BOUNDARY STRATEGY:
A NEW SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL

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by

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Abstract

This thesis is a work of historical sociology, presenting a developmental model of the British State that tracks its growth as a strategic system since 1066. It is comparable with the work of Mann (1986) and Tilly (1992) in arguing for a long-term model of state development that focusses on elite strategies. Boundary strategy is defined as a field of strategic action, with the state at its centre, which helps to produce a national population that imagines its internal boundaries of 'race', ethnicity, class and location in ways that conceal the objective structure of political and class relations. The thesis demonstrates how this field has developed in Britain over the centuries into six key strategies, defined as Blood, Pollution, Property, Civilisation, Nation and Race. The study achieves this by dividing British history since 1066 into four phases. The first is the Feudal State, 1066-1529. The second is the Protestant State, 1530-1829. The third is the Incorporation State, 1830 to the present day, and the fourth is the Fortress State, 1903 to the present day. It is argued that the Incorporation and Fortress phases of the state's development have unfolded concurrently since 1903, forming two distinct but interdependent functional dimensions. The thesis devotes one case study chapter to each phase. The final case study chapter then examines how the incorporation and fortress dimensions have been synthesised in the policy of asylum seeker dispersal since 1997. Each study is structured around the strategies and investigates how the strategies have responded to conflicts between elite interests and popular pressures 'from below'. The case studies also examine how popular violence against minorities has resulted from the unintended consequences of boundary strategies.
Research Question

How has the state moulded the social imagination at different stages in British history? What types of strategic boundary has this process created? How has the state managed contradictions between elite interests and popular pressures 'from below'? How has popular violence against minorities resulted from the unintended consequences of these actions?
The model of boundary strategy has been adopted in order to achieve four sociological aims. The first has been to 'bring the state back in' to the academic fields of cultural studies, 'racialisation' theory and political economy, where the state has arguably been neglected in recent years. Whilst some recent authors have shared this aim (Goldberg, 2002; Omi and Winant, 1986), they have tended to over-emphasise the concept of 'racial formation' at the expense of a more comprehensive model that accounts for cultural exclusion, antisemitism and class exclusion.

The thesis argues that the state does not merely 'penetrate' civil society in the manner suggested by Mann (1993). It claims instead that the state has two strategic arms - defined as 'the accumulative arm' and 'the gatekeeper arm' - that construct many of civil society's economic and normative structures. The accumulative arm ensures that the maximisation of profit (rather than redistribution or environmental sustainability) remains the dominant goal of economic activity. It regulates economic conditions, flows of labour, laws of contract, and rights of property. The gatekeeper arm controls membership of 'the social' by regulating access to national identity, citizenship rights, moral worth and prestige. It also regulates the production of 'the self' through the institutions of socialisation. The state is therefore central to the formation of 'the subject'. This can be shown by the pivotal role played by the state at each stage of a person's life cycle, including for example:

- The legal basis of the family, whereby the state uses laws and welfare arrangements to encourage some family forms and discourage others;
- The educational curriculum and its control over forms of legitimate knowledge;
- The artificial extension of adolescence by denying young workers and apprentices the employment rights that are granted to adult workers, a process that can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century (Brigden, 2000: 75-76).

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1 This is done not simply through immigration but also through such fiscal measures as the manipulation of pensions and incapacity benefits, and the raising or lowering of the age of retirement for men and women. It is also done via the encouragement or discouragement of women and young males to enter the workforce or higher education.
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The second aim has been to synthesise the 'objective' sphere of material and ideal interests with the 'subjective' domain of social identity. This has entailed a study of how the state and its ideological partners have engaged in the normative management of identity. It is argued that boundary strategies - creating mythical 'representations' of socially included and excluded groups - play a similar role to that played by "the world's images" in Weber's metaphor of "a switchman":

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the world's images that have been created by ideas, like a switchman, have determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest (Weber, 1946: 280).

As section 1.2 demonstrates, this is not simply a 'top down' process, as it requires the state to respond to conflicts between different elite interests, and contradictions between elite and folk beliefs. The state must also deal with popular disapproval of the dependence of dominant elites' upon foreign labour and expertise. Boundary strategy also entails the state having to repair problems caused by the unintended consequences of its actions, such as when the state whips up popular xenophobia but this xenophobia is then turned back against the state's supposed protection of foreigners.

Thirdly, the model has aimed to reinstate the distinction between racism, cultural exclusivity and antisemitism that has been unfortunately distorted by theorists of 'new racism' (Barker, 1981). As Figure 2 demonstrates (see sections 1.4 and 1.5 below), these three concepts are vital because they refer to strategies that are clearly distinct in their historical origins, ideological purposes and modes of representation. The thesis argues against the use of the concepts 'new racism' (Barker, 1981), 'neo-racism' (Balibar, 1991: 17-28) and 'racism differentiste' (Taguieff, 1990) on the grounds that these terms conflate biological racism with processes of cultural exclusion and xenophobia. This conflation reduces the explanatory power of the term 'racism' and blunts the effectiveness of anti-racist politics. An example of this, cited by R² Cohen (1994: 194), can be found in Sarup's argument (1991: 89) that:

It is evident that many racists have the capacity to link the discourses of Englishness, Britishness, nationalism, patriotism, militarism, xenophobia and gender difference into a complex system which gives "race" its contemporary meaning.

² Note on references: authors are indicated by surname only except in cases where two or more authors with the same surname appear in the Bibliography. In these exceptional cases, the authors' initials are used to distinguish them. Examples of this procedure are B. Anderson and P. Anderson, and P. Cohen, R. Cohen and S. Cohen.
This passage identifies the correct problem but offers the wrong solution. Sarup is correct to argue that statecraft can mobilise floating signifiers that merge 'race' into other exclusions, but the solution to that problem is to identify the tactic, not to make an a priori assumption that racism must always be present within those other exclusions. R. Cohen (1994: 194) defines Sarup's quotation as a form of 'aggregation' and argues in response that:

The aggregation procedure is not so much flatly wrong as it is tenuous - stretching the elastic band of 'racism' around a fatter and fatter bundle of related (yet importantly distinct) phenomena so thinly that the band is in grave danger of snapping off and flying out of sight.

A similar problem occurs in the work of Balibar (1991). As Fenton (1999: 219) notes, Balibar tends to define racism as "any politico-cultural construction which falls short of 'Universalism'." Such a definition operates at such a high level of generality that it offers very little scope for use as a subtle tool for empirical investigations into the dynamics of specific cases.

The model of boundary strategy outlined below enables the distinctiveness of racism, antisemitism and cultural exclusion to be recovered by showing how the strategies of Race, Pollution and Civilisation have been mobilised through separate myths in a wide range of combinations. Although all three strategies have often been present within the same formation, it is only by maintaining a separation between their constituent elements that the diversity and historical specificity of these combinations can be understood. The thesis aims to show that antisemitism is mainly a strategy of Pollution (see chapter two), and cultural exclusion is primarily a strategy of Civilisation (see chapter three). The concept of Race is viewed by the thesis primarily as a tool of incorporation. These issues are discussed in more detail in sections 1.4 and 1.5 below.

Fourthly, the theory of boundary strategy argues against the 'modernist' claim that the emergence of capitalism, or the Great Transformation, totally altered the strategic structure of social boundaries and identities. The case studies present strongly argued evidence of continuity between feudal, Protestant and capitalist representations of hierarchy, 'the other' and social 'pollution'. Whilst capitalism clearly added new strategic elements of political economy, 'racial science' and class incorporation to the field of action, it also tended to borrow and adapt strategic materials that were already present instead of throwing them out.
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Classical sociologists often neglected these continuities. Marx, Durkheim and Weber exaggerated the degree to which the economic and political transformations of the nineteenth century supplanted older social boundaries. Durkheim's model of 'organic solidarity' - which he outlined in his masterpiece *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893] 1964) - predicted that kinship ties and ethnic myths would decline as advanced societies developed secondary institutions and meritocratic systems of reward (Fenton, 1984: 100-101). He also regarded the inheritance of private property as an irrational tradition that rational social organisation would gradually eliminate (ibid.). In this regard, Durkheim therefore clearly failed to comprehend how inheritance played two key roles in capitalism: the material reproduction of class privileges, and the ideological justification of those privileges as being derived from the 'natural' right to hold property in perpetuity for one's children.

Marx and Weber clearly did recognise the power of property interests but shared Durkheim's tendency to underestimate the survival of traditional social norms. Marx's model of capitalism depended on capital and labour being totally 'free' of the previous feudal bonds that had tied them to mutual obligations and fixed spatial locations. Weber's work arguably placed too much emphasis on the rationality of bureaucracies and neglected their ability to promoted irrationalities (see Herzfeld, 1992).

It could therefore be argued that Marx, Durkheim and Weber failed to identify the continued existence of Gemeinschaft ties (myths of kinship, solidarism, lineage and tradition; see Tonnies, 1974) within the wider framework of Gesellschaft (ibid.). The thesis seeks to correct this anomaly in classical sociology by showing that modern systems of legitimacy are neither totally new nor original: they build their 'authenticity' by re-articulating earlier forms of hierarchy and legitimacy. Gellner (1998: 74) came close to this realisation when he argued that:

> It must be repeated that nationalism is a phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft: a mobile anonymous society simulating a closed cosy community.

Despite his modernist leanings, Gellner was aware of the fact that nations need to simulate links to an imagined past. The point that Gellner missed however, was how the state makes this simulation feel authentic. This requires the state to import and institutionalise some of the folk myths of the past, which the state cannot simply fabricate. Furthermore, as B. Anderson ([1983] 1991: 6-7) argues, Gellner failed to grasp the greater power of an
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'imagined' community over that of an 'imaginary' community. Only the former can feel authentic, because it utilises each individual's inner 'habitus', derived from centuries of cultural transmission within kinship groups and local institutions. This process results in the nation-state being imagined "as a place where we have always been - and always will be - 'at home'" (Balibar, 1991: 95).

The case studies therefore present a unified theory of British State development that opposes both the Marxist (Hobsbawm, 1983) and the modernist (Gellner, 1998) insistence that capitalism created an entire new set of social relations and identities and eliminated the structures of identity formation that preceded capitalism.

1.2 The Role of the State

The role of the state in this model is defined as the conversion of interests into political strategies that achieve their effects through the shaping of the social imagination. These interests have varied at different stages in British history, from military, land and Church interests under feudalism to a complex mixture of property, financial and bureaucratic interests under bureaucratic (or corporatist) capitalism. The 'accumulative' and 'gatekeeper' arms of the state have evolved around those interests. The accumulative arm currently consists of the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the departments that regulate labour relations. The 'accumulative' arm represents the interests of financial and industrial capital.

The 'gatekeeping' arm is run by the Civil Service, which has a vested interest in maximising its departmental powers through apparatuses of surveillance, immigration control and welfare control. It also consists of normative agencies - Parliamentary committees, advisory groups, 'spin doctors' and so on - which form strategic alliances with non-state actors such as religious leaders, intellectuals3, political party managers, journalists and media owners. The thesis argues that this apparatus is highly centralised in Britain compared to other European states because the Reformation transferred gatekeeping functions from the Church to the state far earlier in Britain than elsewhere.

This model of the state has some affinities with the European neo-Marxist model of "ideological state apparatuses" (Althusser, 1971) but it departs from both orthodox Marxism and European neo-Marxism in four crucial ways. Firstly, the model does not

3 See the discussion of Jessop below.
assume that the dominant interests controlling the state are always those of capital. It argues for the state having 'relative autonomy' and also demonstrates how interests relating to bureaucracy (the gatekeeper arm) may over-ride the immediate interests of capital (the accumulation arm) in certain instances. In this regard, the thesis follows Jessop (2002), who has provided one of the best analyses of the state's 'relative autonomy' by integrating the ideas of Poulantzas (1973), Gramsci (1971), Luhmann (1995) and Polanyi (1944) into his definition of the state:

Combining their ideas, one can define the state as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically selective institutions, organisations, social forces and activities organised around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community (Jessop, 2002: 6).

Jessop follows Poulantzas in rejecting economic determinism on the grounds that there is an "inherent incapacity of capitalism to achieve self-closure in economic terms" (ibid: 19). He notes that "the economic lacks the self-closure necessary to determine the extra-economic without being reciprocally determined by the latter in turn" (ibid: 23). He then takes from Polanyi the idea that capitalism is always "embedded" in supportive extra-economic institutions (ibid.). Moreover, following Luhmann, he argues that institutions tend to operate on the basis of "autopoiésis" (ibid: 5), which means that they only engage with other institutions when they have a mutual interest. The capitalist state is not one of base-superstructure determination: it is characterised by a "Mutual structural coupling of operationally autonomous systems under [the] 'ecological dominance' of accumulation (strongest when the world market is fully developed)" (ibid: 35).

It follows from this that the state is not monolithic but is, instead, a battle between different sectors seeking to impose their own priorities. For example, in debates concerning immigration, the gatekeeper arm has often provided a counterweight to the demand for cheap foreign labour that has been promoted by the accumulation arm. The model therefore allows for a conflict between dominant interests, whilst rejecting the liberal assumption that all social groups have a fair opportunity to gain access to the state. In other words, this model is still closer to a power elite model than a democratic model of the state, but it recognises that power elites may be divided into two or more competing but interdependent fractions, arguing within shared institutional parameters.

Secondly, the thesis rejects the somewhat arbitrary distinction, which was made by both Althusser and Gramsci, between repression and ideology. The thesis does not accept that
the coercive arm of the state (such as the military and police) is detached from the institutions of hegemonic regulation. Instead the thesis places them both within the 'gatekeeper' arm. The implausibility of the repression-ideology dichotomy can be demonstrated by the fact that Althusser's model of Ideological State Apparatuses results in him placing schools in the 'private' sphere, outside the repressive apparatus, despite the fact that education is usually a domain of the state. Similarly, as Goldberg (2002: 100) argues, Althusser's model fails to recognise how the military is a unit of socialisation as well as repression:

[The] military is no longer simply, if it ever properly could be conceived as, an exclusively repressive state apparatus. It plays also a more or less defining role for state socialisation in regimes of racial patriarchy. This in turn reveals intersections more complex, nuanced, and subtle than Althusser's well-worn distinction between repression and ideology warrants.

An artificial separation between coercive and non-coercive state apparatuses can also be detected in some non-Marxist models, such as the concept of 'capitalised coercion' found in Tilly (1992: 151-160). Tilly views Britain's success between 1600 and 1900 as being due to the concentration of coercion and capital in the same urban centre of London, but he gives little or no weight to the role of Protestant bourgeois ideas and identities in catalysing the state's success. His list of state functions (ibid: 97) includes protection and extraction but excludes normative pacification and identity formation. Whilst Tilly acknowledges the role of 'bargaining' between the state and the population (ibid: 99-103), he does not acknowledge the role of a relative monopoly of knowledge and myth making in skewing the bargaining process in the state's favour. Tilly's model therefore has an element of materialism (capital) and of military determinism (coercion) but lacks a perspective on how both capital and coercion require normative legitimacy.

Thirdly, the thesis disputes Marxism's historical assumptions concerning class revolutions. Whereas Marx believed that the bourgeoisie replaced the aristocracy in a revolutionary schism, this thesis follows Elias ([1939] 1994) and P. Anderson (1992) in arguing for a process of cultural fusion between those classes into a dominant hegemonic bloc. The glue in this bloc was the state's control over religion following the Reformation, which enabled the state to take over the Church's normative 'gatekeeper' functions and to regulate processes of class incorporation.

The fourth crucial departure from Marxian models of the state is that the thesis recognises the existence of popular xenophobia and pressures 'from below'. Dominant interests have
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to respond to popular resentments and acts of political resistance and social violence. Furthermore, state actions produce unintended consequences and unanticipated public reactions, which must then be managed by the state. There is thus a mix of 'top down' and 'bottom up' forces. The relationships between these forces, and their implications for the model of boundary strategy, can be illustrated most clearly in cases where xenophobia, antisemitism and racism have been expressed in acts of mob violence against minority groups. Six such instances are included in the thesis, spread across the case studies:

- Murders of Jews in the pogroms of 1189-1190, culminating in the deaths of 150 Jews in York on March 16th 1190 (Richard of Devizes, 1963; Dobson, 1974; Carpenter, 2004; C. Roth et al (eds), 1972);

- Attacks on Flemings and Lombards in London during the Peasants Revolt of 1381 (Froissart, 1978; Schama, 2000);

- 'Evil May Day' 1517, when apprentices attacked and killed foreign merchants in London (Brigden, 2000: 174), thereby suggesting a close early link between the state's construction of youth labour and the tendency of that labour to engage in xenophobic violence;

- Attacks on Catholics in the Victorian period, most notably those that took place in Lancashire towns dominated by the cotton industry between 1850 and 1881 (Kirk, 1980; Foster, 1974) and those that accompanied political debate concerning Irish Home Rule in the period 1866-1874 (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000);

- Attacks on 'coloured' seamen in Liverpool and Cardiff in 1919 (Jenkinson, 1993);

- Attacks on 'dispersed' asylum seekers since 1999 (see chapter six).

Each of these instances arose ultimately from an underlying contradiction between the ruling elite’s economic dependence on migration and its ideological dependence on the image of England as a community of common descent. At each stage of its history, English boundary strategy constructed 'Frontiers of Identity' (R. Cohen, 1994) for the English imagination that were contradicted by the economic need to attract migrant populations with unique skills into trading cities and financial centres. Moreover, the legitimacy of the state itself has an ambivalent relationship with xenophobia. The state draws legitimacy from its 'protection' of a territorial space. This legitimacy is enhanced when perceived threats to
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the population from outside the territory are highlighted and exaggerated. This also extends to cases where an external enemy can be converted into an 'enemy within', such as when Catholics in Elizabethan England were accused of colluding with Spain and the Papacy to commit treason. This causes problems for the state, however, because xenophobia can become a vehicle for anti-government hostility. Occasionally this can be fatal for the current monarch, as it was in 1649 when Charles I was perceived to be pro-French and pro-Catholic.

These events therefore require concepts of contradiction, ambivalence and unintended consequences to be incorporated into the model of boundary strategy. Normative regulation requires the state and its ideological partners to manage conflicts within the elite; contradictions between the economic and ideological interests of elites; and the messes that can be created when the state's reliance upon popular xenophobia creates forces that are turned back upon the state itself.

Conversely, however, there is a danger of giving too much weight to 'bottom up' forces. It is important to note that 'bottom up' forces usually lack the capacity for strategic co-ordination and bureaucratic integration that is enjoyed by state forces. A key example of this is given in section 5.1 of the thesis (see below), which discusses the relationship between state racism and popular racism in the 1950's. The section acknowledges working class racism in the form of trade union discrimination and mob violence, but it also shows that the labour movement was divided on immigration issues. Consequently, pressure from below was not sufficiently co-ordinated or cohesive to force the state's hand. Acts of state racism, by contrast, were carried out covertly throughout the 1950's, independently of public opinion, and utilised the machinery of surveillance and departmental integration that had been established in the anti-alien measures of 1905-1919. It was therefore always more likely that, in the field of immigration policy, these 'top down' processes would carry more weight than a divided, incoherent and ad-hoc racism generated within the labour movement.

A 'top down' preference can therefore be defended on the grounds that the state has "a relative monopoly of organised intelligence" (Jessop, 2002: 223). This is not confined to the core of the state: it is also acquired through Quangos and by creaming off expertise from universities and economic institutes. There is also a long British tradition of the state co-opted intellectual elite, an establishment intelligentsia that can be traced to the 'British
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Enlightenment" (Porter, 2000)\textsuperscript{4} and, before that, to official theology\textsuperscript{5}. The state therefore has in-built advantages of historical continuity, legal-rational integration, and intellectual monopolies when it deals with pressures from below. The following section explores how these advantages are manifested in the moulding of the social imagination.

1.3 The Moulding of the Social Imagination

The ability of dominant interests to mould the social imagination in their favour depends on three features of social development. Firstly, social development must be characterised by the moulding of intimate social relations by central institutions. That is to say, social development cannot simply produce a formal, public relationship between institutions and individuals; there must also be an institutional moulding of private thought, fantasy and motivation. There is thus some affinity between boundary strategy theory and Foucault's work, but with the qualification that whereas Foucault (1980) sees power as transmitted in 'discourse' (power-knowledge), boundary strategy gives greater weight to political institutions centred on the state. Similarly, there are parallels with the Frankfurt School of neo-Freudian writers (Adorno, 1991; Fromm, 1942; Marcuse, 1964) but with the qualification that the main sphere in which consent is engineered is the political one, rather than mainly the cultural one. In other words, as was stated above (see section 1.1), the thesis seeks to 'bring the state back in' to the field currently dominated by cultural studies.

This thesis explains the state's moulding of civil society as being the outcome of a long chain of historical development. It was not achieved in one epoch but took several centuries. The crucial institution that began this process was the Roman Catholic Church. This organisation was unique in European history because it was a major power player in inter-state relations (the Holy Roman Empire) but also regulated social thought and sexual morality. The Church therefore was the glue that connected the macro to the micro in European development for several centuries. As Mann (1986) argues, it was this factor that enabled ruling interests to achieve 'normative pacification': a quiescent population that was governed normatively as well as militarily from the centre.

\textsuperscript{4} See the roles played by Locke in establishing the Civilisation tenets of Whig liberalism (chapter three), Tory historians in promoting nationalism, and Fabians in the political compromises that integrated the Labour Party into mainstream state politics. See also Wheen's discussion (2004: 225-226) of the role played by Giddens (1998) in the intellectual discourse of New Labour.

\textsuperscript{5} See, for example, the Church's role in 'normative pacification' in chapter two below, and the role played by the antiquarians employed by Henry VIII to give intellectual legitimacy to the Reformation in chapter three.
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In England, this process escalated after 1066 because the Normans had a close political relationship with the Papacy. This relationship was vital to Norman survival because the Normans were vastly out-numbered by the Saxons, and violent suppression was only a temporary solution to problems of resistance and insurrection. The subsequent development of the state must therefore have sprung from that base. It is therefore logical to assume that normative pacification in the modern era was built on that base, but with other myths taking the place of religious myths. The components of boundary strategy - Blood, Pollution, Property, Civilisation, Nation and Race - may therefore be understood as phenomena that arose from the long transition from religious to secular modes of pacification, taking several hundred years to evolve from their religious roots.

The second necessary feature of social development is the existence of frontiers between the inside and the outside of 'the social'. This is achieved by making the boundaries of the national territory as congruent as possible with the imagined boundaries of national belonging. Dominant interests can then utilise the state and ideology to ensure that the internal frontiers of the state - boundaries of class, ethnicity, 'race' and so on - are reproduced as reflections of the external frontier.

This aspect of the model of boundary strategy has been influenced partially by R. Cohen's 1994 study, Frontiers of Identity, which argues that the policing of national borders has been intertwined with the construction of imagined identities throughout British history. Internal and external boundaries have been coterminous and neither type can be studied plausibly in isolation:

My starting point is that a complex national and social identity is continuously constructed and reshaped in its (often antipathetic) interaction with outsiders, strangers, foreigners and aliens - the 'others'. You know who you are, only by knowing who you are not (R. Cohen, 1994: 1)

The thesis also adopts Balibar's concern with the relationship between the state, nationalism and social class. Balibar shares Cohen's starting-point and traces the intellectual discussion of boundary formation to the work of Fichte:

[To] use the terminology proposed by Fichte in his Reden an die deutsche Nation of 1808, the 'external frontiers' of the state have to become 'internal frontiers' or - which amounts to the same thing - internal frontiers have to be imagined constantly as a projection and protection of an internal collective personality, which each of us carries within ourselves and [which] enables us to inhabit the space of

6 See the English version, Addresses to the German Nation (Fichte, [1808] 1978) in the Bibliography.
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the state as a place where we have always been - and always will be - 'at home' (Balibar, 1991: 95; his italics).

One objection that may be raised to this argument is that appears at first glance to present the general public as passive recipients of ideology. This objection may be overcome by highlighting the role of contradictions and unintended consequences, as discussed above. The population is 'active' in the sense that its kinship and religious myths are incorporated into the dominant hegemony, as Gramsci recognised. 'High politics' and folk myths have an analogous relationship to the one that existed between classical and folk music. Just as Beethoven borrowed folk melodies for his symphonies, without the dominance of high culture over folk culture being compromised, it is equally plausible to view elite ideology borrowing from folk ideology, without elite dominance being jeopardised. Moreover, individuals in the folk population (the so-called 'average person') seek their personal identities from socially approved models. Personal identities are chosen from religious role models (Christ, the Virgin Mary), popular myths (King Arthur, Robin Hood, Beowulf) or celebrity culture. Orwell recognised this process in his discussion of English identity:

Myths which are believed tend to become true, because they set up a type or "persona", which the average person will do his best to resemble (cited in Ozkirimli, 2000: 222)

The third essential feature is the existence of an 'elective affinity' between interests and myths. Dominant interests, acting through the state and its ideological partners, do not fabricate myths of identity from scratch. They select their preferred identities from the myriad of myths that have previously been generated within the elite and folk culture of the society and then decide which of those myths should be institutionalised in the society's official body of knowledge. This selection is not a conscious process of deliberation: it arises from the success of previous strategic actions that deployed those myths. It therefore follows that boundary strategy is rooted in historical developmental processes rather than conventional modes of conspiracy.

Myths can exist concurrently in both elite and folk culture. State actors may therefore share the same 'habitus' as those they seek to control. Actors do not have to conspire in order to engage in strategic action: they simply have to act in accordance with taken-for-granted rules of political action that have evolved over several centuries, surviving by virtue of their perceived role in key political victories (Hindess, 1996). These rules are therefore based on myths and successes that may have existed in elite and folk culture long before the current generation of state actors took office. They form the 'habitus' of state action in the sense
that actors follow them without necessarily being aware of their overall structure, intellectual history or original purposes. A state actor's conscious reasons for pursuing an action may be consciously sincere but unconsciously false, because the strategic basis of the action pre-existed the actor's life and consciousness. Thought, political ideology and strategic action are therefore part of long historical threads rather than autonomous voluntaristic phenomena. They unconsciously draw upon group myths whose origins are not questioned, because those myths have survived due to their strategic success rather than their truth status.

This point can be clarified further through detailed definitions of the terms 'myth' and 'habitus'. The best definition of 'myth' remains that found in the work of Barthes ([1957] 1972: 142-143):

Semiology has taught us that myth has the task of giving a historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal. Now this process is exactly that of bourgeois ideology. [...] What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a natural image of this reality. And just as bourgeois ideology is defined by the abandonment of the name 'bourgeois', myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things. [...] In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organises a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.

Myths erect boundaries by reifying the histories of communities and classes. They are therefore ideal tools of statecraft because they enable dominant interests to shape how groups insert themselves into an imagined history. Actors can manipulate this process without a great deal of conscious intention: in reality, they are all the more effective when they convince themselves that the myths are true. Actors promote myths, often only semi-consciously, because they coincide with their interests, or the interests they represent. They may, however, in Freudian terms, rationalise a 'higher' motive for their actions than that which actually drives them, or they may simply be unaware of the interests that originally incorporated that myth into state discourse several generations before the current crop of state actors was born.

The relationship between myth and strategy may be further conceptualised by adapting the concept of 'habitus', which is found under various definitions in the work of Bourdieu.
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(1984), Weber ([1905] 2001) and Elias ([1939] 1994). The definition used in this thesis is that habitus consists of the ‘taken for granted’ assumptions that become embedded over several centuries into an institution’s practices, and which all actors draw upon (usually only semi-consciously) when constructing plans of action. The decisive factor in determining habitus is the calculation of strategic success: assumptions are validated by the fact that they have furthered the power of previous state actors. However, this is not a ‘functionalist’ concept, because it brings the actor’s motivation into play. It is argued that actors are motivated by the desire to maximise their opportunities to increase their power, resources and legitimacy, but may conceal that motivation from their own consciousness through a number of rationalisation procedures, which are enabled by the myths that actors absorb from their cultural history. Myths thus survive within political habitus by virtue of their track record in maximising state power. The political actor’s need to reproduce that power ensures that he or she is unlikely to question those assumptions. He or she does not need to understand the roots of each assumption in order to adhere to it. It is merely sufficient that the politician absorbs the taken for granted dispositions of the state to operate within particular ideological parameters, and accepts the myths embedded within those parameters as if they were proven scientific truths.

The myths that these actors draw upon often come from an ‘ethno-symbolic’ pool of social myths, some of which are several centuries old. This thesis therefore shares some affinities with the work of A.D. Smith (1986, 1991), which is centred around the claim that national culture is to some extent built upon myths that have survived several centuries of political change:

[The] ‘modern nation’ in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnie and owes much to a general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the modern era (1986: 18).

However, it also departs from A.D. Smith by adopting the criticism of his work that has been made by Zubaida (1989: 330), who argues that Smith neglected the degree to which ethnic formation resulted from state centralisation rather than vice versa:

'Common ethnicity' and solidarity are not the product of communal factors given to modernity, but are themselves the product of the socio-economic and political processes which, in the West, were institutionalised into the state and civil society. These became the genealogical antecedents of modernity (cited in McCrone, 1998:14; see also Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1993: 25).
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The process whereby centralisation led to state-driven ‘national’ identity formation had a complex but compelling genealogy. The next four sections explain how the chapter case studies divide this genealogy into three historical phases, and how the boundary strategies were synthesised in different ways during each phase.

1.4 The Six Strategies: Property, Blood and Pollution

The relationships between dominant interests and boundary strategies have been different in each stage of history, and have been shaped by the specific problems faced by dominant interests in each period. The six boundary strategies have therefore survived through their ability to offer solutions to those problems through the normative management of the social imagination.

Although the model splits the period since 1066 into four phases, it views the transition from each stage to the next as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. This is another feature of the model that distances it from neo-Marxian approaches. The evolutionary emphasis can be illustrated by the argument that the first three boundary strategies - Property, Blood and Pollution - were specific products of Norman feudalism, but also continued to operate in the Protestant and Incorporation stages, alongside the newer strategies. As the following critique shows, the literature on the history of racism is occasionally guilty of conflating some of the strategies - for example, Blood concepts are sometimes treated as early types of racism (for example, see the critique of Miles below). This conflation can be overcome by highlighting the different origin and genealogy of each strategy.

Chapter two of the thesis demonstrates this point by highlighting the roles of Property, Blood and Pollution in structuring and legitimising the Norman feudal state. The Normans gave land to knights and mercenaries in return for military service. This created the strategy of Property, whereby loyalty to the state was bought by the issuing of property rights. These rights were then extended to the offspring of knights through laws of inheritance, thereby creating the strategy of Blood. Consent for the new ruling structure was then engineered by ‘normative pacification’: the use of religion to create a new myth of unity under God. This myth was reinforced by a strategy of Pollution, targeting groups who did not conform to religious orthodoxy. The primary victims of this strategy were Jews.
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Property was a boundary strategy long before capitalism came into being. As discussed above, its original use was to acquire military body power and loyalty by awarding property to knights in exchange for fealty and service. In other words, feudal Property strategy was a system of inducements created to embed the occupying Norman military elite into English power structures. Furthermore, because many Normans were absentee landlords (fighting in France or on the Crusades), the feudal hierarchy had to be solidified in laws, which could be enforced when the lord returned to England.

In the Protestant period, 1530-1829, Property took on a further meaning whereby it came to be viewed as evidence that the owner had been 'saved' by God. Property therefore brought a further religious dimension into boundary strategy, separating the saved from the condemned. Property was also viewed by Locke ([1690] 1988) and his Whig successors as evidence of 'cultivation' (see 3.6 below). Property thus became synthesised with Civilisation as a symbol of superior culture and better systems of rule than those found overseas. This provided an ideological incentive for colonialism and a fig leaf for the theft of land from non-European populations.

In the modern period, Property has been used to 'incorporate' selected class fractions, by promoting home ownership and the domestic sphere. For example, Thatcher promoted a 'property owning democracy', implying a cleavage of respectability between homeowners and council tenants. The sell-off of council housing could be viewed as part of this strategy, incorporating ex-council tenants into bourgeois respectability whilst creating a contrastive stigmatised identity that could be imposed on those left behind (see Ridley, 1992, for a first hand account of this strategy from an ex-Cabinet minister). Furthermore, the promotion of the private sphere, linking Property to Blood, has been a key legitimising tool of capitalism, via the capitalist state. The desire to pass on property to one's children has been deemed to be 'natural', therefore any socialist 'intervention' in that process is deemed to be an infringement of nature (see Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt, 1968-1971).

Blood is therefore an essential component of the naturalisation of capitalist social relations: it enables Property to transcend the space of politics whilst at the same time being protected by the state. It also encourages the development of spatial 'walled communities', whereby wealth is fenced off in secluded properties protected by surveillance equipment.

This account of Property as a feudal strategy surviving into capitalism clearly puts the thesis in opposition to Marxists such as Engels ([1954] 1972), who assumed that the state was
created by private property. The thesis argues that Property was the effect, not the cause, of the machinations of the feudal state, and it was this political factor that was carried into capitalist social relations. Similarly, Blood survived the transition from feudalism to capitalism because it continued to legitimise the transfer of property from parent to child, thereby reinforcing the hegemony of property relations. This contrasts with the view of the great 'classical' sociologists, who tended to neglect the continuing significance of inheritance. For example, as Fenton (1984: 100-101) notes, Durkheim believed that inherited wealth would cease to play a major role in advanced societies, because the modern division of labour would create new contractual rights and economic roles in which blood ties were redundant. Durkheim therefore failed to grasp the strategic connection between Property and Blood and its key role in the success of capitalism.

Blood strategy has both a 'micro' and a 'macro' dimension, which may be defined as Family and Lineage respectively. Family may be defined as the use of real and/or imagined blood ties to recreate the image of the family at the level of the state. It focusses state strategies on to the patriarchal family unit and legitimises social power by equating the power of the ruler with the power of the patriarch at the 'micro' level of family life. Foucault ([1979] 1991) provided some insights into this process by noting that the original meaning of 'oeconomy' was the management of the family by the patriarch. Foucault's study of 'governmentality' used primary materials, taken from the guidance books given to royal princes, to show that the prince was encouraged to imagine his subjects as a family to be governed in a manner akin to that of a father governing a household. Hindess (1996: 120) shows that this idea was still prevalent in England in the late eighteenth century by citing Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in 1783. This defined "public police and oeconomy" as meaning:

[The] due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood and good manners; and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective stations (Blackstone [1783] 1978: 162).

The family metaphor enabled the state to incorporate gradually into its institutions the gatekeeper functions that had previously been performed by the Church. This occurred earlier in England than elsewhere because the Reformation stripped the Church of many of its normative and welfare powers. The state became, as it were, both the head of the family and the policeman of conscience and behaviour.
These themes of normative gatekeeping, focusing on moral regulation, can be found in all four phases of state development examined in the case studies. In the feudal phase, moral regulation became an essential means of 'normative pacification', with the state using the Church to create boundaries of 'heresy' and Pollution that served the state's own ends. In the next phase, Protestantism used the family as a gauge of social status and religious destiny; gatekeeping was exercised through moral judgements of whether a person's family was among 'the saved'. The age of Incorporation has transformed the family into a unit of consumption, but has also been used by state actors to distort 'macro' issues by presenting them as 'micro' ones. For example, Thatcher denied that "society" consisted of anything more than "men and women and [their] families" (cited in Wheen, 2004: 25), whilst both the Conservative and Labour parties have portrayed themselves as 'the party of the family'. This has enabled state actors and their academic cohorts to portray social ills as being the product of parental failure (see Field, 2003; Etzioni, 1995), whilst the Fabian tradition has often argued that welfare rights should be confined to 'good', 'respectable' families.

Blood has also converted family motifs into 'ethnic' ones, creating a key element of the 'imagined community' that disguises the material roots of class divisions. This has enabled the state to exploit a blood myth that has evolved over centuries, whereas class has only been able to appeal to common positions in the division of labour that may only have existed for a few generations. The long-term survival of the state has usually depended on its ability to tie territorial space to group identity, in such a way that the state can present itself as the 'guardian' of that identity. The 'imagined community' is not merely a nationalist collection of individuals; it is an imagined network of families with a mythical common ancestry. The myth of ancestry may have preceded the emergence of the state, but it is the state that has tied that myth to a monopoly of violence within specified spatial boundaries.

This suggests that the strategic value of Gemeinschaft myths did not cease to play a central role in social identities when the mode of production, division of labour and bureaucratic structure took on a capitalist form. Blood continued to structure property and status relations, even when capitalism appeared to have created a mass society of individuals. This can be seen in the political economy of the present day. For example, Blood clearly still plays a major role in the transfer of property from one generation to the next. In some cases, this has resulted in capitalist societies adopting a caste-like form at the top of the social order, reproduced by the state allowing the top schools and universities to select their intakes almost exclusively from elite families. Consequently, social mobility in the middle
classes has hit a ‘glass ceiling’ beneath the elite, because the top layer is reproduced almost entirely from within. This creation of a caste-like elite has been reinforced since 1979 by the reduction in the top rates of income tax. The wealthy families of Britain have therefore become insulated from social competition as a result of a realignment of Property, Blood and fiscal state management since 1979.

Blood has also served capitalist interests at the level of motivation by offering a solution to the existential problem of disenchantment that was such a dominant theme of Weber’s sociology. The question of how capitalist bureaucracies could keep their workers motivated when religion lost its lustre has effectively been answered by the myth of the bourgeois family. Since 1914, workers have been motivated by the promise of ‘a home fit for heroes’; a house and family that would survive the worker’s own lifetime. This ideology was a common theme of welfare liberalism and Thatcherism: both political movements sought their legitimacy within the facilitation of bourgeois family norms.

The second dimension of Blood is Lineage, which builds inheritance into a lateral system of social stratification, in which each stratum forms a division or caste that claims to be able to trace its inheritance back through several generations. The upper strata of this system are the equivalent of a "lateral ethnie" (see A.D. Smith, 1991: 52-58), a ruling elite with an exclusive culture based on a myth of descent. As is argued below, this is different from Race because the latter is a "vertical ethnie" (ibid.), acquiring its character through populism and the mass mobilisation of myths of descent represented in visual form (myths of phenotype).

Lineage was a creation of laws of inheritance by the Normans but it also took on a new form after the Reformation. Tudors were seeking to justify the break from Rome by employing antiquarians to uncover 'evidence' of an Anglo-Saxon Church that preceded the Roman Catholic one and was therefore more authentic. Miles (1993: 65-66) claims that this led to the birth of a new Anglo-Saxon 'racial' myth. He argues that the subsequent racialisation of the colonies was initially predicated on the ‘white’ Anglo-Saxon identities that had been emerging since the Reformation. Miles’ principal source is MacDougall’s Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons (see the Bibliography). This claims that, by the time of the English Civil War, antiquarian scholarship had been synthesised with German humanism to produce an Anglo-Saxon ‘racial’ myth, which legitimated the new institutions of Parliament and their Protestant religious underpinning.

Cromwell’s regime believed that:
[Parliament] was an institution of great antiquity, with origins in the German democratic tradition, from which the Saxons were considered to have originated (Banton, 1977: 16-18, MacDougall, 1982: 31-2, 56-62, Newman, 1987: 189-91). Hence, in mid-seventeenth-century England, the ideas of the existence of an Anglo-Saxon Church and Parliament, and of an original Anglo-Saxon 'race' suppressed and repressed by a foreign 'race' since the Norman invasion of 1066, legitimated political revolution (Miles, 1993: 65-66).

Miles interprets this finding as evidence that lineage was an early form of racialisation, paving the way for the mentality of scientific racism:

The idea of 'race' employed in these seventeenth-century discourses referred to descent or lineage rather than to the existence of discrete biological categories of people ranked in a fixed hierarchy (Banton, 1977: 18-25). Nevertheless, the idea of lineage suggested the inheritance of characteristics and traditions through time and therefore a certain kind of fixity that was natural and eternal: it is but a short step from the idea of inheritance then to utilise notions such as 'breeding' and 'blood' to sustain a conception of inviolable difference expressed through history. The result closely approximates that created by the racialised typologies of scientific racism (Miles, 1993: 66).

However, this view is fundamentally flawed because it ignores the difference between 'lateral' and 'vertical' myths of descent, as outlined in the work of A.D. Smith discussed above. The actors who deployed the Anglo-Saxon myth in the seventeenth-century were Protestants who believed they belonged to 'the elect': the small minority of God's subjects that he had decided to 'save' (Weber, [1905] 2001). They were therefore presenting themselves as a 'caste': a religiously constructed narrow lateral elite. 'Race', by contrast, is a secular vertical construct that defines populations by presumed somatic and phenotypic characteristics and locates them in separate spatial locations of origin. Lineage and Race therefore represent two separate types of boundary:

- **Lineage**: blood, invisible, lateral, religious, not fixed to a geographical point of origin.

- **Race**: phenotype, visible, vertical, secular, fixed to geographical origins.

This difference reflects the genealogy of each strategy. Lineage reflects the need of a small class of warriors or Protestants to create social distance between itself and the majority of its social inferiors. Race reflects a need to privilege the entire population of one assumed point of origin (England or Europe) over another (Africa, Asia, North America, and so on). Race therefore assumes a large degree of vertical incorporation; Lineage is designed to prevent that vertical movement.
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The third Norman innovation was the strategy of Pollution. This created the illusion of a united and pure body politic by defining any group that deviated from religious norms as a polluted presence within that body. The targets of this strategy were primarily Jews. The Normans required massive military expenditures to build castles and maintain a cavalry of elite knights, and financed this expenditure in part by loans and taxation secured from Jews, who had been brought over from Rouen at the Normans' invitation. The state initially protected the Jews from local violence, but when the state ceased to be financially dependent on Jews after 1215, the state and the Church engaged in a programme of 'normative pacification' (Mann, 1986). This converted the population's traditional antisemitism into a newly centralised persecution of 'heretics' and infidels. The feudal ruling elite therefore disguised its own 'alien' origins by employing a proselytising, antisemitic heretic-burning Church to stigmatise a minority group that the Normans had previously imported for their own purposes.

The strategy of Pollution needs to be separated from Race, even though Race absorbed elements of Pollution after 1870. As Figure 1 shows (see below), the thesis follows Cox ([1948] 2000) in arguing that the victims of Pollution are depicted as anti-social whereas the victims of Race are depicted as subsocial. The reasoning behind this view is broadly influenced by Cox's neo-Marxist theory that the subsocial category is the product of the global capitalist division of labour, which requires work roles that cast many workers into a 'dehumanised' status. Cox argued that 'racial prejudice' was the outcome of this dehumanisation. In contrast, Cox claimed that Jews were not placed in these roles so their persecution was a non-racial phenomenon, which Cox defined as 'intolerance'. The distinction between subsocial and anti-social rests on this difference:

The dominant group is intolerant of those whom it can define as anti-social, whilst it holds racial prejudice against those whom it can define as subsocial...Persecution and capitalist exploitation are the respective behaviour aspects of these two social attitudes (Cox, [1948] 2000: 90).

Cox's distinction between these 'anti-social' and 'subsocial' labels is very useful because it explains how the state switches tactically between exploitation and persecution when constructing boundaries. The principal evidence that supports Cox's claim is that, prior to colonialism, medieval Europe focussed its energies on the 'anti-social' category, which was applied primarily to 'heretics' and 'infidels'. The victims of this 'anti-social' category were almost exclusively chosen in accordance with their religious affiliations: Jews, Protestants, Anabaptists, Muslims, 'witches' and 'pagans'. Cox argued that Jews were still trapped in this
status, whereas the capitalist relations of production had locked 'the Negro' into a subsocial category. The dominant group wanted Jews to cast off their religion and assimilate into 'whiteness', but could not contemplate the same for 'the Negro' because his subsocial status was a necessary feature of capitalist exploitation. The key difference between racism and antisemitism therefore lay in the fact that:

[The] dominant group or ruling class does not like the Jew at all, but it likes the Negro in his place. To put it in still another way, the condition of its liking the Jew is that he cease being a Jew and voluntarily become like the generality of society, while its condition of liking the Negro is that he cease trying to become like the generality of society and remain contentedly a Negro (ibid.).

However, the thesis departs from Cox's formulation in four critical ways. Firstly, the thesis rejects his claim that there has always been a direct correspondence between the binaries 'anti-social/subsocial' and 'Jew/Negro'. The historical evidence presented in the case studies suggests that both Jews and 'blacks' were often placed in the Pollution category in British discourse prior to 1870, whilst both groups were incorporated into racialised categories after 1870. By the 1890's, Jews had been brought into the racial science of eugenics and 'degeneracy', thereby sharing a 'subsocial' status with 'blacks'. These two groups therefore often had similar positions in relation to 'the social'.

Secondly, the thesis argues that Cox's depiction of the class statuses of Jews and 'blacks' was misleading. It failed to provide a plausible explanation for the existence of a 'black' middle class and Jewish working class. Cox was therefore unable to comprehend how Jews could be part of a 'racialised class fraction' or sub-proletariat (Miles, 1993: 141-148).

Thirdly, it is argued that Cox's model was flawed in its limitation of the category 'non-white' to the 'Negro'. It failed to account for the fact that migrant labour from, for example, Ireland and Poland was subjected to strategies of both Pollution and Race for several decades before it 'became white' (Ignatiev, 1995). Lorimer (1978: 14-15) has shown that Victorian racists were "quite certain they could perceive the unique features of Anglo-Saxons, Celts, especially the Irish, Jews, and various European nationalities, as well as distinguish between 'white' and 'coloured' races." Furthermore, Lorimer (1978: 210) has concluded that late-Victorian racism "rested upon established attitudes of class [that] perceived members of the residuum as belonging to an innately different and inferior race."

7 As Goldberg (2002: 26-27) argues, Pollution was imposed on 'blacks' through discourses of 'miscegenation', which could be compared to antisemitic 'limpieza de sangre' (purity of blood) discourses. However Goldberg's analysis of Pollution is largely confined to that observation and is not developed in the ways that this thesis has attempted.
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Cox was therefore mistaken in viewing the Race category as a uniquely anti-'black' (or, in his terms, anti-'Negro') phenomenon.

Fourthly, as Figure 1 shows, a simple dualism between anti-social and subsocial is inadequate because it neglects a third category: the 'pre-social'. This category, which, the thesis argues, was a product of Civilisation strategy, arose from the Protestant State of 1530-1829, which created an imagined cultural cleavage based on a normative boundary between 'the culturally advanced' bourgeoisie and the 'culturally backward' proletariat. The early industrial proletariat in Britain was neither persecuted in the manner of Jews, nor incorporated into the state as citizens, but instead was treated as childlike and uncultivated. The next section explores the emergence of that category, and its ambivalent relationship with the strategy of Race.

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1.5 The Six Strategies: Civilisation and Race

Civilisation was a product of the Reformation in the sense that it arose from the emergence of a new elite, which was Protestant and bourgeois, in place of the old feudal aristocracy that had been kept in power by Catholic hegemony. It has sometimes been argued that this new elite originally developed the strategy of Race as an Anglo-Saxon myth (for example, see the discussion of Miles and MacDougall above). However, this section argues that Civilisation, as deployed in Britain, delayed the rise of Race until the second half of the nineteenth century.

Whereas the North American colonies had embraced Race by the eighteenth century (in order to justify their economic dependence on African slaves), the British bourgeoisie was more concerned by the threat posed by its metropolitan proletariat. It therefore preferred to use cultural means (Civilisation) to distance itself from the labourer. A strategy of Race would have blurred this cultural boundary by emphasising bourgeois biological features that some proletarians may have shared. Civilisation therefore held off the hegemony of Race until the time arrived when it would be necessary and desirable to form tactical alliances with some working class groups.
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Civilisation, rather than Race, originally dominated bourgeois conceptions of class because the proletariat had to be represented as culturally dead in order to justify the infliction of capitalist work tasks upon it. The bourgeoisie needed to separate the bourgeois 'soul' from the proletarian 'body'. This was facilitated by the Enlightenment, which privileged the mind over the body. This point can be demonstrated by citing Kant's directive as to who can and cannot be members of the state:

The domestic servant, the shop assistant, the labourer, or even the barber are merely labourers, not artists or members of the state, and are thus unqualified to be citizens (Kant, 1970: 74; cited in Goldberg, 2002: 48).

Kant mobilised a cleavage between mental and physical labour that was the equivalent of a cleavage between civilised and uncivilised. British writers tended to share Kant's view - for example, E. Darwin declared that "Some must think and others labour" (cited in Porter, 2000: 364). This process was primarily politico-cultural, not racial. The Enlightenment formulation of the state was highly elitist (lateral) and was therefore still closer to caste than race (vertical). It positioned the 'enlightened' capitalist and 'uncultivated' labourer in an adult-child relationship, rendering the latter as 'pre-social'.

One paradoxical consequence of this cultural formation was that Britain developed a concept of 'whiteness' that was cultural rather than racial prior to 1870. 'Whiteness' was racialised far later in Britain than it had been in the USA8. As sections 3.5 and 4.2 of the thesis argue below, the concept of 'whiteness' was an elitist identity in Britain that excluded the whole of the working class until the 1870's. 'Whiteness' only became a 'racial' formation when it began to incorporate the upper sections of the working class, at the expense of a newly racialised 'residuum' that included the Irish, Jews and other migrant groups as well as the urban poor who were descended from the peasantry.

The process that finally persuaded the majority of the bourgeoisie to switch from Civilisation to Race was triggered by the British Reform Act of 1867. As section 4.2.5 of the thesis argues, Conservatives such as Disraeli and [Joseph] Chamberlain fostered new political tactics of 'incorporation' in which imperial populism was fused with anti-Catholic religious politics and the extension of limited citizenship rights to some 'respectable' working class fractions (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall 2000). The boundaries of

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8 Consequently, as Bonnett (2000: 44) argues, the American 'whiteness' literature generated by such figures as Allen (1994), Ignatiev (1995), and Roediger (1992), is of limited value in the British context.
'whiteness' as a cultural project thus only gave way to racialised imperial 'whiteness' after Disraeli had redrawn the state's map of class incorporation.

When Race finally emerged as the dominant force after 1870, it rested upon a cleavage between the 'respectable' proletariat and the 'residuum'. The latter consisted of groups who previously belonged to the Pollution category: Irish labourers, 'black' ex-slaves, paupers, prostitutes, Jews, and so on. Race therefore was not a matter of 'white' versus 'Negro'. As the above citations from Lorimer have indicated, a vast number of European migrants and British casual labourers were included in the subsocial category. Conversely, whilst the 'respectable' working class was made to feel superior to these 'racialised class fractions', it was still culturally excluded from the 'high culture' of the bourgeoisie. The gatekeeper arm of the state offset political incorporation with new forms of status hierarchy and exclusion. British capitalism during the 1880-1918 period could therefore be characterised as 'three nations' rather than two:

- The aristocracy and bourgeoisie, defined by Lineage, Property and Civilisation.

- The 'respectable' Proletariat, regarded as 'white' but relatively uncivilised. Included in the 'social' by criteria of Race but excluded by Civilisation strategies from the higher status positions of the bourgeoisie.

- The sub-proletariat, or 'residuum', originally formed by Pollution, colonialism and slavery, but from the mid-1860's onwards defined predominantly by Race. This bottom third was 'anti-social' prior to the mid-1860's, but subsocial thereafter.

In summary therefore, in terms of political economy, state strategy in the Victorian period was built on a contradiction between two strategic needs. The first, met by Civilisation, was the need to keep bourgeois identities hermetically sealed in caste-like cultural isolation from the lower orders. The second, which became more urgent as the nineteenth century progressed, was to create the illusion of a 'British race' that incorporated some workers into an imperial identity that was superior to the racial identities that were imposed on the rest of the world's population. The state was constantly embroiled in a political conflict between these two contradictory goals. If it chose Race, the proletariat could demand 'racial' privileges as members of the 'white' race. If it chose Civilisation, the proletariat may become disillusioned by their cultural exclusion and may withdraw their consent from political parties and from capitalism.
The political elite responded to this contradiction in two ways. Firstly, it found a racialised 'other' that would perform the most demeaning work tasks. This was achieved through the massive importation of Irish labour from 1830-1850, and the export of primary production tasks to the non-white colonies. This enabled bourgeois class prejudice to be channelled against this new sub-proletariat, creating a political space into which the 'respectable' proletariat could be positioned as superior to 'the residuum'. As Bonnett (2000: 28-45) argues, this was achieved by promoting the 'respectable' working class into a status of 'whiteness' from which it had previously been excluded, whilst finding new biological methods to depict the residuum as 'non-white' (Lorimer, 1978: 14-15).

Secondly, the bourgeoisie, via the state, promoted a new 'high culture' through the public schools, which focussed on superiority of manners (P Anderson, 1992; Elias, [1939] 1994). This enabled it to build a new cultural cleavage between the bourgeoisie and 'respectable' proletariat, which enabled the bourgeoisie to maintain most of its status privileges even though it had been forced to admit the 'respectable' proletariat into 'whiteness'. This was accompanied by the establishment of new hierarchies of taste via classical music, high literature, and so on (Bourdieu, 1984).

These changes enabled Race and Civilisation to be reconciled in the last quarter of the Victorian period. The proletariat could be 'incorporated' into politics and imperial economics by the new identity of Race, which gave the proletariat a dehumanised 'other' towards which it could feel racially superior. At the same time, however, the bourgeoisie still had its own schools, manners, music and literature - the cultural products of the Enlightenment - through which it could maintain a cleavage of Civilisation.

Moreover, the nature of Civilisation became much harsher during the later Victorian period. As Lorimer (1978: 210) demonstrates, the period 1867-1901 witnessed a new "cult of gentility" that "encouraged a greater social exclusiveness and arrogance." It can be observed, for example, in the processes through which philanthropy fell into decline and Empire was used to promote 'muscular Christianity' and a harsher attitude towards the colonies among all 'respectable' classes (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000). Civilisation had previously encouraged philanthropy and social justice, but now it promoted cultural contempt and Social Darwinism.

The contradiction between Civilisation and Race was partially resolved by bringing them closer together, to a point where they became far more difficult to distinguish. As Lorimer's
work suggests, a hardening of class attitudes facilitated a harsher depiction of 'non-whites'. Race arose in parallel with a new type of cultural aggression in which any type of philanthropy was interpreted as weakness. Consequently, although Race enabled some proletarians to be incorporated, it did so at the expense of inflicting a much fiercer cultural regime upon them, in which social status would have to be earned over a lifetime of 'respectable' hard work and cultural conformity to bourgeois social norms. Incorporation was therefore contingent upon a communitarian imperative whereby the 'white' working class only gained 'rights' in exchange for performing 'responsibilities'. The proletariat's gains from the strategy of Race must therefore be offset against the new obligations of Civilisation, which would place every worker under onerous moral regulation and create severe status anxiety.

Conflicts between Civilisation, Race and Pollution could also be found in some of the colonies. The imperialist power in India, for example, attempted to turn elite Indians into 'Englishmen' through education and indoctrination. Civilisation was therefore similar to a Foucauldian strategy of governmentality (Foucault, [1979] 1991; A.L. Stoler, 1995) in which the state sought to turn selected fractions of its subjects into assimilated bourgeois cultural conformists rather than keeping some of them in a subsocial or anti-social status. Conversely, such strategies of Civilisation could very easily revert to a strategy of Race or Pollution if the natives refused to play by 'white' bourgeois rules. A supposedly 'pre-social' group could rapidly become defined as 'anti-social' or 'subsocial' as soon as it resisted authority. This could be charted, for example, in the British approach to Hindus. The British would 'educate' conformist Hindus whilst shooting rebellious ones. The British also applied the term 'nigger' to hostile Hindus (Lorimer, 1978: 226, n.11). Similarly, early Western accounts of 'Red Indians' defined them as either anthropological curiosities (pre-social) or as nasty savages (subsocial), depending on whether they accepted or rejected the European settlers.

Furthermore, Miles (1989: 25-26) argues that there was never just one prototype for British rule overseas. Strategy depended on how the colonised population was suited to particular forms of exploitation. In cases where "the colonised possessed knowledge and skills to permit [the colonisers'] survival", a cultural interdependence could emerge in which "hostile and negative European representations of the Other were discouraged" (ibid: 26). Hostility would be replaced by a patronising 'noble savage' myth (see section 3.2 below) or redirected
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towards a minority that was already stigmatised within the colony (such as Muslims in colonial India).

Race, Civilisation and Pollution could therefore be interchanged in the colonial period depending on the specific role of the chosen colony. Ideology also depended the class of the holder, with different classes expressing prejudice in class-specific forms, a process that continues to the present day (P. Cohen, 1988). Furthermore, as the next section shows, the relationship between Race, Civilisation and Pollution was mediated by strategies of Nation.

1.6 The Six Strategies: Nation

The relationship between Civilisation, Blood, Race and Nation as boundary strategies can be understood by conceptualising them as four alternative ways of representing myths of common descent. These can be summarised as follows:

- Civilisation: Common descent = superiority of morals, manners, culture and values.

- Blood: Common descent = superior lineage, carried in the blood.

- Race: Common descent = division of the human race into distinct types, in which the superiority of inherited characteristics, such as intelligence and temperament, is correlated with phenotype (visible and measurable biological features).

- Nation: Common descent = superiority of destiny.

The literature on racism and ethnocentrism commonly recognises the first three myths of decent (culture, lineage and phenotype), but not the fourth (destiny). The Nation myth is, however, capable of equal, and perhaps even greater, power because it casts the past into the future. Civilisation, Blood and Race do not automatically imply destiny, but Nation is inseparable from destiny.

The linkage between past and future in nationalism can be illustrated by lecture given by the nationalist historian Seeley to his Cambridge students in 1882. Seeley claimed during the lecture that "when you study English history, you study not the past of England only, but also her future" (Seeley, [1883] 1971: 139; cited in Kumar, 2003: 38). Kumar defines this form of nationalism as essentially "missionary" in character because it is driven by the "conviction of a global purpose" (2003: 32). This arguably helps to explain the foreign policies of Britain in the nineteenth century and the USA since 1945. Nationalism in both
these nations was rooted in Protestantism, which persuaded their populations that they were 'the elect': the 'new Israel'. Such a belief can be used to justify the killing of any overseas population that hinders the fulfilment of that population's 'historical destiny'.

To put this into context, it is necessary to review some of the academic literature. Nationalism has been subjected to three academic debates in recent years, which have questioned its nature and origins. Firstly, Freeden (2003) has questioned whether nationalism is a distinct ideology, and has suggested that it does not have the same universal significance as ideologies such as liberalism and socialism. Secondly, there has been a fierce dispute between medieval historians who have located the origins of nationalism within their own specialist period9, and 'modernists' who insist that nationalism was a creation of The Great Transformation. Thirdly, there is a debate as to whether national identity is 'invented' (Hobsbawm, 1983), 'imagined' (B. Anderson, [1983] 1991) or built from 'ethno-symbolic' cultural origins (A.D. Smith, 1991). The following paragraphs illustrate how the thesis uses boundary strategy theory to address these issues.

With regard to Freeden, the key question is whether or not Nation addresses the range of political issues that are addressed by autonomous ideologies. Freeden (2003: 98-99) claims that nationalism is a "thin ideology" because it "does not embrace the full range of questions that macro-ideologies do, and is limited in its ambitions and scope". However, when Freeden illustrates this argument, he makes a fallacious claim that:

It certainly does not produce a scheme for the just distribution of scarce and vital goods - the famous 'who gets what, when and how question' that is seen as central to politics [and] it is silent on individual liberty and rights and on the desired relations between private and public spheres (Freeden, 2003: 98-99).

Freeden overlooks the fact that Western ideologies relating to the "just distribution of scarce and vital goods" are predicated on the global distribution of power, which in turn has been shaped by nationalism since the Victorian period. Western nationalism erected, and continues to legitimise, global terms of trade that overwhelmingly favour the West. This global imbalance of military and economic power in turn fuels the hegemonic belief that it is justifiable for the West to use violence against weaker states when its privileged access to Middle Eastern oil and other global resources is placed in jeopardy. Furthermore, Western populations give tacit consent to these iniquities because their own domestic comforts depend on unequal terms of trade in the globalised economy.

9 For example, see the work of Wormald (2000) and Hastings (1997) discussed below.
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The 'who gets what' question has similarly been shaped by the exclusion of non-nationals from national resources such as welfare and social housing: for example, council housing and welfare payments have been tied to 'residential' qualifications and family preferences (Morris, 2002). The Incorporation State would be inconceivable without a nationalist belief that rights should be based on common descent and (an assumed) common destiny. 'Individual liberty' has also been seen as a privilege of Nation: the British government has interned foreign nationals (R. Cohen, 1994) and has denied habeas corpus to 'Fenians' and 'terrorist suspects'. The norms of political conduct, which enable and constrain state action, are thus made possible by, and firmly embedded within, nationalist assumptions.

The second debate, concerning the moment when national consciousness was formed, has been clouded in ambiguity because authors have often conflated different issues. In particular, nationalism has been taken by some medieval historians (Wormald, 2000) to mean any form of national consciousness, whilst some modernists appear to restrict its meaning to mass industrial nation-states (Gellner, 1998). The most viable solution to this problem may be to change the terminology to recognise that Nation has been around for a long time, but its nature has obviously been constrained by the historical setting.

For example, if it is insisted that nationalism must include most of the population, then clearly nationalism is only possible where there is a printing press (B. Anderson, [1983] 1991), an advanced division of labour (Gellner, 1998) and widespread literacy (Colley, [1992] 1996). However, if nationalism only requires a small band of intellectuals and religious disciples, it could conceivably be traced to the Bible and the model of Israel, as illustrated by this argument made by Hastings:

The Bible, moreover, presented in Israel a developed model of what it means to be a nation - a unity of people, language, religion, territory and government (Hastings, 1997: 18).

This thesis therefore treats Nation as both old and modern. Nation may be found as far back as the writing of Alfred The Great, but that would tell us nothing about the identities of his subjects, who continued to identify with their local village. Similarly, Wormald's argument that a 'national Church' existed in the eighth century must be qualified with the observation that the loyalty of that Church was to God and the Pope, not to the state. It was only when the state destroyed the Church's autonomy under Henry VIII, in the Reformation of 1529-1536, that a national Church could be said to have emerged that served the specific function of nationalism. Even then, as is argued above, the Reformation
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created a Protestant elite that excluded the masses. Full nationalism, like Race, would require the incorporation of a 'respectable' proletariat and the creation of a sub-proletariat in the Victorian period. This brings the thesis back again to the distinction between 'lateral' and 'vertical' integration. A 'nation' can be lateral and caste-like, but nationalism has to be vertical. In other words, a "lateral ethnie" can only be a nation without nationalism (A.D. Smith, 1991: 52-58).

Consequently, the bond of Civilisation and Nation is inseparable from the historical impact of the Reformation, because it freed the English monarch from any obligation to share his normative authority with that of the Pope. Civilisation and Nation were products of that political supremacy, which meant that boundary strategy became dominated by the state, not shared between state and Church.

Crucially, Civilisation and Nation also reflected the fact that the Reformation brought new classes into the arena. The great feudal lords had been weakened by the Wars of the Roses and were now ruled by a more autocratic monarch. The dissolution of the monasteries, combined with the enclosure of agricultural land, resulted in massive migration from the countryside to the city. This created, not just a potentially massive new proletariat, but also middle classes to service those cities. The loss of Church authority resulted in the creation of a large secular bureaucracy. Professional classes of doctors, lawyers and parish councilors began to emerge, as well as artisans and yeomen. The class base of the elite had to become broader.

This period also saw the expansion of English colonialism, beginning with the conquest of Ireland by the Tudors (Canny, 1983) and then escalating through naval power into the overseas conquests of North America and the West Indies. Consequently, the new Protestant elite that took over the state under Elizabeth I and later under Cromwell had two new populations to exploit: a colonial population and a new proletariat evicted from the countryside. New boundary strategies of Civilisation and Nation resulted from these developments, because they suited the mentality of Protestantism, the world-view of colonists towards 'the other', and the massively expanded opportunities for capital accumulation.

By the nineteenth century, agricultural enclosure and colonialism had created a multiform 'residuum', which consisted of paupers, 'fallen women', the unemployed, casual labourers, the Irish and 'black' colonials. Civilisation and Nation were not, in themselves, sufficient to
justify the dehumanisation and proletarianisation of these groups by capitalism. A new strategy therefore emerged whereby the 'respectable' proletariat was split from 'the residuum'. The latter was then subjected to discourses of Pollution until the 1860's when it was absorbed into a global model of Race. Consequently, the switch from Pollution to Race after 1860 facilitated, and was facilitated by, the movement of 'the residuum' from an anti-social status role to a specific economic role as a subsocial sub-proletariat.

The mechanism behind these processes was a new fusion of Race with Nation. The depiction of the English 'nation' prior to 1800 was one that had little room for any working class input. As Colley ([1992] 1996) shows, this began to change during the Napoleonic Wars, when a working class militia began to be mobilised by the state. Disraeli built on this process after he became the leader of the House of Commons in 1866 and began to reorient Tory political strategy towards a form of jingoism that included working class fractions. Disraeli's main focus was the renewal of imperial expansion. Chamberlain extended this populist strategy in the 1890's to include coded attacks on Jews. However, as chapter four shows, Race was also promoted from the Left by the Fabians, many of whom (B. and S. J. Webb, Beveridge, and Stopes) were members of the Eugenics Society. Early Fabianism may be viewed as a synthesis of moral paternalism towards the urban poor and coded attacks on Jews. For example, Beveridge (1905) focussed on 'the residuum' whilst B. Webb (1889: 233) bemoaned "the characteristic love of profit of the Jewish race..." (cited in Gainer, 1972: 87).

By the 1890's therefore, Race and Nation had been fused with class incorporation strategies because they reflected a new sense of political destiny that, in different ways, chimed with new political approaches being developed on both the Right and the Left of the political elite. Antisemitism switched from Pollution to a Race perspective, with Jews being ascribed physiological markers such as hooked noses. The 1890-1914 period could therefore be defined as the one in which Race and Nation became most closely conjoined.

This brings the discussion to the third question, that of whether national identity is 'invented' or based on an 'ethno-symbolic' pool of myths. The thesis has already indicated a qualified preference for the second position, associated with A.D. Smith (see section 1.3 above). Identities are rarely invented from scratch; they require material in the folk culture to mould and manipulate. However, that material is rarely rational and consistent, so the state plays a crucial 'filtering' role to make sense of that material. In so doing, it ensures that those myths re-emerge in a shape that concurs with the dominant interests that control the
state. Thus, national myths of origin can have folk cultural origins, but they will not survive if they cannot gain access to the state.

Consequently, it may be concluded that national identity is not 'invented'; it is 'moulded' by the interests that it encounters when it passes the through state's institutions. Consequently, myths that may begin as radical and subversive will eventually find a conservative form. Nationalism therefore often begins by challenging the state but eventually always becomes its servant.

1.7 Summary of the Case Studies

The five case studies have been designed to explore how the six boundary strategies evolved and intertwined at different stages of the state's development and integration. The first study (chapter two) focusses on the feudal state, and assesses how the new triad of Blood, Property and Pollution consolidated the Norman Conquest. It is argued that existing academic conflicts concerning the nature of English feudalism may be resolved by viewing feudalism as a strategy of military occupation, surveillance and incorporation rather than a system determined by its mode of production. The role of antisemitism in these processes is then examined by dividing it into two stages. The first stage demonstrates that the persecution of Jews was originally a local activity that was done in opposition to the state. The second shows how antisemitism was then centralised by the state when the latter sought new means of normative pacification and non-Jewish sources of revenue. Local anti-Jewish violence was therefore often the last act of mass local violence prior to state centralisation. The expulsion of Jews by the national state in 1290 symbolised the victory of national over local forces. The last part of chapter two then compares the Jewish experience with that of other migrants who experienced violence against them, especially the Flemings and Lombards who were attacked during the 1381 Peasants' Revolt and the 1517 'Evil May Day' riots.

The second study (chapter three) captures the strategic reconstruction of the state following the Reformation. The strategy of Civilisation was born in that period, and the study tracks its subsequent development as a tool of the new Protestant, and increasingly bourgeois, elite. It is argued that Civilisation, rather than Race, originally moulded the capitalist and colonialist English (and eventually British) state because the bourgeoisie's main priority was to impose its normative system on both the aristocracy and the lower orders. It is argued that the direction of boundary strategy was still elitist (lateral) rather than populist (vertical).
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The application of terms such as 'nationalism' or 'democracy' to the 1530-1829 period is therefore misleading, because the bourgeois definition of nation in that period was confined to a small Protestant 'elect'. There was strong bourgeois resistance to any incorporation of labourers into the nation-state.

The third case study (chapter four) examines the processes whereby this bourgeois resistance was finally replaced by populist opportunism following the British Reform Act of 1867. The resultant integration of selected 'respectable' working class fractions into the state's circle of virtue is defined by the thesis as 'incorporation'. It is argued that Race became dominant at that moment and absorbed several elements of Pollution into its eugenic and 'degeneracy' formulae. Furthermore, incorporation led to a major expansion of the state's gatekeeper arm. In the eyes of paternalistic reformers such as the Fabians, the health, education and welfare institutions created to incorporate the 'respectable' working class had to be defended from invasion by 'the residuum' and 'the pauper alien'. The new 'gatekeeper' bureaucracy had a vested interest in exaggerating such threats of 'invasion'. The greater the imagined threat, the more the power and financial security of civil servants would be increased.

This factor was most apparent in the creation of the immigration control apparatus that forms the focus of chapter five. Whilst the existence of working class anti-immigration racism is acknowledged by the case study, it is argued that the state pre-empted that racism. Informal secretive racialised procedures were a mainstay of colonial and postcolonial immigration policy between 1905 and 1962. The formal legislation of 1962-1981 was therefore a formalisation and extension of earlier informal measures rather than an abandonment of a previous 'laissez-faire' approach. Furthermore, whilst state discourse was couched in non-racial Civilisation or Pollution terms, there was little or no discouragement of racist practices 'on the ground' by immigration, policing and welfare officials. Race therefore evolved after 1945 into a pattern of official denial and unofficial cover-up and connivance.

The final study (chapter six) examines the state's response to globalisation. The study argues that the state has utilised centralisation and gentrification methods to realign itself with commodification. This has entailed a further negative construction of minority groups who do not fit the UK's new market profile. This is supported by a fieldwork study of
dispersal policy that shows how the state used a strategy of 'Spatial Pollution'\(^{10}\), focussing on asylum seekers, to increase its control over local housing allocations and voluntary housing charities.

In summary therefore, the case studies focus on key moments in the development of boundary strategy in British State history. The six boundary strategies are shown to have operated in a wide range of combinations, depending on local contingencies and material constraints. The most important finding that emerges from each case study is the capacity of political institutions to transform social identities in accordance with the changing economic and political interests that have flowed through the state.

\(^{10}\) The term 'Spatial Pollution' has been borrowed from Goldberg (2002: 163).
CHAPTER TWO: The Feudal State, 1066-1529

2.1 Feudalism and Boundary Strategy

This case study examines early boundary strategies in four parts. The first shows how an understanding of Blood and Property strategies can clarify academic debates concerning the nature of English feudalism. The second examines how an early Nation strategy utilised an early myth of 'Englishness' to disguise the state's 'alien' Norman roots. The third examines how Pollution facilitated the exploitation of Jews. The fourth then compares anti-Jewish violence with mob violence against other 'alien' workers.

This first section begins with a problem. Historians and sociologists have debated the nature of feudalism since the nineteenth century. Their inability to reach agreement has been due partially to their deployment of different definitions of the term:

Difficulties arise because feudalism is used in different senses. Roughly there is a wide definition favoured by French and German historians and a narrow one preferred by some historians of the Norman Conquest (Clanchy, 1983: 83).

The most influential purveyor of the "wide definition" has been Bloch, who defines feudalism as consisting of:

A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement instead of a salary; the supremacy of a class of specialised warriors; ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man...and in the midst of all this the survival of other forms of association, family and state...(Bloch, 1961: 446; cited in ibid.).

Bloch's definition provides a useful starting point for understanding feudalism, but it is too broad to enable a distinction to be made between English feudalism and the social forms that existed in other medieval societies. As Clanchy comments:

Feudalism in this sense thus embraces all medieval societies between the ninth century and the twelfth, as Bloch intended (ibid.).

Furthermore, some Marxist scholars have imposed a crude materialism in which feudalism has been defined purely as a mode of production. As P. Anderson (1974a: 403) notes, this has led them to dismiss "Laws and States [as] secondary and insubstantial", thereby rendering them "incapable of appreciating the real and rich spectrum of diverse social totalities within the same temporal band of history..."
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Clanchy follows Stenton ([1932] 1961) in arguing that a proper understanding of English feudalism requires the narrower definition favoured by the Norman Conquest historians. This focuses on the Norman State's need for a more tightly defined structure of military bonds. Clanchy notes that this need arose from the specific circumstances of conquest and occupation: "Definition [of roles] was essential because warfare had inevitably destroyed trust and customary practice" (ibid: 86). Feudalism was also characterised by the building of castles (using the forced labour of Saxons) to create "concentrations of power in a hostile land" (ibid.). Castles were structures of surveillance that were designed to keep the Saxons in tightly defined feudal locations. Moreover, castles were physical boundaries that marked and protected new forms of social boundary: the feudal cleavages of Blood and Property.

As Bloch correctly noted, Blood and Property retained some features of Saxon society - in the mechanical structures of "association, family and state" (Bloch, 1961: 446) - but the obligations attached to those structures became far more onerous for those who had to fulfil them. They became literally matters of life and death, as any deviation by subordinates from assigned roles was likely to result in mutilation or execution.

These violent aspects of feudalism have important implications for a critique of Marxist models, such as that of Engels ([1954] 1972), that see the state as determined by the interests of private property. The evidence suggests that Property emerged as a strategy to boost military body power, not simply as a mode of production. It was only later, at the time of the Tudors and the enclosures, that the ruling elite saw itself primarily as a landowner class rather than a warrior class. In other words, the high point of the landowner occurred when feudalism was on the wane. As P. Anderson (1974a: 404) concludes:

In consequence, pre-capitalist modes of production cannot be defined except via their political, legal and ideological superstructures, since these are what determine the type of extra-economic coercion that specifies them [his Italics].

However, Anderson paradoxically fails to apply this same critique to materialist accounts of capitalism. Instead he insists that:

Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is 'purely' economic in form - the wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents which produces, hourly and daily, inequality and oppression. All other previous modes of exploitation operate through extra-economic sanctions - kin, customary, religious, legal or political (ibid: 403, his Italics).
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Anderson therefore fails to grasp how the transition from feudalism to capitalism relied on the continuity of extra-economic features (Polanyi, 1944, Jessop, 2002) as well as the evolution of more sophisticated state techniques of labour exploitation through colonialism and mechanisation. Such phenomena as the Poor Laws, patriarchal rights within the family, debtpeonage, anti-Catholic legislation and the racist structuring of colonial relations were not merely consequences of private property. They were formative in the origins of capitalism, in the same way that the warrior structure of feudalism was an essential precondition (not outcome) of its mode of production. A dichotomy between feudalism and capitalism therefore needs to be replaced by a model that recognises how boundary strategies played formative roles in both systems.

2.2 Church and State and the Origins of Nation

Blood and Property were part of the repressive apparatus that secured the Norman Conquest. By the twelfth century, however, the monarchy had begun to realise that violence was insufficient to achieve total control and stability. Greater success could only be achieved by pacifying the population through normative and spiritual means. The Normans' successors - the Angevins/Plantagenets - therefore gradually changed their focus from that of an occupying power to that of an incorporating power.

As A.D. Smith (1991: 54-57) demonstrates, they did this by using inter-marriage and religious proselytising to fuse their French customs with the ethnic mythology of the English. This created a "lateral ethnie" that was in reality a French/English cultural hybrid, but which had to be presented as culturally 'pure'. An early strategy of Nation therefore emerged that was driven by the need of the Plantagenets to disguise the ad-hoc hybridity and arbitrary legitimacy of their culture behind a veneer of common ethnicity:

Accommodation was the hallmark of developments in England after the Norman Conquest. There was during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries considerable linguistic borrowing, intermarriage and elite mobility between conquering Normans and subordinate upper-stratum Saxons, all within the framework of growing, if interrupted state centralization and an English Catholic ecclesiastical organisation. This meant that the bureaucratic incorporation of subordinate ethnic populations entailed considerable social intercourse and cultural fusion between Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman elements. By the fourteenth century linguistic fusion had

11The Normans were descendants of Vikings (hence the abbreviation 'Norman' from 'Norse man') who had conquered an area of France and renamed it Normandy. They ruled England from 1066 to 1154 but were then replaced by the Plantagenet family, whose descendants ruled England until 1485. The Plantagenets were originally referred to as Angevins because the first Plantagenet monarch, Henry II, was the son of Geoffrey of Anjou and was born in that province (see Schama, 2000: 120-125; Clanchy, 1983: 120-142; Carpenter, 2004: 163-244).
crystallized into Chaucerian English, and a common myth of 'British descent',
propounded in the twelfth century by Geoffrey of Monmouth, had received wide
social and political recognition (ibid: 55-56).

The change from coercion to accommodation can be traced in the development of the
Norman/Plantagenet political structure. When Henry I ascended the throne in 1100, he
issued a 'Coronation Charter' (Carpenter, 2004: 87-89; Clanchy, 1983: 71-72) in which he
promised to uphold some of the key laws of the penultimate Saxon king, Edward the
Confessor. As Henry was often abroad in Normandy, he devolved some of his powers to
his officials, and the Common Law was often developed by circuit judges rather than the
Crown (Carpenter, 2004: 156-158). Royal accountability was further extended by the
Magna Carta of 1215 and the Provisions of Oxford of 1258 - the latter leading to the
formation of the first Parliament under the auspices of Simon de Montfort.

The Plantagenets initiated Nation by appropriating English myths. One of the most potent
of these was the legend of King Arthur, whose 'bones' were supposedly 'discovered' at
Glastonbury in 1191 (see Clanchy, 1983: 20). Similarly, Edward I (who reigned from 1272
to 1307) named himself after the sanctified Edward the Confessor. Moreover, Edward I
invoked Arthurian legend when he embarked on the brutal imperialist annexation of Wales
and Scotland, earning himself the nickname 'Hammer of the Scots' (Schama, 2000). It was
during this campaign that the Plantagenets became defined as primarily 'English', as it
enabled the monarchy's French roots to be submerged in an English enmity towards the
Scots and the Welsh. However, the logical way to achieve a final, decisive camouflage of
the Plantagenets' French roots was to start a long war against the French themselves.

The most significant early formation of English as a 'national' identity therefore took place
during the 'Hundred Years War' that England contested with the French between 1347 and
1451, which was mythologised in accounts of events such as the Battle of Agincourt of
1415. The war was crucial in five ways. Firstly, the state was able to disguise its Norman
roots by siding with the English against the French. Secondly it led to the French language
losing its court privileges, thereby enabling the English tongue (which had originally been
confined to women and peasants) to gradually become the 'national' language (Cottle,
1969). English became the language of Court and replaced Latin as the language of
Parliament in 1362, when "For the first time ever, the Chancellor addressed the assembly
not in French but in English" (Bragg, 2003: 66).
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Thirdly, the war produced the first English iconography in the form of a primitive 'flag' consisting of a red cross laid flat on the ground. This initially had a religious function but its use by monarchs from Henry V onwards was designed to promote allegiance to a Crown that was specifically national in character. Fourthly, the Black Death of 1348 reduced the population by a third, which resulted in the breakdown of feudal bonds and controls. The peasantry began to resemble a rural proletariat, which looked for forms of identity beyond the master-serf relationship of old. This contributed towards the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, which briefly imperilled the monarchy, but once this was suppressed the country rolled towards Agincourt and the new and old classes fell into line behind the flag.

Fifthly, and perhaps most importantly, as Collinson argues, the growth of the Lollard movement under Wyclif led to a contest between France and England as to which territory would become 'the new Israel'. This debate paved the way for the rise of English Protestantism two centuries later:

[It] was then, in the age which produced Chaucer, when poets, politicians and preachers began to utter in English, that many of the mental attributes of the 'Protestant English' originated. It has been shown that the religious symbolism of the incipient nationalism was deliberately borrowed from France, where it had been contrived as an ideology to correct centrifugal and divisive forces...The first Avignon Pope, Clement V, had assured Philip the Fair that the French nation was like 'the people of Israel', 'a peculiar people'. So in 1377 the English Chancellor followed suit, pronouncing in the presence of the young Richard II that 'Israel is understood to be the heritage of God, as is England' (Collinson, 1988: 1).

Collinson's finding is complemented by the argument of Hastings that the genealogy of the concept of 'nation' was facilitated by English translations of the Bible, commencing in the mid-fourteenth century:

[This] usage of the word 'nation' goes back still further to be found in fourteenth-century English translations of the Bible. Thus the translation of a verse in the Book of Revelation (5.9) circa 1350 already has the rendering 'all kyndes & tunge & folkes & nacions', and the Wyclifite Bible a little later 'each lynage and tunge and puple and nacioun', corresponding very closely to the King James version two and a half years later 'of every kindred and tongue, and people, and nation.' These can be compared with the 1960s Jerusalem Bible's 'of every race, people, language and nation' (Hastings, 1997: 16).

However, Hastings makes an academic leap of faith when he infers that Wyclif and later Protestants were using 'nation' in its modern sense, to connote a fixed population governed by one state. Closer textual analysis of vernacular literature reveals that 'nation' has often had a 'jus sanguinis' meaning that can cover a number of populations in several locations.
For example, as Kumar (2003: 112) notes, when Foxe's *The Book of Martyrs* (see Foxe ([1554] 1880) identified a Protestant 'nation', it included Protestants across Europe. Similarly Africans were often identified as a 'nation', as were the Irish (Canny, 1983). None of these 'nations' had single states. It is therefore erroneous to conflate a vernacular medieval notion of nation, which often had no state attached to it, with modern nationalisms such as Zionism whose whole raison d'être was to secure a state.

The focus on Nation in this case study therefore comes with the strict caveat that Nation is not the same thing as nation-state or nationalism. Instead, it should be noted that, even in the nineteenth century, the English had several different geographical and demographic models of Nation operating simultaneously. English imperialism cannot be understood without noting this multiplicity of imagined forms. 'Nation' in British history can mean all of the "English Speaking Peoples" (as in the title of Churchill, [1957] 1991), the history of a 'race' (as in the English as an 'island race') or it can mean patriality (as in the immigration legislation that culminated in the 1981 Nationality Act). The state promotes all these mythical identities but they can have a global form that is not confined to residence on British soil. Multiplicity stems from the fact that, since 1066, England has always been attached to larger political entities such as the Norman Empire, the Angevin Empire, the British Empire and NATO. England has never been confined to its own national borders, so its 'nationalism' cannot be conceived as an attachment to one plot of soil. England is essentially an idea that takes many shapes and forms, and the only way to pin down that form at any time is to trace it back to its strategic root as a creation of the ruling elite.

In summary therefore, by 1415 there was already a primitive national identity beginning to emerge in the culture, cultivated by military adventure and the need to expand the Anglo-Norman ethnie through state incorporation. The next section now turns to the role of Pollution, especially antisemitism, in the creation of that identity.

2.3 Antisemitism and the State

At first glance, it may seem paradoxical to choose antisemitism as an example of statecraft. Between 1066 and 1215, most of the violence and discourse generated against Jews was initiated by middle-ranking Church officials, and was localised rather than nationally co-ordinated. The monarchy was seen as the protector of Jews, due to its initial financial dependence upon them. However, this case study demonstrates that the state turned against the Jews after 1215, when the Anglo-Normans had moved beyond violent coercion.
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of the Saxons and had begun a process of assimilation, thereby creating the need for a myth of homogeneity. At that moment, the Jews became a useful metaphor for Pollution, and this outweighed their economic value.

The state did not originate antisemitic myths. However, their survival throughout the centuries has been enabled by their elective affinity with state tactics, which has made those ideologies seem 'natural' to state actors in the same way that any belief that legitimises an individual's interests will seem natural to that individual. Thus the same English ruling elites that refused to endorse anti-Jewish pogroms in one era were willing to give royal approval to the persecution and expulsion of Jews a few decades later.

The relationship between antisemitism and state interests can be charted in how Jews were depicted as a population. The case study argues that, between 1066 and 1215, the state constructed Jews as a 'homo economicus', for the specific purpose of enabling the Jews to be economically exploited whilst remaining politically dead. This construction was initially sufficient to enable the state to protect Jews from the worst excesses of the Catholic Church, which at that time was beginning to persecute 'heretics' in order to divert attention away from the growing corruption within the Church itself (Mann, 1986). 'Homo economicus' fitted the Church's construction of Jews as 'usurers' as well as 'Christ-killers'. It also enabled the state to ditch the Jews when it became expedient to do so. When the English State found new ways to finance wars without Jewish assistance, the Jews were expelled from Britain in 1290.

The treatment of Jews during this period has prompted some scholars, most notably Netanyahu (1995), to refer to it as 'racism'. The case study argues against this usage and agrees with N. Roth (2002) that the modern conception of 'race' could not have existed in the medieval period. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, in A.D. Smith's terms, the ruling stratum across medieval Europe was a 'horizontal ethnie': in effect, a system of caste. This differs crucially from racism in the fact that racism is 'vertical', incorporating classes from lower social strata into an identity that claims to transcend class. Racism could not therefore be a valid category prior to the modern period because the ruling stratum had no interest in promoting vertical class incorporation into the state.

Secondly, Jews were often given the option of forced conversion to Christianity to avoid punishment. Henry III, for example, "was keen to convert Jews and found a special house for such conversi in what is now Chancery Lane" (Carpenter, 2004: 349; his italics). Many
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such ‘conversi’ were eventually allowed to assimilate into Christian culture, a fact that even Netanyahu eventually conceded. This would not have occurred in a truly racist state: a ‘race’ cannot change its master status and become another ‘race’. The whole point of racist systems is that ‘race’ is irreversible. Thirdly, Jews were not being labelled as ‘inferior’ to Christians: their status was ‘anti-social’, not subsocial. The strategy that led to Jewish persecution was therefore Pollution, not Race.

Pollution was attractive to the state due to its power as a metaphor. If the ‘anti-social’ could be personified as a polluted body or spirit, the ‘social’ could be presented contrastively as ‘pure’. The myth of purity could then be incorporated into the state’s image of itself (using its partnership with the Church) as a sanctified ‘body politic’ or ‘circle of virtue’. The exploitation and expulsion of Jews was therefore part of a much wider process of normative pacification that merged politics with early notions of purity.

The state antisemitism of 1215-1290 in England can be seen as a product of the state’s centralisation of power into this ‘pure body politic’. It was achieved through a closer fusion of Church and state power, with the state taking a greater role in spiritual (and thus normative) matters in order to ensure its own legitimacy. Prior to 1215, local pogroms appeared to express the weakness of the state, and its inability to protect the Jews that it depended upon for loans and taxes. In reality, however, the local killing of Jews was a late display of local power by medieval authorities prior to their final usurpation by the central state. The state would soon assert its supremacy over local religious affairs by taking control of antisemitic violence into its own hands.

This process can be charted in the following historical account of antisemitism in England. Jews, mainly from Rouen, entered England with the Normans following the Battle of Hastings of 1066 and played a key role in financing the Norman State. The Jews’ economic role in European development has sometimes been labelled ‘pariah capitalism’, but this phrase has an unhappy academic history, as it was derived by Weber from the antisemitic writing of Sombart (1913) and assumed that Jewish economic activity was motivated by revenge. Weber was dismissive of Jewish scholarship (his writing on Judaism contains no citations by Jewish authors) and his work characterised the history of the Jews as being founded on vengeance:

In the mind of the pious Jew the morality of the law was inevitably combined with the aforementioned hope for revenge, which suffused practically all the exile and post-exile sacred scriptures...When one compares Judaism with other salvation
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The concept of pariah capitalism is therefore avoided in this study in favour of an approach that recognises how Jewish identity was shaped by the relationship between Catholicism, money lending and state formation. This produced two forces that formed a deadly combination. On the one hand, the Church labelled Jews as Christ-killers and concocted blood libels against them. On the other, the state exacted massive financial tariffs from Jews whilst treating them as dead in every aspect of identity except finance, resulting in a myth of Jews as polluted 'homo economicus'.

Chazan (1997) and Lipton (1991) have shown that the association of Jews with usury began in the twelfth century. Although moneylenders always had a negative reputation before that time, they were not depicted as Jews. It was therefore the state's compulsion of Jews into the money-lending role (by banning them from most other trades) that initiated the association between usury and Judaism.

The myth of 'homo economicus' was fostered by two roles that Jews were compelled to play within the Norman feudal system. Firstly, as Dobson (1974) shows in his brilliant study of medieval York, Jews acted as 'middlemen' in the transfer of land from declining nobles to rising landowners. Jews would loan money to the declining group, who often defaulted on the debt. The new, rising feudal class would then 'buy' the debt in exchange for the debtor's lands. Secondly, Jews paid exorbitant taxes that helped the monarchy survive several economic crises. It is arguable that Jews financed castle building and may even (ironically) have subsidised the Crusades.

The myth of Jewish economic Pollution enabled Church and state to align their powers behind a new fusion of 'spiritual' and 'economic' pollution myths. Prior to 1215, "A strand of Church thought...had always been that the Jews should be preserved and protected because they were visible reminders of Christ's passion" (Carpenter, 2004: 488). As it became closer to the state, however, the Catholic Church had become prone to financial and sexual scandal, which would gradually lead to sceptical 'heresies' being voiced against the Papacy by such groups as the Albigensians and the Lollards. Antisemitism, along with the Crusades, enabled the Church to deflect these scandals on to a scapegoat. The state became a partner in those processes in order to utilise the state's anti-heretical mission to punish deviants from its own rule and authority.
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Pollution strategy was not confined to England. By 1215, the influence of the Church across Europe had enabled several monarchies to borrow its antisemitic myths. This can be illustrated by the remarks of the Capetian monarch Louis IX (1215-1270), as reported by a contemporary chronicler:

William of Chartres, in concluding his report on the discussion between Louis IX and his advisers with respect to Jewish usury, has the king speaking of Jews as infecting his land with their poison. The discussion ends with the king telling his advisers: “Let those prelates do what pertains to them concerning those subject Christians, and I must do what pertains to me concerning the Jews. Let them abandon usury, or they shall leave my land completely, in order that it no longer be polluted with their filth” (Chazan, 1997: 122).

The Church combined these usury myths with the ‘blood libel’, accusing Jews of being ritual murderers. This fiction was first concocted in the first century AD by the Greek propagandist Apion, and claimed that Jews crucified Christian children, pierced their sides and used their blood in the baking of Matzot bread for Passover. The libel had been seldom used prior to the eleventh century, but was revived in France after the First Crusade of 1089 and had reached England in 1144, when the Church had accused Jews of murdering a twelve-year-old boy called William in Norwich. However, the state had refused to endorse the Norwich libel. In contrast, when a blood libel was initiated 111 years later, concerning the death in 1255 of the boy Hugh of Lincoln, the state took a leading role in the libel, resulting in nineteen Jews being executed on the personal instruction of Henry III. As Carpenter (2004: 349) notes, the Lincoln blood libel was “the first time the government itself had sanctioned belief in such delusions.” It therefore marked a key milestone in the state’s centralisation of antisemitism, and the ‘nationalisation’ of Pollution as a specific instrument of the state.

The targeting of Jews had also been made more likely by forcing them to wear the ‘yellow badge’ (the ‘tabula’). This was imposed in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council, which had been convened by Pope Innocent III. This ‘shaming mechanism’ was clearly designed to signify the Jews as a pariah group and make them more ‘visible’ to those who may have wished to abuse them.

These myths and mechanisms gave the state a pretext to inflict massive taxation upon Jews. The king could also claim moneys owed to the Jews for himself. For example, Stephen I (who reigned from 1135 to 1154) freed Christians from the debts owed to Jews on condition that a part of the debt was paid to the king. In 1216, Henry III ascended the
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throne and embarked upon a policy of 'tallage' (arbitrary taxation) that left many Jews penniless (Richardson, 1960). In 1229 Jews were forced to pay half the value of their property in taxes. Between 1241 and 1255 taxes on Jews amounted to £66,000, approximately half the community's total wealth (Carpenter, 2004: 349). One of the reasons for the Jews' final expulsion in 1290 was that the state has bled them to such an extent that they had nothing left to tax.

2.4 Comparisons with Violence against Other Minorities

The intended and unintended consequences of Nation and Pollution strategies can be gauged by comparing antisemitic violence with incidents of mob violence against other migrant groups in this period.

Violence against Jews was initially a local affair, as can be illustrated by the pogroms of 1189-1190. These were described in the contemporary Chronicle of Richard of Devizes (Richard of Devizes, 1963) and have been studied at length by Dobson (1974). At the Coronation of Richard I in September 1189, Jews were excluded from the servicle in Westminster Abbey. The crowds, led by many Crusaders, took this as a signal that the new king had no desire to protect the Jews, and a pogrom took place a few days later. When Richard dealt leniently with the rioters, the pogrom spread to Norwich, Bury St Edmonds and York (Schama, 2000: 153). In London alone, thirty Jews were murdered. Worse followed on 16th March 1190 (the feast day of Shabbat ha-Gadol), when clergymen and nobles murdered 150 Jews at Clifford's Tower in York in order to annul their debts. The bonds of debt were taken from the vaults of York Minster and burned on the church floor. The following month, on Palm Sunday, 57 Jews were killed in Bury St Edmonds and the remainder expelled from the city.

The monarchs who preceded Richard I had protected Jews from such violence because the Normans had relied on Jewish finance to fund the Crusades, build castles and cathedrals, and to create a power base that was independent of the Church. Raising such funds required high rates of interest to be charged on loans by Jews to Christians. Disaster therefore befell the Jews was when the state found new sources of finance. As Schama (2000: 196) and Carpenter (2004: 471-475) reveal, this occurred in 1272-1275 when Edward I oversaw the development of a new system of banking using Italian cash advances from the banking family, the Riccardi of Lucca.
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With this system in place, Edward introduced the Statute of Jewry of 1275, which banned usury and deprived Jews of the protection of the state. Edward then executed 269 Jews in 1278 for alleged 'coin clipping and counterfeiting'. In 1287 Edward imprisoned 3000 Jews and demanded a ransom in return for their freedom. The ransom was paid but in 1290 the Jews were finally expelled from Britain and would not be readmitted until 1656. The expulsion resulted in all Jewish money and property being confiscated by the Crown. A number of Jews also drowned, or were more likely murdered, when their ship failed to complete the journey across the English Channel.

This catalogue of abuse raises the question as to whether the treatment of Jews was unique or part of a wider trend. The latter case is made by R.I. Moore (1987), who argues that the period 950-1250 coincided with the formation of a 'persecuting society' across Europe. Moore cites the persecution of lepers and homosexuals as being equivalent to the abuse heaped on Jews. Moore's analysis fits the chronology of Jewish experiences in England. However, although Moore agrees that state strategy was central to this process, his thesis is unable to adequately explain the leading role that was played in pogroms by middle-ranking friars and bureaucrats who often felt antagonistic towards the state's centralising tendencies. He also overlooks the unique economic role that the state imposed on the Jews. It is also important to note the unique Biblical origins of antisemitism, which placed Jews in the uniquely demonic role of 'Christ killers'. The thesis being presented here suggests that it is necessary to separate the origins of Pollution myths from the state's tactical utilisation and centralisation of those myths. The state did not invent ritual murder myths, but it was the primary actor in ensuring the survival of those myths across the centuries. This is where a theory of boundary strategy, viewing the state as a tactical filter of myths, departs from a conspiracy theory that depicts state actors as conscious inventors of demonising myths.

The theoretical interpretation of violence against minorities is complicated by two further factors. Firstly, such violence was often carried out by mobs as part of anti-state political activity. This was clearly the case, for example, in the Peasants Revolt of 1381 (see below). It was therefore not immediately apparent that such violence would benefit the state, even though ultimately it did serve state interests by distancing the state from the xenophobia that legitimised its own territorial borders. Secondly, violence was often an unintended consequence of state action, rather than the state's own design. The state clearly benefited from a depiction of Jews as 'homo economicus', as it forced Jews to remain in the usury role that financed the treasury, but it had little interest prior to 1215 in the killing of Jews.
To illustrate this point, the experiences of Jews can be compared and contrasted with those of Flemish and Walloon migrants. As with the Jews, these migrants from the Low Countries first came into England in significant numbers during the reign of William the Conqueror, whose maternal grandmother was a Walloon. The principal source of this migration was the weaving trade, which needed the unique skills of Flemish weavers in order to capitalise on England’s expanding production of wool. By the reign of Edward III (1327-1371), Flemish weavers were being actively encouraged to settle in Norfolk to boost the flagging worsted trade, especially in Norwich and Worstead:

Early in his reign Edward III, married to a Flemish princess, actively encouraged [the] Immigration of Flemings to “exercise their mysteries in the Kingdom”. Attracted by abundant supplies of wool in England, a considerable number of weavers settled in and around Norwich where the landscape resembled their native country and where Norfolk sheep provided the same long staple as they had used in Flanders (www.worstead.co.uk/info.htm).

This migration was therefore a simple matter of political economy, but it had profound sociological consequences. Marx identified the weaving trade as the principal incentive for the driving of peasants from the land, which ultimately created the labour conditions necessary for the birth of capitalism:

In insolent conflict with king and parliament, the great feudal lords created an incomparably larger proletariat by the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the same feudal right as the lord himself, and by the usurpation of the common lands. The rapid rise of the Flemish wool manufactures, and the corresponding rise of the price of wool in England, gave the direct impulse to these evictions. The old nobility had been devoured by the great feudal wars. The new nobility was the child of its time, for which money was the power of all powers. Transformation of arable land into sheep-walks was, therefore, its cry (Marx, [1873] 1999: 367).

The Flemish weavers played an unwitting and unplanned role in the transition of England from a feudal to a capitalist state. The growth of the weavers as an occupational stratum coincided with the Black Death of 1348-49, which reduced the population of England by a third. This reduction weakened the bonds of feudalism because it reduced the ratio of peasant to landowner and thus encouraged the peasantry to move from parish to parish and charge the landowners for its labour. This in turn resulted in new class formations, including the emergence of ‘kulak’ peasants who were able to buy their own land, and yeoman craftsmen who were able to charge a higher price for their labour. Some of the ‘kulak’ small landowners employed their own labour, thereby converting a peasantry into a small-scale rural proletariat.
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The nobility initially responded to this new formation by introducing the Statute of Labourers in 1351, which initiated a set of wage controls and restrictions on trade unionism that lasted until the 1830's. These controls were designed to protect the crumbling feudal structure by preventing workers from using their new bargaining power. However, their effect was to make labour more militant, resulting in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. Some of these labourers also eventually became able to move from parish to parish, which diminished the ability of the nobility to tie the peasantry to the land. The nobility initially responded to this new formation by introducing the Statute of Labourers in 1351, which initiated a set of wage controls and restrictions on trade unionism that lasted until the 1830's. These controls were designed to protect the crumbling feudal structure by preventing workers from using their new bargaining power. However, their effect was to make labour more militant, resulting in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381.

The class system of medieval England therefore underwent a fundamental change after the Black Death, not just in its structure but also in its culture. There was always a danger that the groups who were affected by those changes would seek out Flemings and other 'aliens' as scapegoats for their problems. The Peasants' Revolt was the key example of this trend, given that it included Flemings among its targets for looting and lynching. The main inflow of weavers had taken place in the same period - the middle of the fourteenth century - that the Statute of Labourers and exorbitant levels of taxation were placing great strains on class relations. The fact that the weavers were 'free' persons, with no feudal bonds, fed the belief that the Flemish denizens were more privileged than 'true born Englishmen'. As Schama (2000: 252) describes, the rioters targeted these Flemings in a similar manner to that which had been inflicted upon Jews:

Thirty-five Flemings, who had replaced the Jews as the scapegoat of choice - the personification of money - were dragged from sanctuary in St. Martin in Vintry and decapitated on the same block, one after another.

The rioters also killed a number of Lombards, a group of alien financiers who had taken the financial role of moneylending that had been previously assigned to Jews (Froissart, 1978).

The killings of 1381 therefore had much in common with antisemitic violence in England and Spain. In each case, violence that may have had anti-governmental origins resulted in the deaths of minorities. There was also, in each case, a close involvement of middle-ranking religious officials - the Peasants Revolt leaders had close ties with the Lollards who
followed John Wyclif and were seen as heretics as well as traitors to the state (Schama, 2000: 238). In addition, the Flemings had a similar problematic ‘middle man’ position in relation to the fact that they belonged to the state but did not enjoy the full status of subjects. The Flemings were ‘denizens’: they enjoyed economic access that aroused jealousy among the population, but they did not enjoy full integration as subjects into the native population. Again, as with the Jews, the fact that they stood outside the feudal system may have seemed to be an advantage, but in reality it became a curse. It meant that, no matter how successful or ‘English’ in manners the immigrant became, he could never escape the status of ‘the other’.

Most importantly of all, this episode illustrates again how the state was formed against the background of anti-alien feeling, which the state had originally opposed for financial reasons. Although the Peasants’ Revolt temporarily jeopardised the state’s rule, the end result was to make the state stronger, because anti-alien feeling helped to foment an English identity that would begin as a radical identity before settling into a conservative one. As with most incipient national identities, a myth of Englishness began by opposing the status quo but then became the status quo.

The final example of violence against minorities during the feudal period illustrates the importance of the state in regulating the life cycle, and how this role can lead to contradictions between moral regulation and xenophobia. The ‘Evil May Day’ riots of 1517 were instigated by two London apprentices who "had, within hours, mustered hundreds of others to rise on May Day against foreigners" (Brigden, 2000: 174). Apprentices were always susceptible to feelings of violent resentment because the state artificially delayed their entry into adult life (and thus into full social status) by forcing them to serve long years of training under a master craftsman. Some of these masters were 'foreigners'. A pattern can therefore be deduced, albeit an unintended one, between the state's moulding of social discipline among young adults and the feelings of resentment that would be channelled against a foreign scapegoat.

In conclusion, therefore, the feudal period began with the violence of the Normans and ended with violence against the descendants of the ‘foreigners’ the Normans had brought with them. During the intervening period the state and its partners (especially the Church) erected boundaries of Blood, Nation, Property and Pollution that protected the state from the violence that was generated by the intended and unintended consequences of its actions. These connections between the state, social boundaries and violence against
minorities did not end when feudalism met its demise. Instead, boundary strategy carried them forwards into the Protestant age, which in turn fostered them into early modernity and beyond, ensuring their survival to the present day.
3.1 The Transformation of the State

This second case study traces the evolution of boundary strategy from the Reformation of 1529-1536 to the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. For most of this period, England (expanding to 'Britain' from 1707) was officially a Protestant state, excluding Catholics from the franchise and all offices of state. Protestantism provided a sense of civilising mission for new English elites, who believed they were an 'elect', a chosen few selected by God to carry out his wishes.

Furthermore, as Greenfeld (1993: 43-47) argues, the class composition of these elites underwent rapid change during and after the Reformation. New class fractions made up of arrivistes (Fenton, 2003: 162) were created by the enclosure of agricultural land (see section 3.3 below), the transfer of power from Church to state, the expansion of world trade, and the promotion of Protestants within the state bureaucracy. However, these arrivistes faced resistance from the old feudal order, which clung on to its old rights for as long as it could, until the Civil War of 1640-1649 and Glorious Revolution of 1688 forced it to either assimilate into the new order or face death. Greenfeld (1993) argues that nationalism was born in the victory of the new order over this old one: the Reformation thus gave birth not just to nationalism but also to democracy.

As Kumar (2003: 95-100) argues, however, Greenfeld overplays the significance of nationalism in this process. She exaggerates its penetration of the social order and is guilty of a serious misreading of history in her claims that there was a 'democratic' process at work in the Tudor period. Kumar (2003: 97) also shows that Greenfeld's argument is less than novel, as it essentially reproduces the claim made by Pollard (1907) of Tudor democratisation. That thesis can be easily debunked. As Brigden (2000) shows, Henry VIII and Elizabeth I created the most absolutist state in English history. The Act of Supremacy of November 1534 gave the king "the power to determine doctrine...a power [that] was unprecedented, and which shocked even Luther" (Brigden, 2000: 120). This was accompanied by the executions of 308 people for treason12 between 1532 and 1540 (ibid: 163). Moreover, the Tudor period witnessed the introduction of a secret police under

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12 The execution usually involved the accused being 'hanged, drawn and quartered', a procedure that required them to be disembowelled whilst still conscious. Foucault (1979) described the same procedure in a French context.
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Walsingham, punitive Poor Laws and Whipping Acts for beggars, greater use of the death penalty for 'sodomy' (ibid: 163), and the burnings of hundreds of heretics. The state had never previously committed so many acts of cruelty or been so deeply involved in the moral regulation of social behaviour.

Moreover, when Parliament overthrew absolutism by literally cutting off the king's head in 1649, it simply transferred the king's powers to itself. Even the famed Glorious Revolution of 1688 retained the holding of 'rights' within the state:

The 1688 settlement was of great and lasting constitutional importance in some respects, but it did not acknowledge any rights arising out of subjecthood; rather, the rights of subjects were entrusted to Parliament. The Whig view of history glossed over the difference, treating Parliament's rights and subjects' rights as virtually interchangeable, or rather assuming that the former were inevitably an expression of the latter. Today, this view is still held by some people in the political parties. The House of Commons is acclaimed as the guardian of people's liberties by many Labour politicians and Trade Unionists as well as by many Conservatives and centrists. Equally, there is an opposed view in all parties calling for a new Bill of Rights or a written constitution. But the history of English law and British politics has laid no groundwork for a discussion of citizens' rights. Not only was subjecthood left an obedient status by the 1688 settlement; subjecthood as nationality became rapidly more uncertain and confused from that time onward... (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 70).

National identity in this period was therefore still one of a "lateral ethnie" rather than a "vertical" one (A.D. Smith, 1991: 52-56). Nation was simply a device employed by a new elite to discredit an old one by accusing it of being controlled by an alien Pope and descended from an alien 'Norman yoke'. However, Greenfeld is correct to claim that many of the class changes of 1530-1688 created an elite template for national identity that could be adapted by middle-ranking groups later on. Protestants brought a new emphasis on morals and manners into the Court, which would gradually undergo 'bourgeois' cultural influences. The Reformation also made the Bible available in English, creating the possibility of a vernacular literary culture that would eventually filter down into a popular demand for almanacs and pamphlets. These changes created the literary climate that was necessary for nationalism to filter into the middle classes and the militia that fought in the Napoleonic Wars (Colley, [1992] 1996). The full-blooded nationalism of Queen Victoria's reign can therefore be traced back to the consequences of the Reformation, but via a different route from that proposed by Greenfeld. Instead of the state becoming democratised by the Reformation, it is more accurate to speak of the state becoming bureaucratised by it.
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The long-term nationalist consequences of this bureaucratisation were due to the dependence of bureaucracy upon the promotion of talent on merit, and the use of a vernacular literature to spread its ideology.

The evolution of boundary strategy in this period, as discussed in the remainder of this case study, can therefore be viewed as being driven by a post-Reformation bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was influenced by a new capitalist class but was also driven primarily by an elitist religion that assumed that very few of the nation's subjects were among the 'saved'. The result was a combination of Civilisation, Nation, Blood, Pollution and Property strategies that still excluded most of the nation's population, and that created newly stigmatised identities for overseas populations.

3.2 The Relationship between Boundary Strategies

Civilisation and Nation gained their strategic languages in this period. Equally importantly, they affected the structure of the other strategies. For example, Blood continued to organise myths of descent, and was boosted by the emergence of Anglo Saxon antiquarianism during the Reformation, but it also became far more closely aligned with a discourse of manners, morals and culture than in the feudal period.

Moreover, overseas voyages and early colonial exploitation now provided a series of 'others' with which the identity of the English could be contrasted (Curtin, 1964; Walvin, 2000). As section 3.4 argues, this gave rise to a new ideology of 'whiteness', but this 'whiteness' was a Civilisation construction rather than a Race one. This argument puts this thesis at odds with most of the literature on 'whiteness', which tends to assume that 'white' is always a 'racial' identity. The main exception to this rule is Bonnett (2000: 20-21), who argues that non-European societies had concepts of 'whiteness', "But they did not treat being white as a natural category nor did they invest so much of their identity within it" [his italics]. In contrast, "Europeans turned whiteness into a fetish object, a talisman of the natural..." (ibid: 21; his Italics). However, Bonnett assumes that 'white' was already a racial category in England "as early as the sixteenth century" (ibid: 30).

Bonnett's view is mistaken because it overlooks the fact that, prior to the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie used 'whiteness' as a secondary signifier to connote cultural and religious attributes. Culture dominated nature in this picture, not vice versa. 'Whiteness' was a symbol of virginity and a synonym for the virtues attached to membership the Christian
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When 'whiteness' was associated with 'blue blood', its meaning was clearly to connote caste rather than race. Bonnett himself acknowledges that the first use of 'white' as 'ethnic type' cited by the Oxford English Dictionary was by the "English cleric C. Nesse, in 1680" in reference to "'The White Line (The Posterity of Seth)" (Bonnett, 2000: 16). This in turn referred to a myth of Biblical descent - "a post-Flood division of mankind" (ibid.) - which had first been cited in English in 1578 by Best in his chronicle of the voyages of Frobisher (see Hannaford, 1996: 166; Fredrickson, 2002: 44; Braude, 2001: 17-18). There was therefore a Biblical, pre-racial version of 'whiteness' that was intimately tied into bourgeois Civilisation identities long before Race came on to the scene.

The emergence of a proletariat from agricultural enclosure also gave English identity a new class dimension that would encourage the formation of a Civilisation cleavage. Conversely, Pollution did not disappear during this period. Protestantism was still enforced, like its Catholic predecessor, through accusations of heresy. Furthermore, Catholicism was portrayed as a 'Papist Plot', thereby justifying the creation of a surveillance apparatus by Walsingham during the 1580's. Anti-Catholic paranoia was still evident as late as the 1868 and 1874 General Elections, when an alliance of Conservatives and Orangemen won the majority of Parliamentary seats in Lancashire mill towns such as Oldham and Stockport (see section 4.2.5 below). Pollution and Civilisation were therefore complimentary rather than conflicting strategies. Portraying the Irish as uncivilised (pre-social) did not reduce the prevalence of Pollution (anti-social) discourses.

Instead, Civilisation and Pollution were switched according to the needs of class and religious politics. Civilisation depictions of the Irish could be extended in the bourgeois mind to include the whole of the working class. In the proletarian mind, however, Civilisation would be far less effective because the stigmatised features of Irish culture (myths of overcrowding, poor sanitation, drunkenness, and so on) could also be found in bourgeois depictions of working class culture. Depictions of the Irish marketed for a working class audience therefore focussed on religion not culture. This only changed when fractions of the working class began to see themselves in 'respectability' terms (Civilisation) and Race terms in the late-Victorian period. Whilst 'respectability' was the exclusive possession of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, Civilisation could only mould consciousness above the working class, not within it.
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A further feature of the Protestant period was the interdependence of religion and science. It is important to note that science had no institutional or intellectual autonomy in this period. Physicists such as Newton and biologists such as Linnaeus were studying a universe that they still believed was created by God. Consequently, as Kidd (1999: 11) argues, "the study of ethnic difference in the early modern period was largely harnessed to religious questions, rather than vice versa". This is crucial when considering the genealogy of 'ethnocentrism' prior to the emergence of Social Darwinism from the 1860's onwards (C.R. Darwin, 1871; Banton, 1998). Any academic consideration of 'ethnic' ideas prior to that time that divorced them from religious considerations would be bound to suffer from teleology and false interpretation. It would be teleological because it would assume that the victory of science over religion was historically inevitable, when in reality it was politically contingent. It would be false because ethnic theories had already undergone several religious transformations before Social Darwinism gave them a secular form.

As was noted above, the earliest ethnic categories were pre-racial and can be traced to an 'ethnic theology'. This claimed that Noah's three sons - Ham, Shem and Japheth - had dispersed their offspring to all parts of the globe. Some of these 'lineages' had then fallen under false gods. Some of Ham's progeny had migrated to Africa and acquired 'burnt skins' whilst worshipping 'heathen' or 'pagan' gods, whilst one of Japheth's lines had formed into a nomadic 'Scythian' tribe that had eventually spawned the 'heathen' tribes of North America and Ireland (Spenser, [1597], 1763). By the middle of the eighteenth century, this 'ethnic theology' had begun to influence scholars such as Linnaeus into producing the first 'racial science' typologies. The knowledge structure of scientific racism therefore had an unacknowledged religious antecedent. However, it would be a fundamental error to 'backdate' Race to the earlier 'ethnic' categories, because the latter were elitist caste-like constructions that excluded most of the working class in Britain itself.

It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that colonialism established a pattern whereby Race and Civilisation became conjoined strategies. Even then, if religious or Enlightenment thinkers began to object to the depiction of Africans as subsocial, the hegemonic discourse could switch to a religious depiction of them as 'pre-social'. This latter depiction became known as the 'noble savage' myth and was favoured by philanthropists who campaigned for the abolition of slavery (Fairchild, 1928; Curtin, 1964: 48-51; Lorimer, 1978: 69-91). This 'allowed' Africans to attain the status of humans rather than that of beasts, but their human status was that of a child, not an adult. This assumption can still be uncovered in Orientalist
discourses concerning postcolonial Africa, encoded in such phrases as 'tribalism', 'underdevelopment', 'economic backwardness', and so on.

The complex, shifting relationship between Race and Civilisation in British colonialism can also be traced through the careers of philosophers such as Locke and Hume, and (after 1830) Mill and Carlyle, and politicians such as Gladstone and Disraeli. These reveal a conflict between 'civilised' philanthropy and brutal dehumanisation for the purposes of profit that was never entirely resolved by the state. Instead, a 'twin track' emerged whereby politicians used Civilisation arguments in Parliament whilst 'turning a blind eye' towards atrocities committed by racists in colonies, such as that which took place Jamaica in the mid-1860's (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2001). Furthermore, whilst politicians would disavow crude racism in Parliament, their constant promotion of 'British' virtues of Civilisation, linking them to the 'Anglo Saxon' virtues of an imagined English ancestry, would create a pervasive subtext of Race beneath the veil of Civilisation. This twin track would provide the terms by which the 'white' working class could be incorporated into the imperial mission, especially in the eras of Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and the Fabians who embraced eugenics (see chapter four below).

Finally, as section 3.6 argues, this period saw the expansion of Property as a strategy that equated Civilisation with property rights. The right of a group to enter 'the social' was predicated on its ownership of land and capital. Property thus became a convenient mechanism to exclude certain groups from the universalism that was expressed in bourgeois conceptions of freedom and democracy. Consequently, as with Race later on, Property operated as an escape clause for dominant interests that were threatened by the universal principles of the Enlightenment and social contract. Moreover, as with phenomena such as gender, age and mental illness, Property emerged as a 'silent exclusion': a boundary that was rarely made explicit in discourse. Exclusion had to be deduced from the criteria of inclusion, which were themselves falsely presented as universal and fair in character (Pateman, 1988; Goldberg, 2002).

3.3 Civilisation and Elite Class Fusion

The strategy of Civilisation was initially built around on a fusion of aristocratic and bourgeois classes that was predicated on a discourse of manners. One of the best analyses of this fusion is The Civilizing Process by Elias, a study that was originally published in two volumes (written in German) in 1939. Elias ([1939] 1994 traced the relationship between
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the emergence of absolutist monarchy in Europe and the appearance of books and pamphlets that increasingly stressed the need for self-restraint in personal behaviour. Over a period of time, the work of writers such as Erasmus contributed towards a social habitus in which discipline was increasingly internalised to form patterns of self-restraint that became self-reflexive. A cultural formation came into being that was ‘taken for granted’ and far more centralised than previous European cultural patterns. As Elias ([1939] 1994: 267-268) argued:

What slowly begins to form at the end of the Middle Ages is not just one courtly society here and another there. It is a courtly aristocracy embracing Western Europe with its centre in Paris, its dependencies in all other courts, and offshoots in all the other circles which claimed to belong to society, notably the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie and to some extent even broader layers of the middle class […] The members of this multiform society speak the same language, they read the same books, they have the same taste, the same manners, and - with differences of degree - the same style of living.

Elias noted the ‘lateral’ movement of this process, showing that aristocracies have closer ties across national borders than with their own lower classes in this period. His account is therefore comparable to A.D. Smith's model of "lateral ethnie": a caste-like structure with its own "esprit de corps" (1991: 52-58). Elias argued that this lateral movement only began to fade when bourgeois groups emerged and began to exploit the development of national identities in a vertical direction:

[Social] communication between court and court, i.e. within courtly-aristocratic society, remains for a long time closer than between courtly society and other strata in the same country; one expression of this is their common language. Then, from about the middle of the eighteenth century, earlier in one country and somewhat later in another, but always in conjunction with the rise of the middle classes and the gradual displacement of the social and political centre of gravity from the court to the various national bourgeois societies, the ties between the courtly-aristocratic societies of different nations are slowly loosened even if they are never entirely broken. The French language gives way, not without violent struggles, to the bourgeois, national languages even in the upper class. And courtly society itself becomes increasingly differentiated in the same way as bourgeois societies, particularly when the old aristocratic society loses its centre once and for all in the French Revolution. The national form of integration displaces that based on social estate (ibid.).

These events occurred earlier in England than elsewhere, due to the earlier emergence of a mercantile bourgeoisie. The events that Elias ascribed to the eighteenth century in France may therefore have occurred as early as the sixteenth century in England, with their roots going back to the fourteenth (the weakening of feudalism by plague). Furthermore, the
violence of the Hundred Years War was arguably far more brutal than the equivalent European internecine disputes that were essentially ‘family feuds’. The English began to express hatred of the French, and this resulted in English elites acquiring the semblance of a ‘national’ identity much earlier than their neighbours did. In addition, Protestantism and the politics of the Reformation clearly alienated the Tudors from their continental ‘kin’ in Spain and France. This increased after the Armada was seen off in 1588.

The process was also closely tied to naval conquest and the subjugation of the Irish. This enabled the English to imitate the Versailles and Habsburg courts in their imperialist manners, but on a stage that was colonial rather than domestic. That is to say, whereas the stage on which the civilising process was played out in France was the royal court, the English relocated the stage to Ireland, India and North America, with a colonial bourgeoisie behaving like an aristocracy, and a ‘native’ population taking the role of the peasantry. This explains why the monarchy could retain the trappings of absolutism in its overseas relations whilst being constrained by a bourgeois class locally. Civilisation enabled both processes to co-exist: the bourgeoisie ‘civilising’ the aristocracy whilst both classes acted as aristocrats in the colonies. The history of this process is explored in the next section.

3.4 Civilisation, Protestantism and Empire: Anti-Irish Discourses, 1555-1665

The emergence of a ‘Civilisation’ strategy in the treatment of outsiders was prompted by three concurrent events that had taken shape in the 1550’s. Firstly, as noted above, due to bourgeois pressures the aristocracy was becoming more self-conscious about ‘manners’ and ‘civility’ and this began to filter into the Tudors’ courtly lifestyles. Secondly, the transformation of agriculture from crop farming to wool manufacture (prompted in part by the Flemish weavers discussed in section 2.4 above) resulted in a massive migration of paupers from the land into the cities. These were treated harshly by the newly ‘reformed’ Church, primarily due to the influence of the Calvinist work ethic on attitudes towards unemployment and begging. Thirdly, the colonial campaign in Ireland that commenced in 1555 depicted the Gaelic Irish in ‘ethnic’ rather than spiritual terms, due to the influence of ethnic theology and early anthropology on the naval classes that largely commanded the Irish project. The following discussion outlines how the second and third factors combined with the first factor to produce the colonial version of the ‘civilising process’ discussed above.
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With regard to the production of paupers, migration played a key role in the process, but an unintended one. The state had expected Flemish weavers to revive a flagging wool trade and thus to reinvigorate the old rural economy that had been damaged by the Black Death. Instead, the weavers helped to undermine the old feudal system and facilitate its unravelling. Whilst the state used Flemish immigration for the purpose of political economy, it did not foresee or control the real economic forces that such migration unleashed. This was because the state was operating in the interests of regressive capital in the late medieval period, by attempting to prevent the collapse of a feudal system that market forces had already left behind.

During the reigns of the Tudors, as Marx noted in chapters 27-29 of Capital, the state introduced various measures to restrict the size of landholdings in order to prevent the eviction of the peasantry from the land following the collapse of feudalism. The nobility simply ignored these measures:

In insolent conflict with king and parliament, the great feudal lords created an incomparably larger proletariat by the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the same feudal right as the lord himself, and by the usurpation of the common lands. The rapid rise of the Flemish wool manufactures, and the corresponding rise of the price of wool in England, gave the direct impulse to these evictions. The old nobility had been devoured by the great feudal wars. The new nobility was the child of its time, for which money was the power of all powers. Transformation of arable land into sheep-walks was, therefore, its cry (Marx, [1873] 1999: 367).

Furthermore, Henry VIII unwittingly exacerbated this problem through an unintended consequence of the Reformation, namely the eviction of the peasantry from the vast areas of land that had previously been owned by the Catholic Church. The state was therefore implicated, albeit unwittingly, in the processes of proletarianisation and pauperism that it had attempted to prevent.

Within a few decades, the monarchy had become conscious of the new class of paupers that had been created by these evictions. Marx cited Defoe’s claim that, during a journey through the countryside, Elizabeth I was heard to exclaim, "Pauper ubique jacet" ["the poor are everywhere oppressed"] (Marx, [1873] 1999: 367). This experience persuaded her to introduce a Poor Law to contain the problems of destitution and begging. However, this measure mixed poor relief with a highly punitive Protestant morality. The Poor Law of 1572 instructed the authorities to carry out a series of punishments, resulting in 'sturdy
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beggars' being placed in stocks, whipped, and, in some cases, branded with a hot iron behind the ear.

The reasons for this severity can be found in Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, [1905] 2001: hereafter shortened to PE). Weber's approach in PE was to identify those aspects of Calvinism that promoted psychological devotion to a 'calling' (beruf) and constant labour, thereby supplanting the Catholic emphasis on confession and universalism. Weber's thesis argued that Calvinism convinced its believers that their fate was predestined because God chose it before they were born. The answer to the question, 'Am I among the saved?' could therefore only be found by surveying how successfully the individual had pursued the 'calling' that had been assigned to him by God prior to his birth. Calvinism therefore transformed the meaning of poverty from a status that could imply virtue into a condition that could only mean the failure to pursue a 'calling', thereby proving that the poor must have incurred God's displeasure. Weber noted that Catholicism tolerated begging but Calvin strictly outlawed the practice. He also quoted Adams' Works of the English Puritan Divines (Adams, 1845-1847; see Bibliography), in which Adams castigated "the vagrant rogues whose lives are nothing but an exorbitant course; the main begging." (PE: 232n). He then went on to note that:

In the mendicant orders, medieval Catholicism had not only tolerated begging, but actually glorified it. Moreover, because they offered to the wealthy the opportunity for good works (the giving of alms), secular beggars were occasionally depicted as a "status group" - and valued, accordingly, more positively...A formulation of severe laws on the treatment of the poor awaited the participation of the Puritans, who then fundamentally changed the old laws. This could occur because the Protestant sects and the strict Puritanical communities actually did not know begging in their midst (PE: 243n).

Calvinism therefore provided the Elizabethan ruling class with a ready-made explanation of poverty. It also gave them a justification for inflicting severe punishments on the new class of paupers and beggars that had been created by the processes discussed by Marx (the downfall of feudalism, the dissolution on the monasteries and the mass eviction of peasants from common land). From the viewpoint of the emerging new ruling class, poverty was not a 'achieved' status but was pre-ordained. Protestantism may therefore be viewed as the origin of the belief that paupers, criminals, and other social deviants are 'born, not made'.

It is therefore highly significant that this belief emerged at the same time as 'the other' was being categorised in England's early colonies. An 'elective affinity' can be observed between the two processes, whereby the 'otherness' of the colonial subject was projected
on to the European pauper, thereby validating the emergence of a Protestant ethic that
treated paupers far more cruelly than the Catholic Church had tended to do.

Furthermore, the development of ideas about ‘the other’ can be directly related to the
‘ethnic’ categories that emerged in that period, such as ‘Scythian’ and ‘Aryan’. Kidd (1999:
34) demonstrates how ‘ethnic’ categories were originally spread by theological literature by
citing Blount’s Glossographia of 1656, which defined the word "Ethnick" as "heathenish,
ungodly, irreligious", and Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 that offered a similar definition of
"Ethnick" as "heathen; pagan; not Jewish; not Christian". Kidd’s findings therefore support
the contention that theologians developed early formulations and typologies of ‘ethnicity’
before those concepts migrated to science:

The early modern period fostered such a substantial literature on the Scriptural
exegesis of racial, national and linguistic divisions that it seems reasonable to
assume that sacred ethnology constituted an important branch of theology in its
own right. For convenience this body of learning will be described as ‘ethnic
theology’. This choice of shorthand illuminates the substance of the argument
presented below - namely, that the study of ethnic difference in the early modern
period was largely harnessed to religious questions, rather than vice versa (Kidd,
1999: 11).

The original meaning of ethnicity was therefore theological rather than cultural, which begs
the question of how and why ‘ethnic’ concepts changed their character over time. Kidd’s
explanation is that, when naval explorers began to bring back tales from the ‘New World’
after 1550, theologians had to reconcile the Biblical account of universal, common descent
with the exoticism of travel writing. Theologians perceived a danger that exotic descriptions
of ‘different cultures’ within this fanciful literature would lead to doubts being raised about
the Biblical story of Noah, from whom all humans were supposedly descended:

The voyages of discovery of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the
subsequent expansion of European knowledge about the histories, religions and
customs of Asia and America, posed a number of problems for the Christian
intelligentsia of early modern Europe, threatening both to subvert the unquestioned
authority of European standards and to undermine the intellectual and theological
coherence of the Christian world view...(Kidd, 1999: 11-12)

They resolved this tension by highlighting the different lines of descent that were created
by Noah’s three sons – Shem, Ham and Japheth. For example, the Spanish Jesuit Jose de
Acosta claimed that one of Japheth’s descendants spawned the Scythians, a group of
nomads who crossed from Siberia to North America and fragmented into Amerindian
tribes. The Scythians were also believed by Spenser ([1597] 1763) to be distant ancestors of
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the non-Christian Irish (see below). This branch of ‘ethnic theology’ therefore conveniently provided English colonisers with a simultaneous theological ‘othering’ of two different groups that they were in the process of conquering, namely the populations of Ireland and North America.

In the case of the Irish, the English political establishment deployed a complex mixture of Civilisation, Pollution and Blood myths that cannot be reduced to one formula. This complexity of myths has been explored by, amongst others, Jackson (1963), Canny (1983), Innes (1994) and Curtis Jr. (1968). The work of Canny argues that the English gentry, who led murderous campaigns in Ireland between 1565 and 1576, had been influenced by the English translation of the work of Boemus. This was an offshoot of the ethnic theology discussed above, which had divided the world’s population into a number of cultural types, derived from the offspring of Noah’s three sons (Kidd, 1999). The ‘lowest’ type was a nomadic group called the ‘Scythians’, a group that Boemus had ‘identified’ as living a ‘barbarous’ existence around the Caspian Sea. The English colonists convinced themselves that the Irish had ‘Scythian’ characteristics, consisting primarily of poor self-restraint and a lack of sensitivity and manners. Thus, whereas the Irish were previously treated primarily as heretics, they began after 1555 to be denounced as ‘barbarians’. In 1597, Spenser published A View of the Present State of Ireland (see Bibliography), which claimed that the Gaelic Irish were descended from the ‘Scythians’. Spenser’s book therefore completed the path from accusations of heresy to an assumption of degenerate lineage, and legitimised in advance the violence that Oliver Cromwell’s forces inflicted on the Gaelic Irish fifty years later.

Canny notes that the colonisers convinced themselves that the Irish were ‘pagans’ rather than merely heretics. This separation of the Irish from ‘heretics’ was crucial because it meant that their deviance could be blamed on culture rather than religion. The Irish, in other words, were not merely non-Christian: they were outside civilisation:

The first point to note is that the English recognised a difference between Christianity and civilisation, and believed that a people could be civilised without being made Christian but not christianised without first being made civil. It was admitted that the Romans had been civilised despite being pagans, and sixteenth century Englishmen were not ignorant of the existence of civilisations beyond the boundaries of Christian Europe. Supremacy was claimed for western civilisation because it combined the elements of Christianity with those of civility. To admit that the native Irish were Christian would, therefore, have been to acknowledge them as civilised also. By declaring the Irish to be pagan, however, the English were decreeing that they were culpable since their heathenism was owing not to a lack of
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opportunity but rather to the fact that their system of government was antithetical to Christianity. Once it was established that the Irish were pagans, the first logical step had been taken towards declaring them barbarians. The English were able to pursue their argument further when they witnessed [for the first time] the appearance of the native Irish, their habits, customs and agricultural methods (ibid: 57).

This is hugely significant in moving towards an understanding of why Protestantism could incorporate secular boundary strategies without that transformation being apparent to the actors deploying those strategies. Christianity had undergone its own ‘civilising process’ that equated Godliness with certain behavioural norms and self-restraints. Cultures that were perceived by the English not to have gone through that process thus came to appear barbaric. Whereas heresy and infidelity were crimes of belief, barbarity was a crime of culture, defined as an act of cultural regression and behavioural transgression. In other words, Pollution was merging into new paradigms of Civilisation.

Canny also makes the crucial point that the colonists regarded the Irish lack of ‘civility’ to be a deliberate cultural choice rather than the result of lack of exposure to Christian values. The assumption that the Gaelic Irish were pre-social due to deliberate political and cultural choices on their part led to a new fusion of Civilisation and Pollution myths into an ideology that has remained a cornerstone of liberal ideology to the present day. The Gaelic Irish were assumed to have deliberately rejected opportunities to become civilised, so "Their heathenism was owing not to a lack of opportunity but rather to the fact that their system of government was antithetical to Christianity" (ibid.). The Irish were thus placed in the same category as Jews who rejected Christian conversion, or Gypsies and 'New Age travellers' in the present day who decline offers of bed and breakfast accommodation and state education. In all three cases, Christian conceptions of 'the social' have been offered to and spurned by an 'anti-social' or 'pre-social' group. The Christian/liberal conclusion has therefore been to impose a fusion of Civilisation and Pollution, whereby any rejection of Christian/liberal norms and politics is taken to be a voluntaristic decision to remain a heathen, with an uncouth and backward culture. Lack of Civilisation and 'perverted will' have therefore merged into the same discursive formation, which assumes that the 'underclass' has nominated its own 'perverse' status.

The state therefore accelerated the genealogy of boundary strategy when it decided to colonise new parts of Ireland in the Elizabethan and Cromwellian periods. The process of Irish 'othering' became even more useful to the state when it began to seek cheap labour for the Atlantic colonies. The extent to which the Irish had been expelled from the status
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of Civilisation became apparent when the state began to forcibly export Irish women and children to Virginia and the West Indies, to work as maids and labourers. Jackson (1963: ch.3 note 14) reported a public auction that took place during the Cromwell period at a market in Bristol where:

Irish women and children...were exposed naked in the cattle market to be selected and purchased by the agents of planters in Virginia and the West Indies (cited in Dummet and Nicol, 1990: 72)

Moreover, these forced migrations included English paupers and criminals as well as the Irish. It could therefore be argued that Civilisation created a new class beneath the proletariat that consisted of groups who would previously have been dealt with under the rubric of Pollution. When these groups became fully integrated into the global division of labour, it was possible for 'respectable' fractions of the proletariat to be promoted into the discursive spaces occupied by the categories of 'white race' and nation. At that point, therefore, the Irish in the sub-proletariat had gone through a three-stage cycle from Pollution to Race via Civilisation. In other words, the Irish who had been depicted as 'polluted heretics' became portrayed as 'uncivilised barbarians' by 1829, and were then transformed again into a racialised class fraction by the 1870's.

3.5 Civilisation and 'Whiteness', 1555-1829

The Irish who were stigmatised by Civilisation were also excluded from 'whiteness'. This latter category has a complex genealogy that ultimately must be traced to northern European religion (Bastide, 1968), where it symbolised Christian virtues. 'Whiteness' could be traced to the English role in the Crusades, where it became associated with Norman codes of chivalry. It was also borrowed from the iconography of classical art, such as the pristine white sculptures that, it was assumed, had been produced in ancient Greek and Rome. Furthermore, as Mosse (1978: 31) argues, the English were more predisposed towards an ideology of 'whiteness' because the formation of English identity in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had employed Greek concepts of 'whiteness as beauty':

[The] ideal of personal beauty in English letters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries seems to anticipate Winckelmann's much later standard. The figure prized in medieval romances corresponded to Greek statuary, physiognomy was important, and a "skin of dazzling whiteness" exemplified true beauty. Such beauty

13 This must be distinguished from Southern European Christian religions such as that of the Greek Orthodox Church, where medieval iconography frequently depicted Christ and his mother as having darker skins. The author of this thesis has personally observed these icons in churches in Rhodes, Granada and Cordoba.
symbolised goodness, while blackness, small stature, and an ill-proportioned body meant ugliness and evil.

Whilst this duality of ‘white’ and ‘black’ developed very slowly in English culture, and was subordinate to religious conceptions until the Enlightenment secularised its aesthetics, there is suggestive evidence of that duality in operation in Elizabethan England. The Queen presented herself in white make-up, and contemporary accounts equated her ‘whiteness’ with virginity (Jordan, 1968). This suggests that an early Puritan ideology was already emerging that would reach its zenith during the reign of Victoria, whereby the ‘whiteness’ of bourgeois femininity was contrasted with the sexual ‘blackness’ of paupers, prostitutes and even nannies, each of whom was portrayed against the backdrop of ‘colonial’ sexual evil. This point is highlighted by A.L. Stoler (1995), who argues that the bourgeoisie used colonialism to ‘demonstrate’ its status as a superior moral class at home as well as abroad.

The myth of bourgeois cultural ‘whiteness’ was strengthened by new portrayals of sub-Saharan Africans (hereby shortened to ‘SSA’s’) in the same way that the English imported Boemus to provide a template for their anti-Irish prejudices, depictions of SSA’s in England borrowed heavily from the views of the Spanish and Portuguese. However, there were important differences between English and Iberian depictions of SSA’s, which highlight the uniqueness of the English case.

Moors and Christians had been transporting SSA slaves across the desert to the Iberian Peninsula since the eighth century. Malcomson (2000: 140-159) quotes extensively from Iberian scholars such as the Moor, Ibn Khaldun, and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides to show how their contact with SSA’s led to their ‘othering’ of them in their writings. However, Malcomson also illustrates contradictions in this writing, which indicate that the authors had not reconciled slavery with religion. He quotes the contemporary account of the Portuguese chronicler, Zarora, who in 1453 saw "peasants leaving their fields for the day, weeping at the sight of black Africans being enslaved" (ibid: 152). This suggests that the Iberian slave system did not produce a hegemonic racist culture that successfully overcame religious guilt, nor did it erase the possibility of ‘white’ peasants empathising with ‘black’ slaves.

The relevance of these Iberian citations thus lies in the fact that they had not yet produced dichotomous models of ‘black’ and ‘white’ as moral categories that supplanted Christian universalism. This was partially because the people of the Mediterranean, including Moors, regarded their skins as ‘olive’ in colour, not white. Khaldun had equal contempt for
northern European ‘whites’ and SSA ‘blacks’, on the basis that both groups were beneath the ‘olives’ in the world pecking-order at that time. Khaldun also expounded the belief that the ‘blackness’ of the SSA’s was caused by exposure to the sun: "their remoteness from being temperate produces a disposition and character similar to those of dumb animals…” (Malcomson, 2000: 143).

The power of the Moors therefore significantly reduced the chances of a dualism of ‘black’ and ‘white’ arising in medieval Europe. This only changed when English naval power began to replace Mediterranean ‘olive’ dominance with a new global imperialism of people who thought of themselves as ‘white’. Most significantly, whereas the Iberians distinguished Moor from ‘black’, the English treated North Africans and SSA’s as the same. The first contacts made by English explorers with SSA’s occurred in two voyages during 1553 and 1554. After the second of these voyages, the explorer Robert Gainsh exemplified the transition from Mediterranean to English thinking, when he defined Africans as a population:

[In] olde tyme called Ethiopes and Nigrite, which we now call Moores, Moorens, or Negros…a people of beastly lyvyng, without a God, law, religion or common wealth, and so scorched and vexed with the heat of the sun, that in many places they curse it when it ryseth (cited in Malcomson, 2000: 161).

This citation is of huge significance because it shows how the English imported a highly fragmented vocabulary from the Mediterranean but were already using their religious and cultural templates of ‘otherness’ to make sense of those fragments. There are three particular features of the quotation that require close scrutiny. Firstly, Gainsh recognised the Mediterranean distinction between Moors and ‘Negros’ but then went on to collapse that distinction by referring to both groups together as "a people". The old language had recognised multiple populations of Africans, as Malcomson (2000: 142) notes:

Barcelona records from the late thirteenth century show how ethnic (or tribal), religious or colour labels were all used to distinguish one slave from another: Moor of intermediate colour (loro, or neither white nor black, also expressed as “olive coloured”), black Saracen (Saracen meaning Muslim), white Saracen, loro Saracen, white Tatar, Bosnian [and] Greek.

It suited the purposes of the Iberian states to classify subjects in this way, because it had to accommodate Moors into its status hierarchy, but the English were only interested in any Africans as slaves. In their view, Moors had no claim to be treated as fully human. Moors and SSA’s were therefore homogenised into one category: 'the African'.
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Secondly, as with depictions of the Irish, the Elizabethans regarded the absence of a Protestant religion as evidence of "beastly lyyng". The quote by Gainsh specifically accused the Moors of being "without a God", despite the fact that they were self-evidently Muslims. This went beyond Iberian practices because it refused to classify Islam as a religion that could co-exist with Christianity, whereas Christians had lived alongside Moors in Spain for several centuries until the Moors were expelled in 1492. This suggests that the Protestant English were far more likely to cast a group as 'heathens' than were the medieval Spanish. Protestantism in its early Puritan form allowed a far narrower range of competing beliefs to share its spaces. Thus when Elizabeth I made two royal proclamations, in 1596 and 1601, banishing "negars and Blackamoors" from the realm, she specifically referred to them as "infidels", a term that denied Islam any right to exist within her realm:

[Her majesty is] highly discontented to understand the high numbers of negars and Blackamoors which (as she is informed) are crept into this realm...who are fostered and relieved [i.e. fed by] her to the great annoyance of her own liege people, that want the relief which those people consume, as also for that the most of them are infidels, having no understanding of Christ or his Gospel (cited in Fryer, 1984: 12).

Thirdly, as again with the Irish, there was a deliberate attempt to portray African culture as degenerate and backward. This made it easier to justify the destruction of several African societies, on the grounds that Africans did not have a culture worthy of preservation. Unfounded accusations of cannibalism were also used to dehumanise both Africans and the Irish. This enabled agents of the English State to reconcile slavery with their consciences, by 'proving' to themselves that the destruction of 'cannibal' and 'infidel' cultures was a task that God himself had wished them to perform. This also enabled the state to integrate Africans and the Irish into its anti-pauper discourses. For example, one of Elizabeth’s pretexts for expelling "Blackamoors" in 1601 (the year that the Poor Laws were formally introduced) was that the 'blacks' would compete for poor relief against ‘the more deserving’ poor people of the realm. The Elizabethans therefore set a precedent for the later Victorian process whereby a strategy of ‘Race’ would enable the state to construct categories of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor around real or imagined physical, cultural and ‘ethnic’ markers (see chapter four). In its conflation of poverty with 'otherness' Civilisation paved the way for Race.

This evidence lends support to the hypothesis that the ‘civilising process’ of self-restraint and behavioural repression provided the lens through which colonial interests were able to visualise Africans as pre-social, subsocial and anti-social, depending on the strategic
context. If the physical harshness of slavery were being questioned, the slave-owning class could claim that Africans were either incapable of experiencing mental suffering (subsocial), or deserving of God’s punishment (anti-social). If the exclusion of Africans from the ownership of land were being questioned, the owners could claim that Africans were childlike and thus too immature to own property (pre-social), or were permanently below the boundaries of 'the rational' (subsocial). The work of Locke ([1690] 1988; see below) gave credence to this latter argument, whilst the Enlightenment tended to treat rationality as a unique achievement of European cultural development.

3.6 Boundary Strategy, Colonialism and Property Rights

The early English preoccupation with 'colour' took several centuries to evolve into a state strategy of Race. Prior to the nineteenth century, myths of descent were still generated primarily by strategies of Blood. For example, it was Blood, rather than Race, that originated the myth that the English came from common Anglo-Saxon stock. This myth was first propagated by Verstegan ([1605] 1976) in the early seventeenth century and has been explored in the work of Miles (1993) and MacDougall (1982), which is evaluated below. Equally importantly, the Tudor and Stuart periods heralded the emergence of Property as a strategic feature of bourgeois elitism. Property was a symbol of the bourgeois Protestant's belief that he or she was among the 'saved'. It was therefore a key component of England's self-proclaimed status as 'the new Israel'. Blood and Property thus became close partners of Civilisation, embracing both lineage and religion in their mythologies. However, as the following critical discussion shows, it would be misleading to conflate these developments with the later strategy of Race.

The work of Miles (1993) is arguably vulnerable to the criticism that it makes such a conflation. Miles argues that racialisation in the colonies was initially predicated on the 'white' Anglo-Saxon identities that had been emerging since the Reformation. Miles' principal source is MacDougall (1982). This argues that the rise of English nationalism under Elizabeth I coincided with the work of antiquarians, who had been employed originally by Henry VIII to 'demonstrate' that there was an Anglo-Saxon Church in England that pre-dated the Roman Catholic Church and whose laws thus 'transcended' Papal law. By the time of the English Civil War, antiquarian scholarship had been synthesised with German humanism to produce an Anglo-Saxon 'racial' myth, which legitimated revolution and was subsequently used by the state to justify colonial expansion and slavery. According to Miles, Protestants believed that:
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[Parliament] was an institution of great antiquity, with origins in the German democratic tradition, from which the Saxons were considered to have originated (Banton, 1977: 16-18, MacDougall, 1982: 31-2, 56-62, Newman, 1987: 189-91). Hence, in mid-seventeenth-century England, the ideas of the existence of an Anglo-Saxon Church and Parliament, and of an original Anglo-Saxon 'race' suppressed and repressed by a foreign 'race' since the Norman invasion of 1066, legitimated political revolution (Miles, 1993: 65-66).

The anti-Papist xenophobia created by the Reformation became lineage-based in the hands of the radical Protestants who wrested power from the old feudal aristocracy, because the mythology of Parliament was rooted in an Anglo-Saxon lineage myth. The growth of naval power ensured that this myth could be exported overseas during the imperial ventures that gathered speed after the Civil War. Miles argues that these developments paved the way for the gradual replacement of those lineage myths with new racial categories:

[The] idea of lineage suggested the inheritance of characteristics and traditions through time and therefore a certain kind of fixity that was natural and eternal: it is but a short step from the idea of inheritance then to utilise notions such as 'breeding' and 'blood' to sustain a conception of inviolable difference expressed through history. The result closely approximates that created by the racialised typologies of scientific racism (Miles, 1993: 66).

Moreover, Miles shares the view of A.L. Stoler (1995) that the colonial export of a new English identity had repercussions for racialisation at home, because it constructed a racialised colonial 'other' against which the 'whiteness' of the English could be contrasted.

This Miles/MacDougall thesis has several merits. It traces a crucial link between Protestantism and blood concepts, and complements the 'ethnic theology' thesis of Kidd (1999) by illustrating how religion defended itself against encroaching scientific ideas by incorporating them into its own mythology. It shows how religion postponed the hegemony of science by absorbing science into its own pseudo-ethnography. However, Miles is erroneous in applying the term 'racialisation' to this process, because he fails to grasp the key difference between a caste strategy and a Race one. The Tudor and Stuart Protestants were still presenting themselves as a caste - a 'chosen few' - entitled to the same privileges as an aristocratic elite. They were not interested in incorporating the 'white' working class into a 'subspecies' model of scientific racism. Their strategies therefore had far more in common with the feudal caste system, as they shared its dependence on 'lateral' rather than 'vertical' integration. Anglo-Saxon Protestantism was therefore an old-style religious caste strategy, not a new Race strategy. It would take three centuries for the Anglo-Saxon myth to evolve into a language of race. Even then, prominent Anglo-
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Saxonists such as Thomas Arnold "showed less interest in explaining the physical variations of alien races than in describing the national character of the peoples of the British Isles" (Lorimer, 1978: 135). This suggests that Anglo-Saxonism was primarily a strategy of Nation, rather than simply an example of Race.

Property followed a similar elitist genealogy. As Tully (1993) argues, imperialist elitism was defended in Locke's theory of property ([1690] 1988), which legitimised colonialism by defining 'property rights' as only belonging to people who made 'good use' of their land by 'working it' on behalf of the 'common weal'. This eventually paved the way for Civilisation-based assumptions about groups who lived on land but did not 'work' it. In other words, it allowed the ruling class to form connections between Property and Civilisation that would become hegemonic on a global scale.

Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, written in 1690 (see Bibliography), help to generate this formation with its justification of British imperialism in North America. As Tully shows (1993: 156), Locke formulated a definition of property rights that was a tautology, designed to specifically exclude Amerindians from those rights:

> [The] ethic of 'industriousness' that drives and legitimates the process [of European cultivation] is defined contrastively as superior to Amerindian land use. Although god gave the 'World to men in Common', he did not mean that they should leave it 'common and uncultivated', but that they should 'draw from it' the 'greatest conveniences of life.' Accordingly, he gave it to the Industrious and Rational. [...] Locke [then] sets up cultivation as the standard of industrious and rational use, in contrast to the 'waste' and lack of cultivation in Amerindian hunting and gathering, thus eliminating any title [i.e. property rights] they may claim [see Two Treatises pages 37-48 inclusive].

Liberal cultural exclusivism - the assumption of European superiority in economics and culture - may be deconstructed as a tautology that was derived from the assumptions that structured Locke's formulation. This operated firstly by defining 'legitimate' cultivation purely in relation to European standards of 'industriousness', in accordance with the Protestant Ethic, as concentrated labour on a plot of 'cultivated' land. 'Cultivated' was then defined as land use that involves 'Industrious and Rational' use. Locke's theory is thus a tautology because the definitions of 'cultivation' and 'industrious' are mutually closed: they both define each other, with no third party of meaning present against which an 'objective' linkage to reality can be made. This deconstruction also illustrates the reliance of Whig liberalism upon the Protestant Ethic. Locke made an 'a priori' assumption that 'industrious' labour is always productive, and therefore ignored the numerous occasions in colonial
history that European methods resulted in failed harvests, leading often to deaths, diseases and the abandonment of land following misuse.

Furthermore, the flawed assumptions that Locke bequeathed to liberalism can still be found in the attitudes of some Western observers towards the so-called Third World. The concept of ‘underdevelopment’ has been derived indirectly from Locke’s writing on ‘waste’ to create the impression that many African lands are ‘uncultivated’ or that Islam is ‘backward’ because it discourages the creation of surplus value from debts. Such views may also be traced to the Tudor depiction of Irish agriculture that preceded Locke, as was discussed above. Just as Spenser’s writing in the 1590’s had dismissed Irish agriculture as nomadic and Scythian, in order to legitimise the English theft of that land, Locke’s thesis justified the same fate for Amerindian farmers.

Moreover, as Tully notes, Locke was a keen reader of travel writing and early anthropology. Locke’s depiction of the Amerindians may thus have been derived directly from Boemus or from Spenser, or it may have reached him indirectly via nonconformist Protestantism. Locke applied a Whig work ethic derived from Protestantism to adjudicate on the moral worth of utility. In his view, groups who failed to recognise that property must be ‘productive’ should forfeit the right to own it.

Although this idea was not in itself inherently racist, and Locke belonged to the Civilisation school of writers rather than racist ones, there was a clear genealogy from the denial of property rights on ‘cultivation’ grounds to its denial on racist ones. Basing arguments on ‘culture’ would always leave colonists vulnerable to the possibility that the ‘natives’ would one day become integrated and would reclaim their lands. Locke’s work set a precedent whereby the denial of property rights could be extended after 1830 to visual and other supposedly ‘biological’ markers of ‘lack of cultivation’, such as when Amerindians were racialised by white Americans to justify the genocide of the nineteenth century (Malcomson, 2000). Locke was thus one of many examples from this period of an ‘ethnocentric’ thinker whose work made it easier for future racists to acquire state legitimacy. Given Locke’s key role in the foundation of Whig liberalism, it could also be argued that liberal states were always indebted to potentially racist discourses.

In conclusion, therefore, the picture that emerges from the 1530-1829 period is of a society in which religion still dominated boundary strategy, but equally it is one in which the future basis of modern boundary strategy was already being prepared. Referring to British
depictions of Africans and Amerindians before 1800 as 'racism' would be problematic because the status ascribed to them was still one of 'infidel' or 'noble savage'. The evidence does suggest, however, that these representations prepared the ground for Race strategy by setting precedents for the denial of basic rights to certain categories of people. Depicting non-white groups as unfit to own property was perfectly attuned to the later interests of capitalists who would need to institutionalise their property rights following the abolition of slavery. Depicting other cultures as inferior provided material for the future time when the state would need to offer the working class a 'white' identity in order to secure its incorporation into colonial capitalism. Race came into being after Civilisation had secured the rule of the bourgeoisie and had enabled religion to survive the rise of ethnography, but had not placated a working class that had no interest in bourgeois pretensions of 'civility'. When the state needed to incorporate that class, the 'black and white' materials, which had gestated in embryonic form (cloaked in Civilisation discourses) during the 1530-1829 period, suddenly became useful, and the era of racial science gained official state endorsement.

A theoretical model that can aid the understanding of this transition from Pollution to Race via Civilisation is A.D. Smith's distinction between 'horizontal and vertical ethnie', discussed in chapter one. The early events in the colonial period (Elizabethan depictions of the Irish and other 'pagans') were predicated on a horizontal system in which the nobility was still caste-like and in which Protestants believed themselves to be a 'chosen few'. There was then an intermediate Blood stage in which lineage served the function of 'naturalising' the new bourgeoisie elite as privileged by both its Anglo-Saxon blood and its Protestant faith. This was still a 'horizontal' process. Although the use of 'blood' might imply Race in a nineteenth century context, its function in the seventeenth century was to solidify the privileges of a new caste that defined its master status through symbols of Civilisation rather than Race. It was not until the second half of the Victorian period that integration became 'vertical', facilitated by a strategy of Race.

In conclusion, therefore, the period of Civilisation surveyed in this chapter was a transitional one between caste and Race. It used pre-racial Blood images, initially to signify Pollution, then to signify 'breeding' in the cultural sense of superior socialisation. This was combined with theological 'ethnic' categories that were also pre-racial, but set a precedent for the development of later secular typologies. The driving force behind these changes was the rising Protestant mercantile class that became the bourgeoisie, which the fragmented
nobility of the Civil War period was anxious to incorporate. Religion was able to survive this early bourgeois period by moulding itself to conform to bourgeois notions of 'civility' and high culture, whilst maintaining a cultural disregard for the peasantry and early proletariat. Religion and capitalism therefore maintained Civilisation as a preferable strategy to Race. It was only when the secular working class became a political force that science replaced religion and Race challenged Civilisation as the dominant myth system for classifying human populations.
4.1 Three Axes of British National Identity

This case study examines how, since 1830, sections of the working class have been incorporated into a hegemonic British national identity. In so doing, it argues that this national identity has not been a stable entity, but has instead been constantly shifting along three distinct but interdependent axes (or continuums). These axes may be defined as follows:

- The Elitist-Populist Axis

- The Missionary-Defensive Axis

- The Blood/Soil Axis

Each of these continuums has been alluded to in earlier sections of this thesis, but will be elaborated far more fully in this chapter. The Elitist-Populist Axis was a manifestation of the movement from a "lateral" to a "vertical" ethnie (A.D. Smith, 1991: 52-58), or from Blood and Civilisation to Race. That is to say, it represents a shift from a form of nationalism propagated by a Protestant class that was considered to be 'the elect', to a popular nationalism devised by such figures as Disraeli, [Joseph] Chamberlain and Churchill. Populism was closely aligned to a new, vertical concept of Race for the purpose of mobilising working class political support in an expanded post-1867 franchise. Incorporation was a feature of this latter type of Populist nationalism.

The Missionary-Defensive Axis of nationalism was introduced in section 1.6 above. Missionary nationalism (Kumar, 2003) dominated incorporation strategies when the economy and Empire were expanding. It was aggressive, self-confident and arrogant. Although Missionary nationalism was originally Elitist, it became aligned with Populist nationalism during the era of Disraeli. Conversely, British nationalism became Defensive after the loss of Empire in the 1950's. Instead of seeking foreign adventures, the nationalist ideologies of 1957-1979 adopted a Defensive mode - negative, xenophobic, distrustful of Europe, and anxious about supposed 'Arab' control of the oil supply.

The Thatcherite combination of nuclear deterrence, anti-European rhetoric and anti-immigration statements may also be viewed as part of this Defensive strategy. However,
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Thatcher was also attracted to the Missionary nationalism of the USA (this separated her from one of her mentors, Enoch Powell, who was staunchly opposed to NATO). Her partial switch from Defensive to Missionary mode was completed by Blair, who committed himself (for example, in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq) to an American-led policy of 'spreading democracy' by interventionist means. Conversely again, however, the Defensive mode was still apparent in the Fortress State of surveillance and immigration control (see chapter five).

The different effects of the Missionary-Defensive axis can be observed in the types of hostility shown towards minorities. Missionary nationalism, in the nineteenth century, tended to focus on the 'laziness' of the colonial worker. As Walvin (1993: 328-336) argues, this escalated into racism after the abolition of slavery because Victorians demanded that the 'freed' slave should be far more productive and industrious. This kind of racism was also closely related to a hardening of class attitudes (Lorimer, 1978). The price of emancipation was therefore a raising of the economic bar to standards that imposed new prejudices on those who did not meet them.

This harshness was also a feature of Left-liberal Fabian discourses (see section 4.5 below), giving it a cross-party legitimacy in mainstream politics. In contrast, the racism of Defensive nationalism is that which seeks a scapegoat for economic decline. Missionary nationalism is thus mainly that of rising classes, Defensive nationalism largely that of declining classes (Wieviorka, 1995). However, as was shown by their own literature, Thatcher (1993) and Blair (1998) arguably found a formula that could appeal in different ways to rising and falling classes. Both of these Prime Ministers depicted Britain in contradictory terms of economic triumph and moral crisis. Britain supposedly was booming in the world economy whilst sinking in a sea of immoral conduct, partially spread by immigration. The contradiction between Missionary and Defensive nationalism in the present day may therefore reflect an alliance between rising and declining groups, in which the rising group exploits politically the resentments of the declining group by deflecting them on to various folk devil scapegoats.

The final axis, Blood-Soil, refers to the conflicting citizenship criteria of 'jus sanguinis' and 'jus soli' (Brubaker, 1996). Although British citizenship criteria have recognised both soil and blood as legitimate claims to membership of the national community, the switch to a principle of patriality in 1968 (see section 5.6 below) gave formal approval to a long-standing informal practice of regarding descent as the primary determinant of status. This
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clearly has implications for an understanding of Race, as is explored below. However, as was outlined in chapter one, it is important to note that Blood and Race are not the same. Blood is expressed in terms such as 'national character' and 'English speaking peoples'. These may carry racial overtones but are not reducible to Race. The following case study therefore seeks to examine the intersections between nationalism and Race, but at no stage is it suggested that Race could drive these processes on its own. Instead Race is viewed as a scavenger tactic that constantly operates in tandem with Blood, Pollution, Civilisation, Property and Nation. The effect of Race on these strategies is to 'naturalise' them, thereby making such phenomena as the nuclear family, capitalism and nationalism feel like natural, rather than socially constructed, realities.

4.2 The Transition from Elitist to Populist Nationalism, 1830-1918

It was argued above that the forms of national expression that characterised the Protestant stage of state development were those of an elite that confined the definition of the 'nation' to a narrow stratum of 'the elect'. This section provides six detailed explanations of how and why a Populist strategy of selective incorporation gradually replaced this Elitist strategy. These explanations acknowledge the existence of 'bottom up' pressures - new demands 'from below' to be included within 'the social' - but they also demonstrate how these demands were 'contained' by a stable, relatively unified governing class. Although there were tensions within the governing stratum - conflicts between Whigs and Tories, or between pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions - boundary strategy ensured that the state was able to keep these tensions within shared parameters. Consequently, when Civilisation was challenged by Race, or Populism challenged Elitism, the struggle between them was managed strategically without major disruption to the prevailing structures of power.

The first explanation for the transition from Elitism to Populism is the expansion of the state from an English base to a British one (Kumar, 2003: 154-174). As Porter (2000) demonstrates, British intellectuals born outside England played a major role in the English Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consequently, as Kumar (2003: 157) remarks:

What is the 'English Enlightenment' without the Scottish Enlightenment, the contribution of that great galaxy of talents that includes David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, William Robertson and James Hutton?

14 As Billig (1995) has shown, this naturalisation of nationalism is achieved as much through the daily rituals of 'banal nationalism' as it is achieved through extravagant and opulent displays of nationalist fervour.
There never was a civilised nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation...Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men (Hume, [1742-1754] 1882; cited in Curtin, 1964: 42).

Curtin (ibid: 42-43) and Porter (2000: 356-57) illustrate how Hume's historicism contributed towards a switch from universalism to polygenesis in models of human descent, paving the way for the pre-Darwinian scientific racism of Kames15, Knox16 and Nott17. It could therefore be argued that the subsequent development of Nation and Race was predicated on this expansion from an English intelligentsia into a British one.

However, this intelligentsia still had contempt for the labourer, as expressed in the dictum of E. Darwin that "Some must think and others labour" (cited in Porter, 2000: 364). The second argument of this chapter is therefore that, in order for Enlightenment values to translate into the incorporation of labour, the working class had to struggle for the right to be included within 'the social'. This was achieved through the sacrifices made by the working class movements that were mobilised by Chartism and trade union activity (Hobsbawm, 1969). These groups looked to 'nation' as an idea that included their own aspirations. Furthermore, these groups were seeking new identities due to the cultural dislocation caused by migration from the country village to the urban metropolis. Nationalism rose from the loneliness of the proletariat and the inability of urban life to recreate the social bonds of the village. This is captured in Gellner's claim that "nationalism is a phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft: a mobile anonymous society simulating a closed cosy community" (1998: 74).

The strategy of Nation was not therefore imposed on a passive working class, but was instead partially a response to demands 'from below'. This can be shown by the fact that advances in the franchise and other modest welfare reforms often followed major military

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15 On Kames, see Curtin (1964: 42-43) and Porter (2000: 357).
16 On Knox, see Banton (1998: 70-75) and Curtin (1964: 377-382).
17 On Nott, see Curtin (1964: 372, 381, 413) and Banton (1998: 53-61).
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conflicts, when the working class was directly recruited for participation in international struggles (see section 4.2.4 below).

However, the third argument advanced by this section is that Populist nationalism was predicated in changes in the division of labour that created cleavages between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Incorporation into the idea of 'nation' was easier to achieve when the state was able to incorporate artisans, factory workers and petit-bourgeois traders into citizenship at the expense of the 'rough' working class beneath them. Furthermore, this conversion of the division of labour into a class division was facilitated by the importation of labour from Ireland, Poland, Italy and the colonial territories. This enabled the unskilled sector to be converted into a sub-proletariat or "racialised class fraction" (Miles, 1989) that could be situated beneath 'the social'. This group also contained groups who had previously been stigmatised by the 'Pollution' category, such as the East European Jews who came to London in the 1880's. Furthermore, Irish Catholics were still subjected to violence and intimidation, such as in the riots that took place in Lancashire mill towns between 1850 and 1881 (see below).

The fourth argument is that Nation and Race were also influenced from 'below' by the new need of male industrial workers to 'valorise' their bodies. By placing the 'white' male body at the top of a racial hierarchy, boundary strategy responded to a need to disguise the exploitation of the 'white' worker's body by capitalism. Workers conspired in this process because their expectations of masculinity demanded a positive valuation of the body. This process could therefore be cited as evidence of 'bio-power' being generated through the subject's self-conception of his own body.

Fifthly, class incorporation was a tactic of party politics. The British Reform Act of 1867 was a classic piece of statecraft devised by the Conservatives (led by Disraeli) to take votes from the Liberals. Moreover, as section 4.2.5 indicates, there is evidence that local Conservatives formed alliances with Orangemen to campaign on an anti-Irish platform in the 1868 and 1874 General Elections. This resulted in several Lancashire seats falling to the Conservatives (Kirk, 1980; Foster, 1974).

Finally, incorporation was a trade-off between citizenship and a harsher, more demanding labour process and class culture. The harshness of the labour process was emphasised by the role of 'scientific management' and the techniques that came to be defined as Taylorism. Lorimer (1978) has highlighted the harshness of the new class culture and
documented the gradual replacement of mid-century social philanthropy by a ruthless Social Darwinism. Moreover, this Social Darwinism was not the preserve of the Right of the political spectrum. Fabians such as B. and S. J. Webb, Beveridge and Stopes became members of the Eugenics Society and campaigned to restrict the breeding of the 'unfit'. This was part of a trend across Europe whereby key players in the advancement of racialised brands of nationalism, such as Klemm, Lombroso and the Fabians, were often liberal democrats or 'socialists'.

The following six subsections explore each of these arguments in detail as well as offering some critical comments on the sociological literature in this field.

4.2.1 The Unity of the British State

The expansion from an English ruling class identity to a British one was predicated on a broadening of the ruling stratum to include middle class political and cultural groupings. The importance of class unity above the working class was noted by Elias ([1939] 1994: 506-512), who observed that the greater emphasis upon the super-ego in the English national character arose from the early class settlement of the seventeenth century (the Glorious Revolution of 1688). This led to a gradual entwining of upper class 'manners' and middle class morals, creating a psychological economy of 'affect controls' that was shared by both classes:

[In] the development of English society one can observe a continuous assimilating process in the course of which upper-class models (especially a code of good manners) were adopted in a modified form by middle-class people, while middle-class features (as for instance elements of a code of morals) were adopted by upper-class people. Hence, when, in the course of the nineteenth century, most of the aristocratic privileges were abolished, and England with the rise of the industrial working classes became a nation state, the English national code of conduct and affect-control showed very clearly the gradualness of the resolution of conflicts between upper and middle classes in the form, to put it briefly, of a peculiar blend of a code of good manners and a code of morals (Elias, [1939] 1994: 506).

This development of a “national code of conduct” can be related to specific economic and political events. For example, the combination of bourgeois and proletarian pressures that forced the state to abandon the Corn Laws in the 1840’s in favour of ‘free trade’ was a great victory for bourgeois class interests. However, instead of accepting defeat, the aristocracy transformed itself into a more commercially oriented class. Consequently, as P. Anderson argues, there was a dual process of class fusion in the nineteenth century whereby the

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18 See Voegelin ([1933] 2000) for an extensive discussion of Klemm.
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aristocracy became more commercial and the bourgeoisie underwent a process of gentrification:

[An] increasing horizontal intertwining of landed, commercial and industrial capital took place...The second generation of any parvenu bourgeois family could henceforward automatically enter the 'upper class' via the regulating institutions of assimilation (1992: 22).

The political economy of class fusion was facilitated at a cultural level by the new public schools, which created ‘gentlemen’ amongst the bourgeoisie and ensured that a common cultural outlook dominated industry and agriculture:

[There was] a systematic symbiosis of the two classes, effected above all by the arrival of a common educational institution: the new public schools, designed to socialise the sons of the - new or old - rich into a uniform pattern that henceforth became the fetishized criterion of a 'gentleman' (1992: 22).

Anderson's analysis of assimilation thus has much in common with that of Elias cited above, but Anderson places a Gramscian emphasis on the process instead of the neo-'Durkheimian' perspective of Elias. Anderson thus writes of a 'hegemonic bloc' being formed through the ability of the nobility to control agrarian commercialisation, the surplus from which was then used to dominate London's property market and finance capital via the Stock Exchange. Capitalism was built around an aristocratic class that was able to ensure that the bourgeoisie continued to respect landed interests and conservative values. Anderson illustrates this argument with citations from the studies of Rubinstein (1981, 1987), which analysed London probate records. He cites Rubinstein's remark that "England's role as the clearing-house of the world preceded its emergence as workshop of the world", thereby explaining how the aristocracy retained a degree of control over the state through its dominance of the City and, by extension, the exchequer (P. Anderson, 1992: 139). He also cites the works of Cannadine (1980) and Rubinstein (1981) on the aristocratic ownership and control of town property. These are coupled with the insights of Schumpeter ([1943] 1976, 1951) into the ways in which the ex-feudal nobility continued to dominate imperial status hierarchies due to its monopolisation of militaristic icons of command and national superiority. Taken in combination, these factors still had a key role within the political structure up to 1918, and only began to subside when agriculture belatedly declined and the aristocracy lost its imperial role overseas.

In conclusion therefore, the effect of these events was to make the bourgeoisie far less 'revolutionary' than it had been in France. An alliance between the aristocracy and
bourgeoisie was in place prior to the Industrial Revolution, so capitalism did not require a culling of the old ruling elites. By 1830, therefore, the state could embark on gradual incorporations of groups below the elite, secure in the knowledge that the ruling bloc was sufficiently powerful to absorb those groups without being displaced by them.

4.2.2 Working Class Nationalism

The work of Colley ([1992] 1996: 330-345) documents the entry of selected British working class groups into the apparatus of national identity. She argues that the key pre-conditions for this process were the survival of Protestantism in working class culture and the recruitment of working class militia for the Anglo-French Wars of 1714-1815. She notes that, by 1803, Britain had raised a Volunteer Corps of 500,000 men to protect the homeland, in addition to a further 500,000 troops for overseas duties. Colley argues that this military dependence gradually gave working class soldiers a political voice. This created a momentum for reform that snowballed over time, resulting eventually in the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867. As Colley concludes, when the impact of the two World Wars is taken into account, the significance of warfare is impossible to ignore.

The fact that votes for women and universal manhood suffrage had to wait until 1918, and that a welfare state was fully implemented only in the aftermath of the Second World War, confirmed what the post-Waterloo period also demonstrated: that in Great Britain, a nation forged more than anything else through military endeavour, the winning of radical constitutional and social change was also intimately bound up with the impact of war (Colley, ([1992] 1996: 382-383):

A necessary corollary of the reliance of citizenship upon military mobilisation was that the resultant citizen-soldier's worldview was likely to be jingoistic and susceptible to racism. One of the most cogent and honest contemporary accounts of how militarism and imperialism affected English identity can be found in the collected writing of Orwell. In 1940, for example, Orwell wrote the famous essay My Country Right or Left, which was recently reprinted in the collection Orwell's England (see the Bibliography). The essay included the following passage:

Most of the English middle class [is] trained for war from the cradle onwards, not technically but morally. The earliest political slogan I can remember is 'We want eight (eight dreadnoughts) and we won't wait'. At seven years old I was a member of the Navy League and wore a sailor suit with HMS Invincible on my cap. Even before my public-school O.T.C. I had been in a private-school cadet corps. On and off, I have been toting a rifle ever since I was ten, in preparation not only for war but for a particular kind of war, a war in which the guns rise to a frantic orgasm of sound…(Orwell, [1940] 2001: 245)
Moreover, Orwell's middle class experiences had parallels at working class level. Bonnett (2000: 39) cites A. Williams' (1981) account of patriotic fervour in a railway factory, whilst Blanch (1976: 119) insists that "imperialist and nationalist sentiment obtained real roots in working class opinion." These accounts thus lend support to the argument of Goldberg (2002: 100) that the military machine was a tool of socialisation as well as violence. The effect of this socialisation was to create a population that could be drilled into service at short notice, as shown by Orwell’s comments in a later piece about events during 1940:

There is no question about the inequality of wealth in England. It is grosser than in any European country, and you have only to look down the nearest street to see it. Economically, England is certainly two nations, if not three or four. But at the same time the vast majority of the people feel themselves to be a single nation and are conscious of resembling one another more than they resemble foreigners. Patriotism is usually stronger than class-hatred, and always stronger than any kind of internationalism. Except for a brief moment in 1920 (the ‘Hands off Russia’ movement) the British working class have never thought or acted internationally. For two and a half years they watched their comrades in Spain slowly strangled, and never aided them by even a single strike. But when their own country (the country of Lord Nuffield and Mr Montagu Norman) was in danger, their attitude was very different. At the moment when it seemed likely that England might be invaded, Anthony Eden appealed over the radio for Local Defence Volunteers. He got a quarter of a million men in the first twenty-four hours, and another million in the subsequent month. One has only to compare these figures with, for instance, the number of Conscientious Objectors, to see how vast is the strength of traditional loyalties compared with new ones (Orwell, [1941] 2001: 260).

Moreover, it could be argued that the period from 1830 to 1940 witnessed a technological synthesis of militarisation and proletarianisation. Mass warfare coincided with the introduction of Taylorism and Fordism into factories. A working class male from, for example, the Lancashire mill towns therefore often alternated his working life between the mill and the army without much discontinuity of experience. Both of those working environments inflicted danger, dominated his waking hours and confined him to a highly regulated and imprisoning temporal and spatial world. His daily routine was so 'well drilled' that he had very little space in which to think or to question his fate. His enjoyment of his new 'citizenship' was therefore severely constrained by his position within the military and industrial division of labour.

4.2.3 The Division of Labour and Construction of Citizenship

The 'division of labour' question is a crucial site of conflict between sociologists inspired by Durkheim and Marx respectively. The former grouping includes Elias ([1939] 1994), Gellner (1998) and Marshall (1950), each of whom shared Durkheim's expectation that the
division of labour would create greater opportunities for social mobility and reduce fixed class and 'ethnic' divisions. Gellner viewed capitalism as being characterised by a move towards a knowledge society with a shared high culture. The greater dependence of capitalism upon education would create greater meritocracy and social mobility. Elias similarly argued that the growing division of functions "nullifies hereditary privileges" ([1939] 1994: 511). Marshall's view was more materialistic in that he believed that class antagonisms could be removed by eliminating the material disparities in the quality of life that existed between different occupations. These disparities made the division of labour seem illegitimate, but, Marshall believed, once they were removed by social provisions like universal health care and a social 'living wage', these apparent illegitimacies would disappear. Marshall epitomised the assumption of 1945-1979 Labour governments that capitalism would be 'humanised' by ameliorative welfare provisions.

As Barbalet notes (1988: 87-93), this 'Durkheimian' understanding of the division of labour led Marshall to overlook the fact that the labour process under capitalism remained extremely arduous, irrespective of 'industrial reforms', universal education and levels of welfare provision. Working life continued to include such factors as excessive hours, shift working, lack of control over the work environment, no provision for childcare, physical discomfort, fatigue, long-term damage to health, and intense nervous stress.

The key contribution of Marxism to the understanding of the limitations of citizenship is its focus on these aspects of the labour process. In the Victorian context, the cultural divisions created by the division of labour were expressed in new cleavages of social identity and status between different grades of labour, which enabled some labourers to be incorporated into the 'social' at the expense of racialised unskilled workers, often recruited from overseas. Nationalism gave the incorporated labour a means by which it could feel superior to this stigmatised foreign labour, as shown in section 4.2.5 below.

4.2.4 Race, Imperialism and the Working Class

As Hobsbawm (1969: 164) has argued, the period when British imperialism was at its height, 1870 to 1918, was also the period when "the pattern of British working-class life which the writers, dramatists and TV producers of the 1950's thought of as 'traditional' came into being." It is therefore possible to identify a historical link between class formation and imperialism at that period. In the light of the work of Lorimer (1978), C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall (2000) and MacMaster (2001), this linkage maybe identified in how British class culture began to focus on an empiricism of the body. Whereas earlier
philanthropy had promoted Civilisation ideals of morals, manners and charity - that is to say, primarily the spiritual and ethical realm - the 1870-1918 period expressed concerns with 'degeneracy' and sexual perversion. Christian philanthropy was replaced by a harsher 'muscular Christianity', promoted through outdoor sports and the military socialisation of youth movements such as the Boy Scouts, the National Service League and the Territorial Force (Blanch, 1976: 119). The high point of British power was therefore characterised by a heightened form of 'bio-politics' (Foucault, [1976] 1979).

This 'bio-politics' can be illustrated in four ways. Firstly, as was shown in section 4.2.2 above, boys were trained in military discipline throughout their childhood years. Secondly, in 1885, the state introduced Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which created the offence of 'gross indecency' for sexual acts between males. As McKenna (2004: 105-110) demonstrates, whereas the 'sodomy' legislation of 1533 had only criminalised acts of penetrative sex, the 1885 Amendment introduced a whole new raft of offences. In effect, it created a new caste of sexual non-person by outlawing any expression of homosexual desire. Thirdly, 1885 was also the year that association football achieved professional status, creating a new way of fetishising the male body in a 'muscular Christian' setting. Fourthly, as Miles (1982: 119) argues, mass circulation fiction brought a racist world-view into the working class cultural sphere, in the field of entertainment and fantasy.

This evidence suggests that the 1880-1918 period was marked most strongly by Race strategies acting on the body, alongside new Pollution discourses that focussed on sexual 'perversion'. However, the speed with which this cultural form became hegemonic suggests that there was also a 'pull' factor 'from below'. This can be deduced from the transformation of the working class male's relationship with his body power, particularly its conversion into a commodity form by capital. The willingness of working class males to embrace 'white' racial identities could be viewed as a reaction against commodification that nonetheless had the effect of reproducing the body's own exploitation. Furthermore, this neo-Marxist insight may be complemented by a Weberian acknowledgement of how this valuing of the body became embedded in forms of "ethnic honour and status honour" (Fenton, 2003: 62; Hughey, 1998) among certain fractions of the 'white' working class. Weberian status formation therefore reproduced capitalist class formation. The 'white' working class therefore unwittingly colluded in the conversion of its labour power into a commodity when it began to situate its own cultural and biological identity in the imagined domain of 'racial' hierarchy.
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4.2.5 Conservative Opportunism and Anti-Catholic Violence

The incorporation of the 'white' working class into bio-politics between 1870 and 1918 was assisted by party political strategies aimed at national and local constituencies. These were partially designed by Disraeli, who led the House of Commons during the passage of the 1867 British Reform Act and was Prime Minister from 1874 to 1881. Banton (1998: 4) cites the account of Disraeli's biographer (Vincent, 1990: 27-37) of how Disraeli equated 'race' with modernity and science. Similarly, Wieviorka (1995: 28) and Arendt (1968: 180) cite Disraeli's claim that "all is race, there is no other truth" and his reference to an "aristocracy of nature". However, whilst the young Disraeli was an idealist, Disraeli the statesman was a tactician, and his aim in passing of the 1867 British Reform Act was mainly to gain working class votes on an imperialist ticket. It was in this context that Disraeli made his Crystal Palace speech of 1872, in which he defined the key question of the times as:

[Whether] you will be content to be a comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether you will be a great country, an imperial country, where your sons...command the respect of the world (cited in Eldridge, 1973: 184).

In this period, therefore, Disraeli clearly connected 'one nation' Tory Populism with an imperial mission, or Missionary nationalism (Kumar, 2003). His rejection of 'continental' values in favour of global interventionism foreshadowed the attitudes that would lead to British involvement in later acts of military interventionism - such as the 1956 Suez conflict and the 2003 Iraq War - that damaged Britain's diplomatic relations with other European states.

These 'high politics' of incorporation were mirrored by the activities of Conservatives at local level. For example, Kirk (1980: 93) claims that, in Lancashire during the in the 1868 General Election, "Conservative candidates throughout the cotton districts took up 'No Popery' as their election cry." A political union of Conservatives and Orangemen was backed up with regular outbreaks of anti-Catholic violence. For example, Fenton (1999: 160) and Kirk (1980: 75) cite an anti-Catholic riot in Stockport in 1852, whilst Kirk (1980: 78) describes attacks on Catholic chapels in Ashton and Oldham in 1861. Tacit local party support for this agitation transformed several Lancashire constituencies into Tory strongholds in the 1868 General Election:

At Ashton, newly-enfranchised Stalybridge, Salford and Bolton, the Conservatives made a clean sweep...The shift towards the Conservatives continued in 1874 when
twenty-six Conservatives and seven Liberals were elected to parliament from Lancashire (Kirk, 1980: 92; see also Foster, 1974).

This evidence, combined with that of the 'Murphy Riots' of 1866-1868 (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000: 217-220) suggests that the formal religious settlement of 1829 had not filtered down into the Protestant working class. As Colley's work makes clear, this is hardly surprising when one considers the degree of anti-Catholic invective that was spread down the class structure via the immense popularity of almanacs from the 1680's onwards:

The majority were crude and intolerant productions, offering a jumble of useful and sensational information, combined with 'an endless popular diet of jingoism, abuse of Catholics, and predictions of the downfall of the Pope and the French' (Colley, [1992] 1996: 22).

In the eighteenth century, the formal, 'civilised' anti-Catholicism of the state had been enforced at local level by harassment and discrimination. The events of the 1860's suggest that the abandonment of explicit prejudice at the level of 'high politics' does not preclude its continuation at local level. A similar process would occur when the state formally outlawed 'racial' discrimination in some sectors of public life in the 1960's.

4.2.6 Class, Culture and Eugenics

A further crucial reason why Missionary nationalism and imperial racism became hegemonic in 1870-1918 was their adoption by the Left-of-centre of the political elite. The ideological pliability of the labour movement's leadership was recognised by Orwell in his 'Wigan Pier' diary entry for 6th-10th February 1936:

I am struck again by the fact that as soon as the working man gets an official post in the Trade Union or goes into Labour politics, he becomes middle-class whether he will or no,[sic.] i.e. by fighting against the bourgeoisie he becomes a bourgeois. The fact is that you cannot help living in the manner appropriate and developing the ideology appropriate to your income...(Orwell, [1936] 2001: 27).

As Orwell implies, one explanation of this pliability is materialism - union leaders have a financial stake in the status quo. However, an alternative explanation is that Nation and Race were present at the birth of the labour movement and were formative of its essence. Racism and nationalism therefore did not 'pollute' the movement from outside - they were embedded in the original package.

The Fabians who came into prominence from the 1880's - B. and S. J. Webb, Beveridge, Stopes, Shaw and so on - had two principal strategies that made their view of class relations often as harsh as those of the Tories. Firstly the Fabians promoted a model of 'active
citizenship, developed from the writing of John Stuart Mill, which insisted that the poor should be encouraged to resolve their problems through active participation in 'the social' rather than being dependent on the state. This was developed by Fabian writers into a model that was a forerunner of communitarianism, insisting that poor relief should impose obligations on the poor instead of giving them unconditional rights. The Foucauldian research of Dean (1991, 1999) suggests that these embryonic 'dependency culture' and 'active agency' discourses were essential to the emergence of liberal modes of governmentality:

Liberal governmentality, whether in regard to state or non-state measures, is overwhelmingly concerned with the establishment of those conditions both negative and positive - which make the poor responsible for what later generations would call their 'standard of living'. It is around the tactics of responsibilisation that the liberal economy always contained within itself the possibility of interventions in favour of a specific form of life for the labouring population...The notion of self-responsibility is the key to the gaining/granting of civil individuality on the part of the male labouring poor (Dean 1991: 218).

A parallel may be drawn between the "tactics of responsibilisation" deployed by reformist liberals prior to 1918 and the concept of 'responsibilities before rights' that frames New Labour's communitarian philosophy. This would help to explain the ambivalent manner in which New Labour has incorporated the Human Rights Act into its legislation. The genuine universalism of the European Convention on Human Rights is simply not commensurable with the model of British citizenship that is driven by communitarianism. The former decrees rights to be absolute, but the latter can only recognise rights that incorporate the citizen into the state's own virtuous circle: a domain that imposes norms and responsibilities that some potential citizens are unable to meet. This helps to explain why, in reality, social citizenship is exclusionary rather than universal: the boundaries of belonging are always semi-permeable, being designed to allow through only those attributes of personality, culture and phenotype that fit the state's definition of normality and civilisation. The Fabians ensured that the British labour movement actively conspired in the construction of those boundaries.

Secondly the Fabians were actively involved in the development of Social Darwinism, as demonstrated by their membership of the Eugenics Society. Oakley (1991) sought to explain this trend - her specific interest being the career of her father, Titmuss, who had been a member of the society between 1937 and 1973. Titmuss had clearly felt that there was no essential contradiction between his work for the Society and his academic career as
a ‘champion’ of the Welfare State at the London School of Economics. Titmuss’ early publications on poverty, health and welfare were funded by the Eugenics Society, whose other members included Beveridge, B. and S. J. Webb, and Keynes.

Oakley made two essential points about this period that can help to clarify the relationship between liberalism and ‘race’. Firstly, Oakley argued that the methodology of early British sociology was modelled on eugenics:

> British sociology derived an important part of its own orientation to social reform from the evolutionary model of Social Darwinism: sociological theory and investigation was a superstructure to be erected on the basis of this biologically constructed groundplan (Oakley 1991: 167)

Between 1890 and 1930 there was a close interdependence between sociology, eugenics, and the use of statistics to define and measure populations. Individuals such as Galton, Pearson and Huxley regarded themselves as experts in all three fields. This period could therefore be cited as strong evidence in favour of the Foucauldian view that governance, surveillance and racism developed simultaneously using such controls as the statistical manipulation of population data, creating a dominant epistemology that determined how ‘the social’ was perceived and measured. ‘Racial’ categorisation and management could also be viewed as a logical progression from Bentham’s Panopticon - the objectifying gaze of the laboratory complementing the ‘racial’ and dehumanised gaze of workhouses, prisons, lunatic asylums and colonial ethnography.

Oakley’s second argument was that eugenics was perceived by liberals to be a radical philosophy because it allowed them to argue for a social order based on ‘meritocracy’ rather than ‘patronage’. Titmuss believed that there was a large reservoir of working class talent that was being left untapped by the class structure, and that environmental deprivation was preventing the working class reaching its biological potential. Eugenics was thus seen as a basis for reform rather than a conservative philosophy. This belief can be placed into context by considering it in relation to P. Anderson’s analysis of assimilation outlined above. Fabianism was an attempt by liberals to create a 'progressive' bourgeoisie that was not beholden to financial, aristocratic and paternalistic class interests. For the Fabians, eugenics was thus an argument for a 'level playing field' against the institutionalised biases of the public schools, Oxbridge and military rank.

Comparable developments in France may be cited to support this argument. As Foucault (1980) argued, the French socialist movement developed virulent forms of antisemitism
and anti-Germanic sentiment as a reaction against the conservative ‘blood’ model of Boulanvilliers and Gobineau. Conservatives had sought to justify feudalism on the grounds that the nobility was descended from Franks whose ‘Germanic’ blood was superior to the ‘plebeian’ blood of the ‘Gauls’. The French Revolution set in motion an oppositional racist discourse, which argued that the aristocracy carried ‘degenerate’ blood, corrupted in part by contact with Jews. Foucault claimed that this was then channelled into ‘scientific racism’ via the work of Lombroso:

[What] is new in the nineteenth century is the appearance of a racist biology, entirely centred around the concept of degeneracy...above all with the idea that the rotten decadent class was that of the people at the top, and that a socialist society would have to be clean and healthy. Lombroso was a man of the Left. He wasn’t a socialist in the strict sense, but he had a lot of contact with the socialists, and they took up his ideas. The breach only occurred at the end of the nineteenth century...Modern antisemitism began in that form. The new forces of antisemitism developed, in socialist milieus, out of the theory of degeneracy. It was said that the Jews are necessarily degenerates, firstly because they are rich, secondly because they intermarry. They have totally aberrant sexual and religious practices, so it is they who are carriers of degeneracy in our societies. One encounters this in socialist literature down to the Dreyfus affair. Pre-Hitlerism, the nationalist antisemitism of the Right, adopted exactly the same themes in 1910 (Foucault, 1980: 223-224).

The eugenics movement in Britain shared Lombroso’s obsession with degeneracy, and this may help to explain some of the antisemitism that emerged in London during the 1890’s, the same decade as the Dreyfus Case in France. For example, Gainer (1972: 87) cites the reference of B. Webb (1889: 233) to "the characteristic love of profit of the Jewish race..." as an indicator of Fabian antisemitism, which coincided with the Fabians’ worries about degeneracy within the ‘rough’ working class. The Jew and the pauper became conjoined in the discourse of the ‘pauper alien’, which was popularised in part by Fabian studies of the London poor that were published in the 1880’s.

A similar contradiction between philanthropy and eugenic degeneracy discourse can be found in the pioneering study of unemployment written by another Fabian, namely Beveridge (1905). Whilst Beveridge’s early work (circa 1903-1912) facilitated the emergence of unemployment exchanges and modest welfare reforms (sometimes referred to as ‘Lloyd Georgism’; see Barbalet, 1988), it also contained a scathing attack on the ‘residuum’ that was typical of Fabianism:

It is essential...to maintain the distinction between those who, however irregularly employed, are yet members, though inferior members, of the industrial army and those who are mere parasites, incapable of performing any useful service.
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whatever...[The unemployable] must be removed from industry and maintained adequately in public institutions, but with the complete and permanent loss of all citizenship rights - including not only the franchise but civil freedom and fatherhood (1905: 326-327; cited in Rose, 1999: 254-255).

To a post-1945 audience, Beveridge's 1905 prescription may appear to contradict his contribution to the design of the modern Welfare State, which emerged after his report, titled Social Insurance and Allied Services, was published in 1942. In the context of the Fabian movement, however, his advocacy of forced sterilisation made perfect sense, as it complemented their advocacy of birth control for the working class and their condemnation of 'unfit' mothers who had too many children. Fabians may or may not have been conscious racists, but their efforts had the consequence of allowing racism to acquire a hegemonic position among groups on the Left as well as the Right, even though (like Titmuss) many of them subsequently renounced their earlier beliefs.

In conclusion therefore, a 'racism of the Left' was clearly evident in the political movement that brought certain fractions of the working class into citizenship. This was even apparent in the work of Orwell, who spent the years 1922-1927 working for the Indian Imperial Police in Burma. The following passage recounts some of his experiences. The most notable feature of the passage is the contradiction between Orwell's recognition of the imperialist structural context in which he worked, and his paradoxical inability to avoid heaping blame upon his victims:

For five years I had been part of an oppressive system, and it had left me with a bad conscience. Innumerable remembered faces - faces of prisoners in the dock, of men waiting in the condemned cells, of subordinates I had bullied and aged peasants I had snubbed, of servants and coolies I had hit with my fist in moments of rage (nearly everyone does these things in the East, at any rate occasionally; orientals can be very provoking) - haunted me intolerably. I was conscious of an immense weight of guilt I had to expiate ([1936] 2001: 158).

The casual racism of the phrase "orientals can be very provoking" reveals why Orwell could experience guilt but not shame. Orwell could experience guilt as a liberal for participating in a brutal oppressive regime at a systemic level, but shame would have required him to feel that he had failed in a personal duty to regard all individuals as having the same moral worth as himself. Moreover, this helps to explain why so many middle class authors who regarded themselves as 'progressive' could still display interpersonal racism: their politics related to an Enlightenment view of mankind in the abstract that did not translate into an ability to accord equal treatment to people in face-to-face interactions. Eventually their bourgeois training was exposed in their underlying mental boundaries, or
'habitus', which they shared with the other members of their class. The Public School left its imprint on all future political figures, whether they belonged to the Right, Centre or Left of the spectrum.

It therefore follows that the incorporation of the working class was always likely to occur through a Race channel irrespective of whether it took place through the Right, Centre or Left wings of the political structure. It was therefore always likely that British Populist nationalism would become indistinguishable from racism at the height of the 1880-1918 period.

4.3 From Missionary to Defensive Nationalism, 1918-Present Day

British imperialism peaked in the Edwardian period. In 1911, for example, "seven out of every ten tons of shipping [that] sailed through the Suez Canal were British" (Humphries, 1998: 1-2). These years also constituted the peak period of racial triumphalism, epitomised by the boast of the White Star Line shipping company in 1911 that the building of the Titanic demonstrated the "pre-eminence of the Anglo-Saxon race in command of the seas..." (cited in ibid: 2). Conversely, the sinking of The Titanic a year later was highly symbolic, as it coincided with the beginning of imperial doubt. Liberalism was entering a deep crisis (Freeden, 1986) and the state had begun to embark on a 'Fortress State' path with the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act and 1911 Official Secrets Act (see chapter five). The seeds were therefore already being planted for a switch from an expansionist imperialism, in which 'British values' were spread outwards by 'Anglo-Saxon' naval power, to a Defensive nationalism in which the main goal was to defend the national territory from alien threats.

The remainder of this chapter and most of chapter five are built on the consequences of this pivotal moment. Boundary strategy had constructed Civilisation and Race as arrogant and confident modes of incorporation, but from around 1911 incorporation became more of a Defensive game. Expansion was replaced by retrenchment. Racism became more 'territorial' in nature and thus more tribal, as it began to focus on guarding spatial borders rather than conquering overseas populations. This explains why, as chapter five shows, 1911 and 1919 witnessed major 'racial' attacks on 'coloured seamen' in Liverpool and Cardiff, who were accused of 'corrupting white women' (Jenkinson, 1993). Whereas the victims of Victorian racism were groups who were perceived to inhibit expansion and
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economic glory, the new victims were accused of degeneracy and Pollution, especially in the realms of economic behaviour and sexual conduct.

However, it was after 1956 that such attitudes accelerated at their fastest rate. The Welfare State had been constructed in 1945-51 on the promise that all classes would achieve social citizenship. Even sociologists such as Marshall (1950) had an expectation that welfare would reduce class divisions. It failed to so for a number of reasons: the lack of adequate state investment in the NHS and social housing stocks, the numerous middle class opt-outs, and the overall decline of the economy. Racism provided the bureaucratic elites of the state with a scapegoat for that failure: the 'coloured' immigrant. The racism of success thus gave way to the racism of decline.

4.4 Incorporation and the Rise of 'Underclass' Discourses

The 'racism of decline' is, in reality, a mixture of Race, Civilisation and Pollution strategies. Explicit racist statements by government ministers became rare after 1945, due partially to fear of upsetting Britain's postcolonial 'Commonwealth partners' and losing economic privileges in Commonwealth trading relationships. Pollution and Civilisation, by contrast, could target the same populations using a language that was couched in terms of crime, cultural incompatibility or economic dependency.

The most common device used to propagate these discourses was to conflate liberal concerns about 'social exclusion' with conservative discourses concerning 'the underclass'. In some respects, this device repeated the conflation of 'progressive' Fabianism with conservative eugenics that occurred in the 1890's. On the one hand, the term 'social exclusion' emerged in the 1970's as an offshoot of 'Durkheimian' social policy studies, and was used to justify 'progressive' liberal measures and to promote social integration and a limited redistribution of wealth. On the other hand, the concept of 'the underclass' perpetuated the idea that economically excluded groups have only themselves to blame due to fecklessness and poor family structures.

Procacci (1998: 71) has traced the origin of the phrase 'social exclusion' to Lenoir's Les exclus, published in 1974 (see Bibliography). Lenoir brought together several types of social stigma and explained them as failures of social integration. His thesis may thus be defined as 'Durkheimian' in the sense that it assumed that the goal of social policy was to achieve 'organic solidarity'. 'Social exclusion' was understood by Lenoir to be a combination of
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'anomic' (the absence of 'organic solidarity') and the failure of French institutions to protect the 'weakest' members of society (e.g. the physically and/or mentally 'disabled'). It was therefore analogous to the welfare liberalism of the 1945-1951 Attlee government: a liberal compromise between egalitarian ideals and bourgeois 'one nation' paternalism.

On the other hand, the notion of 'the underclass' was originally an American concept. The term had originally been used by Myrdal ([1944] 1962) to refer to an economic category of urban poverty that seemed to cross generations and resist social intervention. The 'underclass' did not participate in class politics and could not benefit from industrial expansion or economic growth. Although Myrdal's liberal intentions were broadly 'Durkheimian', conservatives remodelled his concept to focus on alleged cultural deficits. Consequently, as Procacci argues:

[The] concept lost its essentially economic character and cultural definitions created a degree of ambiguity which the analysis of poverty in the USA has never completely transcended (1998: 67).

By the 1980's, as Katz (1989) argues, the term 'underclass' had become "the most modern euphemism for the undeserving poor" (cited in Procacci, 1998: 69). Mead (1986: 4) noted that the 'underclass' debate had resulted in a political culture whereby "the politics of conduct is today more salient than a politics of class." The term 'underclass' enabled conservative academics to construct a Middle American/Middle British norm of respectability and to define the socially excluded as self-selecting groups of individuals who excluded themselves voluntarily from society by refusing to conform to that norm. This American literature dragged 'social exclusion' discourses back to the Victorian terrain of Civilisation, whereby groups were assessed and stigmatised according to bourgeois criteria of culture, 'manners' and conduct. The 'civilizing process', which originally preceded Race, rose again from the embers of Race. This gave Civilisation the potential to both 'stand alone' from Race as a boundary strategy in its own right, and to revive the imagery of Race in a cultural setting.

Furthermore, although some of these developments originated in the USA, they found a keen audience in the UK, especially after 1979. As Deacon (2000: 2) argues, the writings of Murray (1984) and Mead (1986) on 'cultural dependency' (in which 'cultural inadequacy' was linked to the passive receipt of welfare) had a huge influence on both Thatcher and Blair.
Their ideas about welfare dependency and the underclass had a profound impact upon all points of the party political spectrum in Britain. They all but furnished some members of the Conservative government with a new vocabulary, as the then Secretary of State for Social Services, John Moore, made a series of speeches which did little more than précis first Murray's Losing Ground and then Mead's Beyond Entitlement... [Moreover] Margaret Thatcher recorded in her memoirs how these ideas reinforced her conviction that that there was no conflict between individualism and social responsibility (1993: 627). If anything, however, the impact upon the centre and left was more fundamental still. More than anything else it was the American dependency theorists who pushed on to the agenda issues which had been neglected, indeed all but suppressed, by the then dominant Titmuss Paradigm.

'Underclass' theory led to the revival in the UK of 'undeserving poor' discourses that, Deacon claims, had been "neglected, indeed all but suppressed", in the 1945-1979 post-war welfare settlement, represented by the "Titmuss Paradigm". However, the next section will argue that 'undeserving poor' discourses were never far beneath the surface of the Welfare State. The original concerns of welfare liberalism with national unity and organic solidarity were similar to those of the 'Durkheimian' school that produced the literature on 'social exclusion' identified above. However, New Labour's approach to 'social exclusion' has been to combine the French and American approaches discussed above, in a way that disguises their differences. As F. Williams (2001) has argued (in a special edition of the journal Critical Social Policy), this has had the effect of removing 'inequality' from the political agenda:

[New Labour has] managed to combine the integrationist emphasis of the French/EU social exclusion discourse with the "underclass" notion of neo-liberal poverty discourse, whilst moving away from the focus on inequality and redistribution of the social democratic poverty discourse.

The ease with which New Labour was able to conflate the 'Durkheimian' 'social exclusion' model with Murray's 'underclass' paradigm illustrates how little autonomy welfare liberalism had been able to create for itself from earlier conservative models. It also demonstrated how discourses could slide along a continuum from Left to Right as they became incorporated into state strategies.

The concept of meritocracy took a similar ideological journey. The concept was born in the eugenic period as a late 'progressive' attack on aristocratic privilege. A century later, however, private education remained unchallenged by the state. The creation of a 'level playing field' would require the abolition of inherited wealth combined with a large measure of redistribution. However, Blair's May 2001 Newsnight interview with Jeremy Paxman...
indicated how decisively he had rejected redistribution as a goal of policy. This extract is taken from the BBC transcript of the interview:

PAXMAN: Is it acceptable for the gap between rich and poor to get bigger?

BLAIR: What I am saying is the issue isn’t in fact whether the very richest person ends up becoming richer. The issue is whether the poorest person is given the chance that they don’t otherwise have.

PAXMAN: I understand what you are saying. The question is about the gap.

BLAIR: Yes, I know what your question is. I am choosing to answer it in my way rather than yours.

PAXMAN: But you’re not answering it.

BLAIR: I am.

PAXMAN: You are answering another question

BLAIR: I am answering actually in the way that I want to answer it. I tell you why I want to answer it in this way. Because if you end up saying no, actually my task is to stop the person earning a lot of money, you waste all your time and energy, taking money off the people who are very wealthy when in today’s world, they probably would move elsewhere and make their money. What you are not asking me about, which would be a more fruitful line of endeavour, is what are you doing for the poorest people to give them a boost (source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/newsnight/newsid_1372000/1372220.stm).

New Labour’s embrace of the ‘dependency culture’ approach towards ‘social exclusion’ has to be placed in this context. If Blair had accepted the French model in its original form - or for that matter even the original US model of Myrdal - he would have been required to acknowledge that the 'underclass' was a structural problem; and that capitalism was producing ‘anomie’ and alienation. Blair could not do this because his entire philosophy rested on the grounds that free markets were compatible with social justice, in the same way American writers reinforced the belief of Thatcher that there was no conflict between individualism and social responsibility.

Blair’s embrace of ‘dependency culture’ theory also indicated that he shared some of Thatcher’s ‘bottom up’ view of community, but with a greater emphasis (taken from

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19 This was aided by the fact that the "entrepreneurial theology" (When, 2004: 315, n.27) of Thatcher and Blair chimed with their older 'missionary' Christian values. For example, When (2004: 27) cites an early speech by Thatcher from 1951 in which she stated that "the future of the world depended on the few men and women who were Christians and who were willing to...propagate that faith abroad" (Dartford Chronicle, 8 June 1951). These modern politicians therefore initiated a renaissance of the earlier Protestant State’s 'missionary' ideologies.
Clinton) on the need for the state to provide a safety net for needs that could not be met by charity. However, the framing of this ‘safety net’ mirrored both Thatcherism and Fabianism in its view that the state must make the welfare recipient active rather than passive. This had the effect of placing the imperative for overcoming exclusion back on to the excluded person. As Rose (1999: 268) argues, this shifting of the burden was achieved by a subtle change of language that transformed an unemployed person into a ‘job-seeker’, a homeless person into a ‘rough sleeper’, and a stateless person into an ‘asylum-seeker’. The implication followed that, because each of the new nouns was active, the person in that category must have chosen that lifestyle. As with Thatcherism, this discourse excluded any possibility of structure determining action, therefore the state was exempted from blame for the persistent patterns of poverty and exclusion that continued to exist.

This discourse therefore continued the liberal ‘tactics of responsibilisation’, derived from the Victorian Poor Laws, as noted above by Dean. The clearest expression of that discourse was the work of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), created by New Labour in 1997. The SEU staked out its ground in the 2001 document *Preventing Social Exclusion*, which intentionally or unintentionally omitted all mention of class and racism from its ‘explanations’ of why people ‘become’ socially excluded and homeless:

3.2 The economic changes that have driven social exclusion include the following: a more open global economy that has meant more competition and the need to continually update skills; the decline in the importance and scale of traditional industries such as manufacturing and mining; and the growth of knowledge-based industries that require higher levels of qualifications.

The SEU avoided any suggestion that human agency might be involved in decisions to downsize organisations and de-skill the workforce. It tacitly followed the Thatcherite strategy of insisting that governments cannot intervene in the decisions of business. The Social Exclusion Unit also provided ‘social’ explanations for exclusion that clearly owed their origin to the American body of literature discussed above:

3.4 At the same time wider changes in society have weakened or removed some of the support systems that helped people cope in the past: more young people have grown up in lone parent households, which are disproportionately likely to be on a low income; many more people have experienced breakdown in their parents’ relationship and/or their own, which can leave them less well equipped to cope with other difficulties they may face; communities have become more polarised and fragmented, so that, for example,
poor and unemployed people are less likely to live in a community where others might be able to put them in touch with a job.

These ‘family breakdown’ explanations were rehashes of ‘underclass’ stereotypes of one-parent families, which were potentially racist if used as an explanation of ‘ethnic minority’ exclusion. They failed to explain why high divorce rates in the middle classes had not prevented their offspring obtaining jobs. The final paragraph was counter-intuitive: it assumed that if people were unable to find jobs through ‘the grapevine’, it must have been because the grapevine was broken rather than because the jobs did not exist or were simply too degrading to be attractive.

Finally, the most notable features of the SEU were not the explanations it offered but the explanations it failed to offer. Despite New Labour’s formal commitment to anti-racism, there was no mention given to ‘institutional racism’ as an explanation of social exclusion. ‘Race’ was implied in the priority given to family breakdown, but there was no place for ‘race’ in the SEU’s policy framework. This might have been because ‘race’ had been compartmentalised as a Home Office function (or offloaded to the CRE) or it may have been that Civilisation is already doing the ideological work that Race used to perform. Furthermore, the SEU’s emphasis on family breakdown indicated that blood was still being used as a strategy in these discourses. The family was being represented as both cause and saviour: the cause was ‘dysfunctional families’ and the implied saviour was a return to the bourgeois two-parent patriarchal heterosexual family that ‘deviant’ groups had supposedly abandoned.

4.5 Blood, Property and the Myth of Meritocracy

The use of Family as a Blood strategy by the governments of both Thatcher and Blair helps to explain how the state remodelled the concepts of equality and social justice from 1979 onwards. Blair outlined his preferred definition of 'equality' in an interview with Jeremy Paxman for BBC2’s Newsnight, screened on 16th May 2002:

[Equality] doesn’t mean that people are the same. Does equality mean equality of outcome? Or does it mean equal status, which includes equal opportunity? In my view it means equal opportunity (BBC Television, Newsnight, Thursday 16th May 2002).

Blair’s definition contained two key assumptions. Firstly it assumed that "equality of outcome" was not a desirable government policy because "people are [not] the same". Secondly, it assumed that the aim of government policy should be to remove the obstacles
that prevented people reaching their full potential. This would then result in "equal opportunity" for all citizens.

It may be argued that the second assumption was the equivalent of the position held by the Fabians and Titmuss, namely that meritocracy required the removal of patronage and the environmental barriers to natural talent. However, Blair's first belief that "Equality doesn't mean that people are the same" was closer to Thatcher than Titmuss. Liberals of the Titmuss and Beveridge school (the 1930's London School of Economics) believed in a form of universalism that used eugenics to emphasise the common biology of rich and poor. They saw the 'British race' as having a 'common stock' that was being retarded by class and poverty. Titmuss would therefore regard 'equality of outcomes' as proof of the British race's oneness. Blair, in contrast, wished to emphasise British individualism in a communitarian setting, and, as with Thatcher, this led to his promotion of a middle class bourgeois vision of active moral individuals fulfilling their potentials at the same time as exercising their responsibilities.

Blair's vision of meritocracy is therefore shared Thatcher's tendency to 'individualise' social problems. New Labour abandoned all forms of 'top down' social explanation in favour of a neo-Thatcherite 'bottom up' social perspective. Conversely, this was less 'racial' than the Fabian vision because it did not rest on the assumption of biological community based on 'common stock'. Blair shared Thatcher's stated aim of 're-moralisation', utilising an autonomous discourse of Civilisation rather than a quest for biological improvement. The strategies of both Thatcher and Blair could therefore be explained without the need for a concept of 'new racism'. They mobilised Victorian bourgeois motifs of Blood, Pollution and Civilisation that were arguably older than that of Race. Although Race resonated with these motifs (given that racism had absorbed them between 1870 and 1945), they had an autonomy that allowed them to perform similar but not identical ideological work.

Furthermore, as chapter six demonstrates, the Thatcher and Blair projects perpetuated the importance of Property as a boundary strategy. The previous case studies in this thesis demonstrated how Property helped to structure social relations in the feudal and Protestant eras (for example, see the Whig view of Property derived from Locke outlined in section 3.6 above). Property then evolved in the incorporation period as a way of structuring citizenship. The British Reform Act 1867 limited the franchise to certain categories of property ownership (C. Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000). Similarly, female citizenship was, for many decades, expressed through the institution of marriage, in which the wife was
the property of the husband (see Pateman, 1988; Dummett and Nicol, 1990; Abbott and Bompas, 1943). The transfer of property through the male line fixed Property to patriarchal conceptions of Blood.

After 1979, the Thatcher government embarked on creating an electoral cleavage between private homeowners and council tenants. The former were given mortgage tax relief whilst the latter were marginalised by the selling off of the higher quality council stocks (Conway, 2000). The selling off of public utilities was then conjoined with this policy with the stated aim of creating a 'property owning democracy'. This latter concept, equating democracy with the ownership of property, was consistent with the development of liberal boundary strategy since the age of Locke. The ruling elite used the state in order to clearly demarcate those who belonged to the 'imagined community' of liberal democracy from those who were merely 'welfare dependent' or 'irresponsible'. In the case of Thatcher, state assets were cashed in for the purpose of literally buying the votes of an incorporated 'privatised' group of workers at the expense of new categories of 'polluted' and 'uncivilised' class or status fractions. Despite the apparent novelty of its political language, the strategic structure of Thatcherism and its New Labour successor was as old as liberalism itself. However, as the next section argues, its mode of nationalism was more individualistic than that of older liberal forms of Nation.

4.6 Individualism and the Persistence of Nation

By the 1970's, Britain was in full 'Defensive' mode. Embroiled in the Cold War (as part of NATO), exposed economically by the oil crisis, and suffering from industrial conflict, British nationalism may have seemed anachronistic. Yet at that very moment, a number of prominent trade unionists were spying on their members on behalf of the capitalist state. In October 2002, a BBC investigation, True Spies, uncovered evidence that 23 prominent Trade Unionists had participated in Special Branch operations throughout the 1970's. The Guardian summarised these findings:

Joe Gormley, the miners' leader who presided over two successful strikes against the government in the early 1970's, was named yesterday as a police special branch informant.

Ray Buckton, the long-term leader of Aslef, the train drivers' union widely derided as militant, was also a special branch informant, it was revealed yesterday.
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The two men, both dead, are said to be among as many as 23 “senior trade unionists” who regularly passed information - unpaid - about their tactics and internal disputes to a special unit of the special branch called the industrial section.

According to former special branch officers interviewed for the forthcoming BBC series, True Spies, the intelligence was shared with the security service, MI5, which at the time was also busy targeting union leaders, leftwing groups and civil rights organisations that it considered subversive.

As NUM president, Mr Gormley is remembered as a leader of the dispute which led to the three-day week and the downfall of Edward Heath’s government in 1974.

Perhaps even more surprising is the claim that Mr Buckton was a special branch informant. He was always regarded as a leftwing stalwart.

“We found ourselves actually going to unions and talking to top union officials about what was going on,” says Ken Day, a former Metropolitan Police special branch officer. “One of them would be Joe Gormley.” Another former officer, identified as Alan, says of Gormley: “He was a patriot and he was very wary and worried about the growth of militancy within his own union.” (Norton-Taylor, ‘Gormley and Buckton named as special branch informers’, The Guardian, 24 October 2002).

The trade unionists involved in these activities were displaying a combination of individualism and nationalism that would come to dominate the Thatcher government of the 1980’s. Their example illustrates how the state exploited the Weberian problem of disenchantment: how societies adapted to the loss of faith. The emotional comfort and sense of vocation, which populations previously derived from religious myths, may have initially been invested in a socialist vision of society by these union leaders, but they eventually decided to settle for ‘bourgeois’ comforts.

A similar process could be detected in the 1980’s among the ‘rank and file’, whereby all personal aspirations were invested in the purchase of the family home. Workers became far more compliant in the workplace due to fear of losing that home, and employers were able to exploit this compliance in order to generate an ‘overtime culture’ in several economic sectors (Bunting, 2004). Consequently, by 2002, one out of every six British employees worked more than sixty hours per week, and many more supposedly ‘chose’ not to enforce their rights under the European Working Time Directive to have a statutory limitation of 48 hours on their working week (The Guardian, 30th August 2002). The British worker thus, on average, worked far longer hours than his or her counterpart in mainland Europe.

The fantasies of the private sphere had therefore done the ideological work that was previously carried out by religion. Nation, in combination with Property and Blood, had
enabled capitalism to survive and prosper in its 'post-Fordist' phase (see Burrows and Loader, 1994; Jessop, 2002), by marrying a more Defensive definition of Little England with a more individualist mode of 'I'm alright Jack' personal politics. Politics became the domain of the middle class bourgeois family, isolated from the rest of society.

In conclusion therefore, boundary strategy under these regimes protected the interests of 'macro' institutions by deflecting political attention on to 'the micro'. The 'imagined community' became a 'bottom up' construction, in which society could only be imagined as a collection of smaller units, thereby concealing the macro structures of capitalism and class advantage. Thatcherism and New Labour could both be defined as ideological units that suppressed 'big ideas' politics in favour of (to paraphrase Freud) the narcissism of imagined differences (see Freud, [1917] 1999).

4.7 Conclusion: Incorporation, Gatekeeping and the Fortress State

This chapter has ranged from a discussion of Victorian nationalism to a reflection on the cultivation of the private sphere in the present era. These themes were not as disparate as they may at first have appeared, as they each constituted ways of 'forming' the citizen and non-citizen in relation to the state. After 1830, 'respectable' class fractions were incorporated into 'the social' at the expense of 'others' who were placed outside or beneath it. Individualism masked those processes by creating the myth of a community of individuals possessing equal opportunities to advance up the social ladder. Boundary strategies provided mythical explanations for the failure of some groups to succeed in market competition.

Equally importantly, however, there was always a trade-off between incorporation and proletarianisation. Incorporation destroyed the unity of the proletariat as an 'imagined' class but it did not ease the working life of the proletariat, given that the latter had to undergo commodification of its labour power. Instead, incorporation offered citizenship rights in exchange for greater productivity, longer working hours and the continued commodification of labour power. The six boundary strategies of Civilisation, Pollution, Nation, Blood, Race and Property disguised that process by providing channels through which a proletarian group could experience 'bio-power' in relation to others, thereby concealing from itself the commodity status of its own labour power.
Moreover, the state helped to create a global system of exploitation from which the British labourer largely benefited. Labour power from Britain's former colonies did most of the 'dirty jobs' that the 'white' British labourer no longer wished to perform. In order to maintain the 'incorporated' labourer's satisfaction with that process, however, the state had to ensure that the post-colonial migrant labourer did not make demands upon the welfare resources that the state had given to the 'incorporated' labourer as a citizenship reward for loyalty to the nation. The Incorporation State therefore inevitably had to strengthen the gatekeeper arm that had been developing since the Reformation. Gatekeeping became a mechanism for 'sealing in' the welfare state (as part of a process of retrenchment) and for ensuring that the 'incorporated' industrial classes remained loyal to the state. It also enabled the state to develop mechanisms of surveillance that increased in size even when Britain lost much of its world influence.

However, these mechanisms also generated contradictions that the state was only partially successful in managing. The exclusion of groups from welfare on barely concealed 'racial' grounds (such as the exclusion of migrants from social housing due to their failure to meet 'residential' qualifications) undermined the liberal claim that British institutions were founded on principles of 'universalism'. Welfare exclusion also required groups to be stigmatised despite the capitalist state's need for their labour power. The state therefore revived a label of 'homo economicus' that had previously been attached to Jews (see chapter two above). This had the effect of enabling migrants to be treated as economic units whilst being constructed as socially dead. Incorporation was therefore facilitated by the continued construction of a sub-proletariat of non-persons.

These gatekeeping processes could not be managed by the state's institutions in the form that they existed at the end of the Victorian period. Consequently, from 1903 onwards, the state developed new apparatuses of surveillance and immigration control. This new state machinery, which the thesis defines as the Fortress State, gradually became a strategic actor in its own right, with its own interests and channels of influence. It had a vested interest in demonising migrants because each new measure of immigration control strengthened its own institutional power and influence. The next chapter examines the history of this machinery and the consequences of its actions.
CHAPTER FIVE: The Fortress State, 1903-Present Day

5.1 State Racism or Popular Racism?

The incorporation of 'respectable', 'white' working class fractions in the twentieth century was accompanied by the erection of barriers against 'undesirables', usually defined as 'non-white'. These barriers did not always correspond to observable differences of skin colour. Irish labourers, Poles, Italians, Jews and Slavs were all, at some point, depicted as racially 'non-Caucasian' and thus socially 'non-white' (Holmes, 1988; Bonnett, 2000; Lorimer, 1978: 15-16). This chapter examines the role played by immigration policy in that process, and how this was synthesised with the growth of an apparatus of surveillance and secrecy.

The main argument of the chapter is that the state often adopted hostility towards Jewish and 'coloured' immigration without being compelled to do so by popular pressures. In other words, immigration controls did not simply respond to a racist electorate. There are three ways in which the relationship between state racism and popular racism could be conceptualised:

- Reactive: the state responds to public pressure.
- Evasive: the state evades public opinion by pushing 'race' issues to the periphery of the political structure (see Bulpitt, 1986).
- Proactive: the state pre-empts popular racism by introducing anti-immigration measures before there is any evidence of popular demand for them.

This chapter argues that the weight of evidence debunks the first two positions and supports the 'proactive' interpretation. The chapter does not deny that racism existed among sections of the working class. It acknowledges the working class racism that was expressed in violence against 'blacks' in 1919 and 1958. It recognises that the National Union of Railwaymen and Transport and General Workers' Union called for immigration controls as early as 1955 (Miles and Phizacklea, 1984: 33). It also notes the observation by Miles and Phizacklea of working class racism in the workplace:

West Indian workers were excluded from trade and labour clubs and there was industrial action when New Commonwealth workers were employed or promoted in factories in various parts of Britain (ibid: 47).
The argument of this chapter is that such racism was not uniform or organised in a way that compelled the state to adhere to it. The Labour Party had racist elements but was elected in 1964 despite having opposed the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. The TUC General Council did not follow the lead of the NUR and TGWU in calling for immigration controls until 1965. Furthermore, the main parties were more concerned with the middle class vote in 'swing' seats, and this demographic segment was not regarded by the Cabinet of the mid-1950's as exhibiting clear racist demands of immigration controls.

Spencer (1997) cites three occasions - in 1955\textsuperscript{20}, 1957\textsuperscript{21} and 1958\textsuperscript{22} respectively - where Cabinet meetings expressed the view that immigration control was desirable but did not have public support. The following extract, from the first of these meetings, on 3 November 1955\textsuperscript{23}, was cited originally by Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987: 335) and is also cited by Miles (1993: 150) and cited by Spencer (1997: 84):

\begin{quote}
The problem of colonial immigration has not yet aroused public anxiety...[But] if immigration from the colonies, and for that matter from India and Pakistan, were allowed to continue unchecked, there is a real danger that over the years there would be a real change in the racial character of the English\textsuperscript{24} people.
\end{quote}

Layton-Henry (1992: 73) gives further support to this finding by arguing that public debate concerning 'coloured' immigration did not become politically significant until after the so-called 'race riots' that occurred in Nottingham and Notting Hill between 23 August and 2 September 1958. Even then, however, an in-house analysis of newspaper editorial comment, prepared for the Cabinet, found that less than a quarter of the sample called for formal limits on immigration\textsuperscript{25}. There was also no evidence of a public clamour for immigration controls during the October 1959 General Election, during which the fascist Oswald Mosley lost his deposit for the first time in his long career (Spencer, 1997: 120).

The conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that public opinion was divided on 'race' and these divisions allowed the state a large degree of autonomy. It could play up to the racist sections of the electorate, or it could emphasise the arguments against such controls, as Labour did in 1961. Furthermore, far more explanatory power for the rise of racist

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{20} CM39(55)7, 3 November 1955, PREM11/824, cited by Spencer (1997: 84)
\textsuperscript{21} CC57(57)5, 25 July 1957, CAB128/31, cited by Spencer (1997: 87)
\textsuperscript{22} Minute on Commonwealth immigrants, 27 June 1958, PREM11/2920, cited by Spencer (1997: 98)
\textsuperscript{23} CM39(55)7, 3 November 1955, PREM11/824.
\textsuperscript{24} Note the preference for 'English' over 'British' in the definition of the 'racial character' of the 'people'.
\end{footnotes}
immigration measures can be deduced from the conflicts that existed within the state itself. For example, the ex-miner turned Labour radical, Nye Bevan, had secretly expressed the view as early as 6 October 1948 that 'black' and 'Asian' workers were "in his view, both difficult to control and likely to be the cause of social problems." The views of Churchill were even more explicit, as cited by one of his ministers, Macmillan:

I remember that Churchill rather maliciously observed that perhaps the cry of 'Keep Britain White' might be a good slogan for the [1955] election which we would soon have to fight without the benefit of his leadership (Macmillan, 1973; cited in Miles and Phizacklea (1984: 32).

Consequently, as with the Fabian-eugenics alliance of 1890-1918, divisions within the state concerning 'race' were overcome by a tacit alliance between forces led by a Left-wing radical (Bevan) and a Right-wing Tory imperialist (Churchill).

Despite its private admissions concerning public opinion, the state spent the mid-1950's discussing immigration controls. 'Coloured immigration' was discussed in Cabinet on five occasions in 1954 and eleven occasions in 1955 (Spencer, 1997: 51). In that period, immigration control legislation was drafted, presented to Cabinet but then postponed due to fears of splitting the Conservative Party and the Commonwealth (ibid: 69-81).

Instead of formal public controls, the state introduced covert measures throughout the 1950's that discouraged the issuing of passports to 'undesirables' in the 'non-white' Commonwealth. Pressure was exerted on British officials overseas to plug migration at source. Passport applications were scrutinised and rejected if the applicants were 'undesirables' (Spencer, 1997: 21-38), whilst a financial bond was imposed to exclude the poor (suggesting a class element as well as racism). The government, in effect, operated a double standard whereby a public espousal of equality for all Commonwealth subjects was contradicted by private acts of racism condoned and encouraged at Cabinet level. This was made clear in a Cabinet memo, written by Douglas-Home in 1955 (cited in Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 180):

On the one hand it would presumably be politically impossible to legislate for a colour bar and any legislation would have to be non-discriminatory in form. On the other hand we do not wish to keep out immigrants of good type from the old Dominions. I understand that, in the view of the Home Office, immigration

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26 Bevan was speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Labour in the 'Working Party on the employment of colonial labour', 1948, CO1006/1, cited by Spencer (1997: 40).
officers could, without giving rise to trouble or publicity, exercise such a measure of
discrimination as we think desirable.

The mid-1950's was therefore illustrative of the covert nature of boundary strategy in three
ways. Firstly, it demonstrated that there was often a huge gap between 'law' and 'policy' that
was not always recognised by observers. Parliamentary legislation and common law gave
the state an appearance of fairness and universalism that was contradicted by its covert
procedures. Secondly, officials of the state often viewed themselves as the guardians of a
particular identity - the "racial character of the English people." Thirdly, the state reserved a
great deal of arbitrary power for its own officials; it created political 'spaces' in which
discriminatory practices could proliferate, secluded from democratic accountability. This
was partially because pressure from below was usually divided and less organised than the
state's own machinery.

The covert controls of the 1950's were only possible because the state had already
constructed an apparatus between 1905 and 1919 that gave huge arbitrary powers to a new
brand of state servant, namely the "frontier guard" (R. Cohen, 1994). As Dummett and
Nicol argue:

The First World War was the great turning point in the history of British
immigration control. It established a lasting system of general controls over all
entrants and alien residents, which was in the hands of the executive branch of
government and of officials, who between them made policy. Scrutiny by
Parliament and the courts was minimal, while the role of the police and of
intelligence services working under or with the War Office was greatly enlarged.
The traditional concept of 'alien friend' had been eroded, first by the 1905 Act's
formal designation of certain types of alien as 'undesirable' but much more
significantly by the 1919 assumption that all aliens should be regarded with
suspicion as potential subversives. The greatest shift of all was from the historic
presumption that an alien could come and go freely unless there was a specific
reason to exclude him, to the new presumption that an alien had no claim to be
received, or to remain, but could enter only as the interest of the state - as defined
by the state authorities - permitted (1990: 112).

The period 1903-1919 witnessed the establishment of the machinery that would define
national security up to and including the Blair administration's 'War on Terror'. The Aliens
Act of 1905 was part of a ramp of measures that included the establishment of MI5 in
1909, and the Official Secrets Act of 1911. The development of this state apparatus was
one of the factors that tore apart British liberalism during World War 1, as captured in the
writing of such figures as Hobson and Hobhouse (Freeden, 1986). Hobhouse, in particular,
recognised that the state controls of 1914-1918 were a watershed in British political history

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that would allow conservative forces to constrain liberal freedoms after the war ended. The subsequent permanence of immigration controls could be viewed as a verification of his fears.

The case study evidence presented below outlines three broad phases in the development of this illiberal state machine and clarifies the changes in boundary strategy that it facilitated. The first phase was the targeting of Jews, 'anarchists' and 'Fenians' in the legislation of 1905-1919. The notable feature of this period was the mutual reinforcement of Race and Pollution. At the same moment that the Fabians embraced eugenics, the new security apparatus was hunting down internal enemies. It was but a short step from this Edwardian paranoia to the internment of foreign nationals in World War I. Moreover, internment was accompanied by mob violence against Italian and German businesses in London and other major cities (Panayi, 1993). This was followed in 1919 by violence against 'coloured' seamen in Liverpool and Cardiff (Jenkinson, 1993). A pattern may thus be observed whereby state xenophobia begets mob violence.

The second phase was the mid-1950's, when, as was noted above, the government proactively erected barriers against 'non-white' migrants despite the initial absence of public pressure for immigration control. This period eventually produced the discriminatory legislation of 1962-1981, which resulted in the concept of 'patriality', whereby immigration was restricted to those who had ancestors born on British soil. This implicitly tied immigration policy to myths of descent.

The third period, from the 1980's to the present day, has focused on asylum seekers and the 'threat' of illegal immigration. The global nature of migration has made it difficult for state officials to define in 'racial' terms. Ministers were also restricted by their formal commitment to the Race Relations Act, which committed the state to a public position of 'racial' equality (although the Immigration Service was exempt from some of the principles of that legislation; see Dummett, 2001). The political elite and its media cohorts therefore reverted from Race to a revival of Pollution, linking immigration to issues of terrorism, crime, disease and welfare. Asylum seekers have thus become the new Jews, and public discourse has shifted towards an 'anti-social' position akin to antisemitism. Race may still have operated beneath the surface of this Pollution strategy (in the implication that asylum seekers were 'naturally' devious, anti-social and violent) but it was as 'pollutants' of the body politic that they were most powerfully shaped in the 'imagined community' of the public mind. Furthermore, this aspect of the social imagination was not solely the creation of
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Cabinet ministers, tabloid newspapers and racist agitators. As this case study shows, the 'gatekeepers' of welfare institutions and the NHS were also responsible for its dominance. These liberal guardians exhibited a similar 'progressive racism' to that of the Fabians, in that they viewed asylum seekers as a threat to the 'progressive' gains of incorporation: the paternalistic bureaucracy of welfare liberalism and 'respectable' social reformism.

5.2 Boundary Strategy versus 'New Racism'

A key issue that arises from this study is that some sociologists have tended to overstate the dominance of phenotypic racism in immigration policy from 1903 to 1971 and underplay the significance of Civilisation, Nation and Pollution strategies in that period. This has caused them to commit a 'category error' since 1981 by promoting the erroneous concept, 'new racism' (Barker, 1981; Balibar, 1991; Gilroy, [1987] 2002; Winant, 2001) to describe 'new' forms of non-phenotypic prejudice that, in reality, are largely identical to the Pollution, Nation and Civilisation strategies that produced the 1905-1919 anti-alien legislation.

Liberal discourses relating to Jews and asylum seekers usually defined both groups as anti-social rather than subsocial. Fabian discourses in the 1880's focussed on the Jews who allegedly ran sweatshops, leading to the reference of B. Webb (1889: 233) to "the characteristic love of profit of the Jewish race..." (cited in Gainer, 1972: 87). As was noted in Section 4.2.6 above, Fabian concerns about the 'pauper alien' were fuelled by liberal bourgeois class prejudice. Consequently, Fabian antisemitism gave credence to Pollution and Civilisation discourses in relation to Jewish sexuality and family life that gave the state a number of templates for the construction of alleged 'pimps' and 'deviant family structures' in the Caribbean communities that migrated to the UK after 1945. As the following paragraphs demonstrate, similar discourses were mobilised against asylum seekers from the 1980's onwards, constructing the myth of the anti-social alien.

The ability of the state to fall back on these pre-1914 strategies enabled it to adopt a position whereby it could use Civilisation and Pollution to do the ideological work of Race without having to resort to an explicit racist stance. This point cannot be grasped adequately by relying on the term 'new racism'.

One of the most notable incongruities of the anti-alien discourse that emerged after 1880 was the ubiquity of the term 'pauper alien'. This was epitomised in 1886 by the
establishment of the Society for the Suppression of the Immigration of Destitute Aliens. The title of this 'Society' was actively misleading because the Jews it purported to describe did not seek Poor Relief and were members of the working population, albeit low-paid ones:

By 1898, authorities had already destroyed the 'pauper' myth. The Board of Trade Reports of 1894 on the Volume and Effects of East European immigration had shown by the Poor Law statistics that aliens were not paupers and did not swell the population of infirmaries and lunatic asylums...It contended throughout that aliens did not displace Englishmen (Gainer, 1972: 273, n.70).

The persistence of this falsehood after 1898 must therefore indicate the presence of a deliberate strategy to conflate Jews with an already stigmatised population, the 'undeserving poor.' Antisemites were able to convince a large group of MP's that Jews occupied the same moral and cultural status as paupers, despite their different economic status. Jews were also portrayed as being in breach of the Protestant Ethic (Mosse, 1978), despite working long hours, and were accused of offending public decency with their allegedly poor hygiene and tendencies to sleep in the back garden in the summer.

This antisemitic conflation of deviousness and poverty could still be found in equivalent form after 1945 in the policing of welfare entitlements for ethnic minorities. By 1976, this 'policing' function had spread to the DHSS and the NHS, as in the following case in Leicester:

Nearly 200 Asian women attending the Leicester General Hospital's ante-natal clinics in 1976 were asked to produce their passports before receiving care. One woman who had previously given birth to a child at the hospital refused to do so and was subsequently refused ante-natal care. The matter was then taken up in parliament by the Liberal peer, Lord Avebury (Gordon, 1985: 34).

The links between this incident and anti-immigration measures can be clarified by noting Leicester's local context. In 1972, Leicester City Council had sought to prevent 'Ugandan Asians' travelling to Leicester (this is discussed further in the section 6.2 below). The Leicester Mercury had a notorious editor who ran inflammatory articles against the 'Asians' (see Troyna's 1981 study of press reporting, published by the CRE, listed in the Bibliography). The National Front ran a venomous local election campaign in 1976 that received extensive coverage in the Mercury. Some NHS staff and managers in Leicester would have been Mercury readers.
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A notable feature of this example was the ability of the state to defend its actions by keeping Race and Pollution separate. This enabled it to deny accusations of racism whenever the Pollution strategy was deployed. The implication of the hospital's action was that 'Asian' women exhibited devious and underhand 'health shopping' behaviours similar to the mendacity previously ascribed to Jews. Similar accusations, aimed at asylum seekers, would characterise boundary strategy under New Labour.

The interdependence of Pollution, Civilisation, Nation and Race can be found in numerous examples of political discourse during the twentieth century. With regard to Pollution, for example, Hayter (2000: 39) cites this contribution from 1904, attributed in Hansard to W. Hayes Fisher MP:

> Just as one river could carry a certain amount of sewage, but not the sewage of a whole Kingdom, so one portion of London cannot carry the whole of the pauper and diseased alien immigrants who come into the country.

The accusation that immigrants carry diseases into the country has a history that can be traced to the Black Death, when Jews were accused of poisoning wells. Its modern manifestations included articles blaming immigrants for the persistence of TB in the UK. This accusation was levelled at Jews in the 1890’s, Pakistanis in the 1960’s (Ahmad, 1993), and asylum seekers in 2003 (The Guardian, 2nd February 2003). Another common device was to link immigration with sexually transmitted diseases. The most recent manifestation of this discourse targeted African nurses working in the NHS, who were accused of importing the HIV virus (The Guardian, 9th December 2002).

One of the most clever and artful examples of a politician deliberately skirting the semantic boundaries of Pollution, Civilisation, Nation and Race was Thatcher's television interview for World In Action in January 1978, in which she stated that:

> [People] are really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people of a different culture. The British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, then people are going to be quite hostile to those coming in (cited in R. Cohen, 1994: 58).

The cleverness in this statement was that it constructed a racist argument that could be camouflaged as a Pollution, Nation or Civilisation one. Its racism lay in the invocation of the "British character" and the assumption that this national "character" was inherently superior to those beyond its borders. Her mission to defend the "British character" from
immigration echoed the Cabinet's concern from 1955\(^{27}\), cited above in section 5.1, that "there is a real danger that over the years there would be a real change in the racial character of the English people." Similarly, a mixture of Civilisation and Race messages could be inferred from Thatcher's apparent defence of the British Empire as an institution that had "done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world."

Thatcher repeated this assertion in a xenophobic, anti-European form 21 years later:

> In my lifetime all our problems have come from mainland Europe and all the solutions have come from the English-speaking nations across the world (The Guardian, 6th October 1999).

Thatcher presented the "British character" and "the English-speaking peoples" in a way that conflated culture and race. Her view of Nation was not confined to national geography: it also incorporated the USA, the Falklands and the other Old Dominions. Conversely, Thatcher tacitly shared Enoch Powell's view that "people of a different culture", even those born on British soil, could not become British merely by being present in the UK. Her version of Nation was therefore 'jus sanguinis' rather than 'jus soli' (Brubaker, 1996). Despite Thatcher's aversion to Germans, her definition of "national character" had a close affinity with Anglo-Saxonism and German nationalism. Thatcher's use of the "swamping" metaphor also placed her comments in the Pollution camp. It had historical connotations of antisemitism, as in the "sewage" metaphor cited above from 1904. The aim of the term "swamping" appeared to be to suggest that immigration was a catastrophe, on the same scale as a natural disaster. It is arguably unlikely than any politician using the term would be unaware of its connotations

A further example of Pollution may be cited from Blair's first Cabinet. In March 2000, the tabloid press accused Roma women of using their children to beg for food on the London Underground. The 'immigration minister' Barbara Roche gave legitimacy to the stories by appearing on BBC Radio Four's The World At One to announce that the government was considering introducing measures to fast-track the deportation of women who used their children to beg for food. Roche then went on to make these inflammatory remarks:

> They have clearly come here with the intention of exploiting the system and also exploiting their children... The public, very understandably, are very upset by young children, some of them babes in arms, being exploited in this way and it really is a vile thing to do (www.bbc.co.uk; 19 May 2000).

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A number of notable features can be observed in this statement. Firstly, the premeditated use of a dichotomy between ‘they’ (the Roma) and ‘the public’ (British citizens) was clearly intended to imply that the Roma would not be given any opportunity to belong in the UK. This was thus a classical use of the ‘anti-social’ label that characterises Pollution strategies. Secondly, the equation between "exploiting the system" and "exploiting their children", implying that the two are morally linked, was clearly designed to link begging with ‘benefit shopping’, thereby mobilising nineteenth century anti-pauper discourses to imply a lack of civilisation. Thirdly, the term "vile", targeted at people whom the Minister had never met, let alone had never been convicted of a crime, imposed a homogenising assumption on a group with the clear intention of demonising it in a manner akin to antisemitism.

Fourthly, Roche’s emotive use of gender was an example of New Labour’s characteristic use of Family motifs (Blood) to imply that aliens did not conform to the bourgeois family model that Britain had spent so many centuries constructing. The role of welfare was also crucial to this strategy because it implied that an over-generous Welfare State encouraged deviant family forms. The link between strict immigration control, policing, anti-welfare discourse, and ‘defending the bourgeois family’ was therefore an important source of continuity between New Labour and its Thatcherite predecessors in government. This can be observed in two extracts from a speech made in 1997 by Teresa Gorman, a former Westminster City counsellor, to move an adjournment motion in the House of Commons:

The Daily Mail today reports the case of a woman from Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for five years. According to the magistrates’ court yesterday, she has cost the British taxpayer £40,000. She was arrested, of course, for stealing… (Hansard, 5th March 1997, Column 838)...

I had the case of a woman who has managed to remain here for five years by playing the system. She has given birth to two children while she has been here and she is so addicted to the social services that, when she needs to go shopping in Basildon, she telephones her social service assistant worker and asks for a minicab to take her there because she cannot bring back her shopping (ibid: Column 840).

Gorman’s prejudiced attack on Russian women had a demonstrable parallel with antisemitism: the Jews attacked in the run-up to the 1905 Aliens Act were also Russian in origin. Whilst it may be tempting to cite Gorman as an example of ‘new racism’, such a description would be inaccurate due to the fact that the prejudice expressed by Gorman could just as easily have been uttered in 1897. It was thus not ‘new’ at all.
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5.3 The Anti-Alien Legislation of 1903-1919

5.3.1 Bureaucrats and Mandarins

The history of British immigration controls in the twentieth century began with the 'Report of the Royal Commission on Immigration', published in August 1903. Although some of the Report's recommendations were not implemented until the period 1914-1919, the overall structure of the Report formed a template for the state's approach to immigration throughout the century. The 1905 Aliens Act, introduced by the Conservatives, was initially undermined by the electoral victory in 1906 of the Liberals, who had largely opposed the legislation. The policy of the Liberals was to use their discretion to largely avoid implementing the legislation. However, the bureaucracy that the Act set in place gradually acquired its own institutional power as a self-preserving political machine. When international tensions after 1910 caused the state to construct a 'need' for immigration officials to be given the authority to turn away migrants at the port of entry, a momentum was created in favour of the expansion of the immigration officers' political status. Every subsequent panic concerning 'foreigners' was then converted into political capital by the Home Office, which lobbied the government repeatedly to increase the legal powers of its officers. Consequently, by the time of the First World War, the Liberals who had scorned the 1903 Report found themselves rushing to implement its measures, prompted by the ability of their civil servants to manipulate anti-alien discourse to their own institutional advantage.

This case study therefore argues that many of the immigration controls that were taken for granted in post-1945 politics, owed their longevity to the self-perpetuating statecraft of Home Office mandarins, as well as their cultural prejudices. Rather than 'peripheralising' issues of 'race' (Bulpitt, 1986), which the 1906 Liberals had hoped to do, these officials staked their pensions on the guaranteed expansion of their bureaucratic empires, which could only be achieved by keeping 'race' in the spotlight. Bulpitt has argued that some political mandarins in the executive may have preferred to isolate 'high politics' from the potential powder-keg of popular racism, but the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that these civil servants have usually been outnumbered by those who needed immigration controls to pay their mortgages. The group that has won the day has been the Home Office bureaucracy that has often had a career stake in convincing Ministers that tight immigration controls are 'essential for the maintenance of good race relations'.
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5.3.2 Precedents and Templates

The political success of the immigration service, in rising from a fledgling government department in 1905 to a key voice in policy by 1919, was also illustrative of the importance of 'precedent' in political policy. In the Victorian period, there was no machinery for registering, monitoring, detaining or deporting aliens. The absence of such machinery led to the view that 'laissez-faire' was Britain's 'natural' immigration policy, despite the fact that anti-alien measures were taken against suspected French radicals during the revolutions in 1793 and 1848 (see Hayter, 2000; Foot, 1965). The principal reason for this 'open borders' approach to migration was the political hegemony of 'free trade' economics after the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840's. The Liberals had formed an alliance with organised labour to oppose all forms of protectionism on the grounds that only 'laissez-faire' could guarantee cheap bread. When the Conservatives, prompted by Chamberlain's tariff reform movement, went against this hegemony in 1905, they calculated erroneously that the labour movement's antisemitism would over-ride its support for Liberal free trade. The result was a massive Tory defeat at the polls in 1906.

Paradoxically, however, as Gainer (1972) argues, although the 1905 Act was initially buried with the Tories, it was sufficient for the legislation to be on the statute book for it to become part of the political furniture. The fact that Parliament had voted for restriction was enough for the legislation to survive its initial neglect. When the national mood changed from Edwardian complacency to paranoia concerning anarchists following the Sidney Street siege of 1911, the Liberals were forced to change policy, and began to use the anti-alien machinery they had inherited from the Act. When public concern mounted further, fuelled by German spy scares, Parliament responded with the 1914 Aliens Restriction Act, which, as Gainer notes, "authorised powers which the Government had fought against for the last ten years" (1972: 207). The Act was only meant to be in place for the duration of the war, but in 1919 it was renewed and extended. Most of its provisions remained in place until they were incorporated into the 1981 Nationality Act.

As was argued above, this sequence of events was more significant than the post-1945 legislation because it covered all aliens. 'West Indians' and 'South Asians' only escaped its effects because they were British subjects and thus entitled to enter Britain freely. The effect of the 1962-1981 legislation, which discriminated on barely concealed 'racial' grounds against the New Commonwealth, was to convert the antisemitism and Germanophobia of the 1905-1919 legislation into the 'colour prejudice' of the Enoch Powell generation. The
machinery that would implement the 1962-1981 legislation, with racist zeal against its 'black' and 'Asian' victims, consisted of policies and practices that had already been in place for fifty-seven years at the start of that period.

5.4 Institutional Racism within the Immigration Service

In the early 1980's, the Commission for Racial Equality embarked on a study of procedures and practices within the immigration service. This was eventually published in 1985 (see Bibliography). The obstructions that the CRE faced, and the findings that it eventually produced, are summarised by Dummett:

The CRE had had great difficulty in making the investigation, the Home Office having objected, but the High Court decided in October 1980 that the CRE's duty to promote good race relations permitted the work to be carried out. The Court "could not accept that Parliament must be assumed to have intended, as the Home Office contends, that the field of immigration should be a no-go area for the Commission". The report concluded inter alia that there should be a major change of emphasis in the procedures. A significant number of genuine applicants were being refused. In countries where there was supposed to be "pressure to emigrate", procedures were heavily biased against acceptance of individuals. Among would-be visitors, those from New Commonwealth or other Third World countries were the most likely to be refused or detained at port or admitted under more restrictive conditions. For example, in 1980, visitors from the New Commonwealth or Pakistan were 30 times more likely to be refused than visitors from the Old Commonwealth. Procedures for admitting spouses from the Indian sub-continent were often drawn out for years, while spouses from New Zealand or Canada met no difficulty. Differential treatment in family reunion caused particular concern. The appeals system had not impinged on any of the fundamental problems in immigration control procedures. Cautiously expressed though the whole report was, it confirmed criticisms of unfair bias against applicants from non-white applicants. Its quotations from unpublished instructions to immigration and entry clearance staff show that, if the full force of the anti-discrimination measures in the Race Relations Act 1976 had been applicable to immigration control, procedures would have had to be radically and fundamentally altered (2001: 4).

The following discussion aims to show how this institutional racism developed from the 1905 Aliens Act onwards. It has already been noted above, and acknowledged in the quotation from Douglas-Home, that public servants were tacitly expected to discriminate against certain migrants at the port of entry. The 1905 Aliens Act was modelled on the Natal Act of 1897 in South Africa and the US Congressional Act of 1882 that had stigmatised Chinese migrants (Goldberg, 2002: 178-183). It empowered an Aliens Inspectorate to exclude 'undesirables', defined as those aliens who lacked the means to support themselves or their dependants. However, between 1905 and 1924, a huge change occurred in the application of this measure. In 1905 the Home Secretary [Henry] Gladstone
had instructed that, in cases where aliens were claiming persecution, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ should be given to the applicant. In 1919, however, his successor, Shortt, laid down a ‘national security’ pretext for reversing that procedure:

Where there is a choice between our own safety and the safety of our people and the infliction of hardship on an alien, then that hardship becomes necessary and ceases to be unjust (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 108).

A number of policies evolved from this logic, not just the turning down of asylum applications, but also the internments of German nationals in World Wars One and Two, Iraqi nationals during the 1991 Gulf War and Irish Republicans in the 1970’s (R. Cohen, 1994). More recently, since the so-called ‘War on Terror’ was declared in 2001, the state has approved the suspension of ‘habeas corpus’ in the detention of suspected Islamic terrorists.

One of the most significant facts to arise from these trends was the arbitrary power given to state officials, who could use ‘security’ as a pretext for a range of prejudicial decisions. The official was unlikely to be asked to justify his or her decision in a court of law if he or she could invoke a ‘security’ factor.

The civil servants running the Home Office were notably conservative in style and substance. The Permanent Under-Secretary from 1908 to 1922, Edward Troup, was a restrictionist who recruited his staff from the armed forces and bitterly resented the Liberals’ ‘soft touch’ approach to the 1905 Act. Troup also ensured that no aliens or women could work in the immigration service (women remained excluded from the service until the 1960’s and aliens are still excluded under the 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act). Moreover, the evidence suggests that this mandarin culture was able to transcend changes of government. Both Conservative and Labour Ministers found themselves following a script written by their civil servants. Gilroy ([1987] 2002: 91) supports this point in his citation of James Callaghan’s 1982 Home Office bicentennial lecture:

There had always to be some approach towards the centre because, whatever their politics, Home Secretaries sprang from the same culture, a culture it was their duty to preserve if the country was to remain a good place to live in.

As the next section demonstrates, Callaghan was the ideal Home Secretary to carry forward Troup’s ethnocentric ‘culture’ and the conservative values of the civil service (handed down from the Edwardian bourgeoisie) into the world of post-1960’s consumerism that would create Thatcherism and Blairism.
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5.5 The Birth of Patriality

It could be argued that basing an organisation’s duties on the ‘need’ to preserve a culture is
only a small step away from asking it to prevent that culture being ‘swamped’ by ‘alien’
one. Although the latter position is associated with Thatcher’s television interview for
World In Action in January 1978 (discussed in section 5.2 above), it was the earlier Wilson
government (with Callaghan as Home Secretary) that originally turned it into an act of law
by passing the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968. This responded to hostile media
coverage of 'Kenyan Asian' refugees by introducing the principle of ‘patriality’, defined in
the relevant clause as follows:

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 provided (in s.1, adding a new s.1 (8A)
to the 1962 Act) that a British subject would be free from control only if he, or at
least one of his parents or grandparents, was born, adopted, registered or
naturalised in the United Kingdom (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 202-203).

This was a monumental change to previous practice, because it shifted the definition of
British nationality from one that was primarily ‘jus soli’ to one that included a large element
of ‘jus sanguinis’. That is to say, whereas British subjects previously qualified by being born
on British soil (including the soil of the Empire outside the UK itself), a true British subject
was now redefined as a person who had ‘British blood’, or at least a quarter of that blood.
British nationality thus became a question of lineage, and was essentially a racist
conception, in the same way that German ‘jus sanguinis’ law had functioned for several
decades to maintain a diasporic ‘German’ identity through lineage ties whilst denying
citizenship to its ‘guest-workers’.

Callaghan’s motives were clear at the time. He had been pressured by hostile media
anticipation of the imminent arrival of ‘Asians’ who had been expelled from Kenya. He was
also convinced that Labour was vulnerable on ‘race’ because it had lost two high profile by-
elections since 1964 to Tories (most notably Peter Griffiths) who had played an explicit
‘race card’ (Foot 1965). Labour’s defeated candidate in those votes was the Foreign
Secretary designate, Patrick Gordon Walker, who was viewed as pro-immigration. These
defeats had therefore panicked the Labour leadership into changing its policy to a strict,
racist stance. Callaghan’s predecessor Frank Soskice had restricted the number of work
vouchers given to New Commonwealth immigrants. The racist allocation of these
vouchers can be shown by the fact that, from 1967-1971:
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[Work-vouchers] for the Commonwealth averaged only 4,000 a year (including a preferential quota of 1,500 annually for Hong Kong) while alien work permits averaged 50,000 [a year] without exciting any public comment (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 206).

Solskice and Callaghan had therefore implemented a ‘racist twin track’ of their party’s own design. Whilst ‘white’ aliens were being welcomed as labour migrants to the tune of 50,000 per year, Callaghan was making it much harder for ‘Asian’ families to bring over their dependants and was ‘shuttlecocking’ vulnerable stateless persons between international airports (ibid: 203). Again, however, Dummett and Nicol suggest that Callaghan, like Solskice before him, had been constantly badgered by his civil servants to tighten up voucher restrictions even further (claiming that the earlier 1962 legislation was not being implemented toughly enough). This casts further doubt on the Bulpitt thesis that state mandarins were trying to ‘offload’ race issues at this time.

Furthermore, Cabinet papers from 1971, that were only released thirty years later, show that some members of the Heath government, which succeeded Labour in 1970, had wanted to pursue a blatantly racist policy. This would have consisted of an ‘open door’ for migrants from the Old Commonwealth, operating alongside a ‘closed door’ to the New Commonwealth (The Observer, 1st January 2001). Heath declined the policy because he believed it would produce an outcry from liberals, but he does not seem to have opposed it on moral grounds. The same Cabinet papers reveal that the government rejected a request from London Transport to recruit more labour from the West Indies. The grounds for refusal were familiar: too much migration from the West Indies would "unsettle race relations" (ibid.).

These revelations are significant because they debunk the view that immigration controls were designed to ‘prevent overcrowding’. If Labour could find room for 50,000 aliens per year with work vouchers, and some Conservatives were willing to throw open the borders to welcome Rhodesian farmers, it must be concluded that the political objections to ‘Kenyan and (later) Ugandan Asians’ were on grounds of colour and culture. When the Conservatives strengthened the patriality ruling with the Immigration Act of 1971, they ensured that the ‘right of abode’ of non-patrials would be the same as that for aliens (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 217). In reality, this simply formalised into ‘law’ a ‘policy’ of colour discrimination that immigration officers had been operating on the ground since the 1950’s. The favouring of ‘whites’ was common practice in 1955, when Douglas-Home circulated his Cabinet memo quoted above, and had been a feature of daily immigration
procedures since the moment that Jews had been replaced by 'blacks' as the main target of immigration officials (Spencer, 1997).

Furthermore, the research of R. Cohen (1994: 88) has helped to explain the findings of the 1985 CRE study by presenting evidence of prejudice and hostility within the service's trade union, the Immigration Services Union (ISU):

In 1986 it surfaced for the first time that the ISU had acted not merely as a somewhat surly gatekeeper and enforcer of parliament's wishes, but as an active lobby group in its own right. According to apparently reliable sources (New Statesman and Society, 10 Oct., 1986; Guardian, 8 Sept., 1986) the decision to impose visas in 1986 [on Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ghana and Nigeria] was not discussed with the Commonwealth countries concerned, and was made against the advice of the Foreign Office, whose staff would have to issue the visas. Nor was any consideration given to the impact of the restrictions on race relations in the UK. Instead, the ISU itself seems to have orchestrated a campaign for more staff, for visas and for a general toughening-up of policy. The union also appears to have put David Waddington up to attacking MP’s for abusing their rights of representation in immigration cases.

With the possible exception of the Professional Cricketers’ Association, the ISU has been the most right wing trade union in the UK. The union had been a branch of the Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS) but had broken away in 1981 after the SCPS conference called for a repeal of the 1971 Immigration Act. The ISU also opposed a Passport Office strike organised by the SCPS, and (perhaps most tellingly) opposed the union’s anti-apartheid policy. R. Cohen (1994: 89) also gives an example of the arbitrary manner in which the ISU dispensed the discretionary powers allocated to it by the state:

The documentation for the 1988-89 pay claim also provides open evidence of one example of the ISU blatantly ignoring the critical CRE report [see above]. In the wake of the sudden imposition of visas, [immigration officers] were sent to Dhaka (Bangladesh) to act as temporary entry clearance officers. According to the ISU’s own document, ‘settlement cases are decided on the basis of one issue, one deferral and one refusal for every three interviews conducted’. If this were true, they might as well throw dice as go through the farce of interviewing visa applicants.

5.6 Racism in Other Departments of the State

The institutional racism within the Home Office, which Soskice and Callaghan dutifully obeyed in the 1960's, had its counterparts in the Colonial Office, DHSS, local government and the Metropolitan Police Service. The following section discusses how this impinged on immigration.
A precedent for racial discrimination by departments of state was set by the treatment of 'coloured' seamen (see Gordon, 1985: 5-13). In 1894, the Merchant Shipping Act endorsed pay differentials for seamen based on race. This was endorsed in the 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act and was not repealed until 1970. Furthermore:

William Haldane Porter, Chief Aliens Inspector, said of the unemployed Chinese seamen in Liverpool in 1919 that 'it was impossible and indeed undesirable that these men should be found work' (our italics). The Ministry of Labour instructed Labour Exchange managers to keep coloured seamen in ignorance of their rights to assistance (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 165-166).

The docks and seaports of Glasgow, Cardiff, London and Liverpool had witnessed periodic tension throughout the nineteenth century between groups who competed for jobs aboard ships. Haldane Porter’s actions were bound to worsen such tensions. The ship-owners were happy to exploit the resultant conflict, combined with the workers’ lack of effective unionisation, to keep wages at low levels. These tensions erupted into riots at several ports during the severe depression of 1919. Jenkinson (1993) highlights how the responses of the police and judiciary to these tensions depended on the ‘race’ of the victim. If the victims were ‘coloured’, they often received harsher legal penalties than those handed to the ‘white’ perpetrators of the violence. Gordon (1985: 6) argues that the tendency to discriminate had its origins at the highest levels:

The Assistant Chief Constable of Liverpool, for example, in a letter to the Home Office, blamed the riots on ‘blacks interfering with white women [and] capturing a portion of the labour market…”

The state’s ‘solution’ to this problem was to offer financial inducements to West Indians to ‘repatriate’ to their countries of birth. The failure of those inducements then led the state to introduce an Order in Council in 1925 requiring alien and ‘coloured’ seamen to register with the police, unless they could produce documents proving they were British subjects (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 167). When it was pointed out that many 'black' seamen were British citizens, police in Cardiff “destroyed British passports and other evidence of nationality, thus requiring the holders to register as aliens” (Gordon, 1985: 8). As Haldane Porter admitted, registration was “calculated to prevent the arrival of other coloured seamen” (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 167). Sir John Pedder of the Home Office echoed the racism of the legislation in his claim that “The British Empire has to endure its own 'black' and 'coloured' subjects; it need not extend the same charity to similarly coloured aliens” (ibid: 167). Dummett and Nicol also record official concerns about “coloured seamen breeding with lower-class white women” (ibid.), a theme repeated in the scorn attached to...
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sexual contact with 'black' American servicemen stationed in Britain during 1939-1945. In addition, the failure of voluntary repatriation in the 1920's did not prevent New Labour introducing a scheme in 2003 to induce Afghani asylum seekers to return. When this failed, the state began to deport them by force.

The prevalence of such attitudes and practices indicates that post-1945 bureaucratic racism did not start from scratch. When the Attlee government expressed concern at the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948, with its shipload of West Indian workers, civil servants that were cut from the same cloth as Haldane Porter and Pedder were briefing Ministers to produce a negative response. The clearest continuity between the generations can be found in the behaviour of the Colonial Office, which instructed some of its African colonies to omit the term 'British subject' from British Travel Certificates (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 177). It also instructed Governors in the West Indies to delay the issue of passports to migrants (ibid.). As Dummett and Nicol conclude:

It is most unlikely that all such ideas sprang from the politicians: they are more characteristic of the modus operandi of officials (1990: 178).

Furthermore, the expansion of registration requirements for immigrants, which equated New Commonwealth visitors with aliens, had the designed effect of conflating immigration control and policing. The police became immigration controllers, and vice versa. The work of Gilroy ([1987] 2002) and others on the racialisation of policing since 1973 therefore becomes highly relevant. This is discussed further below.

5.7 Immigration Controls and Policing

The discursive linkage between 'race' and crime can be traced to the 1919 'race' riots noted above. Although the police initially focussed upon 'blacks' as a sexual menace rather than a violent one, they ensured that the state's surveillance apparatus was trained on West Indian migrants from the moment the Windrush landed in 1948. Police in Sheffield, for example, stored the names and details of every 'black' resident on a surveillance file as early as 1950 (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 167-187). West Indians (along with Cypriots) were also accused of running the sex trade, illustrating the obsession that racists have with 'black' sexuality. However, as Gilroy ([1987] 2002) notes, up until approximately 1973, moral panics concerning crime mainly focussed on white youths such as 'Mods' and 'Teddy Boys'. Crime was only 'racialised' when the police began to target 'black' urban areas as supposed 'hotbeds' of crime. This targeting was influenced by institutionalised assumptions about
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Jamaicans, such as the one voiced by Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Kenneth Newman:

> In the Jamaicans, you have a people who are constitutionally disorderly...It's simply in their make-up; they are constitutionally inclined to be anti-authority (cited in Gilroy, [1987] 2002: 84).

Newman’s depiction of Jamaicans was, on one level, a racist hand-me-down from colonialism. It was the equivalent of Orwell’s claim, cited above, that "orientals can be very provoking" (Orwell, 1936] 2001: 158). It bristled with assumptions about ‘the restless native’ and the ‘white man’s burden’. On another level, however, it inherited its discourse from the apparatus of security. This can be shown, for example, by the fact that minutes from Cabinet meetings in 1945-1951 emphasised misgivings about the loyalties of ‘Fenians’, based on the allegation that the Irish had not been totally ‘loyal’ in World War Two (Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987). It could therefore be hypothesised that the immigration service and police force were unwilling to regard non-whites as ‘loyal’ Britons and treated them accordingly. This assumption was also apparent in the assumption that British Muslims tended to be disloyal, leading to the detention of Iraqis during the Gulf War and after the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001.

The definitive study of how immigration controls led to ‘racialised’ police surveillance is Gordon’s Policing Immigration (1985). Gordon describes how the Immigration Act of 1971 gave the police "wide powers of arrest without warrant in cases of suspected illegal entry" (p.17), increased the Home Secretary’s powers of deportation, and was accompanied by the establishment of the ‘Illegal Immigration Intelligence Unit’ at New Scotland Yard. This Unit carried out numerous ‘passport raids’ and liaised with the immigration service’s own intelligence unit, which had been set up in 1970. By 1976, this ‘policing’ function had spread to the DHSS and the NHS, resulting in the Leicester case discussed in Section 5.4 above.

5.8 Party Politics and Working Class Racism

5.8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to further debunk the idea that the immigration controls of 1903-2003 resulted from pressure from the electorate. The evidence presented below shows instead that the ‘race card’ has been far less of a vote-winner than politicians have
often assumed. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the real pressure for controls came from the state’s own employees.

Political parties in the UK have often been sensitive to ‘race’ as an electoral issue. The following discussion argues that this sensitivity has often been misconceived, primarily because politicians and political scientists alike have assumed that ‘race’ exerts a far greater influence on working class voting patterns than has actually been the case. For example, Bulpitt (1986) has devised a model of ‘peripheralisation’, which assumes that working class racism is an ever-present threat to the autonomy of ‘high politics’, and that central governments are therefore compelled to push ‘race’ issues to the margins. The evidence presented above has already argued strongly against Bulpitt by showing that civil servants have actively promoted ‘race’ issues in immigration policy. The following evidence now takes that process further by showing that Ministers have been susceptible to such racialising strategies because they have been led to expect racism to exert a far deeper influence on voting behaviour than has materialised in reality.

5.8.2 Evidence from General Elections 1997-2001

This case study does not deny the existence of racism in the attitudes of labour leaders or their voters. The matter at issue is the manifestation of racism in political action. The evidence displayed in Figures 2 and 3 (see overleaf) compares the performances of four political parties in the General Elections of 1997 and 2001 in four constituencies. The first two constituencies are mainly situated in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, whilst the latter two are constituencies that include one or more of the ‘Cinque’ ports. The results show that, in 2001, there was a stronger swing towards the Conservatives in the ports than in Tower Hamlets. An explanation for this trend is given below, but firstly it is necessary to describe the profile of each constituency, and why it is significant.

‘Bethnal Green and Bow’ includes the old Huguenot and Jewish quarters of Spitalfields and Brick Lane, which prior to 1965 had formed part of the old Borough of Stepney. In the census of 2001, Bangladeshis formed 33.4% of the population of Tower Hamlets, and were the main target of fascist activity organised by the BNP. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, the BNP was in decline in Bethnal Green and Bow by 2001, and had switched its fascist activities to the northern towns of Burnley and Oldham. Moreover, despite the Conservatives choosing to focus on asylum in the 2001 campaign, there was a swing of 0.5% to Labour in the constituency.
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'Poplar and Canning Town' was a more successful seat for the Conservatives, who gained a 3.4% swing. Some of this gain may have been at the expense of the BNP. This would support a hypothesis that the Conservatives exploit 'race' in order to extract votes from the fascist parties rather than from Labour. However, of greater long-term significance may be the fact that this constituency includes the old and new docklands, especially in the Millwall ward, which returned a BNP councillor in 1993. This suggests that the 'working class race vote' in London has been primarily the dockers' vote.

The empirical and theoretical significance of racism among dockworkers can be explained by the longer history of racial violence in the ports and docks than in the inland areas of Britain. This stems from the fact that the shipping industry used West Indian, African, Chinese and Indian labour to undercut the wages of 'white' seamen throughout the period 1830-1970. This led to violence against 'coloured' sailors in Cardiff, Liverpool, Glasgow and London during periods of unemployment, especially in 1911 and 1919 (Jenkinson, 1993). Furthermore, Gainer (1972: 21-22, 57-58) claims that the most virulent antisemitic vandalism of the 1880's occurred in the St George's-in-the-East riverside district, where the dock labourers included a high proportion of London-born Irish, who reacted violently to perceived labour competition. Dockers were also the most conspicuous working class supporters of Enoch Powell after his sacking from the Cabinet in 1968. It may therefore be concluded that the docks have deep-rooted racist electoral patterns that are not typical of London as a whole.

Figure 2: Percentage Shares of the Vote in the 1997 and 2001 General Elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservatives</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>BNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bethnal Green &amp; Bow in 1997</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethnal Green &amp; Bow in 2001</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplar &amp; Canning Town in 1997</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplar &amp; Canning Town in 2001</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover in 1997</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>No Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover in 2001</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>No Candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folkestone and Hythe</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>No Candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This finding can be supported further by comparing the 'Cinque port' constituencies. Despite the fact that Dover is primarily a working class port and 'Folkestone and Hythe' is primarily a gentrified coastal constituency, the two constituencies produced very similar swings in 2001 of 5.1% and 5.4% respectively. This suggests that location rather than class was the 'swing' factor. Working class racism operated mainly in coastal or docklands areas of severe labour competition.

5.8.3 Evidence from General Elections 1895-1906

The source for this section is Gainer (1972: 197), whose own source was Pelling (1967). During the 1880's there was a significant migration of Russian Jews into the East End of London, fleeing from the Tsarist 'May Laws' of 1882. By 1895, there was significant electoral support for the restriction of this migration. This was demonstrated in the results of that year's General Election, at which 'restrictionist' Conservatives gained or held the East End seats at Bow and Bromley, Limehouse, St George's in the East (aided by the dockers discussed above) and Mile End. In the 1900 Election these were joined by the seat of Stepney, which fell to the imperialist Major Williams Evans-Gordon, who was also a leading figure in the British Brothers League.

These victories suggested that anti-alienism was a significant influence on voting patterns during the 1890's, when there were severe housing problems across the East End. Its political currency was also aided by the fact that the 1895 Trade Union Congress voted to support immigration restrictions. However, the 1906 results clearly show that this
electoral impetus largely disappeared when the housing crisis eased after 1900. The TUC reverted to its earlier policy of open borders when it realised that restriction was being used by Joseph Chamberlain as a Trojan Horse for Tariff Reform, which the working classes feared would result in a new equivalent of the Corn Laws. The Conservatives thus badly mistimed the introduction of the 1905 Aliens Act, which was really more attuned to the climate of 1895. Consequently, at the 1906 poll, the Conservatives retained only two East End seats: Stepney and Hoxton. As Gainer concludes (1972: 197):

Even in East London, where, if anywhere, the Unionists [Conservatives] might have expected the Aliens Act to consolidate their hold on the workingman, they were badly mauled.

In conclusion, Gainer (p.284n) provides a good measure of how ineffective the anti-Jewish vote had been in 1906: the Conservatives polled 45.8% of the East End vote (excluding Bethnal Green) compared to a median of 43.9% for Britain as a whole. The 'race' factor could therefore only have increased the Conservative share of the vote by 1.9%, which is broadly in line with the pattern that materialised across Tower Hamlets in 2001.

5.9 Conclusions

This chapter has argued that actors within the state, rather than public pressure from the working class, initiated the racialisation of immigration policy. The electoral data cited above support that view and suggest that state strategies of surveillance and control lie at the heart of immigration controls. The chapter has also shown that Pollution and Civilisation continued to operate as discourses that supported immigration controls after 1945, therefore the decline of Race as a discourse of 'high politics' after Hitler's defeat did not jeopardise the overall anti-immigration apparatus.

The state could continue to 'imply' racial meanings as secondary signifiers within Civilisation and Pollution strategies that were nominally non-racial. This was because an informal reflexive relationship between Race, Civilisation and Pollution had already been structured into the original design of the pre-1981 legislation, resulting in 'patriality' continuing to function as an active parameter of exclusion even when the state had supposedly renounced its racial meanings.

The decline of Race as a feature of high politics did not hinder the institutional racism of the immigration service, many of whose officers remained wedded to colonial assumptions about the relative merits of 'white' and 'non-white' migrants. The state continued to rely
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upon the racism of individual agents, as was demonstrated by the opt-out given to immigration officials in the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act. Cabinet ministers did not indicate any concern that individual officers may have continued to interpret their permission to discriminate on grounds of nationality as tacit permission to discriminate on the same racist grounds that they had done in the past.
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CHAPTER SIX: Boundary Strategy and Spatial Manipulation. Segregation, Gentrification and Dispersal in UK Asylum Policy, 1997-2003

6.1 Spatial Pollution and Globalisation

This final case study uses a fieldwork study of dispersal policy under New Labour to demonstrate how the central state exploited boundary strategy to increase its control over local bodies. The study argues that a strategy of 'Spatial Pollution' was used to justify the centralisation of control over housing allocations to dispersed asylum seekers.

As chapter five argued, Pollution regained its position as a dominant boundary strategy in the UK after 1945. This was especially true of the state's treatment of asylum seekers, many of whom were nominally 'white' and therefore less vulnerable to a primary strategy of Race. This coincided with the rebirth of London as a gentrified space for global capitalists, prompted by the deregulation of the City and of the housing market. However, this required the importation of labour migrants to do the 'dirty jobs' required by capital, especially in the service sector. These migrants, alongside claimants for political asylum, often settled in the spaces that had been allocated to gentrification, in such boroughs as Westminster and Wandsworth. Some local authorities worsened this problem by selling their council stock. 'Spatial Pollution' provided a solution to this problem by justifying the dispersal of asylum seekers and other migrants away from those gentrified areas. In so doing, it provided central government with a pretext for centralising powers that had previously been allocated to local authorities.

This has important implications for the future study of government policy. During its first term (1997-2001), New Labour promised that proposals would be introduced to establish new forms of regional government. This may have been interpreted as signifying a willingness to decentralise governance. However, if research indicated that regional governance could be accompanied by an increase in central control, it would cast these policy developments in a new light. Regionalisation could then be viewed as a shifting of policy implementation to the regions that was accompanied by an increased centralisation of political control.

'Spatial Pollution' may be defined as the process whereby a government displaces an 'undesirable' population in favour of a 'desirable' gentrified one. This increases the power of the state by giving it more control over housing allocations. Spatial Pollution could also
enable the state to resist the effects of globalisation. Consequently, whereas some authors (Bauman, 1999) have argued that globalisation 'hollowed out' the state, this chapter argues that boundary strategy helped to keep the state at the centre of the stage. Global capitalism boosted the size and supremacy of the City, resulting in London becoming virtually a self-enclosed economic system, with house prices and top salaries that were far higher than in the rest of the UK. London's leading capitalists responded to the state's sponsorship of this process by rewarding the state with their endorsement.

In the period covered by this case study, between 1997 and 2003, instead of working against a Labour government, the City observed New Labour's gentrification strategy and voiced its approval. The state was able to broaden its power into a large number of public-private bodies. This resulted in the state and capital becoming symbiotic: the state needing the support of capital, but capital in turn requiring a strong state.

This has important implications for theories of boundary strategy. It has been argued throughout this thesis that state strategies have combined old and new approaches. Spatial management has done this by calling upon ancient myths of Blood and Pollution in the name of modern processes of consumerism, urban renewal and progressive development. Between 1997 and 2003, asylum seekers are demonised through discourses that recalled medieval symbols of Pollution, because the aim of such discourses was to depict minorities as polluters of the taxpayers' dream spaces, spoiling the private family fantasy of open spaces and unlimited property values.

The following discussion illustrates these themes and puts recent migration, dispersal and gentrification projects into their historical context by demonstrating how the state used emigration, resettlement and dispersal as tactical weapons in previous centuries. As the next section demonstrates, these strategies provide further evidence of continuity between old and new modes of statecraft.

6.2 A Brief History of Dispersal

Although population dispersal and gentrification are common topics within social geography, sociology has not yet produced a historical overview of politically engineered dispersal. Joly (1996), Mynott (2002) and S. Cohen (2003) have studied specific examples of dispersal policy, but no author has connected those examples to earlier attempts by the state to redistribute populations for the purposes of gentrification or social control. This
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The academic neglect of dispersal may be partially explained by the fact that the state practised dispersal under many political disguises. Within social policy, for example, the use of ‘bussing’ in the USA, or the de facto housing segregation practised by estate agents in the UK (S.J. Smith, 1987), were described as ‘dispersal’, yet its results were the same, isolating racialised communities from ‘mainstream’ networks and resources. In many instances, dispersal operated as a mechanism of ‘spatial closure’, which functioned to protect monopolies of resources from newly arrived groups. In other instances, it was used to facilitate gentrification by ensuring that poor groups were successfully ‘cleaned out’ of the city to make way for the moneyed classes. The different names given to these programmes – ‘zero tolerance’, ‘urban renewal’, ‘regeneration’, ‘bussing’ and so on – disguised their common features and divided sociologists into fragmented fields of enquiry. This section seeks to overcome that fragmentation by exposing the underlying unity of the state’s dispersal processes.

As was noted in chapter two, the state employed population strategies as far back as the feudal period, when an occupying force of Norman conquerors sought to embed its rule by bringing over settler populations from the European mainland to lay roots in the old Saxon towns. These settlers gradually transformed the political economy and culture of each town, in accordance with Norman designs. Normans formed the ruling class (the Saxon nobility having been slaughtered in the Battle of Hastings) and also brought across an economic denizen population of Flemings, Walloons and Jews. The earliest manifestation of the state’s potential for spatial manipulation was therefore its ability to change the population profile of a territory through engineered migration.

A similar population strategy was central to British imperial policy in Ireland and North America, where it was integrated into the strategies of Civilisation and Property. The catalysts for this process were initially religion and taxation. The first permanent English emigrants to the ‘New World’ were Puritans, who were encouraged by the monarchy to build plantations in order to ‘civilise’ the existing ‘native’ population. In Ireland, Puritans began the long process of building privileged Protestant settlements in ‘the Pale’ that creamed off the island’s resources. By the reign of Queen Anne, the Crown was sponsoring colonial resettlement for the specific purpose of raising tax revenue and/or ‘rents’ from colonial lands. One way of achieving this was to invite refugees from Europe to come to
London, whereupon they were sold colonial plots and relocated to the colonies for prices favourable to the Crown.

The best example of this process in operation was the resettlement of the Palatines who entered England in 1709. These were Protestants who had lived in the German Rhineland area before being forced to flee by a combination of famine and religious persecution in 1708-1709. Queen Anne of England sent a fleet of ships to meet the Palatines when they arrived in Rotterdam, and offered them safe passage to England. The reasons for this apparent generosity have been interpreted differently by historians (Jones Jr., 1990; O'Connor, 1989), but the three main explanations are:

- The Queen assumed that these Protestants would help fuel the anti-Roman feelings developing in England;
- The Crown wished to reinforce the Protestant faith in Ireland. Three thousand Palatines eventually relocated to Ireland, where there was already a strong Huguenot presence, especially in Cork;
- The Crown wished to create a tax base in the American colonies. Several thousand Palatines were each given a strip of land in America and a small stipend by the Crown.

Two further points are worth noting about this episode. Firstly, the fact that the Palatine emigration was caused by famine and persecution demonstrated that there was often no simple dichotomy between ‘economic migration’ and ‘asylum seeking’. Economic distress could be caused by political persecution, through such measures as the deliberate engineering of food shortages and famine. Secondly, Palatines who had money were treated more sympathetically than those who were visibly impoverished. The Palatines could thus be viewed as an early example of a distinction being made between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ refugees, with the latter being demonised on the basis of their ‘poor’ dress and appearance.

By the Victorian period, emigration was being encouraged on the grounds of Race. There was a deliberate promotion of ‘white’ resettlement in the Dominions, especially in Canada, South Africa and Australia. The latter had originally been used as a penal colony, but when the economic resources of the colony became known, a ruling class of Protestants was established to keep the ‘subaltern’ white population in check. Moreover, these Dominions subsequently developed strict immigration policies against the ‘non-white’ Commonwealth.
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nations, several decades before Britain followed suit, indicating that 'whiteness' was a more explicit ideology in the colonies than in the Mother Country (Paul, 1997). The latter was more likely to camouflage its colour racism beneath a eugenic language of 'good stock' or a cultural language of Civilisation. The Dominions also pioneered the practice of neutralising minorities by forcibly removing their children to be raised by settler families.

This mirrored the broader colonial strategies of either 'breeding out' minority characteristics through intermarriage, or alternatively creating a strict caste society through apartheid. The first strategy required the dispersal of the dominant imperialist power's population; the latter strategy required the dispersal of the subordinate population. Occasionally a subordinate population in the Mother Country (such as the Irish) would become a middle-ranking population in the colonies through being dispersed. It was also common for one immigrant population to 'pull up the drawbridge' to prevent the next generation of migrants following in its path, as the Irish did to East Europeans in the USA (Ignatiev, 1995). It could be argued that the fate of refugees and asylum seekers in the period 1997-2003 was, in part, conditioned by these earlier strategies. Dispersal was not a 'stand alone' policy; it arose instead from a state apparatus that had relied for several centuries upon population management to preserve its power.

The state's management of the labour supply on behalf of capital also conditioned the fate of migrants. Miles (1993), for example, argues that the state deliberately preferred to recruit refugee labour because it could control the settlement, work practices and trade union affiliation of that labour. The refugee population was attractive because it was 'unfree', allowing the state to dictate the terms of settlement. Miles shows how Polish refugees were actively encouraged to settle in Britain by the Attlee government, which assigned them a range of skilled and semi-skilled jobs in areas of labour shortage such as coal mining and agriculture (see Sword, 1988: 236-7; Miles, 1993: 155-169). At the same time, however, Miles shows how Attlee's cabinet secretly suppressed the possibility of using labour from the West Indies to plug these gaps. Miles concludes that this can be partially explained by racialisation - the Poles were given 'positive' racial attributes in Parliamentary discussions whilst West Indians were assumed to be unskilled and culturally backward.

A second cause of post-war refugee recruitment was the Cold War and the British State's desire to highlight the persecution of Eastern Europeans under Communism. Miles acknowledges these factors but argues that the state mainly preferred Polish labour because it could be directed towards specific jobs through the work permit system, whereas West
Indian labour at that time would have been 'free' so could migrate to any job it chose. A parallel could thus be drawn between Polish labour in the 1940's and the increased use of work permits to plug 'skills gaps' under New Labour. In 2003, for example, 44,443 work permits were issued to non-EU migrants to work in the NHS alone (The Independent, March 2nd, 2004).

In the mid-1950's, the main gap in the market had been mainly for 'unskilled' labour, due partially to the incorporation of 'white' workers who no longer regarded themselves as suited to 'dirty jobs'. The state responded by recruiting workers from the Caribbean and South Asia. However, these workers were kept out of council housing by residential qualifications, whilst a 'colour bar' operated in the private sector. Immigrants were thus forced into 'Rackman-like' poor quality multi-occupancies, segregated from the 'white' population. Moreover, as S. J. Smith notes, when 'black' tenants were subjected to racist abuse, the response was often to relocate the victims instead of moving the perpetrators. Dispersal was therefore used to placate prejudice. This was most noticeable in the policies of Birmingham City Council from 1969 to 1975:

[The] policy appears to have been less a gesture of unqualified altruism than a pragmatic response to the exclusionary demands of a small group of white tenants. It was precipitated by a petition and threatened rent strike by nine white tenants concerned about the entry of a second black household into their block of twelve maisonettes. Following this incident, a dispersal policy was implemented to ensure that, in future, each black household would be separated by at least five white tenancies (1987: 100).

This dispersal mentality among councils was illustrated again in 1972 by the response of Leicester City Council to the imminent arrival of 'Asians' expelled from Uganda. This was summarised by Addley in an article for The Guardian published on January 1st 2001:

On September 15 1972, an 'important announcement' appeared in the pages of the Ugandan Argus newspaper in east Africa. The announcement was financed by the ratepayers of the city of Leicester, England. 'The City Council of Leicester, England, believes that many families in Uganda are considering moving to Leicester,' the notice read. It's advice was straightforward: don't. Thousands of families were already waiting on the council's housing list, schools were full to bursting, social services were stretched to the limit....'In your own interests and those of your family you should...not come to Leicester'.

Furthermore, Addley added that a "delegation was sent to the home secretary, Robert Carr, urging him to find homes for the Ugandan Asians - but not in Leicester." Leicester's actions were part of a wider government strategy in which the country was divided into
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‘red’ and ‘green’ zones and refugees were directed away from the red ones, which included London and Leicester (see Kuepper, Lynne Lackey and Nelson Swinerton, 1975). As would happen thirty years later, Scottish councils were called upon to take a large proportion of the new arrivals. However, unlike the 1999 legislation, Carr’s government did not compel refugees to move into the dispersal zones. Consequently, despite a venomous campaign in the Leicester Mercury (Troyna, 1981), 'Ugandan Asians' arrived in Leicester by the thousand from 1973-1976. Their subsequent economic achievements were eventually considered to be a success, creating thousands of new jobs during a period of economic slump elsewhere (Marett, 1989).

Despite this object lesson, the state proceeded to disperse Chilean and Vietnamese programme refugees between 1975 and 1985. As Joly (1996: 98-106) noted, this policy appeared originally to contain altruistic elements because it was administered in part by the Ockenden Venture (a precursor of the Refugee Council) and was aimed at finding affordable social housing outside London. However the dubious underpinnings of the process were revealed by “the guidelines of not more than ten and not less than four [families] in a single locality” (ibid: 98). The policy was abandoned as a failure in 1985 when it became apparent that many of the refugees had returned to the point from which they were originally dispersed.

Furthermore Joly argues that the Thatcher government manipulated the refugee crises for covert tactical reasons. On the one hand, Thatcher reversed the Callaghan regime’s policy of welcoming refugees from Chile, because the Conservatives had close diplomatic ties to the Pinochet regime and wished to suppress evidence that Pinochet had used mass torture. Conversely, Thatcher welcomed refugees from Vietnam because they provided an opportunity to embarrass that country’s Communist regime, which had overcome American military power in the previous decade.

A similar motive may be deduced from the UK’s decision in 1999 to accept asylum applications from refugees who could prove that they were Kosovan Albanians, whilst rejecting the majority of Serb applicants. This action was taken purely on the grounds that the UK had pursued a military campaign against Serbia, supposedly in defence of the Kosovans. The effect of this decision was therefore to protect the political ‘legitimacy’ of the military action. If Kosovan Serbs could have been shown to have been victims as well as perpetrators of atrocities, it would have undermined the simplistic moral distinctions that were used to justify military intervention.
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Furthermore, this blatant discrimination followed a deeper pattern whereby successive Conservative and New Labour administrations drew up a so-called 'white list' of countries from which asylum applications were rejected as 'manifestly unfounded' on the assumption that there was no evidence of torture in those countries. This list was frequently contradicted by evidence from Amnesty International. Furthermore, the list tended to favour those countries (such as Turkey) that behaved in accordance with Britain's economic interests, and with which Britain wished to maintain friendly diplomatic relations, irrespective of their objective records of torture and persecution. This demonstrated again that the government's population strategy continued to be dictated by wider tactical concerns.

6.3 Dispersal Under the 1999 Legislation

Having outlined the principles of population management, this chapter now turns to a detailed study of the dispersal of asylum seekers between 1999 and 2003. The key to this policy was the degree of centralisation imposed on local groups by New Labour. This in turn set a precedent for how boundary strategies, focussing on 'Spatial Pollution', may be implemented in future decades. This may be summarised as a structure in which central government manipulated local spaces for strategic ends, whilst coercing local 'enabling' bodies into managing the negative consequences of that manipulation.

The government disguised the centralisation of policy by inventing an 'enabling role' for new Regional Consortia that consisted of local authorities and voluntary agencies. One aim of the following discussion is to explore tensions within the 'enabling role'. In particular, the study focusses on the ways in which these regional bodies tended to have 'responsibility without ownership'. This made their roles very difficult to fulfil because they were always liable to be undermined by decisions taken at the centre. The following investigation into the problems faced by the Consortia, and the strategies that the Consortia developed to deal with those problems, is therefore intended to illuminate the tensions and power balances that characterised the growing imposition of boundary strategy upon the future development of regional social policy.

The dispersal of asylum seekers involved a simultaneous process of centralisation and regionalisation. From April 2000, dispersal policy was the responsibility of a new Home Office department called the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), which imposed centralised control upon asylum seeker housing allocations that had previously been the
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responsibility of local authorities. However, instead of setting up its own regional offices to
implement the policy, NASS relied upon a network of 'enabling' Regional Consortia,
consisting of local councils, LGA's, health authorities, housing charities and police
organisations. Dispersal may thus be viewed as a policy in which centralisation and
regionalisation were complementary processes rather than contradictory ones. The
existence of Regional Consortia may normally have been expected to signify a
decentralisation of social policy, but dispersal reversed this expectation by creating an
'enabling' function that separated the officials who controlled the policy from the agencies
that enabled the policy to work on the ground.

The concept of the enabling role may be traced to the Conservative government’s reforms
of council housing policy in the 1980’s. This led to local authorities being redefined as
‘enablers’ rather than providers of social housing. The principles underlying this change
may be illustrated by three documentary sources from the early 1990’s. The first is a written
answer given to the House of Commons on 24 January 1991 by Tim Yeo MP:

The new emphasis on local authorities acting as enablers rather than direct
providers of subsidised housing parallels the expansion of the housing association
movement. Housing associations are becoming the principal providers of new
subsidised housing. Local authorities can fulfil their duties under the homelessness
legislation by placing those they accept as homeless in their own dwellings; by using
nomination arrangements to place them in dwellings owned by housing
associations; or through similar arrangements made with other providers (Hansard,

Yeo’s answer reflected his government’s desire to create a ‘purchaser-provider’ split in
public service provision. The reasoning used to justify this split was that councils made
poor landlords, so their provision function should be transferred to housing associations
and other Registered Social Landlords (RSL’s). This preference for private bidders for
public housing funds remained a theme of New Labour’s first term and was carried over
into dispersal policy, as shown in the evidence presented below.

The second extract is also taken from Hansard and quotes a speech made by the Under-
Secretary of State for the Environment, Tony Baldry, in 1992:

[Local] authorities are enablers and they, together with housing associations and
others and the private sector, should provide. Their principal role, however, is as
enablers...Of course, they still will have - and many do have - a responsibility as
landlords. It is of concern to us that many of them, in exercising their responsibility
as landlords, are failing in that duty to themselves and to their tenants. However,
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their primary responsibility as enablers is to make things happen (Hansard, 5th June 1992, Col.1036).

By defining the 'principal role' of councils to be the 'enabling' role, Baldry and his colleagues placed local authorities in a position whereby their responsibilities would grow more complex but their power would be weakened. Local authorities were still required, in Baldry's phrase, "to make things happen", but their ability to do so was hindered by two factors:

- The imposition of reduced rental revenues and a lower Rate Support Grant
- The increased complexity of contractual relationships with RSL's.

The third documentary source is Ridley’s book, My Style of Government, published in 1992, which revealed that one of the aims of council house sales was to end the 'incestuous' relationship between councils and their tenants. The Conservatives believed that the subsidisation of the rates and the provision of council housing were bribes that made tenants more likely to vote for Labour councils because those councils were giving their tenants housing and services at below the market price. The introductions of the Poll Tax and purchaser-provider split by the Conservatives were therefore intended to alert the public to the inefficiencies of Labour councils (as implied by Baldry's speech) and the superiority of the private sector, thereby validating Conservative policy and weakening the anti-Conservative vote.

The net effect of these changes was to weaken councils and to centralise power in the hands of the government. Councils suffered a reduction in their financial power and their authority as landlords, so the centre could control and own social policy far more easily as a result. Local authorities retained responsibilities for such issues as housing standards and environmental health but no longer 'owned' the majority of housing over which this responsibility was exercised. Their role may therefore be defined as 'responsibility without ownership'. This partially explains why New Labour imposed centralised control upon the allocation of asylum seeker housing and left Regional Consortia in an 'enabler' role. It 'fitted', or had an 'elective affinity' with, the structure of central-local relations that had developed over the previous twenty years. Stoker (1995: 1) has identified four features of this new relationship:

- Political 'spaces' that were previously monopolised by local councils now had to be shared with other organisations such as housing associations, private companies and
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non-governmental organisations (NGO's). This led to the development of a multi-agency local structure, which was reflected in the design of the Regional Consortia that are the focus of this case study.

• These multi-agency structures increasingly operated from guidelines and 'Service Level Agreements' imposed by central government departments, so the political autonomy of local government was substantially reduced. Their role was increasingly defined as the implementation of national standards (enabling) rather than the creation of those standards (owning).

• The distinction between 'public' and 'private' spheres became tenuous: many council departments came to resemble the structure of private companies, especially when they had to compete with private companies for contracts under purchaser-provider deals. Private companies now occupied 'public' spaces and forced those spaces to conform to market principles.

• Government was increasingly centralised: local bodies did not, in the main, govern their territories: they enabled national policies to be implemented in those territories.

The following discussion explores three major problems that arose from the policy of dispersal, each of which may be traced to tensions within this centralised structure. The first was that the structure of dispersal policy separated control from expertise. NASS dictated the number of asylum seekers to be accommodated in each region, but the expertise required to find suitable housing and to integrate asylum seekers into the community continued to reside within the Consortia.

The second problem was that dispersal involved an unstable mixture of public and private contracts. NASS negotiated approximately 60% of its housing contracts directly with private landlords and only used the Consortia to supply the other 40% of the housing required. Moreover, the NASS private contracts were negotiated more rapidly than the Regional Consortia ones, therefore 'the enabling role' of the Consortia could not be exercised fully in the early stages of the process. The Consortia tended to be brought into the dispersal process at a later stage than would otherwise have been the case. The initial priority of NASS therefore appeared to have been to ensure that private contracts were signed quickly rather than ensuring that the enabling role was carried out effectively.
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- The third problem was that dispersal policy created a separate housing channel for asylum seekers at a time when the existing channels were undergoing decline and residualisation. Some of the housing that was allocated to asylum seekers in, for example, Glasgow and Liverpool consisted of properties that were excluded from existing channels due to their unpopularity with tenants. The placing of asylum seekers in these properties highlighted their social segregation as a stigmatised group whilst at the same time enabling myths to be fostered that the properties may become eligible for refurbishment funding and welfare benefits that had not been previously available to tenants on the estates.

To explore these processes and problems in greater depth, three interviews were carried out between March and May 2001 with members of the East Midlands Consortium. The first interview, conducted on 29th March 2001, was with the Regional Co-ordinator of the Consortium (Helen Everett), at the East Midlands Regional L.G.A. in Melton Mowbray. The second and third interviews, conducted on May 24th 2001, were with the Asylum Seekers' Housing Managers of Leicester and Nottingham City Councils (Manny Akigyina and Graham De Max respectively).

The interviews were structured around ten core questions, but the sequence in which these questions was asked varied according to the flow of the conversation. Follow-up questions were also inserted into each interview depending on the answers received to the core questions. Furthermore, when the ten core questions had been dealt with, the final phase of each interview was unstructured, allowing for a more open discussion of issues arising during the interviews. The ten core questions were as follows:

- 'What is your role within the Consortium?'
- 'How was the Consortium formed?'
- 'Does each council have an equal role in the Consortium or has one council taken a leading role?'
- 'What is the financial support structure between NASS and the Consortium (for example, how does the Enabling Grant work?)'
- 'What are the channels of communication between NASS and your group?'
- 'Why did it take so long to sign the contract with NASS?'
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- 'Do you experience any difficulties with private providers?'
- 'What is the ratio of public/private accommodation?'
- 'Is there a 'cluster limit' on the number of asylum seekers the region/city will support under the scheme?'
- 'Will the choice of accommodation take account of religious needs, legal access, and the 'ethnic' composition of the neighbourhood?'

In addition to these interviews, the research utilised the websites of the other Consortia and downloaded references to the Consortia from national and local newspapers and from journals such as Inside Housing and Roof. Another vital source was Hansard, which published dispersal statistics in response to questions raised in Parliament. The following sections summarise the findings of the research.

6.4 The History of NASS and the Regional Consortia

The following extract, albeit very strident in nature, provides essential background information about the circumstances that led to the formation of NASS:

Until a couple of years ago, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate was called Lunar House and was situated on the other side of the road. Back in 1997 it was commonly referred to in Whitehall as the "bureaucratic swamp." In an attempt to cut costs and improve efficiency, the then Tory home secretary, Michael Howard, announced that he would scrap 1,200 jobs at the IND, introduce a £105m computer system and move to new premises over the road. But the new system ran more than a year late, and it didn't work. Meanwhile, a change of government had put Jack Straw at the helm. Against the advice of unions and staff, Straw decided to make all the changes at once. He sacked the staff, moved the directorate across the road and introduced the computer system. With more than 200,000 paper case-files stretching along more than 14 miles of shelves, Straw called it the "big bang" option. It blew up in his face. The entire asylum system broke down, as did the process for renewing visas for foreign nationals (Younge, The Guardian, May 22nd, 2001)

The government and the I.N.D had intended it's new computer system to speed up the processing of asylum applications, but instead the collapse of the system resulted in a huge backlog of applications. This in turn exacerbated the problems of councils in London and Kent, which had to house asylum seekers, whose cases were taking years to resolve. In addition, it may be argued that the inability of councils such as Wandsworth and Westminster to house asylum seekers cheaply had been partially caused by their decisions
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to sell off a large quantity of social housing during the Thatcher and Major administrations. This had been enabled by legislation that had been designed partially for that purpose. Consequently, the roots of the policy of 'dispersing' asylum seekers to 'cluster areas' in the North and Midlands may be traced to pressures created by the negative consequences of earlier government decisions, and the chaotic organisational structure that had caused the I.N.D. to leave such a backlog of asylum cases.

The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) was created by the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act and was given the responsibility of dispersing new asylum applicants to the cluster areas. To assist in this process, NASS relied upon the enabling role of Regional Consortia consisting of councils and other interested parties such as health officials, police representatives and voluntary refugee welfare groups such as Refugee Action. One of the principle aims of the fieldwork interviews was to ascertain how the structure of Regional Consortia came into being. The interview with Helen Everett elicited the following information:

Question: I understand that before the Asylum and Immigration Act came into effect in April 2000, there was a 6 months voluntary dispersal period and the LGA was responsible for co-ordinating that. I was wondering whether the Consortium role grew out of that or was it specifically set up to commence in April 2000. In other words was there a prehistory?

Answer: There was a prehistory. The Home Office via the national LGA had been urging local authorities to set up regional arrangements for some 18 months before then [April 2000]. The home office provided funding for a secondment to the National LGA of an officer called Mike Boyle whose role was to assist the regions in setting up Consortia. His role lasted 12-18 months and finished in September 2000. Since then, however, there has been very little national co-ordination by the LGA because they do not have any dedicated staff to work on asylum policy issues at the moment (extract from transcript of interview with Helen Everett).

The implication of this passage was that, when NASS took over control of dispersal in April 2000, it inherited the structure that had already been built by the LGA. Consequently, although the national LGA withdrew from the arena in September 2000, the regional LGA remained crucial to the process. Moreover, NASS did not set up the Consortia structure so it did not share its organisational roots. There was therefore a potential for conflict between the expectations of NASS and those of the Consortia members.

The relatively low priority given to the enabling role by the government and NASS is indicated by the fact that the Regional Consortia received a small proportion of the dispersal budget, especially when compared with the budget given to NASS. As of April
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2001, each Consortium received an 'Enabling Grant' of £100,000 per annum. Ten Consortia received these grants in the year 2000, making a total of £1m. The total NASS budget for the same period was “604m on direct support and 594.5m on processing and operational costs” (The Guardian, June 27th, 2001). Helen Everett made the following observation:

According to the papers (I know you don’t believe everything you read in the papers) it’s 650m-850m pounds. Presumably the majority of that goes on the offices in Croydon and then the asylum seekers’ accommodation. I think that it would be interesting to compare that with the amount it gives to the regional Consortia, which is only £1m, which is £100,000 per region. So they’ve got a total budget of £650 million and they’ve decided that the Regional Consortia can have £1 million split up for the whole country (extract from interview transcript).

The developing tensions between the Home Office/NASS and the Consortia were revealed in a meeting of the 'Central-Local Partnership' that took place on 12 July 2000. The Deputy Prime Minister chaired the meeting, and those present included the Home Secretary and the Minister for Local Government and the Regions. The Minutes of the meeting record the following exchange:

41. Councillor Chris Clarke said that a major problem for local authorities had been the difficulty of finding information about contracts with the private sector for the housing of Asylum Seekers. This lack of information made it very difficult to assemble consortia.

42. The Secretary of State for the Home Department [Jack Straw] said that NASS was trying to be open about contracts with the Private sector. He also said that local government should have come forward earlier with consortia arrangements and that he had been forced to go to the private sector because they had not done so. However, he acknowledged that there had been a steep learning curve on both sides, but hoped that local government would help fully, and put consortia arrangements in place by the end of July as requested. He said that if this was not done, that private contracts would be let and authorities failing to set up consortia would find broadly the same number of asylum seekers in their area anyway. He pointed out that if local government wanted central government to help the London Boroughs and authorities in the South East, the rest of local government would have to help (Source: http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/clp/papers/120700/clpminutes.pdf).

Straw's response was a classic piece of statecraft that requires careful deconstruction. Four statements deserve specific attention:

- "NASS was trying to be open about contracts with the Private sector". The reality was somewhat different. When MP's raised questions about private contracts in the
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Commons, and when councils wrote to NASS for information, the reply was that the contracts were commercially sensitive and subject to the Data Protection Act.

- "[Local] government should have come forward earlier with consortia arrangements and that he had been forced to go to the private sector because they had not done so". Straw blamed the Consortia for his own over-reliance on private landlords. As is shown below, it was always the Home Office's intention to have a 60:40 ratio in favour of private provision.

- "[Authorities] failing to set up Consortia would find broadly the same number of asylum seekers in their area anyway". This was conclusive evidence of the Home Office's determination to control the policy, irrespective of any concerns raised by councils about their inability to absorb the numbers dictated from the centre.

- "He pointed out that if local government wanted central government to help the London Boroughs and authorities in the South East, the rest of local government would have to help". Straw implied that local authorities, rather than central government, initiated dispersal policy. Whilst it was true that councils such as Westminster and Dover had lobbied for a national dispersal policy, it was disingenuous of Straw to suggest that local authorities outside the South East had wanted the policy. The reality was that central government was forcing councils in the North and Midlands to assist the London councils.

In summary, Straw was attempting to shift responsibility for the implementation of dispersal policy from the centre to the Consortia whilst at the same time making it clear that the ownership of the policy remained with the Home Office/NASS. This passage thus provided firm evidence that the ‘enabling role’ was meant to carry ‘responsibility without ownership’.

6.5 The Centralisation of Control

As of April 2001, NASS employed 532 staff but only seven were based outside Croydon. The latter seven were the regional managers who worked with the Consortia. It may be argued that this structure reflected the centralisation of dispersal policy. This observation was confirmed during the interview with Graham De Max in Nottingham in May 2001:

Certainly it's a huge centralisation because the one thing that NASS doesn't seem to have is any sort of decentralised structure, so the effect has been to overwhelmingly
centralise and I think that’s been one of the key problems with it really, you know, that when problems do arise at local level, how are they dealt with bearing in mind that NASS has no regional structure apart from the regional managers? (extract from transcript of interview with Graham De Max).

Two consequences of this centralisation may be highlighted. The first was that it damaged the quality of communication:

There have been several individual cases with providers where we have had to deal with someone in Croydon rather than somebody locally. But that’s inevitable in a way because the Civil Service does not decentralise very easily. They were starting from scratch to be fair, but the appointment of regional managers could have gone a step further to at least have given them some resources and back-up and clout perhaps (extract from transcript of interview with Graham De Max).

The second consequence was the separation of control from expertise. It may be argued that the role being performed by NASS would have been more efficient if it had been based in the DETR rather than the Home Office:

It was always going to be difficult for just one central government department to deal with this problem, and I think certainly everyone would say that there was insufficient coming together of the relevant central government departments and still is. Asylum comes under the Home Office as an immigration issue so that was its natural home in that respect; but now it has become an accommodation thing you could argue that the DETR would be appropriate. Certainly there has been little input from the DETR, and for us as a housing authority, which has an accountable relationship with the DETR, it has been absent. I do think that at least the DETR has some sort of regional structure, which the Home Office does not. And as I said at the start of this [interview] that’s a major problem: everything has to be dealt with in Croydon (extract from transcript of interview with Graham De Max).

The problems caused by centralisation were therefore exacerbated by the fact that, from a local Housing Department viewpoint, NASS was not based in the appropriate government department. There was a problem of accountability: Local housing authorities had an 'accountable relationship' with the DETR, which had become firmly established, but their accountability to the Home Office was much less clearly defined. There was no regional structure within the Home Office that would have allowed the central-local relationship to develop the same depth as the DETR one.

6.6 Cluster Areas and the Choice of Accommodation

In August 2001, dispersal policy occupied the front pages of the national press following the murder of the asylum seeker Firsat Dag in Sighthill, Glasgow. The Guardian found that:
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Welfare workers believe that the current dispersal system bears little resemblance to
the one originally outlined by Home Office ministers, who promised to ensure that
refugees would be sent to "cluster areas" where there were existing minority ethnic
communities which could support the asylum seekers (Alan Travis, The Guardian,
7 August, 2001).

The case of Sighthill appeared to demonstrate that the dispersal to Glasgow had been
accommodation-led rather than being based on a guarantee that asylum seekers would be
placed among sympathetic populations. A number of Sighthill residents had given
interviews claiming fatuously that the asylum seekers owned luxuries that were beyond the
means of other council tenants. Moreover, the Sighthill murder was just one example of
violence and intimidation inflicted on asylum seekers across the country (see, for example,
The Independent dated 14th August 2001, which documented incidents in Bradford, Hull
and Sunderland).

In the same month that the Sighthill murder occurred, Liverpool City Council withdrew
from the dispersal programme. BBC News Online reported that the council was unhappy
with the locations to which asylum seekers had been dispersed by NASS:

Liverpool City Councillor Richard Kemp (Lib Dem) said the council was unhappy
with the government's willingness to work with "dodgy" parts of the private sector.
He said the council would still play a part in helping to solve the problems caused
by "dumping" asylum seekers in areas such as Everton, Kensington and Toxteth
which already have acute social problems. The social problems cited by Cllr Kemp
are evident in the area around Everton's tower blocks. A small park nearby presents
the only greenery in an otherwise barren, concrete landscape. The area has a run­
down air with boarded up shops and few leisure facilities. Mohammed, an Afghan
asylum seeker, said the lack of facilities added to their problems. He said: "I get
vouchers but they're only for food. We only get £10 cash [that] is not very much.
It's 70p from here to the city centre one way so it doesn't take you far. You can't go
out every day and you certainly can't go to clubs or anything like that. There's
nothing to do so we just hang around and get bored," he said. Another asylum
seeker, Emmanuel from the Democratic Republic of Congo, echoed Mohammed's
sentiments. He said the lack of things to do added to asylum seekers' frustration.
"You are moved with no choice to an area where you don't know anybody. Once
you are there you find most of the local population doesn't want you there, and you
get little money to get away from the area once in a while," he said (Liverpool's

The frustration, boredom and despair of being 'dumped' on a sink estate ran counter to the
government's stated intention of choosing cluster areas that would support the asylum
seekers' religious and social needs. It also left asylum seekers vulnerable to intimidation and
violence. Moreover, it undermined the 'enabling' role of the Consortia, one of the main
purposes of which was to facilitate the 'integration' of asylum seekers into the 'host'
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community. The evidence from Sighthill and Liverpool suggested that accommodation-led dispersal decisions may have made integration impossible, because there was often no viable 'community' for the asylum seekers to integrate into, only an alienated, marginalised substratum of the urban poor.

6.7 The Mix of Public and Private Contracts

The Consortia supplied housing to NASS that consisted primarily of unpopular council housing stock, but it also included some housing procured from housing associations and private landlords. However, the contracts between NASS and the Consortia took several months to negotiate, so by the time the Consortia housing came into operation, a large supply of private sector housing had already been contracted directly by NASS. This raised the question of how the Consortia dealt with the private landlords who were already contracted to NASS before the Consortia became involved. To explore this problem, during the course of the interviews with Consortium members in the East Midlands, four questions were raised about the mix of contracts:

- 'What is the ratio of public sector to private sector housing?'
- 'Who will manage the housing that you have contracted with NASS?'
- 'Have you experienced difficulties with private landlords?'
- 'Where will most asylum seekers be concentrated in the region?'

The proportion of public to private provision was the subject of disagreement between sources of information. In the early months of the project, there appeared to be a 60:40 split in favour of private provision. As of 24th November 2000, NASS had allocated 15306 bed-spaces to private landlords and 8673 spaces to the Regional Consortia, a ratio of 64:36 (Hansard written answer December 7th, 2000). In her report commissioned by Shelter, Garvie (2001) claimed that this ratio was intentional:

NASS had originally estimated that 65,000 bedspaces would be needed for the dispersal system in 2000/01, although this figure is now estimated at 44,000. It expects to obtain 60% of its target via direct contracts with private landlords and some social housing providers, with the remaining 40% contracted from consortia made up of local authorities, registered social landlords or private landlords (Garvie, 2001: 26).
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However, during the interview with Helen Everett, it emerged that this 60:40 ratio disguised wide regional variations. In her view, these variations meant that the ratio had little meaning on the ground:

[The] 60-40 split was what NASS originally proposed before the programme started, but look at what’s happened. Glasgow City Council provides 100% of the housing for its area with no private provision. I certainly don’t think that private providers in any region have been tolled to restrict provision to a notional 60%. It isn’t working like that at all. In Yorkshire and Humberside private providers have supplied 4000 bed-spaces, which is not 60% of the overall total for the region (extract from interview transcript).

The ratio tended to favour public sector housing in the northern regions (Scotland 100%, North East England 95%), and private sector housing further south, due to a north-south divide in the availability of spare council housing. This divide also accounts for why Scotland and the North East signed their contracts more quickly that the Consortia further south, as Everett explains:

Glasgow and Newcastle City Councils were in the fortunate position of having a large number of hard-to-let council properties lying empty of which they were gaining no rent or council tax so any income they received from NASS was profit for the council coffers. They got a good deal from NASS and concluded their deal very quickly; but the further south you come the less vacant properties there are to rent and the higher the rents are, so it is not such a good deal for local authorities in the South and the Midlands and it took us some time to convince NASS of the proper rates for our properties (extract from interview transcript).

This was one reason why NASS negotiated its housing contracts with the Consortia at a slow rate, resulting in some contracts being signed up to a year later than planned. As the next section shows, NASS concluded deals quickly with Consortia that had plenty of empty stock but adopted a different stance towards those that had less available stock.

6.8 Contract Negotiations between NASS and the Consortia

As Figure 4 demonstrates, there was a North-South divide in the negotiation and signing of contracts. The further north the Consortium was situated, the quicker the contract was signed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consortium</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>April 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East of England</td>
<td>June 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire and Humberside</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>8th November 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The difficulties and tensions involved in negotiating the contracts were highlighted in a the following press release issued by Manchester City Council on the date the North West contract was signed, namely November 21st, 2000:

COUNCIL CONSORTIUM SIGNS ASYLUM SEEKERS CONTRACT WITH HOME OFFICE

Manchester City Council today signed a contract with the Home Office to make up to 1500 properties available to accommodate asylum seekers in the region over the next five years. The contract, signed on behalf of a Consortium [sic] of 11 North West councils, follows a year of negotiations between council and Home Office officials and brings with it an assurance for council chiefs that the scheme will be self financing. Councils had at one point threatened to pull out of negotiations because of what they described as ‘unreasonable demands’ by the Home Office. Consortium officials feared that these demands would have led local councils to subsidise the programme out of Town Hall funds.

The deal means that councils can now bring back into use properties that have stood empty for years and local councils are making plans for identifying a range of public and private sector housing stock, as well as working with Housing Associations. Over the next 18 months councils within the consortium will begin to make properties available to the Home Office up to the maximum number (1500) agreed for the consortium area.

The Home Office target is that asylum seekers can now expect decisions on their asylum applications within six months. Successful applicants will be able to leave their allocated properties to set up more settled homes. Those given negative decisions either have to make their own way out of the UK or will be deported by immigration officials.

Once properties become vacant, the Home Office will disperse new asylum seekers to the properties in consultation with council officials. Currently some 6,000 fresh asylum claims are made in the UK each month, and in an attempt to reduce the accommodation pressures on London and the South East, the Home Office are dispersing new claimants on a no-choice basis.

In addition to being responsible for all the asylum seekers’ accommodation related needs, councils within the consortium will also provide essential support to assist people to register with local GPs and other health services, to find school places for children and young people, and to access voluntary sector support groups. In terms of schooling the Government has begun to respond positively to requests for extra resources for schools which take in the children of asylum seekers.

Councillor Marilyn Taylor, Executive Member for Health and Social Care, and co-chair of the North West Asylum Seekers Consortium said: “We are pleased that the
process of receiving asylum seekers into the Greater Manchester and Blackburn areas can now begin. The last eight months have proved to be very problematic to this region because of the chaotic way in which asylum seekers were being directly dispersed by the Home Office into private landlord accommodation. Usually with no prior consultation with Councils, these people then found themselves isolated, with no support, and in accommodation that often fails to meet basic standards.

The new deal means we can show how dispersal can work much more sensitively to the needs of local people and communities. Manchester and surrounding districts have been a safe haven for those fleeing violence and persecution for all of the last century. It is a record that people are rightly proud of and we intend that this tradition continues in the new Millennium.

Councils remain very concerned about the quality and appropriateness of the accommodation the Home Office is using in the private sector. The few good examples are completely eclipsed by the majority that are of poor quality, in some cases uninhabitable, and in areas that are not at all appropriate. We will continue discussions on this issue with the Home Secretary and the Minister so that they can hear directly from us the dreadful mistakes that are being made.

The Greater Manchester contract is the fifth public sector one to be signed (after Glasgow, North East, Yorkshire and Humberside and West Midlands). It covers Manchester, Stockport, Tameside, Oldham, Rochdale, Bury, Bolton, Wigan, Salford, Trafford and Blackburn with Darwen. (Source: www.manchester.gov.uk).

Two critical points emerged from this Manchester document. The first is that Manchester felt that NASS was making 'unreasonable demands' on the councils, which would have resulted in the councils bearing costs that should have been met from the centre. The second is that the Home Office was moving asylum seekers into poor quality private accommodation without consulting the councils or giving adequate consideration to the asylum seekers' needs. Similar criticisms of NASS emerged from the interview with Helen Everett:

[The] draft contract that was first offered by NASS to the Regional Consortia back in October 1999 was a contract that had been designed primarily for the private sector. The initial reaction of local authorities was that this kind of contract was totally inappropriate for local authorities as NASS seemed to be offering local authorities a contract which had been drafted with the private sector in mind.

EMCASS has chosen to make arrangements differently from any other region in terms of using a managing agent – the Refugee Housing Association. EMCASS asked the RHA to produce a business plan and the first draft was produced in February 2000 and sent to NASS prior to our first meeting. NASS had the contract for four weeks without bothering to read it prior to the meeting...that's an example of why it's taken so long. I mean we had hoped to negotiate the contract quickly and maybe sign it by May or June 2000. That was based on NASS wanting 75% family accommodation and 25% singles – or the other way around - but when we then went for a meeting in March 2000, NASS changed the goalposts and that resulted in a lot of renegotiations in May and June.
There were also lengthy negotiations over the price levels. Glasgow and Newcastle City Councils were in the fortunate position of having a large number of hard-to-let council properties lying empty of which they were gaining no rent or council tax so any income they received from NASS was profit for the council coffers. They got a good deal from NASS and concluded their deal very quickly; but the further south you come the less vacant properties there are to rent and the higher the rents are, so it is not such a good deal for local authorities in the South and the Midlands and it took us some time to convince NASS of the proper rates for our properties.

However we did agree the terms and prices with NASS on August 3rd, 2000, so the further length of time it has taken to sign the contracts has reflected (a) the uncertainty from NASS about their requirements, which ran through the Autumn (i.e. did they still wish to contract with the East Midlands or not) and (b) the complexity of our legal agreements. Apart from the main agreement between EMCASS and NASS we have legal agreements between the 3 cities, and between EMCASS and the Metropolitan Housing Trust, and between EMCASS and the Refugee Housing Association, so there were actually five sets of lawyers involved. That said, the contract was signed on 2nd March and the start date is the 30th of April (extract from interview transcript).

The East Midlands' decision to use the Refugee Housing Association as a managing agent added to the complexity and multi-agency nature of the contractual process. However, the main factor in the slowness of negotiations was "the uncertainty from NASS about their requirements" and the difficulties caused by the inability or unwillingness of NASS to produce a draft contract that was tailored to the needs of the East Midlands region and the public sector. It is also worth noting the frustration revealed in the sentences, "NASS had the contract for four weeks without bothering to read it prior to the meeting," and "NASS changed the goalposts."

In August 2001 the journal Inside Housing published a survey of councils and Consortia. This produced a highly negative response concerning NASS, especially in connection with NASS's relationship with private providers:

Inside Housing spoke to councils and consortia representing over 40 local authorities involved in the dispersal programme. Seventy per cent of respondents rated the National Asylum Support Service's handling of dispersal as 'poor' and 'very poor'. A handful said the service was average but none rated the Home Office directorate 'good' or 'very good'... There was widespread disapproval of the way it used private sector providers. Cardiff Council deputy mayor Linda Thorne said: 'We are trying to manage the situation here, then NASS do deals with the private sector which creates problems.'

Another worker who did not want to be named said: 'The irony is that the problems with the private sector usually come back to haunt NASS across the front pages of the press.'
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Lack of consultation and communication between all the different agencies came out as a major source of concern for councils (Charles, 'Councils Rate NASS As Poor', Inside Housing, August 17th, 2001).

In the light of these negative feelings about NASS and the private sector, the next section of the research dealt with specific problems that the Consortia experienced with private providers.

6.9 Problems arising from the Use of Private Sector Accommodation

Due to the length of its negotiations with NASS, the East Midlands Consortium spent the year 2000 dealing with asylum seekers in exclusively private sector accommodation because the contract for public sector housing had not yet been signed. The interviews therefore focused on whether any problems had been experienced with private providers. The responses included some positive comments from Graham de Max:

I do know that among providers locally we’ve not had too many complaints, and one in particular has been very good at liaising with our Environmental Health Officers on standards of health and safety in multi-occupancy accommodation. The report that Shelter brought out was actually misleading because the research preceded the NASS programme. We’re told that NASS has a very intensive inspection programme. Where there are complaints (and we’ve had some), we will take them up (extract from interview transcript).

The interviewees were reluctant to engage in criticisms of specific providers but one theme that did emerge was the use of subcontractors. As de Max noted:

All I know is that locally there was a problem with the subcontractor of Adelphi but we were told that they had been dispensed with. So it seems that, if the complaints reach a certain level, even if the penalties are not effective, the subcontractors will be dispensed with...I think there have been queries about Adelphi nation-wide but that may be something to do with the fact that they leave it to a subcontractor locally and don’t exercise much control over them (extract from interview transcript).

Wilson (2001) conducted a research project for the Joseph Rowntree Trust in West Yorkshire and found that the quality of support offered by private providers to asylum seekers in that region was generally far lower than that provided to asylum seekers in local authority accommodation. The Guardian carried an interview with Wilson to publicise the report:

Government failure to fund the asylum-seeking system properly is by far the worst flaw, according to Ruth Wilson, researcher and author of the study, who also found that the 14-day deadline for filling in the long and complex Home Office form was
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"hopelessly unrealistic". She said: "The deadline becomes even more of a nightmare if the asylum seeker starts the process in London but is then sent off to a dispersal area, leaving his or her legal advisers behind."

Communication problems also bedevil essential links between local authority workers and the support service, with misunderstandings of the Official Secrets Act leading to serious blunders on housing and damaging ignorance of how many asylum seekers an area has and exactly where they are. "We found one case where West Yorkshire police were aghast that asylum seekers had been housed in a notoriously racist corner of an otherwise safe estate," said Ms Wilson. "On another occasion, a large group arrived for help at a community centre which had no idea they were living locally and had not been given any advice or preparation to help."

Such muddles were almost always the result of excessive secrecy surrounding the support service's contracts with private hostels, says the report, which calls for the removal of the Official Secrets Act from the sector and much greater networking between local council/voluntary sector consortiums and the support service. Private hostels also need to network far more effectively with local colleges and other support, the findings argue, as their share of asylum seekers increases: Bradford has 923 asylum seekers privately housed, as against 60 in council flats; Leeds has 648 as against 55.

"We found that people in council care were almost automatically plugged in to English classes, health care, and every other type of support," said Ms Wilson. "We hope the findings will help to spread that effectiveness more widely" (The Guardian, 27th June, 2001).

The problems associated with private providers, especially their reliance on subcontractors, may be explained by the fact that some of them were established specifically for dispersal contracts and had no prior housing experience. An investigation by The Observer found that:

Ministers are concerned about the dozen or so firms which won multi-million pound contracts to house dispersed refugees. One of the smaller ones, Adelphi Hotels, based in Hove, East Sussex increased its profits from £180,000 to £1.4m after winning a dispersal contract in April last year. Michael Holland, the main shareholder, gave himself a £250,000 pay rise. Companies House has confirmed it is taking action against two companies, Clearsprings and Landmark Liverpool, which have so far failed to produce annual accounts. Clearsprings confirmed it had a turnover of £2m last year, mostly Home Office money. Owned by Graham King, an Essex gaming tycoon, it had no experience in housing or refugee work before it took its state contract in April 2000. It now claims to be 'the fastest growing property company in the UK'. Councils in the North of England have complained to the Home Office that private contractors such as Clearsprings have been dumping asylum seekers in sub-standard accommodation without telling them. Landmark owns two crumbling tower blocks in Liverpool, where residents have complained of harassment by the firm and staged a hunger strike. The Liberal Democrat leader of Liverpool council, Richard Kemp, said: 'The Government are responsible. They gave contracts to these companies who are dumping asylum-seekers in our cities' (The Observer, 2nd September 2001).
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Adelphi was also the subject of an investigation by *Private Eye*, which alleged that Adelphi had withheld payments from its subcontractors and had engaged in hostile take-overs when its subcontractors fell into financial difficulties (see *Private Eye*, Nos. 1034 and 1036, Aug-Sep 2001).

However, it would be erroneous to assume that there was a simple formula of 'private sector = bad, public sector = good'. The worst case of community hostility towards asylum seekers in the first 18 months of dispersal occurred on the Sighthill estate in Glasgow, where the housing for asylum seekers was entirely public sector. It could therefore be argued that criticisms of NASS's contracts with the private sector should have been directed at the specific omissions from those contracts (for example, the omission of penalties for landlords who failed to place asylum seekers among populations that shared their cultural beliefs). Criticism should arguably have been levelled at NASS's poor record in monitoring standards of accommodation, rather than making an 'a priori' assumption that all private accommodation chosen by NASS would be of poor quality.

6.10 Problems arising from the Use of a Separate Housing Channel

Under the 1996 Housing Act, asylum seekers were excluded from the housing register. The 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act also obliged them to live on vouchers rather than housing benefit, so they could not participate in the 'consumerist' Welfare State. Councils who participated in dispersal were obliged to:

- Select stock that had been out of use for some time, thereby making it likely that the stock would need to be refurbished, often under the public gaze of other council tenants who harboured resentments about delayed repairs to their own marginalised properties;
- Select stock that was likely to be geographically segregated, thus hindering community integration and making it more likely that asylum seeker housing would be targeted by vandals and racists;
- Seek sources of funding (such as EC grants) that were external to the council and which therefore carried no accountability. The councils did not need to be accountable to the asylum seekers because the money that was spent on their accommodation came from an external source.
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It may be argued that most of these problems could have been overcome by allowing asylum seekers to participate in the economy, housing market and the Welfare State, because asylum seekers would then have become active participants in a market rather than passive recipients of segregated housing and benefits. The skills of professionals, such as doctors, could also have been utilised for the benefit of the country, and asylum seekers could have found their own level in the housing market, just as their 'Ugandan Asian' predecessors had done in the 1970's (Marett, 1989). However, such participation would have forced the state to admit asylum seekers into 'the social', thereby undermining the real purposes of the separate housing channel, which were to signify the Polluted status of asylum seekers and to demarcate their exclusion from 'the social'.

6.11 Conclusion

The case of dispersal policy has been cited at great length in order to indicate the twists and turns that the state was prepared to go through under New Labour in order to keep asylum seekers out of existing housing channels. The fact that many asylum seekers were eventually housed on northern sink estates indicates the lower political power of the residents of those estates in the 'Not In My Back Yard' ('NIMBY') hierarchy. Similarly, when dispersal began to break down in 2001-2002 and New Labour turned instead to detention centres in areas such as Oxfordshire and the Isle of Wight, it faced a much louder 'NIMBY' protest than dispersal had provoked, largely because those centres affected a more privatised middle class community. This did not mean that asylum seekers were better off on the sink estates. It meant instead that 'NIMBY' middle class voters tended to protest using political channels whereas sink estates such the one at Sighthill (see section 6.6 above) had used cruder forms of intimidation to make their point.

This finding points again to the importance of recognising Pollution as a strategy of gentrification and incorporation. The state manipulated the spatial location of groups that it regarded as undesirable in order to promote the interests of incorporated groups. Housing channels were segregated in order to reinforce strategic boundaries between the categories 'social' and 'anti-social'. The concept of Pollution is therefore a more cogent tool than the label 'new racism' for analysing and understanding this sociological process.
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusions

7.1 Key Findings

This thesis has examined how the strategies employed by the British State, at different stages of its development, intentionally or unintentionally generated and reproduced boundaries of social identity. Its findings are summarised in Figures 5 and 6 below, which chart the development of each boundary strategy in each case study.

The 'boundary strategies' have been divided into six types and studied in relation to how they have helped to create internally stratified and compartmentalised 'imagined communities' in which material and political relations are concealed behind myths of identity. The class interests served by these exclusions could be analysed in material terms, such as those of landowners and capitalists, but their first point of origin was the military caste created by the Normans to generate body power for violent conquest. Their subsequent development also created powerful normative and bureaucratic interests, expressed in the power of the Church and then latterly in the bureaucracy of welfare, immigration control and surveillance.

The nature and variety of these interests often created antagonisms between boundary strategies. This led to conflicts such as those that were expressed in the Victorian era between the advocates of Civilisation (pre-1867 philanthropists such as Mill) and the aggressive advocates of Race such as Carlyle and Disraeli (see section 4.2 above). Occasionally these conflicts involved whole structures, such as when a capitalist demand for cheap labour was by immigration and welfare gatekeepers and the bastions of corporatism. The state had to 'manage' these conflicts and did not always resolved them fully, preferring instead a strategy of false compromise, such as the immigration formula that pretended to have 'fair' immigration controls whilst informally allowing officers to discriminate in a racist manner beyond the public gaze.

The case studies have also shown the importance of national myths to capitalism. Whilst it has long been recognised by Marxists that the state organises capital into national blocs, less attention has been paid to the parallel structuring of labour into national units of class. Chapter four (subsection 4.2.4) demonstrated that labourers had their own reasons for wishing to value their bodies in racial and national terms. These could be manipulated by the state's institutions, through their regulation of the life cycle. Similarly, feminists such as
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Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1993) have emphasised the role of women in reproducing not just a proletariat but a workforce steeped in an 'ethnos' of national mythology. The state's role in boundary strategy has therefore been enacted through its ability, not merely to 'penetrate' civil society, but to provide civil society with the very basis of its existence through the formation and socialisation of its subjects into a structured and stratified 'imagined community'.

Figure 5: Summary of Findings for Blood, Property and Pollution.

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7.2 Can These British Findings Be Applied to Other States?

The thesis has been designed to focus exclusively on England up to 1707 then Britain thereafter. A comparative method has been avoided because it would have required the same level of detailed excavation of the history of each society under discussion. Such an excavation would have massively increased the time and resources required for the project to a level that went far beyond those available for the thesis.

However, the evidence presented above does beg the question as to whether the British State has been typical of Western states in general. Can a boundary strategy model of the British State be presented as a universal model of 'the state' across the whole of the West? The thesis cannot give a definitive answer to that question for the reasons stated above, but it can offer a few observations as to which of the findings of the thesis are unique to Britain's idiosyncratic history and development. These cautious observations are presented in chronological order.

Firstly, feudalism was a specific Norman invention: cavalry, castles and chivalry were all imports from Normandy. Consequently, the "lateral ethnie" (A.D. Smith, 1991: 52-58) created by the Normans was spread across the whole Norman domain, of which England was just one part. Similarly, the 'civilisation process' outlined in section 3.3 of the thesis had its centre in the court of Paris (Elias, [1939] 1994: 267-268). The English State must therefore be viewed as part of a larger European project until at least the Hundred Years War, when the English and French aristocracies finally parted company. It makes little sense to regard England as a unique cultural and political entity between 1066 and at least 1348 because the ruling class spoke French, prayed in a Roman Church and wrote in Latin. However, this changed from the Black Death of 1348-1349 onwards. Feudalism collapsed in England far earlier than in the more rigid peasant economies of Europe. The land was given over to sheep farming and a 'kulak' class emerged as an intermediary stratum between the landlord class and the peasantry (see sections 2.4 and 3.4). Rural England became far more commercial in outlook than its overseas equivalents.

Secondly, the Reformation gave the English State control over religious doctrine and gave England religious and political autonomy from the Catholic powers that dominated other European states. This enabled the bourgeoisie to create the kind of cultural base in England that it had only previously enjoyed in certain European city-states.
Thirdly, the bourgeoisie assimilated the aristocracy into its commercial and Protestant value system far earlier in Britain than elsewhere. The bourgeois revolution in England was a politico-cultural one, enacted through the state between 1649 and 1688, rather than a revolution determined by the economic base. Furthermore, Britain was the only major European nation-state in which the aristocracy was transformed by bourgeois values before its Industrial Revolution. France and Germany, by contrast, entered modernity with a powerful rural class interest still pulling the strings of the state.

The first three unique features of the British case were therefore the early collapse of feudalism, the early break from Rome and the fact that the politico-cultural class settlement between aristocracy and bourgeoisie preceded industrialisation. The fourth and fifth features to be added to this picture concern the formulation of 'race' and class. Section 1.5 of the thesis noted that Britain differed from the USA in the fact that Civilisation postponed racialisation. 'Whiteness' had a racial meaning in the USA by 1700 but British 'whiteness' arose originally from Civilisation, not Race. The latter did not become dominant in Britain until 1870-1918.

Conversely, in the 1870-1945 period, British racism did converge with European and American models. Lorimer (1978) has shown how the American Civil War affected attitudes in Britain whilst the British antisemitism of the 1890's was mirrored by the Dreyfus Case in France. The 1905 Aliens Act was, to some extent, modelled on the Natal Act of 1897 in South Africa and the US Congressional Act of 1882 that stigmatised Chinese migrants (Goldberg, 2002: 178-183).

Furthermore, the history of antisemitism as a Pollution category is a global phenomenon that stretches back to the Bible. However, England had the dubious distinction of being the first state to give legal sanction to the 'blood libel', as shown by the citation from Carpenter (2004: 349) in section 2.3 above. Conversely, there are remarkable parallels between the expulsion of Jews from England in 1290 and the later expulsion of Jews and Moors from Spain in 1492. In both cases, antisemitism was originally localised and opposed to the state, but was then centralised by the state prior to the expulsion declaration (Netanyahu, 1995; N. Roth, 2002; Kamen, 1997, 2003). Conversely again, however, there was no British equivalent of 'limpieza de sangre' (purity of blood). Instead, the fear of hybridity (Goldberg, 2002: 26-27) and the concept of 'one drop of blood' (Malcomson, 2000) appear to have migrated from Spain to the USA, possibly via Mexico (see Hernandez, 2000).
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Finally, economic, political and cultural convergence between Britain and other capitalist states since 1945 can clearly be demonstrated in the growing interdependence of the world economy and the mass media. A convergence of state models could be explained with reference to 'post-Fordism' (Burrows and Loader, 1994) and 'Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regimes' (Jessop, 2002: 247-274). It could also be explained by the domination of American cultural consumerism, as per the arguments of the Frankfurt School of neo-Freudian writers (Adorno, 1991; Fromm, 1942; Marcuse, 1964). The phenomenon of 'the affluent worker', favouring a privatised, narcissistic existence over a civic, public-centred life, may also be an American import (see Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt, 1968-1971).

In conclusion, therefore, whilst this thesis would strongly argue that all nation-states require boundary strategies that create an 'imagined community', it has to express caution about whether those strategies evolved in the same way in other states outside the UK. The thesis is confident that Pollution is a global phenomenon (as evidenced by the global adoption of immigration controls). It is also clear that Race dominated the whole of Western culture between 1870 and 1945. Conversely, Civilisation and Nation have been far more culturally localised. The relationship between Civilisation and Race has a different meaning in France than it does in the UK and USA (see Lamont, 1997). The same applies to the political development of anti-racism in those societies (see Lentin, 2004; Lamont, 2002). France attempts to promote a civic culture in which, for example, the wearing of religious dress by Muslim girls in state schools is illegal. Britain, by contrast, tends to opt for the multicultural tokenism of 'saris, samosas and steel bands'.

This preliminary comparative sketch offers some clues for future research, but must remain highly tentative until the history of boundary strategy in nations such as France, Germany and the USA has been studied in the same depth as this thesis has attempted in the case of Britain.

7.3 Implications for Anti-Racism

Anti-racist strategies face a dilemma in Britain that has not really been faced. This may be summarised as the fact that politicians since 1945 have increasingly avoided explicit racist language in favour of Pollution and Civilisation discourses. Political attacks on asylum seekers have focussed on alleged cultural deficits and 'bogus' asylum claims rather than a political language of phenotype. It could therefore be argued that "post-racial and post-
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Racism and "post-racial racisms" (Goldberg, 2002: 201) are, in reality, updated articulations of pre-racial strategies within a 'knowing' post-racial framework.

In other words, politicians who would, in the 1870-1945 period, have used 'race' to articulate themes of degeneracy and otherness have now taken the option of using pre-racial myths to target the same groups that would have qualified under the definition of race. This has enabled those politicians to claim that their concerns are cultural and behavioural, even though the only groups being targeted by such concerns have been those that used to wear 'racial' labels - Arabs, Slavs, Afro-Caribbeans, and so on. Civilisation and Pollution are thus being asked to perform the same task as 'race' but in a setting that is nominally 'colour-blind' and 'raceless'. The theoretical problems created by this new 'post-racial' development for anti-racist writers are profound and troublesome.

These difficulties are crystallised in the paradox contained in Goldberg's terms "post-racial and post-racist racisms" (ibid.), which implies that racism can still be present as a social structure even after 'race' as an idea has faded away. One problem with Goldberg's formulation is that it cannot distinguish between strategies in which Civilisation is clearly being used by racists as a convenient substitute for Race, and those in which cultural exclusion is being employed with no racist intent. An anti-racist author may argue that an example of the former is the 'underclass' discourse (see section 4.4), in which a racist agenda is being peddled as a cultural one. Examples in which cultural exclusion is being employed with no racist intent may include the clumsy attempts of Conservatives to preserve mythical English identities steeped in false national memories of Agincourt or the Blitz. Anti-racists are understandably angry that some racists are able to peddle their wares behind denials of racist intent, but similarly there are some genuine 'ethnic exclusionists' who resent being accused of racist motives they do not hold.

On the basis of the evidence presented above, it may be argued that the best solution to this problem is to judge boundary strategies as products of the state's ingrained 'habitus' (see section 1.3) rather than by assuming conscious intentions on the part of state actors. It could then be argued that political assaults on asylum seekers should not be defined as a 'new racism', or 'post-racist racism', but should instead be acknowledged as a set of embedded state practices, or institutionalised boundary strategies. These have the intended or unintended effect of perpetuating the persecution of groups previously excluded intentionally by racism. The fact that some racists will exploit culturalist discourses as
convenient fallback positions should also be acknowledged, as should the ease with which Civilisation and Pollution arguments can blur into Race ones.

Moreover, this thesis has demonstrated that regarding groups as 'anti-social' (Pollution) or ‘pre-social’ (Civilisation) has often produced the same levels of cruelty and injustice as when they have been defined as subsocial (Race). If this fact were more widely acknowledged, such an acknowledgement would make Civilisation and Pollution strategies less 'respectable'. This, in turn, would reduce their attractiveness to politicians, who may otherwise have believed that strategies of Civilisation, Nation, Pollution and Blood were benign alternatives to the politics and morality of playing the Race card.
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