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ABSTRACT


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In the face of fierce criticisms against the role, size, and performance of government, searching strategies to limit the role and size and improve the performance of government, especially of the civil service, has been one of the significant goals of many governments all over the world since the early 1980s. Within this framework, staff cutback is one the strategies of the policy of the withdrawal of government since the staffing aspect of government is considered as one of the significant elements of the problem of government size and performance. Criticisms against the size and widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the Turkish Civil Service lead us to analyse the staffing aspect of the Turkish Civil Service. The Motherland Party (MP) Governments under the premiership of Turgut Özal aimed to have a small size and rational-productive bureaucracy with the effect of New Right ideology. In this thesis, the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990 has been examined. Although the MP Governments shared similar ideological aims and followed similar policies adopted by the conservative governments in many developed Western countries, they could not cutback the staff size of the Turkish Civil Service in both absolute and relative terms. The resistance of the traditional bureaucratic elite and the existence of civil service guarantees, which were the legacies of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, as well as the populist policies pursued in the face of increased political competition towards the end of period were the most significant obstacles to the success of the MP Governments. However, the overall effects of the MP governments on the growth of the Turkish Civil Service was much restrictive than the previous governments except the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime. Therefore, it is not possible to name this period as a period of cutbacks but it can be considered as the restraint years since the rate of increase in the Turkish Civil Service staff was lowered significantly.
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ABBREVIATIONS*

DIE: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (The State Institute of Statistics/SIS)
DPD: Devlet Personel Dairesi (The State Personnel Department/SPD)
DPT: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (The State Planning Organisation/SPO)
The DP: The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti/DP)
The JP: The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi/AP)
The MP: The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi/ANAP)
The RPP: The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/CHP)
The NSC: The National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi/MGK)

* Including only government institutions and political parties often cited in the thesis
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INTRODUCTION

The public sector has become topical issue because of profound changes in its economic and political-ideological conditions since the late 1970s. In many countries, especially in the Western world, the renewed interest of governments and academic circles in the public sector result from a number of factors, inter-linked in a variety of combinations. The economic and financial challenges and difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s, including slowing down growth rates, changing international commodity market and increasing international competition originated by mainly East Asian economies, made it increasingly difficult for Western governments to control their economies and to extract revenue from them by mainly reaping the private economy. This led to budgetary deficits, then sharp increase in public sector borrowing, foreign debts and interest rates, and eventually high inflation and unemployment. This situation became more serious with the rising demands for welfare services and their increasing costs. This gave rise to the changes in ideological perceptions about the role of government in social and economic life and then the collapse of post-war consensus based on Keynesian economic management and the institutional-universal welfare state in the Western world. All these developments placed new demands on cutback and privatisation policies at the first stage and then on the search for the most suitable institutions, mechanisms and techniques for promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the public services. The collapse of command-and-control economies in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe and the failure of government-dominated development strategies in developing countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s completed the picture. Thus, in practice, economic and political-ideological conditions overlapped and reinforced each other. As a consequence, the whole landscape of the public sector has changed over the last two decades.
Reform efforts in the public sector before 1980s were undertaken as mainly a technical activity to improve the ability of government within the sphere of the traditional public administration understanding. However, governmental failure has been considered as a political-ideological problem in addition to its technical (economic and managerial) aspect since the early 1980s. The debate of the post-1980 period has been about the appropriate role, size and capacity of government in a modern society. In other words, it has been about redefining the boundaries between the public and private sectors in favour of the private sector in the face of governmental failure and improving the capacity of government in undertaking the new role envisaged for it within the limits of its new size.

The opposition to the over-expansion of the public sector has gained ground since the late 1970s; and then the “withdrawal of government” has become the official policy of conservative governments in Western Europe and North America. This ideological climate has spread to other countries and affected even some social democrat governments as in the cases of Australia and New Zealand. Governments have responded to the phenomenon of “big government” through cutting back public expenditures and public employment in order to reduce taxes; privatising state owned enterprises and public utilities and deregulating private economic enterprises with their belief in the “superiority of market” in efficient allocation of resources; and launching efficiency scrutiny for savings. In brief, one of the question has to be answered in the post-1980 period is “what” the public sector should be doing. However, even if the public sector is downsized, whatever remained in the public sector should be better managed (i.e. providing at least the same level of public service with relatively fewer resources) since resources allocated to the public sector are now more scrutinised. Thus, the problem of economic, efficient and effective use of resources in this smaller public sector has still been waiting to resolve especially for core public services financed through taxation. In other words, since there is a limit to achieve reduction in the relative share of the government in the economy, pressure to improve efficiency through market-type mechanisms and managerial techniques has increased. In brief, the other question has to be answered in this period is “how” government should go about completing its tasks. Thus, since the early 1980s, we have double focuses: One is on “what” government organisations manage in this limited, liberalised and commercialised public sector, with an external and economic concern; the
other is on "how" government organisations are managed, with an internal and managerial concern. Under these circumstances, the roles, size, values, structure, and functioning of national public sectors, especially national civil services, have been affected deeply all over the world.

Actually, questions about the role, size, and the capacity of government have been on agenda since the late nineteenth century. Wilson pointed out these crucial questions in his classical study (1887). However, the debate has intensified since the early the 1980s. First question is more normative since there is no objective way to establish an optimal and universally accepted size for government. The mixture of financial difficulties and anti-government political orientation has led to the commitment to "cut" government. The second question is more operational-instrumental. Searching answer to this question has led to the so-called "efficiency strategy" (i.e. improving the performance of government through using public resources more efficiently). However, these two questions are closely interrelated. In other words, first, government must be downsized; and second, this smaller government must learn how to manage public resources more efficiently. It can be expected that main attention may be given to the first question since staff cutback is often regarded as a strategy concerned with the reducing the size of the public sector (and the civil service) within the general framework of the policy of withdrawal of government. But this is not the fact. The policy of withdrawal of government, as is defined in Chapter One, contains strategies dealing with both of these questions. Although the effects of staff cutback strategy on efficiency are out of the scope of this thesis, the importance of both questions should be emphasised since staff cutback strategy affects both of them. Staff cutback strategy is directly related to the size of civil service and affects the allocative efficiency of civil service through reducing the size of civil service. At the same time, it is indirectly related to the performance of civil service and affects the X-efficiency of civil service (i.e. changing structure, operation and culture and morale of civil service) through various cutback techniques. Thus, the significance of staff cutback strategy in terms of both the size and performance (i.e. both allocative and X-efficiencies) of the civil service is quite obvious.
Purpose: In the face of fierce criticisms against the size and performance of government, cutting back the size of the public sector and searching efficiency-oriented institutions and mechanisms within the public sector, especially in the civil service, is one of the recent goals of many governments. Until the 1980s, it was not commonly acceptable to speak about the size and efficiency of public organisations or public services. The unions reacted strongly against the idea and most policy-makers tacitly accepted their arguments (Rosen, 1984). In the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, significant change in the traditional attitude can be observed at both academic and governmental levels (Christensen, 1988: 56). Efficiency, in both allocative and productive senses, has become a global pressure on government (see Welch and Wong, 1998). For example, at the beginning of 1980s, Sir I. Bancroft, then Head of the Home Civil Service (the U.K.), was talking about a “smaller”, “leaner” and also “fitter” civil service (Bancroft, 1981). The impacts of this pressure have appeared in many different parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then many OECD governments have launched cutbacks and privatisation programmes, efficiency scrutiny and set up annual or periodic targets for efficiency improvement in their national public sectors including national civil services.

As in the case of other national civil services, the Turkish Civil Service has long been attacked by political parties, academic and business circles, and media from different ideological standpoints on several grounds. It has strongly been argued that the Turkish Civil Service has been oversized, overstaffed, bloated and cumbersome; has become self-interested and unresponsive to the public; has been infected by widespread corruption; and, therefore, has lost its ability to manage public affairs efficiently and effectively. It has also been claimed that the Turkish Civil Service has become one of the main obstacles to the economic restructuring and development that has been mainly fuelled by the Turkish private sector recently (for example, see Güner, 1975; TÜSİAD, 1983; Çapoğlu, 1997; Aktan, 1999a and 1999b). While Turkey is a member of the OECD and the G-20 and an official candidate for full membership of the EU, some of her socio-political and administrative features (e.g. political spoil and nepotism, corruption, and widespread waste in public bureaucracy) still resemble those of developing countries. Therefore, the origin of a need for a comprehensive civil service reform programme aiming efficiency in Turkey comes from both severe pressures from outside circles, mainly the EU and international
financial institutions such as the IMF, the OECD and the World Bank, and endogenously perceived requirements for development objective. Taking the general trend on this issue within the OECD and, in particular, the EU regions as a yardstick, Turkey clearly does need to take a serious action in this direction.

In brief, the fierce criticisms against the size and widespread dissatisfaction with the structure, operation, and performance of the Turkish Civil Service lead us to analyse the staffing aspect of the Turkish Civil Service. Unfortunately, there is no simple and objective way to establish an ideal or optimal size of civil service and debates on the issues of governmental and organisational size still continue (see Lane, 1993, and Goodsell, 1994). It cannot be denied, however, that civil service staffing is inseparable part of the size and performance problems of the civil service. Staff cutback strategy should be examined in order to get some clues in sorting out these problems. In this thesis, staff cutbacks as one of the strategies of the policy of withdrawal of government will be examined with special reference to the strategy pursued by the Motherland Party (MP) (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) Governments under Turgut Özal’s premiership between the years of 1984-1990 in Turkey.

In order to solve heavy political and economic crises experienced in the late 1970s the New Rightist movement, constituted itself in the MP, tried to establish a new hegemony in Turkey during the 1980. With its liberal orientation in economic issues and conservative-orientation in moral issues, the MP under the leadership of Özal was an agent ready for action. Partly with the personal ideological choice of Özal and partly as a result of the worldwide tendency, the MP pursued such an aim enthusiastically (see Tüney, 1993). As in the many Western cases, this attempt was identified with the policy of withdrawal of government.

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1 This subject was, in particular, discussed intensively in the Marxist literature. For the “New Rightist hegemonic project” and rhetoric, forms, and strategies of such a hegemonic project in the context of Gramscian system of thought (Gramsci, 1973), for example, see Jessop (1983). Although this theoretical framework is developed in order to study the political economy of the Western world, as Tüney (1993) aptly argues, there is no reason to restrict this framework to advanced capitalist countries alone. It can be argued that the Turkish case cannot immediately be compared to the cases of Western capitalist countries, since there are immense differences with respect to their historical
Staff cutback strategy pursued within the general framework of the policy of withdrawal of government in many Western countries is mainly based on two aims: ideological aim (i.e. to reduce the size and the role of government in society) and economic aim (i.e. economic efficiency). These anti-government aims were shared by the MP governments in Turkey as well. The MP Governments aimed to have a small size and rational-productive bureaucracy but not an overstaffed and inefficient bureaucracy with the effect of New Right ideology. However, a certain political interest was also sought by the MP governments through the pressure of staff cutbacks over the bureaucracy. In other words, the MP governments did not refrain from rendering the bureaucracy into a loyal and party-book bureaucracy. Thus, the staff cutback strategy was also used as an indirect tool to achieve this political-party interest.

Many strategies of the MP Governments pursued within the framework of the policy of the withdrawal of government produced reactions in national and international public opinions (e.g. trade liberalisation and privatisation). In order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and the civil servants, the MP governments, however, preferred to follow a low-profile strategy in the field of staff cutbacks. As a matter of fact, the elimination and purge operations of the Military Regime and the transition from the civil service status to the contracted personnel status in the state owned enterprises and public utilities during the MP Governments attracted more attention of some writers (see, for example, Dood, 1990: 52; and Younis, Ibrahim, and McLean, 1992: 27, 28, 29-30). Whereas, the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments was the most significant attempt, with that of the previous Military Regime (1980-1983), in the modern history of the Turkish Civil Service. Moreover, the MP Governments were the most important civilian governments attempted to cut the size of the Civil Service under the conditions of competitive politics. Therefore,
we think that it is worthy to examine this strategy in the face of the importance of its political-ideological and economic aims and its affects over the Civil Service.

We are going to take this strategy in the context of historical characteristics of the Turkish Civil Service and then analyse it by using a theoretical model. Through this model, we will try to find out empirically whether and to what extent the Turkish Civil Service was cutback and restructured in terms of its staff aspect and what sorts of constraints and opportunities appeared on the road of staff cutback strategy during this period. This study will be the first comprehensive attempt in the literature to analyse the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments with many aspects by means of a theoretical model.

In this thesis, we have three major “hypotheses” to be discussed and tested:

Hypothesis I: “Since the MP Governments shared similar ideological aims and followed, more or less, similar socio-economic policies adopted by many conservative governments in industrialised OECD countries, it is expected that the MP Governments (1984-1990) could cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment or, at least, restrain the growth of the Civil Service staff”.

Hypothesis II: “In spite of the relative weakness of the civil bureaucracy in the 1980s in comparison to previous decades as a consequence of the increased fragmentation within the civil bureaucracy in terms of its legal status, socio-cultural origins and economic rights, it is expected that the resistance of the traditional bureaucratic elite and the existence of civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure), which were the legacies of the bureaucratic ruling tradition in Turkey, were likely the most significant obstacles to the success of the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments”.

Hypothesis III: “Staff cutback strategy affects not only the size of the civil service but also its structure and composition. Political ideologies, competition among political parties, social and economic trends, financial difficulties, and the self-
interest-seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats shape the basic patterns in staff cutback management. Therefore, it is expected that the conventional-popular party-political explanations, the social-economic trend explanations, and the bureaucratic process and bureaucratic self-interest explanations can do quite well in respect of explaining the cutback process in the Turkish Civil Service. In particular, it is expected that the behaviour of traditional bureaucratic elite in terms of the bureaucratic process and bureaucratic self-interest explanations is likely to display various bureaucratic constraints on and opportunities for the staff cutback strategy”.

Within the framework of these major hypotheses, the “purpose” of this thesis is, therefore:

1) To understand whether and to what extent the Turkish Civil Service was cutback and restructured by the MP Governments in terms of its staff aspect;

2) To find historical-political, socio-economic, legal, and bureaucratic constraints and opportunities appeared on the road of staff cutback strategy; and to find basic patterns of change in the size and composition of staff in the Turkish Civil Service as a result of the implementation of the staff cutback strategy;

3) To analyse the overall effect of the MP Governments’ strategy of staff cutbacks in the Turkish Civil Service.

In order to achieve this purpose:

1) An overall evaluation of the changes in perceptions and priorities in the public sector since the late 1970s will be made; the economic and ideological background of staff cutback strategy will be examined within the general framework of the policy of withdrawal of government; and then the role and effects of staff cutback strategy in achieving this policy and creating a limited and efficiency-oriented civil service will be established;
2) A set of explanations for the patterns of change in the size and composition of staff in a civil service (i.e. the conventional-popular party-political explanations, the social-economic trend explanations, the bureaucratic process explanations and bureaucratic self-interest explanations) and some related hypotheses will be developed to analyse the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service;

3) The origins and development of state and bureaucracy traditions in the Ottoman-Turkish polity will be reviewed; the position of the MP vis-à-vis these traditions will be established; and then the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments will be examined in this context;

4) Finally, all hypotheses will be tested by using public expenditure and public employment figures related to the Turkish Civil Service for the period concerned.

We believe that this endeavour will help us to understand the approach of the MP as an anti-bureaucracy political party to the Turkish public bureaucracy in general and to the issue of employment in the Turkish Civil Service in particular.

Scope: The scope of thesis is restricted in several points. First, since the Civil Service is the main body of the Turkish public sector in terms of size and significance and civil service staff is seen as an undeniable part of the size and performance problem of the public sector, this study has been devoted to the analysis of the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service.

Second, although the staff cutback strategy was launched by the Military Regime in the early 1980s, only the 1984-1990 period, so-called the “Özal Period”, has been analysed in this thesis. The main reason for this restriction is theoretical difficulty in applying party-political explanations to a non-party Military Regime despite the fact that the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime was heavily influenced by New Right ideology. Also, there is a lack of detailed and consistent data about the Turkish Civil Service staff for the period of 1980-1983. However, some general comparisons have been made between the period of 1980-1984 and the period of 1984-1990 in order to understand
the general trends in public employment in the Turkish public sector as a whole as well as in the Turkish Civil Service.

The MP was founded in 1983 with the transition to democracy after the three-year long Military Regime and stayed in power between December 1983 and November 1991. The first two MP Governments (December 1983-December 1987; December 1987-October 1989) were led by Özal; the third MP Government (November 1989-June 1991) was led by Yıldırım Akbulut; and the fourth MP Government (June 1991-November 1991) was led by Mesut Yılmaz. In this thesis, as is noted above, only the 1984-1990 period in which the cutback strategy was pursued has been covered. Although Özal was elected by the Turkish parliament as the President in November 1989 and this is a politically neutral post according to the 1982 Constitution, he acted as a backseat driver of the Akbulut Government. The Akbulut Government was, at least in its first year, guided by Özal without any diversion of policies of the second MP Government under the premiership of Özal. This influence gradually eroded towards the end of 1990 and, in particular, during the Yılmaz Government in the second half of the 1991. In the face of this reality, the first year (1990) of the Akbulut Government has been included in the analysis, but 1991 has been omitted. In other words, the Özal period (i.e. the first and second MP governments) has mainly been subject to examination. However, year 1990 has also been included in the analysis since the first year of the Akbulut Government is usually considered as an extension of the second MP Government under the premiership of Özal. In addition to the policy continuation, a technical necessity about official data used in thesis has forced us to include the 1990 figures in our analysis but omit the 1989 and 1991 figures from the analysis. Reliable official figures were published biennially by the State Personnel Department in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1990 figures in Public Personnel Survey (DPD, 1990a) were also partially corrected by the figures in Civil Servants' Occupied and Vacant Positions Statistics (DPD, 1990b). Therefore, year 1990 for which civil service staff data is available has been chosen as an end of the period instead of 1989, in which the premiership of Özal came to an end, or 1991, in which the MP was ousted from political power. Furthermore, the economic policies of the third and fourth MP Government’s were substantially distorted by the indirect effects of the Gulf War in 1991 (see DPT, 1993) and these governments did not show any serious intention for staff cutbacks in 1991. The
period of Coalition Governments (1991 onwards) has also been excluded from the analysis since the Coalition Governments did not pursue such a strategy.

Third, the Thatcher Governments’ cutback strategy (1979-1990), as a striking example of staff cutback strategy, more or less corresponds to the period in which the Military Regime (1980-1983) and the MP Governments (1984-1990) pursued the staff cutback strategy in Turkey. Therefore, the Thatcher Governments’ strategy is important to capture the insights of staff cutback strategy. However, it has only been overviewed since a detailed analysis of it goes beyond the aim and scope of this thesis.

Fourth, since the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments has been analysed at a macro-level (i.e. the general effects of the staff cutback strategy on the size and composition of the staff in whole civil service), meso-level (i.e. departmental or agency level – intra-organisational - effects of the cutback strategy) and micro-level (i.e. professional or individual effects of the cutback strategy) issues have, in principle, been excluded from the analysis. Therefore, apart from some general remarks, detailed explanations about intra-organisational, professional and individual aspects of staff cutback strategy have not been included in this thesis.

**Perspective and Method:** The general dissatisfaction of the Turkish public opinion with the role, size, structure, and operation (i.e. the overall performance) of the Turkish Civil Service has forced us to examine its staff aspect as one of the causes of this phenomenon. Staff cutbacks as a particular strategy of the policy of withdrawal of government has attracted our attention in dealing with this phenomenon. However, the staff cutback strategy in the civil service is a highly controversial and intricate topic because of its political, financial, managerial and behavioural dimensions.

The civil service is at the point of intersection of various scientific disciplines such as political science, public law, public administration, administrative history, economics, and management. It is normally expected that the multidisciplinary character of the field bring richness in approach, whereas the different methodological viewpoints and separate sets of terminology often cause an immediate problem of communication. Unfortunately, the
civil service is usually treated in the framework either of fully legal-normative or historical-political foundations of bureaucracy. Cultural-behavioural or managerial studies are usually concentrated on a single organisation or profession in a rather short period of analysis. Economic analysis of bureaucratic behaviour is quite a new approach in this field. While efficiency is rarely an important objective in legal-normative and historical-political studies, which are mainly interested in the protection of the public interest through legal-institutional mechanisms, economic-managerial studies put special emphasis on rearranging institutions and motivating bureaucrats in order to increase efficiency but usually ignores the legal and historical-political aspects of bureaucracy. The civil service is at a crossroads in many countries because the issues concerning the civil service go beyond some legal-bureaucratic problems and arise from serious economic-financial difficulties and problems of a political-ideological in nature.

In this thesis, the civil service has been mainly treated from the point of view of political economy of bureaucracy. We believe that our perspective is broad enough to accommodate the various dimensions of the civil service (e.g. political interactions; institutional arrangements and managerial practices; bureaucratic culture and behaviour) in order to explain the staff cutback strategy properly. This differentiates our study considering the interrelationships between economics, politics and management from narrow economic or management studies on cutback management and from conventional reform studies based on the traditional public administration concepts. With such a perspective, some powerful insights can be sought by going beyond the artificially created disciplinary boundaries in order to understand the true nature of the economics, politics and management of the staff cutback strategy. This perspective which is both outside the mainstream of economics and political science is likely to convince those who are sceptical about the value of economic-managerial approach to the public domain and those who totally ignore the value of political science (in particular, public administration) in explaining bureaucratic behaviour in the public domain.

When someone attempts to explain developments and changes in a national bureaucracy even in a short-term, he/she has to find out the historical-cultural origins of a particular type of bureaucratic values and attitudes. Therefore, not only some rational
motives of bureaucratic actors in a short-term, but also the cultural values and structural location of bureaucrats in a historical-comparative perspective should be taken into consideration as explanatory variables of their attitudes in the analysis. This is also true for political actors as well. We think that such a historical-comparative perspective supports our analysis made from the point of view of political economy of bureaucracy adopted in this thesis. In other words, with the help of this historical-comparative perspective, power relations among the state elite (the military and civil bureaucracy), the political elite and the other socio-economic groups can be much better taken into consideration by the political economy approach. It is expected that this perspective will provide some significant clues about the position of the modern Turkish bureaucracy vis-à-vis political power and the strength of the Turkish Civil Service against any kind of policies of political power.

Although staff cutback strategy was pursued by conservative governments in various Western countries and the MP Governments put this strategy into effect with similar ideological and economic aims, this strategy has been analysed in the context of historical-traditional characteristics of the Turkish Civil Service. It is known that Özal and his close circle had strong personal preferences for Anglo-American political-administrative and economic values that are quite alien to the Turkish case that has been heavily influenced by its Ottoman heritage and the continental European traditions. It is not likely that the experiences of one set of countries, especially those of Western countries, will be repeated elsewhere (Heper, 1997b: 66-67). It does necessarily follow that economic and administrative reforms are undertaken in a country will automatically have the same results in a different country. Without considering their cultural relativeness, reform programmes and strategies should not be transferred from Western countries, in particular Anglo-American countries, to other countries. Every single country needs to adapt such reform programmes and strategies according to its political and administrative culture and traditions and socio-economic circumstances (Hood, 1995a). This is particularly true for staff cutback strategy since it is closely related with political and bureaucratic traditions and socio-economic circumstances of a country. Otherwise, an analysis of staff cutback strategy would be a futile attempt of playing some quantitative figures in historical-cultural vacuum.
The place of Turkey among the countries of the world has been somewhat mixed in terms of cultural backgrounds and levels of socio-economic and political development. Turkey does not traditionally take place within the family of developed Western countries. The institutionalisation of the state (i.e. the relationships among the state elite, the political elite, and the civil society) and the socio-economic development pattern in Turkey, with her Ottoman past, is rather different from the Western countries, most of which had a European-style feudal origin, religious reform, philosophical enlightenment and industrial revolution experiences, a capitalist mode of socio-economic development, and, as a result, a strong tradition of democracy. Although Turkey is often seen, at least at first sight, a middle-rank, developing country by most socio-economic indicators such as per capita income and then placed by many economists and sociologists in the same basket with other developing countries, she does not fit the prototype of state with colonial background either. Her contemporary history has more in common with those of certain European countries than, for instance, with Nigeria, India or Brazil (Hale, 1976: 1; see also Mango, 1977: 265; Dodd, 1990: 136). The modernisation of the Ottoman-Turkish state and society has been achieved with close contact with the Western World during the last two centuries (see Heper, 1985).

As an emerging economy, Turkey is among the twenty biggest economies of the world in terms of total GNP. She is also a member of the NATO, of the Council of Europe, and an associate member of the EC, as a consequence of her long-lasting relations with Europe. Despite some relatively brief interruptions due to military interventions and some inadequacies in her democracy as a consequence of her strong state tradition (i.e. the relative weakness of the civil society vis-à-vis the state), Turkey, with her people (elites and masses), major political parties and civil and military bureaucracies, has remained committed to a democratic regime. Democracy in Turkey is not something planted in Turkish soil by some foreign or colonial power but it is a system imported and developed by the Turks themselves. Its basic features were not unknown to the Ottoman intelligentsia of the nineteenth century that put remarkable efforts to graft democracy on to the Ottoman political system. The founders of the Republic were also influenced by this tradition. Despite its strong elitist attitude in terms of being a true guardian of the state,
democratic regime is seen by the civil bureaucracy as the natural culmination of a century-old process of modernisation and especially of the Kemalist reforms, the purpose of which was to create a Western type of secular, republican, modern state. The military shares the society's general commitment to democracy although it displays certain elitist tendencies in protecting the state and national unity. The major political parties have necessary commitment to democracy despite their leaderships do not always show a propensity for compromise and accommodation. The masses with all elements share a belief in the general appropriateness and desirability of democracy since it allows them articulate their various demands in spite of their some of the anti-liberal, anti-deviationist, and intolerant attitudes embedded in the Turkish political culture. Although there has always been a great deal of public anxiety over increasing political polarisation and violence as in the late 1970s and over serious economic crises due to bad administration of the country and widespread corruption as in the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of Turkish voters do not seem to hold the democratic regime responsible for the crisis but the politicians. With all these characteristics, it is not an accident that Turkey is the only Muslim country has a democratic political regime. Presently, Turkey is the only democratic country in the entire Middle East region, with the single real exception of the very special case of Israel, as well as was in all of Eastern and South Eastern Europe, with the single but not very bright exception of Greece, until a decade ago. In view of the positive overall relationship between the levels of socio-economic and democratic development, Turkey is one of the few countries that are more democratic politically than they ought to have been according to the level of their socio-economic development. This could be explained by the strong elite commitment to democracy and the relatively favourable political structural factors such as developed central governmental authority and institutions and the existence of political equality and political participation. Turkey's familiarity with the constitutional and representative government since the last quarter of the nineteenth century has helped to institutionalise her democratic structures and procedures (see Dodd, 1990: Chp. 5 and 6; Özbudun, 1990; and Heper, 1991b).

Turkey with such features is quite different from most of the developing countries of today. It differs, in particular, from the Third world countries in that she never experienced a colonial past. Democratic and bureaucratic institutions were not directly
imposed from outside, but are generally seen as a natural outgrowth of internal political processes, which keeps their legitimacy high in the eyes of the political elite and the public. The Republic of Turkey has inherited the strong state and historical bureaucratic ruling tradition of the Ottoman Empire, only partly comparable to the French and German experiences in the last two centuries. The state elite, including the bureaucratic elite, has long dominated the political system. The political elite, in turn, has attempted to turn the bureaucracy into a mere tool at its disposal. As a result, no modus vivendi could develop between the two sets of elites. Thus, the modern Turkish polity has been characterised by a fundamental tension between the state and political elites (Heper, 1992a). Therefore, any analysis of the state, bureaucracy, economy or democracy in Turkey cannot be attempted without reference to its Ottoman past and the effects of this heritage on the contemporary setting (see Heper, 1987b; and Özbudun, 1990). In brief, the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments, which can be considered as a significant part of the political-ideological and economic attempt of an anti-bureaucracy political party to put the Turkish Civil Service under its control and tame, has been subject to an analysis within this context.

The determination of this useful perspective is very important but not an adequate step since the staff cutback strategy needs to be examined empirically in this thesis. Government growth has become an important subject to criticism almost in every country. Governments and their policy advisers have spoken of the need to cutback public expenditure and public employment. However, cutting back is not an easy task. A great deal of academic thought has been given to explain the problem of government growth, but there has been no comparable attention paid to explain how the achieve cutbacks; and how to analyse cutback strategy and its results. In this thesis, a theoretical model (i.e. a set of explanations for the patterns of change in the staff of a civil service and twenty six related hypotheses) has been developed through reviewing the literature on “cutback management” (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989) and “bureaumetrics” (see Hood and Dunsire, 1981) in public bureaucracies in order to empirically analyse the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service. Hypotheses, which are related to the patterns of change in the staff of the Turkish Civil Service, have been tested by using public expenditure and public employment figures for the period concerned.
In order to set up the model, find empirical data to test the hypotheses of this model and collect necessary information to analyse the aim, practice and results of the staff cutback strategy, a broad literature review has been done. In this framework monographs and articles; laws and other regulatory documents, official reports and statistics have been examined carefully and in detail.

In approaching this rather formidable subject, especially in the face of the bureaucratic difficulties in having permission from government departments to conduct an empirical research which questions the government policy about the size and performance of the Turkish Civil Service, our advantage probably lies in having had two years experience (1986-1987) as a public personnel specialist in the State Personnel Department. We have drawn on this experience to throw light on the aim and practice of the staff cutback strategy in the Civil Service. We are aware that generalising from one's own experience is suspect but even anecdotal evidence may be worth reflection. Furthermore, working in a central control organisation, which was one of the responsible government organisations for the staff cutback strategy, in the period of staff cutbacks provides useful insights more than some patchy anecdotes. During this period, we had also a chance to get the confidential views of some higher and middle-level administrators and specialists who worked in the central controlling organisations (e.g. the Office of Prime Ministry, the Administrative Development Department of the Office of Prime Ministry, the State Personnel Department, the Ministry of Finance, and the Audit Court) on the behavioural patterns (i.e. self-interested attitudes of bureaucrats give rise to empire-building, waste and corruption) within the Turkish Civil Service in general and on the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in particular. Therefore, this limited experience should be considered as an auxiliary instrument to our study based on the analysis of public expenditure and public employment figures.

**Basic Concepts:** Although many key concepts for this thesis (e.g. the policy of the withdrawal of government, staff cutback strategy, strong state tradition, bureaucratic ruling tradition, patrimonial-legal bureaucracy, the substantive rationality of the bureaucratic elite) have been defined in detail in chapters concerned, some basic and often used concepts need to be clarified at this stage.
The term “bureaucracy” here refers to an organisational structure and its values, rules, procedures, and personnel at governmental level. In terms of organisational structure, the Turkish bureaucracy consists of three major divisions: the “central government”; the “local governments”; and the “state-owned enterprises and public utilities”. The term bureaucracy has often been used, as in the cases of civil and military bureaucracies, to refer a certain socio-political and professional group as well as an administrative entity. It should be kept in mind that the bureaucracy does not act as a monolithic entity. The members of the bureaucracy critically placed at the upper grades of the bureaucracy and their leading behaviour are very important. Within this context, the term “bureaucrat” covers both higher career public servants and a few political appointees (e.g. provincial governors and ambassadors occupy excepted positions). The “bureaucratic elite” has often been used interchangeably with the corp(s) of bureaucrats in order to indicate the socio-political position and power of bureaucrats in the society.

The “civil service” is a more limited and specific term than the term “bureaucracy”. The civil service has been part of the day-to-day vocabulary of public affairs for quite a long time but the underlying meaning of the term has been elastic. As a matter of fact, there is a lack of clarity surrounding the term civil service in the British public administration literature (see Drewry and Butcher 1991:9-17; and Wood, 1981:480). Similar problems arise when we try to draw international comparisons, using the familiar vocabulary of the British Civil Service with reference to the central bureaucracies of other Western countries.

We can approach this problem in three ways in respect to the Turkish case since there is no general established term in the Turkish language corresponding to the “civil service” in English: Organisational structure, budget, and personnel. Although the term civil service has never been defined both in the legal-official documents and Turkish public administration literature in terms of organisational structure, the main part of the central government, excluding the Ministry of Defence and other bodies related to the Armed Forces, and some quasi-governmental bodies is considered as the equivalent of the British Civil Service. However, the Turkish central government covers many public
services such as health, education, social security, and internal security that are mainly provided by the central or local authorities - outside the Civil Service - in the U.K..

Central government departments which are financed by the consolidated government budget (general and annexed budgets), special budgets and revolving budgets; and some civil central government bodies which are financed by fund budgets form altogether the Turkish Civil Service in terms of budget allocations. Local governments, state-owned enterprises and public utilities, and some quasi-governmental bodies that are financed by their own resources as well as by the consolidated budget are out of the scope of the Civil Service.

The Civil Servants’ Law dated 1965 and numbered 657 has brought a broad definition of civil servant for personnel employed in the state-owned enterprises-public utilities, local governments as well as ones employed in the central government. This definition covers almost all public employees except workers, contracted and temporary personnel in the Turkish public sector and it goes beyond the aim and scope of the thesis since our main concern is the central government.

What we mean by the Civil Service for Turkey in this thesis is that the central government departments (merkezi hükümet kuruluşları)- except the Ministry of Defence and other bodies related to the Armed Forces and some quasi-governmental bodies - which are financed by the consolidated, special, revolving and fund budgets; and personnel (civil servants/devlet memurlari) employed in those departments and universities excluding ministers and members of the Parliament, members of the Armed Forces, civilian personnel employed in the Ministry of Defence and the National Intelligence Organisation, judicial officials, academic officials, personnel employed in the Presidential Office and the Parliament and personnel employed in some quasi-governmental bodies.

Thus, it can be said that the Turkish Civil Service embraces civilian public servants (civil servants) of certain central government departments that are employed on a permanent statutory basis (see also Mihçioglu, 1964: 90, 92). In this context, civilian public servants that are employed on a similar permanent statutory basis in local governments and the state owned enterprises and public utilities are kept out of scope of
the Civil Service in this thesis. Also, some types of public servants (i.e. contracted personnel, temporary personnel, and workers) that are employed on a contractual basis in different levels of government do not normally take place in the scope of the Civil Service. In brief, the term Turkish Civil Service covers only civil servants employed in the central government in thesis.

Since the scope of Civil Service in Turkey has changed during the course of time and the legal-institutional differences between the Civil Service and the rest of the bureaucracy (i.e. some parts of the central government, the local governments, and the state-owned enterprises and public utilities) have not always been taken into account in the relevant literature, the term bureaucracy, as an organisational structure and its personnel, has been preferred to use in Chapter Three and Four in dealing with the historical evolution of the Turkish bureaucracy. However, as the Civil Service constitutes the core of the Turkish bureaucracy, any comment on the whole Turkish bureaucracy cannot be wrong, at least in principle, for the Civil Service either. When it is considered necessary, some remarks have been made to indicate the differences between the Civil Service (and the civil servants) and the rest of the Turkish bureaucracy (and other public servants) and between the bureaucratic elite and the rest of the all public servants (including the civil servants).

Structure: This thesis is made up of five chapters in addition to introduction and conclusion sections. In the introduction section, the purpose, scope, perspective, methodology, basic concepts, and structure of thesis has been clarified. The conclusion section has been devoted to the main findings of thesis and some forecasts for the future.

In the first chapter, an overall evaluation of the changes in perceptions and priorities in the public sector since the late 1970s has been made; the problem of government growth has been posed and the policy of the withdrawal of government developed to overcome this problem has been defined and examined with its political-ideological, economic and managerial aspects. Within this framework, the role and effect of the staff cutback strategy in achieving the policy of the withdrawal of government and creating a limited and efficiency-oriented civil service has been established. The British experience in the period of the Thatcher Governments (1979-1990) has also been overviewed since it is a striking
example of staff cutback strategy. Finally, some concluding remarks have been made about the overall effects of the policy of the withdrawal of government on the role, size, structure and operation of the public sector in general and the civil service in particular.

In the second chapter, a theoretical model (i.e. a set of explanations for the patterns of change in the staff of a civil service and twenty-six related hypotheses) has been developed through reviewing the literature of bureaumetrics and cutback management in public bureaucracies in order to empirically analyse the staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service. The methodological strengths, weakness and limitations of this model and the problems faced in its application to the Turkish Civil Service has been discussed.

In the third chapter, a theoretical framework has been drawn to analyse the role of bureaucracy in the historical context of Ottoman-Turkish society. Then, the historical evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy has been overviewed in order to determine the common feature of the relationships between the state, the constitutive system (including political power) and the bureaucracy. Thus, a general situation of the Turkish Bureaucracy (and the Turkish Civil Service) has been portrayed when the MP captured political power.

In the fourth chapter, the general policy of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal towards the state, economy and bureaucracy has been examined in order to illuminate the general atmosphere in which the MP Governments' staff cutback strategy pursued in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990. Thus, political-ideological and economic dimensions of the MP Governments' policy towards the state and bureaucracy (e.g. the size and the role of the state in social and economic affairs and the status of the bureaucratic elite in the polity) have been discussed.

In the fifth chapter, the MP Governments' strategy of staff cutbacks in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990 has been examined in order to understand whether and to what extent the Turkish Civil Service was cutback and restructured by the MP Governments in terms of its staff aspect in accordance with the MP's general policy towards
the Turkish bureaucracy. The basic patterns of change occurred in the size and composition of staff in the Turkish Civil Service as a consequence of the staff cutback strategy and political, socio-economic and bureaucratic constraints on and opportunities for the MP Governments' strategy of staff cutbacks have been analysed by using the hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. These hypotheses have tested by using public expenditure and public employment figures related to the Turkish Civil Service for the period concerned. In order to understand and explain the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments with all aspects, the staff cutbacks initiated by the Military Regime (1980-1983) has been overviewed before moving this analysis.
CHAPTER I. THE STRATEGY OF STAFF CUTBACKS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE POLICY OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF GOVERNMENT

It has almost been three decades since the first “Oil-Price Shock” gave rise to serious economic and financial difficulties in Western economies. It has also been about two decades since the first conservative government in a Western country came to power on the basis of ideology which repudiated the “post-war consensus” formed around “Keynesian mixed economy” and the “welfare state”.

The 1970s and 1980s were decades of economic difficulties in most industrialised Western countries in contrast to the prosperity of the preceding decades. On the one hand, Keynesian economic management was rejected as an ineffective solution under the new economic conditions-stagflation. On the other hand, the welfare state, which was expanded in the post-war period, was considered as a scapegoat of the financial crisis. The post-war consensus was challenged by the “New Right” both as an ideology and political movement. The New Right has advocated a return to pre-Keynesian economic principles and a residual-selective welfare state. This outstanding break with the post-war social and economic policy in the Western world has affected the ideas and practices in the all sections of the public sector (i.e. central government, civil service, local government, state-owned enterprises and public utilities). Since the early 1990s centrally planned economies of the Eastern Bloc and many developing countries, previously committed to widespread government control and regulation, have retreated from étatist policies and moved towards policies aimed at liberalising their economies. In parallel to these unprecedented developments, the traditional model of public administration (its culture, values, and practices) has been seriously questioned. As a consequence of all these developments, which will be examined in detail in the following pages, traditional perceptions about the public sector has fundamentally changed. Since the early 1980s, the question has been how to establish a balance between the public and private sectors in the sense of public policy-making vis-à-vis market allocation; and how to improve public management by
using criteria such as economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This question has been developed around the phenomenon of “Big Government”.

In this Chapter, first, the changes in perceptions and priorities in the public sector since the late 1970s will be reviewed briefly. Then, the problem of government growth will be posed and the policy of the withdrawal of government, which has been developed to overcome this problem, will be defined and examined. Within this framework, the role and effect of the staff cutback strategy in achieving the policy of the withdrawal of government will be established. The British experience in the period of the Thatcher Governments (1979-1990) will also be overviewed since it is a striking example of staff cutback strategy. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made about the overall effects of the policy of the withdrawal of government on the role, size, structure and operation of the public sector (and the civil service that is a significant part of the public sector).

A) The Public Sector is at the Crossroads: The Changes in Perceptions and Priorities in the Public Sector since the Late 1970s

Before we start to examine the state of the public sector in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s we should clarify the concept of “public sector”. Leaving the semantic questions about the terms “public” and “private” aside, the public sector can be defined in different ways such as resources (material, labour, and capital) the government uses; amount of public money the government spends; institutions and financial assets the government owns; institutions, individuals, and activities the government controls; and outputs the government produces or finances (see Gemmel, 1993b: 2-3). In each way, however, the “demarcation problem” (i.e. what is, and what is to be public, private or public-private mix) involves in the derivation of any definition of the public sector (Lane, 1993: 13).

The public sector generally means that “public institutions (central government, local governments, social insurance institutions of public character, state-owned enterprises and other public corporations) and their activities (i.e. production, provision, financing, redistribution, regulation) in an area which is mainly regulated by public law and administrated and controlled by the political authority and its agents”. This general
definition implies administrative (public institutions), economic (the activities of these institutions), legal (exercising public authority) and political (control and accountability) dimensions of the concept of the public sector. All these dimensions should be taken into consideration in order to understand the nature of the public sector.

As we mentioned in Introduction, the public sector, including the civil service, has become topical issue because of profound changes in its economic and political-ideological conditions during the 1980s and 1990s. All these changes have overlapped and reinforced each other and then placed new demands on cutback and privatisation policies at the first stage and then on the search for the most suitable institutions, mechanisms and techniques for promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the public services.

Most of these new concerns have been usually viewed as only technical questions and a great deal of research has been conducted to improve management of public affairs, through policy analysis or better management techniques. However, as Muhammad stated:

« Now, public administration is embroiled in larger forces in society and the result is that certain fundamental questions are being posed about its proper role and efficiency. These questions go beyond technical issues and are essentially of a political nature. In fact, public administration is at the crossroads in many countries, and the ongoing debates may well determine its course for years to come» (1988: 3).

Therefore, the economic and ideological conditions of the public sector must be taken into consideration when any related issue is examined in this field.

1) Post-war Consensus

The accepted conception of the proper functions of government has undergone a vast transformation over the past century. Historically, the main duty of government was first and primarily seen to lie in its security function. Maintaining public order and defending national boundaries were the primary concerns. Liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century advocated the minimalist conception of the “nightwatchman” state and saw government as
a threat to individual rights and liberties. But this view was challenged with the rise of public dependence upon government as a counterweight to the potentially harmful workings of social and economic processes that had been initiated by the Industrial Revolution and democratic political transformation in Western Europe. And then government has been regarded increasingly as a benign and helpful force for the promotion of the economic and social welfare of its citizens.

Government’s activities have expanded in scale, in subject matter and in variety throughout the twentieth century (Rose, 1976). The welfare state has replaced the nightwatchman state (Sleeman, 1973; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1984), and national public administrations designed for traditional governmental functions have adopted the claims of modern states (Corson and Harris, 1963). A series of incremental adjustments in the scope and thrust of government activity have taken place in response to changing circumstances. The idea of government intervention was also influenced by significant political and economic events, such as the “First and Second World Wars” and the “Great Depression”. These developments marked discontinuity with the past but they were also stepping stone to the future: new social and economic roles for government that were the basis of what came to be called the “post-war consensus”.

The post-war consensus comprised three interrelated elements: a “mixed economy” incorporating Keynesian demand management economic policies; the “welfare state”, with institutional-universal social services; and a “political consensus”. The Keynesian approach involved governments assuming prime responsibility for economic management and fine-tuning the economy. This approach aimed at creating high levels of aggregate demand for goods and services in order to maintain full-employment. Governments relied on a combination of fiscal and monetary policies in their efforts to attain four primary economic goals: full-employment; price stability; balance of payments; and economic growth.

The welfare state component of the post-war consensus was a wide range of publicly and universally available services which are produced and financed by public authorities,

2 On the post-war consensus, see Deakin (1987); Kavanagh and Morris (1989); and Sullivan (1992).
including a system of social security payments, a comprehensive health and education opportunities, public housing, and personal social services. Although there were some differences in the degree to which governments allocated resources to particular welfare services, or managed to meet the needs of their citizens, government involvement in welfare was ubiquitous and internationally accepted. For example, Beveridgean welfare state under the dictum of "care from the cradle to the grave" went hand in hand with Keynesian economic management in the U.K. under the "Butskellism".

The political consensus, sometimes known as the "social democratic consensus" in the U.K. as well as in many Western countries, is described by Marquand as the:

"set of commitments, assumptions and expectations, transcending party conflicts and shared by the great majority of the country's political and economic leaders which provided the framework within which policy decisions were made" (1988: 18).

There was a high level of agreement across political parties and political elites about the substance of public policy, especially on the role of government. Kavanagh points out that the political consensus also referred to the tendency of a new government to accept its predecessor's legislation, even when, in opposition, it had opposed it (1987: 7). There was also an agreement on the nature of the political system and its key institutions. This consensus did not go unchallenged but the minority who opposed it was overshadowed by the widespread support for the consensus. McCarthy's strident anti-communism, the warnings of anti-collectivist economists such as Nozick, Hayek and Friedman, and the intellectual efforts of some research centres such as the Institute of Economic Affairs failed to stem the heady expansion of the public sector during the 1950s and 1960s. The question dominated mainstream political and academic circles was: "how much?" or "when" but not "whether?" (Heald, 1983). By the early 1960s, both right and left-wing political parties had endorsed statism (étatism), and accepted the idea that public agencies should manage the economy by owning and operating industrial enterprises, regulating

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3 The term "Butskellism" was constructed by The Economist in 1954 from the names of Butler and Gaitskell, the Chancellors of the Exchequer of the British Conservative and Labour Governments respectively in the 1950s, to characterise this consensus view of politics.
private sector activities, providing a wide range of public services. The steady rise in the standard of living and a pervasive sense of well being contrasted sharply with socio-economic conditions just a generation earlier. As the major political parties in both Western Europe and North America competed on a limited ideological field for electoral support, the political influence of radical movements further on the right and left declined. And, in the electoral campaigns of the time, the continued expansion of public services became a central feature of political platforms. In addition to the social democrat parties and governments, the socio-economic policies of Republican Nixon Administration in the U.S., the Conservative Party under Heath’s leadership in the U.K., Adenaur’s Christian Democrats in West Germany and the centre-right coalition of Giscard d’Esteing in France also contributed to the expansion of the public sector and, in particular, the welfare state. The disagreement between conservatives and social democrats turned on what kind of welfare state should be constructed in the post-war era - on its size, its generosity, and its relationship to the market and the imperative of capital accumulation (Brown, 1988). The relative dominance of social democracy (i.e. Fabianism in the U.K.) in social policy; pluralist theory in political science; functionalist theory in sociology; Keynesian mixed economy model in economics; and the “end of ideology” (Bell, 1960) and “convergence” (Lipset, 1964 and 1969) theses contributed to the consolidation of the post-war consensus (Johnson, 1987) both at theoretical and practical levels.

The sustained growth and growing economic prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s in the world economy also facilitated the consolidation of consensus. This period could be seen as a “golden economic age” when growth in GDP and growth in public expenditure and therefore taxation were themselves at historically high levels. Much of thinking on the public sector in those years was influenced by optimism on the subject of the availability of material and human resources for development. A common belief that even high growth rates should be achievable without too much difficulty led to widespread confidence that increasing public expenditure was affordable. Therefore, the implicit goal of governments was to expand public services in the name of public interest (see Foster and Plowden, 1996: 3, 9-10). As Christensen points out, «the aim has been, of course, not “Big Government” by itself, but the creation of ... modern welfare state» (1988: 37). The implications of this expanded role of government have been rising taxes; growth in public
expenditure; more and even larger publicly financed and managed institutions because of administrative expansion and nationalisation; and the expansion of public bureaucracy in all segments of the public sector.

Turkey was also affected by this general economic trend. Although right-wing parties, which were oppose the role of government in social and economic affairs in rhetoric, were in power in most of the period, their populist economic policies and import-substituting development strategies in practice expanded the public sector. The étatist economic tradition of Turkey and the Constitutional principles favouring economic planning in a mixed economic system contributed to this expansion as well (see Aktan, 1991-1993: 63-66).

2) The End of Consensus

By the early 1970s, however, cracks were appearing in the consensus and opposition grew louder as concerns were being expressed about the post-war consensus. A turning point was the sharp rise in oil prices after the Arab-Israeli war in 1973-74. The slowing down of economic growth in the 1970s eventually undermined the mixed economy model. The symptoms of a fiscal crisis appeared in most advanced economies because public expenditure and therefore taxation were growing faster than GDP. The growth of public expenditure colliding with electoral, middle class opposition to higher taxes was the prime reason for the fiscal crisis. Deepening recession played as an intensifying role for the fiscal crisis since it reduced government income from taxes. Low productivity growth in the public sector due to both the relative price effect (i.e. poor productivity improvement in labour-intensive public services) and strong public sector unionism (i.e. increased labour costs) deteriorated the situation of advanced economies. In addition, the rediscovery of poverty was considered as a failure of the welfare state. Public sector deficits rose during the 1970s. In Crosland terms, “the party was over” (quoted in Foster and Plowden, 1996: 12).

There was a great fear at the time that this would challenge the political stability of Western democracies (see Friedman, 1976; also see Rose and Peters, 1978). Also, the problem of financing public sector deficits and the economic consequences of financing
them caused anxiety and concern. Western Governments’ response to this shock was to cutback public spending by adopting monetarist policies. The presence of high levels of inflation and unemployment at the same time (i.e. stagflation) was regarded that Keynesian solutions were no longer relevant. The weakening of Keynesian economic orthodoxy went hand in hand with growing challenges to the welfare state. For example, the expansion of the role of government was seen as responsible for Britain’s economic problem (Bacon and Eltis, 1976).

The Oil Crisis, stagnant economic growth, inflation and unemployment, increased labour activities and other economic problems in the 1970s were impeding the ability of governments to satisfy rising expectations and deal effectively with the problems of the day. Hood and Wright (1981) described this period as “hard times”. In some Western countries such as Austria the post-war consensus was transformed into a highly structured corporatist arrangement. In others, such as the U.S. and the U.K., the corporatist strategy failed in spite of the attempts of various political parties to reach accord with dominant constituencies (Smith, 1979; Schmitter and Lembruch, 1979). By the way, Turkey faced a serious political deadlock and economic crisis in the late 1970s, partly with the effect of the populist economic policies and government-led development policy based on import-substitution (see Barkey, 1990a; Dodd, 1990: Chp. 1 and 2; and Yeşilada and Fisunoglu 1992). Briefly, governments failed to achieve the four major economic policy objectives (i.e. growth, low inflation, full-employment and balance of trade) on which the post-war order had been based (Gough, 1979; Goldthorpe, 1984). An intensifying international recession focused attention on the relationship between the economic and social policies of governments (Argyriades, 1986: 7-9; Digby, 1989: 2). This new economic climate has changed the picture since the late 1970s. Questions have been raised about the capacity of governments to bring about economic readjustments effectively or to realise efficiency and effectiveness comparable to those of other institutions in a society, i.e. market. The role of government in economic management, development and modernisation has also come under review in both developing countries and, formerly centrally planned economies (Muhammad, 1988: 5).
Under this new socio-economic and political climate conservative governments, taking political power in the late 1970s and 1980s in many democratic countries, broke with the post-war consensus and introduced a new politics based on the ideology of the “New Right”. This development is sometimes called as an economic “counter-revolution” (Judge, 1982). This was the real point of departure from the post-war consensus and real starting point for the general attack on government. The political opposition to government growth was strengthened and then it interpreted the public support for public expenditure growth in the last decades as either electoral myopia or irrationality (see Foster and Plowden, 1996: 11). Broader “economic restructuring” of the 1980s, based on more flexible forms of production, labour market segmentation, and organisational arrangements, facilitated the departure from the post-war economic, social and political consensus. The very language is even created to characterise this transformation: “Post-Fordism” (Hall and Jacques, 1983, 1989). The result has been a new consensus on the role of government in society: “limited government”.

3) The New Right and The New Rationale for the Public Sector

The New Right has emerged as a serious intellectual and political force in this political and economic climate. As we noted above, although ideological opposition to the welfare state had emerged over the years, none could successfully shake the central tenets of welfarism. “Tax revolt” in California (Proposition 13) to limit the property tax (see Higgins, 1981: 150-151), unexpected success of tax protest parties such as the populist “Progress Party” (Mogens Glistrup) in Denmark and the “Anders Lange Party” in Norway (see Higgins, 1981: 151; Einhorn and Logue, 1982; Peters, 1989: 31) and increased tax

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4 This general term is used throughout this dissertation to refer not only governments formed by conservative parties but also other right-wing governments followed New Rightist (neo-liberal and neo-conservative) policies.
5 Jessop (1993) distinguishes this new consensus from the Keynesian welfare state by labelling it the “Schumpeterian workfare state”.
6 As is the case with most writings on contemporary political ideologies and movements, the literature of the New Right has not produced a standardised terminology. The radical right, neo-conservatism, libertarianism, neo-liberalism, monetarism, Thatcherism and Reganomics, and the New Right are some of the labels given to the body of argument offered in last two decades as a challenge to the post-war consensus. These terms have been used by different writers at different times, and the issue is further complicated by the use of different terminologies in different societies. For different use of these terms in different countries, see Glennester and Midgley (1991: xii-xiii). One of the best discussions of the distinction is to be found in Peele (1984). Also see Kristol (1978; 1983).
evasion in many Western countries (see Feige, 1980) in the 1970s were actually early manifestations. They illustrated the political power of groups seeking to dismantle some elements of the welfare state. However, they had only limited and local implications since these reactions were against certain aspects of taxation and expenditure rather than against government in general (Wilensky, 1975; Hibbs and Madsen, 1981). But, the New Right represents a significant departure from established liberal-social democrat approaches advocating government responsibility in social and economic affairs.

The ideas comprising New Right ideology are complex, multifaceted, and even internally inconsistent to some extent. It covers a diverse set of intellectuals, ranging from libertarian philosopher to conservative ideologues; and a range of practical political movements, extending from those pressing for sweeping-cutbacks in public expenditure to moral crusaders for authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism or the de-legalisation of abortion. Two main strands can, nevertheless, be identified in New Right ideology: “liberalism” (or neo-liberalism) which comprises the restoration of the traditional liberal values of individualism and individual liberty, anti-collectivism and limited government, and free market forces; and “conservatism” (or neo-conservatism) which consists of claims about government being used to establish societal order and authority based on social, religious and moral conservatism. Not all political thinkers or politicians who subscribed to the New Right hold both neo-liberal and neo-conservative views; but it is clear that these mainstrands of the New Right are often coincided in the programmes of some right-

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7 The liberal strand of the New Right covers several major schools or famous thinkers such as “anarcho-libertarianism” of Rothbard (1973, 1982); the “objectivist” philosophy of Rand (1957, 1961a, 1961b, 1964); the “minimal state libertarianism” of Nozick (1974); the “Austrian School”, most commonly associated with Hayek (1944, 1949, 1960, 1967, 1973-76-79, 1978); the “Chicago School” (Monetarism) whose most famous exponent is Friedman (1962; 1980 and 1984 with Rose Friedman); and the “Virginia School of Public Choice Theory” (economics of politics), most strongly linked with Downs (1657, 1967), Tullock (1965, 1976), Niskanen (1971, 1973), Buchanan (1975, and 1962 with Tullock; 1977 with Wagner; 1978 with several authors; 1986 and 1987); Mueller (1989); and Brennan (1985 with Buchanan). The conservative strand includes views advanced by social authoritarians who are concerned with the re-establishment of the state-power; and views developed by conservatives who fear the extension of political, social and economic citizenship rights; and also moral-religious and pre-1960s social values (e.g. Oakeshott, 1962; and Scruton, 1981). For example, while the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Centre for Policy Studies have been the power-houses for the liberal strand of the New Right, it is the Salisbury Group (and their journal, Salisbury Review) has provided the energy behind the revival of conservative beliefs in the UK. For detailed information on these different strands of the New Right, see Seldon (1985); Levitas (1986); Barry (1987); Green (1987); King (1987); Gamble (1988); Glennerster and Midgley (1991); and Heywood (1992).
wing political parties or governments to displace collectivist economic policies and permissive social policies.

However, we should indicate that the components of the New Right, liberalism and conservatism, contradict each other on a number of important issues including the role of government; the role of individual; the nature and scope of freedom; and the importance of religious and family values in society (Nisbet, 1966). In other words, there is, at least at theoretical level, a contradiction between the liberal belief in a “free market-limited government” and the conservative adherence to the maintenance of authority and public order through a “strong state”. This contradiction has been noted by many writers, particularly in relation to the policies of the Thatcher Governments in the 1980s (see, for example, Gamble 1979, 1985, 1988; King, 1987; also see Hall and Jacques, 1983; Held, 1984; Elliot, 1985; Elliot and McCrone, 1985; Moore, 1985; Levitas, 1986; Barry, 1987; Jessop et al., 1988). King emphasises that « the contradiction between liberalism and conservatism concerning the role of the state is striking. Where liberalism implies a limited government, conservatism requires a strong state to maintain social order and authority» (1987: 23).

How can a liberal limited government be reconciled with the conservative authoritarian state? According to King, each strand gains something from joining with the other. Liberalism is the source of economic and political theories and policy objectives; conservatism provides a set of residual claims to cover the consequences of pursuing liberal policies. For example, the New Right wants to restrict the range of social and economic citizenship rights because both liberals and conservatives fear the expansion of citizenship rights. For the former group, these rights increase the role of government in society and thereby limit individual liberty; for the latter group, they extend rights to wider groups and thereby limit traditional hierarchical order and authority relationships, and encourage welfare dependency culture. Therefore, both strands are united in their criticism of the role of government and, in particular, of the welfare state (1987: 3, 9, 25). New Right ideology requires a limited state in the area of welfare, but a mighty state in other areas of life, particularly in law and order (Kingdom, 1990: 22). As Gamble aptly points out, the New Right does not only represent a simple return to a nineteenth century politics
of liberal political economy and Victorian values, but it is an expression of the new politics of the recent decades. The quest for a free economy and a strong state is a response to the changed circumstances of the world economy and the internal disarray of social democracy (1988: 37).

The reconciliation of the dual aim of the New Right, the expansion of liberty in economic affairs and the restoration of authority in social life, in the case of Thatcherism, summed up neatly by Gamble (1988) as “free economy and strong state”. Gamble (1979, 1985, 1988) demonstrates that the ability to establish a “free economy” in the U.K. was facilitated by the creation of a “strong state”. He argues that the idea of a strong state reflects the necessities of upholding the free market system. The state must be strong firstly to unwind the coils of social democracy and welfarism; secondly to police the market order; thirdly to make the economy more efficient; and fourthly to uphold social and political authority (1988: 32-37). The strong state is necessary to intervene actively in all institutions of civil society to impose, nurture and stimulate the business values, attitudes and practices (1988: 232). The tactical measures used by the Thatcher Governments, for example, to implement their objectives was to create a strong state that could carry through its policies, supposed to be reflecting the wishes of the individual citizens as consumers/voters, without political constraint from either local authorities or powerful pressure groups. Functional groups with vested interests (e.g. businessmen, trade unions, professionals, bureaucrats) within this context were perceived as a distortion of the democratic relationship between citizens and government. As a matter of fact, the Thatcher Governments intervened in the areas of the civil service, local governments, welfare services, and labour relations to facilitate their policy of rolling back the frontiers of government. In ideological terms, this policy shift can be considered as a break with the “One-Nation” Conservative tradition of Churchill, MacMilland and Heath and a return to the traditional British Conservatism by Thatcherism. It can also be regarded as a move from “welfare state capitalism” to “laissez-faire capitalism” (Barry, 1987; Gamble, 1988; Edgell and Duke, 1991). The state tried to create necessary conditions for the market to operate without giving attention to the paradox of intervention in limited government and market economy. As Farnham and Horton point out, the strengthening of the role of central government involved using a range of policy instruments. These included
legislation, administrative directives and financial controls (1996: 19). In fact, the Thatcher Governments produced more legislation than any other government in British history (Benyon, 1989: 170-178). By means of these measures, theoretical contradictions between limited government and strong state were resolved by New Rightist politicians in practice. The Reagan and Thatcher administrations, for example, launched economic policies based on individualism and social policies based on cultural traditionalism and authoritarian populism, and then they synthesised these different ideologies in a way that was easily understood and supported by ordinary people (Glennerster and Midgley, 1991: 8, 22; see also Clarke, 1992: 302; and Johnson, 1993: 29). Although such different ideologies are sometimes mixed together in an inconsistent way in the course of the formulation of governmental policies (see Jackson, 1985: 11-31, 36; Aitken, 1988), various ingredients are skilfully blended to appeal to a range of tastes (see Aitken, 1988; Pollitt, 1993: 46).

It would be too much to suggest that the conservative governments in the Western world since the late 1970s have been simply vehicles for the New Right. What is clear that New Right ideology have had a great influence on politicians and governmental policies with the intellectual efforts of think-tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Heritage Foundation and the Public Choice Society. But, some conservative governments (e.g. the Reagan, Thatcher and Mulroney governments) were much more committed to the reforms guided by New Rightist prescriptions than other conservative governments in the Western world (e.g. Kohl and Chirac governments) (Savoie, 1994). It should also be kept in mind that proponents of neo-Marxism and new social movements (e.g. feminist, anti-racist, and green movements), and the idea of civil society indirectly helped New Rightist theorists and politicians to break down the post-war consensus by severely criticising the bureaucratic and oppressive nature of the welfare state. In addition, even left-of-center governments (e.g. Labour governments in Australia and New Zealand; leftist governments in Denmark and Sweden) undertook reform programmes heavily influenced by New Rightist prescriptions though they were not as ideologically committed about these reforms as conservative governments (see Mascarenhas, 1993). Thus, a widespread conviction has appeared that the post-war
consensus should be broken rather than simply setting out to rework the elements of the prevailing philosophies (Hall, 1983: 25). Under these circumstances, the post-war settlement was fractured beyond repair and a new consensus and new rationale for the public sector has been formed around New Right ideology.

In 1979, the Conservative Party came to power in the U.K. and Mrs. Thatcher presented her cabinet as anti-government expansion, anti-bureaucratic and pro-marketer. She exhibited hostility towards the public sector and associated public sector with bureaucratic inefficiency, absence of choice and welfare dependency culture. These were socio-economic and administrative viruses had to be eradicated immediately (see Johnson, 1993: 28). Mrs. Thatcher saw privatisation as a central means of reducing the power of the state captured by socialist ideas (1993: 676). At the 1980 presidential election a Republican, Mr. Reagan, captured the White House on a similar programme (see Palmer and Sawhill, 1982, 1984; Rubin 1985; Palmer, 1986; and Fiorina, 1984). President Reagan made his attitude toward the state crystal clear in his inauguration speech and argued that «... government is not the solution to our problem: government is the problem» (1990: 226-227). These two politicians were almost religious believers in the benefits of free markets and the evils of government intervention. Many other countries, including Denmark (1982), Netherlands (1982), West Germany (1982), and France (1986) politically swung to the right in the 1980s. Turkey’s swung to the right was actually happened at the same time with the U.K. (the Fall of 1979) with the Justice Party (JP) Minority Government. This position was further strengthened by the Military Regime (1980-1983) and the MP governments (1983-1991). All these governments in various countries shared the same intention to make a radical change in traditional post-war policies, even if the words use to give substance to the new policy were different. As Christensen emphasised:

8 See Pierson (1991: Chp. 2 and 3); Taylor (1993); Williams (1993); Newman and Clarke (1994: 26).
9 For detailed information about Thatcherite policies, see Hall and Jacques (1983); Riddell (1983); Minogue and Biddiss (1987); Gamble (1988); Jessop et al., (1988); Skidelsky (1988); Edgell and Duke (1991); and Marsh and Rhodes (1992).
10 In many of those countries, pragmatic political leaders proposed similar policies only in areas in which one could anticipate major efficiency gains (Castles, 1990: 495-497). James differentiates President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher from other recent reformist leaders by labeling them “market libertarians” as opposed to their more pragmatic colleagues in countries such as Australia and New Zealand whom he describes as “market liberals” (1992: 16-18).
"... in the late 1970s and early 1980s withdrawal of government in a much broader sense moved into the political agenda. Suddenly it was the official policy of a number of liberal-conservative governments in Western Europe and in the USA. ... at their accession to power they shared one goal: government and the public sector had to withdraw from their presently potent role" (1988: 38).

In Western countries, and most especially in the U.S. and the U.K., economic and financial crisis was translated into a general crisis of the Western state. Such a translation required individual political leaders to explain the deteriorating socio-economic environment as a consequence of government actions, not just as a factor that states had to cope with. This crisis provided a unique historical opportunity for political actors such as Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher who had long opposed government intervention in social and economic matters. For these actors, the crisis was not just an opportunity to reform the public sector but one that allowed them to launch a frontal assault on the role of the state in society (Cohn, 1997: 587-588; Haque, 1998: 15). These politicians and their ideological successors, both in developed Western countries and developing countries (e.g. Mr. Özal in Turkey), exploited the economic difficulties of the 1970s and the fear and anger of people against over strong trade unions and inefficient bureaucracies to return to the free market system. “Bureaucrat bashing” became a common tactic of such politicians to justify radical pro-market reforms which facilitate the expansion of political control over public bureaucracy, especially when there was a considerable increase in public dissatisfaction with the existing bureaucratic system (see Campbell and Peters, 1988, Savoie, 1994, and Haque, 1998). Government regulation, the decline of entrepreneurship, excessive taxation, bureaucratic inefficiency, the disruptive tactics of trade unions, and overly generous welfare system were considered as responsible factors for the crisis (Glennerster and Midgley, 1991: 11, 21). In this context, New Rightist ideologues have considered reductions in taxation, denationalisation of state-owned enterprises and public utilities, introduction of market discipline, competition and managerial practices to the public sector as basic cures for the crisis.

11 The fiscal crisis of the “tax state” which had occupied Schumpeter’s (1954) attention so many years ago seemed to come of age during the 1970s and 1980s.
In sum, the role and size of government and the fundamental values of the traditional public service have been challenged to a great extent. These economic and ideological changes have brought a “new rationale” for the public sector around the idea of “limited and efficient government”. “Leaner but fitter” government has become a popular dictum among academic and political circles. Within this context, the traditional public service has become a controversial subject. The phenomenon of public service, which is essential concept of both administrative law and public administration, is now considered equal to imposition, budget deficit, red tape and nationalisation, and it is perceived as the opposition to private enterprise which symbolises efficiency, effectiveness and dynamism. It is asserted that traditional understanding of public service is strict, formal and slow-moving and thus unable to cope with newly created functions, whereas flexibility and adaptability to the changing nature of modern public services has become necessity. This situation is interpreted as a transition from “legal rationality” to “managerial rationality” (Chevallier and Loschak, 1982: 681; Braibant, 1984: 13 quoted in Tan, 1988). Although managerial emphasis in the public sector, in particular in civil service\(^\text{12}\), is not wholly new (Greenwood and Wilson, 1989: 10), until recently it was not common to speak about efficiency in the public sector mainly due to the resistance of labour unions and public servants (see Rosen, 1984). The notion of “efficiency” has emerged as a new source of legitimacy for the provision of public services.

The economic and ideological conditions have overlapped and reinforced each other in practice. Excessive expansion of the public sector and the inadequacies of the traditional understanding of public service in terms of efficiency and effectiveness have been used by political and academic circles to build a new rationale for the public sector based upon the basic tenets of New Right ideology. In addition, economic restructuring in debt-ridden developing countries has been accompanied by recipes given by international financial institutions (e.g. the IMF and the World Bank) in order to reduce the role of government in economic management, to give a greater role to the private sector, national or multinational firms operating under free market conditions, and to improve

\(^{12}\) In 1968, for example, “Fulton Report” recommended the establishment of accountable units within British government departments: “... units where output can be measured against cost or other criteria, and where individuals [the civil servants] can be held personally responsible for their performance” (Cmd 3638, 1968: Para.150). Despite Fulton’s enthusiasm, only limited progress was made during the 1970s in the U.K.
administrative organisation and management of the public sectors of those countries
(World Bank, 1987; Muhammad, 1988; Caiden, 1991: Chp.12; Minogue, Polidano and
Hulme, 1998). Economic and administrative reform programmes which have been put in
practice since the late 1980s in Russia, China and Eastern European countries are also
result of general dissatisfaction with the over-centralised and over-bureaucratic economic-
administrative systems (Caiden, 1991: Chp.10; World Bank, 1996). Turkey could not stay
out of this trend either. As will be examined in detail in Chapter Four, highly
comprehensive economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes has been put
into practice with similar aims since the early 1980s (see Ayman-Güler, 1996; Parasız,
1998).

B) Reason for the Policy of the Withdrawal of Government: Big Government

Government is the most frequently used term in describing the collective choice
sector. One can regard government rather simply as taxes, expenditure and employees in
institutions that are formally designated as governmental. Government is, most
fundamentally, the institution that imparts direction to its society by various means of
collective decision-making and exercises the state’s authority on a daily basis. With the
use of public service provision (production and finance), regulatory policies, expenditure
and taxation policies, contracting powers and insurance obligations, we see that
government can attempt to control almost all activities in society (Peters and Heisler,
1983). In this context, what does “Big Government” mean?

Big government means, simply, that a considerable portion of the resources of
society is mobilised by public bodies such as central and local governments and allocated
by these bodies to various programmes, thus reducing the scope for markets (Lane, 1993:
190). However, the conceptualisation about government in this context should be
examined and extended to include the excessive authorities, roles and resources used by
not only central government and local governments but also by state-owned enterprises
and other public corporations. Therefore, if it is not specified in particular cases, when we
talk about big government, government growth or the size of government, the scope of the
term should be considered as equal to the scope of whole public sector in order to
understand the “change” experienced in the 1980s, rather than strictly general government sector or federal government level in American sense where economic activities of all sorts of public corporations had never been significant.13

1) The Growth of Government

When Buchanan (with Wagner, 1977; with Brennan, 1980) stated that government is too large, the budgetary expansion of government is beyond control, then it is obviously pertinent to search for the normative criteria upon which such views are based. It has been suggested that government should not be larger than some proposed thresholds in terms of GDP/GNP, Clark’s 25 percent in 1945, Friedman’s 60 percent in 1976 or Burton’s 25 percent in 1985 (Rose, 1981a). However, the optimal size of government is a tricky issue (Lybeck, 1986: 249). It is not possible to justify a government of a specific size without commitment as to how various amounts of national, regional and local public goods and services are to be combined to produce a government of a certain overall size and at a specified level (Tibeout, 1956; Buchanan, 1965; Oates, 1972). It is not also easy for citizens/voters to make a rational choice as to the optimal size of government by balancing the marginal utility of an expanded government against the added disutility of extra taxes (Lybeck, 1986: 249). There is simply no objective way to establish the ideal or optimal size of government. The size of government is a function not simply of properties of goods, nor only of the preferences of citizens, but of the prevailing values in a society identifying what is an externality and a jointness. The solution to this problem cannot be derived by investigating economic matters only. Furthermore, the size and growth of government is not a single factor affecting the macro-economic performance of a country.

13 A common source of confusion in matters of the policy of withdrawal of government is the distinction between “government” and the “public sector”. While the term government is generally used by political scientists to refer to the body which exercises the state’s authority, the public sector is used by economists to refer the larger area of economic activities. Although the former has its own difficulties in terms of defining the scope of the state’s authority, the latter term brings the serious demarcation problem between the public and private sectors. Another source of confusion is the distinction between “general government” and the “public sector”. The term general government includes central and local government whilst the public sector includes them plus public corporations, the most important of which are the state owned enterprises. As McNutt points out, it is interesting to note that much of contemporary political rhetoric about the undesirability of big government is largely dissatisfaction about the degree of involvement of public enterprises in the economy and the concomitant policy of privatising such enterprises is not directed towards reducing the size of government per se but directed rather towards reducing the number of public enterprises (1996: 79).
The empirical evidence on the relationship between the size and growth of government and economic growth is not clear-cut (see Rubinson, 1977; Landau, 1983; and Ram, 1986; for a debate on this issue, see Bacon and Eltis, 1978; Ringen, 1987: 17; Keman, 1993: 29; Hughes, 1994: 115, 116; Foster and Plowden, 1996: 9). The debate on "governmental" and "organisational" size also continues (see Starbuck, 1965; Blau, 1974; Hood and Dunsire, 1981; Lane, 1993; and Goodsell, 1994). Therefore, political criteria seem crucial elements when we try to derive a size for government (Lane, 1993: 34,45). The size of government is determined by many social, political and historical factors (Saunders and Klau, 1985: 21).

The size of government, in this context, is very controversial issue; asking about the proper size of government may imply different problems as follows (Lane, 1993: 15-16):

a) What is the proper place of governmental authority in society? Or, how much private authority are we to recommend? (i.e. the problem of individual freedom).

b) What proportion of the total resources of society should be left to the government choice as public consumption and investment? And how much should be turned over to private choice? (i.e. the allocation problem).

c) How large should the government budget be? Or, how much private income should be generated without governmental influence in the form of transfers? (i.e. the distribution problem).

d) How much of the goods and services provided by the government should also be produced by the government? (The production problem).

e) How much of the means of the production should be owned by the government? (i.e. the ownership problem).

f) How much of the workforce should be employed in governmental organisations? (i.e. the size problem of bureaucracy).
Not only is big government a serious issue but its borders are not easily identified in the face of these problems (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Hood and Schuppert, 1987; Lane 1993). Although the size of government matters to ordinary citizens (Rose, 1989), nobody really knows how large government is in the average OECD country (Rose, 1984a).

To ask “how big is government?” is easy, but to answer this question is difficult, and the answer may even be misleading (Rose, 1984a: 20). Any attempt to say unambiguously that government is growing or shrinking is subject to a great deal of error and misinterpretation (Peters, 1989: 16; see also Cullis and Jones, 1992: 375). The problems mentioned above show us that there are different ways of measuring the size of government in an economy: the amount of resources (labour, capital, land, and material inputs) the government uses; the amount of government spending; the amount of properties the government owns; the scope and capacity of government control; the amounts of government outputs (see Gemmell, 1993b: 2-3). The size of government can also be measured in relative terms: total public expenditure in relation to GDP; public production as a share of total production; public employment as a fraction of total employment; public savings or investments as a share of total savings or investments, and so forth (Lybeck, 1986: 1).

Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on the size of government has concentrated on public expenditure, tax revenues and public employment. This is partly because of the ease of measurement and availability of data via national accounts and government statistics. It also reflects economists’ interest in the “non-market” aspects of the provision of goods and services through public expenditure and public employees rather than through the price mechanism. However, the content of public expenditure and changes in labour productivity should be investigated carefully when the size of government is measured (Gemmell, 1993b: 7-9). Detailed comparisons between national figures are still not very easy task because of the problems of reconciling differences in the ways that public expenditure are defined (Hood and Dunsire, 1981: 11, 247; Heald, 1983: 14-18; Flora, 1986, Vol. 2: 164; Saunders, 1993: 18-21, 32). Furthermore, government controls societal activities without directly intervening through public expenditures and
employees (Schultze, 1977; and Peters and Heisler, 1983). The number and effect of laws and regulations, government organisations and public programmes are much harder to quantify. However, the fact that all elements of government are not equally amenable to quantification does not alter the importance of those that are harder to measure (Rose, 1984a: 22, 24). Although it is not an easy task, our analyses will be inadequate and misleading until the qualitative aspects of government growth are taken into consideration (Bennett and Johnson, 1980: 3-4, 55). As a matter of fact, Higgs strongly argues that we could gain little insight by using only quantitative measures since they do not correspond with the underlying essence of government, which is coercive power. Government can greatly increase its expenditure or employment share but still not become big government. According to Higgs, what distinguishes the Leviathan is the wide scope of its effective authority over economic decision-making (1987: 27-28). In a similar vein, Aharoni argues that the relevant question is not the size of the public sector relative to the private one, but rather its “impact” on the private sector, and the methods used to achieve this impact by limiting *de facto* some property rights and creating others (1977: 77).

Thus, each measure has imperfect aspects (e.g. differences in the type and quality of pieces of legislation; differences between employment types and positions; and differences in the impacts of various expenditure types on economy) (see Peirce, 1981: Chp. 20). As Lybeck points out, no measure is the right one to use in all instances in measuring the size and influence of government in society because the different measures answer different questions (1986: 1). Multidimensional nature of the public sector makes the use of a single measure encompassing all aspects of government activity impossible (Saunders and Klau, 1985; Saunders, 1993). Therefore, there is no uniquely correct or preferred measure of government size and each of them have its own merits (see Larkey, Stolp and Winer, 1981: 163; Taylor, 1983; Gemmell, 1993b: 7-9). However, public expenditure (particularly general government expenditure)\(^{14}\) in relation to GDP\(^{15}\) is the most widely used measure of the relative size of government.

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\(^{14}\) Broadly speaking, “general government expenditure” includes the expenditure of central and local government, but “public expenditure” includes this plus the expenditure of public corporations (see The United Nations’ standardised System of National Accounts; also see also Thompson, 1979: 6). The basic measure of the size of government within the System of National Accounts (SNA) developed by the U.N. is the total consolidated spending of all general government agencies after netting-out transfers between the different levels of government. The resulting aggregate is general
Whether or not the phenomenon of big government is regarded as a serious problem, it is certainly a major issue of politics and economic policies of governments (Rose, 1984a: 1). The growth of government is not a new phenomenon. The relative size of government has increased over the past two centuries, but growth has accelerated since the Second World War (Mueller, 1989: 320-321). There has been a major debate over the size and growth of government since the 1970s (Rose and Peters, 1978) because of the fiscal crisis in this period. It is a battleground for deeply conflicting and strongly held viewpoints (Cullis and Jones, 1992: 377). With the recent political controversies, it is also a resurgent interest field among academics, in particular, political economists (see Tarschys, 1975; Bennett and Johnson, 1980; ACIR, 1981: Chp. 5; Larkey, Stolp and Winer, 1981; Taylor, 1983; Lybeck, 1986; Berry and Lowery, 1987; Higgs, 1987; Lybeck and Henrekson, 1988; and Gemmell, 1993a). Therefore, a great number of “theories of government growth” have been advanced, reviewed and many conventional theories have been tested.

These socio-political and economic theories range from highly abstract forms to heavily empirical ones. On the one hand, “macro models” of government growth attempt to account for the long term growth of general government expenditure (e.g. the developmental model associated with Rostow and Musgrave; the organic state model associated with Wagner; the political constraints model associated with Peacock and Wiseman; and the leviathan model associated with public choice school). On the other hand, “micro models” attempt to explain changes in particular components of general government expenditures, whether caused by increasing demand for individual services or by changes in their cost structures (e.g. behaviour of voters, politicians, bureaucrats and pressure groups) (see Bailey, 1995: Chp. 3). These theories are also grouped according to whether they belong to the “demand side” or the “supply side” (see Peacock, 1979). By government expenditure or more specifically referred to as “general government outlays”. The concept of general government expenditure as a measure is favoured for international comparisons because it is less affected by institutional differences between countries, since it is the state owned enterprises (and also off-budget activities) component of the public sector that reduces the consistency of inter-country comparisons (see Saunders and Klau, 1985: 13-14; Saunders, 1993).

15 The size of government is usually measured by the ratio of public expenditure (in particular general government expenditure) to gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices, a measure of the resources available to society. This ratio is thought to be more accurate representation of relative size than that for gross national product (GNP), especially for developed countries, because GNP
demand side theories\textsuperscript{16} is meant that government grows because people want more public services. It is assumed that governments are passive reactors to voter and/or pressure group preferences. However, demand might be manipulated by government agents, strong interest groups, by imperfect information etc. Therefore, we should also look at the supply side. By supply side theories\textsuperscript{17} is meant that the major reason for government growth must be found inside the public sector itself. This classification is based on the distinction

\textsuperscript{16} Demand side theories suggest that socio-economic development implies more public resource allocation, i.e. Wagner's Law of Increasing State Activity (Wagner, 1883); that the median voter's demand for publicly provided goods and services is an effective demand for more public spending (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958); that electoral competition among parties leads to more public spending (Downs, 1957; Kramer, 1971; Tuft, 1975); that sudden social shocks such as war necessitate budgetary shift-points towards much higher levels of public expenditure, i.e. displacement effect (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961); that the welfare spending by the neighbourhood state implies a demand for welfare programmes at home (Pryor, 1968); that middle and upper income groups that are the major beneficiaries of public services create strong pressure for more public spending (Stigler, 1970; Le Grand and Winter, 1987); that increasing affluence implies larger budgets (Wilensky, 1975); that collective ideologies promote government expansion (Wilensky, 1975); that interest groups exert pressure on government to expand government size (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1977; North and Wallis, 1982; Olson, 1982; Becker, 1983, 1985; Mueller and Murrell, 1985, 1986); that bureaucratic voting power creates electoral support for propositions concerning more public spending (Bush and Denzau, 1977; Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1979; Musgrave, 1981); that the increasing openness of a national economy to the world creates demand for budgetary stabilising of the erratic fluctuations of market and then for the expansion of the public economy (Cameron, 1978); that public expenditure increases in order to cope with the broad demographic and social changes (Self, 1980); that the dominance of the left in society or government means budget expansion replacing market mechanisms (Castles, 1982); and that a spending coalition increased the demand for more public spending (Butler, 1985).

\textsuperscript{17} We may come across hypotheses in supply side theories that government growth is caused by the behaviour of vote-maximising and then interest-maximising politicians (inspired from Downs, 1957; and Buchanan and Tullock, 1962); that public spending involves bureaucratic waste (Tullock, 1965); that government growth is function of bureau-size maximisation (Downs, 1967); that the relative decline of public sector productivity is an inescapable reality, claiming the increasing unit costs of public goods and services due to labour-intensive production with a zero productivity growth, i.e. Baumol disease, or more technically, the relative price effect (Baumol, 1967); that budget-making rests upon taxpayer's misperception (i.e. fiscal illusions) the relation between costs and benefits of public goods and services and that the bureaucracy and then the legislature can deceive the citizens about the true size of government (Buchanan, 1967); that bureaucrats over-supply and maximise their budgets in order to maximise their self-interests (Niskanen, 1971); that the contradictory functions (accumulation and legitimisation) of the capitalist state increase welfare spending (O'Connor, 1973); that the institutional procedures and legislative norms have a direct or indirect influence on the level of government expenditure (Ferejohn, 1974; Fiorina, 1979; Weingast, 1978; Shepsle, 1979); that politicians stimulate public spending periodically by means of political business cycles (Nordhaus, 1975); that the re-distributive activities of government support government growth (in addition to its demand side dimension due to the pressures of some interest groups for favourable re-distributive activities) (Meltzer and Richards, 1978, 1981, 1983; Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981; Peltzman, 1980); that the size of government is an unintended consequence of government solving other problems, i.e. organisational process model (Beam and Colella, 1979; Kaufman and Larkey, 1980); that constitutional decay over time results in creating tools for excessive government such as forced riding, special interest effects, logrolling and bureaucratic slack (Burton, 1985); and that invisible tax structure and tax elasticity promote higher spending (Oates, 1988).
between demand-driven “responsible” government and supply-driven “excessive”
government (see Lybeck, 1986: Chp.5).\textsuperscript{18}

The identification of “cause” is one thing, but the relative importance of each of them
is another matter. Different causes might have dominated at different times and degrees in
any particular country (Peacock, 1986: 48-49). As Mueller aptly says, how much of the
growth of government can be explained by demand-side factors or supply-side factors
remains an open question (1989: 344-347). There is no general agreement amongst
economists and political scientists about the determinants of this long-term growth. Only a
few studies have attempted to test for the relative strengths of demand and supply side
factors. The results of the studies conducted by Pommerehne and Schneider (1982),
Lybeck (1986) and Henrekson (1988) gave also mixed support for each factor. Some
support as well as some contrary evidence can be found for each of the theory advanced.
Searches for mono-causal explanations of complex socio-economic and political
phenomena may be attractive but are fruitless (Berry and Lowery, 1987). Even after
exhausting these demand and supply factors there still remains a residual reason for the
growth of government expenditure and this has to do with problems connected with the
formulation and implementation of expenditure plans (McNutt, 1996: 88). What is
happening, as Peters says, is the confluence of all of these reasons; there is no single cause
for the growth of government, but rather a large number of factors (1989: 24). What
appear to be needed are new and more comprehensive theories to explain the growth of
government, or more imaginative testing of existing theories (Lowery and Berry, 1983).
This is the case in Jackson’s (1993) “integrated” approach that brings together various
strands from public choice and more institutional perspectives.\textsuperscript{19} Another recent study
edited by Lybeck and Henrekson (1988), tried to establish whether it was possible to

\textsuperscript{18} Some explanations of government growth can comprise both demand and supply-side dimensions. For example, Peacock and Wiseman’s “displacement effect approach” (1961) is usually considered as a demand-side explanation of government growth but it is seen by some other authors as a supply-side explanation (see Thompson, 1979: 28; see also Saunders and Klau, 1985: 92). “Baumol Disease” (Baumol, 1967) is interpreted as a supply factor behind the rising share of government. But relative prices will also have an effect through the elasticity level of demand for publicly supplied goods and services (see Lybeck, 1988: 32-33).

\textsuperscript{19} As Gemmell points out, Jackson’s intention is not to develop an all-encompassing model but to facilitate understanding of the various influences on the size of government by combining them within a consistent framework (1993b: 11-12). Jackson (1993) concluded from his analysis that economists need to devote more attention to political decision-making processes and the constraints which decision-makers face.
develop a common "super-model" to explain the growth of government. Cross-country comparisons of the growth of government in European countries were undertaken to establish whether the growth and size of government could be related to common models. While particular models of government growth performed well in some economies, they were rejected in the cases of other countries. There is no valid general explanations of government growth have yet been found (see Mueller, 1989: Chp. 17). As Lybeck concludes, we are still a long way from deriving a common model that can explain the growth of government in several countries (1988: 44). Although economic models do illustrate the wide-range influences on government growth, we need a more multidisciplinary approach and more detailed micro-studies guided by this approach.

It would be misleading to leave the impression that the plurality of explanations of government growth necessitates disproving alternative theories (Gemmell, 1993b: 11) or all these factors operate separately and in isolation. In fact, they are closely linked (Savas, 1987: 29). Although none of those tells the whole story, each offers a useful and valuable insight. Political leaders and public bureaucrats may have some discretionary power to advance their own interests at the citizen's expense, but citizens' preferences, as registered through existing political institutions, may also constitute a consequential constraint (Mueller, 1989: 344). Beneficiaries of public services, service producers, politicians and bureaucrats who form a "spending coalition" have caused the growth of government altogether (Butler, 1985: 9-28). Therefore, behavioural relationships among these groups should be taken into account (see Bennett and Johnson, 1980: 4, 88).²⁰

2) Bureaucracy's Role in the Growth of Government: Bureaucracy as a Member of the Spending Coalition

The distinction between demand-driven "responsive" government and supply-driven "excessive" government (Buchanan, 1977) gives us an opportunity to understand ideological roots of these theories in terms of the general theories of the state. Most of the demand and supply side theories, in fact, stem from alternative conception of the state in

²⁰ Despite its shortcomings, public choice theory partly provided this missing behavioural foundation through the demand function of the median voter and supply function of public decision-
capitalist society. "Pluralist" theory of the state regards government as a neutral and non-partisan agent for the voice of citizens (principals). Ultimate authority lies with the citizens. The state exists to carry out the will of the people. State policies are reflections of the preferences of individual voters. This theory provides us with the concept of neutrality of the state (and bureaucracy) by means of politics-administration dichotomy. In brief, it is based on citizen-over-the state view of polity. "Marxist" theory of the state argues that government (and bureaucracy) is a mechanism in order to ensure the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production in favour of the dominant class (capitalists) in society, although neo-Marxists indicate the existence of relative autonomy of the state. "Elitist" theory of the state considers bureaucracy (at least, higher echelon of bureaucracy) as a part of the state elite and argues that bureaucracy as an organised group shape public policies in respect to its own interests by controlling bureaucratic power. "New Rightist" theory of the state, including the public choice approach, views government as a potential source of distortion in the relationship between governed (principals) and governors (agents) where various special interest groups have strategic positions to promote their self interests, including those of politicians and bureaucrats. It is the preferences of the state or the individuals in government that are decisive. The New Right puts a light on the special type of motivation of politicians and bureaucrats and its effect on bureaucratic inefficiency. In brief, it raises the possibility that government is not neutral vis-a-vis its constituencies and criticises this state-rules-citizen view of politics (see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Schwarzmantel, 1994; and Pitelis, 1991).

The important point in terms of our purpose is that public bureaucracy is included in the process of the growth of government as a member of spending coalition. According to some public choice scholars, such as Niskanen (1971), who takes bureaucracy as an "endogenous factor" in their analysis, the oversupply of public services is exacerbated by the nature of the public bureaucracy. First, the public bureaucracy is itself a powerful interest group and public bureaucrats have a rational interest in maximising their own budget and the size of their own departments. Second, public bureaucracy does not normally face competition, or indeed any of the serious economic constraints of acting in a marketplace. Where costs are not weighted against benefits and where the utility-makers and producers within complex bureaucratic and political processes (see Jackson, 1990; see
maximisation of bureaucrats is dependent upon the maximisation of their budgets, Niskanen insists that there will be a chronic tendency for the public bureaucracy to oversupply goods and services and then government growth in terms of public expenditure and organisational structure in the end.

Given the distinctive characteristic of bureaus and the political markets in which they operate, this “oversupply” hypothesis led to the conclusion that bureaus supply is larger than optimal output (allocative inefficiency), but that the production of this output, except in a special case, is generally efficient (X-efficiency). In contrast, several authors have put forward that the major source of inefficiency in bureaucratic supply is X-inefficiency because bureaucrats derive utility from that by means of bureaucratic discretion and not from, as Niskanen’s model implies, allocative inefficiency due to oversupply of output (e.g. Migué and Bélanger, 1974; Breton and Wintrobe, 1975; Peacock, 1979 and 1983). Niskanen’s own subsequent experience and the criticisms of other scholars and bureaucrats have led him to modify his perspective radically on the behaviour of bureaucrats. Niskanen, in his recent writings, (1991 and 1994), admits that his model of budget-maximising bureaucrat (and allocative inefficiency) should now be recognised as a “special case”. He regards the surplus-maximising bureau (and X-inefficiency) as the “usual case”. It should be pointed out that Niskanen has not completely rejected the existence of oversupply in the public sector and then the importance of allocative inefficiency in total public sector inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency will be very serious problem in the public sector unless a new set of mechanisms is developed to correct the imperfections in the demand articulation and decision-making processes. What important in his recent contribution to the subject is that he has pointed out the other side of coin, X-inefficiency in the public sector.

We believe that both kinds of inefficiency may arise in different situations in different degrees, and that both are important to understand the inefficiency problem in the public sector. The relationship that exists among the bureaucrat, the politician, and the voter (including interest groups) could be specified as follows (see Fiorina and Noll, 1978a and 1978b; and Bennett and Johnson, 1980: Chp. V; Mitchell and Simmons, 1994: Chp. 3 also Hamlin, 1993).
and 7): the self-interests of each of these actors may sometimes overlap. They perceive their self-interest to be enhanced by an enlarged and wasteful public sector. Bureaucrats play a crucial role in shaping the demand for their own services and have authority to prepare and recommend budgets to the legislators. There is a weak parliamentary and governmental control over the actions of government agents due to the asymmetric information between bureaucrats and their political masters. Since the costs to the legislators of monitoring the service are substantial, legislators have little reliable information on costs. Moreover, overloaded ministers do not have the capacity to control the decision process that generates public spending. Information costs grow rapidly as the bureau expands. All these factors grant bureaucrats a good deal of discretionary power that can be used to pad budgets with X-inefficient practices. Large budgets provide bureaucrats with more opportunities for personal gains in terms of rank, salary, prestige, and perquisites of office. Therefore, a strategy to reduce public sector inefficiency should aim either to change the incentives of bureaucrats by a new reward system, so as to make it in their interests to produce efficiently, or to provide sponsors with the necessary information on costs by introducing competition into the supply of public goods and services to enable them to force bureaucrats to produce efficiently. Although internal competition can provide public decision-makers with some clues about consumer preferences, it will not necessarily eliminate allocative inefficiency since the decision to produce the output is not determined by consumer sovereignty.

In addition to this bureaucracy-generated expansion and inefficiency, the purposive behaviour of the politician who takes place in appropriation committees in the legislative body may result in large budgets. Niskanen argues that the legislators who might have some information of costs would not have the incentive to reduce costs substantially (1971: 136). Bureaucrats try to convince the politician that enlarged programmes are not only essential, but also enhance the self-interest of the politician. Vote-maximising politicians use such large budgets prepared by bureaucrats to please their voters in order to guarantee their re-election. Bureaucrats themselves form an impressive voting constituency and this fact does not escape from the attention of the perceptive politician. Therefore, we can hardly be surprised at joint efforts by politicians and bureaucrats to maintain and expand the supply of services through larger budgets. Politicians can be
willing or unwilling partners of the bureaucrats in this process. Voters (citizens/taxpayers) are in an even worse position in terms of asymmetric information relationship with the bureau and can therefore be readily taken advantage of and exploited with the tricks of principal-agent relationship. However, voters (and interest groups) are assumed to maximise their utilities by electing politicians who are able to provide the greatest facilities to constituents. In the final analysis, we have than an “iron triangle” (Mitchell and Simmons, 1994: 60) or “spending coalition” (Butler, 1985) which will push a larger and more wasteful public sector and civil service.

Despite Niskanen has modified his model of budget-maximising bureaucrat to a substantial extent, “bureaucratic self-interest” and “utility-maximisation” hypotheses are still firm and significant to understand the bureaucratic behaviour and bureaucratic inefficiency. As is seen, the widely accepted notion that bureaucrats are solely committed to the “public interest” has been questioned for last three decades. With both strong and weak aspects, the public choice critique of bureaucracy has contributed to the policies of conservative governments launching a crusade against oversized and inefficient bureaucracies.

Although bureaucrats are officially required to dedicate themselves to the public interest through legal and professional rules, they act within an environment, which gives them no clear signals about whether or not they are efficient or effective in what they have done. In the absence of the profit motive and disciplinary powers of competitive markets, there is always a room to serve not only the interests of their political masters but their own self-interests rather than the public interest. Therefore, empire-building, slack-maximising and wasteful practices may arise. Now, new strategies are being searched to establish both a smaller and an efficiency-oriented bureaucracies within an alternative environment in which bureaucrats can have some signals about their conducts. Staff cutback seems to be a significant one among these strategies. However, in order to achieve this aim, structural, operational and cultural aspects of bureaucracies should be taken into consideration. Otherwise, the staff cutback practices may easily degenerate into numbers game. The staff cutback strategy with the idea of increasing efficiency must not
be used as a "Trojan horse" to conceal the crusade launched against the notion of public service.

C) The Policy of the Withdrawal of Government: Political, Economic, and Managerial Dimensions

The "withdrawal of government" is not a completely coherent policy because there is no clear-cut consensus on the phenomenon of big government. As Christensen states:

« It is an apt term used to characterise a multitude of political goals and policy strategies to which many governments of the 1980s adhere. What unites them is the belief that the public sector has grown too fat, and that a withdrawal of government from some of its present activities and from its present size will cure some of the evils for which they blame the public sector and more specifically the welfare state» (1988: 40).

Variations in institutional structures and political-bureaucratic cultures among countries also explain why some governments put special emphasis on certain parts of this policy and therefore why they are successful in such areas. Despite such variations, the policy of withdrawal of government has become a very popular aspect of conservative governments' programmes and evolved since the early 1980s.

This policy has some political, financial and managerial dimensions. We can categorise its main sets of goals and strategies to achieve these goals 21 as follows:

1) Redefinition of the Role of Government

The "government failure" 22 and the "crisis of the welfare state" 23 have been main arguments to justify the "redefinition of the role of government" since the late 1970s.

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21 For a tentative attempt to categorise these goals and strategies within the framework of the policy of the withdrawal of government, see Christensen (1988).
Government intervention in economy is usually justified on the ground of market failures. Government intervention may, however, introduce other inefficiencies and distortions into the economy. In other words, it may result in a failure to achieve an efficient allocation of resources; a failure to satisfy consumers’ preferences; an increase in bureaucratic waste and X-inefficiency; and a failure to check the growth of government. This result is closely related to the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats. Thus, government failure has been a common problem as much as market failure in the economy. In close relation with government failure, the welfare state has been questioned and challenged in the face of fiscal, efficiency and legitimacy problems concerning the state welfare provision. Welfare pluralism (i.e. commercial, voluntary, and informal sector beside government) has been encouraged in order to overcome the crisis of the welfare state. Political demands to attribute less producing and regulatory role but more co-ordinating, facilitating and financing role for government have increased. In this context, the following strategies have been pursued in order to redefine the role of government:

a) Deregulation of the economy (i.e. lifting regulatory constraints on the economy and abolishing public regulatory institutions and mechanisms; liberalisation and market reforms);

b) Dismantling the institutional-universal welfare state (i.e. replacing the institutional-universal welfare model with residual-selective welfare model through substituting income transfers for state provided and subsidised institutional services).

2) Rolling Back the Frontiers of the Public Sector

Since the scope of the public sector was considered too large by the conservative governments in the Western world in the face of the new role assigned to government, the policy of rolling back the frontiers of the public sector has been pursued since the early 1980s. This is not simply a case of reducing the provision of public services, but generally it emphases transferring service provision to the private sector as much as possible and

22 For detailed information about government failure, see Peirce (1981); Le Grand (1991); Cullis and Jones (1992: Chp. 14); Pitelis and Clarke (1993); Wolf (1993); and Bailey (1995: Chp. 2 and 7).
making whole economy more responsive to market disciplines. Within this framework, the following strategies have been used:

a) Reducing legislative and executive activities (i.e. cutting down the number of laws, decrees, regulations and by-laws);

b) Reducing the scope of administrative structure (i.e. cutting down the number and size of public organisations and the scope of whole administrative structure);

c) Cutting back public expenditure (i.e. budget cuts; rational use of public money; efficiency savings; and public sector pay freezes);

d) Cutting back public employment (i.e. natural wastage, recruitment freeze, early retirement; dropping or curtailing some functions; rational use of workforce; contracting-out; and hiving-off);

e) Privatisation (i.e. transferring ownership; the application of the market principles into the provision of public services; and encouraging non-statutory, mainly private, provision of public services through franchising, contracting-out, user charges, etc.);

f) Tax reform (i.e. tax cuts, reduction of tax scales, and reorganisation of tax structure).

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23 For the debate on the crisis of the welfare state, see George and Wilding (1984); Mishra (1984 and 1990); Taylor-Gooby (1985); Pierson (1991); and Ömür günül sen (1994a).

24 Various forms of privatisation (see Savas, 1982 and 1987; Pirie, 1985; Bailey, 1995; Chp. 13) were put into practice in a large number of countries during the 1980s and 1990s, including developed Western countries (see Ramanadham, 1988; Gayle and Goodrich, 1990; Beesley, 1992; Savas, 1992; Clarke and Pitelis, 1993; Clarke, 1994; Jackson and Price, 1994; Bennett, 1997), developing countries and countries which have transitional economies (see Blanchard et al., 1991; Carbo, Coricelli and Bossak, 1992; Ash, Hare and Canning, 1994; World Bank, 1996). For the limited privatisation attempts of the Turkish governments in the last two decades, see; Karataş (1990); Aksoy (1991-1993); Önlü (1991b); and Dartan, Arıoğlu and Coates (1996; Chp. 4).

In addition to the demands for the redefinition of the role of government and the rolling back the frontiers of the public sector, there have been recently some strong pressures to change the traditional values, attitudes, structures, processes and techniques of the public sector. As is mentioned in Introduction, the debate of the 1980s was about redefining the boundaries between the public and private sectors in favour of the private sector in the face of the phenomenon of big government. This anti-governmental trend led to a policy seeking to shrink the public sector through cutbacks and privatisation. The debate of the 1990s and early 2000s is no longer the same though it is linked to the previous debate. Even if the public sector is downsized, whatever remained in the public sector could still function in a traditional bureaucratic way. Thus, the problem of management (i.e. efficient and effective use of resources) in this smaller public sector has still been waiting to resolve. In other words, resources must be used efficiently and effectively to provide public services, at least, at the same level as in the past since the amount of resources allocated to the public sector are now more questioned. This reality has forced governments to search a new system of ideas, structures, techniques and practices that is appropriate for this relatively smaller public sector. As Christensen pointed out, the search for more efficient provision of public services has been expanded to a “general crusade” to reorganise the public sector, and especially to introduce new forms of management to the civil service (1988: 55). Therefore, another anti-governmental trend which is against the traditional bureaucratic values, structures, processes, and techniques, has gained ground and deeply affected national public sectors, and national civil services, all over the world. A cost-conscious, de-bureaucratised, market-oriented and customer-favoured public service has become an “ideal” system to build. The provision of public services by more able managers and more flexible structures and processes in accordance with both efficiency criteria and wishes of consumers has become the central theme with the effect of the “public management” approach (see Perry and Kraemer, 1983; Gunn, 1987 and 1988; Bozeman, 1993; Hughes, 1994; and Ömürgonülşen, 1997 and 1999) and, in particular, its specific version, the “new public management” (NPM) approach which have hitherto dominated academic thinking and the practice of public administration.
Thus, NPM\textsuperscript{25} as “a new paradigm”\textsuperscript{26} poses a direct challenge to both the traditional public administration approach and the distinctive values, culture, and fundamental principles of the discipline of public administration by introducing competitive market conditions (competitive tendering, contracting-out, internal markets); introducing decentralised structures and processes (decentralised, disintegrated, and deregulated civil service departments; devolved budgeting; decentralised and deregulated human resource management); introducing new management information and performance measurement systems; and importing business culture and management practices.

Not only in developed Western countries (in particular, in English-speaking countries) but also in developing countries and transitional economies, conservative and even social-democratic governments launched similar administrative reform programmes concerning decision-making, budgeting, decentralisation, human resource management, information technology, etc. in order to keep up with the economic and political-ideological transformation during the 1980s and 1990s (see Muhammad, 1988; Aucoin, 1991; Bahadur, Pradhan and Reforma, 1991; Caiden, 1991; Wright, 1992; OECD, 1993 and 1995; Pollitt, 1993; Hughes, 1994; Foster and Plowden, 1996; Lane, 1997).\textsuperscript{27} Similar

\begin{itemize}
  \item In many countries there has been much talk of “administrative revolutions” or “paradigm shifts” in the study and practice of the public sector as a world wide phenomenon (Gray and Jenkins, 1995: 75-76). For the U.K., see Jones (1989); Pollitt (1993); Metcalfe (1993); Painter (1993); Overman and Boyd (1994); Horton (1996). Also see Major (1989); Butler (1992) as public figures. For Commonwealth countries, see Borins (1994). For the U.S. and Canada, see Aucoin (1990); Barzelay and Armanjani (1992); Lan and Rosenbloom (1992); Osborne and Gaebler (1992); Gore (1993); Kernaghan (1993). For a highly critical debate in the Turkish public administration literature on the paradigm shift in the study and practice of the public sector, see Üstüner (1986), 1992 and 1995; Uysal-Sezer (1992); Ayman-Güler (1994 and 1997); Aksoy (1995); Ergun (1995); Saylan (1996). For a pro-view on this issue in the Turkish literature, see Yaşamış (1997). If we review all this literature, it can be said that some authors consider NPM as a “revolution”, or a “paradigm shift”, but others see it as “explorations” towards a new paradigm or a “competing vision” (see Kooiman and Eliassen, 1987; Gray and Jenkins, 1995).
  \item The major examples of contemporary pro-market and managerial reforms in the public sectors of developed countries are: “Financial Management Improvement Programme” in Australia; the “Administrative Management Project” in Austria; “Public Service 2000” in Canada; the “Modernisation Program for the Public Sector” in Denmark; the “Renewal of the Public Service” in France; the “Fundamental Policy of Administrative Reform” in Japan; the “Major Options Plan” in Portugal; the “Financial Management Initiative” and “Next Steps” in the UK; and the “New Performance Review” (its name was changed to “National Partnership for Reinventing Government” in 1998) in the US (see OECD, 1993 and 1995). The reform attempts of the MP Governments under
steps though they were not adequate were taken in Turkey in the same period (see Tan, 1995 and Ayman-Güler, 1996).

Within this framework, the main debate and the related strategies developed around this debate are as follows:

a) Paradigmatic change in the approach to the public sector? (i.e. the critique of the traditional public administration approach and the emergence of the new public management approach);

b) Changes in values, attitudes, structures, processes, practices and techniques in the public sector (i.e. the application of market-type mechanisms and managerial practices and techniques).

D) Staff Cutbacks as one of the Significant Strategies of the Policy of the Withdrawal of Government

Staff cutback is one of the strategies of the policy of the withdrawal of government since the staff aspect of government is considered as one of the significant elements of the problem of big government.

1) The Strategy of Staff Cutbacks: Technical Aspects

Several terms such as decline, retrenchment, cutbacks, and downsizing have often been used synonymously to refer actions associated with public expenditure and staff reductions since the late 1970s (see Jones, 1998: 6)\(^2\). They are actually derived from a
common source: fiscal difficulties (i.e. the need for contraction of budgetary resources). Therefore, fiscal matters in the public sector are the overriding factor behind them. The financial result of a staff cutback strategy is particularly important since there is a direct relationship between the number and type of staff and its financial burden on organisational and governmental budgets (for example, see Hildreth, 1993).

In this thesis, we preferred to use the term “cutback”, which were often used in the 1980s for the expenditure and staff reductions in the public sector (see Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988; Dunsire and Hood, 1989). Others involve structural-behavioural changes as well as expenditure and staff reductions.

Several factors affect the success of a cutback strategy: (i) consensus on political and economic necessities of cutbacks (e.g. political preferences and priorities; financial deficits); (ii) the political commitment and the technical ability of political power; (iii) bureaucratic traditions (e.g. bureaucratic resistance to change); (iv) social traditions (e.g. social values protecting employees or, at least certain employee groups in society); (v) legal constraints (e.g. civil service regulations); (vi) the selection and use of cutbacks techniques (see Ross, 1997: 176; and Jones, 1998: 167-171).

There are various cutbacks techniques can be used by public managers authorised by the government. Each cutback technique has its own advantage and disadvantage. These techniques can be classified in different ways such as “voluntary staff cuts/non-voluntary staff cuts”; “across-the-board cuts/selective cuts” (see Levine, 1978; Rubin, 1985; Jones, 1998).

“Voluntary staff cuts” are based on the personal will of public employee as in the cases of natural attrition through resignation, retirement, death and early retirement schemes with benefits. This type of cuts is the easiest way of staff cutback since it does not hurt any public employees. In contrast, “non-voluntary staff cuts” are done by public managers without any consultation with public employees as in the cases of cuts based on performance, contracting-out, and hiving-off. Since public employees are forced to leave
their offices or, most importantly, their jobs, this type of cut is the most difficult and problematic way of staff cutbacks.

"Across-the-board cuts" refer to "sharing the pain" by all public organisations, their sub-units, and all public employees in cutbacks, irrespective of impacts of cuts on the long-term capacity of the organisation and their sub-units. Making cuts on the basis of across-the-board cut technique is easier for public authorities because it is socially acceptable, easier to justify, and involves few decision-making costs. It is politically expedient for political power because it appeals to common sense ideals of justice. In contrast, "selective cuts" refer to the sorting, sifting and assignment of cuts in accordance with the contributions of organisational sub-units and public employees to organisational performance, irrespective of their distribution. Selective cuts, therefore, involve costly process of decision-making.

The techniques of cutbacks can be enumerated from the simplest one to the most difficult one as follows:

(i) "Natural attrition": It reduces the size of staff through resignation, retirement, and death without any struggle with public employees.

(ii) "Hiring freezes" and "personnel ceilings": They prohibit an agency from filling vacated positions and authorising new ones. They are convenient short-run strategies to buy time and preserve options. In the short-run, hiring freezes and personnel ceilings hurt no one already employed because they rely on natural attrition to diminish the size of staff. In the long-run, however, they are barely the most equitable or efficient ways to seal down staff size. They may harm organisations, organisational sub-units, and professional groups differently since attrition is likely occur at different rates among these organisations, sub-units, or groups. For example, if recruitment freeze is used heavily in the long-run, it will result in middle-aged staff structure.

(iii) "Hiving-off": It is a transfer of staff to other in-house units, other public organisations, or other employment status. It can be regarded as a way of massaging staff
figures since the total size of employment is not changed even if the size of staff in a certain organisation or in a certain level of the government is reduced.

(iv) "Early retirement": Public employees are encouraged or forced to retire if they are at a certain age and/or complete a certain length of service. In the voluntary type of early retirement, an encouraging benefit scheme is provided for them. If a generous early retirement programme is offered, the result is likely that anybody who is capable of getting a job in the private sector go off, while the mediocre stay behind.

(v) "Privatisation": Various forms of privatisation (e.g. load-shedding; contracting-out) are very influential in diminishing the staff size.

(vi) Non-voluntary cuts-in-force: This is the most difficult technique to be used in staff cutbacks. The principal criteria used for management decisions on non-voluntary terminations fall into four groups: functional area (e.g. technical staff vs. general administrative staff; and white collars vs. blue collars); positional level (e.g. higher ranks vs. lower ranks); service length (e.g. tenured employees vs. new comers); and performance.

The combination of these techniques and its application affect the success of a staff cutback strategy.

2) Staff Cutbacks as a Tool for Limited and Efficiency-Oriented Civil Service

The problem with government is about both its role and size in social and economic affairs ("what are the activities and functions that governments are, and should, involved in?") and its way of operation ("how is government doing its functions?" or, in other words, "what is the best way of delivering them?"). The perpetual problem of governmental size and performance is reflected very well by the views of general public, politicians and academics on government and its bureaucracy (see Downs and Larkey, 1986; Caiden, 1991; Goodsell, 1994).
Although the issue of government size and performance (i.e. public sector efficiency) is nothing new, since the late 1970s it has become a lively issue again between politicians, academics and practitioners with the simultaneous and contradictory effects of excessive budget deficits and taxpayers’ pressures. It has often been claimed that government (and civil service) is inefficient because either resources are allocated wrongly or public services are not supplied at minimum cost. Within this framework, it has been argued that public spending and employment should be cut or, at least, controlled (i.e. “cutback” or “downsizing”) and the bureaucracy should be forced to work more efficiently (i.e. “get more yield out of these scarce resources” or in other words “do more with less”).

Public sector efficiency has actually two dimensions. The essential feature of allocative efficiency in the public sector is the concern about whether too much or too little is being produced or something is being produced which should not be done at all. Allocative efficiency, in this sense, refers to the efficiency in the distribution of products (i.e. how much a certain public service should be produced and who should receive it?). Therefore, it takes account of consumer preferences appear in the markets. The emphasis is on the “demand-side” (Mulreany, 1991). In other words, allocative efficiency has to do with matching supply to demand - with getting just the right output of things (Stanbury and Thompson, 1995: 421). In contrast, X-efficiency in the public sector concerns with the production of services (i.e. given that we want a certain public service, what is the cheapest way of producing it?). The emphasis is on the “supply-side” of the economy (Mulreany, 1991). Even if goods and services are produced at lowest cost, resources may still be used inefficiently if the output mix contains too much of one product and too little of another. This is the situation of allocative inefficiency. On the other hand, even if the right output mix is being produced, good and services may not be produced at the lowest cost. This is the situation called X-inefficiency. By taking account of consumer preferences, allocative efficiency is concerned with markets, in contrast with X-efficiency which is concerned with the internal process of organisations (Mulreany, 1991). In other words, while adjusting public supply to collective demand is the main concern of allocative efficiency, the internal process of providing public goods and services is the main concern of X-efficiency (Palmer 1991: 6). In this context, allocative efficiency is mainly about demand-side (i.e. consumers/voters incentives); X-efficiency is about supply-
side considerations (i.e. politicians' and bureaucrats' incentives) (Bailey, 1995: 107-108). Therefore, public sector managers face two efficiency problems in practice. First, they need to ensure allocative efficiency; second, they need to produce at minimum cost (Jackson, 1988b: 6-8; Jackson and Palmer, 1988: 200).

Although the staff cutback strategy of the MP governments will not be evaluated quantitatively in terms of its efficiency results, the role and effect of this strategy in creating limited and efficiency-oriented civil service should be established since this strategy changes the size, structure and composition and then affects the operation of a civil service. As is noted above, staff cutback is one of the strategies of the policy of the withdrawal of government since the staff aspect of government is considered as one of the significant elements of the problem of governmental size and performance. Most of the strategies of the policy of withdrawal of government can also be considered as the tools for a limited and efficiency-oriented civil service. So, staff cutback strategy, which aims to downsize civil service through staff cuts (i.e. increasing allocative efficiency) and to change the composition and activity of civil service staff through various means (e.g. recruitment freezes, early retirement, dropping or curtailing some functions, rational use of workforce, contracting-out and hiving-off) (i.e. increasing X-efficiency), is one of those tools.

It should be, however, emphasised that staff cutback strategy may not automatically ensure efficiency in the civil service. If it is not applied with necessary care, it may result in decline in morale and performance. Staff cutback strategy is proposed here as a tool which has a potential for betterment in terms of overall efficiency in comparison to the present situation by removing the factors considered as the sources of both allocative and X-inefficiencies in the civil service.

29 Although staff cutback is advocated on the ground of limited and efficient government, there is no well established consensus on how cutback affects organisational performance and the morale of staff. The “leaner means fitter” (i.e. higher efficiency) argument is sometimes counterattacked by the “leaner means weaker” (i.e. greying and demoralised bureaucracy) argument (see Hood; Roberts and Chilvers, 1990). In this thesis, we do not deal with these issues but it should be pointed out that some dysfunctional effects of staff cutbacks are theoretically discussed and/or empirically determined by some recent studies in the British (see Reed and Ellis, 1987; Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988; and
In brief, with the policy of withdrawal of government, government is asked to return to the line of its traditional functions and to do these functions efficiently. Its role, the scope of its authority and the resources it uses are tried to be restricted (Rosenau, 1982: 256). The policy of the withdrawal of government has, therefore, important implications for national public bureaucracies since the authority and resources granted them have been more and more questioned since the late 1970s. All public servants and especially senior civil servants have been forced to accept changes in getting smaller bureaucratic world due to cutbacks with new forms of management practices. The most important changes have occurred in the fundamental values of public service and the relationship between bureaucracy and its political master. Therefore, this policy has also been perceived as an attack on the premises and privileges of civil servants. As a result, various strategies including staff cutback strategy within the framework of the policy of withdrawal of government have been counterattacked by bureaucrats, at various degrees and in various successes in different countries, with mixed feelings of protecting the public interest and their own departmental and self-interests (Christensen, 1988). Since the examination of the application of all these strategies goes beyond the aim and purpose of the thesis, in the following section we will only deal with the general trends and overall results of public expenditure and staff cutback strategies pursued in the OECD region in the 1980s.

E) Public Expenditure and Staff Cutback Experiences in the OECD Region in the 1980s

Public expenditure and staff cutbacks are considered as important strategies within the framework of the policy of the withdrawal of government. Since they are closely connected processes, public expenditure and staff cutback experiences will be examined respectively with special reference to the 1980s that was the heyday of cutbacks especially in developed OECD countries.\(^{30}\) The examination of the conservative governments' cutback attempts in the 1980s is likely to give some useful insights when the record of the MP governments concerning the staff cutback strategy (1984-1990) is evaluated.

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\(^{30}\) For international comparisons and general trends in terms of OECD countries, more reliable and comprehensive OECD figures are preferred in this thesis.
1) Expenditure Cutbacks

The growth of public expenditure has long been identified with the growth of government. In this context, it would not be surprising that cutting back public expenditure was considered as the first aim of the socio-economic policy of the conservative governments in the 1980s.

The 1950s and 1960s marked the highest period of sustained growth in the world economy. Governmental activities increased in parallel with this sustained growth in the golden age of the mixed economy and the welfare state. The programme coverage was extended or benefit and service levels were raised with the effect of economic expansion as well as political and demographic pressures. Government growth, its public expenditure aspect particularly, was widely viewed as both a means and consequence of economic expansion accompanied by political stability. However, public expenditures grew faster than GDP. As a result, the share of general government expenditure as a main component of public expenditure in GDP increased from approximately 30 percent to around 40 percent on average for OECD countries between the years of 1960-1980 (OECD, 1985: 13; Oxley and Martin, 1991: 154, Chart 5) 31. Welfare expenditure was the fastest growing component of general government expenditure. Its share in general government expenditure increased sharply in the same period in OECD countries. In nineteen OECD

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31 There are diverse characteristics between developed and developing countries in terms of the size of government and its rate of increase, reflecting different historical specificities, social and economic structures, political culture and institutions and technological levels. Although some broad trends are discernible across the OECD region as a whole, there are a variety of experiences within individual countries. There are also too many variations among developing countries for any generalisation to be made (Thompson, 1979: 9, 37; Saunders and Klau, 1985: 114-115; Lim, 1993; Saunders, 1993: 17-18). For the effects of various determinants of public expenditure growth in developing countries, see Heller and Diamond (1990). Although the rate of increase in public expenditure in the period of 1960-1980 appeared substantially higher in developing and newly industrialising countries than in developed countries, the proportion of GDP devoted to public expenditure is lower in the former group (Peters, 1989: 18; see also Lim, 1993). In newly industrialising countries such as Asian tigers, there has been a great deal of emphasis on ensuring a good business climate for a growing private sector. The main reason for the relatively lower rate of public expenditure in developing countries is that so much of their GDP comes from agriculture and especially subsistence agriculture. This means that there are fewer “free-floating resources” in the economy that are readily taxed. If we calculate the rate of public expenditure in relation to the secondary and tertiary sectors of economy (manufacturing and services, respectively), we get a somewhat different picture. Using this calculation, many developing or newly industrialising
countries welfare (social) expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from 13.1 percent to 25.6 percent, in other words, it was doubled in period of 1960-1981 (OECD, 1985: 21).

Despite the awareness that the growth of public expenditure could have been doing some harm as well as good, the mood was one of optimism in the 1950s and 1960s. Opinions were conditioned by the reassurance that increase in real income thanks to the unprecedented rates of economic growth would allow increments to public spending. However, towards the end of the 1960s doubts were beginning to emerge about the efficiency of certain public programmes and the effectiveness of fiscal policy itself. It was argued that if the public sector grew at the expense of the private sector due to the steady increase in public expenditures and the public sector has less scope for productivity improvements than the private sector, then the productive potential of the economy would decrease. This would be exacerbated to the extent that the higher levels of taxation required to finance those public expenditures led to disincentive to work and invest efforts. Alternatively, higher levels of public sector borrowing might have led to higher interest rates and less private sector investment, or to further inflation. This crowding-out would lead to lower rates of economic growth and to living standards that were lower than they otherwise would have been.

Unfortunately, all these doubts turned out to be true in the 1970s. After the sustained growth of previous years, the mid-1970s brought severe stagflation in the aftermath of first Oil Price Shock in 1973-74. Industrialised Western economies experienced lower rates of economic growth and investment but higher rates of inflation and unemployment. The second Oil Price Shock in 1979 escalated the economic difficulties (OECD, 1985: 14). For a while countries attempted to follow traditional financial principles by raising taxes to finance the additional expenditure but the growth of general government revenue, mainly tax revenue, was considerably less than that of expenditure in those years. Much of the difference can be explained by the effects of oil-shocks (i.e. a sharp rise in expenditures partly as a direct consequence of it and partly as a policy response to it) and deep recession (i.e. a sharp decline in economic growth rates) experienced in OECD countries (Saunders and Klau, 1985: 16-17). Furthermore, up to the mid-70s, governments tried to match the
expenditure increases with the increases in tax revenues and this made the tax burden too high. Financing growing expenditures by increases in taxes was perceived as self-defeating unless the growth of GDP is strong and continuous but it was impossible under such economic conditions. As a matter of fact, taxpayer resistance started developing so that governments found it politically more difficult to continue matching the increase in spending with the increases in revenue. The net result was that during the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic performance of the advanced capitalist world deteriorated sharply; budget deficits and internal debt became a common feature of these economies. This, in turn, resulted in a growing expenditure for interest payments that made even more difficult the containment of fiscal deficits (see Saunders and Klau, 1985; Tanzi, 1985 and 1986; Peacock, 1986).

This relatively poor economic performance was accompanied by the reassessment of the consequences of large and growing public expenditure in terms of the possible adverse effects of high levels of taxation or public sector borrowing on both allocative efficiency and economic growth (Bailey, 1995: 149, 151). This reassessment resulted in imposing a cutback policy by many Western governments. The initial phase of cutback policy (1975-1979) was less than an actual retrenchment. It was the imposition of limits on the growth of public spending (Brown, 1988: 8, 10). Social democrat and pro-welfare governments in Western countries such as the Schmidt Government in West Germany, Carter Administration in the U.S. and the Callaghan Government in the U.K. appropriated similar policies to restrain the growth of public expenditure. As a matter of fact, the average the rate of increase in general government expenditure slowed down but general government expenditure still grew faster than GDP in OECD countries in the second half of the 1970s.

OECD club such as the US (see Peters, 1989: 18-19).

32 This policy shift was noted by several authors for different countries: for the U.K., see Gough (1979: 129-134; 1983: 461), Ruggles and O'Higgins (1987: 160), and Krieger (1988: 140); for the U.S., see Lampman (1983: 380), Ferguson and Rogers (1986: 80, 105-111); for West Germany, see Alber (1986: 115-116). For the British case, see also the 1976 White Paper on Public Expenditure (Cmd 6393, 1976) and subsequent annual White Papers on public expenditure. However, one point should be clarified that these governments were not ideologically enthusiastic for such policy shift. For example, The British Labour Party was forced by circumstances to use IMF recipes to dampen down inflation after 1976, but it did not have any anti-public sector sentiment the Conservative Party under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher strongly had (Johnson, 1993: 27). As a matter of fact, the policy initiatives of the Conservative Governments (e.g. monetarist economic policy and the application of private sector management practices) were a significant departure from the programme of previous Labour Government (see Jackson, 1981: 1; Willcocks and Harrow, 1992: 17, 18).
For example, although the average annual growth rate of welfare expenditure in OECD countries (4.8 percent), as a main component of general government expenditure, was a good deal lower in the period of 1975-81 in comparison to its average annual growth rate (8.4 percent) in the period of 1960-1975, it was still higher than the average annual growth rate of GDP (4.6 percent in the period of 1960-75 and 2.6 percent in the period of 1975-1981). This is the principal reason why the share of general government expenditure in GDP continued to rise. Although the figures suggests that a measure of success was achieved in terms of restraining the growth of expenditure, this success must be judged modest in terms of the relative size of government (i.e. general government expenditure/GDP) due to the worsening growth performance of OECD countries (i.e. deceleration in the growth of GDP) in the same period (OECD, 1985: 11-14, 21).

As Brown pointed out, if social democrat and pro-welfare governments of the 1970s initiated cutbacks, the conservative governments of the 1980s consolidated and extended the effort (1988: 11). The second phase of the battle over cutbacks began with Mrs. Thatcher’s election in 1979 and the Reagan Administration’s massive budget cuts attempt in 1981. The first sentence of the Thatcher Government’s first white paper on public expenditure asserted that « public expenditure is at the heart of Britain’s present economic difficulties» (Cmnd 7746, 1979: 1). The distinctive feature of the 1980s was that most governments actually undertook efforts to reduce public spending in absolute terms (Brown, 1988: 11) or, at least, in relative terms. While the predecessor governments had seen themselves as pragmatists, reluctantly taking nasty medicine, the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, in particular, had a fundamental belief in the need to shift the boundaries of private and public activity. They saw the medicine not only as necessary but also as positively desirable (Ruggles and O’Higgins, 1987: 161). Since the fact that election outcomes are strongly influenced by an incumbent government’s economic success or failure (i.e. the levels of inflation, unemployment, economic growth) in developed countries (see Butler and Stokes, 1969; Hibbs, 1987; and Mueller, 1989: 277-285), the fiscal crisis altered the position to one where public expenditure control, rather

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33 For example, the Thatcher Governments’ commitment to cutback public expenditure changed during the 1980s. By the mid-1980s the government modified its objective from reducing public expenditure in real terms to hold public expenditure broadly constant in real terms, and finally to expenditure fall or restrain as a ratio of GDP (Mullard, 1993: 198-199; Bailey, 1995: 149).
than public expenditure growth, was thought to be needed to deliver vote-winning economic policies. It is more interestingly, this could be achieved in the name of "public interest" in the long-run by considering the harmful effect of excessive public spending (Foster and Plowden, 1996: 25-28). Thus, the conservative governments abandoned public expenditure as an instrument of economic management (Nickell and Layard, 1985). The new dictum that "it is finance which decides expenditure and not expenditure finance" reinforced the dominance of a specific perception of public expenditure (Mullard, 1993: 231). In sum, cutting back public expenditure (through budget cuts; rational use of public money; efficiency savings; and public sector pay freezes) became a vital element of the policy of withdrawal of government in the 1980s.

The strategy of public expenditure cutbacks was enthusiastically adopted and pursued by the conservative governments during the 1980s, but what in fact was the result of this cutback strategy? If the outcomes of the cutback strategy are measured in terms of public expenditure, it can be said that the effort is not successful. This strategy did not led to sharp reductions in public expenditure and it did not radically resolve the fiscal pressure impinging on governments at the end of the decade.

While the tendency of general government expenditure (the consolidated expenditure of central government, states, regional and local authorities and the social security institutions) to grow as a share of GDP was restrained to some extent in the 1980s, the size of government was not diminished. Table (1.1) shows that the general government expenditure (i.e. general government outlays) as a share of GDP in OECD countries was 32.3 percent in 1970 and increased to 37.4 percent in 1979. Although this trend was restrained to some extent in the 1980s and in some countries there were years in which the

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34 Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that governments in election years try to manipulate events by means of political business cycles (see Mueller, 1989: Chp. 15; and Mullard, 1993: 50). However, it can be argued that elections are now less determined by national economic performance. Because, national economies are seen to be increasingly at the mercy of international forces beyond governments' control or countries' economic identity is submerged in some larger whole, like the EU (see Foster and Plowden, 1996: 27).

35 Although each one puts different emphasis, many scholars are agree that there was no major cutback in terms of public expenditure (including welfare expenditure) and public employment. For example, see Gretton, Harrison and Beeton (1987); Judge (1987: 16); Ruggles and O'Higgins (1987: 186); Brown (1988: 12-14); Christensen (1988); Klein and O'Higgins (1988: 217); Krieger (1988: 140-141); Smith and Stone (1988: 240); Harrison (1989); Glennerster (1991: 168); and Oxley and Martin (1991: 154-173).
ratio fell, at the end of the decade, the average general government expenditure as a share of GDP in OECD countries (40.7 percent in 1990) was still above its 1979 level (37.4 percent). This was also partly result of the fall or little increase in GDP associated with recessions of that period in some OECD countries (see McNutt, 1996: 80). If the previous financial burden of privatised state-owned enterprises and public utilities on the national economies is taken into account, this picture changes to some extent in a way favouring the governments of some countries that enthusiastically pursued the privatisation strategy (e.g. the U.K.). However, it is not too difficult to say that the conservative governments in the Western world could not roll back government in terms of public expenditure as much as they wanted. Therefore, this period can be interpreted as a phase of “consolidation” rather than of rolling back. For example, general government expenditure continued to increase in the early 1980s and reached its peak in the mid-1980s; and then decreased in the late 1980s and it was consolidated in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the U.K. (42.5 percent in 1979, 47.2 percent in 1984, 42.9 percent in 1990) (Oxley and Martin, 1991: 187, Table A3). Similar trend continued in the 1990s and the forces that affected this trend in the 1980s and 1990s are likely to continue in the near future (see Bailey, 1995: 149-150; OECD, 1994 and 1995: 20).

36 The policy objective to reduce public expenditure as a ratio of GDP does create some new problems for both governments and analysts. First, there is a problem associated with the economic cycle, in that during a downturn cycle, as GDP falls and unemployment increases, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP is likely to increase faster, which means that the government is losing its battle in the control of public expenditure. During a recession, rather than the government increasing public expenditure to counter the cycle it finds itself reducing public expenditure further. Second, the comparison of public expenditure with GDP does not amount to measuring like with like. Some items of public expenditure may not be included in GDP, which means that public expenditure is higher than estimated. Also expressing public expenditure as a ratio of GDP does not allow for a rational evaluation of different expenditure programmes (i.e. capital, current and transfer expenditures) on the economy. Therefore, the public expenditure/GDP ratio is influenced by the absolute levels of exhaustive expenditure and transfer payments, the absolute level of GDP and the relative growth of public expenditure and GDP. However, this method allows us to make reasonable international comparisons to grasp the change in expenditure trend. Although some of them are not precise and completely accurate, the OECD figures are usually preferred in terms of expenditures, employment and taxes in order to make reasonable international comparisons.

37 Whilst public expenditure/GDP ratio was restrained, it proved difficult to constrain public expenditure in real terms. General government expenditure continued to increase enormously in cash terms and modestly in real terms, especially in the U.K. in the same period.

38 As a matter of fact, similar trend continued in the first half of the 1990s. In spite of slight increases in general government expenditure as a share of GDP in many OECD countries (especially in the U.K. due to the rise in spending on unemployment and social security benefits during the recession), the growth was moderate. The average general government expenditure as a share of GDP in OECD countries was levelled around 41 percent. Although by the early 1990s, fiscal crisis still stalked to some extent in most OECD countries, the forward projections were more promising.
TABLE (1.1). GROWTH OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN OECD COUNTRIES (General Government Expenditure/Gross Domestic Product, %) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (2)</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of above</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other OECD average (3)</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECD Average (3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) This data comprise the consolidated expenditure of central governments, states, regional and local authorities and the social security institutions.
(3) The OECD data does not include Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey. The relative size of the general government sector in Turkey was around 30 percent of GNP in 1980 and 40 percent in 1990 (see Oyan and Aydin, 1991: 27-31; 1992: 135-138; Aktan, 1995: 37-42). Turkey displayed similar trend with the OECD average during the 1980s and caught up with the OECD average figure in 1990.

The consolidation tendency mentioned above was also valid for welfare expenditure. Although the upward trend was reversed in the 1980s, it did not bring a major effect on welfare expenditure. For example, in the U.K., welfare expenditure was consolidated in the 1980s (25.5 percent in 1979; 25.7 percent in 1989 as a ratio of GDP). Welfare expenditure either increased slightly or declined slightly in other OECD countries in the same period (Oxley and Martin, 1991: 163-164, Table 3). This result indicates that the change in rhetoric about welfare expenditure was considerably larger than the change in actual spending. The conservative governments could not dismantle the welfare state in contrast to their rhetoric. As Alber indicates, the recent period should be interpreted «as a phase of consolidation rather than of welfare state dismantling» (1988: 463).
It should be emphasised, however, that the composition of public expenditures changed due to some inevitable social and economic trends and changes in priorities in public spending. Over this period general government expenditure went up mainly through inevitably increased transfer payments which were affected by a number of factors such as demographic structure (i.e. ageing population), household structure (i.e. increasing number of single parent families), economic recession (i.e. increasing unemployment and other income maintenance benefits and public debt interest payments) but also because of various election pledges on defence and law and order in the 1980s (see Foster and Plowden, 1996: 26). The general trend indicates the increasing importance of transfer payments (particularly income maintenance programmes within welfare spending and public debt interests) and the downgrading of “traditional” government activities such as public good provision and subsidies to public and private enterprises (see Saunders and Klau, 1985: 16; and Saunders, 1993). In addition to this inevitable social and economic trends, the priorities of public expenditure were altered and then public resources were reallocated by de-emphasising state welfare provision in some areas and placing a new emphasis upon law and order, and defence expenditure (McVicar, 1986; Carroll, 1987; King, 1987: 120-123; Ruggles and O'Higgins, 1987: 186). For example, while housing and education expenditures were declining, health, social security, law and order and defence expenditures increased their shares in total public expenditure in the period of 1979-1990 in the U.K. due to basically ageing trends, and unemployment and security policies of the Thatcher Governments (Hogwood, 1992; Mullard, 1993). Therefore, as Lybeck said, it may be meaningless to discuss limitations (i.e. across-the board-downsizing) on the total size of government. Instead, the discussion on the priorities and composition of public spending (i.e. demands of particular public goods and services) and their financing should be focused on (Lybeck, 1986: 250).

An important component of public expenditure cutback strategy by which conservative governments tried to exercise was to freeze public sector pay and recruitment. Since the recruitment side of the problem will be examined below in detail under the topic of staff cutbacks, we are now content with explaining the general pattern in public sector

pay in the 1980s. Table (1.2) indicates that public sector wages, in general government sectors of OECD countries in real terms, remained flat (e.g. Denmark, France, the U.K.) or declined (e.g. Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden) in the first half of the 1980s. In the second half of the decade, a stabilisation or modest recovery in real wages occurred in almost all OECD countries. Therefore, at the end of the decade, OECD governments still had large bills for public sector wages, which had an important effect on the degrees of success of expenditure cutback strategies.

**TABLE (1.2). AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF REAL PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES IN SOME SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES (%) (1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1979-1984</th>
<th>1984-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oxley and Martin (1991: 166-167)

Note: (1) Relative to the private consumption deflator.

2) Staff Cutbacks

Public employment is one of the fundamental components of the public sector. First, public employees produce public goods and services ranging from traditional services such as national defence and law-order to modern welfare services. Secondly, public employment is a substantial portion of total employment, and it tends to grow faster than employment in the private sector. Thirdly, public sector employment is the principal source of income of millions of people, and the pay of public employees makes a major claim upon tax revenues (Rose, 1986: 69). Fourthly, government is the biggest employer
in an economy and the membership of trade union is quite high among public employees (Fredman and Morris, 1989). Finally, voting behaviour of public employees is also considered as a reason for public sector expansion by public choice writers (see Blais, Blake and Dion, 1991 and 1997). All these factors bring a special political dimension to public employment.

Although there are some difficulties in defining public employment in terms of all levels and forms of government for a comparative study, it can be said that over the post-war period, big government on an employment dimension has arrived in Western countries (see Rose, 1985). In most individual countries and for the OECD region as a whole, the share of general government employment in total employment increased steadily between the years of 1960 and 1980 (e.g. the OECD average is 11 percent in 1960; 13.2 percent in 1970; 15.3 percent in 1975; and 17.2 percent in 1980) (see Saunders and Klau, 1985: 63). Public employment increased particularly in welfare services such as health and education (see Rose, 1986: 79-80). As a matter of fact, the growth of public sector employment and financial burden of personnel expenditure on national economies in the 1970s (Oxley and Martin, 1991: 165-168) draw the conservative governments' attention to public sector employment.

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39 Public employment as a measure of people working for government is very concrete from the viewpoint of economists in comparison to public expenditure, which is very sensitive to changes in the value of currency and the government's policy towards the private economy in many immeasurable ways. Public employment/total employment, public employment/total labour force, public employment/population ratios, and public employment per capita are important relative measures. Public employment has also a virtue of revealing information about the nature of public bureaucracies from the viewpoint of political scientists. However, even this measure has its own practical difficulties for the purpose of comparison in terms of defining the boundaries of the terms such as government employee or public employee due to the different status of public corporations, local governments, quasi-independent agencies in different countries and in terms of counting part-time, seasonal or contractual employees (see Heller and Tait, Chp. III; Rowat, 1990: 212-213). It is highly difficult to compare the size of "civil service" between countries that legally or technically define the institution in different ways. Some public employees are not really part of the civil service at all, even though they are locally classified as civil servants (Rose, 1983: 164).

40 As in the case of public expenditure, general government employment only covers employment in the central government and state and local governments. Public sector employment as a broader term includes employment in the state owned enterprises and public utilities as well as general government employment (see Heller and Tait, 1983: 6).

41 Rose and his associates' study (1985) revealed large differences between developed OECD countries, in the proportion of public employment in total employment, in the proportion of persons working for central and local government and public enterprises, in the proportion of those working in the various categories of governmental service, and in the rate of growth of public employment. We should also point out significant differences between developed and developing countries and great variations among developing countries. The wealth, geographical size and population of a
The New Rightist political and academic circles have long argued that public opinion that the public sector is overstaffed, that public employees are overpaid and extremely well-protected by statutory laws and therefore they are not motivated to work efficiently (see Downs and Larkey, 1986: Chp.1). They have considered that "overstaffing" and "overpaying" are the basic reasons for inefficiency in the public sector. Within this framework, the strategy of staff cutbacks took a significant place in the policy of the conservative governments in the 1980s. Almost all OECD countries, whether they had conservative governments or not, tried to streamline the public sector and freeze or reduce the public employment in those years (see Rubin, 1985: Chp.1 and 2; Dunsire and Hood, 1989; Gore, 1993; OECD, 1993, 1994, 1995; Jones, 1998: Chp.1).

As "civil service" was considered as the most prominent status of public employment, a cutback strategy was pursued in national civil services as well as in the rest of the public sector. For example, both the Reagan and Thatcher administrations tried to "de-privilege" and then "discipline" their national civil services by using cutback measures and some private sector practices (see Pollitt, 1993: Chp. 3). Thus, the size, composition and cost of civil service have become controversial subjects since the early 1980s.

The size question was debated extensively including the desirable ratio of civil servants to total public employment, total labour force and total population; the total cost of civil service (i.e. personnel expenditure) to GDP; and managerial techniques for ensuring the optimum use of civil servants. A number of strategies were introduced by these governments in order to reduce the size of national civil services: hiring freeze, early retirement, redundancy. Also redeployment, retraining for alternative employment and proper placement of staff were used in order to optimum use of civil service staff. Dropping or curtailing some functions, contracting-out and hiving-off were often used to
massage their national civil services. However, these governments had to bear the worsening problem of unemployment in their minds while pursuing cutback strategies (Muhammad, 1988: 25; also see Dunsire and Hood, 1989).

As a result of the strategy of staff cutbacks, employment growth in the general government sectors of OECD countries slowed substantially during the 1980s compared with the 1970s. As is seen in Table (1.3), the average share of general government employment in total employment rose between 1979 (16.5 percent) and 1984 (18.0 percent), and stabilised thereafter at around 18 percent. However, the OECD average (weighted-15.6 percent and unweighted-18.2 percent) in 1990 was still higher than the average in 1979 (weighted-15.3 percent and unweighted 16.5 percent). Only in the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Japan, it fell slightly below the level of 1979. At this point, the British record for the 1979-1990 period (declined from 21.2 percent to 19.6 percent) diverged from other continental European cases. This point will be developed later in this Chapter.
TABLE (1.3). GENERAL GOVERNMENT SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN SOME SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES (Share in Total Employment, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990 (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia (2)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (3)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2)</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2)</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (3)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (2)</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unweighted average for OECD (4)</strong></td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weighted average for OECD (4)</strong></td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oxley and Martin (1991: 168)

Notes:
1. On latest year available
2. Last year available is 1989
3. Last year available is 1988
4. Excluding Turkey. The share of general government employment (the central government and local governments) in total civilian employment in Turkey rose between 1984 (8.6 percent) and 1990 (9.1 percent) (see Table V.3 and V.4). This is not very different from some individual cases in the OECD region. It should be pointed out, however, that the level of general government employment in Turkey is almost half of the OECD average. This point will be developed in Chapter Five.

3) The Limited Effects of the Cutback Strategies

In spite of the forceful rhetoric on the rolling back the frontiers of the public sector, in particular, in terms of public expenditure and public employment, the overall result of this policy for the period of 1980-1990, except some sectional gains in few countries (e.g. the civil service cuts in the U.K.), seems not successful. How can the limited effects of the cutback strategies be explained?

The general ideological attack created an anti-government climate of opinion in the 1980s, but it did not necessarily translate into practicable policy proposals. New Rightist politicians soon discovered that getting rid of government was harder task than they had
imagined. The actual governments’ policies and their outcomes in Western countries were
different from the think-thank schemes or party manifesto promises. For example, the
Thatcher Governments proceed their agenda gradually rather than directly implementing a
“grand plan” in a short term. They began where resistance was weakest (e.g. some
national industries and housing) and carried on where anti-government prejudice was
strongest (e.g. health, education and social security). Only in the late 1980s, the third
Thatcher Government seriously began to extend market forces in those areas of public
sector. Therefore, even the Thatcher Governments’, were the most radical ones among all
OECD governments of their time, success in translating the ideological change into the
policy change and then into the policy outcomes was limited to some extent (see Marsh
and Rhodes, 1992; Mullard, 1993).42

42 Mullard argues that there is disagreement among scholars about the nature of “Thatcherism”
(1993: 146). On the one hand, it is argued that it is a “grand strategy” or a “coherent hegemonic
project”. On the other hand, it is considered as a “pragmatic incrementalism” or an “ad hoc
collection” (or a “pot pourri”) of political and economic concepts. Thatcherism is considered by some
Marxists, who are usually associated with the journal “Marxism Today”, as a radical departure from
the politics of the post-war settlement and a deliberate attempt to radically reshape British political
and socio-economic values and institutions in accordance with New Right ideology since 1979.
Hall’s work on “authoritarian populism” (1985) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) can be located within
this approach. In Hall’s own terms, Thatcherism is a “hegemonic project” whose aim is to destroy
the previous post-war social democratic consensus and replace it with a pro-market anti-collectivist
set of values (see Hall, 1980, 1983 and 1985). Many other Marxist scholars consider Thatcherism as
a coherent hegemonic project as well (see Jacques, 1979; Gough, 1983; Hall and Jacques, 1983; and
also see Gamble, 1988). However, such an argument is criticised by Riddell (1983), Levitas (1986)
and Jessop et al. (1988). There is an argument that the rhetoric and policies of the Thatcher
Governments’ were not static. This is why, during the three Conservative Governments under the
leadership of Mrs. Thatcher (1979-1983, 1983-1987, 1987-1990), Thatcherism developed and
evolved in the light of changing circumstances (see Jessop et al., 1988). Instead of proposing a
grand design or a complex scheme for comprehensive reform at the outset, progressively ambitious
reforms were introduced phase by phase. In other words, reforms spread from one area of the public
sector to another, and from simple to more developed models, with first steps being succeeded by
more far reaching ones. The first Thatcher Government was identified with cutbacks, moderate
privatisation schemes, and efficiency scrutinies rather than with a full blown privatisation and
managerialism. Also some Marxists such as Jessop et al. (1988), and Edgell and Duke (1991) argue
that there is little evidence of a new Thatcherite consensus by taking sustained public support for the
welfare state into account. According to them, what Thatcherism achieved is a shift in terms of
political debate. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s the debate concentrated on more or less
nationalisation, in the 1980s the debate concentrated on mainly market values and privatisation.
On the other hand, there are some market-liberal sceptics who point out that the Thatcher Governments
did not seek to challenge vested interests, and that these governments, like all previous governments,
worked within the context of political judgement, expediency and political arithmetic. They reject
the idea that the Thatcher governments pursued dogmatic and coherent strategy to change the public
sector radically (see Brittan, 1977, 1983; Minford, 1980 and 1984; Riddell, 1983; Rose, 1984b).
Although Thatcherite reforms were heavily influenced by New Right ideology, considering New
Right ideology as the main causal factor is to overestimate the coherence of the Thatcherite reform
process and to underestimate the mundane, the accidental, the unintended and the historical
antecedents (see Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). In our opinion, Thatcherism was far more successful in
spreading free market values than practices in all spheres of life. In spite of its failure in rolling back
For some other reasons, the cutback policy proposals did not necessarily translate into policy outcomes. One important reason for this is, in fact, external to the public sector and the welfare state but internal to the contemporary Western societies. The welfare state is driven by structural features of Western societies over which policy makers have little control. Retrenchment efforts in the 1980s were mainly defeated by recessions, stagnant Western economies or, at least, an absence of robust growth, and an increase in unemployment and poverty levels (Brown, 1988: 14-15). In addition to the increasing burden of unemployment benefits due to economic recession and popular support for the welfare state, the changing age structure of the population (with an increasing number of elderly people, in particular, requiring greater expenditure on pensions and institutional care); and fragmenting family units contributed to the growing number of claims made on the welfare state. Therefore, once a nation establishes the welfare services, especially transfer payment policies, its burden of income transfers is largely outside its control.

Another reason is internal. Some empirical evidence seem to suggest that public expenditure is income elastic (i.e. it increases at a faster rate than does national output or income generally), so that there is, as a consequence, a growing proportion of government activity in the economy. Also, it seems that the apparent increase in government’s share of aggregate expenditure is a reflection of the comparatively high prices of government inputs, coupled with the productivity lag and labour intensity of many public services (Thompson, 1979: 10). Therefore, the cost of supplying most of the public services (e.g. welfare services) tends to increase more quickly than do costs in an economy as a whole. The increase in the relative cost of labour intensive public services, which could not match the savings achieved by increased industrial productivity (the relative price effect), caused the failure of cutback strategy. It is also because some parts of the welfare state (e.g. health services) are technology-dependent, and the governments found themselves spending large amounts of money on new machinery and equipment (Holliday, 1994: 88).

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the frontiers of government (and in the dismantling of the welfare state), Thatcherism contributed to the collapse of post-war consensus and restructuring the public sector in general and the welfare state in particular.
The effective resistance to the cutbacks is another important reason. As Butler emphasises, the beneficiaries of public services, service producers, politicians, and bureaucrats who formed a spending coalition, caused the growth of government altogether (1985: 8-9). Therefore, it would not a mistake to argue that this coalition also resisted the cutbacks in the 1980s. As a matter of fact, Piven and Cloward (1988) stress that this resistance came from bureaucrats, professional organisations, and institutions with a clear interest in sustaining the flow of cash and services. In this context, we can derive an argument from the writings of mainstream public choice scholars (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Breton, 1978) that “vote-maximising politicians” and “budget-maximising (or utility-maximising) bureaucrats” would not welcome the cutback strategy of any government. Some reforms toward a large-scale marketisation of welfare could not be achieved due to the vested interests of these groups (Giersch, 1997). Before 1980, Western welfare states had enlarged the web of beneficiaries and vastly increased the number of public employees, many of whom were strongly supportive of the welfare state (Brown, 1988: 14-15; Olson, 1986: 96; Johansen, 1986: 369; Ferrera, 1986: 462-463). As Le Grand and Winter (1987) argue, the middle class also supported the expansion of welfare spending as main beneficiaries of the welfare state. Thus, in addition to economic forces, the mobilisation of pro-public services and pro-welfare state coalitions and the institutionally complex structure of the welfare state became serious counter effects against the retrenchment policy in the 1980s. Since attempts to rein back welfare expenditure almost inevitably involve removing entitlement to benefits from some part of the electorate, only few politicians could have the courage to do so for obvious electoral reasons (Foster and Plowden, 1996: 6-7). As a result, the conservative governments continued to provide public services to protect the more visible and vociferous vested interests by considering their political fortune.

Technical difficulties with planning mechanism (e.g. expenditure planning, manpower and staffing planning, redundancy and early retirement programmes) and practical difficulties with implementing the cutback strategies could have formed another

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43 It should be noted that Dunleavy’s “bureau-shaping” model of bureaucracy (1985, 1989a and 1989b, and 1991) is quite different from “budget-maximising” or “utility-maximising” models of bureaucracy in explaining senior bureaucrats’ attitude against cutback strategies. This point will be developed later.
reason for the limited effect of the cutback strategies. In the face of such difficulties, many
governments preferred to pursue "cosmetic" or "window-dressing" type cutback
programmes as well as "real" cutbacks (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 7-11).

F) The British Experience of Staff Cutbacks

In this section, the Thatcher Governments' cutback strategy (1979-1990), as a
striking example of staff cutback strategy, will be overviewed in order to capture the
insights of staff cutback strategy since a detailed analysis of it goes beyond the aim and
scope of this thesis.

The Thatcher Governments came to office pledged to reduce not only public
expenditure but also, the size of public employment including that of the British Civil
Service.44

Table (1.4) shows that when the first Thatcher Government came to the office in 1979,
there were approximately 7.5 million employees in the public sector. Public sector
employment declined to 6 million in 1990 (-18.9 percent). This decline becomes sharper if
the full-time equivalents are taken into consideration (-22.5 percent). The same trend is also
valid for civilian public sector employment. Almost 1/5 of public sector employment was cut
in the period of 1979-1990.

If we look at the figures in detail, it can be seen that the main cuts came from the public
corporations and a particular part of the central government - the Civil Service.

44 Although the Civil Service is regarded as the most important component of the British central
government, there is a lack of clarity surrounding the term civil service in the British public
administration literature (see Wood, 1981:480; Drewry and Butcher 1991:9-17; and Dowding, 1995: 17-
20). We are interested in the British Home Civil Service and Diplomatic Civil Service in this thesis.
Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Overseas Civil Service are out of our interest. Although
Northern Ireland has its own civil service, there is a certain amount of interchange of staff between
Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Home Civil Service. For example, there is a Northern Ireland
Office and a couple of hundred civil servants for the services in Northern Ireland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Headcount</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th>Full-time Equivalent</th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Central Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Armed Forces</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) NHS</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Civil Service (2)</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>-21.4</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Other Cent. Gov. (3)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Local Govs. (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,997</td>
<td>2,965</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>2,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Public Corps. (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) National Indus.</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>-64.1</td>
<td>1,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Other Pub. Corp.</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-46.8</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Civilian Public Sector</td>
<td>7,135</td>
<td>5,737</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
<td>6,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Total Public Sector</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>-18.9</td>
<td>6,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) For details of the definitions and coverage of the sectors and sources of the statistics and changes in them between 1981 and 1990, except in the case of the Civil Service which is documented back to 1969, see Central Statistical Office (1990: Appendix 2).
(2) Civil Service data for 1990 is an average of the April and October figures. It includes the civil servants employed in the newly established Next Steps agencies.
(3) The establishment of HMSO from 1 April 1980 as a trading body implies the transfer of 6,000 employees to public corporations.
(4) Polytechnics were transferred to the private sector in April 1989, reducing local authorities by around 60,000 (39,000 FTE). Community Programme employees were transferred to the Employment Training Scheme in 1988.
(5) For details of transfers of public corporations to the private sector, including the number of employees involved, see Central Statistical Office (1990: Appendix 2).

Table (1.5) indicates that the share of civilian public employment in total civilian employment, total civilian labour force and total population decreased significantly in the same period. The proportion of civilian public sector employment in total civilian employment decreased from 28.5 percent to 21.9 percent. Its share in both total civilian labour force and total population decreased sharply as well. If the full-time equivalents are
taken into account, a similar trend can be traced. In other words, public sector employment in the U.K. suffered from a relative contraction as well as an absolute one in the period of 1979-1990.

**TABLE (1.5). UK CIVILIAN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN COMPARISON WITH TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (1979-1990) (Thousands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Civilian Public Sector Employment (Headcount)</td>
<td>7,135</td>
<td>5,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Civilian Public Sector Employment (Full-time equivalent)</td>
<td>6,276</td>
<td>4,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civilian Employment</td>
<td>25,079</td>
<td>26,198 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Civilian Labour Force (2)</td>
<td>26,313</td>
<td>28,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Total Population</td>
<td>55,946</td>
<td>57,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 1/3 (%)</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 1/4 (%)</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 1/5 (%)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 2/3 (%)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 2/4 (%)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) 2/5 (%)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (1) This figure excludes participants in work-related government training programmes (WRGTPS).

The Civil Service figures are more striking. Although in the 1976 White Paper (Cmnd 6393, 1976) the Labour Government had promised a reduction in civil service staff in relation to the budget cut programme, the decrease in staff numbers, from 748,000 to 732,000, (see Table (1.6)) was not fast enough for Mrs. Thatcher.

Thatcherists argued that the contraction of the Civil Service was vital for Britain's economic recovery; and believed that the civil servants were inherently privileged because they enjoyed job and income security (Wilson, 1991: 331-332)

On 13 May 1980, just a year after taking office, the Prime Minister made the definitive statement in the House of Commons:
« In the past, Governments have progressively increased the number of tasks that the Civil Service is asked to do without paying sufficient attention to the need for economy and efficiency. Consequently, staff numbers have grown over the years. The present Government are committed to both a reduction in tasks and to better management ...

... When the Government took office the size of the Civil service was 732,000. As a result of the steps that we have already taken it is now 705,000. We intend now to bring the number down to about 630,000 over the next four years. (HC Deb. 13.5.80; quoted in Appendix 2 of the Fourth Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 1979-80, HC 712-II).

Mrs. Thatcher’s announcement implied a reduction between 1 April 1979 and 1 April 1984 of 102,300 civil servants or 14 percent. Staff in post at 1 April 1984 actually numbered 623,972 (see Table (1.6)), so that target was undeniably achieved, at least on paper.

In the 1985 White Paper on Expenditure Plans (Cmd 9428, 1985) the Government published a fresh set of departmental targets for 1 April 1985 and each year until 1 April 1988, totalling respectively 606,565; 604,925; 600,439; and 590,447. The target for 1985 was subsequently revised downward to 603,765; but the actual staff in post at 1 April 1985 totalled 599,026, so that not only had the 1985 target been met by then, but the original targets for 1986 and 1987 as well. This number decreased to 580,000 in 1988 and to 562,000 in 1990 (Table (1.6)). The staff number in the Civil Service declined in the period of 1979-1990 relatively as well as absolutely. In other words, population per civil servant increased from 76.4 to 102.2 in the same period (Table (1.6)). As Dunsire and Hood emphasised «in contrast to experience on expenditure reductions, experience on staff reductions appears to be a story of remarkable success» (1989: 18). This trend continued during the 1990s as well (see Cabinet Office, the 31st Civil Service Year Book, 1998/99).
### TABLE 1.6. BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE STAFF NUMBERS (1970-1990)
(Thousands as at 1 April Each Year) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-Industrial Civil Servant</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Industrial Civil Servant</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Total Civil Servant</th>
<th>Population per Civil Servant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>736</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>649</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>624</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>598</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>569</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>102.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (1) Part-time staff are counted as half-units.

As we mentioned above, some degree of "creative accounting" or "statistical reclassification" usually creeps into figures of staff cuts. However, even allowing for a generous amount of massaging (hiving-off, contracting-out, etc.), it would be difficult to argue that a reduction in staffing of 170,000 civil servants in eleven years is wholly attributable to creative accounting. As a matter of fact, more than 1/3 of total cuts were achieved by "changing methods, dropping or materially curtailing some functions, privatisation (change in ownership), and working more efficiently - instilling VFM spirit" in the period of 1980-1985 (see Reed and Ellis, 1987; Hood and Dunsire, 1989: Chp. 6; also see Fry, 1986).
As Dunsire and Hood point out, a reduction of a certain percentage overall does not necessarily mean that each department lost staff by that amount (1989: 20). We cannot understand fully what the staff cutback has meant in the British Civil Service unless we break down the figures. However, this attempt goes beyond the aim and scope of this thesis. We will apply this approach - by developing some hypotheses - to the Turkish case. However, it should be just noted that the failure of the Thatcher Governments in expenditure cutbacks could be regarded as the validity of Niskanen’s “budget-maximising” model of bureaucracy and Butler’s “spending coalition” argument. On the other hand, the Thatcher Governments’ success in staff cutbacks could be regarded as a sign of the confirmation (see Ömürgönülşen, 1994b; see also Hood, 1995c) of Dunleavy’s “bureau-shaping” model of bureaucracy (see Dunleavy, 1989a and 1898b, 1991), which argues that bureaucrats seek to satisfy their interests by rearranging their bureaus (i.e. smaller bureaus with more discretionary budgets, better quality staff, and better facilities) rather than boosting their budgets and staff. Hood (1995c) found that the less privileged parts of the Civil Service (e.g. blue-collar staff) suffered the most and the most privileged parts of the Civil Service (e.g. “mandarins” in central controlling organisations) suffered the least.

G) Concluding Remarks on the Policy of the Withdrawal of Government

The question raised in mind is concerned with to which extent conservative governments could implement their own policy prescriptions. However, our aim in this Chapter is to grasp the spirit of the policy of the withdrawal of government and to indicate the significance of staff cutback strategy, not to evaluate the results of the policy of the withdrawal of government, since it requires another comprehensive academic study. We are also well aware that broad-brush generalisations about the effects of the policy of the withdrawal of government, without any doubt, will not assist enough public decision-makers to determine whether the strategies used within the framework of this policy are feasible alternative when considering how to improve the public sector performance. Only more and more empirical research could shed light and definitively indicate whether such strategies lead to positive or negative results under specific conditions. Nevertheless, we
should briefly indicate the basic trends developed in this period in order to understand the actual effects (and side effects) of these strategies used to withdraw government.

It would not be a mistake to say that the public sector could not be rolled back and the welfare state could not be dismantled despite the various efforts of privatisation and cutbacks. However, it should be pointed out clearly that this does not mean that the problems the most of the world faced did not cause a change both in the economic and political-ideological atmosphere and the landscape of the public sector. This recent change experienced in the public sector is not only a rhetorical debate or a cosmetic change achieved by the exploitation and manipulation of New Right ideology, it is a natural consequence of serious uneasiness stemming from the structure and functioning of the public sector. Since the early 1980s the public sector has experienced a wide-range “restructuring”.

The rhetoric of the New Right exceeded its achievement in the period of 1980-1990. This is true, but the significance of the recent changes occurred in the public sector cannot be denied. The conservative governments, in particular the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, may not have achieved all that they intended, but they nevertheless have changed both the climate and the structure and operation of the public sector and the welfare state substantially (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby, 1987; Ruggles and O’Higgins, 1987; Morris, 1989; Johnson, 1990; Karger, 1991; Mangen 1991; Wilding, 1992a and 1992b; Clarke and Langan, 1993). The impacts of their efforts are still felt strongly not only in their countries but also in all over the world.

If the overall effect of the policy of withdrawal of government on the public sector is taken into account, such a picture can be seen in the public sector in the 1990s and early 2000s: especially in the developed part of the world, first, public expenditure and public employment, more or less, have been stabilised through privatisation and cutbacks strategies. Second, the composition of public expenditure has changed. Third, although there is a substantial support for public services, including core welfare services, opinion polls show growing tolerance for public finance-private provision of services and for
welfare pluralism. Both governments and public do not want to abolish the welfare state, but they want to bring it up to date. The benefits of the welfare state are still appreciated, but the costs associated with those gains (i.e. disincentive to work effort; and economic inefficiencies) seem to be increasingly recognised. Therefore, policy-makers are now seeking to reduce the financial burden of the welfare state through eliminating inefficiencies and improving incentives. Fourth, serious steps have been taken to restructure the over-centralised and over-bureaucratic public sector through market-type values and mechanisms and managerial techniques in accordance with efficiency criteria. 

The idea of monopolist, over-bureaucratic and unresponsive state provision of public services (and welfare) has taken a hammering. In other words, the ideas of responsive bureaucracy, consumer choice, efficient and effective provision of public services have come into the agenda of governments since the late 1980s. Finally, the visions of a pure

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45 Public opinion polls, carried out mainly in the U.S. and the U.K. between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, showed no signs of an increasingly strong majority determined to roll back the frontiers of the public sector. The tide of sympathy existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s for across-the-board cuts in government expenditure seemed to have receded since the late 1980s. Evidence from the latest surveys points to these main conclusions. First, there is a quite strong public support among all social groups for a high level of government involvement in preventing crime, solving environment problems, and in core welfare services such as education, health and pensions while lowering the level of approval for benefits to single-parent families, council-house tenants, unemployed people and minority groups which are usually called “undeserving” groups. Second, in spite of this strong support for government involvement in certain areas, public do not usually want to see government any more in producing non-public goods and services. Therefore, the privatisation of the state-owned enterprises/public utilities and some local services have gained some support, at least not strong hostility, from the middle-class that has increasingly become shareholder in the capitalist economic system. Third, there is also evidence that better-off people would like to retain access to the private sector (including the private welfare sector operating alongside the welfare state) and that growing concern about the quality of provision (see Smith, 1987; Taylor-Gooby, 1989 and 1991; Hastings and Hastings, 1992: 147-148; and Hastings and Hastings, 1996: 171; see also Warren, 1993: 25). The clear message is that neither socialist planning nor pure free enterprise enjoys the majority of support among voters (Lipsey, Shaw and Willman, 1989: 7-8). The results of the elections held in many Western countries such as the U.S., U.K., France and Germany in the 1990s were also good indicators for the change of climate in the way explained above.

46 For further information about the recent changes in the public sector, and about their advantages and disadvantages, see Boston (1991, 1996); Aucoin (1988, 1990, 1995); Caiffi (1991); Isaac-Henry, Painter and Barnes (1993); Mascarenhas (1993); Ormond (1993); Pollitt (1993, 1996); Hughes (1994); Peters and Savoie (1994); Savoie (1994); Zifcak (1994); Holmes and Shand (1995); Kouzmin, Dixon and Wilson (1995); Farnham and Horton (1996); Foster and Plowden (1996); Ingraham (1997); Lane (1997); and Löffler (1997) for the Anglo-American world. For more measured changes in European countries, see Flynn and Strehl (1996); Kickert (1997); Verheijen and Coombes (1998); and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000). Also see OECD-PUMA public management reform and development surveys in the 1990s (e.g. OECD, 1995) for the changes in the OECD region. For recent applications in the context of developing countries, see Minogue, Polidano, Hulme (1998). For recent developments in the size, structure and operation of the Turkish public sector, see Ömtürköğlu (1995); Tan (1995); Akyar-Güler (1996); and Oyan (1998). To which extent such developments in Turkey are in harmony with the general trend noted above will be examined in detail in Five.
capitalist society without welfare state and of a collectivist society beyond welfare capitalism have both proved illusory.

Not only the size of government but also the performance of government is now given higher priority in enhancing the capacity of national public administration in national development and international competition. The performance of government has come under increasingly close scrutiny of both scholars and politicians from different theoretical/ideological standpoints. Each standpoint brings with it a reform agenda that covers a set of prescriptions (see Self, 1985: xi, xii). In this context, the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector is one of the more recent goals of governments. Conservative governments, in particular, have tried to establish the notions of “value for money” (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) in the public sector in general and civil service in particular with the effect of New Right ideology. The Thatcher Governments, without any doubt, were the most ambitious ones among conservative Western governments, turned away from the classic issues of the public sector towards efficiency issues (Cmnd 8616, 1982). The Conservative Party’s election victories were partly the result of the belief among the electorate that the Conservative Party would fight with excessive and wasteful government despite the degree of emphasis on these issues was different in each term of the Thatcher Government during the 1980s. To implement its programme, the Government required new values, mechanisms and techniques but more especially it needed to change the “civil service culture” (Jackson, 1988a: 247; see also Harrison and Gretton, 1987; Drewry and Butcher, 1991).

In the U.K., for example, every segments of the public sector has been affected in some way since the early 1980s (see, for example, Isaac-Henry, Painter and Barnes, 1993; Maidment and Thompson, 1993; Farnham and Horton, 1996; and Foster and Plowden, 1996). Many state-owned enterprises and public utilities were privatised. Public expenditure, more or less, has been stabilised through privatisation and cutbacks strategies but its composition has changed. The public sector employment, in particular employment in the Civil Service, has faced serious cutback attempts. The main pillars of the welfare state (i.e. social security, the NHS, education, housing and personal social services) have been transformed to some extent with more pluralist, residual and selective welfare policy.
The central and local public services have also got their share from the new market-oriented policies. In the whole public sector, the virtues and values of private or voluntary provision have been rediscovered and then the government has become less of a monopoly provider of services. The whole public sector, including the Civil Service, has been subject of policies intended to make it function like an effective business by introducing of market-type and managerial practices instead of bureaucratic forms of resource allocation and service provision. A new management approach (i.e. NPM) which stresses the values of efficiency, consumer responsiveness and accountability for results has replaced, to some extent, the traditional public administration approach. Consumers have been empowered to some extent to make choices about public services and entitlements have been secured through citizen charters. Within this framework, all public servants have been forced to adopt this new set of roles by some radical changes in the values and structure, processes, techniques of the public sector. Especially senior and middle-level civil servants have been required to view themselves as managers, responsible for the efficient allocation and use of resources, rather than as administrators who processed paper in the implementation of government policies (Jackson, 1988a: 247). In other words, new public managers have increasingly been required to think, act and perform more like private sector managers, and to run public organisations on the basis of private sector notions of value for money (Gray and Jenkins, 1986: 171).

Similar policy changes have come into the agenda of other countries, including Turkey as well as the U.K. with similar aims. Recent policy changes at global level are, therefore, more than a simple slowdown in the rate of growth of government but arguably less than a result of a life-threatening crisis. Therefore, if we take these global changes into consideration, we can talk about an essential “restructuring” of the public sector including the welfare state and civil service but not a whole “dismantling” as a direct result of a serious crisis.47

Within the framework of the new role determined for government in social and economic affairs (i.e. it is not as a direct provider of growth but as an enabler, catalyst, and

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47 This is especially true for the British welfare state. For example, see Klein and O’Higgins (1985, 1988), and Heclo (1984), Pierson (1991). For similar European experience, see Mangen (1991); and Judge (1987).
facilitator) (see IIAS, 1994 and World Bank, 1997), the public sector reforms all around the world seem to be a quite "irreversible" set of changes (see Metcalfe, 1993: 351, 352, 369; Hughes, 1994: 22, 260, 278; Clarke, Cochrane and McLaughlin, 1994a: 5, 1994b: 227, 229; and Ömürgönülşen, 1997: 537-541 and 2000). In other words, it seems that the "pendulum cannot be swing back" (Foster and Plowden, 1996: ix-xi) unless the distinctive nature of the public sector and the true demands of the public are ignored.
CHAPTER II. DEVELOPING A MODEL TO ANALYSE STAFF CUTBACK STRATEGY: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The size of civil service is a controversial topic. The increase in the number of civil servants has become an important subject of criticism almost in every country. Governments and their policy advisers have spoken of the need to cut public expenditure and public employment. However, cutting back public expenditure and public employment is not an easy task. A great deal of academic thought has been given to explain the problem of government growth, but there has been no comparable attention paid to explain how to design a staff cutback strategy in the public sector, how to overcome the implementation difficulties of this strategy, or how to analyse the results of this strategy.

In this chapter, our main aim is to develop a theoretical model to empirically analyse the staff cutback strategy pursued by the MP Governments in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990 in accordance with the general perspective drawn in Introduction. This model will be developed through reviewing the literature of “cutback management” and “bureaumetrics” in public bureaucracies. Then, the methodological strengths, weakness and limitations of this model and the problems faced in its application to the Turkish Civil Service will be discussed.

A) Cutback Management and Bureaumetrics as Significant Research Tools to Analyse Staff Cutback Strategy

As we mentioned above, the academic literature on cutback strategy in public bureaucracies is still in its infancy. The literature on public expenditure cuts (e.g. Wildawsky,
1980; and Bramley and Stewart, 1981) and public employment cuts (e.g. Hood, Huby and Dunsire, 1987; Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988; Dunsire and Hood, 1989) has started to develop since the early 1980s in parallel with the withdrawal of government programmes of conservative governments.

We have benefited largely from "cutback management" (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989) and partially from "bureaumetrics" (see Hood and Dunsire, 1981) in developing our model.

Cutback management systematically analyses what happens in a specific country's public sector in a specific period of cutback. It examines a range of theories about cutback processes, embodied both in popular expectations and academic writings on politics, public sector economics, and public policy and administration; and tests the plausibility of these theories by systematic study of figures on the public record (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: xiii, 2). Thus, it provides governments with some significant clues about the cutback process: how to achieve cuts in public expenditure and personnel at minimum cost to political objectives. It also provides academics with necessary clues about the basic patterns of change in the size and composition of expenditure and personnel and political, socio-economic, and bureaucratic constraints on and opportunities for a cutback strategy. This is true for our study as well.

Bureaumetrics is the quantitative organisational analysis and comparison of government departments and agencies. Bureaumetrics attempts to quantify the relationships between government departments in terms of their characteristics. In this respect, bureaumetrics stands in relation to the theory of bureaucracy as does econometrics in relation to the theory of the market (Hood and Dunsire, 1981: xiii; Dunsire, 1987: 94). Bureaumetrics helps us to understand major similarities and differences between government departments. Departments are analysed and compared in terms of a number of individual aspects such as size (e.g. budget, staff, clients, service area), internal structure (e.g. hierarchical levels, degree of dispersion, degree of specialisation, occupational groups), environment (e.g. connections with political and financial circles, type of clientele), and technology or type of work process (see Hood and Dunsire, 1981).
Departmental vulnerability to staff cutbacks can be measured by some quantitative techniques gathered under bureaumetrics. However, we have not applied bureaumetrics with full rigour since we have preferred a macro level analysis rather than meso-level analysis in this thesis. Furthermore, we do not have detailed official and reliable budgetary and personnel figures for most of the civil service departments and their sub-units to do such a quantitative analysis for the period concerned. We have made comparisons based on absolute and relative changes in the size and composition of the Civil Service, as did in many empirical studies about staff cutbacks (e.g. Dunsire and Hood, 1989; and Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988), rather than sophisticated quantitative techniques. It should be admit that bureaumetrics has provided us with some useful insights for bureaucratic process explanations (i.e. which departments or services can be clustered in the same group?).

The literature on cutback management and bureauetrics revealed the difficulties faced by the researchers in operationalising, let alone testing, some of the best-known theories in organisational sociology and public choice. Hood and Dunsire in their various works have, however, provided a sharp and concise account of the predictions that can be extrapolated from certain theories of bureaucracy (O’Leary, 1988: 225).

Hood and Dunsire are aware of the methodological strenghts and limitations of their studies on cutback management and bureauetrics. The simplicity of explanations in cutback management is one of its strengths. The quantitative elegance of bureauetrics is its strength for explanatory capability. However, the problem of availability and quality of data for the analysis and the lack of interviews to supplement the analysis can be considered are the most basic weaknesses of these research tools. These points have been taken into consideration in our analysis as much as possible.

The applicability of theories and models developed for Western bureaucracies to the Turkish bureaucracy has also been kept in mind in developing our model and related hypotheses since the modern Turkish bureaucracy resembles Western bureaucracies in many respects but differs in others with the effect of its historical origins and traditions.
B) A Model to Analyse Staff Cutback Strategy

We have come across four main kinds of explanations for the patterns of change in the size, structure and composition of a civil service through the review of the literature on cutback management and bureaumetrics: "Party-political explanations; trend explanations; bureaucratic process explanations; bureaucratic self-interest explanations". These explanations are partly rooted in popular stereotypes and expectations and partly embodied in scholarly attempts to analyse the cutback process (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 23-24).

We will examine each of these explanations for such patterns and try to develop some hypotheses to analyse the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in the period of 1984-1990.

1) Party-Political Explanations

There are enough theoretical discussions both on the behaviour of political parties to gain the support of different sections of the society and the effect of the colour of political parties on public spending pattern. In terms of waged or salaried-workforce in many democratic Western countries, which is a significant part of the electorate, the right-wing parties, compared to the left-wing parties, traditionally draw their electoral supports disproportionately from private sector rather than from public sector employees and from white-collar employees and occupational groups rather than from manual or blue-collar employees (see Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1991). The general results of studies finding differences between parties of the left and right is that the left-wing parties, compared to the left-wing parties, generally favour high public spending (see Cameron, 1978; and Castles, 1982). At the functional level, the evidence of the effect of the partisan composition of government on public expenditure out-turns is even more persuasive. For the left welfare

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48 For the connections of political parties with different socio-economic groups in society and the various strategies they follow to gain electoral support, for example, see Hotelling (1929); Downs (1957); Finer (1975); Nordhaus (1975); Pommerehne and Schneider (1983).
49 For the influence of the colour of political parties and governments on public spending patterns, for example, see Wilensky (1975 and 1984); Cameron (1978); Castles (1982); Gould (1983); Kohl (1984); Rose (1984b); Blais, Blake and Dion (1993); and Ross (1997).
services and for the right defence and law and order services tend to be politically more sensitive (see Gould, 1983).\(^5\)

Not only such theoretical discussions and empirical research results but also the programmes of right-wing and left-wing parties should be taken into consideration when we try to reach a judgement on these issues. In accordance with the popular stereotypes of right-wing and left-wing parties, the right-wing parties are more keen on reducing the size of public spending and staffing than their left-wing counterparts. If all these are taken into account, it can be said that the right-wing (Conservative or Christian Democrat) parties are more committed to cut public expenditure and staff in general than are the left-wing (Labour or Social Democrat) parties. The right-wing parties are also committed to higher spending on defence and law and order than are the left-wing counterparts, and the left-wing parties are committed to higher spending on welfare services and staffing than their right-wing counterparts. Considering their political colours and electoral support-bases, it can be expected that a right-wing government, in a period of cutbacks, is determined to cut civil service staff and spending on civil servants' salaries by a greater amount than a left-wing government. A right-wing government is likely to cut blue-collar staff numbers by a greater amount than white-collar staff numbers; and cut lower-level staff grades by a greater amount than top- and middle-level staff grades. The strategy of a left-wing government on staff cutbacks might be expected to be the opposite in each case. Similarly on geographical distributions, each party or government may not hit the regions from where they derive a substantial amount of their votes in terms of spending and staffing.

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\(^5\) Despite these general inclinations, some points need to be clarified. According to some authors, the pre-1980 experience shows that the colour of political power influenced the growth of public expenditure to a limited extent contrary to conventional expectations since public expenditure continued to grow under the terms of both left-wing and right-wing governments (see, for example, Rose, 1984b). But, they also admitted that governments by a grand coalition expanded public expenditure more quickly (1984a: 200; see also Kohl, 1984: 324-327; and Esping-Andersen, 1985). Alber indicated that centre-right coalitions promoted social expenditure growth as same as governments formed by single left party or leftist parties' coalition (1983: 166-169). Also, Wilensky (1984) argued that left-wing governments spent more when subjected to intense Catholic competition. The effect of the colour of political power seems to gradually evaporate in the last two decades. While public expenditure has been, more or less, stabilised since the early 1980s with the effect of conservative governments' retrenchment policies, some left-wing governments managed to cut public expenditure more than some right-wing governments in several developed Western countries (see Ross, 1997). However, in the light of such clarifications, we still believe that the colour and composition of governments is a significant factor to explain the variations among political parties concerning the level and composition of public expenditure.
These generalisations are also valid for Turkey, if, particularly, the programmes of the MP (1983a and 1987a) are taken into account.

The theoretical discussions, empirical research results, the contents of political party programmes, and stereotypes about party-political rivalry can therefore generate a large number of hypotheses for testing against observed behaviour of political parties (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 24-28). These hypotheses will help us to understand what actually happened in the Turkish Civil Service in spite of the political rhetoric of the MP Governments.

Hypotheses developed by taking multi-party politics into consideration as follows:

**Hypothesis (1):** “Under a right-wing government, general government spending as a proportion of GNP/GDP and general government staffing (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment, total labour force and total population will decrease markedly with respect to the previous period”.

**Hypothesis (2):** “Under a right-wing government, spending and staffing on defence and law and order services will increase as a proportion of total spending and staffing; and spending and staffing on welfare services will decrease as a proportion of total spending and staffing”.

**Hypothesis (3):** “Under a right-wing government, staff numbers in both the general government sector and civil service and their share in total employment, total labour force and total population will decrease; spending on wages and salaries as a proportion of total spending will decrease”.

**Hypothesis (4):** “Under a right-wing government, blue-collar staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will decrease; and white-collar staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will increase”.
Hypothesis (5): “Under a right-wing government, lower-level staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will decrease; and top-level staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will increase”.

Hypothesis (6): “Governing party will not hit the regions from where they derive a substantial amount of their vote in terms of spending and staffing”.

2) Trend Explanations

Trend explanations rely on social and demographic developments and projections to explain movements in public spending and staffing. Trend explanations give us some clues that we can predict what will happen in the near future from knowing what has happened in the past and what has been happening now (Dunsire and Hood, 1989:28-32).

For example, welfare spending and staffing is correlated strongly with demographic trends. The ageing population will increase social security (pensions), health and personal social services spending and staffing; and the decline in the proportion of school-age children will decrease education spending and staffing in developed countries. On the other hand, a disproportionately young population in developing countries, of course, will increase education and health (childcare) spending and staffing.

The age structure of the civil service is directly affected by demographic trends. Increase in middle-age group in developed countries will give rise to a middle-aged civil service. On the contrary, developing countries will have a young and middle-aged civil service.

Another social trend is the increase in the participation of women in working life. The proportion of women in both total civil service staff and top-level of civil service will increase due to social change and improvement in education opportunities and anti-discriminatory legislation concerned.
Industrial trends and the intensifying of international competition from countries where production is cheaper and more efficient confirm that heavy industries will decline in the long-term; and new technology industries employing fewer people will expand. Also, the size of the service sector will increase relative to the total industrial sector. Therefore, numbers of white-collar employees will increase while numbers of blue-collar employees will steadily go down.

There is also a generic trend in the direction of middle-heaviness in modern bureaucracies due to changes in age structure and education opportunities. Therefore, there is a drift to middle-heaviness in civil services (see Hood and Wright, 1981).

A Marxist analysis of the driving forces of social change can be considered another trend explanation. If the cutback era is itself seen as a part of period of crisis of capitalism, the state will increase spending and employ more staff in welfare sector (as a ransom paid) and in law and order services to prevent social unrest in society (O'Connor, 1973; Gough, 1979; Offe, 1982 and 1984).

We can now develop another set of hypotheses in the light of basic socio-economic and demographic trends as follows:

Hypothesis (7): “Welfare spending and staffing will increase or not decrease as a proportion of general government spending and general government (including civil service) staffing. In developed countries, spending and staffing in social security, health and personal social services will increase; but education spending and staffing will decrease or not increase as a proportion of total general government spending and staffing. In developing countries, health and education spending and staffing will increase significantly as a proportion of total general government spending and staffing”.

Hypothesis (8): “The proportion of middle-aged group in civil service will increase in developed countries. In developing countries, young and middle-aged civil service staff will be the large part of total civil service staff”.
Hypothesis (9): “The proportion of women civil servants in both total civil service staff and top-level of civil service will increase”.

Hypothesis (10): “The proportion of civil service staff at higher and lower-level ranks will decrease more than those of middle-level ranks, and therefore the relative size of middle-level ranks will increase. Thus, the civil service bureaucracy will become middle-heavy”.

Hypothesis (11): “The proportion of blue-collar employees in civil service will decrease”.

Hypothesis (12): “Spending and staffing in welfare services and law and order services will increase as a proportion of total government spending and staffing (based on Marxist analysis)”.

3) Bureaucratic Process Explanations

Until now, we have developed two sets of hypotheses derived from theories or trends which are not specifically directed or related to cutback management. These are essentially simpler than the hypotheses about bureaucratic processes and behaviour which will be developed from now and on.

The idea to be explored now is that there are some technical and organisational factors in bureaucratic processes that may determine which programmes or departments are cut more than others, when selective cutbacks are made. Some programmes and departments are more vulnerable to cuts than others, because of what they do and how they do it. However, much of the cutback management literature concentrates on departments (bureaux) rather than programmes and suggests that cutbacks can be predicted on characteristics of individual departments or bureaucracies (Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 44-55).

Some scholars have already debated on the political vulnerability theme for programmes, departments or professional groups (e.g. Midwinter and Page, 1981; Hartley,
1981; and Glennerster, 1981). Probably the most systematic and sophisticated attempt to produce a bureaucratic process account of "vulnerability to cutbacks" is that offered by Jorgensen (1985 and 1987). He identifies three dimensions of vulnerability and implies that a bureau's fate over a period of cutbacks is predictable from its overall profile on these three dimensions. The three dimensions are as follows:

1) "Identificational vulnerability" (or invisibility, as Dunsire and Hood, 1989, call it): the probability of being identified by central allocators of spending budgets and manpower as a potential target for cutbacks. The more "transparent" a department's structure, budget and staff composition, and production functions are, the more difficult to escape from cutbacks.

2) "Operational vulnerability" (or output effects vulnerability in Dunsire and Hood's terms): the extent to which cutbacks if imposed will cause immediate and publicly visible damage to the public services produced by the bureau in question. The more damage immediate and publicly visible is, the more easy to be saved from cutbacks.

3) "Allocational vulnerability" (or political clout in Dunsire and Hood's terms): the ability to mount effective resistance to proposed cutbacks. Departments which are closely in touch with their clients or buttressed by professions are more likely to have power to resist to cutbacks.

Within the context of vulnerability to cutbacks, it can be expected, for example, that cash-intensive programmes and money-shifting departments are likely more vulnerable to cuts than manpower-intensive ones as a consequence of the potential resistance of staff providing such services or employed in such departments. If a programme's or department's budget is largely composed of wages and salaries of employees, it will resist cuts more strongly than a programme or department whose budget is largely composed of grants, loans and subsidies due to the similar type of resistance of staff to cutbacks.

It can also be expected that programmes or departments providing pure public goods (e.g. defence and law and order whose benefits are general) will suffer more than
programmes or departments providing welfare services (e.g. health, education, housing, social security, personal social services whose benefits are highly visible for certain groups). Similarly, programmes and departments whose clients are organised into pressure groups will suffer less than ones whose clients are less organised.

Departments which are more suitable for contracting-out or hiving-off of work will suffer more since they comprise more manual and routine works and employ more blue-collar staff or staff in lower clerical grades.

A common argument simply says that those who have the power to wield axes use them on anyone but themselves. In this context, the central controlling departments are likely to be the last to suffer; staff cuts and restraints will fall more heavily on the spending departments. The larger departments through using their weight in the Cabinet may easily divert staff cutbacks and restraints onto the smaller departments.

We could develop a large number of hypotheses by using these dimensions of vulnerability. As a matter of fact, these dimensions have been discussed in detail by Jorgensen (1985 and 1987) and Dunsire and Hood (1989). They have tried to test departmental vulnerability by taking into consideration the size and structure of departments, their budgets, staff, clients, etc. As Dunsire and Hood point out, ideas about programme or departmental vulnerability are rich and subtle, but do not always lend themselves to ready measurement. Problems usually arise in operationalising the arguments for testing by available statistical data (1989: 47, 51-52). The availability of data is a more serious problem in the case of Turkish civil service. Therefore, we are content with a couple of testable arguments about cutbacks in departments and bureaux.

We can now translate all these arguments into hypotheses as follows:

Hypothesis (13): “In the periods of staff cutbacks or restraint, programmes or departments providing pure public goods and services (e.g. defence, law and order) will suffer more than programmes or departments providing welfare services (e.g. health, education, social security, housing, personal social services)”.
Hypothesis (14): “In the periods of staff cutbacks or restraint, departments where wages and salaries form a high proportion of total budget will suffer less than other departments”.

Hypothesis (15): “Departments suitable for contracting-out or hiving-off of work will be more vulnerable to staff cuts and restraints than other departments”.

Hypothesis (16): “The central controlling departments in Turkey, mainly Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the State Personnel Department) will be the last to suffer; staff cuts and restraints will fall more heavily on the spending departments”.

Hypothesis (17): “The larger departments through using their weight in the Cabinet will divert staff cutbacks and restraints onto the smaller departments”.

Hypothesis (18): “The concentrated departments (most staff at headquarters or in very few regions) will be less vulnerable to staff cuts or restraints than dispersed departments which have extensive local office networks”.

4) Bureaucratic Self-Interest Explanations

Bureaucrats’ reputation in the halls of academe is quite mixed. Bureaucrats are portrayed as guardians of public interests as well as self-interest-seekers; lazy creatures as well as empire-builders; poor performers as well as budget-maximisers; agents of the leviathan as well as jesters or fools; and merciless oppressors as well as cunning operators (see Peters, 1989: 24; and Goodsell, 1994: 19).

Bureaucratic self-interest explanations give us some clues about the “power game” inside the bureaucracy and the behaviour of bureaucrats (Dunsire and Hood, 1989:32-44).

There are two mainstream explanations about bureaucratic behaviour. The first one is Weber’s (1978) “ideal-type” or “legal-rational” bureaucratic model. He highlighted a
hierarchical and functionally specialised structure; a routinised and rule-based procedure; and
a qualified and disciplined staff in a career system who would implement decisions given by
its political masters in an impersonal and disinterested way (see Gerth and Mills, 1948;
Albrow, 1970; and Beetham, 1987). This model is in accord with the pluralist theory of the
democratic state mentioned in Chapter One: State policies are reflections of the
preferences of individual citizens and bureaucrats are the neutral agents of the state in the
service of citizens. Bureaucrats are traditionally regarded as the guardians of the public
interest. They are assumed to cast aside their private interests in order to serve the public
because of their altruistic intentions. Therefore, the activities of bureaucrats other than
serving the public interest are not expected within the public sector (see Dunleavy and

The second type of explanation is rather different. The model regards bureaucrats as
“administrative eunuchs” was long criticised (see Mises, 1944). A group of economists such
as Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), Niskanen (1971) and Breton (1974), who are usually
titled “public choice scholars”, try to apply the principles of the methodology of
economics to bureaucratic institutions and behaviour. The basic postulate of public
choice, as for economics, is that man is an “egoistic, rational, utility maximiser” (see
Buchanan, 1978: 3; and Mueller, 1989: 1-2). Subsequently, bureaucrats are no longer
viewed differently than any other actor in society since they are “rational-economic agents”
(utility-maximisers) pursuing their self-interests. Bureaucrats, like businessmen, maximising
their personal advantages in official operations, but not in the market place. They also get not
only financial gains but power and prestige. Just as businessmen compete for share of
market, so bureaucrats compete for share of budget in order to get more staff and then more
supervisory posts and more promotion prospects. The implication of utility-maximising
bureaucrats is not of corruption because they have similar motives like the rest of us have. In
this framework, the Public Choice School, especially its New Rightist version, argues that the
objectives of bureaucrats are the maximisation of personal utility functions rather than
seeking public interest. This maximisation is considered as one of the main reasons for the
growth of government. Bureaucrats always try to give us “more government expenditure
and staff” than we need. Bureaucrats influence the size of public spending and staffing in
two ways: first, in their capacity of utility-maximising state agents; and second, in their
capacity of utility-maximising voters (see Mueller, 1976 and 1989). Cutbacks in budgets and staff, of course, diminish their benefits and so are strongly resisted by bureaucrats. A radical version of the Public Choice School developed by Dunleavy (1985, 1989a, 1989b and 1991) (i.e. "bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy"), however, argues that self-interest-seeking bureau chiefs satisfy their interests by rearranging their bureaus (i.e. smaller bureaus with more high-status staff and more discretionary budgets) without boosting the budget and staff of their budgets necessarily. In both cases, we should be concerned with the self-interest seeking behaviour of bureaucrats.

This kind of understanding of bureaucratic motivation has already passed into the daily language. The successful British television comedy programme "Yes Minister" possibly arose from this sort of understanding. The fictitious Permanent Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby says:

«There has to be some way to measure success in the service. ... The civil service does not make profits or losses. We measure success by the size of our staff and budget. By definition, a big department is more successful than a smaller one .... this simple proposition is the basis of our whole system» (Lynn and Jay, 1981: 57).

The fictitious Minister for Administrative Affairs Jim Hacker is told by his political adviser:

«They [the civil servants] don’t want cuts. ... Asking Sir Humphrey to slim down the Civil Service is like asking an alcoholic to blow up a distillery» (Lynn and Jay, 1981: 56).

Even when bureaucrats see themselves as representing the state and guarding general interest of the society, it cannot be denied that they also represent different constituencies as a result of their interactions with policy-making process in a pluralist democracy (Suleiman, 1984b: 6). Furthermore, nobody can argue that bureaucrats who have significant authorities in the allocation of public resources can easily disregard their own group or individual interests in public policy-making process. In countries with strong
state and bureaucracy traditions such as Turkey where bureaucrats traditionally regard themselves as the guardians of the public interest (see Heper, 1985a), a serious problem comes to the agenda: "Whether or not they actually seek their self or group-interests under the veil of protecting the public interest?" It is generally admit that bureaucrats in many developing countries give their sole attention to their own group's interest (see Riggs, 1963).

We will deal with the second type of explanation (i.e. self-interest-seeking and self-preserving) about bureaucratic motivation but not with the Weberian type since the former is more inclined to produce operational hypotheses to explain the staff cutback process in terms of bureaucratic behaviour. As the MP was mainly guided by the prescriptions of New Right ideology (based on mainly public choice assumptions) like its other Western counterparts (see Kuruç et al., 1985; Uras, 1993; and Kahraman, 1995: Chp. I/4) in the period we cover in this thesis, the results are expected to be more illuminate for the staff cutback strategy.

The basic assumption here is that the self-interest-seeking bureaucrats will resist cutbacks with various tactics. If they are not able to resist enough to cutbacks but they like to continue to get their benefits, they will act at the expense of the weakest bureaucratic groups: "exploit the exploitable" (Levine, 1978: 320). As a former British Prime Minister's policy adviser, Dr. Donoughue says: «it seems absolutely human and understandable that if cuts are imposed, those who decide where the cuts should be implemented decide "they should be on anybody else but us"» (The Times, 2 April 1980). If the watchword is «"Axeman, save thyself!", who gets axed?» Dunsire and Hood asked themselves (1989: 42).

It can be expected that the "mandarins" (the top-level rank who makes these decisions) will ensure that the burden of cutbacks will fall on the middle and lower ranks. The long-standing rivalry between the "generalists" and the "specialists" for succession to top jobs is a well-known story. The generalists (the administrative occupational groups) will probably protect themselves at the expense of the specialists and technical occupational groups. Similarly, the blue-collar staff is likely suffer more than white-collar staff; the staff at the centre (headquarters) is likely to be cut less than the staff in the regions. Also, it can be guessed that in cutbacks, well-entrenched male civil servants will prune female civil servants
before other males. The main source of "relatively painless" staff cutting (avoiding compulsory redundancies and dismissals) is the non-replacement of "natural wastage" (through deaths, retirements, resignations, secondments, etc). It seems a reasonable idea to appoint temporary or part-time staff where for any reason staff lost by natural wastage has to be replaced. As Dunsire and Hood argue, they can keep the bureaucratic fabric in place for future restoration. And, they also give governments an opportunity to get rid of the legal problems about redundancies and dismissals in the case of future privatisation programmes. Therefore, the numbers of temporary and part-time staff in the cutbacks will go up in both absolute and relative terms in the early times of cutbacks but they will decline if the cutbacks continued to protect the "core" civil service (1989: 38-39). In other words, in the long-run cutbacks will fall most heavily on such marginalised group of public employees (Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988: 266).

So, we have further testable hypotheses as follows:

**Hypothesis (19):** "When general government spending is rising as a proportion of GNP/GDP, general government employment (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment will rise with it. On the other hand, when general government spending is declining as a proportion of GNP/GDP, general government employment (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment will decline at a smaller rate than spending".

**Hypothesis (20):** "When general government spending is rising, spending on wages, salaries and associated costs for public servants (including civil servants) will rise at a greater rate than total spending. On the other hand, when general government spending is declining, spending on wages, salaries and associated costs for public servants (including civil servants) will decline at a smaller rate than total spending".

**Hypothesis (21):** "In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of top civil servants will not decrease, or will decrease less than those of middle- and lower-ranks; in a period of staff restraint, the top-ranks of civil service will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than middle- and lower-ranks".
Hypothesis (22): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of staff in administration groups will not decrease, or will decrease less than those in other specialist and occupational groups; in a period of staff restraint, the administration groups will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than other specialist and occupational groups”.

Hypothesis (23): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of white-collar staff (civil servants in the Turkish civil service) will not decrease, or will decrease less than blue-collar staff (temporary personnel and workers in the Turkish civil service); in a period of staff restraint, the white-collar staff will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than the blue-collar staff”.

Hypothesis (24): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of civil servants in the centre (headquarters) will not decrease, or will decrease less than those employed in provincial or regional offices; in a period of staff restraint, the staff in the centre will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than those employed in provincial or regional offices”.

Hypothesis (25): “In the periods of staff cutbacks and restraint, the proportion of female civil servants both in total civil service staff and top-level civil service staff will decrease”.

Hypothesis (26): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of temporary and part-time staff will decrease more than those of permanent and full-time staff in both absolute and relative terms; in a period of staff restraint, the temporary and part-time staff will have less ability to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than the permanent and full-time staff.

When we look at these twenty-six hypotheses altogether, it can be seen that some hypotheses are based on predictions about proportional changes in the Civil Service staff and expenditure and some others have been developed by taking both staff cutback and restraint cases into consideration. Therefore, the hypotheses developed here are
explanatory not only for staff cutbacks but also for staff restraints. It is strongly expected that testing of these hypotheses will illuminate typical features, constraints, opportunities, and obstacles to the cutback or restraint process.

C) The Methodological Strengths, Weakness and Limitations of the Model and the Problems Faced in its Application to the Turkish Civil Service

This study is a preliminary attempt to analyse the Turkish Civil Service through a model testing some hypotheses by using available quantitative data rather than relying largely on discursive assessments. With this study, we have tried to demonstrate how the cutback and bureaumetrics techniques can be employed in the Civil Service where the legal-institutional tradition is dominant.

Like all attempts to analyse public policies, the analysis of staff cutback strategy is far from simple. There are some methodological problems and limitations and some practical difficulties in analysing of staff cutback strategy (see Eichenberg, 1983: 138, 141).

As in all scientific studies, throughout this thesis we are concerned with the fundamental principles of scientific research such as objectivity (neutrality), validity, comprehensibility, and reliability (see Welch and Comer, 1988: Chp. 3; O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1989: Chp. 3, 4 and 9; Gujarati, 1995: 25-27; Sarantakos, 1998) in constructing the theoretical model, choosing data and measuring variables, and evaluating the empirical results.

First of all, any scientific research is expected to comply with rules of “objectivity” (neutrality) and freedom from bias. In this thesis, maximum care has been taken despite the subject is too political by itself.

Second, in order to ensure the “theoretical validity” of the model (i.e. whether the findings of the research comply with the theoretical principles of the scientific discipline), we have primarily consulted the literature for any evidence on the appropriateness of the
model. It has been considered whether a similar model has been used before by others to measure the phenomenon we wish to measure. In this thesis, we have taken a model already developed by Dunsire and Hood (1989) as a guide and used it with some necessary modifications and simplifications. The model developed here seems explanatory not only for staff cutbacks but also for staff restraints. It also seems that testing of the model through twenty-six hypotheses can illuminate typical features, constraints, opportunities, and obstacles to the cutback or restraint process. It can be said that the meaningful findings obtained by means of a set of explanations and hypotheses based on the theoretical construct for cutback management (Dunsire and Hood, 1989) and bureauetrics (Hood and Dunsire, 1981) seems to indicate the theoretical validity of the model we have developed and used.

We are, however, well aware of the methodological limitations of this study as well. The problem of availability and quality of data for the analysis and the lack of questionnaires and interviews to supplement the analysis can be considered are the most basic weaknesses and limitations of this study as in the various studies of Hood and Dunsire on cutbacks.

The most of data used in this thesis are only available for the whole Civil Service or, at the most, for certain public services and departments. Such highly aggregated data are, therefore, not able to tell us much about the dynamics of the behaviour of sub-units of these services and departments. The lack of annual and quarterly staff data for the whole Civil Service and the lack of detailed staff data for individual civil service departments for the period in question prevent us to do sophisticated statistical analyses. The period in question (1984-1990) is not a sufficiently long period either for rigorous statistical analysis to be done. This unfortunately reduces the predictive capability of our model in certain aspects of staff cutback process.

In the face of the bureaucratic difficulties in having permission from government departments to conduct an empirical research which questions a highly delicate governmental policy, already published sources of information has been fully exploited before falling back upon direct enquiry of any kind. We are also aware that long
interviews or long questionnaires in such a highly delicate issue may not be welcomed by present or ex-civil servants who were somehow affected by the staff cutbacks. However, we have tried to have some confidential views of some higher and middle-level administrators and specialists who worked in the central controlling organisations on the behavioural patterns within the Turkish Civil Service in general and on the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in particular. This limited attempt should be considered as an auxiliary instrument to our study based on the analysis of public expenditure and public employment figures.

In order to encompass the totality of elements, which are significant parts of the phenomenon we attempt to measure, we have tried to develop a model to cover the different aspects of cutback phenomenon. Thus, an adequate effort has been given to the completeness of the analysis in order to increase the validity of the model. It has been tried to reveal the details of the Turkish Civil Service (e.g. total size and individual departmental size; organisational concentration/dispersion; service class, rank and age differentiation) within the framework of cutback management and bureaumetric techniques.

As is noted in Introduction, the aim and scope has, however, been limited in some respects in order to examine the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in the Turkish Civil Service at a macro-level in the light of the political economy approach adopted in this thesis.

Although only the Civil Service has been subject to examination in this thesis, should success of the staff cutback strategy be judged only in terms of what happened to the Civil Service? What if a government succeeded in reducing the size of the civil service staff without succeeding in rolling back the frontiers of the public sector in a wider sense? It could be argued that the government might achieve “illusory rollbacks” by transferring some public agencies and their staff or responsibilities to other categories of government (i.e. hiving-off), and that the whole picture therefore needs to be examined (see Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988: 245). In our analysis, we have mainly concentrated on what happened to the Civil Service but we have referred to the changes in the whole public
sector when it felt necessary. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the weight of the Civil Service in the public sector in Turkey affects the direction of change for the total public sector.

Since the staff cutback strategy has been analysed at a macro-level (i.e. the general effects of the staff cutback strategy on the size and composition of the staff in whole civil service), meso-level (i.e. departmental or agency level – intra-organisational - effects of the cutback strategy) and micro-level (i.e. professional or individual effects of the cutback strategy) issues have, in principle, been excluded from the analysis. Therefore, apart from some general remarks, we are not concerned with detailed explanations (e.g. preconditions, constraints, problems, and possible consequences) about departmental, intra-departmental, professional, and individual aspects of staff cutback strategy. In other words, individual, professional, and departmental responses to staff cuts are not included to our analysis in this thesis.

Although staff cutback is advocated on the ground of limited and efficient government, there is no well-established consensus on how cutback affects organisational performance and the morale of staff. To answer these questions properly requires direct performance measurement of all, or a significant proportion, of government’s activities and empirical survey on the morale of staff over a substantial run of years, respectively. Such data does not exist, at least for Turkey. It can be attempted to indicate the way of change in performance and moral through using some indicators (e.g. rank and age structure of staff and the ratio of part-time and female staff for change in performance and the rates of resignation and voluntary retirement for change in morale). However, these indicators are not definite and therefore, the meaning of “leaner and fitter” is contentious. The “leaner means fitter” (i.e. higher efficiency) argument is sometimes counterattacked by the “leaner means weaker” (i.e. greying and demoralised bureaucracy) argument (see Hood, Dunsire and Thomson, 1988: 260-268; and Hood; Roberts and Chilvers, 1990). In this thesis, therefore, there is no attempt to measure organisational performance and the morale of staff except some general remarks about the change in the structure and composition of the Turkish Civil Service in terms X-efficiency. The lacks of regular and
detailed staff and budget data for individual civil service departments prevent us to do such an attempt either.

Potential problems of “internal validity” (i.e. causal relationship between variables) and “external validity” (i.e. issue of generalising the findings of a study beyond the specific cases involved) have also been taken into consideration as much as possible in designing the model. In this way, many common factors (e.g. political party ideology; social and demographic variables, structural and behavioural manners of bureaucracy) causing the changes in both the structure of the Turkish Civil Service and the behaviour of civil servants have been evaluated by developing various hypotheses. Thus, it has been aimed to show that whether more than one factor affecting the result. In questioning some hypotheses, necessary care has been taken in sampling strategy (i.e. selection of representative civil service departments for the analysis) in order to indicate the appropriateness of extending or generalising research findings to the rest of the Turkish Civil Service.

As is noted in Introduction, although the entire population of the Civil Service (i.e. staff employed in ministries, connected and affiliated departments to ministries, and some autonomous agencies) is subject to analysis, departments have been clustered by ourselves according to service area, staff size, budget composition, concentration/dispersion index, etc. to analyse particular aspects of the staff cutback strategy. The age groupings of civil servants made by the State personnel Department have been kept as they are since the clusters of age seem to adequately sensitive and explanatory. The methods used to form such clusters have been explained in noted below related tables.

Third, “comprehensibility” is an important consideration as well as comprehensiveness and completeness in constructing a theoretical model and pursuing an analysis as mentioned above. A researcher writes for readers who are not specialists in the field such as legislators, bureaucrats and members of the public and students as well as for specialists. Therefore, it is very important to choose a model and pursue an analysis that is simple and understandable to the potential audience. A model that is too complex and esoteric, no matter how valid, may not be understood. The simplicity and comprehensibility are significant features even for
doctoral studies. The simplicity and comprehensibility of theoretical model and analysing techniques used are the most credited features of studies of cutback management and bureauometrics.

Fourth, not only a valid theoretical model but also valid and reliable data used by the researcher within the framework of the theoretical model are crucial. A researcher who works with data must be concerned with validity and reliability and ask himself/herself appropriate questions respectively: "what do these data indicate?" and "how much are these data reliable?" A researcher who includes all quantitative information in his or her decision-making may make an inappropriate decision if the data are invalid or unreliable. Because of these problems, the researcher should always keep in mind that the results of research are only as good as the quality of the data and should try not to be dogmatic about the results obtained from a given study, especially when the quality of the data is suspect. The data used by social scientists for the public sector are not always valid and reliable. Changes in cabinet and governmental bodies, variations in reporting public records across governmental bodies, changes in bureaucratic attitudes makes more data for the public sector unreliable. Furthermore, since these data are generally not subject to the control of the researcher, the researcher faces serious problems in pinning down the exact cause or causes affecting a particular situation. However, maximising validity, reliability and completeness of data may mean increasing cost in terms of money and time. Cost and wise use of resources are important considerations for a researcher. In fact, the necessary data can be found in prior surveys conducted by public and/or private entities for a purpose other than the given research study. In many cases, the researcher has no choice but to depend on the available data. The availability of data (e.g. regular and detail staff statistics in our case) is also an important problem. Whether or not secondary data are appropriate for the research study depends on both research questions and the nature of data. Since the most of socio-economic data for the public sector are generally available at a highly aggregate level, especially because of confidentially in the public sector, such data may not able to tell us much about the details of dynamics of the behaviour in the public sector. By using secondary data, however, we may avoid the constraints on data gathering capacity, time and money. Organisations that specialised in collecting data have also well-trained, professional staff to check the reliability of data better than the individual researcher.
In this thesis, we have used secondary data (i.e. official statistics) rather than data privately gathered by the author. The latter might be more suitable for the purpose of the research by providing all necessary details about the Civil Service, but it is highly expensive, and especially in this case, technically and legally almost impossible. The most obvious resources of secondary data are governmental databases and published official statistics. In Turkey, for example, the Ministry of Finance, the State Institute of Statistics, the State Planning Organisation, and the State Personnel Department have their own databases and reveal some important statistics regularly on public expenditure, public employment, and other relevant socio-economic indicators. The State Personnel Department is, in particular, authorised to collect statistical data in relation to public personnel and issue at regular intervals. As a matter of fact, such statistical data were used in some other studies (see, for example, Mihçioğlu, 1964; Gülmez, 1973; Oktay, 1983 and 1986; Çitçi, 1988) on the public sector employment in Turkey though the aims, scopes and methods of such studies are quite limited. However, identifying a database is only half the battle. Access to it, and evaluate its quality and applicability to a study are important problems to be solved. Access to public data may be limited by confidentially guarantees to the respondents. Organisational policies, contractual guarantees, and a researcher’s inclination may become important factors in any agreement to allow someone to access data. The authors’ job experience in the State Personnel Department, without any doubt, should be counted as an important advantage to overcome these problems. Some statistics and documents officially collected but restrictively circulated (e.g. The Occupied or Vacant Positions of Civil Servants (DPD, 1990b)) have been used with permission.

Data used in this thesis are both valid for our research aim and reliable. In fact, although some minor criticisms could be directed to their scope and details, continuity, and collection techniques, the official governmental databases are still the most comprehensive, detailed, functional, and reliable ones for the public sector in Turkey. The quality and reliability of the official data on public employment mainly provided by the State Personnel Department have also been cross-checked with other comparable and reliable official data released by other governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the State Institute of Statistics, and the State Planning Organisation. The
definitions about the data, their techniques of collection, and any gaps and omissions in the data as well as any revisions have been stated clearly in the notes take place at the bottom of each table in the thesis. The familiarity with the database has again helped the author make inferences about the quality and reliability of data. The staffing aspect of cutbacks is notoriously vulnerable to creative accounting, so that a mere rearrangement of the civil service (e.g. hiving-off) can be made to look like downsizing the civil service. The period (1984-1990), we have examined in this thesis, is however relatively stable period in terms of governmental continuity and structure of governmental bodies in comparison with pre-1984 and after-1990 periods. Therefore, reliability problem, at least for these aspects, is minimised in this research.

Social scientists have become increasingly concerned with various problems relating to the notion of the state since the state is one of the most central phenomena in political and socio-economic spheres. The relationships between the state and the civil society and between the state and its agents have been the most controversial issues in this field. Some serious attempts have been made for a marriage between the theories of the state and the theories of bureaucracy. On the one hand, some writers mainly concentrate on the role of the state in socio-political and economic life and the behaviour of its agents in terms of the issue of “big government” in contemporary settings. This perspective, mainly based on the modern ideologies (e.g. the New Right) about the state and bureaucracy, has been used in the previous chapters in order to understand the political economy of the bureaucracy, in particular, in terms of public employment. On the other hand, some others try to explain the emergence and development of the state with a historical-comparative perspective to find out common properties and variations that affect the current configurations of these relationships in different states. This perspective will be used in this Chapter in order to understand the evolution of the configuration of these relationships in the Ottoman-Turkish society. It is expected that this perspective will provide some significant clues about the position of the modern Turkish bureaucracy vis-à-vis political power and the strength of the Turkish Civil Service against any kind of staff cutback policy of political power.51

51 The term “state” is generally used to refer to a distinct set of political institutions whose specific concern is with the organisation of domination, in the name of common interest, within a delimited territory (see Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, 1996; also see Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987: 1-4; and Heywood, 1999: 74-77). Since the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition has been questioned in order to understand and explain the role of the bureaucracy in the context of Ottoman-Turkish society
should be emphasised that these two different perspectives are not contradictory but complementary\textsuperscript{52}, and it is strongly believed that they together are able provide us with the necessary historical and theoretical framework to explain the main strategies of Turkish governments and bureaucrats during the cutback period. Although the second one will be the dominant perspective in this Chapter, it will be benefited from the first perspective when it comes necessary.

Before moving to the details of the theoretical framework used in this Chapter to analyse the role of bureaucracy in the historical context of Ottoman-Turkish society, some important points need to be clarified. First, as was explained in Introduction, the term "bureaucracy" is more general and comprehensive than the "civil service". Since the scope of Civil Service in Turkey (i.e. mainly the central government) has changed during the course of time and the legal-institutional differences between the Civil Service and the rest of the bureaucracy (i.e. some parts of the central government, the local governments, and the state-owned enterprises and public utilities) have not always been taken into account in the relevant literature, the term bureaucracy, as an organisational structure and its personnel, has been preferred to use here. However, as the Civil Service constitutes the core of the Turkish bureaucracy, any comment on the whole Turkish bureaucracy cannot be wrong, at least in principle, for the Civil Service either. Within this context, the term "bureaucratic elite" which covers higher career civil servants as well has been used to indicate the socio-political position and power of bureaucrats in the society. When it is

\textsuperscript{52} Even if public choice theorists within the first perspective take state agents (e.g. bureaucrats) individually as an endogenous agent in their analysis, they have long failed to take into account the state itself as an endogenous agent. A "state-centred" approach should be developed to examine political and bureaucratic processes (e.g. political business cycles, rent-seeking, bureaucratic empire-building, corruption) in semi-democratic non Western countries where the state has a special place. This can help us to understand the dynamics of policy-making in these countries in which fundamental democratic institutions, such as parliament, are officially in charge but the military and civil bureaucracies play a significant and autonomous role in policy-making process. A limited government proposed by those using society-centred public choice approach developed for pluralist-democratic Western countries is a limited solution and a misleading way to understand the policy-making process in developing countries (see Demirbaş, 1998; Demirbaş and Jackson, 1998). Although bureaucrats in such countries attempt to maximise their utilities like their counterparts in pluralist-democratic Western countries, their behaviour can be better analysed with a systematic reference to the type of state. Since military and civil bureaucratic elites are usually and historically a part of the state elite, there is no effective control in practice on their self-interest seeking activities. As a matter of fact, the Turkish bureaucracy will be examined historically with a special reference to a "strong state" and "bureaucratic ruling" traditions in this chapter.
considered necessary, some remarks have been made to indicate the differences between the Civil Service (and the civil servants) and the rest of the Turkish bureaucracy (and other public servants).

Second, sometimes the bureaucratic elite, sometimes the rest of the civil servants, and most of the time the whole bureaucracy has been exposed to anti-bureaucracy policies of the political elite. Since the regime of security of tenure has, more or less, been same for all the public servants, the whole bureaucracy (including the civil servants) has been exposed to similar threat in terms of any purge programme of political power. However, it should be emphasised that the bureaucracy does not always act as a monolithic entity in practice. The cohesion of those critically placed at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and their leading behaviour is important for the strength of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis political power. However, such a feature does not always bring affirmative outcomes for the all members of the bureaucracy. Therefore, we should be aware that some valid generalisations about the bureaucratic elite might well be untrue with reference to all public servants (and civil servants) especially in terms of socio-economic rights and political-administrative coercion. This is even true for the single-party years of Turkey, which is called as a “golden age” for all civil servants. This differentiation has been sharpened with the decline in the homogeneity of the bureaucracy as a result of the socio-economic changes happened in the Turkish society during the second half of the twentieth century and with the decline in the purchasing powers of the middle and lower levels of bureaucracy as a result of the inflationary economic policies pursued by the governments. With the increased fragmentation in the bureaucracy in terms of legal status, socio-cultural origins and economic rights, the bureaucratic elite has gradually lost its character to be an advocate of the whole bureaucracy. When such remarkable differences were occurred between the bureaucratic elite and the rest of the bureaucracy in the course of time, necessary remarks have also been made to pay attention to these developments.

In this Chapter, first, a theoretical framework will be drawn to analyse the role of bureaucracy in the historical context of Ottoman-Turkish society. Then, the historical evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy will be overviewed in order to determine the common feature of the relationships between the state, the constitutive system
(including political power) and the bureaucracy. Thus, a general situation of the Turkish Bureaucracy (and the Turkish Civil Service) will be portrayed when the MP captured political power.

A) The Relationships between the State, the Constitutive System, and the Bureaucracy: A Theoretical Framework

From a historical and comparative perspective, a number of writers seek to find out the roots of principal variations in the early forms of Western European states and the effects of these early forms in the subsequent forms and substances of political activity in different countries (see Tilly, 1975: 13). The type of relationship between the state and the civil society in resolving conflicts over fundamental claims in society is generally regarded as an essential factor creating such variations in the early forms of states (Heper, 1985b: 87-88).

The “state-centred” approach, which attributes autonomy to the state, takes the state as a formation that shapes socio-political dynamics rather than as a by-product of a particular (capitalist) socio-economic structure. It questions the generalisations of Hegelian, Marxist and Weberian models stemmed from the state formation in this particular structure and indicates the significance of historical and contextual features of the state formation (see Badie and Birnbaum, 1983; Skocpol, 1985). There have been efforts to provide a proper terminology for distinguishing the different developments in state formation in terms of the strength or weakness of the state: e. g. “the level of stateness” (i.e. “high in stateness” or “low in stateness”) (Nettl, 1968); and “state societies” or “stateless societies” (Dyson, 1980). Some writers such as Dyson (1980) and Badie and Birnbaum (1983) have tried to classify major Western polities in terms of the strength

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53 Some other writers have also attempted to distinguish conceptually state-dominated polities and societies from those where the state plays a minimal role, or none at all. Berki (1979), for instance, differentiates “transcendentalism” (i.e. man belongs to a moral community), or “statist” orientation, from “instrumentalism” (i.e. man take places within an interest community), or “societal orientation”.
of the state\textsuperscript{54} and to explain the polities high in stateness or state societies with a historical-comparative perspective on the basis of "state tradition". Thus, the scope of stateness may show differences between one polity and another; and in the same polity, one may come across different degrees of stateness at different historical periods. It should not be thought that over different historical periods the strength of the state in a polity remains the same. A state tradition, once established, may, therefore, not linger on indefinitely. The nature of public bureaucracies may also change in accordance with the type of polity (degree of stateness) and time. There is, therefore, a need for a historical-comparative perspective. The reflections of this approach developed to explain differences in state formation in various Western countries can be traced in Heper's studies (for example, see Heper, 1985a, 1987b and 1991a) in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The main question dealt with in Heper's studies is that to which extent a certain type of state form and mentality affects the political-administrative dynamics of Turkey. He has used conceptualisations such as "strong state tradition" and "bureaucratic ruling tradition" in order to deal with this question. In his studies to analyse the Ottoman-Turkish polity within the framework of state-centred approach, Heper has taken centre-periphery cleavage, which is mainly used by another prominent Turkish social scientist, Mardin (1973) to indicate the serious differentiation between the ruler and the ruled at the socio-cultural level in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, and then transformed into a cleavage between the state (the state elite) and civil society (the political elite) at political-institutional level.\textsuperscript{55} With the reservation that some fair theoretical and methodological criticisms directed to the argument of determinative role of the state in society (see Özman and Coşar, 2001) should be kept in mind, we believe that the approach used in Heper's studies is very helpful to understand the true nature of the state and the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity.

\textsuperscript{54} For example, Badie and Birnbaum distinguish France from Anglo-American countries with her strong state tradition (1983: 103ff).

\textsuperscript{55} The state elite is here referred to a group of elite, which is primarily the "self-designated guardian" of the public interest. It acts in the name of the state, which is not conceived as a "tool" of at the disposal of the political elite. The state elite does not reconcile sectional interests in terms of "procedural" norms; rather, it "filters" the demands coming from the society through the "substantive" (state) norms that it itself formulate. The political elite, on the other hand, is the "elected representative" of people and essentially accountable to them (see Heper, 1987a: 4).
Whereas the relationships among the state, socio-economic structure and political culture have been the subject of extensive study, as Heper aptly argues, there has been a relative lack of systematic attention to the place of bureaucracy in these re-formulations. It is true that students of the state pay hardly any attention to the phenomenon of bureaucracy with respect of the state, but, the reverse is often the case for students of bureaucracy (1985b: 89-90; 91). In the mainstream literature, bureaucracy is examined exclusively in terms of the political regime, without any reference to the phenomenon of the state (for example, see Heady, 1966; and also see Riggs, 1963). This particular approach of studying bureaucracy can be traced back to the Weberian state, class and bureaucracy views (Beetham, 1974: 50, 53, 74). It follows that neither the Weberian nor the Hegelian conception of bureaucracy is definitive or exhaustive; that is not enough to consider bureaucracy as unable to rise of its own stratum or to conceive of it as the absolute class or embodiment of the general interest. Heper argues that «[t]he roles that bureaucracy has played historically, and continues to play, are infinitely varied, and differences in regime types are by themselves inadequate to explain fully the variances» (1985b: 93). He also emphasises that although the political regime (Heady, 1966: 74), political culture (Presthus and Monopoli, 1977: 176) and cross-cultural borrowing and/or imposition (Hamilton, 1964; and Braibanti, 1966) would all have formative impact upon the public bureaucratic structures, their relative influence would not be the same in different contexts (see Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980: 138-139). Therefore, various bureaucratic models based on different bureaucratic traditions can be seen, in the past and present, among Western and non-Western countries (see Farazmand, 1994).

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56 Heper argues that although Heady (1966) and some other students of comparative public administration (e.g. Fainsod, 1963; Riggs, 1963 and 1964; Esman, 1966; and Diamant, 1970) asserted a relationship between political regime types and the political role of bureaucracy, they did not provide us with the nature of this complex relationship and factors affecting it (Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980: 151-152). Riggs, in his article responded to the criticism of Heper, admits the validity of Heper's criticism but argues that Heady (1966: 99-105) already pointed out this issue (1980: 305). Although Heady gives a special importance to political regime type, he considered both regime type and historical bureaucratic traditions as independent variables to take into account in any effort to explain the characteristics of a country's public bureaucracy. When Heady referred specifically to the Thai (1966: 81) and Turkish (1966: 85) bureaucracies, a good deal of emphasis was put on historical continuities and discontinuities. Riggs argues that political regime type and the historical bureaucratic tradition are not alternative but complementary explanations. According to Riggs, there are also other important domestic and international socio-economic, cultural, and environmental variables, undoubtedly underplayed in the comparative public administration literature of the 1960s,
The state, the bureaucracy, and the constitutive system may each exert pressure on the others. The phenomenon of the state should be taken into consideration in both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of the bureaucracy (Heper, 1985b: 93). Heper also claims that «[t]he “historical bureaucratic tradition”, rather than variations in type of regime, may offer the better explanation of the behaviour of the public service in some countries, especially where there exists a firmly established tradition of the civil service» (1985b: 92 and also see Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980: 152-153).

Although Weber felt that the bureaucracy of all modern nation-states was proceeding toward a generally similar institutional structure and behaviour pattern characterised by the norms and values of legal-rational authority, the developments with regard to the convergence of bureaucratic structures and behaviour patterns have been disappointing.\(^\text{57}\)

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\(^{57}\) Three ideal types of bureaucracy can be distinguished in the literature: (i) “patrimonial bureaucracy” and (ii) “legal-rational bureaucracy”, both formulated by Weber (1978), and (iii) “rational-productive bureaucracy” defined by Ilchman (1969). The basic characteristics of Weberian ideal type of patrimonial bureaucracy are: (i) conflicting series of tasks and powers; (ii) absence of clear rules on who shall decide a matter or deal with appeals; (iii) appointments and promotions based on patronage and loyalty and randomness in the terms of office; and (iv) lack of technical training as a regular requirement. The corresponding characteristics of Weberian ideal type of legal-rational bureaucracy are: (i) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules; (ii) a rationally established hierarchy and functionally specialised structure; (iii) a regular system of appointment, and promotion made with a view to merit; and (iv) technical training as a regular requirement (Weber, 1978: Vol. 1, 212-241). Thus, patrimonial bureaucracy as a personal instrument of the monarch is contested by legal-rational bureaucracy filled with qualified and disciplined staff who can make decisions in an impersonal and disinterested way. According to Ilchman, the common bond that joints rational-productive bureaucrats derives from largely from their legitimising source in knowledge, their loyalty to substantive programmes, and their value commitment to productivity. Rational-productive bureaucracy provides specialised input to public policy-making and effectively implements the policies determined by politicians (1969: 474-479). These ideal types of bureaucracy have had a better fit with the general lines of political evolution in the Anglo-American polities than elsewhere. The transformation of patrimonial bureaucracy into legal-rational bureaucracy took place following the substitution of the supremacy of parliament for those of the monarch and his bureaucracy. In the wake of this evolution, bureaucrats began to owe obedience to an legal impersonal order established by parliament (Diamant, 1962: 88). Later, rational-productive bureaucracy emerged as a result of the increased complexity of socio-economic issues and the advanced level of knowledge needed to tackle those issues. Whereas politics is the source of law for the legal-rational bureaucrat, the rational-productive bureaucrat claims expertise often superior to that of the politician. Consequently, the rational-productive bureaucrat may engage in politically unresponsive behaviour (Ilchman, 1969: 476-478). This tendency, however, does not lead bureaucrats in the Anglo-American settings to have a condescending attitude toward politicians. Although they insist that they are technically well equipped to make the most rational decisions, they grant that politicians have the last word. In contrast, continental European countries have traditionally had more autonomous bureaucratic elites who think that they should have the last word on these matters in the name of public interest (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 143-144). In non-Western
While there are some similarities of structure and behaviour pattern, the differences are far more glaring (Silberman, 1993: ix) since these countries have different starting points, routes and speeds of modernisation (Eisenstadt, 1966: 46ff). This becomes particularly apparent when one studies the different patterns of modernisation both in the West and developing countries (Heper, 1971: 436). The significant difference between the ecology of the bureaucracies in the West and that of the bureaucracies in developing countries actually indicates the incompatibility of the Western models, especially offered by comparative public administration, for developing countries (Heper, 1971: 422-423).

On the one hand, the bureaucracies of developed Western countries are most closely approximated the Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy in terms of both the structural prerequisites and the behavioural tendencies (Heady, 1966: 38-39). Some of them even approximated the rational-productive bureaucracy type of Ilchman (1969) to some extent in the last couple of decades. Bureaucracies in the West assumed its general characteristics during the transition from feudalism to the modern industrialised state. During the rise of the nation state, the monarchical policy of unification and centralisation and its corollary – mercantilism – necessitated the emergence and the systematic use of modern bureaucracy by the monarchic-dynastic states (see Barker, 1944: 3). With the advent constitutionalism in the wake of the middle classes, including the bourgeoisie, the bureaucracies lost their autonomies in the polity and were induced to adopt what we might call a more technical concept of rationality in their operations. This development exposed a crucial relationship between the middle class supremacy in politics and the nature of bureaucratic performance. In other words, the middle class, in particular the bourgeoisie, desired an efficient and effective state that would facilitate and protect the development of commerce, and later, of industry (see Lipset, 1952: 222; and Moore, 1967). Thus, the Western bureaucratic orientation has gone through a transformation from the modernising bureaucracies, as in the Ottoman-Turkish case, there has been no smooth transition from one ideal type to another respectively at all.

58 Although the Western bureaucracies are most closely approximated the Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy model in terms of its structural features, the behavioural attitudes of Western bureaucrats are still in question. In addition to the criticisms of the Public Choice School on the bureaucratic behaviour (i.e. self-interest maximisation and empire building) as will be explained below, the actual influence of bureaucrats on public decision-making process in the Western democracies is well above the level Weber assumed in the ideal-type of legal-rational bureaucracy. For the latter issue, for example, see Dogan (1975); Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981); Suleiman (1984a); Peters (1987); and Page (1992).
version of bureaucratic ethos toward the technocratic version of the bureaucratic ethos; and from substantive rationality toward instrumental rationality. As the class interests of the bureaucratic elite largely coincides with those of its political master representing the leading socio-economic class, the development in question has not led to an alienative political involvement on the part of bureaucrats but to a high and constructive or, at least, a neutral political involvement (see Smith, 1974). Nevertheless, there are dissimilarities even among the bureaucracies of developed Western countries (e.g. “Bonapartist”, “Prussian”, and “Anglo-Saxon” bureaucratic traditions) (Suleiman, 1984b: 5), stemmed from differences in the degree of stateness in different polities. In the “classic” administrative systems of continental European countries of France and Germany, where the state and society were historically almost two separate entities and the degree of stateness is high, the modernising version of the bureaucratic ethos had persisted even until present and the bureaucrats continued to have a distinct political culture under the conditions of discontinuity in politics in contrast to the administrative systems in the “civic culture” countries of the U.K. and the U.S., where the state and society intertwined and the degree of stateness is low, that have had relatively stable political development (see Heady, 1966: 41-57).

On the other, bureaucracies of developing countries are closely associated with the patrimonial bureaucracy type (see Heady, 1966; and Silberman, 1993). In developing countries, both in the historical bureaucratic empires and in the colonial settings, one could not witness an industrialisation process led by the middle classes. In the historical bureaucratic empires, as in the Ottoman Empire where the degree of stateness is high, the ruler and his entourage, a group world apart from the rest of society usually overtaxed the resources of the society for their non-economic pursuits. Although the bureaucracies in these empires were initially subjugated to the ruler, they gradually gained autonomy with political and administrative dimensions in the polity (i.e. bureaucratic ruling tradition). As such, they either assumed a role of guardianship or developed orientations of self-aggrandisement, and they developed into barriers on the road to modernisation in its natural conduit and opted for a selective modernisation (Eisenstadt, 1963a, 1963b, and 1966; Heper, 1974a). In the formerly colonial countries, with their chaotic and praetorian systems low in stateness, bureaucracies developed out of a tradition of service to the
colonial governments. After the advent of independence in these countries, a power vacuum has emerged, and was effectively filled by the bureaucracy (Almond and Coleman, 1960). Thus, they too were involved in the political process (Eisenstadt, 1963b: 113).\textsuperscript{59} In both types of settings, the transformation of these bureaucracies into a model approximating the Weberian characteristics failed or was essentially delayed.\textsuperscript{60} In other words, substantive rationality has not been replaced by instrumental rationality and the transformation of the status elite into functional elite\textsuperscript{61} has been delayed since the weaknesses of the middle classes, including bourgeoisie, in these countries. The modernising version of the bureaucratic ethos has been more apparent in developing countries that have never been under colonial rule. The bureaucratic elite with historical bureaucratic ruling code usually dominated the political scene until the end of the Second World War. With the impact of socio-economic development, democratic elections brought new political elites into office and they were mainly interested in rendering the bureaucracy politically less influential (Eisenstadt, 1963b: 108-109). In the face of the increasing challenge of the new political elite, the bureaucrats' political involvement was alienative leading to an antagonistic political tendency (see Smith, 1974). In these countries, as in Turkey, such bureaucratic behaviour pattern has still been influential to some extent in the relations between the political and bureaucratic elites (see Heper, 1977b). Therefore, as Heper strongly emphasised, it is not likely that the bureaucratic experiences of one set of countries, especially those of Western countries, will be repeated elsewhere (1971: 422-431 and 1977b: 66-67). It is important to discuss the context of bureaucracy for each national setting (Steel, Davenport and Warner, 1993: 414-415). Since the bureaucratic models of the West, which the developing countries have been aspiring to adopt, has developed as a response for a particular mode of socio-economic transformation, these models and remedies developed to modify these models in the face o

\textsuperscript{59} For the pivotal role of bureaucrats in public policy-making process in developing countries, see Heper, Kim and Pai (1980); and Steel, Davenport and Warner (1993). Not only civil bureaucrats but also military bureaucrats often play an important role, sometimes even a more important role than civil bureaucrats, in public policy-making process in developing countries (see Riggs, 1980: 311).

\textsuperscript{60} Many scholars view public bureaucracy in developing countries as generally constituting a serious impediment to development. It has been characterised as being "elitist, irresponsible, heavy, decadent, inefficient and expensive, and corrupt" (see Tummala, 1982).

\textsuperscript{61} A status elite which occupies the upper level of the social strata plays a dominant role in public policy-making process rather than in implementing policy decisions whereas a functional elite which occupies a more modest place in the social strata plays an active role in implementing, with technical
new circumstances should be critically examined by politicians, bureaucrats and academicians of developing countries if the adaptation of them to their own countries is seriously thinking.

We believe that neither political factors such as "government regime type" (e.g. monarchy/constitutional monarchy/republic or assembly government/presidential/semi-presidential/parliamentary), "political regime type" (e.g. democratic-pluralist/bureaucratic-elitist or democratic/authoritarian/totalitarian), "party system type" (e.g. single-party/multi-party or two-party/multi-party), and "political culture" nor the differences in the socio-cultural structure (e.g. Western/non-Western) and in the level of economic development (e.g. developed/developing) is adequate on its own to understand differences among national bureaucracies and changes occur in a national bureaucracy in time. These factors altogether can help to explain such differences and changes to some extent if they are taken into the analysis in a historical perspective. However, even this attempt is not enough to explain all these differences and changes. Therefore, not only these factors but also the place and role of the state (i.e. the state tradition) and the relationship between the state, the constitutive system and the bureaucracy (i.e. model of bureaucracy) should be taken into account in historical and comparative perspective in order to grasp the true nature of the political economy of the Turkish bureaucracy.

1) The State, the Constitutive System, and the Bureaucracy: A Historical and Comparative Model

The relationship between the state, the constitutive system, the bureaucracy, and the civil society can be studied from a historical and comparative perspective by a model put forwarded by Heper. Although this model is fundamentally based on Heper (1985b), it has been developed and slightly modified by ourselves through Heper's related views on the same subject expressed in his other recent works (see Heper, 1987b and Heper and Sancar, 1998). This model is based upon this central assumption:

expertise, policy decisions taken by politicians representing dominant socio-economic groups in society (see Heper, 1975: 123; see also Marx, 1963).
«[T]here is a critical relationship between the nature of consensus present in a given polity and legitimising values of that polity. At a given time and place, there is, in turn, a significant relationship between those values and the nature of the polity, i.e., either there is or is not a state dominant vis-à-vis civil society and the constitutive system. The central argument is that where there is such a state, the basic characteristics of bureaucracy can be understood only in terms of the three-way interaction between the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy» (Heper, 1985b: 95).

This model with its historical and comparative perspective has a capacity to indicate the relationship between the degree of stateness and the type of polity and the correspondence between the types of polities and bureaucracies. It is also able to show that the interactions among the state, the constitutive system, the bureaucracy, and the civil society may bring about new political-societal configurations in different places and times.

Before explaining some likely set of relationships based upon the model, some vital concepts used by Heper (1985b: 86-87, 96) such as “state”, “constitutive system” and “civil society” should be clarified and necessary modifications should be made. In this model, in contrast to Strayer’s argument (1970: 10), formalisation (i.e. development of impersonal institutions) is not taken as a necessary conditions for the presence of a state since the locus of the state, where there is a state dominant vis-à-vis civil society and the constitutive system, varies. Heper argues that the state may be structured in the person of the ruler as well as in a parliament, bureaucracy or in a political party. For the purpose of this model, a state exists if the basic decisions in the polity are taken independently of civil society. In other words, in different polities, or in the same polity in different historical periods, there will exist a greater or lesser degree of “stateness”, depending upon the extent to which the fundamental goals for society are designated and safeguarded by the state, independent of civil society and sometimes of even the constitutive system. In order to examine both historical and present forms, Heper uses the constitutive system to intent to mean the “political system” minus the ruler and bureaucracy. Parlement and Stande are, for example, taken as historical instances of the constitutive system. Since an electoral system, a party system, and even an elected assembly did not exist in most historical
instances, Riggs' broader definition for modern political systems (1969: 17) is not regarded suitable by Heper for all times. In this thesis, however, political power (i.e. the ruler as a person or a modern government as a political institution) is included in the constitutive system in addition to government regime, political regime, party system, and electoral system. This modification helps to examine the crucial relationship between political power and bureaucracy in a much clear way in modern Turkish political history. Heper also does not use the term civil society exclusively as a "a sphere of universal egoism" in Hegelian sense (see Avineri, 1972: 142), rather he adopts a more neutral conception (1985b: 86-87, 96).

In this model, Heper assumes that the legitimising values are closely related to the nature of political-societal consensus, the presence or absence of which is historically determined by antecedent endogenous and exogenous variables. By "endogenous variables", he basically refers to the origins of the respective countries. Concerning these origins, it is possible to distinguish between "centralised feudalism", "decentralised feudalism", and "patrimonialism/personal rule". While Medieval England provides a good example of centralised feudalism (Bendix, 1978), the best example for decentralised feudalism is France in the middle and new ages (Finer, 1975). The Ottoman Empire is seen as a good case for patrimonialism, at least, for certain periods (Mardin, 1969; Inalcik, 1973; Shaw, 1976; Heper, 1980), with some features such as traditional nature of authority of the sultan and his bureaucracy rather than legal-rational authority, centre-periphery contradictions, and bureaucracy acting as personal instruments of the monarch rather than based on meritocracy (Heper, 1977a). Whereas in both centralised and decentralised feudalism, central authority is effectively checked by countervailing forces, in patrimonialism the periphery is almost totally subdued by the centre. Within this context, while in feudal-imperial regimes of the continental Europe the normative system of the centre including that of the bureaucracy was to some extent interpenetrated by aristocratic and middle class values (Armstrong, 1973: 93-103; Eisenstadt, 1987: 175-176, 182), in imperial regime of the Ottoman polity the centre was far more autonomous than its European counterparts (Mardin, 1969; Heper, 1980). Heper further argues in his paper dated (1991a: 677) that the imperial regime of the Ottoman Empire was even a more "bureaucratic-centralist" rather than a traditional patrimonial polity, if the latter is defined,
after Eisenstadt (1987: 179), as a polity where the centre may turn out to be more grandiose than the periphery, but the centre is nevertheless structured according to principles that are not greatly different from those prevalent in the periphery; and if the greater autonomy of the Ottoman bureaucratic centre from the periphery (Mardin, 1969; Heper, 1980) and the exclusive devotion of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite to the secular interests of the state (İnalçık; 1964: 55) are taken into consideration. The particular class structure in the Ottoman society was also determined in accordance with its conformity to a “bureaucratic empire” rather than to a “European-style feudal system” (see Huntington, 1968: Chp. 3).

If the types of relationships suggested by Heper may be expected between the antecedent “endogenous variables” (i.e. centralised feudalism, decentralised feudalism, and patrimonialism/personal rule), antecedent “exogenous variables” (i.e. existence of serious external threat as in the case of the continental European countries and the Ottoman Empire, and absence of serious external threat as in the case of England) and the degree and nature of consensus (i.e. lack of consensus, imposed-static-fundamentals either challenged or not challenged, or consensus as progressive resolution of conflicts), then what are the likely relationships between the nature of consensus and the legitimising values of the polity?

Concerning the central norms of the polity, Heper’s model contains a continuum for polity types proposed by Berki (1979): “extreme transcendentalism”, “moderate transcendentalism”, “moderate instrumentalism”, and “extreme instrumentalism”.62 Whereas transcendentalism is based on the belief that man primarily belongs to a moral community, instrumentalism embodies the belief that man primarily belongs to an interest community. Whereas in a “transcendental polity” one finds a state dominant vis-à-vis civil society and the constitutive system (i.e. a polity “high in stateness” or a “strong state”),63

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63 The term “strong state” is used here not in the sense of the state having the ability to successfully penetrate society and extract resources from it but as a state which is able to frustrate the development of civil society into an entity with political efficacy, by placing too much emphasis on
in an “instrumental polity” the reverse situation (i.e. a polity “low in stateness” or an “absence of state” or a really “weak state”) is seen. Under their extreme forms, either the state or the civil society is virtually smothered (Heper, 1985b: 101).

The extreme form of transcendentalism may be distinguished from moderate transcendentalism by the fact that, in the former, rulers are under almost no constraints since they are the source of state norms (i.e. absolute despotism) (D’Entréves, 1967: 184-186). When, however, a consensus is imposed upon a society in the form of static norms, we move on to moderate transcendentalism. Here the state may still be structured in the person of the ruler, but the ruler no longer rules arbitrarily (i.e. enlightened despotism) (Lefebre, 1965: 52). A transition from the extreme form to the moderate form, therefore, entails a movement from force to a system based in justice, justification and values. The state that is now a power authorised to exact obedience in order to attain certain definite ends (D’Entréves, 1967: 47, 157). In transcendental polity, the determination of those ends is made independently of the political elite and civil society. Even if the sovereignty may legally belong to people in this polity where the degree of stateness is high and the people are assumed to exercise that sovereignty through their representatives, sovereignty may be exercised by the state elite, including the bureaucratic elite (Heper, 1985b: 102 and 1987c: 189).\(^64\)

In instrumental polity where the degree of stateness is low, in contrast, sole emphasis on rule for the people is rejected. In instrumentalism, therefore, goals for society are set by the political elite in close interaction with the civil society. In moderate instrumentalism, however, a measure of inequality within civil society is both acceptable and taken for granted. It is assumed that consensus as progressive resolution of conflicts can only emerge in an atmosphere of civility, or restraint. The “deferential democracies” of the English-speaking countries are based on the plea for a fair balance between right, duty, and office. Only in such polities is there a room for dynamic consensus through politics to be used as a method in the progressive resolution of conflicts. In extreme instrumentalism,

\(^64\) The sovereignty of the state refers to its independence in formulating goals for society; its autonomy has to do with its independence in working out its internal organisation (see Nettl, 1968).
inequality even within the civil society is rejected. This is a "levelling democracy" (D'Entreves, 1967: 217) that is based on continuing, active and effective consent of the governed (Manicas, 1974: 166). The _sans-culotte_ republicanism of Babeuf in France is the best example of a polity based upon extreme instrumentalism. Many developing countries today, with their chaotic and praetorian systems, also show characteristics of extreme instrumentalism. Heper argues that there seems to be a relationship between lack of a consensus and/or the successful rejection of (static) legitimising values, on the one hand, and extreme instrumentalism, on the other (1985b: 103).

a) The interrelationship in a transcendental polity among the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy

By considering the extreme and moderate forms of transcendentalism, we can distinguish four different types of interrelationship in a transcendental polity among the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy as follows:

i) Personal civil servant bureaucracy of the ruler: In extreme transcendentalism, there are no fixed state norms and personal rule is supreme. The civil servants act as personal instruments of the monarch. Government and administration in the less institutionalised absolutist states of the Continental Europe were in the hands of a centralised bureaucracy that was entirely authoritarian in structure and loyal to the monarch in behaviour. Thus, the most desirable quality on the part of a civil servant is "loyalty" to the person of the ruler rather than his qualifications. Heper argues that with this trait, the bureaucracy in an extremely transcendental polity may come close to a mixture of the characteristics of Weberian traditional and charismatic authority models (1985b: 103-104).65

The state and bureaucracy tradition so established left its indelible mark on the later historical periods. In modern times and settings, transcendental polity in extreme form was revived time to time (e.g. The Nazi regime in Germany; the Stalinist period in the Soviet Union) (Heper, 1987c: 184). A move toward personal rule does not, of course, lead

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65 For Weberian traditional, charismatic and legal authority models, see Weber (1947).
to a complete revamping of existing institutional patterns. Nevertheless, charismatic leaders often find those existing settings rather constrictive (Heper, 1985b: 104; see also Heper, 1984a)

ii) Machine model bureaucracy: In moderate transcendentalism, personal rule is not supreme. The state is institutionalised around definite norms, and its locus, may, of course, vary. The state may be structured around the person of the ruler but even the ruler is the first servant of the impersonal state. Under such circumstances, the bureaucracy is rendered into a "machine". This happened in a number of continental European countries such as Prussia as when their absolutist rulers were replaced by enlightened rulers (Heper, 1985b: 104). During the Atatürk period (1919-1938) and the latest Militray Regime (1980-1983), some deliberate steps were taken to establish a machine model of bureaucracy in Turkey (Heper, 1984a: 91, 1987b: 142 and 1991a: 681).

Machine bureaucracy can be distinguished from Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy since the former emphasises "legality" rather than "rationality". In the machine model of bureaucracy, bureaucrats have little discretion; they are supposed to implement the orders what are given from above. The ruler himself is not a part of the machinery (Heper, 1985b: 96, 104). In the early decades of nineteenth-century Prussia, for example, bureaucrats were not allowed to exercise personal judgement or initiative, but were kept under tight, multiple, and continuously documented control by both peers and superiors, with lines of information and initiative converging on the king himself (Skocpol, 1979: 107).

iii) Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy: In a moderately transcendental polity, it is also possible for the state to be structured in the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy as the locus of the state differs from Weberian legal-rational model in that here "substantive" rather than "instrumental" rationality66 is emphasised. Bureaucracy is primarily assumed as a political institution with substantive rationality rather than a purely administrative body with instrumental rationality and technical expertise. The separation of administration from politics, which is an important issue in Anglo-American context

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66 These concepts were used, like Heper did in his various writings, as in Bendix (1960).
where the degree of stateness is low, is actually a misnomer in politeis high in stateness. In such a polity, there is a fusion of administration and politics. The bureaucratic elite considers itself as the political elite as well since the bureaucrats think they should have the last word on policy-making as well as policy-implementation. The “French Bonapartist bureaucracy” and the “Prussian Rechtsstaat bureaucracy” in the nineteenth century are best historical examples of this from (Heper, 1985b: 104-105 and 1987c: 184, 188).

In nineteenth century France, the *Bonapartist* bureaucrats who were guided by the ideology of the general interest saw themselves as the powerful agents of a neutral state and set apart from civil society. Although they continued to be recruited from the privileged social classes, they acted not in terms of their class origins, or their political opinions, but in terms of the role that they performed in the institutions of state (Birnbaum, 1981: 69-70 and 1987). In other words, they acted unresponsively to disparate socio-economic interests and their political representatives. Marx believed that political power in France was in the hands of the bureaucratic state and *Bonapartism* was the central model for his analysis of the relationship between the state and classes in France (see Beetham, 1987: 76, 79, 82).

In the same period, when the Prussian state was restructured in the bureaucracy rather than in the person of the ruler, the machine model was replaced by the concept of *Rechtsstaat*, which served as a legitimisation of official autonomy. “Cameralism” was the source of the state norms that were to guide political life. The servants of the Crown gradually transformed themselves into servants of the state (i.e. *Staadiener*). As servants of the state rather than of the ruler, bureaucrats were to be accountable to no one as long as they acted within their legal spheres. The rules that governed their behaviour were formulated primarily by the bureaucratic elite itself, and not by the elected representatives of social groups (Armstrong, 1973: 162-164; Dyson, 1977: 63ff). The bureaucratic ethic came to embody the idea of the political neutrality of the state, as represented by its servants, its superiority to social interests and organisations representing them, and the value of obedience and authority as opposed to debate and partisan activity (Southern, 1979: 110, 140). The state could act as the independent arbiter of the public interest. The
civil servants were not simply public employees but one expression of the authority of the state. Their patterns of behaviour were further strengthened by a special Beamtenrecht (i.e. the bureaucratic mirror image of the Rechtsstaat) (Smith, 1979: 68, 186).

The Ottoman-Turkish case, which was heavily influenced by the French and Prussian-German cases in the nineteenth century (Chambers, 1964: 301-302), is also the best example for non-European strong states (Kazancigil, 1981; Heper, 1985a). As will be explained in detail in the following Chapter, the state has been much stronger in the Ottoman-Turkish polity as compared to French and Prussian-German polities. The distance between the state and civil society has even been more pronounced in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity has occupied a much more dominant place vis-à-vis civil society. The bureaucratic ruling tradition has grown out of the Ottoman state and bureaucracy tradition and further crystallised with the effect of the étatist (statist) and centralist Kemalist reforms during the Republican period. As reflected in “Cameralism” in Prussia and in “reason of state” in France, “Kemalism” has long constituted the Turkish version of the state norms behind a moderately transcendental polity and Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy. This Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy has traditionally attributed to itself a greater degree of substantive rationality and considered itself as the guardians of the state. During the period of multi-party politics, the political elite, in turn, has attempted to turn this bureaucracy into a party-book one. The negative effects of this strained relationship in terms of the consolidation of democracy in Turkey have still felt since the patterns of political and bureaucratic culture in a society do not change easily (Heper, 1985a and 1992a).

The contemporary Turkish case, which is now a moderate form of Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy, is surely not an isolated one. Another closer example is the French bureaucracy, which Crozier characterised as the “bureaucratic phenomenon” (1964: 308). Both the French and Turkish bureaucracies have long safeguarded their autonomies from political power through statutory rights provided in the positive law so that they could adopt substantive rationality (Heper, 1987c: 184).
iv) **Party-book bureaucracy:** In a moderately transcendental polity, the locus of state may be a political party rather than a single ruler or the bureaucracy itself. A good example is the *Parteienstaat* in post-1949 Federal Republic of Germany (Heper, 1985b: 105-106). In Turkey, too, there was attempts to structure the state in the political party in power in the second half of the 1980s (Heper, 1991c: Preface).

Political parties in Germany have been regarded as *Staatsorgane* (i.e. organs of the state) since 1949. The parties have constitutional functions of discharge. They have a special relationship to the state. They are no longer solely concerned with representation. They have a strong moral function rather than simply pursuing an interest-based politics (Dyson, 1977: 10; Smith, 1979: 67). As compared to the traditional bureaucrat (i.e. *Beamter*), a new type of German official has emerged. The bureaucrats have lost some of their earlier prestige due to developments toward a polity low in stateness. Putnam indicates that this new type of official is more “politically conscious” (i.e. more responsive to the constitutive system) than the traditional one (1973: 271). There is not the clear conception of the role on the part of German politicians and bureaucrats that one finds among, for example, the British. Therefore, the relationship between the constitutive system and the bureaucracy in Germany is far different from that in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Political and administrative styles are intertwined (Heper, 1985b: 106). For example, one comes across increased party use of such political officials to exert political direction (Dyson, 1977: 28-29). This group resembles, to some extent, *le cabinet de M. le Ministre* in France (Suleiman, 1974: 181ff) and, to lesser extent, political executives in the U.S (Heclo; 1977: 110). During the period of multi-party politics in Turkey, the political elites have continuously tried to establish a party-book bureaucracy replacing Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy (see Heper, 1985a: Chp. 4 and 5).

b) **The interrelationship in an instrumental polity among the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy**

Just like we did for the transcendental polity, by considering the extreme and moderate forms of instrumentalism, we can distinguish three different types of interrelationship in a instrumental polity among the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy as follows:
i) **Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy:** As we move from a transcendentalist polity to a moderately instrumentalist polity, the type of relationship becomes more familiar, as happened in Western democracies, especially in Anglo-American countries with “civic culture”. Since there is no sovereign state \textit{vis-à-vis} the constitutive system and civil society, we can see the use of consensus in the resolution of conflicts about fundamental claims. A mutually acceptable level of inequality within civil society is a fact of life. As Heper says, the characteristics of the bureaucracy in moderately instrumental politics become meaningful when seen within this framework (1985b: 107). In the U.K., for example, since the ministers have traditionally almost full trust to civil servants (Rose, 1981b: 48), they are agree not to meddle in the internal affairs of bureaucracy (Johnson, 1977: 95-96). This absence of meddling in bureaucratic affairs also comes about because British civil servants do not have a hostile view of party politics. They adhere to the position that their roles must be politically neutral. This non-partisan attitude is to be expected because they have no tradition of the German \textit{Beamten} or the French \textit{fonction publique}. Since they do not substitute for a paralysed party or electoral system, British civil servants do not have an independent doctrine of administration (Balogh, 1968: 24ff; Christoph, 1975: 30; Johnson, 1977: 94).

Heper aptly argues that a moderately instrumental polity provides a favourable environment for instrumental rather than substantive rationality. Bureaucrats regard themselves as responsible primarily for suggesting and implementing rather than making policies. The dynamic consensus that exists in society makes possible a harmonious relationship between the bureaucracy and constitutive system. Furthermore, the bureaucracy does not attempt to substitute for the constitutive system. In return, the functional expertise of the bureaucracy is respected because a moderate degree of inequality in society is taken for granted (1985b: 107).

ii) **Rational-productive bureaucracy:** In a moderately instrumentalist polity, absolute obedience to impersonal rules and procedures, objective assessment of merit, and political responsiveness are not sufficient characteristics any more for the successful operation of public service. An advanced level of technical expertise is needed in the face
of the increased complexity of socio-economic issues in the contemporary Western societies. As a result, the Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy model is criticised on both theoretical and practical grounds and rational-productive bureaucracy model emerged.

As mentioned above, in rational-productive bureaucracy model, bureaucrats derive their legitimacy from their technical knowledge, their loyalty to substantive programmes, and their value commitment to productivity. Politics-oriented instrumental rationality in the legal-rational bureaucracy model is replaced by programme-oriented substantive rationality in the rational-productive bureaucracy model. As a consequence of these shift, bureaucrats may engage in “politically unresponsive behaviour” or the “politics of anti-politics” (Ilchman, 1969: 476-478). Since this tendency happened in moderately instrumentalist and contemporary Western polities, it did not lead bureaucrats to have a condescending attitude toward politicians as happened in moderately transcendental polities. Although they insist that they are technically well equipped to make the most rational decisions, they grant that politicians have the last word, in particular, in the Anglo-American countries with civic culture. Although continental European bureaucracies, in particular French and German bureaucracies, have traditionally had more autonomous and bureaucrats think that they should have the last word on these matters in the name of public interest, bureaucrats in these countries have become more politically responsive during the twentieth century (Dyson, 1977: 57-58; Suleiman, 1974: 181ff). As a result of the mix effect of traditional autonomy and recent political responsiveness, bureaucrats in contemporary France and Germany, too, have increasingly evinced characteristics of “responsive competence” rather than “neutral competence”.

As Heper and Sancar indicate, the phenomenon of responsive competence has been a consequence of a successful “marriage” between two bureaucratic traditions - legal-rationality and rational productivity – that one come across in the Anglo-American and recently in the continental European settings (1998: 145). This hybrid form, emphasising both political responsiveness and technical expertise, is, in fact, closer to the reality in many contemporary Western countries than pure forms of legal-rationality and rational-productivity. Heper and Sancar emphasise, however, that the legal-rational bureaucratic
tradition, emphasising impersonal order, merit, and political responsiveness, constitutes a critical prerequisite for the development and institutionalisation of rational-productive bureaucracy that does not evince characteristics of either patrimonialism or politically unresponsive behaviour. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship between patrimonialism on the one hand and legal-rationality and rational productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of relationship between legal-rationality and rational productivity. Most of the contemporary Western bureaucracies first approximated the legal-rational bureaucracy model and only then took on the characteristics of the rational-productive bureaucracy model (1998: 145, 159, 160) or, at least, the hybrid form (i.e. responsive and competent bureaucracy). Since the legal-rational tradition is not well developed in many developing countries (both in the historical bureaucratic empires and in the colonial settings), one cannot expect a proper rational-productive bureaucracy or even a hybrid form mentioned above.

iii) Spoils system bureaucracy: In an extremely instrumental polity, as is mentioned before, even a moderate degree of inequality is rejected and a levelling of values is sought. The constitutive system places sole emphasis on responsiveness to the public at the expense of responsibility; and the bureaucracy’s claim to functional expertise is not accepted. The spoils system, rather than the merit system, is in operation. The end result is an amateur and corrupt bureaucracy. In this model of bureaucracy, bureaucrats would be preoccupied basically with promoting their own particularistic interests (Heper, 1985b: 108 and 1987c: 185). Historically, the U.S. during the period of Jacksonian democracy came fairly close to being such a polity where the bureaucratisation of government was successfully rejected, although the merit principle in that case was not entirely sacrificed (Mosher, 1968: 61-63). Apart from many underdeveloped civil service systems of the Third World, more recent and even better example was the state of affairs in the Turkish polity in the second half of the 1970s (Heper, 1979-1980: 105-106).

In brief, Heper has developed a model that aimed to include the phenomenon of the state in historical and comparative analyses of bureaucracy. Over different historical periods, various relationships occur through interaction of the state, the constitutive

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67 For the details of concepts of “responsive competence” and “neutral competence”, see Aberbach
system, and the bureaucracy. The consensus in society may increase or decrease; the nature of consensus itself may be transformed, and then the polity become more or less transcendental, or more or less instrumental, or it may even jump over the fence from instrumentalism to transcendentalism, or vice versa. Thus, the relationship between the degree of stateness and the type of polity and the correspondence between the types of polities and bureaucracies can be traced in this model.

2) Similarities and Differences in the Traditions of the State and Bureaucracy in the Light of Historical-Comparative Model

As is mentioned in the previous Chapter, bureaucratic behaviour (i.e. the positions of bureaucrats in terms of seeking different types of interest - public interest, class or group interest, or individual self-interest) can be analysed with the help of the modern state and bureaucracy theories, based on a rather ideological perspective such as pluralism, Marxism, elitism, and the New Right. As a complementary to this perspective, Heper’s model with its historical and comparative perspective is also able to put a light on the true nature and evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic culture. It can give significant clues about the general attitude and behaviour patterns of the Turkish bureaucrats toward political power and the civil society.

There are some significant differences as well as some similarities in politician-bureaucrat relationships and/or in bureaucratic behaviour in terms of self interest-seeking from one country to another at a given time or in different periods in one country. The British civil service, for example, is often seen one of the best examples of Weberian legal-rational bureaucracy model, which has instrumental rather than substantive rationality, in a polity low in stateness. For a British civil servant to claim too much authority in the interpretation of substantive interests is regarded dangerous. Although if a British bureaucrat is honest and conscientious, he/she can add a dimension to this process which the politician may miss (Johnson, 1977: 94-97; 105). On the one hand, as Heper points out, it is hard to attribute to the civil service in the U.K. the concept of public interest inherent in the German Beamtenitum or the French fonction publique which have basically

substantive rationality in interpreting the public interest (1985b: 90). On the other hand, it is argued that self-interest-seeking bureaucrat typology developed by public choice scholars, basically based on their American experience, is not a good explanatory framework for the general attitudes of British bureaucrats (see Houghton, 1973; Kogan, 1973; Margolis, 1975; and Campbell and Naulls, 1991).

On the other hand, historically, both France and Germany are the best examples of strong state and bureaucracy in the continental Europe (Dyson, 1980; Keane, 1988). The Ottoman-Turkish case, which was heavily influenced by the French and Prussian-German cases in the nineteenth century (Chambers, 1964: 301-302), is also the best example for non-European strong states (Kazancigil, 1981; Heper, 1985a). The Prussian-German state developed, at least, facing major contenders from civil society. It was confronted by a largely self-governing landed aristocracy (i.e. the Junkers) with political, judicial, and territorial rights (Rosenberg, 1958: Chp.1; Taylor, 1945: 21). In the French case, the state had greater autonomy from civil society. But, even in that polity, the central authority did not come to have virtually unlimited powers. In France, from the nineteenth century onward, there was a constant tug-of-war between the local grandees and the king (Finer, 1975: 126). In late eighteenth century France, the local parlements effectively challenged the taxing powers of the kinds (Blanning, 1987: 29; Myers, 1975: 136-141). Within this context, as Heper points out, the French Bonapartist bureaucracy, based upon Jacobinism, can be distinguished from the Prussian-German Rechtsstaat bureaucracy. The former, rising on the assets of the sans-culotte democracy, could act more arbitrarily than the Prussian Rechtsstaat bureaucracy could, which was established in a polity that had a stronger tradition of Standestaat (1985b: 105).

In contemporary Germany, the chief legacy of the state is the sense that both political and administrative actors have a moral function, and must seek to embody the common welfare and a concern for the public interest in their widest sense. A further legacy is a continuing respect for objective and rational assessment as the basis for the authoritative determination of the public interest. Even under the post-1949 Parteienstaat, where the bureaucracy is largely subordinated to the constitutive system, the German bureaucrat continues to be a political decision-maker who is often empowered with considerable
discretion (Dyson, 1977: 28, 64). This legacy has lent a particular twist to the meaning of expertise, one, which granted the right to act autonomously (Jacob, 1963: 202).

The situation is not essentially different in contemporary France, which has its own heritage in the Bonapartist conception of society based on order and hierarchy, and devoid of squabbles that threatened anarchy (Suleiman, 1978: 20). In post-1958 France, where, like the case of Germany, there have been serious efforts to introduce a party-book bureaucracy, lack of trust and confidence between civil servants and ministers continues; civil servants tend to consider the state and the constitutive system or politics and administration as distinct domains. They conceive of themselves as guardians of the general interest and of politicians as defenders of segmental interests; and they categorise arguments as "political" and "technical". The demand of the grand corps for administrative authority is more than a claim for a secure career. It is a demand for an autonomous function that would not be liable to the hazards and turbulence of politics (Suleiman, 1974: 177, 222-223, 235-307).

As a non-Western case, the situation of the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy is more delicate on this issue. As will be explained in detail in the following Chapter, the Ottoman-Turkish polity has constituted a polar case among the polities with a strong state. As compared to France and Germany, the state has been much stronger in Turkey. Although the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy seem to have greater affinity to the French case rather than the German case, the distance between the state and civil society has even been more pronounced in the Ottoman-Turkish context. The state in the Ottoman-Turkish polity has occupied a much more dominant place vis-à-vis civil society. The Ottoman-Turkish polity has followed a road quite different from France and Germany, because, unlike the experience of the latter, the state in Ottoman-Turkish polity has developed not alongside civil society but virtually smothering the latter. If civil society, as an entity impinging on the affairs of the state, has been a limited one in the French and German contexts, it has been virtually absent in the Ottoman-Turkish case. (Heper, 1992a). In the Ottoman Empire, the localities did not have autonomous powers. The Ottoman local notables did not develop into an aristocracy able to impinge on the affairs of the
centre as a result of the classical Ottoman land tenure system and the military and civil bureaucratic recruitment systems (see Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1980).

The bureaucratic ruling tradition has, in part, grown out of the Ottoman state and bureaucracy tradition, and has been further crystallised in the étatist (statist), centralist and secularist Kemalist reforms during the single-party years of the Republic. Thus, the state has continued to be a prominent figure during the Republican period in much different form from many developing countries. As reflected in “Cameralism” in Prussia and in “reason of state” in France, “Kemalism” constituted the Turkish version of the state norms behind a moderately transcendental polity and Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy. Its effects have felt even in the multi-party political life since the patterns of political culture in a society do not change easily. The state and political elites in the French and German polities have found it easier to iron out their differences and developed a modus vivendi among themselves as a consequence of the features noted above. In contrast, in the essentially polarised Ottoman-Turkish polity, the distrust between the state and political elites has lingered on. The state elite has never fully accepted the authority of the political elite over policy-making. As a significant part of the state elite, the Turkish bureaucrats, who are even more Bonapartist than their French counterparts, have traditionally attributed to themselves a greater degree of substantive rationality. They have considered themselves as the guardians of the state\(^6\) and have been recalcitrant toward bourgeois politics. The political elite, in turn, has attempted to turn the bureaucracy into a mere tool at its disposal (see Heper, 1976a, 1976b, 1980, 1987c, 1992a; and Heper and Sancar, 1998: 146). The relations between these two groups have passed through cycles of domination, protest, and re-domination. Consequently, the consolidation of democracy has been much more difficult in Turkey (Heper, 1992a).\(^7\)

As is seen, bureaucrats still regard themselves as the guardians of the public interest in countries have had Rechtsstaat/Bonapartist bureaucracy tradition. Since they try to achieve this aim with substantive rather than instrumental rationality, a serious problem

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\(^6\) We refer to “guardian bureaucracy” in this thesis in the sense Marx (1957: 55) used it. Marx recalls Plato’s government by guardians who personified the essence of the public interest and the approved ideology, and who were to be their devoted instruments.
comes to the agenda: "Whether or not they actually seek their self or group-interests under the veil of protecting the public interest?" In addition to self-interest maximising models of bureaucracy developed by the Public Choice School for mainly Western bureaucracies (see Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; and see also Jackson, 1982), Riggs (1963) argue that bureaucrats in the developing countries give their sole attention to their own group's interest. This orientation, in general, results in rent-seeking activities and bureaucratic corruption. The Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic elite can historically be described as a "guardian bureaucracy", as noted above. Since major goals for society are mainly determined and safeguarded independently by such bureaucrats under the shadow of higher and loftier goal of the "saving the state", seeking an answer for this question becomes important. In the following sections, this question will be kept in mind in respect to the relationships between the constitutive system (including political power), the civil society and the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polities.

B) The Relationships between the State, the Constitutive System, and the Bureaucracy in Turkey: A Historical Overview

As is said in Introduction, Turkey differs from both developed Western countries, most of which had a European-style feudal origin and developing countries, most of which had a colonial past. The Ottoman state tradition has been noted by İnalçık: «Within the Islamic community of peoples Turks have had a special state tradition ... [which] can be defined as recognition of the state's absolute right to legislate on public matters» (1980: 7). Also, concerning the phenomenon of the state in Republican Turkey, Mango observed: «Experience in statecraft, respect for the state, importance of the state in Turkish culture, have all been specific steadying factors in the history of the Turkish Republic, endowing it with a degree of political gravitas, absent from most new [Third World] countries» (Mango, 1977: 265; see also Akarlı, 1975; and Hale, 1976: 1). These features, indeed, places Turkey in the category of strong states (i.e. a polity high in stateness) (Heper, 1992a: 171). After the attainment of independence, in most of new Third World countries that had been under colonial rule, earlier experiments with democratic regimes were

69 Different degrees of stateness have significantly different consequences for the consolidation of democracy. For a detailed analysis for the Turkish case, see Heper (1992a).
replaced by authoritarian/charismatic personal rule. The political actors have been unable to transcend their particularistic orientations and develop a distinct political collective identity. Power structure is characterised by coalitions of semi-autonomous elites and social groups at the local, regional, and national levels. Politics in these countries has been, therefore, based on a system of relations linking rulers not with the “public” but only with patrons, clients, supporters, and rivals, who together constituted the “system” (Eisenstadt, 1973; 14, 49; Heeger, 1974: 8; Clapham, 1986: 43, 49, 143). A strong state tradition has been largely absent in even many “old” Third World countries such as Iran where the power structure has been historically fragmented and compartmentalised among social-economic classes, ethnic groups, and the bureaucracy; and civil societal elements (e.g. the bazaar and the mosque) have had a prominent place in the polity (Binder, 1964: 36).

The Republic of Turkey has inherited the strong state and historical bureaucratic ruling tradition of the Ottoman Empire, differed in important respects from most European polities, only partly comparable to the French and German experiences in the last two centuries. Although the founders of the Republic developed a rhetoric emphasising discontinuity with the Ottoman heritage especially in terms of secularist Republican values, Kemalist reforms were generally regarded as a new phase of modernisation efforts started in the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, the administrative mentality and practices of the Republican regime, especially during the single-party period, were shaped under the shadow of the Ottoman state and bureaucratic ruling tradition (Heper, 1985a; Erdoğan, 2001: 17-18). Therefore, an analysis of the state, economy and bureaucracy in modern Turkey cannot be attempted without reference to its unique Ottoman past (see Heper, 1987b and 1990c; and Özbudun, 1990).

1) The General Characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish State and Bureaucracy: A Sui Generis Polity

The Ottoman-Turkish polity evinces a “strong state” in a non-European context from a comparative perspective. The Ottoman Empire, the antecedent political formation of the present-day the Republic of Turkey, has been an “imperial-bureaucratic” polity (see Heper,
1991a) where centre-periphery relationships are characterised by a high level of distinctiveness and autonomy of the centre (Eisenstadt, 1963a and 1987).

The first general characteristic of the Ottoman polity is that in the first half of the sixteenth century authority came to be “depersonalised”. Initially, the strong and energetic Ottoman sultans tended toward personal rule due to the long-lasting war between the Ottoman State and the Christian Byzantine Empire and Muslim-Turkish principalities in Anatolia. Also, the existence of petty lords, local and nomadic chieftains and artisan guilds with a strong religious orientation, which were inherited from the Seljukid Empire, posed a deadly threat for the integrity of the state (Mardin, 1969: 271; Shaw, 1976: Chp. 2). The civil bureaucracy during this period of quasi-medieval order was a relatively insignificant component of the polity (İnalçık, 1964: 42). Once the central authority had been more or less intact, however, the Ottomans adopted the old Turkic idea of supreme law (yasa) that the ruler had to act with a view to equity and justice without regarding of his personal wishes (Shaw, 1976: 134). It was at this juncture that the notion of the will or command of the sultan as a secular ruler (örf-i sultani) was adopted. It means that government was to be based on measuring rods of “necessity” and “reason”, and not on the personal whims of the sultans (Mardin, 1962: 104). This led to the emergence of a “state-oriented tradition”. Called adab, it developed as a consequence of efforts to identify government with the newly adopted norms, formulated independently of civil societal elements (Findley, 1980: 9). The military and civil bureaucratic elites assimilated these ideals and values through the process of education in the state-run schools, through the processes of their recruitment and in-service training, and through the roles they filled, that is, through organisational socialisation (Findley, 1982: 158).

Second, the process of depersonalisation of authority is also closely related to the “secularisation” process in the Ottoman State. Although it was a “Muslim state”, in relative terms, the influence of the religion, at least, on matters of state was greatly constrained. The Ottoman sultans developed their powers of discretionary legislation to a

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70 The depersonalised functioning of state is likely to occur when the state has especially great power vis-à-vis civil societal elements. The notion of depersonalisation as viewed here has little to do either with its Weberian or Crozierian versions: By depersonalisation, the reference is neither to efforts for making the bureaucracy more efficient and effective nor interpersonal relations within the bureaucracy (see Heper, 1992a: footnote 2).
degree unprecedented in other Islamic states (Findley, 1982: 154). Thus, the temporal power overshadowed the divine one. The religious class (ulema) did not have a corporate identity but was a part of the state bureaucracy. The Ottoman sultans issued rules and regulations that flouted freely the Islamic precedents (İnalçık, 1968-1970: 21). Governmental initiative was exercised within the framework of such laws proclaimed by temporal powers (kanuns) based on the norm of rationality rather than religious verses (Gibb and Bowen, 1950: 197). If the state or public interest required it, the sultans could take measures that conflicted with the religious law (İnalçık, 1958: 107).

Third, in the Ottoman polity, the fundamental political cleavage until the nineteenth century was a centre-periphery cleavage. In this polity, one can easily come across a dominant centre facing a weak periphery (see Mardin, 1973; Akarlı, 1975; and Heper, 1980). The particular class structure of the Ottoman society was determined by its conformity to a bureaucratic empire rather than to a European-style feudal system. The Ottoman society was divided into two major classes. The ruling class representing the centre included those to whom the sultan had delegated executive or religious power, namely officers of the court, the army, civil servants and religious functionaries. The ruled, on the other hand, representing the periphery included all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government, such as peasants, merchants and artisans. Such division was also a cultural (i.e. a division between the high culture of the centre and lower culture of the periphery) as well as political. As İnalçık aptly points out, it was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the ruling class (1964: 44). It was the sultan’s duty to maintain this order, assisted by the members of the ruling class, by keeping everyone in his appropriate social position. Thus, the state was above and independent of the society. Political power did not derive the society, but was imposed upon it by the will of God (in conquest) from outside (see Berkes, 1964). It was this primacy of politics over society that was to affect the nature of social and political changes in the Ottoman Empire for many centuries (see Özbudun, 1976).

The “recruitment (devşirme) system” and the “land tenure (timariot) system” (Heper, 1976a: 509; Özbudun, 1990: 176-177) in the Ottoman polity reinforced the rigid
dichotomy between the ruler (the centre) and the ruled (the periphery). As Heper points out, this rigid dichotomy was basically due to the fact that the military played a crucial role in the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. There was an emphasis on almost purely political goals of regime consolidation, territorial expansion, and maintenance of a strategic position in diplomacy at the expense of an emphasis on the economic strength, expansion of polity through mercantilist policies, and advancement of social groups or the whole society (Heper, 1991a: 677). In contrast to the European experience, the types of goals pursued and success in attaining them reduced the Ottoman rulers’ interaction with the civil societal elements and helped them to maintain their autonomy from these social groups (Heper, 1991a: 678). Elsewhere war-making between roughly equal powers generally obliged rulers to grant constitutional rights to social groups whereas the Ottoman’s initial military supremacy vis-à-vis their neighbours and ample revenues that they gained through war booty strengthened their hand. In order to keep this autonomy from the civil society, they adopted the recruitment system of previous states of the Middle East and developed it (Heper, 1992a: 177). This system was based on a periodic levy on the male children of non-Muslim subjects. The Ottoman rulers forcefully recruited young men from among the non-Muslim peasantry in the conquered areas; converted them to Islam but carefully socialised them through education in the state-run schools, especially the brightest in the Palace School (Enderun), to the secular norms of state; employed them as military or civil officials, and used them to tax and control the Muslim social groups. “Janissaries” (“New Troops”/“Yeniçeriler”) and many eminent commanders and bureaucrats were the results of this process. Since they replaced the positions of the members of the old Turkish aristocracy, this aristocracy was gradually removed from its position of the ruling class. Since these recruits were reduced to the status of slaves (kapikulu) and they legally became the sultan’s property, and the sultan could take their lives and confiscate their wealth without legal process, they were in no position to challenge the sultan’s authority (see Miller, 1941; İnalçık, 1964: 42; Mardin, 1969). As İnalcık noted, those who were in the service of the sultan or who exercise authority in his name were considered a separate and distinct group above the rest of population (1971: 113). Within this socialisation process, it is not surprising that the primary concern of the bureaucratic cadres had always been that of “saving the State” (Berkes, 1964: 62; Heper, 1985a: 1-20). Even after the abolishment of this system in the early nineteenth century,
both military and civil bureaucrats were not recruited from any well-established class in the Ottoman society. They were recruited from a wide-range of backgrounds among the Muslim populace, and it was the years of training in military or civilian schools which constituted the vital socialising experience resulting the whole-hearted allegiance to the state (Dodd, 1990: 2).

The other system, which was also instrumental in maintaining a strong central authority over the large territories of the Empire, was the Ottoman land tenure system. This particular fief (timariot) and military recruitment system based on the state ownership of the land in rural areas which was inherited from Byzantine, Islamic (Abbasian), Seljukid and Sasanid Empires (Ortayli, 1979: 91-99). In return for the land grant, the fief holder (sipahi) was expected to collect taxes, supervise peasant (reaya), and recruit, train and support a local contingent of soldiers under his jurisdiction. The Ottoman land system basically differed from feudal land system of Western Europe in that the fief holders held their lands temporarily, in virtue of their offices. The fiefs were granted by the central government and could be taken away by it. Especially, after their death their riches would be seized by the state. Hence, the monarchy was exposed to little danger from the rivalry of this class of its tenants-in-chief who had no hereditary rights to their lands (Gibb and Bowen, 1950: 52; Karpat, 1968a: 74). Except in the case of foundations (wakfs), establishment of permanent institutions possessing legal personality was not permitted (İnalçık, 1969). In addition, activities of artisans and merchants were also strictly regulated by the state through guild-like bodies (lonca) and sumptuary laws (Baer, 1970; Shaw, 1971: 33-34, 75-78; and Ortaylı, 1979: 207-216) in order to extract as much surplus as possible to finance its goals (Mardin, 1967: 129-130 and 1973: 180). Their wealth was often confiscated by the state in order to prevent capital accumulation outside the control of the state (Heper, 1976b: 488). Thus, this particular socio-economic structure ruled out the flourishing of any autonomous local aristocracies or bourgeoisie with an inherited wealth and social prestige (Hourani, 1968).

Thus, with no hereditary aristocracy seen in European-style feudalism due to the Ottoman land tenure system; no independent religious hierarchy comparable to that of Christianity since the religious functionaries in the Ottoman society held appointive posts
and were completely dependent on the state; no strong and independent merchant class since the Ottomans did not pursue mercantilist policies carried out by a powerful Muslim merchant class and non-Muslim minorities took the lead in international trade activities were barred from the opportunity of converting such economic power into a significant political role in an Islamic state; no powerful guilds; no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution staffed with slave officials, the Ottoman Empire in its classical age represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism. In the West, non-governmental intermediary social structure (e.g. the Church, guilds, free cities) operated relatively independent of government and played a cushioning role between the state and the individual. These had no parallels in the Ottoman Empire (Dodd, 1990: 136; Özbudun, 1990: 177-178; see also Mardin, 1969 and 1973). All the particular arrangements and the lack of a stress on economic goals in the Ottoman polity enabled the rulers to obviate the need to mobilise social groups, and thus to accommodate their political demands. The rulers did not have to grant political participation rights to the social groups in question. In this context, Standes and Parlements, which were parts of the political and administrative history of Europe, remained alien to the Ottoman scene (Heper, 1991a: 678). Although the Ottoman polity was not entirely devoid of the idea of “consultation” (meşveret) in the conduct of governmental affairs (see Shaw, 1970), the consultative councils clearly had no representative character. The representative institutions could only be established in the second half of the nineteenth century (Özbudun, 1990: 178-179). Even the first Ottoman parliament (1876), as well as semi-elected local administrative councils, was considered by the centre a useful tool to manipulate the periphery or, at least, an institution to decrease the administrative overload of the centre in providing public services to the provinces rather than a democratic representative institution (see Ortaylı, 1983). This dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled led to class-consciousness very different from that of the West. The saliency of the ruling class in the Ottoman Empire replaced the European saliency of class connected with the production and distribution of goods and services (Mardin, 1967: 127).

It naturally follows that similar to the political experience of continental Western European polities, there was a distinctive centre, with its own normative system, in the Ottoman polity, too. In the Ottoman case, however, the centre was far more autonomous
than its European counterparts in the face of the absence or weaknesses of economic classes and intermediary structures (Mardin, 1969; Heper, 1980). With the dominant role in the politics and economy, the “autonomous centre” gained a very special position in the Ottoman-Turkish polity in terms of socio-economic and political development of the country. While in the imperial-feudal regimes of continental Europe the normative system of the centre including that of the bureaucracy was to some extent interpenetrated by aristocratic and middle class values, in the imperial-bureaucratic regime of the Ottomans the bureaucrats were devoted exclusively to the “secular interests of the state”; it has even been claimed that «they represented no group or class interest, not even their own» (Berkes, 1964: 62). One significant implication of bureaucratic structuring of the Ottoman polity for the later periods has been that «the respect for the state and the salience of the state had been important dimensions of the Turkish political culture» (Heper, 1991a: 678). On this particular point, the Turkish political-administrative experience has differed sharply from both those of many Western countries and developing countries.

Given this particular development of the Ottoman-Turkish polity, as is noted in the previous Chapter, Heper argues that the political and administrative roles that the Ottoman and Turkish bureaucrats have adopted can be placed in perspective if, after Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1985), we “bring the state back in” and view it as an alternative mode of political integration and legitimisation (1991a: 678). The state as conceptualised in this latter approach is a “generalising” idea. It embodies norms and values formulated by the self-designed “state-elite” in the name of general interest. Two complementary characteristics of the state in question derive from its generalising nature: (i) the state is an “integrating” idea which attempts to unify the disparate elements of society around the norms and values in question; and (ii) the state is a “legitimating” idea which refers that only the political power exercised in line with such norms and values is legitimate (see Dyson, 1980: 208-214; also see Heper, 1987a: 3-6).

The salience of the phenomenon of the state in the Ottoman-Turkish political-administrative experience as conceptualised here gave rise to a long-lasting conflict between the “state elite” and the elected “political elite”. For the most part of the bureaucratic elite acted as the state elite. Thus, as Heper argues, the political role of the
bureaucracy in Turkey did not vary significantly, as Heady (1966) and some other authors (e.g. Fainsod, 1963; Riggs, 1963; Esman, 1966; and Diamant, 1970) hypothesised, with the “regime type”; if anything, the reverse was true (1985b and Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980). In spite of transition from one type of government regime to another (i.e. from autocratic monarchy to constitutional monarchy, from constitutional monarchy to republic), from one type of political regime to another (i.e. from authoritarianism and bureaucratic-elitism to democratic-pluralism), and from one type of party system to another (i.e. single-party politics to multi-party politics) since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the elitist political aspirations and manipulations of the Turkish bureaucracy in the context of the bureaucratic ruling tradition have not changed significantly. Although the evolution of the security of tenure for bureaucrats has been interrupted by wars, state of emergencies, military interventions and anti-bureaucracy political movements (Ömürgehniülşen, 1989a: 392), the bureaucratic ruling tradition has, more or less, kept its influence in the administration of country. Even if their political power has diminished to certain extent since the transition to multi-party politics, the Turkish bureaucrats have still showed their eagerness in public policy-making as if the authoritarian and bureaucratic-elitist political regime71 in the single party years remained intact.

The democratisation of the Ottoman-Turkish polity was not an outcome of increased pressures from the weighty social groups; it was rather engineered by the state elite as part of the modernisation strategy it pursued. Its origin goes back to the 1860s when the young and secondary elite (i.e. Young Ottomans/Genç Osmanlılar) within the Ottoman bureaucracy wished to participate in the decision-making process. Thus, democratisation of the system was conceived as a means to greater degree of (substantive) rationality on the part of the bureaucratic elite. This elite group aimed to arrive at more intelligent decisions through a clash of ideas. Democratisation was not taken as a process that would make possible conciliation of sectional interests in the society. In a similar way, the founders of the Republic aimed to create a new state infused with norms developed independently of these sectional interests. In other words, they developed a Republican version of the state tradition (i.e. a new version of the adab tradition), later referred to as “Kemalism” and then “Atatürkism” (i.e. an official ideology clamped upon the Turkish

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71 A bureaucratic-elitist regime is one in which political power is concentrated in the hands of civil
polity by the state elite including the bureaucratic elite). During the single party regimes of the late Ottoman and the early Republican periods, such an understanding did not cause a serious tension because it was highly difficult to distinguish the state elite from the political elite. However, in the long run, it has contributed to the foundation of the intolerance of state elite towards the elected political elite who claimed to represent sectional interests (Heper, 1987b: 131-132). As a matter of fact, the transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s gave rise to a sharp configuration between the state elite and political elite since the political role of the state elite (in particular, that of the bureaucracy) did not vary with the change of regime type. Since the state was regarded, within the context of the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucratic ruling traditions, as an entity that is autonomous from and over the civil society and that represents the “high interests” of the general public, the bureaucratic elite believed that political elite should act within the framework defined by this “sacred” state. The “high interests” of the general public would, not surprisingly, be determined by the bureaucratic elite (Erdoğan, 2001: 19). The bureaucratic elite acting as the state elite attempted to carve out a sphere for itself in which it could act autonomously, and to monitor the activities of the political elite in the area the former left to the latter (Heper, 1991a: 679).

An analogy that gained wide currency in the early years of multi-party politics was the relationship between “a watch and its owner” (see Yücel, 1954; and Tanyol, 1954). It was claimed that the relationship between the bureaucracy and the government was not dissimilar. The function of the watch is to indicate time; this would not change according to the owner. Thus, it was the responsibility of the civil servant to carry out public services on the basis of “objective criteria”, and not in accordance with the whims and “illegal interventions” of the politicians. The formula discovered here was the concept of the “requirements of the service”, which could be only and expertly determined by the bureaucrats. What role was left to politicians within this framework? A clue to this question may be found in a distinction made at the time by the bureaucratic intelligentsia reflected the division of labour in question. This intelligentsia distinguished “active dynamic politics” (i.e. capture of political office and “articulation” rather than “aggregation” of interests by the political elite) from “politics in its widest sense” (i.e.}

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and military bureaucracies (see Heady, 1966: 77).
determination of public policy by the bureaucratic elite on the basis of “rational” criteria) (Savci, 1955). In other words, if politics is considered as a “policy-formulation”, the contributions of bureaucrats are not incompatible with political neutrality; but if politics is considered as a “partisan politics”, they are in conflict with political neutrality (Güven, 1976: 57). Since the bureaucrats saw themselves as the guardian of the public interest, their primary role in making public policy, according to them, could not be interpreted as an interfere in the discretion area of elected politicians. Thus, the formula developed by the bureaucratic intelligentsia was used by the bureaucratic elite to bolster its attempt to structure the state in the realm of public bureaucracy (Heper, 1985a: 82). In the eyes of the bureaucratic elite, the elected governments were legitimate to the extent to which their activities did not violate the norms and values designated by the bureaucratic elite. Although this attitude has become softer with the effect of the fragmentation and politicisation of the bureaucracy since the late 1960s, it did not evaporate. As a matter of fact, all of three military interventions in Turkey (in the years of 1960, 1971 and 1980) were also carried out because the elected governments were perceived as having drifted away from these norms and values (i.e. “Kemalism” or “Atatürkism” as a static official ideology) (Tachau and Heper, 1983).

In fact, this problem mainly stems from the difference in the interpretation of democracy. The notion of “rationalist democracy” advocated by the state elite (including the bureaucratic elite) clashed with the idea of “populist democracy” espoused by the anti-bureaucracy political elite. The proponents of rationalist democracy placed

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72 The level of bureaucratic involvement in public policy-making process varies across countries due to differences in state tradition, political culture, party system, and organisational structure and recruitment practice of the bureaucracy (see Suleiman, 1984b: 6). For the relationship between political authority and bureaucracy and the influence of bureaucrats on public decision-making process in a comparative perspective, for example, see Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981); Suleiman (1984a); and Farazmand (1991). For the politics-administration dichotomy as a long and unresolved issue in the public sector, see Ömürdoğan (1989a: 105-107 and footnotes 24, 25 and 1997: footnotes 6, 7). For the political neutrality problem in the public service, see Merikoski (1969 and 1973); Tutum (1977); and Ömürdoğan (1989a: 105-107).

73 For the bureaucrats democracy was a means of finding the best policy through enlightened debate rather than reconciling different views and interests through adversial politics. Their democracy understanding was, therefore, a “rationalist democracy” (see Sartori, 1987: 51-55). Thus, the bureaucrats had always in their minds a depersonalised state with its own norms and goals, formulated virtually independently of socio-economic groups. They also believed that norms and goals of the state designated by themselves should have constituted the parameters within which the political representatives of socio-economic groups had to act. Thus, their democracy understanding was also a “juridical” one (see Heper, 1993: 39).
emphasis on general interest determined by the state elite through enlightened debate; the
supporters of populist democracy based their claims on national will determined by the
interests of the majority of the voters through free elections (Heper, 1990a: 322).  In
other words, while the state elite tried to keep the strong state and bureaucratic ruling
traditions on the basis of rationalist democracy, the new political elite reacted to this elitist
attitude on the basis of populist democracy. The failure in the reconciliation between the
responsible attitude of the state elite in terms of general interest and the responsiveness of
the new political elite towards the demands of the various socio-economic groups based on
sectional interests, as happened in the 1950s and 1970s, resulted in the crises of democracy
in Turkey (see Heper, 1992c). Consequently, in that polity there was no development in
the bureaucracy away from substantive rationality to instrumental rationality. In the
legitimacy crisis pervaded the pre-1980 Turkish politics, as Heper aptly emphasised,
always at issue was the “nature” of substantive rationality on the part of the bureaucracy,
and not its “replacement” by instrumental rationality (Heper, 1991a: 683).

Although the basic cleavage in the Ottoman-Turkish society has been “cultural”
(Mardin, 1973 and Heper, 1980) and the confrontation of the centre vs. the periphery has
been an integral dimension of this cleavage (Sunar, 1974), a “functional” (economic)
cleavage has emerged and developed gradually since the early 1970s (Özbudun and
Tachau, 1975; Özbudun, 1976 and 1980; Yücekök, 1983: 133-148). On the one hand, the
centre (the state elite) has been fragmented and the relative importance of its elements have
changed since the early 1970s (Heper, 1984b: 69-70). On the other hand, the earlier
nebulous periphery has gradually developed into a civil society in which distinct groups
are getting pragmatically interested in their own particularistic interests and political
parties, functioned autonomously from weighty social groups for a long (Heper, 1990a),
are now more responsive to these particularistic interests (Heper, 1984b: 77; Yücekök,
1983: 133-148; Dodd, 1990: 36-38, 113-115). Although these developments are quite
promising for the transition to instrumental rationality for the bureaucracy, the type and
degree of confrontation between the state elite and the political elite in the modern Turkish
polity will be determinative for this transition. As will be examined in detail in the

74 Actually, the notion that power cannot be suspect if it comes from the people is a dangerous
creed, as much as elitist anti-democratic views, which has developed everywhere as well as in
Turkey by the centre-right politicians since the French Revolution (see O’ Sullivan, 1983).
following Chapter, the 1980s were highly significant years in terms of the attempts to change the bureaucratic rationality.

It is for all these reasons that, as Heper noted (1974a, 1985a and 1985b), the dominant (Weberian) paradigm on bureaucracy has been less than satisfactory to explain the political role of the bureaucracy in a country like Turkey on its own. Even those who approach a consideration of the state in their analyses (e.g. Diamant, 1970: 509-510; Presthus and Monopoli, 1977: 176) have not entered into an explicit discussion of the role of the state in the sense it is conceptualised above. As is mentioned in the previous Chapter, Heper also argues that survey data in Turkey showed that the "historical bureaucratic tradition" may offer the better explanation of the behaviour of the bureaucrats in some countries, especially where there exists a firmly established tradition of the bureaucracy (1985b: 92 and Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980). Therefore, instead of the dominant neutral bureaucracy understanding in a pluralist state structure, a historical-comparative perspective has been adopted to explain the true nature of the political economy of bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity.

2) The Evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish State and Bureaucracy: A Historical Overview

Although we have emphasised the importance of a historical perspective throughout this Chapter, we are very well aware that a full examination of the evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, we are content with a historical overview to show the main features of the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy. However, major trends and breaks-shifts in these trends during the evolution of the bureaucratic ruling tradition in Ottoman-Turkish polity will be emphasised within the framework of this historical perspective. Thus, significant clues

75 Any student of Turkey, who wants to get an overview on the modern history of Turkey (nineteenth and twentieth centuries) in English, can consult to Lewis (1961) and to Shaw and Shaw (1977). Zürcher's recent work (1993) provides biographical notes for prominent Ottoman and Turkish political actors as well as a brief but quite revisionist interpretation of modern Turkish history. Among numerous works in Turkish, recent works of Akşin (1988), Koçak (1989), Tunçay (1989a and 1989b), Özdemir (1989), and Tanör (1997) in a series edited by Akşin can be mentioned. For the bureaucratic reforms in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, Findley's works (1980 and 1989) and Heper's works (1974a and 1985a) are the most competent and comprehensive ones.
will be derived from this overview to portray the general situation of the Turkish bureaucracy when the MP captured political power and to understand and explain the anti-bureaucracy policy of the MP governments under the premiership of Özal.

Within the framework of the particular perspectives adopted in this thesis the evolution of the bureaucratic ruling tradition in the Ottoman-Turkish polity can be divided into six distinct periods as follows:

a) The initial institutionalisation pattern (from the fourteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century)

In this period the rule of the Ottoman Empire based on carefully delineated impersonal state norms (i.e. enlightened despotism). As is mentioned in the previous Chapter, whereas in both centralised and decentralised European feudalism, central authority is effectively checked by countervailing forces, in patrimonialism the periphery is almost totally subdued by the centre. In feudalism, such countervailing forces weakened central and local governments, but their petty goals were never pursued so far as to destroy existing institutions. The Ottoman Empire, regarded as an example of patrimonialism, on the other hand, was from the very beginning threatened by powerful Turkoman ghazis who had been a community of marching warriors that formed the early seed of the state. Their descendants, who formed the old Ottoman aristocracy, posed a deadly threat for central authority. The only viable policy was not even co-opting them, but pushing them to the periphery (Shaw, 1976: Chp.2). During its classical age (from the fourteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century), following an earlier stage that showed signs of personal rule, the Ottoman polity developed into a special type of traditional patrimonialism. The state was structured in the person of the sultan; and the concentration of power at the apex of the polity, that is, in the sultan, was considered necessary in order to preserve harmony through providing order and justice (İnalçık, 1964: 43). The sultan, however, was not a typical patrimonial ruler. His rule was not a personal rule for he was regarded as the first servant of the state (Heper, 1991a: 680). During this period, impersonal state norms were developed and the rulers were expected to conform to them (İnalçık, 1973: Chp.3). As a distinct group above the rest of population, the civil and military officials, with their substantive rationality crystallised within the secular and state-
oriented tradition, became the main agents to preserve such order. As is noted in the previous Chapter, as a consequence of the greater autonomy of the bureaucratic centre from the periphery and the exclusive devotion of the bureaucratic elite to the secular interests of the state, the imperial regime of the Ottoman Empire was even a more bureaucratic rather than a traditional patrimonial polity (Heper, 1991a: 677, 678).

In this imperial-bureaucratic regime of the Ottoman polity, two important features characterised the political-bureaucratic culture. One was the predominance of status-based values rather than market-derived values; the other was the dichotomy resulting from the cultural division in the Ottoman society between the place (high) culture and local or provincial (lower) culture (Özbudun, 1990: 200-201). These features were the outcome of the bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman polity. The centre (i.e. the sultan and his military and civilian bureaucrats) by itself set the norms of the polity. The centre sought to eliminate all rival powers in the periphery.

b) Degeneration of the order (from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century)

This particular institutionalisation pattern underwent significant transformations from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century. As soon as the Ottoman Empire was consolidated into its quasi-medieval structure, destructive forces began to work within it. The end of conquests and war booty and adverse trade relations with European countries also led to serious financial deficits (Shaw, 1976: 171-174). As a result, the sultans began to lose their full control over economic resources, the local notables, and the civil and military bureaucracy and then over the whole polity. In the face of such financial difficulties, the fief system was eliminated, and the taxing rights (iltizam) were sold to private parties—the so-called tax-farmers (müftezims). The degeneration of classical order was started by the emergence of influential local notables (ayan) through their role as tax farmers (Cem, 1970: 186-195; Ortaylı, 1979: 118-122, 256-262). The resultant compartmentalisation of power and politics between the centre and the periphery loosened the grip of the sultans on the economic resources of the Empire, with an accompanying slackening of their control on the bureaucracy (Levy, 1982: 243; Heper, 1994a: 661). The bureaucracy lost its earlier characteristics as the loyal servant of state in
the person of the sultan (Cem, 1970: 202-204). Heper points out that the civil bureaucracy had been a relatively insignificant component of the government during the early Ottoman centuries. In the period of degeneration and disintegration, it, however, benefited from the disintegration of power at the top of the polity; and became part of the ruling oligarchy comprising the military, religious, and civil bureaucracies (1994a: 661). Although the powers of all these social groups always remained *de facto*; and they were never granted economic or political legitimacy as provided to their European counterparts (Heper, 1980 and 1992a: 179), the secular and state-oriented tradition of the earlier centuries was partly eroded (Heper, 1991a: 680 and 1994a: 661). As a result, the Ottoman polity became to show the characteristics of a patrimonial, even personal rulership, rather than bureaucratic rule (Heper, 1984a: 89).

c) The emergence and development of a bureaucratic ruling tradition (1789-1876)

From the end of the eighteenth century, some serious efforts (e.g. Tanzimat/Regulation Edict in 1839 and Islahat/Reformation Edict in 1856) were made to curb the degeneration of the order and disintegration of the Empire. Codification movement and centralisation activities in the Ottoman administration strengthened the position of civil bureaucracy (Chambers, 1964: 301-327; Ortaylı, 1983: 88-120). The Ottoman bureaucrats were given significant guarantees, for the first time, by the abolition of confiscation (*müsadere*) and political assassination (*siyaseten katl*) (Mardin, 1962: 157, 448; Mumcu, 1963: 173-174). New titles, precedence, and tables of rank announced for them in the framework of the standardisation of the status of the civil service; and legal regulations provided the office-holders with a security of tenure (Chambers, 1964: 305). Thus a new class of civil servants equipped with life, property and job securities replaced the slaves of the sultan. Therefore, the nineteenth century is considered as a crucial era for the emergence and development of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (Heper, 1974a; also see Findley, 1980 and 1989). The secular and state-oriented tradition was revived and the civil bureaucratic elite became the leading component of the government (Heper, 1994a: 662). The result was a kind of “authoritarian Rechtsstaat”, in which the officials would take on the air of a European nobility (Findley, 1982: 163). The period of Sublime Port (Bab-ı Âli Asr) (1839-1876) represented by reformist statesmen (i.e. Tanzimat Pashas
such as Reşit, Âli and Fuad Pashas) at the governmental palace (Ortaylı, 1983: 64-65) is, in particular, called as “civil –bureaucratic hegemony” by Findley (1980: 151-220). Thus, the state was structured in the Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat type of civilian bureaucracy rather than in the sultan.

During this period, the civil bureaucracy became the prominent part of the state elite. Since the civil bureaucratic elite had no organic links with other social groups, it regarded itself as the true guardian of the state (Heper, 1990a: 321 and 1992a: 175, 179). Within the framework of substantive rationality it developed (Heper, 1991a: 681), the civil bureaucratic elite took all initiative in the pursuance of the Ottoman modernisation, the so-called selective Westernisation programme (i.e. Westernisation with an emphasis on only selective supra-structure institutions of the Western countries with little or no regard to the socio-economic base) (see Davison, 1963: 63; Weiker, 1968). During this period and after then the bureaucracy had been in the foreground as a “social change agent” in the Ottoman-Turkish society (Chambers, 1964: 301; 323-324; Bent, 1969). Whether of military or civilian origin, the bureaucrats constituted a strong elite group whose mission was to re-establish and retain the political, economic and social control of the centre over society. Not unlike the rationalist tradition of eighteenth century Western Europe, the political conception underlying such an effort was a direct relationship between the state and each of its subjects. In this particular scheme, there were no place for a privileged local notable class, not even for their role as intermediaries, as in the case of Western Europe, between the state and its subjects (Heper, 1991a: 680). As a part of the benevolent ruling system, the bureaucratic elite felt responsible for the welfare of its subjects but, in return, it felt free from any constraints from the periphery. The bureaucratic elite tried to introduce changes from above or from the centre and resisted any change originated by the periphery. With the effect of Westernised education system, a significant cultural gap emerged between the bureaucratic elite and those it ruled and the alienation of the bureaucratic elite from the masses increased (Davison, 1963: 32; Chambers, 1964: 306; and Weiker, 1968: 455; Karpat, 1973b: 263; Rustow, 1973: 100).

Throughout this period, all the efforts were organised around the question very often posed by the Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals and bureaucrats: “How can this state be
saved?” (Heper 1992a: 181). This was the natural outcome of their self-declared guardianship mission for the state. It should be emphasised, however, that they had also a chance to seek their self or group-interests in one way or another while dealing with this question since the major goals for the society were mainly determined and safeguarded independently by the bureaucrats. Since they were primarily occupied with saving the state from destruction by its external and internal enemies, the bureaucrats felt an indiscriminate hostility towards representation of sectional interests other than the general interest defined by itself (Mardin, 1973: 293). Especially barriers to the legitimisation of an autonomous civil society and unwillingness of the bureaucratic elite to assume the role of carrying out popular demands entered into the cultural ideology of Turkish intellectuals in this period (Mardin, 1969: 279).

d) The early reactions to the bureaucratic ruling tradition (1876-1908)

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, the civil bureaucratic elite and its worldview, however, came under severe attacks. Actually, the first attack came from the certain part of the civil bureaucracy. In their efforts to realise the autonomy of the civil bureaucracy, the Old Ottomans (i.e. the Tanzimat Pashas who support monarchic autocracy) resorted to heavy-handed policies. Such policies found their opponents in the persons of the “Young Ottomans” (i.e. a group formed by mainly civil servants and journalists such as Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi) who had a rationalist constitutional democracy in their minds. They broke camp in the 1860s with the grand viziers of the decade (i.e. Ali and Fuad Pashas) and started agitating for the introduction of some sort of a liberalisation process (Mardin, 1962). This was, in fact, an intra-elite conflict since both groups came from the ranks of the Westernised civil and military elites. The persistent efforts of the Young Ottomans and Midhat Pasha, the leader of the reformist-constitutionalist faction, came together with the increased pressure of Western European countries on the Sublime Port for the acceptance of liberal reforms in order to protect non-Muslim subjects resulted in the establishment of the first constitutional monarchy regime in the Ottoman-Turkish history (Meşrutiyet I) (1876-1878). The power struggle in the Ottoman Dynasty made this transition easier (see Yücekök, 1983: 74-77; Akşin, 1988: 148-154).
The bureaucratic ruling tradition experienced even more difficult years during the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) (Heper, 1974a: Chp. 4). The reign of Abdülhamid II was significant in respect of the relationships between the sultan and the bureaucracy. On the one hand, in its struggle to dominate the ruling of the state, the pro-Western bureaucratic elite often conflicted with the sultan. Abdülhamid II immediately gave an end to the first Ottoman constitutional period. He tried hard to render the civil bureaucracy subservient to his regime of absolute monarchy. In the eyes of him, “meritorious bureaucracy” was “loyal bureaucracy” (Pears, 1917: 106). Abdülhamid II made use of conflicts inside the bureaucracy itself and received support of bureaucrats who sought their self-interest in the short-run, and who were against the reformist wing of the bureaucracy (Yalçındağ, 1970: 48-53). All critical positions were filled with his coterie of protégés in order to dismantle the institutionalised recalcitrance against his rule (Akarlı, 1976: 84ff). The political modernisation was not the only reason for the conflict between the sultan and the bureaucracy; the other important reason could be the non-delegation of authority to the bureaucracy by the sultan (Bozkurt, 1985: 190). On the other, the reign of Abdülhamid II was also important because of the improvements in the status of the civil service and the guarantees of civil servants (see Findley, 1980 and 1989). However, this cannot be considered a paradox; instead, it can be seen a natural outcome of a reasonable policy. Abdülhamid II went through some re-arrangements in the structure and operation of administrative organ with the requirements of intensive international connections on the one hand and the necessity of establishing an effective control mechanism over the society and bureaucracy on the other (Karal: 1983: 232-233; Ortaylı, 1983: 56-61). Abdülhamid II tried to control the bureaucracy not only by his well-established spying and reporting network, but also by quite modern central control agencies for responsible for regulating the appointment, discipline, promotion, transfer and retirement of civil servants more or less in the Western manner (Shaw and Shaw, 1976: 215, 218-219; Karal, 1983: 264-265). Even the aim was different the arrangements in the civil service during his reign constituted an important step in the rationalisation of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy (Ömürören, 1989a: 144). Furthermore, although Sultan Abdülhamid II’s administration was a very conservative one, paradoxically, he was personally acquainted with the Western type of modernity. The sultan, therefore, supported the modernisation of
education system (Frey, 1964: 214; Ortaylı, 1979: 273; Zürcher, 1993: 80-82) even if many of the opponents of the sultan, actually, graduated from the military and civil high schools established or modernised by his administration (Lewis, 1961: 180-181; Kazamias, 1966: 99). Since for the reformist wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy and intellectuals the state’s salvation laid in rationalising the government as well as other reforms in the political arena, such attempts could be seen as important gains in the modernisation of the state.

e) The revival and consolidation of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (1909-1950)

In this period, which was fluctuated with military interventions, wars and political regime changes, the ruling tradition of the military and civil bureaucracies was again revived and then consolidated. The civil and military bureaucracies alternated as the leading groups within the centre. Although there were some initial reservations about the bureaucratic ruling tradition in the early years of the Republican regime, this tradition was consolidated firmly as a natural consequence of the bureaucratic, civil or military, origins of the leading cadre.

i) The Young Turk era (1908-1918): In spite of the counter attacks of the Abdülhamid II’s administration towards the end of the nineteenth century, the bureaucratic ruling tradition of the earlier decades was not altogether abandoned (Heper, 1974a: 79-82; 1994a: 664), partly with the effects of legal-institutional and educational improvements in the civil service carried on in the reign of Abdülhamid II.

The second constitutional period (Meşrûyet îi) (1908-1920) in the Ottoman Empire started when Sultan Abdülhamid II had been compelled to restore the Constitution in 1908 as a consequence of a long struggle of the reformist wing of civil and military bureaucracies (i.e. Young Turks/Jön Türkler) (see Ahmad, 1969: Chp.1; Akşin, 1980: Chp.1; and Tunçay, 1989a). The bureaucratic ruling tradition was totally revived in the Young Turk era (1908-1918) under the authoritarian administration of the Union and Progress Party (UPP/İttihat ve Terakki Partisi). While the militaristic character of the UPP Government was represented by Enver and Cemal Pashas, the social and economic
policies of the Government were directed by civil bureaucrats such as Talat Pasha and Cavid Bey (Toynbee and Kirkwood, 1927: 39). However, this time, dominance shifted from the civil bureaucracy to the military bureaucracy as a natural consequence of the military bureaucracy’s significant role in the restoration of the Constitution and the wars prolonged during the second decade of the twentieth century (e.g. the Balkan Wars and the First World War) (Heper, 1994a: 665).

It should be emphasised, however, that although the status of civil service had been arranged affirmatively by legal documents since the Tanzimat Edict (see Heper, 1974a: 82 and 1977a: 87-91; Hourani, 1974: 74; Mardin, 1975: 56), the Ottoman bureaucracy continued on having some patrimonial characteristics in the recruitment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and remuneration regimes (Heper, 1977a: 64-70; Karal, 1983: 158-159). In spite of the existence of bureaucratic ruling tradition, the higher echelons of bureaucracy benefited rather than ordinary civil servants (Ömüröğünlüşen, 1989a: 147). The legal and financial positions of the civil servants were effected badly due to the extraordinary political conditions during the prolonged wars in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Under these conditions, the security regime for them disappeared, and the civil servants could not even manage to get their salaries regularly (Adal, 1968: 37-39). This problem could be solved by the Republican regime with the consolidation of the bureaucratic ruling tradition with all legal aspects as well as political ones in the 1920 and 1930s.

ii) The National Liberation era (1919-1922) and the reform years of the Republic under the energetic rule of Atatürk (1923-1931): With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire under the administration of the UPP at the end of the World War I and the success of nationalists in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk76 in the “War of Independence” (“Kurtuluş Savaşı”) (1919-1922) against the Allies’ occupation armies, a new era began in the Turkish history. Despite some efforts made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to render the Ottoman bureaucracy into a

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76 Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), who was the famous Ottoman-Turkish commander of the “Gallipoli Campaign” (“Çanakkale Savaşı”), the victorious commander of the “War of Independence” (“Kurtuluş Savaşı”), and the founder of the Republic of Turkey, was given a family name, “Atatürk” (the father of Turks) by the Turkish parliament in 1934. He has generally been called Atatürk since then. His views have been called either “Kemalism” or “Atatürkism”. For his biography, see Kinross (1993).
legal-rational bureaucracy, the Ottoman bureaucracy had some patrimonial features (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 147). The founders of the Republic of Turkey, and in particular Atatürk wished to put an end to the patrimonial rule (and the personal rule as was often conceived) of the Ottoman sultans. Atatürk aimed at a moderate transcendentalist state that would not smother Turkish society, but rather help it to realise its potential for reaching the level of Western civilisation. According to him, the moderate transcendentalist state would gradually be transformed into a moderate instrumental one to the extent that the society actually realised that potential. During this transformation, the public bureaucracy would also develop a basically instrumental rationality. In other words, he considered a high degree of stateness as a transient phenomenon. The basic motive behind his thoughts was the desire to create an "impersonal, sovereign institutionalised state" infused with norms developed independently of the "traditional centre" as well as the "society" (see Heper, 1980-1981, 1981b and 1987b: 132-133).

Atatürk was instrumental in developing a Republican version of the secular state tradition, later referred to as "Kemalism" and then "Atatürkism", in the form of the Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, étatism, and reformism.77 In his view, such pragmatic principles were necessary means to reach the level of contemporary civilisation. Thus, Atatürk did not come up with a certain political manifesto (i.e. an "ideology"), but with a general conception of the world (i.e. Weltanschauung par excellence) (see Heper, 1985a: 65, 1987b: 133 and 1991a: 681-682).

In other words, Kemalism as taken by Atatürk was not an ideology in the Shilsian sense (i.e. a closed system of thought), but it was a mentality (Özbudun, 1981: 87-92) or non-codified ways of reacting to situation (Linz, 1975: 266-269). It was a worldview emphasising reason versus the dogmatic religious norms.

77 These principles are also known as "six arrows" ("altı ok"). They represent the political principles of the RPP, which were found by Atatürk and his close associates just before the proclamation of the Republic. Kemalist principles were pragmatically developed during the Kemalist social and political reforms and then accepted as the party principles in the RPP's 1927 and 1931 congresses. Such principles became the constitutional rules with a constitutional amendment made in 1937, reflecting the state-party identification in the single-party period (Karal, 1981; Kili, 1982: 182-187). Although Kemalist principles are, in essence, pragmatic guidelines in accordance with the general political attitude of Atatürk, they were transformed to dogmatic principles during the single party years, especially after he died in 1938. This static version of Kemalism was presented as a political manifesto by the political-bureaucratic elite of the single party years and then, unfortunately, has become a "taboo" in time.
In the light of this worldview, Atatürk rejected one of the integral elements of the Hegelian state—"the absolute class" as the sole formulator and infallible guardian of the general interest. Atatürk passed over the civil bureaucracy as an appropriate locus of the state, as he was unwilling to revive the "bureaucratic class" ("memur sınıfları") of earlier periods (1961: 90). For the civil bureaucracy he adopted instead machine model (Heper, 1984a: 91 and 1991a: 681). Atatürk considered the civil bureaucracy as the lesser part of the state, a mere instrument (1961: 211). Although was what is often called a charismatic leader, Atatürk paid the most meticulous attention to organisational and formal legality (Rustow, 1973) in accordance with the emphasis on legality in the machine model. According to him, the civil bureaucracy should be an impersonal organisation structured on the basis of strict hierarchy and staffed by civil servants acting in accordance with the letter of law. Atatürk wanted the civil servants to be loyal to the goals of the Republic (Cumhuriyet mefküresi) (1961: 340). Yet the Republic's bureaucrats were not to be Hegel's "absolute or universal class"; substantive rationality would be defined for them, in the form of the Kemalist principles. Atatürk had routinised substantive rationality by insisting on the machine model. In other words, the bureaucratic elite were expected to behave competently within the legal order and also be loyal to and promoter of Kemalism (Heper, 1984a: 92-93 and 1991a: 681).

Atatürk's vision of civil bureaucracy was shaped by his perception of the Ottoman bureaucracy as well as by the goals he set for Turkey (Heper, 1984a: 93). Atatürk, initially, did not trust the civil bureaucrats inherited from the Ottoman Empire with a variety of values and attitudes (Rustow, 1959: 524) since he regarded some of them either self-interest seekers through total subservience to the sultan (1959: 104 and 1964: 2) or traitors who actively worked against or, at least remained indifferent to the national liberation effort to save the country (1938: 207-208). Thus, during the national liberation era, the military bureaucracy, naturally, played the crucial role and less attention was paid to the civil bureaucracy. In other words, Atatürk tried to relegate the civil bureaucracy into a secondary role in the state (Heper, 1991a: 681). Once the war was over, the military, which was initially utilised to a great extent, was played down and more attention was gradually paid to the civil bureaucracy (Heper, 1994a: 666).
Although Atatürk did not want to create a bureaucratic class, he was well aware of its function in modernisation process. As in all newly established political systems, the civil bureaucracy was gradually seen as an important means in settling the Republican regime, and bureaucratic structure which was inherited from the Ottoman Empire was modified in accordance with the modernisation aim of the Republic. In order to carry out the Westernisation policies, a new breed of civil servants had to be created. With this aim, some steps were taken to gain loyalty of the former Ottoman bureaucrats in the face of lack of qualified personnel, and then the graduates of the new schools offering a Westernised curriculum began to join the civil service (Heper, 1980-1981). Atatürk began to see civil servants, together with the military officers, as the people who keep the state machinery running (1959: 90-91) and then as an integral element of the leadership group expected to complete the nation-building process and consolidate the reforms in order to reach the level of “contemporary civilisation” (Heper, 1991a: 681; see also Ward, 1942).

In brief, Atatürk first identified the locus of the state with the military bureaucracy during the Turkish national liberation period (1919-1922) and the parliament (The Great National Assembly/Büyük Millet Meclisi) and its Government during the 1921 Constitution (1921-1923). With the proclamation of the Republic in the fall of 1923, the locus of the state was partly structured in the National Assembly under the control of his party, the RPP (the Republican People’s Party/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) but mainly in the Presidential Office (Heper, 1981b; and also see 1984a: 91 and 1987b: 134). The bureaucracy in this polity was structured in a machine model. In due course, the organisation of RPP was made more influential than other institutions including the civil bureaucracy (Heper, 1987b: 134). Thus, the Party became an important part of the apparatus of Republican state (Lewis, 1961: 382-383). It should be emphasised, however, that despite the significant role of the RPP, the young Turkish polity was still a state-centred polity rather than a party-centred polity, at least, until the 1950s.

iii) The consolidation of the single-party regime (1931-1950): After two unsuccessful attempts to transition to multi-party system, the single-party regime of the RPP was consolidation (see Tunçay, 1981). With the consolidation of the single-party regime, the locus of the state was appropriated by the civil bureaucracy and the RPP since
the Turkish Revolution came neither from a discontented bourgeoisie nor from peasant
dissatisfaction. In spite of the Atatürk's reservations about the bureaucratic class, the civil
bureaucracy's place and role in the polity was gradually solidified in the 1930s and 1940s.
Especially after Atatürk died, the bureaucratic elite aspired to a much more substantive
role (i.e. a guardianship role) than an instrumental role that Atatürk initially attributed to
the civil bureaucracy. During the presidency of İsmet İnönü\textsuperscript{78} (1938-1950), the guiding
ideology for the Turkish bureaucrats was a static version of Kemalism. In other words, in
the absence of a counter ideology, Kemalism was gradually transformed by the
bureaucratic elite from a general worldview into an ideology during those years. The
bureaucratic elite tried to legitimate its self-declared role of guardianship over the state by
transforming Kemalist mentality into a political manifesto loaded with substantive
meanings (Heper, 1984a: 93; 1991a: 682 and 1994a: 667; also see Heper, 1976a and
Heper, 1980-1981). Kemalist principles became ideological "ends" rather then pragmatic
means to reach to the level of contemporary civilisation. As a result, the bureaucratic elite
came to see itself as the guardian of the ideology in question (Heper, 1987b: 135 and

Consolidation of the bureaucratic elite was also aided by staffing the legislature with
the former bureaucrats (Frey, 1965: 181; Yücekoğ, 1983: 110-111). As an outcome of a
happy marriage with the other significant part of the state elite, the bureaucratic elite
shared the power with the political elite represented by the RPP (Özbudun, 1970). The
identification process of the state with the Party and the bureaucracy was completed during
the single-party period (1931-1945) (see Yücekoğ, 1983: 111-116) and the polity was
heavily bureaucratised.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, the étatist economic policy of 1930s and 1940s (see

\textsuperscript{78} İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) was the close colleague of Atatürk during the national liberation era, the
famous chairman of the Turkish delegation at the peace negotiations in Lausanne, several times
prime minister and the second president during the single-party period. During his presidency he
was often called as "Milli Şef" ("National Leader") (see Koçak, 1986). However, he clearly showed
his personal commitment to democracy in the transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s. He
also kept this commitment firmly when he was in power or opposition in the 1950, 1960s, and early
1970s. For his biography, see Heper (1998).

\textsuperscript{79} If the ties between the bureaucracy and the political system are too intricate, it is equally plausible
to speak of the bureaucratisation of politics as well as the politicisation of bureaucracy. In either
case, a paradox appears: either the bureaucracy becomes an instrument of the political power, in
which case the notion of the neutrality of bureaucracy receives a severe blow; or the bureaucracy
plays a critical role in the allocation of public resources, in which case the notions of the supremacy
Boratav, 1981; and Hershlag, 1984) provided the civil bureaucratic elite with an extra power base for its domination of the political system (Turan, 1984: 110). Thus, the machine model of bureaucracy Atatürk intended to establish was gradually replaced during the 1930s and 1940s with a Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat bureaucracy model, which had been well established in the Tanzimat, Islahat and Young Turk periods.

During this period, the prevailing tendency of the bureaucratic elite was an adamant insistence to capture the public policy-making process on the basis of an essentially étatist and secular value system. This value system was originally considered as “revolutionary” in comparison to the continuing clash between religious and secular values in the period of Ottoman Empire (see Mardin, 1971) but soon acquired static characteristics. While the bureaucratic elite was mixing the Republican values with the traditional bureaucratic values inherited from the Ottoman Empire, which were not basically in conflict with each other, the traditional bureaucratic values partly distorted some of the Republican ones (e.g. replacing “dynamic reformism” with “static, cultural guardianship”) (Özen, 1991-1993: 36). Thus, they contributed to this transformation. Both the political and bureaucratic elites developed their substantive rationality around such static reformism. For them, reformism came to mean preserving and safeguarding whatever institutional transformations were achieved in the socio-political fabric of the Turkish society. These institutional transformations in question became ends when they should have been only means (Turhan, 1967: 15, 71-72).

The delineated set of norms imposed upon and adopted by the bureaucratic elite, with the help of the education system built in accordance with the requirements of the Republican regime (see Frey, 1965: Chp. 3; Kazamias, 1966), gave it a sense of cultural as well as political guardianship in the society (Heper, 1976a: 512-513). Thus, the status-based value system strongly persisted during the single-party years contributed to the strengthening of an all-powerful centralised state and hindered the development of a civil society (Özbudun, 1990: 200). Since they inherited many common characteristics from of politics and the legitimacy of the electoral mandate are undermined (Suleiman, 1984b: 6-7). While the latter case had been dominant in the certain periods of the Ottoman Empire and the single-party years of the Republic since the political and bureaucratic elites were intertwined, the former case has appeared to be a common feature since the transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s.
the Ottoman bureaucrats, the Republican bureaucrats, whether of military or civilian origin, also constituted an elite group whose mission was to retain political, economic and social control over society though this time they were convinced by rather a different ideology. Their approach to administration was regulative, rather than representational or mobilisational (Turan, 1984: 103, 111). Citizens were still be viewed as passive objects to their benevolent ruling. With the aid of the single-party regime, they were freed to a great extent from popular constraints and they were granted extensive authority. They tried to introduce change from above the centre in accordance with their unquestioned vision and resisted any sort of change originated by the periphery. They perceived the society as something that could be socially engineered by themselves. When the change through regulation failed to generate popular acceptance of Westernisation polices, they inclined to impose such policies by compulsory means. Their attitude against participation of or compromise with the periphery coincided closely with the Ottoman notion of statecraft. Since the intermediate institutions and socio-economic groups were traditionally weak in the Ottoman-Turkish society, the power of the bureaucracy increased remarkably during this period. There was almost no counter-force to limit the power of the bureaucracy in political, economic, and administrative domains, with the effect of the exodus of the non-Muslim merchant and artisan groups with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The bureaucracy was, therefore, generally regarded by the mass as an apparatus of the authoritarian-bureaucratic state mechanism (i.e. “despotic state”、“ceberrut devlet”) as was in the Ottoman Empire period (see Roos and Roos, 1971: 16-17). With the ideological Westernisation of the bureaucrats, the existing cultural gap between them and those they ruled increased significantly. The consequence was the increase of alienation of them, which was started with Tanzimat, from the masses. They were increasingly resented by the other segments of society especially after the death of Atatürk. The elitist attitudes of the bureaucratic elite produced tensions in the political system in the long run and became dysfunctional for the development of democratic government (Turan, 1983: 29, 52-55).

While the bureaucrats were mainly dedicating themselves to the service of the state in the way they knew best, they had also an opportunity to protect and improve their class or group interests with the effect of this gradual change. With legal, financial and social

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80 Rustow notes that 93% of the Ottoman military officers and 85% of the civil servants remained
guarantees provided (see Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 176-261), the civil service became a very respectable career in the 1920s and 1930s (see Dodd, 1965; Mihçuoğlu, 1968; and Szyliowicz, 1971). The bureaucracy also gained an additional prestige by taking an important role in carrying out Republican reforms (Tutum, 1972: 79; Us, 1973: 51-53). The bureaucrats (and all civil servants) enjoyed their “golden age”, in particular, between the years of 1929-1939 (Timur, 1971; Akin, 1973; Us, 1973). Even under the extraordinary conditions of the Second World War, their salaries were reinforced with assistance in kind – coal, clothing, food, and the like (Karpat, 1959: 129-130). Thus, a “bureaucratic state” (Turhan, 1967: 15, 71-72) was established and protected by a “bureaucratic middle class” (Mardin, 1957: 11)

In brief, the bureaucratic ruling tradition was revived in the 1930s with the consolidation of the single-party regime and reached its zenith in the late 1930s and 1940s, especially after the death of Atatürk in the fall of 1938. In the mind of the bureaucrats, just like their Ottoman predecessors, the state was their raison d'etre. It was the institution to which they gave their ultimate loyalty and devoted their services. The survival and strengthening of the state was a preponderant concern in their actions (Karpat, 1959: 50-51; Turan, 1984: 103-104, 111-112). This is the best reflection of the characteristic of the Turkish bureaucracy being a guardian of the state stemmed from the historical bureaucratic ruling tradition (Heper, 1984b: 64-65). Furthermore, since loyalty to the self-designated mission of the bureaucracy (i.e. safeguarding Kemalist Republican values) had greater significance than merit (i.e. efficient and effective implementation of policies adopted by politicians) for the bureaucratic elite, Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat characteristics of the Turkish bureaucracy was coupled with strong doses of patrimonialism again (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 148).

e) The bureaucratic ruling tradition on trial (from 1950 to 1984)

In the second half of the twentieth century, the ruling tradition of the military and civil bureaucracies was again questioned and, time to time, seriously challenged. The induced pattern of social change was gradually replaced by organic change with the

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within the borders of the Republic after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1964: 387).
transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s. Participation of the differentiated periphery in the political decision-making and the splintering of the traditional state elite resulted in the erosion in the dominant and autonomous position of the bureaucratic elite vis-à-vis the emerging socio-economic groups and their political representatives in the long run (Heper, 1976a: 518-519 and 1976b: 486; Şaylan, 1986: 86-87). The confrontation raised between the bureaucratic elite and the new political elite that representing the periphery on both ideological and economic grounds continued with different degrees except for the brief periods of interim regimes after the military interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980.

If we keep in mind that populism, as one of Kemalist principles, assumed a basic harmony among the social classes or groups instead of class struggle and articulation of different interests and that bureaucrats thus perceived no need for more than one party (Timur, 1968: 103-106), we can understand the mental resistance of the bureaucrats through Kemalist ideology toward further socio-economic differentiation and concomitant political institutionalisation in Turkish society (see Heper, 1976a). Within the context of "induced" modernisation in which bureaucrats were imposed new sets of values through the Republican education system, no one could expect bureaucrats who were ready for the requirements of the multi-party liberal democratic regime in the mid-twentieth century (Heper, 1976a: 518). Thus, there were some serious difficulties in the way of transition to multi-party politics.

At the same time, however, forces were preparing the "doomsday of the happy marriage" between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite of the 1930s and 1940s (Heper, 1994a: 667). The state elite had assumed "an integrated and classless society" to be raised "to the level of contemporary civilisation" through policies based on Kemalist principles. Whereas its pragmatist étatist economic policy, which was not rejecting the existence of private enterprise, pursued during the 1930s and its ambivalent economic policies pursued during the Second World War paradoxically allowed the strengthening of certain social and economic interests in society (Şaylan, 1986: 79-80; Yücekök, 1983: 120-121). After the Second World War, a getting stronger economic middle class aspired for political office since étatist economic policies interfered with its economic interest could
not be tolerated any more (Cem, 1970: 223-239; Şaylan, 1986: 80-81). The local notables, at least a part of it, and an emerging liberal intelligentsia were also engaged in finding new alliances against the repressive socio-cultural policies of the RPP during the single-party years. The traditional political-bureaucratic elite who was tired out as a consequence of Republican reforms and the indirect effects of the Second World War could not resist to such energetic forces as well as to democratic views became champion in the world politics after the Second World War (Yücekök, 1983: 120-121).

The transition from the single-party regime to the multi-party regime in the mid-1940s in Turkey can be explained by several factors as follows: Changes in the socio-economic structure and then shifts in class alliances in the Turkish society; the erosion of bureaucratic power with the unfavourable socio-economic effects of the Second World War; democratic ideals surrounded the world politics after the Second World War; and democratic ideals of the founders of the Republic even if they could not be realised until the end of the Second World War. (see Turan, 1969: 105-106; Eroğul, 1970; Özbudun, 1985; Koçak, 1989; Dodd, 1990: 8-10). These factors altogether brought a new opposition party into Turkish political life in the early days of 1946: the DP (Democrat Party/Demokrat Parti).

i) The triumph of the counter political elite during the Democrat Party Governments (1950-1960): The DP was actually founded and led by a group of politicians who were the dissident members of RPP’s own parliamentary group and played fairly important roles as a member of the state elite in the single-party period (e.g. Celal Bayar who was a prime minister when Atatürk died, and Adnan Menderes who was an ex-RPP deputy). However, it became immediately a broad coalition of various types of oppositions to the RPP. The liberal intellectuals who were against the bureaucratic ruling tradition; the agricultural bourgeoisie who opposed the RPP’s land reform project; the commercial bourgeoisie who was against the étatist economic policy of the RPP; and the religious conservatives who were against the Kemalist reforms supported the DP wholeheartedly (Karpat, 1959: 316-317 and 1968b: 300; Özbudun, 1976: 52). The heterogeneous character of the DP coalition suggests that the dominant social cleavage of the era was socio-cultural as well as economic in nature. The common denominator of the
DP supporters was their opposition to the bureaucratic ruling. The DP differed significantly from the RPP in its underlying attitudes toward the proper role of government, bureaucracy, private enterprise, and local initiative, toward peasant participation in politics and toward religious practices. The motto of the Democrats was “enough, now the nation has the word”, implying that greater political, economic and social-religious freedoms would be given to the masses which had not had an input in running society (Mardin, 1973: 184; Turan, 1984: 114; Özbudun, 1990: 187). With a liberal economic policy, limited Westernising reforms, and concessions on religious matters, the Democrats wished to break the shackles that had been imposed upon the polity by the bureaucratic elite (Heper, 1994a: 667). In this sense, the rise of the DP was “a victory of the periphery over the centre” (Özbudun, 1990: 187). As a matter of fact, the DP managed to capture political office in the 1950 elections with an overwhelming majority. Thus, the political power passed from the state elite to a new political elite representing certain socio-economic groups. This result could be regarded as a good indicator for the accumulated resentment by the masses against bureaucratic elitism (Karpat, 1973a: 79-80). The new political elite took its distinguished place in contemporary Turkish politics and sought to change the nature of the bureaucratic tutelary state.

When it was in the opposition, the DP was became a spokesman of the socio-economic groups who complained about the despotic attitudes of governors, district governors, public prosecutors, civil servants and security forces. It was argued that some attitudes of these public officials were incompatible with the requirements of the multi-party politics. Those complaints were generally aimed at limiting the authorities and guarantees granted to public officials including civil servants. The DP asserted that civil service guarantees had became “privileges”; the security of tenure transformed into a “security of post”; then it became the main reason for bureaucratic inertia and arbitrariness and eventually damaged service ethic and accountability to the political power and, in the final analysis, to the public (Tutum, 1972: 80-84, 87-91). According to DP, such excessive

81 Participation of the periphery in the political decision-making in transitional societies is conceptualised as “ruralising elections” or “green uprising” (see Huntington, 1968: 74-75, 448-460). For the application of these theoretical constructs to the Turkish case, see Roos and Roos (1971: Chp. 9) and Tachau and Good (1973).
legal guarantees provided for civil servants had to be abolished; civil servants had to be responsive and kind to citizens; partisanship in the bureaucracy had to come to an end; and then the political hegemony of civil bureaucracy had to be broken (Eroğul, 1970: 99). Despite all its complaints about the partisanship of bureaucracy and promises for the democratisation of the administration mechanism, the DP did not assert necessary principles in arranging the bureaucracy (and the Civil Service) in terms of the requirements of the multi-party politics when it was in power (Tutum, 1972: 83-84). The new political elite who captured political power as an anti-thesis of the traditional state elite could not manage to bring out a new conception that could replace the bureaucratic ruling tradition and impose it upon the bureaucracy (Karpat, 1973a: 91; Heper, 1974a: 128-130, 1976a: 513 and 1976b: 495). Although the DP had promised to replace the conception of “civil servants being the vehicle of the political power” with the conception of “civil servants being the servants of the public”, it could not keep its promise; and it further politicised the bureaucracy (Tutum, 1972: 84). Thus, the replacement of the state-centred polity by the party-centred polity came to the agenda.

With the election victory of the DP, the public bureaucracy was put under the political leadership of a counter-elite with which had no organic ties (Şaylan, 1976: 46). The bureaucratic elite did not have a favourable attitude towards the emergence and development of new socio-economic groups with political leverage. Therefore, the bureaucratic elite, which was the main pillar of the single-party regime, retained its loyalty to the RPP under multi-party politics, and resisted the DP’s efforts to consolidate its political power against the bureaucratic ruling tradition. The bureaucratic reaction against the Democrats was primarily a reaction to the new concept of the state, which was perceived as contrary to the earlier bureaucratic ruling tradition. The bureaucratic elite still asserted its right to contribute substantially to the making of critical decisions about the future of the country and, therefore, it did not look with favour at the efforts to make them

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82 In a state-centred polity, state elite functions autonomously from the rest of the society in accordance with its substantive rationality. In a party-centred polity, political elite, based on political parties, functions autonomously from the powerful social groups. By contrast, in a bourgeoisie polity the organised interests in society effectively participated in government through political parties and interest groups (see Heper, 1985a: 100-101).

83 The civil bureaucracy must have presented quite alien territory for the DP, so much so that the Party even resorted to sending “spies” to that stronghold through appointing janitors (Bener, 1978: II, 39).
more responsive to closer government. Due to the bureaucratic ruling tradition, the bureaucrats simply unused to taking orders from a political leadership whose preferences appeared to deviate significantly from the previous one and their own (Turan, 1984: 114; Özbudun, 1990: 189, Heper, 1994a: 667-668). In this context, the bureaucratic elite regarded it as its duty to protect the “public interest” against efforts to use public funds for political patronage purposes (Özbudun, 1990: 189). It thought that politics was no longer used to promote the “interests of the nation as a whole”, but to promote the ends of “a privileged few” (Heper, 1994a: 667). Both the civil and military bureaucratic elites did not interpret the concept of sovereignty in the 1924 Constitution in the true sense of popular sovereignty. They put emphasis on “general” rather than “sectional” interests (Turan, 1990: 389-340) following the Atatürk’s own interpretation. This meant that in the view of the bureaucratic elite a search for “what best for the country” was far more important than the reconciliation of interest groups (Heper, 1992b).

In spite of the increased threat to the bureaucratic ruling tradition by the DP Governments, the bureaucratic elite, thus, continued to have political elite aspirations (Heper, 1974a: Chp. 7 and 1976a: 516). Although the bureaucrats showed a formal commitment to democracy, their attitudes towards elitism, blended with Kemalist thought, remained intact (Heper, 1974a: Chp. 7 and Heper, 1976a: 514-518). They believed that politicians should play their roles within the framework drawn by the state with regard to “high interests” of the public. Such interests, without any doubt, would be determined by the bureaucratic elite (Erdoğan, 2001: 19) since the bureaucratic elite could judge the public interest much better than the political elite could (Heper, 1987b: 135 and 1991a: 682). In the eyes of the DP leaders, this elitist attitude was totally against the “national will”. As a matter of fact, the notion of “rationalist democracy” advocated by the bureaucratic elite clashed with the idea of “populist democracy” espoused by the DP leaders. The failure in the reconciliation between these two views resulted in the deadlock in the democratisation process of Turkey in the late 1950s (see Heper, 1992c).

84 In multi-party politics, the demarcation line between the loyalty to the political regime and the loyalty to the ideology of present government is highly fluid. For the problem of ideologically repugnant order in the public service, see Chapman (1959: 142); also see Tutum (1972: 33, 39) and Ömürğünülüm (1989a: 69-70, 107).
85 For more information about the Turkish bureaucrats' unshaken confidence in their higher responsibilities to the nation, see Bent (1969).
When the threat increased, instead of living by the rules of representative government the bureaucratic elite did not abandon its guardian role and then opted for "negative politics"86, doing its best to preserve its caste characteristics by manipulating the machine built decades earlier (see Heper, 1977b). In other words, when the bureaucratic elite failed in moulding public policy, it resorted to distorting it. In its confrontation with the new political elite, the bureaucratic elite became alienated rather than co-operative (Heper, 1984b: 73, 74). This was actually a vicious circle. Since the bureaucratic response to the demands of both the DP Governments and the local organisations of the Party was slow, and often negative, the new holders of political power gradually intensified their intervention in the civil bureaucracy (Turan, 1984: 114). The new political elite’s counter strategy was two folds. One tactic was that of frustrating the bureaucratic decision-making process through political party interference. It aimed to make the civil bureaucracy ineffective by reversing its critical decisions. Another tactic was to decrease the influence of the civil bureaucracy in the polity with some new socio-economic policies (Heper, 1984b: 74). Thus, the DP intended to form a loyal bureaucracy to the Party by reducing the legal guarantees and socio-economic rights provided for civil servants (Tutum, 1972: 80-95; and Ömürgeňňışen, 1989a: 224-261).

The Democrats wanted a bureaucracy that would serve them in the same way that the bureaucracy had served the RPP during the single-party period. They failed, however, to recognise that the congruence of ideology and role expectations between the government, the RPP, and the bureaucracy had been unique to the single-party regime and could not be replicated, and might not be desirable, in a competitive multi-party regime. The anti-bureaucratic spirit of the DP and the attacks of its Governments on the positive law protecting the bureaucrats (and all civil servants) (Eroğul, 1970: 116; Tutum, 1972: 87-91) increased the discontent among the bureaucrats. Constantly challenging their actions and punishing them by the Democrats only served to increase their consciousness as a political stratum and to unify their ranks (Turan, 1984: 114). In its struggle with the new political elite, the RPP and the most of the Turkish intelligentsia took the side of the bureaucratic elite (Karpat, 1968b: 300; Heper, 1974a: 131-136). Under these conditions, the political

86 This concept was used, as Heper (1977b) did, in the sense Weber defined (see Bendix, 1960).

Both the military and civil bureaucracies not only experienced a loss of political influence and a deterioration in tenure rights under the DP Governments, but also adversely affected in terms of their social status and relative income due to the socio-economic policy pursued by the DP Governments (see Payashoγlu, 1961: 31; Frey, 1964: 224-229; Kazamias, 1966: 243; Roos, 1968; Eroğul, 1970: 192; Us, 1973: 53-56; Şaylan, 1986: 84-86). Thus, an socio-economic dimension was added to the political/ideological controversies between the DP Governments and the bureaucracy. The DP ideologically opposed government intervention in economy and advocated a liberal economic policy instead of étatism of the RPP (see Kuruça, 1963: 144). Despite this anti-government rhetoric, the public sector continued to expand in the 1950s through establishing new state-owned enterprises. This expansionary economic policy of the DP Governments was, however, not in favour of the bureaucracy. The DP Governments' economic policies were based on import-substituting industrialisation and the modernisation of agriculture, largely through external borrowing and inflationary financing. A relatively high rate of economic growth was achieved in the early 1950s was warmly welcomed by both agricultural producers and trade bourgeoisie and brought an another election victory for the DP in 1954. However, income distribution grew much more inequitable due to the intensified inflation in the mid-1950s. The earnings of salaried groups, mainly the military and civil officials, did not keep up with inflation. The general deterioration in the economic conditions during the second half of the 1950s, eventually resulted in the acceptance of an economic stabilisation programme in 1958, affected these groups badly as well. The DP

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88 Since the new political elite was actually interested in a rapid development strategy, it ignored the traditional bureaucracy, and then created a new type of public servants who had some technical skills could keep up with the development. This group of public servants, who were employed in the state-owned enterprises and public utilities as well as the traditional civil service, had more advantageous financial status than the traditional civil servants and, thus, protected themselves much better from the inflation. This was also the early sign of the fragmentation and competition within the civil bureaucracy (Roos and Roos, 1971: Chp.4; Tutum, 1972: 94-95; Heper, 1984b: 74).

89 The last DP Government had to put an economic stabilisation programme, supported by the international financial institutions including the IMF and some Western countries, into practice in the summer of 1958 in the face of increased deficits in the budget and balance of payments as a result of its expansionary and populist economic policies pursued during the 1950s. The sharp decline in
Governments were not particularly sensitive to the complaints of the bureaucracy on financial issues as well as the counselling of the bureaucracy on political issues. Political and economic decline gradually led to a fall in social status as well. The Governments’ policy of weakening the traditional bureaucracy financially and creating alternative power structures outside the traditional bureaucracy discouraged the talented people from joining the civil bureaucracy. Although the civil bureaucracy managed to maintain its homogeneity as a respected member of the centre, if it is compared with the later decades (see Heper, 1984b: 72; also see Karpat, 1959), it was no longer the most significant stratum of the population towards the end of 1950s. The 1960 military intervention found, therefore, an easy acceptance among military and civil officials for economic as well as other reason (Tutum, 1972: 95; Turan, 1984: 114-115; Özbudun, 1990: 189).

The DP remained in power for ten full years and five DP Governments were formed under the leadership of Menderes until it was ousted by the military intervention of 1960. The struggle between the DP and the RPP representing the state elite quickly deteriorated. Especially after the 1957 elections, the last DP Government responded to its declining electoral support, due to various political, (e.g. repressive attitudes adopted and measures taken by the last DP Government against the opposition parties and the press). social (e.g. the permissive attitude of the DP Governments in the face of intensified anti-secular activities) and economic reasons (e.g. general deterioration in the economic conditions during the second half of the 1950s due to the expansionary and populist economic policy of the DP Governments) (see Turan, 1969: 123-126; and Tunçay, 1989b), by resorting to increasingly authoritarian measures against the opposition, which only made the opposition led by the RPP more uncompromising and vociferous. The DP Governments intensified its efforts to provide symbolic gratification for the masses by utilising anti-secular and anti-étatist symbols. The bureaucratic elite perceived these efforts as a serious threat to very essence of the Republican value system, and to the agricultural production in the mid-1950s due to the bad weather conditions also put an extra strain on the Turkish economy (Parasiz, 1998: 116-122).

Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) was one of the most prominent members of the opposition towards the RPP and the founders of the DP. He served as a prime minister during the 1950s; arrested after the 1960 military intervention, tried, sentenced to death and executed in 1961. He was identified with the development efforts based on free-market economy in the 1950s. With his highly undulated performance and his tragic end, Menderes is one of the most controversial political portraits of the
institutions which it had fought so hard to build and preserve. Permissive policies of the DP Governments toward religious activities were especially considered as a betrayal of the Kemalist legacy of secularism by both the military and civilian bureaucracies. It was now their raison d'etre that was being challenged (Turan, 1984: 115; Özbudun, 1990: 189; Heper, 1994a: 667). The legal guarantees of civil servants, academicians and judges were curtailed; and the academic freedom of universities was restricted due to their intellectual-bureaucratic reactions to the last DP Government. A number of them were forced to retire early; and many civil servants were transferred to passive duties or to remote areas as a punishment. The Prime Minister, Menderes, paid homage to the religious leaders; he often expressed his nasty attitude towards judges; he referred to university professors as "those in black gowns", and rendered the opinion that he "could run the military with reserve officers if it were necessary". All his attitudes naturally intensified the anti-government feelings among the military and civil bureaucrats, judges, academicians and Republican intellectuals. When the channels of democratic change were blocked in 1960, the public unrest increased. Marches of judges and academicians against the authoritarian measures of the DP Government and then the clashes between the students and the police in major cities led to the declaration of martial law in the spring of 1960. This put the military, which has historically been a part of the Republican state elite, in the unwanted position of suppressing the opposition on behalf of a government for whose policies it had little sympathy. The military elite like the rest of the state elite took Kemalism as the official ideology, and, therefore, as a definitive source of public policies, and then regarded the political elite of having acted against Kemalism. Like the bureaucrats and many intellectuals, the military could not gain enough shares in the prosperity either, which had undoubtedly created in the 1950s. Finally, the competitive political life came to an end when the military intervened in the spring of 1960, with the welcome and support of the opposition including the RPP and the civil bureaucracy who felt their existence were in danger (Özdemir, 1989: 192-197). In this context, the military intervention of 1960 could be considered as an outcome of the co-operation between various parts of the state elite in clash with the political elite of the 1950s (see, Harris, 1970). In 1960, the cause of freedom was paradoxically championed by the state elite who had always been afraid of throwing open the gates to the masses (Dodd, 1990: 10).

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contemporary Turkish history. For more information about Menderes and his period, see Zürcher
This role of the state elite seems to be a consequence of the fact that the political elite lacked enough ideological support of bourgeoisie since the emerging bourgeoisie itself depended upon and worked through the state (see and Karpat, 1973a: 52, 91, and Neyzi, 1973: 143-148). As a consequence of strong state tradition, unless governments were responsive to them, the civil societal elements (i.e. interest groups) had traditionally little influence on public decision-making in those days (Heper, 1991c).

**ii) Short-lived restoration of the bureaucratic ruling tradition with effect of the military intervention of 27 May 1960 (1960-1965):** The 1960 military intervention was an important, and perhaps the last-ditch effort by the intellectuals and the civil and military bureaucratic elites to re-bureaucratise the government. The 1961 Constitution, drawn up in the wake of the 1960 military intervention by the Military Regime and a co-opted Representative Assembly (*Temsilciler Meclisi*) dominated by the pro-RPP bureaucrats and intellectuals, reflected the basic political values and interests of these groups. It stacked the bureaucratic elite against the elected political elite and reinforced the traditional aspiration of the bureaucratic elite to have the last word. It did not allow sole emphasis to be placed on “national will” by creating a system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected representatives of the people. A second legislative chamber (i.e. the Senate of the Republic/Cumhuriyet Senatosu), which was a mix of elected and appointed members, and a new Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*) were created to balance the power of the National Assembly (*Millet Meclisi*) which was formed totally by elected members. The role of military increased through the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*), which was created as a new constitutional institution in which the representatives of the Turkish armed forces take place along with the civilian politicians (e.g. the president, the prime minister, and key ministers). Some public agencies such as the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*TRT*) and the universities were also granted substantial autonomy. The State Planning Organisation-SPO (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı-DPT*) was established to give a new form and direction to the socio-economic development efforts of political authority by technocrats/bureaucrats. The bureaucracy captured a significant position through SPO to influence decisions on resource allocation, income

(1993).
distribution and rent-seeking. Thus, the bureaucratic agencies were designated as enlightened watchdogs of the political regime (Heper, 1985a: 85, 88-89; also see Heper, 1991a: 682-683 and 1994a: 668; and Özbudun, 1990: 190).

In addition to these institutional arrangements, a serious reform attempt in the civil service regime had an outstanding place within the administrative reform projects of the Military Government (Sürçit, 1972: 77-80; Ar, 1984). The State Personnel Department (Devlet Personel Dairesi/DPD) was established in the end of 1960. The basic rules of the security of tenure for the civil servants were determined by the 1961 Constitution and thus, a constitutional guarantee was provided for all civil servants. During the period of Coalition Governments (1961-1965), which could be called as a period of transition to democracy after the short-lived Military Regime (1960-1961), the personnel reform was carried out enthusiastically as well. Within the general framework of the administrative reform project pursued by these Governments, a new general code for the civil servants ("The Civil Servants' Law"- CSL/"Devlet Memurlari Kanunu"-DMK), aiming to provide significant guarantees for civil servants, was enacted in the summer of 1965 (Kantarlıoğlu, 1977: 26-39; Ömür-gönül'sen, 1989a: 264).

Before the transition to multi-party politics, Atatürk's, and partly, İnönü's charisma had provided the necessary support for the state. In their absence, the high degree of stateness in the multi-party regime needed to be justified in constitutional-legal terms. This was the motive behind the 1961 Constitution and other institutional and legal measures noted above. As there did not exist an aristocracy and/or well-developed civil society institutions that would have exercised a moderating influence in politics, this was the solution devised at the time for checking tendencies in the Turkish politics toward a praetorian polity from party-centred polity (Heper, 1987b: 136). Many of these institutional arrangements were actually inspired by the experience of the Western democracies; and the constitution-makers adopted such arrangements with a belief that unlimited political power legitimised by popular will, as experienced in the 1950s, may actually hamper the functioning of a democratic system (Turan, 1984: 115). These
arrangements were also indicators of the state elite’s intolerance of the political elite.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, the state elite tried to relegate the political elite to a secondary position.

By taking advantage of the military intervention, the civil bureaucratic elite tried to regain its prestigious status of the single party period in the early years of the 1960s since the civil bureaucracy was forced to become a party-book type during the DP Governments. However, it was impossible to revive the Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat type of bureaucracy in a multi-party regime. The political and socio-economic status of the bureaucracy could not be restored to the level of a “political class” in the single-party years (see Frey, 1975: 57; and Heper, 1976b: 491). Furthermore, the constitutional-legal institutions and measures provided only a limited veto power to the bureaucracy, and as such were bound to be ineffective against a government determined to dominate bureaucracy. Whenever possible, the political elite reacted over-defiantly with the reinforced prejudices against the state elite (Heper, 1987b: 136). Although the bureaucratic elite had gained a considerable autonomy during the period of transition to democracy (i.e. the first half of the 1960s), the restoration of the bureaucratic ruling tradition had a very short life since the Justice Party/Adalet Partisi (JP), the principal heir to the DP, captured political power in 1965.

The political engineering attempt of the Military Regime to keep its effect in politics in the following years was fired backs and left the military in quandary in the early years of the 1960s. The early sign for the lower popularity of the Military Regime was the modest majority achieved when the new Constitution was submitted to referendum in the summer of 1961. Despite all the new constitutional and legal arrangements, the RPP fared badly in the general elections held in the fall of 1961. Although the pro-DP votes were fragmented among several parties, the election results gave a majority in the parliament to the heirs of the ousted DP. This can partly be interpreted as a reaction to the misuse of power by the Military Regime, in particular, in the trial process of the DP leaders and the hang of ex-Prime Minister Menderes as a result of such a defective trial (Özdemir, 1989: 202-208). Moreover, the electoral chance of the RPP was affected negatively throughout the 1960s since the RPP was regarded by the majority of electorate as the ally of the Military Regime to re-capture political power (Yücekök, 1983: 135).

\textsuperscript{91} For the general intolerance of dissenting views among the Turkish elite, see Mardin (1966: 384ff)
iii) The revival of the power of political elite during the Justice Party Governments (1965-1971): The JP gradually established itself as the principal heir to the DP during the period of unstable Coalition Governments (1961-1965), either led by the RPP (1961-1965) or the JP (1965) with the effect of the pressure of the military in the face of fragmented parliamentary composition (see Özdemir, 1989: 206-216). It successfully filled a void in the party system after the Military Regime had outlawed the DP. The JP appealed to the same socio-economic base as the DP (see Ergüder, 1980-1981). Using similar techniques of clientelistic politics (Sayar, 1978: 103-104), the JP forged a coalition of the right, which cut across diverse cultural and socio-economic cleavages. With the victory of the JP under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel92 in the 1965 general elections, the period of transition to democracy came to an end. The JP won an absolute majority of the National Assembly seats both in the 1965 and 1969 general elections. Three JP Governments were formed under the premiership of Demirel between the years of 1965-1971. This was also a new and difficult period for the bureaucratic ruling tradition.

In the beginning, the important question was whether the JP would be acceptable to the military or whether it would seek to take revenge on the military for the treatment meted out to the DP. The likelihood of a return to power by the military led the JP keep political tension low as compared to the 1950s (Turan, 1990: 402). Fortunately, the JP elected a moderate leader, Demirel (Dodd, 1990: 11-12), and followed a moderate way of politics largely due to the traits of its leader who was himself a former bureaucrat. This does not mean, however, the political elite, including Demirel, had sympathies with the regime institutionalised by the 1961 Constitution. Celal Bayar, one of prime ministers of the Atatürk period and founders of the DP, and also president of the Republic from 1950 to 1960, declared that the 1961 Constitution was no more than a constitutional legitimisation of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals (Mardin, 1973: 186). Demirel repeatedly

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92 Süleyman Demirel (1924- ) was elected as the chairman of the JP in 1964 and became the premier several times between the years of 1965-1980. He was banned from politics for the 1980-1987 period by the 1980 military intervention. Then he returned to active politics with a new party and managed to form a government in the 1991-1993 period. He became ninth president of the Republic of Turkey (1993-2000). Demirel is known the most accomplished politician and public speaker in the contemporary Turkish political history. For more information about Demirel and his period, see Zürcher (1993).
complained that the country could not be governed with the 1961 constitution (Heper, 1985a: 89). Thus, the centre-right political circles of the 1960s, as in the 1950s, were not slow to assert that their widespread popular support justified sidestepping inconvenient checks and balances on the exercise of the power (Dodd, 1990: 39-40, 94). Although there was an exaggeration in these views, it is true that the 1961 Constitution reflected a distrust of the masses as the only source of authority. As is mentioned above, a number of institutions were designated as a source of authority in addition to the people (Turan, 1984: 115). As a matter of fact, the JP Governments of the late 1960s reacted to the state elite’s prejudices against the political elite and, for example, continuously challenged the jurisdictions of the Council of State (the Turkish version of Conseil d’Etat in French administrative law system/Danıştay) and the Constitutional Court.

A serious disagreement came up, in particular, between the JP Governments and the Council of State on the meaning and the scope of the security of tenure in the process of appointments to the higher-level posts in the civil service. While the JP Governments were trying to have more discretionary power in such appointments in accordance with the party-book bureaucracy type in their minds, the Council of State undertook a role of advocating the rights of civil servants by reviewing the government’s discretionary power from the viewpoints of the notion of public interest and the requirements of public services (Tutum, 1972: 97-98). The Council of State insisted that it is duty of a civil servant to implement the decisions of the government but this does not mean that the civil servant should also be expected to share the views and the philosophy of the government. Thus, the Council of State constituted a countervailing power against the government (Heper, 1984b: 75; see also Güran, 1980).93

The strains in the relations between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite resurfaced during this period, but their importance had gradually declined in parallel with the erosion in the power and prestige of the bureaucracy (Turan, 1984: 116). First, the cohesion among the state elite had gradually disappeared (see Cohn, 1970). The

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93 It should be pointed out that these higher tribunals which sympathetic to the views of the bureaucratic elite on the whole, did not always make their decisions in an impartial manner since they attempted to test not only legal validity but also political and administrative desirability of the parliamentary acts and administrative decisions (Dodd, 1990: 39-40; Heper, 1990a: 323).
bureaucratic and intellectual groups, which had achieved a consensus that the DP rule should come to an end in the late 1950s, had fallen into disagreement on what should be done afterwards. Partly with the effect of the liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution, the academic intelligentsia could no longer furnish support for the civil bureaucracy in the latter's confrontation with the new political elite, in particular, in the field of socio-economic development (Heper, 1976a: 519). Although the military contributed to strengthening the influence of the civil bureaucracy through the 1961 Constitution, the rift between the natural allies became apparent in the 1960s. In the eyes of the civil bureaucracy, the military had shown its ineptness in the handling of socio-economic developmental problems during the Military Regime (Spring 1960-Fall 1961) (see Roos and Roos, 1971: 160-176). More significantly, the Military Regime’s elimination programme which was originally aimed to punish those civil servants who had close links with the DP went beyond its aim and thus shaken the confidence of the civil servants as a whole (Tutum, 1972: 95-96; Heper, 1974a: 137, 140; and Mango, 1977: 122). From the mid-1950s, the political representation of bureaucrats in the parliament decreased as a consequence of the realities of the competitive democratic regime (Roos and Roos, 1971: 44-45; Tachau and Good, 1973: 554). Moreover, an ideological rift was also created between the traditional bureaucratic elite and the RPP with the adoption of the “left-of-centre” policy by the RPP in the mid-1960s (Yücekök, 1983: 143-144).

Second, the homogenous character of the bureaucratic elite gradually disappeared in the 1960s as a result of diversification in the institutions of higher education that bureaucrats attended and in the political ideologies that bureaucrats exposed. As bureaucrats received different types of education, or they were politicised by anti-bureaucratic political parties such as DP and JP, or were exposed to different outside influences, one would expect to find among the bureaucrats different groups with different worldviews and political attitudes. Thus, in addition to the étatist and secularist general tendency among bureaucrats, a group of bureaucrats who were in favour of liberal economy or conservative (religious/nationalist) morality appeared (Heper, 1993: 42-43, 49-50). Also, the fragmentation and competition among bureaucrats (i.e. traditional-94 For some decades bureaucrats were mainly graduated from the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, former Mekteb-i Mülkiye/The Civil Service School) that produced bureaucrats-cum-statesmen dedicated to Kemalism.
generalists vs. technical-specialist) that subject to different social and financial status in different types of public agencies (e.g. new ministries, and state owned industries and public utilities concerned with heavy investments in the development activities), started in the 1950s under the DP governments, continued with an accelerating rate during this period as well (Roos and Roos, 1971: Chp. 4; Tutum, 1972: 94-95; Heper, 1984b: 74). This led some traditional bureaucrats to modify their political values and attitudes in a more moderate way.

Third, the civil bureaucracy that had traditionally considered itself away from and over other socio-economic classes or stratum, began to be influenced by and resemble to the emerging socio-economic groups, with effect of social change accelerated since the 1950s. Bureaucrats were increasingly recruited from among those with the lower social strata and/or technical backgrounds due to the expansion of education to the lower social strata as well as the expansion of the bureaucracy as a result of development activities of the governments. This new generation of bureaucrats was less loyal to the traditional values of the bureaucracy, more prone to accept the increasing dominance of the political elite, and rather loyal to the developmental-productive values (Dodd, 1965; Roos and Roos, 1968 and 1971: Chp. 4; Bozkurt, 1980: Chp. 5; Şaylan, 1986: 201-207). While the traditional state elite was losing its homogeneity, the ice was also gradually being broken between the civil bureaucracy and the new socio-economic groups, including the private entrepreneurs (Heper, 1975: 126-128 and 1976a: 519-520).

As a consequence of these changes, some bureaucrats found that it was convenient or desirable to change their unfavourable attitudes toward these new socio-economic groups and work closely with their political representatives (i.e. the JP Governments), while many others remained sympathetic to the RPP, tried to keep the bureaucratic ruling tradition alive and did not want to be subservient to other socio-economic groups (Cohn, 1970: 85-98; Heper, 1975: 132-134 and 1976a: 519-520; Turan, 1984: 116; Dodd, 1990: 46). In other words, some parts of the civil bureaucracy took a sharp turn and became opportunistic but many others insisted on their rigid attitudes against the political elite (Berkes, 1965: 138). Despite the strengthening tendency of co-habitation in some parts of the civil bureaucracy, as Heper (1977b) indicates, the majority of the bureaucratic elite’s
response was that of engaging in “negative politics” against the JP Governments. Although the civil bureaucrats were aware of losing control over policy-making, they found difficult to accept the new power configuration (see Kayra, 1981) and kept their elitist attitudes against the politicians (see Heper, 1993). Thus, the bureaucracy on one side and the government and parliament on the other became hostile powers again. The former began to sabotage the latter’s policies (Heper, 1977b: 80-82) by giving a minimum or distorted information and slowing down policy implementation (Özaktaş, 1981: 10) since the bureaucrats still thought that they were the most able ones in formulating public policies (see Heper, 1976a: 516). The bureaucratic elite also attempted to promote the idea of “state capitalism” alongside the Kemalist ideology and restrict the area left to private enterprise, with the opportunity provided by the 1961 Constitution on the welfare state, social and economic planning, and the “mixed economy”, feeling that it needed a new kind of legitimisation (Aytür, 1966; Roos and Roos, 1971: 62; Karpat, 1973a: 91; Neyzi, 1973). This attempt of the bureaucratic elite could be considered as an extension of the state tradition stemmed from the traditional Ottoman-Turkish socio-economic order based on the regulation through the bureaucracy rather than the entrepreneurship of the national bourgeoisie (see Heper, 1976b). When the state began to pay more attention to economic development since the early twentieth century, it attempted to achieve it through extending its size and increasing its agents rather than forming effective links with civil societal elements (Birtek, 1978: 151).

Their modernising efforts along etatist and secular Kemalist lines, which is of course a reflection of the dominant cultural cleavage, did not endear the traditional bureaucratic elite to the Justice Party as well as the DP (Heper, 1984b: 74). As reflected in the its relations with the Council of State, the JP Governments, with its conservative orientation in politics and liberal orientation in economics, did not want to accept the guidance of the civil bureaucracy. Demirel clearly indicated that the JP emerged as an antithesis of the

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95 Heper tried to find out whether or not there had been a change in the behavioural tendencies of the bureaucrats who had worked at senior civil service posts in several ministries in different periods. With this aim, he applied the same questionnaire, used in 1969 for bureaucrats who worked in such posts in the period of 1945-1960 (see Heper, 1974a: Chp. 7 and 1976a: 516), for bureaucrats who worked in similar posts in the period of 1960-1970. The results showed that although this new generation of bureaucrats began to accept the fact of democracy and the crucial role of politicians in public policy-making, they still had strong elitist tendencies. While they displayed some features
civil bureaucracy and would not surrender to the civil bureaucracy (Ardanç and Ergun, 1980: 9). Although the JP did not radically challenge the presence and traditional values of the bureaucracy due to the bureaucratic background of its leader, it did not refrain from politicising and dominating over the bureaucracy (Roos and Roos, 1971: 44, 95). The JP Governments were, in particular, critical about bureaucrats who had radical leftist views. Although, as compared with the post-1973 period, the JP Governments adopted a relatively moderate stand against its opponents in the civil bureaucracy, it did attempt to transfer the leftist and/or pro-RPP civil servants from critical posts to passive duties (Bener, 1978: II, 179, 184-185). Therefore, more emphasis was being placed on making civil bureaucracy more neutral toward the new political elite (Tutum, 1972: 95-100).

In spite of its strained relations with the JP governments, the civil bureaucracy enjoyed the relative improvements in its economic position in addition to some affirmative attempts in the positive law regulating the civil service regime in the second half of the 1960s (see Kantarcioğlu, 1977: 38-68; and Ömürgonülşen, 1989a: 266). This could not be regarded as a paradox since Turkey, in this period, experienced one of the most successful years in her contemporary history in terms of economical development and political liberalisation (see Özdemir, 1989: 216-219). The effects of the pressure of the public opinion as well as that of the military and civil bureaucrats in a liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution could not be denied either in this relative progress.

In addition to the struggle between the bureaucratic elite and the political elite, towards the end of the 1960s the Turkish economic and political systems began to experience new problems. On the economic side, the JP Governments pursued an inward-oriented mixed economic policy in practice, partly with effect of the constitutional principle of socio-economic planning for development, despite the JP, like the DP, was, at least in rhetoric, in favour of a liberal economic policy. The last JP Government had to put an economic stabilisation programme, supported by the IMF, into practice in the summer of 1970 in the face of increased deficits in the budget and balance of payments. Such deficits occurred as a result of the JP Governments' expansionary and populist economic policies pursued in the late 1960s and its import-substituting industrialisation model indicating that they began to turn into a functional elite, they still tended to feel as a status elite (see
pursued during the second half of the 1960s (Parasız, 1998: 140-145; see also Türkkan, 1996: 208-216).

On the political side, political relationships were getting complex. In the first place, it should be noted, the JP was a grand coalition party in which extreme-nationalist, extreme-religious, and former DP elements took their place alongside more liberal elements. With the effect of the economic policy pursued by the JP in favour of large industrial capitalists, the growing dissatisfactions of large landowners, local notables, small traders, businessman and artisans eventually resulted in large defections from the JP and a Poujadist movement on the right giving support to extreme right-wing parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Yücekök, 1983: 133-139; Dodd, 1990: 12-13). In a similar vein, there were new developments in the front of the state elite. An ideological shift was started in 1965 with the adoption of the “left-of-centre” policy by the RPP. This policy change caused an ideological conflict within the Party and a substantial group of Party members representing a conservative version of Kemalism and anti-leftist political position defected from the RPP. Extreme-left parties, associations, and trade unions also took their place in the political arena as a result of growing industrialisation and urbanisation. In addition to fragmentation in the front of old political elite, the bureaucratic and intellectual elites started to suffer from disintegration in the late 1960s. Not only some bureaucrats and intellectuals began to co-operate with the political representatives of big bourgeoisie, but also some others started to incline to question Kemalist ideology. The military, in particular its higher echelon, was getting disturbed from the developments on the left of the political spectrum (see Eroğul, 1990: 145-155). These tendencies were early but significant signs of the disintegration of the state elite (Yücekök, 1983: 139-148).

Partly as an extension of the fragmentation both in the right and the left sides of the political spectrum and partly as a result of the relatively liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution in order to ensure the development of a free and democratic society, extreme left-wing and right-wing groups appeared on the political scene. This was followed by increased acts of political violence, especially by extremist youth groups, with

Heper, 1975).
the partial effect of the world-wide radicalism of youth in the late 1960s. As matter got increasingly out of hand in the universities first and then outside, with the police prevented by the Constitution and the related positive law from policing them effectively, the last JP Government began to rely more and more on military support (Dodd, 1990: 12-15). Although Prime Minister Demirel established a détente policy between the JP Governments and the higher echelons of the military bureaucracy (Özdemir, 1989: 215-216), the military was getting more critical about the last JP Government’s performance in handling the political violence. The crisis was aggravated by the activities of various conspiratorial groups within the military. These radical officers, frustrated by the successive electoral victories of the conservative JP, aimed at establishing a longer-term military regime ostensibly to carry out radical social reforms. In fact, the military memorandum of 12 March 1971, which forced the JP Government to resign, was a last-minute move by the high command of the armed forces to forestall a radical coup (Özdemir, 1989: 226-228; Özbudun, 1990: 190-191).

iv) The military memorandum of 12 March 1971 and the increased role of the military and civil bureaucratic elite (1971-1973): The military, this time, did not go far as dissolving the parliament and assuming power directly for a fresh start. Instead, through an intervention-by-memorandum, it chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly and encouraged the formation of an impartial and credible government in order to prevent anarchy and carry out socio-economic and administrative reforms required by the 1961 Constitution (Dodd, 1990: 15, 28-29). Therefore, the 1971 military intervention can be characterised as a “half coup”. If one reason for the intervention was the failure of the JP Government to cope with political violence, a more deep-seated cause was the distrust felt towards the JP by many military and civilian bureaucrats. As a matter of fact, the 1971 memorandum, in a sense, still reflected the old cleavage between the centralist bureaucratic elite and the forces of the periphery that commanded an electoral majority in the 1960s (Özbudun, 1990: 191).

During the “technocratic” and “caretaker” governments were formed by impartial political figures in the parliament with the pressure of the Military Regime (Spring 1971-Fall 1973), the bureaucratic elite came to the forefront again but this influence had a short-
life. (Özdemir, 1989: 229-231; Dodd, 1990: 15-16, 28-29). Some military and civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals who supported the military intervention in the beginning with the hope of radical social, political and administrative reforms were the actual looser since the radical military officers were purged from the armed forces and the reform-oriented technocrat ministers resigned by the end of 1971 due to the resistance of the parliament. With the co-operation of conservative component of the armed forces and the conservative majority of the parliament under the influence of Demirel, the increased authoritarian attitude and practices of the 12 March regime mainly targeted the leftist politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals (Özdemir, 1989: 227-228, 232-233; Dodd, 1990: 15-16, 28). Thus, in the end of the era, neither reformist technocrats-bureaucrats nor leftist politicians, military and civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals achieved their goals they had at the time of memorandum. Some bureaucrats who were considered as drifted away from Kemalism or Atatürkism in anti-extremist sense the military believed were pacified or removed. Not only the bureaucratic elite was fragmented on the political level and some members were treated very badly but also the security of tenure for the civil servants, which was reinforced by the 1961 Constitution and the CSL enacted in 1965, was affected negatively by the martial law and legal amendments on the Constitution and the positive law concerning the status of the civil service (Tutum, 1972: 100; Ömür dönüşen, 1989a: 327-328). There was a real chance of preventing the development of negative politics on the part of bureaucratic elite toward the political elite since the political elite of the interim regime had a bureaucratic background (Heper, 1971: 445) but this chance was unfortunately missed due to the political volatility experienced in this period.

In the 12 March interim regime, the 1961 Constitution was extensively revised with a view to not only strengthening the executive authority through decrees having the force of law, but also to limiting certain civil liberties that were seen as responsible for the emergence of political extremism and violence. More important, perhaps, was the initiative that allowed the National Security Council, as a constitutional institution, to advise the Council of Ministers on national security issues, not just, to offer information on request. This heralded an increase in the role of military through the National Security Council in the governing of the country in the next decades (Dood, 1979: 101-102; Harris, 1988: 188; Özdemir, 1989: 226-233).
The interim regime of 1971-1973 also accelerated the disintegration process of the state elite and the new political elite. While the military, especially its higher echelons, was getting closer with the JP, some bureaucrats and intellectuals who were aware of the decline in their political and socio-economic powers and prestige accepted to co-operate with the political representatives of big bourgeoisie. The left-of-centre policy of the RPP was not appreciated by some traditional bureaucrats who were not ready to give up their socio-political privileges in a democratic system. Some other bureaucrats and intellectuals started to question Kemalist ideology and give their support to extreme-left parties other than the RPP and even to solutions out of democracy. The fragmentation within the bourgeoisie also resulted in the disintegration of the new political elite and the emergence of several parties on the right (Yücekoğ, 1983: 133-148; Şaylan, 1986: 173-184). This disintegration did not, however, bring a pluralist political structure but caused several difficulties in terms of the viability of democracy with the effect of the Turkish political culture that does not appreciate compromise and consensus.

v) **The Coalition Governments and the end of crucial role of the civil bureaucracy (1973-1980):** The interim regime legally ended with the 1973 parliamentary elections. However, the fragmentation of both the right and the left produced a National Assembly with no governing majority and made coalition governments inevitable. The 1977 parliamentary elections did not significantly change this picture either. Although the military and business circles repeatedly called a national coalition, excluding extremist parties (e.g. the National Salvation Party/Milli Selamet Partisi (NSP) and the National Action Party/Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (NAP)\(^96\)), the major parties (the RPP and the JP) resisted this idea due to fierce rivalry between their leaders. In the period of 1973-1979, various coalition governments were either led by the RPP under the premiership of Bülent Ecevit\(^97\) or led by the JP under the premiership of Demirel (i.e. the right-wing National

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\(^96\) The NSP under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan was a political combination of defence of Islamic moral and cultural values with a defence of the interests of small merchants, artisans, and businessmen. The NAP under the leadership of Alpaslan Türkeş was a representative of an ardent nationalism and anti-communism with strongly interventionist economic policy; and its tactics involved the use of militia-type youth organisation seemingly implicated in right-wing terror in the 1970s. (Özdemir, 1989: 223-225, 236-237; Özbudun, 1990: 192).

\(^97\) Bülent Ecevit (1925- ) was long served both in the RPP and the parliament. He launched the RPP’s “left-of-centre” policy in 1965. He opposed the 1971 military intervention. He became the

These coalition governments had to tackle serious economic problems, mainly stemming from internal (e.g. inward-looking and import-substituting development model) and external factors (e.g. the 1974 and 1979 Oil Shocks), as well as national (e.g. political violence) and international political problems (e.g. the Cyprus crisis, the Aegean Sea question, and the U.S. arms embargo). Towards the end of the decade, however, the political and economic conditions of the country were alarming. The inability of unstable coalition governments to take courageous policy decisions aggravated economic and political problems and resulted in the legitimacy crisis of the regime. While the RPP-led Coalition Government under the premiership of Ecevit (1978-1979) was taking some economic measures, it was heavily occupied with maintaining law and order. However, it could not succeed in overcoming economic difficulties and extinguishing political violence under the conditions of political instability and left these problems to be sorted out to its successor. Despite its shaky parliamentary support, The JP Minority Government under the premiership of Demirel (1979-1980) put into action a major austerity and reform package, known as the “January 24 Measures” (“24 Ocak Kararlari”). Although the Government put some serious steps in controlling the economic crisis through this economic stabilisation programme, it could not show the same success in the field of political violence. Political violence escalated and control seemed to be slipping more and more out of the Government’s hand. The economic situation also encouraged numbers of damaging strikes, which added to the unease and confusion both socially and economically. The parliamentary deadlock occurred over the selection of a new President of the Republic and the stiffening opposition to the Government through forcing votes of no confidence on individual ministers triggered the political crisis in the second half of 1980. In the midst of increasing political crisis, the military, as a sensitive institution to the extreme use of force by others, in particular, could not sit back and wait on events.

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party leader ousting the octogenarian İnönü in 1972. He also became the premier twice as a leader of the RPP in the 1970s. He was banned from politics for the 1980-1987 period by the 1980 military intervention. Then he returned to active politics with a new party and after a long political struggle, he managed to become the premier again in the early years of 2000s. Ecevit is internationally known as the one who took decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1974. For more information about Ecevit and his period, see Zürcher (1993).

The failure of the experiment of Turkey with democratic politics in the 1970s can be explained by several factors, which cannot be treated here in full account except one concerning the politicisation of the civil bureaucracy. If we keep in mind that the Turkish politics has always been under the scrutiny of the military, at least, since 1960, the immediate reason behind the military intervention was the growing political violence and terrorism between 1975 and 1980. Thus, in a sense, the pattern that had led to the military intervention of 1971 was repeated, only this time on a much larger and more alarming scale. It was not only the nature of the violence but also its extent was the prime factor in causing the military intervention. The military, whose main ideological bent was formed by Atatürkian nationalism, secularism and populism against ethnic nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and class conflict, was especially disturbed by these extremist ideologies. The unstable governments of the late 1970s were unable to cope with this problem as well as aggravating economic problems due to increased ideological polarisation among the political parties and deep personal rivalry among their leaders in the parliament. The lack of political tradition of making consensus on crucial issues, which is actually the most serious deficiency of the Turkish democracy since Young Turk times, aggravated the legitimacy crisis of the regime and resulted in the breakdown of the democracy (see Özdemir, 1989: 243-248; Dodd, 1990: 17-45, 93-94, 135; Özbudun, 1990: 193-194, 209).

The polarisation and politicisation of state institutions, including the Civil Service, as well as the other institutions of society such as professional associations and trade unions, contributed to the decline in the legitimacy of the political system and, in the end, the breakdown of the democracy (see Dodd, 1990: 45-48). Significant structural changes in the Turkish society caused by economic development, rural immigration and rapid urbanisation infused with expanded civil liberties and social rights provided by the 1961

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98 Developments leading to the military intervention of 12 September 1980 are now quite well documented despite perspectives and evaluations naturally differ. Apart from numerous specific articles written by Turkish and Western authors on different aspects of the failure of democracy and the military intervention (see Heper, 1984b: footnote 4; and Özman and Coşar, 2001: footnote 31), two comprehensive studies should be particularly mentioned: Dodd (1990); and Demirel (1998).
Constitution, despite the restrictive amendments made in 1971, led to ideological polarisation and political fragmentation (Karpat, 1981: 31; Dodd, 1990: 39-40, 93, 122). In this atmosphere, while the ideological gulf was deepening between the two major parties (i.e. social democrat RPP and liberal democrat JP) which had assured the survival of Turkish democracy (Karpat, 1981: 31), hard ideologies of leftist and rightist variety flourished among bureaucrats as well as intellectuals, and competed successfully with Kemalism, which was regarded by them as outdated in the face of social and economic pressures (Frey, 1975: 70). This eventually undermined the regime.

With the introduction of new ideologies into the Turkish society, ideological cleavages emerged among the bureaucrats in the late 1960s and 1970s, dysfunctional for their solidarity as a political stratum. New recruits into the civil bureaucracy did not share the group consciousness and ideological orientations of the older generation. Since they believed that the official ideology was no longer providing explicit solutions for socio-economic problems, they subscribed to new ideologies. The socialisation process was not totally successful, as new recruits were exposed to diverse influences before and after they became bureaucrats (Turan, 1984: 116). An empirical research conducted by Bozkurt in 1978 showed that the Civil Service became more heterogeneous in terms of the social origins of civil servants; the economic status and social prestige of civil servants declined; the civil servants felt themselves closer to the middle class and even the working class rather than to the ruling elite; and the tendency of leaving the Civil Service, especially among the senior civil servants, increased. Perhaps, one of most significant changes among the perceptions of civil servants was that they no longer saw themselves as the sole guardians of the public interest (see Bozkurt, 1980), despite many senior civil servants (i.e. traditional bureaucratic elite) were still unwilling to accept the reality of pluralist political life and kept their elitist tendencies in the face of politicians who seek sectional interests rather than the public interest (see Heper, 1977b; Bozkurt, 1980: 130; Heper and Kalaycioglu, 1983; and Şaylan, 1986: Chp. 5). Moreover, the changes in the structure

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99 Some empirical studies were conducted in the 1970s give some clues about the continuity and consistence in the attitude of bureaucrats. An empirical research conducted by Şaylan in 1972-1973 indicated that approximately half of the 80 bureaucrats interviewed supported to a non-party or a single-party regime in which they could protect their interests as well as the state against the interests of various classes, including those of the bourgeoisie. The great majority of them had also negative views about politicians (Şaylan, 1986: Chp. 5). In 1974, among 345 civil servants in eight central
and the functions of government due to the new roles given to government in socio-economic life also accelerated the fragmentation in the Turkish civil bureaucracy (and the Civil Service) in terms of the values, attitudes and qualities of bureaucrats. The number and importance of bureaucrats that had technical-specialist skills gradually increased at the expense of bureaucrats with only general qualifications as a result of increased complexity in government functions (Saylan, 1986: 89). Although this development could be seen as a transformation, which had prepared the necessary conditions for the transition from "status elite" type to "functional elite" type (Heper, 1973: 64 and 1975), it could not be totally successful due to heavy politicisation in the late 1970s. Since the bureaucracy was no longer monolithic as was in the 1950s and early 1960s, the relations between the bureaucracy and governments became more complex in the 1970s.

Particularly from 1973 on, "amoral partyism" (Kalaycioglu, 1988: 166) increased sharply. The political parties tried hard to capture the state by their co-ideologists. This political polarisation and fragmentation affected and undermined the civil bureaucracy as well. The lack of formal rationality and political neutrality concerns in the Turkish civil bureaucracy, which are sine qua non components of a bureaucracy in a pluralist democracy, was very influential in the politicisation of bureaucrats very easily in a short period. The bureaucrats realigned themselves behind certain ideologies and/or political parties in the 1970s, instead of defending the state as they used to (Bener, 1978: I, 65). Thus, 1973, as a starting point of unstable coalition governments, can also be considered as the beginning of the end of the significant role that the civil bureaucratic elite played in Turkey (Heper, 1987b: 137). It could hardly be expected that the bureaucrats serve

ministries, on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 with higher scores indicating a higher ranking on each scale, the mean scores for "tolerance for a democratic way of life", "elitism", "social responsibility", and "programmatic commitment" were 1.48, 3.58, 3.53, and 3.00, respectively. These scores indicated that they had reserved attitudes toward the politicians and condescending attitudes toward the bourgeoisie and the peasants, that they still saw themselves as guardian bureaucrats, and that any clash with the political elite would led them toward "negative politics" (Heper, 1977b). Again, in 1974, personal interviews conducted among 232 higher civil servants employed in major civil service departments clearly indicated that the bureaucrats displayed elitist attitudes acquired through direct socialisation at school (Heper and Kalaycioglu, 1983). Another study conducted toward the end of the period clearly indicated the continuity in elitist attitudes among the bureaucrats. In 1978, among all the interviewed civil servants in the central organisations of three ministries, only 16.5 percent disagreed with the statement that the civil servants judge the country's interests better than other citizens (Bozkurt, 1980: 130). Further empirical evidence about the elitist and unresponsive attitudes of the Turkish higher civil servants in the 1970s may be found in Heper, Kim and Pai (1980) and Heper (1993).
governments with strong extremist inclinations. The erosion in the socio-cultural homogeneity in the civil bureaucracy since the 1950s and deficiencies in its organisational structure (i.e. non-existence of centrally controlled recruitment, promotion and transfer systems based on merit), however, prevented it to form a corporate front against these governments or carry the governmental functions during the political instability. Furthermore, it could not derive enough support from its traditional allies, the RPP and the military, this time (Dodd, 1990: 46-47). The very narrow majorities in the National Assembly gave the minor radical parties an enormous bargaining, more correctly blackmailing power in coalition governments, which they effectively used to obtain strategic ministries and to colonise them with their own partisans. In other words, each ministry was brought under the complete jurisdiction of a political party as if each ministry had been appropriated by a particular political party.

At no time in contemporary Turkish history had the public agencies been so divided and politicised as in the second half of the 1970s. Changes of government were followed by extensive arbitrary purges in all ministries, involving not only the higher civil servants or political appointees, but also middle and lower level civil servants. The primary purpose behind the politicisation experienced during the 1960s and early 1970s under the JP Governments was to bring to the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy those sympathetic to the JP in order to maintain clientelistic relations with the constituencies of the JP (see Özbudun, 1981). This basic motive was coupled with unbridled political patronage and the staffing of the civil bureaucracy with sympathisers and even militants in the second half of the 1970s. The political parties managed to turn many members of the bureaucracy into political party bureaucrats. Things got so out of hand that sometimes wholesales changes in bureaucratic ranks took place even when a minister from the same political party replaced another. The ministers' success began to be measured by the number of militants they managed to plant in the agencies under their control. Thousands of new civil service posts were created in order to achieve this aim. Thus, unrestrained partisanship and nepotism became a norm in the civil service, which had retained its essentially non-political character until the mid-1970s (Tutum, 1976: 20; Heper, 1979-80: 105-106 and 1984b: 75-76; Güran, 1980: 279-298; Dodd, 1990: 18-19, 21, 26, 46-47; Özbudun, 1990: 194). Often and arbitrary reshuffles among high-ranking civil servants
reached the peak point during the RPP-led Coalition Government and the JP Minority Government (1978-1980) (Ardanç and Ergun, 1980: 11 and Güran, 1980: 290-291). Some critical posts were filled by ideologically committed militants or even by outright partisan roughnecks. Even the most sensitive agencies, such as the police and security services were not immune from such penetration of the civil bureaucracy by the political parties (Tutum, 1976: 29; Karpat, 1981: 38-40; Dodd, 1990: 18-19, 47; Özbudun, 1990: 193). Some militant civil servants also attempted to "persuade" their colleagues to their viewpoints by resorting to physical violence (Çulpan, 1980: 33). The effect of these wholesale changes in the civil bureaucracy was not only to create partisanship, but also to undermine the predictability of bureaucratic processes and to promote irresponsible government (Dodd, 1990: 47). The governments tried to render the bureaucracy into a loyal party bureaucracy rather than a legal-rational one (Heper, 1991a: 683).

In the face of this heavy politicisation, the civil servants could not enjoy the guarantees provided by the positive law regulating the status of Civil Service. Either some necessary by-laws and regulations were not enacted by the governments in time or the positive law concerned was modified and lost its original aim and coherence with some laws and decrees having the force of law enacted in this period (Tutum, 1980: 102-104; Canman, 1985: 3; Ömürşen, 1989a: 264). Transfer policy was used by the political power as a means of punishment and thus, the security of tenure was jeopardised (Güran, 1980: 279-292; Ömürşen, 1989a: 267). The Council of State became ineffective towards the end of the period as the governments fabricated all kinds of legal covers or skilfully manipulated the loopholes in the relevant positive law (Güran, 1980: Chp. III-D; Tutum, 1980: 103). The positive attitudes of the Constitutional Court and the Council of State concerning the civil bureaucracy were regarded, in particular, by the right-wing parties as bastions of the RPP mentality rather than as upholders of values of the rule of law and liberal democracy (Dodd, 1990: 19).

In every change of government in the 1970s, while a new government was rewarding its sympathisers in the bureaucracy, the rest of bureaucracy that felt deprived resorted to negative politics. Some other bureaucrats who did not blindly insist on the virtues of their rigid ideas took a sharp turn and followed an opportunistic strategy. "Negative politics" or
"alienative political involvement", occurred between the majority of the civil bureaucracy and the JP Governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Heper, 1977b), became one of the major bureaucratic reactions to the efforts on the part of governments to politicise the whole bureaucracy during the 1970s. Bureaucrats sabotaged the policies of governments viewed as hostile to their interests and ideological standpoints by distorting information or slowing down implementation (Özaktas, 1981: 10). As the bureaucrats could no longer manipulate appointments, transfers and promotions and thus keep under control political spoils, they followed these strategies through a "pathological bureaucratisation of the system". Strong bureaucratism (i.e. undue emphasis on rules and regulations) on the part of the Turkish bureaucracy became a convenient means of negative politics (Heper, 1977b: 80-82). Thus, when the military intervened in 12 September 1980, it no longer viewed the bureaucracy as the upholders of the norms that held the society together (Heper, 1994a: 669).

In Turkey, to the extent that the state-dominated political system was eroded, it tended to be replaced by a party-centred (Heper, 1985a: 100). However, with the demise of the bureaucratic centre, as a result of the polarisation and fragmentation of Turkish politics and the politicisation of the bureaucracy by the political parties in the 1970s, which was not accompanied by the rise of intermediary structures that would have exercised a moderating influence, the party-centred polity in Turkey gradually drifted toward a praetorian polity (Heper, 1987b: 137). In that polity, it could not be expect any development in the bureaucracy towards formal rationality, as reflected in narrow specialisation in administrative techniques (Heper, 1991a: 683). The result was one of the best examples of spoils system bureaucracy (Heper, 1979-1980: 105-106).

As is mentioned before, as a consequence of the increasing socio-economic and ideological differentiation in Turkish society, it became increasingly difficult to make traditional distinction between the centre and the periphery in the 1970s (Heper, 1984b: 69-70). Some members of the centre began defecting to the periphery, which had it begun to show signs of experiencing a metamorphosis toward a civil society. The most critical development in this regard was the effort of a new group under the leadership of Ecevit in the RPP to transform the Party into a class party, and thus, part company once and for all
with the traditional civil bureaucracy, and drive a wedge between the RPP and the military. The increasingly negative attitude of pro-Ecevit clique within the RPP against the technocratic governments during the Military Regime (1971-1973) and the co-operation of Ecevit with Demirel in the 1973 presidential election against the Military Regime were, in fact, good indicators for the shift of the RPP’s position within the state elite and of the RPP’s relations with the higher echelons of military bureaucracy which increasingly developed anti-leftist ideology and conservative version of Kemalism. The polarisation of the political party system also constituted a watershed vis-à-vis the politician and bureaucrat relationship. Under political pressure, the civil bureaucracy began manifesting an orientation like other members of the society in that the it gained a predominantly particularistic view, in contrast to its traditional role of guardianship of the state. Thus, as Heper emphasised, the centre, where the state elite played a crucial role for a long time, was vacated in the 1970s by the RPP and, to some extent, by the polarised civil bureaucracy and it was to be filled with even greater assertiveness by the military (Heper, 1984b: 70).

With the decline in its political importance as a result of politicisation and in its socio-economic status as a result of inflationary economic policies of the late 1970s, and the gradual loss of a sense of mission as the guardian of cultural modernisation, the civil bureaucracy moved from being a major actor of policy-making to being an obstacle which governments have to contend with in making and implementing their own policies. Thus, the bureaucratic ruling tradition reached new lows, at least, in terms of the civilian part of the bureaucracy. The military bureaucracy, however, maintained its esprit de corps and its effectiveness. It accepted “saving the Republic” (similar to “saving the state” in the Ottoman period) as a fundamental mission, assuming political responsibility in cases where civilian politics is judged to have failed (Turan, 1984: 116). Thus, toward the end of the 1970s, the guardianship of the state gradually passed from the hand of the civil bureaucratic elite to that of the military. When the military intervened in 1960, it considered the civil bureaucracy and the RPP under the leadership of İnönü as the natural allies within the state elite (Heper, 1987b: 138). In the eyes of the higher echelons of military in the end of 1970s, however, not only the highly politicised and fragmented civil bureaucracy, but also the RPP under the leadership of Ecevit, who liked to follow an
independent foreign policy from NATO and Turkey's Western allies and a more interventionist economic policy, could not be relied upon as it could in 1960. The RPP's coalition partnership with the NSP in 1974 and its flirt with the NSP again in 1980 to bring the JP Minority Government down was regarded a serious danger for the secularist pillar of the regime. The RPP's role in general amnesty in 1974, its resistance to the establishment of the state security courts to cope with political violence, and its close links with a radical trade union, the Revolutionary Workers' Confederation (the RWC/DİSK), which all were seen as an encouragement of political violence, did not escape the attention of the military either (see Özdemir, 1989: 245; Dodd, 1990: 20-22, 25, 30-31, 35-36). Therefore, the military was stacked against not only the old members of the periphery but also against its previous allies within the old centre. First time in the history of the Republic, the military took a position against the civil bureaucracy and the RPP as well other political parties. As a matter of fact, the military took the power again in 1980 in order to give an end to the political turmoil regarded too dangerous for the permanence of the state; and then it tried to redesign the structure of the state in accordance with this positional change.

vi) The military intervention of 12 September 1980 and the increased role of the military bureaucracy (1980-1983): The military intervened in 1960 largely as a reaction to the failure of democracy in the hands of the civilians, especially the new political elite represented by the DP. The 1961 Constitution recreated the state institutions in order to reinforce the position of the civil and military bureaucratic elite as well as safeguard democracy. The constitutive system, however, paralysed, particularly in the 1970s, where each political party, including the post-Inönü RPP, championed solely particularistic interests. The 1971 military intervention did not try to install any specific form of hegemony, except some authoritarian constitutional and legal amendments, and restricted itself to police measures in order to cope with the political violence. Turkey of the late 1970s, however, witnessed one of the most illustrative cases of a hegemonic crisis in the Gramscian line of thought (see Gramsci, 1973: 210): on the one hand, the collapse of political order as a result of the parliamentary deadlock and political violence; on the other, the collapse of economy as a result of import substitution strategy resulting large deficits in the balance of payments and then debt crisis. The military high command also made its
displeasure public on numerous occasions when calls for co-operation for the survival of
democratic political system were continuously turned down by the major political parties
(see Barkey, 1990a: 180; Dodd, 1990: 34; also see Arcayiirek, 1985 and 1986; and Birand,
1987). The consequence of this state of affairs was the military intervention of 12
September 1980. Under such conditions, the military intervention was generally
welcomed by Turkish people\textsuperscript{100} and somehow tolerated by the Western allies, particularly
by the U.S..\textsuperscript{101}

Although it seems paradoxically at first sight, the 1980 military intervention was an
attempt by the military to reshape the Turkish political system so that a viable democracy
would take root (Ergüder and Hofferbert, 1987) and a long-term economic transformation
would be materialised (Barkey, 1990a: 180).\textsuperscript{102} From the first moment it took over the

\textsuperscript{100} In the face of increasing bloodshed as a result of the political violence and the inability of the
politicians doing anything effective about this serious situation, the military intervention of 1980 was
generally welcomed by the public (see Dodd, 1990: 34, 49). It should also be pointed out that the
Turkish military reflects the larger society’s somewhat ambivalent values toward democracy: a belief
in general appropriateness and desirability of democracy for Turkey and some of the anti-liberal,
anti-deviationist, anti-compromise and intolerant attitudes embedded in the Turkish political culture
(Dodd, 1990: 112-113; Özbudun, 1990: 207). Furthermore, in the face of heavy polarisation and
fragmentation in the society, the military’s claim that the armed forces were the only institution
capable of representing the general interest of the society was received general acceptance from the
public. For the last point, especially in the case of developing countries, see Silberman (1993: 422-
423). It is sometimes claimed that the military did not work effectively enough, even under the
conditions of martial law, to stop the political violence in order to legitimise its forthcoming
intervention (Kafaoğlu, 2001: 14). It can be argued, however, that if the two major parties had been
able to unite to put down political violence they could have been successful. The lack of political
direction combined with the politicisation of the civil authorities made the military’s task difficult.
Once in power the military soon showed that tackled with rigour by a united government with the
public behind it violence could be easily controlled (see Dodd, 1990: 34, 135).

\textsuperscript{101} The military intervention of 1980 in Turkey was somehow tolerated by the Western governments
as well under extraordinary international political conditions (i.e. the Islamic Revolution in Iran and
the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan) that bolstered Turkey’s strategic position in the eyes of her
Western allies, at least in the eye of the U.S.. For the main strategic reasons behind the harmonious
relations between Turkey and the U.S. and the Reagan administration’s effort to persuade the
European countries, which were more critical about the Military Regime, to look favourably on
Turkey during the Military Regime, see Dodd (1990: 65; also see footnote 59 in this chapter). The
military intervention was also seen as a necessary or, at least, facilitating step in carrying on the
economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme (see Birand and Yağcı, 2001: 110-111;
Kafaoğlu, 2001: 14). It cannot be denied either that the military felt to delay the date of intervention
throughout the year of 1980 until the economy was basically put on the right track by the economic
programme (see Çolaşan, 1983; and Birand, 1987).

\textsuperscript{102} As we pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, it may come as a paradox to an Anglo-Saxon
student of politics that the military as a part of the state elite in Turkey try to “save” democracy from
“irresponsible” political elite in a party-centred polity in which no genuine intermediary structures
are available through a state-centred polity in which the state elite, either military or civilian, acted as
pseudo-intermediary structures for “moderating”conflict (see Heper, 1985a: 150). It should be
government, the Military Regime made it clear that it intended to eventually return power
to democratically elected civilian authorities, as were happened in the cases of 1960 and
1971. Therefore, the overall aim was not “away” but “toward” democratic government.
The interruption in the democratic process was more in the nature of re-equilibration of
democracy than full-blown authoritarian interlude. Despite its elitist attitude and distrust
in political parties and politicians representing particularistic interests rather than the
national interest, the commitment of the Turkish military to democracy in the final analysis
distinguishes it from its Latin American and the Third World counterparts. The
pointed out, however, that this interventionist attitude of the military cannot be justified even on
rational democracy ground (see Özman and Coşar, 2001: 92-93).

The emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes as a backlash to the expansive and
inclusionary politics and import-substituting economic development model both in Turkey and many
Latin American countries, notably Argentina, Brazil and Chile, in the 1960s and 1970s naturally gave
rise to numerous studies comparing the economic and socio-political similarities among such
countries (see O’Donnell, 1988; and Barkey, 1990a). It is generally admitted that the political
violence and economic bottlenecks associated with the development strategy based on import-
substitution resulted in military interventions (Özbudun, 1990: 213-214). This argument is
unmistakable, with the exception that military regimes were always of much shorter duration and less
repressive in Turkey due to the Turkish military’s commitment to democracy as a result of its distinct
historical background, Turkey’s political commitments to its Western allies and organisations, and
Turkey’s well established state tradition which critically differs Turkey from Latin American
counterparts as well as other developing countries. The Turkish military has been interested neither
in setting up a long-term authoritarian regime nor in supporting a specific socio-economic class or
political group as happened in many Latin American countries. Although the military as well as
other actors in Turkish society has had some rent-seeking activities (see Amelung, 1991), there was
no complex network of mutual favours among the military, the civil bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie.
It always intervened essentially for putting an end to the drifting of the regime into what it perceived
as a debilitating democracy and for restructuring the democracy so as to renders it more viable, as it
knew best (e.g. the creation of the National Security Council in the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions).
Under the conditions of moratorium put on political activities, the military wanted to get down to the
rational business of government, hoping to achieve rapid and sustained results. Then it quickly
returned to barracks (Heper, 1987d: 61 and 1990a: 324; Dodd, 1990: 1, 27; Barkey, 1990a: 187; see
also Heper, 1992c and Heper and Güney, 2000). It should also be noted that when the military was
in power it was, for military regimes, remarkably sensitive to the need to rule by consent, and with
extensive civilian advice in making new constitutions and constitutional amendments and through
technocratic civilian cabinets. This can be regarded as a natural result of a tradition of military
closeness to the state, especially developed through the military participation in politics during the
Young Turk and the National Liberation periods. Apart from enabling the military rule with greater
degree of success in the face of complex political and socio-economic issues, this mode of
governance also made the return to barracks easier (Dodd, 1990: 5-6, 28). Furthermore, during the
military interventions in question the military elite realised that although it had no other choice but to
intervene from time to time, it was next to impossible to regulate democracy to its own satisfaction.
After each military intervention, the regime, the military tried to regulate, was immediately spoiled
by the politicians in a party-centred politics. In particular, the military came to the conclusion in the
late 1980s and 1990s that trying to clamp an official ideology on the polity was a futile attempt, and
that in the process its prestige suffered too. As Heper emphasised, this crucial decision on its part
meant that there was now more scope in Turkey for “politics” (1990a: 325-326). As a matter of fact,
the military has preferred to intervene in politics since 1983 in indirectly ways rather than coups. For
example, the centre-right Coalition Government under the premiership of Erbakan was forced to
resign in the early 1998 by serious decisions taken by the National Security Council against the anti-
military made it equally clear, however, that it did not intend to return to the *status quo ante* but intended to the "re-equilibration of democracy". The military rather aimed at a major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent a recurrence of the political polarisation and fragmentation, and violence that had afflicted the country in the late 1970s, and thus to make the military's continued involvement in politics unnecessary (Özbudun, 1990: 195, 199, 207, 213-215; see also Dodd, 1990: 1, 25). In other words, with an ambitious plan for restructuring Turkish political institutions, this was to be the military intervention that would end all interventions (Barkey, 1990a: 187). Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that when the military intervened in Turkish politics in 1980 a new chapter began in Turkish political-bureaucratic development. In the eyes of the military, the crisis essentially indicated to the one major failure of the system: "the almost complete erosion of the dominant state" in the absence of intermediary structures with a moderating influence (Heper, 1991a: 683). The military's conclusion was that the "state had to be revived" (Heper, 1985a: Chp. VI). Since the intermediary structures in question could be no other than political parties and the civil bureaucracy, it was not surprising that the political parties and the civil bureaucracy became the first targets of the Military Regime in the revival of the state in the early 1980s. As Heper aptly points out, in the post-1980 restructuring of the Turkish political system the military reserved for itself the "mission of the guardianship of the state" (1991a: 683-684). As a result of the military's historical weight in politics, it could be said that almost no one in the Turkish politics can rival the "political importance of the military" (Harris, 1988: 178), at least, in the early 1980s.

Within this framework, the Military Regime of 1980-1983, under the presidency of General Kenan Evren and the premiership of Bülent Ulusu, unlike the previous ones,
ambitiously aimed at political, economic, and administrative restructurings. On the political sphere, the organs of the state, the party system, the electoral system, etc. were redesigned. On the economic sphere, the application of economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme of 1980 was carried on. On the administrative sphere, some serious steps were taken in order to make the bureaucracy neutral and rational. All these political, economic, and administrative re-engineering attempts can be viewed as an attempt to establish a new hegemony, but obviously with no well-defined hegemonic project or coherent ideological system (Tünay, 1993: 19). The Military Regime’s attempt to curtail the unchecked liberal pluralism provided by the 1961 in the face of the nasty experience of the 1970s gave the state elite a much better chance of enhancing its autonomy vis-à-vis society (see Yeşilada, 1988; Dodd, 1990: 87, 90, 124; and Barkey, 1990a: 187-189). In fact, such an attempt was long suggested by the right-wing of the political elite. Furthermore, as will be explained below, the military elite’s attitude towards the political elite in terms of the saving of state norms also modified to some extent with the change in the interpretation of Kemalism. Despite all its rhetoric about the maintenance and further development of the secular Kemalist thought, the Military Regime tried to counter balance the revolutionary left forces by providing support to religious and nationalist movements (i.e. “the Turco-Islamic synthesis”/“Türk-İslam sentezı”). The military’s inclination to move away from étatist economic policy to liberal economic policy was also a good indicator for the effect of the New Rightist economic formulations. Although the Military Regime did not pursue any specific hegemonic project, its attempts in many spheres paved the way for the hegemony of the New Right, under the dictum of “strong state and free economy” through the MP under the leadership of Özal in the 1980s since such attempts significantly changed the balance of political forces and social and economic views in the Turkish society.

bureaucrats and retired high-ranking military officers, was immediately formed under the premiership of Bülent Ulusu, who was the former commander of the Navy, and stayed in power during the Military Regime. The NSC of the Military Regime should not be confused with the National Security Council of 1961 and 1982 Constitutions.

105 Such political and economic orientations occupied a central position in the New Right formation, and in its internal conflicts and contradictions as well, in Turkey (see Dodd, 1990: 129-133; and Eralp, Tünay, and Yeşilada, 1993: 4; for the Turco-Islamic synthesis, see Toprak, 1990).
On the political sphere, having re-established socio-political order by repressing political violence through the effective use of security forces under martial law, the Military Regime re-arranged political system without any serious opposition (Yeşilada, 1988; Dodd, 1990: Chp. 3 and 4). The Military Regime excluded all organised political groups from any meaningful role in the transition period in contrast to the previous cases. All political parties, including the RPP, were disbanded and former political leaders were prohibited from active politics. Although ideological influence of the centre-right (i.e. the liberal and conservative intellectual, bureaucratic and business circles) was felt much more in both political and economic spheres, the Military Regime did not rely on a specific political party or a socio-economic group but on General Evren's intrinsically popular personality (see Dodd, 1990: 59, 79-80, 84, 109-110). The 1982 Constitution and many significant laws concerning political parties and elections, which were prepared by the NSC itself in collaboration with the NSC-appointed and no-party Consultative Assembly (Danışma Meclisi). The Military Regime encouraged the establishment of a party system comprising two or three brand new political parties, which would function responsibly as well as responsively (see Turan, 1988: 73-75). It preferred a proportional representation system with a high national and constituency thresholds, which would ensure stable parliamentary majorities (Barkey, 1990a: 189; Dodd, 1990: 88). The new institutional-legal arrangements reflected the aim and concern of the military and indicated the extent to which Turkey's new attempt at democracy was intended to be different from its earlier democratic experiments (Özbudun, 1990: 195). These were all formal aspects of the attempts to restructure Turkish politics and restrain some of its tendencies towards polarisation and fragmentation experienced in the 1970s (Ergüder, 1991: 152).

In addition to these re-engineering attempts in the party and electoral systems, state institutions and, in particular, the executive organ was reinforced in the 1982 Constitution in order to guard the state effectively. The executive organ was divided into a dualistic executive: the "president" as a "statist" executive and the "council of ministers" as a "political" executive. The 1982 Constitution transformed the Presidential Office, as a part of the executive function, from largely ceremonial one, as it was under the 1961 Constitution, into a much more powerful one with effective autonomous powers. Whereas the 1961 Constitution had entrusted the guardianship of the state to the bureaucratic elite,
1982 Constitution concentrated power in the hands of the impartial president, both symbolically and effectively (Heper, 1987b: 139; Dodd, 1990: 91, 139; Özbudun, 1990: 196). Although the system of government is essentially kept as parliamentary rather than semi-presidential, the president's power is considerably enhanced (see Rumpf, 1988: 231; Turhan, 1989: Chp. 3). The 1982 Constitution strengthened not only the president but also the other part of the executive organ, the council of ministers. The council of ministers was strengthened against the legislative and judicial organs especially in terms of the law-making power (i.e. issuing decree having the force of law with greater ease), in contrast to the original text of the 1961 Constitution. The position of the prime minister within the council of ministers was fortified in accordance with aim of strong executive organ. The prime minister vis-à-vis his ministers is no longer primus inter pares. The framers of the 1982 Constitution aimed at a Turkish version of Kanzlerdemokratie. It was true that they considered "bringing the state back in" indispensable. (see Tachau and Heper, 1983; and Turhan, 1989: Chp.3). Thus, the executive organ designed by the 1982 Constitution turned out to be a "compromise" between the state elite and the political elite since each one had its own separate executive, a statist executive, on the one hand, and a political executive, on the other (Heper, 1990c: 306). Although such an arrangement was made to have a viable democracy in the light of the terrible experience in the 1970s, the most significant part of the executive organ for the constitution-makers was the president.

According to the 1982 Constitution, the president, as a new locus of the state with the military, is obligated to safeguard the principles and reforms of Atatürk. The place of Atatürkian (or Kemalist) thought was, however, significantly changed in the Turkish polity in the 1980s in accordance with the change in the centre. The emerging state-civil society confrontation differed in one fundamental respect from the traditional centre-periphery conflict. In this new confrontation, the state elite did not assume sole possession of truth, and thus did not presume it was inherently superior to the civil society. Atatürkism began to be considered as the only justification for the state elite to assume for

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106 It can be argued that such a constitutional arrangement is not surprising since General Evren would be in the Presidential Office until 1989 according to 1982 Constitution and coming presidents, in the mind of the military, will be likely to have military backgrounds like many former presidents.

107 The term "Atatürkism" (İzatürcülük), is preferred by the military, has particularly been in fashion since the military intervention of 1980 because the term "Kemalism", is generally used by foreign authors, connotes radical secular and étatist policies of the single party period.
itself the responsibilities of seeing to it that the general interest was not given short shrift. If the politicians’ proposals coincided with the demands and interests of some sectors of the civil society, those proposals were not *ipso facto* rejected. Thus, Atatürkism was not regarded any more as a source for all public policies. The military as the state elite was no longer take it as an ideology in the Shilsian sense, but reverted back to the original notion of it as a mentality or worldview. The drawing up of economic policy, for example, was left to the government and the civil bureaucracy was redesigned in accordance with the economic policies of the governments and the interests of some entrepreneurial groups. The military’s interpretation of secularism became more conciliatory than it had been in the past. Atatürkism served however, as a justification for rejecting the radical ideologies of the leftist, rightist, religious and separatist varieties (see Heper, 1984b: 70, 1987b: 139 and 1987d: 61).

In parallel to the change in the interpretation of Atatürkism, the place and importance of Atatürkian thought in Turkish politics and social life degraded in the 1980s. Although Atatürkism was particularly emphasised in many articles of the 1982 Constitution and speeches of Evren, it was seen that Atatürkism could not be a substitute for Turco-Islamic moral values (Heper, 1987b: 140). This new approach has led to a new visibility of Islam in Turkey (see Heper, 1981a). Thus, the Military Regime resorted to Atatürkian thought, this time, for discovering Turco-Islamic historical and moral values and developing a new normative ethics. In brief, although Atatürkism were in the forefront in the rhetoric of both the Military Regime and civilian governments of the 1980 and most part of the 1990s, many of its crucial principles (e.g. secularism, nationalism, and étatism) were consciously rendered ineffective by the counter policies of these governments (e.g. moderate Islam, Turkish nationalism, and liberal economy, respectively) as result of the change in the interpretation of Atatürkism. This trend could be easily detected especially in various policies of the Military Regime of Evren and the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal in the 1980s.

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108 During the Military Regime Turkey’s political and economic relations with the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries increased with rather pragmatic aims (Dodd, 1990: 66). Later, Özal and the leading figures of the MP adopted a concessionary attitude toward Islamic political and economic activities in Turkey in accordance with their worldviews.

109 The 1980s marked a new trend both in domestic and foreign policies of the Republic – a trend which culminated in the revival of the Muslim identity of Turkey and the establishment of closer
Just like the political sphere, the economic and administrative spheres were also affected by the Military Regime. Once in power, the Military Regime immediately announced its adherence to the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme launched by the JP Minority Government in 1980 as the only way out of Turkey's economic crisis. It also demonstrated its commitment by picking the technical architecture of the programme, Özal as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic matters. From political perspective, the Military Regime provided the programme with forward momentum (see Yeşilada, 1988: 351-352; Barkey, 1990a: 180-181; Dodd, 1990: 59-60; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 89). The economic policy of the Military Regime was also in a good accordance with the economic prescriptions of the international financial institutions and the anti-government policies of many Western governments including the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. As a matter of fact, this approach was enthusiastically taken over by the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal in the 1980s (see Aktan, 1988; and Tünay, 1993).

Some important steps were also taken by the Military Regime in order to clean up and restructure the administrative system of the country. Like previous ones, after the military intervention of September 12, 1980, the Military Regime tried to reshape the Turkish administrative system including the Civil Service according to its political and economic links between Turkey and the Middle East and a souring of relations with the West, except the U.S.. Despite efforts to integrate Turkey into the world market, the 1980s witnessed a serious deterioration of Turkey's political and economic links with Western Europe. As Western Europe increasingly distanced itself from Turkey due to Turkey's military rule and human rights record, the U.S. took on a more supportive position and had a chance to apply its "moderate Islam" fantasy in the region. This situation constituted a major turning point not only in terms of Turkey's foreign policy but also in its identity. Since Atatürk as a founder of the modern Republic opted for development in line with the Western model of modernisation, Turkey has maintained the political goal to become part of the West. Western Europe's decision to distance itself from Turkey enabled those anti-Western forces in Turkey to use this to challenge the vitality of Westernisation. Ironically, the domestic policies of the Military Regime, as is partly mentioned in this thesis, helped to strengthen the position of the anti-Western forces. Efforts by the military to use soft forms of religious belief and nationalistic feeling (i.e. "the Turco-Islamic synthesis") as a buffer against radical ideologies of the right and left eventually allowed a hitherto suppressed Muslim identity a voice. This is ironic, because the military was one institution in Turkey that had always opposed religious and other anti-Western groups. Closer political and economic ties with the Middle East and disenchantment with Westernisation-modernisation policies at home prompted a search for new ways of development and a new identity. With this shift in the early 1980s, Islamic identity became more visible during the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal. The adherents of the Turco-Islamic synthesis began to occupy important positions in the state apparatus in the 1980s (see Dodd, 1990: 129-133; Eralp, Tünay, and Yeşilada, 1993: 4).
administrative and economic understanding (Emre, 1986: 35; Karaer, 1987a: 3). In the programme of the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime, it was stated that the structure of the Turkish public administration which had become outmoded had to be reviewed thoroughly, and the positive law on the Civil Service regime had to be rearranged. It was also asserted that “over-centralisation”, “imbalance in the distribution of duties, authority and responsibilities”, “over-staffing”, “idle capacity”, “inefficiency”, “red-tape”, and “ politicisation” were the main illnesses of the Turkish public administration. The civil bureaucracy, in particular, was mentioned as “an obstacle to economic development” (Başbakanlık, 1982b: 276).

The heavy politicised and cumbersome civil bureaucracy was especially targeted by the Military Regime. All bridges were burned between these two traditionally allied institutions, which for centuries had alternated as props for and/or incarnations of the Ottoman-Turkish state (Heper, 1984b: 66). A tight hierarchical control enforced by the Military Regime over the all parts of the civil bureaucracy as well the affairs of political parties, judicial organs, the trade unions, professional interest associations and universities. This orientation and the measures taken brought the Military Regime close to a being an ideological polity (Heper, 1987b: 142).

The military’s concern with the civil bureaucracy was characterised by two parallel orientations: ideological and technical orientations. Since the ideological stances of the civil servants were considered more critical than their efficiency and effectiveness, first priority was given to the issue of restoring the impartiality of politicised and polarised civil bureaucracy (Heper, 1987b: 142). The civil bureaucracy had rather low esteem due to the heavy politicisation in the eyes of the military (Heper, 1987b: 141-142). In this regard, the Military Regime sought to create an impartial civil bureaucracy rather than a purposive and activist state bureaucracy imbued with capacities suitable to the representation of the state interest (Dodd, 1990: 111). General Evren accused those in the civil bureaucratic ranks of having subscribed to “reactionary ideas” and “perverted ideologies” (Başbakanlık, 1982a). He also warned that the civil servants should loyally serve the new regime and

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110 Turkish governments have always tried to make the civil bureaucracy a loyal institution to the political power. The efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy was not adequately appreciated until the serious governability crisis in the early 2000s.
should not attempt to take their cues from the former political leaders (Heper, 1984b: 66, 81). Earlier this point was also implied in the programme of the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime, submitted on 27 September 1980 (Başbakanlık, 1982b).

The Military Regime took some serious actions to “clean up” the politicised elements and tame the whole civil bureaucracy was through authoritarian measures such as administrative and penal punishment, transfer in office, discharge from the Civil Service, and early retirement (see Heper, 1987b: 141-142 and 1984b: 66-67; Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 329-333). In order to use these measures, some restrictive modifications were made in the related positive law at the expense of civil servants and the way of judicial review over these measures was closed. Thus, the Military Regime wanted to design “a status that is similar to the status of military officers” (Duran, 1984: 12). These legal modifications and practices, however, harmed both individual rights and the security of tenure (Aksoy, 1988; Duran, 1988: 116-119; Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 332). Beside these highly authoritarian measures, some positive steps were taken by the Military Regime to ensure impartiality in the civil bureaucracy (e.g. the State Personnel Department was hold responsible for regulating entrance examinations for the Civil Service). But, most of them, including the central examination system, could not be put into practice or simply abolished by the following civilian governments.

The Military Regime’s effort to control and manipulate the civil bureaucracy, however, faced some difficulties. Such difficulties especially stemmed from the fact that the military is ultimately dependent upon civil bureaucrats for critical information about public policies. This proves to be the case even when it comes to the question of whom to purge, retire or to promote (Heper, 1984b: 68). As a Turkish journalist indicated, it is risky to operate a policy of strengthening the state through purge on a patient with an operating crew whose objectiveness is doubtful at best (Erel, 1981a). This situation is exacerbated by the fact under the Military Regime the political parties were completely banned; the mass media was rather cautious in their criticisms; interest and pressure groups were subdued though not completely suppressed; and the jurisdictions of the high courts were somewhat circumscribed. Furthermore, the Military Regime’s effort to control and manipulate the civil bureaucracy had dysfunctional effects upon the bureaucracy.
Certainly, the morale of the civil servants was adversely affected. Many senior civil servants, and also many academicians and judicial officials, were alienated while at the same time a tendency of exodus from the public service including the civil service became more remarkable. There had been a long trend among, in particular, senior civil servants, to leave the civil service for better posts elsewhere (see Canman, 1975 and Bozkurt, 1980: 143-148) but the exodus in the early years of 1980s far surpassed the earlier trend (Heper, 1984b: 68 and footnote 17).

During the interregnum, there were also some technical efforts of the military to mould the civil bureaucracy into a legal-rational one. In fact, this task was taken within the general framework of reorganisation of administrative system. During the early 1982, the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime asked for power to “streamline the civil bureaucracy structurally” by governmental decrees so as to make it more efficient and effective, that is render it into “a legal-rational institution” (Heper, 1984b: 68-69 and 1987b: 142). In the summer of 1982, a bill was enacted (i.e. the Law numbered 2680) to enable the Government to reform all sections of the civil bureaucracy. In order to reach this goal, three commissions were established to determine problems and find solutions for the employment policy, the public personnel regime, and the reorganisation of public administration (Başbakanlık, 1982c: 6). Although these commissions produced their reports and submitted them to the Government (Emre, 1986: 37; Karaer, 1987a: 85), the legal procedure about these proposals could not be completed due to the 1983 general parliamentary elections. But, it should be emphasised that proposals of these commissions deeply affected the legal-institutional arrangements made by the MP Governments in the Turkish administrative system including the Civil Service.

In the Technocratic Government’s programme, it was stated that the Civil Service was much larger than was necessary and, therefore, overstaffing would be eliminated gradually in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service (Başbakanlık 1982a: 277). This approach to the civil bureaucracy was an upshot of the fact that, unlike the earlier ones, the Military Regime had, particularly in economic matters, “a less étatist orientation” (Heper, 1994a: 669). Since the military shed its earlier prejudice toward the private sector in the early years of the 1980s (Heper, 1984b: 77), the Military
Regime placed emphasis on making the civil bureaucracy more responsive to the demands of the real economy. This approach was, in fact, as an extension of the economic policy put forward in the early 1980 by the JP Minority Government under the premiership of Demirel. The military envisaged a political system in which responsibility concerning economic matters would be left to the political elite. In this respect, the Military Regime evinced additional characteristics that properly belong to a liberal polity (Heper, 1987b: 142).

Thus, the nature of the state, its locus, and some features of bureaucracy were critically reviewed by the Military Regime. While Turkey had experienced a high degree and large scope of stateness during the single-party years, such features of the polity became the main political issue during the pre-1980 multi-party politics. Toward the end of this period, as is explained above, the state became impaired. In the early 1980s, Turkish polity had high degree stateness with a narrow scope (Heper, 1987b: 132). The military, with the president, became the new locus of the state with the effect of 1982 Constitution. The civil bureaucracy was no longer as an influential part of the state elite. The state elite, represented exclusively by the president and the higher echelons of the military represented in the NSC, came up with a rather narrow definition of its responsibilities (Heper 1987d). There was a clear division of labour between the state and the political elites (Karpat, 1988). The state elite considered itself responsible, first and foremost, for the internal as well as the external security of the country (Heper 1987d). It felt that it was no longer responsible for political, particularly economic, issues. The definition of general interest was no longer viewed by the state elite as an all-embracing task in the light of Atatürkism (Heper, 1988). The mixed characteristics of the Military Regime in terms of the nature of the state (i.e. ideological polity in terms of political-administrative matters and liberal polity in terms of economic matters)\textsuperscript{111}, as Heper indicates, brought two different models of bureaucracy in the early 1980s: one approximating a machine model, another resembling the some aspects of Weberian legal-rational model (1987b: 142). Despite the partial effects of these models, it should be admitted that the Turkish bureaucracy still reflected the general characteristics of "patrimonial-legal bureaucracy" during the first half of the 1980s.
vii) General remarks on the period in which the bureaucratic ruling tradition on trial: During the period of 1950-1984, several distinct patterns of relationship emerged between the politicians and the civil bureaucracy on the one hand and the civil bureaucracy and the military bureaucracy on the other. The Turkish political elite launched crusades against the civil bureaucracy time after again. The basic motive behind these crusades was to reduce the socio-political influence of the civil bureaucracy and make it loyal to government at time.

First, in the 1950s, the DP attempted to cut the ties of the civil bureaucracy with the RPP and make it loyal to its governments. Although the DP Governments tried to transform Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat style bureaucracy inherited from the single-party period into a party-book one in a party-centred polity, the civil bureaucracy managed to preserve its autonomy, if not its sovereignty. The civil bureaucracy attempted to act as a veto group in alliance with the other members of the traditional centre (i.e. the RPP, the military bureaucracy, and Kemalist intellectuals). Kemalism as the essence of the ideological legitimisation was the basic weapon at the disposal of the centre. Later, the DP Governments resorted to policy of creating alternative power structures outside the traditional Civil Service while adversely affecting the political and socio-economic position of the civil bureaucracy in the polity.

Second, after the military interventions of 1960 and 1971, the civil bureaucracy attempted to become the locus of the state again together with the military with the effect of the 1961 Constitution. Despite the constitutional and political-administrative re-engineering attempts of the military, the revivals of the bureaucratic ruling tradition had a short life.

Third, during the second half of the 1960s and particularly during the 1970s, the traditional-Kemalist civil bureaucracy lost the battle on more than one front in a polity away from the state-centred to the party-centred. The political elite of these years attempted to eliminate what was left from the influence of the civil bureaucratic elite, and

111 Such a conservative and liberal mix is actually not unfamiliar to the New Right ideology, as is
turn the civil servants into the servants of the political party. These attempts coincided with, and in turn, further contributed to the disintegration of the traditional centre in Turkey. With the defect of the RPP to the periphery-so-called civil society, the traditional bureaucrats lost one of most important allies against the new political elite. As a consequence of socio-economic differentiation and fragmentation in the civil bureaucracy as well as in the society, a new type of bureaucrat-technocrats who had technical skills and better socio-economic conditions started to replace the traditional bureaucrats in critical positions in the civil bureaucracy. A change also seemed to develop in the dialogue between the civil bureaucracy and the political elite toward a softening of relations between them, partly as a result of the gradual decline in the homogenous character of the bureaucracy and the increase in the strength of the bourgeoisie. This was, however, not a smooth development. While some parts of the bureaucracy accepted the legitimacy of the political elite in return for some benefits such as promotion, the rest of it still stuck to a strategy sabotaging governments' policies. When they were in power, the “anti-bureaucracy” political parties, the DP of the 1950s and its follower, the JP in the second half of the 1960s, therefore, tried to make the civil bureaucracy loyal to their governments and capture the state from within. However, these parties did not have the basis from which to act responsibly, so, they could not create a proper Turkish party-book bureaucracy (i.e. Parteienstaat) in the relative absence of a developed civil societal elements (e.g. interest group associations). They put efforts to render the bureaucracy responsive to the constitutive system, but not to make it more meritorious.

Fourth, the constitutive system, especially during the Coalition Governments of the 1970s dominated by extremist parties, attempted at eliminating the autonomy of the civil bureaucracy through heavy politicisation and polarisation never seen before. One important motive of such attempt was to render the civil bureaucracy into an entity, which did not have substantive rationality of its own. In brief, the political parties, the RPP and the JP as well as their extremist coalition partners, pursued deliberate policies to redesign the civil bureaucracy in accordance with the model of bureaucracy in their minds. The party-book model and then, in particular in the second half of the 1970s, spoils system model was welcomed by the political parties. Thus, in the eve of the 1980 military
intervention the civil bureaucracy was no longer able to safeguard the state and uphold the norms that held the society together.

Fifth, the Military Regime of the early 1980s sought to neutralise the extremely polarised and politicised civil bureaucracy and tried to establish a machine model for it in a state-centred polity. According to the military elite, it was a non-autonomous civil bureaucracy, closely watched and supervised through hierarchical supervision, but, at the same time, suffused with Atatürkism in a version in the minds of the military elite. The civil bureaucracy was to be re-institutionalised and rationalised in accordance with the need of the economy but it was not to be elevated to the same level as the military in running the affairs of the state. Despite the intention and effort of the Military Regime in this direction, when the MP captured political power in fall of 1983, it faced a bureaucracy still having patrimonial-legal characteristics.

In brief, the pre-1984 period in Turkey, the state had long dominated civil society and there had been an absence of constructive involvement in politics by the representatives of the organised interests. To the extent to which the political elite had the upper hand since the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey, the state-centred polity was replaced by a party-centred polity, but not by a bourgeoisie polity. An uncompromising confrontation occurred between the state and political elites structured around cultural as well as newly developed functional cleavages. As soon as the hand of the political elite was strengthened, the bureaucratic elite as a part of the state elite adopted a hostile attitude against the political elite. The bureaucratic elite attempted to sabotage the political elite’s policies overtly or. Under these circumstances it was not possible for the political elite to transform the pathologically bureaucratised the civil bureaucracy into a legal-rational bureaucracy. Actually, it had not any intention to do so. The political elite’s response was that of an effort to completely de-bureaucratise and politicise it. As Heper indicates, the Turkish political elite never believed in an autonomous bureaucratic organisation that it could fall back on for guidance (1984b: 74). Consequently, there was no hint of a shift by the civil bureaucracy away from substantive rationality, as reflected in reason of state in the Turkish context, and toward instrumental rationality, as reflected in
narrow specialisation in managerial techniques and the norms of efficiency and effectiveness (Heper, 1989b: 462).

This historical overview indicates that the relationship between the state, the constitutive system, and the bureaucracy (i.e. the bureaucratic ruling tradition) has not solely been determined by some political factors (e.g. the type of government regime, political regime or party-system) in Turkey. In addition to the effects of these political factors and socio-economic transformation the country experienced, the place and role of the state (i.e. the strong state tradition) in the polity has strategically affected this relationship in a historical continuum. Although fundamental changes occurred in the political and socio-economic structure of the country during the last two centuries, the civil and military bureaucracies have managed to keep their influence in different kinds and degrees with the effect of the deep-seated tradition of historical bureaucratic ruling. And this tradition, with its strong and weak aspects, gives us important clues about the attitudes of bureaucrats in the face of the MP’s anti-bureaucracy policies.

C) A General Situation of the Turkish Bureaucracy before 1984

The relationship between the civil bureaucrats, politicians and military officers was generally free from tension in Turkey when the centre-periphery cleavage was in full swing, when the political legitimisation was mainly along cultural-ideological lines, and when the centre was firmly represented by the state elite comprising the civil and military bureaucracy and Kemalist politicians and the periphery was a nebulous entity. A similar state of affairs may occur in a polity where the state-civil society confrontation is dominant, where the political legitimisation is mainly along functional (economic) lines, and where politicians act not only responsively but also responsibly and civil and military bureaucrats operate within the legal and rational framework designed by the politicians. As Turkey experienced a long lasting “transition period” (i.e. transition from the cultural cleavage to the functional cleavage) during the second half of the twentieth century, the relationship between such main actors in the polity were not free from such tension. The consequence of the interactions with tension was a “decay” rather than “improvement” in the civil bureaucracy (Heper, 1984b: 80)
Thus, in the pre-1984 period in Turkey, the political values of the civil bureaucracy were always an important issue. The bureaucratic elite tried to keep its substantive values developed during the single-party years stubbornly. Since a genuine middle-class and its ethic was absent in the social development of modern Turkey, it was almost impossible to translate such middle-class values as profit into such administrative values as efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, efforts to de-institutionalise and re-institutionalise the bureaucracy were not, and perhaps could not be, paralleled by efforts to bureaucratise it properly, that is, to create a “legal-rational” bureaucracy. It was never realised that infusing political values to what was a patrimonial bureaucracy (i.e. a bureaucracy guided by general moral norms but its functions are ill defined) could not have activated it toward the desired goals. In the period of 1950-1984, as it did in the late nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth centuries, the Turkish public bureaucracy evinced strong patrimonial-legal characteristics.

In this last section of the Chapter, the legal, structural and cultural-behavioural characteristics of the pre-1984 Turkish bureaucracy will be reviewed briefly in order to obtain necessary clues to analyse the MP Governments' reform attempts in the Turkish bureaucracy including the Turkish Civil Service. As we cited throughout in this Chapter, the legal, structural and cultural-behavioural aspects of the Turkish bureaucracy have long been subject to various descriptive or empirical studies. In these studies, some contradictory features in the legal-structural aspect of the Turkish bureaucracy (e.g. fragmentation, disintegration, and politicisation and corruption vs. centralisation, unification and standardisation, and legal rules and guarantees) have come to the forefront. Some incompatible political and administrative attitudes of the Turkish bureaucrats with democratic political system and rational administrative system have also been referred. Without any doubt, it is inevitable to analyse the structural and cultural aspects of the bureaucracy in an integrated way since they are quite related to each other. Within the

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112 For legal, structural, and cultural-behavioural characteristics of the Turkish bureaucracy, for example, see, Kingsbury and Akkan (1955); Matthews (1955); Caldwell (1957); Bradburn (1963), TODAIE (1963, 1992b and 1992c); Frey (1965); Mihçioğlu (1964 and 1968); Bent (1969); Dodd (1969); Roos and Roos (1968 and 1971); Sürğit (1972); Tutum (1972); Heper (1974a, 1975, 1976a, 1977a, 1977b, 1984b and 1993); Cem (1976); Bozkurt (1980); Güran (1980); Heper; Kim and Pai
framework of discussion made in this Chapter and in the light of such legal-structural and cultural-behavioural aspects, the general characteristics of the Turkish civil bureaucracy the MP faced when it came to power can be summarised as follows:

(i) The place and role of the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity gradually strengthened with the effect of legal codification and centralisation activities (Chambers, 1964: 301-327; Ortaylı, 1983: 88-120). Despite some fluctuations during the last two centuries, the status of the Civil Service, as the major component of the Turkish bureaucracy was improved and the civil servants were equipped with some legal, financial and social guarantees. The Civil Service was standardised and organised as a career service similar to its many Western counterparts. Other parts of the Turkish bureaucracy (i.e. the administrative part of local governments and state owned industries and public utilities) was also structured in more or less similar way (see Tutum, 1972; Ömürgönülşen, 1989a).

In the early years of the Republican Turkey, the Civil Service was structured as a closed career system through the seniority rule and an educational caste system. Initial entry was governed by educational qualifications; thereafter, seniority played a significant role. Lateral entry was insignificant. The civil servants were given a permanent salary and fairly secure tenure. The Council of State with its legal review also provided a secure bulwark against the politicians' encroachments to bureaucrats' turf as in the case of unfair treatment by the government (see Tutum, 1972; Ömürgönülşen, 1989a). Within this legal and institutional framework, the civil servants enjoyed a well-developed esprit de corps. The civil servants, at least, the bureaucratic elite, were very careful not to let any one of their members slip from their privileged status (Karpat, 1959: Chp. 4).

In the second half of the twentieth century, there was an accelerated tendency of differentiation and fragmentation in the Civil Service in terms of its organisational structure and legal and financial rights. Political neutrality of civil servants also became a serious issue in the multi-party politics. All these issues were partly as a consequence of rapid socio-economic changes in the Turkish society and partly as a result of the policies

(1980); Ergun (1981); Heper and Kalaycioğlu (1983); Oktay (1983); Ergun and Polatoğlu (1984);
of anti-bureaucracy political parties developed during their struggle with the state elite. In spite of administrative reform projects comprising personnel reform came into agenda just after each military intervention (see Sürgit, 1972; Ar, 1984; Emre, 1986; Karaer, 1987a), such issues could not be resolved. In spite of the existence of a central personnel department, each individual public agency continued to operate as a separate entity in personnel matters and this made it difficult to pursue a well-coordinated personnel policy (e.g. manpower planning, standardised entrance examinations) (see Mihçıoğlu, 1964; Aktan, 1967 and 1985). The numbers of public employees (and civil servants) increased and, most importantly, the civil servants were unevenly distributed among public agencies, public services, and geographical regions, without any serious legislative oversight. In the face of widespread unemployment problem, the civil service employment was seen a remedy by populist politicians without seriously calculating its financial burden on the economy. This policy eventually reduced the economic welfare and social prestige of the crowded Civil Service (Bozkurt, 1980; Oktay, 1983: Chp. 3 and 4). The economic welfare of the civil servants was further undermined due to high inflation in the late 1970s (Pakdemirli, 1991: Chp. 6). Thus, the Turkish Civil Service (and also other parts of the Turkish bureaucracy) was highly fragmented, internally incoherent, and socially and economically deprived when the MP captured political power. The only affirmative development was the de-politicisation of the whole bureaucracy, which was highly polarised and politicised in the 1970s, by the Military Regime of 1980-1983.

(ii) Although the bureaucratic ruling tradition had always been influential in the administration of Ottoman-Turkish polity, the evolution of the security of tenure for civil servants was interrupted by wars, state of emergencies, changes in government regime or political regime, military interventions and anti-bureaucracy political movements (Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 392). The lower echelons of the Civil Service, in particular, could not always get benefits from affirmative legal and financial arrangements made since the Tanzimat Edict (1839) as much as the bureaucratic elite could (Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 147, 180, and 223). As a matter of fact, the most important elimination (tasfiye) and cutback (tensikat) attempts were also made just after such events.
With the transition from the absolute monarchy to the constitutional monarchy, palace-oriented pashas and conservative and useless functionaries were dismissed by the reformist military bureaucracy in the early years of the Young Turk era (Lewis, 1961: 238). During the War of Independence, governors, district governors and civil servants that were against the national liberation effort were removed from their offices with the help of the military bureaucracy (Selek, 1968: 57-59; Avcioğlu, 1969: 139-144). In the early years of the Republican regime, some elements from the bureaucracy inherited from the Ottoman Empire were purged in order to remove the division in the bureaucracy in terms of political loyalty (see Tunçay, 1978). In a similar way, the The Military Regime of 1960-1961, which insisted on the principle of politically neutral administration, launched an elimination programme in order to clean up the civil bureaucracy from civil servants who became the tools of the partisan policy of the DP Governments in return for some personal interests (Heper, 1974a: 137, 140). A more comprehensive programme with the similar aim was strictly pursued by the Military Regime of 1980-1983 (Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 329-333).

These examples clearly indicate that the elimination and purges in the Turkish bureaucracy were generally made either directly by the military as a part of the state elite or the civilian part of the state elite with the help of the military under the extraordinary political conditions. Under the conditions of competitive democratic politics, the effects of the elimination and cutback programmes of governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties were rather limited (e.g. The first DP government’s limited elimination policy of early retirement by administrative discretion (Tutum, 1972: 86-88)). On the one hand, the post-1960 constitutional and legal arrangements about the security of tenure provided the civil servants with enough legal protection against many kinds of elimination and cutbacks. On the other hand, the governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties did not seriously attempt to launch cutbacks programmes since they gradually invaded the Civil Service with their sympathisers and followed populist rather than efficiency-oriented employment policies in the 1960s and 1970s.

(iii) Beside the legal-structural features of the Turkish bureaucracy, its the cultural-behavioural features should be taken into account in terms of the relationship between the
bureaucracy and political power. The political values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats are particularly important to understand the relationship between the political and bureaucratic elites in Turkey before the MP captured political power. The attitudes of bureaucrats toward “politicians” (i.e. bureaucrats’ perception of political career in terms of its contribution to development issue and the actual performance of politicians), “political regime” (i.e. bureaucrats’ perception of democracy as a proper regime for the country), and “policy-making” (i.e. bureaucrats’ perception about their role in public policy-making process vis-à-vis those of other relevant actors) can be regarded as the political attitudes.\footnote{For an analysis of change/stability in the political values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats, see } 

In the pre-1984 period, Turkish bureaucrats’ attitudes toward politicians were characterised by a “stable unfavourable image of politicians” with respect to their quality and performance despite they showed a “decreasing hostility to politicians” after the mid-1960s. As we repeatedly said throughout this Chapter, one of the fundamental and most enduring characteristics of the Turkish civil bureaucracy was a strong tendency toward “elitism”. Even though the bureaucratic elite gradually ceased to be arbiter of the development process in the course of time, it largely regarded itself as a part of the state elite charged with special guardianship responsibilities for the state and society. The roles of Ottoman state tradition, which was based on a clear division between elite and mass cultures, and Kemalism cannot be denied in the development of this attitude. Even one of the element of Kemalism, populism principle, had turned out to be a theoretical justification for the bureaucratic elite for “rule for the masses” rather than “rule by the masses”. The political and socio-economic conditions of the single-party period created a bureaucrat type characterised by his/her belonging to the upper social strata as isolated from the rest of the society, high educational background with a normative-generalist perspective, and his/her political identification with the ruling party (the RPP). Under these conditions, the bureaucratic elite became a part of the state elite and its value system was partly imposed by the traditional bureaucratic values inherited from the Ottoman bureaucracy and partly imposed by the new Republican regime (i.e. Kemalist principles). Since bureaucrats regarded themselves as the “enlightened” group who had the key to truth to be guardians of the state, they had a very low opinion of politicians. They regarded
politicians as people who mainly seek their own interests rather than the vital interests of the country. This value system prescribed a basic harmony, not conflict among social groups in the society, gave a primacy to the collectivity (the state) and general interest rather than to specific socio-economic groups, and determined a guardianship mission to maintain Republican reforms. With these characteristics, it was obviously inconsistent with the realities of competitive politics.

As a matter of fact, with the transition to the multi-party politics, a serious conflict occurred between the values of bureaucrats and competitive politics. The bureaucratic elite gradually developed a very critical view about politicians who could represent the interests of specific social groups in the society. This attitude was sharpened by a power struggle between the bureaucratic elite and the new political elite (the DP) since the bureaucratic elite was severely challenged by the political elite. The politicians wanted bureaucrats to be the servants of political power, not political masters. The bureaucrats, on the other hand, continued to subscribe to a substantive rationality and to see themselves as guardians of the state and a source of political authority. As a consequence, the former showed extremely hostile attitudes toward the latter before the mid-1960s. After then, the bureaucrats began to learn to some extent to live together with politicians and they became less hostile to political influence. Specific political and socio-economic developments started with the mid-1950s and accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. increase in the significance of the technical aspect of the bureaucracy at the expense of its ideological aspect; increase in the number of new bureaucrats with lower socio-economic background and more conservative values; decrease in the political representation of bureaucrats in the parliament; the political fragmentation of the traditional bureaucratic elite within itself as well as with its traditional allies, such as the military and the RPP; and a less hostile political atmosphere since the mid-1960s) brought some significant changes in the power, socio-economic and educational composition, and traditional values of the bureaucracy. While the bureaucrats were adopting a less hostile attitude toward politicians in the course of time, their unfavourable attitudes toward them with respect to their quality and performance remained stable. They kept complaining about the personalities and intentions, educational and professional qualities, and performance of politicians in the

face of the sensitive problems (i.e. national unity, the preservation of the Republican values, and development) of the country. Although bureaucrats thought that democracy was the best regime in principle, they believed that politicians could not be trusted and, therefore, bureaucrats should have played a prominent role on matters critical for the long-term interests of the country. They tried to rationalise their non-democratic attitudes through resorting to the official ideology. Thus, the basic obstacle in the necessary de-elitisation process of the Turkish bureaucracy was paradoxically the politicians themselves. When the politicians did not measure up, in view of the bureaucrats, to the image of a proper politician (i.e. a statesman), the bureaucrats were always ready to revert to their earlier posture of guardian bureaucrats.

The attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats toward political regime (i.e. democracy) was characterised by a “stable recognition of democracy as a proper political regime” but also a “stable paternalism in terms of the fundamental rights in democratic regime”. During the single-party regime and even the early years of the multi-party politics, although the bureaucrats were not against the idea of democracy, their attitudes were generally not consistent with the democratic principles since the bureaucrats long perceived that the society as something that could be socially engineered by themselves. The bureaucrats’ attitudes toward democracy modified, or in fact, fluctuated with the transition to multi-party politics, giving an impression that they became quite sensitive to the social and political events. Under the conditions of low political tensions (e.g. in the mid-1960s) bureaucrats indicated their acknowledgement of democracy whereas under the conditions of social and political unrest (e.g. the late 1960s and early 1970s and the late 1970s) they tended to acknowledge less or undemocratic regime types. If we eliminate the influence of the “situational pressures”, it could be said that although Turkish bureaucrats acknowledged democracy, especially in the sense of “rationalist democracy”, in principle, they basically evinced “paternalistic” attitudes toward the fundamentals of a democratic regime. What may seem paradoxical is the fact that the Turkish bureaucratic elite for long attributed to itself the task of “Westernising” Turkey, thus also making Turkey more “democratic”, but at the same time, it conceived of itself responsible for the task of bringing this about. It is obvious that the bureaucrats’ condescending attitude towards

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114 For an elaboration of this worldview, see Heper (1975, 1976a and 1993); Heper and Kalaycioglu
politicians and their intolerance for political struggle are all in conflict with the requisites of a liberal-democratic state (i.e. the need for tolerance and compromise, attribute legitimacy to peripheral elements, and strike a balance between sectional interests and the long-term interest of society). This was an outcome of a strong state tradition subscribed to by the majority of bureaucrats in Turkey.

The attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats toward policy-making were characterised by a “stable tendency to involve in every stage of policy-making process with an emphasis on implementation stage” and a “decreasing elitism in terms of the formation of public policies”. An examination of bureaucratic role in policy-making as perceived by different generations of bureaucrats provides such a picture: The bureaucrats were increasingly engaged in policy-making with an emphasis on implementation. However, the contributions of old-generation who were inherited from the single-party period was rather “political” since the political and bureaucratic elites were intermingled in that period whereas the contributions of relatively new generation of bureaucrats were more “technical” (professional). The former group checked every decision and action of political power according to its political values, and in the case of any conflict, attempted to block or to distort policy-making process and/or to slow down implementation (i.e. negative politics). This attitude was a version of alienative political involvement since the decision-making criteria of the old generation of bureaucrats were predominantly coloured by political rather than administrative norms. Strong bureaucratism, as a consequence of patrimonial-legalism, on the part of the Turkish bureaucracy also became a convenient means of negative politics. Thus, the difference between these two groups was due to the difference in the content, rather than the scope, of their role in policy-making. Although the former group evinced highly elitist attitudes in the formation of policy-making, the saliency of these attitudes declined to some extent after the mid-1960s with the changes in social and educational composition in the bureaucracy. Thus, the Turkish bureaucrats gradually began to tend to consider the necessity of involving the wishes of people in policy-making through pluralist democratic mechanisms.

(1983); also see Bener (1978 and 1991); and Yenice (1990).
(iv) In addition to these political values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats, their administrative values and attitudes are so important to understand the bureaucratic behaviour in Turkey before the MP came to power. The attitudes of bureaucrats toward “decision-making” (i.e. bureaucrats’ respond to authority-delegation and participation in decision making), “subordinates” (i.e. bureaucrats’ treatment and communication style with their subordinates), and “initiation-innovation” (i.e. bureaucrats’ role in taking initiative and being innovative in their work environment) can be regarded as the administrative attitudes.\textsuperscript{115}

In pre-1984 period, the attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats toward decision-making were characterised by a tendency to “centralisation” (i.e. no authority delegation to subordinates) and a “personalisation” and “non-participatory” tendency with little consultation with their colleagues and subordinates. The bureaucracy was not accustomed to organisational thinking since it did not acquire the full characteristics of a formal organisation and, in fact, this was not appreciated either. Critical decisions were not the result of organisational thinking based on participative and detailed works but the handiwork of a few people, usually a clique in the bureaucracy, or even of a single high-ranking bureaucrat as in the cases of the application to associate membership of EEC in 1959, the preparation of 1980 economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme, and the university reform of the early 1980s. This feature results in unsuccessful translation of political goals into administrative principles, problems of co-ordinating administrative principles and activities among government agencies, and distortion of policies somewhere down the hierarchical echelons.

Turkish bureaucrats’ attitudes toward subordinates were characterised by “paternalism” (i.e. benevolent-authoritarianism). Superiors adopted mainly paternalistic attitudes toward their subordinates while subordinates were showing high respect, loyalty, and dependence toward their superiors. Under these circumstances, a modern working atmosphere could not develop.

\textsuperscript{115} For an analysis of change/stability in the administrative values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats and of administrative procedures and practices in the Turkish bureaucracy, see Özen (1991-1993).
Turkish bureaucrats neither did take initiative nor did they motivate their subordinates to perform their duties more effectively in a transparent atmosphere. Instead, they sought the "conformity" with their superiors and/or with the letter of law and regulations. This crippled initiative and tended to promote subordinates who seek no more than get along in one way or another. The Turkish bureaucracy was, in principle, bounded by legal rules and this was achieved by the general orientation of "over-regulation" in the absence careful specification of what was regulated. This over-regulation eliminated the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis its political master in theory but the precision in legal rules in some areas of administration was matched by excessively wide discretion in others in practice. This paradoxically gave enough legal manoeuvring room for bureaucrats. Furthermore, under extensive regulation and political pressures, many of the rules were not internalised and, therefore, perceived as something to be circumvented or overlooked altogether. This eventually led to suspicion, distrust, arbitrariness and unethical manoeuvring. Not only were legal and administrative rules not uniformly applied to both bureaucrats and citizens but they were also changed frequently by the political authority or the bureaucracy. These rules were also used by the bureaucrats as a shield against political power and as a means of domination over the citizens. Adopting a rigid bureaucratism, the bureaucrats often resorted to non-co-operative behaviour vis-à-vis both political power and citizens; they hardly co-operated with the government and the parliament, and tended to turn the daily administration into a Kafkasque world for citizens. Therefore, the internal working of the bureaucracy was quite "esoteric" and "unpredictable". Non-uniformity in the application of rules and the frequent change of rules were the natural consequence of the "patrimonial" characteristic of Turkish bureaucracy. In fact, they were not compatible with the legalistic characteristic of the bureaucracy either, which was held in very high esteem in the rhetoric but not the practice of bureaucracy in Turkey.

These administrative attitudes did not significantly change during the second half of the twentieth century and even in the 1980s. The "stability" of the administrative attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats can be explained by the corresponding stability in the administrative values and administrative procedures and practices. The "benevolent-authoritarianism" and "action-avoidance" were dominant values of bureaucrats. These
values were largely shaped by socio-cultural institutions such as family and education. The patriarchal, benevolent and close-knit family system inculcated submissive and paternalistic tendencies in interpersonal relations. After 1950, the bureaucrats were increasingly recruited from the lower social strata where the family system was always traditional (i.e. patriarchal, authoritarian, extended, and close-knit) and was changing at a slower pace as compared to the family in the upper strata. Therefore, the changing recruitment pattern of the bureaucracy functioned as a mechanism that contributed to the stability of overall administrative attitudes by recruiting less from the upper social strata with diminishing authoritarian values, and more from the lower social strata with insistent authoritarian values. Apart from this tendency, even if the authoritarianism partly diminished in the families of the upper or lower social strata, this could be countered by the other institutions such as education. The authoritarian teacher-student relation in Turkish education system further strengthened the formation of the authoritarian interpersonal relations. The authoritarian and memorisation-based education system reinforced the submissive tendencies inculcated by the family system and prevented the development of creative-thinking ability required for initiation and innovation. The dominance of general-social subjects over technical subjects particularly in higher education and the recruitment of generalists rather than specialists into the bureaucracy, at least until the 1980s, were conducive to the development of initiative and innovative attitudes.

The administrative procedures and practices, which underlined the administrative attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats in the pre-1984 period and which are partly inherited from the Ottoman bureaucracy and partly borrowed from the French Bonapartist and the Prussian Rechtsstaat bureaucracies, were the “centralised decision-making procedure”, the “education/seniority/political loyalty-based recruitment, promotion, reward”, and the “legal-based, uncertain and punishment-oriented control system”. Despite the administrative reform efforts in post-1950, the administrative procedures and practices did not significantly change so as to improve the attitudinal dimension of the bureaucracy. Among the many reasons, the most important ones can be found within the dynamics of administrative reform: “weak societal pressure”, “lack of political commitment”, and “dominance of political influence”. In Turkey, at least two factors prevented the society
from putting pressure on the government for higher performance and accountability. One is the weak middle class, which was not effectively organised as interest group to influence the decisions and actions of the government; the other was the deep seated high respect for the authority of the state. Only, a certain group (big industrialists and businessmen) began to manifest its complaints about the performance of the bureaucracy after the mid-1960s. Since parentalistic and clientelistic relations between the state and the private sector was strong, such attempts were far from putting enough pressure on the bureaucracy to improve its performance by changing its attitudes. Given the weak societal pressure, political power was always given low priority to administrative reform on its agenda and, therefore, was reluctant to implement reform projects prepared. When political power felt to oblige to implement them, it tended to implement them to maximise its own interests. The major motive behind the political elite was always to dominate over the bureaucracy and keep and strengthen its power to use the higher posts of the bureaucracy as an instrument for maintaining clientelistic relations with its constituencies. Therefore, administrative reform efforts were initiated and formulated in general without paying attention to improving the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the society. Under these circumstances, the bureaucracy did not show any progress in adopting modern rational-productive values, professional norms and specialist orientation. Work related values and attitudes of the Turkish bureaucrats determined by the historical bureaucratic ruling tradition both frustrated, and at times, distorted that progress. As a consequence, they never changed its work tempo and routine. Although the MP initially aimed to downsize government and put the bureaucracy into the service for the public, it gradually adopted the traditional attitude of the Turkish political elite.

While the political values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats showed a tendency to change to some extent in the course of time, their administrative values and attitudes almost entirely remained stable. The main reasons for this differentiation seem to be found in the nature of factors underlying the change and stability in the political, economic and socio-cultural environment surrounding the bureaucracy in the pre-1984 period. As is mentioned above, after 1950, certain changes in such environment diminished the socio-cultural isolation of the bureaucracy. The diminishing isolation resulted in the weakening of traditional political values and the rise of new political values that in turn, resulted in
change some political attitudes but stability of some administrative attitudes. In other words, the development of the political system toward pluralist democracy (i.e. less elitist attitudes in policy-making and less hostile attitudes toward politicians) did not necessarily bring administrative attitudes which would make the bureaucracy more efficient and effective, in contrast sometimes it brought the worsening of attitudes (i.e. strengthening the centralised, non-participatory decision-making, the authoritarian-benevolent interpersonal, and the initiation-avoidant attitudes). Given the weak societal pressure and the party-centred polity characterised by the tendency to use the bureaucracy for the aim of political clientelism, the extent of change in the political environment was far from introducing attitudinal change to make the bureaucracy more efficient and effective, even further undermined the preformance of the bureaucracy by strengthening prevalent unfavourable administrative attitudes (see Özen, 1991-1993).

(v) With these political and administrative values and attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats, the Turkish bureaucracy was primarily “patrimonial-legalists” and did not fully acquire either “legal-rational” or “rational-productive” skills and orientations. Turkish bureaucrats’ strong adherence to rules and regulations (i.e. bureaucratism) is a reflection of this orientation (see Heper, 1977 and 1980-1981). The absence of such a metamorphosis did not made them functional for the increasing number of critical socio-economic tasks that needed to be done in Turkey after 1950.

The unusually strong Bonapartist tendencies in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy prevented its being transformed into a legal-rational bureaucracy with its all dimensions despite some efforts made since the Tanzimat Edict (1839). In the absence of a politically influential economic middle class that would have effectively demanded a more predictable political environment and efficient implementation of governmental functions and policies, it was not surprising that these efforts did not meet with success. The persisting patrimonialism in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy was basically due the fact that, until the transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s, the bureaucratic elite constituted part of the ruling strata and its functions could not be distinguished from those of politicians. Even during the multi-party politics, the bureaucratic elite considered loyalty to its self-designated mission (i.e. safeguarding the Kemalist principles) as more
important than merit (i.e. the efficient and effective implementation of policies adopted by politicians). Thus, the bureaucratic elite’s *Bonapartism* was coupled with strong doses of patrimonialism. When it was de-statified and then politicised by the anti-state political parties in the post-1950 period, the bureaucracy’s neutrality turned into responsiveness to political power, but the bureaucracy remained inefficient and ineffective because the anti-state political parties paid attention to political loyalty not merit. In spite of the existence of some signs of a transition from “status-elite” type to “functional-elite” type as a consequence of socio-economic changes in the society, this development did not produce any result due to heavy politicisation of the bureaucracy in the 1970s. The substantive rationality was gradually declined in the course of time, but it was not replaced by any rationality render it to higher performance within the framework political neutrality.

(vi) Apart from the political and administrative values of bureaucrats, the structure of patrimonial-legalists bureaucracy was not functional for the implementation of MP’s programme. Although the civil bureaucracy contributed to the political stability thanks to its ruling tradition on several occasions when consensus between political parties were absent in the 1960s and 1970s, it gradually became more open to “political influence” through recruitment, appointment and transfer policies of the political power. Some legislative efforts to render the Turkish bureaucracy legal-rational organisation in the early 1960s and early 1980s could not rescue it from polarisation, fragmentation and incoherence. The politicisation of the bureaucracy, especially toward the end of the 1970s, reduced its stability and internal coherence. Partial amendments made on the positive law in terms of its legal-administrative, social and financial rights and duties further increased its instability and incoherence. As is mentioned above, when the MP captured political power, it faced a bureaucracy, which was deprived of a clearly delineated identity and a unity of structure, status and outlook. In the face of this reality, the bureaucracy was no longer regarded as a “modernising agent” that is necessary for the initiation and implementation of dynamic socio-economic development rather as an obstacle to such development.

(vii) Turkish bureaucrats were not only hostile to politicians but also they were unfriendly with private entrepreneurs. While in the West the merchants and artisans
developed into self-made capitalists, these groups were always given short shrift in the
Ottoman-Turkish society (Mardin, 1980: 37, 44) until recently. The state elite, and
especially the bureaucratic elite, had an ambivalent and somewhat condescending attitude
toward entrepreneurs. Not only foreign capital and investments were regarded distrustful
in the light of Ottoman experience but also national entrepreneurs were approached
unfavourably (see Heper, 1976b). The private entrepreneurs were viewed as speculators, if
not thieves (Avcioglu, 1969: 250), and business was for a long time downgraded and
looked upon as an occupation, which no respectable Turk would enter (see Alpender,
1967: 235). Under such circumstances, Private entrepreneurs had never become influential
in political life (Karpat, 1972: 261ff).

After a short-lived liberal economic policy in the 1920s, the Republican regime
adopted étatism in the early 1930s due to the insufficiency of capital accumulation in the
private entrepreneurs, the 1929 Great Depression and its unfavourable effects on the
Turkish economy, the reluctance to involve foreigners in economic activity, and the
apparent economic success of economic planning in the Soviet Union (see Boratav, 1981;
and Hershlag, 1984). With the effect of étatism as an economic doctrine, bureaucrats
became convinced that government should lead the economic development effort. Thus,
the expansion of the private sector was constantly resisted by the bureaucratic elite. The
private sector was “legitimised” only as late as the 1950s with the effect of the DP
Governments’ socio-economic policies favouring private entrepreneurs (Heper, 1976b:
495). This legitimacy began to increase in the second half of the 1960s (Karpat, 1973c:
358; also see Heper, 1975) under the positive atmosphere provided by the JP
Governments. Then, the private entrepreneurs made an effort to develop their own
ideology of economic liberalism (Heper, 1976b: 495-496). This ideological orientation
was, however, a lopsided one in the sense that the private sector’s need to depend upon the
state for credit facilities, import and export permission and quotas and the like was readily
admitted (see Neyzi, 1973). The Turkish private entrepreneurs remained weak in terms of
capital and were dependent upon the state since they were a state-made group (see Heper,
1976b: 488, 491-492). The private sector achieved a rapid growth after 1950 only with the
facilities of infra-structural investments realised by government, the relatively cheap inputs
produced by the state owned enterprises and public utilities, and qualified managerial and
technical personnel trained in public organisations (see Turan, 1984: 118-119). Turkey was neither a well-developed civil society in which professional business groups and associations could emerge and constitute a real pressure nor a state tradition that could give a way to such development. Since professional organisations of businessmen, in particular chambers, were (and still are) generally organised in the nature of public organisations, they acted as quasi-bureaucratic arm of governments. Under these conditions, long-established traditional attitudes of subservience to the state (i.e. parentala relations) and clientala relations, which do not always serve the public interest, were still to be expected. Since the state had a significant leverage over the economy, the persistence of such relations was not surprising (Dodd, 1990: 122-125, 137-138; also see Heper, 1991d and 1991e). Although there were signs that the civil and military bureaucracies' shed their earlier prejudices toward the private sector (Heper, 1984b: 77) as a consequence of the adoption of liberal economic policy in the early 1980s, this development was not enough to the change the established relationship between the state and the private sector.

The private sector's dependence upon the state and the inability of professional businessmen organisations to influence economic decision-making due to monist type of state-interest group relations promoted an inclination among individual private entrepreneurs to become manipulators of the bureaucratic mechanism. To have personal connections (i.e. clientala relations) with the key figures in the bureaucracy were seen necessary for smooth working relations with the bureaucracy in the face of heavy red tape (Yavuz, 1972: 641; Heper, 1976b: 490, 496). The private sector recruited a number of managers from the public bureaucracy not so much to use their knowledge, skills and experience but so as to use their connections within the bureaucratic mechanism (Roos and

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116 The defensive attitude of the private sector in the face of traditional power of the state persisted long (see Avçoğlu, 1969: 250; and Soysal, 1974: 2) because the anti-bureaucracy parties failed to developed a counter ideology to replace the official ideology of the state elite. The traditional power of the state over the private sector, at least for the pre-1980 period, was clearly revealed by the Chairman of TÜSİAD in late 1981 as follows: «In this country our philosophy has always been that of taking the “Paterfamilias State” as paramount, refraining from challenging it, and of pursuing an economic policy, not in spite of, but together with the “Paterfamilias State”... Hesitancy on the part of the members of the private sector to run for public office stems from this philosophy of not questioning the dominant “Paterfamilias State”, from the belief that the state is still influential, and that alienating the state would not bode well for them. ... [I]n Turkey every businessman thinks that even if he has not done anything illegal, the state, if it chooses to, may find a pretext and crush him» (quoted in Erel, 1981b).
Roos, 1971: Chp. 6). Thus, the private entrepreneurs were less interested in organised pressure upon the bureaucracy at the stage of policy-making and were more oriented toward individual manipulation at the implementation phase of these policies. It is in this sense that there was an absence of constructive involvement in politics on their part. Such an attitude had some important implications whose negative effects have still been felt: "irregularities in public service provision" and "corruption". This attitude did not improve the image of the private sector in the eyes of the bureaucratic elite. For the bureaucratic elite, economic benefits accruing to bureaucrats could easily be justified on the ground that they could fulfill their self-designated mission. But self-interest on the part of the private entrepreneurs was easily labelled as selfish. In fact, some bureaucrats and, in particular, lower-level civil servants supplemented their income while the private entrepreneurs were permitted to violate the regulations. Furthermore, the bureaucrats who increasingly felt status discrepancy developed pathological behaviour (i.e. bureaucratism) against the private entrepreneurs as well as negative politics against the political elite. They started to use the red tape in order to enhance their authority vis-à-vis the other segments of the society. Some of them attempted to increase their ability to receive larger amounts of bribe through increasing red tape. Emphasis on manipulation and lack of long-term investment planning in the private sector left little necessity for uniform, predictable and efficient services by the civil bureaucracy despite some early signs of efficiency concerns appeared in some sections of the private sector in the 1970s. Such a state of affairs left room for the substantive rationality in a distorted way rather than instrumental rationality to predominate as the basic orientation of the bureaucracy in Turkey (see Heper, 1974b, 1975: 132-133, 1976b: 495-500). As will be explained in the following Chapter, this attitude became sharper with the effect of socio-economic and bureaucratic policies of the MP Governments in the 1980s (Heper, 1991c).

In brief, when the MP captured political power, the general situation of the Turkish bureaucracy was as follows: the civil bureaucracy was relegated into a secondary place within the state elite with the increased influence of the military bureaucracy as a consequence of military interventions. Although the senior bureaucrats who were heirs to the elitist bureaucratic ruling tradition, the rest of the civil bureaucracy, especially middle and lower levels of the Civil Service, lost their socio-economic and ideological coherence.
Moreover, with the defection of the RPP from the state elite, the civil bureaucracy was deprived of substantial support vis-à-vis the anti-bureaucracy parties. Differentiation and fragmentation in the civil bureaucracy reduced solidarity among the members of the bureaucracy and made it more open and vulnerable to cutbacks. The worldwide repudiation of bureaucratic rationality vis-à-vis business (managerial) rationality further increased this vulnerability. The civil bureaucracy was, however, still enjoying legal protection (i.e. the security of tenure and the judicial review of Council of State over administrative decisions of political power) against the decisions and actions of political power. When these guarantees were threatened in the case of administrative restructuring and downsizing attempts, bureaucratism and negative politics were the most important weapons of the bureaucracy could be used against political power.

As is emphasised in the introductory section of this Chapter, comments made about the whole civil bureaucracy are, more or less, valid for the Turkish Civil Service. Thus, when the MP came into power in 1983, it faced a highly fragmented, internally incoherent, and socially and economically deprived Civil Service. The only affirmative development was the de-politicisation of the Civil Service, which was highly polarised and politicised in the 1970s, by the Military Regime of 1980-1983. In fact, the relative weakness of the Civil Service in the 1970s and the early 1980s, compared to the pre-1970 period, made the implementation of the MP Governments’ de-bureaucratisation policy easy. However, the patrimonial-legalist features of the Civil Service (e.g. the persistence of elitist attitudes of bureaucratic elite as a consequence of its substantive rationality; and the security of tenure) were still the main obstacles for the MP Governments in restructuring and downsizing the Turkish Civil Service in accordance with their political and socio-economic visions.
CHAPTER IV. THE MOTHERLAND PARTY’S GENERAL POLICY TOWARDS THE STATE, ECONOMY AND BUREAUCRACY (1984-1990)

In this Chapter, the general policy of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal towards the state, economy and bureaucracy will be examined in order to illuminate the general atmosphere in which the MP Governments’ staff cutback strategy pursued in the period of 1984-1990. The MP Governments’ policy towards the state should be regarded as a reaction to both the size and the role of the state in social and economic affairs (i.e. “Big Government”) and the status of the state elite in the polity. Therefore, it contains both economic and ideological dimensions. As we explained in the previous Chapter, it should be kept in mind that the MP Governments’ general policy towards the bureaucracy covers their approach to the Civil Service as well.

Within this framework, first, extraordinary economic and political conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s that gave rise to the emergence of Özal and his Party as new actors in the political arena of the 1980s will be overviewed; and then the New Rightist hegemonic project attempt of Özal under such specific conditions of Turkey will be examined. The MP Government’s policies and strategies pursued in socio-economic and administrative fields should be considered as requirements of this attempt. Therefore, the MP Governments’ general policy towards the bureaucracy will be treated in connection with their economic policy(s), in which the staff cutback strategy was installed as well.
A) Extraordinary Economic and Political Conditions of the Late 1970s and Early 1980s that Gave Rise to the Emergence of Özal and the Motherland Party as New Actors in Turkish Politics

During the second half of the 1980s Özal and his Governments embarked on a mission of fully integrating Turkey into the world market via implementation of the basic policy reforms of the January 24, 1980 economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme. Since the fundamental political and socio-economic policies of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal were crystallised with the effect of the economic and political crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the extraordinary economic and political conditions of these years need to be reviewed. Such an approach will help us to examine the cutback strategy of the MP Governments within the general framework of the political economy of the late 1970s and 1980s, which was a decade marked a crucial turning point in Turkey’s political and socio-economic structure. It should be, however, cleared that the economic conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s will be reviewed more detailed than the political conditions of the period since the latter has been partly treated within the context of political power-bureaucracy relations in the previous Chapter.

1) The Turkish Economy in Crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s

The 1980s were the decade in which major developing countries, especially following the balance of payments and external debt crises, adopted “economic stabilisation and structural adjustment policies” (Nelson, 1990). During the ensuing crisis, authoritarian military regimes or conservative democratic governments came to power determined to undo their predecessors’ inward-oriented policies based on import-substituting industrialisation and launched export-oriented growth policies (Barkey, 1990a; Nelson, 1990). This was also the case in Turkey (Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992; Atiyas, 1996). How could Turkey actually come to this point?

During the period from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Turkish economy recorded high growth rates due primarily to an almost uninterrupted investment drive in line with an “inward-oriented import-substitution” strategy formulated through five year long
development plans in accordance with the understanding of the “mixed economy”. Various socio-economic groups that had different interests in the system successfully lobbied for import-substitution strategy. Not only the business groups whose industries were protected by the state against foreign competition through customs and trade barriers but also the civil and military bureaucracies and trade unions were in favour of this strategy. By the mid-1970s, however, a turning point was reached and the late 1970s, the Turkish economy faced what was perhaps the worst crisis of her post-the Second World War history. It was saddled with foreign exchange problems, alarming trade and balance of payments deficits, growing external debt, negative economic growth, spiralling inflation and high unemployment, a series of shortages in many commodities, and labour disputes. The base of this economic crisis can be viewed as the “crisis of the import-substituting industrialisation”.

Industrialisation based on production for the internal market reached its structural limits as it became increasingly more difficult to obtain foreign exchange to import intermediate and capital goods. With such difficulties, Turkey was the first major developing country to face debt-payment crisis after 1973 (Celasun and Rodrik, 1989: 193).

The factors responsible for the near collapse of the Turkish economy in the late 1970s can be classified into two categories: internal economic and political factors; and external economic developments. On the one hand, high government spending, stagnant domestic savings, inward-oriented development strategies, poor debt management, political unrest and labour disputes were crucial internal factors. The results of these internal factors were serious balance of payments deficits that, in turn, led to heavy external borrowing if it was possible, public deficits and increased inflation. The growth was also slowdown and serious shortages in commodities appeared due to foreign exchange scarcity and labour unrest. Balance of payment problem is not out of the

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117 The civil bureaucracy was in favour of import-substituting industrialisation in order to guarantee their autonomy in national planning and decision-making processes, increase their salaries, and allocate more financial capital for state-owned enterprises. The military bureaucracies also involved in the promotion of this strategy in order to protect their rents received through the Army Mutual Assistance Association (Ordu Yardımcılık Kurumu-OYAK), which was founded just after the 1960 military intervention as a pension fund but has become a large holding company protected under the umbrella of the import-substituting industrialisation strategy (see Demirbaş, 1998).

118 For an overview of the import-substitution strategy in Turkey and an analysis of the problems confronted by that strategy which led to its eventual demise in the second half of the 1970s, see Öniş (1987).
ordinary for the Turkish economy. Between 1950 and 1980, the country experienced three growth cycles with important similarities: a period of rapid industrial growth followed by a major foreign exchange crisis, a massive devaluation of the Turkish lira, and a slowdown in growth. As Yeşilada and Fisunoglu note, at the end of each cycle Turkey experienced two developments that seemed to be related. First, at three junctures, in 1957-1958, 1969-1970, and 1978-1980, the ruling governments adopted IMF-sponsored economic stabilisation programmes that included high devaluation.119 Shortly thereafter, growing social and political unrest resulted in the military interventions of 1960, 1981, and 1980 (1992: 185). On the other hand, sudden and sharp increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979, the U.S. economic embargo imposed after the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the country’s deteriorating terms of trade, decrease in the opportunity of export due to the world-wide recession, and rising international interest rates and decrease in the remittances of Turkish workers in Europe, as the significant external factors, further hampered the governments’ ability to control its domestic inflation and its balance of payments deficits and to continue debt servicing. Not surprisingly, each of these had a detrimental impact on the other further aggravating the overall condition towards the end of 1970s: negative growth, high inflation and shortages in many commodities (Barkey, 1990a; Yeşilada and Fisunoglu 1992: 184, 185).

Inward-oriented development strategy, which was quite rightly adopted to assure Turkey’s “economic independence” and to protect “domestic infant industries” against outside competition within the frame work of étatist and then mixed economy policies since the early years of the Republic, was no longer solution to the economic problems of the country. Furthermore, it was aggravating these problems. Despite the heaviness of the crisis and the urgency of taking measures, the weak and unstable Coalition Governments in the post-1973 period were unwilling or unable to alter their policies. Instead of limiting public investments for internal balance and limiting imports for external balance, they ignored the danger signals in the economy by maintaining high levels of investment for political patronage-oriented projects, keeping unrealistic and populist price policy for oil-products and the products of state-owned enterprises through heavy government subsidies, and keeping the level of import through external credits. This policy eventually resulted in

119 For detailed information about these stabilisation programmes, see Parasiz (1998).
higher budget deficits and then higher inflation. These Governments also failed to increase domestic savings and their balance of payment policies remained inward-oriented, favouring import-substitution over export-promotion despite the fact that Turkey's current account deficit increased steadily. Although Prime Minister Demirel favoured an IMF-type austerity and monetary discipline programme in 1975, he could not receive any support from his coalition partner, Erbakan of NSP who was the champion of government-led economic development policy. In the mid-1970s, the inflow of worker's remittances provided enough import facilities for the economy. The deficits was mainly financed by short-term commercial credits, known as convertible Turkish lira deposits (Dövize Çevrilebilir Mevduat Hesabı-DÇM), between the years of 1974 and 1977. This scheme only temporarily solved the foreign exchange problem until the end of 1977 when the deposits came due. The end result of this policy was the debt crisis of 1977. In fact, Turkey experienced its debt crisis well before Latin American countries – all of which experienced debt problems after the second oil price shock of 1979. Turkey could no longer service its debt, foreign lenders withdrew, foreign banks refused to roll over credits, and the government ran out of foreign exchange reserves. In their attempts to correct these problems, the weak and unstable coalition governments of Demirel (1977) and Ecevit (1978-1979) took some economic measures but they had to have recourse to IMF for the necessary financial assistance (Dodd, 1990: 21-22; 58; Yeşilada and Fisunoglu 1992: 185-186).

The economic crisis was, in fact, further aggravated during the RPP-led Coalition Government under the premiership of Ecevit due to heavy government controls and interventions in the economy made in such a way that nothing much was left to the price mechanism. Ecevit was loudly proclaiming the need for an independent foreign policy, smarting under the blow of the U.S. arms embargo, and for an interventionist economic policy, with the promise of greater control over foreign oil and mining companies and of new land reform legislation. In the face of heavy crisis in the balance of payments, the Ecevit Government had to recourse to the international financial institutions. The Government, in fact, successfully negotiated financial assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD. Although the Government did take some economic measures, including devaluation, in 1978 and 1979, in order to receive external financial assistance
and avert the economic collapse, a comprehensive economic stabilisation and adjustment programme, in the mind of IMF and other international financial institutions, could not be put into practice due to the Government’s ideologically reluctant relationship with these institutions. The difficulty for Ecevit was that the IMF obliged the Government to take measures with which Ecevit did not fundamentally agree, and whose acceptance the OECD made a condition of its help. That this external financial assistance was arranged was a considerable achievement for Turkey, but was not a development for which the Government could claim positive credit. It was forced to accept aid from abroad on terms with which a left-wing government could not be in sympathy simply in order to keep the country afloat. Nevertheless this vital financial assistance was obtained and economic collapse was averted for a while. Despite such external assistance, the problems in the operation of the economy were still unresolved. In addition to the anti-market economy attitudes of the Ecevit Government, the debate on the causes of the widespread scarcity in many commodities, due to mainly the lack of foreign exchange as a result of the crisis in the balance of payments and partly the black-marketing supported by some anti-Ecevit business circles, increased the tension between the government and the business circles. In brief, the Ecevit Government could not solve the economic problems of the country due to the lack of political commitment to enforce these programmes under growing political instability in the country (Dodd, 1990: 21-22; Yeşilada and Fısunoğlu 1992: 185-186).

Growing social and political unrest in the country further intensified these economic problems. During the second half of the 1970s, as was mentioned in detail in the previous Chapter, both the state institutions such as the civil bureaucracy and the civil society institutions were almost completely polarised and politicised. As a result of this development, the country came close to the conditions of civil war; thousands of people lost their lives as a result of political violence and terrorist activities despite the imposition of martial law in the late 1980s. This made it almost impossible to reach a national consensus to solve economic problems (see Tachau, 1984; Yeşilada, 1984: Chp. 2-3 and 1988; Dodd, 1990: Chp. 1 and 2).
a) The January 24 1980 Measures taken by the Justice Party Minority Government

Faced with growing economic and political problems, the last civilian government of the 1970s, JP Minority Government headed by Demirel, adopted a bold economic stabilisation programme on January 24, 1980, known as “the January 24 Measures”, by taking a very high political risk. Despite its shaky parliamentary support, the homogeneity of the government provided Demirel with necessary internal consistency of the views on economic matters. This programme, which was advised by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD and technically prepared by Özal as an official under-secretary of the Office of the Prime Ministry and an acting under-secretary of the SPO, aimed at stabilisation and then massive restructuring of the economy with an emphasis on export-oriented growth strategy. The U.S. administration and these international financial institutions hailed these measures and the IMF provided the Government with enough financial assistance necessary for the operation of economy (Özdemir, 1989: 246-247; Barkey, 1990a: 174; Dodd, 1990: 22; Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 184; see also Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 3).

The economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme, which closely resembles the “neo-orthodox” policies, adopted by many developing countries in the 1980s (see Kahler, 1990), emphasised the following points: “(i) institutional changes aimed at making policy-formulation and implementation more effective; (ii) a devaluation of the Turkish lira and the limitation of multiple exchange rate policies; (iii) greater liberalisation of trade and payment regulations; (iv) promotional measures for exports; (v) substantial price increases for government traded goods and services and abolition of price controls; (vi) increased competition for state owned enterprises through elimination of government subsidies and abolition of price controls on their products; (vii) higher and real rates of interest; (viii) promotional measures for foreign investments; (ix) arrangements for consolidating private commercial debt; (x) and drafting legislation for tax reform” (OECD, 1980: 25).120 With these characteristics, this programme was a much more radical and comprehensive than the previous stabilisation programmes. Through this programme,

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120 For the complete text of the January 24 Measures, see OECD (1980: Annex).
Turkey embarked on a new policy designed not only as a comprehensive package of economic stabilisation, aimed to obtain foreign financial assistance, to remove shortages in many commodities, to control inflation, and to re-operate the price mechanism, but also as a fundamental re-orientation of economy away from heavy government regulation and control toward greater reliance on market forces, foreign competition, and foreign investments. This programme also gave way to the idea of rolling back the frontiers of the public sector, which is of particular interest to us, through cutbacks and privatisation (Uygur, 1993: 9). All of these factors simply signalled the sharp acceleration of Turkey's economic integration with global capitalism (Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 187). Thus, January 24, 1980 is usually considered as one of the most important cornerstones in the modern Turkish economic and political history.

Despite its comprehensive aims mentioned above, this programme initially adopted a very pragmatic approach to sort out two immediate problems of the economy: to obtain foreign financial assistance in order to improve the foreign-exchange deficit; and to remove shortages in many commodities and black-market (Hatiboğlu, 1995: 7-8). From the outset, the success of the January 24 Measures, as Barkey points out, depended on three crucial ingredients: first, a re-scheduling of Turkey's external debt; second, the cooperation of the various domestic socio-economic and political groups; and third, time for the results of the programme to sprout. The first ingredient was necessary to stimulate the foreign trade sector and resume the inflow of fresh money into Turkey. These objectives could only be achieved with the approval of major international lending institutions, like the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD. The Turkish government needed to convince these institutions of the seriousness with which it approached this task. As a matter of fact, the Turkish government adopted a very pragmatic approach this time and prepared economic measures that were exactly similar to measures suggested by the international financial circles. The second and third ingredients were more difficult to obtain because the transformation desired entailed enormous political risks for Demirel and the JP. After all, a much less ambitious programme in 1970 had undermined the JP's dominant position (see Boratav, 1989: 332; and Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 185). Therefore, the sacrifices now required from the public could easily jeopardise the JP's hard-won political comeback. On the other hand, in the face of desperate economic and socio-political
conditions which were different from the situation in 1970, the Government obtained the public’s prior consent indirectly through the by-elections for the National Assembly and partial elections for the Senate held in the fall of 1979 and the military high command’s prior consent through special economic briefings given by Özal in the late 1979 and early 1980. Furthermore, international political conditions (i.e. the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and Iran-Iraq War in 1980) bolstered Turkey’s strategic position in the eyes of her Western allies, particularly the U.S., and facilitated the external financial assistance for the programme (1990a: 174-175; see also Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp.3).

It should also be pointed out that the most significant chance of the programme was Demirel’s strong political commitment to the programme and Özal’s technical commitment to the preparation and implementation of the programme (Kafaoğlu, 2001: 13). Özal, as an official under-secretary of the Office of the Prime Ministry and an acting under-secretary of the SPO, prepared the programme and presented to the Prime Minister Demirel, the Council of Ministers and the nation as measures of the last resort since another year of indecision could only lead to a collapse of the Turkish state. He also argued that an indecisive JP Government would suffer the same fate as its predecessor, the RPP Government under the leadership of Ecevit. Therefore, by instituting a bold new programme, the JP could hope to be rewarded in early elections for confronting the hard choices ahead (Çölaşan, 1983: 289-299).

The JP Minority Government under the premiership of Demirel tried to restore some degree of acceptable economic stability by adopting fiscal and monetary discipline and to eliminate most of the shortages of essential commodities (Yeşilada and Fısunoglu, 1992: 191; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 91-94). In order to achieve these aims, the 24 January Measures had to be put into practice through either government decrees and regulations or legislative acts. Whereas those measures which could be introduced through government decrees and regulations (e.g. institutional changes aimed at making economic policy-formulation, co-ordination and implementation more effective; devaluation of the Turkish lira, adoption of a new exchange regime involving daily changes of the parity of the Turkish lira vis-à-vis foreign currencies; adoption of a tight monetary policy in order to
reduce inflation; liberalisation of import regulations, introducing export incentives, abolition of price control mechanism and some government subsidies, freeing of domestic interest rates) were taken decisively, those measures which required parliamentary approval (e.g. tax reform; privatisation of state-owned enterprises, restrictions on collective bargaining and other labour disputes) could not be put into practice due to opposition the Government faced inside and outside the parliament (Barkey, 1990a: 175-176; Hatiboglu, 1995: 8-10). As a matter of fact, the latter measures were successfully put into practice by the Military Regime and the single-party governments of the MP in the 1980s.

Although the JP Minority Government put some serious steps in controlling the economic crisis through implementing most of these measures, it could not take the country out of the economic crisis due to the political crisis that plagued Turkey. The Government lacked the necessary parliamentary power to carry out this programme with full rigour. Despite the seriousness of the economic problems facing Turkey, even the parties supporting the JP Minority Government without directly participating in the cabinet were odds with the Government over the nature of the programme. The NAP of Türkçeş and the NSP of Erbakan opposed elimination of government subsidies and other populist measures. The opposition RPP regarded the programme as total capitulation to IMF demands (Yeşilada, 1984: Chp. 2-3; Barkey, 1990a: 181-182). In the face of this serious economic crisis, some large business groups gradually turned away from import-substitution strategy and supported the economic liberalisation measures taken by the JP Minority Government. Except these groups, whose initial reaction were favourable, socio-economic groups in the society whose interests vested in inward-oriented and import-substituting industrialising strategy were critical about or against the programme. For example, a record number of workers went on strike with the call of the RWC and these strikes added to the unease and confusion both socially and economically. In the face of deepening of the existing recession as a result of the tight monetary policy applied in accordance with the IMF prescriptions, the initial support of the private sector, especially in the case of companies which had benefited extensively from the past import-substituting industrialisation, did not last long (Barkey, 1990a: 176-178).
During 1980, political violence escalated and control seemed to be slipping more and more out of the Government's hand. The parliamentary deadlock occurred over the selection of a new President of the Republic and the stiffening opposition to the Government from the RPP and NSP through forcing votes of no confidence on individual ministers triggered the political crisis in the second half of 1980 (Özdemir, 1989: 246-248; Barkey, 1990a: 173, 179-180; Dodd, 1990: 23-26; Özbudun, 1990: 192-193;). Thus, the Government was besieged on all sides by the socio-political forces of the society and the state was deprived of its autonomy. Faced with such chaos, the JP Minority Government fell victim to a military intervention on September 12, 1980.

b) The adoption and application of the January 24 Measures by the Military Regime

The unwritten policy suggestion in this programme, supported by the IMF, was "the restoration of socio-political order to enable the government to carry out the economic measures" (Yeşilada, 1992: 187). Thus, the 1980 military intervention undertook two sets of political economic tasks. In the first place, it established the socio-political order and restructured the political system, without which the long-term economic transformation would not have materialised. Second, it boosted, and even rescued the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme (Barkey, 1990a: 180).

With the technical guidance of Özal and his small technocratic-bureaucratic team, the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime was, in fact, succeeded in its many economic aims (e.g. eliminating all kinds of shortages in commodities; lowering inflation, promoting export, improving the balances of budget, payments and current account; keeping the relative size of public sector spending at the same level; and dissipating the atmosphere of imminent economic collapse) despite some indicators (e.g. lower rates of economic growth in comparison with those of the 1960s and early 1970s; instabilities in financial markets-the brokers scandal-in the summer of 1982; deterioration in the distribution of income at the expense of agricultural producers and salaried groups; persistence of high unemployment rates) were still showing a general fragility in economic activities (see Dodd, 1990: 59-61; Balkır, 1993a: 8; and Kazdağlı, 2001: 458-460).
Several factors contributed to Özal and the Technocratic Government’s achievement in restoring normalcy to the Turkish economy in the first couple of years of the 1980s (see Sayari, 1990: 398; Barkey, 1990a: 175; Öniş, 1991a: 37-39; and Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992). First, the near collapse of the country's economy in the late 1970s created a suitable milieu from economic and financial reforms. The poor performances of the Coalition Governments in managing the economy between 1974 and 1980 discredited both import-substitution and étatism as effective strategies of economic growth. Many people, especially among the influential business and military elites, were convinced of the need for a new approach to the country’s economic plight.

Second, the ideological hegemony of the New Right in some influential Western countries such as the U.K. and the U.S. in the early 1980s remarkably affected the political atmosphere in Turkey as well and thus facilitated the shift in the economic policy from traditional étatism to market economy. Özal and his team politically and technically identified themselves with the new economic policy and committed to its implementation.

Third, except the first three-quarters of 1980, Özal implemented the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme under an authoritarian military regime. By the time the military intervened on September 12, 1980, the January 24 Measures had showed their early impacts on the economy. Nevertheless, their long-term success was not by any means guaranteed. Therefore, the military intervention became instrumental in buying time for the programme. Following the intervention, the Military Regime very quickly regained the state’s autonomy and established socio-political order to carry out the programme properly. Actually, Özal, with the consent of the Prime Minister Demirel, gave briefings to the higher echelon of the military about the outlines of the programme before the military intervention and received supportive signals from them. So long as existing programme appeared to be producing results, the military was perfectly content to maintain them. As a matter of fact, once in power, the NSC immediately announced its adherence to the programme as the only way out of Turkey’s economic crisis. In order to demonstrate its commitment to the programme, the NSC picked Özal as Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs and delegated the running of the economic policy to him, even before settling on who would lead the next technocratic cabinet (see Çolaşan, 1983: 101-111; Yeşilada, 1988: 351-352; Barkey, 1990a: 180-182; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 3-4). A structural change in the Turkish political system was deemed
necessary by the NSC and the Technocratic Government under the authoritarian Military Regime. An authoritarian-bureaucratic control over the society was established through the decrees issued by the NSC and the Technocratic Government and through the 1982 Constitution and the laws related to political life enacted by the NSC and the Consultative Assembly (Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 187, 188). Thus, the January 24 Measures had a real opportunity to be applied with full rigour by the dynamic and internally consistent Technocratic Government under the special conditions of the Military Regime after the 1980 military intervention. In other words, the new Military Regime and its Government, under the technical guidance of Özal and his team, put the programme into effect enthusiastically without any serious socio-political opposition from any segment (e.g. left-wing political parties, radical labour unions, intelligentsia and students) of the society.¹²¹ The Technocratic Government, by using the military as a shield, aimed to consolidate the climate of economic stability; to maintain the relative price realignment; and to emphasise export-oriented growth.

Fourth, as we mentioned above, Turkey’s increased geopolitical and strategic importance in the face of some serious international developments in 1979 and 1980 also worked in Özal and the Military Regime’s favour. As a result, the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment measures in the early 1980s received substantial financial backing from Turkey’s Western allies and from the international lending agencies. Turkey emerged in the early 1980s as the test-case for the policies of the IMF and the World Bank developed for developing countries.¹²² In addition, some regional and international

¹²¹ This fact raises a serious question of whether such an authoritarian military regime is a prerequisite for the implementation of an economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme in developing countries like Turkey. On this issue, see Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu (1992: 189-190, 207); and Barkey (1990a: 180-181, 184). Another serious question is that of whether the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme had not taken place, the military in Turkey would institute such a programme on its own. On this issue, see Barkey (1990a: 181); and Milliyet (a Turkish daily, January 24, 1990).

¹²² During the crisis period of 1977-1979 the IMF was the principal actor, and the World Bank was absent from the scene. Yet, the stand-by agreements concluded with the IMF ended in failure. In the early stages of the 1980 economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme, the IMF and the World Bank collaborated and considered Turkey as the test-case for their newly instituted joint programme involving “cross-conditionality”. Then the World Bank became unambiguously the principal actor in the post-1980 period through five successive “structural adjustment loans” (1980-1984) and “sectoral adjustment loans” (after 1984). Thus, the scale of the financial assistance provided to Turkey during the first half of the 1980s exceeded by a considerable margin the amount of resources made available elsewhere under similar programmes (Öniş, 1991a: 37-38; also see Kirkpatrick and Öniş, 1988).
economic conditions (e.g. new export opportunities for Turkey as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and the increased purchasing power of the Middle East countries due to high petroleum prices in the 1970s; the positive effect of stabilisation of petroleum prices at a lower level in the early 1980s on the balance of payments of Turkey) also helped Özal and the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime to carry out the programme successfully.

Finally, compared to the vast majority of developing countries, Turkey possessed the infrastructure for successful adjustment. These favourable internal circumstances and external environment enabled Özal to “internalise” the programme and implement it in a consistent way without any deviation from its targets.

Thus, under extraordinary economic conditions of the early 1980s, Özal, as a deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs of the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime in the period of Fall 1980-Summer 1982\(^{123}\) had almost a free hand in determining the nature and the application of the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme (Özdemir, 1989: 246-247; Barkey, 1990a: 180-184; Yeşilada and

\(^{123}\) As was mentioned in the previous chapter, Özal lost the support of the Military Regime as a result of the financial scandal and panic broken out with the bankruptcies of most of the brokers in the summer of 1982. First, Kaya Erdem, the minister of finance, and then Özal were felt to resign from their posts in the Government. Özal’s propensity to advocate minimal intervention with market forces made him a convenient scapegoat upon whom this scandal and the ensuing panic could be blamed, even though he was not directly responsible for them. In fact, in a weak regulatory environment resulting from the generally underdeveloped nature of financial markets, these brokers had mushroomed and acted irresponsibly beyond the imagination of anyone. Özal’s resignation, however, was widely interpreted as a victory for the large import-substituting concerns, which had exerted a great deal of pressure on the military. The private sector’s initial enthusiasm for the economic measures did not last long because the kind of transformation Özal envisaged did not bode well for the future of many large conglomerates which had benefited extensively from past import-substituting industrialisation. Such an opposition, combined with that of the traditional bureaucracy, was effective to some extent even during the premiership of Özal in the 1980s. Despite its ambivalence over some technical and legal aspects of economic measures, the NSC continued to implement them after the resignation of Özal in view of the support the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme had received abroad. The NSC, however, appointed Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu, a critic of Özal and his strategy, as a minister of finance, just before Özal’s resignation. This actually triggered his resignation. Thus, the economic policy of Government was directed by the Ministry of Finance during the rest of the Military Regime, as was before 1980. However, the economy gave alarming signals again in 1983 since the new team in charge of the economy relaxed the controls on monetary and fiscal tools (Barkey, 1990a: 178, 183-184; Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992: 195-196; Kazdağlı, 2001: 459-460; also see Çolaşan, 1984; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 120-138).
Fisunoğlu, 1992: 190-191; see also Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 3 and 4). This fact affirmatively affected the political attempt of Özal with the MP in 1983.

2) Transition to a Tutelary Democracy in 1983

During the military interregnum (Fall 1980-Fall 1983), the state elite (i.e. the president and the higher echelon of the military or the NSC) enjoyed having almost an absolute power in restructuring the political system of the country as well as her economic system. As was mentioned in the previous Chapter, this task was mainly accomplished by the NSC in accordance with its views about the causes of the breakdown of Turkish democracy in the late 1970s. Within this framework, party and electoral systems were radically altered. The Military Regime preferred a party system with two or three brand new parties (see Turan, 1988: 73-75). An electoral system, the d'Hondt version of proportional representation with a high national and constituency thresholds, was designed to ensure stable parliamentary majorities (Barkey, 1990a: 189; Dodd, 1990: 88). The provisional article 4 of the Political Parties Law enacted during the Military Regime gave the NSC the right to veto the founding members of new political parties since all former political parties had earlier been dissolved by a decree of the NSC. The NSC made use of this power, as a final attempt at political engineering, in such a way that only three moderate parties were able to compete in the general elections. Other newly established parties that looked like credible successors to the former parties were thus eliminated from electoral competition (see Ergüder, 1988; Hale, 1988; Yeşilada, 1988; Vaner, 1990; and Tanör, 1997: 51-56). Parties could contest in the 1983 general elections were the Nationalist Democratic Party/Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (NDP), the Populist Party/Halkçı Parti (PP), and Motherland Party/Anavatan Partisi (MP). The NDP was founded to represent the centre/centre-right of the political spectrum and received the blessing of the Military Regime. The NDP leader, Turgut Sunalp, was a former general; and many of the candidates of the Party were the distinguished figures of the Technocratic Government and the Consultative Assembly during the Military Regime. The PP was founded as a moderate centre-left party to represent the former RPP voters. It was led by Necdet Calp who was a former governor and under-secretary of Office of the Prime Ministry. If the NDP was destined to become the majority party in the new parliament, the
PP was thought as a loyal opposition. This was an artificial attempt to replay the immediate past, but with a new understanding (i.e. world-wide supremacy of market-based ideology over socialist ideology) and new actors. The MP, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, was formed by a group of young and relatively unknown people who primarily came from the private sector or who had played a role in the lower echelons of the pre-1980 right-wing political parties.

Özal's rise to national political leadership was one of the significant developments in Turkish politics ushered by the 1980 military intervention. Özal, who had spent most of his working life in various government posts as a technocrat, became the dominant civilian politician in Turkey during the 1980s and early 1990s. During the 1960s and 1970s, Özal's technocratic career benefited substantially from his position as a protégé of Demirel. Özal had worked at the Electrical Power Survey Administration (Elektrik İşleri Etüt İdaresi) under the authority of Demirel, and then two men had worked together in the SPO. When Demirel became prime minister in 1965, he appointed Özal as his special technical adviser. Two years later, Özal was put in charge of the SPO by Demirel. When Demirel launched his economic stabilisation programme in 1970, Özal was one of his key policy advisers. Özal remained at the head of the SPO until the 1971 military intervention that ousted Prime Minister Demirel from office. Subsequently, Özal went to work for the World Bank as a special projects adviser and economist. Upon his return to Turkey, he served as the executive director of some large private business companies and a major employer's association between the years of 1973-1977. Although Özal enjoyed being a high-level technocrat/bureaucrat, he made his first attempt to become involved in national politics in 1977. He joined the religious-oriented NSP with the effect of his younger brother who held a prominent position in the NSP's leadership ranks. Özal contested in 1977 general elections, albeit not wholeheartedly and successfully, a seat in the National Assembly, on the İzmir NSP lists. After this politically ineffective attempt, which was, therefore, took no notice of the public opinion, Özal genuinely preferred to serve to the governments as an ambitious technocrat/bureaucrat until 1983. During the JP Minority Government (1979-1980), Prime Minister Demirel again gave a key role to Özal in economic policy-making. Özal's appointment as an official under-secretary of the Office
of the Prime Ministry and an acting under-secretary of the SPO came at a time when Turkey was in the throes of a severe political and economic crisis mentioned above. Known as the January 24 Measures, Özal’s plan lay the foundations for the stabilisation of the Turkish economy in the early 1980s. Following the 1980 military intervention, the Military Regime asked Özal to remain in charge of economic affairs as deputy prime minister in the Ulusu Government. Özal accepted the offer, with the unofficial consent of Demirel who was ousted from office second time by the military, and continued to implement the economic austerity and reform measures that he had begun under the Demirel Government. Özal worked as the Military Regime’s “economic czar” from 1980 through 1982. Although these measures gave their positive results immediately, he felt to resign from his post with his team in the summer of 1982 in the wake of a financial scandal (i.e. the "Bankers Crisis") that shook the country’s banking sector with the bankruptcies of most of the brokers, which had been mushroomed uncontrollably and had acted irresponsibly in the market (Sayari, 1990; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 1-4).

When the Military Regime declared to hand power back to the civilians in 1983, Özal initially hesitated to involve with the active politics with his own political party. Furthermore, he could not receive the blessing of Demirel this time. After this short period of hesitation, Özal decided to form his own political party in order to achieve projects developed in his mind during the last two decades (see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 5). He was actually somewhat closer to politics than most of his colleagues in the MP. In terms of former political associations, he was occupying a space in Turkish politics somewhere between the moderate and more secular right of the JP vintage and the religious right of the NSP. With the effect of Özal’s personal reputation, formed as a consequence of relatively successful economic policies, in the eyes of both the Military Regime and international political and financial circles, the MP was allowed to participate in the general elections. The NSC most likely to thought that Özal’s Party as a smallest one in the parliament could have been an element of balance especially in the economic affairs. The MP’s claim to be the representative of all “four different political inclinations” (i.e. centre-right, centre-left, religious-right, nationalist-right represented by former JP, RPP, NSP and NAP respectively) (see ANAP, 1983a: 153; ANAP, 1987b: 23-24), but not

124 For more information about the biography of Özal (1927-1993), see Sayari (1990); Cemal
that of the reincarnated version of ex-parties, was also be regarded by the NSC as a safety factor against potential polarisation in the society.\textsuperscript{125} Although Özal and his Party are considered by ex-political cadres no more than a pawn of the Military Regime since Özal worked in harmony with the Military Regime and the MP was allowed to participate in the 1983 general elections, the MP was actually the most spontaneous or the least artificial party of all three. It cast an image of being a natural product of the society rather than a creation of the military. It was closest to the expression of the genuine popular will within the limits of the electoral party system set by the Military Regime. Although the MP was a brand new political party, it was especially closest to a conventional centre-right party - an image that the DP and JP moulded since 1950 - that gets things done and is responsive to policy demands (i.e. bread-and-butter issues) of the masses. Özal successfully capitalised all economic achievements occurred during the Military Regime and blame the Military Regime for all the things went wrong. Despite some serious accusations about his role in the scandal of brokers, Özal and his Party was well served by his forced resignation in 1982 as drawing a line between himself and the Military Regime (Barkey, 1990a: 189-190; Dodd, 1990: 96; Özbudun, 1990: 197-198; Ergüder, 1991: 163, 164; Kafaoğlu, 2001: 17; and Yayla, 2001: 428-429). This feature of the MP played a significant role in its clear victory in the general elections held in the fall of 1983.

In contrary to the NSC's plan, as happened in 1961, the 1983 elections were not won by either the NDP or the PP, but rather by an unexpected newcomer, Özal and his MP.\textsuperscript{126} This result was undoubtedly a blow for the military. The MP won the majority of seats (53 per cent) in the National Assembly with 45.2 percent of the total valid votes cast in the elections. It was the highest level reached by a party and enough to form a single-party government since the 1969 elections. Although a majority of the MP votes presumably came from former JP supporters, it appears that the MP also received votes from the supporters of the former NSP, NAP, and even the RPP. The PP came out as the second largest party with the support of the former RPP voters, which was a better result than

\textsuperscript{125} For detailed information on various assumptions about the foundation of the MP by Özal and its participation in the 1983 general elections, see Cemal (1989: Chp. 1); and Birand and Yağış (2001: Chp. 5).

\textsuperscript{126} For details on the problems faced by the military and the politicians during the transition period to democracy, see Cemal (1989: Chp. 1); Barkey (1990b); and Birand and Yağış (2001: Chp. 5).
most observers expected. Despite the high expectations of both the Military Regime and its leadership, the NDP finished a poor third. As agreed by many political commentators, this seems to be related to the fact that most voters perceived the NDP as an extension of military rule, or as a kind of a “state party”, an image that the party leadership did not try to dispel. In the eve of the general elections, the General Evren’s plea for the support the NDP in the ballot box was generally fired-back. The PP was also regarded by many voters as an old-fashioned with the effect of repudiation of the étatist economic programmes in the 1980s around the world. In this sense, the election outcome can be interpreted as reflecting the desire of majority of Turkish voters for a rapid normalisation of political life (see Özbudun, 1990: 198; also see Yeşilada, 1987; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 188-191). Similar to the election victories of the American Republicans under the leadership of Reagan and the British Conservatives under the leadership of Thatcher, the MP’s appeal under Özal’s leadership to traditional values and market rationality struck a responsive cord with the Turkish electorate (Ergüder and Hofferbert, 1987: 38).

B) A New Rightist Hegemonic Project of Özal

After three-year long military interregnum, in which the state elite enjoyed having almost an absolute power in restructuring the political and economic systems of the country, the position of the political elite in the polity revived gradually during the MP Governments (December 1983-November 1991). Following its victory in the general elections that held in the fall of 1983, the new political elite represented by the leadership cadre of the MP initiated a campaign to establish a “new hegemony” over society. While IMF-directed economic policies secured Turkey’s further integration into the world capitalist system, a New Rightist political alliance constituted itself in the MP in the 1980s showed great similarities in its ideological stance and specific strategies to those of Reaganism in the U.S. and Thatcherism in the U.K.. In spite of the differences exist among these countries with respect to their socio-political structures and the degree of their capitalist development, similar political and economic policies were implemented in those years within the New Rightist ideological framework (see Tünay, 1993).
1) The Content and Application of the New Rightist Hegemonic Project of Özal

As an important tool of the New Rightist hegemonic project, the MP of Özal was not the reincarnation of any of the pre-1980 parties. It is true that the emergence of the MP was somewhat similar to that of the JP. The MP, just like the JP’s position in the early 1960s, filled a void in the party system with the transition to democracy. Different from the JP of the 1970s, however, the MP was able to draw from the sympathisers of banned political parties located in different points in the political spectrum despite it received most of its votes from ex-supporters of the JP. It provided a broadly acceptable, pro-system alternative, neutralising and re-integrating, if not eliminating, the anti-systemic tendencies on the radical right. As a moderate, centre-right political force, it served to draw back into the mainstream supporters of those pre-1980 parties of the radical right. It was also attractive for the moderate, centre and centre-left voters. Organisationally, in addition to its appeal to those who were internationally minded and market oriented, it was able to draw on those who had been identified with pre-1980 political parties, mainly worked in the JP organisation, but were unable to rise in the ranks of their own parties. The MP created a new cleavage in Turkish politics which cut across the old cleavages of the right and perhaps extending into the moderate, centre-left (Ergüder and Hofferbert, 1987: 37, 39; Dodd, 1990: 115-116, 118-119; Ergüder, 1991: 155-156). In this respect, Özal was the architect of a major realignment in Turkish party politics. Until 1980, newly formed parties in Turkey had consistently failed to become major players in party politics due to the strength of the two-party system. Özal believed, however, that the MP as a new political organisation could appeal to several different constituencies of the pre-1980 party system and could especially seek the support of a broad social coalition of middle-class voters. The MP’s electoral successes in the 1980s, therefore, marked a radical departure from this long-established trend of Turkish party system (Sayari, 1990).

Özal, of course, was aware of the inherent contradictions in this structure, such as those between the liberals and the conservatives and also those between the social democrats and the rest. Therefore, he tried to shape a new ideological system to establish an “expansive hegemony” over the whole society by harmonising all contradictory elements of the traditional ideologies represented within the MP. Thus, his attempt centred
not only on the acquisition of governmental power but also extended to the capture of crucial hegemonic fields such as individuality, schools, religious behaviour, and media. In a way, Özal and his Party in the light of the New Right ideology struggled for the reinforcement of its political power with the creation of a new collective will in the society (Tünay, 1993; Çakır, Can, and Bora, 1996: 6). In other words, "Özalism" and the MP was the domestic branch of the international New Rightist movement in Turkey or "à la Turca" model of this movement. Although Özal did, in rhetoric, criticised the authoritarian and bureaucratic nature of the Republican state, he did not question enough the national and religious sources of authoritarianism. He also tried to be a champion of economic liberalism in its most uncontrolled form. Thus, he attempted to blend neo-liberal economic views with religious and nationalist conservatism in accordance with the New Rightist counterparts in the Western countries (Çakır, Can, and Bora, 1996: 6). In fact, this blend was a natural outcome of Özal’s personal worldview: liberal in economic affairs; conservative in social-moral affairs. He displayed a personality that was open to the Western world in economic and technological affairs but close to the traditional Turkish-Islamic society in social-moral affairs. He shared most of the traditional cultural values of the Turkish society with the effect of his social-family background. His conservatism was, however, beyond the traditional conservatism with the effects of his educational background (i.e. engineering) and work experience in the Western world and thus, it is called as "conservative progressivism" (Göle, 1994).

As an extension of such personality and ideological tendency, Özal advocated a development and modernisation model based on the synthesis of traditional Turco-Islamic cultural values with Westernisation with technological dimension rather than the Republican modernisation model based on secularisation and Westernisation (Göle, 1994; Ataman, 2000). Özal claimed that such a shift in the strategy of modernisation in

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127 With the ideological shift (from traditional Atatürkism to the Turco-Islamic synthesis) made by the Military Regime at the level of the state elite in the early 1980s, Islamic identity became more visible not only because of increased veiling and prayer practices in the streets and in the universities, but most importantly in the educational and cultural policies of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal. The adherents of the Turco-Islamic synthesis began to occupy important positions in the state apparatus (see Dodd, 1990: 129-133; Eralp, Tünay, and Yeşilada, 1993: 4). This trend reached its peak in the mid-1990s because the Islamic-oriented party of Erbakan, the WP, emerged as a major political force in Turkish politics by exploiting socio-economic inequities in the society as well as religious feelings of individuals. This trend partly came to an end in the early 1998 when the Erbakan Government was forced out of power by a "post-modern coup", put into action by
Turkey would give a new impetus to development efforts through sorting out the “identity crisis” (East-West dilemma) of the Turkish state and people (Ataman, 2000). Although Özal’s attitude towards the Western world in terms of political (freedom of thought and expression), social (freedom of religion and conscience), and economic (freedom of establishing private enterprise) criteria was generally positive since he often noted these three fundamental freedoms as a basis of his and his Party’s structure of thought, it is true that his attitude was not so much “ideological” as that of Kemalists who emphasised political and cultural Westernisation. He rather adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the Western world and, in particular, the EU, especially in the issue of economic development, with keeping his conservative identity (i.e. Turkish nationalism and Islamism) and his relations with the Arab-Islam world intact.128

In accordance with the modernisation and development model in his mind, Özal’s general view about the state and society was different from Kemalist ideology. It was even more radical than that of the DP-JP liberal tradition. Özal was the most significant follower of the anti-state and anti-bureaucracy tradition in Turkey in recent times (see Çavdar, 1992).129 Özal radically reflected this tradition into his Party and Government programmes by reviewing the experiences of the PRP, the FRP, the DP, and the JP in the Republican period (see Karakoyunlu, 1993). Özal approached to the relations among the state, society, and individual within the framework of three freedoms: freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion and conscience, and freedom of establishing private

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128 Özal and the leading figures of the MP, in particular, adopted a concessionary attitude toward Islamic political and economic activities in Turkey in accordance with their worldviews. While Özal initiated to the process of application of full-membership to EU, he also developed strong economic relationships with Arab and other Islamic countries of the Middle East. Özal was also one of the sympathisers of the “green belt” and “moderate Islam” projects of the U.S. (see Cemal, 1989: Chp. 5; Ataman, 2001; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001). If Turkey’s application for the full-membership of European Union is rejected or prolonged unnecessarily, there is a strong possibility that such anti-Western and pro-Islamic forces will gain ground again. For detailed information about U. Steinbach’s (from the Orient Institute of Hamburg) view on this subject, see Cemal, 1989: 181).

129 Although the origin of this tradition could be traced back to the Prince Sabahattin, who was the advocate of private enterprise and decentralisation, and Ohannes Efendi and Cavid Bey, who were the advocates of market economy, in the late period of the Ottoman Empire (see Çavdar, 1982: 55; Kaygi, 1992: 85), it had remained quite weak until the early 1980s in comparison with the bureaucratic ruling tradition.
enterprise (Ataman, 2000). While he was putting a special emphasis on religious faith, family life, social solidarity and assistance as the conservative aspect of the MP’s programme, he indicated the significance of open economy as the liberal aspect of the MP’s programme. With such an approach, he was appreciated by both liberal and conservative circles in Turkey (see Ataman, 2000 and 2001; Erdoğan, 2001; Yayla, 2001).

Starting from the 1983 general elections, Özal tried to derive popular support from different sections of the society through emphasising the related type of freedom for the targeted section. Firstly, Özal aimed to make natural contacts with the social discontent about the “sacred” and “bureaucratic” state accumulated in the deep inside of the society, with his liberal economic and conservative political discourses. In rhetoric, Özal particularly used the phrases “the reconciliation of the state with its nation” and “the state existed for the people not the other way around” (Çakır, Can, and Bora, 1996: 6; also see ANAP, 1983a and 1983b). In a way quite similar to the Thatcherite discourse, “anti-statism”130 was manipulated as a device to create a national-popular consensus in the society, which was necessary for the establishment of an expansive hegemony. Özal and the leadership cadre of the MP were very well aware that the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition (i.e. the central role of the state in all corners of both the political and civil societies) had been creating serious problems not only critical issues but also in daily life. Therefore, they decided to carry out palliative de-bureaucratization reforms in order to ease the tension exerted by the state apparatus over individuals without enacting serious structural reforms (Tünay, 1993: 22).

130 The term “anti-statism” here should be understand within the context of the New Rightist formula, “the revival of the state but the downsizing and de-bureaucratization of government”. As a matter of fact, anti-statism was expounded as privatization, deregulation and de-bureaucratization in practice but not as any movement against the constitutional principle of the existence of the Turkish state as an indivisible entity with its territory and nation. Although Özal opened the way to discuss some issues that had been previously regarded as taboos in the Turkish society (e.g. the civil-military relations; secularism; and minority rights), did not try enough to change, except in the field of economy, the authoritarian structure and style of the state particularly reinforced by the Military Regime in the early 1980s. Despite this anti-statist and anti-bureaucratic ideological standpoint and rhetoric, Özal, paradoxically, followed, at least at the beginning, a policy that increased the power of government. Since he could not enjoy enough support from the civil-intellectuals and bureaucrats for his policies, Özal tried to de-bureaucratise government through the machinery of government but this machinery was filled by Özal with his political and bureaucratic entourage. Just like Mrs. Thatcher did in the U.K. (see Benyon, 1989), Özal used legal and administrative regulations in widespread in order to reduce the size and power of the big government (Oyan and Aydn, 1991: Chp. 3; Oyan, 1998: Chp. 1, and 1998b: 279-280; Erdoğan, 2001: 26). Therefore, it is often argued that the
Secondly, this anti-bureaucratic sentiment also went hand in hand with a liberal-competitive individualism through economic measures taken in favour of free market economy. The Turkish bourgeoisie generally welcomed Özal, since the famous and well-articulated British formula (i.e. “there is no alternative”) forced it to do so. Although the export-promotion, which was chosen by Özal and the MP as an accumulation strategy of their New Rightist hegemony project, was not compatible with the interests of different sections of capital, especially those of which had largely benefited from import-substitution model, the bourgeoisie hoped that a government, which was in favour of free market economy, would serve its political interests in the long run (Tünay, 1993: 23). By indicating the potential benefits of the free market economy, he also tried to attract the attention of the masses eager for upward socio-economic mobilisation (Balkır, 1993a: 5).

Thirdly, the bias shown in favour of religion and nationalism was used to mobilise different sections of society around a one nation hegemonic project. The crucial support of the religious conservative circles was also secured through the special emphasis given on the role of religion in education and the liberation of sectarian activities from state control, which marked a turning point in the history of the Republican Turkey (see Tünay, 1993: 22).

Finally, in order to derive the support of these traditional conservative sections and disillusioned social democrat-oriented masses to a national-popular programme by dissolving any mode of thinking based on class analysis, like Thatcherism, Özal asserted certain concepts, such as “ortadirek” (main pillars/middle classes) (Tünay, 1993: 22). Özal put a special emphasis on the struggle against inflation since he thought that a reduction of inflationary pressure would ensure political support from the impoverished masses, the “ortadirek”, in particular. This centrist/middle class-oriented discourse, together with his “social justice” understanding blended with Islamic social solidarity, was successfully used.

 authoritarian and personal ruling style of Özal resembles, to some extent, the ruling styles of Reagan and Thatcher.

131 The term “ortadirek” literally means the “central pole of the nomad’s tent”. Here, it refers specifically to small agricultural producers, workers, public employees, craftsmen, and artisans, who symbolically constitute the centre of Turkish society (see ANAP, 1983a: 170-172).
Beyond social and political issues, the economic approach of Özal and his Party in the light of the New Rightist formulas was central to the establishment an expansive hegemony. The MP exhibited an important feature that distinguished it from the pre-1980 parties and their policies: similar to the New Rightist social, economic and managerial policies of the Reagan administration in the U.S. and the Thatcher Governments in the U.K., the MP under Özal’s leadership appealed to both traditional moral values and market rationality. In the electoral campaigns of 1983 and 1987, Özal ran on a platform stressing the significance of open economy, economic rationality, economic growth and prosperity, efficient service delivery and de-bureaucratisation, and fiscal caution, in addition to traditional moral values. Özal advocated de-emphasis on government intervention and regulation in economy. He was keen on changing Turkey from a government-dominated economy based on inward-oriented import-substitution policies to a free market economy based on limited government and outward-oriented export-promotion. Özal declared that the economy should be understood in its technical content. He supported the principle economic rationality that the economy has its own laws and economic decisions must be responsive to market signals rather than being based on bureaucratic priorities and patron-client relations – an important characteristic of Turkish economy and politics. If these laws were improperly implemented with social and political considerations, as done by the governments in the 1970s, it would be impossible to cope with economic problems. Özal was against the centralisation of all activities in the capital, which enlarged the pie to be distributed as political patronage. Therefore, he put special emphasis on decentralisation of government and privatisation of public assets and activities. He planned to privatise state owned enterprises and public utilities with the same political rationale: to safeguard them against political patronage. An extra caution taken by Özal to shield his small technocratic-bureaucratic team, employed as economic adviser or managers in the public sector and authorised in economic policy-making, from politics and even from the patronage-oriented demands of the members of his own Party. Özal also put an effort to emphasise an efficient service delivery to the citizen; a well-conducted campaign to show the relations between taxes paid and services delivered. Özal and his Party attempted, with some success, to revolutionise the concepts of government and citizen and the attitudes of each to the other. He emphasised the measures to reduce the burden of bureaucracy on the

The MP under the leadership of Özal addressed a new set of issues and devised a new policy approach to tackle the problems of the country. Özal developed a new “creed” with an entrepreneurial spirit, based on modern economic rationality, coupled with an emphasis on conciliation and moderation in political discourse. With some slogans, he managed to capture the imagination of voters of the 1980s: “getting things done without any delay”, “exploiting the economic and political international potential of the country”, “skipping an age” (“çağ atlamak”/“catch up with the modern world”). With his engineering-technocrat background in both the public and private sectors, Özal presented himself as an able and tenacious technician turned politician who knows the rational formulas to tackle Turkey’s socio-economic problems with conviction and without any selfish political consideration (Ergüder, 1991: 164; also see Birand and Yalçın, 2001). The MP cast an image of a political party that, in contrast to the polarised and ideological style of politics of the 1970, was emphasising on pragmatic debate and criticisms over the rationality of public policies. In particular, Özal was able to explain the policy position of the MP, even in the case of unpopular economic measures to combat inflation and budget deficit such as raising the prices of the products of state owned enterprises and public utilities and reducing agricultural subsidies, by using modern channels of communication (Ergüder, 1991: 164). This was an imitation of the Thatcherite rhetoric that “we are only obeying the dictates of the science of economic” (Tünay, 1993: 23; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 215). As Tünay aptly points out, this point of view marked a significant change in the attitude of the Turkish right, which in the past had always stressed the primacy of political, moral, and cultural factors over economic issues (1993: 22). Even if economic issues had been primarily discussed in the past, this activity had always been paralysed with heavy socio-political considerations.
Emphasising pragmatic debate and criticisms over the rationality of public policies rather than ideological conflict on the regime appealed to the masses and brought the success of the MP in the 1983 general elections. After a decade of excessive ideological polarisation, the Turkish electorate was searching for stable government to provide efficient solutions for socio-economic problems in the early 1980s. “Softening of political conflict” and “policy-oriented dialogue” appeared to be two key concepts that shaped the form and content of the post-1980 political life (Göle, 1987: 11; Ergüder, 1991: 156-157, 164). Özal and other leading figures of the MP through a dynamic leadership style successfully grasped this centrist and pragmatic leaning of the Turkish electorate and came up with a conciliatory style of politics, at least until the return of the leaders of the pre-1980 parties to active politics in 1987. Thus, the earlier steps, at least, of the establishment of an expansive hegemony over the society were taken by the MP thanks to the Özal’s performance in both during the Military Regime and the election campaigns. Özal tried to develop such a hegemony in the middle-term with the help of anti-statist and anti-Kemalist forces in domestic politics and of the U.S., as a consequence of her strategic interests in the Middle East and indirect application of her “moderate Islam” and “green belt” projects, in international politics.

With the victory in the 1983 general elections, Özal obtained a great opportunity to put the policies in his mind into practice within the framework mentioned above. The legal existence of the NSC came to an end and the Council members became the members of the Presidential Council (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Konseyi) chaired by President Evren. Özal was duly invited by President Evren to form the new government, and he received a comfortable vote of confidence from the National Assembly. Despite the speculations to the contrary, the new MP Government did not include any independent ministers close to or favoured by the military. Also, another MP deputy was easily elected as the speaker of the National assembly, again disproving speculations that Ulusu was favoured by the military for that prestigious post. In the local elections held in the spring of 1984, all parties were allowed to contest; and these elections re-confirmed the popularity of the MP. Thus the transition process proceeded smoothly following the general and local elections and a new phase in Turkish politics started (Özbudun, 1990: 198; also see Cemal, 1989: Chp. 2 and Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 193, 195-200).
In this phase, the Turkish society and, in particular, the Turkish economy experienced a serious transformation with many positive and some negative aspects. Özal repeated in many occasions that Turkey experienced a kind of “transformation” that could be seen only in the establishing years of the Republic and thus, Turkey has caught up with the modern world (ANAP, 1987c). Although he is the most controversial one in terms of his views and performance, Özal, first as a prime minister (1983-1989) and then as a president (1989-1993), emerged as one of the most powerful leaders of modern Turkey. Whatever their personal opinions about Özal’s personality, views, and performance, both Turkish and Western authors generally agree that Özal has deeply affected the political and socio-economic life in the contemporary Turkey (see Ataman, 2000: 53-54; Bozkurt, 2001: 171-172; Erdoğan, 2001: 30; Yayla, 2001: 427-428; also see Birand and Yağmur, 2001 and Sezal and Dağı, 2001). He played an important role in the process of transition to democracy with his Party. Özal’s main objectives in holding frequent electoral contests through elections and referendums were to legitimise the supremacy of civilian control in politics and his own role in Turkish politics and to consolidate the MP’s position as the leading party of the centre-right. This strategy also included the legitimisation of the institutions of electoral competition, interest representation, and executive accountability, all of which contributed significantly to the re-democratisation of Turkish politics in the 1980s (Sayar, 1990: 399-400). He also boldly opened the way to discuss some issues that had been previously regarded as taboos in the Turkish society (e.g. the civil-military relations; secularism; and minority rights). It should be pointed out, however, that Özal’s record concerning democracy is quite mixed. Some legal and political attempts in favour and disfavour of democratisation and human rights were made at the same time. His efforts toward political liberalisation increased during his presidency (see Tanör, 1997: 91-103; also see Cemal, 1989: Chp. 7 and 308-326; Ataman, 2000: 55, 57-58; Birand and Yağmur, 2001: 108, 328-331, 386; Erdoğan, 2001: 20, 23-24, 25; Yayla, 2001: 436-439).132 Özal personally believed that democratisation automatically comes after economic

132 Towards the end of his presidency, Özal developed a new programme (i.e. the “Second Change Programme”/“İkinci Değişim Programı”), with the help of a group of liberal intellectuals, emphasising democratisation, rule of law, and free market economy. He was also thinking of returning to active politics in order to put this programme (Akyol, 2000; Ataman, 2000: 62; Birand and Yağmur, 2001: Chp. 15; Bozkurt, 2001: 189-193; Erdoğan, 2001: 23-24). For detailed
development and paid most of his attention, especially during his premiership, to economic issues rather than democratisation and human rights issues (Cemal, 1989: Chp. 11; Ulsever, 1999: 234; Ataman, 2000: 56; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 327-328; Erdoğan, 2001: 25-26; Yayla, 2001: 438). As a matter of fact, he gained international recognition for his efforts to restructure Turkish economy in accordance with liberal economic principles and to integrate Turkey more fully into the world politics and economy (Tünay, 1993). The application of Turkey, which has been an associated member since the mid-1960s, for the full membership in the E.U. made in 1987 with Özal’s own initiative could be considered within this framework (see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 286-288).

This phase, following the by-elections of 1986, the general elections of 1987, two hotly contested constitutional referenda in 1987 and 1988 and the local elections of 1989, lasted until when the MP lost the power in the general elections of 1991. In the 1983 general elections, the MP came to power, as is mentioned above, because it was the only hope and the representative of whatever civil society there was in Turkey. The technician characteristic of Özal and the entrepreneurial spirit of the MP also facilitated the electoral success. The inclusive structure of the MP, which encompassed four different political orientations, made the minimum conditions ready for the establishment of an expansive hegemony (a national-popular consensus) over the society. The MP gained a further confidence from the 1984 local elections in which all political parties, in and out of the parliament, were allowed to participate. Whereas it won 41.5 per cent of the total valid votes cast, other parties fared badly. The MP also came first in the 1986 by-elections and the 1987 early general elections because it adopted the winning formula of DP-JP, based on an effective policy performance on the issues of economic growth and service delivery. It was still able to capture the imagination of many voters with an emphasis on bread-and-butter issues, coupled with an emphasis on conciliation and moderation in political discourse. Özal successfully explained his policy positions even in the cases of unpopular economic measures by using the media properly.

Information about Özal’s intentions and efforts toward political and economic liberalisation within the framework of this programme during his presidency, see Özal (1992a and 1992b).
2) The Eventual Failure of the New Rightist Hegemonic Project of Özal

Although the MP captured vast majority of the seats (64.9 per cent) in the National Assembly, partly with the help of the electoral re-engineering made immediately before the elections in favour of the MP and partly with the effect of the unreadiness of some newly organised political parties, the results of 1987 early general elections, together with those of 1986 by-elections, showed the early signs for the decline in the electoral support for the MP (32.3 per cent in 1986 and 36.3 per cent in 1987). Towards the end of 1980s, this trend accelerated and the electoral support for the MP declined to almost half and then the leadership of Özal was challenged. The MP Governments’ inflationary growth policies at the expense of the welfare of great bulk of the electorate, the anti-secularist attitudes of some ministers in the MP cabinets, and some serious corruption and nepotism claims about the members of the MP and the Özal family were the most important factors in its waning electoral popularity. The constitutional referendum held just before the 1987 early general elections was another important landmark for the MP and for post-1980 Turkish politics. In this referendum, the constitutional ban on the political rights of former political leaders (Provisional art. 4 of the 1982 Constitution) came to the agenda. All political parties and groups except President Evren and Prime Minister Özal and his Party were against this constitutional but undemocratic ban. Özal did not prefer to lift this ban in the parliament through a constitutional amendment but to go to a referendum since this ban was imposed by the constitutional referendum held in 1982. Although they did not have any sympathy for former leaders, neither President Evren nor the military resisted such a referendum. By this way, Özal found an opportunity to show that he was not afraid of former leaders, in particular of Demirel. There was also a probability that the electorate may not lift the ban. The ban was lifted by the margin of the vote. This was actually a fine-tuned message given by the electorate to both Özal and the former leaders. With the return of all former leaders to active politics as a result of referendum, Özal and the MP, however, faced a real and serious political competition in the 1987 early general elections and the following elections.133 The 1987 referendum could also be regarded as an important political event.

133 Encouraged by the mere one percent approval for former political leaders’ return to politics in the referendum, and fearful for the most distant feature, Özal sought to advance the next general elections by one year. As is mentioned above, in spite of all political manoeuvres and electoral re-
It signalled the departure of Özal and the MP from a conciliatory and moderate style of politics on an issue of basic political rights that should have never been submitted to a referendum. This referendum, therefore, put the MP, in the long term, in a difficult and inconsistent stance with its declared commitment to basic democratic values. Özal’s and the MP leaders also gradually gave up their friendly attitude, especially with respect to the press and civil society organisations. Thus, the tightening policy of the second MP Government in socio-political life in the face of this growing opposition was another important factor in the decline of the popularity of both Özal and his Party. Finally, another problem that plagued the MP was the growing competition between the liberal and conservative factions within the Party and even the stiffening opposition to Özal within the Party itself. An important sign of popular resentment to the increasingly personal and authoritarian style of Özal’s leadership in the late 1980s was the use of the term “dynasty” with reference to decision-making by Özal in consultation with his immediate family, brothers and cousins, and some close advisers, to the exclusion of the properly elected executive and the Party organisation (Sayar, 1990: 400; Dodd, 1990: 95-104, 107, 115; Ergüder, 1991: 154-166; Tanrı, 1997: 62-78; also see Cemal, 1989: Chp. 4, 7, 10 and Conclusion; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp. 6, 8 and 11). Furthermore, after a period of very high performance, Özal and his Party gradually suffered from the fatigue of being in power. In the face of such fatigue, bureaucratic resistance to the policies of the MP Governments gradually increased. Since the most of the bureaucracy was not convinced but forced to adapt itself to the change envisaged by Özal, the de-bureaucratisation effort of the MP Governments was not complete success (Görmez, 1996: 69). The increased political competition between the MP and its rivals and within the MP itself after 1987
eventually forced Özal and the second MP Government to follow a populist economic policy, which had actually plagued the Turkish economy and politics in the 1970s and, therefore had been fiercely criticised by Özal in the early 1980s. Thus, while Özal was a technician-politician who emphasised economic development issues during the first MP Government (December 1983-December 1987), he gradually lost his technocratic identity and reformist characteristics and more often displayed the general characteristics of a populist politician as a result of the competition with the “old guys” during the second MP Government (December 1987-October 1989) (see, for example, Görmez, 1996: 67; Türkkan, 1996: 221-229; Bozkurt, 2001: 185-189). However, this populist policy could not save the MP from heavy electoral defeats134 at the 1989 local elections135 and the 1991 early general elections136 and, moreover, accelerated the deterioration of the Turkish economy towards the end of 1980s.

The New Right, owing its existence in part to the specific policies of the Military Regime of the early 1980s and constituting itself in the MP under the leadership of Özal,

134 In addition to political factors mentioned above, it should be emphasised that many populist options available to JP under the inward-oriented import-substitution strategy during the 1960s and 1970s were no longer feasible options for the MP in the context of the 1980s (see Önış and Riedel, 1989) and, in fact, did not work to keep the broad electoral coalition constructed by the MP intact.

135 In the face of increasing political competition and worsening macro economic indicators due to the populist policy pursued, which will be treated in detail in the following chapter, Özal sought to advance the local elections by one year. He also tried to convert the sympathy for himself to votes as a consequence of assassination attempt at the Party Conference in the summer of 1988. Since rescheduling of local elections was a constitutional matter requiring a qualified majority in the parliament and such a majority could not be obtained in the parliament, it had to do by means of a referendum. The opposition successfully turned this unnecessary referendum into a vote of confidence for Özal and the MP. The result of constitutional referendum held in the fall of 1988 was, however, another blow for Özal and the MP. Özal obtained only 35 per cent of the votes, even below the level the MP had in the 1987 early general elections. Despite the protests of the opposition, Özal denied it was a defeat and stayed in power. The local elections held in the spring of 1989 also became a vote of confidence for the MP. The MP obtained only 21.9 per cent of the votes, coming third behind the SDPP and TPP. Despite call for resignations, Özal resolved to stay on and began to political calculations to become a president of the Republic (see Dodd, 1990: 99-100; Tanör, 1997: 76-78).

136 Özal announced his candidature, disregarding cries from the opposition parties that, with the proven unpopularity of the MP, it was immoral though it could not be illegal. In the fall of 1989, Özal was elected president relying on the overwhelming majority of the MP in the parliament. Rather than wait for the next MP congress to choose a new leader for the Party, Özal nominated the Speaker of the National Assembly, Yıldırım Akbulut, as prime minister. Under the weak premierships of Akbulut (November 1989-June 1991) and Mesut Yılmaz (June 1991-November 1991), the MP's popularity did not improve. With the effect of the Gulf War, political and economic problems of the country intensified. As a consequence, in 1991, the MP lost the early general elections and eight year long single-party governments of the MP came to an end (Dodd, 1990: 100; Heper, 1994b; Tanör, 1997: 78-87).
tried to establish a new hegemony in Turkey during the 1980. The MP Governments pursued initially an "expansive hegemony" and later a "passive revolution". The initial attempt to create an expansive hegemony was doomed to fail, since no national-popular consensus necessary for this type of hegemony could form. In spite of an all-encompassing national-popular (one nation) campaign and electoral successes in the period of 1983-1987, two nations character of the hegemonic project of the MP Governments could be clearly observed in several critical areas such as income distribution and labour relations. The major reason for the failure of this project was the inability of the MP Governments to provide benefits for neither the whole of the first nation (i.e. a few private monopolies, interest-bearing capitals, a group of rentiers, and speculators) nor the second nation (i.e. the majority of agricultural producers, workers, government employees, artisans and small tradesmen, pensioners, and unemployed).

Furthermore, in addition to the social democrats, some parts of liberals, Islamic fundamentalists, and pan-Turkists remained out of the New Right bloc represented by the MP and supported other political parties. After the 1987 general elections, the second MP Government made a significant change in its strategy toward a transition from an expansive hegemony to a passive revolution. An obvious two-nations project appeared as a last resort. However, this attempt was equally futile, because a passive revolution requires the neutralisation of the interests and demands of the second nation and the formation of a unity, or at least a temporary fusion of interests, within the sections of the first nation. As Tünay points out, neither of these was possible at that time. The neutralisation or containment of interests in society presupposes the prior existence of a coherent, cementing ideology to secure moral and intellectual leadership of at least one faction of the first nation. The initial claim of MP representing "four different political orientations", in particular, lost its meaning after the 1987 constitutional referendum, because each political orientation was represented by its original political organisation.

The masses that faced serious economic difficulties in the late of 1980s due to increased inflation were looking new way outs from these political parties. Also, a fusion of interests among the sections of the capital under the political leadership of the MP was a very remote possibility, since many of those sections had already shown both their economic and political resentments toward the MP Governments as well. Thus, they were in search of alternative political formations. Moreover, the increased contradictions within
the MP, such as the ideological conflict between Americanophile liberalism and nationalist/religious conservatism, also contributed to the failure of this project (1993: 25-27).

Despite the failure of this project in the final analysis, it is admitted by even the opponents of Özal that the political and socio-economic atmosphere of the country changed significantly in the 1980s in comparison to that of the 1970s (Barkey, 1990a: 190-191). As will be explained in detail below, an open economy and society integrated with the world political and socio-economic system is the most significant legacy of Özal (see Aktan, 1991-1993; Balkır, 1993a; Uras, 1993; and Yayla, 2001). The MP Governments' policies pursued in economic and administrative-bureaucratic spheres were among the most crucial ones realising this important, and probably irreversible, change.

C) The Economic Policy(s) of the Motherland Party Governments

The 1980s, in particular, are termed by Rodrik (1990) as the “Özal decade” in Turkey. The MP Governments under the premiership of Özal in the period of December 1983-October 1989 had almost complete autonomy in economic policy-making. After economic stabilisation and structural adjustment efforts put by the JP Minority Government under the premiership of Demirel (1980) and the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime under the premiership of Ulusu (1980-1983), a more comprehensive application of the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme of 1980 was achieved by Özal and his Governments. Favourable internal and external circumstances enabled Özal to “internalise” the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme and to popularise it as the MP Government’s own strategy. The scale of external financial assistance provided between the years of 1980 and 1984 also gave considerable autonomy for Özal and his Governments from societal pressures in terms of their ability to implement the programme in a consistent way without any serious deviation from its targets, at least, until 1987. This economic programme was, without any doubt, the most important tool of the New Rightist hegemonic project of Özal.
It could be argued that the MP Governments did not pursue an economic policy remained unchanged throughout the post-1983 period. Therefore, the existence of economic policies rather than a single-unchanged economic policy could be mentioned. In fact, we can distinguish two different periods in terms of the aims and results of the economic policy. In the first term of office (December 1983-December 1987), the MP Government under the premiership of Özal was generally successful in terms of levels of structural adjustment, liberalisation and international integration, and macro-economic indicators. In the second term of office (December 1987-October 1989), the MP Government under the premiership of Özal could, however, not show the same success, in particular, in terms of fundamental macro-economic indicators. The changes in policies in the late 1980s, especially after 1987, unfortunately resulted in deterioration in many macro-economic indicators. Similar tendency continued during the years of 1990 and 1991 under the short-lived and unsuccessful MP Governments under the premierships of Akbulut and Yılmaz. As will be indicated in detail in the following Chapter, the staff cutback policy pursued in the 1980s followed this general economic trend as well.

1) The Main Aims and Features of the Economic Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programme Pursued by the Motherland Party

In the realm of economics, the MP Governments’ policy (s) drawn by Özal centred on two successive principal objectives: first, to permanently get Turkey out of the economic paralysis it faced in the late 1970s through carrying on the application of fundamental economic stabilisation measures of the programme of 24 January 1980; and second, to catch up with advanced Western economies through emphasising the structural adjustment measures of the programme. In the period of 1980-1983, the programme of 1980 was, in general, successfully carried out by the Demirel and Ulusu Governments, with a special emphasis on the re-establishment of economic stability (e.g. lowering inflation and improving the balances of budget, payments and current account). Özal, as an architecture and principal practitioner of the programme, gained a good reputation in the eyes of national and international economic and political circles through the remarkable success achieved in normalising the country’s deteriorating economic-financial

137 For a similar categorisation, see Öniş (1991a: 29).
conditions and re-operating the price mechanism. Although Özal was aware of the importance of keeping this good record and, therefore, following an economic policy in the light of the spirit of the January 24 Measures, he was not content himself with that when he came to the power in the end of 1983. After turning the economic tide in the early 1980s, Özal gave a new direction and impetus to the economic programme to be followed by the MP Governments. Thus, Özal’s attention shifted from the initial aims of the programme of 1980 (i.e. the stabilisation measures) to the comprehensive aims of the programme (i.e. measures facilitating structural adjustment and international integration of the Turkish economy) (see Kazdağlı, 2001: 460). Thus, in the post-1983 period, he sought to find a solution to country’s chronic economic malaise through a series of ambitious economic and financial reforms, which was called by Özal himself as “transformation” (Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 338). These reforms, or transformation efforts, were put into practice within the general framework of the policy of the withdrawal of government dominated the agenda of many governments in the 1980s. The final aim of Özal was, in accordance with this policy, to thoroughly integrate the Turkish economy into the world capitalist market.

This ambitious structural adjustment programme contained significant changes (i.e. liberalisation, deregulation, downsizing, and de-bureaucratisation) in the economic-financial regulations and practices in the fields of trade regime, foreign investment, financial markets, taxation, government subsidies, privatisation and bureaucratic controls and procedures. Some of these changes were actually initiated by Özal during the Military Regime but this time they were given a new direction, volume and impetus. First of all, a fundamental choice was made in favour of the superiority of market forces over administrative decisions in determination of commodity and factor prices; thus, price control mechanisms were abolished and government control over private sector prices ended. Another major policy switch from import-substituting industrialisation to export-promoting development was achieved with the abolition of foreign-exchange controls and the radical changes made in the trade regime. While the MP Governments began a massive export drive by providing various incentives, subsidies, tax rebates, preferential credits, and exemptions for customs duties to the exporters and abolishing restrictions, such as licensing and price controls, on exports, it also proceeded to lift the restrictions on
the import regime, except duties. The restrictions on imports through tariffs, quotas, licenses, and advance deposit requirements were relaxed considerably. Thus, some serious steps were taken in order to integrate the Turkish economy with the international markets. A more favourable environment was created for foreign investment with decreasing controls on capital and foreign exchange markets in order to improve the balance of payments and to receive new employment and advanced technology opportunities. Some other measures that represented marked departures from established practices were also introduced. Within this framework, new laws were created and the present ones were modified to have a more developed institutional structure and liberalised practices in domestic banking and financial markets. The determination of exchange and interests rates was left to the free market system and the foreign exchange regime was liberalised step by step. In parallel with the changes in financial markets, important modifications were made in taxation system. Within this framework, new taxes such as V.A.T. were introduced. With the effect of supply-side economics' hypothesis on the relation between taxation structure and rates and saving and investment levels, the structure of tax revenues and tax rates were changed remarkably in favour of direct taxes on capital income in order to encourage savings and investments. In order to increase their efficiency and competitiveness, government subsidies to the state-owned industries were trimmed and they were allowed to raise the prices of their products through periodic adjustments to the prevailing market conditions. In accordance with the MP's preference that government should only be content with infrastructure investments in some strategic sectors such as energy, communication and transport and no longer invest in manufacturing industry, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises came to the agenda first time seriously. Privatisation schemes were introduced to open up the possibility of an eventual transfer of state-owned industries and large-scale public works and properties to private shareholders. Finally, excessive bureaucratic controls and procedures were either eliminated or reduced and simplified almost in all areas of economic activity (e.g. trade regime, the process of investment approval, and price determination) for a favourable environment for the operation of a market economy (see Aktan, 1991-1993: 66-85; Balkır, 1993a; Hürgüş, 1993; Kazdağlı, 2001: 461-466).
2) A Mix Record of the Economic Policy of the MP Governments

Before going into an in-depth discussion of the cutback strategy of the MP Governments in the following Chapter, a brief review of the outcomes of economic policy pursued by the MP Governments might be helpful to figure out the general economic atmosphere of the period.

The high performance of the Turkish economy during the early and the middle of the 1980s reflected the impact of the changes that were implemented under Özal’s both technocratic guidance and political leadership (Sayari, 1990; Aktan, 1991-1993; Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992; Balkır, 1993a; Uras, 1993; Hatiboğlu, 1995: 7-11). Following its recovery in the early years of 1980, the economy experienced a relatively high growth rate and a moderate inflation during the first MP Government under the leadership of Özal (December 1983-December 1987). The annual growth rate of GNP averaged about 6.7 per cent for the period. Inflation rate averaged about 38.8 per cent, which was a moderate figure for Turkey but was still too high by international standards (see Table IV.1).
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<td><strong>GNP growth rate (%)</strong></td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<td>(at 1968 prices-at market prices)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inflation rate (%)</strong> (wholesale price index, average of year, at 1968 prices)</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>53.1</td>
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<td><strong>Unemployment rate (%) (1)</strong></td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exports (million $)</strong></td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>2,910</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>5,746</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td>7,134</td>
<td>7,958</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>10,190</td>
<td>11,662</td>
<td>11,625</td>
<td>12,959</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exports/Imports ratio (%)</strong></td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Exports/GNP ratio (%)</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total foreign trade volume/GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign capital investment</strong></td>
<td>228</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>3,163</td>
<td>4,634</td>
<td>6,419</td>
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<td>(cumulative inflow, million $)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External debt (million $)</strong></td>
<td>14,234</td>
<td>16,227</td>
<td>16,841</td>
<td>17,619</td>
<td>18,385</td>
<td>20,659</td>
<td>25,476</td>
<td>32,101</td>
<td>40,428</td>
<td>40,722</td>
<td>41,751</td>
<td>49,035</td>
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<td><strong>External debt as % of GNP</strong></td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>44.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External debt service ratio (%)</strong></td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic debt as % of GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
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<td><strong>Cons. budget exp./GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consolidated budget deficit/GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PSBR/GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td><strong>Current account deficit (million $)</strong></td>
<td>-1,413</td>
<td>-3,408</td>
<td>-1,936</td>
<td>-952</td>
<td>-1,923</td>
<td>-1,439</td>
<td>-1,013</td>
<td>-1,465</td>
<td>-806</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>-2,611</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Current account deficit/GNP (%)</strong></td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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Note: (1) Not including disguised unemployment; if it is included, the figures are expected to be doubled.
Another macroeconomic indicator that shows significant improvement was the current account deficit. The deficit figures fluctuated between the reasonable margins and then showed positive results in both absolute and relative terms in 1988 and 1989. The most striking results were achieved in the promotion of tourism, exports, and foreign investments, especially following the liberalisation of trade and investment regimes. During the Military Regime (1980-1983), the amount of exports in monetary terms was almost doubled and exports/GNP ratio was more than doubled. Although Turkey’s export performance gradually lost its momentum during the first MP Government, the amount of exports in monetary terms was more than doubled at the end of the decade with the effect of some extra measures taken by the second MP Government. In 1990, exports/GNP ratio, which was actually improved during the 1984-1989 period, declined to the level of 1983 as a consequence of sharp increase in annual growth of GNP for the year 1990 (see Table IV.1).\textsuperscript{138} A transformation also took place in the structure and variety of exports and the proportion of industrial exports was remarkably increased in the total exports. In the first half of the 1980s, the share of the Islamic countries in Turkey’s total exports sharply increased due to Özal’s sympathetic approach to Arab-Islam world and remarkable increase in purchasing power of these countries as a result of the high oil prices in the 1970s. In the second half of the decade, the place of the members of the European Community in Turkey’s total exports became prominent again. The amount of imports in monetary terms also increased as a result of the outward-oriented economic policy despite the exports/imports ratio was improved during the 1984-1990 period. Thus, the degree of openness of the Turkish economy in terms of the ratio of total foreign trades (exports plus imports) to GNP increased (see Table IV.1).

As a result of the increased confidence in the stability of investment environment in Turkey and some legal and administrative measures taken by the MP Governments,

\textsuperscript{138} In addition to the radical changes in the trade, incentive and exchange-rate policies of the MP governments, the new market opportunities brought by the Iran-Iraq War for Turkish products and the over-invoicing of exports or the exaggeration of export claims with fictional earnings (hayali ihracat) by Turkish exporters who received subsidised credits and tax rebates from the governments for their activities could be accounted for the crucial determinants for the improvement in exports in the 1980s (Rodrik, 1988: 176-177; Barkey, 1989; Hıç, 1989). It is also argued that rapid growth occurred in the early 1980s primarily as a result of exporting available stock of idle capacity rather than through additional investments in export industries (see Balkır, 1993b; and Yılmaz, 2001).
foreign capital investments (number of firms, annual and cumulative foreign capital inflow) dramatically increased. Whereas the cumulative foreign capital inflow into Turkey amounted to $228 million during 1954-1979, the corresponding figures for the 1980-1983 period was about $932 million and for the 1984-1990 period was about $6.4 billion (see Table IV.1). Foreign capital investments increasingly targeted the service sector such as tourism, commerce and banking. The flow of foreign capital investments also benefited from the establishment of several free trade zones in the second half of the 1980s (see DPT, 1990: 49-50). Despite these developments, foreign capital inflow could not reach to a satisfactory level if the Turkey’s position is compared with other emerging markets (Balkır, 1993a: 7).

Özal’s effort to deregulate and privatise the public sector had less striking but nevertheless significant results for the change in the general atmosphere of the Turkish economy. The abolishment of several statutory monopolies, the cutback of government subsidies and the lifting of price ceilings forced the state-owned enterprises to be more competitive. Emphasis in the privatisation policy was initially not placed on the direct sale of state-owned enterprise assets via issue of shares, but on offering management rights in the enterprises on a rental basis and in particular on revenue participation certificates which enabled to public to have a share in the operating income of the enterprises. After 1986, privatisation involving the transfer of ownership to private companies was attempted on a limited basis, with the effect of some legal and institutional arrangements. Various types of privatisation schemes (e.g. user charges in higher education and health; contracting-out for local public services; joint venture system) were also put into effect. In the late 1980s, attention increasingly shifted to the direct sale of some state-owned enterprises to foreign investors in order to finance some large infrastructure projects. Thus, the initial rationale behind privatisation, that of spreading ownership to the public, was gradually replaced by a fiscal one of decreasing public deficits (see Heper, 1990a: 327; also see Özmen, 1987: 57-82 and 181-186; Karataş, 1990; Aksoy, 1991-1993; Öniş, 1991b; Dartan, Arıoğlu and Coates, 1996: Chp. 4). Although government regulation on economy did not significantly decrease, except some areas such as import and price
controls\textsuperscript{139} and ambitious privatisation schemes did not go breakthrough\textsuperscript{140} the general atmosphere of economy changed remarkably. In general, the transformation of the country's economic infrastructure, financial institutions, and links with global capitalism progressed at a rapid pace. At the end of the decade, the effect of these ideological and economic transformations could easily be seen in the positions taken by the new post-1983 opposition parties, the private sector, and many civil society institutions. Despite their dislike for Özal's policies and their misgivings about some of the results of the post-1980 economic measures\textsuperscript{141} they agreed, and still agree, that, for the most part, a return to the 1970s economic positions was not a realistic option (Barkey, 1990a: 190-191). An open economy integrated with the world economic system, which is exactly opposite model of pre-1980 inward-oriented and government-heavy Turkish economy, is the most significant legacy of Özal (see Aktan, 1991-1993; Balkır, 1993a; Uras, 1993; and Yayla, 2001).

Despite these significant changes, especially achieved in the first term of office of the MP Government, Özal's economic transformation programme ran into serious problems during the second MP Government in the late 1980s. This result was actually not surprising that some unintended economic and social costs of such a significant transformation achieved in a rather short time were inevitable. Therefore, as his political performance, Özal's economic performance is quite mixed (Sayarı, 1990; Ergüder, 1991: 165; Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992; Balkır, 1993a; Hatiboğlu, 1995: 7, 11-12; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 208, 294-296, 332-335; Yayla, 2001: 432-433). Özal and his Party could not achieve their basic socio-economic commitment, i.e. withdrawal of government through expenditure cutbacks and privatisation. Although the consolidated budget

\textsuperscript{139} Despite all the rhetoric on the necessity to restrict government regulation and thus promote the free functioning of the market mechanism, government regulation on economy, even in the field of export-promotion, continued in different forms and degrees (Eralp, 1985 and 1990).

\textsuperscript{140} Although the first serious privatisation attempts were made by the MP Governments, the result of this policy was not satisfactory. Some privatisation schemes were failed since the necessary technical infrastructure and legal studies were not properly done by the Governments. The public opinion also reacted fiercely to direct sale of whole state owned enterprises to foreign investors due to a lack of consensus in public opinion on the necessity and techniques of privatisation. The lack of transparency in key operational steps of privatisation process was another important factor for the sluggishness of privatisation in Turkey (see OECD, 1992: 94; Oyan, 1998b: 274). From its inception in 1986 up to 1990, the proceed of privatisation amounted to only $0.65 billion and it hardly covered the expenses of privatisation process (see Ozelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı, 1999; and TİSK, 1999: 15). The privatisation experience in the 1980s did not result in a significant retreat of government (Aksoy, 1991-1993: 52).
expenditure did not increase in relative terms, except 1989 and 1990, in comparison to the 1983 level and levelled around 20 percent of GNP between the years of 1984-1990 (see Table IV.1), it should be pointed out the consolidated budget expenditure figure does not include some parts of expenditures of local governments and state-owned enterprises and also social security outlays, internal and external debt payments (for the post-1986 period), revolved-budget expenditures, off-budget funds. Therefore, the consolidated budget could not be any longer as a single criterion for measuring the relative sizes of both the general government sector and the whole public sector. If these other items were included in the total, the relative size of the general government sector would be levelled around 30 percent of GNP between the 1980-1984 period. With the same assumption, the relative size of the general government sector would be around 30 percent of GNP in 1984 and 40 percent of GNP in 1990; and the relative size of the whole public sector (i.e. general government sector plus state-owned enterprises) would be even larger than these figures. These figures clearly show that the Military Regime was successful, at least, in keeping the public sector in the same size in terms of spending. Whereas, the MP Governments enlarged the size of the public sector and thus, failed in the aim of rolling back the frontiers of the public sector (see Oyan and Aydin, 1991: 27-31; and Oyan, 1992: 135-138; also see Hiç, 1989: 42; Aktan, 1995: 37-42). With this modified figure, the relative size of the general government sector in Turkey, at least for 1990, was levelled around the average of the OECD region (see Table I.1).\footnote{For the general critique of Özal's economic policy, see, for example, Oyan and Aydin, 1991; Oyan, 1998a; Kafaoglu, 2001; Kazdağlı, 2001).} \footnote{It should also be pointed out that if the “new” GNP series, put into action by the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey in 1987, was used, the relative figures would be lower than the aforementioned figures and Turkey’s position in terms of the relative size of government would be rather similar to those of the OECD countries with low public spending (e.g. Japan and the U.S.) and those of developing countries than those of the OECD countries with high public spending. In this case, the issue of “big government” is rather questionable for Turkey (see Oyan, 1998a: 88-100 and 1998b: 294-297). For a counter argument see TÜSİAD (1988); Aktan (1995: Chp. 1); and Akalin (1996). If compulsory military service and foundations belong to public agencies are taken into account, the size of government may even be larger than the figures noted above (see Akalin, 1996). However, since the hidden (underground) economy remarkably increased in Turkey in the 1980s, the actual relative size of government (i.e. total public expenditure/GNP including officially registered and hidden economic activities) may be smaller than the official figure. It should be emphasised that almost all economies suffer from the same problem (see Özsoylu, 1996).} In a similar way, while the consolidated budget deficit and total public sector deficit were reduced and put under pressure during the Military Regime, the MP Governments could not displayed the same performance, in particular, in the second term of office. The consolidated budget deficit could not be
reduced either to below 4 percent of GNP in the second term of office of the MP Government (see Table IV.1). The most of this deficit stemmed from transfer expenditures and external and domestic debt interest payments. The consolidated budget would give slight surplus in the years of 1988, 1989 and 1990, if debt interest payments were not included. During the same term, the financing of increased total public sector deficit (PSBR) (see Table IV.1), mainly stemmed from remarkable increase in public spending due to transfer expenditures, external and domestic debt interest payments, deficits of state owned enterprises, and heavy investments in infrastructure projects on the one hand and insufficient increase in public revenues due to changes made in the taxation system with the effect of supply-side economics on the other (see DPT, 1993: 37 and Table 6.2), through mainly internal and external borrowings and partly the credits of Central Bank resulted in alarming economic conditions (i.e. increase in external and domestic debt burden and inflation, decrease in investments due to high interest rates, and eventually deterioration in the distribution of income). Consequently, it was observed that the MP Government in the second term of office diverted from some fundamental policy objectives and that some serious side effects of the programme appeared (Oyan, 1992: 137-140 and 1998b: 271, 290; Balkir, 1993a: 8-12; Uras, 1993: 163-164; Kazdağlı, 2001: 468-469).

First of all, although both Özal and the first MP Government initially committed to lower inflation, events did not turn out as planned. Turkey was once again faced with a slowing down in growth and a runaway inflation in the years of 1988 and 1989. The steady growth of the mid-1980s was replaced with a sharp decline in the late 1980s. This decline in economic growth was also coupled with a sharp increase in the inflation rate (see Table IV.1). This was a disturbing development because the economic stabilisation programme originally brought down and put under control the inflation. Furthermore, it could be interpreted as a complete failure for the second MP Government, which completely identified itself with the fight against inflation. Thus, the short-term successes of the programme were replaced with troubling results by the end of the decade. The

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143 The ratio of public gross fixed investments/total investments, in fact, decreased in the 1984-1990 period in favour of the ratio of private gross fixed investment/total investment. The MP Governments, however, preferred to concentrate on public investment on infrastructure projects rather than manufacturing activities (see DPT, 1993: 13, Table 2.2).
monetary and fiscal discipline achieved in the early years of the economic stabilisation programme actually relaxed since the mid-1980s because of several reasons. First, foreign assets were not adequate, thus making it necessary to mobilise complementary domestic assets. Second, public spending by central and local governments increased as they spent heavily for infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy. Third, the state owned enterprises continued to rely on the Central Bank for money supply. Fourth, the domestic political pressures gradually substituted for the external constraints on the Government (Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992: 196-197). The external control of the World Bank on the Governments' activities was largely lifted since the institutional limit of five successive structural adjustment loans was reached at the end of 1984. Although the World Bank and the internal financial community, in general, continued to exercise an indirect influence during the post-1984 period, the MP Governments could relax fiscal discipline in the absence of direct conditionality (Öniş, 1991a: 39) in order to cope with the increased domestic political pressures. Özal's problems in managing the economy were compounded by the emergence of competitive politics as a result of the constitutional referendum held in the fall of 1987 on the issue of lifting the ban on the political activities of pre-1980 political leaders. Thus, as is explained above, the MP faced a strong challenge from the centre-right and centre-left parties in the general elections of 1987, constitutional referendum of 1988 on the issue of early scheduling of local elections, and local elections of 1989. Frequent elections contributed to the fiscal problems as the MP traded money for development projects for votes. In this competitive political atmosphere, the second MP Government under the premiership of Özal resorted to the same economic policy measures popular at election time during the 1970s. Especially stiffening opposition of the conservative wing within MP, which was in favour of using the discretionary power of government as an instrument for broadening the electoral base of the Party, forced Özal to adopt a policy which was politically rational in the short-term but economically irrational in the medium-term. Although Özal emphasised on economic rationality behind policy decisions in the early years of the first MP Government, government expenditures those related to political patronage-oriented projects, rose sharply as Özal sought to main his popular support in electoral contests between the years of 1987-1989. Thus, political rationality came into conflict with economic rationality in these years (see Öniş, 1991a: 37). The magnitude of the rent-seeking in various types involved during this "liberal"
period was probably even larger than those under the pre-1980 mixed-economy regime (for example, see Demirbaş, 1998: 16, 28). Thus, Özal did or could not radically change the rent-distributive nature of the state in Turkey. This was actually in conflict with the underlying objectives of transition to a free market economy.

In addition to the slowing down in growth and runaway inflation, another disturbing result pertained to Turkey’s external debt. It is worth noting that when the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme was adopted in 1980, Turkey’s external debt was around $16.2 billion. During the Military Regime (Fall 1980-Fall 1983) this figure increased to $18.4 billion. At the end of the decade, after repeated attempts at monetary austerity, Turkey’s external dept tripled - to $49 billion due to persistent current-account deficits. The external debt/GNP ratio increased significantly to surpass the % 50 mark in the second half of 1980s. Furthermore, debt service continues to consume around 1/3 of Turkey’s export earnings (see Table IV.1). The short-term borrowing from private sources further aggravated the problem. Although Özal retained the confidence of the international financial community by fulfilling Turkey’s external debt-servicing requirements, the country faced a growing debt burden especially in the second half of the 1980s as a result of the finance the economically populist policy of the MP Governments (Rodrik, 1988; and see Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992: 193, 200-203). The re-emergence of inflation was primarily due to increased public spending made under political considerations and financing the public sector deficit through heavy borrowing from domestic and foreign markets.

Increasing inflation immediately prompted loud criticism from all quarters since reducing inflationary pressure was a major commitment of Özal and his Party. In spite of the rhetoric of the MP Governments on strengthening the middle classes (“ortadirek”/main pillar), fixed income groups (e.g. the civil servants, industrial workers in the public and private sectors, and retired people) were among the hardest hit by the spiralling inflation rate. The first MP Government in its early years in power tried to reduce domestic demand in order to control inflation through primarily limiting wage, salary and pension increases
to below the level of inflation. This “belt-tightening” strategy of the Government was justified on the ground that during 1963-1979, when Turkey subscribed to an economic development strategy based on import-substitution, the real wages of workers in the public and private sectors, the salaries of civil servants and the pensions of the retired people had increased significantly. These increases were in accordance with the needs of the import-substituting industrialisation model, basically the expansion of the domestic consumer market. Once economic development strategy shifted from this model to export-oriented model coupled with austerity measures, reduction in wage, salary and pension increases came to the agenda to restrict consumer’s spending. When the inflation was out of control towards the end of 1980s, however, the discontent among the fixed income groups sharply increased (Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 198-200). Furthermore, the economic policy pursued by Özal worsened the gap between the rich and the poor as the latter experienced a drastic decline in their standard of living and real income. For example, high exchange and interest rates as a consequence of liberalisation of exchange and interest markets resulted in the deterioration of income distribution in the long run through instigating inflation (Balkır, 1993a: 7, 8, 9). Legal and institutional framework imposed by the 1982 Constitution and the related laws concerning industrial relations gave rise to the decline in the power of labour unions and thus to erosion in the financial and social rights of the working class. Radical changes in price and support policies in the agricultural sector made the life more difficult for agricultural producers. Government subsidies to the state-owned industries were also trimmed and they were allowed to raise the prices of their products. This was another strike for the fixed income groups (Oyan, 1998b: 276-277). The modifications made in the taxation structure and tax rates, resulted in decrease in the share of direct taxes and increase in the share of indirect taxes in the total tax revenues, also affected the farmers, salaried groups and small entrepreneurs negatively (Oyan and Aydın, 1991: Chp. 1 and 2; Oyan, 1992, 1998a: Chp.1 and 1998: 273, 276; Balkır, 1993a: 10). The restraints on welfare expenditure in terms of its relative weight within the total public expenditure during the early and mid of the 1980s, despite towards the end of 1980 some additional sources were used from the consolidated budget and social service and assistance funds established in the 1980s as a consequence of the disputed social justice

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144 For the figures, with reservations on the methodological problems about the scopes and contents of the concepts used, see Pakdemirli (1991: Chp. 6) and Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu (1992: 198-199).
aspect of the MP's programme,\textsuperscript{145} did not help such groups that had heavily needed for public welfare services (Oyan and Aydin, 1991: Chp. 2; Oyan, 1992: 135 and 1998b: 277). Moreover, the decline in real wages during the decade was not accompanied by any improvement in the unemployment picture (see Table IV.1). Salary rises made by the second MP Government to public employees including civil servants towards the end of the decade (see Pakdemirli, 1991; Erdoğan, 1991; Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992; and Teker, 1993) with the aim of maintaining electoral popularity in the face of inflationary pressures was also inflationary in the long run. Moreover, the price for inflationary distortions was chiefly paid by the salaried groups (Hershlag, 1988: 152). As is seen, the overall result of this policy was the worsening of income distribution at the expense of agriculture, wages and salaries but in favour of profits, rents, and interest income. Thus, a shift, benefiting the bourgeoisie that received enormous amount of income from the investment, support and incentive, and borrowing activities of the MP Governments, at the expense of the farmers, workers and civil servants occurred (see Oyan and Aydin, 1991: Chp. 1 and 2; Oyan, 1992, 1998a and 1998b; Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 198-200).\textsuperscript{146}

This shift was actually the direct product of the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme (Şenses, 1993) pursued by the MP in the light of the new approach to economic issues. This new approach implied that once the economy was considered as the most important variable with its independent laws, then the recognition of certain inequalities necessary in the functioning and development of capitalism became inevitable. The productivist ideology adopted by the MP (see ANAP, 1987a: 81-82; and 1987b: 101), like other the New Rightist parties in the West, as a lever for industrialisation meant to reward productive sectors, services, and persons while penalising the unemployed, pensioners, unskilled and semi-skilled worker, and a large section of government employees. The Thatcherite rhetoric that "future benefits will follow from present suffering" or "we are only obeying the dictates of the science of economics" covered the misfortunes of these groups only for a while. The relative affluence in the society as a result of open economy strategy came to end very soon for such disadvantaged groups

\textsuperscript{145} Beside highly liberal economic views, Özal and his Party had conservative views that held government responsible in the fields of the protection of family and children, social solidarity and assistance (see ANAP, 1983a and 1983b; also see Yılmaz, 2001: 101).
when the inflation became out of control. Since the Military Regime's restrictive legislation on labour relations (i.e. restrictions on collective bargaining, the right to strike, and salary increases) remained untouched during the MP Governments, these groups could not protect themselves from the negative aspects of the hegemonic project of the MP Governments. In spite of an all-encompassing national-popular (one nation) campaign, or in other words, of expansive hegemonic project, two nations character of the hegemonic project of the MP Governments could be clearly observed in this field (Tünay, 1993: 22-23, 24-25). This total result is often called by the critics of Özal as the "legacy of the Özal decade" in Turkey (see Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 200).

Some other economic indicators also became alerting towards the end of the 1980s (see Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992). Despite efforts by the MP Governments that remarkably increased the country's exports, the trade deficit was not improved satisfactorily since the country's imports increased as a result of Turkey's increased exposure to international trade during the 1980s (see Table IV.1). To make matters worse, all this occurred despite a continuous attempt at maintaining realistic exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. The current account deficit was mainly reduced thanks to increased export and tourism revenues and the remittances of Turkish workers in Europe; and the balance of payments was maintained through external debts (see Table IV.1).

This alarming trend in the monetary and fiscal policies of the MP Governments prompted warnings from both domestic and foreign political and financial circles. At domestic level, political parties and academics on the left blame the economic policy. Those on the centre right blame the MP Governments, not the economic policy (Dodd, 1990: 102). At international level, the World Bank joined this second group as early as in the fall of 1986. Since the institutional limit of structural adjustment loans was reached at the end of 1984, the direct external control of the World Bank on the Government's activities was largely lifted (Öniş, 1991a: 39). Despite the significance and clarity of the indirect warnings of the World Bank, the Government continued to spend irresponsibly as it tried to appease voters. Finally, in the spring of 1988, the World Bank issued an internal report in which it criticised the state of the Turkish economy and warned that unless

146 For detailed information on the distribution of income in the 1980s see Pamuk (1986); Celasun
crucial decisions were made economic crisis seemed inevitable. It favoured a return to austerity by the second MP Government. A similar warning was also made by the IMF in the spring of 1988 on the negative economic consequences of the Government’s ongoing policies (Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992: 197). Thus, the second MP Government, in particular, received necessary warnings from abroad for Turkey’s integration into the world capitalist system without any deviation from the principles of stabilisation and structural adjustment programme. The Government, however, faced serious socio-political and technical barriers in adapting and applying such principles to the structure and specific conditions of the country. It tried to control the money supply with monetarist policy in order to press inflation downward while, paradoxically, increasing the supply of commodities, specifically through product diversification. Pursuing contradictory policies in the face of such barriers, it failed to fulfil the requirements of the international financial institutions (Tünay, 1993: 24).

The intensifying consolidation crisis of the Turkish party system with the return of old political leaders to active politics in the late 1980s inevitably pushed the MP to the old ways of party politics as witnessed by the emergence of patron-client relations, excessive public expenditures at election time to win votes, leadership oligarchy within the party, and a less conciliatory attitude towards the opposition and the press. Failure to realise earlier and rational policy commitments, especially with respect to inflation with its negative impact on income distribution also created an important credibility loss for both Özal and the MP. (Ergüder, 1991: 165-166; Tünay, 1993: 23, 24; also see Birand and Yalcın, 2001: 340-341). The populist economic policy pursued by Özal and the second MP Government in the face of increased political competition after 1987 could not save the MP from electoral defeat at the 1989 local elections and, moreover, accelerated the deterioration of the Turkish economy towards the end of 1980s. Despite some initial positive effects in terms of increased variety in financial tools and increased speed and flexibility in the economic-financial system, the effects of the disintegration of economic-financial administration (e.g. creation of an alternative economic-financial bureaucracy to the traditional bureaucracy of the Ministry of Finance, the establishment of special funds) and increased changes and irregularities in the economic-financial legal and administrative

(1989); Kazgan et al. (1992); Özmucur (1992).
regulations and practices in this deterioration should not be underestimated. Paradoxically, the disintegration of economic-financial administration gave rise to the centralisation of economic decision-making in the personal rule of Özal.\textsuperscript{147} Such policy changes resulted in financial chaos in the long-term in a bureaucratic system where legality is temporary ignored. (Oyan and Aydin, 1991: Chp.3; Oyan, 1992: Chp.1 and 1998a: 277-279).

To what extent was the economic policy(s) of the MP Governments, which aimed at decreasing both the scale of public sector activity as well as the degree of state intervention in the operation of the market, successful? In other words, to what extent has Turkey become a more decentralised and market-oriented economy? Turkey's political economy in the 1980s displayed a fundamental paradox. A series of measures in the direction of liberalising the economy was accompanied by an ambitious growth strategy based on the expansion of the public sector. In the face of this complex pattern of relationships, the simple dichotomy of "rolling back the frontiers of the state and expanding the private sectors" failed to capture the reality. The projected retreat of the state did not materialise in the Turkish case. What happened was a significant re-structuring of the state. A closer examination of the Turkish experience in the 1980s reveals that the steps taken in the direction of a market-oriented economy were accompanied by a significant centralisation and concentration of power in the hand of the political executive. Certain elements of the pre-1980 import-substitution regime (e.g. a large public sector and rent-seeking behaviour), albeit in novel and modified forms, continued to manifest themselves in spite of the profound shift in economic route followed in the post-1980 period. The specific conditions of early 1980s (e.g. the favourable international circumstances and the memoirs of the acute crisis of the late 1970s) helped to generate a considerable degree of autonomy to governments vis-à-vis domestic societal pressures and provided legitimacy for the economic programme. Yet, the emergence of domestic constraints in the second half of the 1980s forced the second MP Government to resort to populist expansionary policies and created problems for the implementation of the economic programme (Öniş, 1991a: 31, 33, 39-40). The deterioration in main economic indicators started in the late 1980s, combined with the negative effects of the Gulf War and populist and irregular economic

\textsuperscript{147} Actually, this situation should not be seen as a paradox since the disintegration of economic-financial administration was deliberately aimed to facilitate the centralisation of economic decision-making in the personal rule of Özal.
policies of the Coalition Governments of the 1990s, eventually gave rise to two serious economic crises in the Turkish economy in the mid 1900s and early 2000s.

D) The Motherland Party Governments’ Policy towards the Bureaucracy: The Revival of the Political Elite vis-à-vis the State Elite

With the transition to democracy in the fall of 1983, the state-society confrontation began to differ in a certain respect from the earlier centre-periphery conflict. Although the military still acted during the 1980s as the locus of the state through the Office of the President and the NSC, the state elite (the president directly, and the military indirectly) did not generally presume that it was inherently superior vis-à-vis the political elite or that it had the sole possession of the truth. The military did not attempt to exercise tutelary powers over “politics” in terms of official ideology (i.e. Atatürkism); its jurisdiction was restricted by itself to that of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country and the unity of the nation. With the president as the statist executive, the military could take the reins of the political elite unto itself only in such matters when it deemed necessary. The state elite essentially withdrew from the political, especially the economic sphere. Atatürkism, as is mentioned above, was not taken as a sole source for public policies; it was rather perceived as an antidote to the radical ideologies.\textsuperscript{148} Thus, the sphere of “politics” vis-à-vis the “state” became much greater (Heper, 1987b: 139, 142, 1990a: 325 and 1990c: 308). Prime Minister Özal, who was a forceful advocate of political preference, sought to establish a working relationship with the military. He eased the transition period with his moderate and pragmatic approach to the military and the president without giving any serious undemocratic concession to them (Heper, 1987b: 142; Sayarı, 1990: 399; and also see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp.5).

In the second half of the 1980s, despite some disagreements in the way of governing the country, both President Evren and Prime Minister Özal showed their good intentions to obey the minimum conditions of the so-called system of co-habitation brought by the 1982

\textsuperscript{148} It should be pointed out, however, that the views of the state elite, especially those of the military, vis-à-vis the political elite has changed fundamentally with the increasing role of the military in dealing with the separatist Kurdish terrorism and fundamentalist Islamic activities in the 1990s. The permissive attitude of Özal and his Governments on these issues was indirectly criticised by the military elite later (see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 229).
Constitution. Initially, President Evren as the head of the statist executive, seemed to have the upper hand, but this situation later began to be successfully challenged by Prime Minister Özal, as the head of the political executive. Also, earlier, President Evren

149 As the head of the statist executive, or head of state, President Evren primarily considered himself as the spokesman for the “silent majority” and, along with another constitutional institution, the NSC, as the ultimate co-defender of the well being of the country. He perceived the role of statist executive as a safety valve that would start functioning, if and when, in his opinion, the political executive gave short shrift to the general interest. Therefore, he felt responsible for drawing the Government’s attention to the critical nature of some developments in internal and international politics and economy. Politicisation of, at least the higher echelons, of the civil bureaucracy was one of such areas. In general, however, he refrained from suggesting specific remedies. For example, he did not want to interfere to economic issues since economy is seen as government’s responsibility. President Evren studiously refrained from involving himself in governmental affairs in other ways, too. For example, he refrained from chairing the Council of Ministers, and normally did not even attend. Despite the expectations of the bulk of the public opinion to the contrary, he did not contest the appointment of certain ministers and higher civil servants presumed to have close affinity to non-Atatürkian thoughts, if those appointments were not made to what he considered critical posts. Unlike the situation in France (see Suleiman, 1981 and Birnbaum, 1987), President Evren did not seek to create his own network of bureaucratic elite within the Civil Service. He considered it perfectly acceptable for the political executive to bring in its own team of higher civil servants. He did not put obstacles in the way of a constitutional referendum to decide whether former banned political leaders could participate again in politics though he did not have any sympathy for them (Dodd, 1990: 92, 105-108; Heper, 1990c: 308-313). He did not intervene in the cutback operations performed by the MP Governments either with such considerations. As his confidence in the MP grew, President Evren became more relaxed and Özal began to assert himself more. In conclusion, he showed a high degree of common sense and realism, whilst appearing as a father figure and guardian of the national interest (Dodd, 1990:106, 107).

150 In the period of transition to democracy, Prime Minister Özal acted in a rather circumspective manner toward the president. During his early years of office, he rarely made public statements on subjects other than the economy. He went on to say that internal security, national defence, foreign policy and education were in the “domain of the state policies”. Özal managed to regain the military’s trust by preserving its control in policy-making on such issues and by supporting the military against its critics over allegations of human right violations. He was careful enough not to openly challenge the implicit military guardianship of the post-1982 constitutional regime. This state of affairs, however, could not go on for long. Soon Özal began to feel embarrassed by his image of an “assistant prime minister responsible for economic affairs”, as was in the Military Regime. Özal, however, studiously avoided getting into a direct confrontation with the president when he thought such a course of action would not get him anywhere and would unnecessarily strain his relations with the president. As time passed, Özal became less hesitant in asserting the prerogatives of the political executive. He initiated debates on some issues were considered taboo in the Turkish politics until Özal: the location of office of the chief of the general staff in the state organisation and the size and content of its budget. One significant milestone here was the appointment of the new chief of the general staff in the summer of 1987. In the past, with very few exceptions, the military itself had in effect made that decision, and the governments merely rubber-stamped it. This time, however, the first Özal Government “interfered” to the process, and appointed his candidate rather than that of the high command. Through these interventions, Özal aimed to indicate the superiority of the civil political authority over the military bureaucracy. In a related fashion, Özal more and more underlined the autonomy of the government not only from the president but also from the NSC in 1987. Özal observed that if the president, the NSC and the government all thought along the same lines, the government could be seen as nothing more than an emanation of the first two. In line with this new approach, some higher civil servants who were reputed to have the personal blessing of President Evren, began to be appointed to either positions of lesser significance or were altogether removed their posts. Later, the contracts of some civil servants with a military background were not renewed. In the late 1980s, Özal dubbed the MP an anti-status quo party, similar to the DP of the
acted as if he had primary responsibility in a great number of areas, including law and order, foreign affairs, and the impartiality of the bureaucracy. Later, however, he began to show signs of developing into a genuinely reserve executive. Parallel to the steps taken by Prime Minister Özal so as to render the political executive more autonomous and effective, President Evren, too, began to be less insistent on some issues, including the amendment of the 1982 Constitution (Heper, 1990c: 315). Especially after the constitutional referendum held in the fall of 1987, their relationships became more friendly and supportive since both President Evren and Prime Minister Özal and his Party were against the return of all former leaders to active politics. Towards the end of 1980s, President Evren became increasingly unwilling to use the powers at his disposal against the political power (Heper, 1990a: 325). Thus, as Heper indicates, the tug of war between the holders of the executive power eased (1990c: 315) and the grip of the state on politics and society was considerably loosened and some signs of the replacement of the state-centred polity by a party-centred polity were seen in the second part of the decade (1990a: 325). The military and the president as the locus of the state lost some of their earlier influences towards the end of the decade, and a small autonomous political and technocratic-bureaucratic elite came together around Özal became important in the party-centred polity.

The MP Governments attempted to launch a so-called “liberal revolution” (Rustow, 1985) in terms of government’s role in social and economic life. In other words, “the policy of the withdrawal of government” (i.e. liberalisation, deregulation, downsizing, privatisation, de-bureaucratisation, and managerialism) was pursued with characteristic speed and boldness of Özal (see Aktan, 1991-1993; Oyan and Aydın, 1991; Oyan, 1998a and 1998b; Ayman-Güler, 1996). Prime Minister Özal and his close circle designed in a determined fashion an economic policy, in other words a structural adjustment programme, the glimmers of which had surfaced in the economic measures taken on January 24, 1980. Actually, Özal and this group of people were the technical, if not political, architectures of.

1950s, making revolutionary changes in the system. According to Özal, the MP could not be a political organisation playing to the tune of the civil and military bureaucratic elites. He also wanted to put on the political agenda the issue of constitutional reform and civil-military relations in favour of the predominance of civil democratic institutions to steal the thunder away from the opposition parties (Heper, 1990c: 313-315; Sayar, 1990: 399; Dodd, 1990: 108; Ergüder, 1991: 162; Evin, 1994; Ataman, 2000: 58-59; also see Cemal, 1989: Chp. 8; Birand and Yağın, 2001: 307-316). Despite such rhetoric and limited attempts, it should be point out that Özal and the MP did not show
such decisions carried out during the JP Minority Government under the premiership of Demirel and the Military Regime (Birand and Yalçın, 2001: Chp.3). As was mentioned above, this economic policy emphasised market forces and a development strategy based on outward-oriented export promotion rather than government involvement in the economy and a development strategy based on inward-looking import-substitution (Rustow, 1985 and 1988). Özal sought to achieve a "radical transformation" in the economic sphere, along with far-reaching changes in other areas necessary to bring about the transformation in question. As a part of this attempt, the MP Governments decided to keep the efforts going concerning the reforming the civil bureaucracy during the interregnum (1980-1983) but it gave a new direction and impetus to such efforts in accordance with this programme. Within this framework, it adopted a two-pronged policy of (1) de-bureaucratisation of the system in accordance with the general aim of liberalisation and (2) rendering, in particular, the upper echelons of the civil bureaucracy into a rational-productive rather than a legal-rational one (Heper, 1991a: 684).

Before moving to explain these policies, some important points related to the "scope, speed, vision and strategy of reform" adopted by the MP Governments should be clarified. First, it should be emphasised that the administrative reform attempts of MP Governments, especially those of the first MP Government, under a democratic regime were noteworthy in terms of their scope and speed (Yayla, 2001: 436) since the administrative reform projects in Turkey, as noted above, generally came to the agenda just after the military interventions. Despite the fact that the preliminary studies of some of these reform attempts were actually done by the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime (Karaer, 1987b: 53-54), the first MP Government under the energetic leadership of Özal gave a new direction and impetus to these studies in accordance with the new vision drawn for Turkey by Özal (see Yılmaz, 2001: 101). Second, before 1983, whenever governments had felt compelled to carry out certain services more rationally, they created new public agencies but left the old ones in tact. This strategy had crowded the administrative system and made the civil bureaucracy even more cumbersome (see Heper, 1976a). Also, in practice, administrative reforms had been preceded by long drawn-out studies done by technocrats and academicians in their "ivory towers". This strategy was abandoned by the
MP Governments under the premiership of Özal (Heper, 1989b: 464). Prime Minister Özal and the inner circle of the executive decided by themselves the purpose, content and method of the policy they pursued toward the civil bureaucracy thanks to their experience in both the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy, international organisations and the private sector during the 1970s and early 1980s (see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 204-207). A small task force affiliated to the Prime Ministry but led by a minister of state was formed to make the policy detailed and worked in close co-operation with the O and M units within the individual public agencies (Heper, 1989b: 464).

1) The Policy of De-bureaucratisation

The de-bureaucratisation policy of the MP Governments had the potential, in theory, for the pendulum to swing from the state, through the political party, to society. The repudiation of government involvement and the stress on market forces by the MP governments had the capacity for strengthening the civil society. The MP governments tried to carry out de-bureaucratisation policy through several strategies as follows: (i) privatisation of some the state-owned enterprises and some governmental activities; (ii) liberalisation and deregulation of economic activities; (iii) decentralisation of government (i.e. the devolution of authority and the transfer of funds to the local governments); (iv) reducing the size of public employment; (v) side-stepping some age-old ministry bureaucracies and establishing an alternative bureaucracy (i.e. more flexible boards and agencies) directly responsible to the prime minister, (vi) simplification of bureaucratic procedures (Heper, 1991a: 684 and Heper, 1994a: 669-670).

If we put the privatisation\textsuperscript{151}, liberalisation and deregulation\textsuperscript{152}, and decentralisation\textsuperscript{153} strategies aside since they were carried out with limited scope and regime designed by the 1982 Constitution and the related laws enacted by the Military Regime.

\textsuperscript{151} The privatisation policy of the MP Governments was not involved with the Civil Service, except some simple examples of contracting-out in the fields of cleaning, catering, and public transportation. For the limited privatisation attempt of the MP Governments, see; Karataş (1990); Aksoy (1991-1993); Önış (1991b); and Dartan, Arıoğlu and Coates (1996: Chp. 4).

\textsuperscript{152} For the limited scope of liberalisation and deregulation attempts of the MP Governments, see Amelung (1988); Rodrik (1990); and Krueger and Aktaş (1992).

\textsuperscript{153} For the limited administrative and financial decentralisation attempt of the first MP Government involving local governments (in particular establishing metropolitan municipalities) and the
success in the fields of state-owned enterprises, large scale public works and properties, import and price controls, and of local governments successively within the framework of general aim of reducing the size of government\textsuperscript{154}, the rest of de-bureaucratisation strategies are directly related to the concern and scope of this thesis. Since the public employment policy of the MP Governments (i.e. cutting back public employment, employing contracted personnel instead of civil servants with security of tenure in state-owned enterprises; contracting-out and hiving-off some public services), which kept the debate on the security of tenure on the agenda (Ömürgönülşen, 1989a: 334), will be examined in detail later, we should mention briefly about the other de-bureaucratisation strategies pursued by the MP Governments at this stage.

\textbf{a) The establishment of an alternative bureaucracy}

As a de-bureaucratisation strategy, an “alternative bureaucracy” with flexible structure was created by the MP Governments to by-pass the traditional bureaucracy whenever necessary as happened in different forms in many Western countries. Initially, some executive ministries in charge of similar functions were united and thus, the numbers of executive ministries were reduced. Then, additional ministries of state (\textit{Devlet Bakanları}) (i.e. cabinet ministers who are not in charge of certain traditional ministerial portfolios) were established with specific responsibilities. This was not only an attempt to provide some additional posts for politicians in the governing party but also a conscious attempt of the Government to by-pass the traditional bureaucracy. For example, some ministers of state were assigned to be responsible for specific aspects of the Government’s socio-economic policies and related agencies just affiliated to the Office of the Prime Ministry (\textit{T.C. Başbakanlık}); some others, and sometimes, on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, persons

\textsuperscript{154} Although former anti-statist parties in Turkey such as DP and JP promised to privatise the state owned enterprises during their election campaigns, they did not even touch them and add new ones to the system when they were in power. The MP’s approach to the state owned enterprises was not too much different either (Kafağlı, 2001: 20). In spite of the MP Governments’ rhetoric in privatisation, privatisation turned out to be a complex exercise requiring both a genuine political commitment and patience and a long and careful financial, technical and legal analyses. In the face of these difficulties, the limited privatisation policy of the MP Governments in the second half of the 1980s did not significantly change the role and weight of government in the economy. Government regulation on economy continued in different forms and degrees. Also, decentralisation policy of the
from the private sector, were made responsible for different aspects of Turkey’s international relations (e.g. the European Community, the Middle East). The cabinet ministers who were in charge of certain traditional ministerial portfolios were no longer solely responsible for these matters. This practice pointed towards not only a decline in the powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, but also those of the Cabinet itself relative to the Office of the Prime Ministry which became the “ministry of ministries” (see Karaer, 1987a and 1990; DPT, 1991: 34; Öniş, 1991a: 33; Ayman-Güler, 1996: 62-63).

In a similar way, a new layer of what might be called “managerial-economic bureaucracy” (e.g. the Under-secretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade/Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı; the General Directorate of Incentives and Implementation/Tevzik ve Uygulama Genel Müdürlüğü; and the Administration of Mass Housing and Public Participation/Toplu Konut ve Kamu Ortaklığı İdaresi), functioned under the direct control of the prime minister, was superimposed upon the traditional bureaucracy; and this led a significant decline in the powers of the traditional civil service departments and agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (Maliye Bakanlığı) and the Ministry of Trade (Ticaret Bakanlığı). Some significant components, authorities and functions of the Ministry of Finance and SPO, which were the primary representatives of the étatist-bureaucratic understanding, were transferred to new agencies and boards. What used to be relatively autonomous agencies were brought under the closer control of the Government like the regular ministries (e.g. the Central Bank/Merkez Bankası). In many traditional civil service departments, several committees, boards, and the like were eliminated but new ones were created and authority was concentrated in the hands of the prime minister and his close circle. New boards (e.g. the High Co-ordination Council of Economic Affairs/Ekonomik İşler Yüksek Koordinasyon Kurulu) were created to co-ordinate and speed up economic activities under the chairmanship of the prime minister. Some special fund administrations, out of the span of control of the parliament, were created in the areas of national defence, housing, social assistance, etc. Most of these new agencies, boards, and special fund administrations were put under the authority of the Office of the Prime Ministry. In addition to the constitutional principles reinforcing the prime minister against the cabinet members, the prime ministerial power was increased in relation to the

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MP Governments did not enough to change the negative attitude of the central government towards

In addition to newly created agencies and boards, which are mainly concerned with the management of the economic affairs, some autonomous units were created within the existing agencies (e.g. a unit responsible for the South-East Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi-GAP) created in the SPO. Some important functions and powers were transferred from these existing agencies to the newly created agencies, boards and autonomous units. Furthermore, the limited decentralisation of government turned out to be an effort not to promote local political participation for the sake of democracy and local autonomy but to curb the influence of the traditional bureaucratic elite through restricting administrative tutelage powers of the Ministries of Interior (İçişleri Bakanlığı) and of Public Works and Resettlement (Bayındırlık ve Iskan Bakanlığı).

Prime Minister Özal preferred to work with such new flexible and alternative bureaucracy filled with his entourage (i.e. a group of young Turkish people who had mainly engineering background like Özal and his brothers and specifically brought in from outside the bureaucracy, especially from the U.S.) rather than with the traditional civil service structures filled with traditional bureaucrats. Thus, the “alternative bureaucracy” brought an “alternative bureaucrat type” as well (Heper, 1989b: 466-468, 1990b: 611 and 1994a: 670; Ayman-Güler, 1996: 61; Heper and Sancar, 1998: 152-154; Yılmaz, 2001: 99-100). Thus, a small autonomous political and technocratic-bureaucratic elite (i.e. some ministers of state, special advisers, and a limited number of high level bureaucrats) within the executive inner circle of Özal with economic priorities tended to replace the role of traditional bureaucratic elite in the second half of the 1980s.

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155 For Özal’s negative attitude towards traditional bureaucrats who were mainly graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University which represents the traditional bureaucratic culture in the eye of Özal, see Heper and Sancar (1998: 151); and Birand and Yalçın (2001: 220-221).
b) The simplification of bureaucratic procedures

As an another strategy of de-bureaucratization policy, bureaucratic formalities were simplified by the MP Governments. The MP Governments, like the DP and JP Governments, were against the traditional bureaucratic ruling tradition (Erdoğan, 2001: 20-21; Yayla, 2001: 434-436). They were very keen to facilitate the citizens’ dealing with the street-level bureaucracy since Özal and the Party leaders knew that the traditional bureaucracy was not sympathetic to the citizens (Heper, 1990b: 612, 613; DPT, 1991: 35, 37). Özal strongly reacted to the tradition of “the supremacy of the state over its citizens” (i.e. “sacred state”) and tried to “reconcile the state with its nation” (Erdoğan, 2001: 18-21, 31). In accordance with the aim that the reconciliation of the state with its nation, Özal pointed out that for the first time in Turkey “the state existed for the people not the other way around” (ANAP, 1983a and 1983b). He deliberately preferred to take place by the citizens rather than the state. This must be one reason why the MP still enjoyed a considerable public support during the second half of the 1980s despite its inflationary growth policy at the expense of the most of the electorate. Within this framework, the MP Governments sought to simplify procedures where the citizens had face-to-face interaction with the civil servants (see Başbakanlık, 1989 and DPT, 1991: 35-38; also see Heper, 1989b: 465 and 1994a: 670; Yılmaz, 2001: 100). So, the Law numbered 2977 enacted in 1984 enabled the Council of Ministers to pass decrees having the force of law designed to reduce the cost in time and money to citizens in their transactions with the bureaucracy at street-level. In conjunction with this attempt, the MP Governments promoted closer cooperation and co-ordination among public agencies and among various units within the same agency in order to better serve the public (see Emre, 1986: Chp.2). Where the elaborate rules and regulations had to be left intact, the Governments urged the civil servants emphatically to be as helpful to the citizens as possible. Thus, the MP governments tried to make the bureaucracy friendly with the citizens through changing their traditional elitist bureaucratic attitudes toward the public (Heper, 1989b: 465-466 and Heper, 1994a: 670).
c) The critique of the de-bureaucratisation policy

While the policy in question did succeed in having some consequences envisaged, these consequences were not always good for the society as well as the bureaucracy. The immediate consequence of the de-bureaucratisation policy was to weaken further the role of the traditional bureaucratic elite in public policy-making and not to strengthen the hand of civil societal elements. The strategy of the establishment of alternative bureaucracy increased the autonomy of the economic bureaucracy from the rest of the civil service as well as the political and civil societal elements. The majority of the bureaucrats had a lesser role to play in the making of economic decisions. Furthermore, the MP was interested, in practice, in “economic” rather than “political” restructuring in the sense of bolstering the civil societal elements when deemed necessary; and this was evident in the strategies were used (Heper, 1990a: 326). Actually, placing greater emphasis on market forces by the MP Governments, in practice, emerged as an effort to make the Turkish private sector competitive in international markets, but not as an effort to render the “market” supreme over “politics”. The measures taken under the name of liberal economic policies have been accompanied by a significant concentration of economic and political power in the hand of the Government. At the same time, the “concentration” and “technocratisation” of economic decision-making made the economic bureaucracy politically less responsive to the interest groups including the businessmen and to the

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156 In Turkey, the state-interest group relationships have historically been structured in “monist” type (i.e. one-to-one relationship between the state and interest groups) (Heper, 1991d and 1991e) rather than pluralist, neo-corporatist or state-corporatist types (see Bianchi, 1984). The autonomy of the state vis-à-vis interest groups stems from the strong state tradition in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, which earlier was structured in the civil bureaucracy and/or the military bureaucracy, and later was more and more structured in the political party in power. The prevailing understanding of democracy, adopted by the state elite as a means of defensive modernisation (i.e. Westernisation) rather than as a consequence of rising social groups, could not facilitate flourishing interest group politics in Turkey. The monist type of state-interest group relationships, developed by the state elite, was later adopted by the political elite (i.e. the DP, JP and the MP) since the state-centred polity was replaced by a party-centred polity but not a civil society-centred one. During the second half of the 1980s, the state-interest group relations also continued to follow the monist type since no need was felt by the political elite to let interest groups participate in public policy-making. The socio-economic interest groups as well as the traditional higher civil servants were given a short shrift by the MP Governments that aimed to capture the state. There was hardly any pluralistic or neo-corporatist give-and-take between the weighty social groups and the governments. The MP Governments, like its predecessors, established parentala relations with interest groups (Heper, 1991d and 1991e). The former, in fact, now found many channels to the Government blocked even more than before because of the “autonomisation of an executive inner circle”. This was made up of Prime Minister Özal and few technocrat-bureaucrat advisors around him including the close members of the Özal family (i.e. the “Özal Dynasty”). Özal did not work closely with the whole
MP organisation\(^{157}\) (Heper, 1989b, 1990a: 329-333; and 1991e: 164-165, 173; Öniş, 1991a: 33). While the MP Governments were applying de-bureaucratisation strategy

body of the Council of Ministers. He rather preferred to work with this technocratic close circle he could trust. The executive inner circle in question did not wish to be talked to; they themselves talked to the concerned, and usually after the event since this circle did not want any interest group to lobby them. Those in this circle formulated policy decisions all by themselves (Heper, 1990a: 330 and 1991e: 164-165, 173; see also Oyan and Aydin, 1991: Chp. 3; Oyan, 1998a: Chp. 1 and 1998b: 277-278; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001) without any serious consultation, let alone bargaining, with those groups as well as with the Party organisation, the Parliamentary group of the MP, the Opposition, and traditional higher civil bureaucrats employed in the concerned civil service departments; and put them into effect immediately by issuing governmental decrees and decrees having the force of law or legislative acts by relying on the majority of the MP in the parliament. They were constantly revised not in response to pressures coming from outside but when the inner circle thought that new policies were necessary. Then the prime minister or a member of the inner circle appeared on the scene to explain the decisions taken, and where necessary, to placate the groups with vested interests, either through special meetings or by attending the scheduled meetings of the relevant interest group associations. And not all such encounters aimed at providing “explanations” for government policies; more often, they were occasions for this small autonomous political and technocratic-bureaucratic elite to communicate their “directives”, if not “threats”, to the members of the private sector. In other words, Özal and his inner circle were inclined to “instruct” the interest groups in their monologues than exchange views with these groups. Their attitude in this *parental* variant of clientelistic relationship was, as Günsör Yener, the Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce said: «I do it, so will it be » (quoted in Heper, 1990a: 331). Throughout the second half of the 1980s, both the chambers (i.e. professional organisations in the nature of public organisations) and voluntary interest associations had a rough time in their relations with the MP Governments. How can this attitude of the MP Governments be reconciled with the Özal’s rhetoric that “the reconciliation of the state with its nation” is questionable. Özal and his inner circle, in particular, through the governmental authority tried to manipulate and even direct the economic activities of the private sector so that they would not clash with the overall economic policy of the Government. If the private entrepreneurs stayed away from this policy, they could be ruined by selective measures adopted by the Government. The restrictive constitutional and legal measures brought against interest group activity by the Military Regime also helped Özal in his efforts in this direction. Furthermore, Özal followed such a strategy when the position of private entrepreneurs in the society was highly strengthened with the effect of Özalist socio-economic policies in the 1980s (Heper, 1990a: 330-331; see also Heper, 1989c and 1991e). Özal and his team also helped the creation of one economic interest group in accordance with the “liberal” economic policy of the MP Governments: “the foreign trade companies”. While they were not responsive to many interest groups, especially to ones favouring “old-type” relations based on import-substitution, they consciously encouraged export-oriented rent-seeking in accordance with their trade policy (Heper, 1990a: 329-330; Öniş, 1991a: 31-32; Demirbaş, 1998: 15). An industrialist in 1987 observed: «Even today a businessman is under the command of the bureaucrats in Ankara» (quoted in Heper, 1990a: 331). Such an attitude was clearly against the liberal economic principles despite the fact that it was paradoxically assumed for the liberalisation of the economy.

\(^{157}\) Not only the traditional bureaucracy and interest groups but also the Party organisation of the MP was given a short shrift by the single-handed rule of the executive inner circle (see *Haftaya Bakış*, an Istanbul weekly, 26 April-6 May, 1987, p. 7; and Birand and Yalçın, 2001). The parliamentary group of the MP and its Party organisation could not form an effective links between the civil society and the Party leaders, or to be more correct, with Özal due to either their strong personal political loyalties to Özal as a result of their political inexperience or their political conflict with the leadership group as a result of their previous political connections and manner of politics (Heper, 1990a: 332-333). Although keeping in touch with the people was actually one of the priorities of Özal when he found the MP and he achieved this in the early years of the first MP Government with his conciliatory attitude (Ergüder, 1991: 156-157), the Party gradually lost touch with the people. This was considered one important reason why the Party did so poorly in the 1989 local elections (Heper, 1990a: 332-333).
against the traditional bureaucratic structure, the decision-making was paradoxically centralised, concentrated, and personalised in the hands of a small elite group. This move was clearly in contradiction to the alleged purpose of the creation of a liberal politics and economy. The government still had the high capacity to exercise control over the economy through the economic activities of state-owned enterprises and public utilities including public banks, export incentives and contracts of public investment given by the public authorities, and off-budget funds. Off-budget funds, constituted one of the strategic tools of government to generate revenues from non-standard sources, in particular, led to a decline in the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive since the revenues accumulated under such funds could be channelled to various uses without prior legislative approval and control of the Audit Court affiliated to the National Assembly. (Oyan and Aydin, 1987 and 1991: Chp.4; Öniş, 1991a: 32-33; Oyan, 1998a: 281). Despite the rhetoric of the MP Governments over the limited government and the market forces, the political elite represented by the MP continued to exercise their hold over the bulk of economic resources as happened throughout the Republic period (see Keyder, 1987).

While the MP Governments were weakening the role of the traditional bureaucratic elite in public policy-making, they tried to strengthen the position of ordinary citizen vis-à-vis the street-level bureaucracy in their daily interactions through simplifying the bureaucratic formalities. With this strategy, the MP Governments wanted to keep their promises to end the supremacy of the state over its citizens one the one hand and to conceal the heavy concentration of power in the hands of a small group at the expense of civil societal groups on the other hand. As a result of the legal and administrative regulations noted above, the paperwork required for certain applications to official

158 Although special funds (in-budget and off-budget funds) were always used in the Turkish public sector, the number and volume of these funds (in particular, off-budget ones) were increased remarkably during the MP Governments. In the period of 1984-1990, the number of funds was almost doubled; its financial size exceeded the half of the consolidated budget revenues and reached almost 1/3 of the total public revenues. As a consequence, the relative size of total funds was tripled and thus exceeded 10 per cent of GNP in 1990. With these characteristics, special funds became alternative to the consolidated budget of the government in the 1980s. The fund policy is one of the best examples of Özal’s pragmatic approach to economic-financial problems. The special funds were often used by the MP Governments as an alternative way in financing public activities in order to keep up with the reform projects put forwarded by Özal. This policy was, however, heavily criticised since most of the funds were out of control of the parliament and open to any kind of irregular use and corruption (Oyan and Aydin, 1987 and 1991: Chp.4; Oyan, 1998a: 281). The trend of disintegration of the public financial system, which was dominant in the 1980s, has been partly reversed since 1993, with the transfer of some funds to the consolidated budget (Oyan, 1998a: 279).
statements or permissions in many areas of civil life and business were reduced significantly. The MP Governments’ efforts to make easier citizen’s relations with the bureaucracy also met with some success and were greatly appreciated by the public. The Governments’ success in making the civil servants more helpful was, however, still less than satisfactory since the civil servants could not easily change their traditional elitist bureaucratic attitudes toward the public (Heper, 1989b: 465-466 and Heper, 1994a: 670).

2) The Policy of Creation of a Rational-Productive and Initiative Bureaucracy

In addition to the de-bureaucratisation efforts, the MP Governments attempted to render the bureaucracy into a rational-productive one. A Report issued by the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayici ve İşsadamları Derneği-TÜSİAD)159 in 1983 on the public bureaucracy was, in fact, a very good indicative of a new concern of business world with efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.160 In this Report, the bureaucracy was portrayed as an inefficient, cumbersome, overstaffed and unenterprising body, which was failing to adapt itself to changing social and economic circumstances in the world outside (TÜSİAD, 1983: 10, 78).161 With this Report, the Turkish businessmen were calling attention of political parties to the problem of

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159 Socio-economic developments have widen the gap between the bureaucratic elite and the entrepreneurial groups in terms of income and wealth at the expense of the former and almost diminished the cultural and educational gap between them in favour of the latter since the 1950s. In addition to these developments, the vital shift made in the development strategy of the country has strengthened the position of private entrepreneur vis-à-vis the bureaucratic elite since the early 1980s. Although the state-interest group relations, in principle, continued to follow the monist type in the 1980s, the private entrepreneurs were no longer viewed as an adversary and a subordinate group, but as more or less equal as an upshot of market-oriented economic policies of the 1980s. TÜSİAD Report (1983) was a good indicator of this development.

160 In the early 1980s, the focus of complaints of the Turkish private sector concerning the general attitude of the state and its bureaucracy gradually shifted from the authoritarianism to inefficiency. Although the Turkish private sector began to voice complaints on matters (e.g. the performance of the bureaucracy) other than partisanship in the bureaucracy on professional and political platforms in the 1970s (Tutum, 1973: 23-24; Heper, 1975: 133), such complaints became widespread in the 1980s as a consequence of the serious political and economic crises of the late 1970s. For instance, Ali Koçoğan, Chairman of TÜSİAD, said in 1980: «the Turkish civil bureaucracy needs a philosophy» (quoted in Heper, 1984b: 80). As Heper argues, he obviously would not have in mind a substantive political philosophy but administrative principles so that civil bureaucracy would be predictable in providing public services (1984b: 80).

161 As Dodd emphasised, this was a damning indictment, which has been supported by other research to some extent (see Sencer, 1982), though most national bureaucracies seem to suffer from these defects in more or less measure (1990: 111; see also Çiçci, 1982-1983: 118). This sort of defects of the Turkish bureaucracy are also very well portrayed in a satirical way in the Turkish literature (for example, see Bener, 1978). For a critical review of the TÜSİAD report see Çiçci (1982-1983).
bureaucratic inefficiency just before the 1983 general elections. Many suggestions of this Report found an opportunity to be put into practice immediately when the MP came to power. The MP’s programme drawn by Özl’s personal view on this issue was similar with the views expressed in the TÜSİAD Report. Since Özl worked both in the public and private sectors, he, not surprisingly, found the bureaucracy unable to keep pace with the transformation he had in mind (Başbakanlık, 1984: 8.2). Both Özl and the Party leaders knew that most of the traditional bureaucratic elite was neither sympathetic to the programme of the MP Governments nor dynamic/innovative enough for its successful implementation (Heper, 1990a: 326; Heper and Sancar, 1998: 150-151). Those bureaucrats still had strong elitist inclinations in socio-political relations and étatist inclinations in economic issues. They had also sympathies toward the previous governments. Many of them did not have the necessary expertise or were too stepped in their old inefficient and ineffective ways to contribute to the structural adjustment programme (Kazdal, 1990: 190; Atiyas, 1996: 334). In spite of the increased structural-functional differentiation in the society, the transition from “status-elite” type to “functional-elite type”, which could be regarded as a serious step taken in respect of the creation of technically efficient and effective bureaucracy (Heper, 1973: 64 and 1975), delayed due to the resistance of the bureaucratic elite and heavy politicisation of the bureaucracy in the 1970s.162 Thus, the Turkish bureaucracy was far away from the rational-productive bureaucracy model (i.e. programme-oriented rationality and effectiveness) Özl envisaged (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 151). The anti-bureaucratic parties like the DP and JP were partly succeeded in gradually enfeebling the bureaucratic elitism but they could not supplanted it with a new bureaucratic worldview (see Heper, 1977b: 77, 81-82 and 1979-1980). The MP tried to achieve both aims through a new set of strategies (see Heper, 1989b and 1990). The policy of rendering of the bureaucracy into a rational-productive one and replacing status-elite type with functional elite-type was tried to be effected through the strategies of (a) side-stepping the traditional bureaucrats by “princes” (i.e. appointing technocrats recruited from outside the bureaucratic ranks to the

162 The number and importance of bureaucrats that had technical-specialist skills gradually increased at the expense of bureaucrats with only general qualifications in the early years of the 1970s (Şaylan, 1986: 89). This could be considered as the early sign of a transformation from “status-elite” type into “functional-elite” type (Heper, 1973: 64; 1976a: 520; see also Heper, 1975). This development, however, did not produce a satisfactory outcome due to heavy politicisation in the late 1970s.
heads of the critical public agencies) and (b) encouraging the exercise of initiative (Evin, 1988: 201-207; Heper, 1994a: 669-670; and Yılmaz, 2001: 98-100). Thus, the policy of de-bureaucratization (i.e. the creation of alternative economic bureaucracy) and the policy of rendering the bureaucracy into a rational-productive went hand in hand (see Heper and Sancar, 1998: 154).

a) Side-stepping the traditional bureaucrats by “princes”

Side-stepping the traditional public bureaucrats necessitated the formation of brand-new cadre with staff and line duties, consisting of different categories of people. One group comprised some members of parliament who were among the founders of the MP and who became very influential in the making of critical decision although they did not hold ministerial portfolios (Gökmen, 1992: 114, 217, 219-220). Since at the time the MP was founded, as noted above, the Military Regime had not given its endorsement to that Party, many qualified people had not expected a victory for the MP at the polls and had not joined the Party. Therefore, Özal found that politicians with the qualities he sought were in great scarcity, except a small group mentioned above.163 Then he decided to compensate this scarcity through importing young people who had programme-oriented expertise, dynamism, and innovative spirit (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 151-152). Thus, a second group was made up of persons outside the parliament. All educated in the U.S. and mostly have engineering background they became close personal advisers to Prime Minister Özal and worked as “shadow ministers” within the governing party. They were referred in the public opinion to as “princes”. People in both groups, some of them were close members of the Özal family, took place in the close circle of the Özal administration. All of them were considered as “belonging to the family” and addressed Özal as their “elder brother”. In the 1987 general elections, some of these “princes” became members of parliament, and, along with a number of persons in the first group, were given ministerial portfolios. Most of them were made minister of state which does not have any institutionalised-conventional ministry but responsible for monitoring some civil service departments or critical economic agencies outside the Civil Service. These agencies

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163 This information was provided from the interview with Mr. Hasan Celal Güzel, former Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, former member of the parliament, and former minister in the
included state banks as well as the Central Bank and some state-owned enterprises. The heads of the state banks, too, were persons brought from outside the bureaucracy. The latter, known as the "second generation of princes", were all educated in the U.S. too. Prime Minister Özal gave short shrift to counsel from the traditional civil servants and chose to work with his close entourage. To make this possible, many higher civil servants were sacked and the princes were appointed. In order to appoint them to certain civil service posts, seniority and promotion rules were relaxed. In efforts to create an alternative bureaucracy headed by his close entourage so as to have a freer hand in policy-making and implementation, in particular, in economic issues, Özal and his Governments had considerable success (Heper, 1989b: 468-469, 1990b: 611, 612 and 1994a: 670; and Heper and Sancar, 1998: 152-154). Özal emphasised that this move was regarded necessary in order to inject a new enthusiasm and spirit to the public bureaucracy (Hürriyet, an Istanbul daily, 7 January 1989) through a new and more modern team (Cumhuriyet, an Istanbul daily, 29 July 1987). He knew that he could not put his transformation programme into practice with the existing senior bureaucrats since it was not possible to reform the bureaucracy by traditional bureaucrats or academics very close to the bureaucracy (see Heper, 1984c: 16). In Özal's view, the princes were people not tainted with the bureaucratic bad habits and also they had connections, particularly in the U.S. To Özal, those connections were important because he aimed at fully integrating the Turkish economy with Western economies. The princes were expected to help Özal have an effective liaison with international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the European Union and the Council of Europe (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 152). In addition to these rather "objective" criteria, in some cases appointments to the heads of the critical agencies were made in the light of some subjective criteria such as being a relative of the Özal family, being personally known by Özal, or by his wife and particularly by his elder son, Ahmet Özal, and having an engineering degree from the U.S. Özal especially equated engineer's logic with rationality and he preferred engineers who have empiricist-analytical approach rather than the graduates of social sciences who have had basically a normative-utopian approach until recently. Only in exceptional cases, a person who had previously proven his skills in the bureaucracy was appointed to such posts (Kozanoğlu, 1993: 201-206; Heper and Sancar, 1998: 152-154, 155-156). Under the

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MP Governments in the 1980s, made by Professor Metin Heper in May, 1994. Mr. Güzel was also a
circumstances, whether persons who were placed in charge of critical agencies would perform well was left to chance factors. Some of them actually did well but there were complete failures as well (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 156).

b) The encouragement of the exercise of initiative

One of the overriding themes of the MP Governments was to encourage the exercise of initiative. Programme-oriented rationality (i.e. contribution to policy-making based on expert knowledge) and openness to innovation and initiative, summed up by Özal with a very famous phrase “the ability to get things done”, were the primary qualities Özal sought in bureaucrats (Barlas, 1994: 116). This was closely related to Özal’s belief in the virtue of free market and free competition. According to Özal, the ability to get things done was an antidote to the bureaucratic pathology. Özal and his close followers strongly believe that when given authority and opportunity to prove themselves, the bureaucrats on the scene would do a better job. The bureaucratic inertia could be overcome and taking initiative could become a common attitude if everybody knew what he/she was supposed to do. Thus, efforts were made to standardise the titles of civil service positions and to define functions, authorities, and responsibilities clearly. Authority had to be commensurate with responsibility. Overlaps in function and authority, which led to ambiguity, had to be avoided. The number of bureaucratic echelons had to be decreased in order to increase job enrichment and employee satisfaction. Where appropriate, authority would be delegated because that would made work more meaningful (ANAP, 1983a; Başbakanlık, 1989: 3-4; DPT, 1991: 34-38). Within this context, the first MP Government tried to improve division of labour and co-ordination among various public agencies and their internal units and to encourage the delegation of authority, with the Law dated 1984 and numbered 3046. Also, a governmental decree passed in the same year strengthened the position of prime minister vis-à-vis the individual ministers in the cabinet. One of the reasons for this re-arrangement, like its predecessor, was to promote co-ordination at the highest level of government. The Government also tried make civil servants more enthusiastic about their work, and for this aim some measures were adopted

prominent member of the group mentioned above (see Heper and Sancar, 1998: footnote 15).
as follows: application of a merit principle instead of seniority principle for the more successful functionaries (e.g. promotions by jumping echelons, paying of bonuses, contracts with special terms), increases in supplementary payments, more frequent pay increases, and greater flexibility in moving people through set civil service positions (Heper, 1989b: 464-466; Heper, 1994a: 669-670).

c) The critique of the policy of creation of a rational-productive and initiative bureaucracy

During the most of the 1980s the substantive rationality on the part of the bureaucracy was under serious attacked and toward the end of the decade, it came to be eroded to some extent (Heper, 1991a: 684). Of course, such an attempt clearly showed that transforming the patrimonial-legal bureaucracy into a legal-rational one and then into a rational-productive is painstaking task required consistent and well co-ordinated efforts in the long run. It is also known that the establishment of a legal-rational bureaucracy, let alone a rational-productive one, in many countries who have patrimonial bureaucratic legacies is highly difficult (Haque, 1998). Despite their so-called liberal revolution, as Heper emphasised, the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal felt no compulsion to convert the civil bureaucracy into a legal-rational one in Weberian sense. Instead, during the second half of the 1980s, the political elite tried to turn the civil bureaucracy into virtually subordinate and loyal arm of government, and it was even more successful (1994a: 670). What distinguishes the MP Governments from the previous ones that tried to create a party-book model of bureaucracy was that the MP Governments gave so much importance to rational-productive or problem-solving aspect of the issue. Özal and his Governments sought to design a rational-productive bureaucracy without first successfully transforming it into a legal-rational one (see Heper, 1989b; and Heper and Sancar, 1998) and to transform status-elite type to functional-elite type (Yılmaz, 2001: 98-99). However, Özal and his Governments' strategy of transforming the bureaucracy in a rational-productive direction had still strong doses of patrimonialism. They could easily adopt such a strategy because legal rationality had not taken firm hold in the Turkish

\[164\] Some of this information was provided from the interview with Mr. Ahmet Molvalı, head of the task force in question and with Adnan Kahveci, the Minister of State to whom the task force affiliated, made by Professor Metin Heper in May, 1988 (see Heper, 1989b: 464).
bureaucracy. The patrimonial dimension of the efforts (i.e. political and personal considerations of Özlü in both structural and operational aspects of the bureaucracy as in the case of appointments) to turn the upper echelons of the bureaucracy into a rational-productive one undermined the efforts to transform the bureaucracy in the intended direction. Some rational-productive features emerged in the bureaucracy, in particular in the economic bureaucracy, but they were accompanied with patrimonial characteristics and then these fragile features were degenerated quickly. Consequently, rational-productivity in the Turkish bureaucracy was tainted by a lingering patrimonialism. This strategy further weakened the already feeble legal rationality of the bureaucracy and increased politicisation, violation of legal and bureaucratic norms, and corruption. Patrimonial practices used by Özlü and his Governments periled the institutionalisation of rational productivity in the bureaucracy and resulted in a weird combination, patrimonial-rational productivity in this period. The Turkish case also constituted a very good support for the argument that legal rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalisation of rational productivity that is untainted by patrimonialism (Heper and Sancar, 1998).

Within this context, the effort of side-stepping of the traditional bureaucrats by princes in order to create a rational-productive and initiative bureaucracy was not successful at all. First, it should be pointed out that even this new breed of bureaucrats, time to time, displayed bureaucratic elitist attitudes and tended to reject political constraints as inputs in policy making (Heper, 1993: 63-66). Second, the most of the second generation of princes, in particular, became unsuccessful in their duties due to mainly their inexperience in the public service; and their activities gave rise to some unintended results (e.g. authority conflicts, bureaucratic tensions, even impropriety and corruption). Özlü’s version of getting things done often led to going around rules. In the process, established rules and norms were given short shrift and in some cases even criminal offences were committed (see Heper and Sancar, 1998: 156; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 304-305).

In spite of the MP Governments’ effort to improve division of labour and coordination among various public agencies and their internal units, to encourage the delegation of authority in the bureaucracy, and to make bureaucrats more enthusiastic
about their work, the bureaucrats were reluctant to change their traditional administrative styles. They could not adapt themselves to the policy shifts in many areas introduced by the MP Governments (Heper, 1989b: 464-466; Heper, 1994a: 669-670). Furthermore, adaptations were seen only in cases violating legal and administrative rules. As Özal placed great emphasis on the ability to get things done, he, in fact, expected the bureaucrats to effectively implement policies at all costs (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 151). As a matter of fact, once he confessed that «[a]s we tried to give priority to the substance and not to the procedure, we sometimes came to the brink of violating the law» (quoted in Cemal, 1989: 116).

As a result of the strategies of de-bureaucratisation and the creation of rational-productive and initiative bureaucracy, the whole bureaucracy and, in particular, the Civil Service further lost its internal consistency and some important legal and economic safeguards. By the Law dated 1984 and numbered 2999, the first MP Government was authorised to rearrange the Civil Service, in particular the status of the civil servants, by decrees having the force of law in order to keep up with the changes it envisaged. With these decrees, the principle of the regulation of the status of civil servants by law was seriously breached though the most of civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure) could not be swept away by the Government (Ömürğönül, 1989: 334). Moreover, these decrees could not overcome the problems of the Civil Service, as they were partial and superficial (Canman, 1985-1986: 53-54). Second, in addition to the potential demoralising effect of the staff cutback strategy, the real salaries of civil servants declined sharply between the years of 1984-1988 while recovering to some extent in 1989 and 1990 (see Pakdemirli, 1991; Erdoğan, 1991; Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992; and Teker, 1993). Salary rises made by the second MP Government to public employees including civil servants towards the end of the decade with the aim of maintaining electoral popularity in the face of inflationary pressures was also inflationary in the long run. Moreover, the price for inflationary distortions was chiefly paid by the salaried groups (Hershlag, 1988: 152). Furthermore, diversification created consciously by the MP Governments in the salary

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165 A survey conducted in 1987 covering a major portion of the private industrial sector found that for managers of the firms in this sector, major problems related to the public bureaucracy were over-regulation, red tape, slow operation of the system and the nasty attitudes of street-level bureaucrats (Esmer, 1991). Despite the efforts of the first MP Government, similar problems mentioned in the TÜSİAD Report (1983), were still intact on the agenda.
regime of civil servants, generally in favour of higher-level bureaucrats and some professions, also increased the friction in the Civil Service and reduced the solidarity among the civil servants against any action of the MP Governments towards the whole Civil Service (Ayman-Güler, 1996: 65-66). This situation indicates that the 1980s were difficult years for the Turkish civil servants except some professions and high-level bureaucrats.

3) The Politicisation and Heavy Control of the Bureaucracy under the Personal and Over-centralised Rule of Özal

The civil bureaucracy was under the close control of the political executive during the MP Governments. In the process of de-bureaucratisation, the MP Governments used a conscious tactic of politicisation of the civil bureaucracy in order render the civil bureaucracy less able to exercise autonomously whatever powers they still enjoyed. When they faced resistance from the civil bureaucracy against the liberal reforms, they increased the dose of politicisation. An alternative bureaucracy, created and affiliated directly to the Office of the Prime Ministry by these Governments and led by the princes of Özal, increased the ability of the Government to control the civil bureaucracy. Many committees, boards, commissions etc. in the traditional civil service, which were the examples of participatory administration, were abolished; and the authority and responsibility was concentrated in the hands of individual senior managers sympathetic to political power. What used to be relatively autonomous agencies were also brought under the closer control of the Government. Thus, the bureaucratic structure was centralised and personalised in the hands of few people favoured by the MP Governments. Some higher civil servants that had étatist-leftist orientation, in critical posts, in terms of the economic and internal security policies of the MP Governments, that resisted such policies were purged or pacified. Such posts were filled with conservative-oriented civil servants on the basis of political expediency rather than merit and seniority, with the effect of the two conservative factions (i.e. nationalist and religious factions) within the MP. Some posts in the civil bureaucracy were made less secure and some civil servants were obliged to work on a contract basis. Thus, the civil bureaucracy became either politicised again or deadwood (Heper, 1990b: 610-611; also see Güran, 1989; and Ayman-Güler, 1996: 58-68). This was a natural consequence of the inability of the bureaucratic and political elites
to develop a harmonious relationship among themselves and of their inability to effect a transition from virtually complete bureaucratic domination to virtually complete political domination (Heper, 1994a: 671).

Although great emphasis was put on the importance of the state in the early 1980s and the state was structured in the Presidential Office and the higher echelon of the military represented in the NSC with the effect of the 1982 Constitution prepared in the Military Regime, the grip of the state through the president and the military on politics and society was considerably loosened in the second half of the decade (Heper, 1990a: 325). Some signs of the replacement of the state-centred polity by a party-centred polity (e.g. the norms of state were given short shrift by the leadership of the MP) were seen during the MP Governments. This was not, of course, the same thing as the executive coming under the control of the parliament. In Turkey, parliaments never had power that they could later lose. This feature of the parliament became more apparent during the Single Party Governments of MP (Heper, 1990c: 316). Instead of the parliamentary control, a small autonomous political and technocratic-bureaucratic elite came together around Özal undertook a crucial role in the party-centred polity. This new political elite, as is explained above, enthusiastically launched the policies of liberalisation of economy and de-bureaucratisation of government. While this new elite was concentrated on these policies, they increasingly disregard for rules and regulations in the name of “getting things done without delay”. In the process, rules changed constantly, and in very rapid order. For example, in order to appoint certain persons, who were very close to Özal but without the necessary civil service qualifications, to certain critical posts, including the Under-secretariat of Office of the Prime Ministry, such qualifications were immediately modified. Laws were enacted very rapidly without paying enough attention to their constitutional validity. Therefore, more than half of the laws submitted to the review of the Constitutional Court was abrogated by the Court due to their constitutional invalidity. Some court orders were disregarded while some public expenditure through the fund-budgets was incurred without regard to the relevant laws and the principle of budgetary discipline. Some legal requirements for the management of public money (e.g. parliamentary consent for external borrowing) were also abrogated. Özal and his Governments often displayed an attitude as if liberal economy means an irregular and
undisciplined economic system. Prime Minister Özal by himself, concerning the date of local elections, declared in 1988: «No harm would be done by violating the Constitution once» (quoted in Buğra, 1994: 164), justifying this on the grounds of political necessity, if not expediency (Heper, 1990b: 612; Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 255, 331-332; Kafaoğlu, 2001: 20-24). All these examples were enough to show the tendency of Özal and his Governments away from legality to practical necessity in both political and economic domains. Nevertheless, this tendency gave rise to serious erosion in social and economic ethic (i.e. “personal achievement whatever the social and moral costs may be!”/“kışeyi dönme!”) and to bureaucratic corruption (i.e. “My civil servant know how to survive well!”/“Benim memurum işini bilir!”) in the long run (see Birand and Yalçın, 2001: 267, 341-343; Kafaoğlu, 2001: 21-22). The increased politicisation and corruption in the Turkish bureaucracy during the 1990s was a consequence of this tendency of the MP Governments in the 1980s as well as the permissive policies of the patchy Coalition Governments of the 1990s (see Heper and Sancar, 1998: 156-158). As a consequence of the deprivation of any socio-political protection shield, apart from the legal guarantees, against the political elite, individual salvation of civil servants through any kind of corruption (i.e. partisanship, bribe-taking) replaced the group solidarity (esprit de corps) in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the process, the Özal administration evinced strong doses of centralisation under a personal rule. As is already mentioned, Prime Minister Özal ruled with his close personal entourage including the close family members. Özal’s distrust of the bureaucrats

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166 In spite of the private sector’ close concern with the improvement in the performance of the bureaucracy during the 1980s (see footnote 44 in this thesis), the overt or covert manipulations of private entrepreneurs in their transactions with bureaucrats had very much influential on the bureaucracy and often resulted in bureaucratic corruption as happened in the previous decades.

167 Under the special conditions of Turkey during the 1980s (i.e. the revival of the state but the de-bureaucratisation of government), it is sometimes argued that leadership style of Özal resembles to that of Thatcher in the U.K. in the same period. It may be true in terms of strong personal leadership qualities of both politicians and their ideological orientations toward social life (i.e. traditional values) and economy (i.e. market rationality). However, the British state did not become too much “informal” in the hands of Thatcher due to the strength of the British democratic culture and legal-rational characteristics of the British bureaucracy, as the Turkish state became in the hands of Özal. At least, the traditional British bureaucracy under the Thatcher administration was transformed, more or less, from the legal form to the legal-rationale plus productive form in parallel with the market-type and managerial reforms in the British public sector during the 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast, the Özal administration did not have any inherent incentive or compulsion to transform the Turkish bureaucracy from the legal-patrimonial form to the legal-rationale and then the legal-
led him to conduct his administration by individual decisions where governmental decrees were required, and by governmental decrees where laws were necessary (Heper, 1990b: 612; also see Oyan and Aydınlı, 1991: Chp. 3; Oyan, 1998a: Chp. 1, and 1998b: 277-278).

The resentment of increasingly personal leadership style of Özal, however, increased among both the opposition and the MP members. His opponents claimed that the state in Özal’s hand became an informal, if not at times arbitrary, government (Heper, 1990b: 612). It was also often claimed that Özal tended to govern the state as if it was a private firm and even a tribe and that he successfully covered this tendency with the de-bureaucratization policy (see Ekşi, Hürriyet, an İstanbul daily, 30 August 2001; Kafaoğlu; 2001: 21-22). The Opposition leader, İnönü, stated: «We want the state back» (Cumhuriyet, an İstanbul daily, 11 September 1986). Its independence of the state structured in the Presidential Office and the NSC and aloofness from civil society helped the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal to de-bureaucratise government. The Presidential Office and the NSC could not extended their “machine” bureaucracies into the rest of the administration. The MP Governments took some important steps to create a party-book bureaucracy in a party-centred polity. Thus, as Heper aptly emphasised, the Turkish polity of the 1980s was characterised by a strange combination: “a fairly high degree of stateness with narrow scope and a high degree of de-bureaucratisation of government” (1990b: 612-613). Moreover, Özal-the-politician replaced, as president, Evren-the-statesman in the fall of 1989 and he politicised the presidency in the early 1990s until he died in the spring of 1993. Thus, the state executive and the political executive relations changed significantly after 1989168 since Özal, who was the best representative of the political elite, captured the presidency through the overwhelming majority of the MP in the National Assembly and manipulated, if not directed personally, the economic and foreign policies of the MP Governments under the leadership of Akbulut and Yılmaz.

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168 This very volatile combination could not persist for long. After the death of Özal, the MP under the leadership of Yılmaz has moved to the centre, abandoned the radical policies of Özal period, and developed a more friendly relationship with the state elite. Demirel who replaced Özal as a new president has also turned to be a statesman and took his place within the state elite. The state elite, in particular military and even the police chiefs, has become more and more eager to keep a constant vigil on everyday politics in the second half of the 1990s with effect of their increased role in dealing with the separatist Kurdish terrorism and fundamentalist Islamic activities. This tendency reached its peak at 28 February, 1998 when the state elite, the president and the NSC, clearly forced the political elite to obey the fundamental values and principles of the Republic followed, with some short intervals, since the time of Atatürk.
The function of the state elite to guard the state was lost once more in a party-centred polity during the MP Governments and, in particular, the presidency of Özal (Dodd, 1990: 139).

Although Gamble’s (1988) “free economy and the strong state” dichotomy shed some light on the Turkish case in the 1980s in terms of two simultaneous developments (i.e. the steps taken in the direction of a free market economy were accompanied by a significant centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of the political executive), it does not tell anything about (i) the degeneration risk of attempts toward free market economy and (ii) the relationship between the centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of the political executive and the capacity (or the incapacity) of the state (Öniş, 1991a: 28). While an “irregular” economy was emerging rather than a free market economy with its all institutions, the state became an “arbitrary” in Turkey under the Özal period. Although the state had still restrictive on the activities of the civil society as a heritage of the strong state tradition, it gradually became an incapable one in the face of increasing modern demands of the public as a natural outcome of open economy policy of...
the 1980s. An “irregular economy” and an “arbitrary but incapable state”, not a “free economy” and a “strong state” were the legacy of Özalist reforms in the 1980s. These are still main problems of Turkey that have to be overcome at the beginning of the new millennium.

E) Concluding Remarks

As was mentioned in the previous Chapter, in terms of the institutionalisation of the state norms in a bureaucratic form, the Ottoman-Turkish experience was, more or less, similar to the strong state tradition of certain continental European countries such as France and Germany, in particular during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. In France and Germany, after the Second World War, however, democracy flourished in a “dual” polity in which the parties to the conflict checked each other’s powers and therefore had to respect the expertise or interests of their rivals (see Heper, 1992a). In Turkey, the political system was opened up in a polarised polity in which the confrontation between the state elite and the political elite has not manifested the characteristics of a positive-sum-game, but has rather become a zero-sum-game. In the process, the state elite attempted to maintain an over-bureaucratised government; by contrast, the political elite tried to de-bureaucratise government (Heper, 1990b: 608). Within this context, the de-bureaucratisation policy of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal was, without any doubt, the most significant attempt of the political elite in modern Turkey.

In the post-1984 period, the MP Governments, in principle, continued to the policy of streamlining the civil bureaucracy pursued by the Military Regime. However, the scope, speed and vision of the policy were significantly altered by Özal. By taking advantage of the disintegration of the state elite and the fragmentation within the bureaucratic elite during the 1960s and 1970s, in the process the bureaucracy became very vulnerable vis-à-vis the political elite, Özal tried to establish hegemony over the bureaucracy as well as the society. Within this framework, the substantive rationality on the part of the bureaucracy was attacked seriously but it was not be replaced properly by instrumental rationality.

a new political party and campaign for presidential system of government before he died (see Heper,
With the rise of influence of the political elite who represents certain segments of the civil society, it could be expected that the substantive rationality would gradually be replaced by the instrumental rationality, as happened in developed Western democracies. This hypothesis was not confirmed by the Turkish case. Although the bureaucracy was forced to adjust to a new situation in the 1980s, it was burdened by its own elitist past. While the hostile attitudes of bureaucrats toward politicians were gradually declining, their traditional administrative attitudes were almost remained intact. In other words, in spite of the relative decline in the substantive rationality, it was not replaced by any rationality render it to higher performance within the framework political neutrality. The Turkish experience indicated that such bureaucratic ethos, rationality and practices would not be short-lived where the political elite does not come up with a substitute worldview to replace the bureaucratic ideology. As is seen throughout Chapter, such an attempt was partly made by Özal in the second half of the 1980s but could not be very successful.

The MP Governments, like the DP and JP Governments, were not keen to develop a modus vivendi with the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. Özal and his team, like Menderes and Demirel, remained political elite only, and did not attempt to double as the state elite nor did they tolerate others to play that role. Their intense conflict with the state elite, and, in particular, with the bureaucratic elite prevented them from appreciating the particular function the state and its bureaucracy had been performing in Turkey. They failed to make “political” arrangements that would have performed the same function or, at least, to supplant bureaucratic elitism with a new bureaucratic worldview. Within this framework, it attempted to turn the civil bureaucracy into a subordinate and loyal arm of government through various politicisation strategies rather than a legal-rational servant of the public. Although the MP Governments, like the previous ones, tried to create a party-book model of bureaucracy in a party-centred polity, it gave so much importance to rational-productive or problem-solving aspect of the issue. However, this attempt had also patrimonial overtones. Consequently, the efforts of the MP Governments to render the partially legal and partially patrimonial bureaucracy into a rational-productive one did not produce the expected results and the Turkish bureaucracy has remained “patrimonial-legalist” (i.e. an orientation of placing undue emphasis on rules with a readiness to violate

them) (see Heper and Sancar, 1998). Thus, the strategy of staff cutbacks, which was pursued by the MP Governments in accordance with their general policy towards the state and bureaucracy, should be examined within this framework.

In this Chapter, the MP Governments' strategy of staff cutbacks in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990 will be examined in order to understand whether and to what extent the Turkish Civil Service was cutback and restructured by the MP Governments in terms of its staff aspect in accordance with the MP's general policy towards the Turkish bureaucracy. Also, the basic patterns of change in the size and composition of staff in the Turkish Civil Service as a consequence of the staff cutback strategy will be determined. The basic patterns of change in the size and composition of staff and political, socio-economic and bureaucratic constraints on and opportunities for the MP Governments' strategy of staff cutbacks will be analysed by using the hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. In order to understand and explain this strategy with all aspects, the staff cutbacks initiated by the Military Regime (1980-1983) will be overviewed before moving this analysis.


Since the early 1980s, the dominant opinion about the whole Turkish public sector is that this sector is too big, overstaffed and cumbersome. The Turkish public administration system, including the Civil Service, has lost its flexibility to adapt itself to the requirements of social and economic development due to the long-term political and economic crises of the 1970s. It has also been far from fulfilling its functions efficiently and effectively since it has suffered from the inadequacies in the positive law concerning its structure and personnel, and also from over-politicisation. Therefore, public expenditures and public employment increased faster than the economic growth and the scope and quality of public services. Then, the Turkish public administration became a financial burden to the economy (see, for example, TÜSİAD, 1983).
One of the most problematic areas of the public administration system was the institutional structure and employment of the Civil Service, which has traditionally been the most significant and largest part of the Turkish public sector. In accordance with their claims to be striving towards the goal of withdrawal of government, the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime and the MP Governments pursued strategies to downsize and reshape the Civil Service. Before a detailed analysis of the MP Governments’ strategy of staff cutbacks in the Turkish Civil Service in the period of 1984-1990, it may be useful to make some remarks on the general attitudes of the Military Regime and the MP Governments toward the size of employment in the whole public sector as well as the size of employment in the Civil Service.


While the Military Regime was rearranging the Civil Service regime, as mentioned in Chapter Three, it took some measures through the Technocratic Government to reduce the size of the Civil Service staff. In addition to the early purges made in the first year of the Military Regime in order to “clean up” the politicised civil bureaucracy (i.e. get rid of civil servants who were considered as inconvenient in terms of its policy), some further cutbacks came to the agenda when the administrative reforms were announced in 1982. Although Prime Minister Ulusu disclaimed any intention to initiate mass cutbacks (Dodd, 1990: 58), it was stated in his Government’s programme that the Civil Service was much larger than was necessary and overstaffing would be eliminated gradually (Başbakanlık 1982a: 277). This approach to the civil bureaucracy was an upshot of the fact that, unlike the earlier ones, the Military Regime had, particularly in economic matters, “a less étatist orientation” (Heper, 1994a: 669). This new orientation was, in fact, as an extension of the economic policy put forward in the early 1980 by the Minority Government of the JP under the premiership of Demirel.

The Military Regime had three significant measures to achieve these aims. First, the Martial Order Law numbered 1402, which was put into effect in the period of 1980-1983, granted great authority to the martial law commanders to discharge civil servants from the public service. Moreover, the right to defence was not recognised to civil servants; and the ways of administrative objection and judicial review were closed. Within in the first year
of the Military Regime, a total of 18,000 public employees including the civil servants were either taken into custody or arrested and convicted and then received either administrative or penal punishments due to their illegal and/or partisan activities before the 1980 military activities (Yeni Forum, III, no. 57, 15 January 1982; see also Heper, 1984b: 66). 2,314 civil servants in the whole public sector (including 2065 civil servants in the central government - so called the Turkish Civil Service) lost their jobs in the period of 1980-1983 (DPD, 1988: 64-67).

Second, the Law dated 1981 and numbered 2559 encouraged civil servants to be retired and granted an authority to the administration to retire civil servants who had completed twenty years in service; or who had completed ten years in service and who were more than the age of fifty-five on January 31, 1982. A considerable number of public employees including civil servants were offered certain inducements for voluntary retirement; some who did not wish to leave, however, were forced to do so by unilateral action. It is clear that this Law aimed to eliminate some civil servants with political considerations and to reduce the number of civil servants (Çarklı, 1981: 2-4). These two measures threatened the security of tenure in the Civil Service and resulted in a limited achievement in terms of cutbacks (Ömürgönülşen, 1989a).

Third, the Military Regime also used hiring freezes as an effective means to reduce, or at least, not to increase the number of civil servants between the years of 1981-1983.

As a result, for the first time in the history of Turkish Civil Service, the number of civil servants decreased from 1,312,000 to 1,294,000 in the whole public sector (Table (V.1)); and decreased from 995,000 to 991,000 in the Civil Service (i.e. the civil servants in the central government) (Table (V.2) and Figure (V.1)) in the period of 1980-1982. Although the number of civil servants increased in both sections (+2.90 and +1.11 annually on an average respectively) between the years of 1982-1984, the rates of increase were very low in comparison with the rates before 1980. This increase can be explained by zigzags in the economic stabilisation programme and the general elections held in the fall of 1983. When we look at the whole period (1980-1984), we can see that the Military Regime more or less achieved its goal in terms of cutbacks. Although it could not roll-back employment in the
public sector and in the Civil Service staffing, the rate of increase declined sharply: 0.50 percent annual average increase in total civilian public sector employment (from 1,940,000 to 1,979,000, Table (V.3)); 1.09 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Turkish public sector (from 1,312,000 to 1,369,000 Table (V.1)); 0.45 percent annual average increase in the Civil Service staff (from 995,000 to 1,013,000, Table (V.2) and Figure (V.1)). The annual average rate of increase in the Civil Service staff in the 1970-1980 period was extremely high (11.77 percent) when it is compared with that in the 1980-84 period (0.45 percent).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Year</th>
<th>Civil Servants</th>
<th>Annual Average Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>+7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>+3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>+13.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Military Regime Period (1980-1984)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>+2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The Motherland Party Governments Period (1984-1990)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>-4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>+7.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Some figures indicate the staff numbers in post in January and others indicate these in July.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Year</th>
<th>Civil Servants</th>
<th>Annual Aver. Increase (%)</th>
<th>Population per Civil Servant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Before 1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>+13.06</td>
<td>196.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>+2.48</td>
<td>192.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>+9.09</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>+4.53</td>
<td>110.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>+9.98</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>+8.64</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>+4.25</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>+16.07</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>995</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The Military Regime Period (1980-1984)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+0.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>+1.11</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Motherland Party Governments Period (1984-1990)</td>
<td></td>
<td>+4.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>-4.35</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>+14.16</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>+4.25</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE (V.3). TURKISH CIVILIAN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN COMPARISON WITH TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT, TOTAL CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE AND TOTAL POPULATION (1970-1990) (Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Civilian Public Sector Employment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>(2,430)</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Central Government</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Civil Service (Civil Servants in the Central Government)</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Total Civilian Employment (2) (3)</td>
<td>12,583</td>
<td>13,813</td>
<td>15,019</td>
<td>17,935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civilian Labour Force (3)</td>
<td>14,375</td>
<td>15,619</td>
<td>17,024</td>
<td>19,487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Population (4)</td>
<td>35,321</td>
<td>44,438</td>
<td>49,070</td>
<td>56,098</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 1/2 (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>(13.55)</td>
<td>12.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 1a/2 (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 1b/2 (%)</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 1/3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.42</td>
<td>11.62</td>
<td>(12.47)</td>
<td>11.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 1a/3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 1b/3</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) 1/4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>(4.33)</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) 1a/4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) 1b/4</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) For an explanation for this column, see Table (V.4), Note (1).
(2) The figures include disguised unemployment especially in the agricultural sector; if it is not included, the figures are expected to be lower than these levels.
(3) Age 15+
(4) Estimates of mid-year population.

In brief, the Military Regime succeeded in not increasing the absolute size of the Civil Service and in reducing its relative size slightly. This is particularly so when one
The size of the public sector and the Civil Service in terms of employment decreased in relative terms as well in the period of 1980-1984. The figures in Table (V.3) show that the share of civilian public sector employment in both total civilian employment (from 14.04 to 13.18 percent), total civilian labour force (from 12.42 to 11.62 percent) and total population (from 4.37 to 4.03 percent) decreased slightly. Also, the share of civil servants employed in the Civil Service both in total civilian employment (from 7.20 to 6.74 percent), total civilian labour force (from 6.37 per to 5.95 percent) and total population (from 2.24 to 2.06 percent) decreased.
considers the absolute and relative increase in the size of the public sector and in that of the Civil Service, in the 1970s.

While the Military Regime was trying to control the civil bureaucracy and reduce its size, its efforts in this direction nevertheless had dysfunctional effects upon the latter. As is mentioned in Chapter Three, the morale of the civil servants was adversely affected. Many senior civil servants were alienated while at the same time a tendency of exodus from the civil service became more remarkable. There had been a long trend among senior civil servants to leave the civil service for better posts elsewhere (see Canman, 1975 and Bozkurt, 1980: 143-148) but the exodus in the early years of 1980s far surpassed the earlier trend (Heper, 1984b: 68 and footnote 17).


After the restoration of democracy, the MP Governments, at least in the first term of office, followed, more or less, the same restrictive policy pursued by the Military Regime concerning the size of the Civil Service. It was not surprising since Prime Minister Özal was as a forceful proponent of the policy of withdrawal of government which was followed by the conservative governments in developed Western countries during the 1980s (see Kuruç, 1985; Uras, 1993). Staff cutback strategy as well as the strategies of privatisation, liberalisation, and the use of market-type mechanisms and private sector-managerial techniques should be treated within this framework.

The Turkish Civil Service as well as the whole administrative system was severely criticised by the MP due to its over-centralised, over-bureaucratic, wasteful and inefficient, and overstaffed characteristics in the official party documents and in the public addresses of Özal (see, for example, ANAP, 1983a and 1983b). In fact, the MP’s general opinion about the Turkish Civil Service was in parallel to the views expressed in the TÜSİAD Report (1983) containing the private sector’s criticisms of and reform proposals for the bureaucracy (see TÜSİAD, 1983). It was argued in this Report that the Turkish public bureaucracy was over-bureaucratic, over-centralised, cumbersome, and overstaffed with unqualified and incompetent employees who received high salaries that they did not
deserve as well as authoritarian and hostile to private enterprise. According to TÜSİAD, it was better for government to undertake only its traditional functions such as justice, internal and foreign security, and foreign affairs since the private sector was ready to undertake services to the public apart from these traditional functions. Furthermore, the public administration had to be in the service of the private sector. Therefore, the downsizing of the bureaucracy had to be one of the crucial goals of any proposed reorganisation project. Many suggestions of the TÜSİAD Report, including reducing the size of employment in the Civil Service (1983: 23-30; see also Çiç, 1982-1983: 122), found an opportunity to be put into practice when the MP came to power in the end of 1983.

The MP governments mainly used hiring freezes and personnel ceilings for certain segments of the Civil Service rather than across-the-board cuts within a given target. In fact, civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure) provided for civil servants by the 1982 Constitution and the CSL dated 1965 and numbered 657 were the legal obstacles for such cuts. Performance appraisal process was not operated properly since it was traditionally considered as a quarrel with one’s bread and butter (see Ömürğönülşen, 1989a). The MP Governments could overcome this issue only in the state owned enterprises and public utilities through contracted personnel system. In the Civil service, some legal and technical limits were imposed to establishing new positions and filling in vacant positions. These techniques were even sometimes applied in non-officially articulated manner. Despite the fact that there was not any pressure of labour union under the restrictive constitutional and legal rules on the rights of civil servants to establish labour union and participate in administration and that public opinion kept itself distant from political protest movements as a consequence of authoritarian legal measures enacted and de-politicisation policy pursued by the Military Regime, the MP governments preferred to follow a low-profile strategy. In order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and not to directly challenge the traditionally secure atmosphere of the Civil Service, the first MP government did not set a specific target for staff cuts. While such a strategy was minimising reactions in the beginning, it became a main obstacle in the long-run in convincing the civil servants and public opinion for the necessity of cuts since it did not clearly show the commitment of political power in this matter.
The record of the MP Governments should be examined in two periods: 1984-1986 and 1986-1990. In the first period (1984-1986), the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme was followed enthusiastically by the first MP Government. Within this framework, the staff cutback strategy was pursued strictly. Serious efforts were made to standardise the titles of civil service positions, to reduce the numbers of these titles and to define functions, authorities, and responsibilities clearly. The authority of establishing new civil service staff positions was transferred from the executive body to the legislative body by the Decree having the force of law dated 1984 and numbered 190 (see DPT, 1991: 36-37). Since the establishment of a civil service position could be possible with an act instead of a government decree, this put a significant break on the demands of individual departments from the Government to increase the number of civil service positions in their departments and to fill in them immediately. Recruitment freezes and natural wastage also helped the Government cutback public sector employment including the Civil Service staff. The number of the civil servants in the Turkish public sector decreased from 1,369,000 to 1,249,000 (-4.38 percent annually on an average, see Table (V.1)); the number of civil servants in the Civil Service also decreased from 1,013,000 to 925,000 (-4.35 percent annually on an average, see Table (V.2) and Figure (V.1)). The Government’s rhetoric is supported by the figures for this period.

However, it is impossible to reach the same result for the period of 1986-1990. The number of civil servants in the whole public sector increased from 1,249,000 to 1,409,000 (+3.20 percent annual average increase); the number of civil servants in the Civil Service also increased from 925,000 to 1,288,000 (+9.81 percent annual average increase). Although between the years of 1988-1990 there was a small decrease (from 1,434,000 to 1,409,000; -0.87 percent annual average decrease) in the number of the civil servants in the Turkish public sector, this decrease almost entirely came from the re-classification activity in the state-owned enterprises and public utilities conducted by the second MP Government. Since 1985, only contracted personnel have been recruited for the state-owned enterprises and public utilities and the existing civil servants have been encouraged to be contracted personnel through additional financial incentives. As is shown in Table (V.4), the number of civil servants declined sharply (-83.7 percent) and the number of contracted personnel
increased remarkably (+34,728.6 percent) in the period of 1984-1990. If we look at the number of civil servants in the Civil Service, there was not any decrease between the years of 1988-1990; in contrast the size of Civil Service increased gradually (+4.25 percent annual average increase, see Table (V.2) and Figure (V.1)).\textsuperscript{170} However, when it is compared to the 1986-1988 period (+14.16 percent annual average increase), the period 1988-1990 can be called as a period of “restraint”.

\textsuperscript{170} For a detailed assessment of this development, see Ömürçönülşen (1990).
**TABLE (V.4). TURKISH CIVILIAN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT (1984-1990)**
(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>1990 (1)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1) The Central Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Civil Service (Civil Servants)</td>
<td>1,231.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>1,557.2</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>+26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Contracted Personnel</td>
<td>1,012.5</td>
<td>(51.2)</td>
<td>1,287.7</td>
<td>(53.0)</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Temporary Personnel</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>+383.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Workers</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>+234.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Others (2)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>+50.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2) Local Governments</strong></td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>+19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Civil Servants</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>+19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Contracted Personnel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(77.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Temporary Personnel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(26.7)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(77.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Workers</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(77.5)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>(77.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3) State-Owned Enterprises and Public Utilities</strong></td>
<td>686.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>695.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>+1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Civil Servants</td>
<td>296.2</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>243.8</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>-83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Contracted Personnel</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>243.8</td>
<td>+34,728.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Temporary Personnel</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>-67.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Workers</td>
<td>326.3</td>
<td>382.8</td>
<td>+17.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4) Total Public Servants</strong></td>
<td>1,978.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,325.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Civil Servants</td>
<td>1,369.4</td>
<td>(69.2)</td>
<td>1,408.6</td>
<td>(60.6)</td>
<td>+2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Contracted Personnel</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>261.2</td>
<td>(60.6)</td>
<td>+5,974.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Temporary Personnel</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>(90.0)</td>
<td>-16.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Workers</td>
<td>499.2</td>
<td>547.1</td>
<td>(624.6)</td>
<td>+9.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Others</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>+50.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) The 1984 figures do not include the staff (except the civil servants) employed in the local governments due to the lack of data. Also the 1990 figures for the public sector might be smaller than actual figures due to some central government departments and local governments did not hand in their actual staff numbers. The 1990 figures for the civil servants in the central government is corrected by using data published by the State Personnel Department in 1990 (DPD, 1990b). The 1988 figures are used for local governments for the year 1990. Therefore, the 1990 figures, in particular, for local governments are smaller than actual figures (est. approx. 50,000).

(2) This category mainly includes academic and judicial personnel and personnel employed in the Presidential Office and the Grand National Assembly. Civilian personnel employed in the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Organisation are not included due to both the lack of data and the secrecy of data. The figures related to this category are calculated by the author.
When we evaluate the whole period (1984-1990), it can be said that the achievement of the MP Governments was well behind its rhetoric: 2.91 percent annual average increase in total civilian public sector employment (from 1,979,000 to 2,325,000, Table (V.3)); 0.49 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Turkish public sector (from 1,369,000 to 1,409,000, Table (V.1)); 4.52 percent annual average increase in the numbers of civil servants in the Civil Service (from 1,013,000 to 1,288,000 Table (V.2) and Figure (V.1)). The annual average rate of increase in the Civil Service (4.52 percent) in the 1984-1990 period was higher than that of the 1980-1984 period (0.45 percent), but it was still markedly lower than that of the 1970-1980 period (11.77 percent).

When we look at the relative size of the public sector employment including the Civil Service, the figures indicate an increase in this period. The shares of civilian public sector employment and the Civil Service employment (i.e. civil servants in the central government) both in total civilian employment (from 13.18 percent to 13.55 percent and from 6.74 percent to 7.18 percent respectively), total civilian labour force (from 11.62 percent to 11.93 percent and from 5.95 percent to 6.61 percent respectively) and total population (from 4.03 percent to 4.14 percent and from 2.06 percent to 2.30 percent respectively) increased slightly despite the rhetoric (see Table (V.3)). The gains made during the Military Regime in this field were, unfortunately, lost in this period. In addition, the weight of the central government and the Civil Service in civilian public sector employment increased (from 62.2 percent to 67.0 percent and from 51.2 to 53.0) at the expense of local governments and, in particular, state-owned enterprises and public utilities in this period (Table (V.4) and Figure (V.2)). This result is in accordance with the policy of the MP Governments concerning the reducing the role and size of government in economic activities but also indicates further centralisation of government in terms of public employment. This result also made the decentralisation and cutback programmes in the Civil Service more urgent in the near future.
It is generally accepted that factors such as the expansion in the role of government; the search for finding at least a partial solution for the unemployment problem; the lack of manpower planning at both country and departmental levels; and the attempts by governments to create civil service positions for their sympathisers contribute to the increase in the number of civil servants (see Gülmez, 1973; Topçuoğlu, 1975; Şaylan, 1980; Tutum, 1980; Güran, 1980; Oktay, 1983 and 1986; Çiçti, 1988; Ömürgönülşen, 1990). The figures for the second half of 1980s show that these factors are of importance in the Turkish Civil Service. Also, the increase in the number of civil servants went in parallel with the economic difficulties in the 1970s and the second half of the 1980s. While the 1980-86 period was relatively stable in terms of economic and political life, the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme was jeopardised by alarming economic indicators (e.g. high inflation, public expenditure increase due to off-budget activities, increase in public sector borrowing requirements, increase in external debts) in the period of 1986-1990 (see DPT, 1993) due to mainly populist policy of the MP Governments in the face of successive general, local and by-elections and referenda. This correlation indicates the need for further research about political business cycles in terms of public employment as well as public expenditure.
Before examining the period of 1984-1990 in terms of cutback strategy in detail, we should clarify some points. It is usually claimed that in developed Western countries the ratio of civil servants in total population is about 1 percent and it is argued that this ratio has already been exceeded in Turkey (see TÜSİAD, 1983). When we consider all the civil servants in the public sector, this ratio was 2.51 percent in 1990; when we take into account only the civil servants in the central government (so-called the Turkish Civil Service), this ratio was 2.30 percent in 1990. However, as Çiğçi neatly points out, some truths are hidden while talking about the ratio of the number of civil servants to the total population being 1 percent in developed Western countries (1982-83: 126). For example, the “Civil Service” is considered in the U.K. as only one of the public services. Apart from the Civil Service, education, police, and social services are provided by local governments and health service is undertaken by the NHS. When the increase in the number of civil servants is discussed, those areas are not counted. Therefore, the size of the British Civil Service was only 1.01 percent in 1990. If we take into account health, education, police, and social services, in addition to the Civil Service, which are mainly provided by the central government in Turkey, this ratio would be 6.71 percent in 1990.171 As for the U.S. and Germany, it is observed that a similar mistake is made when only federal personnel - not state governments’ and local governments’ personnel – are considered as civil servants.172

In our opinion, it is more logical to treat the subject in terms of the ratio of civilian public sector employment in total civilian employment, total civilian labour force and total population. For example, the ratios in the U.K. in 1990 were respectively: 21.9 percent; 20.4 percent, 10.0 percent (see Table (I.5)). In Turkey those ratios in 1990 were respectively: 13.0 percent, 11.9 percent, 4.1 percent (see Table (V.3)). The share of general government employment in total civilian employment in Turkey for 1990 is 9.1 percent whereas this ratio for the weighted average for the OECD region is 15.6 percent for the same year (see Table (I.3)). As is clear, although the ratios of Turkish public sector employment increased in the 1970s and stabilised in the 1980s, they have not reached the average ratios of developed countries. One of the serious problems of the Turkish public sector is that it is unbalanced in respect to the distribution of staff to the different levels of government (the central government and the state owned enterprises-public utilities vs.

171 For the figures about the U.K., see Central Statistical Office (1990 and 1992); and OECD (1993b).
local governments), different regions (developed regions vs. underdeveloped regions), public services and programmes (administrative and subsidiary services vs. technical and welfare services), and public organisations and their sub-units (headquarters vs. local offices). While demand for welfare services (e.g. education and health) and some local services is very high, the levels of supply of these services are quite low and varied due to inadequate budget appropriations and staff numbers (see Oktay, 1983: Chp.3 and 4 and 1986). This unbalanced staff structure of the Turkish public sector (and the Civil Service) has always been very influential on overstaffing arguments. Therefore, the issue of overstaffing in the Turkish public sector should be examined very carefully.

B) An Analysis of the Motherland Party Governments’ Strategy of Staff Cutbacks in the Turkish Civil Service (1984-1990) through the Theoretical Model

The previous section indicates that although the MP Governments adopted the strategy of staff cutbacks, it could not pursue this strategy strictly. Therefore, we cannot name this period as one of cutbacks but as a period of “employment restraint”. This point should be kept in mind in the course of testing hypotheses relating to cutback strategy. In this section, the basic patterns of change in the size and composition of staff and political, socio-economic and bureaucratic constraints on and opportunities for the MP Governments’ strategy of staff cutbacks will be analysed through twenty-six hypotheses in four main groups developed in Chapter Two.

1) Party-Political Explanations

In this section, six hypotheses related to the political colours of parties will be tested.

**Hypothesis (1):** “Under a right-wing government, general government spending as a proportion of GNP/GDP and general government staffing (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment, total labour force and total population will decrease markedly with respect to the previous period”.

172 For country cases, see OECD (1993a).
Table (V.5) shows that the consolidated budget expenditure and the current expenditure as a percent of GNP increased in the period of 1975-1980. The Technocratic Government of the Military Regime tried to decrease the size of the public sector by pursuing the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme strictly as noted above. In this framework, the consolidated budget expenditure (and current expenditure) declined significantly to 20.6 percent (and to 8.1 percent) of GNP in 1984. However, the MP Governments, which were more enthusiastic about the rolling back the frontiers of the public sector, could not achieve the same success in democratic competitive atmosphere in the period of 1984-1990, leaving the 1984-1986 period aside, in which it was as successful as the Military Regime. As is explained in detail in the previous Chapter, after 1986-87, in particular, most of the economic and financial indicators became more and more alarming. The populist rhetoric of the opposition parties forced the MP governments to follow populist policies in order to compete with them at ballot box. As a matter of fact, at the end of the period the consolidated budget expenditure and current expenditure levelled at 23.4 percent of GNP and 9.2 percent of GNP respectively - well above the 1984 levels.173.

It should be clarified that the consolidated budget expenditure does not include some parts of expenditure of local governments, social security outlays, internal and external debt payments (after 1986), revolved budget expenditure and, in particular, off-budget funds. If they were included in the total, the relative size of the general government sector would be levelled around 30 percent of GDP between the 1980-1984 period. With the same assumption, the relative size of the general government sector would be around 30 percent of GNP in 1984 and 40 percent of GNP in 1990 (for a similar argument, see Oyan and Aydin, 1991: 27-31; Oyan, 1992: 135-138. Also see Aktan, 1995: 37-42). This is another indicator that while the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime was successful, at least, in keeping the public sector in the same size, the MP Governments failed in the aim of rolling back the frontiers of the public sector in the period of 1984-1990.
TABLE (V.5). CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURE AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE (1975-1990) (As a Percent of GNP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Budget Expenditure</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Expenditure</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In parallel with the trends concerning public expenditure, as mentioned in the previous section, while the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime succeeded in cutting back the public sector employment including the Civil Service, the MP Governments apparently failed. The figures in Table (V.6) show that the ratios of total general government, central government and the Civil Service employment to total employment, total civilian labour force and total population increased gradually in this period. In other words, the gains made in the period of the Military Regime in this field were, more or less, lost. Therefore, Table (V.5) and Table (V.6) clearly indicate that hypothesis (1) is not supported by the data.

173 Both indicators in 1990 were better than the indicators in 1980 though they were not as good as the indicators in 1984.
TABLE (V.6). TURKISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT (1984-1990) (Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Change 1984-1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Total General Government</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>1,630(1)</td>
<td>+26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Central Government</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,557(2)</td>
<td>+26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The Civil Service (Civil Ser. in Central Gov.)</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>1,288(2)</td>
<td>+27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Civilian Employment</td>
<td>15,019</td>
<td>17,935</td>
<td>+19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 1/4 (%)</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 2/4 (%)</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 3/4 (%)</td>
<td>6.74</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Total Civilian Labour Force</td>
<td>17,024</td>
<td>19,487</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 1/8 (%)</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>8.36</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 2/8 (%)</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>+10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) 3/8 (%)</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>+11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Total Population (3)</td>
<td>49,070</td>
<td>56,098</td>
<td>+14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) 1/12</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>+10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) 2/12</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>+10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) 3/12</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>+11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) The 1990 figures for total general government are smaller than actual figures as the 1988 figures are used for local governments.
(2) The 1990figures for these two categories include the personnel employed in departments with special budgets. These departments, which were in the scope of the consolidated budget until 1985-86, are not in the scope of the consolidated budget any more. Social security institutions take place in this category as well. The 1990 figures also include the personnel employed in special (off-budget) funds. However, the personnel employed in the consolidated budget departments make overwhelming majority in the 1990 figures.
(3) Estimates of mid-year population.

Hypothesis (2): “Under a right-wing government, spending and staffing on defence and law and order services will increase as a proportion of total spending and staffing; and spending and staffing on welfare services will decrease as a proportion of total spending and staffing”.

Table (V.7) shows that both the shares of law and order and welfare expenditure in total consolidated budget expenditure increased significantly. The steady increase in law and order
expenditure is in accordance with our hypothesis. However, the significant increase in welfare expenditure (more than that of law and order expenditure) in relative terms is not compatible with the hypothesis. The ratio of welfare expenditure remained unchanged during the first MP Government (i.e. 1984-1987 period) but the second MP Government (i.e. 1987-1990 period) changed its policy in the face of political pressures from ensuing elections. And then the ratio of welfare expenditure increased significantly and, more or less, compensated the loss made in the first half of the 1980s. However, it should be kept in mind that the relative size of the consolidated government budget shrunk in total public sector spending in the late 1980s. Therefore, it is doubtful that this increase met the welfare needs of the public (see Oyan and Aydın, 1991: Chp.2; and Oyan, 1998a: Chp. IV). In brief, hypothesis (2) is partially supported in terms of spending by the figures.

TABLE (V.7). CHANGE IN CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURE BY SELECTED PROGRAMME GROUPS (1984-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Group</th>
<th>Share in Total Consolidated Budget Expenditure</th>
<th>Change in Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984 (%)</td>
<td>1987 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Law and Order (1)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Welfare (2)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Education</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Health</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Social Services</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) It covers law, justice and internal security expenditure. It does not include defence expenditure since there is a remarkable off-budget activity in the late 1980s in defence area. Furthermore, we do not have accurate figures about the civil personnel employed in the Ministry of Defence to make meaningful comparisons.

(2) It does not include social security outlays as it is outside the consolidated budget. Also, it does not include small-size off-budget activities in the fields of social assistance and benefits. Such off-budget funds were established in the 1980s as a consequence of the disputed social justice aspect of the MP’s programme.
When we look at the staffing side of the hypothesis, we can see almost the same picture. As is seen in Table (V.8), both the absolute and relative sizes of security service and general law and order services increased in terms of staffing. Their absolute sizes, in particular, increased (+52.94 percent and +39.19 percent respectively) more than that of total Civil Service (+27.18 percent). The numbers of personnel employed in health service increased significantly in both absolute and relative terms as well. However, the absolute increase in the numbers of personnel employed in education service (+6.29 percent) was well below the increase in total Civil Service (+27.18 percent). Therefore, its relative size was diminished significantly. But, the staffing both in health and education services could not be rolled back. Therefore, hypothesis (2) is again only partially supported in terms of staffing.

TABLE (V.8). CHANGE IN THE TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE STAFF BY SELECTED PROGRAMME (SERVICE) GROUPS (1984-1990) (Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme (Service) Group</th>
<th>Absolute and Relative Change in Civil Service</th>
<th>Absolute Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984 Share (%)</td>
<td>1990 Share (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Security Service (1)</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Health Service</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Education Service</td>
<td>380.0</td>
<td>37.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) General Law and Order Services (2)</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Total Civil Service staff in the Central Gov.</td>
<td>1,012.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) Police force are employed in the General Directorate of Security and classified under the title of Security Services Class.
(2) It is not a service class and it is clustered by the author on a basis of departments concerning law and order services. This category includes the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Security, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Council of State and the Court of Accounts. This category includes only the civil servants, but not judicial officials.
**Hypothesis (3):** “Under a right-wing government, staff numbers in both the general government sector and civil service and their share in total employment, total labour force and total population will decrease; spending on wages and salaries as a proportion of total spending will decrease”.

In contrast to the hypothesis, the absolute and relative sizes of total general government employment (and the Civil Service employment) in terms of total civilian employment, total civilian labour force and total population increased under the MP Governments. For this reason, the staffing side of our hypothesis is refuted by the figures in Table (V.6).

Table (V.9) shows that the share of personnel expenditure in total consolidated budget expenditure and current expenditure declined towards the end of 1970s. This tendency was accelerated by the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime as a result of the economic stabilisation programme pursued in the early years of the 1980s. The personnel expenditure as a proportion of total consolidated budget expenditure remained steady in a rather low plateau between the years of 1984-1987 but rose remarkably between the years of 1987-1990 compensating for the decline in the 1975-1987 period. Personnel expenditure as a percent of current expenditure recovered more quickly and reached a level in 1987 which was higher than the level in 1984. It increased remarkably in the period of 1987-1990. When we look at the whole period (1984-1990), both ratios were higher than the ratios of 1984, even higher than those of 1975 and 1980. Therefore, we cannot talk about a roll back of the Civil Service in terms of spending on wages and salaries.

As noted above, however, we should approach the consolidated budget figures cautiously since the consolidated budget, although the biggest, is not the only item of total general government expenditure in Turkey. It has been, unfortunately, transformed into a budget just for transfer expenditure, debt interest payments, and personnel expenditure since the late 1980s. Moreover, high ratios in the late 1980s and 1990 should not be interpreted as implying that the civil servants had greater purchasing power in those years since the size of the Civil Service at the end of the 1980s was larger than its size in the 1970s. Although they are suffered from some methodological problems about the definition of civil servant and the scope of personnel expenditure, some recent studies (see
Erdogan, 1991; Pakdemirli, 1991; Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992; Tecer, 1993) show that the real salaries of Turkish civil servants declined sharply between the years of 1979-1988 while recovering to some extent in 1989 and 1990, more or less, in accordance with the increase in the relative size of personnel expenditure. The real salaries of civil servants in 1990 were still below the figure of 1979 since the improvement observed in 1989 and 1990 was not enough to compensate the lose occurred in the previous years. Moreover, the decline in real salaries occurred in a period of constraint on the size of the Civil Service.

In addition to fluctuations in real salaries, factor shares in national income can give some insight into the relative situation of the civil servants in terms of income distribution. The relative position of the civil servants deteriorated during the MP Governments since the income distribution in the society worsened at the expense of agriculture, wages and salaries but in favour of profits, rents, and interest income (see Yeşilada and Fisunoglu, 1992: 198-200). This outcome indicates that the late 1970s and 1980s, a significant process of restructuring in the economic system was in progress, were financially difficult years for the Turkish civil servants except some professions and high-level bureaucrats. In fact, the Turkish experience is not different from other OECD countries (see Table (1.2)). At the end of the decade, the Turkish Government, whatever each individual civil servant’s financial position, had still to pay a substantial amount for the salaries of the civil servants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE(V.9). THE PROPORTION OF PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE IN THE CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURE AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE (1975-1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Expenditure (as a percent of total con. budget exp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Expenditure (as a percent of current exp.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Briefly, the spending side of the hypothesis is not supported either due to the developments in favour of total personnel expenditure at the end of the period.
Hypothesis (4): "Under a right-wing government, blue-collar staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will decrease; and white-collar staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will increase".

Table (V.10) shows that the blue-collar staff numbers as a proportion of the Civil Service staff decreased (from 17.9 percent to 16.3 per cent) and the white-collar staff numbers as a proportion of the Civil Service staff increased (from 82.1 percent to 83.7 percent). This structural change in employment was more considerable in the rest of central government. In relative terms, the size of blue-collar staff declined. If the whole central government is taken into account, a similar pattern can be traced. If we consider the change in absolute terms, it can be seen that the numbers of white-collar staff increased (+29.6 percent; +85.7 percent; +31.8 percent respectively) more than the general average of the Civil Service (+27.2 percent), more than the rest of central government (+22.9 percent), and more than the total central government (+26.4 percent). The rates of increase in the numbers of blue-collar staff in both sections were lower than the general averages (+16.0 percent; +11.5 percent; +13.7 percent respectively). Therefore, its relative size decreased in the period and the hypothesis is supported.

The pattern can be explained partly by the structural change in the Turkish industrial sector in favour of service industry in the last couple of decades. In our opinion, this is the outcome of a deliberately pursued policy: "hit blue-collar staff more than white-collar staff". Personnel employed in Subsidiary Services Class in the Civil Service, and the workers and temporary personnel in the whole central government are regarded as ones who should be got rid of first by using recruitment freezes, contracting-out, automation and computerisation.
### TABLE (V.10). CHANGE IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STAFF IN TURKEY (1984-1990)
(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change 1984-1990(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Civil Service</td>
<td>1,012.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,287.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) White-collar civil servants (1)</td>
<td>831.5</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>1,077.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>+29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Blue-collar civil servants (2)</td>
<td>181.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>210.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>+16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Rest of Central Government</td>
<td>219.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>269.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) White-collar staff (3)</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>+85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Blue-collar staff (4)</td>
<td>185.7</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>207.1</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>+11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Central Government</td>
<td>1,231.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,557.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) White-collar staff (1a + 2a)</td>
<td>865.1</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>1,140.1</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>+31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Blue-collar staff (1b + 2b)</td>
<td>366.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>417.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>+13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) Civil Servants in the central government excluding the civil servants employed in the Subsidiary Services Class.
(2) Civil servants in the Subsidiary Services Class.
(3) Include contracted personnel, judicial officials, academic personnel and others.
(4) Include temporary personnel and workers.

**Hypothesis (5):** “Under a right-wing government, lower-level staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will decrease; and top-level staff numbers as a proportion of total civil service staff will increase”.

It is usually claimed that rapid increase in the total numbers of civil servants and problems in the promotion system have distorted the position pyramid in the Turkish Civil Service and have caused a slowdown in the functioning of the Civil Service, a rise in costs and a loss in esteem and material gains (Güran, 1980: 13, 37). The figures in Table (V.11) clearly support the hypothesis by indicating that top-level and middle-level staff increased in both absolute and relative terms at the expense of bottom-level staff in the period of 1984-1990. This pattern can be explained in a couple of ways: First, this pattern is a reflection of the generic trend in the direction of middle-heaviness in modern bureaucracies everywhere. Second, hiring freezes on entry-levels; automatic career-ladder promotions based on the length of service and level of education; high turnover in lower-grades; contracting-out of less complex and lower-graded work; and automation resulted in the shrinking of the bottom-
level. Significant numbers of staff in both top level and middle level grades are, in fact, not in administrative posts. The position and grading systems in the Turkish Civil Service regime have lost their direct connections with the hierarchical order of jobs and they have become means of paying more salary to an individual civil servant, in particular, in a period when the purchasing power of civil servants were being continuously eroded. Therefore, it has become necessary to fill the higher grades at the risk of distorting the position pyramid (Ömürğönülşen, 1987 and 1988). Third, the numbers of top-level positions were increased by the Law dated 1984 and numbered 3046. While the Law uniformed the structure of the central government (i.e ministries and affiliated departments), it also created some artificial and unnecessary top level and middle level positions for the sake of uniformity (Karaer, 1987). These well-endowed positions were usually filled by the MP Governments from in and out of the public sector in order to make the bureaucracy more loyal to the Government and thus to reduce the resistance to the MP governments’ policies.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change in (1984-1990) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Top-level (Grade 1)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>+303.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Middle-level (Grade 2, 3, 4)</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>198.5</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>+142.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Bottom-level (Grade 5-15)</td>
<td>917.7</td>
<td>90.64</td>
<td>1,037.6</td>
<td>80.57</td>
<td>+13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total</td>
<td>1,012.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,287.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Hypothesis (6):** "Governing party will not hit the regions from where they derive a substantial amount of their vote in terms of spending and staffing".

Public Personnel Surveys which are conducted by the State Personnel Department do not give us detailed and consistent statistical data on the basis of region, province and, in particular, city. Therefore, we are not able to test this hypothesis. However, we should
emphasise that although they are not strong, Dunsire and Hood have found some evidence that the party in power may well have tended to favour regions with a concentration of marginal seats in order to increase its electoral support in the U.K. (1989: 74-76). This point, without any doubt, requires more detailed research for both the British and Turkish cases.

The test of party-political explanations gives us quite mixed results. Two of the hypotheses were not supported by the figures (hypotheses 1 and 3). One of them is only partly supported (hypothesis 2). Only two of them (hypotheses 4 and 5) are supported. This result can be considered as an indicator that the state and bureaucracy traditions, the structure of the state organisation, and the political culture of society rather than party ideology have significant effects on the implementation of government policies (see Wildavsky, 1985). As a matter of fact, although the MP has a strong anti-government and anti-bureaucracy ideology, the persistence of resistance of the bureaucratic elite to anti-bureaucracy policies of the political elite, which was shaped under the influence of the strong state and bureaucratic ruling traditions, was probably very influential in having such a result. The effect of the populist policies of the MP governments pursued after 1987 due to fierce political competition cannot be denied either.

2) Trend Explanations

In this section, six hypotheses about social and demographic trends will be tested.

Hypothesis (7): “Welfare spending and staffing will increase or not decrease as a proportion of general government spending and general government (including civil service) staffing. In developed countries, spending and staffing in social security, health and personal social services will increase; but education spending and staffing will decrease or not increase as a proportion of total general government spending and staffing. In developing countries, health and education spending and staffing will increase significantly as a proportion of total general government spending and staffing”.

The spending side of the hypothesis is supported by the figures in Table (V.7). The share of welfare expenditure in total consolidated budget expenditure remained steady (+15.9
percent) in the first half of the period (1984-1987); but in the second half it increased remarkably to stand at 24.6 percent in 1990. Also, welfare components (health, education and social services), more or less, followed the same pattern. Table (V.7) shows that health and social services gained more than education service in relative terms. This result can be explained partly by the deprivation of health service since the late 1970s despite the fact that there was no significant decline in the need for health care; and partly by the increase in education service provided by the private sector in the 1980s. But it should be borne in mind that the relative size of the consolidated budget was diminished considerably in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, the real size of the welfare state in Turkey is relatively much smaller than her Western counterparts; and the welfare needs of the Turkish society were not satisfied enough by the MP governments in the second half of the 1980s.

Table (V.8) indicates that the figures about staffing in the welfare services should be interpreted more cautiously. Both the absolute (+ 61.90 percent) and relative (from 7.80 percent to 9.93 percent) sizes of staffing in health services increased. However, the relative size of education staff, which is the major component in the Turkish Civil Service, diminished (from 37.53 percent to 31.37 percent) and its absolute size increased only 6.29 percent - well behind the general average of the Civil Service (+27.18 percent). This result leads us to conclude that the Turkish case in terms of education service is more similar to the case of developed countries than to that of developing countries; or that we should not expect a rapid expansion in the education service in near future as has happened in the last couple of decades since the level of this service has already reached a certain satisfaction level throughout the country with the contribution of the private sector in recent years. On the other hand, this outcome might be a simple reflection of budget constraints or of the closing down of some primary schools in small and remote villages in the Eastern and South Eastern Turkey for security reasons to protect teachers against terrorist attacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These points, without any doubt, require more research.

In brief, in addition to its spending side, the staffing side of hypothesis (7) is partly supported by the figures.
Hypothesis (8): "The proportion of middle-aged group in civil service will increase in developed countries. In developing countries, young and middle-aged civil service staff will be the large part of total civil service staff".

Figure (IV.3) at first sight, gives mixed results. In this Figure, the results of 1988 Public Personnel Survey were used additionally in order to prevent any distortion due to the lack of information about some civil service departments in 1990 Public Personnel Survey.

Figure (IV.3) shows that the relative weight of the age band 18-23 increased gradually; but the relative weight of the age band 24-29 decreased noticeably in the period of 1984-1990. It is quite difficult to explain the difference between these two age bands by using the justifications of young-age structure or hiring freezes at entry levels. However, one point is quite clear that the numbers of civil servants in the middle-aged bands (30-47) increased significantly in the period. This pattern of change can partially be explained by cutback techniques used by the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime and the MP Governments: hiring freezes at entry levels and early retirement. This pattern is also in accordance with the recent changes in the age structure of the Turkish society. The more the Turkish population becomes middle-aged (see DIE, 1991), the more the Turkish Civil Service becomes a middle-aged bureaucracy. Therefore, the age structure of the Turkish society is getting closer to that of developed Western countries. In the light of this discussion, we can reach the conclusion that hypothesis (8) is generally supported by the figures.
Hypothesis (9): “The proportion of women civil servants in both total civil service staff and top-level of civil service will increase”.

The proportion of women civil servants in the total Civil Service remained unchanged in the period of 1984-1990 (Table (V.12)). We do not have figures about the numbers of women civil servants at the top-level of Civil Service. The figures in Table (V.12) do not fully support hypothesis (9) although there is almost no change in its relative size. We were expecting slightly higher figures for 1990 in the face of a social trend that indicates an increase in the participation of women in the labour market in the 1980s (DIE, 1991). This figure might be explained to some extent by emphasising the dominance of conservative ideology in the second half of the 1980s. However, it is most likely that this result was caused by the failure of some civil service departments to classify their staff figures by sex.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984(%)</th>
<th>1990(%)</th>
<th>Change in Share 1984-1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women civil servants in the Civil Service</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.1 (1)</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) This figure might be slightly different from the actual figures because some civil service departments did not hand in their staff figures. However, this slight difference cannot affect the general tendency.

Hypothesis (10): “The proportion of civil service staff at higher and lower-level ranks will decrease more than those of middle-level ranks, and therefore the relative size of middle-level ranks will increase. Thus, the civil service bureaucracy will become middle-heavy”.

As was mentioned when we explained the figures in Table (V.11) above, not only the number of civil servant at middle-level ranks (+142.1 percent) but also the number of civil servant at top-level ranks increased remarkably (+303.1 percent). At the expense of bottom-level ranks, the relative sizes of top and middle-level ranks increased significantly. The
increase in their relative size of the middle-level ranks can be explained by the generic trend in the direction of middle heaviness in modern bureaucracies everywhere (Martin, 1983: 51-54; Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 103-104). But this excessive increase, in our opinion, is a result of automatic career-ladder promotion system, better education opportunities and financial difficulties that push up artificial promotions. Briefly, hypothesis (10) is supported partially.

**Hypothesis (11):** “The proportion of blue-collar employees in civil service will decrease”.

Table (V.10) neatly shows that the relative size of blue-collar staff shrunk in both the Civil Service and the central government in accordance with the general trend in industrial countries. Therefore, our prediction is fully borne out. As is explained above (see hypothesis (4)), this result was caused mainly by the structural change in the industrial sector in favour of the service sector where white-collar staff employed at higher rates (DIE, 1991; DPT, 1993) and by the MP governments’ investment and employment policies favouring the service sector in the 1980s.

**Hypothesis (12):** “Spending and staffing in welfare services and law and order services will increase as a proportion of total government spending and staffing (based on Marxist analysis)”.

Table (V.7) and Table (V.8) show that spending in both law and order services and welfare services increased as a proportion of consolidated budget spending. Staff employed in both law and order services, security service and health service (but not in education service) increased as a proportion of central government staff including the Civil Service staff. This outcome is in accordance with the Marxist state contradiction theory.

The increase in law and order spending and staffing should be interpreted in the framework of the conservative ideology of the MP - on ideological ground; and of anti-terrorism policy of the MP governments - on practical grounds. Regarding welfare spending and staffing, the first MP Government neglected the welfare sector for the sake of the economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme between the yeas of
1984-1987. After 1987 and, in particular, in the last two years of the period (1989-1990), the second MP Government changed its policy as a result of the political pressures stemmed from social unrest and as a result of coming elections. Furthermore, it increased the ratios of spending and staffing relatively. Therefore, hypothesis (12) is generally approved by the figures.

Trend explanations give us mixed results although they have done much well than party-political explanations. Three hypotheses out of six (8, 11, 12) are supported by the figures; and two of them (7, 10) are also partially supported. Only one hypothesis (9) is refuted. Like its counterparts in many countries, the changes in the Turkish bureaucracy more or less followed the general social and demographic trends. These trends affected the staff cutback strategy of the MP governments through either bringing some constraints (e.g. higher demands for welfare services) or opportunities (e.g. structural changes in the industrial sector and employment types)

3) Bureaucratic Process Explanations

In this section, six hypotheses related to bureaucratic characteristics will be tested.

Hypothesis (13): “In the periods of staff cutbacks or restraint, programmes or departments providing pure public goods and services (e.g. defence, law and order) will suffer more than programmes or departments providing welfare services (e.g. health, education, social security, housing, personal social services)”.

The figures in Table (V.8) show that hypothesis (13) is only partially supported. Security service and general law and order services did not suffer in terms of staffing in the period of employment restraint. On the contrary, the rates of increase in the number of staff employed in these services were higher than the general average of rate of increase in the Civil Service staff and the rate of increase in the number of staff employed in education service. Only the rate of increase in the health service staff was higher than the rate of increase in the security service and the general law and order services staff.
Hypothesis (14): “In the periods of staff cutbacks or restraint, departments where wages and salaries form a high proportion of total budget will suffer less than other departments”.

The prediction is not borne out. Table (V.13) indicates that the reverse is true. The Civil Service staff in the departments where wages and salaries form a high proportion of total budget increased (+16.85 percent) less than the general average of the general budget departments (+18.66 percent). Half of the departments in Category (1) gained less than the general average. In contrast, every single department in Category (2) gained more than the general average. And the average increase in the Civil Service staff in this category (+93.06 percent) was well above the general average. This result leads us to conclude that most of the departments where wages and salaries (i.e. core budget) form a high proportion of the total budget cannot protect their staff in cutbacks periods. This is an interesting point in terms of the bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy developed by Dunleavy (1985, 1989a, 1989b and 1991).
### TABLE (V.13). CHANGE IN STAFF AMONG SELECTED TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENTS ACCORDING TO THEIR BUDGET COMPOSITION (1984-1990) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (2)</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Change 1984-1990(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1) Total staff in this category</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Constitutional Court</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>+107.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Court of Accounts</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>+24.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Council of State</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>+16.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Supreme Court</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>+11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) The Presidency of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>49,784</td>
<td>76,355</td>
<td>+53.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) The State Institute of Statistics</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>-11.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) The Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>458,440</td>
<td>491,548</td>
<td>+7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) The Ministry of Health</td>
<td>111,305</td>
<td>156,321</td>
<td>+40.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2) Total Staff in this Category</strong></td>
<td>53,603</td>
<td>103,488</td>
<td>+93.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Prime Ministry</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>+46.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Ministry of Finance and Customs</td>
<td>50,228</td>
<td>98,025</td>
<td>+95.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>+151.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Ministry of Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,374</td>
<td>+31.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) The Ministry of Energy and National Resources</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>+72.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3) Total Civil Service Staff in the General Budget Department</strong></td>
<td>923,521</td>
<td>1,095,829</td>
<td>+18.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: 
(1) Include only the civil servants employed in the general budget departments.
(2) Departments taken place in Category (1) allocated a substantial amount (more than 50 percent) of their budgets in 1984 to staffing costs. Departments in Category (2) allocated a very small proportion (less than 10 percent) of their budgets in 1984 to staffing costs. It should be pointed out that staffing costs include not only the civil servants' salaries but also other personnel's wages.
Hypothesis (15): “Departments suitable for contracting-out or hiving-off of work will be more vulnerable to staff cuts and restraints than other departments”.

The prediction is borne out. Whereas the Civil Service staff increased 27.2 percent in this period, two of the three departments in Table (V.14) could not achieve the same amount of staff gains; and another one shrunk in absolute terms (-3.7 percent). This result is also in accordance with the staffing patterns of blue-collar and lower-level staff explained in detail above.

| TABLE (V.14). CHANGE IN STAFF AMONG SELECTED TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENTS (1984-1990) (Thousands) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Departments (1) | 1984 | 1990 | Change 1984-1990(%) |
| 1) General Directorate of Title Deeds and Cadaster | 11,8 | 14,1 | +19.5 |
| 2) General Directorate of Meteorological Affairs | 3,2 | 3,3 | +3.1 |
| 3) General Directorate of Forestry | 32,7 | 31,5 | -3.7 |
| 4) Total Civil Service | 1,012,5 | 1,287,7 | +27.2 |


Notes: (1) Departments in which the Civil Service staff employed in fields, workshops, factories, etc. forms more than 1/4 of total Civil Service staff.

Hypothesis (16): “The central controlling departments in Turkey, mainly Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the State Personnel Department) will be the last to suffer; staff cuts and restraints will fall more heavily on the spending departments”.

When we interpret the figures in Table (V.15) in terms of the hypothesis of “axeman, save thyself”, it can be said that two of the three central controlling departments - the Office
of Prime Ministry and the Military of Finance and Customs - increased the size of their staff in the period of 1984-1990. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported in these cases. However, the rate of increase in the staff employed in the State Personnel Department (+10.9 percent) was left behind the general rate of increase in staff employed in the total Civil Service (+27.2 percent). Although the State Personnel Department could not increase staff as much as other central controlling departments did, it has become endowed with better personnel and better working conditions since 1984 just as others had previously. This point is in accordance with the Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Change 1984-1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The Office of Prime Ministry</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>+46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The State Personnel Department</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>+10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) The Ministry of Finance and Customs</td>
<td>50,228</td>
<td>98,025</td>
<td>+95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Civil Service</td>
<td>1,012,475</td>
<td>1,287,714</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Hypothesis (17):** “The larger departments through using their weight in the Cabinet will divert staff cutbacks and restraints onto the smaller departments”.

The prediction is simply not borne out. The figures in Table (V.16) neatly show that small departments, in contrast to the hypothesis, became better off in the period with a very high rate of increase in their staff numbers (+110.3 percent). Also, their relative size in the total Civil Service staff rose remarkably (from 7.59 percent to 12.54 percent). The relative size of the large departments decreased (from 92.41 percent to 87.46 percent) due to a lower
rate of increase in the number of staff (+20.4 percent) than the general average of the Civil Service (+27.2 percent).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments (1)</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change in 1984-90 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Large Departments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>458,4</td>
<td>45.27</td>
<td>491,5</td>
<td>38.17</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Ministry of Health</td>
<td>111,3</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>156,3</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>+40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The General Directorate of Security</td>
<td>78,5</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>115,2</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>+46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs</td>
<td>58,7</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>35,9</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>-38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) The Ministry of Finance and Customs</td>
<td>50,2</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>98,0</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>+95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) The Presidency of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>49,8</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>76,4</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>+53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) The Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>39,6</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>50,3</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>+27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) The General Directorate of Social Insurance</td>
<td>33,0</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>41,2</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>+24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) The General Directorate of Forestry</td>
<td>32,7</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>31,6</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) The General Directorate of Title Deeds and Cadaster</td>
<td>11,8</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>14,1</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>+19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l) The Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>15,7</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>+34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Small Departments</td>
<td>76,8</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>161,5</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>+110.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civil Service</td>
<td>1,012,5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,287,7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+27.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Civil Service departments are classified into "large departments" and "small departments" according to their staff numbers. Departments, which have staff more than 1 percent of the total Civil Service staff, are classified as large departments.

Hypothesis (18): "The concentrated departments (most staff at headquarters or in very few regions) will be less vulnerable to staff cuts or restraints than dispersed departments which have extensive local office networks".

Table (V.17) indicates that the hypothesis is supported. While the rate of increase in the staff employed in most concentrated departments (+30.8 percent) was higher than the general average for the general budget departments (+18.7 percent), the rate of increase in staff
employment in most dispersed departments (+16.0 percent) was slightly lower than the
general average. As can be seen, the most concentrated departments are smaller departments;
and the most dispersed departments are larger departments. This result is also in accordance
with the figures in Table (V.16): “cut the big battalions first”.

### Table (V.17). Change in Staff in the Turkish Civil Service Departments
According to Their Concentration/Dispersion Index (1984-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (1)</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Absolute Change in 1984-1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Most Concentrated Departments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Office of Prime Ministry</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>+46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Constitutional Court</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>+107.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Court of Accounts</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>+24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Council of State</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>+16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) The Supreme Court</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>+11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) The State Personnel Department</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>+10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) The State Planning Organisation</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>+15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Under-secretariat of Environment</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>+37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) General Dir. of Press and Information</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>+63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>+72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Most Dispersed Departments</td>
<td>780,284</td>
<td>905,052</td>
<td>+16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>11,738</td>
<td>15,651</td>
<td>+33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) The Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports</td>
<td>458,440</td>
<td>491,548</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) The Ministry of Health</td>
<td>111,305</td>
<td>156,321</td>
<td>+40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) The Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Rural Affairs</td>
<td>58,712</td>
<td>35,885</td>
<td>-38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) The Presidency of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>49,784</td>
<td>76,355</td>
<td>+53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) The General Directorate of Security</td>
<td>78,517</td>
<td>115,177</td>
<td>+46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) The General Directorate of Title Deeds and Cadaster</td>
<td>11,788</td>
<td>14,115</td>
<td>+19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civil Service Staff in the General Budget Departments</td>
<td>923,521</td>
<td>1,095,829</td>
<td>+18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: (1) Civil Service departments in the general budget sector are classified into “most concentrated departments” and “most dispersed departments” according to the majority of their staff numbers employed in the headquarters or local offices.
Bureaucratic process explanations also give mixed results. Three hypotheses out of six (15, 16, 18) are supported by the figures, one of them (13) is also partially supported. Only two hypotheses (14, 17) are refuted. As is noted above, however, some of the results are meaningful for the Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy. The results about the central-controlling and concentrated departments could also be interpreted as an indicator of the resistance of the traditional bureaucratic elite, which was still partially influential in the administration of such departments, to staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments.

4) Bureaucratic Self-Interest Explanations

Finally, eight hypotheses related to bureaucratic behaviour will be tested in this section.

**Hypothesis (19):** “When general government spending is rising as a proportion of GNP/GDP, general government employment (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment will rise with it. On the other hand, when general government spending is declining as a proportion of GNP/GDP, general government employment (including civil service) as a proportion of total employment will decline at a smaller rate than spending”.

Table (V.18) indicates that consolidated budget expenditure as a percent of GNP and general government employment and civil service employment as a percent of total civilian employment increased together in the period of 1984-1990. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported by the figures in general. But it should be pointed out that the rates of relative increase in both general government employment and the Civil Service employment were less than the rate of relative increase in consolidated budget expenditure. Furthermore, this happened in a period in which the share of general government expenditure both in total public expenditure and GNP declined to some extent due to increased off-budget activities. This pattern may partially be interpreted as a relative improvement in the financial position of the civil servants at the end of the period in comparison to the beginning of the period.
TABLE (V.18). CHANGE IN CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT (1984-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Change in Share 1984-1990(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Budget Expenditure (as a percent of GNP)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>+13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government Employment (as a percent of total civilian employment)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service (as a percent of total civilian employment)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>+7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Hypothesis (20): “When general government spending is rising, spending on wages, salaries and associated costs for public servants (including civil servants) will rise at a greater rate than total spending. On the other hand, when general government spending is declining, spending on wages, salaries and associated costs for public servants (including civil servants) will decline at a smaller rate than total spending”.

The figures in Table (V.19) prove our interpretation about the relationship between the spending and staffing in the Turkish Civil Service. The prediction that while general government spending is rising, spending on wages, salaries and associated costs for public servants (including civil servants) will rise at a greater rate than total spending is borne out. The expenditure on wages and salaries remained steady in relative terms between the years of 1984-1987 but after then increased quickly. It increased at a greater rate than the increases in the total consolidated budget expenditure and the current expenditure. This result seems to indicate that the financial position of civil servants recovered to some extent in the late 1980s if it is compared with the figures for the early 1980s. It should be noted, however, that this result might also be the consequence of the tendency that the consolidated budget became a budget for debt interest payments and personnel expenditure towards the end of the period.
TABLE (V.19). CHANGE IN CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURE AND EXPENDITURE ON WAGES AND SALARIES (1984-1990) (Billion TL, Current Prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Total Consolidated Budget Expenditure</td>
<td>3,784</td>
<td>12,696</td>
<td>67,193</td>
<td>+1675.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Current Expenditure</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>4,537</td>
<td>33,380</td>
<td>+2140.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Expenditure on Wages and Salaries</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>26,465</td>
<td>+2853.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 3/1(%)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>-66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 3/2(%)</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>+31.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Hypothesis (21): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of top civil servants will not decrease, or will decrease less than those of middle- and lower-ranks; in a period of staff restraint, the top-ranks of civil service will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than middle- and lower-ranks”.

The hypothesis is supported in one sense by the figures in Table (V.11) as there was no actual cutbacks but rather an employment restraint in the Turkish Civil Service. The administrative reorganisation and employment policy of the MP Governments (i.e. creating an alternative bureaucracy in addition to the traditional one) distorted the position pyramid and resulted in very high staff increases at the top-level of Civil Service in both absolute and relative terms at the expense of middle and, in particular, lower-level Civil Service.

Hypothesis (22): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of staff in administration groups will not decrease, or will decrease less than those in other specialist and occupational groups; in a period of staff restraint, the administration groups will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than other specialist and occupational groups”.

The hypothesis of "axeman, save thyself" is also supported by the figures in Table (V.20). The number of generalists increased in both absolute (+49.9 percent) and relative (from 34.6 percent to 42.0 percent) terms at the expense of specialists. This was obviously a serious blow to Özal favouring technocrats instead of generalist bureaucrats in the bureaucracy.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change 1984-90 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Generalists (1)</td>
<td>212.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>318.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>+49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Specialists (2)</td>
<td>405.9</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>439.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>+8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civil Service (3)</td>
<td>618.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>758.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>+22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (1) Include civil servants employed in the General Administrative Services Class.
(2) Include civil servants employed in the Classes of Technical Services, the Health Services, the Education Services, the Security Services, the Religious Services, the Provincial Administration Services and the Legal Advocacy Services.
(3) Exclude civil servants employed in the Subsidiary Services Class as they are not considered as either generalist or specialist.

**Hypothesis (23):** "In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of white-collar staff (civil servants in the Turkish civil service) will not decrease, or will decrease less than blue-collar staff (temporary personnel and workers in the Turkish civil service); in a period of staff restraint, the white-collar staff will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than the blue-collar staff".

Table (V.10) shows that the relative size of white-collar staff increased at the expense of the blue-collar staff in both the Civil Service and the central government in accordance with the hypothesis of "axeman (white-collar staff), save thyself". The blue-collar staff became the first victims of the staff cutback or, at least, employment restraint strategy in Turkey in the period of 1984-1990.
Hypothesis (24): “In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of civil servants in the centre (headquarters) will not decrease, or will decrease less than those employed in provincial or regional offices; in a period of staff restraint, the staff in the centre will have more opportunity to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than those employed in provincial or regional offices”.

Table (V.21) shows that the numbers of civil servants in the centre (headquarters) increased (+14.10 percent) less than those of civil servants employed in provincial/regional offices and overseas offices (+28.74 percent). Therefore, the relative size of the Civil Service staff in the centre was diminished slightly. This result does not prove hypothesis (24).

**TABLE (V.21). TURKISH CIVIL SERVICE STAFF BY REGIONS (1984-1990)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change in 1984-90 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The Centre (Headquarters)</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>123.0</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>+14.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Provincial/ Regional Offices and Overseas</td>
<td>904.7</td>
<td>89.35</td>
<td>1,164.7</td>
<td>91.45</td>
<td>+28.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Total Civil Service</td>
<td>1,012.5</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,287.7</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>+27.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This situation can mainly be explained by the legal restriction, made by the Decree having the force of law dated 1984 and numbered 190, which inhibits the transfer of positions from the provincial/regional offices to the centre (headquarters) but allows movements in the opposite direction. Also, the need for public services (such as health, education, security and religious services and technical expertise) is quite high in the provinces and regions as these services are provided by the central governments' provincial/regional offices in Turkey. The newly formed provinces and districts in 1989
and 1990 (see Ömürğönülßen, 1989b) also increased the need for civil servants to be employed in these areas.

**Hypothesis (25):** "In the periods of staff cutbacks and restraint, the proportion of female civil servants both in total civil service staff and top-level civil service staff will decrease".

Table (V.12) indicates that the relative size of female civil servants remained the same. Although the prediction that the proportion of female civil servants in the total Civil Service will decrease is not completely borne out, the figures are quite disappointing. The figures in Table (V.12) could be interpreted cautiously as a result of the conservative policy of the MP Governments and the dominance of male civil servants in the recruitment process. The prediction that the proportion of female civil servants in the top-level civil service staff will decrease could not be tested due to lack of related data.

**Hypothesis (26):** "In a period of staff cutbacks, the numbers of temporary and part-time staff will decrease more than those of permanent and full-time staff in both absolute and relative terms; in a period of staff restraint, the temporary and part-time staff will have less ability to save and/or increase its size in both absolute and relative terms than the permanent and full-time staff.

This prediction is not borne out. Table (V.22) shows that the numbers of contracted personnel (mainly part-timers) and temporary personnel increased in both absolute and relative terms more than those of permanent personnel. This pattern can be explained in a way that it might seem a reasonable idea to appoint temporary or part-time staff, who can keep the bureaucratic fabric in place for future restoration, if cuts are an ephemeral aberration in secular growth, but who can be let go more easily if further cutbacks are required. We might expect, therefore, that if the cutbacks (e.g. contracting-out, hiving-off) continues, the numbers of temporary staff and part-time staff will decline in both absolute and relative terms (see Dunsire and Hood, 1989: 38-39).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>1984 Share (%)</th>
<th>1990 Share (%)</th>
<th>Absolute Change in 1984-90 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Contracted Personnel (Part-time)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>+383.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Temporary Personnel</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>+234.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Permanent Personnel (Civil Servants/Workers)</td>
<td>1,215.4</td>
<td>98.67</td>
<td>+23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total Central Government Staff</td>
<td>1,231.8</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>+26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Bureaucratic self-interest hypotheses, in fact, do well in explaining most of the cutback patterns. Five out of eight hypotheses (19, 20, 21, 22, and 23) are supported; one of them (25) is partially supported by the figures. Two of them (24 and 26) are refuted by the actual figures. The results of the tests for hypotheses (21, 22, and 23) seem to support the general idea of the bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy. The bureaucratic elite in the Turkish Civil Service (i.e. white-collar, middle-aged, top-level and generalist staff in central controlling departments) was very successful in diverting staff cutbacks and restraints onto the ordinary civil servants in big battalions. Furthermore, extra perks and perquisites were provided by the MP governments to this group as well as to the

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174 The bureaucratic elite has always been granted some perks and perquisites (free of charge or heavily subsidised lodgings, cars, service shuttles, lunches, secretaries, bodyguards, nursery schools, holiday resorts, etc.) in the Turkish Civil Service in spite of the anti-bureaucracy rhetoric of many governments. The amount and quality of such facilities, in fact, increased during the MP Governments. In addition to the “princes” in the alternative bureaucracy, the traditional bureaucratic elite got benefit from such facilities.
alternative bureaucracy in order to overcome the bureaucratic resistance to staff cutbacks and restraints. While the bureaucratic elite was resisting to the de-bureaucratisation and staff cutback strategies of the MP Governments with the effect of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, it sought to have its share from such benefits. Thus, the bureaucratic elite tried to save itself from the negative effects of the relative decline in the financial situation of civil servants. Towards the end of decade, the second MP Government, however, shifted to a populist salary policy. This situation was partly explained with the effect that the second MP Government began to suffer from the fatigue of being power in the face of fierce political opposition and increased bureaucratic resistance towards the end of the decade.

4) Concluding Remarks

According to the results of our analysis, it can be said that the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments was not successful enough as a part of the policy of the withdrawal of government. The MP Governments could not cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment but only restrained its growth. However, the overall effects of the MP governments on the growth of the Turkish Civil Service was much restrictive than the previous governments except the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime.

In fact, the record of the MP Governments should be examined in two periods: 1984-1986 and 1986-1990. If the period of 1984-1986 is taken into consideration alone, the first MP Government can be considered as the most successful government in terms of staff cutbacks in the modern history of the Turkish Civil Service. Therefore, this short-period can be called as a period of “cutback”. However, the political will of the Government on this issue was melted away after 1986 in the face of increased political competition and bureaucratic resistance. In the first half of the 1986-1990 period (i.e. 1986-1988), the numbers of civil servants increased sharply, but this increase was put under pressure in the second half of the period (i.e. 1988-1990). Therefore, it is not possible to name the whole period (1984-1990) as a period of cutbacks but it would not be a mistake to call as the restraint years since the rate of increase in the Turkish Civil Service staff was lowered remarkably (+4.52 percent annually on an average). Since the MP Governments could not
manage to change constitutional and legal rules in order to reduce the effect of civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure), their attempts were limited with the modest contributions of natural attrition, hiring freezes and personnel ceilings. It should also be noted that the periodic development of staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments was in good accordance with the general tendency of macro economic indicators under the MP Governments.

During this period, the structure and composition of the Civil Service, however, changed significantly as a consequence of the staff cutback strategy. The relative weight of staff employed in law and order and welfare services; white-collar staff; top-level and middle-level staff; middle-aged group staff; generalists; temporary and part-time staff increased in the Civil Service. Departments where wages and salaries form a higher proportion of total budget; departments which are suitable for contracting-out or hiving-off; larger departments; ordinary departments rather than central controlling departments; and departments which have extensive local office networks were much more affected by the cutback strategy.

The social-economic trend explanations, the bureaucratic process and bureaucratic self-interest explanations have done quite well in comparison to the conventional-popular party-political explanations in respect of explaining the cutback process. In the face of socio-economic realities of the country (e.g. young population and high unemployment rate), and increased political competition and bureaucratic resistance towards the end of the 1980s, party-political explanations failed to explain this process. The bureaucratic elite in the Civil Service (i.e. white-collar, middle-aged, top-level and generalist staff in central controlling departments) rated quite well despite the staff cutback strategy. This result seems to support bureaucratic self-interest explanations, and especially Dunleavy's bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy. When the public policy-making process was partially sealed off by the MP governments to the intervention of the traditional bureaucratic elite, the MP governments may condone the empire-building activities of bureaucratic elite (i.e. extra perks and perquisites) in return for compensation. Furthermore, it promotes such activities in order to gain and then keep the loyalty of bureaucratic elite. With the increased fragmentation in the Civil Service in terms of legal status, socio-cultural origins and economic rights, the bureaucratic elite lost its character to be a an advocate of the whole Civil Service.
Although the bureaucratic elite, in principle, resisted to staff cutback strategy of anti-bureaucracy MP Governments, it was very successful in diverting staff cutbacks and restraints onto the ordinary civil servants in big battalions.
CONCLUSION

The 1980s were the heyday of the policy of the withdrawal of the government pursued by the conservative governments in many industrialised OECD countries. Staff cutback was also used enthusiastically by the conservative governments as one of the strategies of this policy in accordance with New Right ideology.

Staff cuts were actually preceded by IMF-oriented cutback attempts. For example, the British Labour Government's (1975-1979) expenditure and staff cutback strategies were pragmatic and IMF-driven strategies in contrast to the ideology-driven strategies of the Thatcher Governments (1979-1990). In the face of the crisis of Turkish economy and the heavy-politicisation of Turkish bureaucracy, a pragmatic strategy of elimination and staff cutbacks was also adopted and carried out by the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime (1980-1983) in Turkey. Both of these attempts eased the political resistance to following ideology-driven cutback attempts within the framework of the withdrawal of government and they achieved their modest cutback targets.

Elimination and purges in the Turkish civil bureaucracy had generally been made either directly by the military as a part of the state elite or the civilian part of the state elite with the help of the military under the extraordinary political conditions. Under the conditions of competitive democratic politics, the effects of the elimination and cutback programmes of governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties were rather limited. On the one hand, étatist or government-led mixed-economy policies pursued by governments and the prominent place of the civil bureaucracy in the state elite protected the civil bureaucracy against serious attempts of elimination, purges and cutbacks. Also, the post-1960 constitutional and legal arrangements about the security of tenure provided the civil servants with enough legal protection against such attempts. On the other hand, the
governments formed by anti-bureaucracy parties did not seriously attempt to launch
cutback programmes since they gradually invaded the civil bureaucracy with their
sympathisers and followed populist rather than efficiency-oriented employment policies in
the 1960s and 1970s. This pattern had continued until the economic stabilisation and
structural adjustment programme put forward in 1980 in the face of serious economic
crisis of the late 1970s. In the 1980s, with the serious decline both in the reputation of
étatist and government-led mixed economy policies and their political and socio-economic
prestige, the civil bureaucracy in general and the Civil Service in particular became more
vulnerable to ideologically-oriented and large-scale staff cuts. If we put the pragmatic and
de-politicising elimination and staff cutback strategy of the Technocratic Government of
the Military Regime aside, the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal was the
most important civilian governments attempted to cut the size of the Civil Service.

The MP Governments under the premiership of Özal aimed to have a small size and
rational-productive bureaucracy but not an overstuffed and inefficient bureaucracy with the
effect of New Right ideology. Partly with the personal choice of Özal and partly as a
result of the world-wide tendency, the traditional influence of continental European state
and bureaucracy understanding on the Turkish bureaucracy gradually decreased and the
bureaucracy was heavily affected by the Anglo-American state and bureaucracy
understanding. Just like their predecessors, the DP and JP Governments, the MP
governments did not refrain either from rendering the bureaucracy into a loyal and party-
book bureaucracy in a party-centred polity instead of a Bonapartist/Rechtsstaat
bureaucracy of strong state bureaucratic ruling traditions. However, the efforts of the MP
Governments to render the partially legal and partially patrimonial bureaucracy into a
rational-productive one did not produce the expected results due to personal and arbitrary
practices of Özal and his small inner circle and the Turkish bureaucracy has basically
remained "patrimonial-legalist". Moreover, since there was not any serious examination on
their cultural relativeness, many of the administrative values, techniques and practices
transferred from the Anglo-American context to the Turkish bureaucracy were failed in the
face of resistance of the bureaucracy. The establishment of a loyal and party-book
bureaucracy attempt was not successful enough either. The traditional bureaucracy could
not be eliminated and the dual structure (i.e. the alternative bureaucracy vs. the traditional
bureaucracy) took root in the Turkish bureaucracy. The politicisation of the bureaucracy came to agenda again in a polity inclined to be party-centred. The attempt of the MP governments to have a small-size bureaucracy was also failed since their cutback strategy did not produce all intended results. Despite all these disappointing results in the short-run, it should be admitted that the traditional state and bureaucratic mentality has been questioned and the Turkish bureaucracy has become, at least partially, more open to outside world since the mid-1980s with the direct and indirect effects of such attempts. This was the most significant legacy of the MP Governments under the premiership of Özal.

In this thesis, we have attempted to analyse the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments in the period of 1984-1990.

We have tried to test three major hypotheses determined in the Introduction section by using public expenditure and public employment figures of the period concerned. Twenty-six hypotheses, developed in Chapter Two for four different kinds of explanations for the pattern of change in the size, structure and composition of a civil service, have helped to do this test, especially for hypotheses (I) and (III).

According to the findings of this study, first, although the MP Governments (1984-1990) shared similar ideological aims and followed, more or less, similar socio-economic policies adopted by the conservative governments in many industrialised OECD countries, their staff cutback strategy was not successful enough as a part of the policy of the withdrawal of government. The MP Governments could not cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment. The civilian public sector employment in general and the Civil Service employment in particular increased in both absolute and relative terms in this period. However, the overall effects of the MP governments on the growth of the Turkish Civil Service was much restrictive than the previous governments except the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime.

If the record of the MP Governments is examined in two periods, 1984-1986 and 1986-1990, the first MP Government for the 1984-1986 period can be considered as the
most successful government in terms of staff cutbacks in the modern history of the Turkish Civil Service. Therefore, this short-period can be called as a period of "cutback". However, the political will of the Government on this issue was melted away after 1986 in the face of increased political competition and bureaucratic resistance. In the first half of the 1986-1990 period (i.e. 1986-1988), the numbers of civil servants increased sharply, but this increase was put under pressure in the second half of the period (i.e. 1988-1990). Therefore, it is not possible to name the whole period (1984-1990) as a period of cutbacks but it would not be a mistake to call as the "restraint years" since the rate of increase in the Turkish Civil Service staff was lowered remarkably. It should also be noted that the periodic development of the staff cutback strategy was also in good accordance with the general tendency of macro economic indicators under the MP Governments. The 1984-1986 period was more successful than the 1986-1990 period in terms of both staff cutbacks and macro-economic indicators. In brief, hypothesis (I) is partially supported by the figures used in our empirical analysis.

Second, in spite of the relative weakness of the civil bureaucracy in the 1980s in comparison to previous decades as a consequence of the increased fragmentation within the civil bureaucracy in terms of its legal status, socio-cultural origins and economic rights, the resistance of the traditional bureaucratic elite was the one of the most significant obstacles to the success of the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments. The civil bureaucracy had no link with a certain political party unlike the civil bureaucracy-the RPP link before the 1970s. There was not any pressure of labour union under the restrictive constitutional and legal rules on the rights of civil servants to establish labour union and participate in administration. Public opinion also kept itself distant from political protest movements as a consequence of authoritarian legal measures enacted and de-politicisation policy pursued by the Military Regime. In the face of the lack of support from political parties, labour unions, and public opinion, the only serious opposition and resistance against the staff cutback strategy came from the bureaucratic elite. However, because of the fragmentation in the civil bureaucracy, the bureaucratic elite was no longer an advocate of all civil servants in the Civil Service. Thus, middle and lower echelons of the Civil Service could not get enough support against cutbacks and reorganisations from the higher echelons. As a matter of fact, not only the newly created alternative bureaucracy but also
the traditional bureaucratic elite tried and succeed to divert staff cuts onto the rest of the Civil Service with some bureau-shaping manoeuvres.

The civil service guarantees (i.e. the security of tenure) provided for civil servants by the 1982 Constitution and the CSL dated 1965 and numbered 657 was other main obstacle in achieving large-scale cuts in the Civil Service. Since the MP Governments could not manage to change constitutional and legal rules in order to reduce the effect of civil service guarantees, their attempts were limited with the modest contributions of natural attrition, hiring freezes and personnel ceilings. Performance appraisal process was not operated properly either since it was traditionally considered as a quarrel with one’s bread and butter. Thus, hypothesis II is basically supported by the results of our historical and empirical analyses made in Chapter Three, Four and Five.

It should be pointed out that not only the resistance of the bureaucratic elite and the existence of civil service guarantees but also some other factors were influential on the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments. The pressure of persistent unemployment problem on the MP Governments, the persistence of political patronage in the recruitment system of the Civil Service, and the technical inadequacies in the personnel administration system of the Civil Service (e.g. manpower planning), which are usually considered as the main causes of the growth of public sector employment in Turkey, can also be counted as other important reasons for the limited effect of the staff cutback strategy of the MP Governments.

In order to avoid any possible reactions from the opposition parties and the civil servants, the first MP government did not set a specific target for staff cuts before starting the programme. However, such targets were clearly determined in the successful cases of staff cutbacks (e.g. the British case). While the MP governments’ low-profile strategy was minimising reactions in the beginning, it became a main obstacle in the long-run in convincing the civil servants and public opinion for the necessity of cuts since it did not clearly show the commitment of political power in this matter.

The Office of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Personnel Department were main agents in designing and implementing the staff cutback strategy.
However, a top-down approach was adopted and initiatives at departmental level were not encouraged. Cultural and motivational aspects of the strategy were ignored to a large extent as well. Since the meso and micro-level analyses of the staff cutback strategy are out of scope of this thesis, we are not able to make any judgement about the certain effects of motivational factors at individual and departmental levels on the level of success of the staff cutback strategy. However, it seems that these factors were also influential on the limited success of the staff cutback strategy.

Third, the social-economic trend explanations, the bureaucratic process and bureaucratic self-interest explanations have done quite well in comparison to the conventional-popular party-political explanations in respect of explaining the cutback process. They have more successfully displayed various socio-economic and bureaucratic constraints (e.g. higher demands for welfare services and inertia commitments of governments arising from pre-existing statutory entitlements to receive welfare benefits) on and opportunities (e.g. structural changes in the industrial sector and variations in the status of employment) for the staff cutback strategy. In the face of socio-economic realities of the country (e.g. young population and high unemployment rate) and increased political competition towards the end of the 1980s, the first MP Governments lost its enthusiasm in the staff cutback strategy after 1986 and adopted populist employment policies. This tendency accelerated during the second MP Government. Thus, party-political explanations failed to explain this process.

Although the MP Governments could not cutback the size of the Turkish Civil Service in terms of employment and only restrained the growth of the Civil Service staff, they changed the structure and composition of the Civil Service significantly as a consequence of the staff cutback strategy. The relative weight of staff employed in law and order and welfare services; white-collar staff; top-level and middle-level staff; middle-aged group staff; generalists; temporary and part-time staff increased in the Civil Service. Departments where wages and salaries form a higher proportion of total budget; departments which are suitable for contracting-out or hiving-off; larger departments; ordinary departments rather than central controlling departments; and departments which have extensive local office networks were much more affected by the cutback strategy. Thus, a “selective cut
strategy" was preferred by the MP Governments instead of an "across-the-board cut strategy".

The bureaucratic elite in the Civil Service (i.e. white-collar, middle-aged, top-level and generalist staff in central controlling departments) rated quite well despite the staff cutback strategy. This result seems to support bureaucratic self-interest explanations, and especially Dunleavy's bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy. When the public policy-making process was partially sealed off by the MP governments to the intervention of the traditional bureaucratic elite, the MP governments may condone the empire-building activities of bureaucratic elite (i.e. extra perks and perquisites) in return for compensation. Furthermore, it promotes such activities in order to gain and then keep the loyalty of bureaucratic elite. With the increased fragmentation in the Civil Service, the bureaucratic elite lost its character to be an advocate of the whole Civil Service. Although the bureaucratic elite, in principle, resisted to staff cutback strategy of anti-bureaucracy MP Governments, it was very successful in diverting staff cutbacks and restraints onto the ordinary civil servants in big battalions. The bureaucratic elite also tried to save itself from the negative effects of the relative decline in the financial situation of civil servants through extra perks and perquisites. The ordinary civil servants at the lower level of the Civil Service who deprived of any socio-political protection shield, apart from the legal guarantees, against political power became very vulnerable to the staff cutbacks. Thus, hypothesis (III) is also supported by the figures used in our empirical analysis.

Although the staff cutback strategy is not assessed quantitatively in terms of its efficiency results in this thesis, it is known that this strategy has an ability to affect the size, structure and composition of a civil service as a tool for establishing a limited and efficiency-oriented civil service. It can be argued that the assumed efficiency gain could not be achieved in terms of allocative efficiency due to the failure in cutting back the size of the Civil service staff. However, the assumed efficiency gain is questionable in terms X-efficiency. The model we used in this thesis does not provide us with enough information, except some clues, about the change in the structure and composition of the Turkish Civil Service in terms X-efficiency. The lack of regular and detailed staff and budget data for individual civil service departments prevent us to do sophisticated statistical analyses about the results of
the MP Governments' attempts to make the legal-patrimonial bureaucracy more rational-productive.

What is the future of cutback policy? By considering political developments, demographic trends, and technical improvements concerning public services, various scenarios about the future of cutbacks can be developed. As Dunsire and Hood indicate there might be three scenarios: First, civil service cutbacks will appear as a temporary hiccup in the long-term development of government growth in staffing and spending as a result of the erosion in the political commitment and energy in the long-run. Second, cutbacks will bottom out relatively soon into a new lower plateau due to both practical limits of automation and contracting-out of government operations and bureau-shaping strategies to be followed. Third, it presages a continuing process of cuts in the civil service well into the twenty-first century due to a profound shift in popular expectations of the role of government, further managerialism of civil service culture, and the flowering of the information technology and automation (1989: 208-217).

We are expecting a gradual increase in the numbers of civil servants in the short-term in Turkey due to increasing welfare needs of the public (e.g. education and health); internal security and social and economic development needs of the South Eastern region of Turkey. As a matter of fact, a large number of positions were created in order to win general and local elections and to crackdown on the separatist and sectarian terrorist activities in the 1990s (see DPD, 2000). Moreover, the issue of overstaffing in the Turkish Civil Service should be examined very carefully. Although the ratios of Turkish Civil Service employment sharply increased in the 1970s and more or less stabilised in the 1980s, they have not reached the average ratios of developed countries if the scope of Civil Service in Turkey is taken into consideration. One of the serious problems of the Civil Service is that it is unbalanced in respect to the distribution of staff to different geographical regions, public services and programmes, and public organisations and their sub-units. The Civil Service staff in general administrative and subsidiary services at the headquarters of the civil service departments is relatively fat in comparison to those in technical and welfare services at provincial/regional offices. While demands for welfare services (e.g. education and health) and local public works services are very high, the
levels of supply of these services are quite low and varied due to inadequate budget appropriations and staff numbers. This unbalanced staff structure of the Turkish Civil Service has always been very influential on overstaffing arguments.

However, staff cutback is likely to return to the agenda of governments in the face of economic difficulties. As a matter of fact, the prolonged economic crises (1998-1999 and 2001-2002) has already forced the present Turkish Coalition Government under the premiership of Ecevit to reconsider the size of the Civil Service by considering the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank. Turkey’s resolution to become a full member of the European Union has also obliged the Government to upgrade the efficiency of the Civil Service in terms of its size, structure and composition, and operation. In the medium and long-terms, the Turkish Civil Service is likely to face cutbacks as happened in 1980-1982 and 1984-1986. These cutbacks, at least, will be achieved in general administrative and subsidiary services that are the focus of debates about bloated government and that are more suitable for contracting-out and hiving-off as a consequence of the progress in the automation and information technologies. It should be, however, emphasised that if the security of tenure regime for civil servants is not modified in accordance with modern performance appraisal systems, coming governments will be content with modest staff cuts based on hiring freeze and early retirement and cosmetic staff cuts based on contracting-out and hiving-off.

Many Western governments as well as the Technocratic Government of the Military Regime and the MP Governments made almost all-possible mistakes in staff cutbacks. Thus, Turkish governments in near future will have a considerable advantage to derive lessons from the experience of former governments. Staff cuts should trim fat but not cripple the Civil Service. Otherwise, public services cannot be provided in the intended manner and quality.

The study of bureaucratic responses to staff cutback strategies is still in its infancy. Carefully designed national-level studies and cross-national comparisons are quite new. A great deal of work along these lines is needed if we are to distinguish factors which are generic to bureaucratic processes and behaviour from those which are specific to political, legal-institutional, and demographic structures of a particular country.
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