Prevention of Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: A Case Study of Turkey

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Leicester

by

Ihsan BAL
BA (PA, Ankara), MA (Leicester)

Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order
University of Leicester

April 1999
Abstract

This study analyses the effects and threats posed by revolutionary and ethnic terrorism to the Turkish democracy and also explores possible solutions to the problem within a framework of democratic pluralism. In doing so, this thesis intends to contribute to general debates on prevention of terrorism in democratic countries as well as to the position of the Kurdish Community in Turkish society.

It first explores these issues by way of a conceptual and structural analysis of terrorism and democracy, playing particular emphasis to the causes of terrorism. The analysis establishes the following hypotheses: that democracies can accommodate the religious, political and ethnic differences which terrorists seek to exploit; that a participative form of democracy has a greater chance of success because the general population would be more willing to contribute and co-operate with anti-terrorist government programs; and that the approach any country takes in response to terrorism will depend, in part, on its own peculiar socio-cultural and economic history.

The thesis then proceeds to examine these hypotheses in the light of the Turkish state’s experience of and dealing with ideological and ethnic-separatist terrorists, in particular the PKK. The author submits that the hard-line and uncompromising approach of the Turkish state to terrorism has been generally unsuccessful. This has been due to its limited understanding of democracy, which has limited democratic participation to all but ruling elite, and its insensitivity towards the reasons and motives behind terrorist actions.

As a result, the thesis offers a new approach -the third way- which takes into account the multi-dimensional nature of terrorism, by stressing participation, co-ordination, co-operation rather than domination, as a means of dealing with the problem. It submits that an anti-terrorist package that has popular backing, which is gradually implemented, and which works in conjunction with social and economic reform, is more likely to be successful in combating terrorism in Turkey, and perhaps, in combating terrorism further afield.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been made possible only with the help and support of a large number of people, only a few of whom can be mentioned here. The first person to thank to is my first supervisor and director of studies, Prof. John Benyon. His enthusiasm and constant support were instrumental in the completion of this thesis.

The next person whom I owe thanks is Dr. Mike Rowe, my second supervisor.

I also acknowledge the constant and immeasurable support of my family, my wife and my three-year old daughter Beyza and most of all my mother.

All of my close friends, especially Sedat Laciner, deserve thanks for their company.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the sponsorship and support of the Police Academy.
CONTENTS

Prevention of Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: A Case Study of Turkey

Abstract
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study 1

Methodology
Limitations of the Survey 13
Plan of the Study 15

CHAPTER II
TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY

Introduction 25

Terrorism 27
Historic Perspective 27
The French Revolution and Its Aftermath 28
What is Terrorism? 37
Terrorism and Anarchism 42
Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare 44

Democracy 54
What is Democracy? 54
Reasons for Setbacks in Democratisation Process and Problem of Maintaining Democracy 58
CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire and Its Legacy to the New Republic of Turkey (1808-1923)

The Emergence of Kemalism in the New Republic of Turkey (1923 - 1938)
  Republicanism
  Nationalism
  Populism
  Revolutionism
  Secularism
  Etatism

Transition to a Multi-Party System

An Examination of Nature of the Turkish Military and Its Role in Politics and Combating with Terrorism

The Effects of the Military in Turkish Politics and Policy-Making Process

Conclusion
## CHAPTER IV

**TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1960 AND THE RISE OF IDEOGICAL-REVELOLITIONARY TERRORISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Socialist Movement in Turkey</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconditions of the Movement</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Constitutional Factors</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Socialist Movement and Its Effect on Political Development in Turkey</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism and the Political Parties in 1960-70s</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Discourses</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Response of the Political Parties</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey After 1983: The Post-Military Period</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Constitution and the New Legal Framework</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özal Period</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER V

**KURDISH COMMUNITY IN TURKEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Origin and History of the Kurds</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments on the Origin of the Kurds</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Current Perception of the Kurdish People</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sociological and Cultural Description of the Kurds</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Demography of the Kurds</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments Behind Kurdish Uprisings in History</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Political Ideologies During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VI
SEPARATIST TERRORISM vs. TURKISH DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF THE PKK

Introduction 218

An Analysis of the PKK 220
A Brief History of the PKK 220
Ideology 232
Structure 240
Strategy and Methodology 243
Internal Violence and Isolation of the PKK over Civilian Killings 252

The Survival of the PKK 261
Foreign Support 261
Drug Trafficking and Extortion Connections 270

The Causes of the PKK Terrorism 273
Why Terrorism? 273
The PKK’s Will to Use Violence 276
The Cost of PKK Terrorism 290

Combating Terrorism within the Framework of Liberal Democracy 291
Is Democracy Necessary? 291
The Main Approaches to Combating PKK Terrorism in Turkey, and the State Policy 295
Policy-Makers’ Attitudes to Terrorism During the 1990s 299

A Third Way 311

Conclusion 315
Postscript 321
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Towards a Solution 324

Two Main Responses to Ideological-Revolutionary and Ethnic-Separatist Terrorism 326

The Turkish Case 329

Revolutionary-Ideological Terrorism vs. Turkish Fledgling Democracy 332
Ethnic-Separatist Terrorism and Turkey's Response 335

A Third Way and Lessons of Turkish Case 339

BIBLIOGRAPHY 347

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Survey for the Region of City Diyarbakir
Appendix 2: Background of the Militants of DHKP-C, Revolutionary Terror Organisation (Age, Education, Occupation, Father's Occupation, Origin and Number of Brothers and Sisters).
Appendix 3: Breakdown of Estimated Kurdish Population
Appendix 4: PKK, Security Forces and Civilian Casualties, 1984-1995
Appendix 5: Map of Turkey and the Conflict Regions between PKK and the Security Forces
Appendix 6: The Diagram of the PKK Administrative Tree
List of Abbreviations

ARGK Artese Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan (*The Liberation of Kurdish Army*).

ANAP Anavatan Partisi (*Motherland Party*).

A.Ü. Ankara Üniversitesi (*The University of Ankara*).

DP Demokrat Parti (*Democrat Party*).

DDKD Revolutionary Eastern Culture Association.

DDKO Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearts.

DYP Dogru Yol Partisi (*True Path Party*).

ERNK Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan (*The Liberation Front of Kurdistan*).

ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna, (*Euskadi and Freedom*), Spain.

FLN Front de Liberation Nationale, (*National Liberation Front*) Algeria.

GAP Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (*Southeastern Anatolian Project*).

HADEP Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (*People’s Democracy Party*).

HEP Halkin Emek Partisi (*People’s Labour Party*).

HRK Hazen Rizgariya Kurdistan (*The Kurdistan Freedom Unit*).

IRA Irish Republican Army, United Kingdom.

KDP Kurdish Democratic Party, Northern Iraq.

JP Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi, AP*).

MER Middle East Report.

MHP National Action Party (*Milliyetci Hareket Partisi*).

MP Millet Partisi (*Nation’s Party*).

MRG Minority Rights Groups.

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NSC  National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu).
NSP  National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP).
NUC  National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi).
OECD Organization of Economic and Cooperation and Development.
PA  Polis Akademisi (Police Academy), Ankara.
PKK Partia Karkare Kurdistan, (Kurdish Workers Party).
PRP Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkası (Progressive Republic Party)
PUK  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Northern Iraq.
RPP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP (Republican People’s Party)
R-IRA Real Irish Republican Army, United Kingdom.
SBF  Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, (The Faculty of Political Science), Ankara.
SHP  Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat Populist Party).
TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey).
TC  Cumhuriyet'i (Republic of Turkey).
TDF  Turkish Democracy Foundation (Turk Demokrasi Vakfı).
TDN  Turkish Daily News, daily, Ankara.
TLP  Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TIP (Turkish Labor Party).
TOBB Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry).
TRT  Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyonları (Turkish Radio Television broadcasting).
UK  United Kingdom.
UPP  The Union and Progress Party (Ittihad ve Terakki Firkası).
USA  United States of America.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this work is to analyse the effects on and threats posed by ideological-revolutionary and ethnic-separatist terrorism to Turkish democracy and to examine the different ways in which they can be countered within a democratic framework. Revolutionary terrorism began in the late 1960s but declined after the military coup in 1980. During these decades, ideological-revolutionaries inspired by the ideologies of Marx and Lenin, and the practical revolutionary strategies of Mao, Che-Guevara, and others, wanted to replace the existing democratic political system in Turkey with a communist state through 'revolutionary warfare'. Their aim and strategy was to destroy the system and to undermine the government’s legitimacy and ability to function. In response, Turkish governments declared martial law and imposed strict security measures to curb such a challenge. On the whole, it was the army that rose to the challenge and stemmed the turmoil created by the terrorists, it appeared that civilian efforts were too limited and too late in combating the subversion (Altug 1989; O’Ballance 1989 and 1996; Dilmaç 1997).

In the wake of the 1980 military coup, an ethnically motivated marxist organisation, the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), emerged with the aim of setting up an independent and
marxist Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey. The organisation has not only aimed to foster a Kurdish ‘ethnicity’, through exploiting the weaknesses of the political system, it also attempted to generate resentment against the government by exploiting inadequate infrastructure, education, housing, social services and economic investments in the region. The Turkish governments have considered this serious challenge primarily a security issue and passed a number of emergency measures and anti-terrorism laws. Although revolutionary terrorism differs from ethnic terrorism in nature, the response of the policy-makers in Turkey has almost been the same in dealing with both problems, adopting what has been described as a either ‘zero sum’ or ‘hard-line’ policy (Barkey and Fuller 1997 and 1998).

It has always been problematic for democratic governments to adopt hard line approaches to combat terrorism, because of issues of human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law, even more so when these are the areas that terrorists have tended to exploit frequently in order to gain national and international recognition and support (Byman 1998; Wilkinson 1986a and 1989; Bal and Aytaç 1998). Governments have to respond to terrorism in order to protect their citizens and to maintain law and order in their societies, but they do so in different ways. Some countries, like Turkey, seem to perceive the matter as simply a contest between the state and the terrorist, an approach which tends to under-estimate the public role in combating terrorism. Some other countries, like Britain in the case of Northern Ireland and Spain in the case of Basque, have sought to persuade as many citizens as possible that terrorism is against their interests and in doing so, they hoped to undermine the support for the terrorist groups.
Those governments that try to counter terrorism by implementing tough security measures, have appeared to ignore the importance of a more liberal democratic approach, which purports to accommodate and satisfy different ethnic, religious, ideological, cultural and socio-economic groups within society. It is important that no single group should be stigmatised as a permanent loser. In other words, in order to achieve overall success in the prevention of terrorism, there needs to be a delicate balance between tough security measures on the one hand, and a more conciliatory approach on the other. Sometimes, it can be difficult to make a clear distinction between the hard-line terrorists and the more moderate large communities who can be, at the same time, exploited by terrorist groups who cast themselves as their natural representatives. Hard-line policies therefore can miss their intended targets and end up counter-productive. This point was made in an editorial in The Times, which stressed the need for continuation of the principles underpinning the Good Friday agreement, even after the Omagh Bombing in Northern Ireland on 16 August 1998:

As each individual story of human tragedy unfolds, the agony of the Omagh bombing intensifies. The evil that lies behind those who executed this outrage demands a security response and should receive one. But what response? The Republican fanatics who constitute the "Real IRA" would willingly see its whole membership put behind bars if that was the price of destroying political reconciliation. The outraged must resist the temptation to press for measures that sound suitably firm but may prove ineffective or even counter-productive in practice. The government must seek to suppress the activities of the terrorists who stand outside the peace process but must do so in a fashion that underpins not undermines the Good Friday agreement (The Times 18 August 1998).

In the wake of the Omagh bombing by the 'Real IRA', the most appropriate and feasible way to deal with terrorism was a widely discussed subject in Britain. The government’s
approach was to isolate the terrorists as much as possible, by passing tough anti-terrorist legislation specifically targeted at small dissident groups, and by selectively tightening security so as not to provoke a backlash in the larger community.

Conventional countermeasures may engender broader support for an insurgency or separatist movements even when they hamstring or defeat a specific terrorist group. Because state's strategies often backfire, an ideal strategy is to compel 'in group' policing - encouraging ethnic moderates through carrots as well as sticks to punish radical activities (Byman 1998: 149).

With its long tradition of democracy and considerable experience in coping with terrorism, the UK government has good prospects of obtaining maximum national and international support for its fight against the 'Real IRA', and minimising support for that group within local communities. This is by virtue of a long process of negotiation and co-opting of significant sections of the terrorist groups and isolating those who remain committed to violence.

Although it is often difficult to draw direct comparisons between different forms of terrorism in different countries, as they emerge and develop within quite different contexts, it is still useful to identify some common ground not only in terms of the methods of terrorist groups but also in the approaches of different democratic governments in seeking to combat terrorism. This is particularly true in the Turkish case, where democracy does not have a very long tradition compared to some other western countries.

Turkish democracy began at the beginning of the twentieth century and developed a
pluralistic character after the first multi-party elections in 1946. Turkish society has been introduced to democracy by a Turkish elite who had travelled to European countries - most notably France - around the turn of the century, and who had witnessed the operation of that system. Subsequent to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the new elite class, including the military, favoured a form of democracy. In their understanding and interpretation, this did not entail popular participation, since they considered the education and the ability of the masses were not up to the required level. Consequently, they imposed a system from the top-downwards. This attitude was continued in the following decades by policy-makers when dealing with socio-political issues, even tough public awareness of democratic values had improved considerably (Karpat 1977 and 1981; Özbudun 1988; Koker 1997; Rustow 1957 and 1991; Dodd 1990; Laçiner 1997). As a natural consequence of this attitude, when serious crises appeared such as terrorism, public consent and opinion were not taken sufficiently into account. Instead inclination towards tough security measures were employed, which culminated in military interventions. In short, it appears that, the benefit of public support for democracy and its capacity to solve the crises has not been fully appreciated or utilised in Turkey.

Another crucial point emphasised in this study, is the scepticism of many Turkish policy-makers who have been often preoccupied with upholding of a notion of unitary state, and with the fear that this could be threatened by minority demands supported by foreign countries. This fear can be traced back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when ethnic and religious minorities were openly accused of conspiring with foreign powers
(Köker 1997; Laçiner 1997). Therefore, many suggestions for radical change in the
country have been treated with suspicion and not properly considered. The inadequate
performances of democracy and suspicion towards change have deterred Turkish
governments from introducing a policy that effectively could respond to terrorist
challenges to the system and its unitary status.

Turkey is a country that has suffered badly from terrorism and understanding the reason
for this may lead to its reduction mainly both in terms of human life and the huge
economic cost which is estimated at 8 billion US dollars annually and over 100 billion
US dollars up to the present time (Kinzer 1999). These has also seen a negative impact on
international relations with neighbouring countries as well as the western democratic
states, as illustrated in Chapters IV and VI. Surprisingly, there has been a noticeable
dearth of scholarly research on terrorism in Turkey. The studies that do exist often do not
focus on maintaining a delicate balance between ‘hard-line’, and ‘soft-line’ approaches.
Many of the Turkish studies take a hard line approach. Turkish authors like Emin Çölasan
Torumtay (1994 and 1997), all argue that the only way to overcome the problem is to
destroy the terrorists. They claim that social, economic or democratic reforms cannot be
implemented without ending terrorism. These authors, however, seriously underestimate
the role of ideological, economic and social factors and the significance of the support of
local communities. They generally imply that those who argue for the necessity of change
are either traitors or utopians.
On the other hand, the romantic-idealists, like Ahmet Altan (1990), Mehmet Altan (1995), Cetin Altan (1967 and 1995), Ismail Besikci (1969 and 1991) and Abdurrahman Dilipak (1996) argue that Turkey can solve the problem of terrorism solely by implementing appropriate social, cultural and democratic reforms. These writers tend to underestimate the importance of developing effective security measures, emphasising the mistakes of the state rather than the wrong-doings of the terrorists.

Nevertheless, there have been some moderate and well-balanced studies. Such authors include Dogu Ergil (1980 and TOBB-1995) Ismet Imset (1992), Kemal Kirisci (1993), Mehmet Ali Birand (1984, 1993 and 1995), Mehmet Barlas (1994), Taha Akyol (1992 and 1995), O. Faruk Gençkaya (1994 and 1996) and Mete Tuncay (1993). Akyol (1992) for example, claims that the negative reaction of the PKK against the democratic reforms, proves the efficiency of democratic improvements within the country. At the same time, he criticises the state for hesitating in their implementation. Similarly, Criss (1995) underlines the causes of the PKK terrorism and the state’s responsibilities in combating terrorism. However, these moderate and balanced studies have had difficulty in persuading others of their ideas due to the rising tension in the country.

Some non-Turkish academics have provided valuable, well-researched studies on the subject. Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages of looking at the problem from outside, it is inevitable that writers who are not members of Turkish society will miss some dimensions. Fuller (1993), Barkey and Fuller (1997 and 1998), Bulloch and Morris (1992) Chaliand (1993 and 1994), do not consider the different development of Turkish
political structure and they examine the terrorism in Turkey as if Turkey is an advanced
democratic country. The most significant contributions by external writers are those by

Moreover, another problem with the existing literature is that most of the studies on
terrorism seem to miss the significant relationship between the dominant ideology of anti­
terrorist policies and the role of ideologies in terrorism. Although there are many authors
who recognise relationship between ideology and terrorism, most of them are seen partial
or ideologically-biased. For example, Ismail Besikci focuses on ideological aspect of the
issue, but he considers himself a supporter of the PKK’s arguments, as can be seen in his
Kürtlər’ın Zorunlu Iskani (1991). Likewise, Kemal Burkay sees the problem as a clash
between the state ideology and the Kurdish people (1992), as a radical communist, he
avoids analysing the motives behind state attitudes, he simply assumes that the system in
Turkey is authoritarian and that wrong policies in such a political order are only to be
expected. There are also some others who present themselves, as supporters of the
dominant ideology, Kemalism, like Emin Çölaşan (1995a, 1995b and 1995c), Fatih
Altayli (1992), Fatih Çekirge (1992), Nevzat Bolugiray (1992) can be included in this
camp.

Studies of this subject have mainly focused on individual cases instead of viewing
terrorism in Turkey holistically. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand (1992), Ahmet Aydin
(1992) and Nevzat Bolugiray (1992) focus solely on PKK terrorism, without referring to wider experiences, and use this limited view to make general conclusions about terrorism in Turkey. Inevitably this results in missing similarities and the differences between varieties of terrorism, and the responses of the state to terrorism at different times. As a result, it can be said that there is no comprehensive study, which covers the whole picture. Two main dimensions have not been appreciated: first, the relationship between state ideology, terrorism and the states’ response to terrorism in Turkey; second, the similarities and differences between various terrorist movements during the Republican era.

This thesis aims to draw upon the perspectives contained in the studies mentioned above. This approach, as can be seen in the Plan of the Study below, assumes that the role of dominant state ideology and, therefore the perception of ruling class towards terrorism, are crucial factors in understanding the situation in Turkey. The thesis argues that the state has taken only a narrow view and has failed to address the reasons behind terrorism. Also, this thesis draws upon the history of many forms of terrorism in Turkey because it is impossible to understand the causes of state policies without establishing a general picture.

As will be detailed in the Plan of the Study section below, the main objective of this research is to offer alternative solutions in the prevention of terrorism by emphasising the necessity for an appropriate balance between tough security measures and consistent with a liberal democracy. It also considers whether this approach is feasible in combating
terrorism in Turkey, as the hard security measures have not achieved lasting success so far despite the heavy costs in terms of finance, democracy and international standing of the country.

Moreover, the present study aims to contribute to a general understanding of the reasons for terrorism, and to provide a theoretical framework in which the problem can be understood and cured. The thesis mainly makes use of the Turkish experience of terrorism to do this. Nevertheless it establishes same common features of terrorism in general; one of the main assumptions in this thesis is that the unique, historical, and social conditions, which are peculiar to countries dealing with terrorism, are crucial in determining the attitudes of terrorists and the state. Therefore, this study tries to find the connections between the dominant ideology of state, the historical evolution of the political system and the forms of terrorism. General problems of Turkish democracy, which are not directly related to terrorism in Turkey, fall outside of this study.

Methodology

The thesis undertakes an evaluation and discussion of terrorism and democracy. The Turkish experience of terrorism and democracy is analysed to shed more light on possible approaches to prevention. The perception and application of democracy by the elite, ruling class and the military and their effects upon state policy to prevent terrorism are also considered. In addition, the function and the role of political parties, particularly the Turkish Labour Party, are briefly examined. Another significant issue analysed in this
study is socialism in Turkey, as this is closely connected with the dominant ideology of revolutionary terrorism, and also with the PKK. In order to observe the relationship between the PKK's ideological claims in its manifesto and the political preference of the Kurdish community, the ethnic, cultural and historical background is assessed with particular reference to Kurdish political attitudes towards the state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In undertaking the research it has been necessary to examine secondary sources and information relating to terrorist activities since the 1960s in Turkey. Secondary information for the thesis, which has contributed to the theoretical basis and discussions, was gathered in England as well in Turkey. Publications in English were mainly gathered from libraries in the UK; particularly the libraries of the University of Leicester, the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, King's College, London, London School of Economics, Warwick University and London University. The study of the development of democracy and terrorism in Turkey has benefited from literature available in Turkish and collected from institutions such as the General Directorate of Police Staff, the Supreme Governor's Office and Archives, Archives of the Police Headquarter in Ankara and Diyarbakir, Archives of the Police Academy, Ankara, the National Library, Ankara, the archives and library of SBF (the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University), and the Library of the Bilkent University, Ankara.

As this study is concerned with a contemporary issue, which is still one of the top items on the government's agenda, it has been important to analyse first-hand information. In
order to understand the organisation’s views, primary sources and information including publications of the PKK, have been taken into account. During field research, the author has endeavoured to see the case from different perspectives and as objectively as possible in order to understand the various dimensions of the problem.

Although this study is mainly a theoretical-based research, some empirical research processes have been applied to ensure the reliability and the validity of the possible findings. In order to understand terrorism and produce feasible recommendations about possible solutions to the problem, some empirical data gathering methods, such as observation, interviews, surveys and analysis of various private security documents held by the Supreme Governor of the City of Diyarbakir and the anti-terror department of Ankara, or as Wolcott (1992) puts it, watching, asking and examining, have been employed. This research has also used an array of publications, ranging from books, articles, journals, and official data in order to develop a deeper appreciation of the nature and history of terrorism in general, as well as in Turkey. The data collection and analysis methods employed this study, now, will be elucidated in detail.

First, both subdivisions of observation technique, participant and non-participant observation in the south-east of Turkey, were used in this study. During observations, notes of the events and details were kept by the researcher to be used for further analysis. The aim of the observations was to find good moments that reveal the unique complexity of the cases.
Second, interviews have been employed as another useful data collection method throughout this study. The aim of the interviewing was to fill the gap within the analysis, and the results are meant to complete and ensure the full picture of the cases. As one of the major data collection methods in social sciences, interviewing can be seen mainly in three forms: unstructured, structured and non-structured interviews (Mishler 1986). In this study, semi-structured interviewing was preferred that the questions are typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic order, allowing the interviewers sufficient freedom to go into more detail. In this way, the interviewer is expected to explore far beyond the answers to their standardised questions. This type of interviewing represents a compromise between structured and unstructured formats, avoiding the shortfalls of both: being either too rigid or too flexible for the interview framework: ‘overall, the semi-structured interview should maintain a balance between a free-flowing and a directed conversation’ (Lee 1998:62).

Third, a questionnaire survey was issued in the region of Diyarbakir of south-east Turkey and completed by 154 local people. Finally, the analysis of the documents made available to the researcher by the Supreme Governor Archive of Diyarbakir was another instrumental source.

Limitations of the Survey

Field research undertaken for this study consisted of a survey, interviews with key figures, participant observations in the south-east of Turkey, and the analysis of the
documents made available to the researcher by the Supreme Governor Archive of Diyarbakir. All the information gathered has been evaluated to try to understand the reasons behind PKK violence, including economic, ethnic, cultural matters and foreign support. It is also worth noting that another important conclusion drawn from these data is the terrorists' persistent belief in the effective use of violence in reaching their goals.

An important part of the fieldwork was a survey conducted in the region of Diyarbakir, a city that was chosen for its reputation as a highly politicised, centre of Kurdish national consciousness. In the preparation and conduct of the survey some difficulties were encountered. First, it was dealing with delicate and sensitive issues for all those involved in and affected by terrorism. To reduce refusals and the anxieties of those questioned, complete anonymity had to be guaranteed. Another problem was the level of education and knowledge of the local inhabitants. Questions were put in a simple form as far as possible and some were included to elicit a better understanding of some points in other questions. Respondents were chosen in order that the final sample represented every socio-economic and political group. It was also important to try to avoid various misunderstandings and attempt to provide objective and reliable data.

Some interviews which were carried out have not been used in their entirety for ethical and security reasons, for example when the interviewee was a captured terrorist or a member of the intelligence service. However, what was said in confidence has been carefully evaluated to help with the overall view. The results of such interviews have been used in appropriate parts of the research, but without enabling identification of the
interviewee. This avoids harming the individuals and breaching state secrecy and security.

Moreover, the documents and files (Security Documents and Reports) gathered from the government departments and Police Archives were used in the thesis with the reference numbers as categorised by each institutions, like ‘EGMA/TMDB…’, ‘OHBV/GÖV…’ or ‘If. Tu./D/1993…’. All these sources can be found under the titles of ‘Olaganüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği Arsivleri ve PKK Örgüt Yayınları’ and ‘PKK Terör Örgütü Mensupları Ifade Tutanakları’ in the Bibliography section. In brief, the study has endeavoured to be inclusive covering both government and opposition perspectives as well as those expressed by different communities, academics and researchers.

To sum up, a mainly theoretical approach for this study was preferred and secondary information sources were utilised. Also, some data collection methods and the analyses of the data were to be used to ensure the reliability and the accuracy of the findings. The reason for such an allocation of the research methodologies was the limitations encountered, as explained above.

**Plan of the Study**

As noted earlier, prevention of terrorism in liberal democracies is a delicate and difficult task. Arguably terrorist organisations have a better chance of operating in a free society than in totalitarian or closed societies. However, it is also suggested that democratic societies have a better chance of coping with such problems, as long as they canvass for public consent and support for their policies. This study concerns the prevention of
terrorism in a democratic society and it is essential to offer some kind of agreed definition of these phenomena and to understand them in order to provide the basis for further argument and discussion. Chapters II and III, outline a conceptual framework, historical and theoretical background, and the main assumptions and hypothesis which will be used in this thesis. The main assumptions are: i) terrorism exploits the differences between political, religious and ethnic groups within societies; ii) the nature of open societies make it easier for terrorists to operate; iii) nevertheless democratic regimes are better able to produce effective solutions against terrorism; iv) each country has particular social, economic and political features and problems; v) finally Turkey's anti-terrorist policies have shown a remarkable continuity despite the dramatic changes within the social, economic and political structure of the country.

The second part of the thesis focuses on particular forms of terrorism, namely political violence of ideological revolutionaries and ethnic separatist as two case studies in Turkey. These chapters examine the general assumptions and arguments and aim to draw some general conclusions.

The thesis consists of seven chapters. Having established the purpose, methodology and plan of the study in Chapter I, Chapter II attempts to resolve ambiguities about terrorism and democracy in general, to enable a more informed consideration of the situation in Turkey. The first part of Chapter II examines examples of terrorism in an historical context. In doing so, the views of different parties, notably academics, historians, governments as well as the terrorists themselves, are taken into account. In this respect,
the study discusses the issue of terrorism from an historical perspective as well as from a contemporary one, so as to develop a better understanding of the nature of the issue. Chapter II also seeks to differentiate terrorism from other kinds of political and non-political violence, in particular the differences between terrorism, guerrilla-warfare and anarchism are analysed, which is necessary since it seems these three phenomena are sometimes confused.

Chapter II also focuses on the essential elements of democracy, as it seems to have different meanings ascribed to it, depending on the nature of the society, time and place. In addition this discussion throws some light upon some sub-issues within the democratic context, such as the negative effects of terrorism in democratic societies; the role of the military in combating terrorism; social discourse of violence; the capacity of a democratic system to overcome such problems; and the maintenance of democracy in developing societies.

Chapter III focuses on the development of democracy in Turkey. Neither the causes of terrorism in Turkey nor the precautions implemented by the state can be understood without an appreciation of the historical evolution of Turkish democratic life. The present Turkish state and its democratic values and institutions, have been shaped by fears of internal and external enemies and these fears can be traced back to the late Ottoman period and to a misinterpretation of Kemalist ideology. As will be argued in Chapter IV and VI, revolutionary and separatist terrorist organisations have exploited the historic structural weakness of Turkish democracy. It is important, therefore, to explore the main
principles underpinning Turkish democracy and the roots of the present fears and anxieties that determine the Turkish State’s attitude towards terrorism.

Chapter III considers the democratic experience in Turkey from the last years of the Ottoman Empire, which finally ended in 1923 when the new Republic of Turkey was established. This was led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who introduced a system of government, which later came to be called Kemalism. During his tenure, and particularly following his death in 1938, some of the new Turkish leaders - hiding under the ‘mask’ of Kemalism - used the rise of Fascism in Germany, Italy and Spain, and the excesses of Stalin in Russia, to justify their re-interpretation of Atatürk’s model of government. At his death, Atatürk was a national hero and his successors were able to use the notion of Kemalism to introduce a more authoritarian system of government which only loosely reflected the political ideology of Atatürk himself.

During the 1950s, a more pluralistic system of government evolved in Turkey. This was a result of internal pressures from the Turkish population and from international demands for Turkey to have greater transparency in government. The post-war international climate provided the stimulus, in Turkish case, for a systematic introduction of democracy. Ever since its conception, policy-makers in Turkey followed a policy of Westernisation according to which they hoped to reorganise their society and their relations with the outside world (Eralp 1993: 26).

In this framework, Chapter III also examines a number of inter-related issues about
Turkish democracy. First, it considers the introduction of western political ideas and how these were interpreted by Turkish society. It then considers the socio-political environment historically, and examines how western values were introduced, and, importantly, how they influenced the attitudes of the elite and ruling class in their introduction of these new political thoughts and processes.

Second, it analyses how the official ideology of Kemalism was interpreted and introduced in the new Republic of Turkey by those in a position of influence, and how selective - sometimes cynical - interpretations of its principles shaped Turkish socio-political life and political accommodation. Third, the study examines the use and understanding of Kemalism in the multi-party era between 1946 and 1960. Fourth, it addresses the effects and status of the military in Turkish political life and examines military interventions as well as the Army's role in safeguarding the Republic and Kemalist philosophy, which have had much to do with combating the need for, and suppressing incidences of terrorism.

In undertaking this brief assessment of the history of Turkish socio-political change, Chapter III considers the meaning and concept of democracy in Turkey as defined in the previous chapter. It seems that the development of Turkish democracy relied on the efforts of the elite and ruling class rather than public support. It seems that these groups had their own understanding of democracy and were intent on excluding the general population. This understanding also seems to have affected the policy-making process in Turkey in dealing with social turmoil, in particular, in combating terrorism. As a result,
co-operation between the rulers and the general public has not reached the satisfactory level one might expect in a developed liberal democracy. Consequently, public support and consent seems to have been largely ignored by the policy-makers in their efforts to overcome problems, such as terrorism, when it should have been central to their policies. This chapter also studies how this perception of democracy was established in the minds of the Turkish policy-makers, which lays the foundation for further arguments arising from experience of the Turkish reaction to revolutionary and ethnic terrorism.

Chapter IV presents a summary of the failure of Turkish attempts to overcome revolutionary terrorism within the confines of a more liberal democratic approach, and it considers why the military decided to take-over civilians’ responsibilities in dealing with terrorism. In this chapter, the main focus is on the revolutionary terrorist groups and their behaviour in particular it examines why the groups of extreme left resorted to violence, and the ways in which the government responded and the effects this had upon Turkish democratic life. This section also evaluates how far the delicate balance between radical hard-line approaches and more liberal democratic approaches have been achieved by Turkish policy-makers.

In order to answer these questions, it has been necessary to examine a number of parallel issues which were crucial to developments in Turkey. First, consideration has been given to the socio-economic conditions and to the legal and constitutional framework which fuelled opposition against the official ideology of the state at a time when socialism was being introduced. Second, the contrast between the use by some groups of accepted
channels of democracy, and the terror tactics of others to achieve similar goals, is discussed. The study also examines the resilience of Turkish democracy when faced with the threat of terrorism, and the ability and capacity of the government of the day, and of the political parties, to overcome the objections and resolve of the terrorist splinter groups. Finally Chapter IV assesses why the government of Turkey failed to deal with terrorism and had to seek the support of the military to overcome the crises which had begun to threaten its fledgling democracy.

Chapter V examines the ‘Kurdish issue’ from its early days up to the present time. The ‘Kurdish question’, or the ‘south-east Anatolian issue,’ as it is widely known in Turkey, has been a phenomenon of major significance since the late 1960s. The roots of the problem in the south-east of Turkey go back at least to the nineteenth century when it was known as the ‘Eastern issue’. Both the area, and the issue itself, have developed and changed in many ways throughout this period, in terms of the people, the geography, the political thoughts of the region’s intellectuals, and in terms of the parties who have been involved both nationally and internationally. In order to analyse and understand the essence of the currant present-day political debate concerning Kurdish issues and the PKK, this Chapter examines the histories of Kurdish groups within Turkey. As Kendal has argued ‘The present situation of the Kurdish people can only be understood in its historical context, notably in the light of the events of the last hundred years’ (Kendal 1980: 19). An understanding of the issues involved in the Kurdish question, particularly from an historical perspective, enables the study to develop an alternative analysis of present day terrorist activity, of Turkish democracy and points to the ways in which such
terrorism might be countered.

In addition, Chapter V focuses on the reasons and motivations behind Kurdish tribal uprisings, and the development of political ideas within the Kurdish community. It examines, throughout twentieth century, the role of the traditionalists and conservatives on one side and the socialists and Marxists on the other. This review contributes to an understanding of the differences and similarities of political, social, cultural, religious and economic demands raised by the Kurdish community throughout history. Another important feature that is examined the demography of the Kurds, because, as will be seen in Chapters V and VI, those living in different areas of Turkey have different attitudes toward terrorism and towards the policies of the state. The ethnic, cultural and religious composition of the Kurds in Turkey are also clarified, in order to have a better understanding of the level of support offered to the present-day PKK.

Chapter VI is based on the author’s research in south-east Turkey, where the PKK have been active, particularly in City of Diyarbakir. It also examines suggested measures and possible responses to the problem. In order to obtain a comprehensive analysis of terrorist activities of such ethnic organisations, it is necessary to take into account their historical background, ideology, structure, strategy and methodology. Within the framework of the analysis of terrorism, particularly by the PKK, it is also important to assess the motives behind the violence and bloodshed, and the heavy consequences of such activity on both the terrorists and the state itself.
Alternatives to terrorist activities within a democratic framework in Turkey are presented in the light of the author’s observation and assessment of the PKK and their activities. Although influenced by the models presented by various researchers, the author develops his own alternative solution, named ‘the third way’. The investigation helps to highlight similarities and differences between present PKK claims, their actions and strategies and the Turkish government’s attitude to the problem. The separatist movement in Turkey has become an international, as well as a national issue, in that it not only threatens democratic life internally but also externally in its possible accession to the EU, and her international relations with the Middle East and with the Balkan states (Gunter 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1997). The reactive and hard-line approaches pursued by governments are usually justified on grounds of national security, therefore the army and the police should be left to do the job’. Other anti-terrorist policies adopted by the Turkish government, that have targeted economic investment and education, have failed to curtail revolutionary terrorism, especially between 1970-1980, and resulted in a military coup in 1980. This thesis maintains that the roots of these failures can be traced to mistiming, to the misinterpretation of the nature of terrorist the challenges, to a lack of commitment and to the blind eye cast in public participation in defeating terrorism.

Given the failure of these strategies, Chapter VII summarises my findings and offers conclusions. Chapter VII especially aims to show the connections between the anti-terrorist policies and the perception of the ruling class towards democracy and terrorism. It also summarises the findings about the feasibility of combating terrorism in a liberal democracy.
To summarise, it is clear that a new basis for action is required, and this thesis aims to provide a starting point for the development of a new approach, that would be efficient and well-suited for Turkey. The problem of terrorism is often described as intractable, and there is thus a natural tendency to despair at solutions and to implement policies which limits terrorist activities to 'manage the problem'. However, it is possible to develop new policies and approaches which bring opposing sides together and enable a dialogue to occur. Of course, such a development requires a context within which progress can be made. This thesis seeks to examine the Turkish case and concludes by suggesting an approach, which might lead to some progress with the terrorism problem that has affected that country.
CHAPTER II

TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY

Introduction

Terrorism may be a widely discussed issue but is also one of the least understood (Laqueur 1978). Similarly, in the case of democracy, there is no agreed definition for it and indeed attempts to agree one have been resisted from all sides (Orwell 1957). Since this research concerns the prevention of terrorism in a democratic society, it is necessary to offer some kind of definition or understanding of these two terms, in order to undertake a meaningful study. Thus, it is important to identify and clarify the concepts of terrorism and democracy to facilitate discussion of how one may affect the other.

This chapter examines the concept of terrorism. In doing this, it takes into account the views of a number of different parties, such as academics, historians, governments and also terrorists themselves. The issue of terrorism is considered from an historical perspective but the chapter also draws on recent and contemporary political experiences. In this way it should be possible to develop a deeper understanding of the causes of the problem and hence to make suggestions about the prevention of terrorism. The chapter differentiates terrorism from other kinds of political and non-political violence, and examines the justifications for it. The question of whether terrorism is a weapon of the weak or a new form of warfare is another issue addressed. In order to appreciate the
causes of terrorism it is also important to consider the perpetrators’ arguments in justification for their actions, especially when such acts occur within democratic societies.

The second part of the chapter focuses on central issues and controversies in democracies. The term ‘democracy’ also has different meanings in different societies, times and places and for different people and groups in the same society. The chapter examines the success or failure of democracies when facing severe tests from social conflicts, particularly in terms of the breakdown of law and order, and also the terrorist threat to democratic governments and institutions. In the case of developing democracies, the thesis considers arguments about the capacity of democratic system to overcome such problems, as well as how democratic values and institutions maybe maintained. As Turan (1977) pointed out, the nature of issues which cause political conflict is an important factor in shaping and developing a political system. This chapter also examines the role of the army in combating terrorism. It is assumed that in a democracy contentious issues are negotiable, and can be bargained over, and compromises can be reached, so no single group is a permanent loser. However, what constitutes a non-negotiable issue varies from one society to another, but also varies within a society between different groups and many change over time. This chapter also discusses different responses to violence and social discontent, from perspective of differences in understanding of democratic values between strong, well-established democratic systems and the weaker so-called fledgling democracies. Finally, the chapter outlines and discusses whether terrorism can be justified in democratic societies under any circumstances.
Terrorism

Historic Perspective

Terrorism is an ever-changing subject bound up in complex meanings. The assassination of kings or rulers in olden times can be thought of as a simple historical precedent to the more complex terrorism which has developed over the last two centuries. Today, with the involvement of many interest groups, ideologies, religions and minority issues, in particular those affecting ethnic minorities, it can threaten the actual existence of political systems and states. Arguably, terrorism can be best understood by studying historical and contemporary experiences and analysing the particular contest and circumstances in which it occurs. Historically, the word 'terrorism' was first used during the French Revolution (Laqueur 1978 and 1987), which ironically is seen by many as the beginning of modern-day democracies. This paradox makes it worthwhile to examine the political perspectives of both sides of the Revolution in France. A brief historical examination of terrorism will show the impact of the French Revolution on subsequent terrorism, and how actions have been justified through history, as well as the changing methods, tactics and nature of terrorism. Finally, the question, 'is terrorism really the struggle of the weak?' will be addressed.

As indicated in the previous paragraph, the use of the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' is of relatively recent origin. The 1798 supplement of the dictionary of the Academia Francaise indicated the meaning of terrorism as 'regime de la terreur', literally 'a regime
of terror' (Laqueur 1978: 6). Historically, there have been many incidents which have had similarities with terrorism as it is understood today. Obvious historical examples include the assassination of Julius Caesar, the rebellion of the Jewish community in AD 66 against their kings whose rule, they claimed, was illegitimate because their laws were against the principles of the holy sacrament, the 11th century assassins belonging to the Ismaili Muslims, whose terror was directed against the Sunni Muslim leadership; and Hereward the Wake in England who was in conflict with the Norman rulers (Friedlander 1977 and 1982). These are examples of historic cases in which some element of 'terrorism' was used to promote the political, religious or nationalist views of groups of people against what they believed to be tyrannical ruling regimes.

As a phenomenon, terrorism has been in a gradual but constant process of change. For instance, the French Revolution of 1789 was based on a belief in individual rights of equality, and rights of free expression in response to coercive monarchs. However, what appeared to be good and civilised demands by groups did not always lead to peaceful protest. Individual groups have sought new rights in accordance with their ideology, so such demands have been made through both peaceful dialogue and threatened and actual physical violence.

The French Revolution and Its Aftermath

Terrorism, as it is now understood, was used by the post-Revolution Jacobin dictatorship as an instrument of political oppression, originating from the ruling class rather than from
individual subject groups. The Jacobin upper-middle class took part in the French Revolution of 1789, and took the lead in 1791 remaining in power between 1791-1794, with the period being known as the Jacobin Republic (Furet 1992: 101). Laqueur (1978: 6) suggested that the Jacobins were the first to use the term ‘terrorism’ in a positive sense when they corresponded with each other. The general perception amongst the instigators of the French Revolution seems to have been that terrorism was a justified weapon for overthrowing a corrupt privileged regime in order to introduce the new political ideas of ‘Liberte’, ‘Egalite’, ‘Fraternite’, as there was no other alternative. This approach encouraged the Jacobins to take brutal measures against their opposition, which in turn prompted the use of forms of terrorism against the Jacobins, given that the concept of ‘terrorism’ was generally unacknowledged in those days. It did not take long to recognise the coercive, ruthless features of terrorism. Not so long after the Revolution in France, the British philosopher Edmund Burke (1796) wrote about ‘thousands of those hell hounds called terrorists’ who were let loose on the people (Laqueur 1987: 11).

As stated earlier, the French Revolution has an ironic dual meaning for students of politics. It is often regarded as a key event in the development of liberalisation and democracy, yet it also entailed the use of terrorism as a political method. Many terrorist organisations have subsequently justified their violence by arguing that they are a subject to violence in the first place from the ruling body. It is thus important to examine the reasons why Jacobins used terrorism in order to promote their political objectives. Although some other groups used similar methods, after the French revolution, ‘the term Jacobinism has been used to denote any revolutionary movement or political attitude
which is determined to impose its aims at whatever cost, in the conviction that the end justifies the means, and that the people, being ignorant, must be compelled towards the aims of revolution and cannot be expected willingly to adopt them' (Scruton 1996:277).

It should be noted that the reasons why the Jacobins used terrorism as a repressive measure remain a controversial point for many academics and historians. Edmund Burke suggested that because the Revolution in France happened so quickly the society was not ready for profound changes such as social equality, representative government, or the effects of the devaluation of governmental authority (Mosher 1991: 391-397). In his work, Mosher (1991: 394-399) discussed Burke's theory about the Revolution in France, claiming that if it was a more evolutionary process rather than one of such rapid change, there would not have been civil disobedience and an outcome of terror. Burke's theory regarding civil disobedience and rapid change in the political structure of a society appears to be valid for various other countries, including the Republic of Turkey, where many radical political changes took place after 1923. These issues will be addressed further later in Chapter III.

Sutherland (1985: 204-205) took a different perspective and suggested that the economic crisis which took hold during the Revolution caused many of the subsequent problems, because the Jacobins, were not as politically or economically skilful as their predecessors the aristocrats, some business people, and the religious elite. He pointed out that by the Spring of 1793, through organising the Committee of Public Safety, leading representatives of the country created a new category of economic crime directed at those
demanding high wages, because of the drastic increase in the price of commodities. This committee also took whatever the measures they believed necessary for public safety, in actual fact to strengthen and establish the new regime regardless of public consent (Sutherland 1994: 101-103). The imposition of heavy punishments did not have the desired effect, and this failure led to fewer reasons and incentives to obey the law because of a general feeling that the law was nothing but an illusion. Sutherland’s argument is a good reminder that governments should seek public consent in order to ensure widespread support for their legislation and thereby avoid civil disobedience and disregard for the rule of law.

Probably one of the most significant and unfortunate statements about Jacobin terrorism appeared in Robespierre’s writings. While defending the Jacobin terror, Robespierre stated that it was ‘circumstantial, and because of internal and external threats to the revolution, a dangerous situation of potential anarchy and economic crisis had arisen. He argued that there was a need to make sure that the authorities maintained order, so as to be able to solve many initial difficulties brought about by the revolution’ (Mosher 1991: 393). Robespierre, analysing the French Revolution, may have needed to give some alternative justification for the use of terrorism, but the majority of modern-day academics do not agree with the brutal outcome of terrorist suppression of any government or group. It can be argued that if any approach justifies the use of terrorism it would also enables other groups to justify their own violence.

The reign of terror of the Jacobins continued during the era of the Thermidor, from July
1794 to 1799. This period also witnessed the growth of extreme forms of terrorism - despite the fact that it was intended by the new authority to put an end to terror (Furet 1992: 152-153). When an authority permits or justifies violent actions against opponents, as did the Jacobins, other dissatisfied individuals or groups in society may respond in a similar manner. The experience of the French Revolution indicates that once rulers use violence as a matter of policy individual political or terrorist groups can more easily justify their own use of violence.

The revolutionary activities soon spread from France to other European countries, where various individuals and groups adopted similar strategies in order to achieve their own political objectives. These groups introduced new tactics into the terrorist agenda and from this were born modern terrorism (Wardlaw 1989). The legitimacy of terrorism in democratic society, will be discussed later but it is worth mentioning one or two historical cases of terrorism. In the early nineteenth century, Philipe Buonarotti and Auguste Blanqui, who advocated sudden sporadic insurrection to overthrow regimes, were among these activists. Their ideas of terrorist activity were rather less complicated than those witnessed today, generally involving barricades and street fighting (Alexander 1977; Laqueur 1987).

An important ideological statement of early terrorism, was Der Mord by Karl Heinzen published in 1849 in Germany. His interpretation of terrorism was as follows:

If to kill is always a crime, then it is forbidden equally to all; if it is not crime, then it is permitted equally to all. We do not desire any killing, any murder, but if our enemies are not of the same mind, if they can justify murder, even
going so far as to claim a special privilege in the matter, the necessity compels us to challenge this privilege; and it is no great step from this necessity to becoming Robespierre and to the adoption of Robespierre's role, condemning hundreds of thousands to the scaffold in the interest of humanity (Heinzen 1849: 54-55).

Once any kind of justification permits the use of terrorism no matter how circumstantial (as argued for the case of French Revolution), then opposing groups may use the same arguments to use terrorism for their political opposition, as illustrated by Heinzen in Der Mord. The Russian ideologist Mikhail Bakunin is considered by George Woodcock (1975) as the father of anarchism and was also identified by Laqueur (1979) as one of the most prominent ideologues of terrorism. He stated:

... the present generation must in its turn produce an inexorable brute force and relentlessly tread the path of destruction. The healthy, uncorrupted mind of the youth must grasp the fact that it is considerably more human to stop and strangle dozens, nay than hundreds, of hated beings that to join with them to share in systematic legal act of murder, in the torture and martyrdom of millions of peasants (Bakunin 1869: 67-68).

The ruthless nature of terrorism developed throughout the 19th century. The ideas of Heinzen and Bakunin were opposed by many of their radical contemporaries, including Marx and Engels, as being highly destructive and coercive and not applicable to revolution (Bal and Aytaç 1997).

It is not only the theory and effects of terrorism that were discussed by early revolutionaries, but also the terrorists themselves were guided by these ideologues. For instance, in 1869 Sergey Nechaev, suggested principles by which the revolutionary must be guided, in his article known as 'Catechism of Revolutionists':
The revolutionary is a doomed man ... He is an implacable enemy of this world, and if he continues to live in it, that is only to destroy it more effectively ... The revolutionary despises all doctrinaires and has rejected the mundane science ... The revolutionary is a dedicated man ... hard towards himself ... no place for any romanticism, any sentimentality, rapture, or enthusiasms (Nechaev 1869: 68-70).

In the nineteenth century there was another effective terrorist movement called Narodnaya Volya, which operated in Russia. The Narodnaya Volya group carried out its terrorist attacks on rather selective targets, mainly on the Tsarist authorities (Wardlaw 1989). This policy of selective targets gave some degree of legitimacy to the Narodnaya group, unlike the indiscriminate killings of their counterparts. Subsequently, acts of terrorism were not confined to the countries where revolutionary figureheads lived, such as Russia, Italy and Germany. It was also practised throughout the British Empire, most notably in Ireland and India, and at the turn of the century by Croats against Serbs, Armenians against Ottomans, and Algerians against their French rulers.

The twentieth century experienced the movement of revolutionary guerrillas from rural to urban environments. One of the main reasons for this development was the increasingly sparse rural population resulting from urbanisation. Alongside this, there has been an increasing presence in many metropolitan areas of an articulate cadre of students and intellectuals willing to embrace terrorism. The availability of targets, funds, intelligence, medical supplies and food within urban areas, and the anonymity that an urban area can provide compared to a rural area, also encouraged the spread of terrorism in cities and towns (Miller and Russell 1979).
In these ways terrorism has become a more complex national and international phenomenon than was the case in earlier times. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, no one questioned where anarchists and revolutionaries were getting their finance, because terrorists were generally poor and there was no secret about their funding (Altug 1989). On the other hand, terrorism in the twentieth century developed beyond simple political aspirations and terrorist groups include political parties, interest groups, and huge sums of money are involved. Some groups have been supported by foreign states and so terrorism has become a new method of waging war between states. This development in the use of terrorism became apparent in the 1930s after the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia by a paid assassin in 1934:

Are they Croats, or Czechs or Germans, or perhaps Hungarians? Everything about them is wrong - with the exception of their money and their arms. Where did the money come from, how were these poor persecuted Croats able to pay for expensive journeys through many countries? Who has armed and financed them, who has provided their false passports? In short, who has commissioned them? (Milicevic 1959:44).

Despite their different aims and ideologies, various terrorist groups, many of whom have been used and manipulated by other countries willing to support terrorist tactics to promote their own political goals. In Turkey, for example, the separatist PKK have been supported by the governments of a number of countries, particularly Syria and Greece, while the revolutionary communist groups, such as Revolutionary Youth and Revolutionary Path, were funded by Russia in the 1970s (Imset 1992). This is discussed further in Chapters IV and V. This policy undermines terrorists' claims to represent the weak and the oppressed, and erodes the supposed legitimacy of their struggle against
governments. Such groups are perceived by many as the puppets of external powers rather than genuinely representing the struggle and interest of any particular group within their own country.

This brief summary of the origins and development of terrorism indicates that it has a lengthy history. Recorded data show that terrorism was often associated with conflict between different nationalities, for instance between the Saxons and Norman's. Acts of terrorism were also practised in the name of religion, such as in the case of the Ismaili Assassins and Jews. However, the terrorism that this study is concerned with is modern-day terrorism, which it is widely accepted developed from the French Revolution, when political transformation involved acts of violence against differing social classes and established authorities. Modern-day terrorism continues to revolve around the concepts of nationality, race, religion and social class. The focus of activity has tended to move from rural areas to towns and cities, especially during the past two decades, and much terrorism has become international. The technological developments in weapons and communication have enabled terrorists to commit acts of terror throughout the world. The international dimension and dependency on foreign support has weakened terrorists' claim to represent weak's struggle against tyranny. In some cases it has almost become a new way of war between opposing states, which makes it difficult to accept terrorism as a weapon of the weak. Last but not least, Robespierre's justification probably contributed more to the development of terrorism than any other single statement, by defending and justifying the use of terrorism by the state itself. Any authority attempting to justify the use of violence outside the framework of the rule of law would be unacceptable in terms
of democratic and liberal values and provides justification for minority groups to use similar methods in pursuit of their own claims.

What is Terrorism?

Existing literature suggests that there is little consensus on the definition of terrorism amongst the parties involved (McLean 1996: 492; Jenkins 1975: 13 and 1981). However, it is necessary in this study to identify some kind of agreement amongst the different parties, to examine the differences between them, to categorise terrorism and political violence, and to further analyse what distinguishes political terrorism from other crimes, guerrilla action, conventional war and anarchism. As Thackrach (1989: 25) wrote: 'the question of the definition of terrorism is central to an understanding of the phenomenon and to the success of any rational measures directed against it'. There is some consensus among scholars that political violence covers all collective organised attacks against a regime, and that the perpetrators of such acts may include competing political groups and also incumbent governments. Terrorism is thus a form of political violence.

Any definitive statement regarding the nature of terrorism must come from extensive consideration of all aspects and viewpoints.

The main problem that a truncated object of study creates for the researcher is that it precludes the possibility of comparative analysis. It blinds the researcher to possible similarities across context, as well as to significant factors which differentiates the use of terrorism in one context from its use in another (Crelinsten 1989: 4).

Terrorism itself as a phenomenon is no more difficult to define than other political
concepts, but the meaning of terrorism may vary under different circumstances. For example, the concept of 'terror' when discussed in the domain of international policy escapes from definition (Thackrach 1989:24).

According to Pasquino (1987) terrorism consists of a series of acts intended to spread intimidation, panic, and destruction in a particular population. Individuals or groups either opposing a state or acting on its behalf can carry out these acts. The amount of violence is often disproportionate, sometimes apparently random, and often deliberately symbolic. The intention is to hit targets which will convey a message to the rest of the population (Pasquino 1987: 240-41). This definition helps us to understand the nature of terrorism and the methods of terrorist attacks, but fails to comment on the identification or political outlook of the perpetrators. Terrorism seems to be defined by the nature of an act rather than the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. This approach is usually taken by academics. Amongst them Jenkins has suggested the nature of a terrorist act consists of the following elements:

... all terrorist acts are crimes - murder, kidnapping, and arson. Many would also be violations of the rules of the war, if a state of war existed. All involve violence or the threat of violence, often coupled with specific demands. The violence is directed mainly against civilian targets. The motives are political. The actions generally are carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organised group, and unlike other criminals, they often claim credit for their act. And finally the act is intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage (Jenkins 1980: 2-3).

Clutterbuck's analysis of terrorism recognises various elements of the phenomenon such as the use of, or threat of, violence against small numbers, in order to put large groups in
fear, to coerce government officials and the public into conceding to demands, to achieve publicity, to extort money, and to destabilise the government (Clutterbuck 1986: 20-21).

The use of violence against symbolic and small numbers in order to intimidate the larger population highlights the indiscriminate nature of terrorism, for nobody can feel safe from, or have any guarantee of being unharmed by, terrorist violence. As Bouthoul (1975: 51) puts it, to a common terrorist strategy is not to restrict attacks to an overt enemy, but to strike at the innocent in order to create fear and insecurity. Although many more people die from natural causes and as a result of accidents, this does not cause the same anxiety to citizens as terrorism does. Wilkinson (1989: 454) explains: ‘It is also characteristic of acts of terror that they appear entirely unpredictable and arbitrary to the society which suffers them’. Andreski, also, points out: ‘... no observance of command, no matter how punctilious, on the part of prospective victims can ensure their safety’ (in Wilkinson 1989: 454).

It is widely acknowledged that terrorism is a specific method of struggle rather than a synonym for all political violence or insurgency (Wilkinson 1989: 453). According to Wilkinson (1989: 453) ‘terrorism is a special kind of violence, a weapons system that can be used on its own or as part of a whole repertoire of unconventional warfare.’ The methods of terrorism have been employed by a variety of groups internationally including governments, political factions, criminal gangs and even religious movements and cults (Taylor 1989; Rapaport 1989). This variety means that it is almost impossible to agree upon any world-wide definition of terrorism. Since acts of terrorism have become more international and are no longer confined to a particular country’s borders, attempts have
been made by many differing nations to create an international law relating to such crimes (Freedman 1986; Wilkinson and Windsor 1986; Freestone 1981; Lodge 1981; Alexander 1976). However, such attempts have failed each time due to the fact that each country has a different perspective upon the definition of the phenomenon and different interests in seeing particular groups and activities curtailed.

... asking the Soviet Union to join such system would be like inviting a Mafia chief to take control of the police force... the members states of the UN have not been able to agree on a definition of international terrorism... (Wilkinson 1990: 225).

This argument was no doubt valid for the Soviet Union before its demise, and there are still countries actively supporting terrorism for their own political reasons. This makes it impossible to create any internationally accepted definition of terrorism, much less an international body of law to deal with it.

In view of the lack of international agreements, many countries have made individual attempts to suppress acts of terrorism through the law as it pertains to that country. The United Kingdom has been one of these countries. For example, legislation concerning terrorism in the UK was passed as the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. The UK 1976 Act defined terrorism as ‘the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act 1976: 14-1). The British legislation gives the law enforcement authorities greater powers than any other statutes within the British legal system, and certain statutory individual rights might be suspended as a result (Eryilmaz
It is in these areas that it is difficult for democratic countries to combat terrorism, because tough action to tackle the problem is likely to result in the sacrifice of some rights of individual citizens.

Turkey, like the United Kingdom, has, for the purposes of legal enforcement, defined terrorism as follows:

Methods of violence, repression, threatening, intimidation, or by use of any weapons, the purpose being to try to change the constitution of Turkey, which is a liberal democratic country, whereby all groups within its territory have equal rights, re-enforced by the secular laws. Terrorism is an attempt also to divide the country, or to threaten the existence of the country known as Turkey. Also threatening both the internal and external security of the state, or an attempt to abolish all the civil rights of its citizens. Two persons or more, acting together, for a common purpose must commit such acts. Such a group is classed as a terrorist organisation (Prevention of Terrorism Act, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi No 3713; 1991).

Thus, the Turkish Parliament has defined some elements of terrorism as being intimidation, repression, threats, violence and the use of weapons. It omits some characteristics of terrorism sometimes referred to elsewhere, such as indiscriminate violence and, coercive intimidation.

There is no doubt that in order to fight against terrorism there is a need for international co-operation. Nevertheless, as explained above, there is no clear consensus on the definition of terrorism among the international community. This hampers world-wide co-operation against terrorism. Consequently, individual countries which are subject to terrorist attacks set their own agenda and often implement their response in isolation.
Terrorism and Anarchism

Terrorism is sometimes confused with other forms of political violence and anarchism. It has been suggested that there is general recognition that terrorism is a specific method of struggle rather than a synonym for political violence, anarchism or guerrilla war and insurgency (Wilkinson 1986a). Although it is a kind of armed struggle, terrorism differs from wars and battles. It also differs from the brief, violent actions which are intended to seize power by surprise, such as conspiracies, palace revolutions and coups d'etat. These seek to surprise but not to terrorise systematically (Bouthoul 1975: 51). Moreover, as Woodcock (1975) suggested, terrorism is distinct from anarchism, as the latter is broader than terrorism. Anarchism is a socio-political doctrine that poses a criticism of existing society and a view of a desirable future society, involving the replacement of the authoritarian state by some form of non-governmental co-operation between free individuals (Woodcock 1975: 7-16). ‘Anarchists urge that men should rid themselves of all form of governmental authority prior to building a new society based on justice, love and a spirit of co-operation’ (Briottet 1987:7). Terrorism could be used as a tactic to achieve such a society. Anarchism is a theory which rejects the possibility of any morally persuasive general theory of political authority of the state, but as Horton (1992: 109-111) suggested a society without authority is made more vulnerable to social conflicts which might ultimately result in terrorism. People tend to describe the absence of authority as anarchy, and the people involved with it are named as anarchists, but in reality this situation should be described as one of chaos. Such circumstances might of course arise as a result of widespread terrorism.
Some critics such as Kumar (1987) described anarchism as a political philosophy which holds that societies can and should exist without rulers. According to him anarchists believe that this will not, as is commonly supposed, lead to chaos in the popular sense but on the contrary to an increase in social order. Anarchists see the state as the ultimate source of corruption and disorder in the body politic. Kumar (1987: 3-4) believes that French socialist Pierre Joseph Proudhon, the German Max Stirner, and the Russian Michael Bakunin, were the main nineteenth century anarchist thinkers who proposed the use of terrorism as a political tool to create an anarchist society. Although it seems evident that terrorism often develops in poor societies, anarchists who supported the use of terrorism usually came from the petite bourgeoisie.

In his criticism of anarchism, Apter (1973) stressed the differences between rationality and theories of anarchism. He regarded anarchism as a doctrine that employs a socialist critique of capitalism and a liberal critique of socialism. On a practical level, however, anarchism was associated with irrationality and bombs, violence and irresponsibility. Moreover, the use of terrorism and agitation was often ad-hoc and random (Apter 1973: 11-12). Theoretically anarchism might not be suggesting the use of violence, but on a practical level it involved many kinds of political violence. Some early anarchists, such as Bakunin, believed that terrorism was an effective way of achieving a political end, and that the absence of power and authority within a society was bound to end in violence between the different groups.

Beetham (1993) described anarchism as a doctrine holding that the absence of
government would not be a condition of chaos, but one of harmonious order. He admitted that although in theory anarchism advocated non-violent action, in practice this principle was compromised in order to advance popular revolution through mass disobedience to the state (Beetham 1993: 10). As discussed earlier, attacks against symbolic targets as a means of fulfilling political aims is accepted by various authors as one of the elements which constitute the definition of terrorism. Thackrah (1989: 30) noted that terrorism involves the use of terror as ‘a symbolic act against symbolic targets’ (emphasis added) designed to influence political behaviour by abnormal means, entailing the threat of violence.

It could be concluded that anarchism, as a social doctrine, seeks to bring about revolution and the creation of a stateless society based on justice and equality. Some anarchists advocate terrorism as a tool to this end, but this does not mean that anarchism is identical or synonymous with terrorism. Confusion with terrorism in the literature may be explained in two ways. First of all, some of the defenders of anarchism have had close ties with terrorism. Second, the theory that the rejection of state power implies chaos and social disobedience, which may in turn lead to the misuse of the word anarchism as a synonym for terrorism.

**Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare**

It is also worth examining the similarities and differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. It has been argued that guerrilla warfare presents a more comprehensive
challenge to the state than terrorism. Groups engaged in this type of action may have greater legitimacy as they have larger public support, and a political programme after gaining power, and they may tend to be more discriminate in their activities in order to avoid civilian casualties. Terrorism was contrasted with guerrilla warfare by George-Abbiye and Daniel:

... guerrilla warfare involves a challenge to a state's authority, legitimacy, and very right to exist. Thus, a challenge to the authority of the state invariably includes the challenge to the power of the state that is, the ability of the state to enforce its legal political will. Terrorism on the other hand, involves the use of illegitimate force, illegal force, or threat of such for a rather more limited political purpose, such as the challenge to the power of the state (George-Abbiye and Daniel 1991:3).

This explanation of the differences between the two phenomena indicates that they are not identical. However, it is not necessarily valid to suggest a limited purpose for terrorism, as it can continue for a long period and can be as threatening to the state authority and legitimacy as can a guerrilla war. The use of terrorist violence may be more coercive, indiscriminate and unpredictable than guerrilla warfare. Some argue that there are distinct differences between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. For instance, Jenkins (1989: 581) argued that guerrilla war is not synonymous with terrorism but contributes doctrinally to the tactics of terrorism. It is suggested that terrorism may be a characteristic of the first phase of revolutionary warfare but are unlikely to be characteristic of later phases, which tend to be dominated by guerrilla and conventional warfare. However, according to (Thornton 1964) a rigid classification along these lines is not valid, for terror can extend throughout all three stages. Terrorist organisations seek to be named as guerrilla movements, in order to gain political support and legitimacy from the outside.
world as well as from within their own society.

On the other hand, Laqueur (1987) argued that terrorism is not a subdivision of guerrilla warfare, and that its political function is quite different. He stated the differences between a guerrilla fighter and a terrorist are as follows:

The difference between a guerrilla and a terrorist is not one of semantics but one of quality. A guerrilla leader, to put it in the briefest possible way, aims at building up ever-growing military units and eventually an army, and establishing liberated zones in which an alternative government can be put up and propaganda openly conducted. While guerrillas have quite frequently used terrorist tactics, the opposite has virtually never happened, for in the urban milieu there are no opportunities for guerrilla warfare ... While it is easy to think of guerrilla movements which defeated the forces opposing them, and while terrorism has been on occasion a major destabilising force, it is difficult to think of more than one or two cases in which terrorism has brought about lasting, radical changes (Laqueur 1987: 5).

Bouthoul (1975) expressed a similar view:

Neither is guerrilla warfare necessarily terrorist action, but rather a way of conducting hostilities in certain circumstances. It is (...) a particular form of military tactic characterised by the dispersal of forces, mobility, sudden strikes and commando action. Guerrilla tactics consist of refusing to be committed to large-scale engagements. Often it is delaying strategy, awaiting propitious political and military circumstances (Bouthoul 1975: 51).

In general it is accepted that terrorism is the first of a three-step development which may progress through guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare (Crozier 1960: 163). The first phase involves the use of 'strategic offensive and the insurgents' strategic defensive', during which guerrilla tactics are secondary to conventional mobile warfare. The terrorist phase terminates before the guerrilla phase begins, and guerrilla tactics are abandoned before conventional operations are undertaken (Thornton 1964). The second phase 'will
be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and preparation for the counter-offensive’ (Wardlaw 1989: 47). Wardlaw (1989) summarised the developments of stages. He argued that the second phase is the longest and the one during which guerrilla warfare rises to a position of primacy.

Following this period, the third phase is entered during which the insurgents launch a counter-offensive and force the incumbents into a strategic retreat. During this final stage the existence of ideological thrust, organisational form, and programmatic content are essential, for the insurgents must demonstrate to the populace that there are alternative structures of government to satisfy their needs (Wardlaw 1989: 47). It is argued that only in this way are the insurgents able to mobilise the populace into backing their cause (Cerny 1981; Clutterbuck 1981).

First of all, it seems that terrorism is a rather limited strikes against symbolic targets to cause panic and anxiety. In contrast, guerrilla warfare exists in larger scale of attacks against rather selective targets which are mainly against military and government institutions. Secondly, terrorism is indiscriminate but guerrilla war could be more discriminate. For example, a terrorist attack to World Trade Centre in New York in a few years ago had resulted many civilian casualties, whereas, the FLN in Algeria concentrated mainly in military targets against French presence in 1950s. In our case the PKK has resulted in their attacks around 5,014 civilian casualties between 1984 to 1995 and 3621 security forces deaths in the same period (Appendix 4). Many of these civilian casualties are ethnically Kurdish origins (Goltz 1999) of the Turkish citizens whom the PKK is
claiming to be fighting for their rights. This example clearly illustrates that the PKK is a terrorist group rather than a guerrilla warfare organisation.

The other example might be the Afghan mujahaddins when they were fighting against Russian invasions in the period of 1979-1990. In their fight against this invasion, the mujahaddins not only targeted Russian military presence and Russian backed government military forces in Afghanistan, but also they had a great public support which clearly shows the difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare in terms of public support. In other words, a guerrilla organisation has larger public support than a terrorist group.

However, there are occasions that terrorism and guerrilla warfare overlaps. For example while the PLO has overwhelming public support from the Palestinians and mainly targeted Israeli security forces, it has also engaged indiscriminate violence against Israeli and Western civilians. One of the most striking example of PLO was the attack of Munich Olympic in 1972 which resulted many civilian deaths.

In recent Turkish experience, revolutionary groups in the 1970s, and separatists in last two decades, have claimed to be guerrillas rather than terrorists. Whether they were in fact terrorist or guerrilla organisations will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. For this part of the study, it can be argued that the way these organisations have operated, in terms of their methods, public support and foreign involvement, indicates they should properly be regarded as terrorist rather than as guerrilla groups. (McGrath 1990).
Terror, by itself, cannot be the final outcome of the war against an authority. It can only be regarded as a means to an end, namely political control. Its only effect on the masses may be to elicit an emotional response that may result in no constructive activity. Having terrorised, the insurgents then try to use tension to manipulate and affect public and the state. However, if the insurgents are in a position of political strength, it is unnecessary and even wasteful for them to initiate further guerrilla warfare. In such a case they may adopt a more peaceful method in order to achieve their aims.

It seems that there are many occasions when terrorism is a strategy employed by the weak against a strong authority. Terrorist tactics are concentrated on such activities as bombings, robberies, kidnappings and assassinations thereby trying to strike at the heart of the enemy. By resorting to these tactics they effectively admit their own political weakness. While the employment of such tactics is seen as necessary by the terrorist, they can often backfire and increase support for the incumbents rather than the insurgents, since they make victims of innocent people. The rejection of terrorist activities by the population might therefore help to reinforce support for the established authority, providing that the authority does not behave as the terrorist does and instead seeks to win over the general population. Therefore, Wardlaw (1989) argued that terrorism has a limited and secondary role rather than a decisive role in defeating the established political authority and creating a revolutionary authority. In contrast to terrorism, Berry (1989) argued that those wanting to weaken a political authority tend to use strategies such as guerrilla warfare, so that the outcome may be more within their own control.
Guerrilla fighters usually strive to develop a political infrastructure and the mobilisation of the masses through a historical, cultural and religious ideology (Taylor 1989). Thus, liberation movements tend to express themselves in the form of guerrilla wars, as happened in Algeria (FLN), in Afghanistan, and in Palestine (McGrath 1990). In practice, the phase of guerrilla war can last for a long time, since at this stage there is a tendency towards expansion through a territorial base, gradually becoming more conventional as time goes on. Guerrilla warfare also develops through an increase in support among the population in areas still under the legitimate political authority. In areas controlled by guerrillas, an interim government might be established and assume some functions. This does not happen when a terrorist campaign is being conducted.

There are various examples of revolutions collapsing because a policy of terror was used extensively. For example, towards the end of the communist revolution in Greece in the late 1940s over half a million of what should have been the revolutionaries strongest supporters were driven into the cities by the widespread and indiscriminate use of terror (Wardlaw 1989). The same could be said for the Turkish Revolutionary Youths of the 1970s, who used terrorism so extensively that the public turned against them and, to an extent, the people even welcomed the military intervention of 1980.

Accordingly, when different authors suggest the classification of the three stages of revolutionary warfare, terrorism is assigned a specific, subsidiary, controlled and conditional role. Indeed, some groups might not be concerned with winning the hearts and minds of the people, but rather seek only to destroy without the aim of reaching the
stage of revolutionary warfare (Altug 1995). Similarly pattern to terrorists in Greece, Turkish Revolutionaries in 1970s and, more recently, the separatist PKK practised terrorism in the same manner. Öcalan (1993: 28), the leader of the PKK, explained the use of terrorism against society, phrasing it as 'the power of coercion and intimidation, in order to establish the authority of the PKK in Kurdish society'. Wardlaw (1989) and Altug (1995) noted that, with the possibilities for mass disruption, which exist in modern society, contemporary terrorist groups' present new dangers and challenges. In comparing terrorists and guerrillas it should be stressed that the tactics which are employed are different, and the guerrilla consciously places political and ideological commitments above military considerations and appears to be a relatively civilised being compared with the terrorist. It has been said that guerrilla fighters would be insulted to be called terrorists (O’Sullivan 1986).

From the analysis of literature referred to in this chapter, terrorism can be distinguished from other forms of violence and political violence by the following characteristics. First, although terrorism is legally a crime like murder, arson or kidnapping, its aim is to achieve a political goal. The fact that, unlike ordinary criminals, terrorists often claim credit for their acts, means that the crime of terrorism can be differentiated from non-political crime. Second, terrorism differs from other kinds of political violence due to its deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation and the indiscriminate nature of its violence. Third, terrorism is not a synonym for guerrilla warfare and similarly it should not be confused with anarchism. There are different views on the concepts of terrorism and guerrilla war, which revolve around the relative legitimacy of guerrilla
warfare compared with the terrorists’ illegitimate and coercive activities. Whilst governments tend to categorise any violent campaign against its authority as terrorist, the combatants, whether terrorist or not, often claim to be guerrilla groups and so hope to gain some sympathy from the international community for their cause. This study suggests that both sides have political motives regarding the use of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘guerrilla warfare’.

Generally academics argue that guerrilla warfare is longer lasting, exercises a high degree of resistance in fighting against authority, and has large acceptance and support from the people and from the world community because of the more selective nature of the violence that is used. Often guerrillas seek legitimacy for their actions, and they usually have a political programme and policies to apply when they gain power. Guerrilla groups are more likely to obtain power, and set up liberated zones or areas which they attempt to govern. In contrast, terrorism is accepted as a rather limited action, possibly subsidiary to guerrilla warfare, and often does not seek legitimacy for its brutal campaigns. It is indiscriminate in tactics, coercive in nature, and is seldom successful in its own right.

Anarchism and terrorism are often mistakenly regarded as synonymous because the lack of order in a society, a common definition of anarchy, is also one of the effects caused by terrorist activity. In fact anarchism is a doctrine, that argues for a harmony between individuals in the absence of an overarching authority, while terrorism utilises tactical violence to distract or possibly breakdown this authority.
In order to avoid confusion and to achieve meaningful comparison, this study defines terrorism in terms of its nature with reference to the relevant academic authorities in this field. Wilkinson (1986b) stated that the central problem in defining terrorism lies with its subjective nature. After considering the differences between political and other forms of terrorism, he defines terrorism as: 'the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorise individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorist's political demands' (Wilkinson 1986a: 51). It is also worth mentioning that terrorism is defined differently by different bodies, according to their particular perspectives. The phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is a well-known view which reflects the difficulties in reaching consensus on a definition.

Having considered different views and definitions of terrorism and other forms of political, and non-political violence, this study is now able to offer its own definition of terrorism.

Political terrorism can be defined as violence or the threat of violence, coupled with political demands and motives. Terrorist actions are carried out or designed to achieve maximum publicity, and to produce effects beyond the immediate damage to people and properly. The methods used are extreme, destruction is ruthless, and the behaviour is not constrained by the rules of war. The nature of the violence is indiscriminate, unpredictable, and coercive; it is a collective act
and targets can be members of security forces, government officials, and members
of the public.

Democracy

What is Democracy?

Having explored definitions of political terrorism, it is necessary for this thesis to
consider the concept of democracy. This will enable a comparative study of terrorism and
democracy, and an analysis of the relationship between them. It has been noted that the
purpose of terrorism is to further political demands, using the instrument of violence,
creating hostility between opposing factions, and forcing government to offer
concessions. Most, if not all, democratic countries tend to take a tough stance against
terrorists, sometimes at the expense of modern-day liberal and democratic values. It is
therefore necessary to analyse the ways in which power is exercised in democracies in
response to terrorism. In doing so, it is appropriate to address the following issues: the
meaning of democracy; the weakness of developing democracies; democratic setbacks in
conflicts with terrorism.

Another significant point that needs to be considered is the nature of public consent,
particularly in plural and divided societies where different groups have different priorities
for government decision-making. The ability of democratic governments to satisfy the
demands of the general public is also important to this study. Countries still developing a
culture of democratic values face the problem of maintaining and stabilising their
fledgling democratic systems, while subject to major terrorist campaigns and social and economic crises.

There are many dimensions to concept of democracy. As far as this thesis is concerned, the most important ones are: legitimacy; equal participation; the rule of law; political institutions; accountability; consensus; and the role of civil culture in the process of democratisation. These dimensions are important in understanding democracy in divided as well as plural societies. Since Turkey might be considered as a plural rather than a divided or homogenous society, this study will give priority to understanding the exercise of democracy in plural societies.

George Orwell pointed out the problem of ascribing an agreed meaning to democracy:

In the case of a word like democracy not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides... The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning (Orwell in Sartori 1965: 1).

The literal meaning of the word democracy is 'rule by the people'. According to Sartori (1965: 3) this definition only solves the terminological problem, and is nothing more than a 'word-word definition' that renders in a known language the meaning of a term from another language. This definition does not describe the conceptual phenomenon. It seems that almost all students of politics go beyond simple dictionary definitions of democracy, bringing increasing complexity to the subject. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate about the essential features of democracy also helps to increase understanding of what democracy
really entails. Although scholars have different views on the matter, some common questions arise, such as how can one identify a country or regime as being democratic? and is there a definitive form of a democracy?

Although there has been a lack of consensus amongst students of politics in defining the concept of democracy, there is and has been some common ground about the nature, conception, ideals, and values of democracy. For instance, Sorenson raises a number of questions after his reference to a definition of democracy as ‘rule by the people’. Who is to be considered ‘the people’? What form of participation do ‘the people’ have? What are the effects of social and economic conditions on the participants? What is the appropriate field of democratic activity? What limitations do rules impose upon the people? Under what circumstances, if any, are democracies entitled to resort to coercion against their own people, or against those outside the sphere of legitimate rule? (Sorenson 1993).

Plato's and Aristotle's theories of 'rule by the wise, trained and educated', are not appropriate for modern-age democracies. As Sorenson states, democracy can only be said to exist in a society where three dimensions of democracy exist: competition, participation for every individual and civil and political liberty. Recent authors such as Elklit 1994, Weir 1994, Biryukov and Sergeyev 1994, and Parekh 1994 argue that it is necessary for any democratic country to operate the rule of law, to guarantee basic human rights, freedoms and liberties, and to allow equal participation for all parties, groups and the public as whole for democratic ends. High levels of literacy and economic growth and development in a modern society mean that every individual may be considered 'wise, trained, and educated'. Of course, it is more difficult to conceive how a country which is
poor, and in which the majority of the population is illiterate, can meet the standards which democracy requires (Sorenson 1993).

Further elucidation on the nature of democracy can be gained by consideration of political systems. Many people would endorse Robert Dahl's 'procedural minimal' conditions for democracy:

1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections. In which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.

5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters.

6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.

7) To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups (Dahl 1982: 10-11).

These conditions are those required for any country or regime to claim itself as a democracy. Descriptions that come from academics such as Dahl help students of politics to come to some sort of conceptual understanding of democracy, instead of merely looking for the literal translation from the Greek language. What can be gained from Dahl's concept of democracy and also from the theories of Beetham (1994), Elklit (1994), Sartori (1987), and Weingast (1997), is that in order to have a democratic regime there is
a need to exercise certain standards in society. These might include a common will, participation, rule of law, legitimacy of government, limitation of government power, equal participation, development of a civic culture, development of a middle class, development of the economy, high levels of literacy, and a public will to maintain the system. Some of the authors like Beetham suggests 30 conditions for any country to be claimed as democracy (Beetham 1994). However, it is useful to have some commonly agreed list of minimal democratic procedures, such as Dahl’s, in order to assess whether a country is indeed a democracy.

Whether a country or regime can be called a democracy must be considered in the light of these variables. However, because of the nature of politics, whereas violent groups try to avoid being labelled as terrorists, regimes throughout the world try to justify their actions and consider themselves as democratic. This thesis has made an attempt to clarify the concepts of terrorism and democracy, and this clarification will continue throughout this investigation into the effects of terrorism on the democratisation of Turkey, and vice versa.

**Reasons for Setbacks in the Democratisation Process and Problems of Maintaining Democracy**

Four major factors seem to be important in determining success in the process of democratisation. These are the breakdown of law and order as a result of a severe terrorist campaign, pluralism in the society, deep divisions in the society, and socio-economic
problems. These factors overlap and affect each other. Terrorism is more likely to occur in divided and plural societies where people have different views on government policies and where there are serious socio-economic problems. In such circumstances there may be a decline in law and order. This occurred in Turkey during the late 1970s and in Northern Ireland at the beginning of 1970s. The stability of a democracy is often difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, there seem to be some clear differences between more advanced democracies and developing democracies. For example, public outrage over terrorism in Northern Ireland did not lead to serious concern about loss of democracy in the UK. In the case of Turkey, the public may have been willing to suspend their democratic rights to help defeat terrorism, although it is unclear whether this would have succeeded. A key question is how do such differences relate to the functioning of democracy in different countries?

Huntington noted that one of the most common reasons for setbacks in democracies is the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or insurgency (Huntington 1993). This appears to be the case in the developing democracies rather more than in well-established ones. Turkey is an example of this and one can also add examples of Latin American countries which have had to respond to terrorism in rather different ways. In the case of Turkey, although the military responded to terrorist incidents, causing a decline in democracy, they did not stay in power, in direct contrast to a number of Latin American countries. The role of the military in Turkey was also in marked contrast to the developed west, which is comparatively more advanced in democratic life. The military’s role in combating internal threats in Turkey will be discussed further in Chapter III.
Nevertheless, it is necessary here to make a brief comparative analysis of the military’s responses to terrorism in different countries.

Stepan and Johnson’s (1988) analysis of Brazil suggests that in the 1964 coup the military acted only after it sensed considerable popular support for its action. Bolayra (1986) in his study of Venezuela found that in 1983 more than half the public (53%) could conceive of a situation in which military coups were justified. Loveman and Davis (1978) argued that most Latin American constitutions facilitate military intervention, for example by provisions that oblige the military to maintain public order. It seems that military coups are more likely to occur in a society where the public consciousness is ready for it, and where constitutional arrangements provide avenues for military intervention.

Turkey’s Muslim culture and Kemalist ideology, combined with the gradual acceptance of western values and the separate role of the military and civil bureaucracies, are all factors which have influenced the democratisation process as well as the decision making mechanism of the state (Çelik 1996; Dodd 1992). The establishment of a system of democracy in Turkey on any level has gone through a number of difficulties, as in any democratic country. But, perhaps peculiar to Turkey, democracy and democratic values have been implemented from above and they are perceived as the values of those who introduced them, particularly the ruling class, the elite and the army. These groups are therefore expected to guard these values (Özbudun 1988; Özdemir 1993a). As a result, the intervention of the army into domestic affairs, including the attack on terrorism, led to controversy. This damaged the army’s position in society and has also weakened the
country’s claim to have a full commitment to liberal democracy. The leader of the 1980 military coup, General Kenan Evren, said ‘It is the army’s duty to rescue the country, restore order and democracy within the country and defend the country against internal and external enemies, which our military law obligates us to do’ (Karpat 1981: 7). Karpat explained the paradoxical position of Turkish democracy in relation to the role of the military:

The paradox of the situation in Turkey lies in the fact that the military have emerged as the defenders of the political democracy (whatever its scope and meaning) against the continual failure of the civilian governments to implement or protect it ... the Turkish situation contradicts the common view, accepted by Western students of politics, that democracy is the product of compromises and agreement among civilian groups and is somehow an antidote for militarism (Karpat 1981: 7)

In Turkey democracy has undergone three grave crises since its inception some fifty-five years ago. All three resulted from the failure of civilians to reach compromises regarding political beliefs, whether in power or in opposition. Karpat argues that there is an assumption that ‘Turks are attuned to perform best under authoritarian governments’ (Karpat 1977 and 1981: 8) and this has appeared to be common reality in Turkish politics. This assumption also reflects some groups’ understanding of democratic values, which also contributed to the military interventions (Hale 1994). Military involvement in democratic countries is more controversial than in countries which have no intention of being democratic. It is worth examining the counter-terrorism role of the military within a democracy particularly with respect to public and constitutional accountability. It is unlikely that terrorism can be solved by the sole efforts of any one institution because terrorism has many dimensions. Bulent Ecevit, former prime minister (1973-1975),
Armies naturally are taught to cope with external threat, not internal. Yet if they are given internal duties they do not refuse that. However to go over terrorism with army can be likened to killing a mosquito by using a tank. In another word army is not so effective in combating terrorism (Ecevit 1989:1).

Thus, the implementation of anti-terrorist policies cannot be left only to the military or any other particular institution.

Examining the development and maintenance of democracy requires further conceptual discussion. The second important issue to consider is the political accommodation of different political beliefs in plural and divided societies. In divided societies, members of separate ethnic, linguistic, religious or racial groups may have differing views on aspects of government policies, laws, and socio-politic rights. Weingast (1997) noted that these differences result in co-ordination dilemmas for a society, where shared beliefs on the appropriate boundaries of the state are absent. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972: 12) emphasise that deeply divided societies typically lack consensus, and sub-national cultural groups serve as the primary basis of citizen loyalty. Although the divisions are not so severe, plural societies are qualitatively distinct from homogeneous ones in that some groups may resort to violence rather than peaceful resolution of their differences. Thus deeply divided societies are less likely to sustain a stable democratic system and plural societies are more likely to function effectively if there is a well-established democratic system of government and consensus on democratic values. (Horowitz 1985).
Although it is often difficult to maintain peace in a divided community, as Weingast (1997: 257) noted, there are some societies, most notably Belgium, Switzerland and even developing India, that have managed to overcome such problems. Weingast explains how these divided countries have achieved consensual behaviour amongst their citizens:

Those societies have devised a set of constitutional provisions to limit the effect of ethnic and religious divisions. In terms of the model, these institutional provisions reflect a solution to the co-ordination dilemma, constructed so that limits on the state can be sustained in equilibrium. In the presence of credible limits on the state, ethnic groups can trust one another and support mutual tolerance (1997: 257).

First, stable democracy can be sustained if there is mutual tolerance amongst different groups, which enables them to consent to the constitution. These constitutional arrangements have been successfully implemented by Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, and to some degree in Turkey. Second, it is also agreed by many academics, such as Lijphart (1968) and Weingast (1997), that both the decentralisation of political power and explicit limits on the power of majorities decrease the likelihood that one ethnic or religious group will use political control to discriminate or subjugate another. For instance, in the Netherlands, both the degree and extent of political consensus are limited, but one vitally important element of consensus is present: the desire to preserve the existing system. Each bloc tries to defend and promote its own interests but only within the confines of the total system and without the threat of secession or civil war (Lijphart 1968). Third, besides institutional arrangements, the values and consequent behaviour of both the public and the elite are important. In mature democracies people reach a level of common understanding and consensus over major issues. As Lijphart
notes, different sides and groups agree that politics is not like warfare and that no group should attempt to dominate or repress another. Large numbers of politically divisive issues should be settled so that resources are distributed proportionate to the size of the relevant groups.

It is appropriate to offer some brief explanation of these issues in relation to the socialist movements in Turkey in the late 1960s, to see how the accommodation of different groups in plural societies operates in practice. In democracies, after losing an election, an incumbent party has two options: it may accept its loss or it may attempt to subvert the democratic process to retain power. For these to be a potential compliance problem, the value of subversion must exceed that of accepting one’s loss (Weingast 1997). Those who lose elections must step down; they must follow established procedures for policy choices rather than impose them arbitrarily; and they must honour civil and citizens’ rights. The survival of democracy and the rule of law requires that political parties honour a range of limits on their behaviour; in other words, these limits must be self-enforcing (Weingast 1997). Moreover, as Anderson and Guillory (1997:79) noted, institutional reforms that allow those in the political minority more access to the decision-making process, while ensuring that winning is still meaningful and allows for the implementation of policies preferred by the majority, may go a long way towards increasing citizen satisfaction with democracy and toward ensuring the viability of democratic systems in the long term.

However, this behaviour may not always occur, as the case of the TLP Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Labour Party) indicates. After losing the election of 1969 some members
of the party lost faith in the democratic process and they instigated an armed struggle against the established, legitimate authority in order to obtain their political objectives (Lipovsky 1992; Ahmad 1977 and 1993). Although democracy entails a competition between different political views in society, there are still some people who are not satisfied with the system if their views do not prevail. The Turkish socialists seemed to believe in violence as the most appropriate and quickest way of obtaining power.

It can be suggested that the politics of accommodation and democratic stability reflect three factors, which were summarised by Weingast (1997). First, there is a consensus on the rules to be followed. Citizens agree that even the intended beneficiaries of such behaviour must defend the rules. Second, the behaviour of the elite as well as the public is of importance. Third, stability depends on the interactions of informal norms and formal institutions. Hence, for the case of plural and divided societies, it can be suggested that stable democracy can be maintained with an appropriate set of political institutions; rights that define the limits of the state, and a shared set of beliefs among the elite and the public.

Socio-economic conditions also appear to play an important part in determining the success of the democratisation process. As Held noted:

Where the members of a community suffer from chronic malnutrition and frequent illness, participation in common affairs that is both broad and deep is difficult to maintain. Where the lot of the masses is often that of acute hunger, or where disease runs rampant, the expectation of any genuine democracy among such masses is naive (Held in Sorenson 1993: 11).
Held's views on democracy are helpful in explaining why under-developed and developing countries find it difficult to achieve and sustain advanced democracy in their societies. It is widely accepted that countries with serious economic difficulties, low levels of education and social and political polarisation are not likely to achieve and maintain democratic values to the extent of developed ones (Aytaç 1997; Sorenson 1993). Such countries lack the consensus and mutual tolerance, which is necessary for a stable democracy. Terrorists can exploit socio-economic deprivation, which may also result in military coups and the imposition of dictatorial governments. Huntington (1996) pointed out that, severe economic difficulty, social and political polarisation, and the break-down of law and order frequently result in setbacks for developing or less-established democracies.

This discussion has indicated that a number of factors appear to play an important role in threatening the maintenance of a democratic system. If democratic values are not well established amongst key elite groups and the public, serious economic problems and intensified social conflict may lead to the imposition of authoritarian remedies. As Karpat (1981) and Harris (1985) outlined, this occurred in Turkey in the 1970s, with social and political polarisation, a breakdown in law and order and an increase in terrorism and insurgency. In such circumstances, countries like Turkey have to consider the following issues in terms of maintaining democratic stability: the accountability of the military in dealing with internal disorder, improvements of democratic values in society as well as the elite and bureaucracy, increased mutual tolerance amongst different groups, the development of institutions that guarantee rights for the minorities and the
decentralisation of political power where possible.

Is Terrorism ever Legitimate or Justifiable in Democracies?

There have been a number of arguments used by terrorists and their supporters to justify their use of violence in that no other option is open to them, or the use of terrorism is the most appropriate and feasible way to achieve their aim. In order to appreciate the logic of using terrorism for political ends it is necessary to consider the terrorist's viewpoint as well as analysing the opposing sides opinions. This will also help us to understand the question of whether terrorism is legitimate or not within democracies.

In order to explore the concept of legitimacy and its relationship to terrorism/terrorist activities, it is necessary to first consider the concepts of power and authority. As regards to power, this is usually defined as 'the ability to make people to do what they would not otherwise have done' (Mclean 1996: 395). Similarly Weber also defined power, briefly, as 'the possibility, probability or chance of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of others, despite their resistance' (Weber 1947: 155). Broadly speaking power is the 'ability' to do something. In contrast political scientists perceive authority as the 'right' to do something. Authority is an attribute of a role that bestows upon the incumbent the right to exercise power within socially-established limits, and to impose on others a positive or negative sanction depending upon the quality of their behaviour. It is thus the exercise of power in a manner which others (within the community) have thought as acceptable and hence are prepared to support it (Aydin 1998). As discussed previously,
the absence of consensus in divided societies poses a difficult problem for authority and
the exercise of power. Authority is therefore described by Jaques (1976: 39) as the
institutional transformation of power channelled and limited within a social system, rather
than relying on the majority consent of a society alone.

In liberal democracies it is generally accepted that the legitimate power, or authority, is
related to proper operation of constitutional and legal rule that governs, how power is
obtained, sustained and exercised. As Weber noted, power that is expressed in rational-
legal terms is dependent on the perceptions of members within the organisation who
accept that the power is founded on the legal structures and legitimate processes. Weber's
understanding of power and authority relates these two concepts to legitimacy and he
defines authority as legitimised power. Legitimacy, as defined in dictionaries, is 'the
condition of being in accordance with law or principles of lawfulness'. According to
Lipset 'legitimacy involves the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain
the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society'
contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends upon the ways in
which key issues have historically divided the society.

Hence, one can argue that the legitimacy of power depends upon the extent to which its
use coincides with values held by those over whom power is exercised. But what are the
indications of this acceptance or why and when do people accept or oppose the legitimacy
of the power? For example, Beetham (1991) noted some elements in legitimacy as being
the legal validity or justifiability of rules. According to some political scientist, legitimacy is equivalent to legal validity, which means that power is exercised according to established rules or, in other words, the power a state is legally exercised within the law (Aydin 1998). According to Beetham this could be suggested as the first condition of legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 3-14). So how does the terrorist respond to this or to dissatisfied people in society?

Moral and political philosophers have considered that the legitimacy of power depends upon whether rules governing it are justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles (Beetham 1991). It can be argued that power systems require justification and can claim legitimacy, if they meet the interests of the subordinate as well as the dominant. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, in 1998, between those representing the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority, can be cited as a recent example of an attempt to establish such legitimacy.

Aydin (1998) noted that validity of legitimacy is depends on it’s acceptance and support by individuals and groups within the society, because legitimacy can only be established once citizens accept it and believe that the ruler is acting in a proper and legitimate way. Thus, legitimacy is equivalent to the continuation of people’s faith in elected government’s policies. In that case, if the followers believe in a regime and have trust in it, the state and its agents will be perceived as a legitimate power or authority, according to Weber (1968), Beetham (1991) and Aydin (1998). Three factors may influence legitimacy: the legal validity of the exercise of power, the justifiability of the rules.
governing a power relationship in terms of the beliefs and values current in a given society, and the evidence of consent derived from the government’s actions (Beetham 1991: 12). Moreover, legitimacy requires consensus from the whole community. The usual definition of consensus is common agreement and, in the sense used here, this refers to common agreement on the rules to be followed and behaviour expected. The view of the majority should prevail in the outcome of elections and in other decisions. However, a mere majority view on its own is not sufficient for an ideal legitimate authority, because consensus requires consideration of the views of the total population. Therefore, there must be a willingness for the majority to accept minority views as well (Jaques 1976: 212-15). Failure to establish a minimum level of consensus about rules and behaviour, including the views of minorities, is likely to undermine legitimacy and may lead to growing discontent and the possibility of terrorist activity.

The link between democracy and legitimacy is crucial, as it is clear that legitimacy comes to governments when citizens actively and meaningfully participate in the processes of government, particularly in electing the government. Democratic principles mean that there should be a maximum of self-government in society and free and open access to elections and to the institutions of government. Given this close link between democracy, authority and legitimacy, there arises the question of whether terrorism can ever be justifiable or legitimate in a democracy.

Every person or group employing force tends to justify it. As the amount of force increases, the need to justify it becomes greater. Whatever the motivations are, every
terrorist organisation sought justification for their actions. Throughout history terrorists have tried to legitimise their use of force in terms of arguments about fighting against tyranny (such as brutal kings, aristocrats and dictators), opposing injustice and inequality, fighting for freedom, and, particularly in the twentieth century fighting for independence and revolution.

As discussed earlier, the Jacobin dictatorship used terror as an instrument of political repression and social control. The so-called Reign of Terror during the early years of the French Revolution was thus a state-directed activity (Friedlander 1977). The Jacobins justified their use of extreme violence and the irrelevance of the old order and the need to sweep it away, no matter how bloody the means. For them the ends justifies the means. The new regime lacked legitimacy and so order was difficult to maintain through public consent and within the rule of law. Consequently they used the instrument of terrorism in order to gain and maintain their power regardless of legitimacy of their power (Baker 1994). This illustrates the interplay between legitimacy, power and authority during the Jacobin Republic.

Political consensus, and consequently public opinion, has dramatically changed over the centuries in terms of the legitimacy of the power and authority of the state. In feudal society, kings and emperors were widely held to be the legitimate head of state, accepted by the people, regardless of their brutal, unlawful, despotic or illegitimate behaviour. From eighteenth century onwards, the legitimacy of such regimes has been open to debate. Thus, in the decades following the French Revolution new enlightenment values
came to the fore. As Bien and Grew (1978) noted, the success of different forms of government and regimes was not only linked to maintaining order, but also the pursuit of liberty, equality and social justice. Moreover, the aftermath of the Revolution in France not only emphasised the importance of liberty, social justice, and equality but also introduced the criterion for government legitimacy of acting in accordance with the law and consensus (Bien and Grew 1978).

Although societies have benefited from the introduction of new ideas to political life, disagreements about such changes have led to violent conflict between rival factions. The end justified the act of political violence, as the case of Robespierre clearly demonstrates:

They say that terrorism is the resort of despotic government. Is our government then like despotism? Yes, as the sword that flashes in the hand of the hero of liberty is like that with which the satellites of tyranny are armed ... The government of the Revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny (Robespierre in Scruton 1996: 546).

Similarly following Robespierre, terrorism can frequently be justified as a legitimate means to promote political ends. For instance, in terms of the justification of terrorism, German socialist Karl Heinzen pointed out that it was not possible for a rational person to accept obliteration by an authority which is considered an enemy, or to justify the violence committed by the state and condemn all the others. Moreover, he believed that theological and legal fictions do not alter these and, as noted earlier, he stated, ‘if to kill is always a crime, then it is forbidden equally to all, if it is not a crime, then it is permitted to all’ (Heinzen 1849: 54). It is understood from Heinzen’s statement that once one perceives that the enemy is not behaving according to the law and justly then one is
allowed to use force against them. However, it is not clear in what particular circumstances and to what extent one is permitted to use violence.

Nevertheless many others, such as Nikolai Morozov and Mikhail Bakunin in Russia, the German socialist Johann Most and the Irish nationalists Jeremy O'Donovan Rossa and John Devoy, interpreted terrorism as a legitimate way of achieving their political demands, that is to say using coercive, indiscriminate violence against anybody who they perceived to be an enemy. Bakunin (1869) argued in his letter about revolution that terrorism was a response to the barbarian party (authority) designed to achieve public desires. Bakunin himself did not agree with the idea that terrorists are murderers and his justification of terrorist violence was similar to Heinzen's statement of: ‘... blood for blood, murder for murder, destruction for destruction’ (Bakunin 1869). Bakunin did not hesitate to advocate the use of terrorism, in pursuit of a victory for freedom and humanity, ‘no matter how brutal it may look’ (Bakunin 1869: 69). If there was no alternative but to use terrorism in terms of self-defence against tyranny then it may be considered legitimate, according to these defenders of terrorism. However, the argument of self-defence appears to be rather subsidiary when considering Morozov's justification of terrorism.

Morozov (1880), who was one of the leading defenders of terrorism in the nineteenth century and the very first to suggest that terrorism was a new form of revolutionary struggle, proposed that it was acceptable to commit a series of political assassinations rather than a nation should kill each other. He said:
Against this large [Russian Security Forces] organisation, the depressed, intelligent Russian youth brought forth and handful of people insignificant as to numbers but strong and terrible in their energy and elusiveness. ... It is also the most convenient form of the revolution.... and such successful methods of struggle.... then there can be no doubt that the last days of monarchy and of brutal force will be over... The act of human justice against tyranny had been accomplished but it was also followed by retribution. ... Every man has a right to kill a tyrant, said St. Just during the trial of Louis Capet. These words are the slogan for the future struggle and violence (Morozov 1880: 72, 74-76)

Consequently terrorism according to Morozov, was not only self-defence but also a new effective fighting method against the aggressors. Since it was conceived as self-defence, Morozov’s view of terrorism could be claimed as legitimate, but it could also be claimed that Morozov was in favour of using terrorism because of his belief in the terrorist struggle to achieve desirable political goals. Historically terrorism has been legitimised as a means of resisting despotism. Although the ‘Jacobins’ justified the use of terrorism only as a means of ridding their country of a despotic aristocracy, it appears that Morozov like his counterpart Heinzen, defended ‘pure terror’ (Morozov 1880).

In contrast, various scholars believe that terrorism cannot be justified in liberal democracies. The first concern is the nature of terrorism as indiscriminate, unpredictable, ruthless, destructive and immoral. Wilkinson stated:

Political terror, if it is waged consciously and deliberately, is implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian considerations for the sake of some political end. Ideologies of terrorism assume that the death and suffering of those who are innocent of any crime are means entirely justified (Wilkinson 1974: 17).

Wilkinson’s view of terrorism as morally unjustifiable can be contrasted with views such Morozov’s claim that it is a convenient form of revolutionary struggle or Bakunin’s
justification of brutality. The modern-day scholar pays more attention to the nature of the act rather than its political aim. Finger (1976 and 1990) and Wardlaw (1989) are amongst those who claim that because of terrorism's unrestricted and indiscriminate nature, innocent civilians are subject to a daily risk anywhere in the world. Wardlaw (1989) also emphasised the differences between terrorism and other crimes, since terrorism is indiscriminate and arbitrary.

Another concern of contemporary scholars is the legitimacy of governments and the nature of terrorism. Weber defined the state as 'a human community which claims a monopoly of legitimate force within a given society' (in Hoffman 1994:10). Liberal democrats who condemn terrorism argue that political terrorism cannot be morally justified in democracies, because it's argued that the authority and legitimacy of the state is based on the public support and consensus. Indeed one such scholar Mumcu argued that there is no possibility of democracy under the threat of terrorism and he noted:

It is not possible to talk about the constitution, the rule of law, free elections, and independent judiciary where terrorism reigns. Unless the bloody mortgage of terrorism is lifted, free democracy cannot be sustained... (Mumcu Cumhuriyet 15 September 1980)

Consequently, in terms of democracy, terrorism is regarded by many scholars, such as Johnson (1990), Pisano (1986), Janke (1986), and Wilkinson (1974, 1979, 1981a, 1986ab and 1989), (Wardlaw 1989), as unjustifiable behaviour.

When, as is generally the case in liberal democracies, aggrieved minorities enjoy full protection and rights of participation in the liberal state, and their enjoyments of these rights is not under attack either by state or by other groups or factions, violence for political ends cannot be morally justified. It
can never be right for minorities - however intensely they may desire to realise particular aims or to redress specific grievances - to use violence to try to coerce the majority of the government into submitting their demands. They are entitled to use to the full the normal channels of democratic argument, opposition and lobbying through the political parties, pressure groups, the media and peaceful protest (Wilkinson 1986b: 39).

In democratic countries, terrorism is not a legitimate way of obtaining political goals. As Wilkinson illustrated, in a democracy there are avenues for peaceful dialogue in political terms which can accommodate different groups in society into the decision-making process. For instance, in the case of Turkey, Kurdish people have been able to participate in the decision-making mechanisms of the country since the move to multi-party politics from 1950 onwards. However, there are some dissatisfied Kurdish groups which claim that their basic rights such as cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity have not been fully appreciated by the State. Consequently, one of the most comprehensive Kurdish political pressure group was established in 1991 under the name of Eastern Parliamentarian Group and also various business groups have been established 1990 onwards. As a result, these groups have managed to ease the critical situation of economic, political and social tensions in the region despite the threat of the PKK.

On the other hand this development did not satisfy some sections of the Kurdish people in terms of the recognition of their demands by the government. One could argue that this led to the political violence in south-eastern Turkey in the 1980s, but it seems more plausible that it was not the lack of normal channels of democracy that lead to the violent conflict, but rather it was the belief of the PKK that using terrorism was a convenient form of struggle in order to obtain its political objective (Criss 1995).
In such a case, it is therefore not the lack of political channels which forces some people to use terrorism but rather it is the terrorists themselves who choose this course because of their belief that such tactics will assist in achieving their goals. As discussed earlier, the fundamental characteristic of a democracy is that it enables the majority views to prevail. However, there will often be minorities who have differing, and in some instances fundamentally opposed, views to those of the majority. In these circumstances, it is essential that the minority has opportunities to express views and receive a sympathetic hearing. Thus, the main issue for liberal democracies is to find a solution to the demands of minorities and to satisfy these demands through peaceful dialogue.

A fundamental cause of terrorism within a democratic framework appears to be that a minority feels alienated from the majority, and often oppressed by them, so much so that some people resort to acts of violence to achieve their objectives. Thus a minority opposes the decision of the majority with acts of terrorism. A democratic political system cannot accede directly to the demands made by terrorist organisations, as to do so would undermine the very principle of democracy where the consent of the people counts as legitimate way of exercising power and decision making. However, if terrorism is to be avoided great efforts must be made to include the alienated minority in the political process and to reach a consensus among the different views in the society. Sometimes this may entail devolved forms of government or the establishment of special institutions so that the minority feels its views can be effectively expressed and acted on. Failure to do this will often result in the growth of terrorist activity and the resulting reaction by the government may threaten or undermine democracy, particularly in countries where it is
not yet well-established.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined different views on terrorism, and other forms of political violence. The author has offered his own view of terrorism, which can be defined as, 'violence or the threat of violence, coupled with political demands and motives. Terrorist actions are designed to achieve maximum publicity, and to produce effects beyond the immediate damage to people and property. The methods used are both extreme and ruthless, and are not constrained by the rules of war. The nature of the violence is indiscriminate, unpredictable and coercive. It is a collective act and targets can be civilians, innocent people, government officials and members of the security forces.

Whether terrorism is a weapon of the weak, or a new way of warfare, can be summarised as follows. From the academic views on the subject, it is suggested that terrorism started as a weapon of the weak used against more powerful tyrannical regimes or rulers. However, over the centuries terrorism has become more common and international and is an instrument used by many groups and nations. It has almost become a new means of waging war between certain states. Thus, it is almost impossible to view most terrorism as timid, small, helpless groups struggling against tyranny. Since the turn of the twentieth century, it has become an easy option for nations to support terrorist organisations outside their borders, rather than engaging in a more costly and comprehensive war in order to realise their political goals toward other societies. Terrorism is also a useful weapon for
revolutionary and minority groups, in their struggle against legitimate authorities in
democratic countries. Instead of using the channels of democracy, which can be time-
consuming or require compromise and hard work, ethnic and revolutionary groups often
resort to terrorism to satisfy demands for rapid political changes.

Having considered the views of various authorities, this study suggests that democracy
can be defined according to certain generally accepted basic principles. These core
principles of democracy can be identified as: open and accountable government, free and
fair elections, civil and political rights. These together create a democratic society.
However, as Sartori noted (1987), a democracy requires not only majority rule and
participation but also freedom, equality, consensus, mutual tolerance, pluralism,
constitutional rule and finally a legitimate, responsive government based on the consent
of the people that it represents. Having considered the definitions of democracy and
terrorism, it can be said that terrorism is seeking change by violence whereas a democracy
provides the opportunities for peaceful dialogue.

This chapter has also considered the question of whether terrorism can be legitimate in a
democracy. This question could be answered in terms of the methods used to obtain
political goals. As far as this study can discern, there may have been a case to argue when
terrorists could claim that there was no alternative in the fight against tyranny. This
argument might hold some truth in the case of despotic monarchs or even in some
modern-day dictatorial states. However, the argument does not seem defensible for
democratic countries, where terrorist groups have the opportunity of using the channels of
It is evident that there is an inverse correlation between the ability of well-established and fledgling democracies to deal with severe crises within the community, western countries compared with Latin America, Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries. When responding to terrorism, less developed democracies tend to see the issue primarily as a security matter, rather than concentrating on the principles of democracy. Such a hard-line approach may on occasions lead to military coups resulting in the demise of democracy in these countries. In the case of Turkey, if all political parties and groups were to adhere to the practices of democracy, in order to conduct political argument, as Unat (1979), Dodd (1979, 1990 and 1996), Mardin (1984), Karaosmanoglu (1993) pointed out, the capacity of the political system to solve problems would be greatly improved.

Another point that has been established in this chapter is that the argument of fighting against tyranny, is one of the most common justifications advanced by terrorists. Governments, in particular liberal democratic governments, should take such claims into consideration when they are operating against terrorism. That is to say, liberal democratic governments must operate within the rule of law, and should respect human rights and individual freedoms, in order to limit possible support for terrorist organisations.

The main argument of this study is that terrorism can be prevented within a democratic system. As Wilkinson pointed out, democracies are vulnerable to exploitations by
terrorists but at the same time they have a very important advantage against terrorism:

Democracies are clearly vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the openness of their societies and the ease of movements across and within frontiers. It is always easy for extremists to exploit democratic freedoms with the aim of destroying democracy. But a well-established democratic political system also has enormous inner strengths. By definition, the majority of the population sees the government as legitimate and accountable. They willingly cooperate in upholding the law, and they rally to defend democracy against the petty tyrants who try to substitute the gun and the bomb for the ballot box. There is no case in the modern history of terrorism in which a European democracy has been destroyed by a terrorist group and replaced by a pro-terrorist regime (Wilkinson 1989: 458).

Thus, it can be suggested that countries are likely to have a better chance of finding a long-lasting solution for overcoming terrorist incidents, either from revolutionary or ethnic groups, if the country performs well in terms of the democratisation process, and the solution is sought within the framework of democracy. Democracies have their own strengths, not least a high level of legitimacy and a strong commitment by many of the citizens to defend their system. The remainder of this thesis is devoted to an examination of terrorism and democracy in Turkey and assessment of how Turkish democracy might best fight against the terrorist menace.
CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

Introduction

Following the examination of the relationship between terrorism and democracy in the previous Chapter, this Chapter focuses on the development of democracy in Turkey. The reasons for terrorism in Turkey, and the measures taken by the Turkish state against terrorism, cannot be understood without an appreciation of the historical evolution of the democratic system and values in Turkey. The present Turkish state and its democracy have been shaped by the fears, obsessions and misinterpretations of the Kemalist ideology and the Ottoman legacy. As discussed in Chapter IV and Chapter VI, revolutionary and separatist terrorist organisations have exploited the Turkish democracy’s historic structural weakness. Therefore, it is important to explore the main principles underpinning Turkish democracy and the roots of the present fears that determine the Turkish state’s attitude towards terrorism.

This chapter considers the democratic experience in Turkey from the later years of the Ottoman Empire, which finally ended in 1923 when the new Republic of Turkey was created. This was led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who introduced a system of government which came to be called Kemalism. This was based on the six basic principles of ‘populism’, ‘revolutionism’, ‘secularism’, ‘etatism’, ‘nationalism’, and ‘republicanism’.

82
Even during Atatürk’s own time in office, and following his death in 1938, some of the new leaders - hiding under the ‘mask’ of Kemalism - used the rise of fascism in Germany, Italy and Spain, and the policies of Stalin in Russia, to justify their re-interpretation of Atatürk’s model of government. At his death, Atatürk was a national hero and his successors were therefore able to use the notion of Kemalism to introduce a more authoritarian system of government which only loosely reflected the political ideology of Atatürk himself.

In the 1950s, a more pluralistic system of government evolved in Turkey. This was created not only as a result of internal pressures from the Turkish population but also from international demands for Turkey to pursue a more open approach to politics and government. The post-war international climate brought about this new political approach by Turkish politicians towards the systematic introduction of democracy. Ever since its conception, policy-makers in Turkey had followed a policy of westernisation according to which they hoped to reorganise their society and their relations with the outside world (Eralp 1993: 26).

In the Cold-War climate, the west was trying to maintain a united front from which Turkish policy-makers did not wish to be excluded. Taking the opportunities thus provided, Turkey’s leaders applied to join almost all the institutions that were created in the developing western alliance, for example, the Marshall Plan, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the European Community and NATO (Dodd 1992). It could be argued that joining NATO in 1952 and the subsequent application for membership of the EC in 1959
both had a big influence over the democratisation process in Turkey.

This chapter examines a number of inter-related issues about Turkish democracy. First, the chapter examines the introduction of western political ideals and how these were interpreted by Turkish society, with particular emphasis on how these values came to Turkey, the socio-political environment in Turkey into which these values were introduced, and, importantly, the attitude of the elite and ruling class towards the introduction of these new political thoughts and processes.

Secondly, the chapter analyses how the new official ideology of Kemalism was interpreted and introduced into the new Republic of Turkey by those in a position of influence, and how selective - sometimes cynical - interpretations of its principles shaped Turkish socio-political life and political accommodation. Thirdly, the study examines the use and understanding of Kemalism in the multi-party era between 1946 and 1960.

Fourthly, this chapter addresses the effects and status of the military in Turkish political life, particularly with reference to military intervention and the army's role in safeguarding the Republic and Atatürk's principles, which have deeply affected terrorism and policy makings in combating terrorism in Turkey.

In this short history of Turkish socio-political change, this chapter will apply the meaning of the concept of democracy examined in the previous chapter and correlate this with that of Dodds', Unat's and Turan's observations about democratic practice and development in Turkey. This can be summarised as: i) a general process of change in the political
system to encompass mutual tolerance and consensus; ii) increased popular participation in politics; iii) the political system's capacity to solve problems; iv) the ability to improve political performance; v) creation of democratic institutions; vi) public awareness of democratic culture and principles (Unat 1979; Dodd 1979: 15; and Turan 1977 and 1993).

The Ottoman Empire and Its Legacy to the New Republic of Turkey (1808-1923)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a period in history when the world was dominated politically by a comparatively small number of countries which had brought to subjection many different peoples, the Ottoman Empire was one of the largest empires in the world. Ruled by the Sultan from the Turkish capital Istanbul, the Empire included a vast area including the present day country of Turkey, the Middle East, the Balkans and North Africa. It was composed of many different nations, cultures and religions, most predominantly Muslims and Christians. The Ottoman Empire, being an Islamic state, had a system of government which complied with Islamic law as well as recognising the cultural differences of the religious minority.

During the nineteenth century the absolute control of the Sultan over the Ottoman Empire began to be challenged. This was a period of internal unrest, and at the same time challenges were being made to the Ottoman Empire's position by the growing empires of France, Russia and Great Britain. The position of the Sultan, and ultimately the unity of the Ottoman Empire, started to be affected. Until this time the Ottoman Empire had experienced no serious disunity within its borders, but the whole of western Europe was
also undergoing a period of great social change (Macfie 1998; Shaw and Shaw 1977). France was still reeling from the aftermath of the 1789 revolution, a revolution which reverberated throughout the civilised world. This too was a time of rapid industrial growth, a time of the emergence of a strong, wealthy middle class, who began to question the hereditary rule of the aristocracy and of their monarchies. The Ottoman Empire also felt the effects of this political and social upheaval and of a rapidly changing ideology. However, the interpretation and implications of western ideologies had a different impact on the Ottoman elite and society. Circumstances in the Ottoman Empire were not identical to those in other countries, especially with regard to cultural and economical differences, and the creation of a Turkish middle class was not complete until the 1960s (Rustow 1991; Harris 1985; Robins 1991; Mango 1992; Sugar 1964).

The differences between other western empires and the Ottoman Empire were not merely economic, but also a result of the cultural differences of the society. As Robins pointed out:

The Ottoman Empire was not typical of the European empires of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whose underlying characteristic was that of a distinct people of the metropolitan core, motivated by a nationalist ideology, seeking the subjugation of peoples in a geographical periphery ... for instance in the case of parts of the French empire, elite integration was on the whole negligible. The Ottoman Empire, by contrast, was not a Turkish Empire in which the ideological motivation was Turkish nationalism. The chief motivating ideology of the state was Islam (Robins 1991: 17-18).

Moreover, the Ottoman elite was a group evolving from the culture of empire, rather than the exclusive notion of ethnicity or race (Robins 1991; McCarthy 1997: 55).
Nevertheless, the nationalistic attitude of Ottoman society began to change towards the end of the nineteenth century when the state started to weaken and become increasingly influenced by the western concept of nationalism (Hale 1981; Ahmad 1969 and 1986).

The first challenge to the absolute rule of the Sultan came in 1808, when certain forces within the Ottoman Empire came together, under the name of the Lords of the Valleys, creating an army which forced the Sultan to sign a document known as the *Sened-i Ittifak*. This assigned certain powers to central government and provincial magnates, both sides pledging mutual respect for their vested rights (Unat 1979). Whilst the promises made in the document were gradually eroded over the next two decades by the Sultan, it established a situation where his absolute rule was successfully questioned. The impact of this document can be equated to that of the English Magna Carta in 1215, by which King John conferred rights on his nobles (Unat 1979: 4)

A characteristic of the political developments in the Ottoman Empire was that the changes that came about were induced mostly by external forces and only to a less extent by internal forces (limited numbers of the elite were mainly situated in Istanbul and Selanik).

Observing economic and political developments in several parts of the world we can easily distinguish some countries in which developments occurred organically, and others in which it was induced. The nations in these two categories have changed for different reasons, at different times, and in different manners (Sugar 1964: 146)

As Sugar (1964) noted, the changes within the Ottoman Empire were induced by external
pressures, rather than resulting from natural political developments. These changes caused considerable misunderstandings and suspicions, within the Empire and subsequently within the Republic of Turkey, towards the western-originated political values. In order to see this confusion and suspicion within the Turkish community, it is important to look at some main historic, economic and political relations between the Ottoman Empire and western countries, such as Britain, France and Germany.

The nineteenth century was a period of economic growth, due to extensive international trade and new political agreements. One such agreement was the Tanzimat Edict of 1839, which was introduced by Mustafa Resid Pasa following the Anglo-Ottoman trade agreement in 1838. This agreement resulted in the Ottoman Empire developing closer ties with the British Empire - an empire with a relatively liberal system of government, committed to free trade. The Tanzimat Edict established an agreement whereby the Sultan agreed to meet the demands of the propertied classes for legal protection, and no longer was his bureaucracy to be known as the slaves of the Sultan, but as the servants of the people. Following the Tanzimat Edict, the established principles where incorporated in the law, as were the administrative councils, and the general councils for each province (Shaw and Shaw 1977)

The Tanzimat Edict also addressed the west's concerns about the Christian minorities within the Empire. Generally, the Muslim-dominated Ottoman society remained suspicious and resentful towards the west, regarding its interference as a threat to its dignity and sovereignty. Historians have also debated whether the Tanzimat reforms
represented a sincere attempt to improve the condition of the state and its people, or were mere window-dressing, designed to please the western powers, on whom the Ottomans relied as a counterweight to Russia as well as to secure western help for their economic developments (Sugar 1964: 152). Unat (1979), Zurcher (1993) and Sugar (1964) illustrate the different characteristics between western and Ottoman society and these differences result in temporary and artificial change rather than organic. Consequently, the reforms did not penetrate deep into the society nor did they have the same meaning as they did in the west.

The early part of the last century was also a time of increased travel and overseas education for the more wealthy members of society. This resulted in new political theories being expounded in western Europe - particularly in France - being introduced to Turkey. These radical views were shared within Turkey by people such as Talat Pasa, Cemal Pasa, Enver Pasa, Ziya Gokalp, Prens Sabahatdin, Mithad Pasa and Sinasi who were all educated in the theories of Robespierre, Montesque, Rousseau and Kant in Europe. They came to be known as the ‘Young Turks’, but they were unable to communicate these ideologies to the masses, who could not identify with the privileges of wealth and education that the Young Turks possessed (Mardin 1962).

Nevertheless, it was the combination of these external and internal forces within the Empire that persuaded the Sultan to create what is known as the first Constitution of Turkish history in 1876 (Kili 1971:12-15). The Constitution of 1876 established a representative assembly, although its authority and influence were very restricted. The
name of this new regime was called the Constitutional Monarchy (Tuncay 1984: 22-23; Ahmad 1969).

The Sultan was eventually forced to acknowledge that he no longer had absolute power and that power must be shared with the people. The first elections were held in 1877. This Parliament was not a full democratic assembly by the accepted meaning of the word, as the Sultan still retained a power of veto over the Parliament. In emergencies, such as the declaration of war, the Sultan would retain his old powers. The Parliament which was established in 1877 had only been in existence for a period of one year, when war was declared between the Ottoman Empire and Russia and the Sultan resumed his role of absolute monarch. Although the situation appeared to have reverted to absolutism, the constitution of 1876 was still the basis under which the Sultan ruled (Hale 1994). Thus, the position of the Sultan was affirmed, but the general populace retained their newly awarded rights and privileges. A standard of government had been irrevocably established in statute law (Kili 1971:150-159).

From 1878 to 1908, a threat of war was perceived to exist, although the Ottoman Empire was not constantly at war with other nations. This threat, whether real or imaginary, was used as a justification for the Sultan to retain his emergency powers as defined within the terms of the constitution (Tuncay 1984). This was considered by opponents of the Sultan’s rule to be an abuse of the constitution, leading many of the Young Turks to seek exile in other parts of Europe. It was from these countries that they organised themselves into an underground movement which became known as the Union and Progress Party.
(Ittihad ve Terakki Firkasi). This group produced political literature, and became an effective opposition in exile to the rule of the Sultan.

In 1908, the regions of Macedonia, Istanbul, and Kosova revolted, resulting in the Sultan recalling Parliament, in line with the constitution of 1876. This situation did not prevail for long as in 1909, part of the Ottoman Army revolted, the Sultan was deposed and power within the empire was transferred to the Young Turks (parts of the Union and Progress Party). The Young Turks, educated in the west, and supported by a German-trained military, wished only to curb the Sultan’s despotism, not to overthrow the bureaucratic elite, from which they themselves originated (Hanioglu 1995). When they did come to power in 1909, the Young Turk regime became more authoritarian and rather more severe on the opposition than during the regime of the Sultan (Ahmad 1969; Hale 1994).

The Ottoman Empire, having stood for 500 years, collapsed very quickly and by 1919 ceased to exist. Many factors contributed to this, but the misrule of Parliament through the Young Turks era, the military coup of 1909 and the misinterpretations of western democratisation, were arguably the most crucial events which accelerated the end of the Empire. The vacuum created by the Sultan’s departure in 1909 was replaced by a constitutional government controlled by people who were also unable to communicate effectively with the public. An absolute ruler was replaced by an authoritarian regime, which did not command popular support, and which by the political decision of entering the First World War as an ally of Germany accelerated the demise of the Ottoman
Empire. It is important to note that the final removal of the Sultan was effected by the Young Turks, a group with a strong military background. This is yet another indication of the influence that the military had over the political life of the country. The military has continued to play an important role in Turkey's political development (Ahmad 1993; Hale 1994), and this factor will be discussed later in this chapter.

To conclude this section, it can be argued that the Ottoman political ideology was shaped by external pressure from western powers. This influence was limited to the western-educated elite, influenced mainly by French scholars and the army members of Istanbul, mainly trained by the Germans. The ideals were viewed with suspicion, mistrust and seen as a Christian interference by the Muslim community. Consequently, western political ideals, like nationalism, liberty, equality, freedom, and secularism, were not welcomed by the great majority of the population.

Furthermore, these new political ideals were not fully understood by the very people who were set to implement them, mainly the Ottoman elite and army. Lack of knowledge and misinterpretation of new ideologies, combined with deep suspicions within the society and lack of industrial development, resulted in different political problems. Finally, lack of knowledge, the misinterpretation of new ideologies, combined with the deep suspicions within society was the legacy of the Ottoman Empire that proved to be the biggest obstacles for Kemal Atatürk, leader of the Republic of Turkey (1923-1938) who tried to introduce and establish these western values and political ideologies in the newly emerging Republic of Turkey.
The Emergence of Kemalism in the New Republic of Turkey

The new Republic of Turkey was born in 1923. Its political ideology was influenced by previous governments which were themselves shaped by 500 years of absolute rule by the Sultan, as well as the recent radical governments of 1908 onwards. Moreover, the main figure and creator of the new Republic, Mustafa Kemal, was influenced greatly by the activities of the Young Turks (Ahmad 1986; Kayali 1997). He too had a military background and he met other progressive young officers at military school. The majority of historians describe him as an energetic and charismatic person, who greatly enhanced his reputation as a military leader in the war of independence after the First World War (Rustow 1991; Dodd 1996; Kili 1969). Turkey had been on the losing side in World War One and as a result many powers were occupying its borders, and threatening its very existence as a country. Mustafa Kemal was one of the military leaders responsible for defeating these occupying powers between 1918 and 1922, over-throwing the last Ottoman Sultan in 1922, and thereby establishing the present-day country of Turkey in 1923. Mustafa Kemal was later given the surname Atatürk (father of Turks) by the Parliament, and became the most powerful man in Turkish history during the period of 1923 until his death in 1938. As Sugar suggests, from 1878 until 1938 during the democratisation progress of Turkey, 'Turks lived under absolute masters, Abdulhamid and Mustafa Kemal' (Sugar 1964:152).

The Kemalist ideology has never been formally written down like other political theories, although the existence of Kemalism as an ideology has been discussed by many people. It
was thought to be an interpretation of western ideologies which was shaped in Turkey during Atatürk's era and confined within Turkish borders. As Rustow noted, Mustafa Kemal refused to identify his movement with any other ideological thoughts, such as democracy or socialism, as explained by the famous statement of Atatürk himself; 'They will say that we don’t resemble anything. Let them say so; for, gentlemen, we resemble ourselves (biz bize benzeriz)' (Rustow 1991: 12). Atatürk was a man of his time who had to respond to a situation which demanded a quick solution, thus Kemalism was forced to evolve over a very short period of time. As Recep Peker, a close associate of Atatürk acknowledged in a speech given in 1935:

We are not among those who scribble on paper before getting down to action. We prefer to achieve results first. Superficial people reproach us for working without a plan or a programme, but they lose sight of the fact that the best plans and programmes are not always written down. The cardinal plan, the source and the starting point of all our programmes, are the energy and the insight concentrated in the brain, and in the soul of our spiritual leaders (Peker in Dumont 1993: 25).

Observers of Turkish history, when reviewing this period from 1923 to 1938, proclaim the Kemalist revolution as a break with the past. Some observers have argued that in the history of the world few countries have been reformed so extensively. However, it could be argued that Mustafa Kemal had only continued the reforms that began in the nineteenth century, and that his inspiration and that of his associates were in part inspired by previous models (Kabakli 1992: 7-12).

It is important for the scope of this study to investigate the real extent of Kemalist ideology as it relates to modern-day Turkey, as well as its relationship to Turkey in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Kemalists faced a number of difficulties in portraying their ideology in such a manner that it could be understood by the masses. In other words, the government was not able to establish a dialogue with the people that could ease the way for the reorganisation of Turkish political life. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal, credited with creating modern-day Turkey, summarised his programme to the population in the 1930s with the introduction of six main principles, which were deliberately kept simple so that they could easily be understood by the population. Although these six key objectives did not encompass all the ideology of Kemalism, they did illustrate the most important objectives (Kazancigil and Özbudun 1997).

Dumont, in his study of Kemalism, is of the opinion that the ability to communicate with the population was crucial to the success of this new programme, allowing such dramatic political change to take place in a comparatively short period of time (Dumont 1993: 26). However, lack of communication did cost the country a great deal. The main principles of Kemalism, (republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism and etatism) achieved step-by-step, were written into the Republican People’s Party programme in 1935 and into the Republic’s constitution in 1937 (Rustow 1991).

Since 1923 the Republic of Turkey has created three constitutions (1924, 1961, 1982) in order to adapt its political ideology to respond to a constantly evolving situation both internally and externally. It would be appropriate at this point to look more closely at the six principles of Kemalism. These principles are fundamental to an understanding of the philosophy of modern-day Turkey, and its constitutions have been strongly influenced by
them (Kili 1971: 163; Karal 1997). Moreover, these principles have also provided the main guidance for Turkish political parties and institutions, especially the military.

**Republicanism**

The term *cumhuriyet* is an Arabic word for republic, and was the chosen by Atatürk when defining the new Turkish regime in 1923. This term is in line with the intentions of the Tanzimat Edict of 1839, which first instituted a more democratic system of government by statute. When preparing this edict Mustafa Resid Pasa, who is acknowledged by many to be the father of the Ottoman reforms, identified republicanism more or less with that of democracy, as part of the ideological trends that prepared the foundations of the Republic of Turkey (Lewis 1968).

Early political activists stated that their interpretation of the word *cumhuriyet* was not a republic, but a kind of constitutional monarchy, based on the sovereignty of the people and the Sultan. At a time when the rule of the Sultan was absolute, and associated with repression, well-informed people preferred not to use the word cumhuriyet, and instead used the word *mesrutiyet* (constitutional regime) or *mesveret* (consultation) (Lewis 1968: 17; Karal 1997).

Frustration among the reformists at always having to moderate their ideas in an increasingly absolutist state caused an underground ferment, of which Mustafa Kemal was a typical product. This dissatisfaction led to the Young Turks' Revolution of 1908 against the Ottoman Sultan. The Young Turks initially remained faithful to the Sultanate
as this was thought to be the only institution that could maintain what was then the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad 1969; Hanioglu 1995). The First World War dispensed with this requirement, and many countries that had formerly been under the Ottoman Empire, such as Egypt, officially declared themselves a republic. Mustafa Kemal declared Turkey a Republic just after the war of independence on 29 October 1923, and introduced republicanism, as the first principle of the Kemalism when he believed that public was ready for such a change. Initially, Mustafa Kemal did try a democratic republic, and a multi-party system of government was attempted in the years 1924 and 1930. However, this was a time of disunity and the leaders of the Turkish Republic were only ready to tolerate a pluralist democracy in 1950s (Rustow 1991: 13).

Atatürk’s attempts to set up an opposition political party still remain controversial. Was it a genuine attempt to establish competitive political life by creating an opposition party or was it a necessity in views the public reaction to the new ideas that Atatürk introduced to society. Whatever the case, Atatürk seem to recognised the importance of public support and participation in politics, and once he discovered that the opposition was gaining majority support he concentrated on greater public penetration by establishing public houses and rooms (halkevleri, halk odalari) where the general public was taught the new ideas of Kemalism (Dodd 1990).

Nationalism

During the second half of the nineteenth century, nationalism became an important topic
of debate amongst political theorists within the Ottoman Empire. Three different views of nationalism appear to have been discussed. The first view was based on the idea of Ottomanism and the main supporter of this view was Namik Kemal, a member of the group known as the Young Ottomans. Their definition of the term Ottoman was similar to the British conception of an empire. The term Ottoman incorporated all people within the Ottoman Empire, not having any regard for their culture, race, or religion. The second concept of the Young Ottomans was one based on a religious identity and was put forward as an alternative to that based on the Ottoman Empire (Kayali 1997). However, in reality it would have achieved the same end because the Empire was predominantly Muslim. During these years it was very difficult to defend nationalism based on race because, for many people, the term ‘Turk’ has a somewhat derogatory connotation (Landau 1995: 29).

The third concept was put forward by the Union and Process Group (formerly known as the Young Turks), and originated by Ziya Gokalp (Gokalp 1963; Lewis 1968; Kushner 1977). This was based on race, language and religion, a combination of these three features creating a new national identity. Because of his close association with the Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal’s view came close to the political ideology of Gokalp. However, his group was keen to assert its profile as a secular movement and initially intended to eliminate Islam from their concept of a nation, although in practice they gave certain considerations to the Muslim religion.

To clearly understand the Kemalist approach to nationalism, a speech made by a close
associate of Gokalp, Recep Peker, in 1931 defined the term ‘We’, when discussing nationalism as follows.

We consider as ours all those citizens who live among us who belong politically and socially to the Turkish nation, and among whom ideas and feelings such as ‘Kurdism’, ‘Circassianism’ and even ‘Lazism’ and ‘Pomakism’ have been implanted. We deem it our duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an absolutist regime and the products of long-standing historical oppression. The scientific truth of today does not allow an independent existence for a nation of several hundred thousand, or even of a million individuals. We want to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding our Jewish or Christian compatriots. Our party considers these compatriots as absolutely Turkish insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideals (in Alp 1937: 253-254).

In addition to the effects of the Turkist movements on the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal saw diversity as a weakness. For him one of the reasons for the collapse of the Empire was its diverse structure. Therefore, Turkey had to maintain an emphasis on a unitary nation. However, there were many races and language groups, and even the Turkish people did not consider themselves as a single nation (Landau 1995). Thus, it was evident that any Turkification or nation-building process would be resisted by some groups, religious or racial. Such resistance can be seen in the number of Kurdish revolts, beginning in 1925 under the leadership of Sheikh Said, and more dramatically with the formation of the PKK terrorist group in the 1980s under Abdullah Öcalan (Mumcu 1992).

From the official perspective, this notion of nationalism was aimed principally at ensuring the cohesion of the Turkish Republic and preventing the growth of separatist movements that might eventually threaten the unity of the country. Therefore, for the policy-makers,
Turkey’s policies were not flexible and any attempt to challenge this nationalism were conceived as a threat against the unity of the country.

**Populism**

For Kemalists the word *halkcilik* (populism) implied an idea of democracy and militant intellectual activity aimed at leading the people to progress. The Turkish vision was to establish a nation based not upon class, but upon interdependence through occupational groupings. This concept was based on the theoretical teachings of the French radical politician, Leon Bourgeois, and the sociologist Emile Durkheim. The Young Turks, as already illustrated in this chapter, were considerably influenced by French political thinking. This, combined with the emerging economic wealth of Western Europe and the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, convinced many that the social structure of the country had to be radically changed (Kraal 1938). Notable Turkish ideologists, Tekin Alp and Gokalp stated that the concept of the French theorists had to be adapted to the Turkish model of republicanism if the objectives of creating a new state structure were to be achieved:

> If a society comprises of a certain number of strata or classes, this means that it is not egalitarian. The aim of populism is to suppress the class or strata differences, and to replace them with a social structure composed of occupational groups, having a solidarity with each other. In other words we can summarise populism by saying there are no classes, there are occupations (Toprak 1977: 92).

The views expressed by Gökalp captivated the young, as well as aspiring Mustafa Kemal. However, when in 1923 the new constitution was being prepared, Kemal appeared to opt
for a much more vague form of populism stating that: 'The people were the only
sovereign, exercising power directly or indirectly' (Arar 1963).

Nevertheless, the theory of the solidarity of occupational groups remained one of the
basic principles of Kemalist ideology, and whilst the wording within the constitution
appears to be somewhat ambiguous it did justify the one party state. As the Turkish state
was classless, it was not necessary to have different parties representing sectored
interests. The view that the Republican Party represented the interests of all the people
was reinforced by Mahmut Bozhurt, a theoretician within the Republican Party who said:

No party has ever represented the whole nation as completely or as
sincerely as the Republican Party. Other parties defend the interests of
various social classes, and strata, for our party we do not recognise the
existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. There are no
gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set, and this set
is the Turkish nation (in Berkes 1973: 215).

This interpretation of populism is heavy with meaning yet it relates very little in concrete
terms. It was relayed to the masses to justify a one-party state, and the young Turkish
bureaucracy found it an acceptable justification when answering embarrassing social
questions. Although it was one of the most accepted of all Kemalist principles, the utopia
of a united nation, welded together as a family, was too difficult to realise in a nation that
became more industrialised and educated after the Second World War. That may be
contrast with the political atmosphere of 1930s when more dictatorial governments
such as those of Hitler of Germany, Stalin in Russia and Mussolini in Italy were popular.
This allowed people like Recep Peker (General Secretary to the RPP) to identify and
justify their political thoughts as ‘one party, one nation and one state’. Karpat points out that Peker was not defining the existing party structure of Turkey, but rather he was fulfilling his own ambition of becoming the leader of the country (Karpat 1991: 58).

**Revolutionism**

Another element of Kemalism was revolution (*devrim*). Rustow (1991), Dodd (1990) and Robins (1991) define revolution as a process of change over a short period of time. According to them, this revolution - as opposed to evolution - is the correct term used to describe the political changes taking place in Turkey. For a Kemalist, revolution meant devotion to the cause of modernisation and to the relentless struggle to transform Turkey into a country capable of playing an important role amongst European nations. In Turkey, revolution signifies a transformation of outlook, the adoption of western culture, the fight against ignorance, superstition of old Ottoman habits, the importation of new ideas, economic development, and in particular a continual application of science (Dodd 1990; Heper 1987).

The Kemalists assigned great importance to economic revolution as well. Compared with other countries in western Europe, Turkey at this time was in decline. The role model for economic prosperity was western Europe. In theory revolution was designed to bring European fiscal success into the Turkish state. As discussed earlier, Turkish society was suspicious of new political thoughts that had developed in the western world and had been transferred to Turkey. In order to avoid any public backlash, Atatürk’s policies
remained somewhere between those of revolution and evolution, showing that he paid
great heed to public opinion. At the same time, he kept his plan for transforming Turkey
from old habits to a new modern, secular, westernised Republic secret, believing that it
would be easier to achieve public understanding and support with step-by-step changes.

To carry out his theories, Atatürk set a generous deadline for achieving secularism in
Turkey, his most radical and controversial political goal for Turkish society. However his
associates, mainly the ruling part of RPP and the elite, did not adopt the same approach
which resulted in a failure of Kemalism in many ways. Finally, it can be said that the
concept of revolution in Turkish society is still controversial and it is unclear whether it
was intended to be evolution or revolution. It is possible to argue that Atatürk’s approach
was evolutionary but on the other hand, his successor and some of his associates were
revolutionary in their methods of introducing new political thoughts to Turkey (Heper
1988; Ward 1942).

Secularism

The linchpin of Kemalism is laiklik (secularism) (Sertel 1969; Berkes 1973; Allen
1968:169-228). The basic conflict between secularism and atheism is not necessarily
between religion and the world, as was the experience of the Christian religion. The
conflict is often between the forces of the tradition of religion, sacred law, and the forces
of change (Berkes 1957). Kemalists, when defining secularism, chose the word ‘laicism’,
(laiklik) which defines more narrowly the process of separating the state from religion. In
1867, a member of the Young Ottomans, Mustafa Fazil, stated:

Religion ... rules over the spirit, and promises other - worldly benefits to us. But that which determines and delimits the laws of nations is not religion. If religion does not remain in the domain of eternal truths, in other words, if it descends into interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a destroyer of all, as well as of it own self (in Dumont 1993: 36).

This idea was gradually implanted in the teaching of many of the intelligentsia, which in an Empire steeped in the tradition of Islam was an extremely radical view, especially as the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a resurgence of Islam within the Ottoman Empire. The intellectuals, some of whom were members of Young Ottomans, had to restrain their secularist views because to express secularist sympathies would have subjected them to Hamidian censorship. Secularism was the last principle of Kemalism to be introduced (1937) to the Turkish nation (Ahmad 1993), yet it was the most problematic one. As has been discussed earlier, the Ottoman Empire identified itself with religion, but not race or language. Even after the Empire had collapsed the Turkish people were identifying themselves as Muslims but not as Turks. Moreover there were other issues in Anatolia, like ‘the Kurdish question’, and which prevented people identifying themselves as Turkish. As a result, it was obvious that the state’s secular reforms would meet with resistance from the people.

**Etatism**

The term etatism (*devletcilik*) has two separate but related meanings. In its broadest sense it refers to the condition of state intervention, and to all social, economic, and cultural
activities. Atatürk proclaimed that whilst giving priority to the achievement of the individual, individual efforts must be performed for the general good of the state, with the objective of leading the country into a climate of prosperity and wealth (Lewis 1968: 69).

In a more limited definition, etatism has a specific economic meaning.

Mustafa Kemal interpreted etatism, in relation to his model of the Turkish state, as the government being the supreme authority for all important initiatives and decisions. Most references to Kemalist etatism relate to the central government being directly involved in all important economic developments, such as the trauma of the aftermath of the First World War, the subsequent War of Independence, and finally the advent of the 1930s and the subsequent world-wide economic depression.

In a series of articles on etatism, Gokalp stated that:

The new Turkey which has to introduce the latest and most developed techniques of Europe cannot wait for the spontaneous rise of enterprise amongst individuals. Only the state can achieve the task of introducing large-scale industry in every field. Turks are temperamentally etatist and they expect the state to take the initiative. Even social change has to be introduced by the state, it is the duty of the state to safeguard these changes, both socially and economically, against forces of reaction (Gökalp 1859: 310 to 311).

There is an unbroken continuity in Turkish modernist doctrine, from the ideology of the Tanzimat edict, to the six principles of Kemalist doctrine. It has often been stated that the Kemalists imported their doctrine from the west and whilst this in part may be true, they were guided by the convictions which had already inspired certain Ottoman reformers. However, what did distinguish the Kemalist era from previous reformers was that the
changes which took place were very rapid between 1923 and 1938. Because of this, some critics argued that Kemalism represented a total break with the Ottoman past (Kinross 1964; Tunaya 1996; Ahmad 1993). This argument may have some weight with regard to the secularisation of Turkey, but an overwhelming majority of researchers seem to agree that Kemalism inherited a significant proportion of its ideology from its Ottoman antecedents (Oran 1990:38-54). Mustafa Kemal, however, is famously quoted as saying to one: 'They will say that we do not resemble anything. Let them say so; for, gentlemen, we resemble ourselves' (Rustow 1991: 12).

Rustow claims that Mustafa Kemal, emphatically refused to identify his movement with any other ideological slogans, such as democracy or socialism, disregarding objections that this would leave the nature of the new political regime inappropriately vague (Rustow 1991:12). Eventually the six ideological tenets of Kemalism were written into Republican People’s Party programme of 1935, and later into the republic constitution in 1937. However, Kemalism as a political ideology has never been written down in detail in any book, so knowledge of them was incomplete. This led to the situation where many political groups claimed that they are the ‘real Kemalists’ although their ideologies are completely different than each other and Kemalism. For example, one of the Turkish socialists groups of the 1960s were claiming that they were Leftist Kemalist (Özdemir 1993b), while the nationalists were arguing that Mustafa Kemal had been against the socialists.

Turning to the personality and political skills of Atatürk, it can be said that he had a
complete belief in himself and his policies. He was also a very astute man who understood political skill in relation to opportunism, as the following part of a speech illustrates:

To declare (my policies) would not have been a very good idea at the beginning. In order to develop the policies, I needed to wait for the right opportunity, and for the right circumstances, as well as taking into account the feelings and expectations of the population and this has meant that I have implemented all the decisions over a period of time through a gradual process. This process has taken nine years (Atatürk 1963: 14).

To summarise, Kemalism played the major role in shaping the development of Turkish democracy. It inherited some legacies from the later Ottoman period, such as linguistic and cultural nationalism, a constitutional parliament, and populism. Also, without doubt, Kemalism was influenced by western civilisation, and its debt to the French legislative and administrative system is clear. During Atatürk’s time in office (1923-1938) Turkey did not have an opportunity to practise a multi-party system, as the objective of Kemalism was to create, in a relatively short time, a nation capable of competing in all spheres with comparable western European nations. During his time as Baskumandan (highest post in Army), and later on as permanent President of the country, Atatürk did make an effort to transform Turkey into a nation that could be described as modern, nationalist, individualist and secular, but these, like other political beliefs of Atatürk, were interpreted by his closest associates in rather confused and contradictory ways.

Arguably the most important examples of Atatürk’s beliefs were: freedom, equality, a classless society, individualism and collectivism, secularism and nationalism. Some of
the questions he confronted, such as the national identity of Turkey, arguably remain unresolved up to the present time. Consequently, as Gençkaya (1994 and 1996) argued, the present-day separatist terrorism is closely related to the unresolved dilemma of national identity as well as to the secularisation of Turkey. Popular understanding of democratic values is still incomplete, and requires an honest, objective, constructive approach by all of the parties which are in a position to shape Turkey’s future (Mardin 1977; O’Ballance 1989; Ahmad 1993). Barkey and Fuller (1997) argued that the wrong implementation of democratic principles has bedevilled all Turkish governments, and have resulted in a failure to develop realistic policies to overcome present-day terrorism. As a result, not only can the causes of social and internal security problems, like terrorism, be traced back Kemalist ideology but so too can state policies and their implementation. Without consideration of the role of Kemalism policies and problems of terrorism and anti-terrorism in Turkey cannot be properly understood.

The following part of this study will undertake an examination of political life in Turkey, looking particularly at the roles of the political parties and the military. These institutions will be examined in relation to Kemalism, as will the development of democratic values and the ability of the democratic system in Turkey in to accommodate public unrest and political pluralism following the single-party era. It will also attempt to show how, from a one-party state, led by charismatic but absolute leader (İsmet İnönü), a multi-party democracy developed with a wide spectrum of political views. The culmination of this development was multi-party elections in the 1950, and a more pluralistic society in the 1960s. The military’s role in the political development of the country will also be
examined.

Transition to a Multi-Party System

For nearly a decade following the death of Kemal Atatürk in 1938 it was unclear how a successful transition to democracy could be achieved. There was a similar situation in Spain, which occurred just after the death of Franco. The essence of the problem of Spain’s transition to democracy has been described in this way:

The fundamental question was whether it would be possible to establish a democratic regime through an evolutionary process of reform, or whether the regime could only be dislodged through a more abrupt and probably tumultuous process, forced by the mass mobilisation of segments of Spanish society (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988: 34).

The development of democracy in Turkey was probably less dramatic than in Spain, with Turkey evolving in a more stable manner. Ismet İnönü, the successor of Atatürk after his death in 1938, gave notice that he recognised the need to liberalise the regime. In his crucial speech of 19 May 1945, İnönü revealed his decision to open Turkish political life to multi-party competition as the logical culmination of Atatürk’s own commitment to populism (Rustow 1991:14). As had been the case for all the reforms since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this process of establishing democratic institutions was from above downwards rather than through a joint effort of the general populace and the policy-makers of Turkey (Rustow 1991: 12).

Some authors, like Harris, have argued that Ismet İnönü may have reverted to a
democratic ideal to fulfil Atatürk’s grand design for political democracy. According to Harris, İnönü also acted out of concern about Soviet intentions against Turkey. This move to a more democratic state would create an environment where the west would be more likely to provide assistance against Soviet aggression should it have been required. Moreover, he was well aware that rising domestic discontent would not have permitted further delays in instituting competitive party politics (Harris 1985: 58).

The formation of the Democratic Party in 1946 established the first credible opposition to the Republican People’s Party, which had been the only authorised political unit within Turkey since 1923. Four prominent defections from the Republican People’s Party, headed by Celal Bayar, who had been Atatürk’s last prime minister, established the credibility of the Democratic Party to such great effect that the party performed strongly in the general elections of July 1946. To independent observers this was surprising in view of the short time the party had been in existence. During the years between 1946 to 1950, the Democrats consolidated their position within the Turkish political system, and survived a major split amongst their number when members who supported a conservative political ideology resigned to form the National Party. Nevertheless, the Democrats - with their policies - were able to appeal to a diverse group of the population, including intellectuals, business persons, peasants, landholders of Anatolia, and in later years civilian bureaucrats desirous of change (Ahmed 1977: 16; Harris 1985: 59).

Following the elections of 1946, the Democrats advanced their policies, concentrating upon the notion of freedom. The strategy adopted by the Democrats against the
Republican People's Party used the word free within their political slogan 'More freedom, more jobs, and free enterprise'. This attracted many commercial and industrial middle-class voters (Lewis, in Sugar 1964: 171). This manifesto, with its emphasis on freedom, appealed to the electorate and the Democrats were successful in defeating the ruling Republican People’s Party in 1950. The Democrats won the election with such a clear mandate that even İnönü himself was taken by surprise. However, victory was not greeted in every quarter with uncritical acclaim and, of course, the Republicans were dismayed by the election result. However, İsmet İnönü, the ruling President until the elections, resisted all suggestions by the military that he should set aside the election results, and instead resigned his presidency to assume the new task of leader of opposition in a democratic Parliament (Rustow 1991: 15).

Adnan Menderes, the first freely elected prime minister of Turkey, described his victory as arising from the national will, and promised the nation that its participation would play the greater part in the new government’s policy-making. His historic speech continued as follows:

In many respect, the Ninth Grand National Assembly will have in our history a unique place. It is for the first time in our history that, as a result of a full and free expression of the national will, this distinguished Assembly has come to a position where it can shape the nation’s destiny. We shall remember that historic day (14 May 1950) as the day of victory not only for our party but for Turkish democracy (Menderes in Ahmad 1977:35).

The Democrats also won the following election and stayed in power until 1960 when they were deposed by a military coup. Many observers expressed surprise at the military takeover, but from a militaristic viewpoint the state of Turkey had been formed by a great
military leader, the founder of the Republican People’s Party, which had created stability. In addition, the military was siding with the elitist group within society and they considered themselves to be the natural successors to Turkey’s leadership. Feroz Ahmad argued that when the economic conditions started to deteriorate during the second half of the 1950s the Democrats replaced their free enterprise policy with that of rather rigid etatism, which caused some discontent amongst the middle classes. In addition, the Democrats’ promises of freedom and free economic enterprise did not come to fruition and the aspirations of many were dashed (Saribay 1991; Ahmad 1977: 86-88). Also, despite advocating the virtues of democracy, as their title implied, they sought to maintain control by methods that were not considered democratic (Harris 1985: 59).

In September 1955 there were riots in Istanbul to which the Democrats responded with the imposition of martial law in all the major cities throughout Turkey. This government reaction was considered by many to be over-dramatic, and against the principles of democracy. Ahmad commented ‘Martial law enabled Menderes to checkmate the opposition temporarily but it also demonstrated the weakness of his government. It was a confession that he could no longer control the situation by normal means’ (Ahmad 1977: 89). It can be argued that in the situation of martial law the government delegated its political authority to the military, which eventually made it easier for the military to take over the reins of government in 1960.

When one considers the democratisation of Turkey, Dodd’s views on the concepts of political development may assist in developing some clear understanding of the process.
Dodd put forward the view that the increased popular participation in politics increases political awareness among the population. It is this motivation amongst the population that creates within them expectations in the concept of democracy, and its capacity to solve problems (Dodd 1979: 15). With the establishment of multi-party democracy the question of the ruling the country according to the ideology of Kemalism was discussed, but all parties had their own interpretation of which are still relevant and effective in the political life of present-day Turkey.

İnönü's Republican People’s Party constantly advocated the six principles of Kemalism, and how the liberal reforms advocated by many other political parties were against the basic principles of Atatürk. These principles were enshrined in the Republic and were considered sacrosanct. This perceived conflict within the ideology of Atatürk’s reforms seems to have been designed as a strategy to slow down the process of change and to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. The Democratic Party leaders were embarrassed by the accusation of anti-Kemalism which was levelled against them, but knew of no way to deal with it adequately since the accusation could never be satisfactorily defined (Toker 1981: 128). Independent observers argued that the claim of the Republican People’s Party was not valid, since the leadership, and many distinguished members of the Democratic Party, had also been close associates of Atatürk.

A characteristic of Turkish political life is that it has no long traditional history. Political ideology has not evolved over a long period of time: it was created in only a limited period of time. As a result much of Turkey’s political theory is superficial, created to
react to a situation. This has led to an environment where the personalities of the political leaders are as important, if not more so, than their ideologies. Speeches and rhetoric play an important part in political life. An example of this can be observed in a speech made by Mükreem Sarol, a prominent Democrat and a confident of Menderes, the leader of the Democrat Party in the 1950s: ‘We have very few differences between us (referring to the Republican Party) that cannot be resolved, the only issue is the leader of the Republican Party if he (İnönü) did not exist then there would be no problem that we could not resolve’ (Toker 1991). On this point many authors share the view of Feroz Ahmad’s, where he explains the extent of opposition in democratic life of Turkey as follows:

For the Democrats, the relationship between their party and the RPP could be summed up in one word: İnönü ... This view was inevitable in a political system as ideologically limited as the Turkish, in which political parties became personality parties rather than parties based on doctrines and ideology. The DP became a personality party by 1954, and the RPP did not stop being İnönü’s party until 1972, when it dropped İnönü. It now seems to have become Ecevit’s party (Ahmad 1977: 46).

It is important to note that any observer who seeks to examine the shaping of democracy in Turkey needs to clarify what is meant by the term democracy within Turkey. Ilter Turan defines democracy in its broadest sense, clarifying this definition under two distinct headings for a better understanding of the subject. ‘A political system characterised by individual liberties, and responsive government’ (Turan 1977: 429). From this viewpoint, if we consider individual liberties as those of the citizen it ought to mean that the citizen should have unrestricted opportunities to formulate public goals and express them both to their fellow citizens and to those who are in a position to make decisions which are binding for all members of the political community. Many observers
agree that there was not sufficient evidence of freedom of expression, freedom of the
press, freedom of the association and other liberties during the period of the RPP (1923-
1950), and DP government (1950-1960). This could well be explained by Turkey’s
limited knowledge and experience of democracy prior to 1923, and in reality was an
extension of the Ottoman experience. A liberal democratic state was an unknown
phenomenon, the 1924 constitution was in reality an extension of previous Ottoman
government, the divine right of one ruler, formerly the Sultan and then Kemal Atatürk. A
second factor, resulting in democratic stagnation, could be that in reality the two major
parties had very little to differentiate them in that they were similar in political ideology.
Society’s role was restricted to merely going to the ballot box. To all intents and purposes
the outcome of the election made very little difference. These observations could be said
to describe the biggest obstacles to a democratic government in the history of Turkish
democracy.

The political situation in Turkey, as illustrated previously, is largely personality
orientated. The ethos is driven by the government’s reaction to a situation. In other words,
government policy is *reactive*. That the political system is designed to appease the
populace with promises that are usually not kept has led to problems in the evolution of
the democracy in Turkey. According to many authors like Harris (1985), Belge (1995),
Erogul (1970); Ahmad (1977 and 1991), and Tuncay (1984), the Democrat Party came to
power in 1950 with a number of the promises which included such things as liberalisation
of the press and media and more open governmental religious tolerance. The list was
endless, and would have fulfilled the aspirations of all, however in reality none of these
promises were actually kept. Many critics argued that the Democrat Party did not have its own policy other than Kemalist ideology, which was also policy of the RPP, thereby a situation prevailed in which the established status quo was maintained. The fear of destabilising the country made it almost impossible for any party to introduce any new radical policies. As Orlow suggests:

> Virtually all political groups in the country profess to adhere to Atatürk’s programme and much of the violence committed in the last 25 years has been perpetrated in the name of restoring or preserving ‘Kemalism’ (Orlow 1982: 55).

It could be suggested that the first attempts to have a multi-party democratic experience in Turkish political life were not successful, and reinforced a situation of decline where the inception of new ideas and creativity have not materialised. It is correct to state however that a high proportion of the electorate between 1950 and 1960 did believe in the ideology of democracy, and this is reflected in the fact that some 80 per cent of the people actually voted during this period until the first multi-party experience of Turkey was interrupted in 1960 by a military intervention.

**An Examination of the Nature of the Turkish Military and Its Role in Politics and Combating Terrorism**

The army is the only institution in Turkey to have maintained an uninterrupted existence from the ‘Selcukies’ of the tenth century to the present time. The military has been intimately associated with the state since its inception - one cannot think of the state without the army, or vice-versa. The head of the state throughout the Ottoman period and in the new Republic of Turkey, with the exception of the period between 1950 and 1960
(the Democrat Party era) and after 1989 and onwards, has always been a member of the military or has spent a part of their career in the army. During the Young Turks movement, and also the War of Independence, the army was the leading force. The Revolution of 1909 against Sultan Hamid II was carried out by members of the Young Turks who were mostly members of the military, and it was a soldier, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who rose from the military ranks and played a crucial role during the War of Independence, ultimately becoming an iconic symbol of the new state.

Despite the fact that the Ottoman government was essentially in the hands of the military, even when performing civilian functions, Mardin (1977) argue that the society did not become militarised. In fact, the opposite was true. The military’s association with and control of the government was preserved even after the introduction of a general conscription system in 1855. Service in the army after that date had a certain equalising effect, as all recruits were treated equally regardless of their social origin or status. In the Republic the educated were trained as reserve officers, but their treatment within their own quarters was egalitarian (Karpat 1981: 10). With its strong reputation, the military has used legal, constitutional, historic, cultural, and structural means to retain its privileged position in issuing demands and making suggestions and warnings on political matters. Sometimes the military has gone as far as staging military take-overs, in the name of safeguarding the Republic and its political ideology of Kemalism, or to preserve the status-quo against terrorism caused by ethnic, nationalist, or revolutionary communist movements (Sakallioğlu 1997). There is a number of questions which arise when one discusses the military’s role in combating terrorism. These include, accountability, the
rule of law, policy making, and the extent of the military response to political violence. In addition to such factors, the role of the military in combating terrorism is affected by the way that military school students are educated, which is a point discussed further in the following section.

The Effects of the Military on Turkish Politics and the Policy-Making Process

Despite ongoing discussion about the army’s political place in Turkey, it remains unresolved whether the military is above politics, anti-politics, within politics, or serving the interests of any political groups or class. One fact that is clear is that Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, tried to keep the army out of politics. When Atatürk addressed the military in March 1930, it was a clear statement of his policy regarding the place of military in the structure of the state. According to Atatürk, the army should remain outside daily politics: ‘It is essential to keep the mind clear of daily politics, while performing the essential duties of the army. It must be borne in mind that there are people who take care of politics as well’ (Atatürk 1963-64). There is much evidence that Atatürk did not want the military to be involved in politics. He is credited with saying that for the military to act as a political party would discredit its reputation in society. Therefore the army should remain impartial on politics and neutral with respect to party politics. For instance, when Atatürk allowed opposition parties to enter political life, he asked some members of the Progressive Republic Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkası) who were members of the military at the time, to resign from their military posts if they had an intention of continuing as politicians (Dodd 1990).
Having made a brief historical introduction to the military's political status in Turkey, it is also essential to look at the socio-economic background of the military in order to identify its behaviour in society.

Social and economic background of military school students (Birand 1989)

When one examines the social class of Turkish military officers, the empirical work of Mehmet Ali Birand Yes Commander (1989), \textit{(Emret Komutanım)}, shows that the social background of the Turkish military was not necessarily from rich families. In his work, Birand discovered that Turkish officers were recruited from the middle and lower classes and occasionally from the peasantry. As officers they were not identified ideologically with any of these classes, or with any oligarchy or aristocracy. Thus, the Turkish military, unlike the military in Latin America or in neighbouring Greece, is not identified
politically with a specific social class but with the state only (Birand 1989). This research supports the claim of Sakallioglu (1997) that the military in Turkey does not function as a defender of the middle class or any particular class, in conflict with the wishes of some members of the elite and middle class, particularly during the 1960s. This will be discussed later on in this study.

Another characteristic is that members of the military considered themselves to be an internal part of everyday society. Many authors like, Birand (1984 and 1989), Hale (1994), and Özdemir (1992 and 1993a) have stated that when the military have stepped in to exercise government power they have done so not for their own sake or on behalf of a particular social group but for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the state, which in turn guarantees their role and position. It can be argued that this identification with the state makes the military relatively immune from political infighting, which in turn gives the military unlimited freedom to intervene on the grounds of defending the state. Hale (1994) argued that the role of the military has changed from being impartial in politics to shaping and influencing politics. This was especially true following the military intervention of 1960, and the establishment of the body called the National Security Council (NSC). The latter allowed the military to act with what Sakallioglu (1997) calls political autonomy, pertaining to political goals and influences.

The views of the military about civilians and daily politics are undoubtedly affected by the separate life that they lead from the age of 14. The high degree of group consciousness of a Turkish officer begins to develop quite early, when he is a cadet in the
military high school. He lives and works apart from the rest of society, and becomes distinguished from his civilian friends and from the other members of his own family by his behaviour and by his uniform and insignia of rank. Civilians seem to him undisciplined and even impolite (Karaosmanoglu 1993). In the eyes of the military, political parties are gatherings of undisciplined individuals, most of whom subordinate national interests to their own. Although the military shares the view that the multi-party system is an integral element of democracy, there is a strong emphasis in the military’s approach to politics that parties should not divide the nation into different groups and provoke class and interest conflicts, but should contribute to the welfare of the people and the development of the country (Birand. 1989: 115-16).

This idea of constructive politics amongst the ruling class was developed during the early Republican era when there was only a single political party. With the introduction of a multi-party system more pluralistic views began to proliferate, and then the unity of the political system started to crumble and weaken. Instead of politicians introducing new alternative ideas and solutions for the country’s growing economic and social problems, such as revolutionary and separatist terrorism, there was more argument about the party leader’s personal life than its political program or thoughts. Consequently they were accused of incompetence, lack of discipline, and lack of constructive politics by the army.

There is not much doubt that the Turkish army wishes to see opposition parties acting constructively. The suspicious attitude of the army towards the civilian governments can be seen in the memoirs of General Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 military coup, in
which he strongly indicated his discontent with the political parties. He complained about expressing disagreement for its own sake: ‘I have never seen an opposition party approving a governmental policy or decision’ (Karaosmanoglu 1993: 27 and Milliyet 23 October 1990: 9).

Why does the military consider itself able to intervene whenever a social crisis takes place? Birand posed this question to one hundred military school students almost all of whom gave the same answer: ‘When the unity of the country is in danger from foreign enemies as well as internal conflicts, it is their duty to intervene’. There was also unity amongst students, who supported military intervention if necessary to defend Atatürk’s principles (Kemalism) within the country (Birand 1989).

It could be argued that the identification of the military with the state, and with society at large, was reinforced during the war of Liberation (1920-22) which led to the creation of the Republic. The military regarded the new state and the modernist reforms as Atatürk’s legacy (Toker 1991). Yet military men were forbidden to enter politics so long as they maintained their army commissions. It is worthy of consideration that Atatürk himself became involved in nationalist politics in 1919 only after he resigned from the army (Özdemir 1992).

Atatürk’s successor was Ismet Inönü another ex-general. He served during the War of Liberation, later resigned and was elected as Member of Parliament. Inönü was not as successful as Atatürk was in keeping the military out of politics. The first evidence of this
appeared when İnönü was about to make a decision on multiple political parties within the Turkish Parliament. This occurred when adopting the democratic principle of opposition parties, freedom of assembly and expression. This decision was taken in 1945-46, but not before İnönü had consulted with the military chiefs and secured their approval (Toker 1991: 123-129).

The sensitivity of the army to political reforms was clear when they only supported İnönü with the condition that ‘the political parties would not be allowed to violate Atatürk’s reforms’ (Toker 1991: 129). İnönü told the army chiefs that they had a duty to preserve the democratic order (Karpat 1959). The military, therefore, were entrusted with two positions: not only were they custodians of the state, but they were also charged with the task of guarding the state’s newly established democratic order. However, direct involvement in politics was strictly forbidden as part of Atatürk’s legacy. Hence, Turkish democracy came into existence with the express consent and support of the military (Erguder and Hofferbert 1987; Ahmad 1981).

One of the leading experts in this field, Karaosmanoglu, highlighted three dimensions of the army’s approach to politics:

...staying out of politics because it is harmful to professional integrity, but intervening in politics whenever it’s necessary for the protection of the secular and democratic regime; safeguarding the democratic regime and contributing to the process of democratisation [because democratisation is part and parcel of westernisation] but refraining from acting as an instrument of the political government; joining the western community of nations to become an integral part of it, but maintaining a guard against the west (Karaosmanoglu 1993: 32).
It can be argued that the development of a pluralistic order in Turkey after 1950 took place with the tacit support of the military. However, the civilian structures developed outside and at times conflicted with the control of the military, challenging the army's traditional position and values. The tensions born out of this conflict have always been kept under control. Moreover, many believe that in the long-term the transition of Turkey's social and political system to an entirely civilian order is an essential and inevitable party of liberal democratic life (Erguder and Hofferbert 1987).

There is an argument amongst scholars that many of the political crises faced by Turkey since 1950 stem from the process of this transition, especially when one considers the army as defender of Atatürk's principles, which have been debated and gained different meanings amongst the different parties and social groups, such that none of the parties have managed to find a clear understanding of Kemalism. However, there is a consensus that Kemalism is a transition from the old monarchic Ottomans to a new modern, secular, western-oriented Republic, which seeks political participation and competition in a constructive manner (Kili 1969). The question that arises is identical to the one which was debated in the early part of this study in reference to Burke: will the transition finally be achieved through violence and the total destruction of the old order, as in the French Revolution, or will it take place gradually, with the old order being quietly replaced by the new, such as the evolution of democracy which took place in Britain. In the case of Turkey, it may be argued that this transition took a rather quick but nevertheless relatively smooth route until the 1960s.
The military played key roles in 1960, 1971, and 1980, when it intervened in what many considered to be its traditional political role in Turkey. Some argued that the military interventions in the Turkish political system seem to have expedited the overall gradual transition, first by defining the army's role in the democratic order, and secondly by consolidating the democratic process through various constitutional and legal devices, which brought more political autonomy for the military. As Sakallioglu noted (1997), protecting the military's (self-governing) autonomy turned into an instrument for limiting the government's prerogatives by strengthening the military's own decisions-making powers. This trend developed following the military intervention of 1971 and the coup of 1980 strengthened the position of military in terms of policy making and influence in normal civilian matters. It can be argued that although the Turkish army intervened in the politics with good intentions, providing the legal basis for such actions under the constitution of 1961 and the military law of 1970, it challenged the Kemalist ideology, which directly opposed military interventions in politics.

There is a strong fear that the army might become more politically polarised and forget its defensive duties, eventually harming the reputation of the military in Turkish society. In addition it may damage the development of country on a more liberal democratic path. To understand the implications of the military's involvement in internal security matters normally considered to be civilian police duties, it is essential to find the causes and reasons for the military interventions. Comparative analysis of the military interventions in terms of democracy, the role of political parties, and the means of combating terrorism, will allow interpretation and understanding of the situation.

There is a consensus amongst scholars that the military take-over of May 27th 1960 was a result of concern by the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and military regarding the rise of civilian disorder and the undermining of Kemalism by the Menders government. This disorder was caused by a shortage of food, in the late 1950s and subsequent discontent. This finally led to the disintegration of the traditional elite order, brought about by the policies of the Democratic Party (DP) government of Adnan Menders and Celal Bayar (Özdag 1997).

Unlike the interventions of 1971 and 1980, the military coup of 1960 was engineered by a secret organisation consisting chiefly of middle-ranking army officers. The generals who were involved in the coup were drafted in only shortly before and during the early hours of the take-over. This was preceded by student demonstrations and growing underground activity, chiefly led by the younger members of the Republican Party.

It is believed that the 1960 coup was carried out with the extensive help of RPP and its leader İsmet İnönü (Kabakli 1992). This became evident, during the later stage of the take-over, when members of the RPP took most of the seats in the Constituent Assembly which drafted the Constitution of 1961. The views of the RPP on the future of Turkey had already been expressed in various publications issued by its Research and Publication Office (Kabakli 1992). The young members of the Research and Publication Office of the RPP, some of whom later became identified with radical leftist movements and the
publication of the 'Yon' (Direction), played a significant part in shaping the thought of Turkey's leftist ideology (Özdemir 1993b) and subsequent political developments in the 1960s and 1970s. These are discussed further in Chapter IV.

It has been suggested that the instigators of the military take-over of 1960, described euphemistically as the work of the zinde kuvvetler (vigorous young forces), had the view that the Democratic Party and its members were anti-democratic, reactionary, conservative, and anti-secular. In other words, they were accused of opposing Kemalism, and as a result were unfit to govern the country (Hale 1994). Consequently, the DP was likely to be opposed and challenged vigorously by the RPP. This is an accepted condition of a multi-party democracy, however there was a tacit assumption that the army would step in to defend the party of Atatürk (RPP) against a government run by reactionaries (Özdemir 1989).

This led the Constituent Assembly to create a barrier with the sole objective of preventing reactionaries entering Parliament. The military and the RPP co-operated to prevent what they perceived to be reactionary conservatives from gaining political credibility during the 1960s. However, this attempt was not successful because of the public's growing awareness of political arguments and democratic values, which resulted in victory for the Justice Party of Demirel in the elections of 1961 in which the conservatives won 216 seats. The National Assembly at that time consisted of 450 seats, and this result was declared by the military as being counter-revolutionary.
When one examines the causes and consequences of the 1960 military coup there are a number of issues which can be identified. There did not seem to be any real legitimate reason to suppose that there was any threat to the security of the state or that the revolution of Atatürk was under threat. Rather, it was the emergence of another political party from the ranks of the Kemalist RPP which in itself did not threaten the existing ideology of the state. However, the DP did underestimate the influence and strength of the military and civilian bureaucracy combined with RPP. During the late 1950s some public disorder occurred, mainly in Istanbul but also to a lesser extent in Ankara and Izmir (Zurcher 1993). The Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes made another major misjudgement, and declared martial law. Instead of relying on the civilian police to carry out law enforcement, the government asked the army to take action against the public disturbance. This provided the background and context for the military coup of 1960.

Looking at the reasons for the military intervention of 1971, Karpat (1981) argued that 'It is wrong to say that government weakness is the root cause of political troubles in Turkey which resulted chiefly from the failure of any political party to win a majority'. However, it is simplistic to suggest that failure of political parties caused the second military intervention, since the economy was in decline, and from 1965 to 1971, there was not a hung parliament and the Justice Party maintained majority support to form a government. The Justice Party were targeted by some groups and accused of being anti-Kemalist and anti-modernist. There were signs that as early as 1965. Some members of the military, RPP and elite believed that the government could not be trusted to maintain the constitution (Frey 1965).
The Justice Party alone won a comfortable majority in both the 1965 and 1969 elections. Examination of daily newspapers and other publications from the period shows that the decade from 1961-1971 was spent in vigorous ideological debate between the parties. Forces operating inside and outside Parliament, such as the Turkish Labour Party, and the Direction group (Yon), were able to frustrate the work of the government (Lipovsky 1992), the most common criticism being that the government was not changing the Constitution and not taking account of new developments from the modern world. The Justice Party, on the other hand, felt that its constituency was unjustly maligned and deprived of constitutional rights and it was therefore uncooperative (Kurtul 1993). Feroz Ahmad went further, arguing that the liberal constitution which democratised Turkish politics was a luxury that could not be afforded (Ahmad 1981: 6).

The military intervention of 1971 took place in an atmosphere of social and political turmoil. The army accused Demirel’s government of:

... pushing the country into anarchy, factions struggle, social and economic unrest through its wrong views, attitude and policy. Its credibility in the eyes of the public has fallen, any hope of achieving the level of civilisation envisaged by Atatürk has become impossible and moreover to enforce the reforms mentioned by the constitutions places the future of the Turkish republic in grave danger (Milliyet 13 March 1971).

Unlike the coup of 1960, the intervention of 1971 was led by the Chief of Staff, General Faruk Gurler, on behalf of young nationalist democratic officers who feared a left take-over by a group headed possibly by General Madanoglu (Primary Office Publications 1973). It was their major justification, after the intervention, that Madanoglu, who had
supposedly been receiving the counsel of radical leftists intellectuals, could have been
leading the country into communism. Since the idea of achieving communism through
democracy looked very unlikely, if not impossible, to the left-wing intellectuals, they
considered the option of employing the military to further their cause. This is discussed
further in the next chapter. This idea of involving the army in politics was not only
advocated by some left-wing intellectuals but also by the RPP and the elite who had been
keen on using the power of the army as early as 1960. Left-wing revolutionaries
considered the intervention of the army as being vital. For example, the militant group
Revolutionary Youth and Revolutionary Path (Dev-Genc and Dev-Yol) displayed posters
along these lines that could be seen on every street corner in the big cities during the early
seventies.

O Revolutionary youth, it is time for us to go to war. Take the gun in your
hand against Imperialism. Proletariat, peasants, youth, army together hand-
in-hand. Nobody can stop us. We the powerful Revolutionaries are going
to win. Proletariat, peasant together, we will come to power. Long live the
war of the proletariat (Primary Office Publications 1973: 22).

Although the military chiefs accused the Demirel government of gross incompetence,
they also intended to prevent the extreme left from taking over the government. In their
view the country was being reduced to anarchy, political hostages were being taken,
universities were being occupied, and acts of terrorism were occurring daily in the streets.
The military justified their intervention on the grounds that the civilian government was
being undermined and the country was slipping into 'anarchism'.

Although the government of Prime Minister Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, had a
clear majority in Parliament, it is worth considering whether violence could have been prevented without the take-over of the government by the generals. When Karpat interviewed Süleyman Demirel, he asked him why he did not use his authority to oppose the illegal seizures of the universities and to prevent the intimidation of students and professors by political thugs who not only violated the law but threatened democracy. Demirel's answer was: 'The demonstrators would realise that the public did not agree with them. Having exhausted their arguments, they would realise the fruitless reason of their cause' (Karpat 1981:14). This illustrates a fundamental difference between politicians and soldiers at a time of rising political tensions. The former indulges in political debate, at least for a period. If this fails they trust that common sense will prevail. The military has rather less patience with political polarisation and undisciplined, and is likely to act more precipitously and firmly to suppress disorder.

Much of the political turmoil in Turkey, which began first in the universities and then spilled over into society in general, could have been avoided if the university administrations and the government had possessed the legal power and the determination to uphold the rules of a true democracy. Like the governments of Menderes in the 1950s, the governments of Demirel had perceived the issue of the communist challenge to Turkish democratic life as an matter of security, which the military was there to deal with it if necessary, and this approach consequently lead to the military intervention of 1971.

As with the previous military intervention in 1960, the army promised to hold free elections once the violence and disorder had been totally eradicated. Their intention was
to restore normality and to re-establish civil government (*Milliyet* 14 March 1971). One significant difference in the 1971 military intervention, compared with that of 1960, was that all the political parties, including the RPP, opposed the military intervention. Unlike its stance in 1960, the RPP criticised the intervention, and their new leader, Bulent Ecevit, had a totally different attitude towards this military involvement in civilian politics than had his predecessor İsmet İnönü in 1960. The military intervention of 1971 failed to secure the support of a major social group or political party and it was limited to forcing the Demirel government to resign and establishing a so-called technocrats government for a limited period.

The most recent military intervention was carried out on 12 September 1980, by the armed forces under the command of General Kenan Evren, leading chiefs and general commanders of the ground forces, air force, gendarmes and admiralty. This intervention was without any violence, and was described by critiques as a definite turning point in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The intervention was arguably the only way out of a crisis so complex as to preclude any hasty judgement of the action taken or of its future consequences.

The Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren addressed the Turkish nation justifying the reasons for military intervention as follows:

> The Turkish republic has given its trust to us; as a nation with a territorial entity it is faced with treacherous ideologies and physical attacks instigated by external and internal enemies, whose aim is to destroy the very existence of Turkey, its political system and independence. The government and its principal organs have been rendered uncooperative, the
constitutional institutions have turned contradictory or silent ... the political parties have failed to secure unity, togetherness, while reactionary and other ideological deviations have flourished in the place of Kemalism (Tercüman and Milliyet 13 and 14 September 1980).

Kenan Evren went on to identify the aims of the coup in the following terms:

To preserve the country's integrity and achieve national unity and togetherness, to prevent a possible civil war, and a war among brothers, to restore the authority of the government, to assure the existence of the state and eliminate the obstacles which prevented the democratic system from proper functioning (Tercüman and Milliyet 13 and 14 September 1980).

This was a clear statement from the military that they had usurped the civil government in order to ensure the fulfilment of public trust. Public confidence had to be restored by the reintroduction of the principles of Kemalism. Firstly, they argued that it was their duty to intervene, otherwise it would have been almost impossible to avoid a large-scale civil war in the country. Second, the above-mentioned reasons gave them a constitutional legitimacy to intervene. Third, the loss of public faith in democratic institutions had to be restored. Last, the traditional responsibility for the defence of the country was their duty, given to them by the creator of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Birand 1989; Özdemir 1992). Together this reasoning provided a strong defence for the legitimacy of the intervention with its intention to restore the credibility of government. It could be suggested that much more acceptable reasons then those of 1960 and 1971 justified the intervention of 1980. The generals had the confidence of the public, as well as the support of western democratic countries, such as the USA and EC countries. Both the United State and Europe provided Turkey with economic credits at this time (Aytaç 1997).
To conclude this section, there is a number of points that can be made. First, as Wilkinson noted: ‘internal security duties under the strict limits imposed in a constitutional liberal democratic system conflict fundamentally in many respects with the professional instincts, traditions and ethos of the military’ (1996: 5) which is one of the central arguments of this work. The nature of the army’s training and the way that they are educated does not equip the military for the task of defeating terrorism. As Wilkinson argues, the main task of the military is the identification and destruction of an enemy, but this is a task which is difficult to achieve, when dealing with terrorism, without provoking or escalating the levels of violence, rather than diminishing it and maintaining order (Wilkinson 1996: 5).

Second, it can be argued that the use of the civilian police to combat public unrest and terrorism is preferable to the use of the military, for reasons of accountability and legitimacy. This argument based on the ‘Community-based policing’ (King 1998: 282) in liberal democracies which is expected to be more legitimate and accountable. Third, it is important that if the police force is unable to maintain public order and the army has to be asked to assist in serving the authority of the government by carrying out law enforcement duties’ the military must be seen to be under the control of the civilian government. These are central issues in Turkey with regard to the army’s position in terms of combating terrorism and maintaining law and order.

It can be argued that the Turkish military took a sensitive attitude towards internal security matters and, despite some over-reaction was generally restrained in restoring
order where the civilian forces failed. Nevertheless, the intervention of the army adversely affected the country in number of ways. First, after a long tradition of the military history, Turkish democracy and party government has now been affected several times by military coups. This has prevented the development of a political system in which multi-party competition has become the accepted form of government, because the possibility of military intervention is ever present. Second, the behaviour of the armed forces in intervening in politics has led to considerable criticism, which has undermined and damaged the position of the military and its role in Turkish society. Third, and perhaps most importantly, although the military has taken tough action against terrorist groups within the country, it is evident that this approach has met with only limited success as terrorism has continued following each military coup. The army is the last resort in such matters and if brought in too soon may merely exacerbate matters.

Finally, it would seem that despite the attention paid to national security in relation to extreme socialist and communist revolutionary movements and ethnic-oriented terrorism, the civilian authorities did not show sufficient courage in tackling the problems. Thus, the military was to some extent forced to take the initiative in maintaining order, and this has developed an attitude, amongst both civilians and the army, that military intervention is a usual and expected occurrence in certain circumstances. Such an expectation has not assisted either the civilian alternative or the army in the campaign against terrorism in Turkey.
Conclusion

This chapter has primarily been concerned with the process of democratisation in Turkey during the last two centuries. This began with the last Ottoman Empire through the foundation of the new Republic in 1923 and, more recently, has included the transition to a multi-party system. This chapter has also examined the role and effect of the army’s involvement in political developments, particularly its role in combating terrorism and public disorder. An understanding of these periods of government, and of the political developments leading to multi-party democracy, enable a deeper appreciation of the context and causes of terrorism since the late 1960s and the attempts of successive governments to combat it.

The chapter has discussed the fierce hostility towards, and misunderstandings of, perceived western imported values following their introduction during the late Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the new Republic. The reasons for this opposition to democratic values can be summarised in number of ways. With a few exceptions, western-style political rights, national aspirations and secularism were perceived as imported foreign values, which would undermine the identity and cultural past of Turkey itself. These feelings increased yet further as a result of the behaviour of the Republican People’s Party and the ruling elite which in the period up to the 1950s adopted a coercive Jacobin-style approach to implementation rather than by seeking public consensus. The mass of the people was not ready for dramatic changes in such a limited period of time, as the approach adopted by the ruling class did not encourage political debate, education and
democratic values to develop in an evolutionary manner. Consequently, the early introduction of the ideology of the new Republic, Kemalism, did not have a real chance to penetrate deep into society, as a result of the lack of appropriate education, communication and understanding. Furthermore, because the principles of Kemalism were never written down in detail, nor aligned with any of the other existing political doctrines, the ideology is unique to Turkey.

The result was to create an environment in which some opportunist groups, mainly the ruling Republican People’s Party and the elite, were able to use supposed principles of Kemalism to suppress those people who were opposed to their doctrine. The abuse of Kemalism and the way in which the ruling classes used it to justify their approach to society in general played a major part in shaping modern political life in Turkey. The truth of this was summarised by Orlow (1982:55) when he wrote: ‘most of the violence was committed in Turkey in the cause of preserving and restoring Kemalism’. Inevitably, opposing factions rejected the new political principles by resorting to violence.

The political role of Kemalism in a changing world is also questionable. Since the death of Atatürk in 1938, Turkey has undergone many economic, social and political changes, like most other societies. Because Kemalism has never been clearly defined, it has been interpreted differently by various individuals and political groupings. The result has been that Kemalism and Atatürk’s principles, which were supposedly based on modern western values and democracies, have not always been compatible with them.
Moreover, Turkey inherited a fear about the unity of the country because ethnic and political minorities, in particular, played a key role in the collapse of Ottoman Empire which saw such minorities as the divisive tool of foreign states. As a result, for Kemalism the most important principle of the Republic was the unity of the country and language and unity in race and origins, sharing a common past and a shared morality (Köker 1997: 69). As a result of the Ottoman experience, there has been considerable scepticism about minority demands and external involvement in minority issues (Laçiner 1997: 85). These experiences, rooted in the past and the dominant ideology of the state have determined Turkey's attitudes towards terrorism and, as discussed further in Chapter IV and VI, theses fears, to some degree, have made it difficult for governments to find democratic and political solutions for terrorism.

With the rise of communist revolutionary movements in the 1960s, the upsurge in Kurdish national aspirations and the threat from extreme religious movements, the Kemalists were unable to find an effective political solution, and resorted to the use of the military in maintaining authority. Nevertheless, although Turkish society suffered badly from the effects of misrepresentation by the elite, and misinterpretation of the meaning and implementation of democracy, society did manage to create and facilitate some basic values of democratic life. In particular, since the introduction of multi-party elections, Turkey has seen the development of competition in politics, increased level of participation, and an expectation of the legitimacy and accountability of government actions and behaviour.
As to the role of the military, there is a number of issues that have been highlighted in this chapter. The role of the military in Turkey is different from the role of militaries in most western democracies. Since the military is perceived to be the safeguard of the Republic and of Kemalism, any perceived challenges always attract the army's attention. Therefore, unlike liberal democratic countries which expect to counter terrorism and political violence through their civilian police forces, it has been an easy option for civilian governments in Turkey to use the military. Although the intentions of the military have been to maintain law and order within society, the country's anticipation of military intervention has increased so that it is often expected to deal with any major political crisis which arises. If the normal channels of democracy had been given a better chance to develop, Turkey might have seen a better-developed, more stable and more mature democratic system than it has today.

However, the behaviour of the military in Turkey is also different from that of the militaries of Latin America and some Far Eastern countries. The major difference is that the Turkish military has never had any ambition to take-over and run the country. As Sakallioglu noted (1997): 'civilian posts are alien to them'. Therefore, it can be argued that politicians in Turkey stand a better chance of developing a liberal democratic approach in dealing with political crises. Unat's (1979), Dodd's (1979), and Turan's (1977) approaches summarised the true meaning of democracy as being: the general process of change in the political system which is seen to comprise, the expansion, centralisation, differentiation and specialisation of political functions and structure; increased participation in politics; a political systems capacity to solve problems; mutual
tolerance; and responsive rather than responsible government (Turkish phrase Devlet baba, father state, government). Adoption of this approach would help the political parties to understand and perform political concepts in a more logical, understandable and acceptable way. Finally, greater adoption of liberal democratic principles would undoubtedly increase the security and authority of the government in avoiding and resisting the threats from terrorist groups.

Chapter IV examines the challenge of revolutionary terrorism to Turkish democracy and the response of the political parties to the challenge. It has been noted in this chapter that the response to terrorism by governments in liberal democracies has to be within a framework of democracy. However, the capacity of a political system to respond to the demands of the population in a democratic way, and its ability to respond to terrorist incidents is dependent on the relative maturity of the democracy, in which the public's awareness of democratic values plays an important part. The following chapter will address the issues of political accommodation in Turkish democracy, the attitudes of political parties and others towards democratisation, and the terrorist challenge to democratic life and institutions in Turkey.
CHAPTER IV

TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1960 AND THE RISE
OF IDEOLOGIC-REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

Introduction

This chapter considers socio-political life in Turkey following the military coup of 1960, up to the 1980 military take-over, and the civilian government of Özal in 1983. Central questions include: how did the traditional policy makers respond to the crises in Turkey; how did the political parties respond to Turkey’s increasing problems during the 1970s, and what was the role played by the military in such crises; how and why did the socialist revolutionary groups used street fighting and terrorism as a means of changing the political system?

In order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine a number of parallel issues which were crucial to developments in Turkey. The first considerations are the socio-economic conditions and the legal and constitutional framework, which resulted in a reaction against the official ideology of the state at a time when socialism was being introduced into Turkish political life. Secondly, this chapter examines the reasons why some groups used accepted channels of democracy, while others adopted terror tactics to achieve similar goals. The study also examines the resilience of Turkish democracy when
faced with the threat of terrorism, and the ability and capacity of the government of the
day, and of the political parties, to overcome the opposition of the terrorist splinter
groups.

This chapter also assesses reasons why the governments of Turkey failed to deal
effectively with terrorism and had to seek the support of the military to overcome crises
which threatened the fledgling democracy in the country. The nature of politics and
political parties in the 1970s, when crisis in the Turkish economy was commonplace, and
when violence, social disorder and terrorism were almost daily occurrences, is also
examined.

The Socialist Movement in Turkey

During the 1950s Turkey achieved a partial democracy which did not fulfil the aspirations
of the public. The resulting frustrations manifested themselves in public disorder and
strife. In this environment, the government led by Menderes was in a weak position when
the armed forces took control in 1960, following which the military commanders ruled
the country for 18 months before returning the country to civil rule in 1961. Primarily
because the army leaders did not seek political power, the initial coup was achieved
without violence. As noted in the previous chapter, Ataturk had proclaimed that military
and political power should be kept separate, with the result that as the guardian of
Ataturk's principles, the ruling military officers were uneasy about occupying political
positions. Subsequent representations by the National Unity Committee were accepted by
these officers, who agreed to restore civil democratic control (Unat 1979; Hale 1994).

In 1945 the President Inonu decided to allow the formation of opposition parties. The main factors that persuaded him to democratise the regime were the international pressure, the long tradition of westernisation and the social unrest due to wartime shortages and profiteering (Saribay 1991:119). As a result, fifteen new parties were founded in two years, yet the Democratic Party (DP) emerged as the biggest one. The DP soon became the spokesman for private enterprise and individual initiative. The Democrats also gained the support of the businessmen as well as the liberal intelligentsia (Ahmad 1996: 105). In the 1950s, Turkish attempts to establish a multi-party democracy raised so much optimism and confidence amongst the public. This period is now known as the 'revolution of the Turkish democracy'. However, the 1960 military intervention raised many questions about the resilience and vulnerability of this new democracy. During the 1960s, Turkey entered a new and uncharted phase, labelled a pluralistic democracy (Korkmaz 1992). This period of democratic experiences witnessed a dramatic rise in public argument and political violence, starting in the late 1960s and increasing in the late 1970s. It is worth investigating of causes of this, because they are thought to be the main reasons behind the faltering Turkish democracy in 1971 and again in 1980. Political observers believe that the activists of the radical left, emanating from a wide range of socialist ideologies, constituted a major contributory factor to the political instability in Turkey during this period. As part of this study, particular attention is concentrated on these socialist movements between 1960 and 1970, and on the development of underground insurgency following the 1969 elections.
Preconditions of the Movement

The first factor that nourished the left movements was development in the trade unions. In 1952, during the period of Democrat Party rule (1950-1960), the first centralised trade union, known as the Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions, was created. The stated objective of the Democrat Party when setting up a labour union was to create one central body of workers with which the government could establish a dialogue. At the same time, the government hoped that bargaining and negotiation could be made more effective by eliminating the need to discuss labour issues with many different bodies. Also, more importantly, the new order would enable the government to establish and maintain better control of the newly emerging working class (Özbudun 1988). Such a situation, it was hoped, would reduce political consciousness and militancy among the rank-and-file members so as to facilitate drigisme from above (Sakallioglu 1994). Various writers have described state-labour relations under the Democratic Party government as a sub-type of inclusive state corporatism, whereby it is the state, which legislates and regulates the Unions, co-opting its leadership for the purpose of de-politicising, weakening and dominating labour.

After 1960, internal migration increased to more industrialised parts of the country, especially to the cities in the western part like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and Bursa, and consequently urbanisation proceeded at an unexpectedly fast rate. At that time a large number of Turkish workers also emigrated to Germany. The movement of labour from agriculture into industry provided employment within the cities, and a growth in working-
class movements. In the 1970s the Turkish economy grew rapidly. It was the decade of industrial development (Ahmad 1981). In common with many developing countries, increasing industrialisation caused serious social disorders, as a result of workers operating within a more structured industrial environment being able to achieve a level of solidarity not previously possible in an agricultural economy.

As a consequence, industrialisation had serious political implications. On the one hand, Turkey was establishing a middle class, which Huntington (1993) suggested that it is a necessary precondition for stable, liberal democracy. At the same time, the process of industrialisation was creating a number of discrete industrial working groups, considered as the breeding ground for socialism by the Turkish socialists of the 1960s. This was in direct contrast to the claim of a classless society in the 1930s by Peker and his associates, as discussed in Chapter III.

The migration of agricultural labour to industrial areas was inevitable as Turkey became less isolated, and as farming itself became increasingly more mechanised. The status quo that had existed for centuries started to collapse, with the traditional relationship between workers and farmers, landlords and tenant farmers no longer being maintained. The displacement of these people was not just confined to Turkish cities, as many Turkish nationals emigrated to Germany and other countries. Consequently, as Ahmad (1981: 12-13) argued, these developments and others materially affected political life in the country. At this time, the role of the Young Turks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been replaced by the new industrial workers in the big cities and the Turkish
guest-workers abroad, who collectively increasingly influenced Turkish socio-political and economical life (Martin 1991; Sen 1996).

In 1963, labour unions were granted the right to strike, with the predictable result that the industrial workers used their new powers to become a source of major unrest. The extension of educational opportunity and the growth of mass communication, in some part due to the government’s efforts, resulted in a noticeable rise in economic and social expectations, the advent of which made it more difficult for largely traditional political leaders to maintain control over the new, more politicised, working class.

Moreover, the international environment was very suitable for a dramatic increase in the leftist ideologies. The global political trends inevitably nourished the Turkish left. Turkish political life was very vulnerable to the radical, ideological movements and some groups were not ready for such a change. For example Turkish university students had become an active and radical force in the political life of the country since the beginning of the multiparty period (Roos, Roos and Field 1968: 198).

Legal and Constitutional Factors

One of the most important factors that deeply affected the development of the Turkish left and left-originated terrorist movements was the legal element (and the ways in which it affected the socialist movement in Turkey). As a framework for such a debate, Barchard identified some of the main obstacles to Turkish policy-making in relation to the many newly-arisen issues and new developments within society:
The inability of the system to react swiftly to events, and its slowness in taking decisions; the total lack of detailed day-to-day planning; and the strange combination of rigorous procedures and tough laws with a certain aimlessness in practice, all demand attention. No one complains more of the difficulties of dealing with bureaucracy than the ordinary Turkish citizen whose complaints in this area are notorious... These shortcomings have bedevilled every Turkish government and reduced its capacity to make changes. ‘Turkey is a country where the state may be strong, but the government is always weak’, says one former US ambassador to Ankara (Barchard 1998: 13-14).

Nevertheless, the liberalisation of political life in Turkey, following the adoption in 1961 of the most democratic constitution in her history, created one of the most important preconditions for legal activity by proponents of socialist ideologies, alongside the rise of the working class (Sencer 1969; Sulker 1976; Lipovsky 1992: 11). Indeed, following the 1961 constitution, Behice Boran, one of the most important figures of the socialist movement in Turkey, noted that ‘... essentially it was only following 27 May 1960 that socialism in Turkey became a legitimate currency of political thought and a political movement’ (Boran 1970: 100).

An understanding of the effects of the 1961 constitution is an essential prerequisite to an appreciation of the political and social developments in the country in the 1960s. While the labour force produced some grounds for socialist movements, it is equally important to recognise that there were additional legal grounds for political developments. Therefore, it is worth briefly mentioning the legal development of the Turkish constitution, since the rule of law is treated as one of the main element of democracy whereby opposing political viewpoints and aspirations can be accommodated within a pluralistic society.
It is generally agreed by researchers that the history of the Turkish constitutional movement commenced in 1808, this being the first time that the Sultan could be persuaded by the Grand Vezir (Prime Minister), supported by some of his army commanders, that he had to declare a charter for the sake of restoring the ailing state’s authority and of reducing the general unrest. The second attempt at constitutional reform was in 1839, when the Sultan’s close economic ties with the British Empire, and his well-educated Grand Vezir Mustafa Resid Pasa, unilaterally declared a new charter and promised to obey the laws which the Sultan himself had issued (Tuncay 1984: 22). However, these charters did not last long and were quickly rescinded. This situation prevailed until 1876 when a charter generally recognised as being the First Constitution was introduced. This document established a representative assembly, thereby ushering in an era of parliamentary rule for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire. A few months later, however, it was suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II until its restoration by the Young Turks’ revolution of 1908. This constitution was modified several times until the last Ottoman Parliament, which was dissolved on 11 April 1920.

Since the birth of the new Republic of Turkey, there has been an ongoing debate on the number of constitutions, the general consensus now being that there have been three. Authors such as Tuncay (1984) refer to the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982, while others, including Altug (1989) and Sencer (1988), also include that of 1921. This study is based on the findings of the former, and briefly investigates the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 for their effects on Turkish political life. Motivation and intent, combined with the democratic processes, will assist us in understanding the reasons and objectives
of the politicians who implemented these constitutions.

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29 October 1923 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which was prominent in obtaining independence from the victorious Allied powers after the First World War. The first constitution of the Turkish Republic was declared on 20 April 1924, at the instigation of the Grand National Assembly, having been conceived during the War of Independence. It is this first constitution that has created the fundamental ideology of modern Turkey. Bernard Lewis argues 'These were new radical ideas and their appearance in a constitution and subsequent enactment marks the first decisive step in the legal processes that transformed Turkey from an Islamic universal empire into a secular national state' (Lewis 1968: 77).

It is argued that creators of the constitution of 1924 were influenced by the French and Polish constitutions, which when combined with the difficulties experienced within Turkey after its recent hostilities meant that the constitution was conservative and did not include radical liberal approach to democratic freedoms. This is especially apparent when one considers article 5, which gives absolute power to the Grand National Assembly and states that the laws and their interpretation cannot be questioned by any other executive body, although Article 8 declares that the judicial authority, exercised by independent tribunals in the name of the nation in accordance with the laws and regulations in force, has the authority to deliver interpretations of laws passed by the general assembly (Kili 1971). Critics argue, however, that the general assembly exercises judicial power as well, this latter point having caused its critics to question the true nature of Turkish
Democracy.

Tuncay (1984) noted the following on the Constitution of 1924:

This constitution was widely inspired by the French and Polish constitutions... Legislative power was to be exercised by the Grand National Assembly, the representative of the national sovereignty, while executive power was delegated to the government, which was chosen from among the deputies. Although this Constitution delegated the judicial authority to independent judges, it did not accept judicial reviews of constitutionality. Moreover, it guaranteed some fundamental rights and freedoms but did not indicate the sanctions in case of their breach. .... this constitution was very susceptible to dictatorship (1984: 23-24).

Tuncay also observed that this constitution was enacted during a period when wartime conditions prevailed, when the wielding of what some observers believed to be unconstitutional power was considered acceptable (Tuncay 1984: 23). Indeed, enactment of the 1924 constitution generated a kind of government which has since been described by many observers as 'one party rule', although Turkey later introduced multi-party democracy during the 1950s.

Although the 1924 constitution provided for a system of government that could function satisfactorily, it had some vulnerable characteristics, which became particularly evident after the establishment of the multi-party system. Although, in theory, the Assembly had supremacy over government, in practice the reverse was true: it was the government, which dominated the Assembly. The President, the Prime Minister, other members of the Council of Ministers, and the President of the Assembly were all members of the majority party. The enormous powers granted to Parliament by the 1924 constitution were
exploited by the sitting government in the interests of the majority party. The absence of a
system that provided for an effective judicial review of legislative acts and the absence of
a strong pluralist society in Turkey facilitated the Democrat Party government's
domination of the Assembly in the 1950s.

In May 1960 the Democrat Party was swept from power by a military coup. The leaders
of the coup formed Milli Birlik Komitesi, the National Unity Committee (NUC) which
introduced a temporary constitution on 12 June 1960, and suspended the provision of the
1924 constitution relating to legislative and executive powers. On the very first day of the
coup, the NUC appointed a special commission, composed of professors from the
universities of Ankara and Istanbul, to draft a new constitution (Özdemir 1993a).

Given the political and practical effects of the 1924 constitution, its support of what, in
effect, was a one-party parliamentary state and its regulation of all aspects of public and
private life, it was essential for the new regime to introduce reforms. The 1961
constitution gave particular weight to both human rights and to the separation of state
powers. It is widely accepted that the new constitution was intended to address directly
what was perceived to be the anti-democratic provisions in the 1924 constitution
(Özdemir 1989: 25). The new constitution of 1961 contained significant provisions
designed to ensure the impartiality of the President of the Republic as well as new rights
for individuals. These included new stipulations in respect of human rights and liberties,
the intention being that under the constitution the Assembly could be challenged through
an independent judiciary, thus establishing a system under which the absolute power
exercised by previous political rulers would be reduced. As noted earlier, politics within
the Assembly were very much dictated by the leader of the ruling party. The constitution
of 1961 attempted to make the position of President non-political, by making anyone
aspiring to the presidency sever all political links with any political party, and decreeing
that the President had to submit himself for the election and could not be President for
more than one term.

The 1961 constitution paid special attention to the judicial branch of government. The
provisions included guarantees of the independence of the judges and were
comprehensive and detailed. Kili (1971) noted that the authors of the constitution fully
recognised the importance of the role of the judiciary in maintaining constitutional
democracy. Consequently Article 144 introduced a new authority known as the Supreme
Council of Judges, which was given power to decide all matters relating to the
appointment of the judiciary. Article 144 also provided for judicial review of
administrative acts, and established a constitutional court entrusted with the power and
authority to protect the rights of the individual. This established in legal terms the rights,
liberties, and guarantees of the populace within a constitutional democracy. It can be said
that the 1961 constitution was the single most important event in securing Turkish
democratic development since 1924.

In contrast to its predecessor, the constitution of 1961 listed and guaranteed fundamental
rights and freedoms, recognising also the right of collective bargaining and strikes. The
legislative branch was divided into two separate bodies, the House of Representatives and
the Senate. Executive power was exercised by a cabinet in the traditional parliamentary sense. Most importantly, the Court of the Constitution was established with authority to review the legality of laws passed by the Grand National Assembly. Observers of Turkish political history have stated that having suffered the trauma of the First World War, Turkey was not prepared for a multi-party system when the 1924 Constitution was drafted. The constitution of 1961 was considered by many to respond to the need for the establishment of a more pluralistic democracy (Özdemir 1989; Kili 1971; Tuncay 1984). According to these observers the constitution of 1961 provided conditions suitable for the development of socialism within a legal and democratic framework.

Many authors, like Boran (1970), Altan (1967), Özdemir (1989), Ahmad (1981), Dodd (1986), stressed that the 1961 constitution permitted ideological debate outside the Kemalist framework and that, as a result, socialist and social democratic clubs were permitted to operate legally within the framework of the law. Moreover they also believed that improving relations with the outside world, as well as the dramatic increase in the labour force and the better education enjoyed by an expanding number of young people throughout the country, created appropriate for the development of socialist thought and practice within Turkey.

Initially, everything seems to have gone smoothly for the socialists, without recourse to non-peaceful means. So what went so wrong that the development of socialism in Turkey ended up in violence? To find a clue to the answer to this question, it is necessary to investigate the extent of the socialist movement in Turkish political life in relation to its
operational strategies, its aims and its effect on the pluralistic democracy.

The Turkish Socialist Movement and Its Effect on Political Development in Turkey

In its early stages, Türkiye Isci Partisi, the Turkish Labour Party (TLP), the largest and most organised socialist party in the country, in common with the rest of the Turkish socialist movement, consisted not so much of the working class but other, non-proletarian workers, which markedly outnumbered the Turkish proletariat. According to TLP data, the class and social structure of the party was as follows: 27 percent of the party members were industrial workers, 9 percent agricultural workers, 17 percent peasants, and 47 percent were non-proletarian urban workers such as craftsmen, clerks, students, and intellectuals (Boran 1970: 161). This basic social characteristic of the TLP was described by Lipovsky and Boran as being representative of the interests of non-proletarian workers as well as the working class (Lipovsky 1992:12). Another characteristic of the TLP was the non-theoretical level of Turkish socialism which was developed within Turkey. Indeed, the leading member of the TLP, Behice Boran, summarised the situation when he claimed that ‘Turkish socialism has not produced any great theoreticians of socialism’ (Boran 1970: 64). However, in its defence, it has to be said that Turkish socialism was shaped and fostered from the huge amount of socialist literature available internationally at the time.

From its foundation in 1962 until its first congress on 9th February 1964, the TLP concentrated on a nationwide organisation campaign. This first congress introduced the
population to two clear, major and pragmatic tenets. Firstly, socio-economic progress was possible only on the basis of a non-capitalist path to development, and secondly, in order to achieve the non-capitalist path of development, changing the nature of power was second step (Lipovsky 1992:14). In the TLP programme adopted at the first congress in 1964, as in the party charter, nowhere appeared the words socialist or socialism appear. This point of secrecy can be explained by the circumstances facing the TLP, with particular reference to the legacy of Kemalist political policies.

From the establishment of the Republic up to the emergency of the TLP in 1962, Turkey had been governed by a succession of essentially capitalist parties, which advocated what Mardin (1977: 316) described as a form of state capitalism. First, there was the rule of Ataturk, followed by that of the RPP, which continued his policies of Kemalism, as discussed in Chapter III. The Democrats succeeded them in 1950, and the Justice Party replaced them in turn, after the military coup of 1960. Observers like Özdemir (1989), Tuncay (1984) and Belge (1995), argued that although these parties had some differences they all operated within the framework of Kemalism. The dictate emanating from the first Labour Party congress was, therefore, the first time that any party had proposed a programme opposing Kemalism. The Turkish Labour Party chose not to use the word socialism or socialist as part of its strategy to lessen opposition, at least for the time being, although the party ideologues considered socialism the ultimate goal of the party.

As Igor Lipovsky explained:

In 1961-1965 they limited themselves mostly to criticising capitalism and its inability to solve the problems of social and economic development of Turkey: they propagated the ‘non-capitalist way of development of Turkey’
The leader of the TLP, Mehmet Ali Aybar, defined their understanding of the non-capitalist path of development as a mixed economy on a planned foundation with a dominant role exercised by the state sector. He declared that the main parts of his party's proposals were agrarian reform, the nationalisation of foreign trade, banks, insurance companies and of foreign capital in the country (Altan 1967). 'The non-capitalist way', Aybar explained, 'is the name of the economic policy that the TLP will implement after taking power with the aim of constructing socialism' (Aybar 1968: 515-516). While the socialists were trying to avoid strong opposition from the Kemalists, they were also taking account of another strong theme of Turkish cultural identity, that of Islam, which was as opposed to socialism as it was to non-believers.

In order to achieve their goal, the strategy of the Turkish Labour Party was different from other socialist movements, which they believed to have adopted a revolutionary approach rather than an evolutionary one. Aybar illustrated the need for their evolutionary policy as:

"Turkey is not making the transition to socialism in one fell swoop. No society can move to socialism at once. After assuming power the foundations of a socialist economy will be laid and socialist relation of production will replace the capitalist ones. These transformations will constitute a definite stage in the historical process (Aybar 1968:516)."

The economic policy of the TLP was designed to gain public confidence and thereby to create conditions in which they could move to the second stage of the evolutionary process.
Critics argued that with its dual strategies for success, of secrecy or indivisibility and evolution, socialism reaped the benefit in the 1965 general election in which the Labour Party won almost 270,000 votes and sent 15 delegates to the Turkish Parliament. Encouraged by their success in the elections, the TLP decided to change the direction of the party from the struggle for national democratic transformation to formulating solutions and proposals of a socialist nature. The new policy of the party appeared to be a struggle for socialism and justice in peaceful way (Ilhan 1970). After the 1965 elections, the TLP started to use the word *socialism* openly, it ended the policy of secrecy, and took advantage of the opportunity to use the parliamentary forum to propagate its socialist ideas.

Between 1965 and the end of the decade, however, the TLP’s use of normal, democratic channels to gain power and influence started to change towards a more violent strategy. During the mid-1960s, three important strategies appeared for the establishment of socialism in Turkey. The first, which was supported by the Turkish Labour Party, was to develop a political consciousness among the labouring masses, to organise them, and having won the parliamentary elections, to implement the required social and economic changes (Lipovsky: 1992). The second, which was defended by the socialist intellectuals known as the *Yon* group, was for a coup with the aid of the military and civilian intelligentsia. They argued that, having taken power, it would be possible to institute reforms supported by the labouring people (Özdemir 1993). This method was strongly opposed by TLP and its leaders who believed in ‘no coups and reform from above to build socialism’ (Aybar 1968: 247). Mainly the extreme left known as the Proletarian
Revolutionists, who were operating in the country illegally, suggested the third path. They believed that power could be achieved only through armed force with the support of the broad popular masses. They argued against constructing socialism through electoral success and believed in the ability of the leftist sector of the military and civilian intelligentsia to lead the country to socialism (Lipovsky 1992: 40).

During the 1960's, these three stratagems were often debated amongst the socialists in Turkey. The first, defended by the Turkish Labour Party, enjoyed the largest support among the socialists. It could be said that the strategy of the TLP was itself designed within the framework of the 1961 constitution and that they used the parliamentary system of the country for its own political ends. Defending the official strategy of the party, Boran stressed that: ‘... in a country where parliamentarism exists, a party of the working class should not belittle the importance of elections and parliamentary activity. We regard our chief goal as taking part in elections, fighting for the vote of the elector, and representing in Parliament the working classes and strata of the labouring people who are its allies’ (Lipovsky 1992: 73).

At the following parliamentary elections, the Labour Party won 35,000 votes less than in 1965, its share of the vote falling from 3 to 2.65 percent, and the Party returned only two deputies to Parliament. Thus, the 1969 election was a major setback to the TLP, with many of its followers seeing no hope for meaningful change through the processes of formal democracy (Orlow 1982: 61). Following the TLP's failure at the 1969 elections, adoption of the policies of the Proletarian Revolutionists towards armed struggle became more popular among the socialists in Turkey, especially members of youth organisations. Consequently, the Revolutionary Youth, the Proletarian Socialists, the Turkish Workers and the Peasants' Liberation Army all adopted policies of armed struggle for the implementation of socialism in Turkey. The ideological leaders of these groups were influenced by the thoughts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro and Guevara
One of the leading figures in the Turkish socialist revolutionary movement, Mahir Çayan, defended the use of violence to obtain political goals as follows: 'It is justified to use violence in Turkey, since the country is considered to be under the occupation of external imperialists and their capitalist allies within the country' (Çayan 1979). This attitude towards revolutionary socialism in Turkey was not so very different from views of other nineteenth-and-twentieth century terrorist organisations. Whatever the legal and constitutional freedoms for different political activities, and for freedom of speech and thought, there are still extreme groups who wish to act outside the framework of legitimate order and the rule of law. Terrorist organisations have come to believe that the quickest way (perhaps the only way) to achieve their ends and to gain power is to terrorise society and to undermine legitimate government authority, rather than to persist with prolonged political debate within the established democratic process.

The youth organisations were ultra leftist groups, which operated on the basis of the ideological and political precepts advanced by the Proletarian Revolutionaries and the Proletarian Socialists. Although the total number of members of these terrorist organisations was no more than a few thousand, they succeeded in destabilising the political situation in the country and in jeopardising Turkey's foreign policy obligations (Ergil 1980). As Wilkinson noted: 'It is fallacious to assume that terrorists need mass support before they can perpetrate murder and destruction, as we have already observed, many contemporary terrorist groups are tiny' (Wilkinson 1986b: 16)
To summarise, from the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the evolution of democracy has led to a more pluralistic system, including participation by socialist activists in the political life of the country. However, these same organisations also engaged in terrorist activities and caused enormous damage to the still young, fragile and imperfectly formed democratic system. The result was to weaken the government in power and to bring about the second military intervention in Turkey, on 12 March 1971.

One obvious weakness in the strategy of the Turkish socialists was a result of their incorrect assessment of the dynamics of Turkish society, in which the socio-political life was too strongly consistent with Kemalism and Islamic themes to provide any realistic opportunities for socialism in the short term. This was in spite of the fact that there were some trends which should have favoured a move towards socialism, such as the increasing numbers of the working class, more liberal amendments to the 1961 constitution, an already extensive library of translated foreign socialist literature, and the increasing popularity of socialism as a political doctrine throughout the rest of the world. In spite of all this, a serious misjudgement was made by some members of the socialist party in trying to use the military to further their political ambitions. The use of direct terrorism by extreme hard-liners within the socialist movement, prevented wider acceptance of socialism. The next section examines the effects of these terrorist activities and the response of the political parties to them.
Terrorism and the Political Parties in 1960-70s

Social Discourses

Following the 1961 military coup, the Turkish political system could not fully recover. The army continued to play an important role as guardians of Kemalism, and in the words of Hershlag Turkish democracy became a ‘guided democracy’ (Hershlag 1988: 21). Also some political groups could not be accommodated within the existing system. The weakness of Turkish democracy, the global economic crisis, interventions of some Communist neighbour countries and some social and economic crises caused the stability of the country to deteriorate. During the 1970s these factors both caused and were affected by the political violence.

Throughout the seventies, Turkey experienced important changes in its democratic, social and economic system. The rise of extremists at both ends of the political spectrum, right and left, resulted in extensive terrorism and in total 5150 people have lost their lives up to 12 September in 1980 (EGMA / TMDB- ARC. / Sec. Doc, 840746, See Figure 4.2) This led to serious conflict between the major political parties, Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, JP), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, RRP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, NSP), and Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, NAP). As a result there were endless debates about the 1961 constitution – whether or not it was too liberal- and the development of ineffective government policies, which in turn led to a state of social instability, and eventually, in 1980, to military intervention.
The centre-right parties (JP, NAP and MSP) had different and diverging views of how best to resolve the rising problem of terrorism from the centre-left RPP, which had been accused of encouraging and fostering terrorism during the 1970s (Demirel 1969; Levi 1983). The Turkish democracy could not curb the radical groups in a legal, democratic system. Competition between the right and left groups aggravated the problem and the left groups in particular could not be satisfied within the regime. Thus, even the moderate parties became the subject of the political polarisation (Dodd 1990:43). As has been noted, even the major parties had very little previous parliamentary experience and their aggressive rhetoric against each other increased the tension. Also this prevented the political parties from producing an effective solution to ever-increasing social turmoil and instability. The catastrophic effect of an ineffectual political system made the country vulnerable to the military coups and social conflicts such as terrorism.

Also as a result of the imperfect civil after the military coups occurred in 1960 and 1970, the internal conflicts, the country was unable to sustain the impressive rate of real economic growth, of 6.5 percent per year that it had recorded during the 1960s (Hershlag 1988: 21). In addition, Turkey relied on the importation of many raw materials, including 80% of its total oil requirement, and as a result the oil crisis of 1973 had a dramatic effect on the whole Turkish economy. The rapid rise in oil prices and the need to meet foreign exchange requirements for essential energy imports left Turkey facing mounting deficits in its balance of payments (Hale 1981). By 1979, the annual rate of inflation had risen to 100% with the Gross National Product actually falling slightly in real terms, whereas unemployment increased (State Statistics Department 1988). Finally, international
borrowing opportunities were withdrawn and Turkey was faced with imminent bankruptcy. The outcome was one familiar to Turkish economists, politicians, sociologists and researchers, as a vicious circle: economic crisis, unemployment, social disorder, and terrorism.

**The Response of Political Parties**

An analysis of the political parties and governments of the 1970s gives a better understanding of the failure of Turkey's second experiment in democracy. The country was unprepared to face the economic turmoil caused by the 1973 oil crisis, and the parliamentary election of the same year produced a National Assembly with no governing majority, as shown in figure 4.1. This weakness at a time of economic and social crisis led to a situation where no effective decisions were made, due to the widely differing ideologies of the parties. Instead of leadership and consensus there was only dissent.

After the years of electoral failure, the Republican Peoples Party emerged in 1973 as the largest party with a third of the popular vote and 41% of the Assembly seats. A political commentator on the 1973 elections, Özbudun (1988), attribute the rise of the RPP to two factors: first, the energetic leadership of Bulent Ecevit, who replaced the autocratic Inonu as party leader, and secondly, the new social democratic image of the party. Özbudun also considered that, as the 1973 voting patterns indicate, the new image of the RPP appealed to the urban lower classes, including those who may join the extreme groups, following the closer of the TLP with the military coup of 1971. (Özbudun 1988. 21). This view was
shared by many authors as well as by Ecevit himself (Karpat 1981). This change signified a realignment in the Turkish party system, as the old centre-periphery divisions were replaced by a new functional party system. The RPP increased its vote particularly in the former strongholds of the Democratic and Justice Parties, winning support from previously loyal supporters of the centre-right DP and the conservative JP (Mert 1996).

Figure 4.1: The Result of Turkish Parliamentary Elections, 1961-1977, percentage of seats.

The RPP can be considered as centre-left while the JP, the NAP, the DP (Democrat Party), and the NSP are centre-right parties. As figure 4.1 indicate, the parties on the centre right were badly split in the 1973 elections. The JP obtained only about 30% of the vote while the Democrat Party, a splinter group of the JP, received just under 12% of the vote, as did the National Salvation party.

The main differences between the three centre-right parties can be summarised as being
that the NSP combined its upholding of Islamic moral and cultural values with a defence of the interest of small merchants, artisans, and businessmen, whereas the manifestos of the JP and DP failed to make this broad appeal. Importantly, another new political party, the National Action Party, established itself in Turkish politics in the 1970s. Although it won only a small minority of the vote in 1973 (3.4%), the NAP grew in the 1970s under the leadership of the former revolutionary Alparslan Turkes. Although this political movement was initially insignificant, in a comparatively short period of time, through a combination of dedication, discipline, and inspirational leadership, it became an important organised political force (Heper and Evin 1988). The National Action Party's ideology combined an ardent anti-communist nationalism with strongly interventionist economic policies. It was accused of using military-type youth organisations seemingly implicated in right-wing terror by the socialist terrorist groups (Mardin 1977).

The data in figure 4.1 have two important implications, one immediate and the other long-term. According to Rustow, between 1973 and 1980 the small number of seats held in the Assembly by the NSP and NAP were often sufficient to swing the balance between the two major parties, and hence they were able to extract important concessions. He also noted that:

The prolonged, cynical haggling often would immobilise legislative activity altogether. The resulting governmental paralysis would discredit the democratic process, encourage political activists to resort to street violence instead and prevent the enfeebled government from coping with the resulting wave of terrorism without calling in the military or being displaced by them (Rustow 1989: 82).
Moreover, Turkish political parties had already experienced the lack of a co-ordinated administrative authority in implementing policies. As noted by Heper (1993) and Barchard (1998), a hung Parliament and weak coalition governments reduced the capacity of the governments to make the efficient and effective changes that the circumstances of the time needed. It seems, following the military coup of 1960 and another military intervention in 1971 to the political life of the country did contributed to the fragmentation of political parties and political process did not take place in its natural manner, instead it appears that rather enforce and unnatural political development taken place.

The first coalition government was formed under the premiership of Bulent Ecevit. This initial coalition consisted of members of the social-democratic RPP and the Islamic NSP. The coalition collapsed in the autumn of 1974 and was eventually replaced by a ‘National Front’ coalition under Suleyman Demirel, with the participation of the JP, the NSP and the NAP. The instability of this period is indicated by the fact that eight governments held office during the seven years between 1973 and 1980. As a natural consequence of this there were no successful government policies that could seek long term success since there was not a single viable government.

Furthermore, of those eight governments, five represented majorities in the Grand National Assembly. Of the remaining three, the first was an all-party cabinet, appointed to supervise the election of 1973. The second was a ‘technocratic government’ of civil servants, diplomats, and professors selected to overcome a parliamentary deadlock in the
winter of 1973-74, and the third was a minority government of Ecevit’s RPP that failed to obtain a vote of confidence after the 1977 elections.

The 1977 election did not significantly change matters, although the strength of the two leading parties within the coalition did increase at the expense of the minority parties. The RPP, which increased its share of the popular vote by eight points, came close to an absolute parliamentary majority. The JP also improved its share of the vote and its members of assembly seats. The NSP lost about one-quarter of its votes and half of its parliamentary contingent. The defeat of the NSP in the elections of 1977 might have reflected its Islamic supporters’ resentment of the coalition government established by the NSP and centre-left RPP. The right-wing NAP grew considerably, however, almost doubling its popular vote while increasing its small contingent of assembly seats fivefold, up to 7.6% (Prime Minister’s Statistics Office 1980).

Following the 1977 elections, another weak and paralysed coalition government called the Nationalist Front was formed, again under Suleyman Demirel, with the participation of the JP, NSP, NAP. This period of Turkish politics up to 1980 could be described as a ‘reign of terror’, which lacked effective government. Within a few months, the National Front government had lost its parliamentary majority as a result of the defection of some JP deputies. Consequently, Bulent Ecevit was able to form a government with the help of these dissident JP members, who were rewarded with ministerial posts in the new government. This new government lasted barely 22 months, losing power in November 1979, when the partial elections for one-third of the Senate and the five vacant National
Assembly seats resulted in sharp gains by the JP, which won 47.8% of the vote (Prime Minister's Statistics Office 1980). At the same time, support for the RPP declined dramatically to 29.8% (Prime Minister's Statistics Office 1980). Consequently, Suleyman Demirel formed a government with the parliamentary support of his former partners, the NAP, and the NSP. This government had been in office less than one year when it was ousted by the military coup of 12 September 1980.

How can we account for the failure of Turkey's experience with democracy during the 1970s? The immediate reason given by the Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, was the growing political violence and terrorism that, between 1975 and 1980, left more than 5,150 people killed and three times as many wounded (Dilmac 1997). Acts of violence, which became particularly acute between 1978 and 1980, also included armed assaults, sabotages, kidnappings, bank robberies, the destruction of workplaces, and bombings. At this time, some 49 radical left-wing groups existed, opposed by a number of right-wing organisations. The political situation within the country was in turmoil (Altug 1989). Thus, in a sense, the pattern that led to the military intervention of 1971 was repeated during the late 1970s only on a much larger and more alarming scale.

Although, as previously discussed, Turkey had been developing politically and had enjoyed some degree of liberal democracy, it was still lacking a secure infrastructure in which to contain and resolve such sharpening conflicts as political terrorism. The democratic institutions, which have emerged in other European countries, have done so as the result of civil war, revolution and continuing reform. A second major blow to the
political stability of Turkey was the government’s decision to declare martial law and to view the resolution of violence on streets as the job of the military. They treated it as a security matter, rather proposing any real political alternatives to reduce the rising political tension within society.

Figure 4.2 The Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Between 1974-1980

![Graph showing the incidence of terrorist attacks between 1974-1980](image)

Source: EGMA / TMDB- ARC. / Sec. Doc, 840746.

Figure 4.2 indicates the dramatic rise in terrorist incidents in second half of 1970s. This caused much damage to all aspects of life in the country. The governments were unable to cope with the worsening situation, even though martial law was in effect in much of the country. Martial law under the Turkish constitutional system entails the transfer of police functions to the military authorities, the restriction or complete suspension of civil liberties and the creation of military martial law courts to try offences associated with the causes that led to the declaration of martial law. This section of the Turkish constitution has been criticised by many journalists and academics. Altug describes it as being a
highly authoritarian and restrictive (Altug 1995). In spite of this, even martial law could not contain the political violence and terrorist activities during this period.

Social scientists, such as Özbudun and Evin (1988), Turan (1977 and 1993 and Erguder (1987), have all agreed that besides the combination of the economic and social unrest, other important factors lay behind the constitutional crisis. This included infiltration of the police force, by both the right-and left-wing extremists, combined with the resentment of martial law by the majority of the population. The three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were preceded by martial law regimes instituted by civilian governments.

To what extent were civilians responsible for the failure of Turkey’s second experiment with democracy? Some critics state that it was the ideological polarisation of the different political parties within Turkey, which created the context for the crisis. These extremes increasingly caused political frustration, which eventually led to the politically motivated violence (Özbudun 1988: 23). As was noted earlier in this chapter, after the dramatic failure of the Turkish Labour Party in the election of 1969 many of the extremist left-wing ideologists considered terrorism to be a legitimate method of achieving their objectives. One of the most infamous figures of the extreme left, Mahir Çayan, made it quite clear early in the 1970s that he considered that there was no alternative, and that political power had to be obtained through the methods of armed violence (Çayan 1979).

The radical left, unlike the radical right, was not represented in Parliament. However, extreme leftist ideologies found many supporters among students, teachers, and in some
sectors of the industrial working class. When the leading conservative party of Suleyman Demirel (JP) was pulled to the right by its partnership with the NAP and the NSP, the Social Democrat Party of Bulent Ecevit (RPP) was pulled to the left by the radical groups within its own organisation. Evin stated that ‘at no time in recent Turkish history has Parliament been so divided, polarised and politicised as it was in the late 1970s’ (Evin 1993: 97). Changes of government were followed by extensive purges in all ministries, involving not only the top echelons but also many middle and or lower-rank civil servants. Partisanship became a norm in the civil service, which had retained its essentially non-political character until the mid-1970s (Evin 1993: 98).

The practice of pluralistic democracy in Turkey had failed to attain maturity and mutual tolerance between the right-wing parties and the same could be said for the centre-left RPP. The NSP was not itself involved in violence but its use of Islamic themes did not endear itself to those committed to the Kemalist legacy of secularism, including the military (Mardin 1984). However, terrorist attacks and the rapid collapse of government authority, combined with the high rate of inflation and the deadlock over the election of the President in 1980, limited the possibilities for the solution of Turkey’s multi-sided crisis. For Karpat, only the National Salvation Party of Necmeddin Erbakan, with its policies and political organisation, was capable of appealing to the citizens’ basic loyalties (Karpat 1981:3).

Many authors shared this view because the argument stressed the responsible behaviour and inherent security of the NSP. Although essentially a radical rightist association, the
NSP had managed to remain outside the violence which had overtaken the other radical parties. Moreover, there seems to be a consensus among many researchers about the party programme of NSP, which appealed to the majority in respect of economic policy and social justice. At the same time, it also offered to the left certain considerations in regard to history, culture and national identity. In substance it offered something for everyone, and could have created a common front, whereas the RPP and the right-wing JP were lacking any real consensus regarding issues and policies concerning the combating of terrorism and an effective economic policy.

Alternatively, it was argued that the parliamentary arithmetic and the inability or unwillingness of the two major parties (the RPP and the JP) to agree on a grand coalition and a minority government arrangement gave the two minor parties (NAP and NSP) an enormous bargaining power, which they effectively used to obtain important ministries and to staff them with their own partisans (Altug 1989 and 1995).

The second alternative to overcome Turkey’s crisis was seen as a military take-over. It was agreed that this would neutralise the Islamist NSP’s appeal, reaffirm the Republic’s fundamental principles and possibly preserve the necessary foundations for the restoration of a civilian democratic order. It has been a long running argument since the military coup of 1980 that fear of the NSP alternative made the military intervention welcome in some quarters (Birand 1984 and 1987). According to this, much of the population, deeply disappointed by the paralysis of the political system and the threats to their lives and security, was not only fully prepared to accept the military intervention but actually
sought it, especially after they had lost faith in the political parties as a result of the endless verbal debates and accusations and counter-accusations.

A coalition between the two major parties (RPP and JP) would have been welcomed by most of the important political groups in Turkey, including the business community, the leading trade union confederation, the press, the military, and by a majority of the JP and the RPP deputies. All these political groups shared the view that a government based on their joint support would probably have been strong enough to deal effectively with the subsequent political violence. However, the deep personal rivalry between Demirel and Ecevit, which was said by Özbudun to be due to their tendencies to see problems from a narrow partisan perspective, and their failure to appreciate the real gravity of the situation, made such a democratic rescue operation impossible (Özbudun 1988). Democracy can only take root within a society where awareness of the majority of political parties, their leaders, and the general population is well advanced on democratic values as discussed in Chapter II. As the experience of many countries has shown, anti-democracy parties can perhaps be tolerated in opposition but their active participation in government tends to undermine the system (Ergil 1980).

A related phenomenon that contributed to the decline in the legitimacy of the political system in Turkey was the immobility of several governments and Parliaments during much of the 1970s. The very narrow parliamentary majorities and the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions, both the Nationalist Front and the Ecevit governments, meant that new policies could be initiated only with great difficulty. Pressing economic
problems, such as high inflation, major deficits in the international trade balance, shortage of investment and consumer goods, unemployment, and international problems, such as the Cyprus crisis and the United States arms embargo, were aggravated by the inability of government to take effective and immediate policy decisions (Ahmad 1981: 7-11). Put another way, this lack of effectiveness served to de-legitimise the regime. Perhaps the most telling example of such governmental failure was the inability of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to elect a president of the Republic in 1980. Actually, this was not a failure of the Assembly according to Özdemir, who argued that the constitution of 1961 made it difficult for a weak government to elect the president of the Republic (Özdemir 1989). Nevertheless, the six-month presidential deadlock provided further justification for the military coup of 12 September 1980. Examples of lesser deadlocks abounded, particularly in matters of economic and foreign policy.

The experience during the 1970s also demonstrated another inherent weakness of the 1961 constitution, which was that Parliament frequently lacked a decisive majority for one party because of the divisive electoral system of proportional representation. As Rustow noted in his study:

The variety of proportional representation, in due course, produced in Turkey the same splintering of parties that had paralysed the Weimer Germany in the 1920s and the French Fourth Republic in the 1950s and is creating periodic difficulties for Israel’s governments (Rustow 1989: 70).

As was noted in Chapter III, Turks have inherited from the highly bureaucratic Ottoman state a tendency to accord respect to laws and regulations as long as there is a government
deemed capable of enforcing them. It was argued that historically Ottoman and Turkish
governments have been authoritarian only when their authority to maintain the law was
challenged. As illustrated previously, totalitarianism, as understood in the west and in
Eastern Europe, has been conspicuously absent in Turkey even under the most restrictive
governments (Barchard 1998).

Recent history has witnessed efforts to undermine democracy in Turkey. The traditional
understanding of government and authority, and their implicit supremacy, began to be
replaced by an individualistic and interest-oriented understanding of government and
authority. Indeed, it has been argued that democracy was successfully established, at some
level such as party competition and participation) and has survived in Turkey (with some
lapses) not only because of a temporary coincidence of interests and opinions among
Turkey’s elite but also because of the coincidence of traditional beliefs and values with
certain forms of collective action of the Turkish people (Kabakli 1992: 140-148).

On balance, however, it appears that it was not popular disillusion with democracy but
the failure of the political parties and the intelligentsia to develop an economic policy or
political consensus amongst themselves which prevented democracy from succeeding in
Turkey in this period. These issues were not confined to the economy, they also
concerned social justice, culture, religion and the historical identity of Turkey. Although
the failure to establish a consensus undermined democracy, it did not destroy the concept
in the eyes of the people.
However, predictably, opposing factions within Turkey perceived the nature of democracy from different viewpoints. The radical left claimed that parliamentary democracy in Turkey was a device to perpetuate social injustice and backwardness, allowing the upper classes to enrich themselves by maintaining semi-feudal relations in society. The right considered that democracy had destroyed the traditional social order and its values, allowing the left the freedom to subvert and undermine the national integrity and character. Both shared the deeply entrenched belief that democracy had permitted the ignorant masses, alleged to be mainly preoccupied with petty material interests, to make and influence fundamental decisions affecting the welfare and future of society and that a variety of established groups had been allowed to manipulate the ignorant electorate according to their own wishes.

It is also important to note that the new elite group, which emerged during the 1960s, differed from the traditionalists who, together with their claim to enhanced formal education, superior family background and wealth, emphasised their association with the Republican Peoples Party. This elitism placed an emphasis on leadership ability and the capability of defining the problems affecting the entire nation-society.

**Turkey After 1983: The Post-Military Period**

**1982 Constitution and the a New legal Framework**

Turkey has learned from its mistakes. We will never again experience such problems which deteriorated the country’s economy, threatened its unity, cost the lives of its citizens, and from now on, it is time to look forward to a prosperous Turkey, not backward (Özal in Barlas 1994: 11).
This was the famous slogan of Turgut Özal, the leader of the newly established Motherland Party, which was established following the passage of the new 1982 constitution. The constitution, approved by the constituent Assembly in 1982, established a system that lay between the extreme concentration of powers of the Ataturk era and the elaborate checks and balances erected in 1961. Although the 1982 constitution was clearly closer to the 1961 version than the concentrated powers of the 1924 constitution, the current system provides for decisive remedies in times of national crisis (Turan 1993: 92). On these occasions, the broad civil, political, and social rights can be suspended to further the national interest. In normal times, the primacy of civilian rule and the sanctity of human rights are established in law. The new constitution was introduced in an effort to redress the imbalances in the previous two-house Parliament that had so conspicuously failed to provide effective government in the period leading up to the military take-over of 1980.

The aim of the new constitution was to create a system of government that would avoid political chaos posing a threat to the fledgling democracy of the country. Under these guidelines, new systems were introduced to strengthen the powers of the presidency compared with the authority granted in the 1961 constitution. Another striking characteristic of this constitution is that it was designed to avoid the damaging effects of terrorism on democracy, specifically making reference to the National Security Council. This body was originally created in 1961 to assist in taking decisions and ensuring necessary co-ordination in the field of national security policy in its broadest definition. The Cabinet was empowered to give priority consideration to the decisions of the
National Security Council. The powers of this are no longer the ultimate authority of the state, as they had been between 1980 and 1983. Designed as a safety valve, the National Security Council permits the senior military commanders to communicate their views and concerns to the top civilian leaders, and provides a forum for the President to speak in the name of the armed forces.

An independent judiciary remains an integral basis of the new system. Once appointed, judges and public prosecutors serve until they are 65 years of age, provided they maintain a good character. As an innovation, the 1982 Constitution institutes State Security Courts to deal with offences against the integrity of the state, the democratic order, and the internal and external security of the country.

Özal Period

The military coup of 1980 ended in 1983 following new elections. After the military period, Turgut Özal, the leader of Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), secured a victory and gained a comfortable majority in 1983 and became Prime Minister. During his time in office (1983-1989, he won the next elections in 1987 and was elected by Parliament as President in 1989, serving as President until his death in 1993. Özal adopted liberal economic policies and forged closer ties with Turkey's western allies, which ensured the development of Turkish democracy along Western lines. The Turkish press and political groups enjoyed more freedom with the abolishing of articles 141, 142 and 163 from Turkey's criminal laws, which banned the introduction of communism and Islamic
discussion into political debate (Barlas 1984). The era of Özal, aside from the economic
boom that the country experienced, has also become known for the huge developments in
telecommunication and the introduction of the first private television channel. There are
now more than fifteen national television channels in Turkey, many of which have
undoubtedly helped in improving political knowledge and understanding in society. De
Gaulle noted, famously, ‘you can not govern the country with a single party which has got
two hundred different chessmen’. This phenomenon became apparent in the Turkish
political agenda (Birsel 1998). The developing economy and relatively more democratic
government increased democratic demands and diversity. Similar to the 1970s the
terrorist organisations, notably the PKK, wanted to exploit this, yet now the political and
economic structure were stronger than ever. Since terrorism in 1980s and response of the
Özal governments are discussed in the Chapter VI in detailed, now we do not go further.

Conclusion

During the 1960s, Turkey experienced the rise of socialism and questioning of, and
challenges to Kemalism. Initially, leading socialists used the normal channels of
democracy to achieve their political goals. Turkish democracy, operating under the most
liberal constitution in Turkish history, the constitution of 1961, permitted such
challenges. The increasing number of industrial workers and the influx of diverse
political and economic ideas and literature from abroad also contributed towards socialist
consciousness in society, especially amongst the intellectuals and students. After losing
momentum following the setbacks of the 1969 elections, hard-liners within the TLP
turned their backs on peaceful dialogue and instead began to embrace violence.

As noted in Chapter II, the use of violence might have some defensible arguments if it were committed against authoritarian and brutal governments, if there is ever a justification for such acts. However, in the case of Turkey, it cannot be said that such a justification has ever been supportable. Even leading socialists like Aybar and Boran admitted that there exists a legal framework within which to establish and operate a socialist party, and they took the opportunity to establish the Turkish Labour Party.

Unfortunately, splinter groups from the socialist movements spurned the use of normal channels of democracy as the means of achieving their own ends and justified their violent acts in two ways. In their view, Turkey was under the occupation of imperialist western countries and their international companies. Secondly, none of the major revolutions in history took place without armed struggle and violence.

The military, as a guardian of the state and of Kemalism, rather than the political parties, acted against violent terrorist activities, and this can be explained by the inherent weakness of the governments of the day. As Barchard put it: ‘the inability of the system to react swiftly to events, and its slowness in taking decisions; the total lack of detailed day-to-day planning; and the strange combination of rigorous procedures and tough laws with a certain aimlessness in practice all attracts attentions’ (Barchard 1998: 13).

These shortcomings have bedevilled every Turkish government and reduced their capacity to make changes when most needed. The army intervened in 1971 and closed
down the TLP, taking rigid measures against extreme groups. This outcome did not help the rising tension within the country, as argued in Chapter III, when the normal channels of democracy would have given a better chance of establishing an atmosphere in which the use of violence could have been dispelled.

The validity of this argument was proven when, following the free parliamentary elections in 1973, terrorism re-emerged and by the end of the 1970s was claiming an average ten lives a day. It can be said that the lack of political experience, the absence of an appropriate political response, economic deterioration, the US embargo following the Cyprus dispute and the extensive support of terrorist organisations within Turkey by the Soviet Union, took the country to the edge of civil war. It was again only the army's action in stepping into the breach on 12 September 1980, which rescued the country from growing turmoil and strife, and prevented further deterioration. As noted in Chapter III, the Turkish military did not have any ambitions to run the country and declared immediately after the coup that they would hand power back to the civilian authorities as soon as law and order had been restored within society. This they did in 1983.

However, as noted in an earlier chapter of this study, the campaign against terrorism can be conducted on two fronts. As Wilkinson put it:

To counter terrorism effectively, the tough-line approach involves waging two kinds of war: a military-security war to contain and reduce terrorist violence, and a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support which must be the basis of any effective modern democratic government. ... it is important for the success of anti-terrorist operations that popular support for terrorists should remain limited to a minority, indeed that they be as isolated as possible from the general population (Wilkinson 1986b:
In Turkey, while the army was fulfilling its responsibility to counter terrorism – tough, overreacting and impatient from time to time - the political and psychological war to secure popular support and consent was absent. Past experience has demonstrated the need for government to develop political policies and strategies, which eliminate the perceived need for terrorism in minority groups.

Political developments since the 1970s have contributed significantly to the knowledge and experience of democratic practice in the country, albeit at a cost in human lives, destruction of the social and economic order, rocketing inflation, mounting unemployment and, in 1980, the necessity for military intervention.

In spite of these setbacks, it can be argued that Turkey has gained much from these political experiences, provided that heed is taken of the lessons learned. For example, there has been: increased popular participation in politics; creation of different social and civil pressure groups; increasing understanding of how to perform political functions. In the next Chapter, I will debate how the new era after 1983 developed, with particular emphasis on the growing separatist terrorism of the PKK, and how the democratic institutions have withstood and responded to this political crisis.
CHAPTER V

KURDISH COMMUNITY IN TURKEY

Introduction

The 'Kurdish issue', or the 'south-east Anatolian issue' as it is widely known in Turkey, has been a phenomenon of major significance in the country since the late 1960s. The roots of the problem in the Southeast of Turkey go back as far as the nineteenth century when it was known as the 'Eastern issue' (Sönmez 1992). Both the area, and the issue itself, have developed and changed in many ways throughout this period in terms of the people, the geography, the political thoughts of the region's intellectuals, and the parties which have been involved with the issue both nationally and internationally. In order to analyse and understand the essence of present-day political debate concerning Kurdish issues, this section examines the history of Kurdish groups within Turkey on the ground that 'the present situation of the Kurdish people can only be understood in its historical context, notably in the light of the events of the last hundred years' (Kendal 1980: 19).

It has been noted earlier in this study how the elite and the ruling class have shaped the functioning of Turkish democracy and how, within this framework the policy makers have reacted to violence in the country. As observed in previous chapters, these policies were essentially reactive. However, a reactive approach does not necessarily produce best policies to tackle terrorism and might, as Ross and Miller (1997) and Wilkinson (1986ab)
have suggested, play in to the terrorists' hands. It may also restrict democratic life within a particular country, as mentioned in Chapter II and Huntington (1993). Turkey has adopted a tough, hard-line approach towards terrorism on the basis that 'terrorism is a security matter, and therefore the army and the police should be left to deal with the problem, although other policies, including education and economic investment, have also been adopted on occasions.

This chapter examines central issues underlying the Kurdish problem in Turkey. In order to understand the rise of terrorism associated with the Partia Karkare Kurdistan (PKK), one needs an appreciation of the historical development of the Kurdish people, their experiences, ideas and expectations, and their grievances and demands. It is also necessary to clarify a number of issues concerning the Kurds. Who are they and where are they located? What is their language and religion? How have they developed politically, and what were the reasons for the Kurdish uprisings that have taken place? What is their socio-political position as an ethnic group in Turkey? What is the rationale behind the terrorist activity associated with the Kurds?

This investigation will help to highlight similarities and differences between the PKK claims, actions and strategies and the Turkish government's attitude to the problem. As noted in the previous chapter, the inability of successive governments to overcome terrorism has cost the country dearly. The separatist movement in Turkey has become so international in extent that it not only threatens democratic life internally but also external issues such as Turkish accession to the EU, and her international relations in the Middle
The Origin and History of the Kurds

Research into the Kurdish people is hampered by the lack of modern academic studies concerning their ethnic and cultural origins. Moreover, much of the research which has been carried out cannot be considered accurate, because of racial or cultural biases for or against the Kurdish ethnic group. Also some governments in the region tried to use history to justify their official policies.

Arguments on the Origins of the Kurds

Johon and Harwey (1993: 55) state that ‘there is no definitive answer to the question of their origins’, except to say that an identifiable Kurdish people have inhabited the mountainous regions north of Mesopotamia for a period of between two and four thousand years. The first historical reference to the forefathers of the Kurds appears in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, which sets out a contemporary account of the epic journey of the Greeks as they headed north from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea.

After twenty-four centuries the identity of these ancient barbarians may still be obscure - but their name and their location - north of modern-day Mosul - connects them to today’s Kurds, as does their attitude to central authority (Johon and Harwey 1993: 55).

Much of this evidence is disputed, although Johon and Harwey observed an historic link between the Carduchis of twenty-four centuries ago and today’s Kurds. Even Xenophon
tells us little about the Carduchi beyond their war-like qualities combined with their skill with the bow (Johon and Harwey 1993: 55-57), which is also very much a part of the Turkish tradition and culture. The investigations seem unable to establish the actual origins of the Kurdish people, but it is suggested that the name ‘Carduchi’ may relate to the word ‘Kurd’.

Some researchers have suggested that there is a possibility that some Kurdish tribes could have moved from Europe to Mesopotamia four thousand years ago (McDowall 1992a and 1996a). However the view of Kurds as being of Indo-European origin, gives little consideration to their culture, religion, language and other ethnic attributes (Çay 1993; Yildiz 1992; Andrews 1989: 152-171).

In the 8th century BC, the Assyrians were conquered by the Medes, who overran a large part of the territory now occupied by modern Kurds. Around 550 BC it was the Persians who conquered the region which was previously held by the Medes. Andrews (1989) claims the success of these two nations living peacefully together can be found in the nature of the Kurds who share the same linguistic origin as the Persians. This strongly suggests they have Persian origin, but this argument, must be considered doubtful in the light of other historical data, and the conquests of Mesopotamia by many nations such as the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Seljukis and Ottomans makes uncertain this seemingly tangible piece of evidence (Çay 1993). In spite of some commentators’ claims it is impossible to determine with any certainty the closeness of the relationship between today’s Kurds and the ‘successors’ to the Medes and Persians.
In seventh-century Arabia, during the Caliphate of Omar Al Khattab, a campaign against the Persians was waged, culminating in the conquest of Persia and Mesopotamia. It has been assumed that the Kurds converted to Islam following this conquest (Gençkaya 1996). It is very difficult, however, for any historian to make any definitive statement as to the Kurdish identity, as historical documents make no mention of the Kurds as a people. While historical accounts do make reference to various peoples going to war with each other, such as the Greeks, Ottomans, Persians and Arabs, the records are silent about the Kurdish people.

Other accounts argue that the Kurdish people originate from the Central Asia. They suggest that the Kurds might have been a sect of the Turani peoples from Central Asia, where the Anatolian and Mesopotamian Turkish people originally came from. This argument has been advanced by several authors of Kurdish studies such as Yildiz (1992), Çay (1993), Aydin (1992) and Kodaman (1987), and was used as official policy by some of the Turkish governments.

Çay (1993) suggested that when one investigates the origins of the Kurds there is a need to look at a variety of sources. He raises a number of possibilities and reasons for the origin of the word ‘Kurd’. In the sixth century AD, the ruler of the then Turkish Empire in the Central Asia was Oguz Khan, whose ambassador to the Islamic Prophet Mohammed was a person known to be Kurdish. Such evidence, whilst remote, nevertheless has to be considered. Secondly, in his research into the origin of the Kurdish language, Çay observed that there were certain similarities between Kurdish and the
language of the Ural Altay area of Central Asia. This area can also be identified as the origin of the Turkish language, and there are certain similarities between them (Çay 1993: 53-59). However, Çay suggested that the unique characteristics of Kurdish culture, language, art and literature make them closer to the Turani people than any other race in the world (Çay 1993: 64-95).

Another author who shares similar views is Aydin. In his research, Aydin stated that he did not believe the Kurds were descendants of the Medes, nor did he believe they were of Iranian, Arab or Indo-European origin. He considered that although the people known as the Kurds resided in seven different countries, they appeared to have more in common with Turkish culture than any other (Aydin 1992: 27). Another researcher into Kurdish identity was Yildiz (1992), who suggested that the area of the Middle East called Kurdistan in the twentieth century had never previously existed in an ethnic geographical sense. After the First World War, all this area of Asia was divided into countries, according to the preferences of the compatriots. Yildiz stated that until the eighth century this region had been ruled by Rome, Armenia, Persia, Arabia and the Byzantium. Subsequently, this area was populated until the eleventh century by a group that could have been the Turani Central Asian Turkish tribes, although they were known by various tribal names such as Saltuklular, Artukogullari, Cubukogullari, Sokmenliler and Mengucukler (Yildiz 1992: 27-29). In the eleventh century, the area was conquered by the Seljukis who ruled until the fourteenth century, when the area was conquered by the Ottoman. Yildiz pointed out that no person can in truth call themselves Kurdish in a proven ethnic sense (Yildiz 1992: 27-32).
Arguments over national identity can be pursued throughout the world, because many races have no clearly definable root. However, as Winrow and Kirisci (1997) pointed out, this does not prevent people identifying with a particular nationality as the Welsh, Irish and Scots do within the British Isles, and an analogy can be drawn here with the Kurdish people.

The arguments put forward by Yildiz do appear to have historical substance, and the people of this area do appear to be of mixed origin. However, what cannot be disputed is that the people within this area of Asia today identify themselves with the particular area now called Kurdistan. Also, if a people feel themselves to be of a different race, nation or language group, one cannot claim that the cause of this group is not valid. In another word, the Kurdish peoples identify should be respected.

**The Current Perceptions of the Kurdish People**

In addition to its historic origins, it is clear that there is a necessity to consider the present circumstances of Kurdish identity. Current identity is closely related to the perceptions of the people and their views of a particular nation. However, it must be noted, as Bulloch and Harvey have argued that, much of the present population of Kurdistan would not call themselves Kurds, considering themselves to be Turks, Iranians or Arab.

In South-eastern Kurdistan, around the Iranian town of Kermanshah, the local population has traditionally regarded itself as more Persian than Kurdish, and in language and religion it is indeed closer to the Persians than it is to, say, the Syrian Kurds of the Kurd Dagh (Bulloch and Harvey 1992: 52).
The area of Kurdistan historically known as Mesopotamia has been conquered by many nations and this has led to such a complex history that it is practically impossible to establish a true regional identity. As Bulloch and Harvey stated:

The racial mix became even more complex over subsequent centuries, as Turkish and Arab tribes pressed in on the Kurdish heartland. In early medieval times some ethnically Turkish tribes became Kurdified, while Kurdish tribes became Turkified. Kurds became vassals of Arab chieftains and vice versa, and Arab and Turkish words entered the vocabularies of the Kurdish dialects (Bulloch and Harvey 1992: 58).

The different perceptions and academic disciplines used by researchers seem to complicate the understanding of Kurdish ethnic origin and any current description of Kurdishness. Mutlu (1995) suggested that the only reasonable way to identify anybody as Kurdish is through his or her mother and whether that person speaks Kurdish or any Kurdish dialect. However, as Winrow and Kirisci (1997) noted, there are people who cannot speak the language but identify themselves as Kurdish. For that reason, they defined a ‘Kurd’ as, ‘Someone who considers him/herself to have a Kurdish ethnic identity, irrespective of whether Kurdish is the mother-tongue’ (Winrow and Kirisci 1997: 121). However, in the case of Turkey, this approach raises the question of who is a ‘Turk’. Winrow and Kirisci made a theoretical and also a pragmatic attempt to analyse this particular issue, examining the concept of ‘Turk’ in terms of ethnic backgrounds and citizenship:

Individuals may perceive that they have multiple identity. Which identity a person may choose to stress could be dependent on a particular context. And largely psychological ‘boundaries’ between ethnic groups are not fixed. Different generations within a certain family could thus perceive themselves as either Kurdish or Turkish or they may feel that they belong to both
identities. A Kurd could consider him/herself to be a member of specific tribe, hold a Kurdish ethnic identity and also feel him/herself to be a Turkish citizen... Therefore some like Hikmet Cetin (Ex Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister) would consider himself an ethnic Kurd of Turkish nationality (citizenship). He would regard himself as Turkish Kurd (Winrow and Kirisci 1997: 121).

Within the scope of this thesis, the origin of the Kurdish identity is not the most important objective, and this historical discussion has of necessity been abbreviated. Authors such as David McDowall (1996ab) noted that some Kurdish tribes were probably Turks, some Arabs and some of them the successors of the early Mesopotamians who lived two thousand years ago in the region. Most of the researchers of this field seem to agree only upon the uncertainty of the origin of these people. The only practical answer is that the Kurdish people are all those who, as a consequence of the environment in which they live, feel a sense of Kurdish cultural identity, or describe themselves as Kurdish.

It is important for this study to take this approach in order to examine the links between this understanding of Kurdishness and that of the Kurdish Workers Party' (PKK). It is difficult to define from the above analysis the Kurds as a distinctive nation within a subjective description of nation, such as race, ethnicity, religion and language. Decades-old tribal conflicts, clan-type social life, absence of common historical and cultural heritage, and geographical isolation in remote regions, hindered the emergence of a Kurdish sense of nationhood (Barkey and Fuller 1997). Despite these difficulties in defining 'Kurdish nation', during the second half of the 1960s the issue of Kurdish ethnicity was explored by the Kurdish and Turkish socialists. The socialist groups saw the problem from the perspective of socialist solidarity. For them Kurdish and Turkish, all
citizens of Turkey, were under the attack of 'imperialist', 'capitalist' forces, thus they had to co-operate against these enemies. During the 1970s the Kurdish ethnicity issue was exploited for political reasons by radical socialist and separatist groups, like the PKK. The studies used by these political groups were obviously partial, yet the state policies after the creation of the Republic had discouraged the research into the Kurdish identity because of concern about separatism. The Turkish state tended to claim that Kurds are a part of Turkish people, not a separate people (Bruinessen 1992ab). Research and publications sponsored by external powers, most of them for their own political interests, has further complicated matters.

The different views outlined above have bedevilled attempts to find a reasonable and objective conclusion to the matter. It is thus difficult to make a definitive comment about the real origins of the Kurds in this study. However, what can be said is that the more the state tried to avoid any research into the Kurdish issue (Yalcin-Heckmann, 1990), the more opposition groups, such as the PKK, exploited the issue.

A Sociological and Cultural Descriptions of the Kurds

To understand the causes of Kurdish insurrections during this century, and the subsequent emergence of the PKK (Partia Karkare Kurdistan), it is necessary to examine the religious, cultural, political and social background. The historical evidence suggests that Kurdish society was essentially tribal, originating from a semi-nomadic existence which can still be seen in most Kurdish tribes to this day (Kodaman 1987; Winrow and Kirisci
This characteristic of Kurdish society may have changed, especially during the second half of this century, but it remains a cultural hallmark of the people. McDowall states that ‘loyalties, first to the immediate family, then to the tribe are as strong as any in the Arab world’ (McDowall 1989: 8). It is suggested by historians, that unlike the Arabs, Kurdish tribal cohesion is based on a mix of blood ties and territorial loyalty (McDowall 1989).

Another most important factor in Kurdish society has been religion, Islam. Alongside the tribal ties are strong religious loyalties, especially to the sheikhs, aghas, and to the local leaders of religious brotherhoods. Although the Kurds are known as a highly religious people, this characteristic is comparatively recent, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century, when two religious Muslim orders, the Qadiris and the Naqshbandis, began to spread rapidly throughout Kurdistan (Kodaman 1987: 67-75).

Following the destruction of the emirates in the middle of the century, secular power became more localised and devolved on the tribal basis. In the absence of the mediation previously provided by the emirs, there was frequent disorder and conflict between the groups or tribes. The vacuum was filled by the growing number of religious sheikhs (McDowall 1992b: 15).

This situation provided the sheikhs of the two religious orders with an opportunity which far exceeded religious guidance, allowing them to enter the political sphere. An authority and security was established in the region, with the sheikhs frequently acting as intermediaries in inter-tribal conflicts and in disputes between the tribes and the government (Bruinessen 1992; Yalcin-Heckmann 1990). In this way these two religious orders were able to keep peace and harmony within society. The traditional feudal lords
and the religious people perceived themselves as ‘Sunni Muslim subject s of a fundamentally Islamic empire and had no interest in an unpredictable Kurdish entity in which their own status may change for the worse’ (McDowall 1992b: 17). Despite some problems during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire Abdulhamid’s policies prevented any uprising. During these years Islam played a vital role in uniting the Turkish and Kurdish people. Also, in the Independence War the Kurdish resistant movement was actually an Islamic movement and aimed to save the Ottoman empire but not to establish a secular state. However, with the Republic the picture was completely changed. It was Islam that assumed a major role in bringing Turks and Kurds together and the Republic was radical secular. Moreover, contrary to the Ottoman Empire, the new regime aimed to Turkify the land in order to protect the unity of the country. For example Inonu, Ataturk’s successor, summarised the official policy in 1925: ‘We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price’ (Simsir 1991: 58).

Thus after the secularisation of the new Republic the orders lost their serving authority in the region. Consequently there was a power vacuum which was not filled as the central government of Ankara wished it to be. Authors such as Gençkaya argued that:

It is obvious that the fundamental cultural difference between the Turks and Kurds living in Turkey is linguistic. Islam has become a unifying element for both the Turks and Kurds in Anatolia after the first Turkish tribes from Central Asia migrated in the late 10th century (Gençkaya 1996: 94).

So, it is argued that adoption of secularism and implementation of the ethnically based Turkish nationalism after the creation of the Republic did weaken the unifying elements
between the Kurds and Turks. Indeed, one of the most famous Kurdish uprisings occurred in 1925 and the figurehead of this rebellion was Sheikh Said, who explained the reason for the uprising:

I have always thought of Islam that it would be the best suited system for our government to put it into effect and practice. I would never hesitate to declare this (Sheikh Said in Mumcu 1992: 124).

Said was among those who fought against the 'modernisation' of the country which was described in Chapter III.

The rebellion of Sheikh Said in 1925 certainly attracted many supporters both in and outside of the region, and made a considerable impact which led to an Islamic uprising against the modern reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Olson 1989). Evidence also suggests that external political interests encouraged unrest in the area, caused primarily by the potential economic wealth in the region, from the oil fields of Kerkuk and Mosol. Another reason put forward for this political instability was the vested interests of the local chieftains who considered they could assume greater power in its broadest sense, through the creation of an independent state of Kurdistan (Mumcu 1992; Kodaman 1987). Indeed, Said’s uprising may have shared a feature with all the previous Kurdish rebellions throughout history in that it was not so much a struggle for national independence but rather a rebellion of the chieftains against the reactionary interests of the central government, which they considered a direct threat to their position as feudal lords.

Kinnane (1964) suggests that up to the twentieth century the tribal life of the Kurdish
people helped them to resist the outside influences of cultural change that would have been imposed by any central authority within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman system of rule, however, had devolved political authority to the regions within the Empire, and thus was fundamentally different from that established in Turkey after 1923 (Kemalism), whereby society was controlled centrally Kinnane (1964).

Historically, the Kurdish people displayed diverse political and cultural objectives. Even the Kurdish language contains different dialects which, it has been suggested, are a result of their multi-ethnic origins. Bruinessen (1992a) noted that the influence of the states, which form the area known as Kurdistan, has resulted in different educational systems in the individual countries that control the area. This influence is not only confined to education. The individual Kurdish populations of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Russia have also been subjected to the influence of the mass media, as well as having distinctive political cultures, and therefore have also influenced and probably led to the creation of today's different dialects (Bruinessen 1992a: 35).

The people who identify themselves as being Kurdish speak different languages, which are not mutually intelligible. A well-respected writer on this subject, Andrews (1989), observed that language divides the Kurdish people. Those who reside within the Turkish border differ from those residing in the other main countries by their language and religion. According to Andrews, the majority of the Kurdish-Sunni people within Turkey speak a dialect of Kurmanji. A small percentage less than 10% speak dialects known as Zaza, Sorani, or Gurani (Andrews 1989: 152-175). Also approximately 30% of the
Turkish Kurds, known as the Alevi, who speak Kurmanji and Turkish and a great number of them also speak Zaza (Andrews 1992: 162).

The linguistic diversity of the Kurds can be categorised within the main dialect groups as Kurmanji (spoken mainly in Turkey), Zaza, (spoken in Iraq), and Gurani which is the most common dialect in Iran (Bruinessen 1992a: 35). As a result of these linguistic differences, the Kurdish tribes have been prevented from acting as one nation and from communicating with each other in one language. That is probably one of the reasons why it is difficult to make clear statements with reference to Kurdish issues, since one is not talking about one particular and unique people, but a combination of tribes each of which has different perceptions and demands.

To summarise, after the creation of the new Republic in 1923, Kurdish groups seemed to object to the implementation of new political ideas. At the beginning whilst under the influence of Islam, the Kurds fought against the secularisation of the state. However, with the introduction of the multiparty system since the 1950 elections and also as the result of more pluralistic and open political styles since 1950, many Kurds took advantage of these developments and made their voices heard in the parliament in Ankara, as well as participating in different aspects of the social and political development within the country (Barkey and Fuller 1997; Fact Book I and II 1996). Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1970s, some Kurdish students, who had migrated to the larger cities of western Turkey, developed a different approach to Kurdish issues under the influence of communism. These students saw the political ideas of Marx at this time as the way
forward. The political sentiments of a society founded on communism, however, were contrary to the interests of the feudal rulers or tribal leaders and traditionalists so even, amongst the people seeking insurrection, aspirations were diverse. The Marxist group held the view that the feudal rulers put their own interests before those of the people. This view was strongly supported by Marxist Kurds, some of whom later formed the PKK (Fact Book I and II 1996; Dilmac 1997).

**The Demography of the Kurds**

When one considers the geography of the area known as Kurdistan, it is worth noting that since the thirteenth century and throughout the Ottoman period to the present day, the term 'Kurdistan' has not been based on any historical political entity. That is to say, Kurdistan is a geographical term referring to a place where large numbers of Kurds are found. The Minority Rights Group drew two conclusions from this in their 1989 report on the issue. The first view was that is that no map of Kurdistan can be drawn without contention, and for this reason the demographic map they produced was not a political statement, but a statement of where large numbers of Kurds were found (McDowall 1989). The report also found that although the population was not exclusively Kurdish, in this imaginary map, the dominant culture was Kurdish.

After examination of these variables, McDowall defined the geography of Kurdistan as the mountainous area where Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet, an area where Kurdish settlement can be traced back for centuries. He describes this area as:
Consisting of extremely rugged mountains of the Zagros range, running in ridges north-west to south-east. In the west these mountains give way to rolling hills, thence to the Mesopotamian plain. To the north the mountains slowly turn to a steppe-like plateau and the highlands of what used to be known as Armenian Anatolia (McDowall 1989: 5).

The actual population of the Kurds has long been a subject of controversy between scholars. The overall population is estimated at between 15 and 30 millions throughout the world. This broad estimate derives from the difficulty of defining who is a Kurd. In addition, there has been no census of the Kurdish population during the period of Ottoman rule or the period of the Turkish Republic. Consequently, estimates of the size of population of the Kurds have been the result of scholarly guesswork rather than based on accurate statistics. This thesis concentrates on Turkey's Kurdish population, rather than the Kurdish people living in Iran, Iraq, Syria and other countries.

Andrews (1989) made a comparison between the figures produced by various researchers on the Turkish Kurd population. Their findings were as follows: 1,480,246 (the 1935 census in Turkey); Kinnane (1964): 2,500,000; Area Research Handbook for 1970 census: 1,500,000; Edmonds (1971): 3,200,000; Burinessen's (1992b) estimation: 7,500,000 taking account of the 1975 census in Turkey; and finally Andrews (1989) estimated the population of the Kurds in Turkey in 1982 as 3,800,000 people. These population figures are all estimates and do not reflect actual numbers. Some authors, such as Bruinessen (1992b) and Ignatif (1993) argued that the official estimates of persons of Kurdish origin within the sovereign state of Turkey have always been kept small, in order to reinforce the fact that politically they are a small group.
In this context, it is relevant to take into account the research of Robins (1993), which is relatively highly regarded by other contemporary researchers. According to Robins, the population range extends from the official figure of 7.1 per cent of the population, to 24 per cent according to Kurdish sources. It seems reasonable to assume that the real figure in somewhere between these extremes, at 17 to 18 per cent of the population of Turkey, which was around 60 million for the 1990s. This would indicate a Kurdish population figure of between 10 and 11 million (Robins 1993: 661). Furthermore, the situation in Turkey is different from neighbouring countries which also have a Kurdish population within their own borders. Well over half of the Kurdish population reside within the heartland of Turkey mainly as result of industrialisation and, consequently, they have been absorbed within the general population, whereas in other countries the majority of the Kurdish population occupy their own designated areas (Robins 1993: 661).

**Arguments behind the Kurdish Uprisings in History**

This section seeks to examine and understand the causes of the various Kurdish rebellions that have occurred, how the public supported them and how the authorities responded. The instigators of most of these rebellions were either religious or tribal leaders. It is worth studying incidences of insurrection during the Ottoman Empire, in order to make comparisons with the rebellions that have occurred since the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

Nineteenth century uprisings seem to have been intended to extract various concessions
from central government and were not seeking the establishment of an independent state of Kurdistan. Initially, the rationale behind these uprisings was the need for feudal tribal rulers to maintain their own authority. To accomplish this, the tribal lords needed to gain popular support without appearing to be seeking autonomous power or independence on an ethnic basis (Kendal 1980: 25). Amongst the dozens of rebellions in the nineteenth century, the uprising of 1880 led by Sheikh Ubeydullah stand out from the others because its motives included demands for the Kurdish people on an ethnic and national basis. Bulloch and Harvey quote the relevant parts of Ubeydullah’s letter to the British consul at Bashkal as follows:

The Kurdish nation is a nation apart. Its religion is different from that of others, also its laws and custom. The chiefs of Kurdistan, whether they be Turkish or Persian subjects, and the people of Kurdistan, whether Muslim or Christian, are all united and agreed that things cannot proceed as they are with the two governments. It is imperative that the European governments should do something, once they understand the situation... We want to take matters into our own hands. We can no longer put up with the oppression (Bulloch and Harvey 1992: 73).

Although this letter was the first clear statement of modern Kurdish nationalism, it also referred to Kurdish identity and a unification of tribes and tribal leaders in the creation of a Kurdish state. Sheikh Ubeydullah described Kurds and Kurdish culture quite differently from the picture usually given by historians, especially in relation to religious comments. Ubeydullah described Kurdish society as Muslim and Christian whereas almost all the Kurds were in fact Muslim. As noted in Chapter IV, since western interests were mostly concerned with the Christian minorities in these states, this kind of approach may have been designed to secure European support for Ubeydullah’s struggle against the
Ottomans. Indeed, their plea received an immediate response for Sheikh Ubeydullah, because the English vice-consul to the Van Province provided weapons and ammunition, which was said to have arrived under the cover of famine relief (Kendal 1980: 31).

The letter also put forward a nationalistic view, which did not necessarily represent the views of the Kurdish people. It is generally accepted amongst scholars that nationalism is an essentially modern development, and it is a recent phenomenon for the Kurdish people (Kodaman 1987). A British political officer, serving in Eastern Turkey immediately following the First World War, who had an interest in seeing the Kurds unite against Turkey, observed that:

As a race they are not a political entity. They are a collection of tribes without cohesion, and showing little desire for cohesion. They prefer to live in their mountain fastness and pay homage to whatever government may be in power, as long as it exercises little more then nominal authority (Hay 1921 in Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992: 50).

Another issue relates to the consequences of the rebellion and its impact on the policy of Sultan Abdulhamid II. During and after the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion, Sultan Abdulhamid II introduced a government policy incorporating the teachings of Islam which became known as ‘Pan-Islamism’. With this policy the Sultan was hoping to secure a united empire and, as a considerable majority of the population were members of the Muslim religion, he considered that by extolling the virtues of Islam throughout the empire, this would have a unifying effect. During his time in power (33 years, from 1876 to 1909) this policy proved so effective that despite the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, the nation remained unified, and from it emerged a new and strong Ottoman
nationalism, united by the Muslim faith as discussed in Chapter III (Öke 1991). It was this policy of unification and the case for nationalism that ultimately defeated the rebellion of Sheikh Ubeydullah, who was unable to secure sufficient Kurdish support. The policies of the Sultan were so effective in creating a nationalistic spirit, which prevailed after his death in 1909, that by the commencement of the First World War in 1914 the Ottoman Empire was able to provide a unified army, incorporating many different people from throughout the Empire, amongst them many Kurds. These were known as the Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments and gave the Sultan total support, fighting alongside other Muslims from the Ottoman Empire (Bulloch and Harvey 1992: 223).

The establishment of the Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments has been the subject of considerable research by historians. The establishment of these regiments began in 1891 and by 1895 the number of regiments had risen to fifty-six (Kodaman 1987). This supports the view that a large spectrum of Kurdish society, including the tribal and religious leaders, supported the Sultan and enthusiastically embraced the creation of these Hamidiye Regiments (Kodaman 1987: 34-50). This solidarity with the Sultan was not readily apparent throughout the Empire, especially in regions where the dominant religion, Islam, was not so popular. This was particularly evident in the areas now known as Greece, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Serbia, which all revolted against the rule of the Sultan during this period. There is no firm evidence that the Kurds revolted for nationalist reasons in 1880, apart from the letter of Sheikh Ubeydullah to the British Consulate of Van Province. This could mean that the sense of being Kurdish was not the primary reason for revolt. Rather the rebellion by the Kurds may have been a reaction to the
imposition of taxes, by the central government, and other such measures which the feudal and religious chiefs perceived as attacks on their authority (Arvasi 1986). This view is strengthened when one recognises the fact that the Kurds sided with the Turkish government during the First World War and in its aftermath.

During the last period of the Ottoman Empire, an active policy of integration was pursued by the Sultan. Positions of governmental responsibility were given to members of the Kurdish community whose forebears and families had been in conflict with the Empire in 1880s. For example, Bahri Bey, whose father, Bedir Khan was the one of the rebellion chieftains, was appointed aide-de-camp to the Sultan himself (Bozarslan 1992). The descendants of Abdurrahman Pasha Baban’s obtained senior posts in the administration and the university in Istanbul. Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, Ubeydullah’s son, became President of the Ottoman Senate in 1908 and was later appointed as President of the Council of State. The gates of the Imperial Palace were kept wide open for the exiled Kurdish leaders. Simple clan chieftains and notables also benefited from the Imperial magnanimity, receiving honours and titles to land (Aytepe 1998: 13-15).

The objective was obviously to incorporate respected and important Kurdish dignitaries within the Ottoman establishment, legitimising the rule of central government, thereby reducing the political power of the local tribal chiefs and religious clerics. As illustrated in Chapter One it is also one of the main instruments of liberal democracy which demands that all parties contribute in power sharing and the decision making process, and that no group is a permanent loser. It is very difficult to suggest that the Ottomans were
aware of the liberal democracy as we understand today, however, what could be argued is that during the last period of the Ottomans (1890 to 1914), the Kurdish issue or Eastern problem was addressed while maintaining the rule of central government. This was achieved through some of the principles of liberal democracy, rather than through the absolute power of the Sultan. This policy seemed effective by resolving the differences between the central authority and the Kurdish community of the Empire. In fact there were no major rebellions throughout the last part of the nineteenth century, and relative peace was maintained up to 1925.

**Kurdish Political Ideologies During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries**

It was not until the political uncertainty in the early part of the twentieth century that Kurdish discontent once again became an important matter of concern. This was influenced by changes that were taking place in the central government as discussed in Chapter III. Monarchical rule was being challenged by young educated upper class citizens known as the Young Turks. The first Kurdish organisation emerged in the period following the Young Turks’ seizure of power in 1908 (Kendal 1980). Those who actively took part in the establishment of this Kurdish Association were called *Taali ve Terakki Kurdistan* (Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan). The principal activists of this group were all working in high posts in the Ottoman administration. The most notable of these were Emir Ali Bedir Khan Bey, General Sheriff Pasha, and Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, Ubeydullah’s son, who was President of the Ottoman Senate. The intellectual and ideological framework of this organisation was set out mainly by Said-i Nursi, better

The political thought of these two leaders, and in particular that of Bediuzzaman, have been a source of inspiration to Kurds ever since. To fully appreciate the position in the nineteenth century it is necessary to understand the tensions that were responsible for the conflict against the rule of the Sultan. The existing world order at the end of the nineteenth century was changing, it was a time when political ideas internationally were being exchanged, power structures were being challenged, new nations were growing in importance and the rule of the Empire was starting to decline. This change originated in the Christian-dominated west, but the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire was not immune from these experiences, as noted in Chapter III. The wealthy upper-classes travelled abroad extensively, particularly to France, where the political ideals of democracy were still evolving. Discussions about the national status of Turkey amongst Muslim intellectuals started during the later stages of the nineteenth century and intensified in the twentieth century (Piscatori 1991; Chapter II). The political ideology of Sultan Abdulhamid II Pan-Islamism created an environment which fostered the theories of a nation state amongst the Christian people of the Ottoman Empire. As Piscatori puts it: ‘Ironically, the rise of Pan-Islamic sentiments helped to establish the credentials of particularised nationalism’ particularly within the Christian inheritance of the Empire (Piscatori 1991: 77).

Although it is accepted that nationalism within the Ottoman territories was inspired by western influences, many researchers argue that the ideas of the nation state and
nationalism were interpreted differently by Muslim intellectuals. As far as the Muslim population of the Empire was concerned the nationalism was that of _millet_ system - based on religion and common culture rather than ethnic origin - that covers all Muslim inhabitants of the state, regardless of their ethnic origin. This view generally accepted the need to create an internationally-recognised, national identity, within the Muslim religion (Piscator 1991: 76).

The Ottoman State shaped its political policy in response to the different minorities who were themselves influenced by nationalism. As illustrated in Chapter III, the Christian minority were the first to rebel in search of its independence and they were followed by Arab nationalist movements, which created a kind of ethnic phobia within the Ottoman Empire. These ethnic groups were perceived as betraying the ideals and unity of the Ottomans with the help of western countries and, as noted in Chapter III, this fear was inherited by the new Republic of Turkey and shaped its policy in response to dissident voices (Laçiner 1997; Köker 1997). This period witnessed – in terms of ethnic nationalism or nation building theories - conflicting views of western nationalism, Pan-Islamism and the Turkish nationalism of the Young-Turks.

Said-i Nursi a prominent Kurdish intellectual and a military man was involved in many political and social organisations, such as the Association for the Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan, and the Kurdish Educational Publication Society. His ideas were rooted in Pan-Islamism, particularly rejection of interventions by the outside world into the Kurdish problem, opposing the western style nationalism and also opposing interpretations of
western nationalism devised by the Young Turks as a Turkish nationalism (Yildiz 1992).

In contrast to the notion of the nation-state in the Islamic world, or pan-Islamism, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Said-i Nursi and his contemporary, Jamel al-Din al-Afgani, proposed a different view of the subject. They argued that religious unity must be given priority ahead of political unification. Nursi’s understanding of the nation and nationalism needs to be clarified. In his many writings he distinguishes a nation by religion, such as the Christian nation or the Muslim nation (Nursi 1978: 330). According to Nursi, every nation can be proud of its ethnic origin, but this pride must not become an obsession which drives aggressive behaviour. He referred particularly to the Germans as an example of what he perceives to be negative nationalism (Nursi 1978: 331). One of the most distinctive parts of his argument was that he described nationalism as existing at two levels, one ethnic, the other cultural. According to Nursi, the nature and attitudes of the people in Europe are different from those of Asia, and therefore it was wrong to copy another nation-state by interpreting their nationalism in the same way. While ethnic nationalism played a part in the unity of communities, it should only be one of the ingredients of success. When referring to the concept of cultural nationalism, he stated that religion was the most important factor. Ethnic values might help to identify a nation but it was religion that was the unifying factor, the Muslim religion being an integral part of the everyday life of the Kurdish population (Nursi 1978: 330-335).

It can clearly be seen in the writings of Said-i Nursi why he opposed the western-style nationalism of the Young Turks. In contrast to ethnic nationalism, he defended the Pan-
Islamism policy and cultural nationalism. However, Nursi also believed in values such as public participation in the decision-making process, and he valued freedom of speech and publication, which he thought could be adopted from attitudes in the west. Nursi saw the Kurdish problem as an entirely internal matter, and believed that the solution should be found in Istanbul rather than in London, Paris or Berlin. In his opinion there was no doubt that foreign governments were using the issue for their own ends rather than to benefit the Kurds. This idea was shared by almost all the conservative and traditionalist Kurdish intellectuals up to the present time (Arvasi 1986).

Another important indication of the Kurdish desire to create a independent Kurdish state came after the First World War. Following the defeat in the First World War, the Treaty of Sevres signed between the Ottomans and the Allies Forces on 10 August 1920 gave some kind of autonomy to the minority groups of the Ottoman nation. It recognised the rights of ethnic minorities, at the suggestion of President Wilson of the USA. The Treaty of Sevres made a clear declaration on the Kurdish issue in section III, Articles 62-64:

If within one year from the coming into force of the present treaty the Kurdish people within the areas defined in Art. 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that the majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey... Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. ... If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurdish inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet (Vanly 1992: 144).

For the Kurds, the Treaty of Sevres was the closest point they ever came to achieving a
Kurdish state (Kendal 1980: 40-41; McDowall 1992a: 17). However, leading members of the Kurds, the sheikhs, chieftains and intellectuals did not appear interested in the offer made by the Allies. Most notably one of the two figureheads of this society, Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, and Said-i Nursi, dismissed the proposal as unwanted foreign meddling into the affairs of Islamic nations (McDowall: 1992b). Sheikh Abdul Qadyr, the leading member of almost every Kurdish organisation and head of the Organisation for the Liberation of Kurdistan, objected to the Treaty from a different viewpoint, regarding it as a dishonourable treaty: ‘To desert the Turks in their hour of need and to deal them a fatal blow by proclaiming the independence of Kurdistan would be an unworthy and dishonourable act in consideration of the long friendship between the two nations’ (Kendal 1980: 40).

As a solution, it was suggested that rights be given to the Kurds within the framework of a parliamentary system which would cement co-operation between Turks and Kurds in Anatolia (McDowall 1992b: 16-18). This idea gained support amongst the Kurdish community, who had fought loyally with the Turkish army, and were opposed to the Treaty of Sevres which they saw as mechanism by which the Allies would set up a new Republic against the wishes of Turkey. As a result of this approach, Qadyr, proposed an option which granted the Kurdish people possible autonomy under the Turkish state (Aytepe 1998). Nursi, on the other hand, perceived the matter as not only right for the Kurds, but also good for developing harmony and co-operation between Kurds and Turks and influencing the decision-making mechanisms of the new Republic of Turkey. He also advocated the importance of education, hoping that better-educated people would be an
asset when problems might eventually have to be resolved by mutual tolerance and consensus reached by compromise and negotiations (Yildiz 1992; Salih 1993). For that reason, Nursi backed the creation of a university known as Medreset-uz-Zehra situated in the middle of eastern Turkey in the province of Van (Nursi 1987: 195-197). Intellectuals such as Nursi assumed that by improving education for the people, future generations would be better equipped to solve the country's problems without foreign involvement.

After the creation of the Republic the principles of Kemalism were put into practice, as discussed in Chapter III. Of the six main dimensions of Kemalism, the Kurds seemed to reject two of the principles. The first one was the new interpretation of nationalism, which identified the phenomenon of nationalism as being rooted in ethnic origins rather than in religious ones. The second was the secularisation principle. It is argued that, one of the unifying factor between Turks and Kurds is Islam and secularisation of the new Republic damaged this tie (Gençkaya 1996). In addition, as noted earlier, the most significant Kurdish rebellion during the new Republican era demonstrated clear opposition to the secular nature of the Republic and also the new implementation of ethnic nationalism. Between 1925 and 1950 there were dozens of public uprisings, particularly in the Kurdish regions, which slowly transformed the public perception of nationalism and the idea of the nation state (GKB 1992). This new ideological concept was discussed in a publication of the Turkish Clubs (Türk Ocakları) in 1946, where cultural and religious values and feelings of historical togetherness were emphasised as being of more importance than the ethnic origin of the race. The opportunity to put into practice this theoretical approach – cultural nationalism - came about during the multi-
party elections of the 1950s, when the authoritarian regime was replaced with a more liberal system (Karpat 1977).

More recently, Kurdish thinking seemed to develop in two distinct ways. On the one side, the traditionalists and conservatives looked for wider participation in politics. In contrast, the Kurdish left wing, which came to Turkish political life late in 1960 and developed in the 1970s, preferred a policy of confrontation with the system, and in the end, some of these groups rejected all ties with the existing system (Aytepe 1998). The Kurdish left owed its development mainly to socio-economic changes and, with the emergence of a secular and populist conception of the Kurds, gained some ground from the earlier aristocratic and religious groups (Bruinessen 1992: 53). In contrast, another characteristic of the 1950s was the wish of the Kurdish population to participate in the Turkish National Assembly. They appeared to be enacting Nursi’s desire of complete involvement and participation in all aspects of political life, from that of a school teacher to ministers of state. Barkey and Fuller summarised this era as:

Heralded by the success of the Democrat party at the polls in 1950, the coming of multiparty politics to Turkey somewhat eased the pressure Kurds had experienced during Kemal and his successor’s rule, they promised both to ease some of the ‘cultural restrictions in the east’ and also reduced the more ‘secularist’ policies of the state (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 14).

As a result of these promises, the Democrat Decade was notable for the freedom of expression that allowed all, including the Kurds, to express their complaints. Another characteristic of this decade was the emergence of the commercial bourgeoisie in Turkey, including some of Kurdish descent who in later years became influential in Turkish
politics.

The return to democracy in 1961 with a liberal constitution, as discussed in Chapter IV, and the growth of a multi-party system, allowed the development and emergence of Kurdish and Turkish alongside one another. The decades of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed growing differences between the traditionalist, conservative, business communities of the Kurds and the socialist activists (Lipovsksy 1992; Bozarslan 1992; Bruinessen 1992a and 1992b). Kurdish socialism initially grew as part of the broader Turkish socialist movements. However, during the 1970s, a split developed between Turkish socialism and Kurdish socialism which lead to the formation of the Partia Karkare Kurdistan, or the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK). This development was mainly a result of the Turkish left’s rejection of the nationalistic tendencies of Kurdish socialists. The PKK made its first appearance in 1974, and later in the same decade turned against the traditional authority of the religious and tribal leaders and towards the Turkish revolutionary groups, adopting the practices of violence and terror (Imset 1992).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has established a number of points. First, it is difficult to ascertain the origins of the Kurds. They do, however, share a similar cultural and religious heritage to that of the Turks, the only major difference being one of language. There is a considerable number of people living in Turkey who identify themselves in a multiple ethnic sense as being of Kurdish descent while having Turkish citizenship, describing themselves as both
Turk and Kurd. Ethnically based nationalism in the Kurdish community appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon. It has developed only in the last thirty years, and mainly fostered by the socialist movements. The earlier uprisings were not ethnically based as has been seen in Ubeydullah and Sheikh Said cases. Some, Kurds identify themselves as purely Kurdish in an ethnic sense, although as a whole this group accounts for a relatively small percentage of the Kurdish community.

Originally the Kurds occupied the mountainous areas of eastern Turkey, western Iran and northern Iraq. However, with the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of Turkey, a majority of the Kurds living in Turkey migrated to the more industrialised parts of the country, notably Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Adana and Ankara. Consequently, Kurds living in Turkey are no longer located in one particular region, and this, with inter-racial marriages between Kurds and Turks, have weakened ethnic nationalism, whilst at the same time giving rise to divisions within Kurdish communities. Kinzer demonstrated this clearly by contrasting the attitudes of a Kurd living in Istanbul called Cemal, and a Kurd called Baran who lived in Van, a city in eastern Turkey, a thousand miles a way from Istanbul:

'I am a Kurd, but what differences does that make?’ asked Cemal as he sat behind a glass full of gold bracelets and earrings. ‘I am Turkish. I love Turkey. Never once have I had a problem because I happen to have Kurdish blood. Everyone is equal in this country’ (Kinzer 1997: 1).

Baran’s thoughts were very different: ‘My identity as a Kurd is the most precious thing I have’, he said (Kinzer 1997: 1). These two quotations illustrate the differences between the
attitudes of Kurds to their ethnic heritage, a second important point established in this chapter.

Although rebellions were instigated by the sheikhs, such as Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880 and Sheikh Said in 1925, as well as the tribal leaders, there is a strong argument that the reasons for the rebellions were rooted in economic or religious demands, or in keeping the status and interests of a particular tribe or leader, rather than seeking an unified Kurdish nationalism. It can be said that the nature of Kurdish rebellions up to the twentieth century were primarily tribal. These revolts mainly led by chieftains and sheikhs and their ultimate aims were more local power and protection of their traditional rural and tribal lifestyle against the central government. This tradition continued in the twentieth century against modernisation and secularisation policies of the new Republic. This view was shared by large number of authors, most notably by, Mumcu (1992), Bruinessen (1992b), and Olson (1989 and 1996a).

The rise of nationalism in the world, at the end of the nineteenth century, and the political debate on pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and nationalism, had an effect on Kurdish attitudes towards central government, and may have been the embryo of the Kurdish national identity to some extent. Nevertheless some influential scholars rejected the western style of ethnic nationalism, having a different conception of nationalism which they called millet, a nationalism based on civic culture and religion.

In brief, the Kurdish people did not claim an independent nation-state in western style.
Yet, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the elite of the newly established Republic of Turkey aimed for a secular, western style homogenised nation-state which inevitably dismissed the Kurdish demands. This was discussed in the case of Inonu.

With the emergence of a multiparty system in the 1950s the Kurdish community involved themselves in political activities, and many Kurds achieved high political office during this period and participated in the decision-making processes. During these years the cultural and political integration of the Kurdish people gained some momentum. However, with the military coup of 1960, relations between the citizens and the ruling class crumbled again and this affected relations between the Kurdish people and the central government. In these years, political polarisation occurred among the Kurds as it had in Turkey in general. In 1960s socialism became a more influential political force within Turkish politics. The socialist movement was divided into Turkish and Kurdish socialism. The Kurdish socialism exploited the differences between two societies and blamed the government for everything that went wrong. In contrast to traditional and conservative Kurds, who proposed wider participation in politics using the normal channels of democracy Kurdish socialists wanted to break ties with the existing system and opposed any involvement in Turkish politics. As a result, a more radical approach was taken by a splinter Kurdish socialist group, which led to the formation of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The socialist guerrilla movement evolved to a separatist movement and the PKK resorted to an armed struggle against the Turkish state and against other Kurdish groups who participated in political affairs.
The next chapter examines the rapid rise of the PKK, including its roots, survival, and support, and also explores the PKK's ideas and demands and the effects of their actions upon the Turkish central government. The impact of the PKK on the Turkish democratic system and on international relations are examined and the governments' response to the PKK terrorism, and possible future methods of combating the terrorism, within the framework of democracy, are also be addressed.
CHAPTER VI

SEPARATIST TERRORISM vs. TURKISH DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF THE PKK

Introduction

This chapter discusses the two main political issues in present-day Turkey: the combating of terrorism within the framework of democracy, and the PKK's threat to Turkish democracy. In doing this, emphasis is placed on the nature of the PKK, its claim to represent the Kurds and the effects that democratic institutions have upon the PKK's challenge. The chapter also explores the results of a survey carried out by the author concerning the reactions of the people of Diyarbakir; the largest Kurdish-populated city in Turkey. Wilkinson (1986ab and 1989) and other academics have argued that one of the dramatic effects of terrorism is to destroy the balance and structure of democratic life in a country. This argument has been proved valid on three occasions during the Turkish experiment with democracy: in 1960, 1971 and 1980. As demonstrated in earlier parts of this work, terrorist incidents were cited as being the most important reasons for the military interventions, which took place during these years.

It was not so long ago in 1983, that Turgut Özal, the newly elected Prime Minister of the country, declared that Turkey would never go back to the dark ages of the 1970s, when the country paid a heavy price for terrorist acts against the state. So what has gone wrong, how did it begin and why were miscalculations made? In the mid-1980s, Turkey faced a
dramatic surge in terrorist incidents and these increased during the 1990s. Nobody had predicted such a situation, especially during the honeymoon period of the Özal era in the early 1980s.

Of the many problems which the government confronted during the period of political reconstruction after the military coup of 1980, none was as full of danger as the regional issue. Despite many difficulties, by mid-1984 the democratisation process of the country was largely complete and the newly-formed institutions were functioning. But in the spring of 1984 unexpectedly severe violence from a tiny Kurdish group, which was unknown by the large majority of the people, made the name of the PKK (Partia Karkare Kurdistan) familiar to every Turkish citizen. As noted in earlier parts of this work, it is in the nature of the Turkish military to be particularly sensitive to political developments which threaten the state in this way; thus, the question of whether to take a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ approach to combating terrorism reappeared on the country’s political agenda.

Although Turkey was no stranger to the activities of a variety of terrorist groups, this time the terrorism was different from that of previous revolutionary terrorist organisations in that the newly-emerging PKK was separatist in nature. The real extent of the worry was described in a speech given by Süleyman Demirel, the longest serving Prime Minister during the multi-party era. He said:

*Opening the Kurdish problem to discussion would lead to the disintegration of a country in which people from 26 different ethnic groups live. That is why I say dealing with the Kurdish problem is playing with fire (Demirel, in Gunter 1992: 98)*
Could it be possible for all the parties to break the deadlock in combating terrorism, using the framework of democracy, something that they had failed to accomplish three times in past three decades? This study charts the course of PKK violence from its small beginnings in 1973 to its dramatic heights in the 1990s; examines its aims and support, and assesses the threat it poses to the nation’s unity and democracy. Lastly, it recounts how the state has responded to the terrorist challenge and considers the possible solutions to problem.

An Analysis of the PKK

A Brief History of the PKK

As indicated earlier in this study, Kurdish participation under the democratic umbrella of the Republic satisfied a large proportion of the community on most levels. However, during the second half of the 1960s, Turkish marxists and socialists, as well as some Kurds, began to question democratic rights and the level of public participation in decision making. Broadly (in late 1960s), the socialist TLP (Turkish Labour Party) raised the question of the Eastern provinces of Turkey and criticised the government for ignoring the economic development and the educational, social and health problems of these people, as discussed further in Chapter V.

In general, from the first appearance of the Kurdish issue until now, two major viewpoints have predominated, which are largely shared by the two communities of Kurds- traditionalist and socialist. The first argues for wider participation in power-
sharing in the government as well as in all aspects of political, social and economic life, while the second rejects all ties with the state and believes in armed struggle. This division was first seen but to a lesser extent, between tribal leaders, and between religious Sheikhs. They mainly sided with the government although some, such as Sheikh Said in 1925 and Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880, rejected the authority and in some cases renounced the legitimacy of the government, as mentioned in Chapter V. During the multi-party era, which began in the 1950, traditional Kurdish groups were almost completely integrated with the rest of the country and started to enjoy the benefits of constitutional government, a democratically elected and sovereign legislature, established civil and political rights.

The major division in the Kurdish community appeared during the late 1960s and early 1970s between the traditionalists and the socialists. Kurdish conservatives and liberals (traditionalists) believed in discussions and participation in the democratic life of the country and in taking advantage of democratic institutions to raise their demands. The socialist and extreme leftist Kurdish organisations on the other hand, rejected peaceful dialogue, preferring armed struggle against what they perceived to be an 'imperialist' and 'fascist' Turkish state (Dilmac 1997; Öcalan 1989).

The second group was originally fostered by the Turkish extreme left and gradually gained some support in the Kurdish community as outlined in Chapter V. Amongst these, the PKK proved to be the strongest and most widely known (Gunter 1992 and 1997). The PKK however, was not the first extreme left Kurdish organisation. Most notably, there had been the DDKO (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth), which was created in 1969.
by Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara (Barkey and Fuller 1998). Members of the DDKO and the Kurds were active in the TLP and there was some overlap, representing the left wing of the emerging Kurdish movement (Aydin 1989; Besikci 1991).

Another group grew up during the 1970s around the journal _Rizgari_ (Liberation). This group did have some differences with the DDKO, especially in terms of its working with the Turkish left, and they did not support the centre-left RPP in the critical 1977 elections as their fellow brothers did. The differences between the _Rizgari_ group and DDKO were actually strategic rather than ideological, for while the DDKO kept a strong faith in working with the Turkish left, the _Rizgari_ group dismissed it. They declared:

> The Kurds had nothing good to expect from the Kemalists; as a colonised people, they should be more concerned with their own liberation than with the political problems of the colonised nation. This liberation would be achieved through a socialist revolution under the leadership of the Kurdish proletariat (Besikci 1991: 10)

There were number of other Kurdish organisations active between 1970 and 1980, but these groups had little noticeable effect on Turkish political life and do not warrant further discussion in this study.

The question of what the PKK represents evokes different answers from different sections of the Turkish people. However, this confusion about the extent, effect and nature of the organisation, as well as the role of its leader, is not shared by Ismet G. Imset, who has been described by Gunter as one of the most knowledgeable people on the PKK by Gunter (1997). Imset clearly stated:
The history of the PKK, which has established itself as not only the strongest and most ruthless outlawed guerrilla organisation in Turkey but in all of the Middle East region, dates back to the early 1970s and closely depends on the activities of the organisation's leader Abdullah Öcalan (Imset 1992: 9).

Abdullah Öcalan is, without any doubt, the sole leader and originator of the PKK. Öcalan was born one of seven children in Omerli, a small town in south-east Turkey, to a Kurdish peasant family. After a childhood in poverty, he moved to the capital, Ankara, for university education in 1970. During these years, the Turkish radical left groups were very influential with the university students (Lipovský 1992; Çalıslar 1996). Öcalan first joined the Turkish left-wing youth movement, the Revolutionary Youth, in 1970. The following year he became a member of the Ankara Higher Education Association and also a supporter of the DDKO, where he studied marxism and during which time his ideas about Kurdish nationalism evolved (Birand 1993). After serving a seven-month prison sentence in 1971 for demonstrating illegally for the cause of 'independent Turkey from imperialism', Öcalan started to talk to the members of the south-east region of the Ankara Higher Education Association about the idea of setting up a movement on behalf of the Kurdish people. In a short time this led to the first meeting of Öcalan and his associates, which would lead to the establishment in 1973 of the National Liberation Army, arguably the nucleus of the PKK (Bal and Aytaç 1998).

Birand (1993), Imset (1992), Dilmac (1997) and other sources indicate that, in terms of ideology, the organisation dates back to the early 1970s, although the name PKK did not appear until 27 November, 1978, in the village of Fis in Diyarbakır, where the nucleus of the PKK was established, and the first draft party program was announced.
(EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 930562). Although the organisation itself first used the name National Liberation Army in 1974 and changed it in 1978 to PKK, they came to be known by the regional people as *vicious Apocus*, especially during the late 1970s (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D./Ter. Doc. Rap. 930221).

In order to create a PKK legend and to make its name heard among the people, the organisation targeted famous people in the south-east region. The first sensational attack of the PKK was carried out in 1979 against Mehmet Celal Bucak, who was a Deputy for the Justice Party from Urfa province. His son, Fatih Bucak, explained the reason for the attack:

They started their campaign first with an attempt to assassinate my father who was a Member of Parliament from the Justice Party at the time, and followed this with Öcalan’s use of indiscriminate terrorist activities in the region, which rapidly managed to spread fear, panic and frustration among the people. This lead to the use of the name “vicious Apocus” named after the leader of the organisation Abdullah Öcalan (interview with Bucak, 1993).

Another tribal leader, Mehmet Artuk, also stressed the same point: ‘We were aware of Apocus in 1978; they were attacking our villages, children and elderly, in short everybody they could get. And even our properties, just to intimidate and scare the people’ (interview with Artuk, 1993). While Öcalan and his comrades were fighting and making their name, they did not have a well organised and disciplined militant force (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162). Therefore, terrorism was seen as the best way to recruit new comrades for the organisation. As a Marxist-Leninist group the PKK was struggling to promote a Marxist-Leninist ideology in that part of the country. A repentant
Although the organisation itself first used the name National Liberation Army in 1974 and changed it in 1978 to PKK, they came to be known by the regional people as *vicious Apocus*, especially during the late 1970s (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D./Ter. Doc. Rap. 930221).

In order to create a PKK legend and to make its name heard among the people, the organisation targeted famous people in the south-east region. The first sensational attack of the PKK was carried out in 1979 against Mehmet Celal Bucak, who was a Deputy for the Justice Party from Urfa province. His son, Fatih Bucak, explained the reason for the attack:

They started their campaign first with an attempt to assassinate my father who was a Member of Parliament from the Justice Party at the time, and followed this with Öcalan’s use of indiscriminate terrorist activities in the region, which rapidly managed to spread fear, panic and frustration among the people. This lead to the use of the name “vicious Apocus” named after the leader of the organisation Abdullah Öcalan (interview with Bucak, 1993).

Another tribal leader, Mehmet Artuk, also stressed the same point: ‘We were aware of Apocus in 1978; they were attacking our villages, children and elderly, in short everybody they could get. And even our properties, just to intimidate and scare the people’ (interview with Artuk, 1993). While Öcalan and his comrades were fighting and making their name, they did not have a well organised and disciplined militant force (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162). Therefore, terrorism was seen as the best way to recruit new comrades for the organisation. As a Marxist-Leninist group the PKK was struggling to promote a Marxist-Leninist ideology in that part of the country. A repentant
PKK member, who did not wish to be identified, said: 'We were not able to explain our ideas to the ordinary people of the region. In any case, we did not have enough people eligible to teach our ideology' (interview with Saskin, 1993). Martin van Bruinessen, one of the most respected scholars of Kurdish affairs, observed that Öcalan's group was the only Kurdish organisation whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the lowest social classes, half-educated village and small-town youths who wanted action rather than ideological sophistication (Bruinessen 1992a: 41).

Thus violence became one of the main characteristics of the PKK, as its leader believed that force and violence were the only ways to mobilise the public and achieve a 'National Liberation Movement' (Öcalan 1989). Öcalan defended the use of violence against civilians believing it was necessary to gain public support for the national war of liberation through fear of violence, rather than expecting the public to understand the PKK's aims or seeking public consent for it (Öcalan 1989 and 1991). He believed that, the public was 'ignorant, illiterate, feudal' and that the labour force was not large enough to generate a proletariat front against imperialist Turkey (Öcalan 1989). This justification is representative of many who defends or advocate terrorism (Chapter II).

The PKK struggled to explain its ideology, as did the groups of the radical left in the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey (Chapter IV). It was difficult for a marxist organisation in a region where the people were largely religious and traditional and the solely still tribal in nature. In Chapter IV, it was shown that the people of the south-east and eastern parts of Turkey pay considerably more attention to religious values then elsewhere in the country.
was probably the most important reason why the PKK had a problem explaining and establishing a Marxist-Leninist mentality in the region. Öcalan himself, in his secret documents to the high command, admitted that ‘up to now (the late 1980s, probably late 1980s), one of the major mistakes had been not to pay enough respect to the religious values of the region. Even more costly was to actually attack those values’ (Öcalan 1989; GMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920342). The need for strong propaganda underlining the PKK’s respect for the public’s religious beliefs was strongly advocated by Öcalan in the late 1980s (Dilmac 1997). This policy shift within the PKK programme is discussed further on this chapter. Unlike the ETA’s experience in Spain, and to some extent the IRA’s experience in Northern Ireland, the PKK did not enjoy the support of the traditional and religious people of south-east Anatolia. As Ben-Ami explains the case in Spain:

Indeed, modern Basque nationalism can be explained as a response by traditional society to the tortuous road leading from tradition to modernity. In the process, the old Catholic -integrist and foralist tradition- always respectful to the historical unity of Spain- gave way to a secessionist and anti-Spanish brand of Basque nationalism (Ben-Ami 1988: 498).

In contrast, the traditionalist and religious sections of the Kurdish community seem to have enjoyed much participation in the democratic life of the country. This view is strengthened when one considers that a large percentage of the south-east Anatolian people supported the centre-right parties during the multi-party elections after 1950. Most of the tribal and religious leaders joined the centre-right political parties (JP, DP, MP, SP) and many became Members of Parliament in Ankara (Heper 1993). Moreover there were no Kurdish uprisings emerging from conservative, traditionalist Kurdish groups,
during the multi-party period. The traditional, religious and conservative nature of the region was one of the main obstacles for the radical left and separatist PKK, and, as will be discussed later, Öcalan acknowledged this factor and changed party policy and ideology in the late-1980s as a result (Öcalan 1993; EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162).

As Bilge Criss noted, Öcalan spent much of his time between 1974 and 1978 studying theories of Marxist revolutionary activity and considering how to mobilise the Kurdish groups under the so-called ‘Independent Kurdish Movement’ (Criss 1995: 18). Öcalan also absorbed the methodology and strategy of the radical left terrorist groups within and outside the country, particularly the ‘Shining Path’ of Peru. Despite these obstacles, the organisation was established on 27 November 1978, in Lice near Diyarbakir under its new name, the PKK (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162). The PKK unveiled its first manifesto in 1978:

All communists who are the known defenders of the internationalism of the proletariat and of patriotism! Let us organise the ranks of the PKK which aims at...operating under the guidance of scientific socialism (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162/3).

The first programme of the PKK was also drafted in 1977 and was put into practice the following declaration of 1978. This programme is summarised as follows:

The structure of the revolution will be a national democratic revolution. The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned Kurdistan State in the region. The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-Leninist principles. The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution. The peasants will be the major force of the revolution. The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers,
peasants and intellectual youth... Propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence (Donmez, in Imset 1992: 15-16).

The outline of the PKK’s programme clearly indicates that the final objective was to become an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state. In order to do that, peasants and proletariats were to be a pioneering force. However, the organisation did not indicate how to recruit members or how to get the support of these groups. How far the PKK succeeded in its objectives will be considered later in this study. For now, it is important to note the obstacles cited by the PKK to achieving its goals are: ‘Fascists, the agents and state-supported network, feudal landlords and natural collaborators’ (Imset 1992: 16). Among these groups, the largest and most problematic were the ‘traditionalist landlords’ and ‘natural collaborators’ (Öcalan 1989). According to Öcalan, anybody who objected to the PKK were collaborators of the Turkish government and betrayers of Kurdish freedom, whatever their ethnic origin or political aspirations for the Kurdish groups (Fact Book I 1996).

To achieve its goals the organisation declared its strategy as the immediate establishment of a revolutionary Marxist ideology in the region combined with armed struggle against the Turkish government. As mentioned earlier, the first significant PKK attack was against the Bucak tribe in 1979 (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930221). After this, the PKK waited until 1984 before carrying out more serious attacks.

Initiating separatist warfare based on Marxism was difficult at first for two reasons. First, it was clear that the public was not ready for such a struggle. Second, the military coup of
made the conditions for the existence of the organisation difficult (Öcalan in Birand 1993). Under the active counter-measures of the Army, almost all terrorist organisations collapsed, and many terrorist leaders were forced to leave the country. Not many Turkish officials foresaw the danger posed by the timid PKK that survived to become the biggest terrorist organisation in the Middle East. Abdullah Öcalan summarised his escape abroad as follows:

By the end of the 1970s it was evident that a military regime was coming. Meanwhile, our resources to develop the party’s central structure and its armed struggle were running out. Our going abroad is closely related to these developments. We had to go out and create the resources, which would feed our struggle whatever happened (Öcalan in Imset 1992: 25).

Öcalan himself said to Birand: ‘We were the only lucky organisation who sensed the military coup beforehand and escaped from Turkey’ (Öcalan in Birand 1993: 111).

The organisation started to leave the country in 1980, crossing to Syria and heading for the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. The PKK performed a feat which none of the other terror organisations could have managed in Turkey. Although the Syrian government have always rejected any support for the PKK, it is obvious that no such organisation could have survived in Syrian territory without at least tacit acceptance by the authorities. Having avoided the military coup of 1980 with minimum casualties, the PKK faced the new task of reorganising itself and implementing terrorist attacks from Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory.

Öcalan organised the first PKK congress in Syrian Lebanon in 1981, and the second
Congress was held in the same territories in 1982 (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930223). The outcome of these two congresses identified the basic structure and strategy of the PKK. Decisions of the first and second congresses can be summarised as a war of independence in the so-called area of Kurdistan to be carried out in three stages: the first stage is strategic defence, the second phase strategic balance, followed by strategic offence (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 920245/7-11). These phases discussed further on this study.

Their first major terrorist campaign began in 1984 and is still continuing and has been employed against civilians as well as the security forces. It is more appropriate therefore, to class the PKK as a terrorist organisation rather than as a guerrilla organisation, according to the criteria set out in Chapter II. As noted in that chapter, in the realities of a war for national independence, guerrilla-warfare is commonly used as a primary method and is based on the consent and support of a large proportion of the people. The PKK however, has lacked that support, relying upon a small minority, who have been either forced to support the organisation, or have chosen to do so voluntarily, as will be illustrated further on in this study.

Besides deciding on the strategy, the first (1981) and second (1982) congresses of the PKK, also formulated a network of new branches which were to extend the influence of the PKK in south-east Turkey in the late 1980s. Consequently, the PKK set up a professional leadership structure and a central committee. Under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan the central committee consisted of two main sub-committees: the
ERNK, the Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan), which was established on 21 March 1985, and the ARGK, Kurdish Liberation Army (Artese Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan). After establishing its ideology and political objectives, the PKK completed its organisational structure in the mid-1980s (although there have been some further changes subsequently) (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960596).

There have been three major phases in the history of the PKK. First, the PKK started as a small terrorist organisation in the late 1970s, unnoticed by Turkish officials, in the southeast of Turkey (Bal and Aytaç 1998). Second, after the military coup of 1980, its leader and limited numbers of militants managed to cross the border to Syria. With the generous help and contrivance of this country, it reorganised itself and completed its structure, developed its training skills, and in 1984 it started its hit-and-run terrorist assaults from abroad (Pelletier 1993; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Gunter 1997). Third, although the PKK was not highly successful in carrying out these assaults, the no-fly zone area created by the Allies following the Gulf War in 1990 in northern Iraq became the PKK's new training ground and the most appropriate territory from which to enter Turkey and carry out its attacks (Gunter 1992 and 1997). Consequently, following the Gulf war the number of attacks conducted by the PKK has risen rapidly and average, over a thousand people have lost their lives every year (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960596). The PKK started as a group of about twenty militants in 1978 (Imset 1992). Its numbers rose and were estimated at around 15,000 in 1994, but after the introduction of tight security measures in 1998 its numbers fell and were estimated at between 5,000 and 7,000 (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 980002).
The following sections of this chapter will concentrate on the evolution of the PKK’s ideology, structure, strategy and methodology. These three areas will be examined in the light of Ross and Millar's (1997) actor-based typology, in addition to the insights gained from the authors on the subject including my own data obtained from a survey and field study, and from official documents gathered by the author from the relevant departments of Ankara Police force library and archives and Diyarbakir Supreme Governor’s Archives.

**Ideology**

Ideologically, the PKK has past through three stages. The first stage was from 1969 to 1978 when the nucleus of the PKK was finally established. The second stage was between 1978 and 1989, and the third phase has been from 1989 to the present. These ideological phases have been shaped by circumstances surrounding the PKK, political developments within the country, and the PKK’s own pragmatism.

In the late 1960s, a revolutionary Marxist approach was developed in Turkey by groups (as outlined in Chapter IV), mainly led by Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmis. They believed in armed struggle in what they perceived as 'a revolution of proletariat against bourgeoisie within Turkey and imperialist powers outside the country' (Dilmac 1997). As noted in Chapter IV, this development mainly resulted from the disappointing results of the TLP in the 1969 general elections and the un-likelihood of introducing a communist state peacefully. The ideological thoughts of Öcalan were greatly influenced by these
revolutionary Marxist groups and also by Deniz Gezmis and Mahir Çayan (Mumcu 1993). Among these revolutionary groups, *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth) was formed in 1969 (Barkey and Fuller 1997 and 1998). This group focused on the social and economic backwardness of eastern Turkey and believed that it could be solved through communist revolution. Members of DDKO were operating in solidarity with the Turkish Revolutionary Youth and Revolutionary Path. They perceived the problem in the east not as a separatist and ethnic issue but rather as an issue of independence from outside imperialist forces and the bourgeois, i.e. both for the Turks and the Kurds (Lipovsky 1992).

That was the general political outlook in Turkey at the time when Öcalan moved from his native south-east Anatolia to Ankara to complete his higher education in 1970. Öcalan, with his admiration for leaders of the Turkish radical left, became an active member of both Turkish and Kurdish radical left organisations (Dilmac 1997). During the second half of the 1970s his ideology shifted from revolutionary marxism to separatist revolutionary marxism, which eventually led to armed violence between the groups of the radical left and Öcalan’s group. As Imset observed:

Öcalan’s debate with the Turkish left gradually took the form of armed clashes. Soon, the rural areas of south-east Turkey were almost totally deserted by left-wing organisations controlled from Ankara and Istanbul, and replaced by Öcalan’s small-scale but relatively powerful forces [at the end of 1978] (Imset 1992:18-19).

The first and second stages of Öcalan’s political ideology merge with each other during the 1970s. During this period, Öcalan developed his own ideas of revolutionary war-fare,
which were similar to Peru’s Shining Path (Bal and Aytaç 1997), and between 1974 and 1978 he established the PKK. At that time, the ideology of the PKK was Marxist-Leninist, separatist, anti-religious and anti-traditionalist, seeking an independent Kurdistan through violence (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr./1993).

The third stage of ideological development within the PKK began during the second half of the 1980s. This development was brought about mainly by opposition to the original ideology of the PKK by the Kurdish groups in south-east Anatolia. These groups were mainly traditionalist, religious and tribal as noted earlier. Pelletiere described the PKK militants and their understanding of revolution as follows:

The PKK comprised mainly lower-class ghetto youths, self-styled Marxists. This was the time of the Maoist Revolution, and youths throughout the world were embracing China’s conception of Marxist ideology. Like a lot of other youth groups at that time, the PKK’s understanding of Marxism was dim—evidenced by its programme, which called for little else than ‘emancipating’ south-eastern Anatolia. As to what would occur once Liberation was secured the PKK cadres seemed unsure (Pelletiere 1993: 4).

Members of the PKK have a reputation of being illiterate or semi-educated and from poor family backgrounds. Bruinessen (1992) described them as people wanting action rather than ideological sophistication. A survey conducted by the Anti-terror Department in Ankara in 1996 of 262 convicted PKK militants clearly indicated that this characteristic of PKK members was still much in evidence. According to these data, 9% were illiterate, 12% pre-school educated, and 39% left the school after finishing only primary school (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960113). In total 60% of the PKK members in prison were either illiterate or poorly educated (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960113).
In its early phase, the PKK mainly targeted feudal landlords and radical left groups, but during the 1980s the PKK’s targets broadened to include Turkish nationalists, Turkish and Kurdish radical left-wing groups, ‘state collaborators’ and feudal landlords (Winrow and Kirisci 1997: 127). Among these groups the local feudal landlords and what Öcalan liked to call ‘state collaborators’ and religious people proved to be the biggest obstacle to Öcalan’s success in establishing popular support for a Marxist-Leninist movement (Aygan, in Imset 1992; EGMA/TMDB Arch./Sec. Doc. 960113). Putting its ideology into practice in the south-east and trying to establish a Marxist-Leninist ideology amongst its poorly educated members, the PKK faced considerable resistance from the people of south-east Anatolia.

A clear indication of this came out in the author’s own survey: 28.6% of the respondents described themselves by religion such as Muslim or Safii, rather than by ethnicity (Appendix 1.Q1). More importantly, the majority of the respondents (78%) who either described themselves as Muslims or Kurdish said they perceived the PKK as a terrorist organisation and believed that if the PKK ever created a free Kurdistan it would be a communist state, which they would not be happy to support (Appendix 1.Q 7). From the survey results, it is clear that the religious people of this region would not be happy to see a communist Kurdistan, and they do not approve of the PKK’s ideology. This outcome is not surprising. Even the more liberal western parts of the country were not eager to support Marxist-Leninist movements during the 1970s, and by 1977, the extreme left movement’s highest popular support was only 3.9% (Ahmad 1981: 58).
As far as the religious community viewpoint was concerned, in regarding of the PKK activities, it was important to take the view of the most widely known religious order in the region, which are the Naksi order. When the author asked Sheikh Mahmud of the Naksi order (a senior figure of this order) about his views on the PKK, his answer was straightforward: 'anti religious, communist, infidels'. He was not happy with the Turkish government's treatment of them, but he added; 'there is no common ground between the PKK and us' (interview with Sheikh Mahmud, 1993). It is evident that the region's large religious population does not sympathise with the PKK's Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Furthermore, the traditional feudal nature of the people of the region did not assist the establishment of a Marxist ideology. As stated in Chapter V, the nature of Kurdish society was strongly feudal and tribal, a view also shared by Öcalan in his writings, and it was this which had prevented him from gaining popular support (Öcalan 1991 and 1993; Besikci 1991). Öcalan attacked these groups in every possible media appearance and in his own writings as 'collaborators with Imperialist Turkey'. Anybody that rejects the political thought and operational policies of Öcalan has been condemned as a 'state collaborator', including even PKK members (Criss 1995).

After experiencing these difficulties and recognising the importance of the religious values and traditional life in the region, the PKK pragmatically attempted to shift its ideology and softened its anti-religious and anti-traditionalist tendencies. After 1988, there was a clear indication of this approach in PKK activities, which signalled the development of the third phase in the evolution of the PKK's ideology. The early 1990s
the establishment of the Imams and the Alavis associations in order to build closer
between the PKK and religious leaders (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap.
674). However, this attempt never managed to achieve the same level of popular
port, which the Basque separatist ETA enjoyed from the Basque Catholic Church
-Ami 1988).

In his beginnings as a young revolutionary marxist in the early 1970s, Öcalan
 realised the importance of the strong religious and traditionalist values of the
which were so contrary to his own political thought. Consequently, religious
nes were injected into the PKK’s ideology in the late 1980s, in order to try to win the
port of this large community (Criss 1995; OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap.
674). Although the Party’s ideological framework did not differ greatly from what it
been in its early days, the Party Politburo did make an important secret declaration to
comrades:

In the realities of the Middle Eastern people there is no way of leading a
successful revolution without taking account of the importance of the
people’s religion. Ignorance of religion causes a counter-revolution, which
inevitably prepares our defeat . . . In this concept to create an association of
Imams, to work in religious institutions and influence them to become
institutions of national independence . . . In that respect, every mosque must
become a centre of propaganda and public uprising (OHBV/GÖY
Arc./D/PKK Pr./1990:11-12).

took twenty years of experience for Öcalan to redefine the operational policy of the
KK away from the political ideas inspired by the Turkish Marxist-Leninists Mahir
yan and Deniz Gezmis. At the beginning of the 1990s, PKK members were made to
learn the Koran instead of Marxism, and to collect Hadith literature, containing the words of the Prophet Mohammed, in the context of national struggle and liberation. The reason behind this new policy was the recognition of the defeat of Marxist teaching in the region; the PKK had to relay on Islamic inspiration to get public support for its actions (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr./1990:11).

The question of whether the PKK was moving away from a Marxist-Leninist ideology towards the Arab socialism, which became popular with Gaddafi and Nasir during the 1960s and 1970s, is worth considering. Some have argued that during his time in the Bekaa Valley and Syria, Arab socialism may have influenced Öcalan’s political thoughts (Dilmac 1997), as his idols Çayan and Gezmis were also influenced by Arab socialism (Çalislar 1996). However, the apparent embracing of Islam was not a genuine policy change by the PKK but rather was a superficial change in its policies to try to attract the traditionalist and religious people of the region. Today, the core of the PKK’s ideology remains the same but some ‘window-dressing’ has been applied in order to win over sections of Kurdish society.

It can be said that the third phase of the development of the PKK’s ideology dates from the appearance in their propaganda of Islamic beliefs in their propaganda during the late 1980s, after the failure of the marxist approach during the early parts of the 1980s. This was followed by dropping the claim for an independent Kurdistan in 1993, and replacing it with demand for a Federation of Kurds and Turks in Anatolia (Winrow and Kirisci 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1997; Gunter 1997).
To summarise, the ideology of the PKK is a mixture of the theories of Marx, Lenin and Mao, and the interpretation of these theories has been shaped by the circumstances in south-east Turkey. In developing his ideology, Öcalan regarded the region as semi-feudal, and also as a colony ruled by an 'imperialist' and 'fascist' Turkey, that itself was deemed a semi-colony of the capitalist western (Öcalan 1989). Öcalan’s views on the social, economic and political structure of the region are similar to those of Abimael Guzman Reynoso, the ideological leader of the ‘Shining Path’ guerrillas of Peru. Öcalan regards himself as picking up the mantle of Marx, Lenin and Mao, not only intellectually, but also by being in the vanguard of the international communist revolution, which is a scientific-historical inevitability betrayed by revisionists in the hands of reactionary imperialists (Öcalan 1989 and 1993; Strong 1993). Öcalan was also strongly influenced by so called Turkish revolutionary Marxism and observed also the other Marxist and Maoist movements throughout the world, leading to the ‘Ideology of the PKK’, which attempted to take account of the realities of both the Middle East and Turkey (Öcalan in Birand 1993; Öcalan 1991). However, Öcalan’s understanding of Marxism and its implications in south-east Turkey has not led to many successes, particularly amongst the traditionalist, religious, tribal and liberal people of the region, and has cost the lives of many civilians as a result.

The next part of this chapter analyses the question of how far the PKK managed to achieve its objectives, from 1978 to 1998, in this troubled and backward region of Turkey. The structure of the PKK must be examined in some detail to assess its effects on its strategy and methodology.
**Structure**

Although the PKK was established with only a handful of terrorists in 1978, the organisation developed over the next years to become one of the most comprehensive and deadliest terrorist organisations in the Middle East (Barkey 1996b; Barkey and Fuller 1997 and 1998). Its administrative structure has three branches. At the top, the politburo or the central committee was under the command of Öcalan and is the only existing body that dates back to the creation of the PKK, although its functions and structure have developed over time (Appendix 6). The ERNK, its political wing, was created in 1985 and ARGK, the Armed Propaganda Wing was created in 1986 (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap.930959).

The ERNK is divided into two main sections. The first, the Domestic Central Office, consists of dozens of sub-committees, such as the Association of Patriotic Kurdish Workers, the Association of Patriotic Kurdish Youth and the Association of Patriotic Kurdish Teachers. The second section of the ERNK organised itself in foreign countries under the administrative name of ERNK Foreign Central Office, and is mainly responsible for the financing of the organisation and lobbying for acceptance of the PKK as a legitimate political organisation which is fighting on behalf of the Kurdish people (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 920962/22-30).

In one of the most respected studies of the PKK, Imset explains the activities of the ERNK in two areas, in Europe and in Turkey. The ERNK unit in Europe has been
responsible for the following: a) liaison with the PKK leadership; b) contacts with local
terrorist groups in Turkish territory such as the Revolutionary Youth; c) contacts with the
PKK bases in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Greece; d) all propaganda activities inside and outside
Turkey; e) collecting money and information for the PKK; f) staging demonstrations and
protests to attract attention to the PKK, g) finding new recruits and training them for the
ARGK; and h) camouflaging ARGK militants (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 
920962).

The ERNK unit in Turkey is mainly responsible for: a) generating recruits for the ARGK;
b) co-ordinating and organising PKK activities in urban and rural settlements; c)
information and intelligence gathering for the PKK; d) collecting money for the
organisation; e) organising mass riots, urban rebellions and small-scale military attacks; f)
trying to take on judiciary-police responsibilities in areas where there is a vacuum of
authority, showing the PKK’s strength to the public and trying to act as a government; g)
carrying out Islamic activities and propaganda on behalf of the PKK, which became
important after the failure of Marxism (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 920962). This
last duty was issued to the ERNK after the publication in 1990 of the Book of
Institutions of the Urban Revolution (A Handbook of the PKK), in order to counteract the
anti-religious image of the organisation, after recognising the strong religious tendencies

The second main committee under the Central Committee is the ARGK. This committee
originated in 1984 under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom Unit, HRK (Hazen

241
Rizgariya Kurdistan). Following the third congress of the PKK, the name of the unit was changed to the ARGK on 30 October 1986. It is mainly responsible for the armed struggle and for carrying out terrorist activities. The PKK has divided up the south-eastern part of Turkey into six military regions (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930965) under the ARGK committee, calling them operational bases. These areas are Guneybati, Orta Eyalet, Serhat, Botan, Mardin and Dersim (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930965, The Scripts of the PKK Congress 1989). Structurally, the PKK is closely based on the Shining Path of Peru, the organisations also resembling each other ideologically as noted earlier. The ARGK, like the Shining Path, has three kinds of militants: principal forces, local forces and base forces (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930965; Strong 1993). Unlike the Shining Path, however, the principal forces of the PKK are based outside the country, in northern Iraq, the Bekaa Valley and in Syria. Each of the operational bases is supposed to have a local force and it is also planned that each town and village will have a base force, but the PKK has remained a foreign based terror organisation rather than a local and national guerrilla organisation. Plans concerning overall strategic political and terrorist objectives are drawn up by the Central Committee of the PKK, the decisions being taken by Abdullah Öcalan (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 940448; The Scripts of the PKK Congress 1989).

In summary, surprising as it may seem, the PKK started out as a Marxist-Leninist organisation in the conservative south-east part of Turkey, where religious and tribal characteristics are still very strong. Although the ideological aspects of the organisation did not take root in the region, the PKK nevertheless managed to establish a structure
which can be described as comprehensive, as a result of the congresses held between 1981 and 1986 (Appendix 6). The following section of this chapter examines the PKK’s ability to mobilise the masses to further its aims of an independent Kurdistan in this troubled part of the country, with the extensive use of terrorism that it employed throughout the years, as its main tool for obtaining its political objectives.

**Strategy and Methodology**

As discussed in Chapter II, terrorist organisations use indiscriminate violence as their main tool to further their objectives. Ross and Miller (1997) observed that terrorism is a form of communication. With this approach, they note, terrorists deliver their communiqués to the authorities and the general public both directly and indirectly (Ross and Miller 1997: 77). The PKK is a typical example of this having used communication by means of violence from the very beginning. As a former PKK militant noted: ‘The best method to spread Marxist-Leninist ideology was armed propaganda’ (Imset 1992:16). The PKK’s use of violence consists of both internal violence against the organisation’s own militants and external violence conducted against state authorities and the general public. In this section, the PKK’s external violence will be examined in depth as a means of communication to reach its objectives, while the internal violence of the PKK is addressed in the following section.

The PKK has directed its tactical violence first against radical left groups and local tribal leaders. This strategy was designed to cause fear in the community and to dissuade other
terrorist organisations from being active in the region. Therefore, the reaction of the victims’ families and the general public against the tactical use of violence by the PKK was very important, for the PKK and other radical left terrorist organisations and for the state. As noted earlier, the PKK had succeeded in driving the radical left Kurdish and Turkish terrorists from the region. However, achieving the same success against local tribes proved to be a different story. In 1979, the PKK started its major armed assault against one of the largest tribal leaders, Mehmet Celal Bucak of Siverek in Urfa, an MP for the Justice Party. Although the assassination attempt failed, Öcalan stated that it was an important assault, for it was noted by many people and made the PKK’s name known to a large community (Öcalan in Birand 1993). This was a ‘kind of propaganda by death’ in order to publicise the terrorists’ cause, and a show of strength within the region, which is a strategy used by many terrorist organisations, as noted in Chapter II. Ross and Miller (1997) quite rightly describe it as ‘a communication of terrorists’ with their opponents, the public, the international community, the state, and the immediate victims (1997: 77).

When the author asked Fatih Bucak, the second in commend to the Bucak tribe, why they were at the top of the PKK’s list, he replied without hesitation:

If the PKK had succeeded against us that would have meant a victory against the strongest tribal leader in the region, which would ultimately form a way for the terrorists to establish authority in the region. We don’t agree with their proposals or objectives. They describe us and virtually everybody in this region [Urfa and Siverek] as a ‘state collaborator’. We believe that they are a communist and foreign seed, planted in our lands (interview with Bucak, 1993).

From the reactions of the Bucak tribe, it is evident that their anger was directed against the terrorist organisation instead of the state, and eventually, following a number of
assaults against this particular tribe, they started lobbying to obtain weapons from the government to defend themselves. As Ross and Miller indicated in their typology, these types of response are common from the victims’ families, as a consequence of terrorist attacks (1997: 85-86). As a result of lobbying, the Bucak tribe, which is estimated to have 100,000 members (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930199) managed to get government support and to defend themselves from the PKK. They have provided the largest number of members for the village guard -(There are local people who voluntarily defend their villages against terrorists), the total number of which was about 60,000 in 1998.

With the establishment of the ERNK and ARGK in the mid-1980s the strategy of the PKK can be summarised as two-pronged: units of ERNK were engaging in a campaign of propaganda in order to gain national and international support, whilst the ARGK was trying to establish the party’s authority in the region by using violence. To support these efforts the PKK adopted the following tactics: a) carrying out a show of strength; b) terrorising the people into supporting the organisation; c) killing civilians indiscriminately as a priority and clashing with the military; d) training new terrorists; and e) carrying out attacks with the aid of local supporters (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930199).

The terrorist activities of the PKK intensified against civilians as well as the security forces during the second half of the 1980s. The PKK made its standpoint clear, declaring ‘We will not tolerate people who betray the Kurdish cause’ (Imset 1992: 55). The
‘people’ referred to here were particularly the Kurdish ethnic groups who did not agree with the strategy or the ideology of the PKK, particularly the conservative and traditional families. As a result, indiscriminate killings took place and houses were burned down, regardless of age, sex and innocence (Appendix 4). The targets selected by the organisation and hit during the night were almost always civilian, with the exception of relatives of the terrorists. The logic behind this kind of atrocity puzzles many ordinary people and was evident also in 1998 when the Real IRA killed 28 ordinary people, in the centre of Omagh in County Tyrone in Northern Ireland, on the 15 August 1998 (The Times 1998, Sunday Telegraph 1998). The terrorists justify their actions as a means to a greater end, as noted in Chapter II. Öcalan’s orders to his militants are clear in this respect:

One must be able to say patriotically that he supports the PKK. If one is courageous and self-sacrificing, he must be able to walk out of his house and propagate PKK ideology to his neighbours and friends; if he is courageous enough, he must kill the traitors in his village with a knife, axe or burn their houses... Some places require blood, courage and self-sacrifice, and these must be shown when necessary (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930199/27)

Between 1984 and 1990 the PKK claimed the lives of 199 children, 160 women and 399 men (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 910094). Another security document suggests that the PKK intensified its attacks against civilians between 1987 and 1993 when the civilian death toll, according to the Supreme Governor’s statistical bureau, was 1,242 men, 178 women and 246 children (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 940933). This outcome could be explained in two ways. First, the PKK needed to create safe zones for the terrorists after hit-and-run operations, because after every attack it was difficult for the
terrorists to travel the long distances to Iraq and Syria, and therefore it was intended by
the PKK to intimidate the public into supporting the organisation through a force.
Second, the PKK hoped to achieve an increase in nationalism and group identity, which
would ultimately result in stronger Kurdish nationalism and greater public support for the
PKK, by way of hitting some civilians targets and in return expecting a deep division with
the society.

Increased public support had to be achieved in order for the PKK to begin the second
phase of the party programme, which was to attain a strategic balance or the amount of
public force that can inflame the popular public upraising against government forces
(If.Tu./D/1993 Ter. 00155). From both the PKK documents and the results of the author’s
survey, it can be seen that the absence of a breeding ground for Marxism and the public’s
reaction against political violence provided the main obstacles to the PKK’s achievement
of this aim. Nevertheless, Öcalan maintained his belief in the systematic use of murder to
terrorise individuals, groups and communities to create public support for the
organisation by fear (If.Tu./D/1993 Ter. 00155).

Overall, this strategy had little success. The legacy of the PKK’s ten years’ of extensive
terrorism in the region was revealed in the author’s survey which showed that 64.3% of
the respondents described their feelings about the PKK in terms of ‘worry’, ‘terror’,
‘hatred’ and ‘disgust’, while only 5.2% replied using favourite terms such as ‘love’ and
‘hope’ (Appendix 1.Q4). In the period 1987-93 the PKK’s campaign of violence claimed
1,666 civilians’ lives, including those of 246 children, but only 5% of the population
declared their support in the survey. According to Ross and Miller’s hypotheses, when the general public experience anger, outrage and fear, the possible public responses as follows

an increase in nationalism; more lobbying; sharpening of group differences; greater loss of government legitimacy; greater amount of fear, greater amount of physical and psychological problems; the greater the amount of fear, the more the amount of demographic change (1997: 91).

As Ross and Miller noted, these responses will vary according to the country, type of regime, kind of terrorist organisation, and the victims’ reactions (1997:91). This is precisely the case in Turkey. As a result of PKK terrorism, lobbying increased, many people have moved to western parts of the country (TOBB Report 1995), and national consciousness’ increased within Kurdish community (Gunter 1997; Winrow and Kirisci 1997). However, instead of agreeing with the PKK, people in the region increasingly began to defend themselves, leading to the Village Guard system, which was originally established in April 1985, with the number of guards rising to 40,000 in 1995 and 60,000 in 1998 (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 980058).

In fact, the Village Guard system was not an entirely new concept. A similar scheme was used during the period of Sultan Hamid in the 1890s, when the Hamidiye Regiments were set up in eastern Turkey, as discussed in Chapter V. Almost 90 years after Sultan Hamid’s establishment of these regiments, public demand for self-defence against the PKK’s violent campaign created the conditions to establish temporary Village Guards in areas where levels of violence required a state of emergency. It is therefore not surprising that
the Village Guard from its beginning was at the top of the hit list of PKK targets. According to Minister of Interior Aksu (1988-1991), the terrorist organisation began to panic when the population started to battle against them on the side of the government (interview with Aksu, 1993). The PKK had to overcome this resistance to give credibility to its claim that it was fighting on behalf of the Kurdish people. Aksu pointed out that it was a contradiction that on the one hand the PKK was killing Kurds and, these people were resisting the PKK’s challenge, while on the other hand it was claiming that it was fighting on their behalf (interview with Aksu, 1993).

Besides the general public, the PKK targeted the business community and public investments in the region. Its strategy was to force the business community out of the region and increase the pressure on the government by the lobbying business community. It seems that the PKK has been relatively successful in implementing this strategy. Following the frequent attacks by the PKK, the business community reacted in a number of ways: more investment in security, which led to special training of staff against such attacks; new technology security systems; employment of anti-terrorism experts; and lobbying by the business community over government policies to combat the terrorism. During the second half of the 1990s, different business communities started to employ more security personnel and experts, but many of the businessmen ended up paying a ransom to the PKK particularly in south-east Turkey (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 980146). In 1995, big business confederations such as TOBB (Turkish Union of Chambers) asked experts to examine PKK terrorism and find possible solutions to it. The resulting report became known as the TOBB report and aimed to influence some of the
government policies on terrorism. Thus the PKK’s strategy to force the business community to influence the government has produced some success, but not to the extent that the PKK was hoping. Reactions to the TOBB report will be discussed later in this study along with the government’s response to the terrorism.

Another strategy of the PKK has been to disrupt the relations and communications between the people of the region and the government as well as disrupting the democratic system within the region. To achieve this aim, the PKK targeted public servants, local political party bureaux, and media representatives. They also burned and removed ballot boxes and threatened people who cast votes in the elections (Imset 1992; Fact Book I 1996; OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 980146; Press Association 1996; Criss 1995).

The challenge of the PKK against Turkish democracy is elaborated on later in this Chapter, but for now it can be noted that the PKK deliberately targeted local party members, threatened people not to go to the ballot box, and prevented the public from using the normal channels of democracy. Other PKK strategies of drug trafficking and establishing foreign alliances are also examined in following parts of this Chapter.

As has been noted, the PKK’s overall strategy has been much like that of the ‘Shining Path’ of Peru. Strong (1993) and Marks (1992) observed that the ‘Shining Path’ has a three-phase strategy identical to the PKK. These three stages are: strategic defence, strategic balance and strategic offence. The reasoning behind these three stages can be illustrated by the PKK leader’s explanation. In the first stage, the Turkish security forces are strong and effective and the PKK are relatively weak. In this period, the organisation
had the view that the extensive use of terrorism will garner new recruits for the organisation and that the local people will be forced into supporting the armed struggle (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930961; OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr. 1993). The security forces then face a political dilemma, chaos ensues and finally the balance of the power changes in favour of the PKK in the south-eastern parts of the country (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 980146; OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr. 1993). In the second phase of the strategy, the organisation seeks to develop its authority in the region in order to start a larger-scale guerrilla war. It is essential to mobilise the populace into backing their cause and this is difficult when feudal and tribal authority have dominated the society for centuries. As illustrated in Chapter II, terror itself is the first stage, leading to the second stage, which can be categorised as larger-scale guerrilla warfare, and finally to conventional warfare. The third stage of the strategy is to aim for conventional warfare with the total contribution of the people in the region (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr. 1993). The three-stage plan which the PKK adopted for its strategy is similar to that described by Crozier (1960), Wardlaw (1989) and Jenkins (1989), who explained that terrorism is the first stage of a three-step development, which progresses onward through guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare.

To summarise this section, the PKK has been using coercive and indiscriminate violence as its main method to establish an independent Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan. In order to reach this goal, it is evident that the organisation has used different types of strategies, which are summarised by adopting the typology of Ross and Miller (1997). These are: a) attacking the general public, in order to show the strength of the organisation, force the
public into supporting the organisation, undermine the legitimacy of the government, and consequently to increase the legitimacy and operational ability of the PKK; b) attacking the business community in order to increase this community’s pressure on government policy, to force them to pay money to the PKK, and to increase the costs of the business as a result of expensive security investments; c) to target government workers, institutions and investments, particularly in south-east Turkey; d) to develop an ethnic and nationalist consciousness within the Kurdish community.

Analysing the three-phase strategy of the PKK, it is evident that the organisation is still in the first phase of the three-part strategy. Since its early days extensive use of terrorism has continued. Lack of popular public support has not allowed the PKK to establish safe areas for its members to settle down in south-eastern Turkey and start the second phase of its strategy, which would entail a guerrilla warfare to claim more legitimacy and diminish the government authority, leading to conventional warfare.

Internal Violence and Isolation of the PKK Over Civilian Killings

As a result of PKK attacks, 1,278 civilians were killed from 1984 to 1991 and 3,736 were killed between 1992 and 1995. By the end of 1995 the death toll had reached 20,181 in total including security, civilian and PKK casualties (Appendix 4). With the causalities of security members and terrorists, the death toll from 1984 to present day reached about 30,000 (Goltz 1999; Sabah 30 May 1999; Zaman 1999). The use of violence by the PKK, particularly targeting civilians, was aimed at polarising society along Kurdish and Turkish
lines (Winrow and Kirisci 1997). According to the views of Ross and Miller, the greater the amount of anger as a result of terrorist attacks on the general public, the greater the likelihood this will lead to increased nationalism; and the greater the anger, the higher the possibility of sharpening group differences (Ross and Miller 1997: 91). Although some ethnic consciousness has been developing within the Kurdish community in Turkey as result of the PKK’s violence (Bozarslan 1992), as illustrated earlier, this has not reached the level that the PKK was hoping for, nor has it resulted in widespread support for its organisation (Criss 1995; Dilmac 1997; FACT BOOK II 1997). As the Turkish Democracy Foundation observed, after each funeral of a victim, people condemned the PKK rather than express resentment towards the Turkish state (FACT BOOK II 1997). Social polarisation and deep divisions between Turks and Kurds did not occur. In contrast, the indiscriminate use of violence by the PKK against civilians has exacerbated the tension between the pro-Kurdish organisations, other radical left revolutionary groups and the PKK (Dilmac 1997). This method also raised criticism within the organisation, which ultimately resulted in using violence against the organisation’s own comrades, including senior figures within the PKK (If. Tu./D/1993 Ter. 00145).

As noted earlier, the coercive violence carried out by the PKK during the 1980s, under the strategy of armed propaganda, did not generate the popular support for which the PKK had aimed. Indeed, the PKK’s bloody campaign seems to have tarnished the party’s image, and adversely affected its relations with other Kurdish and extreme left Turkish groups. Significantly, the most violent terrorist groups of Turkey’s pre-military period, the Revolutionary Path, the Road of the Turkish Revolution and the Turkish Workers-
Peasants Liberation Army, agreed to fight the PKK on its own grounds if it continued to
attack civilians (Imset 1992; Criss 1995; Gunter 1988). This joint decision was taken in
Paris during the winter of 1987-88, and was approved at a meeting held in Munich
(Gunter 1988: 20). Another serious setback to the PKK came from Barzani’s KDP
(Kurdish Democrat Party of Iraq). As Gunter noted, relations between the two had been
cooling since 1985 because of the PKK’s violent tactics against women and children
(Gunter 1992). In May 1987, referring to the 1983 agreement they had signed as required
under the principles of solidarity, the KDP made its views clear:

It is clear they [PKK] have adopted an aggressive attitude towards the
leadership of our party, towards its policies, and the friends of our party.
Continuing, Barzani’s party denounced what it termed, ‘terrorist operations
within the country and abroad and their action to liquidate human beings’... The mentality behind such action is against humanity and democracy and is
not in line with the national liberation of Kurdistan (Gunter 1988: 19).

The termination of the relationship between the PKK and the KDP came about because of
differences that appeared between the two groups in both methods and ideology. The
KDP believed that the solution to the Kurdish issue was to be found in the democratic
and political arena where its exists in Turkey (Dilmac 1997). With this approach,
Barzani’s KDP secured Turkish sympathy, and the best example of this was witnessed
after the Iraqi bombing of Kurdish towns and villages in Northern Iraq, which led to the
government of Turkey opening her borders to the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 (Criss 1995). Some
60,000 Iraqi Kurds were allowed to enter Turkey in what Prime Minister Özal called a
humanitarian gesture to Turkey’s brothers across the border. More significant pressure
came from other Kurdish groups such as KAVA, and SPTK, in response to Öcalan’s
violent tactics against civilians, which they described as unacceptable and brutal (Briefing 29 August 1988). Öcalan, desperate for new allies, was severely criticised for his call for active unity, when the other Kurdish groups of Turkey had reportedly already established an alliance against the PKK called the Kurdish Liberation Operation (Gunter 1990a and 1990b: 20). This indicates that the greater the indiscriminate killings, the greater the lobbying against terror organisations in the Turkish case.

In addition to these setbacks the PKK, did not enjoy popular support in south-eastern Anatolia because its violent methods. When the author enquired in this survey whether the people of the region agreed with the killings carried out by of the PKK, the results indicated low levels of support for the terrorist organisation. When asked ‘Are the killings of the PKK ever justifiable?’. 83% of respondents said they did not agree with the political killings under any circumstances. Only 7.1% of respondents said attacks against military targets might be acceptable and only one person replied that any target could be legitimate, as outlined further in Appendix (Appendix 1.Q5). Thus it can be seen that a clear majority of respondents did not support the killing of civilians by the PKK. This finding is supported by the TOBB report that half of the respondents to the question ‘what did they not support among the PKK’s activities’, disagreed with the PKK’s extreme acts of violence and their attempt to stop democratic debate (TOBB Report 1995).

However, the campaign of violence carried out by the PKK militants, achieved some success in that the PKK secured nation-wide publicity, with newspapers giving extensive coverage of terrorist incidents. By the end of the 1980s, the PKK had became a major
problem for the Turkish government, despite the government’s claim that they were a merely ‘bunch of bandits’. The reputation that the PKK created by the tactics of ‘propaganda by death’, however, did not, win it any sympathy. Moreover, far from developing the support base in south-eastern Anatolia, the PKK the organisation lost instead its main radical left Kurdish and Turkish allies as well as the support of Barzani’s KDP’s.

The question of who was responsible for the weakening image of the PKK led to an internal crisis within the PKK. Some members began to doubt the hitherto unquestionable position of Öcalan as leader of the PKK, but Öcalan’s methods of dealing with internal opposition were brutal. According to a Middle East report based on information from former members of the PKK, all reading other than of the PKK’s own publications was forbidden, friendships were undermined by encouraging everybody to suspect their comrades as possible agents, and criticism of the party’s policies was regarded as betrayal. In the report it was also added that some twenty members of the organisation had been killed for defecting from the party or disagreeing with its policies (Middle East Report 1988: 44). Öcalan has continued to use violence not only against civilians and security personnel, but also against his own comrades.

Amongst the dissident voices from within the party, the most notable were Öcalan’s wife, Kesire, and his so-called right-hand man, attorney Huseyin Yildirim, who disagreed with Öcalan over policies of indiscriminate violence. The Turkish daily newspaper Hurriyet reported the incident as a ‘bloody division within the PKK’ (Hurriyet 29 June 1989).
Another daily paper the *Milliyet*, reported that the division was due to criticism from a splinter group in the PKK camps abroad concerning their ruthless methods (*Milliyet* 7 May 1988). This group was also strongly opposed to the way Öcalan dealt with internal critics. Some reports claimed that at least thirty-eight senior PKK leaders had been killed on Öcalan’s orders in a period of less than a year, following a revolutionary trial during 1987 and 1988 (*Milliyet* 7 May 1988). Öcalan’s wife, who had been among the top ranks of the PKK since 1978, also strongly opposed the brutality of Öcalan within the party, as well as the killing of civilians. The criticism almost cost her life when she was put under detention in Bekaa. Later, with the help of friends, she was smuggled out of the camp, and managed to escape to Sweden where she reportedly joined Huseyin Yildirim (Imset 1992). During the author’s field study in Diyarbakir, a repentant PKK member who did not want to be named said ‘Everyone was scared of each other, because Öcalan said one word could be more than enough to be charged by the revolutionary court and then sentenced to death, which I have witnessed more than twenty-five times in Mahsun Korkmaz Training Academy in Bekaa Valley alone, in a period of three and a half years’ (interview with Kazim ex PKK member, 1993).

Imset noted several examples of the internal violence within the party. In the PKK controlled Mahsun Korkmaz Academy in Bekaa, some twenty PKK high-up members were placed under arrest, tried, found guilty of betrayal and executed. In June 1989, a PKK hit-man attempted to assassinate attorney Huseyin Yildirim in Holland near the Belgian border and Yildirim was severely wounded (Imset 1992: 163). Amongst the number of dissidents who managed to escape from Öcalan’s harsh policies were Sari
Baran, Chairman of the Military Council, Abdurrahman Kayikci, head of security, and Mehmet Sener, the former politburo secretary of the PKK, who took refuge with the KDP in Iraq. In an interview with the popular left-wing weekly *Ikibine Dogru* in 1990, Sener accused Öcalan of running the party as a dictatorship and criticised the PKK's violent strategy (*Ikibine Dogru* May 1990).

Although the main divisions started within the PKK, rival organisations echoed the accusations in the European and Turkish press. Öcalan answered with more bloodshed. He started the so-called 'rival cleansing operation' in the late 1980s by denouncing dissidents as Turkish agents and traitors, and accusing rival organisations of plotting with the Turkish authorities to destroy the Kurdish revolution (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/PKK Pr./1991). It was obvious that Öcalan was not going to tolerate criticism of any kind. In the publication 'A Guerrilla's Handbook', Öcalan explained his use of violence to quell dissent within the PKK:

The provocative activities carried out by agents who infiltrated the party by various methods, are the reason why the people turned away from identifying themselves within our movement in Kurdistan... As for the KUK [Kurdish National Liberators], almost all their activities have been directed towards the [PKK] party. As for the DDKD [Revolutionary Eastern Culture Association], they passed on intelligence and information [to Turkey]... Middle-of-the-road revolutionaries, who do not recognise the party revolutionary line, or, who, rather than abide by it, try to gain the leadership of the party, have narrow views which are not able to get around a captive peasant-mentality. It has clearly been seen what sort of provocation these traitors have come to (Öcalan in Imset 1992: 166-67).

According to Öcalan, people who left the PKK were either 'intelligence agents' of Turkey, 'provocateurs', 'collaborators', or they simply did not understand the PKK's
policies. This is the same argument which Guzman of the Shining Path has used (Marks 1992; Hazleton and Hazleton 1992). However, it is known that many of the members of the PKK accused of such behaviour had been serving in the top ranks of the organisation. Examples include Sari Baran, Abdurrahman Kayikci, and Mehmet Sener, who occupied positions of great power in the party for years, while Kesire Öcalan and Huseyin Yildirim were Öcalan’s foremost deputies and were amongst the founding members of the PKK in the late 1970s (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930702; FACT BOOK II 1997). It is not reasonable to suggest that these people were enemies of the PKK, rather they represented opposition to what Huseyin Yildirim called ‘the atmosphere of terror’ that the PKK was generating for the innocent people of south-east Turkey and for members of the party itself. Nevertheless, Öcalan dealt with rivals and dissidents by the familiar methodology of terrorism and more bloodshed. As a result, ‘propaganda by death’ has survived as the main policy of the PKK under the absolute leadership of Öcalan until the present day.

The effects of violence as a main policy of the PKK can be summarised as follows. First, it did help to create some Kurdish ethnic consciousness, but it did not create major divisions between Turks and Kurds. Second, a number of radical left groups, pro-Kurdish groups within and outside Turkey and, more importantly, some members of the PKK itself have criticised the use of violence against civilians. Consequently, the PKK became isolated from these groups and in desperation the organisation resorted to more violence, including violence against its own militants who criticised the violent policy of the organisation. Third, lack of popular support meant that mobilising Kurdish groups against
the Turkish government under the name of 'a national independence war' or, 'a popular guerrilla warfare' with the consent of the people could not be achieved by the PKK. This was the second main phase of the organisation's strategy, to claim legitimacy in the south-east as well as in the eyes of European countries.

As noted in Chapter II, the use of indiscriminate violence cannot be justified in liberal democracies. In the case of Turkey, it is not defensible to suggest that the use of indiscriminate violence to obtain political objectives is the only way left to the opposition. Although there are some co-ordination problems in meeting people's demands and some misinterpretations of democratic values and their implementation in practice, as noted in Chapter II, over the years Turkey has been gradually developing a better practice of liberal democracy (Chapter II and III).

However, the PKK is still one of the strongest terrorist organisations in the Middle East and its active members are estimated at about 5,000 to 8,000 in 1999, although this number varies from time to time and depends on the source that reports it (The Economist 20 February 1999). This raises the question of how the PKK survives and keeps its strength. The next parts of this chapter will concentrate on the financial support and foreign dependency of the PKK.
The Survival of the PKK

Foreign Support

Research on the PKK’s fifteen-year campaign of propaganda and violence clearly shows that the terrorists have achieved neither public support nor the establishment of ‘liberated’ zones in south-eastern Anatolia (Criss 1995). Given this lack of success, the PKK has survived remarkably well. Statistical data supplied by the Turkish security departments, along with the media coverage of terrorist incidents, indicate that the activities of the PKK still flourish despite prevention of terrorism being the first priority of the government. Two major factors have contributed to the survival of the PKK and these are strong foreign support and involvement in drug trafficking and extortion, both of which are important in financing its operations. Despite a number of setbacks that the PKK has had to face in Turkey, Syrian, Iranian, Iraq, Greek, and Russian support for the PKK has remained strong (Time 1998; Dilmac 1997; Imset 1992; FACT BOOK I 1996; Gunter 1990a, 1990b and 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Fuller and Lesser 1993; Pelletiere 1993).

There are three groups of countries which, it can be argued, support the PKK for different reasons. The first group is Turkey’s southern neighbours, whose support stems from a water dispute. These are Syria, which also claims the Turkish province of Antakya, and to a lesser extent Iraq (Gunter 1997; Fuller 1993; Muslih; 1996). The second group is Iran and Russia, whose support stems mainly from the issue of the influence of Turkey in the
Middle East, Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus (Fuller 1993; Barkey and Fuller 1997; Eralp 1996). The third group is Greece and Greek Cyprus, whose support is related to the Greek expansionist policy in the Aegean Sea and the future status of Cyprus.

From the early period following the 1980 military coup, the PKK has received its greatest support from Syria. According to security sources, Abdullah Öcalan has until his recent arrest been living in Damascus, the capital of Syria, a privilege accorded no other terrorist leader (Pelletiere 1993). Pelletiere explains this development: The PKK, after being purged by Turkey’s army, fled to Syria where Assad took it under his protection. In 1983, he selected this group to participate in, and ultimately to lead, the terror war against Turkey’ (Pelletiere (1993: 5). As noted earlier, the PKK had not only managed to establish itself in Syrian controlled Lebanon, but also received Syrian military assistance (Aygan in Imset 1992). Imset summarises the facilities provided to the PKK by Syria as follows:

To give living places to PKK militants who had managed to escape from Turkey; to provide money and false identification for militants travelling into Lebanon for guerrilla training; to provide PKK militants with necessary permission to travel in Syria without hindrance; to create a joint front against Turkey along with Turkish extremist organisations; to allow for the party congress to be held within Syrian territory [most of the PKK congresses and conferences were held in Syrian-controlled Lebanese territories (FACT BOOK I 1996: 52; Gunter 1990: 99)]; to provide weapons and ammunition for the PKK; to allow the printing of organisational documents and material in Syrian printing houses [The PKK’s famous centre, the Mahsun Korkmaz Academy is in Syria (Dilmac 1997)]; to assist PKK militants travelling to Europe and Iran on false passports (Imset 1992: 172).

It can be seen that the PKK has received every possible type of support from Syria. These
facts explain why 81% of the respondents in the author’s survey believed that the PKK relies on foreign support and direction, and why the public do not believe that the PKK is working for the interests of the Kurds (Appendix 1.Q11). But what is the reason behind Syria’s enthusiastic support for the PKK? The reason for Syria’s support of the PKK is that Syria, along with Iraq, Iran and Russia, has Kurdish groups within its borders, as Mango (1993) noted, not one of these countries provides the Kurds with the same rights as Turkey does, especially in electoral and democratic terms. It is therefore not evident that these countries are sympathetic to Kurdish rights.

Syrian support for the PKK is driven by two factors. As Muslih (1996) noted, Turkey has been building a major dam over the Euphrates River for the south-eastern Anatolian Project GAP, and Syria claims that this dam might reduce the flow of the Euphrates below 500 cubic meters per second, although Turkey has guaranteed this level to Damascus. The second reason Muslih (1996) noted is that Syria considers Turkish sovereignty over Hatay as illegitimate. The extent of Syrian support has gone so far that the PKK has lost most of its organisational freedom according to Pelletiere (1993) and this raises the question of the legitimacy of the PKK in terms of whether its fighting for the Kurds or acting for Damascus interests in the Middle East (Barkey 1996a). In answer to question 10 of the author’s survey, some 21.4% of respondents believed that the increase in terrorism in Turkey could be attributed to the attempts of some countries to undermine Turkey’s influence in the Middle East (Appendix1.Q10). During his field study, the author encountered a considerable number of people who said that Syria does not want a powerful Turkey and that the same could be said for Iraq, Iran, Greece and
Russia. Indeed, some 38.8% of the respondents in the survey believed that certain foreign powers are trying to destabilise the economy and foreign policy of the country, and that this is one of the major causes of terrorism. At the same time 81% of respondents (Appendix 1.Q11) believed that there is foreign support for the PKK. Indeed, Gunter noted that:

The Kurdish factor has also curtailed Turkey’s ability to play a stronger role in the Balkans unfolding on its western door, as well as restricting severely the opportunity to make gains in the Caucasus and central Asia by taking advantage of Russia’s problems in Chechnya (Gunter 1997:114).

According to the Ross and Miller typology (1997:100), The greater the co-operation among states, the less the amount of terrorism. Co-operation is essential for the Turkish case, in order to fight against terrorism. In an unstable part of the world, Turkey has to overcome a number of problems with neighbouring countries before having a realistic chance of cutting the PKK’s foreign support. From the beginning of 1985 until the present day, there has been much diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Syria in which the PKK was undoubtedly one of the major topics of discussion. As the reports of Middle East and Turkish officials suggest, Syria is using the PKK as a trump card in negotiations over Turkey’s project to dam the Euphrates River and use the water supply for the demands of the south-eastern Anatolian project (Middle East Report 1998, OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 930432). One of the Turkish negotiators, Aksu, has said:

Although we did show all the evidence to the Syrian officials about the support provided to top comrades of the PKK by this country, including the presence of Öcalan in Damascus, Syria repeatedly either refused or ignored our arguments until recently when president Asad acknowledged the reality and promised that they will suspend all the aid which has been going on so
far. However we are aware of the fact that Syria has never kept her promises to us (interview with Aksu, 1993).

It seems unlikely that Syria will give up its support of the PKK unless Turkey and Syria resolve their differences over the disputed areas. As underlined in the Middle East Report, 'Until that time, Damascus will likely allow the PKK to be a serious nuisance to Turkey, but not to the point of provoking Ankara to take military measures against Syria' (Middle East Report 1988). Some 13.6% of the respondents to the authors survey believed that the south-eastern Anatolia project would increase the activities of the PKK (Appendix 1.Q12), an indication of Syria's use of the PKK as a tool in its negotiations with Turkey on the water issue.

Although the PKK did not receive the same hospitality from Saddam Hussein of Iraq, after the Gulf War in 1990, an area of northern Iraq was declared as a United Nations safe-haven for Iraqi Kurds, eventually leading to the collapse of any kind of authority in the region. The honeymoon period between the two main Iraqi Kurdish organisations, under the rival leaderships of Barzani and Talabani, ended in a bloody war over a power-sharing dispute, which consequently left the area vulnerable to PKK operations. An analysis of the statistical data shows that the PKK has taken full advantage of this situation and has increased its cross-border activities between northern Iraq and Turkey. This began in the spring of 1991 and the resultant terrorist activity claimed four times as many human lives annually as in the previous years (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 950345). In response, Turkey has been conducting a number of 'hot-pursuit' operations into this region. However, either the prior information given to the Barzani and Talabani
groups passed on to the terrorists, or the intelligence gathered from some other countries, is believed to have undermined the success rate of the operations (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 950345). The military operation conducted by Turkey in March-April 1995 received heavy criticism from some western European countries including France, Germany and Holland, which consequently brought about strong arguments for the need for international consensus in order to overcome the problems in northern Iraq (Gunter 1997; Milliyet, Sabah and Hurriyet newspapers in the last week of March and beginning of April 1995). Nevertheless some countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, showed some measure of understanding, declaring that they supported Turkish efforts to combat terrorism.

As Andrew Mango notes: 'with its secular, democratic and liberal free market economy, Turkey is the best candidate to be a model for the newly independent central Asian Turkish states and Middle Eastern Muslim states’ (Mango 1993:727). If the so-called Turkish model is possible, it must rely on the internal and external stability of the country. If Turkey were to become a regional model and a major power in the Middle East, many countries would feel threatened into supporting the terrorism of Turkey's neighbours (Birand 1993). The competition with Iran and Russia to become a model to be imitated by other nations in Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Mango 1993; Fuller 1993), has led some to circumstances in which Turkey’s terrorists have been seen as valuable opportunity to curtail her effort in these areas. The interests of Tehran, Ankara and Moscow in Central Asia and Transcaucasia seems to conflict with each other, rather than leading to co-operation between these countries (Pahlaven 1996; Eralp 1996). Turkish
officials argue that terrorists are ending up in either Iran or Syria after every 'hot pursuit' operation conducted by the army on the borders of these countries (OHBV/GÖY Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 950345). On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Russia sends its military trainers to the PKK camps in northern Iraq and did so in the Bekaa Valley. The most obvious example of the Russian attitude towards terrorism in Turkey came after the Russian intervention in Chechnya. When the head of the Russian intelligence service paid a visit to Ankara, for the first time in its history, he declared that if Turkey did not accept the fact that the ongoing war against the Chechnian rebels was a legitimate use of power by Russia in order to defend her integrity and interfered in the matter, they would consider the Turkish fight against the PKK in the same manner (Sabah and Milliyet March 1995).

To achieve political co-operation, the leaders of Russia, Iran and Turkey must reformulate their strategic and tactical policies in the region (Henze 1993; Fuller 1993; Lesser 1993). This task is not an easy one, particularly when the political interest and political systems of the countries differ so greatly. Iran invariably emphasises the Muslim solidarity in the regional countries, while Turkey stresses the ethnic and linguistic communities within those countries, and the success of the Turkish model of development (Pahlaven 1996). At the same time, Turkey and Russia must come to an agreement, if they are to achieve any chance of co-operation against terrorism, on common areas of interest. As former Turkish President Turgut Özal noted '... the interest of our countries [Russia and Turkey] in the region requires a co-operation and harmony on both sides, rather than competition and aggressiveness towards each other' (Özal radio broadcast 25 September 1992).
Despite this, it is clear that Turkey's concern over these countries' support for the PKK remains.

PKK’s relations with Greece remain another obstacle for Turkey. The relationship between Greece and Turkey has many times become inflamed over issues such as Cyprus, territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, air space over the Aegean Sea and persecution of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace (Lesser 1993; FACT BOOK I 1996: 54). Disagreements between Turkey and Greece over these issues resulted in Greek support for any terrorist organisation active in Turkey. It was radical left terrorist groups during the decades of 1970s, as mentioned in Chapter IV, and later Greece who became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the PKK (The Economist 18-24 March 1995; Baser 1995; FACT BOOK I 1996; Time Magazine 30 March 1998). Time reported, on PKK-Greek relations as follows:

The ERNK’s induction ceremonies are just the tail end of the process for turning refugees into revolutionaries. The real indoctrination and recruitment goes on at place like Lavrion [A training camp where many radical Turkish left terrorist groups received training during the 1970s], 45 km south-east of Athens, one of about five main refugee camps for the 100 or so Kurdish asylum seekers arriving each month. ... In the US, such open PKK activities would be a breach of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 and would bring prison sentences of up to 10 years for those perpetrating them. But in Greece, the PKK’s terrorist fire spreads virtually unchecked (Calabresi Time 30 March 1998: 33).

The Greeks involvement and support for the PKK has become even more evident after Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was forced out of Italy because of the Turkish official pressures and the threat of Turkish public boycott for the Italian goods, and could
not find any sheltering place in Europe. Abdullah Öcalan was hidden in Greece with the help of the Greek Foreign Ministry, then flown to Kenya using a Greek passport and kept in secret at Greek Embassy in Nairobi for a week before he was captured by the Turkish security forces on 15 February 1999 (Bowen 1999; The Washington Post 26 February 1999).

Although the PKK has been classed as a terrorist organisation by many democratic countries, such as the USA, Germany and France (FACT BOOK I 1996; Gunter 1997), like some other neighbouring countries, Greece does not hesitate to use a terrorist organisation as a political tool in its relations with Turkey.

In summary, since the PKK’s formation its survival has been largely dependent on foreign support. In fact, as Gunter noted, it would not have survived or been resurrected without foreign help (Gunter 1990: 99). This assistance has been important in allowing terrorists to infiltrate back into Turkey to stage hit-and-run attacks on Turkish targets. Many people would argue that it is important for Turkey to take some further steps towards democratisation to combat terrorism and, furthermore, attitude is necessary against the Kurdish groups within Turkey. However, since the PKK terrorism is considered to be international, and its very existence depends on foreign help, another argument has to be kept in mind. Is it possible to overcome terrorism just by adopting measures within Turkey? Even stronger countries, such as the US and UK, suffer from terrorism. This study will elaborate on the possibilities of internal measures against terrorism within the framework of democracy later in this chapter. However, combating
the PKK also relies on international co-operation as well as internal measures. Therefore, consideration should be given to Turkey's relations with neighbouring countries as well as with the western democratic nations. Accordingly, it can be argued that the PKK is an international terrorist organisation, and that any real change or permanent solution to this problem will require great effort by Turkish foreign officials and their counterparts in the countries that are involved with this issue, particularly those mentioned in this chapter. This underlies the argument put forward in Chapter II, that terrorism is sometimes a form of warfare between different countries, in a much larger scale than it used to be. The next section of this chapter examines another aspect of the problem, which helps us to understand the survival of the PKK. This is the finance of the organisation through drug trafficking and extortion.

Drug Trafficking and Extortion Connections

Ross and Miller (1997) noted that terrorists need resources to achieve their objectives. If the needs of terrorist groups for money and other resources are not obtained through donations from supporters, then terrorist groups may acquire them through illegal channels, drug trafficking, protection rackets, and extortion. Consequently, as suggested by the Ross and Miller typology, 'The greater the need for resources (in particular financial ones), the greater the possibility that terrorist organisations will engage in criminal activities that generate income' (Ross and Miller 1997: 80).

It has already been shown that the PKK has used indiscriminate violence to try to achieve
its objectives. However, it was also noted that after a long campaign of armed struggle it has not managed to establish popular support. Therefore, the survival of the PKK has been very dependent on foreign powers and also on its criminal activities in order to meet its rising costs. This became widely recognised by the world media after a number of successful operations conducted against the organisation during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In July 1989, PKK militants Yılmaz S. and Ahmet Y. were caught in Belgium in possession of sixty kilograms of cocaine and in the same year PKK member Turgut S. was caught with ten kilograms of heroin in Istanbul (Tempo 23 September 1992). According to the Turkish weekly magazine Tempo, the PKK's involvement in major shipments of drugs to Europe continued and in November 1990 another member of the organisation, Cengiz B., was caught in Arnheim on the German-Dutch border with forty-eight kilograms of heroin. In May 1992, Mehmet A., described as a leading member of the PKK, was caught with 13.5 kilograms of heroin. According to the Tempo reports and also FACT BOOK I 1996, of the forty-one narcotics operation carried out world-wide in 1991, smugglers caught in twenty-three of these operations were part of the PKK drug network and the drugs involved had come through Turkey and the Middle East. As Imset noted, despite other financial sources such as voluntary donations, protection rackets, robberies:

The most profitable PKK financial operation to date has been this organisation's increasing involvement in the international traffic of drugs which, according to one official, has provided the organisation with an annual income of not less than DM 500 million [This number probably meant fifty million] in the 1990s (Imset 1992: 156).

Probably one of the largest hauls of drugs (4.5 tonnes) was captured in a PKK camp in
northern Iraq by the Turkish army during a cross-border operation (Sabah 20 April 1995). After the operation some western officials, including American drug experts paid a visit to the area and confirmed that the PKK is not only selling drugs but also producing a large amount in northern Iraq (TRT News 19 April 1995). It is clear that the PKK is an international drug trafficker as well as a terrorist organisation. As a result of this, western democratic countries, which are increasingly vulnerable to such trade, declared their opposition to the PKK. The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, was the first to condemn the PKK activities and declared that it is the duty of all liberal democratic countries to fight against terrorism, naming the PKK as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in this respect (TRT 19-20 April 1995).

Another source of money for the PKK is extortion. It is a known fact that the PKK has been practising extortion not only on local businessmen but also businessmen in Istanbul, Ankara and throughout the country. Even the people outside the country are not immune from the PKK's threat and are forced in to paying money to the organisation. Particularly, Turkish guest-workers in Germany, France, Holland and the UK are among those who have been forced to pay money to the PKK (FACT BOOK I 1996; Criss 1995; Milliyet 1 November 1993). The director of the Terrorism Research Forum in Germany discovered that 69% of the incidents of extortion in Germany in 1994 were in connection with the PKK (Der Spiegel in Hurriyet 21 February 1995). It seems clear that the lack of voluntary donations to the PKK has led it to resort to criminal activities, which is the case for many terrorist organisations as Ross and Miller’s typology suggests.
To sum up, the international nature of modern terrorism means that, a country’s fight against terrorism is seldom simply an internal matter. In this study, it has been shown that the PKK is not only a threat to Turkish interests and stability, but also to the regional and world order alongside other international terrorist organisations. In order to overcome such threats to world peace, international co-operation and understanding between different nations is needed. The members of the world community should take a co-operative approach against terrorism, rather than using it for their political advantage under the guise of supporting ‘freedom fighters’.

The following section of this chapter concentrates on the internal reasons and causes of PKK terrorism and elaborates on these reasons in terms of the internal dimension of terrorism within Turkey.

The Causes of the PKK Terrorism

Why Terrorism?

As noted in Chapter II, terrorism is seen as a convenient and feasible way to reach a political objective by some organisations, and it has been increasingly practised for more than two hundred years. The use of violence has developed and become a form of struggle justified as a weapon of the weak against the powerful tyrants and dictatorial regimes. However, there are strong arguments that, the use of indiscriminate violence cannot be justified, particularly in liberal democracies. Moreover, terrorism cannot be perceived as a legitimate weapon of the weak when there is considerable foreign
involvement and manipulation of terrorist organisations. As noted in Chapter II, and in parts of this chapter, some countries have used terrorist organisations for their own political objectives. This has been seen in the Cold War period of Soviet expansion policies and recent examples are of Turkey’s neighbours’ involvement with the PKK. In light of these developments, terrorism is sometimes a form of warfare between competing nations. It can be argued that the main reasoning behind terrorist activities is that regardless of moral considerations violence can be justified as a pragmatic strategy in which the ends justify the means.

As far as the Turkish experience is concerned, the terrorist organisations have willingly resorted to violence. As Wilkinson (1986b) noted, terrorism does not require many people to cause great disruption for states and countries, which was precisely the case with the revolutionary terrorist groups in late 1960s, and the same can be said for the PKK in the late 1970s, when it comprised only twenty persons. Further, when the political history of Turkey is examined, it appears that the use of terrorism to achieve political goals has been one of the major methods of several organisations. As argued in previous chapters, two major causes for the extensive use of terrorism in Turkey since the late 1960s can be identified.

First, terrorist organisations refused to use the channels of democracy available to them and because of that attitude towards democracy, armed struggle was inevitable and the only way for them to secure their political goals. However, as illustrated many times, this action does not necessarily reflect the lack of democratic channels within the society, as
the recent example in Omagh has showed. In the Turkish case, the best example of this came in 1969 when, after losing the general elections, a group emerged from the ranks of the Turkish Labour Party believing in the use of armed struggle to take power regardless of the availability of democratic channels within the country. A member of the extreme groups went underground, and started a so-called 'revolutionary war' (Chapter IV).

A second example is the PKK’s terrorism, in which Öcalan declared the use of violence as his main method, despite the fact that majority of the Kurdish citizens of Turkey were participating in democratic life. With these experiences of both revolutionary and separatist Marxist terrorism in Turkey, it could be argued that the reactive approach taken by the Turkish governments exacerbated matters. Consequently, in both experiences terrorists took full advantage of the situation and generated maximum propaganda. The reactive policies and lack of democratic experience, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, contributed to the escalation of the violence (Gunter 1990 and 1997; Winrow and Kirisci 1997; Barchard 1998; Barkey and Fuller 1997 and 1998). This study has argued that neither the deficit of the democratic system nor the government’s policies are the principal causes of terrorism in Turkey. It does argue, however, that the government’s reactive measures following terrorist activities have both failed to reduce terrorism within the country, and also inflamed the situation. This has had the effect of making a bad situation worse. This raises the whole issue of the government’s approach to political terrorism, which will be discussed further below.

The second reason for terrorism in Turkey is rooted in its social and economic problems.
that existed within the country, educational disadvantages and more importantly, as Fuller (1997), Gunter (1992 and 1997), Winrow and Kirisci (1997) and Barchard (1998) have noted in the hesitation of the Turkish government to take the necessary steps and precautions to deal with root causes if the problem. Instead, they have regarded it as purely a security matter. The combined effect of these factors has made Turkish democracy vulnerable to terrorism and consequently, democratic life in Turkey has been disrupted on three occasions, as mentioned previously.

The PKK's Will to Use Violence

The PKK's use of indiscriminate violence and their reasons have already been discussed. These included the PKK's inability to persuade and mobilise the people of the region, its attempt to eliminate the other alternative Kurdish groups from the political arena, and an assault on particularly within the democratic integration of the region, south-east Anatolia (Criss 1995; Dilmac 1997). Moreover, the difficulty of establishing a force of volunteer recruits and the rejection by local people of the Marxist-Leninist ideology also contributed to the PKK's use violence against all these groups and the public. Sometimes the level and extent of violence was such that entire families were killed.

However some authors, such as Bozarslan (1992 and 1996), excuse the PKK on the ground that 'the PKK has been forced into armed struggle by military violence' (1992: 105). It has been established from many sources, however, including the words of
Öcalan himself that, from the first day of the PKK's establishment in 1970s, it was the clear policy of the organisation to use violence, according to the first 'party' programme of the PKK in 1977. As noted in Chapter II, terrorist organisations resort to violence because they think that is the best, most convenient and quickest way to obtain their objectives. As Bakunin stated, wars kill many people, but with terrorism one can achieve maximum profitability with minimum casualties. It is incorrect to suggest, therefore, that the PKK resorted to violence because of the Turkish government's policies. Nevertheless, it is also true that some of the policies adopted by the government contributed to further escalation of the violence.

Bruinessen (1988), one of the most respected scholars of Kurdish affairs, reported that Öcalan's group was the only Kurdish organisation whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the lowest social classes, poorly-educated village and small-town youths who wanted action rather than ideological sophistication (Bruinessen 1988: 41). This finding is backed up by the response to the author's survey. In answer to the question, 'From what kind of social group does the PKK get its support?' 31.2% of the respondents said 'poorly educated', and another 29.9% thought 'poor people' supported the organisation. Thus, a total of 61.1% believed that poor and less well-educated sections of society provided support for the PKK. 16.9% of respondents said they did not know where the PKK found its support (Appendix 1.Q8).

These findings underline another aspect of the problem, namely that the PKK lacks educated recruits to promote its political aims. Consequently, the only way left for the
PKK to achieve its goals is to terrorise the general public rather than use democratic means to persuade the public. Moreover, the findings of the TOBB report also suggest that the majority of the respondents (70%), who wanted an independent Kurdish state were either illiterate or primary school graduates. It was not a coincidence that the majority of the PKK militants were uneducated village boys, concluded the TOBB Report (TOBB Report 1995). As noted earlier, 60% of the convicted PKK members were either illiterate or primary school educated people (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960113). These findings tend to show that lack of education is a major factor in terrorist violence in Turkey.

As discussed in Chapter IV during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s terrorist organisations exploited the economic backwardness of the country in order to attract public support. The PKK was quick to exploit this position in south-eastern Anatolia, recognised as the poorest and least-educated part of the country (Winrow and Kirisci1997). Although the government’s public spending in south-eastern Turkey has been proportionately higher compared to that of other regions, there has been a low level of private investment, partly as a result of terrorist attacks and partly because of the unattractive profit margins due to its mountainous terrain and poor communications (Winrow and Kirisci 1997:123-125). Winrow and Kirisci further noted that the gross per capita income is lowest in eastern and south-eastern Turkey compared to the other regions, and only six out of every 100 privately- owned cars in 1991 were registered in the eastern and south-eastern regions, which indicates the relative lack of prosperity in these regions (Winrow and Kirisci 1997: 122). As a result of the depressed nature of the
economy, there have been high levels of unemployment, particularly amongst the youth, with a figure of 36% for this particular region, according to the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This contributed to the rise of terrorism and has been one of the terrorists’ most well-used facts in their propaganda.

The ‘South-eastern Report’, prepared by the parliamentary group of the Socialist People’s Party, noted that socio-economic problems are the major cause of terrorism in this region and added there are 10.4% hospital beds per 10,000 people compared to 23.7 for Turkey as a whole (SHP Report 1990). The SHP report accepted that the difficult geography of the area meant there was little economic incentive to attract private investment to the region. However, the SHP believed that government investment could have been better used, and also that the fight against unemployment, which is the biggest problem in the region, should have been given top priority. The SHP report also noted that although south-eastern Turkey accommodates 8.5% of the country’s population, it received only 5% of the total investment budget in the period 1981-1985. Another study, carried out by Besikci, argued that the regional backwardness of the country also fostered many social problems which needed to be addressed (Besikci 1991). These economic factors are of course affected by the terrorist presence in the region, and by attacks on investors, teachers and public servants (Criss 1995).

The author’s survey asked the question ‘There has been a dramatic increases in terrorist incidents since the second half of the 1980s. What reasons could there be for that?’. The most popular answer was low income and underdevelopment in regional economic
growth, given by 28% of respondents (Appendix 1.Q10). It is evident that economic backwardness is a key contributor to terrorism.

The problem of foreign support for the terrorists was discussed earlier in this chapter. As noted, it is one of the most important areas that the Turkish government has to address. Alongside other evidence, what is most important is that the survey respondents did not believe that economic reasons alone were responsible for the increase in terrorism. Responsibility was also attached to certain groups, both internal and external, who were seen as trying to decrease economic development in Turkey (15% of respondents) while 21% blamed foreign powers trying to weaken Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East (Appendix 1.Q10).

The survey also indicated that a considerable number of people blamed the Turkish government for the incidence of terrorism. Some 26.6% of respondents argued that misguided government policies affected the rapid increase of terrorism during the second half of the 1980s (Appendix 1.Q10).

Three reasons have been put forward for this. As illustrated in the reports of the SHP, the lack of long-term policies intended to solve acute regional problems, in fields such as education, housing, unemployment, health and land reforms, have had no success in satisfying the public demands (SHP Report 1990). Second, the public has not been satisfied with the way that the government has been handling the fight against terrorism. Terrorist incidents increased the severity of security measures and the public increasingly
felt this. People in the regions in eastern Turkey have particularly experienced this, where the state of emergency is still in force. As Ross and Miller suggested, 'The greater the passage of special enactment legislation, the greater the violation of human rights' (Ross and Miller 1997: 96).

Ross and Miller mainly focused on the type of governmental response following the terrorist incidents. The government has used police forces, military units, intelligence agencies, parliamentary units, numerous government-managed security outfits and special anti-terrorist units (1997: 97-99). The operations of these units, under special amendments to the law (the Prevention of Terrorism Act; Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law and the declarations of states of emergency issued in July 1987 in ten provinces in eastern and south-eastern Turkey, now reduced to six provinces) have inevitably imposed constraints on public life. They are the cause of many complaints by the public. As noted earlier, these kinds of special amendments to the law become necessary when there is a increasing level of terrorist oppression. Unal has noted that many advanced democracies in the west, including the UK, have enacted similar legislation (Unal 1997). He further noted that along with Turkey, the UK, in its battle with the IRA, has resulted in frequent litigation at the European Court of Human Rights.

However, the severity of the security measures and its effects on the public was one of the main issues complained about, during the author's observations in the region. The author asked ex-Minister of the Interior Aksu why they did not abolish the emergency law, although it had been lifted in all other parts of the country following military rule in 1980-
1983. Aksu admitted that the use of the extraordinary powers given to the security forces by this law caused anxiety. However, he likened the situation to the chicken and egg conundrum: ‘Which comes first? The law is there because terrorism is there’ (interview with Aksu, 1993). Nevertheless it is apparent that security measure alone has not been successful in defeating terrorism.

Government policies for combating terrorism can be divided into three categories. First, there are proactive measures against terrorism, such as socio-economic policies and education programmes. Second, there are reactive policies such as the security measures and finally, there is the democratisation project, which will be considered later in this chapter.

The government of Turgut Özal (1983-1991) seemed to realise the importance of economic development in combating terrorism. The biggest public investment in the history of the Republic, the ‘Southeast Anatolian Project’, better known as GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi), was given priority. The project comprised a sprawling network of hydro-electric power plants and irrigation schemes spanning the Euphrates and Tigris rivers along Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Syria. According to the GAP Department of the State Planning Organisation, the total cost of the project was 32 billion US dollars (Türkiye 1994). The objective of the project was to redress the imbalance of the country’s poorest region, creating jobs in an area facing endemic unemployment, the country’s highest population growth, and social and economic deprivation, all of which have been seen as major contributors to the fifteen years of terrorist incidents. The
economic output and social impact of the project is promising: it will increase Turkey’s irrigated farmland by a third and power from the dams will double the country’s electricity capacity. Spanning eight provinces in the region, the GAP is envisaged as being the economic catalyst for a multitude of ancillary economic activities from seed manufacturing to textile production (Financial Times 24 July 1992).

According to the Financial Times survey, the social impacts of the GAP will allow long awaited land reform, offering a panacea for poor farmers caught in a trap of dept in a region where feudal allegiances are still predominant. The Financial Times report noted:

> With the introduction of new advanced farm technologies the rural communities of the region will shrug off backwardness and progress into the modern age, with rising income levels and the introduction of mechanisation and the input of modern science (Financial Times 24 July 1992).

Another two objectives of the GAP were to stop the flow of migrant workers, which had put strains on public services in cities such as Izmir, Istanbul, Adana and Ankara, and most importantly, to win the support of the regional peoples and undermine support for the PKK through the promise of jobs and a better life (Financial Times 24 July 1992).

Of course, with its growing budget deficits and spiralling inflation, which climbed to a devastating 159% in 1994 and has levelled off at around 100% per year since, Turkey cannot afford to slow down investment in the region. An important point is whether the GAP is going to help attract peoples’ hearts and minds in undermining and isolating terrorists and minimising their support. What effect would GAP have on Turkey’s fifteen-year battle with the terrorists? In order to discover the feelings of the region’s people, the
author's survey asked, 'Do you think that the south-east Anatolian Project will have any effect on the activities of PKK? The outcome of the survey indicated support for GAP, with 62% of the respondents believing that the project would undermine and weaken the PKK's efforts, while 14.9% thought that no changes would result and 13% argued that it would increase the power of the PKK (Appendix 1.Q12). A minority (14%) predicted a rise in terrorist activities as a result of economic investment. This group's priority might be ethnic interests and cultural rights rather than economic development of the region, which has to be looked at from a different perspective. There is the example of the ETA in Spain, which developed in more prosperous Spain (Ben-Ami 1988).

During the author's field research he witnessed an illustration of this outcome. In a small coffee shop in Kocakiri (a small town near Diyarbakir), a conversation took place during which it was said that 'more money may create new resources for the terrorists, who are already financed by a considerable amount of money taken by force from the regional people'. The governor of the town, Selim Cebiroglu, explained his worries:

You can see much half-finished work around here, which has been heavily subsidised by the government under the plan of priority of the project for the underdeveloped regions. Where is the project and where did the money go? I have heard many times that half of the money goes to the PKK and the other half to the fugitive businessman. If the government is not careful, every penny we pay will be of benefit to terrorist organisations. So if we want to succeed against terrorism we have to stop this pipeline (interview with Cebiroglu, 1993).

The views of these people echo the position in Spain after Franco, when economic development of the Basque region did not help to stop ETA's terrorism, but rather fuelled
it. So it is not economic development alone but also, as Home Secretary Aksu stated, a package programme consisting of economic, social and democratisation developments that are needed to achieve a long-lasting solution (interview with Aksu, 1993).

However, in many respects the situation in Turkey is quite different from that of Spain. In April 1995, Turkey celebrated the official opening of the first irrigation tunnel resulting from GAP, which at that time had cost its economy 12 billion US dollars (Sabah 8 April 1995). Despite the high cost of the project, the government was hoping that GAP would remedy the economic and social imbalance between east and west Turkey. However, it is not just the financial costs of the project that Turkey has had to cope with, but also the strong criticism from its neighbours Syria and Iraq, and the PKK’s attacks on public investments in the region (which the organisation claims is another deception by Turkey perpetrated on its Kurdish population).

To give an illustration of terrorist opposition to GAP-funded work in the south-east, in 1993, a total of 477 public works vehicles and 408 private works vehicles were destroyed, while 439 public service buildings and factories and as many as 1,012 private houses and economic investments and factories were destroyed (EGMA/TMDB Arc. /Sec. Doc. 940348). Although there are no data available about the actual cost of these economic losses, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the PKK has severely damaged an already depressed regional economy. Turkey has had to invest more in order to prevent its economic investments from becoming terrorist targets as well as maintain its level of public investment in the region in order to prevent issues such as housing,
unemployment, education, health and so on from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism.

Güneri Civaoglu, the editor-in-chief for the Turkish daily newspaper *Sabah*, summarised the nature of Turkey’s effort to overcome economic backwardness of south-eastern Anatolia and its effect on the people, following the opening ceremony of the GAP:

On the way from the city of Urfa to the Ataturk Dam with two journalist colleagues Yalcin Dogan and Yavuz Donat (both columnists for *Milliyet*), our young Marxist guide from the region was saying Turkey is an occupant here and you are a bourgeoisie. But the same boy, as the journalists passed through the grassy plain of Harran said: This is my family’s land. The waters of the Ataturk Dam will reach here. Our land will be valued hundreds of times more than it is now. I will be so rich and I will buy a summerhouse in Bodrum and houses in Istanbul (*Sabah 12 April 1995*).

The surprised journalists looked at each other and said: ‘Where did the young boy’s Marxist speech and Kurdish nationalism disappear? All the way along the journey he was talking about them and how fascinating was the change in the boy’s mind, getting rich in the grassy plain of Harran and buying a house in Istanbul and Bodrum’ (*Sabah 12 April 1995*). It is generally accepted that in any instance of social turmoil, economic and social factors will either contribute to terrorism or prevent it, depending on the how far the public is satisfied by developments and the government’s awareness of the public need (Ross and Miller 1997). Guneri Civaoglu quite rightly stated that the solutions to separatist terrorism such as that of the PKK, are: ‘better standards of living, better public service and more effective democracy’ (*Civaoglu Sabah 12 April 1995*).

Turkey celebrated the opening of the GAP irrigation tunnels on 10 April 1995, and the
following day almost all the papers were discussing how much the project will contribute to the national economy and how effectively terrorist incidents will be prevented. The consensus was that rich and economically satisfied people of the eastern Turkey would head for the sunny beaches of Bodrum, Marmaris, and the business centres of Turkey rather than become recruits of the PKK. It was clear that effective government policies to curb the social and economic problems would undermine the claims and propaganda of the PKK.

Among Turkish government policies for combating terrorism, the adoption of various security measures have been the most contentious. Critics of these policies have mainly been from two camps. The first group, such as Barkey and Fuller (1997), Winrow and Kirisci (1997), Gunter (1990, 1992 and 1998) have argued that the Turkish government perceives the matter as simply a security issue. The second group of critics, such as Criss (1995), Dilmac (1997), Bal and Aytaç (1997), argue that although there is a necessity to have some degree of security measures, their implementation has to be considered very carefully in order to avoid public dissatisfaction and abuse of civil liberties. It is argued that, like in any other democratic country when public life and order are threatened by terrorists, it is inevitable that governments will take security measures that will have an impact on civil liberties (Bal and Aytaç 1997; Unal 1997).

As noted earlier, terrorism does not require many militants or large-scale public support to cause disruption to democratic societies. This was witnessed recently (15 August 1998), when 28 civilians in Omagh Northern Ireland were killed by the ‘Real IRA’ whose
total membership was thought to be no more than one hundred. As many expected, new security measures were carefully introduced by both the Irish and British governments. It is essential that such security measures should not be counter-productive in a way that the terrorists might benefit. That is to say, the level of security measures in terms of their effects on individual freedoms, the attitude of the security forces towards the people and their accountability to relevant institutions within a democracy, all need to take account of local sensitivities to win local support.

As discussed in Chapters III and IV, once the terrorist incidents began increasing in Turkey, security measures were stepped up and the military who again took the decision making role. Although the military has a valuable and important role to play in any country where security concerned, they need to be accountable to elected governments (Wilkinson 1996). It is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy that, as with any other problem within the society, elected governments are accountable and responsible for any special measures or initiatives. In the case of the Turkish fight against PKK terrorism, while the government may appear to be winning the war against terrorism, they may be in danger of losing public confidence and causing an increase in nationalist consciousness within the Kurdish community in Turkey (Winrow and Kirisci 1997; Gunter 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1998). It is important that security operations take place within the rule of law, in order to avoid public complaints and dissatisfaction with the security forces. Otherwise there is a danger that the government will gradually lose its legitimacy and public support in fighting terrorism.
Government policies on the prevention of terrorism must aim to minimise the negative effects on the general public. As noted in Ross and Miller's (1997) typology, the severity of security measures can weaken public confidence in the government and may lead to the legitimacy of the government's actions being undermined. As can be seen from the Turkish experience, a considerable number of the south-eastern Anatolian people, have not been happy with the way the government has handled the situation. As Wilkinson (1974, 1986a, 1986b, 1989 and 1996) has noted, people's backing of the government's fight against terrorism is essential.

As argued in Chapter IV the use of terrorist violence to obtain a political goal does not reflect the inability of the system to satisfy all parties in Turkey. Although Turkey adopted the most liberal constitution in its history in 1961, including the free discussion of socialism, some radical groups resorted to violence, believing that it would be the most appropriate and feasible way to achieve their objectives. As a result, some tough legislation was enacted to tackle the terrorism and finally the Constitution of 1982 was partly created as a response to the revolutionary terrorism of the 1970s. The PKK have adopted the same method that radical left groups did previously, instead of using the channels of democracy it has used the weakness of the Turkish democracy as propaganda material for its terrorist cause.

There are issues that mentioned in this section, which demand carefully planned government policies, and currently provide the basis of propaganda for terrorist groups to manipulate and weaken the government's position. The government needs to take further
action to solve economic and social problems, particularly housing, unemployment, health and education. It is also evident that the severity of security measures is another issue that needs to be addressed, and this too has handed propaganda material to the terrorists. Security measures should be selective within the rule of law and be accountable. The issues examined in this section raise questions about the cost of terrorism in Turkey. This may be considered in three respects the economic cost, the erosion of individual freedoms and the cost of repairs.

The Cost of PKK Terrorism

The Bishopsgate bombing by the IRA in London on 24 April 1993 and the bombing of the New York World Trade Centre in the same year concentrated the world’s attention on a number of questions. *The Times* newspaper stated ‘The price for Britain will be heavy in three areas: the cost of repairs, the purchase of better security and the further erosion of personal freedom’ (*The Times* 26 April 1993). While the PKK has long been targeting economic investments in the eastern provinces, it started a bombing campaign in early 1990s in the western regions of the country, where many of Turkey’s most famous tourist resorts are situated. This campaign cost an estimated 5 billion US dollars for the tourism sector alone during the period 1991-1993 (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1993). In total, it is estimated that there is an $8 billion annual cost of terrorism to the Turkish economy (Star TV 23 May 1997; *The Economist* 20 February 1999). Turkey has experienced many terrorist attacks that have resulted in high costs of repairs, a rising cost of security and further loss of individual freedoms.
The Ross and Miller typology can be applied to the tactical violence of the PKK and their strategy of preventing economic developments in the region. This approach can have a number of results, such as increased inflation, the prevention of public and private sector investment, and demographic changes (Ross and Miller 1997). The PKK’s aim in attacking economic targets is principally to raise the question in Turkish society of whether continued involvement in the south-east region is worth the high cost in lives, resources and civil liberties. The evidence indicates that Turkish people have not yet begun to consider such questions seriously (Criss 1995). As demonstrated in this Chapter, the PKK is not seen as representative of Kurdish groups in Turkey; rather the public appears to believe that the PKK is trying to destroy harmony and goodwill between Kurdish and Turkish people and so are prepared to resist the terrorism, if they are invited to decision-making process.

**Combating Terrorism within the Framework of Liberal Democracy**

**Is Democracy Necessary?**

The history and development of democracy in Turkish life has been examined and explained in previous chapters of this thesis. This particular section stresses the necessity of democracy to the political development of Turkey in order to curtail terrorism, most notably terrorism related to ethnic demands. Four points are worth considering: the necessity of democracy for Turkey from the public point of view, the policy makers’ attitude in resolving the ethnic terrorism in Turkey, the policies of different groups in
Turkey in combating terrorism and finally, the author's findings and suggestions for resolving the present-day terrorist problem in Turkey within the framework of democracy.

Under the present circumstances how can Turkey achieve further democratisation and accommodate different interests, issues and demands that arise without threatening its national unity and territorial integrity?. A general understanding of the concept of democracy in Turkey has developed over a century, and different forms of public participation are now well-established after they were first introduced in 1946, as discussed in Chapter III and IV. In this respect, it is possible to contrast the nature of democracy in other developing countries. The democratisation process of Turkey has had its ups and downs as mentioned in previous chapters. However, Dodd has observed the strengths of democratic life in Turkey and the public perceptions of democracy, and summarised them accurately:

It is also often argued as one of the strengths of Turkish democracy that it was not something planted in Turkish soil by some foreign or colonial powers. It is a system imported and developed by the Turks themselves. Its basic features were not unknown to the Ottoman intelligentsia of the nineteenth century; they made a remarkable effort to graft democracy on to the Ottoman system (Dodd 1990: 136).

As discussed in Chapter III and IV, in 1876 a constitution was drawn up which provided valuable legal and constitutional precedents, as well as experience in the practice of democratic institutions (Dodd 1990). In 1923, the leader Mustafa Kemal became President, and he envisaged the future of Turkey as a democratic European state. Authors like Mango (1993), Dodd (1990) and Özbudun (1988) have suggested that there are many
factors favouring the success of democracy in Turkey. However, despite considerable achievements, and the practice of multi-party elections since 1946, military interventions on three occasions since 1960 have raised questions about the fragility of Turkish democracy.

Nevertheless, the democratisation in Turkey has proved itself over the years, and has become a way of life. As Turkish intellectuals argue, if state power has to be based on the will of the sovereign people then the Turkish people have demonstrated their will in the elections (Özbudun 1988). They have also shown how to control this governing body not only by simple voting but also by raising their demands for various other institutions, which is in practice the nature of civil society in a well-functioning liberal democracy (Sorenson 1993; Ahmad 1997). As noted in the second chapter, it is important for governments to have widespread public consent in implementing their policies, which is an indicator of a liberal democracy, and a necessity for establishing legitimacy. Turkish people have adopted democratic values as their own values and they would be very reluctant to abandon these values and institutions. It is clear that policy makers in Turkey must recognise the factors and operate within the framework of democracy.

Since the introduction of pluralist democracy in Turkey, the overwhelming majority of the people have not abused the freedom and civil rights brought by it. Indeed, ordinary citizen have contributed to the development of democracy such that one of the most Liberal Prime Minister and Presidents of the Republic, Özal, expressed his appreciation to Turkey’s people by saying ‘society is far in advance of us’. Governments must give
credit to people's experiences of democracy and their common-sense. So far none of the radical parties have managed to win a high percentage of the votes in general elections, nor have extremists gained major public support for their programmes. As can be seen from Lipovsky (1992), public support for extreme movements has not extended beyond 3.9% in Turkey, and, there is little popular support for the present-day PKK. Furthermore, as revealed by the results of the author’s survey as well as the TOBB (1995) survey, the majority of the Kurdish groups believe that a solution to their problems can be obtained through the democratic system.

Probably most importantly, citizens of Turkey are not polarised or divided along Kurdish and Turkish lines. Winrow and Kirisci (1997) share the view of many researchers, such as Criss (1995), Ergil (1995), and Birand (1993) that the solution to present-day Kurdish question lies in the following approach:

It would seem that the PKK is not representative of the Kurdish population of Turkey. Many Kurds apparently believe that a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question is possible through a dialogue with the authorities from which the PKK could be excluded. ... Within Turkey itself, hopes for further democratisation and devolution of decision-making powers, the development of a dialogue, and the possible emergence of multiculturalism based on a real and genuine civic nationalism still remain at present only hopes (Winrow and Kirisci 1997: 214-215).

As noted in Chapter II, it is possible to find solutions to such divisions and accommodate differences within liberal democracies and this has occurred in various countries in the West. In the case of Turkey, ethnic and cultural differences can be solved, as Winrow and Kirisci have suggested, through further democratisation and pluralism in Turkish society.
which would ultimately reduce the amount of tension and division within society and undermine the status and claims of the separatist PKK.

**The Main Approaches to Combating PKK Terrorism in Turkey, and State Policy**

In common with many countries, whenever terrorism emerges in Turkey two distinct camps appear: hard-liners, who perceive the problem as a ‘security matter’, and soft-liners, who advocate accommodation and state that the problem can be solved only by ‘further democratisation’.

The defenders of the hard-line approach have suggested tough policies, which require new amendments to laws, and a greater security presence to deal with them. These groups of people are usually from the elite and who are defenders of the principles of Kemalism; from the ruling class, the military and from some nationalists, as discussed in Chapters III and IV. Critics of this group, such as Aytaç (1997), Winrow and Kirisci (1997), Gunter (1992 and 1997), and Çandar (1995), regard them as people whose main aim is to keep the status-quo. Like many other critics of this approach, Winrow and Kirisci (1997) argue that their behaviour mainly stems from what has been called ‘Sevres syndrome’, which was elaborated upon earlier in this study. Barkey and Fuller having examined the effects of Sevres syndrome on the present Kurdish problem and also on PKK terrorism, stated:

> Turkish policy is driven by the fear that any major concession to Kurdish demands whether political, economic, or cultural will ultimately lead to greater demands at a future date that could culminate in the break-up of Turkey. The often invoked precedent for such an eventuality is the 1920 Sevres Treaty signed between the victorious allied powers and the Ottoman government that called, among other things, for interim
autonomy for Kurdish areas of eastern and south-eastern Anatolia with a view to independence (1997: 61).

Consequently, the hard-liners have been suspicious of every new and radical proposal and change that could be introduced into society and seek to maintain the status-quo, fearing a breakaway from the state and erosion of the unitary status of the Republic of Turkey. Sensitive issues, such as the national security of the state have been treated in a particularly uncompromising manner.

Two striking examples of this happened in recent Turkish history. After the emergence of the radical left in the late 1960s, Turkey experienced a military coup and by memorandum in 1971, outlawed the Turkish Labour Party accompanied by tough measures against terrorism. However, as noted in Chapter IV, after a short period, revolutionary terrorism reached its peak in the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980. Clearly, this hard-line approach failed to solve the causes of terrorism and this led to the military coup on 12 September 1980 and another hiatus in the democratic process. The second example came following the growth of the separatist marxist terrorism of the PKK, when new legislation was introduced. Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and accompanying emergency legislation were implemented in six provinces of south-east and eastern Turkey. Of course, Turkey should protect its citizens' lives and its borders against the brutal and indiscriminate violence of the PKK. However, one has to consider the possible effects of these amendments and anti-terrorism measures on ordinary citizens in addition to its questionable success in curtailing PKK terrorism. The implementation of security measures has to be selective and effective. Under the present circumstances, it is not easy
to estimate the present cost and damage of PKK terrorism to the Turkish economy, democracy and foreign policy, is less than it was in the 1980s.

The second group prefers a soft-line approach to terrorism. These are usually newspaper columnists and intellectuals, in particular Cengiz Çandar (1995), Ahmet and Mehmet Altan (1995), and Çetin Altan (1995), who have declared their opinions in a number of articles following the famous TOBB Report of 1995. The approach of the soft-liners in combating terrorism are similar to the views of Birand (1993), Gunter (1997), Barkey and Fuller (1997 and 1998). According to them, PKK terrorism can be fought successfully by adopting new approaches. This would include not only tough security measures and legislation but also some radical political and institutional change.

The major difference between this view and that of the author stems from an understanding of the causes of PKK terrorism. Defenders of the soft-line approach, such as Barkey and Fuller, argue that: ‘Our discussion of the "Kurdish conflict" emphasises the assumption that the nature of the problem is basically one of ethnicity and identity rather than primarily economic or terrorist in nature’ (1997:61). Examining this view, in the light of the present study, it is difficult to agree that the terrorism by the PKK is principally a problem of ethnicity. As noted earlier, the PKK has tried to exploit every possible weakness of Turkish democracy and political life, including its various economic problems, to get public support for its actions, but it is evident that the PKK has not been successful in its efforts. It is true however that the PKK has been successful in causing considerable upheaval in Turkish socio-politic and economic life. Barkey and Fuller
(1997 and 1998) are right to suggest that sidelining more moderate groups (named as traditionalist conservative and liberal Kurdish groups within Turkey) representing Kurdish interests, might actually contribute to the rise of the PKK and leave the PKK as the only representative of the Kurds.

The proponents of the soft-line view have been accused of being ignorant, and over-optimistic utopians divorced from reality (Bolugiray 1992; Çölesan Hurriyet 1995). Terrorism in Turkey has not been solved just by using security measures, and it would also be naive to suggest that terrorism can be solved with a soft-line approach. As many experts such as Wilkinson (1986b), have argued, a soft-line approach has a major disadvantage: if a government implements this approach it may encourage terrorists to demand more concessions from the government, and such successes might cause the violence to escalate even further.

Although both sides have some valuable points to be considered, it is evident from the experience of the 1990s that neither view on its own is likely to solve the terrorist problem in present-day Turkey. It has been demonstrated in this study that terrorists do not always resort to violence in the absence of democracy and it is possible that the soft-line approach might encourage the terrorists. On the other hand, strengthening democracy and democratic values does allow the government to operate against terrorism with confidence and to generate public support. It is arguable that the two approaches should be combined in combating terrorism. This could be described as a third way for Turkey: further democratisation with security. The third way will be discussed in more detail after
examining the policy-makers' attitude towards PKK terrorism. Thus we will see which approach has dominated the state policies and whether it has been successful in overcoming terrorism.

Policy-Makers' Attitude to Terrorism During the 1990s

In any democracy threatened by terrorism, a loss of public freedom is inevitable to some degree, and this depends on the extent of terrorist incidents and reactions of the authorities. Examples of similar situations to Turkey include that in Spain (Janke 1983), and the Peruvian experience with the 'Shining Path' (Strong 1983). Paul Wilkinson's studies of, Terrorism and the Liberal State (1986) and Terrorism Verses Liberal Democracy: The Problem of Response (1986), Janke's work on the ETA's threat to Basque democracy (1986) and Pisano's examination of the Red Brigades challenge to Italian Democracy (1986) raise issues and experiences which are similar to the Turkish experience of terrorism. The Turkish experience with revolutionary terrorism has been discussed earlier and it was noted that it ended with the defeat of democracy. It has also been shown how separatist terrorism has developed and become a substantial threat to Turkey's interests in the region, which has affected its foreign relations and its own socio-economic stability. It is now worth briefly examining how terrorism has affected the internal policies of Turkey and what approaches the policy-makers have adopted in trying to counter terrorism in the 1990s.

As mentioned in Chapter II, one of the major aims of terrorist using violence is to attract
public attention to their cause, and to undermine the legitimacy of the government. In that respect, the PKK has employed indiscriminate and brutal violence to demonstrate that it is the only representative of the Kurdish cause in Turkey, and to undermine the legitimacy of the Turkish National Parliament in Ankara as well as Kurdish organisations purporting to represent the people of south-east Anatolia.

However, it seems clear from the statistical data that the PKK that it has not enjoyed the same success as some other terrorist organisations in terms of public support. This can be seen in the comparison between the ‘Shining Path’ of Peru and the PKK. As noted earlier, the PKK has adopted similar strategies to those of the Shining Path and hoped to achieve similar success. One of the Shining Path’s greatest successes was to wreck the 1989/90 municipal and general elections in many areas of Peru. Strong noted that:

Nearly 60 per cent of registered voters either spoiled their ballot papers or, in spite of heavy fines, failed to turn up (this compared with 36 per cent in the 1986 municipal elections) ... The 1990 general elections suffered a similar fate ... Thirty-five per cent of registered voters spoiled their votes or stayed away from the ballot boxes in the first round, dropping to 28 per cent in the second (Strong 1993: 10-11).

The PKK used the same strategy to try to prove that it had public support, to influence international observers, to show its strength to its followers, and to question the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). It did not, however, achieve the success it was hoping for. The electorate was threatened with reprisals if they cast their votes, and politicians were threatened if they stood for office. According to Birler’s findings:
The turnout by voters in Diyarbakir, where the PKK is believed to be strong was 79.86%, with the percentage of spoiled votes standing only at 7.8%. In Hakkari, 89.40% of the voters turned out, with spoiled votes at only 7.8%. In Sırnak the turnout was 74.54% and spoiled votes only 8.3% (Birler in Criss 1995).

These findings suggested that PKK’s instructions were not heeded or carried out, and that the people of the region demonstrated that they were not supporters of the PKK (Criss 1995). Moreover, it can be suggested that the people of south-eastern Anatolia were indicating recognition of the Parliament in Ankara as their legitimate representative (Winrow and Kirisci 1997). The PKK’s argument that they are the only representative of these people seems to lack substance, suggestive of mere propaganda.

According to the author’s survey, the people of Diyarbakir have a strong faith in the Parliament in Ankara. When asked if the solution for terrorism should be found in the Parliament, 67% agreed, 12% of respondents disagreed, while 16% expressed no view (Appendix 1.Q13). Terrorist organisations rely on public support, in the same way that governments of countries subject to terrorist acts also have to rely on public support in order to produce a strong challenge against the terrorism (Wilkinson 1986a and 1986b). It is essential for the success of anti-terrorist operations, that popular support for terrorists remains limited and that terrorists are isolated as much as possible from the general population (Wilkinson 1986a; Dilmaç 1997). Public support for the PKK amongst Kurdish groups appears to have remained low, which might explain why the PKK has had to rely on largely foreign support, as noted earlier.

It is evident that terrorism is employed as a weapon of psychological warfare to create
a state of panic or collapse, to destroy public confidence in the government and in the
security forces, and to ensure that terrorist party members obey their leadership. It is
this side of terrorism that has most influenced the decision-making of Turkish
governments, especially that of Süleyman Demirel, such that they have been hesitant
to open up the Kurdish issue to debate. According to Gunter, Demirel was afraid that
such a debate could spiral out of control (Gunter 1992). There was a feeling that the
government was being forced into tough measures by the terrorists on the basis that if
they took a liberal approach to the Kurdish problem, it could be misinterpreted as a
government weakness. The severity of the response to terrorism must be looked at in
detail in order to develop any kind of national reconciliation policy.

To achieve this, agreement between two national institutions is particularly important,
these being the army and the political parties. Knowing the sensitivity of the Turkish
army over the national security of the state, which was discussed in Chapter III in
detail, the political parties have to tread warily when they take decisions about security
matters. There has always existed the danger of projecting an image of weakness of
which the terrorists would take full advantage. However, President Özal took an
unusual initiative on Kurdish issues, as Gunter (1997) and Barlas (1994) noted. Özal,
the most liberal-minded figure in the state mechanism, opened the Kurdish issue to
debate to the extent that even the integrity of the state could be discussed. With this
approach to the problem, Özal became the most criticised President in the new
Republic’s history and was criticised for being too soft on the terrorists. Among these
critics was Nevzat Bolugiray, a retired general, who argued that Özal was dividing the
country and that he was to blame for the rapid rise of terrorism during his time in power (Bolugiray 1992).

After the 1991 election, a compromise was adopted based upon recognition of the reality of the Kurdish issue. Although nobody had denied the existence of the Kurdish groups, it was important that it was officially acknowledged. It was also good for Turkish politics that Demirel of the centre-right and İnönü from the centre-left managed to establish a coalition government under Demirel, a situation which had not been possible during the 1970s. When Demirel formally assumed office in November 1991, he declared in an interview with Köyatasi that:

> Turkey's integrity, borders, official language and unitary status of the state can not be debated, but the demands of ethnic groups to retain their own ethnic identity and culture should be recognised (Köyatasi Hurriyet 1991).

In this interview, the Prime Minister recognised that Kurdish citizens of Turkey had been using their own languages, and encouraged them to go further in developing their own history, and folklore. His deputy, Erdal İnönü went even further saying: 'The Kurdish citizens' cultural identity must be recognised in full (Gunter 1992). The two major parties of the left and the right, which historically had been arch-rivals, released a joint report on the matter. This stated:

> The era of seeking rights by arms, violence, and terrorism has come to an end. The conditions of our time have created peaceful rules and institutions for the pursuit and preservation of rights. The CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] and the Paris Condition have introduced global rules, rights, and freedoms for all countries and peoples. As a signatory to these agreements, Turkey must also comply with these rules. A state of law based on human rights and basic freedoms will definitely be established across our
entire country. ... Diversity does not weaken a democratic and unitary state. ... Everyone's right to search, to preserve and to develop his mother tongue, culture, history, folklore, and religious beliefs is part of his basic human rights and freedom. These rights will be guaranteed within the framework of laws (Gunter 1992: 104).

There are a number of issues that can be derived from the new policy of the Demirel and Inönü coalition government. These may be grouped under the title of 'a national reconciliation' policy. The most important goal for this policy, to find a peaceful solution to the problem, inevitably lies in Kurdish integration within the existing state, an argument which is central to this study. Since this view is not held by the PKK, the government realised that for it to be successful, support for the terrorist organisation must be minimised. In proclaiming Kurdish rights, the government of Demirel and Inönü intended to isolate the terrorists or to end their support completely. In return, Kurdish loyalty to the government was expected (Gunter 1992:104). With this demonstration of the good intentions of the government came the following statement regarding the reactions to further terrorist actions: 'Attacks against the civilian, democratically elected, totally legitimate democratic authority of the state, through violence and the use of terrorism is incompatible with human rights and basic freedoms and cannot be acceptable' (Milliyet 17 November 1991).

The government of Demirel managed to overcome the differences between all parties by ensuring that the unitary status of the state, its borders, its flag and official language, would not be compromised under any circumstances. In this way, Demirel avoided the hesitation and reservations of all parties, including the army, and won their support for his policies towards the Kurdish issue and in the fight against terrorism.
Thus, the government was able to balance a tough, 'hard-line' policy with a 'soft-line' approach in combating terrorism within the concept of a liberal democracy. The policy of the government was designed to provide a balanced approach to combating terrorism whilst effectively dealing with the social, cultural and economical issues behind the Kurdish problem.

However, there was still much to achieve in terms of gaining public confidence for the government. Although the overwhelming majority of people had faith in the Parliament as an institution, a large number did not appear to have confidence in the government. In order to gain public confidence, the new coalition government lost little time in trying to show sincerity, with ministers paying visits to the troubled region of Anatolia:

To announce their intentions and study the situation firsthand, on December 7 and 8 Demirel and İnönü journeyed to five south-eastern provinces: Diyarbakir, Siirt, Sırnak, Hakkari and Mardin. With them were the chief of the general staff Dogan Güres, state ministers Akin Gönen, and Mehmet Kahraman, Defence Minister Nevzat Ayaz, Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin, and Gendarmerie Commander Esref Bitlis. The high-level nature of this delegation emphasised the importance the new government attached to the Kurdish problem (Gunter 1992: 105).

The failure of the government's policies in terms of gaining public support and confidence could have had a number of causes. As Horowitz (1985) argued, one of the most common reasons could be the miss timing of the new reforms and policies. Some argued that the reforms had come too late and some argued the opposite. For example, Barkey and Fuller (1997) argued that reforms came too late and would have had a
much greater chance of success had they been introduced several years earlier. However, timing is also important from the point of view of convincing the majority of the public and all of the parties involved with the issue that they must have confidence in new government policies. Consequently, it can also be argued that new and radical chances have to be introduced at a time that society is ready for such chances.

As the government was moving towards further democratisation, something happened which was very similar to the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland. A rapid increase in violence following the Nawroz holiday in March 1992 did not help the government’s more liberal policy in overcoming terrorism. Rather, it helped the case of the hard-liners, who argued that terror had to be dealt with by showing no mercy or tolerance, the ‘zero tolerance’ policy. Hard-liners argued that the introduction of new policies should not have taken place at all, as these changes were interpreted by the terrorists as a weakness on the part of the state. Finally, and more importantly, the attitudes of some Members of Parliament of Kurdish descent caused public frustration and contributed to a failure of public confidence in the Parliament and in the new government’s policies. From the beginning of the first session of the National Assembly in 1991, a few MP’s, of Kurdish-descent particularly Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana, showed their support for the PKK. They caused outrage in Turkey by their actions, which included holding a handkerchief with the PKK colours and wearing the PKK colours on headbands while being sworn in (Criss 1995: 26). These actions were broadcast live on all television stations and reported the next day in the national press. Gunter wrote:
... İnönü [Coalition partner to Demirel] himself denounced the two former
HEP [People's Workers Party, Halkin Emegi Partisi] members and called
for their resignation, while other members of Parliament termed their
behaviour, "antidemocratic, uncivilised and a great number of other things."
Bülent Ecevit, the former Prime Minister and current leader of the small
democratic Left Party, declared: 'My heart is crying tears of blood.' The
following morning the majority of the newspapers carried headlines such as
'Nation-wide Anger', 'An Ugly Show in Parliament', 'Two terrorist MP's'

Parliament was once again in danger of losing public confidence and anger was felt
nationwide. 'The terrorists are in parliament so why look outside' became a common
opinion in Turkey in the following weeks. Nevertheless, President Özal had a
reputation for being a calm and charismatic leader and he tried to calm the situation.
He gave strength to the new government by saying: 'Dicle and Zana have not helped
the cause of the citizens in the south-east' (Gunter 1992: 104), and pledging that the
democratically-elected, legitimate Parliament of Turkey would do whatever was
necessary on the nation’s behalf. Prime Minister designate Süleyman Demirel further
cooled the fires by adding that there was 'nothing to panic about'.

Following the distasteful actions of these few Kurdish deputies in Parliament, and the
atmosphere created by the Özal initiative, the efforts of Demirel-Inönü coalition
government for further democratisation in combating terrorism started to disappear. The
Demirel and İnönü coalition protocol on this matter did not have any real chance of being
put into practice. Moreover, following the unexpected death of President Özal in April
1993, the possibility of finding a solution to terrorism through further democratisation
and reform seemed lost. The damage to the reputation of Parliament and the loss of public
confidence in government policies ultimately gave the initiative to the military in tackling
terrorism. The average annual death toll rose to over 1,000 during the years between 1993 and 1995 (EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc.950449).

Following the untimely death of President Özal, the Çiller government took office in June 1993, and Demirel became President. As many researchers, such as Barkey and Fuller (1997 and 1998), Winrow and Kirisci (1997), and Gunter (1997) have noted, during the early years of the Çiller government a tough-line or 'zero-sum' policy was adopted. The famous phrase of Çiller was, 'Terrorism will finish, whatever it might cost'. The government wanted to finish terrorism first through the extensive use of security, and then to start reforms and socio-economic investment in the region. Although some considerable success was achieved against the PKK during this period, nevertheless, as noted earlier there was a danger of public dissatisfaction with the hard-line policies and consequently increasing sympathy for the terrorists or an increasing Kurdish nationalism. Acknowledging this fact, and also trying to avoid criticism from the EU countries, (before the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and EU, the Çiller government started to look at possible alternative solutions to terrorism in 1995 (Gunter 1997). One of the most famous outcomes of this new approach led to the preparation of the TOBB Report, which was sponsored by the Turkish Union of Chambers (TOBB) and conducted by Professor Dogu Ergil. The Report was entitled *Dogu sorunu, teshisler ve tespitler*, 'Eastern Question- Diagnosis and Observations'. Debate erupted after publication of this report and a major division occurred between the hard-liners and soft-liners.

The TOBB Report was criticised on two main grounds. One was that the report was
insufficiently scientific (Akyol 1995; Pulur 1995). Second, the report was seen as mere propaganda on behalf of the people who had long been seeking to destroy Turkey and its unitary status and integrity (Toker 1995; Kirca 1995). Some critics went so far as to malign the author of the report, such as Çölaşan, who declared his distaste by saying, 'Dogu Ergil lacks morals and is capable of doing anything for money. Do not believe in his south-east survey, I would not believe even if he would have said there is only one god' (Çölaşan Hurriyet 1995). He also said Ergil was 'a traitor who serves the separatists' (Gunter 1997: 131).

As noted in Chapters III and IV, this style of discussion did not help matters, particularly politicians' reputations in the eyes of the public. Turkey has witnessed fiery rival discussions between the political party leaders, as happened between Menderes and İnönü in the 1950s, but some MP's argued that the only differences between those two parties were the leaders rather than their programmes (Chapter III). The discussions of personalities policies have not helped the country develop constructive approaches towards these serious problems, and have in some ways played into the hands of the terrorists.

The supporters of the TOBB Report, such as Ahmet and Cetin Altan (1995), Çevik (1995), and Cemal (1995), argued that to solve the problem of ethnic terrorism it was necessary to address the Kurdish issue seriously. Therefore, the ethnic demands of the Kurdish community had to be considered in order to bring an end to the PKK terrorism. This could be achieved through more debates and reports such as the one TOBB
conducted.

A group led by Dogu Ergil formed an organisation in 1997 known as the Foundation for the Research of Societal Problems (Kinzer 1997). According to Kinzer, it aimed at promoting 'democratic pluralism' as an alternative to 'authoritarian centralism' (Kinzer 1997: 5). Although it is necessary to develop and use democratic channels in order to combat the terrorism, this group seems to underestimate the terrorists' intention to use violence no matter what the circumstances and no matter what the system offers. As noted already, the root cause of the problem of the extensive use of violence is the PKK's belief in indiscriminate violence. Other issues, such as Kurdish ethnicity, socio-economic problems, and lack of education, play a secondary role, and one that helps the terrorist propaganda. One must consider the negative attitude of the PKK towards political freedom, a free press and investments in the region, as noted earlier in this chapter (Criss 1995; Press Association 1996). Therefore, it does not seem correct to suggest that democratic improvements alone would solve the present-day terrorist problem in Turkey.

After witnessing the fierce criticism of the TOBB Report, none of the political parties, including the Çiller government, took the views of this report seriously. Nevertheless, after the death of Ö zal, the Report managed to open a debate in civil society on PKK terrorism and some other people, encouraged by this development, also conducted surveys and research on the issue and made a recommendations to the government. This has been the positive outcome of the report, despite the strong opposition from the hard-liners, who say 'only we know and we understand how to fight against terrorism, how to
defend the country and how to keep peace in society’. Some people, particularly a number of intellectuals and academics, started to speak out against the effects of the hard-liners on Turkish policy making.

Is there a policy that has a realistic chance of solving the acute problem of terrorism in Turkey in the mid or long term? In light of the long discussions and research on the root of PKK terrorism, and on government policies, foreign involvement, social-economic problems, and lack of proper education, what are the possible remedies for terrorism in Turkey? Can the ‘third way’ achieve what Turkey needs, and has this policy got any realistic chance of bringing peace to the country and creating a prosperous Turkey?

A Third Way

This section discusses the idea of a ‘third way’ to combat terrorism. This policy is similar to the ‘two wars’ strategy, which was primarily used in south-east Asia and could be used in liberal democratic countries depending on the circumstances, as Wilkinson has noted (1986). He explained this strategy as follows:

The doctrine prescribes the harmonisation of two distinctive kinds of campaign by the counter-insurgency forces: (1) the military and security war to identify, isolate and destroy the revolutionary forces, their leaders, logistic support, and lines of communications; (2) the political, ideological and psychological war to sustain and strengthen the base of popular support behind the government and hence to render the terrorists politically isolated and vulnerable (Wilkinson 1986b: 19).

Fuller noted that in the case of Turkey the present-day status-quo policy was based on
‘fist to’ put an end to terrorism and then to consider a solution for the issues that might be fostering the terrorism such as delays in the further democratisation programme (Fuller 1997: 184). Bolugiray (1992) argued that further democratisation was not a good idea when the presence of terrorism was so active. According to Bolugiray (1992), to make a concession to terrorism under the name of democratisation would weaken the state, destroy the morale of the security forces and ultimately lead to an even stronger insurgency.

However, the Turkish democratic experience indicates that further democratisation does not necessarily strengthen terrorist organisations. By considering the terrorism of the PKK as separate to the Kurdish issue, Turkey has a better chance of reaching a long-lasting solution to its political problems. As Akyol (1992) argued, the PKK has been nervous about any democratic project proposed by the government (*Milliyet* 30 July 1992). There was a evidence of this, when PKK terrorism increased rapidly following the attempt by the government of Demirel to put a further democratisation package into practice. This was also evident during the 1995 elections and when the PKK attempted to halt and when the PKK opposed the abolition of the law restricting the use of the Kurdish language in publications (Criss 1995). In combating PKK terrorism, a third way could be formulated as the use of well-organised accountable security forces to fight against terrorism, and at the same time employing further efforts to develop the democratisation project, in order to secure public support for government policies. This can be summarised as security plus further democratisation.
It can be argued that this third way has a realistic chance of success in Turkey. First, as illustrated in this study, at times of further democratisation, such as moving to the multi-party system in 1946, after the introduction of the liberal constitution of 1960 and the abolition of Articles 163, 141 and 142 of the Turkish penal code in 1992 (which prohibited free discussion and speech on communism and Islam), Turkish people have shown political maturity and there was no evidence that the people abused their new freedoms. Second, according to the author's survey, an overwhelming majority of the people in the south-east region (67%) (Appendix 1. Q 11) were looking for a solution within the unitary status of Turkey and most of them (62%) wanted some further degree of cultural rights, and respect for their way of life (Appendix 1. Q 9). According to the TOBB Report only 4.6% of the ethnically Kurdish citizen of Turkey viewed the PKK as their legitimate representative and wanted the government to negotiate with the PKK (TOBB 1995).

In light of this evidence, there seems to be little reason to fear that new freedoms and democratic channels for the people of the region might encourage support for the terrorists or that the people might abuse this further democratisation. This fear was one of the main reasons behind the reluctance of the Demirel government to implement further liberalisation measures on Kurdish issues. As can be seen from the above statistics, the south-eastern people are willing to be part of Turkey, and this has also been demonstrated by the traditionalist nature of Kurdish groups in Turkey.

Third, although democratic reforms and liberalisation may be an essential step in solving
the political violence, it would be naive to suggest that this would be sufficient on its own. Even with widespread public support for the government, terrorists do not need huge public support to commit their crimes. As noted already, in the modern age terrorism is sometimes a new form of warfare and whatever the level of democracy in any particular country, there is always a possibility that some dissident groups might resort to violence, and be supported by other countries for their own ends. PKK terrorism is a reality in Turkey, and it seems essential that strong and firm security measures should be adopted by the government. A key question is to decide on the level of the security activity, the strategy, the methodology of the security forces, and also the accountability of the security forces to the democratically elected government and to the rule of law.

What is essential in the policy of the third way is that the people in the decision-making process, particularly those, who influence and direct Turkish policies on terrorism, must balance necessary steps in the direction of democratisation, with effective security measures against terrorism. There is no reason to fear the effects of more freedom or of a well-functioning democracy. Increased public participation is likely to bring benefits to the government decision-making process. The internal stability of Turkey, and indeed the regional stability, relies to a great extent on the performance of the democratic system in Turkey. Maintaining and strengthening the stability of Turkey in a volatile part of the world is more likely to occur as a result of democratic reforms. The hostile response that Turkey has faced from a number of western countries has weakened Turkey's power in regional politics as well its ability to enjoy a good relations with western democratic nations, as observed by Winrow and Kirisci (1997) Gunter (1997), Barkey and Fuller
(1997 and 1998). Increased democracy and liberalisation is a means whereby Turkey's relations with other countries might be improved, increasing stability as well as bringing other benefits. If it does not follow this route, hard-line policies might enable the military to hijack the decision making process, after which it will be difficult for the democratic institutions to resume overall control.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are various points which merit attention. Turkish democracy has been facing a severe test as a result of PKK terrorism since 1984. The nature of PKK terrorism is different from that of the revolutionary Marxist and Leninist terrorist groups of the 1970s, which caused a suspension of democratic life in Turkey in 1980. The basic difference between those revolutionary groups and the PKK is that the latter are also separatists, who have been trying to manipulate Kurdish groups in order to create a separate communist Kurdish state.

In order to create a realistic chance of producing a more effective policy to combat terrorism, it is necessary to focus on the underlying causes of the terrorism, the PKK's strength in terms of public support, and foreign manipulation of the PKK. Acknowledging the strong challenge presented by the PKK, this chapter examined the response of the government and different sections of Turkish society to the terrorism. Consequently, the following points have been established.

First, the PKK's use of indiscriminate violence and the employment of armed struggle
as its main method, has not been caused by the absence of democratic institutions in Turkey; rather, the PKK has taken advantage of the weakness of Turkish democracy. From the outset of its campaign, the PKK has not utilised democratic channels available; in fact, as a Marxist-Leninist organisation, it has appeared nervous of any further democratic developments within the country. The PKK continues to fight Turkish democracy violently and relentlessly, instead of using democratic means. As noted earlier, there are currently over one hundred ethnic Kurdish deputies in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and they have been defending and the demands of the Kurdish people. The PKK was not forced into violence, nor is it fighting to restore lost democratic rights (as some observers and romantics seem to think). In fact, the opposite is true in that as a result of the PKK’s terrorist campaign the government has inevitably slowed down the democratisation project, and has not implemented all of the reforms that were needed after the restoration of democracy in 1983. Because of the constant threat of terrorism by the PKK, the Turkish government has had to take necessary security measures in order to try to protect its citizens and to preserve the integrity of the country.

In order to combat terrorism there are various ground rules to be considered by any liberal democratic government. First, security measures have to be accountable and must not go so far as to have the effect of creating sympathy for the terrorist organisations. Second, it is the very essence of liberal democracy that any kind of security has to be conducted within the rule of law. As pointed out by Ross and Miller (1997) and Wilkinson (1974 and 1986), strong security measures might increase
sympathy for the terrorists and question the legitimacy of the government. Therefore, it is important to assess measures selectively and to employ an appropriate level of security with public consent.

It has also been demonstrated in this chapter that the socio-economic backwardness of south-east Anatolia and the low level of literacy are major conditions which the terrorists have exploited. Accepting the difficulties of achieving considerable progress with the disruption caused by terrorism, the Turkish government cannot afford to wait to curtail terrorism before improving these conditions. The statistical data presented in this chapter indicate that the socio-economic conditions are serious and that the terrorists are the beneficiaries. Clearly, further investment in employment, education, health, housing and other essential needs of the people, is needed alongside the security operations.

The terrorist incidents that Turkey is experiencing are not only an internal problem, but also an international one. As illustrated earlier, the survival of the PKK depends greatly on foreign support. Consequently, strong international co-operation is needed in order to secure a victory against them. Unfortunately, as has been shown, there are various neighbouring countries that are prepared to use terrorism as a new mode of war, which makes it difficult for Turkey to bring about international condemnation of PKK terrorism.

Another important issue that has been highlighted is the ill-conceived policies of the
ruling body in Turkey. As can be seen from the data presented in this chapter, south­
eastern Anatolian people have not been fully agreed with the government’s policies in
combating terrorism. Once terrorism challenged the state, two opposing views
emerged in Turkey. One group argued that terrorists are a ruthless, violent people
attempting to divide the unitary status of the country, threatening its single flag and its
ruling principles of Kemalism. They have regarded the problem as a security matter,
and deemed alternative suggestions as siding with terrorists. The opposite view
criticises the use of tough security measures, and sees the root of the problem in the
failure of democratic institutions and values. This chapter has suggested a ‘third way’
that combines the moderate aspects of these two distinct views. The author believes
that such a balanced approach has a more realistic chance of gaining the support of the
majority within the society, which is essential in order to end terrorism.

In the case of ethnic separatist terrorism, it is important that the Kurdish community
should be able to express their demands and develop their own culture without
threatening the unitary status of Turkey. As noted earlier, few people in south-east
Anatolia, or elsewhere, advocate an independent Kurdistan. Even PKK sympathisers
did not advance this idea according to the TOBB survey (Milliyet, August 4 1995).
Moreover, the same survey suggested that only 4.3 % of Kurds viewed the PKK as
their representative. The author’s own survey found that the overwhelming majority of
Kurdish groups in Turkey hoped for a solution to their problems from the Parliament
in Ankara.
Thus, there is no reason for the government to be hesitant in undertaking further
democratisation, which would probably reduce yet further the fragile and weak support
of the PKK. In order to achieve this, open and free arguments need to be encouraged,
particularly concerning the terrorism and the Kurdish issue. None of the groups inside
or outside the government should behave in a way that suggests only they know what
is best for the country. Such an attitude has not been helpful in resolving Turkey’s
problems. As illustrated in Chapter II, the legitimacy of the governing body relies on
the people’s consent and the accountability of its actions. This is only possible with
open discussions within a pluralistic and liberal society, which are more likely to
produce long-lasting solutions to existing problems. As the former President Özal said
many times, the people of Turkey should be encouraged to speak openly about any
matter that concerns the country, and everybody will benefit from the outcome.

Although some foreign countries have supported terrorism in Turkey, outside influence
on Turkish politics is not always treated with suspicion. After Turkey signed the treaty of
the Customs Union agreement on 11 March 1995 with the EU, the Turkish daily Milliyet
conducted a survey the next day, which showed that 77.4% of respondents supported the
treaty and close relations with the EU. This demonstrated that the people of Turkey would
like to enjoy the benefits of western standards of living and political life. This integration
with the west would also contribute to the development of democratic life in Turkey and
would help to develop a common approach of security between Turkey and the EU, in
contrast to the Sevres Syndrome that was highlighted earlier in this chapter.
Finally, Turkey has managed to achieve a promising increased in popular participation in politics and the new democratic reforms after the military coup of 1980 have produced a political system with the ability to solve the crisis which the country is facing. The political experience of the country has developed so much that a compromise between rival groups is possible, as can be seen from the establishment of the centre-right Demirel and socialist İnönü coalition government in 1991, which hitherto, had been inconceivable. To undermine the support for separatist terrorism further democratisation is required. The acute socio-economic backwardness of eastern Turkey also needs to be remedied, along with security mechanisms transparently conducted within the rule of law.
Postscript

One of the significant dilemmas the thesis has faced is that the subject being explored is not a completed but an on-going issue. Ethnic terrorism in particular has been at top of the political agenda of Turkey for decades and still continues to occupy a key place on the agenda. In other words, the thesis subject is not just a past issue but a current one. It is well-known that social scientists cannot conduct effective research without reliable evidence, such as documents, interviews etc. Therefore, inevitably some recent developments could not be fully covered in the study because of the lack of reliable sources that this study requires. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan 15 February 1999 in Kenya, the leader of the PKK, is a good example of this. Obviously, Öcalan’s apprehension, which occurred just about two months before the submission of this thesis, was an important development in combating PKK terrorism and would be a valuable research subject for researchers. For present purposes, the recent developments and the apprehension of Öcalan make a postscript to this study desirable.

1) The thesis argues that it is difficult to destroy a terrorist organisation by only capturing its leader, and there has not yet occurred any developments to prove otherwise in the Turkish case.

2) It is apparent that the capture of Öcalan and Semdin Sakik, who was the deputy leader of the PKK, were spectacular developments and have increased the freedom Turkish policy-makers have to innovate in combating terrorism. In other words, these
developments have granted a golden opportunity to Turkey to carry out the policy, which is suggested in this thesis. Obviously, the policy-makers should not see capturing the terrorists as the final stage in combating terrorism. After the apprehension of Semdin Sakik, Kinzer argued: ‘by capturing him, the generals believe they settled an important military score. Whether they have contributed to peace and reconciliation in Turkey’s Kurdish south-east, which must be their overriding long-term goal, is far less certain.’ (Kinzer *The New York Times* 3 May 1998). The same point applies in the case of the capture of Öcalan too. Obviously, a greater will for action must come from Turkey. If policy-makers make similar mistakes as in the past, they may miss a once-only opportunity for defeating terrorism in Turkey. As Ergil (1999) pointed out, not every Kurd who expresses his cultural identity is seeking to undermine the state. Turkey needs to respond to Öcalan’s arrest with greater political openness and with real efforts to address Kurdish complaints. As can be seen from picture outlined above, the capture of Öcalan has not changed the subject of this thesis, but rather underlined its main arguments.

3) Furthermore, most of the information about recent developments are based on rumours or documents which were leaked by the government agencies, like Turkish (MIT), Greek, American (CIA) or Israeli (MOSSAD) secret intelligence services. For instance, even how Öcalan was captured is still debatable. As a result it is apparent that a comprehensive scientific research cannot be made at this stage. Öcalan has first appeared in court on 31 May 1999. It is interesting to note that Öcalan began his defence by arguing that full implementation of the democratic process in Turkey
renders the need for separatist terrorist activities no longer necessary (Kinzer 1999, *The New York Times*, 1 June 1999). It is ironic to end by seeing the primary argument in the thesis supported by the terrorist leader.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Towards A Solution

The object of this study has been to explore the possibility of overcoming terrorism in Turkey within the framework of democracy. This work notes that prevention of terrorism in democratic societies requires a delicate balance between the hard-line measures against terrorists and a more liberal approach so as to maintain the support of the general public in the fight against terrorism. This delicate balance is greatly dependent upon the level and relative maturity of the democratic system within a particular society. This delicate balance is also dependent upon limiting support for dissident terrorist groups, while at the same time satisfying the rest of the society within the confines of democracy and securing their consent for government action against terrorism. It is from these perspectives towards terrorism that the two main terrorist campaigns in Turkey, the ideological revolutionary terrorist groups and the present-day separatist PKK, have been examined.

In pursuing this objective, this thesis has tried to resolve the conceptual ambiguities of terrorism and democracy as well as looking at the historical evolution of terrorism in terms of its nature, ideology, methods and instigators. Political terrorism is defined as
'violence or the threat of violence, coupled with political demands and motives'. The actions of political terrorists are designed to achieve maximum publicity, and to produce effects that go beyond the immediate personal and physical damage. The methods used are both extreme and ruthless, and are not constrained by the rules of war or normal morality. The violence is indiscriminate, unpredictable and coercive. It is a collective act the targets of which are civilians, innocent people, government officials and security members.

The scholarly debate on the subject suggests that terrorism began as a weapon of the oppressed against tyrannical regimes or rulers. However, over the centuries terrorism became global, and has been used as an instrument for political gain by many groups, and indeed by some nations. In several instances, it has also become state-sponsored. Thus, it is almost impossible to view terrorism in general terms as the reaction of minority groups struggling against tyranny. Since the nineteenth century, some states have preferred to support terrorist organisations outside their borders in furtherance of their political goals rather than engaging in a costly war. Terrorism has also become a useful weapon for revolutionary and minority groups in their struggle against the governments of apparently democratic countries. In the second half of the twentieth century, Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisations, in particular, developed rapidly throughout the world, along with the ethnic and separatist terrorist and guerrilla groups.

During the last two centuries the main Western/European political systems have evolved from an authoritarian base to a more democratic and pluralistic framework. Thus the main
argument of terrorist groups that violence is a weapon of the oppressed against totalitarian and dictatorial states or monarchs has lost its persuasive force. As McClintock points out, 'the ballot box has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements' (1992: 226). Recently, pluralistic approaches towards the demands of minorities have reduced violence in many cases, for example in Spain, Northern Ireland and Corsica. The success of democracy in dealing with social-political crises is largely due to open, legitimate, responsible and accountable government, free and fair elections, civil and political rights, freedom, equality, mutual tolerance, pluralism, constitutional rule and guarantees for minority rights. Democracy has undermined the ideological justification for terrorism.

Two Main Responses to Ideological-Revolutionary and Ethnic-Separatist Terrorism

One of the most significant forms of terrorism that democracies have had to deal with has been revolutionary-ideological terrorism, and Marxist-Leninist terrorism in particular. Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist and Maoist groups have used terrorism in order to realise their goals regardless of the affected countries socio-economic and political conditions. Thus, in democratic countries, instead of using the channels of democracy, which require compromise for any political ideology to be established and accepted, revolutionary groups have resorted to terrorism in order to satisfy their demands for rapid political change.

As a result of the ideological competition between eastern communist countries and the democratic countries of the west, terrorist groups were encouraged and given support to
bring down legitimate governments of the west rather than to engage in a costly conventional war between those states. Thus, encouraging terrorist organisations in other territories became a new way of waging war. Hence, Communist countries gave their support to Marxist-revolutionary groups in Turkey, Greece, and much of Western Europe and Latin America. During the Cold War year, various developed nations, as well as developing, fledgling democracies, were ‘confronted by ideological terrorism. Yet their responses were different and produced either reactive or pro-active policies against terrorism. That is to say, two main different approaches, the ‘iron glove’ to the more liberal-democratic perspectives, have been evident. The particular approach which countries have taken has depended on their own understanding of democracy and their own history and traditions.

Well-established democracies have focused on defeating the arguments of terrorist groups rather than relying solely upon military and security measures. As can be seen from the experiences of Germany, Italy and Japan, this led to the defeat of ideological terrorist groups within the confines of democracy, because their governments were successful in winning public support for their policies and in limiting the support for terrorist organisations through open democratic debate. In less-established democracies, however, which are more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration, their governments have tended to emphasise security measures which has led to open confrontation between the terrorists and state: This has often enabled terrorist groups to partially legitimise their actions by forcing governments into unlawful operations which has led to criticism of state and persuaded some people to support terrorists. In practice, this tough approach has had only
limited success and; indeed, in some cases it has been a total failure. Past experiences have shown that this kind of policy against terrorism has proved costly for developing democracies such as Greece, Turkey and some of states of Latin America where democratic life has been suspended on several occasions as a result of military coups. While these countries have had some limited successes against terrorist groups, these successes have to be weighed against the sacrifices made by many people and the undermining of democratic life.

Moreover, the elite of some of these developing countries have regarded the people as immature, and insufficiently ‘informed’ to make appropriate decisions. In doing so, they have underestimated the democratic potential. This perception has badly damaged the struggle against terrorism, because it has resulted in a lack of communication and co-operation between state and its people. As a consequence, this has enabled terrorist groups to influence the people and to exploit their legitimate democratic rights and demands.

Governments have faced additional problems in confronting ethnic-based terrorism. Ethnic terrorism is complicated as it has its roots in the historical experiences of the country. It is difficult to overcome as it results from differences in ethnicity, culture and religion. It is necessary to accommodate these differences within a pluralistic society, instead of ignoring them or seeking to suppress them which has facilitated the spread of ethnic terrorism, as argued in Chapter II. Here, too, two main approaches have been evident: hard-line and democratic-pluralistic policies.
The Turkish Case

In Turkey two prominent terrorist groups have emerged since 1960: one is based on ideology and the other founded on ethnicity. In response to these terrorist groups, Turkish policy has been determined by two structural factors: first, the fears about the fragility of the political, social and economic structure inherited from the Ottoman Empire; second, the ideology, perception and interpretations of democracy by the elite of the new Republic.

Chapter III examined the development of democracy in Turkey and sought to explain why and how successive governments formulated and implemented particular policies in response to revolutionary terrorism in the 1970s and separatist terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish Republic emerged in 1923, from the ashes of a diverse and multicultural Empire. These differences—unless resolved and accommodated within the new system upon which the Republic would be based—would make Turkey especially vulnerable to the social conflicts and terrorism. In other words at the end of very long and tiring wars, terrorist organisation were in a very good position to exploit the social, political and economic problems that would result the new political system of the Republic and its policy-making methods, has directed and informed every government in power ever since. The methods by which successive governments have attempted to resolve these differences and the socio-economic problems have formed the foundation for the development of this thesis.
One of the most significant disadvantages of the new Republic was its perception of the different ethnic and religious groups and its attitude towards national unity. Among the factors which contributed to the demise of the Ottoman Empire was the exploitation of the ethnic and religious minorities by foreign powers against the Empire. The uprisings of these groups played a significant role in the disintegration of the country. As a result, the new ruling class saw the different ethnic groups, and their different ideologies, as a threat to the unity of the country. State gave a primacy, therefore, to homogenising the population in terms of language, race, class, and culture. As outlined in Chapter III this policy was summarised as: ‘One nation, one state, one party’ at the beginning of the new Republic. As illustrated in Chapter III, the new Republic was unable to accommodate all these differences, so its policy focused on creating a homogenous society in the form of a nation-state. Furthermore, the Republic was weak economically, and politically fragile. The institutions were young and not yet able to resolve the problems that then beset the country. Consequently, draconian measures were introduced by the new elite and ruling class to resolve the problems within the country.

Another significant factor that affected Turkey’s policies against terrorism was state’s and the elite’s ideology and perception of democracy. Reminiscent of intellectual thought during the French Revolution, they thought they knew better than people. Indeed, at the very beginning of the new Republic the socio-political awareness of the people was similar to Huntington’s (1993) description, noted in Chapter II, that people should not expect to contribute towards democratic development of the country where there are low levels of literacy and acute economic and social problems. According to this
understanding, and influenced by French political developments of the Jacobean period as well as the political situation of the time in the western world, where communism and fascism had become increasingly prominent, the Turkish elite and ruling class, thought that the people should be directed to the true way, which they regarded best as represented through western values, such as nationalism, secularism and democracy. Thus state ignored the people’s contribution to the socio-political development of the country. This perception inevitably affected their policies in combating terrorism in the later years of the Republic, which I demonstrated in Chapter III. As has been noted, the most important tool against terrorism is the support of the people. Hence, government scepticism towards the people lost them the most effective instrument in the fight against terrorism. That is to say, the benefit of public support in the development of democracy and its capacity to solve crises was not fully utilised by the ruling Turkish elite.

This failure to win public support for political developments and the fear of pluralism, in terms of multiculturalism, ideology and ethnicity, led Turkish policy-makers to rely on the army to quell social unrest, political violence and terrorism. This strengthened the army’s position and its influence in political matters, and limited the ability of the political parties to produce a credible plan to overcome the crises. The role of the army is one of the significant factors that this work has evaluated in Turkish policies against terrorism. As seen in Chapter II, since the military has perceived itself as the guardian of the Republic and became of its dominant secular ideology, any challenge to these has always attracted the army’s attention. Therefore, unlike liberal democratic countries which attempted to counter terrorism and political violence through government-
controlled civilian forces, it has been an easy option for civilian governments in Turkey to rely on the military to curb and eliminate terrorist organisations within the country. Consequently, it appears that in Turkey, in contrast to Wilkinson’s (1996) observation that the military is not accountable to civilian government when dealing with internal affairs such as terrorism, there have been occasions, such as in 1960, 1971 and 1980, when military coups ensured that civilians were subjected to the military.

At this stage of the conclusion, there is another point which should be made. One of the most striking characteristics of Turkish democratic development was that democracy was supported by some privileged people and introduced from above, and this excluded the majority of ordinary people from the process. Consequently, it seems that Turkish policy on prevention of terrorism evolved from the very beginning in contradistinction to the more liberal democratic approach.

As discussed earlier, countries are likely to have a better chance of finding a long-lasting solution for overcoming terrorist incidents, either from revolutionary or ethnic groups, if the country performs well in terms of the democratisation process, and the solution is sought within the framework of democracy: Viewed in this way, Turkish democracy was vulnerable to terrorism because of the structural problems in the developing liberal system.

**Revolutionary-Ideological Terrorism vs. Turkey’s Fledgling Democracy**

During the 1960’s, Turkey experienced the rise of socialism in parallel to that of Western
Initially, leading socialists used the normal channels of democracy to achieve their political goals. Turkish democracy, operating under the most liberal constitution in Turkish history, the Constitution of 1961, permitted such challenges. The increasingly high number of industrial workers and the influx of diverse and doctrinaire political and economic tracts from abroad also contributed towards socialist consciousness in society, especially amongst intellectuals and students.

However, after losing momentum following the setbacks of the 1969 elections, hardliners within the TIP (Turkish Labour Party) turned away from peaceful dialogue and many of them started an armed struggle. As it was the case in so many other European countries, the radical Marxist terrorist groups were not interested in what democracy might offer them, but rather preferred violent methods to bring down the legitimate government of the time to replace it with a communist one. The difference between Turkey and many of the developed nations was in the response of the government towards terrorism. Two main factors mentioned throughout this thesis have been present in Turkish policy-making towards terrorism. First, fear of disunity and the ideology of the ruling class limited their efforts in combating terrorism. They did not see the people as an effective tool against terrorism and they perceived any democratic demand as an attempt to destroy the homogeneity of the country. The second factor was that foreign support for the terrorist organisations, particularly communist countries' encouragement of revolutionary terrorism, was perceived as another attempt to destroy the unity and the political system of the country. Communist foreign support made Turkish policy-makers
nervous, because they perceived revolutionary terrorism as part of a global Communist
attack. Thus, the government saw the terrorist problem as an external threat and failed to
appreciate the significant role of its own people in its counter-terrorism policies, which
invariably resulted in losing popular support.

The government, therefore, did not look towards civilian support for its campaign against
terrorism and so Turkey missed a practical method of combating terrorism, as a result of
its own democratic tradition, historic fears, and perceptions about the relations between
the people and their state. The government saw the problem as a security matter,
neglecting the social and ideological roots of terrorism, just as the Greeks and Spaniards
had done during the 1970s.

Ultimately, as has been seen in Chapter IV, the government went on to declare a state of
martial law in 1970 and this was followed by the military coup by memorandum in 1971.
The army closed down the only legitimate, moderate socialist party, namely the Turkish
Labour Party, formulating strict measures against extreme and terrorist groups. These
rigid measures did not prevent tension within the country, on the contrary, terrorism took
the country to the edge of a civil war, claiming an average ten lives a day by the end of
the 1970s.

In addition to the lack of democratic experience and knowledge of appropriate political
responses to resolve the social conflicts, Turkey faced a serious economic deterioration,
due to the US embargo resulting from the dispute about Cyprus and the extensive Soviet
support for terrorism, which aimed to destroy political and economic stability in Turkey. These factors made it almost impossible to implement a full democratic solution. Thus, Turkey drifted towards the military coup.

It may be concluded from a study of the Turkish experience of ideological-revolutionary terrorism that if normal channels of democracy had been utilised alongside appropriate security measures, Turkey would have had a better chance of establishing a democratic, pluralistic state with a gradual reduction in the use of violence. However, Turkey lost the chance of a democratic solution in the mid-1970s because of the government’s approach and the contemporary economic and global problems.

Ethnic-Separatist Terrorism and Turkey’s Response

The Turkish State also appears neglected the importance of the role of the people, in the struggle against ethnic-separatist terrorism since the 1970s. In the light of the previous Turkish experience of revolutionary terrorism, one might have thought that the policymakers would have learned from the lessons of the past.

As discussed in Chapter V, ethnic and nationalist claims by the Kurdish people were not apparent until the emergence of the PKK. Even then, the PKK was set up originally as a revolutionary Marxist organisation, and the PKK’s later claim for an independent Kurdistan were unsuccessful in attracting public support. In fact, during the Republican era, the series of revolts by the Kurds were largely directed against the process of secularisation and the new national identity of the Republic (Ward 1942: 63). Yet, as a
result of foreign support, internal economic, social, cultural, and educational factors, and states' failure to analyse the real essence of the problem detailed in Chapter VI, the PKK issue has remained at the top of the agenda in Turkish politics. The findings in Chapter V and Chapter VI indicate that the activities and methods of the PKK and the response of the Turkish State provide a striking illustration of the reasons and methods of terrorism and the causes of the failure of state's policies in successfully combating terrorism.

There is no doubt that the PKK has all the features of a typical terrorist organisation. It has not promoted a more democratic and developed economic system in the Kurdish region, but has exploited the economic, social and democratic weaknesses of state in the area. The PKK has purported to be concerned with democratic and economic developments, but though its actions it has prevented economic investment and obstructed the participation of the local people in the democratic processes as discussed in Chapter VI.

Continuing the traditional state policy, the Turkish government saw the problem predominantly as a security matter and as a fight between state and the PKK. Moreover, the PKK was not taken seriously until it became a strong terrorist organisation.

Paralleling the increase in PKK terrorism, the security forces intensified their responses and did not distinguish between terrorists, sympathisers, legal radical groups another people in the region. During the first decade, the army and the government perceived anyone who demanded political change as an enemy of state and as a threat to the stability
of the regime. Yet, as outlined in Chapter V, the only major difference between the Kurds and Turks has been their language, rather than religion, history or culture. Moreover, marriages between Kurds and Turks and Kurdish migration from the south-eastern region to the Western cities of Turkey had already weakened ethnic nationalism among the Kurds. As Kinzer's demonstrated (see Chapter V), the Kurds living in the metropolitan areas are more moderate and as a result do not identify themselves as having a different ethnicity to the majority of Turks. Also, it is well known that nationalism in the Kurdish community is a relatively recent phenomenon, having developed only in the last thirty years, fostered by socialist movements in the community. Prior to that, the Kurdish people had showed a clear intention to participate in Turkish political life. During the multi-party era, many Kurds achieved high political office and participated in the decision-making processes. State had the most important and effective tool against the terrorists: the support of the people.

The PKK was aware of this and started a campaign in order to undermine the trust of the Kurdish people in state by using any available opportunity. They bombed buildings, killed soldiers and civilians to instil confusion in the minds of people and to ensure that its arguments would be heard. However, state merely saw the slaughter and destruction rather than underlying causes of the terrorist threat. State should have acted to undermine the terrorists' links with the people, but the opposite happened enabling the PKK to undermine the authority of state in the region. The PKK had grown in popularity by exploiting the relatively undemocratic conditions which had resulted from the military coups in the 1970s and 1980s. The PKK has also shown that it is against any democratic.
and pluralistic reform in the region. Because state saw the problem as a security matter, it perceived any democratic and cultural reform as a compromise with the terrorists. These policies in conjunction with foreign support, (notably Syria’s) accelerated the rise of the PKK. This forced state to revise its policy on terrorism. However, structural and historical factors prevented radical change. Although state tried to improve economic conditions in the region, it was almost impossible to attract investment when the region was under constant attack. As Chapter V and VI showed, the main reason for the PKK terrorism was not the economic backwardness of the people, but, the PKK used these factors as a means to get more members.

The Turkish State made similar mistakes during the 1970s, but when it began realise all of the dimensions of the problem it was too late to formulate new policies because of the climate of fear which terrorists had engendered. On analysis of these experiences shows that the most appropriate way to overcome terrorism is to implement security, economic, cultural, educational and political measures together, rather than separately.

When these policies exacerbated the climate of fear in the region, the official armed bodies of the government increased their already significant input into the policy-making process. The violent environment forced the government’s hand into pursuing strategies that were similar to those of the terrorists. External factors, such as the Gulf War and the support for the PKK from Syria and Greece, worsened the situation. As a result, although state and the army have been fighting PKK terrorism for more than 15 years, the prevalence of terrorist influence remains the most important issue on the agenda of the
Turkish politics. This indicates that Turkey’s methods employed against terrorism have not been politically effective.

However, Turkey was not able to change her policies at the appropriate stage. As argued in Chapter VI, if the state does not implement a whole anti-terror package, including social, ideological, economic, and political measures to get the support of the people, as well as security measures, it becomes difficult to change its policies, because it begins to use methods similar to those of the terrorists. Terror taints the other functions of a democratic system, and it becomes difficult to even discuss change in the policies because of the increased tension. Different ideas and democratic demands are perceived as capitulation to terrorism or even as treason. Furthermore, the state’s ideology and the unique historical factors prevented the ruling class from using the support of the people against terrorism even though the majority of Turkish and Kurdish people have never supported the terrorist organisations. It is suggested, therefore, that policy-makers should review their efforts and focus on the relations between the state and the people instead of fighting with the terrorists on their own ground: In short, the state should be proactive rather than reactive and should seek to wrestle the initiative from the terrorists.

A Third Way and the Lessons of the Turkish Case

In addition to the particular findings in relation to ethnic and revolutionary terrorism in Turkey, some more general conclusions can be drawn. First, the Turkish state, as a result of its dominant ideological principles, has perceived terrorist attacks as an assault on
itself rather than on the people. It has tried to protect the state’s integrity, state’s unity, and the state’s ideology rather than the people. This has inevitably weakened its struggle against terrorism and strengthened the arguments of the terrorist organisations.

In addition to its neglect of a popular role in the reduction of the terrorist threat, the state also failed to produce countervailing arguments against terrorists because according to the state they were just armed criminal groups. Thus, Turkey tried to destroy them militarily. The government accepted what the terrorists wanted by perceiving the problem as a purely security matter. The aim of the terrorist attacks was to undermine Turkish democracy and the relations between the state and the people. When the state joined in, it unconsciously participated in damaging Turkish democracy and the trust which the people had for their state. As with revolutionary terrorism, this form of terrorism may now be at an end, yet the damage to the system is long-term. Even terrorism can change in nature, as seen in the transition from the revolutionary terrorism to ethnic separatism after the military coups.

In conclusion, the policy makers saw the people as insufficiently mature to participate in and contribute to a solution for terrorism and as a result the terrorists were able to continue their attacks to destroy the last Turkish state in history. Despite the fears and scepticism of the policy makers about their citizens, the people proved otherwise by behaving circumspectly and prudently in the fight against terrorism. Their demands for more democratic rights and their participation in the political system have proved their ability to work within a democratic culture, without giving support to extreme or radical
groups.

It might be said that the causes and the solution of the problem are rooted in the relations between the state and its people. It is evident that there are considerable differences between the ability of well-established and fledgling democracies to deal with severe crises within their countries. Generally, the less-developed democracies tend to see terrorism as purely a security matter, rather than as a problem of democracy and the need to balance competing demands from different groups. The case study of Turkey demonstrates the limits of this approach in coping with terrorism.

This thesis has suggested a third way between hard-line militarism and capitulation. Given the failure of the ‘iron fist’, and the relative success of liberal democratic methods, it seems that the latter might produce results in the case of Turkey. A well-established democratic political system has enormous inner strengths. By definition, the majority of the population see the government as legitimate and accountable. They willingly cooperate in upholding the law, and they rally to defend democracy against the petty tyrants who try to substitute the gun and the bomb for the ballot box. There is no case in the modern history of terrorism in which a European democracy has been destroyed be a terrorist group and replaced by a pro-terrorist regime (Wilkinson 1989: 458).

This new liberal-democratic framework can be set out as follows:

1) As the examination of revolutionary terrorism has established, terrorism is not purely a product of economic backwardness, lack of democracy or social disorder. These
factors do help to provide a fertile environment in which terrorist organisations emerge, but they are not the solely reasons. Terror can be the result of an ideology or a set of beliefs, as outlined in this thesis. Improving economic and social conditions, by themselves, are just measures. In brief, these should be considered as preventive or supportive rather than as the guiding thread behind the policy.

2) The aim of terrorists is not to destroy houses, bomb roads or to kill people. These targets are mainly symbolic. Rather they want to be heard and to advance their goals and ideas. They know that they cannot put an end to the state or to destroy a whole army. Terrorists want to turn people's minds and hearts against the state by exploiting economic, social and democratic problems. Hence, the state must act accordingly and produce a stronger argument than the terrorists. The winner of this conflict would be the side who which gains the support of the people, so the state must try to persuade the ordinary people.

3) Terrorists try to manipulate the people into believing that state is not only targeting them but also ordinary people, in order to generate a broad alliance against the state. Under these circumstances, the people are confused, and need help to understand the real aims of the terrorists, and to understand who is right and who is wrong. They need to be distinguished from the terrorists. Hence the state, at the beginning, must clearly identify who is the "terrorist".

4) Loses of lives, bombings, and violent conflict create an emotional environment in
which it is difficult to think logically and calmly. In these circumstances, even third parties and those who never participate in terrorist attacks might be seen as members or sympathisers by the state. This kind of attitude broadens the anti-state block by generating more sympathy for the terrorists. So, the state must try to decrease tension in the society, and be more patient and understanding than under normal circumstances.

5) As the Real IRA and the PKK cases have demonstrated, terrorists try to provoke armed responses and undemocratic methods through their use of indiscriminate violence. When terrorists succeed in that it is difficult to formulate new policies for the state. Therefore, the state must obey its own written rules, rather than the rule of terrorism, even if it thinks that the law is against their short-term interests. Otherwise, the people might think that there is no difference between the terrorists and state. That is to say, anti-terrorist efforts must be carried out within the framework of law, and if it is possible within a full democratic framework, without harming individual civil rights and freedoms.

6) Anti-terrorist law, in particular, should take into account conditions, both in terms of people and geography before implementing any law. It must not damage the other functioning parts of the democratic system, or else the law becomes ineffective, serving only to legitimate terrorist’s arguments.

7) Naturally, terrorism is an attack against the state and its people which no political
system can accept. Therefore, the security forces’ military style and other armed responses are understandable. Moreover, it is unlikely that terrorists would give up their armed struggles without being forced to do so. It is evident that security measures are needed and they have to be one of the most important policies in the prevention of terrorism. Yet two main principles should be kept in mind: first, the security measures taken must be on a reciprocal basis and within the confines of the law; second, such measures should specifically target terrorists rather than the people generally.

8) The purpose and rule of government institutions vary according to their character and function. For example, armies focus on the destruction of the enemy while social services focus on rehabilitating people. When dealing with a multi-dimensional problem such as terrorism, it cannot be left to one government body, or even to the government itself. There needs to be close co-operation and co-ordination between the institutions, but not a domination by any one of them. Accordingly, anti-terrorist policy should receive well-balanced attention and consideration from all relevant agencies and institutions.

9) Terrorist action is not a battle. The military measures against terrorism must have a limit or sometimes they may even worsen the situation. In many cases the civil institutions may be more effective than army. As can be seen in the German case (Katzenstein 1990: 12-13), the reform of the police forces and financial, technological improvements in the institutions implementing anti-terror policies could be helpful in
10) Timing is vital if this anti-terrorism package is to succeed. If one of the measures, whether it is economic, social, cultural, political or security, is omitted or delayed, the expected benefit from the other measures may not materialise. Therefore, all necessary measures must be implemented as part of an integrated policy.

11) Terrorist organisations seek alliances with foreign powers, international terrorist organisations and the international community. Even some countries see terrorist groups as a convenient strategy for pursuing their national interests and geo-political concerns. International co-operation, therefore, is an essential element of the 'anti-terrorist package'. The countries who support terrorists might face the same problem themselves in the future.

12) Finally, it might be said that terrorism might be justified when it occurs under undemocratic, cruel, and totalitarian political systems, as a tool of the oppressed against the oppressor. However, an evaluation of the pluralistic and democratic systems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries undermines this argument because democratic systems provide an opportunity to almost all ethnic and political groups to have their voices heard. In other words, liberal democracy is the antidote of the arguments of terrorism.

As a result, it can be said that the most important aspects in the prevention of terrorism are: i) appreciating the importance and necessity for public support of anti-terrorist
policies; ii) maintaining the delicate balance between the need for adequate security with the need for a more liberal - democratic approach.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources and Documents


Terör Güvenlik Evrakları (Security Documents and Reports)*:

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 840746.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920162.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 920342.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 930562.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 940348.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 950444

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 950449.

EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 960596.
EGMA/TMDB Arc./Sec. Doc. 980002.


Guerrillas Handbook of the PKK, (Mahsun Korkmaz Akademisi, PKK 1997)

Olaganüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği Arsivleri Güvenlik ve PKK Orgut Yayınları

(The Supreme Governor's Security and PKK Papers), (1980-1993), Diyarbakir, Turkey:


OHBV/GÖV Arc./D/Ter. Doc. Rap. 920962


PKK Kongre Yayınları, (The Scripts of the PKK Congresses)

- 1984 Kongresi.
- 1985 Kongresi.
- 1989 Kongresi.
- 1991 Kongresi.

Sehir Devrimleri Talimnamesi, (Instructions for Urban Revolutionaries), (September 1990), PKK Genel Sekreterliği (The General Secretary of the PKK)

SHP'nin Güneydogu Anadolu Raporu (The South-eastern Report of SHP, Social Populist Party), (1990), SHP

Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, (1988), Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü

Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, (1993), Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü

1994 Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, **TBMM Tutanak Dergisi** Vol. 8.


**UK Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989**, London: HMSO.

* Security documents are marked in the thesis as Security Document (1-10) or named after the city document collected.
Interviews and Informal Sources

Informal Interviews (*) with the members of the PKK militants, in Diyarbakir Prison and Diyarbakir Police Cells, during May-June 1993.

Kazim, 1993.

Saskin, 1993.


Interview, (May 25 1993) with Cebiroglu, (The Governor of Kocigiri, Diyarbakir, Turkey).

Interview, (May 27 1993) with Seyh Mahmut, (The Sheikh, one of the most influential religious person in Diyarbakir, from Naqshbandi School).

Interview (June 24, 1993) with Muharrem Durmaz, (The Chief-Inspector in Anti-Terror Department, Ankara, Turkey)

Interview (June 20 1993) with Fatih Bucak, (The Leader of the Bucak Tribe and the son of M. Bucak, the assassinated MP of Adalet Partisi -the Justice Party)

Interview (June 22 1993) with Mehmet Artuk, (One of the tribal leaders in Diyarbakir, Turkey).

* These interviews cannot be named because of the security and ethical reasons
and the requests of the people interviewed. Therefore I had to be renamed them with the fake names in the study. (I.B.)
Books and Articles


Ahmad, F., (1986) Ittihatciliktan Kemalizm'e (From Ittihatilik to Kemalism). Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari,


Allen, H.E., (1968) *The Turkish Transformation, A Study in Social and


Bakan, S., (1994) *The Emergence of a Modernised Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Domestic Structures and Values in Relations with the European Community and Emergent Organisations*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Nottingham University


Berkes, N., (1973) *Türkiye'de Çagdaslasma*, (*Modernisation in Turkey*).


Birand, M. A., (1995) *Bu Rapor Tam Tamina DGM’lik, (This Report is Exactly for the DGM!)*, Sabah daily, 5 August.


New York: Routledge.


Çayan, M., (1979) *Bütün Yaziları, (His All Writings)*. Istanbul.


Çölaşan, E., (1995c) *Ayıptır Ayip, (It is a Shame)*, *Hürriyet*, 9 August.


International Terrorism Characteristics, Causes, Controls. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.

21.

Press.

Oxford.

Furlong, P., (1981) Political Terrorism in Italy: Responses, Reactions and
Immobilise, in J. Lodge (ed.) Terrorism: A Challenge to the State.
Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, (1994) Teror Örgütü PKK’nın Gerçek Yüzü, (The


Gençkaya, O. F., (1994) The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics, in Kalleja, Wiberg and
Bussittil, (ed.), Research for Peace in the Mediterranean Region. Malta:
Mireva Publication.


Gökmen, Y., (1994) *Özal Yasasaydı, (If Özal was Alive)*. Ankara.


Hale, W., (1998) Identities and Politics in Turkey, Departmental Seminar Notes in
SOAS, London, 7 October.


Diary of 1968’s) Istanbul: Araba Yayinlari.


Milicevic, V. (1959) Der Königsmond von Marseille (King’s Murder from Marseille). Bad Godesberg.


Istanbul: Tekin.


Nursi, S., (1987) *Sözler (Speeches)*. Ankara: Sözler Yayinevi


Olson, R., (1989) *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh*


Olson, R., (1996c) *The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies Since the Gulf War*, Middle East Policy, 4, March, pp. 106-118.


Özdemir, H., (1993a) *Rejim ve Asker (Regime and Military)*. Istanbul: Iz
Yayinlari


392


Sulker, K. (1976), 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri (The Labour Movements in Turkey in 100 Questions). Istanbul


Toprak, Z., (1977) *Halkçılık Ideolojisinin Olusumu*, (*Emerge of the Populist Ideology*) İstanbul: İstanbul Üni. Mezun Dernegi


Tunaya, T.Z., (1996) Türkiye’nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri


Vasiliev, A., (1994) *Turkey and Iran in Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia*, International Conference Paper on Middle East, University of Warwick


Newspapers, Magazines and Other Broadcastings


Daily Telegraph, daily, London, UK.


Kurdish Report (by PKK), London, UK.


Newsweek.


Nokta, weekly magazine, Istanbul, Turkey.

Özgür Gündem, weekly/ (then) daily, Istanbul, Turkey.
Özgür Ülke, daily, Istanbul, Turkey.


Sabah, daily, Istanbul, Turkey. (30-31 May 1999)


Tercüman, daily, Istanbul, Turkey. (1 January-30 September 1980)


Time International Magazine, weekly, USA. (March 15 1998)


The Washington Post, daily Washington, USA. (26 February 1999) and (May-June 1999 Collections)


Turkish Daily News (TDN), daily, Ankara, Turkey.
Türkiye, daily, Istanbul, Turkey.

Wall Street Journal, daily, Washington, USA.


Yeni Yüzyil, daily, Istanbul, Turkey, (1 January-30 September 1998)

Zaman, daily, Istanbul, Turkey.
Appendix 1
THE SURVEY FOR THE REGION OF CITY DIYARBAKIR
(By Ihsan BAL)

Subject: Prevention of terrorism in liberal democracies. A case study of Turkey. Aim of the survey is to discover the extend of the public support for the PKK and try to identify some noticeable causes of terrorism.

Question 1
How do you describe your nationality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Kurdish</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Turkish and Kurdish</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Religious (Safii or Muslim)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Others</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 2
What kind of state policy would be the most efficient to meet the public demand?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) More respect for the cultural and religious rights</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) More economic investment</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) More security and more security forces</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Others/Don’t know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) No Answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- More respect for the cultural and religious rights: 45%
- More economic: 31%
- More security and more security forces: 18%
- Others/Don’t know: 5%
- No answer: 1%

[Pie chart showing the distribution of responses]
Question 3
Who should be responsible in combating terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Government</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Government with public participation</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Public</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Don’t know</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) No answer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie chart showing responses to Question 3]

No Answer 9%
Don’t know 13%
Government 34%
Government with public participation 39%
Public 5%
## Question 4
### How do you feel about the PKK?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Worry and terror</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Hatred and disgust</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Love and hope</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) No feelings</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) If others, please specify</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 154 100.0

- Worry and terror: 34.4%
- Hatred and disgust: 25%
- Love and hope: 5.2%
- No feelings: 26%
- Others: 4.5%

![Pie chart showing distribution of feelings about the PKK](image-url)

- **Worry and terror**: 34%
- **Hatred and disgust**: 25%
- **Love and hope**: 5%
- **No feelings**: 26%
- **Others**: 4.5%
# Question 5

Are the killings of PKK ever justifiable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Certainly not</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Might be acceptable</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against military targets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Yes any target can be count as legitimate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie chart showing the distribution of responses](chart.png)

- Certainly not: 83%
- Might be acceptable against military targets: 7%
- Yes, any target can be count as legitimate: 1%
- Don’t know: 4%
- No answers: 5%
### Question 6

**What is the real aim of the PKK?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) To create a communist Kurdish state.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) To create Kurdish state on religious base.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) To create a hostile position between the Kurdish and Turkish people.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Others/Don’t know</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 154 100.0

![Diagram showing percentages of options]

- To create a communist Kurdish state 33%
- To create a Kurdish state on religious base 31%
- To create a hostile position between the Kurdish and Turkish people 5%
- Others/Don’t know 28%
- No answers 5%
**Question 7**
How do you describe the PKK?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) A Terrorist organisation</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Army of freedom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Don't know/Others</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie chart showing the results of the survey.](chart.png)
### Question 8
From what kind of people the PKK gets its support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Less educated people</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Educated people</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Poor people</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Religious people</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Don’t know</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) No answer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 154 100.0

![Chart showing the distribution of support by type of person]
Question 9
Which one of following options could lead to the successful, happy end for you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) To become independent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) To become autonomous or federal region within Turkey</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) To improve the economic investment in the region, and to pay a more respect for the cultural and religious right of the regional people</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Others/Don’t know</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 10
There has been a dramatic increase of terrorist incidents after the second half of the 1980s. What could be the reason for that?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Lack of investment in Turkey by foreign countries</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) An attempt to weaken the Turkish influence in the region by foreign countries</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Lower income and underdevelopment in regional economic development</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Wrong policies of the Government</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Others/Don't know</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram:
- a) Lack of investment in Turkey by foreign countries 15%
- b) An attempt to weaken the Turkish influence in the region by foreign countries 21%
- c) Lower income and underdevelopment in regional economic development 28%
- d) Wrong policies of the Government 27%
- e) Others/Don't know 9%
Question 11
Do you believe that there is a foreign support for the PKK?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Yes</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Don’t know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) No answer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie chart showing the distribution of responses: Yes (81%), No (4%), Don't know (12%), No answers (3%)]
**Question 12**
Do you think that there would be some effect of the southeastern Anatolian project over PKK activity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Yes, it would undermine and weaken the PKK’s clime and strength</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) No, nothing would be so effectively happen</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Increase the public support for the PKK</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pie chart showing the distribution of responses]

- Yes, it would undermine and weaken the PKK’s clime and strength: 62%
- No, nothing would be so effectively happen: 15%
- Increase the public support for the PKK: 14%
- Don’t know: 8%
- No answers: 1%

- Yes, it would undermine and weaken the PKK’s clime and strength
- No, nothing would be so effectively happen
- Increase the public support for the PKK
- Don’t know
- No answers
Question 13
Do you believe the effective solution to terrorism should be and can be found by the Parliament?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Yes</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) No</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Don’t know</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don’t Know 16%  No 12%  Yes 67%  No answers 5%
Appendix-2

The Militants of DHKP-C, Revolutionary Terror Organization
1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-20</th>
<th>20-25</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>30+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Age Distribution Graph]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart showing education levels](image)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Blue-Worker</th>
<th>Civil Servant</th>
<th>Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Occup.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Father's Occupation**

- Unemployed: 14
- Blue-worker: 20
- Civil-servant: 13
- Farmer-self-employed: 53

[Graph showing the distribution of father's occupations with Unemployed, Blue-worker, Civil-servant, and Farmer-self-employed categories]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number Of Brothers &amp; Sisters</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number Of Brothers &amp; Sisters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anti-Terror Department, Ankara.
Appendix 3

Breakdown of Estimated Kurdish Population
By geographical regions in 1990 (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number (000)</th>
<th>As Percent of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>2,230.29</td>
<td>41.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern</td>
<td>2,365.04</td>
<td>64.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>296.99</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>37.88</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>579.38</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>810.13</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>726.55</td>
<td>8.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for all Turkey</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,046.26</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As Percent of population for all Turkey</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.60</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from S. Mutlu, The Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces, New Perspectives on Turkey, 12, Spring 1995, p. 49.

(*) The figures are estimated. There are different estimations from 5-20 million because there is no official figures on the ethnic composition of the population of Turkey.
## Appendix 4

### PKK, Security Forces & Civilian Casualties 1984-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PKK</th>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984-91</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>3,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-95</td>
<td>10,102</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>3,736</td>
<td>16,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,546</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>5,014</td>
<td>20,181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


![Bar Chart](image)