Geneva’s Reformation Wall, five metres high and one hundred metres long, stands in the Bastions Park against the ancient defensive walls of the old city. Begun in 1909, the 400th anniversary of Calvin’s birth, the monument inscribes in stone an emphatically Whiggish interpretation of Calvinist history. At its centre are four towering statues of great Reformers – Farel, Calvin, Beza and Knox. On their flanks, and smaller in scale, stand six Calvinist statesmen – Frederick William I of Prussia, William the Silent, Admiral Coligny, Roger Williams, Oliver Cromwell and the Transylvanian István Bocskai. Eight bas reliefs depict key moments in the history of international Calvinism – the Prussians welcoming Huguenot refugees in 1685; the Estates General of the United Provinces adopting their Act of Abjuration in 1581; Henri IV signing the Edict of Nantes in 1598; the Reformers preaching to the people of Geneva in 1534; Knox thundering before the Scottish nobility in St Giles Cathedral in 1559 with George Buchanan by his side; the Pilgrim Fathers taking the Mayflower Covenant in 1620; the Lords and Commons presenting William of Orange with the Declaration of Rights in 1689; and the victorious Bocskai securing ‘la liberté religieuse’ in Royal Hungary at the Peace of Vienna in 1606. Above each relief, an excerpt from the relevant document is carved in the original language, and across the monument runs the Genevan motto: *Post Tenebras Lux.*¹

This is the history of Calvinism as the City Fathers of Geneva wanted it to look - the epic saga of a cosmopolitan movement that inspired devout heroes to lead collective revolts against tyranny and persecution for the sake of liberty and independence. It depicts a tradition that embraces religious freedom, a point made forcefully by the inclusion of Roger Williams, the
tolerationist founder of Rhode Island. This is Calvinism seen from the other side of the Enlightenment. After Darkness Light.

The Genevan monument was designed to counter another, quite different, version of Calvinist history. In both Europe and America, the Reformer and his followers were frequently portrayed as repressive, illiberal and intolerant. The elderly Thomas Jefferson declared that Calvin worshipped an ‘atrocious’ God and that the Presbyterian clergy were ‘the most intolerant of all sects…ready…to put the torch to the pile, and to rekindle in this virgin hemisphere, the flames in which their oracle Calvin consumed the poor Servetus…’.² In nineteenth-century American school textbooks, Calvin featured as a grim persecutor guilty of un-American activities.³ This view remained strong through the twentieth century. When the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig wanted to defend freedom in the face of Fascism, he wrote a book pitting the tyrannical Calvin against the libertarian Castellio.⁴ The historian Hugh Trevor-Roper declared that early modern Calvinism ‘was intolerant, fundamentalist, scholastic, determinist…[the religion of] intellectual reactionaries, scholastical bigots, blinkered Augustinians, Hebraic fundamentalists’.⁵

Against this, there has been a strong counter-current, sympathetic to the Genevan Reformer and to the Whiggish interpretation of Calvinist history. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, himself a native of Geneva, praised Calvin for editing ‘our wise laws’, and declared that ‘so long as the love of country and liberty is not extinct among us, the memory of this great man will the held in reverence’. The New Englander John Adams begged to differ from his friend and rival Jefferson. ‘Let not Geneva be forgotten or despised’, he wrote. ‘Religious liberty owes it much respect, Servetus notwithstanding’. The historian George Bancroft claimed that ‘the fanatic for Calvinism was a fanatic for liberty’.⁶ Most recently, in The Reformation of Rights, the American legal historian John Witte Jr has highlighted concepts of liberty in Calvin, Beza, Althusius, Milton and the New England Puritans. While admitting that early modern Calvinism had ‘its grimmer side’, he tells a strongly teleological tale about its contribution to the emergence of ‘a human rights culture’.⁷

I want to move beyond the Whiggish approach (and its opposite) by exploring how Reformed Protestants employed the language of liberty in a series of revolts between the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). I shall argue that Calvinist
resistance theorists were in two minds when it came to ‘liberty’. On the one hand, they legitimised armed rising by presenting their struggle as a war of deliverance from civil and ecclesiastical bondage. Invoking the example of the biblical Exodus, they hailed their political leaders as Mosaic liberators. On the other hand, Calvinist resistance theorists (for the most part) had no intention of lending support to ‘libertines’ who promoted so-called ‘liberty of conscience’ for heretics and idolaters. To underline the point, they turned to another kind of Old Testament narrative, interpreting contemporary events as a re-enactment of Israel’s history under its kings, when idolatrous tyrants had been overthrown by the people, and godly monarchs had extirpated false religion. However, in both the Dutch Revolt and the English Civil War, Calvinist ideologues found that by talking of Exodus and liberation they had commissioned conceptual armoury that quickly fell into other hands.

II

Before exploring the writings of Calvinist resistance theorists, we need to consider Calvin himself. According to William Bouwsma, Calvin’s writing is marked by ‘his distrust of liberty, even of that Christian liberty which Luther so valued’. The *Institutes* did contain an entire chapter on ‘Christian Liberty’, but it began with a lament:

The moment any mention is made of Christian liberty lust begins to boil, or insane commotions arise, if a speedy restraint is not laid on those licentious spirits by whom the best things are perverted into the worst. For they either, under the pretext of this liberty, shake off all obedience to God, and break out into unbridled licentiousness, or they feel indignant, thinking that all choice, order, and restraint, are abolished (*Institutes* III.19.1)

Tellingly, Calvin’s label for those who opposed the disciplinary regime of Geneva was ‘Libertines’. In one form or another, they were to trouble the Reformed orthodox
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Dutch ‘Libertines’, like their Genevan counterparts, did not hesitate to turn the slogans of the Reformation against ecclesiastical discipline – they invoked ‘evangelical freedom’ against this ‘remnant of the papal yoke’, and declared that they had not overthrown the Spanish Inquisition to submit to the Genevan.\(^9\) In England and New England, the precisianist demands of early Stuart Puritanism provoked a powerful antinomian backlash from within. Invoking Luther, radical Puritans exulted in ‘free grace’ and announced their ‘freedom from the law’.\(^10\) By labelling such opponents ‘Libertines’, conservative Reformed divines sought to rescue the term liberty from its abusers, people who talked of freedom but actually practised licence. The language of liberty was too important to relinquish, but it had to yoked to concepts of law, discipline and covenant, each of which implied a powerful element of restraint.

Calvin’s polemic against the abuse of Christian liberty recurs in Book IV, chapter 20 of the *Institutes*, where he considers civil government. Here he attacks anarchistic Anabaptists, who think that Gospel liberty must mean an end to ‘courts, or laws, or magistrates, or anything else of the same sort, which they imagine obstructs their liberty’. ‘We must therefore take great care’, writes Calvin, ‘to confine that liberty which is promised and offered to us in Christ within its own limits’. Christian liberty is a spiritual reality, not a social or political programme. ‘Spiritual liberty and civil servitude’, Calvin explains, ‘can stand very well together’.\(^11\)

Having made this point, Calvin then goes on to articulate his own understanding of civil liberty. He insists that magistrates are appointed as ‘guardians’ or ‘protectors’ of liberty, charged with ensuring that the people’s freedom…suffers no diminution of any sort under their rule’. However, ‘the best form of government is one that permits a well-tempered liberty’.\(^12\) As always, Calvin is keen on restraint and anxious about licence. His ideal magistrate is an interventionist enforcer of the Decalogue. But Calvin is equally concerned that rulers themselves do not act without restraint. He prefers aristocracy or polity to kingship, because a king does not often have others to ‘curb his licence’.\(^13\) If, however, magistrates become tyrants, Christians should submit under their ‘yoke’. As has often been noted, Calvin is profoundly reticent about armed resistance.
Nevertheless, he does identify three possible agents who might overthrow tyrants and deliver oppressed peoples: divinely-inspired ‘avengers from among his servants’; foreign powers; and ‘popular magistrates’. Much has been written about the third category – whom Calvin identifies with the Ephors of Sparta, the Tribunes of Rome and the three estates of modern kingdoms. Much less has been said about the first kind of agent – the godly deliverer - though Richard Serjeantson has recently traced this figure from Reformed commentaries on the Book of Judges to Milton’s *Samson Agonistes*. Twice in his chapter on civil government Calvin contemplates the possibility that God might send liberators who are ‘raise[d] up’, ‘called’ and ‘armed by God’, ‘to deliver the oppressed from their wretched calamities’. The prime example given in both passages is Moses, who ‘destined by the power of God to be the liberator of his people’, became the means by which Yahweh ‘freed the people of Israel from Pharoah’s tyranny’. Calvin is very careful to warn that private persons must not imagine that they have been called to bring down God’s judgement on tyrants. But by invoking Moses and adding that popular magistrates or the three estates might lead resistance to tyranny, he leaves a door slightly ajar that some later Calvinists will fling wide open. For if the notion of ‘Christian liberty’ had explosive potential, so too had the story of the Exodus. In future Calvinist revolts, divinely-appointed liberators and inferior magistrates would be conflated and acclaimed as Mosaic deliverers.

In Calvin himself, however, the accent is on subjection and restraint rather than liberty. The limits of his ‘well-ordered liberty’ were thrown into high relief by the case of Servetus. Calvin disagreed profoundly with Castellio’s claim that heretics should enjoy ‘liberty of conscience’. Surprisingly, perhaps, Castellio’s writings were not marked by an intensive use of the language of liberty. But in both *Concerning Heretics* (1554) and in his *Advice to a Desolate France* (1562), Calvin’s greatest critic lamented the ‘forcing’ and ‘restraint’ of conscience, either by direct physical interference or by legal threat (one of the examples he gives is that of ‘the Jews of Spain, baptised by force’). Such coercive means, Castellio argued, were contrary to the mind of Christ, who ‘only wants voluntary disciples, without constraint’. As he puts it in a striking metaphor, Christ wants a volunteer army, not conscripts.

For Calvin and Beza, Castellio was pleading not for liberty, but for licence. Servetus had abused Christian liberty by spreading heresy. And he had not been executed in order to
force his erroneous conscience. Beza insisted that the magistrate could not coerce faith any
more than the clergy. Faith was a gift of God, and the conscience as an internal faculty was
beyond the magistrate’s reach. What the magistrate could police was external actions,
including the propagation of heresy. Servetus was a ravenous wolf devouring the flock of
Christ. He was, argued Calvin and Beza, like the false prophets and blasphemers of ancient
Israel, whose mouths were shut by godly kings. \(^{18}\)

This robust defence of the coercive powers of the Christian magistrate in matters of religion
was firmly in line with the mainstream of Reformed thought. John Marshall has stated that
‘To every one of the leading magisterial Reformation thinkers of the sixteenth century,
toleration was simply a “diabolic doctrine”’. \(^{19}\) This is, I think, a little too emphatic.
Nevertheless, the Reformed orthodox did steadfastly insist that Christian magistrates had
the same coercive powers in religion as Old Testament kings – indeed, they had a sacred
duty (whenever feasible) to suppress idolatry, heresy and blasphemy. ‘Liberty of conscience’
as touted by Castellio, the Anabaptists and the Socinians was regarded as a misnomer. The
only ones who had a right to freedom of conscience were true believers who exercised
consciences that functioned properly. Error had no rights. What the sects really wanted,
asserted most mainstream Calvinists, was licence for men of no conscience or bad
conscience.

Thus while ‘Christian liberty’ was one of the original mottoes of the magisterial Reformation,
it did not lead naturally to ‘liberty of conscience’ for non-Calvinists, especially Papists and
heretics.

\[\text{III}\]

But if the Calvinists saw themselves as the party of law and order, they were to acquire a
well-earned reputation for sedition and disobedience. \(^{20}\) From the late 1550s onwards,
Reformed clergy preached armed resistance in a series of risings, rebellions and revolts. As
Heinz Schilling explains, ‘The offensive and aggressive character of Calvinism obviously
stemmed from the fact that Calvinism was directly confronted by the Catholic religious,
legal, diplomatic and military offensive – in Geneva, France, the Netherlands, northwestern
Germany, and to some extent, even in Britain. Lutheranism, by contrast, generally enjoyed legal protection – as in the Holy Roman Empire or in Scandinavia’. In legitimising their revolts, militant Calvinists depicted these conflicts as confrontations between true religion and idolatry, using the exclusivist (and even apocalyptic) rhetoric of ‘confessional fundamentalism’. Yet the Reformed also reached for non-sectarian arguments that were common currency among early modern intellectuals, so that a great deal of Calvinist resistance theory was ‘not...specifically Calvinist at all’. In particular, they seized on the language of liberty, enhancing their patriotic appeal by posing as champions of national liberties. They also called for religious freedom (for themselves) and exploited the characteristically Protestant language of Christian liberty. And they framed contemporary events within the biblical narrative of the Exodus, presenting their leaders as providential deliverers sent to liberate them from civil and ecclesiastical slavery.

If we turn first to the British Calvinist resistance theorists of the 1550s, notably Christopher Goodman and John Knox, we can see how they latched onto Calvin’s tentative asides about heaven-sent deliverers. Goodman provides several examples of such liberators, including the inter-testamental Jewish rebels, Judas Maccabeus and Mattathias, but the Old Testament figures he cites are the two we find in Calvin’s *Institutes*: Moses and Othniel. Through these leaders, we are told, God freed his people from what Goodman calls ‘vile slavery’. The people ‘ought not to suffer all power and libertie to be taken from them’, Goodman maintains, ‘as though they were no difference betwixt bonde slaues and free subjectes’. Instead, he advises his readers (in the wake of Wyatt’s failed rising), that having ‘lost all godlye libertie’ they must now ‘expell Antichrist and all his adherents, by whom you are broght in this miserable slauey and bondage, both of bodies and soules’. We find the same analysis in Knox’s revolutionary pamphlets of 1558. Mary Tudor and Mary of Guise have overthrown the ‘ancient liberties’ of England and Scotland. ‘If ye will not be slaves’ unto the French, Knox warns the Scottish nobility, you must join our forces to defend your ‘liberties’. Knox draws a direct analogy between the Scots and the Israelites in ‘bondage’ in Egypt – like Moses, the nobility are exhorted to ‘hazard [their] own lives’ by entering into ‘the presence of Pharoah’ to demand the ‘deliverance’ of their brethren. This may not work of course, but Knox reminds his readers that ‘proud Pharoah...and his army in their cruel rage [were] drowned by the waters of the Red Sea’.24
Given these references to the Exodus story in Knox and Goodman, it is hardly surprising to turn to the Geneva Bible, and find on the title page a striking image of the Israelites pinned against the shore of the Red Sea with the Egyptian army bearing down upon them. In 1560, when the Genevan translation was published, British Calvinists had just experienced their own crossing of the Red Sea, thanks to the accession of Elizabeth I and the triumph of the Scottish Reformation. Yet by picturing the moment before the seas parted, the moment of greatest anguish, the image reminded Protestants of how fraught their situation had been just a few years earlier. The British Reformations were a divine deliverance of powerless slaves. As the text surrounding the picture declared, ‘FEARE YE NOT, STAND STIL, AND BEHOLDE/ the salvation of the Lord, which he will shew to you this day’.

Yet as Goodman pointed out, the Israelites were delivered in order to serve Yahweh. Goodman reminded his readers that, as they prepared to enter the Promised Land, the Israelites were confronted with a choice as to whom they would serve – the Lord or the local deities. Exodus was a story of liberation, but also a tale of subjection to Israel’s God. Like Calvin, Goodman warned that magistrates must not permit ‘ouermuche libertie’ or ‘carnall libertie’.  

For these Calvinist theorists, then, resistance was a religious duty, not merely a political right. It was bound up with a confrontation between Yahweh and his rivals, the true God and the idols. Idolatry is a far more central theme in Goodman and Knox’s tracts than liberty. Indeed, it is arguably what makes Calvinist resistance theory distinctively Calvinist. As Carlos Eire has argued, ‘If there is one concept, that stands out as some sort of red blinking light in all the Calvinist theories from Calvin to Buchanan, it is precisely this issue of idolatry’.  

Buchanan, in fact, is an exception – there is nothing particularly Calvinist about De Jure Regni, a humanist dialogue that contains no reference to idolatry. But Knox was obsessed with idolatry, and condemned Mary of Guise as ‘an open and obstinate idolatress’. In a 1564 debate with Mary Stuart’s secretary, Knox poured contempt on Secretary Lethington’s argument that the queen had allowed ‘liberty of religion’. For him, liberty for the Protestant Kirk was not enough; popish worship must be extirpated, for ‘the whole of Scotland’ was guilty ‘of the Queen’s idolatry’, and at risk of divine vengeance. Knox had prayed, ‘O
Lord...purge the heart of the Queen’s Majesty from the venom of idolatry, and deliver her from the bondage and thraldom of Satan’ (she was, he said, ‘a slave of Satan’). He argued that like the ancient Israelites, ‘the people assembled together in one body a commonwealth unto whom God has given sufficient force’, were ‘bound to keep their land clean and unpolluted’ by making ‘inquisition’, suppressing idolatry and even executing idolaters.27 This line of argument left little room for multiconfessional compromise. The Scots Confession of 1560 made this very clear in its article on the civil magistrate: rulers were appointed ‘for maintenance of trew Religioun, and for suppressing of Idolatrie and Superstitioun whatsoever: As in David, Josaphat, Esechias, Josias’.28

The Huguenot resistance theorists may seem to offer a sharp contrast to the implacable and triumphalist Knox. As a vulnerable minority, Huguenots had every reason to advance non-sectarian arguments and embrace religious toleration. That is, indeed, what we find in many Huguenot texts. The public statements of the Prince of Condé during the 1560s relegate religious concerns to a minor role, and emphasise the constitutional obligations of the nobility. In the same way, François Hotman’s Franco-Gallia (1573) relies almost entirely on an historical argument about the French constitution, and the main body of the book is almost devoid of divisive confessional argument.

However, Denis Crouzet has detected a deep ambivalence in French Calvinist discourse in the early wars of religion. On the one hand, Huguenots deployed legalistic and constitutionalist arguments tailored to appeal across confessional lines. But this discourse was largely tactical and designed for external consumption. In texts written for a Reformed audience, the religious dimension dominates. Here we find appeals to ‘the great God of armies’ who is ‘delivering his Church’ from ‘the enemies of the Christian religion’. The vision here is not one of compromise and coexistence between the two confessions, but the triumph of the Calvinist Gospel. Crouzet argues that Calvinists had ‘two identities, a primary identity rooted in faith, and a tactical identity based on politics’, with the political identity being ‘merely a tool of the religious identity’.29 On this interpretation, the Huguenots were closer to John Knox than to Sebastian Castellio – although they often sounded conciliatory and non-sectarian, what they really sought was the destruction of popish idolatry by godly magistrates.
It is worth pointing out that liberty is not a term that looms large in either Beza’s *Du Droit des Magistrats* or the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*. Although one part of the latter work was eventually translated into English as *A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants* (1648), the word ‘Libertas’ did not feature in the original title. But like Knox and Goodman, the *Vindiciae* took up Calvin’s hint about liberators. In fact, the author (who wrote under the Roman pseudonym ‘Stephanus Junius Brutus the Celt’) used the same Jewish examples as the two British writers, including the rather surprising Mattathias, from the Apocryphal Book of Maccabees, who had ‘waged war against Antiochus for religion and country’, altars and hearths. Mattathias ‘restored the true worship of God’, and was the instrument ‘to liberate the kingdom’, ‘casting off the yoke’ of the tyrant. The author must have been aware that Condé had been praised as the Huguenot Moses, and he would not deny that ‘the very same God who has visited Pharaohs and Ahabs upon us in this our age, may not also raise up a few extraordinary liberators from time to time’. In Book IV, Brutus suggests that God might use foreign princes ‘to free God’s church from tyranny and captive Christians from the yoke of servitude’. For if it was lawful for the Crusaders to ‘free Christians from bodily slavery (for the Turks coerce no-one [in conscience]), is it not much more so to manumit the souls of the wretched, and restore them to liberty?’.

What is noticeable about this account of deliverers is that – like that of Knox and Goodman – it is framed in terms of true and false religion, and especially deliverance from enslavement to idolatrous kings. Indeed, the theme of idolatry once again ‘stands out like a red blinking light’. As the Catholic critic, William Barclay, noted the protestations of bi-partisan neutrality in the preface to the book were rather undermined by apocalyptic references to the Babylonian whore (i.e. the Papacy) who ‘would in the end be slaughtered by the arms of the ten kings whom she had seduced’. ‘Although the church is not enlarged by arms’, wrote Brutus, ‘yet it can be justly defended by arms’.

The defence of true religion by force of arms was illustrated in Question Two of the *Vindiciae* by numerous references to godly Old Testament kings, and revolts against their tyrannical, idolatrous counterparts. These references functioned not merely as proof texts; they invited the reader into the story of ancient Judah, and suggested that biblical history was being replayed in sixteenth-century France. By placing contemporary events within a narrative frame that pitted true religion against idolatry, the *Vindiciae* invited readers to
imagine that the people of God – led by ‘liberators’ – could employ armed resistance to overthrow tyranny and idolatry and ‘restore the temple’ and pure worship. In doing so, they could perhaps participate in the apocalyptic destruction of the popish whore. It is hardly surprising that the first English translation of one part of the Vindiciae, published in the year of the Armada, was entitled A Shorte Apologie for Christian Souldiours: wherein is conteined, how that we ought both to propagate, and also if neede require, to defende by force of armes, the Catholike Church of Christ, against the tyranne of Antichrist and his adherents (1588).

Unlike Knox, the author of the Vindiciae drew on a rich array of secular arguments, from Roman law and other sources, and these come to the fore in the third section of the book, which is markedly more secular. But its powerful emphasis on idolatry and covenant made this a distinctively Calvinist treatise, one that reflects the desperate polarisation of the 1570s. The same can be said of Beza’s Du Droit des Magistrats (1574). Although it advanced a variety of non-confessional arguments for resistance against tyrants, it concluded with a discussion of how to respond to ‘tyranny in religion’. Here Beza turned apocalyptic, referring bluntly to ‘the bloodstained whore of Rome’. Like the godly kings of Israel and the early Christian emperors, ‘he should use the weapon of the law against disturbers of true religion…and his military arm against those who cannot otherwise be halted’. Although it is wrong to plant or introduce’ religion by force of arms, force can be used to ‘preserve it once it is established or to restore it when it has been buried’. Christian princes have a duty to convert their subjects ‘from idolatry and superstition to true religion’, not least by enforcing good edicts against those who ‘from pure stubbornness, would resist establishment of true religion, as has been done in our time in England, Denmark, Sweden, Scotland, and in a large part of Germany and Switzerland, against Papists, Anabaptists, and other heretics’. If, however, a magistrate attempted ‘to force idolatry’ upon the ‘conscience’ of his subjects, they must either suffer or go into exile, except where there are toleration edicts in place (as in contemporary France). An idolatrous king who violates such edicts is ‘guilty of flagrant tyranny’ and may be resisted by his subjects led by ‘competent authorities’.  

John Witte points out that Beza’s treatise speaks of ‘liberty of conscience’ and ‘the free exercise of religion’, but it is clear from the context that these are to be granted to the true Reformed faith in France, not to heretics or Catholics in a Calvinist state. It is simply naïve to
suggest (as Witte does) that ‘the mature Beza’ had undergone ‘a reversal of thought’, and now ‘insisted that all persons, even heretics, must enjoy the liberty of conscience to be left alone in their error if they wished’.35 Beza publicly approved of the beheading of the heretic Gentile at Berne in 1566, and the Arian Johann Sylvanus at Heidelberg in 1572. He explained his settled position in a letter written in 1570: ‘Shall we proclaim that freedom of conscience should be granted? Certainly not in the sense it is usually taken that each should adore God after his own fashion. That is simply a diabolical dogma. It pretends that everyone is at liberty to perish if he wants to’.36 Beza’s *Right of Magistrates* is entirely consistent with this position. While he welcomes the French toleration edicts, and accepts that Protestants might have to endure persecution and minority status, his dream is to see France become a new Israel purged of idolatry.

So although ‘la liberté de conscience’ was becoming a familiar phrase during the wars of religion, that owed less to Calvinist theologians than to *politique* statesmen, and even *politiques* advocated toleration on essentially pragmatic grounds. In the later stages of the religious wars, especially after the accession of Henry IV, leading Huguenot intellectuals, including Beza, Hotman and Du Plessis-Mornay, also worked to secure a political settlement based on the co-existence of the rival confessional communities.37 But typically, such calls for toleration were predicated on necessity and expediency, and should not be equated with Castellio’s far more radical claim that it was morally wrong to use force against heretics and idolaters. The most authoritative statements of Huguenot beliefs (the 1559 French Confession of Faith and the Second Helvetic Confession adopted by the French Reformed in 1571) were clear that godly magistrates have a duty to punish crimes against the First Table of the Decalogue by rooting out superstition and idolatry and drawing their sword against stubborn heretics.38

The Dutch Calvinists were officially committed to the same position. The Belgic Confession, the primary symbol of the Dutch church, first written in 1561 but revised and reaffirmed at the Synod of Dort in 1619, taught that magistrates ‘may remove and prevent all idolatry and false worship; that the kingdom of antichrist may be thus destroyed...’39 Its author, Guy de Bray, one of the leading Calvinist ministers until his martyrdom in 1567, taught that magistrates should (like Josiah and Hezekiah) banish all idolatry, and judge heretics (though he rejected ‘burning, hanging and killing’).40
However, the Dutch revolt presented a challenge to this standard Reformed teaching. Firstly, the revolt was from the outset presented as a struggle for freedom - freedom from both political tyranny and the religious bondage of the Spanish Inquisition. Secondly, the rebellion was (in its origins) ‘confessional’, a rising in which Calvinists fought alongside Catholics against Spanish imperial rule, and William of Orange worked hard to promote a ‘Religious Peace’. Of course, this became increasingly difficult as the revolt was steadily Calvinised by waves of iconoclasm and regional edicts banning Catholic worship. But by comparison with Scotland’s revolutionary Reformation or the French Wars of Religion, there was much greater cooperation between Catholics and Calvinists, and more support for a generous concept of liberty of conscience.

Indeed, in some of their official statements, the Reformed embraced the language of liberty with enthusiasm. In the *Defence and True Declaration* of 1570, Calvinist rebels depicted the Dutch in a state of ‘servitude and subjection’, their necks bowed under the ‘yoke’ of the Spanish Inquisition. They were fighting to restore the ‘ancient liberties’ of their country, and to gain ‘free liberty’ to profess their religion. Distancing themselves from popular iconoclasm (which had happened ‘without the commandment or consent of our Ministers, Elders or congregations’), they emphasised that the Spanish had oppressed papists too, and suggested that the tyrants were only using religion as a ‘veil’ or ‘pretense’ to hide their lust for worldly domination.\(^{41}\) Twelve years later, another Reformed manifesto *Political Education* (1582) reiterated the contention that they were defending the ‘fatherland’ against the threat of ‘eternal slavery’. And they argued eloquently that, since faith was a gift of God, it could not (and should not) be forced. Kings and governments had power over bodies and goods, but not over ‘the souls and consciences of men’.\(^{42}\)

One striking feature of these two texts – in contrast to those of Goodman, Knox, Beza and the author of the *Vindiciae* – is the lack of any reference to the godly kings of Judah extirpating false religion. Dutch Calvinists were perhaps less inclined than their coreligionists in Britain or France to frame the conflict as a clash between the true religion and popish idolatry. Some ministers did call for the Catholics to be treated like Old Testament idolators, and Andrew Pettegree has argued that ‘the true spirit of Dutch Calvinism’ was revealed in the iconoclastic riots.\(^{43}\) But in the two key works cited above – both of which avow the
Reformed religion – there is a striking scarcity of biblical reference. There is little in either work that is uniquely Calvinist.

For the republican Dutch, examples of Old Testament kings had less appeal than the story of the Exodus, which fitted so well with their claim to be fighting to liberate their country from Spanish bondage. As Simon Schama points out, we ‘find the Exodus story everywhere in early modern Dutch culture’. It appeared in sermons, songs, silver plagues, wall tiles, engravings, paintings, and the stage. William the Silent was hailed as the Dutch Moses, regaled with theatrical performances of ‘Moses’s Deliverance of the Jews’, and praised in song:

O wondrous fate that joins Moses and Orange...
The one leads the Hebrews, through the Red Sea flood
The other guides his people through a sea...of tears and blood.

In 1581, the artist Hendrick Goltsius produced a portrait of William surrounded by images of Israel’s liberation from Egyptian bondage. The Exodus story, says Schama, had attained ‘semi-official’ status as ‘patriotic Scripture’. 44

Because the Dutch Revolt had been legitimised as a struggle for freedom against the Spanish Inquisition, the Netherlands proved less than receptive to hardline Calvinist calls for coercive religious uniformity. Indeed, Reformed spokesmen themselves sometimes sounded more like Castellio than Beza. Martin van Gelderen has argued that ‘the most important point of divergence between the political thought of Dutch Reformed Protestants and Calvin concerned freedom of conscience’. 45

Yet we must be careful not to exaggerate this divergence. According to Jonathan Israel, there was ‘a clash of interpretations of the Revolt. For the Calvinists it was above all a struggle about religion, for the “true faith”. For the regents it was a struggle for freedom from oppression and tyranny’. 46 Israel underplays the extent to which Calvinists themselves had bought into the language of liberty, but Dutch Reformed theologians remained at best ambivalent about freedom of religion. They were torn between their Confession of Faith, which pictured godly magistrates suppressing idolatry and heresy, and the Union of Utrecht, which guaranteed ‘freedom of conscience’ for the Dutch. Most resolved this tension by
arguing that freedom of private conscience did not necessarily entail freedom of public practice. While Protestants would not establish a Spanish-style Inquisition and force Catholics or Mennonites to convert, neither would they tolerate the open worship of their rivals, including Lutherans. Critics of the orthodox Reformed clergy warned that this arrangement was no more than ‘Genevan popery’. In Gouda, they made their point by adding a ‘freedom of conscience’ window to the Reformed church in 1598. For the non-aligned spiritualist Dirk Coornhert, the Christian liberty preached by the Calvinist clergy was a long way from true liberty of conscience, the essence of which was ‘to speak one’s opinion freely’ (i.e. publicly and without constraint). When Coornhert’s tolerationism was endorsed by the maverick Reformed minister Caspar Coolhaes, he was summoned before a national synod and excommunicated in 1582. His critics argued (in line with Calvin) that he was promoting ‘libertarian licentiousness’ rather than ‘Christian liberty’. True liberty, they warned, did not ‘consist in our doing everything we can do freely as we like’.

But if in theory, the leading Calvinist divines (like Knox, Beza and de Bray before them) dreamed of a new Israel purged of heresy and idolatry, in practice they had to make do with something messier. Semi-clandestine Roman Catholic worship abounded in the Dutch republic, as did Anabaptist and Arminian heresy. Magistrates (despite the Belgic Confession) did little to remove, prevent and destroy it. Yet even in the Dutch republic, a state created by a titanic struggle for freedom, Calvinists were reluctant to acknowledge that Catholics and heretics had any right to liberty of conscience.

In Hungary, Bohemia and Moravia, the Reformed were more ready to sanction religious diversity. The Bohemian Confession of 1575 is unusual among sixteenth-century Reformed creeds in having no reference to the magistrate’s coercive power in matters of religion. Instead, the clause on secular government simply teaches the need for obedience to temporal rulers. But then this Confession was not an exclusively Calvinist document; it was a joint production designed to express the common beliefs of the region’s Protestants. By contrast, the Hungarian Confessio Catholica of 1562, a staunchly Reformed text, cited Augustine’s compelle intrare; it urged magistrates to execute heretics and destroy idols in the manner of godly Old Testament kings. In Hungary, this was not unfeasible. Protestants comprised a majority of the population (with Calvinists forming the largest single group), and more than 90% of the books published in Hungarian during the sixteenth century were
Protestant works. Yet while an organised political Calvinism helped to form an anti-Hapsburg and anti-Catholic bloc, it was dedicated to securing Estate rights and freedom of religion, rather than Reformed hegemony. The region was unusually pluralistic, and in the Duchy of Transylvania, Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed and Unitarian churches enjoyed legal recognition and equal rights, a situation without parallel elsewhere in Europe.54

When the Hungarian Estates took up arms in 1604 under the leadership of the Calvinist nobleman, István Bocskai, they legitimised their revolt in both secular and religious terms. As Márton Zászkaliczky shows, they consistently presented their case with reference to Estates law and natural law, both in Latin texts designed for external consumption and in domestic documents written in the vernacular.55 The Hungarian language texts, however, contained an additional feature. Martin Rady observes that they proclaimed the divine mission of Bocskai, sounding a confessional note that is largely absent from the Latin statements issued to a foreign audience. Among Hungarian Calvinists we find the kind of dual identity that Crouzet detects in the Huguenots. As one might expect in a revolt in which Calvinists were the dominant force, the diet of Szerencs (which opened with a Reformed service) hailed Bocskai as the ‘Moses of the Hungarians’, who had been sent by God to deliver his people from captivity. Bocskai himself embraced his divinely ordained role in his public utterances and private letters, declaring that God had raised him up just as he had taken Moses from his shepherding. As in the Dutch revolt, the Hungarian rising was characterised by providentialism and Hebraic patriotism. But it was not marked by iconoclasm. Instead the goal involved securing recognition of religious freedom from the Emperor, something that was achieved at the Peace of Vienna in 1606.56

Bocskai stands next to Cromwell on the Genevan monument, though the Puritan Revolution looms far larger in Whiggish mythology than the Hungarian revolt. But the British would have found it hard to contemplate the multiconfessionalism of Eastern Europe. As the Fast Sermons to Parliament reveal, most of the clerical propagandists for the Covenanters and the Parliamentarians were emphatic opponents of religious toleration. Two of the leading resistance theorists of the 1640s, the Scottish divine Samuel Rutherford and the English Puritan lawyer, William Prynne, published hefty treatises to justify war against Charles I before going on to write lengthy works against what Rutherford called ‘pretended liberty of conscience’ in the late 1640s.57 Rutherford’s own work of resistance theory, Lex Rex, was
shot through with a quintessentially Calvinist hatred of popish idolatry.\textsuperscript{58} And Prynne’s zeal for civil liberty was twinned with a hatred of ‘libertines’ who denied the magistrate’s power ‘to punish idolatry, apostacy, heresie, blasphemy and obstinate Schism’.\textsuperscript{59} The great majority of Puritan divines shared this appalled reaction to calls for the ‘toleration of all religions’. The London Ministers lamented the ‘Patronizing’ of ‘Errours, Heresies and Blasphemies…under the grossely abused notion of Liberty of Conscience’.

In 1648, the Westminster Parliament responded to Presbyterian pressure by passing a draconian Blasphemy Ordinance that would have satisfied Calvin himself.

Such was the concern that the Westminster Divines devoted a chapter of their Confession of Faith to a careful exposition ‘Of Christian Liberty and Liberty of Conscience’ – the first time a Reformed confession had done so. Like Calvin, the divines displayed acute ambivalence over this grand Protestant theme. They did not want to surrender the language of liberty to the sects, and they understood its polemical value against popery and prelacy. But whilst the first two clauses of the chapter articulated a positive doctrine of Christian liberty, clauses 3 and 4 warned against those who ‘upon pretense of Christian liberty’ indulge their lusts or oppose lawful ecclesiastical or civil power. Anyone who published opinions or maintained practices contrary to ‘the light of nature or to the known principles of Christianity’, could be proceeded against ‘by the power of the civil magistrate’. Chapter 23 was even clearer that the magistrate had a duty, like the kings of Judah, ‘that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed’.

Significantly, the leading Independents agreed. They favoured liberty for orthodox sects, but not for heretics. At the Whitehall Debates in 1648, Henry Ireton maintained that the magistrates should restrain heretics.\textsuperscript{62} The Savoy Confession, drafted by the conservative Independents in 1658, made some minor amendments to the wording of the Westminster Confession, emphasising that where the godly differed on non-fundamentals, ‘there is no warrant for the magistrate under the gospel to abridge them of their liberty’. But it still taught that the magistrate was ‘to take care that men of corrupt minds and conversations do not licentiously publish and divulge blasphemy and errors’.

However, the English Civil War, like the earlier Calvinist revolts we have considered, was legitimised as a war of liberation from political and ecclesiastical slavery. This was done, as
Quentin Skinner has demonstrated, through appeal to Roman law and to classical historians and philosophers, but the Parliamentarians also mobilised biblical narrative. Puritan preachers and pamphleteers depicted the crisis as a new Exodus from Egyptian bondage. Stephen Marshall, the great Puritan demagogue, announced in September 1641 that “this wonderfull yeer” had been a year of “Jubilee,” a year of deliverance for slaves. “This yeer have we seen broken the yokes which lay upon our estates, Liberties, Religion, and Conscience; the intolerable yokes of Star-Chamber, and terrible High-Commission.” Addressing the “Right Honourable and Noble Senators,” he declared that they were at the start of their own “Passover”. In Fast Sermons before Parliament, the preachers presented the parallel histories of ancient Israel and Protestant England as stories of ‘deliverance upon deliverance’. ‘Deliverance’ was one of the key words of the Revolution, and in Henry Cockeram’s *English Dictionarie* of 1623 it was defined, in one word, as ‘Liberation’.

As in the Dutch revolt, advocates of religious liberty seized on the language of liberty. Writers like John Milton, Roger Williams and Henry Robinson agreed that the civil war was being fought to liberate England from civil and religious servitude. But tolerationists feared the re-imposition (in another form) of what Robinson called ‘Inquisition bondage’. John Goodwin, one of the most influential resistance theorists in 1642, issued a stream of tolerationist tracts from 1644 onwards, depicting the hardline Presbyterians as Egyptian Taskmasters, and presenting Cromwell and the New Model Army as deliverers from civil and religious slavery. For supporters of the Army, this Exodus would not be complete until what Williams called ‘soul yokes’ had been removed. ‘The greatest yokes yet lying upon English necks’, he declared, ‘are of a spiritual and soul nature’. The Leveller William Walwyn concurred: Parliament had been chosen to secure the people’s ‘Freedome, whereof Liberty of conscience is the principal branch’.

Like Castellio, radical Puritan tolerationists emphasised that God wanted voluntary service, not ‘inforced uniformity’. The conscience or the will themselves must not be coerced. In a startling phrase, Roger Williams accused persecutors who forced men to participate in public worship against their conscience of the crime of ‘spirituall Rape’ or ‘soule rape’. For him, pure worship was free worship, depending on consent or ‘a free Vote’, for Christ did not desire ‘an unwilling Spouse’ or a ‘forced Bed’. Liberty then, was the opposite of ‘constraint’, being *forced into* something against one’s conscience, either through direct
physical compulsion or indirect legal threats of punishment. But the notion of ‘free exercise’ of conscience also assumed the absence of restraint, or being forcibly held back from exercising your conscience. At the Whitehall Debates, both sides agreed that the magistrate did not have ‘compulsive’ power, but only the radical tolerationists denied that he possessed ‘restrictive’ power. Williams wrote that Parliament should ‘proclaim free and impartial liberty to all the people of the three nations, to choose and maintain what worship and ministry their souls and consciences are persuaded of’. Only then would the people be engaged to maintain ‘that power that has from Heaven set them free from so great and so long continued slavery’.

‘Pretended liberty of conscience’ was repeatedly denounced by Presbyterians as the doctrine of Libertines, Socinians, Anabaptists and Arminians, but some of the leading tolerationist spokesmen identified firmly with the Reformed tradition and insisted that they taught ‘no doctrine of libertinisme’. Robinson condemned those he called ‘the Reformed persecutors’, but like Goodwin, Williams and Milton he wrote as a Reformed Protestant. They were engaged in ‘the reforming of Reformation itself’.

In this, they were remarkably successful. As Blair Worden has recently demonstrated, ‘the phrase “civil and religious liberty” was the creation of the Puritan Revolution’. In 1640, the godly said they were struggling for ‘religion’ and ‘liberty’, but not for ‘religious liberty’. By 1660, ‘civil and religious liberty’ had become a slogan, popularised by Oliver Cromwell, but often used by his radical critics. ‘In the long term’, notes Worden, ‘it nourished a Whig tradition which eschewed the vision of a godly commonwealth that had been the guiding objective of his life’. In the hands of Milton and his contemporaries, the Calvinist political tradition, with its obsessive focus on idolatry and deliverance, was being reworked. In the eighteenth century, radical Whigs would condemn the idolising of kings and proclaim deliverance from clerical tyranny.

IV

This development was far from inevitable for the relationship between civil liberty and liberty of conscience in Calvinist political thought was complicated. Reformed thinkers
adopted various positions on armed resistance and religious toleration. Some, like Calvin at his most cautious, condemned both. Many, like Knox, Beza, Prynne and Rutherford were pro-resistance but anti-toleration. A few, like Pierre Bayle in the 1680s, repudiated resistance theory but championed religious liberty. Finally, others like Caspar Coolhaes and John Goodwin supported both revolt and a principled commitment to religious liberty. To make things more complicated, the positions of individual thinkers were often unstable, and attitudes to both resistance and toleration shifted according to political circumstance.

Nevertheless, once allowance has been made for the conflicted character of the Calvinist political tradition, some generalisations can be drawn. First, the Reformed legitimised a series of early modern revolts as wars of liberation. In Scotland, France, the Netherlands and England, they presented themselves as defenders of the ancient liberties of the nation. But they also developed Calvin’s passing references to divinely-ordained liberators like Moses, and depicted their rebellions as re-enactments of the biblical Exodus. Indeed, this biblical theology of political liberation could even be seen as one of the hallmarks of Calvinist resistance theory. In the face of severe persecution, Calvinist resistance theorists declared that they were fighting for deliverance from both civil and ecclesiastical bondage. Mary Tudor, Mary of Guise, the French Catholic monarchy, the Spanish Inquisition, and the Laudian bishops were cast in the role of Egyptian taskmasters, enslaving the consciences of the people of Israel. These revolts, then, were being fought to free godly consciences.

Secondly, however, mainstream Calvinists were very reluctant to endorse freedom of conscience for false religion. There is a remarkable consistency here in the teaching of the major Reformed confessions, from the Scots, French, Belgic, Hungarian, and Second Helvetic Confessions produced between 1559 and 1564 to the Westminster and Savoy Confessions of the English Revolution. Officially – i.e. according to their doctrinal standards – the Reformed held that godly magistrates had coercive power in religion and a duty to employ that power (wherever feasible) against heresy and idolatry. That stress on idolatry was another of the key features of Calvinist resistance theory. It emerged from minds powerfully shaped by Old Testament narrative, especially the story of Israel’s monarchy, when idolatrous rulers were overthrown by liberators, and godly ones suppressed false prophets and idolaters. This remained the dominant model among the Reformed clergy throughout
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, though with some variation according to national context.

Even in the late seventeenth century, and in the wake of suffering severe persecution themselves, Scottish Presbyterians like Sir James Stewart of Goodtrees and Huguenot clergy like Pierre Jurieu combined militant resistance theory and an Augustinian defence of religious coercion in much the same way as Knox and Beza. Stewart wrote in support of Covenanter rebellion and the Glorious Revolution before becoming Lord Advocate of Scotland and presiding over the trial and execution for blasphemy of the Edinburgh student Thomas Aikenhead in 1697. This conjunction of resistance theory and religious intolerance seemed contradictory to later generations of Protestants who saw ‘civil and religious liberty’ as inseparable twins, but between 1559 and 1700 it was a combination embraced by an impressive roll-call of eminent European Calvinists.

If this was the standard Reformed position, however, we have seen that from Castellio onwards, a minority of Reformed writers rejected the mainstream consensus and argued for far-reaching ideas of liberty of conscience. In the Dutch Revolt and the English Civil Wars, radical reformers seized on the Protestant language of liberty and exploited the liberationist potential of the Exodus story. Agreeing with the Calvinist clergy that God was delivering whole nations from popish slavery, they took a decisive step further. Liberty of conscience was not just for Reformed Protestants with rightly informed consciences – it extended to the heterodox, and (for Roger Williams at least) to ‘the most paganish, Turkish, Jewish or Antichristian consciences and worships’. In the 1640s tolerationists were still regarded as dangerous libertines. Eventually, they would find their place on Geneva’s Reformation Wall.

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3 Davis 1996.
4 Zweig 1936.
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7 Witte 2007, p. 2.
8 Bouswma 1988, p. 50.
12 *Institutes* IV.20.8; Höpfl 1991, pp. 57, 86.
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