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by

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“Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.”

Baruch Spinoza
Abstract

The mass media, among other institutions, plays a critical role in the reproduction of socio-political and ideological discourses, which include a variety of representations. These promote social solidarity by reinforcing national identity, common beliefs and language, and forming collective memories. Since media representations are closely linked to the policies of elite institutions and to public opinion, they are especially important during transitions from war culture to peace culture.

A century of violence between Jews and Arabs has reinforced traditional Jewish myths and stereotypes, and enhanced the Israeli quest for security and desire for peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict shapes the socio-political and ideological discourses, reflected by the Israeli mass media.

This thesis analyzes representations of topics and actors relating to security, peace and politics by exploring news text in context, hence, the printed news discourses between 1993-1994. It focuses on the Israeli printed media before and after the signing of Oslo accords between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993. This dramatic event marks a significant shift in Jewish history, and is defined in this study as a “transitory” breakpoint, accompanied by a national breakpoint.

Global changes in the 1990s marked the beginning of a new chapter in Middle East politics, and in Israeli-Palestinian relations, in particular. It led to the Oslo peace process, culminating in the historic signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993. This not only entailed the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the PLO; it also changed perceptions of the Palestinian leadership among Israelis, as reflected by the news media discourses.

The study compared the news discourse of the first two pages in two daily newspapers (a quality versus a popular publication) during two consecutive time periods, pre- and post-Oslo. As the dominant political and ideological discourses of war and militarism gave way to jubilation and expectations of peace, the former enemy was portrayed as an equal partner for peace. The emergence of a new domestic enemy, and the controversy created by dissonance between the security discourse and the peace discourse, had a profound impact on Israeli politics and national identity. The pattern of changes resembled a see-saw model, which is validated by the research findings.

The research methods used in this study combine quantitative and qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. The thesis includes selected quotations from news text and personal interviews with leading political figures, which trace the dramatic changes that occurred in the news discourses.

The conclusions of this study stress that news ‘reality’, rather than reality itself, reproduces attitudes of political elites at a given time. The interpretation of these representations, if properly understood, might ultimately contribute to future peace building.
Acknowledgments

Many people supported and encouraged me during this study, some, I am pretty sure, without even realizing it. The following is only a partial list of those to whom I am heartily grateful.

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To the Sala Charitable Trust and the Sophia Trust, I am extremely grateful for scholarships, and thank them for believing in the importance of research on issues relating to security and peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

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I would like to thank Alina Bernstein for introducing me to Leicester University, and to Olga. Alina accompanied me with her belief, advice and endless listening to my uncertainties. Her special contribution to the process was precious advice: “Relate to your thesis as if you were analyzing a historical war of the 16th century”.

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Words cannot express the gratitude that I feel to my beloved sons, Ronen and Gil, and their families for their unconditional love, trust and tolerance towards me throughout this process. Their belief fuelled me with the necessary energy and discipline.

Last, but not least, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of Jacob, my husband and the father of my two sons, a victim of the war on security and peace. It is in his spirit that this thesis was written. His true love and care for his family, fellow human beings and humanity inspired me.
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## Abbreviations

- List of abbreviations

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Aliyah - Immigration to Israel (lit. ascending), with a spiritual connotation [Hebrew]

Ashkenazi - A Jew whose ethnic origin is generally in western or central Europe. pl. Ashkenazim [Hebrew]

Hartzufim - Satirical puppet show focusing on Israeli current affairs, broadcast weekly on Israeli television.

Intifada - Popular uprising (lit. upheaval) of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during 1987-1991. [Arabic]

Jihad - Islamic concept of holy war. [Arabic]

Keffiyeh - Traditional Arab headscarf. [Arabic]

Knesset - Elected parliament (lit. assembly) of the State of Israel. [Hebrew]

Sephardi - A Jew whose ethnic origin is generally in the Middle East, North Africa or the Iberian Peninsula. (pl. Sephardim) [Hebrew]

Salaam - Salutation (lit. peace) commonly used on meeting and parting. [Arabic]

Shalom - Salutation (lit. peace) commonly used on meeting and parting. [Hebrew]

Yishuv - The Jewish community (lit. settlement) in Palestine before 1948. [Hebrew]
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<td>CE</td>
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<td>DOP</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defence Forces</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Member of Knesset</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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Part I
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Overview

In the last decade of the twentieth century, walls of hostility, great nations and ideologies collapsed, changing geography and history worldwide. However, security and peace remain unresolved issues in a world that continues to confront ethnic, religious, political and cultural conflicts.

The Jewish-Arab conflict in the Middle East, in which the Israel-Palestinian conflict plays a major role, is one of the longest lasting confrontations and is represented locally and globally by the mass media. “In dealing with conflict and the prospects for peace in the Middle East, there is no way to escape the realization of how intimately intertwined are the history, the aspirations, and the fate of two long-suffering peoples, the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs” (Carter 1986:112).

This study concerns the representation of security and peace during a period of political change as represented in the Israeli news media. It examines the changes that occurred within the news discourse as Israeli society evolved from a war culture via the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords towards a vision of peace. The primary aim is to develop an understanding of how news stories represented changes in relevant topics and actors within the context of historical and socio-political changes. It also analyzes relations between the frames of security, peace and politics, and the topics and actors presented in the news, and considers how they were determined by ideology. Consequently, it shows changes in the political and ideological news discourses.
This study deals with news texts and its contexts, which constitute the actual field of discourse analytical descriptions and theoretical formation (Van Dijk, 1988). The analysis focuses on the construction of ‘reality’ regarding security, peace and politics as presented and represented in news articles. The question of whether the news media presents reality, or rather sets or builds that reality remains open to debate.

Israel should be viewed in the context of political, economic and social developments of the twentieth century, in particular the process of decolonization. Contemporary political concepts are shaped by the two world wars, still rightly called ‘great wars’ because no others have left the same footprint on history (Hurd, 1997:8). During the last decade of the twentieth century, many regions underwent transitions to new political, ideological and economical patterns. Examples include the demise of apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of the Berlin wall, the dissolution of the USSR and the upheavals in Eastern European states, and transformations, such as, those in Northern Ireland, more akin to those in Israel and the Middle East. It is in this context that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the path to peace discourses should be analyzed.

This research adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the study of news in the printed press by news discourse analysis. It combines mass communication research with social, political, cultural and historical perspectives. It is concerned with changing conceptions of Israeli politics as a discursive pattern of news discourse in relation to cultural representations.

Hall (1996) explains that national cultures are composed of symbols and representations. A national culture, he claims, is a discourse. “It constructs identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it” (Hall, 1996:293).

McQuail (1994) argues that a “narrative helps to provide the logic of a human motive which makes sense of fragmentary observations” (McQuail, 1994:240). O’Sullivan et
al. (1994) claim that, paradoxically, narrative offers an implicit image in order to make sense of changes, especially where the terms ‘before’ and ‘after’ a certain event imply the passage of time. They define narrative as a feature of non-fiction, such as news, where professional codes determine certain structure orders and components of any story. Indeed, by linking topics (events or acts) and defining actors (people) represented in the news stories by their recognizable characteristics (McQuail, 1994), the thesis structures itself and frames a narrative schema (see thesis outline).

Bernstein (2002) defines the functions of contemporary mass media as preserving, transmitting and creating cultural information through representations. She explains that media representations refer to the relationship between the ideological and the real. This explanation supports the classic argument that the media reproduce interpretations which serve the interests of the ruling class and related ideological conflicts (Hall, 1978).

This study largely reflects a Marxist orientation associated with French structuralists such as Foucault, Bourdieu and Barthes, who pay particular attention to the ideological analysis of news media from historical and socio-political perspectives. According to Bourdieu, the deepest logic of the social world can only be grasped by plunging into the particularity of an empirical reality, one that is historically located and dated, but with the objective of constructing it as a special case in a finite world (Bourdieu, 1998).

My research involves a comparative analysis of the Israeli news discourse before and after the signing of the Oslo accords (September 1993). It compares the political and ideological news discourses within two distinct time periods (pre- and post-Oslo) in relation to certain political and social events. The aim is to acknowledge the structure in each variable observed and to contribute to a deeper understanding of how issues relating to security, peace and politics were represented through the Israeli news media. The study also shows how these changing discourses influenced the
construction of national identity during the transformation from war culture to peace culture through a peace process.

The approach to news discourse analysis is based on the concept of "news schemata" as formalized by Van Dijk (1983, 1988). He argues that a schema determines how the topics of a text should be ordered, and developed as an empirical framework for the analysis of news (McQuail, 1994). The thesis systematically studies frames, topics and actors represented in the textual structure of news and relates them to historical and socio-political factors. Hence, it tackles the complex relationship between news texts and context.

1.2 Approach to the Thesis

Hobsbawm (1998) claims that an epoch in world history ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc (1989-1991). "Whatever we read into the events, a page of history has been turned" (Hobsbawm 1998:311). The Oslo peace process or "political process", as Herman (1997:32-33) defines it, took place within the context of dramatic changes in the global arena. All those involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- the domestic and foreign actors -- were also part of this broader process. They were represented within discourses created by political and ideological news media. Van Dijk (1988) claims that media news can be viewed as involving an entire discourse which includes the physical shape and those which have a more semantic nature: "New information as given by the media and as expressed by news articles" (Van Dijk, 1988:4). Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that news media have become the central arena for political and social conflicts.

Political and social scientists stress the important role of the press in conflicts due to two functions: public information; and historical, social and political documentation and analysis (Altheide, 1996). It is also important to understand the contribution of news media to either peace building in war-torn societies or in sustaining, or even enflaming tensions (Kempf, 1998) through news media discourse.
In many ways, the 1993 Oslo accords marked a radical change in Israeli politics. The mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian people, and the handshake on the White House lawn between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on September 1993, were dramatic and revolutionary steps. They reflected changes in the attitudes of the Israeli government and the media towards the Arab world in general, and the Palestinians in particular. Politicians, the media and left-wing groups in Israel perceived the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with sincere and total enthusiasm, as a real peace agreement. Israeli and international supporters of the process described their images of peace, depicting different aspects of the imagined New Middle East which they believed would emerge in the immediate future (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998). Meanwhile, groups on the political right kept silent during the initial post-Oslo period (Guyatt, 1998).

The Oslo peace process accelerated the internal disputes between religious and secular communities, and between the political left and right within Israel. This had started after the 1967 Six Day War but remained muted because solidarity and consensus were based on security-related perceptions and fears. According to Etzioni-Halevi (1997), various studies show that wars or security-related incidents reinforce a sense of national solidarity. With the advent of peace, this solidarity often vanishes and makes room for social conflicts. Solidarity in relation to national identity was formerly part of the obvious “national imagination” (Anderson, 1991:42).

The Israeli political lexicon commonly labels those who support peace as ‘doves’, a term synonymous with ‘leftists’. The term ‘hawks’ is synonymous with the right wing, who are perceived as politically conservative and religiously observant (Peres, 1995; Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997). Consequently, the political terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ within Israel have lost their historical meanings in relation to capitalism and socialism (Arian and Shamir, 1983). In recent years, the peace camp upheld the Palestinian right to self-determination and advocated the return of land for peace,
while the national camp believed that the Jewish homeland consisted of all of 'Greater Israel' on grounds of religion, ideology and security.

The inherent contradictions and the ambiguity of the Oslo transition shifted the political and ideological discourses of the Israeli government and media from dark pessimism to a unidimensional euphoric optimism (Shavit, 1997). The new discourse was dominated by the idea of peace and the immediate provision of benefits relating to security rather than dangers. It also reflected the changing ethos of national security. This vision tended towards what Gellner (1998) defines as "noxious idealism, the view that culture -- the set of ideas shared by a community -- is the main or the only agency of social order and control" (Gellner 1998: 186).

The prominence of the security discourse and its implications for rifts between left and right in the Israeli political context (Arian and Shamir, 1983) raise questions about media discourse and, in particular, whether journalists are influenced by ideological principles and political attitudes (Horowitz and Lissak, 1990). The Oslo peace process also gave rise to controversy over the news media discourse. Many Israelis subsequently accused the media of promoting the leftist attitudes of the coalition government and supporting peace with the PLO, which was regarded as leading to the destruction of the Jewish state (Hiro, 1996).

The Israeli media all devoted a large proportion of news space to peace topics and the news media discourse was transformed. The PLO, formerly regarded as the ultimate enemy, was represented as a partner for peace while the national partner was represented as the enemy of peace. Consequently, the security, peace and political discourses in the Israeli society were dramatically changed.

The press and the public learned for the first time about letters of mutual recognition exchanged between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, in the press conference led by the Israeli prime minister. This specific occasion is defined in this study as a "transitory' breakpoint" (Azar and Cohen, 1979:159), i.e., a turning point and apex in a transformation from war to peace.
Given that violence between Israel and the Palestinians had been a constant feature of the Israeli collective experience, the possibility of achieving peace stimulated euphoric and emotional reactions of victory among the peace camp. This was followed by a discussion and disputes among two groupings within Israeli society, namely the peace camp and the national camp.

During the years 1993-1994, Israeli domestic and foreign policies were stimulated by the possibility that peace might become a real alternative to war, and that hopes for peace could materialize. In addition, parts of the Arab and Muslim worlds supported the process. States that had previously imposed economic blockades on Israel opened their gates and some even exchanged ambassadors (Zakheim, 1994). There was speculation about a ‘New Middle East’, a Middle Eastern common market and flourishing trade with Arab countries (Sagi, 1997).

The political shift from militarism, regarded as essential to national existence (Herzog, 1995), to a new situation would clearly require painful concessions for the sake of peace. Peace, security, and economic cooperation came to the fore of public debate as militarism and violence supposedly gave way to peaceful relations. The transformation through a peace process to a new era of peace culture (see Chapter 9) constituted parameters in which the status of the security establishment inevitably declined (Herman, 1997) and the link between a free market economy and democratic civic culture became increasingly salient (Ezrahi, 1997) and related to peace. The media representations between ideology and reality are addressed in this thesis through the research of news discourse.

1.3 Approach to the Research of News

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines news as: “Tiding: the report or account of recent events or occurrences, brought to or coming to one as a new information; new occurrences as a subject of report or talk”. In short, news constitutes ‘new information’ about events, things or persons (Van Dijk, 1988). For the purpose of
analyzing news as discourse I found Reah’s (1998) definition more useful: “Information about recent events that are of interest to a sufficiently large group, or may affect the lives of a sufficiently large group” (Reah, 1998: 4). Clearly, the way news is produced, what it concentrates on, how its stories are put together and who takes an interest in it, all depend to some extent on national habits and conventions (Hartley, 1982).

Thanks to the electronic and printed news media people are exposed to multiple sources of information. Herman (1997) argues that the public is increasingly information-independent in areas that were once the exclusive province of decision makers and the ability to mobilize public opinion is extremely important for converting decisions about change into a reality of change. In this regard, “news is seen as the most prestigious of daily media genres, and its role at the center of the exercise of power in modern societies” (Bell, 1998:4). Moreover, news media have become the central arena for political conflicts (Wolsfeld, 1997). Policymakers, journalists and social scientists all point to the important role of press discourse in crisis events, such as, wars, conflicts and what may sound as a contradiction — “peace as crisis” (Azar and Cohen, 1979:159).

The newspaper is, arguably, “the archetype as well as the prototype” of all modern mass media (Tunstall, 1977: 23), and news is the central ingredient of the newspapers on which radio and television were modelled (McQuail, 1994). Hartley (1982) argues that news is a very specific example of ‘language-in-use’, of socially structured meaning. This is one of the reasons I decided to study news discourse as accessible material that cannot be separated from its social function.

Nonetheless, the news, whether heard on radio, read in newspapers or seen on television, is shaped primarily by the medium in which it appears (Hartley, 1982). Van Dijk (1988) asserts that news in the press is a specific kind of mass media discourse, which might bear some resemblance to news on radio and television. As a result, I decided to follow the schematic structure suggested by Van Dijk, (1988),
and to focus on primary and secondary topics and actors deriving from the notion of the whole text in the context of historical and socio-political frameworks.

In certain disciplines, such as history, politics, sociology, psychology and international relations, which focus on texts and contexts, discourse has become an important field of inquiry. Like news, history is documented by texts that relate to real events. Researchers find that in order to understand these texts, they must examine how they are constructed, including story-telling devices that are an integral part of their construction. The same applies to discourse analysis, which is essentially related to personal models and goals, on the one hand, and socially shared goals, attitudes, or ideologies, on the other hand (Van Dijk, 1988).

The sample was analyzed on a weekly random basis over two consecutive periods, marked by the signing of the Oslo accords as the transitory breakpoint. The methodology employed a discourse content analysis of 1186 news articles selected from the first two pages of two major daily Israeli newspapers. The pre-Oslo period was defined as 20 January 1993 to 26 August 1993; the post-Oslo period, from 3 September 1993 to 31 October 1994, when the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed. The period under review therefore encompasses the transformation process from war culture towards a peace culture.

A systematic analysis of newspaper documentation provides insights into how mass communication works through the body of messages and meanings resulting from the media news discourse. Moreover, it also offers the possibility to analyze the role of news discourse as a social agent. According to Fiske (1997), the term ‘social agent’ entails the ability of people to recognize their own social interests and power to promote those interests. This applies to a cultural elite who promote their interests by meanings, ideology and discipline. This assumption raises the question of objectivity in the journalistic production and scientific interpretation of news.
1.4 Approach to Research Issues

Cultural transformation within Israel is symbolized by two myths which represent continuity between ancient and modern Jewish history: the 'people apart syndrome' (Arian, 1995), and the 'vision of the end of days' which reflects the longing for peace and security. An immediate change from one syndrome to the other caused a cognitive dissonance and brought about social and cultural conflict.

Azar and Cohen (1979) explain that protracted conflicts tend to deepen and reinforce mutual images of deception and hatred (see Chapter 7). These images do not allow for any change and continuously and reduce the possibility of resolving issues. They add that the Arab-Israeli conflict would modify the nature of inter-state and interpersonal relationships in the region. In this situation, peace would constitute a breakpoint and a crisis as well.

Etzioni-Halevi (1997) points to the dilemma of what would happen to Jewish collective identity in Israel in a period of transition to a culture of peace — without conflicts and wars or “to coexistence with the Palestinians” (Etzioni-Halevi, 1997:28). The complex notion of peace and its political and ideological implications are discussed in Chapter 9.

Giddens (1993) explains that culture consists of the values, norms and material goods characteristic of a given group. It refers to the ways of life of the members of a society. Prior to the Oslo accords, Israeli society was characterized by security concerns in accordance with values and norms of those living under the threat of war and destruction.

This thesis focuses on changes in representation and classification at a given point in time in the transitory breakpoints, and the articulation of new voices as reflected in news discourse (Foucault, 1981). It is illustrated by quantitative content analysis in which the representation and classification of specific actors and topics (present or
absent) were reproduced and reformulated in accordance to the ‘order’ of the discourses of security, peace and politics.

In addition, the qualitative analysis included examples of discursive news statements which produced meanings and changed social reality. A review of discourse studies by Van Dijk (1988) shows that this field largely ignores how journalists interprets the news environments and how such interpretations shape the reproduction of news events and news discourse. The quantitative analysis was supported by qualitative content analysis of news quotations and personal interviews with key figures (see Chapter 5).

1.5 Approach to Mediatized Political Discourse

This section emphasizes what Fairclough (1995), influenced by Bourdieu, calls ‘mediatized political discourse’, which means how political discourse is structured in the media. I pay specific attention to the classification and articulation of voices as represented by actors and topics in the news.

Analysis of Israeli news media discourse strives to understand the structure and mechanisms of the news discourse that are overlooked by journalists and politicians alike, such as the presentation and representation of peace, security and politics and/or the media reproduction of these realities. It could be argued that the lasting “conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours laid the foundations of the collective conscience and national identity” (Bar-Tal, 1995:8).

My emphasis is then, on the need for critical press watchers (Diamond, 1978) to contribute to a better understanding of the role of news media discourse in peace building as ‘responsible journalism’. Thus, it might be possible to register the real differences that separate both structures and dispositions; the principle which should be sought lies not in the particularities of some national character but rather in the
particularities of different collective histories. The sense of the past as a collective continuity of experience remains surprisingly important (Hobsbawm, 1998).

Hobsbawm (1998) notes that the passing of the generation that experienced the Second World War coincided with major political shifts within all countries, without exception, as well as changes in the historical perspective on the war and the resistance. This demonstrates why the major political shifts in Israel, which were dominated by nationalist mythology and polemic, started in the middle 1980s – forty years after the establishment of the state. The same is true of Irish history that was dominated by Fenian (the revolutionary Irish movement) myth and unionist counter-myth until the 1960s.

Analysis of news in Israel assumes that there are ‘important’ rather than merely ‘interesting’ news (Gans, 1979). As I discuss later, it is ‘information’ rather than ‘discourse’ in news articles that either reflects or splits national identity. Thus the role of the news media discourse in shaping national identity in contemporary history requires analysis and discussion.

The question of political bias in news is the leading issue to explore through the news discourse. Hartley (1982) suggests examining whether news reports cover events that are meaningful, or whether the journalist translates them into its own meaning-system and scale of values. If s/he does, then which social and political groups or forces benefit most from this translation of events into meanings?

Fairclough (1995) works simultaneously on representations and classifications of reality and people by considering the function of a text in addition to the total frequencies in which a topic occurs, and the number of articles (volume) in which it figures within the news media discourse.

According to Jalbert (1983), ideology is a routine feature of the social production of news articles which promote political and economical interests, organized and unorganized. He claims that by discourse, the mass media appear to play a significant
role as organizers of ideological production. This argument raises the question whether besides information, does the news media play an agenda-setting role?

As for the issue of agenda setting, McCombs and Shaw (1972) argue that it refers to two questions:

1. What topics do the media present to the audiences?
2. How the topics are represented by media language?

Based on an understanding of how audiences process media messages, news discourse enhances the influence of these messages on certain groups. As a result, well-targeted messages -- based on political and ideological topics, rank, location, context and quantity of news media and delivered by credible sources which are frequently and consistently disseminated through the news media, focus public attention on defined and selected issues. Rogers and Storey (1987) claim that "communication operates within a complex social, political and economic complex matrix and could not be expected to generate change by itself" (Rogers and Storey, 1987:831). I propose to investigate whether news discourse whose language-in-use, meaning and social practice are familiar to readers complements or reinforces national agenda-setting and building of national identity.

Fairclough (1995) argues that readers with a background in media studies who analyze discourse language use as a form of social practice are able to explain and highlight contemporary processes of cultural and social changes. The analysis connects discourse structures with social and cultural strategies of cognition.

In sum, in order to understand a discourse, Hartley (1982) suggests looking more closely at the social, political and historical conditions of its production and consumption, because "these 'determinants' shape what it says, the way it develops, the status it enjoys, the people who use it, the uses to which it is put and so on" (Hartley, 1982: 3).
The Marxist orientation of this study pays attention to the ideological analysis of the news discourse from historical and socio-political perspectives. Hence, the historical and socio-political frameworks of Israel are examined in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, in the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict that shapes Israeli society and national identity.

1.6 Outline of the Thesis

Van Dijk (1988) explains that a narrative structure consist of normative forms which require an introduction, or theoretical section, and experimental section that has subcategories and a final discussion chapter. He adds that scientific discourse will be followed by conclusions. I found this narrative structure to be appropriate to the structure of my thesis.

This thesis is divided into four parts:

Part I Chapter 1 introduces my thesis by examining the representation of an ideological discourse consisting of security, peace and political discourses. It describes my approach to the issues analyzed and the conceptual frame that guided the research. Chapter 2 examines the historical background relevant to the specific topics analysed in the sample of news texts. It investigates the international, regional and local contexts, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter 3 explores the specific socio-political background of Israel in relation to the frames, actors and topics of this thesis. It also considers the relationship between political institutions and the printed press in Israel, the path to peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

Part II The second part includes two chapters. Chapter 4 examines the theoretical frameworks of my research in terms of discourse and media discourse analysis. It discusses meanings of the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘media discourse analysis’ and describes the analytical framework for media discourse, including the socio-political and news values dimensions. Chapter 5 outlines the research methodology. It
explains the selection of quantitative and qualitative research methods, primarily content and discourse analysis. It illustrates how these methods were combined and applied to the empirical study.

Part III The third part of my thesis, which consists of five chapters, presents the findings of my empirical study and related discussion. The findings are supported by news quotations and data from personal interviews. Chapter 6 presents and discusses the changes of frames and superframes within the news discourses of security, peace and politics. It also analyzes representation of the domestic and foreign actors involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the pre- and post-Oslo periods. Chapter 7 analyzes changes in the image of the enemy in the news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 are devoted to the findings and discussion of how security, peace and political changes were represented by the various news discourses in the printed press before and after the signing of the Oslo accords.

Part IV Chapter 11 presents the summary and conclusions which outline some of the possible implications of the thesis.

Appendix 1 presents the coding schedule, designed specifically for this study. Appendix 2 includes tables of additional data derived from my research.

1.7 A Note on the Ethnocentrism of this Study

The fact that my research has been carried out in Israel has some advantages but also poses some challenges. In many ways, Israel is a unique model of both a modern, democratic state and also a war-torn society. Ironically, its most prominent feature is its endless involvement in conflicts and consensus, framed by peace and security topics and actors in which notions of ‘us’ versus the ‘other’ are changing according to political events and circumstances (Wolfsfeld, 1997), either external or internal. These conflicts receive an enormous amount of coverage in the news media, locally
and internationally, thus, providing the researcher with very special site for in-depth news analysis. Consequently, the news discourse of security, peace and politics in the Israeli newspapers can be easily traced for analysis.

Three major advantages in the ethnocentric study are worth noting:

1. Engaging in news discourse means undertaking processes of interpretation and social interaction. This study therefore focuses on an understanding of how discourse structures influence and are influenced by the social situation. Van Dijk (1988) argues that this can be fully understood only if someone is familiar with the representations of discourse and knowledge of the social situations and its contexts.

2. Many previous studies relating to political conflicts have been carried out in the US. Wolfsfeld, (1997) argues that this fact makes it essential to look at other cultures for the purpose of comparison. Moreover, Van Dijk (1988) explains that most discourse analysis in the US was made mostly on television with an American journalistic approach. Meanwhile, British researchers worked out discourse analysis within the tradition of political sociology. Their work does not include any ethnomethodological perspectives, however, it is close to those by French researchers with a Marxist orientation.

3. My ethnocentric research was carried out in a language other than English. However, the research used a universal methodology. Furthermore, most of the literature review and research methods employed historical, social, political and mass communications’ research theories and articles published in English. I therefore argue that my contribution to news discourse analysis is that the ethnocentric approach could be generalized: the thesis was written in English so could be used as a model for news discourse analysis by many other ethnocentric cultures and war-torn societies, and for comparative studies.

I argue that ethnocentric researchers are moving between two worlds: one concerns political policies, journalistic construction and reproduction of news discourses; the
other employs social science to place these interactions within a broader context (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

There are, however, various challenges:

1. In order to categorize and understand the frames of topics and actors, and their meanings (explicit and implicit) in news discourse, a researcher should be familiar with the language of the news texts. The researcher also should be informed about the historical and socio-political background that provides the context (Van Dijk, 1988; Altheide, 1996).

2. The vast number of news texts in which security, peace and politics are represented in the daily news could not be explored via electronic documents as the relevant newspaper archives have barely been computerized. The research was therefore conducted manually. Moreover, the Lexis/Nexis service (Hansen, 1996) does not operate in Hebrew. Thus, lexical and syntax analysis were excluded.

1.8 A Note on Objectivity

According to McQuail (1994), the mathematical theory of communication provides an objective approach to the analysis of communication texts. He argues that the basis for objectivity (quantification) forms the basis for digital computing, and that the number of questions required to solve a problem of meaning equals the number of items of information as a measure of information quantity. Following this approach, my research uses quantitative content analysis, supported and reinforced by qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis.

When researches concerns contemporary events rather than classical antiquity, personal experience of these times inevitably shapes the way we see them, and even the way we assess the evidence to which all of us, irrespective of our views, must appeal and submit (Hobsbawm, 1998). The events of 13 September 1993 are part of the recent past but also belong to the present. Indeed, the euphoric media headlines and the victory of the Israeli peace camp can still be regarded as a dream.
As Van Dijk (1988) stresses, the processes of representation and interpretation have a subjective dimension and strategies may be applied in different ways, depending on various characteristics of the language user. He also adds that to collect data from large bodies of text and to obtain specific research goals, quantitative content analysis may be both relevant and appropriate in order to obtain at least overall insight into the nature of the news coverage.

McQuail (1994) explains that the work of Osgood et al. (1957) on the evaluative structure of meaning in a language lead to the identification of frequently recurring words according to their 'common meaning' in everyday use and which are connected with relevant attitude objects in the news such as, political leaders, policies, countries and events. He suggests therefore, that this format enables one to quantify the marked evaluative direction of attitude in media content. This method does have the potential to allocate an evaluative meaning to whole texts, as well as to facts or items of information, within a particular culture and society. Contextual knowledge is however, a necessary condition.

1.9 A Note on Translation

In my research, I analyzed a selection of articles published in two Israeli newspapers that were published in Hebrew. In addition, part of the qualitative content analysis used in my study is derived from direct quotations from news and personal interviews that are interwoven into the thesis. These quotations were translated personally by me into English. I translated them as literally as possible in order to maintain the spirit of the original. I therefore take full responsibility for the translation.
1.10 A Personal Note

Since my thesis is based on an ethnocentric notion, I feel obliged to mention the political frames that have shaped my own biography. I was born in the Land of Israel and lived through all the wars and violence involving the State of Israel since its inception. As part of the Israeli collective, I was raised in the shadow of Jewish myths and stereotypes of 'them' against 'us', with a sense of belonging to my 'imagined community'. My professional background in journalism and extensive experience as a communications consultant for political think-tanks and research institutes sparked an interest in the relationship between media and politics. The events of 13 September 1993, the historic handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn in Washington, inspired and motivated this research.
Chapter 2
Historical Framework

2.1 Introduction

The manifestations of globalization have become so common that we have come to take many of them, especially the beneficial aspects, in our stride. Through communications, whether transportation, media, or the Internet, we have all become world citizens to an extent which was unimaginable only decades ago. The assumption that socio-political life consists of a process of communication and interpretation that takes place in a historical-cultural context (Altheide, 1996) guided my study of the security, peace and political news discourses in Israel before and after the signing of the Oslo accords.

From this perspective, the one hundred years of Jewish-Arab conflict are interwoven into broader world developments and processes. According to Azar et al. (1978), for many years, these conflicts were a product of great power intervention and explained in terms of campaigns for hegemony in the Middle East by one or another regional or international power. However, since 1948, the Israeli-Arab conflict has become a source of inter-state conflict and an arena where hostile interactions occur between opposing ideological forces.

It is important to examine the international, regional and the local contexts in which events have evolved. Hence, this chapter briefly considers the dramatic aggregate of the twentieth century and the momentous political developments in the transformation from war culture to peace culture during this period. Hall (1996) argues that nation-states were never as sovereign as they claimed to be, although at the end of the twentieth century complex processes and forces of change, termed ‘globalization’, dominated national identities rather than cultural identification. From this global
perspective, it is then important to examine the regional context and, finally, the representation of local developments on which this research focuses.

2.2 From War Culture to Peace Culture

The Western world, accustomed to conditions of war or the threat of war, witnessed the advent of a different school of thought since the end of the Cold War, namely one that advocates the possibility of phasing out military and political conflicts and transforming war culture to a peace culture. It is thus no wonder that in war-torn societies, peace entails a ‘fatal connection’ with war in that it can only be perceived as an absence of war, without addressing the philosophical, sociological, and political meanings of peace per se. Yet, changing attitudes within war-torn societies are neither accomplished by government ratification, nor by peace treaties (Azar, et al., 1978). This requires such changes in culture and in national identity as can be conveyed by social agents such as education, language, social practice, and the media (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992).

It has become almost an article of faith that the mass media must play a crucial role in the construction, articulation and maintenance of various forms of collective identity. Schlesinger (1991) suggests abstaining from a priori assumption of linkages between media and collective identities and, instead, placing considerable emphasis upon what might be learned through detailed conjunctural analysis and comparison, “both diachronically and synchronically” (Schlesinger, 1991:307).

Although war, disarmament, and peace are always linked, they are, in fact, separate fields in which different discourses compete. Bruck (1989) claims that these discourses exhibit shapes and structures, follow sequences, and have the power to transmit. They are socially formed and form the infrastructure for public debate. Blumer and Gurevitch (1997) claim that “post-modernist writers tend to make the connections between media changes and social change” (Blumer and Gurevitch,
1997:133). In this changing world, people are less able to rely on traditional value systems. When they come into contact with a broader range of sometimes-conflicting cultural perspectives, they often resort to their personal perceptions and beliefs.

De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989), who developed the theory of media dependency, predict that under conditions of uncertainty, people tend to become more dependent on media information and interpretations. In other words, dependence on the media becomes more intense when the social environment is ambiguous, threatening, and/or rapidly changing.

Sreberny-Mohammadi (1997) argues that time and space have collapsed in the global world. "The best example is that both antagonistic blocs of East and West gave way to international markets, technologies, and media. Yet, nationalist, tribal and ethnic struggles are breaking out all over" (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1997:178). All of these conditions appear to have increased since the end of the twentieth century, and this has implications for all the fields of social science on the international, regional and local levels. Consequently, in analyzing any social agent, especially, the news media, these factors should be addressed.

2.3 The International Context

While wars have been waged around the globe more or less continually throughout the centuries, only in the twentieth century did war become a truly mass phenomenon (Carruthers, 2000). Indeed, the century was marked by the two most destructive wars in human history, which Hobsbawm (1994) defines as lasting thirty-one years. Consequently, many political, economic, and technological changes occurred. Attempts to understand the meanings of contemporary discourse and their reflection in the mass media during the transition from war culture to peace culture are bound, I would argue, to be affected -- both conceptually and substantively -- by wider, rapidly shifting, political, economic, technological, and cultural configurations.
This study starts by recognizing the profound cultural consequences that have been processed as a result of the twentieth century, along with the political, economic, and technological changes that have affected the discourses of nations, states, and consequently, collective national identities.

The First World War brought an end to the age of dynasties. By 1922, the Hapsburgs, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone (Carruthers, 2000). In place of the Congress of Berlin came the League of Nations, which included non-Europeans. Henceforth, the legitimate international norm of states in Europe was the nation-state.

The cataclysm of the Second World War intensified the nationalism which constructed what Anderson (1991) calls an ‘imagined community’, one in which a cultural interpretation of national identity is based on specific understanding of the past history of a country. This entails the development of mass education, teaching of own language, and promotion of nationalist ideology through social agents, including the mass media. His idea is that ‘nations’ and ‘nationality’ are constructs, “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”, (Anderson, 1991:6).

Blumer and Gurevitch (1997) argue that this concept implies a potential for invoking a sense of affiliation with an imagined global community. Schlesinger (1991) points out that this process promotes a collective identity that is sustained by a dual process: one of inclusion that provides a boundary around ‘us,’ and one of exclusion that distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’. He suggests that we should see such identities as "constituted in action and continually reconstituted in line with both an internal dynamic and external balances of force" (Schlesinger, 1991: 300). Lewis (1998) adds that identity-based patriotism, accompanied by language and nationalism based on ethnic origin, are factors in evoking political wars and conflicts.
In addition, as an outcome of the wars, technological progress mechanized and industrialized warfare. The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction also influenced new forms of nationalism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and inequalities between rich and poorer nations -- all potential sources of global conflict (Giddens, 1993). It could be argued that, paradoxically, present-day warfare, due especially to nuclear potential, has become so destructive that it can no longer be used to achieve realistic political or economic objectives (Hobsbawm, 1994).

Technology also facilitated the emergence of information -- the mass media. Press and the radio broadcasts covered much of Europe and North America by 1930s, with some states, such as Nazi Germany, deliberately fostering radio audiences for the sake of transmitting propaganda of ideological unity. At the same time, the visual media (such as film and newsreels) were also evolving rapidly, providing people in many industrialized countries further opportunities to 'witness' combat, as well as gain other information.

Carruthers (2000) points to the irony that modern forms of both mass warfare and mass media both emerged during a particularly fertile period of invention and were derived, more or less directly from military developments. In some cases, technology enabled civilians to learn of, or even 'see', events in a war zone.

Among the most important influences on wars seem to be the rise of state-based societies, from traditional states to nation-states with centralized governments. Giddens (1993) argues that states that cannot successfully handle negotiation through diplomacy may go to war and try to acquire some or all of another's territory. War may also occur because of a struggle over resources, or as a result of ideological or religious clashes. These decisions require the mobilization of civilians into the armed forces, as war changes from the concern of the army as an elite to the business of society as a whole.
Some of the main factors which promoted warfare in the past, particularly the drive to acquire new territories by conquest, are less relevant today, as modern societies are much more interdependent, globally, than in the past. In addition, for the most part, country boundaries have been fixed and agreed on by the international community of states.

Most twentieth-century wars were determined by political, economic, territorial, or ideological interests. Shinar (1998) refers to the racism and nationalism that characterized the Second World War; the political and economic factors at play in the Vietnam and Gulf wars; and the nationalist, economic and territorial interests typical of Latin America, such as the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Azar et al. (1978) add another parameter: protracted social conflict which includes an important element of national identity.

Nationalism has steadily become the most universally legitimate value in political life. According to Anderson (1991), "both nationality and nationalism are cultural artifacts of a particular kind of socio-cultural concept: everyone can, should, and will have a nationality, just as he or she 'has a gender'" (Anderson, 1991:3). In other words, nationalism provides a sense of common identity and history which also motivates political activism (Giddens, 1993).

Finally, this also is a period of change in the international order. Therefore opportunities exist for reducing the dangers of the past. Still, the words of Clausewitz remain pertinent: "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same in other means" (Clausewitz, cited by Giddens, 1993:358). Thus, one cannot rule out the possibility that new doctrinal orthodoxies with mass-mobilizing potential, and capable of legitimating new kinds of regime, democratic or authoritarian, could and probably will arise (Held, 1992).
Ultimately, however, this does not imply the end of international conflict, per se. Fukuyama (1989) argues that conflict between states will still be possible, and terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda. But large-scale conflicts appear to be declining. He suggests that this trend should be perceived as the end of history, that is, the end point of humanity's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy.

2.4 The Regional Context

Broader political changes of the twentieth century, dominated by issues relating to national identity and collective consciousness also led to the tragedies of the Jewish-Arab and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. This is crucial to understanding the challenge posed to Israel during the transition from war culture to peace culture. The transformation of the Levant -- Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (Transjordan), Palestine, and Gaza -- part of the Ottoman Empire for some 400 years, to a group of modern states was swift. In 1850, neither Jews nor the Arabs viewed themselves as members of any ethnically, culturally, linguistically homogeneous, territorially-based nation in the modern sense of the word; within less than a century, both had developed identities of nation-states (Peters, 1985).

During this transition, the region witnessed the decline of empire and colonialism. Britain had been the dominant power in North Africa and the Persian Gulf. France was granted control over Syria and Lebanon, and Britain was granted mandates over Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. Both ceded this influence after the Second World War, as nation-state identities developed among the peoples they were governing (Ovendale, 1992). Meanwhile, the seeds of Jewish-Arab discord had taken root. The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be found in history. Carter (1986) explains that the seedbed of the three monotheistic religions -- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam -- and their aspirations are regarded as the sources of the conflict: Jews
consider the covenants made by God with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses to apply exclusively to them. At the same time, Muslims and Christians also justify their presence in the Holy Land by reference to scripture.

For many Jews, the former territory known as Palestine represented the history of the Hebrew tribes; they had intermittently lived in and occasionally ruled this land from the second millennium BC until their expulsion from Jerusalem by the Romans in 135 AD (Allen, 1974). Furthermore, God promised the land to the ancient Hebrews and their descendants, in a covenant with the prophet Abraham. According to the Book of Genesis (15:18), God told the Hebrews: “To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river Euphrates”.

Peters (1985) argues that, while the existence of the ancient Hebrew kingdoms in Palestine is undisputed, this does not justify the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Nonetheless, for the Jewish people, these ancient religious-historical ties carry tremendous historical and emotional weight, as well as religious and political legitimacy. Palestinian claims are also grounded in history and include their continuous presence within the land since the Arab invasion of the seventh century AD. Peters also argues that although Jerusalem is not mentioned in the Qu’ran, the term ‘al-Aqsa’ (“the distant place”), which does appear in the Qu’ran, is interpreted as referring to Jerusalem in order to amplify religious claims of Muslims to Jerusalem.

Furthermore, for centuries, the Middle East has been a crossroads of trade and a centre of conflict for control of the precious land surrounding the holy places of the three monotheistic religious (Allen, 1974). This was used to justify the interests of emperors, great powers, and the superpowers for intervening in the region from time immemorial. The Crusades, for example, were mounted to free the Holy Land from the Muslims. But it wasn’t until the formulation of Zionism -- its name taken from the Hebrew synonym for Jerusalem -- that Jews thought beyond the abstraction of facing in the direction of Jerusalem during their daily prayers and began to conceptualize the renewal of nationhood (Smith, 1988).
This led to the onset of problems in Jewish-Arab relations, with Arabs being opposed to the creation of a sovereign Jewish presence, even as they formed their own independent states (Peres, 1995). The Jewish-Arab conflict emerged with the renewal of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel over a hundred years ago, since Zionism claimed Palestine. With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, at the same time that the indigenous Arabs were unwilling to accept the UN Partition Plan for the establishment of their own sovereignty (see below), the Jewish-Arab conflict was transformed into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Zionism was primarily a redemptive movement, which, from its beginning, projected a messianic-like vision of a Jewish state (Ringler, 1997). The early Zionists believed that the defining Jewish values of national life would best be realized in a social-democratic political framework in Palestine. Smith (1988) suggests that Zionism, as a European movement, was initially seen by the Arabs in Palestine as another attempt by Western imperialists to subordinate Muslims to Europe.

As noted above, after the First World War, the conflict between Jews and Arabs occurred within the framework of the apportionment of the Middle East between the major victors: Britain and France. The decolonization process after the Second World War established the Israelis and the Arabs as the major actors in the Middle East. However, the interest of the superpowers in intervening in the Israel-Arab conflict derives from the strategic geo-political location, along with economic interests in the oil deposits (Horowitz and Lissak, 1990).

The forces of nationalism, late-nineteenth-century modernism, Jewish emancipation and integration into cosmopolitan culture combined to strengthen Jewish national identity (Sachar, 1996). Oz (1998) suggests that the State of Israel was the product of intermarriage between the Zionist yearning of return to the Jewish homeland and the excitement of the ‘spring of the nations’ in Europe, crystallized between lifestyles in the Diaspora and modern ideologies of social justice.
In November 1917, British Foreign Secretary Balfour wrote to Jewish philanthropist and Zionist supporter, Baron Rothschild:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exist in non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour Declaration, quoted in Laquer and Rubin, 1995:16).

This declaration enabled the Zionists to expand immigration into Palestine. It also exacerbated tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities (Allen, 1974).

Eilam (1984) argues that the Zionists tried to change the term ‘national home’ to the term ‘Jewish state’ in order to guarantee borders for the land of Israel. To the Zionists, this represented a return to sovereignty over the land of their ancestors after two thousand years of exile (Cattan, 1988).

In any event, Zionism was the only modern movement of European peoples to succeed in establishing a nation-state in a non-European area. “This could only be done by relying heavily on a major colonial power, Great Britain, with its own imperial interests” (Sachar, 1996:292). For the Palestinians, it was a case of a colonial-settler community being granted preference over the rights of self-determination of the indigenous population (Gerner, 1991). Consequently, the Arab states and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine sought to prevent the creation of a Jewish state, refusing for decades thereafter to accept its existence. Palestinian nationalism subsequently became a liberation movement, using similar militancy and terrorism as its predecessors, including the Zionists.

Violence (1918-1948) spiralled as the Palestinians came to regard Jewish immigration as a threat to their livelihood and as a form of political intimidation. By 1947, the British in Palestine found themselves in an impossible position, so a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed to deal with the ‘Palestine
question'. UNSCOP proposed that the British Mandate in Palestine should be terminated and the territory partitioned into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, with Jerusalem an international zone under UN control. It also proposed linking the two states in an economic union to promote trade (Brooman, 1989; Sachar, 1996; Peres, 1995).

This led to UN Resolution 181, adopted 29 November 1947, concerning the partition of the country and the setting up of two independent states, one Jewish and one Arab, with the support and de facto recognition of Israel by the US, followed immediately by the USSR (Hareven, 1989). The leadership of the Jewish community agreed to the solution, while the Arabs rejected it; first, politically and then militarily. Gazit (1998) argues that their insistence on possession of the entire area caused them to lose it all. Hareven (1989) views the origin of the problem as Arab resistance to compromise in terms of giving the Jews sovereignty in any part of the region.

Arab leaders regarded Israel as the product of Western imperialism, peopled by Europeans brought in with American and European encouragement at a time when other countries were struggling to gain complete independence from European domination (Sachar, 1996). On the other hand, Israel's attitude to the Arab world was predicated on the Jewish experience in Europe, particularly the trauma of the Holocaust (Hiro, 1996).

On 15 May 1948, the State of Israel was established and on the same day, was invaded by armies from the five neighbouring Arab countries. During the subsequent fighting, nearly a million Palestinians either fled or were forced to leave their homes (Peres, 1995; Morris, 1988). A significant number of Palestinians remained in the parts of Palestine not taken over by Israel: the West Bank (under Jordanian control between 1948-1967) and the Gaza Strip (under Egyptian military rule between 1948-1967 (Hareven, 1989).
However, the Palestinian Arabs were not the only ones to become refugees as a result of the 1948 war; entire Jewish communities from Arab countries fled to Israel. There they joined the remnants of European Jewry who came to Israel as refugees, after surviving the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust. In fact, “by the early 1960s, 1.2 million Jews had immigrated to Israel, the majority of these also refugees” (Hobsbawm, 1994:51).

The 1948 war between Israel and the Arabs ended with a series of armistice agreements, but no peace treaties. The borders of the State of Israel after the War of Independence greatly enlarged the area allotted to the Jews under the 1949 UN partition plan.

Throughout the first nineteen years of Israel's existence (1948-1967), resistance to Israel was expressed almost entirely by surrounding Arab states (Gerner, 1991). Israel's military confrontations involved sovereign armies, including those of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Israeli efforts to initiate political negotiations for peace were met with the Arab answer formulated at the Khartoum Summit (September 1967): “No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no recognition of Israel” (Harsgor and Stroun, 1997: 250).

During the 1956 Sinai campaign, Israel collaborated with the two declining colonial powers, France and Britain, which were fighting pan-Arab nationalism. Developments in the Arab world, including the problems connected with the dispute with Israel, exacerbated the Cold War. This, together with the advent of the Palestinian nationalist movement and the publication of the Palestinian Charter (May 1964), which called for the destruction of the State of Israel (Laquer and Rubin, 1995), heightened the severity of the conflict.

With the escalation of Arab terrorist raids across the Egyptian and Jordanian borders and persistent Syrian artillery bombardment, Israel was faced by hostile Arab forces on all fronts. As a result of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, cutting off
Israel's only outlet on the Red Sea, Israel initiated combat on 5 June 1967 (Gazit, 1998). At the end of six days of fighting, Israel had occupied part of the West Bank administered by Jordan, including East Jerusalem, in addition to the Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula, and the Golan Heights.

Following the 1967 war, the borders of the State of Israel became the focus of the Israel-Palestinian dispute. According to Leibowitz (1992), the Israeli victory, which came on the sixth day of war, led on the seventh day to its catastrophe. 1.1 million Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem came under Israel rule. East Jerusalem was reunified with the rest of the Israeli capital. This was a decisive turning point in Israeli history.

International pressure to resolve the problems led to UN Resolution 242 (22 November 1967), calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories (Laquer and Rubin, 1995). It also confirmed the right of all states to live within secure and recognized borders, thus calling for a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem (Ashrawi, 1995).

UN Resolution 242 demanded that Israel return 'territory in exchange for peace', but only on condition that the Arab countries end their quarrel with Israel through peace agreements. This may have created the formula of 'land for peace' -- the emotional slogan of the centre-left in Israel (Baron, 1998). Arian (1995) argues that the polar opposite of this concept -- the centre-right's call to annex the occupied territories -- divided Israeli society into two different camps, both politically and socially: the secular Ashkenazim and the more religious (by and large) Sephardim. Horowitz (2000) argues that the 1967 war marked the beginning of decay whereby Israel started to develop a culture of occupation, accompanied by a slow process of domestic political and ideological conflict.

At any rate, following the Six Day War in 1967 (which was defined by religious Jews as the year of redemption), the balance of power changed between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This fact also had an impact on the national security and self-confidence
of Israeli society. On the one hand, Israelis experienced feelings of power, strength, and determination not to retreat to the former vulnerable borders. On the other hand, the extent of the utter defeat of the Arabs led to the expression of emotional appeals and ideas in Israel, while a military administration was imposed on the Palestinian Arabs living in the occupied territories.

In the early 1970s, due to a combination of security concerns and religious beliefs, a new Jewish movement that included secular Jews won support from successive Israeli governments in order to develop settlements in the territories. The Labour administrations proclaimed this policy would provide political leverage to obtain peace treaties from its Arab neighbours (Melman, 1993). The Likud government, which came to power in 1977, strengthened support of the settlement policy for religious and biblical reasons. The Jewish community in the West Bank and Gaza continued to grow rapidly. The Jews who lived in the occupied territories were subsequently defined by the Israeli public and media discourse as 'settlers'.

In late 1968, Egypt began a war of attrition against Israel, which continued until the summer of 1970, when it was finally concluded via mediation led by the US administration (Stein and Lewis, 1993). The relative calm was shattered on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), the holiest day of the Jewish year, when Egypt and Syria coordinated a surprise assault against Israel (6 October, 1973).

While the Yom Kippur War ended without a clear outcome, it was an Arab success in that it shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility and created a situation wherein Israel, Egypt, and Syria wanted to reach agreements. In Israel, anxiety returned, together with some sobering from the intoxication of power that had prevailed since 1967. Meanwhile, the Arab countries understood that, despite their partial victory, the chance of military victory over Israel was slight.

This war led to UN Resolution 338 following Resolution 242, which ultimately led to the US-brokered Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt and the signing of a peace treaty in 1979. The new US president, Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet premier,
Leonid Brezhnev, outlined a document as a basis for peace in the Middle East that advocated a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, including autonomy for the Palestinians.

The visit by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem (November, 1977) ultimately resulted in the Camp David accords (18 September, 1978), which contained a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and included a detailed proposal for Palestinian self-government based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This was the start of Israeli government undertakings that “within a year negotiations would begin concerning the introduction of a Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories” (Rabin, 1979:579). The cycle of rejecting peace had been broken. Menachem Begin, the Israeli right-wing (Likud) prime minister, offered the Arabs a version of autonomy in the occupied territories which the Egyptian leader could accept but the Palestinians rejected the framework (Harsgor and Stroun, 1997).

On 26 March 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in Washington, ending the thirty-year state of war between them. President Carter compared the event to Neil Armstrong’s “one small step for mankind” upon the moon (Carter, 1986:13). It is important to note that since 1967, the US had become the sole mediator involved in the dispute (Stein and Lewis, 1993). The Arab world accused Sadat of betrayal, and its judgement was carried out five years later, when he was assassinated by Egyptian Islamists.

Baron (1998) argues that the peace with Egypt (1979) and later with Jordan (1994) should be seen as the outcomes of the 1967 war. Both brought about the realization that it was impossible to reverse the events of 1948 and to cancel the fact of the existence of the State of Israel.

Gerner (1991) suggests that the basic objective of Israeli foreign policy was always survival. However, after the 1967 war, and the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, which
was achieved through US mediation, the ‘Palestinian problem’ became the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.5 The Local Context

Between the years 1891-1936, the Jewish-Arab conflict involved two communities living in the same territory. Since then, Hirschfeld (2000) contends that the Arabs dragged the western world into a struggle, which turned into a regional conflict. From 1947, this conflict has grown in proportions, spilling over into the international arena through the active involvement in the region by the superpowers. During the 1950s, the conflict became interwoven with the Cold War: the USSR extended its patronage to the Arabs/Palestinians, while the US supported Israel and the Jewish people.

Horowitz and Lissak (1990) add that the Israeli War of Independence turned the Jewish-Arab conflict into a conflict between states. Since 1948, the Jewish society in Israel, which had, until then, been a minority community within a bi-national territorial framework, turned into a sovereign state with a Jewish majority. They explain that the Arab-Israeli conflict ceased to focus on hostility between countries, and became focused on relations between two national communities: Israelis and the Palestinians. Since the 1967 war, this conflict has been played out on two different levels. On one hand, it involves confrontation between Israel and the Arab world, and the neighbouring Arab states, in particular. On the other, it was recast, at least partially, into an inter-communal conflict (Benvenisti, 1993).

From 1967, relations between Israel and the Palestinians became increasingly complex. The identity of democratic Israel and its relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds hinged on relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Hirschfeld (2000) claims that Israel’s national vision and the existential needs of Israelis and Palestinians grew out of historical traditions -- religious and nationalistic -- which, for hundreds of years, sanctified violence and sacrifice. He also notes that the formulation of peace
and normalization of relations are necessary for all practical reasons: political, economic, and psychological.

Antagonism between Israel and the PLO -- which, according to Harkabi (1974), represented the 'Palestinian problem' -- stemmed from two irreconcilable ideas. Israel could not give up the idea of Jewish statehood. Meanwhile for many years, the central tenet of the PLO was rejection of a Jewish state and the demand that it should be superseded by a Palestinian state.

The exodus of Palestinians from Israel in 1948 meant that many young Palestinians were raised in refugee camps, either in the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian administration; in the West Bank, which came under Jordanian governance; or in Lebanon. "The mythology of the return to Palestine came to occupy a central role in the lives of generations of displaced Palestinians ... and the thinking of other Arab states" (King, 1994:36). The younger generation of Palestinians began to realize that Arab states could not be depended on to liberate Palestine. Therefore, they began to organize their own military forces (Brooman, 1989).

The growth of Palestinian nationalist ideals (1964) led to the formation of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the PLO (Ya’ari, 1970; Bechor, 1995). Palestinians continued to stage terrorist operations against Jews in Israel and abroad, while Israel responded with counter-attacks, regularly assaulting Palestinian bases. At this stage, the US refused any contact with the PLO, as long as it continued to reject UN Resolution 242 and denied the right of Israel to exist.

After the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, it redeployed in southern Lebanon. From there, it repeatedly attacked towns and villages of northern Israel (including the Galilee), causing numerous casualties and extensive damage to property. On 6 June 1982, Israel subsequently invaded Lebanon in order to destroy PLO military bases. Israel succeeded in forcing the PLO out of most of Lebanon, and
until the year 2000, maintained a security zone within Lebanon along its own northern border.

Gazit (1998) claims that the relocation of the PLO to Tunis ended its ability to conduct an effective armed struggle against Israel. The result was to seek a political solution to the conflict. However, Israel under the Likud government, according to Gazit, "was not ready for a direct dialogue with the Palestinians" (Gazit, 1998: 91).

The Lebanon War was represented in the Israeli media as the first war without domestic Israeli consensus (Schiff and Ya’ari, 1984). Unlike the wars of 1948, 1967, 1970, and 1973, not all Israelis viewed this operation as essential to the survival of the Jewish state. In Israel, as among the Palestinians, there was opposition to any territorial compromise or historical determination that might bring about change in the relations between the two peoples. Raids and counter-raids continued between the two sides. The PLO, in spite of military defeat and relocation from Lebanon to Tunis, remained essential to the central political force for the Palestinians (Arian, 1995).

In December 1987, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip initiated a widespread uprising that became known as the Intifada. This spontaneous uprising against the Israel occupation was led by a populist movement, i.e., it was initiated by a broad range of individuals who did not belong to the PLO hierarchy (Bechor, 1995; Gazit, 1998). Although it followed twenty years of military occupation, it was sparked primarily by socio-economic conditions, including high unemployment, among Palestinian Arabs. It was subsequently exploited and translated into political capital by the only formal entity of the Palestinians -- the PLO who were located in exile, in Tunis.

From 1998, the Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, initiated military operations against Israel in accordance with policies which emphasized that "only a jihad [holy war] can solve the Palestinian issue" and "the destruction of Israel is a Qu’ranic inevitability" (Hiro, 1996:536).
The Intifada can be regarded as a turning point in the perspectives of the Israeli public and its leaders (Shamir and Shamir, 1993; Arian, 1995). It was accompanied by competing efforts for the sympathetic attention of the media worldwide (Gazit, 1998). Waller (1990) argues that these news reports overshadowed pressing events around the world and the Israeli news discourse.

Friedman (2001) argues that the paradigm through which much of the world looked at the Israeli-Arab conflict after the 1948 war was that of David versus Goliath: a tiny little state standing up against seven Arab countries seeking to destroy it -- a concept which lasted until the 1967 war. Since that time, a new paradigm took hold: Israel as colonizing force, with Israeli policies in the occupied territories compared to South Africa under apartheid or France in Algeria.

The Intifada did not succeed in driving out the Israelis from the occupied territories or in ending the economic dependence of the Palestinians on Israel. However, for the Palestinians, the Intifada bolstered the pride of the Palestinian 'little David' who stood up bravely to the mighty Israeli Goliath and exercised its own right to establish an independent state in the occupied territories (Hirschfeld, 2000; Ashrawi, 1995). For Israelis, the Intifada forced a reassessment of the situation, as they came to terms with the Palestinians' existence and the need for political solutions to the Palestinian problem, which could no longer be shelved indefinitely (Shamir and Shamir, 1993).

McQuail (1994) argues that "conflicts and tensions which exist nationally and internationally find their expression in conflicts of ideology, competing claims for resources and, occasionally, social crisis" (McQuail, 1994:2). In this sense, the media along with other socialization agencies provide the mental frames in the context of social reality (Wolf, 1988) through the media discourse.
As a result of the Intifada and the 1991 Gulf War, Israeli and Palestinian delegations embarked on bilateral talks in Washington, thereby moving towards a path to peace (see Chapter 3).
Chapter 3
Socio-Political Framework

3.1 Introduction

The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish people and contains a widely diverse population from many different ethnic and religious streams, as well as cultural and social backgrounds. Israel is a unique model of a democratic state in the western world. At the end of the twentieth century, it was still dealing with undetermined territorial frontiers, both vis-à-vis the international community and in terms of its national/cultural identity. This chapter examines the unique fabric of Israeli society in the 1990s since this is vital to an understanding of decision making in relation to foreign policy, in general, and the controversy in Israel over the Oslo peace process, in particular.

In order to understand the importance of the relationship between Israel’s past and present, this chapter elaborates a chronicle process, an ‘imaginary’ one, “mediated by the continual, selective reconstitution of ‘traditions’ and the social memory ... as active constructors of national identity” (Schlesinger, 1987:261). Relations between Israel and its neighbours cannot be understood without taking into account both legend and tradition, in addition to historical facts.

“Israel is the political society par excellence. During the state’s formative decades, the collective political ‘we’ always took precedence over the individual ‘I’” (Peres, 1995:2). In the 1990s, this feature was a source of national strength, but also of internal weakness since highly motivated political and social groups, fired by conflicting myths and memories, continued to clash along these lines and grapple for power.
3.2 Zionism and the State of Israel

In order to understand modern Israeli society, it is necessary to start at the birth of the modern Zionist movement. Throughout centuries of persecution in various lands, the folk memory of the Jewish people was of the land of Israel, and the universal Jewish theme was always the concept of the messiah who would lead them back to Zion (a synonym for Jerusalem). Zionism was the manifestation of the long and formidable journey of 2000 years — during which the land of Israel was often more than a symbol of messianic restoration accompanied by historical myth. Its main theme was exemplified in the anthem that eventually became that of the independent State of Israel: “to be a free people in the land of Zion, Jerusalem”.

The outbreak of persecutions in late nineteenth-century Europe mobilized many Jews to emigrate and to seek to find a solution for the ‘Jewish problem’. The early Zionists concluded in 1897 that “we, Jews, must first change our own destiny by becoming a nation, like other nations, with its own state, language, government, army and economy; a nation returning to its roots, to the sources of its strength” (Peres, 1995:4).

Zionist doctrine attached weight to evidence from the Bible that the birthplace of the Jewish people was the land of Israel and that Jews had maintained a presence in the land throughout the centuries, although the majority were forced into exile. The creators of modern Israel undertook to terminate the condition of exile as expressed by religious doctrine by restoring the Jews to their ancient homeland. Thus, the ingathering of the exiles to their ancestral homeland was the raison d’être of the State of Israel.

The first Zionist settlements in Israel were established in the late nineteenth century by Jews from Eastern Europe. This movement was known as the First Aliya (wave of immigration). To the religious arguments among the Jews of Europe and other monotheists was added a new, secular dimension: nationalism in the form of political
Zionism, aimed at creating a Jewish state.

Sachar (1996) claims that the mounting intensity of nationalism and the growing antisemitism began to leave their marks, and a Zionist solution was needed. "The Jewish state is a world necessity", wrote Herzl in his diary (cited by Sachar, 1996:3). This led to the second wave of immigration from Eastern Europe in 1904-1914. The Hebrew language was revived, and Hebrew literature and newspapers were published.

During the First World War, British policy makers gradually accepted the notion of a Jewish home in Palestine. The 1917 Balfour Declaration represented the first political recognition of Zionist aspirations by a world power (see Chapter 2). In 1922, Britain was entrusted by the League of Nations with the mandate for Palestine. Within that framework, the Jews and Arabs in Palestine ran their own internal affairs, with the help of the British Mandate.

Between 1919 and 1939, three successive waves of Jewish immigrants arrived in the country from Eastern and Central Europe. The Jewish community in Palestine, known as the Yishuv, began to establish political, social and economic institutions. For example, the Jews of the Yishuv elected their own governing body, known as the National Council. The British encouraged these state-building activities, particularly as they were funded through contributions raised primarily by world Jewry and Zionist-inspired organizations. Thus, most of the political, economic and cultural bases of contemporary Israeli society were formed during the period of the British rule. This Jewish national revival was strongly opposed, however, by indigenous Arab population, especially the nationalist elements. The volatility this created led Britain to impose restrictions on Jewish immigration from 1939.

During the Second World War, more than six million European Jews were murdered in the Nazi Holocaust. The need for a Jewish national homeland became all the more urgent, and this was supported by a groundswell of sympathy in the US and elsewhere in the West. To this day, the experience and memory of the Holocaust continues to
have a profound impact on many aspects of Israeli society (Nossek, 1994).

During the Second World War, and in its immediate aftermath, the British authorities in Palestine opposed the wide network of illegal Jewish immigration, aimed primarily at rescuing Holocaust survivors. British inability to reconcile the conflicting demands of the Jewish and the Arab communities led to the 'question of Palestine' being placed on the agenda of the UN, resulting in a plan to partition Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. While the Jewish community accepted the UN resolution, the Arabs of neighboring countries and those living in Palestine refused to accept it.

According to Aronson (1978), Zionism pursued a national revolution by aspiring to political, psychological, cultural, and social change. Zionists wished to create a 'new Jew', reviving the historic figure of the sovereign Jew who would return to take possession of and work the land. National sovereignty was, thus, tightly bound up with the return of a specific territory that was declared to be the natural and historic right of the Jewish people.

Underlying modern Zionism was the wish to establish an independent Jewish existence in Palestine, “the ancient land of Israel which the Jews had last governed nineteen hundred years before” (Smith, 1988:25). Within Palestine, the Zionist elite tried to settle parts of the country, as extensive tracts of land were progressively purchased; develop social solutions; and create instruments of political power in order to absorb a large number of Jewish immigrants. Externally, they worked with the agreement of the forces that controlled and influenced the region: the Ottomans, Britain, the USSR, US and France.

When the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, its leaders focused on building the nation. Modern Hebrew was spoken, and an emphasis was placed on establishing separate Jewish social and cultural institutions: schools and universities, hospitals, banks, law courts, and media. Meanwhile, the existing political entities and defence forces continued to develop. Since then, life in Israel remained constantly in the
shadow of prevailing danger and threats, repeated wars, terrorist operations, and bloodshed.

3.3 Ingathering of Exiles: Immigration and National Identity

Israel is a young state and a largely immigrant society, populated by Jews from more than a hundred countries, each group with its own traditions, beliefs and orientations. “The state policy of ‘the ingathering the Jews from the four corners of the world’ runs hand in hand with the emphasis that is laid, in official and private circles, to link the Jewish past with the present” (Hiro, 1996: xxi).

According to Gorny (1987), at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were fewer than 7,000 Jews in Palestine. By 1880, there were 24,000. Three successive waves of as many as 260,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in the land between 1919-1939 from eastern and central Europe. They were partly responsible for laying the foundations of the social and economic style of the rural communities -- the kibbutz and the moshav. Some 165,000 Jews who immigrated in the 1930s following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, contributed to the development of the economy and urban life (Facts About Israel, 1996). “The population grew more than eightfold, from about 55,000 at the beginning of 1918 to an estimated 475,000, including unrecorded immigrants, at the end of 1939” (Lucas, 1974:109).

The first Israeli government removed the restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by British rule. The Declaration of Independence stated that:

The State of Israel will be open to Jewish immigration from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of liberty, justice, and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; will uphold the full social and political rights of all its citizens without distinction of religion, race or sex (Declaration of Independence, cited in Laquer and Rubin, 1995: 108).
The 1950 Law of Return granted every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and immediately become a citizen in accordance with the concept of the ‘ingathering of the exiles’ which lies at the heart of Israel’s raison d’être. This law determined that “this right is founded on the historical link which has never ever been broken at any time between the people and their homeland” (Divrei Haknesset, 3 July 1950: 2036-37). The main significance of these laws was the formalization of mutual links between the Jewish people worldwide and the state of the Jewish people (Hacohen, 1998).

According to Lucas (1974), the establishment of the state inaugurated a period of mass immigration that continued unabated until the end of 1951. In the first two years of Israel’s existence, approximately 684,000 Jewish immigrants were absorbed by the 650,000 Jewish inhabitants; some 250,000 from eastern Europe who had survived the Holocaust (Ofer, 1998), as well as Jews from communities in North Africa, Asia and the Middle East which had existed since ancient times. This created a Jewish majority in the country for the first time in the modern era. During the first decade of independence, Israel absorbed about 1.4 million Jews, and the number of citizens increased by over 250%.

Great efforts were invested in the absorption of the immigrants in terms of housing, food, language training, employment opportunities, education, and social and political activities. Mass Jewish immigration and economic development came to be seen not merely as measures of Zionist fulfillment, but also as vital tools of survival. The main emphasis of foreign policy was subordinated to the need for increased military strength and power, thus exacerbating hostility among the Arabs and, in turn, reinforcing the policy.

Lissak (1998) argues that the outcome of the War of Independence, at least prior to 1967, determined the territorial borders of the sovereign state of Israel. But it was immigration, which made its mark on political and the social processes. The generation responsible for the creation of the state tended to identify with an elite --
3.4 A Social and Demographic Profile

Throughout the years of nation-building, Israel provided an example of a successful democratic, yet deeply divided society. The Jewish population was divided almost equally between Jews of European and Asian-African origins, and the Palestinian Arab minority constituted about 15% (excluding the occupied territories).

As noted above, during the early years of statehood, Israel absorbed Jewish immigrants from East and West, resulting in a diverse social structure. The former were Oriental and Eastern Jews, known as Sephardim, who came from Middle Eastern and North African countries. The latter were Western Jews, known as Ashkenazim, including the veteran settlers who had founded the Jewish state in the image of their East European background and the Holocaust survivors, most committed to democratic concepts.

In 1948, four-fifths of the population were Ashkenazim. The Sephardim were relatively small in numbers, lacking formal education, effective communal leadership, and previous contacts, political or filial, with Zionist groups. “The infusion of this underclass into Israeli society inadvertently enabled the earlier settled Ashkenazim to move upwards, socially and economically” (Hiro, 1996:117). In the late 1950s, the two groups coexisted with virtually no social or cultural interaction. Ultimately, the Sephardim expressed their frustration and alienation in massive anti-government protests, later shaping this frustration into demands for political participation, compensatory allocation of resources, and affirmative action.

Government policy was to attempt to ‘modernize’ the Sephardim who, despite social, economic and cultural disadvantages, became a demographic majority by about 1965. But even in the 1990s, many Sephardim still resented the Ashkenazim, particularly
those who had dominated the Labour governments of the 1950s (Ben-Simon, 1997).

National cohesion within the Jewish society nonetheless proved strong enough to meet the challenges of nation building. In 1993-1994, after almost a half century of independence and with a strong economy, ethnic diversity still existed, affecting cultural, religious and political life. Lissak (1998) claims that, in the absence of a common denominator between veterans and new immigrants, and due to disputes between religious and secular sectors, severe difficulties arose in crystallizing a common collective identity beyond the religious-national one.

The most recent wave of immigration to Israel was from the former Soviet Union, with some 100,000 Jews arriving in the 1970s and over 700,000 during the years 1989-1991. Among them were highly educated professionals, such as scientists, musicians and physicians, who contributed significantly to the economy and to cultural life in Israel. The late 1980s and the 1990s also witnessed the arrival of two massive airlifts of approximately 30,000 people from the ancient Jewish community of Ethiopia.

3.5 Religion and State

From the inception of the state to the period under review, the relationship between the state and Judaism was of paramount importance, and all coalition governments included religious parties. Jewish society comprised a spectrum of ultra-Orthodox, Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and those defined broadly as secular Jews. The strength of Orthodox Jewry lay in an unwritten agreement reached on the eve of Israel's independence and known as the 'status quo', which stipulates that no fundamental changes would be made in the status of religion. Thus, for all Jewish citizens, issues of personal status -- such as marriage, divorce and death -- were determined by the Chief Rabbinate, with the general backing of most secular Jews.
Although the majority of Israelis regarded themselves as secular (i.e., non-observant) Jews, the collective identity was determined by tradition and culture associated with religion. In addition, identity was based on the perception of Israel as a small nation surrounded by enemies. Whenever wars occurred or security is otherwise threatened, this sense of solidarity was reinforced.

There are no authoritative statistics regarding the proportion of religious citizens in the Israeli society. The notion 'religious' is a complicated one, as it varies with degrees of respect for the practice of religious precepts. The only measurement that can be used is the share of the religious parties in the Knesset, where they comprised around a fifth of elected members. "The religious collective identity encompasses only some 20% or 30% of Israeli society ... It has problems coping with the modern world ... It frequently segregates itself" (Etzioni-Halevi, 1997:26).

However, it is worth noting that:

Secular (Jewish) Israelis have the need, so it seems, to maintain religious institutions which will keep the faith on their behalf but, at the same time, by the extremist nature of these institutions, make sure that the majority of (Jewish) Israelis have nothing to do with them (Marmur, 1982:53).

The minority of observant Jews were those who adhered to a religious way of life, regulated by Jewish religious law, while participating in national life. In contrast, ultra-Orthodox Jews believed that Jewish sovereignty in Israel could be re-established only when the Messiah arrives. They lived in closed communities, divided between a small but volatile sub-group who did not recognize the State of Israel and disdained national duties such as taxation and military service, and the pragmatic majority who participated in politics, targeting their efforts at reinforcing the Jewish religious character of Israel.

One of the fundamental and most controversial issues between religious and secular Jews concerned the definition of a person as a Jew. Orthodox groups advocated determining a Jew according to Jewish law as born of a Jewish mother, while the secular supported the definition based on civil criteria of an individual's identification
with Judaism. One of the reasons for this debate was the Law of Return, which granted immediate citizenship to any Jew (see above).

Since 1967, Israel faced many political, cultural and religious disputes between secular and religious Jews regarding the occupied territories in general, and the peace concept in particular. The most extreme concept was that of the ‘promised land’ whose adherents take draw inspiration from the Bible. This concept was also supported by right-wing parties and pressure groups, defined as ‘hawks’ and associated with the national camp, in contrast to the left-wing, regarded as ‘doves’ and associated with the peace camp.

Not all threats to Israel’s peace and security emanated from traditional Palestinian enemies, militant Islamism, or even from local crime. Some of the threats derived also, for example, from ultra-Orthodox Jews and militant settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who learned to paralyze traffic, throw stones at secular Jews, as well as exerting political pressure.

The debate over the territories after the 1967 war emphasized the secular culture that was developing in Israel and split the collective into two identities: one based on religious-cultural identity (Jewish) and the other civic (Israeli). However, Ben-Simon (1997) suggests that since its establishment, the state was unable to determine its national identity. Was it a society of Jews or Israelis? Of religious or secular? Was it ‘a nation like all nations’ or ‘the chosen people? Was it the ‘continuation of Jewish heritage’ or the ‘messengers of new Israelites’? Israel became a ‘tribal federation.’ According to former prime minister Shimon Peres (1995), “tribalism has won over Israelism” (Peres, 1995:5).

3.6 The Arab Minority in Israel

In the 1990s, almost 15% of Israeli citizens were Arabs. The majority (75%) were Muslims residing mainly in small towns and villages in the north of the country.
Another 15% were Christians, who lived mainly in urban areas, while the remaining 10% were Druse, Bedouin, and other. In accordance with the policy of Ottoman rule, the state did not recognize them as a single, national group, but as members of religious minorities. Wolfsfeld et al. (1998) argue that the Arabs in Israel saw themselves as part of the Palestinian people, in particular, and of the Arab world, in general. The relationship between the Arab minority and the Jewish state was always complex but relations between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians outside Israel were by no means straightforward.

A survey conducted in 1995 by Smooha and Ghanem showed that 65% of Israeli Arabs supported the option of a Jewish state that gave Arabs limited autonomy along with equality on an individual basis. Furthermore, “most of the Arabs in Israel support a separation of the Palestinians in the territories from Israel ... and accept their status as a minority in the state of Israel” (Ghanem, 1997: 61).

Israeli Arabs were regarded as a marginal element of two societies: Israeli and Palestinian. They lived in a constant conflict because they were Palestinians by nationality who also held Israeli citizenship. Peled (1992) claims that the basic definition of Israel as a Jewish state characterized tension between Jews and Arabs. This view is shared by Smooha:

From the Israeli-Arabs’ viewpoint, the provision that Israel is the land of Jews all over the world, but not necessarily of its citizens, degrades them to a status of invisible outsiders, as if Israel were not their own state (Smooha, 1990; 402, cited by Peled, 1992: 439).

The Arabs who remained in the territory of Israel after 1948 were immediately granted Israeli citizenship. They were entitled to vote and to be elected, to organize political parties, to manage their community and religious life, and to use their language. Nevertheless, one important obligation denied to them was military service. (It was assumed that the remnant Arab community in Israel would experience divided loyalty and might demonstrate a rejection of the Jewish regime.) Peled (1992) argues that the Arabs’ exemption was a matter of administrative practice and was probably
unavoidable as long as the primary task of the Israeli military is to fight Arabs. Still, many social privileges in the state were linked to military service, making the Arabs ineligible for them. Ironically, Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews were similar because neither served in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). However, while ultra-Orthodox Jews opted out of military service individually, Arabs were excluded as a group.

The social, political and economic integration of Israeli Arabs was traditionally regarded as a potential security risk. Over the years, however, the power of the Arab minority within the Jewish majority in Israel increased, demographically. Nevertheless, as Yuchtman-Yaar (1997) points out:

No one questions the fact that over the years the Arab minority in Israel has been discriminated against on the institutional level ... as well as on the individual level...although, discriminatory policy is dwindling, the socio-economic and political disparities between the two groups are still very much in evidence (Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997:64).

Unlike Muslim and Christian Arabs, the Druse minority gained all rights and obligations of citizenship, including service in the IDF. Halabi (1983) suggests that most Druse youngsters accepted this as natural and identified with their recruitment into the army, even considering it a community achievement. They were raised to respect its symbols and customs, often distinguishing themselves in later years as officers, border guards, and scouts. In spite of this, “Druse soldiers could be identified as ‘good Druse citizens’, still, they did not yet gain the status of being ‘Israelis - members of the Druse community’” (Halabi, 1983:14).

Finally, there were the Bedouins: Moslem Arabs who belong to some thirty tribes, most of them scattered over a wide area in the south -- the Negev desert -- with some based in the northern region of the Galilee. In the 1990s, they were undergoing a transition from a nomadic tribal social framework to a permanently settled society. They also served in the IDF and were gradually entering the mainstream labour force.
3.7 Israel-Diaspora Relations

Relations between religion and state are a key element of the dialogue between Israel and Diaspora Jewry. Jews in the Diaspora made their most enduring contribution to Israel's welfare in the vital areas of financial, moral, and ideological support for all Jewish causes. In turn, the burst of identification and creativity awakened by Israel activated virtually every facet of Jewish life in the US, as in other Diaspora communities. Sachar (1996) argues that the Jews of the US and other Western nations were committed to exerting every effort and utilizing every available technique and power, politically and economically, to guarantee the source of their renewed security.

However, Israeli policy makers, together with the world Zionist leadership (the Jewish Agency and many other Jewish organizations abroad) realized that only a swelling Jewish presence in Israel would guarantee the Jews' tenuous existence in the new country. This engendered a complex -- almost love-hate -- relationship between the Jews of Israel and the Diaspora.

3.8 Political Institutions of Israel

Israel is a parliamentary democracy. The 120-seat Knesset (parliament) is elected by direct, equal, secret and proportional elections every four years. Every Israeli citizen aged eighteen and older can vote and every citizen over twenty-one can be elected. Each party selects its leader through the party committee that selects its chairperson as candidate for prime minister. The elected leader of the largest party forms a coalition of over 61 Members of Knesset (MKs) which forms the government (Israel Government Press Office, 1996; Neuberger, 1997).

The essence of the Israeli democratic-parliamentary system during the period under review was the political coalitions. Indeed, since its inception, Israel was given to coalition governments in which no single party ever won most seats in the Knesset.
(Koren, 1994). The largest two parties (the left-wing Labour Party and the right-wing Likud) enjoyed similar support, not sufficient to ensure a majority in the Knesset. This situation enabled small parties representing minorities, such as the religious parties, to gain disproportional political power.

However, images of the parties favoured by the electorate reflected their positions regarding the major issue dominating Israeli politics since 1967: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the occupied territories. Arian (1995) demonstrates in a number of surveys (1992, 1993 and 1994) that the Labour Party was perceived in recent years as better able than the Likud to secure true peace and democracy. The Likud was perceived as better able than Labour to secure a Jewish majority, land and peace, and law and order in the territories. He claims that this signified a dramatic change from the 1988, 1990, and 1991 surveys, in which the Likud led in all categories.

Israeli foreign relations expanded steadily after 1948, and close ties were developed with the US, British Commonwealth, most Western European states, nearly all the countries of Latin America and Africa, and some in Asia. In 1965, ambassadors were exchanged with the Federal Republic of Germany, a move which had been delayed until then because of bitter memories of the crimes committed against the Jewish people during the Nazi regime (Facts About Israel, 1996).

As noted in Chapter 2, the Six Day War (1967) changed the balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbours and, above all, the political, economic and social conditions within the state. However, as Baron (1998) suggests, despite its many achievements, the inherent fears of destruction still undermines the sense of security among the Israeli public.

In 1967, new territories populated by one million Arabs came under Israeli military control. Contradictory as it might have seemed, at the same time, the Palestinians were employed in Israel, and Palestinian farmers were given access to Israeli markets as well as to overseas export facilities, though Arab agriculture was restricted.
Progress was made in industry and commerce, and tourism facilities received assistance. Ironically, many Israeli politicians dubbed this a 'humanitarian occupation'.

For its part, Israel was provided a crucial stimulus to its own economy. Furthermore, successive governments encouraged Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. This led to the growth of the concept of the 'promised land', however, and caused political disputes between the right wing and ultra-Orthodox Jews who believed in the idea of 'Greater Israel,' on the one hand, and the left wing, who sought territorial compromise and peace.

3.9 Militarism and Israeli Society

As outlined in Chapter 2, the first fifty years of Israeli independence were marked by six critical wars. Between these wars, there were hundreds of terrorist operations and reprisals causing the deaths of tens of thousands of people on both sides. As a senior columnist in *Ha'aretz* notes, "Israel is the only country in the world that has been involved in at least one war for every decade of its existence" (Marcus, 1998).

Throughout the history of the state, military service was the main focus of civic duty (Ezrahi, 1997). Jewish and Druse male citizens contributed at least five years in active military service (three years in mandatory regular duty and one month, annually, in reserve duty). Jewish women served in the IDF for two years, but only a small number were obligated to serve for several years in the reserves. As Yossi Beilin MK notes (1999):

We are so used to perpetual danger that we shall have to accustom ourselves to the new situation... We, the generation born in the land of Israel, simply do not know what peace is. It is the height of paradox that some people fear the peace process on the grounds that it will reduce the motivation of the young to fight in the next war (Beilin: 1999: 4).

A survey by Lumski-Feder (1998) illustrates that Israeli men did not regard war as a
crisis event, instead, they 'normalize' the war into their current life course. This, she argues, indicated the cultural patterns of society. As Azar and Cohen (1979) conclude, it became safe to say that in the Middle East violence was the norm and conflict was the status quo. (For further details on factors affecting the security ethos in Israel, see Chapter 8).

3.10 The Israeli Government and the Printed Press

The intense political partisanship that characterized the Israeli media, due mostly to security considerations, shaped the relationship between the government and the news media. During the period under review, most legal restrictions on the dissemination of information were neutralized by contentious security concerns, which marked the boundaries of the ongoing political process in Israel, a relatively small country in size and population. These factors created symbiotic relationships between media and politics (Goren and Rothman, 1982). The effects of political culture on the construction of media frames in a democratic state flowed two ways: politicians needed media channels in order to reach audiences and solicit support. In turn, the media looked to political institutions as key sources of information of public interest.

Goren and Rothman (1982) discuss the day-to-day performance of the press that was affected by the legal framework -- a combination of laws derived from British mandatory powers, yet influenced by a liberal tradition and aware of the requirements of security -- which marked the boundaries of the relationship. She argues that the Israeli press was committed to the preservation and defence of the state, and the conflicting demands of an intensely politicized situation. This commitment created a special relationship between government and media; although information was frequently 'leaked' to the media, a strict form of self-censorship was practiced.

Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that journalists inevitably interpret the world from a national, or even nationalistic, perspective, especially when they cover conflicts involving their
own country. On the other hand, political antagonists' information and access to media depends mostly on their ability to ensure that events offer a good narrative. Consequently, political antagonism affects the struggle over access to the media in addition to the battle over meaning.

Mobility between media and politics in Israel had implications for journalists and politicians in terms of informal relationships and patterns of information, and many political personalities were previously involved with media. The founder of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl, was a foreign correspondent for the Austrian Neue Freie Presse in Paris (Elon, 1975), Berl Katzenelson, one of the leaders of the Israeli Labour Party was the editor of the daily newspaper, Davar. Many MKs such as Yossi Beilin, held important positions in the media before entering politics. “The existence of such relations apparently supports the conception that perceives the media as an integral part of the socio-political system and the establishment that heads it, a kind of bond between elites” (Caspi and Limor, 1999:275).

Furthermore, many political figures engaged journalists as advisors or spokespersons who effectively served the organization by framing the information disseminated to the public. In addition, the military censor imposed security censorship on the media. These factors accumulated into control over the media which contradict the social responsibility model of communication, freedom of expression and the public right to know (Segal, 1990). The best example of this was the ability of the Rabin government to keep the secret channels of communications during the Oslo process channels hidden from the media by maintaining complete control over the events and then controlling the flow of information in the first week after the story broke.

Lehman-Wilzig (1994) argues that a more educated citizenry, new communication technologies and gradual reduction of national security tensions all increased the pressure on the authorities to lessen power and censorship. The media therefore became more open, and greater freedom of expression was evident, particularly among the print media.
Israel is a pluralistic society with a hegemonic culture and many sub-cultures. In the 1990s, it was still devoted to the concept of building the State of Israel on the basis of a pervasive approach that led to Jewish domination across most aspects of Israeli society. Geertz (1977:244) suggests that despite its western orientation, Israel exhibited many features typical of development in cultural processes in the Third World — collective integration, cultural renaissance, and socio-economic change; “an interplay between institutional change and cultural reconstruction”. He argues that such a process can be characterized as a series of simultaneous, multi-dimensional interactions between internal and external forces, from which various results may emerge in different patterns, rates, and rhythms (Geertz, 1977).

3.11 The Path to Peace

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became the core issue of Israeli society and politics, as Israel sought a peaceful resolution with the Palestinians within the context of global change. Since 1967, both the Israelis and Palestinians rejected one another's rights to exist in their own homeland. Over the course of the years, both parties moved from mutual non-recognition towards dialogue. Both the Israeli leadership and general public understood that a peace process would inevitably lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its own national identity (Hirschfeld, 2000). On the other side, Palestinian leaders and public came to understand that Israel required stability and the alleviation of doubts regarding security as fundamental conditions for peace.

The Intifada (1987-1991) undoubtedly changed the perspective of some Israelis. Rolef (1997) claims that since 1988, a growing number of Israeli academics and political figures became convinced that real change was taking place within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), particularly in regard to willingness to give up its maximalist goals and accept compromise, ie., coexistence with the State of Israel.
As a result of the Intifada, the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and the military response of the US-led coalition against Iraq (January 1991), the US initiated comprehensive peace negotiations between the Israeli government and the neighbouring Arab governments and the Palestinians. The first Middle East peace conference, which took place in Madrid on 31 October 1991, established a framework for bilateral and multilateral talks. Within this framework, direct meetings were held between Israeli representatives and a Palestinian delegation from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The local Palestinian leadership assembled the ‘Palestinian delegation for peace talks’ to negotiate a peace process with the ‘Israeli delegation for peace talks’.

Kriesberg (2001) explains that at the same time, traditional mediation efforts to create negotiating agreements between Israel and the PLO were undertaken. For example, some Arab governments provided services between the PLO and the US government, and indirectly with the Israeli government. Egypt and the US played important mediating roles between Israel and the Palestinians and the PLO. Moreover, in 1992, the Egyptian foreign minister conveyed questions and responses between the head of the PLO department for national and international relations in Tunis, and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres (Abbas, 1995).

The Madrid conference, held under the auspices of America and Russia, marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the Middle East. To a large extent, this was the most significant breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations (Bregman and El-Tahri, 1998), since President Sadat’s historic visit to Israel on 19 November 1977, which led to the first ever peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state.

Since the Intifada and the Madrid conference, the peace process brought about modifications in Israeli public opinion. Following these events and in accordance with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Israelis willing to compromise on land for peace increased (Shamir and Shamir, 1993).
It seemed obvious that the old order was doomed. The old society, the old economy, the old political systems had, as the Chinese phrase puts it, 'lost the mandate to heaven'. Ultimately, this paved the way to the victory of the Labour Party leader, Yitzhak Rabin, in the elections to the thirteenth Knesset on 23 June 1992.

In his election campaign, Rabin had promised to reach an agreement with the Palestinians in the occupied territories within six to nine months (Bregman and El-Tahri, 1998). However, Rabin referred to peace negotiations with members of the local Palestinian leadership, which excluded PLO activists because Israel had outlawed direct contacts with the organization (Rolef, 1997). The amendment (August 1986) of the Order for the Prevention of Terrorists had prohibited meetings with members of the PLO, an offence punishable for up to three years imprisonment.

The new Labour government (1992) promised to transform the dream of peace into reality, creating a coalition 'peace government' with the parties of Meretz (left-wing) and Shas (Sephardi religious). It was followed by a period of regional instability, including a series of violent actions that strengthened the standing of Islamic organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah, on one hand, and militant Jews among the settlers, on the other. Meanwhile, the US administration, which was keen to advance a peace process, received cooperation from the Russian government, which desisted from backing Arab agitation (Beilin, 1999).

In November 1992, Rabin gave a public speech at Sokolov House in Tel Aviv (headquarters of the Israel Press Association) in which he compared the PLO to the World Zionist Organization (Yedioth, 30 November 1992). According to some observers, this appeared to signal the beginning of a 'de-demonization' of the PLO (Hirschfeld, 2000).

In December 1992, Hamas carried out a string of attacks against the IDF, killing many soldiers. Israel subsequently deported 415 Hamas activists to Lebanon. These expulsions brought about a freeze in the bilateral talks taking place in Washington
between Palestinians and Israelis, and negatively affected public opinion, both regionally and internationally. Moreover, with Hamas emerging as the main force behind the Intifada and pressures from the left-wing government coalition, the Rabin administration decided to lift the long-established ban on contacts with the PLO on 19 January 1993 (Hiro, 1996).

In retrospect, this date represents an interesting coincidence: the first meeting of the Oslo secret channels took place on 20 January 1993. This study therefore selected this date from which to investigate the printed news discourse. It should be noted that Bechor (1995) lists fifty meetings between Israeli and PLO officials including Arafat that took place during 1976-1989. By contrast, Rabin continued to declare that he would not conduct negotiations with the PLO and Arafat (Beilin, 1999; Savir, 1998).

As noted above, the Oslo channel began with secret meetings while negotiations between the Israeli and the local Palestinian delegations took place. A series of secret unofficial meetings took place between Israeli academics and three high-ranking PLO members. The Norwegian government facilitated these meetings and assisted in communications between negotiating rounds (Savir, 1998). "It gave the academic negotiations a sense of political purpose" (Hirschfeld, 2000:100).

The essence of the Oslo concept was the commitment to embark upon negotiations leading to a permanent status agreement at a defined time on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territories for peace (Peres, 1995). At least twelve rounds of meetings took place between the Israeli and PLO representatives from January through September 1993. Participants developed the idea of a joint DOP to include free elections for Palestinians in the occupied territories and gradual establishment of Palestinian autonomy.

On 19 August 1993, Israel Foreign Minister Peres came to Norway. The draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed in secret by Israeli and Palestinian representatives under the aegis of the Norwegians. At the same time, bilateral talks
between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations were reconvened before the secret
talks in Oslo were publicized. On 30 August 1993, the DOP was presented for
government approval in Israel, winning a unanimous vote. It then won approval by a
vast majority in the Knesset with only three right-wing MKs abstaining (Beilin, 1999).
The media first learned of the DOP on this date, in a news conference held by Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Norwegian Foreign
Minister Jurgen Holst. There, Rabin signed his first letter addressed to 'Chairman
Yasser Arafat'.

On 9 September 1993, the most important political revolution took place: a mutual
letter of recognition was exchanged. Arafat cited Israel's right to exist in peace and
security and denounced all forms of violence and terror. Rabin recognized the PLO as
the representative of the Palestinian people (Abbas, 1995). According to Beilin, "the
mutual recognition between the former 'murderous organization' and the 'Zionist
entity' -- a branch of world imperialism -- was signed as an irreversible act" (Beilin,
1999:14).

The signing of the DOP in Washington on 13 September 1993 was accompanied by a
grand ceremony and reported by almost all international media with much public
fanfare. It therefore radiated hopes for a new era of an 'imagined' (Anderson, 1991)
global peace. Rabin and Arafat, life-long enemies, shook hands in the presence of
worldwide media channels. Moreover, this event encapsulated "the metamorphic
change that the PLO chief had undergone, from a terrorist leader to a world
statesman" (Hiro, 1996:481).

The mutual recognition demonstrated by the signing of the DOP and the historical
handshake between Rabin and Arafat dissolved a fundamental objection on each side.
According to Kriesberg (2001), the Palestinians saw that Israeli Jews finally
recognized their existence as a people, and the Israeli Jews saw that the Palestinians at
last accepted their Jewish state. Mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO provided
the basis for the first limited autonomy for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank city of Jericho until the permanent settlement, which was to take effect in December 1999.

The DOP transformed into a working document in Cairo on 4 May 1994 (Oslo I) and on 1 July 1994, Arafat and the PLO offices left Tunis to administer the first Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho. On 28 September 1994, Rabin and Arafat signed the second Israeli-PLO accord (Oslo II) in Washington. This led to the peace treaty signed by Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan in October 1994 in the shadow of the Hamas terrorist attack which killed 22 Israelis on a bus in Tel Aviv only one day earlier. Eventually, the peace process was perceived as irreversible (Beilin, 1999; King, 1994; Peres, 1995). The signing of the treaty between Israel and Jordan marked the end of the post-Oslo period, as defined in this study.

3.12 Implications of the Oslo Accords

As noted above, the DOP signed between Israel and the PLO and the dramatic handshake between the prime minister of Israel and the head of the PLO was a historic turning point. Arafat came to be regarded as a legitimate leader, winning international recognition and the Nobel Peace Prize (December, 1994), together with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. The DOP was greeted with strong emotions from all sides. Beilin (1999) claims that the change appeared to have been accepted easily, and the handshake did not offend sensibilities in Israel or around the world. Public opinion surveys in Israel indicated that the public had come to terms with it spontaneously and appeared ready for ideological revolution. Kriesberg (2001) added that some Jews and Palestinians shed tears of joy and embraced each other. On the other hand, he argues that the secrecy that made the DOP possible also undercut its acceptance because it narrowed participation on both sides.

Beilin (1999) explains, however, that the Israeli reaction was characterized more by shock than agreement. Collective thinking and consensus seemed to be revealed again.
This might explain why opposition to the peace process was muted in the immediate aftermath of Oslo. He adds that the government saw itself as having been relieved of responsibility for engendering agreement among the public or explaining the future process, thus, not leaving room for question marks among circles distant from the peace camp.

As a result of the Oslo accords, the conflict between the coalition government and the parliamentary opposition was crystallized. The government and the peace camp were represented by the 'peace and security' concept of territorial concessions in terms of land for peace. It promoted the vision of a 'New Middle East' (Peres 1995) of peaceful coexistence and flourishing international trade with Arab countries (Sagi, 1997). In contrast, the national camp upheld the concept of Greater Israel, supported the settlers and the settlement policy, and rejected the agreement strongly.

Those two camps constituted the sharpened socio-political dispute around the 'Oslo' resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Peres, 1995; Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997a). This split between the two camps was accompanied by arguments over the notion of the 'state of Israel' versus 'the land of Israel', and the issue of the Jewish state and democracy (Gavison, 1999). This dilemma was constantly placed at the top of the media news agenda by the political elite and by the general public.

It should be emphasized that the transitory breakpoint (Azar and Cohen, 1979) in the Israeli reality affected its national identity. This was clearly split after Oslo into two distinct and separate identities, one Jewish and the other Israeli. The two camps became mutually antagonistic. On the other hand, Etzioni-Halevi (1997) argued that "there is no democracy without disagreement, neither is there democracy without some collective identity that bridges such disagreements" (Etzioni-Halevi, 1997:23).

The Oslo processes took place in the shadow of terrorist attacks, on the one hand, and ever-growing frustrations among the right-wing religious-nationalistic Jewish Israelis on the other. The latter culminated in an attack by a Jewish settler, who killed
twenty-nine Palestinians in the Cave of Machpelah in Hebron -- a shrine holy to both Jews and Muslims. Then, another Jewish militant opposed to the Oslo accords, murdered Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1994. Yitzhak Rabin paid with his life for the Oslo accords and the historic handshake with Arafat. As widely debated in the Israeli media and society after this event, the anti-Oslo rhetoric of the right-wing opposition probably contributed to the atmosphere of incitement prior to the assassination.

The story of the Oslo channel is one of historical paradoxes. A dialogue that was supposed to be absolutely secret, only to be revealed as archival material after peace materialized -- and that was, indeed, kept secret for eight months -- not only became public, but turned into a political concept among all consumers of media in Israel and worldwide.

The Oslo process, which brought about mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, also facilitated the peace agreement with Jordan, opened the way for Arab League countries to establish both official and informal relations with Israel, and brought about the suspension of the Arab economic boycott against Israel, leading to an flow of investments into Israel from around the world. All of this permitted many to dream of a New Middle East' (Hirschfeld, 2000; Peres, 1995; Beilin, 1999; Savir, 1998). The political and ideological discourses of the Israeli government and the general public were radically changed. Hirschfeld (2000) claims that “Palestinian and Israeli hard-liners who boarded the peace train were inclined to express nationalistic claims which radicalised the opposition” (Hirschfeld, 2000:261).

The peace discourse, wrapped in euphoria, changed gears in terms of innovations and propaganda (Shavit, 1997), replacing the former enemy with a new one. A natural coalition of 'peace supporters' developed: the Israeli government, members of the Israeli public who supported the Oslo accords, the Palestinians, the Americans, the ‘enlightened’ democratic countries of the Western world, and the media. These groups united to demonize Hamas and the Israeli right wing, “which joined together
to harm the peace” (Yitzhak Rabin, quoted in Yedioth and Ha’aretz, 4 July 1994). The anti-Oslo camp included religious Jews, along with Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, who maintained the religious-nationalistic ideology of Greater Israel.

In sum, concerns in Israel were, and continue to be fed by a history of violence and hatred, each party trying to delegitimize the other by policies based on myths and stereotypes while vigorously propounding the unique and exclusive merits of its own cause. For Jews, Israel has been the fulfillment of biblical prophecy and the culmination of a dream to establish and live under a government of their own choice. For the Palestinians, the dream of their homeland has yet to be realized.

Although the conflict was originally political, starting as a dispute over land, it spilled over into cultural, psychological, and ideological fields. Theoretically, I found Giddens (1993) argument pertinent, namely that real change towards permanent acceptance of coexistence is not a question of a diplomatic or political act, but one of national transformation; not a change of norms, but of values.
Part II
Chapter 4
Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

A journey into current history and the elements that incorporate the complex relations between Israel and the Palestinians via the ‘passage to peace’ calls for close examination of contemporary socio-political agents: the policymakers and the media.

In many ways, the 1993 Oslo accords marked a radical change in Israeli politics. As noted in Chapter 3, Israelis viewed the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) marked by the handshake on the White House lawn in Washington between Prime Minister Rabin and Arafat on September 1993, as a dramatic and revolutionary step. It reflected a change in government and media attitudes towards the Arab world, in general, and the Palestinians, in particular. Israeli politicians, the media and left-wing groups embraced the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with genuine enthusiasm, as a ‘real peace agreement’ and a political change. Others on the political right were threatened by it (Guyatt, 1998).

The definition and significance of ‘Oslo’ as a peace process were articulated by the government and media news discourses, thereby creating a new public agenda that conformed to their expectations. “The news ‘selection’ and ‘transformation’ are guided by reference, generally unconscious, to ideas and beliefs” (Fowler, 1991:2).

My study analyzes the media news discourse during the transformation from war culture to peace culture during the period before and after the signing of the Oslo accords. The new discourses reflected, among other things, the attitudinal change towards the ‘ultimate enemy’, and the adaptation of the media to the images of the ‘new era’. Consequently, it was necessary to examine changes as represented by
media news discourse reflecting representations of both foreign and domestic politics during two time periods within a war-torn society.

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the study, which draws on the concepts of discourse analysis, media discourses and media discourse analysis. According to Van Dijk (1988), the concept of discourse embodies three main dimensions: language use; the communication of beliefs (cognition); and interaction in social situations. Before examining these three dimensions in the news as discourse, it is important to stress that the theoretical literature relating to media discourse refers to media in the democratic world.

4.2 Discourse Definitions

Discourse is the social process of making and reproducing sense(s). The concept is widely used in a number of different disciplines, often with different purposes. Hall (1980) suggests that discourse may be seen as a specific configuration of social knowledge used by language (discursive) community within which the discourse originates. Discourse "concerns a fundamental arrangement of knowledge of beings so as to make it possible to represent them in a system of names" (Foucault, 1970:157).

Unlike language, the term 'discourse' is both a noun and a verb. Hence it is easier to retain the sense of discourse as an act. In common usage, "discourse referred both to the interactive process and the end result of thought and communication" (O'Sullivan et al., 1994:92). The Oxford English Dictionary (1988) defines discourse as a noun: "A speech, talk and/or as a verb: to give a serious or formal talk". Van Dijk (1985) argues that there are many similarities between the ways people speak and write when using language to communicate their ideas, and the same is true for listening or reading to spoken and written discourse.
Discourses are the product of social, historical and institutional formations, and meanings are produced by these institutionalized discourses (Garrett and Bell, 1998). In this sense, discourse is defined as the surface forms of texts. However, it is also a contextual system of representation that has been developed socially in order to communicate meaningfully about specific topics and actors, and functions as a context of text production (Fiske, 1992). It can be defined as the “institutionalized use of language and as a social practice” (Fairclough, 1995:7). Hartley (1982) adds another dimension, pointing out that everyday interactions are structured by social/economic/political relations, experienced through various discourses that establish our familiar routine of ‘reality’ through language. In sum, discourse is the social process of making and producing sense.

According to Van Dijk (1988), news discourse involves essentially news structures and their cognitive processing, both in production and in understanding. He suggests that ideologies reflect the basic criteria that constitute social identity and define the interest of a group.

Finally, discourse is a relatively new multidisciplinary field. Therefore, it is hard to squeeze everything known about discourse theories and practices into one simple definition, which includes concepts of language-in-use, communication, interaction, society and culture. However, discourse studies deals both with the properties of text and talk, and with what is usually called context. The notion of discourse is essentially blurry, and constitutes a complex field (Garrett and Bell, 1998).

4.3 Discourse as Language-in-Use and Social Practice

In order to understand the meaning of discourse, language-in-use as a social practice should be considered first. Language users speak or write in order to be understood and to communicate ideas. They do that, both as individuals and as members of social groups, in order to inform, persuade or impress others or in order to
accomplish other acts in social situations, institutions or social structures (Van Dijk, 1997).

Language is a system of representations, a signifying structure of culture and a social form of the linguistic patterns which people use to represent their experience. Discourse as a social practice, links language with the social, and hence highlights the understanding of language meanings that are conditioned by the signifying practices of culture. All values, beliefs, assumptions and background knowledge that people use to understand a social phenomena are shaped by social relations and struggles internal to culture (Fairclough, 1989).

In order to understand language-in-use as a representation and signification of a specific culture, it is important to trace its history. Van Dijk (1988) argues that much of his discourse analysis is formulated within the tradition of political sociology, which bears a Marxist orientation by emphasizing the established and fixed nature of the distribution of power in society (Negrine, 1994). Some discourse concepts were developed from analysis of language, such as the work of the French structuralist, Michel Foucault. O'Sullivan et al. (1994) explain that the concept of discourse attempts to combine into one term some of the structuralist theories about where meaning comes from.

The influence of structuralism has tended to focus on the problem of competing ideologies in society, to see the social production and reproduction of meaning as interwoven with the power of the dominant social group to propagate its representations as the only legitimate basis for social knowledge (Hall, 1980a). In this sense, the term ‘discourse’ is defined by Abercrombie et al. (1994) as “a domain of language use that is unified by common assumptions” (Abercrombie et al. 1994: 119). Abercrombie et al. (1994) also cite Foucault in order to describe the concept of language in different discourses of different topics as ways of talking and thinking about -- which have changed over time. They explain that, for Foucault, there may also be similarities between discourses of different topics at any given time. However, he stresses that discourses may overlap each other, but may also conflict.
Giddens (1993) found discourse relevant to analyzing certain aspects of human behaviour and useful in exploring communication and culture through the meanings of words.

Indeed, in the history of Western societies, different and often contradictory discourses have coexisted. A discourse, as a ready-made way of thinking, can rule out alternative ways of thinking and hence, preserve a particular distribution of power. This means that discourses may have an effect similar to that of ideology (Van Dijk, 1998). We can therefore assume that discourse is the social process of using language to produce texts either written or spoken, and different discourses could produce different texts and different meanings.

Fairclough (1995) suggests that readers with media studies background who analyze discourse language use as a form of social practice are able to explain and highlight contemporary processes of cultural and social changes.

In order to understand the use of discourse analysis I referred to its existing multidisciplinary theories.

4.4 Discourse Analysis

Van Dijk (1988) explains that discourse analysis provides the theoretical and methodological means for a critical approach to the interdisciplinary study of new social problems, power and inequality. It emerged from several other disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences at the beginning of the 1970s when various developments of French post-structuralism were influenced by psychoanalysis, Marxism and history. Many disciplines became engaged in the discourse analytical enterprise, interested in models of discourse production and the understanding of language users. However, for many levels and dimensions of analysis, the field still lacks the theoretical instruments about the precise structures and processes of media discourse (Van Dijk, 1997).
Discourse analytical studies distinguish various levels, units or constructs within each of these dimensions, and formulate the rules and strategies of their normative or actual uses. They function by connecting discourse structures with structures of social and cultural contexts, and strategies of cognition. Discourse analysis thus moves from macro- to micro-levels of text, context, and society, and vice versa. The concept of discourse analysis underlies the study of content, which entail messages and meanings in texts.

It should be noted that it is difficult to distinguish sharply between discourse and text. The traditional view of text as printed words developed into a far broader definition to include “spoken text and grouping items, marking boundaries, indicating historical periods, and so on” (Garrett and Bell, 1998:3). In addition, text-as-meaning is produced by negotiation between readers and text. This act takes on the interactive qualities of discourse. However, the meaning of text is produced first by negotiation between the writers and the text, and only then is meaning produced by the readers.

Furthermore, it is important to identify the aims of discourse analysis. Theories points to the major aim of discourse analysis as the production of explicit and systematic descriptions of textual and contextual dimensions, such as cognitive processes and representations of socio-cultural factors. Discourse is usually said to have a theme or topic, from which the description and the meanings could also be derived from the entire texts in context to a specific culture.

Fowler (1991) argues that news discourse could be considered in terms of stories, topics or paradigms. A discourse analyst may focus on one aspect of text or talk, or even on one general class of discourse, such as media discourse. It is also significant that text or discourse may have general, abstract, or context-free properties, which might be accounted for by some discourse grammars and properties that vary across different contexts (situations, speakers, etc.).
In sum, discourse analysis can be understood as an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices and socio-cultural practices. After reviewing the philosophical ideas that constitute the concept of discourse and discourse analysis theories, in general, the following sections examine theories that deal with media discourse and news as discourse.

4.5 Media Discourse Analysis

The media and mass communication are increasingly involved in a discourse analytical approach to various media genres in which both text and context are the actual fields of discourse analytical description and theory formation.

The term ‘discourse’ usually refers to a form of language-in-use. However, the term is increasingly popular in the media and in certain social sciences where ideas or philosophies may not pay attention to language use at all, but, to the communication of beliefs (cognition), and as a form of interaction in social situations (Van Dijk, 1988).

Much like discourse analysis, the study of mass communication is also an interdisciplinary enterprise. Despite influences from several disciplines, especially those of the social sciences, mass communication research has developed as an autonomous and self-contained discipline (Van Dijk, 1998), which determines the processes involved in the production, understanding, and uses of news in the context of mass-mediated communication.

Garrett and Bell (1998) explain that scholars in the broader field of media studies have for some time focused on media discourse. To paraphrase, this is due to four distinct but interrelated reasons:

1. The media is a source of easily available data for research.
2. Media functions represent and influence attitudes and use of language.
3. Media use can tell us about social meanings and stereotypes projected through language and communication.

4. The media reflects and influences the creation and voice of culture, politics and society.

Contemporary analysts therefore use media discourse analysis as a tool for mapping cultural and political signification and representation -- expressed in the text as well as implicit meanings that underline words, sentences or the whole text -- rather than historical or sociological facts alone.

Still, some weaknesses have been recognized. The relation between text and the practices which produced it, and relations between the media institution and social formation, are problematic because those social and institutional practices which produced the text may themselves carry meaning. Furthermore, texts are organized according to an inherent logic in which the media professionals are simply the bearers. McQuail (1994) claims that media could not adequately be theorized as merely a neutral message-carrying network. He cites Hall (1977) that "the practice and signification through language establishes maps of cultural meanings which promote the dominance of a ruling-class ideology, especially by establishing a hegemony" (Hall, cited in McQuail, 1994: 259).

Those weaknesses are reinforced by Van Dijk (1998), who proposes that ideologies reflect the basic criteria that constitute the social identity which defines the interest of a group, and may be represented as "group self schemata". These criteria include categories such as membership (who belongs to our group?), activities (what do we do), goals (why do we do this?), values (how should we do this?), position (where are we?), resources (what do we have?) (Van Dijk, 1998). These categories might influence journalists who produce the news text that constitutes news values. News production and construction are also positioned with respect to their readers, the authorities, and their typical group resource.
This creates an additional problem: It is argued that the way groups and their members represent themselves and others may be biased. Subjectivity in this case contradicts objectivity as the ideal standard of news reporting practice and the basic principle of freedom of the press as a professional standard norm in democracy.

McQuail (1994) argues that under certain conditions such as war or crisis, the freedom to report can only be accomplished in return for objectivity. On the other hand, freedom also includes the right to be biased or partial. He adds that when facts are in dispute, objective presentation can be achieved by allowing equal space for different perspectives or versions.

The advantage of using media discourse analysis is that it engages with news interpretation, processes and social interactions and also describes the cognitive and social contexts. Ironically, the systematic relationship between text and context—understanding the influence of media discourse structure—is itself influenced by different social situations. Therefore, issues such as change of knowledge, beliefs and attitudes also belong to the discourse systematic investigation (Van Dijk, 1988 and 1993; Fairclough, 1995).

Discourse also means engaging with the terms of linguistic grammar, such as syntax and semantics. Ultimately, in order to provide a full treatment of media discourse and to distinguish it from other kinds of discourses, Fowler (1991) argues that attention should be also paid to other dimensions, such as the graphic format of a page. Kress and Van Leeuwen (1998) explain that this is crucial to the organization of newspaper text because while writing, the message is expressed not only linguistically, but also through visual arrangement of marks on page. They argue that any form of textual analysis that ignores this “will not be able to account for all the meanings in texts” (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1998:186). I argue that ‘packaging’ meaning through texts is useful both for a better articulation of the meaning through a signified system of the media news layout, and for the promotion and marketing purposes of the economics-based society.
Fairclough (1995) notes that media discourse analysis focuses on the language of what might be called 'public affairs' in the media news. To paraphrase, he proposes three questions about media output:

1. How are events or volumes of subjects represented?
2. What identities are arranged for those involved in the news, such as reporters, audiences, actors referred to or interviewed?
3. What relationships are arranged between those involved: reporter-sources, reporter-politicians, etc.?

Van Dijk (1998) places special emphasis on conceptualizing news comprehension in which he defines news discourse as not just text and production, but also as a form of interaction. A full-scale analysis of discourse involves the integration of text and context, in the sense that the use of a discourse in a social situation is at the same time a social act. It is similarly the interpretation and production of a text. Thus, discourse analysis involves the "mental processes of interpretation and formulation, the retrieval and use of knowledge, and strategies of the cognitive dimension of discourse" (Van Dijk, 1988:29).

Although textual analysis is central to media analysis, it is best understood if complemented by analysis of audience response or analysis of text production. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study and could be considered for further inquiry.

Finally, it has been argued that special attention should be paid to news discourse as a specific genre of media text and its role within mass communication in a dramatically changing world. Van Dijk (1985) notes that many media studies in recent years implied meanings that represent ideological positions emphasizing that news is a specific kind of the reconstruction of reality with the specific norms and values of a society. He also articulates the professional routines of the media management of information sources, in addition to interaction among journalists in the formulation and reproduction of reality, which are all part of the complex production of news.
Foucault (1972) views discourse as a systematic form of representing a topic in a particular way at a given point of change in the history which limits other ways in which it can be represented, and consequently shapes public perceptions and social practice. It is referred to as "linguistic and non-linguistic conditions which make possible the emergence of a specific type of discourse at a particular historical junction" (Hall, 1992:291). This means that discourse does not emerge in a vacuum, but is produced cognitively according to a certain social practice.

This concept was used in this study of the news discourse analysis in Israel before and after the Oslo accords. It was necessary to take into account the social, political and historical context of the Jewish nation which has gradually developed into a nation-state, from the beginning of modern Zionism until the Oslo peace process, incorporating the prevailing images, myths and stereotypes, past and present. These notions are defined by Hartley (1982) as the determinants which shape "what it says, the way it develops, the status it enjoys, the people who use it, the uses to which it is put", and so on (Hartley, 1982: 6).

I refer below to the concepts of ideological and political discourses that I believe to be relevant, whether they worked explicitly or implicitly, intentionally or otherwise, in the Israeli news discourse before and after Oslo. These discourses undoubtedly played important roles in politics and the media, especially after the signing of the Oslo accords -- part of a process that symbolized the desire for an end to conflict in the Middle East, in general, and between Israelis and Palestinians, in particular.

One question, however, remains unresolved: Did the news discourse after the Oslo accords reflect a singular event in Israeli history or a transitory breakpoint, known in international relations as a "step in the process of transition from war to peace" (Miller, 2001:199-221). This issue clearly requires careful consideration but is also beyond the scope of this study.
4.6 Ideological Discourse in the Media

In order to examine the complex relationship between ideology and media discourse, it is necessary to consider how ideology is expressed by news discourse structure. Han (1998) claims that ideology can be defined as the "belief structure" of the society. In his view, "communication cannot occur without reflecting the ideology of the individual or society in which (s)he is a member" (Han, 1998: 14).

Jalbert (1983) argues that ideology is regarded as a routine feature of the social production of news. Gamson et al. (1992) also assume that a wide variety of media messages can also teach values, ideologies and beliefs whether intentionally or not.

In short, the concept of ideology has become central in the study of the media, in particular, and communication, in general. "Ideology means the social relations of signification in class societies.... This often refers to knowledge and representations characteristics of/or in the interest of a class or a group" (O'Sullivan et al., 1994:139-43).

Elements of social structures (such as groups, institutions, power or inequality), as well as the everyday social practices of discourse and other forms of interaction among people as group members, are systematically related to the social construction of their minds (Van Dijk, 1988). Although Van Dijk refers to opinion articles, I argue that the everyday practices of Israeli journalists formed and indeed, changed news discourse according to their own social ideology and political inclinations, which are reflected in the news articles. As Hartley (1982) puts it: "News discourse is a very specific example of 'language-in-use', and of socially structured meaning" (Hartley, 1982: 7).

In order to inform the public, journalists (including editors and correspondents) who create news, either by editorial policy or by professional norms, use news values that are positioned with respect to their readers, the authorities, and, their typical group resource (information). This is because the social and institutional practices which
produce the text are themselves not free of meaning and are bound up with forms of understanding regulated by institutional ideologies and professional commonsense. The nature of the relations between media and society depends on circumstances of time and place (Fairclough, 1995). The application of this argument is considered in the Israeli case study.

Van Dijk (1988) proposes that ideologies reflect the basic criteria that constitute social identity and define the interest of a group. That is why it is important to first answer the questions: Who? What? Why? How? Where? I believe that those parameters refer to journalistic norms; they are also important to the researcher. Journalists do not overtly and formally identify themselves, (at least, not explicitly), with any defined social or political trends in order to obtain the norms of objectivity. However, Negrine (1994) argues that news is the expression of ideology; it provides the view of ‘reality’ through the interests of the dominating power.

Hall (1996) explains that all ideologies function through the category of subject. This does not mean that journalists deliberately plan to alter people’s consciousness, but rather that dominant institutions work through values, conceptions of the world and symbol systems in order to legitimize the current events through widespread use of ideas “about the way things are, how the world ‘really’ works and should work” (Lye, 1997:1). Since it can be argued that discourse is constructed of various currents of ideologies, it becomes a battleground upon which “ideological struggles are waged in and over language” (Fairclough, 1989:77).

This study focuses on the explicit messages reflected in news discourse analysis in context with the political domain on security, peace and political news discourses during the periods before and after the Oslo process.
4.7 Political Discourse in the Media

The concept of politics describes the attitudes, beliefs and rules that guide a political culture and process. It defines the interaction of different social systems (Abercrombie et al., 1984). The nature of politics in different times and places is a matter of how these systems interact differently. Indeed, it affects the relation between media and politics, which have mutual influence on the political discourse.

The interaction between the political system and the media in general, and in Israel, in particular, are complex. It would be superficial to analyze the political and ideological discourses without reference to the political system and their relations to the socio-political conditions (see Chapter 3). The analysis, however, gave rise to the following questions:

1. What, at a given point in time, was the space taken up by the political discourse in the media news?
2. What were the main points of tension, the main flow and the main directions of movement that provided different images through the news discourse?

According to Negrine (1994), political information provides both images and texts that form public perceptions and responses to events. Fairclough (1995) labels these messages 'mediatized political discourse'. He refers to the classification and articulation of voices, discourses and genres in mediatized politics. He explains that in accordance with Bourdieu, the political discourse is a field associated with struggle, internally, to produce a coherent political discourse, and, externally, a discourse that is associated with trust and support from the public.

Fairclough (1995) follows Bourdieu who explains that professional politicians have become increasingly cut off from the people they claim to represent, and the discourse produced by them is doubly determined; internally, by its position in the autonomous field of politics, and, externally by its relationship to the world beyond politics. In particular, news discourse radiates on communication between politicians and the public because the latter rely heavily on information from the mass media.
Consequently, Fairclough (1995) suggests that media discourse analysis needs twin focuses on particular instances, i.e., particular texts (communicative events), and on the order of mediatized political discourse. He argues that according to Bourdieu, "it reproduces or changes the social world by reproducing or changing people's representations of it and the principles of classification which underlie them" (Fairclough, 1995: 182). He also argues that discourse analysis works simultaneously on representation and classification of reality, and representations and classifications of people.

The aim of classifications is to determine the character of groups, individuals and species into general units that enable them to fit together and to form a table.

These characters are drawn from the total representation of the individuals concerned: they are the analysis of that representation which constitutes an order...It is not because a character occurs frequently in the structures observed that it is important; it is because it is functionally important that is often encountered (Foucault, 1970:226-29).

The representation of events and actors reveals how news production and reporting reflect changes in the social world and create political discourses. This can be observed by the total frequencies in which topics and actors occur, and the volume they enjoy in the news media.

Although Foucault did not apply it to the news media, power is interpreted as referring to political and media institutions, as Fairclough (1998) defined the mediatized political discourse. He claims that media give unjustified prominence to the official political system. "Journalists rely to a great degree on official sources and routine channels" (Gamson, 1992:376). Wolfsfeld (1997), however, explains that the ability of government to promote policies through the news media "varies over time and political circumstances" (Wolfsfeld 1997: 29). Ironically, on closer examination, the news media turn out to be an integral part of the "social administration of domination...speaking the language of power...reportorial subsystem of the dominant socio-economic system and give no room to alternative voices" (Bruck, 1989:111).
It should also be noted that media corporations and capitalist organizations which own the means of news production can campaign and expose ideologies which help to promote the political or social directions of a country (Hartley, 1982). Since political and economic elites have easy access to journalists, editors and media owners, this reflects the social structure outside the newsroom (Negrine, 1994). Clearly, such power may lead to a dangerous imbalance and inequality, and may eventually contradict the concepts of the free press and the freedom of expression.

In sum, Fairclough (1998) argues that political discourse should be located within fields of social practice and in relation to social and cultural forces and processes that shape and transform them.

According to Tunstall (1996), in Western democracies, much of the potential political and partisan power of television has been deliberately neutered in line with consensual public interest. Newspapers, however, exercise a continuing prerogative both to bias the news and to slant the comment. It is the newspapers that first spill the politician's blood; only then does television swoop into the action replay.

Fairclough (1995, 1998) uses the terms 'order of discourse' to describe the processes of social and cultural change affecting the media and other social domains. However, discourse cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the concept of news as discourse. This means, the interaction between discourse and the news values they entail, as discussed in the following section.

4.8 News as Discourse

The role of news media in political issues, especially in political conflicts has received much government and public attention in recent years. The news media have become a central arena for political conflicts (Wolfsfeld, 1997), in general, and in Israel, in particular.
According to Reeves (1993), in the middle of the nineteenth century, the concept of news was originally understood as current opinion, with newspapers presenting ideological debates and political positions on the growth of new nations. The changing economic structure of independent states and the link between states changed the concept of news. New factors, which gradually affected the concept of news (Reeves, 1993) include the eager demand for new information about recent and immediate events. Bell (1998) explains that news is central to power in modern societies. Indeed, in the age of globalization involving high-speed information, knowledge relies heavily on the media and mostly on the news.

Furthermore, Fowler (1991) stresses that news provides a particularly important example of the power of all language in the social construction of reality. However, even today, the notion of news remains ambiguous and the public have to relate to the general notion of news, meaning new information about events, ideas, things or persons.

Negrine (1994) suggests that “events do not get into the news simply by happening, no matter how frantically” (Negrine, 1994: 75). Events need to be recognized as coming from a known and trusted representative source and seen as newsworthy. The term ‘newsworthy’ is problematic as it defines the news values by which to select an event or an issue. McQuail (1994) suggests that a great deal of newsgathering revolves around people. Often it is exclusively from prominent individuals that journalists obtain information and scoops. On the other hand, many news stories are ready-made and used by reporters through prepared statements of spokespersons and public relations practitioners representing interests that are either political, ideological or commercial. When dealing with peace and security topics and actors, information is known to derive from elite institutions.

The term ‘newsworthy’ also raises questions regarding objectivity in writing the news and the power to promote public awareness, debate and public opinion. Those terms are also defined in the concept of agenda setting. The hypothesis of the agenda-setting function was that the mass media set the public agenda by shaping the
most salient issues of daily life in relation to political information. Severin and Tankard (1992) claims that the news media force attention on certain issues, constantly presenting objects and suggesting what individuals should think about, know about and have feelings about (Lang and Lang, 1959, cited by Severin and Tankard, 1992).

It should be noted that it is the responsibility of newsmakers to conform to a variety of professional norms and methods that provide order (Schudson, 1989), such as the pyramidal structure described by Van Dijk (1988) as news schemata. He defines this as a ‘top-down’ structure with high-level information relating to each topic appearing first. Golding and Elliott (1979) add that news is manufactured, distributed and sold through a chain of more or less accepted professional practices.

Lexical and semantic implications may involve evaluations based on the ideology of the journalist. According to Fowler (1991), genuine news articles may feature opinions, despite the ideological belief of many journalists that news gives facts and not opinion. The question to be addressed here is whether news merely report facts, as they are supposed to do, or whether they are produced in the service of either powerful interests or self-interest in which their content and semantics are transformed to a cultural discourse.

From the professional point of view, the notion of news values has often been used to explain the selection of news items and their chances of being published. The very use of the notion of value suggests the location of news values in social cognition. They are values about the newsworthiness of events or discourse shared by the professionals, (Lester, 1980), and indirectly by the public of the news media (Atwood, 1970). “They provide the cognitive basis for decisions about selection, attention, understanding, representation, recall and the uses of news information in general” (Van Dijk, 1988:121).

Hartley (1990) adds an additional dimension, arguing that news comes to us as the preexisting discourse of an impersonal social institution that is also an industry. He
also claims that news as discourse is a very specific example of language-in-use, of socially structured meaning. This means that news is composed of the comprehension of linguistic, social and cultural determinants and transforms raw material into a cultural news product, which a certain society can accept as familiar.

This obviously raises questions regarding impartiality. Does news discourse produce the public discourse? Is the news biased towards one political position? Is it a mouthpiece to those in power? Does news produce or translate events into self-meaning system and scale of values? Ultimately, the question of impartiality cannot be understood in isolation from the political institutions and the actors involved in making the news. However, it is also linked to the issue of objectivity, as there is little chance of achieving a value-free assessment of value freedom (McQuail, 1994).

Addressing this point, I agree with Negrine (1994) who argues that in general, professional news tend to bias the authority as it is an important source for news. On the other hand, he argues, that journalists naturally and inevitably carry their own ideologies, so we cannot expect events to be reported freely and without bias.

4.9 News Values

News is considered as part of complex communication processes. It is therefore essential to understand news values and how they are used in the news discourse. News values are defined as “the professional codes used in selection, construction and presentation of news stories in corporately produced mainstream press and broadcasting” (O'Sullivan et al., 1994:201). They select and prioritize stories for media coverage to be about government policies, economy, domestic and foreign affairs, which include conflicts, disasters or sport.

The traditional news values classification was suggested by Galtung and Ruge (1965) in their classic study of foreign news in the Scandinavian press in order to explain the selection of news items and their chances of being published (Bell, 1998). They
propose twelve categories that govern the media selection of news: frequency; threshold; unambiguity; meaningfulness (cultural proximity and relevance); consonance; unexpectedness; continuity; composition; reference to elite nations; reference to elite persons; personalization; and negativity.

Although these are crucial in the selection of events as news, Negrine, (1994) argues that these values makes certain assumptions about society. It is regarded as politically fragmented into distinct spheres (elite persons), composed of individuals who are ‘newsworthy’ (usually associated with only one social sphere), hierarchical (centralized socially and regionally), and ‘consensual by nature’ (with the notion of one nation, one people) (Negrine, 1994: 81).

Van Dijk (1988) revised the classical news values of the informal paradigm of Western journalists into a systematic and explicitly cognitive definition. He argues that the notion of value suggests the location of news values in social cognition for the uses of news information because of economic terms of news production, assumed beliefs and opinions of both powerful news actors and the public determined agendas. He argues that the topics and the ideological orientation of news is formulated or implied by the selection and treatment of stories and by the mutual relationship with the social and political elite and accessibility to sources. His argument implies that the ‘agenda-setting’ concept can not be excluded when analyzing news media, moreover, when analyzing news discourse.

I found the revised news values based on Van Dijk (1988) to be the most useful. Van Dijk (1988) divided the classical news values into seven categories, summarized as follows:

1. **Novelty.** News should be about new events. The model conveyed by a story must contain information not yet present in the current models of the reader. Consequently, this may involve updating of present models.

2. **Recency.** Events should be new in terms of timing, i.e., have just happened, within a margin of between one and a few days. Recency is also a major factor in attention, interest and recall, both for events and for texts.
3. **Presupposition.** The evaluation of novelty and recency presupposes knowledge and beliefs. Events and discourse can be understood on the basis of vast amounts of previous information. Much of this information in news may be left implicit. In other words, novelty in the news is narrow and limited.

4. **Consonance.** News should be compatible with socially shared norms, values and attitudes in which existing opinions are involved. It is easier to understand and to integrate news that are compatible with the attitudes of journalists and readers, i.e., with the ideological consensus in a given society or culture. News is also about people, countries, or actions that accord with our dominant attitudes, but such news has less chance of being covered unless it confirms to negative schemata about such subjects. Although news articles are generally selected according to ideological consensus, some may be more interesting and memorable precisely because they deviate from the consensus.

5. **Relevance.** In general, information is preferred about events or actors that are relevant for the reader. This information provides models that may be used for the interpretation of other discourse or for the planning and execution of social action and interaction. Relevance is also determined by the interests of those controlling the social system.

6. **Deviance and Negativity.** Best known, perhaps, is the general value of negativity. Much news discourse is about negative events such as problems, scandals, conflict, crime, war or disaster. These various forms of negativity in the news might be seen as expressions of personal fears, which provide belief and tension by negative events and are directly meshed with emotional defence.

7. **Proximity.** This news value includes knowledge presupposition and relevance: we know about our own country through direct experience and on other experiences through media messages which provide information. This information leads to ready made frames and stereotypical attitudes of updated knowledge. It also positions the priorities of the relevant events and actors within a familiar location.

These news discourse values are interdisciplinary and mutually integrated. To conclude, news discourse is so complex that concentration on one aspect, such as news stories inevitably leads to neglect of others. That is why most news values as
Van Dijk (1988) suggests, should be used in interdisciplinary terms because they involve economic, sociological, and psychological criteria of newsworthiness.

News values have culturally specific discourse codes in which socio-political prominence and the power of elite actors and their events are reproduced and confirmed by the press. Together, the values listed above convey messages which entail the relevancy of the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, actions, personalization and results, values that story-tellers use to create a tale (Bird and Dardenne, 1988).

This study stresses that the thematic discourse analysis of news schemata, as suggested by Van Dijk (1988), show that newsworthy topics and actors can be read through the news lead only. He argues that the lead carries a summary function of the news text. It defines the overall situation and indicates to the reader the preferred overall meaning of the text. Clearly, the lead indicates the primary topics and actors in which the discourse meaning is explicit. However, in order to understand news discourse fully, the secondary topic and even tertiary topics and actors should be examined in order to reveal the interplay between them, and thus, to interpret the implicit meanings of the text and its context.

Many scholars argue that news should be studied primarily as a form of public discourse (Van Dijk, 1985; Fairclough, 1995). Hence, this study initially concerned primary and secondary topics and actors represented in the news texts that were generated by the news discourse in the newspapers. In this way, the analysis of news presentation contributes to an understanding of social practices and ideologies relating to myths, stereotypes and images in the collective memory of the nation. Universal methods of news making and the institutions of the news media (Van Dijk, 1988) in the context of political institutions are linked, however, to the cultural and ideological perspectives of a specific society. These points will be addressed in the following chapters.
Chapter 5
Methodology

A. Research Methods

5.1 Introduction

This study explores the implicit ideological construction of meanings that changed between two specific periods of time, before and after the signing of the Oslo accords. It combines traditional quantitative content analysis with textual analysis of news discourse. The first section of this chapter examines the methodology of content analysis, and explains why quantitative and qualitative methods were integrated as the most effective tools for data collection and analysis. The second section outlines the research design and describes how these methods were applied.

5.2 Content Analysis

Content analysis has been developed as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the content of communication. It involves statistical “analysis of frequencies in manifest content of messages using the identification and counting of key units of content as the basis of its method” (O’Sullivan et al., 1994:62). “Content analysis assumes that the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. This assumption implies that the frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process, under specific conditions” (Berelson, 1996:205).

O’Sullivan et al. (1994) explain that the results of content analysis are usually expressed in percentage form rather than in raw figures. Content analysis was
designed in order to bring the severity and rules of scientific research to the study of human and social phenomena (Deacon et al., 1999).

The procedure of content analysis is based on the assumption that the link between objects mentioned in the text will be reasonably evident and clear, and the frequency of occurrence of chosen references will validly express the 'meaning' of the text in an objective way (McQuail, 1994). Ultimately, it aims to verify or confirm the hypothesized relationships (Altheide, 1996) between text and context and consequently to produce a 'big picture' over a large aggregates of texts (Deacon et al., 1999). O'Sullivan et al. (1994) add that a comparison between two sets of figures is usually necessary in order to describe meaningful results of a statistically constituted sample of texts.

I found content analysis best suited to the investigation of the essential political and/or ideological insights in the news discourse of politics, peace and security issues over two time periods. This follows the explanation of Kaplan, cited by Berelson (1996), that the technique of content analysis should "attempt to characterize the meaning in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion defined" (Kaplan, 1943, cited by Berelson, 1996: 202).

In order to quantify a variable accurately and reliably, it is necessary to select categories; this is the most problematic part of content analysis. The need to contain all relevant categories that correspond to the meanings understood by communicators, analysts and the audience (Deacon et al., 1999) presents a further challenge, due to the issue of objectivity. Quantitative content analysis has also been criticized for restricting itself to manifest and counting units. It is therefore necessary to supplement this with research methods that allow for textual analysis.
5.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative content analysis is designed to explore and assess things that cannot easily be summarized numerically. It allows for new dimensions and aspects to continually emerge for further examination (Hansen, 1992) and to explore the implicit meanings they carry. Qualitative content analysis relies heavily on interpretation and analysis of how topics and actors are represented in the text and what they do and say (Hornig Priest, 1996).

Mixing traditional quantitative content analysis -- beginning with the design of a coding schedule and applying to the text -- with a supplementary method of qualitative content analysis could be a more powerful means of interpreting the meanings. However, Hansen (1992) argues that a sharp line cannot be drawn between quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper texts. However, he explains that traditional quantitative content analysis begins with the design of predefined categories that are applied to the text, and qualitative analysis allows new aspects to emerge from the text. Thus, qualitative content analysis offers a greater flexibility in exploring patterns in the texts, hence patterns and messages conveyed through the text in context.

5.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of Content Analysis

The main advantage of content analysis is that it can be applied to large bodies of text or content (Hansen, 1992). Berelson (1996) claims that quantitative description of communication content not only provides numerical data, but is also meaningful because the frequency of occurrences of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process, under certain conditions. Moreover, quantitative methods are sometimes regarded as more objective than qualitative ones (Hornig Priest, 1996).
Another major advantage of content analysis is that it uses clear definitions and systematic procedures to analyze large corpora of relevant media texts (Hansen, 1996). On the other hand, scanning a large quantity of texts in the newspapers, one may get distracted and miss references relevant to the subject under scrutiny; it might be “easily misused and misunderstood”, hence “the danger of fragmentation and decontextualising of meanings” (Hansen, 1992:2-5).

O’Sullivan et al. (1994) stress that the problem of objectivity extends beyond decisions of what to count and how to categorize. Firstly, constructing a category before applying it involves the risk of imposing the meaning-system of the researcher rather than obtaining it from the text (McQuail, 1994). Secondly, decisions regarding the size and sample also reflect subjective judgment. Moreover, the interpretation and production of meanings of the statistically processed results cannot be value free (Deacon et al., 1999). McQuail (1994) claims that it is easy to use qualifying factors of reliability that might consequently be low in objectivity and ambiguous.

While some scholars regard quantitative and qualitative approaches to text analysis as mutually incompatible (Deacon et al., 1999), others claim that they can be used productively in a complementary fashion (Hansen 1992; Van Dijk, 1988 Altheide, 1996; Hornig Priest, 1996). Finally, Wolf (1988) claims that recent media research tends to move from the analysis of contents to an examination of ‘media discourse’.

5.5 A Discourse Content Analysis Approach

As noted in Chapter 4, discourse is defined as the social production of social, historical and institutional formations; meanings are produced by these institutionalized discourses which reflect power relations. It follows that textual analysis can be employed to examine power relations and may be traced in texts, such in media (O’Sullivan et al. 1994). Like content analysis, it also needs systematic structures. Hence, news discourse analysis begins with categorization of notions as themes or topics (Van Dijk, 1988) and frames which are crucial in the overall
understanding of the meaning derived from a written language use (Fairclough, 1996) in defining situations (Altheide, 1996).

Hansen (1992) explains that defining the range of topics, issues or discourse-clusters which are employed in the text is problematic almost regardless of the subject to be analyzed in the newspaper. Altheide (1996) argues similarly that it is difficult to specify themes or topics for research purposes, especially for the categorization of the most important information in a large stretch of talk or text (Van Dijk, 1988).

Van Dijk (1988) therefore suggests following the textual thematic structure of news discourse in which topics are a property of the meaning of a text and are defined as the summary of the most important information given in the whole text, not exclusively by individual words or sentences. In sum, discourse analysis aims to interpret meaning derived from the systematic relationships between text and context.

In order to explore the implicit ideological construction of how meanings have been changed between two time periods, before and after Oslo, I used traditional quantitative content analysis in combination with textual analysis of news discourse (Van Dijk, 1988). Both methods offer systematic ways of exploring the meaning of documents (Deacon et al., 1999) and were further complemented by qualitative analysis of textual quotations from news articles and in-depth personal interviews.

I therefore combined the traditional method of the arguably objective quantitative content analysis (as discussed above) with the interpretation of text and context of news stories by discourse analysis, as both, "text and context are the actual field of discourse analytical description and theory formation" (Van Dijk, 1988:23).
5.6 Comparing Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis

The interpretation of meaning derived from discourse analysis is the outcome of systematic relationships between text and context. Van Dijk (1983) argues that features of discourse analysis are relative to content analysis. He mentions four differences between the two methods that can be summarized as follows:

1. Discourse analysis examines a media message as a discourse in its own right, in different from content analysis which aims to find the relations between content of messages and customs of the reporter and/or the reading public.

2. Discourse analysis aims to explain qualitative data rather than quantitative data, although it may be based on explicit qualitative analysis of quantitative measures.

3. Discourse analysis pays attention to implicit semantic structures in texts in order to explain underlying meanings rather than countable data of content analysis, such as words, phrases, sentences, stylistic features or the whole text.

4. Discourse analysis is part of cognitive and social theory about strategies that underlie the production and understanding of media discourse. It tries to explain how media discourse is represented and understood rather than correlating data.

5.7 Drawbacks of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis, like other research methods, involves certain drawbacks: Firstly, the assignment of topics within a text might be biased by different knowledge and beliefs (Van Dijk, 1983). The interpretation and representation processes also have a subjective dimension. Furthermore, strategies may be applied in various ways and depend on personal characteristics of the language user and personal models. Due to different biographies, knowledge and beliefs about a situation, information may be processed in different ways.

An additional point is that different language users may notice other information types in a text that could be assigned local or global meanings. Van Dijk (1988)
argues that a dialogue stimulated by news texts is often controversial because readers depend on beliefs constructed from years of understanding, experiences and actions.

5.8 From Theory to Practice

A preliminary review of the theoretical literature is crucial to reflect on ways to exclude topics that are not relevant to the research problem. Hansen (1992) defined three key steps for content analysis, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Definition of the research problem.
2. Sampling and text retrieval.
3. Analysis and interpretation.

He argues that “aspects of texts should be examined or how those dimensions should be interpreted” derives from a theoretical framework, which includes the social context of the text analyzed.

This study used the following procedures:

1. Selection of the media and sample.
2. Definition of analytical categories.
3. Construction of a coding schedule.
5. Preparation of data for analysis.

In considering discourse analysis, the question arises over what “sorts of things would be straightforward but nonetheless significant to quantify in an analysis” (Deacon et al., 1999:123). O’Sullivan et al. (1994) add that categorization, ie., how to choose and classify the units to be counted, is the most problematic part of content analysis. The complexity of categorization is emphasized by Berelson (1996), who concludes that “content analysis stands or falls by its categories” (Berelson, 1996: 205).
Van Dijk (1988) notes that empirical research shows that news discourse routinely features categories in which both journalists and readers use, at least implicitly, news schemata in the production and understanding of news because systematic content analysis is inherent in the thematic structure of the news stories. He explains that topics and their categories are realized step-by-step throughout the news text in the prominent headline position or in the lead paragraphs of press reports in newspapers and the most relevant information comes first from top to bottom (Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijk, 1988).

Secondary topics are identified by a logical order of actors and events included in the information. Altheide (1996) argues that “communication and media formats enable us to recognize various frames that give a general definition of what is before us” (Altheide, 1996:30). He suggests that news texts should be conceptualized as ‘frames’ or ‘superthemes’ as the frequent occurrences of information, while ‘themes’ are the frequent typical category that run through much of the news text.

Consequently, a clear formulation of some qualifying criteria for identifying relevant items are the bases for the precoding (Altheide, 1996), or preparation of the coding schedule (Hansen et al., 1998). Clear guidelines for assessing prominence before the data is collected are the bases for analysis. Next comes the coding manual that contains the codes (numbers) of each variable listed on the coding sheet (Deacon et al., 1999). The pilot study can then be conducted.

A pilot study (Hansen et al., 1998) or ‘road test’ (Deacon et al., 1999) on select examples is important for testing and fine-tuning the coding schedule on the one hand, but also for assessing the difficulties of certain categories and/or how systematic, accurate and predictable they are. The descriptive statistics of topics and actors’ categories as defined by discourse analysis concept of what “accounts” (Van Dijk, 1988; Altheide, 1996), enabled me to draw a map of the ‘reality’ of news discourse in two distinct time periods. Hence, I chose to examine the periods before and after the signing of the Oslo accords.
The interpretation of meanings within the news texts and context were supported by discourse analysis theories and complemented by randomly selected quotations from news articles, according to the qualitative content analysis approach. As Altheide (1996) suggests: “Your best material will come from descriptions and even quotations from the document”. He also notes: “Qualitative analysis relies a good deal on text and tend to be less precise and fairly short” (Altheide, 1996: 27). Furthermore, in-depth personal interviews were conducted with some of the Israeli politicians who initiated, designed and actually implemented the secret negotiations leading to the Oslo accords and with a selection of Israeli media professionals.

The upshot is that text and news discourse carry messages that reflect certain themes and frames (Van Dijk, 1988). These are described as “the most powerful features of public information and the study of their origins, how they change over time, and their taken-for-granted use in everyday life is essential to understanding the relevance of communication media for our lives” (Altheide, 1996:31).

Van Dijk (1988) suggests a four-step theoretical framework for comprehending the news. These are summarized as follows:

1. **Perception and attention** to a given news text. This involves identification of newspaper formats, news items and categorization of headlines. It accompanies other information that interferes with the textual processing.
2. **Reading** with attention to special topics according to a top-to-bottom strategy.
3. **Understanding** — decoding and interpreting headlines and leads that together function as summary which includes time, location, participants and events or actions. This requires local knowledge of political and social conditions.
4. **Text representation** of news is hierarchical and assumes that information from each topic is filed according to its respective primary theme or frames.

Van Dijk argues that these key steps can be undertaken simultaneously while processing data and can be combined to facilitate interpretations which are hypothetical until confirmed or denied. These steps produce empirical results that are integrated with knowledge of social, political and historical conditions.
B. Fieldwork

5.9 Introduction to Fieldwork

The fieldwork approach adopted an interdisciplinary orientation based on social science theories with particular focus on contemporary history and mass communication research. The analysis focused on text and context in the news articles related to security, peace and political topics and actors that were involved in conflicts regarding Israeli foreign and domestic politics.

News media in general, and in Israel, in particular, play a central role in the political conflicts in which competition over news making is pervasive (Wolfsfeld, 1997). It is accompanied by struggle over ideological discourse as particular texts take up elements of different discourses and articulate them (O’Sullivan et al., 1994).

My research focuses on a specific time period from 20 January 1993 until 31 October 1994. This was segmented into two subsidiary periods:

1. Pre-Oslo period: 20 January 1993 through 26 August 1993 (7 months)
2. Post-Oslo period: 3 September 1993 through 31 October 1994 (13 months)

The pre-Oslo period dates from the first secret meeting between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Beilin, 1999; Savir, 1998) which took place at the time when the PLO was still delegitimized as a national organization and as a potential partner to negotiate peace.

The post-Oslo period followed immediately the first period and was marked by letters of mutual recognition exchanged between Yasser Arafat, as the representative of the PLO, and the prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin -- communication that was revealed in a press conference. This was followed by the ceremony with the historical handshake between the two leaders in Washington (13 September 1993), which marked the transitory breakpoint in which the Oslo accords were signed. The second phase continues through the advent of Palestinian self-government in Gaza,
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and until some days after
the moving ceremony when the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed
(26 October 1994).

5.10 Goals of the Study

This study examines whether there was a change in the singularity of the Israeli news
discourse, and its implications for the construction of Israeli national identity during
the transition from war to peace in two separate periods of time between 1993-1994.
My goal was to understand the discourse of the media news in representing topics
and actors at a given point of change (Foucault, 1967) in the history of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. I also investigated the specific kind of news discourse that
constructed the change in the news media reality (Van Dijk, 1985) pre- and post-
Oslo, with the Oslo accords as the transitory breakpoint. It should be stressed that the
goal of the study was to map and describe news ‘reality’. ie. reality as reflected by
news rather than reality per se.

In order to achieve the research goal, some questions were outlined. The central
research questions were as follows:
1. How did the news media present frames, actors and topics relating to security,
   peace and political issues?
2. What meaning did it represent through the news discourse before and after the
   signing of the Oslo accords?

Following Fairclough (1995), additional questions were formulated:
1. How was the world represented through the news (events, volumes of topics) in
   the context of security, peace and politics during the pre- and post-Oslo periods?
2. What identities were set up for the actors (domestic and foreign) in the news that
   referred to ‘enemies’ or ‘partners’, pre- and post-Oslo?
Secondary questions followed:
1. To what extent did news in the selected newspapers help to legitimize government policy through the topics and actors relating to security, peace and politics?
2. Was it possible to distinguish via the topics and actors covered in the news text, the political and ideological changes in attitudes towards the traditional enemy and accordingly, towards Israelis opposed the Oslo accords?
3. How did coverage of government policies on peace and security relate to news values in the context of political policy and attitudes toward the Palestinians and the Israeli public?

5.11 Selection of Media and Genres

Despite the importance of television, radio and the Internet as sources of information, my study relates to newspapers because “the printed press remains very important and regular readers of newspapers continue to attach a great deal of weight to the print medium” (Dekel, 1996). Moreover, Caspi and Limor (1999) explain that the printed press maintains an advantage over radio and television; linguistic and topical variation allow them to cater to the different needs of identifiable and homogeneous groups such as ethnic or socio-economic groups.

One key power of newspapers is to impose a ‘political crisis’ definition of current events (Negrine, 1994). Newspapers, however, “exercise a continuing prerogative both to bias the news and to slant the commentary” (Tunstall, 1996:1). Newspapers are able to cover more news items and devote more space to details. Lily Galili, a leading journalist in *Ha'aretz*, explained the importance of newspaper news as follows:

Politicians usually leak information first to newspaper journalists as they can easily stay 'unidentified'. The journalist writes that a prime source said.... In addition, the reader can return once again to the newspaper and manage a dialogue with what he reads, which he cannot do with the snapshots of television (Lily Galili, interviewed on 12 December 2001).
Van Dijk (1988) argues that how news stories are produced, what they concentrate on, how they are put together and who takes interest in them, depend to some extent on national habits and conventions. In this regard, the Israeli public is regarded as “addicted to news” (Lehman-Wilzig et al., 1994:111). For example, over 85% of Israeli adults read a newspaper on a daily basis (Gallup Israel, 1992).

This study is concerned with the genres of news in the printed press, ie., with news discourse in the Israeli daily newspapers. There are few discourse studies of newspaper news (Van Dijk, 1988) which provide insights into the structure of news in the press based on a vast collection of articles (Van Dijk, 1997).

I limited my application to ‘news’ discourse in the printed press, thereby neglecting other newspaper genres and other media channels, such as television and radio broadcasts. Advertisements, weather reports and other practical information about events and issues unrelated to security, peace and politics were excluded. I also paid less attention to other properties of discourse characterized in terms of linguistic grammar, stylistic or rhetorical analysis or the graphic format of news pages. Rather, I was concerned with the specific interpretation of the whole text of the news articles.

News was selected as the focus of this study because it is regarded as the most prestigious of daily media genres, and its role is at the centre of the exercise of power in modern societies (Garrett and Bell, 1998). News is also the central ingredient of a newspaper (McQuail, 1994). It presents something not yet known to the reader and, thus directs the reader’s attention to the most important message and issue (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1998). Study of the character of news stories as social products might contribute to a deeper understanding of public discourse and concepts (Altheide, 1996). Furthermore, news, whether heard on radio, read in newspapers or seen on television gains its shape from the characteristics of the medium in which it appears (Hartley, 1982).

The study focuses on news reports as presented in the first two pages of the two major newspapers in Israel. The front-page news orients readers to the structure of
the ideal/real world and presents them with different degrees of salience and framing, thereby evaluating them (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1998). The front page is also regarded as the “newspaper’s shop window” (Limor and Man, 1997:480). The second page, i.e. the inside front page, is also a news page and often carries news articles that continue from the front page (Limor and Man: 1997).

5.12 Selection of Newspapers

This study involves the two leading daily newspapers in Israel, namely *Ha'aretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, which together constitute 65% of the daily readership during the week. The circulation is segmented as follows: 54.4% of the daily readership reads *Yedioth* on weekdays and 67% at the weekend; 11% of the total population reads *Ha'aretz* (Limor and Caspi, 1999:79-89). (It should be noted, however, that the study did not involve the ultra-Orthodox-affiliated press, nor those newspapers published in languages other than Hebrew.)

The choice of these media allows for comparison of ‘quality’ versus ‘popular’ press. The slogan of *Ha'aretz* is “the newspaper for the people who thinks” while *Yedioth* claims to be “the newspaper of the state” and promotes itself as being read by almost every household in Israel (Caspi and Limor, 1999; Lehman-Wilzig, 1994).

*Ha'aretz*

*Ha'aretz* is the oldest private newspaper in Israel, was established in 1918 and is the country’s most prestigious daily. Its status resembles that of elite publications such as *The New York Times*, and *The Times* of London. The newspaper maintains liberal and dovish attitudes (Lehman-Wilzig, 1994), and is identified with an anti-nationalistic line in political and security issues. It advocates territorial compromise with the Palestinians and supports the peace process.

*Ha'aretz* enjoys wide circulation within political, intellectual and business circles, and serves as mediator among political, economic and social elites. The high profile
of the readership accords it influence beyond the scope of its circulation (Caspi and Limor, 1999; Lehman-Wilzig, 1994).

**Yedioth Ahronoth**

Yedioth, a daily, is the most widely distributed newspaper in Israel and enjoys a very high degree of popularity and wide circulation. It was established by private owners in 1937 in the format of an evening newspaper. However, in recent years it has been distributed early in the morning because of commercial competition. Yedioth was designed as a pluralistic newspaper and adopted many of the popular press features with a tabloid such as editorials, concise news, dynamic headlines, limited scope of information, lower linguistic register, a casual style and colourful photographs. Nonetheless, it publishes a wide variety of commentary from across the entire political spectrum.

Unlike the standard format of tabloids, the content of Yedioth, especially that of the first page, is not primarily sex and crime. The newspaper’s superior adaptability to cultural and demographic changes contributes to its wide circulation (Caspi and Limor, 1999; Lehman-Wilzig, 1994).

### 5.13 Selection of Categories

As noted above, I chose to analyze and compare the Israeli news discourse in the pre- and post-Oslo periods in the selected print media and to examine the role it played as a social agent in the transition from war culture to a new era of peace. The aim was to gain a better understanding of social and political changes as reflected or set by the news media discourse in two period times which were divided by Oslo.

My first major consideration was the description of categories to characterize the news articles representations: mapping the graphical format of the front page of the newspapers and defining the frames in relation to topics and actors in the context of security, peace and political dimensions. These conformed to the technique of...
content analysis in reporting the frequency that different aspects of texts occur and their relative prominence in relation to other aspects or dimensions (Hansen et al., 1998).

My coding procedures took account of the security, peace and politics news by providing primary and secondary codes for the frames in the print news articles according to the relative prominence of each given frame and how they changed between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. The prominent topic or actor in the news story’s lead was defined as ‘primary’. The second most prominent topic or actor in the text itself was defined as ‘secondary’ (see Appendix 1).

In the first stage of the research, the topics in the news text were classified and divided into five frames: security, peace, politics, terrorism, and economy of peace. 1186 news texts were categorized according to their focus on the detailed primary and secondary 69 topics clustered into 46 topics. 18 domestic actors and 23 foreign actors were subsequently clustered (see Chapter 6). Statistical tests were performed to identify the differences between the two time periods and the two newspapers in their coverage of these five primary and secondary frames. The primary frame was calculated by merging the statistical results of the primary topics related to each frame. The secondary frame resulted from merging the secondary topics relating to each frame. In the second stage, these were reclustered into three superframes, namely security, peace and politics.

A coding schedule was devised by listing predetermined variables to be examined and coded in the sampled news articles. In order to code the classification list of categories, the data was collected in two forms:

*Form 1* followed the definitions of analytical ‘identifier’ categories proposed by Hansen et al. (1998): medium, date, item serial number, position within the medium, size of item, type of article, additional material relating to the article. This was followed by ‘primary definers’, including: quotations (government factors), sources-authors (journalists), actors (domestic and foreign) and topics. The latter two
categories were each divided into two columns for additional coding of the main and secondary topic or actor.

*Form 2* included the complementary qualitative data e.g., quotations from the actual news text. Each article had its own page on which references and quotations from the news stories were written manually. Form 2 comprised a total of 1186 pages.

Given that news leaves many things unsaid, its meaning can only be understood by acknowledging the absence of certain subjects and actors.

### 5.14 Pilot Study

A sample of 12 editions of the two selected newspapers were analyzed to verify the validity and reliability of the coding schedule. Due to the small scale of material, the results were analyzed manually and the analytical categories were fine-tuned and reorganized for the final coding schedule.

Coding instructions were prepared in order to conduct a second pilot of the actual selected sample by a second coder in order to compare complexities derived from the coding schedule. Consequently, some questions and problems of the coding schedule led to the final fine-tuning.

### 5.15 Sampling

The rationale for qualitative content analysis emphasizes clarifying the process and definition of what is presented, and the emphasis and meanings of the messages. This approach also influences the sampling strategy, in that the main goal is seldom to 'generalize' one’s findings to an entire population (Altheide, 1996:32).
This study reviewed 2342 newspaper articles published on the first two pages of the selected newspapers. The sample was carried on a random basis of sampling one day every week through the whole time period of the study. In order to construct a credible, representative sample in relation to the time of the sampling period (Deacon et al., 1999), 1186 relevant news stories were assigned for analysis.

Israeli newspapers are published six days a week, from Sunday to Friday, inclusively. (Weekend supplements are distributed on Fridays.) Hence, the random research sample was made every eight days.

The volume of articles devoted to news within the context of frames relating to security, peace, politics, terror and economics of peace are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Selection of News Articles from the Period under Review (20 January 1993 to 31 October 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 1</td>
<td>Page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of articles</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News stories about security, peace and politics</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequencies per page (format)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 illustrates the salience of topics relating to security, peace and politics in the news articles during the entire period reviewed (43% in Yedioth and 57% in Ha'aretz). The changes that occurred between the pre- and post-Oslo periods are demonstrated and discussed in Chapters 6-10.

The different style and format of the two newspapers in terms of editorial policy explains the disparity in the number of articles analyzed. Ha'aretz, as a quality newspaper is more politically orientated, while Yedioth, as a popular newspaper,
resembles a tabloid and its orientation is more populist. However, the trend in both newspapers appeared similar regarding the specific news allocation on each of the first two pages. The second page contained more news dealing with peace and security issues than the first page, which was invariably more diversified.

Altheide (1996) summarizes the factors to consider in developing a sampling strategy:

An optimum sampling strategy will permit comparisons and contrasts in that 'facts' or findings by themselves may be interesting but do not provide clarity or understanding ... unless they can be compared with something else. Two of the easiest ways to do this are to compare documents from different TV networks, different newspapers, or perhaps different countries. Another way is to study different media -- print versus television, and different time periods -- the start and end of a crisis (Altheide, 1996: 32-33).

The sampling strategy of my study was based on comparing topics and actors in two newspapers between two different time periods, pre- and post-Oslo. The comparison between two different newspapers contributed to an understanding of the news discourse during the transformation from war culture to peace culture, as demonstrated and discussed in the next chapter.

Since the owner of Ha'aretz expressed interest in the subject of this thesis, I was granted free access to the newspaper archive in Tel Aviv and was offered assistance in retrieving the material. Research on Yedioth was conducted at the national newspaper archive in Ariella Library in Tel Aviv. Since neither of these archives was computerized at the time of study, data collection was conducted manually.

5.16 Processing the Data

Data collected for the identifier and primary definers categories was statistically processed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The data was clearly summarized by a descriptive statistical technique. A frequency table is
determined by the level of measurements in which the particular variables attain and list the proportion of values that fall under each of the values used to categorize the variable (Deacon et al., 1999). Categories were subsequently reclustered in accordance with the research question. This process produced tables that allow for comparison of data between the two time periods and the two newspapers.

Five frames incorporated 46 subcategories coded within the area of investigation: security, peace, politics, terrorism and economy of peace. Topics were signaled by the news item in headlines and leads. They defined the overall situation and indicate to the reader a preferred meaning (Van Dijk, 1988). Thus, each topic category involved the coding of one main topic and one additional sub-topic in order to examine the emphasis of the subject in the text. Actors, both domestic and foreign, also included one main actor and a secondary one in order to understand the implicit inter-relations between the main actor and the second in context with the topics.

Although all the analytical categories were coded, processed and elaborated into tables, I found the primary definers sufficient to illuminate the meanings in the whole text of news discourse. Tables illustrating results pertaining to the identifier categories are shown in Appendix 2.

Some researchers regard quantitative and qualitative approaches to text analysis as incompatible (Deacon et al., 1999), others claim they can be combined productively (Hansen, 1992; Van Dijk, 1988; Altheide, 1996; Hornig Priest, 1996). Deacon et al. (1999) argue that either method may be appropriate according to the different stages and focuses of study. However, when quantitative and qualitative approaches are combined, the resulting analysis is invariably stronger because the weaknesses of any single method are balanced by the strengths of the other. I followed Altheide’s recommendation:

... not to be afraid to try new angles of investigation or different tools of analysis” and combined quantitative, qualitative and discourse analysis. The rationale for qualitative content analysis is to clarify the process and definition of what is presented and the meanings of the messages (Altheide, 1996:32).
The present study emphasizes the importance of an explicit structural discourse analysis of news reports which provides a qualitative alternative to complement the traditional methods of content analysis (Van Dijk, 1988; Altheide, 1966). The quantitative discourse content analysis was complemented by some relevant quotations from the news articles analyzed in this thesis, and personal interviews as articulated in the following section.

The categories for analysis provided a map of the Israeli media 'reality' which does not necessarily reflect the actual reality in Israel. "News is not characterized as a picture of reality, which may be correct or biased, but as a frame to which the social world is routinely constructed" (Van Dijk, 1988:7-8). Thus, it may sharpen the problematic dilemma as to whether the news media reflect reality or create it.

5.17 Interviews and Interviewees

After analyzing the findings of my study, I conducted four in-depth interviews with Shimon Peres (3 May 2002), Ron Pundak (12 May 2002), Dalia Rabin-Pelossof (14 May 2002) and Yossi Beilin (15 May 2002). The interviews were arranged after personal introductions with the respective individuals and took place in Tel Aviv. No written correspondence and/or preliminary questions were submitted in advance and the interviews were arranged with a few days notice. As a result, the interviewees spoke spontaneously and fluently, and a good rapport was established. Each of the four interviews lasted for approximately one hour (between 55 to 75 minutes). All were conducted in Hebrew and selected data translated into English.

I found the convergent interview method proposed by Dick (1998) to be most useful. This method suggests asking a single, broad and 'content free' question and only later adding some specific questions/clarifications. Dick (1998) argues that this method combines some key advantages of both the unstructured and structured interviews and achieves its results by leaving much of the content to be determined.
by the interviewee. The process is, however, structured as it allows for systematic analysis of information.

Deacon et al. (1999) claim that it is important for oral interviews to be recorded on audiotape for two reasons: Firstly, to be able to transcribe properly the script and to establish evidence provided by his/her own words; and secondly, to enable one to concentrate on the interview and its development. The emphasis throughout the interview was on activities that centered around media news. The opening question focused on the role of the Israeli news media in the transition from war culture to peace culture with the Palestinians, before and after the signing of the Oslo accords.

Aspects of the media discourse were detailed later by the following three questions:
1. Did the media contribute to the public understanding of the actual meaning of the Oslo peace process?
2. What information was absent from the news discourse?
3. Did the media set or reflect the government agenda and/or public opinion?

In-depth personal interviews were conducted with the following individuals:

*Shimon Peres* was prime minister of Israel in 1984. In 1987, he was foreign minister of the national unity government headed by Likud prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir. In 1992, when Labour came to power under Prime Minister Rabin, Peres was appointed foreign minister. The Israeli media hailed Peres as the architect of the breakthrough with the Palestinians. Together with PLO official Abu Ala, Peres was one of the signatories of the Oslo accords. Peres envisaged what he called the 'New Middle East', an Israel at peace in a union with Jordan and the Palestinians as partners of economic cooperation. Peres received the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize, together with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. Peres currently serves as foreign minister of Israel.

*Yossi Beilin* MK, a former journalist, to the ideological left of the Israeli Labour Party, was appointed in 1984 by Prime Minister Peres as cabinet secretary. In 1987,
he was appointed by Foreign Minister Peres as his deputy minister. For years, this idealistic Labour MK consistently urged for a dialogue with the PLO. Indeed, Beilin initiated the Oslo secret channel and was subsequently defined by the media and by the Israeli public, for better or for worse, as architect of the Oslo process.

Beilin sent two messengers to Oslo in order to establish contacts with PLO officials and to persuade them to join the Israelis and grasp the opportunity to make peace. *Ron Pundak* was one of these messengers (together with Yair Hirschfeld). These two left-wing intellectuals went to Oslo and secretly opened a real dialogue with the PLO during which mutual barriers were broken down and confidence established. As noted in Chapter 3, Israeli officials continued negotiations with PLO representatives until the Oslo accords were finally signed.

The three interviewees named above were responsible for the first political negotiations and accords with the enemy, and were involved in the implementation of the Oslo accords.

Prime Minister Rabin became the victim of the peace initiative and was assassinated in November 1995 by a right-wing Jewish militant. The legacy of Rabin passed to his daughter Dalia Rabin-Pelossof, who took up the campaign for peace on a personal and professional level. Rabin-Pelossof, a lawyer, was first elected as a Labour Party MK in Ehud Barak’s government in May 1999. She currently serves as the deputy defence minister of the Israeli government.

The quantitative content analysis supported by the qualitative analysis produced me the clear patterns which derived from my research findings. However, I was interested in interviewing the respectable political personalities mentioned above because they played a crucial role in the Oslo process and its consequences.

Additional interviews were conducted with: Eitan Haber, Yitzhak Rabin’s senior communication consultant; Kalman Gayer, Rabin’s consultant on public opinion polls; and Lily Galili, a senior journalist for *Ha'aretz*.
Part III
Chapter 6
Frames and Actors

Research Findings and Discussion

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the statistical results and findings of the news discourse content analysis in which the representation of security, peace and political actors and topics were framed in the Israeli news before and after the signing of the Oslo accords. It presents data regarding the issues most covered in the news, i.e., those that are clearly of most interest to Israeli society. The data collected from the two first pages of the newspapers was compiled into tables for comparison between two time periods and between the two newspapers. The aim was to understand the political ideologies of the Israeli news discourse in changing times during the transition from war culture to peace culture.

The findings of the frames and topics of news discourse analyzed in this chapter are discussed in relation to the ideological nature of the news media which reconstruct the political and social reality, thereby reproducing the dominant forces and ideologies in society (Van Dijk, 1988).

The analysis begins first by presenting the news frames in which the news articles of security, peace and politics were represented. Next, it examines how the news discourses defined the role of the domestic and foreign actors who participated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and/or efforts at conflict resolution. The actors were defined and articulated according to how they were presented in the news discourse by their role designation. It proceeds by presenting how the traditional enemy of Israel was portrayed in the news media and in what contexts it was framed in the news discourse during the pre- and post-Oslo periods.
Frames, topics and actors are related to media formats, which refer to the selection, organization and presentation of information. The media format constitutes the media genre, while frames constitute certain related topics and actors, and focus on the subject discussed in the discourse of a specific frame (Altheide, 1996).

The topics of the news text within the context of security, peace and political issues were analyzed and organized into frames. The analysis and discussion of the different frames were then segmented into security, peace and politics discourses prevailing in the news media. This process enabled me to identify the 'new enemy' and the 'new partner', and show how they were represented in the news discourse of the printed press both pre- and post-Oslo.

6.2 Research Findings on Frames and Superframes

The number of articles analyzed and the proportion of the total news they constituted in the first two pages of each newspaper is demonstrated in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2: Volume of News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre-Oslo Period (20 January 1993 to 26 August 1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 1</td>
<td>Page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of articles</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of news articles on security, peace or politics (SPP)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative frequencies</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequency of SPP news per page</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 shows that during the pre-Oslo period, 39% of news articles on security, peace and politics appeared on page 1, and 61% on page 2 in both Yedioth and Ha’aretz. Surprisingly, both newspapers show a considerable correlation in the placing of news on the first two pages. It is clear that pre-Oslo, both newspapers featured security, peace and political issues on page 2, while page 1 covered more diverse issues. The total relative frequencies of security, peace and political issues were 28% in Yedioth and 40% in Ha’aretz. The differences can be explained by the different orientations of the two newspapers, one political and the other popular. Nonetheless, the positioning of 40% or even 28% of news articles on peace, security and politics on the two first pages in a daily newspaper is not negligible and points to the importance attached to these topics by the society in question.

The change in the amount of news articles relating to security, peace and politics after the signing of the Oslo accords is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Volume of News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Post-Oslo Period (3 September 1993 – 31 October 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories Post-Oslo</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 1</td>
<td>Page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of articles</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of news articles on security, peace or politics (SPP)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative frequencies</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequency of SPP news per page</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 demonstrates that 67% of the news articles in Ha’aretz covered security, peace and politics post-Oslo, compared to 40% pre-Oslo, and 49% in Yedioth post-Oslo, compared to 28% pre-Oslo. In absolute figures, the news discourse relating to
security, peace and politics increased dramatically on the first two pages of both newspapers between the pre- and post-Oslo periods: 67.5% more news articles in Ha'aretz and 75% more in Yedioth.

Tables 2 and 3 show changes in the news discourses relating to security, peace and politics between the two time periods. These news articles in Yedioth comprised 36% of the news pre-Oslo and 64% post-Oslo; in Ha'aretz, the increase was from 38% pre-Oslo to 62% post-Oslo.

Table 4: Changes in the Volume of News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics between the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News volume</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total change</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows a considerable correlation in the increase of news articles relating to security, peace and politics in both newspapers, although the change in Yedioth was slightly greater than that in Ha'aretz.

A comparison of the position of news articles relating to security, peace and politics on the first two pages of the two newspapers pre- and post-Oslo, as shown in Table 5, highlights the importance of these issues in Israeli society.
Table 5: Position of News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Page 1</td>
<td>Page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yedioth</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha'aretz</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows a complete change in policy between the two periods in terms of salience, balance and proportion of security, peace and politics discourses. Surprisingly, a clear correlation was found in the changing policy of both newspapers regarding security, peace and political topics. Pre-Oslo, both newspapers published 39% of news relating to security, peace and politics on the first page and 61% on the second page. Post-Oslo, more news was placed on the first page in both newspapers. Ha'aretz shifted the salience of security, peace and political news to the first page (51% post-Oslo, compared to 39% pre-Oslo), and published less on the second page (49% post-Oslo, compared to 61% pre-Oslo). Meanwhile, Yedioth increased the news on security, peace and politics on the first page (43% post-Oslo, compared to 39% pre-Oslo), but the coverage on the second page hardly changed (57% post-Oslo, compared to 61% pre-Oslo).

It can be concluded that the importance of the security, peace and politics news discourses was more equally divided between the first two pages post-Oslo than pre-Oslo. However, the significance of security, peace and politics are clearly illustrated by the dramatic increase in volume of news articles on these issues on the first two pages of both newspapers. While this data shows the importance attached by the media to these issues across two time periods, it does not, however, reveal the corresponding degree of significance attached to the same issues by the general public (McQuail, 1994).

Public perceptions of political topics and actors incorporate language-in-use from news media (Altheide, 1996; De Fleur and Ball Rokeach, 1989). These perceptions
may be influenced by size, intensity and coherence of 'strategic news' (Graber et al., 1998) in a changing political climate, referred to as 'political waves' (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

The topics, rank, location, context and quantity of news relating to security, peace and politics post-Oslo enabled me to consider the degree of public attention on selected issues (Gandy, 1982), which are also defined by Cappella and Hall Jamieson (1997) as 'strategic coverage'. This, they argue, involves game-oriented political reporting which may expose the public to political manipulation rather than to the specific issue. Clearly, the findings of Tables 2 and 3 raise questions about the agenda setting of the Israeli news media.

6.3 Frames and Topics

The discourse and themes employed by the news, and the ways in which they are framed is crucial to the vernacular and perceptions of truth and reality (Fowler, 1991). Gamson (1989) argues that a media frame is a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue: facts drawn from informational content of news articles have no meaning unless they are embedded in a frame that organizes them and give them coherence.

Wolfsfeld (1997) claims that all news media operate from a particular cultural and political base, and this has a major impact on the tone of news coverage. Moreover, political and ideological topics and actors only make sense if located within a range of known social and cultural identifications (Hall 1980). Giltin (1980) argues that the implicit meanings of media frames organize the world both for journalists and for the audience who reads the news reports. This might also apply to the researcher who reads the news in order to analyze it.

To understand the social production of news discourse pre- and post-Oslo, the presentation of security, peace and politics news items were placed within frames of
topics and actors. To identify relevant frames, I used the concept of ‘preferred reading’ (Gamson, 1989) which organizes particular elements for a given frame with typical phrases in the Israeli news discourse. Hall Jamieson and Cappella (1998) argue that once topics are defined, the framing of the media coverage follows.

The topics in this study reflect the most important information expressed in the news articles. This conforms to Van Dijk’s (1988) definition that topics belong to the content of a text and play a central role in the overall understanding and the meaning of discourse description (O’Sullivan et al., 1994). According to Foucault, “discourse is a systematic way of representing a topic in a particular way at a given point in history, limiting other ways in which they can be represented and consequently shaping perceptions and social practice” (Foucault, cited in Hall, 1992:291).

The topics were defined on the basis of content discourse analysis and general knowledge of political events, figures, etc. (Bell, 1998) during the pre- and post-Oslo periods. The relevant topics are discussed below in relation to the security, peace and politics frames. Although the news discourses often featured several topics, they were semantically interconnected within the different frames (Van Dijk, 1988).

The analysis of frames focused on comparing the relative prominence of the competing frames as a measure of outcome (Gamson, 1989). As noted in Chapter 5, the frames were based on factors relating to historical and socio-political myths and stereotypes within Jewish-Israeli society (see Chapters 2 and 3).

The findings of Table 2 and 3 illustrated the salience of security, peace and politics frames in the Israeli news ‘reality’. Highly significant differences between the two time periods in the five frames were revealed, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Representation of Primary Frames of News Articles: Topics relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth Post-Oslo</th>
<th>Ha’aretz Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Ha’aretz Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N =97</td>
<td>N=391</td>
<td>N=170</td>
<td>N=528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli armed forces</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli domestic politics</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace economy</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings suggest that news relating to security, peace and politics was presented differently during the pre- and post-Oslo periods, marking a critical change in the discourses and in messages conveyed by both newspapers to their respective audiences. The differences between the two periods can be summarized as follows:

1. The armed forces frame decreased.
2. The frame of terrorism decreased.
3. The frame of Israeli domestic politics increased.
4. The frame of peace increased dramatically.
5. The frame of the peace economy increased.

A comparison of the primary and the secondary frames illustrates a critical change in the news discourse in both newspapers, although in different percentages (see Table 5). The correlation between the two newspapers however, may not be surprising because the most important filter through which news is constructed is “the cultural air we breathe, the whole ideological atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and others had best not be said” (Hoggart, cited in Schudson, 1997: 154). Schudson argues that elite institutions create the ‘cultural air’ in relation to the ideology of a specific society.
The changes in representation of these frames between the two periods can be summarized as follows:

1. The representation of peace discourse increased sharply in Yedioth, and divided the coverage of the topic between the primary and secondary frames.
2. The armed forces discourse clearly decreased and was much more prominent in the secondary frame, both pre- and post-Oslo.
3. The terrorism discourse, which decreased, came much more to the fore as a primary frame and competed only with the peace discourse as the dominant news discourse.
4. The politics discourse, which increased, gained more prominence as a secondary frame.

The peace economy increased, and gained more prominence as a secondary frame (see Chapter 9).

Table 7: Representation of Secondary Frames of News Articles: Topics relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo N=68</td>
<td>Post-Oslo N=314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli armed forces</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli domestic politics</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace economy</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in the representation of the frames are clearly illustrated by Table 8.
Table 8: Changes in the Representation of Frames relating to Security, Peace and Politics between the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

| Frames                     | **Yedioth Ahronoth** | | **Ha'aretz** | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                            | **Primary** | **Secondary** | **Primary** | **Secondary** |
| Israeli armed forces       | -36%        | -21%           | -51%          | +0.7%           |
| Terrorism                  | -36%        | -46%           | -42%          | -36%           |
| Israeli domestic politics  | +41%        | +34%           | +128%         | +25%           |
| Peace                      | +67%        | +34%           | +62%          | +7%            |
| Peace economy              | +0.7%       | +3%            | +3%           | +4.5%          |

Table 8 shows the changing representation of the primary and secondary frames of security, peace and politics in the news in both newspapers pre- and post-Oslo. The table illuminates exactly the same policy changes in the two newspapers.

Both newspapers devoted the largest proportion of news articles devoted to peace in the post-Oslo period. *Ha'aretz* showed an increase of 62% in the peace representation of security, peace and politics news after Oslo (48.8% post-Oslo, compared to 30% pre-Oslo). *Yedioth* exhibited a similar, albeit, more dramatic change, namely an increase of 67% in the representation of news relating to security, peace and politics (42.8% post-Oslo, compared to 25.6% pre-Oslo).

Coverage of news relating to the Israeli armed forces decreased sharply in both newspapers. The data relating to the primary frame in *Yedioth* illustrates a decrease of 36% (12.8% pre-Oslo, compared to 8.2% post-Oslo), and a decrease of 21% in the secondary frame (32.8% pre-Oslo, compared to 25.8% post-Oslo). In *Ha'aretz*, there was a sharp decrease of 51% (21% pre-Oslo, compared to 10.3% post-Oslo), and in the secondary frame there was no significant change (17.9% compared to 18.1%).

Data on Israeli domestic politics reveals a relatively large increase in the amount of news articles in both newspapers post-Oslo. The increase in the primary frame in


Yedioth was 41% (10.5% pre-Oslo, compared to 14.8% post-Oslo) and for the secondary frame, there was an increase of 34% (14.9% post-Oslo, compared to 20% pre-Oslo). In Ha’aretz, the representation of the primary frame increased by 128% (5.7% pre-Oslo, compared to 12.9% post-Oslo), and that of the secondary frame increased by 25% (13.4% pre-Oslo, compared to 16.8% post-Oslo). Although domestic politics was lightly represented compared to the other frames, it was closely related to all other frames and therefore had a major impact (see Chapters 10 and 11).

Data on the representation of terrorism reveals a sharp decrease in the post-Oslo period in both newspapers, although considerable differences are shown between the two newspapers. In Ha’aretz, the representation of the terrorism primary frame decreased by 42%, while in Yedioth the decrease was 36%; in the secondary frame the decrease in Ha’aretz was 36%, compared to a decrease of 46% in Yedioth.

Data on the representation of the peace economy in Yedioth illustrates an increase of 0.7% in the primary frame, and 3% in the secondary, compared to Ha’aretz where it increased by 3% in the primary frame and 4.5% in the secondary.

In general, the editorial policy of both newspapers is very clear. Coverage of peace and the peace economy increased significantly. Coverage of issues relating to security, including the armed forces, on one hand, and terrorism, on the other, sharply decreased. Politics became much more salient in both newspapers. These five frames were subsequently reclustered into three superframes (see below).

6.4 Superframes

Data regarding the five frames show the relationship between the Israeli armed forces and terrorism. These are linked by the term ‘security’ because the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) defends the nation against terror attacks (see Chapter 8). Peace and the peace economy are clearly interrelated (see Chapter 9). The domestic politics frame became more dominant and required special attention (see Chapter 10).
frames were therefore reclustered into three superframes: security, peace and politics. These comprise issues at the core of Israeli existence and those which impact most on the Israeli public and their national identity (Arian, 1995; Shamir and Shamir, 1993).

Table 9: Representation of Reclustered Primary Frames into Superframes of Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 9 and 10 were analyzed together because of the similarities found in the editorial tendencies of both newspapers during the two periods. The results are illustrated in Table 11.

Table 10: Representation of Reclustered Secondary Frames into Superframes of Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The primary superframes in Table 9 reveal the same tendencies as the secondary superframes in Table 10. The peace discourse was most dominant, overshadowing security in both superframes. In Yedioth, it increased from 27.9% to 45.5% between the two periods while in Ha'aretz, it increased from 30% to 52%. The same tendency is implied by the findings pertaining to the secondary security frame. Pre-Oslo, security was the most prominent issue in the news and post-Oslo, peace took first place.

The security primary superframe decreased sharply between the two periods, from 61.6% to 39% in Yedioth, and in Ha'aretz from 64.3% to 35.3%. Representation of the secondary security frame showed the same tendency in both newspapers.

Politics was more prominent in the secondary frame (14.9% pre-Oslo, compared to 19.6% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and 13.4% pre-Oslo, compared to 16.8% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz) then in the primary superframe (10.5% pre-Oslo, compared to 15.5% in Yedioth; 5.7% pre-Oslo and 12.9% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz). Nonetheless, the percentage increase was much higher in the primary frame then in the secondary frame, as illustrated in Table 11.

### Table 11: Changes in the Representation of Security, Peace and Politics Superframes in the News Discourse between the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-37%</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>+63%</td>
<td>+51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>+47%</td>
<td>+34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 11, the frames of peace and politics received significantly more emphasis post-Oslo than pre-Oslo in both newspapers. The peace discourse was the
leading superframe in the news discourse post-Oslo. Similarly, in both newspapers, the security frame received significantly less emphasis post-Oslo than pre-Oslo. Although political frequencies were higher in the secondary superframe in both periods, the increase was much more critical in the primary topics.

Table 11 maps changes in the media discourse since the Oslo transitory breakpoint. After considering how the production of the dominant news discourse was framed and reframed, it is important to analyze data regarding the actors and topics.

Tables 9, 10 and 11 all suggest links between peace and politics versus security. It could be argued that this is a see-saw model between two opposites; when security was high on the news media, peace was low, and vice versa. However, both, peace and security are related to politics (see Chapter 11). In both superframes, the general changes were significant between the two time periods. The primary and secondary superframes together increased in Yedioth from 19% pre-Oslo to 81% post-Oslo and, in Ha'aretz from 23% pre-Oslo to 77% post-Oslo.

6.5 Actors

This section focuses on the analysis of domestic and foreign participants in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pre- and post-Oslo.

Patterson (1998) and Graber et al. (1998) argue that there is a broad consensus in communication studies about the journalistic principles of news presentation. Political news must involve issues and actors that are politically significant for groups of audiences because of the implications for their daily life.

The chances of achieving media attention depend on the role and the position of the actors, their resources and their objectives. Wolfsfeld (1997) explains that all actors in the political sphere, i.e., parties, parliamentary factions, interest and advocacy groups, social movements, individual politicians, compete for media attention. He
argues that compared with parties and interest groups, the government has better chances for its messages to pass the media filters.

As noted in Chapter 2, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed in September 1993 was a critical event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The roles of the Israeli government and opposition, the perceived enemy, the PLO and their political opposition (terrorist groups such as Hamas) all underwent transformations in politics and in the media (Wolfsfeld, 1997) between the two different time periods.

This study distinguishes between domestic and foreign actors pre- and post-Oslo. On the domestic level, the individual government figures were clustered as government factors. All members of the armed forces, police and intelligence were linked as security factors. Members of the peace talks delegations, peace supporters, parliamentary opposition, settlers and religious groups, and citizens constituted the actors involved security, peace and politics issues on the news agenda.

The foreign actors that figure in this section are those who dominated the news discourse during the pre- and post-Oslo periods. Those actors are defined according to their roles in the history of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, either as an enemy or as a partner, mediator and /or an ally (see Chapter 2).

The analysis of domestic and foreign actors in the context of the security, peace and politics discourses reinforces the personalization of issues within political conflicts. The structural characteristics of the domestic and foreign actors used the top-down principle of relevance organization in the news by which high-level specifications were given to the primary actor first, followed by lower-level details for the secondary actor (Van Dijk, 1988).

During the pre-Oslo period, all mainstream Israeli institutions rejected the idea of negotiating with Arafat and the PLO. They viewed the problem of the Palestinian uprising in terms of immediate military goals instead of adopting a long-term political strategy (Arian, 1995:172). During the pre-Oslo period, while the Intifada continued and the local Palestinian leadership failed to replace Arafat and moved
towards agreement with Israel, the Labour-led government undertook a historic policy change. In September 1993, the imagined ‘peace’ seemed to be ‘real peace’ in Israel. The practical and emotional meaning of peace, a research topic in its own right, is discussed further in Chapter 9.

As noted above, actors involved in domestic policy are defined in this study as domestic actors while those who are not Israeli are defined as foreign actors. Both groups were divided between primary and secondary actors. These are analyzed and discussed in the context of comparison between pre- and post-Oslo periods, between the two newspapers and between primary and secondary actors. The findings of domestic actors are illustrated in the tables below.

Table 12: Representation of Primary Domestic Actors in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =81</td>
<td>N=323</td>
<td>N=141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government actors</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security actors</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary opposition</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of the Oslo peace process</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers and religious groups</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli delegation to peace talks</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli general public</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings related to primary domestic actors show a critical change in their roles between the two periods in both newspapers. A considerable correlation was also
found in the policy of both newspapers regarding domestic actors on the changing agenda. Frequencies of government factors in Yedioth increased by 55% (34.6% pre-Oslo, compared to 53.6% post-Oslo). It could be argued that Yedioth responded to public demand and became much more politically oriented. Ha’aretz showed constancy; government frequencies were high before and remained so (48.9% pre-Oslo and 49.1% post-Oslo).

As expected in relation to the frames analysis, the frequency of security actors decreased by one third; in Yedioth, 37% pre-Oslo, compared to 25% post-Oslo, and in Ha’aretz, 35.5% pre-Oslo, compared to 26.7% post-Oslo. The heavy representation of security actors was evidently replaced by right-wing actors (parliamentary opposition (1.2%) + settlers and religious groups (2.6%) = Yedioth) and (parliamentary opposition (0.7%) + settlers and religious groups (2.8%) = Ha’aretz). They became dominant post-Oslo as shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Representation of Right-Wing Actors in the News Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yedioth</td>
<td>3.8% (27% of the news)</td>
<td>10.2% (73% of news)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha’aretz</td>
<td>3.5% (24% of the news)</td>
<td>11.3% (76% of news)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the pre-Oslo period, right-wing groups were represented in Yedioth in 27% of the news where they were the primary actor; post-Oslo they figured in 73% of the news. In Ha’aretz, this group was represented in 24% of news articles pre-Oslo and 76% post-Oslo. Peace supporters evidently played no role in either newspaper. It can be assumed that the left was associated with the Labour-led government and was therefore represented by government actors in the news discourse.

As expected, representation of the Israeli delegation to the peace talks declined post-Oslo in both newspapers. The only differences between the newspapers was in relation to the general Israeli public; although marginal in both newspapers; they
received more coverage in Ha'aretz post-Oslo (3.2% of news articles post-Oslo, compared to 2.1% pre-Oslo), while in Yedioth they almost disappeared (1.9% post-Oslo, compared to 4.9% pre-Oslo).

The total frequencies demonstrate a critical change in the involvement of the domestic actors and how they were represented in the political and ideological news discourse pre- and post-Oslo. A considerable correlation in policy towards the domestic actors was found in the two newspapers. In Yedioth, 20% of all actors were represented pre-Oslo, and 80% post-Oslo. In Ha'aretz, 23% were represented pre-Oslo and 77% post-Oslo.

Table 14: Representation of Secondary Domestic Actors in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post- Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=37</td>
<td>N=137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government factors</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security factors</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary opposition</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of the Oslo peace process</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers and religious groups</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli delegation to peace talk</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli general public</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of the secondary domestic actors shown in Table 14 demonstrate similar results to Table 12, though some differences are worth noting. The secondary domestic actors in Yedioth were represented in 22% of the pre-Oslo news discourse
and 78% post-Oslo, while in Ha'aretz they were represented in 17% pre-Oslo and 83% post-Oslo. The major difference between the two newspapers and the primary and secondary actors was revealed in the representation of the national camp (right-wing opposition MKs, settlers and religious groups).

In Yedioth, this group was represented in 8.1% of news articles pre-Oslo and increased to 18.3% post-Oslo. Ha'aretz exhibited a similar policy with 18.8% pre-Oslo and 20% post-Oslo. Compared to the primary domestic actors, their representation doubled as secondary actors. Peace supporters and the Israeli public showed low frequencies in both newspapers as both primary and secondary domestic actors.

Although tensions existed pre-Oslo between the national camp and the peace camp, this posed no real threat to the right wing since consensus ruled that the perceived enemy (Arafat and the PLO) could not be regarded as a negotiating partner. The peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian delegations started after the Madrid peace conference (see Chapters 3 and 7) while the right wing and the enemy, represented by Arafat and the PLO in Tunis (see Chapter 7), played no role.

Since representation of security factors declined post-Oslo, the right-wing actors increased dramatically in the news discourse. In effect, only two groups of actors remained in the domestic arena, namely the peace camp and the national camp. The legitimacy of the latter was undermined by the news discourse; both newspapers represented the national camp as socially and politically marginal, and as the enemy of peace (see Chapter 10).

In contrast, it seems that enthusiasm for peace in the news was not bolstered by reference to actors: it was sufficient to refer to government. On the political and ideological levels, two conflicting groups of actors were represented in the news discourse -- the government and the peace camp versus the parliamentary opposition and the national camp. Indeed, in this conflict, the national camp appeared to win the battle when three years later Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish fanatic and the peace process died with him.
The total change in the primary and secondary domestic actors (Tables 12 and 14) demonstrate that in Yedioth, 21% of the domestic actors were represented pre-Oslo and 79% post-Oslo, while in Ha'aretz, 20% were represented pre-Oslo and 80% post-Oslo.

The representation of primary foreign actors in new articles relating to security, peace and politics during the pre- and post-Oslo periods is illustrated in Table 15.

Table 15: Representation of Primary Foreign Actors in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =73</td>
<td>N=284</td>
<td>N=431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat + the PLO</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan)</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf states + other Muslim countries</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US government</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian general public (West Bank and Gaza)</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of frequencies of the primary foreign actors involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Chapter 2) reveals their changing roles in both newspapers. Arafat and the PLO, perceived as the ultimate enemy (see Chapter 7) and constantly
delegitimized pre-Oslo, either by exclusion from the news or negative imagery, appeared in the news post-Oslo as a legitimate partner for peace. Arafat not only appeared in the Israeli news, but was also granted considerable status in the news discourse (see Chapter 11), and participated in international events, culminating in the Nobel Peace Prize that he shared with Rabin and Peres.

Representation of Arafat and the PLO increased from 6.8% of news articles pre-Oslo to 40.1% post-Oslo in *Yedioth*, and from 8.1% to 29.5% in *Ha'aretz*. Representation of the local Palestinian leadership sharply declined in both newspapers, indicating a shift in perceptions, from a legitimate actor after Madrid to a steep decline from 15.1% pre-Oslo to 2.8% post-Oslo in *Yedioth*, and from 16.2% to 4.2% in *Ha'aretz*.

The involvement of the neighbouring Arab countries, including Egypt, became much more dominant in the news discourse in *Yedioth* (5.5% pre-Oslo, compared to 10.9% post-Oslo) and in *Ha'aretz* (18.8% pre-Oslo, compared to 5.4% post-Oslo). There were barely any references in the news discourse in the two first pages of either newspaper to Arab states that were hostile to Israel such as Iraq, Iran and Libya.

Oslo saw the demise of the economic boycott of Israel by Arab and Muslim states that had consistently refused to recognize the State of Israel. Post-Oslo, these states became new actors in the Israeli discourse. Many members of the business communities in these countries viewed their counterparts in Israel as ideal commercial partners (Zakheim, 1994) and started to feature in the Israeli news discourse (in 4.9% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 3.5% in *Ha'aretz*). Hence, the main focus in the Israeli news discourse shifted to Arab world.

This trend was supported by traditional Western allies, but to a lesser extent post-Oslo than pre-Oslo. The US, Israel's prime ally and the only remaining superpower, declined as a primary actor in *Yedioth* (from 15.1% pre-Oslo to 8.1% post-Oslo) and in *Ha'aretz* from 10.8% to 8.4%. Representation of European countries remained relatively slight, although in *Ha'aretz* there was still a small increase post-Oslo.
(0.7% pre-Oslo, compared to 5.8% post-Oslo), and similarly in Yedioth. (1.4% pre- and post-Oslo), yet secondary to the US.

Data regarding the secondary foreign actors demonstrates similar trends in both newspapers. Nonetheless, there are some noteworthy differences. Firstly, Arab countries were more prominent post-Oslo as the secondary topic in Yedioth (23.9%, compared to 15.8% pre-Oslo). In Ha'aretz, the level of representation in both the primary and secondary topics was constant. Yedioth was probably more concerned about ratings and wary of alienating readers. In contrast, Ha'aretz was more confident of the attitudes of its audience.

Both newspapers dramatically increased representation of the US in the secondary foreign actors topic in the post-Oslo period: in Yedioth, from 8.8% in the primary representation to 17.6%, and, in Ha'aretz, from 8.4% in the primary representation to 24.2% in the secondary. This result can be explained by the tendency to demonstrate direct peace relations with the Arab world as the primary achievement of the Oslo process, thereby pushing the US mediation to the secondary importance. However, the US were implicitly represented in the news discourse. These findings are illustrated in Table 16.

Data for both newspapers reflects the same policy regarding representation of both primary and secondary foreign actors.

Tables 15 and 16 illustrate changes in the representation of primary and secondary foreign actors between the two time periods. In Yedioth, the total of foreign actors who were represented increased from 19% pre-Oslo to 81% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz, the increase was from 24% pre-Oslo to 76% post-Oslo.
The prospects for peace post-Oslo in the news discourse and the vision of peaceful coexistence with new partners in the Middle East, which were linked to the local and the global changing world, seemed to promise a bright future. In the news discourse a new phrase was coined, ‘the New Middle East’ (Peres, 1995).

Neither newspaper paid any attention to the UN post-Oslo. Nor did the Palestinian population play any significant role in either newspaper. This was also the case of the Israeli general public as domestic actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo N=32</td>
<td>Post-Oslo N=142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat and the PLO</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf states and other Muslim countries</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US government</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European countries</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian general public (West Bank and Gaza)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The definition of Israel's enemies was narrowed to include two stateless groups; the Palestinian Islamist organization, Hamas, active primarily in the occupied territories, and Hizballah, based in Lebanon. Although Hamas had emerged relatively recently as an enemy (since the Intifada) (Bechor, 1995), the new partner Arafat was regarded as willing and able to constrain Hamas. In both newspapers, the representation of Hamas increased post-Oslo; in Yedioth from 6.8% pre-Oslo to 11.3% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz from 8.8% pre-Oslo to 11.1% post-Oslo. Hamas was also perceived as the major threat to the Israeli public and to the Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Although the threat remained, the representation of Hizballah declined steeply in both newspapers, from 45.2% pre-Oslo to 19.4% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 33.1% pre-Oslo to 10.9% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz. This figure validates the decline found in the security frame and in the security factors as domestic actors.

The findings in the primary foreign actors show that the relative frequencies of the above actors in Yedioth comprised 20% of the news discourse pre-Oslo and 80% post-Oslo and in Ha'aretz, 26% pre-Oslo and 74% post-Oslo. The findings of the secondary foreign actor reveal similar trends to the primary actors.

It was interesting to discover how foreign actors were divided in the news discourse into three groups and how they were represented in the Israeli news discourse during changing times, pre- and post-Oslo. The terms 'enemy versus partner' do not only reflect political labels, but also carry with them ideological associations. Many group ideologies involve the representation of 'self' and 'other', 'us and 'them'.

The way groups and their members represent themselves and others may of course be biased, when seen from a point of view of others (Van Dyjk, 1988a). The representation of various groups of perceived enemies and allies in the news discourse is illustrated in Table 18. The foreign actors were defined as Western and Arab countries, and groups involved in terrorism.
Table 17: Representation of Foreign Actors in the News Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods, Divided into Three Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo  Post-Oslo</td>
<td>Pre-Oslo Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western countries</td>
<td>N=73  16.5% 10.2%</td>
<td>N=284 11.5% 14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>N=148 27.4% 58.7%</td>
<td>N=431 32.4% 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist groups</td>
<td>N=148 51.9% 30.7%</td>
<td>N=431 50.7% 22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17 shows the change in the roles of the foreign actors in the news discourse. The focus of attention during the post-Oslo period was, to a large degree, the Arab world; 58.7% post-Oslo, compared to 27.4% pre-Oslo in Yedioth, and 56% post-Oslo, compared to 32.4% pre-Oslo in Ha'aretz. New political and economic negotiations were launched in the wake of international diplomacy.

News relating to Western democracies took only second place, and terrorism seemed less threatening during the post-Oslo period than before. This can be explained in terms of a philosophical debate that dates from biblical times through centuries of dispersion until Oslo. This debate revolves around the concept of 'Israel among the nations' in a non-Jewish world (Klieman, 1994). The world view as represented in the news discourse towards the outside world was then segmented into two categories: the allies ('good actors') and the enemies ('bad actors').

Pre-Oslo, the Western countries were perceived as allies but post-Oslo, both Western and Arab countries were seen as allies. Pre-Oslo, the Arab countries and terrorists were perceived as enemies, but post-Oslo only terrorists belonged to this category. This is illustrated by Table 18.
Table 18: Representation of Foreign Allies and Enemies in the News Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequencies of allies</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative frequencies of enemies</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A considerable correlation was found in the news discourse of the two newspapers regarding the definition of who was ‘with us’ and who was ‘against us’ in the world pre- and post-Oslo. Ironically, those opposed to Oslo on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides came to be regarded as enemies of peace. Both Hamas and the Israeli right wing were represented in the Israeli news discourse as enemies of peace, and therefore as threats to the state. The headlines of both newspapers quoted Prime Minister Rabin as saying: “A wicked partnership has been created between the right wing and Hamas in order to thwart the peace process” and his words were repeated within the text of news articles (Yedioth and Ha'aretz, 4 July 1994). Hence, the Israeli national camp, which was identified with the right wing, was defined as the enemy.

At the same time, Arafat, the delegitimized enemy pre-Oslo -- mentioned only three times in Yedioth and seven times in Ha'aretz during almost nine months prior to Oslo -- was subsequently perceived in the post-Oslo news discourse as an equal and major participant in the efforts to achieve Middle East peace process.

Ultimately, the enemy was represented by Hamas and the Israeli national camp while all other domestic and foreign actors all over the world were represented in the news discourse as partners (see Chapter 9).
9.6 Conclusions

The representation in the news discourse of domestic and foreign actors as enemies or partners to peace is illuminated by Table 19.

Table 19: Representation of Domestic and Foreign Actors Identified as Partners and Enemies of Peace during the Post-Oslo Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Domestic partners$^a$</th>
<th>Domestic enemies$^b$</th>
<th>Foreign partners$^c$</th>
<th>Foreign enemies$^d$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yedioth</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha’aretz</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One. Domestic partners include all actors who participated in the peace process but excludes the Israeli general public who could not be identified as a distinct group.

Two. Domestic enemies includes the Jewish opposition to the Oslo process.

Three. Foreign partners include Arab, Muslim and Western countries but excludes Palestinian civilians.

Four. Foreign enemies are defined as Hamas and Hizballah.

Kriesberg (2001) explains that the Oslo accords were signed by Arafat and the PLO as representatives of the Palestinians. Hamas did not participate in the process and had an interest in undermining it. Similarly, the Israeli opposition to the Rabin-led government rejected the peace process with the PLO and, together with other elements, acted to undermine it. Kriesberg’s explanation defines the ‘new enemy’ of the Oslo peace process on each side, as shown in Table 19.

The findings illustrate clear changes in discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. There seems to be a considerable correlation in the policy and attitudes of both newspapers despite the distinction between a quality newspaper versus a popular newspaper. Both demonstrate the complexities of a dramatic political and social change in a transformation from war culture to peace culture, defined by Azar et al. (1979) as ‘a peace crisis’ associated with changing enemies.
Paradoxically, during the last decade, Israel can be characterized as a 'culturally divided society' (Peri 1998). Peri (1998) and Etzioni-Halevi (1997) claim that the peace process divided the Israeli domestic actors who were traditionally regarded as part of a united society and a consensus, especially for security reasons.

Both political and media expressions played powerful roles in establishing the categories in which conflicting political and ideological interests were defined by semantics and discourse. The official discourse of Israeli governments and that of the media expressed the ideology of conflict and consensus by using the expressions 'peace and security' versus 'security and peace'. These two themes expressed the 'pragmatic ethos' versus the 'messianic ethos', terms which symbolize the internal division within Israel between the peace camp and national camp. In practice, it marked a distinction between those who belonged to 'us' and those regarded as 'the other', meaning the enemy.

As articulated in Chapter 2, throughout Jewish history and during Israeli independence, in particular, relations with the non-Jewish world were traditionally depicted in conflictual terms. The division between 'us' and 'them' was reproduced in myths that 'the whole world is against us' and that the Arabs and the Palestinians, in particular, were not partners for peace. Furthermore, post-Oslo, the conflict developed a new dimension for enemies: peace supporters versus peace opponents.

Jews and Palestinians who were excluded from the Oslo process framed the conflict in such a way that they categorically rejected it. Kriesberg (2001) argues that Jewish extremists viewed the conflict in terms of religious nationalism. Militant Islamists Palestinians rejected outright the existence of a Jewish state, and thus the Oslo accords. These two actors, opponents of the Israeli and Palestinian policies, were framed by the government and by the news discourse as enemies for peace.

Fowler (1991) explains that language, in general, and news discourse, in particular, play a cognitive role: They provide an organized mental representation for the public experience. They influence thought in the sense that they structure channels to the
mental experience of the world. Differences in expression carry ideological distinctions and thus differences in representation.

Journalistic features in a political discourse conveyed by news media vary according to the different political cultures and ideologies; some groups take sides and become advocates for certain causes while other are detached from partisan or ideological competition. Graber et al. (1998) note that some theories of democracy support competition among diverse groups of journalists, regardless of who dominates the selection of what is to be published in a text. Determining what level of selection is too high or too low remains controversial. After the signing of the Oslo accords, the Israeli newspapers evidently changed their attitudes, and adopted a propaganda role recognized in mass communication. Fairclough (1998) notes that professional politicians change their political discourse in response to the shifting structure of the discursive practices and the media follows them.
Chapter 7
The Changing Image of the Enemy

Research Findings and Discussion

7.1 Introduction

This study analyzes the stereotypes and myths relating to images of the Israeli state and the perceived enemy -- Yasser Arafat and the PLO -- as portrayed in news texts. It was clear that during the Oslo process, the image of the 'other' among Israelis and Palestinians was shifting. Yet, the Israeli public rarely considered the multifaceted nature of these images and what impact, if any, they had on the two peoples. Given that media representations are known to be closely linked to public opinion and public policy, they are especially important during transitional periods when people are most open to change (Dennis, 1991). The aim of this chapter is to discuss the presentation and representation of the enemy in the news and the influence of ideological and political discourses.

7.2 Media, Image and Myths

Images or representations of people, ideas, and even nations have been part of the literature of media studies for decades. (Dennis, 1991). Images are not meaningless surfaces, but rather resource banks from which meanings can be made and remade (Fiske, 1997). Kuhn (1996) discusses how certain elements in images and representations produce meanings within social and historical contexts which are disseminated by mass communication through narratives and myths (Nossek, 1994). Roach (1993) explains that images and myths sustain beliefs that justify war making
and the need to view the ‘other’ as an enemy. Geertz (1977) adds that as a symbolic system, myths and news act both as a model of a culture and as a model for a culture. Theorists writing about images, myths and stereotypes are generally inclined to focus on pre-existing and value-laden sets of ideas derived from the culture and transmitted by communication. Media content often draws on familiar or latent myths and images present in the culture of the makers and receivers of texts (Barthes, 1993).

Originally, theorists writing about image meant a visual representation of reality, either physical or imaginary, such as a photograph or a picture, and in literature or music. O’Sullivan et al. (1994) define image as “the public impression created to appeal to audience rather than to reproduce reality: it implies a degree of falseness in so far as the reality rarely matches up to the image” (O’Sullivan et al., 1994:144). McQuail (1994) argues that myths about national character are likely to be invoked for communicative purposes.

Barthes (1993) explains that meanings are produced through the codes at work in representations, and that while meanings might appear to be natural, they are, in fact, produced: they are constructed through identifiable processes of signification in all representation. Following Fowler (1991), this study refers to a discriminatory discourse which, I suggest, reinforces myths and stereotypes which characterize the Jewish-Israeli past and present.

Relationships between groups of people in any society are reflected in the mass media. It is in via instruments of communication that images are created and information is transmitted. Diplomacy is therefore played out in the public arena, typically in newspapers, on television, in books, magazines, etc. Whereas some information may be confined exclusively to the diplomatic pouch, accessible only to governments and policy-makers, most of what we know about other countries, nations and leaders, especially, about a perceived enemy, comes from the media.

O’Sullivan et al. (1994) define the role of myth as a pointer for understanding, expressing and communicating self-identity in a specific culture. He argues that in
the anthropological ritual, myth is “anonymously composed narrative that offers explanations of why the world is as it is”, In literary theory, “myth becomes a story about, or image of, what are seen as human truth”, and, in the semiotic meaning, “it refers to an unarticulated chain of associated concepts by which members of a culture understand certain things” (O’Sullivan et al., 1994:192). The relevance of this explanation to the study of news discourse is that news, like myths, provides a way for people to create order out of disorder and transforms knowledge and familiarity in shared communal experiences (Bird and Dardenne, 1988). Ultimately, the relationship between the information function of the news text and the meanings of context often convey opinions which are drawn from myths and images in the culture of the political and ideological discourse makers and the audience who receive it (Barthes, 1993). In this regard, printed news, editorial pages, op-ed columns, television and radio talk shows, and commentaries all contribute to the representation of image and opinion making which are based on prevailing social myths.

7.3 Ideology, Stereotypes and Representation

The media is deeply involved in constructing meanings of national and international tensions which find expression in conflicts of ideology (McQuail, 1994).

Journalism has a strong bias towards elites, both as sources of information and as subjects to cover (Galtung 1996). News discourse is based not merely on facts but often on information that is already interpreted in a subjective way support or reject political perceptions. Bernstein (2002) explains that the media use stereotypes in order to represent reality. Like myths, media stereotypes can be understood by audiences in relation to familiar codes and conventions. She argues that repeated media representation in multitude of texts about the ‘other’ has the power to reinforce negative stereotypes of certain groups. “Stereotyping is an ideological process that works to the advantage of the powerful groups in society” (Bernstein, 2002:266).
Bird and Dardenne (1988) refer specifically to news and argue that news resembles narrative and story, hence it reflects the troubled relationship between "reality and stories about reality" (Bird and Dardenne, 1988: 68). Thus, they continue, news stories, like myths, do not "tell it like it is", but rather, "tell it like it means" (Bird and Dardenne, 1988:71).

Jalbert (1983) argues that ideology is seen to be a routine feature of the social production of news articles that are compatible with political and economic interests. Dennis (1991) claims that because the press is closely connected with the state structure, the media -- in spite of their presumed adversarial role -- are largely sympathetic to government policies, especially foreign policy. It is generally agreed that the media do play an important role in shaping images, whether alone or together with other institutions. In this context, Sarsar and Raby (2001) argue that "people's intuition does not exist in a vacuum... moving from present view to envision a preferred future would require reflection upon images of reality, since images are equally, if not more important, than reality itself" (Sarsar and Raby, 2001:1).

Since its inception, Israel experienced several wars with its Arab neighbours and endless terrorism by Palestinians, leading to countless casualties and suffering. Throughout these crises, the Israeli nation called for solidarity around the hegemonic ideology of the leadership. This ideology contained a collection of images, myths and stereotypes which are represented by the most dominant Jewish concept of 'a people who shall dwell alone' and 'the whole world is against us' (Gertz, 1988). The relationship between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the news discourse representation of the enemy construct the relationship between ideology and reality.

7.4 The Significance of Myths and Stereotypes in Israel

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict served as a perpetual source of political and ideological discourses which influenced personal identity, collective memory, social beliefs symbols, myths and language (Bar-Tal, 1995). Thus, in Israel, where wars
and terrorism constituted daily reality, the common rhetoric was of a nation under threat (Arian, 1995). Ongoing conflicts with the Arabs, and the Palestinians, in particular, were routinely stereotyped by images and myths which made the linkage between Jewish past and present and were widely supported by the public, the media and the political leaders. These included concepts inspired by biblical quotations such as ‘a nation who shall dwell alone’ and ‘the whole world is against us’.

Dramatic events in Jewish and Israeli history reinforced the images, myths and stereotypes that characterized the perceptions of its enemies. The personification of the contemporary enemies of the Jewish people was linked to past tradition. Examples include: Titus, the Roman emperor whose army destroyed the second Jewish Temple in AD 70; Haman, the advisor to King Ahaseurus of Persia in the fifth century BC: and Adolf Hitler, who destroyed half of European Jewry in the Second World War. These images are used concurrently to emphasize the link between the Jewish past and present.

The ultimate enemy of the Israeli state was traditionally personified by images of Arafat and the PLO. Essentially, the Israeli media demonstrates only primitive understanding of Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians, in general. Images among Israelis of Arabs, in general, and Palestinians, in particular, date back many years. The imprints left by these images on Israeli individuals and on the national psyches are part of collective memories.

Jalbert (1983) writes that for years, in Israel, the Palestinians were referred as ‘terrorists’. A distinction was initially made between the PLO led by Arafat and the Palestinian people. But since the Lebanon War (1982), when it became clear that the majority of Palestinians people supported the PLO and recognized it as their sole representative (Hiro, 1996), the category ‘terrorist’ was routinely applied to all Palestinians by the Israeli media.

The images of Arafat and the PLO in the Israeli media (see below) were typical of the rigid thinking that characterizes conflict situations. Elizur (1993) defines a
stereotype as an image whose effective or emotional content does not change even when it can be demonstrated that its cognitive content is inaccurate. She argues that when political leaders use stereotypes, they reinforce concepts and distort reality.

The denial of the opponent’s rights, demonization of intentions, condemnation of actions and emphasis of the threat posed all undermine the legitimacy of an opponent. Dehumanization also serves to justifies one’s own hostile acts since the enemy is cast “into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups within limits of acceptable norms and values” (Bar-Tal, 1989:170). This creates a vicious circle in which both sides distort the perception of reality to the point that opportunities for conflict resolution may be missed.

The paradigm through which much of the Western world first looked at the Arab-Israeli conflict after the 1948 war was that of the outnumbered Jews (representing the biblical figure of David) fighting off five Arab armies (representing Goliath) (Elizur, 1984). This paradigm lasted until the 1967 war (Friedman, 2001) when Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Nossek (1994) argues that the Israeli press used the Holocaust in order to emphasize the significance of the Palestinian threat and the recovery of the Jewish people in the Jewish state. This reinforced the psychological need for consensus in the face of an enemy and for the ethos of national security. Representation of this ethos became a dominant cultural process forging the Israeli collective identity.

According to Arian (1995), Israeli leaders sought to promote the idea of Israel as a nation-state under threat. The motif of the Holocaust continued to play a central role in the conception and rhetoric of political leaders, especially that of the right-wing Likud governments. On the other hand, the existence of the State of Israel enabled its Jewish citizens to feel relatively safe in their own nation-state. Arian points to the fact that in 1986, 82% of Israelis polled believed that a holocaust was unlikely to occur again, possibly due to the absolute trust invested in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).
To conclude, the protracted conflict experienced by Israel activated group solidarity and ideological consensus that contributed to the survival of the nation. It also preserved the 'people apart' myth and the need to delegitimize a stereotyped enemy.

7.5 Perceptions of Arafat and the PLO in Israel

For much of the first twenty-five years of Israeli history, the existence of the Palestinians was completely denied by official rhetoric. The general notion expressed was that the Palestinians were Arabs, without a distinct national identity. This attitude was imprinted by the statement attributed to the former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in 1969: “There never has been a Palestinian nation” (Rolef, 1997; Peres, 5 May 2002). For three decades following the establishment of the PLO in 1968 (Bechor, 1995), Israeli propaganda depicted it as a terrorist organization whose raison d’être was to establish a Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine (Dennis, 1991), including territory belonging to the State of Israel.

From the early 1980s, a few Israeli peace activists, such as members of the Communist Party and a handful of academics, started to meet PLO members and Arafat clandestinely, in Europe as well as locally. Barnea (2002) recalls that the editor of the left-wing weekly Haolam Hazeh, Uri Avnery MK, “bravely crossed the lines to Beirut in summer 1982 and interviewed Arafat in the middle of the Israeli bombardments and courageously published support in the ability of Arafat to negotiate peace”. In his own account of clandestine meetings with PLO activists during the early 1980s, the journalist Avnery attests to the value of these intital encounters:

Political decisions are made by people. People’s actions are shaped by their perceptions. Mere politicians do not understand the underlying psychological realities of the world in which they move. Our job is to change these realities on both sides in order to change the course of events from war to peace (Avnery, 1986: 334).
Contacts between Israeli and Palestinian leaders were extremely rare prior to the period of the Intifada. Indeed, it was only in 1986 that the Israel government acknowledged a need to prohibit all contacts with the PLO (see Chapter 2). Ashrawi (1995) notes that all Western media represented Arafat with unidimensional image of a terrorist, representative of all Palestinians.

Generations of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours, together with the Palestinian demands for the elimination of the State of Israel generated hatred and fears which, in turn, determined Israeli attitudes towards Arafat and the PLO. Arafat was represented as a bloodthirsty terrorist whose aim was to destroy Israel and the Jewish nation. Rubinstein (1995) relates that beyond the Middle East, for many years Arafat was called head of Palestinian guerrilla organizations, while among Israelis he was simply described as head of the PLO terrorist organization.

As noted in Chapter 3, the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza) between 1987-1991 led to a new era of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and some neighbouring Arab countries. These developments emerged as a result of the 1991 Madrid conference at which Israeli and Palestinians delegations met for the first time to discuss peace talks.

The Palestinian delegation of local Palestinian leaders from the West Bank was defined by the Israeli government and media as the ‘alternative leadership’. Israel thereby hoped to establish an alternative Palestinian leadership to replace the exiled Arafat and the PLO as their representative (Bregman and El-Tahri, 1998). These developments also paved the path to the Oslo peace process and the peace treaty with Jordan (Shamir and Shamir, 1993).

The use of stereotypes to promote social solidarity (Abercrombie et al., 1994) through news discourse, according to structural linguists (Levi-Strauss, 1995), creates images which are designed to appeal to audience rather than to reproduce reality. Not only in Israel, but also in Europe and in the US, Arafat’s image as a terrorist caused concern. Yet, his political importance as leader of the Palestinian

To Jews in Israel, Arafat was a demon of their modern mythology and a perpetrator of terror. Successive governments in Israel referred to Arafat and the PLO as terrorists and murderers while depicting Israeli citizens as victims. Prime Minister Begin (1977-1983) referred to Arafat as “Hitler in his lair” (Corbin, 1994:15). The attitudes of both Labour and Likud governments were illustrated by former prime minister Yitzhak Shamir when he asserted his refusal to deal with the terrorist PLO who wanted only to destroy Israel and the Jewish people.

One common denominator which characterized all Israeli prime ministers from Golda Meir (1969) to Yitzhak Rabin until the signing of the Oslo accords was hatred of what Arafat represented and how he behaved. It is hard to describe the extent to which even “the hairs on his face” in the words of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, were the subject of worldwide derision (Rubinstein, 1995:29).

Loathing of Arafat was thereby combined with sweeping generalizations, traditional fears and Holocaust-related anxieties. He was referred to as “the Nazi in the Bunker”, and “the beast on two legs” (Barnea, 2002). He was generally depicted as wearing military uniform and carrying a revolver, with a keffiah (headress) arranged in the shape of the map of Palestine.

In spite of these images, some Israelis did initiate contacts with the PLO members, even after the passing of the amendment to the Order for the Prevention of Terror of 1986 (Rolef, 1997). Indeed, secret meetings between Israeli government figures and PLO members occasionally took place. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) (1994), the second most important official of the PLO, provides details in his memoirs of the clandestine contacts between the two leading Israeli political parties, Labour and Likud, and the outlawed PLO. He even mentioned dates: during the Likud government, PLO officials and Likud politicians met in Europe in December 1991; and during the Labour government, PLO leaders met with a senior Labour Party

The ongoing mutual hostility between Israelis and the Palestinians in general and with Arafat and the PLO, in particular, continued until their mutual recognition and the signing of the DOP on the White House lawn in Washington (13 September 1993). As noted previously, this led to a whole new dynamic in the Israeli-Palestinian relations. Hanan Ashrawi (1995), a member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace talks, noted that a transitional phase had begun with all the uncertainty of a passage to the unknown.

Dehumanization of the enemy on the battlefield serves always as an essential psychological function, but in times of peace, this function change. Before the Oslo peace process, Arafat had personified the enemy and the Palestinian problem. After Oslo, the emphasis moved from identification of the Palestinian problem to the efforts to find a solution for reconciliation and peace negotiations.

The mutual recognition between PLO and the government of Israel on 13 September 1993 was supported by most of the world and challenged in a way, the myth of the Jews as a ‘people that shall dwell alone’. Israeli media discourse reflected the public jubilation and a sense of victory. Newspapers, in particular, were subsequently loaded with peace ideology and portrayed the former enemy as a friend. The image of Arafat presented in the media post-Oslo was as if terror belonged to a past heritage. From then on, Arafat was the chairman of the PLO and the leader of the Palestinian people, the partner for peace. A public opinion poll conducted by Gallup Israel in December 1996 revealed the transformation of Arafat’s image when he was selected to represent the favourite character of the Hartuzim (satirical puppet show) on Israel Channel 2. (Barnea, 2002).

The changing policies of the political framework and media give rise to the following question: How could Arafat’s image change so rapidly from that of enemy to a statesman and a leader? Ezrachi (2002) argues that the representation of Arafat as
either a satanic image or as a partner to peace was a response to strong emotional needs among the public. The changing image of the enemy in the news texts over time corresponded to the political changes that took place post-Oslo. These are analyzed in the following section.

7.6 Research Findings on Changing Images

In the pre-Oslo period, Arafat and the PLO were virtually ignored in news articles (over 255 days, they were mentioned only 5 times in Yedioth and 7 times in Ha'aretz). This represents a form of delegitimization by the news media pre-Oslo. At the same time, the Oslo secret channels between Arafat, the PLO and Israeli officials were established away from the government, the Knesset and the media.

Changes in the political and ideological news discourses between the pre-Oslo and post-Oslo periods are exhibited in Tables 20 and 21. These show the different frequencies with which Arafat and the PLO were mentioned in news articles, either as main (primary) actors or as sub-actors (secondary actors). The Palestinian delegation that had been negotiating with the Israelis in Washington pre-Oslo evidently became irrelevant post-Oslo, and almost disappeared from the news media.

The personification of the enemy through Arafat and the PLO, and the undermining of their legitimacy took on greater significance, politically and ideologically, often to the point of either demonization or notable absence. The political delegitimization of the enemy by the 1986 ban on contacts with PLO members was upheld by media discourse. Arafat and the PLO were delegitimized in the news discourse, which regarded them as a non-issue. In the nine months pre-Oslo, Arafat and the PLO barely figured as either primary or secondary actors in either newspaper: in Yedioth, they appeared in 6.8% of news articles and in Ha'aretz, 8.1% (see Tables 15 and 16).

The following quotations (selected from the first two pages of the newspapers) illustrate stereotypical perceptions of Arafat:
ORIENTATION OF PAGE IS AS PER THE ORIGINAL IN THE BOOK.
• "Arafat [in exile in Tunis] congratulated the deported terrorists, praised the holy
dead and called the Palestinians to remain steadfast to their land" (Ha'aretz, 31
March 1993).
• Prime Minister Rabin told American Jewish leaders that "there is no change
towards Israel relations with PLO and we will not negotiate with them" (Ha'aretz, 2
August 1993, shortly before the signing of the Oslo accords).

As noted above, Arafat was hardly mentioned in the political news discourse in
Israel. His image, however, was reinforced by news articles about the Middle East
policy of the US, Israel's most important ally (through third and fourth topics in the
texts).

The following quotations (selected from the first two pages of the newspapers) attest
to this trend:
• "[Warren] Christopher [US secretary of state] said to the Palestinians: 'For you,
Arafat is a president, but, not as far as we are concerned. We do not recognize
him'"(Ha'aretz, 12 March 1993).
• "A senior American official said that through partners, the US are looking for a
young Palestinian leader to replace Arafat who is no longer essential" (Ha'aretz, 31
March 1993).
• "American reporters noted that the key for peace talks lies with the Palestinian
people" (Yedioth, 23 February 1993).

The total frequencies of the perceived enemy (Arafat, the PLO, the local Palestinian
leadership and Hamas) were represented pre-Oslo by 28.7% of the foreign actors in
news articles in Yedioth, and 33.1% in Ha'aretz (just 49 news articles in almost nine
months) (see Table 15).

It is also noteworthy that in both newspapers, the topic of Hamas and that of Arafat
and the PLO (defined as enemies) were represented by similar frequencies (6.8%
each in Yedioth, and 8.1% in Ha'aretz). Meanwhile, the local Palestinian leadership,
which participated in the legitimate bilateral talks with Israel, was represented by
double these figures in both newspapers during the pre-Oslo period (see Table 15).
In order to show the dichotomy in the news discourse representation between the legitimate Palestinian local leadership and the delegitimatized PLO leadership headed by Arafat in Tunis, I separated them from Table 15 and considered them together as Palestinians represented pre- and post-Oslo (see Tables 20 and 21).

Table 20: Representation of the Primary Foreign Actor (Palestinian Representatives) in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20 shows the dramatic transformation of actors (the enemy) in the news discourse; from delegitimization (ie. perceived as almost a non-issue) to dominant actors. During almost nine months prior to the signing of the Oslo accords, Arafat appeared in only 3 news articles in Yedioth (25%) and the PLO (16.7%) with 2 references as primary actors. In Ha'aretz, Arafat was covered by (30.4%) in 7 news articles, while the PLO had 21.7% (2 references). During this period, the local Palestinian local leadership figured in 58% (7 references) in Yedioth and 47.9% (11 news articles) in Ha'aretz.

Post-Oslo, Arafat's frequencies immediately increased to the very high level of 75% (78 news articles); the PLO increased to 24% (25 news articles); together they were represented with a total of 99% of news articles in Yedioth. In Ha'aretz, Arafat was represented with 69.3% (79 news articles) and the PLO with 27.2% (31 news articles). Together they totalled 97.5%. In contrast, the local Palestinian leadership
vanished from the news, figuring in just 1% of the news in Yedioth and 3.5% in Ha'aretz. This is indicative of the fact that the media legitimized Arafat as the Palestinian representative and recognized him as a partner for peace, while immediately ignoring the local Palestinian leadership.

Clearly, both newspapers displayed the same attitude towards the Palestinian actors: the dramatic increase in representation is demonstrated by the role Arafat played as PLO leader and representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO, although represented with more frequencies in post-Oslo, appeared in the news media secondary to Arafat, both pre- and post-Oslo.

Arafat was clearly perceived in the news discourse as leader of the PLO during the two time periods. The Palestinian local leadership, which received much coverage pre-Oslo, was represented post-Oslo by an “eloquent absence, their silence; or refracted through the glance or the gaze of others” (Hall, 1986:9). The model between these two forces, namely Arafat and the local Palestinian leadership, resembles a see-saw; when one was high on the news agenda, the other was low.

In sum, analysis of the data pertaining to Ha'aretz and Yedioth demonstrates the same policy towards Arafat as the leader of the PLO and the Palestinian nation pre- and post-Oslo. The local Palestinian leadership represented as partners to ‘peace talks’ pre-Oslo became marginal post-Oslo, while Arafat and the PLO became the representatives of the Palestinian nation, and legitimized partners for peace.

The news ‘reality’ that validated the change in Israeli government policy towards Arafat, the PLO and the local Palestinian leadership is illustrated in the tables below.
Table 21: Representation of the Secondary Foreign Actor (Palestinian Representatives) in News Articles relating to Security, Peace and Politics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>N=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21 exhibits the representation of secondary references to Palestinians in the news pre- and post-Oslo. The tendency in both newspapers was evidently similar to those illustrated in Table 20. As expected, Ha'aretz granted central representation to the local Palestinian leadership (60%), Arafat was represented in 10% of news articles, and the PLO in 30% during the pre-Oslo period. This conformed to the agenda of the Israeli government who delegitimized Arafat and the PLO pre-Oslo. Yedioth, a populist newspaper, related less than Ha'aretz to the local Palestinian leadership, who were represented by 40% (2 news articles), the PLO (also 40%, 2 news articles) and Arafat (only 20%, 1 news article).

However, both newspapers dramatically increased representation of the PLO and Arafat in the news discourse post-Oslo, thereby granting Arafat and the PLO the new status as legitimizing political partners for peace. Shimon Peres (interviewed on 3 May 2002) pointed out that “for the first time Arafat recognized worldwide the right of Israel to exist in peace and security according to UN resolution 242 and Israel has recognized Arafat as the Palestinians’ leader” (see Chapter 9). Indeed, Arafat and the PLO were seen as representing the Palestinian nation and became active partners to peace negotiations and conflict resolution.
The data below demonstrates the dramatic changes in the news representation of the Palestinian actors.

Table 22: The See-Saw Model between Two Palestinian Forces as Primary Actors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat and the PLO</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the popular newspaper Yedioth, the data showed a dramatic change between the two time periods. In Ha'aretz, the change was less marked but still significant. The frequencies of Arafat in the news in Yedioth increased by 230%; in Ha'aretz it increased by 190%. However, the total frequencies in which Arafat and the PLO are represented in the news indicate a considerable correlation in both topics. The primary representation in Yedioth was 99% and in Ha'aretz, 96.5%.

The differences also apply to the local Palestinian leadership which were more prominent in Ha'aretz pre-Oslo than in Yedioth. The differences between the two newspapers can be explained by the fact that Ha'aretz is a quality publication with an emphasis on political issues. Yedioth became more political post-Oslo in response to the demands of its readers. However, both newspapers reflected government policy and discourse, and responded to the public need for information.

It is interesting to analyze representation of the secondary actor in the Palestinian arena, and to examine the interplay of both newspapers between the primary actor and the secondary one. The same tendency regarding the main foreign actor was
shown regarding the secondary one. Firstly, representation of Arafat increased dramatically in the news coverage post-Oslo. Secondly, representation of the PLO also increased, more so in Ha’aretz than in Yedioth. Thirdly, the local Palestinian leadership lost their position in the Israeli news media.

While the changes described above are very clear, the interplay between the primary and the secondary actors is particularly interesting. In both newspapers, Arafat, as the primary actor was more prominent than the PLO both pre- and post-Oslo, while as the secondary actor the PLO gained more prominence (53.8% in Yedioth and 63.2% in Ha’aretz) than Arafat (41% in Yedioth and 34.2% in Ha’aretz) in post-Oslo. As secondary actors, the Palestinians became marginal (5.1% in Yedioth and 2.6% in Ha’aretz). In general, the tendency of the secondary actor in both newspapers was similar to the primary one in terms of the pre-Oslo enemy who became a legitimate partner post-Oslo.

These results of the secondary Palestinians actors validate the see-saw model found in Table 22 of primary actors and are illustrated in Table 23.

Table 23: The See-Saw Model between Two Palestinian Forces as Secondary Actors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods (Data derived from Table 21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat and the PLO</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Palestinian leadership</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Table 22, which showed data regarding the primary actors, the data in Table 23 shows the see-saw model between the levels of representation of Arafat and the PLO on the one side, and the local Palestinian leadership, on the other. A perfect
correlation in frequencies was revealed in both newspapers: Arafat and the PLO figured as the primary actor more than twice as often as he was featured as a secondary actor in post-Oslo. In Yedioth, they appeared to be more salient than in Ha'aretz, although, with a very small difference. In short, Table 22 shows that both newspapers exhibited the same policy and the same changes in the representation of Arafat and the PLO image pre- and post-Oslo, and are similar to the end result of Tables 20 and 21.

Post-Oslo, Arafat and the PLO together were represented as follows:
Table 20 and 22: primary actor = 99% in Yedioth and 96.5% in Ha'aretz.
Table 21 and 23: secondary actor = 94.8% in Yedioth and 97.4% in Ha'aretz.
The local PA leadership decreases to very small numbers (see tables 22 and 23).

Arafat and the PLO became so popular in the Israeli media following the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO that both newspapers declared him a partner and a neighbour. Depicted as head of the terrorist PLO pre-Oslo, Arafat became the leader of the Palestinians post-Oslo, who signed the “peace of the brave” (Ha'aretz and Yedioth, 14 September 1993). Arafat himself was quoted in both newspapers using the term: “peace between the brave” (Ha'aretz and Yedioth, 17 January 1994).
He was frequently represented in the news in both newspapers. Furthermore, journalists often used identical adjectives and titles to describe both Arafat and Rabin, and these two leaders were represented with similar frequencies in each of the news articles.

A main news article on the first page of Ha'aretz was randomly selected to analyze Arafat’s frequencies during the pre-Oslo period (21 March 1993). This showed that the Palestinians were mentioned 19 times, the PLO twice and Arafat once. On the day that the Oslo accords were signed (13 September 1993), one news article in Ha'aretz mentioned Arafat 21 times, the PLO 16 and the Palestinians just 6 times. Post-Oslo, one randomly selected news article in Ha'aretz (6 October 1993) mentioned Arafat 20 times, the PLO 15 and the Palestinians 3 times. Similar figures apply to a selection of articles from Yedioth: Pre-Oslo (2 May 1993) the Palestinians were mentioned in one randomly selected news article 11 times, the PLO once and
Arafat once. Post-Oslo (6 October 1993) the main article mentioned Arafat 16 times, the PLO 11 and the Palestinians only 4 times and on 30 December 1993, the news article mentioned Arafat 18 times, the PLO 7 and the Palestinians, 10 times.

When mentioning ‘Prime Minister Rabin’, news articles referred to ‘Chairman Arafat’. When the prime minister was referred to by his surname, the same convention was applied to ‘Arafat’. When articles mentioned ‘Yitzhak Rabin’, they also mentioned ‘Yasser Arafat’. For the first time, Arafat was referred to as ‘Mr. Arafat’ and was portrayed as a human being.

The following examples (all selected from the first two pages of the newspapers) illustrate this trend:

- “Yasser Arafat and his wife Suha arrive in Gaza (12 July 1994, Yedioth).
- “Yasser Arafat presented an ancient Bible aged 300 years old to Yitzhak Rabin” (Yedioth, 26 September 1994).

Another quotation illustrates the positive atmosphere relating to Arafat as a partner to negotiating peace:

> It was a good meeting between Rabin and Arafat at the Erez checkpoint … The two reached an agreement and the peace process was fuelled again…It was undoubtedly the most successful meeting between Rabin and Arafat to date. The two personalities who, to put it mildly, do not like each other, renewed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Arafat, for his part, promised to subdue terrorism. In general, Arafat yesterday supplied the goods (Yedioth, 26 September 1994).

Arafat was also legitimized in the Western world:

- “…the American media event where the US President Clinton hugged both Arafat and Rabin while shaking hands…” (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002, see Chapter 9).
- “The peace era has begun and the war era ended” (Yedioth and Ha’aretz, 13 September 1993).
- “The handshake that changed the Middle East”, “A new Middle East” (Yedioth and Ha’aretz, 14 September 1993).
Both newspapers published public opinion polls that strengthened and supported the Oslo peace process and government policy. According to a poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute, which was published on the front page of both Ha'aretz and Yedioth on 15 September 1993, 61% of Israelis supported the ‘Gaza and Jericho First’ plan [granting autonomy to the PA in Gaza and Jericho, under Arafat]. “The PLO suggested a united economy between Israel, Jordan and the PA” (Yedioth and Ha'aretz, 29 September 1993). Another poll by the Dahaf Institute, published in both Yedioth and Ha'aretz (18 February 1994), revealed that 64% of Israelis estimated that a Palestinian state would be established.

7.7 Conclusions

It is easy to speak glibly about the image of an enemy and to describe it impressionistically without measurement or systematic assessment. However, the results of quantitative content analysis demonstrate the transition from delegitimization to total legitimization and are supported by quotations from news articles. The news media reflected through its discourse a change of image from the stereotype of ultimate evil emerged a new stereotype, namely a partner for peace.

Hiro (1996) argues that Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres were both sincere in their commitment to achieving peace. They accepted the basic premise that the core intent of Oslo was to create the appearance of a balance of power between Israelis and Palestinians over five years so that the two peoples could start to coexist peacefully. He stresses that the change in the image of the enemy was reflected by mutual trust leading to the establishment of a telephone hotline between Rabin and Arafat, along with the use of hidden channels of communication.

The Israeli media experienced a dramatic and immediate transformation, as reflected by the media discourse. The phrase ‘the peace of the brave’ was used to invoke the idea of a ‘Brave New World’. Ari Shavit (1997), a veteran columnist in Ha'aretz, uses the expression “messianic times” to describe the intoxicated atmosphere and
pervasive sense of victory. In the same article, he also illustrates the change in the media discourse:

We felt the great powers were beside us and became wild. We didn’t hesitate to mobilize our power as reporters. We believed that the global changes indicated the ‘end of history’, the end of conflict and wars and that Rabin and Peres would create for us Western Europe in the Middle East (Shavit, Ha’aretz, 26 December 1997).

Kempf (1998) argues that the more a society is involved in a conflict, the more escalation-oriented will be its media coverage of the conflict. He explains that even the most powerful political leaders cannot just switch to a cooperative strategy once a cease-fire or peace treaty is settled. They risk losing power or even their lives. Willingness to compromise may even be regarded as betrayal. (Indeed, such was the case of Israel, where Rabin was murdered by a Jewish militant.)

Beliefs which help a society to withstand ongoing conflict remain dominant. Thus, transformation from the custom of war to the norm of peace require a gradual demolition of stereotypes and enemy images in addition to trust building; this can be achieved by developing a strong civil society. This process cannot be achieved by simply using a new political discourse and ideology that idealizes cooperation, as reflected by Israeli news media discourse post-Oslo. “If stereotypes and prejudice are suppressed only, they will prevail under cover and return to the surface of social life as soon as they are given the slightest chance” (Azar and Cohen, 1979:169).

The danger of an ideology is rooted in the performance of image and the promotion of the enemy’s political identity (Young, 1992). Rubinstein (1995) argues that due to bitter differences over the Middle East conflict, the personal opinion of each reporter determined whether Arafat was immediately described as ‘the PLO leader’, or ‘the chairman of the PLO executive’.

The investigation of images in conflict and peace shows the immediate transition of the media in representing Arafat and the PLO, from archenemy to a partner for peace and a legitimate national leader. While generally connected to the main themes of
conflict or peace or both, these images vary in content, complexity and abstraction. If properly understood, such images might ultimately contribute to peace building.

It is also worth noting that Arafat’s status changed within the Arab world during this period. At a special meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria in 1988, Arafat symbolically declared the establishment of an independent state of Palestine. Together with the Palestinian leadership, he approved a statement recognizing the Jewish state within its pre-1967 borders and accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338 in addition to denouncing terrorism. Arafat subsequently gained the title “the president of Palestine” (Hart, 1994), which was used in Palestinian publications. On arrival in Gaza in July 1994, was termed ‘chairman of the PA’.

The results of this study show that the news media discourse did not exhibit the image of the Palestinians in a holistic way, as being one institutionalized partner for peace. Rather, they replaced the actors with one another. Van Dijk (1998) argues that “the media essentially help reproduce preformulated ideologies” (Van Dijk, 1998: 11). He explains that the reality represented in or through the news is itself an ideological construct based on the definitions given by accredited sources, such as government. In other words, the media are not a neutral or rational mediator of social events, but essentially help reproduce preconceived ideologies.

Hitherto, it was Shavit (1997) and Barnea (2002) who accused the media of promoting a “left-wing religion” in the aftermath of 13 September 1993. Barnea (2002) recalls that after the major wave of terrorism in 1996, a well-known journalist, Dankner (1996) wrote in Ha’aretz: “Arafat is not the Evil Empire’s frightful Caesar anymore… he is the chosen leader of the Palestinian people who made a peace treaty with the Israeli people” (Barnea, 2002:7).

In this context, Ezrahi (2002) argues that Israeli journalistic concepts and values adapted to the emotional needs of the Israeli public in order to rationalize the security problems in Israel. He claims that serious analysis could reinforce forces and power of reality even when they contradict attitudes.
Clearly, these images illustrate how the government and the press relate to simplistic personifications of the enemy as threats to Jewish existence and the Jewish state. Apparently, the media should be concerned by the question of Arafat’s mythological construction. After representing him for decades as the ultimate enemy and arch-terrorist, how did he become overnight a legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation, a human being, a neighbour and a partner? Moreover, the news discourse did not raise any issues in relation to the Palestinian delegation to peace talks and their continuing role in the process. Furthermore, no news or any background information about Palestinian culture was conveyed to the Israeli public.

Analysis of findings related to Arafat, the PLO and the Palestinians can teach us how mass communications implement ‘reality’ elements into the news discourse. It can be argued that the news discourse in the printed press are part of the ideological and political policy of government, and disseminate messages to the public, identifying the national enemy and conveying legitimacy on potential partners for peace.

In effect the news semantics, as described above, were constantly reasserted definitions of a social situation by way of media news discourse rather than political or economic power (Hall, 1980). However, the news rhetoric was used through a “laundry of words” as Grossman defines it. He argues that this is a “variety of words that do not describe reality but try to hide it” (Grossman, 1998:44). On the other hand, McQuail (1994) argues that mass media do not define reality on their own but give preferential access to the definitions of those in authority.

McHoul (1993) raises a question following Foucault’s (1967) theory of change:
If the historical flow of ideas is radically discontinuous and are also part of the system, then aren’t we left in a rather difficult situation: either to accept the system, or submit to the chaotic and random changes brought about by discontinuity?” (McHoul, 1993: 42).

The discontinuity in the political and ideological news discourses, analyzed within the broader context of socio-political changes, are discussed in following chapters.
Chapter 8
Security Discourse

Research Findings and Discussion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses changes in security topics in the news discourse between the periods before and after the signing of the Oslo accords. Security was analyzed in relation to the Israeli armed forces and terrorism during the transformation that seemed to be taking place from war culture to peace culture. The purpose was to explore the role of the news discourse in representing the function of security in Israeli society during this transition.

8.2 Approach to Security

In political science, security denotes domestic as well as international conditions that protect individual nations, states, and people against threats. Each nation has a unique combination of geographical location, historical experience, and political culture that shape its core beliefs about security (Bar-Tal and Jacobson, 1998).

Standard dictionary definitions explain security in general terms of safety, i.e., freedom from danger and risks. National security is defined as integration of domestic and foreign policies in order to safeguard a nation and its citizenry. Professional definitions of security refer to armed forces and terrorism. Larsen and Wirtz (2001) argue that military forces serve offensive and defensive functions, deterring and preventing attacks by other nations, as well as terrorists. Livingston (2001) explains that defence from terror requires an offensive capability equal to that
previously mobilized against recognized threats, such as military and intelligence forces. Therefore, armed defence and terrorism provide the parameters of the frame of security concerns, practically and conceptually.

The definition of terrorism is still problematic. Whitaker (2001) asserts that no single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. He notes, however, the preferred definition by the US State Department: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Whitaker, 2001:1).

The definition of terrorism proposed by Wardlaw was considered most comprehensive and appropriate to this study:

Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators (Wardlaw, 1990: 16).

Carruthers (2000) argues that when a state declares an emergency in order to deal with terrorist threats or actions, it expects almost total compliance from national media organizations to adopt a counter-terrorist stance. A complex question remains: does media exposure encourage terrorism by raising personal fears that might crush the civil society? (Schlesinger et al., 1983).

It seems reasonable that war, terrorism and conflict increase public attention to the media. A survey published in Ha’aretz (6 December 2001), shows that since 11 September 2001, 23% of Israelis read more news in the daily newspapers during periods of increased security-related tension, and that issues regarded as most interesting are those related to security (Barabash, 2001). A second survey, reported in Ha’aretz on 14 May 2002, indicates a further increase (30%) in the reading of newspapers news during security-related tension (Barabash, 2002).
Chomsky (2001) regards terrorism as merely another name for conflict. Carruthers (2000) claims that ironically terrorism generally occurs in peacetime. However, terrorist actions proclaim a state of war where innocent people are targeted. These definitions involve conventional concepts that link armed forces and terrorism under the umbrella of ‘national security’. This study analyzes the news security discourse in relation to the terms ‘armed forces’ and ‘terrorism’, as defined above.

Bar-Tal and Jacobson (1998) explain that a complementary social-psychological approach that acknowledges economic and cultural conditions can be added to the aforementioned military and political concepts. They argue that citizens are governed by external and internal conditions in which security is experienced. At any rate, the definitions above only concern the strategic functions of security. Not one ‘positive’ approach to security was found, ie., one which does not focus on offensive or defensive functions, but rather on how to create a world beyond conflicts and wars in which societies are completely free from threats.

8.3 The Security Ethos

In addition to a series of wars, Israel experienced countless terrorist attacks by Palestinians (Nossek, 1990). Israeli society was therefore shaped by its preoccupation with national security. During the period under review, the concept of security in Israel had two sides: one concerned the armed forces, namely the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), the police and intelligence services; the other concerned the phenomenon of terrorism.

For many years, security was the organizing ethos in Israeli society, determining the hierarchy of other values and maintaining the most prestigious status in terms of both financial and human resources (Lissak, 1998a). Threats to security that proliferated during conflicts with Arabs in general, and Palestinians in particular, created a special relationship between the IDF, and Israeli society and the media.
The boundaries between politics and the military in Israel were evidently blurred and certain political decisions were influenced by links between political and military elites. Herzog (1999) argues that the political domain consequently tended to lose a degree of autonomy when dealing with security calculations. To understand these patterns it is important to note that the Israeli concept of security was shaped by Jewish historical experience in the Diaspora, in addition to a set of images drawn from tradition and traced to the Bible (Luz, 1998).

Hence, national security played a prominent role in Israeli culture and in its political and ideological discourses (Pery, 1998). Given that the news media conformed to the unusual political consensus, the national security ‘beat’ in journalism was invariably the most prestigious, and provided a model for other reports (Hallin, 1997).

The question of how best to guarantee the security of individuals, as well as the continued existence of the Jewish collectivity in Israel preoccupied every government and every citizen of the state since its inception. This was also true of the media (Arian, 1995; Bar-Tal and Jacobson, 1998).

The IDF was generally perceived by Israelis as qualified to handle security problems and other national matters, ranging from the process of war to the settlements policy in the occupied territories (Lahav, 1993). The Israeli public, and many beyond Israel, came to believe in the ability of the IDF to defend the nation. Lahav (1993) notes that one of the most prominent characteristics in Israeli discourse was the subordination of national considerations to security calculations.

The search for solutions to the constant threat of Palestinian terror created a dilemma over the effectiveness of either political or military responses. This was accompanied by powerful debates between those defined as belonging to the national camp and the peace camp (Arian, 1995). This debate, which divided Israeli society, was expressed through political and ideological discourses in the news media.
The traditional dominance of the security discourse in Israeli politics is illustrated by the hierarchy within government positions. For instance, the Ministry of Defence was considered the most important and prestigious portfolio. Indeed, this portfolio has ten held by the prime minister too eg., David Ben Gurion, 1948-1951, Yitzhak Rabin 1992-1995.

Due to the status of security, high-ranking military officers were frequently able to transfer to successful civilian careers in politics. This direct track is evident by the fact that many government ministers and other parliamentarians previously achieved senior military rank. Even the military censor's office (which is part of the intelligence corps) was headed by a rank of brigadier, appointed by the minister of defence, rather than the IDF chief of staff (Caspi and Limor, 1999).

8.4 The Government, the IDF and the News Media

Arab hostility, military considerations, media centralization and foreign policy interests consistently shaped relations between government and the media (Caspi and Limor, 1993; Goren and Rothman, 1982). Open criticism of government policies was limited because the media belonged to the consensus regarding the need for national self-preservation. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Lebanon War, however, the Israeli press began to review its role regarding acceptance of official messages. The media discourse thus began to change (Peri, 1998).

Peres claimed:

In all nations, in all times, the relationship to security changes on the eve of danger, and during danger, the value of the army increases. Everybody becomes patriotic, only praising the army and repelling criticism. This includes the media as well. When danger is over, criticism of the army and of security starts. The same happens here. As long as the chances of peace increase, criticism against security increases. As long as the danger to security increases, everyone becomes a soldier and salutes the right, as now... That's why in discussing events, there is a need to scan first the dangers, as these are what fix the tone, prejudice and myths. This also includes the media (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002).
Indeed, this statement supports the argument that despite changes in the security discourse, security and concerns over threats to the nation remained constantly valid in the press. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, Israeli journalists linked security considerations with freedom of the press and the willingness to maintain democratic values in the society (Goren and Rothman, 1982). In practice, this was rare since IDF spokespersons were the only source of information on security issues, and journalists made little effort to exercise freedom of opinion or promote the public right to know.

During each of the Israeli-Arab wars, and even earlier (prior to the establishment of the state), the media was asked to rally around the prevailing ideologies of national leaders (Gertz 1998) and express solidarity with the IDF. It is natural to aspire to a critical observation of government; this is clearly an important aspect of the democratic functioning of the media (Curran, 1998). Although the media often acted in the public interest by investigating and exposing official malpractice (eg., Watergate during the Nixon presidency), when it comes to national security dangers, most contemporary media malfunctioned, partly, they argue, for the sake of social responsibility. Peri (1998) argues that the Israeli media regarded themselves as a tool of the political elite for advancing collective goals “in the service of the state and the nation” (Peri, 1998: 216).

Caspi and Limor (1993) describe the Israeli media as a unique product of a mixed model derived from theories of authoritarian and social responsibility. Many of the tensions that developed over the years between the political, security and media institutions are the result of this mixed model. Until the establishment of the state, the political and the Hebrew media institutions shared a common ideology and goals. The political and security forces still perceived the press as a branch of the establishment to be regulated to promote ideological and national aims (Peri, 1998).

Military correspondents in Israel were subject to military and organizational constraints and certain secrecy regulations. According to Goren and Rothman (1982), most Jewish Israeli journalists, even non-military correspondents, served in the IDF, and in wartime, some became military correspondents. It is worth noting that female
journalists may have served in the IDF but only during compulsory service, rarely as reservists. The proportion of women employed by Israeli newspapers increased dramatically in recent years: at Ha'aretz, from 6.5% in 1976 to 36.1% in 1996, and at Yedioth, from 12.4% in 1976 to 42% in 1996 (Caspi and Limor, 1999). Yet not a single woman was employed as military correspondent in the printed press. Security was and remains a male domain.

In addition, since the 1967 war, all major international news organizations stationed permanent representatives in Israel. Members of the foreign press were not subject to the Israeli censor. Thus, their coverage of sensitive subjects provided opportunities for expanded coverage in the Hebrew press and increased the amount of information on security issues.

It could be argued that this situation resembled other democratic states during wars. For example, in Britain during the Falklands War, in the US during the 1991 Gulf War, and during the recent war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, all journalists conceded to the dictates of national security constraints.

Carruthers (2000) asserts that media operations in war and peacetime are more linked than often imagined:

> It would be misleading to imagine that media in Western democracies are subject to state interference and regulation only in wartime. Clearly, many of the special conditions war imposes for media in pluralistic systems obtain constantly more authoritarian regimes where the media is subjugated to the state and fulfil transparently ideological purposes (Carruthers, 2000: 14).

The multiplicity of print and electronic media outlets by private conglomerates influenced by the commercialization of the Israeli media and its globalization. The link between a free market, economic activity and democratic civic culture became increasingly salient (Ezrahi, 1997). In addition, Herman (1997) claims that the status of the intelligence services and the armed forces seemed doomed to decline in the last decade of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, little changed in the national
security realm. At the end of the 1990s, government sources continued to serve as the mainspring of information, the agenda was dictated by the authorities, and reporting on foreign affairs and security issues relied on official statements (Peri 1998).

Political leaders transmit their security beliefs to society through their easy access and control over the channels of information, communication, education and socialization (Jacobson and Bar-Tal, 1998). Consequently, the security discourse became an integral part of public discourse and affected the Hebrew language-in-use through the media discourse.

The relationship between the official institutions and the media demonstrates the conflicting values in Israeli society and the press. Lahav (1993) portrays the Israeli media as drawn with two faces: one with democratic values which smiles, the other dealing with security issues which bears a non-democratic grimace.

Ultimately, the transformations to a single democratic/capitalist system that occurred at the 1990s (Fukuyama, 1989), created far-reaching changes in the discourses of the Western World. Nonetheless, within Israel, national security continued to take precedence over capitalism and democracy, and to dominate the national ethos.

The centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict undoubtedly highlighted the importance of the military sphere. Relations between the IDF and Israeli society penetrated every aspect of life. However, since 1967, security revolves around the political status of the occupied territories and affects the political and ideological discourses. The notion of security was interpreted differently by members of the peace camp, on the left, and those belonging to the national camp, on the right.

8.5 Myths and Stereotypes relating to Security in Israeli Society

As noted above, from independence until the 1990s, the concept of security became the most critical factor in the lives of Israelis, as individuals and collectively. It also
played a critical role in determining ideological approaches to relations with the Palestinians and Arab states. The psychological backdrop to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which characterized Israeli society, incorporated a set of shared values relating to historical, cultural and social issues (Bar-Tal, 1990). Among them was the ‘people apart’ myth, a nationalist extension to the biblical covenant and the notion of the Jews as a ‘chosen people’ (Arian 1995). This myth became a major element of the political culture of Israel (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1983).

Gertz (1998) argues that two dominant narratives in Israeli culture expressed the concern of society with security. Firstly, the notion of the ‘war of the few against many’, which represented the Israel-Arab conflict, and was perceived as David versus Goliath. The second narrative expressed what Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) call the “siege mentality” (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992:1) which emphasized the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’. The trauma of the Holocaust underpinned belief that only a secure State of Israel could safeguard against the recurrence of such destruction (Bar-Tal, 1990). In this context, the Jewish slogan ‘never again’ was meaningful.

The experience of antisemitism is undoubtedly part of Jewish heritage, including that of Israelis. Although political and economic factors were most critical, debates over the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism remained unresolved at the end of twentieth century. In addition, the prevailing antisemitism in the Arab world evidently influenced opposition to the establishment of the Jewish state. The Palestinian National Charter which called for “a total repudiation of the existence of Israel” was regarded as evidence of antisemitism (Harkabi, 1979). Given that the revision of this text was an obstacle to peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, its symbolic value cannot be underestimated.

The Hebrew aphorism ayn breira (no choice) combined with the idea inherent in the biblical quotation, “the guardian of Israel will neither slumber nor sleep” (Psalms 121: 4) both convey the contemporary ideal of Israeli military heroism. Ultimately, this ideal provided an excuse for the continuation of conflict and wars (Arian, 1995) and enabled the concept of ‘no choice’ to penetrate the national belief system.
The centrality of security issues in Israeli society also infiltrated family life by granting women and family a special glory. Herzog (1999) notes that since the growth of late nineteenth-century nationalism, national continuity became a goal in its own right, and women were regarded as responsible for perpetuation as “mothers of nation” (Herzog, 1999:330). The succession of wars and the need for men to fulfill military reserve duty, influenced the roles of women within the family and society.

Although Israelis produced and consumed a great deal of information relating to the military and political situation, information deemed harmful to the prevailing myths was often effectively screened out. This was accomplished partially through military censorship, but more often through a process of self-censorship imposed by editors and reporters (Arian, 1995).

Keren (1998) notes that it is not only journalists, but also intellectuals and academics in the fields of Middle Eastern history, political science and international relations who contributed to the creation of the security discourse over the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was constrained by the national security ethos. Nonetheless, he admits that blame cannot be apportioned to those living under security threats for adhering to Hobbesian speech modes which stress security considerations alongside universal ones.

Arian (1995) argues that attitudes towards security in Israel incorporated certain elements with an instrumental orientation and others that were mystical. On the symbolic and psychological levels, Israelis invoked God and the Jewish people; on the rational and professional levels, they referred to the IDF and security services. The latter were the most respected institutions in Israel. Indeed, security was not only the national ethos but also regarded as a quasi-religion based on core beliefs about the nature and destiny of Israel and the Jewish people.

Analysis of the findings of the security discourse illuminate relations between the armed forces and terrorism in the Israeli approach to national security, and the
changes in the security discourse between the periods pre- and post-Oslo, as demonstrated and discussed below.

8.6 Research Findings on the Armed Forces

Table 24 illustrates the interest of the Israeli public in the defence forces and their trust in dominant institutions. Due to the continuation of the Jewish-Arab conflict, the security threat became an integral feature of Israeli discourse, which is dominated by the army, military and masculine culture (Kimmerling, 1998).

Table 24: Representation of Primary Armed Forces Topics in News Articles relating to Security during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th><strong>Yedioth Ahronoth</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ha'aretz</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>N=29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security arrangements</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal from the occupied territories</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police activities</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF attacks</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing IDF activities</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF operations against Hamas</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas prisoner release</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 24 shows, the indisputable trust of the Israeli public in the ability of the IDF to defend Israel is exhibited by the fact that IDF activities were represented in 63.7% (ongoing IDF activities +IDF attacks +IDF operations against Hamas) of the
news discourse pre-Oslo. The leading topic in Yedioth was IDF operations against Hamas (27.3%). IDF attacks, ongoing IDF activities and the military withdrawal from the territories were related and each represented in 18.2% of news articles.

The IDF and its different operations were linked with the threat and insecurity regarding the possibility of territorial withdrawal. Security arrangements police activities were represented less, with only 9.1% each. National security and the topic of the Hamas prisoner release were completely absent from the agenda as primary actors. These results demonstrate the perceived need for defence and the importance of the IDF in the collective consciousness. In contrast, in Ha'aretz, national security was the most prominent topic on the agenda (33.3%), related to IDF operations against Hamas (21.2%), IDF attacks (18.2%), ongoing IDF activities (15.2%) and security arrangements (12.1%). The withdrawal from the territories, police activities and the Hamas prisoner release were not represented as primary topics (0%).

It could be argued that the armed forces topics in both newspapers reflected an agenda. The leading topic of national security in Ha'aretz explains the security perception and the importance of the IDF to the Israeli public: the link between national security, IDF attacks and operations against Hamas, relates to ongoing IDF activities and security arrangements. Meanwhile, in Yedioth, IDF activities against Hamas was the leading topic, a perceived response to all danger and threats.

The armed forces topics discourse changed completely, from 17% pre-Oslo to 83% post-Oslo in Yedioth and from 20% pre-Oslo to 80% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz. In both newspapers, withdrawal from the territories was the leading topic (55.2% in Yedioth and 33.3% in Ha'aretz), and the next topic in both newspapers was IDF attacks (13.8% in Yedioth and 15.7% in Ha'aretz). However, in Ha'aretz, IDF operations against Hamas were represented by 15.7%, while in Yedioth it was represented by only 3.4%. (This result validated the argument that Ha'aretz recorded actual events more faithfully then Yedioth, according to the list of terror incidents provided by the IDF spokesperson, see below). However, in Ha'aretz the next important topic was IDF activities (15.7%), security arrangements (7.8%), Hamas prisoner release (5.9%)
and police activities (2%). In Yedioth, the third topic, namely the Hamas prisoner release was represented with 10.3%, related to security arrangements with 6.9%. IDF attacks, operations against Hamas, ongoing activities and national security were similarly marginal, with only 3.4% each.

These findings show the clear change of the armed forces news discourse in both newspapers between the two periods. Pre-Oslo, each newspaper demonstrated a different set of priorities regarding security topics. The leading topic in Ha'aretz was national security and in Yedioth, it was IDF activities against Hamas. Post-Oslo, the collectivity expressed a greater degree of consensus: the leading topics on the agenda of both newspapers was withdrawal from the occupied territories in relation to IDF operations against Hamas.

It could be argued that post-Oslo, the security issue was linked primarily to threats from Hamas, and tension in regard to the IDF defence was less necessary because peace seemed imminent. This also validated the dramatic decrease in the security superframe (see Table 11). However, it is also possible that withdrawal from the occupied territories, linked to IDF operations against Hamas, was related to security concerns versus the euphoric peace discourse (see Chapter 9).

Ultimately, this issue lay at the core of the political dispute between the peace camp and the national camp (see Chapter 10). These two polar factors -- trust in IDF activities versus the frequencies of threats (withdrawal from the occupied territories plus the Hamas prisoner release) -- are illustrated by Table 25.
Table 25: Representation of Primary Defence Factors versus Threat Factors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>N =11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence factors⁵</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat factors⁵</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Defence factors include: ongoing IDF activities, attacks and operations against Hamas, security arrangements and national security.
b. Threat factors include: withdrawal from the occupied territories and the Hamas prisoner release.

Considering the saliency of security in Israeli culture, the dramatic changes in the security discourse are manifest by the sharp decline in the frequency of defence factors in both newspapers: in Yedioth, from 81.8% of news articles pre-Oslo to 34.5% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz, from 100% pre-Oslo to 60.8% post-Oslo. This was accompanied by a dramatic increase in frequencies of threat factors: in Yedioth, from 18.2% pre-Oslo to 65.5% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz, from zero pre-Oslo to 39.2% post-Oslo.

These findings confirm the see-saw model which characterized the changes between the pre- and post-Oslo periods in the news discourse:

**Pre-Oslo:** High defence factors = Low threat factors

**Post-Oslo:** High threat factors = Low defence factors

Table 26 shows how these factors were illustrated in the secondary topics.
Table 26: Representation of Secondary Armed Forces Topics in News Articles relating to Security during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =22 N=75</td>
<td>N=24</td>
<td>N=85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security arrangements</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal from the occupied territories</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police activities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF attacks</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing IDF activities</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF operations against Hamas</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas prisoner release</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the secondary armed forces topics pre-Oslo in Yedioth, the leading topic was IDF attacks (36.4%), followed by national security (27.3%) and IDF operations against Hamas (13.6%). Security arrangements and ongoing IDF activities were represented by only 9.1% each, and withdrawal from the occupied territories, which was merely hypothetical, was represented by 4.5% only. The police and the Hamas prisoner release were deemed irrelevant and absent from the news. All that represented defence and security was related to the IDF.

In the post-Oslo period, Yedioth changed its news agenda. Security arrangements, which were marginal pre-Oslo, became the leading topic, represented in 45.3% of news articles, compared to withdrawal from the territories (29.3%) and national security (14.7%). All IDF activities became marginal with very low representation (a total of 8% for all three IDF topics). It followed the Hamas prisoner release (2.7%).

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In *Ha'arets*, pre-Oslo, the leading topic of national security was represented with 50%, related to security arrangements and IDF attacks, each with 16.7%. Withdrawal from the territories was represented in 8.3% of news articles and ongoing IDF activities and terrorist release were represented with 4.2% each. IDF operations against Hamas and the police were entirely absent (0%).

However, the agenda in regard to the armed forces completely changed between the two periods: the leading topic was security arrangements, compared to national security and withdrawal from the territories (18.8% each). The various IDF activities were marginalized with low frequencies: ongoing IDF activities (9%), IDF attacks (7%) and IDF operations against Hamas (3.5%).

Critical changes in the armed forces discourse were similar in both newspapers. In *Yedioth*, it consisted of 23% the armed forces news topics pre-Oslo and 77% post-Oslo, and in *Ha'aretz*, it was 22% pre-Oslo and 78% post-Oslo (Table 26).

As noted above, the leading topic in *Ha'arets* pre-Oslo was different from that on the news agenda in *Yedioth*, as one would expect of a quality newspaper versus popular newspaper. Post-Oslo, both newspapers established the same news agenda regarding the armed forces discourse. It should also be noted that in both newspapers, the number of news articles regarding the secondary security topics appears much higher than the primary topics post-Oslo. The armed forces topics seemed to be pushed further into the text post-Oslo. This could be explained by the tendencies of government and the media to keep the ‘reality’ of the ‘imagined peace identity’ alive.

The conclusions validate the findings of the media discourse as illustrated in the security superframe (see Tables 9 and 10).

The representation of the secondary armed forces were divided into defence factors versus threat forces represented in the news discourse (see also Table 25). Table 27 shows the changes that took place between the two periods in the secondary security discourse in both newspapers.
Table 27: Representation of Secondary Defence Forces versus Threat Factors during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence factors</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat factors</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Defence factors include: ongoing IDF activities, attacks and operations against Hamas, security arrangements and national security.
b. Threat factors include: withdrawal from the occupied territories and the Hamas prisoner release.

Tables 25 and 27 can both be in two directions, horizontally and vertically:

1. Horizontally, the primary and the secondary armed forces representation show that the topics of the threat factors dramatically increased between the two periods, while the defence factors (see explanation above) decreased considerably.

2. Vertically, the see-saw model is clearly exhibited: When the defence forces were highly represented in the news discourse, the threat forces were low, and vice versa. Ironically, despite the transformation to an era of peace, threat factors were very dominant in the news discourse.

The formula found in Table 25 for the primary representation of defence forces was also valid for Table 27, the secondary representation of defence forces.

**Pre-Oslo: High defence factors = Low threat factors**

**Post-Oslo: High threat factors = Low defence factors**

The see-saw model was clearly maintained in both newspapers and in both, the primary and the secondary topics. The interplay between the primary and secondary armed forces topics demonstrate that security remained an integral discipline in Israeli social ‘reality’. This was conveyed by the expression, “the army is the nation”, an idea that dominated national consensus and identity (Lissak, 1998).
It is important to point out, however, that *Ha’aretz* kept its policy of the news agenda regarding the presentation and representation of the leading topics post-Oslo in both, the primary and the secondary armed forces topics. But, *Yedioth* post-Oslo, resembled *Ha’aretz* post-Oslo in both primary and secondary topics as shown in Table 28.

### Table 28: Representation of Leading Armed Forces Topics as Primary and Secondary Topics during the Post-Oslo Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Yedioth</em></th>
<th><em>Ha’aretz</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>•Withdrawal from the occupied territories</td>
<td>•Withdrawal from the occupied territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•IDF attacks</td>
<td>•IDF attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Release of Hamas terrorists</td>
<td>•IDF operations against Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security arrangements</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security arrangements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Withdrawal from the occupied territories</strong></td>
<td><strong>National security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Withdrawal from the occupied territories</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* primary topics  ** secondary topics

Table 28 shows the common agenda of the two newspapers post-Oslo in both primary and secondary topics. This consensus did not permit the standard distinction between quality and popular newspapers.

Beilin defined this phenomenon:

Just as in wartime, no arguments exist, the same relates to peacetime. The media easily adjusted itself to the new situation.... The media expressed the ‘zeitgeist’ in which all of us participate (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002).

As evident by Tables 25 and 27, the news discourse evidently sharpened the notion of threat and narrowed the notion of defence. This explains the enthusiasm with
which the peace camp, including the government, the left and the media, adapted to the dramatic shift from war to wishful peace. Peri (1998) explains that the majority of political correspondents, reporters and feature writers in Israel identified closely with the left-of-centre in terms of social affinity and ideological views. The same applies to reporters who write about the military, Arab affairs and the territories. However, the change in the saliency of the security discourse in the news should be viewed in the context of a widespread belief in a transition to peace culture which followed the decline in the security ethos since the Lebanon War (Peri, 1998).

The political and ideological discourse of the government was expressed by a number of slogans: 'no more wars, no more bloodshed', 'the end of a hundred years conflict' and 'a new era of peace'. McQuail (1994) argues that a ruling ideology is not imposed but apparently exists by virtue of an unquestioned consensus; the mass media do not define reality on their own but give preferential access to the definitions of those in authority. It is effectively a hegemony, a constantly reasserted definition of a social situation by way of discourse rather than political or economic power. (Hall, 1980a).

The Israeli public relied heavily on information provided by external sources while forming beliefs via mass media reports and commentaries mediated to them. The security discourse was always high on the news agenda and impacted the public agenda, images and perceptions (Bar-Tal and Jacobson, 1998). The news discourse evidently reproduced the political and ideological agenda and discourse of the government.

The changes in the armed forces discourse between the two time periods in both newspapers was illustrated in Tables 24 and 26. In both the primary and secondary armed forces topics which validate the results of the armed forces changes were found in the secondary frames (Tables 6 and 7). Changes in the terror topics as the second element of the security discourse are analyzed in the next section.
8.7 Approach to Terrorism

Since the peace treaty with Egypt (1979) the involvement of the State of Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict was characterized by response to Palestinian terrorism which developed into its primary security problem pre-Oslo. After the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), symbolizing reconciliation with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), terrorism was undertaken primarily by the Palestinian Islamist organizations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah. Hamas was most active in expressing Palestinian opposition to the Oslo process by carrying out terror acts against Israel. Meanwhile, opposition to Oslo within Israel was expressed in the media and in public demonstrations by settlers, other right-wing citizens, religious groups and the parliamentary opposition (Wolfsfeld, 1997).

Meanwhile, the Israeli government claimed that the PLO, led by Arafat, could restrain Hamas and other terror groups more effectively, in addition to other peace benefits (Hiro, 1996). In a sharp turnaround, the news media supported this view immediately post-Oslo by portraying the former terrorists, namely Arafat and the PLO, as moderate and genuine partners for reconciliation (see Tables 20 and 21). In the Israeli reality, social-psychological factors played a major role in the way security issues were perceived, shaped, and constantly redefined in the Israeli news discourse (Barzilai, 1998), as shown in Tables 25, 27 and 28 and those below.

8.8 Research Findings on Terrorism

Table 29 exhibits the representation of primary terrorism topics. It should be noted that in all the tables below, the term 'Palestinian' refers to Palestinians resident in the West Bank and Gaza.
Table 29: Representation of Primary Terrorism Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N =42</td>
<td>N=110</td>
<td>N=68</td>
<td>N=124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror attacks against Israelis</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>66.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas activities</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizballah attacks against Israel</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to personal security</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition responses to terrorism</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government responses to terrorism</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture and deportation of terrorists</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli violence against Palestinians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli casualties and funerals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian casualties and funerals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As anticipated, terror events gained by far the most attention in the Israeli news media during both periods under review. Both newspapers illustrated the salience of terror events in Israeli society. Yedioth maintained the same level of coverage, i.e., 66% of terror news stories pre- and post-Oslo, while Ha'aretz increased the terror frequencies as primary topics in the news from 50% pre-Oslo to 66.1% post-Oslo. However, when the topics of Hamas and Hizballah were linked together with all terror attacks against Israelis, the figures were critical: 69.1% pre-Oslo and 70% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and 53% pre-Oslo and 71.7% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz. The increase in terror events demonstrated by Table 30 validates again the findings demonstrated in the threat factors (Tables 25 and 27) in the armed forces topics.
I compared the frequencies of terrorism as represented in Ha’aretz and Yedioth with the list of terror attacks against Israelis reported by the IDF spokesperson, with the approval of the military censor. In Yedioth, the representation of terrorism did not increase post-Oslo despite the actual increase in terror attacks against Israelis. In contrast, in Ha’aretz the representation of terror increased by almost 50%, from 53% pre-Oslo to 71.7% post-Oslo.

According to the IDF report, the number of recorded terror incidents against Israelis were divided between the two periods as follows: 30% pre-Oslo and 70% post-Oslo. This massive increase in terrorism post-Oslo validates the increased representation of terrorism in Ha’aretz. In this sense, Ha’aretz exhibited more reliability and social responsibility than Yedioth.

Table 29 also demonstrates that terror was the second topic on the agenda represented in the news of both newspapers. The high representation of terrorist attacks against Israel were related to the capture and deportation of terrorists which decreased dramatically from 19% pre-Oslo in Yedioth to 5.5% post-Oslo, and from 42.4% pre-Oslo to 3.2% post-Oslo in Ha’aretz. The government response to terrorism declined as well: from 7.1% pre-Oslo, to 0% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 1.5% pre-Oslo to 0.8% post-Oslo in Ha’aretz.

The personal security threat topic also decreased in Yedioth from 4.8% pre-Oslo to 0.9% post-Oslo. In Ha’aretz, it was not mentioned at all pre-Oslo and was insignificant post-Oslo (1.6%). The Israeli injuries and funerals topic were represented pre-Oslo in Ha’aretz only 2.9%. Palestinian injuries and funerals were not mentioned in the news of either newspaper during both periods.

It is interesting, however, that the dramatic changes between the two periods in the news discourse reveal exactly the same news agenda with the same rank (although with different percentages), and the same tendency to decrease the terror discourse in both newspapers. The primary terror topics illustrate the change in terror discourse:
from 28% pre-Oslo to 72% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 35% pre-Oslo to 65% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz (see Table 29).

The findings confirm the stance repeatedly expressed by PM Rabin: “The government will relate to terror as if there is no peace and to the peace as if there is no terror”.

This policy predated Oslo, as indicated by the following quotations (all selected from the first two pages of the newspapers):

- “To strive for peace and fight terror” (Yedioth, 29 March 1993).
- “The agreement with the PLO will guarantee Israel an end to Hamas terror activities against Israel” (Ha'aretz and Yedioth, 3 September 1993, immediately after the exchange of letters of recognition between Rabin and Arafat.)
- “It is necessary to support and strengthen the PLO against the rejectionist organizations”. On the same pages, another news article reported that the right wing claims that “the agreement is a threat to Israel’s existence”.
- Rabin was quoted as saying: “To exhibit the agreement between Israel and the PLO as an apocalypse that threatens Israel’s existence is a hysterical and baseless form of scare-mongering” (Ha'aretz, 19 September 1993).

An additional terrorism topic was that of Israeli violence against Palestinians. Table 29 shows that pre-Oslo, neither of the two newspapers published any reference on this topic in the first two news pages. However, post-Oslo this topic received much attention in both newspapers: 18.2% of news articles in Yedioth and 19.4% in Ha'aretz. Most related to the militant settler, Baruch Goldstein, who committed the massacre in Hebron on 25 February 1994, although, this act was not defined as terrorism in the Israeli news discourse. It is important to note that Palestinian casualties and funerals were mentioned only twice in Ha'aretz and absent altogether from the first two pages of Yedioth.

Quotations from the first two pages of the newspapers on just one day (20 February 1994), a week before the Hebron massacre, demonstrate the atmosphere that was building up. The news discourse was full of threat factors, as shown below:

- “Another victim died on the altar of peace.”
• "The settlers' leaders said: It is not permissible to let the security situation deteriorate and our blood be spilled with the "soft glove" policy and while negotiations are being created with the Palestinians."
• "MK Landau [Likud]: 'The policy of this government is an invitation to murder'."

Two weeks later, Rabin was quoted as saying: "There will be additional terror events of the worst kind possible ... that's how it is" (Yedioth, 8 March 1994).

Logic suggests that increased representation of terrorism accompanied by a decline in representation of defence factors reflects an increase in perceived threats (see Tables 25 and 27). Ultimately, the decline in the threat factors frequencies, as shown in Tables 25 and 27, is validated by the decline in the terror topics in both newspapers, as shown in Table 29. It can also be seen in the discussion on the armed forces discourse with reference to Tables 24 and 26 (see above).

The frequencies of news articles concerning violence committed by Israelis against Palestinians are shown in Table 30: The Israeli government response to terrorism, including the capture and deportation of terrorists. The category of personal threat factors (also Tables 30 and 31) includes threats to personal security, and the Israeli and Palestinian casualties. It is important to note that Palestinians casualties were absent from the first two pages of Ha'aretz and Yedioth.

Table 30: Representation of Leading Primary Terrorism Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo N=42</td>
<td>Post-Oslo N=110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror against Israelis/violence against Palestinians</td>
<td>69% (+)</td>
<td>89% (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government response to terror</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5% (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to personal security</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6% (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+) increase  (-) decrease
Data for Table 30 was used to examine changes in representation of violence/terrorism of both Palestinians and Israeli, threat factors and the Israeli government response in the two newspapers.

Table 30 shows the increasing representation of terror factors in both newspapers; from 69% pre-Oslo to 89% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 53% pre-Oslo to 92% post-Oslo in Ha' aretz.

These results reconfirm the reliability of Ha' aretz. Table 30 also demonstrates relatively high frequencies of defence factors pre-Oslo which decreased sharply post-Oslo; from 26% pre-Oslo, compared to 5% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 44% pre-Oslo, compared to 4% post-Oslo in Ha' aretz. Threat factors increased but were relatively stable due to the policy of both newspapers to shift threat factors, which appeared dominant, into secondary topics (see Table 28).

These results can be summarized by the following formula:

High terror frequencies + high government activities = Low threat image
High terror frequencies + low government activities = High threat image

The see-saw model was again validated by this formula.

Data on the secondary representation of terrorism is similar to the data of the primary representation (see Table 29), with some slight differences.
Table 31: Representation of Secondary Terrorism Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror against Israelis</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas activities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbollah attacks against Israel</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to personal security</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition response to terrorism</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government response to terrorism</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture and deportation of terrorists</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli violence against Palestinians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli injuries and funerals</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian injuries and funerals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31 (above) shows that in general, the relative changes in terror discourse in Yedioth were from 28% pre-Oslo to 72% post-Oslo in the primary terror topics (Table 29) and 30% pre-Oslo to 70% post-Oslo in the secondary terror topics. In Ha'aretz, the relative change in the terror discourse was 35% pre-Oslo and 65% post-Oslo in the primary topics (Table 29), and 31% to 69% post-Oslo in the secondary topics (Table 31).

Data from Table 31 was processed in order to examine the representation of peace camp attitudes versus national camp attitudes through the secondary terror topics of the newspapers (Table 32). In addition, the news agenda of both newspapers was analyzed (see Table 33).
Table 32: Representation of Secondary Leading Terrorism Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror against Israelis/violence against Palestinians</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50% (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government responses to terror</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12% (=)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to personal security</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38% (+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(+): increase; (-): decrease; (=): equal

Table 32 shows that the representation of secondary terrorism topics increased in Ha’aretz from 47% pre-Oslo to 77% post-Oslo, (in contrast to Yedioth, where it decreased from 59% to 50%). The government response to terrorism decreased from 18% to 7% during this period in Ha’aretz. In Yedioth, the level of representation remained constant (12%). This was accompanied, however, by a decrease in representation of threat factors, from 34% pre-Oslo to 17% post-Oslo in Ha’aretz. In contrast, Yedioth showed a sharp increase in the threat factors from 29% to 38% post-Oslo.

It is interesting to see the interplay of both newspapers where personal threat factors were represented in high frequencies in the secondary topic. It was pushed from the primary topics in which it was represented in very low frequencies in both periods and in both newspapers. This can be explained by the interplay between primary and secondary topics using the secondary terror topics to show the trust in the government policy and the ideology of the Oslo peace process. This policy was compatible with the attitudes of the peace camp.

It is also interesting to see the formula that emerged for each newspaper as a result of the interplay between the primary terror topics and the secondary terror topics (see Tables 29 and 31).
High terror frequencies + low government anti-terror frequencies + low threat frequencies = peace camp attitudes: trust in the peace process.

High terror frequencies + solid government anti-terror frequencies + high threat frequencies = national camp attitudes: intimidation by the peace process.

Table 33: Representation of Leading Terrorism Topics as Primary and Secondary Topics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yedioth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Terror against Israelis</td>
<td>* Terror against Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Violence against Palestinians</td>
<td>• Violence against Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capture and deportation of terrorists</td>
<td>• Capture and deportation of terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Terror against Israelis</td>
<td>** Hamas activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Threats to personal security</td>
<td>** Terror against Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Hizballah attacks against Israel + Israeli injuries and funerals</td>
<td>** Hizballah attacks against Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* primary topics    ** secondary topics

As in Table 28 in the armed forces discourse, Table 33 exhibits exactly the same news agenda represented by the primary terrorism topics and a similar one in the secondary topics. Both shifted the Hizballah attacks into the secondary topics and repeated the topic of terror against the Israelis.

Security was evidently the most important value in the Israeli reality. As previously noted, changes in the security discourse that commenced gradually after the wars of 1973 and 1982, continued dramatically post-Oslo (see tables above). It is interesting and surprising that the two newspapers probably maintained a predetermined concept about security, the IDF, terrorism and other threat factors. However, post-Oslo, the number of frequencies dramatically changed, and this was accompanied by the sharp decrease of all factors relating to security discourse. Ultimately, the stereotypes of
solidarity of a nation in danger — under a unified news agenda — were similar during both periods.

The armed forces topics in Tables 24 and 26 plus Tables 29 and 31 (armed forces + terrorism) show the changes in the news discourse in both primary and secondary security topics. The relative changes in the security discourse (reclustered armed forces and terrorism) were represented in Yedioth by 25% pre-Oslo and 75% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz, by 30% pre-Oslo and 70% post-Oslo.

Barzilai (1998) argues that Israeli journalists were actors in the political arena together with the government. In addition, most of the armed forces information was provided by authoritative military institutions. The media reproduced and disseminated supportive cultural symbols in accordance with target audiences.

Rabin-Pelossof described her late father's opposition and anger towards the media during the post-Oslo period:

He didn't want the media to give Oslo and the following events such powerful coverage. The perception that was built up through the media coverage gave the impression of a very strong opposition against the Oslo process. In reality, this was not true. The media incessantly used symbolic national and religious elements relating to security threats and repeated it all over the media news. The message conveyed to the public was opposition to the process rather than the proper and courageous steps that were taken (Dalia Rabin-Pelossof, interviewed on 14 May 2002).

Different cultural symbols are effective for the understanding of the policy of each newspaper: primary topics entailed the professional universal news values while secondary topics reflect implicit subjective attitudes. The different attitudes represented by the newspapers can be explained by their respective readership and the concepts of quality versus popular publications.
8.9 Conclusions

As previously noted, perceptions of the IDF and terrorism were linked by security. Together, the representation of these topics in news articles created the security perceptions. Relative changes in the security discourse (armed forces and terror clustered together) through both the primary and secondary topics were: in Yedioth from 25% pre-Oslo to 75% post-Oslo and in Ha’aretz, from 27% pre-Oslo to 73% post-Oslo (Table 53).

Table 34 compares defence factors to terror factors during both periods, as represented by the news discourse.

Table 34: Representation of Clustered Primary Security Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =53</td>
<td>N=139</td>
<td>N=101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security defence factors(^a)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security threat factors(^b)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Refined defence factors include defence factors in Table 25 + government responses in Table 29.
b. Refined threat factors include threat factors in Table 30 + personal threat factors in Table 32.

Data pertaining to both newspapers validates the see-saw model (described above). In relation to the security discourse, this means that when the defence factors frequencies were high, the threat factors’ frequencies were low within the security discourse in the printed press, and vice versa. Table 34 shows that post-Oslo, following the changes in the primary security discourse in both newspapers, the frequencies of threat factors sharply increased while the frequencies of defence factors decreased, despite the ongoing peace process.
The findings of the secondary frequencies in the security news discourse, as exhibited by Table 35, validate the additional parameter found in all security findings while the results confirm the see-saw model. In Yedioth, the change was marked by an increased representation of threat factors, from 17% pre-Oslo to 35% post-Oslo. This contrasted with Ha'aretz where the representation of threat factors decreased from 26% pre-Oslo to 22% post-Oslo. This contrast is explained by the different ideologies implicit in the secondary topics of each newspaper.

Of particular significance was the correlation between defence factors and threat factors in the news discourse of both newspapers post-Oslo (see Table 31).

Table 35: Representation of Clustered Secondary Security Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence factors</td>
<td>N=39</td>
<td>N=115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Refined</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat factors</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Refined defence factors included defence factors in Table 26 + government response in Table 31.
b. Refined threat factors include threats in Table 25 + personal threats in Table 30.

In sum, when frequencies of security defence factors were more prominent than security threat factors pre-Oslo, the news discourse represented the national security consensus. As shown in Table 34, the defence forces sharply declined post-Oslo and the threat factors in Yedioth multiplied by four. Although Ha'aretz showed a slight decrease post-Oslo, still, 41% of threat factors are a high representation in the security discourse. Interestingly, Table 35 of secondary security topics post-Oslo reveals an increase in threat factors in Yedioth, (similar to Table 34 of primary topics), in opposite to the decrease in Ha'aretz (similar to Table 34 of primary topics). The policy in Ha'aretz towards security topics stressed the peace situation explicitly and underrated security topics. Yedioth stressed the threats in both primary
and secondary topics. *Yedioth*’s distribution (to 55% of the population) might explain the increased perception of traditional fears and confusion reflected by the media and expressed by the national camp. This contrasted with the optimistic perception exhibited in *Ha’aretz* which also characterized the government and the peace camp (see Chapters 9 and 10). It can be argued that differences between the newspapers reflected a mirror picture of the Israeli society and the dichotomy between the national camp and the peace camp (see Chapter 10).

The primary and secondary armed forces (Tables 25 and 27) and the primary and secondary terrorism topics (Tables 30 and 32) which together constitute the security discourse changed in *Yedioth* from 27% pre-Oslo to 73% post-Oslo, and in *Ha’aretz*, from 32% pre-Oslo to 68% post-Oslo.

Most hard news pre-Oslo typically consisted of security discourse. In spite of the changes in the security discourse frequencies post-Oslo, security issues were still prominent in news. The discursive notion of national security was linked to notions like terrorism and threats that belonged to the particular formation used pre-Oslo (Bruck, 1989).

It is worth clarifying that despite the DOP, it was evident that not all Palestinians were likely to accept a peace settlement, that some terrorist attacks were launched from the area of the PA and that the Israeli public perceived the PLO as having been replaced by the new actor, Hamas.

Zakheim (1994) argues that Palestinian terrorism against Israel posed a serious problem because it required Israel to increase security precautions while making peace. Nevertheless, whereas pre-Oslo Israeli defence factors were heavily represented in the news discourse by the frequency of offensive/defensive operations, these declined dramatically post-Oslo. Consequently, security concerns and tensions not only continued to be imprinted in the collective memory, but were supported by the meaning derived from texts and its contexts.
Despite the change in the security discourse, Israeli journalists, especially those covering political, military and Arabs affairs, could not avoid the constraints of the context in which they operated, namely security threats (Keren, 1998). Although they tried to adhere to universal professional norms, such as freedom of the press, national security considerations consistently affected the selection of information and discourse. As the media became more varied and competitive in Israel, the scope of available opinions became broader, but the habit of self-imposed censorship is very strong (Arian, 1995) This obviously made it all the more difficult to balance the expression of threats and optimism which many Israelis experienced post-Oslo.

Change in the news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods led to the creation of images that expressed implicit myths and beliefs. It could therefore be argued that the news stories presented facts in a way that also reinforced perceptions and understandings concerning the PLO (Chapter 7) and the IDF.
Chapter 9
Peace Discourse

Research Findings and Discussion

9.1 Introduction

In his first meeting with members of the thirteenth Knesset (13 July 1992), the newly elected prime minister Yitzhak Rabin addressed the need to reexamine the opportunity to take part in global changes:

We are not necessarily anymore a ‘people who shall dwell alone’, nor is the ‘whole world against us’. We should join the world’s peace campaign, the reconciliation and international co-operation which gallop today over the globe. Thus, the central aim of this new government is to promote peace making in order to end the Israeli-Arab conflict. It should be based on the Arab states and the Palestinians’ recognition of Israel as a sovereign state and of its right to live in peace and security (Pursuing Peace, 1995:16).

Rabin called again in his speech for peace to prevent further suffering and bereavement: “enough blood and tears”. The notion of peace was expressed as an end to a painful process, or as Chomsky put it, “a painful peace” (Chomsky, 1996:1). This speech represented the ongoing desire and quest for peace and security; although referring specifically to Israel, it was applicable worldwide. As a metaphor, it might also explain the complexity of Jewish myths and stereotypes illustrated by the phrases, ‘the whole world is against us’ and ‘a people who shall dwell alone’ which link the Jewish past with the Israeli present (see Chapter 7).
As noted earlier, the Oslo peace process marked a mutual breakthrough in the century of Jewish-Arab conflict. Peres explained that:

For the first time, Israel had recognized Arafat as a leader and certified his return from exile in Tunis to Gaza, and recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination. The Palestinians were the first to recognize Israel as the Jewish state with the 1967 borders instead of 1948, to exclude terrorism and to accept a demilitarized Palestinian state. This was a sensation (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002).

This dramatic event caught the Israeli news media and public by surprise. Raz (1995), a political reporter from Israel Radio, claimed that during the eight months from January 1993 that Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials and Israeli representatives were engaged in secret negotiations, the media were completely unaware and therefore unable to expose the greatest contemporary news story. As Rabin proclaimed: “It is impossible to manage political negotiations and to get results while there is media intervention and coverage” (Yedioth, 2 November 1993).

Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that since the government press conference in August 1993, when the Oslo story broke, the power of the Israeli government over the media news could be compared to that exercised by public officials during wartime. Raz (1995) explains that in the pre-Oslo era, the Israeli media was totally imprisoned by the idea of the PLO’s lack of legitimacy, and that every attempt to talk to Arafat would be disqualified by PM Rabin. Post-Oslo, the media news discourse dramatized the peace symbols, narratives and cultural codes of Israeli society. The public ceremonies that followed in Jerusalem, Washington and Cairo were treated as media events that provided the common symbols and rituals in which ‘reality’ was presented as it ought to be (Dayan and Katz, 1992). These events can also be viewed as “cases of media diplomacy, in which the media -- television in particular -- can be said to have made a difference” (Katz and Dayan, 1985:305).

The Israeli recognition of the PLO created a new phase in the relationship between the Palestinians and the Israeli media. Palestinians who could not be interviewed in the pre-Oslo era became welcome media guests, and vice versa. Israeli reporters
were invited for the first time to meet Arab leaders worldwide and also carried out
interviews with Arafat and the other PLO leaders who were still in exile, in Tunis
(Sela, 1995). Whereas pre-Oslo, the news media ignored/demonized the Palestinian
leadership, the media suddenly legitimized and related to them as political leaders
and partners for peace. Consequently, the peace process started to dominate the
media and public discourse.

This chapter analyzes changes in the peace discourse according to government policy
and political circumstances before and after the signing of the Oslo accords. The
findings reveal that news media coverage was dominated mostly by peace issues: in
Ha'aretz, the primary peace topics were covered in 51.8% of the news articles
(45.5% in Yedioth) as shown in Table 9, and 46% in the secondary topics in Ha'aretz
(40.6% in Yedioth), as shown in Table 10. Before analyzing the findings, the
approach to peace should first be defined.

9.2 Approach to Peace

The traditional concept of peace has evolved for centuries as the absence of war, a
concept that dominated Western political discourse. Tolstoy argues that war and
peace were the two most timeless and touching themes in the history of humanity.
(Roach, 1993). Barash (2000) stresses that “peace is never fully achieved, it can only
be approached”. What is frustrating, he adds, “is not that peace is so close, but
remains so far away” (Barash, 2000: 1).

The notion of peace traditionally included the absence of war and was invariably
accompanied by the notion of security. Roach (1993) explains that “peace is rarely
absolute” (Roach 1993: 2). Today, peace is defined not only by negation -- as the
absence of war or ‘negative peace’ -- but something more akin to Galtung’s
formulation of ‘positive peace’, which entails patterns of cooperation and integration
between major human groups. Galtung (1996) explains that creating peace obviously
involves reducing and avoiding violence. He argues that peace and violence should
be seen in their totality in which inter-gender and inter-generation conflicts are no
less important than inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Ultimately, war, conflicts, violence and security are still strongly tied to peace.

The origins of wars can be traced to historical, religious, demographic, economic and psycho-cultural forces. Slack and Doyon (2001) argue that the post-colonial and the post-Cold War worlds are in transition, marked by two trends, one towards democratization, which is defined as a transition to peace culture, and the other towards the re-emergence of ethnic nationalism and territoriality, which leads to violent conflicts.

In this context, the fiftieth anniversary of the Geneva Convention on August 1999 was marked by a project titled ‘People on War’, launched by the International Committee of the Red Cross (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1999). This project was carried out simultaneously in twelve areas engaged in conflict, namely Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Georgia/Abkhazia, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia and South Africa. The aim was to build greater respect for fundamental humanitarian principles in order to avoid conflicts. The findings of the study (to which I contributed) show that Israeli and Palestinian societies have mobilized for war to a greater extent than perhaps any others in the world, and, that neither society make distinctions between civilians and fighters.

The concepts of peace and security developed in parallel. Traditionally, security meant the defence of state and society against internal and external threats (see Chapter 8). Due to technological advances over the last century and the emergence of nuclear weapons, the threat to security developed a global dimension (see Chapter 2). Hurd (1997) argues that after the Second World War, the peace of 1945 rested on the threat of nuclear war and what was called the concept of mutually assured destruction, known ironically by its acronym, MAD.

Since 1989 with the sudden collapse of Communism, accompanied by the dissolution of the USSR and the international coalition against the aggression of Iraq in 1991,
civil and ethnic wars and terrorism have come to the fore. Tehranian (1993) notes that of the 120 violent conflicts waged worldwide in 1993, 72% were ethnic wars. Consequently, the end of the Cold War has not given birth to peace; this appears to remain an unachievable goal in Israel, as elsewhere.

In sum, war and peace agreements between states, such as those signed at Vienna (1914), Versailles (1919) and Yalta (1945), have been replaced in recent decades by either spontaneous public action (the collapse of the Berlin Wall and demise of the USSR in 1989), civil wars (Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia), or terrorism (the Middle East).

Peres argues that since the middle of the twentieth century, the world economy (Russia, China, East Europe, Indonesia, etc.) underwent a revolution. Hence, there are no longer political solutions to political disputes. The 1994 Nobel Prize winner suggests that the real solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict may be in the economic and social domain: "Only economic relations can lead to peace in the technological era of globalization in which transportation has been replaced with communication" (Shimon Peres, interviewed 3 May 2002). In general, he claims that it is not the size of land, nor the wealth of natural resources and not the number of people that makes a country great or small, but rather its intellectual capacity, science, technology and education.

Shinar (1998) notes the parameter of cultural dispute to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and argues that modern armed conflicts that are mobilized by political forces and social rifts are based on cultural, ethnic, religious and ideological disputes. Barash (2000) notes that given the present cultural and technological situation of humanity, there is a good reason to consider intra-national aggressions as the greatest of all dangers to human societies. Tehranian (1993) argues that communication technology and new cultural forces including mass media are essential features in the transition towards a peace culture.
Consequently, much attention is paid today by academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to peace studies, peace theories and research, and to the development of peace culture. Groff and Smoker (2002) explain that in the last few years, the term 'culture of peace' has become increasingly popular among the leadership of UNESCO -- but at present, no clear consensus exists as to how the terms 'peace' or 'peace culture' should be interpreted.

Indeed, a review of countless dictionaries, encyclopedias, book titles, websites, etc., and similarly, during many consultations, produced definitions of peace that were juxtaposed to war, conflict and violence. During a review of some six volumes of the Journal of Peace Research published in 2000-2001, and books written about peace theories, I found that the word 'peace' was mentioned only in the context of conflict resolutions. Not a single study on peace per se appears to have been published. Reardon suggests a relationship between peace definitions and peace action: "Peace definitions or concepts ... are the basis on which we decide how to make peace" (Reardon, cited by Rinehart, 1989:1). The central questions, therefore, remain elusive: What precisely do the terms 'peace' and 'culture of peace' entail, and, what do they mean on the philosophical and the practical levels?

Bruck and Roach (1993) argue that structural and ideological connections should be established between communication, media and peace because of the essential role mass media play in war and peace. Roach (1993) adds that the missing perspectives of peace results in the lack of literature dealing with the relationship between the mass media, communication or culture, war and peace. In reviewing some issues of the Journal of Peace Research in 1991, she found no articles dealing with the media, culture, or communication, but the journal Media Development published a special issue on communication and peace in 1983 only.

Modern warfare links the need for national security, which is a basic prerequisite for peace, with the search for efficient conflict resolution. I suggest an alternative term, namely the search for 'peace solutions'. Fowler (1991) argues that although "there is a casual relationship between semantic structure and cognition: that language
influences thought in the sense that its structure channels our mental experience of the world". However, “differences in expression carry ideological distinctions and thus, differences in representation” (Fowler 1991: 4-5). He claims that there are always different ways of saying the same thing in positive or negative terms.

Discourses are best understood as the different kind of use to which language is put (Hartley, 1982). Hartley (1982) also implies that certain terms become loaded with significance. I presumed that the galaxy of terms surrounding the concept of peace incorporate the notions of army, terrorism, politics and economy. These terms contribute to the meaning of the familiar Jewish-Israeli struggle for existence, and thereby to the ethos of peace and security, which is at the heart of Israeli national identity.

In this context, Pundak argued:

A peace process is perceived by the Israeli public as serving their own needs for security instead of national strategic needs. The media maintain the same attitudes themselves, however, but are carried after the political policies of governments (Ron Pundak, interviewed on 12 May 2002).

Harkabi (1982) argues that peace is a common aspiration among the nations of the world, and among Middle Eastern states, in particular. Peace was always one of the major goals of Zionism and an important dimension of Israel’s national interest in conjunction with the national ethos of security.

In the regional context, it is worth noting that Hebrew and Arabic are the only national languages in the world in which the term ‘peace’ is implemented into daily greetings and used frequently in daily life. Hebrew-speakers greet each other with shalom and the Arabic-speakers with salaam. Both terms are a direct translation of the English term ‘peace’. Ironically, the only two nations who pronounce ‘peace’ frequently every day are in constant war over that same ideal.
I found an interesting definition for peace in the introduction to a recently published liberal Jewish prayer book. Assaby (1995) explains that peace can only be achieved by using two other derivatives of the etymological root of the Hebrew word shalom:

- lehashlim -- to come to terms with our reality through a reevaluation of our priorities; and,
- leshalem -- to be prepared to pay the price it takes to gain the whole someness [sic] we seek, both as individuals and as people” (Assaby, 1995: 31).

He also mentions the Hebrew term shalem, derived from the same root and meaning ‘wholeness’. Indeed, for Israelis, the dilemma of what price should be paid for peace and coming to terms with reality lies at the heart of the internal conflict.

Although peace was a common aspiration, since the 1967 war the issue of the occupied territories gradually became the basic of contentions in the Israeli politics due to the trade-offs involved. Arian (1995) claims that “the basic values commonly recognized and widely used in the political discourse and political culture of Israel are expressed in the Declaration of Independence, which therefore have great symbolic importance: Israel as a Jewish state; the land of Israel; democracy; and peace” (Arian, 1995: 210).

Public opinion polls conducted by Arian (1995) in 1988 and 1990 showed that the two values ranked highest by Jewish Israelis were those of a Jewish majority and peace. Arian also explains that the policies of security made by politicians supported the ideological division of two camps and two kinds of discourses. For Israelis on the left, peace could only be achieved by returning the territories and thereby avoiding the need to deal with the 1.6 million Arabs under Israeli military rule. For those on the right, the strategic depth provided by the territories, coupled with massive Jewish immigration, would strengthen the state, offset the demographic advantage of the Arabs in the territories, and most likely reduce hostilities.

The right wing, which included religious Jews and the radical right, provided much of the discourse relating to the idea of ‘Greater Israel’ in the spirit of nationalism and interpretations of events in terms of security. They combined statements that
proclaimed a unique relationship between Israel and God, with assertions that Israel would ultimately have to rely on itself for its security.

The two derivations of the terms defined by Assabi (1995) — "be ready to pay the price" and "to come to terms with reality" — confirm Arian's (1995) conclusion that "most Israeli Jews might support a value if it were cost-free, but in reality, trade-offs must be made" (Arian, 1995: 210). These values explain the differences between the Israeli left-wing slogan of 'peace and security' versus the right-wing slogan of 'security and peace', a dichotomy that characterizes the political conflict within Israel and their discourses.

The ideal of peace incorporates a sense of hope in every era and every area. The need for security, accompanied by disarmament and peace, is an ancient one, expressed in the Bible, as follows: "And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Micha, 4:3-4).

Myrdal (2000) points out that security is intimately connected with the yearning for peace everywhere. Ultimately, this explains why the Oslo peace process was embraced by Israeli policy-makers, the media and the left as peace itself, in contrast to the parliamentary opposition, settlers and religious groups (see Chapters 3 and 9).

Galtung (1996) explains that peace, like security, should be viewed through political a political lens. This explains the socio-political concepts of peace and security that have become the dominant motives in the Israeli political discourses and has been expressed through the ideological news discourse. Van Dijk (1988) argues that one news discourse often features several topics that are rarely fully independent semantically. Indeed, the Israeli news discourse pre- and post-Oslo reinforces his argument. Security, peace and political discourses were interrelated, and together they constituted the Israeli news media discourse. Almost every subject covered in the news was linked and interrelated with peace (see examples below).
9.3 Research Findings on Peace

Table 36 illustrates the analysis of the peace discourse on the first two pages of the two newspapers during the pre- and post-Oslo periods.

Table 36: Representation of Primary Peace Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Yedioth Post-Oslo</th>
<th>Ha'aretz Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Ha'aretz Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace talks/process</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral peace talks</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret channels</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy/Oslo/Cairo talks</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace ceremonies</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of peace</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangers relating to peace</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US mediation</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the PLO and the Palestinians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Gulf states and other Muslim countries</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European support</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 36 shows that pre-Oslo, peace talks was represented in 95% of the peace discourse in Yedioth, and 83% in Ha'aretz. The high frequencies of peace talks in
connection with the Arabs/Palestinians can be explained by the new semantics that penetrated the news discourse through the political and ideological discourse. The change in Israeli public opinion towards territorial compromise started to develop gradually after the Intifada and the Madrid conference. For the first time, direct talks on peace took place between Israeli and Palestinian delegations alongside other delegations from neighbouring Arab countries (see Chapter 5). In Yedioth, the topic of peace talks was linked to dangers, represented by 5%. In Yedioth, peace was represented pre-Oslo by two topics: peace talks and dangers related to peace.

As for the secondary peace topics (see Table 37), the notion of peace was developed more widely to include four topics. Among them, US mediation was the leading topic with 44% of frequencies, followed by involvement of neighbouring Arab states (22%), which were related to peace talks (17%) and Palestinian autonomy (17%).

The primary peace topics in Yedioth were limited pre-Oslo to two: peace talks and dangers relating to peace. Secondary subtopics were represented by two additional themes that broadened the peace discourse. In contrast, Ha'aretz represented the primary peace topics in the news discourse with five topics: peace talks led with 83% of news articles. It was related to multilateral talks (7%), dangers related to peace (4%), US mediation (4%), and Palestinian autonomy in the territories (2%).

All other topics and actors pre-Oslo, relating to Israeli allies and enemies were represented by secondary topics (see Table 37): the leading subtopic was multilateral talks (43%), related to peace talks (29.4%), US mediation (10%), Palestinian autonomy (8%), benefits of peace (4%), neighbouring Arab countries (4%) and the PLO (2%). The topics of dangers related to peace, European support, the Muslim world, and peace as a process were totally absent from the pre-Oslo discourse.

The association of the term ‘talks’ with ‘peace’ in the pre-Oslo era might be viewed as an emotive rather than a political decision. ‘Peace talks’ indicates a normative idea, rather than a positive achievement. Post-Oslo, Israeli officials not only spoke publicly to PLO officials for the first time, but also engaged in a political process.
The term 'peace talks' was barely used by either publication in the post-Oslo period. The discourse was changed to 'peace process' which was the primary topic represented in 11.9% of the news articles in Yedioth, and 21.1% in Ha'aretz. The term 'peace process' entailed active dimensions and was translated into practice. Substantial coverage was granted to joint activities of Israelis and Arabs, such as agreements (Oslo, Cairo, committees and negotiations), which featured in 35.1% of news articles in Yedioth and 36% in Ha'aretz. Representation of dangers related to peace declined in Yedioth from 4.5% of the news pre-Oslo to 0.7% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz, from 4.3% pre-Oslo to 0.4% post-Oslo.

Peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries were represented by 31% of the primary topics in Yedioth and 26.4% in Ha'aretz. Next was the support of the Gulf states and the Muslim world: 8% in Yedioth and 7.4% in Ha'aretz. The US intervention in the peace process was represented by 2.6% in Yedioth and 2.1% in Ha'aretz while relations with the PLO and the Palestinians were hardly mentioned in either newspaper; 1.3% in Yedioth and 0.4% in Ha'aretz.

It is worth noting that the language-in-use mostly represented the different agreements, peace talks with the neighbouring Arab countries, relations with the Arab world and the Gulf states and the peace process. These themes were newsworthy and entailed news values such as, novelty, recency, relevance and consonance. They were more interesting and deviated from the familiar collective consensus. This contrasted with relations with the PLO; after Oslo, peaceful relations were suddenly perceived as the norm. Interestingly, news about US mediation appeared frequently and was pushed to the secondary topics in both newspapers.

It is particularly noteworthy that the quality newspaper and popular newspaper adopted exactly the same policies post-Oslo, with very similar frequencies of topics represented in the news discourse. The only differences were firstly, the emphasis on peace ceremonies (8% in Yedioth, compared to 1.2% in Ha'aretz) and secondly, the
representation of multilateral talks and the benefits relating to peace (3.3% and 1.7%, respectively in Ha'aretz) but completely absent in Yedioth as primary topics.

Changes in peace representation as the primary topic in the news discourse were dramatic. Peace and related topics were represented in Yedioth by 13% pre-Oslo and 87% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz by 16% pre-Oslo and 84% post-Oslo (see Table 36). Both newspapers exhibited similar trends regarding changes in the peace discourse.

Table 37: Representation of Secondary Peace Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=18</td>
<td>N=105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace process</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral peace talks</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret channels</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy/Oslo/Cairo talks</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace ceremonies</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits relating to peace</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangers relating to peace</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US mediation</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the PLO and the Palestinians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Gulf states and Muslim countries</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European support</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Peace, as primary topics was represented in the news discourse in *Yedioth* with 2 topics pre-Oslo, compared to 9 topics post-Oslo, and in *Ha'aretz* with 5 topics pre-Oslo, compared to 10 topics post-Oslo. Both newspapers featured more diversified text in the secondary topics pre- and post-Oslo. As for the secondary topic, the news relating to peace was represented in *Yedioth* by 4 topics pre-Oslo, compared to 11 topics post-Oslo, and in *Ha'aretz* by 7 topics pre-Oslo and 12 topics post-Oslo. Peace, as secondary topics in the news was represented with somewhat different frequencies in both newspapers. The topics were ranked and rated differently from the primary topics shown above.

In *Ha'aretz*, the three leading topics were: US mediation (23.4%), agreements with the Palestinians (22.4%), the peace process (20.8%), and neighbouring Arab countries (16.7%). These four topics together reflect activities related to the peace process. The next topics are all related to the peace process: benefits of peace (4.7%), peace ceremonies (4%), dangers related to peace (2.1%), relations with the PLO and the Palestinians (2.1%), the Gulf states and the Muslim world (1.6%) and European support (1%). Multilateral talks, and secret channels were almost absent (0.5% each).

In *Yedioth*, the leading topics were: agreements with the Palestinians (33.3%), compared to US mediation (14%) and neighbouring Arab countries (13%). Here, the effects were: peace ceremonies (7.6%), the peace process (7.6%), the Gulf states and the Muslim world (6.7%), European support (5.7%), dangers related to peace (4.8%), benefits (2.9%), the Oslo secret channels (2.9%), and relations with the PLO and the Palestinians (1%). Multilateral talks were completely absent (0%).

The heavy representation of the US in the news peace discourse can be explained by the fact that since the 1973 war, successive US administrations played a leading role as mediators in Arab-Israeli conflicts (Miller, 2001), initiating an Arab-Israeli peace process, which led to a cold peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978-1979.

One of the ways to facilitate negotiations between disputants is through mediation by a third party. In this context, Fisher and Ury (2000) explain that one way of gaining
peace “by means of peace and not by means of war” (Fisher and Ury, 2000: 70-79) is for the contending sides to reach a mutually acceptable agreement conditioned by varying degrees of good or ill will. This argument is illustrated well in the peace discourse which emphasizes the practical means of peace and the semantics used in text and context.

Although the notion of peace should be seen in the context of global changes, its structure and semantics regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was problematic. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the Gulf War demonstrated the dependence of both Israeli and most Arab states on US military and economic power through financial assistance, credit, military and technology transfers. Thus, the hegemony of the US created a powerful logic in favour of peace, albeit a cold one. Arab-Israeli relations between 1955-1991 were characterized by a protracted ‘cold war’ punctuated by short ‘hot wars’. This was determined by regional and domestic factors but ended through superpower intervention.

Changes in peace representation as the secondary topics in the media news discourse were also dramatic. Peace and related topics were represented in Yedioth by 15% of news articles pre-Oslo and 85% post-Oslo, and in Ha’aretz by 21% pre-Oslo and 79% post-Oslo. However, Ha’aretz represented peace topics more than Yedioth in the secondary topics pre-Oslo, and post-Oslo it represented peace less in the secondary topics than in the primary topics and less than Yedioth with 6% (Table 37). Both newspapers exhibited similar trends regarding changes in the peace discourse.

Findings relating to the peace discourse and the differences in the policies of the newspapers are demonstrated in Table 38. It shows how topics were ranked and rated by each of the two newspapers in the news text and in context of the discourse.

The comparison between the peace representation in the primary and the secondary topics (Table 38) during the pre- and post-Oslo periods illustrates the emotional notion of peace talks that were represented pre-Oslo in the primary topics by 95.5% of news articles in Yedioth, and in by 83% in Ha’aretz. Post-Oslo, the newspapers
provided more coverage of practical topics such as: agreements with the Palestinians, peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries, and the peace process which together represented in 78.1% of news articles in *Yedioth* and 83.5% in *Ha'aretz*.

Additional topics such as peace ceremonies, the Gulf states and Muslim world, US mediation, European support, dangers and benefits of peace were represented by 19.8% in *Yedioth* and 12.8% in *Ha'aretz*. Relations with the PLO and the secret channels were represented by 2% in *Yedioth* and 3.7% in *Ha'aretz*.

### Table 38: Comparison between Peace Representation in the Primary and Secondary Topics during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th><em>Yedioth Ahronoth</em></th>
<th><em>Ha'aretz</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace talks</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy/committees/Oslo/Cairo agreements</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace process</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US mediation</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace ceremonies</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Gulf states and Muslim countries</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European support</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangers relating to peace</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits relating to peace</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret channels</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the PLO and the Palestinians</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral peace talks</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures marked in italics and bold are for the secondary topics
The rating of topics represented in the peace discourse demonstrate the news values of the media. Topics in the news discourse that consistently reflected official government policies included: working committees on political arrangements between the Israelis and the Palestinians; agreements produced by the latter; and relations with Arab countries linked to the peace process. Journalists perceived these topics as novel, recent and relevant. At the same time, both the PLO and the secret channels were immediately transformed into existing facts, and thus became irrelevant as news. Everything related to direct relations with PLO officials, the new partner for peace, was represented most frequently in both primary and secondary topics. This trend contributed to the public impression that peace did, in fact, exist.

It is interesting to note that both newspapers post-Oslo exhibited the same news policy and agenda for the primary and the secondary news topics. The representation of peace was similar, either by topics or rank of frequencies in the news.

The following primary topics received special emphasis in both newspapers: working committee meetings, Oslo/Cairo agreement; peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries; and the peace process. Except for the peace ceremonies that gained more emphasis in Yediot (8.6%) compared with Ha'aretz (1.2%), and the multilateral talks, which were represented in Ha'aretz by 3.3%, but was absent in Yediot, all the topics were represented according to the same order, frequencies and salience during the post-Oslo period.

The following secondary topics received special emphasis in both newspapers: working committee meetings, Oslo/Cairo agreement; peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries; US mediation; and the peace process Differences been the two newspapers presenting the secondary topics were found only in the frequencies. Ha'aretz viewed US mediation as more salient (23.4%) than Yediot (14.3%). The same applied to the peace process (20.8% in Ha'aretz, compared to 7.6% in Yediot). Ha'aretz included almost double the number of references to US mediation compared to Yediot. Meanwhile, Yediot provided more coverage of support of the Gulf states, the Muslim world (6.7%) and Europe (5.7%), compared to Ha'aretz with
1.6% for the Gulf and Muslims and 1% for European support. Yedioth also placed more emphasis on dangers related to peace (4.8%) than Ha’aretz (2.1%); this was the exact opposite of the representation of benefits related to peace: in Ha’aretz (4.7%) and in Yedioth (2.9%).

Between September 1993 and the end of October 1994, the two newspapers published 919 articles in which peace was the primary topic. The quality press (Ha’aretz) published 528 items during this period, while the popular press (Yedioth) featured two-thirds of this number. Peace topics dominated all other topics as both primary and secondary topics. This is illustrated by Table 39.

**Table 39: Frequencies of Peace Representation in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary topic</td>
<td>Secondary topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yedioth</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha’aretz</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The peace discourse findings reveal that the post-Oslo period witnessed an explosion of news covering peace topics in both newspapers: 67% of the news covered by Ha’aretz on the first two pages related to security, peace and politics discourses (Table 4). In 52% of these news articles, peace was the leading primary topic, and in 47% it was the secondary topic. In Yedioth, security, peace and the political discourses were represented in 49% of the news on the first two pages; peace was the leading primary topic with 45.5% and 41% as the secondary topic.

Changes in the representation of both primary and secondary peace topics demonstrated a major change in peace discourse: in Yedioth, from 14% before Oslo to 86% after Oslo, and in Ha’aretz from 18% to 82% (Table 36 and 37 clustered).
The change in peace representation as the primary topic in the media news discourse was significant. In general, both newspapers exhibited similar trends regarding changes in the peace discourse.

As the media was the only source of information, much of the Israeli public responded angrily, dubbing it the "media of the left" (Cohen-Almagor and Yanovizki, 1999). In response to those who complain that the news media focuses only on 'bad news', it should be noted that the Israeli media post-Oslo was accused of creating a euphoric atmosphere which was naturally regarded as 'good news'.

Analysis of the flood of good news associated with the term 'peace' in the news stories reveals both positive and negative meanings. Ultimately, the media brought about a 'boomerang effect' in public attitudes, culminating in the slogan 'the public against hostile media' (Guterman and Stavi, 1995:19). The Oslo peace process was presented as a finished masterpiece rather than a process. The government, together with the media, embraced the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with ideological beliefs and presented it via practical and emotional discourses as peace itself.

Pundak claimed that in the first few months after Oslo, the news media suffered from a "euphoria syndrome". The use of terms such as 'peace process' or 'peace agreements created an unrealistic discourse:

We did not sign any peace agreement. The DOP was the threshold into which the political negotiations were channelled and no more than that. The Israeli public discourse was surrounded by peace with the Palestinians as a result of the media discourse. It could not be peace when the occupation did not end and siege and oppression continued. The subsequent dissonance was due to the gap between the high expectations created by the media. Although the media cannot be blamed by itself, the government created these euphoric hopes and expectations, but the media inflamed these emotions and exaggerated without analyzing the procedures (Ron Pundak, interviewed on 12 May 2002).

The term 'peace talks' in the news discourse pre-Oslo which was defined by the government and the media as talks that might lead in the future to a sustainable peace were replaced with different discourses in which the word 'peace' was integrated
into the text in mixed contexts. Peace and war were twin nouns and the semantics of peace was conditioned by the semantics of war.

To cite just a few examples (all selected from the first two pages of the newspapers):

- "We, for existence, will go to war and do peace" (Yedioth, 3 September 1993).
- "It is impossible to stop peace, Arafat. Peace has already started and is irreversible", (Shimon Peres, quoted in Yedioth, 5 September 1993).
- "The era of peace has begun and the era of war has been exhausted...we made the peace of the brave for our children" (Ha'aretz, 13 September 1993).
- "One hand stretches out to peace while the other starts to shoot at you" (Ha'aretz, 19 September 1993).

Frequency, topics and actors emphasized government policies relating to the Oslo peace process in which the pre-Oslo archenemy, Arafat and the PLO, became full partners for peace post-Oslo. Any relations and events regarding peace with the neighbouring Arab countries, the Muslim world, or the Gulf states were completely absent from the news discourse pre-Oslo in both newspapers, as shown in Table 36. These states were considered enemies pre-Oslo, but became new allies post-Oslo.

The following quotations (selected from the first two pages of the newspapers) from the post-Oslo news articles illustrate the findings:

- "The Gulf states are going to announce their support of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and establish a 'peace fund'" (Ha'aretz, 5 September 1993).
- "We signed on peace", citing the Saudi ambassador to the US; "Zimbabwe announced yesterday it was considering the renewal of relations with Israel" (Yedioth, 14 September 1993).
- "King Hasan [of Morocco] has anticipated comprehensive peace which is an important indication for the future", citing Peres in Morocco (Ha'aretz, 15 September 1993).
- "The fact that many states around the world have recognized Israel now is a correction of injustice"; "Israel expects that the state that never had a direct conflict with Israel will gradually normalize relations with Israel", citing Rabin in Egypt (Yedioth, 19 September 1993).
- "We talked about expanding the peace circle, the possibility of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon joining the political process", citing Beilin; "Israel is trying to establish diplomatic relations with Laos...after Vietnam and Cambodia strengthened economic and tourism relations with the South Asia states" (Ha'aretz, 15 October 1993).
- "The Tunisian foreign minister called on Israel to promote the peace"; "After reconciliation with the PLO, Israel invested special efforts to establish normal and
open relations with moderate Asian Muslims”, citing Rabin in Indonesia (Yedioth, 17, October 1993).

• ‘King Hussein gained yesterday a mandate from his people to sign a full peace with Israel’; “The regional peace economy is on its way -- Peres expressed one of the iron rules of political theory: democratic states do not manage wars between them, they resolve conflicts by peaceful means”; “King Carlos [of Spain] offered to help develop relations between Israel and Arab and North African states” (Yedioth, 10 November 1993).

• “Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt expressed support for Israel” (Ha’aretz, 22 December 1993).

• “Israel and the Vatican will sign today an agreement to establish full diplomatic relations between the two states” (Ha’aretz, 30 December 1993).

• “Assad, [president of Syria] in his meeting with President Clinton, expressed willingness to get over the obstacles favouring a global just peace between the Arabs and Israel” (Ha’aretz, 17 January 1994).

• “A plan for a new port to Israel and Jordan...central part of the ‘peace valley’ along the border with Jordan”; “The prime minister of Mali is ready to establish relations with Israel”, citing Peres (Ha’aretz, 5 August 1994)

• “The peace agreement with Jordan was signed yesterday” (Ha’aretz, 27 October 1994).

The list above is just a small sample of quotations from the many that were published in both newspapers. Some related to diplomatic and political relations with Israel, others to economic relations or future intentions.

9.4 Research Findings relating to the Peace Economy

Peace was directly interrelated to economics. Zilberfarb (1994) explains that the Arab boycott and tension in the Middle East in the pre-Oslo era harmed Israeli trade relations with the Arab and the Muslim world, and with Third World countries. The Oslo peace process enhanced Israel’s international status and led to the establishment of trade with countries that had previously rejected such links. Multinational companies that were reluctant to invest in Israel pre-Oslo due to the Arab boycott started to explore investment opportunities in Israel. Zilberfarb also points out that with the exception of Egypt, no direct trade existed between Israel and other Middle Eastern countries. Politicians and the business leaders expected that a comprehensive peace would generate considerable trade between Israel and the Arab world. The
peace economy became an integral part of the developing peace atmosphere and was thus, represented in both, primary and secondary economic topics. The representation of the peace economy was therefore related to the representation of peace in the news stories. Although analyzed in separate data and tables, I decided to integrate it into the peace superframe (see Chapter 6). Findings of the peace economy discourse as represented in the news pre- and post-Oslo are illustrated by Table 40.

Table 40: Representation of Primary Peace Economy Topics in News Articles relating to Peace Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N =2</td>
<td>N=11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian-Arab</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnerships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International projects and</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>investments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic benefits</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conferences</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic relations based on partnerships between Israel, and the Arab states/Palestinians barely existed pre-Oslo (except with Egypt since the 1979 peace agreement); these topics appeared in only 2 articles in Yedioth i.e., 2.3% relating to international projects and benefits, and none in Ha'aretz. These topics, however, were represented post-Oslo by 3.1% of news articles in Yedioth and 3% in Ha'aretz as primary topics. The international economic conferences were covered in 45.5% in Yedioth and 53.3% in Ha'aretz.

Post-Oslo, Israel's economic relationship with the Arab world and the Palestinians was represented in 27.3% of news articles in Yedioth and in 26.7% in Ha'aretz. These findings reflect changing attitudes towards the Arab world and the
Palestinians, who not only became partners in the peace process but also recognized Israel as part of the international community.

Furthermore, the similarity between the two newspapers demonstrates the same policy towards the global economy. The only differences between the two newspapers were in the salience given to the domestic economic benefits: in *Ha'aretz* 13.3% and in *Yedioth* 9.1%. This difference was offset by coverage of international investments in the domestic economy which *Yedioth* covered in 18.2% of news and *Ha'aretz* in only 6.7%.

### Table 41: Representation of Secondary Peace Economy Topics in News Articles relating to Peace Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th><em>Yedioth</em></th>
<th><em>Ahronoth</em></th>
<th><em>Ha'aretz</em></th>
<th><em>Yedioth</em></th>
<th><em>Ahronoth</em></th>
<th><em>Ha'aretz</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian-Arab partnerships</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International projects and investments</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic benefits</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conferences</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of Tables 40 and 41 support the arguments outlined above. The representation of primary economic topics post-Oslo, 45.5% in *Yedioth* and 53.3% in *Ha'aretz*, reflect the enthusiasm for the international conferences. This was followed by Israeli-Palestinian-Arab projects (27.3% in *Yedioth* and 26.7% in *Ha'aretz*). These topics were related to the economic benefits of peace and international investment in the area. The secondary economic topics mostly emphasized benefits relating to peace, which was heavily represented by 69.2% in *Yedioth* and 41.6% in *Ha'aretz*. Next were projects with the Palestinians and the Arabs (30.8% in *Yedioth* and 37.5% in *Ha'aretz*). *Ha'aretz* gave more salience to international investments in
the secondary representation (16.7%, compared to 6.7% in the primary), and less to international conferences (4.2%, compared to 53.3% in the primary). Yedioth avoided the international aspects in the secondary topics.

Both newspapers represented the peace economy post-Oslo. In both, the primary topics related mostly to international support for the peace process and only next were the regional relations. In both, the economic benefits were emphasized as secondary. Yedioth gave more emphasis to international investment as primary topics, while Ha'aretz emphasized more the benefits relating to peace.

Peres (1993) argued that the transition from war to peace, and from a confrontation economy to a peace economy created an opportunity for integration into the changing world community in addition to genuine interest in peace and increased living standards throughout the region. Peres foresaw a new economic order for the region, a 'new Middle East' with international commercial possibilities and international financial institutions which started to establish a fund for economic development in poorer countries in the area.

He elaborated on the economic significance of peace:

After Oslo, the economic breakthrough was enormous. In the first international economic summit in Casablanca, 3000 political leaders came from all over the world, from the Arab, Jewish and Western world. Later, four more economic conferences took place in Cairo, Rabat, Amman and Doha. The Israeli economy grew by 50%” (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002.)

Rabin-Pelossof added:

Oslo showed immediate results. The economy prospered and the public perception was that the political list of priorities changed. Even today, when I visit development towns people refer to it (Dalia Rabin-Pelossof, interviewed on 14 May 2002).
Economic changes were reflected through change in the news discourse (Table 40). In *Yedioth*, the primary economic topics were represented pre-Oslo by 15% and post-Oslo by 85%, and, in *Ha’aretz* by 0% pre-Oslo, compared to 100% post-Oslo.

The findings of the secondary representation of peace economy topics show some other list of priorities in the policy of both newspapers. The economic benefits of peace gained the most coverage and related to new forms of cooperation with the Palestinians, the Arab and the Muslim world, which were granted with the highest frequencies as primary representation (see Table 36). These findings are supported by the news quotations and by interviews with Shimon Peres and Dalia Rabin-Pelossof (see above), and are illustrated in Table 42.

Like the government and the peace camp, the media attempted to demonstrate that peace with the Palestinians would advance peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, namely the Arab and Muslim worlds. This vision was to increase prosperity for Israel and the entire region and to increase the possibility of Israel becoming a major economic power.

The changing relations between Israel and the Arab states took place in many spheres. Among the possibilities envisioned were: open borders between Israel and the Palestinians; a high degree of economic interdependence; intensive people-to-people interactions; tourism and widespread cultural exchange. However, mutual suspicions were strong enough to derail the development of a genuine warm peace.

In this context, Peres commented:

Since war, like the modern economy changed its form, science replaced land. Knowledge is more valuable today then territory and borders. People are associated through the air - telecommunications and websites and the real revolution is in the transformation from transportation to communication. Thus, in order to live in a peaceful world there is a need to assist the Arabs to make the move from feudalism to a free economy and to take part in the economic revolution (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002).
Data on the peace topics (peace and the peace economy, clustered by primary and secondary topics) shows a dramatic change in the peace discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. It demonstrates that 10% of peace topics were represented pre-Oslo and 90% post-Oslo in both newspapers (see Tables 36, 37, 40 and 41).

As noted above, the two newspapers also exhibited the same agenda in the leading peace topics. Cohen (1980) defines this kind of representation in the daily press news as having “all the properties of a press ‘panic’” (cited by Van Dijk, 1988a:167).

Following Altheide’s (1996) approach to qualitative analysis, I analyzed first the relationship of format, superframes (primary and secondary) and peace topics (primary and secondary) that constituted the peace discourse and then examined the changes between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. This is illustrated in Table 42.

Table 42: Changes in Format, Frame and Topics of Peace in News Articles between the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format (change in the amount of news stories relating to security, peace and politics)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superframe (change of news stories relating to peace)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace topics *</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Peace topics include topics listed in Tables 1, 2, 4 and 5.

In both newspapers, the change in frequencies of format and superframes were surprisingly similar. The volume of news relating to security, peace and politics increased in Yedioth from 36% pre-Oslo to 64% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz from 37% pre-Oslo to 63% post-Oslo. As for format, the representation of security, peace and politics superframe changed in Yedioth from 17% pre-Oslo to 83% post-Oslo,
and in *Ha'aretz* from 21% to 79%. The change of primary and secondary peace topics in both newspapers was from 10% pre-Oslo, to 90% post-Oslo.

### 9.4 Conclusions

As the peace discourse took up a very large volume of the news discourse post-Oslo, I decided to look for the way the word ‘peace’ was presented in the text and in what context it was presented in the news articles. The aim was to combine the ‘how’ with the ‘what’ in order to interpret the meaning of peace messages. Pre-Oslo, the term ‘peace talks’ was the most prevalent expression to characterize the peace discourse. Post-Oslo, the expressions became more varied, depending on context.

To cite a few examples (selected from the first two pages of the newspapers):

- “Peace has began and it is irreversible” (*Yedioth*, 5 September 1993).
- “The peace era began and the war era ended”; “this peace agreement will bring happiness to millions of Israelis and Palestinians”; “this is the peace of the brave for our children and next generations” (*Ha'aretz*, 13 September 1993).
- “Breakthrough in the peace process”; “peace is worthwhile”; “the new Middle East”; “real peace”; “only a strong Israel, secure and protected can make peace”; “comprehensive peace will reinforce peace”; “peace refusals”; “peace opponents” (*Ha'aretz*, 15 October 1993).
- “We will fight in the peace enemies”; “the blow was the gift of Hamas to the false peace” (*Yedioth*, 15 October 1993).
- “Sweeping victory to the peace supporters”; “mandate for peace”; “every step towards democracy is a step towards peace” (*Yedioth*, 10 November 1993).
- “The murdered Bedouin pursued peace and was murdered by enemies of peace...on the way to peace there are victims”; “terror tries to kill Jews and to kill the chances of peace”; “the region moves towards peace”; “losing hope in peace”; “ready to withdraw in return for peace” (*Ha'aretz*, 11-12 November 1993).
- “trial to murder peace”; “the young trust peace”; “peace of the brave”; “hot peace”; “the burning fire in Islam is a threat to peace”; “goodbye to the peace process”; “the window of opportunity for peace is closing”; “no bullet, no Molotov bottle and no stone will change our obligation to peace”; “the peace murderer”; “victims of peace”; “the plot of peace”; “Hamas and the right-wing extremists have become partners: they lie and celebrate the blood of terror victims”; “valley of peace”; “peace for the mothers and babies”; “peace for next generation”; “Israel is well aware of the enemies of peace” (*Yedioth*, January-October 1994).
- “Normal peace relations”; “sustainable peace”; “peace of honour”; “a new era of peace”; “land for peace”; “territories for peace”; “in peace, as in war, there is a need
to understand the other side’s mentality”; “victim on the altar of peace”; “there is a need to learn to live together and to overpower the extremists who are the opponents of peace”; “the peace dove”; “murder instead of peace”; “We do not want victims of peace, but healthy soldiers for a healthy peace”; “the prize for peace”; “just peace”; “full peace followed by security arrangements”; “stick to the peace process”; “to strive for peace and fight terror”; “the one who wants peace should be prepared for war”; “Hamas wants to murder peace”; “a hard hit to the peace process”; “the soldier of peace”; “goodbye to you, the Jewish mother, the peace that was born today brings hope that your son will not know war” (Ha'aretz, January-October 1994).

This review tells the confused peace narrative post-Oslo and shows the changing notion of peace in news text in the context of changing events including the changing policies of the newspapers. In 1993, pre-Oslo, both newspapers reported on ‘peace talks’, in a consistently passive form. Post-Oslo, changes occurred in the context and format of peace. It became active when the most commonly used term in the media became ‘peace process’. Goren (1995) argues that consistent use of this phrase had a cumulative effect because “it points to a positive predisposition in relation with the end result of the process” (Goren, 1995: 45).

The term ‘peace agreements’ was also used frequently. The context, however, for both phrases was either emotionally high or desperately down. Both patterns were blurred and inconsistent. The context of peace changed over time and circumstances characterized by joy, despair, fear, violence and conflict. In both cases, the term ‘peace’ either in its positive or negative form, was combined with war semantics, such as ‘peace of the brave’, ‘the victory of peace’, ‘soldier of peace’, and, at the other extreme, ‘murderers of peace’ and ‘victims of peace’. The hope that accompanied peace in the news discourse was also associated with terror, violence, fear and security concerns. This polarization in the news discourse was clearly demonstrated. Hope and despair were inseparable and did not convey a solid meaning of either ‘peace’ or ‘fierce’. The news discourse reflected the heights of peace and the despair of terrorism, part of the collective memory derived from the Jewish experience, myths and stereotypes.
Peres noted: "Unlike the understated language used by the British media, the Israeli media suffers from a language of overstatement. The scoop in Israel is more important than accuracy" (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002).

A trivial example of this was the report in Yedioth (15 September 1993) that "at least 150 Jewish babies were born during the last month since the peace agreement was signed and were named Shalom". Firstly, it should be stressed that no peace agreement was actually signed; Oslo only produced a DOP. Secondly, the Oslo accords were signed two days earlier, and, the letters of recognition between Arafat and Rabin were exchanged only two weeks earlier. Thirdly, the use of the term 'Jewish' instead of 'Israeli' is significant because it differentiates between 'them' and 'us'.

In a separate interview, Pundak (12 May 2002) confirmed Peres' view of the overstated language in the news. Peres also stressed that since newspapers are commercial enterprises, ratings are paramount. In other words, distribution is more essential than the impact on public opinion. Pundak also noted that Israeli newspapers respond to public demand and that during the periods under review Yedioth, in particular, understood immediately what information would especially appeal to the interests of the public.

One of the political reporters interviewed by Wolfsfeld (1997a) in 1995 said:

One thing is true about the coverage of the peace process. It's not objective. The peace process is not some anonymous process that you leave up to the reader to decide whether it's optimistic or pessimistic. In principle, when the media relates to the peace process it is primarily relating to the word 'peace'...the attitude then, is optimistic, or even celebratory... just like it is completely clear that if there is a terrorist attack the attitude is negative. When the media comes to cover the ceremony, or the historic handshake at Oslo they relate to the word peace and if there are complains about that [the biased coverage] then maybe they are justified (Wolfsfeld 1997a:22).

It should be mentioned that since the signing of the DOP, the value of the news related to it declined. The routine of the negotiating delegations of both sides,
although covered daily, was no longer ‘hot news’. On the other hand, the media reported misunderstandings, failures, the atmosphere between the delegations and optimistic or pessimistic predictions were prominent. Moreover, terrorist incidents aimed at disrupting the peace process were widely reported.

Goren (1995) claims that news thereby presented and classified events and actors relating to the peace process and attempts to impede it according to news values and not in accordance to their inherent importance. She adds that the accumulated impact of such coverage was expressed by audience attitudes to the peace prospects. I would add another parameter, namely that reporters’ overuse of the notion of peace constructed a misled ‘reality’ of an existing peace. However, positive and negative expressions relating to peace in the news should be seen within the context of the dominant discursive process and the combination of hope and despair that prevailed in the news media.

The media clearly undertook to shoulder the government mission and accepted the information disseminated to reporters without questioning or investigating the political establishment. Pundak, however, accused reporters of being superficial and “ethnoeuphoric”:

If the journalists had studied the accord they would have understood that it was neither a peace agreement nor a security agreement. This was the political trash that produced the horizon in which the future arrangements could start to be built. What the media created was a euphoria on one hand, and misunderstanding of a security horizon in a peace agreement, on the other hand (Ron Pundak, interviewed on 12 May 2002).

Pundak also argued that the media did not change its ‘diskette’ [stored information] from the conflict era to the building of a peace era.

Beilin added:

Before Oslo, the media practically used the term ‘peace talks’ when reporting much on the bilateral delegations’ meetings in Washington. The news discourse of the peace talks did not create any real expectations. This was also the message conveyed by the government to the political reporters... After Oslo was signed, although we told the
media that it was only some pages of thin principles to be worked out later into political interim agreements and a step towards a final peace agreement. The media ... ignored completely the fact that it was not a peace agreement, and presented it as such.

Thus, Israelis and the world public missed the information when they saw Clinton between Rabin and Arafat, hugging them both while they shook hands. This was the scene engraved in history. Later it was impossible to go back and say: wait a minute, it is not a peace agreement, it is only an open-ended accord, it will take some years to reach a peace agreement, and frankly, we do not know now how it will be than.

Admittedly, legitimization was one of the advantages of it. On the other hand, it was perceived as a peace treaty that raised unrealistically high expectations and led to misunderstanding and despair when terror continued. The public asked what kind of peace is it? Why do they violate the peace agreement? The weakness of the news was its inability to write news texts about the nuances. This could be covered by long articles that few people read (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002).

Each of the policymakers interviewed for this study emphasized that the media missed an opportunity to contribute to peace: Peres argued: “The media neither contributed to peace nor to an understanding of the peace process” (Shimon Peres, interviewed on 3 May 2002). Beilin added: “The media could not cope with the fact that no one could predict in advance where the peace process would lead in the future. By focusing on peace agreements, they misled the public” (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002). Pundak stated: “The media did not try to break the Israeli misperception about the Palestinians” (Ron Pundak, interviewed on 12 May 2002). Rabin-Pelossof concluded: “You do not see in the media any attempts to build a message of national pride like in the US ...there is only nosiness and self-destruction, which unfortunately, reflect the image of political institutions” (Dalia Pelossof Rabin, interviewed on 14 May 2002).

Following Altheide (1996), I argue that the different context, uses and meanings of peace texts provided by the media discourse, maintained the relevant meanings that the journalists used to write or talk about. He explains that text or talk concerning motive are important elements in everyday interactions and maintain the language that serves both the social and the individual functions. Van Dijk (1988) adds that
discourse includes the socio-historical conditions surrounding a communicative event, and the culture in which the text links the language and the meaning, hence, the interplay between text and context.

In this sense, the news stories were as contradictory as the society to which they belonged (Bruck and Roach, 1993). Given the myths and stereotypes relating to Jewish-Israeli history, the reality constructed by the media news discourse reflected the situation defined by Azar and Cohen (1979) as one in which peace constituted a breakpoint and a crisis.

The ideal of peace was connected to motives, such as an end to the ‘siege mentality’ (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992:633), characteristic of a state surrounded by enemies, plagued by isolation, wars and conflict. On the other hand, peace could not exist if terror continued. Although peace was considered by many as a worthwhile goal, it was closely linked to the idea of security and the end to terror. Bruck (1989) concludes that peace and war are not separate issues but issue fields in which different discourses compete. He suggests that these kinds of discourses work mostly in bipolar terms with the construction of enemy image and peace characteristics that are divided between good and evil.

Findings relating to the peace discourse suggest that although media reproduce the dominant ideology of the political elite, the dozens of news articles published on peace on the first two pages of both newspapers show the discursive practice of peace phrases, inconsistencies and contradictions. This also provides a way of understanding how power is structured in discourse, and of understanding how the relations between text and context are manifest in actual social practice.

Finally, the changes in representation and classification of the peace language-in-use in relation with social practice were linked to the articulation of new voices (Foucault, 1972), and reflected by the media peace discourse. The analysis of the peace discourse reveals the dramatic changes in frequencies accompanied by semantic confusion of the news media in the post-Oslo era. It indicates a “general
Chapter 10
Political Discourse

Research Findings and Discussion

10.1 Introduction

The study focused on Israeli political culture, manifest in values and attitudes that are compatible with the national culture (Abercrombie et al., 1994). This chapter analyzes the political news discourse in Israel from historical and socio-political perspectives. It outlines the findings derived from the content discourse analysis which examined how agents, such as the Israeli government, political parties and interest groups, were represented in the mass media news discourse before and after the signing of the Oslo accords.

The representation of security and peace discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, highlight tensions that emerged within the socio-political frame of the Israeli news discourse post-Oslo. The findings were analyzed specifically within the detailed primary and secondary political superframe, structured by 18 topics, clustered and reframed into 12 topics that were analytically coded. Comparison of the primary and the secondary superframes revealed a significant correlation in the increased number of political topics represented. A critical change in the news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods was statistically evident.

10.2 Approach to Politics

The security and peace discourses discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, deal with the two core issues of the Israeli nation state, issues that bind together Jewish
heritage and Israeli reality. Since the inception of the State of Israel, the concepts of war and peace have dominated Israeli political culture, influencing the processes that determined social practice and national identity.

The findings and discussion in this chapter focus on the political attitudes of Jewish-Israeli society in relation to the Oslo peace process and how it was represented by the news discourse. As noted previously, in many ways, the Oslo accords marked a dramatic change in the Israeli political arena. Raz-Krakotzkin (1998) argues that it not only reflected a change of political policy, but also “the breaking of a taboo...for many years the demonization of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was an essential factor in the construction of the Israeli consciousness” (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998: 59). Therefore, from the point of view of the peace camp -- the Labour government, the coalition parties, and the left-wing public -- the instant recognition of the former enemy, Arafat and the PLO, as representatives of the Palestinian people and as equal partners for peace, was not only revolutionary, but, dramatically positive.

In contrast, for members of the national camp -- the parliamentary opposition, religious parties and Jewish settlers in the occupied territories -- committed to the concept of ‘Greater Israel’, and to certain myths which reinforced the image of the Palestinians as the enemy, Oslo was an ideological betrayal. This perception was especially acute among the settlers who saw it as incorporating the collapse of their visions.

Tensions between the slogans ‘peace for land’ and ‘Greater Israel’ reflected the debates between these two camps, debates that heightened during the Oslo peace process. Van Dijk (1998) argues that more than any kind of discourse, political discourse is exceptionally ideological. He defines ideology as the basis of the social representation of groups. The analysis therefore focuses on how the news represented the two groupings.

Hall et al. (1978) argue that news is elaborated through a variety of images and
discourses that articulate what the audience is assumed to be thinking. They suggest that the underlying significance of news presentation lies in the fact that it often presents information about events which occur beyond the direct experience of the majority of the public. Indeed, the Israeli public and media were taken by surprise when news of the Oslo accords broke on 26 August 1993. The events that led up to the signing happened far from the political community, the media and the public in Israel and worldwide. In spite of the total surprise, Beilin (1999) explains that the historical handshake between Rabin and Arafat "did not cause the pillars of the universe to sway" (Beilin, 1999: 3).

The Israeli government approved the accord unanimously and in the Knesset it passed with a large majority (Beilin, 1999). Interviewed in May 1998, Kalman Gayer and Eitan Haber explained that according to public opinion polls, 73% of Israelis supported the peace process. Beilin (2002) also confirmed that the change in policy seemed to be easily accepted. In the immediate aftermath, the media discourse displayed a clear consensus. However, the news discourse analysis of the political process during the pre- and post-Oslo periods revealed that the Oslo process lead towards domestic conflict within Israel.

Patterson (1998) believes that news media are affected by the political beliefs held by journalists. Indeed, Ari Shavit, a senior journalist at Ha'aretz, confirms this belief by identifying his colleagues as belonging to the peace camp (Shavit, 1997). Furthermore, a survey on the function of the mass media by Cohen-Almagor and Yanovizki (1999) found that the Israeli public regarded their national media as subjective, politically biased and responsible for 'strategically' framing the news (Cappella and Hall Jamieson, 1997).

10.3 The Political Agenda within Israel Pre- and Post-Oslo

Since the Six Day War (1967) the issues of peace and security were defined politically in relation to the Israeli-Arab conflict in general, and to the occupied territories, in
particular. As noted in Chapter 7, these issues dominated the images of each of the leading political parties.

The combination of the Intifada (1987-1991), the Gulf War (January 1991) and the Madrid peace conference (October 1991) created a sense of urgency for peace in the Middle East (Karsh, 1994). These developments were precipitated by global changes including the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, changes in East European states, etc.

Public opinion surveys conducted by Shamir and Shamir (1993) highlight the fact that Israeli attitudes became more dovish immediately after the 1992 electoral victory of the Labour Party. Nevertheless, after the Intifada, as terrorism continued and bilateral peace talks with the Palestinians froze, public opinion was perceived as hawkish. Although the nation was already divided equally between those who campaigned for 'peace and security' and those advocating 'security and peace', genuine conflict did not occur until the signing of the Oslo accords.

This conflict is analyzed against the background of the prevailing political circumstances accompanying the news discourse. Following the Madrid conference and the bilateral peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians at the end of 1991, a solution to the Palestinian problem was proposed, based on the formula of autonomy. Israeli and Palestinian delegations met in Washington under the auspices of the US. These meetings received widespread coverage in the Israeli news; media personnel became active actors, joining members of the delegations and the politicians. Like everyone else, even the journalists were taken by surprise when the news story about Oslo broke at the end of August 1993 and the formerly delegitimized enemy was legitimized at once (Beilin, 1999; Hirschfeld, 2000; Benvenisti, 1993). It should be noted again that the Oslo secret channels did not accord with objections expressed by the government to negotiating with the PLO prior to August 1993 (see Chapter 3).
10.4 Research Findings on Politics

The shifts in political attitudes among the Israeli public can be seen by the findings illustrated in Tables 43 and 44.

Table 43: Representation of Primary Political Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo N=9</td>
<td>Post-Oslo N=52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic politics</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign politics</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government activities</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary opposition to process with PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing opposition to peace process with PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and settlers reject peace process</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations against peace process with PLO</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence by Israelis against Palestinians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations with the PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion polls</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bereaved families</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations in support of peace process with PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 43 reveals that in Yedioth, government activities were represented pre-Oslo by 44.4% of news articles. In contrast, Yedioth did not provide any coverage on the first
two pages of either the parliamentary opposition, the religious and settlers, or the right-wing public. Next in terms of amount of coverage were demonstrations against negotiations with the PLO (33.3%) and domestic politics (11.1%). Israeli violence against Palestinians and negotiations with the PLO were notably absent from the news discourse.

Similarly, in Ha'aretz, the parliamentary opposition and right-wing public were entirely absent from the first two pages during the pre-Oslo period while government activities and domestic politics were equally represented, each by 22.2%. In contrast to Yedioth, the religious and settlers were represented in Ha’aretz by 22.2% of news articles, as for demonstrations against negotiations with the PLO. Public opinion polls in both newspapers were represented by 11.2%.

As expected, pre-Oslo, Ha’aretz, with its left-wing orientation, legitimized negotiations with the PLO (22.2% of news articles) and represented religious groups and the settlers similarly (22.2%). In contrast, Yedioth, a popular newspaper appealing to a broader population, provided no coverage of negotiations with the PLO, but represented Israeli demonstrations against negotiations with the PLO with a relatively high number of articles (33.3%), compared to zero in Ha’aretz.

It is interesting to illuminate the topics absent from the news discourse during the pre-Oslo period in both newspapers: the peace camp, foreign politics and Israeli violence against the Palestinians. This can be explained by the interpretation of text and context: Foreign policy related primarily to the conflict with the Palestinians; the peace camp was perceived as supporting the Palestinians; and Israeli violence against the Palestinians was not relevant. These topics remained outside public consensus and declared government policy. Thus, they were not covered in either of the two newspapers.

In both newspapers, the range of political topics on the first two pages were very limited; out of the 12 topics analyzed, only four were covered by Yedioth and five by Ha’aretz. Comparison with the secondary political topics implies that different topics
were pushed into the news by both newspapers. These included: political negotiations with the PLO (40% in Yedioth and 22% in Ha'aretz); Israeli violence against Palestinians (20% in Yedioth and 11% in Ha'aretz); and Israeli demonstrations against negotiations with the PLO (20% in each paper), as shown also in Table 44. Only Ha'aretz covered government activities, and opposition to negotiations with the Palestinians, religious and settlers (16.7% each), the peace camp (5.6%), national politics and foreign politics (5.6% each). Yedioth represented the right-wing opposition to the government policy in the secondary topic.

The only topic that was represented in both the primary and secondary topics in Yedioth was Israeli demonstrations against negotiations with the Palestinians. Interestingly, this topic was not represented in Ha'aretz, either in primary or secondary topics. Negotiations with the PLO were represented in both primary and secondary topics in Ha'aretz, while in Yedioth it was represented only in the secondary topic. Little wonder that Ha'aretz was branded a 'leftist' publication: all political judgements were made in relation to one's position on negotiations with the PLO or with peace, and support for either of these concepts was associated with the left-wing. Yedioth, which appealed to a broader audience, pushed these topics down the text, in order to avoid antagonizing its readership.

Yedioth represented a limited number of 4 topics, while Ha'aretz represented 9 political topics out of 12 in the secondary topics pre-Oslo (see analysis of Table 44). Political attitudes were clearly defined by this selection. Yedioth gave salience to demonstrations against negotiations with the PLO, while Ha'aretz gave salience to negotiations with the PLO. Ha'aretz gave prominence to the rejection of the peace process by religious groups and settlers, while Yedioth avoided the subject completely. As anticipated, both newspapers provided substantial coverage of government activities and domestic politics (55.5% of news articles in Yedioth and 44.4% in Ha'aretz). This trend is also evident by the number of government quotations published by both newspapers during the period under review (see Table 51).
The dramatic changes in the political discourse of both newspapers was manifest firstly by the range of topics covered post-Oslo: Yedioth covered 11 of 12 topics in the coding schedule as the primary topic of the news discourse while Ha'aretz covered 10 topics.

Analysis of the detailed topics (see Table 43) shows that post-Oslo the most represented topics in Yedioth were, in descending order, the parliamentary opposition (18.2%), negotiations with the PLO (14.5%), public opinion polls (12.7%), and domestic politics (10.7%). Right-wing public opponents of Oslo were represented by 9.1% of news articles. The government, the religious and the settlers, and demonstrations against Oslo, were, surprisingly, represented by exactly the same frequencies of 7.3%. A significant correlation was found in the representation of Israeli violence against Palestinians, and demonstrations supporting the Oslo peace process (5.5% each).

As for Ha'aretz, the dominant topic was negotiations with the PLO, which was represented by 28.1% of news articles, followed by domestic politics (26.6%) and, as expected, the religious and settlers (17.2%). Ha'aretz appeared consistent in its political policy. Demonstrations against Oslo were represented with 9.4% of news articles, and parliamentary opposition to Oslo and demonstrations in support of Oslo were each represented similarly by 4.7%. Public opinion polls decreased to only 3.1%, and opposition to Oslo among the right wing was represented by only 1.6%. Foreign policy was also represented (by 1.8% in Yedioth and 3.1% in Ha'aretz) because new actors came into play post-Oslo (see Tables 15 and 16). It is noteworthy that right-wing opposition to Oslo and government activities were both marginal with only 1.6% each.

The two newspapers display similarities and differences in their policies. The political orientation of Ha'aretz is indicated by the coverage of negotiations with the PLO, linked to domestic politics and the opposition. Yedioth, meanwhile, gave most attention to the parliamentary opposition, linked to political negotiations with the PLO and then to social attitudes represented by public opinion polls. The changes in the
political discourse was found to be from 15% pre-Oslo to 85% post-Oslo in Yedioth, and from 12% pre-Oslo to 88% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz (see Table 43).

Table 44: Representation of Secondary Political Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=97</td>
<td>N=391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic politics</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign politics</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government activities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary opposition to the peace process with PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing opposition to peace process with PLO</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and settlers opposition to the peace process</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations against peace process with PLO</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence by Israelis against Palestinians</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations with the PLO</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion polls</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bereaved families</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrations in support of peace process with the PLO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the secondary topics post-Oslo, Ha'aretz maintained its political policy, again giving prominence to negotiations with the PLO (28%), as in the primary topics. The next most salient topic, however, was the religious and settlers who opposed the negotiations (25%, compared to 17% in the primary topics), and third was demonstrations against Oslo, pushed into the secondary topics (16.5%, compared to
9% in the primary topic). The same refers to parliamentary opposition, which became prominent as a secondary topic (13%, compared to 5% as the primary topic). All other topics were represented with small frequencies as secondary topics.

During the post-Oslo period, Yedioth represented first and foremost negotiations with the PLO (24%, compared to 14.5% as primary topic). Second was domestic politics (19%, compared to 11% as the primary topic) and third, Israeli demonstrations against Oslo (17%, compared to 7% as the primary topic). Next were right-wing opposition to Oslo (also 15%, compared to 9% as the primary topic) and government activities (10%, compared to 7% as the primary topic).

The total frequencies of the topics indicated a significant correlation between the primary and secondary topics in the news, and point to a change in the news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. It should be stressed that the two newspapers showed similar tendencies in terms of changes in the political frequencies. The change in Yedioth is indicated by the fact that 15% of political topics were represented in the news pre-Oslo, while 85% were represented post-Oslo; in Ha'aretz, 12% of the political topics were represented pre-Oslo and 82% post-Oslo.

Data relating to the political topics in the news post-Oslo that the changing social world was reproduced through a “mediatized political discourse” (Bourdieu, cited by Fairclough, 1995). This involved the representation and classification of events and groups of people (see Chapter 6). The importance of these topics was to point to the salience given to them by the government discourse and by the news discourse (Fairclough, 1995).

Despite similarities between the findings relating to the primary and secondary political topics, it is worth examining the interplay between them within the news. Tables 45 and 46 compare the most prominent political topics in the news in the two newspapers. The topics were listed in descending order (28%-10%). Together, 3 of the primary topics presented constitute 72% of the primary topics and 69% of the
secondary news topics. These topics comprise the discourse of two conflicting groupings: for and against the Oslo process. It is important to point out the changes in the secondary political topics, which increased in Yedioth, from 15% pre-Oslo to 85% post-Oslo (similar to the primary topics), and in Ha’aretz from 18% pre-Oslo to 82% post-Oslo (Table 45).

The comparison of the most represented primary and secondary political topics in Ha’aretz and Yedioth post-Oslo is shown in Tables 45 and 46.

Table 45: The Political News Agenda of the First Two Pages of Ha’aretz during the Post-Oslo period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Political Topic</th>
<th>Secondary Political Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Negotiations with the PLO</td>
<td>Negotiations with the PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Domestic politics</td>
<td>Religious and settlers opposition to the peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Religious and settlers opposition to the peace process</td>
<td>Demonstrations against the peace process with the PLO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 45 shows the three most salient topics in Ha’aretz post-Oslo. The main focus was on negotiations with the PLO, a topic that stressed the nationwide split between supporters and opponents of Oslo. Table 46 illustrates the political news agenda of Yedioth. Again, topics are listed in descending order (28%-10%). Together, the 5 topics presented above constitute 57% of primary topics and 86% of the secondary news topics. The news discourse here stresses the consequences of Oslo for the primary and secondary topics; however, it deals with the conflicting elements in the secondary topic only.

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Table 46: The Political News Agenda of the First Two Pages of Yedioth during the Post-Oslo Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Political Topic</th>
<th>Secondary Political Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary opposition to peace process with the PLO</td>
<td>Negotiations with the PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations with the PLO</td>
<td>Domestic politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion polls</td>
<td>Demonstrations against the peace process with the PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic politics</td>
<td>Right wing opposition to peace process with the PLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>Government activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 46 shows that the political topics represented in the news in Yedioth were more diversified than those in Ha'aretz. Representation of the secondary topics in Yedioth resembled that of the primary topics in Ha'aretz where the news discourse expressed the conflicting elements in Israeli society. The popular newspaper therefore seems to have adapted its policy and become more political, more like Ha'aretz. However, Yedioth placed the conflict in the secondary topics to avoid provoking readers opposed to the Oslo process.

Of particular interest is the interplay in Yedioth between the primary and secondary topics where the conflicting elements are discursive. This can be explained by the public involvement in the political processes that occurred at the critical breakpoint of Oslo, as well as commercial considerations.

Despite the diversified political coverage of the two newspapers post-Oslo, the data implies a clear split between left and right in relation to the Oslo peace process. The findings show a clear segmentation by both newspapers into the following four groups:

**Group 1:** Government activities regarding peace and security, and negotiations with the PLO.
Group 2: The peace camp, ie., supporters of the peace process.
Group 3: Parliamentary opposition to the peace process.
Group 4: The national camp, ie., the right wing, religious and settlers opposed to the peace process (including demonstrations against the peace process, and violence by Israelis against Palestinians).

Table 47 shows the clear changes between the two periods in the representation of government versus the opposition, and the peace camp versus the national camp, in both newspapers.

Table 47: Representation of Supporters and Opponents of the Oslo Peace Process during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 Government</td>
<td>N=8</td>
<td>N=45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 Peace camp</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 Parliamentary opposition to peace</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4 National camp</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 47 shows a slight difference between the newspapers in terms of the topics most covered in the news pre-Oslo. In Yedioth, the government was represented by 62% of news articles, compared to 75% in Ha'aretz, while the national camp was represented by 38% in Yedioth, compared to 25% in Ha'aretz. Neither newspaper provided any coverage on the first two pages of either the parliamentary opposition or the peace camp.

However, the news discourse of both newspapers changed post-Oslo: In both newspapers, the primary and the secondary topics together comprised the total change.
from 15% pre-Oslo to 85% post-Oslo. Attention was paid to a greater variety of groups within Israeli society. Indeed, the debate between the four groups, as indicated in Table 47, was very dominant in the political and ideological discourse, and likewise, in the news discourse. These were represented by two competing groups: the government versus the national camp. These two groups were each represented in Yedioth by 35% of news articles pre-Oslo; in Ha'aretz, the government featured in 61% of news articles, compared to the national camp with 39%.

The other two competing groups were the parliamentary opposition, represented in Yedioth by 23% of news articles, and the peace camp with 7%; in Ha'aretz both were marginally important, with 5% each. This data is demonstrated in Table 48.

These findings suggest that Yedioth shifted its focus from political institutions (government and domestic politics) pre-Oslo (62%) to the different political/ideological groups post-Oslo. Its political discourse was dramatically changed and focused on the range of internal debates among the Israeli public. It paid much more attention post-Oslo to the national camp, (the political opposition, the right-wing public, the religious and the settlers). Although it became much more politically oriented, it did not jeopardize its circulation to a wide political spectrum, due to commercial, rather than ideological considerations.

Ha'aretz maintained its political orientation and its target audiences, adjusting only slightly the heavy representation of government between the two periods. This is also exhibited by the frequency of government quotations, as illustrated in Table 51. However, it did increase representation of the national camp opposed to the Oslo process. Contrary to expectations, the peace camp was represented with small frequencies, like the parliamentary opposition. These two groups were probably not deemed newsworthy for other reasons: the peace camp was likely identified with government policy while parliamentary opposition was represented by the national camp. This conforms with the policy of both newspapers of publishing statements on the first page that dubbed members of the national camp extremists opposed to peace.
and marginal. This particular phenomenon started before the historic handshake in Washington.

Following are a selection of quotations (from the first two pages of the newspapers) that illustrate how the right wing, religious and settlers were stereotyped as a group opposed to peace in contrast to government policy supporting peace:

- "Tens of thousands participated yesterday in a rally to support the government...among the slogans at the demonstration: 'The Right Creates Hysteria while Rabin Makes History', 'The Right Cannot Stop Peace', 'Time Has Come For Peace'" (Ha'aretz, 5 September, 1993).
- "The PM was confronted yesterday by a group of right wingers who reviled him as a 'traitor'...Rabin said: 'Those people called Begin a traitor too. They will demonstrate against anyone making peace, and there is no need to pay attention to them'" (Ha'aretz, 12, September 1993).
- "Nachman [a settler leader] claimed that Labour argues the illegal settlements of the Gush Emunim [settlers political movement] constitute ideological lawbreaking by the extreme right..." (Ha'aretz, 16 September, 1993).
- Headline: "MK [Avraham] Burg [Labour]: If you oppose [the peace process], we will recruit the rabbinical college students" (Yedioth, 21 September 1993).
- "Since signing the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Washington, security has deteriorated in Israel and our PM sends us messages that the negotiations will continue despite terror" (Yedioth, 18 November 1993).
- "[Uri] Savir [director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry] said 'We must learn to live together, to overcome the extremists, the opponents of peace'" (Ha'aretz, 10 April 1994).
- "The opposition chairman Netanyahu said: 'This government abandons us and our children to those who seek to destroy us'. MK [Benny] Begin [Likud] said: 'This government signed a disgraceful document and completely ignored Arab terror against Jews'" (Ha'aretz, 10 April 1994).
- Headline: "Shamir [former Likud PM] against the government"
- "To issue an order to a soldier to evacuate [a settlement] is like ordering him to kill his mother". Gur [deputy defence minister]: "He [Shamir] speaks like an ex-terrorist that has not forgotten anything", "Shamir said: 'To issue an order to soldiers to evacuate Jews from the land of Israel and to evacuate settlers from Hebron is unthinkable'" (Yedioth, 10 April 1994).
- "Forty-four right-wingers were arrested in demonstrations opposite the prime minister's house...The prime minister said that a wicked partnership has been created between the right and Hamas in order to thwart the peace process... But the peace process will continue as we committed ourselves... Rabin said angrily: 'I don't need any authorization from Likud members regarding Jerusalem. None of them contributed to the unification of Jerusalem in Israel's wars, as we did. Neither [Binyamin] Netanyahu [Likud MK], nor [Ehud] Olmert [Likud MK, mayor of Jerusalem] will teach us what united Jerusalem is...The opposition reacted acutely and the Likud blamed Rabin for wild incitement while losing sense and hysteria. They said that Rabin is causing a national split and hatred between brothers...Rabin blamed the
right for intending to disrupt life here and endanger life..." (Ha’aretz, 4 July 1994).
• Following the explosion in the Jewish community offices in Buenos Aires: "It is pity that Arabs antisemites and Nazis remind us that we are one people..." (Ha’aretz, 20 July 1994).
• Headline: “Haetzni [a settler leader]: Rise up against the government: a soldier that takes part in evacuation is a kozak [barbarian]”; “Any Jewish soldier, who forces us, our wives, our children and grandchildren out of our homes in order to destroy us and turn us into refugees, commits a pogrom (Ha’aretz, 31 August 1994, cited in Nekuda, the settlers’ newspaper).

As soon as the first shock waves caused by Oslo subsided, the national camp felt genuinely threatened by the consequences that it had previously feared. At this juncture, the news discourse repeatedly presented and represented official quotations that were replete with symbols belonging to the national camp and Jewish myths that opposed the universal, liberal and democratic values of the peace camp. This coincided with terrorist attacks against Israelis by Hamas while legitimized peace negotiations took place with the new partners, Arafat and the PLO.

The sample of quotations listed above form part of the narrative of the Israeli nation-state. It links all conflicting political powers of the historical and socio-political frameworks (see Chapters 2 and 3). Bird and Dardenne (1988) argue that like history and anthropology, news also narrates real events; hence, the troubled relationship between reality and stories about reality. In this sense, these quotations contribute to an understanding of the Israeli-Jewish narrative that represents the Israeli political dichotomy and its ‘reality’. Thus, if we study news discourse as a narrative, we can learn about the values, myths and stereotypes that have meaning in a given culture.

These quotations include stereotyped image of most Israeli political groups: Jews and Israelis, Likud and Labour, left and right, religious, settlers and liberals, peace and security, fear and hope, terror and defence. All are embodied within the conflicting elements represented and classified by the news discourse. It is worth noting, however, that no conflict was found with women or Israeli Arabs who simply did not exist in the news discourse ‘reality’ which was dominated by a [Jewish] male elite.
Interviewed on the subject of the conflicted discourses presented in the news articles, Rabin-Pelossof argued that her late father satisfied neither the right nor the left:

Oslo was Peres and Rabin only, and Rabin was very much alone. He blamed the media for drawing a picture of a total opposition to Oslo perceived by media audiences (see Chapter 9).

However, she claimed:

While explaining properly and regularly to journalists you can get their attention and cooperation. The media do, indeed, have a role to play in building national strength. The problem of the media is its double message standards conveyed to the public. The media reflects the confusion (Dalia Rabin-Pelossof, interviewed on 14 May 2002).

This argument supports the national narrative found in news quotations above, which represents the confusing values among conflicting elements within Israeli society.

However, the perception that most of the public supported Oslo was confirmed by Arian (1995) who claims that in 1993, almost all Israelis supported and were interested in the continued participation in the peace process; only 5% did not support or were not interested in a peace process. By 1994, interest remained high, but alarm was expressed by those opposed negotiations with the PLO.

As argued above and confirmed by the news quotations, the future of the territories became salient in the political discourse in conjunction with the news discourse. More than ever before, the possibility of removing Jewish settlements from the occupied territories generated a split in Israeli society.

Beilin explained:

After Oslo, we [Labour] did not campaign among the settlers to explain the accords, as I did after Rabin's assassination. The ideological settlers saw Oslo as a concession of Greater Israel and those who were not ideologists were stressed for economic reasons. We did not understand the need to relate to both, and frankly, we did not yet have answers. The media reported, but neither asked questions, nor raised arguments or criticized. Except for some radicals, public opinion supported Oslo...I do not think that the media set anything. However, this is the only instrument to convey information to the public. A political process hardly exists without the media (Yossi Beilin, interviewed on 15 May 2002).
Pundak also elaborated on the subject:

In the first months [post-Oslo] the media undoubtedly suffered from a euphoria syndrome. Euphoria is a psycho-public situation set by the media....Politicians are also to be blamed for raising expectations and setting the euphoric mood. However, a symbiotic relationship exists between politics and media. Politicians create the first magic and the media support it. The media towed after the public expectations because of ratings considerations. It represented a kind of a reality translation that suited the time and public desires (Ron Pundak, interviewed on 12 May 2002).

The political and ideological changes in the news discourse were clearly exhibited by classifying the opponents and supporters of the Oslo peace process in Table 48.

**Table 48: Representation of the National and Peace Camps in the Political News Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =8</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 Peace camp</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 National camp</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that in both newspapers the news discourse significantly changed after Oslo. Given that the peace camp was ideologically aligned with the government, together they were represented by 42% of news frequencies in Yedioth and the parliamentary opposition affiliated with the national camp was represented by 58%. Meanwhile, in Ha’aretz, the government as part of the peace camp was represented by 66% and the opposition increased to 34%.

It could be argued that both newspapers adjusted to the prevailing political atmosphere
during the pre- and post-Oslo periods, and adjusted the representation of the two
groups in response to the perceived demands of their target audience. The news
discourse in both newspapers reproduced the debate between the national camp and
the peace camp by the salience of the topic, the volume and the space awarded to each.
Moreover, the classification into two adverse groups reinforced the ideological dispute
that challenged the national consensus.

The representation of secondary topics by the news discourse were illustrated by Table
49 and 50 in order to compare the primary and the secondary political topics pre- and
post-Oslo, and to compare between the two newspapers.

Table 49: Representation of Supporters and Opponents to Negotiations with the
PLO in the Primary and Secondary Political Topics in News Articles during Pre-
and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=10</td>
<td>N=57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 Government</td>
<td>(62%) 40%</td>
<td>(35%) 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 Peace camp</td>
<td>(-) (-)</td>
<td>(7%) 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 Parliamentary</td>
<td>(-) 20%</td>
<td>(23%) 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition to peace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4 National camp</td>
<td>38% 40%</td>
<td>(35%) 40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The secondary frequencies in bold are next to the primary frequencies (in parentheses)

Table 49 reveals the changing policies of both newspapers post-Oslo in context with
the ideological discourse by illustrating the interplay between the primary and
secondary topics. I argue that the primary topics can be characterized as the overt
political news message and the secondary as the ideological covert message.

In this context, Yedioth changed the salience of the topics in the news discourse. Pre-
Oslo, in Yedioth, the salience of government activities was represented more in the
primary topics and less in the secondary topics. Post-Oslo, the policy was changed and
the government salience was shifted to the secondary topic. The peace camp, which was marginal pre-Oslo, stayed marginal after, as well, in both the primary and the secondary topics. The parliamentary opposition was represented only in the secondary topic pre-Oslo, and shifted to the primary topic post-Oslo. The representation of the national camp in both the primary and secondary topics was consistently high during both periods.

Despite slight differences in frequencies, the findings reveal a correlation between the policies of both newspapers towards all four categories outlined above. The parliamentary opposition decreased dramatically in the secondary topic, from 20% to 4% and became marginal, especially in comparison to the primary topic (23%). The peace camp was probably perceived in both periods as represented by the government and did not play any role. The national camp, with frequencies of 40% in both periods, were a dominant group in both primary and secondary topics.

Both newspapers associated the peace camp with the government. Hence, it was marginalized in the political discourse. It is noteworthy that the national camp took second place after the government in terms of the most heavily represented category in both primary and secondary topics both pre- and post-Oslo in both newspapers. Meanwhile, the parliamentary opposition was linked with the national camp. Hence, the nation was divided into two clear groupings: the peace camp versus the national camp, as illustrated in Table 50.

Table 50: Representation of the National and Peace Camps in Primary and Secondary Political Topics in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =10</td>
<td>N=57</td>
<td>N=18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 Peace camp</td>
<td>(62%) 40%</td>
<td>(42%) 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 National camp</td>
<td>(38%) 60%</td>
<td>(58%) 44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The secondary frequencies in bold are next to the primary frequencies (in parentheses)
Table 50 highlights the polarization between the two camps represented in the news discourse in both newspapers. Both devoted considerable attention to the two defined camps in both periods. *Ha’aretz* demonstrated the see-saw model post-Oslo by granting greater coverage to the national camp post-Oslo (61%) than the government (39%). Although *Yedioth* changed policy and granted more coverage to the government, the national camp continued to be heavily represented both pre- and post-Oslo. The see-saw model between the national camp and the peace camp in the secondary topic is prominent in *Ha’aretz* and can also be applied on a different scale to *Yedioth*, pre- and post-Oslo.

Hall Jamieson and Cappela (1998) argue that newspapers pay too much attention to political conflicts and not enough to their resolution. Giltin (1980), in his book about the news media treatment of the New Left in the 1960s, argues that political movements who play by conventional rules are liable to be assimilated into the hegemonic political worldview expressed in the news discourse. This may explain the marginality of the peace camp in the post-Oslo news discourse. On the other hand, Giltin (1980) explains that opposition groups realized that if they stayed outside the dominant realm of discourse, they were liable to be considered marginal and politically irrelevant. Therefore, creating major events to make a political impact could make them newsworthy (Wolfsfeld, 1997) by extreme actions and reactions.

Indeed, in the Israeli news discourse, right-wing groups were depicted in conjunction with terms such as ‘opposition’, ‘rejection’, ‘demonstrations against’, ‘violence against’, etc. (see Tables 43 and 44). Giltin (1980) explain that for opposition groups to be represented in news they need to move through four cycles: “First, they are ignored, then they receive some respectful coverage. Then they are trivialized and finally sensationalized” (Giltin, 1980:53). In this sense, the definition proposed by Cappella and Hall Jamieson (1997) of strategic news as dealing primarily with the game of politics -- winning and losing -- seems to be very significant in the news discourse and might be applicable to Israeli journalism.

Although changes in the political discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods
can be understood in the context of broader political changes, internal tensions within Israel appeared to be most pervasive in the news discourse. This is probably due to the fact that the news involved opposing actors and extreme actions such as demonstrations, violence against the Palestinians, aggressive declarations against the government and the Left, etc. (Graber et al., 1998).

Given that the centralization of power is generally deemed dangerous to democracy (Graber et al., 1998), the Israeli media, which practices self-censorship and traditionally depends on government sources of information, both because of security reasons, constitutes a threat to democracy. In addition, use of the language of the government does not allow for the expression of alternative voices. Right-wing groups in the national camp were defined by the Israeli prime minister as marginal and trivial, and these expressions were quoted in the news discourse. The identification of Israeli journalists with government policy clearly demonstrates a subjective ideological news discourse.

The news discourse ‘reality’ presented and defined the socio-political polarization created by the Oslo peace process. Israel became more divided then ever between two camps that were defined in relation to the Palestinian question. On the left, the peace camp included secular Israelis who were perceived by the religious as ‘spoilers of Israel’. On the right, the national camp included religious Jews and members of the extreme right, viewed by leftists as compulsive and oppressive (Oz, 1998). Ben-Simon (1997) adds that the Labour government and the Left seemed to behave in a patronizing and arrogant manner towards religious groups and the Sephardi Jews during this period, but this was hardly a new phenomenon.

Opponents of the Oslo peace process advocated the concept of ‘Greater Israel’. Their views clashed directly with those who supported territorial compromise in order to end the conflict and preserve the democratic nature of the Jewish state (Gavison, 1999). Raz-Krakotzkin (1998) explains that both camps used different political and ideological vocabulary that stood at the centre of the internal conflict, and also demonstrated the existing contradictions in Israeli culture. Thus, the polarization of
political attitudes of both camps had fundamental implications for Israeli identity (Horowitz and Lissak, 1990) and was emphasized by the ideological news discourse, as demonstrated in Tables 48 and 50.

This socio-political polarization post-Oslo was reinforced by writers (Keren, 1994), such as Shulamit Hareven (1993), who wrote that the “Oslo accords signified a coalition between the ‘sane’ elements among Israelis and Palestinians” (Hareven, 1993). Amos Oz expressed a similar outlook: “Our moderate and pragmatic principles are being affirmed these days by the Oslo accords between the Israelis and the Palestinians that recognize the need for coexistence’ (Oz, 1993).

This emotional discourse was countered by right-wing commentators, such as West Bank ideologist Benny Katzover (1993), who wrote: “Weariness, fatigue, normative emptiness are leading to the modern calf, called this time ‘peace’” (Katzover, 1993). In a similar vein, Noam Frankel (1993) viewed the accords as ‘a pact with the devil, signed by the leftist politicians whose Jewish soul was degenerated” (Frankel, 1993).

Nonetheless, the government and the peace camp probably assumed that the Oslo accords would be accepted by a large majority of Israelis and would create a new consensus in Israel. Ultimately, this proved otherwise, as illustrated by the news quotations (see Table 51).

The Oslo process created a wide rift in the Israeli national identity because it divided Israeli society into two identities and revealed a serious crisis in the Israeli collective consciousness (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998; Etzioni-Halevi, 1997). It follows Azar and Cohen’s (1979) argument that a transitory breakpoint is a turning point and apex in a transformation from war to peace.

Moreover, the political news discourse after Oslo was characterized by a discursive structure which, although it defined Oslo as an ‘irreversible peace’, was mixed with security threats and ideological wars. The definition of ‘irreversible peace’ was used constantly by politicians who were quoted repeatedly in the news articles of both
newspapers. This definition conformed to government policy and was even used by Arafat and quoted by the media news. In contrast, the national camp represented the Oslo process as a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state.

10.5 Quotations from government sources

Rakow and Kranich (1996) argue that news media personnel conventionally rely on so-called authoritative sources to provide interpretations of events. This was an additional consideration in my research. Hence, the study also analyzed the frequencies of political quotations by government officials in the news discourse during both periods.

Analysis of the structure of news reports illustrated the top-to-bottom style of writing (Van Dijk, 1988) and its reliance on quotations. Bruck (1989) suggests that this style gives a distinct advantage to the government agenda and that sources are selected and legitimized according to political hierarchies. He claims that media reprocess discourses expressed by their sources and reproduce the social and political order of the day by the political statements that make up news texts.

McHoul (1993) explains that a statement is part of a technique for the production of human subjects and institutions. He cites Foucault (1972):

Discourses always function in relation to power relations, and a statement is a function which enables one to say of a series of signs whether or not they are present in it...and reveal them with concrete contents in time and space (Foucault, 1972: 86-87).

As a result, I decided to analyze the statements of the elite figures quoted in the news articles. Van Dijk (1988) claims that such statements are considered not only newsworthy but also reliable. "Quotations not only make the news report livelier but are direct indications of what was actually said and hence true-as-verbal-act" (Van Dijk, 1988:87). Fairclough (1995) notes that a striking feature in the study of political discourse is the effort to measure the extent to which news stories incorporate
governmental quotations.

The linkage between government and media is evident by the frequencies of government statements quoted in the news texts in the first two pages before and after Oslo in both newspapers (see Table 51). Direct quotations from leading officials (prime minister, foreign minister and defence minister) appeared in Ha'aretz in 49% of news articles post-Oslo (compared to 33% pre-Oslo), and in Yedioth, in 27% post-Oslo (compared to 21% pre-Oslo). These figures do not include other official statements, nor quotations that were not specified by inverted commas in the texts.

Table 51: Representation of Government Quotations in News Articles during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha'aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>N=97</td>
<td>N=391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 51 shows the linkage between the news discourse and politics and the importance attached by each newspaper to the government pre- and post-Oslo. The analysis reveals the quotation patterns of both newspapers.

Fairclough's (1995) observation about quotations (see above) was more pertinent to Ha'aretz than Yedioth. Direct quotations of government sources appeared in almost 50% of Ha'aretz news articles, which at times included more than one official quotation in a single text post-Oslo.

It could be argued that during the post-Oslo period, government policy was represented in both newspapers as more powerful and prestigious. However, in Ha'aretz, quotations by government officials were published more frequently than in
Yedioth. This conforms to the policy of Ha’aretz as targeting a specific, narrow albeit quality audience, while Yedioth aimed to appeal to a much wider popular spectrum.

Data on government quotations also validate the differences found in the findings of the political discourse and the representation of government activities in both newspapers (see Tables 43 and 44). Ha’aretz journalists tended to faithfully reproduce the literal quotations of official sources. Pfetsch (1998) claims that government actions are inherently more newsworthy than the argument of the opposition. Van Dijk (1988) reinforces this argument, claiming that ‘real actors’ i.e. quotations of familiar politicians represented by the news, are more reliable as opinion formulating because quotations are direct indications of the truth and “more reliable than event descriptions by the reporter” (Van Dijk, 1998: 87).

On the other hand, quotations are often used to establish distance between the newspaper and the opinions expressed. Wolfsfeld (1998) argues that the press can either strengthen or negate the images of the enemy and spread either optimism or pessimism about the chances of ending a protracted conflict peace, strengthen or weaken the public willingness to make compromises, and increase or decrease the legitimacy of the government. The number of quotations used by journalists post-Oslo might point to their active role in the political process, which was not fully acknowledged as a defining feature of democratic political system.

Members of the political elite were regularly displayed in the news media in relation to the position taken by their parties, speeches they made, and the policies they advocate (Graber et. al., 1998). On the one hand, the publication of quotations conveys human and dramatic aspects to news events. On the other hand, Van Dijk (1988a) explains that in a study of quotation patterns, he learned that most sentences in the text were indirect quotations. The quotations were seldom totally correct and were even irrelevant, contextually. However, they were made to reinforce credibility and reliability of the source in the news.

Hallin (1997) claims that since Vietnam, Watergate and the struggles over race and
gender in the US, the question of journalists self-positioning, either with the elite or with the public, paved the way for national newspapers to shift towards a new era of interpretations and subjectivity. This is accompanied by direct quotations and implicit quotations that are not indicated as such, but are nevertheless either copied from an official press release or quoted without indicating the reference. I found evidence of this during my professional experience in the field as a communications consultant. Most of the press releases that I wrote were simply copied into the newspaper and published as such under the name of the targeted journalist who received it. On some occasions, the same press release was published on the same day by various different newspapers without any communication between them.

10.6 Conclusions

As noted in Chapter 3, the Israeli media was widely perceived as promoting the left-wing attitudes of the government and the campaign for peace with the PLO which was perceived by the right wing as leading to the destruction of the Jewish state. Post-Oslo, the Israeli printed press, television and radio devoted a large proportion of news space to peace topics and the news media discourse was transformed: The ultimate enemy was changed into a partner for peace and the national partner became the enemy of peace. Gamson (1992) argues that no texts can be taken at face value since they contain subtexts that may have more invisible "metamessages" (Gamson, 1992: 381).

It is important to stress that prior to the Oslo peace process, incessant violent between Israelis and Palestinians had been (and remains to date) a constant feature of the Israeli collective experience. The possibility of a transformation from war to peace stimulated euphoric emotional reactions of victory among the peace camp and bitter controversy with the national camp. This was demonstrated through changes in the political news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods. However, the news discourse presented and represented the need of journalists for drama and novelty for ‘good’ news stories. In this sense, the conflict of power between the national camp and the
peace camp provided the really newsworthy events.

Dramatic changes in discourse raised the question whether news discourse was influenced by the ideological and political attitudes of journalists. This was partly answered by Wolfsfeld's study (1997) on constructing news about peace. He interviewed an Israeli journalist who explained: "It's true that Israeli journalists are mostly peaceniks...they really wanted this dialogue with the PLO ... and they don't vote for the right wing" (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 21).

In another context, Wolfsfeld (1997a) quotes another journalist:
It is very convenient for the Left to emphasize the extremist circles. The minute you emphasize the extremist actions, everything will stick to the Likud in the end. The media has a certain bias and they want to show the right wing as a crazy bunch that do some kind of nonsense (Wolfsfeld, 1995: 31).

Gamson (1992) explains that journalists feel no need to balance different points of view when dealing with political images. He argues that much of media discourse reflects a struggle over meaning. To this end, the press serve as an important agent in defining and reinforcing change in the political climate (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Analysis of the news pre- and post-Oslo highlights the sharp changes in the political news discourse and resembles the findings illustrated also in the security and peace discourses (see Chapters 6-10). However, the dramatic changes found in the news discourse did not ensure the dominance in peace meaning constructed by the readers.

Security and peace discourses in the Israeli news media were narrowed and channelled into the realm of the political discourse. In the news discourse, they appear as transparent description of reality, even pre-Oslo. However, post-Oslo, a dramatic change in the news discourse transmitted politically mediatized messages of political change. This conforms to the explanation offered by Gamson (1988): "Themes exist in a dialectic relationship with counter-themes, both have cultural roots" (Gamson, 1988: 227).
The empirical findings of this study confirm that peace and security are indeed the two core imperatives that determine the social structure and character of Israeli society in the local, regional and international contexts. The findings also confirm that journalists may frame news text and context in relation to the power of the political elite. I argue that such social construction in the news discourse might provide images that encourage the definitions of the enemy and the partner accompanied by a competition between social and political groups. This point was particularly relevant to the opponents and supporters of the Oslo peace process. I also argue that by examining media discourse between two time periods, one can trace socio-political changes. Moreover, I suggest that analyzing media news discourse in real time and monitoring the text in context might help to identify socio-political processes and make future assumptions.

The see-saw model described in the previous chapters does not allow for equilibrium; nor does it allow for any middle ground. News media subsequently reinforce unbalanced social and political forces. They thereby emphasize the concepts of ideological conflict versus consensus in the Israeli society. The news construction also validates the professional news values as classified by Van Dijk (1988): novelty, recency of events, consonance with the ideological attitudes of journalists post-Oslo, relevance, and negativity and deviance. Inevitably, such news discourse heightens the polarization between two separate and distinct groupings, namely enemy and partner. These conclusions also raise questions relating to the agenda-setting role of the media.
Part IV
Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusions

11.1 Overview

This thesis explores the impact of the Oslo peace process on the political and ideological news discourses in Israel. It focuses on how security, peace and politics were represented in the Israeli printed press through a "transitory" breakpoint in Jewish history, which appeared to signify a new era of peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

The prime purpose of the research, therefore, is to outline changes in news 'reality' as reflected through news discourse over two distinctive periods, pre- and post-Oslo. This chapter outlines the overall objectives of the research and presents a summary of the empirical findings, firstly of the superframes, and then of the actors and topics as interpretive of the general meaning (Altheide, 1996) represented by security, peace and political discourses of news articles.

This study starts by examining the historical, social and political developments of Jewish Israeli society within the context of global, regional and local changes. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of Jewish myths and stereotypes in contemporary Israel and the prevailing ideologies, social practice and language-in-use. This is based on the premise that ideologies reflect the basic criteria that constitute the socio-political beliefs and identities which define group interests (Van Dijk, 1998) in keeping with Bourdieu’s concept of ‘mediatized political discourse’ (Fairclough, 1995).

The study considers Fairclough’s (1995) argument that major political activities and genres of the elite are also the genres of the media. Thus, a political news discourse is relative and relational to political changes. It mirrors the socio-political world by
reproducing or changing the classification which underlies actors and topics presented and represented by texts (Foucault, 1981) in context. Consequently, news discourse is viewed as the institutional form of language-in-use and political practice.

The analysis involved two consecutive time periods, from 20 January 1993 until 26 October 1994, divided by the signing of the Oslo accords (13 September 1993), portrayed as a “transitory” breakpoint from war culture to peace culture.

For the news discourse analysis on security, peace and politics in the Israeli printed press, I devised a coding schedule to calculate the primary and secondary frequencies of three superframes, 46 topics, 7 domestic actors and 10 foreign actors that were represented in the news articles (see Appendix 1). The analysis was applied to 1186 news articles that were published during the pre- and post-Oslo periods. The sample was selected from two publications, one a quality newspaper (Ha ’aretz) and the other a popular one (Yedioth).

The news articles were analyzed in a thematic structure from top to bottom. This confirmed the conventional structure of news articles in which the lead or the first paragraph of the news article is the most prominent feature. It enabled me to comprehend the significance of the most salient topics and actors in the news text, as well as to evaluate and interpret them.

Findings of the quantitative discourse analysis are supported in the thesis with qualitative data from the sample of news articles. News quotations, derived from the first two pages in the selected newspapers, convey similar messages, with only some semantic variation between the publications. This data is further complemented by extracts from personal interviews that I conducted with some of the key participants in the Oslo peace process itself.
11.2 Superframes

As argued throughout the thesis, the superframes symbolize the three imperatives of the Jewish-Israeli nation state which also link the Jewish past with the Israeli present. The saliency of security, peace and politics is evident by the volume of news related to these issues on the first two pages of both newspapers throughout the period under review: 43% of 1120 news articles in Yedioth and 57% of 1222 news articles in Ha'aretz (see Table 1).

Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 indicates the changes in these discourses. Almost a third (28%) of news articles in Yedioth related to security, peace and politics pre-Oslo; this increased by 57% to 49% post-Oslo. In Ha'aretz, 40% of news articles covered security, peace and politics pre-Oslo; this increased to 67% post-Oslo (see Chapters 5 and 6). These figures show the format and superframes of prominent issues in Israeli society during the transition (see Tables 4, 9,10 and 11).

The connections between the three superframes are related to socio-political practice, shared language, collective memory, image, myths and stereotypes -- all disseminated through social agents including the mass media. Ultimately, security, peace and politics are evidently symbiotic and inseparable.

This section focuses on the security, peace and politics superframes rather then on all the individual topics for two reasons: firstly, the superframes defined and constituted the most salient features of news discourse (see above); and secondly, the superframes incorporated all the topics analyzed in detail in Chapters 6-10, inclusive.

For each of the pre- and post-Oslo periods, the news narrative was formulated by identifying the three topics and actors most represented in the news texts, which correspond to the three superframes of security, peace and politics. Among the 46 coded and analyzed topics, the three main topics that were represented most frequently in each superframe (clustered together) actually structure the Israeli news narrative during each period.
11.2.1 The Pre-Oslo Narrative
Pre-Oslo, the superframes’ news discourse was divided between the three clustered (primary and secondary) superframes as follows: security (56%), peace (30%) and politics (14%).

Security superframe: (1) The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) carries out operations against Islamist terrorist organizations (2), namely Hamas and the Hizballah, that attack the IDF and civilians and thereby undermine security. (3) The IDF capture and deport Hamas terrorists for the sake of national security (see Tables 29 and 31).

Peace superframe: (1) Following the Madrid conference, the Israeli delegation meet with the Palestinian delegation for peace talks (comprising local Palestinian leaders) in Washington (2) under the auspices of the US, which is also involved in (3) multilateral talks between Israel and neighbouring Arab countries (see Table 39).

Politics superframe: (1) Israeli government activities and (2) policies regarding security, peace and domestic issues are (3) opposed by some demonstrations of Jewish settlers and religious groups (see Tables 46 and 47).

11.2.2 The Post-Oslo Narrative
Post-Oslo, the superframes’ news discourse was divided between the three clustered (primary and secondary) superframes as follows: security (46%) peace (37%) and politics (17%).

Peace superframe: (1) The Israeli-PLO committees on the Oslo peace agreement are meeting daily (2) and peace talks with neighbouring Arab countries are integral to the (3) peace process. This is followed by US mediation and support of the Gulf states and Muslim world (see Tables 36, 37 and 38). Economic benefits are accompanied by Israeli-Arab-Palestinian cooperation (see Tables 40 and 41).
Security superframe: (1) Withdrawal from parts of the occupied territories are accompanied by (2) IDF operations against Hamas and Hizballah, who are responsible for terrorism that causes (3) Israeli injuries and funerals. This is accompanied by security arrangements and national security issues (see Tables 28 and 33).

Political superframe: (1) Government activities relating to negotiations with the PLO and the Oslo peace process (2) confront violent opposition of settlers and religious groups, (3) right-wing Israelis and parliamentary opposition. This is accompanied by demonstrations against domestic policies (see Tables 45 and 46).

The discourse content analysis demonstrates a significant change within each superframe of the news discourse between the two periods. It also illustrates a similar news agenda in each of the two newspapers; the leading primary topics and actors of each superframe. A similar change is evident in the news discourse of both newspapers. Topics and actors were mostly ranked in the same order, with similar frequencies of peace, security, and peace primary topics, and domestic and foreign actors represented by the news texts.

The results of the statistical findings established by the quantitative discourse content analysis reveal slight differences in the frequencies of the secondary topics and actors, and a difference in order, albeit, directly related to the primary topics policy.

The dominant topics mentioned above correspond to political perceptions and policy which Van Dijk (1988) defines as ideologies. He argues that these are the “fundamental framework that organize frames, scripts and attitudes... represent the general views of society and involve overall topics, goals and interests which monitor our social practice” (Van Dijk, 1988:147). However, he explains, evaluative frameworks may change over time due to construction of new information. The superframes of the news discourses were constantly revised and changed in meaning post-Oslo. Indeed, the superframes changes are illustrated by the quantitative findings and the different frequencies of topics and actors post- Oslo (see Tables 9,
10 and 11). The detailed frequencies of the topics and actors as represented in the superframes are summarized below.

11.3 Topics and Actors relating to the Superframes

In general, the topics and actors in news articles on the first two pages of both newspapers point to a discourse of consensus about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pre-Oslo and about personal and national security in relation to the common enemy. Similarities in the findings relating to topics and actors for both newspapers point to the trend of rallying around the dominant authorities. In other words, both newspapers were primarily interested in topics that also concerned elite institutions. Changes in the security, peace and political discourses (topics and actors) were defined by the news in terms of complex responses to peace which divided Jewish-Israeli society post-Oslo into two distinct groups (see Tables 49, 50 and 51).

The emphasis on topics and actors covered by the news indicates the political and ideological split in the perceptions of the legislature and the political ideologies as were defined by group identities (peace camp and national camp). Of particular significance was Lewis' (1998) observation that in the Middle East, more than anywhere else, group identity focused on memories of a common past and events which are either "part of the collective memory or sometimes imagined history" (Lewis 1998:19).

This study explores the representation of security and peace issues (see Chapters 8 and 9, respectively). Israeli expectations of peace were conditioned by fears for personal and national security and were related to the political hegemony (see Chapter 10). The political mechanisms of group solidarity and ideological consensus became key factors in the nationwide socio-political schism, which, in turn, reinstated the actual issues of security and peace on the political news agenda.
Wars and conflicts with neighbouring Arab countries, the Palestinians and the Muslim world figured prominently in the perceived threat to the existence of the State of Israel. The question of how best to guarantee the security of individuals, as well as the continued existence of the Jewish collectivity in Israel clearly preoccupied every government and every citizen of the state since its inception (see Chapters 2, 3 and 7). This also applied to the news media.

During the pre-Oslo period, security dominated the news discourse of the daily newspapers. The prevailing topics and actors were the IDF, followed by hostility to Israel. These were the security issues that combined to preoccupy political policy, the media and public discourse. Despite ideological and socio-political differences, as well as controversies among Israeli citizens on the future of the occupied territories, the centrality of security provided a unifying factor in Israeli society. Indeed, security lay at the heart of the Israeli national ethos and promoted solidarity based on collective memory, images, myths and stereotypes integrated in Jewish-Israeli culture (see Chapter 8).

During the pre-Oslo period security, constituted 61.6% of the 97 news articles covered in Yedioth and 64.3 % of 170 news articles covered in Ha’aretz. Peace was the second superframe, constituting 27.9% of news articles in Yedioth and 30% in Ha’aretz. Domestic politics was ranked as the third superframe, represented in 10.5% of news articles in Yedioth and 5.7% in Ha’aretz (Chapter 6).

The frequent references to IDF operations against terrorism (Table 35) represent two conflicting elements: the IDF (54% in Yedioth and 72% in Ha’aretz) versus the terrorist threat (11% in Yedioth and 53% in Ha’aretz). In both newspapers, there were many more references to the IDF than to hostile forces. As noted in Chapter 8, Israeli society believed in the ability of the IDF to defend the nation. Lahav (1993) argues that one of the most prominent characteristics of Israeli discourse was the subordination of national concerns to security calculations.
This data is significant because it confirms the centrality of security topics and related actors who were defined as allies or enemies (see Table 18). Pre-Oslo, 79.3% of foreign actors in Yedioth were classified as enemies, and 83.1% in Ha’aretz. Images and stereotypes of the enemy focused on Arafat and the PLO with whom the Israeli law forbade any contacts. Successive Israeli governments had demonized Arafat and refused to recognize him as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people (see Chapter 7). This was reflected in news pertaining to foreign actors. Arafat and the PLO [in exile in Tunis] were mentioned in only 6.8% of news articles in Yedioth and 8.1% in Ha’aretz (see Table 15).

Following the Madrid conference, bilateral talks were established between an official Israeli delegation and an alternative Palestinian leadership. With US mediation, the two delegations discussed Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. Among the foreign actors, the local Palestinian leadership was represented in 15.1% of news article in Yedioth and 16.2% in Ha’aretz (see Table 15). These figures were double those for references to Arafat and the PLO (see Tables 15 and 20). These findings therefore mirror government policies during the pre-Oslo period.

In addition, as a result of the Madrid conference, multilateral talks with neighbouring Arab countries also started although diplomatic relations had not yet been established. These countries figured in 5% of news articles in both newspapers (see Table 15). They were still included by Israeli political elites within the category of enemy. Meanwhile, Hizballah and Hamas were portrayed as the most prominent enemies (see Tables 15 and 16). The world was divided between representatives of enemies (as 80% in both newspapers) and allies (as 10% in both newspapers): ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Table 18).

Pre-Oslo, peace was invoked by Israelis as a distant wish, a prayer and a blessing. As noted above, and in Chapters 6 and 8, the peace superframe constituted 30% of news articles in both newspapers (see Table 9). The major topics of the peace discourse were bilateral peace talks between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations (95.5% in
Confidence in government policies was demonstrated by the major domestic actors represented in the news. The government was represented by 35% of news articles in *Yedioth* and by 48.9% in *Ha'aretz*, and security actors by 36% in both newspapers (see Table 12). This trend was also evident by the publication of official government statements (see Table 51) in news articles (21% in *Yedioth* and 33% in *Ha'aretz*). The security forces were also dominant among domestic actors (see Table 12).

During the pre-Oslo period, mainstream Israelis rejected the idea of negotiations with Arafat and the PLO as representatives of the enemy (terrorists). Furthermore, they did not relate to any political peace strategy because the topic discussed between the Israeli-Palestinian delegations for peace was Palestinian autonomy, not peace.

The division of Israeli public opinion was expressed by antagonistic slogans: 'security and peace' versus 'peace and security'. Despite fierce debate between the right-wing 'hawks' and the left-wing 'doves', Israelis shared a common 'siege mentality' (see Chapters 8 and 9). Thus, both left and right were represented in each newspaper by less than 4% of news articles (see Table 12).

Hirschfeld (2000) explains that during the bilateral talks with the local Palestinian leadership, it became obvious that Israel could neither ignore nor replace Arafat. Various other factors combined to encourage efforts to resolve the conflict: the military burden, the economic costs, the challenge of the immigration from the former Soviet Union and pressure from the US. The need for security and economic solutions inspired the second channel that took the form of secret negotiations in Oslo parallel to the bilateral talks in Washington.

The 1992 electoral victory of the Israeli Labour Party, with a mandate to seek peace, was the signal for Israel to enter into dialogue with the PLO at the beginning of 1993. The Oslo channel, which ended discreetly with the DOP signed by Abu Ala [PLO
official] and Shimon Peres [Israeli foreign minister] on 30 August 1993, was arguably one of the most shocking changes of the twentieth century.

The post-Oslo period witnessed dramatic political changes, perceived as heralding the transition from war culture to peace culture. The political superframe of the Israeli Labour Party demonstrated ability to overcome conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world by peaceful means. Government policy indicated that nations could, indeed, make peace with enemies. Images of the historic handshake between PM Rabin and his former enemy Arafat, who had suddenly won international recognition as official leader of the PLO and the Palestinian nation (see Chapter 7), were publicized worldwide and won international acclaim.

Euphoric peace messages were conveyed to the world through all media channels. Arafat figured frequently on the first two pages of the Israeli daily newspapers. He was represented in the news as a partner for peace and was identified among the foreign actors of the democratic world (40% in Yedioth and 30% in Ha'aretz, see Table 15). The local Palestinian leadership almost disappeared from the news (2.8% in Yedioth and 4% in Ha'aretz, see Table 15). Hence, the image of Arafat changed critically. He was interviewed and quoted repeatedly by the media, in Israel and internationally (Chapter 7). Table 22 illustrates the changing representation of Arafat and the PLO in both Israeli newspapers; he was mentioned in virtually all (between 96.5% to 99%) references as representing the Palestinian people (see Table 22).

Negotiations with the PLO on a peace agreement became the leading topic of the news agenda in both newspapers (36% of peace topics, see Table 36). Political negotiations with the PLO and Arafat was the leading topic of the political discourse (14.5% in Yedioth and 28% in Ha'aretz, see Table 43) while withdrawal from the occupied territories was the leading topic in the security discourse (55% in Yedioth and 33% in Ha'aretz, see Table 24).

The peace superframe overshadowed all other superframes (46% in Yedioth and 52% in Ha'aretz, see Table 9). Thereby, the security superframe declined dramatically by
almost half of its pre-Oslo volume (39% in Yedioth and 35% in Ha'aretz, see Table 9). This was accompanied by powerful debates between Israelis identified with the national camp versus the peace camp (see Tables 48 and 49). This debate was traced through the political and ideological discourses in 919 news articles post-Oslo (391 in Yedioth and 528 in Ha'aretz).

The political superframe doubled in Yedioth and tripled in Ha'aretz (see Table 9) as reflected by the representation of increased objections to the Oslo peace process by the right-wing opposition and the national camp (see Table 45). Representation of economic relations with the Palestinians and the Arab world was accompanied by benefits of peace which increased by 100% (see Table 40) and were interrelated with the peace discourse. Representation of government in the news was 54% in Yedioth and as 50% in Ha'aretz (see Table 12), and quotations from government sources (see Table 51) increased accordingly (27% in Yedioth and 49% in Ha'aretz). The foreign actors were mostly unified by supporters of the peace process who became peace allies of Israel (70% in both newspapers, see Tables 18 and 19) while enemies decreased to 30% in Yedioth and 22% in Ha'aretz (see Tables 18 and 19).

The perceived enemies of peace were primarily Hamas and the Israeli national camp, who appeared to share an interest in damaging the Oslo peace process (see Table 18). Political opposition was the leading topic of the political discourse in Yedioth, followed by the negotiations with the PLO. Meanwhile in Ha'aretz, peace negotiations with the PLO was the leading political topic, followed by domestic politics relating to the religious, and settlers’ opposition to the peace process (see Tables 38 and 39). Perceptions of domestic politics were divided into two distinct groups in which representation of the national camp group tripled: from 3.5% pre-Oslo to 11.3% post-Oslo in Ha'aretz, and in Yedioth from 3.8% pre-Oslo to 10.2% post-Oslo (see Table 13).

The security discourse decreased dramatically and was represented in both newspapers mainly by military withdrawal from the territories which tripled in Yedioth (55%) and doubled in Ha'aretz (33%) (see Table 24). It was followed by the
IDF attacks against terrorists. Security arrangements were pushed into the secondary topic in both newspapers (see Table 26) while terrorism continued to occur. The IDF were mentioned more frequently in relation to the PLO while threat forces increased dramatically (see Tables 25 and 27). This raised fear and anger in the national camp who were regarded as 'outsiders' while the peace camp, with their vision of a 'new Middle East', was portrayed as joining the democratic and enlightened international community.

Dramatic changes in topics and actors in the peace discourse are illustrated in Table 38, which indicates a complete upheaval between the two periods under review. 10% of the news topics were represented pre-Oslo and 90% of the peace topics were represented in the news post-Oslo. The Oslo 'panic press' (Van Dijk, 1983) peace topics represented in the daily news discourse reflected the changing ideology of Israeli political policy.

The news media contributed to negative stereotypes of the national camp as violent opponents of peace and to positive perceptions of the peace camp as enlightened supporters of peace (see Chapters 9 and 10). This dichotomy was initially reflected in the primary topics of the security, peace and political news discourses which reproduced the discourse of political authority through the primary topics in the lead, supported by the secondary topics further in the text. Quotations from the news text and interviews that describe the socio-political process pre- and post-Oslo appear in Chapters 7-10, inclusive.

11.4 Summary of Changes in Media Discourse

The research findings show that the newspapers faithfully reproduced and legitimated different political attitudes during each time period. Comparison between the representation of security, peace and politics topics and actors in each period shows that the routine news strategy was to highlight official policies and their statements.
I argue that ideological discourse is inherent in language-in-use and social practice, and constitutes security, peace and political discourses in every society. The terms 'security and peace' or 'peace and security' reflect different political ideologies. Thus, political and ideological concepts are translated into one 'ideo-politics' discourse and promotes group identities.

More than one thousand news articles on security, peace and politics that were published on the first two pages of Israel's daily newspapers reproduced the dominant ideology of the political elite during each period, including its language-in-use. (This is also evident by the news quotations in Chapters 7-10 and by Table 51).

The findings reveal the discursive practice of the inconsistencies of peace and security and contradictions in the news discourse. It also contributes to an understanding of how relations between text and context radiate actual socio-political practice and how power is structured into discourse through the "political consequences, not political intentions" (Negrine, 1994:83).

Changes in ideological news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods are clearly illustrated in Table 52. This outlines the Israeli narratives during each of the two periods and the discourse of collective consciousness revealed by similar tendencies in both newspapers. Changes in the topics and actors, as represented in the news articles, were illustrated by changes in format (volume of news articles), superframes (clustered superframes), topics and actors (domestic and foreign) who figured prominently in news articles.

Table 52 outlines the findings and results derived from analysis of the representation of security, peace and politics in the Israeli news discourse pre- and post-Oslo.
Table 52: The Relative Change of Primary and Secondary Clustered Actors and Topics of the News Discourse during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Yedioth Ahronoth</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Oslo</td>
<td>Post-Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign actors</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Domestic actors</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total relative change</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A: The order of topics and actors according to the percentage of change in the pre-Oslo period
B: The order of topics and actors according to the percentage of change in the post-Oslo period

**Volume.** Security, peace and political issues were represented by 36% of news articles pre-Oslo and 64% of news articles post-Oslo in Yedioth. In Ha’aretz, 37% of news articles were represented by security, peace and political topics and actors pre-Oslo and 63% post-Oslo (clustered Tables 2, 3 and 4).

**Superframes.** The relative changes in the superframes of news articles related to security, peace and politics in Yedioth was represented by 17% pre-Oslo and 83% post-Oslo, and, in Ha’aretz by 21% pre-Oslo and 79% post-Oslo (clustered Tables 9 and 10).

**Security topics.** The relative change in the representation of security topics in the security discourse in Yedioth was 25% pre-Oslo and 75% post-Oslo, and in Ha’aretz 27% pre-Oslo and 73% post-Oslo.

**Peace topics.** The relative change in the structure of peace discourse in news articles in both newspapers was represented by 10% of peace topics pre-Oslo and 90% post-Oslo.
Political topics. The relative change in representation of political topics in the political discourse in both newspapers was 15% of political topics pre-Oslo and 85% post-Oslo.

Domestic actors. The relative change in the representation of domestic actors in security, peace and politics news articles in Yedioth was 21% pre-Oslo and 79% post-Oslo, and in Ha'aretz 23% pre-Oslo and 77% post-Oslo.

Foreign actors. The relative change in the representation of foreign actors in security, peace and politics news discourses was 20% in Yedioth pre-Oslo and 80% post-Oslo and in Ha'aretz, 19% pre-Oslo and 81% post-Oslo.

Table 52 outlines the changes in the structure of Israeli news in terms of the major actors and topics in the news articles of the two newspapers. It indicates the news discourse changes, as discussed in Chapters 6-10. This was accompanied by changes in the Israeli list of policy priorities during the pre- and post-Oslo periods. The findings outlined in Table 52 therefore form the Israeli political/ideological narrative conveyed by the news discourse pre- and post-Oslo. This confirms the concept of news as discourse.

Table 52 can be read both horizontally and vertically. It illustrates the revolution in the structure of the news and the system, i.e., changing policies towards security, peace and political news discourses in both newspapers. It is interesting to view the absolute correlation between both newspapers in the schema of the topics and actors presented pre- and post-Oslo. Table 52 also demonstrates the correlation in the policies of both newspapers both pre- and post-Oslo. It can therefore be viewed as evidence of the consensus and solidarity of the media.

Changes in the three superframes that comprise related topics, and the related domestic and foreign actors are demonstrated in Table 52.
Horizontal reading. This demonstrates changes in representations of topics and actors relating to security, peace and politics. The overall total relative change of the different discourses was from 18% in Yedioth (21% in Ha'aretz) pre-Oslo, to 82% in Yedioth (79% in Ha'aretz) post-Oslo.

Vertical reading. The discourse analysis is demonstrated and the research findings are summarized thematically: From bottom-up (A), it presents the salient topics and actors represented in news articles pre-Oslo, and from top-down (B), it presents the topics and actors represented post-Oslo. A vertical reading of Table 52 also illustrates the see-saw model.

Table 52 presents the total changes in the policies and structure of news representations related to security, peace and political discourses in both newspapers.

Table 53 is derived from data presented in Table 52. It emphasizes the changes in the order of topics and actors between the two periods and thereby illustrates the application of the see-saw model.

Table 53: The Changing Order of Primary Topics and Actors in both Newspapers during the Pre- and Post-Oslo Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Pre-Oslo</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Post-Oslo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Domestic actors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign actors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Foreign actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Domestic actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.5 Validating the See-Saw Model

Table 52 validates the see-saw model. The Oxford English Dictionary (1993) defines ‘see saw’ as “a game in which persons sit at each end of a long board balanced on central support and move up and down alternatively”. It is used figuratively to mean “a contest in which the advantage repeatedly changes from one side to the other”. The central axis which alternatively moved up and down the security versus peace (pre-Oslo) or peace versus security (post-Oslo) news discourses was the collection of topics and actors representing Israeli national conflict (the future of the occupied territories) in the news discourse, as seen in Table 53.

The news ‘reality’ was presented as two conflicting powers and represented security and peace in a see-saw model. The topics and actors were presented by a unidimensional image of conflicting elements: peace versus security, which intercrossed the political perceptions of the elite. This image was consistent in the news discourse during the two time periods analyzed. However, the ‘reality’ of security versus peace was juxtaposed in the two time periods. The news discourse narrative can be illustrated by the superframes’ movement according to the see-saw model.

Statistics cited in the following two paragraphs were calculated by clustering the primary and secondary security superframes, and halving the total.

a. The pre-Oslo period
When topics and actors relating to security were represented most in the news articles -- 56% in Yedioth and 56% in Ha’aretz – then, topics and actors relating to peace were represented by relatively low frequencies (27% in Yedioth and 34% in Ha’aretz). Domestic politics relating to security and peace was represented by 14% in Yedioth and by 10% in Ha’aretz.
b. The post-Oslo period

When topics and actors relating to peace were represented in most news articles -- 43% in *Yedioth* (increased from 27% pre-Oslo) and 49% in *Ha'aretz* (increased from 34% pre-Oslo) -- then, topics and actors relating to security were represented by relatively few news articles, i.e., 39% in *Yedioth* (declined from 60% pre-Oslo), and 36% in *Ha'aretz* (declined from 56% pre-Oslo).

Evidently, the dynamics of the see-saw did not allow for either a process nor for nuanced perceptions within the discourse. Consequently, a metaphorical empty space was left between the polarized positions that were reproduced. Just as a vacuum has a natural tendency to become filled, so the new drama framed by internal conflicts penetrated the gap between war and peace. It reflected a new conflict between internal enemies and allies for peace: the political right versus the political left, accompanied by stereotyped images of the national camp ideology versus that of the peace camp.

To conclude, Tables 52 and 53 both illustrate changes in the Israeli news discourse between the pre- and post-Oslo periods and reveal the news as discourse. They demonstrate a perfect changeover in the salient issues covered by the news articles and an exact correlation in the policy of both newspapers.

A wide gap was established post-Oslo between the euphoric perceptions of peace sparked by the Oslo accords and Israeli recognition of Arafat and the PLO as partners for peace, on the one hand, and the actual condition of insecurity due to the continuation of terrorism, on the other. This reflects how the pre-Oslo enemy became a legitimate partner and was replaced by a new internal enemy post-Oslo. The news discourse evidently reproduced the ideological policy of government and opposition.

I argue that the media news discourse informs the public about political priorities through mediated political discourse that changes according to political policy in addition to global processes, regional circumstances and local ideology. Although Israel reclassified actors, traditional perceptions, which maintained an enemy for the
sake of group consensus, remained. The former external enemy was replaced with a new internal one. Henceforth Israeli national identity was divided between the Israeli left and the Jewish right.

The press reclassified topics and actors, replacing the former enemy with new ones (the Israeli national camp together with Hamas). A mirror picture was drawn: old enemies became new allies who were identified as enlightened veteran forces in contrast to new enemies who were identified as fundamental dark forces. The salience and centrality of beliefs as well as the effects of the underlying needs, wishes and fears clearly changed with time according to different political situations (Bar-Tal, 1990).

Israel became associated with the global community of the changing world in the last decade of the twentieth century, and the news media possessed a new discourse order—a new division between new allies and enemies—in accordance with government priorities:

1. The major foreign actors who became new allies post-Oslo were: Arafat and the PLO representing the Palestinians; neighbouring Arab countries; the Arab and the Muslim worlds; and the US and Europe. Together with the Israeli government and the left-wing public, these constituted the partners for peace (see Tables 18 and 19) who shared the dream of a ‘New Middle East’. Shavit (1997) argues that the media peace discourse, wrapped in euphoria, changed gears in terms of innovations and propaganda.

Hirschfeld (2000) notes that hard-liners among both Israelis and the Palestinians were inclined to express opposition to peace by nationalistic claims that radicalized opposing perceptions. Thus, new coalitions between Israelis, Palestinians and Arabs were built through the framework of political and ideological discourses of the Israeli government and the mass media. At the same time, this deepened the polarization within Israeli society.
2. The new enemies post-Oslo were the Israeli right-wing parliamentary opposition, the right-wing public, the religious and settlers who, together with Hamas, were identified as enemies of peace (see Tables 18 and 19).

Israeli society traditionally enjoyed a high degree of consensus based on social and cultural values constructed around security issues. Paradoxically, the 'imagined peace process' of Oslo divided Israeli society politically, ideologically and psychologically. According to Roach (1993), the culture of a nation indicates whether values promote militarism. He also stresses that although mass media, intertwined with culture, plays an important role in virtually all areas of modern life, it is particularly significant during wars and conflicts. The news discourse analysis in my study confirms that Israel entered the era of a culturally divided society (Peri, 1998).

Journalists who participate in news production may encounter dissonance between the professional news values and their personal socio-political perceptions. Van Dijk (1988) asserts that this affects their knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, goals, plans or ideologies, all of which are also partly shared by professional or wider social groups. The post-Oslo news discourse conveyed the impression of an endless and repeated drama involving topics and actors that were familiar and understood by readers.

The topics and actors selected as newsworthy for the security, peace and political discourses' news values reflected specific cultural codes. Hence, the power of government actors was reproduced and confirmed by the news discourse, on one hand, and familiarity, on the other hand. Thus, inherent messages were characterized by relevancy of the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, actions, personalization and results which are values used by story-tellers (Bird and Dardenne, 1988).

Media scholars (Giltin, 1980, Gamson, 1992) argue that news values are constructed by attributes of polarization, marginalization and trivialization. I suggest that news values characterize the 'empty space' between two polarities from which
marginalization and trivialization are derived. News values do not allow for the nuances of a linear political process.

The search for resolutions to the threat of Palestinian terror created dilemmas within Israel over the effectiveness of political or military responses, and deepened the split between the concept of ‘Greater Israel’ or ‘land for peace’. The conceptual gap between them remained empty. The beliefs, stereotypes and images of security and peace remained imprinted on Israeli Jews by past and present experience and perceptions. Consequently, security and peace values were channeled into the political conceptualization of cultural and social practice.

Through news discourse we can learn about values and symbols that have meaning in a given culture. This realization changes the notion of an objective representation of reality through news discourse to that of news as discourse. Ultimately, the reality as informed by the security, peace and political news discourses transformed political and ideological disputes. Therefore, the news outlined a discourse about reality, not reality itself.

It should be stressed that the news media discourse post-Oslo presented Israeli national identity as split between two elements: a ‘Jewish’ identity that possessed a messianic-security ethos versus an ‘Israeli’ identity characterized by a democratic-peace ethos. These were not only mutually antagonistic; the gulf between them precluded any form of communication between their ideologies and discourses. In fact, if culture is understood as “knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs and habits acquired by members of a society” (Roach 1993:4), they could be seen as embodying different cultures.

Ultimately, the transitional period under review entailed more than diplomatic initiatives stereotyped by news discourse. The media presented the lack of dialogue between peace and security which were represented in terms of conflicts between security and peace, and between left- and right-wing political stereotypes in Israel.
My thesis shows that the security, peace and politics discourses that existed in the Israeli media and in political institutions were activated by ideological conflicts. These discourses bestowed legitimacy on different domestic and foreign groups, defining them as allies and enemies, ‘us’ and ‘them’ according to their ideologies.

Changes in discourse occur when there is a break in historical narrative. Such was the case of the Oslo peace process, which signified a historic change for Jews and Arabs. Changes in discourse that took place between the pre- and post-Oslo periods, led by government policy, influenced the news structure and the news as discourse. Representations of shifts in socio-political relations evidently influence language-in-use which is likely to alter perceptions, as reflected in the news ‘reality’. Such changes in representation therefore carry ideological significance.

The news discourse ‘reality’ after Oslo presented the conflicts between those fighting for peace and those fighting against it. Between these two polarities, a space was created which was filled with a discourse of abstract fear and anger, as well as historical political and cultural symbols. The war over the occupied territories was perceived as a struggle against external enemies from ‘there’ and local enemies from ‘home’. As a result, the collective consciousness and national identity was ‘privatized’ between a Jewish collective and an Israeli collective.

The political discourse and the news discourse subsequently formed a coalition, translated into ideological solidarity between both newspapers, which, together, were read by a total 66% of the Israeli population (see Chapter 5). The conflicted domestic discourse as reflected through the news discourse analysis conveyed the message, which transpired to be the absolute reality: the internal conflict discourse defeated the war on peace discourses. Ultimately, it lost the battle. Thus peace seems today as far as far can be. This confirms Azar and Cohen’s (1979) definition of “peace as crisis and war as status quo” (Azar and Cohen, 1979: 159).

My research suggests that news media discourse tells the public about the dissonance of the political agenda that prevails at a given time. Traditional assumptions about
the relation between news media discourse and public discourse, and the issue of agenda setting, in particular, require further investigation. This, I suggest, could be conducted in future by an audience study.

Additional news discourse research should be conducted on political and ideological changes in the news media of other western countries for comparative and cross-cultural news discourse studies. Furthermore, in future, I would like to undertake a joint research project, together with a Palestinian counterpart, in order to examine changes in the news discourse in the Palestinian news media. This kind of cross-cultural study would not only cast further light on the relations between media and politics in the context of shifting policies in the Middle East, but would also improve the understanding of peace between two adversaries.
Appendices
APPENDIX 1

Coding Schedule

1. Newspaper
   (1) Yedioth Ahronoth
   (2) Ha'aretz

2. Date (day, month, year) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 2-7

3. Item Serial No. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 8-11

4. Position within pages (one location) [ ] 12
   (1) Main topic of front page
   (2) Top of front page
   (3) Middle of front page
   (4) Bottom of front page
   (5) Inside front page
   (6) Main topic on front page with inside continuation
   (7) Inside front page with continuation

5. Measure of article (calculated by 8 parts of a page) [ ] 13
   (1) 1/8 page
   (2) 2/8 page (1/4 page)
   (3) 3/8 page
   (4) 4/8 page (1/2 page)
   (5) 5/8 page
   (6) 6/8 page (3/4 page)
   (7) 7/8 page
   (8) 1 page or more

6. Additional material relating to the article (one) [ ] 14
   (1) Picture/s
   (2) Tables
   (3) Maps
   (4) Diagrams
   (5) No additional material

7. Does the headline/article include quoted statement of government officials? [ ] 15
   (1) Yes
   (2) No
8. **Type of article** (one type) 16
   (1) News
   (2) Picture
   (3) Commentary
   (4) Public opinion poll
   (5) Headline only
   (6) Reaction/issue of the day

9. **News Author** 17-18
   (1) Political/parliamentary/parties correspondents
   (2) Military correspondent
   (3) Territories/security/policie/Palestinian/Arab affairs/ correspondents
   (4) Newspaper reporter (without specific definition)
   (5) Joint correspondents
   (6) Israeli news agency (ITIM)
   (7) Foreign news agencies
   (8) Palestinian media
   (9) Media of Arab country
   (10) Israeli media
   (11) Newspaper reporters abroad
   (12) Identity unknown

10. **Actor/Actors** (quoted, interviewed or mentioned) 19-20
    (A) **Domestic Actor/Actors** (up to two)
    (1) Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
    (2) Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
    (3) Prime Minister Shimon Peres
    (4) Military/political/government/security/senior figures
    (5) Other ministers
    (6) Other coalition MKs
    (7) IDF chief of staff
    (8) Military officials
    (9) Police/intelligence/security officials
    (10) Leader of parliamentary opposition
    (11) Other opposition MKS
    (12) Pressure groups (left-wing)
    (13) Pressure groups (settlers)
    (14) Religious groups
    (15) Right-wing demonstrators
    (16) Soldiers
    (17) Israeli general public
    (18) Israeli delegation for peace talks
    (19) Israeli government
(B) Foreign Actor/Actors (up to two)  [ ][ ][ ] 23-24
[ ][ ][ ] 25-26

(1) Yasser Arafat
(2) PLO officials/seniors
(3) Local Palestinian leadership
(4) Hamas terrorists
(5) King Hussein of Jordan / senior Jordanian ministers
(6) President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt / senior Egyptian ministers
(7) President Hafez al-Assad of Syria / senior Syrian ministers
(8) Leaders of other Arab countries
(9) Foreign ministers of Arab countries
(10) US President Bill Clinton
(11) Other US government officials
(12) Prime Minister John Major of Britain
(13) United Nations
(14) Other prime ministers/presidents
(15) Jewish / Israeli organizations abroad
(16) Other terrorists (excluding Hamas)
(17) Palestinian delegation for peace talks
(18) Palestine Liberation Organization
(19) Arab factors (not Palestinians)
(20) Hamas prisoners
(21) Palestinian police
(22) Palestinian Authority
(23) Palestinian general public (West Bank and Gaza)

11. Topics (one primary and one secondary)

Primary topic [ ][ ] 27-28
Secondary topic [ ][ ] 29-30

(A) Peace Topics
(1) Peace talks/process
(2) Bilateral talks
(3) Multilateral talks
(4) Secret channels relating to ‘Oslo’
(5) Oslo accords/Declaration of Principles (DOP)
(6) Cairo/Gaza-Jericho agreement
(7) Autonomy agreement / Self-governing agreement
(8) Peace ceremonies
(9) Nobel / UNESCO Prize for Peace
(10) Peace with Jordan
(11) Peace negotiations with Syria
(12) Peace talks with Egypt
(13) Benefits related to peace
(14) Dangers related to peace
(15) US mediation in the peace process
(16) Support from Gulf states and other Muslim countries for peace process
(17) Support from European countries for peace process
(B) Armed Forces Topics
(18) Security arrangements relating to peace and security
(19) Withdrawal from the occupied territories
(20) National security
(21) Police activities relating to peace and security
(22) Ongoing IDF activities
(23) IDF operations against Hamas
(24) Hamas prisoner release

(C) Political Topics
(26) Domestic politics
(27) Foreign politics
(28) Government activities relating to peace and security
(29) Political stability/instability relating to peace and security
(30) Parliamentary opposition activities/reactions against peace process
(31) Right wing opposition to peace process with the PLO
(32) Religious groups' rejection of peace process with the PLO
(33) Settlers rejection of peace process with the PLO
(34) Political opportunities relating to peace
(35) Israeli demonstrations against peace process with the PLO
(36) Palestinian demonstrations against the peace process
(37) Violence by Israelis against Palestinians
(38) Media/political criticism of the Oslo accords
(39) Political negotiations with the PLO
(40) Public opinion polls / Public referenda
(41) Bereaved families
(42) Demonstrations in support of peace with the PLO

(D) Terrorism Topics
(44) Terrorist attacks against civilians
(45) Terrorist operations against soldiers
(46) Palestinian casualties
(47) Hamas activities
(48) Hizballah attacks against Israel
(49) Threats to personal security
(50) Opposition response to terrorism
(51) Government responses to terrorism
(52) Capture of terrorists
(53) Violent protest actions of Israelis relating to security
(54) Israeli violence against Palestinians
(55) Terrorist attacks against Jews/Israelis abroad
(56) Deportation of Hamas terrorists
(57) Israeli casualties and funerals
(58) Palestinian casualties and funerals
(F) Economic topics (in context with Oslo)
(59) Co-operation between Israel and the Arab countries
(60) New Middle East'
(61) New projects and international investments
(62) Economic dangers relating to peace with the PLO
(63) Economic benefits relating to peace with the PLO
(64) International conferences relating to Oslo peace process
(65) Economic sanctions - closure of territories
(66) Economic relations with Muslim states relating to Oslo
(67) Economic solutions for refugees
(68) Economic activities of the PLO in Gaza and Jericho
(69) Normalization of economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians
APPENDIX 2

Additional Data derived from the Study

1. Position of Article Within Pages (one location)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>10.8 %</td>
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<tr>
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2. Measurement of Article (calculated by 8 parts of a page)

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## 5. News Authors

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<td>Foreign news agencies</td>
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<td>Newspaper reporters abroad</td>
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## 6. Pictures

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