerating its

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nuclear ambitions to strategic disengagement, a renewed scrutiny of its nuclear program and a growing improvement in US-India relations; this policy-shift became more pronounced during the Clinton presidency. Conversely, the end of the Cold War did not significantly ameliorate Pakistan-India relations. As discussed in Chapter 5 throughout the 1990s Pakistan’s military establishment—primarily the army high command and its intelligence agencies particularly the ISI—exercised potent control over Afghan, Kashmir and nuclear policies during civilian rule, giving rise to a new governance structure i.e. the Troika, in which the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) were the three key decision-makers with the army chief being the most powerful.

During the 1990s growing Indian conventional military power and nuclear ambitions, continued instability in Afghanistan and improvement in US-India relations contributed to Pakistan’s security dilemma—a situation that stems from the existential condition of uncertainty confronting states vis-à-vis motives and intentions of an adversary capable of inflicting harm and in which security-enhancing measures of one state can lead the other to respond with similar measures (as discussed in Chapter 1).

Islamabad’s quest for nuclear parity with New Delhi, its support for the Taliban and manipulation of local developments in Indian Kashmir were at variance with foreign policy goals of the Clinton administration. However, this study demonstrates there was also a temporary convergence of interests between the erstwhile allies. Pakistan used both convergence and divergence to protect its regional security interests. By examining the interplay between Islamabad’s regional compulsions and US global objectives within the parameters of a

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12 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management”, http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Pakistan-Political_Transitions_and_Nuclear_Management.pdf, accessed 14 July 2013. Constitutionally, the Chief Executive has the authority over Pakistan’s nuclear program. During the 1990s this constitutional requirement was upheld although the military retained its control as discussed in Chapter 5.
securitized relationship this thesis argues that the United States played a role in the evolution of Pakistan's security choices and PFP formulation in the 1990s.

In general, this work demonstrates that Pakistani strategic choices deserve closer scrutiny and understanding, even if these went against the post-Cold War American trends. More specifically, this study makes several important contributions by examining the role of the United States in the shaping of Pakistan's strategic choices in the 1990s. By highlighting the hitherto neglected Pakistani perspectives this research addresses a gap in knowledge and thus adds value to the existing literature on Clinton's foreign policy and Pakistan's security paradigm in the 1990s. By doing this it provides the missing link between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the US-led War on Terror in 2001 thereby broadening the scope of analysis of post 9/11 US-Pakistan relations. By broadly situating this study within the International Relations concept of the security dilemma this research adds to the existing literature on the subject. This thesis therefore makes contributions at multiple levels.

At the same time it is important to point out what this research does not do. It is not a broader effort to test theoretical concepts such as the security dilemma, nor does it identify ethical or moral dimensions of either Clinton's foreign policy towards Pakistan or Pakistan's strategic choices in the 1990s. Furthermore, while developments in the 1990s deserve special academic focus to explain the nature of post-9/11 US-Pakistan re-engagement, this latter time period is beyond the scope of this study. The following section explains how each chapter contributes to this research project.

**Thesis structure**

This thesis begins in Chapter 1 with a description of the conceptual framework employed for this study. It has three sections: Section 1 incorporates a literature review to highlight a gap that this study aims to address. Section 2 discusses and justifies analytical tools employed by the thesis to explain and interpret data. Finally, an explanation of the methods of data collection follows in section 3.

The second chapter provides a historical perspective on the nature of Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War; by contextualizing the research focus it serves as a scene-setter. Highlighting Pakistan's motivation behind joining the US
collective security arrangement it discusses inherent contradictions in the alliance partnership and subsequent implications for Pakistan’s regional goals. This chapter emphasizes major variations in the relationship between 1954 and 1989 and how the Pakistani leadership used convergent and divergent trends to protect national security interests.

The third chapter focuses on the immediate catalysts for the relationship during the George H.W. Bush administration. Focusing on the initial cracks in the Pakistan-US relationship between 1989 and 1993 it examines Islamabad’s relevance to the evolving US foreign policy goal of global leadership in a changing security environment. Highlighting the rationale for PFP in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan conflict it examines Pakistani perspectives of the Bush administration’s approach towards Islamabad’s nuclear program and the process of US strategic disengagement from Pakistan.

The fourth chapter explains Clinton’s foreign policy choices and the tools employed to deal with Pakistan. By doing this it examines the reinforcement and entrenching of trends initiated during the Bush presidency. Investigating the Pakistan-specific key drivers behind Clinton’s Pakistan policy, this chapter examines and explains the extent to which post-Cold War US global interests interacted with Pakistan’s India-specific regional objectives and in the process impacted the latter’s Afghan, Kashmir and nuclear policies. It explores the degree to which variations in the relationship impeded Clinton’s foreign policy goals.

The fifth chapter explains Pakistan’s responses and coping devices adopted to offset the implications of Clinton’s foreign policy. Discussing Islamabad’s foreign policy-making process and perceptions of its civilian and military actors this chapter examines the rationale behind Pakistan’s Afghan and Kashmir policies and its quest for nuclear parity with India.

The final chapter draws the overarching argument of the study to a conclusion and sums up the findings of the research to demonstrate how and why PFP resisted US pressure by opting for nuclear deterrence and actively supporting proxies in Kabul and in Indian Kashmir. Demonstrating the centrality of the failure of Clinton’s foreign policy this chapter highlights the contributory role of the United States in the evolution of Pakistan’s strategic goals in the 1990s. As well as
concluding the principle argument it also offers a reflection on other key themes and arguments developed in the course of this study.
The central aim of this thesis is to examine the role of the United States in the evolution of Pakistan's security objectives in the 1990s. More specifically, it investigates the foreign policy approach of Bill Clinton's administration between 1993 and 2001 to examine the extent of its impact on Pakistan's strategic choices. This chapter aims to examine the phenomenon with the help of a Conceptual Framework developed for rigorous investigation of various factors. It proceeds in three sub-sections:

The first sub-section underscores the rationale of the study by identifying the limited explanatory power of the relevant academic literature. It aims at situating this research within the existing knowledge on the subject of US-Pakistan relations during the Clinton era. This redresses a gap in literature which neglects implications of Bill Clinton's foreign policy for Pakistan's strategic choices as well as Pakistani perspectives of the rationale for Islamabad's quest for nuclear weapons and its Afghan and Kashmir policies in the 1990s. The second sub-section introduces the framework of analysis developed for the thesis. Justifying the interdisciplinary approach adopted by this study, it discusses the relevance of the concept of the security dilemma as a means to explain historical events. Finally, the third sub-section explains and justifies methods for data collection adopted by this study. It rationalizes the use of qualitative research and explains why primary sources of data collection were appropriate for understanding and explaining the focal points of this research project.

(1) Literature Review

The authorship of the available the pre and post 9/11 literature on the subject is divided between academics, foreign policy professionals and journalists.; taken as a whole no group has examined the role of the United States in Pakistan’s strategic choices. Being primarily dependent on American and Western sources the available literature neglects to highlight in detail the Pakistani side of the story.
Books and articles written prior to 9/11 largely ignore Pakistan’s internal and external security compulsions in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The explanatory power of the post 9/11 literature is limited by a tendency towards mono-causality in that it primarily holds the Pakistan military establishment—primarily the ISI—responsible for mismanaging the fallout of the Soviet-Afghan War. Explanations for Pakistan’s strategic priorities are reduced to its military’s India-centric obsession or the ISI’s rogue behavior. This thesis in contrast offers balanced explanations based on empirical evidence to highlight the standpoint of Pakistani civilian and military policy-makers, diplomats and intelligentsia that are largely missing in the American and Western discourse. By providing an original account within the historical context this research addresses the gap in available literature and in the process makes a substantial contribution to knowledge.

The joint memoirs of George H. W. Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*,¹ bear testimony to a lack of interest in Pakistan. The book’s central narrative pertains to foreign policy matters and international events between 1989 and 1991. Authors’ official positions ensured their access to official documents and their own private notes giving the book a certain authority. Signifying the onset of diminished strategic interest in South Asia following the end of the Soviet–Afghan War, the book does not mention Pakistan although it does devote a few sentences to Afghanistan. Apparently, this lack of concern was inherited by the Clinton administration. Bill Clinton’s voluminous *My Life*² spares three to four descriptive paragraphs to Pakistan in connection with the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 and a few more in condemning Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Clinton’s first Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s memoir *Chances of a Lifetime*³ chronicles his personal recollections of domestic and international leaders and events during his experience in public life. It does not mention Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan is discussed in a couple of paragraphs only in connection with China’s assistance to its nuclear program. Although the rise and consolidation of the Taliban movement coincides with Christopher’s term in office—1993 to 1997—there is no reference to the group in

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his narrative. British historian John Dumbrell’s description of Warren’s memoir as “a model of controversy avoidance”\(^4\) is plausible in view of this omission (although Dumbrell probably did not have it in mind). Clinton’s second Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s autobiography \textit{Madam Secretary}\(^5\) briefly touches the subject of the Taliban-Pakistan connection while justifying Clinton’s approach to terrorism. However, it is a book of personal recollections without any direct connection with foreign policy strategy or execution. In \textit{“The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House”}\(^6\) John F. Harris argues for Clinton’s high intellectual capability to see all sides of a question; the biography however does not discuss why he did not exercise this ability with regard to Pakistan’s security concerns in the 1990.

Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s \textit{Engaging India}\(^7\) is primarily a first-hand narrative of Talbott’s role in US-India diplomacy after India-Pakistan 1998 nuclear tests. His interaction with Pakistani officials in this regard and Clinton’s handling of the Kargil episode also form part of the book. However there is no discussion of the American role in the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions or a balanced analysis of Pakistani perspectives. Drawing mostly on secondary sources Clinton’s first National Security Advisor Tony Lake’s \textit{6 Nightmares}\(^8\) speaks broadly of the emerging threats to the US in an increasingly globalized world. It does not offer any analysis of the specific genesis or evolution of such threats in the backdrop of Pakistan-US relations during the 1990s. In contrast to these political memoirs and first-hand narratives this thesis offers a comprehensive account of Pakistan-US interaction in the 1990s. Examining the role of American foreign policy in the evolution of Pakistan’s strategic choices this research also narrates the Pakistani side of the story in its entirety—something that is conspicuous by its absence in the available literature.

From the Pakistani side Iftikhar Murshed’s \textit{The Taliban Years}\(^9\)is a first-person account of his experiences as Islamabad’s special envoy to Afghanistan with

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\(^{6}\)John F Harris, \textit{The Survivor: Bill Clinton in the White House} (New York: Random House Inc., 2005)


\(^{9}\)S. Iftikhar Murshed, \textit{Afghanistan: the Taliban Years} (London: Bennet & Bloom, 2006).
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the mandate to bring the Taliban and other Afghan factions to the negotiating table. Drawing on his interactions with Russian and American government officials and the United Nations Murshed highlights Pakistani efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. However, the book’s scope does not encompass a scrutiny of Pakistan’s strategic choices or an examination of Clinton’s approach. Two political memoirs by former Pakistani foreign ministers—Gohar Ayub Kahn’s *Glimpses into the Corridors of Power* and Sartaj Aziz’s *Between Dreams and Realities*—narrate relevant events but do not offer any in-depth analyses of US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. Conversely, based on empirical evidence this thesis comprehensively examines and analyzes Pakistan-US relations in the 1990s thereby addressing the gaps in afore-mentioned historiography.

Drawing on his substantial journalistic experience in Afghanistan and Central Asia Ahmed Rashid’s account *Taliban* devotes two chapters to the rise of the Taliban while also analyzing the effects of changing American attitudes toward the movement during the Clinton era. Rashid focuses on the evolution of the Taliban within the context of Afghanistan. While it discusses ISI’s role in the empowerment of the movement, a comprehensive investigation of the impact of Clinton’s foreign policy on Pakistani strategic goals is not part of the narrative. Moreover, unlike this thesis, Rashid has not interviewed any senior officials of the ISI to get competing or reinforcing evidence. Clearly, by failing to provide competing Pakistani arguments and premises the afore-mentioned memoirs/first-person narratives offer a lop-sided view of history. In contrast to these this study examines the American contribution to Islamabad’s policy preferences in the 1990s while highlighting competing and compatible Pakistani positions on various subjects relevant to this research project.

*Disenchanted Allies* by Dennis Kux is the only comprehensive diplomatic account of the history of the US-Pakistan relationship from 1947 to 2000. Kux, who twice undertook diplomatic assignments in Pakistan, (1957-1959 and 1969-1971), draws on a number of primary sources including oral history interviews. However,
the book is not an investigation of the American role in the evolution of Pakistan’s strategic choices. Kux does not offer any in-depth analysis of the subject or utilize official/diplomatic documents when discussing US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. In comparison this research resorts to triangulation and utilizes both oral histories and available declassified US diplomatic communication of the period.

Published in 1997, Shirin Tahir-Kheli’s *Breaking with the Past*,¹⁴ discusses the Pakistan-India-US relations during the Cold War. Prescribing policy options for the United States in the post-Cold War environment the book does not examine American foreign policy to explain Pakistan’s security choices in the 1990s. Thomas Perry Thornton and Stephen P Cohen discuss Pakistan-India-US relationship in *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years*.¹⁵ Both writers identify levels of mistrust during and after the Cold War but do not investigate Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan or its implications for Islamabad’s regional strategic policies. Kamal Matinuddin’s *The Taliban Phenomenon* is an analysis of the rise and evolution of the Taliban between 1994 and 1997. It discusses the role of regional countries with a focus on Pakistan’s Afghan policy; however, the book does not investigate the American role in Pakistan’s strategic goals in the 1990s.¹⁶ It must be pointed out that historical narratives and analytic accounts are selective in their treatment of Pakistan’s case whereas this research offers an in-depth examination and balanced explanation of the subject by developing linkages between Islamabad’s security choices on the one hand and the American contribution to these choices on the other. Subsequently, it addresses the gap effectively by presenting Pakistan’s case in an integrated and comprehensive manner.

From the relevant post 9/11 literature Bruce Riedel’s *The Deadly Embrace*¹⁷ claims to discuss the American role in Pakistan’s instability and radicalization over the years. However, Riedel, who was a CIA analyst for more than twenty years besides serving on the National Security Council in the Clinton administration,

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offers mono-causal explanations in that he attributes Clinton's foreign policy failure to his inability to revoke the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment. As such the book—which emphasizes ISI's contribution to the rise of global terrorism—does not discuss multiple implications for Pakistan ensuing from Clinton's diplomacy which derived from not only the Pakistan-specific restrictive legislation but also from convergent and divergent security goals. Given his professional experience Riedel appears to hold back a bulk of first-hand information possibly for security reasons. Drawing on US government sources and interviews—and his journalistic experience in Afghanistan—Steve Coll's *Ghost Wars* offers revealing details of the CIA's involvement in the evolution of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban prior to 9/11 attacks and its inadequate resources to detect the threat. The book highlights the role of regional actors and the US in Afghanistan's instability— but it is not a study of the US impact on Pakistan's security policy choices in the 1990s.Drawing on selected declassified US government documents and interviews, Seth Jones' *Graveyard of Empires* is a study of specific aspects of insurgency in Afghanistan. Jones, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, emphasizes the role of the ISI in Afghanistan in a short chapter dedicated to the 1990s; however he does not take into account the impact of Clinton's foreign policy on Pakistan's strategic policies or provide an insight into relevant Pakistani standpoint by providing any empirical evidence. Journalist Roy Gutman's *How we Missed the Story* is a well researched account of how various American institutions missed the emerging Taliban threat from Afghanistan. While the book provides some interesting insights into American institutional processes it is not a study of US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. Thus, while these four books furnish useful relevant primary data and historical information, they do not investigate the American role in the formulation of Pakistani post-Cold War security strategy based on empirical evidence and competing arguments and perspectives. In contrast, this study utilizes oral history interviews and available primary and secondary documents to construct a narrative that focuses on

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competing views and premises in order to explain the relevant phenomenon in a balanced manner.

State Department officials during the Clinton administration Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier refer to a number of primary and secondary sources in *America Between the Wars*. The book’s primary focus is on US domestic political developments and responses in the post-Cold War world and its connection with US foreign policy. It is revealing that although the book is written after 9/11 and devotes a number of pages to Clinton’s foreign policy analysis it does not focus on either the US-Pakistan-Taliban interaction or Clinton’s approach to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during the 1990s and refers to his approach to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons only in passing. Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s *Second Chance* examines the personal leadership of George H W Bush, Bill Clinton and George W Bush vis-à-vis America’s post-Cold War global role and its impact for the US global standing post 9/11. While allocating a whole chapter to Clinton’s foreign policy Brzezinski briefly mentions Pakistan only in connection with its nuclear ambitions and, unlike this thesis, neglects to examine the contributory role of Clinton’s approach for Islamabad’s strategic choices in the 1990s.

Drawing upon a number of primary sources, Shuja Nawaz’s *Crossed Swords* is a comprehensive discourse on the operational and political role of the Pakistan army since 1947. It briefly discusses US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s; however, Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan or its implications for Islamabad’s foreign policy are beyond the scope of the book. Although Nawaz uses interview material he does not utilize US declassified documents when narrating relevant events of the 1990s. This thesis in contrast refers to declassified documents and provides a wider range of oral histories vis-à-vis Pakistani perceptions while examining the impact of US foreign policy in the 1990s. Drawing upon primary and secondary sources, Hasan Abbas’s *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism* links terrorism with Pakistan army’s security policies and fluctuating U.S-Pakistan relations. Filled

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21 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).
with interesting historical anecdotes the book is not a study of the subject matter selected by this research project.

Making use of a number of primary sources Levy and Scott-Clark’s journalistic account\(^\text{25}\) is a scathing criticism of the American role in the continuity of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Feroz Hassan’s *Eating Grass*\(^\text{26}\) offers an insider’s account of the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear program from the Pakistani perspective. In keeping with the selected themes of the books, however, they are exclusively focused on the nuclear issue. In contrast this thesis offers an integrated analysis of Pakistan’s strategic goals in the 1990s.

To be sure there are books and journal articles which analyze Clinton’s foreign policy in some detail. In *Between the Bushes*\(^\text{27}\) Dumbrell investigates goals and the process of Clinton’s foreign policy-making but he approaches the subject from a predominantly European standpoint; hence there is no comprehensive investigation of the US-Pakistan interaction. Cox dedicates a chapter to the significance of the post Cold War Third World for the US in his *Superpower without a Mission?*\(^\text{28}\) However, it is an overview and not a comprehensive discussion on Clinton’s Pakistan policy. Nonetheless, by identifying Clinton’s foreign policy goals as a continuation of the Cold War mindset—with its focus on Russian internal developments and containment of China—Cox offers an insightful observation. Analyzing the failure of Clinton’s foreign policy in Iraq and Somalia William G. Hyland attributes it to Clinton’s lack of pragmatism and consistency in *Clinton’s World: Remaking of America’s Foreign Policy*\(^\text{29}\) Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan’s nuclear program and the futility of sanctions are noted briefly but there is no in-depth investigation of the American impact on Islamabad’s security options during the period. Warren I Cohen’s *America’s Failing Empire*\(^\text{30}\) and Joan

\(^{25}\) Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, *Deception* (New York: Walker & Company, 2007.)


\(^{28}\) Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission*? (London: Pinter, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).


Hoff’s *A Faustian Foreign Policy*\(^{31}\) examine Clinton’s activist foreign policy with a focus on humanitarian interventions and ideological underpinnings. Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup in *US Foreign Policy Toward the Third World*\(^{32}\) focus on Clinton’s economic interest in Afghanistan under the Taliban but do not provide any insight into its impact on Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s. Clearly, none of these books offer a comprehensive analysis of US-Pakistan relations during the Clinton era. This thesis in contrast moves beyond the existing inadequate and selective accounts and makes a substantial and original contribution to literature on Clinton’s foreign policy.

There are significant journal articles of the 1990s that analyze Clinton’s foreign policy but with no reference to Pakistan. Primarily focused on the pros and cons of the humanitarian aspect of Clinton’s foreign policy Michael Mandelbaum\(^{33}\) and Richard Haass\(^{34}\) are critical of Clinton’s efforts in states peripheral to US immediate interests at the cost of relationships with major powers whereas Stanley Hoffmann\(^{35}\) supports the moral element in Clinton’s approach. Stephen Walt\(^{36}\) views casualty aversion in humanitarian intervention as “hegemony on the cheap.” Hyland\(^{37}\) posits that Clinton’s inconsistent foreign policy approach failed to construct a post-Cold War strategic doctrine. To this Stephen Schlesinger\(^{38}\) adds that Clinton’s foreign policy suffers from hesitancy and deference to US military. On a relatively positive note Dumbrell\(^{39}\) sees Clinton’s goal of democracy enlargement not totally without merit as it achieved NATO expansion and progress

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35 Stanley Hoffmann, "In Defense of Mother Teresa: Morality in Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs* 75:2 (March-April 1985), pp.172-175.
36 Stephen Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs* (March-April, 2000) [www.jstor.org](http://www.jstor.org) accessed on 20 July 2010.
Douglas Brinkley perceptively argues that the guiding principle of democracy enlargement was limited to areas that offered lucrative economic opportunities. Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman discuss Pakistan’s contribution to Afghanistan’s problems but do not offer a balanced explanation for Islamabad’s behavior. Marvin Weinbaum’s articles discuss the subject of Islamabad’s strategic approach towards Afghanistan however none of these narratives offer a balanced explanation of Pakistan’s complete security paradigm or examine the contributory role of Clinton’s foreign policy. This research in comparison makes an original contribution to relevant historiography by looking at various dimensions of the phenomenon and offers balanced explanations based on empirical evidence.

To sum up, none of these narratives—books and articles—address or explain Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s or investigate the impact of US foreign policy in this regard. Dumbrell argues that:

Clinton’s presidency constitutes the era from which political analysts, journalists and political scientists have retired, and to which professional, document-oriented historians have yet to direct their attention.

Dumbrell’s words correctly indicate that the decade of the 1990s is largely overshadowed by the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. Furthermore, it will be some years before a gamut of official declassified documents are available for the academics to grapple with the decade. This thesis thus makes a substantial contribution to the existing literature on Clinton’s foreign policy and US-Pakistan relations.

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43 John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, p.1.
Taken as a whole the above historiography clearly demonstrates that the available literature is deficient in balanced explanations of why Pakistani policy-makers chose to go against the post-Cold War American global interests. For example, directing the entire blame to the ISI for the military’s Afghan and Kashmir strategies is a mono-causal approach which eschews complex explanations of the phenomena. ISI’s role in policy-making and implementation during the 1990s is a symptom of a deeper problem to which the contributory role of the United States cannot be ignored. Unlike this thesis none of the works offer an in-depth analysis of how American post-Cold War approach towards India impacted Pakistan’s threat perception or how Clinton’s foreign policy contributed to the regional security dilemma emanating from India-Pakistan security competition. None of the works include first-hand information and empirical evidence generated through wide-ranging oral history interviews with Pakistani generals, politicians, intelligence officials, journalists and diplomats and compare them with American sources. By failing to highlight Pakistani perspectives the literature falls short of providing competing as well as reinforcing evidence thereby providing only a lopsided view of history. This study moves beyond the existing accounts to avoid inherent problems in available historiography and acts as the missing link in US-Pakistan relations between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001. This research project therefore makes a substantial and original contribution to knowledge.

Aims and Objectives

In order to address the gap in literature this study seeks to answer the following primary and secondary research questions. The principal research question to be addressed by this thesis is:

To what extent did Clinton’s foreign policy impact upon Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s?

The research question derives from the hypothesis that during the Clinton era US global interests combined temporarily with Pakistan’s regional goals to allow convergence; simultaneously, there were areas of serious disagreement. Variation in the relationship created space for the Pakistani military to consolidate certain foreign policy goals and instruments that aimed at attainment of nuclear
weapons and bolstering the Taliban movement. The main objective of the study is to examine and explain a phenomenon that has hitherto escaped parsimonious academic focus. In this regard the thesis attempts to answer the following secondary questions:

- What is the historical significance of the Cold War mindset?
- What strategic factors drove Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan?
- By what process did the Clinton team formulate its Pakistan policy?
- Why did Pakistan opt for bolstering the Taliban in the 1990s?
- Why did Pakistan accelerate its nuclear program despite US pressure?
- By what process did Pakistan formulate its security policy?

While some of these questions have been addressed separately in academic and journalistic work—as shown in the literature review—an effort to examine the combined impact of Clinton’s policies on Pakistan’s security objectives and instruments in the 1990s has not been undertaken so far. In order to achieve its stated aims and objectives the research turns to the following analytical tools as a means of understanding and explaining the phenomenon.

(2) Analytical Tools

This study adopts an interdisciplinary approach in that it works between and across the disciplines of history and international relations. The reason for choosing this approach is that historical narrative lends itself to a qualitative enquiry that captures the richness and diversity of data and helps contextualize the processes under investigation. It focuses on how individuals or groups made sense of the events and actions during the time period under scrutiny. Based on oral histories, primary documents and secondary sources this thesis aims to construct a narrative of the 1990s within the context of US-Pakistan relations during the Clinton era. On the other hand, a conceptual lens borrowed from international relations provides the means to understand and explain phenomena.
Bryman points out that conceptual constructs help reduce data to a manageable corpus and assist in identifying themes. Accordingly, this thesis is broadly situated within the international relations‘ concept of the security dilemma as part of international relations theory. The aim is not to view US-Pakistan relations and policy processes through this conceptual lens but to use it as a means to analyze the interplay between diverse variables. In other words this study does not test theoretical parameters of the security dilemma; instead the concept is used to reflect upon the political history contained in this study. In this sense it contributes to the body of knowledge on how overarching security dilemma can affect the foreign policy of a state.

Robert Jervis describes the security dilemma as a condition in which measures taken by one state to maximize its security motivates another state to respond with similar measures thus perpetuating a chain of action and reaction. German academic John Herz and British historian Herbert Butterfield are the founders of the formal concept. Butterfield argues that human nature is essentially insecure and feeds upon existential fear. He maintains that individual decision-makers are unable to empathize with their rival to mitigate the security dilemma because of “the absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma” that lies at the heart of “the very geometry of human conflict” and upon which all “other patterns may be superimposed.” John Herz while accepting the centrality of existential fear and uncertainty rejects Butterfield’s causal explanation of human nature and instead argues that the security dilemma is the outcome of international anarchy — i.e. the absence of an overarching governing body to regulate state behavior. He maintains that state behavior can be modified but argues that the security dilemma cannot be resolved completely since policy-makers could never be entirely certain of the scope and nature of other’s foreign policy objectives.

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Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, who have made major contributions to the concept, maintain that misperceptions based on lack of knowledge of other’s intentions can lead to inaccurate assessment of threat perception. Such a process is usually reflected in arms races. Under such a scenario the rival’s intentions are considered co-extensive with his capabilities. Therefore, states buy as many weapons as they can afford. In other words, the security dilemma can lead to strategic reductionism i.e. taking politics out of interstate relations and reducing them to military balance or imbalance. Schweller on the other hand sees predatory states and not the security dilemma as the source of conflict. Herz however maintains that the dilemma of “kill or perish” and not aggressiveness or greed constitutes power politics and war.

Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist argument maintains that the anarchical structure of the international system determines state behavior and forces states to assume a worst-case scenario. Since states cannot turn to any higher authority to provide their security, they resort to self-help. Therefore, out of safety, states must always assume that the other is a threat. Robert Jervis adds that “once a person develops an image of the other—especially a hostile image—ambiguous information will be assimilated to that image.” Thus, states resorting to self-help in an anarchic system are untrusting of rival intentions and “...tend to assume the worst” thereby contributing to arms competition. Barry Posen, however, postulates that anarchy does not of itself create the security dilemma but provides necessary conditions in which it can occur. Nonetheless, for Herz and Jervis, whether a cause or a necessary condition, the structural significance of anarchy for

54 John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p.231.
56 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p.75.
the security dilemma cannot be ignored. Clearly, the concept is undergirded with existential fear; the psychologically exaggerated reaction to perceived external threat thus draws upon the absence of an international overarching governing body along with uncertainty vis-a-vis others’ intentions.

According to Jervis a state may not have aggressive designs but the interplay of mistrust aggravates suspicion and leads to an action-reaction process between states. Jervis points out the difference between two models; the deterrence model in which a state means to deter the other to remain secure and so builds up its capacity; and the spiral model in which neither side wishes harm but ends up fighting one another because of mutual mistrust of increasing capabilities. The first model therefore does not constitute a dilemma but only a security problem which leads to a correct course of action. Schweller contends that “If states are arming for something other than security.... then it is no longer a security dilemma but rather an example of a state or coalition mobilizing for the purpose of expansion.” Wheeler and Booth also distinguish security dilemma from a security problem arguing that once the threat has been accurately perceived by a state then the situation cannot be classified as a security dilemma; “it is simply a security problem, albeit perhaps a difficult one.” However, it is obvious that the main difficulty in operationalizing the concept in this way emerges from the perceptual capacity to identify “real” from an “apparent” threat. It is this ambiguity of intentions that initiates the security dilemma in the first place.

Others have challenged the concept of the security dilemma. Alexander Wendt, for example, opposes both human nature and structure as causal explanations. "We do not begin our relationship in a security dilemma” given by anarchy or nature. Anarchy is a social construct and not an objective entity leading directly to worst-case scenarios. State behaviour is determined by actors’

60 Randall L Schweller, “Neorealism’s Security Bias”, p.117
conceptions of their own identities that are relative to others. Thus, "states act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not." State behavior, according to Wendt, is the sum of our past and present encounters. Here one may argue that not only past and present experiences but future encounters also constitute part of inter-state relations. Wheeler and Booth argue that preconceptions are always there and actions at the first encounter will be affected by these. Thus, perceptions of intentions with their inherent ambiguity remain one of the core causal factors in the security dilemma. Jervis argues that the security dilemma emerges from the failure of policy-makers to "recognize that one's own actions could be seen as menacing and the concomitant belief that the other's hostility can only be explained by its aggressiveness." Thus, decision-makers, fearful of others' intentions can opt for actions based on the assumption of the others' malevolence. Indeed, Wheeler and Booth's definition of the security dilemma is predicated on uncertainty of intent. Thus a security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state spawn uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes, i.e. security enhancement, or whether they are offensive actions aimed at weakening the other's security. It is the dual purpose role of the weapons that generates both security and insecurity that has led most writers to view security dilemma through almost exclusively military lens.

**Pakistan and the security dilemma**

According to Wheeler and Booth once a state has gauged the intentions of its enemy the “dilemma of interpretation” is settled. It is then followed by the second phase which entails choosing a suitable response from available options. In the

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case of Pakistani policy-makers, their perceptions of past experiences and future apprehensions have combined to formulate a particular threat assessment that sees the actions of its eastern neighbor India as inherently hostile thus settling the first phase of dilemma. Accordingly, with regards to the second phase Islamabad chose to continue its security competition with India. In the post-Cold War environment Pakistan's security fears were enhanced due to instability in Afghanistan and the spillover of post-conflict problems such as millions of refugees, illegal arms, and narcotics. At the same time an unfriendly government in Kabul could translate into increased Indian influence on Pakistan's western border. Fears of Indian encirclement added to the security dilemma worsened by US strategic disengagement, military aid termination following nuclear sanctions and Clinton's growing interest in India. Supporting the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime was aimed at protecting security interests by obviating Indian encirclement of Pakistan. Furthermore, exploiting indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir to tie down substantial Indian forces can also be understood as a security maximizing tool. Indian quest for nuclear weapons aggravated the security dilemma and mistrust of Indian intentions motivated Pakistan to create its own nuclear arsenal. All these strategies may be explained through the conceptual construct of the regional security dilemma. Booth and Wheeler argue that negative outcomes flowing from choices underpinning a state's security dilemma are not inevitable and that positive outcomes are possible. However, in the case of India and Pakistan empathy or security dilemma sensibility has not yet evolved to build trust despite some isolated examples of cooperation. It is note-worthy that Chinese technical assistance and transfer of missile technology to Pakistan exacerbated Indian security fears. Moreover, the Indian threat perception was further aggravated by the rise of the Taliban whom the Indians saw as supporting Pakistan's proxy warfare in Indian Kashmir. This added to the process of regional security dilemma.

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68 Interview with Pakistani official D.
69 Booth and Wheeler *The Security Dilemma*, pp 6-7
70 For instance the water-sharing agreement i.e. the Indus Waters Treaty signed on September 19, 1960 by Nehru and Ayub Khan and the 1972 Simla Agreement signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that facilitated the return of Pakistani Prisoners of War after the 1971 war.
71 See "China’s Missile Exports and Assistance to Pakistan: Statements and Developments", [http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/mpakchr.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/mpakchr.htm), accessed 6 March 2012,
By looking for alternative strategies in the 1990s, Islamabad resorted to self-help so as to compensate for termination of US military and economic aid through market diversification and by increasing its reliance on China. It accelerated efforts to achieve nuclear capability as force equalizer against India.\textsuperscript{72} It is noticeable that while Pakistan’s relations with the US did not stem from the security dilemma the wider American security concerns underpinning Clinton’s approach-- preventing the rise of rival powers such as China with which Islamabad had close relations--impacted Pakistan’s regional security dilemma. In addition to this US intelligence reports of Islamabad’s sale of nuclear technology to third parties such as North Korea, Iran and Libya\textsuperscript{73}—the three countries that made the list of Clinton administration’s “backlash states”\textsuperscript{74}—added to US anxieties over Muslim Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. The question of nuclear proliferation had become very important for the Clinton administration\textsuperscript{75} in view of transnational terrorism after the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War diffused nature of the threat posed by non-state actors—their irrational behavior that glorified death and the fragmentary dynamics of globalization that assisted their operations—were alarming challenges. Difficulty in interpreting the intention of a faceless, irrational enemy on the one hand and that of the Pakistan military establishment on the other was therefore bound to aggravate American security concerns. The concept of the security dilemma can further explain the Clinton administration’s approach towards the Taliban.

The Taliban was initially seen by members of the Clinton team—such as Robin Raphel, Albright and Lake—as a stabilizing force.\textsuperscript{76} At the same time, there was difficulty in gauging the intentions of an unknown quantity supported by Pakistan—a state in pursuit of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{77} The Taliban’s perceived closeness to former anti-Soviet fighter from Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden—who according to US intelligence reports was involved in attacks on American assets

\textsuperscript{72} Interview with Pakistani Officials A and H.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Michael Krepon (3 January 2012).
\textsuperscript{74} Described in Chapter 3. Remarks of Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”
\textsuperscript{77}Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February, 2012).
during the 1990s—aggravated American security fears. Therefore, the concept of the security dilemma serves as an appropriate interpretive model to understand Pakistan’s India-centric existential fears on the one hand and on the other the contributory role of US global security compulsions in aggravating the regional security dilemma.

In order to fully utilize the explanatory framework, and move beyond the limitations of much of the available literature this research ascribes to the following methodology.

### (3) Methodology

This study derives from qualitative research in order to investigate different variables impacting US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. Specifically, it aims to understand the extent to which post-Cold War US-Pakistan relations contributed to the strategic choices made by Pakistan. Qualitative research can provide a deeper understanding of beliefs and attitudes by explaining “why” and “how” rather than just “what”. It is grounded in a philosophical position which broadly aims to interpret how the social world is understood, experienced or perceived. Therefore, it is based on flexible methods of data generation and its analyses and explanations derive from an appreciation of complexity, detail and context. Marsh argues that “when we seek to understand or explain how and why a political institution, event, issue or process came about, we are necessarily asking [research] questions that can be answered through using qualitative methods.” Qualitative research “cannot be independent of context.” It is based on “detailed, text-based answers” or “thick” description and analysis deriving from personal experience and reflection of participants in political institutions, or processes.

Devine identifies key problems with qualitative research as being “unrepresentative and atypical. Its findings are impressionistic, piecemeal, and even idiosyncratic”. However, he agrees that it is most appropriate in exploring

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78 Interview with Seth Jones (15 February, 2012).
“people’s experiences, practices, values and attitudes in depth and to establish their meaning.” Mason maintains that the strengths of qualitative research are overlooked by its critics who see it as “anecdotal or at best illustrative” and practiced in “casual and unsystematic ways”. She argues that while no research method is perfect, the criticism that qualitative research possesses these inherent weaknesses fails to appreciate the significance of context in explanations of social reality. Qualitative research cannot be neatly pigeon-holed into prescriptive set of principles and indeed it is one of the strengths of the method that different disciplines using it “operate with distinctive views about what makes the social world go round.”

Given the research focus of this study oral history interviews were judged as the most appropriate method for collecting diverse “biographical particulars as narrated by the ones who live them.” In other words, the historical aspect of the research could be understood through respondents’ experiences, perspectives and perceptions. More specifically, twenty-six face-to-face and nine semi-structured telephonic/Skype interviews were carried out from a cross-section of elite civil and military policy-makers, diplomats, politicians, academics, journalists and commentators in Pakistan and the US. Interviews were conducted twice—Pakistani actors were largely interviewed between July and October 2011 while American interviewees were accessed between January and April 2012. Face-to-face interviews were undertaken in Pakistani cities of Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Peshawar. Telephonic and Skype interviews were conducted with respondents in Washington D.C., Virginia, California and London (see bibliography for detail). Each interview was recorded with permission from the respondents. Some interviewees asked that part of the interview should not be attributed to them; this has been ensured in the study. In keeping with research ethics it has been made certain that the information provided by the respondents is not tampered with or fabricated to make the results more palatable. The bulk of data generated through oral history interviews for this study has not been replicated elsewhere and therefore has not informed other previously published politico-historical accounts.

81 Ibid., p.141.
82 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching, pp.1-3.
Oral histories afforded an insight mostly into personal experiences and perceptions of those directly involved in the policy-making process of the period under investigation. Many of the actors revealed much about the Pakistani and American mindsets in the 1990s. Some former Pakistani army chiefs and ISI heads, politicians, senior diplomats, journalists and academics provided important information not only concerning military and civilian perceptions but also about how these thoughts and fears shaped Pakistan-US relations in the 1990s.

Interviewing as a method of data collection was appropriate in addressing the research questions raised by this study. For instance, it allowed the researcher to understand the organizational and perceptual context within which foreign policy processes work in Pakistan and the US. Similarly, psychological nuances behind Pakistan’s India-centric approach and the American attitude towards nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism were gleaned from the narratives. The resultant insights and first-hand factual information were instrumental in driving the arguments and themes of this study. In view of the historical dimension of the research questions it was deemed proper to use semi-structured interviews. A thematic, topic-centered approach, encouraging narration of events was adopted with the understanding that the interview was open to development of unexpected themes. This flexibility facilitated greater understanding of individual experiences. This was done with the awareness that it was not the question of simple reporting of facts and that knowledge was not being excavated but rather being constructed and reconstructed. It was also kept in mind that “meanings and understandings are created in an interaction, which is effectively a co-production, involving researcher and interviewees.”

Like the Pakistanis, most of the US interviewees were happy to share their experiences and perceptions of the events. There were also exceptions when the interviewees provided the public account of events or those versions which extolled a particular institution. From the American camp a few were reluctant to answer specific questions related to Clinton’s role in the shaping of Pakistan’s strategic policies. Diplomats from both the countries offered diplomatic rhetoric but also a great deal of substance as they shared diplomatic and personal experiences during the 1990s. Many Pakistani respondents provided interesting

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84Jennifer Mason, *Qualitative Researching*, p.63.
and enlightening versions of the historic post-Cold War developments in Afghanistan. The military elite in Pakistan were welcoming and eager to talk and so were the politicians. Diplomatic elite and policy-makers, including those who had directly interacted with their counterparts in American or Pakistani military and civilian bureaucracy, provided a wealth of information regarding the processes of foreign-policy making in the two countries. Their respective perceptions and views regarding each other were also revealing.

Interviewing was deemed especially useful since declassified government documents or official records pertaining to the 1980s and 1990s are almost impossible to access in Pakistan. A bulk of declassified documents from 1947 to 1970s is however available in book form. Conversely, fewer interviews were conducted with the Americans since the main contribution of this research pertains to Pakistan. Moreover, many relevant American diplomatic communications and intelligence assessments are available on George Washington University website, under Freedom of Information Act. Disclosure of previously classified documents to aid the 9/11 Commission Report and leaking of diplomatic communication by Wikileaks have added to the list of disclosed US diplomatic and intelligence material. Moreover, relevant US congressional debates, hearings and research papers, and public papers of US presidents are accessible through the University of Leicester library. US think-tank assessments and research papers are also available on the internet. Relevant journal articles and books related to the American academic and journalistic views could also be found in the University library or loaned from the British Library. Furthermore, many relevant actors of the period, including Bill Clinton, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Tony Lake, Strobe Talbott and Bruce Riedel have either written their memoirs or compiled or analyzed events of the time period in post 9/11 books or in interviews given to American journalists and authors.

Conversely, a couple of relevant memoirs by Pakistani officials—Gohar Ayub Khan and Sartaj Aziz—while providing some factual information do not specifically investigate variables relevant to the research focus of this study. Military actors in particular have so far not written any comprehensive account of the 1990s. In the absence of a vibrant research culture even academic and

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journalistic secondary sources are in short supply. Caveats within the Freedom of Information Act are easily manipulated by concerned institutions to refuse information.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, “secrecy is a norm while provision of information to citizens is an exception.”\textsuperscript{87} Despite assistance from elite contacts the material made available by the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this thesis in 2011 was inadequate and any direct access to the archives was not granted on the plea that documents required for this study are “highly classified.” It is important to bear in mind that foreign policy choices in the 1990s were the domain of the civil-military Troika as explained in Chapter 5. Accessing any military record in this regard was next to impossible owing to the military culture of secrecy. Multiple visits to the research centre of the National Defense University in 2011 did not yield any useful results.

At the same time, due to unprecedented media freedom in Pakistan since 2004 there appears to be a growing need for catharsis and an increasing criticism of the military’s involvement in politics. Many relevant actors, especially from the military, were willing to share their experiences during the interviews, perhaps to indirectly answer open, and sometimes bitter, criticism of their role in supporting militancy in the 1990s. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the criticism leveled at the Clinton team’s approach towards terrorism in the 1990s,\textsuperscript{88} it is possible that former Clinton administration officials were keen to give their version of the events. Oral histories therefore are the primary source of data collection for this research project.

Chief problems in oral history interviews pertain to bias introduced by memory lapses or willful distortion of facts as well as preconceptions of the researcher. According to Grele, active participation of the interviewer makes the interview a conversational narrative involving conversation and the telling of a tale. Thus, social and psychological relationship between the two participants

\textsuperscript{86} Zahid Abdullah, “Right To Information Remains Off Limits To Many” \textit{The News}, Islamabad, October 24, 2010.


needs to be remembered. There was the possibility of unintentional inaccuracy, deliberate falsification or distortion of events or avoidance of facts by interviewees especially those directly involved with the policy-making of the period under study. Too close an event can prevent clarity of impressions just as hindsight can influence one’s perspective. The significance of this aspect was not overlooked in terms of 1990s being a close event in historical-time. Moreover, there is also the tendency to amplify the extraordinary over the mundane when remembering the past. The researcher was mindful of these facts when analyzing and interpreting data and reporting conclusions and findings. Efforts were made to follow “empathetic neutrality” that entails understanding complex social or political events while trying to remain non-judgmental. Finally, the overall historical context of US-Pakistan relations, individual political and ideological affiliations, dynamics of the 1990s and the nature of US-Pakistan relations after 9/11 were considered when assessing the responses of Pakistani and American interviewees.

Rich, experiential oral histories contextualized the research questions and ensured the validity of this research. The breadth and range of interviewees encompassing different fields within Pakistan and the US helped account for researcher biases. Each interview was transcribed and listened to multiple times over the course of the research. This allowed for picking up nuances missed the first time; it helped in detecting and interpreting new dimensions after going through primary and secondary sources; it allowed the researcher to cross-check evidence against competing or compatible evidence; lastly, listening and re-listening to the interviews assisted in rechecking transcribed material for any errors. Transcriptions were then addressed to find common themes or diverse arguments regarding a particular subject. On the whole, interviews in the thesis offer access to a wide spectrum of respondents. The study highlights competing evidence and explanations and also points out contradictions.

The research, however, does not rely on oral history interviews alone and triangulation has been employed so that evidence and findings may be cross-checked. Interviews helped fill gaps in archival research such as capturing the

90 Stuart Sutherland, “All in the Mind”, Sunday Telegraph (January 2 1983).
mood of a relevant actor, reconstructing personalities; identifying important documents; and revealing assumptions behind primary documents\textsuperscript{92} such as Congressional record on the Pressler Amendment debates or Clinton’s policy speeches. Conversely, Burnham argues that public records and private papers of key officials are vital sources of data collection for qualitative research.\textsuperscript{93} Documents may provide access to “a set of events or processes, which you cannot observe” and such phenomena cannot be interpreted “without recourse to verbal descriptions and reconstructions.”\textsuperscript{94} Thus, cross referencing the claims made in interviews through archival research was undertaken by this study. This included diplomatic correspondence, Congressional record comprising hearings, reports and debates, presidential papers, government policy documents, and print and electronic media reports. This was done to minimize factors related to selective memory or willful distortion of facts. It was also helpful in gleaning factual details and understanding wider political thinking regarding US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. US government documents further provided insight into the US foreign policy objectives and relevant processes during the Clinton era. That said, it has been taken into account that declassified US government documents are incomplete.

In addition to primary sources, available secondary sources comprising books, journals and journalistic analyses were also utilized. Mason argues that all textual analysis “involves mediation between the frames of reference of the researcher and those who produced the texts” and needs to be analyzed “in the context of their nature, production and use.”\textsuperscript{95} Documents are important not just for the information they contain but also their context and the implied readership. Atkinson and Coffey argue that documents form a kind of “documentary reality” and should not be taken as transparent representatives of what they report.\textsuperscript{96} In other words, as Bryman points out, official or governmental communication may be written with the possibility of “prospective scrutiny” by public under the

\textsuperscript{94}Jennifer Mason, \textit{Qualitative Researching}, pp.74-75.
\textsuperscript{95}Jennifer Mason, \textit{Qualitative Researching}, p.76.
Freedom of Information Act, at a later date. Thus, texts are written with distinctive purposes in mind and do not necessarily reflect the truth in totality. It is therefore important to pay attention to the historical and social context in which they were produced.

Burnham et al, while endorsing the foregoing arguments add that an approach that pays attention to the conditions under which a document was produced, the intended audience and any possible vested interests of the author would guarantee reliability. This study has ensured that such principles are kept in mind. For example, the Congressional record of a Pakistan specific debate was analyzed against the temporal and spatial historical contexts while the intended audience, political affiliations and potential partisan associations were scrutinized. Efforts were also made to separate political rhetoric from substance in order to draw balanced inferences.

**Contributions and positioning**

This thesis fits into the broader thinking about the shaping and evolution of Pakistan’s strategic objectives between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of American War on Terror in 2001. In its dealing with the under-assessed area of the role of the United States in the development of these strategic goals this thesis highlights the effects of international dynamics and regional security processes on Islamabad’s national security perceptions. By doing this the research addresses an important gap in literature pertaining to why Pakistan made certain strategic choices in the 1990s. Thus, although post-9/11 is not the research focus, this study broadens the scope of analysis of the post-9/11 disparity between the US and Pakistani national security thinking. By developing an analysis of how international and regional influences interacted with respective security compulsions of the two states, this thesis moves beyond the relatively simplistic understandings of Pakistan’s responses to American foreign policy approaches primarily during the Clinton era. By highlighting Pakistani perspectives through oral history interviews this study thus adds to the knowledge of an issue that hitherto has not been fully analyzed.

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98 Ibid., p.560.
The findings of this study are:

- The US contributed to the shaping of Pakistan’s security choices in the 1990s
- Clinton’s foreign policy choices contributed to Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons
- The Clinton administration contributed to the empowerment of the Taliban and the perpetuation of Islamabad’s Kashmir policy
- Pakistan’s choice of strategic goals in the 1990s was in keeping with its national security interests
- Cold War thinking patterns continued to mark US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s

This study goes beyond mono-causal narratives and asks questions that have escaped academic and journalistic attention so far. These include not only “what” but primarily “how and why” questions regarding strategic drivers behind Clinton’s foreign policy approach towards Pakistan and the policy-making process. By doing this the study challenges the broadly accepted American and Western versions that put the entire onus for the spawning of global terrorism on Pakistan. Similarly, it interrogates Pakistan’s rationale and the process of choosing a particular set of strategic goals and tools in the 1990s. By doing this the study highlights the largely neglected Pakistani standpoint.

This thesis argues that Clinton’s ambivalent approach towards Pakistan reinforced Cold War thinking patterns in the post Cold War world – a world in which there was a warming of US-India ties. The ensuing convergent and divergent security interests created space for the Pakistani policy-makers to continue to pursue nuclear ambitions while using proxies in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir to protect national security interests. The proxies were thus a means for keeping the western border secure while indirectly engaging Indian forces in the east. This in turn facilitated the civil-military leadership’s single-minded pursuit of nuclear weapons while allowing the military establishment to retain its control over key strategic areas of foreign policy.
This line of argument allows the thesis to demonstrate the prioritization of Clinton’s foreign policy goals, what definitions were applied to refer to these and how these definitions were operationalized. On the other hand, the “how and “why” questions address Pakistani perspectives and facilitate investigation into deeper meanings and narratives underpinning Pakistan's behavior as a pragmatic actor in the post-Cold War environment. In this sense the study explains the processes behind US and Pakistani foreign policy-making and the contributory factors influencing the choice of respective goals and tools in the 1990s.
US-Pakistan relations during the Cold War were based on periodic convergence of strategic interests. The two states developed a securitized relationship in the early 1950s based on security agreements, military aid and training as well as intelligence cooperation. Pakistan’s strategic location and its armed forces primarily became important for US security goals when the defense of the Middle East emerged as a significant element in the American strategic doctrine of Soviet containment (hitherto Containment). Successive US administrations recognized

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1 In the aftermath of World War II there emerged an indirect political, military, ideological and economic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, expressed through military alliances, proxy wars, and arms competition. The Cold war began to wind down in the late 1980s and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 the United States emerged as the sole superpower.

India’s strategic importance for US foreign affairs but Indian policy of non-alignment⁴ and its simultaneous closeness to Soviet Union⁵ obviated alliance partnership. Pakistan’s strategic location and its armed forces provided an alternative. Its near-contiguous border with the Soviet Union and direct land connection with China made it a suitable site for US bases.⁶ Its western wing’s proximity to the Persian Gulf afforded it the potential role of the defender of the Middle East oil resources and the Indian Ocean area.

At the same time, its eastern wing was close to South East Asia⁷ thus providing a link between South East Asia and the Middle East.⁸ Pakistan’s British trained military commanders were perceived by US foreign policy experts as susceptible to American rather than Soviet influence and its armed forces, if well equipped, were seen as capable of defending the Indian Ocean area.⁹ US policy-makers understood that local forces under indigenous command would be acceptable to the Islamic Middle East.⁹ Pakistan’s Muslim identity thus added to its operational utility.

Muslim Pakistan was carved out of a predominantly Hindu India in 1947 after the British withdrew from the sub-continent. Religious and cultural issues between the two communities were further marred by massacres and migrations.

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²The stated aims of the Bandung Conference—a meeting of Asian and African states on April 18–24, 1955 in Indonesia—were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism. The conference was a significant step toward the crystallization of the Non-Aligned Movement which proposed non-engagement with either of the two superpowers militarily. See Nazli Choucri, “The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception, and Behaviour”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 2:1 (March 1969), pp.1-17; For Indian perspective see Deepa Ollapally, “Third World Nationalism and the United States after the Cold War”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 110:3 (Autumn 1995), pp.417-434.


⁸ Department of State Policy Statement with respect to Pakistan (3 April, 1950) in K. Arif, (ed.), *America-Pakistan Relations: Documents*, Vol.1, pp.27-28

on both sides of the border in the wake of partition. Division of military and financial assets was another source of contention with Pakistan inheriting a weak economic base and an ill-equipped military whose inadequacy was reflected in the Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir in 1948. The undecided fate of the state of the autonomous princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became—and remains—the epitome of Pakistan-India rivalry.

Relations with hostile India in the east were impacted by an unfriendly Afghanistan in the west. Successive Afghan leaders—friendly towards India and later also the Soviet Union—did not recognize the British drawn border with Pakistan which cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas in North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces politically dividing Pashtun, Baluch and other ethnic groups. That India could exploit the situation by fuelling irredentism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) was thus added to Pakistan’s security concerns. In other words, the security dilemma vis-à-vis territorial integrity was already in existence at the time of independence.

Subsequently, Pakistan was the first South Asian country to join a US constructed regional collective-security system in 1954 in return for American military and economic aid\(^\text{10}\) to bolster its defense against India in order to secure its territorial integrity. During the Cold War diverse US-Pakistan security interests translated into a pattern of closeness and estrangement largely symbolized by the frequency and volume of the American military aid. This securitized relationship was important for Pakistan Foreign Policy (PFP) in stabilizing its first principle of territorial integrity despite growing disenchantment in the 1960s. Pakistan’s territorial integrity was severely undermined following the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 but cooperation with Washington in the 1980s provided Islamabad the opportunity to secure its western border through intervention in Afghanistan—an advantage which PFP will aim to reinforce and expand after 1989.

This chapter examines Pakistan’s regional security compulsions as the motivation behind its alliance with the US. Focusing on inherent contradictions and the resultant major variations—explainable by disparity in respective foreign policy goals—this chapter contextualizes the questions being asked by this

research project. The chapter is divided into three sections: The first section explains Pakistan’s India-centric threat perception as the prime mover of its alliance membership. The second section investigates inherent contradictions in the alliance and its implications for PFP. The third section examines how variations flowing from contradictions in the relationship affected the primary PFP goal of securing territorial integrity especially between 1971 and 1989.

(1) Why Pakistan Joined the US Military Alliance

PFP aimed at allying with the US to augment its military defense capabilities to compete with India and in the process bring diplomatic pressure upon India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In other words Pakistan expected a security guarantee from the US against Indian aggression as well as American political support for Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir.

Pakistan and India have continuously been hostile neighbors since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. According to the partition plan under the outgoing British administration Pakistan was to comprise of Muslim majority areas of undivided India whereas the 562 autonomous princely states were to independently decide which country to join. The final outcome was less than perfect since the status of the Muslim majority states of Jammu and Kashmir and Junagarh and the Hindu majority state of Hyderabad remained

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11 The Indian National Congress under Nehru’s leadership and extremist Hindu advocates of “Akhand Bharat” (unified India) had opposed Pakistan’s raison d’être—the Two-Nation Theory based on incompatibility of Hindu-Muslim cultural and religious beliefs and perceived partition as emasculating Indian regional power and prestige. See for example, President Indian National Congress, Acharya Kripalani’s statement in *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, Calcutta (18 August 1947); Home Minister Sardar V P Patel’s statement quoted in Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p 115-116; after the fall of East Pakistan in 1971 the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi declared in a public speech “Today we have drowned the Two-Nation Theory in the Bay of Bengal”, [http://beta.dawn.com/news/615495/obscene-barrier-another-view](http://beta.dawn.com/news/615495/obscene-barrier-another-view), accessed 3 August, 2011; For the Two Nation Theory see Khurshid Ahmed Khan Yusufi, (ed.), *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam*, Volumes II and III (Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal, 1996)

12 As per partition plan all 562 autonomous princely states, except Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu-Kashmir, acceded to either India or Pakistan.
When the Indian military annexed princely states of Junagarh in 1947 and Hyderabad in 1948, it stoked Pakistani fears of Indian annexation of Kashmir and also retaking of Pakistani territory. When the Indian military annexed princely states of Junagarh in 1947 and Hyderabad in 1948, it stoked Pakistani fears of Indian annexation of Kashmir and also retaking of Pakistani territory.

Pakistan’s geographical and military vulnerability to India was a major source of existential fears. Pakistan’s two wings, East and West Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The western wing (now Pakistan)—with a thousand miles in length but at various strategic points only three hundred miles in width—was, and remains, vulnerable to Indian flanking movements in the north and south and a central assault can split it into two. By comparison, Indian troops can fall back many miles before critical positions are compromised. Lahore, the capital of Pakistan’s most prosperous Punjab province, is only fifteen miles from the Indian frontier. There are no high mountains or rivers separating the two countries; the desert in the Sind province, the Punjab plains and even the coastline are easily penetrable.

Stephen Walt counts geographic proximity as one of the significant factors that impact a state’s threat perception vis-à-vis a potential aggressor. One may argue that the degree of geographic vulnerability is dependent on the capability of a state’s defense forces and national resources and Pakistan was clearly at a disadvantage with regard to the division of post-partition physical and financial

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14 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p. 29. Between 1947 and 2000 the two states have fought three wars over the disputed territory in 1948, 1965 and 1999 besides exercising brinkmanship in 1950-1951, 1986-1987 and 1990. India also intervened militarily in the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961 to annex it to India. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp 24-5, 72, 83


19 India’s population at partition was four times larger than Pakistan’s and after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, it was seven times larger. W. Howard Wriggins, Dynamics of Regional Politics, p. 102
assets in view of emotional bitterness and hostility. The original agreement called for the armed forces and other assets division at 64-36, with India getting the larger share. Eventually Pakistan only received one third share of the assets.

Pakistan military's failure to challenge India when it annexed Junagarh that had opted to join Pakistan and the first Indo-Pakistan armed conflict over Kashmir in 1948 clearly accentuated the inadequacies of an under-equipped Pakistan military and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan requested the UN to ensure a ceasefire. A combination of geography, weak economy, post-partition mass migrations in the midst of Hindu-Muslim massacres along with an ill-equipped military spawned insecurity against the backdrop of the unresolved Kashmir dispute. Fears of re-absorption into India were thus at the heart of Pakistan's early years.

Pakistan's geographical and operational vulnerability to India in the east was reinforced by its relations in the west with Afghanistan, the only country to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations in 1947. Till the late 1970s successive governments in Kabul had reservations about the Durand Line claiming that "Pashtunistan"—the land of the Pashtun—was on both sides of the border.

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23 Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, pp.24-35; after a formal cease-fire was declared the dispute was referred to the United Nations. A UN resolution was passed that called for a plebiscite in Kashmir. India rejected the resolution and annexed the part under its control to the Indian Union. Similarly, Pakistan refused to vacate the occupied area as a UN precondition to plebiscite, giving it nominal autonomy as Azad or Free Kashmir. The cease-fire line was recognized as the Line of Control in 1971. The 1947-48 war left 35% of Kashmir in Pakistan's control with India holding 45%. The rest was claimed by China in the northeast. S.M. Burke & Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historic Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp11-12.


25 The Durand Line refers to the 2,640 kilometers porous border demarcated by Sir Durand Mortimer of British India in the nineteenth century making Afghanistan a buffer state between British India and Imperial Russia. Afghanistan claimed that it had lapsed with the transfer of power in India in 1947 and to date does not recognize it. Pakistan and Afghanistan were on the brink of war on three occasions and diplomatic ties were severed in 1955 and 1962. Afghanistan—a landlocked country dependent on Pakistan's trade-routes—however did not take any military advantage of Pakistan's vulnerability during Indo-Pakistan wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971. See for
Kabul’s close economic and political ties with New Delhi—both were recipients of Soviet military and economic aid and resented Pakistan-US alliance—provided India the opportunity to promote irredentist sentiments on its western border as well as strategic operational advantages thus spawning fears of Indian encirclement.26

The dynamics of the security dilemma aggravate mutual mistrust and suspicion leading to a process of action-reaction27fusing fears into assessment of threat perception.28Hence, India’s stronger military capacity motivated Pakistan to fortify its defense by integrating its regional goals with US global interests. Through its alliance Pakistan sought security guarantees from a great power to secure its territorial integrity and also hoped to win diplomatic support for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand the American unresolved uncertainty regarding Soviet expansionist intentions29 was reflected in the National Security Council policy document, NSC 68, which recommended an increased US defense budget and the expansion of the Containment strategy to cover the entire globe through strengthening of alliances.30Thus, the concept of Containment juxtaposed with NSC 68 31presaged subsequent Pakistan–US


24Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).


30 As Truman’s Director Policy Planning Staff, Kennan held different views from his successor Paul Nitze regarding modalities of Containment. Kennan insisted that his call for “counter-force” was more political, economic and psychological in which the industrial–military areas were to be the focus of Containment. Nitze, on the other hand, perceived the Soviet challenge primarily in terms of a military threat that demanded US power projection and commitments beyond major industrial areas.

partnership as Pakistan became relevant to Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' Northern-Tier defense policy.\footnote{Dulles' new strategy was predicated on an idea of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs, Henry Byroade. Advocating protection of Persian Gulf oil resources with the help of Northern-tier countries—Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria—Byroade argued that US military support to "a geographical arc of Muslim countries" in the south of the Soviet Union could make the region less vulnerable to Soviet expansion. Byroade's interview with Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.47.}

Pakistan and the US formally initiated a securitized relationship following the signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on 2 May 1954. Later that year, Pakistan joined Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).\footnote{Using its eastern wing's proximity to South East Asia, Pakistan justified SEATO membership in return for substantial military aid—and also used the forum to raise the Kashmir issue— even though its eastern wing was never in danger of perceived Soviet expansionist designs.} In 1955 Pakistan Iran, Turkey and Iraq along with Great Britain, entered the Baghdad Pact (renamed Central Treaty Organization or CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1959) to emerge as "America's most allied ally in Asia."\footnote{Mohammed Ayub Khan, \textit{Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography} (New York, 1967), pp. 130.} According to academic Bajwa since the US did not itself opt for membership Pakistan was initially reluctant but joined the Baghdad Pact under British pressure.\footnote{The US never became a full member opting instead for observer status as the Congress was wary of the implications of the alliance in case of an Arab-Israel war. Hamza Alavi, 'Pakistan-US Military Alliance', pp.1151-54; Farooq Naseem Bajwa, \textit{Pakistan and the West}, pp. 140-42.} One may argue that the British were able to persuade Pakistan because PFP's goal of territorial integrity could be realized through alliance with the US. Pakistan clearly signed the two Pacts to protect its regional interests.

Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and Mutual Security Act of 1951 Eisenhower committed to a major US economic and military aid program for Pakistan. In return, in 1957, following the consent of Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy and the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Ayub Khan, a secret US base at Badaber in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province was established thus giving extra-territorial rights to the US. It was subsequently used for intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and China while the Peshawar airport was used for U2 flight operations for aerial spying. The formal agreement for the establishment of the base—termed "Communications Centre"—was formalized later in 1959.\footnote{Department of State Press Release on the establishment of a communications facility at Peshawar in Pakistan, 19 July 1959, K Arif, (ed.), \textit{America-Pakistan Relations: Documents}, Vol.1, p.169.} The base remained an anchor of US economic and military aid to
Pakistan besides restraining US arms sale to India.\(^{37}\) Ironically, Pakistan was willing to grant territorial rights to one country in order to protect its sovereignty—its authority as an independent state—from another; thus demonstrating both insecurity and desperation emanating from its India-centric regional security goals. US military and economic assistance in the first decade\(^{38}\) not only helped secure PFP goal of territorial integrity but was also provided psychological advantage as Pakistan leadership saw it as “driving a wedge between the United States and India.”\(^{39}\)

Robert McMahon argues that Pakistan “virtually forced the Eisenhower administration’s hand” to respond to its agenda through a clever combination of public diplomacy and newspaper leaks.\(^{40}\) Ridgway B Knight, deputy chief of mission in Karachi in 1955 recalls, “I happened to feel that the Pakistanis were taking us to the cleaners,” and that the US aid was being used to develop military formations against India. Similarly, US diplomat Christopher Van Hollen remembers that privately some Pakistanis admitted that the aid was being used against India but “we went through the charade of highlighting the Soviet threat.”\(^{41}\) However, no state, least of all a great power will formulate policy decisions based on diplomatic blackmail. Clearly, American officials disregarded Pakistani regional motives because of their perception of Pakistan’s relevance to Containment. Thus, countering McMahon’s argument Pakistani historian Hamza Alavi contends: “the old imperial option of direct military intervention using troops based in India was no longer available” following the independence of India and Pakistan. Hence, “in truth, it was the US that took the initiative and went to great lengths to maneuver support for it in Pakistan.”\(^{42}\)

The Northern-Tier alliance, Dulles hoped, would

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37 Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, pp.55-56.
38 Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan received over $630 million in grant military assistance for weapons, $619 million for defense support assistance, and some $55 million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis. Stephen P. Cohen, “US Weapons and South Asia”, p.50.
42 Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan-US Military Alliance” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33:25 (August 1998), pp.1551-1557, p. 1551. Since the nineteenth century Iran and Egypt had served as strategic assets of the British Empire. Iranian oil was supplied to the West through Egypt’s Suez Canal. The 1950s saw the electoral victory of anti West Mosaddaq in Iran. This resulted in the overthrow of pro-Western monarchy and the nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1951.
separate the issues of regional defense from Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab politics.\textsuperscript{43}

Primary and secondary evidence provides support to Alavi’s argument.\textsuperscript{44}

In fact following Soviet atomic parity in 1949 pre-empting Soviet moves through intelligence gathering took on added urgency for US decision-makers concluded that military bases “farther away from our own vital areas” could enhance “our chances of surviving successfully an attack by atomic weapons and of destroying the enemy which employs them against us” thus making Pakistan a pragmatic strategic choice.\textsuperscript{45} It is therefore not surprising that following his May 1953 visit to India and Pakistan, Dulles found Pakistan to be a “dependable bulwark against Communism.”\textsuperscript{46} Vice President Richard Nixon was another increasingly vocal proponent who told Congress, "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for."\textsuperscript{47} Thus, in 1951 the US Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenburg told Chester Bowles, the American ambassador to New Delhi,\textsuperscript{48} “We are going to give you some trouble out there in India because we have our eyes set on bases in Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{49} Thus the US offered alliance membership to Pakistan in keeping with its own strategic interests as McMahon himself concedes that the US interest in the Middle East accentuated Pakistan’s significance in view of "Egyptian and Iranian unreliability."\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, considering Pakistan’s dire need for military assistance, the American foreign-policy experts feared its possible engagement

\textsuperscript{43}Ara Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”, \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, Vol.33, No.2 (April, 1997) pp 226-266
\textsuperscript{46}“Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” in Ibid, p.77.
\textsuperscript{48}Bowles criticized US strategy on twisted geopolitical reasoning contained in Sir Olaf Caroe’s book \textit{Wells of Power} which argued that the stability of the Middle East and Southeast Asia had formerly rested largely with the Indian army; in view of Nehru’s non-alignment stability now rested on capacity building of Pakistan’s military. K Arif, (ed.), \textit{America-Pakistan Relations,} Vol.1, pp.84-86
with China or the Soviet Union in case of Western disinterest\(^\text{51}\) which again demonstrates the American angle.

Pakistan's regional angle was never a secret; Prime Minister Suhrawardy asserted in February 1958 that Pakistan's motivation behind alliance membership was US military aid for defense purposes against India.\(^\text{52}\) Clearly, the US took advantage of Pakistan's strategic preferences in order to protect its own Soviet-centric existential interests.\(^\text{53}\) For PFP the larger Soviet threat was secondary while its primary threat emerged from India. Thus, in keeping with the pragmatic logic of smaller states balancing against a threatening state and not necessarily against a powerful one,\(^\text{54}\) Pakistan allied with a great power to mitigate its regional security dilemma. Its partnership with China in the 1960s clearly reflects that Pakistan had nothing against communism per se.\(^\text{55}\) As the former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Fasih Bokhari argued:

> Pakistan had a serious existential problem...{especially} after the Indians began to reabsorb Junagarh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir {militarily}... So where do you turn? To the most powerful state for help ... and the rest was the Cold War dynamics of SEATO and CENTO.\(^\text{56}\)

That said, evidence shows that Pakistan made pragmatic efforts to take advantage of the American security compulsions. As early as September 1947 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, told a cabinet meeting: “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam....Our interests [lie] more with ...the UK and the USA rather than Russia.”\(^\text{57}\) In one concise statement Jinnah

\(^{51}\) Department of State policy Statement with respect to Pakistan (3 April, 1950) in K. Arif, (ed.), American-Pakistan Relations: Documents, Vol.1, pp. 27-31


\(^{56}\) Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).

\(^{57}\) Minutes of Cabinet discussion, 9 September, 1947, 67/CF/47, NDC, in Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p.20.
established a link between Islam, democracy and Pakistan and demonstrated Pakistan’s willingness to ally with the US and its allies against the Soviet Union. After Jinnah’s death in 1948 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan persevered in the mission of supporting US positions on international issues and emphasizing commonalities in democratic outlook. Interestingly, Liaquat promptly accepted Stalin’s invitation to visit Moscow in the wake of American invitation to Nehru in 1949. Subsequently, Liaquat never visited Soviet Union but was welcomed in Washington in 1950. His move was hailed by Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, Mirza Abol Hasan Ispahani, as a “master strategic stroke.” When Dulles visited Pakistan in 1953 army chief Ayub Khan offered a convincing strategic assessment of the Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf through the mountain passes of Central Asia. His proposed response was a strong Pakistan military for containing perceived communist expansionism a proposal that clearly resonated with Dulles. Thus, Pakistan was able to cope with its regional security concerns by manipulating America’s Soviet-specific security dilemma.

That Pakistan accorded priority to its regional security objectives was clearly manifested throughout the relationship. For example, Pakistan did not shift its primary concern from India and Kashmir to China in the late 1950s and 1960s when the rise of China as a Soviet surrogate was one of the key US foreign policy themes. Instead it established partnership with China despite being a member of the anti-communist pacts. In view of the perceived Indian threat, it did not free its troops from its eastern border and Kashmir to focus on the Northern-Tier as the US desired.

Clearly, Pakistan’s willingness to become a tool of Containment stemmed from the regional security dilemma. With the European powers and the Soviet

60 “Assessment of the Soviet threat to Pakistan and the Armed Forces needed to meet this Threat”, memo dated December 1952, presented to Dulles by Ayub Khan, May 23 1953, Pakistan, 1953 Folder, SOA Files, DSR, National Archives, in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p. 55.
Union devastated by two world wars the US had emerged as the wealthiest nation accounting for over 40% of global production\(^63\) and was thus the best choice as an ally. That said the alliance suffered from inherent contradictions as discussed below.

\((2)\) **Alliance Contradictions and Implications for PFP**

The Mutual Defense Agreement explicitly provided that US military hardware was for deterring communist attack and was not to be used against a non-communist nation;\(^64\)Eisenhower confirmed that the Pakistanis had given assurances accordingly.\(^65\) This begs the question whether Pakistan knowingly breached the terms during its wars with India or was there inherent ambiguity in the alliance terms that emerged from the US ambivalence in its relations with India and Pakistan. Pakistani diplomat Abdul Sattar argues that following Pakistan’s earlier reluctance to sign the Baghdad Pact the US signed a Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan on 5 March 1959 wherein the US made concrete commitments to support Pakistan’s defense.\(^66\) Article 1 stated:

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\text{In case of aggression against Pakistan the United States of America will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East.}^{67}
\]

The caveat of the Joint Resolution was the key since in keeping with the Eisenhower Doctrine it authorized US military and economic assistance to Middle Eastern countries seeking protection from communist aggression. Thus, when Pakistan tried to use SEATO and CENTO platforms to raise the Kashmir issue the

\(^{63}\) Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, p.40.


\(^{66}\) Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, pp.56-58.

US did not support Pakistan ensuring that the dispute remained bilateral or confined to the UN. 68

The 1959 agreement further stated that the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan was vital to its national interest and to world peace. 69 The agreement was supplemented with a formal note presented by Ambassador James Langley to Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on 15 April 1959 that stated “the US would promptly come to the assistance of Pakistan if it were subjected to armed aggression.” 70 Such written promises were not legally binding and were carefully watered down by the Americans when making press statements. 71 Nonetheless, the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (hitherto bilateral agreement) was “taken by Pakistan as virtually tantamount to guaranteeing an effective US role in the preservation of Pakistan’s independence and security.” 72 According to Cohen “American officials now admit that such pledges were made but contend that they were not binding.” 73 As late as 1973 US and Pakistani positions regarding CENTO’s role in intra-regional disputes remained at variance. 74

Pakistani expectations are also explainable by US arms transfer which Wriggins posits, suggests immediate military symbolism and diplomatic support. 75 For Pakistan this was a confirmation of the US commitment to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty although the US had no doubts about the nature of its own commitment. 76 Other than military and diplomatic symbolism arms-transfer also signifies trust; one may argue that the US trusted Pakistan not to use weapons

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68 Hamza Alavi, “Pakistan-US Military Alliance”
70 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp.56-57.
71 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p. 132.
72 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 6-8
75 W. Howard Wriggins, “Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan”, Pacific Affairs, 57:2 (Summer 1984), pp.284-303
against India. However, this would go against the tenets of a pragmatic foreign policy. Ambiguity in the relationship allowed Pakistan to express “moral outrage” against the US while using US weapons to fight non-communist India. Moreover, it allowed Pakistan to adopt certain regional policies that were at variance with the US long-term objectives. Thus, Pakistan could exploit the ambiguity in the alliance to further its security competition with non-communist India. Similarly, from 1970s onwards Pakistan was able to continue its nuclear program despite US reservations. In other words, since the United States was strategically required to balance its relations with India and Pakistan it gave the latter certain leverage where it could exert reverse influence. Keohane thus correctly argues that a small state can influence US decision-makers when “common interests—in bases, military strength, aid programs or intelligence information” spawn American agencies’ dependence on the smaller ally’s consent for presence on its territory. That said Pakistan’s expectations were not entirely wishful thinking considering verbal reassurances from senior US officials. For example, in 1962 when Kennedy provided military assistance to India in the Indo-China war of 1962, ambassador McConaughy handed Ayub Khan an aide-memoire promising US assistance in case of Indian aggression and “formally reiterated” America’s “past pledge” in this regard.

Again, during one-on-one Khan-Johnson meeting on 15 December 1965 the American president promised Khan that the US would come to Pakistan’s assistance if, in Khan’s words, India tried “to knock us [Pakistan] off.” In any case the Pakistani decision-makers believed there was a “moral commitment” ensuing from the bilateral agreement. That the bitterness has lasted to this day is reflected in former ISI chief Lt General Hamid Gul’s grievance during the interview: “Badaber, SEATO, CENTO... they always used and misused and then abandoned

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80 Memorandum reporting President Johnson’s second private meeting with Ayub, 4:30-5:30 P.M., December 15, 1965, in Ibid, p.67

us.“\(^\text{82}\) Former foreign minister Sardar Assef Ali however criticized such an approach as the ”greatest folly of our foreign policy establishment who thought that relations could be based on friendship.”\(^\text{83}\) However, when it came to using the US aid for regional goals Pakistan was clearly capable of pragmatic self-interest. Academic and author Ayesha Siddiqa perceived Pakistan’s entry into the US military alliance as ”a patron-client relationship in which we agreed to become a rent-seeking state because we were providing services.”\(^\text{84}\) While Siddiqa’s argument cannot be dismissed the situation on ground for Pakistan was more complex. Former Chairman of the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Tahir Amin thus argued that ”the partnership served Pakistan at a very critical time {and} made up our deficiencies when we were defenseless.”\(^\text{85}\) Amin’s premise is plausible when seen against the view of many outsiders—including American diplomats—who saw Pakistan’s re-absorption into India as only a matter of time.\(^\text{86}\) According to academic Mohammad Islam, “strategic, nationalist and religious dimensions of Pakistan’s regional compulsions were seen from the monolithic logic of Containment.”\(^\text{87}\) Moreover, ”the alliance was flawed on several counts” argued Tahir Amin:

There was hardly a sense of common purpose or common threat perception. In the end CENTO and SEATO did not provide Pakistan with the security umbrella it sought against India. The defense treaties added to the regional security dilemma and contributed to a Delhi-Moscow-Kabul nexus.\(^\text{88}\)

Amin’s premise is endorsed by McMahon who argues that his quest “through the voluminous American planning documents” failed to clarify how Pakistani troops were expected to foil a Soviet military invasion or intervene in the Middle

\(^{82}\) Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\(^{83}\) Interview with Assif Ali (19 September 2011).
\(^{84}\) Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
\(^{85}\) Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
\(^{86}\) US Embassy Karachi dispatch to State Department 27 October, 1947 quoted in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p. 18; Charles W. Lewis to Department of State, Oct. 27, 1947, file 845F.00/10-2747, Records of the Department of State, RG 59 in McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, p. 66; S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp.116-18.
\(^{87}\) Interview with Dr. Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011)
\(^{88}\) Interview with Dr. Tahir Amin (12 July 2011)
East. According to primary US documents CENTO never actually provided its members with a means for guaranteeing collective defense.

Kux maintains that one of the reasons for lack of a clear policy was bureaucratic. The Northern-Tier concept was promoted by Dulles and Byroade with scant Department of Defense involvement. As Eisenhower looked to reducing defense expenditure the military was not keen on new missions. As for Dulles he was more interested in getting the idea going than really worry about finer details. The following conversation between Dulles and Lippmann is enlightening in this regard:

“Look Walter,” said Dulles “I have got to get some real fighting men into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. That’s why we need them in the Alliance. We could never get along without the Gurkas [sic].” “But Foster,” Lippmann reminded him, “the Gurkas aren’t Pakistanis, they are Indian.” “Well,” responded Dulles, unperturbed by such nitpicking, “they may be Indians but they are Moslems.” “No, I am afraid they are not Moslems either; they are Hindus.” Lippmann stated. “No matter”, the secretary of state retorted.

Clearly, the policy remained vague in military terms due to lack of rigorous planning and policy review. Byroade himself later termed the concept as more political and psychological than military. The ambiguity allowed the US to balance its relations with India.

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89 Robert J McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 175-180, 155, 835, 815-840.
91 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p.62.
93 Henry Byroade’s interview with Kux in Disenchanted Allies, p.62
Before sending arms to Pakistan Eisenhower promised Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that these will not be used against India, pledging appropriate UN action against Pakistan in case of such an event and offered a similar package to India.\(^94\) Although India never joined the US military alliance in view of Nehru's nonaligned stance, it remained the largest recipient of US economic aid from 1951 to 1992.\(^95\) According to Kux President Eisenhower — and all subsequent US administrations — were wary that arming Pakistan might ensnare the United States in India-Pakistan disputes.\(^96\) That this possibility did not stop the US from arming Pakistan anyway demonstrates Pakistan's strategic importance for the US. On the other hand, the alliance while helping secure Pakistan's territorial integrity did not provide either a security guarantee against India or exert political pressure for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The US approach to the Kashmir dispute fundamentally remained grounded in crisis management and not peace-building.\(^97\) The US did support the 1948 UN resolution calling for plebiscite to settle Kashmir's accession\(^98\) and also made some early efforts towards conflict resolution after the 1948 India-Pakistan war,\(^99\) but quickly lost interest after Nehru spurned a series of proposals.\(^100\) Pakistan's strategic importance to Containment started to decline in the 1960s and after 1971 the US began to treat the Kashmir dispute as bilateral.\(^101\)

\(^94\) Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, pp.50-51
\(^96\) Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, p.47.
\(^100\) UN affairs officer Howard Meyers and assistant Secretary McGhee interviews with Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, p.31
\(^101\) This was after the pledge to solve all issues bilaterally was made part of the Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India in 1972. However, the bilateral Agreement was neither legally binding nor could it override UNSC resolutions regarding plebiscite. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, p.79.
The early American interest encouraged Pakistani leadership to expect political support from the US. As a new state desperately in need of infrastructure and a running economy Pakistani leadership was averse to diverting indigenous insufficient resources to defense spending.\textsuperscript{102} Conflict resolution over Kashmir could minimize such expenditures. Evidently, from the US perspective military aid was congruent with Containment while the Kashmir dispute was peripheral to it although the alliance did internationalize what India believed to be a bi-lateral issue. The bipolarity of the international system inculcated a client-patron mentality where the great powers were expected to control and shape the behavior of their smaller allies.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, the nature of the dispute was – and remains - complex with its historical, religious and political dimensions; unless the two disputants were ready to find a lasting solution no third party mediation was likely to succeed. Furthermore, in view of the Indian non-aligned posture relevant US leverage was inadequate. That said, precisely because the dispute resolution was undermined by India the Pakistanis expected active US support. Diplomat Maleeha Lodhi argued:

They have never really helped resolve Kashmir…. \{the US\} has always been fire fighting without finding out why the fire erupted each time.\textsuperscript{104}

Clearly, active US assistance was not forthcoming because the regional Kashmir dispute was marginal to US global policy as substantiated by Washington’s comparable interest in the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute. Tahir Amin pointed out:

They \{the US\} were not interested in resolving the Kashmir issue but they wanted a settlement in Afghanistan... They did not choose to see the linkage between the two \{issues\} from


\textsuperscript{103} Ussama Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History”

\textsuperscript{104} Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
Pakistan's angle... just as they do not want to see it today {post 9/11}. 105

Primary evidence shows that the Pashtunistan issue was seen as part of Soviet expansionist designs and the State Department launched a diplomatic initiative in 1950 and offered third party mediation to resolve Afghanistan-Pakistan disputes over the Durand Line. 106 For instance, reacting to Khrushchev’s backing of the Afghan position on Pashtunistan, Dulles publicly pledged SEATO’s support for Pakistan’s sovereignty which “extends up to the Durand Line.” position in March 1956.107

Acknowledging Pakistan’s threat perception was likely to annoy India and Indian voters and supporters in the US. At the same time the US would not openly acknowledge that India was not a threat for fear of losing Pakistan. So the US, argues Tahir-Kheli, left the nature of the US commitment to Pakistan deliberately vague.108 Dulles tried to explain the American balancing act vis-à-vis India and Pakistan philosophically, assuring Pakistan that US relations with India were “intellectual” while relationship with Pakistan “came from the heart.”109 Dulles’ semantics notwithstanding, there were policy-makers in the State and Defense Departments as well as voices in the print media that presented India as a means to curtailing Soviet influence in South Asia.110 Conversely, American misgivings about Indian neutralism increased during the Eisenhower presidency. Senator William F Knowland as well as Secretary of State Dulles were skeptical of Indian non-alignment with Dulles perceiving it as undermining the “moral weight” of the Cold war issues.111

105 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
106 For details see Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, April 2, 1955; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, April 16, 1955 http://www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/ch , accessed 14 April 2012.
108 Tahir Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, pp.5-6 & 24-26
111 Robert J McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery, pp. 175-180, 155, 835, 815-840
The following sub-section focuses on some key implications for Pakistan flowing from its securitized partnership with the United States.

**Implications for PFP**

Jinnah and Liaquat’s themes of Pakistan’s compatibility with American values and its vulnerability to Russia were adopted by all subsequent arms procurement advocates between 1951 and 1953.\(^\text{112}\) This is not to suggest consensus. According to Tahir-Kheli between 1947 and 1957 Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Khawaja Nazimuddin had been unwilling to commit fully to the American camp without concrete security guarantees against India. The earlier civilian leadership requested not only military assistance but also a “Treaty of Commerce” to promote trade between the two countries.\(^\text{113}\) The general feeling amongst the middle and lower echelons of political leadership, that did not include prominent leaders Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza, and Hussain Suhrawardy, was that the slow delivery of aid was not commensurate with the commitments the US had undertaken.\(^\text{114}\) (Reflecting inter-agency rivalry the Americans dragged their feet mainly because Secretary of State Dulles had pushed through the arms deal without significant input from the Department of Defense.\(^\text{115}\)) Political leaders from East Pakistan like Khawaja Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali Bogra were wary of a strong largely non-Bengali Pakistani military\(^\text{116}\); others were skeptical of the whole arrangement.

Veteran diplomat Abdul Sattar notes that PFP from 1950s onward suffered from a flaw in that the domestic public sentiment was overwhelmingly with the Muslim world.\(^\text{117}\) Simultaneously, the Baghdad Pact was criticized by Arab countries; Egypt perceived it as part of American imperialism in support of Israel and Saudi Arabia termed it “a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim

\(^{112}\)These included foreign secretary Ikramullah, special emissary Mir Laik Ali, Army Chief General Ayub Khan, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and foreign minister Zaffarullah Khan. For a detailed narrative see Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, pp.46-49.

\(^{113}\) See Liaquat Ali’s speeches in K. Arif, (ed.), America-Pakistan Relations: Documents, Vol.1, pp.31-34. The focus became relatively more security-specific as the military became an increasingly powerful political player.

\(^{114}\) Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p.15.

\(^{115}\) Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, p.62.

\(^{116}\) Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan-US Military Alliance", pp.1153-54

\(^{117}\) Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, p. 61.
Thus, Muslim Pakistan’s security dilemma with India motivated it to ally with a great power for strategic reasons at the cost of ideological values. The domestic dissent was highlighted when reacting to Pakistan’s initial pro-West policy during the Suez Crisis. Veteran leaders of the Pakistan Movement, like Jinnah’s sister, Fatima Jinnah and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, along with Nazimuddin demanded unqualified support for Muslim Egypt. Masses came out on the street, forcing Pakistan’s foreign minister Feroz Khan Noon to finally backtrack and support Egypt’s position. The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and Defense Minister General Ayub Khan, however, saw the US as the only source of massive military aid to Pakistan. Ayub Khan, supported by senior military commanders Generals Burki, Azam and Sheikh, executed a military coup in 1958, deposing President Iskander Mirza to become the second president of Pakistan while relinquishing the charge of C-in-C to General Mohammad Musa; in 1959 he promoted himself to the rank of Field Marshal. During the Ayub Khan era (1958-1969) foreign policy decisions were taken by Khan and his trusted foreign policy advisors like Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, Aziz Ahmed and later S. M. Yusuf. Any dissenting political opinions were thus side-lined. Alliance implications for PFP were influenced by the process of foreign policy making that lacked open debate under military dictatorships 1958-1969, 1969-1971 and 1977-1988.

After Khan’s military coup in 1958 the US did not oppose Pakistan’s move “from an unstable pro-Western democracy to a more stable pro-Western military dictatorship.” According to a US State Department assessment a prolonged period of military rule would increase Pakistan’s underlying political problems.

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118 *Dawn*, Karachi, 26 September, 1955
119 In the aftermath of Jamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal the British and French forces, with help from Israel, attacked Egypt in 1956. Initially Pakistan’s foreign office supported the western forces. Muslim leaders such as Nasser saw US-Pakistan alliance as furthering Western interests in the Middle East by strengthening Israel. See Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, 61-64.
120 As serving commander-in-chief of the army Ayub Khan was inducted into the civilian cabinet of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1954 as Defense Minister.
121 Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p.15.
122 Ayub’s coup and presidential powers were upheld by the Supreme Court.
123 Ayub Khan nationalized large part of the press and used the Press and Publication Ordinance, 1962 to pressurize media. Interview with Ashfaq Saleem Mirza (24 October 2011).
especially between the east and west wings;\textsuperscript{125} nonetheless, Eisenhower was happy to have “a strongman in Pakistan to ensure the alliance lasted” and visited Pakistan in December 1959 on the first ever presidential visit to the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{126} This attitude will also be manifested in the 1980s when, as noted later, the Reagan administration entered into a tight cooperative linkage with General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Clearly, the US central concern was limited to Pakistan’s security cooperation with the United States; the alliance thus contributed to strengthening the political role of the Pakistani military establishment.\textsuperscript{127}

Immediately after independence Pakistan lacked strong political institutions.\textsuperscript{128} The British trained civil servants and military commanders were the key decision-makers during the first decade and were traditionally susceptible to the Western and not Soviet influence. Moreover, over the next three decades the shifting graph of arms supply reflected American willingness to deal with Pakistani military rulers while being uncomfortable with civilian leaders such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Assef Ali argued:

They preferred to deal with the military …every time there was a military ruler there was {American} cooperation and every time there was a civilian set-up we were subjected to {US} sanctions.\textsuperscript{129}

The soundness of Ali’s premise is evident from Gross Domestic Production (GDP) growth rates. Under General Ayub Khan (1958-1968) GDP rose from 3.5% to 6.1% and from 4.2% to 6.6% under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). It was the lowest at 4.2% during the civilian government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977).\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127} The term refers primarily to the larger army and its intelligence agencies as compared to a much smaller Navy and Air Force.
\textsuperscript{128} For a detailed analysis see Ayesha Jalal, \textit{The State of Martial Rule}
\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
Thus American analyst Michael Krepon agreed that

Supporting the military rule has been a repetitive mistake on the part of US policy-makers who believe the civilians cannot deliver...This construct was double flawed - it undermined civil society and the military never delivered.\textsuperscript{131}

US military aid played a fundamental role in capacity-building of the Pakistani military and in creating close institutional relations between the two militaries. Pakistan could not have competed with India, argued Kux and Islam, without US arms supply and military training which reduced the burden of maintaining a large army.\textsuperscript{132} The military to military relations between the two states remained strong throughout the Cold War giving way to personalized approach. For example, even before he took over the country Khan's demands for US aid were often directed through his Washington contacts rather than the Pakistan based office of the US Military Advisory Group (USMAG). There were close military to military contacts but “no compatible link with professional staff in the State Department or Congress” which kept Pakistan “at the mercy of changing US presidencies.”\textsuperscript{133} As long as pro-Pakistan Eisenhower, Dulles and Radford or Kissinger and Nixon were in office Pakistan could influence some decisions. Once government officials were not relatively amenable, as in the case of Kennedy, Rusk, and Carter influencing US decisions became more difficult.

At the same time arms transfer had regional implications that played a role in the formulation of PFP. From provision of a small amount of arms aid in 1954 the aid “ballooned into a $500 million” by 1957, forcing Eisenhower to declare it was “a terrible error but now we seem hopelessly involved in it.”\textsuperscript{134} This demonstrates a hasty process of decision-making in which unintended consequences were not deliberated nor competing views accommodated. For example, Director Mutual Security Averell Harriman expressed concerns over aid

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Michael Krepon(3 February 2012)

\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012); Interview with Mohammad Islam(12 July 2011)

\textsuperscript{133}Tahir Kheli, \textit{The United States and Pakistan}, pp.5-6 & 24-26

\textsuperscript{134} Report of the January 3, 1957 NSC Meeting quoted in Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.84.
to Pakistan as potentially exacerbating regional disputes. Bowles warned that the Soviets could enhance their position in South Asia by befriending India in response to the American aid to Pakistan. His words proved prophetic as following the alliance the Soviet Union, which had hitherto been largely neutral, repeatedly used its veto in the UN Security Council to support Indian positions while remaining its main arms supplier throughout the Cold War. On a visit to India in 1955, Russian leaders, Premier Nikolai Bulganin and President Nikita Khrushchev denounced the partition of India in 1947 and un-divided Kashmir was referred to as part of India. Similarly, Soviet leaders announced support for ‘Pashtunistan.’ Thus, while the alliance contributed substantially to Pakistan military’s capacity building it negatively impacted its relations with the great power in its neighborhood.

Political Scientist Norman Palmer sees Eisenhower's military assistance in the 1950s as fuelling regional arms race. Cohen endorses Palmer’s premise by offering details of Indian purchases of equivalent weapons from the U.S and the Soviet Union as well as Europe. Palmer and Cohen make a convincing argument; Cohen argues that in the wake of the alliance “the central concern of the Indian military” was that Pakistan’s military capacity-building to deter communist aggression could translate into offensive posturing against non-communist India. Reflecting inherent contradictions in the alliance the US thus tried to persuade India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully while simultaneously feeding the regional security dilemma through weapons transfer. Henry Kissinger argues that Containment came to be equated with constructing

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137 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, pp.10-11.
138 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p.64
military alliances and undermining diplomacy. This premise is applicable to the impact of US policy on regional disputes as manifested in unintended consequences. Thus, massive US arms transfer to Pakistan in the 1950s and substantial military aid to India during the Sino-India conflict in 1962 encouraged military solutions to political problems such as the accession of Kashmir or border adjustments between China and India. Similarly, the security-based partnership in the Afghan-Soviet War in the 1980s has had long-term outcomes for both Pakistan and the US in the 1990s.

The above narrative leads to the conclusion that the alliance had implications for the resolution of Pakistan-India rivalry. Indian analyst M. J. Rajan correctly posits that Eisenhower’s decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan in the 1950s meant that “the hitherto bilateral India-Pakistan relations now assumed a triangular relation with United States as the third party.” India viewed American military assistance as a deliberate threat to its regional hegemony thus hardening its stance towards the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. On the other hand American policy of crisis management contributed to Indian resolve to maintain the status-quo on the issue. After the loss of East Pakistan, SEATO became meaningless for Pakistan and determining finally that CENTO did not enhance its regional security Pakistan withdrew in 1979 (CENTO was also disbanded in the same year.)

Clearly, the securitized partnership was marked by inherent contradictions that in turn spawned episodic convergence of interests followed by periods of estrangement. As the following section will show Pakistan took advantage of convergence and divergence to protect its regional security interests.

146 Selig Harrison, “The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past?” Current History, 96: 6149 (December 1997) pp. 401-406
**Variations in the relationship became clearly manifest during four wars in 1962, 1965, 1971 and the 1980s. The 1962 Sino-India conflict—20th October to 21st November coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis—15th to 25th of October—in which the US and Soviet Union came the closest to a nuclear confrontation creating a “spectre of communist invasion of India” and opened floodgates of US and Western military assistance148 which continued even after the war.149 Khan requested Kennedy—unsuccessfully—to use US leverage to force Nehru to resolve the Kashmir issue. President Johnson approved a long-term military aid program for India in May 1964. In response to divergence PFP shifted its focus to finding alternative sources of military supplies thus strengthening ties with China.150**

In keeping with the regional security dilemma Pakistan saw growing Indian military capability as directed against Pakistan and not China. Stepping up his rhetoric in favor of China, Khan pointed out the blurring line between an ally and a neutral.151 Khan’s disquiet was not entirely misplaced; according to 1961 US

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150 For details see Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, pp.115-151; Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, pp. 219-244; The two states signed a border agreement in March 1963 and Chinese leadership publicly supported Pakistani position on Kashmir in 1964. Ayub Khan further annoyed Johnson by refusing a token Pakistani military participation in Vietnam so as not to antagonize Peking. Pakistan also publicly questioned the value of SEATO. Ibid; K Arif, (ed.), *America-Pakistan Relations: Documents*, Vol.1, p. 236.
intelligence estimate the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and its support to India on Kashmir and Pashtunistan was increasing after the downing of U2 plane that took off from Peshawar. Nonetheless, having acquiesced to Kennedy’s wishes in 1962 Khan’s later gripe that “the great opportunity which history had offered of the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir dispute was thus lost” does not sound convincing. It is likely that Khan’s acquiescence had a regional angle. Pakistan’s military was close to achieving its target of military equipment and trained manpower by early 1960s. It was thus not in Pakistan’s interest to annoy the US at that point in time.

The alliance partnership was again tested in 1965. Ayub Khan, on the advice of his foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, decided to launch Operation Gibraltar in Indian Kashmir in 1965. India responded by attacking Lahore on 6 September 1965. Rejecting Khan’s invoking of Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement 1959 President Johnson—whose administration was deeply involved in Vietnam—denounced Pakistan’s use of US weapons against a non-communist country and imposed arms embargo on arms shipment to Pakistan and India. The embargo impacted Pakistan but did not translate into a comparable pressure on India because it continued receiving arms from the Soviet Union. Growing estrangement was reflected in Ayub’s visit to Soviet Union for economic and military aid.

Unable to distinguish between the offensive and defensive nature of the Indian forces Pakistan expected a worst-case scenario. Thus while the US aid had built Pakistan’s military capacity it was clear that despite informal commitments and

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154 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p.92-93.

155 Foreign Minister Bhutto proposed infiltration of trained politico-military proxies into Indian Kashmir to establish cells and assist the local population in a national rebellion. India responded by attacking Pakistan. Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, pp.219-244.


157 For a detailed analysis of the 1965 war based on primary data see Farooq Naseem Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent: The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War (London: C. Hurst & Co Ltd, 2013); for the 1965 war and Ayub-Johnson interaction see Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, pp. 147-177; also “US won’t renew aid to India and Pakistan”, New York Times, April 13, 1967.
verbal reassurances it would not directly intervene on behalf of Pakistan’s territorial integrity when threatened by India. According to Assef Ali:

Ayub miscalculated that being a strong ally of the US he’ll get away with the 1965 adventurism... but was seen {by the US} as bluffing them by using US weapons against India; it was then that they decided to have Pakistan as a tactical partner rather than a strategic one.158

Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Centre Shuja Nawaz argued from another perspective:

Once the US changed the status quo in 1962, Pakistan was free to choose alternatives... Ayub Khan visited Moscow and Beijing to hold economic and security negotiations and also reacted positively to Moscow’s mediation for India-Pakistan ceasefire {in 1965}.159

Thus one may infer that the main implication of this variation was not only that the US decided about the future nature of its relations with Pakistan but also that China replaced the US as Pakistan’s main arms supplier. According to Keohane the alliance stood revoked when Pakistan established close relations with communist China.160 Keohane’s argument can be replicated and extended to the 1962 US weapons aid to non-aligned India, a close friend of the Soviet Union. It is worth remembering that Pakistan cemented bilateral security relations with Peking after the Sino-India conflict of 1962. It was a pragmatic choice since throughout the embargo period (1965-1975) India continued receiving weapons from the Soviet

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158 Interview with Sardar Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
159 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
Union. Thus the wars of 1962 and 1965 clearly highlighted the disparity of PFP's regional goal of territorial integrity with US global objectives of Containment.\textsuperscript{161}

In 1971 Pakistan's territorial integrity received a shock after the loss of East Pakistan. Active Indian political and military role in exploiting indigenous uprisings against the Pakistani government contributed to the dismemberment of Pakistan. Bengali grievances against the central government in West Pakistan led to a civil war in 1970 and an insurrection in early 1971. Indira Gandhi’s government actively supported Bengali guerilla fighters. The ensuing Indo-Pakistan war culminated in Pakistan military's surrender to Indian forces on 16 December 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh.

In a brief re-emergence of convergent security interests Ayub’s successor General Yahya Khan used his access to Zhou EnLai to facilitate US-China opening by arranging a secret visit to Peking by Nixon’s National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.\textsuperscript{162} Pakistan's initiative was based on its need for US arms supplies and American pressure on India to retract its support of the separatists in East Pakistan while the US wanted to engage China to counter the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{163} Thus, once again, though briefly, Pakistan's regional goals converged with US Containment strategy as Pakistan looked to use it to protect its security interests.

American Consul General in Dacca, Archer K. Blood, sent his famous Blood Telegram and an earlier dissenting message\textsuperscript{164} to the State Department urging condemnation of Pakistan military's atrocities against the Bengalis. However, despite State Department and Congressional pressure\textsuperscript{165} the White House, illustrating reverse influence, was reluctant to apply diplomatic leverage on Yahya Khan because of his ongoing role in US access to China. For instance, Nixon's

\textsuperscript{161}Shirin Tahir-Kheli, \textit{The United States and Pakistan}, pp 107, 110; see also Sattar Baber, \textit{United States Aid to Pakistan} (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1974); ShaheenIrshad Khan, \textit{Rejection Alliance: A Case Study of US-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1967} (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1972).

\textsuperscript{162}There was no American diplomatic presence in China since the US had not recognized the Peoples'] Republic of China (PRC) till 1970.

\textsuperscript{163}Shuja Nawaz, \textit{Crossed Swords}, p.275.


\textsuperscript{165}The US Congress was concerned that American-supplied equipment was being used to suppress the Bengali movement. See Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia" \textit{Asian Survey} 20:4 (April 1980), pp.339-361.
handwritten note on a memorandum emphasizes a “hands-off” approach saying “Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.”

Thus when tensions in East Pakistan escalated into India-Pakistan war in West Pakistan Nixon allowed a one-time waiver on military supplies despite Indian protest. However, Yahya’s invoking of the 1959 bilateral defense agreement did not oblige the US to come to Pakistan’s rescue. Kissinger argues in his book that “the plain import” of the agreement was that the US would come to Pakistan’s assistance in case of Indian aggression. Keeping in mind that Kissinger is criticized for offering modified explanations of events retrospectively, it is unlikely that he supported Pakistan’s stance behind closed doors at the time. Congressman Christopher Van Hollen argues that Pakistan military’s atrocities eroded the goodwill for Yahya Khan in the US State Department bureaucracy and media hence it became increasingly difficult for Nixon to help Pakistan. Van Hollen’s argument does not account for systemic changes as described by Thornton. Pakistan’s geographic location by now was of dwindling interest to the United States since Iran had become the U.S. listening post and, along with Saudi Arabia, the principal supporter of U.S. interests in West Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, with Washington’s direct access to China another Pakistani key leverage had disappeared.

Nixon did not lift the arms embargo despite US intelligence reports that India was contemplating seizure of Pakistani Azad Kashmir which would have deprived Pakistan of its common boundary with China. In a clear manifestation of the balancing act however, Nixon ordered a U.S. Navy task force, headed by USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal to pressurize India into a cease-fire. Kissinger justifies Nixon’s “tilt” as prudent at a time when “America’s weight as a factor in the world was already being undercut” in Vietnam. The “tilt” confined the conflict to the Subcontinent without allowing the Soviets to intervene and harm “our China


\[167\] Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, pp.219-244

\[168\] Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p.131

\[169\] Ibid; Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Little Brown, 1979), p.895

\[170\] See Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited”


initiative” or spawn Chinese skepticism of American credibility as Pakistan’s ally.\textsuperscript{173} Academic Tahir Amin agreed that it was US pressure that the Indians did not continue war at their western border.\textsuperscript{174} However, despite the “tilt” which supported Pakistan’s territorial integrity in the western wing, the Pakistanis contrasted absence of US military assistance with massive Soviet aid to India during and prior to the 1971 war\textsuperscript{175} thus tilting relative power distribution in India’s favor.\textsuperscript{176} The emergence of Bangladesh was a traumatic event in terms of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and, according to academic Mohammad Islam it “proved to be a watershed in Pakistan’s determination to opt for nuclear weapons as a force equalizer with India.”\textsuperscript{177}

The 1970s saw a fracturing of the alliance manifested in diminished US aid. As demonstrated in Scowcroft’s memo to Henry Kissinger Pakistan requested (unsuccessfully) for immediate weapons supply in view of India’s increased military budget, the Soviet efforts at “fomenting trouble” on Pakistan’s western border, Indian nuclear tests in 1974 and the continued Soviet arms supply to India.\textsuperscript{178} The combined effect of these developments had implications for PFP. Prime Minister Bhutto followed Ayub Khan’s strategy and nurtured Pakistan’s military and economic ties with China. Reflecting an overt divergence with the US goals he also sought to improve ties with non-aligned Muslim nations and adopted pro-Arab positions on Arab-Israeli issues.\textsuperscript{179} Promising to “eat grass” Bhutto publicly resolved to achieve nuclear parity with India. Kissinger’s offer of A-7 aircraft could not dissuade Pakistan as the nuclear option was “a clear threshold of national interest” that could not be bartered.\textsuperscript{180} That this new PFP goal will have far-reaching impact on Pakistan’s relations with the US in the 1990s was manifested in American concerns during the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{174} Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{175} Tahir-Kheli, \textit{The United states and Pakistan}, p.49.
\textsuperscript{177} Interview with Dr. Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
Reacting to reports of Pakistan’s nuclear ambition the Carter administration suspended aid in August 1978 and then resumed in October 1978 when France tacitly dropped a nuclear processing plant deal with Pakistan. Later, aid was again halted in 1979 after Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was reported as capable of producing weapons grade material.\(^\text{181}\) The downward spiral of relations was in proportion to diminishing US aid between 1963 and 1979. Carter’s visit to India in 1978 without stopping in Pakistan was a clear message that relations had reached the breaking point\(^\text{182}\) and that the US wanted to strengthen ties with the “regional boss.” India had introduced nuclear weapons in South Asia but it was Pakistan that saw itself as being punished;\(^\text{183}\) the resentment was reflected in the storming of the US embassy in Islamabad by a group of students.\(^\text{184}\) With the Soviet military move into Afghanistan in 1979, however, Carter declared the Persian Gulf to be of vital interest to the U.S to be defended, militarily, if necessary.\(^\text{185}\) Seeking Pakistan’s help he offered $200 million in economic aid and $200 million worth of military hardware. Carter’s offer was famously rejected by Zia-ul-Haq as “peanuts.”

Under the Reagan administration a March 1985 national security directive authorized significant escalation in U.S engagement in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s help in return for substantial military aid.\(^\text{186}\) There thus emerged a convergence of security interests since, according to Siddiqa, “Pakistan was seen as a dependable engagement tool [in view of its own security interests].”\(^\text{187}\) This effectively meant tolerance of Pakistan’s India-centric nuclear program and regional objectives in Afghanistan since, as Weinbaum correctly argues, without Pakistan there could have been “no effective Afghan resistance movement” or any “prospects for its

\(^{182}\) Pakistan moved out of SEATO in 1971 since after the loss of East Pakistan the Pact was no longer relevant while CENTO was dissolved in 1979.
\(^{183}\) Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, pp. 95-96.
\(^{184}\) Students belonging to Jamaat-i-Islami stormed US embassy in November 1979. They were enraged by a radio report wrongly claiming that an ongoing terrorist attack on Islam’s holiest site in Mecca was supported by the US. See Steve Coll’s detailed narration of the event in Ghost Wars (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 21-37.
\(^{185}\) W. Howard Wriggins “Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan”, pp. 284-303.
\(^{187}\) Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
success against the Soviets.”\textsuperscript{188} Soviet aircraft periodically violated Pakistani airspace\textsuperscript{189} aggravating Pakistan’s security fears on its western border\textsuperscript{190} even as India and Pakistan locked horns at 20,000 feet above sea-level in Siachen.\textsuperscript{191} A permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan could have translated into increased Indian strategic influence on Pakistan’s western border. Convergence of interests obviated any Soviet ambitions of reaching the warm waters of the Persian Gulf via Pakistan.

Thus, US-Pakistan security cooperation helped Islamabad protect its western border. At the same time, the partnership was based on covert strategy and contributed to the strengthening of institutional linkage between US and Pakistani intelligence agencies. Accordingly, the CIA and ISI remained close partners till the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989.

The CIA—with Saudi financial contribution\textsuperscript{192}—funneled money ($3.5 billion) and weapons (including Stingers)\textsuperscript{193} into Afghanistan between 1980 and 1992 using the ISI as a conduit while offering technical and strategic advice on training, intelligence, and sophisticated technology.\textsuperscript{194} Pakistan’s Pashtun-dominated tribal areas—Fata, adjacent to Afghanistan, facilitated the Afghan resistance to regroup amongst a sympathetic tribal population. Together the CIA-ISI nexus executed the largest covert operation in history.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{189} W. Howard Wriggins “Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan”, p.285.
\textsuperscript{190} Tahir Kheli, \textit{the United States and Pakistan}, p.159.
\textsuperscript{191} The Siachen Glacier dispute relates to 1984 Indo-Pakistan troop deployment and clashes over their contested claims to one of the world’s largest non-polar glaciers situated at the height of 20,000 feet near the border with China. The dispute remains unresolved to date. For a detailed discussion see Robert G Wirsing, "Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State" (New York: St Martin’s Press Inc., 1991), pp.143-194.
\textsuperscript{192} Besides having economic interests in the region Saudi Arabia—a Sunni state—was interested in preventing Iranian Shia influence in Afghanistan after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.
\textsuperscript{194} There were no American military forces involved, except for some Special Forces officers as trainers, who were co-opted. The number of CIA operatives was no more than a hundred working at CIA headquarters and in Pakistan and elsewhere. Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979”, \textit{World Policy Journal} 10 (1993), pp. 73-82; For a first-hand account See Brigadier Muhammad Yusuf and Mark Adkin, \textit{The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story}, Fifth Edition,(Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2003).
These developments contributed to the empowerment of the ISI whose jurisdiction under Zulfiqar Bhutto had already expanded to institutionalize domestic political spying. Former ISI chief, Lt General Asad Durrani pointed out:

The partnership worked because there were clear rules of engagement. The CIA did not interfere with ISI’s {money and weapons} distribution plans.

ISI became more deeply involved in the Afghan policy implementation since, as the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Aslam Beg (1988-1993) asserted, regular Pakistan army troops were not involved in Afghanistan. The $3.2 billion US military and economic aid program to Pakistan in 1982 was followed by another $4 billion for 1988-93, mostly earmarked for defense expenditure allowing Pakistan to purchase military hardware and anti-submarine weapons that were more suitable for countering India than the Soviet Union. Massive arms supplies and large weapons depots were located in Pakistan but Americans also tolerated ISI’s regular siphoning of aid into Afghanistan to favorite Islamic groups clearly demonstrating Pakistan’s long-term interest in the country. More importantly the Zia regime used US aid to bolster and further the PFP goal of achieving nuclear capability.

According to journalist and author Ahmed Rashid CIA Director William Casey supported the ISI plan for recruiting radical Muslims around the world in 1986 to demonstrate that “the entire Muslim world was fighting

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196 See for example Sean P. Witchell, “Pakistan’s ISI”; Charles G. Cogan, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979”.
197 Interview with Asad Durrani (Islamabad, 24 April, 2012).
198 In 1972 the title of the army chief was changed from C-in-C to COAS.
199 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
201 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, p.7.
Communism.” However, former Director General ISI Lt. General Hamid Gul (1987-1989) posited:

It was not an ISI plan; it was Reagan and the CIA who had come up with the plan in the 1980s, spending billions to produce an army of Muslim fighters for the Soviet-Afghan conflict. They are the ones who internationalized the Afghan resistance.²⁰⁵

Beg endorsed Gul:

In keeping with Reagan’s policy even American Muslim leaders like Farah Khan were allowed to preach ‘jihad’ in the US…it gained global reach and in the process made ISI strong and independent… the CIA trained thousands of Muslim fighters. It {the CIA} established forward bases in Peshawar and Quetta with support bases in Karachi and Lahore and the controlling head quarter in Islamabad. They almost took over Pakistan!²⁰⁶

Fasih Bokhari added:

The use of religion was encouraged by America, Saudi Arabia and the UAE and they invested heavily in the building and mushrooming of orthodox {Wahabi} religious seminaries… and religious economy started gathering pace.²⁰⁷

This line of argument was supported by the left-wing politician Afrasyab Khattak who was in Kabul throughout the Soviet-Afghan war posited:

²⁰⁵ Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
²⁰⁶ Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
²⁰⁷ Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
It was Reagan's idea. The US invested billions of dollars to raise Jihadists {Muslim fighters} with no plan to disarm them... the children in religious seminaries studied pro-Jihad syllabus prepared in the University of Nebraska.\textsuperscript{208}

Interestingly Gul is known for his orthodox religious views and Bokhari for his liberal credentials; Khattak on the other hand is a senior leader of the secular, nationalist Awami National Party and a close friend of the Soviet backed Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah. The fact that all held the same view shows that even if the idea was floated by the ISI its execution was possible only with US active participation since the ISI lacked the resources. Clearly, ISI was a tool of PFP which employed religion to protect US and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. In this effort it was supported—financially and materially—by the CIA. Pakistan used this convergence of security interests to secure its western border, strengthen its security interests in Afghanistan to counter Indian influence or operational advantage. More importantly, it continued to pursue nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{209}

The Geneva Accords\textsuperscript{210} were signed in April 1988 during the Reagan presidency by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan and guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the US. The Accords to which the Afghan Mujahedeen had not been made a party, facilitated Soviet withdrawal and US disengagement but did not provide for the dissolution of the Soviet backed Najibullah regime in Kabul or the formulation of an interim government.\textsuperscript{211} Hamid Gul argued:

\begin{quote}
As ISI chief I was summoned to the joint session of the Parliament in 1988 to give my views on the process... I begged Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Junejo not to sign the Accords because it would be a betrayal of the Mujahedeen... but the civilian leadership was under American pressure ....some of them had been on the ISI pay-roll...I knew they were purchasable...Zia looked very perturbed after my
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{208} Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
\textsuperscript{209} See declassified US documents showing Reagan era tensions over Pakistan's nuclear program--available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nuevault/ebb377/, accessed February 2013
passionate speech but in the end he gave in to American pressure.\textsuperscript{212}

Gul’s premise is supported by UN special representative for Afghanistan Diego Cordovez who confirms “strenuous efforts” by the US State Department to pressurize Pakistan to sign the Accords. He also refers to the Soviet pressure on Pakistan including “a scarcely veiled threat to reactivate Afghan irredentist claims” in Pakistan’s tribal areas.\textsuperscript{213} Clearly, after achieving the objective of Soviet withdrawal, neither Reagan nor the Bush administration insist on an interim Afghan government expecting that absent Soviet military assistance the Najibullah regime will not endure for long.

By the end of the 1980s PFP goals included not only securing territorial integrity through conventional and nuclear capabilities but also through the use of CIA-ISI trained proxies. This was not peculiar to PFP—proxies had been employed before as in 1948 and 1965—but with the US cooperation the ISI had grown powerful both financially and operationally and the US trained manpower and weapons were available to it. Clearly, both proxy warfare and nuclear weapons were pragmatic choices since this obviated depletion of military resources while keeping it intact as a deterrent. Thus Fasih Bokhari argued:

\begin{quote}
The Americans helped us in developing an asymmetrical force in Afghanistan that destroyed an industrial force... we learnt the art and used it in Kashmir ...if the US could do it in the 1980s then so could we in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{214}
\end{quote}

\section*{Conclusion}

Pakistan-US relations during the Cold War era emerged from episodic convergence of security interests. This securitized relationship suffered from inherent contradictions stemming from Pakistan’s India-centric regional goals that were

\textsuperscript{212} Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{213} Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, \textit{Out of Afghanistan}, pp.935-936.
\textsuperscript{214} Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
often at variance with the US Soviet-centered global aims. At the time of independence in 1947 security concerns with India in the east and Afghanistan in the west aggravated Pakistan's security dilemma. PFP sought to ameliorate this predicament by allying with the US in 1954 and subsequently receiving substantial economic and military aid which it primarily used to build and use its military capacity against a much stronger India. The key PFP concern thus revolved around territorial integrity. In return Pakistan offered its territory for a US base for surveillance against the Soviet Union.

In keeping with the goals of Containment, while the US bolstered the Pakistan military through aid and training it remained mindful of the strategic importance of India thus settling for managing rather than help resolving the Kashmir dispute; despite non-binding commitments it did not give any formal security guarantee against non-communist India. As the US foreign policy approach aimed at performing a balancing act between India and Pakistan this regularly highlighted inherent contradictions stemming from disparity in respective security goals.

In this asymmetric, predominantly patron-client relationship PFP was periodically able to demonstrate some independence in view of Pakistan's reverse influence. On the other hand there were domestic and regional implications for PFP as US weapons aid initiated and perpetuated a regional arms race. American willingness to deal with military dictators and the development of military to military relations strengthened the political role of the Pakistani military establishment. Military and intelligence structures thus gained in strength over a period of nearly three decades of US economic and military aid which varied in degree but was never terminated between 1958 and 1990. Variations in the relationship could be measured against the frequency and volume of military US aid thus emphasizing the securitized basis of bilateral relations. PFP aimed at exploiting both convergent and divergent trends to secure its security goals.

Convergence of interests during the 1950s and early 1960s was used by Pakistan to bolster its military capacity and use US weapons against non-communist India during the 1965 and 1971 wars. Kennedy's military aid to India in 1962 and Pakistan-India war of 1965 demonstrated inherent contradictory and ambivalent underpinnings of the alliance. As well as highlighting disparity between
Pakistan's regional interests and American global objectives these wars exposed respective contradictory expectations in a fundamentally securitized alliance. During the period of estrangement in the 1960s-- symbolized by US military aid to India and arms embargoes-- PFP substantially shifted focus to building relations with communist China thus clearly demonstrating that it had nothing against communism per se and that its alliance with the US emerged from India-centric regional concerns.

The brief convergence of interests in 1971 when Islamabad facilitated US opening to China allowed Pakistan to elicit some favorable responses from the Nixon administration. That said, PFP's goal of territorial integrity was severally undermined with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 in which India played an active political and military role. Nixon’s selective “tilt” did not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan in view of the disparity in security goals. Following this and the Indian nuclear tests in 1974 PFP expanded to include the goal of active pursuit of nuclear weapons as a force equalizer against India. Evincing independence and the priority of its regional security compulsions PFP pursued this goal despite US concerns and sanctions.

Congruent security goals in the 1980s translated into a tight CIA-ISI linkage in which the ISI was used as a conduit for US weapons and funding to the Afghan resistance minus accountability or oversight. This extensively contributed to the strengthening of Pakistan’s military and intelligence structures. Consequently, the ISI, which served as a PFP instrument in the 1980s, emerged as a powerful entity with substantial financial and operational resources. Pakistan-US cooperation in the 1980s thus provided Pakistan the opportunity to secure its western border by enlarging its footprint in Afghanistan thereby lessening the threat of a two front war.

Subsequently, by 1990 an important context had evolved and PFP was driven by three core security principles: First, territorial integrity based around security against India in the east through asymmetrical warfare; second, territorial integrity on the western border by influencing internal developments in Afghanistan; and third, continued pursuit of nuclear capability as a force equalizer against India.
As the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 the disparity in PFP regional interests and US foreign policy's global objectives began to unfold. The following chapter will examine the immediate catalysts for US-Pakistan relations in the early 1990s.

Immediately after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the future of US-Pakistan relations was not clearly outlined. By analyzing relevant catalysts after 1989 this chapter aims to explain the widening divergence in security goals between Pakistan and the US. As discussed in the previous chapter contradictions in Pakistan-US relations stemmed from disparity in global versus regional goals. This chapter argues that in keeping with the Cold War securitized relationship patterns PFP’s India-specific regional goals impinged upon Bush administration’s global security objectives as the US moved towards becoming the sole superpower.1 Shifting American global interests were reflected in diminishing strategic interest in Pakistan except for a renewed scrutiny of its nuclear program. Subsequently, the American response to Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the process of US disengagement after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan emerged as the two immediate catalysts for the bilateral relationship during the presidency of George H W Bush.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section investigates broad aspects of the emerging US role and policy prescriptions for perpetuating and consolidating US superpower status. By doing this it contextualizes the American approach towards Pakistan’s regional goals. The second section explains the Pakistani predicament after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Examining Pakistani perspectives of changing American strategic priorities this section provides a broader background to the changing relationship. Explaining immediate variations the third section investigates the process and dynamics of the immediate factors pushing the erstwhile allies towards estrangement in the early 1990s.

1America’s economy was 40 percent larger than that of its nearest rival, and its defense spending equaled that of the next six countries combined. The United States led the world in military power, higher education, scientific research, and technology. Stephen M. Walt, “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs, 79:2 (2000), pp.63-79, p.63.
(1) Replacing Containment

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the protracted collapsing of the Soviet Union heralded an uncertain period of fundamental systemic structural changes. The Bush administration attempted to give new foreign policy guidelines to replace Containment in its single term (1988-1992) during which the Soviet Union was still intact before finally ceasing to exist in December 1991. The first post-Cold war administration of Bill Clinton felt that “... absent a reversal in Russia, there is no near term threat {that} holds the same immediate dangers for us.” This liberating sentiment provided impetus to the quest for supplanting Kennan’s Containment with a new doctrine. The quest for new guiding principles by the two administrations was taken against the backdrop of an enthusiastic American academic and journalistic discourse pertaining to the post-Cold War role of the United States. Soviet threat depletion was welcomed with triumphant declarations of the “end of history” and the “unipolar moment”. The new cultural fault-lines were identified as the source of future “civilizational clashes”

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4 Syndicate columnist Charles Krauthammer perceives the early 1990s as “the unipolar moment” that will last for the next few decades and urges US policy-makers towards American global leadership. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs 70:1 (March 1990-91), pp.23-33.

5 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1992-93), pp. 22-49; Harvard professor Huntington’s influential article for public, academic and policy purposes argues that the end of bipolar rivalry is primarily the harbinger of the end of conflicts within the Western civilization but also of inter-civilizational wars emerging from cultural fault-lines. For competing arguments see for example Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance”, [http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=0,1], accessed 11 September, 2012.
America the “benevolent hegemon” was hailed as the harbinger of global stability. Policy prescriptions offered by academic and journalistic debate primarily subscribed to retrenchment—a reduction in overseas commitments to redirect funds to domestic requirements, and internationalism—an activist foreign policy and deep global engagement. The United States, according to Melvyn Leffler and Michel Cox, has had a long-cherished foreign policy goal of a U.S. led political, military and economic world order. Accordingly when realists, neo- 

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conservatives\textsuperscript{11} and internationalists\textsuperscript{12} debated structural issues of unipolarity\textsuperscript{13} and multipolarity\textsuperscript{14}, or prescribed strategies of multilateralism or


\textsuperscript{13} A unipolar system comprises a single geopolitically preponderant power obviating the formation of a balancing coalition against it. Christopher Layne "The Unipolar Illusion",p.5; for a discussion of America’s comparison with other states see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective".

\textsuperscript{14} A multipolar system comprises “several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns.” Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 78:2 (March-April 1999), pp.35-49, p. 35.
unilateralism,\textsuperscript{15} selective engagement\textsuperscript{16} and the use of soft power\textsuperscript{17}, the shared aim was to perpetuate post-Cold War American global pre-eminence.

Clearly, deep engagement whether unilateralist or multilateralist, assumes the supremacy of American political and economic values and perceives American benevolent hegemony as the source of universal peace and prosperity in an imposed American world order. It is less clear how unilateral actions by a preponderant power are to appear benign to less powerful states. An overwhelmingly unequal distribution of relative power is more likely to spawn fear rather than reverence in weaker states. It is thus a case of perceiving the international system through the lens of American self-image as a power for good. Hence, the US discourse largely expresses the desire for the preservation of raw military and economic prowess in idealistic terms. As Seymour Lipset points out, “Americans must define their role in a conflict as being on God’s side against Satan, for morality against evil, not, in its self-perception, to defend national interests.”\textsuperscript{18} Within this discourse isolationism i.e. withdrawal from major global military entanglements—a recurring pattern in US history of foreign relations—did not appear to be an option in view of economic interdependence and advancement in military technology\textsuperscript{19} despite efforts to promote the “America First” approach.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward a Post-Cold War World”, \textit{Foreign Affairs},70:2 (Spring 1991), pp.102-122, p. 102
\item See Patrick J. Buchanan, “America First and Second, and Third,” \textit{The National Interest}, 19 (Spring 1990), pp.77-82.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Thus, the first Gulf War against Iraq (1990-91) during the George H. W. Bush presidency (January 1989 - January 1993) demonstrated that the end of the Cold War did not mean an end to American global activism.

Addressing the Congress in the fall of 1990 George H. W. Bush argued that a new international order was emerging from “a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle.” Again, in his State of the Union address he warned against the world's oil resources falling into the hands of aggressive states “to finance further aggression” and advocated building peace based on “shared principles and the rule of law” under American global leadership. Clearly, US objectives flowed from a linking of US military power with economic interests and collective security. He appeared to reject the concept of American "overstretch" while his emphasis on multilateralism reflected recognition of limits on American power. Bush, a foreign policy pragmatist who confessed to being deficient in “that vision thing”, perceived his New World Order as furthering democracy, prosperity and the rule of international law under American global leadership. While this signaled a post-Containment focus on great power cooperation unambiguous focus on American preeminence—as in supporting a UN sanctioned coalition effort albeit under US command in the Gulf war— diluted Bush's emphasis on strengthening of international institutions making the concept ill-defined and projecting “many things to many people.” However, vagueness also provided more freedom of action whereby the US could choose between multilateralist and

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21 It signaled an end to the Cold War era spheres of influence politics as the Soviets did not object to Bush's multilateral campaign against their erstwhile client, Iraq.
24 John Dumbrell, “Evaluating the foreign policy of President Clinton, or Bill Clinton: Between the Bushes”, Lecture, British Association for American Studies Annual Conference, 2005 (Cambridge University, 14-17 April 2005).
27 According to Brzezinski "Order" suggested stability to the traditionalist conservatives who believe in status-quo and slow change; to the "reformers" the adjective "new" suggested a rearrangement of priorities; while the internationalists understood the word "world" as implying universality of American values. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, p. 30.
unilateralist responses without being constrained by international institutions. Clearly, as a believer in power politics Bush did not want restraints on American power by making foreign policy decisions subservient to international institutions; it is against the nature of the powerful to willingly forfeit or surrender their interests; that would require ideological leanings and according to Hyland, “... [The Bush] Administration’s main theme [was] not ideology but pragmatism; prudent approaches carried out by skilled practitioners.” Accordingly Bush’s team—notably Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, second Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell—were more concerned with practical operational efficiency rather than the “vision thing.”

That said, much like competing arguments offered by the academic debate, two documents of the Bush era manifest two competing visions within the Bush administration. The Defense Policy Guidance 1992 (DPG)—drafted by Undersecretary Wolfowitz's aide Zalmay Khalilzad and leaked to Pat Tyler of the New York Times in March 1992—demonstrates Secretary of Defense Cheney's preference for unilateral use of American military capability to obviate the rise of rival powers. Conversely, Secretary of State Eagleburger's twenty-two paged memo to his successor Warren Christopher offers a more complex assessment of the post-Cold War challenges—nuclear issues, ethnic conflicts, economic

interdependence—and prescribes US leadership by example and not fear. Clearly, Cheney's guiding principles emerge from the dynamics of the “unipolar moment” while Eagleburger’s memo appears to favor the concept of the “benevolent hegemon” capable of humanitarian intervention and building coalitions to resolve conflicts. Bush’s New World Order reflected the two strands. Yet, his emphasis on multilateralism reflected a pragmatic recognition of limits on American power, especially in view of massive US budget deficit in a world in which a possible resurgence of a weakened but intact Soviet Union remained a source of concern. Unlike the Bush administration Clinton’s team—that entered the White House after the collapse of the Soviet Union—was less preoccupied with security threats.

A study group under Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake comprising NSC members Jeremy Rosner, Leon Fuerth, and Donald Steinberg embarked upon the task of finding a suitable doctrine to replace Containment. In keeping with the internationalist policy prescription their strategy document recommended “democracy enlargement.” The concept made promotion of democracy and free markets the principal aim of the Clinton administration. It aimed at containing reactionary regimes and pursuing select humanitarian goals because the “character of the foreign regimes” could impact American security. Concurrently, Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin conducted a Bottom-up Review (BUR) that assumed the future of military operations as emerging from the strategy of “engagement, prevention, and partnership.” In other words, US

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31 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, pp.43-52; According to the authors’ well-researched account the memo was never made public. The writers, who were given access to the memo, have submitted a Freedom of Information request for its declassification. P. 48 and Note 31 on p. 348.
32 John Dumbrell, “Evaluating the foreign policy of President Clinton, or Bill Clinton : between the Bushes”.
37 Douglas Brinkley "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine" Foreign Policy, 106 (Spring, 1997), pp. 110-127.
internationalism entailed not only a commitment to multilateralism but also to “assertive multilateralism” that involved the use of US military power. This suggests a desire to ameliorate the image of the Democrats as averse to using military force and being “temperamentally scarred by Vietnam.” This also flowed from a belief in the concept of the “unipolar moment”. In other words, while many states and cultures perceive themselves as unique the US had the military power to back up its self-image.

Clearly, much like the neo-conservatives, Anthony Lake and Les Aspin saw democracy and free market economy as a progressive and moralistic end point for the attainment of which American power should be applied. Subsequently, Clinton integrated the concepts of Lake and Aspin in his successive National Security Strategy statements emphasizing domestic prosperity as the linchpin of foreign policy strategy thus closely linking the two. Clinton’s approach evidently assumed that in an increasingly economically interdependent world US engagement with non-democratic states would eventually serve as a catalyst for their regimes. Clinton’s aide Sidney Blumenthal along with historian James Chace coined the term, “the indispensable nation” in 1996. The concept perceived American power as the source of global peace and prosperity thus legitimizing it in the pursuit of democracy and free market economy.

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40 Clinton was a draft-dodger during the Vietnam War a disadvantage in his relationship with the US military. See Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, pp. 103, 59-62.
42 Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, pp.121-122.
43 Douglas Brinkley “Democratic Enlargement”.
Separating moral from hard security issues, however, was not easy and had its supporters and detractors. On the one hand, it was reminiscent of the ideological and universal dimensions of the Cold War era when the periphery was deemed vital to US interests; on the other, it was a continuation of the idealistic approach to an otherwise pragmatic American foreign policy based on power politics that consistently marks the US history of foreign relations. Clinton's failure in Somalia and Haiti and his economic interests in China reduced the emphasis on democracy enlargement as an overarching strategic framework. This contributed to foreign policy contradictions demonstrating Clinton's lack of interest in foreign affairs especially during his first term when he leaned heavily on his advisors—Christopher, Lake, Les Aspin, Berger and Albright. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell termed the White House foreign policy sessions as “coffee-house meetings.” The second term saw a more engaged Bill Clinton although even then “neither the President, nor Vice President Al Gore or Secretary of State Albright took charge.” That said, the goal of nuclear non-proliferation that emerged as an important goal for Bush and the key catalyst in US-Pakistan relations remained a consistent foreign policy priority for both Bush...

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48 18 U.S. marines on a humanitarian mission were killed by a mob in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993; a ship carrying military trainers was turned back in response to demonstrations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 12 October 1993. The two events served as the most important foreign policy setbacks; in view of US economic interests Clinton backtracked from his campaign promise of no truck with the Chinese government unless human rights were protected. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, pp. 80-83,13; Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work”.

49 William G. Hyland “A Mediocre Record”.


51 Brzezinski, Second Chance, pp. 86-87.
and Clinton against the backdrop of continued academic discourse on the dynamics of nuclear deterrence and its regional and nationalistic dimensions. Clinton’s National Security adviser Tony Lake warned of certain undemocratic “backlash states” that were ambitious to attain WMDs and missile delivery systems. Thus, the control of nuclear, biological and chemical WMDs emerged as “one of our nation’s highest priorities” in an increasingly globalizing world.

Stepping back to the competing visions of DPG and the Eagleburger memo, the one aspect in the documents—relevant to the purposes of this chapter—is the consensus on preventing the rise of new nuclear powers. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program therefore re-emerged as an important foreign policy issue before Clinton entered the White House. Post-Cold War American budgetary problems, diminishing public interest in foreign affairs and renewed Congressional focus on nuclear non-proliferation influenced Bush’s approach towards Islamabad as early as 1989. The following section will contextualize Pakistan-US relations.


54 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States”, Foreign Affairs 73: 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 44-55; Galen argues that the US feared not only the rise of undemocratic nations but also democratic allies such as Japan. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Delusions of Indispensability”, National Interest, 124 (March-April 2013), pp.47-55, p.49.

55 William J Clinton, “Speech before the UN General Assembly”; the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in four independent nuclear-weapons states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. The danger of weapons or technology falling into the wrong hands gained importance following post-Cold War ethnic, nationalist and religious tensions and the rise of transnational militant groups. It was deemed important by the US to ensure that the nuclear arsenal was located only in Russia. Bruce W. Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century, Third Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 2007), pp. 313-315.
during the Bush presidency by discussing the nature of bilateral relations immediately after the end of the Afghan-Soviet conflict.

(2) Pakistan and Bush after the Soviet-Afghan Conflict

Compared to the US, Pakistan did not see the end of the Cold War as ushering in a period of lessened security tensions within the context of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Once the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan the US interest in the region began to decline. Pakistan could not disentangle from Afghanistan because of its strategic stakes that are explainable on three levels:

First, a still heavily armed and mobile Afghan resistance and a large refugee community in Pakistan’s tribal belt, in coalition with some Pashtun elements, “could conceivably secure a domestic political voice, creating a de facto Pashtunistan.”56 Former governor of Pakistan’s frontier province Lt General Aurakzai, who hails from Pakistan’s tribal region, argued that there has never been a real threat of a “Greater Pashtunistan” because traditionally “the tribal people on Pakistan-Afghanistan border have looked eastwards and not westwards {towards Afghanistan} for prosperity.”57 However it could not be discounted that the end of bipolar competition meant that no over-arching great power supervision would keep a lid on indigenous rivalries. This could provide India with a strategic advantage to destabilize Pakistan by fomenting trouble in Fata.

Secondly, as former President and COAS General Pervez Musharraf maintained:

Before the 1980s, we followed a strategy of military deterrence on our eastern border; never in the west. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan changed our strategic thinking... {and thereafter} ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul became our strategic priority.58

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57 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
58 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
Musharraf’s words reflect the security fear of what Durrani termed the “nutcracker-dilemma” that emanated from “India-friendly Soviet Union on our western border and Soviet-friendly India in the east.”59 Since “Pakistan’s territory lacks depth”, as defense analyst Hasan Askari argues, it creates “serious handicaps” for the military.60 Thus, a friendly government could ensure a larger footprint providing Pakistani military with operational and psychological benefits as well as strategic depth (discussed in chapter 5) to counterbalance Indian geographical advantage.

Thirdly, the end of the superpower competition opened up five former predominantly Muslim Soviet states.61 Pakistan could thus access Central Asian markets and energy resources via Afghanistan.62 A vital zone, hitherto under the Soviet Union’s influence, could now become available to Pakistan with potential security and economic benefits. As Hamid Gul put it:

> It was a historic window of opportunity when resources of Central Asian Republics became accessible for Pakistan....a friendly-government in Kabul was strategically very important for us.63

Against these strategic interests an indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir arising out of local grievances against the Indian government64 presented Pakistan with an opportunity to take strategic advantage of the situation by tying down Indian

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59 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
60 The main railroad link from south to north runs parallel to the India-Pakistan border; at several points it is within 60 miles of the Indian border or the Line of Control in Kashmir. Three Pakistani cities, Lahore, Sialkot, and Kasur are situated very close to the border. There are hardly any natural barriers especially in the Punjab area. No Pakistani military airfield except Quetta is more than 150 miles from the Indian border. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture" in Michael R. Chambers, ed., South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Strategic Studies Institute of U.S. Army War College Report, (November 2002), [http://scholar.google.co.uk/](http://scholar.google.co.uk/), accessed 4 August 2012.
61 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
63 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
64 The 1989 insurrection after a rigged state election in 1987 in Indian-controlled Kashmir was indigenous. For details see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp.231-34.
forces in Kashmir. For this purpose the trained manpower and training camps in
Afghanistan could be utilized. That said, continued instability in Afghanistan and
post-conflict fallout prevented Pakistan from attaining its strategic interests.

As the Soviet army withdrew Pakistan was hosting nearly three million
Afghan refugees.\textsuperscript{65} There were thousands of fighters in Afghanistan armed with US
provided weapons who had easy access to Pakistan's tribal areas following the
softening of borders during the Afghan war. Moreover, the Soviets had left behind
huge ammunition dumps in Afghanistan. According to Lt General Javed Ashraf
Qazi Director General ISI from 1993 to 1995:

\begin{quote}
I was told by visiting Taliban leaders Mullahs Ghaus and
Rabbani 'we don't need weapons from anyone...there are
huge dumps in Afghanistan and just one storage site, the
Pasha Dump near Kandahar, that has fallen to us, has
seventeen tunnels filled with arms and ammunition' .... This
was enough to equip an entire Corps!\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

Even before the Taliban emerged, this provided the means for the Afghans to
escalate the power struggle into a full scale civil war perpetuated by the
ensuing regional security dilemma.\textsuperscript{67}

Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) between 1988 and 1991 argued that
"it was Reagan who had planned disengagement before he left office...Bush
merely implemented his plan." \textsuperscript{68} Beg’s premise is substantiated by the fact that
Reagan's policy of aiding anti-Najibullah forces (as indeed the uninterrupted
flow of the Soviet aid to Najibullah) after the signing of Geneva Accords in April

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Rhoda Margesson, “Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects” CRS Report for
December, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17August, 2011).
\item \textsuperscript{67} Iran, India and Russia supported the Shiite Northern Alliance and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
supported Sunni fighters, under Gulbadin Hekmatyar. Iran is a Shia state that sees American pro-
Israel polices as anti-Muslim. The Saudis who belong to the Sunni sect wanted to curtail Iranian
influence in Afghanistan—a goal convergent with America. The Russian and Central Asian
governments dreaded the spilling of conflict into their territories. Interview with Seth Jones (15
February 2012); Seth G. Jones, \textit{In the Graveyard of Empires America's War in Afghanistan}, (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2010),pp.46-47.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011)
\end{itemize}
1988 was continued by the Bush administration. The Accords explicitly demanded non-interference by external actors, so as to allow Afghans domestic groups to resolve their disputes in keeping with their cultural and tribal traditions. As the two great powers contravened the Accords it contributed to the perpetuation of a power struggle between the Soviet-backed Afghan government of Najibullah and the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen. It also provided Pakistan’s ISI the space to continue with its intervention in Afghanistan. In September 1991, the Soviet Union and the US, working towards ending the Cold War, agreed to cut off aid to both sides. By April 1992 the Najibullah regime collapsed and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s administration—guided by the military establishment—stepped in to form Afghan Interim Government (AIG) through the Peshawar Accord at the Governor’s House in April 1992, followed by Islamabad Accord in March 1993.

According to Karl Inderfurth:

Pakistan has always had a stake in Afghanistan because of its security interests...if its legitimate interests are not addressed there can be no peace in Afghanistan...it is as true now {after 9/11} as it was then.

Inderfurth shared these thoughts in the 2012 interview conducted for this thesis; however there is no evidence that he aired such understanding publicly as Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration (1997-2001). According to Hamid Gul the Bush administration also did not demonstrate any empathy:

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69 Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 924.
70 Charles G. Cogan, "Partners in Time".
71 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
72 Afghan Interim Government (AIG) was formed with a rotational head of government drawn from different ethnic groups until the final settlement. However, President Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, who became the first president refused to transfer power to the Pashtun Gulbadin Hekmatyar, leading to long drawn battles. For details see S. IftikharMurshed, Afghanistan: the Taliban Years (London: Bennett & Bloom, 2006), pp.33-41; critics point out that the Pakistan-sponsored Afghan council was unrepresentative of all Afghan groups and comprised only ISI- backed religious parties. See Zalmay Khalilzad, Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government" RAND Paper (1991), http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3949.pdf, accessed 14 August 2010.
73 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
Bush did not make efforts to appreciate Pakistan’s long-term interest in post-conflict political arrangements to ensure that Kabul will not conspire with New Delhi against Islamabad’s security interests.\textsuperscript{74}

Writing in 2008, Brzezinski points out that the United States “made little effort to galvanize the international community to help Afghanistan stabilize politically and recover economically.”\textsuperscript{75} Yet, in 1988 Brzezinski along with Kissinger advised the Bush administration against getting involved in Afghan affairs or assist in the formation of AIG.\textsuperscript{76} Clearly, expecting the UN to stabilize the situation without American active support was very difficult indeed. Thus, according to Iftikhar Murshed, Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan (1996-2000):

\begin{quote}
The United Nations tried with scant success to promote peace settlement ... The US provided some humanitarian aid and verbal support to the UN in some areas. This was not enough.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

Karl Inderfurth, who witnessed the Soviet withdrawal as a journalist in 1989, confirmed during the interview:

\begin{quote}
The UN had little institutional autonomy from its member-states... it was dependent on their material and political
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{75} Zbigniew Brzezinski, \textit{Second Chance}, p. 66.
capital... it could never have acted effectively in the absence of American support.78

That full-fledged US support was not forthcoming was not unexpected as Lt General Asad Durrani, Director General ISI (1990-1992) explained:

The US behaved like a realist power... we always knew they were going to withdraw once their Soviet-specific goal was achieved and we were not shocked. 79

Hamid Gul endorsed Durrani’s pragmatic explanation with an emotional one:

There was nothing unexpected {about US disengagement}. Bush was merely behaving in keeping with how the US has always behaved with Pakistan...using us for their strategic interests and then discarding us in favor of India.80

The two perspectives show that Pakistanis were cognizant of the limits of Pakistan-US convergence of Cold War interests within the ambit of their securitized relationship. However this did not translate into a sudden fracture between the two states. According to Beg:

The Pentagon still needed Pakistan. They needed us to protect their interests... they wanted our support for American efforts in the First Gulf War... they wanted us to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia.81

Durrani confirmed:

79 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
80 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
81 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
There was some cooperation between the two militaries till 1992. Largely because the ISI was the only one with the clout in Afghanistan and the CIA needed its cooperation to tie up some loose ends. By 1993 things began to really change.\(^{82}\)

Journalist and author Zahid Hussain posited:

1993 onwards there was a complete cut-off between Pakistan military and the Pentagon...old traditional links reduced; training programs cancelled...there was massive resentment and anti-American feeling within the military.\(^{83}\)

The above-mentioned DPG recommended “rebuilding” a “constructive relationship” with Pakistani military for stability in Southwest and Central Asia.\(^{84}\)

That the Pentagon still perceived Pakistan as a useful ally in the Middle East is confirmed by US media reports highlighting Pentagon’s discomfort with Congressional efforts to penalize Islamabad for its nuclear ambitions.\(^{85}\) There is evidence that between 1990 and 1994 there were some useful contacts between the two militaries. For example, US-Pakistan joint military exercises regarding specialized high altitude fighting in 1994 caused concern in India vis-à-vis the Siachen conflict and were perceived by the Indian policy-makers as “growing US-Pakistan military ties.”\(^{86}\) Similarly, the American and Pakistani naval exercises in 1993-94 were conducted according to plan.\(^{87}\) That the institutional links did not fracture suddenly is borne out by the approach of some State Department officials such as Howard Schaffer who favored close ties with Pakistan.\(^{88}\)

\(^{82}\) Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\(^{83}\) Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
\(^{84}\) Draft Defense Planning Guidance Excerpt.
\(^{87}\) Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
Academics like Thomas Thornton saw Pakistan “as the key” to U.S role in “the evolving situation in Afghanistan” and the Gulf.\(^9\) In a 1994 column Pakistani journalist Syed Mushahid Hussain maintains that the US still perceived Pakistan as a potential observation post for China, Iran and Central Asia. Nonetheless, he correctly sees this intimacy to be inadequate from the Pakistani perspective as it did not derive from US commitments of military hardware or financial grants.\(^9\)

This inadequacy derived from the re-emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program as an important Congressional issue by 1989. Thus it may be surmised that although institutional links between the two militaries did not rupture suddenly, these began to come under strain during the Bush presidency.

Unlike the US, Pakistan’s motive was not simply to defeat the Soviets but — as noted above — Islamabad had long-term strategic interests in Afghanistan. The fact that Pakistan was left on its own to tackle with the Afghan problem may have been a positive development for the Pakistani ISI that could continue influencing outcomes in Kabul to secure Islamabad’s strategic goals. However, the imposition of nuclear sanctions by the Bush administration in 1990 leading to a complete cutoff of military and economic aid in the backdrop of American loss of strategic interest in Pakistan aggravated Islamabad’s India-centric security dilemma. Thus the 1990 nuclear sanctions marked a key benchmark in Pakistan-US relations.

**Pakistan’s nuclear program and Bush**

During the Soviet-Afghan conflict Presidents Reagan and Bush had continued to issue the annual certification that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons capability.\(^9\) Congress accepted certifications because of the crucial stage of the

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\(^9\) Thomas P. Thornton, “The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations”.


\(^9\) The Pressler Amendment to US Foreign Assistance Act specified that US aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan would be cut off unless the president certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed US assistance program will significantly reduce this risk. The Pakistan-specific non-proliferation efforts were first introduced by the Republican Senators Alan Cranston and Larry Pressler in March 1984; later the amendment offered by Senators Pressler, Charles Mathias and Charles Percy was adopted by the Congress on 3 April 1984. Initially, it was supported by Pakistan because it diluted the more stringent Symington (1976) and Glenn (1977) Amendments with no caveats. Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, “The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan” *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1999), pp.1-16, [http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/morrow64.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/morrow64.pdf), accessed 27 February 2011.
Afghan conflict “rather than with any assurance that Pakistan had really
downgraded its nuclear program.” In 1989 CIA Director William H. Webster
informed the Senate that India was moving towards attaining nuclear weapons and
Pakistan was seeking an equalizer. During a 1989 visit to Washington Aslam Beg,
was warned of impending sanctions by the outgoing national security advisor Colin
Powell and his nominated successor Brent Scowcroft in separate meetings saying
Bush will not lie to the Congress. Durrani however argued during the interview:

Presidents Reagan and Bush had already issued false
 certifications to the Congress on behalf of Pakistan’s nuclear
 program during the Afghan war. They had already lied and
 cheated the Congress and they knew it.

Journalist Seymour Hersh seconds Durrani’s premise arguing that:

The certification process became farcical in the last years of
 the Reagan Administration, whose yearly certification—
 despite explicit American intelligence about Pakistan’s
 nuclear-weapons program—was seen as little more than a
 payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its support in
 Afghanistan.

Reagan and Bush, however, were not the only ones resorting to “doublespeak”.
Addressing the joint session of the Congress during an official visit to Washington
in June 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto denied possessing or building nuclear
weapons. During this visit Benazir was briefed by Webster on Pakistan’s nuclear

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93 William Webster, “Nuclear and Missile Proliferation,” Hearing before the Committee on
 Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, May 18, 1989 (Washington: Government Printing
 October 2013.
94 Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, p. 299.
95 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April, 2012).
97 David Ottaway, “Addressing Congress, Bhutto formally renounces nuclear arms”, *Washington
Post*, 8 June, 1989.
program. The purpose was to encourage her to freeze uranium enrichment, a feat impossible to accomplish given the military’s powerful position in Pakistani politics and its control of the nuclear program as discussed in Chapter 5. Kux quotes Benazir as confessing she was “carefully scripted” by the military elite and their hand-picked President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on how to handle the nuclear issue during her US visit. A senior Pakistani official confirmed such briefings before her official visits to Washington:

One of us played the role of the US president and asked questions and she practiced answering them... she herself wanted the military to brief her because she did not want to make any wrong commitments {to the Americans}.

Evidently, some in the military saw Benazir as cooperative and well-meaning. On the other hand military actors like Hamid Gul had “no such misgivings about her loyalty” and accused her of allying with the Americans to consolidate her own political position. The political truth is somewhere in the middle given the army’s security agenda and Benazir’s political ambition to stay in power by appeasing the military establishment. Either way she played her part well as following her visit Bush issued the required certification to allow sale of sixty F-16s and $600 million aid to Pakistan. However, Benazir’s “scripted performance” was not the only explanation. Bush had intelligence reports that, following Beg’s visit, Pakistan had stopped the production of weapons grade uranium.

That said Bush did not issue the required annual certification in 1990 since by then, according to US ambassador to Islamabad Robert Oakley, the US intelligence had “definitive information” about Pakistan crossing the line. According to US Congressional document Pakistan military elite privy to the nuclear program as well as nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, maintain that

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100 Interview with a senior Pakistani official A.
101 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
102 Dennis Kux, *Disenchanted Allies*, p. 300.
103 Ibid, p.310.
they had achieved the capability to build a bomb by 1988 and did not cross any
new threshold in 1990. Beg confirmed:

Yes, we put a freeze on it {sic}...no further enrichment...no
hot tests only deterrence ....we had achieved nuclear
explosive capability by 1989... we retained the option of the
first strike.

Lending credibility to the Pakistani position Kux quotes unnamed US
“knowledgeable sources” conceding that Pakistan may not have added to existing
capability after 1989. Former army chiefs during the 1990s, Generals Aslam Beg
and Abdul Waheed argued during the interview that the US moved the goal-posts
replacing “freeze” with “roll-back” by destroying bomb cores. Clearly,
Congressional bipartisan support for non-proliferation in the aftermath of the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan motivated Bush to pressureize Pakistan into
curtailing its nuclear ambitions. General Pervez Musharraf thus correctly argued:

After the Soviet defeat Pakistan’s help was no longer
required and the Bush administration resorted to
pressurize us under the Pressler Amendment whose raison

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104 Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security issues”, Report, Congressional Research Service (CRS), (19 March 2013),
105 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
106 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, Note 58, p.442.
107 Interviews with Beg ( 2 July 2011) and Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
108 Senator Larry Pressler, “Origins of the Pressler Amendment”, Congressional Record 102nd
The Herald Tribune, June26 1992, Congressional Record 102nd Congress, July 31, 1992,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record&c=102 accessed 12 May. 2013; Other
advocates included Alan Cranston (D-CA), Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Albert
Gore(D-TN), Trent Lott (R-MS), Claiborne Pell (D-RJ),Jesse Helms (R-NC) etc. Randy J Rydell,
“Giving Non-Proliferation Norms Teeth: Sanctions and the NPPA”, The Non-proliferation Review
d'être in 1985 was to facilitate uninterrupted flow of aid to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{109}

Similarly, Hamid Gul argued:

\begin{quote}
They knew about our nuclear ambitions in the 1970s and 1980s but kept quiet... now they behaved as if it was a revelation! Such reports became public when Bush was due to certify Pakistan’s nuclear status after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

Gul’s premise cannot be discounted; after all, as a Pakistani journalist pointed out Pakistan’s nuclear program, “like Rome, was not built in a day.”\textsuperscript{111} Clearly, from the Pakistani perspective once the US had achieved its strategic goals in Afghanistan it moved to undermine Islamabad’s nuclear ambition while using the “crossing the threshold” pretext.

Bush was under greater Congressional pressure not to issue the annual certification in 1990 following Congressional reports on Pakistan’s sale of nuclear technology to Iran.\textsuperscript{112} A U.S. company, Consarc Corporation, refused to sell Pakistan dual purpose high-temperature furnaces in 1990.\textsuperscript{113} Beg rejected the Iranian connection and countered that “before the post-Cold War stringent nuclear safeguards, any country could buy technology from the underground nuclear bazaar.”\textsuperscript{114} The bazaar presumably was a product of the Cold War era considering that Pakistani procurement agents in Europe and America were apprehended in


\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).


\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July, 2011).
the 1980s. Subsequently, the Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was passed by the US Congress in 1985 which included a presidential waiver. Thus, during the Soviet-Afghan conflict, Reagan imposed the penalty when a Pakistani agent was caught in the US for violating the Solarz Amendment, and then immediately issued the waiver to remove it. “Yet we were sanctioned in 1990” argued Aurakzai “as if our nuclear program had emerged out of nowhere!” Documentary data supports Aurakzai’s premise. There is evidence that the US was well aware of the status of Pakistan’s nuclear program before the Bush era. Confirming prior US knowledge of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status a post 9/11 Congressional report cites official US assessments in the mid-1980’s of Pakistan being a couple of years short of becoming a nuclear power. According to US official documents although it was unclear as to when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device, the United States had information “during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs.” Former army chief Waheed posited that the Americans had prevailed upon Zia-ul-Haq in mid-1986 to cap the nuclear program. Newly declassified US documents after 9/11 however substantiate that Zia-ul-Haq did not oblige Reagan. That

116 The Solarz Amendment prohibits military and economic assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state that illegally exports or attempts to export nuclear-related items from the United States.
118 Interview with Aurakzai
119 A 1985 National Intelligence Council report states that Pakistan “probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device” and was “probably a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough” highly enriched uranium for such a device. A 1987 National Security Council (NSC) memorandum describes Pakistan’s “continued pursuit ... of its nuclear weapons option.” A 1993 report to Congress, apparently from the NSC, states that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons efforts "culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary by the end of the 1980s.” Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”
121 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
said, it is clear that the Reagan administration, which needed Zia’s cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, risked his resentment by pressurizing him on the issue, thus demonstrating that the program had reached the red line. This is also substantiated by Beg’s confirmation that “We carried out cold tests in 1986 and trials of the delivery systems in 1987. The US knew this yet Reagan issued the certifications.” Moreover, during the 1980s the CIA was conducting joint covert operations with the ISI in Afghanistan and it is difficult to believe that as a close ally the US intelligence was unmindful of Pakistan’s progress towards nuclear weapons. Thus, in 1992 Senator Glenn argued that Bush’s 1989 certification, “conflicts with widely available information indicating that Pakistan was {already} a de facto nuclear weapons state.”

US intelligence reports that Beg was in favor of aiding the crash five-year nuclear program of Iran after the Gulf War added to Congressional concerns as noted above. Countering American claims Beg argued during the interview:

> Iranians did approach me as well as Benazir {but} the civil-military leadership was able to deflect such requests without seriously jeopardizing bilateral relations.  

Endorsing Beg’s premise Ehsan posited:

> There was no clear evidence against the state or government of Pakistan despite a lot of finger-pointing in 1990 against the sale of nuclear technology to third parties.

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123 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
124 See Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception; Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Conspiracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2007). Also Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge”
127 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
128 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
Nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan—the so-called “father of Pakistan’s bomb”—maintains that the final information and components provided to the Iranians were “not sufficiently detailed to enable mastery of this difficult technology.”

Stephen Cohen notes that evidence regarding the Iran-Beg connection was ambiguous. However, Iran’s growing geopolitical compulsions are likely to have added to the US anxiety emanating from, what Fasih Bokhari, called, “the fear of the rise of an Islamic threat”:

The Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979 was the game-changer…. the US followed the policy of demolishing Iran with counter-religion in the Soviet-Afghan war. {The Islamic threat} was very real for the US. I know (from first-hand experience) that US military officers were giving presentations on the subject by mid-1980s.

It was therefore not surprising that Congressional members called upon the State Department to “redouble its efforts” to curb Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Bipartisan advocacy of non-proliferation in the Congress, notably championed by Senators Larry Pressler (R-SD) and John Glenn (D-Ohio), was strengthened when in October 1991 Abdul Qadeer Khan publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s ability to build a bomb. Pressler argued that Pakistan had deceived the US by spending aid designated for progress on nuclear capability instead. This was a flawed argument since the primary premise related to Pakistan’s use of the

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131 Shia Iran’s security goals stemmed from fears of increasing Saudi Sunni influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and from its anti-Israel stance.

132 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011)


American aid and not to Islamabad’s resort to nuclear proliferation as such. He further maintained that Pakistan had used US aid to achieve the capability while India had indigenous sources. One might argue that having indigenous sources could not be treated as a justification for nuclear proliferation. Clearly, the American approach was grounded in pragmatic national interests and not ethics.

Given that Pakistanis themselves had achieved nuclear technology through clandestine means the Americans clearly feared the possibility of anti-US states such as Iran attaining nuclear capability. Earlier, the official rationale for the 1989 certification was that the Soviet backed regime in Kabul was still in place hence continued engagement with Pakistan was crucial. Subsequently there was a series of selective sales of spare parts and equipments to Pakistan. Clearly, both states were well aware of mutual deception for the sake of perceived respective national interests; post 1989 this added to the process of drifting apart.

From the Pakistani side the indication of growing disenchantment with the US was manifested by 1991 when Islamabad turned to China for missile technology. In early 1991 US intelligence reported that Beijing was selling Pakistan M-11 missile equipment and launchers besides assisting it in the building of a manufacturing plant. That relations were deteriorating was also reflected in the army chief Aslam Beg’s shifting stance on the Gulf crisis. For example, in August 1990 when Iraq attacked Kuwait Beg supported the American position. Later in 1991 Beg, contrary to the Nawaz Sharif government’s stated position, defined the anti-Saddam coalition effort as “strategic military intimidation” by the great powers, in keeping with the “Western-Zionist game plan to neutralize the Muslim world.”

Beg’s words draw more upon political rhetoric than keen military assessment; yet, this provides an insight into the Pakistani counter-narrative to

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American “unipolar moment” as supplanting the communist threat with the Islamic one. For instance, such reactions to Bush’s approach became evident in response to Pressler’s anti-Pakistan statement while in New Delhi, and the American silence on Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability. Since no country could match the American “unipolar” military might, argues Pakistani journalist Omer Kureishi, “the introduction of the nuclear element was exactly the sort of alarm-mongering that will make the enemy credible.” Perceiving the western lack of trust in Pakistan’s responsibility as a nuclear state as part of the colonialist approach whereby the “natives” lacked the intellectual skills to handle their own “burden” independently, Kureishi notes that compared to the “Islamic Bomb”, the “Hindu Bomb” seems as safe as the “Jewish or Christian Bombs”, since in those countries “no nut will ever press the button.”

Endorsing such sentiments Hamid Gul linked the nuclear and Afghan issues:

They {the US} are loath to let us remain Islamic and nuclear.... there was no provision in the Geneva Accords for an Afghan interim government {comprising Mujahedeen} because they did not want to empower Pakistan {but} India as a supporter of Israel.

Gul’s argument clearly demonstrates that Pakistan’s security anxieties stemmed from the fear of US support to potential Indian regional hegemony by discouraging Islamabad’s efforts towards nuclear parity; this could in turn threaten Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Gul’s position is supported by academic Tahir Amin:


142 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July, 2011).
Post Cold War there is a rapprochement between western liberal world order and Hindu India... Islam is the potential enemy therefore India is being promoted... while Pakistan {when needed} will only be a tactical partner. 143

Interestingly, former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel largely endorsed Pakistani perspective:

After the Bush era sanctions almost every high level conversation {in the 1990s} was dominated by Pakistan’s complaint against US double standards vis-à-vis India and Israel. There was much about the Pakistani stance that was correct and true. There has long been an American double standard vis-à-vis Israel and other nuclear programs. 144

Riedel’s views appear to be more a result of post 9/11 hindsight because there is no available evidence of his endorsement of the Pakistani position during the 1990s. Thus Riaz Khokhar, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington in the late 1990s posited:

They just did not want a Muslim Pakistan to go nuclear and that is the crux of the matter. The quality of {Pakistani} political leadership {in the 1990s} was not that good and the economy was weak... and then our closeness to China... the US was not happy with our dependence on China. 145

In the light of such complexities reflected in US fears of a potential Comunist China and Muslim Iran-Pakistan-nexus, the Pakistani policy-makers perceived US as soft on Indian nuclear ambitions. Thus, former Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub argues that in the 1990s Indians developed their nuclear weapons unhindered primarily because “the US looked the other way.” 146

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143 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
144 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
145 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
146 Gauhar Ayub Khan Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, p. 299.
Clearly, Pakistan’s counter-narrative had not only nationalist and regional undertones but was also concerned with the Muslim identity. Thus, Washington was seen by the Pakistani press as pressurizing China to stop M-11 missile equipment supply to Islamabad “because of American fears of a Muslim nuclear power capable of helping the Middle East neutralize the Israeli threat.”\textsuperscript{147} It is evident that Pressler’s political statement on a so-called Islamic-bloc is simplistic. The Muslim world after all is not a homogenous body; there are internal conflicts and disagreements.\textsuperscript{148} Similarly, Pakistani perception of US-India-Israel nexus is monolithic. After all, the Middle East conflict also has indigenous Arab and Muslim sources of dissention and is more than the exclusive work of the US and Israel.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, treating the US as a monolith by Pakistani interviewees demonstrates a subconscious bias towards all things American rather than particular US policies.\textsuperscript{150} Noticeably, however, what the Pakistan press resented more than Pressler’s reference to the Islamic bloc was his rejection of Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb” in contrast to—what Pressler termed— the Indian “peaceful bomb.” This underscored the importance Pakistan accorded to its regional, India-specific security competition. It must also be noted that during the 1990s Pakistan’s print and electronic media was not entirely independent\textsuperscript{151} and the points of view expressed in the leading newspapers or on state-controlled Pakistan Television (P.T.V) channel were likely influenced by the military establishment, a powerful stakeholder.

\textsuperscript{147}Mushtaq Ahmed, “Pressler’s Indiscretion”, \url{http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA334252}, accessed 3 August 2012.
History demonstrates that Muslim states guarded their national sovereignty and if necessary went to war against each other to defend their political and territorial integrity, for example the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Similarly, regional interests in Afghanistan in the 1990s were varied: while Pakistan was supporting the Pashtuns with help from Saudi Arabia, the CARs and Iran were supporting the Northern Alliance. Secular Turkey was an active member of the NATO and links with the CARs were primarily based on historic and ethnic bonds. Iran was improving its trade relations with India during this time and was unhappy with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s support for the Sunni Afghan factions.
\textsuperscript{149} The power struggles between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, for instance, may have contributed to the longevity of the conflict there.
\textsuperscript{151} From 2000 onwards Pervez Musharraf allowed independent media to flourish.
This section has provided a broader context to variations in the Pakistan-US relationship during the Bush era. Accordingly, the following section will examine the dynamics of the immediate catalysts.

(3) Drifting Apart

There were two immediate catalysts for the bilateral relationship during the Bush presidency: Bush administration’s response to Pakistan’s nuclear program and diminishing US strategic interest in Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

PFP and US nuclear sanctions

In September 1990 President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, received a presidential letter delivered by Ambassador Oakley apprising him of US sanctions. Consequently, after October 1990, $700 million aid pledged for 1988-1994 was suspended. Declining to transfer F-16 aircraft and other military equipment for which Pakistan had already paid a billion dollars in cash, an embargo was imposed on Pakistan-owned military equipment sent to the US for repairs; US military training programs for Pakistani officers were also stopped. Immediately this meant suspension of the $564 million military and economic aid approved for 1991. Until then Pakistan was the third largest recipient of US economic and military aid after Israel and Egypt, receiving nearly $300 million worth of military equipment and supplies annually. Subsequently, US assistance to Pakistan in the 1990s was the lowest since the 1950s.

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153 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p.251.
154 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p.308.
The sanctions according to diplomat Sarwar Naqvi “brought about a major low point in our relations.”\textsuperscript{156} “There was no doubt”, argued Amin that “the Bush administration was keen on rolling back Pakistan’s nuclear program...this was no conspiracy theory.”\textsuperscript{157} Bush’s response to PFP’s regional goals thus initiated the process of estrangement. Riedel argued:

The Pressler Amendment undermined the possibility of any kind of military to military relationship {and} actually restricted American ability to influence Pakistani strategic thinking.\textsuperscript{158}

Former Director General ISI General Ehsan-ul-Haq agreed:

Nuclear sanctions were a serious disadvantage for the military...it blocked a large amount of equipment in the pipeline. In fact Beg’s reaction to Gulf War was in reaction to {US} sanctions...I wouldn't say it was the army's thinking but sanctions were a turning point in Beg’s thinking.\textsuperscript{159}

The sanctions however were also “a blessing in disguise”, argued Beg, “now we could concentrate on indigenization of weapons industry with help from our friends in the east, especially China.”\textsuperscript{160} This line of argument implying the American contribution to Pakistan’s indigenous capability of weapons manufacturing as well as market diversification, was supported by Musharraf:

Bush’s approach reinforced the lesson that the Americans are unreliable ...so we leaned towards the east-China, Russia,
Korea... his approach was the beginning of Pakistan's focus on indigenization of its weapons industry.\textsuperscript{161}

Indigenous efforts meant an acceleration of PFP's goal of attainment of nuclear weapons because as Assef Ali argued “the US should have realized that an insecure state is a dangerous state.”\textsuperscript{162} Journalist Zahid Hussain concluded that:

Bush era sanctions began the negative impact on Pakistan's foreign policy. {Subsequently} Pakistan would progressively become more stubborn {in the pursuit of its security goals} in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{163}

Oakley would later reminisce, “The Pakistan military accused us of betraying them and leaving them defenceless against the Indians.”\textsuperscript{164} The erstwhile allies thus began to drift apart.

A November 1991 meeting between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and US under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew reflected the growing estrangement. The latter lost his temper and walked out on Khan after the Pakistani president stuck to Islamabad's position on nuclear weapons. Bartholomew was later told by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan that the US was bullying Pakistan.\textsuperscript{165} That Bartholomew, a junior US official, was authorized to hold discussions with the President of Pakistan was a reflection of the low priority the US now accorded Islamabad even if the nuclear issue itself was important. That the President received a junior US official to discuss Pakistan's program reflects the importance Pakistan accorded to US military aid and PFP’s regional security goals. Bartholomew's conduct, moreover, symbolized US "unipolar" arrogance on the one hand and on the other hand it reflected frustration with a weaker state's reluctance to fall in line. Islamabad's rejection of

\textsuperscript{161} Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 Jukky 2012)
\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{164} Quoted in Seth Jones \textit{In the Graveyard of Empires}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{165} Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p. 314.
Washington’s request for inspection of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities without comparable Indian inspections was another source of contention. Aslam Beg and Hamid Gul argued that the US itself was a nuclear proliferator since it had provided technology to Israel. Both military officers thus perceived American approach as favoring non-Muslim India that had friendly ties with Israel.

As it is, Pakistan viewed most US nuclear legislations as discriminatory and favoring India. This perception of discrimination goes back to 1974 when India did not face any US economic sanctions after it tested a “peaceful” nuclear device. In fact India was never sanctioned prior to 1998 although restrictions were imposed on export of dual-purpose technology. The Symington Amendment penalized states pursuing nuclear weapons after 1974 thus effectively leaving India off the hook. Subsequently, Symington and Glenn Amendments were invoked to justify arms embargo and sanctions against Pakistan in 1978 and 1979. The Indian stance that its nuclear weapons were China-specific was not convincing for Pakistani security managers. Prior memories of events aggravate the effects of the security dilemma which can set in motion the dynamics of action and reaction. Mistrust of Indian intentions against the backdrop of growing military strength thus drew upon Pakistani policy-makers’ prior experience—especially the Indian role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971—making it difficult to distinguish offensive from defensive Indian material capabilities. US global security goal of nuclear non-proliferation influenced Bush’s approach towards Islamabad and in the process aggravated the regional security dilemma. Pakistan’s reluctance in conforming to US demands was impacted by the end of bipolar rivalry following which there was diminished great power interest in checking regional anarchy. Thus, Congressman Fortney Stark argued that:

166 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
167 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
169 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
The strategic equation in the South Asian subcontinent now turns not on the reliability of the United States as a guarantor but on mutual Indian-Pakistani deterrence.\textsuperscript{171}

Clearly, PFP goal of attainment of nuclear capability was impacted by the dynamics of increasing US disinterest emanating from diminishing bipolar rivalry.

The Pressler Amendment was Pakistan specific and did not affect the Indian nuclear program or impact its military capability because India was not dependent on American weapons and spare parts hence fear of sanctions did not translate into effective, comparable non-proliferation pressure.\textsuperscript{172} The Pakistani position is that India is the nuclear proliferator in South Asia and that Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions are in reaction to Indian capability.\textsuperscript{173} Thus, former ambassador to Washington Maleeha Lodhi correctly argued:

\begin{quote}
Had India been pressurized to roll back or cap its program Pakistan would have followed suit. Both the states could adhere to the policy of nuclear ambivalence wherein they could possess the capability without declaring it... India was the proliferator in South Asia {but} it was Pakistan that paid the price.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}

Confirming Sagan’s hypothesis of domestic politics and national prestige as motivators of nuclear ambitions,\textsuperscript{175} Siraj-ul-Haq of the Jamaat-i-Islami added:

\begin{quote}
The Bush administration and the US Congress chose not to concede that Pakistan’s hostility with India primarily shaped Islamabad's security policies... the civil-military leadership
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{171} Representative Fortney Pete Stark, Extension of Remarks, (10 October, 1990), Congressional Record, 101st Congress-1989-1990.  
\textsuperscript{174} Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
\textsuperscript{175} Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”
was conscious of domestic political costs of failing to keep up with New Delhi.\footnote{Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).}

Bush did try to delay sanctions in 1990 to allow the new Pakistani government under Nawaz Sharif to conduct a policy review. But Democratic Senators Glenn and Cranston as well as Republican Senator William Cohen were adamant not to allow any lowering of nuclear standards.\footnote{R Jeffery Smith, “Administration unable to win support for continued aid to Pakistan”, \textit{Washington Post}, 10 October, 1990; Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.309.} In 1991 the Bush administration made efforts to repeal the Pressler Amendment as part of a broader legislation aimed at restricting the Congress ability to impose conditions on the disbursement of U.S. foreign aid.\footnote{Larry Q. Nowels, “Foreign Aid Budget and Policy Issues for the 104th Congress”, CRS Issue Brief (Updated 15 February, 1995), \url{http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pcaaa648.pdf}, accessed 19 October 2012.} Opponents of sanctions contended that “the Pressler aid ban has reduced U.S. influence in Pakistan at a time when that country is making fateful decisions about its military and political future.”\footnote{Steve Coll, “Hill Pressed to Lift Curb on Pakistan”, Extension of Remarks,(9 May, 1991) Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991-1992), \url{http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archives}, accessed 3 December 2011.} Supporters argued that by sanctioning Pakistan the US will be sending a strong message to all future nuclear aspirants. The issue found resonance among those who viewed foreign aid program as a target for budget reduction.\footnote{Thomas P. Thornton, “The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistani Relations”.} Foreign aid was never popular in America and “[T]he only way it could be legitimised” and justified to the public and Congress “was in terms of its value as a weapon in the Cold War.”\footnote{Michael Cox, \textit{US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission?} (London: Pinter-Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp.104 & 116.} Hence, Representative Jim Kolbe failed to win substantial support when he advocated “an even-handed treatment” for Islamabad.\footnote{Hon. Jim Kolbe, Remarks in the House of Representatives,(11 August,1992), Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991-1992), \url{http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archives}, accessed 3 December 2011.}

The question of neither supplying F-16s nor reimbursing Pakistan impacted the relationship negatively. When Pakistan was not allowed possession of F-16s the planes ended up in storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base near Tuscan, Arizona. The Pentagon urged Pakistan military to ensure continuity of
disbursements including parking charges partly to help the cash-strapped General Dynamics Corporation\textsuperscript{183} in keeping with the so-called “military-Industrial-complex”\textsuperscript{184} approach; non-payment of dues also meant breach of contract. Subsequently, Pakistan continued to pay before it suspended disbursements in 1993.\textsuperscript{185}(It is noticeable that the Pressler Amendment did not stop Washington from reimbursing Islamabad and the F-16s, as discussed in Chapter 4, were used as a bargaining chip.) Despite this serious disagreement Pakistan’s civil-military leadership made efforts for damage control because Pakistan needed American aid.

Before Bush invoked the Pressler Legislation, Benazir’s Foreign Minister Yaqub Ali Khan flew to Washington in October 1990 and offered Baker the option to freeze Pakistan’s nuclear program instead of a roll-back, but Baker “was cold and lacking in sympathy for Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{186} Clearly, Bush’s reliance on a small group of trusted advisors such as Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft, and Sununu encouraged groupthink where consensus is seldom challenged.\textsuperscript{187} In early 1991 senior diplomat Akram Zaki was dispatched by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to reiterate Pakistan’s position in Washington.\textsuperscript{188} In return Washington asked Islamabad to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);\textsuperscript{189} Pakistan showed willingness to do so if India signed it.\textsuperscript{190} Sharif then called a five power conference comprising the

\textsuperscript{183} Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.313.
\textsuperscript{184} The term, famously used by Eisenhower, broadly refers to the politically and economically driven policy and monetary relationship between legislators, armed forces and the military industrial base. Dwight D Eisenhower’s Farewell Speech to the Nation (17 January, 1961), relevant video excerpt available at \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8y06NSBBRty}, accessed 3 May 2013
\textsuperscript{185} Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.313.
\textsuperscript{186} Yaqub Ali Khan, Bob Oakley and Teresita Schaffer interviews with Dennis Kux, p. 310.
\textsuperscript{187} T.L Diebel, “Bush’s Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction”.
\textsuperscript{188} Maleeha Lodhi, \textit{The External Dimension} (Lahore; Jang Publishers, 1994), pp. 111-21
\textsuperscript{189} The NPT regime prohibits its nuclear and non-nuclear members from acquiring or seeking assistance in the fabrication of nuclear devices. UN Website, \url{www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html}, accessed 2 November 2011.
US, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and India, to consider banning nuclear weapons in South Asia. America showed interest but India rejected the proposal.\footnote{Steve Coll, "India Rejects Pakistani bid for talks on nuclear ban", \textit{Washington Post}, 8 June 1991; Indian position is that nuclear proliferation is global and not a regional issue and that its nuclear weapons are to deter China.}

In a more favorable development, most likely arising out of the military-industrial complex considerations, the State Department approved licenses for $120 million for the fiscal year 1991 allowing Pakistan to purchase military equipment commercially. This drew criticism from Senators Pressler and Pell and Representative Solarz.\footnote{"Senators seek full cutoff of arms to Pakistan", \textit{New York Times}, 8 March 1992} Pressler argued that sanctions did not exclude commercial arms sale.\footnote{Senator Larry Pressler, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 102nd Congress, 1991-1992 (30 July, 1992), \url{http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archives}, accessed 3 June 2011.} However, the legislation does not specifically mention this; a loophole which Secretary Baker manipulated in the Senate.\footnote{James Baker, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 102nd Congress, 1991-1992 (5 February 1992), \url{http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archives}, accessed 11 June 2011.} Despite this favorable development for Islamabad relations continued to deteriorate against the backdrop of Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons.

The US fear that passions in Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear conflict derived from the historical fact that the two states had already gone to war during the Cold War years and had indulged in brinkmanship in 1987 and again in 1990.\footnote{Indian forces carried out a massive multi-phased exercise Operation Brass-tacks in 1986-87 which raised bilateral tensions. Between January and May 1990 Kashmir-infiltration related tensions rose between India and Pakistan. India moved offensive units on Pakistan's border prompting the Pakistani military to respond. Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn (eds.), \textit{Report, "Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences"} (The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2011), pp. 11-12; \textit{Report "The Task Force On Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare"}, House Republican Research Committee, House Of Representatives, (24 August, 1994), \url{http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h940912-pak.htm}, accessed 30 May 2011.} Given Pakistani officials' periodic allusions to Pakistan's advanced stage of nuclear capability\footnote{Larry Pressler, Remarks Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, (30 July, 1992), Congressional Record 102nd Congress (1991-1992), \url{http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archives}, accessed 11 June 2011.} tensions in 1990 brought into focus the possibility of conflict escalation. Bush dispatched CIA and NSC directors Robert Gates and Richard Haass to Islamabad to defuse the situation. Richard Kerr, a deputy director at the CIA, later commented on the possibility of a nuclear exchange: “It was the most dangerous nuclear situation we have ever faced since I’ve been in the US.
Thus, cognizant of the Indo-Pakistani historical baggage, American fears were grounded not only in Pakistan’s affiliation with an “Islamic bloc” but also in the possibility of a nuclear conflict between the two neighbors. This regional context was closer to reality. Bush’s approach was perceived by Islamabad and particularly the military establishment as primarily a bid to enhance Indian regional position. Ehsan reflected this stance by arguing that:

{The} Indian nuclear position was understood and accepted by the US and the West but not Pakistan’s problem of a nuclearized India...an adversary that had already played an active military role in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. 198

From the Pakistani perspective for a military dependent on US weapons, termination of aid had serious implications as discussed in Chapter 5. Against the backdrop of its security compulsions it was not surprising that Islamabad increased its dependence on Beijing. Beg thus minced no words:

Yes, China provided all kinds of military assistance ... especially following US supply of aircraft and other weapons to Taiwan. After Bush sanctioned us I went to China and gave their leadership a list of all the equipment we needed....they gave us everything we wanted worth about a billion dollars. 199

Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons had been a PFP strategic goal since the 1970s and there was substantial progress in the program during the 1980s as confirmed by former COAS Aslam Beg. It is however pertinent to point out that progressive US loss of strategic interest during the Bush era coupled with continued instability in Afghanistan impacted Pakistan’s quest for nuclear

197 New Yorker (29 March, 1993).
198 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
199 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
weapons and missiles because as Ehsan pointed out: “growing Indian military power was bound to add to our existential concerns especially with continued instability in Afghanistan.”

Combining the Pakistani anguish at nuclear sanctions with US disengagement Musharraf endorsed Ehsan’s premise:

We were in a terrible military state in the aftermath of Bush sanctions {sic} because our economy in the 1990s was plunging down ...military was very hard-pressed. India was spending on conventional and nuclear weapons and Afghanistan was in turmoil...the Americans left us in the lurch.

Clearly, Pakistan’s continued focus on Afghanistan as against diminishing US strategic interest in Islamabad impacted PFP’s India-centric security goals as reflected in Hamid Gul’s argument:

The Geneva Accords did not provide a formula for transfer of power... the Bush administration did not want the Mujahedeen to form a government in Kabul because this would have been an Islamic government sympathetic to Pakistan instead of India... their primarily target was to prevent Pakistan—not India-- from becoming a powerful, nuclear state.

Reflecting Pakistani perspectives academic Mohammad Islam argued that the American approach to nuclear non-proliferation stemmed from the American self-perception as the “benevolent hegemon” while simultaneously “lacking sensitivity towards the Pakistani strategic and cultural mindset.” Having said that, the conduct of US foreign policy is primarily determined by its relative

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200 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
201 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
202 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
203 Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
power\textsuperscript{204} and it was in the US interest to prevent the rise of nuclear Pakistan with close ties with China. Thus, Bush’s approach towards Pakistan’s nuclear program stemmed from the securitized dimension that had marked the Cold War alliance and which failed to consider sustained non-security avenues of cooperation. Riedel therefore posited that:

Sanctions poisoned the Pakistan military’s view of the US and in retrospect it is particularly disappointing because in the 1990s Pakistan was trying to build up a democratic government.\textsuperscript{205}

Within the securitized relationship the disparity between PFP’s regional and America’s global objectives once again contributed to growing estrangement as the US progressively lost interest in Pakistan.

\textit{PFP and US disengagement}

Bush’s approach reminded me of Zia-ul-Haq’s words to Cyrus Vance that Pakistan’s relationship with the US is like living on a great river that changes course every five years; friends find themselves stuck in the sand.

Tahir Amin\textsuperscript{206}

Amin’s words reflect Pakistani expectations of the Bush administration’s foreign policy and the quality of post-Cold War relations in the light of previous experience. Bush’s approach however was not unexpected as Khokhar pointed out: “When the chips are down Pakistan’s strategic objectives are poles apart from the

\textsuperscript{205} Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).  
\textsuperscript{206} Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
US."\(^{207}\) Thus, in a 1989 article CIA official Charles Cogan recommends that the US policy towards Afghanistan must “maintain a prudent distance... {from} the “internal purification problems” of others.” In the same article he argues that the ISI “gave most of the weaponry to the fundamentalists....to install a {post-Cold War} fundamentalist and anti-American regime in Kabul” and also siphoned it off for later use “most notably in Kashmir.” Cogan’s approach characterizes an implicit understanding of the limits of the future US role after the Cold War; it also shows awareness of Pakistan’s intertwined strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Cogan’s argument that Washington made sustained efforts to formulate a post-war government in Afghanistan\(^{208}\) is however not supported by empirical proof as discussed earlier.

Partly spurred by concern for diplomats’ safety Secretary of State James Baker closed down the American embassy in Kabul in 1989, depriving the US of possible point of contact with the Najibullah government. According to Haass, in keeping with the policy of avoiding contact with communist Najibullah, and in the absence of diplomatic presence in Kabul, State Department officials like Robert Kimitt refused to talk to officials of the Soviet installed Najibullah regime.\(^{209}\) According to US media reports Pakistan’s civilian government under Benazir Bhutto grew frustrated with the Bush era policy of aiding the resistance forces, without demanding that they stop feuding amongst themselves, participate in efforts for a broad-based government and deliver a military victory by capturing Kabul. The Bush administration however was “reluctant to make” such a move.\(^{210}\) Pakistan’s frustration with the Bush administration’s approach was highlighted in the Congress.\(^{211}\) Nonetheless, the CIA continued its, now diminished, support to the anti-communist Pashtun Islamists, such as the Afghan commander Gulbadin Hekmatyar, through the ISI.\(^{212}\) Former ISI chief Asad Durrani however disagreed:

\(^{207}\) Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
\(^{208}\) See Charles. G. Cogan, “Partners in Time”, quotes from p. 82.
\(^{209}\) Quoted in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, pp. 298-99, p.302.
It is a misperception that the ISI was bent upon favoring the Pashtun or Islamic fundamentalist Afghan leaders right from the start. It was our initiative to bring Iran on board because they too had clout in Afghanistan and could help build a regional consensus. In principle by and large we followed the policy of a broad-based government in Afghanistan.  

(Durrani’s premise is further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). As noted in the first section it was not strategically beneficial for the military establishment to disentangle from Afghanistan. Durrani however downplayed any perpetuation of CIA-ISI links while confirming that the two militaries to some extent “kept the link alive” especially because:

There was an American compulsion... they wanted their Stingers back and the ISI could have helped them since it had distributed CIA weapons during the Afghan conflict.

Durrani’s argument while credible is nonetheless inadequate. The Stingers did not represent an existential threat to the US and therefore could not have been the primary reason for continued support of anti-Soviet elements in Afghanistan. According to Scowcroft, Bush saw no need to contest continued aid to Afghan militias as the Mujahedeen supporters in the Congress backed this position, urging “no truck with the communists.” Moreover, the staying power of Najibullah was assessed as a few weeks. Later, Bush and Scowcroft would concede that “the conventional wisdom on the staying power of Najibullah had proven wrong.”

According to Aurakzai as the US lost interest:

UN funds for refugees were curtailed......instead of helping us rehabilitate the refugees and the Afghan Mujahedeen the Bush administration said our interests have been achieved

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213 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
214 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April, 2012).
215 Brent Scowcroft quoted in Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, and p.297.
now it is your problem only...the chaos in Afghanistan impacted us.  

Ehsan provided the rationale behind PFP’s Afghan context:

Like any other country we too did not seek a two-front war with India...if you look at force differential we face a very real existential threat.....we needed to minimize our inferiority with India by seeking security on our border with Afghanistan.

Adding to Ehsan’s premise Musharraf argued that:

After 1989 US changed its strategic policy... no assistance to Pakistan...worst of all no rehabilitation of the fighters....these people had been trained and raised as fighters only...all they knew was how to make war...they were armed to the teeth...this meant continued ‘warlordism’ in Afghanistan and instability in Fata which could benefit India.

Clearly, the Pakistani security elite saw a connection between US disengagement, instability in Afghanistan and a potentially explosive situation in Fata; this was bound to add to Islamabad’s security dilemma vis-à-vis India.

One explanation for Bush’s misreading of the Afghan situation, according to Kux, was the lack of clarity in US policy. The State Department wanted to shift covert funds to Afghan rehabilitation; the CIA wanted to wash its hands off Afghanistan but for the Congressional support for the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen. The absence of a great power adversary diminished the role of the US intelligence operations in the region contributing to the gap in interagency coordination. Moreover, the CIA also made efforts— independent of the ISI — to co-opt non-

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217 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
218 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
219 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
Pashtun leaders like Ahmed Shah Masood.\textsuperscript{222} Clearly, the complexity of the Afghan scenario did not lessen Pakistan’s security dilemma and its leadership was wary of Bush administration’s approach toward the issue. Thus, former Inspector General Frontier Corps Lt General Mumtaz Gul maintained that: \textsuperscript{223}

After the Soviet withdrawal members of the Bush administration began supporting the non-Pashtun, pro-India elements thus creating the \textit{sic} wedge between us and the Afghans to weaken Pakistan and undermine our strategic gains.\textsuperscript{224}

The two former ISI chiefs during the time Hamid Gul and Asad Durrani perceived Bush administration’s dual approach from another perspective. They argued that the Bush administration was keen to weaken the ISI as well as the Afghan Mujahedeen in order to prevent the rise of a Pakistan-friendly, Islamic government in Kabul. Durrani argued:

\begin{quote}
It was not just the nuclear weapons that the Americans were unhappy with but also because the ISI had established clout in Afghanistan...this was a major concern...they did not want the \{Islamic\} Mujahedeen government but could not do much about it...so the next option was to defang the ISI.\textsuperscript{225}
\end{quote}

Gul endorsed Durrani; recalling a White House meeting called by George H.W Bush in 1989. This was attended by among others, officiating CIA director Richard Kerr who—as implied by Gul—"told me that Bush wanted ISI wings clipped to contain Pakistan."\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{222} For a comprehensive analysis see Steve Coll’s \textit{Ghost Wars}
\textsuperscript{223} The Frontier Corps is a federal paramilitary force operating along the western borders in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). It is commanded by a Major General.
\textsuperscript{224} Interview with Mumtaz Gul (19 October, 2011).
\textsuperscript{226} Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
Durrani and Gul’s assessments may be biased since they served as Director Generals ISI during the 1990s; however this perspective gathers credibility from communications of the US representative in Peshawar, Peter Tomsen. Prescribing weakening “the CIA-ISI nexus” Tomsen warned that ISI-backed Hekmatyar’s victory “will enable Pakistan’s direct control of Afghanistan, destabilizing strategic balance in Central Asia.”\footnote{227} The potential instability in Central Asia quite clearly emerged from US fears of a strong Islamic bloc in the region. In his 1991 RAND paper, Zalmay Khalilzad who served as special advisor on Afghanistan in the Reagan administration also warned that ISI’s leverage over key Afghan commanders allowed “Pakistan to increase its direct control over military operations.”\footnote{228} Beg’s version of events was that:

The Pakistan military wanted the US to reward the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen but the US betrayed them...the CIA wanted to play a double game by supporting both the Pashtun and non-Pashtun groups... the latter with Indian help. They wanted the Afghan factions to destroy each other because they never wanted a Mujahedeen dominated government in Kabul...the Americans having seen what the ISI could accomplish were wary...frightened.\footnote{229}

Bokhari concluded:

They themselves used the strategy in Afghanistan ...taught the ISI how an asymmetric force could destroy an industrial power...they did not realize it then...now they may demonize {ISI’s use of proxies} because they have no answer to what they have created.\footnote{230}

Thus Beg and Bokhari’s versions lend support to Gul and Durrani’s premise. Clearly, the Pakistani military elite viewed Bush’s approach with a great deal of

\footnote{227}{Peter Tomsen’s interview with Roy Gutman in How We Missed the Story, p. 31.}  
\footnote{229}{Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).}  
\footnote{230}{Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).}
skepticism which was then reflected in PFP thus adding to the process of drifting apart.

Confirming interagency dissention however Steve Coll argues that Bush was not fully in picture about the CIA’s continued covert supply. Thus, when in 1991 Milt Bearden, the former Islamabad CIA station chief broached the issue of the ongoing fighting in Afghanistan Bush asked, “Is that thing still going on?”\textsuperscript{231} Besides a lack of interagency coordination this also shows that Pakistan was no longer a priority at the highest US governmental levels; a low level covert engagement was however allowed till the end of the Najibullah regime. This leads to the conclusion that while US strategic interest in Pakistan was declining there was a continuation of the Containment response. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, a former ISI officer closely involved with the Afghan war in the 1980s, while explaining the inadequacy of the Geneva Accords argues that the Bush administration did not want Kabul to fall.\textsuperscript{232} This premise may be considered against Bush’s traditional status-quo oriented thinking emanating from a belief in the stability of the Cold War bipolar order and as Baker put it “doing what we can to strengthen {the Soviet} centre”.\textsuperscript{233} This attitude reflected the period of flux where fears of resurgence of the Soviet Union resided side by side with concerns for the consequences of Soviet collapse.\textsuperscript{234}

Against the backdrop of such complexities and Pakistani skepticism regarding the Bush administration another development added to the murkiness of the situation. From 1989 onwards Pakistan’s Afghan and Kashmir policies became increasingly entwined. Taking advantage of the local developments in Indian Kashmir Islamabad began supporting Kashmiri dissidents and their Pakistani supporters to “continue bleeding India” \textsuperscript{235}(discussed in chapters 4 and 5). This leads to the conclusion that while US disengagement from Afghanistan was seen as “betrayal” by Pakistani actors, from a pragmatic angle it also provided the PFP the space to continue its Kashmir policy. In Durrani’s words:

\textsuperscript{231}Milt Bearden’s interview with Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}, p.228.
\textsuperscript{232}Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, \textit{The Bear Trap}, p.217.
\textsuperscript{233}Zbigniew Brzezinski, \textit{Second Chance}, pp. 61-62.
\textsuperscript{234}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{235}Interviews with Pakistani officials B and C.
There is no concept of abandonment in international relations... as for the Kashmir insurgency... well, any state—whether Pakistan, India or the US—would manipulate a favorable situation for strategic advantage.236

Presenting the Indian version, Raman states that in 1991 the Government of India gave to the Bush administration a detailed dossier outlining Islamabad’s sponsorship of terrorism. Rejecting the information the Bush administration argued that much of the evidence was based on interrogation reports which, according to US law, were suspect due to the possible use of torture by the Indian police.237 One explanation stems from continued CIA-ISI cooperation between 1989 and 1992 until the unraveling of the Najibullah regime. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of coordination between State Department and the CIA. Marvin Weinbaum, who served in State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003, confirmed during the interview that “the US intelligence had reports of the ISI’s interference in Kashmir from the early 1990s.”238 However judging from the available US diplomatic communication from Islamabad at the time there was no definitive report of ISI’s support for the Kashmir insurgency.239 On the other hand Coll—quoting anonymous senior US officials—emphasizes interagency rivalry and a lack of coordination arguing that CIA’s definitive reports on the subject “gathered dust in the middle level of the bureaucracy.”240 Clearly, US interagency problems also flowed from a diminishing strategic interest in Islamabad.

Indian academic Sharma maintains that after an attack in 1992 on a group of Israeli tourists in Srinagar, Kashmir, George Bush, then in the midst of his campaign for re-election, came under pressure from Jewish voters to act against Pakistan. Subsequently, the 1991 dossier was re-examined by the State Department, “which now felt there were, after all, strong grounds for action against Pakistan.” Bush, however, lost the election before any action could be

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236 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
238 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February, 2012).
240 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 228.
contemplated.\textsuperscript{241} Sharma’s perspective appears credible when compared with Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington in 1992, Syeda Abida Husain’s version that Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Arnold Kanter conveyed to her informally that Pakistan could be declared a terrorist state.\textsuperscript{242}

Clearly, resolving the issue regarding Kashmir by extension meant involvement in Afghanistan and the end of global superpower rivalry had removed incentives for the Bush administration to intervene in the Afghan conflict. Academic Tahir Amin correctly points out that “the US wanted Pakistan to pursue a special kind of policy but failed to see the link between Afghanistan and Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{243} Thus, the source of variation in Pakistan-US relations was not the American “abandonment” per se but the disparity between PFP’s regional compulsions and US global goals that flowed from it.

\section*{Conclusion}

In comparison to the progressive declining of bipolar rivalry and the emergence of the US as the most powerful nation in the early 1990s, Pakistan did not perceive any mitigation of its regional security competition with India. Unlike the United States PFP’s security and economic stakes in Afghanistan and the post-conflict fallout ensured the continuation of Pakistan’s role in political and strategic developments in Afghanistan.

Continued instability on Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan spawned security fears of enhanced Indian influence which could lead to strategic disadvantages and obviate Islamabad’s access to Central Asian markets. Driven by the regional security dilemma PFP was simultaneously impacted by the Bush era nuclear sanctions mandating termination of military aid. Renewed US focus on

\textsuperscript{242} Syeda Abida Hussain’s interview with Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p. 316. A classification of being a terrorist state would have made Pakistan ineligible for any United States aid, including humanitarian aid, and Congress would have been required to vote against any loans from multilateral lending agencies (the Pressler sanctions did not restrict this). In addition, section 505 of the International Trade and Security Act of 1985, would have banned Pakistan from importing goods and services to the United States. See “United States and Pakistan Relations” (May 25, 1994) Congressional Record 103\textsuperscript{rd} Congress (1993-1994), http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905.U_S_Archives, accessed 22 July 2011.
\textsuperscript{243} Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
Islamabad’s nuclear program coupled with growing US strategic disinterest had negative material and psychological implications for Pakistan as India continued with the pursuit of its nuclear and conventional capability. Thus, the nuclear issue and US disengagement, without meaningfully addressing instability in Afghanistan, served as the two immediate catalysts for the bilateral relationship in the early 1990s.

PFP’s focus on nuclear weapons contributed to American fears of the emergence of a strong regional Islamic bloc which in turn could benefit China and Iran. Reports of Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s missile program and of an alleged Pakistan-Iran understanding on transfer of nuclear technology added to Congressional concerns influencing Bush’s approach towards Islamabad. This in turn favored India which was continuing with its nuclear build-up unfettered by any US sanctions. Since US policy-makers were not ready to take Pakistani regional security dilemma into consideration this contributed to the process of drifting apart.

Washington’s progressive loss of strategic interest in Kabul and Islamabad between 1989 and 1992 perpetuated Pakistan’s intervention in post-Soviet Afghanistan. On the one hand the Bush administration did not actively and adequately support the UN to help form a broad-based Afghan government; on the other hand CIA’s efforts to manipulate rival Afghan factions struggling for control of Kabul aggravated Islamabad’s regional security compulsions. Bush administration’s approach primarily emanated from a lack of sustained focus on developments in Afghanistan in view of US involvement in fast moving developments in Europe and the Middle East.

The policy, however, was also aimed at obviating the installation of an Islamic, Pakistan-friendly Mujahedeen led broad-based government in Kabul so as to discourage potential security and economic cooperation between Muslim Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and communist China. The approach strongly suggests an agenda to curb an empowered ISI that had begun to divert the CIA-taught lessons in asymmetric warfare to Indian Kashmir by 1989. Bush era response to PFP was thus clearly detrimental to operational advantages that Pakistan had gained on its western border with US help during the 1980s.
In conclusion Bush era sanctions and US disengagement served as the two immediate catalysts for the securitized Islamabad-Washington relationship. Reinforcing foreign policy trends of the Bush administration the Clinton presidency solidified the immediate catalysts with implications for PFP’s regional objectives and US global interests in the 1990s. Clinton's approach towards Pakistan will be examined in the next chapter.
Clinton’s Foreign Policy and Pakistan: Reinforcing Catalysts

But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread....And we must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems before they harm our national interests.¹

Thus spoke President Clinton in San Francisco on 26 February 1999. His words foreshadowed the US decision to bomb Kosovo during the nationalist-ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Less than three thousand miles from the Balkans, Afghanistan’s civil war had been raging since 1991. The brutal power struggle between local warlords was exacerbated by regional actors who continued to support rival groups for perceived national security goals. Pakistan in particular was playing an important role as it perpetuated its involvement in Afghanistan even though the Afghan-Soviet conflict had ended and the Soviet Union had withdrawn. Yet, the US did not choose to focus on this region during the 1990s.

As discussed in the previous chapter the core US strategic goal of power consolidation was aimed at discouraging the rise of potential challengers and was actively integrated with the concept of democracy enlargement. Even though Leslie Gelb argues the main strategic challenge for the United States was to cope with the problem of civil wars and the post-conflict problems of state collapse,² Clinton’s criteria for selective engagement—a real threat to international peace, clear objectives, anticipatable costs and a clear exit strategy³—clearly, did not apply to Afghanistan’s complex law and order situation. Thus, Clinton continued the Bush

era policy of strategic disengagement from the area which, in the light of
Islamabad’s continued entanglement, by extension meant diminished interest in
Pakistan.

Tony Lake identified the developing or the Third World, with backlash
states located there, as the primary source of global terrorism.\(^4\) Nuclear non-
proliferation and curtailment of transnational terrorism marked PFP’s relevance to
Clinton’s foreign policy and security strategy. Interestingly, the selected
instruments pertained to coercive diplomacy and did not involve any economic
incentives or public diplomacy in a country that had returned to democracy in
1989 after eleven years of military rule. At the same time, Clinton’s focus on
economics increased the importance of India.

The previous chapter discussed immediate catalysts underpinning
Pakistan-US relations between 1989 and 1993 during the Bush administration.
This chapter demonstrates that the catalysts were reinforced during the first post-
Subsequent variations aggravated Pakistani policy-makers’ security dilemma and
contributed to solidifying and sustaining a particular set of strategic choices. These
included the quest for nuclear weapons, installing a friendly regime in Kabul and
facilitating infiltration into Indian Kashmir.

The Clinton presidency raises some interesting questions. Why did Clinton
fail to achieve his foreign policy objectives in Pakistan? To what extent did PFP’s
regional security goals facilitate or impede American post-Cold War global ends?
Addressing these broad questions this chapter is divided into three sections. The
first examines the status of the Pakistan-US-India triangular relationship before
examining key international and domestic drivers behind Clinton’s approach
towards Pakistan; section two investigates Clinton’s role in the shaping of PFP’s
goal of attainment of nuclear weapons while the third section analyzes the Clinton
administration’s approach towards PFP’s goals of supporting the Taliban and the
Kashmir insurgency. The last two sections highlight the convergent and divergent
trends in Clinton’s foreign policy towards Pakistan.

\(^4\) Anthony Lake, Remarks, "From Containment to Enlargement"; Anthony Lake, "Confronting
Backlash States".
This section has examined. The following section will investigate the impact of Clinton’s foreign policy on the second and third option i.e. bolstering the Taliban and supporting the Kashmir insurgency.

(1) Clinton and the Triangular Relationship

During the Cold War, South Asian affairs were managed by the South Asia and Near Eastern desk in the State Department. On 24 August 1992 a separate Bureau of South Asian affairs was created as a result of Congressional legislation. When Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel took charge of the Bureau in 1993 it seemed to indicate that South Asia would now be paid sustained attention. However, Sarwar Naqvi, who served as the Deputy Chief of Mission to Washington (1991-1995), argued that despite a separate South Asia desk, Pakistan was not on the State Department’s list of priorities with Assistant Secretary level officials dealing with it. Pakistan’s ambassadors to Washington, Maleeha Lodhi (1995-1997) and Riaz Khokhar (1997-1999) confirmed Naqvi’s perspective. Khokhar recalled that Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright “hardly ever” engaged with him and “mostly it was her junior Tom Pickering who dealt with us.” Although Albright visited Pakistan in 1997, the visit was driven more by US domestic politics than any focus on US-Pakistan relations.

That Pakistan, in the words of author and RAND researcher Seth Jones, had “fallen off the radar screen”, was reflected in official attitudes. In his statement before the Senate in 1993 Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher for instance emphasized US interest in promotion of “human rights and free elections

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6 Interview with Naqvi (12 October, 2011).
7 Interviews with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October, 2011) and Riaz Khokhar (28 July, 2011).
8 By 1997 women’s rights issue was taken up by Albright under pressure from indigenous women rights’ groups such as the Feminist Majority and National Organization for Women (NOW). Theresa Loar, senior adviser on international women’s issues in the State Department was also a vocal supporter. Her visit was focused on a trip to meet Afghan women at the Nasir Bag Afghan refugee camp in Peshawar where she lashed out at the Taliban regime’s misogyny. See Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, Second Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 2013), pp.363-380.
9 Interview with Seth Jones (15 February, 2012).
in Pakistan, Burma and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{10} Considering that Pakistan had held a free election in 1989 and had a democratic government in place at the time, the incumbent administration clearly lacked interest in the country. According to co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center Michael Krepon, who served as an arms control official in the Clinton administration, Clinton did not begin his tenure with any pre-conceived notions of alienating Pakistan as opposed to India.\textsuperscript{11} His words find some evidence in Clinton’s first term record.

In contrast to its Cold War policy India liberalized its economy in the early 1990s, facilitating US investments and improving bilateral ties. However, there remained disagreements on human rights abuses in Kashmir and Indian Punjab.\textsuperscript{12} According to Indian analysts, Indian reports on Pakistan’s support for cross border infiltration into Indian Kashmir were not adequately addressed between 1993 and 1994\textsuperscript{13} nor did Indian allegations of the ISI’s support of the Sikh separatists in the Indian Punjab receive much attention.\textsuperscript{14} In fact, Clinton initially expressed support for Sikh rights and promised to take up the issue with India\textsuperscript{15} while Assistant Secretary Raphel, much to Indian chagrin, described Kashmir as “disputed territory” and termed the insurgency in Kashmir as “self-sustaining”\textsuperscript{16}. Raphel, along with Defense Secretary William Perry, “supported closer Pakistan-US ties” perceiving Pakistan as a “potentially useful friend” in western Asia and the Middle East\textsuperscript{17} and an important source of contingents for the UN peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{18}

In April 1995, Bhutto visited Washington and Clinton responded positively to her request to either release the pre-ordered F-16s or reimburse Pakistan. He

\textsuperscript{10} Statement by Warren Christopher, Confirmation Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1993, http://www.archive.org/stream/nominationofwarr00unit/nominationofwarr00unit_djvu.txt, accessed 5 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} See B. Raman, Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally, pp.8-11.
\textsuperscript{16} Hindu, 30 October 1993.
\textsuperscript{17} Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012).
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Aslam Beg (July 2011). Pakistan sent 6000 troops to Somalia and 3000 to Bosnia.
promised to urge Congress to reconsider the Pressler Amendment and supported Republican Senator Hank Brown’s efforts towards this end which culminated in the Brown Amendment in 1995. Furthermore, he helped Nawaz Sharif in defusing the Kargil situation with India in 1999. That said, the US did not renew aid, release F-16s or oblige Islamabad in its quest for resolution of the Kashmir dispute which demonstrates that the bilateral relationship remained constrained by Bush era policies. Conversely, the administration's interest in India rose steadily despite White House and Congressional reservations on Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir. Clinton was the first US president who according to defense analyst Ayesha Siddiqa ceased to view US-India relations through the prism of regional conflicts, especially Kashmir, by “de-hyphenating the India-Pakistan construct.” This, as a RAND report explains, meant that “each state would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to US interests rather than by fears about how U.S. relations with one would affect relations with the other.” In other words it was recognition of India’s regional power that in the post-Cold War world, merited greater attention unconnected with its bilateral disputes with Pakistan, especially Kashmir. This was confirmed by Lodhi who argued:

The US had to de-hyphenate the two sides for they did not want to alienate India. They never helped in {the resolution

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19 Interviews with Dennis Kux (18 March, 2012) and Bruce Riedel (2 February, 2012)
20 The Brown Amendment was aimed at one time waiver on Pressler Amendment to release embargoed military equipment in the pipeline.
23 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
of Indo-Pakistan disputes. They only wanted to manage relations to keep Pakistan engaged in a nuclear dialogue.  

The US assumption was that the geopolitical weights of the two countries were divergent pertaining to the significance of US grand strategic interests.  

The effort to build a new partnership with India derived primarily from Clinton’s foreign policy focus on economic interests although there was a security angle as well. India’s huge market and population offered opportunities for Clinton’s market-oriented foreign policy. The US was India’s largest trade partner and a major source of investment and technology throughout the 1990s.  

Moreover, New Delhi became the largest South Asian recipient of US development and food aid with US assistance reaching a total of $170 million in the fiscal year 2000, more than 45 times that of Pakistan’s $3.78 million. Pakistan comparatively offered far lesser economic opportunities and its close relations with China were not to its advantage. Conversely, India, with its significant military capability was seen as a potential geopolitical balancer to China that could consolidate American primacy.  

Clinton’s economic priorities are captured by Talbott’s assertion that Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests in May 1998 provided Clinton with a powerful incentive to engage India and “give the US a degree of traction with India that it never had during the Cold War” even as relations with Pakistan were downgraded. Although sanctions under the Glenn Amendment were imposed on both Islamabad and New Delhi after the May 1998 nuclear tests, the effect on India, not dependent on US military aid, was marginal as compared to Pakistan.  

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26 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).  
30 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest”.  
31 On May 11 1998, India detonated 5 nuclear devices in operation Shakti. Pakistan responded with the testing of 5 nuclear devices on May 1998 at Chaghai.  
33 For statistics and other details see Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, “The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan”.  

rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\textsuperscript{34} in October 1998, Clinton's pressure on India to sign the treaty weakened. Economic sanctions against India were partially lifted through the Agriculture Export Relief Act, 1998 and the India-Pakistan Relief Act, 1998 or the Brownback Amendments.\textsuperscript{35} However, while waiver in case of India could continue beyond October 1999, in case of Pakistan the military coup invited the so-called democracy sanctions.\textsuperscript{36} The Brownback legislation, which did not authorize the waiving of military sanctions, removed obstacles between US-India economic and trade relations, however it failed to improve Pakistan's predicament since it was under the Pressler and MTCR sanctions.\textsuperscript{37} US punitive measures against Pakistan contributed to India's comfort level in its post-Cold War relations with America.\textsuperscript{38}

In January 1995 Clinton's Secretary of Defense William Perry signed a security agreement in New Delhi to establish a Defense Policy Forum for reviewing post-Cold War strategies and to enhance military to military contacts through upgraded training, exchange programs and joint exercises. This agreement was a breakthrough in bilateral relations as it meant moving beyond the Cold War estrangement. Immediately after Perry's visit Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce visited India and signed an agreement establishing a "Commerce Forum" to promote bilateral economic relations.\textsuperscript{39} No comparable commercial agreement was signed with Pakistan although Perry also visited Islamabad in January 1995 to find ways to improve security relations.\textsuperscript{40} Subsequently, the Pakistan-US Defense Consultative Group on security issues, which had not met since 1990, was revived in September 1996. It is noteworthy that the military cooperation forum was re-

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\textsuperscript{34} CTBT is a multilateral treaty that aims to ban all nuclear testing whether for military or civilian purposes. The UN general assembly adopted it on 10th September 1996 but remains un-ratified by eight states including the US, India and Pakistan. \url{http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/ares50-245.htm}, accessed 7 July 2012.

\textsuperscript{35} The Brownback Amendments, moved by Republican Sam Brownback in 1998 and 1999, authorized the President to waive most non-military sanctions under Glenn, Symington and Pressler Amendments.

\textsuperscript{36} Under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.


\textsuperscript{38} Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).


\textsuperscript{40} Dennis Kux, \textit{Disenchanted Allies}, p.328.
activated just when the Taliban was strengthening its hold in Kabul. It is likely the symbolic action with no financial or material benefits for Pakistan was taken to not alienate the military altogether in view of its perceived leverage over the Taliban regime viewed as potentially useful for US economic interests in Central Asia. This argument becomes credible when seen against the backdrop of Raphel’s intense shuttle diplomacy between regional actors for winning a stake in the proposed Turkmenistan gas pipeline during the same time period 41(discussed in section 2).

US-India bilateral relations became considerably warmer after the Indian Prime Minister, Narsimah Rao’s official visit to Washington in May 1994; he was the first head of government in the Clinton presidency to deliver a speech to the US Congress. Conversely, in late May 1994 US officials virtually ignored Pakistan’s President Farooq Leghari’s private visit to Washington.42 Writing in his political memoirs Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan recalls how the US media ignored Nawaz Sharif’s address to the UN General Assembly and later neglected to highlight his Press Conference in September 1997.43 Mixed signals in Clinton’s first term were replaced with positive gestures towards India signified by the August 1997 replacement of Robin Raphel with Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Rick Inderfurth who, as Krepon confirmed was “very strongly inclined towards India” with a significant commercial aspect.44 The fact that a pro-India official was chosen to replace pro-Pakistan Raphel reflects Clinton’s shift towards India whose government and media were unhappy with Raphel’s stance on Kashmir.45 Inderfurth’s inclination was reflected in first visiting India and then Pakistan and stopping again in New Delhi before flying home.

According to Krepon Pakistan’s nuclear testing and the Kargil conflict significantly shifted US policy towards India as could be gauged from Clinton’s “carefully crafted “language on Kashmir as a bilateral dispute in July 4

42 David S Chou, “US Policy Towards India and Pakistan in the Post- Cold War Era”
44 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
communiqué” following the Blair House meeting; “India was the primary beneficiary” as this endorsed the Indian position. According to Khokhar Nawaz Sharif was clearly told that he will not be received by Clinton unless he intended to withdraw from Kargil. Musharraf argued:

We were in a very, very strong position; Sharif accepted to withdraw because of US pressure... Kargil was undertaken to bring Kashmir back into international focus... after Americans started supporting the Indian position on Kashmir you could not even talk about it in the UN.

Musharraf’s political objective, if there was one, however remained unfulfilled; Khokhar correctly saw the Kargil conflict as “a watershed event because after this India was able to build the case against trusting Pakistan.”

Clinton’s handling of the Kargil crisis, which increased Indian trust in Clinton’s efforts to cultivate India, was impacted by Pakistan’s unconvincing explanations of the Kargil conflict being “indigenous” with no army involvement. The potential nuclear escalation played an important role although according to Inderfurth, “there was no real risk of a nuclear confrontation.” Khokhar recalled:

Tom Pickering called me and used very strong language; he said ‘Kargil has damaged Pakistan and the US saw it as a huge example of a nuclear country behaving in an irresponsible manner.’

The Kargil episode thus provided an opportunity for a clean break for Clinton without even the need for diplomatic niceties. The overt US shift was exemplified by Clinton’s visit to the two countries in 2000. He spent five engaging days in India

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46 Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
47 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
48 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
49 Admiral Fasih Bokhari who attended the meeting between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif prior to the Kargil debacle maintained that initially Musharraf was clueless about the political goal of his military campaign; it was an after-thought. Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
50 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
51 Interview with Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
52 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
and barely five hours in Islamabad where he refused to shake hands or be photographed with Pakistan’s new military leader, Pervez Musharraf. Yet, he found it important to explain himself to the Pakistani nation in a televised speech during which he made none too subtle an allusion to the Kashmir dispute saying “this era does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood.”\(^5\) His words were little more than rhetoric since the post-Cold War era was no different from the Cold War years in that US foreign policy was driven by self-interest in both the periods. This unprecedented television performance can be explained as an unconscious effort to clarify American “abandonment” of Pakistan in favor of India as well as Clinton’s personal desire for approval. More importantly, Clinton’s visit to Islamabad followed his visit to New Delhi and his public statements about Kargil/Kashmir in Pakistan were meant to reinforce improvement in US-India relations.

It is important to note that two years prior to the Kargil conflict there were efforts by Nawaz Sharif government to resolve the dispute through dialogue. Accordingly, Sharif requested American support for his efforts during his meeting with Bill Clinton in New York in 1997. In response, says former Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan who was present at the meeting, Clinton emphasized the Indian position to settle the issue bilaterally saying, “We have not developed leverage with India as yet” after the Cold War.\(^5^4\) The Indian media response was triumphant perceiving “Sharif’s attempts to wear down his hosts” as futile.\(^5^5\) Keeping in mind that no two international situations are alike due to the presence of diverse variables, to cite Indian resistance as a justification for not mediating is unconvincing when compared to Clinton’s role in brokering peace in Ireland without much British enthusiasm.\(^5^6\) According to Khokhar even though the US stance on Kashmir became more overt in the Clinton era, it was in the making during the Cold War, “they do not have enough clout with India” argued Khokhar “so they can only pressurize us”.\(^5^7\)

\(^{5^4}\) Gohar Ayub Khan, *Glimpses into the Corridors of Power*, p.279.
\(^{5^7}\) Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
Khokhar’s view misses an important point. Even though Clinton’s approach was a continuation of the Cold War American position there was a distinct post-Cold war angle to it — there was no strategic requirement to balance the triangular relationship. The US had lost strategic interest, thus depriving Pakistan of any reverse influence.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, even during the Cold War the US was not without influence. As noted in Chapter 2, India was the largest recipient of US economic aid; furthermore, it accepted US weapons during its conflict with China in 1962. The US approach was therefore more in keeping with its Containment policy than an absence of influence. After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, New Delhi was more conducive to American assistance. Thus, Karl Inderfurth’s tautological argument in Clinton’s defense that, “Kashmir is a manifestation” of Indo-Pakistan hostility and “not a cause”\textsuperscript{59} does not provide a full explanation.

What better explains Clinton’s approach towards Kashmir is not the leverage narrative but rather the perception that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute was a regional issue (as discussed in Chapter 2) that clearly did not impact American global interests which in Clinton’s case derived primarily from economics. Clearly, democracy enlargement did not commit the Clinton administration, sensitive to public opinion and media image,\textsuperscript{60} to concern itself with conflicts in places such as Kashmir because neither were they economically attractive nor a vocal issue raised by a strong US domestic interest group. Clinton’s reorientation of foreign policy, liberalization of Indian economic policies and to some extent US fears of potential Chinese strategic competition are likely to have strengthened his perception of the dispute. Since Pakistan was a relatively less lucrative option, US-Pakistan relations during the Clinton era were primarily security-driven and thus a continuation of the Cold War mindset. The following sub-section highlights key strategic and domestic drivers behind Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan.


\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February, 2012).

\textsuperscript{60} Chollet and Goldgeier, \textit{America Between the Wars}, pp.57-59
Key strategic drivers

The first key strategic objective pertained to nuclear non-proliferation. Clinton inherited the legacy of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment and the issue of F-16s was still unresolved. Clinton supported the Brown Amendment passed by the Congress on 24 October 1995 authorizing the supply of military equipment that Islamabad had ordered and paid for prior to 1 October 1990 but excluded the F-16s. The Brown Amendment did not temper the Pressler Amendment nor permit new arms sales to Pakistan.

Following the 1998 nuclear explosions by India the Clinton administration embarked on a diplomatic effort to dissuade Pakistan from responding. Pakistan’s refusal to comply brought about more sanctions. The United States along with fourteen countries61 suspended bilateral aid programs as a sanction against India and Pakistan. They also suspended all loans to Pakistan, which totaled $231 million in 1997-98, and cancelled grant aid of approximately $55 million while opposing any future non-humanitarian lending by international monetary institutions like the World Bank.62

The second key strategic goal that drove Clinton’s Pakistan policy pertained to Pakistan’s Afghan policy. As discussed in the previous chapter after the Soviet withdrawal and US disengagement from Afghanistan armed power struggle among local groups continued. The United Nations, as noted in the previous chapter had little support from major states.63 Inderfurth correctly pointed out that “the UN cannot by itself exert strong influence unless supported by the five permanent members of the Security Council.”64 The breakup of the Soviet Union also reduced great-power leverage in the conflict. Regional powers like Pakistan and Iran, with their own strategic goals, were thus able to attain greater latitude to intervene. However, despite losing interest in Pakistan the region remained important.

Forestalling Chinese strategic impact and preventing the anti-US Islamic regime in Iran from expanding its religious and political influence into Afghanistan

61 Including UK, Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Russia and Sweden.
64 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February, 2011).
and the neighboring CARs were important strategic goals. That said, the Clinton administration’s interest in the region was primarily economic with a focus on the proposed oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan to Pakistan’s Gwader Port for onward supply to Europe and America. The American oil company, Unocal was competing with the Argentinean firm Bridas for getting the contract. However, as journalist Rashid argues, Clinton’s foreign policy team—focused on the Balkans, Russia and East Asia—did not want to get directly entangled. Riffat Hussain who served as Press Secretary in Pakistan’s embassy in Washington (1994-1996) also argued:

The Clinton administration chose to depend on anti-Iran Saudi Arabian monarchy and Pakistan’s ISI to protect its economic interests in Afghanistan.

By supporting the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline Unocal’s commercial interest was protected and the pipeline avoided Iran even though it provided the shortest and most economical route.

The third key strategic goal that drove Clinton’s Pakistan policy pertained to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. It was reported by the media that the training camps established by the ISI in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1980s were being used for training anti-India fighters to fuel an ongoing insurgency in Kashmir.

Pakistan, as noted in chapter 3, was subject to active review for possible inclusion on the State Department’s terrorist watch list in early 1993. A statement released

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65 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
66 Ahmed Rashid Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords, pp.170-182 and 144-156;
67 Interview with Riffat Hussain, (7 August, 2011).
68 Clinton’s interest was neither accidental nor altruistic; between 1991 and 1995 the US supported liberalization policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan so as to make way for American investment. The Turkmenistan-Turkey–Iran gas pipeline to Europe was not allowed to be built as the US pressured Turkmenistan to avoid Iran route which was actually cheaper and quicker. President Niyazov was influenced by the Clinton administration into signing a contract with US oil giant Unocal and its Saudi Arabian partner Delta Oil. Pakistan supported Unocal for economic reasons and also to help legitimize the pro-Pakistan Taliban regime. For detailed narrative see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, pp. 157-182.
by the State Department on January 8, 1993, announced that the US was considering classifying Pakistan as a terrorist state following Indian allegations. In the wake of the March 1993 bomb blasts in the Indian commercial city of Bombay (Mumbai), India again pointed a finger at Pakistan's ISI, urging the US to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. According to Lodhi, “Relations sunk to an all-time low when Washington threatened to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

Pakistan’s name was, however, dropped from the terror watch list in July 1993 because according to Warren Christopher “Pakistan’s policy of ending official support for terrorists in India is apparently now being implemented on the ground.” Although Pakistan was never declared a terrorist state, the question of ISI interference in Kashmir and the use of Afghan territory for training camps remained a major driver since the US considered this as undermining Clinton’s foreign policy objective of terrorism containment.

The fourth key strategic objective that shaped Clinton’s policy toward Pakistan pertained to US-India relations, the dynamics of which have been discussed above. Clinton’s approach lacked interest in non-security issues and contributed towards strengthening the political role of the military; an omission that Riedel conceded during the interview:

We can be cynical about Benazir and Nawaz Sharif’s political success as prime ministers during the 1990s, but there was an awareness of the necessity to develop democratic rule in Pakistan and the US should have been a supporter of that not only rhetorically but practically.

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71 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
73 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
According to Riedel, Clinton’s Pakistan policy was heavily influenced by the non-proliferation interest groups within the Congress. His premise brings into focus the following key domestic drivers behind Clinton’s foreign policy towards Islamabad.

**Key US domestic drivers**

Clinton was elected with less than half of the popular vote, and the 1994 Republican midterm electoral victory tilted the political balance of power between the two branches. Clinton was therefore more vulnerable to Congressional infringement than his predecessors. \(^{74}\) The 1994 Congress wanted mostly to concentrate on domestic economic issues and questioned the rationale for foreign aid in the post-Cold War era when there was no comparable adversary to challenge the US. \(^{75}\) In the aftermath of the Gulf War there was a loss of public interest in foreign affairs; polls in the 1990s rarely found more than five percent of Americans who could name the most important foreign policy issue; a steep fall from more than fifty percent who named a foreign policy issue during the Cold War. Similarly, public support for the protection of weaker nations against foreign aggression fell from 57 to 24 percent in the 1990s. Thus, as James Lindsay argues, while the President and his inner circle of advisors matter more than the Congress when it comes to foreign policy, members of the Congress who challenged the White House on foreign policy ran negligible electoral risks during the 1990s. The main reason being that in the post-Cold War environment the importance of ethnic, business and single-issue groups was re-established. \(^{76}\)

Congressional re-assertion, for instance, was manifested in the difference in approach to the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Congress viewed the Balkan issue largely within the context of US-Europe relations and vital US

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\(^{75}\) Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, pp.116-117.

economic and military interests in Europe. The President and the Congress both saw a stable Balkans important for US interests.\textsuperscript{77} Afghanistan, on the other hand, did not present any comparable strategic challenges nor motivate Congressional or public support for humanitarian interventions.\textsuperscript{78} In Pakistan’s context the Congressional non-proliferation group led by Senators Glenn and Pressler and the American Indian lobby\textsuperscript{79} were especially important influences on Clinton who was sensitive to public opinion and media.

With the afore-mentioned key strategic and domestic drivers in mind the following two sections will explain how the Bush era catalysts were reinforced during the Clinton presidency. In the post-Cold War world PFP rested on three policy choices: attain nuclear weapons capability; bolster a pro-Pakistan faction in Afghanistan as a regional ally; support insurgency in Indian controlled Kashmir.\textsuperscript{80} From the US foreign policy perspective the first two options were in direct contravention of its stated post-Cold War global objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and curtailment of terrorism. The Clinton administration’s initial perception of the third option was ambivalent containing elements of convergence and divergence. The following section will examine the role of Clinton’s foreign policy in Pakistan’s first strategic choice i.e. attainment of nuclear weapons.

(2) Clinton and Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions

During Clinton’s first-term efforts were made to resolve the F-16 dispute by proposing a one-time waiver in exchange for certain nonproliferation-related


\textsuperscript{78} Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, pp. 121-22, p.122

\textsuperscript{79} “The House’s India caucus was first organized in 1994, evolving out of a dialogue between the Indian American Forum for Political Education (IAFPE, formed in the late 1980s) and a small group of congressmen including Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), a key congressional champion. The main impetus was IAFPE’s deep frustration with the critical views toward India then being expressed by the U.S. State Department, particularly regarding its human rights policies in Kashmir. Through concerted efforts by pro-India congressmen by 1999, the caucus claimed 115 members—more than one-quarter of the entire House.” Jason A. Kirk, “Indian-Americans and the U.S-India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?” Foreign Policy Analysis,4:3 (July 2008), pp.275-300.

\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).
agreements. This move was easily defeated by strong issue leaders like Senators Pressler, Glenn, Feinstein and Patrick Moynihan who made any revision or legislative relief in a Republican dominated Congress an uphill task. 81 Despite Riedel’s claim that Clinton wanted to address unfairness to Pakistan vis-à-vis the F-16s,82 primary record shows that the proposed one time waiver to supply F-16s to Pakistan was not out of American contrition. Rather, it was the first step toward a new diplomatic strategy aimed at circumventing the Indo-Pakistan nuclear stalemate.83 Aimed at easing the Pakistan military’s anxiety, the real target was to persuade acceptance of international inspections of Pakistan’s key nuclear facilities to ascertain levels of uranium enrichment.84 Robert Einhorn, a key policy maker on nuclear issues during the Clinton era, confirms that the US sought formal commitment of restraint on nuclear and missile technology and fissile material development in exchange for the F-16s. 85 Thus, the underlying US motive pertained to securing American global interest.

This is also evident from the Pakistani reaction when the incumbent COAS General Abdul Waheed refused any such trade-off in a meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Talbott writes: “Mimicking the face of a man on the gallows he said, ‘We will choke on your carrots.’”86 Waheed confirmed the interaction; “Why should we have agreed when India was hell-bent on producing as much fissile material as possible for its own nuclear bomb?”87 It is evident that Clinton’s approach to India was perceived by Pakistani leadership as undermining

82 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012)
85 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011); Robert Einhorn’s interview with Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p 477.
87 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
Pakistani national security interests. F-16s were certainly important for strengthening the Air Force but on the cost-benefit calculus attainment of nuclear deterrent as a force multiplier was non-negotiable. Moreover, in the backdrop of continuing sanctions and the suspension of all military and economic aid, it was difficult for the Clinton administration to influence Pakistani military and civilian decision makers.

Clearly, in order to secure its long term vital security objective Clinton was willing to make a short term bargain by proposing changes in the Pressler Amendment. But, as a press report argued, “if the proposal...touched off a storm of criticism in Congress, the {Pressler} amendment probably would be retained.”\textsuperscript{88} That it should be retained was ascertained by Senator Pressler who termed the move as contravening the legislation that did not provide for a one time waiver.

“Encouraged by the Indian embassy,” according to Talbott, Senator Pressler “publicly vowed to keep sanctions in place even if the Pakistanis agreed to the US plan.”\textsuperscript{89} Talbott’s premise has some weight when seen against Huntington’s assertion that “Indian-Americans contributed about $150,000 to Senator Larry Pressler’s reelection campaign because he supported limits on U.S. arms exports to Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{90} Such allegations were also leveled against Senators Pressler and Brown during the run up to the passing of the Brown Amendment in 1995 when Pakistanis led by Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi won the goodwill of Senator Brown.\textsuperscript{91}

Pressler argued that Clinton’s team was supporting Pakistan in “lobbying the Congress to pass the Brown Amendment” despite ongoing “illegal sale of {Chinese} nuclear technology.”\textsuperscript{92} Brown alluded to Pakistan’s steadfastness as an ally insisting that “We owe them the return of their money or the delivery of their equipment” and in response Pressler complained “We don’t have a non-


\textsuperscript{89} Strobe Talbott, \textit{Engaging India,} p.32.

\textsuperscript{90} Samuel P Huntington, \textit{Who are We?: the Challenges to America's National Identity} (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2004), p.290.

\textsuperscript{91} In September 1995, Republican Senator Hank Brown introduced a bill aimed at a onetime waiver on the Pressler Amendment to remove Pressler restrictions on all forms of non-military assistance and release embargoed military equipment worth $ 368 million. In the House of Representatives a similar endeavor was spearheaded by Republican Doug Bereuter, Chairman House International Relations Sub-Committee on South Asia. Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Washington Post}, 8 February, 1996.
proliferation policy any more...We have an arms bazaar.” Pressler’s premise implies a hidden US agenda to appease Pakistan but as South Asian specialist Robert Wirsing points out, “in the face of the remarkable recent upgrading by Washington officialdom of India’s global importance” such an insinuation “strains credulity”. It is evident that besides discrediting Pakistan’s “Islamic Bomb” Pressler’s response reflects American security dilemma vis-a-vis China as a potential rival. Pakistan’s closeness to China and hostility towards India were enough to create mistrust of Chinese intentions on the one hand and on the other perceive Pakistan’s nuclear program as undermining US global power. Interestingly, Pressler agreed to support a Clinton administration proposal to sell the F-16s to a third party to repay Pakistan. This was most likely meant to undermine Senator Brown’s efforts towards changes in the Pressler legislation.

That said, assumptions about partisan allegiances may be somewhat overblown in the case of Republican Senators Pressler and Brown as neither “had significant numbers of Indian or Pakistani constituents to motivate their interest in the subcontinent.” It could however be a case of intra-party rivalry between the two Republican senators. For instance, Kux recalled how Brown was “disgusted” with Pressler’s comments pertaining to Pakistan’s “Islamic Bomb” in New Delhi. More importantly, Senator Brown’s fact finding mission to the subcontinent “convinced him that sanctions against Pakistan were damaging US interest.”

That the Indian lobby was actively supporting efforts to undermine the release of military equipment or any renewal of military aid to Pakistan was confirmed by Washington based diplomats Maleeha Lodhi and Sarwar Naqvi Indian efforts were in line with the increased importance of the interest groups during the Clinton era. Compared to the Indian lobby, Lindsay notes Pakistan’s disadvantage in the competition to court lawmakers because the Pakistani community was one-tenth the size of the Indian community and their government had close ties with China. Clearly, these issues weakened Pakistani lobbying

97 Interview with Dennis Kux (18 March 2012).
98 Interviews with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011) and Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
efforts mainly undertaken by government officials. Moreover, the largely personal style of dealing with the US under military regimes, as noted in Chapter 1, also contributed to this weakness. Assef Ali argued:

There emerged a caucus for Pakistan when Benazir visited Washington in 1995. Senators Kennedy and O’Leary were very receptive... and we cultivated the White House... Sandy Berger and William Perry...were wonderful...\textsuperscript{100}

However, while authorizing a one-time waiver the Brown Amendment did not facilitate the release of 28 F-16s or reverse Washington’s earlier decision to force Pakistan to return eight leased U.S. frigates and destroyers, replacement of which was extremely costly for the Pakistan Navy.\textsuperscript{101} This shows that the Pakistanis failed to muster strong support in and outside the Congress. Considering the Indo-Pakistan combined annual defense spending of $12 billion, no one could “reasonably contend” that the one-time waiver tilted the arms balance in Pakistan’s favor.\textsuperscript{102} Thus lobbying by Pakistan does not explain the passage of the Brown Amendment in a complex policy-making environment containing a number of variables.

Cox posits that the Benazir government, under US pressure, halted all nuclear cooperation with the Iranians in early 1994, which in turn paved the way for the Brown Amendment.\textsuperscript{103} Cox, however, does not present any credible evidence. Lodhi’s observation was acerbic:

When it is in the US interest it can bypass, overrule and modify its own laws {as in the case of Brown Amendment}
and when expedient it invokes that law or brings a new one on the statute books.\textsuperscript{104}

Lodhi’s cynicism aside, Clinton’s support for the Brown Amendment merged with his political interests. For instance, Clinton’s interest in encouraging Middle East peace talks between Israel and Palestine possibly kept Muslim Pakistan’s perceived leverage in the Middle East in focus. What explains Clinton’s support for the legislation even better is the US tactic of bargaining F-16s for nuclear concessions by Pakistan although it failed to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of either party.

The non-delivery of F-16s remained a major bone of contention for the better part of Clinton’s second term. The money was reimbursed in 1998 after Pakistan threatened to take the US administration to court. “We told them we had great faith in the American judicial system,” recalled Khokhar “Clinton convinced visiting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for an out of court settlement and so the problem was resolved.” \textsuperscript{105} Subsequently, according to Sharif’s Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, relevant letters were exchanged between Khokhar and Inderfurth and Pakistan was reimbursed $555 million in cash and $100 million in other commodities.\textsuperscript{106} Clearly, the Clinton administration was capable of resolving the repayment issue without Congressional approval but chose not to in order to leverage Pakistan. At the same time it is likely that Clinton was not averse to Congressional rejection of Pakistan’s position because it allayed Indian concerns about the delivery of the nuclear capable aircraft which furthered Clinton’s economic interests in India.

In any case, whatever possibility the Brown Amendment may have produced for renewal of economic aid, it ran aground with increasing Congressional concern at US media reports of Beijing’s transfer of nuclear technology to Islamabad; the reports also alleged Pakistan’s transfer of technology to Libya and Iran in return for finances and to North Korea for technical

\textsuperscript{104} Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October 2011).
\textsuperscript{105} Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{106} Sartaj Aziz, \textit{Between Dreams and Realities} (Karachi: Oxford University Press), pp. 234-236.
expertise. The perceived linkage between a nuclear Pakistan and anti-Israel, Islamic Iran caused anguish in the US as demonstrated in Congressional speeches and reports from 1993 onwards. The assumption was that Pakistan in collaboration with China and Iran could serve as a centre for Islamic strategic influence in the region including the Middle East. This was a weak argument not least because of intra-Islamic sectarian differences. Nonetheless, perceiving this, by extension, a threat to Israel and American interests in the Middle East, Congressional members demanded the Clinton administration take stringent action against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT unless India did so was another source of strain in US-Pakistan relations. India had high standard export controls to prevent the spread of technology abroad and therefore, argues Talbott, it had an edge over Pakistan. India’s superior record however did not justify nuclear proliferation. Waheed therefore disagreed with Talbott arguing that “while Pakistan was sanctioned under the Pressler Amendment India continued with its nuclear program.”

Primary evidence shows that Pakistani leadership conveyed its fears...
of the incumbent Indian nationalist government of Bharatiya Janata Party as
radical and anti-Muslim\textsuperscript{113} and more conducive to going nuclear. It appears that
Pakistani warnings of impending Indian tests were ignored by the Clinton
administration as a case of "jitters."\textsuperscript{114}

Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Conference on
Disarmament, Munir Akram, confirmed warning the US of possible Indian tests
while highlighting perceived US discriminatory approach.\textsuperscript{115} In his memoirs
former Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan argues, "I had written to fifteen of my
counterparts around the world and so had the Prime Minister to ask them to stop
Indian tests."\textsuperscript{116} Both Akram and Khan imply the US turned a blind eye.\textsuperscript{117} However,
as argued by Talbott, it was more a case of inadequate inter-agency coordination
and analysis\textsuperscript{118} since it was not in the US interest to allow proliferation of nuclear
states.

\textit{Engaging Pakistan after Indian nuclear tests}

In the wake of the Indian tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 Clinton's team—Talbott,
Inderfurth, Riedel and General Anthony Zinni— embarked on an, "emergency dose
of face-to-face diplomacy", to stop Pakistan from conducting its own set of tests.\textsuperscript{119}
In response Pakistani civil-military leadership was unwilling to trust either India
or the US.

To the incumbent army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, Indian nuclear
tests seemed to be the first logical step in its strategy "to intimidate Pakistan into
solving the Kashmir problem once and for all" by forcing it "to give up all claims to
the disputed territory." Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub and foreign secretary
Shamshad Ahmad were equally dismissive, telling Talbott that India would get

\textsuperscript{113} Document ID 98ISLAMABAD2617, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, “Pakistan Tests “Ghauri”
\textsuperscript{115} Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United
\textsuperscript{116} Gohar Ayub Khan, \textit{Glimpses into the Corridors of Power}, p.299.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid; Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram.
\textsuperscript{118} James Risen and Tim Weiner, "US may have helped India hide its nuclear activity" \textit{New York
hide-its-nuclear-activity.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, accessed 15 June 2011; also Strobe Talbott,
\textit{Engaging India}, pp.1-3.
\textsuperscript{119} Strobe Talbott, \textit{Engaging India}, pp.56-66.
away with the tests and would end up benefitting politically and militarily as international outrage will dissipate. "India will then force itself into permanent membership of the UN Security Council." Pakistan wanted an iron-clad security guarantee from a nuclear power in view of the Indian nuclear tests which Karamat termed "politicians' panic" saying Pakistan can look after its own defense; instead what it needed was a solid relationship with the US in which there was no "arm twisting" or "forcing us into corners." In any case, provision of any security guarantee entailed a major US strategic decision involving the Congress and Pakistan was no longer strategically important. However, Riedel stated that Pakistan went ahead with the tests despite lucrative incentives including the release of F-16s. However, according to Riaz Khokhar, the US offer of incentives was vague and included nothing concrete. American appeals to "maturity and restraint" and improving international image by restraining response were not enough in view of Pakistan’s security dilemma.

According to Talbott Clinton called Nawaz Sharif and offered the release of F-16s and considerable relief on Pressler since the Congressional mood had shifted after the Indian tests; thus, once again showing the US bargaining motive behind the F-16 issue. However, Sharif was not swayed since "the lure of money, praise and gratitude from around the world along with F-16s was less powerful than the Pakistanis' fear of what had happened just across their border." Talbott however overlooks Pakistan's security dilemma which spawned mistrust of both India and the Unite States as reflected in Waheed’s words:

The Clinton administration was not very hard on India… {they} wanted to prop them up against China. It was in the US interest to have a nuclear India. On the other hand they were wary of nuclear proliferation in the Islamic world.

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120 Ibid, pp. 60-63; quotations on pp.61-62; Gohar Ayub Khan, Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, pp.299.
122 Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
123 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India, pp.57-59.
124 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011)
Waheed’s argument has some weight although a great power's foreign policy cannot be described in binary terms. That said, fears of an “Islamic bloc” as discussed by American legislators were mirrored by Pakistani perceptions of Clinton’s “pro-India tilt” that saw in it the future trajectory of US-India relations. From the Pakistani perspective the signal read: in a unipolar anarchic international system the greatest power on earth is now on the Indian side. Mistrust and uncertainty of others’ intentions thus added a powerful psychological aspect to the structural mechanism of anarchy. It is therefore not surprising that Islamabad continued self-help through acquisition of nuclear weapons. By moving closer to India’s enemy and America’s potential competitor, China, it not only sought alternative source of weapons supply but also attempted to obviate Indian efforts at regional hegemony.

US diplomatic communication perceives Pakistan’s response to the Indian nuclear tests as the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s buckling under public and political pressure.\(^\text{125}\) This assessment is reductionist. Karamat maintains that the decision to test was taken by joint civil-military leadership after much deliberation. Academic Rasul Bakhsh Rais agreed positing that “on the nuclear issue there was complete consensus between the military and civilian leadership.”\(^\text{126}\) That said, given the military’s control of nuclear policy and its threat perception it was a foregone conclusion that once India had “gone nuclear” Pakistan would respond. Moreover, as Feroz Hassan argues, it was unthinkable for the Pakistani strategic mindset to acquiesce to Indian hegemony.\(^\text{127}\) Nawaz Sharif was invited to the National Defense College on the morning of 28 May 1998 for discussion. During this event, when more than sixty senior military officers were asked to vote for or against the testing, only one Pakistani naval officer dissented. Even those who privately opposed the tests joined the supporters when it came to the final decision thus evincing groupthink. “It was the army that had the final say” and without their concurrence “Nawaz Sharif was in no position to oblige the


\(^{126}\) Interview with Rasul Bakhsh Rais (12 August 2011)

Americans.” American leverage was thus inadequate in a country where its military establishment was by then coping with sanctions for nearly a decade. Ironically the sanctions inadvertently contributed to Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear weapons instead of curbing its behavior.

Sanctioning blues

By imposing nuclear sanctions on Pakistan the United States sought to modify Pakistan’s behavior. However, sanctions were not effective in view of Pakistan’s India-centric existential anxiety and mistrust of American intentions. Moreover, Chinese support in this regard provided the resources and the motivation to continue. Thus despite the fact that the Clinton administration elevated the role of sanctions beyond that of any of the previous administrations, Pakistani behavior remained unmodified. Stephen Cohen argues that throughout the 1990s Pakistan was expected to “unilaterally strip itself of its key policy instruments without positive US inducements” in the form of military aid or active support for the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Albright recognized that “the very tough sanctions {that have} no waiver authority and no flexibility {are} just blunt instruments {while} diplomacy requires us to have some finesse.”

By late 1990s, voices in Congress argued that broad sanctions left little choice for countries such as Pakistan other than going for nuclear equalization by finding alternative sources of capital and technology; and that termination of military education, training and aid had reduced U.S. influence with a powerful constituency in Pakistan.

Haass posits that broad sanctions appeared to jeopardize “an entire bilateral relationship.” Christine Fair, a RAND expert on US-Pakistan relations, observes that “broad sanctions levied between 1990 and 2001 harmed U.S. interests more than they curbed Pakistani behavior.”

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128 Interview with Pakistani official G.
130 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, interview “Late Edition,” Cable News Network (June 14, 1998), p.11.
Kheli and Hyland criticize US sanctions as being deficient in recognizing nationalism as the force behind nuclear proliferation. Their argument was endorsed by Inderfurth:

No political leader could have taken any other decision in view of India-Pakistan hostility...it was short-sighted because the US was largely attempting to build a relationship based on punitive measures.

Inderfurth’s premise is clearly the product of hindsight because there is no evidence that he aired such thoughts while serving in the Clinton administration. Talbott justified sanctions on the ground that they created a disincentive for other states. Talbott’s argument is challenged by academic T. V. Paul who insightfully argues:

Sanctions against a potential proliferator in a protracted conflict zone without a nuclear ally are unlikely to succeed particularly if the proliferator is an isolated state.

According to Shaikh “Pakistan's defiance of the non-proliferation regime has been shaped by deep resentment against the United States” whereas Fair argues against the Pakistani perception of discrimination asserting that India’s May 1974 nuclear test precipitated non-proliferation legislations in the 1970s. Fair, however, omits to mention Islamabad’s reservations against the Symington law (noted earlier) due to which Pakistan and not India was sanctioned in the 1970s.

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135 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).


fact as Senator Glenn noted the United States did “nothing, absolutely nothing” after India violated its peaceful-use assurances and used nuclear fuel shipped by the United States in its 1974 explosion.140

An explanation of US leverage-failure was highlighted by Prime Minister Sharif. In a confidential communication with Clinton Sharif pointed out that selective sanctions “had produced a totally untenable security equation between Pakistan and India” and that this “evident selectivity in the pursuit of global nonproliferation goals” had left Pakistan more insecure.141 By doing this the US overlooked “India’s much older, more advanced, and larger nuclear program (and more importantly) Pakistan’s natural dread of an Indian nuclear monopoly.”142 Thus Lodhi argued:

The irony about U.S. non-proliferation policy in South Asia was that while the impetus for proliferation at every step came from India, it was Pakistan, and not India, that was subjected to penalties, embargoes and sanctions.143

Even when Clinton sanctioned India along with Pakistan following May 1998 nuclear tests, the Pakistani perspective was that sanctions should have been imposed only on India that had started the nuclear race and jeopardized regional stability.144 The assumption was that had India kept its capability undeclared Pakistan could meet its deterrence requirement through nuclear ambiguity.

Clearly, Clinton’s non-proliferation efforts fell short of taking in Pakistan’s fears that appeared to endorse Waltz’s conclusion that when faced with the security dilemma states assume the worst.145 Anarchy thus motivated Pakistani goals of nuclear weapons in keeping with the concept of self-help as a pragmatic choice to deter external threat through coercive power. The Clinton administration

143 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi (25 October, 2011).
overlooked the premise that “weapons have meanings in relation to the context and the beliefs of the relevant actors”\textsuperscript{146}\ pertaining to their offensive or defensive purposes. Clinton’s team failed to correctly gauge the impact of their actions on Pakistani policy-makers. This inability drew upon the difference between the US self-image and how others perceive it. Moreover, Clinton’s efforts were inconsistent in that after imposing sanctions he looked for ways to give one-time waiver to Pakistan; on the other hand, according to Riedel, he neglected to undertake sustained efforts to change or repeal the Pressler Amendment.\textsuperscript{147} Clinton’s approach not only perpetuated the US role in the evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear program but also contributed significantly to Islamabad’s resolve against the background of improving US-India relations.

The scrutiny of Pakistan’s nuclear program was accompanied by a lack of sustained high-level interest in Pakistan’s Afghan policy thus allowing Islamabad to deal with Kabul’s security problems. This section has examined Clinton’s role in the shaping of Pakistan’s first post-Cold War policy option i.e. attainment of nuclear weapons. The following section will investigate the impact of Clinton’s foreign policy on the second and third option i.e. bolstering the Taliban and supporting the Kashmir insurgency.

\textbf{(3) The Clinton-Pakistan-Taliban Connection}

As noted in the previous chapters, ISI’s institutional power increased during the Afghan war in the 1980s when it collaborated with the CIA as the conduit for US funds and weapons to the Mujahedeen.\textsuperscript{148} Although the agency was not a king-maker per se during the 1990s it was, as noted in the next chapter, employed by senior military and civilian leadership to influence the political process\textsuperscript{149}, in keeping with past practices,\textsuperscript{150} to ensure the smooth implementation of the military establishment’s security goals. Evidence shows that the Clinton administration did not pay sustained attention to the ISI’s ongoing role in

\textsuperscript{146} Booth and Wheeler, \textit{The Security Dilemma}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{147} Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{148} According to Durrani “They were absolutely sure that what we told them about who was getting what was not true but they never questioned us.” Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\textsuperscript{149} Interview with Hamid Gul (1 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{150} Sean S Witchell, “Pakistan’s ISI: the Invisible Government”
Afghanistan. “By 1995 Hekmatyar, [ISI’s} fair headed boy, was not delivering” argued Weinbaum “{and} the Taliban {became} the best regional option.”

In his memoir the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Zaeef, argues that the Taliban movement was initially indigenous and that Pakistan’s ISI later hijacked it for its own interest. Many Pakistani and American interviewees also described the rise of the Taliban as an indigenous movement supported only by the Afghan people fed up with local mafias. This was confirmed by Pakistani journalist and former BBC correspondent Rahimullah Yusufzai who had access to the Taliban leadership. The ambiguity of the situation is explainable against the murky situation in Afghanistan following the breakdown of law and order during the civil war. That said, US diplomatic communication clearly identified the ISI as the key supporter of the Taliban; a premise with which Siraj-ul-Haq of Jamaat-i-Islami candidly agreed:

The Taliban did not emerge suddenly; Pakistan played a major role in organizing it. The Taliban tsunami that rose from Kandahar and reached Kabul could not have done so without the help of military intelligence agencies. The Taliban stopped when and where the intelligence agencies wanted it to stop!

Yet, US primary source material does not show sustained US effort to prevent Pakistan from bolstering the Taliban between 1993 and 1996. Observing that the US “gave tacit support by encouraging Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to support the Taliban,” academic Tahir Amin agreed with Ahmed Rashid’s assertion that

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151 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
152 Mullah Zaeef, My life with the Taliban, pp. 104-6 & 123-126.
153 Interviews with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011); Hamid Gul (13 July 2011) Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011), and Aslam Beg (2 July 2011); Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012) Seth Jones (15 February 2012), Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012) and Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
154 Rahimullah Yusufzai was present in Kandahar when the city fell to the Taliban in 1994. Upon his return to Pakistan from Kandahar Yusufzai received several calls from ISI officials wanting to find out about the Taliban leadership and their mission as they did not seem to know much about them. That Benazir’s interior minister Major General (retired) Naseerullah Babar tried to take undue credit for the rise of the Taliban was also highlighted by Yusufzai who said “he never called them “my boys” when he talked to me; he knew I had access to the Taliban leadership and knew the truth.” Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October, 2011).
155 Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).
156 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
“between 1994 and 1996 the US supported the Taliban politically through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western.”\textsuperscript{157} Weinbaum, an analyst with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research during Clinton’s second term, confirmed that Clinton’s team was “very, very hospitable to the notion of an American connection with the Taliban.”\textsuperscript{158} US diplomatic communication shows that the Clinton administration was cognizant of “Pakistan’s contacts with all the major opponents of Rabbani and Masood and {was encouraging} cooperation among them.”\textsuperscript{159} Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs during Clinton’s second term, however, posited:

The US government had no formal understanding of the movement and there was a gradual evolution in the US understanding of the situation. Initially it was seen as a local movement to establish peace but by 1997 it became clear that it was a political movement that wanted to impose its own interpretation of Islam on the society.\textsuperscript{160}

To this Weinbaum added:

Afghanistan or Pakistan was not on our list of priorities. The Clinton administration came alive with the embassy bombings in 1998 and we woke up to the fact that there was an organized element that had managed to locate itself in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{161}

Inderfurth and Weinbaum are only partially correct since the administration, according to the primary data, had been alerted to the rising political power of the Taliban since 1995 and US intelligence sources confirmed the movement’s political

\textsuperscript{157} Ahmed Rashid \textit{Taliban}, pp.144-156.
\textsuperscript{158} Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{160} Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{161} Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
motives well before 1997. Between 1994 and 1997 there were several US intelligence reports on the Taliban-Pakistan nexus. In 1995, the Taliban took over Herat that was outside its putative sphere of influence, i.e. Kandahar, thus demonstrating their expanding political ambition which—according to US sources— included receiving military and financial support from Pakistan. An excised US fax dated December 5 1994, for instance, informs the State Department of the ISI’s heavy involvement in Taliban operations in Kandahar. Pakistan’s air force officials were said to be preparing Kandahar airport for support of a large Taliban military operation in Farah and Helmand provinces and Spin Boldak on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.\footnote{Fax sent to Ron McMullen, Afghanistan Desk, US Department of State by Unidentified Sender(December 5, 1994) ; see also Document ID 1994ISLAMA11584, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, """"-(excised)Believes Pakistan Supporting the Taliban",(December6,1994) http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm, accessed 15 December 2011.} One of the unnamed sources confirming Pakistani military’s assistance—material and manpower— was granted a detailed audience with US Assistant Secretary Raphel demonstrating its credibility and stature.\footnote{No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, “Pak Foreign Minister asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan” (February 21, 1996), Ibid.}

According to Afghanistan-Pakistan expert and RAND researcher Seth Jones, “based on historical records, that is the American primary documents, there appeared to be ISI backing for the Taliban by 1994-95.”\footnote{Interview with Seth Jones (15 February 2012).} Senior US official Richard Armitage’s premise that, “we drifted too long in 1989 and failed to understand the independent role that the ISI was playing”\footnote{Armitage Interview with Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p.299.} is thus untenable. Bruce Riedel, who served with Clinton on the National Security Council and National Intelligence Council, posited:

We knew about the ISI support for the Taliban movement from the very beginning...the Clinton administration had credible intelligence reports early on and the Northern Alliance was pretty quick to bring Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban to our notice.\footnote{Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).}
However, this information did not elicit any opposition from the Clinton administration between 1994 and 1996. Nor did the early reports of Taliban religious orthodoxy and treatment of women motivate the Clinton administration to denounce the movement’s actions. Moreover, the summary execution of former President Najibullah on 26 September 1996 ordered by Taliban leader Mullah Raziq drew no serious condemnation by the US other than terming it as a “regrettable development.” This suggests a lack of interest in the region as well as tolerance of the emerging Taliban phenomenon. Robin Raphel argues that there were two competing policies within the State Department; one in favor of trying out the Taliban and the other inclined towards supporting the anti-Taliban factions such as the Northern Alliance. Throughout the Taliban rule “both approaches existed in a kind of foreign policy schizophrenia.” On the one hand US officials like Albright—under pressure from US women rights groups—issued anti-Taliban statements denouncing their anti-women policies and on the other there was no US serious effort to dissuade Pakistan from supporting the repressive regime. According to reports, human rights abuses by the Taliban government between 1996 and 1999 did not force Clinton to take any punitive action.

The Taliban that emerged during the first term of President Bill Clinton was not a homogenous group of orthodox extremists. It comprised many moderate elements and, according to US diplomatic sources, on the whole it did not harbor

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167 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, “Pak Foreign Minister asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan”.
168 For instance, when they took over Kandahar in 1994 the Taliban banned chess and marbles and ordered women to stay at home with no access to education or male doctors. Female professionals considered their livelihood to be under threat. A female doctor is quoted as expressing her fear of the Taliban, the “ignorant thugs” who are willful and capricious. Document ID1995ISLAMA00966, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, (January1995) [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm), accessed 15 December 2011.
169 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, p.49.
171 Robin Raphel’s interview with Gutman, *How We Missed the Story*, p.78.
deep-seated hatred of the United States. This was substantiated by Yusufzai who having personally visited girls’ schools in Laghman, Naghman and Nangarhar provinces disputed the American claim that all members of the Taliban set-up were opposed to women’s education.

It is evident from US diplomatic sources that the Clinton administration did not exploit Taliban divisions or its goodwill for the US. A 1995 cable quotes the Taliban leadership as looking up to both the US and the UN while being unhappy with Pakistan’s ISI whom it perceived as treating Afghanistan as a Pakistani province. Clinton’s lack of focus on external security issues during his first term—which coincided with the rise of the Taliban—flowed from reduced interest in the region. The foreign policy making process, focused more on press strategy and political implications of foreign policy than substance, was further undermined by Clinton’s aversion to daily intelligence briefings by the CIA director, James Woolsey. Thus, even as diplomatic communication warned of a worsening regional security dilemma the Clinton administration failed to undertake consistent efforts.

The American inaction spawned the view that the Taliban was an American proxy being assisted through Pakistan against Iranian regional interests. Describing meetings between Taliban officials and un-named US diplomats outside Afghanistan, a daily CIA intelligence brief highlights the Taliban conviction that the US was using Islamabad as a conduit for funding it. In contrast, the anti-Taliban Rabbani government in Kabul felt alienated from the US as conveyed to Robin

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175 Interview with Rahimullah Yousufzai (19 October, 2011).
177 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars*, p. 58.
Raphel in October, 1995. This leads to the conclusion that by remaining disengaged, the Clinton administration implied tacit acceptance of the Taliban without deliberating unintended consequences of the approach. US government documents suggest that there was a small window of opportunity in which to undermine the Taliban-Pakistan connection in 1996 before the former took over Kabul. The Taliban had been pushed back from Kabul twice by Rabbani forces and was willing to consider a broad-based government with proportionate ethnic representation. Skilful management, such as an arms embargo on all parties and the creation of an All Party Afghan Conference may have helped start a dialogue between Afghan factions. The US ambassador to Pakistan Thomas Simons argued there was a:

Growing awareness, previously absent, of their {sic} own limitations, which may be the modality through which they{sic} can be coaxed, over time, to the negotiating table... the bottom line is that there still appears to be reason for limited optimism.181

This was an important moment since it coincided with an apparent change in Pakistan's stance. An April 1996 US cable indicated that Pakistani civilian and military decision-makers were not monolithic in their support for the Taliban. As the Taliban leadership was becoming increasingly independent in its decision making, Islamabad was said to be looking for alternatives.182 This diplomatic assessment found endorsement in Waheed’s assertion:

The Taliban} has its own peculiar ways to settle problems.  
As army chief in the mid-1990s I advised Benazir not to

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182 Ibid.
Prime Minister Bhutto, her Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali and Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh indicated that Pakistan needed to broaden its policy and pursue an enhanced dialogue with Rabbani’s government in Kabul. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Jahangir Karamat called the Taliban “a millstone around our necks.” It was understood by the Americans that “fearing regional isolation on Afghanistan policy, {Pakistan} is reaching out and wants to engage with the US”, cooperate with Iran by holding an Afghan Conference and support the UN mission.

Again, this diplomatic communication was confirmed by former Sardar Assef Ali who argued that Pakistani efforts—reaching out to Tehran and convincing former Afghan King, Zahir Shah to act as peace-maker—were more diverse than merely supporting the Taliban at this stage. According to him the ISI and the Taliban leadership were receptive to these efforts and were conducive to the formulation of an ethnically representative Afghan government.

Assef Ali’s premise is supported by US diplomatic sources that show Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto telling visiting Senator Hank Brown and Congressman Charlie Wilson that her government supported the UN and not the Taliban. Conveying interest in the Turkmenistan gas pipeline she recommended US diplomatic presence in Afghanistan and a more active US role in the region.

Iftikhar Murshed who was Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 argued that his mandate was to bring the Taliban and the Northern Alliance to a negotiated settlement; he recounted his intense shuttle missions between Kandahar, the Taliban headquarters and a few other Afghan provinces under different ethnic leadership. His diplomatic efforts to win support for UN peace mission under UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, he posited, clearly

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183 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July, 2011).
185 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011)
demonstrated that “the Pakistani leadership was not averse to a broad based, multiethnic Afghan government.”\textsuperscript{187}

Echoing Waheed and Karamat's above-mentioned skepticism about ISI and civilian governments' interference in Afghanistan Mumtaz Gul asserted that "Pakistan imposed AIG on Kabul" whereas the Afghans should have been allowed to “sort things out for themselves.”\textsuperscript{188} Such views from within the military lead to the possible conclusion that the institution was not monolithic in its view of the Taliban regime. The available primary and secondary sources do not, however, demonstrate that the Clinton administration exerted sufficient pressure on Pakistan or manipulated differences of opinion at the time. As Assef Ali argued:

> Every time we approached them {the State Department} their attitude was ‘we don’t want to take Pakistani chestnuts out of the fire…it is your business’…they had this hands-off approach. They threw the baby with the bathtub at our door.\textsuperscript{189}

Yet, there is evidence of US interest in the movement. Testifying before a Congressional hearing in 1995, Raphel stated that the Taliban supported a peaceful political process.\textsuperscript{190} After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Raphel asserted that it was a "completely indigenous movement" and “the best way to moderate {their leaders} is to engage them.”\textsuperscript{191} Regarding the Taliban’s imposition of strict Islamic law, State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said “On the face of it, there is nothing objectionable at this stage.”\textsuperscript{192}

According to Weinbaum, Anthony Lake and Albright also initially saw the Taliban as harbingers of stability in Afghanistan in view of their ability to curtail

\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (29 August 2011).
\textsuperscript{188} Interview with Mumtaz Gul (18 October 2011).
\textsuperscript{189} Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
the drug trade and their announcement to back the UN peace mission. Even Warren Christopher saw the Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar as comprising moderate and orthodox “Pashtun chauvinists” potentially amenable to American influence. The US approach towards the Taliban take-over of Kabul was, according to Agence-France Presse correspondent Stefan Smith, stationed in Kabul during the time, “largely sympathetic.” Smith maintains, “We had the very general impression, including from US diplomats in Islamabad that the Taliban were not such a bad bunch after all.” Diplomat Sarwar Naqvi noted that “the Americans let the Taliban come to power... during our discussions with State Department officials we could see their total frustration with Mujahedeen warlords.”

That said, there was no consistent approach towards the issue in the Clinton administration. Raphel complains, “I did everything except dance naked on Secretary of State’s staff’s table to draw attention to the problem” but her efforts were not backed by serious US government commitment. Confirming intra-agency differences Raphel asserts that within hours of the Taliban take-over the State Department announced opening diplomatic relations with the regime but then retracted the announcement. This also shows lack of US intelligence assessment that could serve as policy guidance in Washington. On the other hand, a senior Pakistani military official asserted during the interview that the US pressurized Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to recognize the Taliban regime which was seen by the Americans as a stabilizing force. At the same time, the US was reluctant to recognize the Taliban regime itself even when it controlled over 90% of Afghanistan. Moreover, it procrastinated in allowing Rabbani, who no longer ruled the country, to continue holding the UN seat. It is thus evident that the

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193 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012); Madeline Albright, Madam Secretary, pp 368-377; No. 1997STATE231842, Department of State Memo, (December 11, 1997), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm, accessed 17 December 2011.
194 No.168281600State, Department Memo from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, (December 1996). Ibid.
195 Quoted In Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p.77.
196 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
197 Raphel’s interview with journalist Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p.57.
199 Interview with Pakistani official A.
Clinton administration was willing to give the Taliban some latitude but was wary of domestic public opinion vis-à-vis the regime’s religious orthodoxy and women’s rights issues. Moreover, in view of scant strategic interest in the region, it was reluctant to engage the Taliban through economic incentives which, argued Musharraf “could have translated into a convergence of security interests.”

Clearly, since the Afghan issue was not an American strategic priority the Clinton policy-makers were content with regional countries stabilizing the situation in Kabul; in other words this signaled tolerance of ISI’s role.

Subsequently, argues Rashid, Pakistan was not restrained from supporting the movement between 1994 and 1996. By 1997, he asserts, there was a “change of heart” as “US officials began to voice fears that the threat of terrorism and fundamentalism posed by the Taliban “could overwhelm its old and now decidedly {economically and politically} fragile ally Pakistan”. Riffat Hussain however perceived the “change of heart” as an outcome of Taliban’s growing disenchantment with Unocal in view of no possibility of American financial help to Kabul. Thus, respective economic interests can largely explain Clinton administration’s later approach.

Explaining Clinton’s stance former CIA analyst and member of the Clinton administration, Bruce Riedel stated

The US was ambivalent {toward the Taliban} as it saw the civil war end through a popular movement...{therefore} in the mid 90s there was some convergence of US-Pakistan security interests —to try Taliban out as an instrument of peace in Afghanistan.

Confirming Riedel’s premise Weinbaum argued “they had brought peace to Kandahar and the adjoining areas and this in itself was a great achievement.” Clearly, the Clinton foreign policy team was content with the ISI involvement in tackling the Afghan imbroglio. This was endorsed by Durrani who stated:

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200 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
202 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
203 Interview with Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012).
204 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
The Americans were keen to disengage in 1989 allowing the ISI to resolve the post conflict issues...Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the US—all three tried to hobnob with the Taliban.205

Bruce Riedel, Karl Inderfurth and Seth Jones interpreted Clinton’s ambivalent approach as loss of American strategic interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As noted in chapter 1 Clinton’s Democratic administration was criticized for 9/11 security lapses and lack of interagency coordination; thus misreading the terrorist threat. It is therefore likely that the respondents were giving the counter-narrative of the events in the 1990s.

Available primary evidence strongly leads to the conclusion that Clinton’s approach towards the Pakistan-Taliban connection was primarily shaped by a temporary convergence of Washington and Islamabad’s security interests. Thus, Clinton resorted to the Cold War mindset where a peripheral country’s regional interests were accommodated to further American global objectives. However, reports of ISI’s use of the Taliban territory for training militants206 for infiltration into Indian Kashmir was in opposition to Clinton’s professed goal of curtailment of terrorism.

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and Clinton

During interviews conducted for this thesis some interviewees were willing to confirm ISI’s involvement in training anti-India elements in the 1990s.207 Former Director General ISI and Chairman Joint Services General Ehsan-ul-Haq and former President of National Defense University Lt General Shahid Iqbal, however, highlighted private groups as the main variable.208 Arguing that Pakistan was “more drawn into it rather than organize {training of militants for infiltration into Indian Kashmir},” Ehsan saw the civilian government as trying to “regulate the inflow and outflow” of the Azad Kashmiri and Pakistani volunteers through

205 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April, 2012)
207 Interviews with Pakistani officials B and D.
208 Interviews with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July, 2011) and Shahid Iqbal (6 August 2011).
Beyond 1989 the civilian government policy was to support the Kashmiri fighters to bring India to the negotiating table... Pakistan based organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba drew support from Pakistan...there may have been some ISI help or turning the blind eye but basically it was the government policy...there was open recruitment. But there was no nexus between the Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Taliban; it happened only after 9/11. 

The above premise regarding the civilian government policy is credible in that the civilian leadership in the 1990s was vocal about Kashmir as the “unfinished agenda of partition” that had been over-shadowed throughout the 1980s due to Pakistan’s focus on the Afghan–Soviet War. Pakistan’s involvement also stemmed from the concern that Kashmiris may opt for a state independent of both India and Pakistan especially in view of reduced attention during the 1980s. But was the civilian consensus independent of military’s influence? A Pakistani official saw the situation thus:

In the 1990s the military was totally in control of policies....the military shifted its focus from the western to the eastern border after 1989.... we had trained people available—local Kashmiris, Pakistani volunteers raised by Jamaat-i-Islami and the Afghans...some areas in Indian Kashmir such as Doda, were allocated to our people...there was some talk of shifting Stingers....

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210 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
212 Interview with Pakistani official B.
Journalist and author Zahid Hussain who has researched and written extensively on terrorism, argued that in 1990-91 “the ISI under General Javed Nasir-an orthodox Islamist-was definitely involved...and during the Nawaz Sharif administration there was strong evidence of ISI involvement” in Kashmir.213 Endorsing Hussain, another senior decision-maker of the early 1990s agreed that “the Military Intelligence and the ISI supported the insurgency in Kashmir...when Clinton came in 1992 the direction was set.”214 Durrani who headed the ISI between 1991 and 1992 avoided talking about the issue thus evincing that it was not straightforward.

In 1995 linking the nuclear question and Kashmir, Prime Minister Benazir argued that Kashmir had changed the face of security competition from conventional weapons to nuclear arsenals. This is not to say that the Americans did not realize the relevance of Kashmir to the nuclear issue. Before the tests Talbott had suggested manipulating the issue to “hold the Pakistanis back from testing”215 and afterwards, in a bid to influence Pakistan into signing the CTBT, he spoke of the centrality of the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan’s strategic interests216 which included nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Clinton administration attempted to deal separately with the two issues by supporting the Indian position that Kashmir was a bilateral problem.217 Thus, Talbott’s recognition of the significance of the Kashmir problem can be seen as little more than rhetoric. What cannot however be disregarded is the available US primary record that shows Pakistani interference in Indian Kashmir. By 1995, US intelligence reports confirmed ISI’s support to Harkat-ul-Ansar’s (HUA)218 efforts to train and infiltrate anti-Indian elements including former Afghan fighters into Kashmir. The HUA was running training camps in Afghanistan under the Taliban controlled areas of Khost

213 Interview with Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011).
214 Interview with Pakistani official D.
215 Talbott, Engaging India, p.67.
216 U.S. Department of State, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address at the Institute of Strategic Studies, "Pakistan, the U.S., and the Quest for Common Ground" Islamabad, Pakistan, (February 2, 1999).
218 HUA, a militant Kashmir group with links to Pakistan’s religious political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, was believed to be involved in the kidnapping of five western tourists in 1995 in Indian Kashmir.
and Jalalabad near the Pakistan border.\textsuperscript{219} In a July 1996 communication, Benazir confirms receiving “disturbing” intelligence reports of HUA camps. Her account is confirmed by an unnamed British Journalist.\textsuperscript{220} It thus became increasingly clear to the US embassy in Islamabad that the ISI’s support for the Taliban had a Kashmir angle.\textsuperscript{221}

From the US perspective, terrorist attacks against American assets\textsuperscript{222} during the Clinton era demanded US foreign policy focus on the Pakistan-Taliban connection. US intelligence reports pointed a finger at the Saudi billionaire and former anti-Soviet fighter, Osama Bin Laden who was allowed by the Rabbani government to live in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{223} From 1997 to 2000 the expulsion of Osama Bin Laden to the US for legal proceedings remained the “the paramount issue between the US and the Taliban.”\textsuperscript{224} To further complicate matters there were reports of HUA’s contacts with Bin Laden who was said to be financing HUA activities. US intelligence quotes Yusufzai as confirming that Bin Laden was indeed


\textsuperscript{221} Document ID ISLAMA05010, US Embassy Cable Islamabad, (July 1, 1998), Ibid.

\textsuperscript{222} Killing of three CIA officials in Langley, Virginia in 1993; World Trade Centre Bombing in 1993; US embassy Bombings in Kenya and Nairobi in 1998; attack on USS Cole in Yemen in 2000; attack on Khobar Towers in 1996, where US forces were stationed.

\textsuperscript{223} Like many young Islamic radicals, OBL, a Saudi billionaire, had joined the Mujahedeen to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. After returning home, he opposed Saudi close ties with the USA and was forced into exile. He went to Sudan first but was expelled from there and then found refuge in Afghanistan where the Rabbani regime allowed him to stay; he founded the organization Al-Qaida that was allegedly implicated in attacks on American assets in 1996, 1998 and 2000. Bin Laden issued a “fatwa” or religious edict in 1998 urging Muslims to attack American civilian and military targets around the world. See Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}; Bruce Riedel, \textit{The Search for Al-Qaeda: its Leadership, Ideology, and Future} (Washington: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008); See also Robert Dreyfuss, \textit{Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Islamic Fundamentalism} (New York: Henry, Holt and Company, 2005). Murshed argues the US approach to Taliban-Pakistan connection shifted from human rights, gender issues, and narcotic trafficking to terrorist camps and finally "gravitated to the single issue of Osama Bin Laden." Iftikhar Murshed, \textit{Afghanistan: the Taliban Years}, pp. 244-245.

in Taliban-controlled Jalalabad. In a 1996 State Department memo Strobe Talbott drew an analogy between Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and militants in Indian controlled Kashmir warning of unintended regional consequences. Thus, a link between Bin Laden, ISI and the HUA camps was established by the US. Yusufzai confirmed that when he visited Bin Laden in Afghanistan for an interview in 1998 his visit was facilitated by members of HUA who took him across the Pakistan border to Afghanistan after eluding the Frontier Corps border patrol. He also confirmed that HUA members were present with Bin Laden when he issued his 1998 “Fatwa” or religious edict, declaring war on the US. This leads to the conclusion that the HUA leader signed the edict as alleged by the US.

The US expected Pakistan to use its leverage with the Taliban to have Bin Laden expelled. Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth suggested invocation of relevant Security Council resolutions and giving India a greater role in the UN peace efforts in Afghanistan to pressurize Pakistan. Available documentary evidence shows that such steps were not taken to curb Pakistan’s behavior; nor was it placed on the terror watch-list again. Clinton however did order a cruise missile attack on Bin Laden’s training camps in Khost on 20 August, 1998, using Pakistan’s airspace without prior information. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston –according to US plan was having dinner with the COAS Karamat when the attack was launched to assure him that the incoming missiles were American and not Indian. Bin Laden escaped unhurt but some of the

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226 No. 12705932, Department of State Memo, “Pak foreign Minister asks US Cooperation on Afghanistan” (February 21, 1996), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm.

227 Document ID ISLAMA01054, US Embassy Islamabad Cable, (February 6 1997), Ibid.

228 Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October 2011).


230 UNSCR 1214 and UNSCR 1193 direct that Afghanistan’s neighbors cease interference in the country’s internal affairs.


232 Bill Clinton, My Life, p.799
missiles landed in Pakistani territory. This added to the downward spiral in the relations.\textsuperscript{233}

One explanation for Pakistan's behavior is that it did not have as much leverage on the Taliban as was perceived by the US. As argued by Riffat Hussain the Taliban increasingly grew more independent; to this Durrani added that the Taliban's approach emerged from an Afghan culture known for its independence.\textsuperscript{234} Murshed argues that US under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering was aware of "Pakistan's limitations" and agreed that Pakistan was not in a position to "deliver all that {the US} wanted" even though he maintained that "Pakistan was not doing enough."\textsuperscript{235} Moreover, it is probable that such steps were not taken because following the 1990 nuclear sanctions, aid termination and strategic disengagement from an unstable Afghanistan the Clinton administration did not have much leverage over Islamabad. Thus, Islamabad did not have any significant incentives to comply with the US demands. However, another explanation is more plausible.

By 1996, for the first time since independence, there was a pro-Pakistan Afghan government that was not averse to helping the ISI in sustaining its proxy-warfare in Indian Kashmir to secure its border in the east. Clearly, using proxies to secure borders in the west while tying down Indian forces in Kashmir provided space for the Pakistani military to focus on and accelerate its nuclear weapons program. From the civil-military policy-makers' perspective Pakistan's strategic choices regarding the Taliban, nuclear weapons and Kashmir were interlinked. From Clinton's standpoint issues of the Taliban, terrorism and nuclear weapons were linked, whereas Kashmir was a separate problem that could be managed, if not resolved, independently and preferably, bilaterally.

\textit{Explaining Clinton's approach}

Arguing that from 1995 to 1997, US support for the Taliban regime was driven by the oil and gas pipeline project, Rashid points out that the project predated the

\textsuperscript{233} Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011); Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}, pp.405-414.
\textsuperscript{234} Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011) and Assad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\textsuperscript{235} Iftikhar Murshed, \textit{Afghanistan: the Taliban Years}, p.226.
Taliban.\textsuperscript{236} This is confirmed by a US diplomatic cable outlining Raphel’s discussion with President Rabbani.\textsuperscript{237} A 2001 newspaper report quotes Afghan and US officials confirming Raphel’s “intense round of shuttle diplomacy” between potential stakeholders prior to the Taliban take-over of Kabul.\textsuperscript{238} According to Gutman, Raphel tried to use the pipeline as “leverage in dealing with the parties” but the White House showed little interest.\textsuperscript{239} This implies that Raphel’s efforts were more or less personal or represented the minority view in the Clinton administration. However, contrary to Gutman’s premise meetings were held between U.S and Taliban officials after Raphel’s departure in 1997. For instance, Raphel’s successor, Inderfurth received in Washington “three senior members of the Taliban delegation” visiting the US under the “auspices of Unocal.”\textsuperscript{240} This indicates that the project did not become increasingly irrelevant after Raphel’s departure.

Aslam Beg however offers another possible explanation for the US tolerance of the Taliban:

It was neither the pipeline nor any security reason... by betraying the Afghans in 1989 {the US} had lost leverage in Afghanistan...they could not have controlled the Taliban even if they wanted to.\textsuperscript{241}

Pakistan was one of the three countries that recognized the Taliban regime along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But the Saudi and UAE governments closed down their missions in Kabul after differences with the Taliban regime and the Clinton

\textsuperscript{239} Roy Gutman, \textit{How We Missed the Story}, pp.74.
\textsuperscript{240} No. 1197STATE231842, “Karl Inderfurth meets Taliban”, Department of State Memo (December 11, 1997) \url{http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index4.htm}, Accessed 27 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{241} Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
administration never tried to renew diplomatic relations. The diminished role of the US intelligence operations in the region in view of scant US strategic interests was influenced by Clinton’s lukewarm relations with the US intelligence community. Moreover, the borderless, transnational threat was by definition diffuse and murky. Therefore, America sought Pakistan’s assistance and the Pakistani foreign ministry facilitated the visits of American state department officials to meet the Taliban leadership in Kabul. Benazir’s Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ali (1993-1996) recalled during the interview:

Even though the Americans did not recognize the Taliban they were very keen to do business with them. Raphel came to Islamabad and wanted to meet Mullah Omar who never met women. I arranged her meeting with the Taliban council. And she invited them to the US.

Various news reports during this period show Taliban-US interaction. The Taliban leaders visited the US to discuss the pipeline project in December 1997 and Bill Richardson, Energy Secretary in the Clinton administration, travelled to Afghanistan in April 1998 to hold talks with Taliban leaders. Clearly, while Clinton’s approach lacked sustained attention and a diminished strategic interest in Pakistan, the economy-driven foreign policy-makers were not unmindful of the strategic value of the pipeline in a region with the world’s last known oil and gas reserves. Thus, South and Central Asia expert Ahmed Rashid maintains that Clinton’s NSC Adviser Sandy Berger set up an inter-agency government committee on formulating policy towards Central Asia as trade between the US and Uzbekistan suddenly increased eight-fold between 1995 and 1997.

Musharraf recalling his 2000 meeting with Clinton argued:

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243 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
245 Conrad Schetter & Bernd Kuzmits, “The Revival of Geopolitics”, pp. 165-167
I told Clinton you have committed a big blunder by failing to engage the Taliban... by failing to understand its tribal culture and psychology... their leadership is uneducated and has no international exposure... isolating it was not the answer... had you invested in Afghanistan you could have moderated the Taliban.247

In 1996 Khalilzad, as advisor to Unocal, had also urged the Clinton administration to treat the Taliban regime as a positive entity since construction of gas and oil pipelines can go forward only “if Afghanistan has a single authoritative government.”248 Murshed maintained that the US was willing to do business but not prepared to understand the Taliban phenomenon.249 This suggests a lack of access to first-hand intelligence in view of American diplomatic absence in Kabul; this was further conditioned by a focus on economic prosperity being the harbinger of political stability. Notably, there was no Afghan expert in Clinton’s foreign policy team250 thus demonstrating a disinterest in comprehending cultural influences on the Taliban mindset.

There was also a security dimension to the US approach, albeit less important. A State Department memo from Christopher refers to a US intelligence report describing Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism against Israel and aiming to undermine Clinton’s Middle East peace efforts for a negotiated settlement of Israel-Palestine issue. Warning that Iran was promoting an anti-Taliban coalition, the report indicated Iranian development of nuclear weapons and efforts at expanding “politicized Islamic influence”251 in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Thus an anti-Shia Taliban was clearly an antidote to Iran as implied by Khalilzad.252 According to Pakistani military interviewees, such as Beg, Durrani and Bokhari, Iran continued to figure as a security threat to US interests in the 1990s.253 Riedel, however, downplayed the importance of Iran in the equation, arguing “most US governments have been obsessed with Iran trying to block energy outlets and

247 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
249 Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (12 August 2011).
250 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p.407.
252 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Time to Reengage”.
pipelines that may benefit Iran.” Seth Jones also offered a competing perspective arguing that neither the Iranian influence nor the pipeline drove initial US support for the Taliban. Jones, along with Riedel, Inderfurth and Weinbaum maintained that the primary reason for Clinton’s approach to the Taliban-Pakistan connection was US disinterest in the region and its focus on the Balkans, Somalia and Haiti. Joseph Nye, who served as chairman of National Intelligence Council during Clinton’s first term, refused to comment on whether the US had any convergence of interest with Pakistan.254 Most of these analysts were part of the Clinton administration with access to information which gives them an aura of credibility. However, it is not farfetched to consider their answers (or lack thereof) as protecting decisions taken during their respective tenures in office. What is noticeable is that most of them confirmed initial US acceptance of the Taliban. A bulk of primary data confirms that potential economic benefits coupled with inconsistent foreign policy dynamics primarily drove US approach towards the Taliban-Pakistan connection; the issue of Bin Laden was a latter addition to the agenda. Maleeha Lodhi confirmed: Yes, there was US interest in the pipeline—but then they took their eye off the ball.255

In 1999 Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher accused the State Department of withholding documents that would provide evidence of US support to the Taliban in the 1990s, saying:

I am making the claim that there is and has been a covert policy by this administration to support the Taliban movement’s control of Afghanistan ... and {has} kept the Congress in the dark ... {and it is} currently engaged in a major effort to obstruct the Congress from determining the details behind this policy.256

Rohrabacher’s remarks may be seen against the forthcoming general elections and thus Democrat Tom Lantos was quick to dismiss them as, “absurd and

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254 Interviews with Seth Jones (15 February 2012), Bruce Riedel (2 February 2012), Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012), Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012) Joseph Nye (7 March 2012).
255 Interview with Maleeha Lodhi(25 October 2011)
delusional”.\(^{257}\) Having said that, US diplomatic assessment that the Taliban will not be “systematically unfriendly to US interests”\(^{258}\)—and the ensuing US inattentiveness—suggests that US economic interests in the CARs provided Pakistani military establishment the opportunity to continue its support of the movement. Similarly, there was a lack of interest in the ISI’s role in Indian Kashmir.

The explanation for Clinton’s decision to strike Pakistan’s name off the terror watch list is reflective of the complexity of US-Pakistan relations during the era. Cohen argues that Pakistan was not declared a terrorist state despite evidence of its support of militant groups for fear of strengthening extremists at the cost of the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.\(^{259}\) However, his view does not present the whole picture. While Pakistan military continued its support of the Kashmir insurgency Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments also facilitated high profile extraditions\(^{260}\) in February 1995; the time period coincided with Pakistan’s efforts that led to the Brown Amendment. Moreover, the religiously orthodox Director General ISI, Javed Nasir (1992-1993), accused of supporting militants in Indian Kashmir and Punjab, was removed by the Prime Minister and the charge was handed over to Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi who was tasked to purge the ISI of Islamists promoted by Nasir.

Qazi argued “Pakistan was removed from the list because I purged the ISI...changed the rules of the game... no extremist links- only professional work.”\(^ {261}\) From this one can infer that prior to his taking over in May 1993 the “rules of the game” included “links with “extremists.” Others indicated the shifting of training camps from Azad Kashmir to the far flung Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) near the Pak-Afghan border as a ploy to show that Pakistan had closed all training camps in the mid-1990s.\(^{262}\) This then is another explanation for not declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. Moreover, also, early US reports show that “hard evidence” of Islamabad’s support “was lacking,” although private anti-Indian

\(^{257}\) Quoted in Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, p. 174.  
\(^{259}\) Stephen Cohen, Idea of Pakistan, p.364.  
\(^{260}\) Aimal Kansi was alleged to have killed three CIA officials in Virginia in 1993- while Ramzi Yousuf was involved with the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993. Ramzi handed over in February 1995 and Kansi in June 1997.  
\(^{261}\) Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p.292.  
\(^{262}\) Interview with Pakistani officials C and E.
groups were “free to raise funds and find recruits in Pakistan.” Thus, as late as May 1993, some voices in the US Congress were opposing Pakistan’s placement on the terror watch list although Weinbaum confirmed that US intelligence had reports of the ISI’s interference in Kashmir from the early 1990s. According to Shuja Nawaz the Washington visit of Beg’s successor General Asif Nawaz (1991-1993) played a part in allaying American fears. Considering that General Nawaz was Shuja’s brother there may be an element of bias in his perspective. However the new COAS, according to Hamid Gul, was inclined towards capping Pakistan’s nuclear program which could be the primary reason why the Clinton administration was receptive to him.

Clearly, along with initial acceptance of the Taliban Clinton’s lukewarm approach towards ISI’s involvement in Kashmir inadvertently contributed towards protecting Islamabad’s regional interests while impeding US global objectives.

Conclusion

The strategic vision of the Clinton era, as much as there was one, perceived threats to US interests from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. At the beginning of his first term, Clinton’s foreign policy tenets for South Asia were seen by the Pakistani intelligentsia as following a balanced approach toward India and Pakistan. However, US-India ties began to improve in view of Clinton’s emphasis on economics as the bed-rock of his foreign policy. In contrast Pakistan was largely perceived through the security prism despite there being a civilian set-up in place in Pakistan.

Instead of curtailing PFP’s nuclear weapons’ goal US sanctions inadvertently contributed to the acceleration of the process while diminishing 

265 Interview with Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
266 Asif Nawaz died in office in January 1993.
267 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
268 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
Washington’s leverage. Bilateral relations were further fractured by perpetuation of the F-16s issue, nuclear testing, Islamabad’s support for the Kashmir insurgency, its reluctance to modify Taliban behavior and finally the Kargil conflict. Conversely, US active opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program on the one hand and tolerance of Islamabad’s support for the Taliban, and the Kashmir insurgency on the other, created space for the Pakistan military establishment to pursue its regional security goals.

Jervis argues that security dilemma emerges from policy-makers’ inability to recognize the menacing image of one’s own actions while concomitantly explaining other’s actions as hostile. The Clinton administration expected Pakistan to recognize US actions as saving Pakistan from itself, as it were, while deciphering Islamabad’s clandestine sale and purchase of nuclear technology as evidence of supporting “backlash states” rather than self-help. A combination of disinterest and inconsistency in Clinton’s approach towards Pakistan against the backdrop of improving India-US ties thus reinforced Bush era catalysts.

The Clinton administration neglected to understand that for the first time since the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the achievement of psychological and operational strategic advantages against India appeared possible on the western border thus minimizing Islamabad’s perennial fears of geographic vulnerability and Indian encirclement. Moreover, the probability of accessing Central Asian markets further brightened the broader strategic picture for PFP. There was a possibility that Islamabad could, from a position of strength, pressurize India into resolving outstanding issues.

In congruence with the Cold War pattern, PFP’s regional security strategies and objectives were largely at variance with American global goals even as there was a period of convergence vis-à-vis the Taliban; Islamabad utilized convergence and divergence to promote PFP’s security objectives. What were the implications of Clinton’s foreign policy approach for Pakistan? And how did Islamabad respond? This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Coping Mechanisms: Pakistan’s Response to Clinton’s Foreign Policy

The truth is that the US too often used its aid as a lever. We did not succumb in the past and we [did] not give up our principles for the sake of American aid or fear of war [with India].

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan

The defiance in President Ishaq’s words reflects the Pakistani attitude towards US foreign policy throughout the 1990s against the backdrop of increasing disparity between American and Pakistani security preferences. Harboring tacit bitterness towards the pragmatic US foreign aid policy, the Pakistani leadership was ready to review rules of engagement with the US while remaining inflexible towards India-centric strategic goals.

As discussed in the previous chapter coercive tools and an attitude of sustained high level disinterest marked the Clinton administration’s approach towards Pakistan. It sought to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan without having to perform the Cold War era balancing act while remaining stuck in the contradictory and security-specific Cold War mindset in its approach towards Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan-US relations were more or less a repetition of the Cold War interaction minus the US security compulsion of Containment.

The Afghan interim government under Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, was friendly towards India which could have facilitated a stronger Indian footprint in Afghanistan. This factor, along with growing US-India ties, aggravated Pakistan

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Thus, after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, the Pakistani military establishment, in view of its security dilemma, was not going to let go of their proxy at the command of a superpower. With the Taliban regime facilitating infiltration into Kashmir to jeopardize Indian security interests, and the access to nuclear weapons a bright possibility, for the first time since 1947 the military establishment could counter Indian regional power with lesser operational disadvantages.

From the Pakistani perspective the three issues of Afghanistan, Kashmir and nuclear weapons were interconnected since these derived from the Indian threat to the security of Pakistan. At such a moment in history when Pakistan was closer than ever to strengthening its relative regional standing against India Clinton’s continuation of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment had a negative impact on Pakistan’s military capability, tilting the regional balance of power in India’s favor. Pakistan’s response to Clinton’s foreign policy was a hardening of position on nuclear weapons and the Taliban policy. Accordingly, the military establishment through its empowered intelligence outfit, the ISI, tightened its grip on the foreign policy process. By influencing domestic political developments the military establishment was able to ensure continued support of the civilian leadership— that was largely eager to appease the military to retain political power—for nuclear, Afghan and Kashmir policies.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Clinton’s inconsistent and unfocused approach reinforced the Bush era catalysts (examined in Chapter 3) while creating space for Pakistan to perpetuate selected regional policies. This chapter explains Pakistan’s coping strategies to offset the implications of Clinton’s foreign policy. It is divided into two sections: Section one explains Pakistan’s policy-making process in the 1990s followed by a discussion on the key perceptual drivers behind it. Section two examines coping mechanisms adopted by Islamabad to continue the

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pursuit of PFP’s regional strategic objectives that were at variance with US global security goals.

(1) The Making of a Policy

During the eleven years of his rule (1977-1988) Zia-ul-Haq had retained the dual offices of the COAS and President while installing his selected candidates in the Parliament, the military and the civilian bureaucracy. His trusted bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan\(^3\) was Chairman of the Senate when Zia died and took over as President according to the Constitution. General Mirza Aslam Beg, the new COAS, opted not to continue the military rule and instead allowed general elections to be held which led to civilian governments between 1989 and 1999.\(^4\) Given the political power of the military establishment, however, it did not relinquish control of Pakistan’s India centric foreign policy.\(^5\) While holding the dual offices of the president and the army chief, Zia-ul Haq had kept the nuclear command and control strictly under his authority and Aslam Beg, as Zia’s Vice Chief of Army Staff, had not been part of the control mechanism. Thus, upon Zia’s death the authority passed to Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Prime Minister Benazir sought to regain control of the program which was initiated and controlled by her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s; on the other hand, Aslam Beg also entered the system. “Thus was laid the foundation of a new system of government in Pakistan, known as the Troika,

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\(^3\) Ghulam Ishaq Khan had been closely associated with the nuclear program since Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto made him Defense Secretary in 1975. His services were retained by Zia-ul-Haq after he deposed Bhutto in 1977. Benazir Bhutto accepted him as President in 1989 as part of her deal with the army for political reasons. Zia-ul-Haq had introduced the 8th Amendment to the Constitution giving himself the presidential power to dismiss civilian government and dissolve parliament thus effectively furthering a presidential form of government over a parliamentary system. These powers were inherited by the pro-military Ishaq Khan who as President was also the supreme commander of the armed forces and had the authority on nuclear decision-making. Thus, between 1988 and 1997 the executive power rested with the Presidents Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari. Nawaz Sharif did away with the 8th Amendment in 1997 reverting executive power to the Prime Minister. When Musharraf took over in 1999 he revived these powers under the 17th Amendment; this was finally scrapped by Zardari through the 18th Amendment in 2008.

\(^4\) Beg insisted the decision was taken because he wanted to further democracy. However, Fasih Bokhari argued that Benazir “sold her {persona} and liberal values” to the US and the West in the years preceding Zia’s death. Her political struggle was perceived by influential politicians in the US as her commitment to secular democracy and in the post-Cold War environment her leadership in Pakistan suited US foreign policy goals. Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011); See also Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, pp.411-425.

providing a modicum of checks and balances to the political system” but always keeping the three main actors—the President, the Prime Minister and the COAS—in the forefront.⁶

According to retired Brigadier Feroz Hasan Khan who was associated with the nuclear program during the 1990s, President Ishaq Khan (1988 -93) had the final say on all nuclear matters and the COAS supported and coordinated on his behalf. It was in 1993 that the nuclear responsibility and records were transferred from the office of the President to Pakistan army’s General Headquarters (GHQ).⁷ However, the Presidential authority was not as absolute as argued by Feroz Hassan especially when seen against the words of Musharraf who confirmed that “Ishaq Khan being a civilian, {immediately} brought the new COAS into the loop” after Zia’s death. ⁸

In theory, the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), created in 1976, was the primary defense policy-making body. However, under military governments⁹ it rarely functioned as an effective entity and met only a few times during the 1990s. The Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS) was set-up in 1997 by President Farooq Leghari and the National Security Council was formulated by Pervez Musharraf in 1999. The two bodies comprised Army, Navy and Air-force Chiefs, relevant government ministers as well as foreign policy experts. Nonetheless, according to independent sources key decisions were taken by the Troika.¹⁰ This was confirmed by Admiral Fasih Bokhari who, as the incumbent Naval Chief, was a member of the CDNS.

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⁶ Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p.422.
⁷ In early 1993, the Army Chief General Abdul Waheed pressured the President and the Prime Minister to resign from the office and hold elections (discussed later). Ishaq Khan who until then was custodian of the nuclear program did not trust the interim government and handed over the classified nuclear weapons program including all documents to Waheed. For a concise background to nuclear management see Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan: Political Transitions and Nuclear Management”, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1156&rid=6, accessed 13 September 2013.
⁸ Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
⁹ Pakistan has been under periodic military regimes for almost 31 years since 1958.
Recalling CDNS meetings, Bokhari narrated how the President, the Prime Minister and the COAS would assemble in a separate room to take decisions before they walked in together and ostensibly opened the issue for debate:

I’d say, ‘why do you invite me? Just hang my uniform on the chair...you don’t listen to others, you just want a photo opportunity’...the Troika was a kind of oligarchy, a distorted decision making chain comprising the political leadership and the army. The job of the foreign office was {only} to collate political data and pass it on to the ISI which had its own sources but got a wider picture this way.\(^{11}\)

Former foreign secretary and career diplomat Riaz Khokhar contended that:

The foreign office studies and presents policy options to senior leadership and then implements their decision... it does not take positions although we do say our piece...it is nonsense that the army was the only decision-maker in the 1990s.\(^{12}\)

Referring to Benazir and Sharif’s reaching out to India (noted later) academic Rasul Bakhsh Rais endorsed Khokhar’s premise arguing “I do not agree that the army alone was making {PFP} decisions.... Benazir and Sharif dealt independently with India which shows the military was not controlling them.” Yet in answer to another question during the interview Rais maintained:

I strongly believe that {the military} removed {conservative} Nawaz Sharif government in 1993 and brought in {secular} Benazir to keep Pakistan off the US Terror Watch list during Clinton’s time.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
\(^{12}\) Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
\(^{13}\) Interview with Rasul Bakhsh Rais (12 August 2011).
Clearly, if the military had the power to remove civilian governments it is highly unlikely that the civilian leadership was independent enough to meaningfully influence security policies. Thus, in his memoir Sharif's foreign minister Sartaj Aziz recalls that when Sharif—in response to Clinton’s demand—pressurized Mullah Omar to eject Bin Laden from Afghanistan the Taliban’s response was lukewarm because they knew that the real political power flowed from the military and not the civilians.\footnote{Sartaj Aziz, \textit{Between Dreams and Realities}, p.212-13}

This leads to the conclusion that despite a civilian parliament in place the army was able to wield influence on PFP through various ways: the sheer traditional political power of their position; through the Eighth Amendment that allowed the executive to dissolve the parliament thrice during the 1990s and through ISI’s manipulation of the political process aided by the military’s hand-picked president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. This is illustrated by the following example. The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a coalition of right-wing politicians, was formed in September 1988 by the ISI to oppose the liberal Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) in the forthcoming elections in 1990. The IJI was able to form a government in the centre in 1990. Under orders from the army chief Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq, large sums of money was then disbursed to IJI by Asad Durrani, the ISI chief in 1991.\footnote{A petition was filed against the ISI by Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan in 1996. In 2012 the Supreme Court of Pakistan found it maintainable and ordered the government to take action against Beg and Durrani, “1990 election was rigged: SC”, \textit{The News}, 19 October, 2012 \url{http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-72104-1990-election-was-rigged-SC-}, accessed 2 January 2013.} Beg denied the allegation during the interview and instead held the late President Ishaq responsible for the act.\footnote{Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).} However, Durrani maintains that the “army chief holds more influence than others” including the ISI and the executive.\footnote{“Mehrangate: Durrani says Beg was on board” \textit{The News}, 16 May 2012, \url{http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-49363-Asghar-Khan-case-Durrani-says-Beg-was-onboard}, accessed 1 August 2012.} Hamid Gul, Director General ISI (1987-1989), confirmed his role in forming the IJI during the interview.\footnote{Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).}

Clearly, the army’s approach to political manipulation arose out of its Afghan policy. A conservative government was deemed more supportive of the ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir as compared to Benazir who— in the
words of Hamid Gul — was furthering the US agenda at the cost of PFP’s security preferences19 such as nuclear weapons and supporting proxies in Afghanistan. This is substantiated by Nawaz Sharif’s support of the Kashmir cause after becoming Prime Minister in 1990 as confirmed by former ISI chief Ehsan-ul-Haq.20 Moreover, the ISI, acting independently of the Foreign Ministry, had reportedly sent “advisers” into Afghan combat zones in early 198921 when Hamid Gul was in charge. He confirmed he remained involved in Afghanistan after his retirement:

I used to be on a peace mission to Afghanistan in my private retired capacity during the 1990s. I pulled out in 1995 and got in touch with the Taliban later only after my own secret delegations vouched to their good conduct.22

It is possible that such contacts worked well for the ISI both ways—it could absolve itself of any actions taken by retired officials while simultaneously it could use the same officials for its own purposes when required.

That said, Benazir Bhutto did create the so-called Afghan and India Cells to induct civilian contribution to foreign policy-making.23 These comprised the President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Director General of the ISI. Ashraf Qazi, who was the ISI chief in the mid-1990s, maintained that, “at the operational level it was the core group or the Cell that took the decisions.” The COAS General Waheed, who was aversive to getting embroiled with “bloody civilians”, was not a member. “I was the bouncing ball between the civil and military leadership”, recalled Qazi.24 Assef Ali who was Benazir’s foreign minister also insisted that there was a civil-military consensus on decisions that diminished after Benazir’s government was dismissed.

19 Ibid.
20 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
22 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
23 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
24 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
Nawaz Sharif had no interest in Afghanistan and it was then that the ISI took over the whole policy...the nuclear issue was left to me; the ISI never understood the international issues; it was not running the show. I was in touch with the military and also reported to the Prime Minister.\(^\text{25}\)

Ali’s comments have an element of political rhetoric. Critics, such as Riffat Hussain, thus perceive the Cells as “showpieces” rather than actual vehicles for civilian control over foreign policy. The Afghan Cell for example, argued Hussain, was dominated by Pashtun ISI officers to monitor Afghan developments.\(^\text{26}\) It may be noted that the ISI could not be prevented from involvement in Afghan policy given its strong involvement in regional developments throughout the 1980s. Moreover, it suited the Pakistani military and civilian elite as many ISI officials, being Pashtuns, knew Afghanistan well having served in Fata i.e. the tribal areas. Their knowledge and analyses helped the policy-makers in devising an informed Afghan strategy.

Beg argued: “There was no foreign policy mechanism...there was no institutionalized approach...I never found any {well defined} policy on Kashmir or Afghanistan or Iran...all hit and run approach.” He maintained that the Afghan policy-making had “nothing to do with the army” as the ISI and not the army was the executor of Zia’s Afghan strategy in the 1980s. In the 1990s the policy to support proxies like the Taliban was “the brainchild of the ISI-Benazir government.”\(^\text{27}\) Hamid Gul also portrayed his acquiescence to the Prime Minister on the Afghan policy, especially blaming her short-sightedness in “ordering” him to carry out the botched Jalalabad offensive by the anti-Najibullah Mujahedeen in 1989 to win territory in order to gain US recognition for the Pakistan based Afghan Interim Government.\(^\text{28}\) Beg demonstrated civilian independence claiming that the Jalalabad operation was given a go-ahead by Benazir while he was on a tour abroad.\(^\text{29}\) It is more likely that the two interviewees did not want to take responsibility for an operation gone wrong. Bokhari however endorsed the premise that the Kashmir policy and “the policy of imposing a friendly government

\(^{25}\) Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
\(^{26}\) Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
\(^{27}\) Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
\(^{28}\) Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\(^{29}\) Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
in Kabul” were initially civilian policies, adding that “the military allowed this because it suited their agenda.”\textsuperscript{30} Bokhari’s premise is closer to reality.

The Cells were clearly created to give a semblance of a democratic process. This allowed the military to hedge its bets by giving the impression of diffusion of powers that “helped us pass the buck when approached by the US officials.” For instance, the military could just refer US officials to “President Ishaq Khan” who working in close coordination with the army on the nuclear and Afghan issues “guarded the nuclear treasure like a snake” in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{31} Given the military’s dominance of security policies it is highly unlikely that decisions crucial to their threat perception were left to the politicians whose narrow, personal agendas, according to military and civilian interviewees, rendered them not only untrustworthy but also incapable of creating a counter-narrative to military’s political power.\textsuperscript{32}

From another perspective, intellectuals and academics also did not exert policy influence\textsuperscript{33} although there were some well established think-tanks in Pakistan during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{34} However, this trend was not specific to the 1990s; “the policy-makers have never been interested in our views or recommendations,” argued academics Tahir Amin and Mohammad Islam at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, pointing out that “academics playing the ISI’s game by writing in favor of the nationalist narrative are usually given prominence.”\textsuperscript{35} The military “does not trust the civilians to attain strategic objectives”, posited academic Ayesha Siddiqa.\textsuperscript{36} For the military it worked well: the lesser the outsiders in the policy-making chain, the more effective the implementation of the military’s agenda. Thus, despite a civilian setup in place between February 1989 and October 1999 neither Benazir nor Nawaz Sharif could strengthen their grip over foreign policy even though, as discussed later, they showed some independence in reaching out

\textsuperscript{30}Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and Hamid Gul (13 July 2011) and Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{31}Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\textsuperscript{32}Including Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011); Hamid Gul (13 July 2011); Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011); Zahid Hussain (21 July 2011); Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011); Shahid Iqbal (6 August 2011).
\textsuperscript{33}Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011); Interview with Ashfaq Saleem Mirza (24 October 2011).
\textsuperscript{34}For example Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA), Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS).
\textsuperscript{35}Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011) and Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{36}Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
to India. That the COAS wielded the ultimate power was demonstrated in 1993. Following a prolonged tussle between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ishaq Khan over the controversial Eighth Amendment Waheed prevailed upon both the leaders to resign and call for fresh elections. Apparently the constitutional impasse over the Eighth Amendment was obviating political stability. Waheed confirmed that with his focus on security issues, especially the nuclear program, he did not want unnecessary domestic disturbances. In this regard the military was not willing to make any concessions—not even for the President, a member of the Troika and a trusted bureaucrat. Waheed recalled he told Ishaq Khan he had to go because “not only the civilians but the military also hates your guts!”  

Once the COAS demanded their resignations the President and the Prime Minister had to leave.

So far this section has demonstrated that although there was some civilian contribution to policy-making, Pakistan’s military establishment remained firmly in control of PFP’s security choices. The following sub-section will examine Pakistani perceptions of Clinton's foreign policy and Islamabad’s threat-perception. By doing this it will provide a better understanding of why the military continued to control the policy-making process.

**Perceiving US actions**

"We helped them defeat the Soviet Union. We should have been rewarded, not ditched."

General Pervez Musharraf

“We always knew that India was their first love...”

Lt General Asad Durrani

37 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
38 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
The language of the two quotations above is revealing. It reflects an approach which is both romanticized as well as pragmatic—the two elements that undergirded US-Pakistan relations during the Cold War years; at the same time there is an element of self-importance that betrays a rigid military mindset. That such language was used by two important military decision makers of the 1990s demonstrates two conceptual constructs shaping Pakistan’s security perceptions in the post-Cold War world: the unreliability of great power politics and, subsequent fears of a shift in the regional balance of power.

The American approach to Pakistan’s nuclear program was primarily perceived within these parameters. Thus, one of the predominant perceptions of Clinton’s continuation of the Pressler legislation and imposition of new nuclear sanctions pertains to cutting Pakistan down to size to facilitate Indian regional hegemony. Academic Tahir Amin reminisced about his interaction with Clinton’s advisor Joseph Nye in the 1990s. He spoke of his “amazement” at Nye’s “simplistic” assumption that “the Americans could prevail upon the Pakistan military to roll back its nuclear program.” Terming as equally futile Clinton’s efforts to stop Pakistan from responding after 1998, Amin emphasized “the truth is that the day India conducted nuclear tests nobody answered the phone in Islamabad.”

Clinton’s approach was perceived as discriminatory by former Director General ISI and Chairman of the Joint Services General Ehsan-ul-Haq:

{The Indian} position was recognized by the West while Clinton put pressure on Pakistan not to respond; again, miscalculating the centrality of Pakistan’s existential requirements and [a] disregard for our total security paradigm.

Ehsan’s response also highlights Pakistan’s—not entirely unfounded—objection that the US has no regard for Islamabad’s genuine security concerns. A 2001 US

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39 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
40 Pervez Musharraf was Director General Military Operations (DGMO) between 1993 and 1995 and took over as COAS in 1998; Durrani who was Director General Military Intelligence in the 1980s served as Director General ISI between 1991-92.
41 Interview with Tahir Amin (12 July 2011).
42 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
report on Indo-Pakistan rivalry concedes that Islamabad’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests and its missile tests in 1998 and 1999 were likely “a means of bolstering its own deterrent.” It also states that Pakistan will likely test in the future “only if India tests first.” 43 This suggests support for Waheed’s position that “should Pakistan have agreed to American non-proliferation regime formula in view of the Indian threat? No leader would!” He saw the invoking of Pakistan specific Pressler Amendment by Bush as a “tacit agreement to bolster India as the regional power.” 44 The Pakistani argument that the proliferator in South Asia was India that tested first is therefore worthy of attention.

Hamid Gul saw a link between US disengagement, Pakistan’s nuclear program and the American approach towards Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Gul represents ISI officials with deeply religious views about the identity of Pakistan linked to— what was the dominant narrative in his interview—the Islamic “Ummah” (community). 45 Yet he clearly argued that “state boundaries are indispensible for national identity though not for trade or ideological affiliation.” Postulating that the US supported India and Israel but “did not want us to take advantage of the potential economic opportunities that the CARs could provide us” Gul maintained that the main US reservation was Pakistan’s potential economic growth and its prestige as a regional power.”46 This line of argument implies a nexus between non-Muslim India, Israel and the US in contrast to Islamic Pakistan and mirrors the “Islamic bloc” and “Pakistan-China-nexus” as well as “civilizational fault-lines” premises offered by Senator Pressler and other Congressional members and a section of US academia and media (discussed in chapter 3). Notably, both sides see each other as a monolith which demonstrates over-simplification of complex phenomena. Elements of mutual mistrust are thus apparent as symptoms of respective security dilemma that found expression in not only pragmatic actions but also conspiratorial psychological responses.

From another perspective US sanctions were a blessing in disguise for Pakistan as argued by Asad Durrani:

44 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
45 Gul had propounded the idea of a Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation in 1989. Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
46 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
The US governments exhausted their pressure tactics... Pakistan leadership had greater freedom to act... we reached out to Iran, we reached out to {former Afghan King} Zahir Shah to resolve the Afghan imbroglio... we did whatever we wanted to in Afghanistan.

The idea was, Durrani continued:

If you are going to terminate military aid and target our nuclear program, things will change in Pakistan too... when {pro-India Senator} Solarz was coming to Pakistan {the US diplomat} Bob Oakley begged me to meet him. I refused. 47

Reflecting self-importance and some exaggeration Durrani’s words clearly depict Pakistani resentment at American policies in the 1990s. Reading between the lines his words also imply the American role in impacting Pakistan's security options. Interestingly, there is a competing view in Pakistan that appears to endorse American concerns.

This school of thought perceives the military's security goals as aimed at expanding Pakistan’s political and territorial boundaries into and beyond Afghanistan. For instance, defense analyst Ayesha Siddiqa argued:

Pakistan is a middle sized nuclear power with power-grabbing ambitions that are restricted by India in the east and Iran in the west, so that leaves Afghanistan and the CARs... 48

Siddiqa's premise lacks hard evidence. In the 1990s using proxies as a coping strategy was operationally viable in the disputed territory of Kashmir or in an

47 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
48 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July, 2011). In a Pakistani television show Zalmay Khalilzad argued that Pakistan had pan-Islamic motives in the 1990s. He cited an intercepted message to ISI HQ in Islamabad from the ISI representative in Herat when the city fell to the Taliban which read: “Today Herat-Tomorrow Tashkent” the capital of Uzbekistan. However when asked by another participant, Senator Akram Zaki, if he had any proof, Khalilzad backtracked saying “this was the perception.” Talk Show, “Platform”, Dunya T.V, Lahore, (13 September, 2011), Video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogvnV15xfU, accessed 23 August 2012.
unstable Afghanistan where Pakistan had been politically and militarily involved for a decade. On the other hand, anti-Taliban CARs were former Soviet states where Pakistan’s influence was negligible. This leads to the conclusion that Pakistan’s interest in the CARs was largely trade oriented and its search for strategic depth in Afghanistan (discussed later) was primarily aimed at obviating a balance of power tilt in India’s favor. Moreover, Hamid Gul and Javed Nasir, the two ISI heads commonly associated with such expansionist aspirations, were removed from their jobs prematurely. It demonstrates that their “visions” were not acceptable-or deemed indispensable-at the highest civil-military level.49

Siddiqa further posited:

They {the Pakistani military} are constantly focused on Indian capabilities without analyzing which capability will translate into aggression.50

Siddiqa’s argument can be replicated and extended to Pakistan’s perceived expansionist ambitions and its actual aggressive military capability on ground including its nuclear weapons that serve as a deterrent specifically aimed at India. Talat Masood posited that Pakistan, instead of facing the reality of a {US-Pakistan} patron-client relationship, behaved like a regional power despite a lack of resources.51 However, having ambitions and actually possessing the instruments to realize them are two different aspects. Hence, Masood’s words are contradictory and speculative with no concrete evidence.

The Pakistan military based its strategy on its India-centric threat perception. As a Pakistani general argues, “the whole raison d’être of the army is to defend against India.”52 The role of the ISI in this regard cannot be overstated.

49 Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
50 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July, 2011). In a Pakistani television show Zalmay Khalilzad argued that Pakistan had pan-Islamic motives in the 1990s. He cited an intercepted message to ISI HQ in Islamabad from the ISI representative in Herat when the city fell to the Taliban which read: “Today Herat-Tomorrow Tashkent” the capital of Uzbekistan. However when asked by another participant, Senator Akram Zaki, if he had any proof, Khalilzad backtracked saying “this was the perception.” Talk Show, “Platform”, Dunya T.V, Lahore, (13 September, 2011), Video at www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogvnV15xfU, accessed 23 August 2012.
51 Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).
given Pakistani military’s preference for proxy-warfare to engage comparatively larger Indian forces indirectly. The Soviet-Afghan conflict allowed the ISI to expand its reach towards Afghanistan as well. Thus, the major US concern, as Durrani put it, was to curtail the post-1980s emergence of the ISI as a competent intelligence outfit operating in this part of the world arguing that “The Americans were after the ISI’s blood.”\footnote{Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).} British academic Anatol Lieven posits that since the Afghan War the ISI had shown willingness to pursue separate tactics and some retired ISI officials joined militant outfits. Yet, there was no mass disobedience and the ISI followed orders and policies of the high command.\footnote{Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, pp.185-187.} Former ISI chief Ehsan-ul-Haq noted that, “the ISI is as much a state institution as CIA or MI6; there is deliberate disinformation about ISI”, emanating from internal and external sources.\footnote{Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).} That such arguments suggest US pressure on the intelligence outfit is substantiated by internal changes in the institution during the 1990s when there were “major purges” of ISI’s rank and file” to rid it of extremist elements.

The first was carried out during Benazir’s first term when she fired Hamid Gul. However, this could very well have been more of an off-shoot of a power struggle\footnote{Benazir intervened in internal postings and appointments of the military and also removed Gul as ISI chief. See Shuja Nawaz Crossed Swords, pp.423-427.} between civil-military leadership than a purge per se. Benazir’s ISI chief in her second term, Ashraf Qazi, confirmed that the second “purge” was conducted under his watch. He agreed that Pakistan was under a great deal of American pressure because of the Indian allegation of ISI connection with the Bombay bombings in 1993. It was feared by the Americans that the ISI was acting independently to further Islamic agenda in the region supported by Qazi’s predecessor Javed Nasir. Qazi confirmed that under Nasir’s command “the ISI had gone berserk” and was “in the doghouse” administratively. Thus, Waheed as the army chief ordered Qazi to cleanse the ISI of extremist elements “with deep links in Afghanistan” and “I threw out 37 officers in two weeks.”\footnote{Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).} However, “whether these {purges} ever led to changes in policy is another matter,” argued Durrani. “When it came to taking decisions and making policies, the new guard had no
choice” but to follow ongoing ISI policies.\textsuperscript{58} While explaining why Clinton was unable to repeal the Pressler Amendment Michael Krepon argued that inertia was a powerful force in US politics.\textsuperscript{59} Clearly, inertia was an equally powerful force in the ISI in terms of Afghan and Kashmir policies.

It was interesting to note during the interviews that there appeared to be a broad consensus on PFP’s strategic choices in the 1990s. Nationalists like Generals Waheed and Musharraf and religiously orthodox Siraj-ul-Haq of Jamaat-i-Islami were as proud of the nuclear capability as former foreign minister Sardar Assef Ali with his western education and feudal background. Similarly, seasoned diplomats like Iftikhar Murshed, Riaz Khokhar and Maleeha Lodhi—no religious fundamentalists—were unanimous in their view of Indian hostility to Pakistan and the American shortsightedness in opposing Pakistan’s Taliban policy. Despite their divergent views on Musharraf’s regime they all agreed with his analysis that Clinton committed a “huge blunder” by failing to engage the Taliban leadership in order to moderate their actions. Criticizing American ahistorical approach, Musharraf asserted:

\begin{quote}
What Clinton neglected to understand was that the erstwhile Mujahedeen, hailing from diverse Muslim countries, had not been rehabilitated. They were armed to the teeth. Finally, it was the same Mujahedeen that coalesced and became Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

In other words, the Mujahedeen, nurtured by the CIA and ISI in the 1980s, emerged as the first cogent transnational threat to American interests. Qazi, confirmed that there were many Algerian, Egyptian and other Arab fighters who were not rehabilitated mainly because their governments refused to accept them for fear of potential instability. They had settled in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan’s North West Frontier (later Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa) province. “Peshawar was the subsequent headquarter of Al-Qaeda.”\textsuperscript{61} American policy-makers’ shortsightedness

\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011).
was expressed in their failure to leverage the Taliban by exploiting their economic vulnerability. "(Bill) Richardson promised them $4 million {for female schools} but the funds were never given" argued Murshed.\(^{62}\) Yusufzai criticized American propensity to see the Taliban movement as a monolith and the failure to exploit internal differences, for example regarding female education.\(^{63}\) The assumptions behind this line of argument are that the US could have been more accommodating and since it remained ambivalent the Taliban became rigid in its stance. Yet, there was a tendency from within the Pakistani power circles to view Americans as a monolithic entity; this is ironic considering that many Pakistani civil-military elite criticized the US approach towards the Taliban as monolithic and simplistic. Many from within the power circles also perceived ISI’s support for infiltration into Kashmir as legitimate.

Musharraf argued, the international border or “the Line of Control (LOC) is violable.”\(^{64}\) His premise was supported by Ehsan who also justified military intrusion in “disputed territory.”\(^{65}\) Krepon’s input appears to endorse Musharraf’s stance:

> Clinton was hesitant to place Pakistan on the terror list because, there was no clear-cut international border {in Kashmir} and the grievances were legitimate.\(^{66}\)

The Kashmir narrative, depicting Muslims in Indian Kashmir as forced to live separately from their natural kith and kin in Pakistan by the Hindu state and its armed forces,\(^{67}\) has deeply influenced not only the strategic mindset but also the

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\(^{62}\) Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (29 August 2011)

\(^{63}\) Interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai (19 October 2011).

\(^{64}\) Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).

\(^{65}\) Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).

\(^{66}\) Interview with Michael Krepon (3 February 2012).

society at large through curricula, literature and print and electronic media. It is therefore not surprising that there existed a hidden orthodoxy within the civil-military interviewees that primarily derived from the Kashmir narrative. A few who spoke against the mindset, such as Ayesha Siddiqa and Talat Masood, were labeled as “American or Indian stooges”; in other words they were perceived as “un-Pakistani.” Yet, despite such ideological nuances Pakistani security managers are pragmatists.

The above-quoted emotional outburst of Musharraf at the opening of this section does not adequately explain Pakistan military’s perceptions of the implications of US disengagement. Musharraf therefore qualified his sentimental response with, "but then this made us look for market diversification. We knew things had changed and we could no longer rely on American aid.”

The US had changed its policy direction and so had we...both states acted as pragmatists... it was clear to us that in order to woo India the Clinton administration had to prove how much pressure the US can put on Pakistan.

Hence, the real issue that the Pakistani civilian and military elite found threatening was not the American “abandonment” per se but its impact on Pakistan’s national security interests.

Pakistan’s security dilemma derives from a deep sense of physical insecurity when compared to a much larger India as explained in Chapter 2. Clinton’s friendly overtures to India added to the insecurity because, as Lt General Aurakzai contended:

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69 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
70 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
Any cozying up of US-India is seen by the military as partnership at the expense of Pakistan because it gives India more confidence, more opportunity, trade, economic benefits. ⁷¹

From this perspective, a pro-India regime in Kabul could facilitate Indian encirclement of Pakistan and the dreaded two-front-war could become a reality. Asad Durrani argued:

Pakistani strategic thinking primarily draws on India-specific security threat which, as discussed in Chapter 2, emerges from a combination of geographical and historical factors. Riaz Khokhar, who served as ambassador to India and the US in the 1990s (besides spending ten years in India earlier as a junior diplomat), stated:

Against this background of security concerns Clinton's friendly overtures to India compounded Islamabad's existential fears. Nonetheless, as pragmatists the military policy makers perceived Clinton's reaching out to India as a foregone conclusion after the Cold War. Durrani had no confusions as he contended “we

⁷¹ Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August, 2011).
⁷² Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
⁷⁴ Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
always knew that our alliance was tactical and not strategic.”75 Regarding Clinton’s de-hyphenating India and Pakistan General Ehsan argued “the US approach has always been the same {since the 1950s}... always discriminatory.”76 Assef Ali maintained that “The Clinton administration was not prepared to say a word about Kashmir or the Kashmiri people for fear of upsetting India. This they told us very frankly.”77

From a pragmatic standpoint “the logical course for Pakistan would be to come to terms with the status quo power of India,” but Pakistan was psychologically unwilling to accept India’s superiority and political dominance. As defense analyst Feroz Hassan puts it Pakistani strategic mindset demands a “never-say-die–attitude” and subservience remains a non-option.78 It is one of the reasons why Pakistan did not readapt its foreign policy choices in the 1990s. Ayesha Siddiqa offered another reason, “there is a huge gap of strategic thinking in both Indian and Pakistani militaries” which did not evolve over time but was instead inherited from the British.79 While Ayesha’s analysis cannot be rejected out of hand it is also important to remember that from Pakistan’s security point of view the end of the Cold War did not usher in a conflict resolution with India or stability in Afghanistan.

Khattak argued that the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime was ready to have good relations with Pakistan in the 1990s but “the Pakistan military’s polarized Cold War mindset” was not ready to open up and the religiously orthodox ISI chief Javed Nasir refused to talk to “the ‘infidel’ Communists.”80 Interestingly, Nasir’s orthodox approach is reminiscent of another orthodoxy i.e. members of US Congress shunning talks with Najibullah regime because, as Scowcroft confirmed (Chapter 3), the Americans wanted no truck with the Communists!

Emotional outbursts at the outset of this section notwithstanding it is clear that pragmatist concepts, arising out of the security dilemma, marked Pakistani strategic mindset in the 1990s. This called for self-help as a means to ensure

75 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
76 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
77 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
78 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture”; also Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture”.
80 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
security in an anarchic environment. The following section will examine Pakistan’s strategies to cope with the implications of Clinton’s foreign policy.

(2) Survival of the “Unwilling”

They {the Americans} want to play masters... we sometimes play slaves but we are not always willing slaves.

Lt General Hamid Gul

Gul’s comment can be interpreted at three levels; it sums up the patron-client nature of US-Pakistan relations; it concedes Pakistan’s acquiescence to protect its regional goals where required and it implies challenging American global objectives where necessary. In a nutshell, Gul’s remark embodies Pakistan’s assessment of the relationship against the regional security dilemma in the 1990s. It is revealing that a partnership which Pakistan began as America’s “most allied ally” in 1954 should now be seen through the master-slave lens thereby illustrating the widening distance between respective regional and global dimensions of foreign policy. Zahid Hussain argued that in the 1990s:

US disengagement had a negative impact that accelerated Pakistan’s drift towards strategies that were at odds with the US and added to policy inflexibility.

One might add that policy inflexibility marked the approach of the Clinton administration as well. In response Pakistan adopted coping strategies which primarily included market diversification and development of indigenous production facilities; attainment of nuclear weapons; supporting proxies in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir and diplomatic efforts. The following sub-sections will examine each strategy.

81 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011)
82 Interview with Zahid Hussain (20 July 2011).
Looking for new supply sources

Nuclear sanctions suspended the supply of a large amount of military equipment including F-16 fighter jets, tanks, guns, helicopters and other military hardware, which Pakistan had already paid for. The cut-off of spare parts, Karamat told Talbott, cost eleven air-force crashes in one year alone. The US suspended the lease of three destroyers and the navy was forced to return them—a serious disadvantage against the much superior Indian navy. Finding spare parts was a serious issue, argued Ehsan “an item [that] through direct supply was $10, for instance, in black market or indirect market [was worth] $50. Economic sanctions provided an extra burden that affected military preparedness.” Simultaneously, India’s allocation of $11 billion for its defense budget in 1989-90 and plans for supersonic air force and blue water navy, advanced ballistic missiles programs and building conventional capacity added to Pakistan’s alarm. Pakistani strategists perceived the Indian military build-up as Pakistan-specific and the improved US-India relations as providing the latter with a strong foothold in Afghanistan. According to Jervis once a particular image of the adversary is formed intentions with their inherent ambiguity remain one of the core causal factors in the security dilemma.

According to former army chiefs Aslam Beg and Abdul Waheed Pakistan took several steps to enhance existing indigenous defense facilities that

83 Karamat quoted in Talbott, Engaging India, p.110.
84 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
85 A blue-water navy allows a country to project power far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. Itikhar H. Malik “The Pakistan-U.S. Security Relationship: Testing Bilateralism”, Asian Survey, 30:3(March, 1990), pp.284-299
86 Editorial daily Jang, Rawalpindi, (7 April 1989); Thomas P. Thornton, “The New Phase in U.S. Pakistani Relations”.
87 As the world’s largest arms importer, India had already purchased $5.2 billion worth of weapons from diverse sources in 1987; this was 12 times more than Pakistan. Ross Munro, ”Superpower Rising,” Time, 3 April 1989, p.7; a super port for submarines, surface ships and aircraft carrier was being developed in southern India. Itikhar H. Malik “The Pakistan-U.S. Security Relationship”; The construction of India’s aircraft carrier was scheduled to begin in 1991 to be commissioned in 1997. Evan R. Pilling, ”Indian Surface Combatants: Sea Power for the 1990s”, Naval Postgraduate Thesis, (Monterey,California:September,1991), p 22, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA246185, accessed 2 June 2012.
88 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
89 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 75.
90 Pakistan Ordnance Factory was built at Wah in 1951 to manufacture small arms, ammunition and explosives. The Heavy Industries Complex at Taxila and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, at Kamra were both constructed in the 1970s with Chinese assistance.
manufactured conventional weapons and missiles. The Ministry of Defense Production was created by the civil-military leadership in September 1991 to promote and coordinate military production and research and development facilities. The National Development Complex (NDC) was established in 1993 with the objective of developing an infrastructure for indigenous weapons development to achieve self-reliance in missile technologies. In 1995 the NDC initiated the Shaheen missile program. M-11 and No Dong from China and North Korea respectively, were reverse-engineered to develop and produce ballistic missiles in 1998 and 1999. “That is how we were able to manufacture the Ghauri missile in answer to the Indian Prithvi.” The two key nuclear facilities that played a major role were the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Khan Research Laboratories under Abdul Qadeer Khan at Kahuta.

Pakistan signed agreements with China for thermal power plants and tried to obtain French financial assistance in upgrading its nuclear power plant in Karachi. Sea and submarine-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles and a variety of short-range air-launched tactical missiles were also purchased from China and France. Beg argued that the US “provided weapons but never technical know-how or transfer of technology”, whereas China was most generous. Thus, in keeping with its Cold War mindset Pakistan resorted to self-help and also looked for a powerful ally to remain relevant to the regional security dilemma. Turning to China, however, failed to minimize the American significance for Pakistan, argued Ayesha, because “no-one else would give you free goodies”. This however is a sweeping statement; the US used the Cold War alliance to construct anti-Soviet

91 Interviews with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011) and Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
93 Interview with Pakistani official A.
97 Interview with Ayesha Siddiq (19 July 2011).
bases in Pakistan, elicited its assistance in building relations with China and as Weinbaum argued, without Pakistan’s help it would not have been possible to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{98} Academic Islam thus contended that PFP’s reliance on the US:

\ldots emanated from the ground reality that only the US—as a great power—could assuage Pakistan’s India-centric security dilemma. That is why it was during periods of estrangement that Pakistan initiated its nuclear program in the 1970s and tested nuclear weapons in the 1990s. As long as the US remained a partner Pakistan stuck to nuclear ambiguity.\textsuperscript{99}

Islam’s premise can be extended to argue that Pakistan moved closer to China also during periods of disenchantment with the US.

Feroz points out that Islamabad’s relations with Beijing draw on a common “Islamic–Confucian’ cultural value of not abandoning friends unlike the US”.\textsuperscript{100} The Pakistani national narrative recalls Chinese help, if not rescue, in time of economic hardship such as in the 1970s when it helped build up weapon production facilities. During the interviews senior policy-makers described how Chinese leaders offered them both material help and sound advice in the 1990s: “if you are going to defy the US then do so at the strategic and not the tactical level.”\textsuperscript{101} In keeping with the Chinese advice, Pakistan took several tactical steps to remain off the US terror watch list in 1993-94; while extraditing persons wanted for terror acts to America it showed willingness to help curtail narcotics trade\textsuperscript{102} that was benefitting anti-US militants. Moreover, as General Waheed asserted, “we sent peace-keepers to Somalia, and contributed forces to Bosnia...this is how we kept them {the US} in good humor.”\textsuperscript{103} But when it came to US strategy of preventing the rise of new nuclear states Pakistan was ready to defy the sole superpower. Thus, it opted to pursue nuclear weapons capability as a coping strategy to offset the repercussions of Clinton’s foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012).
\textsuperscript{99} Interview with Mohammad Islam (12 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{100} Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture”.
\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Pakistani official A.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011)
Attaining nuclear weapons

With the Americans breathing down our necks I knew it was now or never. The US had pressured Zia into capping the nuclear program in 1986 and now there was no time to lose. By the end of my tenure in 1996, we were already a middle order nuclear power.

General Abdul Waheed

In Waheed’s mind Pakistan’s middle-order nuclear capability status was clearly comparable to India’s. Narrating the “nuclear saga” with enthusiasm nearly seventeen years on, Waheed provided an insight into his primary priority and conviction in the 1990s reflecting the military’s single-minded devotion to the goal. Pakistan remained steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT and CTBT unless India did so. Consequently its nuclear facilities remained out of the purview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Assef Ali narrated how “we refused to enter negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), unless we get the provision in the treaty to equalize {Indian levels}.” Ali recalled, “Strobe Talbott, Sandy Berger and Robert Einhorn kept approaching us with letters and demarches from President Clinton.” But they were told “we are in this game because of India.” The difficulty was that unlike India that possessed local supplies of nuclear weapons material, Pakistan lacked indigenous resources. Clinton and Al Gore were told, “India has a huge plutonium stock and ... we have a huge psychological issue.”

The psychological issue arising out of existential fears could only be addressed with nuclear parity with India. Reflecting the significance of the historically personalized nature of US-Pakistan bilateral relations, Waheed quoted “my American friend”, Commander US Central Command General Joseph Hoar as saying that during his visit to India:

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104 Ibid.
105 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
....the incumbent Indian army chief pointed to a ceremonial board bearing names of successive Indian army chiefs saying 'soon this will be the only board for the sub-continent.' {Hoar} said he got worried and sent a message to the State Department. 106

According to Waheed, “this is when I made up my mind that Pakistan must attain nuclear weapons.”107 His words symbolize the dynamics of the security dilemma in which the adversaries are inclined to anticipate worst case scenarios. In the end, then, the American pressure proved insufficient to prevent Islamabad from responding to Indian nuclear tests, demonstrating Islamabad’s irresolvable uncertainty regarding Indian intentions that according to Booth and Wheeler is at the heart of the security dilemma.108

While pursuing nuclear weapons capability many in the military establishment mistrusted not only external powers but also domestic politicians. It was therefore not surprising that Benazir’s efforts to intervene in the army’s nuclear domain were not seen kindly by certain military policy-makers. Hamid Gul justified ISI’s manipulation of the domestic political process through formation of the IJI to prevent Benazir’s re-election because “we had to block the American agenda.”109 Beg endorsed his view by adding that “both the ISI ’purges’ took place during her tenures. She was obviously furthering US interests.”110 Waheed however disagreed, “we had no problems with her. She was very supportive.”111 It is possible that both perspectives are correct. In her first term (1989-1991) Benazir tried to take control of the foreign policy and the nuclear program. Waheed served as the army Chief during her second term (1993-1996) when she was more amenable to appeasing the army to stay in power.112 Waheed was more suspicious of the Americans and was convinced that the US was ready to employ

106 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
107 Ibid.
109 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
110 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
111 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
112 Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012).
deceit to unravel Pakistan’s nuclear program. Arguing that Talbott and Lake tried hard to drive a wedge between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the military, Waheed narrated Talbott’s efforts to meet Benazir separately by circumventing military officials during his visit to Pakistan. He recalled that during his 1993 visit to Washington, he was asked to attend an unscheduled meeting with the CIA Director James Woolsey:

{The} CIA Director {and later Tony Lake} tried to goad me into taking over the country! They wanted to inspect our nuclear facilities and the Director kept insisting, ‘Tell us what do you want from us? You should bring a secular government.’ The Americans were trying to bribe me.\(^\text{113}\)

Considering that his late predecessor General Asif Nawaz had also expressed such reservations about the CIA\(^\text{114}\) Waheed’s words cannot be dismissed lightly given historical US comfort in dealing with military dictators. Moreover, considering that it was the State Department that was conducting the dialogue with Pakistan’s civil-military leadership regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program it is revealing that Waheed was asked to attend an unplanned meeting with the CIA chief. This demonstrates that American security interests trumped Clinton’s professed support for democracy enlargement in the case of Pakistan.

Waheed’s mistrust of Clinton’s team was shared by the political leadership. For example, Benazir’s foreign minister Assef Ali narrated Talbott’s secret efforts to manipulate Pakistan and China separately. In a meeting in New York in 1996, Talbot asked him to confirm that China had indeed supplied M-11 missile launchers, and “we will take you off the {Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)} sanctions list unilaterally.” When Assef shared the offer with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, he confirmed that Talbott had made a similar offer to him that "if China confesses, [MTCR} sanctions will be lifted against China!"\(^\text{115}\) Strobe Talbott, however, does not mention either of the above interactions in his book in which he is none too happy with Waheed and uses uncomplimentary

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\(^\text{113}\) Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
\(^\text{114}\) Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, p.452.
\(^\text{115}\) Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
words for Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed and other Pakistani interlocutors. His irritation manifests a hidden resentment emerging from Waheed’s refusal to give in. Demonstrating his bias against the Pakistani nationalist sentiment Talbott’s frustration derives from a small Third World country’s defiance of the “benevolent hegemon.”

Upon completion of Waheed’s three year tenure in 1996 General Jahangir Karamat was appointed the new COAS by President Farooq Leghari in keeping with his constitutional powers. Karamat was just as adamant as his predecessor in his pursuit of nuclear weapons. After the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 he maintained that the incumbent Indian right-wing government of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was anti-Muslim and that the Indian nuclear tests were the first logical step in its strategy “to intimidate Pakistan into solving the Kashmir problem once and for all” by forcing it to give up all claims to the disputed territory. In view of its economic problems Pakistan could ill afford to lose American aid, yet, once India went nuclear, Riedel maintains, Nawaz Sharif refused to cooperate despite “promises of enormous U.S. aid.” Thus, the fear of more sanctions was not enough to modify Pakistani behavior. Clearly, in the minds of the military decision-makers nuclear deterrence was synonymous with Pakistan’s survival. India was a huge threat that justified the beg-steal-borrow-policy. This was how “we played our little double-game”, boasted Hamid Gul. Clandestine activities were employed on “all is fair in love and war” logic and so “we rose to the occasion” argued Ehsan-ul-Haq. He maintained that Pakistan had an adequate “scientific base” and “infrastructure” and Chinese technical help was sought only in case of a bottleneck. He denied Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s involvement in extensive proliferation, saying, “Only some key components may

\[116\] Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India*, p.105- The only Pakistani he admires is Riaz Mohammad Khan, a career diplomat married to a former State Department official.
\[119\] Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
\[120\] Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House”, p.6.
\[121\] Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
have come from abroad—we were way beyond the expected nuclear threshold of technology.”

Beg maintained that:

Stuff was available in the nuclear black market... that is where they {the American intelligence} took A Q Khan’s pictures with other buyers who had come for the same purpose.

Musharraf had a different point of view of Khan’s “shady deals” whose organization was given a free hand by successive civilian governments because of his contribution to the nuclear program, although “he was just a metallurgist lacking sophisticated knowledge of the process.” Claiming that “Khan took independent decisions ...no evidence was ever found” of government involvement Musharraf lamented "he is our national hero but he is a liar and a cheat.”

Musharraf’s perspective which shifts the entire blame to Khan and the civilian leadership is not convincing considering the military’s control of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Waheed was more forthcoming “sure he was a shady character who ate money {sic}... he got the job done, didn’t he?”

It is clear that Khan played a major role in acquiring nuclear technology and components for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missiles. Pakistan was determined to protect its program as the only force multiplier against India. This explains Khan’s transfer of technology to third parties, such as Iran, Libya and North Korea, in return for missile technology or financial gains for an economically weak Pakistan.

Feroz Hassan identifies three common themes among nuclear aspirants: national humiliation, international isolation, and national identity.

For Pakistani civil- military leadership, surrendering to India and the creation of

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122 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
123 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
124 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
125 Interview with Abdul Waheed (20 July 2011).
Bangladesh in 1971 was the watershed both in terms of lowered national morale and enhanced security fears. International isolation in the 1990s flowing from disparity in US-Pakistan security goals accelerated the process. The national consensus developed and solidified because of the regional security dilemma and became a “symbol of national determination.”\textsuperscript{129} The Clinton administration, however, lacked the required level of strategic interest to understand such psychological nuances of Pakistan’s choice of nuclear weapons as its primary coping mechanism. Moreover, discontinuation of US military aid and training programs for the Pakistani officers, as required by the Pressler Amendment, contributed to reduced US influence and the Pakistani officers’ exposure to the US strategic thinking and values.\textsuperscript{130} Thus, the US approach inadvertently contributed to Islamabad’s threat perception; this along with diminished US leverage explains Pakistan’s non-compliance with Clinton’s goal of non-proliferation. So far this section has examined two coping strategies i.e. market diversification and attainment of nuclear capability. The following sub-section investigates Islamabad’s third coping strategy i.e. bolstering proxies in Afghanistan and Indian Kashmir.

**Supporting proxies in Afghanistan**

Peace in neighboring Afghanistan was imperative for Islamabad for security and economic reasons. According to Weinbaum the Pakistani leadership wanted Afghanistan to avoid civil strife and focus on state-building so Pakistan could unburden itself of the refugees and the related law and order issues such as narcotics and weapons smuggling.\textsuperscript{131} As the Afghan power struggle continued Pakistan was “sucked into the unfolding events in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{132} “The question was what kind of instruments were available to us to stabilize Afghanistan?” argued Riffat Hussain. Pakistan could not rebuild Afghanistan economically and as Musharraf argued, “The US had no Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, the

\textsuperscript{129} Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass*, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{130} Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States*, p.64.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Zahid Hussain (20 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
UN could not be effective unless key members, especially the US, “supported its efforts with funds and peace-keepers.”

This was difficult to accomplish due to lack of US strategic interest as well as post-Cold War Congressional vocal opposition to American financial and manpower support to the UN. Clearly, the economic dimension was beyond the scope of Pakistan’s resources.

From the security angle however it was possible for Islamabad to utilize the Pakistan-Afghanistan porous and (post-Soviet-Afghan war) soft border to look for strategic depth in Afghanistan by first supporting the Pashtun Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami faction and then the Taliban movement as their proxy in Afghanistan.

Asad Durrani denied that Hekmatyar was bolstered as a favorite by the ISI, attributing his popularity to his leadership qualities. His fighters were loyal to him because even during the Afghan-Soviet confrontation “he spent foreign aid on his outfit’s training and needs, unlike other Mujahedeen commanders.” That Pakistan was backing the Hekmatyar faction was, however, confirmed by Hamid Gul, who was Director General ISI between 1987 and 1989. The ISI, according to Weinbaum, gave up on Hekmatyar after his forces failed to dislodge the Rabbani government in Kabul. In view of the ISI’s support for his rival Hekmatyar, argued Seth Jones, President Rabbani turned to India. This in turn exacerbated Pakistan’s security fears. According to Ahmed Rashid—whose relevant narrative has received wide coverage—the ISI bolstered the Taliban with recruits from madrassahs and refugee camps in Pakistan with financial assistance from private religious groups and political parties such as the Jamiat-e-Ulma-e-Islam (JUI). Rashid is criticized by Pakistani civilian academics and military elite for

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134 Interview with Karl Inderfurth (2 February 2012).
136 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, pp.320-330.
137 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012); Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011)
138 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012)
139 Interview with Hamid Gul (13 July 2011)
140 Interview with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012)
141 Interview with Seth Jones (15 February 2012); Seth G Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, pp. 41-52.
142 Ahmed Rashid Taliban, pp.18-80
writing for a western audience\textsuperscript{143} while a US diplomatic cable describes him as having a “conspiratorial” disposition.\textsuperscript{144} Former ISI chief Javed Ashraf Qazi was contemptuous of Rashid’s assessment emphasizing his lack of factual information.

The Taliban leaders Mullah Rabbani and Mullah Ghaus visited Islamabad around 1994-95 asking us to remain neutral and not support any faction against them. Other than that they requested neither weapons nor manpower...they had plenty of both... the JUI’s head Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman came to my office twice begging me to introduce him to them. Until then the Taliban leaders had never heard of him... Ahmed Rashid sat in the lap of \textauuml;anti-Taliban Ahmed Shah Masood and sold his country for a few bucks!\textsuperscript{145}

Different perspectives on ISI’s role in the rise of the Taliban (also discussed in the previous chapter) demonstrate the murkiness of the situation in Afghanistan which could be interpreted differently by different actors for personal or institutional reasons. It also shows the likelihood of hindsight influencing the decision-makers’perspective of the events. The same ambiguity marks the perception of Islamabad’s goal of attaining strategic depth in Afghanistan.

\textbf{Aslam Beg had begun to propound his philosophy of strategic depth around the same time as he prescribed “strategic defiance” against the US in the first Gulf War and “till the end of his term was discussing collaboration with Iran’s visiting delegations.”\textsuperscript{146} The idea, according to Ashraf Qazi, was that by “tying-up with Afghanistan” Pakistani military forces could retreat into Afghan territory and operate from there to offset geographical disadvantage in case of war with India.\textsuperscript{147} It was a flawed idea argues Shuja Nawaz, because:

\textsuperscript{143} Interviews with Dr. Tahir Amin (12 July 2011), Ambassador Iftikhar Mushshed (12 August 2011), Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011) and Lt General Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{144} US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. ISLAMA05010 (July 1 1998)
\textsuperscript{146} Interviews with Dr. Tahir Amin (12 July 2011), Ambassador Iftikhar Mushshed (12 August 2011), Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi (17 August 2011) and Lt General Hamid Gul (13 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{147} Javed Qazi quoted in Shuja Nawaz, \textit{Crossed Swords}, p.440
.... allowing India to capture key Pakistani cities and then retreat into Afghanistan or eastern Iran ...ran counter to every policy of Pakistani government’s war directive, which insisted that the army defend every inch of the border. {It would mean} “Game Over” for Pakistan. 148

To this, former governor of the frontier province Ali Jan Aurakzai added:

There was no question of ceding territory; this has never been our strategy... this is not our training. It is an absurd idea that should not have been propagated. It sowed doubts in the fiercely independent Afghan mind to our discredit....

Aurakzai, who hails from FATA, recounted what an Afghan leader said to him during his 2006 official visit to Kabul:

What do you mean by strategic depth? We are not your fifth province; we are older than you. The independent state of Afghanistan came into being more than 200 years ago. 149

The Afghan angst depicts the prevalence of this idea and its negative connotations for Pakistan; it also demonstrates the intense US media attention it has received post 9/11. Thus Ehsan-ul-Haq maintained

This concept has been abused. No country wants a two front war. We seek security on our border with Afghanistan but this does not mean that the Pakistan military wants to occupy Afghanistan. 150

Beg’s own explanation was:

148 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, p.419.
149 Interview with Ali Jan Aurakzai (4 August 2011).
150 Interview with Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011).
Conditions were ripe for Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{151} to create a joint security organization. I was seeking the depth of relations. It was an abstract idea. I was not seeking physical depth. It is preposterous to think I did.\textsuperscript{152}

Considering the fact that Beg contradicted himself on other issues, such as the nuclear cold tests as noted in the following sub-section, it is likely that his explanation was suffused with hindsight. However, it must be pointed out that the military was aware of the problems associated with the occupation of Afghan territory even if "the army high command, being a disciplined lot, did not challenge its Chief."\textsuperscript{153} Strategically it was not possible for Pakistan to hold Afghan territory. As Durrani delineated:

\begin{quote}
We may see Afghanistan in terms of forward depth, buffer zone, strategic depth or maybe also relief zone... there are many examples in military history where neighboring territory was used for such purposes during war... but if anyone ever believed we would occupy Afghan territory then he has no idea about Afghan history and culture of fierce independence.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

Clearly, vacating mainland Pakistan to take advantage of strategic depth in Afghanistan went against the very grain of operational strategy, training and the military’s strategic mindset. Abdicating Pakistani territory to the Indian forces and retreat into Afghanistan to regroup may sound like a practical military tactic but this could not be an easy idea to sell to the army rank and file who perceive Pakistan-India hostility within the David and Goliath paradigm.

Some US and Pakistani political and defense commentators ascribe a territorial dimension to the concept. For instance, Khalilzad and Byman view it as a

\textsuperscript{151}“In Pakistan there was democracy after eleven years; Iran-Iraq war was over and the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan.” Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{152}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153}Shuja Nawaz, \textit{Crossed Swords}, p.419.
\textsuperscript{154}Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
viable military option with ideological pan-Islamic and territorial angles. \(^{155}\) Endorsing this line of argument Pakistani defense analyst Talat Masood, argued that the military rethought the policy after it was discredited, \(^{156}\) while Riffat Hussain posited that “back in the early 1990s it had a territorial dimension to it.”

Pakistan’s geographical dispersal is very limited. If Afghanistan is secured it could be used {not only for troops but for} weapons storage, as well. It was sub-imperial thinking towards Afghanistan, seeing it as our province, which was at the heart of this idea. \(^{157}\)

Siddiqa endorsed their views referring to the “military’s grandiose vision.”\(^ {158}\) It is revealing that during the 1990s the military’s war gaming in the National Defense College revolved around proxy warfare in Kashmir and strategic depth in Afghanistan. \(^ {159}\) This lends credibility to the argument about the territorial dimension—stationing troops and storing weapons—yet the competing premises as discussed above have valid points. Clearly, the concept is not as straightforward as either camp would like it to be.

To sum up, a friendly government in a stable and independent Afghanistan through the proxy strategy provided a psychological as well as strategic advantage against India. Above all proxies in the west helped ISI’s strategy of training, arming and facilitating infiltrators into Indian Kashmir as discussed in the previous chapter. This served as part of the coping mechanism.

**Supporting the Kashmir insurgency**

As noted previously there is evidence that Pakistan in early 1990s began manipulating an indigenous uprising against the Indian government in Kashmir into a struggle for self-determination. It is likely that Pakistan saw a reflection of the anti-Pakistan developments in East Pakistan in 1971 with active Indian support, and considered it an opportunity to settle scores with India. Primarily

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\(^{156}\) Interview with Talat Masood (6 September 2011).

\(^{157}\) Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).

\(^{158}\) Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).

\(^{159}\) Interview with a Pakistani official G.
however, in view of US sanctions, the strategy was cost-effective and was implemented without committing Pakistan military troops and also prevented military casualties. Referring to the military standoff in 1990 Beg argued, “we were eyeball to eyeball with the Indians on the Line of Control….of course we were going to get embroiled.”\textsuperscript{160} Musharraf and former ISI chief Ehsan-ul-Haq maintained that this was not so much a military strategy as the fact that “many private groups had sprung up” in Pakistan in support of the Kashmiri indigenous uprising in 1989. Ehsan explained that “there was a huge Kashmiri diaspora in Pakistan which had taken part in Afghan Jihad and now wanted to join the fighters in Indian Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{161} US diplomat Alexander Evans corroborates Durrani and Musharraf’s version to some extent arguing that “in 1988, the ISI was surprised at the scale of response by Kashmiris.”\textsuperscript{162}

To drain Indian military resources and force them to reduce their troops on the Pakistani border, argues Coll, Kashmiri and Arab recruits received training in ISI camps with the support from Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami.”\textsuperscript{163} Coll’s premise is confirmed by a Pakistani source:

\begin{quote}
We learnt the power of asymmetrical warfare {during the Afghan-Soviet conflict} where the human himself becomes the weapon…and we used it in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Another source elaborated:

\begin{quote}
We used Kashmiri mujahedeen and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) recruits…. the ISI briefed and trained them in camps established in Azad Kashmir. There was motivation in madrassahs {to fight in Kashmir} but not training. Under the US pressure the camps in Azad Kashmir were closed down.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{160} Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
\textsuperscript{161} Interviews with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012) and Ehsan-ul-Haq (7 July 2011)
\textsuperscript{162} Alexander Evans, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture & U.S-Pakistan Relations”.
\textsuperscript{163} Interview with US Officials in Steve Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{164} Interview with Pakistani official D.
However, this was eyewash since these were shifted to Fata.165

Jamaat-i-Islami leader Siraj-ul-Haq did not deny helping the cause while arguing, “Kashmir is part of Pakistan and it is our moral duty to actively support the Kashmiri (right of) self-determination.”166 Musharraf insisted that the Taliban-Kashmiri nexus came about only after 9/11167 whereas Levy and Scott-Clark argue that Musharraf planned the operation as Director General Military Operations (DGMO) in early 1990s.168 Certain knowledgeable interviewees also confirmed that the ISI redirected the Afghan resources to Kashmir in the early to mid-1990s; this puts a question mark on Musharraf’s assertion.169 It is revealing that Jehangir Karamat as General Beg’s DGMO in 1989 was tasked to create an impression for Indian consumption “through carefully orchestrated” war games that “the victorious fighters from Afghanistan would be organized into Pakistan-officered brigades and used in Kashmir.” 170 This shows that the military was contemplating such an action in early 1990s.

US primary records from 1989 to 1994 suggest that some elements of the ISI and private extremist groups actively supported Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), a Kashmiri militant group with links to Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami religious political parties. However, “hard evidence” of state involvement “was lacking,” although private anti-Indian groups were “free to raise funds and find recruits in Pakistan.”171 US intelligence reports quote Yusufzai as confirming that Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Taliban-controlled Jalalabad172 and that the ISI supported the Taliban primarily because it allowed the HUA training camps to function in their area.173 Thus, as noted in the previous chapter, it is probable that there was a link

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165 Interview with Pakistani official E.
166 Interview with Siraj-ul-Haq (19 October 2011).
167 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012)
168 Adrian Levy and Catherine-Scott-Clark, Deception, p.398.
169 Interview with Pakistani officials B & C.
173 US Embassy Cable Islamabad, No. ISLAMA05010( July 1,1998), Ibid
between Bin Laden, ISI, the Taliban and the Kashmiri militant group HUA as established by the US.\textsuperscript{174} After all, as Siraj pointed out, self-determination of the Kashmiris was as just a cause for Pakistan as the Afghan struggle against the Soviet Union was for the US.\textsuperscript{175} So much so that Nawaz Sharif’s government, as claimed by senior politician Afrasyab Khattak, was overthrown in 1999 by Musharraf because Sharif had promised to deliver Bin Laden to Clinton during the Blair House meeting.\textsuperscript{176}

According to Ayesha Siddiqa, because the civilians may have differed with the military's discourse, “a new intermediary”—the militant—was brought in who agreed with the military’s ideological nationalist narrative.”\textsuperscript{177} Shuja Nawaz offered a less conspiratorial explanation, ”The ISI preferred the radicals because they were cost effective and their ideological fervor was operationally useful.”\textsuperscript{178} Shuja has a point. A conventional conflict was outside the economic and operational prowess of the military. The anti-Soviet Mujahedeen which included Afghan, Arab and Kashmiri fighters, on the other hand, were battle hardened; the strategy being covert provided the ISI with impunity and anonymity.

The strategy in Kashmir served the purpose of maintaining regional balance of power in two ways: The use of proxies for low-intensity conflict tied down sizeable Indian forces in Kashmir\textsuperscript{179} thus “bleeding India”\textsuperscript{180} and minimizing chances of sparing reserve forces to encircle Pakistan. While keeping the Kashmir dispute alive internationally the strategy denied India the time and resources for influencing developments in Afghanistan. Finally, by keeping both borders relatively secure military leadership could concentrate on the development of

\textsuperscript{174} US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. ISLAMA01054(February 6, 1997), Ibid
\textsuperscript{175} Interview with Siraj-ul Haq, (19 October 2011); and Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p. 322-23
\textsuperscript{176} Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011)
\textsuperscript{177} Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011)
\textsuperscript{178} Interview with Shuja Nawaz (19 January 2012)
\textsuperscript{180} Interview with Admiral Fasih Bokhari(15 July 2011)
nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s attainment of nuclear status changed the regional context; Islamabad thus supported its proxies with renewed confidence.\textsuperscript{181}

So far this section has discussed military options—market diversification; attainment of nuclear weapons and supporting proxies— as part of Pakistan’s response to offset Clinton’s foreign policy implications. The following sub-section examines relevant diplomatic efforts as part of the coping mechanism.

**Diplomatic efforts**

Major diplomatic efforts during the 1990s were geared towards circumventing the Pressler Amendment to release F-16s or get reimbursement, selling the Taliban to the US, safeguarding the nuclear program and defusing tensions in Kargil. All these issues were security related and important to the military policy-makers. Throughout the 1990s Pakistani diplomats, such as Sahibzada Yaqub Ali, Akram Zaki, Aziz Khan, Iftikhar Murshed, Maleeha Lodhi, Riaz Khokhar, Shahryar Khan and Najmuddin Sheikh, remained involved with the developments in Pakistan’s neighborhood. While Sharif assisted the military in negotiating with the Mujahedeen commanders to formulate the Afghan interim government, Benazir’s foreign minister Sardar Assef Ali searched for regional solutions to the Afghan problem. Benazir also reached out to Iran. Initially this was supported by the ISI as confirmed by Durrani.\textsuperscript{182} Beg’s overtures to Tehran in 1989-1991 may be seen in the same context. However, 1994 onwards in view of the Benazir-ISI support for the anti-Shia Taliban movement there was a “hardening” of Iranian position that perceived it as tacit US support for the Taliban.\textsuperscript{183}

Durrani confirmed that Assef Ali visited Rome to convince ex-Afghan monarch Zahir Shah to return to Afghanistan to unify the country since he was largely acceptable to all factions.\textsuperscript{184} Assef Ali maintained that even the Taliban

\textsuperscript{181} US Embassy Islamabad Cable, No. ISLAMA 05010(July 1,1998); the strategy became less effective by 1999-2000 in view of Indian military and politica;l efforts and rivalry between Kashmiri groups. For overall analysis see Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay”, *International Security*, 21:2 (Fall 1999),pp 76-107.  
\textsuperscript{182} Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012)  
\textsuperscript{184} Loya Jirga or a council of the elders in keeping with the Afghan tribal culture could bring all factions to the negotiating table.
supported this effort but the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Saudi Intelligence chief Turki Al Faisal refused to get involved because of Zahir Shah’s closeness to Iran. Clearly, the plan also did not work because “the ISI was not happy in view of Zahir Shah’s anti-Pakistan stance on Pashtunistan in the past although the PM and the President supported the plan.” Explaining his approach to US-Pakistan relations during his tenure Assef Ali maintained that:

{Pakistan’s US policy} was not a policy; it was a grievance.
We had to create an environment for a multidimensional policy where we could have many points of contact. And {for this} Benazir’s persona was a great asset.

The strategy, Ali argued, was to engage the US administration in dialogue while reaching out to the US public, the Congress and the State Department, through media and personal contacts such as Hank Brown, Bob Oakley and Robert Hathaway. In her first official visit to Washington in 1989 Benazir addressed the Congress and received massive support in the US especially due to her image of a democracy loving politician who had defied the dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq. The efforts, according to Ali, yielded results with the passage of the Brown Amendment that allowed a onetime waiver on military supplies to Pakistan although it was not applicable to F-16s.185

In her second term, Benazir tried to tap commonality of US-Pakistan economic interests in the trans-Afghan gas and oil pipeline. This was seen by the American diplomats as trying “to bring potentially helpful actors onto the Afghan stage.”186 It was in keeping with the military’s threat perception that the issues of the nuclear weapons and Kashmir were linked. During her official visit to Washington in 1995 Benazir argued that Kashmir had retarded progress on nuclear and missile programs.187 During her first term she agreed with George H. W. Bush’s plan of freezing uranium enrichment in return for the release of

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185 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011)
economic aid and, as noted in Chapter 3, was motivated by the Americans to bring
the nuclear program under her control.\textsuperscript{188} She also reached out to India, inviting
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan and holding talks with him. Against the
military’s wishes she wanted to cooperate with India in resolving the Siachen
dispute.\textsuperscript{189} The Bombay bombings in 1993 undermined such efforts as India
blamed the ISI.\textsuperscript{190} Her efforts at independence added to her unpopularity with the
military establishment which—along with allegations of corruption and
administrative mismanagement—contributed to her government’s dismissal.\textsuperscript{191}

The Brown Amendment in 1995 reopened the possibility of renewal of
economic aid, but it ran aground with increasing US concern for Pakistan’s M-11
missile equipment imports from China.\textsuperscript{192} The non-delivery of F-16s remained a
major bone of contention for the better part of Clinton’s second term. The money
was reimbursed after Pakistani diplomatic offensive under Riaz Khokhar during
Nawaz Sharif’s second term (1997-1999). The initiative threatened to seek
recourse with the US judicial system against the American government and
induced “Madeleine Albright to make a rare call to me. Mostly, it was her junior
Tom Pickering who dealt with us,” recalled Khokhar. Low level of American
attention can be attributed to the fact that Islamabad was not an attractive
economic choice; throughout the late 1990s Khokhar was dealing with Pakistan’s
military specific cases i.e. reimbursement for F-16s, nuclear tests, Kargil and the
Taliban-Bin Laden connection.\textsuperscript{193}

Between 1989 and 1991 Benazir and Nawaz Sharif denied at public fora
that Pakistan wanted to go nuclear or was supplying nuclear technology to third
parties and argued that Pakistan was willing to accept inspections of its nuclear

\textsuperscript{188} Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception, pp. 190-191; interviews with Aslam Beg (2
July 2011) and Hamid Gul (13 July 2011)
\textsuperscript{189} For Siachen Dispute see Chapter 2
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, p 190
\textsuperscript{192} Financial Times (August 27, 1993) p. 4; Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011); See also
http://rooms2.library.le.ac.uk/rooms/portal/page/21905_U_S_Archive accessed 7 January 2012
\textsuperscript{193} Interview with Riaz Khokhar (28 July 2011).
facilities and international safeguards if non-discriminatory. This approach was in keeping with the military’s efforts to circumvent the Pressler Amendment and reopen US aid channels. By 1992 there emerged a few statements from Pakistani officials, such as foreign secretary Shahryar Khan, who spoke of Pakistan’s advanced capability. This coincided with General Beg and Abdul Qadeer Khan’s contradictory statements on Pakistan’s cold tests in 1987 and its advanced stage of nuclear technology. Beg later denied giving the statement saying, “there is no such thing as a cold-test.” Khan supported his stance. The synchronization between statements shows the military’s guidelines to the foreign office aimed at eliciting the US attention possibly to strike a bargain. These were also for Indian consumption as throughout the 1990s the two states continued to engage in allegations and counter-allegations over Kashmir, Afghanistan and respective military build-up. It is noticeable that in the 2011 interview for this thesis, Beg admitted that Pakistan had indeed conducted nuclear cold tests in 1987.

As noted in chapter 3 Nawaz Sharif proposed the creation of a nuclear free zone in South Asia. The proposal coincided with a Pakistani delegation’s visit to Washington DC to debate the halt of American aid. Therefore it is likely that Sharif’s proposal was in keeping with the military agenda to dispel American doubts on Pakistan’s nuclear intent to facilitate aid resumption. Rejecting the proposal as a ploy for aid resumption, the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, refused to participate in “an arrangement in which no one knows what the other

199 Interview with Aslam Beg (2 July 2011).
200 His regional regime for South Asia included Pakistan, India, China, the US, and the CARs to be sponsored by the US, USSR and China.
country is going to do in spite of the agreement.”

Sharif, however, did succeed in inviting Rao’s successor Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pakistan in his second term. By inviting Vajpayee to Pakistan and signing the Lahore Declaration with him in January 1999, Sharif appeared to be on the road to improved trade relations with India after the 1998 nuclear tests.

Afrasyab Khattak maintained that the military was not ready to trust the Nawaz-Vajpayee talks. General Musharraf denied the charge, arguing that “the military did not oppose Sharif’s overtures to India. “But we wanted him to make sure that Kashmir remains the central focus of his talks with Vajpayee.” The fact that the joint Lahore Declaration does not highlight Kashmir as the central issue clearly shows that Sharif had acted in opposition to the military’s perspective. Sharif’s position was further undermined when he visited Washington to request Clinton’s help in defusing the Kargil crisis in July 1999. Musharraf maintained “I told him he can take whatever political decision he may think appropriate.” Conversely, Fasih Bokhari, who as the incumbent Navy Chief was present during high level meetings on Kargil, identified clear lines of disagreement between Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif regarding “the purely military Kargil adventure” which Musharraf could not justify in terms of any political purpose.

As noted earlier Khattak was of the view that Sharif was ousted for making a deal with Clinton in the Blair House meeting to force Taliban to extradite Bin Laden if Clinton could help him in dealing with his military. Khattak supported his premise by arguing that “The corps commanders who assisted Musharraf’s coup—Generals Mahmud, Aziz and Usmani—were known Taliban and Bin Laden sympathizers.” The reason was that HUA camps were being run in the Taliban controlled areas and it was strategically important to keep the Taliban regime “on

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204 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October).

205 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).


207 Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).

208 Interview with Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011).
In his memoir Clinton does not mention the deal—if indeed there was one—but does confirm Sharif’s fears of a possible military take-over. Khattak’s views are reflective of Pakistan’s murky political scene and the complexities of civil-military relations.

Diplomatic efforts by the Sharif government to formulate Afghan interim setup have been discussed in Chapter 3. Assef Ali, ostensibly to distance Benazir’s government from the Taliban phenomenon, pointed out: “Remember we never recognized the Taliban {in 1996} nor asked others to do so.” However, it was Benazir’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar who had initially supported the Taliban movement so as to gain access to CARs. Benazir had earlier recommended US diplomatic presence in Afghanistan after Kandahar and Jalalabad were secure under the Taliban, urging an active US role in stabilizing the region. This was part of her administration’s efforts to normalize relations with the US in order to minimize the impact of the Pressler legislation. However, Ali’s premise is correct in that the Taliban regime was recognized during the Nawaz Sharif administration.

The Taliban victory in Mazar-i-Sharif effectively put it in control of 85 percent of Afghanistan; Pakistan was the first country to recognize it on 25 May 1997 followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Sarwar Naqvi confirmed that the foreign office had recommended against recognizing the Taliban regime during the Nawaz Sharif tenure. “The Taliban is isolated, we said, and will be seen as our surrogate. But foreign minister Gohar Ayub was summoned to the Prime Minister House and two hours later Pakistan recognized the Taliban.” A Pakistani official, as noted in Chapter 4, maintained that the recognition came about under US pressure. At the same time, Gohar Ayub Khan, recalls that the ISI chief Lt General

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209 Interview with Afrasyab Khattak (18 October 2011).
212 Interview with Assef Ali (19 September 2011).
213 Interviews with Marvin Weinbaum (2 February 2012), Fasih Bokhari (15 July 2011); also Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, pp. 17-30.
215 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
Naseem Rana was "breathing down" our necks to announce recognition.\(^{216}\) Apparently the ISI was not averse to following the American instruction—if indeed there was one. Clearly, the recognition of the Taliban regime had more to do with the military’s decision rather than any democratic process involving the parliament. As Musharraf, reflecting the military’s preference, stated, “I told Bill Clinton {during his visit to Pakistan} that the only way to curb Taliban extremism is to recognize them.”\(^{217}\)

There is evidence that the military was interested in selling the Taliban to the US. From 1997 to 2000 the US expected Pakistan to use its leverage with the Taliban to have Bin Laden expelled. In this regard Assistant Secretary Karl Inderfurth, UN Permanent Representative Bill Richardson and Ambassador William Milam remained engaged with the Taliban with the assistance of Pakistani diplomats, such as Najmuddin Sheikh, Iftikhar Murshed and Aziz Ahmed.\(^{218}\) Riffat Hussain who served as Press Counselor in the Pakistan embassy in Washington (1994-1997) recalled that Pakistan’s Defense attaché in Washington, Brigadier Javed Hassan, acting on behalf of the military establishment, facilitated the Taliban visit to the US and worked for their appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Taliban delegation was invited by Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi for dinner where it privately met with members of the Senate Committee such as Hank Brown and Robert Hathaway. This delegation consisted of most of the members of the future Taliban Council minus Mullah Omar. Our effort was to take the Taliban out of isolation and bring it into the mainstream diplomatically.\(^{219}\)

The time-period, as confirmed by Hussain, coincides with Benazir’s second term in office (1993-1996). Hence, this contradicts Assef Ali’s assumption that Benazir was not furthering the military’s Taliban agenda. The foreign office, despite its own stance on issues, was influenced by the military establishment. The military’s

\(^{217}\) Interview with Pervez Musharraf (16 July 2012).
\(^{218}\) Interview with Iftikhar Murshed (12 August 2011).
\(^{219}\) Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
dominance of the diplomacy pertaining to the Taliban-US narrative can be adjudged from an official’s assertion that:

The military drove nuclear and Afghan policies....Most of the noting that (Ambassador) Maleeha Lodhi did for the foreign office was going first to GHQ (General Headquarters of the Pakistan army in Rawalpindi)...the military was happy with her because she shared everything with them.220

In early 2000, Hussain recalled, there was a conference in Islamabad where Pakistani envoys expressed their “deep disappointment with the Taliban for not listening to the concerns of Pakistan and through Pakistan that of the international community.” But the military and the ISI insisted that the Taliban had grown too independent in its decision-making regarding American concerns and demands.221 Siddiqa argued that Islamabad had a great deal of leverage since land-locked Afghanistan is dependent on Pakistan for trade and supplies.222 While crediting Siddiqa and Hussain with some insight in view of Durrani’s premise that “we were the only one with clout in Afghanistan”,223 reality cannot be understood in binary terms. The Taliban was dependent on Pakistan for trade, fuel and cash, hence clearly there was a level of ISI leverage; conversely, the Taliban leadership could be intransigent as confirmed by those in direct contact—such as Murshed and Yusufzai.

That Pakistani diplomatic efforts deriving primarily from the military’s strategic compulsions did not make Clinton happy was apparent in his 2000 visit to Islamabad. “During his stop-over” recalled diplomat Sarwar Naqvi (who was part of the reception committee):

Clinton did not shake hands with Musharraf... I had met him in Washington and knew him to be a voluble and friendly

220 Interview with a former government official F.
221 Interview with Riffat Hussain (7 August 2011).
222 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa (19 July 2011).
223 Interview with Asad Durrani (24 April 2012).
person but here he was “dheema” (pensive) and his conversation was “wajibi” (restrained).224

Clearly, Islamabad’s coping mechanism comprised strategies that were at variance with the Clinton administration’s security goals of nuclear non-proliferation and curtailment of terrorism.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on the Troikas’ response to Clinton’s foreign policy as Pakistani civil-military leadership tried to look for workable coping strategies. These included market diversification and acquisition of nuclear weapons as force equalizer; this, to a large extent, allowed Pakistan to cope with the negative implications of US sanctions for its military capability; it thus allowed the military to continue its regional security competition with India.

PFP goals of supporting proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir were perceived by the civil-military elite as strategically viable and economically cost-effective coping options. The strategy in Kashmir served the purpose of maintaining the regional balance by indirectly engaging sizeable Indian forces while minimizing chances of Indian encirclement of Pakistan. By bolstering the Taliban regime Islamabad denied India the space to influence developments in Afghanistan or Fata. By keeping both borders relatively secure the military leadership concentrated on the development of nuclear weapons.

Civilian diplomatic efforts were also undertaken as part of PFP by the civilian governments giving the process of policy-making a semblance of democracy. However, in practice such efforts were largely aimed at furthering the military’s security objectives. Overall, the military establishment retained its control of Pakistan’s foreign policy and continued its pursuit of regional goals that were largely at variance with Clinton’s foreign policy agenda. In keeping with the Cold War mindset the Pakistani elite perceived the American approach from both pragmatic and romanticized dimensions. That said, the Pakistani coping strategies drew upon a pragmatic approach towards the

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224 Interview with Sarwar Naqvi (12 October 2011).
implications of Clinton's foreign policy. The Pakistani response to Clinton's approach is thus explainable in terms of increased security dilemma and reduced American leverage.
Conclusion

The primary goal of this study has been to examine the role of the United States in the evolution of PFP’s strategic objectives between 1989 and 2001. By doing this it has answered the primary question formulated at the beginning of this study: To what extent did Clinton’s foreign policy impact Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s? In answering this primary question, and a raft of secondary questions outlined in Chapter 1, this thesis has examined the assumptions underlying the hypothesis that Clinton’s foreign policy created space for Pakistan’s military establishment to further its regional goals while impeding the global objectives of the United States.

As noted in the Introduction, Clinton’s eight years as the first post-Cold War president in the decade of the 1990s is the focal point of this research because of the implications of his foreign policy approach towards Pakistan. Other than the fact that Clinton’s presidency dominated the era in terms of historical duration, his administration was relatively free of the constraints of the strategic doctrine of Containment. From the perspective of Pakistan-US relations it meant that Clinton was relatively less obliged to perform a balancing act in American relations with India and Pakistan.

This thesis has argued that the US foreign policy towards Pakistan in the 1990s rested primarily on nuclear non-proliferation and curtailment of terrorism. The securitized approach impacted Pakistan’s India-centric threat perception and added to an increase in strategic uncertainty, leading PFP towards increasing its nuclear and missile capacity, support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and covert operations in Indian Kashmir. The foreign policy hard-line adopted by Bill Clinton perpetuated and reinforced the Bush era catalysts for the bilateral relationship against the backdrop of Clinton’s tilt towards India.

By the end of the 1990s Clinton’s foreign policy had clearly failed to achieve its goals in Pakistan: Islamabad tested nuclear weapons in 1998, actively aided the pro-Pakistan fundamentalist Taliban regime in Kabul and continued to support militancy in Indian Kashmir. In contrast to his professed emphasis on democracy
enlargement Clinton’s securitized approach did not contribute to the empowerment of Pakistan’s civilian institutions throughout the 1990s and instead strengthened the political role of Pakistan’s military establishment; by the end of the decade a military coup dislodged the nascent democratic system in Pakistan.

As discussed in Chapter 2 throughout the Cold War variations in the securitized relationship were the outcome of temporary convergence and divergence between Pakistan's regional goals as opposed to US global objectives. PFP since 1947 has been tightly-focused on Pakistan-India hostility based around territorial integrity which further intensified after the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. However, while Pakistan’s territorial integrity was shaken by its dismemberment in 1971, Islamabad’s close cooperation with Washington in the 1980s enabled it to protect its regional security interests by securing its western border thus enlarging its footprint in Afghanistan and move towards attainment of nuclear weapons capability.

Pakistan’s weak political institutions during the 1960s and 1970s facilitated the emergence of strong military and intelligence structures that became more entrenched in the 1980s as Islamabad became the conduit for US military and financial aid to the Afghan resistance. Accordingly, the financial and operational base of the ISI was substantially increased due to its close cooperation with the CIA. Indeed, contrary to the accepted American and Western version the ISI was part of PFP and not a rogue agency. It learnt the power of asymmetrical warfare through its collaboration with the CIA which provided material and financial resources to train and equip the Afghan resistance in keeping with the policy of Soviet containment. Consequently, by 1990 an important context had evolved within which PFP’s vision and practice of security was driven by three key security concerns: territorial integrity based around security against India through asymmetric, low-intensity conflict; territorial integrity based around influencing developments in Afghanistan through support of proxies and the uninterrupted pursuit of nuclear weapons capability to balance Indian regional power. PFP goals prevented depletion of the military’s conventional resources while maintaining its deterrent posture. Once again ISI was used as PFP tool as it diverted lessons learnt in Afghanistan to Indian Kashmir. Pakistan thus kept applying pressure on India.
without direct confrontation until 1999 much like the US did against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

As discussed in Chapter 3 by 1989 Washington’s security policy shifted from supporting Islamabad to disengagement except for a re-energized scrutiny of Pakistan’s nuclear program. US disengagement from Afghanistan and the Bush administration’s response to PFP’s nuclear weapons goal served as immediate catalysts for the relationship between 1989 and 1992, the years that saw the completion of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its surrogate Najibullah regime in Kabul. Bush’s approach was a continuation of the Cold War securitized relationship. This security-specific pattern of relations continued during the first post-Cold War Clinton presidency. The two terms of the Clinton administration saw a strengthening of a coercive foreign policy towards Pakistan while improving relations with India. Thus, instead of modifying Islamabad’s strategic behaviour Clinton’s approach inadvertently strengthened PFP around its core principles. Clinton’s foreign policy towards Pakistan was a failure as Islamabad adopted and reinforced certain regional strategic choices that were at variance with the global objectives of the US. Pakistan thus continued to demonstrate foreign policy independence throughout the Clinton presidency.

By making nuclear non-proliferation the most important goal of the US security paradigm while employing coercive sanctions, Clinton reinforced immediate catalysts. As examined in Chapter 4 there was an intense scrutiny of Islamabad’s nuclear program in the absence of an effort to understand its India-centric security dilemma; this was accompanied by a tolerant approach towards the Pakistan-Taliban connection, and an inconsistent response towards Islamabad’s support of the Kashmir insurgency. In the case of the Pakistan-Taliban connection the US approach shifted temporarily from geopolitical compulsions to economic considerations but in view of the purely securitized nature of the relationship non-security issues did not attract sustained attention of the Clinton administration. By not engaging the pro-Pakistan Taliban primarily through economic incentives and recognition of its regime that controlled more than 85 percent of Afghanistan the Clinton administration contributed to the hardening of PFP.
Similarly, despite the Clinton administration's adoption of democracy and economics as the bedrock of US foreign policy, US-Pakistan relations remained enmeshed in Cold War patterns thus strengthening the political role of the Pakistani military establishment as examined in Chapter 5. Furthermore, perpetuation of nuclear sanctions encouraged Pakistan to develop indigenous armament industry and in this regard move closer to China in opposition to the US goal of restraining Chinese regional importance. As with any social phenomenon, Clinton's foreign policy conduct was influenced by a number of variables. Clinton's approach towards external security issues, the intellectual inclinations of his foreign policy team and a Republican Congress shaped his Pakistan policy to a large extent as discussed in Chapter 4.

Pakistan's strategic and diplomatic responses—examined in Chapter 5—formed the architecture of a coping mechanism devised primarily by the military with some civilian input to offset the implications of Clinton's approach. The mechanism, aimed at minimizing the effects of nuclear sanctions and the attendant stoppage of military aid, further impeded Clinton's foreign policy goals in a post-Cold War world of emerging transnational threats. The ensuing interaction thus contributed to the entrenchment of PFP's security vision.

A key premise running through this study is that the US has played a role in the evolution of Pakistan's post-Cold War strategic choices. Specifically, the thesis has shown that Clinton's approach towards Pakistan strengthened and reinforced the immediate post-Cold War catalysts for the bilateral relationship. The role played by the US has been demonstrated in its approach to Pakistan's nuclear program during and after the Cold War. Nonproliferation represents status-quo which was deemed important for the maintenance of American power by stemming the rise of new nuclear powers. The US fear of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands was also a reflection of the American security dilemma. The emerging threat from non-state, transnational actors was amorphous and thus a source of deep mistrust. The Clinton administration's apparent inability to discern how US actions affected Pakistani policy-makers flowed from the difference between the self-image of the US and how others perceived it. Subsequently, coercive sanctions—perceived by Pakistan as discriminatory—failed to modify Islamabad's behavior and inadvertently motivated it to attain nuclear weapons.
This all sticks and no carrots approach aggravated Pakistan’s security dilemma. The US ability to leverage Islamabad diminished in the aftermath of aid termination and the F-16s issue. This was reflected in Pakistan’s refusal to give up on its nuclear program.

In a world where America was the sole superpower in terms of its military might, Clinton’s closeness to India exacerbated Islamabad’s security concerns. Pakistan’s perception of the American tilt towards India was reinforced by the continuation of the Pakistan specific Pressler Amendment and the stoppage of military aid. Waivers under the Brownback Amendment were more beneficial to India which was establishing economic links with the US. These were less beneficial for Pakistan whose primary concern was the renewal of US military aid. This study has shown that existential fear in an anarchic regional environment helps explain Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s. All states fear betrayal and hence trust and cooperation especially among neighbors is in short supply.¹ These aspects of the security dilemma were clearly visible in the aftermath of US strategic disengagement from Pakistan and Islamabad’s inability to deal with the post-Afghan conflict fallout. Instead of moving towards conflict-resolution like the two great powers, the two regional adversaries were indulging in brinkmanship as early as 1990. The US policy-makers however failed to recognize or mitigate Islamabad’s security dilemma.

During the Cold War the Kashmir dispute became progressively less amenable to diplomatic resolution partly due to Indian intransigence but also because of the security interests of the two superpowers. During the Clinton era some officials saw the Kashmir issue as a legitimate dispute that needed to be addressed; however this began to change by 1994. Despite rhetorically encouraging Indo-Pakistan’s erratic dialogue in 1997, no meaningful effort was made by Clinton to pressurize the two nuclear aspirants towards conflict resolution. The Kashmir insurgency primarily had a political dimension which was exacerbated by human rights abuses committed by the Indian forces during the 1990s. Thus ISIS’s support of the dissidents was not the only contributory factor. Indian abuses of human rights in Kashmir and the Punjab did concern Clinton initially however these were later trumped by US economic interests. This became

apparent in the Clinton-Rao meeting in 1994 when neither the human rights issue in Kashmir nor the suppression of the Sikh movement in Indian Punjab was raised by President Clinton. Holding the ISI solely responsible for the perpetuation of the insurgency was therefore a reductionist approach.

The post-Cold War US power and global status, from the Pakistani perspective, offered an opportunity for pressurizing India into resolving the Kashmir issue. Clinton’s peace overtures in the Middle East, the Balkans and Ireland were examples of his ability to make efforts towards conflict resolution. However, in keeping with the Cold War mindset and in view of Clinton’s focus on economic liberalization, the US refrained from alienating New Delhi. Clinton’s overt de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan stoked Islamabad’s fears that the Kashmir dispute would be shelved. Simultaneously, Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s pro-India overtures spawned security concerns of a larger Indian footprint in Afghanistan and the “nutcracker dilemma.” Pakistan supported the rise of the Taliban as this provided the military establishment with an opportunity to balance enhanced Indian power. The ISI exploited the indigenous uprising in Indian Kashmir, with the Taliban regime providing training camps and manpower. By tolerating the Taliban initially for economic reasons the Clinton foreign policy managers later did not take advantage of opportunities to wean Pakistan away from the movement before it captured Kabul and before Pakistan became a nuclear state. Once there was a friendly Taliban government in Kabul, Islamabad viewed it as a strategic gain acquired after years of unfriendly and pro-India Afghan leadership.

In order to modify Pakistan’s behavior the US needed to address the underlying cause of Pakistan’s existential fears while taking into account its strategic mindset which drew upon anti-India hostility. Under security dilemma states resort to pre-conceptions and base their assessment of enemy intentions on visible material capabilities. Indian efforts at achieving nuclear weapons continued unabated and unchecked by the United States while New Delhi also continued to add to its conventional military capacity. Indian claims that its nuclear arsenal was for defense against China were inadequate for Pakistan because “weapons have

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meanings in relation to the context and the beliefs of the relevant actors”\(^3\) pertaining to their offensive or defensive purposes. Clinton’s emphasis on economics was certain to enhance India’s position as a lucrative market and economic benefits were bound to increase Indian military capabilities. Moreover, post-Cold war China with its communist identity and massive economy began to emerge as a source of security concern for the US; this enhanced India’s importance as a potential counter-force to China. Consequently, Pakistan’s mistrust of Indian intentions was aggravated by improvement in US-India relations; this added a deep psychological aspect of heightened insecurity to the structural mechanism of anarchy.

In the early 1990s the ideological supremacy of democratic values as opposed to Soviet communism brought into focus the “end of history” and America’s role as a potential benevolent hegemon. This was in keeping with the traditional American self-image of being a force for global good. In an era that manifested the contradictory trends of economic interdependence and ethnic fragmentation, American global leadership was seen by both Bush and Clinton as integral to global peace. Clinton in particular focused on the spread of American democracy through multilateralism. Yet, Clinton’s “democracy enlargement” excluded the democratic process in Pakistan. In order to include Pakistan the US would have been required to focus on civilian areas of common bilateral interest with a commitment to providing economic benefits. Neither of the two options was possible as long as Pakistan was sanctioned. Since the American approach was purely security-oriented the US in keeping with Cold War patterns continued to deal with the military leadership in Pakistan thereby reinforcing its political role. Hence, the bilateral relationship was between a liberal democracy and a powerful illiberal institution with political powers. Such an interaction, in the words of Michael Doyle, “can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.”\(^4\)

Strong non-proliferation Congressional lobbies and pro-India interest groups played an important role in ensuring the continuation of the Pressler law while reducing the impact of efforts such as the Brown Amendment that could

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soften the impact of Clinton’s foreign policy tools. That the US approach derived from Cold War thinking patterns was reflected in its focus on Pakistan’s nuclear program and in using the F-16s issue as leverage. This mindset was also reflected in the pattern of divergence between American global objectives and Pakistan’s regional security goals with temporary periods of convergence.

Demonstrating that Pakistan’s India-centric security policy orientation emerged from an action-reaction dynamic of security dilemma, this thesis has assessed the pragmatism of Islamabad’s strategic choices in the decade under study. It has demonstrated that as a pragmatic actor in an anarchic international system Pakistan’s resort to self-help was in keeping with its national security interests. In other words, PFP’s post-Cold War regional strategies were practical choices corresponding to Islamabad’s threat perception. Pakistan’s efforts to achieve nuclear technology through third parties were also in congruence with this premise. These choices were made to ensure policy outcomes which maximized self-interest in keeping with the concept of states as pragmatic actors in the international system. In keeping with the Cold War pattern, however, these goals were largely at variance with US global objectives in the 1990s.

The narrative of Pakistan-US relations in the 1990s is a reflection of wider changes in US strategic thinking after the Cold War. Its global role as the sole superpower necessitated that it minimize its own security dilemma by obviating the rise of potential rivals. Against this background the question of nuclear non-proliferation in a world of emerging transnational threats to American interests took on added significance. This narrative is also the story of the post-Cold War crystallization of changes in Pakistan’s strategic thinking that took root in the 1980s with CIA-ISI collaboration. It is thus the story of how two states and erstwhile allies chose to optimize post-Cold War outcomes to protect their self-interest as pragmatic actors.

Pakistan-US relations in the 1990s were a replay of the ambivalent Cold War partnership albeit with a fundamental caveat emerging from the demise of the doctrine of Containment. This in turn meant greater freedom of action for the sole superpower in its relations with India while simultaneously depriving Pakistan of any reverse-influence. Consequently, in this asymmetric and securitized
relationship the United States played an important role in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy choices and in the perpetuation of PFP's regional security goals.
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