CULTURE AND SUBCULTURE
IN THE TURKISH POLICE FORCE

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# CONTENTS

## ABSTRACT

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

## CHAPTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>Theoretical Perspectives</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-</td>
<td>The Role of Turkish Police Officers</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-</td>
<td>Becoming a Police Officer</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-</td>
<td>The World of Turkish Police Officers</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX

## BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABSTRACT

Culture and Subculture in the Turkish Police Force

Muammar YILDIZ

This study analyses the relationship in Turkey between police deviancy and police culture. It is argued that deviant individuals are able to excuse their deviant practices in an environment that provides them ample opportunity. The study demonstrates that police misconduct is a matter of institutional facilitation and organisational responsibility, more so than a matter of individual deviance. The 'bad apple theory' merely provides an attempt to normalise or invent plausible excuses for deviant conduct by the police authorities. On the contrary, it is argued that police violence is culturally rooted in the operational code that exists within groups of police officers. It is due to such an operational code that allows violence in certain situations to be regarded as a logical, acceptable or at the very least, a condonable form of behaviour.

Hence, from this perspective, for positive development to be effective, it must be targeted at the informal culture of the police and their practical working rules, as opposed to the cosmetic legislative changes and initiatives aimed at public relations.

Consequently, this study explores the Turkish police culture and shows that the element of 'authority' is almost a single dominant factor behind the occupational culture of the police officers' – despite two elements: danger and authority. It is these two elements, which marks it apart from police cultures in England and Wales and the United States. The core characteristics of the Turkish police culture are closely related to police officers' authority to that of a 'man in charge'. Police violence is thus deemed an almost inevitable tool in defence of this mandate, and to subsequently prevent an erosion of authority. Thus, in order to understand this mentality of Turkish police officers, the historical development of their role has also been emphasised.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to their presentation to the Turkish public as proud forces against terrorist groups and other criminals, in recent decades, security forces in Turkey have been under close scrutiny of international human rights observers, such as Amnesty International, UN Commission on Human Rights and European Committee for the Prevention of Violence, about human rights violations. Disappearance in police custody, and extrajudicial execution are most cited examples of violations:

There were more than 35 disappearances, 15 reported deaths in custody as a result of violence....Relatives [of disappeared] who have attempted to draw public attention to their plight have been subjected to ridicule and insults, beatings and detention by local security force. Some have even been imprisoned (Amnesty International Country Report, 1997, p. 2).

According to the same report, violence is used to obtain confession and information, to punish individuals and groups and as a key part of anti-terrorist strategy. The methods of violence include beatings to all parts of the body including to the head, sexual organs and feet, electric shocks, hosing with pressurised water, hanging by the arms. According to their severity, these types of police brutality or excessive use of force have a deep effect on public concern, and consequently other forms of police misconduct, such as the use of profane and abusive language, threats to use force if not obeyed and approaching with a pistol, are overshadowed.
In different degrees, Police brutality is a widespread problem in every part of the world. According to Bayley (1996) police brutality in the United States has become synonymous with unjustified force in the making of an arrest. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, according to Maguire and Corbett (1991), arrest-related assaults constitute one of the major categories of complaints against the police.

**Research Problem**

There is a close relationship between the research problem of this thesis and the meaning of police violence according to the Turkish authorities and their approach to it. In order to expand and consequently make clear the research problem, firstly, the police and their functions need to be well explained. In the literature, there are many studies available on these issues (Reiner, 1992; Barker and Carter, 1994; Crank, 1998). According to these studies police officers fulfill important functional and symbolic roles in modern societies, representing one of the most important protectors of individual and group liberties. Paradoxically, police officers can also pose a significant threat to these same liberties.

Functionally, the police are charged with the ethical, just, and humane enforcement of laws, provision of service, and maintenance of order. In this charge, law enforcement officers are vested with a significant amount of authority to restrict the freedom of movement of persons and to lawfully subject such persons to embarrassment or indignity in the course of the investigation, search, and, or arrest processes. Symbolically, police officers are not only the most overt symbol of the criminal justice system but they also clearly represent a potential legitimate source of restraint in a free society. Police officers have the responsibility of maintaining order, but doing so within strictly limited legal
constraints. Furthermore, police practices are viewed, to some extent, as the gauge by which we measure sanctity from government oppression, and adherence to constitutional guarantees. In many ways, police integrity is the window through which we assess the rectitude of all governmental actions. What they do and how they do it affects the perceptions of how we view the fairness and honesty of the entire criminal justice system.

Given these responsibilities, in industrialised and democratic societies, it is understood that the officer who violates the covenants of proper behaviour has both trespassed on the fundamental precepts of a free society and violated the symbolic contract of propriety in government. From this point of view, societies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have been involved in continuous efforts to overcome this negative aspect of policing and police officers, by researching police violence, its roots and connections with other aspects of life. As a result of these efforts, police brutality and other forms of misconduct were not simply seen as matters of individual deviance. Brutality is viewed increasingly as a matter of institutional facilitation and organisational responsibility (Bayley, 1996: 290). Hence the focus of corrective efforts is shifting from individuals to organisations.

This is clearly an important phase in mutual understanding between the state and the public in the industrialised and democratic societies. According to social scientists, like Bayley (1996) and international observers, like Amnesty International, this mutuality in the Third World countries is not seen. Police brutality in these countries is usually regime supported. As a result, solutions to brutality become a matter of high politics, requiring change in regimes and systems of government (Bayley, 1996: 290). In the short term, this could be only
a dream for these types of countries. On the contrary, what has been observed in these countries is usually an official denial of police misconduct, as the General Director of Police Agar said:

Careful examination reveals that there are no allegations of violence of those detained for drugs or common criminal offences, but in the most simple anti-terrorist investigation allegations of violence put forward ... The aim is to undermine the success of the police in their struggle with terrorism (Cumhuriyet, 13 December 1994).

When the case is so obvious, the 'rotten apple' theme is given as an explanation of police misconduct. According to the authorities the rotten apples are either weak individuals who have slipped through the elaborate screening process and succumbed to the temptations inherent in police work, or deviant individuals who continue their deviant practices in an environment that provides them ample opportunity. This approach to police misconduct is currently debated in the literature. It is seen as an impression management or normalisation of deviance technique than an explanation of police misconduct (Barker, 1994: 46). Indeed, according to several public statements, the initial reaction of police administrators, applying the label 'rotten apple' or 'rogue police officer' to publicly exposed officers, is an attempt to normalise or invent plausible excuses and explanations for deviant conduct.

As an active member of the police force, I find the normalisation of police deviance by using the 'rotten apple' explanation as understandable according to several points. Firstly, the authorities in Turkey have a shortage of social scientific research that shows the roots of police misconduct. In other words, the 'rotten apples' theory has not faced any alternatives. Therefore, it is easy to label deviant police officers as rotten apples that help authorities to escape in many
aspects including accountability. Empirical studies in the United Kingdom and the United States showed that the theory 'rotten apples' cannot be the only explanation of police misconduct as Murphy pointed out:

The "rotten apples" theory will not work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not natural born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutional different from their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples - the organisation, not just the individuals in it. Because corrupt police officers are made, not born (Murphy, 1973, quoted in Barker, 1994: 46).

Secondly, Turkey is a developing country. The connection between police abuse and the character of government is more than semantic, in the sense that democracy means an absence of repression by official agencies. As Bayley (1996) states. the enjoyment of human rights is related to levels of economic development and democracy is related to economic development. From this point of view, contrary to developed and experienced countries, where generally a consensus between the state and its citizens is seen an important condition in official works, in Turkey, political and economical development is carried out without public consensus. In other words, there is always a standard official policy that covers every aspect of political life. Criticism is seen as unpleasant. If the officials in Turkey accept the alternative explanation of police brutality then they will put themselves in a dilemma that most of them would directly be related to official policing policies. This is unacceptable, and therefore, presenting police brutality at individualised level partly protects themselves from criticism.

Having stated the existence, or the claims of the existence of police misconduct, and official explanations of the phenomenon, the research problem of the thesis
becomes clear. In order to overcome the problem of police misconduct or brutality, along with the change in policing policies, the role of police culture in police brutality must also be stated. Because as Uildriks and Mastrigt state:

Police violence ... is culturally rooted in the operational code of groups of police officers. It is such an operational code that allows violence in certain situations to be regarded as a logical, acceptable or at least condonable form of behaviour (1991: 179).

Although changes in regime and systems are a matter of politics, my contribution, as an academic member of the Turkish police force, would be convince the authorities of the more reasonable explanation of police violence through a scientific research study. The research problem is, then, to define the role of police culture in police work. This includes police misconduct as well as planning future policing policies.

**Purpose of the Study**

With reference to police brutality or violence, the main purpose of the study is to examine the core characteristics of Turkish police culture and its implications for the future of police administration policies, including the recruitment and training of police officers. It is the first substantial piece of work about Turkish police culture. In the United States and England and Wales police cultures have been studied for decades. In these countries there is considerable amount of data and publications on police culture are cumulated and available for prospected researchers. Although some studies have already been carried out on Turkish police community they are either minor or not related to police culture. Moreover the general methodology - participant observation - has not been used. Therefore this study is a path breaking piece of work about Turkish police culture for either methodological point of view as carrying out a participant
observation and scientific point of view as making the connection between police activities and their culture. Models from the United States and England and Wales had to be used because of both methodological and scientific points of view as they guided the present study. In examining the functions and performance of the police force it is important to remain aware that there is always more to how a police force operates than the formal structure or framework within which members of that organisation exist. Taking the example of police culture, it is known that the informal rules, values and attitudes associated with it are of great importance in understanding the existing reality of police brutality. For example, when he defines "tough cops" as cynical in the sense that they presume that people are motivated by narrow self-interest, and conceive of the role of police of crime control, focusing especially on serious crime, Worden (1996) says:

[Tough cops] believe that the citizenry is hostile towards police, and they identify with the police culture. They believe that experience and common sense are the best guides in dealing with the realities of the street, and that curbstone justice is sometimes appropriate and effective (1996: 26).

Being cynical is a well-known reality of police community and is presented as a core characteristic of police culture in the literature. Stoddard goes further and sees the effect of police culture more widespread by saying that '...illegal practices of police personnel are socially prescribed and patterned through the informal "code" rather than being a function of individual aberration or personal inadequacies of the policeman himself' (1995: 313). Therefore, if this power of police culture has been recognised in other countries, perhaps, the authorities in Turkey should turn their attention on Turkish police culture. Because, as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) point out, the fundamental culture of policing is similar in every part of the world. This is understandable, since the same
features of police role - danger, authority, and the mandate to use coercive force-
are present everywhere.

The second purpose of the thesis is to examine the factors that make Turkish
police culture differentiated from the police cultures in the United Kingdom and
the United States. This could help us to develop a more understandable
explanation why the Turkish police force is seen as one the most complained
against force in the world. One of these factors is the role of Turkish police and
its development, especially in the period of the Republic that has started from
1923 till the present day. At the beginning, the state had seen a great change
from the empire to the republic and this was followed by a couple of compulsory
radical reforms, like the westernised way of dressing and the acceptance of
European Law. These are discussed in Chapter 5.

The immediate effect of these radical reforms was their enforcement by using
the security forces. The lasting effect is to organise security forces as the
 guardian of the status quo in both ways as structural and policing policies.
Therefore, as will be stated in Chapter 7, the contemporary police community
places the crimes against the state at the top and sees others as time consumer of
the police. From this point of view, I agree with Chevigny who says:

In particular, the concept of law-enforcement work has come to
include the order-keeping and social-control functions; law and
order become one. Thus the police see a threat to themselves as a
threat to order as well as a danger very like the danger of crime

Actually, the very obvious disparity between Chevigny's research subject, the
US police community and Turkish police community, is that the latter has the
overt support of the political authorities. But the consequence is similar, as
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) pointed out:
We shall explain [excessive use of force] with the proposition that two principal features of police role - danger and authority - combine to produce in them a distinctive world view that effects the values and understanding of cops on and off the job, sometimes leading to admirable valour, sometimes to brutality and excessive force, and sometimes to a banding together, a cover-up a conspiracy of silence (p. 90).

The third main purpose of the thesis is to state the necessity of giving priority to a consideration of police culture in any debate about police reforms. Because, as Amnesty International observers pointed out in their 1997 Turkey Report, current political authorities in Turkey rely on cosmetic legislative changes and public relations initiatives. Naturally these efforts do not work, because as it will be stated later, problems are deeper than supposed. Authorities' initiatives are seen as effort to cover up policing failure of the state by the international experts and mechanisms of intergovernmental organisations.

The feasibility of reforms, other than those based on police culture, is seriously questioned by many social scientists. In their review of the police literature Brogden et al. (1988) point to methods of police reform such as rule-tightening as a means of controlling police discretion and changing the informal culture of police organisation. Reiner notes the uneven impact of law reform on police practice and concludes that legal regulation alone has limited effectiveness for changing police practice and says 'the key changes must be in the informal culture of the police, their practical working rules' (Reiner, 1992: 232).

Similarly, McConville, Sanders, and Leng (1991) seriously question the utility of law reform as a method of changing police practice, since the occupational subculture of the police 'appears resistant to change' (1991: 193). Chan agrees with them by equating police culture to resistance to change. She concludes:
... radical change, though politically risky and unpopular, can be more successful in transforming organisational directions than incremental change, which requires a long period of sustained organisational and political committed to produce effects. On the other hand, change introduced from the top of the organisation is often resisted by those at the bottom. Similarly, externally imposed change can be sabotaged by members within the organisation (1997: 1).

The last main purpose of the thesis is to help to the development of the relationship between the police and the community through mutual understanding. The police force needs a friendly society and vice versa the society needs a capable police community. Because the police and the community should work together to define and develop solutions to problems (Skogan, 1998). Moreover, it is argued that by opening themselves to citizen input the police will become more knowledgeable about, and responsive to, the varying concerns of different communities. This could be seriously questioned in an environment dominated by scepticism about the ability of the police force. Although police officers are raised among this environment, the public still criticise them as being brutal while 'police believe themselves to be a distinct occupational group, apart from society' (Crank, 1998: 221). As a result of this, police officers see themselves as outsiders that are a basis for police secrecy, when secrecy protects police from departmental directives and public oversight, and consequently 'they are confident that whatever they say will be used against them' (Chevigny, 1995: 141). The exploration of police culture would certainly help the public to understand the police community and vice versa.
Research Questions

As the purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the police misconduct and police culture in Turkey, then the main research question is to find an occupational basis for police violence. However, for example, abusing human rights by police forces or other security forces is not a uniquely Turkish concern; the same question could well be asked in Los Angeles, where the videotaped beating of Rodney King brought shame to a police department said to be "a shining example of the best in reform policing" (Sparrow et al. 1990, quoted in Chan, 1997: 4). In order to explain the Turkish case, it is useful to reiterate what I have previously stated which has been claimed by many other social scientists, that police culture is an important factor behind police brutality. The research question therefore reveals two linked areas of concern, what are the core characteristics of Turkish police culture and how do they influence police officers that they become or known as one of the most brutal police communities. Here it is also important to make clear what is meant by police culture, as a clear definition of police culture would certainly make the issue more approachable. For example, police culture is a subculture and a subculture may refer:

...a division of a national culture defined by such social factors as occupation, ethnicity, class and residence, which in combination form a functioning unity that shapes the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the group's members (Cole, 1992: 226).

This definition draws attention to the national culture as well as the police culture. Because police culture is derived from national culture, then the national characteristics became an important point in exploring the Turkish police culture like any other. In the example of political characteristics, according to Radalet (1980), policing has tended to be viewed primarily as a political institution. Also
Wilson's comment 'police work is carried out under the influence of a political culture' (1968: 233) stress that policing is inextricably tied to the function of governing through the executive responsibility for enforcement of laws. Therefore it is pertinent to ask a supplementary question that may illustrate the influence of Turkey's harsh political, social, economic, and historical realities on Turkish police culture and separate it from contemporary Western police cultures in terms of policing process.

Indeed, this enquiry could be meaningful in the case of the Turkish example. As will be presented in Chapter 5, historically and politically the role of the police has always been as the guardian of the status quo through law enforcement, contrary to European police forces, where the role of police has gradually been transformed into serving a community function. Law mainly represents ruling ideology in the third world countries and consequently law enforcement requires the opposition to be crushed. In 1923, while he was in application radical reforms, the first president of Turkey, Ataturk said, "Bloody revolutions are the strongest. Revolutions without bloodshed do not become eternal" and continued:

I am telling you this an indisputable truth: fear not, this path is imperative and this obligation leads us towards a lofty and important goal, if you wish I can tell you that to reach such a lofty and important goal, we shall if necessary suffer casualties. This has no importance (quoted in Galoglu, 1972: 141-142).

Indeed, Ataturk's era and aftermath played a very important role in structuring the contemporary Turkish police culture. The element of 'authority' is almost seen as a single dominant factor behind police culture contrary to dual dominant factors - danger and authority - in the United Kingdom and the United States police cultures.
Handling Police Culture

If this thesis aims to argue that police culture is an important factor behind current tough policing practices in Turkey, then an adequate theorised notion of police culture is relevant to the debate about how the police should be reformed. As Chan points out, reform of the police - whether through law reform or cultural change - has been stymied by an inadequately theorised notion of police culture (1997: 65). In order to demonstrate a more fruitful approach to contemporary policing practices through police culture we need to examine the way to handle the concept of "police culture".

In spite of Reiner's acknowledgement that "cop culture" is not "monolithic, universal nor unchanging" (Reiner, 1992: 109), police culture is often described as though it is. Chan (1997) made several criticisms here. First one concerns the failure of existing definitions of police culture to account for internal differentiation and jurisdictional differences. According to her, what is often described as the police occupational culture in fact refers to the 'street cop culture', rather than the 'management cop culture' (Chan, 1997: 65). Similarly, Manning points to internal differentiation as he said "The police as an organisational do not possess a common culture when viewed from inside" (1978: 244). Instead as he suggested that there are "three subcultures of policing: command, middle management, and lower participants" (Manning, 1993: quoted in Chan, 1997: 66). From this point of view, in this thesis on Turkish police culture I am aware of the existence of multiple cultures within a police force. As a result of these guidelines and also because of time and budget limitations, I have chosen police stations as research sites. In their situation as the first contact
points with the citizens, this option was also helpful in understanding police abuses.

The second criticism against the way handling the concept of "police culture" relates to the implicit passivity of police officers in the acculturation process. Reiner (1992: 109) suggested that officers are not "passive or manipulated learners", but did not elaborate on the nature of the "socialisation" process. Fielding demonstrated that the individual officer is the "final arbiter or mediator" of the structural and cultural influences of the occupation (Fielding, 1988: 10). Similarly, the salience of work demands and occupational pressures is mediated by individual experiences. For example, a focus on risk and uncertainty is part of the enacted environment of police work, since the perception of danger "is constructed and sustained by officers in the course of their routine work" (Holdaway, 1983: 19). Therefore, as it has been taken in Chapter 6, a study of police culture should recognise the interpretative and active role of police officers in structuring their understanding of the organisation and its environment.

The third criticism of current police culture theories is its apparent insularity from the social, political, legal and organisational context of policing. Some have argued that police corruption and misconduct could not exist without the tacit approval of the community (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990). There is evidence that secrecy and solidarity of the culture sometimes breaks down under the strain of external investigation. Punch (1985) has documented the internal conflict and divisions caused by a corruption scandal in a Dutch police force, although he was pessimistic about its eventual impact on police corrupt
practices. Therefore, especially in Chapter 5, the Turkish police culture has been situated in the political and social context of policing.

The final criticism is related to the first three: an all-powerful, homogeneous and deterministic conception of the police culture insulated the external environment leaves little scope for a cultural change. As Manning (1993) suggests, the tension apparent in the occupational culture generally and between the organisation and the environment are the dialectic source of change in policing. Therefore I have followed the point that "A satisfactory formulation of police culture should allow for the possibility of change as well as resistance to change" (Chan, 1997: 67). This will help to establish a more satisfactory framework for understanding Turkish police culture. This framework will explain police cultural practice in terms of the interaction between the social and political context of police work and the institutionalised perceptions, values, strategies, and schemas.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Police practices, other than those stated in law, have long been a topic of interest and inquiry among researchers and observers of the law enforcement scene in the developed democratic societies. The literature shows that this subject has not lost its importance since the period of Peel, when modern police forces were seeded with principles aimed to provide police-public peace and police accountability. Some of these were: to prevent crime without having to use repressive force and to avoid intervention by the military in community disturbances; to manage public order non-violently, using force to obtain compliance only as a last resort; to minimise and reduce conflict between the police and the public; and to demonstrate efficiency by means of the absence of crime and disorder, rather than by visible evidence of police actions in dealing with problems. The mandate here, according to Cole, was to keep a low profile in maintaining order. Because of fears by political leaders that a national force might emerge that would threaten civil liberties, every effort was made to keep direction of the police at the local level (1992: 128).

Indeed, in contemporary industrialised democratic societies like the United Kingdom, according to the above principles, police forces have been organised on a mainly decentralised basis and increasingly in co-operation with the public. Community acceptance of police authority in such countries is:
...contingent on their behaviour, their compliance with the rule of law, and on there being effective processes in place to ensure that if police break the law they have sworn to uphold, or are in serious breach of disciplinary regulations, they will be held accountable for their actions (Chappel, 1996: 2).

However, this sensitivity of liberal and democratic societies towards police accountability makes police officers represent one of the most important protectors of individual and group liberties, but they also clearly represent a potential legitimate source of restraint in a free society. Barker and Carter say, "policing in a democratic and free society is the most difficult form of police work" (1994: 3); because police officers have the responsibility of maintaining order, but within strictly limited legal constraints. This does not mean that police officers always respect the law. On the contrary, as the police literature shows, there are many examples of officer activities that are inconsistent with their official authority, organisational authority, values, and standards of ethical conduct. According to Barker and Carter "they have both trespassed on the fundamental precepts of a free society and violated the symbolic contract of propriety in government" (1994: 3).

The definitions and concepts of the typology of police deviance establish a foundation to examine improper police behaviour and especially its cultural background. Primarily, it permits us to understand how a wide range of deviant behaviours can relate to the police subculture. Moreover, it serves as a common starting point to examine improper police practices. Understanding police deviance and its cultural roots has important ramifications for us. Through a conceptual understanding of the various forms of deviance, we can direct police authorities in Turkey to focus alternative approaching to the issue instead of simply but unsupported theories such as "rotten apples". 
The police literature presents different approaches that have been taken to describe police deviance. For example, Sherman (1980) defined police violence as the justified and unjustified use of any physical force (including deadly force) against citizens. Friedrich (1980) was somewhat more specific, inferring that the police use of force included any forceful activity - either legitimate or illegitimate - that produces physical or emotional injury. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) approach the Rodney King case as the example of 'excessive force' which is defined as violence to a degree that is more than justified to effect a legitimate police function.

Police deviance is sometimes presented as misconduct in literature. Lynch and Diamond (1983) take police misconduct as police officers' violations of (1) formally written normative rules; (2) traditional operating procedures; (3) regulations and procedures of both the police and other public service agencies; and (4) the criminal and civil laws. Geller and Toch (1996) uses police misconduct in a broader context. His definition of the term contains brutality, harassment, corruption, violation of constitutional rights, and the failure to take required or appropriate action.

Furthermore, Barker and Carter (1994) give a more comprehensive approach to police deviance. They take it to represent a two-point typology: occupational deviance and abuse of authority. Police occupational deviance is behaviour committed during the course of normal work activities or committed under the guise of the police officer's authority. The authors perceive police occupational deviance manifesting itself in two forms - police corruption and police misconduct - both of which specifically apply to the officer's role as an employee.
rather than the practice of policing, per se. This type of deviance is concerned with how an officer performs as an organisational member rather than the method by which the officer discharges his or her police duties.

The authors, Barker and Carter (1994), define abuse of authority as any action by a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human dignity, manifest feelings of interiority, and or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency in the course of performing police work. Within this context, abuse of authority addresses three areas of police deviance. The first is physical abuse, which incorporates brutality and police violence. Physical abuse occurs when a police officer uses more force than is necessary to affect a lawful arrest or search, and / or the wanton use of any degrees of physical force against another by a police officer under the colour of the officer's authority.

Second is psychological abuse. This includes circumstances wherein a police officer verbally assails, ridicules, discriminates, or harasses individuals and / or places a person who is under the actual dominion of the officer in a situation where the individual's esteem or self-image are threatened or diminished. Threats by an officer of physical harm to an individual or the unjustified threat of an arrest are examples of psychological abuse. The third classification is legal abuse, a type that will typically occur independently without physical or psychological abuse. It is defined as the violation of a person's lawful, constitutional protected rights by a police officer. An improper search or stopping a person without legal grounds is all examples of legal abuse.
Three distinctions are noted by Barker and Carter (1994) between "abuse of authority" and "occupational deviance". The first distinction deals with motivation. Whereas abuse of authority is largely motivated by the officer's intent to accomplish a direct or peripheral police goal, occupational deviance is largely prompted by the personal benefit, gratification, or convenience of the individual officer. The second distinction concerns the police department's liability. Liability arising from abuse of authority is more pervasive than occupational deviance. The third distinction is that there is greater peer tolerance for abuse of authority than for occupational deviance. The reason is:

... (Abuse of authority) typically seeks to achieve a legitimate end while addressing the frustration and stressors most officers have experienced thereby establishing a common bond of understanding for the behaviours. Conversely, occupational deviance is more likely to be viewed as "wrong" by other organisational members and will typically not engender the same amount of peer support (Barker & Carter, 1994: 9).

The abuse of authority typology is more helpful in understanding current tough policing practices in Turkey which has been documented by several international observers such as UN Committee against Torture as they pointed out "...the existence of systematic torture in Turkey cannot be denied" (UN, 1993: 1). Torture or deaths in police custody are two examples of the abuse of authority. Moreover, the police literature stresses that police subculture is one of the most important explaining factor of police deviance and consequently the abuse of authority (Uildriks and Mastrigt, 1991; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Chan, 1997). It suggests that there is a close relationship between core characteristics of police culture and generic stressors behind the abuse of authority.
Similarly, Carter (1994: 276-277) has identified seven generic stressors, each of which contributes to the abuse of authority. These are: life-threatening stressors which are characterised by the embodiment of "a constant potential of injury or death" (similar to "danger" in Reiner's cop culture theory); social isolation stressors such as isolation and alienation from the community, authoritarianism, cynicism, prejudice, and discrimination; organisational stressors such as peer pressure, role models; functional stressors such as role conflict; personal stressors such as family problems or financial constrains; physiological stressors such as fatigue from working off-duty jobs; and psychological stressors such as depression.

**Police Culture and the Causes of Police Deviance**

The police literature offers us a large amount of references on the relationship between the causes of police deviance and police culture. In one example, Stoddard (1995) discusses the informal code of police deviancy addressing personal relationships among police officers within the informal police organisation. The impact of peer expectations and peer pressure is clearly illustrated in this work, which leads to a conceptual understanding of how functional and organisational stressors can influence police behaviour with a specific relationship to abuse of authority. In support of this position Bittner discusses the closed communications system and informal standards characteristic of police organisation that, as Bittner observes, "preclude informing on even those officers who are violent and sadistic" (1975: 67). Carter (1994) interprets this silence as "condoning the abuse, thus establishing an illegitimate organisational norm which could contribute to more abuse" (p. 278). Uildriks and Mastrigt
(1991) agree with them by saying:

Police violence ... is culturally rooted in the operational code of groups of police officers. It is such an operational code which allows violence in certain situations to be regarded as a logical, acceptable or least condonable form of behaviour (1991: 179).

However, this culture of the police is also seen as "functional to the survival and sense of security among officers working under dangerous, unpredictable and alienating conditions" (Chan, 1997: 46). It is indeed widely presented as a negative influencing factor on police work. From this point of view, the linkage between force and culture is often viewed negatively, as a collusion among officers to keep quiet about abuses of force (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). According to this idea, the need to cover up abuses of force requires that officers cover for each other, which spawns a culture of secrecy impenetrable to administrative oversight. Chan made a similar link between police culture and police corruption by saying that "the so-called police code has helped police verbal link and corruption to flourish within the force while protecting wrong-doers from detection and prosecution" (1997: 46). Culture in this context, is a mask for deviant police behaviour (Kappeler, et al, 1994).

The Causes of Police Brutality

Having touched to the relationships between police brutality and police culture, it is now pertinent to show that police culture is related to other causes of police brutality as well. From this point of view, the police literature draws attention to the importance of police culture in understanding certain causes of police brutality, as well as the brutality itself.
The literature takes police deviancy or criminality as a crime that has long been discussed by social scientists. There are many theories that deal with crime and deviance. From these, classical theory accepts individual criminals engage in a process of rational calculative decision making in choosing whether to commit crime. There are two assumptions: one that individuals have free will; the other that individuals are guided by hedonism, the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of pain (Walklate, 1998: 17). Hedonism is seen as part of police deviance and police culture by some contemporary authors (Geller & Toch, 1996 and Crank, 1998). However, the classical theorists deliberately ignored social conditions of crime and differences between individuals as in example of where they see no differences between first offenders and recidivist. They treated them exactly alike, solely on the basis of particular act that had been committed (Jones, 1998: 93).

A more approachable view to police deviance through the lens of police culture is in sociological positivist theories. According to these theories, crime is caused by social factors as well as psychological factors. Criminals differ from non-criminals in terms of their values, which are provided by their social environments. As the values provided by these institutions (family, friendship groups and social groups) become fragmented, several opposing definitions about proper behaviour arise and come into conflict. Continued disorganisation makes the potential for conflict even more likely. Deviant or criminal behaviour generally occurs when one behaves according to definitions that conflict with those of the dominant culture. Crime and delinquency are transmitted by frequent contact with criminal traditions (Jones, 1998, Vold et al. 1998).
Indeed, in contemporary world, police officers may live in an isolated police community that provides cultural values such as protecting members, secrecy and solidarity between officers (Reiner, 1992). Opposition to these values may lead to sanctions. Dominant culture (or status quo) bounds this police community particularly three roles as peacekeeping (or maintaining order), crime fighting, and community service. These are the sources of the police officer’s most difficult conflicts according to Rubin (1974). Campbell describes the tensions created by conflicting expectations of the police roles. He sees conflicting police roles as the most important source of police frustration and the most severe limitation, suggesting that:

Here both the individual police officer and the police community as a whole find not only inconsistent public expectations and public reactions, but also inner conflict growing out of the interaction of the policeman’s values, customs, and traditions with his intimate experience with the criminal element of the population (quoted in Rubin, 1974: 131-132).

Consequently, police officers live in an atmosphere of social conflict, without a well-defined, well-understood notion of what they are supposed to be doing in police work. Their work demands more efforts that may make their roles more conflicting in Turkey where national conditions reflect a closed society and authoritarian state traditions that are expanded upon in the following chapters of this thesis.

Another approach to the understanding of police brutality in Turkey is to use theories of anomie. In Durkheim’s view, anomie refers both to the breakdown of social norms and a condition where previously established norms no longer control the activities of societal members (Vold et al, 1998). As an example, in
Turkish society, as will be stated in chapter 5, there had been a breakdown of social norms resulting from the radical reforms in the aftermath of the declaration of Republic of Turkey in 1923. These radical reforms established a gap between the political authorities and the community. The role of the police since then has usually been understood as being guardians of the reforms. Political authorities seem to have missed an important point while they were institutionalising new but radical reforms. According to theories of anomie, norms must be widely internalised and be common to the whole society and act as a powerful force in shaping the way members behave (Jones, 1998: 137). If a rule or ideal is considered part of the normative order it must be widely sanctioned, conformity will be rewarded and non-conformity will be punished (Vold et al, 1998). This is what has been seen in the first fifty years of the Republic of Turkey. In order to understand the mentality of contemporary tough policing and authoritarian characteristics of police culture, this period of the state must be taken into consideration. Chapter 5 of this thesis deals with this background of the Turkish police culture.

Another important approach to the explanation of police deviance that must be mentioned here are labelling theories. According to these theories, no behaviour is inherently deviant or criminal, but only comes to be considered so when others confer this label upon the act, hence:

Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them outsiders. From this point of view ... the deviant is the one to whom the label has been successfully applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label (Becker, 1963: 4).

In a similar way, Van Maanen's study "The Asshole" (1978) carries footprints of these labelling theories. In his analysis of police overuse of coercion, he noted
that police tended to focus, not on suspects, but on 'big-mouts', individuals who had not committed a legal violation but who (in their behaviour) displayed resentment about the intrusion of the police into their affairs. 'Assholes', Van Maanen argued, represented a type of individual that takes a great deal of police time. The process of labelling someone an asshole emerged in concrete encounters with citizens. The consequence of the label was an increased likelihood of street 'justice', such as arresting.

Similarly, a labelling theorist, Cicourel (1968) developed a perspective suggesting that when police officers perceive their role primarily in terms of crime control, they will be more concerned with the spirit of the law, and thus more likely to respond on the basis of their subjective definition of a situation and the personalities involved. Thus if a suspect's dress, appearance, behaviour and other background factors fitted the police officer's conception of the typical delinquent, then it was more likely that some kind of further action would be taken (Vold and Bernard, 1986: 260-262).

Labelling is said to be more evident in the relationship between police and ethnic minorities (Chan, 1997; Crank, 1998). Police behaviour is mobilised by characteristics of dress, behaviour, and attitudes. These are, according to Crank:

... associated with membership in minority groups. The colour of someone's skin, style of dress, or accent, in a word, symbol of cultural difference, become symbolic shorthand for identifying suspicious character. Over time, they become common knowledge, accepted as the obvious way of doing things. Skin-color or ethnicity can thus become a common-sense base for police investigation (1998: 207).
An important point by Box (1981) here is that police brutality towards ethnic minorities is also a consequence of the criminalisation process. In his motivational deficiency of control theory, differential policing practices, and institutional biases at different stages of the criminal justice system, all operate in favour of the most advantaged sections of the society and to the detriment of less favoured citizens. He saw the criminal process as a response to social problems that the subject merely symbolises:

Thus, the economically marginalised and the oppressed ethnic minorities - because they will also be economically marginalised - will be treated more harshly by the judicial system not simply because of who they are, but also because of what they symbolise, namely the perceived threat to social order posed by the growth of the permanently unemployed (Box, 1981: 200).

It is plausible to apply Box's approach to the Turkish case in that society has been divided mainly into two parts from the period of the Republic in 1923, as citizens who favour the revolutions and those who do not favour the new life style. In this division enemies have faced labelling and prosecution by the authorities. In this system the role of the police, as explained above, is the guardian of the status quo. Indeed, in contemporary Turkey, the number of political detainees is quite a high percentage of the total conviction rate (State Statistical Institute, official publication, Statistical Yearbook 1997).

Along with his macro view, Box (1981) also contributes to general understanding of criminal behaviour at an individualistic level. His explanation of an individual's 'deviation' carries many similarities with subcultural theories. According to him, the 'deviation' of an individual depends on the possibility of concealment, the necessary knowledge and equipment, social support derived from associates, and symbolic support from the wider culture. Each of these
factors has found its place in police subcultural studies in different terms as an example, social support is defined as solidarity among police community. Therefore Box's theory should also be considered as a study of police culture. However not only Box's theory, but all of the other theories discussed above carry some value in a contemporary subcultural approach to police deviance at different levels. From this point of view, it could be said that subcultural theories can only be taken as complementary, along with others, in exploration of police deviancy. As the subject of this thesis is police culture and its influence over police work, the approach of subcultural theory to police deviance will be dealt more widely in the following chapters.

Lastly, Uildriks and Mastright's (1991) explanation of police violence should be mentioned here as many characteristics or background factors of police culture can also be seen in their explanation. They distinguish three different types of explanations. Those focusing on the characteristics of individual police officers, the situation in which they use violence and the organisation in which they work. Within the individual approach, the main question to be addressed is why some officers use violence whilst others do not. In essence such an approach relates to the two most popularly advanced theories of police violence, they referred to as the "rotten apple" and what is described as the "fascist pigs" theory. Both treat police violence as basically the result of psychological defects of the officers involved (1991: 16). As mentioned earlier, the "rotten apple" theory is often put forward by police management following media publicity of incidents involving police violence. An implicit assumption of this theory is that most police officers do act according to the official regulations. Screening, selection and supervision
procedures, however, cannot prevent a few officers with flaws in their moral character and personality occasionally slipping through and deviating from official standards.

The "fascist pigs" theory differs from the "rotten apple" view in respect of the relative number of rotten apples in the basket, its advocates possibly even reversing this notion and assuming that some good apples may accidentally have fallen into a basket full of rotten apples. This theory holds that by their nature police organisations will be attractive to those who are most violence-prone. One of its proponents, Reiwald has argued, for example, that "A profession related to the enforcement of criminal justice, which makes use of force to such a degree, and moreover has need of it, attracts the aggressive elements in society, for it provides an excellent opportunity for exercising aggression" (cited by Uildriks & Mastroigt 1991: 16). However there is a considerable amount of research on individual characteristics of police officers such as sex, race and ethnicity or psychological peculiarities, or on the issue of whether 'authoritarian' personality traits can be attributed to police officers as differing greatly from the average population (MacNamara, 1967; Neiderhoffer, 1967; Lefkowitz, 1977). The findings on these points are inconclusive and often contradictory (Uildriks & Mastroigt 1991: 16).

In the situational approach, explanations are sought in the characteristics of the condition in which police violence occurs. The essential question is why police officers use violence in certain situations and not in others. One of its proponents, Reiss (1980: 292), found that almost half of the cases in which the police used violence involved open defiance to the police officer's authority, although not
necessarily their official authority. However there were many instances in which such defiance did not result in the officer responding with violence, the crucial characteristic is the officer's success in asserting his or her authority despite the threat to it, and the feeling that he or she remained in charge of the situation.

The negative behaviour of a member of the public towards police officers is also important in the case of police use of force in the situational approach (Westley, 1970). Similarly Friedrich also found that "police use of force depends primarily on two factors: how the offender behaves and whether or not other citizens and police are present" (1980: 95). In particular, Friedrich shows that the use of force is affected by the citizen's demeanour and sobriety. Friedrich supported by Worden, argues that an officer is more likely to use force when other officers are there to provide physical and social psychological reinforcements (1996: 40).

Finally, in the organisational approach, the central questions to be looked into relate to which factors of police work and organisation are inductive to police violence (Uildriks & Mastrigt 1991: 18). This approach suggests that elements of formal organisational structure affect the incidence with which force is used. The classic study in this respect is Westley's (1970) where it is argued that the rough police methods he found in the small police department of Westville should be understood against the background of the isolated social position of the police vis-à-vis a substantial proportion of the population. The police came to see the public as generally hostile and sometimes dangerous. In response, the police drew together as a group; allow particular customs and a moral code to develop as part of which the rough or even violent treatment of the public came to be seen as legitimate practice.
As a conclusion to this part of the thesis, on the causes of police deviancy, it is argued that police culture is important issue in understanding police community as a whole. However the police literature shows that none of the analyses of the causes of police deviance demonstrate that officers' characteristics or attitudes have a substantively significant effect on the use of force. The most prudent conclusion of this analysis is that if officers' propensities to use of force are affected by their backgrounds and beliefs, then those effects are contingent on other factors, including the characteristics of the police-citizens situations and the characteristics of police organizations.

**Strategies for Change and Police Culture**

Central to the ideas presented above is that the behaviour of and abuse by the police only makes sense when viewed through the lens of culture, which enables a wide variety of police activities to link together in ways. They are, though not systematic, sensible enough to give meanings to different kinds of situations in which police officers find themselves. It will be shown later that organisational traditions are customary ways of performing tasks and they take on common-sense value that cannot be changed easily. This is why many researchers, such as Fyfe and Skolnick (1993), and Crank (1998), say that efforts to change the police, whether the change concerns traditional ideas of patrol, getting officers to talk about corrupt fellow officers, or even changing the type of weapons they carry, must first win the hearts and minds of its officers. On this point Crank says:

> Until advocates of police change recognise the importance of culture, they will continue to be as surprised as they have been for the past 100 years at the profound limitations of reform efforts to yield real and enduring changes (Crank, 1998: 6).
Indeed, keeping police culture in mind when attempting to reform the police may provide support from the public where officers are described in terms of their corruption, cynicism, and hostility to due process, criminal treatment of suspects, excessive use of force, and their penchant for secrecy. Police culture is described as a troubling aspect of police work that obstructs change and prevents meaningful oversight of police behaviour. Culture is equated with police secrecy, a secrecy that prevents reform, protects bad officers, and undermines respect for the law. Police are 'on the take', hopelessly cynical, violent and brutish, and are themselves the victims of their own occupational environment, the corrupting influences of the street.

Before going on to strategies of police reform, it is necessary to touch upon some requirements what we have seen as preconditions of successful police reform in the police literature. For example Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) point out that if police reform is to be more than window dressing, it must be supported by the powerful institutions among which police organisations exist. They give the example of the success of Patrick V. Murphy who was appointed as the Police Commissioner of New York City after the Knapp Commission investigation on police corruption in the NYDP which includes a well-known Frank Serpico case where a New York police officer who blew the whistle on police corruption to the New York Knapp Commission. After testifying to the Commission, Serpico was shot in the face by a drug dealer. According Skolnick and Fyfe, one thing that distinguishes Murphy from Wollmer and Wilson is that Murphy was an insider; born and bred to the department he eventually reformed. Contrary to Wollmer and Wilson who were imports into unfamiliar territory in Los Angeles and Chicago, Murphy came from
a cop family, had walked foot beats in NY, worked his way up through the ranks, taught in and commanded NY's Police Academy, and knew the politics and the bureaucracy of the city. On his way to success he enjoyed in NY a degree of external support for police reform that simply did not exist in Wollmer's Los Angeles, O.W. Wilson's Chicago:

In both those places, the principal political actors and opinion makers were so heavily invested in the old ways of doing business that attempts to make lasting change were certain to be sabotaged regardless of the Police Chief's administrative and political talents (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 185).

This conclusion is perfectly applicable in the case of the Turkish police in that its contemporary administration is heavily dependant upon political authorities who are very often changed and consequently new police chiefs are installed. In this atmosphere, as will be discussed more widely in forthcoming chapters, police chiefs do not usually feel safe in their post and follow the path of a political agenda, whereas in the example above from New York, Murphy's reforms were successful because, as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) said, he recognised and acted upon truths not readily acknowledge by many of those who work their ways through the ranks to the tops of organisations. Where it is needed:

...lasting reform cannot be imposed either by the personal charisma of a single chief executive or by simply replacing wrongdoers with fresh blood. Persistent problems like police abuse or corruption require fundamental systematic changes that, in a way, are indictments of the organisations in which chiefs have themselves labored so long and so successfully (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 186).

Indeed, in another example, changes, instigated by William H. Parker, transformed the Los Angeles Police Department's former shady image for a new version of police professionalism in policing philosophies and practices, which
endured long beyond his passing in 1966. He received strong support from reform-minded mayors, the press and politicians as well as the public (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993).

In contrast to Skolnick and Fyfe, Kelling and Klietsmet (1996) state that the necessity to define the function of the police is another important factor in the successful outcome of police reform. By definition, not only must the public understand the purpose of the police officer's role, but also the officer must be placed in a position where conflicts with society's expectations have been resolved. Until the role of the police is defined and understood by both criminal justice officials and the general public, the police will continue to operate under what has been called "the impossible mandate" Kelling and Klietsmet (1996), in which citizens' expectations about police work are dramatically different from daily reality.

In modern societies, as the literature has shown, the bulk of police activity does not relate to the crime control function and even most of the crime-related contacts are really after-the-fact report taking from victims (Wilson, 1968; Cole, 1992; Dixon, 1997). The police are increasingly called on to perform 'services' for the population. This service function, like providing first aid and extending social welfare, has become the dominant element of police activities as Cole points out:

> The vast majority of all resident requests sampled were related to the maintenance of order, the settling of interpersonal disputes and the need for advice and emergency assistance.... Police are occupied with peacekeeping - but preoccupied with crime fighting (Cole, 1992: 137-138).
As will be explained more comprehensively in forthcoming chapters, a result of this occupational environment is that police officers have to face role conflicts, which have a great impact on structuring police culture, and consequently police deviance. As Rubin argues:

Frustration with the peacekeeping and community service roles leads the policeman to be angry with the community he serves – particularly with the black community…. The policeman begins to develop stereotypes that reinforce any preexisting prejudiced attitudes he has. The officer’s peers … support his tendency to stereotype the citizenry as the "bad guys" and tend to acculturate the young policeman. (Rubin, 1974: 135).

Lastly, one more precondition is also envisaged by other researchers. Uildriks and Mastrigt (1991) say that recognition and acknowledgement of the occurrence of police violence within every police force is a precondition of the pursual of any rational and effective policy. Otherwise, as evident in the Turkish police force, there will have always be a widespread tendency on the part of police management to react very defensively in allegations of police malpractice.

**Strategies for Reform**

As suggested in the literature, police deviance is culturally rooted in the operational code of groups of police officers. The same literature presents links between core characteristics of police culture and police deviance. According to Crank (1998) police use of force is a powerful stimulus for cultural solidarity which feeds sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and sense of isolation that develops from military style organisational arrangement:

Tenets of culture link the militaristic mind and violence: *Cops protect their own. It is war out there, be careful. Always cover for another officer. Don’t back down. Always bring superior force to bear* [emphasis in the original] (Crank, 1998: 70).
Similarly, Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) point out that 'esprit de corps' among police officers is desirable and necessary, but when coupled with the necessity of routine violations of the rules in order to get the job done, it delegitimatizes everything the police uniform can do. It also effectively neutralizes officers who might otherwise speak out about serious misbehaviour by their colleagues:

There is no privacy in police working groups - everybody who is an active member of every police squad knows everything about everybody else in the group. When rule breaking is part of the routine in such groups, everybody also has something on everybody else (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 122).

The influence of police culture on police work is discussed in Manning's work of 1977. He states that it is the contradictory demands of productivity in crime-fighting and adherence to rules which produce the cultural solutions of bending and breaking the law by employing informal working rules which guide practical police work (1977: 162). It is suggested, therefore, that strategies to reform "should aim at changing the nature of such operational codes, both by specifically addressing those factors which shape them, and by reacting wisely to incidents of violence which have occurred" (Uildriks and Mastrigt, 1991: 179). Increased police professionalization and the kind of general policies which can be expected to increase standards of professionalism have been emphasised as reform strategies and, as Uildriks and Mastrigt (1991) argue, the police themselves constitute the agency most capable of effective police violence control. A fully professional zed police, as they envisage it, would be able to exert internal control, imbuing officers with a professional attitude towards their work, with knowledge, skills and ethical standards guiding their behaviour. Here, there is an important point which must be stated that, according to the same authors, the
issue in reform strategies is not how to undermine police culture or an operational
code of policing; both are a necessary and inevitable part of the police
organisation and police work. Rather than undermining police culture or an
operational code of policing:

... the issue is how shape police culture and the operational culture in
such a way that these may incorporate ideas of respect for citizens' rights, of peer-group norms favouring the proper use of force, and
some form of basic respect for the public whereby rough and violent
treatment is not seen as legitimate practice (Uildriks and Mastrigt,

More recently, Chan (1997) discusses two main approaches to achieve police
accountability: the first advocates tightening of rules as a means of controlling
police discretion, while the second aims at changing the informal culture of police
officers. In the first, rules may be tightened by means of a range of measures,
including changes in legislation, administrative rules, and codes of practice,
accountability procedures or policy guidelines.

One of the proponents of this approach, Lord Scarman, has envisaged rule
tightening in his recommendations following the Brixton riots, that prejudiced
and discriminatory behaviour be included "as a specific offence in the Police
Discipline code" and that the normal penalty for breaching this code be dismissal
(Scarman, 1981: 201). Scarman also recommended that the law regarding police
powers to stop and search should be rationalised and additional safeguards
introduced; that lay visitors to police stations should make random checks on
interrogation and detention of suspects; and that independent investigation of
complaints against police be introduced (Scarman, 1981: 207-208).
Similarly, Brogden and Shearing (1993) see rule tightening as the making or changing of internal or external rules. Internal rule making includes the setting of professional standards, codes of practice, as well as various paper or technological record keeping requirements to increase the transparency of practice. External rule tightening includes legislative reform, independent appraisal of police effectiveness through victim surveys, reform of complainant systems, and the establishment of monitoring schemes such as lay visitors or other more interventionist auditing functions (Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 120-122).

However as "a popular option among police reformers" (Chan, 1997: 55), rule tightening has been criticised from a culturalist point of view. For example, according to Ianni and Ianni "it is the immediate work or peer group and not the larger organisation that motivates and controls the individual's behaviour" (1983: 251). They point out that where 'management cop culture' and the 'street cop culture' confront each other, resistance to change was strong at the bottom:

The street cops who are still into the old ways of doing things are confused and often enraged at the apparent change of the 'rules' of the system. So they fight back in the only way they have at their disposal: foot dragging, absenteeism, and a host of similar coping mechanism and self-defending techniques (Ianni and Ianni, 1983: 270).

Another criticism comes from Goldsmith (1990). In contrast to Brogden and Shearing he sees internal rules as 'rules within the police culture' (Goldsmith, 1990: 95). External rules are the totality of what Brogden and Shearing divide as internal and external rules. According to him, a number of specific features of police work contribute to the 'relative autonomy' of the police culture from external rules. There are, for example, pressures upon street-level officers to produce results, and there is the 'low visibility' of street-level decisions. In this
environment, legality (the substantive and procedural criminal law, departmental rules and regulations) is often sacrificed for efficiency (Goldsmith, 1990: 95). Therefore he criticised rule tightening because of the demonstrated inability of external rules to influence and control certain aspects of police work.

**Changing Police Culture**

Weaknesses of rule tightening as a method of reforming the police has led to a growing interest among social scientists in a more potentially appropriate approach: changing police culture. The main reasons of this growing interest, as we have seen in the police literature, lie under the limited capacity of rule tightening and the significant negative influence of police culture upon police conduct. Therefore Brogden and Shearing argue that rule making must be complemented by strategies 'to change the culture from inside' (Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 97). In his work on theories of law in policing, Dixon (1997) presents police culture as devaluing rules and assuming that effective police work cannot be done according to legal procedures. Consequently, Chan (1997: 55) has questioned the utility of law reform as a method of changing police practice as she sees the occupational culture's resistance to change. The uneven impact of law reform on police practices was also observed by Reiner, who concludes that legal regulation is of limited effectiveness because 'key changes must be in the informal culture of the police, their practical working rules' (Reiner, 1992: 232).

While he promotes rule effectiveness in order to regulate informal culture of police, Goldsmith (1990) also draws attention to the type of rules. He divides rules of the police working environment as 'working rules' which are internalised
by police officers to become guiding principles of their conduct; 'inhibitory rules' which are factors police officers take into account when deciding how to act; and 'presentational rules' which are exist to give an acceptable appearance to the way that police work is carried out. After this separation, he concludes similarly with Reiner that:

... in order to promote rule-effectiveness, approaches to regulation of police behaviour should concentrate upon the development of working rules that pursue defined objectives in structuring police discretion in ways that do not do undue violence to the existing normative fabric of police work (Goldsmith, 1990: 97).

Accordingly he argues that rules, which can be produced in conformity with this general description, would seem to stand the best chance of directly influencing police behaviour. Furthermore, Brogden and Shearing (1993) make more concrete points regarding what Goldsmith envisages as the development of working rules in order to change police culture by 'taking the police to the community', and 'bringing the community to the police' (1990: 98). According to Chan (1997), the first approach includes various recruitment and training strategies, while the second involves 'community policing' strategies. Indeed, the policing environment in many parts of the world (as in Holland and Sweden, community policing has become the dominant philosophy - Brogden 1999: 175) is clearly changing to one that is radically transforming the nature of police work and police organisations as Brogden argues:

Organisational and structural problems could be resolved by a new policing philosophy which recognised the fundamental importance of community problems, priorities, and relationship (Brogden, 1999: 174)
In response to this challenge, there is a growing consensus among police executives, police professionals, community representatives, academics and others especially in developed countries like the United Kingdom where community policing is seen as the most appropriate response to those problems the 'Anglo-Saxon crime fighting models were to be resolved by an historical resurrection of the solution in the community' (Brogden, 1999: 174).

The necessity of close police-community relations was an important recommendation of Lord Scarman as he stressed to senior officers that all aspects of police work should be premised upon active community consent, trust and participation. He argued that the police and society needed to recognise that the police working on their own could not make a significant impact on local crime problems. Effective crime prevention was the responsibility of the whole community. In order to neutralise racial influence of police culture, Lord Scarman also recommended the recruitment of more black people into the police, and the improvement of police training to give more attention to 'training in the prevention, as well as the handling, of disorder, and in an understanding of the cultural backgrounds and the attitudes to be found in our ethnically diverse society' (Scarman, 1981: 200).

However there is evidence, in the literature, to suggest that the effect of training recruits is often undermined by the reality of police work and the 'common-sense' of the police occupational culture (Brogden et al., 1988: 32-33). Moreover, according to Chan (1997), cross-cultural training, in particular, must be conducted with care, or it can confirm existing prejudices rather than lead to greater tolerance of minority cultures. In general;
... training and education must be seen to be relevant to police operations and pitched at a practical rather than an abstract level. Training must also be reinforced and supported by peer groups and senior officers if it is to have any long-term influence on behaviour (Chan, 1997: 57).

A similar concern has been evident in the United Kingdom. The Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993), for example, enthusiastically advocates more and improved training for police officers in the field of investigative interviewing. It fails to recognise however that the positive effects of training are likely to be seriously undermined in the workplace if steps are not taken to counter the adverse effects of police culture.

Along with training and recruitment the second method, bringing the community to the police or in its most common mode 'community policing' is also criticised from some perspectives. Originally this approach is based on a theory that 'if the police culture is subject to continuing encounters with community sensibilities, it is liable to undergo a positive modification' (Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 103). Accountability to the local community is also supposed to influence occupational culture by providing 'an alternative reference group, away from the immediate work-group influence of police peers' (ibid.: 104).

Community policing- through a decentralisation of all possible tasks and authority and regional authority- is attempted to respond to a changing society by changing the nature of policing. According to the literature, traditional concepts of policing as command and control-oriented has been found inappropriate because they failed to reduce crime and the fear of crime. In order to overcome this insufficiency, democratic societies, along with many other aspects of the public
sector, proposed community policing in a strategy which starts from the needs of the community and seeks to have police engage in proactive and preventative measures that require officers to become involved in solving the problems of communities of citizens. 'In order to prevent crime, modern policing must be reorganised so that thinking takes precedent over reaction' (Bayley, 1994: 157). This approach requires a change in the organisation to accommodate an operation that is more supportive of the community and empowers police officers using their initiative (Nixon & Reynolds, 1996: 55). Goldstein (1990) argues that police managers who are committed to introducing this problem-oriented policing must be prepared to be flexible in their management style and give greater freedom to their command officers.

The important point should be stated here that 'without re-engineering of the structure of the police organisation to produce both a different attitude and a different context for policing, community based policing has come as far as it can' (Nixon & Reynolds, 1996: 56). Indeed, when we consider official policies in Turkey, which policing is based on, community policing would only be presented in words rather than application.

Moreover, it is clear from the literature that both approaches - tightening the regulations and control of police practice or changing police culture - have serious flaws: regulation from without and control exercised from the top are often ignored or subverted, while strategies aimed at changing culture mostly produce the appearance rather than the reality of change. Brogden et al. (1988: 167) have argued that the crucial issue is not 'whether formal rules should be tightened or the cop culture co-opted', but the relationship between formal rules and
subcultural values. They suggest that deviant cultural practices are allowed to thrive in police organisations because formal rules and structures are too 'permissive'; therefore the tightening of formal rules should be seen as the primary concern in the change process.

Contrary to these authors, Chan (1997) argues that, in practice, externally imposed rules are not always successful in narrowing discretion. If regulation is not always effective, it makes little sense to talk about it as a primary factor of change. She argues, furthermore, that the debate about how police reform should be achieved has been based on a faulty conception of police culture that it is uniform, unchanging, powerful, and somehow separate from formal structures, as she pointed out:

The notion that police officers all become 'socialised' into this all-encompassing and unchanging police culture, and that it dictates their values and their actions, seems as believable as that of the monolithic racist state apparatus which takes over every aspect of social life. This notion of police culture explains everything and it explains nothing (Chan, 1997: 63).

One thing is certainly clear from the literature that empirical research on police work has uncovered something which could be vital to our understanding of how and why police misconduct is tolerated in police organisations, as well as why reforms seem to make little difference to policing practice. It is, therefore, theoretical perspectives relating to police culture, without discarding current theories, which need to be expanded and will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

It was argued in the last chapter that police culture dictates relationships between individuals within the service and between police officers and 'outsiders' such as the public. This is important because, without accepting this proposition any approach to understand the problem of contemporary police misconduct would remain inconclusive (Reiner, 1992; Brogden and Shearing, 1993). In connection to this, it was also argued that, in order to reform the police, strategies must be complemented by strategies 'to change the culture from inside' (Brogden and Shearing, 1993: 97). However, Chan brings an important point into consideration here that:

...the debate about how police should be reformed - whether through law reform or cultural change - has been stymied by an inadequately theorised notion of police culture (Chan, 1997: 65).

Indeed, this is more evident in terms of the Turkish police force where social research on police and policing is not a common part of policing policies. We first of all need to identify the concept of 'police culture'. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to identify the notion of "police culture" within its theoretical perspectives.

The Concept of 'Police Culture'

It would not be very helpful to see culture only as a body of knowledge that emerges through the shared application of practical skills to concrete problems encountered in daily routines and the normal course of activities. This body of
knowledge appears to contain a code of deviance, and behaviour tends to flow from this body of knowledge in ways that are self-confirming. In the application of this approach of culture to the police community, Crank (1998) goes further and sees police culture as more complex and elegant than suggested by a focus on dark elements of policing such as corruption, deception and cynicism. First, he views culture as a confluence of themes of occupational activity. The word "confluence" is a metaphor suggesting the emptying of streams and rivers into a common body of water. At a confluence, diverse aspects of organisational activity merge into a whole united by commonly held values and shared ways of thinking (Crank, 1998: 14-15).

Indeed, in the case of the Turkish police community (like any other police communities in the world), culture cannot be explained by the presence of any particular theme (though it could be clearly visible through the theme) but rather by the unique mix of them all in a particular occupational setting. For example, the police force in Turkey historically has been male in spirit and gender composition of the work force. As a cultural theme masculinity carries ideas of the appropriateness of men for police work - and by implication, the inappropriateness of everyone else. It is about the kind of work that police should do, and how police work should be done. The tough working practices of police officers could be meaningful in this mentality. The texture of police culture lies in the way in which in these themes join together in some particular encounter, play off each other, motivate and justify behaviour, and are expressed in some story a police officer tells another.

Second, culture, again according to Crank (1998), is a carrier of institutionalised values that are shared by members of a group. The idea that some ways of doing things become valued in themselves means that they have become institutionalised: police officers are tough because they share a belief
that stronger punishment will deter. For them deterrence is the concrete way problems are resolved. It is acted out as toughness. Dangerous or troublesome offenders are isolated, harassed or arrested. This belief is shared by the most part of the society who expects police officers to reinforce informal exercise of coercion to control out-of-kilter situations (Crank, 1998: 15-16).

Third, police culture is the way the police sometimes express emotions. Indeed, as police literature points out, police work is something more than a set of organisational structures, formal policy, tactics, and strategy, according to Crank, the "something more" is the powerful personal sentiments that officers feel about what they do. From this point of view, a study of police culture must somehow look beyond overworked and usual ideas of organisational structure and look at the feelings police officers hold for each other and about their work. If police work is meaningful, then this study of police culture must tap some of the meanings and feelings that police work holds for officers (Crank, 1998: 16).

In the exploration of the concept of "police culture", Chan (1997) becomes an important guide. She brings us three perspectives to the concept of "police culture". In the first perspective, she uses Schein's and Sackmann's cognitive perspective of culture, which envisages police officers are being socialised into, and guided by police culture. According to Schein's (1985) organisational perspective, culture is the property of a stable social unit, which has a shared history. Culture is a learned product of group experience. His definition of organisational culture is particularly appropriate when applied to police organisations:

[Culture is] a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1985: 112).
Sackmann takes the issue further and describes the essence of culture as 'the collective construction of social reality'. Her model of culture encompasses all forms of shared organised knowledge: '...the form of things that people have in their minds; their models for perceiving, integrating, and interpreting them; the ideas or theories that they use collectively to make sense of their social and physical reality' (Sackmann, 1991: 21). She classifies cultural knowledge in organisations by four dimensions. First, dictionary knowledge, which provides definitions and labels of things and events within an organisation; secondly, directory knowledge, which contains descriptions about 'how things are done' generally in the organisations; and third, recipe knowledge, which prescribes what should or should not be done in specific situations; and finally axiomatic knowledge, which represents the fundamental assumptions about 'why things are done the way they are in an organisation'. Axiomatic knowledge, often only considered by top management, constitutes the foundation for the shape and future of the organisation. It may be adjusted or revised from time to time as a result of critical evaluations or growing experience. Sackmann (1991), furthermore, sees cultural cognition as being held by groups rather than individuals. This cognition is socially constructed, and may be changed or perpetuated by organisational processes through repeated applications. In time, this cognition is imbued with emotions and acquires degrees of importance; it also becomes 'habits' of thoughts that translate into habitual actions.

In the second perspective, culture is seen as construction. Shearing and Ericson (1991) have argued that police officers are active in constructing and making references to the culture. For police officers, the culture is a 'tool-kit' used in the production of a sense of order, and the constant 'telling' of the culture accomplishes for the officers a 'factual' or 'objective' existence of this culture. According to Chan (1997), in this perspective, rather than a socialisation
process and internalisation, the transmission of police culture is seen through a collection of stories and aphorisms that instruct officers on how to see the world and act in it. Stories, according to her, prepare officers for police work by providing a 'vehicle for analogous thinking', creating a 'vocabulary of precedents' (Chan, 1997: 70).

Cultural knowledge in the form of police stories presents officers with ready-made schemas and scripts which assist individual officers in particular situations to limit their search for information, to organise information in terms of established categories, and to constitute a sensibility out which a range of actions can flow, and which provide officers with a repertoire of reasonable accounts to legitimate their actions. She, however, also points out the defectiveness of this perspective as it is silent about the social and political context of police work, even though police stories undoubtedly contain implicit or explicit expressions of power relations within police organisations (Chan, 1997: 70).

Finally, Chan mentions a third perspective that sees culture as relations. In this perspective, two key concepts of the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu have a special importance. These are field and habitus:

A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations 'deposited' within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation and action (Chan, 1997: 71).

For Bourdieu, an ensemble of relatively autonomous fields constitutes society. A field is a social space of conflict and competition, where participants struggle to establish control over specific power and authority, and, in the course of the struggle, modify the structure of the field itself. Thus a field 'presents itself as a structure of probabilities - of rewards, gains, profits, or
sanctions - but always implies a measure of indeterminacy' (Bourdieu 1992, quoted in Chan, 1997: 71). In terms of police work on the streets, for example, the field may consist of the historical relations between certain social groups and the police, anchored in the legal powers and discretion that police are authorised to exercise and the distribution of power and material resources within the community.

Habitus, on the other hand, is a system of ‘dispositions’ that integrate past experience and enable individuals to cope with a diversity of unforeseen situations (Chan, 1997: 71). Instead of seeing culture as a 'thing' - a set of values, rules, or an informal structure operating on actors in an organisation - Bourdieu argues for the primacy of relations, so that habitus and field function fully only in relation to each other. Habitus generates strategies, which are coherent and systematic, but they are also 'ad hoc because they are "triggered" by the encounter with a particular field' (ibid.: 71). Like the police stories discussed in the second perspective, habitus allows for creation and innovation within the field of police work. It is a 'feel for the game'; it enables an infinite number of 'moves' to be made in an infinite number of situations. It embodies what police officers often refer to as 'common-sense' (Manning 1977) and what are commonly known as 'policing skills' (Brogden et al. 1988).

Contrary to the argument that police practices have the appearance of rationality, the 'cop code' is more the result of 'codification' than a set of rules, which generate practice. Chan (1997) quoting Bourdieu that rationality rarely plays a part in practical actions:

The conditions of rational calculation are practically never given in practice: time is limited, information is restricted, etc. And yet agents do, much more often than if they were behaving randomly, 'the only thing to do'. this is because, following the institutions of a 'logic of practice' which is the product of a lasting exposure to conditions similar to those in which they are placed, they anticipate the necessity immanent in the way of the world (Chan, 1997: 71).
Thus, according to Chan, Bourdieu's theory is successful in relating policing 'dispositions' or cultural knowledge to the social and political context of policing. The main weakness of this perspective, however, is that it overemphasises the positional and dispositional aspect of policing 'at the expense of the interactive-situational' dimension. The fact that police practices can be the result of conscious decisions and strategies cannot be ignored. The role of the police officers in interpreting their positions and making creative and conscious decisions must therefore be an essential component of the reconceptualised understanding of police culture (Chan, 1997: 72).

Cultural Change

The three perspectives outlined above allow some scope for cultural change. In order to change, Shearing and Ericson (1991) see human action as 'guided and improvisational'. For Bourdieu, cultural change is possible through changes in the field or in the habitus. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, is 'an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structure' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 133). Thus, changes in the field affect the habitus, because the field 'structures the habitus' (ibid.: 127).

In Sackmann's model, cultural cognitions are 'socially created, maintained, changed, and perpetuated'; they 'emerge in the process of joint problem-solving in which meanings are negotiated' (Sackmann 1991: 41). These solutions to perceived tasks or problems, when adopted by others repeatedly, become associated with emotions and different degrees of importance. Aspects of cultural knowledge are then communicated to new members who acquire and reinforce this cultural knowledge by learning, but may also import different cultural knowledge into the organisation. Cultural knowledge, Sackmann observed, acts as a link between strategy and organisational processes. Thus
changes in organisational culture occur when axiomatic knowledge (which constitutes the basic rationale of policing) is changed. As a result:

In the process of negotiating axiomatic knowledge, existing dictionary and directory knowledge was altered. This knowledge then guided the thoughts, attention, and actions of organisational members both in terms of organisational processes and in terms of strategic concerns and their implementation. Their actions, and the outcomes of their actions, in turn, maintained reinforced, and further adjusted directory, dictionary and axiomatic knowledge (Sackmann, 1991: 156).

The implications of this approach are fruitful. Indeed, the close relationship between police cultural knowledge (habitus) and the structural conditions of police work (field) has long been recognised in the literature, since culture is said to have been developed as a way coping with the danger and unpredictability of police work. The link between cultural knowledge and police practice is also commonly assumed.

In the above approach to police culture, police officers play an active role in the links between structural conditions, cultural knowledge and police practice. According to this perspective, structural conditions do not completely determine cultural knowledge, and cultural knowledge does not totally dictate practice. Working within the structural conditions of policing, members have an active role to play in developing, reinforcing, resisting or transforming cultural knowledge. They are not passive carriers of police culture. In a similar way, officers who have learned 'a feel for the game' (cultural knowledge) are not restricted to a limited number of 'moves' (modes of practice). Hence officers in their practice take any changes to structural conditions into account. Whether a structural change results in any change in cultural knowledge or institutional practice depends on the nature of the change and the capacity of officers to adapt to the change (Chan, 1997: 73-74).
This perspective, instead of explaining racist police practice in terms of the
inculcation of racist values among officers through a process of socialisation,
views officers as active decision-makers who are nevertheless guided by the
assumptions they learn and the possibilities of which they are aware. Their
acquiring of cultural knowledge creates schemas and categories which both
help them to organise information and lead them to resist evidence contrary to
these schemas. Their awareness of structural possibilities provides menus of
legitimate accounts or a vocabulary of precedents, which they can use to justify
their actions. Hence, institutional practice is partly the product of a practical
consciousness or logic of practice, which is based not on rational calculations
but on learned 'common-sense' and skills (ibid.: 74).

In short, recognising the active role played by police officers is an important
antidote to the simplistic view that deviant institutional practice is caused by a
deviant police culture, which is in turn a necessary product of the structural
conditions of police work. This way of thinking about police culture uncovers
possibilities and useful alternatives for reform. In the following section, the
relevance of this framework for understanding the relations between police
culture and structural conditions will be discussed. I will begin with
dimensions of cultural knowledge suggested by Sackman (1991). These are:
axiomatic knowledge which constitutes the basic rationale of policing,
dictionary knowledge which sets up categories people whom police come into
contact with, directory knowledge which informs officers on how to go about
getting their work done, and recipe knowledge which prescribes the menu of
acceptable and unacceptable practices in specific situations. Starting with
axiomatic knowledge, each of these is explained below.
'War Against Crime': The Police Mandate

This is an example of axiomatic knowledge which refers to the fundamental assumptions about 'why things are done the way they are' in an organisation. This will also help us to understand police culture from a historical and traditional perspective as will be discussed in chapter five. Indeed, the police have traditionally been said to see their work in terms of waging a 'war against crime', maintaining order, and protecting people's lives and property. Reiner points out that officers often regard their work with a sense of mission: 'their sense of themselves as "the thin blue line", performing an essential role in safeguarding social order, which would lead to disastrous consequences if their authority was threatened' (1992: 112). Skolnick and Fyfe make this point more clearly, arguing that the view of police officers as soldiers engaged in a war on crime not only diverts attention from more effective strategies for crime control but also is a major cause of police violence and the violation of citizen's rights (1993: 115). When police officers go to war against crime, their enemies are found in society and especially among minority populations. Uildriks and Mastrigt point out that 'the more police "war against crime" ideology is emphasised, the more this will contribute to a police attitude of a war against groups of the population' (1991: 201).

The traditional crime-fighting role of the police lies in the establishment of the police as an organisation. When the first modern police were created in Great Britain in 1829, Sir Robert Peel made great efforts to distinguish individual police constables from soldiers, he borrowed heavily from the military organisational model in order to convince critics that his New Police would do its job as flawlessly and as incorruptibly as the military did. The important point here is that, modelling the police along military lines helped to ease
Peel's difficult task of convincing the sceptical British public that a new form of official authority was needed to deal with disorder and crime. Besides, according to Skolnick and Fyfe, 'Peel and those who worked with him to assemble the London Metropolitan Police had few options' (1993: 117). Police forces might well be differently organised now although had other efficient models been available.

The difference between the quasi-military and the civil policeman is that the civil policeman should have no enemies. People may be criminals, they may be violent, but they are not enemies to be destroyed. Once that kind of language gets into the police vocabulary, it begins to change attitudes (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 113).

According to Crank (1998) that military style in organisation has substantial implications for the culture of the police. A brief historical review of military-style organisation and discipline among the police is necessary to understand the extent to which militaristic thinking and acting is among Turkish police officers today.

As a starting point, it is useful to state here that, for example in the United States, the emergence of paramilitarism is linked to the prestige associated with the military after the Civil War. Activities such as morning roll call and the adoption of military titles followed almost naturally for the police (Lane, 1992). The latter historical developments led to the unlikely marriage of professionalism and militarism. The consequences of developments such the vast power held by urban political machines, a type of municipal government characterised by big city bosses, pervasive corruption, and unregulated hiring and firing practices bring attention to the desire of reformists who aimed to remove the influence of political machines and the separation of urban politics from the affairs of the police. They sought to make police departments
autonomous from city politics and instituted a wide-ranging agenda in pursuit of goal. The police were to have a mission: law enforcement. Officers were to be dedicated to that mission. The militaristic rank-structure, well established in police organisations, provided the form and the ideology for crime control. Thus:

...militarism and professionalism were joined under the banner of the "police professionalism movement," an unfortunate label for a police movement that was astonishingly anti-professional in its efforts to control the behaviour of its employees, and could have been more properly been labelled a police militarism movement (Crank, 1998: 66).

Over the next half century the professional model gradually displaced the machine model of policing in western world (ibid. 66). But the professional model was a model of quasi-military discipline and rank structure: what was called professionalisation was simply a system for the importation of traits of outward military discipline (Bittner, 1970). It was a quite successful model for chiefs seeking municipal funding and political prestige: the militaristic image provided a powerful metaphor for politicians seeking election on a war-on-crime platform. The rhetoric of professionalism continues to have a stronghold on the police, and its unlikely companion - police militarism - is central to the way the police are organised and how they think today (Crank, 1998: 67).

The police force in Turkey is not far from this tradition and even some senior officers, in the Turkish Police argue that direction of change for the organisation should be more paramilitarisation of existing structure (Cerrah, 1998: 55). Contrary to Western paramilitary police forces, paramilitarism for the Turkish police is not accidental. Prior to its formation in 1845, policing, as it is understood now, had been carried completely by some divisions of the army. Along with other rehabilitative efforts of the state, policing had been
separated from the army and formed under a new name: 'polis' (police). However it carried on many similarities of the old structure such as being headed by an army general and staffed by military personnel (Yasar, 1997: 7). This structure had not changed much with the declaration of the Turkish Republic. Undoubtedly there are two main reasons behind this: the low level of political culture as Finer points out 'yet ... Turkey's level of political culture was and still is immature' (Finer, 1962, quoted in Aydin, 1997: 109), and the prestigious status of the army in the state structure:

The Turkish military traditionally pride themselves as being a national institution drawn from all sectors of society, and an institution above all social organisation and political parties. They are trained for a long time, to act or to intervene whenever they find it necessary (Aydin, 1997: 109).

They define their mission as 'defending the state' which means to exercise oversight on civilian politics (Abadan-Unat, 1989: 18). 'Defending the state' includes policing functions:

The responsibility for internal security in Turkey is given to the military forces by law, such as the Responsibility for Armed Defence Against the Internal Enemies Act (Memleket Ici Dusmana Karsi Silahli Mudafaa Mukellifiyeti Kanunu), and articles 117-122 of the Constitution. Therefore, military involvement in policing in Turkey is lawful and constitutional. These laws do not refer to military aid to the police, but empower the military with a policing role (Aydin, 1997: 107).

As military officials do not trust politicians and act almost independently, it is difficult for politicians and civilian governments to deal with public disturbances and political violence within the limits of law. The Turkish military do not believe in political solutions, control the destiny of the country from the behind the scenes and consider it their 'duty' to intervene when there is political instability and disorder, or a threat to security. Indeed, due to this mentality of the army the country has seen three military coups. The most
evident consequences of these interventions are the reorganisation of many state institutions as well as the police force. From this point of view, it is no exaggeration to say that the police force in Turkey carries more paramilitarial characteristics than a paramilitary style of US police force.

According to Crank (1998), the professional/military model is about control, rather than the granting of professional status to police officers. Indeed, this is a very fruitful point of comparison with the Turkish police. Because the paramilitary structure of the Turkish police force could serve the purposes of political and military authorities, whose goals are largely to bring the behaviour of police officers under administrative control. However, they forgot to consider an important point, the police force is very different. In comparing to army personnel, police officers on the street make everyday decisions on life and death matters, have the least status, lowest rank, and lower pay. As Skolnick and Fyfe note, efforts to "shoehorn street-level officers' great discretion into the lowest level of a military organisational style has resulted in the creation of elaborate police rulebooks..." (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 120). Officers inevitably "devalue rules and find shortcuts" around administrative procedures. They believe they are isolated in their own organisation, and in a real sense they are. The working habitat, they note, is perceived as "cops against bosses" (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 122). Moreover, as Bittner (1970) noted, outward military discipline tended to displace misconduct by officers into areas difficult to regulate. In a word, it intensified many aspects of police culture; secrecy, criminal activity by the police, and deception.

The functional conclusion of paramilitary structure is to consolidate the 'war against crime' mentality. The metaphor "war" labels those who disagree with the police in warrior terms of "enemy". It provides a way to view the police as
protectors of society and to view criminals as moral enemies. It promotes a perspective that criminals are enemies of the state, and therefore not worthy of state legal protection. From this perspective, anyone supporting a loosening of criminal sanctions is in league with enemies of the state. A consideration of the language used by the police to describe police and criminals reveals the nature of the "war" metaphor. We're at war with crime. We have to fight crime. Police are outgunned or outnumbered by criminals. Police are the thin blue line that separates order from anarchy. It's them versus us. Police are crime-fighters. Police gather intelligence about criminals.

The language of war provides a vocabulary that unites officers in a militaristic identity, and provides individual officers with a warrior persona. This identity is ever-present:

Thinking of themselves as soldiers and crime fighters, all the police carry guns, even when working in the radio room or the juvenile division. They wear uniforms with badges of rank, like soldiers. They have military inspections and sometimes arch as units in parades. They expect violence from the enemy and are ready to respond to violence in its own coin (Betz, 1988: 182-183).

Betz further observed that the military model becomes embodied in cop identity and encourages violence:

The policeman is tainted by his Janus-like position. He has one foot planted in decent society and one in the criminal underworld. He crystallises and focuses the hate of respectable society for the criminal, but he learns to think like the criminal and to make counter-moves in the criminal's own game ... If his coercive force crosses the line to become violence, no one watches, or watching, no one objects (ibid.: 183).

As a conclusion, militarism, a model that has been celebrated for the discipline and accountability it provides for officers, has resulted in a paradoxical
conclusion: it provides a basis for many of the enduring features of the police culture. Cop identity, tied into a military "us-them" sense of self-worth, watches "them" for "us" as Betz (1988: 184) put it: "The police thus withdraw into themselves - another sense of us versus them. They observe their own comrades brutally mistreating suspects, and disapprove, but do not report them. Tenets of culture link the militaristic mind and violence: Cops protect their own. It is a war out there, be careful. Always cover for another officer. Don't back down. Always bring superior force to bear. Thus, many of the more coercive, violent, and secretive themes of cultural identity are intensified in a militaristic model of policing.

Manning (1978) approaches this militaristic model of policing from its effects. He observes that 'Based on their legal monopoly of violence, [police] have staked out a mandate that claims to include the efficient, apolitical, and professional enforcement of the law.' Manning calls this the 'impossible mandate', which is driven by public expectations rather than the reality of police work. The heroic public image of the police as 'crook-catchers' and 'crime-fighters' is encouraged by police officers themselves and militaristic mentality of the structure. The public in turn demands 'more dramatic crook-catching and crime prevention'. These demands are then converted by police organisations into 'distorted criteria for promotion, success and security' (ibid.: 13).

As a result of the acceptance of this impossible mandate, police often make a distinction between 'real police work' and the work they routinely perform. 'Real police work', for new recruits observed by Van Maanen (1973), is about exercising their special occupational expertise: 'to make an arrest, save a life, quell a dispute, prevent a robbery, catch a felon, stop a suspicious, disarm a
suspect, and so on'. However, very little of these officers' time on the street is spent on what they consider to be their 'primary function'. 'Real' police work, then, becomes both 'a source of satisfaction and frustration' (Cole: 1992).

**Police Categories**

According to Holdaway (1995), police work requires officers to summarise complex and ambiguous situations in a short period of time and to take some action. Hence police officers develop routine ways of categorising their environment and the people they encounter in the community. This categorising forms the dictionary dimension of cultural knowledge of police officers. Through this categorising, police officers make a distinction with regard to the general public between 'the rough and respectable elements, those who challenge or those who accept the middle-class values of decency which most police revere' (Reiner, 1992: 117-118). Similarly, Ericson (1982) notes that police officers develop notions of normal and abnormal appearance in relation to the public places they patrol. Accordingly, the indicators of abnormality includes '1) individuals out of place, 2) individuals in particular places, 3) individuals of particular types regardless of place, and 4) unusual circumstances of regarding property' (Ericson, 1982: 86).

It is argues that the factors that have encarased police officers to make such classification are danger and authority. Cole (1992) says that the danger of their work makes police officers especially attentive to signs indicating potential violence and lawbreaking. Throughout socialisation processes the recruit is warned against incautious actions and is told about fellow officers who were shot and killed while trying to settle a family squabble or write a speeding ticket (*ibid.*: 149). Kappeler et al. say that police vicariously experience, learn,
and re-learn the potential for danger through 'war stories' and field training after graduation from the police academy. Training instructors provide stories of dangerous encounters and personal experiences to convey a focus for occupational danger. Training is in many ways like "being prepared to be dropped behind enemy lines to begin a combat mission" (Kappeler, Albert & Sluder, 1994: 101).

In their work Cullen et al. (1983) note that concern over violence and physical risk was a distinguishing feature of the police occupation. According to official records, however, police work did not seem particularly hazardous. Actual incident counts of bodily harm to police officers seemed to be infrequent. The researchers conducted a survey and found that officers recognised that the real likelihood of danger was not particularly high. They stated that it was not the actual danger that caused fear, so much as the potential for danger that infused their working environment. Daily work activities, from routine traffic stops to calls to investigate suspicious circumstances, contained in them the seeds for violence against officers and produced deep concerns over officer safety. Though the chance that an officer would be hurt was slight, they argued, the potential for injury was present in a great deal of ordinary police work.

Cullen et al. (1983) concluded their discussion with a second paradox that fear of danger was both 'functional and dysfunctional.' Very real hazards of police work, they commented, make it essential that officers remain vigilant to the potential risks of their work. However, police concerns over danger contributed to heightened work stress and a depressive symptomology. Officers recognised that there was a great potential for injury, and it came from individuals who
sought to deliberately harm them. Officers were consequently preoccupied with
danger in police-citizen encounters.

Symbolic Assailant

It seems therefore that potential danger shapes police work, converting daily
activity into a craft of identifying threats to public and officer safety. The
powerful reality of danger converts it to a puissant unifying theme of police
culture. The reality and the symbol interact in Skolnick's (1994) idealised
notion of the "symbolic assailant". According to Skolnick (1994), police
routinely encounter particular signs that suggest that a person may be
dangerous. signs include the way someone is dressed (suggesting gang
affiliation), their gait (carrying a weapon) or their talk (lack of respect, a
troublemaker). Over time, from the gathering of common experiences, officers
learn to recognise potentially dangerous persons. Such clusters of signs become
a sort of "symbolic assailant" - an individual that carries characteristics that
indicate danger - and rouse an officer's suspicions that they are engaged in a
potentially perilous encounter. The symbolic assailant is a composite
individual that arises from common experience and serves as perceptual
shorthand to rapidly identify and cognitively process potentially dangerous
individuals.

Symbolic assailants may also have racial characteristics. As Kappeler et al.
observed (1994: 98-100), since police tend to be homogenous in values and
attitudes, and because their routines may put them in regular contact with
ethnic groups different from themselves, the symbolic assailant may take on
characteristics of economically or ethnically marginal groups in their
jurisdictions. In addition geographies, as well as people, are converted into
potential threats. These "assailant geographies" are public and private areas
that show signs that experienced officers recognise as potentially perilous. Playgrounds are assailant geographies - they represent areas that drugs are exchanged, gangs meet, and older people are mugged. Assailant geographies, like symbolic assailants, are a powerful trope called an irony. Through the irony of suspicion, safety transforms into danger, and involves the transformation of seemingly safe areas into dangerous landscapes (Crank, 1998). In short, danger transforms suspicion into both a characteristic of police personality (Skolnick, 1994), and an element central to the culture of a police officer's working environment.

**Police Methods**

Police methods are the part of directory knowledge, which informs police officers how operational work is routinely carried out in the habitus of policing. According to Chan (1997), to a certain extent, these operational methods follow from the definitions and categories designated by dictionary knowledge. For example, in proactive policing, officers are chronically suspicious and are forced to make snap decisions about the appropriateness of what people are doing. Having developed indicators of normality and abnormality, roughness and respectability, police officers tend to target the unusual and the disreputable. Following these cues, the work may be routine but the effect may be serious for some part of the society as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, in their Public Statement on Turkey (1992) claimed:

> In the light of all the information at its disposal, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture can only conclude that the practice of torture and other forms of severe ill-treatment of persons in police custody remains widespread in Turkey and that
such methods are applied to both ordinary criminal suspects and persons held under anti-terrorism provisions.

Although torture and similar types of practices by police officers are illegal an important feature of police work that leads to these types of severe practices is the capacity and authority to use coercive force if necessary. Bittner (1970) considers this capacity to use force as the core of the police role. According to him, this capacity by the police is 'essentially unrestricted'. Apart from the use of deadly force and the obvious restriction that force must not be used maliciously, there are few guidelines regarding when 'forceful intervention was necessary, desirable or proper' (ibid.: 33). This lack of regulation and guidance means that the concept 'lawful use of force' by the police is 'practically meaningless' (Bittner, 1970).

According to Chan (1997: 78) the use of force or the threat of by police is often seen as a legitimate means of taking charge of situations, to maintain authority, to control suspects, and to obtain information. Similarly, Crank (1998) sees the use of force by police as a mentality similar to that of police officers believing they are saving our planet from aliens. Police officers recognise criminals for what they are; dangerous, unpredictable, violent, savagely cunning, a thin veneer of self-deluding civilisation over an ontology that created a genuinely vicious top dog in a world of capable and talented reptilian, mammalian, and pescian predators. Police officers know that there is only one way to control the alien. Only direct coercion can control it. That alone it understands. The alien is deterred, not by reason or foresight, but by force. Deterrence is through power, by immediate implementation of overwhelming counter force before the alien has a chance to respond (1998: 254).
Similarly, Manning (1978) mentions two principles of police culture regarding this mentality of police officers in the use of force. The first is that the 'legal system is untrustworthy, policemen make the best decisions about guilt or innocence' (1978: 12). The legal system does not deter. It is soft and full of bluster; it threatens and reasons. It will not back up a police officer because the legal system, vis-à-vis prosecutorial discretion, does what it does pretty well - it evaluates the viability of cases based on criteria of evidence and witnesses - that, however, is not a police cultural standard. The standard police officer's use of force comes from within the culture.

His most meaningful standards of performance are the ideals of his occupational culture. The policeman judges himself against the ideal policeman as described in the occupational lore and imagery. What a "good policeman" does is an omnipresent standard (Manning, 1978: 11).

The standard is to get 'bad guys' off the street. To use the law if it will work for them, and to use whatever tools officers have. The ideal police officer is trickier than the law. They know who is bad. When the courts disagree, it is a sorry day for the courts, a sad day for the public.

The second principle is that 'stronger punishment will deter criminals from repeating their errors.' According to Manning (1978), police view deterrence in a fundamentally different way to the courts. For the courts, deterrence lies in the lawful delivery of severe penalties in accordance with state statue. Court deterrence is a fantasy of disinterested and predictable application of the law. For the police, deterrence is quite personal, and is embodied in immediate, concrete exercise of coercion to control situations. It is the concrete way problems are resolved. It is acted out as toughness on the street. Dangerous or
troublesome offenders are isolated, harassed or arrested. Deterrence is the concrete ability to discourage behaviour through aggression.

**Police Values**

This is part of the last dimension of the habitus of policing, recipe knowledge, in Sackmann's (1991) classification of cultural knowledge in organisation. It suggests what should or should not be done in specific situations. It provides recommendations and strategies for coping with police work. According to Chan (1997), core characteristics of police culture — code of silence and solidarity among police officers — are two well-documented aspects of police recipe knowledge.

Similarly, Reiner sees solidarity as a response to the working conditions of policing, 'a product not only of isolation, but also of the need to be able to rely on colleagues in a tight spot, and a protective armour shielding the force as a whole from public knowledge of infractions' (1992: 116). Skolnick and Fyfe observe that, following the beating of Rodney King by members of the Los Angeles Police, one of the indicted officers called for resignation of the Police Chief Daryl Gates because he had betrayed 'the code' which 'decrees that cops protect other cops, no matter what, and that cops of higher rank back up working street cops - no matter what' (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 7). The code, according to Skolnick and Fyfe, is typically enforced 'by the threat of shunning, by fear that informing will lead to exposure of one's own dereliction, and by fear that colleagues' assistance may be withheld in emergencies rather than by violent means (ibid.: 110).

The belief that is 'the public does not like the police officer' entrenches police solidarity. Manning (1978) captured the essence of this with the brief cultural
aphorism *everyone hates a cop*. According to Crank (1998), solidarity is a basis for police secrecy, when secrecy protects cops from departmental directives and public oversight. Police officers know the necessity of secrecy because 'they are confident that whatever they say will be used against them' (Crank, 1998: 222). If they want to avoid trouble they should become invisible. Police consequently stay low and avoid trouble. In most activities they are order takers; many of their tasks are routine, trivial, and involve doing paperwork.

They developed several specific beliefs which are the 'verbal links between a subculture's view of the world and their expression of that view into action.' (Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert, 1994: 110). That is, they described how the idea of invisibility was translated into ordinary activity, providing officers guides for protecting themselves and other officers. Some of them are: *Don't give up another cop* — regardless of the seriousness of the case or the circumstances surrounding it, never provide information to the public or to superior officers; *watch out for your partner first and then for the rest of the shift* — this means not only that officers must protect each other from physical harm, but also that they need to watch out for their interests; *if you get caught off base, don't implicate anybody else* — if something happens and you are discovered in the wrong place or doing forbidden activities, do not involve other cops who might also be punished; *hold up your end of the work* — malingerers draw attention to everyone on the shift; *don't look for favors just for yourself* — in other words, don't suck up to bosses for special favours. Line officers should not develop special relationship with superior officers (Kappeler, et al, 1994).
The Field of Police

Instead of thinking of police officers as being socialised into an all-encompassing, homogeneous and unchanging police culture and being totally dictated by it in values and in action, Chan (1997: 92) has proposed a new framework for understanding police culture, using Bourdieu's concepts of field and habitus, as explained earlier. Thus, police practice is to be understood in terms of the interaction between specific structural conditions of police work (the field) and the cultural knowledge accumulated by police officers that integrates past experiences (habitus). In order to understand the relations between the police and visible minorities, she provides six elements of the field: the political context of policing; the social and economic status of visible minorities; government policies towards minorities; discretionary powers of the police; legal protection against police abuse; and the internal organisation of the police force (ibid.: 80).

As it has been stated before, policing is inherently political, since it is an institution 'created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order' (Skolnick 1972: 41; quoted in Reiner 1992: 2). It would be difficult to understand the violent practices of police officers in Turkey without the political aspect of policing. According to the reports released by international human rights observers, torture and other types of violations are concentrated upon political activists, especially from the East part of the country where the ethnic minority population comprises the majority. In these cases police mostly use the Turkish Anti Terrorism Law and some other well known articles of Turkish Penal Code such as Article 312 which states the crime of being associated with activities that lead the population into parities based on religion. Here it is also important to point that, as Manning (1978: 18-19) said, the law itself a political entity, being the
'product of what is right and proper from the perspective of different politically powerful segments within the community'.

According to an argument by Wilson (1968) understanding the political life of a community will not provide an adequate explanation of existing police policies. To a considerable extent, such policies are left to the police themselves. There may be public pressure for the police to "do something" about some problem. But what to do and how to do it is left to the police:

Police work is carried out under the influence of a political culture, though not necessarily under day-to-day political direction ... with respect to police work—or at least its patrol functions—the prevailing political culture creates a "zone of indifference" within which the police are free to act as they see fit....The most important way in which political culture affects police behaviour is through the choice of police administrator and the moulding of the expectations that govern his role (Wilson, 1968: 233).

Not only torture or similar practices, but also police corruption is also fostered or impeded by the political environment. According to Henry (1994), between 1972 and 1992 there was a general decline in media and academic attention to issues of police corruption. The author claimed that this easing of external pressure allowed police administrators to shift their attention and priority away from corruption controls (quoted in Chan, 1997: 81). Morton (1993) shifts attention to the climate of public tolerance towards police corruption and argues that the police often justify irregular practices by referring to this public tolerance: 'the public does not much care about procedure provided results are achieved and provided that lapses in principle do not become scandals' (Morton, 1993: 343). Skolnick and Fyfe made a similar point about public support for aggressive policing in spite of the revelation of the beating of Rodney King:

Today, permanently changing police organisational norms that tolerate and encourage brutality requires change in the public expectations to which those norms are responsive. However
repulsed viewers may have been by the graphic display of brutality shown in the King tape - and by the fury of the riotous response to it - there is considerable support among the public for an aggressive, kick-ass style of policing (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 189).

Indeed, in Turkey, as long as police aggressiveness is directed to the officially identified targets, suspects of crime of thought and separatists, the absence of public concern and political pressure to scrutinise the standards of police conduct will always be there. This police aggressiveness is supported indirectly by the low status of some groups in society. Police use their wide discretionary powers to stop, question, arrest, search and detain suspects from these groups. The presentation of such groups in the media and official records leads to the low level of protection against police abuse.

**Conclusion**

Vast amounts of research in the police literature suggest that the culture of the police has a great impact on current deviant practices of officers. If we really want to see a positive improvement in this area we need to change police culture. The problem indeed starts here because the police literature has tended to lump values, beliefs, attitudes, informal rules and practices together under the label of police culture. We first need to make clear what we understand as police culture and what we may want to change. Moreover, we also have to consider another point that in the literature there is opposition to changing police culture such as *rule tightening* as a means of controlling police discretion. Both are subjected for discussion. In their work McConville et al. seriously question the utility of law reform as a method of changing police practice, since the occupational culture of the police 'appears resistant to change' (McConville et al. 1991: 193). These authors suggest that to change police practice, an 'attack upon police occupational culture' would be necessary. This is to be achieved by redefining the police mandate and instituting new forms of accountability. Similarly, Reiner notes the uneven
impact of law reform on police practice and concludes that legal regulation
alone is of limited effectiveness for changing police practice as 'the key
changes must be in the informal culture of the police, their practical working

In order to contribute to the positive development of Turkish police force, in
this chapter of the thesis, it has been shown that researchers who emphasise the
importance of police occupational culture considerably underestimate the
power of the field, in terms of the social, economic, legal, and political sites in
which policing takes place. Indeed, without these aspects the real picture of the
Turkish police culture would be blurred. When we consider the national
conditions, it is suggested here that changing police culture would require
changes in the field at both management and street level decisions. From this
point, in this chapter, it was first argued what we understood as police culture.
Police culture was not taken as some internalised rules or values independent
of the conditions of policing. This was done with the help of the Chan's (1997)
work, Bourdieu's conceptions of the field and habitus to assist our
understanding of the relationship between the formal structural context of
policing and police cultural practice.
CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

Police culture is difficult to study because the characteristics of a police community such as solidarity and secrecy, the everyday meanings and definitions which police officers use to 'understand' their work, their role and the area and people they police require the methodological commitments of ethnography to naturalism, and empathy. Different methods vary in their appropriateness to uncovering the aspects of police culture and police deviance that are signalled by different theoretical approaches. The research problem of this thesis "What is the role of police culture in contemporary Turkish policing practices?" is related to criminological endeavors. According to Jupp (1995), the criminological enterprise exhibits plurality and methods of criminological research that need to be examined within the context of this plurality. From this starting point there are several methodological directions that are available. If we focus to the individual deviant police officer, there are four broad analyses can be mentioned. One of these is concerned with biological differences between individuals and with the way in which human behaviour, in the case criminal behaviour, is genetically determined. The work of Lombroso is typical of these approaches. In such work criminals represent a physical type distinct from non-criminals. Along with physical characteristics Lombroso paid attention to environmental factors such as climate, poverty, immigration and urbanisation (Lombroso and Ferrero 1996: 29-33). His
methodology was rather primitive and was based on very limited data as well as simplistic use of statistics.

A second type of approach has a psychological base and focuses on personality differences between individuals and the way in which these might be linked to criminal behaviour. For example, Eysenck (Muncie, et al, 1996: 81) claims to have identified a typology of personality types and also to have evidence for the assertion that certain types of personality are less amenable to conditioning and learning and therefore are more likely to result in criminal and other anti-social behaviour. A third type of approach is less concerned with innate characteristics and more with the primary socialising groups, particularly the family, and with the way in which early socialisation contributes to subsequent criminal behaviour. Some of these analyses focus on child-rearing practices. For example, Durkin (1998) pointed out that the children of 'permissive' parents are more likely to show difficulties in adjusting to school, and also tend to score higher than average on measures of aggressiveness, and in adolescence are more likely to be involved in delinquent and other problematic behaviour. Similarly, parents who are cold, punishment-oriented tend to have children who exhibit higher than average levels of aggression (ibid. 1998: 413).

A fourth area of research pays little attention to individual characteristics or early learning experiences which might be thought to cause criminality. Instead it emphasises freedom of action and the ability of individuals to interpret and construct social reality (Jupp, 1995: 10). If we take deviant police practices according to these theories —each of them comes from different disciplinary bases and differ from each other in significant ways— then the research methodology should be based upon individual police officer.
However the research problem of this thesis is related to cultural values of police officers and their influence on officers' behaviour. Cultural values offer us something more than individual approaches to police deviancy. For example, Durkheim (1964) stated the importance of cultural values in structuring crime. He focused his concerns on the bases of social solidarity, forms of social disorganisation and with the central concept of anomie. The views of Durkheim subsequently influenced three broad analytical strands; first, analyses of structural factors making certain kinds of criminal actions more likely in some social groupings; second, sociological explanations of the social, cultural and spatial distribution of crime in societies; and third, examinations of the way in which criminal values and actions are transmitted within cultural groups. For example, instead of stating normlessness, Merton (1968) developed Durkheim's concept of anomie to one resulting from strains in the social structure which pressurise individuals to pursue goals which, because of their social situation, cannot be achieved by legitimate means (Merton, 1968: 198). Durkheim also influenced the Chicago school of criminology, which was concerned less with the structural sources of social disorganisation and more with its ecological distribution. They were keen to draw spatial maps of social disorganisation. According to Jupp (1995: 11) the Chicago school itself had a profound effect on subsequent sociological analyses of crime pointing the way forward into studies of subcultures of crime and also into the way in which criminal values are transmitted within subcultures.

Some of the sociologists mentioned above were crucially involved in the use of official statistics to measure the extent of crime and other deviant acts. For example, Durkheim analysed suicide rates by using such statistics in his classical study. Merton's work on anomie and crime starts from the
assumption that official statistics provide the best indices of society's crime level, and the Chicagoans used statistics to delineate the natural areas of their city (Jupp, 1995: 11). From this point, it is possible to use official statistics and surveys to explain Turkish police officers' deviancy. But the conclusion would certainly be insufficient. On the other hand, contemporary analyses of police deviancy strongly suggest that it is not the result of some rotten apples as explained earlier. As suggested, it is part of police world where cultural values are the main determinants of police behaviour (Reiner, 1992; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, and Chan, 1997).

In short, the subject is 'culture' and culture requires the researcher to have personally experienced the event or relationship to which it refers in order to analyse or understand it. Therefore the common methodology carried out in similar research problems in social science is participant observation. In a study where a questionnaire is used the researchers are not immersing themselves in the social world in which people are busy experiencing, perceiving and acting according to their interpretations of that world. Rather, it is important to participate in social relations and seek to understand actions within the context of an observed setting, because it is argued that people act and make sense of their world by taking meanings from their environment. As such, researchers must become part of that environment, for only then can they understand the actions of people who occupy and produce cultures, defined as the symbolic and learned aspects of human behaviour which include customs and language (May, 1997: 134).

However, in connection to the tough practices of security forces as the President of Turkey, A. N. Sezer argued, in his speech in May 2000, that "resemble those of a police state" there was a concern about doing a
participant observation among Turkish police officers. As the public in Turkey increasingly questions the practices of the state, the security forces, inversely, closes doors to outsiders although there are some cosmetic developments such as the 'transparent police station' where every activity of police would be under public scrutiny. In order to avoid this scrutiny, the police force certainly continues to deny close analysis of their practices, which is really one of the foundations of any executive power group in that it maintains secrecy about its activities and avoids the possibility for its antagonists to subsume that power. Therefore, it would be of no surprise to find detailed observations of police practices to be antithetical to the philosophies of control by which they operate. In the remainder of this chapter in addition to this problem I will explore some of the other ambiguities and problems of researching the police.

**Participant Observation**

Participant observation, also known as ethnography, is quite popular among social and cultural anthropologists as well as in some other social sciences, particularly sociology and psychology. It is practised through personal participant observation in a social grouping, with the distinct aim of providing an insider's account of some cultural feature of that group. Because of the secrecy among cultural groups against outsiders, participant observation fits to explore deviant and criminal subcultures as well as to penetrate the inside workings of the criminal justice systems as in Holdaway's *Inside the British Police* (1983), Punch's study of Amsterdam police, *Policing the Inner City* (1979), and of police corruption, *Conduct Unbecoming* (Punch, 1985). As he observed many aspects of police practices that are governed by an often-unwritten series of transformations, creating homologies, which reaffirm operational practice, and which are determined by a definitive, but rarely
acknowledged rationale, Young (1991) states the rationality of doing participant observation among police force and concludes:

Analysis of police culture is therefore particularly suited to the anthropological method, for it requires an extended field study to reveal much about the unspoken agenda which determines many aspects of police practice (Young, 1991: 15).

As a method, participant observation refers to the collection of findings by participating in the social world of those one is studying. This involves taking on some role in the social group, or on the fringes of it, and observing, reflecting upon, and interpreting the actions of individuals within the group. Characteristically, participant observers become immersed in the field, such as in the example of Burgess, 1984. Therefore, in comparison with social surveys and experiments, as accepted in the literature, it is often difficult to separate the data from the researcher and to separate the act of collecting data from the that of participating (Jupp, 1995). What is more, participant observation places emphasis upon naturalism — that is, studying groups in their natural surroundings with the minimum of disturbance; upon the direct observation of interactions with particular emphasis on the social meanings which such interactions have for the participant; upon empathy in order to achieve understanding of such meanings; and upon descriptions and explanations formulated with direct reference to the everyday descriptions and explanations employed by the participants themselves. On this point Jupp (1995) says that 'the methodological commitments of ethnography to naturalism, empathy and to capturing everyday theorising are most suited to an analysis of police culture' (ibid.: 59).

Further, according to Jupp (1995) participant observation, unlike other methods of research, which are typically associated with the positivist
tradition in criminology, plays down the exclusive collection of quantitative data, the control of variables, and the search for explanations cast in casual terms. Rather, participant observation progresses, by a 'discovery-based approach' in which there is a development, refinement and perhaps even reformulating of research ideas in accordance with what is discovered as fieldwork continues.

In order to state its strengths and weaknesses in its application to the exploration of police culture it is necessary to discuss several types of application of participant observation, depending on the degree of participation. Burgess (1982: 45) states two main ways of the application of participant observation: complete (or covert) participant observation and participant-as-observer (or overt participant observation). In a complete participant role, the observer is wholly concealed and the research objectives are unknown to the observed. The researcher attempts to become a member of the group under observation. This has been justified on the grounds that it makes possible the study of inaccessible groups that do not reveal to outsiders certain aspects of their life. Presumably, the fieldworker is treated as just another member of the group. A well-known example of this way of participation is Holdaway's observation of a group of British police officers.

Although role-pretence is a basic necessity in complete participant observation, Holdaway had a natural advantage in maintaining his role as he undertook his research because he was in fact an acting officer at the time and had been for a considerable number of years (1983: 63). He was employed by the police, without funding from a research-oriented organisation and already very familiar with the institution when he did return to the service. Any deception involved at this early stage of access was moderated.
Despite its research advantage, the complete participant role has been severely criticised on methodological and ethical grounds. It raises conditions of stress within which the sociologist has to live with him or her self. Holdaway has recognised this saying that:

> For example, tension resulted from working with officers who did not share my values and assumptions about policing. Such, it might be said, is the nature of a nasty world; but I had some direct responsibility for the manner in which these officers behaved (1983: 9).

He occasionally retreated from conversations and incidents over which he had no control and which he found distasteful. At times he had to deal with an officer whose behaviour exceeded the bounds of what he considered reasonable conduct. These situations could easily get in the way of research and increase the pressure of his work.

The possibility of 'going native', which will be discussed later, is quite significant in this style of participant observation. Making decisions about what specifically to observe is another important problem because the researcher should not evoke responses or behaviour and must be careful not to ask questions that might raise the suspicions of the police officers. Recording observations or taking notes is impossible on the spot and a further limitation of complete participation that these have to be postponed until the observer is alone and, time lags in recording observations introduce selective bias and distortions through memory (Nachmias, 1996).

In order to overcome these limitations, some of the literature suggests a participant-as-observer role. In this role the researcher's presence is known to the group being studied. Researchers make long-term commitments to become active members and attempt to establish close relationships with the members
of the group who subsequently serve as both informants and respondents. Van Maanen's (1983) research on police training illustrates the process of taking this role. While he was a graduate student at the University of California he began contacting police officials across the country seeking permission to conduct a one-person field study inside a large, metropolitan law enforcement agency. Although he encountered some initial difficulties in locating a department willing to tolerate the intrusion of research he eventually managed to gain access to one police organisation. Throughout the study he made no attempt to disguise his scholarly aim or identity, and met with little overt hostility from police officers (Van Maanen, 1983: 270).

In this thesis and the exploration of the Turkish police culture, my preference was to be a participant-as-observer. There were several reasons behind this decision. First, complete or covert observation requires duality that the researcher should also be an insider. The 'insider' means 'to be a serving police officer' in the case of observing police culture. In my case it was totally impossible to be a serving officer because law and regulation do not allow dual roles as it is impossible to be either a civil researcher at the Police Academy and a serving police officer at the same time. I was also above the age limit for becoming a police officer. In the case of Holdaway (1983), who was already a serving police officer before he decided to research police culture. This duality served his aims perfectly and smoothly. However he was still not necessarily guaranteed access to the occupational culture of police work. As Holdaway points out:

Research and my previous experience of police work demonstrated the power of the lower ranks, not least their resistance to external control of their work. Any effective research strategy would have pierced their protective shield it was to be successful (Holdaway, 1983: 4).
If access is difficult even for an insider, naturally, it would be almost impossible for an outsider. Indeed many aspects of police culture has a symbolic presence which are conducive to quantitative measures and are difficult to present with absolute objectivity (Crank, 1998). According to Chatterton 'there is a considerable amount of material which is unrecorded and unavailable to the researcher locked away in the constable's heads' (quoted in Young, 1991: 18). Young follows:

This troublesome invisibility in the material record is often inversely related to its semantic value, and activity which may well have a central place in the police model of reality can well remain beyond the grasp of the outsider (ibid.: 18).

Similarly, in the case of outsiders, McCabe and Sutcliffe (1978), who set out to pursue participant observation on the police and found that 'it would be necessary for anyone wishing to fully understand the process of policing to take into account the difficulties in gaining access and an understanding of just what was going on' (quoted in Young, 1991: 25). They admitted that, as outsiders, they were usually not quick enough to grasp the nuances of what was taking place before them. They went on to suggest that where complex insider activities are being carried out in a sub-language designed to exclude the uniformed, the best ethnography would probably be carried out by the insider/ethnographer.

Therefore, my second reason was that the participant-as-observer role provided many advantages of complete observation while eliminating disadvantages. The police officers under observations knew that I was a research assistant at the Police Academy carrying out research. Most of the officers, however, did not know that I was not a serving sergeant because they naturally thought that a Police Academy graduate research assistant should
still be a uniformed police officer. My presence was therefore found quite 
natural and was indeed welcomed. In the police officers' view, my research 
purpose was to observe the real policing outside the Police Academy and to 
transfer observations to the students. Indeed there is a general belief that 
policing on the streets and in the books, are totally different. As a result of 
this, all lecturing staff at the Academy is strongly advised to observe policing 
on the streets. As a member of the lecturing staff at the academy this was a 
very good reason to approach police officers. If this had not been the case, I 
would certainly have faced a problem of gaining access to data.

There were, however some ethical problems here. First, I had used deception 
to gain access to observations that I would have been denied if I had told 
police officers that my observation was part of a research, which was going to 
be submitted to a university abroad. The individual police officers had not 
known the true purpose of the study, nor had they known that they were the 
primary units of observation. Second, police officers had not given their fully 
informed consent because they had not been told that they were the true 
subjects of the research. Third, as I was aware that by doing this type of 
research I could generate distrust among potential police officers to the extent 
that future investigators would find it difficult to obtain information or to gain 
the co-operation of police officers.

However, research that employs deception as part of an experiment has 
become commonplace because it offers methodological and practical 
advantages (Nachmias, 1996: 80). Researchers sometimes collect data without 
the knowledge of the observed individuals. In my research I had to balance 
costs and benefits. With the cost that may include affronts to dignity, anxiety, 
embarrassment, and lost of trust the benefits (that can result from accurately
predicting the effects police culture on policing) may include potential advances in theoretical or applied knowledge.

Through this participant-as-observer role I was able to overcome some obstacles of complete observation. For example, it was unproblematic to make decisions about what specifically to observe and to evoke responses and behaviour. Moreover, recording observations or taking notes was possible on the spot. By doing so, selective bias and distortions through memory as a result of time lags in recording were minimised. In the complete participant observation role these are difficult because, for example, to ask questions might raise the suspicions of police officers.

**Stages of Observation**

There are five basic stages involved in order to do participant observation: gaining access, preliminary socialisation, gaining acceptance, going native, and writing up (May, 1997, Jupp, 1995). If participant observation involves becoming part of a police community to understand it, then it is obviously not simply a case of 'hanging around'. To become part of a police scene and participate in it requires that the researcher be accepted to some degree. This period of moving into a setting is both analytically and personally important. Those aspects of action, which are strange to the observer, may be familiar to the police officers. However, how people manage and interpret their everyday lives is an important condition of understanding a social scene. In this sense, my previous experiences, as being a police sergeant, are central. Three police stations were selected as part of the observation. Because of geographic and practical considerations, the first one was in my hometown. It was easy to gain access to the police station. Police officers thought that, whilst on holiday, I was observing 'real' policing in order to present information to my students at
the Police Academy. But, after a while, I noticed that observing a small town police station would create validity and reliability problems. It was a station that only a small number of officers were working at the same time. Contrary to most metropolitan police stations police - citizens relationships were quite smooth and respect towards the police was more evident in that town. From this perspective it was difficult to make a connection between police culture and police misconduct or deviancy. However this experience was still fruitful from some points. For example, the influence of police culture upon handling domestic violence and wife-husband disputes was more clear than the other two police stations. Moreover it was also useful in terms of making recommendations that some problems between the public and police in large communities could be solved easily by referring to the methods used in such small community where police officers were closer to their clients.

The other two police stations were in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. There were many benefits to select Ankara in that, for example, the close relationship between political culture and the police culture could easily be seen in there. Contrary to the conditions in a small town, the relationship between the police and the public is more distant and police officers have a heavy workload. The public is more challenging towards the police. As the Police Academy is also situated in Ankara the police officers were more open to my approaches to them. The reason is that most young police sergeants, newly graduated from the police academy, are usually appointed to large cities. It was quite possible to see one of our recently graduated sergeants in any police station. The police work in metropolitan cities is more complex than police work taught at the Police Academy and therefore their immediate clumsiness is noticed by experienced officers, making this an interesting site
Having gained access to the observation sites, the literature envisages a preliminary socialisation process that enables both observer and observed to feel comfortable in the company of each other and hence behave in a naturalistic way (May, 1997: 135, 144). In this preliminary socialisation process, I had spent some time familiarising myself with the social setting and the police officers within it (and they with me). Indeed the ethnographer may find the community different from that which had been anticipated and even may endure a period of culture shock. The outsider has to learn new forms of communication, new definitions of acceptable behaviour and identify social roles. However, in the case of observing police culture, where secrecy is an important characteristic, these prerequisites are difficult problems to solve and consequently an outsider would most likely feel excluded from the police community.

As I was a Police Academy graduate research assistant with a background as a former police sergeant I was able to pass this stage less painfully than an outsider. The jargon used by the police officers was familiar to me and I was already seen as one of their colleagues. It seemed that I had smoothly overcome the difficulties of the third stage, gaining acceptance, of an ethnographic study.

The fourth stage is actually a general caution for those who are planning to carry out a participant observation study which requires the researcher to participate actively in the social life studied and consciously eliminate the distinction between the observer and the observed phenomena. These are important for the researcher to become accepted so that he or she will be able to operate within the community. However the researcher sometimes faces a condition of 'going native' which refers to the problem of over-involvement in
the group being studied with the consequence that he or she becomes more of a participant and less of an observer and also begins to take statements and actions for granted rather than as data to be examined, questioned and treated as 'anthropologically strange' (Jupp, 1995: 60). Punch has admitted his over-involvement, remarking that;

However, the more I was accepted the more they expected me to act as a colleague. In my willingness to be accepted by the policemen I over-identified perhaps too readily and this doubtless endangered my research role. For the patrol group is a cohesive social unit and the policeman's world is full of seductive interest so that it is all too easy to 'go native' (Punch, 1979: 16).

According to May (1997: 140) the condition of 'going native' poses a dilemma for the ethnographer; the impartiality of the observer will diminish in proportion to the level of active involvement with the observed, but failure to go native may result in no more than a tertiary understanding. Solution is also given that flexibility, as moving in and out of these two states, lets the researcher to both collect and analyse data simultaneously.

Timing and recording are one of the major considerations in collecting data in observational studies. Obviously, it was impossible to make an infinite number of observations, so I have constructed a time sampling schedule about when to observe. The official case recording notebooks of the stations have assisted me in setting out this timetable. The density of daily cases at certain times of the day ensured the maximum contacts between police officers and the public. I also made a supreme effort to observe a certain group's working life in order to record all aspects one particular group of officers.

I used a notebook to make notes of anything interesting as and when it happened during the fieldwork. However some of the literature (May, 1997:}
144) argues that a notebook may aggravate a situation where people may already be feeling too aware of the researcher to behave in a naturalistic way and note-taking. In my fieldwork, most of the police officers did not show any adverse reaction to note-taking, on the contrary, they helped to take notes of every detail as they wished them to be presented to students at the Academy.

However, I have also used a tape recorders time to time I preferred it keep this secret because I considered that in certain conditions and certain places it would make police officers uncomfortable and less likely to respond as they normally would.

**Interviewing**

During the fieldwork I also carried out some informal interviews with police officers as a useful complement to the participant observation. Most of these interviews were used to access situations that were closed to the researcher through time or place. In this sense I was able get the biography, the career history of an individual police officer and details of situations, which I did not witness.

Despite several advantages of structured interview, such as the wording of the questions and their sequence being identical for every police officer, I have carried out interviews in semi-structured way for several reasons. Structured interviews would leave little room for the police officer to express his or her own feelings and attitudes. It would have been a matter of squeezing police officers into one of a predetermined number of boxes, which may or may not be appropriate to the observation. Moreover there were three assumptions, crucial to structured interviews, which made it unsuitable for my fieldwork. First, because of differences between officers such as experienced and new
recruits, questions in structured interviews might not have the same meaning for each police officer. Second, as a consequence of that it was impossible to phrase all questions in a form that was equally meaningful to each officer; and third, even if the meaning of each question were to be identical for each police officer, then it was very difficult to make its context and all preceding questions identical for each.

As a result of these considerations police officers were encouraged to respond to such questions as describing their activities, how they organise their culture, and contrasting questions, to relate their experiences, to describe whatever events seemed significant to them, to provide their own definitions of situations, and to reveal their opinions and attitudes as they saw fit. I had a great deal of freedom to probe various areas and to raise specific queries during the course of the interview. Indeed in a participant observation, a structured interview would be too formal and most likely to sabotage the trust and confidence between the researcher and the police officers.

As pointed out earlier interviews, as complement to the participant observation, were used as a resource for understanding how police officers make sense of their social world and act within it. A total of 93 police officers had been interviewed during participant observation. 35 of them were carried out at my first observed police station. 46 at two different police stations in Ankara and the rest, 12, were carried out among patrol officers in Ankara. Although the total number of officers interviewed might not representative in the wider sense, but especially at the first station, I aimed to reach all (n: 42) available police officers at the station. As it was during two months summer holiday I was able to interview most of them. As a generality, police officers
were a mix of both newly recruited and more experienced officers and from different part of the country.

**Survey**

Like informal interviews, the survey method was also used as a complement to the main research method. The necessity of carrying out survey lies mainly within a debate in the literature surrounding whether the social background of the police officer is an important factor in structuring police culture. For example, according to Reiner (1978) and Skolnick (1969), police recruits did not particularly display authoritarian or prejudiced personalities; rather, they brought to the service the shared values and perceptions of the lower middle and working classes. Similarly, however it is not proven that the 'rotten apples' theory claims either weak individuals who have slipped through the screening process, or deviant individuals who continue their deviant practices in an environment which provides them ample opportunity. This theory is seen as an impression management or normalisation of deviance technique rather than an explanation of, for example, police corrupt behaviour. Indeed the initial reaction to police authorities, applying the label "rotten apple" or "rough police" to publicly exposed officers, is an attempt to "normalise" or invent plausible excuses and explanations for deviant conduct.

In order to support the case that it is not "rotten apples" but the police culture is the real determinant of police behaviour, and consequently to support my conclusions from the fieldwork, I aimed to carry out a survey among students in a police training school.

The questionnaire consisted of factual questions and questions about subjective experiences. Factual questions were designed to elicit objective
information from the new recruits regarding their background, environment, habits and the like. The most common type of factual question was the background question, which was asked mainly to provide information by which police recruits could be classified by age, education, or income. Such classification can be used to investigate differences in behaviour and attitude. Other kinds of factual questions were intended to provide information on the police recruits' social environment, including, "Do you have any family members who are, or were, police officers?", or the geographic region "Please circle the geographic region of Turkey in which you were born". Subjective experience involves the police recruits' beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and opinions. These questions were designed according to the results from the fieldwork in order to compare new recruits and experienced police officers in their beliefs, attitudes, and opinions on the characteristics of police culture.

Empirically supported generalisations are usually based on partial information because, as Nachmias (1996) stated, it is often impossible, impractical, or extremely expensive to collect data from all the potential units of analysis covered by the research problem. There were two main options to select survey samples in this research; probability and nonprobability sampling. Although probability sampling is preferred for more accurate estimates of the police recruits population parameters, I had to employ a nonprobability sampling method. This is because probability sampling would require the probability of each recruit to be included in the sample in a single draw from the entire police recruit population. When we consider a total of 10,000 police recruits in 20 different police schools in 1998 (these are all in different cities as well), and limitations on resources and time and personnel, a probability sampling was not an option for this study. Instead a convenient sample was obtained by selecting sampling units that were readily available. The most
crowded (with approximately 1,000 student each year) police school was chosen among these 20 schools. The sampling method was to put the school numbers of each student in a bag and to pick numbers at random. The questionnaire was distributed and collected the next day.
CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF THE TURKISH POLICE OFFICER

Police culture is the product of a particular background, or social environment. This includes certain experiences and certain social-institutional influences - officers’ ethnic origin, religion, education social class, parental occupation as well as the country’s historical development, political preferences, and the like. The combination of these influences has produced certain attitudes, beliefs, and values in the individual police officer. How the officer sees and does things will be influenced to some extent by these background variables. In this chapter of the thesis the importance of the influence of Turkey’s historical and political development over the formation of the Turkish police culture through the police role will be presented.

The police service in Turkey is plainly in the realm of the public administration as in many other countries, and is by its nature, political. From a theoretical point of view, policing, traditionally, has been seen primarily as a political institution, inextricably tied to the function of governing through its executive responsibility for enforcement of laws enacted by legislatures and interpreted by courts. The police officer is the personification of the state at street level by virtue of his or her monopolisation of the legitimate means of coercion. Senior officers and the government, produce laws, and give the police authority to take command, and take action in enforcing the law. Hence, in any country, the police are responsible for enforcing all criminal laws, regardless of the willingness of the citizenry to be
policing. Although this theory is applicable for most countries, the real policing at street level could be totally different among these countries. For instance, serving the public dominates police forces in the United Kingdom, but law enforcement could take priority among police forces in the developing or underdeveloped countries. So in Turkey for example:

From a social point of view, the duty of police is to control deviation from law, prevent deviation and to provide public order by taking those who deviates to the courts (Arslan, Chief Inspector of Elazig, 1999: 31).

The political culture in these countries is generally underdeveloped and civil groups are faded or incomplete. According to Caha, the state could be autocratic and hold political, economical and ideological powers (1997: 257). Indeed without consideration of this preposition, the understanding of violent practices of the police and their culture would be incomplete in terms of Turkey.

Historical Development of the Police Role in Turkey

According to Bowden "... the style of a nation's police is as much a product of its political culture as any other state institution" (1978: 42). Here political culture means the attitudes, beliefs and rules that guide a political system, which are determined jointly by the history of the system and the experiences of its members. These beliefs and rules are changeable according to priorities of the countries from liberal to authoritarian ruling systems. In the case of Turkey these priorities are concentrated around the Kemalist ideology, which aimed at changing traditional society in spite of the traditionalism of the people in the first half of the 20th century. Thus it was an ideology committed to full modernisation in spite of the masses’ adherence to traditional ways. A slogan "We should take the West with its positives and negatives" is appropriated and institutional structure of some
European, especially France, was completely adopted (Caha 1997: 258). Contrary to Europe, revolutionary elite forced modernisation downwardly however they faced a strong resistance from the society.

As a consequence of this resistance, the revolutionary elite followed reverse practices than envisaged by the Republic at the beginning as to give sovereignty to the citizens. Instead of rehabilitating the existing situation they aimed to create a new society. In their view, the existing society was "uneducated-ignoramuses" and "sick" mass those who needed to be cured (Caha, 1997: 259). One of their ideologists, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, saw Turkish peasants as the "ape man from stoneage" those who never understood the meaning of the Turkish revolutions and therefore would be resistant to the new lifestyles. This approach of the Turkish elite is indeed very important when we consider that eighty per cent of the population were peasants at that time when the Police force, along with the Gendarmerie were given new powers. With a law passed in 1925 "Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu" (Public Order Law) the society was transformed so that everyone could accept revolutions. In order to do this every social and political association and the political thoughts of citizens were banned and opposition was suppressed (Karaman 1999: 270).

...motivated by civilisation desire, the republican elite brought a series of modern political institutions at a time when modern ethos was non-existent. The distinctive characteristic of this movement was elitism, militarism and avant-guardism (Kadioglu 1997: 281).

Kemal Ataturk and his revolutionary elite and the Republican People's Party played the most important role in directing the political socialisation of the rest of society. In this socialisation process security forces were important actors. Hence the police are the one important key indicator of types of governments in any society, as Bowden states:
... a student of the political institutions of any country desirous of understanding the ‘ethos’ of any country’s government can hardly do better than make a close study of its police system, which will provide him a good measuring rod of the actual extent to which its government is free or authoritarian (Bowden 1978: 47).

If a country is more liberal and developed the relationship between the governments and security forces is formed by objective rules and the police forces are under close scrutiny of the public. On the other hand if the country is under authoritarian government, as happens in many of the third world countries, the police are also authoritarian, because of their role as ‘the defenders of the status quo’ (Bowden, 1978: 12). Therefore, in Turkey, as an example of such countries, the police force constitutes a highly centralised national force linked to the Minister of the Interior, who is a politician. This organisational structure renders the police highly subject to political influence that often makes it a tool of government policy. Political influence can refer either to the influence of the government itself, or important politicians, of interest or community groups, or even of powerful private individuals who seek to exercise some level of control over police functions and operations. Through the first twenty-seven years of the Republic under Presidents Atatürk, and İnönü, problems of influence had been evident in the use of force, which became nothing less than an enforcement arm of a strongly centralised political governorship. According to Kili (1999), during the Presidency of Atatürk transformation of society was not left to chance nor to evolutionary development. She says:

...in order to hasten the process of modernisation Atatürk, the Republican People’s Party, People’s Houses, and the educational institutions as well as the military became the most important agencies for instructing the people with the requisite attitudes, beliefs, values and knowledge that would both support the new regime and also involve them in this process of rapid transformation” (1999: 131).
Therefore the period after 1923, in which the Ottoman Empire was taken over by the Turkish Republic with its totally radical reforms of society using the police and armed forces to gain consensus, is so important in order to understand contemporary the role of Turkish police officers and their culture.

From Empire to the Republic

In 1923 a new Turkish nation-state emerged over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, at the cost of a struggle that extended World War I by four years. This struggle had been waged as much against the Western Great Powers, who had imposed the partition of Ottoman territories between each other and other ethnic groups of the empire, which had hoped to benefit from that partitioning in order to realise their own national claims. The military victory of the Turkish national movement brought about, on the one hand, the disappearance, emigration or submission of the other ethnic groups; and on the other, the replacement of the Treaty of Servies, which expressed the will of World War I, by the Treaty of Lausanne, the result of a laborious compromise between the new Turkey and its old enemies (Akcura, 1981: 47).

The establishment of a nation-state also constituted the decisive stage of an internal dual process; the evolution of a modern life style, referred to as ‘westernisation’ and the affirmation of a Turkish national sentiment. However, the new state still had to ensure its national foundations, and demonstrate its capabilities for modernisation and westernisation. The elaboration of an ideology, and the establishment of a policy geared towards the realisation of these objectives, constituted what is commonly known as “Kemalism” after the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Cecen, 1995: 184).

As a result of Kemalism, a group of radical reforms were applied to society. Atatürk had based reforms on his famous six tenets known as the Six Arrows of Kemalism. These were; (1) Republicanism, (2) Nationalism, (3) Populism, (4) Secularism,
(5) Etatism, and (6) Revolutionism. Over the next fifteen years when Turkey became a republic in 1923 Atatürk inaugurated many radical reforms¹, seeking to destroy old institutions and power structures and to remould Turkey as a modern, western, democratic state. The dramatic reforms of substituting the hat for the fez, working to change the status of women in Turkish life, substituting Latin letters for the Arabic script, adopting a set of legal codes from those in use in European countries, the disestablishment of Islam, are well known. For example, one of the most controversial was the Hat Revolution which required that the fez would no longer be a legitimate form of headgear. Instead, only western style hats were to be worn. Atatürk’s reasons for this were that:

¹ A list of reforms undertaken during the initial years of the new republic indeed reveals a radical transformation of Turkish society from an Islamic to a Western setting. In chronological order, these reforms were the following:

1. The abolition of the sultanate in 1922 by a decree of the Grand National Assembly.
2. The abolition in 1924 of the Caliphate, which had symbolised the unity of the Muslim ummah. The origins of the caliphate went back to the period after the death of Prophet Mohammed; Ottoman sultans had assumed the title of caliph in the sixteenth century.
3. The abolition in 1924 of the office of Seyh ul Islam, the highest religious authority in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, one of whose functions had been to oversee the suitability of political decisions to Islamic Law.
4. The abolition in 1924 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti).
5. The abolition in 1924 of the Seri'at Courts, religious courts based on Muslim Law.
6. The abolition in 1924 of the medrese which had been important centre of religious learning in the Ottoman Empire.
7. The interdiction of religious brotherhoods (tarikat) in 1925, and the ban on all their activities.
8. The passage of a law in 1925 outlawing the fez in favour of the western hat.
9. The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1925, replacing the lunar Hick and solar Rummy calendars.
10. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, giving equal civil rights to men and women.
11. The adoption of European numerals in 1928.
12. The change from Arabic to Latin script in 1928.
13. The deletion in 1928 of the second article of the 1924 constitution, which stated Islam to be the state religion.
14. The granting of political rights to women, first in municipal elections in 1930, later in national elections in 1934.
15. The creation of the Turkish Language Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) in 1931.
16. The adoption of the metric system in 1931.
17. The adoption of family names in 1934.
18. The change of the weekly holiday from Friday (the Muslim Sabbath) to Sunday in 1935.
...It was necessary to get rid of the fez, considered on the head of our nation as a trademark of ignorance, of reaction, and of resistance to progress and development, and replace it by the hat, used as a head-dress in the entire civilised world, so as to show that the Turkish nation is no different from civilised social life in the domain of mentally as well (Ataturk’s speech at the Grand National Assembly in 1923 published as Nutuk, p.895).

The creation of the Turkish Language Society included in its work the replacement of as many Ottoman words as possible with ‘native Turkish’ ones, and the Turkish Historical Society embarked on major research and publication efforts to stress the greatness of the Turkish race through history and to emphasise Ottoman history, which had chiefly been concerned with the activities of the sultans. The effect of the change from Arabic to Latin script in 1928 was cataclysmic, the whole nation became illiterate in a very short time.

In Turkey, where traditions were strong, society revolted against this dictum at first. Here Kili says “Modern ideas had almost completely failed to effect the peasant, who made up 80 per cent of Turkey’s population” (1999: 120). The result was that Ataturk, who "...exercised dictatorial powers whenever necessary to realise his reform program" (Kili, 1999: 125), employed the police and other security forces to enforce the new rules:

We accomplished that under the law for the maintenance of order. We would have also done so without it. But if we said that proclamation of that law eased our task, that would be the most correct (Nutuk, p.895).

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2 Two examples of his power as Lord Kinross describes “During a tour of Western Anatolia when his train reached Ushak (a city in Turkey) a large crowd swarmed around the train, kissing his hands. Among them was a hoja, in turban and robes. On seeing him Ataturk started to growl insults at Islam. The hoja defy removed his turban, dived into the crowd, and escaped. But Ataturk, before proceeding, ordered the imprisonment of the local governor, and instructed that the town of Ushak be bombarded and razed to the ground the next day. Next day, when the order was submitted to him for confirmation, he cancelled it....At an evening when Ataturk was listening an orchestra, he incensed by the sound of the muezzin from a mosque opposite, which clashed with the dance-band, he ordered its minaret to be felled” (1964: 462-470).
Secularism, according to Weiker (1963) was one of the central planks of the Ataturk revolution, is still controversial, and it has always been very important key issue in the context of police-public relations. Historically the Ottoman Empire was a state that based on religious values, and its collapse was believed to be as a result of society's gradual decrease of these values. Therefore, even the rationale for the War of the Independence was to save the country, religion and so the Caliph.

Contrary to expectations, Atatürk aimed for a less prominent place for religion in society as he saw secularism as the only way to the position of the developed countries. He interpreted secularism “...to mean virtually total exclusion of religious influence from public life, and in many cases meant discouraging private religious observance as well” (Weiker, 1963: 3-4). Ozbudun agrees to Weiker by saying that:

Kemalist secularism did not limit itself to the separation of religious from political affairs. It also aimed at liberating the society from the hold of Islam, and to bring about a new type of free individual....the old conception of the state subordinated to religion had been replaced by the conception of religion bound to the state” (1966: 17).

However as Lord Kinross pointed out “Kemal's religious reforms had not been allowed to grow organically, as new habits of life; they were ideas imposed artificially, from the top onwards” (1964: 456). As a result, there were many public riots between the community and the elite, which claimed many lives. Weiker says:

“Secularism became a subject of intense controversy in part because Atatürk insisted on interpreting its requirements rigidly and often gave the impression of being anti religious” (1981: 6).

His policies gave this impression to the public, and this impression was fuelled by the recommendation of a committee headed by the historian, Fuad Köprüllü (later one of the founders of the Democrat Party), charged with examining the problem of
reform and modernisation of the Islamic religion. A project was begun to translate the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet into Turkish. The authorities did not stop there; they also ordered that the language of prayer had to be in Turkish, which caused an uprising. As a result of this the project was cancelled.

All these new but conflicting reforms were carried out by oppressive government without political opposition in the single-party period³. There were two short-lived experiments in a multi-party system, but both were used to identify the opposition. Therefore;

...if it was to be saved, there must be no further talk of democracy. Instead there must be a strengthening but at the same time a broadening of one-party rule. The "strong man" of the People's Party henceforth was to be Recep Peker, now appointed its secretary-general. A ruthless but intelligent autocrat, his political philosophy envisaged a policy of change by 'force and coercion'” (Lord Kinross, 1964: 456).

The increasing power of the opposition led to the end of this period and the Democrat Party, which used religious values in its political struggle and promised free religious practice. The public supported them in the belief that Kemalists would have destroyed religion entirely (Bora, 1997: 127).

However, the policy of the Democrat Party in religious tolerance had been seen as over permissible by the Republican Party members who had seen themselves as the

³ The second president after Ataturk was Inonu. He was also a pasha, and a friend of Atatürk in the War of the Independence. After Atatürk, when he became the president of the Turkey, called himself as "the National Chief"...Inönü’s repressive authoritarian style dominated the World War II and the Pre-multiparty years. He was always under Atatürk's influence, and wanted to be as popular as him in the period he took the power from Atatürk. He even put his portrait on bank notes after Atatürk died. One journalist, describes that "There was only one party dominated by İnönü who saw himself as if the shadow of the God. Even the public could not see his face. Whenever he wanted, his party, RPP (Republican People's Party) did good to the public...In those times nobody liked İnönü. The name of İnönü became the real name of "fear". Until the Democrat Party was established, Pasha İnönü was the only person who can solve any problem, can think on behalf of everybody, can show the true path and can take, in every subject, necessary decision for the best" (Arcayürek, 1983: 28-30).
real owners of the regime. The Democrat Party policy was to reinterpret secularism. They permitted the 'ezan' call in Arabic for Muslims to pray, overturning the imposition during the monoparty period of a Turkish translation which used the nondescript Turkish word 'Tanrı' (deity) in the place of the Islamic 'Allah'. Moreover they started broadcasting Koran readings on state radio, increased the number of schools for religious education, gave greater emphasis to religious courses through the primary grades in school, and increased the government budget allocated to the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

The natural consequence of these moves was intensive propaganda of the Republican People’s Party, saying that Atatürk’s reforms were eliminated from the Republic’s agenda and therefore the army should take control. It was widely felt in Turkey that the government of the Democratic Party leaders had strayed far from the path of the Ataturk revolution, and it was to return Turkey to secular politics that the armed forces took power on May 27, 1960.

The most important characteristic of the Republic in this period was that the majority did not accept the new regime. The confrontation of modernity and tradition led the governing elite to suppress the conservative majority through the action of the security forces. The authoritarian police force were supported by laws and equipped with a wide range of powers. For example, in the first 30 years of the Republic, according to Article 1 of the Law on High Treason ‘exploitation of religion towards political ends’ was a reason for individuals to be investigated. The police were ordered to undertake a wide range of duties to maintain the notorious law for the maintenance of order, which marked the definitive establishment of the monoparty period. Its single article stipulated that the government, with the agreement of the president of the Republic, was authorised through executive decree
to prohibit all formation, provocation, encouragement and publication aiming at reaction or revolt or disturbing social order, peace and tranquillity, public order and the security of the country. In addition, extraordinary tribunals known as Courts of Independence, which had been set up during the Independence war, were re-established. They operated for two years, sentencing to 600 people to death for insurrection.

Atatürk himself insisted that there would be force for the sake of the reforms and, if necessary, executions. He made a cautionary statement on 24 May 1925 in Kastomonu: "...the nation must know that civilisation is a fire so powerful that it burns and annihilates all those who are indifferent to it" (Galoglu, 1972: 139). This speech supported his Bursa city speech on 22 January 1923: "Bloody revolutions are the strongest. Revolutions without bloodshed do not become eternal". On the 27 May, 1925 in Inebolu, he elaborated on the same theme:

I am telling you this as an indisputable truth: Fear not, this path is imperative and this obligation leads us towards a lofty and important goal, if you wish I can tell you that to reach such a lofty and important goal, we shall if necessary suffer casualties. This has no importance (Galoglu, 1972: 141-142).

Indeed, after the hat reform, which was forced by a law passed on 25 November 1925, a series of explosions occurred in various parts of the country, kindling the wrath of the Courts of Independence. Between fifteen and twenty people were eventually executed for refusing to obey the law. It is said that the regime is symbolised by Atatürk, and therefore his words were the rules of the Republic. He believed the hat to be the symbol of Western civilisation. Any divergence, any deviation from this civilisation must be systematically persecuted. What happened in Turkey was that the police became the active arm of the authorities and the first
line of defence of the state against any challenge against to the reforms. As Bowden says, "...every regime gets the police it deserves" (1978: 15).

Moreover, in this period in Turkey, we can also see that the police were given to protect the owners of capital. Atatürk himself highlighted the agricultural characteristics of the country and in an industrialised world agriculture would not provide a challenge to rich European nations. Therefore he drew up a policy of creating a new rich elite and of protecting their interests.

We are evidently obliged to ensure and protect their interest, their present conditions and their future. In the same way as large landowners that might be surmised as opposed to farmers do not exist, likewise too there are no big capitalist opposed to these merchants. How many millionaires do we have? None. Consequently we shall not become the enemies of those who have a little money. On the contrary we shall work to foster the development of many millionaires, even billionaires in our country [Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Ataturk's Speeches and Statements) Vol. 2 p.97].

Indeed the role of the police was clearly drawn by the early leaders of the Republic as maintaining the status quo and as protector to those who held the power. The police were empowered to persecute those who were considered to be 'dangerous' and had authority "...to ban any publication or organisation, to detain anyone for a month without a warrant and to impose curfews at any time and to exercise military authority over the life of any individual" (Cousins, 1973: 5).

**The Military Effects**

Bowden says that totalitarian police forces occur and have occurred more readily in those countries that have paramilitary, centralised, national police forces (1978: 47). Indeed the Turkish police force is a national, centralised, and historically totalitarian police force. This is a reality of most developing countries where military forces
have a great impact on a state’s political and administrative institutions. Such military forces are frequently involved in politics intervening into politic life as well as policing policies. As Kedourie states “...the armed forces consider themselves, indeed, the protectors and guarantors of the constitutional order. It must remain on the cards that should conditions once more call for intervention, they will feel justified intervening” (1992: 151). This has happened three times in Turkey with the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980. Therefore, the influences of the military on the police force and policing policy should be considered in understanding the authoritarian police personality.

The first thing which should be stated here that the Turkish Republic shares several common characteristics with its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. The most important influence is the militaristic structure. As it has been pointed out earlier, the situation of the army has always been very powerful in both states. The army officers have always dealt in politics and policing on a range of matters far beyond military interests. Harris sees the army in Turkey as ‘a key actor in Turkey’s political order’, a ‘special form of pressure group on the Turkish scene’ and ‘the military forces have played a prominent, and sometimes a determinant role even not actually running the government’ (1985: 4).

The political role of the military in Turkish society dates almost from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, with the 'Gazi' tradition and sultans who were both military and political leaders. For most of the period of the Empire’s glory professional soldiers were prominent among the highest officials of the government. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the armed forces became major beneficiaries of defensive modernisation and quickly became one of the main channels for upward mobility of men who not only possessed political as well as military leadership
abilities, but whose exposure to Western political forms also made them potential reformers. Their strength was bolstered by the continuing high status of the military in Turkish culture (Weiker, 1981: 100-101).

This status continued in the Republic period with a special pride that they were behind all the reforms as well establishing a new state. Article 73 of the 1935 Program of the Republican People’s Party presents of this status of the Turkish Army:

**Article 73** - We especially take care that the army of the Republic, which is the unshakeable foundation of the high State organisation, and which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution, as well as its valuable members, be always honoured and respected.

According to Ozbudun “...the military was the main pillar of the reformist but unquestionably authoritarian Kemalist rule” (1966: 14). The bulk of the Turkish military chose to side with Ataturk and to pursue a path of authoritarian reform. For example, Mustafa Kemal, who was an army officer, on the eve of his move to abolish the Caliphate in 1924, went to the site of army manoeuvres to check personally whether the officers were likely to support such a move (they did). The role of the Turkish army in the transition of the country can be illustrated by certain statements Ataturk made:

Our army is the steel like expression of Turkish unity, of Turkish power and ability, and of Turkish patriotism. Our army is the undefeatable assurance of our systematised activity to realise the Turkish ideal, and to protect the land of Turkey...I have no doubt that the army, which is a school of discipline, will also be a school for training the necessary personnel for our economic, cultural, and social efforts, and will show special care and support in this respect (Kili, p.112).
During Ataturk's rule, one of the most important single actions affecting the political role of the armed forces was an Assembly ruling in late 1923 barring individuals from being simultaneously members of the Assembly and active officers. Most of the important officers were chosen to be the members of the Assembly. This action did not, however, lessen their identification with the institution in which they had spent most of their adult lives nor did it reduce their sense of solidarity with the military or the public's identification of them as 'Pasas' (a military rank equivalent to general). This was, as Rustow pointed out, "an important harbinger for the future" (1973: 47).

During the monoparty period between 1923-1946 there was little political visibility of the armed forces, although during the entire period, between fourteen and twenty per cent of the deputies in the Assembly were military background members. In 1950 this percentage dropped to six per cent, mainly due to the electoral landslide, which replaced most Republican People's Party deputies with Democrats (Frey, 1965: 181). But it was difficult for the military being out of the national politics, so there was considerable behind the scenes concern with the course of national affairs, beginning as early as 1954 (Harris 1965: 165). In part this concern grew out of the increasingly difficult situation into which the Democrat Party was getting due to the political repression in which the government engaged, but to a considerable degree it was also connected with the officers' concern over their own welfare. They saw their position suffer economically from the high rate of inflation and shortages, which were the result of the Democrat Party's economic policies and because of government restriction on their salaries. A quotation from the statements of the National Unity Committee members illustrates this point. Major Erkanli, one of the masterminds of the coup, asserted that the Democrats "dragged the country into
disaster in the economic and social fields....In ten years we became one of the poorest nations in the world. This and similar reasons prepared the platform of the 27 May 1960 revolution” (Ozbudun, 1966: 20). They also saw their social political status decline through the steady transfer of political power both to the business and commercial sectors and to local and provincial leaders.

As a consequence of these political changes there was the 1960 military coup and a total military ruling period between May 27, 1960 and October 25, 1961. The reasons behind 1960 military coup were as army officials pointed out “Ataturk reforms retrogressed a great deal. The reforms strayed from their basic routes. They were betrayed” (Ozbudun, 1966: 16). A colonel said “After 1950 I saw with regret that they [the Democrat Party leaders] were leaving the civilised road which Ataturk had outlined for the improvement of the Turkish nation was being dragged backwards, that a rapid retrogression was commencing in every field....It naturally could not continue” (Colonel Yurdakuler, quoted in Ozbudun 1966: 16).

During this period they removed the restriction on salaries, and other benefits. Since 1961 officers have engaged in concerted political action. An informal military council of high officers the existence of which has never been reported to have often given instructions to the National Unity Committee (Harris, 1965: 172). It appears that one of the aims of the this military council was to keep internal disputes out of the public eye, disputes which were reportedly, frequently quite strident. As a result, for the sake of public unity, the officers usually agreed to limit their governmental involvement to matters of law and order rather than venturing into economic and social policy areas, although they remained watchful that economic policy did not again to go to the lengths of inflation and chaos that it had in the latter years of the Democrat regime.
The military controlled civilian government remained until March 1971, when violence had reached very serious proportions, and the armed forces again moved publicly onto the political stage. This time their role was even smaller than in 1960-61 and it again was focused on issues of law and order rather than on substantive economic and political matters. In a memorandum the military strongly suggested that the government of Prime Minister Demirel resign, a demand, which was promptly complied with. It was followed by the imposition of martial law, but also by the continuance of civilian government, even though it was via a series of military controlled cabinets.

The same scenario was repeated in 1980. The army took the power that they have never totally ceded to the civilian governments. This time, unfortunately, there were serious economic problems and urban violence during the late 1970s. The role of the armed forces in public affairs was manifest as a result of several periods in which martial law was declared in order to assist the regular security forces. Security Council meetings also increased in frequency, but other public actions by the officers were confined to relatively infrequent exhortations to the political parties to take action to which there was generally little response. When this third military coup came in 1980, the military governments acted again to repair some of the institutions of Turkish democracy.

According to the Generals, the reason behind their three military interventions into the civilian governments was that "the Turkish state was on the verge of falling apart" (Brown 1989: 390). Apart from discussions about the success of this intervention their involvement in politics created controversial situations. The Generals who headed the 1980 coup changed the constitution and major laws which legitimised the coup, protected those who headed the coup against any trial and
criticism, made the position of the Army stronger than before, gave them more powers, legalised the appointment of many retired Generals to key positions, and made it difficult for civilians to ignore the views of the military through the creation of some new institutions. For example, the National Security Council that provided the Prime Minister and the cabinet with a vehicle by which the military could express their views on national security affairs. The President of the State is the Chairman, and the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie are members of the Council, together with the Prime Minister, and the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. As Kedourie points out, the existence of this council gives, constitutionally, a kind of legitimacy to military interventions (1992: 130). For instance, at the beginning of March 1993, the National Security Council decided to empower the military to 'inspect' all civilian government departments. This is a kind of intervention into political and administrative system, which will make it difficult for the civilian authorities to act independently from the military.

Due to this situation established by the military government, the military continue to control politics either publicly, or from behind the scenes. They do not allow politicians and civilian governments to deal with public disturbances and political violence within the limits of the law, as they are always waiting for an opportunity to intervene. As Hale points out, they establish ground rules by occasional interventions for their exercise of power in the future (1990: 77). When the military forces are not actually ruling the state, they have the role of an influential pressure group, the civilians usually follow the advice of the Generals closely, in maintaining public order. Because the Turkish military do not trust politicians, they always control the destiny of the country from behind the scenes, and consider it their 'duty'
to intervene when there is political instability and disorder, or as they usually
describe, a threat to state security. For example, just before the 12 September 1980
coup, the then Prime Minister, B. Ecevit, stated that those who pose a threat to
internal security 'will receive their lesson within the limits of rules of the democratic
state of law' (Quoted in Twelve September in Turkey 1982: 59), General K. Evren,
then the Chief of General Staff, who later headed the coup, and became the
President of the Republic, said, when expressing his view about internal political
disturbances, that the military will not allow the 'disintegration of our country by a
handful of furious people', and warned that "nobody will have enough power to
destroy the republic which is entrusted to us by Atatürk" (Quoted in Twelve
September in Turkey 1982: 56).

Doorn argues that there is a close relationship between a high level of political
culture and the negligible danger of military intervention. If the level of political
culture is low, the replacement of civil governments by the military governments is
more likely (1976: 27-28). In this low political culture, according to Clutterbuck
(1973: 254), public opinion is sharply polarised on religious, class and ideological
lines while the lack of middle opinion motivates military involvement. These two
viewpoints effectively describe Turkish military politics.

The direct influence of the military through intervention involving the police is
bound to determine the direction of the police role. Today the Turkish police spend
most of their time on political crimes, which the military forces are so keen they
should deal with. In doing that, as Guran says, the military forces co-operate with
the police as well as acting like the police having full powers for public order and
In fact the police have very little choice other than to accept this situation as they have usually been placed under the control of military commanders in intervention periods and at times when Martial Law has been declared (Cousin, 1973: 5). Moreover the Turkish Police Organisation Code (Article 1) gives the Ministry of the Interior the power to call out military forces in maintaining public order in the cases, which the police cannot effectively combat. In the provinces, the governor-generals exercise this power. When they are asked to be involved, the military have to act immediately. Following a report to the Turkish authorities by a group of British police officers (1980), in which the use of armed forces was advised for situations when the internal security and order is threatened by terrorism and civil disturbances, the Turkish military were involved in policing many times during the 1980s.

The Role of Turkish Police Officers

Although in contemporary Turkey the police are regarded as law and public order officers, or even as servicemen, in reality they are the agents of the state in the community. A natural consequence of the historical development of Turkey is that the police have always been ‘the front line mechanism of repression’ (Box, 1989: 113). In this role, the Turkish police have controlled the community, the working class, and have shielded the wealth that has been integral to capitalist development. Bowden has termed this role of the policemen as ‘the defenders of the status quo’ (1978: 12). The second article of the Code of Police Duties and Competence points out it very clearly that ‘One of two main duties of police is to fight with those who behave against the laws, codes, regulations, orders of the government...’
From this point of view, Turkish police officers are dominantly engaged in the role of being an agency of social control. In their control function they have traditionally been involved with intelligence gathering, information control, neutralising of offenders and intimidation of the general population. Tom Bowden has pointed out this role of the police by saying that 'the police were established to deal with dangerous classes and to control the savagery of the lower social orders and by so doing maintaining the status quo' (1978: 20). The police became the active arm of the establishment and the first line of defence of the state against any challenge that might emerge to its power and authority. In this way the police are, for most people, not only the symbolic but also the actual representatives of the state. The police became 'the law', represented 'justice' and became the medium through which the populace came to know and often fear the power of the state, for the police officer could dispense violence on its behalf.

Indeed, the Police Duties and Competence Act (1934) clearly states the position of the police as the strong arm of the state

Addition Article 7: Police; authorised to take protective and preventive precautions and courses of actions to provide the indivisible totality of the State with its nation and territory, public order, and constitutional order; activated to provide security by doing intelligence service and evaluate information, and inform to authorities; It co-operates with other intelligence services of the State.

The police, then, could concentrate on the groups that have been defined as in opposition to the reforms of Ataturk and to the secular structure of the state. People were detained and forced to stay in line with official political thought. As a result of this power the personality trait of being suspicious is more evident in Turkish police officers. For example, according to an Amnesty International report on Turkey, a political suspect said in his testimony that he was detained because he was
suspected of belonging to an illegal political terrorist group and forced to admit his membership

Since the police officers did not get the expected answers, beating and the pressurised water hoses were increased....One officer whispered into my ear that they did not want me to suffer. He maintained that they knew that the association was run by an illegal organisation and all I had to do was confirm it (Amnesty International 1989: 7).

In another example, at the end of April 1989, over twenty suspects were detained in Ankara and held incommunicado at Ankara Police Headquarters until 22 May, well beyond the maximum detention period of fifteen days. Seven of these detained were then released. The remaining fourteen detained were presented to the Ankara State Court on 23 May and six were formally arrested on charges of having carried out violent activities for the illegal organisation, Revolutionary Path (Amnesty International, 1989).

Conclusion

In this chapter, the political and historical development of the country in conjunction with the role of the security forces has been summarised. Without consideration of the country’s political development with the new regime after 1923, an understanding of the Turkish police culture could not be complete.

The most critical and deep-seated issues in Turkish political history - secularism vs. religion and civil-military relations - are important in understanding of the contemporary Turkish police culture. As Heper (2000) noted that from the Republic’s early days until about 1960s, the political discussion was around such Republican principles as secularism and statism. The Turkish revolution aimed at a transformation of values, with the ultimate goal of substituting reason and science
for religious dogma. Due to the efforts of the so-called intellectual-bureaucratic elite, including university faculty members and their former students ensconced in the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy, reason and science turned into well defined principles that gradually became the Republic's dogma. For Ataturk, the greatest obstacle to progress was the dogmatic nature of religion "that one had come across in the Ottoman empire." (Heper, 2000: 128). Thus, a new generation had to be educated to form an elite, which would then educate the rest of the population.

Indeed, during the Democrats between 1950-1960 when a more responsive attitude towards the citizens' religious sensibilities had been adopted this political elite stanced against DP governments that they thought challenged Republican values. Having had a rather low opinion of the people and their elected Democratic representatives, political elite became champions of "rational democracy", holding that public decisions should be made by the educated and patriotic elite and not by the uneducated and self-seeking masses and their representatives (Heper, 2000: 127). In order to prevent similar DP examples in the future, this intellectual-bureaucratic elite converted the principles of Turkish revolution into Ataturkism-as-an-ideology - a set of principles with fixed meanings. Ataturkism, according to them, was a prescriptive for political governments. Since then "the secular authorities increasingly active interpretation of the place of orthodox religion within the modern, reformed, changed Republic" (Shankland, 1999: 68). From this point, Gunduz says "Secularism and unitary nature of the state are the hallmarks of the entire politico-legal system." (2001: 20).

The role of military and its relations with civilians is another important issue, which should be considered. As shown earlier, military forces in Turkey have occupied a special position and enter into politics and policing on a range of matters far beyond
military interests. As Harris (1985) pointed out, the military establishment in Turkey as 'a key actor in Turkey's political order', and a 'special form of pressure group on the Turkish scene', since military forces have played a prominent and sometimes a determinant role even when not actually running the government.

The reason for military intervention in politics and society and the way it happens is related to the level of development of societies and the level of political culture. From this point, military intervention in politics is more the exception than the rule in developed countries and those countries where there is a high level of political culture. If the level of political culture is low, the replacement of civil government by the military government is more likely (Aydin, 1997: 108). As a consequence Turkey has received several military coups and more likely to receive if the country requires to be protected as the Armed Forces Act, Article 35 states that a duty of the military is 'to protect and safeguard' the country. It does not indicate whether this protection is against external aggression or internal threats. Along with the political involvement the military also involves in policing on many occasions. Once they are involved, they do not accept the command and control of any civilian authority.

The role of the military in this development is another important issue which should be considered, especially the military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 which had a great influence not only the police force but also on every aspects of society. After every coup, the role of the police as a guarantor of the status quo has been consolidated. A large amount of power and support has been given to the police in their fight against the enemies of the regime. Therefore, it could be said that contemporary police authoritarianism and suspiciousness are characteristics that are very evident in Turkish police officers. The influence of the political development
of the country over other core characteristics of the police culture will be given in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 6

BECOMING A POLICE OFFICER

In the previous chapter the historical development of Turkey, its tailor-made definition of the role of the police, and the consequences of that have been proposed as the background factors which have to be taken into consideration in understanding contemporary Turkish police culture. Indeed, an understanding of Turkish police culture would not be complete without the consideration of, for example, the Turkish Army's role in the modernisation of Turkey. Not only have its early reforms in the Ottoman era generated a long process of Westernisation from modern education to parliamentary constitutionalism, but also its secularist and progressive stand has been a crucial factor in the transition from a multi-national theocratic empire to a secular-national state in the form of republic.

Turkish police culture, however, is still more than the sum of these background details. Culture is dense in values and beliefs, rituals, habits, full of historical prescription and common sense that guide police officers' actions. Culture processes information, but in value-laden ways and in moral predispositions that are self-affirming. Police culture takes in information from the world around it and acts on that information in predispositive, though not wholly predictable, ways. Police culture is how police officers act out their moral and social identities. Moreover, Reiner (1992) considers police personality traits to be the core characteristics of the police culture. These traits have been suggested by Leftkowitz to be "...authoritarianism, suspiciousness, physical courage, cynicism, loyalty, secretiveness, and self-assertiveness" (1975: 3). What the
police do, therefore, can be regarded as a number of acts which resulting from a
distinct police identity. This identity comprises not only the overt image of state
appointed agents of the law but also a philosophy of tradition which derives in
part from a process of socialisation. In this process we shall consider how police
officers acquire the values, beliefs and attitudes that are commonly associated
with police and police culture. Therefore, in this chapter of the thesis, the
individual police officer will be the focus. The social, economic background and
the motivations and expectations of officers will be investigated in order to
develop a fuller understanding of Turkish police culture.

In order to move forward, this chapter is going to look into the motivations,
attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs of Turkish police recruits, and to
examine how these change as the new officers proceed through their early years
of their career through the socialisation process as they are inducted into police
culture. The selection procedure employed by the Turkish police force will be
examined to see whether it is simply successful in finding recruits who fit the
established profile of police values and beliefs, or, whether it imposes
significant changes on police recruits' view of policing that occur in their initial
training. Their attitudes, values, beliefs and expectations, which police
candidates bring with them to recruitment, if they are substantially the same as
those of the experienced police officers or whether the real changes occur as a
function of the socialisation process, will also be examined in this chapter of the
thesis.

As a starting point, the socialisation process is divided into two parts:
preoccupational and occupational socialisation. In the process of inducting
police officers into police culture, society prepares the individual, with varying
degrees of success, to meet the requirements laid down by other members of that
society, to dictate behavioural norms in a variety of situations. These requirements are based on archetypes recognised by the social group, such as a masculine, authoritative father in the preoccupational socialisation period. Hence in the occupational socialisation period the individual is ready to internalise masculine and authoritarian characteristics of police culture as his or her personality traits.

**Preoccupational Socialisation**

Socialisation as a whole is a continuous process and most human behaviour is learned within the lifetime of the individual. Here, in order to prevent confusion between concepts 'socialisation' and 'enculturation' or intergenerational transmission of culture, it is necessary to make the point that police socialisation process includes the context of enculturation. Some social scientists, for example, Le Vine (1969), prefer the term enculturation to socialisation because it explicitly brings to mind the notion of acquiring, incorporating, or internalising culture. He sees enculturation as broader than socialisation which is role training or training for social participation which occurs on terms set by society rather than on the individual's own terms. The emphasis is on the social purpose of socialisation, a process conceived of as designed to achieve the conformity of individuals to social norms and rules. Socialisation, therefore, has been accepted as “...the process by which an individual comes to appreciate the values, abilities, expected behaviours and social knowledge essential for assuming an organisational role and for participating as an organisation member” (Turner 1990: 1).

The process of socialisation - becoming a member of the Turkish police culture - therefore includes an enculturation period prior the joining the force. Indeed,
for instance, without the consideration the place of women in general Turkish society and raising children accordingly, it would be really difficult to understand contemporary masculinity or conservativeness of Turkish police officers. I have noticed in my fieldwork that most officers have a sufficient degree of internalisation of general male or female roles (that have been found in general Turkish society) both cognitively and effectively that they are likely to perform competently when placed in the appropriate setting of formal expectations. Similarly, Sayar pointed out that the approach of the young male towards a female person is oriented from his childhood experiences. He says “...mostly because of the cultural beliefs the child imagines girls should be placed behind boys in terms of activity as his mother standing in front of him as imaginable mediator” (1983: 37). The female perception of police officers, as one of the core characteristics of the Turkish police culture, either in the force as partner and as general view will be presented in the next chapter.

The influence of the childhood period on the police officers' socialisation in Turkey is probably wider than the police officers in the United Kingdom. Because of the limitation of current study such as time, resources and most importantly the focus of this doctoral thesis being police culture, this preoccupational socialisation could not be researched thoroughly from several points which are relevant for the study of socialisation. For example, ecologically, the size, density, physical distribution, and social composition of Turkish population and its presentation among police officers is important in understanding Turkish police culture. Similarly, economic and political conditions of Turkey as well as system of values as general culture are also important in this preoccupational socialisation period. As pointed out above, the
subject of this thesis is not solely the socialisation process, however this issue is recognised as being of significance for the study.

Perhaps the most important phase of preoccupational socialisation to becoming a police officer is immediately prior to joining to the police force. Indeed most individuals are introduced to a new organisation only after they have had time to think about it and develop some perspective. A practical question facing the police force and many other agencies of socialisation is how to manage the advance preparation so as to increase the probability of a successful outcome. In this part of the chapter this preparatory or anticipatory period before joining the police force will be discussed.

Although some authors (Vastole, 1978; Austin et al., 1987) call preoccupational socialisation as 'predispositional' period, the more popular term is 'anticipatory socialisation' in social sciences (Clausen, 1968; Moore, 1969; Fielding, 1988). Briefly, it is a process of acquiring attitudes, expectations, and perceptions associated with a given role prior to assuming that role. It further refers to the previous knowledge an individual possesses about a role which he or she expects or desires to occupy. In the present study, anticipatory socialisation represents the recruit's construction of expectations, values, attitudes and behaviours appropriate for a police officer.

Pavalco (1971) defines the idea of anticipatory socialisation as having several implications for the understanding of socialisation to occupational roles. He suggests that individuals coming into formal occupational training socialisation situations may bring with them conceptions (and misconceptions) about the
occupational role and group to which they aspire. Thus, the extent to which anticipatory socialisation aids or hinders socialisation in formal training settings is problematic. It depends upon how closely the norms and role expectations to which individuals have socialised themselves match the socialisation goals of the formal agents of socialisation and the actual expectations and norms involved.

So, although in sociology, the concept refers to acquiring the expectations and content of a role prior to assuming it, the conceptual equivalent of socialisation in anthropology and psychology respectively are enculturation (the process of acquiring the cultural values and beliefs of a group), and internalisation (the individual's acceptance into his or her personality structure, self images and attitudes, including beliefs and values associated with group identity or status).

As a general socio-psychological experience, socialisation is a process which begins shortly after birth and continues throughout one's lifetime. Early experiences tend to be beyond the control of the individual, whereas adult socialisation experiences are comparatively more voluntary; the adult often initiates the processes which result in the socialisation experience. Occupational choice is an example of adult socialisation.

The present investigation of Police School recruit trainees concentrates on anticipatory socialisation as the initiation phase of police occupational entry. One of the purposes of the research is to determine the extent to which the anticipatory socialisation phase affects overall police occupational socialisation. Adequate foreknowledge helps an individual achieve the desired status within a role with greater ease. Conversely, ignorance of a status or role impedes the
assuming of the role. In both cases, however, it may be supposed that learning or training can modify the attitudes and beliefs of both those with or without anticipatory socialisation experiences.

One's anticipatory socialisation to a role may be affected by observations of others performing that role, through exposure to mass media portrayals and other perceptions of the role. Because anticipatory socialisation takes place before actual experience in that role, the nature of learning may be either accurate, partially correct, or totally incorrect (Clausen, 1968: 8-9). A role refers to behaviour rather than to a position. As such, it is a normative concept and refers to expected or appropriate behaviour (Gordon, 1970: 406). For most police applicants, initial perceptions of the police role may seem fairly clear, although later they may find that these perceptions and understandings were faulty and inadequate.

If individuals readily, realistically and accurately acquire the role-related attitudes, expectations and perceptions, their transition to the new role will eased. On the other hand, if individuals' perceptions and anticipatory expectations are inaccurate or differ significantly from the accepted, authoritatively outlined role of a police officer, they are likely to encounter great difficulty in adjusting to their new position. Thus, a firm understanding of the dynamics of the process whereby entry-level anticipatory occupational conceptions have been internalised by the recruit should be of great value to Police School training programmes.
Career Choices

The linkage between pre-selection and career choice is seen as a fundamental component to police applicant anticipatory socialisation. For example, McCreedy highlights the preconceived notions of the police commonly held by the members of that group as a factor that influences the quality and quantity of applicants. According to him, coupled with general notions of the police are the specific reputations of individual departments. Most people are willing and able to give their impressions of their own police department. Since the career selected by the individual is inextricably tied to self-concept and since most police officers are locally recruited, the department’s reputation can serve to encourage or discourage qualified applicants (McCreedy, 1981: 73).

When referring to the complex process of socialisation, several researchers use the word career (as an example Schein, 1971) when referring to the complex process of socialisation, meaning a process that begins prior to a person's joining an organisation and continues throughout membership of the organisation. Schein identifies two components of the individual: the basic personality characteristics and the constructed selves, the latter being largely a product of socialisation and capable of changing through re-socialisation. He also observes that what is a career to the organisation, is a perspective held by inside individuals as a set of job expectations. Therefore in this part of the study, the candidates’ motivations for choosing police work as a career, either as a set of expectations or reasons related to their social, cultural and economic backgrounds will be dealt with as important key factors of anticipatory socialisation. Moreover the motivations of those who are already in the force
will be researched. The question whether they would rejoin the police force if they were to begin their careers again would also be asked.

The starting point is why an individual wishes to be a police officer. A cynical answer, and one that is not generally true of those men and women who are accepted into the force, is that they wish to legitimate personality weaknesses such as criminal impulses, sadomasochism, inferiority complexes, and the like. Another answer perhaps is that the police recruit has a sense of social responsibility and service combined with a desire to be a person of action or adventure. Police work has the potential to satisfy all these needs. This view, of course, is not true of all men and women who join the force. For most Turkish police officers the answer might be that it was the best career opportunity open to them.

This is a sufficient reason to join the police force for most police recruits in Turkey, although educational level is, in the contemporary, modernised world the principal sorting mechanism for the adult occupational world. Although schools are regarded as essential (virtually every job requires at least functional literacy), many career choices are essentially negative in that the educational qualifications are not met. Indeed in order to become a police officer in Turkey, the educational level should not necessarily be from university education. Being college educated is enough (although every year over a million university candidates try to enter to university but only small number of them are successful). Therefore as a base we can say that all police officer candidates in Turkey, from one view, are disappointed in their career choice. New job
opportunities are decreasing year by year to the young population who represent a relatively high proportion of the general population by age.

**Table 1:** Population in Turkey by age group (000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11 931</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>12 817</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>10 470</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11 600</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 19</td>
<td>22 401</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>24 417</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>7 425</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9 825</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - Over</td>
<td>14 911</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>16 422</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>50 664</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 shows the age distribution of the Turkish population in 1980 and 1985. When we take into consideration the age group of entry to the police force is 18 to 30, about twenty per cent of the population are potential recruits. Another twenty per cent (age 10-19) are waiting, then another twenty-five per cent (age 0-9) will move to the higher age groups. In other words, the first row of the table shows the potential candidates for the police force moving towards the accepted age of twenty. The second row shows the possible number of
candidates, and the last one states that only thirty per cent of the entire population is not potential candidates.

The population of Turkey is presently in excess of sixty million. The table shows that it was nearly 45 million in 1980 rising to 50 million in the next five years, and it continues to show a rising trend. The core characteristics of this population are: 1) fifty per cent of the population is under twenty which means there is a huge labour force in stock and they will soon apply to the government for official posts like police force, 2) Turkey is a developing country and there are not many job opportunities. Its economy is in chaos. The government has closed some state-owned factories and mines. Even for 2,500 ordinary posts, for which the salary is about half of a police officer’s, at the Department of Social Security, about one hundred thousand people applied in 1996. In such a period of the country's history, police officers are the only occupational group who regard themselves to be essential for the government and vice versa. Therefore the police force is recruiting over ten thousand new officers every year. These are very good job opportunities for those who have few qualifications.

As it will be stated later, one of most frequently expressed reason of choosing police work is the financial security, which seems to be provided by the public sector. Otherwise for those people who are, in reality, unqualified for private sector employment becoming unemployed are an almost inescapable fate.

During my fieldwork an officer told me:

I am now twenty-five and high school educated. If I were not a police officer I would only be a porter or building construction worker. I might have been a casual labourer, but now I am a policeman and I have regular earnings even better than most employees in other departments of the state (male officer, 1999).
Of course, not every unqualified or unemployed person either chooses police work or is able to join the force. The increasing number of unemployed in the country does not give everyone the opportunity of becoming a police officer.

**Table 2: Unemployment in Turkey by age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Population of 12 years old and over</th>
<th>Labour Force</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 - 19</td>
<td>9,298,500</td>
<td>4,063,545</td>
<td>630,795</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>4,189,373</td>
<td>2,609,689</td>
<td>452,541</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>4,075,626</td>
<td>2,755,876</td>
<td>197,671</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - +</td>
<td>19,534,434</td>
<td>11,187,623</td>
<td>427,730</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,097,933</td>
<td>20,616,733</td>
<td>1,708,737</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the year of 1989 8.4

*Source: Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey 1990. State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry of Turkey.*
Table 2 clearly shows that there is especially high number of unemployed among those who could apply to the police force. The younger age group, as they will soon join to the potential candidates supports this. As stated before, the changes of work are slim in the country and police force is one of the biggest employers.

Table 3 shows the popularity of the police force as an option for the unemployed. Comparing the results from the survey part of the fieldwork, it can be seen that over half of the students at one police school were twenty-four years old and over. This indicates that people may have tried to get some other jobs before applying to police force as employment normally starts well below the age group of 22.

Table 3: Age distribution of survey sample of recruits in 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 - 21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 - 23</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 - +</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this point of view, Turkish police officers are distinguishable from other countries in Europe and the United States. In these countries, financial security as a reason for choosing police work, as a career is not as important as the working environment supplied by the police force. For instance, in one study by
Reiner (1978), it was found that the most frequently cited attraction of the job of the police officer was the way of life it offered - interest, excitement, outdoor activity, a 'man's' job- rather than any financial consideration. In his study Reiner asked a sample of 168 British police officers to rate the most important aspects of their work. As a result there was a reasonable match between what was seen as important in a job, and what was experienced once working as a member of the police force. Interest and variety were valued. Over half the sample said they would rejoin the police if they were to begin their careers again.

An American study, carried out by Hageman (1979), suggests that 77 per cent of police recruits gave ‘accomplishing something worthwhile’ as the most important reason for joining the police force, while 65 per cent cited helping the public, and 27 per cent viewed the work as a steady job with a secure future. More than fifty per cent of the respondents said that secure future was somewhat important. Similarly some people want to become a police officer, because they are potentially police-career oriented. Their life interest is concentrated on policing. They dream police work. 'Their knowledge about being a police officer often is acquired through glamorised movies and television shows, spectacular cases presented in the media, and vicarious experiences relayed by friends. Expectations are high and idealised' (Stratton, 1984: 30). For these people police officers are heroes and well liked by families and friends. This is a police officer and is what they want to be.

Although they have given similar reasons as American police officers for joining the police force, almost all of the new recruits in my fieldwork saw fear of 'being unemployment' as the main reason for joining the Turkish police force. They have also opted-out of promotion opportunities which are virtually closed.
to the ordinary police constables. Indeed, in Turkey, the structural foundation of the force limits promotional opportunities to police constables. From the early nineties promotion is only open to those who have graduated from the Police Academy in Ankara. Before that time promotion was also open to police constables either if they took a university BA degree while working or if internal police force examinations were successfully completed. Those passing the internal examinations could be promoted up to baskomiser rank (superintendent of police) starting from sergeant rank. Currently, promotion is closed to 82,419 police constables (85 per cent of the force's personnel). The Police Academy has an official student capacity of 1,800 students and despite the fact that it actually currently has over 3,000 students enrolled. It is clear that many constables desiring promotion are being denied the opportunity to complete through either closing internal examinations or not considering BA degree (Police 1992: 113).

The definition of police work by some officers, as an example “police work is a job of dedication and commitment, with shift work, being on call” found more sympathy among new recruits in order to choose the police work as a career. A more popularly conceived motivation for joining to the police force is to seek action, in other words, police work is seen as active and adventurous. They are mainly men and have experience from other occupations or who have been in the military before joining the police force. They were attracted to police work by excitement, the outdoor setting, and constantly being on the move. They want to escape the boredom of office type jobs and believe they would be restricted or confined in such a setting. A police sergeant who works as a psychologist at a police training centre has supported this result of the research. She found that
even being with a shotgun is the only reason for some police recruits as she says:

There is an incredible interest to the shotgun among recruits. They don't show as much as interest to other lessons as they show to lessons on shotguns. They have already started to ask what make of shotgun will they have at the end of training....Females recruits also show a very close inclination to the same lesson as male recruits (Zaman, a daily newspaper, 30 April 2000).

Even the risk aspect of police work, the element of personal danger, tends to be regarded more as an exciting incentive rather than as a deterrent to many serving officers in an example “...every corner is another surprise. And that is the way I like it. I would not have it any other way” (a male officer, 1999). This aspect of police work is clearly related to a desire for an outdoor life, which is equated with 'excitement' by applicants as one other officer says “I would like to be a police officer exactly because I get the impression that, as a career, it is exciting, challenging and very much an outdoor job”. The idea of excitement is generally drawn in contrast to other types of work according to some recruits: “I wanted to be a police officer because I feel I needed a challenge in life” (fieldwork, a male recruit, 1998).

Contrary their counterparts in the USA and UK, the police recruits see the machismo associated with police work as a core characteristic of the job rather than a reason to join to the force. One officer told me “What differences are there between the army and the police force? They fight against the outside enemies. We fight against the enemy in the country. Fighting is a man's job and the women personnel in the army work behind the men, and they have to work where they have to in the army”. Another officer said “...you know, women are, naturally, more merciful than men, for instance, if they see a child who has
stolen something they could let them free. Actually they should not let them” (a male officer, 1999).

'Manliness' may be crucial to male police officer, because as many studies, for example Neiderhoffer (1967) has shown, his working class has socially isolated him from the prestige symbols available to a member of the middle class. He knows that he cannot make the grade of middle-class occupations because of his limited education and educational opportunities are still very clearly class-centred in Turkey. In addition, manliness remains as a potent symbol of prestige as like having a gun. One officer during the research summarised the meaning of having a gun for themselves "...there is a proverb, as you know, 'horse, wife, and gun'. These are very important for a healthy man". Indeed this old proverb remains very popular even in modern Turkey. The public counts these three with a horse as a transportation vehicle as the core components of being a man. The legal authority to carry a gun gives an individual the ability to do many things ordinary people cannot do and so upholds the manly image and restores prestige in society.

Life-long job security or financial security is another important reason to join the police force. This factor is related to either the fear of 'being unemployed' which was mentioned above and holding insufficient educational qualifications. Indeed low educational levels close many other options or work which could be insecure. From this point, it could be said here that career choice consists of two components. Individuals not only select their occupation, the occupation also selects the individual. Police work offers life-time job security with no requirement for high educational qualifications in the selection process. Therefore, a linkage exists between pre-occupational decision-making and the occupation's need to recruit and retain members. From this point of view, the
candidates in Turkey seem to have fewer alternatives than their counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom where police officers have chosen their careers by a different decision-making process, with more positive reasons for wishing to join the police force. The United States and Europe are industrialised, with a high level of service industries and educational systems, which offer more equal opportunities than in Turkey. Career opportunities are also more varied. Contrary to this, many police officers in Turkey have chosen police work because there are few viable alternatives.

However, these major factors played an important role in their decision, the recruits questioned for present study have rated sixteen different factors from the most to the least important which influenced their decision to join the force. These factors were either chosen from existing literature or have been formulated with regard to cultural and social conditions pertaining in Turkey. It can be seen from the Table 4 that the most frequently mentioned reason for joining the police force in Turkey is that it was the only job they could get. This result was the expected reason as was the pay the police officer received, which was ranked third. Near the bottom of the list is recruitment information from the police department. Official positive recruitment information is very sparse in Turkey, whereas unofficial, negative information is widespread. This type of information could come either from the media or the police officers who currently work in the force, as a recruit stated:

I have chosen the police work as a job, because in my family we have always had a police officer. It is quite an important reason to decide, but not the most important. I mean it is important because it was always on agenda. If I had listened to the things said about the police work I would not have chosen this job. But if you can't get other jobs, you have to get what you can whatever it is said (fieldnotes, a female recruit, 1999).
Table 4: Reasons for joining the Turkish police force

For each of the following reasons, indicate whether it was (3) very important, (2) somewhat important or (1) not important at all, in your decision to become a police officer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It just seemed like the best job opportunity I could get</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge of police work</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay as a police officer</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to help people</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to experience working in the community</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excitement of police work</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of friends who are police officers</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing a uniform</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry a gun</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to work directly with people</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to work outdoors</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have always wanted to become a police officer</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of friends and relatives who are not police officers</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment information from the police force</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of job</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have always had a police officer in the family</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Numbers in parentheses are rankings)

It is also clear from the results that recruits have, in general, either vague or misinformed ideas of the realities of police work before they join. From these points they are quite different than British and US police recruits who decide to
become a police officer as they know why they want to do so and consequently how to satisfy their aims in their decision. If they are disappointed after joining they would have other employment. Decisions about their career are neither casual nor restricted.

A major difficulty with this part of the research is that it is possible that the recruits taking part in the questionnaire were not one hundred per cent honest and may have given preference to the characteristics of the job in their answers, while in private holding different opinions.

If we are honest, we must be grateful for finding this job. We would have had nothing if not policing but, for instance, a cleaning job. In this case, the answers will be commendatory of this job (a male recruit, 1998).

Therefore the more specific profiles of police officers and the recruits must be taken into consideration in order to obtain more accurate answers.

**Background Characteristics of Turkish Police Officers**

Environment plays an important role in building up individual personality characteristics throughout interaction with others. Hence the sociologist sees the individual in society adopting as a framework for his or her own behaviour and as a perspective for the interpretation of the behaviour of others a repertoire of role relationships. Thus socialisation is partly a matter of learning culturally standard role concepts and partly a matter of learning to constitute the social world through the enactment of role processes with their tentative and adaptive character. Therefore, both psychologists and sociologists agree that social, cultural and economic backgrounds can play an important role in shaping the individual.
According to Hahn (1974) the socio-economic origins from which officers are recruited may account for many of the more salient characteristics of the police. His findings state that most people entering the police ranks emerge from working and lower middle-class backgrounds. Hahn quotes two separate surveys of graduates of the New York City Police Academy from a study of Neiderhoffer and McNamara. In these surveys it was found that nearly eighty per cent of the fathers of policemen were employed as labourers or service workers. Hahn continued:

Despite the relatively low pay and unfavourable working conditions connected with police duty, joining the force usually constitutes an advancement over the occupation held by the patrolman's father as well as over most other jobs with which the recruit himself has been associated. Thus, for many recruits, the prospect of becoming a policemen represents an opportunity for upward social movement and improved economic position (1974: 16).

Similarly, Wilson referred to the working-class backgrounds of police offers in many communities and their preoccupation with working-class values: maintaining self-respect, proving one's masculinity, 'not taking any crap,' and not being 'taken in.' (1968: 33-34). Radelet quoted Blum's reference from Milton Rector, "There is a high correlation between violence and the lower cultural-economic levels. If you recruit from these levels, you run the risk of obtaining people who have built-in violent reactions when they run into problems, as the police do. Before you recruit from these levels, you have to assess carefully their attitudes and stability" (Radelet, 1980: 116).

Lastly, according to Lipset (1971) the police derive their conservatism from their working-class backgrounds, with the added consideration that police work appeals primarily to those from a working-class background whose personalities have been shaped in such a way that they value subservience to authority and an
escape from freedom. In short, the background and pre-police personality of police recruits are as important as the occupational socialisation process after they enter police work in shaping their value patterns. Therefore in the coming part of the chapter the questions ‘who are Turkish police officers?’ and ‘what are their social, economic, and cultural backgrounds?’ will be explored.

**Educational Backgrounds**

The role of education in shaping the personalities and cultures is accepted without hesitation in the social sciences. For instance, Gordon says that there does emerge a major pattern of change associated with the college experience. According to Gordon, declining authoritarianism, dogmatism, and prejudice, together with decreasingly conservative attitudes toward public issues and growing sensitivity to aesthetic experiences, is particularly prominent forms of change - as inferred from freshman-senior differences. These add up to something like increasing openness to multiple aspects of the contemporary world, paralleling wider ranges of contact and experience. Somewhat less consistently, but nevertheless evident, are increasing intellectual interests and capacities, and a declining commitment to religion, especially in its more orthodox forms. Certain kinds of personal changes - particularly toward greater independence, self-confidence, and readiness to express impulses - are the rule rather than the exception (1972: 93).

According to Watson and Sterling, differences in educational attainment among police were more significant than any other variable in explaining the contrasting opinions expressed by officers (1969: 119). Although in sociology, and especially in Marxist Theory, educational attainment is class oriented and, so, social class is actually the most important variable. Therefore one might
argue that persons from class level other than lower-middle or working class would make better police officers. Banton makes a good point here that "...to do his job properly, the policeman...has to be to some extent a classless figure. He has to deal with subjects of different class and his relationships with them must be determined by his office, not by his class position" (1964: 181). Banton’s remark could be an ideal policy of policing if both police officers and his or her occupational and political superiors also become classless.

In order to obtain information about the educational backgrounds of Turkish police officers, firstly the level of formal education of officers needs to be analysed. Although some points about the educational situations of police officer have already been discussed, it is important to expand on this topic in order to show the relationships between unemployment and career choices.

**Table 5**: Educational level of the police officers (in thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As can be seen from Table 5 there is a correlation between the educational level and opportunities for obtaining police work as a job. This is one of the official
conditions for becoming a police officer that recruits require at least the minimum college education level, which produce candidates with this minimum level. If only secondary school level was required, it can be argued that there could be a predominance of recruits from this level.

The table also shows that in 1988 over fifty per cent of police officers were graduates from secondary schools, and 42 per cent graduated from colleges. It is clear that nine out of ten of police officers graduated from low level institutions which currently have very low status for candidates for employment in the private sector (Eren, 1991: 126). Only 4.7 per cent of police officers obtained a university degree, but here, the important point is that nearly all of these were higher ranking officers and regulations require that the higher ranks must be university graduated. Therefore, except for the higher ranks, the whole Turkish police force has been educated below the level of university education. It is important, at this point, to stress that the current situation was totally different even fifteen or twenty years ago, because at that time even primary school graduates were accepted into the lower ranks. The increasing entry standard, however, can be correlated with changes and improvements in the Turkish educational system over the same period of time.

After 1988 there was a steady increase in the number of higher ranking officers as a consequence of an increase in total numbers in the force. The proportion of college and secondary schools graduated police officers was maintained at nine out of ten. However college graduates have represented an increasing percentage of officers over secondary school graduates. The percentage of primary school graduates is decreasing because this is now below the required educational standard.
The annual outcome of the Police Academy, which is about five to six hundred personnel, is not influential in increasing numbers of personnel in university graduate level. The reason behind the differences between 1990 and 1992 is that more officers have started to take extra university level education through distance learning education, which does not require them to attend a classroom. Economic difficulties force police officers to obtain a university degree to enable them to gain promotion and so a higher salary:

...even here there is discrimination between the officers. Some officers could easily get a daily break to study lessons. Why? Because their department is convenient and they are also the kind of personnel who approach their superiors in an oily way. But in this police station we have not had even a moment of time to join to a classroom, and another thing oily way is not my type (Male officer, six years' service, 1999).

**Socio-economic Backgrounds**

The social environment is one of widely accepted factors in the shaping of personality. For instance, as already indicated, police officers usually come from the working class part of the society and according to Danziger (1971), middle and working class parents may provide different models for the child to follow. He points out class linked differences among adults with regard to values as well as cognitive and affective functions, where children of different class backgrounds will be exposed to the influence of different models. A professional father who expresses somewhat intellectual values in his behaviour will induce different behaviour in his son than a father who actually opposes such values in word and deed (1971: 126-127).

Naturally the term social class includes the family and it has to be mentioned here that social class is not a preference of a child. The family brings up a child in their class; hence the family is the prime factor in the socialisation process.
As Kerckhoff says “The family is an agency of socialisation in almost all societies” (1972: 12). So, the family may play an important role in the process of choosing the police work as a profession. For example, Hahn has found that in Chicago and New York, a large proportion of police officers have fathers or other relatives who have worked in the same occupation, despite the fact that many departments have come to require examinations that eliminate a sizeable majority of all applicants. A preference for police work is often passed from one generation to the next within a family. The handing down from father or mother to son or daughter of police work as an occupation contributes to the perpetuation of a common body of police values and traditions. The family is therefore an important factor that must be considered in the shaping of police culture.

Further as Turkey is a developing country and tied up with strong traditional and conservative values, the impact of the family over children is frequently perpetuated into adulthood. Turkish parents feel themselves to be totally responsible for their children for a much longer period of time, frequently until they earn their living and get married. Some police officers participating in my fieldwork gave their marriage as an example of the point at which parents began to withdraw their major influence. One said he became a police officer at twenty-four and got married at the next year. His parents found his wife for him and he did not know her until he and his family visited her parents’ house. The Islamic background of the country certainly has a great effect on the kind of socially normative relationships between children and their parents. According to Islamic traditions children cannot gave their parents any sign of boredom or
anger because this would be regarded as sinful. On the other hand, parents also have a strong religion based moral obligation to bring up their children as well as preparing a good future for them.

Sociologists have argued that the effect of traditions, including the values of religion, have a more visible effect in the lower social groups. In other words, as the level of education and wealth rises, people become more liberated from their socially imposed value system. Therefore the social status of police recruit candidates is an important factor in the development and perpetuation of police culture. In order to explore their social backgrounds, police recruits have been asked about their fathers' occupations. Responses have been presented in Table 6.

In Table 6, below, a regular employee refers to those whose income mainly based on a regular salary, which could be either from the public or private sectors of the economy. Casual employees, for example, are those who have seasonal work such as cotton plantation workers who become unemployed after the end of the season. Casual workers can be seen in any part of the economy but are mainly concentrated in those sectors where physical labour is used. Employers and the self employed are mainly those who own factories, shops, and so on. The category of unpaid family worker is a very common social reality in Turkey that is based mainly in the agricultural sectors. Many, of course, are family members of the employer and self employed. Those in the category of ‘others’ encompasses anyone not identifiable with the six major categories. For example, those of working age who are in full time study.
Table 6: Father’s occupations of the recruits (of the sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Sample</th>
<th>General Population (1988)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Employee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual Employee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Employed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6 shows that a large percentage of police recruits and serving officers are from the lower social groups. The total number and percentage of regular, casual employees, and unpaid family workers plus the unemployed clearly shows this. The self employed category consists mainly of small shops, such as corner shops.
and small greengrocers. Therefore when their number is added, the total percentage of the lower and working class increases. Interestingly, there were two police recruits whose fathers were employers. The reasons they gave in order to join the police work were:

I have decided to become a police officer because I got bored working at my father’s business. I had been working there for twelve years after finishing primary school. My father is too bossy and I did very routine things every day. I wanted to escape from that job.... If I could not cope with another job at least there is a place I can go back to. This makes me relax. I do not have to worry about being unemployed (Male recruit, 1998).

And

My father is quite rich. He offered me a job and forced me to work with him. But my uncle is a policeman. I admired of him and having a gun was an ambition of mine. Because of these reasons and knowing that you would not starve if you could not cope with the job, I have chosen police work (Male recruit, 1998).

Although they are neither completely unemployed or employed, the casual employee and unpaid family workers represent a total of fifty per cent of the sample of recruits. This is much higher than the figure from national data, where this group represents only 20 per cent. When the unemployed, one in every ten, has been added, it can be seen that the potential police candidate is the person who escapes unemployment and who might regard the financial security as an important reason for becoming a police officer. For example, one recruit’s parents were seasonal workers at cotton plants. After the cotton season his
parents have to find alternative employment but this was not always easy. This recruit said:

I was doing similar things before attending this police school. There is no future out there, especially with the more technical equipment being put in service nowadays....Before I decided to apply to the force my father and I were unemployed. This also motivated me to apply (A male recruit, 1998).

It seems, therefore, that the social class backgrounds of people are important in terms of socialisation studies, and those differences in parental goals and expectations are also significant.

**Geographical Backgrounds**

The regional division of the country where the recruits come from is also taken as an important key factor in choosing police work in the present study. There are significant differences between the regions that could give some clues in understanding police culture, and so a question relating to the geographic region of Turkey in which recruits were born formed part of the questionnaire. It is therefore important to consider the core characteristics of the Turkish regions. The official geographical division of the country has been taken as the base of the question. Table 7, below, presents this division with the sample's hometown distribution and the national population percentage within each region.

In 1985 about twenty-seven million citizens used to live in the cities (56 per cent) and about twenty-four million were in rural areas (44 per cent). This ratio was reversed in favour of rural areas by 1980, when 53 per cent of the
population lived in rural areas. By the sixties, over 70 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, a clear indication that increasing industrialisation of the country was producing a migration towards the growing wealth of the cities. The population in urban areas is therefore increasing every year, for example, in 1985, eleven million of the urban population, out of twenty-seven million, used to live in only three cities (Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir) and the other 64 cities were home to only 16 million. In 1990, twenty-two per cent of the whole population used to live in Marmara region (where Istanbul is situated with its over 10 Million of the population) nineteen per cent in the Central Anatolia region, and twenty per cent in the East and the South-east Anatolia regions.

The distribution of the sample is different from the national data because police recruits tend to come from less commercial and industrialised regions. Only 4.4 per cent of sample came from Istanbul and its surroundings, although twenty-two per cent of citizens are accumulated in that region. The heavy industrialisation in this area means that a greater percentage of the population is employed, mainly in non-seasonal jobs.

According to Table 7, below, approximately every four in ten recruits had their home town in Central Anatolia whereas the national distribution is only two in ten citizens. When the total amount and percentage of recruits from the Central, East, and South-East Anatolia regions are taken in consideration, the difference between the national data and police recruits can be seen.
Table 7: Hometown distribution of sample and the National Population percentage (in 1990 National Population Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Survey Sample</th>
<th>General Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anatolia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Anatolia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


About sixty-five per cent of recruits gave the Central, East, and South-East Anatolia regions as their hometown while only forty per cent of the population lives there. The main reason behind this is that the people in these regions work in agriculture. However the percentage of the South-east Anatolian region is low in that percentage because of political instability of that region which leads people not to apply police work. One recruit makes it clear as he said:
There are not many officers from our region, because the terrorist activities do not let local people become police officers. Why? Firstly, already the government employs them as a voluntary force against the terrorists and so they already defend their homes and lands. Secondly, the terrorists are very cruel to the official security forces - the police officers and the gendarmes. They have to wear uniform and consequently they are easily detected among the crowds and could be killed. But in the voluntary force, they don't wear uniform. They get some money from the government and also they do their other works as well as defending themselves. If they were to become police officers they would have to do only policing (a male recruit, from the South-east Anatolia, 1998).

Indeed, quite a considerable number of security forces personnel have been killed since the late eighties by separatist Kurdish terrorists. The total number of police officers killed by terrorists was 204 between 1989 and 1992. About 44 per cent of them were killed in 1992, while 30 per cent in 1991, 18 per cent in 1990 and 9 per cent in 1989 (Polis, 1992: 102).

**Formal Socialisation**

In the anticipatory socialisation period we have seen that the police candidates are neither quite total outsiders nor complete members of the police culture. The police force in Turkey, like any other organisation in the world, take these partly integrated candidates to the training schools in order to prepare them for the wide range of objectives of the force. Here the recruits are given some programmes, orientation lectures describing the ideology of the force, and other more formal induction procedures. The authorities place the new recruit in a formal status as a learner and provide programmes designed to ensure his commitment to the force and its purposes, and to instruct him or her so that this can participate fully and knowingly in the force's activities. When the recruit is placed in the formal role of learner, that status-placement includes an
assumption about which recruit should look to for appropriate models. Therefore the formal socialisation process, as recruits become fully invested into the police culture, is important. As Fielding pointed out “...orientation to, and investment value in, the occupational culture, is partly accomplished by the training school” (1988: 54). However, according to some authors, police culture does not highly value ‘book learning’ or academic ability as a skill for police officers (Fielding, 1988: 58). Fielding quotes Sherman (1978) who found that in the United States there is evidence that educated officers get lower performance ratings simply because they are educated.

Indeed this situation is also the case in Turkey. There are many complaints at the Police Academy regarding this issue. I have a post at the Academy as a lecturer and a letter is given to us at the beginning of every academic year, directing that the lecturers should also make connections between the theory and the practice. This is because the most common difficulty the newly graduated officers faces in their first year in the force is the link between lessons and practice outside the training schools, which is often said to be insufficient. In theory, the curriculum at police schools is designed according to contemporary police understanding of modern society, such as to respect human rights in police activities, the authorities and competence of police according to law, and occupational regulations. In practice, the police officers will see the reality is different from that they were taught at the police schools. Undoubtedly this is a dilemma for many countries, and more particularly the underdeveloped and developing countries such as Turkey as they have to face a vicious circle because the role of the police forces is set as the guarantor of the status quo while the public is generally more liberal than the state.
The explanation of the dilemma is quite simple that in theory, which is also the main teaching subject at the police training centres, police forces emerged from the demand for order in a civil society. Their primary task is to preserve public peace and tranquillity. All their other tasks, such as protection and preservation of life and property, the prevention and suppression of crime, the enforcement of laws, the apprehending of offenders and the provision of a wide range of public services, were subordinate to the function of maintaining order (Bowden, 1978: 19).

In the contemporary developed and industrialised countries—especially those who have long historical experiences in democracy, for example the United Kingdom and the United States, the governments have long been reasonably successful in deploying the police forces according to the objectives above. One of the main policing debates in those countries is centred on whether the police force is a law enforcement agency or social service agency, because it has been seen that the majority of police time is spent on social service related work rather than law enforcement.

However, in other countries the regimes are unstable and their democracy does not follow the model familiar to the developed countries. This type of democracy has most likely come by the force of international relationships and the police were established to deal with enemies of the regime, to control the dissent of the lower social orders and so maintain the status quo. The police therefore become the active arm of the establishment and the first line of defence of the state against any challenge, which might emerge to its power and authority. Iraq is a good example of this type of political control. Although contemporary Turkey is different from Iraq in being both developed and a more tolerant democracy, the police force still say in their anthem "At the borders the
army, inland we wait. We are police officers, the defender of laws and the regime.”

Therefore, as Bowden (1978) says, there is a symbiotic relationship between the security forces and the state (especially between the army and the state), the police force having authority to invoke the power of state. From this point of view the police officer is accepted as the actual representative of the state.

The geographical position of Turkey, situated inside Europe and the national desire for Turkey to become a full member of the European Union makes this dilemma more complex. The European Union is forcing the authorities in Turkey to follow a more democratic policing policy, and so the police force is at the forefront of these major political and social changes. The new lessons at the police schools and training centres, such as human rights and police-public relations, are taught following this development. However, one important point must be taken into consideration here. In any conservative country, like Turkey, structural development always proceeds at less than the desired speed. Pro-active development is costly and can bring political instability and so the authorities are frequently forced to ‘back pedal’ for the sake of economic or political expediency. Hence, progress is slow.

Admittance or Introduction to the Police Culture

Whatever happens Turkey in the future, there will always be a police force and, of course, a police culture. Formal socialisation into this culture starts from admission to the police schools and continues until the first months as an active police officer following graduation. The impact of the formal socialisation process is more apparent in the initial stages. Police candidates have to fulfil several conditions in order to be accepted into the police schools. The first
condition is being a Turkish citizen. The second condition is to have a lycee diploma equivalent to a high school certificate, as the minimum level of educational attainment. Until the middle of the 1980s a junior high school diploma was also accepted. The complexity of policing and the rising young population have caused the educational entry requirements to rise.

Social development and contemporary complex social problems have led to this major change in entry requirements of police work. This is based on several arguments. First, the complexity of police work demands an understanding of human behaviour and a knowledge of the social, political, and economic environment. Second, good police work demands an ability to understand the increasingly complex legal requirements governing such issues as search and seizure, interrogation, and the use of force. Third, it is argued that the police force needs to raise their requirements to keep pace with the generally rising levels of educational attainment in society. Finally, the rising number of graduates from distance learning modes of higher education has become a problem for the force. Many serving officers have graduated from this type of faculty while they remain at work. There is pressure from these graduates to use their newly acquired knowledge for promotion to higher ranks. This, of course, brings its own problems as promotion opportunities are limited and moving up the hierarchy becomes very competitive.

There are also some arguments against increasing the requirement to a university level of education. First, police work is seen as a last option job and therefore police officers could leave the force if they get a better job that is more likely when they obtain a university degree. This is regarded as a waste of time and resources by the organisation. Second, the more educated officer is critical
of traditional police practices and more willing to voice those criticisms, which causes a problem for the authorities within the organisation.

The third condition for entry into the police force is to have minimum requirements for age, height, and visual acuity. The minimum age requirement is 18 years old. No one over the age of 27 is accepted. Contrary to the British police (except the Metropolitan Police in London), which lowered its height requirements to admit more candidates into the force at a time when recruitment was low, height requirements for entry into the police force in Turkey were changed recently to an upper level in order to eliminate a huge number of applicants.

The fourth condition is to have a relatively clean criminal record. Candidates who have been convicted to more than six months imprisonment, for whatever reason, those who have been convicted of the crime against the state, embezzlement, corruption, theft, swindling, forgery, and some other type of circumstances which are considered disgraceful by the public, such as being known as prostitute, cannot join the police force. Their fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and spouse are not excluded from this investigation. There is also another condition of service that candidates are not allowed to marry, or even live with, a non-Turkish national.

Although the concept and regulations of the civil service are designed to eliminate favouritism and political influence in the recruitment of police officers and to ensure that recruits are selected on the basis of impersonal, objective criteria, in practice, selection criteria are a matter of great controversy. It is known that there are entrants to the police schools who been selected because
they or their family have contact with influential people, from the prime minister to high ranking police officers.

Those who fulfill the usual entry conditions are taken for an oral interview then a physical activities examination. Finally there is a written examination. Those candidates passing all these examinations are then taken to hospital in order to undergo a clinical appraisal. The successful recruits are then sent to one of the police training centres shown in Table 8.

**Table 8**: Education institutions of the Turkish Police Force and their students numbers for 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Legal capacity</th>
<th>Actual situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Academy</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara Police College</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul Police College</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul Police Training Centre</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir Bornova Police School</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir 100. Yil Police School</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun 19 May Police School</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazilli Police School</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa Police School</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep Police School</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya Police School</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazig Police School</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzurum Police School</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon Police School</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balikesir Police School</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskisehir Police School</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir Police School</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir Police School</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana Police School</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayseri Police School</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                               | 11,101         | 14,436           |

The Police Academy is the only institution offering a university level of educational attainment upon graduation. The period of study there is four years. After graduation, personnel, without any further examination, start work as a police sergeant. The Academy’s main sources of students are the Police Colleges and high school graduates. In 1994 there were only 106 female students compared with 2,990 male students.

The police colleges receive graduates of junior high school who have to be less than 16 years old at the time they apply. They receive four years education, and in for the first year they are only taught a foreign language (mostly English language, but a small proportion of them learn German). The police schools offer nine months training. In the first six months, recruits receive the basic knowledge relating to police work, the next three months they are divided into branches (traffic, political, judicial, intelligence, narcotics, and so on).

It is common practice at all three types of educational institutions is structured as boarding-schools. The authorities without any charge provide all of the needs of the students including food, books, notebooks, pencils, clothing and uniforms. Students also receive monthly pocket-money. In return, students have to work in the force after the graduation at least equivalent time they spent in police educational institutions. If they want to leave the force earlier they have to recompense the money spent during their educational period.

The directors and their deputies of these educational institutions are high ranking chief police officers. The teaching staff at the Academy consists mostly of academics rather than active police seniors, although there are some
occupational lessons given by high ranking chief police officers. At the police colleges lessons are given by a mainstream teacher, because they follow a normal high school curriculum. At the police training centres and schools, almost all of the teaching staff are active high ranking police officers. When we consider that police constables represent 88 per cent of the entire force, the importance of the teaching staff in introducing police culture to the new recruits becomes very apparent.

As illustrated in Table 8, except for five of the police schools, institutions are mainly overcrowded and this particularly true of the Police Academy. There are two main reasons for this. First, all of the successful graduates from police colleges continue their studies at the Academy. Second, as well as the high school graduates, those who already hold a BA degree can apply to the Academy for a one year special training course. Moreover if one’s father or mother was killed for the sake of the state during their employment in an official post, and accepted as a state martyr he or she is accepted to the Academy without any entry requirements (there were 125 of these recruits in 1994; sixty-one of them were female, sixty-four were male). The Academy also started to accept some of foreign students at the beginning of the 1990s especially from old USSR Republics (in 1994 there were 104 foreign students). There are also a number of student at other universities studying for a BA degree for the Academy (there were 159 of these external students in 1994).
Training

The new recruit is initiated into the world of policing and into the department during the training period. This experience is an extremely important phase of his career according to Westley (1970), Van Maanen (1973) and Neiderhoffer (1969). They describe the experience as a formative rite of passage, an experience that shapes an officer's attitudes about the job, the department, and the public. The recruit is usually extremely anxious about doing well but uncertain about what is expected. He or she adopts the insignia of the new job - the uniform, the badge, the weapon - and, more importantly, learns the military system of discipline - to take orders and not question authority.

The Military Coup at the end of 1980, described in the previous chapter, made the police force a more paramilitary organisation. The new regime reorganised not only the system of discipline, they also reshaped the objectives of the education of recruits at police schools. The current objectives are: (1) to bring up recruits to be loyal to Atatürk's (the founder of the Republic) principles and his revolutions; (2) to teach the recruits to be aware of their responsibilities to the Turkish Republic, loyalty to Atatürk's nationality, national ethics and the cultural values of the Turkish nation; (3) to teach attitudes that police work requires; (4) to provide basic knowledge of the law and its practice in normal police duty; (5) to provide instruction in legal, procedural, and practical developments (Polis 1992: 105).

The first two objectives are common components of the curriculum at any education institution in the country from primary school to university level. Every year the principles of Atatürk and his revolutions are repeated. Regardless
of the academic discipline whether engineering, law, physics, sociology or
history, the tenets of Atatürk’s philosophy are incorporated into the subject
matter. This poses a dilemma for the state, because although the state does really
desire to be regarded as a part of, and on an equal footing with, Western
civilisation, the public are resistant to change and do not wish to forego their
conservative and traditional values (Dereboy & Dereboy, 1997: 418). Therefore
what is seen in contemporary Turkey is a conflict between two value systems.
Atatürk’s revolution took place early in this century and so his words and
principles can appear to be anachronistic as we prepare to step across the
millennium to the twenty-first century. However, most people alive in Turkey
today have been brought up with Kemalism as a fundamental part of their
culture.

Under the ideological and military threats of old Soviet regime, the official
policies against citizens were more authoritarian as they presented communism
as a great danger to Turkey. This policy was supported by the United States.
However, after the collapse of communist block at the beginning of the 1990
there was a huge development of the media in Turkey from about 1987. For
example, there was only one nation-wide television broadcasting company,
which belonged to the state. Currently, there are about 20 nation-wide television
channels and most of them belong to private companies as well as hundreds of
private radio broadcasting which led the public to be more liberal. The official
policy from 1995 replaced the threat of communism with the Islamic values that
have been widely accepted by the public. The principles of Atatürk are being
emphasised more strongly in every aspect of governance. Hence today, any
official speech starts with Atatürk’s words and finishes with Atatürk’s words.
Therefore the curriculum in police schools must be taken into consideration carefully as it prepares recruits as the guarantor of status quo.

In Table 9, below, the lessons and their total hours in a year at the police schools are illustrated. There are several important points that should be stressed. Firstly, the curriculum is a heavy load for those recruits who have graduated from high schools or the equivalent, and most of these had been out of the educational system for considerable time between high school and the police school. Moreover, some lessons could be seen as a waste of time by the recruits as they pointed out during the field work "...the curriculum includes some unnecessary lessons...what we just do is to try to pass the examinations from such lessons: Turkish literature, and foreign language. What can you learn in nine months in English language? Not much, we will certainly forget these lessons in a short time" (A newly appointed officer, 1999). Some of them see that several lessons are given for political reasons.

...for example take the lesson about human rights. There is a huge pressure on the force from the media, from international organisations and from politicians because they want to be seen affable to their constituents.... Amnesty International prepare a bad report every year. So then we have a human rights lesson. How about police rights? We are also human (female officer, 1999).

Secondly, some of the law related lessons require some basic knowledge of the law. This could be a serious problem for those who did not take any related lessons in their early educational period. "Training is only one year. They are high school graduated, and do not have any knowledge of the law at all. Therefore what they do is to get the job done by raising their voice" (Piar, 1992: 4).
**Table 9:** Lessons at the police schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons</th>
<th>Hours in a week</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Total in a year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Literature</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Principle of Ataturk and History of Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Judgement System Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Constitution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Occupational Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline Law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Knowledge</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Training and Close Fighting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.66</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police-Community Relations and Tourism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Security and Intelligence Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Traffic Knowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study and Investigation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Writing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Knowledge and First-aid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Riots and Prevention</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Psychology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Optional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Language</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Information</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director's Hours*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>1220</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Egitim Daire Baskanligi Briefing '93*. Ankara: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü

* This is not a lesson. Director of the school attends the class each week and gives advice, listens to recruits etc.

** Recruits can only take one optional lesson. Therefore the total has been derived by adding one optional lesson.

*** Two terms’ lessons. Others are given only in one term. Each term every lesson has 20 hours.
The instructors, who are mostly active high-ranking police officers, are also aware of this situation, so they usually narrate their working experiences instead of teaching subjects. From this point of view, contact with them "is a source of knowledge about the essential tenets of police culture" (Fielding, 1988: 54). Therefore it can be asserted that the theoretical effectiveness of these schools is extremely limited. One possible solution, which the authorities are aware of, is to employ professional academic teaching staff. However, the schools away from the metropolitan areas have no opportunity to get qualified training instructors from the universities. This is also seen as another serious problem to be solved by the authorities. According to Briefing '93 which was presented by high rank officers to the general directorate of the police:

...One more important thing to be done in the long term is to collect police schools in metropolitan cities and to open high quality totally new police schools, thus, either resources will be used more efficiently and more university academic staff will be available in order to solve the problem of current teaching staff (1993: 10).

Currently, only the Istanbul Police Training Centre has this opportunity with 22 academic staff. As can be seen from Table 9, three lessons are seen most important. These are shotgun knowledge, typewriting, and physical training and close fighting. The next most important lessons are occupational law, case study, and riot prevention. Human rights, public psychology, police-community relations and tourism are not seen as important as typewriting. The percentage of occupational lessons in total is 70 per cent for the first term and 86.6 per cent for the second term (Briefing '93: 6).

Physical training and martial arts includes how to march, the hierarchic order system, and the methods of confronting public riots. A clear explanation for this can be given. With the many similarities of the police to the military; wearing
uniforms, carrying weapons, being in service to Turkey, and with usual military interventions, police training reflects both a military format and its values. This training includes things such as: strict military procedures and atmosphere; a superior-inferior relationship between recruits and instructors; extra work for failing - especially by marching, loud verbal abuse and discipline, punitive physical training for mistakes, and the requirements that recruits must speak in a loud, commanding voice and at times command and control the training class during marches, drills and in the classroom. A training officer expressed his view

...without discipline, standard procedures and similarity of response from all officers in given situations there will be a breakdown of police teamwork and effective operation.... The chain of command and the following of appropriate orders should be seen as appropriate in specific policing situations...If we let them free individual officers may end up doing it their own way (Male officer, 1998).

There were several recruits contacted during the fieldwork who found that occupational lessons are given less time than they should be. These recruits usually joined the force because of the special actions related to police work. As one recruit pointed out:

I am a bit disappointed from what I get here. I was expecting to get details about the crime that I have to deal with on the street. Now I am not sure what I should do if I meet with, for example, a member of the parliament who did not stop at red light (Female recruit, 1998).

In order to maintain knowledge of changing laws and requirements and to obtain more effective policing, the force gives frequent in-service training. For example, in 1993 about 105 occupational courses were carried out. However none of these were related to police-community relations. There was only one seminar about this subject, which was given in Diyarbakir, situated in South-East Anatolia where
anarchy is concentrated. The purpose was "...giving information about current and possible dangers, either from inland or abroad towards national security, transferring new developments to the police officers and to keep relations between local citizens and the State warm and to make the benefits of these cordial relationships on the side of the state" (Briefing '93: 7).

**Reality Shock**

The initial experience of actual police work for the new officer is often being seen as a clumsy novice. Although their instructors were mostly experienced and often cynical members of the police culture, recruits would soon realise that many of their preconceptions about police work and the knowledge they obtained at the police schools were not valid. Most recruits tended to be somewhat idealistic and whatever their reasons for joining the police they clearly wished to continue their idealism, for example being polite to the public, and helping them. On the contrary, the new officer soon discovers that citizens can be hostile and belligerent. As a result, officers' attitudes undergo a considerable change during the first year on the job. McNamara found a significant increase over time in the percentage of officers who agreed with the statement that 'Patrolmen almost never receive the co-operation from the public that is needed to handle police work properly' (1967: 221-222). Regoli and Poole found a 'precipitous drop' in the level of professional commitment among police recruits after only six months on the job (1979: 243-247).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter of the thesis the question 'who are the police?' has been asked. It has been seen that 'internalisation' and 'social learning' theories are both important in order to make a clear definition of the police. When we make a
connection between the previous chapter and the core characteristics of Turkish society, we see that potential candidates are actually made ready to undertake the police role. In this, the police in Turkey can be seen to be different from their European and the American counterparts. The economic conditions and the characteristics of the political system have a great influence on individual motivations for becoming a police officer. Police recruits in Turkey were usually unemployed and members of the working and lower social classes. These classes already have the received idea that 'the state is everything and must always be on top' hence they are normally the most nationalistic and defensive section of the society of the state. Therefore it can be asserted that their children's ability to adapt to the job and to the police culture will be significantly easier than their counterparts in the developed countries.

It is, however, a reality that despite the pressure of the European Unions to democratise the Turkish political system, neither the society nor the structure of the state is ready for such a fundamental change. However Turkey has accepted multidimensional international accountability with respect to the protection of human rights, most notably by becoming a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and incorporating into its judicial system the so-called Strasbourg institutions - that is, the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. But Turkey has not yet satisfied the political part of the so-called Copenhagen criteria, which states that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (Gunduz, 2001: 17). Abolition of the death penalty is also another requirement of the Copenhagen criteria, and it is unlikely that any negotiations regarding Turkey's membership in the European Union will proceed until the law is changed. The European Parliament has stated that it would not give its consent to any candidate's accession if it retains capital punishment in its laws. There have
been developments towards greater democracy in Turkey but these developments have been evolutionary and necessarily slow. Such changes are only achieved at a cost, economic, social or political and a balancing act must be performed to ensure stability and continuing economic growth.
CHAPTER 7
THE WORLD OF THE TURKISH POLICE OFFICER

In the previous chapter the socialisation process by which police officers learn the rules, symbols, and values of the police group or the police subculture of which they are members was discussed. It was also stated that this process of socialisation should not be regarded in the narrow sense where socialisation begins on the first day of entering to the occupation but instead should be understood more broadly as covering entire period of police school training. The variables that influence occupational personality are childhood development, the experiences one has had before taking a certain job, and the job itself, which have all been stated. Each of these factors comes into play for an individual's developing self-image; the degree to which one factor or another may predominate depends on the individual and his or her situation. According Skolnick's (1966) point of view the occupational effect upon attitudes and the self-image is especially predominant and more influential than the other two variables.

In this thesis, this view is not entirely accepted. As it has been illustrated in the previous chapters, national socio-political, economical and historical characteristics also have a profound and fundamental influence over the development of the police officer personality. Therefore police personality has been constructed as a result of combined features of officers' social situation.
Hence the police tend to develop ways of looking at the world as distinctive from themselves. In this chapter of the thesis, this world is going to be the focus. This will encompass the third stage of occupational socialisation, which is resocialisation. This occurs after the anticipatory and formal stages and leads to an acceptance of the meanings, values and behaviour patterns that are unique to a police community in society.

Before going forward, it has to be pointed out that the core characteristics of police culture in the United Kingdom and the United States have been adapted as a basis for this research carried out on Turkish police culture. The reason for this is that contemporary knowledge about police cultures in these countries is the product of many research projects, which started as early as 1940. On the other hand, the current research is the first real endeavour in relation to the Turkish police force. Moreover, there remains a great deal of resistance and suspicion from a force that is not accustomed to being researched.

The Core Characteristics of the Police Culture in Turkey

The Turkish police culture carries out approximately the same core characteristics with the police cultures in the United Kingdom and the United States according to one Turkish author, F. Sokullu (1990). She had carried out research on police culture and human rights during her PhD study. The main difference between her study and this work is that she had based her data completely on secondary data and data collected by others, especially the United States researches rather than carrying out observations among Turkish police officers. From a methodological point of view, secondary data may be the only data available for her study as she was an outsider from police officers' point of view. There could be several points to criticise of her work as she had
used American research data for the evidence of a characteristic of Turkish police culture when she was able to provide a Turkish one. As pointed out in the methodology chapter the present study is based on the first hand data collected through participation observation. The differences found were contextual differences relating to national characteristics.

**The Authoritarian Personality**

In order to investigate whether Turkish police officers are authoritarian, the meaning of being authoritarian must be clarified. Simply, authoritarian means an extreme, unquestioning willingness to do what one is told and an extremely hostile attitude towards people who are different from oneself. A study by T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford (1950) should be mentioned here. The authors concluded that there was a prejudiced personality characterised by hierarchical and authoritarian parent-child relationships, a dichotomous view of social relationships leading to the formation of stereotypes, conventionality, exploitative dependency, rigidity and repressive denial, all of which may culminate in a social philosophy which worships strength and disdains the weak. The authors developed “the F scale” in order to show a group of variables of an authoritarian personality. Each was regarded as a more or less central trend in the person, which, in accordance with some dynamic process, expressed itself on the surface in ethnocentrism as well as in diverse psychologically related opinions and attitudes. These variables are listed below, together with a brief definition of each.

- **a. Conventionalism.** Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.
- **b. Authoritarian submission.** Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealised moral authorities of the in group.
c. **Authoritarian aggression.** Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

d. **Anti-intraception.** Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tenderminded.

e. **Superstition and stereotypy.** The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

f. **Power and “toughness.”** Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalised attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

g. **Destructiveness and cynicism.** Generalised hostility, vilification of the human.

h. **Projectivity.** The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

i. **Sex.** Exaggerated concern with sexual “goings-on” (Adorno et al, 1950: 228, Part One).

These variables support the conclusion that authoritarianism is a combined result of both anticipatory socialisation and of learning after joining the forces. The nature of police work, which requires police officers to have some level of authority, could make police experiences more influential, tending to turn officers into authoritarian personalities rather than partly preoccupation authoritarian personalities. According to Reiner (1992), authority - having the power to enforce the laws - plays an important and decisive role in shaping the police culture. Turkish police officers regard authority as the core basis of their duty:

In my opinion, except for parliament, there are two important institutions in the country; the army and the police force. If we do not count the military forces, because they are mainly present for military attacks coming from outside the country, then the police force becomes the most important one....If there is no internal security, all the other institutions could become useless. Therefore we have more authority than any of the others. It should be like this because you cannot show any other state institution that has been
functioned by considerable number of the laws as many as we have. (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999).

Indeed, because the nature of the relationship between the state and the security forces, police officers are aware of their power in Turkey. They believe that the state and the police force have a mutual relationship:

The government in our country cannot feel themselves to be very secure because the political culture is not as developed as it is in European countries. The state does not trust the public and the public regard political ideologies to be beyond their scope. The police force has a duty to reflect the government inside this public arena (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

Because officers believe that the police force carries out some very important roles, and that their authority should reflect their duties, then public order becomes a primary concern in their eyes. They rely upon the notion that the police are an indispensable arm of state control to justify policing practice:

Public order could carry different meanings for each profession. For the police force, it has the most important meaning, that is, the acceptance of state sovereignty by the public whatever it costs. Do you know any country that does not have a police force? You cannot show even one. I think the question should be 'the policy of policing' instead of the necessity of the police force. If you say that our policing policy is hard, you should not forget that we are the middle men between the public and the state and we only apply what the government issues as a law (Female officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

This is not an appropriate arena to discuss justifications for authoritarian policing in Turkey. However all of the police officers observed for this study have accepted that the laws are the main props of their authoritarianism. The historical development of the political structure, the revolutions after 1920s, for example, and the consequences of forcing the acceptance of revolutionary ideas by the imposition of new laws, clearly demonstrate that the authoritarianism of Turkish police officers is a natural result of the estrangement of the political authorities from their own public over the past seventy years.
An important point here is that this oppressive political development mirrors the social traditions with regard to raising children in Turkey, such as forbidding children from smoking in front of their parents whatever their age, the absolute respect which is expected from children towards older people, and teaching that 'the state is everything' in the schools' curriculum:

In my childhood the state was a very great thing and everybody had absolute respect of it. We, as children, feel fear when we see not only the police, but also any other person who had been working in the governmental agencies. Obviously the police were the most feared, because, for example, they had enormous authority and it had been said that many people they had taken into custody had disappeared - one was our neighbour. We were all taught to be respectful to older people by our parents and taught respectfulness to the state in schools. I believe that in today’s crisis this policy has both positive and negative effects. Negatively, it was too oppressive and therefore later authorities had widely loosened it. Too much loosening had brought too much relaxation, so now we cannot control the new generations (an officer, 20 years' service, 1999).

As can be understood from the officer’s words, authoritarianism is directly related to social disorder and civil disputes that have always been on the agenda of Turkish society. The state’s response to uprising and growing unrest has been to strengthen the police force by giving new powers to them through legislation and increased resources. By these means, the state hoped to diffuse protest and resistance. If the new legislation failed to work, then military interventions were implemented as in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Following the last military intervention the state redefined police force priorities and objectives that are in line with the Government’s aims. They are intensifying a process begun in the early eighties, which sees targeting, surveillance and control in the inner cities as the main policing priority.

It can be argued that, as a result of these influences, Turkish police officers are authoritarian. Their authoritarianism is the result of both the strict methods of
parenting they have seen in their preoccupational socialisation period and training and principles they were taught at police training centres after joining. The notion has been fed by continuous public disorder and civil disputes. In other words, the police see themselves in these encounters fully in terms of their official role, meaning that they can, and will, use coercion and violence if they believe it is necessary to do so for the overall good of the state.

**Masculinity**

Although overt maleness has been termed as machismo by Reiner, the term 'masculine work' is preferred here as police officers in Turkey use it. The notion of work is thought to be 'manly' and because work is 'dirty', women who are characterised as being delicate should not be smeared by it. Apart from this general cultural observation, the notion of women in police culture can be divided into two parts; woman as a police officer, and woman as a client of the force. Women, who are clients, are usually rape victims, victims of domestic violence or criminals such as illegal prostitutes. Apart from these examples, contact between the police and the female section of Turkish society is very rare.

Although domestic violence is accepted as violence and subject to prosecution by the law, it has traditionally been treated as part and parcel of the ups and downs of marriage and is generally regarded as a private matter between husband and wife. As in many forces across the world, therefore police officers do not like to deal with domestic violence and they have traditionally placed it at the bottom of their list of priorities.

We are already kept too busy for somebody else's dirty things. Look at that woman: however she is educated she has not learnt how to behave to her husband yet. She just had a few fists...what should I do ...go and fetch her husband here and smack him...in
every house the same things happen, you know, I do smack my wife but I also love her (Male officer, 19 years' service, 1999).

According to the same police officer this type of domestic violence is not increasing. The reality is that women have been gaining more political, intellectual and financial freedom and this is a very real issue that Turkish society has to face.

...too much liberation of women is the sign of doomsday. I do not mean we have to put them inside a cage. What I am saying is that they are watching too many American soaps on television. But Americans are different from us. Liberation may be all right for them. We have different traditions to follow (Male officers, 12 years' service, 1999).

The changing role of women in Turkish society may actually be increasing the incidence of domestic violence as they make more demands for freedom to live a life beyond domestic concerns. Many women desire the financial and social freedoms that their sisters enjoy more developed countries, but the Turkish economy is not capable of supporting them in this endeavour. It is perceived that there are already too few jobs for the men, who, traditionally, are the breadwinners in Turkey. Men may feel threatened by their wives' desire to take an active part in the world. The stronger the tradition of machismo in Turkish society, the more likely it is that threats to this maleness will be expressed in violence. However, of very nature of this type of private violence makes gathering realistic statistical evidence almost impossible.

The same officer said that prostitution has been rising. This is a consequence of a Westernised life style upon Turkish society that has an Eastern value system. This means, according to the same officer, that the younger generation, especially females, firstly want more and more things that they cannot usually afford, and as a result, they may start to sell their bodies if they are not
successful in obtaining money in any other way. Secondly, they are becoming more liberated which means, according to the officer, "...male-female friendships are getting easier, but not every boy or male has good intentions in their relationship with girls and they can let down girls by leaving them" (Field notes, 1999).

The traditional view of women in Turkish society is reflected in the conservative characteristics of police officers, according to the officer's view of the world. Therefore they deal with domestic violence unwillingly and to feel that these incidents are 'wasting police time'. Moreover as criminal convictions in domestic cases are rare, the work is neither 'useful' to the police force in terms of promotion nor in improving the image of the force in the eyes of public. In police officers' terms the meaning of success is based upon the rates of prosecution and conviction, and not the safety and protection they can provide.

As the country is developing in terms of communication, broadcasting, the new lifestyles spread out, police work has been wasted on more or less mediating in domestic cases. Therefore we spend our time dealing with cases which would be more appropriately dealt with by social workers...as a result, the public see us as doing nothing because they see police work as traditional law enforcement and in fact it should be (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999)

Police officers believe that the place of women should be in more traditional roles. They are confronted with two images of women in the police force. One is of a police force as a crime and disorder-controlling, mission oriented, dispassionate and tough body of men, and the other is of women who are weak, emotional, sympathetic and service oriented. Recruits are taught at police schools by their superiors, as police work is a hard but very honourable occupation that only strong-minded and physically strong persons can cope
with. Therefore in the selection of recruits physically superior candidates are chosen.

Police work is full of danger, police officers should have strong bodies...but the place of women is at home, in other words, having an easy and light life...and so [women recruits] are placed at in the office on desk work in the force (Male officer, 3 years' service, 1999).

As far as can be understood from the official statistics, this officer's point of view is shared by the central body of the force as they accept far fewer women than men into the force. For example in 1998, 91 per cent of students were male compared to 9 per cent of female students at the Police Academy. Similarly, in 1993, the total number of students in 18 police schools was 9,238 and only 3.65 per cent of those were women (n=338). This rate is quite high in comparison with the 1960s when it was less than 0.1 per cent, and the 1970s, it was about 1 per cent (Polis 1997, 1998: 32).

The reason behind this increase seems to be the integration of women into every part of Turkish society, contrary to the common belief in the force that female personnel are necessary for specific cases. The integration of women into previously male working territories is one of the most popular subjects in the contemporary Turkish academic arena.

...as a result of Western women’s movements, Turkish women also want to grab a bigger part of the total available work places, or branches of works. In some areas this happens slowly, in others very quickly. It does not matter where it is or how strong the men's castle (Sayar, 1992: 47).

Indeed, the Turkish police force is one male territory where women are trying hard to open the door for themselves. Historically women were employed in the
force as typists, assistants to the officers or even as tea-makers in administrative offices but they were not actual police officers.

In today's Turkey women are being accepted as police officers, however their number are still considerably less than any other state institution. In one extreme example, which is obviously not always the case, their femininity is the key factor in their acceptance, it was said that few female students in one police school were told to oust male students who are known fundamentalists who are, traditionally respect to Islam, not in favour of close relationships with the opposite sex other than in marriage, and that was the reason they were recruited. Of course, recruiting women in order to oust to those who are known fundamentalists is not the only or even a valid reason. According to one chief who was interviewed that women are recruited in order to change the make-up of the police:

If you look at the statistics, you can see that most women police officers have been placed on traffic duties. This is because they are more polite to the public than male officers and that is very important because, as a society, we do not like to argue with women and in my opinion the rate of women officers should be increased...that will increase the respect of the public towards us. Moreover it is a good criterion to show that we are not an overridingly male institution (Male officers, 12 years' service, 1999).

Indeed women officers are situated mainly in three departments of the force; traffic, administrative offices and özel-kalem (a special post, a kind of secretary). The most common characteristic of these three posts is that the main requirements are politeness and appearance. "...my relationship with my boss is so good. I take care of his personal guests and private writings. He is so happy with my work. That is the why he has been taking me everywhere he has been appointed" said a woman officer at one of my fieldwork posts. She was a
plainclothes policewoman and secretary to the head of police in a town of 30,000 inhabitants.

Although women officers seem usually happy in their posts, some of them on traffic duty complained about the difficulties of the work they do. Most of the women officers interviewed said that they would prefer to work in an office work rather than on traffic duty. Difficulties in both dealing with the public and work conditions are the most frequent areas of complaint. Furthermore, the tendency for women to be appointed to office work causes jealousy amongst the male officers. However, they accept it as evidence of their initial concern that the police work is not for the women.

If they are police officers, they should be also appointed to police stations, patrolling and in other front line duties. Show me how many of them were killed on duties? none, or a few. Nobody would see a police officer killed in an office...The real police officers are those who are in the front line - us. (Male officer, 14 years' service, 1999).

The same officer also stressed that office personnel need not be uniformed and this an important point because the pay is different between uniformed and civil personnel. He said: "...as they are always being placed in the offices, they should receive less pay than the real officers." This displays a widely felt reactment towards female officers.

**Burnout**

The characteristics of 'burnout' are very common among Turkish police officers in terms of becoming exhausted by making excessive demands on energy, strength, or resources. Burnout is a state of emotional exhaustion related to overload. Defined in this way, burnout appears to be a disease of over-commitment. Burnout is not a cause, but a description of failure. Clinical studies regard burnout as the debilitating malaise that affects people in the
helping professions, such as social workers or police officers, who initially have high expectations of personal contribution but whose expectations, either of themselves or their work, go basically unsatisfied (Robinette, 1987: 5).

Police work was one the many jobs available to me. I chose it, but I realised that I had made a mistake to choose this job. Here I am working like horse, like other officers. It is all right when you get a return on your efforts but I do not think this will happen as it has never happened.... in other words, I lost my faith in the job (a sergeant, fieldnotes, 1999).

According to my fieldwork some officers are psychologically withdrawing from the work in response to excessive stress or dissatisfaction. For most of them police work was the only job they could get. Therefore they usually do not live to work but work only to live. Burnout starts when police officers realise an imbalance between their personal and official resources and the demands of the job. There are several reasons that can be cited to account for this imbalance. First of all, as it has been stated in the previous chapter, police work is the one of the least desirable jobs and most police officers participating in my fieldwork said they would quit the police force if they had a chance.

Secondly, police work is already one of the most demanding jobs for anyone to undertake and especially for those who have failed to be accepted in any other occupation. For these recruits it is nearly impossible to cope adequately. Because so many laws are related to the police role, police recruits are unable to gain sufficient knowledge of those laws that gives them responsibility to act with authority in the year of study they undertake to become qualified. Moreover the situation could get worse if they are transferred to other departments which could involve knowledge of totally different types of police work as one officer explained;
I have been in the force for twelve years in which time I have been in four different departments of the force and none of them were related closely in type of work. The first one was a kind of patrolling (Çevik Kuvvet) which is, as you know, if there is a protest, marching or an important football match, they send us on, otherwise we usually wait in our barracks. Therefore I forget all what I had learned at school. In fact I have forgotten the formal policing I have been taught at school and I learned informal policing at the barracks. Then I was transferred to office work, doing typing all day. I did not know how to type, but I learned. My third place was again in an office but dealing with smuggling. That was real police work in my opinion; doing plainclothes work following suspects, carrying out sudden raids and such kind of things. And then I am in this police station, doing nothing except guarding the station and typing reports. Sometimes my superiors send me to control the traffic. I do not know what to do if an accident happens. This place is not for me. Real policing was to be had in my previous department. Ask me anything about the laws related to smuggling. I do not where I will be next (Male officer, 1999).

It is obvious that every police officer does not have the same experience. Some other police officers could follow a different direction in the force.

I am in my sixth year in the force. I have worked in two different departments. The first department was related to the computing needs of the force. I am now an expert in computers. Then I was sent here, to a police station. I am doing the usual things, but no computing. I do not like ordinary police work. I may try to obtain another job by using my computing knowledge (Female officer, 1999).

This police officer is a good example of a recruit acquiring skills while serving as an officer that he might not have had the opportunity to do outside the force and using these skills to obtain alternative employment. This is clearly a waste of resources and officers should be encouraged to use their skills to the best advantage inside the force. The police force can also be a useful stepping stone for those officers with other skills, who use the force as a means of acquiring useful contacts who might use their influence in obtaining for them more prestigious employment. As an example, one of my colleagues left the police
force in order to be a local governor, which is more prestigious job than being a police officer:

After I finished in the faculty, I tried my chance for this job. I said tried because, as you know, you have to have some friends in high places if you want to become anything in our country, especially for my job you have to be known by many friends. As I was unknown I was not successful. Then, instead of trying any more, I became a police sergeant for two years. This time was well spent. I studied more for my present job in both ways - I came to be known by more people in high places and in studying the exam (Field notes, 1999).

It can be understood from these respondents that there are chances to quit the force for those who have some extra qualifications; otherwise the illogical policy of the force on transfers of personnel between departments within the force considerably worsens personnel burnout.

If personnel cannot leave, and most of them are unable to take this option, then burnout may turn into alienation and police officers become separated or withdrawn from the original meaning or purpose of police work. Hopelessness and helplessness are the two main reasons for escalating burnout. The feeling that the unpleasant aspects of a job heavily outweigh the pleasant aspects with little opportunity for change and few emotional rewards is a major factor in burnout. There is clearly a major conflict here: the actual reality of police work and the expectations of the recruits are at odds. In my fieldwork at police stations, I have seen that almost all police officers experience some degree of burnout. They desire to have a modicum of control over at least some aspects of their life and work situation. Once they begin to understand that they have little control, feelings of hopelessness and helplessness begin to be established even before they begin to assert what little control they have.

The police force was the only institution that accepted me....Although I knew about the type of work and the force, I never expected that it would control every aspect of my life. It was really
very difficult to find a house to rent because I am a policeman, I rarely see my children's faces as I have to work long hours, I cannot take my family out of the house on any trip to get them relaxed...at the beginning everything was acceptable - I had no other job opportunity, I was single, and thought not long after I could go to another job -, but you cannot control anything, not even yourself. Life is getting more difficult day by day. Unemployment is rising in the country - that means it is very difficult to get another job...I feel myself in a trap...I do not think the job opportunities will be better if the country goes on like this and the only thing is I can do now is to be patient until my retirement (Male officer, 20 years' service, 1999).

Most police officers accept these conditions as their fate and there is no mechanism for internal change. Although the working life of Turkish police officers is, for the majority, less stressful in terms of conflict deriving from police action than their counterparts in the United Kingdom, burnout is still reflected in feelings of frustration, anxiety, fatigue, all of which lead to stress.

Stress as a result of burnout can be asserted as one of the characteristics of Turkish police culture. It is a very common concern of the officers that the failure of the authorities to reorganise the force, change working conditions and to enhance the status of police officers in the eyes of the public and other institutions will inevitably lead to a worsening of conditions for officers. In particular, the relationship between the courts and the police leads to conflict. As an example, police officers said that they have two bosses: their administrative boss is the Ministry of the Interior and their judicial boss is the Ministry of Justice. They are not happy with this situation and one officer explained why:

Anybody can open a trial against us...we are not protected by the public prosecutor. For instance, we have to send our criminal operation lists to him. But the defence lawyer for criminals could get our lists before our operations. That means we could be in trouble (Piar 1992: 12).
Whether police officers are right or not in their view about re-organising the force, stress does exist and it functions as an explanation either for an individual police officer's failure, or to offset any claims against the force's structure or as indemnity against corporate failures. This notion of blame or culpability can be seen as central to the Turkish police culture.

I am neither a salesman nor a clerk, I have not got 30 or 40 pupils to teach at certain times of the day. I am a policeman and I have thieves, murderers, and all types of criminals. Plus insulting...do you know how long I have been working today? Exactly sixteen hours. You cannot expect me to be polite and respectful to the public (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

Similarly another officer:

Everybody expects us to handle any situation at any time as if we were supermen. They say 'you are out there to handle it. It is tough, but that is what you get paid for.' But in fact I don't get what I should get in comparison to work I do. I have three children and live in a rented house. I do not get more money than any other people in other jobs. It is not fair (Male officer, 14 years' service, 1999).

Indeed whomever I interviewed or contacted in my fieldwork complained about everything from the system of the country to his or her station and friends. The Turkish saying 'if it touches one, a thousand hear' (bir dokun, bin isit) expresses this phenomenon. Dissent spreads very readily and very often, the only way to alleviate the stress and frustration is to join in with the complaints. This is not to say that there is no stress in other occupations; however, it can be argued (and indeed is believed by most police officers) that the police profession is more hazardous compared with most other professions. According to police officers the sources of stress inherent in being a police officer are innumerable. Aside from the police work, there are some sources related to the public.

We are policemen and the symbol of control in our society. We control the criminals, not the private lives of the innocent, which is what they accuse us of. They say we are a symbol of restriction...in
fact our role is 'helping' and we help them in order to make their lives more comfortable. What we get is the kind of treatment as if we are second-class citizens of this country (Female officer, 6 years' service, 1999).

However unappreciative they regard the public to be, they rank generic features of their profession as most stressful. Almost all police officers that were consulted for this study complained of working long hours with inadequate payment in return.

The PKK (The separatist Kurdish Terrorist Organisation) killed many members of the security forces plus citizens and the Government pays a lot of money to so-called guards who are supposed to be fighting against the PKK...The same Government promise us to give a special compensation every year, but they have never given it. Recently the Ministry of Interior announced good news to the PKK terrorists that they have an amnesty. We are working four hours extra every day, 120 hours a month. The money for these extra hours is 170,000 TL (compare to the salary of 5 Millions TL app. in 1993) monthly. Funny isn't it? That is the price of being loyalty to the state for police officers" (Hürriyet, newspaper, 28 June 1993).

Working long hours also affects the family life of police officers. According to a report, prepared by Piar in 1992, the biggest stress factor of being a policeman's wife was the uncertainty of the time their husband return from work. One officer's wife expressed her concern by saying "We say good-bye to each other every morning. He usually does not come home, working into the night. I always listen walkie-talkie and the news to see if anything has happened to him.” This wife clearly felt that her husband was at risk of dangerous situations each working day. Partners also worry about the consequences of death or injury to their spouse and the added burden of responsibility, which would be placed on them if disaster struck. Women talked of these fears and the stress and anxiety caused in the report (Piar, 1992: 16).
Rotation of the personnel from the west part of the country to the east is another very stressful practice according to many police officers interviewed. Policy dictates two main principles in rotation. Firstly, police officers cannot be appointed or rotated to the city of where they were born. Although this rule has always been a regulation from the early years of the force, most of the officers interviewed told me that they did not know about it. Secondly, all police officers have to be appointed to the Eastern regions of the country for a certain period of their working life in the force.

Although the regulations are unequivocal, the practice is not so clear. Police officers believe that they have no opportunity to work where they want, but have to go where their superiors want them (Piar, 1992: 9). This can lead to favouritism as officers’ term it. This will be seen as one of the core characteristics of the Turkish police culture and to deal with this issue separately. Here, I want to stress its effect on police officers.

Rotation has usually been used as a way to punish the officer you do not want to work with him, and your superior send you to the East if he could. But if you are very good to him you will feel yourself in secure (Male officer, 7 years’ service, 1999).

There are several problems of being sent to the Eastern regions of the country. The most basic one is that any move is disruptive to family life. Children are most affected in this situation, as they need to get used to a new place, new friends and so on. Therefore police officers will try to curry favour with their superior in order to avoid rotation.

In a developing country, where economic turmoil and political uprising are part of daily life, there are many problems associated with a police officer's work. The dangers of dealing with terrorism, for example, are a routine part of every officer's daily life. This situation can contribute to low morale and consequently...
develop disrespect, not only for themselves, but also for the force that they represent.

**Pessimism**

Most of the police officers encountered during the fieldwork were pessimistic about the nature and direction of social change in Turkey.

> The living conditions are getting worse day by day. I do not expect there to be radical improvement, but do expect some. The population is rising rapidly. Natural resources are decreasing or a few hands control them...our role in this unfair goings-on is that we are becoming part of the movement against the majority in favour of the few (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

Their agricultural and lower class background is important factor in understanding their pessimism. As pointed out previously, members of these classes suffer most from the country's economic chaos. They accept that the most important factor behind their unemployment prior joining the force is the negative social and economic changes in Turkey. They believe that the country is declining. Indeed the country is in economic chaos. Due to inflation, public sector employees earn well below the cost of living. They cannot go to strike, and therefore have always accepted pay offers. Although police officers still earn better salaries than many areas of the public sector, the cost of living is high and not only police officers but also the whole society suffers from the same conditions.

However, police officers claim they should receive more money in consideration of the nature of their work, which is messy, overloaded, and dirty - both mentally and physically. Any glamour associated with the police force has disappeared as the economic and politic conditions of the country declined.

> When I joined the force we were much better off than now. At that time, one salary could buy things that today's four or five salaries
can afford... You know that is very important. The personnel in
criminal justice should be free of the worry of money. Otherwise
corruption is inevitable. I am afraid that is the happening in today's
force (an officer, 19 years' service, 1999).

Besides economic conditions, their working experience in dealing with rising
crime and violent public disorder has also had a great effect on police
pessimism. According to police officers, today's Turkey is very different from
the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s Turkey. When the country was relatively peaceful,
being a police officer was a respected profession, and people were afraid of the
police. During these times even a few police officers could cope with major
public disorders.

Although the number of police officers is increased every year,
from 15,000-20,000 in 1950s to 100,000 - 130,000 in 1990s, still
crimes are increasing and the public sees us as useless. In fact not
only our country has troubles, the whole world is going mad. This
is a general trend of our generation (an officer, 16 years' service,
1999).

Indeed the police force is expanding both in the number of police officers and
in the range of duties they have to carry out, and it seems that they have to work
harder than they used to. There are several reasons behind this expansion. First,
Turkey has been in transformation from the beginning of the Republic in 1923.
As pointed out in detail in chapter five, this transformation has dictated the role
of the police primarily as the protector of the revolutionary governments. While
the state was oppressing the public, the police force showed no mercy for those
who were against the reforms. It is well known that the number of executions in
the first twenty years of the Republic was higher than the number of people
who died in the War of Independence. As the revolutions have gained their
place gradually in the society, the extraordinary duties placed upon the police
have also turned into the received idea of police roles and, as a result, a wide
range of social service style of duties have to be carried out by the force such as
dealing with drunks or giving directions. However this transformation is very slow compared to the police functions in the more developed countries.

The second most important reason behind the expansion in police numbers is that the rural/urban population rate has changed in favour of urban living. As explained in chapter 6, about 90 per cent of the population (14 Million) in the late 1920's was living in rural areas compared to 70 per cent in the 1970s and 40 per cent in 1990, when the population was about 58 Million. This increase in the urban population is important because people have migrated to areas controlled by the police rather than the gendarmerie, and it seems likely that urban population will continue to increase. This increase means that there are more people to guard, control, watch, and arrest by the police.

The third most important reason is that the range and types of crimes that the police have to deal with have been changing. For the first forty or fifty years of the Republic from 1923, the main concern for the police force was how to consolidate the revolutionary action, enforcing new laws and punishing dissidents. As the revolutions have become normalised within society, the role of police has naturally shifted. As a result of the effect of development in the world, Turkey has become more liberal. Crimes against the state have reduced and the police have changed their focus to personal crime. However, crimes against the state are still regarded as the most serious offences by the political authorities. Therefore according to Turkish Criminal Law six out of ten of the main crime categories are related to the structure of the state. These crimes are: against the state, against the government administration, against the judicial system, against public policy, against public security, and against public welfare. About 13 per cent of the total prison population has been sent to jail
because they have convicted of these types of crime (Statistical Pocketbook of Turkey 1990: 69).

The fourth most important reason for expansion is political unrest in the Eastern part of the country. Indeed this is one of the main reasons for recent increases in police numbers. More police officers are being sent to the East, and contrary to the usual practice, police personnel are rotated to this area for a second tour of duty, which is an unwelcome development for the majority of police officers.

Actually, the problem affects not only police officers but also the whole of Turkish society. The government has been spending one third of the Gross National Income in order to solve this problem. According to general opinion there is a direct relationship between inflation and the amount of money spent on curbing this political unrest. Police officers believe that the situation is presented as worse than it actually is to the public by the government to cover the other problems of the country, and the media plays an important part in this:

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Everybody thinks that the problem is growing. In my opinion it can be solved in a short time if the government takes tough measures against it. Actually I also do not think that they will do it because it covers their failure, but this time, people think the security forces are unsuccessful. The media presents us as if we are doing nothing (Male officer, 7 years' service, 1999).
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Police officers also see the public hostility either because of the presentation of the police by the media, or the policy of government's operational matters:

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However hard we work for their protection and safety day and night, they are still not happy and accuse us of being the solely responsible for rising crime. I want to ask them if they have thought, even once, about the conditions we have to work or live in? In fact they are more responsible than us for the lack of law and order. They don't teach their children. If they taught them how to be good citizens, the problem of crimes would be solved at its source (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999).
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These opinions show that the police are not only pessimistic about the nature and direction of social change, but are also pessimistic about the extent of sympathy and support they have from the public. Police pessimism is also based on their working experience in dealing with rising crime and violent public disorder. Many police officers believe that behind the increase of crime, firstly, there is an erosion of authority in society generally, and, in particular, a decline of parental authority and responsibility, and, secondly, a decline of discipline and control, in both the forms of the self discipline and the self control and in the use of sanctions and punishment, in other words, a general liberalisation of Turkish society which is generally based on conservative values which were historically related to religious values. In these values, there is a strong respect for the elders; the state is paramount, and so on. Conservative values have always been very strong in the lower and middle classes of Turkish society. Police officers, who were drawn from these sections of society, are most cautious about social change. Therefore most of the police officers expressed their concern over authority, discipline and control in relation to the next or younger generation:

In our childhood, even the families were different to today's families. Most of the families consisted of grandfather, grandmother, father, mother and children, and hierarchy was absolute. We had to respect to our older generation. Children were not as free as today. They knew that if they did something wrong in the house or outside the house, they would most likely be punished....Today, the ethics, respectfulness and the relationship between generation is so different. I have not got time to give attention to my children. Schools have to teach our culture, but unfortunately their policy is liberal as well (Male officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

Families are becoming smaller in size and authority and discipline within the home and school has changed owing to the values inherent in the process of modernisation of these institutions. The relaxation of discipline within these institutions can be seen to be paralleled by a similar decline in discipline and self-control in the wider social institutions. Therefore, from the police officers'
point of view, if we want to know the actual causes of the rise in crime, violence and public disorder, we have to look for a decline in discipline and self-control, and a decline in the use of sanctions and punishment. The police officers do not exclude themselves from the effects of this liberality saying that the necessity and discipline of work and the work ethics have also declined;

The police force is one of the most open institutions to political influence. Politicians have divided the force into several political fractions. When one political opinion is in power, the same political fraction in the force does not respect others adequately. When the others come to power they do not listen. Now the current credit is your political side instead of work ethic that should be most important...and also the recognition of the necessity of force and coercion in order to maintain society has weakened. Why? It is because the high political influence over the force in order to make their electors happy. They do not want a strong and powerful police force. If we are not strong how we could expect public to be responsible for their own role in the enforcement of the law (Male officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

In summary, many police officers do hold a pessimistic view of society. Because they are the defenders and guardians of the status quo. It seems that they find it difficult to develop an analysis of the nature of society and the direction of social change that would accept and include self-destructive and self-contradictory features.

Conservatism

It is difficult to define the conservatism of Turkish police officers who themselves understand conservatism as the practice of religious obligations. In Turkey, the word 'conservative' is synonymous with the religion of Islam and the people who favour Islam in their life style are termed conservative. This derives from the collapse of the Ottoman State and the imposition of not only a new political system but also an entirely alien culture. The new state regarded the old political system as the main cause of lack of development and so a
western-style political system and culture were adopted wholesale. Every aspect of traditional Turkish life was affected, even down to restrictions on dress. Now, strict adherence to Islam therefore signifies not just conservatism but also a desire to return to the old cultural values.

In modern Turkey, there are two main political opinions in society. Both propose that Turkey should follow the example of the developed countries but the division is related to how far western lifestyles should be adopted, if at all. Conservatives desire economic development but do not want to see the erosion of traditional values. They regard, the most important aspect of the maintenance of Turkish culture is the Islamic religion. Islam is regarded as a positive force behind social improvement and economic progress.

Therefore, the term 'conservatism' should be understood in this dual context. When I refer to a police officer as a conservative I mean that the officer who is in favour of Islam and practising it.

I am a police officer and a Muslim as well. If I say so then I should practise it. I believe that the reason why we are underdeveloped is we are not truly practising Islam, because we do not know what it is. People think it is a barrier to development. It is not true, on the contrary, it encourages the development in order to better understanding of God through scientific studies (Male officer, 2 years' service, 1999).

Conservatism, in this meaning, is not common in the police force. Most of the police officers spoken to in the field said that they believe in Islam but they usually do not practise it. This is largely characteristic of the whole Turkish society. So, although they do not practising it, there is a direct relationship between their religious beliefs and the beliefs about how the policing should be carried out. They perceive that those who have not had a proper education in Islamic values raise the problems of crime and public disorder.
One important point that should be stressed here is that the police officers contacted in the course of the fieldwork displayed a similar degree of moral conservativism as their counterparts in many other countries in the world. This could be due to the universal characteristics of the police work as pointed out by Reiner (1992). Police officers are the agents of states that are bounded by laws and inflexible to social changes. It is a duty of any police force to act against social change in order to preserve the status quo. They are suspicious and, in some cases, are also authorised to use force. As they are always motivated in this logic by the state, then they become one of the most inflexible institutions of any government. A good example to use here is the law on homosexuality and the arbitrary criminalisation or discriminalisation of a section of society. The age of sexual consent is another good example. The age of consent is different in different countries and can be changed through the process of law. Both of these examples depend on the social mores current in society and on the culture and economic conditions of a country. In the case of Turkey, laws are not natural but imposed upon society.

For me it is very difficult to understand how some people can do something which, if they have had done it ten, twenty years ago they would be in real trouble. Now they are free and they do not care who is the police force. If we do not do something now, we will be in chaos (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

In fact the police officers are in a dilemma created by the state and the inescapable results of the globalisation of the world. They believe that for Turkish society as a whole and for themselves as individuals, being conservative is natural and the only way to achieve economic, social and political development. They present their logic as follows:

We are situated in a such part of the world that all our neighbours are the enemies.... I am absolutely sure that they are behind of PKK (separatist Kurdish Terrorist Group) and other terrorist activities. The other main obstacle in front of our political and economical
development is international media. They show us being guilty in our struggle against terrorist activities. It is very difficult to block their broadcasting as everybody seems to have a satellite system.

Unfortunately the government is always too open to these international media in order to pacify them and prevent their lobbying against us. But because of our history I do not think we will ever make them happy. Therefore, instead of trying to make this effort, we should spend our efforts on our children's education. We should teach who our enemies are, what they want and most importantly, they have to learn that ours is the only friendly nation. We have to teach our culture and the values that make us. We have to counter broadcasting against enemies and if it is possible, to ban satellite dishes (Male officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

One other police officer held the same view. After he accepted my assurance that his name would be kept secret, he strongly criticised Western-minded Turkish governments:

I am a realistic person who is not expecting our enemies' mercy. Why I am very angry with our government is that while everything is so clear, they are still so open to the strange cultures and supporting them. They are destroying our future and selling our values (Male officer, 3 years' service, 1999).

There are differences between conservatism expressed by young officers and that of older officers. According to the older officers or those who have been in the force for a long time, conservatism provides a means the way against the degradation of society caused by liberalisation. The proper way, according to them, should be concentrated around a strong and powerful government - the way which was followed during the first thirty or fifty years of the Republic.

My father was also a policeman. Being a policeman was an important job. They were the key element of revolutions in order to strengthen the revolutionary government in society, and they were successful...I do not accept claims that the police was very brutal. Even if we accept these accusations are we more comfortable or peaceful now? ...Everything is getting worse, because there is no authority in society...do whatever you like, you won't get not much punishment (Male officer, 16 years' service, 1999).
This officer is clearly very conscious of the eroded image of the police in society. According to him, the first fifty years of the Republic were golden, even glamorous times. Officers recruited in the last a few years' display two main political opinions. First, they are more liberal than the older, more experienced police officers and usually complained of the practices of police officers from their early years in the force. Younger officers tend to begin their careers with liberal ideas. One officer interviewed, who had served three years in the force, said that he had started his career with a determination to be honest, patient and understanding in his dealing with the public, contrary to his own experience of police officers before joining the force. However, he quickly learned that these ideals are almost impossible to put into practice or change is slow. Not only is there pressure to conform within the police culture, the public themselves, belonging to an essentially inequitable society, fail to respond to such treatment. This young officer had very quickly learned that idealism is wasted in a society, which is less than utopian.

Secondly, some of the new recruits were conservatives as it is understood in a religious context. There is a general trend for Islam to be taken more seriously by the middle and lower classes in society, despite not having a religious family background.

My parents were not very religious and I have learned about the religion from my friends. My aim in the life is to become a good Muslim...I believe that the religion is the only solution to social problems, crimes and especially to the corruption. How else you can prevent somebody who is not a believer and who intends to be corrupted (Male officer, 2 years' service, 1999).

There is a characteristic common to these two groups of young officers that have been noticed during the fieldwork. They have both replaced their political opinions with the older and experienced officers' conservatism. This transformation is much more apparent in the previously liberal officers than the
religiously conservative officers. This is because liberalism is a new phenomenon in Turkey, and therefore has no strong roots in society.

In summary, Turkish police officers, politically, are not conservative when we accept their definition as person who is in favour of religion and who wants the religion to be the main determinant in their lives. But this type of conservatism is gradually growing in the force as it comes to be more accepted in society as a whole. If we consider conservatism in its broader social sciences meaning which is a resistance to great and sudden changes in society, then it could be said that Turkish police officers are conservative. This conservatism is strongly related to the 1920s and 1930s revolutions, which were forced upon society by the state. The main actor of this coercion was the police force, and they have had the duty of safeguarding these revolutionary governments. Therefore police officers are morally conservative as they offer tougher solutions to society's problems.

**Favouritism**

Favouritism is simply the practice of giving unfair advantages to the people that one likes best. It creates enormous problems in the Turkish police force. One officer taking part in the fieldwork said that favouritism is in every department, in every aspect of the force, from the appointment of officers to their relationships with the public. Many police officers believe that favouritism is one of the biggest problems of the modern Turkish police force.

There are two main types of favouritism in officers' classification. The first one concerns the unofficial 'perks' associated with the job. However, every occupation in every country has perk or special, often unofficial, rights associated with it. For example, the free entry of a certain percentage of police
officers' sons and daughters to the police schools and free public transportation for officers even during out of work hours. The problem arises when these perks are regarded as unfair or undeserved by other members of society. The second is the type of favouritism, which is an illegal, corrupt activity. Unfair personnel recruitment and rotations, and being powerless in the face of politically powerful people are the most frequent complaints of officers taking part in the fieldwork.

Legitimate favouritism is a natural consequence of the traditional police-state relationships. This type of favouritism has been regarded as a natural right of officers since the beginning of the Republic. As has been pointed out earlier, the police force has been equipped with power, and in consequence with special rights in their extraordinary roles in the first half of the century. As a result of these, the police force and being a police officer, have been regarded as privileged from the early days of the Republic and regardless of the changing image of the force, these extra rights are still accepted as an integral part of the rewards offered to police officers.

Nowadays there are complaints about us [the police] that we are wasting public money on free public transport, football matches, etc. Do these critics realise how we work, under which conditions? If they did, they would see these few advantages do not compensate us for our working conditions (Female officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

A further core characteristics of Turkish police culture is apparent here, where an officer is rationalising controversial rights by making a counter accusation, this time against the police authorities and the government, who control the working conditions of police officers. Officers clearly feel that their loyalty is not repaid ad feel disillusioned:

Economic conditions are really getting worse since the liberalisation has been chosen as the main policy. The work we
have been doing for the state is not appreciated. Don't they need us anymore? On the contrary, they need us even more now than at the beginning of the republic...Want we want is a fair salary then we will ready to give up our extra rights (Male officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

Almost every officer spoken to in the fieldwork expressed the same views about their 'perks'. Most felt dissatisfaction with their remuneration in relation to the difficulties and dangers of the job. All of them would prefer an increase in basic salary with a loss of these official perks, which generate so much public criticism.

The second type of favouritism is an unavoidable result of the structure of the force. Police officers frequently complain of the favouritism or undue influence arising from the state's relationship with other institutions and the direct effect this has on the operation of the force. The political bodies of the state are most heavily criticised. All police officers contacted during fieldwork believe that the police force is much too open to the influence of politicians and therefore favouritism derives mainly from this source:

The Minister of Interior who is a politician directs the force. Every time when the minister is changed we see a new general director, new deputies...cycle continues right down to the police station levels. Every new superior wants to work with those who are close to him. Therefore nobody feels his or her place is safe (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999).

The belief of the officers in the existence of political favouritism is very widespread. They consider that all new appointments and rotations, without a single exception, are related to favouritism to some degree. Hence, according to them, if anyone who denied being given a 'helpful hand' was lying.

Political uncertainty in the country underpins favouritism. As an example, the recent special classes, which consist of students who have already obtained a
university degree, at the Police Academy are seen as politicians' bribery to the public and extremely unfair to those who see themselves more deserving of these classes:

I do not think special classes will be useful. They do not know what policing is. The government, for the sake of votes, opened the doors of the force to those who have no more policing knowledge than they get on the streets. There are always some people or groups behind this type of personnel recruiting how can a vet be successful as a police officer? We do not have shortages of candidates while we have many police schools and police officers. Open police officers' way to the promotion instead of opening special classes (Male officer, 8 years' service, 1999).

Favouritism is not limited to the entry process, it is also widespread in selecting personnel for rotations. According to one finding of the Piar Report (1992) police officers believe that there is no fixed practice for rotation. Superiors' preference frequently determines the officers' next working place. If we consider that the police force is also a hierarchic organisation, the informal power of superiors over rotation combined with the hierarchical structure leads inevitably to psychological problems for some police officers. Here is the story of one officer interviewed who had recently been transferred to another city and his understanding of the reasons behind the move:

The official reason was that I was not in harmony with other officers there. In fact, this is true, but I did have many friends. My problem was with the head of the police station. I could not get along with him. He tried to give me all the dirty work, and then he accused me of not showing him respect. He has even marked my records with many negative points. You can't do anything about it. I officially informed. The head chose to transfer me here. I have not found a house to rent yet. My family is still there. It is difficult to cope, but I have no other choice (Male officer, 4 years' service, 1999).

It was clear from the fieldwork that this scenario was not uncommon and the emotional strain on officers transferred against their wishes is very apparent. In this instance, the entire family was affected. Officers will feel frustration and
powerlessness in this situation, as well as feeling that they have been treated unfairly. Because the employment situation is difficult, officers with family responsibilities are unlikely to quit their job, whatever the provocation, and many would not even try to appeal to a higher authority, knowing that this would not only be fruitless but may even do further damage. There is no independent body to which an officer might make an appeal and so every officer is sharply aware that he or she must curry favour in order to avoid unpopular transfer posts or unpleasant duties. This leads to low morale and poor management practice.

Political favouritism is also complained of for its interference in police work. Police officers reported that they cannot do their job properly, because, for instance, when they catch a well-known person, there is political pressure to let the person free.

A few days ago we caught a local member of the leading party red-handed. Incredibly we received a huge amount of calls in order to release him, some from the Ministry of the Interior. However we still proceeded with the case so it is likely that some of us will now be sent to police stations in a different places (Male officer, 6 years' service, 1999).

It is hardly surprising that police officers quickly become disillusioned when they are faced with this level of dishonesty and coercion. There is a close relationship between corruption and the favouritism. According to police officers the public is as guilty as the police officers themselves. They say that the public is not aware of the seriousness of corruption and the wider effects of bribery:

Everybody knows that corruption is illegal and very dishonest behaviour. I have been in the traffic department for five years. Honestly I have not taken any money but this does not mean I have not received offers. If you are in traffic you normally receive many
offers in a single day. I know some of my friends take bribes. It is not just their fault. Firstly, the pay is not enough, and the public usually offers a bribe before officer demands it. Secondly, if an officer refuses an offer the man finds somebody who knows the officer or his superior then the case settled down (Male officer, 7 years' service, 1999).

In summary, favouritism is very obvious in Turkish police culture. In fact it is a natural and typical consequence of a developing country where the political life is unstable. As long as political organs shape daily life without the benefit of a stable political culture, favouritism will exist, not only in the police force but also in every department of the state.

**Prejudice and Racism**

It could be argued that the majority of Turkish police officers have never met a member of the minority groups under normal, social circumstances. Even if they have met, they may not have realised, because members of minority groups often change their names to common Turkish names. Therefore their prejudicial conduct represents the dominant attitudes of the majority people towards minorities.

In Turkey, communities have historically always been divided according to their religion. There are two main divisions- Muslims and non-Muslims. The obvious reason behind this division is that, firstly, the Muslim religion advises its adherents to be cautious, and says that the world's Muslims are one nation, while non-Muslims belong to diverse nations. Secondly, the last great state of the Turkish notion was the Ottoman state and this was based on religion. While the state was in its great period Muslims - non-Muslim relations were peaceful.
When the decline started these relations were ruined. The last two centuries of
the state has seen fighting between these two groups. As a result, the non-
Muslim minorities are now unwelcome and many people differentiate between
minority groups:

The minorities are Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. The Kurds are
not a minority. I have many Kurdish friends and we have many
things in common with them. But the others are different. They
don't believe what I believe. They are all right if the country is
strong, but we are not very strong now, so they benefit from this
situation. I don't see why we should be very good with them, but
we are still. I think that is because we do not want to interrupt
relationships with their big brothers in the developed world. You
know, we want money from them and they lend it (Male officer, 11
years' service, 1999).

The tie between minorities and their supporters in the developed world is also
related to the problem of Kurdish citizens in the country.

I believe that Turkey is developing and development would bring
back leadership of Muslim world. This strong leadership is seen as
danger by other nations who do not want Turkey to rise again.
Therefore they provoke ethnic groups, such as the Kurds (Male
officer, 8 years' service, 1999).

Indeed this view matches with the official approach as Cornell pointed out " In
official Turkish discourse, there is no Kurdish problem, but rather a
socioeconomic problem in the southeastern region and a problem of terrorism
that is dependent on external support from foreign states aiming at weakening
Turkey" (2001: 31-32). Whatever the reasons behind the so-called problem of
the Kurds, there are some confused opinions about the Kurds expressed by
police officers:

I don't believe there is a discrimination against the Kurds. They
have same rights I have. They can be elected to government and we
have seen many ministers who were Kurds, and there are many in
parliament. Why do some of them let themselves be used by our
common enemies? They should understand that their misbehaviours could cause the other part of this nation's anxiety and turn us against them. No one would benefit by it (Male officer, 5 years' service, 1999).

I don't think all Kurds agree to the separation of the East from Turkey. They would be the loser, because the East is not as productive as the West. They are immigrating to the West. I think that they are mainly responsible for the East's underdevelopment. They should stay there, and do more useful things (Female officer, 12 years' service, 1999).

The Kurdish problem is indeed one of the most sensitive issues in Turkey. Most European observers define the problem simply as a matter of oppression and denial of rights by Turkish majority group of an ethnic Kurdish minority. Despite almost two decades of armed conflict and thousands of casualties, open tensions in society between Turks and Kurds remain, under the circumstances, minimal. Moreover, a significant portion of Turkey's political and business elite is of Kurdish origin, including three of the country's nine president and that Kurds' representation in the country's parliament is larger than their proportion of the population (Cornell, 2001: 32). The problem is, then, similar to that of 'divided societies' mentioned by Brewer (1991). In a divided society there is selective enforcement of law in favour of the dominant group, and there is excessive attention to the actions of minorities. Police are responsible for ordinary crime and internal security. There are close operational links between the police and the military. The shortage of police personnel, under-funding of the police and the deterioration in internal security cause a reliance on military forces. The Turkish police are similar to the police in divided societies as having lack of autonomy from the political power; no effective mechanism of public accountability; the use of force is relatively unrestrained; different social
groups have different attitudes towards the police; and there is a close relationship between the police and the military.

In divided societies the main task of the police is to police societal divisions (Brewer, 1996: 149), and like the RUC in Northern Ireland, one of the main tasks of the Turkish police is to combat terrorism in particular. In doing so, the police and the military forces in Turkey have co-operation. Since the major terrorist groups are from certain ethnic or religious sections of the society and within fairly definite geographical regions, the attitudes of people in these regions towards the police and vice versa are not the same as in other areas. The officers' prejudice towards political groups is clearer than their racial attitudes.

For instance, the left is the most unwelcome political view.

These, whatever they call themselves, are communists. They refuse all of our beliefs. They are stupid, because even the biggest communist- Russia has abandoned the left and chosen a more logical life style. Ours are still insisting that the only way is communism. Funny isn't it? They should be treated more harshly (Male officer, 3 years' service, 1999).

The negative image of the left has a direct relationship with the right wing governments. Except for a short period in 1940s and about a year in 1979, the left were unable to govern and apart from these periods, right wing governments have always been in power. Consequently, because the police force is one of the most open to political influence and is also responsible to a political body - the Ministry of Interior- political favouritism has usually worked for those members of the public with right-wing leanings.

The officers also regard politicians as distrustful. According to police officers, politicians are the main problem in Turkey because they are too obstinate and insist that theirs is the only way.
Politicians do anything to gain a vote. They look at popular trends and calculate how to make most of it. They [politicians] are very quick to criticise the police and although their criticism might be justified, they do not acknowledge their own role in what is wrong in the force, just as they deny their role in the country's problem (Male officer, 7 years' service, 1999).

One of the most vivid and well-documented examples of police prejudice in Turkey is opposition to civil rights movements:

Look at them. I don't believe they can be so serious about their claims. Where were they twenty or thirty years ago? Are civil rights only for now? These campaigns are very popular in the other countries and our fellows realise that this a very quick way to become popular. Most of them are communists. They think if they insult the nation's beliefs, they would gain the favour of the West. In fact West is using them...We cannot do anything to them. Even if we touch them, they bring everybody in order to punish us, as if we are the only responsible one for the end of the world (Male officer, 16 years' service, 1999).

Indeed without exception, all of the police officers interviewed during the fieldwork believe that civil rights campaigners in the country are merely an arm of foreign civil rights movements, which are regarded as a cover for the industrialised countries' interventions in developing countries. One officer gave his opinion:

These civil rights campaigners never claim the rights of, for instance, the poor, the situation of government employees, and police officers' conditions. Where there is any criminal who is a communist or a criminal who wanted to put dynamite under the base of the state, they are there. And they challenge the state very bravely as if they are not this country's citizens. They are fearless, because others support them. In every trial involving civil rights campaigners, observers from other countries are also present (Male officer, 9 years' service, 1999).

The police very often receive a bad press and all sections of the media are critical of police activity. Police officers believe that this negative image
derives largely from prejudice against the police. The newspapers, according to them, help police detractors.

The main goal of the newspapers should be to enlighten the public without partiality. In reality they do not enlighten the public but our enemies and their criticism are read in other countries. We know most journalists are the left-wing, and you never expect their goodwill. They should understand the importance of the duties we carry out for this country. We are doing our best. They should consider the realities of this country (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999).

In a summary, prejudice is an attitude and can be defined as an unjustifiable aversion or hostility towards members of a particular group solely on the basis of membership in the group. If it is displayed as overt negative behaviour, it becomes discrimination. Prejudice functions to achieve group solidarity and morale. Prejudice is culturally based and so police culture itself can become a sub-group within Turkey's larger culture, not just reflecting but magnifying commonly felt antipathies. The attitude is usually acceptable to an individual member of the force because his or her ego is inflated through police identification. Belonging to the force also imparts a sense of security and expressing prejudice becomes safe in this environment. The ethnic minorities are thought to be a threat to the security of the culture. Often one or two strangers are received as a source of interest and curiosity, but large numbers are perceived as a threat.

In the social sciences it is said that prejudice is strongest in groups that are in declining social or economic status. This can clearly be seen to be happening in today's Turkish police officers. Their racial prejudice directed especially against non-Muslim minority groups. The majority of officers expressing prejudice against minority groups had no direct experience of personal contact with these groups.
Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a desire to get the job done with minimal fuss is an obvious characteristic of Turkish police officers. However, contrary to the British police officers, the pragmatism of Turkish police officers does not include minimal paperwork. Paperwork, much of which might be viewed as superfluous, forms a large part of an officer's work. This apparent paradox is explained by the police officer's understanding of minimum fuss, which is synonymous with minimal responsibility.

As a police officer I work very hard and long hours for the public. I work when they are peacefully in bed. However if something happens to me nobody would defend me. Experience tells us that it is advisable to write down every notes, every detail, instead of minimising paperwork (Female officer, 7 years' service, 1999).

Police officers routinely produce more paperwork than required. Their main concern is to guard against work-related dangers and against extra-work.

I accept that it is better to catch criminals red-handed, but it could be dangerous because we don't know what is waiting for us. If something happens to me all my family would go nowhere. As you know the state does not care about what we leave behind us. The authorities give promises but in reality they talk, nothing happens in practice (Male officer, 16 years' service, 1999).

There are seven officers here at night. A superior one controlling security of the station, one responsible for communication, one to carry out clerical work, two for patrolling and the last as a spare body. We have to police thirty thousands citizens. If there was one case every hour, no problem we can cope it, if there are three or four, then we are helpless and called inept. Therefore it is better to take your time and do it one by one. No other choice (Male officer, 7 years' service, 1999).

Another officer takes pragmatism to a further extreme. He said that most cases are related to petty crimes and suspects are usually the same.

Except for a few serious cases, crimes are usually burglary, thieving, and small-scale fighting. We go and ask about known
suspects during day. Informers tell us who has done it (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

This officer admits that there is some sorts of beatings carried out in the police stations, but does not admit to torture as civil rights activists claim.

Beating is different from torture. I cannot believe any of our friends carry out torture. If you see some beating it must be infrequent, but you must understand that we have no other choice. Because, firstly, there are many crimes to be dealt with, but only a few of us. Everybody expects us to be successful, so we have to deal with every crime. Secondly, you know that the suspect is the person, who committed the crime, but he refuses to own up, then we lightly hit him. They usually confess. Isn't it logical to solve the problem in a short time, otherwise you will take a lot time and get the same result. Thirdly, frankly some criminals are more advanced than us. We have not got the same knowledge and don't have technical equipment to catch them. So you get some clues about who might be, then take him into the station, then he talks (Male officer, 12 years' service, 1999).

Torture is a sensitive issue with police officers. They are all aware of their image in the public and the media related to torture. Although they all deny carrying out torture, but accept that light beating does take place, according to statements taken from suspects at trial, severe beatings do sometimes take place and the police use several cover-up techniques done by suspects at the trials, some heavy beating could happen with using several techniques to cover them. Many officers consider that rough handling a suspect to be a legitimate means of extracting a quick confession from an individual they 'know' has carried out the crime. Officers are also clearly drawing a distinction between this level of violence and torture. There is a strong sense of injustice felt by officers who see that what they regard as pragmatic action is 'misinterpreted' by the developed countries and civil right campaigners as duress or even torture.

According to my fieldwork experienced officers are more pragmatic than young or newly appointed officers. This result supports my argument that socialisation
is a complete and gradual process, beginning prior to joining the force and continuing after joining the police community:

Before joining the force, whenever I had contact with police officers I thought they were using the laws according to their understandings, and I had different views of the same law. After joining I was very careful to apply the law equally for everyone but I have seen that the reality is far from the ideal. In our country, idealism has no place. The conditions require that you act differently in each situation. If you catch somebody who has friends in high places, you'd better be polite to him. You never know, anything can be happen to you (female officer, 5 years' service, 1999).

These young officers are so funny. When they come here at first time they want to follow every rule. Sometimes they criticise us for being too loose but they soon learn how to behave...We teach them or they observe us (Male officer, 18 years' service, 1999).

However, the older officers also told me that the young officers are too pragmatic compared to their own early days in the force. The reason for this is that Turkey is in a much worse position, politically and economically and in these circumstances pragmatism becomes paramount.

In conclusion, Turkish police officers are certainly pragmatic and this can be directly related to the anxieties of their job, to stress and to burnout. They see themselves as overworked, poorly paid and being used as pawns by the politicians and the media. They are therefore reluctant to fulfill all regulations and increasingly willing to bend the rules to make their jobs viable and, indeed, secure.

**Suspicion**

Police officers in Turkey are required to be careful and suspicious about occurrences around them. Most of the officers involved in the fieldwork knew that police work requires some amount of suspicion, but none of them realised the extent to which this would become part of job. One officer told me:
Before joining the force I knew that I would do usual policing, such as protecting citizens, catching criminals, and observing the traffic. While doing these I would have to be very careful about possible violations. But after joining I realised that ninety per cent of police work is based on suspicion. We were strongly taught and advised about those individuals who were to commit crime and were given descriptions of them (Male officer, 2 years' service, 1999).

The experiences gained during the political development of Turkey are the main reasons behind this reliance on suspicion. In the first years of the Republic the state directed the police force to root out opposition to the new revolutionary order. The majority of policing was related to crushing opposition, and therefore even suspecting the opposing of the new rule was sufficient reason to make an arrest. According to a retired officer, police officers at that time were very good at catching criminals because the laws gave them wide scope to act against anyone who might be regarded as enemies of the state:

Police work in the thirties and forties was divided into two parts. The work the force is doing now is only a small part of the work at that time because, as you know, we were very much authoritative than now. Therefore ordinary crimes would not have been seen, people were afraid of us. The biggest part of our work was to catch the enemies of the regime, and it was enough reason to arrest someone if we were suspicious about him (Retired male officer, 1999).

This state-directed police suspicion has been dictated by political insecurity. Especially during the political uprising in the 1970s, every different government directed the force according to their political views.

The force was in different camps in the seventies. Regardless of which political view was in power, they were taking huge quantities of new recruits in order to fill all available posts. When the opposition came to power they were doing the same thing. Therefore whenever they got some evidence or even a suspicion about an officer who might belong to the opposition they had him sacked. If you did not like somebody, you simply talked about him as if he was the enemy of this country and they lost their job (Male officer, 16 years' service, 1999).
This type of case is typical of underdeveloped countries, where there is less political tolerance in comparison to the developed Western countries. The dominant powers generally point to the opposition when seeking a scapegoat for the problems of the country in the developing world.

According to Sokullu (1990), police officers are suspicious because their conservatism leads police officers to be suspicious. When police conservatism is termed as a resistance to great and sudden changes in the society, Sokullu's view has grounds in the police community:

> Our duties are to protect life and property, preserve the peace, and prevent crime... and to be guardians of the system. To do this we detect and arrest violators of the law and enforce the law. We have to be very careful and look around possible violators. If you and I look around us, I could notice many more things than you because I have a long working experience and have met many different types of person. I could smell danger and suspect a person up to something. This is police work (Male officers, 16 years' service, 1999).

Racial prejudice also influences police suspicion as well as conservatism. Recent political fighting against separatist Kurdish terrorist activists has also affected police suspicion. Whilst carrying out field observation in a police station two Kurdish citizens were held under house arrest because they were suspected of writing slogans on walls in favour of separatist Kurdish guerrilla groups. When I asked to officers why especially these two, they replied:

> As you know the government spends a lot of resources on their part of the country. Believe me, my village has no better conditions than theirs, but they are still not satisfied. Then they come to western Turkey because they want to cause disruption. Everybody is pressing us to find the people responsible. If the case is related to their groups, who could be responsible other than Kurds? (Male officer, 8 years' service, 1999).

In summary, Turkish police officers are suspicious and there are several reasons for this. The most important influence is the country's unsettled political
situation. The police have always been responsible for seeking out enemies of the state. They are trained to be cautious, and their culture encourages their suspiciousness.

**Solidarity**

Nearly all-professional groups display solidarity. This solidarity comes from sharing the same working environment, working conditions, and problems. According to the many studies conducted in the West, police officers show an unusually high degree of occupational solidarity more than any other groups in other professions (Skolnick 1966, Westley 1971, Reiner 1992). The reasons given are that police officers wear a uniform and have a common employer, although many other professions also wear their own uniforms.

Sokullu (1990: 72-74) also agrees that a high degree of solidarity exists between Turkish police officers. The results of my fieldwork and working experience as a police sergeant, prior to becoming a research assistant at the Police Academy, confirms the existence of a particularly strong sense of solidarity in the police force:

> There is no other way than to have solidarity between us. We live in a remote area in a lodge provided by the force away from the rest of society. We use the same police force bus to go to work. We work at the same station and normally people have no reason to visit unless they are criminals or are visiting someone under arrest. The media represent us as if we are torturers rather than the guardians of security. Our friends are just our work mates. In these conditions we have to have solidarity (Male officer, 11 years' service, 1999).

It can be understood from this officer’s words that police solidarity derives largely from social isolation; indeed many police officers live in houses provided by the force. The policy of the general director of the force (who was a military general and appointed by the Security Council) following the 1980
military coup, re-established the force along more military lines and part of these new policies was to provide secure housing for serving officers.

Apart from social isolation, the public image of the police also has a great influence on police solidarity:

We are presented as if we are not police officers, but thieves, bribe-takers, torturers, and many other things, such as pimps who regulate prostitution. Actually we are not like this. I do accept some police officers accept bribes, but you cannot call all officers as bribe-takers, or torturers. Even a friend of mine has ended his friendship with me, because I work in the department where prostitution is controlled. But somebody has to do this and this police work. You should not criticise or shun people because of his legitimate job. If others steer clear of us you can only have relationship with your own colleagues. Therefore if you say we are too close to each other, we have to be and it is not only our fault (Male officer, 6 years' service, 1999).

This is, of course, a problem in all societies, and police officers in the United Kingdom and the United States will talk of social isolation. However, in Turkey, this isolation is more extreme due to the public view of the officers and his or her role. The Turkish police might be suspicious, but they are also suspects in the eyes of the public. Most citizens would be cautious about social contact with police in case they do or say something that makes them a suspect as well.

Lying

In one of the rare studies of Turkish Police officers, Sokullu, in her PhD thesis, says that lying is a characteristic of the Turkish police subculture (1990: 88). She argues lying is a deceptive tool to prove suspects are criminals, used by police officers in order to reach a legal end (Sokullu 1990: 88). Similarly a journalist, Erel also says that police officers, in order to prove their efficiency, resort to lying. Moreover, according to him, if police officers cannot clear up a
case because of their inability to act and the pressure of their superiors, they will resort to unlawful methods (Milliyet, a newspaper, 10.1.1981).

In fact, lying is tacitly accepted as a part of daily police life, not only in Turkey, but also in the Western world. Police officers usually lie when they are engaged in unauthorised activities. Strategies on how to apply lying on obtaining information, and to search and arrest procedures are taught at the police schools. These strategies then become part of police culture (Sokullu, 1990: 88). Along with lying, there are extreme cases of deceit such as officers, who having killed or injured a suspect, conceal or plant evidence in order to cover up his own offence (Reiss 1980: 254).

As a starting point Sokullu’s definition of lying as a characteristic of the Turkish police culture is used in my fieldwork. Lying is a reality of daily police work, but I assert that lying is not a characteristic of police culture, rather a part of police pragmatism or their rationalisation of the work that is the real characteristic of police culture. An officer put this situation into perspective by saying that:

Of course we have tricks in order to catch criminals. We use radar in order to catch speeding drivers or we use unmarked cars so drivers cannot tell we are police officers. All these are legitimate police tactics, used by every police force in the world. The important point is to catch criminals. As long as it serves, lying or any other short cut should be used. In such conditions, as insufficient resources or personnel we employ lying as well as others (Male officer, 11 years’ service, 1999).

Sokullu provides a detailed investigation of police lying. She says that there are three main types of lie: the external lie, told to manipulate the public, the internal lie, told to a fellow officer for self-protection, to construct a case, or to protect an informant, and the lie which serves two purposes at the same time (Sokullu, 1990: 88-94). Pragmatism is the common characteristic of these three
types of police lying. The idea behind them is to become successful, or to be seen efficient and effective by the public. The public believes that the criteria for success are directly related to clear-up rates.

Although this public perception is common and can clearly be seen in the United Kingdom in the public interest in clear-up rates, in Turkey, successful policing is more clearly regarded as political success than elsewhere. This is a direct result of the role of the police as an arm of the state in maintaining control. The political responsibility for law and order has a closer link to government. Crime prevention, control and keeping the peace are important aspects of police work. However, the results of these strategies, which are expensive in terms of cost, personnel and police time, are invisible. Crime and clear-up rates provide solid, incontrovertible evidence of success. So the Turkish police force are not only pressurised by public and media opinion to be seen to be acting effectively, the state authorities also prioritise this very visible indicator of success as a means of upholding political stability. In addition, because of the economic situation in Turkey, changing priorities to prevention and control and developing community links, however desirable, are given less priority than dealing with visible crime. The police are under-funded, under-staffed and operate with technologies which might be regarded as absolute in the developed world. Alternative, less legitimate strategies for effective policing are therefore inevitable. Lying forms an integral part of these strategies.

If they want us to be more successful, they should let us to use tactics other than lying... lying is the one of the most harmless tactic the police can use... In Turkey there is so much crime and there are simply insufficient police. For example, in this area there are over 100,000 inhabitants in summer time, but there are less than fifteen officers here. So we have neither the manpower nor the money for preventing policing. We have to use all what we have. If
the lying is the solution we will use it (Male officer, 15 years' service, 1999).

In short, I would assert that lying is not a characteristic that is exclusively linked to police culture but a working tactic. Lying is also a very human characteristic and is certainly not confined to police officers. This tactic is used by many other government employees of departments and by non-government employees. Moreover lying is not categorically illegal. However, the consequences of lying by the occupants of different social roles are different. Citizens, of course, frequently lie to police officers. However police officers in the line of duty in a variety of situations, some involving possible criminal charges and others dealing with public order maintenance, are virtually required to lie if they want to be seen as successful. And also, as Manning (1977) pointed out, police work, especially, undercover work requires a deceptive strategy.

Lastly, it does seem that the police officers have to work within the real limitations of available staff resources and budget. As the example above shows, where one area station with a maximum of fifteen officers was responsible for well over 100,000 inhabitants in the summer season. These officers could only respond to those cases, which needed urgent attention and could carry out no preventative policing. Lying to exaggerate success in clear-up rates also operates for officers on an individual level in terms of impressing their superiors and increasing their chances of promotion, or lessens their chances of being given unpleasant duties.
Application of Police Culture in Some Key Policing Issues

There are several sensitive issues related to the task of policing. These issues have been directly influenced by police culture. Some of these are: police discretion, police corruption and police brutality. Without a consideration of police culture, efforts to understand these key issues in policing would certainly not be complete.

Police Discretion

Probably one of the most important issue for police culture is the discretion used by police officers. Daily police activities involve a high degree of discretion, which has been argued to be the authority conferred by law to act in certain situations in accordance with an official’s or agency’s own considered judgement and conscience (Walker, 1983: 154). Virtually all police activities involve situations where the officer is called upon to make a decision about the best course of action. According to many studies discretion is inevitable, unavoidable and a necessity (Ericson, 1974: 84, Kinsey et. al. 1986: 66, Johnston, 1987: 48, and Reiner, 1992: 211). Lord Scarman said that successful policing depends on the exercise of discretion in how the law is enforced (1981: para. 4.58). Benyon agreed, with others, by saying that a “police officer must frequently make judgements about how the law is to be applied” (1984: 100). In short, discretion is the police officer’s daily task, as Lord Scarman concluded:

The good reputation of the police as a force depends upon the skill and judgement that policemen display in the particular circumstances of the cases and incidents which they are required to handle. Discretion is the art of suiting action to particular circumstances. It is the policeman’s daily task (1981: para. 4.58).
Discretion is a major problem in Turkish policing. The problem is not the use of discretion itself, but the fact that it is uncontrolled. Police officers believe that they have been endowed with special authority to guard society against immorality, impropriety and affronts to public decency. If a police officer relies on personal judgement in dealing with people-related situations, it follows that decisions will be subjective, relying on personal prejudices, beliefs, and predilections. In specific instances, it is a question of which decisions are legitimately discretionary or understandably differential, and which decisions are patently unjust and discriminatory.

As pointed out earlier, police officers believe, with considerable justification, that more younger, minority ethnic group members, and lower income persons are caught committing crimes than others. Simply to be in one of these population categories makes the individual more suspected. If, in addition, a gypsy or a Kurd identified within one of these categories behaves unconventionally, the law of “suspicious person” is promptly applied. The police would regard it as dereliction of their duty if they did not treat such person with suspicion (as we said that to be suspicious is an important quality of the police subculture), routinely question them on the street and detain them for further interrogation if a crime has occurred in the area.

A good example of this type of police discretion was encountered during the fieldwork. The event occurred following a directorate the police force had received in a circular to the police departments in the tourist regions, urging caution against possible violations by the terrorist group, the PKK. A few months later an arson attack occurred at a holiday camp. The police officers detained two Kurds on the same day and kept them overnight in police custody. The next day they had to release them because the real criminal who was not a
Kurd was arrested. Another example involved the way police officers view domestic violence as a 'private' affair best settled within the family. Concern was often expressed that official involvement would only make the situation more difficult for the victim, because she would have to face the possibility of reprisal. These are clear examples of police acting on the basis of their moral beliefs to make judgement about guilt and arrest.

The relationship between police culture and police discretion in so-called 'victimless' crimes is more evident. The nature of some laws, especially those concerning such crimes, place the police in positions in which discretion may be extended in favour of corruption. For example, in the case of speeding, the police can easily turn his or her authority to issue a ticket into an opportunity to take a bribe. Police culture supports officer's actions through solidarity or secrecy. Therefore it could be said that police culture and the discretion of police are inseparable realities of daily policing.

**Police Brutality**

Police brutality is either the use of abusive language, or the actual use of physical force or violence. It is difficult to know the amount of force used illegally because of the low visibility of police-citizen interactions and the reluctance of victims to file charges against their assailants. To further complicate this issue, police officers are authorised by law to use, 'necessary force' to make arrests, but there is no agreement or guidelines on the amount of force necessary. As a result, bringing officers to task for unprofessional behaviour is virtually impossible. In a variety ways, the police are usually able to camouflage misconduct. If a false arrest is made, there is a great temptation for police to charge the citizen with something, simply to avoid the negative consequences of a possible suit or the disfavour of superiors. In instances of
physical abuse, the lack of witnesses, the code of secrecy, and the powerlessness of the victim prevent disciplinary action as a result of the abuse. The code of brotherhood and secrecy among police officers are well supported in some studies (Westley, 1970) that most police officers indicate their adherence to the code of secrecy that would lie to protect themselves and one other is justified within departments by the fraternal bond and the fear of outsiders.

Similarly, Stoddard points out that new recruits are socialised into 'code' participation by experienced officers and group acceptance is withheld from those who attempt to remain completely honest and not be implicated. When formal police regulations are in conflict with 'code' demands among its practitioners, the latter takes precedence. Since the 'code' operates under conditions of secrecy, only those who participate in it have sufficient access to reveal its method of operation. The author concluded that "a police department is an integral element of that complex community structure, and deviance found in an enforcement agency is a reflection of values which are habitually practised and accepted within community" (Stoddard, 1974: 274). In conclusion, official police codes forbid police brutality but police culture encourages it.

**Corruption**

Another good example of the outcome of the operation of police discretion within the police subculture is the “corruption” inside the police community. There are many existing studies that show the relationships between corruption and the values of the police culture. The key to corruption is cynicism, an acknowledged characteristic of police culture in the literature. Cynicism is well supported as a rationalising point to corruption. For example Neiderhoffer points out that:
Cynicism is an ideological plank deeply entrenched in the ethos of the police world, and it serves equally well for attack or defence. For many reasons the police are particularly vulnerable to cynicism. When they succumb, they lose faith in people, society, and eventually in themselves. In their Hobbesian view the world becomes a jungle in which crime, corruption, and brutality are normal features of the terrain (1967: 9).

Cynical officers see the world as a place where “everyone is getting theirs”. They see their own situation as providing an inordinate opportunity for personal gain with little chance of being caught. They can depend upon the code to keep transgressions from coming to light. Rationalisations such as “everyone else is doing it”, “if I don’t take it someone else will” or “nobody is being hurt by this” become easy to accept. On a personal basis the residual nature of cynicism makes it impossible to contain the attitudes engendered by it within the working role. Once internalised, cynicism permeates family life and associations with acquaintances. It also contributes to some degree to the sense of isolation police officers.

Many of the officers I met in my fieldwork displayed cynicism to a greater or lesser degree and it was clearly more pronounced in older, more experienced officers. Cynicism, of course, does not inevitably lead to corruption, but nearly always brings dissatisfaction and frequently a sense of injustice and frustration in the face of government pronouncement on the police operation as a whole. This sense of injustice and frustration easily leads police authority into corruption. Authority is power. According to Lord Acton, "power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (quoted in Muir, 1977: 270).

Corruption is a big issue relating to culture although clearly a difficult matter for participant observer. Police officers do not deny the existence of corruption but explain it as a matter of 'bad apples' inside their community. There are several factors about police corruption relating police culture. These are; police
discretion which creates opportunities as Collins and O'Shea pointed (2000) out that corruption can be expected to increase as the number of discretionary interactions between police officers and public; low managerial and public visibility; and group secrecy and solidarity that cover up corrupt activities. When police officers see their social status lower than most other professions corruption is justified as they feel to get more official benefits.

Conclusion

In this chapter, it is argued that the Turkish police officers are not very different to their counterparts in the United Kingdom and the United States. Although the typical characteristics of the Turkish police have a clear relationship with the traditional culture, police culture in Turkey presents sub-headings and issues comparable with the police cultures in those countries.

Apart from its context within the national culture, police culture in Turkey has the potential to produce more misconduct than others and this has been the subject of international reports, such as those produced by Amnesty International. Misconduct can be seen to arise from the supposedly necessary priorities imposed on the government and the authorities, by the realities of Turkish economic conditions. This gives rise to insufficient control over those areas of police culture and discretion that come under scrutiny from Turkish media and from international sources. The principle of equal application of the law to all citizens in endangered when this control is not in place. Moreover, inconsistency in police behaviour, or the belief that the police do not treat people equally, is a major cause of problems in police-community relations. In order to avoid these problems police behaviour must be controlled, but given the pervasive nature of police culture, a solution is difficult to envisage.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the distinctive ways police officers view the world and its implications for police violence have been discussed. The important underlying reason for this discussion was to examine the police culture, and the way it is affecting current tough police practices in Turkey. Its theoretical importance demonstrates that the general use of police force can be considered an essential function, not only of the police, but also of the State as a whole. In characterization of the modern State, the monopoly of the use of force by the police is reserved against those considered as enemies within the State's territory.

The police, then, are specialized and trained in the use of force and have various weapons such as firearms and batons. Although police work involves more than the use of force, it has been argued that the whole range of police activities carry out thematic unity with the use of force. Whatever the case, whether helping to save a life, attempting to solve a crime or settling an explosive dispute, police intervention means making use of capacity and authority to overpower resistance. It is also perceived to maintain a solution in the native habitat of the problem.

The paramount concern lies in the decision of whether to use of force. If so, what type of force, and how much force to use. Such consideration is significant because the actual use of violence can be considered one of the gravest infractions the police can inflict on the personal integrity and also the physical and psychological well being of citizens. If an individual is attacked by another
citizen, one can in principle, call upon the police to intervene and assist. However, if the police are then the perpetrator, who can then, not only be called upon, but also be trusted to intervene in a situation of crisis? Moreover, a possible negative impact of police violence on public attitudes towards the police could hamper police effectiveness in detecting and solving crime. It is for this reason that use of violence by the police must strictly be controlled.

Three main approaches have been proposed for the strict control of police violence. The individualistic approach, is often proposed by police management, and regards the solution to the problem in terms of weeding out individual police officers that are considered ‘bad apples’. The sociological approach focuses on the characteristics of situations in which police violence may occur. Arrest, for example, is more likely if the suspect is antagonistic or disrespectful to police. Thirdly, the organizational approach emphasizes features of organization in which police officers work.

In this study, it has been argued that occupational culture, in addition to the perceptions and beliefs of police officers’, is one of the main factors in understanding police violence. Further, that all of the above three approaches carry some amount of a footprint of occupational culture in their explanation of police violence. The individualistic approach, for example, maintains that the ‘tough police’ themselves identify with the police culture and believe that the citizens are hostile towards police. Under the organizational approach, the informal organization or peer group is important in directing the behaviour of officers. Here the unwritten ‘code of silence’ consists of one simple rule: an officer does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer. In the sociological approach, for example, Kurd suspects are generally more likely to be arrested because they are seen as separatists.
Under this introductory guideline, it has been shown that occupational culture plays an important role in under-pinning police officers' beliefs, perceptions and values. This compares to the American and British police forces - where danger and authority are two principles features in the role of the police that combine to produce police culture. In contrast, authority or the mandate to use coercive force is the dominant factor to produce the Turkish police culture. Hence, the most evident outcome of this factor is the 'authoritarian personality' of officers that is regarded as the core basis of their authority. Several reasons were argued to lie behind this 'authoritarian personality' of Turkish police officers.

As stated in Chapter 5, the political development and peculiarities of Turkey are the most important factors in understanding not only Turkish police culture, but also many other controversial social and political issues of today. The most critical and deep-seated change came about with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s, when traditional Islamic values were replaced, by force, with the European lifestyle. The security forces have mainly been directed to defend the new regime and its social and political reforms. The military has had a strong influence over the governing of the country since the republic was established, because "it views itself as the protector of Ataturk's secular, modernizing agenda" (Gunduz, 2001: 21). They have always been equipped with a wide-ranging authority to impose these reforms on society. Consequently police officers in Turkey believe that the police force carry out some very important roles. Authority thus should be a feasible characteristic that is reflected in their duties. Public order can only then become a primary concern in their eyes. In short, to justify policing practice they rely upon the notion that the police are an indispensable arm of state control.
As argued in Chapter 6 and 7, the social and economic background of officers along with the political development has fed the authoritarian personality. Generally, they are derived from lower-middle and agricultural society where social traditions are strong. Such traditions that include: forbidding children, whatever their age, from smoking in front of their parents, the absolute respect which is expected from children towards older people, and teaching that 'the state is everything' in the schools' curriculums, are quite powerful. This notion has been further nurtured by continuous public disorder and civil disputes. In other words, when faced by these encounters the police fully see themselves in terms of their official role. This means that they can, and will, use coercion and violence if they believe it is necessary to do so for the overall good of the state.

Army conscription also affects police officers' authoritarian personality and sense of 'being a man'. During their compulsory service they experience a sense of work organisation, morality, group loyalties, sense of camaraderie, masculine focus and tendency towards native conservatism. Therefore it is common among police officers to believe that the direction of change for Turkish police should be more paramilitarisation of the existing structure. They believe that in order to get a better security services the politicians should have no control over police forces as in the Army.

During their weapon training in the army they also learn the power of carrying a gun which transforms police work into a heroic occupation. Guns symbolise the danger of work. With the gun the capacity of the police to deal with problems is not bounded by the physical strength and willingness of an individual officer, though both are desired traits. With guns, police are not just good guys, but good guys with stopping power, a distinction that celebrates the use of all necessary force to resolve any dispute, however violent.
The general consensus amongst most police officers is, that police work is overloaded and dirty, often involving much unpleasantness and facing many undesirable characters. This is believed to belong more in the province of men's work, hence women should have no major role to play in it. If women are accepted into the force there are certain areas of work they are limited to do, such as clerical and domestic duties. These perceptions provide a contrast to the status of women in the United Kingdom and the United States where there are many active female officers, with some holding high rank.

Although sexual equality is still a very big issue in both of these countries, it is clear that the role of women in the Turkish police force is still very much related to their perceived role in society. Again, this can be attributed to the slow economic progress in Turkey and more importantly, to religious and cultural factors. This does not deny the fact that there are many women who wish to take up more active roles, not just in society as a whole, but also particularly in the police force. Not wishing to be merely confined to menial duties, the percentage of women in the force is quite low. Female recruits accounted for about three per cent of recruits in 1993, one per cent in the 1970s compared to 0.1 per cent in the 1960s.

As a result of current pressure from European Union countries, the Turkish government is undertaking efforts to increase the percentage of women in the police force. However, as long as this type of work is culturally regarded as a men's territory, the rising number of women personnel will simply be placed in posts where their femininity remains uncompromised, or where their femininity might be viewed as an advantage in routine police work. One such area of work includes traffic duties. In such encounters, culture dictates that drivers are more likely to be polite to women officers. Another area where women may be viewed
as an advantage in routine police work is in situations involving sexual assault and domestic violence, thus acknowledging the importance of empathy for female victims.

Another important characteristic that is commonly held by Turkish police culture is the belief that no officer can ever be satisfied with his or her job. Officers often suffer emotional and physical exhaustion, which is largely due to an imbalance between available resources and the excessive demands of the job. This is one of the main reasons why police work is not regarded as a positive choice of career. Most recruits join the police force because they have failed to find adequate employment elsewhere. Furthermore, many police officers expressed the opinion that they would quit the police force if they could find alternative employment.

In addition to the heavy demands of work, the relatively poor social and economical benefits also help contribute to a state of 'burnout'. Police officers usually have to work over eighty hours in a week, thus, not only their social life, but also their family life is also compromised. Consequently, they feel that they have a vegetative existence. Stress is thus seen as natural ingredient of police work and it functions as a category of explanation either for police officers' failure, or to offset any claims against the structure of the force or as indemnity against corporate failure.

Related to this burnout, pessimism is also a core characteristic of the Turkish police culture. Police officers are pessimistic about the nature and direction of the social and economic change in Turkey. The economic chaos is believed to cause the lowering of their living standards. Combined with the rising trend in the number of crimes and violent public disorders and the changing types of the
crime they have to deal with in addition to the political unrest in Eastern Turkey, are all major factors related to police pessimism. None of these causes of police pessimism has an easy solution.

The existence of favouritism, especially in relating to rotations between different cities or departments is so obvious among police community. Police officers generally believe that the police force is much too open to the influence of politicians. They consider that all appointments and rotations are related to favouritism to some degree. Similarly superiors' preference frequently determines the officers' next working place.

Contrary to the early decades of the Republic, the contemporary police force has to undertake a social service function that is believed to be low status work. In the early days of the Republic, the country was at peace and being a police officer was a profession that attracted enormous public respect, so much so that even a few officers were able to cope with major public unrest. This has now changed. It is argued that because there has been an erosion of respect for authority in society, this has subsequently caused a decline in parental authority and responsibility, which inevitably has further led to a decline in discipline and control. This has been highly conflictive to Turkish conservative values, which dictate a strong respect for elders, authority and the state.

The definition of the term 'conservative' in Turkey is different from its definition in European countries. A conservative person in Turkey is one who favours Islam and takes an active part in religious observance. From this perspective, Turkish police officers are not considered conservative. Although they say they believe in Islam, they rarely practice their religious obligations. In their perception, those who have not had a proper education in terms of ethic and
respectfulness, which are fundamental to Islamic values in Turkish society, are individuals, who are then susceptible to raise problems of crime and public disorders. These codes of ethics and respectfulness are almost a natural outcome of the lower and working agricultural social background where these values are still held in high regard. It is the more affluent classes that tend to be more liberal in their approach and are thus less likely to adhere strictly to Islamic values.

With regard to their role however, police officers are morally conservative. This is more noticeable in older and longer-serving officers. According to these officers, conservatism is a means of preserving society against putrefaction that they perceive to be caused by the liberalisation. They also believe that the solution lies in a strong and powerful government as it was in the early decades of the Republic. There are two main groups of the younger generation of recruits that are regarded as being open-minded and liberal or religious and conservative. I have noticed however, that both groups gradually replace their views in favour of those of long-serving officers. This transformation is much stronger for the previously liberal officers than for the religiously conservative officers.

Almost all the police officers I have encountered in my fieldwork believe that they should have some sort of privileges attached to their job. Cited examples of such privileges include free public transportation and free admission to the police schools. Their European and American counterparts would call some of these privileges as 'grass-eating'. This granting of job related 'perks' to police officers is rooted in the single party period of the country.

In Turkey, historically minorities are defined in religious terms. Hence, "...no Muslim people was ever accorded minority rights, while Jews and Christian
Armenians, Serbs, Greeks, and others were" (Cornell, 2001: 32-33). When we say that the police officers are racist we mean that they do not welcome non-Muslim minorities such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians. A member of these minority groups would probably never be allowed to join the force if they are known to belong to a minority group. Police officers are sceptical about these ethnic groups. Most of the minorities are regarded as the richest people in Turkish society and therefore they have power to influence politics. This situation makes police officers uncomfortable and encouraged to racist attitudes towards minority groups.

Police prejudice can be seen to operate against more than just ethnic minority groups. They are also prejudiced against politicians whom they regard as untrustworthy. Even the lowest ranking officer can feel the huge negative influence of the politicians over the police force. Civil rights campaigners are another group of people that police officers generally do not like. They believe that these campaigners are associated with foreign civil rights movements. They are also seen as a cover for those industrialised countries' intervening in the developing countries. With its criticism of the police, the media is another major and influential profession that faces police prejudice.

The desire to get the job done, with minimal fuss is an obvious characteristic of Turkish police officers. In contrast to British police officers, the pragmatism of the Turkish police officers does not include minimal paperwork. Paperwork is regarded as a means of minimising the rise of responsibility for Turkish police officers. Their approach to investigating crimes is also a characteristic of police pragmatism. Most police officers in this study said they accept some sort of beating or violence at police stations, particularly in order to obtain information or a confession as a normal part of police routine. The rationale for this is, due to
a lack of resources, shortage of equipment and lack of personnel. Police officers will also justify strong-arm tactics by elevating their past experience and expert knowledge of criminals and their modus operandi to the status of certainty. A suspect therefore becomes the person who has committed a crime but who has not yet confessed. Pressure to succeed and to raise clear-up rates promotes this practice. Contrary to this, although police officers may accept the reality of the use of violence in obtaining results, almost all of them make a clear distinction between this level of violence and torture, which, they say, is out of their ambit. Police officers are very much aware of their image in the public eye and in the media with regard to this sensitive topic.

Another aspect of police culture is 'suspiciousness'. It seems that being suspicious is a natural outcome of police work. Legislation itself orders the police force to be careful and suspicious about events and possible violence of the law in and around communities. The political development of the country has always been the most important reason cited for police suspicion. The role of the police as defenders of security and of the status quo requires that they counter political opposition to the regime. In fact, this is also typical of developing countries, where there is no political tolerance between different political views. In the Western developed countries, political opposition is a fundamental part of the overall political regime, where opposition is reduced to a few different shades of democracy. The suspicion of Turkish police officers is closely related to their conservatism as well as to racial prejudice. In particular, the security problems of the country arising from the separatist Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK, place all Kurdish citizens under suspicion. The implications of suspicion cannot be undermined. As a result police believe that Kurds are capable of
committing any crime and will make an arrest based upon this racial prejudice rather than on firm evidence.

Solidarity is another feature of Turkish police culture covered in this thesis. Police solidarity in Turkey is coupled with their social isolation which, compared with other public service employees, is marked. A large number of police officers live on sites provided by the state, away from the communities they police. The long and unregulated working hours worked by police officers strengthens this solidarity. In Turkey, it seems that police officers work such unsociable hours that they cannot really have a normal family life, let alone the leisure to make social contact with other members of the community.

**Conclusion**

Every society recognises that the police function is essential to its survival. The important issue is to determine the means necessary to maintain that function. In democratic societies, order should not be an end in itself; rather, it should be regarded as a means to an end: that is, of justice and the sanctity of individual liberty. If this is so, the answers to the question of why Turkey's policing policy raises so much criticism about its practices is important. Turkey is a republican and democratic country with an emphasis on the constitution, but yet in a democratic society the police function depends on a considerable amount of self-policing by every citizen. Law observance is the most vital part of law enforcement. Police officers, even under conditions of intensive specialisation and extensive training, cannot possibly perform their duties effectively without abundant self-policing by the citizen. This custom is not merely a matter of cooperation or good relations between police and community. Ideally, it is a matter
of organic union, with the police as part of, rather than apart from, the community they serve.

Moreover, in such a society, the police are a living expression, an embodiment, and an implementing arm of democratic law. If such a principle as due process, for example, is to have practical meaning, the nature of police behaviour is vitally important. What the police officer does, and how he or she does it, is one weighty measure of the integrity of the entire legal system for each person with whom he or she comes in contact. For many people, the police are the only contact they may ever have with the legal system. If democratic law is to be credible and ethical in the eyes of ordinary citizens, with standards of fairness, reasonableness, and human decency, it will be dependant upon the extent to which the behavior of the police reflects such qualities.

When we take into consideration the importance of the police officer in a democratic institution and consider this line of reasoning, and the overall current impression of the force as tough, corrupt, and violators of the human rights; the answer to the question we asked at the beginning becomes clearer. The question was concerned with the understanding of democracy and how to preserve it. In Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, democracy is perceived as a set of social ideas, and where particular institutions are judged by their capacity to meet or embody those ideas. The authorities in Turkey, however, regard democracy as denoting a set of political institutions rather than a set of social ideas. The role of the police is to preserve this set of political institutions, at whatever cost. The police officers' behaviour, and consequently their culture, is therefore corrupt at the expense of democracy.
This suggests reasons why police culture in Turkey is different from the police culture in the United Kingdom or the United States. However, despite the differences within these police forces, a police culture shares the same core characteristics, albeit to a greater or lesser degree. Police culture in the United Kingdom has been raised along with the country's long-term struggle in establishing this set of ideals. The first principle of Peel, claimed that the basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder as an alternative to the repression of crime and disorder by military force and severity of legal punishment. It should be understood from this point of view that democracy is a set of social ideals and that the police exist to prevent breaches of, for example, human rights violations.

Similarly, the police culture in Turkey is a product of its political environment. The general principal that policing has primarily functioned as a political institution, and inextricably tied to the function of government. This responsibility, which is applicable to all police forces in Turkey, is executed via the enforcement of laws enacted by legislatures, and interpreted by courts, is applicable to the police force in Turkey. The difference is that the police service is plainly within the realm of public administration and by its nature, political. There has been a period in the political development of Turkey, as described in Chapter 5, during which the police force has always had responsibility for social control. The basis of social control is authority: the right to command, take strong and harsh action against the enemies of the revolutions, and to make final decisions about the definition of criminals. Turkish police officers tend to be authoritarian as a consequence of the large amount of authority they hold for the sake of regime. They are suspicious because they have to reflect the traits of the state. They are conservative because freedom is a liberal issue that could lead
citizens to criticise the status quo. They are isolated so that they might easily be controlled. Therefore these and other characteristics of Turkish police culture are strongly related to the political culture of the country.

As a general conclusion, although it may not be so in the United Kingdom and the United States, an understanding of the political life in Turkey will provide a foundation for understanding the core characteristics of the police culture. In short, police work is carried out under the influence of a political culture, though not necessarily under day-to-day political direction. The prevailing political culture creates a zone of indifference within which the police are free to act as they see fit. The most important way in which political culture affects police behaviour is through the choice of a police administrator and the moulding of the expectations that govern his or her role.
APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

My name is Muammer YILDIZ. I am a research assistant at the Police Academy in Ankara. I was graduated from the Academy and used to work as a police sergeant. I have been sent to University of Leicester in England by the Ministry of Interior in order to complete my postgraduate education. After the getting my degree I will be a teaching staff at the Academy.

I am now finishing up the work on my PhD degree. The information, contained in this questionnaire, is needed for my PhD dissertation. Because this information is so important and useful in future recommendation to the authorities, I want you to be as truthful and accurate as possible. I want to assure that this is a totally scientific study and I shall keep all personal information secret. None of your names will appear on the questionnaire.

Your co-operation on this study
is sincerely appreciated.
1- You are ____________ years old.

2- What was the specific title of your father's job? ______________________

3- What is (or was) your father's position in his occupation?
   - Regular employee..................1
   - Casual Employee..................2
   - Employer............................3
   - Self employed.....................4
   - Unpaid family worker.............5
   - Unemployed.........................6

4- Your hometown is in
   City ___________ Town ___________ Village __________

5- How would you currently characterise your hometown?
   - Urban...............................1
   - Suburban............................2
   - Rural..................................3
   - Far rural.............................4
   - Remote area........................5

6- Please circle the geographic region of Turkey in which you were born.
   - Marmara Region..................1
   - Aegean Region....................2
   - Mediterranean Region...........3
   - Central Anatolia Region........4
   - East Anatolia Region.............5
   - South-East Anatolia Region.....6
   - Black Sea Region................7

7- What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   - College.............................1
   - Open University....................2
   - University...........................3

8- Prior to joining to the police school what was the your employment history?
   - Never worked........................1
   - Rarely, and only part-time........2
   - Rarely, but then full-time........3
   - Occasionally, but only part-time 4
   - Occasionally, but then full-time 5
   - All the time, but only part-time 6
   - All the time, full-time............7
9- How long had you been considering police work as a career before applying to the force?

- Less than a year .................. 1
- One year .......................... 2
- One to two year ................... 3
- Two to four year .................. 4
- More than four year .............. 5

10- Do you have any family members who are (or were) police officers?

- Father ................................. 1
- Mother ................................. 2
- Brother(s) ............................. 3
- Sister(s) ............................... 4
- Uncle(s) ............................... 5
- Aunt(s) ................................. 6
- Cousin(s) .............................. 7
- None ..................................... 8

11- Indicate the relation (acquainance, friend, parent, spouse, etc.) and the occupation of the persons who influenced you most in choosing police work as a job. Place in order of their importance to you (from most important to least).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12- For each of the following factors, please indicate whether it was very important, somewhat important, or not important at all in your decision to become a police officer (Please circle the appropriate number).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Somewhat important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chance to experience working in the community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance to work outdoor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability work directly with people</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing a uniform</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of friend or relatives who are not police officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment information from the police force</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
. Have always wanted to become a police officer
. It just seemed like a good job opportunity
. We have always had a police officer in the family
. Excitement of police work
. Challenge of police work
. Pay as a police officer
. Carrying a gunshot
. Freedom of the Job

13- Prior to applying for this police job, would you state your feelings towards the police in general as:

- Very positive
- Slightly positive
- No real feelings
- Slightly negative
- Very negative

14- Below is a list of several qualities which might be considered in a "good police officer". For each quality indicate your opinion whether it is very important, somewhat important, or not important at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Not Important At All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Humour</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant Personality</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritativeness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for Superiors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendliness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15- The following is a list of activities performed by the police. For each activity, please indicate whether the police force should spend very much effort, much effort, little effort, very little or no effort, by circling the appropriate number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Very Effort</th>
<th>Much Effort</th>
<th>Little Effort</th>
<th>Very Little Effort</th>
<th>No Effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling in cars</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling on foot</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic control</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime investigating</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Assisting</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searching suspicious persons</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding problems of people in the community</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining crime prevention techniques to citizens</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informing people about services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting victims</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16- The following pages, statements are listed which might represent opinions you might have. Please indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with each statement by circling the number which best represent your response to that statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police should not become personally familiar with the resident of the area they work</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers should have the freedom to use as much force as they think is necessary in making arrests</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police tend to overlook minor law violations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people do not respect police officers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed suspects who assault police officers deserve to be treated roughly</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers are much more honest than other citizens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are times when an officer is justified in using physical force in response to verbal abuse</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention is to bring public order back</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should be up to the discretion of the individual officer as to whether to enforce most laws</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>It does not take much formal education to be a good police officer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical force is the only language some people really understand</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizens must have the right to complain about improper police behaviour</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police officers must be on guard or citizens will take advantage of them</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers should always ignore verbal abuse</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>There are some groups of citizens who simply will not co-operate with the police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a police officer is not a very enjoyable job</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigation of police misconducts are usually biased in favour of police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Because they get so much experience in real life, police officers understand human behaviour as well as psychologists and sociologists</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
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<tr>
<td>The job of police officer is very low in prestige</td>
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<tr>
<td>The newspapers generally seem to enjoy giving unfavourable news coverage about the police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preservation of the peace requires that police have the authority to order people to move along or break it up even though no law is being violated</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>The use of pressure tactics to obtain information from suspects is never justified</td>
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<tr>
<td>The police service needs more educated officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>The best police officers generally have more education than the others</td>
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<tr>
<td>Since the new &quot;transparent police station&quot; policy, the public has a right to pass judgement on the way the police are doing their job</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persons who give officers something are usually expecting something in return</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most recruits, enter the police school with unreasonable expectations of the job</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entry level standards for the police school are too low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nine months is too short a period of time to spend at the police school</td>
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<tr>
<td>The training at the police school is enough, more will be at work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police force has to be more military like organisation to function</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police officer training is adequate for the needs of modern Turkish society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police officers are primarily enforcement officers</td>
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Some of lessons you might think were emphasised too much or need more emphasising, therefore please circle the number which best represent your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Needs more hours</th>
<th>Just about</th>
<th>Not that much important</th>
<th>Not important at all</th>
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<td>The Principle of Ataturk and History of Republic</td>
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</table>
18- Please feel free to make any other comments you feel are important to this survey. You may use the back of this last page if necessary.

Again thank you very much for giving your time
and
all responses are anonymous.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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*Polis 1992* (official publication) Ankara: Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu..


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