The Power of Influence
Human Rights Organisations and Political Mobilisation in Nigeria (1990-1999)

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester

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August 2003
This study examines the impact of human rights in the democratisation process in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. It looks at how human rights organisations influenced domestic politics. It discusses the influence of international human rights networking and the role of local context in mediating the global influence of human rights in Nigeria. It used as a case study, the Civil Liberties Organisation, the first local human rights organisation in Nigeria.

Through a combination of theoretical insights from democratisation, globalisation and media construction of politics, the study developed analytical tools used to examine how human rights organisations influenced democratisation in Nigeria. The study also used a combination of methods within the qualitative research approach to collect primary data.

The findings from this study indicate that instead of a one-way (north-south) perspective of looking at globalisation of democracy, a two-way context based analysis of organisation’s network offers a useful insight into local responses to globalisation. Hence, putting globalisation processes in the context of local responses will provide a better understanding of the dynamics and tensions underlying political and power processes within and across national boundaries.
DEDICATION

To God Almighty, for the gifts of life and good health

To my Supervisor, nobody understands this better than you and the best anybody could ever hope for in doctoral supervision

To my parents, for their love and prayers

To my wife and the little gems that came from the relationship, for your love and understanding
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is long in the making. It started life about thirteen years ago when as a graduate from the University of Lagos, Nigeria; I had to move into uncharted waters of human rights struggle in Nigeria. As a fresh graduate, I had planned to start a career as a public relations or advertising professional having specialised in the two areas at the University of Lagos. However, the mandatory one year national youth service programme, which saw me posted to the first human rights organisation in Nigeria, the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), changed my plans.

At different moments in my study, Dr Gillian Youngs, Dr Nana Poku, Mr Anders Hansen and Mr Roger Dickinson offered valuable academic insights that improved my understanding of the issues dealt with in this study.

My profound gratitude goes to Mr A.O. Raji (now deceased) who convinced me, that fateful afternoon, of the need to sometimes put ones plans in abeyance for higher goals of service to humanity. My gratitude also goes to Mr AA Abdussalam for the immense support in the early years and throughout the highly eventful years with the human rights movement in Nigeria.

At several times my colleagues at the Civil Liberties Organisation and in the human rights movements in Nigeria were of tremendous assistance. My gratitude goes to Olisa Agbakoba SAN, Ayo Obe, Abdul Oroh, Anselm Odinkalu, Chima Ubani and several other colleagues I’m constrained by space to mention here. To my colleagues at the Centre for Free Speech, Richard Akinnola, Tunde Akanni, Tunde Olugboji, Tunde Olakunle, Kola Olaniyan and Iyabo Soyebo many thanks.

Finally to my friends, M Kadri, S. Olagunju, K Omoteso, Bolaji Abdullah, Kayode Ogunbunmi, Waziri Adio; my brothers and sisters: Mrs Adedeji, Dr A. Ibraheem, A Ibraheem, Dr (Ms) M. Ibraheem and my wife and children, once again many thanks, from you, I derived a lot of strength and inspiration.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABN  Association for Better Nigeria
ADGN  Association for Democracy and Good Governance
AFRC  Armed Forces Ruling Council
AFRONET  African Human Rights Network
AG  Action Group
ANA  Association of Nigerian Authors
ASUU  Academic Staff Union of Universities
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BON  Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria
CAN  Christian Association of Nigeria
CAPP  Community Action for Popular Participation
CD  Campaign for Democracy
CDHR  Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
CDS  Centre for Democratic Studies
CECEDEV  Centre for Civic Education and Development
CFS  Centre for Free Speech
CLEEN  Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
CLO  Civil Liberties Organisation
CP  Concerned Professionals
CRC  Constitution Review Committee
CRP  Constitutional Rights Project
DA  Democratic Alternative
ECA  Economic Commission for Africa
ERA  Environmental Rights Action
EU  European Union
FIDH  International Federation of Human Rights
GFSA  Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association
HRA  Human Rights Africa
HRL  Human Rights League
HRW  Human Rights Watch
HURILAWS  Human Rights Law Service
ICJ  International Commission of Jurists
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>IHRHL</td>
<td>Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRLG</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ING</td>
<td>Interim National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>JACON</td>
<td>Joint Action Committee on Nigeria</td>
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<td>JODER</td>
<td>Journalists’ for Democratic Rights</td>
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<td>JOHR</td>
<td>Journalists’ Outreach for Human Rights</td>
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<td>LANE</td>
<td>Legal Assistance Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Legal Resources Consortium</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAMSER</td>
<td>Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Reconstruction</td>
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<td>MAN</td>
<td>Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>MNR</td>
<td>Movement for National Reformation</td>
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<td>MNUD</td>
<td>Movement for National Unity and Democracy</td>
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<td>MOSOP</td>
<td>Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People</td>
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<td>MRA</td>
<td>Media Rights Agenda</td>
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<td>NADECO</td>
<td>National Democratic Coalition</td>
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<td>NADL</td>
<td>National Association of Democratic Lawyers</td>
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<td>NALICON</td>
<td>National Liberation Council of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NAN</td>
<td>News Agency of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NANS</td>
<td>National Association of Nigerian Students’</td>
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<td>NAWOJ</td>
<td>National Association of Women Journalists’</td>
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<td>NBA</td>
<td>Nigerian Bar Association</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nigerian Broadcasting Commission</td>
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<td>NCF</td>
<td>National Consultative Forum</td>
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<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigerian Citizens</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Conscience Party</td>
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<td>NDSC</td>
<td>National Defence and Security Council</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>NECON</td>
<td>National Electoral Commission of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union</td>
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<td>NGE</td>
<td>Nigerian Guild of Editors</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Labour Congress</td>
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<td>NMA</td>
<td>Nigerian Medical Association</td>
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<td>NNNDP</td>
<td>Nigerian National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NPAN</td>
<td>Newspaper Proprietors' of Nigeria</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>Nigerian Press Council</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nigerian Republican Convention</td>
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<td>NSCIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs</td>
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<td>NTA</td>
<td>Nigerian Television Authority</td>
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<td>NUJ</td>
<td>Nigerian Union of Journalists</td>
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<td>NUPENG</td>
<td>National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PENGASSAN</td>
<td>Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>Penal Reform International</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
<td>Social Advocacy Organisation</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SERAC</td>
<td>Social and Economic Rights Action</td>
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<td>SRI</td>
<td>Shelter Rights Initiative</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Transition Council</td>
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<td>TMG</td>
<td>Transition Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>TNAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Networks</td>
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<td>UAD</td>
<td>United Action for Democracy</td>
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<td>UDFN</td>
<td>United Democratic Front of Nigeria</td>
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<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Human Rights</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
<td>Women In Nigeria</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>ZIBF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe International Book Fair</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Background

Since the late 1940s, when the regional system of government was introduced, ethnic considerations have had a significant influence on political mobilisation in Nigeria. The main political parties prior to independence had strong roots in the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria. These were the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the North, the Action Group (AG) in the West and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). After independence, up till the time of the first military intervention in 1966, the three political parties were dominant in Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war, fought between one of the regions (East) and the central government also highlighted the strong influence of ethnic pull in Nigerian politics (Sklar, 1963; Mackintosh 1966; Dudley 1974; Oyediran 1981).

The second attempt at democratic government in 1979 produced five main political parties, but the pattern of dominant political parties with strong following among the three large ethnic groups was repeated. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was the dominant party in the North; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was dominant in the West, while the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) was dominant in the East. This pattern continued until the military intervention of December 31st 1983, which marked the end of the second attempt at democratic government in Nigeria.

From the time of the struggle for independence, right through the late 1980s when the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida introduced another democratic transition programme, ethnic considerations had a very strong influence on political mobilisation in Nigeria. Although other factors such as religion, resource distribution and minority question had at different times influenced the pattern of mobilisation, ethnic and religious factors remained the most important influence.

One common thread that runs through all the factors identified above is the question of political domination. Before the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the three dominant ethnic groups existed as independent entities, with different systems of government (the Hausas and Fulanis in the North, the Yorubas in the West, and the
Igbos in the East). Beside these three groups, there were more than three hundred other ethnic groups that existed either as independent entities or part of one of the three largest ethnic groups before the 1914 amalgamation.

The amalgamation of Nigeria and the adoption of democratic form of government privileged groups with large populations above others. Hence, the struggle for power and control in the country had been dominated by the three main groups (Hausa-Fulans, Yorubas and the Igbos) since the founding of the country in 1914. Irrespective of the government (military or democratic) at the helm at any particular time, there were always agitations over marginalisation and domination by any of the groups that was not in control of the leadership. Hence, the issue of political domination and how to balance power became an important part of political arrangements in the country and key to processes of democratisation.

Under both democratic and military governments, political arrangements such as federal system of government, equitable distribution of resources, federal character (equal access to employment), state creation and constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, were tried to assuage feelings of political domination. From the late 1980s, but more pronounced from 1990, human rights organisations entered the fray of political mobilisation in Nigeria. Using international documents that contained universally agreed human rights principles such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and with an international environment conducive to transnational human rights campaigns; human rights have played an important but largely under-researched role in political mobilisation in Nigeria since 1990. To underscore the importance of human rights in political mobilisation in Nigeria, Human Rights Watch (HRW) Africa an international human rights organisation, introduced a Nigeria section into its annual human rights report from 1990.

The use of human rights as a basis of political mobilisation was prefaced by the adoption of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspired Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1985. This changed the context of political mobilisation in Nigeria. While ethnicity and religion still provide undercurrents for political agitations, the issue of good governance and the deteriorating standard of living provided a new basis on which people could mobilise. This was creatively and
amply exploited by human rights organisations active in Nigeria, as will be explained later.

This study, therefore, examines the struggle for democratisation in Nigeria and the role of human rights networks in the process. Human rights provisions were incorporated into the 1960 Nigerian constitution and all subsequent constitutions as a form of protection for the minorities against domination by the majority (Akande, 1997). However, human rights did not figure as a weapon for political or democratic struggle until the beginning of 1990s. Hence, this study will examine the role of human rights organisations in political mobilisation and democratisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999.

The role of transnational human rights networks has been a subject of recent academic debates (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b; Rise et al. 1999; McCarthy 1997; Smith et al. 1997; Porta and Kriesi 1999; Kriesberg 1997; Cohen and Rai 2000). However, while attention has been paid to the role of international opportunity structures that empower local groups and individuals that are locally disempowered, adequate attention has not been paid to the overall impact of this development on domestic politics and democratisation. As argued by Schmitz (1999) international contacts cannot substitute for the development of a solid domestic political following. Hence, it is important to examine how human rights mobilisation shaped the democratic transition in Nigeria and the role of human rights organisations in mediating the power struggle among the different ethnic groups in the country.

Human rights are used to describe the process of political empowerment through human rights non-governmental organisations. In addition to the roles of religion and ethnicity in Nigerian politics, the role of human rights organisations in political mobilisation offers a unique and refreshing dimension to the history of democratisation in Nigeria.

Rationale of Study
Before 1990, human rights were invoked in Nigeria in two different ways. In the first instance, they were invoked by Nigeria as a member of the countries that lie in the southern hemisphere (South) against economic and cultural domination by the
countries in the northern hemisphere (North). Thus, Nigeria was very active in the north-south debates about the new world economic order and new world information and communication order championed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Commission (UNESCO). In the second instance, human rights were invoked as a protection for minority groups and individuals whose basic rights had been violated as enshrined in the Nigerian constitution.

However, from 1990 human rights became an important subject around which those who were opposed to military government mobilised. For example, the April 22 1990 unsuccessful violent attempt to effect a change in the leadership of the country was predicated on “the need to stop intrigues, domination and eternal colonisation of the Nigeria state by the so-called chosen few as well as the need to lay egalitarian foundation for the democratic take-off of Nigerians States” (Orkar, 1990: 99). In the same year, the Ogoni Bill of Rights (detailing the violations of the human rights of Ogoni people by the Nigerian government) was published. A number of international activities were organised around the Ogoni campaign. It was also in 1990 that human rights and pro-democracy organisations in Nigeria first came together under the banner of National Consultative Forum (NCF) to challenge the military government by proposing to organise a national conference to address the problems with the Nigerian state. This process later gave birth to a number of pro-democracy and human rights movements such as the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) initiative that led to the establishment of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) in 1992. Therefore, from 1990, human rights as a subject assumed a dynamic dimension in Nigerian politics.

At the same time, transnational actions by other human rights groups on behalf of local human rights organisations heightened all over the world but especially between Western-based NGOs and their partners in the South. According to Smith et al. (1999) this was possible because of regular communication that made it easier for organisations and activists to be able to share technical and strategic information, coordinate parallel activities, or even to mount transnational collective action. As mentioned earlier, this development is typified by the introduction of an annual report on human rights situation in Nigeria by HRW Africa from 1990.
This development also changed the context of human rights and democratisation in Nigeria. The state-centric, north-south debate about economic and cultural marginalisation gave way to debates about state respect for international norms and voluntarily ratified international documents. A new north-south relationship emerged between local human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) -which are, in most cases based in the Southern hemisphere- and international human rights NGOs-which are, in most cases based in the Northern hemisphere. This development had an impact on local organising and on the kind of issues that were raised in the context of democratisation locally. Hence, this study focuses on the impact of this development on political mobilisation in Nigeria from 1990.

Research Questions

The main themes of this study were organised into three research questions as follows:

Research Question 1: To what extent did the international environment influence the use of human rights in political mobilisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999? I approached this question by exploring three different approaches to democratisation. These are modernisation, transition and structural approaches. The approaches were examined in relation to the political history of Nigeria and the factors that have shaped political development in the country since 1914.

Research Question 2: What is the impact of human rights organisations on local political pressures and mobilisation in Nigeria? I approached this question by examining theoretical arguments about the role of human rights advocacy in international and domestic politics. The theoretical arguments were examined in relation to the role of a local human rights NGO, the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) in political mobilisation in Nigeria. The way the CLO mobilised and put resources into political use between 1990 and 1999 was analysed.

Research Question 3: How did human rights NGOs and activists carry out human rights campaigns within the constraints of context and existing political structure? I answered this question through a theoretical and empirical analysis of the role of the mass media and powerful institutions such as international
organisations and states in the effectiveness of human rights NGOs campaigns for democratisation in Nigeria.

**Organisation of Chapters**

**Chapter One:** This chapter discusses the theoretical framework used for the study. It examines three approaches to democratisation. These are the modernisation, transition and structural approaches. The chapter also examines the debates in respect of the three different approaches in the light of globalisation pressures, especially as they bear on human rights advocacy and transnational human rights networks. The chapter also examines debates bordering on media and social construction of politics.

**Chapter Two:** This chapter examines the context of the study. It looks at the history of Nigeria and the various factors that have shaped the politics of the country from 1914 when it came into existence. The chapter examines the history of Nigeria from the perspective of power play and the struggle against domination by different groups that made up Nigeria. The chapter argues that whether it is a military government or civilian democratic government, the issue of control and domination lies at the heart of all the struggles for and against democracy in Nigeria. It also examines the influence of human rights in political mobilisation since 1990.

**Chapter Three:** This chapter discusses the methods used to collect and analyse data. This study uses a range of methods within the qualitative approach to collect data. These are case study, participant reflexivity as well as framing and discourse analysis.

**Chapter Four:** This chapter reports the first findings of the study. It examines how the CLO used human rights to build a support base both locally and globally. The chapter explores how universal values of human rights made it possible for CLO to be embedded in powerful networks of power, locally and globally. This chapter also examines the impact of networks through an examination of select campaigns for democracy in Nigeria. The chapter contrasts two domestic campaigns with two international campaigns involving the networks initiated by the CLO. The chapter argues that domestic factors influence the composition of networks and the kind of issues domestic networks campaign on. The chapter also examines how interests of states influence the effectiveness of transnational networks and the kind of issues that
are pushed through by these networks. While domestic campaigns highlight the importance of the domestic environment to global homogenisation, international campaigns highlight the importance of states in international relations in spite of the debates about the decline of state powers. Finally, the chapter maps a participant reflection of the contours of human rights advocacy in Nigeria.

**Chapter Five:** This chapter examines human rights framing activities of the CLO and its impact in a mainstream print media, *The Guardian* newspaper. The findings indicate that the CLO framed democratisation in a way that was different from the official transition to democracy programmes of different governments in Nigeria between the period of 1990 and 1999 covered by this research. The findings also show that the mainstream mass media, through re-echoing the arguments contained in the CLO publications and through issues and groups that were legitimated in the discourse, were influenced by the CLO. However, the chapter also argues that ownership and professional interests might also be some of the factors responsible for this situation.

**Chapter Six:** This chapter synthesises the main points of the study and draws some conclusions. The chapter also discusses the contribution of this study to knowledge as well as its limitations.
CHAPTER ONE

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATISATION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter discusses theoretical frameworks relevant for analysing the role of human rights in the process of democratisation. The role of human rights in democracy advocacy is a recent addition to the more established theoretical debates on democracy and democratisation (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1991; Huntington 1991; Held 1993, 1996). In the new but growing debates on the influence of human rights networks, both domestic and international, democratisation came up as the area where human rights have had a considerable influence (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b; Risse and Sikkink 1999; McCarthy 1997; Smith et. al 1997; Porta and Kriesi 1999). Therefore, I will draw on frameworks from democratisation, globalisation and the role of media in politics to discuss the role of networks in human rights and democracy advocacy.

Democratisation Frameworks

I will be discussing democratisation theory in the context of contemporary experience of domestic and transnational human rights networks’ activities in Nigeria. As Whitehead (2002) pointed out, context matters when attempting to pin down the applicability of democracy in a very wide range of historical, cultural, and social contexts where it is currently being employed.

Relevant for this study, therefore, are conceptualisations of democracy that emphasise the process that bring about the successful introduction of democracy in a country. Among many different frameworks for democratisation (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1991; Huntington 1991; Held 1993, 1996, Linz and Stepan, 1996), I found Potter (1997) three analytical approaches useful for discussing the process of democratisation. The three analytical frameworks are modernisation, transition and structural perspectives. While the three frameworks are not mutually exclusive, they could help to explain the context and the process of democratisation in developing countries such as Nigeria.
Modernisation Framework

The first framework is the modernisation approach. This approach emphasises a number of social and economic prerequisites necessary for successful democratisation. Under this approach, democratisation is tied to the level of economic development of a country. In countries with very high levels of socio-economic development, it is argued that there is a prospect of democracy and democratic consolidation. On the other hand, there is little prospect for democracy in countries at very low levels of socio-economic development. Therefore, most countries at a high level of socio-economic development are democracies, while countries at a low level of socio-economic development are not democracies (Lipset, 1960; Potter 1997).

The modernisation perspective also emphasises the role of socio-economic development in urban concentration of people and the implication this has for the development of civil society and democratisation. Socio-economic development contributes to the growth of civil society throughout the world by physically concentrating people into more populous areas of residence while at the same time dispersing them into wider, more diverse networks of interaction decentralising control over information and increasing alternative sources of information and dispersing literacy, knowledge, income and other organisational resources across wider segments of the population thereby increasing the potential for protests that can challenge authoritarian regimes (Castells, 1986; Diamond, 1992).

In respect of democratisation in Africa this perspective is inadequate. The process of democratisation in Africa, especially after the collapse of communism, has been attributed, largely, to the role of international actors. Leftwich (1995) explored this idea in a discussion of the role of institutions such as World Bank and IMF in the democratisation process in developing countries. Leftwich (1995) argues that the growing concern about the institutionalisation of democracy and processes of democratisation in developing countries (Africa inclusive) has been influenced by four factors, all political and mostly external to the affected countries. One of these is the legitimacy of conditionality as an instrument of policy, whereby international institutions, but especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, have developed ‘structural adjustment’ packages which aimed to curtail the power of the state and support deregulation, privatisation and the growth of market
economies. Democratic electoral politics were seen as a way of controlling vested interests and limiting the power of states. A second is the ascendancy of neo-conservative or neo-liberal theories and ideologies of political economy in the West, which not only extol the virtues of individual personal freedom, rights and liberties, but also hold that political liberalisation compels a government to be more accountable, less corrupt and more efficient in terms of development. Third is that the collapse of communism provided evidential support for this general orientation, and led to the massive movement post-1991 to rebuild Eastern European economies as both market economies but also as politically liberal and pluralist democracies. Last is the growth of real and popular democratic pressures inside many developing countries from the 1980s onwards. Ake (1995) and Joseph (1991) posted similar arguments in their explanations of the forces that shaped democratisation in Africa from the 1990s.

There has also been a near unanimity of opinion among African scholars and Africanist western scholars (such as Joseph 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Bayart 1993; Wiseman 1995, 1996, 1997) that the process of democratisation that took shape in many African countries from the mid 1980s happened in the midst of significant social and economic dislocations occasioned by the structural adjustment programmes adopted by most of the countries in Africa because of international pressures. Nigerian scholars such as Ake (1995) and Achebe (1999) questioned the acceptance of externally inspired democratic reforms in Africa within the context of disempowerment or large scale violation of the social, economic and cultural rights of many of the citizens due to IMF/World Bank imposed conditions and colonial legacy.

The widespread adoption of the structural adjustment programme by African governments from the mid-1980s unleashed significant suffering on the people and a decline in their social and economic well-being. Therefore, on the one hand, internal pressures due to social and economic tensions contributed to the democratisation processes. While discussing the relative importance of external and internal pressures for democratisation, Wiseman (1997) stressed that internal pressures have played the more important role in persuading authoritarian rulers and governments in Africa to restructure the political system along more democratic lines. Wiseman (1997) also identified, churches, trade unions, professional organisations, democracy and human
rights activists as well as the mass media as playing important roles in the transformation.

In many countries in Africa, religious organisations and their leaders played a prominent role in applying pressure for democratisation. Even in the period prior to introduction of SAP in some of the African countries, religious organisations often provided a critical voice in relation to authoritarian rule and were able to retain a degree of autonomy often denied to other societal groups. In some African countries such as Nigeria, popular respect for religious leaders gave them a status and influence which regimes found difficult to ignore. The international connections of religious organisation had a significant influence in this regard. Therefore, religious organisations played a very significant role in exerting pressure for democratisation in a large number of African states (Huntington, 1991; Gifford, 1995).

Another important component in the pressure for democratisation in Africa has been the role of the indigenous independent media, especially the print media. Pro-democracy newspapers and magazines help to create an opening up of political space and then exploited such openings to exert further pressure on authoritarian regimes (Wiseman, 1997). This role drew an historical parallel from the prominent role played by journalists in the struggle for independence in many African countries. Some of the nationalist leaders were also newspaper publishers and editors as will be discussed in respect of Nigeria.

Therefore, in view of the adoption of SAP by Nigeria from 1986 and the low level of socio-economic development between 1990 and 1999, other levels of analysis in addition to modernisation are necessary to understand the process of democratisation in Nigeria. The social impact of SAP and the growing vocalisation of opposition especially among civil society organisations and human rights groups will be discussed in chapter two.

**Transition Framework**

The second approach is the transition approach. The transition approach usually entails looking at democratisation as movement from one stage (usually authoritarian government) to another (democratic government). Potter (1997) also suggested that
the transition approach emphasises political processes and elite initiatives and choices that account for moves from authoritarian rule to democracy (Potter 1997). Useful as the transition approach is, however, the focus on the state as the only legitimate basis for democracy failed to take account of the growing challenges to the territorially bound concept of democracy in the literatures (Hirst 1993; Held 1996).

The idea of democracy as being restricted within the boundaries of nation states has been challenged by studies using globalisation processes to analyse democratisation. The process of globalisation has engendered power shift from the state to institutions above it. Hence, governments and international institutions such as European Union (EU), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN) etc, are coming together to form new centres of authority that limit the authority of national governments (Strange 1988; Held 1996).

Held (1996) further emphasised that states are also constrained by a growing number of international principles, rules, norms and institutions, and by the fact that, in an interdependent world even the powerful rely on co-operative arrangements that restrict their power and give influence to others. Therefore, the processes of regional integration, international treaties, international bodies and supranational institutions are constraining the effectiveness of states. Held (1996) also suggested that the very efficacy of democracy as a national form or political organisation is being questioned in the face of globalising tendencies of capitalism and new information technology which produce instabilities and difficulties within states and between states which is beyond the control of any single state.

The idea of a power shift to institutions and organisations below the state and its implication for democratic governance within states was also explored by Hirst (1993) and Cohen and Rogers (1995). They both suggested an associative basis for democracy. This involved the participation of organisations and other citizen-oriented organisations in democratic governance. At the global level, Falk (1994) considered the role of these organisations in democratisation and globalisation from below.
Hence, based on this development, it is possible to conceptualise democracy beyond the activities of elite actors working within politically and geographically contained space. It could be argued that it is no longer adequate to conceptualise democracy as territorially-bound in a way that the transition approach envisages. The nation state is now increasingly one "power-container" among many possible power brokers (Cohen and Rai, 2000). Isin and Wood (1999) also stressed that the two sovereignties of modernity—the state and the individual—are challenged by the rising claims for group rights. The rise of new classes, the new identities they form and the new spaces they foster challenge the sovereignty of the modern nation-state in a novel way.

Hence, Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996) also contends that something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete. At the same time, it has enabled the creation of new forms of community, solidarity and identity that do not rest on any clear-cut sense of geographically bound space. What has emerged instead is the opening up of a new embryonic global public sphere that provides a new space and voice to social movements, non-state actors, global citizens, international organisations and states (Rai and Cohen, 2000).

However, in spite of the growing importance of international, transnational and supranational factors challenging their authority, states are still the principal actors in international relations. Porta et al (1999) suggested that in respect of international politics, national political context is an important filter, which conditions the impact of international change on domestic politics. Therefore, national political institutions and national political coalitions are still important platform of political mobilisation. They shape in different ways the issues on which people mobilise, the ways in which they organise and act, and the outcomes their mobilisations are likely to have. For instance, the success of political mobilisation of human rights networks depends to a significant extent on support from sympathetic and powerful states as well as the voluntary ratification of international treaties by human rights violating states.

However, the changing global context does have significant consequences for mobilisation within domestic and national contexts. Sreberny (1998) also engaged
with the debates on the growing interdependence by focussing on the universalisation of values and localisation of actions. This refers to groups such as human rights, women, environmental and minority groups organising themselves under the banner of universal values and taking actions locally to challenge marginalisation. Both the global and domestic contexts are important in the articulation of politics. Therefore, instead of emphasising one at the expense of the other, it is important to consider the interdependence of both.

One area where this has been developed properly is the concept of global citizenship. Falk (1994) traces the concept of global citizenship to the emergence of transnational activism that started to become very important for social movements during the 1980s. In the environmental area and with respect to human rights and the women’s movement, activism on a transnational basis became prominent for the first time in history. What this meant was that the real arena of politics was no longer understood as acting in opposition within a particular state, nor the relation of society to the state, but it consisted more and more of acting to promote a certain kind of political consciousness transnationally that could radiate influence in a variety of directions, including bouncing back to the point of origin (Falk, 1994:138). One of the central features of this development is a shared conviction that upholding human rights and building political democracy provide the common underpinning for the types of transnational developments that are desired.

In a position that seems to diverge from Falk’s (1994) Keck and Sikkink (1998a) view transnational civil society as an arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area where “the politics of transnational civil society is centrally about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimised by governments, institutions, and other groups” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 34). It is thus a complex web of advocacy action involving a range of activities across many geographical areas such as local-national, local-national-regional, local-transnational-national.

Therefore, in analysing democratisation process in any country, the transition approach, with its emphasis on politics within the boundaries of a state, is inadequate. However, in spite of the limitations of the transition approach to take on board theoretical perspectives challenging state-based conceptualisation of democracy, it is
still useful for discussing democratic transition and the role of political elites, political parties, elections, as well as the use of the mass media for political empowerment and disempowerment in Nigeria.

Structural Framework

The third approach identified by Potter (1997) is the structural approach. This approach emphasises changing structures of power favourable to democratisation. Unlike the transition approach, democratisation processes are explained not by the agency of political elites but primarily by changing structures of power.

The structural approach is generally traced to Moore (1960) who suggested that the basic premise of the structural approach to democratisation is that the particular interrelationships of certain structures of power—economic, social, political—as they gradually change through history provide certain constraints and opportunities that drive political elites and others along a historical trajectory leading towards liberal democracy.

Using this approach, Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) also stressed that whether or not a society moves towards liberal democracy is fundamentally shaped by the balance of class power, and it is the struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes over their right to rule that more than any other factor puts democracy on the historical agenda and decides its prospects. Therefore, for a society to become democratic, the power balance in civil society has to shift. Since the major power resource of many is collective organisation, their chance to organise in association, unions and parties gains critical influence (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992: 71-85). The changing structure and form of state power is fundamental to democratisation because the changing configurations of transnational power can affect class alignments and the changing nature of the state. The structural approach depicts the meaning of democracy as socially constructed and actively negotiated in the struggle for democratisation.

The structural approach could also be used to explain the changing power configurations brought about by transnational networking. Individuals and groups are joining together on different issues to challenge the hegemony of the state. Within the structural approach, this development has thrown up a number of challenges. The
challenge manifests in the struggles against domination by different people and groups across different countries and cultures all over the world. As mentioned earlier, this process has been conceptualised as “politics of democratisation from below”. This happens when individuals and groups engage in an intricate web of relationships of power that are both horizontal and vertical (Falk, 1994). The struggles of the Aboriginal people in Australia and the Native Americans in the USA (Vincent, 1986), protection of indigenous languages in Nigeria (Achebe, 1999), and the struggle by civil society organisations in Africa against authoritarian rules and policies are indicative of how changing structures of power are making new interpretations of democracy possible.

Hence, it could be argued that no one perspective—whether modernisation, transition or structural— is adequate to analyse theoretical and empirical developments in respect of democratisation in Africa. However, I will focus more on the structural approach because I found it more relevant to discussing the emerging role of human rights organisations in political mobilisation and democratisation in Nigeria. I will complement my use of the structural approach with insights from the other two approaches where I find it necessary and useful to do so. Within the structural approach, I will be looking at the role of networks in democratisation. In this study, I will be using the network approach to explore how political structures are constituted (structure), the active negotiation of the structure on the political field (activities of the actors or agency). I will also be looking at how these tensions play out in the media and political discourse in a state such as Nigeria.

**Democratisation: The Network Approach**

Globalisation has been defined as denoting the processes through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors (Beck, 2000). This implies the creation and intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa. This development has made it possible for people, regardless of where they live, to orient themselves to developments happening thousands of miles away (Giddens 1990: 64). Therefore, borders have become less relevant to everyday behaviour in the various dimensions of economics, information,
ecology, technology, cross-cultural conflict and civil society (Castells, 1999; Beck, 2000).

With this development, an increasing number of problems are solved by coordinated activities from the local to the global level. In respect of human rights, this is made possible through the promotion of universally recognized values and principles that are contained in international human rights instruments such as the UDHR, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), similar other regional human rights instruments as well as documents such as the Commonwealth Harare Declaration. Human rights figure prominently in the debates for democratisation often as a vehicle for opening up political spaces and delegitimising regimes. The UDHR provided the basis for the development of human rights principles, which all governments aspire to realise in their various states. It has also provided a basis for action and platform of solidarity for a number of non-state actors.

The end of the Cold War and the sudden attraction of democracy to a number of countries under military or authoritarian regimes in Africa made human rights attractive to peoples and organisations in Africa as a means of opening up political spaces (Diamond, 1995). Therefore organisations whose mandate is the protection of human rights use international commitments of governments in Africa to demand for political reforms and more openness on the part of the government. The activities of human rights NGOs changed the pattern of political mobilisation in Africa. With connections cutting across state boundaries, new spheres of political and international influence were created.

The politics of human rights have also become increasingly internationalised and transnationalised. In the 1990s, states sign and ratify human rights treaties, international organisations monitor rights abuses, and NGOS mobilise campaigns on behalf of the oppressed all over the world. Domestic groups and individuals suffering repression seek political and financial support from international patrons and provide the international community with crucial information on the nature of repression. Human rights groups join hands with philanthropic foundations, concerned individuals, churches, and others to create transnational human rights networks that span the globe (Hawkins, 1996).
The network approach has become a key trope of contemporary social theory (Castells, 1999). By using new information technologies, organisations from both the North and the South were able to come together and build new advocacy communities around particular causes and issues, thereby transforming the meaning of communities as physically and linguistically constrained space. There is a growing body of literatures on the role of human rights networks in democratisation. Some of the emerging literatures identified international and domestic human rights groups and their networking activities as an increasingly influential factor for regime change (Burgerman 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998a, 1998b; Risse and Sikkink 1999). The strategies used by actors whose aim was to challenge human rights violating states by linking the activities of local and international NGOs and international campaign opportunities were particularly emphasised.

The transnational network organised around Chile pioneered activities that are now standard practice for human rights networks. This includes monitoring of state compliance with human rights treaties, making efforts to achieve international condemnation where states are found to be violating those treaties, funding domestic opposition groups and research centres, the use of special rapporteurs, and lobbying powerful Western states to take action. The defining case was in Chile under Pinochet in the early 1970s but the root is usually traced to the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the growth of international NGOs calling governments to live up to the values and principles they signed up to protect in the international human rights covenants (Hawkins, 1996).

Different writers (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b; McCarthy 1997; Kriesberg 1997; Smith et al. 1997; Porta and Kriesi 1999; Cohen and Rai 2000) emphasised different aspects of human rights network. This has fallen, generally, into two broad categories. The first category is resources mobilisation and the structure of human rights networks. The second category is space of action or human rights advocacy activities of human rights organisations. Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) emphasised the role of existing social networks, political opportunity structures, organisational framing, information politics and the boomerang effects of international campaigns. McCarthy (1997) stressed the role of strategic framing processes, activists' identities and
careers, domestic and international mobilising structures, resource mobilisation, political opportunity structure and repertoires of contention. Kriesberg (1997) as well as Cohen and Rai (2000) emphasised the role of converging and diffusing universal values and global social movements’ activities that are facilitating the development of cosmopolitan politics. Smith et al. (1997) as well as Porta and Kriesi (1999) privileged the role of opportunity structures as well as organisational strategies and frames in the development of network approach to democratisation. Hence, political opportunities structures, both domestic and international, are an important constituent of the emerging powers of human rights and other transnational advocacy networks.

The network approach has also been used to examine how groups disempowered locally have been able to attain positions of influence through their global connections. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, information politics, boomerang influence, organisational or strategic framing are some of the strategies used by transnational advocacy networks (TNANs) to attain positions of influence. Sreberny (1998) explored this idea in a study on how women used networking before the Beijing conference. Hawkins (1996) discussed the use of human rights norms and networks in authoritarian Chile. Bob (1997) examined how transnational networks are used as political tools for fighting marginalisation and marketing rebellion by Chiapas and the Ogoni in Nigeria. Similarly, international networks made it possible to transform negative realities of human rights violations into strength for the indigenous communities and organisations of Chiapas. This made it possible for the local experience and knowledge of a local group, the Las Abejas, to be catapulted into the global arena by changing the slogan ‘act locally and think globally’ into ‘think locally and act globally’. Through an efficient network of communication, Las Abejas was able to report local episodes of human right violations to regional and international organisations, which often represented the only form of protection against the violence of state and other powerful agents (Tavanti, 2001). Sikkink (1991) also demonstrated in her study on the spread of developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina that ideas, actors and institutions are the main variables in the dynamics of ideological diffusion.

Santiso (1998) examined the role of transnational networks in the diffusion of democratic ideas. He pointed out that besides the role of national diplomacy and
international organisations, such as the European Communities with regard to
democratisation in Greece for example, and in the Communist countries, theses of
propagation (by trade or communications) multiplied, assigning a relatively important
place to transnational actors as well as state and interstate ones, all being sometimes
intimately linked (the latter often being providers of funds for the former, for example).

Schmitz (1999) study on processes of political change in Uganda and Kenya during
the 1980s and 1990s concludes that the independent influence of international human
rights norms and their active promotion by transnational networks of non­
governmental actors were important to understanding the whole process. He argued
that in both cases, these networks played a crucial role in transferring the human
rights norms into a domestic context by protecting, empowering, and even creating
local groups and activists. Once human rights networks get a foot in the door, they
contribute to the internalisation of norms because they constantly highlight perceived
gaps between rhetoric and reality.

Researchers working in the field of mass communications have also used the network
approach. Studies on the role of networks in communications research, such as Katz
and Lazarsfeld (1955) and Kadushin (1968) focussed on the role of personal influence
in opinion formation. Their concern was with networks as agency for change.
Keohane and Nye (1971) applied themselves to the role of network structure in the
study of the role of multinational organisations in world politics. Also focussing on
networks and its implication for power structures in the society, Mann (1986)
explored the idea of power in society as “constituted of multiple overlapping and
intersecting sociospatial networks of power”. He argued further that “a general
account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of
four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political
relationships” (Mann 1986: 1-3).

In this study however, I focussed more on human rights networks. What is novel in
these networks is the ability of non-traditional international actors to mobilise
information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade,
pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations and governments.

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As argued by Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b), at the core of network activity is the production, exchange, and strategic use of information. By overcoming the deliberate suppression of information that sustains many abuses of power, networks can help reframe international and domestic debates, changing their terms, their sites, and the configuration of participants. Advocacy networks are among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the international system. At the same time, participation in transnational networks can significantly enhance the political resources available to domestic actors (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b).

From the foregoing, the analysis of transnational human rights network could be approached from two different perspectives. The first approach is the structural configuration of the networks. The second approach is the campaign activities of the networks. I have explored both of these two approaches. I examined the networks of power in which human rights organisations are embedded. I also analysed the power of influence human rights organisations wield through human rights campaigns. As mentioned earlier, many researchers have written on the role of human rights networks or global networks in democratisation, I found Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) more helpful and appropriate to the study of the development and role of human rights organisations in political mobilisation especially in developing countries. Keck and Sikkink's (1998a, 1998b) thesis on the way transnational networks work to empower organisations disempowered by domestic power play and domestic political structure was particularly useful for the analysis in subsequent chapters. Therefore I discussed Keck and Sikkink's (1998a, 1998b) TNANs model more elaborately than others in the section that follows. I examined the structure of the network in which an organisation such as CLO was embedded. This described how relations with powerful institutions and organisations gave weak organisations (such as CLO) leverage over more powerful organisations (such as the Nigerian military government). I also examined the role of the CLO as an actor, in facilitating the development of democracy advocacy networks in Nigeria and on Nigeria between 1990 and 1999.

**Networks of Power: Political Opportunities Structures**

Transnational networks can be categorised according to their motivations. In the first category are those with essentially instrumental goals, especially transnational
corporations and banks. In the second category are those motivated primarily by causal ideas, such as scientific groups or epistemic communities. In the third category are those motivated primarily by shared-principled ideas or values. These are transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b). The different categories of transnational networks correspond to different endowments of political resources and patterns of influence. In transnational relations among actors with instrumental goals, economic resources carry the most weight; in epistemic communities, technical expertise and the ability to convince policy makers of its importance counts most. Like epistemic communities, transnational advocacy networks rely on information, but for them it is the interpretation and strategic use of information that is most important. The way organisations in this category mobilise political human and financial resources through the use of information gave them the kind of influence they were able to exert in international politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b).

Transnational advocacy networks consist of groups and individuals bound together by common principles, values, and discourse who exchange information and resources in a non-hierarchical, voluntary, and reciprocal manner. Network members often include social change organisations, research organisations, churches, intellectuals, intergovernmental organisations, charitable foundations, and other groups working for normative change as well as parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments. Although states themselves are not members of networks, certain state bureaucracies or officials may work closely with networks, and state policy can provide crucial support for network goals (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b).

Keck and Sikkink (1998a) pointed out that transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge under three conditions. First, where channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting in motion a boomerang pattern of influence. Second, where activists or political entrepreneurs believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks. Third, where conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. Where channels of participation are blocked, the international arena may be the only means that domestic activists have to gain
attention to their issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12). I will examine how these three factors impacted on the role of the CLO political mobilisation in Nigeria.

Keck and Sikkink (1998a) also stressed that transnational advocacy groups are important because for the less powerful third world actors, they provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they could not expect to have on their own. For organisations in the North, they make credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only for, southern partners. On other issues where governments are inaccessible or deaf to groups whose claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic arena (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12).

In advocacy networks, the authority of network members relies mainly on a combination of principled adherence to international human rights norms, such as those contained in the UDHR and a professed expertise on human rights issues over decades. Using human rights as an example, Risse et al. (1999) view the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area as crucially dependent on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes to alert Western public opinion and Western governments.

However, success was, often, also crucially dependent on coalitions with other institutions “in authority”, such as the United Nations or Western States. In respect of human rights issues, most of the global efforts to shame particular states centre on the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, with some participation from the U.N. General Assembly. As a result, the single best measure for shame is action by the Commission or the Assembly against a particular state through official resolutions or investigations of its practices (Hawkins, 2001).

The arguments above usefully capture the role of human rights organisations in politics. They are useful for understanding how organisations such as the CLO carved out a space for itself in an already defined Nigerian political landscape. This was done through a principled commitment to the promotion of universal values enshrined in
the UDHR as well as successful mobilisation of financial and political support from other international actors, the views or influence of which the Nigerian government considered important. This will be explained in more detail in chapter four.

As mentioned earlier, in the process of democratisation in Africa, international actors have a profound effect on democratisation in different countries in Africa. This is possible because of the embeddedness of those countries in the international system. Using human rights advocacy as an explanatory framework, Risse and Sikkink (1999) were of the view that states are embedded in dense network of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are, therefore, socialised to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live.

States interact within a web of social understandings and norms, and want to be accepted as legitimate and equal actors within this environment. Transnational actors using human rights frames socialise states into adopting international norms through a combination of social, political and economic pressure, rational discourse and advocacy, and a gradual process of domestic institutionalisation. States respond to these methods because of their interests in maintaining their power, their identities as states, and their desire to be included as legitimate members of the international community (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). States compliance with international norms is not however automatic. It depends on a number of factors among which are the social forces in a particular state and how the actors (non-governmental) mobilised resources to their side. This argument will also be taken further in the analysis of international campaigns on Nigeria at both the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations Human Rights Commission in the mid 1990s.

Hawkins (2001) identified three domestic-level variables that are likely to influence state compliance with international norms. The first, domestic structure refers to the dominant institutions in the state and society and to the links between them. Domestic structure influences network success by determining access to policymakers as well as the requirements for building a "winning coalition" for policy change. The second factor is the congruence between international norms and widespread domestic beliefs and values, labelled normative fit. Where international norms fit with domestic
cultural understandings, states are more likely to comply. Thirdly, crises are often associated with network success as states adopt new policies.

The variables were used to make a broad, two-step argument. First, domestic variables matter more than international factors in determining state compliance with international norms. Second, not all domestic factors matter equally. Domestic structures seem to matter less than domestic cultural beliefs and values, and the particular security and economic circumstances facing the state (Hawkins, 2001).

I will engage with the arguments about network structure of human rights organisations in my analysis of the role of the CLO in political mobilisation in Nigeria from 1990 to 1999. The discussion above highlighted two patterns of structures. The first is international political opportunities structures such as human rights norms, powerful states that are supportive of human rights promotion, other international non-state actors that promote and give voice to human rights concerns in other countries as well as governments and private organisations that give financial and other support to emerging human rights organisations. The second pattern is domestic opportunity structures. These include voluntary ratification of international human rights norms by national government, activists that are prepared to take on human rights struggle, other established social networks that are prepared to give support to advocacy activities of human rights organisations as well as the mass media that are willing to give access to human rights activists as legitimate political actors. These two patterns will be discussed with regards to the role of the CLO in political mobilisation in Nigeria in the next chapter.

**Power of Influence: Space of Action**

Risse and Sikkink (1999) suggest that networks serve three purposes, which constitute necessary conditions for sustainable domestic change in the human rights area. Firstly, they put norm-violating states on the international agenda in terms of moral consciousness-raising. In doing so, they also remind liberal states of their own identity as promoters of human rights. Secondly, they empower and make legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups against norm-violating governments, and they partially protect the physical integrity of such groups from government repression. Thus, they are crucial in mobilising domestic opposition, social movements, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in target countries. Thirdly, they challenge norm-violating governments by creating a transnational structure, pressuring such regimes simultaneously both from above and below. The more these pressures can be sustained, the fewer options are available to political rulers to continue repression (Risse and Sikkink, 1999:5). Keck and Sikkink (1998a) also examined the role of human rights frames and activists networks in the struggle for empowerment by human rights organisations. Conceptual tools developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998a) are considered useful for this study.

Keck and Sikkink (1998a) argued that advocacy captures what is unique about the human rights networks because they are organised to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their interests. They have been particularly important in value-laden debates over human rights, women, infant health, etc where large numbers of differently situated individuals have become acquainted over a considerable period and developed similar world views. When the more visionary among them have proposed strategies for political action around apparently intractable problems, this potential has been transformed into an action network. They build new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organisations; they multiply the channels of access to domestic politics. In areas of human rights, they make international resources available to new actors in domestic political and social struggles. The advocacy activities of human rights networks is important for organisations working under very repressive regimes, such as Nigeria was under military dictatorships in the 1990s. It also provides a refreshing new angle to analysis of politics in Africa where ethnicity and economic survival are becoming almost a permanent feature.

International campaigns also provide a good case for analysing the complex structure and dynamics of collective action in the international context. Campaigns are defined commonly as a pre-planned set of communication activities designed by change agents to achieve certain changes in receiver behaviour in a specified time period (Mendelsohn 1973; Rogers and Storey 1987; Salmon 1989; Windahl et al. 1992). Campaigns are normally issue focussed and thus bring together activists and
organisations working on similar issues, which foster network and alliance building within organisations (Rucht 1999).

Brysk (1993) stressed that international campaigns are characterised by the fact that they move on different levels of action. Therefore, the international, the national and local arenas each provide their own actors, agendas and institutions, in any campaign. Different levels of action act as distinct but interlocking arenas with their proper institutional and organisational structures. According to Lahusen (1999), international campaigns mediate between external conditions and internal movement dynamics on the one hand, and between the global and local level on the other. Therefore, activists working to promote the views of organisations in the international arena would have to adapt their campaigns to the structures and dynamics of the international system.

Further, international campaigns respond both to internal and external conditions. For instance, locally, organisations strive to publicise their issues and demands within the mass media in order to influence the public and they aim to exert pressure for (political or social) change within a system of international relations. Mass media are of particular importance because public campaigns are necessarily carried by the media and thus are strongly shaped by their structure and functioning (Lahusen, 1999). At the same time issues could be publicised at international fora, where structures and operations of organisations such as the UNCHR or the Commonwealth might have significant influence on the effectiveness of campaigns.

For this study, I focussed on international campaigns that are often organised around universally accepted norms such as human rights. Information about norms is one of the most important kinds of information transmitted by TNANs. Activists of the TNAN's provide information from a wide variety of sources and make it comprehensible and useful to a public that is geographically separated. In order to reach and mobilise the public, they generate and organise information quickly about an issue, and then frame it in innovative ways. They uncover and investigate problems and report the facts dramatically. An example is the Ogoni campaign in Nigeria.
As argued by Rucht (1999), the Ogoni campaign gained worldwide attention due mainly to the issues and actors involved. The campaign also involved several levels reflecting the different arenas where the domestic political issues are articulated in the international arena. In case of the Ogoni campaign, elementary rules of justice were violated. This fell under the responsibility of Amnesty International, which is the natural advocate for such concern. But at the same time, a broader human rights issue was at stake, namely the repression of a whole ethnic minority, the Ogoni, to which the defendants belonged and for whom they served as a voice. This caused groups fighting repression and the genocide of ethnic groups to engage as well. Yet another concern was the massive environmental degradation in the homelands of the Ogoni due to extensive oil drilling. This eventually brought Greenpeace and other environmental groups into play. Furthermore, the situation of the Nigerian people in general, and the Ogoni in particular, is just one of many examples of unfair terms of trade to the advantage of the rich countries of the Northern hemisphere at the expense of the poor countries in the South. This was one among several reasons why TransAfrica engaged in the case. Finally, because the life of a well-known writer was at stake, several sections of the International PEN Club had reasons to join the protest (Rucht, 1999: 213).

A goal of TNANs is to pressure governments to implement changes that will benefit their citizens. When they mobilise to accomplish this, the "boomerang pattern" of influence occurs. This means that, "domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly seek out international allies to try to bring pressure from their states from outside (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12)." Usually, this happens as a result of a blockage of channels of communications between states and their domestic actors. NGOs rely on the Internet in order to send out information about a particular situation to other states or NGOs. This information is then used to influence the public in order to force other states to pressure the problematic state and thus to effectuate change (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a).

Transnational networks attempt to influence states to abide by international norms in two ways. First, they use networking to gain access to state officials and to lobby directly for policy change. Activists and other transnational actors are successful in part because they carry new ideas and frame them in ways that make sense to
policymakers. They use political skills such as persuasion and assets like knowledge or reputation to build coalitions that can effect policy change within a given state. In this process of elite learning, network activists convince state decision-makers to change their views on what constitutes appropriate behaviour.

Second, networks attempt to mobilise pressure from other states in the dual form of sanctions and shame. Networks lobby powerful Western states to withhold aid, investment or trade from norm-violating states. They also try to persuade states and intergovernmental organisations to condemn norm-violating states through words, symbols and diplomacy.

TNANs such as human rights organisations are able to influence because the actors in these networks are simultaneously helping to define the issue area itself, convince target audiences that the problems thus defined are soluble, prescribe solutions, and monitor their implementation. Thus TNANs are distinctive in the centrality of principled ideas; their strategies aim to use information and beliefs to motivate political action and to use leverage to gain the support of more powerful institutions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 30). TNANs operate by lobbying and persuasion, by mobilizing information rapidly and by using any available material leverage to pressure states to conform to international norms.

The arguments in the discussion above will be taken up in the analysis of the chapter on the role of human rights advocacy in democratisation. As discussed, political arenas both locally and internationally where the campaigns take place are contested arenas. Human rights activists have to wade through a number of obstacles to get their voices heard. Sometimes, the conflicting interests of states stand in the way of effective human rights campaign at international fora. The different levels at which campaigns are carried out and the way in which activists work through the mine field of conflicting interests of states and other actors is the basis of my participant reflection on human rights advocacy and democratisation in Nigeria. The discussion in respect of the role of the mass media in social construction of politics in taken up in the next section.
Media and Social Construction of Politics

Studies, spanning more than five decades, indicate that there is a sort of symbiotic relationship between politics and the mass media. Many mass communication studies, especially in the early period, were influenced by concerns over the use of the mass media for political purposes (McQuail, 2000). Assumptions about the political impact of the mass media have played a formative part in guiding the direction of mass communication research ever since its inception (Blunder and Gurevitch 1995). Until the late 1930s, the media, where they were developed, were credited with considerable power to shape opinion and belief, to change habits of life and to mould behaviour actively more or less according to the will of those who could control the media and their contents (McQuail, 2000). The significance of the power also came up in the argument of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995):

“Communication processes are involved in the legitimation of authority and serve functions of political articulation, mobilisation and conflict-management. They set much of the agenda of political debate. They are partly responsible for determining, which political demands in society will be aired, and which will be relatively muted. They affect the chances of governments and other political actors to secure essential support” (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995: 19-20).

While discussing the power of the mass media in shaping politics, Street (2001) argues that the mass media are responsible for the circulation of particular ideas and images, and insofar as these shape thoughts and actions, the mass media are thought to wield discursive or ideological power. This responsibility of the mass media derives from the fact that “they provide information- both images and texts- which forms the basis of public perceptions and receptions to events” (Negrine, 1994. 2).

From the messages that people get from the mass media, they make meaning of the many happenings in the society. This role is particularly important if we consider the fact that of all the happenings in the society, only a small proportion could be experienced and observed directly by the people. The people therefore depend on the media to supply them with information on the happenings in the society (McNair, 1996).
In the process of democratisation, the media are also considered powerful. Downing (1995) argued that the underground press played its part in the weakening of the former Soviet Union and in countries behind the iron curtain. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) provided a communication narrative of how the media were used to fight and topple the absolutist rule of the Shah in Iran. Maja-Pearce (1995) linked the demise of absolutist one-party states in Africa in the late 80s to the proliferation of the independent media in Africa. Studies by Campbell (1995), Ihonvbere (1996), and Olugboji (1994), indicated that the press played an important role in the transition to democracy in Nigeria. The foregoing examples suggest a prominent, pivotal role for the mass media in politics. They also raise the question of media and power processes in the society. Downing (1995) stressed that the media are structures of power in any society. The media mediate; they do not stand independent of a given social system but instead provide channels of communication between elements within it. To varying degrees this has meant that they are instrumental to dominant institutions and interests within the society (Randall, 1998).

The mass media also act as the platform through which people and interests in the society express their views. However, access to the media is constrained by many factors. Some of the constraining factors include routine practices of journalists, whose news values identify certain incidents and witnesses as more or less important or relevant than others.

The constraints of access to the media have been explained in terms of sociology of news production by Schudson (1996) and McNair (1996). They provided three models with which to study the sociology of news production. Though there are slight differences in what constitutes the components of each, both agree that studies in the sociology of news have focused on three cognate areas, namely: the political economy approach, the organisational approach or the organisation of news production and the cultural approach.

Under the political economy approach, it was believed that news is principally determined by the economic structure of the organisations concerned. In a situation where media ownership is in the hands of few individuals, the production of news will
be inflected in such a way as to serve the interests of the few owners. News therefore serves to reinforce the ideas and values of the owners.

In the organisational model, McNair (1996) argues that news is produced under some organisational constraints like space and time. As a result of these constraints, therefore, events are prioritised in terms of what will be allocated to the description of a particular event, what proportion of space or time will this report occupy in the total news presentation and what kind of events can evoke journalistic response. “Because of the demands of time and deadlines journalists are inclined to position themselves so that they have ready access to institutions which guarantee a useful volume of reportable activity at useful intervals” (McNair, 1996, 51). The advocates of this approach believed that more than any other factor that may influence the production of news, it is the organisational constraints and/or practices that influences most of the coverage given to events by the media. Under this approach, we can also bring McCombs and Shaw (1972) arguments that in choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality.

The third approach is the cultural approach. This approach focuses on how the media relate to power elite in the society. It considered the most important influence on media contents in the environment external to the journalistic organisations so that content is not simply a function of ownership, or of journalistic practices and rituals, but of the interaction between news organisations, the sources of their output, and other social institutions (McNair, 1996). Using Hall et.al.’s (1978) as an early application, this approach marks out the main influence on news coverage as the power elite who enjoy privileged access to the media, as sources of information and, importantly, of the interpretative frameworks which journalists then use to construct their stories. This power elite are the primary definers (to use Hall's words) of news, while the journalists and their media organisations are mere conduit pipes who only reproduce preferred accounts of the interpretations of social reality by internalising the dominant value structure of their society (McNair, 1996, p.53).

In addition to the three approaches identified by Schudson (1996) and McNair (1996), Schlesinger (1978) explored the influence of journalists in the media coverage of issues. Using the public service model of the BBC, Schlesinger (1978) argues that
what really influences the content is the performance of the journalists as an impartial umpire in the contest for power among various forces in the society. The journalists define reality in terms of what they perceive legitimate or acceptable interests in the society, they enjoy a formal independence from the government, and this enhances their credibility in the minds of the audience.

These theoretical frameworks will be examined in respect of how they bear on the effectiveness of political mobilisation by human rights organisations in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. The general theories about the constraints in gaining access to the media might be useful for explaining how some issues and actors gained prominence at the expense of the others in the democratisation process in Nigeria.

The preceding discussion also implies that communicative events are located within fields of social practice and in relation to the social and cultural forces and processes, which shape and transform those fields. Therefore, it is important to examine the processes that shape the articulation of issues in the mass media. While applying this process to the exercise of power in the mass media, Street (2001) argues that media power operates through the way it privileges particular discourses and constructs particular forms of reality. This refers to the media discourse and public opinion. Fairclough (1995) distinguishes between media discourse and public opinion. Media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists and other cultural entrepreneurs develop and crystallise meaning in public discourse (Fairclough, 1995). Media discourse and framing are considered useful for explaining how organisations overcome constraints of getting coverage in the media.

Gamson and Modigliani (1989) also asserted “media discourse can be conceived of as a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue. A package has an internal structure. At its core is a central organising idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue.... This frame typically implies a range of positions, rather than any single one, allowing for a degree of controversy among those who share a common frame” (1989:3). To understand how media discourses are shaped, it is useful to look at the process of organisational framing.
Organisations and Framing

Frames have been defined as schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large. A frame, thus, is a general, standardised, predefined structure (in the sense that it already belongs to the receiver’s knowledge of the world) which allows recognition of the world, and guides perception, allowing him/her to build defined expectations about what is to happen, that is to make sense of his/her reality (Donati 1992).

Framing involves the organisation of information. However the focus of researchers who examined how organisations use frames have been more on the way frames thematise accounts of events and issues. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) make this point clear when they pointed out that frames are the central organising idea or storyline that provides meaning or “a central organising idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (1989:57). Their general idea is that a frame is an ever-present discursive device that channels the audience as it constructs the meaning of particular communicative acts.

Nelson, et al. (1997) see framing as “the process by which a source defines the essential problem underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly relevant to that issue” (1997: 222). In other words, framing is the process by which a communication source defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy (1997). Frame analysis, therefore, makes it possible to capture the process of the attribution of meaning which lies behind the explosion of any conflict. It also makes it possible to attribute to events and behaviours, of individuals or groups, a meaning which facilitates the activation of mobilisation.

Organisations also mobilise support for collective action around frames. Organisations use frames as a means of identity against the “Others” they are struggling against. Therefore, one theme facilitating the constitution of a movement’s collective identity is the other against which protest is directed and against whom it would act. This “Other” is not merely an intellectual construction, but is almost always a real social actor, an authority, the government, an institution, the state, or a conglomerate of individuals, the technocrats, with whom the movement must strategically interact. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) also contend that the use of frames
by organisations is important as a framework for mobilising supporters, into clearly defined items for political negotiation in the institutional frameworks of the established political culture (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991:101-102).

Understanding the themes that will have resonance with the public and other organisations is important for the successful use of frames by organisations. When a frame connects with the aspiration of the public, this is called frame alignment. Snow et al. (1986) views frame alignment with the aspirations of the public and other organisations as crucial for the success of social movements. "An important condition determining the success of attempts at mobilisation is that a frame alignment occurs between movement activists and the populations they intend to mobilise. In other words, what is necessary is a linkage of individual and social movement interpretative orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and social movement activities, goals and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986: 464). Collective action thus becomes possible at the point at which mobilising messages are integrated with some cultural component from the population to which they are addressed. This point is considered important for understanding how an organisation using human rights frames mobilised other organisations into a human rights and pro-democracy movement in the democratisation of Nigeria.

The success of organisational framing also depends on the identification of an object of blame. In understanding the way social movement organisations legitimise their claims and mobilise support around particular issues, it is important to examine the process of identification of object of blame for a particular situation. In a study of the use of collective action frames by organisations in the anti-nuclear campaign movement in the US, Gamson (1992a) considered this point when he stated that:

The heat of moral judgement is intimately related to beliefs about what acts or conditions have caused people to suffer undeserved hardship or loss. The critical dimension is the abstractness of the target... When we see impersonal, abstract forces as responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept what cannot be changed and make the best of it... At the other extreme, if one attributes undeserved suffering to
malicious or selfish acts by clearly identifiable groups, the emotional component of an injustice frame will almost certainly be there (Gamson, 1992a: 32).

In addition to identifying the object of blame, organisations using frames also seek solutions to identified problems. In a study on social movements in Europe, Porta and Dianni (1999) argue that in the effort to dominate a discourse through the use of frames organisations seek solutions, hypothesise new social patterns, new ways of regulating relationship between groups, new articulations of consensus and of the exercise of power:

"The symbolic elaboration of a movement is thus not necessarily limited to the selection, on the basis of the parameters of instrumental rationality, of practical goals, in a given social and cultural context. Rather, it opens new spaces and new prospects for action, making it possible to think of aims and objectives, which the dominant frame tends instead to exclude from the outset. In this sense, it is possible to conceive of movements as media, through which concepts and perspectives, which might otherwise have remained marginal, are disseminated in society" (Porta and Diani, 1999:72).

Movements and conflicts do not develop in isolation but tend rather to be concentrated in particular political and historical periods (Tilly et al. 1975; Tarrow 1989, 1994). The organisation of a movement must then be placed in relation to the general orientations of a given period. If it is possible to identify conjunctions, which are particularly favourable to the development of collective action, the dominant visions of the world in that period will inform, or at least influence the representations produced by the movements taken together. Thus a restricted number of dominant interpretative frames will emerge, to which the specific elaborations of the various organisations or movements can be reduced, more or less directly (Gitlin, 1980).

The discussion of the use of frames by organisations for mobilisation and collective action provides useful explanatory tools for analysing how an organisation that uses a
human rights frame is able to mobilise other organisations and the public to support a particular version of democracy it promoted. This study will therefore consider the frames used by the organisation, the object of blame identified, the solutions put forward, the contextualisation of the struggle at particular moments during the transition to democracy in Nigeria and the organisations identified as supporters of the democratisation promoted using human rights frames.

Though organisations use frames to mobilise for collective action, organisational frames assume real significance if they resonate with the political discourse dominant in the mass media. As discussed earlier, the mass media are important for the legitimisation of claims in the society. They mediate between different power structures in the society. The study will therefore examine how organisational frames become political discourse in the mass media. This is considered important for this study because it might shed some light on the process of struggle for democratisation in Nigeria.

Media Discourse and Organisations
As discussed earlier, considering the power of the media to control reality and the power those who have access to the media could wield in the society, it is important to look beyond grand theories of media power to examine how power itself is constituted and constructed through media. In this regard, I will be focusing on the power of the message, which shapes discourse. I will also use Foucault analysis of power and organisational discourse as the basis of my analysis.

Foucault (1980) approaches power and organisational discourses from five different perspectives. First, it did not isolate for analytical or explanatory purposes the linguistic, rhetorical, symbolic and communicative components of discursive formations from their physical, technical, organisational and political elements (Reed, 1998). In the process of democratisation, it is useful to look at what is considered legitimate and what is left out. The system of rules and conditions that make certain discursive formations viable, while marginalising others, is the outcome of a complex interaction between material and ideational practices that define the terrain on which the objects and subjects of social life emerge (Reed, 1998: 195). Using an
organisational framing makes it possible to understand the process of interaction that
makes the existence of a discourse possible. Foucault’s discourse analysis is not to be
equated with linguistic analysis, nor discourse with language. “Discourse analysis is
concerned... with specifying socio-historically variable discursive formations,
systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur
at particular times, places and institutional locations” (Fairclough, 1992: 40).

Foucault also treats discourse as constitutive of social reality; that is, both the process
of discursive formation and the social relations which it instantiates are regarded as
determinants of whatever coherence and meaning concepts and entities such as
“society”, “power” or “organisation” manage to sustain and convey (Reed, 1998;
Dryberg, 1997). This links discourse to political discourse in the society.

Foucault further promotes an “agentless” conception of discursive formation in which
the role of specific agents, individual and/or collective and forms of agency is simply
reduced to that of nodal points in the intersection of various discourses which act as
deciphers for the messages that the latter convey (Layder, 1994). Therefore, an
examination of political discourse in the media makes it possible to understand the
structure of politics in the society. This is useful to understand the political structure
behind the democratisation process in Nigeria. Although shedding light on structure is
important, equally significant is the need to understand the political process. In the
case of organisations using human rights to build what has been referred to as
principled issue network (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b), the role of actors is also
very important.

Foucault’s use of discourse also symbiotically ties its construction, articulation and
reformulation to the exercise of power and control in micro-level sites of “dividing
practices” which become organisational nodes in a web of relations through which
individual minds and bodies are normalised and disciplined. It is an inherently
political conception of discourse in that it ties the formation of systems of knowledge
and belief into the matrices of power relations and practices that they inhabit.

Layder (1994) argues that if we break the exercise of power down, it is possible to
talk about the ability to employ a discourse that reflects a command of knowledge of a
particular area. This is usually employed in relation to those who lack such command and have no legitimate claim to such knowledge (Layder, 1994: 97). This could also be applied to organisations that have a command of knowledge of human rights and who use it against others who lack such command.

Discourses are also expressions of power relations and reflect the practices and positions that are tied to them. A discourse refers to all that can be thought, written or said about a particular thing such as a product (like car), or a topic or specialist area of knowledge (such as medicine). Foucault linked power to knowledge. He pointed out that modern power does not operate through the repression or limitation of existing capacities and forms of activity, but through the construction of new identities, knowledge and practices. Therefore, to understand how power is exercised, especially by different organisations, it is necessary to break how power is exercised down. For Foucault, therefore, "the individual has to be decentred or removed from centre stage. Instead, attention should be given to the objective social forms, which constitute society and construct the subjectivities of individuals (Layder, 1994: 96).

Foucault's conception of discourse tends towards a localised, even de-institutionalised, form of organisational analysis in which any concern with wider structural issues and the more durable forms of domination which they represent is rejected in favour of a more "bottom-up" or ascending, rather than descending, analysis of power networks or webs (Reed, 1998; Dryberg, 1997). Therefore, people live their lives through the socially constructed meanings that are available to them. The practices that people engage in daily life act back upon, and thus come to shape, discourses just as the discourses themselves shape practices. But these are social phenomena; individuals themselves do not create these meanings or the practices that they inform (Layder, 1994: 95).

I consider Foucault's conception of discourse useful for analysing the power play and relationship that underlies the struggle for democratisation in Nigeria between different military government and the opposition movement using human rights frames to influence the political discourse in the media.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the theoretical frameworks considered relevant for this study. Within democratisation framework, the chapter considered modernisation, transition and structural perspectives. Structural perspective was discussed more in detail because of its relevance to explaining the emergence of human rights norms and human rights organisations as alternative means of attaining power leverage by organisations previously marginalised within the political system. The network approach was also discussed, in detail, as the means through which human rights empowers organisations in domestic power contests. In this regard, the structure of human rights networks and the campaign activities of human rights organisations were examined. How the organisations use communications through framing and media mainstreaming was also discussed.

The conceptualisation of advocacy networks by Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) sits well within the relevant theoretical frameworks already identified in the preceding discussions. It connects well to media and social construction of politics theoretical framework; it is relevant to the use of frames and construction of politics by human rights advocacy networks. It is relevant to the discussion of democratisation in different international arenas in the human rights advocacy in Nigeria. The model of Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) was examined in the light of opportunities it offered for empowerment to those who are disempowered by domestic political structure and process. This chapter provides the basis for the analysis that follows in the remaining chapters. In the next chapter, I examined power politics in Nigeria and the role of human rights in political mobilisation between 1990 and 1999.
CHAPTER TWO
POWER AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA

Introduction
This chapter discusses the context of this study. It discusses briefly the historical processes that shaped political developments before 1990. It then analyses the developments in view of the democratisation frameworks discussed in the last chapter. In the second section, it examines the role of human rights in the democratisation of Nigeria from 1990. It discusses the role of domestic oppression and the blurring of differences between different professional and minority groups in Nigeria by government repression. This development is examined in the context of changing international environment conducive to human rights advocacy. The last section discusses in the main points in this chapter.

Nigeria’s Unending Democratic Transition (1914-1999)
Nigeria, as it is known today, was decreed into existence with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorate by Lord Lugard, the British colonial Governor, in 1914. Located in West Africa, bordering the Atlantic Ocean and lying between Benin and Cameroon, official estimate puts Nigeria’s population at 126, 152, 844 made of about 350 different ethnic groups (Babangida, 2002). As discussed previously, from the time of colonial government, Nigerian politics had been dominated, largely, by three of the ethnic groups that shared between them the largest concentration of Nigerians. These three ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulanis (in the North), Yorubas (in the West) and the Igbos (in the East). Although political developments in Nigeria, since 1990, catapulted some otherwise ethnic minorities like the Ogonis into political mainstream, Nigerian politics was still dominated by the three large ethnic groups.

The amalgamation in 1914 brought about the political integration of about 350 different ethno-linguistic nationalities into a big country that poses the challenge of governance. Hence, from its inception as a nation-state, Nigeria was faced with many challenges such as north-south dichotomy, religious cleavages, regional allegiances, differential development levels, and ethnicity with its centrifugal micro-national
loyalties (Eteng, 1997). These challenges were to determine the turns and bends in Nigeria’s political development.

In the 1914 constitution prepared after the amalgamation of Nigeria, the colonial government was faced with the problem of bringing the disparate ethnic groups together. As put by one of the colonial governors (cited in Kirk-Green, 1997) the problem faced by Lord Lugard who brought Northern and Southern Protectorate together in 1914 was how to build a system which would allow organic growth and make the unity originally superimposed from outside into a living thing which might progress from varying stages of adolescence to adult nationhood (Kirk-Green, 1997).

There had been fears and suspicions between the North and the South. There was the mutual fear of domination by each group: the northerners feared domination by the more educated and westernized southerners; who in turn disliked the more populous politically-organic northerners whose imposition on the country by the British on independence was feared. The introduction of different forms of government in both Northern and Southern Nigeria only served to reinforce the differences. Therefore, the foundation of the problem of a north-south dichotomy, which became endemic after independence in 1960, had an early history (Nnoli, 1980).

The shaky foundation on which Nigeria has been standing since the joining together of the Northern and Southern protectorate have been identified as the most important challenge of democratisation the country had to contend with. From its inception “the area called Nigeria has been variously described as “a mere geographical expression” (Bode Thomas and Awolowo, 1947), “a country without a nation, a common language, a common tradition and an indigenous name” (Alan Burns, 1904) “a mere collection of self-contained and mutually-independent native states separated by great distances, differences of history, tradition, ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers” (Clifford, 1920); “the most artificial of any administrative units created in the course of British occupation in Africa” (Hailey 1955); “a notoriously previous lumping together of peoples of separate identities...” (Emerson, 1960) (cited in Eteng, 1997).
The lack of consensus as to the desirability of sticking together as one country by the different ethnic groups that made up Nigeria as reflected in some of the phrases above has influenced political developments in the country since 1914. From the time of colonial administration, democratisation has followed the route of constitutional reforms. Hence, it could be argued that political reforms in Nigeria from 1914 had followed the transition model of moving from one stage to the other as discussed in the last chapter. In the 1920s, political reforms were introduced in stages, first in reaction to agitations from Nigerians and as a matter of political expediency to nurture the new country. The reforms came in form of constitutions. The first constitution was the 1922 Clifford Constitution.

The 1922 constitution made provision for the election of Africans to the Legislative Council, considered the first in Tropical Africa. Although confined to Lagos (3 members) and Calabar (1 member), the introduction of the elective principle gave birth to political parties, which contested for the legislative seats. In this constitution the Colonial Government consented that four out of the forty-six legislative council members were to be elected by general adult male suffrage. However, this electoral arrangement was limited to Lagos and Calabar, because these were considered to be the two major towns in Nigeria that had enough educated elites who could use their right of franchise properly. The principle of election enshrined in the Clifford constitution influenced the emergence of political organisations such as the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) (Kirk-Green, 1997).

The legislative council had authority to pass ordinances for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria only in Lagos Colony and the Southern Provinces. The jurisdiction was not extended to the Northern protectorate, which had a different form of indirect rule government. In the Northern protectorate, the colonial government ruled through Islamic native authorities, which were already in place before colonial administration (Eteng, 1997). The use of different systems of governments in both the North (indirect rule) and South (direct rule) led to differences in the approach to governance and development in Nigeria.

The Richard’s Constitution of 1946 altered the separate development of the North and the South. The South was divided into East and West, while the North was kept intact.
The constitution also created a unitary state with wide local government centres in the North, East and West (Sklar, 1963). A national council was created for the country with representations from all the three regions acting as unofficial members. Regional councils were also established in all the three regions. During the time when Richard’s Constitution was operational, the government busied itself with how to create a political system that will advance the possibility of further orderly integration of the country. This was meant to correct the lack of unity and integration which the previous constitution encouraged. Hence, a constitutional framework covering the whole of Nigeria and Legislative Council on which all sections of the Nigeria were given representation was developed (Kirk-Green, 1997). Kirk-Green (1997) further pointed out that the 1946 constitution had triple remedial objectives, which were:

(i) to promote the unity of Nigeria;
(ii) to provide adequately, within that desire, for the diverse elements which made up the country; and
(iii) to secure greater participation by Nigerians in the discussions of their own affairs.

While the Richard Constitution sought to bring about unity and integration in the country, the introduction of regional councils led to the birth of regional political parties such as the Action Group (AG) in the West and the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in the North. Each of them struggled to dominate politics in their areas. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) that had been established earlier as a national party also made effort to control politics in the East after losing out to the AG in the West. Hence, the Richard constitution, while trying to forge national integration inadvertently engendered the birth of a tripod-based regional politics in Nigeria.

The 1946 Richard Constitution was succeeded by 1951 Macpherson constitution. The main thrust of the 1951 Macpherson constitution was the awareness of the need for further decentralization of authority to the three main regions in the country as well as the need to involve Nigerians in democratic consultations and the process of drafting their constitution (Kirk-Green, 1997). Consequently, the constitution created Northern, Western and Eastern regional governments. This also consolidated a process already started with the Richard constitution. A major consequence of these
political integration and decentralisation processes was the forceful manifestation of ethnicity.

Political crises from the 1950s, first in the Eastern region and then among some of the other regions over when to ask for independence for Nigeria brought out some of the weaknesses of the 1951 constitution. However, in spite of its weaknesses, the principles of regional autonomy enshrined in the 1951 constitution had an immense impact on subsequent political developments in Nigeria.

As pointed out by Kirk-Green (1997), the divisive political experience of 1953 at the Cabinet level and the consequent vacuum in responsible government at the centre had demonstrated beyond doubt that in the search for a new political order, Nigeria's only remedy was to move in an orderly fashion away from, rather than lurch uncontrolled toward, that once common African dream of unitary and soon-to-be-one-party state (Kirk-Green, 1997).

Throughout the 1950s, there were series of constitutional and political crises, which threatened the very foundation Nigeria. The most significant was differences over when to ask for independence. While the South wanted independence in 1957, the North preferred a later date. The differences were resolved through constitutional conferences in London in 1954 and 1956. The outcomes of the meetings were new constitutions in 1954, 1957 and the 1959, which made arrangements for Nigeria’s independence in 1960. A national election to appoint the first Nigerian prime minister was held in 1959. The main parties that contested the elections were the NPC (North) AG (West) NCNC (East). At the elections, the NPC won majority seats, followed by AG and NCNC. None commanded a majority enough to form government. Hence, a coalition government emerged with NPC and NCNC joining together to form the government. NPC provided the Prime Minister while NCNC provided the Governor-General. The AG was leader of opposition. This was the arrangement till independence in 1960.

Nigeria gained independence on 1st October 1960 and with independence came a new constitution, the 1960 Independence constitution. The main features of the 1960 independence constitution were the necessary constitutional safeguards for the
survival of the Federal government once the three Regions had been granted selfgovernment. It also had a section on fundamental human rights, especially to protect the minority ethnic groups from domination by the three majority ethnic groups in Nigeria. In 1963, two main changes were introduced to the Independence constitution. These were the creation of the Mid-West region, making Nigeria’s federal framework four instead of three Regions; and a change in the status of Nigeria from a British colony into a Republic (Kirk-green, 1997).

Both the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, in spite of the provisions for fundamental human rights to protect especially the minority groups against domination by their majority, failed to assuage the fears of domination of the three majority groups against each other. There was crisis in the national government with the trial and jailing of the leader of opposition over sedition. There was also political crisis in the West and breakdown of law and order. Opposition parties in the West and East boycotted national elections that were held in 1964.

Therefore, between 1962 and 1967, Nigeria moved from one political crisis to the other necessitating military take-overs of the leadership of the country. In January 1966, a military coup, led by officers from the South, put an end to civilian democratic rule. A counter-coup, led by officers from the North, put an end to the first military government and edged Nigeria towards a civil war. Eventually, a civil war was fought between a coalition of the West and North (which represented the Central government) and the Eastern government that wanted to secede from Nigeria by declaring itself Republic of Biafra.

Due to this development, it is possible to argue that behind the political crisis before and after independence was fears over domination or marginalisation by different ethnic groups, but especially by the three main ethnic groups. This was put succinctly by the Northern delegation to the aborted 1966 constitutional conference, when, in unforgettable and enduring terms in the context of Nigerian society, he spoke of how:

...we all have fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in their own areas are limited and they would therefore wish to expand and venture unhampered in other parts. Some fear the sheer weight of
numbers of other parts which they feel could be used to the detriment of their own interests. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive of groups which they feel has to be regulated, if they are not to be left as the economic, social and possibly political underdogs in their own areas of origin in the very near future. These fears may be real or imagined; they may be reasonable or petty. Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree the actions of the groups towards one another and, more important perhaps, the daily actions of the individual in each group, toward individuals from other groups (Kirk-Green, 1997: 17).

This sentiment was also echoed by Colonel (Rtd) Odumegwu Ojukwu, the leader of Eastern Nigeria at the Aburi Conference in Ghana in January 1967, before the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967:

...in order to avoid further friction and further killing, do submit that the only realistic form of Government today until tempers can cool is such that will move people slightly apart and a Government that controls the various entities through people of their areas. It is better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision. Therefore, I say no single one person today in Nigeria can command loyalties of various groups and, therefore, to save the suspicion, to enable us to settle down, it is essential that whatever form of Government we have in the centre must be limited and controlled by a consensus to which we all agree (quoted in Joseph, 1987: 185).

The underlying cause for the political crises experienced in Nigeria up till the end of the civil war could be summed up in four reasons: First, the attempt by the Central government, controlled by the North and the East, to control the opposition and dominate the West. Second, the falling apart of the central government and the intervention by the military in 1965 which was seen as an attempt by the East to dominate both the West and the North. Third, the counter military intervention in
1966 which was seen as an attempt by the North and the West to dominate the East. Fourth, the attempt by the East to free itself from North and West domination and the efforts by both the North and West to maintain a united Nigeria.

Thus, political development in Nigeria from 1914 up till the end of the civil war in 1970 was dominated by struggles by each of the three majority ethnic groups against domination by other groups. The constitutional arrangements that devolve power to the three regional centres, to some extent, mediate the intense struggle for power and against domination.

The end of the civil war and the creation of more states in the country saw the erosion of some of the powers of the regional governments and the consolidation of the power of the Central government. Joseph (1987) stressed that the defeat of Biafra by Nigeria meant any prospect of becoming a confederation of self-governing states linked by a weak central government was lost. Much to the contrary, it was the federal government which emerged greatly strengthened from the civil war in its economic, political, and police powers, while the sub-federal units (regions, then states) were subdivided and rendered dependent and subordinate.

The military government from the 1970s took away the states' power, including revenue-raising authority, in order to thwart secessionist tendencies and strengthen central authority. The states accepted this loss of power because they were compensated by large ad hoc grants and because, at the time, prospects for continued high income from oil looked good (Baker 1986). Military governance and the joining of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by Nigeria brought enormous oil wealth for the country. The focus on development of the country as well as the military system of central command meant that for some moment, ethnic rivalry was put in the abeyance.

However, the announcement in 1975 of a programme of transition to another civilian democratic rule brought out once again the various divisions in the country. At the constituent assembly called to discuss a new constitution for Nigeria, debates over the inclusion of Sharia (Islamic system of laws) almost disrupted the constituent assembly. The intervention of the military government to allow for the establishment
of Shariah courts by states that wanted it, temporarily tempered the hostile feelings between the Muslims and Christians in the country. However, the development added a religious dimension to the early ethnic pull of Nigerian politics. Hence, the focus of the government in the new political dispensation was how to foster unity among Nigerians.

Five new political parties were registered. These were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), and the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP). Four of the political parties were reincarnation of the political parties dominant in the 1950s and 60s. The NPN was a reincarnation of NPC, UPN a reincarnation of AG, NPP a reincarnation of NCNC, PRP a reincarnation of NEPU. The only outsider was GNPP founded by Waziri Ibrahim a millionaire businessman from the North.

A new presidential style constitution was also approved for civilian democratic government and the date for transfer of power from the military to civilian rule fixed for October 1, 1979. In a repeat of the trend of the 1960s, presidential election was won by the NPN which went into coalition with the NPP. Expectedly, NPN controlled most of the states in the North, UPN controlled most of the states in the West, and NPP most of the states in the East.

Between 1979 and 1980, a sound economy and increased earnings from oil, meant that development projects started by the previous military government were pursued. However, the crash in oil prices and increased government spending from 1981 led to a spiral of external borrowing. This changed the status of Nigeria from creditor nation to debtor nation. At the same time, corruption heightened among government officials and politicians. In 1983, the first term of President Shehu Shagari came to an end. New elections saw the emergence of the ruling party (NPN) winner in what the opposition parties described as a fraudulent and rigged election. The eventual breakdown of law and order in some states in the West as well as the falling standard of living among Nigerians provided justification for another military intervention in Nigerian politics, three months into the second term of President Shehu Shagari.
In the military coup of 31st December 1983, General Muhammudu Buhari and General Tunde Idiagbon emerged as the new rulers of Nigeria. They sought to fix the economy while introducing policies that reduced political space. There was widespread detention and trial of politicians and the introduction of a regime of discipline. Twenty months after, on August 26, another coup by General Ibrahim Babangida terminated the rule of Buhari-Idiagbon. The government of General Babangida introduced a new transition to democracy programme that was to hand over power to a civilian democratically elected government.

In 1986, Babangida announced a timetable for military withdrawal and democratisation to be completed by 1990. Machineries were set in motion by the government to give credibility to the programme. For example, a Political Bureau was established to consult Nigerians for the first time, before making recommendation for the political future of the country. The Bureau was inaugurated on March 27, 1986 and it recommended the retention of the presidential system of government. The Bureau further recommended a two-party system for Nigeria, the membership of which was open to every citizen irrespective of ethnic origin, sex or religion.

In the same year a Constitutional Review Committee headed by Justice Buba Ardo as chairman was set up by the military regime to review and remedy the defects of the 1979 constitution. This revised Constitution was later submitted to the Constituent Assembly for debate and adoption. The government also established political education and mass mobilisation agencies such as the Directorate for Food, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure, the Directorate for Mass Mobilization, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), and the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS). A National Orientation Movement was inaugurated; and other structures aimed at ensuring a lasting democracy were put in place (Ihonvbere, 1996).

Babangida’s transition to democracy programme took off in 1987 with the promulgation of Decree 25 of 1987. On July 1, 1987, Babangida announced a five-year transition to civil rule, which was contrary to his earlier scheduled handover date of 1990. His new handover date became 1992. He also set up two bodies to ensure the successful transition to civil rule. These were the National Electoral Commission, NEC, headed by Professor Eme Awa and National Population Commission headed by
Alhaji Shehu Musa. On July 27, 1987, Babangida announced the ban of former politicians from participating in the new political experiment. On December 12, 1987, local government elections on non-party basis were held nationwide.

In 1989, a new constitution was written by which the Third Republic was to be governed. A Constituent Assembly headed by Justice Aniagolu was set up. It had 450 elected members and 117 others appointed by the government. This body sat 87 times and considered about 800 amendments proposed by 21 of its 23 committees. It wound up deliberations on March 3, 1989 but reconvened on March 29 to give finishing touches to the document. Like in 1976, debates over the inclusion of Shariah almost marred proceedings at the Constituent Assembly. However, the intervention of the military government prevented the situation from degenerating to unmanageable level.

After receiving copies of the 1989 constitution, Babangida lifted the ban on all political activities, giving stiff conditions for registration of political parties. At the close of registrations and applications to NEC on July 19, 1989, thirteen political associations were able to file their papers. By September, NEC recommended six associations for registration to Armed Forces Ruling Council. They were the Peoples Solidarity Party, Nigerian National Congress, Peoples Front of Nigeria, the Liberal Convention, the Nigerian Labour Party and the Republican Party. On October 17, 1989, in a nationwide broadcast, the AFRC rejected all the six recommended associations and established in their place two parties, the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention.

The Babangida’s regime transition programme was anchored on one fundamental assumption. Government officials argued that the previous democratic experiments ended abruptly because of the flagrant abuse of the affluent political elites who had historically dominated electoral politics in all the regions of the federation. It was believed that past attempts at representative democracy failed because regionally based political parties functioned mainly as a patronage system (Joseph, 1987) without any commitment to political accountability. The transition programme, therefore, commit itself to the establishment of a viable democratic system and a
general restructuring of the country’s political and economic institutions (Olagunju et al. 1993, Diamond et al., 1997, Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999).

The major planks of the transition programme were the preparation of a new constitution, the registration of political parties, contestation and election of people to political offices, and the re-orientation of Nigerians to a new culture of political tolerance. None of the four pillars of the transition to democracy were left to have a free rein. As mentioned earlier, the preparation of the constitution was at a time mired in controversies about the inclusion of *Shariah* legal system in the constitution. The registration of political parties attracted its own criticism when the government refused to register any of the political parties formed by the political elites in Nigeria. Instead, the government went ahead to establish two political parties, the National Republican Party (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) for the people. The government financed and wrote the manifestos of these two parties (Diamond et al., 1997).

In respect of the third pillar, contestation and election, the government also decided to ban some politician from contesting elections into public offices. Mostly affected by this ban were members of the opposition. The government premised its argument for excluding mainstream opposition on the need to correct the problems associated with past failed attempts at enthroning democracy. In addition, the government imposed a ten-year ban on all who held national office since independence. The reason given by the government was to correct the ills of the past and to ensure a lasting democracy (Olagunju, et al., 1993). However, escalating political violence and several outbreaks of religious riots in the north indicated that the old problems remain unsolved. As discussed in the last chapter, the three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, who dominate the northern half of the country; the Yoruba, who control the southwest; and the Ibo, who are the largest group in the southeast. From the time of independence, the Hausa-Fulani, the majority of whom are Muslims, has largely, dominated political power.

In respect of the fourth pillar, the government established institutions to educate Nigerians about democratic cultures. The Mass Mobilisation for Social and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) was created as a mass enlightenment organ for Nigerians. The
Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) was created to educate elected public office holders, and the National Orientation Agency was created to educate Nigerian about the virtues of democratic government. Although, most of these organisations took off to a good start, questions were raised about the motive behind the establishment of these organisations (Ubani, 1993).

The government repeatedly interfered with the details of the transition programme by disqualifying candidates of the political parties it created, promulgating military decrees to regulate behaviour of candidates and voters, and changing dates of elections. In January 1992, the hand-over was postponed for a further three months, to January 1993, to allow additional time for National Assembly and presidential elections. In attempting to head off resistance to the postponement, Babangida disbanded the AFRC on January 2, 1993 and replace it with a National Defence and Security Council; inaugurated the National Assembly in December 1992; and replaced the Cabinet with a civilian-led Transitional Council in January 1993.

National Assembly elections in July 1992 took place with a minimal amount of fraud, but then the government announced that the Assembly could not be sworn in until January 1993. Allegations of fraud in the first presidential primary election in August 1992 led the government to annul the results. A second attempt in September fared no better, leading the government in October to annul those results too and to dissolve the parties’ leadership. The National Electoral Commission was given the task of creating a new selection process and screening all prospective candidates. It recommended a return to the secret ballot. In November, President Babangida again announced a postponement of the hand-over date, this time to August 27, 1993, the anniversary of the coup that brought him to power. All 23 presidential candidates were banned from participating in new elections to be held in June 1993 (Human Rights Watch, Annual Report on Nigeria, 1992). New candidates were urged to come forward. In new presidential primaries in February 1993, MKO Abiola emerged as presidential flag bearer for the SDP while Bashir Tofa as the candidate for the NRC.

The democratisation process, which began in 1986, was finally derailed with the annulment of the Presidential election held in the country on June 12 1993 by the military government. Many reasons were given for the annulment of the elections...
(Ihonvbere, 1996). However, after the annulment, it became clear that beyond formal signposts of democracy such as constitution, political parties and elections, the important issues that were raised and suppressed by the military government during the transition programme had a significant bearing on the success or failure of the transition programme. One of the most unfortunate effects of the annulment was the impetus provided to the divisive influences of ethnicity and regionalism, which have tainted Nigerian politics since independence.

Towards the end of the transition programme some of the ethnic groups that made up Nigeria became more outspoken about the deprivations they were passing through. The political space became coloured by religious rhetoric and human rights provided a platform for mobilising opposition against the government (this will be discussed in more detail later). Yet, in spite of the significance of all these developments, the transition programme, with official institutions and procedure for transferring power in place, was thought to be moving along a healthy course until the programme was derailed by the presidential election annulment in June 1993.

An interim government led by a civilian technocrat and chairman of the Transitional Council, put in place since January 1993, Ernest Shonekan, was put in place to contain the resultant crisis. Another military government led by General Sani Abacha on November 17, 1993 replaced the interim government. Upon seizing power on November 17, 1993, Abacha dissolved national and state legislatures, removed the elected civilian governors, and banned all political activities. Abacha also expressed the intention of his government to start a new democratic transition programme while ignoring the June 12 election crisis and other political problems that evolved from Babangida's programme.

In January 1994 the government announced that a constitutional conference, controlled by the military, would be held to decide Nigeria's future form of government. This announcement was condemned by pro-democracy leaders, who viewed it as yet another attempt to prolong the military's stay in power and refused to participate in the military's scheme.
In early May, Moshood Abiola, widely believed to be the winner of the 1993 presidential election, announce his intention to form government. The following week, the formation of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was announced. The group, made up of politicians, retired military officials, and pro-democracy figures, was formed in an effort to coordinate and focus the various pro-democracy factions around four main demands: termination of military rule; installation of Abiola as president; convocation of a sovereign national conference to debate the country’s future; and restructuring of Nigeria along truly federal lines. NADECO immediately called on the government to install Abiola as president before the end of May, and called for a boycott of the Constitutional Conference elections, the first of which was to be held on May 23.

Elections to select 273 of the 369 delegates to the Constitutional Conference (the remainder of whom were government appointees) were largely boycotted in the Yoruba-dominated southwest, the home region of Abiola. On the day of the elections, approximately fifteen human rights and pro-democracy activists were arrested, allegedly for trying to disrupt the elections. They were later released.

On June 11, 1994 Abiola declared himself president. He was arrested on June 23 and held incommunicado until his first court appearance on July 5, when, at a Federal High Court in Abuja that had been set up especially for his trial, he was charged with various counts of treason. He was initially refused bail for several months, but the judge ordered that he be given access to his doctor, lawyers, and family members. Abiola’s charges were later amended to five counts. According to these charges, Abiola levied war against the State.... form[ed] an intention to remove or overawe otherwise than by constitutional means the Head of State.... conspired to do an illegal or treasonable act.... and represented himself to be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, Annual Report on Nigeria, 1994).

In support of the demand of NADECO and Abiola’s declaration, a strike was announced on June 27 by the National Union of Petroleum and Gas Workers (NUPENG), which included among its demands recognition of the results of the June 1993 election. Although the government declared it illegal, the strike began on July 4,
as planned. A week later, NUPENG's white-collar sister union, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), joined. Although the strike did not initially affect oil exports, it had an immediate effect on domestic fuel supplies, sparking riots and protests. By August, the strike had seriously eroded oil export earnings as well (Human Rights Watch, Annual Report on Nigeria, 1994).

In attempting to break the strike, Abacha resorted to bribes, threats, arrests, and eventually, when these methods failed, in mid-August dissolved the leadership of the oil unions and ordered workers back to work. Agents of the State Security Services (SSS) in Lagos arrested Frank Kokori, NUPENG general secretary, on August 20. Other NUPENG and PENGASSAN officials were also arrested, including the NUPENG president, Wariebi Agamene, who was arrested in mid-September by the State Security Service (SSS). Other oil union representatives were also arrested.

Many other unions, including the National Union of Banking and Financial Institutions, the National Union of Air Transport Services Employment, and the National Union of Local Government Employees, also joined the oil workers strike in early July and stayed out for much of the duration of the strike. The National Union of Teachers also joined the strike in early July. The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the national academic union, embarked on a strike on August 22. Many universities had closed down even before the ASUU strike because of protests or school administrators' fear of such protests. The national leadership of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), the national federation of labour unions, initially did not take a strong stand against the government. However, various state branches joined the strike in July. The national NLC finally went on strike on August 3-5, but it was not observed in the northern states. On August 17, the NLC executive was dissolved along with the oil unions' executives (Human Rights Watch, Annual Report on Nigeria, 1994).

Following the announcement of the oil union strike in late June and continuing through August, police and soldiers were unleashed on pro-democracy demonstrators with tear gas and live ammunition. An unknown number were killed, mainly in the Yoruba areas. Government reaction also came in the form of promulgation of many decrees. Decrees were promulgated dissolving the executive councils of the NLC,
NUPENG, and PENGASSAN. The decrees, which were retroactively dated August 18, 1994, forbid any court from inquiring into any actions taken pursuant to the decrees. They also suspended the constitutional protections of fundamental human rights for the purposes of the decree. Decrees banning the publication and circulation of newspapers such as *The Guardian*, *Punch*, and *National Concord* group owned by Abiola were also promulgated.

Another decree amended the administrative detention law, Decree 2, to allow persons who are deemed to present a security risk to be detained for three months without charge on orders either of the chief of general staff of the armed forces or the inspector-general of police. After three months, the detention order may be renewed. Previously, Decree 2 had allowed detentions for renewable six-week periods and only on orders of the Chief of General Staff. The amendment was made effective from August 18, just before a round up of government opponents who remain in detention. Another decree referred to Abacha's coup as a "military revolution" and stipulated that no act, matter or thing done or purported to be done under or pursuant to any Decree or Edict may be challenged in court (LIBERTY Magazine, May-August, 1994: 13). Most of the draconian decrees promulgated by the Abacha government in 1994 remained in force throughout 1995. Although the Nigerian government renewed Decrees 6 and 7, which imposed additional six-month bans on The Punch and The Concord, in early June, these decrees were lifted on October 1. Throughout 1995, government-appointed administrators ran the trade unions.

The repression of the opposition under Abacha continued with the arrest and detention of Chief Gani Fawehinmi, National Coordinator of the National Conscience Party and one of Nigeria's most prominent human rights lawyers, shortly after he had criticised the Abacha government at a press conference on July 3, by the SSS. Fawehinmi was released on July 18, the same day that the SSS arrested Chima Ubani, secretary-general of the Democratic Alternative (DA). In late July, the SSS arrested Abdul Oroh, the executive director of the CLO, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, and Dr. Tunji Abayomi, the chairman of Human Rights Africa and legal counsel to General Olusegun Obasanjo. The arrests were in response to a protest letter on the political situation in the country written by these individuals to General Abacha which was published in *This Day* newspaper on July 21, 1995. Arrests of members of the
National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), which included politicians, retired military officials, and pro-democracy figures that supported Abiola’s installation as president, as well as other government opponents were commonplace in 1995.

General Abacha’s announced on June 27, 1995 that he was lifting a ban on political activities. On October 1, 1995 a programme of transition to civilian rule was announced and due to culminate in a transfer of power to an elected federal government on October 1, 1998. In January 1996, military decrees formalised the transition programme. The Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree 1 of 1996 made it an offence to misrepresent, accuse or distort the transition programme. However, state governorship and assembly elections were postponed by several months. Local government elections held in March were neither free nor fair. The elections were so compromised by executive interference and were largely boycotted by the opposition. Two of the five officially registered political parties declared that General Abacha was their preferred candidate for president; possible alternative candidates for the other three withdrew following intimidation or arrest, and a public campaign for Abacha to succeed himself was sponsored by a number of nominally independent groups. A draft constitution prepared in 1995 in a process under military control, to come into effect with the end of the transition program, was not published, leaving Nigerians in the dark as to the future form of the government for which they were supposed to be voting (Human Rights Watch Annual Report on Nigeria, 1995, 1996, 1997).

Besides the general repression of the opposition, there was the particular repression of the Ogoni, which culminated in the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other eight Ogoni activists as well as the trial and conviction of outspoken retired and serving military leaders over alleged coup plots in 1994 and 1997. I discussed the Ogoni case under the role of human rights in democratisation from 1990 in the section that follows.

The death of Gen. Sani Abacha on June 8, 1998, brought to an abrupt end the controversial transition programme that had apparently been designed for his self-succession as a civilian president. New head of state Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar repealed the 1996 decrees bringing the Abacha programme into existence and announced steps to hold fresh elections to install a civilian government at the end of
May 1999. Three new political parties were registered. These were the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Elections were held in February 1999 and the winner of the presidential elections, General Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP was sworn on 29th May 1999 as the new civilian president of Nigeria.

Transiting to A Modern State: An Analysis

The discussion of the political development of Nigeria, from 1914 up till 1999 have been theorised in different ways by different people. While I followed the transition framework that emphasised movement from one stage to the other in my historical narrative above, others have examined political developments in Nigeria and other African countries from the prism of modernisation and other concepts inspired by understandings in the West.

From the early 1960s when a succession of former European colonies in Africa gained political independence, western political scientists have concerned themselves with the challenge of developing frameworks for analysing and predicting the form and content of politics of the new nations. Much attention has been paid to the role of formal political institutions such as civil societies, independent media, multiparty elections and independent judiciary in democratisation (Dahl 1991; Huntington 1991; Diamond 1992). While the contributions of formal elements are important, the content of democratisation is usually taken as given and the role of informal politics is de-emphasised. Yet, behind every attempt at democratisation is the struggle between empowerment and disempowerment (Falk 1994; Hamelink 1995; Vincent 1986), played out in both formal and informal politics.

Developments in Nigeria since May 29 1999, when a democratically elected government was elected have shown that focussing on only political institutions and processes while neglecting the social institutions that makes democracy possible (or impossible) is inadequate to analyse the democratisation process in Nigeria. There were heightened ethnic and religious violence since the conclusion of the transition programme in 1999. With more than 10,000 lives lost to the violence, democracy in Nigeria sits on a shaky foundation with the prospect of its consolidation looking increasingly uncertain. The problem of democracy in Nigeria brings out the issue of
struggle for power and control that lies behind democratisation or democratic transition in countries such as Nigeria.

This problem becomes clear when we examine the relations of power that brings about political organisations (Foucault, 1980) in societies. Relations of power are very importantly present in most human interactions, and not simply within the formal spheres of political power (Dryberg, 1997). Thus, while informal arena of social interaction can provide a dynamics of power relations that will assist us understand better formal political institutions, formal institutions and processes also have their origins rooted in the informal politics of social interactions. Therefore, it is important to consider politics of democratic transition in Nigeria from the perspective of power struggles between groups that make up Nigeria. As discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, the structural approach that analyses how changing structures of power influence democratisation in any society is the main framework of analysis adopted for this study.

Another important factor that made the use of structural approach relevant was the inadequacy of the modernisation approach to capture developments in Nigeria from 1985. As mentioned earlier, in the 1970s, oil became the main earner of foreign exchange for Nigeria. However, the huge external reserves of the 1970s were frittered away by the civilian administration that took over from October 1979. This transformed the status of Nigeria from a creditor nation to a debtor nation.

Like so many other African countries, which relied on a single foreign exchange earning commodity, Nigeria was not immune from all the significant developments on the international political economy scene from the middle of 1980s. The crisis that faced the Nigerian state compelled the government to search frantically for solutions. As far back as 1980, the Structural Adjustment Programme had been touted as the panacea for Nigeria's economic ills. However, neither the Shagari regime nor the Buhari military regime that overthrew it was able to adopt the measures contained in the Structural Adjustment package (Babawale, 1996).

Battered by a huge debt burden and a comatose economy brought to its knees by large scale official corruption, Nigeria also joined other African countries to adopt the
structural adjustment measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986. The Babangida administration embraced these measures and consequently introduced SAP. The major strategy of SAP was the deregulation of the economy and to make this possible the programme prescribed a range of policies such as huge currency devaluation, trade liberalisation, price and interest rate deregulation, elimination of administrative controls; privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises, abolition of commodity marketing boards; removal of subsidies and introduction of cost recovery measures; drastic reduction in public expenditure levels and export promotion incentives (Babawale, 1996).

Yet, in spite of all these measures, what became clear since 1986 was the steady decline in the Nigerian economy, which SAP was intended to curtail and reversed. In many respects it can be said that SAP complicated existing problems and created new difficulties. It fuelled inflation, worsened unemployment, accelerated industrial decline, and exacerbated decline in living standards.

Opposition to SAP came from professional bodies, student associations, human rights organisations and the trade unions. Many professional associations were proscribed by General Babangida following protests against the implementation of SAP in 1988. The most prominent were the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and the professional association of university lecturers, Academic Association of University Union (ASUU). Following anti-SAP riots led by students in 1989, the government in December 1989 promulgated Decree 47, which authorises imprisonment and fines for any student found guilty of taking part in a demonstration or organizing a protest. In March 1990, a government announcement of an agreement for a $120 million World Bank loan for the 21 federal universities led to lecture boycotts and demonstrations by students who feared that part of the agreement would require a cut in academic programmes and staff. Some of the demonstrations were broken up by armed troops. However, after the April 1990 coup, a number of students were arrested, particularly members of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), which has been banned earlier (HRW, Africa Annual Report on Nigeria, 1990). The government lifted the ban on ASUU in 1990.
Severe economic conditions, which started with the introduction of SAP in 1986, deteriorated drastically with the devaluation of the Nigeria's currency (Naira) by nearly 80 percent in March, 1992. On May 4, riots broke out in Lagos, sparked initially by an increase in commuters' transportation fares. On May 13, a peaceful student demonstration led by the NANS was joined by angry mobs that turned the event into a violent looting spree. Hundreds of students were suspended or expelled in 1992 for either participating in demonstrations or taking part in student union activities and demonstrations. The president of NANS was arrested in May, along with several human rights activists and charged with treason by the government.

The government banned, once again, the professional association of university lecturers, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), following a strike it had called in July 1992 over issues of university funding, conditions of service, and university autonomy. The government then pressured lecturers with threats of dismissal and eviction from their living quarters. Due to the strike, Nigerian universities were closed down during most of 1993. In 1993, ASUU was unbanned but again in May, 1996 the Federal Ministry of Education announced that the activities at the national level of unions at Nigerian universities, including the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), were banned, although chapters on individual campuses could continue to function. In August, ASUU and two other university unions were banned outright, and their assets confiscated. A number of ASUU members were detained at different times and their meetings disrupted (HRW, Africa Annual Report on Nigeria, 1990-1996).

The increased repression and authoritarianism associated with the implementation of structural adjustment combined with the sharp decline in living standards among workers, students and the large class of middle class professionals spurred many social groups to activism. These groups were to play important roles in the transition to democracy programme of the government through the activities of human rights organisations that mobilised the resources of this important part of the civil society to press for democratic reforms. The next section examines how human rights became an important part of the equation in the process of democratisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999.
Human Rights: New Queen on the Political Chessboard

In the previous chapter, I examined how changing structures of power made human rights interpretations of democratisation possible. This is more pronounced in the use of international and domestic political opportunities structures. This section examines the influence of both opportunities structures on democratisation in Nigeria. Most of the data used in this section came from the annual reports on human rights situation in Nigeria published by HRW, Africa between 1990 and 1999.

International Opportunities Structures

In respect of international opportunities structures, I will be discussing the roles of the US, EU and other organisations such as the UN, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and IMF-World Bank. Other organisations and institutions such as TNANs, the Canadian and Scandinavian countries also played important roles, their specific roles were discussed more in the next chapter. More than the other countries the US played a significant role in the democratisation process in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. The end of the cold war, the disappearance of a bipolar world and the emergence of a unipolar world from the mid 1980s meant that the US played an increasingly crucial role in the world. Nigeria was considered important to the US due to its importance on the African continent, its vast natural resources, and its economic potentials.

Different measures were adopted at given times to support the human rights claim and interpretations of democratisation of human rights NGOs by US governments in Nigeria from 1990. Among the measures adopted were official statements, denial of financial aid to Nigerian government, financial support to human rights NGOs, sanctions against Nigerian government officials, sending of official US government delegations to Nigeria to make human rights interventions, parliamentary debates on Nigeria as well as official recognition of human rights activists. Each of these measures will now be elaborated.

Successive US governments issued statements in support of human rights and democratic reform campaigns of human rights NGOs in Nigeria from 1990. In 1990, the Bush administration made public statements expressing concern to the Nigerian government about upholding respect for human rights in Nigeria, including the rule of
law, especially in respect of the executed coup plotters. In September 1991, a speech by Vice President Quayle in Nigeria raised a number of human rights issues of particular significance to Nigeria. He listed the basic principles of democracy as including freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of assembly; freedom from arbitrary intimidation and arrest; and, the rule of law which is the life-blood of democracy; he noted that democracies must be governed by laws, not men, and emphasised the importance of an independent judiciary and press in establishing democracy. Shortly before the 1993 presidential elections, on June 10, 1993 Michael O'Brien of the U.S. Information Service (USIS) issued a statement that a threatened postponement of elections was unacceptable to the US government. Less than twenty-four hours after the election was cancelled, the State Department released a statement "deploring" the move.

In a statement on November 18, 1993 the State Department condemned General Abacha's coup. In response to General Abacha's October 1, 1995 statement, the White House issued a press statement criticising the length of Abacha's transition to democracy programme as well as the government's failure to provide for significant civilian participation in national decision-making in any transitional government. The statement went on to welcome the decision to commute the death sentences of the alleged coup plotters, but called upon the Nigerian government to provide prompt clarification of their status. The statement also reiterated earlier calls for the prompt and unconditional release of political detainees and for an open appeal process for those convicted in secret trials. After the execution of the Ogoni activists on November 10, the White House issued a statement strongly condemning the executions, stating that the executions demonstrated to the world the Abacha regime's flouting of even the most basic international norms and universal standards of human rights.

In addition to statements, US governments also stopped official aid to the government of Nigeria and in some instances imposed sanctions while at the same time increasing financial assistance to human rights NGOs. While in Nigeria in September 1991, Vice President Quayle announced that the two million dollars US aid to Nigeria would be used to support the Babangida transition to democracy programme. The aid was not given to the Nigerian government but to programmes sponsored by the US Agency
for International Development (USAID) to establish links between US and Nigerian NGOs working on human rights, legal issues, women’s political groups, voter education, local government improvement, reporting on political and economic issues, and professional economic associations.

After the annulment of the June 1993 Presidential elections, the US government cut off $450,000 in aid for military training. This was followed by cancelling of an $11 million grant to the Ministry of Health and other smaller grants totalling less than $1 million. The State Department also suspended arms sales to Nigeria. In addition to these steps, Nigeria’s military attaché in Washington was ordered to leave and a US security assistance officer was withdrawn from Nigeria. Military relations between Nigeria and the US were also reduced. The US also reviewed commercial military sales on a case-by-case basis with the presumption of denial. In April 1994, President Clinton added Nigeria to the annual list of countries making insufficient efforts to combat illegal drug production. This precludes Nigeria from receiving US aid and from receiving US support for loans from international lending institutions. Consequently in 1995, the US voted against Nigeria in six multilateral development banks, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the African Development Bank.

After the executions of the Ogoni activists in 1995, President Clinton recalled the US Ambassador in Nigeria Walter Carrington from Lagos for consultations. The US also banned the sale and repair of military goods and provisions of related services to Nigeria. It extended the ban on US visas for top government officials to include all military officers and civilians who actively formulate, implement, or benefit from the policies that impede Nigeria’s transition to democracy. It also required Nigerian government officials visiting the UN or the international financial institutions to remain within twenty-five miles of those organizations.

On the other hand, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) gave substantial funding to the transition programme by providing financial assistance to Nigerian human rights groups as well as to the coalition of human rights NGOs called the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) and other US-based groups working in Nigeria such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute, and the Carter Center to monitor elections in Nigeria. In May 1998, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) presented its annual democracy award to the TMG.

The above highlights the changing relations of power between the US and Nigeria. While the military government was increasingly working itself into disfavour, human rights organisations were being recognised as legitimate players in the political process in Nigeria. An example of this trend was the turning down of the request of Babangida the then head of state to visit the White House while on a visit to the US in 1993 as well as the black out of Nigeria in President’s Clinton’s visit to Africa in 1998. While refusing to visit Nigeria or meet with Nigerian government officials, President Clinton played host to the President of CLO Ms Ayo Obe, who spoke on behalf of Nigeria during Clinton’s stopover in Senegal.

Other measures used to support human rights and democratic reform campaigns of human rights NGOs in Nigeria by the US government were parliamentary debates and official US missions to Nigeria. In respect of parliamentary debates, the first hearing on Nigeria’s political crisis before the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives was held on August 4, 1993 after the annulment of presidential elections in 1993. Human rights organisations in Nigeria such as the CLO were invited to make presentations. Such debates offered opportunities that were denied at home to freely discuss measures that should be taken for democratic reform in Nigeria.

Following the execution of the Ogoni activists in November 1995, a draft “Nigeria Democracy Act” was introduced in November 1995. Though it was not passed, it was reintroduced in Congress in June 1997. The Act proposed further sanctions, including a ban on air links and on new investment in the energy sector and a freeze on assets of members of the Nigerian government held in the US. The act was not passed but it succeeded in highlighting the parlous state of human rights and democracy in Nigeria. By engaging the Nigerian government in a parliament outside the country, human rights NGOs shifted the venue of human rights struggle and in so doing attracted new supporters to their cause. For instance, as will be discussed in the next chapter, a US-based network took up the Nigerian campaign in the US. In a similar fashion, a
number of US cities adopted resolutions preventing purchase from suppliers with businesses in Nigeria (affecting in particular U.S. oil companies Mobil and Chevron). In June 1997 a conference of mayors meeting in San Francisco adopted a resolution welcoming such measures in support of democracy in Nigeria.

Official government missions were also sent to Nigeria to make interventions on behalf of human rights NGOs. Among these was the appointment in 1995 by President Clinton of Donald F. McHenry, to discuss democratic reform with the Nigerian government. He reportedly undertook at least five secret missions to Nigeria in an effort to expedite the transition to democracy and improve US-Nigerian relations. The US embassy also occasionally sent representatives to observe the trials of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni activists.

Not all these measures were successful. For instance, in 1994, some members of the US House of Representatives were denied visas to visit Nigeria. The pressures from the US government did not make the Nigerian government to do a rethink on the annulment of the June 12 elections, nor prevent the execution of the Ogoni activists in 1995. In addition, sometimes, national interests stand in the way of human rights campaign effectiveness. For example, the calls by Nigerian and other transnational advocacy organisations for a total boycott of Nigeria’s oil were not heeded by the US government, because it was argued it would harm the US economy as well as US and Nigerian citizens.

The EU countries followed the same pattern as the US, using public statements and sanctions to support human rights and democratic reform campaigns of human rights NGOs in Nigeria. Following the annulment of the June 1993 election, the European Political Cooperation (the foreign ministers of the European Community), issued a statement on July 14, 1993 in which EU decided to adopt measures such as suspension of co-operation in the military sphere; restrictions on visas for members of the military or the security forces and their families; suspension of visits by members of the military; and suspension of any further cooperation aid to press the government to reverse the annulment.

Individual EU countries also issued separate statements at different times to support
demands made by human rights NGOs. For instance, following the dissolution of the trade unions in 1994, the UK government issued a statement expressing deep regret over the turn of events in Nigeria, describing the banning of the trade union leadership as a further regressive act. A statement issued by Germany (which held the EU presidency at the time) on August 26, 1994 urged the Nigerian government to halt the campaign against political opponents. The statement also expressed deep regret over the shutting down of newspapers, the dissolution of the boards of the labour unions and the NLC. It called on the government to reverse these trends and to move rapidly to restore Nigeria to civil democracy.

Following the execution of the Ogoni activists, all European Union member states recalled their ambassadors for consultation. In December 1995, European Union member states agreed to impose visa restrictions on members (including civilians) of the Nigerian Provisional Ruling Council and the Federal Executive Council and their families (in addition to members of the Nigerian military and security forces and their families, on whom restrictions were imposed in 1993); to expel all military personnel attached to the diplomatic missions of Nigeria in member states and to withdraw all military personnel attached to diplomatic missions of EU members in Nigeria; to deny visas to official delegations in the field of sports and to national teams; to introduce a prospective embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment (allowing existing contracts to be fulfilled); and to suspend development cooperation except to projects through nongovernmental organizations and local civilian authorities. These sanctions remained in force until the death of General Abacha in 1998 and the introduction of a new transition to democracy programme by General Abubakar.

Besides the support of the US and EU countries, other international organisations supported the activities of human rights organisations in Nigeria, by providing opportunities for shifting the venue of campaigns away from Nigeria. The roles of the UN and Commonwealth in this regard will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

While international political opportunities structures played important roles in helping to highlight domestic problems outside the restrictions imposed within geographical boundaries, they were also constrained by the interests of some of the actors. As
mentioned earlier, in respect of the US and the EU countries national economic interests made it impossible for them to grant the request of human rights NGOs for a total boycott of Nigeria's oil. However, in spite of this limitation, international political opportunities structures represented a shift in the balance of power away from states to non-state actors. The next section discusses domestic opportunities structures.

**Domestic Opportunities Structures**

As discussed in the previous chapter, domestic opportunities structures provide resources which advocacy organisations mobilised for political action. In respect of human rights and democracy activists in Nigeria, domestic repression suffered by some of the groups as well as the window of opportunities provided by human rights NGOs to internationalise domestic problems provided the basis on which political mobilisation was carried out between 1990 and 1999. Many organisations played important roles during this period. I however paid particular attention to those groups where human rights organisations such as the CLO had significant impact. Hence, I examined human rights repression in the media and as well how human rights campaigns impacted on some minority agitations in Nigeria.

**Media as Instrument of Power**

As discussed previously, communication processes are involved in the legitimation of authority and serve functions of political articulation, mobilisation and conflict-management. They set much of the agenda of political debate. They are partly responsible for determining, which political demands in society will be aired, and which will be relatively muted (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Several factors influence the coverage of particular issues by the media. Issues such as ownership and the orientation of journalists influence media coverage. In the case of Nigeria, ethnicity and religious orientation act as additional filters in respect of what the media covers. The mass media in Nigeria have played the roles of legitimisation of claims and political struggles in the country from the time the first newspaper was established in the 19th century.

Nigeria presents the picture of a country where there is a medley of both the government and private individuals acting as key players in the mass media industry
with each controlling different key sectors of the industry. Among the 42 radio stations in Nigeria listed in the *Media World Yearbook* (1998) only two are privately owned. Out of the 43 television channels, only six are privately owned. And only the Federal Government owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) has a network reach. Whereas all the 36 magazines listed are privately owned, government controls 38 of the 84 listed newspapers. Added to the number above is a government-owned news agency, the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN)- founded in 1975. Other cognate institutions already in place include a Nigerian Press Council (NPC) and a National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), both established by separate decrees in 1992 basically to discharge regulatory roles over the press and broadcast media respectively (Mohammed, 1996).

Other institutions whose work relate to the mass media are the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria (BON), the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) and the National Association of Women Journalists (NAWOJ). These organisations, as the names suggest, are independent of government and they help articulate the interests of their members. Similarly, we have witnessed in the past couple of years the rise of advocacy groups devoted to articulating issues of press freedom. Among the most prominent ones were the Media Rights Agenda (MRA), the Centre for Free Speech (CFS) and Journalists for Democratic Rights (JODER).

**Print Media and Politics In Nigeria**

The development of the press in Nigeria was tied to the political development of the country. The first newspaper, a missionary paper though, was established in 1859 by Rev. Henry Townsend. The paper called, *Iwe Irohin*, was a bilingual fortnightly newspaper devoted to promoting western values through the spread of education. Though the paper sometimes pursued other campaigns of a purely political nature, which aroused hostile reactions from the colonial administration, its overall philosophy was the promotion of western values and Christianity through education (Omu, 1996).

Nigeria witnessed the birth of newspapers published by Africans from 1880. Although the African successors to the missionary tradition were also committed to the
promotion of education, their focus was different from the missionary newspaper. As Africans, they were denied effective participation in government under the colonial administration. The press took on the role of opposition to government. It encouraged a sense of political and nationalist awareness and involvement by providing the medium of criticism of the authorities, spreading disaffection with aspects of official policies and programmes and co-ordinating movements of agitation (Omu, 1996:3).

The Nigerian press developed along the lines of traditional opposition to the government. A kind of libertarian tradition that places the press at the service of the society, acting as watchdog on the activities of government, and helping to articulate the views and opinions of the people. This tradition guided the operation of the press in the early period until the late 1920s and early 1930s when, due to the increase in political activities, which was perhaps a result of the introduction of constitutional reform which enabled Nigerians, for the first time, to elect representatives into the parliament, there was an upsurge in political activities. The token reform led to an increase in political activities in Lagos and this eventually had an impact on the development of the press in Lagos. During this period, there emerged in Lagos daily newspapers to take the place of the dying and rather erratic militant weeklies of the late 19th century and early 20th century (Omu, 1996). Up till the early 1930s the development of the press was restricted to Lagos. However, what was to change the character of the press in Nigeria happened in 1937. This was how Omu puts it:

The decline in journalism began to recede with the appearance on 22 November, 1937 of Nnamdi Azikwe's West African Pilot whose motto was "Show the light and the people will find the way". In its opening statement entitled 'The Curtain Rises', the paper announced its mission as that of 'sentinel of popular liberty and guardian of civilisation'. The paper's vivid format, dynamic and combative style and ideological salience anchored on a campaign against racial superiority and domination aimed at restoring the dignity and self-confidence of the black man (Omu, 1996:6).
The success of the papers also rubbed off on the political fortunes of its proprietor, who had then emerged as a national leader and its political party the NCNC as a national political party.

The people identified with the radical grandstanding against colonial rule of the newspaper and this translated into a commercial success. From an initial circulation of 6000 copies the newspaper hit an all time high circulation of over 20,000 thirteen years after its birth. Though the *West African Pilot* established by Azikwe set the pace for modern journalism in Nigeria, other newspapers were quick to follow the example of Azikwe and this led to the growth of the press in Nigeria. This came in the form of government established newspaper especially in the North where there was none to counter the influence of Azikwe's paper and other individuals who were following the lead of Azikwe's newspaper success. Thus, a Hausa language newspaper appeared in January 1939 with the establishment by the then Northern Nigerian Government of the *Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo* based in Zaria. It was also in this period that provincial newspapers emerged in Calabar, Onitsha, Aba, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu-Ode and Osogbo (Omu, 1996).

Though efforts were made to establish provincial newspapers by Azikwe and others that followed his lead, Lagos still remained the main centre of press activities in the country. From the beginning of the time of amalgamation of Nigeria, and most importantly, since the introduction of the elective principle, Lagos became a social melting pot; new persons came into journalism thus widening the social basis of the mainstream profession.

Though Azikwe introduced a lot of changes into the profession of journalism, the administration of his chain of newspapers was tied to his political fortune, just like the earlier newspapers. In addition to the fortune of newspapers being tied to the political career of the publisher, the period from 1937 till independence and right through the first republic in Nigeria (October, 1960-January, 1966) also witnessed the attachment of newspapers to the fortune of different political parties. This indicates that ownership is a strong factor in the struggle for media coverage in Nigeria from the beginning of press journalism. Skurnik (1986) also stressed that in Africa, the press is mostly an instrument of power, controlled and directed by the ruling groups. Since
independence, papers supporting the opposition have been progressively taken over by ruling governments.

This development had a negative impact on the development of the press in Nigeria. As Kukah (1996) pointed out, with independence, the press found itself a victim of the political pressures on the regional tripod on which Nigeria rested. The press was now conscripted to fight regional and ethnic battles in defence of the interests of the political classes of the three regions. This gave rise to partisan press to the extent that at independence, the regional governments -North, West and East- felt the need to establish their own newspapers, a clear departure from the past whereby newspapers were set up only by either political parties or individuals. In 1960, the Eastern Nigerian Government upgraded its *Eastern Nigeria Outlook*. In 1961, the Federal Government set up its own, *The Morning Post*. Three years later, the Western Nigerian government established the *Daily Sketch*. And just before the January 1966 coup, the Northern Nigeria Government launched its own newspaper, the *New Nigerian*, apparently correctly anticipating that we were about to enter a new era in every sense in Nigeria (Ekpu, 1996). Hence, the period from 1960 marked the effective entry of the government into the media history characterised by the private ownership.

What was markedly a different tradition in the history of Nigeria took shape in the early 1980s with the birth of *The Guardian* as well as the rise of investigative journalism often associated with the weekly news magazines. According to Omu (1996):

> "a dynamic influence came into Nigerian journalism with the establishment of *The Guardian*. Its founders conceived it as a well planned and carefully thought out enterprise which would present a balanced coverage and projection of news and views, uphold political neutrality and independence and elevate the tone of public discourse. The principles which it exposes and the standards which it represents set it out as a national institution...The *Guardian* has achieved great esteem in and outside Nigeria as one of the most authoritative newspapers in Africa" (Omu, 1996: 11-12).
The success of The Guardian was followed with the establishment of newsmagazines from 1985, first by Newswatch publications in 1984 and then by the Guardian (African Guardian) and Concord (African Concord) in the late eighties. Newsmagazines that were fiercely opposed to military rule came on board in the 1990s. Examples were TELL magazine and The News. These two newsmagazines suffered the most during the regimes of Babangida and Abacha.

The relationship between successive governments in Nigeria and the press have been marked by conflict and mutual suspicion. During the colonial administration, while there were instances of repression and official efforts to stifle the growth of the radical press through cases of libel brought against some newspaper editors, prosecutions were relatively few and harassment was never the rule (Omu, 1996).

At independence, the Nigerian constitution provided in Section 24 of the Independent Constitution for freedom of expression; an umbrella under which the press could derive its powers (Momoh, 1996). Besides this provision, which was retained in the 1979 Constitution, there were other legal provisions that made the practice of journalism in Nigeria an endangered profession. Among these were the Sedition Law, Official Secrets Act, Criminal Code Section 59, Decree 2, Decree 4 and Decree 43 (Newspaper Registration Board); all these impede the practice of the profession of journalism (Ekpu, 1996). Most importantly, however, are the extra-legal or extra-judicial practices especially during military regimes that seem to define the government-press relations. These range from the arrest and detention without trial of journalists, the conviction of journalists for carrying out their constitutionally guaranteed responsibilities, the killing of journalist through bombs, sudden disappearances of journalists, arbitrary occupation of newspaper or magazine premises by armed soldiers, regular proscription of opposition publications, and the seizure of publications.

The military regimes that ruled Nigeria between 1984 and 1999 came down heavily on the mass media in the bid to have a grip over political discourse in the country. In 1984, the government introduced Decree 4 that sought to gag media report of official information. Two journalists were jailed under this decree and a media organisation,
The Guardian, was fined for reporting otherwise true but unofficially sanctioned information about government political appointments. In 1985, a journalist was killed through a parcel bomb, in what many believed was planned by the government to stop a planned exclusive report on misdemeanour of some government officials by the journalist. In 1988, a weekly newsmagazine, Newswatch, was proscribed for six months for publishing the report of a government commission on political blueprint for Nigeria before the official release of the report by the government.

However, none of these repressive actions matched the measures adopted by the government from 1990. Following the failed April 1990 coup, many journalists were arrested and a newspaper organisation temporarily closed. These developments set the tone for what was to follow in subsequent years. In March 1991, three newspapers in Lagos owned by John West Publications were shut down for thirteen days for what was described as embarrassing publications against the president and his wife. In May of the same year, the Lagos State government temporarily closed down The Guardian, after its coverage of the student killings in Lagos following students’ protest. Four journalists and two office assistants were arrested. The paper reopened nearly two weeks later. The journalists and assistants were released the next day without charge.

In 1992, newspapers were shut down and individual journalists were detained and harassed after controversial stories appeared. In April, for instance, the Concord Press Group was closed by police after the African Concord had published a series of articles critical of the government’s handling of the economy and the transition programme. The offices were reopened two weeks later, after publisher Chief Moshood Abiola apologised to the government for the embarrassment caused by the publication. Rather than apologise, Bayo Onanuga, editor of the African Concord, and three journalists resigned to establish their own newsmagazine, The News.

Individual journalists were also subjected to routine harassment by the government. The managing and deputy editors of the government-owned Daily Times, Nigeria’s most widely circulated newspaper, were fired in January 1992, following a front-page story on December 31, 1991 that cited criticism of the open ballot system. In March, editor Fola Olamiti and deputy editor Victor Antwi of the Nigerian Tribune in Ibadan
were briefly arrested following publication of a story entitled "Ibadan Under Police Siege," which claimed that police were making random arrests and demanding bribes to secure the detainees' release. The two editors were released shortly after their arrests (HRW, Africa Annual Report on Nigeria, 1992)

Also in May 1992, the government unveiled the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree, which, although never published, announced a prohibition on promoting "ideas that minimize the sovereignty of Nigeria." It was believed to have been directed at the Ogonis as well as at human rights activists and outspoken journalists. In announcing the decree, the Justice Minister said that it could be interpreted to convict "anybody who acts alone or conspires with anybody...either by word or publication of any material capable of disrupting the general fabric of the country or any part of it." Conviction under the decree would result in death. Two weeks after the announcement, following international protest, the decree was suspended, and it has not been revived.

The press, which became increasingly outspoken in 1993, suffered increasing government assault. In March, the editor of the Kaduna-based Reporter, owned by a former presidential candidate banned by Babangida in 1992, was arrested. In late May, the paper was proscribed. Two new and outspoken publications, The News and Tell, endured incessant campaigns of government-sponsored harassment. In May, The News was shut down and its entire editorial staff declared wanted for arrest. The magazine was later banned for several months.

In 1993, William Keeling, a correspondent for the British daily Financial Times, was expelled from Nigeria and declared persona non grata. The government accused him of writing inaccurate articles to cause mischief and disharmony among Nigerians and between Nigeria and the rest of the world. The government’s statement cited an article in which Keeling had accused the government of not reporting about half of the extra five billion dollars that it was estimated to have earned from higher oil prices during the Gulf war (HRW, Africa Annual Report on Nigeria, 1993).

After the annulment of the 1993 election the government repression intensified. Five media were shut down in July. These were Concord Press, owned by Abiola, Punch,
the Sketch group, Abuja Newsday, and The Observer. All except Newsday were proscribed by decree the following month. In an ironic twist to the principle of federalism two of the newspapers, the Sketch group and The Observer owned by other state governments (Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Oshun for Sketch and Edo for The Observer) were shut down by the central government.

In 1994 the staff of The News/Tempo and TELL were targeted on several occasions. Bayo Onanuga, editor-in-chief, was arrested and detained briefly in August and September. Deputy editor-in-chief Dapo Olorunyomi was arrested twice after August. Journalists at Punch and The Guardian were also arrested in August. On August 26 1994, two CNN reporters were forced to leave the country without explanation. Their expulsion occurred on the same day that CNN aired their report, which included interviews with two opposition leaders whose homes were firebombed the previous night. Several newspapers were proscribed in 1994. They were The Guardian Group, Punch, National Concord. This measure threw a lot of journalists out of jobs.

In addition to closing down media organisations, individual journalists and proprietors were targeted. For instance, in February 1996, Alex Ibru, publisher of The Guardian, survived an assassination attempt. Ladi Olorunyomi, journalist and wife of exiled journalist Dapo Olorunyomi, was detained for six weeks from March 20, 1996. In February 1997, Moshood Ademola Fayemiwo, the publisher of the Razor magazine, was detained by Nigerian agents in the Benin Republic and moved to Lagos. Godwin Agboroko, editor of the Week magazine, was detained from December 1996 to May 7, 1997. George Onah, journalist with the Vanguard, was released on May 14 after a year in detention. Many other journalists were detained for shorter periods and often beaten. In July, the editor of the Owerri-based newspaper the Horn, Oni Egbonine, was arrested by soldiers and beaten into a coma. In the same month, Edetean Ojo of the Guardian daily newspaper was prevented from travelling to a conference in Kenya. Journalists with the foreign media were also targeted. In January, 1994 London Financial Times correspondent Paul Adams was detained for a week; in February, BBC World Service correspondent Hilary Anderson was detained overnight; and in July, a reporter for the Middle East News Agency was detained for a week (HRW, Africa Annual Report on Nigeria, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997).
The attacks on the media and media professional represent a blurring of boundaries between media organisations and professionals and human rights activists and a basis for more cooperative action from the two important constituents of the civil society. How the CLO used this development to mobilise this important part of the political structure in Nigeria will be discussed in more detail in the following two chapters.

Minority Conflicts
April 1990 Coup
The first case that highlights the growing awareness of the role of human rights in political contests in Nigeria was the violent but unsuccessful attempt made by a group of soldiers to take over the leadership of the country. The soldiers had described their unsuccessful attempt as “...a well conceived planned and executed revolution of the marginalized and enslaved people of the Middle Belt and the South with a view to freeing us and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation by a clique of this country... Our history is replete with numerous and uncountable instances of callous and insensitive dominitive and oppressive intrigues by those who think it is their birth right to dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the exclusion of the Middle Belt and the South. They have almost succeeded in subjugating the Middle Belt and making them voiceless and are now extending it to the South. It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and marginalisation...must be resisted with all vehemence.” (Orkar, 1990:99)

Another reason offered for the change was the need to stop intrigues, domination and eternal colonisation of the Nigeria state by the so-called chosen few as well as the need to lay egalitarian foundation for the democratic take-off of Nigerians States. Five states namely: Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi were excised from Nigeria following what they considered as their negative contribution to the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes into effect immediately until certain conditions are met.

The abortive coup of 22 April 1990 effectively highlighted the intensity of ethno-religious grievances over the distribution of power and privilege in Nigeria. Although the coup plotters did not explicitly put forward a religious motive for their action,
their agenda clearly suggested an anti-Islamic one. In the first place, the five states (Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto) which the dissidents had sought temporarily to excise from the Nigerian federation constitute mainly the power base of Muslim North. Second, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, whose removal as Sultan of Sokoto the coup makers had demanded as a precondition for the expulsion of the excised states, was personally one of the most visible defenders of Islamic political interests in the federation. Third, the coup makers explicitly invoked the names of such aggrieved Christian or non-Muslim figures as Tam David-West, Ebitu Ukiwe and Domkat Bali in justifying their declared mission to liberate the “marginalized, oppressed and enslaved people of the Middle-Belt and the South” from the “feudalistic and autocratic domination” of the far North. Although most people dismissed the conditional expulsion of the “far” north as a silly gamble, Ihonvbere (1996) pointed out that the coup forced certain “deep-rooted” conflicts and “critical issues” to the front page of the national discourse.

Although, the group that attempted to violently overthrow the government does not lay any pretence to being a human rights group, their action heightened the agitations for human rights such as: self-determination of different communities in the country, power shift from the North to the South, the Ogoni and other oil producing communities rights over the resources on the lands, sovereign national conference, resource control, federalism, and the Sharia polemics. In essence, it ripped open the fault lines in Nigerian politics. The military government of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida used the attempt as an excuse for a massive crackdown on civilian opposition figures and institutions. The crackdown on dissent that followed the coup attempt shook the foundations of Nigeria's fragile civil society.

**Ogoni Crisis**

In the same year, 1990, the Ogoni people of Nigeria also presented what they called the Ogoni Bill of Rights to the Nigerian government. In the Bill (included in the appendix) the Ogoni people demanded for their right to self-determination. The Bill of Rights presented to the Government and people of Nigeria called for political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, control and use of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni Development, adequate and direct representation as of right for Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the right to protect the Ogoni
environment and ecology from further degradation. The Ogonis, a minority group inhabiting the oil-producing delta region of Rivers State, vocally protested the destruction of their land and culture by multinational oil companies and Nigerian military forces.

In the Bill of Rights, the Ogoni people claimed that after the termination of British rule, the majority ethnic groups of Nigeria usurped their right to self-determination. Consequently, the Ogoni people rejected once and for all "this incompetent indigenous colonialism and calls for a new order in Nigeria, an order in which each ethnic group will have full responsibility for its own affairs and competition between the various peoples of Nigeria will be fair, thus ushering in a new era of peaceful co-existence, co-operation and national progress" (Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990 see Appendix 4).

Pointedly, the Bill of Rights stated that it has been assumed that because the Ogoni were few in number, they can be abused and denied their rights and that their environment can be destroyed without compunction. However, the situation was expected to change as the Ogoni put their case across to the international community in 1992. It is their hope that the international community will respond to these just demands as they have done to similar demands in other parts of the world.

The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, has been at the forefront of the confrontation between the Ogoni people of the Niger-Delta, the oil companies, and the government. Like other communities in oil-producing areas, the Ogoni contended that multinational oil companies, particularly the Shell Petroleum Development Company, with the active cooperation of the Nigerian government, had ravaged their land and contaminated their rivers, while providing little, if any, tangible benefit in return.

The Nigerian government responded to the demands of the Ogoni with brutal force. Ogoni spokesperson Ken Saro-Wiwa became the target of a government harassment campaign, and in June 1993 he was arrested and detained for over one month. On July 13, Saro-Wiwa was charged before a Port Harcourt magistrates court with six counts,
including unlawful assembly and sedition, relating to a boycott by the Ogonis of the June election. Two other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, which Mr. Saro-Wiwa headed, were also charged. Later that month, all three were released on bail, and their trial was adjourned.

On April 21, 1994, the Rivers State Commissioner of Police ordered an operation involving the military and police to restore and maintain law and order in Ogoniland. Following the announcement, villages were attacked, and more than forty Ogonis were killed. Visitors to Ogoniland, both Nigerian and foreign, were prevented from conducting investigations into the Ogonis' complaints. Following the May 21, 1994 murders by a mob of four Ogoni leaders who had been branded as pro-government, the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force embarked on a brutal repression of the Ogoni people. Many women and girls were reportedly raped, and villages were looted and burned to the ground. Hundreds of Ogonis were arrested and detained in military camps in the area; most were later released. The repression was characterized by flagrant human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions, indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary arrests and detention, floggings, rapes, looting, and extortion.

Shortly after the May 1994 murders, Ken Saro-Wiwa and Ogoni activists Ledum Mitee, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpuinen, and Baribor Bera were detained. On February 6, 1995, the prosecution charged them with four counts of murder at the first session of the special tribunal established expressly to hear their case. The eight-month delay in filing charges in the case, in conjunction with the procedural irregularities that characterized the trials including the presence on the tribunal of an active member of the armed forces, the highly militarised tribunal premises, and the lack of any provision for independent review fuelled the belief that the charges were politically motivated. On March 28, the special tribunal assumed jurisdiction over the cases of ten additional defendants, all of whom were formally charged on April 7 with the murders of the Ogoni leaders.

In the face of increasing evidence of the tribunal's bias against the defendants, the original defence team withdrew from all the cases by mid-July 1995 in order to avoid legitimising the proceedings before the tribunal. The immediate impetus behind their withdrawal was the tribunal's refusal to admit into evidence a videotape or transcript
of a government press conference on May 22, 1994, the day after the murders, where Lieutenant-Colonel Komo, the military administrator of Rivers State, accused MOSOP of carrying out the murders. The videotape also includes a statement by a prosecution witness, which contradicts his testimony in the case against Saro-Wiwa, Mitee, Kiobel, Kpuinen, and Bera. The defence team intended to use Kobani’s earlier statement to undermine his credibility.

In late October, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpunien, Baribor Bera, Saturday Dobee, Felix Nwate, Nordu Eawo, Paul Levura, and Daniel Gbokoo were convicted and sentenced to death; the remaining defendants were acquitted. On November 8, the Provisional Ruling Council confirmed the sentences of those convicted. Despite world appeals for clemency, all nine defendants were executed by hanging in Port Harcourt on November 10. The international attention the Ogoni campaign attracted and the international isolation of Nigeria following the killings are examples of how domestic issues are internationalised through activities of TNANs. This will be examined in more detail in the next chapter.

Similar to the Ogoni campaign were the campaigns mounted by the Ijaw Youth Council, another minority group in 1998 and the group that claimed to represent the Igbo people, one of the ethnic majority groups in Nigeria. On December 11, 1998 the Ijaw Youth Council met and issued what came to be known as the Kaiama Declaration (CLO Annual Human Rights Report, 1998). The Declaration asserted that all land and natural resources in Ijaw territory belonged to the Ijaw people irrespective of the decrees passed by governments in which they had no representation. The Declaration indicated the desire of the Ijaw people to cease to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob them of the right to ownership and control of their lives and resources, which were enacted without their participation and consent. They also extend the cooperation to other ethnic nationalities in the Niger-Delta and other areas that are also fighting for self-determination.

The agitations of some of the ethnic minorities and the claims of those responsible for the 1990 coup parallel that of the core mission of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) and its successor organisation, the United Action for Democracy (UAD). In the next
chapter, I will examine how the CLO through its activities in the CD, UAD and TMG influenced political mobilisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999.

The CD made the restoration of the sovereignty of the Nigerian people to self-determination, to choose how to be governed, who governs them and the procedure or process through which they will be governed, as its main objective. The UAD, on the other hand, went a step above the CD. Its charter of demands included the independent convening of a democratically elected Sovereign National Conference on the basis of proportionate representation of social forces such as workers, farmers, professionals, traders, women, minority groups etc to seek popular solution to the political, economic, socio-cultural and other historical problems confronting the country; protection of the Nigerian environment against all forms of degradation and violation by all companies and agencies operating in Nigeria; and an end to all forms of national domination and oppression as a condition for the emergence of a truly united and democratic multi-ethnic Nigerian nation.

The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was one of the organisations that constituted the UAD. Hence, in the case of democratisation in Nigeria, human rights as an issue as well as human rights organisations influenced the direction of democratisation in the country from 1990. In the case of the Ogoni people, their commitment to self-determination as a legitimate issue for democratisation led to the Ogoni boycott of the 1993 national elections in the country.

Discussion and Conclusion
From the 1914 amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single country, called Nigeria, politics in the country have been dominated by how to balance power between the ethnic groups that made up the country. It has taken constitutional routes as well as war route (the 1967 civil war). Several systems of government have been used, but the underlying fault lines (ethnicity and religion) continued to undermine the social cohesion of the country. At the height of oil-dollar boom, the problems were covered over by the resources of the country that was able to go round. With the collapse of the economy and the introduction of IMF-World Bank structural adjustment regime, old wounds were ripped open again.
A new world order that swept through the whole world after the collapse of communism opened the way for new relationships to emerge and for old problems to be framed in new ways. Human rights emerged as one of the main issues around which struggles for political empowerment were organised from the mid 1980s. In the case of Nigeria the April 1990 coup and the attempt to excise some states from Nigeria and the Ogoni and other minority agitations from 1990 highlights this new trend.

However, nowhere was this development brought out more pungently than in the new human rights organisations that gave human rights interpretations to the democratisation process in Nigeria. With international political opportunities structures providing the resources that were mobilised and local conditions that were favourable to human rights advocacy, human rights represented a new addition to the history of democratisation and power struggle by different groups in Nigeria.

These development indicate that rather than use only modernisation or transitional framework to analyse democratisation, the structural approach with its emphasis on changing power configurations is most appropriate to analysing democratisation in a country like Nigeria, where the struggle for power is what democratic or military government actually symbolises for political actors/gladiators. The impact of human rights organisations in the political mobilisation of Nigerians between 1990 and 1999 will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction
The last chapter discussed the theoretical frameworks that will be used for this study. From the discussion, materials in this study cut across three areas; democratisation, transnational human rights networks as well as media and social construction of politics. This chapter examines the methods adopted to collect and analyse data for the study.

Research Approach
I adopted a range of methods within the qualitative research approach for this study. There are some characteristics of qualitative approach that made it most appropriate for this study. The most fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is its express commitment to viewing events, action, norms and values from the perspective of the people being studied. This involves a preparedness to penetrate the frames of meaning with which they operate. Further, qualitative research exhibits a preference for contextualism in its commitment to understanding events, behaviour, etc. in their context. The implications of the themes of contextualism, particularly in connection with the others engender a style of research in which the meanings that people ascribe to their own and other’s behaviour have to be set in the context of the values, practices, and underlying structures of the appropriate entity as well as the multiple perceptions that pervade that entity (Bryman, 2002). Qualitative research method also makes it possible to understand events in the wider social and historical context. Therefore, it is most appropriate for dealing with human behaviour which is not predictable and which might need a lot of observation to unravel the mysteries it covers up.

Research Methods
Three methods of data collection were used for this study. The first was the case study of CLO. The second was participant reflexivity, which includes my activities as Editor of CLO’s LIBERTY magazine, coordinator of a journalist network and member
of the Nigerian United Nations Lobby Project (UNLOP). The third was analysis of political discourse in one mainstream newspaper in Nigeria, *The Guardian*.

**Case Study**

Transnational networks are a new but growing area of scholarship, both theoretically and empirically (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a). Getting appropriate theoretical and methodological framework for this study was therefore a bit challenging. Hence, I had to adopt a method that is most appropriate for generating new theories. Generating theory and formulating hypotheses require different methods from those of testing theory. The approach adopted in this study, therefore, is that of grounded theory approach, which is the most systematic attempt to specify how theoretical insights are generated through qualitative research (Glasser and Strauss, 1967). I selected the Civil Liberties Organisation as my case study.

Before 1987, there were no organised and articulate efforts to promote human rights in Nigeria. This situation changed with the founding of the CLO in October 1987. Therefore, the origin of the human rights movement in Nigeria lies in the founding of the Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria’s pioneer human rights NGO in 1987. The dream of the founders of the organisation was “to establish an organisation that would hold the government accountable and establish a culture of human rights in Nigeria” (CLO Report of Accounts and Activities, 1994).

CLO is a membership organisation with sixteen state branches outside Lagos. It investigated human rights abuses and campaigned through litigation, publications and communications with the government on behalf of people whose rights have been abused. It also undertook human rights education through its empowerment project, such as human rights clinics and seminars on human rights issues. It lobbied governments through dialogue and public censure and campaigned to end specific government abuses.

As the first human rights organisation in Nigeria and an important part of the civil society, CLO stood at the head of a movement for the democratisation of Nigeria.
Organisations, especially from the South, linked up with organisations in the North as a means of coping with realities of conditions of existence and, often, volatile environment. In its early days CLO depended entirely on ability to enlist international support to survive the inclemency of domestic military repression. An example was the introduction by Human Rights Watch (HRW) Africa of annual report on Nigeria and the visit to the CLO in 1989 by the head of Amnesty International.

According to the organisation’s founding President:

"In the first few years, CLO lacked both adequate human and material resources. The few years of the CLO was devoted almost entirely to ensuring the survival of the baby, born into the worst possible conditions. In fact, to stretch the natal image further, CLO was born into an orphanage if Nigeria were her only parent.” (CLO Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994: 5).

Within the domestic context, the social-economic dislocations created by SAP provided a ground for the CLO to align with the struggles of other big organisations such as professional bodies that were fighting against excesses of military governance. Therefore, CLO articulated programmes of cooperation and alliance building with organisations with massive social base in the society. It also went into strategic information exchange, affiliation and funding alliance with powerful international actors. Therefore, CLO established active links with human rights organisations and related non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations or institutions both locally and internationally (CLO Annual Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994).

The CLO was one of the human rights organisations that stood between different power influences linking those disempowered by military governments in Nigeria with organisations and institutions outside the country with tremendous influence internationally. It thus mediated between the Nigerian state and the people in the democratisation of Nigeria.
Through local patrons such as the trade union organisations, student organisations, church-based and mosque-based organisations, women organisations, journalists’ organisations and other grassroots organisations, it provided a platform for formulating an alternative democratisation path for Nigeria. Through its international contacts, such as funders, users of the information contained in its reports, governments in North America and Europe with a commitment to a democratic order that promotes human rights, and others with an abiding interest in Nigeria, it built a strong network of power base that was strong enough to command the consideration and attention of successive Nigerian governments.

The active engagement of the CLO in the democratisation process and the framing of the transition programme in terms of an alternative programme provided a huge reservoir of materials for studying democratisation in Nigeria. This is one of the reasons why CLO was chosen as my case study. In the case of CLO and the democratisation process in Nigeria, the dominant issues revolve around the rule of law, military disengagement, genuine democratisation and political and economic restructuring of Nigeria.

Through the use of publications such as LIBERTY magazine, annual reports, campaigner, democracy review and special reports, alternative frames for understanding the issues at stake in the democratisation of Nigeria were developed by the CLO to counter the official government position. This study, therefore, examined the use of frames in CLO publications to promote the viewpoint of the organisation in the democratisation process.

The CLO had a lot of operational difficulties due to the repressive measures of various military regimes. Many useful materials were lost during raids on the offices of the organisation by the military regimes in the country. Therefore, this study balanced this inadequacy with the researcher’s own active involvement in most of the processes that led to the campaigns and other activities of the organisation in the transition to democracy in Nigeria. One major weakness of this approach is that of the biases that might be associated with my perspective for looking at issues developed while working for the organisation over a period of eight years. To reduce the bias, I also used materials about the organisation written by sources outside the organisation,
in particular Human Rights Watch (HRW) Africa. The annual reports of HRW on Nigeria, provided most of the materials I used to discuss the growing influence of human rights in the democratisation of Nigeria from 1990.

**Participant Reflexivity**

Between 1990 and 1998, I worked for the Civil Liberties Organisation. My experience included editing the publications of the organisation, *LIBERTY* and Democracy Review, I was also in charge of the domestic media campaign of the organisation and the coordinator of the Journalists Outreach for Human Rights (JOHR). In 1996, I was a member of the Nigerian Human Rights Community delegation to the 52nd UN Human Rights Commission and worked with other Nigerians and other organisations to get a resolution on Nigeria passed.

I joined the CLO in 1990 as a research officer. I wrote reports for the quarterly publication of the organisation, the *LIBERTY* and other reports as were assigned to me. However, from 1992, I was made the editor of the publication. As the editor, I was in charge of the contents of the magazine. The first responsibility was to organise an editorial board. The first board had an academic from the University of Lagos Department of Mass Communication, Chairman of Editorial Board of the Guardian Newspaper, and a columnist with one of the mainstream newspapers. While the board improved the content of the publication, it gave little leverage to the coverage of the work of the organisation in the mainstream media.

As editor, I was responsible for developing story ideas and editorial focus of magazine. From 1992, when I became the editor, the magazine focussed on current political issues in the country. This attracted the attention of the government and a number of times; I had to work from home and other safe places. In one instance, the government came to the office and took away the cover design of the *LIBERTY* as well as the artist. The edition had sought to highlight the fallacies engrained in the transition programme of the government with the cover title: *Transition Without End*. A number of editions also focussed on the insincerity of the government on the transition programme as well as on the implication of some of the policies of the government, such as *Killing Nigeria* and the *Battle for Nigeria’s Soul*. I used
materials based on my experience to discuss the human rights advocacy in
democratisation and how actors often negotiate the difficult terrains of contexts.

From 1992 the political environment in Nigeria became charged, as the transition
programme of the then Head of State General Ibrahim Babangida neared its end. The
CLO also took on a more political role with its active role in the pro-democracy
movement, the Campaign for Democracy (CD). It was, therefore, felt that the editorial
board should be reconstituted and more active journalists brought on board, to reflect
the changing situation. Most importantly, from July 1993 the government clamped
down on the mass media, closing down some and proscribing others. As a means of
furthering the cause of freedom of expression in the country, the CLO engaged the
services of some of those who lost their jobs as a result of the closure. Hence, some of
the journalists were incorporated into the editorial board of the \textit{LIBERTY} and other
campaign activities of the organisation.

When some of the media organisations were reopened, the journalists went back to
their old beats, but the relationship already cultivated with the CLO blossomed. This
in 1995, led to the formation of the first network of journalists covering human rights
issues or those interested in human rights issues in the mass media. It was called the
Journalists Outreach for Human Rights (JOHR). JOHR organised a number of
workshops on human rights education for journalists. The network also organised a
conference on developing human rights reporting curriculum for higher institutions in
Nigeria.

Amongst the role of the network was providing additional sources of income to
journalists. This facilitated development of human rights consciousness among a
number of Nigerian journalists. The network also facilitated the participation of some
journalists at international conferences such as the UN Human Rights Commission in
Geneva. The development of a journalists’ empowerment fund that assisted jailed and
detained journalists as well as facilitating funding for further studies for some of the
journalists on the network were also part of the activities of the network. The network
also led to the birth of the Centre for Free Speech an organisation that committed
itself to the promotion of freedom of expression in Nigeria. As the coordinator I was
in charge of running the network, developing projects and raising funds.
Participant reflexivity is not neutral. It is something one must construct by oneself. Hence, it is a fallible history that is subject to the interpretations of the writer. As argued by Bryman (2002) the participant observer is his or her own research instrument. How the participant observer responds to the unfamiliar professional environment and negotiates relationships in the field can also become the object of self-reflection and reflexivity. Reflection on one's own intellectual and emotional responses can provide important insights into the norms and, often unspoken, rules, customs and values informing the professional practices of those observed; it can also throw into sharp relief those of the researcher. Bryman (2002) stressed that one of the strengths of participant observation is that it is not really a single method, but embrace different ways of gathering data and styles of observation.

**Framing and Discourse Analysis**

Whatever frames for understanding democratisation in Nigeria that were developed by the CLO needs to be examined within the mainstream media discourse in the country to understand its impact on the overall political process.

The discourse analysis of one mainstream newspaper, *The Guardian*, in Nigeria was approached in two ways. The first dealt with the news structures of the newspaper, while the second involved the analysis of editorials in the newspaper. The period of analysis covered nine years, 1990 to 1999. The framework for discourse analysis of news was adapted from Deacon et al (1999) and Bell (1999). The framework for the discourse analysis of editorials was adapted from Van Dijk (1998), Fairclough (1995) and Deacon et al (1999).

The analytical framework adopted by Bell (1999) seeks to reconstruct from the often-fragmentary information presented in a news story, what the news says actually happened. It concentrates on the basics of storytelling, which is what, when, where, why and how. This framework provides an indication of how news is made, limitations and the news values behind them. He identified the following elements as necessary to describe the discourse structure of news stories: attribution (source), abstract (lead sentence/ intro and headline), the event (the real news story), background (events prior to the current development), commentary (journalist's or
news actor's assessment of the present development), and follow-up (any action subsequent to the main action of an event; future action).

Van Dijk (1998) framework for editorials and opinion articles was adapted for the discourse analysis. This involves

- Examining the context of the discourse,
- Analysing which groups, or power relations and conflicts are involved,
- Looking for positive and negative opinions about Us and Them,
- Spelling out the presupposed and the implied, and,
- Examining all formal structures that (de) emphasise polarised group's opinions.

Data Analysis

Three different data analysis were used. The first was analysis of official documents, the second was personal experience reconstruction (participant reflexivity) and the third was analysis of newspaper reports.

Official Documents

The first source of my data was the publications of the Civil Liberties Organisation between 1990 and 1999. These included annual reports (8 published between 1990 and 1999), LIBERTY Magazine (30 published between 1990 and 1999), Democracy Review (5 published, between 1997 and 1998), special reports, press releases, and books (published between 1990 and 1999). During this period, the CLO lost many official documents when State Security officers carted away materials from the office. To make up for this deficiency, I searched the Website of organisations identified as having played an important role in the democratisation of Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. I was also a participant in most of the activities of the organisation between 1990 and 1998.

Deacon et al (1999) suggested that we can look at how organisations have documented their activities, strategies and decisions where:

- access to people or situations is restricted or denied;
• historical studies where direct access to people and situations is no longer possible;
• secondary analysis where a project is based on the re-analysis of material previously collected by other researchers;
• textual analysis where the organisation and meaning of the material itself is the major focus of research.

I grounded the analysis in a complete population of materials published by the CLO between 1990 and 1999 as well as the news and editorial comments of one newspaper published during this period. Through the choice of publications my intention was to restrict, as far as possible, potential sample selection bias (being editor of one of the publications of the CLO). In making my selection, I tried to access as wide a range of alternative sources of information about the CLO as possible, so that I could include contributions from different sources, from different backgrounds. I limited my search to the organisations mentioned in CLO publications and that were institutionally connected to the organisation.

In respect of this study, the CLO and the communication processes it used to constitute itself and mobilise support for its human rights activities was the major focus. Although, looking at other organisations would have enriched this study, my selection of the CLO was informed by the need to achieve depth of analysis and the fact that most other organisations had roots in the CLO.

Since the activities of the CLO were based essentially on networking and communication, I used network and framing analysis methods to analyse the official documents of the organisation. Networks are social structures created by communication among individuals and groups. As people communicate with others, contacts and links are made, and these channels become instrumental in all forms of social functioning organisations and in society at large. Importantly, networks are the channels through which influence and power are exerted in organisations and the society at large. One of the strengths of the network approach is the attention paid to the patterned and structured interrelationships of individuals and organisations as
opposed to features such as 'intrinsic characteristics', 'essences', attributes, or goals of individuals or groups (Schmitz, 1999).

**Network Mapping**

The network analysis was organised along the following lines:

**Membership:** This involves analysis of the organisational affiliation of CLO officials and staff. There are more than 15,000 registered members of CLO, however, most of the registration details were seized during raids on the offices of the organisation across the country. Therefore, it is not possible to map the organisational affiliation of CLO members. This is why the study only focuses on the organisational affiliation of CLO officials and of the CLO itself.

**Outreach:** This involves the analysis of some of the programmes of the organisation. From CLO publications, organisations with whom CLO collaborated in the past were identified.

**Communication:** This involves the analysis of how CLO sends out information.

**Support Base:** This involves the analyses of the organisations that supported the CLO through funding, technical expertise and promoting the cause of the organisation at international fora.

In a study on “Mapping Networks of Power: Questions of Media Ownership and Control”, Deacon et al (1999) identified four steps in mapping networks of power, three of which were adapted for this study as follows:

- **Step 1:** Identifying the major players: In this case there is only one major player: The Civil Liberties Organisation.

- **Step 2:** Compilation of basic information on the major players through the organisations reports and published profiles. The CLO publishes annual reports of activities and accounts. This serves as the main material from where most of the information was got. Also, there are bits of information about CLO available through online resources of Human Rights Watch, US State Department Annual Reports, University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, The Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development (AFRONET) and the CLO.
- Step 3: Mapping the network: This involves charting the patterns of connection between organisations which emerge, paying attention to the clusters or nodes of influence suggested by the central position that particular organisations occupy in a network. These maps of links are usually represented graphically (Scott, 1992).

Organisations are also linked together through interlocking directorships. When the director of one organisation sits on the board of another concern, it opens up a channel of communication between them. This in turn lays the ground for shared understandings and co-ordinated action. This involves charting the organisational affiliation of people related to the CLO.

**Reconstructed History**
I used the dairy of my activities to reconstruct history of my role in human rights advocacy in Nigeria. I focussed essentially on two areas. These are my relationship with journalists and my experience at the 52nd United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

**News Reports and Editorials**
The third source of information was the mass media. I examined the media coverage of the democratisation of Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. One mainstream newspaper was picked for analysis. There were about 101 newspapers in Nigeria, both independent and government owned. *The Guardian* newspaper is one of the independently owned newspapers and it is regarded as one of the most outstanding newspaper to have come out of Nigeria (Maja-Pearce, 1996). This is one of the reasons why I decided to select it. I chose the coverage of three incidents for analysis as follows:

- The April 1990 unsuccessful military take-over of government.
- The June 12, 1993 annulled presidential election.
- The November 1995 killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists.

While the three incidents were not exhaustive of events that impacted on the democratisation process in Nigeria during the period of study, they bear significantly
on the factors this study considered as important in the struggle for democracy in Nigeria. As pointed out earlier, movements and conflicts do not develop in isolation but tend rather to be concentrated in particular political and historical periods (Tilly et al. 1975; Tarrow 1989, 1994). The organisation of a movement must then be placed in relation to the general orientations of a given period.

For each incident, I picked three months for analysis, the month preceding the incident, the month of the incident and the month after the incident. Thus for the April 1990 coup, I selected for analysis March, April and May issues of the Guardian. For the June 12 incident, I selected for analysis May, June and July 1993 issues of the Guardian. For November 1995, I selected October, November and December 1995. To make the materials more manageable, I reduced the materials to every other day. Therefore, I was left with 15 issues every month. That was 45 issues per event. I focussed on the news and the editorials pages of the newspaper. For the news pages, I restricted myself to the news on the front and back pages only.

**Reporting the Findings**

The research finding was in three parts. The first was the building by the CLO of network of supporters for its cause. This is through an examination of attention paid to some problems, collaborative programmes with groups, participation at international meetings and the financial backers of the organisation. The second part dealt with the use, by CLO, of campaigns, domestic and international to generate pressure and bring about political change in the country. The third method was the use by the CLO of political frames in the media to present its views to the public and to mobilise others to its position. In this way, it also used its publication like the *LIBERTY* magazine and the annual reports. The political discourse in the mainstream newspaper was examined to find out the impact of the framing activities of the CLO on political mobilisation in the country.
CHAPTER FOUR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN NIGERIA- THE CASE OF CLO

Introduction
This chapter examines the system of relationships that connected the sphere of human rights NGOs to that of broader dynamics of political development in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. It explores a network analysis of relationships, which enabled new interpretations of reality to develop, new solidarities to emerge and new avenues for collective action to be developed using the CLO as a case study.

The profound influence of human rights norms in domestic and international politics is underscored by the fact that when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was proclaimed in 1948, Nigeria was still under colonial government. Yet, after independence, Nigeria subscribed to the provisions by including human rights in the fundamental provisions of the 1960 Independence Constitution. The nature of the Nigerian state (dominated by three large ethnic groups and fears over marginalisation by the remaining more than 300 minority groups) necessitated the inclusion of human rights provisions in the Independence Constitution (Akande, 1997).

In addition to the human rights provisions in the Independence Constitution and all subsequent constitutions up till 1999, Nigeria has been very active at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) a gathering of independent African states. Nigeria was a signatory to the OAU African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a document that sought to protect and promote the rights of the people living in Africa. However, in spite of the horrendous human rights violations in Nigeria between 1960 and 1986, there were no articulate campaigns against violation of human rights in Nigeria by local and international human rights organisations. Cases of violations of human rights, students’ killings, banning of media houses, extra-judicial killings, secret trials were not taken up. There were simply no organisations that could systematically take the cases up. Although professional bodies such as those of the bar and the media often took on cases that bordered on human rights violations, the approach could at best be described as ad hoc.
The huge domestic opportunity for human rights mobilisation remained untapped until the birth of the Civil Liberties Organisation in 1987. The birth and relative success of the CLO at articulating human rights agenda in the political discourse were due to a number of factors. As discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, domestic and international political opportunities structures as well as domestic repression provide a fertile ground for the development of transnational human rights advocacy. However, more important than these two factors, as cited in the arguments of Bob (2002) mentioned earlier, is an understanding of how to make use of the two factors creatively.

This chapter maps, through a network analysis, how the CLO used the two factors to mobilise resources for democratic reforms in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. As discussed earlier, the founding of the CLO in 1987 marked a significant shift in political mobilisation in Nigeria. Before the CLO, political mobilisations in the country were largely based on religious and ethnic appeals. From 1990, for the first time in the history of political mobilisation in the country, there was in CLO an organisation that mobilised resources (human, financial and political) for democratic reforms through respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Human Rights and Transnational Advocacy Networks

As discussed in the last chapter, an increasing number of problems are solved by coordinated activities from the local to the global level. This requires universally recognised values and principles, and these are to be found in the international human rights instruments that have been elaborated in the UDHR. Therefore, the mere grounding of an organisational mission in human rights and the use of universal human rights language provide a platform for linking up with other organisations that subscribe to similar worldviews. In a world where boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred, human rights norms provide basis for solidarity that transcends geographical and physical boundaries.

What made the CLO unique in respect of organised human rights campaign in Nigeria was its commitment from inception to defend and promote, in Nigeria, the principles and practice of fundamental human rights as enshrined in the Nigerian constitution, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and other international covenants on human rights. Thus, besides the Nigeria constitution, human rights values contained in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter became points of reference in human rights campaigns in Nigeria.

Since Nigeria was a signatory to these documents, the CLO also adopted the policy of monitoring as a form of campaign strategy. As mentioned earlier, Hawkins (1996) pointed out that human rights monitoring and information about patterns of abuse in Chile helped to trigger local resistance and international support. The CLO monitors the extent of compliance with universal principles and practice of human rights in Nigeria by government and its agencies including the police, the judiciary, the prisons etc., by issuing reports on them. Another unique feature of CLO's objectives was the realisation of the role of networking and alliance building in human rights campaign. Hence, it made efforts to cooperate with and/or support organisations with similar aims and objectives anywhere in the world. This is done through the exchange of the information -contained in CLO’s reports- with these organisations.

Besides these factors which seem to indicate an awareness of developments outside Nigeria, the CLO set for itself the task of defending the rights of disadvantaged members of the society such as children, women, the disabled in addition to informing and conscientising Nigerians so as to enhance their ability to defend and exercise their democratic and inalienable rights. Finally, it aims to campaign for democracy and ensure popular participation in governance.

The CLO was the first and one of the few NGOs that developed strategies to protect, promote and defend human rights in Nigeria. It documented violations, mobilised public opinion and lobbied for higher standards of conduct from the government. By setting out to hold the Nigerian government accountable to universal standards and by drawing inspirations from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and seeking to cooperate with other organisations with similar aims and objectives anywhere in the world CLO provided the platform for what Falk (1994) called globalisation from below.
As discussed earlier, two lawyers, Olisa Agbakoba and Clement Nwankwo, founded CLO but besides the names of the founders other things about the CLO could fit into what Youngs (1997) described as globalised lives within bounded entities. The name of the organisation was inspired by the activities of the Civil Liberties Union in the US. The mode of operation, litigation and media advocacy, shifting the venue of campaigns, was patterned after that of Amnesty International. Staff members of the CLO undertook internships to learn techniques of human rights advocacy from organisations that were based in the West.

Hence, the CLO provided an example of human rights values-driven processes of globalisation within a physically contained boundary. It is an example of a local organisation that derives inspiration and legitimacy from things happening many miles away from Nigeria. How these processes played out within already established domestic and international political environment would be discussed in the sections that follow.

Mobilising Resources: Domestic Political Opportunity Structures

As discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, political opportunity structures provided emerging organisations such as the CLO with opportunities to take on challenges, which might not be possible without the resources provided by these opportunity structures. At the domestic level, Keck and Sikkink (1998b) stressed the importance of social networks-concrete linkages that derive from locality, shared experience, kinship, and the like as foundations on which network activities are based and social movements are built. This will be examined in respect of the CLO.

Organisational Affiliation of CLO People

As discussed in the research methodology chapter, one of the strengths of the network approach is the attention paid to the patterned and structured interrelationships of individuals and organisations as opposed to features such as ‘intrinsic characteristics’, ‘essences’, attributes, or goals of individuals or groups (Schmitz, 1999). Hence my analysis of the CLO will describe not only how the CLO emerged on the Nigerian political scene but how it was constituted through its network of relationships. I will also describe in this section how the CLO network strengthened new domestic actors whose growing influence cannot be explained with reference to their essential
attributes, such as being a journalist or a lawyer, but by the network and interactions they chose to be part of.

**Fig 1: Organisational Affiliation of CLO People**

The officials of CLO belonged to different professional and social organisations that played important roles in the democratisation of Nigeria. As discussed in the last chapter, besides human rights organisations, other civil society organisations that played important roles in the democratisation of Nigeria between 1990 and 1999 were the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) as well as Women in Nigeria (WIN) (Olukoshi, 1997).

The presidents of CLO since 1987 (Olisa Agbakoba 1987-1995, Ayo Obe 1995-2003) were influential members of the lawyers association in Nigeria, the NBA. In addition,
the first president of the CLO sat on the board of the Justice and Peace Commission, an arm of the Catholic Church responsible for human rights, democracy and development. The former national secretary of the CLO (Emma Ezeazu) was also the former national president of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the association coordinating the activities of student unions of all the higher institutions in Nigeria. The former Executive Director (Abdul Oroh) and the first national treasurer of the CLO (Richard Akinnola) were both former officials of the NUJ, the professional body of all journalists in Nigeria. The treasurer of CLO in 1999 (John Odah) was secretary general of the NLC, the coordinating body of all the trade unions in Nigeria. Two of the members of the Board of CLO (Tunde Fatunde and Nnimo Bassey) were members of the Association of Nigerian Authors (ANA). Two members of the Board (Y. Yau and Tunde Fatunde) were also officials of the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU), the professional union of Nigerian universities lecturers. One member (Isabella Okagbue) was also on the board of Amnesty International, Nigerian chapter.

The repressive nature of military rule that negates the principles of the rule of law and freedom of expression struck a chord with organisations such as the NBA and NUJ that were committed to promoting the rule of law and freedom of expression. The effect of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) implementation that affected so many Nigerian workers and students who had to cope with the harsh reality of economic deprivations also struck at the legitimacy of organisations such as the NLC, NANS and ASUU. Hence, domestic deprivations suffered by these organisations made it imperative for them to look for organisations that could put pressure on the Nigerian government.

While, Keck and Sikkink (1998a, 1998b) have stressed the role international opportunities structures could play for such groups, the CLO’s commitment to human rights in Nigeria provided a window of opportunity for the organisations locally. Hence, local organisations with transnational connections working under repressive environment could also provide other groups deprived locally but without those connections with opportunities to challenge the prevailing repressive condition. This is done through making court representations on their behalf and taking up their cases at international fora. Thus, it is possible to also look at local boomerang effect.
The overlapping membership of CLO officials in other professional and strategic organisations within the civil society in Nigeria also provided a unique opportunity to the organisation to influence policies and activities of the other organisations that their officials were affiliated to in the democratisation of Nigeria. Although, overlapping membership in different organisations might not necessarily translate into direct influence on policies and activities of the organisations concerned, the case of CLO was different. Olukoshi (1997) traced the beginning of civil society activism in Nigeria to the period when CLO was founded.

Olukoshi (1997) pointed out that from the mid-1980s, civil society was awakened in Nigeria because of several problems and policies. Numerous civil associations proliferated in various sectors to project and protect substantive interests. These associations became organised, conscious, active, radicalised, bold, undaunted and resilient in the struggle with the state. During this period the media also proliferated and became more virile and radicalised, providing a platform and medium for the struggle between the state and civil society. Civil society educated, mobilised and led popular struggles and mass political action for the protection of civil liberties, the challenge to state repression and repressive laws through the courts, and agitation against transition inconsistencies and economic policies (Olukoshi 1997: 450-76).

The choice of CLO officials reflected a strategic effort to institutionalise human rights work in Nigeria. This position was reflected in the equating of the history of the activism of the civil society in Nigeria with the institutionalisation of human rights work in Nigeria by the CLO. For instance, Ihonvbere (1996) stated that one reason why the military has always found it easy to hijack popular contestations for political power aside from its legal control over the means of coercion is the weakness and fragmentation of civil society. Although labour and student unions voiced grievances and pursued popular agendas, most self-help and community-based associations were largely individualistic and narrow in focus. There was not a single human rights group in Nigeria until October 1987, when the CLO was founded. By implanting itself firmly through a network of relationships with strategic civil society organisations, the CLO influenced the policies and activities of the civil society movement in the democratisation of Nigeria.
CLO and the Human Rights Movement in Nigeria

In addition to membership in different organisations, many people who worked with the CLO left to found different organisations that played an equally important role in the democratisation of Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. CLO claimed that its programmes created a spirit of popular activism and participation in Nigeria. “This is evident in the proliferation of NGOs with mandates in human rights and pro-democracy work and a growing awareness about fundamental human rights” (CLO Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994).

In 1990 the first National Secretary of the CLO, Clement Nwankwo left to found the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP) in Lagos. The person that succeeded him, Emma Ezeazu left the CLO in 1992 to open another chapter of human rights struggle in Abuja the new administrative capital of Nigeria by founding the Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP). Another human rights NGO, Human Rights Monitor (HRM) was founded in Kaduna northern Nigeria in 1992 by the coordinator of the CLO in northern Nigeria, Festus Okoye who was also the chairman of the NBA in the state. Also, in 1992 another former staff of CLO, Anyakwe Nsirimovu, established the Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL) in Port Harcourt, southern Nigeria. Therefore as at 1992, in addition to the organisations that CLO officials were affiliated to, new human rights organisations sprang up in different parts of the country that were founded by people who had been working with the CLO.

If the organisations founded by former staff of the CLO between 1990 and 1992 were spread across different parts of the country, the dimension changed from 1996 when several former CLO staff members left to found specialised human rights organisations with most of them based in Lagos. These organisations were the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN), founded by Innocent Chukwuma based in Lagos, specialising in the area of law and order and working with the Nigerian Police and other law enforcement agencies in Nigeria; Social and Economic Rights Action (SERAC), founded by Felix Morka, based in Lagos, specialising in promoting social and economic rights issues; Environmental Rights Action (ERA) founded by Nnimo Bassey, Oronto Douglas and Godwin Uyi Ojo, based in Benin, southern Nigeria, specialising in environmental rights issue; Shelter
Rights Initiative (SRI), founded by Eze Onyekpere, based in Lagos, specialising in the rights to decent housing and sustainable environment; Centre for Free Speech based in Lagos founded by myself, Tunde Akanni and Richard Akinnola specialising in freedom of expression; Women Project for Empowerment and Development (WOPED) based in Lagos, founded by Theresa Akumadu, specialising in gender rights issue; Centre for Civic Education and Development (CECEDEV) based in Lagos founded by Mike Opia, specialising in social, economic and development rights; Legal Resources Consortium (LRC) based in Lagos founded by Wale Fapohunda, specialising in legal aid to deprived victim; Human Rights Law Service (HURILAWS), founded by the former president of CLO Olisa Agbakoba, based in Lagos specialising in providing legal services and furthering human rights development in Nigeria; and Human Rights League (HRL) founded by Nankin Bagudu, based in Jos, central Nigeria, specialising in the promotion and protection of civil and political rights of Nigerians.

Figure 2: Organisations Established by Former CLO Staff

Besides the above organisations, there were three other organisations on the board of which CLO officials sat between 1996 and 1999. Two of the organisations were
Lagos based and they specialised in the promotion of freedom of expression. These were the Media Rights Agenda (MRA) and the Journalists for Democratic Rights (JODER). The third organisation, the Social Advocacy Organisation (SAO) based in Sokoto, northern Nigeria, specialised in social and cultural rights.

In its 1994 Annual Report of Activities and Accounts, CLO puts itself in the middle of the activities within the civil society in Nigeria between 1987 and 1994 by arguing that it helped to awaken a dormant civil society. “Today, Nigerians openly challenge the military and demand that they account for their actions in government” (CLO Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994). While it is difficult to measure the validity of this claim by the CLO about awakening a dormant civil society in Nigeria, the connection of CLO to a vast number of civil society-based organisations through membership of its officials and through organisations founded by former CLO staff lend some credence to the claim. Before 1990, the focus of CLO work was the prisons. However, a pattern of increasing engagement with overtly political issues started to emerge with the publication of a report on the “executive lawlessness” of the Babangida regime. This was followed by actions on behalf of those arrested and convicted in respect of the failed April 22 military take-over of government as well as more pronounced work in respect of freedom of expression. From then, CLO also became increasingly vocal in its condemnation of government policies such as the SAP and what it called a regimented transition programme.

The effectiveness of the CLO in this area was reflected in the programme pursued by civil society movement in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. From the early 1990s, the human rights NGOs assumed the additional role of democracy advocacy and leading the resistance to military rule. Human rights and democracy advocacy were seen as essentially complementary roles for human rights organisations and activists. Several protests were organised against practices of the transition, detention without trial of social critics, human rights abuses and government policies between 1990 and 1993. Various protests and strikes were organised between 1993 and 1995 by civic rights and professional groups and trade unions, against the annulment of the 1993 elections and military rule. Between 1995 and 1999 the civil society organisations campaigned against the excesses of military rule and military imposed democratic transition programme in Nigeria.
CLO and the Pro-Democracy Movement

Under its Democracy Action Project (DAP), the CLO also initiated a popular participation project as part of the effort to encourage Nigerians to defend their democratic rights through peaceful means. The CLO, in 1992, in collaboration with four other human rights organisations, instituted a legal action to restrain the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida from reneging on its commitment to the terminal date of 27 August, 1993. And, together with various pro-democracy groups in the Campaign for Democracy (CD) led a nation-wide campaign against the nullification of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election (CLO Annual Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994).

Being at the centre confers enormous power of influence on an organisation in a network. This is reflected in the influence of the activities of civil society movement on the democratisation of Nigeria. The CLO was in the centre of the activities that led to the formal inauguration in November 1991 of the Campaign for Democracy (CD), the pro-democracy coalition that led the struggle for the termination of the military rule of General Babangida in 1993. It started as a forum organised by the CLO to bring together human rights and professional groups to reflect and discuss on what they consider to be a genuine democratic transition programme.

The forum attended by journalists organisations, Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL), Women In Nigeria (WIN), a representative of Market Women and Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association (GFSA), suggested an expanded role for independent NGOs in the transition to democracy programme. Independent NGOs were defined as including "not only human rights organisations working for the promotion of fundamental human rights and basic freedoms, but also various other unions or associations engaged in an organised defence of the economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights of specialised constituencies of the Nigerian people" (Campaign for Democracy Bulletin, CLO 1991). Trade union organisations, professional bodies such as the Bar Association, organisations of journalists, unions of academics; virile students movements and other youth associations as well as women’s were included in the latter category.
Gamson (1975) pointed out that an organisation in its early phases must constitute itself through more or less traditional means of mobilisation, by creating its own structure and its own networks in order to create a sense of collectivity and to ensure its own networks of continuity over time and place. In its early days CLO seems to realise that the success of any campaign depends on it’s grounding in a social base that is strong enough to withstand the inclemency of military repression.

As argued in the theoretical framework chapter, in constituting a network, understanding the themes that will have resonance with the public and other organisations is important for any successful campaign by organisations. It will be possible to mobilise other organisations if their values and orientations are built into the campaign (Snow et al. 1986). This point is considered important for understanding how the CLO mobilised other organisations into a human rights and pro-democracy movement in the democratisation of Nigeria. As suggested by the CLO the lawful activities of the independent organisations, identified above, in seeking to enhance the rights and privileges of their members is a vital constituent of democracy. It was further argued that a clear signal that the Babangida democratic transition programme was not leading to democracy is the dearth of such viable democratic NGOs on the eve of military disengagement. The problem was attributed to the atmosphere of curtailment of freedom of association and government intimidation under which NGOs currently operate in Nigeria. Hence a component of the transition to democracy, the CLO stated, must be the full restoration of the freedom of association among other basic freedoms in order to create an atmosphere conducive to the democratic development of independent NGOs.

To exert an influence on the democratisation programme, human rights groups and other mass organisations in the country were urged to cooperate and coordinate better in order to educate the people, mobilise and empower them to assert their will on the process of governance as the ultimate safeguard against corruption, abuse of office, human rights violation and disrespect for rule of law. The forum later led to more cooperation between the organisations. In 1991, all the organisations came together to form the Campaign for Democracy (CD). This marked the commencement of an articulate democracy reform campaign. CLO also produced the coalition’s first
The CLO was also one of the founding organisations of the Democratic Alternative (DA), a political party established to contest for power through democratic election in Nigeria. DA represented a major strategic shift in the struggle for human rights and democracy in Nigeria, from pressure group agitation to the arena of power politics. DA sought to carry the best traditions of the struggle for democracy in Nigeria, the noble objectives of the human rights movement and the totality of the genuine aspirations of the Nigerian people into the arena of politics.

The CLO also coordinated the United Action for Democracy (UAD), a coalition of organisations that struggle against the entrenchment of the military rule of the late General Sanni Abacha. CLO also co-founded the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of more than 70 NGOs in Nigeria, set up to monitor the transfer of power from the military to democratically elected government in 1999. The CLO was at the centre of the constitutional reform movement in Nigeria, a movement that campaigned for the review of the Nigerian constitution to make it more responsive to human rights and democratic aspirations of Nigerians. The role of the CLO in this regard is depicted in figure 3 below. How the CLO used its influence among other organisations locally and internationally is addressed in the next section.

**Figure 3: Path of Democratisation**

![Diagram showing the path of democratisation with CD, UAD, and TMG as nodes and their respective roles (Secretary, Chair & Secretary, Co-Chair).]

From the design of the programmes of CLO, there was hardly any project standing on its own without a collaborative component built into it. The way the projects were
conceived and implemented suggested a policy of mediation between many interests and the Nigerian state. Linking up with organisations in diverse areas also suggests that CLO activities were connected to different themes that tend to dominate at different times in the transition to democracy period between 1987 and 1999.

Writing about the role of civil society organisations in the democratisation of Nigeria, Ikelegbe (2001) argued that the expressions of civil associational life were of various hues. First were associations that identified with the monitoring and protection of civil rights and liberties. They included Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), and Constitutional Rights Project (CRP).

Second were associations that were focused on agitating and struggling for democracy and accountability. Among these were Campaign for Democracy (CD), Association of Democratic Lawyers (ADLN), Democratic Alternative (DA), United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDFN), National Liberation Council of Nigeria (NALICON) and United Action for Democracy (UAD).

Third were professional and labour associations, which became more social and political in their concerns. Among these were Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the Nigerian Medical Association, National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the petroleum sector unions affiliated to the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC).

Fourth were associations that focused on the protection and projection of substantive economic, social, cultural and gender interests, among which were Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and Women in Nigeria (WIN).

Fifth, were associations of a religious, ethnic, sectional and cultural nature, which were active in the struggle for democracy, good governance, equity and justice. These included the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Catholic Bishops Conference, the Anglican Church, Northern Elders Forum, Afenifere, the Middle Belt Forum, and Southern Solidarity Front. In the Niger Delta region, numerous ethnic, community and environmental associations emerged to articulate regional interests, in terms of
the neglect and pollution of its environment, and joined in challenging the state in respect of civil rights, democracy and the national question.

Hence, by ensuring that it mobilised groups across the five categories presented above, CLO through its people and links with organisations, influenced significantly the development of civil society in Nigeria and consequently, the democratisation of Nigeria. This development highlights the important influence organisations such as the CLO had on political mobilisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. During this period, human rights played the role that was formerly played by ethnicity and religion. While it is difficult to rule out the role of ethnicity and religion in the process of human rights mobilisation itself, the fact that ethnic based groups such as Afenifere and religious based groups such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) were influenced by human rights organisations as discussed by Ikelegbe (2001) underscored the influence of organisations such as the CLO in political mobilisation in Nigeria from 1990.

**Mobilising Resources: International Political Opportunities Structures**

Between 1990 when it started to take on more political roles and 1999 when there was a successful transfer of power from the military to a civilian democratically elected president, CLO succeeded in putting the issue of democratisation in Nigeria, with the support of some other organisations, on the international agenda. Other factors, such as the events surrounding the Ogoni campaign, the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential elections and the campaigns of repression that forced many democracy activists into exile also had a bearing on the internationalisation of Nigeria’s democratisation.

However, the CLO through international resources mobilisation and what Keck and Sikkink (1998a) called information politics and venue shifting contributed in a significant way to the internationalisation of Nigeria’s democratisation. The basis of CLO’s human rights campaign was a commitment to the promotion of respect for international instruments ratified by the Nigerian government and cooperation with other organisations. Hence, the CLO from inception was committed to the promotion of universal values of human rights and this commitment was realised through cooperation with other organisations.
As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter, TNANs consist of groups and individuals bound together by common principles, values, and discourse who exchange information and resources in a non-hierarchical, voluntary, and reciprocal manner. These often include social change organisations, research organisations, churches, intellectuals, intergovernmental organisations, charitable foundations, and other groups working for normative change as well as parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a).

In respect of resource mobilisation, most of the funding for the human rights advocacy activities of the CLO came from Western democracies, such as the US, Canada, EU countries, the Nordic countries and Australia. From the early 1990s, the foreign policies of countries like the US, France (especially in the Francophone African countries) and the other European Union countries began to be influenced by the need for democratisation in Africa. Increasingly, bilateral relationship (and multilateral ones in the case of France and the Francophone countries) was dictated by the need to promote democratisation and human rights in Africa. As discussed in the last chapter, governments, international governmental and non-governmental organisations provided what is called international political opportunities structures on which the campaign activities of organisations such as CLO rested.

The opportunities provided by these organisations also translated in some instances to financial support for the development of democratic institutions and a vibrant civil society in Africa. Monshipouri (1995) argues that the phrase “political foreign aid” became fairly common from the late 1980s. The term refers to money funnelled to foreign political parties, labour unions, and similar organisations to foster democratic reforms. In 1989 in the United States, the amount of political foreign aid totalled nearly $100 million. Many organisations raised funds for political aid abroad: the National Endowment for Democracy, the Agency for International Development, and the US Congress, among others. In Germany, Friedrich Ebert and Adenauer foundations devoted nearly 30 million DM to trade union projects outside Germany and about 20 million DM to foreign mass media in 1988. Funding for democratic assistance was aimed at encouraging certain civil and cultural groups as well as the independent media pivotal to democratic transition. Germany’s involvement is
exemplified by Ebert’s support for African trade unionists, by Adenauer’s for Christian professional groups in Tanzania and Zaire (Monshipouri, 1995, p.60-61).

In the third wave of democratisation that swept most African countries, the forces of democratisation were usually located, outside the state, in the civil society struggling to curtail the totalising powers of the state. Most of the funds that came from the developed world to support democracy in Africa were thus channelled through the organisations represented in the civil society. In some instances enormous amounts were channelled to these organisations to put them in a comfortable position to challenge the state. NGOs thus became an important force in the development of Third World countries. NGOs were the outlet for large sums of government and private monies spent on international projects. In 1987, NGOs transferred about $5.5 billion from industrialised to developing countries (Monshipouri, 1995).

For the CLO, funding for human rights advocacy came in the form of support to carry out research and write reports about patterns of human rights violations and to carry out human rights education for different groups within the civil society. CLO also got international financial support to acquire specific human rights skills in other human rights organisations and to fund international campaign trips. The figure below provides a brief sketch of the sources of funding for CLO activities over a period of nine years, 1990 to 1999. Funding for the CLO came from three discernible sources, private foundations such as Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, semi-government institutions such as Westminster Foundation for Democracy in the UK and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the US, and directly from government agencies as USAID, British Council and DANIDA.
Human rights NGOs used various methods to communicate their messages to other organisations, governments and individuals. Also, through various communication strategies, local issues were transformed into global concerns. From newsletters, to special reports, action releases, letter writing, venue shifting and campaign materials at international fora, human rights NGOs such as the CLO made sure that their alternative views were heard and given a deserved attention by the international community.
As discussed by Falk (1994), information exchange was one of the means through which organisations engaged in globalisation from below interact with each other. This process facilitated the growth of transnational human rights organisations and the development of global civil society. Keck and Sikkink (1998b) also pointed out that the way these organisations use information creatively is what made them unique. The CLO used many methods to communicate its message and to link up with many other organisations. Some of the methods used were publications of reports, newsletters, press releases on important issues in the country, press conferences, journals, occasional reports and action reports, annual report on the state of human rights in Nigeria, letter writing, legal action, posters, handbills, advertisements, books, lobbying and attendance at international fora.

From the communication activities of the organisation, two patterns could be discerned. The first was media outreach for purposes of getting messages across to the public, other organisations, the government, and the international community. Hence, communication of activities of the organisation basically means the mass communication of major human rights concerns through the press by means of short action reports, updates, press conferences, press releases, and the publication of \textit{LIBERTY} magazine. The CLO also used public fora such as workshops, seminars, public discussions, etc., to generate awareness on topical human rights themes (CLO Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994). The use of the \textit{LIBERTY} magazine in the framing of democratisation will be discussed in the next chapter.

Besides \textit{LIBERTY} other publications such as \textit{PrisonWatch}, \textit{Democracy Review}, \textit{Labour Rights}, Annual Report on the State of Human Rights in Nigeria, Books, as well as action reports such as Human Rights Call and Human Rights Update were used by the CLO to promote its views and to network with other organisations. Some of the publications of the CLO were well received internationally as authoritative sources of information on human rights and related issues in Nigeria. For instance, CLO was one of the sources usually quoted in the annual US State Department human rights report on Nigeria. Similarly, organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) quoted from CLO publications to support some reports on Nigeria.

The Annual Report of Activities and Accounts of the CLO published in 1994 stated:
“Right from its inception in 1987, the CLO became a leader in advancing the cause of human rights in Nigeria. Western-based NGOs and media organisations have continued to rely on the CLO as their primary source of information about the human rights situation in Nigeria while CLO publications have remained invaluable reports about the state of human rights in Nigeria” (CLO Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994).

The second category of communication activities falls under communication that required the recipient of a specific message to take action. Among these were campaign materials prepared for lobbying organisations and governments at international fora, such as the annual UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, UN Conventions on human rights and related issues, Commonwealth meetings and the African Human Rights Commission meetings. At the 1993 UN Human Rights Convention in Vienna, CLO prepared a report on human rights and the need for a network of African human rights NGOs. The report formed part of the discussion paper at the African section of the NGO parallel forum in Vienna.

For the CLO, international conferences offered a good opportunity to link up with other organisations with similar objectives or problems. They also offered opportunities for mobilisation of resources for collective action on specific issues. For instance, the CLO used the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993 to network with other human rights organisations in Africa to establish an African coordinating group called African Monitoring Group. This later led to the formation of African Network (AFRONET) in 1994. In 1995 and 1996, the CLO also used the platforms offered by the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Auckland New Zealand and the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva to campaign for democratic reforms in Nigeria.

Another important form of communications used by the CLO for purposes of networking and information transmission was the release of brief periodic action reports on important developments such as the arrest and detention of human rights and activists. Cases requiring extremely urgent action are dealt with through Human Rights Call. Each of these, apart from setting out the basic concerns, usually contain
specific recommended action(s), an appeal to the reader to do one or two practical things to intervene in the matter. This made it possible for the CLO to keep other organisations informed about human rights developments in Nigeria. The periodic action reports were sent to those on the mailing list of the organisation. These included, representatives of governments considered sympathetic to human rights promotion in Nigeria, other organisations that shared the values and views of the CLO on human rights in Nigeria, important members of parliaments in countries such as the US, UK, Canada and the EU. They were also sent to organisations that had working arrangements with the CLO such as the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) as well as the funders of the CLO.

Other important publications under this category were the campaigner published to mobilise organisations for campaigns for the termination of military rule. Posters and handbills instructing people to act in particular ways during periods of crisis with military governments. This category of communication strategy was put into use to mobilise organisations against the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election by the military government led by Babangida. Ihonvbere (1996) observed that the political miscalculation of the Babangida regime in annulling the presidential election results led to massive protests in those south-western areas where support for Abiola was greatest, and where the popular groups led by the CD had more activists.

Keck and Sikkink (1998a) also stressed the creative use of information by TNANs. Sometimes, it was not the content that mattered, but how the information was put to use to get leverage against more powerful opponents such as the Nigerian military government. Hence, CLO occasionally wrote letters to internationally respected personalities urging them to put pressures on the Nigerian military government. For instance, in 1994, the CLO wrote a letter to Rev. Desmond Tutu, the Archbishop of Cape Town, South Africa, calling on him to intervene in the present political crisis in Nigeria. In a two-page letter, the CLO reviewed the historical events that have put the country in the present state of uncertainty. The ruination of the country, which got to its peak with the annulment of the June 12 election and the subsequent dissolution of democratic structures by General Sanni Abacha were unequivocally condemned. CLO also called attention to the clampdown on the civil society by General Abacha.
Also, in collaboration with other organisations letters were written to important governments and institutions asking for urgent intervention on specific cases. For instance, a letter was written in 1996 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights by the human right community in Nigeria comprising of CLO, CRP, HRA and MOSOP supported by international organisations such as the International Human Rights Law Group, AFRONET and International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) asking for the UN intervention in Nigeria. In respect of international organisations, they also wrote separate letters to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urging him to accede to the request of the Nigerian human rights organisations.

The US-based International Human Rights Law Group wrote to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, expressing its support for the initiative launched by the Nigerian human rights community to invite him to Nigeria. While harping on the need to refrain from actions contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a document Nigeria voluntarily ratifies, Mr Gay McDougall, Executive Director of IHRLG said that the intervention will provide an opportunity to engage the military authorities in deliberations regarding the observance of those rights; and also enable the HR Commissioner to fulfil his mandate of monitoring human rights violations and prevent violation of human rights from becoming more serious and widespread. While this approach do not always bring the kind of response that powerful institutions such as the US government, EU governments and organisations such as the Commonwealth and the UNCHR brought to bear on the Nigerian government, they represented a means of venue shifting for the domestic campaigns at home.

**Discussion**

The discussion of the networks of power, both within and outside Nigeria, in which the CLO was embedded, indicate a growing influence of human rights in the political process of Nigeria. The use of human rights to construct a power base reinforces Foucault's (1977) argument that modern power does not operate through the repression or limitation of existing capacities and forms of activity, but through the construction of new identities, knowledge and practices. CLO constructed a new identity within the political structure of Nigeria. This was done through creative...
construction of democratisation in Nigeria in a way that was congruous with the interests of power groups and institutions within and outside Nigeria.

Before the emergence of the CLO, human rights provisions were enshrined in the constitution of Nigeria and institutions such as the media, judiciary and professional associations, were already well established in Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria was a member of most of the international bodies, such as the United Nations, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and none of them considered paying attention to the human rights situation in the country before the CLO and other human rights organisations in Nigeria took up the challenge of using the platforms provided by these organisations to campaign against the human rights situation in the country.

The relative success of the CLO at political mobilisation between 1990 and 1999 highlights the importance of human rights-driven globalisation in a world where communications technology and domestic and international opportunity structures make this possible. The great geographical distance as well as political and cultural divides between Nigeria and many countries were breached when the power of technologies merged with the resources and activism of transnational organisations.

By de-emphasising its traditional non-partisan campaign for human rights protection especially in respect of prisoners for which it was known, and moving to areas where the activities of other international NGOs such as HRW Africa were more pronounced, the CLO showed that transnational human rights advocacy has its own appeals and areas of interests. It also brought out the growing influence of non-state actors and the potential disappearance of the North-South dichotomy debate. In human rights norms, the North and the South seem to have found a meeting point. While it is arguable that the relationship between organisations from the North and the South is that of equal partners, it has highlighted the mutual dependence of the two on each other.

In respect of Nigeria, the existence of universal human rights standards on which the actions of the government could be assessed and the role of established transnational human rights organisations were important factors in the development and growth of the CLO and human rights advocacy networks in Nigeria.
As stated in the objectives of CLO, it believed that networking would further its mission. CLO also emerged in the country at a time when most of the professional associations that were traditional defenders of democratic ideals in the country were either proscribed or their activities significantly curtailed by the government. Hence, as the channels of participation in the domestic arena became increasingly constrained, local groups look up to organisations such as CLO that had international connections, and groups such as CLO in turn relied more and more on transnational human rights advocacy networks and international campaigns.

Hence, as human rights advocacy networks developed more political savvy and mobilised other constituents of the civil society, they became more active in the political development of the country. During the June 12 crisis, they provided the international support that complemented the domestic struggle in Nigeria. In case of the Ogoni crisis, they were the main pillars on which the campaign efforts rested. The next section focussing on specific human rights campaigns within domestic and international contexts will put some of the arguments to the test.

**The Space of Action**

As discussed earlier, from 1990 the CLO took on more political roles and forged working relationships with other human rights and professional associations that eventually led to the formation of networks campaigning for democratic reforms in Nigeria. As argued by Rucht (1999) campaigns are normally issue focussed. They bring together activists and organisations working on similar issues, which foster network and alliance building. Activists frame issues by identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 22). Networks generate attention to new issues and help set agendas by provoking media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously had not been a matter of public debates.

For the CLO, the first task was to look for a frame around which the activities of the network could be organised. The hidden agenda theory and the need for sovereign national conference became reference points. The two cases discussed started as CLO
campaign programmes but they eventually gave way to network organisations that incorporated other organisations. I will be looking at the two cases with respect to the activities of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) and the United Action for Democracy (UAD).

**Case One: The Hidden Agenda behind Babangida's Transition programme.**

When Babangida came to power in August 1985, he promised to defend human rights, curb corruption, impose discipline on the bureaucracy and parastatals, ensure accountability by public officers, and tackle the legion of problems confronting ordinary Nigerians. In 1986, Babangida announced a timetable for military withdrawal and democratisation to be completed by 1990. The programme announced by the government excluded mainstream opposition. Shettima (1995) captures it succinctly:

> “the authoritarian nature of the democratic transition programme manifested itself in several ways: people classified as extremists were prohibited from contesting for power, several trade unions were banned, underlining of the judiciary through the establishment of military tribunals, disrespect for court orders and ouster clauses in several decrees the government promulgated, intimidation of journalists and newspaper houses” (Shettima, 1995: 78).

However, on the part of the government, democratic transition programme was anchored on one fundamental assumption. Government officials argued that the previous democratic experiments ended abruptly because of the flagrant abuse of the affluent politicians who had historically dominated electoral politics in all the regions of the federation. It was believed that past attempts at representative democracy failed because regionally based political parties functioned mainly as a patronage system without any commitment to political accountability (Ihonvbere and Vaughan 1995).

The government, therefore, premised its argument for excluding mainstream opposition and putting enduring structures in place on the need to correct the problems associated with past failed attempts at enthroning democracy and to see that it was the last military rule in Nigeria. With this argument Nigerians were ready to
move with the military government on the path of transition to democracy. So when in 1987 the government imposed a ten-year ban on all who held national office since independence (Campbell, 1995), the reasons fitted squarely into the argument to correct the ills of the past and to ensure a lasting democracy.

However, the former President of the Nigerian Bar Association, Mr Aka-Bashorun who hinted that Babangida wanted to transmute from a military president to a civilian one, raised an alternative debate about the hidden agenda behind the Babangida transition programme. CLO buttressed this view when it argued that the Babangida transition programme would not usher in a dispensation that would be consistent with the legitimate political and economic aspirations of the Nigerian people or protect fundamental rights and basic freedoms. This is because the programme from inception, was implemented by means of a host of military decrees, which subvert the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, oust the powers of the courts to check arbitrary actions of the regime and abridge the full enjoyment by Nigerians of the inalienable rights enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution" (The Campaigner, 1992).

The CLO further stated that the rules guiding the transition programme were being altered so rapidly that it was obvious that General Babangida was either determined to succeed himself or to predetermine who would succeed him. This would ensure that his government would not be called to account for its actions while in office and that his programme including Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the two-party imposition would be perpetuated. Hidden agenda was defined as consisting of plans by General Ibrahim Babangida “…either to perpetuate himself in power or to impose his own choice of civilian successor who will perpetuate his anti-people programmes and cover-up his tracks” (Ubani, 1993). The framing by Aka-Bashorun and the CLO of the democratic transition programme in terms of the booby trap of hidden agenda received further boosts when it was taken up by other organisations.

The first major challenge to the government’s justification for its policy on the transition programme came through a court action by a number of civil society organisations. The Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL), Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), and the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR)
filed a suit at the Lagos High Court seeking a declaration that the extension of military rule beyond October 1, 1992 was illegal, and that it violated the transition decree (CLO Annual Human Rights Report, 1991).

Building on this development, eight major human rights groups and mass democratic organisation came together to proclaim the birth of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) at a press conference on November 11, 1991 at the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Press Centre, Lagos. It was jointly initiated by the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL), Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association (GFSA), National Consultative Forum (NLF), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Women in Nigeria (WIN), Lagos State, and the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). Although, the CD came into existence in 1991, as discussed previously, the processes that led to its formation had an early history in the CLO. The CD was conceived as a non-partisan coalition to rally Nigerians in a more concerted fight to protect human rights and democratise society through popular participation. It was later to grow into a formidable opposition consisting of about forty-three diverse voluntary groups cutting across political and ideological lines.

The CD was formed to work for the restoration of the sovereignty of the Nigerian people to self-determination to choose how to be governed, who governs them and the procedure or process through which they will be governed. Other objectives of the CD included fighting for the restoration of the rights of the people to form their own political parties without interference; the termination of military rule as well as the replacement of imposed transition agencies with independent and impartial ones including the immediate establishment of impartial electoral bodies (CLO Annual Human Rights Report, 1991).

After the transformation of the groups into the human rights and pro-democracy movement in Nigeria, different organisations and personalities were drawn into the struggle for democratisation in Nigeria. For instance, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (the only Nigerian military head of state to have successfully handed over power to a democratically civilian government) in a statement complained that “In the name of
political engineering, the country has been converted to a political laboratory for trying all kinds of silly experiments and gimmicks. Principle has been abandoned for process” (Campbell, 1995, p 25).

The CD convention, held in Jos, Plateau State in May 1992 noted the multifarious problems besetting Nigeria 32 years after independence. Though the gathering was nearly disrupted by security operatives it was able to meet and deliberate on several issues. For example, it spoke out against the arbitrary changes in the transition programme and frequent changes of the hand-over date, it also condemned the imposition of the open ballot system, which it says violates human rights objectives. It condemned, the closure of media houses, the seizure of travelling passports of human rights workers and other persons critical of government, continuing detention of citizens without trial, the state of extra-judicial killings and other abuses of police powers.

At the Jos convention, the CD announced its determination to launch a nationwide campaign against military rule, corruption and all form of abuse of power. Shortly after the convention, in May 1992, a nationwide spate of protests and rioting gripped the nation. After a national riot that greeted shortage of fuel, government arrested leaders of the CD. Those arrested were charged with treason.

Due to international pressure from governments such as the US and from the EU states as well international campaigns from human rights groups such as HRW Africa, the human rights activists were released from detention, the first time such will happen in a treasonable related case in the country. After their release, the activists addressed a press conference, where, they assured Nigerians that the unnecessary and unjustified detention has given them a renewed impetus to intensify their determination and efforts to campaign for a true and meaningful democracy as distinct from a bogus and lopsided transition menu dictated and manipulated by one man.

Around the same time that the campaign of the CD was on, a coalition for Democracy and Good Government led by General Olusegun Obasanjo Nigeria's one time military Head of State was formed. The, association, made up of retired senior military officers and some politicians was set up to force the hand of Babangida off the reins
of power. In a letter to General Babangida in August 1993, Obasanjo stated that any extension of the transition programme will not only bring the Armed Forces into utter disrepute, it will amount to a declaration of war against the sovereign rights of Nigerians to choose their own leaders and conduct their affairs in accordance with the constitution (Campbell, 1995).

The main thrust of this association was how to get Babangida out of power without upstaging the status quo. The association was an assemblage of the elite gathered together to salvage their pre-eminent position before Babangida, in his blind ambition destroys it with himself. For instance, unlike the CD, the association saw nothing positive in the call for a re-organisation of the country and a redefinition of the roles of its constituent parts.

In an address to the assembly at Ota, May 25, 1993, General Obasanjo told members. “Our duty here, to my mind, demands that we pass on a legacy of national unity, cohesion and ordered development, build on the principle and practice of democracy, mutual trust and confidence to our children and succeeding generations, I have infinite faith in the capacity, experience and goodwill of this leadership group in and outside government in producing the best for the nation. An institutional platform however becomes necessary if results are to be achieved.” (The Guardian, May 27, 1993: 1). The association, moreover, did not involve human rights activists and neither did it bother too much with human rights issues.

With many organisations and individuals challenging the main reasons behind its transition programme, the Babangida administration moved the nation inexorably towards the presidential elections on June 12 1993. However, just as the pro-democracy movements grew in scope and depth, so had a number of groups and individuals whose goal was the elongation of Babangida's regime. As the scheduled election day of June 12, 1993 drew near, several of these groups took measures to ensure that their ambition was fulfilled. The most successful of these groups was the Association for Better Nigerians (ABN), which went to an Abuja court where it obtained one of the most controversial judgements in Nigeria’s legal history. In a judgement she delivered at 9.15p.m. Justice Bassey Ikpeme, in her first assignment as a judge, restrained the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from holding the
presidential elections scheduled for the next day. That was despite the existence of Decree 13 of 1993, which made it impossible for any court of law to stop the elections. NEC went ahead to disregard the ruling by holding the election. But, by then, the first crippling shot had been fired at the programme.

NEC was forced, however, to suspend the further release of the election results by Justice Minister, Clement Akpamgbo. Despite the general acceptance of the fact that Chief M.K.O Abiola won the 1993 elections, the government of General Babangida announced that the elections had been annulled. This presented the pro-democracy movements with fresh challenges. An opportunity to mobilise an audience they had already been sold on the hidden agenda behind the transition programme of Babangida.

In a June 26, 1993 address to the nation, announcing the ban on Moshood Abiola and his opponent in the concluded presidential elections, Bashir Tofa, Babangida said that his government knew all along that the two candidates had breached some electoral laws, but chose to ignore them. General Babangida’s government imposed additional conditions as a way of widening and deepening the act of electing the president and sanitising the electoral process. Previously banned politicians were unbanned and new presidential candidates were asked to come out and contest.

Reactions from pro-democracy groups were immediate and swift. Beko Ransome-Kuti, chairman of CD sent a petition to Dr. Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, Secretary general of the United Nations, requesting the UN to prevail on Babangida to compel the military dictatorship in Nigeria to bow to the democratic wish of the people by declaring Abiola winner of the election. CD issued a release to Nigerians wherein it called on them to make the country ungovernable for the Babangida regime or any other form of military rule(CD, 1993). From July 4, 1993, the CD announced a week of national protest to “protect our human rights to choose our leaders from being permanently destroyed by Babangida and his clique” (CD, 1993). The protest involved public burning of voter’s cards. The CD guideline on the protest had a five-point guideline; viz:

(a) Don't participate in fresh elections
(b) insist on the June 12 electoral verdict

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(c) shun any lobby for you to vote
(d) don't accept any political bribe or offer
(e) pass this message to others.

The call was the beginning of a struggle between the pro-democracy groups and the government. Spontaneous protests erupted all over the country, but it was more pronounced in the western parts of Nigeria (CD, 1993).

The CD fought the Babangida regime from July through August 1993, when he handed over to an interim government headed by Ernest Sonekan. One of the first actions of the Shonekan led ING was the release of all journalists and human rights activists arrested by Babangida's government. Shonekan, in his maiden address to the nation promised that the interim period would be towards promoting national reconciliation and healing the deep wounds inflicted by the political crisis precipitated by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections (Ihonvbere, 1996).

The CD, however, vowed to intensify its programme of civil disobedience and mass action in various parts of the country to press home its demand for a restoration of Abiola's mandate. More groups came on board to fight for the restoration of the June 12 election. A group made of Nigerian professionals under the aegis of the Concerned Professionals (CP), the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and new associations such as the Movement for National Unity and Democracy (MNUD) all came out to canvass a restoration of Abiola's mandate.

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the effectiveness of the alternative democratic transition programme promoted by the civil society organisations during and immediately after the regime of General Babangida. However, the fact that the military government of General Babangida abdicated power due to the force of protests organised by the civil societies organisations indicated that the alternative democratisation agenda of the organisations recorded a modicum of success. In addition, from the moment of annulment of the presidential election, the issue of sovereign rights of different ethnic groups were being openly discussed and the Nigerian state was increasingly being challenged. There emerged groups such as Afenifere in the Southwest, Ndigbo in the East and Ijaws in the oil-producing south openly canvassing for the restructuring of Nigeria. Hence, while it is difficult to
measure the impact of this framing on the whole transition programme, political developments in Nigeria in 1993 one year after the beginning of the CD, indicate that other organisations and personalities bought into the CD’s argument.

For instance, there arose other agitations that clearly paralleled the arguments of the CD. The chairman of the Movement for National Reformation (MNR), Chief Anthony Enahoro, called for a National Conference to address the deepening problems of national unity on return of power to the civilians. Leaders from the seven Eastern states, who met under the auspices of the “Eastern progressives” also called for a “national dialogue through a national conference to be organised by the incoming democratically elected government immediately after being sworn in on 27 August. Alfred Illenre, general secretary of the Ethnic Minority Rights Organisation of Africa, suggested that existing nation-states are unworkable, having been forcefully put together to serve colonial exigencies, and that to make nation-states workable, the various ethnic groups need to sit down and determine the basis of their co-existence. On their part, the Ogoni people of Rivers State boycotted the June 12 election to protest the exploitation of the immense oil resources of theirs without the proceeds sufficiently accruing to them.

This development shows that besides international opportunity structures, local opportunity structures could also serve to bring about the development of networks. How domestic networks such as the CD provided a platform through which others that were locally disempowered could get some spec of empowerment could still be looked into in further research.

Case Two: Campaign against the dictatorship of Abacha
In many respects, the second case study mirrors the first one. However, there were some basic differences. In the first instance unlike the first network, the CD, which had the support of many professional groups, such as the NLC and NUJ, the second campaign drew its support base largely from human rights and other minority organisations. This problem was due to military repression of the civil society, violent suppression of agitations for the actualisation of the June 12, 1993 elections, as well as the Ogoni problem.
The exit of General Babangida and the emergence of General Abacha marked another phase in the democratisation process. During this stage, different ethnic groups were agitating for self-determination and a fairer share in governance of the country. However, the two most important agitations were those of the Yoruba’s clamouring for the restoration of the June 12, 1993 election mandate given to the President elect, Moshood Abiola and that of the Ogoni people fighting for fairer distribution of the oil revenue derived from their land.

Like the General Babangida transition programme between 1987 and 1993, General Sanni Abacha who succeeded the interim government put in place by General Babangida after three months in office introduced another transition programme. General Abacha proscribed the two political parties created by General Babangida. In addition, all elected office holders were asked to leave and their offices taken over by people appointed by the military regime. The two houses of parliament were abolished.

The regime of General Abacha showed its capacity for taking on pro-democracy groups. Its first and highly successful weapon was one of accommodation. The Abacha junta incorporated several democracy activists into its government. This brought a lot of divisions into the pro-democracy fold. It also gave new direction to the struggle. The CD broke up into a faction when the younger members led by Chima Ubani and Sylvester Odion-Akhaine revolted against the leadership of Dr. Ransome-Kuti. The rump of Afenifere regrouped under the name, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). This was an association of elderly men and women who saw reason and dialogue as the surest way of achieving their aim. In the North, a pro-democracy group involving people like Dr. Bala Usman, Colonel Abubakar Umar and James Magaji was also formed. The group, Movement for Peace and Progress (MPP), was formed to dispel the impression that the north was against democracy and against the swearing in of the winner of June 12, 1993 presidential election.

All these groups continued their campaign of civil unrest, which had put paid to the ambitions of the regimes of Ibrahim Babangida and Ernest Shonekan. But they had a different client in Sani Abacha. Abacha had the army in his grasp, and he showed a
willingness to deploy its resources to suit his purpose. He took on civil society. The critical media, including The Guardian, The Punch, National Concord and The Daily Sketch, were proscribed. The proscription order lasted a whole year. It also preempted the opposition by arresting and dragging leading members of NADECO to court on charges of felony for the act of forming a prohibited political association called NADECO. On their release on bail, some of the activists escaped from the country. Before that time, summary arrest and detention had formed apart of government's strategy of containing the opposition.

Another form of repression was the detonation of bombs and assassination of members of the opposition. Elderly pro-democracy campaigner, 80-year old Pa Alfred Rewane of NADECO was gunned down in his house. A shocked nation was also to witness the murder of Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, wife of Bashorun Abiola by professional assassins. A near-fatal attack on NADECO leader, Chief Abraham Adesanya as well as Michael Ibru, the publisher of the Guardian Newspaper, convinced other leading activists of the wisdom of going on exile. Professor Wole Soyinka, General Alani Akinrinade, Commodore Dan Suleiman and Chief Anthony Enahoro all went on exile where they undertook campaigns against the government. Professor Soyinka was to take this beyond the scope of rhetoric when he supported the establishment of Radio Kudirat, a pro-democracy radio organ that broadcasts the message of democracy and the various stages of the struggle to Nigerians.

In July, 1995, the Abacha government arrested, and arraigned several human rights activists for alleged involvement in a coup plot against government. These included former head of state and chairman of ADGN, General Olusegun Obasanjo; his military vice-president and chairman of People's Democratic Movement (PDM), General Shehu Musa Yar' Adua; national chairman of CD, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti; his deputy, Mallam Shehu Sanni; the Executive Director of the CLO, Mr. Abdul Oroh and the chairman of Human Rights Africa (HRA), Dr. Tunji Abayomi, as well as journalists, Messrs George Mbah of Tell; Kunle Ajibade of The News; Ben Charles-Obi of Classique and Mrs. Chris Anyanwu of TSM. All the pro-democracy activists, except Mr. Abdul Oroh (of the CLO) and Dr. Tunji Abayomi (of the HRA), were found guilty and sentenced to varying terms.
The Ogoni people were brutally suppressed and nine of their leaders including the environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa were silenced by the state in what was described as judicial murder. Many opposition leaders were assassinated and those who were lucky forced into exile. Many media organisations were proscribed. Journalists were regularly detained. The winner of the June 12 presidential election was arrested and detained indefinitely after declaring himself to be the legitimately elected president of Nigeria.

The toughest challenge the government faced was the national strike embarked upon by the oil workers under the aegis of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and its senior staff counterpart, Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN). The strike action paralysed industry and the transportation system in the country. Also, it almost brought the country onto its knees. But government quickly dissolved the union's executive and arrested the leaders, notably Mr. Frank Kokori and Milton Dabibi. Government also sent in tanks and other armoured vehicles onto the streets to clear it of demonstrations. The cold-bloodedness of this operation broke the back of the CD-led revolt. Under repressive measures adopted by General Abacha, the activities of the opposition were significantly curtailed at home, leaving them with opportunities only offered by international advocacy activities carried out on their behalf by transnational human rights organisations. However, the pro-democracy groups developed another organisational network called the United Action for Democracy (UAD) to challenge the Abacha government transition programme.

Domestic human rights organisations, spearheaded by the CLO formed the UAD a domestic network to campaign for democracy. Made up of CLO, remnants of the Campaign for Democracy (CD), Democratic Alternative (DA), Journalists for Democratic Rights (JODER), Environmental Rights Action (ERA) and Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni (MOSOP). Although the government of General Abacha embarked on a transition programme that was to lead to the emergence of a democratically elected president in October 1998, the human rights and pro-democracy movement initiated an alternative transition programme to challenge the official transition programme of the government.
The groups joined together to fight the "deplorable state of the nation, characterised by a rampaging military dictatorship which has engendered unprecedented economic hardship, reign of violence, escalation of ethnic acrimonies and wars, total breakdown of social services and infrastructure, environmental degradation, emasculation of the judiciary and press, brutal repression of human rights and of popular democratic forces in the country, and the imposition of a pre-determined transition programme on the nation" (Democracy Review, July, 1997). A communiqué issued after the UAD's inaugural meeting in Lagos on May 17, 1997, made some demands among which was "the release of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the winner of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election, to enable him to participate in the formulation of new democratic structures and processes in the country" (Democracy Review, July, 1997).

Other demands included the immediate end to military rule and a transfer of power to a transitional government of national unity, composed of elected representatives of mass democratic organisations and the convening of a sovereign national conference to seek popular solutions to the political, economic, socio-cultural and other historical problems confronting the country. The UAD also committed itself to end to all forms of nationality domination and oppression as a condition for the emergence of a truly united and democratic multi-ethnic Nigerian nation.

As a counterweight to the transition programme of the Abacha government, the UAD mobilised Nigerian against the elections organised under the Abacha government. Although, it is beyond the scope of this study to measure the impact of UAD's mobilisation on Nigerians, elections organised under the Abacha transition programme were marred by voter's apathy and low turn out (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

After encouraging a number of groups to press for its continued stay in office, the Abacha regime supported a group called Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) to organise a 2-million man rally in Abuja. The UAD organised a counter 5-million man march in Lagos. Though the rally in Lagos was disrupted, it scored a moral point drawing Nigerians and international attention to the brutal repression of the Abacha regime. It was also indicative of a growing strength and acceptability of the UAD.
Due to the internal repression of any form of opposition, Gen. Sani Abacha's transition programme was racing sure-footedly towards the transformation of the military general into a civilian government and a potential armed confrontation by the opposition. Although elections were held into local government offices, the high point of the Abacha transition programme was the adoption of Gen. Sani Abacha as the only presidential candidate of all the five newly registered political parties.

Like the network that preceded it, the UAD did not realise its aim as stated in the objectives, but it did generate the kind of awareness and mobilisation that eventually encouraged others to challenge the transmutation agenda of the Abacha regime. For instance, towards the twilight of the Abacha regime in 1998, there emerged the G.34 group, a coalition of 34 leading Nigerian politicians. The association, a grouping of concerned politicians, came on the heels of an earlier coalition of 18 prominent Northern leaders who were shocked by the audacious choice of Abacha as the consensus presidential candidate of the five political parties. In its May, 1998 memoranda, the G.34 expressed its concern at the way the current transition programme was being subverted. We are convinced that the process will, after all, not lead to the establishment of the much-desired democratic government (CLO Annual Human Rights Report, 1998). The group’s emergence and open challenge of the transition programme of General Abacha by the UAD emboldened the activities of other pro-democracy groups, many of which had been decimated by government high-handedness.

This case and the first discussed earlier highlight the importance of local campaigns that were largely under researched. It is local campaigns that provided the vehicle on which transnational campaigns rest. Without domestic network, it is doubtful if transnational networks will be effective. However, transnational connections are also important safeguards, because the activists’ organisations might also suffer the same fate that befell all civil society organisations that lacked the international connections of the human rights networks.

Hence, while there is strength in horizontal networking, as the domestic networks have indicated, the layers of interests of different groups in the domestic arena might be a serious debilitating factor in network formation and campaigns. What the two
campaigns had in common was the attempt to use human rights to legitimise political contest for power. While it brought out the meeting of arguments for human rights and democracy, it also brought out sharply the difficult terrain of campaigns rooted in systemic violations.

**International Campaigns and the Politics of Venue Shifting**

Once again I will be using Keck and Sikkink’s (1998a) network politics model. As argued in the theoretical framework chapter, Keck and Sikkink (1998a) pointed out that transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge under three conditions. First, where channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting in motion a boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of these networks. Second, where activists or political entrepreneurs believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks. Third, where conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. Where channels of participation are blocked, the international arena may be the only means that domestic activists have to attract attention to their causes (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12).

The condition under which human rights and pro-democracy organisations as well as individuals had to operate made it imperative to look for outside assistance. As discussed previously, many prominent opposition figures fled Nigeria for personal safety. Organisations such as CLO and the Ogoni group, MOSOP, embarked on international networking as a means of furthering their campaigns. International programmes such as the annual UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva as well as heads of government meetings such as the Commonwealth, provided domestic organisations with opportunities to shift the venue of conflict and mobilise international opinion against the government.

Hence, in addition to local campaigns and mobilisation, the CLO also actively engaged in international campaigns and the politics of venue shifting to press for democratic reforms in Nigeria. Due to the growing repressions at home and the leverage international campaigns give to organisations, the CLO decided, from 1993, to shift the arena of political struggle outside Nigeria.
It represented the Nigerian human rights movement at the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference held in Vienna, where it contributed to the forming of an African network for human rights promotion. In the first quarter of 1995, the CLO participated in a two-month internship and training programme, organised by the International Service for Human Rights in Geneva. As part of the programme, CLO participated in the 51st session of the UNCHR where it helped to lobby for a resolution against the military government in Nigeria for gross violation of human rights. The CLO subsequently initiated the United Nations Lobby Project (UNLOP). The CLO and three other human rights organisations (CRP, Human Rights Africa and Legal Research and Resource Development Centre) represented the Nigerian human rights community at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair between July 28 and August 5, 1995.

The ZIBF passed a resolution condemning the abuse of human rights by the military regime in Nigeria. In the resolution, participants at the Freedom of Expression Group asked the Nigerian Military Government to stop the ongoing persecution of journalists and human rights activists. They also called on the Nigerian military regime to respect the human rights charter of the Organisation of African Unity in the treatment of advocates of free expression and human rights activists. ZIBF deplored the persecution of journalists who were in jeopardy of their liberties through the inhuman mechanisms of secret trials, and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The participants also condemned the use of military tribunal to try one of their colleagues, Ken Saro-Wiwa, who had been in detention since 1994 on a number of trumped-up charges.

In addition, the CLO participated with other human rights groups in the 52nd and 53rd UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva as well as at Commonwealth meetings where the problem of democratisation in Nigeria were subjected to international discussion and censure. The case that will be examined here was the campaign for the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1995. The analysis was based on the participation of the CLO at the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Auckland, New Zealand in 1995.
The Politics of Shaming: Suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth

Nigeria is a member of the Commonwealth, a group of states formerly colonised by Britain. In 1991, the Commonwealth took a giant leap in the direction of the promotion of human rights and democratisation, when it came up with a document called the Harare Declaration. The Commonwealth Harare Declaration underscores the believe that the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of sovereign independent states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and co-operating in the interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace. However, it stated that its members also share a commitment to certain fundamental principles set out in a Declaration of Commonwealth Principles agreed at the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore in 1971. Among other provisions, the Harare Commonwealth Declaration stated that:

"we believe that international peace and order, global economic development and the rule of international law are essential to the security and prosperity of mankind; we believe in the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief, and in the individual's inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which he or she lives"

(Commonwealth Harare Declaration, 20 October 1991)

The Commonwealth pledged to work with renewed vigour, concentrating especially on the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth; democracy, democratic processes and institutions that reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government. The Commonwealth also expressed a renewed desire for the promotion of fundamental human rights, including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief; as well as equality for women (Commonwealth Harare Declaration, 20 October 1991).

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998a), transnational advocacy networks promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards. Therefore, norms contained in
international documents are active when transnational NGOs work to promote their implementation. The Harare Declaration was never invoked in Nigeria until the transnational advocacy network centred on the activities of the CLO decided to work to promote it in 1995. Through an international campaign committee called UNLOP, the CLO mobilised the support of funders, international partners such as Commonwealth Lawyers Association and organisations such as HRW Africa that had expertise in lobbying governments, to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference held in Auckland in November 1995.

The Commonwealth Conference in Auckland was held amidst increasing tension in Nigeria: the proscription of the trade unions, the trial and conviction of many opposition politicians over an alleged coup, the closure of several independent media organisations, the detention without trial of the presumed winner of the June 12 presidential election, the detention of several trade union officials, journalists and human rights activists, the trial of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other minority rights activists from Ogoni and the palpable tension that enveloped Nigeria over the way out of the political crisis created by the annulment of June 12 elections.

Before the Commonwealth Conference, the CLO prepared a document on the state of the nation and circulated it among all the organisations with which it was in contact (such as Human Rights Watch, Africa) as well as other influential countries within the Commonwealth. Meetings were also held with country representatives of some of the Commonwealth Countries in Nigeria. The participation of the CLO at the Commonwealth meeting was made possible with accreditation from the Commonwealth Lawyers Association.

In the midst of the lobbying of Commonwealth heads of government in Auckland to put pressure on the Nigerian government for political reforms, Nigeria’s military government executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other human rights activists, turning a deaf ear to international appeals for clemency. In his response, the British Prime Minister, John Major invoked the Harare Declaration. He pointed out that if the Harare principles meant anything, Nigeria couldn’t stay in the Commonwealth until it returned to democratic government. Nigeria was subsequently suspended from the Commonwealth for executing the nine environmentalists. South African President
Nelson Mandela, whose country was part of the 52-member Commonwealth, spearheaded the campaign to expel Nigeria from the Commonwealth.

The world also responded swiftly and scathingly to the executions, and many countries, including the United States, Germany and Austria, recalled their ambassadors to discuss how to respond. At the UN Security Council, the United States and European Council members immediately condemned the action. President Clinton responded by recalling U.S. Ambassador Walter Carrington for consultations. US also stopped the sale and repair of military goods and services to Nigeria and asked Secretary of State Albright to begin consultations on appropriate U.N. measures to condemn the actions.

Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation, had asked either President Clinton or Vice-President Gore to personally intervene on behalf of Saro-Wiwa and the eight other Nigerians. The president personally phoned the Nigerian leader, Gen. Sani Abacha, in October to ask for clemency for 40 civilian and military officials condemned to death. The death sentence of the 40 officials was later commuted. However, neither the president nor the vice-president personally contacted Abacha before the executions took place (Human Rights Watch, 1996).

In Brussels, the European Union condemned the executions, and said the 15-nation bloc would re-consider its relations with Nigeria. The International Finance Corp., a World Bank agency, cancelled a $100 million loan to Nigeria, attributing it to the government’s failure to enact certain economic reforms. Environmental group Greenpeace said they were horrified by the executions, and accused Anglo-Dutch giant Shell, the first company to extract oil from Ogoni land four decades ago of having “blood on its hands.”

After the executions, the CLO and other human rights organisations in Nigeria urged the Commonwealth and the United States to turn the screws on Nigeria’s military government by boycotting its oil. The CLO and other organisations appealed to the international community to impose economic sanctions on the country; arguing that this was the only way to force Abacha’s regime to restore democracy. However, the
United States, which buys half of Nigeria's oil, did not consider an oil embargo against Nigeria as necessary. Other countries within the EU did not also consider the issue of oil embargo on Nigeria.

Another example of the way Nigerian domestic political problem could be globalised was the campaign undertaken in support of Nigerian-based groups by organisations in other countries. For instance, in response to the situation in Nigeria, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), a not-for-profit church, trade union and civil rights group supported organisations that works with Congress on Africa-related legislation, initiated a Legislative Action Alert entitled a Special Action Alert on Nigeria Sanctions on 30th December 1995. Bills were introduced in both the US Senate and the House of Representative to intensify pressures against the Nigerian military regime. The bills fell short of the comprehensive sanctions demanded by Nigerian pro-democracy groups and many other groups around the world. But they included new measures such as a ban on all new U.S. investment in Nigeria and a freeze on the personal assets of top officials of the Nigerian regime. WOA urged members to contact Senators and Representatives and tell them that they are concerned that international pressures against the Nigerian military regime have so far been too little and too late. They were to ask the legislatures what stronger actions they are planning to promote human rights and democracy in Nigeria.

Similarly, in South Africa, a local network was formed around human rights campaign on Nigeria. The group called the South African Nigeria Democracy Support Group argued that the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth would send a clear message of disapproval of the human rights situation in Nigeria. It would send a clear message to Abacha that he was not representative of the Nigerian people, but only representative of himself and his military elite. It will further be a clear signal to the people of Nigeria that the international community was indeed aware of and concerned about their plight and would not tolerate the situation where one-fifth of all African people are prisoners in their own country. It urged people and organisations to send faxes to President Mandela and the Foreign Affairs representatives and every Monday until the week of the CHOGM summit (a follow-up meeting to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Auckland) in Scotland.
The demands of the South African Group as well as the US group were the same demands that the human rights groups operating within Nigeria were making. However, the fact that other groups were able to domesticate the issues in their country and make appeals to their governments in this regard highlights the international reach of human rights organisations.

The issue of Nigeria was given further momentum with the publication of a report in 1997 by the HRW Africa, which said Abacha manipulated the transition process to ensure the success of his supporters and possible presidential victory for himself in the election he has promised in 1998. According to HRW Africa report, “the transition programme put in place by General Abacha is a sham. The Commonwealth should not be fooled into believing that the Nigerian military is serious about its promise to hand over power to a civilian government. Nigeria has not taken any of the steps to avoid expulsion stipulated by the Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1995 when it was suspended from membership, and accordingly should be expelled.” (Human Rights Watch, 1997). After successfully organising democratic elections, in 1999, the suspension of Nigeria was lifted and Nigeria returned to the Commonwealth in 1999.

Space of Action: Participant Reflexivity
This section discusses the experience of the researcher over eight years of working as a human rights advocate with the CLO between 1990 and 1998. As mentioned previously, participant reflexivity is important to complement what was obtained from official documents. It also offers an insight into how the waters of activism were navigated amidst waves of seemingly insurmountable challenges. The reports were in two parts. The first part examines challenges to human rights activism in the media and how some of the challenges were overcome. The second part examines the challenges of international campaigns.

The Media and the challenge of Human Rights
In 1990, human rights was a new addition to the more established frames of ethnicity and religion used in the coverage of politics by the Nigerian mass media. Ownership of the mass media was normally viewed through the lens of ethnic or religious...
affiliations of their proprietors. None of the media organisations was owned by anybody publicly committed to promoting human rights.

The option open to human rights advocates was to explore the possibilities offered by routinisation of news by media organisations. The CLO explored this opportunity through correspondents that covered the media beats of news organisations. In the early years, 1987-1990, successful cases brought by the CLO in the courts on behalf of detainees and prisoners sometimes fit into the news definition and routine of some of the judicial correspondents. Hence the activities of the CLO in this area were well reported and relationships were developed with some of the correspondents covering the judicial beats. This was how both Richard Akinnola (then Vanguard Judicial Correspondent) and Abdul Oroh (Guardian Judicial Correspondent) got involved with the CLO. They were later to become treasurer and Executive Director of the organisation respectively.

Outside the judicial beat, CLO materials hardly made it into mainstream news in the mass media before 1990. The only exception was the joint report undertaken by the CLO and The Guardian newspaper in 1988. The investigation conducted by the CLO in collaboration with The Guardian newspapers led to the discovery of Ita-Oko Island, an illegal penal facility established by the Federal Government in the mid-seventies. Due to the scale of atrocities revealed by the investigation, Ita Oko was described as the equivalent of South Africa’s Robben Island (Annual Report of Activities and Accounts, 1994) and eventually closed by the government. The report gave the CLO a credibility edge with The Guardian, which was also one of the most authoritative newspapers in Nigeria at the time. The relationship that started with the collaborative report developed further when the Editor of The Guardian was appointed to the board of the CLO. By collaborating with the newspaper in this way, CLO was able to reach out to an important and influential institution in Nigeria.

However, most CLO releases on government policies and actions were usually not used by The Guardian and other mainstream newspapers. The CLO was yet to fit into the traditional media organisations sources of news such as government officials, government institutions, political parties, politicians etc. Where they were used at all, they were usually subsumed under other “meanwhile” comments that were meant to
balance up news stories. This was one of the main reasons why the CLO decided to establish the LIBERTY magazine as an in-house mouthpiece to articulate the views of the CLO on key human rights and political developments in the country. Published quarterly, LIBERTY was the main organ used by the CLO to frame its own understanding of political and human rights issues.

It investigated and published in-depth reports on human rights violations in the country. It also provided a forum for expanding the frontiers of human rights issues and an avenue for exchanging ideas on human rights issues between individuals and groups all over the world. It was sent to all the human rights organisations within Nigeria and abroad, which were on the mailing list of the CLO. Copies of LIBERTY were also sent to people the CLO considered important to its cause such as editors, ambassadors, funders. Few copies of the magazine were sold by subscription to individuals and institutions such as university libraries.

When I joined the CLO in 1990, I was assigned to LIBERTY as researcher and staff writer. However, from January 1992, I was made the editor of LIBERTY. Hence the responsibility of making the LIBERTY the main advocacy mouthpiece of the organisation fell on me. Before 1992, the LIBERTY magazine focused on issues such as prisons, police extra-judicial killings and freedom of expression. These focus, important as they were, cut little ice in the mainstream mass media whose focus were politics dominated by issues such as ethnicity, religion and where political gladiators such as government officials, political parties and politicians had already made their mark. I set out to carry out the task of mainstreaming human rights reporting by using three strategies. These were: cooptation, networking, and sponsorship.

**Cooptation:** As discussed previously in the theoretical framework, in choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Hence, conscious of this fact, I dissolved the editorial board of the LIBERTY magazine and brought on board journalists from different media organisations in the country. The editorial board members were drawn from the some of the newspapers and newsmagazines such as The News magazine, TELL magazine, Newswatch magazine, The Guardian
newspaper, *National Concord* newspaper, as well as representatives from the CLO and the Campaign for Democracy (CD).

Before each edition of the *LIBERTY* was produced, we had editorial board meetings that discussed the events in the country. The board then identified issues it considered most deserving of attention in the *LIBERTY* magazine. Story ideas were discussed and responsibilities to write them were given out. Most of the time, story assignments were given to members of the editorial board, and where necessary to those outside the editorial boards.

Most of the stories were not published in the editorial board members own media because some of the editors were averse to human rights issues. The thinking was that human rights organisations were doing the bidding of their foreign funders. However, *LIBERTY* offered some of the journalists opportunity to freely express themselves on issues they were unable to publish in their own newspapers. On two occasions, however, editions of the *LIBERTY* were reviewed in the mass media. This called people’s attention to the contents. The raid on the CLO and the seizure of the cover design of the *LIBERTY* in 1992 detailing unending transition programme of the government also attracted media attention to the *LIBERTY*. Significantly, a member of the editorial board was elected as the chairman of the NUJ, Lagos State between 1995 and 1997.

The context of media-government relations also aided cooptation in a different way. The emergence of *The News* magazine in 1992 and the increasing clampdown on another newsmagazine *TELL* by the military government in Nigeria, marked a new era in government media relations in Nigeria. As discussed earlier, these two publications were avowedly committed to the termination of military government and the enthronement of democratic governance. The same principles the CLO had committed itself to since the joint establishment of the democracy network, CD in 1991.

The *LIBERTY* reported the travails of *TELL* and *The News* newsmagazines. On their own part, the two organisations supported the *LIBERTY*. *The News* printed several thousand copies of the *LIBERTY* for free while *TELL* carried the adverts of CLO for
free. Hence, the strategy of cooptation adopted by *LIBERTY* helped to get the support of an influential constituency (media and journalists) for the promotion of human rights issues.

However, in spite of the efforts to co-opt journalists and their media organisations into human rights activism, the editorial board of *LIBERTY* is only made up of very few members from the media profession. Hence, there was a need to reach out to more journalists to be able to effectively mainstream human rights issues and organisations in the coverage of politics in Nigeria. The second strategy of networking was then adopted.

**Networking:** I developed a network called Journalists Outreach for Human Rights (JOHR) in 1995. JOHR was a network of journalists drawn from different media houses (both electronic and print) for the purpose of regular and consistent promotion of human rights awareness. Among the objectives of the JOHR were the creation of a platform for the expansion of the frontiers of human rights, democracy, development and safe environment through citizen education in the mass media; investigation and publication of in-depth reports of human rights violations. The other two objectives were the promotion of an avenue for exchanging ideas on human rights issues and democracy between Nigerian journalists and human rights activists.

Membership of JOHR cuts across both print and electronic media unlike membership of the editorial board of *LIBERTY*, which was made up of only print journalists. JOHR organised a number of programmes to promote exchange of ideas between journalists and human rights activists. The first of such, appropriately tagged national dialogue, was a one-day workshop held in March 1996, to discuss the role of the media in political education. Attended by more than fifty journalists, most of who were political and line editors from both the print and broadcast media, the national dialogue afforded the CLO the opportunity to rub minds with journalists on how to promote political education of Nigerians through the mass media.

At the end of the conference, participants jointly agreed to the publication of a communiqué that had significant impact on the programmes later pursued by the CLO to empower journalists. For instance, in the communiqué the participants urged a
review of the curriculum of journalism schools in Nigeria to emphasise grassroots communication, political and human rights education. This challenge was later taken up when human rights reporting curriculum conferences were organised, with the support of Canada Fund, by the CLO in September and December 1996.

Another important contribution of the dialogue was the request by participants for a concrete plan of action to be worked out for relations of distressed and detained journalists to motivate and enhance their commitment to duty. This issue was also taken up with the setting up of the Journalists Empowerment Fund. An initial grant from a German organisation of $12,000 made it possible for the CLO to provide assistance to families of detained journalists and human rights activists.

Besides these two issues, the participants also urged the mass media to create specialised human rights beats to enhance the investigation of human rights abuses and expose crucial human rights issues. While no media organisation took up this challenge except, the AM News newspaper, the call led to more cooperative engagement with human rights organisations as highlighted by the example of the human rights discussion programme introduced by a government broadcasting organisation discussed later.

Two other dialogue sessions followed, one in September and the last one in November. The sessions were not markedly different from the first session. On the other hand, they reinforced some of the achievements of the first session. Although it is difficult to measure the impact of this network on the later human rights commitments of the members of the network, in the case of the JOHR, some of the members of the network were founding directors of three other freedom of expression groups based in Lagos, the Media Rights Agenda (MRA), the Centre for Free Speech (CFS) and the Journalists for Democratic Rights (JODER). Two of the members were later made editors of two of the mainstream newspapers in Nigeria (Punch and the Times); two members of the network were members of the editorial board of two media organisations (ThisDay newspaper and Tell magazine). Hence, it could be argued that the JOHR succeeded in helping to articulate and spread human rights sentiments in the Nigerian mass media.

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Membership of the network also facilitated the use of CLO campaign materials in the media organisations that had members of the network. While the print media did not introduced sections devoted entirely to reporting human rights issues, human rights issues figure prominently in the politics and news sections of the media organisations where the members of the network were active.

For the journalists, membership of the network provided opportunity for all expenses trips to cover some human rights issues in Nigeria and outside, legal representation from the CLO anytime members of the network were targeted by the repressive agents of the state and support for families of journalists detained by the state.

**Sponsorship:** As discussed previously, in spite of all the measures put in place, the CLO was not always successful in getting front-page coverage for some of the issues in the mass media. This was due to the fact that the political economy of the mass media organisations is also an important factor in newspaper coverage. Hence, strategies were devised, in some instances, to pay for coverage. I used this method in 1995 when I got the government owned Lagos State Broadcasting Corporation to introduce a human rights discussion programme called Rights Time. Rights Time was a twelve-week discussion programme sponsored by the CLO and on which I was a co-producer. Among the topics discussed were the rights to housing, the bail process, detainees rights, the right to the environment. Since it was a government organisation, political issues that bordered on governance were not discussed. However, getting the broadcast organisation to air a CLO sponsored programme helped to correct the impression that CLO was always against the government.

In other media organisations, when the CLO could not get media coverage for important issues, it had to resort to buying advertising space for messages. Though, they might not be as influential as commanding a front-page treatment in a lead news item, they also brought the attention of readers to salient issues raised in the adverts. Among some of the media campaigns that the CLO used adverts for were campaigns against death penalties, campaigns against the execution of alleged coup plotters in 1995 and 1997, as well as campaigns for the release of detainees under the regime of General Sani Abacha. These two examples indicate that where ownership, editorial
preferences, and routinisation of news by media organisations prevent access to the media, strategies such as sponsorship could help provide accessibility.

Another example of the way sponsorship could be used to open up accessibility was the sponsorship of journalists to do in-depth report on the Ogoni crisis. In 1995, a journalist from TELL was sponsored by the CLO to do a story on the plight of the Ogoni. While collecting materials for the story, he was arrested and the arrest itself made news story in his publication. Similarly, a journalist from the Guardian was sponsored to do a report on the crisis in the Niger-Delta area in 1997. Her stories were published in the Guardian and LIBERTY magazine. She eventually developed more interest in this area for which she later won several awards.

The last example of sponsorship was the facilitation by the JOHR of the participation of a journalist from the TELL magazine at the 52nd UNCHR meeting. Although, funding was provided by the Canadian High Commission, it was provided based on the recommendation of the JOHR. Attendance at the UNCHR made it possible for the journalist to report first hand proceedings from the Commission. It was also indicative of the success of the CLO and other human rights organisations in shifting the venue of human rights campaigns from the domestic arena to international arena.

These examples highlight how the CLO, through the activities I carried out as editor of LIBERTY magazine and Coordinator of JOHR, overcame the challenge of accessibility in the mass media. As discussed previously, the mass media set much of the agenda of political debate. They are partly responsible for determining, which political demands in society will be aired, and which will be relatively muted. They affect the chances of governments and other political actors to secure essential support (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). However, access to the media is constrained by many factors, among which are ownership as well routine practices of journalists, whose news values identify certain incidents and witnesses as more or less important or relevant than others. By using strategies that helped to overcome some of these constraints to accessibility, CLO media strategies have shown that a social construction of news perspective is important to understanding how mass media work. Broader issues of how the CLO framed political issues and the influence of the
framing on the political discourse in the mainstream media are taken up in the next chapter.

Nigeria at the UN
UNCHR: A Brief Background
One of the most dramatic developments in the work of the UN since the creation of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in 1946 is the development of mechanisms to deal with violations of human rights around the world, even in countries that have not ratified the major human rights conventions.

The Commission has established, with the approval of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), several procedures for monitoring human rights violations in regard to particular countries under its Special Procedure Mechanism. One of these mechanisms is the appointment of country-specific Special Rapporteur, expert, working group, envoy, delegation or representative of the Secretary General to several countries.

The CHR first made use of this power contained in ECOSOC resolution 9(11) at its twenty-third session, when by resolution 2(XXIII) of 6 March 1967, it set up the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Human Rights in Southern Africa. The original mandate of the Working Group was to investigate charges of torture and ill treatment of prisoners, detainees or persons in police custody in South Africa. This mandate was later extended and enlarged to include studying ways and means of implementing international instruments in that country.

The rapporteurs, representatives, experts, endeavour to visit the country for which they are responsible, but not all have received permission for a visit. Each year, these special rapporteurs, representatives, or envoys submit reports to the commission and, if requested, also to the UN General Assembly. The reports help the CHR or the UN General Assembly, as the case may be, in reviewing the human rights situation in countries where they are responsible and to take appropriate measures in respect of those countries.
When viewed against the background that these mechanisms through their annual report to the CHR help in bringing human rights record of dictatorial regimes, such as the military government in Nigeria, under constant review of the UN by putting them in the agenda of the commission, they are very important in monitoring the observance of human rights in such countries.

In the case of Nigeria, it added to the growing international pressure on the military to ensure a speedy return of the country to a democratic path. At the 51st session of the Commission held in 1995 before the execution Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists, the situation in Nigeria was also a subject of discussion.

A resolution (Number: 1995/L.100) based on reports sent by human rights organisations was presented by France and supported by most Western and EU countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The resolution noted with concern the annulment of presidential elections of 12 June 1993, banning of political parties, dissolution of democratically elected institutions and arbitrary detention of members of the opposition. It also expressed concern at violations of human rights, including arbitrary detention, severe restrictions on freedom of expression and banning of some newspapers, torture, summary and arbitrary executions, abolition of habeas corpus and restrictions on the right to leave the country. It noted that Nigeria is a party to International Covenants on human rights and hence urges government to respect obligations under International Covenants and ensure rights of all persons, including minorities. Consequently, it called on government to restore habeas corpus, release all political prisoners, restore freedom of the press, lift arbitrarily imposed travel restrictions and ensure full respect for rights of trade unionists. It also called on the government to restore Nigeria immediately to democratic rule “in accordance with its own stated process under the Constitution”. Finally, the Commission invited the government to continue to cooperate with thematic rapporteurs and working groups; and therefore requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the situation in Nigeria, on the basis of available information, for the 1996 session of the Commission.
Nigeria opposed the resolution, stating that the resolution was intended to harass and intimidate the government. The delegation noted that the sponsors said the problem in Nigeria was political and suggested that the government was trying to solve the problem through the National Constitution Conference. Nigeria informed the Commission that the recommendations of the conference would be tabled the following week and that the government would act on the recommendations and then proceeds to elections. More importantly, Nigeria claimed that, it was (like other developing countries) a target of the scheming of developed countries and that different rules seem to apply at the Commission for powerful than for poor and weak nations. Algeria, as coordinator and on behalf of the African Group opposed the resolution on the grounds that it was selective and politically motivated.

The resolution was defeated with 17 voting in favour, 21 against 15 abstentions. However, the 51st session provided the opportunity to the UNCHR and the world community to x-ray Nigeria’s human rights situation at the 52nd session in 1996. It (the 51st session) also brought out the tensions involved in human rights campaigns in international arenas dominated by often conflicting interests of different actors. This will be taken up in more details in my discussion of the 52nd session of the UNCHR.

52nd session of the UNCHR

By the time of the 52nd session in April 1996, Nigeria had already become a pariah state in the comity of nations, having been suspended from the Commonwealth following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni activists. In addition to this, before the 1996 session, the CLO joined the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) as its Nigerian affiliate. FIDH had consultative status with the UN Human Rights Commission, and the network of organisations that were affiliated to it as well as its facilities at the UN Human Rights Commission became important mobilisation resources for the CLO.

Like the mass media, so many factors work against accessibility to international arena. As argued by Bob (2002) to groups challenging powerful opponents, global civil society is not an open forum marked by altruism, but harsh, Darwinian
marketplace where legions of desperate groups vie for scarce attention, sympathy, and money (Bob, 2002) Hence, the first challenge was how to get funding to attend the programme. Funders have their interests and it is when the needs of the fund seeker tallies with the interest of the funders that there would be any possibility of funding.

In 1995, the focus of the CLO and especially the LIBERTY on the Ogoni as well as the international attention the killing of the Ogoni 9 generated made it possible that any proposal anchored on furthering the cause of democratisation and the Ogoni would receive a sympathetic hearing among many international funding bodies. As at 1996, EU was one of those vehemently opposed to the Nigerian government actions and policies on the Ogoni and democratisation. In the first part of 1996, Denmark held the presidency of the EU. Based on this consideration, I approached DANIDA for sponsorship to attend the 52nd UNCHR meeting. My request was granted, I thus crossed hurdle number one.

As discussed earlier, repression at home also confirmed Keck and Sikkink’s (1998a) argument that domestic repression makes local organisation shift the venue of human rights campaign. Hence, the UNCHR provided a good opportunity for venue shifting. Venue shifting was however, not as easy as often presented, as activists in Nigeria under the Abacha regime had to contend with a government that understood the potentials for embarrassment that international campaigns constitute. For most activists, the dream to get out of Nigeria to campaign against repressions at home normally ended with seizures of international passports or arrest by the state security services operatives at the Airport. Hence, many activists had to devise ways of getting out of Nigeria by land and then travel from neighbouring countries. For some, confusion with spellings in names ensured that they were always mistaken for somebody else anytime they wanted to travel from Nigeria. Through one of these methods I managed to get out of Nigeria.

As an activist from a developing country such as Nigeria, one is faced with a lot of challenges to attract the necessary attention to one’s cause. Wiseberg (1989) and Bob (2002) neatly summarised the challenges. Human rights NGOs confront a number of dilemmas in the attempt to internationalise domestic campaigns. The first is human rights monitoring focussed only on violations by governments. This was the standard
set by western-based NGOs. Yet, for most activists in developing countries, violations are rooted in skewed social and political structures. This was highlighted in the campaign by CLO and other human rights organisations for the convocation of a sovereign national conference to discuss what they considered endemic problems with the Nigerian state. However, for international human rights organisations, issues such as violations of freedom of association, expression, assembly and other civil and political rights are the basis on which international campaigns are anchored. Therefore, organisations from the developing countries had to adjust their preferences to suit the language of international arenas.

Significantly, most of the organisations from developing countries do not have consultative status with the UNCHR hence they have to channel their demands through a few international NGO’s that by virtue of their competence, professionalism, prestige, have become queens on the chessboard of international human rights campaign. They determine which issues will be taken up and how they will be framed (Wiseberg, 1989). This was the challenge I, and my colleagues, had to contend with in our effort to get the UNCHR take a decision on the festering human rights situation in Nigeria.

There were many interventions on behalf of Nigeria in addition to the CLO-FIDH network. Among the other organisations that made presentation on behalf of Nigeria were, International Commission of Jurists, Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (Canada), International Pen, Article 19 as well as Human Rights Watch, Africa. The presentations of each of the organisation, although largely influenced by the information supplied by local human rights groups in Nigeria, focussed what each of them considered as most important to it and Nigeria.

For instance, for the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) respect for the rule of law and democratic process was paramount. It noted that human rights situation in Nigeria had degenerated rapidly particularly since the aborted transition programme in 1993. It highlighted actions taken by the military government such as arbitrary arrests, detention and execution of its citizens, which exacerbated the tragedy. It also noted the fundamental inconsistencies between the obligations undertaken by Nigeria to respect and ensure rights guaranteed under the Covenant and the implementation of
those rights in Nigeria. For instance, it cited the local government elections that were held on 16 March 1996 amidst wave of retroactive decrees disqualifying already elected persons while the harassment, indiscriminate arrests and unfair trials of innocent citizens continued unabated. It then urged the Commission to call upon the military government of Nigeria to release all political prisoners and stop the harassment of the Ogoni people. The Commission should appoint a Special Rapporteur to monitor the situation in Nigeria and make a report to the 53rd session in 1997.

On its own part, the Canada-based Inter-Church Coalition on Africa submitted that Nigeria remained a country in political crisis throughout 1995 owing to policies of the military regime of General Sani Abacha. Abacha’s military government, more so than preceding illegitimate military regimes, has come to symbolise the denial of fundamental democratic rights. The organisation also catalogue the series of human rights violations in Nigeria which included the regime continued to refusal to recognise the people’s choice of Moshood Abiola as president during democratic elections held in June, 1993. Other violations were the continued abrogation of basic rights such as freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom from torture and the right to a fair trial for most Nigerians. Detention and sentencing to life imprisonment of several notable political prisoners such as the former Nigeria military leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Abacha regime also attracted the attention of the Inter-Church Coalition. Like the ICJ, the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa also called for the appointment of special rapporteur for Nigeria.

Perhaps, due to its commitment to freedom of expression, the International Pen presentation at the commission focussed on the execution of the nine Ogoni activists. The organisation expressed outrage at the judicial execution of the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria in November 1995. Some of the concerns voiced by International Pen included the fact that there was no right of appeal against the tribunal’s decision and that two prosecutions witnesses issued sworn affidavits that they were bribed to give evidence against the defendants. According to International Pen, the judicial killing of Saro-Wiwa represented a threat to all who speak out in Nigeria. Like the
other groups, the International Pen also called for the appointment of a special rapporteur for Nigeria.

On its part, beside making presentations on behalf of Nigeria, the FIDH facilitated meetings between the CLO and other human rights organisations who made presentations on behalf of Nigeria, as well as between Nigerian human rights activists and government missions that were supportive of the appointment of a special rapportuer. The strident indictment of Nigeria on the floor of the meeting by countries such as the US, Canada, the EU and Australia underscored the fact that the image of Nigeria in the international community after the executions of the Ogoni activists had suffered a big dip. It also underlies the importance of coordinated campaigns by transnational human rights organisations. Even Japan, a country that was quite reticent in expressing political views involving developing nations, took Nigeria on at the session on her human rights abuses.

With this background, and with the possibility of the UN appointing a Special Rapporteur for Nigeria to monitor its human rights situation, as expressed in its draft resolution, the Nigerian government found succour in African countries, Iran, China and Cuba. African states rallied round Nigeria to scuttle the appointment of a Special Rapporteur and save the country from global shame. Nigeria found the African states and non-aligned countries as cushions to lean upon. Series of meetings and compromises followed, leading to the rejection of the appointment of a special rapporteur for Nigeria. Apart from solidarising with a fellow Africa state, some of the African countries felt that allowing the clause of Special Rapporteur to scale through would be setting a dangerous precedent, which may eventually necessitate similar action in their respective countries at later years.

Although South Africa, critic of Nigeria’s dictatorship, supported the move against the appointment of a special Rapporteur for Nigeria, its rationale was not against such appointment in principle but the ambivalence and double-talk of the Western countries. The South African delegation felt that it was politically indefensible for EU countries that have been ambivalent on the issue of stringent economic sanctions particularly oil and freezing of accounts of top military officers, to champion the move for a special Rapporteur. South Africa then proposed the visit of two thematic
rapporteurs, which served as a compromise position. This position was adopted by the African group as a reasonable alternative to the appointment of a special rapporteur.

The adoption of a resolution on Nigeria appointing two thematic rapporteurs highlights the success of the campaign at the 52nd session. Under the terms of a resolution on the situation of human rights in Nigeria (E/CN.4/1996/L.52/Rev.1, see Appendix 5), the Commission expressed deep concern about violations in Nigeria, and called upon the Government urgently to ensure observance of human rights, in particular by restoring habeas corpus; releasing all political prisoners, trade union leaders, human rights advocates, and journalists under detention; guaranteeing freedom of the press, and ensuring respect for the rights of all individuals, including persons belonging to minorities.

The Commission further called upon the Government to ensure that trials were held in strict conformity with international instruments to which Nigeria was a party; called upon the Government of Nigeria to cooperate fully with the relevant existing mechanisms of the Commission; and noted the declared commitment of the Government to civilian rule, urging it to take immediate and concrete steps to restore democratic government. The panel also requested the two Special Rapporteurs who had requested a joint investigative visit to the country to submit a report to the Commission at its fifty-third session.

The Nigerian government said the resolution misrepresented the situation in the country. It argued that what Nigeria needed was encouragement and cooperation in rebuilding its society and in creating an economically vibrant country. The Nigerian government also stated that the measure did not take full account of the complexities of Nigerian society nor did it recognise progress made. It then put the cause of human rights violation in Nigeria as the external-debt burden borne by the country.

At the 53rd session in 1997, Nigeria tried to lobby various countries focussing mainly on the African and Latin American countries. They tried to lobby them on the basis of South-South solidarity. With the African countries, the delegation kept on repeating the refrain that Nigeria was being picked on because it is an African country, and that the West wants to destroy Nigeria so that Africa will not be able to recover from its
present situation and rise to its full glory. In other words, the Nigerian government presented itself as the champion of the African continent, which the West wants to oppress so that the exploitation of Africa can continue.

As mentioned earlier, the resolution by which the Commission agreed to send the two thematic rapporteurs to Nigeria was a compromise resolution at the 52nd session of the Commission. At that time, some countries had started pressurising the Commission to send a country-specific rapporteur to focus on human rights abuse in Nigeria. But Nigeria argued that that was not necessary as the situation was not as bad as it was being portrayed and that thematic rapporteurs could come in to verify the facts. The Commission eventually agreed to that compromise resolution based on Nigeria’s firm promise to cooperate with the rapporteurs. So having broken that promise with the aborted visit of the rapporteurs, the Nigerian delegation had a very weak case.

At the 53rd session a resolution appointing a country specific rapporteur was passed. However, it was obvious that many countries voted not on the basis of whether or not they believed there were human rights violations in Nigeria, and that these were serious enough to warrant a visit by a special rapporteur. They voted on the basis of the economic and political interests of their countries. The effects of the blocs was less apparent at the 1997 session in terms of mismanagement of the Commission’s time but it was no less obvious that governments were still committed to advancing bloc interests on the basis of Asian values, or the African way, or the solidarity of developing countries, or the positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries or, finally, the commitment of members of the European Union to act on the basis of a common foreign policy.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The campaigns against Nigeria at the Commonwealth underlie the growing influence of international human rights norms promoting documents as a veritable campaign tool. It also brought out the importance of venue shifting, politics of shaming, international conferences and meetings to domestic struggles for democratisation. However, in spite of the growing powers of the non-states actors, states are also important in international campaigns because of the pressures they brought to bear on norms violating states. However, the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the inability of
the international community to stop the executions also demonstrate, albeit in a negative way, the powers of the state.

Human rights networks and the international opportunities structure that brought them about are not always successful in their campaigns as the case of the failure to reverse the annulment of the June 12 elections and the Ogoni killings have indicated. As put by Evans (2000), even when counter-hegemonic transnational networks are considered as an ensemble there is no overall claim that they constitute an irresistible force, only that they illustrate the existence of important opportunities for acting globally that should be better theorised and taken advantage of in practice. Nor is there any illusion here that acting globally is a magic bullet that obviates the need for other sorts of political work. To the contrary, it is precisely the potential catalytic effects of transnational networks on local struggles that make them worthwhile. Building transnational networks gives local organising new prospects of success and local mobilisation is an essential element of counter-hegemonic globalisation. Therefore, in spite of the limitations they provided political synergy and break into the mainstream political discourse in a country such as Nigeria. However, tensions human rights campaign bring to bear on the sovereignty of states is an important challenge which globalisation of human rights advocacy brings out.

Hence, it could be argued that in spite of the emergence of non-governmental organisations and the influence of values such as human rights in democratisation and political struggles, states are still important actors in both domestic and international affairs. Much of the democratisation literature recognises that successful democratisation presumes the prior existence of a strong or effective state. Thus Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) within their structural approach to democratisation, speak of the need for a state, which is both strong and relatively autonomous from dominant interests (1992). Clapham (1993) summing up prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa, notes with concern that

Whereas the first round of democratisation was undermined by the strength of the state, in relation at least to potentially competing power centres, the second round is likely to be undermined by its weakness… democracy is far more likely to succeed as a mechanism for
introducing accountability into a strong state, than as a means of preserving a weak one (Clapham, 1993: 434).

Although globalisation may help to foment the assertion of 'primordial' identities, as the globalisation as fragmentation proponents proffer, such identities are not articulated in a political vacuum, they are directed at the state. Even while they threaten the integrity of the existing nation-state, they reaffirm the state as the pinnacle and lever of their political aspirations. In sum, the state remains the outstanding point of resistance and self-determination. As argued by Randall and Theobald (1998), states will continue to form a principal object of analysis for political science, while increasingly sharing centre stage with the fluid structures and processes of their global context (Randall and Theobald, 1998:264-5). Hence, in looking at the increasingly influential roles of non-state actors in processes of globalisation in international politics, it is important to always have in view, the not disappearing but significantly curtailed powers of the state.

The development of human rights advocacy in Nigeria, as elsewhere, emphasised the significance of international human rights norms and documents in domestic political struggles. It also offers another window for looking at globalisation processes. Instead of looking at globalisation from a binary window of global homogenisation and global fragmentation, it is useful to look at how politics are locally constructed through opportunities offered by globalisation. Human rights values became domesticated in Nigeria while domestic Nigerian issues became globalised. Hence, human rights networks offer a social construction of globalisation processes by groups embedded in different levels of networks, domestic-domestic, domestic-global, global-domestic and domestic-global.

Human rights campaigns are carried out at different levels, both domestic and international. The role of the CLO and other Nigerian groups that took the campaign to the Commonwealth demonstrated how the local can become global. The roles of organisations such as WOA and the South African Nigerian Democracy Support Group also demonstrated how what has become globalised could be further localised and in the process take on a new life. Hence, in respect of human rights advocacy, it is
more appropriate to look at the multilayered nature of the campaign instead of a two-way top-down, centre-periphery approach.
CHAPTER FIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMING AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER

Introduction
In the previous chapters I examined how changing structures of power in favour of human rights NGOs made it possible for human rights to be used as a basis for political mobilisation in Nigeria. I discussed in the last chapter how CLO used these new relations of power to influence political mobilisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 1999. This chapter examines how human rights issues were framed by the CLO and the impact of the framing on the political discourse in The Guardian newspaper.

As discussed in the research methodology chapter, frame analysis allows us to capture the process of the attribution of meaning, which lies behind the explosion of any conflict. It makes it possible to understand how individuals and organisations interpret their experience with other individuals and organisations. Through the use of publications such as the LIBERTY magazine, annual reports, Democracy Review and special reports, alternative frames for understanding the issues at stake in the democratisation of Nigeria were constructed by the CLO to counter the government position.

For the framing analysis, I adapted Gamson’s framework, which stressed the framing activities of organisations in three areas. These are
a) injustice frame,
b) identifying an object of blame for a particular problem and/or situation, and
c) collective action as the solution to problems.

The success of organisational framing depends on the identification of an object of blame. In understanding the way organisations legitimate their claims and mobilise support around particular issues, it is important to examine the process of identification of object of blame for a particular situation. As mentioned earlier, Porta and Dianni (1999) posited that social problems exist only to the extent that certain phenomena are interpreted in this way, in the light of the cultural frames of those involved. Therefore, a crucial step in the social construction of a problem consists of the identification of those responsible for the situation in which the aggrieved
population find itself. Hence, understanding the themes that will have resonance with the public and other organisations is important for the successful use of frames by organisations.

As discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, considering the power of the media to control reality and the power those who have access to the media could wield in the society, it is important to also look beyond grand theories of media power to examine how power itself is constituted and constructed through media. In this regard, I will be focussing on the power of the message, which shapes discourse. I adapted Van Dijk (1998) framework for the discourse analysis. Following this framework, I focussed on the context of discourse; the groups or power relations and conflicts involved, as well as the positive and negative opinions about Us and Them. I synthesised the two frameworks for the analysis that follows. Therefore, I looked at the context of the discourse (theme); groups or power relation involved (collective action), positive and negative opinions about Us and Them (Injustice Frame) and object of blame. Instead of language in the discourse, I paid attention more to the issues raised in the discourse.

In the analysis that follows, I seek answers to two main questions. These are: How did the CLO frame democratisation in Nigeria? What influence does the framing have on the political discourse in the Guardian?

**How CLO Framed Democratisation**

As discussed in chapter one, the media are important partners in the work of human rights organisations. Activists frame issues by identifying and providing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events, which in turn become catalysts for the growth of networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 22). Human rights networks also generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they provoke media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously had not been a matter of public debates. Through the use of publications such as books, special reports, human rights update and human rights call, posters, advertisements and network campaigns through its journalists outreach, CLO framed democratisation in Nigeria as a human rights issue. In the process, it identified and provided explanations that made mobilisation of other groups and the growth of a pro-democracy network
possible. Through its publications, it also generated attention to new issues and set agenda for discussion of issues that was not part of the public discourse before.

This section discusses the framing activities of the CLO. The most important campaign media used by the CLO was the quarterly publication, *LIBERTY*. On the editorial board of *LIBERTY* were journalists drawn from different media organisations in the country. *LIBERTY* served as a campaign media and as a means of mobilising the support of journalists for the activities of the organisation. It was also the platform used to develop the journalists’ network, journalists’ outreach for human rights discussed in chapter four. CLO started the publication in 1990. Between 1990 and 1999, twenty-eight editions of *LIBERTY* were published out of a possible thirty-six editions. The shortfall was due to the dire conditions under which human rights advocacy were carried out in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998. In some years, only two or three editions were produced.

**Cover Themes in the LIBERTY**

In 1990, *LIBERTY* focussed on issues such as press freedom, rights of kids on death row, and international human rights day. As discussed in chapter three, 1990 was significant in the political calendar of the country because of the aborted violent attempt to change the government. The aborted coup was significant because, it raised issues such as the nature of the Nigerian state, domination and marginalisation, resource allocation in the country. However, while the CLO campaigned for the rights of those convicted to fair trial and the observance of due process by the government, the organisation’s campaign media, the LIBERTY, did not take up these issues.

The cover themes for 1991 were not significantly different from those of 1990. It focussed on issues such as police extra judicial killings, press freedom and repression of students’ organisations in the universities. As in 1990, while the publication showed an awareness of the systematic violations of human rights as it relates to particular groups in the country, the coverage did not reflect the democratisation process in the country. One reason for the focus on these themes might be found in
Gamson's (1975) suggestion that an organisation in its early phases must constitute itself through more or less traditional means of mobilisation, by creating its own structure and its own networks in order to create a sense of collectivity and to ensure its own networks of continuity over time and place. Before 1991, the CLO was unable to bring other organisations together to form the pro-democracy network. However, from 1991 when the Campaign for Democracy (CD) was formed, the cover themes of the \textit{LIBERTY} also changed.

In 1992, the cover themes focussed on repression of the independent media, the fifth anniversary of the CLO, and significantly, the national question. In the edition on the national question, the \textit{LIBERTY} for the first time focussed on an issue that bear on the successful democratisation of Nigeria. This was the same issue raised by the leaders of the failed attempt to violently overthrow the government in April 1990.

As discussed earlier, 1993 was the promised terminal date for military rule in Nigeria. The transition programme that started in 1985 was to terminate in August 1993, with the inauguration of a democratically elected government. However, there were signs that it would not be an easy transition from military to democratic government.
Already, organisations such as the CLO, through the CD, had claimed that the military government of Gen. Babangida had a hidden agenda to make the transition to fail so that the military, and especially Babangida, can continue in power. These developments were also reflected in the cover themes of the *LIBERTY*. The first edition in the year addressed the issue of the unending transition programme of the government. The second edition focussed on the clampdown on the independent press by the government and the implication this might have on a genuine transition programme. The third edition focussed on the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections. From the cover titles of the *LIBERTY*, it became clear that democratisation had become the main focus of the CLO and its campaign media *LIBERTY*.

The trend, which began in 1992, continued until a democratically elected government was successfully inaugurated in May 1999. For instance, in 1994 the *LIBERTY* focussed on the way forward, endless crackdown and 34 years of rot. Like the edition published in 1992 which focussed on the national question, "*Which Way Forward*" also advocated a sovereign national conference as the solution to the problem of governance in the country. The second edition addressed the growing repressions, especially of civil society groups in the country. The third edition, "*34 Years of Rot*" addressed the issue of failure of successive military and civilian governments to stem the tide of institutional decay caused by the failure of governance.

As discussed in the chapter on power and politics in Nigeria, 1995 also witnessed significant repression of civil society organisations and the assassinations as well as political exile of many pro-democracy personalities. This trend was reflected also in the cover themes of the *LIBERTY*. In 1995, it focussed on the nature of the Abacha regime with two cover titles "*Killing to Rule*" and "*A Nation under Siege*". Two editions, one in 1995 and another one in 1996, were also devoted to the issues that arose from the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni environmental activists. These were entitled, "*Judicial Murder*" and "*My Story-Ken Saro-Wiwa*". The other editions of *LIBERTY* published after the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa reflected political developments in the country such as the further clampdown on civil society organisations and activists as well as the transmutation agenda of Gen. Sani Abacha.
From the cover themes, it is difficult to bring out the framing influence of the CLO on the media discourse about democratisation in the mass media. However, the fact that the CLO started focusing on democratisation only after forming a pro-democracy network, and only after making specific demands in respect of democratisation lends some credence to the framing influence of CLO publications. This is examined through analysis of frames of injustice, the objects of blame for particular issues, as well as power relations and interpretations of democracy in some of the items published in the *LIBERTY*.

**Injustice Frames and Object of Blame**

Elements of injustice as well as objects of blame were built into a number of items published in the *LIBERTY* that bears on the transition programme of military governments in Nigeria. For instance a common refrain was to attribute the problems of governance to the pathological feature of military governance, which manifested in the inability of Nigerians to have a say in the nature of the political process and atmosphere of freedom curtailment in the country.

Hence, while the CLO supported transfer of power from the military, it did not hide its rejection of the political dispensation that failed to take into cognisance the need to follow the path of rule of law and respect for the fundamental human rights of Nigerians. For instance, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the Five Years of the African Charter (1991) the CLO described the state of democratisation in Africa thus:

All over Africa, regimes predominate which pursue programmes that surrender the sovereignty of their people to foreign economic and political interests…. A substantial portion of the continent is still under military dictatorship or despotic one-party rules as in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Zaire, Cameroon, Algeria, and Morocco etc…. All over the continent persons are being detained or imprisoned without trial, democratic associations of workers, students, journalists, lawyers and lecturers are being banned while press freedom, academic freedom and other professional freedom are in chains contrary to the provisions of the African Charter. In the midst of all these, it is
encouraging that the African people have continued to assert their love for freedom and democracy through recent pro-democracy agitations in various parts of the continent notably Benin Republic, Togo, Zaire, Kenya, Cameroon, Zambia etc. and through the resilience demonstrated by the South African people against apartheid (CLO Press Release, 1991).

This release connected the issue of democratisation to basic freedoms of the people and emphasises the role of an unfettered civil society. The adoption of economic programmes such as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was also equated with surrendering sovereignty of the country to foreign powers. The injustice frame in this item was the "programmes that surrender the sovereignty of people to foreign economic and political interests. Persons being detained or imprisoned without trial, democratic associations... are being banned while press freedom, academic freedom and other professional freedom are in chains contrary to the provisions of the African Charter." The object of blame was military dictatorship and despotic one-party rules. While collective actions are the pro-democracy agitations for political reform. In the view of the CLO therefore, guarantees of basic human rights are the minimum standards to be used to measure democratisation in a country. Hence, a transition to democratic government that failed to take human rights guarantees into consideration was considered a defective democracy.

**Defective Democracy**

An article by Itse Sagay, a professor of constitutional law, described how the transition programme of Babangida failed to address the basic requirements of democracy. Entitled "Transition Without End: Nigeria’s Bumpy Road to Democracy", it stressed the lack of democratic quality in the transition programme due to the restrictions placed on members of the opposition to participate freely in the process and activities of the government which was fuelling doubts about the whole programme:

"Critics and doubters have been proved right again and again. This transition programme has been the victim of so many road-blocks, diversions, reversals, and has been so denuded of virtually any
democratic quality or ingredient, that it is difficult to imagine an acceptable outcome at its terminal date... Many human rights activists and political commentators have frequently asserted that President Babangida has a hidden agenda, namely, to succeed himself... Some actions of this regime have tended to fuel this suspicion: the uncontrolled growth and proliferation of sycophants and their organisations who want to perpetuate Babangida rule in Nigeria, the clampdown on civil and human rights and pro-democracy organisations; and the rapid training and building up of a National Guard as a well-equipped and armed organisation answerable only to the President…” (Sagay, LIBERTY, 1993: 13).

During the Abacha transition programme, the same arguments were used to discredit the transition programme. An article on the fundamentality of human rights guarantees in Nigeria’s democratic process argued that almost every single one of the rights which ought to have been guaranteed to Nigerians are being breached under the transition programme of the Abacha-led military government. The article argued, “democracy requires much more than the right to vote and be voted for”. Therefore, “human rights guarantees are fundamental, vital and essential, to any democratic process, and until Nigeria embarks upon a process where the guaranteeing of such rights is indeed fundamental, Nigeria will not have embarked upon any democratic process”. It compared the transition programme of the government to the reality of human rights situation in the country and concluded that “in a situation where every one of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution is breached, and yet the transition programme still claims to be succeeding beyond the dreams of its inventors, we cannot but conclude that human rights guarantees are absolutely irrelevant to it....” (Obe, LIBERTY, 1997: 30-31).

Another article also picked on the changing tide of governance in the world to argue that the transition programme of the military government was defective. It stated that Nigeria (ns) “…cannot continue with military rule against the strong tide of history and amidst the developing contradictions of our complex society. Already on the brink, we cannot afford the shoddy cynical transition programmes of the past which only intensified the crisis of political legitimacy and collective identity that they were
supposed to address”. Putting the blame at the doorstep of successive military regimes, it argued further: ...every military regime in Nigeria including this one insists on its commitment to giving Nigeria a lasting democracy....the only way that a military regime including the present one can contribute to an enduring democracy is to remove itself from office as quickly as possible, to be replaced initially by caretaker committee of reputable civilians to conceptualise and carry through the transition taking care to address salient realities” (Ake, LIBERTY, 1995: 10-11).

Several articles were also built around the injustice in a democratic transition programme that excludes the opposition. In an article entitled “Journey Without Destination”, Akanni and Ojo (1997) pointed out that the political transition programme of Nigeria’s military government has only one objective: to create an environment for the Head of State, General Sani Abacha to succeed himself as president. This was because “as the orchestrated campaigns for an Abacha presidency gained momentum... over 171 chairmanship candidates ...were disqualified in six states alone. A new decree enacted after the election empowered General Abacha to sack elected local government officials, a clear breach of the transition programme. The atmosphere of fear and intimidation remain pervasive as the Government chose a few days to the elections to prepare charges of treason, punishable with death, against 17 political opponents, exiles and their associates at a magistrate court in Lagos” (Akanni and Ojo, LIBERTY, 1997: 21).

Besides the transition programme, the coverage of some of the other issues in the LIBERTY also implied a kind of injustice in the actions of the government. A report on the Ogoni with the title “Agony of A Nation”, written by Olumhense and Douglas (1994) pointed out that the ongoing brutalisation of the Ogonis has extended the frontiers of human suffering of a people whose only means of livelihood, their soil, has been undergoing destruction for over thirty years since oil exploration began there. “Series of oil spillage and farmlands and streams overtaken by pipelines, gas and other oil-related installations has made them progressively poor. Soil yield has continued to decline and for a people hemmed in by their own population and by other populations in the creeks and swamps of the Niger-Delta, the war of survival has been a twenty-four hour business for decades. The future of Ogoni and a culture spanning hundreds of years is indeed at stake” (Olumhense and Douglas, LIBERTY,
The trial of the Ogoni activists in 1995 was also variously described as a hollow trial, judicial murder and travesty of justice.

The last article to be considered under this section described military rule and the transition programme it initiated as a kind of war against Nigerians. It argued, "it is a war against all fronts, against everybody and everything, except the country’s ever worsening economic and political problems…. Nigeria today is a complete landscape of repression, of unnecessary and unmitigated assault on its populace by a junta only comfortable with its own voice and that of its army of collaborators, and desirous of an unchallenged reign of fist and iron (Adio, *LIBERTY*, 1996: 10).

The above excerpts from articles in the *LIBERTY* highlight the way democratisation was framed in CLO publications. Through the arguments of the writers of the articles above, it is possible to argue that military governments and the transition programmes they put in place are fundamentally flawed in their repression of the rights of Nigerians. It is a kind of injustice that were considered incapable of standing up to the test of genuine democracy.

After bringing out injustice as an issue that deserve to be addressed, organisations put the blame for the problem on a particular object. The object of blame in respect of the problems in Nigeria was also identified as military governance. Although the heads of the military governments were blamed for particular problems, military governance and its lack of respect for due process and rule of law was identified in CLO publications and campaign activities as the object of blame. Hence, the CLO through the pro-democracy networks it initiated couple genuine democratisation through sovereign national conference to the termination of military rule. As discussed in the last chapter, both the CD and the UAD had as their cardinal objective the termination of military rule and convening of a sovereign national conference to address the problem of democratisation in Nigeria. In the examples used for injustice frame above, the object of blame was also military government.

An example of a clear object of blame was attribution of all economic and social problems in Nigeria since independence to military governance. In an article entitled "Groping in the Dark", Akanni and Ubani (1994) pointed out that "the legacy of both
the military and civilian administrations is a legion of looting of nation’s resources and shameful flaunting of the loot… the animated decimation of our social life, the organised destruction of our economy, the brutal repression of our fundamental rights; the castration of our democratic institutions…. The result of all these are: the collapse of the educational system etc.” It argued further:

…the current economic hardships to which the poor people of Nigeria have been subjected are the cumulative consequences of bad governance by the military class since independence….Unless the joint rule of this exploitative and bankrupt class is brought to a decisive end, the suffering of the people and the ruination of the national economy will continue…. The economy has been run since independence to suit the interests of a particular class of rulers to the detriment of the majority. The precondition for turning things around is to change the relations of power in favour of the oppressed majority….the long term solution to the current crises is to educate, organise and empower the people of Nigeria, on a sustained basis, not only to struggle against military dictatorship but ultimately to bring to power a responsive and accountable civilian government constituted by trusted representatives of the people (Akanni and Ubani, LIBERTY 1994: 15).

Solution (Collective Action Frame)
In the last chapter, I discussed in detail how the CLO mobilised the resources of other organisations in the civil society for collective action. One other feature of the frames used by the CLO was to identify collective action as the solution to the democratisation problems in Nigeria. The CLO saw itself as speaking for the Nigerian people. It also framed democratisation as a struggle between “we” (pro-democracy groups) and “other” (those who don’t want genuine democracy, within the military and among the citizens). One indication of this was the forming of democracy advocacy networks such as the CD, UAD, TMG and a political platform, the DA. During the first year of the Abacha regime, CLO issued a statement that argued that military dictatorship does not possess the capacity and legitimacy for the attainment of the collective aspirations of the Nigerian people. CLO argued that, the military government headed by Gen. Abacha couldn’t guarantee respect for human rights, democracy, transparent accountability and good governance. It therefore, urged it to
hasten the process of democratisation and relinquish power by respecting the wishes of the people. CLO also noted that the Constitutional Conference embarked upon by the government couldn’t lead to genuine democracy. It therefore called for sovereign national conference, truly elected by the Nigerian people to deliberate on the future of Nigeria (CLO, Press Release, “State of the Nation” October 19, 1994).

There were also requests for the intervention of the international community in the political crisis in the country. In the *LIBERTY* magazine, articles called for the thickening of the oil of sanctions and for the intervention of the UN in the situation in Nigeria. The position of the CLO in this regard was represented by contents of Human Rights Call published in August 1994. In it, the CLO called on the international community to support the struggle of the Nigerian people. It stated that Nigerians were worried that the United States, Britain and the EU countries had consistently vacillated over the issue of the June 12 cancelled election. It argued that the rapidly degenerating situation in Nigeria calls for a firm and decisive action from the international community (*Human Rights Call*, August 1994).

The frames used by the CLO, the object of blames identified, the solutions put forward, the contextualisation of the struggle at particular moments during the transition to democracy in Nigeria and the organisations identified as supporters of the democracy prepared the ground for the influence of human rights in the political discourse in the mass media. This will be examined in the next section.

**Influence of Framing on the Political Discourse in The Guardian Newspaper**

As discussed in the methodology chapter, I used *The Guardian* newspaper for the analysis of the political discourse in the media. In *The Guardian* newspaper, I selected only news and editorials for analysis. For the news, I selected only the items that appeared on the front and back pages. This is because the most important news appeared on the front and back pages.

For the discourse analysis of the materials, I purposively selected the materials that best reflect the main issues during the three periods I selected for discussion. As discussed previously, movements and conflicts do not develop in isolation but tend rather to be concentrated in particular political and historical periods (Tilly et al.
The organisation of a movement must then be placed in relation to the general orientations of a given period. If it is possible to identify conjunctions, which are particularly favourable to the development of collective action, the dominant visions of the world in that period will inform, or at least influence the representations produced by the movements taken together. Hence, I selected three events that I consider had significant bearing on democratisation and the framing activities of the CLO. These are the April 1990 unsuccessful coup, the June 12 elections and the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight Ogoni environmental rights activists.

To begin with, I did a brief content analysis of the coverage of the three events in the Guardian. As mentioned earlier, I selected three months for coverage of each event. These are the months before the event, the months of the event and the months after the event. Also, to make the materials manageable, I selected every other issue for analysis. This left me with an average of 15 issues per month. The findings of the content analysis of the coverage of the events are indicated below. In respect of the April 1990 attempted take-over, I used the coverage of issues that border on the democratic transition programme as the basis of my analysis.

**Figure 6: Coverage of the April 1992 Coup**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of News Items</th>
<th>Total News Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>34 (12.6%)</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>27 (11.6%)</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>48 (17.9%)</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Editorials</th>
<th>Total Number of Editorials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>4 (30.8%)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>8 (61.5%)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The news coverage for March, April and May 1990 indicated that, only 12.6%, 11.6% and 17.9% were devoted to the coverage of issues of governance during this period. This shows that governance and democracy issues were not considered the most important news items in *The Guardian*. The month of April, which was the month of the coup, had the lowest percentage of coverage among all the three months. The low
percentage does not reflect, however, the significance of some of the news items carried, as will be indicated in the discourse analysis of select materials.

In the editorials, more attention was paid to issues of governance and democracy as indicated in the pattern of coverage. April had the highest percentage among all the three months with 61.5%. This was followed by March 30.8% and May 16.7%. As editorials represent the official philosophy of the news organisation itself, the pattern of coverage indicates a commitment on the part of The Guardian to issues of governance and democracy. Two of the editorials addressed the issue of role of professional associations and NGOs in the respect for the rule of law and democratisation in Nigeria.

In an editorial carried in March 1990, the newspaper commended the role of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) in standing up for responsive and responsible government in Nigeria. It stated, “at the end of its yearly Law Week, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) issued a communique which touched on several salient aspects of the nation’s legal, political and economic life. Besides urging the government to abide by the transition programme, it called on the Federal Government to take urgent steps to ameliorate the living conditions of the citizenry worsted by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).” While urging other organisations to emulate the exemplary lesson on the proper attitude to matters of common concern, it pointed out that the NBA’s expression of concern in these areas was proof that its vision of society goes beyond the narrow confines of law and the judiciary.

The editorial also brought out the injustice inherent in the use of ouster clauses by the government. It pointed out that of equal importance was NBA’s demand for the removal of ouster clauses in all decrees. These special provisions had rendered impossible the authority of the law courts to question the legality of several draconian enactments. A situation where the powers of the third estate of the realm were so severely curtailed was considered unhealthy for the development of law, not to speak of the ill effects on the freedom of citizens and the securing of justice from the state.

It also counselled the government to listen to the NBA. “As always, the association’s sense of responsibility is not in doubt. And it is as committed to security, law and
order in the nation as the government itself. It would indeed be a mark of its self-confidence if the government could do away with authoritarian provisions that will have no place in the statute books after the military relinquishes power” (The Guardian, March 3, 1990: 8).

The context of the discourse in the editorial was respect for the rule of law and its importance for the enjoyment of citizens’ rights. It also focussed on the growing arbitrariness in governance as contained in government’s policies and laws. The NBA was identified as the group fighting for a just cause on behalf of the citizens and the government was portrayed as the group trampling on the rights of the citizens through its policies and laws. Therefore, the action of the NBA was portrayed as positive and an exemplary lesson to all national associations or professional bodies on the proper attitude to matters of common concern. The action of the government was portrayed as negative and something the government must do away with. The position of the newspaper was similar to the position of human rights groups in the country.

Another editorial addressed the cost of the democratic transition programme. The underlying argument was that it was too expensive and that it addressed only one requirement for the successful democratic transition, which was political structure. The editorial also questioned the justification for the huge cost of the programme at the same time the government embarked on a structural adjustment programme to instil financial discipline in the economy. The context of this editorial was the implementation of the political transition programme of the government and the economic restructuring programme, SAP. It put, side by side, the effects of SAP with the clear profligacy of the government in respect of the cost of the transition programme. It argued that there was no basis for the huge spending when there were other issues that were more deserving of the attention of the government. Underlying the arguments in the editorial was a subtle condemnation of the arbitrariness of government decisions and the lack of accountability such decisions entails. The policy of the government was also portrayed as negative for the development of democracy in the country. It pointed out “...much of the nation’s financial resources are being poured into structures that will keep a lot of contractors and bureaucrats and academic adventurers and create the illusion of momentum but do little to develop a culture of
democracy.” The editorial also suggested an end to the huge expenses, citing the crippling deprivations Nigerians were suffering. In the editorial, the newspaper also stressed the need for the development of the culture of democracy instead of the attention focussed on structures of democracy.

The discourse in the editorials clearly parallels those contained in the democratisation frames used by the CLO and the democracy advocacy networks discussed earlier. However, the editorials were carried before the networks were formed and before the CLO also took on an overtly political role. The two editorials also covered periods before the April coup. Hence, issues such as the nature of the Nigerian state were not yet popular themes in the political discourse. Attention was focussed on the arbitrary nature of military governance and the need for accountability and the rule of law. The April 1990 coup changed the tenor of discussion as issues such as ethnicity, religion, domination and marginalisation became more pronounced in the political discourse. This is reflected in the news stories picked for analysis below. Both news stories were reactions to the coup plot. In the first news item, Christian leaders were reacting to the arrest and detention of some Christian leaders after the coup. In addition, they were also making demands on the government in respect of the perceived marginalisation of Christians in government appointments. The second news item was the reaction of one of the leading opposition leaders in the country, Professor Wole Soyinka, to the coup plot.

**April Coup**

In the news item entitled, “Christians Protests Continue as Okogie goes round”, the Guardian focussed on the reaction of the Christian community in Nigeria to the coup. As discussed previously, there was a religious undertone to the coup with the excision of five core northern Muslim states from Nigeria. The arrest of some Christian leaders had sparked protests by Christians from the country. However, some of the key demands of the coup plotters in respect of perceived marginalisation of Christians were echoed by Christian leaders in *The Guardian* reports.

Among others, the news item stated that for the sake of peace and stability, Christians in Nigeria wanted the restructuring of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) to reflect Nigeria’s geographical and religious diversity. It was argued that since the
Obasanjo Administration (1976 to 1979)- Christian, subsequent governments (headed by Muslims) failed to sustain the balance of power through fair representation of all segments of Nigeria in key appointments. Christians also wanted an unambiguous official statement on Nigeria’s status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) “particularly in the light of a communiqué purportedly issued after a joint meeting of the OIC and the newly-founded Islam In Africa Organisation. The document, issued in Abuja last November claimed, among other things that: One: Nigeria donated $21 billion to the Islamic Development Fund of the OIC; and Two: All facets of public life, including party politics, appointments to top political position, judicial systems, will, ultimately be “Islamised” in all member countries.” The appointment of government officials was also highlighted in the report, as the Christian leaders demanded “the removal of Petroleum Resources Minister Professor Jibril Aminu and External Affairs Minister, Alhaji Rilwan Lukman in the interest of peace and stability since they are not “sacred cows” and because they have served the country long enough.” Among the other demand contained in the news report was the immediate release of all Christian leaders arrested since the April 22 foiled coup bid.

The discourse in the news item brings out the example of how discourse could be used to assert some measure of power. It puts the coup plotters and the Christians in Nigeria as the victim of fundamental injustice of the state, which should not be made to stand. The sources of the news item were basically, leaders of Christians in the country and their umbrella organisation, the Christian Association of Nigeria, and the military government. The events described in the item were reactions of the two groups to the event of the April 1990 coup. It also described the perceived government clampdown on the Christians and the perceived threat to security from Christian leaders. The background to the crisis was also provided in the news item. To the Christian leaders, it was the perceived marginalisation in the armed forces, joining of the Organisation of Islamic Countries to further the Islamisation of the country, and marginalisation through lopsided government appointments. On the part of the government, the problem was unsubstantiated rumours and the lack of religious tolerance from Christians. This news item, threw up issues that had bedevilled the political development of the country since 1914 (*The Guardian*, May 25, 1990:1)
The second news item, a release from Wole Soyinka, also raised the issue of religion in Nigerian politics and suggested a balanced approach to issues as the solution to the problems raised in the broadcast of the coup plotters. It urged the government to consider religion as a “core issue of security”. Soyinka pointed out that those who believe that religion was not critical in the fundamental animation of this tragic episode might be in for a surprise. “... revelation from the trial (of the plotters) itself will rip off the final veils of illusion in this respect... the nation is about to be compelled to take stock of itself in the most painful way to understand finally that religious aggressiveness can only engender the same response in other religions and that the nature and extent of such response belong totally in the territory of the unpredictable and irrational”. This news item much like the earlier one emphasised the place of religion in the politics of the country (The Guardian,).

Human rights organisations such as the CLO described themselves as non-partisan hence the claims of all the religious groups were not legitimated in the human rights frames of human rights organisations. For instance, the CLO focussed only on the individual liberties of each convicted coup plotter or detainee. However, the role of religion in the political dispensation also dominated part of the discourse following the annulment of the June 12 election. This is discussed in the next section.

June 12 Elections

Figure 7: Coverage of the June 12 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of News Items</th>
<th>Total News Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>78 (39.8%)</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>95 (46.8%)</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>126 (53.2%)</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Editorials</th>
<th>Total Number of Editorials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4 (30.8%)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8 (61.5%)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In respect of the June 12 crisis, the newspaper gave more attention to issues of democracy and governance. In July, more than half 53.2% of the news coverage was devoted to issues of democracy, this was followed by the coverage in June with 46.8% and May 39.8%. The attention paid to the coverage seems to be connected to
the issues that were predominant in the media before the June 12 election and after the annulment of the election. This will be examined in the discourse analysis.

The editorials also reflected the pattern set in the coverage of news. July had the highest percentage with 61.5%; this was followed by June with 30.8% and May 25%. As discussed earlier, the month of July was the month pro-democracy organisations staged series of protests to demand the announcement of the results of the June 12 presidential election and the termination of military rule.

Before the June 12 elections, there were heightened agitations for the negotiation of the basis of the Nigerian state. After the April 1990 coup, different groups that were making claims similar to the ones made by the organisers of the April 1990 coup emerged in the country. Towards the June 12 elections, besides issues such as the termination of military rule, power shift from the North to the South, self-succession agenda of General Babangida, new groups that were threatening the basis of the Nigerian state had emerged on the political scene. This was also reflected in the news coverage of the political developments in the country. *The Guardian* paid attention to both the June 12 elections as well as the growing agitations for self-determinations and political realignments of forces in the country based on this development.

Religion featured as an important factor in the process of democratisation before the June 12 election. The flag bearers for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) at the June 12 presidential elections were both Muslims. This was considered insensitive in a country such as Nigeria that thrives on delicate balancing between different powerful interests in the country. A news item was devoted to the meeting held by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) following the choice of Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe- a Muslim- as Chief Moshood Abiola’s running mate to reassure Christians. The item reported CAN’s fears as “the contentious Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), Shariah court, the ban on Christian religious studies in schools in some states, lopsided appointments in favour of Muslims, burning of churches, massacre of Christians in certain northern states.” While reassuring the Christian delegation that “nobody can Islamize a country or
impose a particular religion on the people,” Abiola argued that religious disturbances were caused by unemployment and hunger, explaining that his “government will meaningfully engage the youths of the country in nation development opportunity…. My government will protect every Nigerian irrespective of religious affiliation.” The report also indicated Abiola’s determination not to sacrifice merit for mediocrity in the name of religion in the appointment of government officials. “I am not going to run a religious centre”, he said, stating that his mission was “to salvage the economy with the best hands I can get whether they are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Agnostics or whatever.” He explained that such search for excellence occasioned his choice of Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe as his running mate…. (The Guardian, May 23, 1993: 1-2). From this item, two different discourses were discernible. The first was the discourse of marginalisation by Christians as well as the discourse of a non-religious solution proffered by Abiola. While religions do not seem to have any influence on the voting pattern in the June 12 elections, it did play a role in the media discourse after the annulment.

After the annulment of the elections, agitations over the nature of the Nigerian state that was becoming more pronounced before the presidential elections also assumed a frightening dimension with the country potentially slipping into civil war. Religion also played important role in the effort to find solution to the crisis after the annulment of the election. The Guardian gave a significant attention to the efforts of Islamic organisations to reconcile both Abiola the presumed winner of the election and Babangida who annulled the elections.

For instance, The Guardian focussed on the activities of the 11-man special high-powered committee set up by the National Executive Council (NEC) of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), to mediate in the current political impasse. It stated that the two principal actors in the crisis- General Ibrahim Babangida and Chief Moshood Abiola, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) candidate in the annulled June 12 polls would meet members of the committee. It was believed that although the previous attempts by other interest groups failed to resolve the crisis, the report was optimistic that the Islamic Council would find a viable solution. It argued, “…the Council has been influential in successive administrations in the country. It is believed that the head of the Council, the Sultan of Sokoto (who is also
the head of Muslims in Nigeria) had influenced some important policy-decisions of
the Babangida regime and he’s determined to end the present crisis \textit{(The Guardian,}
July 25, 1993: 1-2). The reference to the role played by the Sultan in the
determination of government policies was a subtle legitimation of the claims of
marginalisation of Christian leaders in Nigeria and the demands of the leaders of the
April 1990 coup.

While Muslim leaders play conciliatory roles behind the scene, Christian leaders
were more vociferous in openly condemning the cancellation of the polls, and
demanding the announcement of the election result without sounding conciliatory. An
example was the story of the reaction of the leader of the Anglican Communion in
Nigeria, Rev Adetiloye. Adetiloye warned that the failure to yield to the people’s
unanimous decision on the presidential election might lead to disintegration of the
country. In an open letter to Babangida, published in \textit{The Guardian}, Adetiloye
expressed the fear that Nigeria might not come out of this crisis as one entity. He
reminded the President that “God himself changes his mind hence human beings pray
to Him”. On the likely consequence of spurning the peoples’ wish, Adetiloye drew
attention to the experience of Lesotho’s President Lebua Jonathan who cancelled an
election that did not favour him but later quit in disgrace.... the reasons adduced for
cancelling the election result were untenable as “even at any palace coup detat there is
always exchange of money and promises of patronage.” The archbishop called for the
release of all political detainees and the announcement of the June 12 election result
to save the nation from disintegration and chaos \textit{(The Guardian, July 17, 1993, pp.1-2)}.

While the CLO did not use religious rhetoric to appeal to Babangida, it did call for the
release of all political detainees as well as de-annulment of the June 12 election. In
one of the reactions of Abiola, the presumed winner of the elections, he also appeal to
the need for social justice as a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence in Nigeria, which
is similar to the frames used by the CLO.

According to Abiola, social justice is a basic recipe for peace to see Nigerian through
the present crisis. He contended that while peace and unity are essential for the
nation’s survival, such attributes would be transient unless founded on social justice.
He also endorsed all efforts to evolve genuine solutions to the stalemate in the political transition. But added; “It is important to underscore what is really at stake in our nation today. What is at stake is social justice upon which any meaningful peace must be based. “To speak of peace without justice will be meaningless and temporary. Indeed, all major religions are predicated on the fundamental requirements of justice. The religions require leaders to adhere to and pursue justice without fear or favour, and that when confronted with justice and injustice leaders must align with justice, with a resolute opposition to injustice…. the ultimate test of leadership is where it stands in a confrontation between justice and injustice.” In the news item, Abiola further stressed the need to use the June 12 elections to address the skewed power equation in the country.

It is a well-known dictum and the common historical reality that peace without justice can only be the peace of the graveyard and therefore temporary. What we need in this nation today is peace based on social justice. All groups and leaders who desire a permanent and lasting solution to the current crisis must not shy away from the question of peace based on justice…. the crux of the political crisis was the freedom of choice and the right to choose. Democracy is indeed based on the sanctity of the choice of the majority. This sanctity is governed by the principle of the equality of the voter and of the right of the individual to cast vote…. It is essential to note that those who are opposed to the outcome of the 12 June election constitute a magic circle whose unifying objective is opposition to the shift of power outside its influence. All other excuses and solutions are designed to achieve the only objective of retaining power and denying Nigerians their democratic right to choose their leader (The Guardian, July 31, 1993, back page).

From the items discussed above, the June 12 elections ripped open the fault lines in Nigeria’s chequered political history. It brought to the fore once again, religion and ethnicity into the politics of Nigeria. Perhaps, it could be argued that the June 12 crisis generated so much internal tension because it involved basically power struggle between two of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria. The success of pro-democracy
demonstrations in the heartland of the Yorubas in Southwest Nigeria and their failure outside the Yoruba areas underlie the importance of ethnic pull in Nigerian politics. The next section examines the Ogoni crisis.

**Ogoni Crisis**

Figure 8: Ogoni Crisis November 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of News Items</th>
<th>Total News Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>62 (28.7%)</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>73 (31.6%)</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>67 (27.1%)</td>
<td>247</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Coverage</th>
<th>Number of Editorials</th>
<th>Total Number of Editorials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>3 (21.4%)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Ogoni crisis, the pattern of coverage was 28.7% for October, 31.6% for November and 27.1% for December. For the editorials, it was 16.7% in October, 21.4% for November and 21.4% for December. Although, a little different, the pattern of coverage of the Ogoni crisis was similar to that of the April 1990 coup. The June 12 crisis was given more attention than the other two, perhaps because it affected two of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria.

As discussed previously, due to increasing repression at home, human rights organisations had to look up to international opportunity structures to shift the venue of human rights campaign outside Nigeria. In the case of Ogoni, more than domestic opportunity structures, international opportunity structures such as Commonwealth meetings, the UNCHR, other international fora provided the arena where the Ogoni battle was fought outside Nigeria. In the reports carried in the Guardian, this development was also well reported. More than the June 12 elections, most of the reports in the Guardian focussed on reactions outside Nigeria.

In the cover story on the front page of *The Guardian* two days after the execution of the Ogoni activists, the mounting international pressure following the international outrage that greeted the killings was the focus of the news item. It reported the efforts of the Commonwealth to punish Nigeria. "The Commonwealth of Nations stipulated a
two-year deadline for the Federal Government to improve its democracy and human rights ratings. At the expiration of the two-year deadline, Nigeria stands the chance of being expelled from the 52-nation voluntary association. Her membership had, on Saturday, been suspended in the thick of global outrage against the executions last Friday, of minority and environment activist and writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa, along with eight others.

The news also justified the action of the Commonwealth on Nigeria by arguing that the demand on “Nigeria is in compliance with principles of the Articles of Harare Declaration. The 1991 Declaration, to which the Saturday suspension of Nigeria’s membership was ascribed, outlined the priorities of the Commonwealth as promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. It is a consensus document which was supported by all the governments that attended the submit including Nigeria.”

The item also carried the reaction of the Nigerian government but balanced the views of Nigerian government officials with that of Nigerians that were critical to the official view. It reported the Special Adviser to the Head of State on Legal matters, Dr Auwalu Hamisu Yadudu, as justifying the convictions and executions, saying they were based on the verdict of a legally constituted court of law which found the convicts guilty of murder. Along with the official view of the government, reactions of other Nigerians harped on the loss by Nigeria of international goodwill. In one of the reactions, Jerry Gana, a former Minister described it as a tragic development. “It is saddening, very saddening. Our loss will be tremendous. It is now a matter of acceptability and recognition before the international community. Our losses will be incalculable.”

The item also expressed the regret of groups, such as Catholic bishops from the five English-speaking West African countries that condemned the development. For instance, Pope John Paul II, deplored human rights abuses in Nigeria, and described the hanging of the Ogoni nine as “painful news” the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) called the execution a criminal act of state murder. Finally, the news item carried an appeal by the son of Ken Wiwa Jnr. that called for a boycott of Nigeria’s oil export while criticising Commonwealth’s policy of economic sanction as
ineffective. He said the group’s policy of quiet diplomacy failed to prevent his father’s execution (*The Guardian* November 13, 1995: 1-2).

*The Guardian* also reported the efforts to isolate Nigeria at the UN after the Ogoni killings. In a December 13, 1995 cover story, it reported how Nigeria’s fortune in the comity of nations had taken a dip with a United Nations draft resolution asking the Federal government to abide by its obligations under international instruments on human rights and take immediate and concrete steps to restore democracy.

According to the report, the UN bill represented a climax to international outrage against last month’s Ogoni minority rights activists who were convicted of murder. The report indicated that the full implications of the UN draft resolution were not immediately clear, “but the document is certain to strengthen the hand of the countries such as South Africa and the US, which have been pushing for multilateral and strategic sanctions, including an oil embargo, against Nigeria.” It also catalogued the range of actions that had been taken against Nigeria since the executions. “Hitherto, the 53-member Commonwealth of Nations had suspended Nigeria’s membership and set a two-year limit for the Federal Government to restore democracy to prevent outright expulsion. Unilateral as well as multilateral reprisals had also greeted the Ogoni activists’ hanging. For instance, many Western and few Asian countries have recalled their envoys, while European Union member-nations and the US have slammed various sanctions, including sports and arms ban, on Nigeria. Although no nation or power bloc rose up to South Africa’s President Mandela’s campaign for oil embargo, the US has consistently said the option had not been ruled out” (*The Guardian* December 13, 1995: 1-2).

The passing of the resolution against Nigeria was also reported on the front page of *The Guardian* on December 15, 1995. The report stated, “with 98 votes to 12, the third committee of the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution yesterday, condemning Nigeria’s execution of nine Ogoni human rights activists including playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa. It also called on Nigeria to respect human rights and take “immediate and concrete steps” to install democracy.” The resolution called on the country to restore the observance of human rights and to take “immediate and concrete steps” to install democracy. The UN committee called on
the body's Secretary-General Dr Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali to enter into discussion with Nigeria and report progress on achieving democracy. The General Assembly will meet next week to consider the resolution. *(The Guardian, December 15, 1995: 1).*

In the reporting of the Ogoni crisis, there seems to be a shift in the political discourse in *The Guardian*, from the domestic environment to the international environment. This is similar to the strategic shift in the campaign activities of human rights organisations from Nigeria to venues and fora outside Nigeria.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Through its activities discussed in the last chapter, the CLO sought to frame democratisation in Nigeria from the prism of human rights. It portrayed the democratic transition programmes of successive military regimes in Nigeria as incapable of bringing about genuine democracy in Nigeria.

The June 12 elections provided a moment where the frames of CLO resonated with the understanding of many Nigerians, especially, the Yorubas who felt cheated by the annulment of the June 12 elections. However, while the hidden agenda frame of CLO provided the impetus for the demonstrations against the June 12 annulment, the resurgence of ethnic and religious factors in Nigerian politics meant that the influence of human rights frames is clouded by the impact of ethnic and religious discourse that also had a bearing on the coverage of the June 12 elections.

However, in the case of the Ogoni crisis, it is possible to talk of the triumph of human rights frames and human rights campaigns as most of the discourse was dominated by activities happening outside Nigeria where human rights organisations had become active due to repression at home.

The framing of democratisation by the CLO and the actual political discourse in *The Guardian* highlight the influence of human rights frame in political mobilisation in Nigeria from 1990 as well as the limitations posed by established political orientations such as religion and ethnicity. Much as human rights organisations provided the basis on which people were mobilised to campaign for termination of military rule, they were helpless in the face of eventual ethnic and religious colouration of the protests.
that followed. This raises the issue of the extent to which universal values, such as human rights could influence domestic political considerations.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

The previous chapters have looked at the different aspects of this study. The introduction provided a general overview of the direction of the study. In chapter one the theoretical arguments and empirical studies relevant to this study were reviewed. In chapter two I examined the context of this study, power politics in Nigeria and the role of human rights in the process. Chapter three looked at the methods used to collect and analyse data. Chapter four described how the Civil Liberties Organisation built a base of social and political power, both domestic and international. Chapter five analysed the framing of democratisation by the CLO and the political discourse in a mainstream mass media. Here, I provide a summary of the main arguments and findings of the study.

In the beginning I set out to answer three basic research questions, which were how international opportunities structures influence the struggle for democracy in Nigeria; how domestic structures in Nigeria mediate international interactions of different groups in the country; and, how human rights NGOs and activists carry out human rights campaigns within the constraints of context and existing political structure. The next section will look at how the discussions in the previous chapters have provided answers to the questions.

International Opportunities Structures and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria

As discussed in the theoretical framework, context and findings chapters, international political opportunities structures played an influential role in the struggle for democratisation in Nigeria. Before the emergence of the first human rights organisation, human rights provisions were enshrined in the constitution of Nigeria and institutions such as the media, judiciary and professional associations, were already well established in Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria was a member of most of the international bodies, such as the United Nations, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and none of them considered paying attention to the human rights situation in the country before human rights organisations in Nigeria took up the challenge of
using the platforms provided by these organisations to campaign against the human rights situation in the country.

As mentioned previously, transnational advocacy networks appear most likely to emerge under three conditions. First, where channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting in motion a boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of these networks. Second, where activists or political entrepreneurs believe that networking will further their missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks. Third, where conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming and strengthening networks. Where channels of participation are blocked, the international arena may be the only means that domestic activists have to gain attention to their issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a).

In respect of the human rights organisations in Nigeria such as the CLO, the existence of universal human rights standards on which the actions of the government could be assessed and the role of established transnational human rights organisations were important factors in the development and growth of human rights advocacy networks in Nigeria.

The international institutions that provided the funds for the activities of Nigerian human rights organisations as well as existing transnational networks whose resources were mobilised and campaign platforms provided by international meetings and conferences conferred a kind of power that were not available before to other organisations before the founding of the CLO and others.

As stated in the objectives of CLO, it believed that networking would further its mission. CLO also emerged in the country at a time when most of the professional associations that were traditional defenders of democratic ideals in the country were either proscribed or their activities significantly curtailed by the government. Hence, as the channels of participation in the domestic arena became increasingly constrained, local groups looked up to organisations such as CLO that had international connections, and groups such as CLO in turn relied more and more on the transnational human rights advocacy networks and international campaigns.
Human rights organisations were in the early stages of their development during the 1990 coup, therefore, they did not play any significant role. However, as they developed more political savvy and mobilised other constituents of the civil society, they became more active in the political development of the country. During the June 12 crisis, they provided the international support that complemented the domestic struggle at home. In the case of the Ogoni crisis, they were the main pillars on which the campaign efforts rested as the preponderance of reports on international reactions to the Ogoni crisis in the Guardian indicated.

The development of human rights advocacy in Nigeria, as elsewhere, emphasised the significance of international human rights norms and documents in domestic political struggles. It also offers another window for looking at globalisation processes. Human rights networks offer a social construction of globalisation processes by groups embedded in different levels of networks, domestic-domestic, domestic-global, and global-domestic. It makes it possible to look at how politics are locally constructed through opportunities offered by globalisation. That is how human rights values became domesticated in Nigeria, while domestic Nigerian political problems became globalised through international campaigns.

As discussed in chapter four, human rights networks and the international opportunities structure that brought them about are not always successful in their campaigns as the case of the failure to reverse the annulment of the June 12 elections and the Ogoni killings have indicated. As put by Evans (2000), even when counter-hegemonic transnational networks are considered as an ensemble, there is no overall claim that they constitute an irresistible force, only that they illustrate the existence of important opportunities for acting globally that should be better theorized and taken advantage of in practice. Nor is there any illusion here that acting globally is a magic bullet that obviates the need for other sorts of political work. To the contrary, it is precisely the potential catalytic effects of transnational networks on local struggles that make them worthwhile. Building transnational networks gives local organizing new prospects of success and local mobilization is an essential element of counter-hegemonic globalization. Therefore, in spite of the limitations they provided political
synergy and break into the mainstream political discourse in a country such as Nigeria.

The emergence of domestic human rights networks and their transnational supporters raise anew questions such as dependency and underdevelopment as well as north-south hegemony and marginalisation debates. While it is outside the remit of this study to go into the debates, it is considered important for further studies.

**Domestic Structures and International Interactions**

Context is important in the application of democratisation theory. In a way, it is the context that was the basis for challenges to homogenising influence of universal values such as human rights. It also brought out the contradictions in the debates about universalisation and relativisation of human rights values. Contexts have also been a serious challenge to the modernisation rhetoric of Lerner and others as demonstrated in the case of Iran presented by Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994). However, in respect of human rights, two arguments could, plausibly, be put forward. The first is that irrespective of contexts, certain patterns are discernible in the activities of human rights advocacy groups for example monitoring, information politics, campaign, venue-shifting etc. In the second instance, contexts do influence the effectiveness of human rights advocacy.

As indicated in the chapter on power and politics in Nigeria, the nature of Nigeria state already skewed power and domination to the side of the three majority groups with the other groups potentially marginalised. However, international solidarity could sometimes turn what one lacks in number to an advantage with the goodwill of international supporters. This perhaps explains the overwhelming international support for the Ogoni cause and less local support and the overwhelming local and not so overwhelming international support for the June 12 election annulment. Hence, the boundaries of the minority and majority could be blurred.

However, international contacts cannot substitute for the development of a solid domestic political following simply because international actors are not a constituency in Nigerian political affairs. Although the expansion of the civil society sector activities after 1990 also led to intensified horizontal networking, these networks
tended to address issues that have different appeals to different ethnic groups in the country. Therefore, human rights networks, which failed to overcome ethnic divisions and simply added international voices to their demands had either a hard time to develop local capacities or were met with increasing hostility by the government. The powerful tool of international networking in protecting one’s life can turn into a serious constraint in the long run. If participants of networks once designed to bring about change are blinded by these successes, they will fail to adjust to new circumstances (Schmitz, 1999).

**Action Contexts and Democracy Campaigns**

The success or otherwise of a campaign depends on a number of factors. While human rights values and activists are important, the absence of which will make it impossible to embark on campaigns, action contexts are also important. As indicated in the study, the April 1990 coup was significant in Nigeria because it raised issues that border on the legitimacy and corporate existence of the country. However, due to the sensitive nature of the issues raised, it was difficult to build an advocacy network around those issues immediately. Instead, the human rights organisations focussed on the individual liberties of the accused.

Similarly, when the advocacy network really emerged through the CD and other groups, the demands marginalised a number of groups in the country such as the Hausa-Fulani Muslim north, who easily latched on this as a design of the south-based human rights organisation and the media to marginalise them. This eventually affected the mobilisation for the June 12 elections as the demonstrations were more pronounced in the Southwest where most of the human rights groups and the press were based.

This also played itself out in the Ogoni crisis. As indicated, the Ogoni people argued that the Nigerian state had not been fair to them and they didn’t seem to have any faith in governmental institutions such as the judiciary or the parliament to get redress. Therefore, they pinned their hopes only on the international community. However, this had an impact on the effectiveness of the Ogoni campaign as most of the other ethnic groups felt indifferent to their cause. This was also reflected in the preponderance of the reports about the international outrage generated by the killing
of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight Ogoni activists. Domestic outrage were rather muted and where this were expressed at all, it was usually coupled to wider issues such as the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections.

In respect of international campaigns, the effectiveness of human rights advocacy were also constrained by the international context of politics and power play even in international arenas such as the UN Human Rights Commission. As discussed previously, the campaigns of the CLO at the UN was constrained by the interest politics of the states that are members of the international community. Usually debates about north-south interests and developing and developed countries sometimes becloud the finer arguments of human rights values. For instance, debates about the structural adjustments programme and debts as obstacles to the protection of human rights were usually put forward by developing countries. Oil interests and economic interests also sometimes act as significant factors. Yet, in spite of this limitation, the human rights advocacy networks were able to record some measure of success as the successful transfer of power to a democratically elected president in Nigeria indicated and the passing of resolutions appointing country-specific rapporteurs for Nigeria highlighted.

As discussed previously, it could then be argued that in spite of the emergence of non-governmental organisations and the influence of values such as human rights in democratisation and political struggles, states are still important actors in both domestic and international affairs. Much of the democratisation literature recognises that successful democratisation presumes the prior existence of a strong or effective state. Thus Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) within their structural approach to democratisation, speak of the need for a state which is both strong and relatively autonomous from dominant interests (1992). Clapham (1993) summing up prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa, notes with concern that

Whereas the first round of democratisation was undermined by the strength of the state, in relation at least to potentially competing power centres, the second round is likely to be undermined by its weakness… democracy is far more likely to succeed as a mechanism for
introducing accountability into a strong state, than as a means of preserving a weak one (Clapham, 1993: 434).

Although globalisation may help to bring about the assertion of ‘primordial’ identities, as the globalisation as fragmentation proponents proffer, such identities are not articulated in a political vacuum, they are directed at the state. Even while they threaten the integrity of the existing nation-state, they reaffirm the state as the pinnacle and lever of their political aspirations. In sum, the state remains the outstanding point of resistance and self-determination. As argued by Randall and Theobald (1998), states will continue to form a principal object of analysis for political science, while increasingly sharing centre stage with the fluid structures and processes of its global context (Randall and Theobald, 1998: 264-5). So, it is necessary to factor in this reality in transnational human rights campaigns.

**The Power of Influence**

From the foregoing, it is important to consider how human rights organisations/networks wield the kind of influence they wield in the domestic and international politics.

In Nigeria, many organisations already disempowered found a window of opportunity in the CLO. The CLO took up their interest and they took up the cause of the CLO in turn. International connections provided support against domestic repression. For instance, when other professional groups were proscribed or had one problem or the other, only the human rights networks could match the government, locally and internationally. Therefore, by forging strategic relations, human rights NGOs such as the CLO created a constituency for political mobilisation, both locally and internationally.

As argued previously by Layder (1994) if we break the exercise of power down, it is possible to talk about the ability to employ a discourse that reflects a command of knowledge of a particular area. This is usually employed in relation to those who lack such command and have no legitimate claim to such knowledge (Layder, 1994: 97). This could also be applied to organisations that have a command of knowledge of human rights and who use it against others who lack such command. Hence, the
knowledge of monitoring compliance with human rights norms confers a kind of power on human rights organisations. This is the power organisations such as the CLO used to provide governments and international advocacy networks with useful information which were then used to put pressure on Nigerian government to comply with voluntarily ratified international treaties.

The mass media, through their structure and orientation, influence political contest between two actors. By providing access to different groups, the media contribute to domestic empowerment or disempowerment of organisations in democratisation. Through issues raised and organisations used as sources of news materials, human rights also influenced the coverage of democratisation in Nigeria as evinced by the discourses on the Ogoni crisis in Nigeria.

**Contribution to Knowledge**

The use of human rights makes it possible to theorise politics as a communication process. For instance, human rights values as message, human rights activists as source, human rights networks as media and governments and international communities as receivers of the message. It also enables a social construction of politics and communication from the activities of human rights organisations. As a study that explores the connection between human rights, media and politics, it offers an opportunity to further explore the questions raised in further studies. It also makes is possible to explore in further studies how human rights organisations embeddeness in domestic politics could also recreate the conditions that brought about their existence.

**Limitations**

The major limitation of this study is its exploratory nature. It has not been studied before. It also relied on materials from one organisation and the fallible memory of the writer which might affect the wider applicability of some of the findings in this study. However, as an exploratory research it provides insights that might prove useful in future research into this area.
The NBA and ouster clauses (Editorial)

"At the end of its yearly Law Week, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) issued a communique which touched on several salient aspects of the nation's legal, political and economic life. Besides urging the government to abide by the transition programme, it called on the Federal Government to take urgent steps to ameliorate the living conditions of the citizenry worsted by the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The NBA's expression of concern in these areas is proof that its vision of society goes beyond the narrow confines of law and the judiciary. This is an exemplary lesson to all national associations or professional bodies on the proper attitude to matters of common concern.

But it is in the area of decrees promulgated in recent years that the NBA's focus has been expectedly most accurate. The NBA reviewed the amendment earlier this month of the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No.2 and concluded that commendable as this is, only "a complete abrogation" of the enactment is acceptable. This is especially remarkable considering that the body was privy to the amendment. More importantly, it bears out our earlier recommendation that the NBA should not put itself in a position where it will be seen as bargaining away the fundamental rights of citizens to freedom, fair trial and just laws. It was proper for the NBA to insist on the scrapping of Decree 2.

Of equal importance is its demand for the removal ouster clauses in all decrees. These special provisions have rendered impossible the authority the law courts to question the legality of several draconian enactments. A situation where the powers of the third estate of the realm are so severely curtailed is patently unhealthy for the development of law, not to speak of the ill effects on the freedom of citizens and the securing of justice from the state. We again completely endorse the NBA's position on this.

It only remains to add that the government must listen to the NBA. As always, the association's sense of responsibility is not in doubt. And it is as committed to security, law and order in the nation as the government itself. It would indeed be a mark of its self-confidence if the government could do away with authoritarian provisions that
will have no place in the statute books after the military relinquishes power” (March 3, 1990: 8).

**Counting the Cost of the Transition (Editorial)**

Even before the final accounting is done, there is reason to believe that ours must be one of the costliest exercises in the restoration of democracy ever undertaken anywhere. Nothing worthwhile comes cheap, of course; and democratic institutions are worth cultivating and nurturing if the nation is to avoid the political errors of the past. The worry, however, is that a great deal of the huge sums that are being passed off as investments in democracy are either nothing of the sort, or are far too large for their advertised objectives, or make little sense in a regime of structural adjustment.

It all began with the Political Bureau, set up to organise a debate nationwide and ascertain the wishes of the people on a new political direction for the nation. The cost of this exercise, the findings and recommendations of which were for the most part discountenanced, has not been stated officially, but about N3 million, is estimated to have gone into the exercise.

One offshoot of the Political Bureau is the Directorate of Mass Mobilisation, set up to mobilise the people for social justice, self-reliance and economic recovery. Last year alone, N80 million was provided for the programme; and yet its achievements are intangible.

The Constitution Review Committee and the Constituent, while they existed, also cost the taxpayers at least N5 million. Yet in the end, no more than six substantive amendments were made to the 1979 Constitution. And they were made more by the Armed Forces Ruling Council than by the Constituent Assembly.

Meanwhile, the government took upon itself the responsibility of building and furnishing party secretariats in the state capitals and council headquarters, the printing of the manifestoes and constitutions of the two government-sponsored parties and the training of all manner of party functionaries and aspiring politicians by yet another bureaucracy of the transition, the Centre for Democratic Studies. All this will cost at least N2 million.

The latest in this unending catalogue of expenses is the N44 million that is going to be spent for the registration of members of the two political parties. Each state and Abuja will receive N2 million for an exercise that six of the disbanded political associations carried out fairly successfully at no cost to the exchequer.
Entire communities live under the scourge of guinea worm because they have no access to clean water. These are the grassroots people whose participation is crucial to the success of the unfolding political experiment. A fraction of what is going to be spent to register them for political participation can be employed to liberate them from the scourge of guinea worm, to unlock their productive energies and thus enable them to take an active part in shaping their own destiny. Many of the other schemes in the transition programme, worthy as they are, can be trimmed and made more cost effective. The savings can then be invested in improving the quality of life of the people.

Democracy is not merely a matter of structures. It is also a matter of culture. Much of the nation's financial resources are being poured into structures that will keep a lot of contractors and bureaucrats and academic adventurers and create the illusion of momentum but do little to develop a culture of democracy.

In the face of the crippling deprivations that the Nigerian people face, the best efforts of the government notwithstanding, the authorities should begin an earnest search for a less costly way of promoting democracy. After all, this would not be the nation's first transition, nor for that matter the first time the people would be exercising their political franchise" (March 17, 1990: 8).

"Christians protests continue as Okogie goes round

The Christians protest of at least five controversial government policies ignited in Lagos on Tuesday was unrelenting on Wednesday.

Catholic Archbishop of Lagos Olubunmi Okogie, who led the way on Tuesday with a press conference in Lagos, was in Abeokuta, Ogun state, on Wednesday for an hour-long meeting with Governor Navy Captain Mohammed Lawal in what observers said may be the beginning of a nation-wide shuttle.

In Kaduna, the youth wing of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), of which Bishop Okogie is national president, addressed a press conference on Wednesday at which it contested government claims that no Christian leader was being held over the April 22 coup attempt.

In Ibadan, Oyo State, CAN leaders went to the Government House to ask the Governor, Col. Adedeji Oresanya, to prove unequivocally that the government has arrested none of its members on the basis of an underground publication alleging that CAN was behind the April 22 putsch move.
Col. Oresanya told them he was aware of the publication and he suspected it originated from the University of Ibadan from where, incidentally, history teacher Professor Obaro Ikime, a prominent leader of the campus Church of the Resurrection, was picked up.

For more than one hour on Wednesday, Archbishop Okogie, CAN president, discussed Nigeria’s precarious religious and political matters with Ogun State Governor Navy Captain Mohammed Lawal.

It was not clear at whose instance the meeting was called in Abeokuta. But Navy Captain Lawal later told reporters that he saw eye-to-eye with Dr Okogie on some torchy national issues such as the nature of political appointments and peaceful religious co-existence.

The meeting came barely 24 hours after Navy Captain Lawal declared today a work-free day for workers to offer prayers for political and religious stability and after Archbishop Okogie addressed a press conference in Lagos at which, “in the interest of peace and stability”, he called for:

- restructuring of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) to reflect Nigeria’s geographical and religious diversity. He said that since the Obasanjo Administration (1976 to 1979), subsequent governments have failed to sustain the balance of power through fair representation of all segments of Nigeria in key appointments

- unambiguous official statement on Nigeria’s status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) particularly in the light of a communiqué purportedly issued after a joint meeting of the OIC and the newly founded Islam In Africa Organisation. The document, issued in Abuja last November claimed, among other things that: One: Nigeria donated $21 billion to the Islamic Development Fund of the OIC; and Two: All facets of public life, including party politics, appointments to top political position, judicial systems, will, ultimately be “Islamised” in all member countries.

- Removal of Petroleum Resources Minister Professor Jibril Aminu and External Affairs Minister, Alhaji Rilwan Lukman “in the interest of peace and stability” since they are not “sacred cows” and because they have served the country long enough.
• Reversal of what might be called the unwarranted on-going retrenchment at the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). He criticised the timing of the retrenchment considering the present economic, political and social atmosphere in the country, and

• Immediate release of all Christian leaders arrested since the April 22 foiled coup bid. In fact, Archbishop Okogie urged the government to spare the lives of all those being tried for the coup bid to “give them the last grace of repentance”.

“It is true they have committed treason. They could be jailed. We don’t need to waste blood. We should give them a chance to repent and reflect on their lives,” he said.

Archbishop Okogie might have discussed all these issues on Wednesday with Navy Captain Mohammed who told reporters later “we were able to resolve the differences. We all have one goal in common, that is, the Almighty God”.

Navy Captain Lawal added that they discussed “the need for religious tolerance, on how to live in harmony with people of different cultural and religious persuasions and the need for acceptance of the occupiers of public political offices as God chosen.”

On his part, Archbishop Okogie urged Christians to be “calm and peaceful wherever they are in the country”. He advised other state governments to emulate Ogun State government by setting aside a day for special prayers or national peace and stability….” (May 25, 1990, pp.3).

“Nigeria can’t afford to split, says Soyinka

In perhaps the most demure criticism of the April 22 foiled bloody coup bid, Nobel laureate Professor Wole Soyinka- in a three-page statement spiced with words of advice- categorically asked the government on Thursday to decide its political preference.

He gave two choices: dismemberment (Lithuanian) or cohesion (Polish), but warned that Nigeria couldn’t now afford the Lithuanian tendency, which the April 22 putsch typifies, lending a strong voice to the country’s unity.

Soyinka, who “confessed” to having raised some of the issues on the dissident’s agenda with President Ibrahim Babangida less than 12 hours before the insurrection, advised the government not to abandon its human rights posture because of the insurrection.
To him, the coup attempt and its attendant carnage deserve to be soundly condemned, but the complaints of the dissidents require “close scrutiny” and “remedial action”. Soyinka’s stand-amplified in “the tendency of transition,” released on Thursday in Abeokuta- is that the military, having promised to return Nigeria to civil democratic rule should exhibit, during the transition, democratic culture in its corporate action and the conduct of its personnel. According to him, acting otherwise will amount to an indirect invitation to coups. In the playwright’s opinion, however, this trait is not sufficiently displayed by some government officials.

Said he: “It is not merely fanciful to suggest that coups have indeed been attempted during this transition period; that there have been acts which have, at the very least, symbolically dismembered the nation.

“And the administration must face up to the fact that from time to time the actions of even his own ministers and governors are indeed forces for this dismemberment.

“The calling for a coup or summons to a coup is a strong feature of actions by such members of government.”

Indeed, it is Soyinka’s belief that some people in the government have attempted coups against Nigeria.

“It is not, therefore, merely when the guns begin to boom against the seat of government that we should realise that a coup has been attempted; others have attempted coups against national cohesion at the “stroke of pen”, he said.

The climate for the attempted coup bid was created by those government officials whose speeches and actions tended to divide Nigeria. Soyinka saw a philosophical lesson to the violent episode, which he said, constituted a test of “leadership resolution and humane commitment”.

He also advised that the government be cautious not to use the coup experience as an excuse for abusing civic and human rights. Said Soyinka: “The trauma of these past days should be kept under firm control. It should not provide a tempting cover for renewed assault on civic and human rights under the guise of security exigencies… confidence in the nation’s capacity to function normally even in the abnormal times should be restored. The security agencies should not act in an opportunistic fashion or be seen to do so”.

Although it has been amplified for the umpteenth time that religion had no place in the foiled coup bid, Soyinka-like the former army adjutant-general, Major-General
David Jemibewon (rtd)- urged the government to consider religion as a “core issue of security”.

His words: “Those who believe that religion was critically in the fundamental animation of this tragic episode may be in for a surprise.

“I am convinced that revelation from the trial (of the plotters) itself will rip off the final the final veils of illusion in this respect”.

Citing some “remarkable insight into the background of some of the principal actors, the accused and arrested plotters”, Soyinka said he believed that “the nation is about to be compelled to take stock of itself in the most painful way to understand finally that religious aggressiveness can only engender the same response in other religions and that the nature and extent of such response belong totally in the territory of unpredictable and irrational.

He, therefore, advised the government to divest itself of all religious obligations (April 27, 1990:Backpage).
APPENDIX 2: JUNE 12 1993 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS
(NEWS AND EDITORIAL MATERIALS IN THE GUARDIAN)

Abiola Meets CAN, Dispels Fears

A meeting aimed at reassuring the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) following the choice of Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe-a Moslem-as Chief Moshood Abiola’s running mate was held at the weekend in Lagos.

CAN’s fears were based on the contentious Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), Shariah court, the ban on Christian religious studies in schools in some states, lopsided appointments in favour of Muslims, burning of churches, massacre of Christians in certain northern states.

On the OIC Chief Abiola said, “as far as I know, the issue of OIC is dead. The Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs does not even want the Federal Government to be involved anymore in its dealings, so I can assure you, nobody can Islamize a country or impose a particular religion on the people, its not constitutional or democratic”.

The Bashorun, clearing the air on the apprehensive Shariah court issue, explained that no president or single individual can unilaterally take a decision on the institutionalising Shariah courts in a country.” It has to be debated and approved by the law-making organs of the country as well as voting money for its funding; and we surely don’t have that time and money”. He blamed religious disturbances in the country on idleness and hunger, explaining that his “government will meaningfully engage the youths of the country in nation development opportunity…. My government will protect every Nigerian irrespective of religious affiliation.”

The Reverend Oyediran who advocated 50:50 parity in the sharing of government offices and positions between Muslims and Christians, perhaps got more than he desired when Chief Abiola asked him: What if it is 70:30 in favour of the Christians if they are found to be more credible and qualified for the positions being considered?” Chief Abiola reiterated his determination not to sacrifice merit for mediocrity in the name of religion. “I am not going to run a religious centre”, he said stating that his mission is “to salvage the economy with the best hands I can get whether they are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Agnostics or whatever.” He explained that such search for excellence occasioned his choice of Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe as his running mate…. (May 23, 1993, pp.1-2).
Islamic Council To Reconcile Abiola, Babangida

The 11-man special high-powered committee set up in Kaduna last Thursday by the National Executive Council (NEC) meeting by the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), to mediate in the current political impasse would this week meet the two principal actors in the crisis- General Ibrahim Babangida and Chief Moshood Abiola, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) candidate in the annulled June 12 polls. ... Although the previous attempts by other interest groups have failed to resolve the crisis, the source was optimistic that the Islamic Council would find a viable solution.... The high-powered committee is headed by the Sultan of Sokoto. The Council has been influential in successive administrations in the country. It is believed to have as well influenced some important policy-decisions of the present regime and his determined to end the present crisis (July 25, 1993, pp.1-2).

Adetiloye warns of dangers of cancelled poll again

Failure to yield to the people’s unanimous decision on the presidential election may lead to disintegration of the country. Most Rev. Abiodun Adetiloye, the Archbishop and Primate of the Church of Nigeria, Anglican Communion, told President Ibrahim Babangida, in an open letter yesterday. It was his fourth letter since the crisis began. “Nigeria”, he feared, “may not come out of this crisis as one entity; and God and history will forget whatever good you may have done and remember you as a military dictator who for one reason or the other took over power in a palace coup detat in August 1985. And because he was holding the butt of the gun, hardened his heart, destroyed the largest black country-Nigeria- approximately a quarter of the black race; with his iron fist and led it into complete disintegration.”

He reminded the President that “God himself changes his mind hence human beings pray to Him”. On the likely consequence of spurning the peoples’ wish, Adetiloye drew attention to the experience of Lesotho’s President Lebua Jonathan who cancelled an election that did not favour him but later quit in disgrace.... the reasons adduced for cancelling the election result as untenable as “even at any palace coup detat there is always exchange of money and promises of patronage. The archbishop called for the release of all political detainees and the announcement of the June 12
election result to save the nation from disintegration and chaos (July 17, 1993, pp.1-2).

No Justice, no peace, says Abiola
Social justice is a basic recipe for the peace to see Nigerian through the present crisis, according to Chief Moshood Abiola, the Social Democratic Party’s flag bearer on the June 12 election. While peace and unity are essential for the nation’s survival, such attributes would be transient unless founded on social justice..... He also endorsed all efforts to evolve genuine solutions to the stalemate in the political transition. But added; “It is important to underscore what is really at stake in our nation today. What is at stake is social justice upon which any meaningful peace must be based. To speak of peace without justice will be meaningless and temporary. Indeed, all major religions are predicated on the fundamental requirements of justice. The religions require leaders to adhere to and pursue justice without fear or favour, and that when confronted with justice and injustice leaders must align with justice, with a resolute opposition to injustice.... the ultimate test of leadership is where it stands in a confrontation between justice and injustice.

It is a well-known dictum and the common historical reality that peace without justice can only be the peace of the graveyard and therefore temporary. What we need in this nation today is peace based on social justice. All groups and leaders who desire a permanent and lasting solution to the current crisis must not shy away from the question of peace based on justice.... the crux of the political crisis was the freedom of choice and the right to choose. Democracy is indeed based on the sanctity of the choice of the majority. This sanctity is governed by the principle of the equality of the voter and of the right of the individual to cast vote.... It is essential to note that those who are opposed to the outcome of the 12 June election constitute a magic circle whose unifying objective is opposition to the shift of power outside its influence. All other excuses and solutions are designed to achieve the only objective of retaining power and denying Nigerians their democratic right to choose their leader” (July 31, 1993, backpage).
Govt defends action as Commonwealth gives Nigeria deadline on democracy

International pressure on Nigeria to protest the hanging of nine minority rights activists mounted yesterday, with the Commonwealth of Nations stipulating a two-year deadline for the Federal Government to improve its democracy and human rights ratings.

At the expiration of the two-year deadline, Nigeria stands the chance of being expelled from the 52-nation voluntary association. Her membership had, on Saturday, been suspended in the thick of global outrage against the executions last Friday, of minority and environment activist and writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa, along with eight others.

The nine had been convicted on October 30 and 31 by Justice Ibrahim Auta-led tribunal for alleged roles in the murder on May 21, last year, of four prominent Ogoni indigenes.... The Commonwealth’s avowed demand from Nigeria is in compliance with principles of the Articles of Harare Declaration. The 1991 Declaration, to which the Saturday suspension of Nigeria’s membership was ascribed, outlined the priorities of the Commonwealth as promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. It is a consensus document which was supported by all the governments that attended the Summit including Nigeria.

Government officials and some politicians berated Nigeria’s critics, denying human rights abuses. In Abuja at the weekend, the Head of State’s Special Adviser on Legal matters, Dr Auwalu Hamisu Yadudu, defended the convictions and executions, saying they were based on the verdict of a legally constituted court of law which found the convicts guilty of murder. “Criminal conduct is not subject to international standards but the domestic laws and procedures of the country concerned.... internationally, murder was normally punished according to the domestic laws of the country just as it carries life jail in Britain and capital sentence in the US if it first degree murder. Nigeria is satisfied that a criminal conduct has been established and the appropriate laws applied. Suspending Nigeria is not appropriate. It has been carried out without due regard for the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-countries. Nigeria needs to restate one fact that there was a premeditated murder of some
prominent citizens of Ogoni land who disagreed with the mode of operation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).... the court was not a military tribunal but one with three members, comprising two judges and one military officer of the rank of a Lieutenant-colonel.... its proceedings were governed by normal legal procedures and that the suspects were given the opportunity to defend themselves.

But former Minister for Information, Prof. Jerry Gana, described it as a tragic development. “It is saddening, very saddening. Our loss will be tremendous. It is now a matter of acceptability and recognition before the international community. Our losses will be incalculable.

Condemnations from international and domestic quarters yesterday trailed the hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight others last Friday at the Port Harcourt prisons. Pope John Paul II, at the Vatican city, yesterday, deplored human rights abuses in Nigeria, and described the hanging of the Ogoni nine as “painful news”. During Sunday prayers at the Vatican, the pontiff said he was “particularly close to those who are in pain, adding: “I pray to God to inspire the leaders of the Nigerian nation to guide their country towards respectful dialogue and justice, in order to construct an ever more harmonious life”.

Son of Ken Wiwa Jnr. Advocated a boycott of Nigeria’s oil export. Speaking in London after returning from the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, he criticised Commonwealth’s policy of economic sanction as ineffective. He said the group’s policy of quiet diplomacy failed to prevent his father’s execution.

The International Commission of jurist (ICJ) called the execution a criminal act of state murder...the ICJ said the government has shown the entire world that it lacks respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law.

Catholic bishops from the five English-speaking West African countries rose from a one-week parley in Enugu at the weekend, regretting the hanging of the Ogoni activists. The clerics, under the aegis of the Association of Episcopal Conferences of Anglophone West Africa (AECAWA) said the news of the hanging came midway
UN draft bill seeks democracy in Nigeria

Nigeria’s fortune in the comity of nations has taken its greatest dip, with a United Nations draft resolution asking the Federal government to abide by its obligations under international instruments on human rights and take immediate and concrete steps to restore democracy.

Hinting at the possibility of concerted sanctions by the world body, the draft urges UN member-nations to consider appropriate actions “to underline to the Nigeria Government the importance of return to democratic rule and observance of human rights…” It also asks the UN commission on Human Rights to give urgent attention to the situation in Nigeria, and requests Secretary-General Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali to undertake discussion with the Federal Government and report in the resolution’s implementation.

The UN bill, introduced on Monday to climax international outrage against last month’s Ogoni minority rights activists who were convicted of murder, followed two weeks of behind-the-scenes negotiations by nations involved on an acceptable wording of the draft. The document condemns the November 10 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, as well as “other violations of human rights” in Nigeria.

Full implications of the UN draft resolution were not immediately clear yesterday. But the document is certain to strengthen the hand of the countries such as South Africa and the US, which have been pushing for multilateral and strategic sanctions, including an oil embargo, against Nigeria. Hitherto, the 53-member Commonwealth of Nations had suspended Nigeria’s membership and set a two-year limit for the Federal Government to restore democracy to prevent outright expulsion. Unilateral as well as multilateral reprisals had also greeted the Ogoni activists’ hanging. For instance many Western and few Asian countries have recalled their envoys, while European Union member-nations and the US have slammed various sanctions, including sports and arms ban, on Nigeria. Although no nation or power bloc rose up to South Africa’s President Mandela’s campaign for oil embargo, the US has consistently said the option had been ruled out (The Guardian December 13, 1995, pp. 1-2).
UN committee votes for democracy in Nigeria

With 98 votes to 12, the third committee of the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution yesterday, condemning Nigeria’s execution of nine Ogoni human rights activists including playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa. It also called on Nigeria to respect human rights and take “immediate and concrete steps” to install democracy. The committee also requested an investigation of human rights abuses in the country.

The resolution itself was a milder version of a strong condemnation sought by the United States, which, along with some other countries, withdrew its ambassador to protest the execution on November 10. Besides, the United States had unilaterally imposed arms embargo on Nigeria and had subsequently sought to have tough measures passed in the General Assembly. The resolution yesterday did not mention arms embargo or diplomatic withdrawal. Among other things, the committee, in its text of the resolution, rejected the arbitrary execution and expressed deep concern about other violations of human rights in Nigeria.

It called on the country to restore the observance of human rights and to take “immediate and concrete steps” to install democracy. The UN committee called on the body’s Secretary-General Dr Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali to enter into discussion with Nigeria and report progress on achieving democracy. The General Assembly will meet next week to consider the resolution. (The Guardian, December 15, 1995, pp. 1).

The Africa Commission briefs UN on Nigeria’s human rights abuses

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights is filing a report to the United Nations Commission on Human rights on the “appalling” human rights situation in Nigeria, as part of its measures to bring about a change. The commission is also asking the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to prevail on the government to ensure that no harm is done to 19 Ogoni youths whose trial on charges of murder is pending before the Civil Disturbances Tribunal in Port Harcourt.

The representation is part of the practical measures adopted by the commission at a two-day extraordinary session held last week at the International Conference Centre in Kampala, Uganda to tackle human rights abuses in Nigeria over which members of the commission expressed “serious concern.”

Ambassador Ahmad Haggag, ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions in Uganda, two Ugandan ministers and representatives of human rights organisations
worldwide. Haggag delivered a message on behalf of the OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmad Salim, on the pre-occupation of the continental body with the human rights situation in Nigeria. He recalled the recent visit by Salim and the special summit on Nigeria held in Pretoria by the Southern African Development and coordinating Council (SADCC) on December 11, and said that the OAU planned to render every help to defuse the crisis now shaking the country and to implement the transition programme announced by the Head of State, Gen Sani Abacha, on October 1.

There were also worries on the human rights situation in Nigeria and measures, which could aggravate it. Members decided to ask the chairman and the OAU Secretary-General to impress on the Nigerian government to ensure that “no irreparable prejudice is caused to the 19 Ogoni detainees whose trial is pending”. The commission’s decision to take the impending trial to the OAU is believed to have been informed by the fact that its previous request on November 1 to stay action on the sentence on Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others was disregarded.

Nigeria’s High Commission in Banjul, The Gambia, which responded to the commission’s November 1 message on behalf of the government, insisted, “Nigeria has not abolished the death penalty having not acceded to the second optional protocol of the United Nations”.

The commission also decided to submit the report of the extra-ordinary session to the OAU chairman, the UN Secretary-General, and the UN High Commissioner for Human rights. It resolved to write a statement to the UN High Commission on Human rights during the next session on “the evolution of the situation of human rights in Nigeria” based on results of its extra-ordinary session and its proposed mission”.

The commission will consider at its 19th ordinary session scheduled for Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in March next year, the mission’s report on the human rights situation in Nigeria and the special Rapporteur’s report on summary and arbitrary executions. It asked the Nigerian government to submit, in conformity with Article 62 of the African Charter, its periodic reports “on measures taken to ensure compliance with rights and liberties recognised and guaranteed in the charter, relevant past resolutions and decisions of the commission”. It also has to comply “with the provisions of the charter relating to the independence of the judiciary, the safety of persons and property, the freedom of opinion and expression and social rights of workers”.

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The commission resolved that in the light of the human rights situation in Africa, it would analyse indepth the idea of installing an early warning mechanism in case of emergencies. It asked non-governmental organisations to help the commission in this area (The Guardian December 25, pp.1-2).
APPENDIX 4: THE OGONI BILL OF RIGHTS PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF NIGERIA WITH AN APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

We, the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo Khana and Tai) numbering about 500,000 being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of Nigeria, wish to draw the attention of the Governments and people of Nigeria to the undermentioned facts:

I. That the Ogoni people, before the advent of British colonialism, were not conquered or colonized by any other ethnic group in present-day Nigeria.

2. That British colonization forced us into the administrative division of Opobo from 1908 to 1947.

3. That we protested against this forced union until the Ogoni Native Authority was created in 1947 and placed under the then Rivers Province.

4. That in 1951 we were forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where we suffered utter neglect.

5. That we protested against this neglect by voting against the party in power in the Region in 1957, and against the forced union by testimony before the Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958.

6. That this protest led to the inclusion of our nationality in Rivers State in 1967, which State consists of several ethnic nationalities with differing cultures, languages and aspirations.

7. That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at K. Dere (Bomu oil field).

8. That oil has been mined on our land since 1958 to this day from the following oil fields: (i) Bomu (ii) Bodo Wes (iii) Tai (iv) Korokoro (v) Yorla (vi) Lubara Creek and (vii) Afam by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Limited.

9. That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira (N40 billion) or 30 billion dollars.

10. That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received NOTHING.

II. That today, the Ogoni people have:
(i) No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
(ii) No pipe-borne water.
(iii) No electricity.
(iv) No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or private sector companies.
(v) No social or economic project of the Federal Government.
12. That the Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are undeveloped and are about to disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.
13. That the ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are gradually pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction.
14. That the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited does not employ Ogoni people at a meaningful or any level at all, in defiance of the Federal government's regulations.
15. That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni one of the most densely populated areas of Africa (average; 1500 per square mile: national average: 300 per square mile.
16. That neglectful environmental pollution laws and sub-standard inspection techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster.
17. That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.
18. That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject poverty and destitution.
19. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth exclusively to other parts of the Republic.
20. That the Ogoni people wish manage their own affairs.
Now, therefore, while reaffirming our to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we make demand upon the Republic as follows:
That the Ogoni people be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called, provided that this Autonomy guarantees the following:
(a) Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people.
(b) The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development.
(c) Adequate direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions.
(d) The use and development of Ogoni languages in Ogoni territory.
(e) The full development of Ogoni culture.
(f) The right religious freedom.
g) The right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.

We make the above demand in the knowledge that it does not deny any other ethnic group in the Nigerian Federation of their rights and that it can only conduce to peace, justice, and fair play and hence stability and progress in the Nigerian nation.

We make the above demand in the belief that, as Obafemi Awolowo has written: *In a true Federation, each ethnic group no matter how, is entitled to the same treatment as any other ethnic group, no matter how large.*

We demand these rights as equal members of the Nigerian Federation who contribute and have contributed to the growth of the Federation and have a right to expect full returns from that Federation.

Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August, 1990 at Bori Rivers State and signed by: (under addendum)

**Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights**

We, the people of Ogoni, being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic or Nigeria, hereby state as follows:

A. That on October 2 1990 we addressed an, "Ogoni Bill of Rights" to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida and members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council:

B. That after a one-year wait the President has been unable to grant us the audience which we sought to have with him in order to discuss the legitimate demands contained in the Ogoni Bill of Rights:

C. That our demands as outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights are legitimate, just and our inalienable right and in accord with civilized values worldwide;
D. That the Government of the Federal Republic has continued, since October 2 1990, to decree measure and implement policies which further marginalize the Ogoni people, denying us political autonomy, our rights to our resources, to the development of our languages and culture, to adequate representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions and to the protection of our environment and ecology from further degradation:

E. That we cannot sit idly by while we are, as a people, dehumanized and slowly exterminated and driven to extinction even as our rich resources are siphoned off to the exclusive comfort and improvement of other Nigerian communities, and the shareholders of multinational oil companies.

Now, therefore, while reaffirming our wish to remain a part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, we hereby authorize the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) to make representations for as long as these injustices continue, to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the European Community and all international bodies which have a role to play in the preservation of our nationality, as follows:

1. That the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has, in utter disregard and contempt for human rights, since independence in 1960 till date, denied us our political rights to self-determination, economic rights to our resources, cultural rights to the development of our languages and culture, and social rights to education, health and and adequate housing and to representation as of right in national institutions:

2. That, in particular, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has refused to pay us oil royalties and mining rents amounting to an estimated 20 billion US dollars for petroleum mined from our soil for over thirty-three years;

3. That the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not protect any of our rights whatsoever as an ethnic minority of 500,000 in a nation of about 100 million people and that the voting power and military might of the majority ethnic groups have been used remorselessly against us at every point in time:

4. That multinational oil companies, namely Shell (Dutch/British) and Chevron (American) have severally and jointly devastated our environment and ecology, having flared gas in our villages for 33 years and caused oil spillages, blow-outs etc., and have dehumanized our people, denying them employment and those benefits
which industrial organisations in Europe and America routinely contribute to their areas or operation:

5. That the Nigerian elite (bureaucratic, military, industrial and academic) have turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to these acts of dehumanization by the ethnic majority and have colluded with all the agents of destruction aimed at us:

6. That we cannot seek restitution in the courts of law in Nigeria as the act of expropriation of our rights and resources have been institutionalised in the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which Constitutions were acts of a Constituent Assembly imposed by a military regime and do not, in any way, protect minority rights or bear resemblance to the tacit agreement made at Nigerian independence:

7. That the Ogoni abjure violence in their just struggle for their rights within the Federal Republic of Nigeria but will, through every lawful means, and for as long as is necessary, fight for social justice and equity for themselves and their progeny, and in particular demand political autonomy as distinct and separate unit within the Nigerian nation with full right to (i) control Ogoni political affairs (ii) use at least fifty per cent of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development (iii) protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation; (iv) ensure the full restitution of the harm done to the health of our people by the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs etc. by the following oil companies: Shell, Chevron and their Nigerian accomplices.

8. That without the intervention of the international community, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the ethnic majority will continue these noxious policies until the Ogoni people are obliterated from the face of the earth.

Adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on the 26th day of August 1991 at Bori, Rivers State of Nigeria.

Signed on behalf of the Ogoni people by:


KEN-KHANA: HRH M.H.S. Eguru. Gbenemene Ken Khana, HRH C.B.S. Nwikina Emah III Menebua Bom, Mr. M.C. Daanwii, Chief T.N. Nwieke, Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, Mr. Simeon Idemyor.


APPENDIX 5: UN RESOLUTION ON NIGERIA (E/CN.4/1996/L.52/Rev.1)

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, other human rights instruments and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;

Reaffirming that all-member states have the duty to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to fulfil the obligations they have freely undertaken under the various international instruments in this fields;

Mindful that Nigeria is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

Recalling Assembly Resolution 50/199 of December, 1995 on the situation of human rights in Nigeria;

Deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Nigeria and the suffering caused thereby to the people of Nigeria;

Expressing concern that the absence of representative government has led to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and recalling in this regard the popular support for democratic government as evidenced in the 1993 elections, and noting that local government elections on a non-party basis were held in March 1996;

Recalling the announcement made by the Government of Nigeria on 1 October, 1995 in which it affirmed the principle of multiparty democracy and the principle of power-sharing, and its intention to lift ban on political activities and the press, to devolve power to the local levels of government and subordinate the military to civilian authority;

Strongly disappointed that only limited action in this regard has followed, while noting some relaxation of restriction on the media;

Taking note of the mission, sent to Nigeria by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 50/199, following an invitation by the Government of Nigeria;

Noting with deep concern reports of grave violations of human rights, including arbitrary arrests and detention, failure to respect due process of law and excessive use of force against demonstrators, as described in, inter alia, reports submitted to the Commission on Human Rights by the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the Special Rapporteur on extra-Judicial, summary or arbitrary executions;
Taking note also of the request of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (E/CN.4/1996/37) and the request of the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions (E/CN.4/196/4) to undertake a joint investigative mission to Nigeria;

Noting with alarm that, among those detained, further persons may be tried by the same flawed judicial process which led to the arbitrary execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his associates.

Expresses its deep concern about violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Nigeria, and calls upon the government in Nigeria urgently to ensure their observance, in particular by restoring habeas corpus, releasing all political prisoners, trade union leaders, human rights advocates and journalists who are at present detained, guaranteeing freedom of the press and ensuring respect for the rights of individuals, including persons belonging to minorities;

Calls upon the Government of Nigeria to ensure that trials are held strictly in conformity with International instruments to which Nigeria is a party;

Also calls upon the Government of Nigeria to accede to the request of the Special Rapporteurs on Extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions and on the independence of judges and lawyers to pay a joint investigative visit to Nigeria;

Further calls upon the Government of Nigeria to abide by its freely undertaken obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other instruments on human rights, including the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights;

Calls upon the government of Nigeria to cooperate fully with the relevant existing mechanisms and of the Commission of Human Rights;

Notes the declared commitment of the Government of Nigeria to civilian rule, and urges it to take immediate and concrete steps to restore democratic government;

Requests the two thematic Special Rapporteurs who have requested a joint investigative visit to the country to submit to the Commission at its 53rd session a joint report on their findings along with any observations of other relevant mechanisms, in particular the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and requests them to submit an interim report to the General Assembly;
Decides on the basis of these reports to consider the situation of human rights in Nigeria at its 53rd session under the same agenda items.
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