A Multistakeholder Foreign Policy: Dynamics of Foreign Policy Making in Post-Apartheid South Africa

by

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**Declaration**

I, the undersigned, declare that this Thesis has not been submitted at any other University or Third Level Institution and that it is entirely my own work.

Lesley Masters  
September 2007
Abstract:

In the main, the study of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has been preoccupied with the examination of policy performance with comparatively little critical reflection on the role of actors within the so-called ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. This analysis moves away from this particular approach by identifying the actors seeking an influence in the making of the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy. The thesis contends that while South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents have maintained a predominant position at the centre of the decision-making process, this has not excluded influence from a number of stakeholders. Following South Africa’s democratic transition (1994), a growing number of state and non-state actors from the domestic and international milieu have been active in pursuing a position near the centre of the foreign policy process. Through a longitudinal analysis, covering the period 1994-2007, this thesis examines the role played by the president, the foreign policy bureaucracy, domestic and international sources of pressure; highlighting the plurality of actors and the varying degrees of influence that play a part in shaping post-apartheid foreign policy. Certainly developments within the domestic context, coupled with South Africa’s international ambitions, expanding international agenda and growing national-international linkages, have seen actors traditionally on the periphery of foreign policy decision-making increasingly drawn into a more prominent position in the foreign policy process. The thesis thus presents South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy as a multistakeholder foreign policy. This not only depicts the multi-layered structure and the plurality of actors (state and non-state) in the foreign policy machinery, it accounts for the changing dynamics, or the fluid movement of actors within the centre-periphery structure of the foreign policy process.
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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACCORD  African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ANC    African National Congress
APLA   Azanian People's Liberation Army (military wing of the PAC)
APRM   African Peer Review Mechanism
Armscor Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited
AU     African Union
CHOGM  Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPS    Centre for Policy Studies
DA     Democratic Alliance
DFA    Department of Foreign Affairs
DG     Director General
DIA    Department of International Affairs (ANC)
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo
DRFN   Desert Research Foundation Namibia
DTI    Department of Trade and Industry
EU     European Union
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment
FGD    Foundation for Global Dialogue
FPA    Foreign Policy Analysis
FOSAD  Forum of South African Directors-General
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEAR   Growth, Employment, and Redistribution policy
GEF    Global Environment Facility
GEM    Group for Environmental Monitoring
GNU    Government of National Unity
GWP    Global Water Partnership
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA   India, Brazil, South Africa Trilateral Initiative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>IGD</td>
<td>Institute for Global Dialogue</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRPS</td>
<td>International Relations, Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>World Conservation Union</td>
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<td>IWMI</td>
<td>International Water Management Institute</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Millenium African Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern American Common Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe (military wing of the ANC)</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola</td>
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<td>NAI</td>
<td>New African Initiative</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NCACC</td>
<td>National Conventional Arms Control Committee</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOCPM</td>
<td>National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>(Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGDs</td>
<td>Other Government Departments</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ of Politics, Defence and Security (SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-African Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCAS</td>
<td>Policy Coordination and Advisory Services Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPCFA</td>
<td>Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SACBL</td>
<td>South African Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADC-WD</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community- Water Division</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANGOCO</td>
<td>South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCAR</td>
<td>World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia, and Related Discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front</td>
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Key Personnel in the New South Africa

President:

1994 – 1999 Nelson Mandela
1999 - Thabo Mbeki

Deputy President:

1994 – 1999 Thabo Mbeki
1999 – 2005 Jacob Zuma
2005 - Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka

Ministers:

Office of the President:

1994 – 1999 Gert Johannes (Jakes) Gerwel
1999 - Essop Pahad

Department of Foreign Affairs:

1994 – 1999 Alfred Nzo
1999 - Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

Finance:

1992 – 1994 Derek Keys
1994 – 1996 Chris Liebenberg
1996 - Trevor Andrew Manuel

Department of Trade and Industry:

1996 –2004 Alexander (Alec) Erwin
2004 - Mandisi Bongani Mabuto Mpahlwa

Department of Defence:

1994 – 1999 Johannes (Joe) Modise
1999 - Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick Lekota

Intelligence:

2004 - Ronald (Ronnie) Kasrils
Deputy Ministers:

Foreign Affairs:

1994 - Aziz Goolam Hoosein Pahad
2004 - Susan (Sue) van der Merwe

Directors General:

The Office of the Deputy President

1996-1999 Frank Chikane (prior to this, 1995-1996, he served as Special Advisor to Mbeki)

The Presidency

1999 - Frank Chikane

Department of Foreign Affairs:

1992 – 1997 Leo Henry (Rusty) Evans
1998 – 1999 Jacob (Jackie) Selebi
1999 – 2002 Sipho Pityana
2003 - Ayanda Ntsaluba

Acting directors:

1998 Thuthu Mazibuko
2002 – 2003 Abdul Minty
Introduction

• The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

The making of foreign policy is 'an inherently political process.' In post-apartheid South Africa there are a number of actors, with competing demands, objectives and interests, attempting to influence foreign policy decision-making and its subsequent outcomes. As Hill observes, international relations are no longer 'monopolized' by foreign offices. Rather, there are a growing number of state and non-state actors engaged in foreign affairs, both from within the traditional boundaries of the state and the international milieu (although the distinction between the two spheres is increasingly blurred). Not only has this elicited questions regarding the continued value of the ministry of foreign affairs, it raises questions regarding the nature of the actors seeking an influence the formal foreign policy process. While the study of foreign policy seeks to explain the behaviour and policy approach of states towards their external environment, it is also concerned with the process of policy making: the interplay between multiple actors in shaping foreign policy. This thesis is focused on the latter, concentrating the analysis on 'who' makes foreign policy, and the influence any one stakeholder has in the processes of foreign policy decision-making.

As South Africa moves beyond its first decade of democracy a certain amount of obscurity remains concerning the influences shaping foreign policy decision-making. As a diplomat pointed out to the former foreign affairs editor for Business Day, Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, '[i]n the US we have good access to the state department and the White House. Here we do not know who is making policy.' There has been very little in the way of a critical analysis of the actors engaged in lobbying the post-apartheid foreign policy process. Certainly Peter Vale has raised a number of questions

that have typically not been addressed in the study of South Africa’s foreign policy including: ‘What is the role of agency in the making of South Africa’s Foreign Policy? Does President Thabo Mbeki enjoy the most important role in the making of South Africa’s foreign policy? How deep is the initiating role of the bureaucracy in the making of South Africa’s foreign policy?’

In addressing the question of decision-making within the so-called ‘black box’ of foreign policy, Hermann and Hermann point to the role and composition of the ‘ultimate decision unit’.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{At} the apex of foreign policy making in all governments or ruling parties there are actors with the ability to commit the resources of the government and the power to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position – the ultimate decision unit. Although this decision unit may change with the nature of the foreign policy problem and with time, its structure will shape a government’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{6}

The ‘ultimate decision unit’ is classified into three alternatives, the Predominant Leader, a Single Group, and Multiple Autonomous Actors.\textsuperscript{7} While this approach considers the character and composition of the ‘apex’ of foreign policy making, in terms of influences from domestic and international actors Hermann and Hermann merely note that these elements are ‘channeled through the political structure of government that identifies, decides, and implements foreign policy.’\textsuperscript{8} There is, however, more to the role of domestic and international influences in shaping foreign policy decisions than this approach reveals. Indeed, it does not critically account for the interplay between the growing number of foreign policy stakeholders and the ‘ultimate decision unit’, nor the subsequent impact these interactions have on the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, pp. 363-364.  
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, p. 362.}
In the second edition of the *Essence of Decision* and Roger Hilman’s *To Move A Nation*, the authors identify a hierarchy of actors within the foreign policy process. Like Hermann and Hermann this approach indicates a central ‘decision unit’, however, it also highlights multiple stakeholders within foreign policy decision-making.

The apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the intranational game. Political leaders at the top of the apparatus are joined by officials who occupy positions on top of major organizations to form a circle of central players, central in relation to the particular decision or outcome the analyst seeks to explain. Some participants are mandatory; others may be invited or elbow their way in. Beyond this central arena, successive, concentric circles encompass lower level officials in the executive branch, the press, NGOs, and the public.⁹

This account not only suggests multiple actors, it also highlights the expanding concentric circles, or multiple layers of influence in decision-making. Nevertheless, in reality the division is less clear, and, as this analysis of South African foreign policy indicates, different actors may assume different positions relative to the centre on any number of decisions. In other words, those actors associated with the outer layers of Hilsman and Allison and Zelikow’s concentric circles: NGOs, other government departments, the media, and even business (which is not specifically highlighted) are drawn into, or elbow their way into, the centre of foreign policy decision-making. Moreover, as the thesis demonstrates, these ‘peripheral’ actors possess the potential to supersede those actors traditionally occupying a key position at the centre of the foreign policy machinery.

The post-apartheid emphasis on democratising the foreign policy machinery, the diversity of state and non-state actors seeking an influence in the foreign policy process, coupled with the growing number of national-international linkages has added to what can be described as a multistakeholder foreign policy.¹⁰ The concept of a multistakeholder foreign policy accounts for the growing networks and inter-relations

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¹⁰ The idea of a multistakeholder foreign policy has been inspired by Brian Hocking’s presentation ‘The Development of Multistakeholder Diplomacy.’ University of Leicester, Department of Politics: Research Seminars 16th of March 2005.
between multiple actors. It draws attention to the dynamics between actors traditionally associated with foreign policy decision-making, and those actors, which by virtue of their interests and resources, have an influence in shaping foreign policy. The increasingly complex nature of international relations, with its mix of actors and multi-layered interactions, supports the move towards a multistakeholder foreign policy as both state and non-state actors find it progressively more difficult to achieve their objectives in isolation from each other.

- **The Aim and Significance of the Thesis**

The central aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the complex interplay (or politics) between multiple actors within the concentric circles of post-apartheid foreign policy. There are two primary research questions underpinning the analysis: ‘who’ (or what) has an influence in the making of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy, and what that particular influence is? This moves away from the more archetypal analyses of South African foreign policy with its focus on evaluating foreign policy performance. Although there has been some discussion regarding the influence of state (government departments) and non-state actors (civil society, business, and the media) in South Africa’s foreign policy process, these analyses have been predominantly single-factor explanations as opposed to examining the changing dynamics between actors. Accounting for the role of multiple actors is, however, a truism in foreign policy analysis. As Rosenau points out, ‘[t]he literature of the field is now rich with “factors” that have been identified as internal sources of foreign policy.’\(^{11}\) However, he goes on to note that ‘[t]o identify factors is not to trace their influence.’\(^{12}\) This study offers an integrated approach, drawing attention to multiple foreign policy stakeholders and their shifting levels of influence within the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making.

Drawing on Hilsman and Allison and Zelikow’s depiction of ‘concentric circles’ (structure) in the foreign policy process, the thesis identifies multiple levels within post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy machinery. In so doing, the analysis evaluates the influence of a number of actors on foreign policy decision-making. At the centre of the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy process is the president; however, as the

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\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 98.
analysis reveals, greater interdependencies between state and non-state actors, as well as the complexity of foreign affairs has provided the scope for other participants in guiding foreign policy decisions. The primary contention of the study is that the position of actors within the concentric circles of foreign policy is not constant. Far from occupying a static position near the centre or on the periphery, actors are continually moving between the two positions in terms of their influence on post-apartheid foreign policy. These changing dynamics, themselves shaped by circumstances including the foreign policy agenda, competition between the actors involved, resources and capability, affect foreign policy output. As the thesis ultimately concludes, although the president may occupy a central role in the foreign policy machinery, this has not precluded influence from a number of stakeholders. South Africa's burgeoning international commitments and ambitions, coupled with the growing transnational nature of civil society, business, and the media has provided the momentum towards a multistakeholder foreign policy.

- The Framework of Analysis

The study of foreign policy faces challenges in its location at the 'boundary' of domestic and international affairs. In the analysis of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy the thesis draws on theoretical frameworks from the field of International Relations. Despite the porous nature of theoretical frameworks from the field of International Relations. Despite the porous nature of international boundaries and the growing transnational relations between non-state actors, states still constitute an important part of international relations. While this analysis recognises the continued role of states in foreign policy, it does not adopt the realist position that states are the primary actors in global affairs; neither does it consider the state a unitary, rational actor concerned primarily with issues of national security. As neither realism, nor neo-realism investigate 'decision-making or other domestic sources of international behaviour', as an approach, it is not appropriate for the study of foreign policy. Indeed, Hill observes '[i]n neo-realist theory, foreign policy, with its associated interest in domestic politics

and decision-making, was simply not relevant, and barely discussed.\footnote{Hill (2003), p. 7.} In evaluating the role of multiple stakeholders in foreign policy, the thesis has its roots within the pluralist paradigm. In contrast to realism, pluralism accounts for the role of non-state actors in explanations of international relations. Moreover, the state is not considered a unitary or rational actor, while the international agenda is regarded as ‘extensive’ as opposed to being determined primarily by security issues.\footnote{Viotti and Kauppi (1993), pp. 7-8.} Pluralism is reflected in Hocking and Smith’s ‘mixed actor’ approach, which depicts world politics as complex layers of networks and systems, comprising both state and non-state actors.\footnote{B. Hocking and S. Smith (1995) \textit{World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.} (Second Edition) London, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 192.} The ‘mixed actor’ approach underpins the analysis in the following chapters, highlighting the diverse range of interests, national-international linkages, and the inherent constraints, bargaining and compromises with which actors must contend in foreign policy decision-making.\footnote{Ibid, p. 184.}

In considering the influences on the making of foreign policy the analysis not only adopts and ‘inside-looking-out’ approach, with its emphasis on internal explanation of foreign policy influence including the president, government departments, domestic civil society organisations, business and the media; it also adopts and ‘outside-looking-in’ approach, highlighting the impact of influences originating from the international milieu.\footnote{A. Klotz (2004) ‘International Causes and Consequences of South Africa’s Democratization.’ \textit{Democratizing Foreign Policy? Lessons from South Africa.} (eds) P. Nel and J. van der Westhuizen. Lanham, Lexington Books, p. 14.} This includes the physical location of the actor as well as constraints emanating from the structure of the international system. In this regard the analysis utilises the ‘world systems’ theory, or ‘structuralist’ approach whereby international relations are explained ‘in terms of the relations between the (exploiting) core and the (exploited) periphery of the global system.’\footnote{J. Dumbrell (1997) \textit{The making of US foreign policy.} (Second Edition) With a chapter by D. M. Barrett. Manchester. Manchester University Press, p. 13. This approach is also referred to as ‘Globalism’ Viotti and Kauppi (1993), pp. 8-9.} This has been particularly relevant in explaining the impact that perceptions of a ‘global apartheid’, held by key decision-makers in the foreign policy machinery, have had on South Africa’s foreign policy. The thesis also draws on a number of post-apartheid foreign policy analyses that highlight the role of neoliberalism in shaping policy decisions, particularly its position as the
dominant international paradigm. As Donna Lee observes, ‘[s]tudies of the political economy of South Africa point to the prominence of liberal social forces – international capital and business groups – within the state that have forced an alignment to neoliberalism within the ANC government. (Rather than the ANC party, which remains a leftist organization).’

In terms of situating the thesis within a discipline, this study falls within what Neack, Hey and Haney refer to as the ‘second generation’ approach to foreign policy research, or foreign policy analysis (FPA). Within the field of foreign policy two ‘generations’, or approaches have been identified. The ‘first generation’, or comparative foreign policy (CFP), gives particular attention to positivist (or scientific) research methodologies, placing an emphasis on events data, defining variables and identifying correlations. As an approach it is however criticised for not ‘probing the politics of foreign policy, internal and external’, as well as its neglect of international relations theory in explaining foreign policy behaviour and processes. The ‘second generation’ builds on the research of the first generation, but includes an emphasis on domestic sources of foreign policy influence. It also recognises that ‘single-cause explanations are not sufficient to explain foreign policy behaviors and processes.

Deborah Gerner notes that FPA is concerned with the ‘intentions, statements, and actions of an actor – often, but not always, a state – directed towards the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions.' Although this description highlights the interactions of actors within the international milieu, it neglects a key element of foreign policy analysis: the examination of the processes involved in the making of foreign policy. Hill’s description of foreign policy analysis is thus more satisfactory. He notes that,

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26 Ibid, p. 11.
FPA enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states. It does this by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the formal self-descriptions (and fictions) of the processes of government and public administration. In so doing it tests the plausible hypothesis that the outputs of foreign policy are to some degree determined by the nature of the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{28}

Foreign policy analysis is inherently multidisciplinary. Moreover, it presents a multilevel framework of analysis in stressing the open interplay of multiple factors, domestic and international.\textsuperscript{29} Gerner highlights that the study of foreign policy is somewhat unusual in that it deals with both domestic and international arenas, jumping from individual to state to systemic levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all these aspects into a coherent whole.\textsuperscript{30} This multidisciplinary-multilayered approach is, however, necessary in making sense of the complex reality in which foreign policy exists.\textsuperscript{31}

The analysis of the actors within the concentric circles of foreign policy has lent itself towards the inclusion of a number of grounded and middle-range theories. Grounded theory (GT) has its emphasis on theory-building research, while middle-range theory (MRT) is associated more with theory-testing research.\textsuperscript{32} However, as the thesis assumes an empirical approach to the analysis of post-apartheid foreign policy (coupled with time and space constraints), there is little scope for the detailed discussion of these theories within the following chapters. Nevertheless, in explaining the dynamics within the 'black box' of South Africa's foreign policy decision-making, theories relating to the role of the individual, group, and external elements, play a key part in informing the analysis.

Analysts who focus on the individual as a level of analysis highlight the impact of individual characteristics such as operational codes, personality traits, or modes of

\textsuperscript{28} Hill (2003), p. 10.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. 8.
conducting interpersonal relationships"\textsuperscript{33} as an influence on foreign policy decision-making. As Alexander George observes, 'the way in which the leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states.'\textsuperscript{34} Although the thesis refers to the historical experiences of the president, and the role of perceptions in shaping post-apartheid foreign policy, the research does not adopt the critical psychoanalytical approach evident in studies such as George's 'Operational Code'.\textsuperscript{35} Rather, as the thesis is guided by questions relating to 'who' makes foreign policy (or the changing influence of actors within the foreign policy process), as opposed to 'why' specific policy decisions were taken, a psychoanalytical approach has not been assumed. The analysis of the role played by an individual's character, perceptions and beliefs thus remains a particular area for future research.

In addition to the foreign policy analysis on the role of the individual, there are a number of studies that examine the affect of bureaucratic politics on decision-making. Research focused on bureaucratic politics explanations of foreign policy examine the 'political bargaining and maneuvering among the bureaucratic players.'\textsuperscript{36} Allison and Zelikow eloquently capture the absence of 'rational choice' in the bureaucratic processes in their analysis of Governmental Politics (Model III), where foreign policy decision-making is understood as the result of 'bargaining games' or the 'pulling and hauling that is politics.'\textsuperscript{37} A detailed analysis of the foreign policy bureaucracy, including its organisational structure, culture and values,\textsuperscript{38} has a great deal to offer in terms of explanatory value in the study of foreign policy. Nevertheless, John Dumbrell notes that an emphasis on bureaucratic politics 'explanations tend to underestimate the power of the president, especially in crisis decision-making.'\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, bureaucratic explanations of foreign policy decision-making are dominated by studies of Developed states. This is attributed to the fact that bureaucratic explanations require 'detailed,
accurate data about what goes on inside the government’, details ‘not easily obtained even within the relatively open United States’,\(^{40}\) and much less ‘easily obtained’ in developing countries.

Foreign policy analysis also includes ‘Societal Source’ explanations of foreign policy decision-making. This approach examines multiple non-state actors from within the domestic context including business, civil society and the media.\(^{41}\) There are a myriad of actors, with a range of interests and objectives that seek to influence foreign policy decision-making. There are thus many divergent areas of analysis in identifying domestic influences on foreign policy, from the study of specific actors (public opinion studies, lobbying, the role of parliament), to Joe Hagan’s discussion on the effects of regime change on the making of foreign policy.\(^{42}\) In identifying the changing domestic sources of influence within the foreign policy process, the thesis draws on Hilsman and Allison and Zelikow’s conceptual model of the ‘concentric circles’ of policy-making. Although this is aimed at explaining the structures within US foreign policy, this model is utilised in explaining the changing relations and positions not only of domestic actors within the concentric circles of South African foreign policy, but the foreign policy bureaucracy and influences from the international environment.

As indicated above, in addition to the analysis of domestic sources of influence on foreign policy decision-making, the thesis also adopts an ‘outside-looking-in’ approach, giving consideration to the pressures, constraints and opportunities emanating from the international milieu. The distinction between what constitutes domestic and international influence, is however, increasingly blurred following greater transnational relations. This is highlighted in James Rosenau’s concept of national-international linkages, where linkage is defined as ‘any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.’\(^{43}\) The idea of inter-linking action and reaction is utilised by Rothgeb in indicating the context of the international system as a key element in shaping foreign policy. Through the use of ‘counterresponses’ Rothgeb

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41 Ibid, p. 22.
demonstrates that 'the international system affects foreign policy by way of constant interactions that occur between actors, with each interaction forcing the affected actors to reevaluate their needs and adjust their policies.'\textsuperscript{44} In analysing the impact of influences from the external milieu, the thesis also draws on Jeanne Hey’s structuralist approach explaining the foreign policy of dependent states, particularly in identifying South Africa’s ‘pro-core’ and ‘anti-core’ foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{45}

- **Research Methodology**

Unlike the emphasis on positivism in the ‘first generation’ of foreign policy studies, FPA accepts the value of both qualitative and quantitative methods in generating innate understandings of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{46} This study undertakes a qualitative approach in examining the influence of multiple stakeholders within the foreign policy process. This includes detailed content analysis of books, journal articles, press articles, government documents and Yearbooks (South African Institute of International Affairs). The value of qualitative research is in the ‘depth’ of the analysis.\textsuperscript{47} The disadvantage of qualitative research is that, as an ‘interpretive’ method, it is subject to researcher bias. However, in the study of foreign policy there is an inevitable amount of bias in the research material used as foreign policy interest and analysis is primarily confined to the ‘elite’, or the ‘attentive public’ within society. This is particularly apparent in the press, where discussion and debate is primarily located within the English-language papers, and then often limited to the *Mail and Guardian, The Sunday Independent* and *Business Day*. The value of the press has, however, been in the access to ‘up-to-date’ information and the comments and analysis from key individuals engaged in the field.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless it is necessary to factor in media bias, particularly the reliability and validity of the press as a source of information.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{46} Neack, Hey and Haney (1995), p. 11.


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p. 107.

The availability of online sources and the quality of websites has facilitated the research, particularly in terms of access to primary material from government departments and the African National Congress (ANC). The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has produced a number of Annual Reports and Strategic Plans, which have been published on the departmental webpage. Moreover, the DFA provides access to the speeches of the Minister, Deputy Ministers and the Director General as well as a detailed events calendar. The speeches of both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are available on the ANC’s webpage (there is also a collection of Mbeki’s key speeches published in 1998),\(^{50}\) facilitating the analysis of the president’s ‘world view’\(^{51}\) through the examination of a number of key speeches including the annual State of the Nation Address and Budget Vote. Furthermore, as President, Mbeki has contributed the weekly *Letter from the President* in the ANC’s weekly online publication *ANC Today*. Although as an online source it is only available to those with Internet access (as opposed to being aimed at the ‘people’), it too provides an important insight into Mbeki’s perceptions.

The research for the thesis includes a number of interviews with actors from government, research organisations and the press. The importance of the qualitative interview is that it is ‘particularly suited to discovery and … understanding.’\(^{52}\) The respondents for the interviews were selected with the aim of eliciting the views and perspectives held by officials within the foreign policy bureaucracy, civil society, and the press, on the levels of participation within foreign policy decision-making. In other words the individuals approached for interviews were both part of the organisation of interest in the study, and possessed a particular knowledge and experience concerning South Africa’s foreign policy. The benefit of the interviews was in the detailed insights into the politics of South Africa’s foreign policy. The interviewing procedure was based on qualitative interviewing techniques, using a flexible non-standardised pattern of questioning.\(^{53}\) In the case of the interviews conducted on a face-to-face basis, the interview took on an unstructured approach. In other words, the content and form of the interview was not pre-determined, nor the respondent informed of set questions. This


\(^{53}\) Corbetta (2003), pp. 265-266.
allowed for a wide-ranging discussion on a number of issues within the topic set out at the start of the interview. This approach provided the scope for the respondent to elaborate on areas deemed important, guided by themes necessary to the final research project. It was not always possible to arrange face-to-face appointments with respondents due to distance. In this instance e-mail correspondence and telephone interviews were adopted. In these cases a more structured approach was necessary due to the nature of the interaction with questions e-mail prior to the discussion serving to guide the interview.

In terms of research time frames, Layder highlights that 'some empirical studies focus on a much narrower time band than others and combine this with a focus on micro changes and processes rather than macro (structural) change.' The principal period of analysis within the thesis extends from South Africa’s democratic transition (1994) to mid-way through Mbeki’s second term as president (2007), although recognition is given to the historical context underpinning current influences in foreign policy decision-making. In covering a longitudinal time frame the analysis is best able to demonstrate the ‘macro’ structural changes in the making of the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy.

- The Structure of the Thesis

Over the course of the thesis the analysis deconstructs the ‘concentric circles’ of post-apartheid foreign policy. Chapter 1 begins by providing a review of the current literature examining post-apartheid foreign policy. Following South Africa’s successful transition to democracy (1994) there have been a number of studies charting the progress of the country’s international relations, particularly the challenges facing the ‘new’ South Africa in reconciling foreign policy principles with practice. The chapter reveals that while there has been considerable reflection of the country’s reintegration into world politics, there has been significantly less analysis of the actors involved in the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. Having surveyed the literature and identified the position of the thesis within it, Chapter 2 sets out to evaluate the role of the president in the foreign policy process. Historically South Africa’s presidents have

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assumed a primary position in the country’s foreign affairs. However, despite criticism that South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents have dominated foreign policy decision-making, there has been little critical analysis of the development of a predominant president and the evolution of this role over a longitudinal period. Chapter 2 highlights the enabling framework facilitating the development of a predominant president in the foreign policy. Moreover, it goes on to argue that although the president may have adopted a predominant position at the centre of the foreign policy process, a predominant president does not equate to an ‘imperial’ president. Highlighting the participation of experts, advisors (individuals and groups) and the growing role of the Office of the President, the chapter concludes that while the president maintains a predominant position, this position does not preclude the development of a multistakeholder foreign policy.

Chapter 3, 4, and 5 build on the discussion of participation in the foreign policy process, detailing the changing dynamics of actor influence within the concentric circles of post-apartheid foreign policy. The analysis in Chapter 3 highlights the developing role of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) within foreign policy decision-making. The initial post-apartheid period (1994-1999) saw the DFA near the periphery following a preoccupation with internal reforms. However, under the guidance of the Minister, Deputy Ministers, and the Directors-General, a number of initiatives were undertaken in an effort to reposition the Department at the centre of the foreign policy process. As the chapter goes on to reveal, this has been complicated by the ‘intergovernmentalization’ of post-apartheid foreign policy. The ‘pulling and hauling’ of bureaucratic politics has seen the DFA place a particular emphasis on facilitating and coordinating stakeholder involvement within the foreign policy process in an effort to build and maintain a pivotal role within the foreign policy bureaucracy.

Chapter 4 addresses the wide-ranging subject of influences emanating from within South Africa’s domestic environment. Constraints on time and space have not allowed for a detailed analysis of all the diversities within domestic sources of foreign policy influence, nevertheless, the chapter highlights the heterogeneous nature of actors from civil society, business and the media. More significantly, Chapter 4 considers the changing levels of influence within, and between, these actors. While Hilsman and Allison and Zelikow have placed domestic actors on the outer-rings of their concentric
circles of foreign policy decision-making, this analysis argues that these positions are not a constant. Rather, actors from within civil society and business organisations may be drawn into the centre of the foreign policy process by virtue of their capability, knowledge and resources. Indeed, the growing transnational nature of many of these organisations, along with South Africa’s expanding foreign policy agenda, creates the scope for a multistakeholder foreign policy.

While the previous chapters consider domestic sources of influence on post-apartheid foreign policy, Chapter 5 highlights the plurality of actors, constraints, and opportunities originating in the international environment. Analysis on post-apartheid foreign policy has typically underplayed the influence emanating from the external milieu. Nevertheless there has been significant pressure from the international environment (direct and indirect), necessitating the reconsideration of foreign policy decisions. Through the examination of South Africa’s ‘counterresponses’ to pressure from the international environment, the chapter highlights the complex position facing foreign policy decision-makers who find themselves increasingly caught between the competing influences of ethical commitments, Western pressure, and African solidarity.

As the analysis deconstructs the concentric circles of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy over the course of the chapters in identifying the actors and influences, the conclusion draws these separate threads together in highlighting the changing dynamics within post-apartheid foreign policy. In addition, it considers the future of decision-making in foreign policy as South Africa continues to consolidate its democratic transition and position within international affairs. Ultimately the conclusion seeks to move the study of South Africa’s foreign policy forward by drawing attention to the study of the processes of foreign policy decision-making and by providing some signposts towards future research.
Chapter 1

The Study of South Africa's Foreign Policy

Introduction:

This chapter provides a review of the research given to the study of South Africa's foreign policy, highlighting the approaches adopted and the gaps within the current literature. To date, there has been a prominent focus on the evaluation of post-apartheid policy performance. Under the broad umbrella of policy performance evaluation, however, there is a further division within the literature. The first approach has been a prominent orientation towards evaluating South Africa's external relations with states, regions and inter-governmental organisations. The second has been specific to the implementation of policy principles and cornerstones in practice. While these analyses present a picture of the problems in the development and implementation of South Africa's principled foreign policy it does little to unpack the proverbial 'black-box' of foreign policy: in other words, who (or what) plays an influential role in the mechanics of foreign policy decision-making in post-apartheid South Africa? As Mills sets out in 2000, '[t]he nature of the foreign policy machinery not only impacts on the ability to implement policy objectives, but also plays an inherent part in shaping the nature of these goals'.\(^1\) While there are a number of threads throughout the literature relating to the role of actors and structures there is little detailed analysis of their role, or indeed the interaction between these elements, in South Africa's foreign policy.

In addition to providing an overview of the research output on South Africa's foreign policy, the discussion below signposts the actors involved in the formulation and conduct of South Africa's foreign policy. The discussion mirrors the structure of the thesis (executive, bureaucracy, domestic participation and external influence) in addressing the current analysis and limitations within the existing literature. This is conducted within the wider context of foreign policy theory, an aspect not featuring prominently in the study of South African foreign policy. Furthermore, this chapter

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introduces the concept of a multistakeholder foreign policy, moving away from a realist perception of foreign policy making, while the final section highlights the literature focused on the role of specific actors and the approach of the subsequent chapters.

**Overview of Studies on South Africa’s Foreign Policy**

The study of South Africa’s foreign policy has seen a rapid proliferation following the consolidation of the country’s new democratic government. Within the analysis there have been two primary shortfalls: comparative foreign policy analysis and the analysis of the role played by actors within the foreign policy machinery. In terms of comparative foreign policy there are those analyses that contrast South Africa’s adoption of a middle power role with the characteristics of long standing middle power states, however, more could be done in terms of a comparative analysis between South Africa’s own middle power foreign policy and the foreign policy of other (emerging) middle power states, particularly its partners within the global South; India and Brazil.

In the application of a comparative analysis, Brian Hesse’s study on the foreign policy of the US and South Africa towards Africa during the 1990s is the one study that stands out.

This thesis sets out to address the second of the two identified shortfalls, the analysis of the actors involved in foreign policy machinery. Deon Geldenhuys notes, in his introduction to *The Diplomacy of Isolation*, ‘[t]here are a good many studies of South Africa’s articulated foreign policy, but precious little work has been done on the actual making of its foreign policy.’

Although an observation made in 1984, this gap in the research was highlighted once again by Marie Muller in 1997, who pointed to the shortfall in research on the ‘processes of foreign policy-making’, particularly in terms

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of the role of the president and the links between the president, parliamentary portfolio committee and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Over a decade after the advent of democracy there has been only a sporadic engagement with questions regarding the making of foreign policy.

The literature on post-apartheid foreign policy is presented through a growing number of contributions, predominantly articles and edited volumes. The edited volumes have been particularly numerous and while they provide scope in the range of issues addressed, they have not all offered analytical depth and cohesive analysis. Publications by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) have received particular criticism in this regard. Pfister notes that in post-1994 South Africa, ‘SAIIA's output increased greatly in volume, but not always in quality’, while Peter Vale singled out the South African Yearbook of International Affairs for its failure to adhere to a thematic approach and its distinct ‘lack of focus’. Vale is also particularly critical of the realist slant within the research produced during the 1990s.

Within the wide-ranging discussions on South Africa’s foreign policy there has been an emphasis on the empirical study of policy performance. Within this broad focus on policy performance, two clusters of analysis have emerged: a focus on external relations and the implementation of foreign policy principles. The first evaluates South Africa’s foreign relations with states, regions, intergovernmental organisations and South Africa’s role within the international system. The second considers the role of identified foreign policy principles and cornerstones, including human rights, democracy, the ‘African Renaissance’, economic development and multilateralism, in guiding decision-making and the (in)consistency in the implementation of post-apartheid foreign policy.

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The *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* reflects a predominantly state-centric focus, concentrating on South Africa’s interactions at the level of state, region and international governmental organisation.\(^{10}\) Despite this more traditional approach these analyses provide key insights in a field, where despite the growing number of non-state actors, the state continues to occupy a central role. Indeed, the post-apartheid government’s discussion on foreign affairs reflects a state-centric focus in the state publication, the *South Africa Yearbook*.\(^{11}\) A number of academic publications include a focus on inter-state relations presenting discussions on South Africa’s interactions with Africa, the EU, Central and Eastern Europe, the US, Latin America, China, Japan, the Middle East and international organisations. Among them are the edited volumes *Change and South African external Relations*, \(^{12}\) *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy*, \(^{13}\) *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004*, \(^{14}\) and *The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy*.\(^{15}\) Even within Alden and le Pere’s contribution, *South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival*, consideration is given to relations with states in Southern Africa.\(^{16}\) As Alden and le Pere point out, ‘[t]his audit of South Africa’s regional engagement highlights the difficulties Pretoria faces in realising its ambitious foreign-policy agenda for Africa.’\(^{17}\)

The analysis of South Africa’s external relations considers the position of the country within the international system. For example, Section IV in Barber’s *Mandela’s World*, places particular emphasis on the role of South Africa in foreign affairs including its position as a middle power state, a bridge builder, and standing in Africa and the

\(^{10}\) However, it has seen a number of chapters that consider the role of non-state and sub-national actors, particularly within the more recent Yearbooks. See for example chapters regarding the role of NGOs and Parliament. Nantulya 2004; van Wyk 1998, 1999, Hughes 2001, 2003; Mills and White 2003.


\(^{17}\) Ibid, p. 53.
The analysis of South Africa as a (emerging) middle power state has received particular attention (Solomon 1997; van der Westhuizen 1998; Schoeman 2000; Hamill and Lee 2001; Bischoff 2003; Jordaan 2003; Spence 2004). The emphasis within these studies is on defining the concept of middle power status and evaluating South Africa’s position in accordance. These analyses provide insight into the country’s international potential as well as the restrictions inhibiting the adoption of a middle power role. However, although Spence notes the potential of a middle power’s NGOs and ‘their vigorous civil societies’, there is only a limited discussion on the role of foreign policy actors within the middle power literature. One of the few analyses to include the impact of actors on South Africa’s pursuit of a middle power position is the article by Hamill and Lee (2001), which notes the impact of the integration challenges confronting the DFA and its subsequent performance, along with the discord within the African National Congress (ANC).

While there has been a move away from a realist perspective in the analysis, the problem facing contributors to edited volumes is that the space allotted does not always provide the scope for an in-depth evaluation, coupled with very broadly defined directives. In putting those engaged in foreign policy analysis under the spotlight Williams points out that ‘[t]o date, the majority of the literature on South African foreign policy reflects what Cox neatly describes as a ‘problem-solving’ perspective.’ This has subsequently led to a divide between ‘real-worlders’ and ‘theorists’, with the former receiving preference in the foreign policy literature.

In his survey of the studies on post-apartheid South African foreign policy, Pfister highlights the literature’s focus on evaluating South Africa’s successful application of foreign policy principles, ‘[f]rom 1996 onwards, Pretoria’s foreign policy-making was tested in four respects [East Asia, Nigeria, Zaire and Lesotho], exposing contradictions in its approach and resulting in significant reflection in the literature.’ While SAIIA’s

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22 Ibid, p. 75.
publication *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future* continues to document South Africa’s ‘burgeoning relations with the world’, it also gives attention to the second cluster of analysis, the implementation of foreign policy principles and cornerstones, drawing out the challenges facing the government in reconciling foreign policy principles with practice. *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy*, covers both approaches within its two sections. Part Two represents the country specific approach while Part One presents an evaluation of South Africa’s policy performance in practice.

Within this second cluster, or research on policy implementation, there are those accounts that present an overview of the problems encountered in the implementation of foreign policy principles and those that have focused their analysis on specific case studies of policy performance. Analyses that adopt an overview approach to South African foreign policy performance creates, to use Jack Spence’s terminology, a ‘balance sheet’ of post-1994 South Africa’s progress. Soon after the release of the 1996 *Foreign Policy Discussion Document*, analysis within the edited volume *Fairy God-Mother, Hegemon or Partner* (1997), set out the challenges facing the government in terms of policy implementation, highlighting a number of challenges in applying foreign policy principles in practice (Henwood 1997; Mills 1997). Articles by both Schraeder (2001) and Barber (2005) address the transformation of South Africa’s foreign policy with reference to its development, as well as provide an analysis of the implementation of principles throughout both Mandela’s and Mbeki’s presidency. The key difference between the two articles is that while Schraeder considers the role of the president, bureaucracy, non-state and international actors, Barber’s emphasis is primarily on the evaluation of policy performance, considering South Africa’s foreign policy in cases from the Nigerian debacle to Mbeki’s support of Zimbabwe.

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Alden and le Pere (2003; 2004) and Mills (2000) have in particular added to the analysis of developments in South Africa’s foreign policy, from the changes within the foreign policy machinery and foreign policy consolidation to South Africa’s external relations. Other contributions that adopt a more general overview of South Africa’s foreign policy in practice include Vale and Taylor’s (1999) discussion of the development of South Africa’s international affairs from one of ‘exceptionalism’ to ‘just another country’.  

Habib and Selinyane (2004) presents a number of cases depicting what they point to as the ‘schizophrenic character of South African foreign policy’, while Nathan (2005) argues for consistency in South Africa’s policy performance approach through, what he describes as, five ‘well-developed themes that give the policy its coherence’, including an emphasis on Africa, democracy and human rights, good governance, security, conflict resolution and multilateralism.

In terms of the analysis given to specific foreign policy issues, Vale and Taylor (1999) pointed to the initial attention given to the opening of embassies, the high-level official visits to South Africa, as well as the ongoing transformation of the DFA, in comparison to the limited analysis of “the overall thrust of South African foreign policy: the normative principles that underlie Pretoria’s interaction with the international community. Even less attention or effort is aimed at explaining or analyzing why South Africa has ‘bought into the programme’”.

Although this may have been the case in 1999, midway through Mbeki’s second term as president (2007) there is remarkably little analysis of the role of the presidency and the foreign policy bureaucracy. Indeed, post-apartheid foreign policy analysis has seen a growing number of criticisms regarding its failures to implement policy principles (human rights and democracy) and its integration into the neo-liberal paradigm.

Johnston (2001) offers a critical account of the role of both democracy and human rights in South Africa's foreign policy while Black's (2001) analysis regarding South Africa's promotion of human rights, demonstrates the move towards multilateralism as the primary vehicle in pursuing human rights. Within the discussion on the implementation of the principles on human rights and democracy there are a number of country specific case studies, particularly in relation to South Africa's relations with China (Mills 1997; Henwood 1997; Alden 1998 and 2001, Alden and le Pere 2003) and Zimbabwe (Black and Wilson 2004; Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004).

The consolidation of democracy in South Africa has produced studies across a number of academic fields, including the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy principle and democratic participation within the foreign policy process. In terms of analysis on the application of the principle of democracy promotion Landsberg (2000) provides an analysis of the problems identified in becoming a 'democratizer', especially within Africa, while South Africa's role as a promoter of democracy and good governance has also been raised in relation to Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Southall 2003; Taylor 2005a; Taylor 2006b). Questions regarding the democratic nature of foreign policy have been highlighted in the edited volume Democratizing Foreign Policy. Acknowledging a gap in the research, and steering away from a state-centric approach, this volume sets out to consider the question: does 'it matter whether policies geared towards an environment beyond [the] borders of the state are formulated and conducted in a democratic manner?'

Thabo Mbeki's pronouncement of his vision for an 'African Renaissance', and the inclusion of the concept in foreign policy, spurred a number of studies into the meaning

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of the concept for foreign policy (M. Mbeki 1998; Vale and Maseko 1998, 2003; Evans 1999; Ajulu 2001; Taylor and Williams 2001; Dunton 2003). Following the initial flurry of academic output on the subject, a general consensus seems to have been reached that it remains 'high on sentiment, and low on substance.' A shift in policy emphasis towards economic diplomacy and multilateralism by the post-apartheid government has seen a subsequent change in policy research and output. Attention has been given to South Africa’s focus on economic diplomacy with particular reference to the external influences of neo-liberalism, imbalances in the global trade and finance regimes and the North-South divide. Ian Taylor has produced a number of analyses critical of the government’s acceptance of the neo-liberal paradigm; any ‘[t]ransformative ambitions that the ANC may have had during the liberation struggle have been tempered by not only an acceptance (via a contested educational and socialisation process) of the ongoing ideology of neoliberalism, but also the structural constraints inherent in a globalising world.’

Bond (2002) argues along a similar line that in contending with global economic inequalities South Africa has ‘bought into’ the global paradigm. As he points out, ‘if international capital and its various institutional foundations, including the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, represent the chains of global apartheid, it is evident that Mbeki’s project [NEPAD] is shining, not breaking, those chains.’ While these contributions offer insight into South Africa’s foreign policy position and role in relation to international capital, Marie Muller (2002) adopts a different approach in her discussion on South Africa’s economic diplomacy. Although South Africa’s adoption of a neo-liberal stance has been highlighted, the article accounts for developments in South Africa’s economic diplomacy and the tensions generated between the DFA and DTI (Department of Trade and Industry).

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Interest in South Africa’s multilateralism, as a pillar of foreign policy, has seen a growth in analysis. These studies incorporate aspects relating to the implementation of the other policy principles including human rights, democracy, economic diplomacy and the African Agenda. Two key texts have been produced in relation to South Africa’s multilateralism. The first, *South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change* edited by Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (2001), covers a range of policy areas including human rights, debt relief, imbalances in the international trade regime and environmental diplomacy. The analyses point to the range of actors increasingly involved in the foreign policy process. International as well as domestic NGOs have been singled out in the discussion on the international campaign to ban land mines (van der Westhuizen 2001), while the evaluation of South Africa’s role in terms of international environmentalism highlights a number of stakeholders and bargaining networks (van der Lugt 2001). The second contribution, *The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy* edited by Lee, Taylor and Williams (2006), draws attention to trade imbalances, human rights and democracy; however, the book is presented in terms of South Africa’s engagement with intergovernmental organisations including the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the European Union (EU), and Southern African Development Community (SADC). In the main, both books add to the creation of a ‘balance sheet’ of South Africa’s multilateral performance, highlighting the country’s conformism to the international order and the necessity of multilateralism in pursuing foreign policy objectives. What these analyses do portray to good effect is the role of external influence on South Africa’s foreign affairs.

Although there are examples within the literature on South African foreign policy analysis that draw on the period prior to 1994, there is a tendency to confine discussions regarding the design and influence of foreign policy to the period post-1994. However, as Spence points out, ‘as in domestic politics, foreign policy is no exception to the rule that however new and transformed a state may be it rarely starts with a clean slate.’ In other words, without considering the historical context there is a gap in the analysis.

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explaining foreign policy design and implementation. For instance the link between the organisational culture that developed within the ANC during the liberation struggle and its impact on current government incumbents and their decision-making, or the continued concern from the southern African region following decades of dominance by South Africa.

There are a number of historical narratives relating to the conduct of foreign policy by the apartheid government. In particular Deon Geldenhuys (1984) offers a comprehensive analysis on South Africa’s foreign policy from 1910 through the height of apartheid policy to the early 1980s in *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making.*44 In terms of foreign policy analysis this book provides coverage not only of the internal and external context, but it also gives attention to the actors involved in the policy-making process, including the head of state and legislature, the executive, the bureaucracy and the role of the domestic constituency. Furthermore, Geldenhuys details the role of the head of government in foreign affairs in the edited volume, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State,* providing an examination of the role of the president in a number of contexts.45 The release of the *History of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs 1927-1993* adds to the historical context of the DFA although, by the admission in the introduction, it does not cover the period 1966-1993.46 It is predominantly a historical narrative and not a critical analysis of the DFA and foreign policy, however, the edited chapters do offer an insight through the perspective of academics and practitioners into the history of the DFA. While these narratives may not offer a critical analysis, they do however provide the context for current explanations, adding depth to the analysis.

There are a growing number of accounts on the foreign affairs of the ANC in exile (Ellis 1991, Thomas 1996, Pfister 2003). Thomas’ historical discussion provides details on the policies adopted towards Africa, Europe, and the relationship with multilateral institutions like the UN, the NAM, and Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Consideration of the historical context is under utilized in the analysis of the new

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government's current approach. For instance, historical accounts highlight changes in
the decision-making traditions within the party from an inclusive, democratic approach,
to increased centralism and a hierarchical structure. In addition to Thomas, Pfister
(2003) discusses the ANC’s period of exile highlighting the establishment of external
missions, Mbeki’s diplomatic skills and role in the Department of International Affairs.
This builds on Thomas’ analysis, as the latter has not given much attention to the
historical role of the current president (only one listing for Thabo Mbeki in the index).

In summary, the literature reviewed for the thesis reveals foreign policy analysis
centred on the country’s external relations and policy performance with little reference
to the wider foreign policy theory. As Pfister points out in his analysis of foreign policy
studies, there are areas that have been neglected including the actors involved and the
interaction between actors, particularly between the military and foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, there are a number of contributions that consider the transformation of
key actors within the formal policy process (Muller 1998; Mills 2000; Alden and le
Pere 2003, 2004; and le Pere and van Nieuwkerk 2004). There has been progressively
more attention given to domestic sources of foreign policy influence including NGOs,
Civil Society (Bridgman 2002; Habib 2005; Naidoo 2004; Habib and Selinyane 2006),
Hughes 2001, 2003, 2004) and even Provinces and individual Cities (van Wyk 1998;
Cornelissen 2006). However, while these accounts provide for the centralisation of
power within the presidency, transition and challenges facing the DFA, the role of
NGOs and Civil Society along with external pressure, there is no cohesive analysis
considering the interaction of these actors within the ‘black-box’ of foreign policy
decision-making.

This thesis sets out to draw the different threads of analysis together to create a coherent
assessment of ‘who’ is involved in the foreign policy process, addressing the question
of agents (presidents, ministers, directors general) and structures (governmental
departments, international systems) in South Africa’s foreign policy process. Although

African foreign policy after apartheid. (eds) W. Carlsnaes and P. Nel. Midrand, Institute for Global
there are questions regarding agents and structures as the causative elements in the study of foreign policy, the thesis accepts Hill’s position on the agency-structure ‘problem’, where ‘it is assumed that causation always involves both structures and agencies, and that – as a number of authors have pointed out, following Anthony Giddens – the two kinds of phenomena help to constitute each other in a perpetual process of interaction.’

A Multistakeholder Foreign Policy

Research into the making of South Africa’s foreign policy falls within the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA), which ‘enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states.’ Writing in 1999, Rosenau highlights the growing number of ‘spheres of authority’ both within and external to the state. Not only have the spheres of authority grown, but the diversity of actors engaged in international relations has necessitated a ‘mixed actor’ approach in today’s international politics. Although the early scholarship in foreign policy recognised a number of actors that had a stake in the foreign policy process, they were often written out in terms of their significance because, as Modelski pointed out, ‘[o]ne community, and the state into which it is organized, cannot have more than one set of policy-makers who speak and act on its behalf...’ However, he goes on to add that ‘there is no single locus of foreign-policy decision-making – decisions that affect foreign policy are made all the time, at all levels, inside and outside the government ...’ Writing in the 1970s, Rosenau provides for the interplay between foreign policy-makers and domestic actors, however, without the organisation of government, the way in which society adapts to its environment is perceived as ‘merely the uncoordinated sum of many private decisions’

49 For instance Snyder points out, “We are still confronted by the empirical puzzle of the extent to which an individual policy-maker ... influences policy outcomes and the extent to which impersonal forces (such as historical movements, ideologies, and governmental systems) also determine actions,” quoted in D. P. Houghton (2007) ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach.’ Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 3(1), p. 31.
51 Ibid, p. 10.
55 Ibid, p. 5-6.
representing behavior that 'is not purposeful, and in many crucial respects it is thus quite different from foreign policy. Nongovernmental adaptation may have important consequences for what officialdom can accomplish through foreign policy, but in itself it does not fall within the purview of the student of foreign policy.'\textsuperscript{56}

The practicalities of modern international affairs has seen foreign policy become a full-time occupation, and primary function, of a number of actors outside of Modelski's initial description of 'professional' foreign policy-makers. After all, foreign policy is no longer the confines of the elite few. Growing interdependence, advances in information and communication technologies and improved public knowledge have created the scope for wider public participation.\textsuperscript{57} As the subsequent chapters point out, a number of actors have an interest in the making of foreign policy, those traditionally associated with the centre of the foreign policy process and those that are not. In some respects government is increasingly reliant on these 'peripheral' actors for resources in terms of both policy-making advice and the implementation of foreign policy. The concept of a 'multistakeholder' foreign policy captures the growing number of complex networks as well as the increase in, and variety of, actors who have a stake in the success of a state's foreign policy and thus seek to influence the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{58} While the term 'stakeholder' may refer to any individual or collective that has a stake in the success of South Africa's foreign policy, in terms of this thesis it is used to denote those groups or individuals that are actively involved in seeking an influence in the foreign policy process.

Powell, Dyson and Purkitt note that 'foreign policy decision-making is usually "black-boxed".'\textsuperscript{59} The idea of the foreign policy 'black-box' is used to depict the challenges in deconstructing the process by which a particular foreign policy decision is arrived at. In an effort to analyse those actors involved in the South African foreign policy decision-

\textsuperscript{58} B. Hocking (2005) 'The Development of Multistakeholder Diplomacy.' \textit{University of Leicester, Department of Politics Research Seminar} 16/03/2005
making process it is necessary to deconstruct the 'black-box'. In other words, the aims and objectives of this thesis are twofold: 1) to identify the actors involved in the new South Africa's foreign policy, 2) to assess the changing dynamics within the foreign policy process.

The following chapters identify and evaluate the role of those actors seeking to influence foreign policy decisions, from the president and government departments, to actors both within the state and in the external milieu. The study of actors (agents) in foreign policy is readily apparent in the literature on US foreign policy; however, it has still to find its place within South African foreign policy analysis. Not only will it allow for greater insight into the making of South Africa's own foreign policy, but it creates the basis for future comparative studies. Although comparative studies is not the focus of this thesis, for future comparisons to be made there needs to be comparable material, otherwise as Rosenau points out, 'it is like comparing apples and oranges'.

The analysis of the actors within South Africa's foreign policy is not just aimed at simply breaking down the elements involved into their constituent parts, but to uncover the interactions and relations between them in explaining the changing dynamics of foreign policy. As noted above the current literature has already identified these actors, however, their level of involvement and the interaction between them has not been the subject of critical analysis, leading to a superficial division between components. Indeed, the president may be singled out for his central role in foreign policy in one analysis while another highlights the central actions taken by business or civil society without any explanation of the networks, links, bargaining or negotiations that may take place between these actors. Not all stakeholders may be involved in the foreign policy process all the time. The movement of actors within the concentric circles of decision-making (centre-periphery) provides an indication of the changing dynamics within the foreign policy machinery. Instead of presenting the actors involved in the decision-making process as locked in a static position within the concentric circles of foreign policy, the thesis highlights the changing dynamics, or the fluid movement of actors,

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that vary in accordance with the issue being raised or even the time frames in which decisions need to be made. In other words, as the introduction to the thesis has indicated, it is possible that an actor traditionally identified as occupying a central position in the foreign policy process, may be superseded by an actor associated with the periphery, circumstances depending.

The Making of South Africa's Foreign Policy

Deconstructing the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making has been developing as a field of study since the 1950s. The initial emphasis was on quantitative research models and measurements (positivism) in an attempt to create ‘scientific’ theories relating to foreign policy. To this end there was frequent reference to frequencies, tables, events data and co-variants, all in an effort to distinguish the impact an identified element had on a country’s foreign policy. In addition, foreign policy studies fell within the wider International Relations paradigm of realism. In other words the state was the principal (and rational) actor, guided by power relations in search of the national interest. The emphasis on power and the perception of the state as a single, rational entity, as opposed to the multiple and often competing actors and institutions, created a gap in the explanations of foreign policy decision-making with little discussion on the decision-making process, nor the influence of domestic actors.

Subsequent foreign policy studies incorporate analysis of a number of different policy actors and influences moving from a state-centric approach to a multi-layered, multi-actor approach. The following section considers the contributions from South African foreign studies in relation to the role of the President, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and other government departments (OGDs), non-state actors and sub-national actors (provincial and local authorities), as well as the international dimension.

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Presidential Leadership

The wider foreign policy literature displays a number of approaches in determining the influence of state leadership on the country's foreign policy, from quantitative studies on the 'verbal output' of selected leaders, to qualitative studies on individual character and psychology. While political psychoanalysis provides explanations into the underlying reasons 'why' a particular decision was made, as an approach it faces difficulties in its 'at-a-distance' measurement of an individual's psychology. Pursuing a different line of enquiry are those analysts questioning 'how' the state's leadership manages foreign policy decision-making, in other words the leadership style and its impact on foreign policy design. Studies adopting this approach reflect the central role of the state's leadership including Schlesinger's (1974) 'Imperial Presidency'; Plischke's (1979) 'Summit Diplomacy'; Neustadt (1960,1980) on 'Presidential Power'; Barratt's (1997) 'Presidential Foreign Policy'; and Mitchell (2005) on 'Centralizing Advisory Systems'. Current international relations trends continue to reflect the central role of the executive, particularly the burgeoning of summit diplomacy.

The literature on Mandela's role as president is critical of the predominant position he assumed, particularly the personalisation of foreign policy. As Mills points out, 'policy has often followed his [Mandela's] public statements, rather than the other way around.' While analysis highlights the central role played by Mandela in foreign policy, this is generally located within the wider discussions regarding South Africa's democratic transition, policy development and policy performance, particularly in

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applying the principles espoused in Mandela’s *Foreign Affairs* article to the practice of foreign affairs. Even Barber’s publication, *Mandela’s World*, does not focus specifically on the role of Mandela as an individual, a point he stipulates at the beginning of the book. The publication provides insights into the political transformation and the challenges facing the new democracy in terms of its foreign affairs. While remarks are made regarding the impact of the difference in leadership style and temperament between P. W. Botha and F. W. de Klerk, detailed analysis of the impact that the post-apartheid president’s style and temperament has had on policy is limited, often hinted at but never discussed in any detail. The book’s focus is primarily given to performance and the inevitable ‘hiccup’ between Mandela and Western leaders along with Mandela’s overseas visits in drumming up international support.

The literature on Mbeki’s presidency assumes a critical appraisal of his role as president, particularly in relation to the centralisation of power. Indeed, Mbeki has been singled out for his ‘imperial presidency’. In her chapter in the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2001/02*, Maxi Schoeman concludes that despite the role of other actors and agencies ‘South Africa’s foreign policy is firmly in the hands of its president’ who ‘takes the lead, sets the guidelines and indicates what he wants and where he wants to take the country (and continent).’ This is predicated against the (brief) background of Mbeki relation to the IRPS cluster, African Renaissance and the imbalance in trade and development. Discussions on the growing centralisation within the executive raises questions relating to the nature of South Africa’s democracy, specifically relating to the context within which the president has been able to carve out a dominant role and how dominant that role really is. The wider rationale allowing for centralisation within the executive is not often considered. Daniel’s (2001) brief assessment, however, does point out that there has been a tendency to point the blame at Mbeki rather than on the government (on the individual as opposed to the collective) presenting a defence that highlights the President as ‘a product of – and in a sense a

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70 Ibid, p. 41.
prisoner of – the commandist-type party into which the ANC evolved in exile, and of the political culture it embraced.\textsuperscript{74}

The authors in the edited book \textit{Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South African President}, present a particularly critical overview of Mbeki’s governmental reforms.\textsuperscript{75} Through a number of contributions, the publication sets out to fill the void in the understanding of Mbeki’s leadership and its implications,\textsuperscript{76} a task achieved predominantly through a performance analysis approach, rather than the psychoanalysis approach or questions regarding leadership style often present within US foreign policy studies. The drawback has been that there is very little consideration of the impact of the president’s character, his perceptions, beliefs or leadership style and the impact this has had on the policy process.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of the debate on the centralisation of the presidency the chapter by Chothia and Jacobs (2002) provides a clear account of developments within the executive pointing out, ‘that, however benign their intent may be, such centralisation could presage an imperial presidency: powerful, imposing and impenetrable.’\textsuperscript{78} The publication does capture the complex mix in Mbeki’s emphasis from business, economic development and trade to social development and Africa; however, there is not always a critical eye on his role.

The editors set out that the intention of the book is to ‘start an incisive and constructive public discourse about Mbeki’s presidency, his government’s policies, and what they mean for the future social and economic development of South Africa.’\textsuperscript{79} However, this is not an analysis specific to the role of Mbeki in the foreign policy-making process, although it does serve as a starting point for debates on the dominance of the president.


\textsuperscript{77} One of the few exceptions in the wider literature on South Africa’s foreign policy is Gerrit Olivier’s analysis, which highlights Mbeki’s leadership traits and subsequent impact on foreign policy. G. Olivier (2003) ‘Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?’ \textit{International Affairs.} Vol. 79 (4), pp. 815-828.


In addition, as it was published in 2002, only a few years after Mbeki assumed office, it does not give much time for the longitudinal analysis of developments in Mbeki’s role.

The shortfall in the study of ‘presidentialism’ and the limited ‘engagement over the changing role of the presidency and its place in the post-Mandela nexus’ continues to represents an area that needs further analysis, especially in relation to foreign policy. Recognising the importance of Mbeki’s role in South Africa’s political life is generally accepted and there is growing debate in this area. Analysis from Nicola de Jager (2006) highlights the continued centralisation of power within the Presidency and the focus on civil society as a means to implement policy. William Gumede (2005) presents an account of Thabo Mbeki’s rise to power including his background, character, and former roles, continuing with assessments of his policy performance (role in the HIV/AIDS debacle, Zimbabwe, NEPAD) and role as ‘CEO’. Gumede’s analysis provides useful insights into the centralisation of power with the president. It is not however, a critical analysis of Mbeki’s role, especially his role in foreign policy, although Mbeki’s international relations have been raised over the course of the book. In a similar fashion Calland’s Anatomy of South Africa highlights the central role played by Mbeki along with offering an account of the key figures surrounding the president, although once again the focus is not on the role of the president in foreign policy decision-making. By Calland’s own admission it is not a ‘comprehensive analysis’. It does, however, offer insights into the key players in South African politics, particularly those actors close to the president. In addition he raises an important issue on the distinction between importance and influence in South Africa’s political landscape. An individual or institution may have importance i.e. as part of their constitutional position in the new democratic South Africa, however, they may not play a significant role when it comes to influencing policy decisions, for example, parliament may be important but questions are continuingly raised as to its ability to influence policy decisions.

Mbeki’s propensity to assume an active role in foreign affairs creates the need for further analysis of his role in the decision-making process. Although Vale and Maseko

82 Ibid, pp. 6-7. Also, see the ‘Power Matrix’ offered on the back cover of the book
(2002) have expressed their dissatisfaction on foreign policy scholarship ‘that has relied on the role of personalities to carry understanding and build explanations’,\(^8^3\) they also note the importance of this approach in light of foreign policy’s move to the office of the president.\(^8^4\) Indeed, as Olivier points out, ‘[a]n outstanding characteristic of South African president Thabo Mbeki’s leadership is his predilection for matters foreign over matters domestic.’\(^8^5\) He goes on to indicate a ‘wavering style of leadership’ and a ‘complicated leadership style’\(^8^6\), however, there is little critical analysis of the development of these leadership styles.

The analysis in Chapter 2 follows a longitudinal approach in the examination of Mbeki’s leadership, covering his role in the ANC’s Department of International Affairs (DIA) to midway through his second term as president (2007). The Chapter raises questions regarding Mbeki’s position as an ‘imperial’ president with reference to the political structure and the role of other actors in foreign policy in light of South Africa’s growing international commitments. The analysis of the president is facilitated by access to primary sources. Mbeki himself is a prolific writer. He is author of his own speeches, and in some instances author of his ministers’ speeches, as well as producing his weekly *Letter from the President* in the ANC’s online journal – *ANC Today*. The ANC’s own website is easily navigable and provides details of both Mandela and Mbeki’s speeches and profiles.

- **Foreign Policy Bureaucracy: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Other Government Departments**

In addition to the impact the president has in shaping foreign policy, bureaucratic politics, or the ‘pulling and hauling’ within the government’s own organisational process, has been raised as an influence in foreign policy decision-making.\(^8^7\) Despite

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\(^{8^4}\) Vale and Maseko (2002), p. 133.

\(^{8^5}\) Olivier (2003), p. 815.

\(^{8^6}\) Ibid, p. 819 & 820.

criticism regarding the bureaucratic politics model, the *Essence of Decision* (1971) has spurred further analysis into the role of bureaucracies in the foreign policy process, particularly in light of evolving bureaucracies in both developed and developing countries.

Analyses on the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) have been dominated by the challenges facing the transformation of the Department post 1994. In their 2003 analysis Alden and le Pere question whether the ANC ‘seriously underestimate the scope and complexity of institutional restructuring and managing the country’s foreign policymaking machinery?’ Fabricius’ brief article (1999) provides an indication of the internal problems facing the DFA including the passive role of Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and the primacy of the president. Moreover, he points to the importance of the bureaucracy rather than relying solely on ‘virtuoso performances by individuals’. Marie Muller’s analysis (1997, 1998) provides a detailed discussion of the key changes within the department following the 1994 elections. There has been particular reference to Alfred Nzo and Jackie Selebi in effecting change within the department (Fabricius 1999; Alden and le Pere 2003; Barber 2004; Nel, van Wyk and Johnsen 2004; van Nieuwkerk 2006). Although there has been some discussion relating to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, there is very little in the way of analysis on the impact these individuals have had on foreign policy, particularly the role of the subsequent Directors-General.

Strained relations between government departments have been highlighted in the literature, particularly in the context of the relationship between the DFA and the DTI (Schoeman 2001; Muller 2002; Alden and le Pere 2003; Alden and van Nieuwkerk 2004; Barber 2004). Additionally aspects of the DFA’s relations with the Department of Defence (DoD) have been provided for; however, there is room for development in this particular area following the country’s growing role in international peacekeeping. Within South African Security Studies there are a number of articles and book chapters available analysing the role of the DoD and the SANDF in South Africa’s foreign

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affairs. However, the focus is primarily given to the developments within the defence ministry and not the wrangling of bureaucratic politics and the effects of inter-departmental relations on foreign policy. Nevertheless, these accounts do provide a platform for further analysis into the interaction between the DFA and the DoD.

The impact of departmental perceptions, aims, and objectives has an influence on the position actors and departments take within the foreign policy decision-making process. As noted in Allison’s argument, “where you stand, depends on where you sit”, or that ‘participants [in the decision-making process] will propose solutions and policies which reflect their own position in the bureaucracy.’ As an area of enquiry the positions adopted by key foreign policy actors and their departments deserves further investigation. Divisions in perspective have already been highlighted within the wider body politic with reference to the arms debate. As Spence points out, ‘[t]here has been pressure on the government from the business community as well as from ‘populist’ elements within the ruling ANC to concentrate scarce resources on social and economic reconstruction rather than military ‘ventures’.

Accounts of parliament’s role in the foreign policy process highlight its limited role as an actor despite the potential that it has for influence. There are discussions on the development of the ‘cluster’ system of governance and the performance of parliament in general (van Wyk 1999; Hughes 2001; Schoeman 2001; Alden and le Pere 2003); however, there are very few analyses of the role played (or not played) by the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster. Interestingly, by the time of the 2004 and 2005 publication of the *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, any discussion of the role of South Africa’s parliament in foreign policy had vanished, itself an implicit admission of parliament’s marginalisation.

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92 Allison quoted in Smith (1980), p. 27.


Access to primary material on the DFA including, annual reports, statements, speeches and strategic reviews, has improved remarkably through the development of the Department’s online website. In addition, staff are willing to engage with researchers, time dependent. Chapter 3 utilises both primary material and secondary analysis in considering the role of the DFA and other government departments (OGDs) in the foreign policy process. The analysis draws on the discussions relating to the transformation of the DFA, the role of individuals and, with its basis in bureaucratic politics, the interrelation between the DFA and other government departments actively engaged in foreign policy, particularly the DTI and the DoD. In addition, the chapter considers the developing influence of the DFA, indicating the marginal role the department played at the outset of the ‘new’ South Africa, to the current departmental emphasis on occupying a central role in facilitating decision-making and the implementation of foreign policy.

- **Civil Society**

The study of foreign policy has evolved from a focus primarily on the state’s leadership and foreign ministry, to consider a number of contributors to the foreign policy process. This changing position is reflected in Hill’s broad definition of foreign policy; ‘foreign policy is about the fundamental issue of how organized groups, at least in part strangers to each other, inter-relate’\(^{95}\) and foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.’\(^{96}\) As he points out, the use of the term ‘independent actor’ covers a number of potential actors. Domestic sources of influence on foreign policy cover a range of participants, from individuals (academics), small groups (big business) to large organisations (NGOs). Although democratic principles have been promoted in terms of public participation in government, public participation in foreign policy has received mixed responses from within the formal foreign policy machinery. Eban captures the questions regarding public involvement in foreign policy in his discussion on the nature of the public as

\(^{95}\) Hill (2003), p. xvii.

\(^{96}\) Ibid, p. 3.
‘wise or foolish, virtuous or imprudent’. In the first instance the public is viewed as a means to provide balance to a head of government who may be acting out of a sense of ‘egotism, vanity and ambition,’ on the other hand, as argued by Walter Lippmann, the complex nature of issues facing government need to be managed ‘by people of mature judgement and specialized knowledge.’ Nel and van der Westhuizen (2004) note that the US public have been found to be “pretty prudent” at least with respect to certain foreign policy issues ... There is no reason to assume that this would not be true in South Africa as well.

There are, however, questions regarding viability of this comparison, particularly in light of the differences in the length of time the democracy has been established as well as disparities in terms of education levels and access to information and communication technology (ICT).

The pluralist nature of the US political system has seen a number of research outputs on the role and influence of public opinion and lobbying on foreign policy decision-making. In contrast, there are relatively few studies on the impact of South African public opinion on foreign policy. Pfister highlights the research done by Anthoni van Nieuwkerk and Phillip Nel in connection to opinion surveys. However, there is room for further analysis in this regard as these initial studies were conducted primarily between 1992 and 1999, which excludes the developments in public opinion under Mbeki’s tenure. Moeletsi Mbeki notes that, ‘[t]he weakness of South Africa’s foreign policy lies in the fact that most of the time, it does not address the concerns of the county’s major constituencies.’ Although he has confidence in expressing the ‘vision’ of the people of South Africa, the role of public opinion is an area that is still in the early stages of development in the study of South African foreign policy.

Following the successful transition from apartheid to South Africa’s first democratically elected government, there has been considerable academic research across a number of

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fields focusing on the concept of democracy, its application and impact on South Africa's body politic. In the field of foreign policy analysis, there has been specific focus on the idea of participation. As le Pere and van Nieuwkerk point out, '[c]ivil organisations now act as agents of interest representation, co-operation with the state and, often, opposition to its policies.'

Democratizing Foreign Policy? Lessons from South Africa provides a number of analyses on participation in foreign policy including the role of civil society, women, labour and social movements. Of particular significance is the distinction highlighted between governance for the people and governance by the people along with the development of civil society's role as a 'watchdog' in the policy process. In their chapter, Civil Society and Foreign Policy, le Pere and Vickers consider the distinction 'between NGO “input” and “participation” in foreign policy making'. They note that there is 'a marked difference between NGOs making intellectual inputs into the policy process and NGOs as a part of the final policy decision. While NGOs aspire to be participants - if only marginally - in foreign policy making processes, it is the government that ultimately makes and decides policy.' While it may be true that government makes the final decisions regarding policy, the distinction between 'inputs' and 'participation' is not always so clear-cut. Indeed 'input' itself may be a form of participation. There is also some discussion regarding the changing role of civil society. In particular, Nicola de Jager (2006) notes that '[p]lurality, as demonstrated in and expressed through the multiplicity of civil society organisations, is too, being restrained with attempts to institutionalise the role of these organisations, and with civil society’s function largely being confined to implementers of governmental policy.'

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In Full Flight: South African foreign policy after apartheid, the contribution to the study of South Africa’s foreign policy from the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), has avoided adopting a state-centric approach, however, there is little analysis given to the role of civil society and NGOs. The chapter entitled ‘Foreign policy-making in South Africa: context, actors, and process’, provides discussion on the changes in the foreign policy process in terms of the presidency, the cabinet cluster system and the DFA, however, apart from noting the range of non-state actors there is little in the way of analysis on their role and impact. The chapter by Habib and Selinyane indicates that research on the role of civil society ‘does not deal specifically with the place of civil society in foreign policy.’ They acknowledge that a state’s agenda may be influenced by civil society, but point out that the position of civil society is secondary to that of the state. The analysis proposes a role for civil society in foreign policy-making, nevertheless the chapter stresses South Africa’s role as a hegemon rather than the role and impact of civil society, only pointing out that civil society needs to move beyond ‘rubber-stamping.’ In terms of identifying the expanding scope of actors increasingly assuming a role in foreign affairs, Scarlett Comelissen presents a key analysis of sub-national actors in the form of provinces and cities, adding to the earlier analysis by Joansie van Wyk. Although the influence of sub-national actors on South Africa’s foreign policy is not the focus of the discussion, this account adds to the idea of a multistakeholder foreign policy in highlighting the development of transnational networks. As she points out, ‘[t]raditional foreign policy analyses need to be reshaped to incorporate the foreign policy impact of substate units ... ’

There are contributions from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) that highlight the role of civil society in South Africa’s foreign affairs, particularly Paul Nantulya (2004) and Kumi Naidoo (2004). Writing from the

perspective of the NGO community Nantulya is particularly positive regarding the role of NGOs in the field of conflict management in Africa. Naidoo's (2004) contribution offers an empirical examination of organisations actively engaged in foreign affairs including the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African NGO coalition (SANGOCO), although there could have been further examination of the impact that 'civil society advocacy' has had on foreign policy. In addition to the literature that has a particular focus on explanations of civil society, NGOs, and business, details of the role played by domestic actors in foreign affairs are found increasingly within the literature on multilateralism. This is particularly evident in the discussions on South Africa's role in the Campaign to Ban Landmines (van der Westhuizen 2001; Cornelissen 2006), environmental diplomacy (van der Lugt 2001) and the influence of business (Lee 2006; Qobo 2006) on South Africa's foreign affairs.

In identifying policy makers, Modelski points to the function of representation; 'what particularly distinguishes policy-makers is their representative status and function, their ability to act and their responsibility for acting “on behalf” of their community.' Today there are a number of non-state actors representing the state in the international arena; however, business is increasingly playing a role in foreign policy through their expertise and as a result of a growing international emphasis on economics. As Garten points out with reference to US foreign policy, 'Washington needs business more than ever to reinforce its goals. The executive branch depends almost entirely on business for technical information regarding trade negotiations, all the more so as the Washington bureaucracy is downsized even as it negotiates an ever broader range of issues.'

Business and government have found themselves ever more entwined in the realm of foreign affairs, particularly as companies bid for projects abroad and increasingly face questions regarding ‘issues such as human rights, labor practices, environmental

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protection, and corruption. In the literature relating to South African foreign policy, the tensions between business and government have been pointed out especially in terms of access to policy makers. The role of business in South Africa's foreign affairs has, according to Mills, been under-utilised. Indeed, Mills and White promote the idea of business actors representing the country. Neuma Grobbelaar's discussion highlights the movement of South African businesses into Africa, although the link between business and foreign policy is not specifically addressed. Dlamini (2004), however, highlights the importance of the collaboration between business and government in achieving the goals of both. This discussion focuses more specifically on business and foreign policy highlighting the growing business networks between states and the government's own emphasis on economic diplomacy taking into account the 'continuities and discontinuities in government-business relations'.

The literature concerning the role of non-state actors in the foreign policy process has seen a number of different focus areas, including Civil Society and Business, however, there has been little discussion on the role of the media. In addition, there has been a tendency to gloss over the differences within South Africa's civil society and business groups. One of the difficulties concerning the study of domestic participation is that within each group there is a range of perspectives, aims, objectives and ideological positions. In other words, discussions tend to consider these actors as a homogeneous entity while reality is a more complicated place. While continuing to indicate the plurality of domestic actors seeking an influence in the foreign policy process, Chapter 4 draws on the current literature in considering the relative position of these actors within the policy-making process. Although the chapter is by no means a comprehensive account of all civil society and business groups that have a stake in foreign policy, it sets out to demonstrate the changing dynamics, or the movement of

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126 Ibid, p. 177.
these actors within the centre-periphery structure of foreign policy decision-making. In other words Chapter 4 questions the position of these actors within the ‘black-box’ of foreign policy decision-making indicating that, in essence, some may be more peripheral than others.

- **The International Dimension**

Foreign policy is distinct from domestic policy in that it is aimed at dealing with events in the external environment. It is, however, also subject to their effects.¹²⁷ As Rosenau noted, ‘[f]oreign policy does not occur in a vacuum. Nor does it arise exclusively out of the demands that originate within societies.’¹²⁸ The interplay of action and reaction, foreign policy response and counter-response, between the domestic and international is represented in Rosenau’s national-international linkage.¹²⁹ Reasons for the growing linkage between states is based on growing interdependence and connectivity, producing circumstances where international issues have become localised and domestic issues internationalised.¹³⁰ As Hocking points out, ‘we are confronted daily with obvious manifestations of the interconnectedness of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics and at least one neologism, ‘intermestic’ has been coined to celebrate this trend.’¹³¹ International sources of influence on a country’s foreign policy are as diverse as domestic sources, from individuals (Bill Gates) to Multinational Corporations (Citibank) to international Non-Governmental Organisations (Red Cross). Moreover, it is not just the plurality of actors within the international system that has an influence on foreign policy decisions, the nature of the international system itself sets out constraints and opportunities on the state’s action, including its position within the international system, physical attributes like geographical size and position, and resources, including natural, financial and human resources.

Despite the (growing) linkages between the state’s external and internal environment, external sources of influence on foreign policy sit uncomfortably with the importance states accord sovereignty, creating particular difficulties in identifying the role of foreign actors. There are a number of analyses that consider the role of external influences on the former apartheid regime. Deon Geldenhuys’ chapter, *International involvement in South Africa's political transformation*, considers the question of cause and effect, the means of pressure used against the apartheid regime, as well as those external factors that served to motivate change. In addition, changes within the external milieu, and the impact this had on South Africa’s own transition, have been highlighted by Guelke (1996) who draws attention to the perspectives of South African analysts Lawrence Schlemmer and Hermann Giliomee on the impact of the end of the Cold War. Although these accounts highlight the significance of the external environment in South Africa’s transition, they do not provide a critical analysis of the impact these changes have had in respect of post-apartheid foreign policy.

One of the criticisms aimed at the 1996 *Foreign Policy Discussion Document* is that it ‘undervalued the limitations of the external environment...’. In some respects this has been the case within South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy literature. There is very little in the way of critical analysis on the role of external influences and constraints on post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making. Examples of international pressure have been used within the broader analysis of foreign policy performance, for instance in the case of the policy U-turn on Nigeria (1995). In addition, discussions on the ‘Two Chinas Dilemma’ indicate that analysts have given some consideration to the international system as an element in explanations of foreign decision. As Spence points out it would have been a ‘folly to ignore a country whose membership of the Security Council and general standing in international society was a source of power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.’ The literature given to the analysis of South Africa’s multilateralism also points to the pressure from the international environment. For instance, the actors in the International Campaign to Ban

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Landmines (van der Westhuizen 2001) the negotiations with the EU (Hurt 2006), trade negotiations and South Africa’s relations with its partners the G20+ and the Africa Group in the South (Lee 2006), expectations from other African countries (Hamill 2006; Qobo 2006; Williams 2006) and US pressure during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review (Taylor 2006).

While the historical narratives and post-1994 analysis provide for the influence of international actors, they are not always specific to their impact on foreign policy. Chapter 5 draws on the analyses highlighting the role of international constraints on foreign affairs in considering the effect on foreign policy decision-making. It takes into account the historical context of both the apartheid regime and the ANC along with South Africa’s post-1994 integration into the international system. A shortfall within the literature has been in identifying the complex, and often competing, range of external influences. For instance, in considering international sources of foreign policy ambiguity, Bischoff primarily highlights the impact of the growing use of unilateralism and South Africa’s own ‘semi-peripheral’ status in the international system on South Africa’s foreign policy. However, as policy decisions in the case of the crisis in Zimbabwe demonstrate, there are a number of competing international pressures on the government. South Africa has continued to pursue a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ despite continued calls for greater involvement from the West, a position more in line with expectations of African solidarity emanating from within the region.

While the thesis seeks to contribute to the analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy by adopting a focus on actors, it too has its limitations. One of the key problems in providing an analysis of the actors involved in the foreign policy decision-making process has been the sheer number of influences in today’s evolving domestic and international society. In order to provide a more wide-ranging discussion on a number of sources of influence, the thesis has adopted a ‘mid-range’ approach. This approach, however, limits the room for a detailed analysis of all the actors and their impact on foreign policy leaving scope for future analysis. For instance, discussion on the role of the media, the influence of business or the impact of parliament could easily become individual chapters in an analysis given solely to domestic sources of influence in

foreign policy decision-making. Detailed analysis of the diversity of actors has also been limited by time constraints. There has also been the challenge of getting around the problem of ‘what goes on behind closed doors.’ Decision-making regarding foreign policy is still conducted by a relatively small group of very busy government officials, civil society and business experts. While officials have been willing to engage with the researcher there is the additional problem of sensitive information, a result of the contemporary focus of this study, which officials are inevitably reluctant to divulge.

Conclusion

The executive may currently occupy a central position in the foreign policy process; however, there are a growing number of actors that seek an influence in foreign policy decision-making. In an effort to address the shortfalls identified in the current literature concerned with South African foreign policy, the thesis focuses on the examination of the actors (agents) in the decision-making process. This represents a departure from the evaluation of policy performance relating to South Africa’s external relations and policy implementation. The transition from apartheid to the ‘new’ democratic South Africa has seen the involvement of a number of state and non-state actors in building South Africa’s capacity in international affairs. This has created the scope for the influence of these actors near the centre of the foreign policy process.

Chapter 1 has identified a number of theoretical constructs from foreign policy analysis in explaining the making of South Africa’s foreign policy. In addition it has introduced the concept of a multistakeholder foreign policy, which acknowledges the presence of a number of actors and networks within the ‘black-box’ of decision-making. This concept is applied to the making of South Africa’s foreign policy throughout the thesis, raising questions regarding the changing dynamics within the foreign policy machinery. The ensuing chapters consider the central role of the president, the developments within the Department of Foreign Affairs and the growing ‘intergovernmentalized’ decision-making, as well as the role of non-state and international actors. In bringing these components together in a single analysis, the thesis offers an integrative account of the actors in South Africa’s foreign policy-making process and the changing dynamics between them.
Chapter 2

A Presidential Foreign Policy

Introduction:

In their analysis of foreign policy decision-makers, Hermann and Hermann note that the composition of the ‘ultimate decision unit’, or those actors involved at the centre of foreign policy decision-making, shapes foreign policy. The notion that “the president makes foreign policy”, has seen US foreign policy analysis give particular attention to explanations pertaining to the impact of the individual in shaping the country’s foreign policy. In contrast, South African foreign policy analysis has seen little critical engagement with the role (and impact) of the president on foreign policy. Indeed, by virtue of the president’s position as head of government and the constitutional functions accorded in terms of foreign affairs, any analysis of the making of South Africa’s foreign policy would be incomplete without a discussion on the role of the president. In the analysis of ‘who’ makes post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy, Chapter 2 begins by considering the central, or predominant role of the president. The predominance of South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents in decision-making is reflected in the emphasis given to presidential initiatives, values and visions within the country’s foreign policy. It is also evident in the capacity of the presidents to undertake unilateral decisions regarding the application of foreign policy, a trait particularly evident during Mandela’s presidency.

Identifying the existence of a predominant president is often as far as the analyses on South Africa’s foreign policy progress. Consequently, and in response to this, this study considers the framework that has facilitated the development of a predominant

president. Although analyses depict Thabo Mbeki as an ‘imperial’ president, this does not represent the entire story. This Chapter reveals an executive led foreign policy, or a presidential foreign policy, which accounts for the influence of staff within the executive as well as advisers and technical experts found outside the executive. In addition, the chapter highlights the evolving context (both domestic and international) within which the president operates and the developments that facilitate wider participation. While an ‘imperial’ president inhibits the development of a multistakeholder foreign policy, a presidential foreign policy, or the president’s adoption of a leadership position as opposed to a commanding position in the foreign policy process, provides latitude for other actors, both within and external to the state, in the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making.

A Predominant President in the ‘New’ South Africa.

A predominant leader is, according to Hermann and Hermann, a leader who as ‘a single individual has the power to make the choice for the government.’ In the South African context, the country’s post-apartheid presidents have visibly assumed a central role in the foreign policy machinery. Indeed, as the literature review in Chapter 1 indicates, both Mandela and Mbeki have been singled out for their primacy in foreign policy through their adoption of positions as both ‘Foreign-Policy-Maker-in-Chief’ and ‘Diplomat-in-Chief’. In the case of the former, policy initiatives and values espoused by both Mandela and Mbeki have become integral components, indeed, cornerstones guiding foreign policy, while in terms of the latter, presidential actions (or inactions) have shaped foreign policy decisions. The analysis of Mandela and Mbeki’s input into the foreign policy process serves as a measure in determining the primacy of the president in the making of foreign policy. This moves beyond merely identifying South

Africa’s presidents as ‘architect[s] of foreign policy’, to considering their influence in shaping the foreign policy process.

- **Nelson Mandela and the Redefining of Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy**

Despite the inextricable link between Mandela and the promotion of democracy and human rights, there is a certain amount of ambiguity regarding his role in the foreign policy process. In the first instance Mandela is described as occupying a dominant, even commanding, position within foreign policy decision-making, resulting in the personalisation of foreign policy ‘overshadowing the DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs], the cabinet and parliament.’ On the other hand there are arguments that Mandela’s role was not as all-pervasive as some accounts suggest. Barber points to Mandela’s limited engagement in the ‘day-to-day business’ of governance and his tendency for ‘arbitrary interventions’. He goes on to note that in ensuring the new ANC-led government played a critical role in foreign affairs, in addition to himself, Mandela actively involved Mbeki in the foreign policy process, particularly towards the end of his tenure, pointing out that “the de facto ruler is Thabo Mbeki. I am shifting everything to him.”

Mandela’s incumbency saw the application of initiatives aimed at developing wider participation within the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. This was evident in the decision to hold a ‘workshop … hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs to

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discuss South Africa’s foreign policy with stakeholders in civil society.’ Moreover, in signalling the involvement of key actors in the formulation of South Africa’s foreign policy over the course of 1995, former Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), ‘Rusty’ Evans, observed that ‘[v]arious decision-makers have been involved in the process of evolving a South African response to this world.’

In his analysis Graham Evans points out that foreign policy was itself viewed as ‘contested territory within the diverse ranks of the ANC Alliance.’ He goes on to note that the period 1994-1999 saw South Africa suffering from a ‘profusion of decision-making centres and actors, each equipped with separate agendas and operating in competition with the others.’ In addition, Venter highlights that there ‘were conflicting views as to the relative influence of President Mandela, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, or Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and their respective advisers – including Defence Minister Joe Modise and Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi’, while Vale and Taylor describe Mandela as a ‘tool of the Pretoria government’s foreign relations.’ Conflicting interpretations reflect the particular challenge in determining Mandela’s role in the making of foreign policy following substantial changes, both within South Africa and in the international environment. Moreover, it reflects the complex position Mandela occupied. As this section indicates, Mandela’s role was neither sustained nor disciplined, however, he played a predominant role in shaping post-apartheid foreign policy, evident in his considerable input into the making of foreign policy.

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13 Ibid, pp. 624-625
In the first instance, Mandela’s role was particularly significant in defining a foreign policy for the new democratic South Africa. Although his article, *South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy*,\(^\text{16}\) was written in his capacity as leader of the ANC and as such reflected ‘agreed views on foreign policy’,\(^\text{17}\) it was quickly associated with the persona of the president. As Alden and le Pere point out, ‘Mandela’s declaration on the eve of the 1994 elections that “human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy” set the tone for the shape and conduct of South African diplomacy in the aftermath of apartheid.’\(^\text{18}\) The six key principles defined in Mandela’s article were later incorporated into the ANC’s *Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa* (1994) and the *Discussion Document on Foreign Policy* (1996).\(^\text{19}\)

In addition, Mandela’s predominance in foreign policy was demonstrated through a number of unilateral foreign policy decisions. Venter highlights Mandela’s decision to write off Namibia’s debt (approximately R800 million) ‘without any cabinet deliberations or consultation with the African National Congress (ANC), let alone opposition parties.’\(^\text{20}\) Moreover, like US President Carter, Mandela’s prioritising of human rights on the foreign policy agenda ‘met with some embarrassing setbacks’.\(^\text{21}\) This was particularly obvious in the case of his 1995 condemnation of Nigeria following the execution of the Ogoni nine. Despite efforts in ‘quiet’ diplomacy by Thabo Mbeki (as Deputy President), Archbishop Tutu, and the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, Mandela actively championed the call at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to suspend Nigeria from the organisation without due consultation with regional leaders.\(^\text{22}\) This drew a number of acrid comments, particularly from Liberia who ‘called on others “not to allow South Africa to

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\(^\text{16}\) N. Mandela (1993) ‘South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy’ in *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72 (5). p. 87
\(^\text{17}\) Barber (2005), p. 1079
\(^\text{18}\) Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 12.
be used in undermining African solidarity'", 23 and Nigeria who ‘spoke of South Africa as “a white state with a black head.”’24

The setbacks experienced in relation to Nigeria did not curtail Mandela’s ‘hands-on’ approach to foreign policy decision-making. Towards the end of 1996, without prior notification or parliamentary approval, Mandela revealed the decision to accord diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), withdrawing official recognition from the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). Although the ‘Two Chinas’ dilemma had seen a relatively high level of exposure and debate among a range of state and non-state actors including the press, business and interest groups,25 the unilateral nature of the final decision served to emphasise the president’s predominant leadership in the foreign policy process. As Alden points out, ‘the decision to officially recognise China was taken neither with the knowledge of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, nor with that of the foreign policy bureaucracy, both of whom expressed obvious surprise at its content and timing.’26

In terms of South Africa’s international relations, Cooper observes that over the course of his presidency Mandela’s ‘extended reliance on personal diplomacy has manifested itself in an increasingly wide range of cases – from the Western Sahara, the Sudan, and East Timor, to the Lockerbie/Libya issue and Algeria.’27 It also saw a number of offers of personal intervention, not all of which were well received. Indeed, his offer, at the 1998 Non-Aligned Movement conference, to assume the role of ‘go between’ in the disagreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir incensed the Indian delegation.28 However, there were positive results from Mandela’s personal role in foreign policy. As president, Mandela undertook an active role in protecting the foreign policy principle of

24 Ibid.
25 C. Alden (2001) ‘Solving South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign Policy-making and the ‘Two Chinas’ Question.’ South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy, (eds) J. Broderick, G. Burford and G. Freer. Houndmills, Palgrave, p. 124 & 125-128. The interested parties to the debate included research organisations like the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Foundation for Global Dialogue now the Institute for Global Dialogue, COSATU who worried about the impact of the cheap labour of Mainland China, ISCOR who were concerned with businesses competitive capabilities in the PRC, the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs and the lobbying of Taiwan’s own diplomats.
universal relations'. A controversial defence of the principle involved a declaration, in front of President Clinton, that those who criticised “our friendship with those who helped us in our darkest hours” should “go and throw themselves into a pool”, a statement made in reference to South Africa’s continued ties with the so-called ‘rogue’ states of Cuba, Libya and Iran. Unlike his foreign policy decision regarding Nigeria, Mandela’s emphasis on maintaining ties with these states ultimately had at least some positive effect for South Africa’s international status. Through the interventions of Mandela and his Director General in the President’s Office, Professor Jakes Gerwel, a successful conclusion was reached in the Lockerbie crisis.

Evidence of the president’s influence in directing foreign policy focus is manifest in South Africa’s engagement with the regional institution, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). During Mandela’s incumbency the immediate region was accorded a central role; however, following a number of decisions and actions taken by Mandela it reached a position nearer the margins. During the early 1990s the SADC (formerly the SADCC) was undergoing internal transformation as well as adapting to the inclusion of South Africa as the region’s most powerful state, particularly in terms of military and economic strength. At the beginning of his term as president Mandela placed the development of relations within the region and its institution as a primary objective in the foreign policy agenda. In his address to the SADC Summit Meeting (1995) held in South Africa, Mandela portrayed the immediate region as the starting point for building relations with the rest of Africa declaring, “[w]e must plant the seeds of Africa’s economic rebirth in the soil of Southern Africa, and see them flower to help bring comfort and a better life to all on our continent.” However, relations between South Africa and the SADC did not significantly intensify following

30 Quoted in Barber (2004), p. 168
the weakening of relations between Mandela and Mugabe on issues of intervention, peacekeeping, and tension over the leadership and role of the SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Indeed, Mandela threatened to withdraw as chair of the SADC following increased tensions with Mugabe on the crisis in the Congo (1997).  

Mandela’s predominance as president was characterised by a blurring between the identity of the individual, the state, and the political party (ANC), evident after it emerged that Mandela was using his official visits as fund-raising opportunities for the ANC. Initially he refused to answer questions on the matter, but it later emerged that he had secured donations of US$10 million from Saudi Arabia in 1998 (which had already on a previous occasion, in 1990, donated US$50 million) and the United Arab Emirates, US$50 million from Malaysia, and US$60 million from Indonesia.  

Although Mandela may have played a central role in foreign policy decision-making, interventions were episodic and often ineffectual. Nevertheless, Mandela’s input into foreign policy decision-making continues to resonate in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. Over a decade later, while there have been modifications to the idea of ‘universal relations’, the principles listed in Mandela’s Foreign Affairs article continue to underpin South Africa’s foreign policy.

- **Thabo Mbeki, New Agendas, and Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy**

In comparison to the analysis of Mandela’s role, there is greater consensus within the study of South African foreign policy regarding Thabo Mbeki’s central position in the foreign policy process. Indeed, Evans purported that in coming to power Mbeki would ‘strengthen, the historic South African tradition of strong executive leadership in foreign affairs – a tradition which stretches back at least to the days of Jan Christian Smuts.’ As Chapter 1 indicates, there are a number of authors that identify Mbeki as

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adopting an 'imperial presidency: powerful, imposing and impenetrable'\textsuperscript{41} in terms of the wider policy process. The concept of an imperial president is used to depict the commanding position of the president, undertaking autocratic decisions, along with the personalisation of foreign policy. In terms of Mbeki's influence on the foreign policy process, le Pere and van Nieuwkerk note that '[w]ith the dissolution of the GNU [Government of National Unity] after the 1999 elections, President Mbeki was in an unassailable position to reshape the contours, institutions and processes of foreign policy.'\textsuperscript{42} Like Mandela, Mbeki has played a leading role in re-shaping South Africa's foreign policy focus and decision-making structures. Nevertheless, as the final section of this chapter argues, a leading role does not equate to an 'imperial' president.

Thabo Mbeki's presidency has seen a decline in the foreign policy principles of human rights and democracy linked to the persona of the president.\textsuperscript{43} Focus has turned to Mbeki's own presidential initiatives, the 'African Renaissance' and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which provide a clear emphasis on Africa. That these initiatives have informed foreign policy decision-making is evident in their integration as fundamental parts of South Africa's foreign policy. The DFA's \textit{Strategic Plan 2003-2005} includes the African Renaissance and NEPAD in the 'tenets ... enunciated as guidelines to instruct our approach to foreign policy',\textsuperscript{44} while references to both the African Renaissance and NEPAD are found in the DFA's 2006 'Definition of South Africa's foreign Policy'.\textsuperscript{45}

The importance Mbeki attributes to Africa has been evident in his position as deputy president and president. A number of documents and statements reflect this focus including his declaration "I am an African"\textsuperscript{46} at the adoption of the Constitution in

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Barber2005} Barber (2005), p. 1088.
\bibitem{Mbeki1996} T. Mbeki (1996) 'Statement of Deputy President T.M. Mbeki, on Behalf of the African National Congress, on the Occasion of the Adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of "The Republic of South
\end{thebibliography}
1996, the release of the document ‘The African Renaissance: A Workable Dream’ in
1997, and his inaugural theme in 1999 which emphasised the idea of an ‘African
Century’. For Mbeki, the vision of an African Renaissance is a means by which to
achieve dignity, respect and pride, to reinterpret African history and build confidence
that Africa “can succeed as well as any other in building a humane and prosperous
society.” Gumede notes that Mbeki’s vision of the African Renaissance (and
subsequently NEPAD), provided a means to ‘stamp his own image on the country’s
highest office’. As Ajulu observes, ‘South Africa’s renaissance discourse, ... has been
mainly associated with the pronouncements of its current president, Thabo Mbeki.’
This emphasis has since been translated into the mission statement of the DFA which
declares, “[w]e are committed to promoting South Africa’s national interests and
values, the African Renaissance and the creation of a better world for all.” In terms of
NEPAD, Mbeki has played a leading role in the initiative’s development and inclusion
into South Africa’s foreign policy focus. Indeed, it was Mbeki who garnered support for
the project, beating a path to the doors of the African leaders of Senegal, Nigeria,
Algeria, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique; while at its launch in October 2001, it
was Mbeki who chaired the steering group that established it.

Mbeki’s predominant leadership style has not only shaped the issues on the foreign
policy agenda, it has shaped foreign policy actions. This has been particularly evident in
the case of South Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe, where Mbeki has been at the centre
of the foreign policy decision to adopt a ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach in the firm belief
that ‘[t]he people of Zimbabwe must decide their own future’. Zimbabwe is one of

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Africa Constitutional Bill 1996” ANC Online
49 T. Mbeki (1998) Statement by the Deputy President Mbeki at the African Renaissance Conference,
accessed 02/08/07
50 W. M. Gumede (2005), Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Cape Town, Zebra Press.
p. 201.
53 Gumede (2005), p. 204.
54 Barber (2005), p. 1089.
the few examples where Mbeki has gravitated towards an imperial presidency. Hermann and Hermann point out that 'when such a leader’s position is known, those with differing points of view generally stop voicing alternative positions out of respect for the leader or fear of political reprisals. Even if others are allowed to continue discussing alternatives, their points of view are no longer relevant to the political outcome.'\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, despite protests from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) regarding Pretoria’s policy position,\textsuperscript{57} Mbeki has maintained a primacy in foreign policy decision-making relating to Zimbabwe.

Moreover, as the crisis in Zimbabwe worsens, Mbeki has steered the foreign policy focus on to more general issues of global imbalance and Africa’s role within the international system. For example, the broader emphasis on Africa beyond the SADC, and particularly Zimbabwe, is reflected in the 2006 \textit{State of the Nation Address},

During 2006 we will continue to engage the African Challenges, focusing on peace and democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan, the strengthening of the African Union and the acceleration of the process of the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programmes.\textsuperscript{58}

In the 2006 Budget Vote, of the eight points highlighted in terms of fulfilling South Africa’s international obligations, only one gave consideration to the immediate region and the strengthening of the SADC and the SACU. The rest of the agenda is given to the AU, NEPAD, conflict resolution in the DRC, Sudan, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the

\textsuperscript{56} Hermann and Hermann (1989), p. 365.
\textsuperscript{58} T. Mbeki (2006) ‘State of the Nation Address’ 3 February
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2006/tm0203.html accessed 09/02/07
Middle East, South-South co-operation, the Doha Development round, democratic reform of the UN and the international financial institutions.\(^{59}\)

In explaining Thabo Mbeki's focus on the wider international context, Olivier notes that Mbeki's 'role perceptions, being revisionist, liberal and universal, led him to deal mostly with big ideas and big issues; international organisations like the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Union, the World Economic Forum and meetings of the G-8 (industrialized nations) have served as favourite platforms for his diplomatic pursuits.'\(^{60}\) As such, more emphasis has been given to South Africa's role in the transformation of the continent's intergovernmental structure, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the subsequent role of the African Union (AU). Indeed, Mbeki faces criticism for giving too much weight to the institutional development and integration at a continental level at the cost of the same focus at the regional level.\(^{61}\) This continental emphasis is also reflected in his role as 'Diplomat-in-Chief'. As Nathan points out, Mbeki has been active in conducting his own shuttle diplomacy through interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, Comoros and the Cote d'Ivoire.\(^{62}\)

In a similar fashion to the personalisation of foreign policy during Mandela's presidency, there has been a blurring in the distinction between Mbeki, the government, and the state. This is particularly evident in Mbeki's presidential pronouncements on HIV/AIDS which, 'provoked groans of disbelief and protest, even from his closest allies'.\(^{63}\) As Alden and le Pere note, '...because South African foreign policy is so closely identified with Mbeki, it becomes tied to perceptions of him. The international outcry surrounding Mbeki's views and policies towards HIV/AIDS has deeply affected international (and domestic) perceptions of his presidency.'\(^{64}\) The international spin and the associated negative image of Mbeki resulted in the international press questioning

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\(^{62}\) Ibid, p. 364


\(^{64}\) Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 69.
his leadership ability and judgement, especially in terms of South Africa’s ability to lead in the Millennium Africa recovery Plan (MAP), subsequently NEPAD.65

In addition to Thabo Mbeki’s influence in shaping foreign policy direction, as president he has played a significant role in reforming the internal structures of governance, buttressing the perception of a ‘foreign policy president’.66 The office of the deputy president, along with the minister without portfolio were incorporated into the Office of the President and managed by a single director-general, Frank Chikane.67 In light of the criticism facing the president regarding the centralisation of power, the 2001 review of the presidency, reiterates that ‘[t]he old-South African Office of the President was not accountable to the majority of the people, whereas the new Government and President are. The old order was militaristic; the new Government is not. Instead, it is participatory and democratic’.68 Nevertheless, the effect of these adjustments saw a reduction in the international relations functions accorded to the position of deputy president. As Chothia and Jacobs point out, ‘[o]f the significant public functions that Mbeki performed as deputy president, only one has gone to Zuma: chairing the South African delegation to the various binational commissions formed with foreign governments.’69 However, over the course of Mbeki’s first presidential term, South Africa’s increased international commitments did see former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, actively involved in seeking a solution to the crisis in the Great Lakes region.70

Mbeki’s presidency has seen a number of initiatives undertaken in order to combat problems of service delivery, policy management and coordination within the government’s bureaucracy. June 1997 saw the Cabinet approve the formation of the Coordination and Implementation Unit (CIU) within the Office of the President, designed

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to "equip government with the strategic planning and management capacity it required".\textsuperscript{71} By June 2000, Mbeki announced the transformation of the CIU into the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Service (PCAS) unit within the presidency,\textsuperscript{72} its function, "to provide the necessary support to the Presidency and the Cabinet with regard to such issues as the co-ordination of the processes of policy formation, programme design and implementation."\textsuperscript{73} Based on a 'cluster' system, the unit is responsible for providing research, analytical support, and acting as a link between Cabinet Committees and the Directors-General clusters.\textsuperscript{74} While this may provide for the co-ordination of policy, Chothia and Jacobs have been critical of this branch, highlighting that it is not accountable to the legislature with the Chief Directors accountable only to Mbeki.\textsuperscript{75}

Although the development of PCAS is aimed at facilitating the decision-making process, the enlargement of the presidency has generated concern regarding the move towards centralising decision-making within the Office of the President.\textsuperscript{76} Despite these concerns, Mbeki has continued to emphasise the need for the "strengthening of the Presidency."\textsuperscript{77} These actions have added to the criticism of Mbeki as an 'imperial president'; however, the primacy of the president needs to be addressed in relation to those factors that have facilitated the central position of South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents. Indeed, despite Mandela’s pronouncement that "the process of deepening democracy, including reconstruction and development, is people-driven and people-


\textsuperscript{74} Clusters within the PCAS include: economic, governance and administration, international relations and trade, justice, crime prevention and security, social sector, planning and special programmes. 'Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services (PCAS).' \textit{About the Presidency: Organisational Units} \url{http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/main.asp?include=about/branches/pcas.htm} accessed 08/02/07

\textsuperscript{75} Chothia and Jacobs (2002), pp. 151-153.


\textsuperscript{77} T. Mbeki (2006) 'Budget Vote Address of the Presidency.' National Assembly, Cape Town. 7th June 2006 \url{http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2006/tm0607.html} accessed 08/10/06
centred", the South African context has been conducive to high-level involvement from the executive, particularly in foreign policy.

A Predominant President: The Enabling Framework

In terms of conducting a critical analysis of the president’s role in foreign policy, it is insufficient simply to identify the state’s leadership as occupying a position at the apex of the foreign policy making process. Although, as highlighted above, there is evidence supporting a predominant president in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy process, there has been little analysis regarding the framework that has enabled the development of this position. As this section indicates, the primacy of the president has been facilitated by a number of variables: a tradition of leadership predominance both within the apartheid regime and the ANC as a liberation movement, seismic changes in both the domestic and international milieu, the president’s prior experience in foreign affairs, and the constitutional weight accorded to the position of president.

Historically, the prime minister (and from 1984 the president) undertook a prevalent role in South Africa’s foreign affairs. Institutionally, South Africa’s Department for External Affairs (created in 1927) came under the direct control of General J. B. M. Hertzog who assumed the role as first Minister of External Affairs while simultaneously occupying the position of Prime Minister. The motivation behind his decision to occupy two such demanding positions was that he personally hoped to ensure that ‘South Africa would project a strong image abroad.’ Not only was it designed to add political weight to the position but, as Muller observes, it was a decision that ‘set a pattern in terms of which his successors as Prime Minister, General Smuts and Dr DF Malan, would maintain personal control over foreign policy until 1954, when Dr Malan retired as Prime Minister.’ Jan Christian Smuts is frequently cited for his role as an international statesman, conducting foreign policy from his office, playing a significant role in the First World War and the formation of the League of Nations, along with

drafting the preamble to the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, as Deon Geldenhuys indicates when it came to public participation South Africa’s early Prime Ministers “sharply discouraged any inclination to discuss the Union’s relationship with other lands.”\textsuperscript{82}

As South Africa faced growing isolation on the world stage, a result of the regime’s domestic policies and growing paranoia within government, any opportunity for broad-based involvement in foreign policy decreased. Following mounting international pressure, H. F. Verwoerd took the unilateral decision to end South Africa’s membership of the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{83} Ned Munger aptly depicts the foreign policy decision-making structure of this period when he notes, “[i]f one were to list the most important people making foreign policy (in South Africa), the names might run: 1. Dr Verwoerd. 2. Dr Verwoerd. 3. Dr. Verwoerd. 4. Foreign Minister Muller. 5. The Cabinet and 6. Secretary G.P. Jooste, Brand Fourie, Donald Sole and one or two other professionals.”\textsuperscript{84}

The consolidation of the central position of president in the foreign policy process was particularly apparent under the leadership of P. W. Botha in his use of the State Security Council (SSC), initially established under Vorster. Designed as a cabinet committee, it fell under the direction of the president and included ‘the ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and of Law and Order as standing members, together with five top officials.’\textsuperscript{85} As Geldenhuys points out, not only did it serve to direct policy formulation away from the full cabinet, parliament and civil society, it favoured Botha’s own style of decision-making, which ‘bore a distinct military imprint.’\textsuperscript{86}

The historic tradition within the ANC as a liberation movement, with its emphasis on hierarchy and party discipline, underpins the current organisational culture within the party. Indeed, one of the key concerns raised in the analysis has been the uneasy transformation of the ANC from a liberation movement to a political party. As Ottaway

\textsuperscript{82} Geldenhuys (1984), p. 10.
\textsuperscript{85} Geldenhuys (1994), p. 278.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
notes, the features of the ANC as a liberation movement were ‘very different from those that encourage democracy’, with party members bringing with them the organisational culture and expectations necessary, even vital, within a liberation movement. Moreover, as Zuem indicates, ‘[m]any of the ANC’s rank and file, accustomed to the more participatory democratic nature of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and civic structures, complained about the lack of consultation within the ANC.’

Secrecy, hierarchy and rigid discipline were essential components in the survival of the organisation as an underground movement, as was faith in the ANC’s leadership. William Gumede highlights that the centralisation of power, emphasis on party discipline, the pre-ordained election of leaders and the closing down of democratic space, are attributes from the legacy of the ANC in exile, aspects which have subsequently ‘become the mantra of the ANC in government’. This has had a direct impact on the policy decision-making process and has been particularly evident in the case of economic policy. In 1996 decisions regarding the transformation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy were undertaken by a small group of ‘experts’ without drawing on wider consultation within the ANC or government structures. It was what Gumede calls ‘typical Mbeki policy-making style: small groups of like-minded experts sweat[ing] it out in seclusion, shielded from elected representatives and institutions.’

Tom Lodge notes that ‘democratic centralism’ has taken hold within the ANC. This in essence ‘binds lower structures to obey decisions made by higher structures’, despite the assertion that decisions take place in an environment of consultation and open debate. Although there was pressure from within the party on the issue of HIV/AIDS,
the legacy of the liberation movement was referred back to in explaining the continued support of the ANC’s leadership.

Thus, many NEC [National Executive Committee] members could vote against their consciences on the government’s AIDS policy, for example, because they abide by the principle of democratic centralism. [Jabu] Moleketi insists this is what held the ANC together when it was a clandestine organisation in exile. “Once a decision was taken, whether there was opposition to it or not, everybody needed to support it; it was vital to the ANC’s cohesion.”

The ANC’s own parliamentary caucus established a code of conduct (1994) that maintained that its parliamentary structures ‘should be subject to the authority of the organisation’s highest decision-making bodies, and that elected ANC members should not use parliamentary procedures to ‘undermine party policy’.’ Moreover, military and ‘struggle’ terminology continues to find its way into the day-to-day running of the organisation, for example, the terms ‘deployment’ and ‘re-deployment’ are used in describing the employment (and subsequent movement) of ANC cadres in key governmental or parastatetel positions.

As the ANC consolidates its position as the dominant party within South Africa, questions concerning the level of democratic participation within the ANC, and its subsequent impact on the policy process, have been raised. In November 2004 Archbishop Desmond Tutu questioned the freedom of expression within the ANC and the level at which the government was really engaging the masses, noting “[w]e should not too quickly want to pull rank and to demand an uncritical, sycophantic, obsequious conformity.” Mbeki’s response was to point out that Tutu was not a member of the ANC, and as such was in no position to judge whether members were ‘toeing’ the party line, instead he highlighted that the ANC ‘insisted on the need for transparent and accountable government, and worked consistently to encourage and enable two-way

communication between government and the people'. Moreover, in rebutting those
who question the democratic character of South Africa’s policy machinery, the
government is quick to point out that they are the official, democratically elected,
representatives of the country.

While historic traditions create the context for presidential predominance, dramatic
changes within the domestic and international environment gave rise to circumstances
enhancing the position of South Africa’s newly elected leaders. As Greenstein points
out, ‘an individual personality has more scope for impact on events in less stable
regimes, and/or in more fluid circumstances than normal.’ South Africa’s own
dramatic internal changes coupled with the seismic changes in the post-Cold War
international order provided the ‘fluid circumstances’ allowing for the scope accorded
to individual personalities, particularly in the case of Mandela and ‘Madiba magic’.
These dramatic changes within the internal and external environments necessitated the
transformation of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Although there were clandestine
discussions between the ANC and the apartheid regime during the 1980s, the pace at
which South Africa’s democratic transformation occurred caught the liberation
movements by surprise. There was no shadow government in-waiting to take over the
reins of governance, and until the early 1990s, the ANC had placed little emphasis on
policy formulation. As Mandela remarked, “[w]e were ... taken from the bush, or
from the underground or from prison, to come and take charge. We were suddenly into
this immense responsibility of running a highly developed country.”

The move into government required an urgent consideration of policy direction along
with the reform of the ‘new’ South Africa’s governmental structures. This had a direct
impact on government departments across the board including the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), whose composition included a predominantly white Afrikaans

99 Ibid. ‘Tutu reads SA the riot act’ (23/11/04) Mail and Guardian online.
101 A. Sparks (1995) Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside story of South Africa’s Negotiated
Revolution. London, Heinemann, pp. 70-86.
102 ANC Policy Documents http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/ accessed 06/02/07
103 Quoted in Barber (2005), p. 1080.
speaking male demographic, and a mere 30 overseas diplomatic missions. As the ensuing chapter highlights, the circumstances within the DFA were such that the limited capability of the department created a void in terms of foreign affairs. This, in turn, provided the scope for an active president in foreign affairs in an effort to meet burgeoning international requests and obligations. Indeed, presidential involvement only served to exacerbate the problem for Pretoria in heightening expectations of their capabilities.

Mbeki may not have the iconic status accorded Mandela, however, his enthusiasm and knowledge regarding international relations saw him gravitating towards a central role in the foreign policy process. As Olivier points out, '[a]n outstanding characteristic of South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki’s leadership is his predilection for matters foreign over matters domestic.' As Deputy President, Mbeki was actively involved in South Africa’s foreign relations undertaking over twenty foreign visits between January 1997 and July 1998. Moreover, Mbeki occupied a key role (along with Vice president Al Gore) in reducing tensions between South Africa and the US on the sale of arms to Syria. Mbeki’s more sustained level of foreign policy interest has links to his former roles within the ANC. Although, as commander-in-chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Mandela had conducted a tour of Africa during the 1960s, Mbeki’s prolonged engagement with the international environment saw him occupy positions as representative of the ANC in, ‘Zambia (1971-73, 1974,1976), Botswana (1973-74), Swaziland (1975-76), and Nigeria (1976-78).’ Furthermore, from 1989-1993 Mbeki assumed the role as head of the ANC’s Department for International Affairs (DIA) in which his primary functions included ‘orchestrating the international anti-apartheid

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104 Barber (2005), p. 1082. Also see Alden and le Pere (2003), pp. 14-19. on ‘Transforming the instruments of foreign policy’
106 Olivier (2003), p. 815
campaigns, raising the ANC’s diplomatic profile and acting as the principal point of contact for foreign governments and international organisation'.

In addition to the historical tradition of predominant leadership, changes within the domestic and international environment, and the individual’s pre-occupation with foreign affairs; South Africa’s Constitution (1996) serves to reinforce the precedence accorded South Africa’s president in international relations. As Schraeder notes, ‘[t]he Constitution of 1996 that formalized South Africa’s entry into the community of democratic nations clearly stipulates the overriding importance of the president in the formulation of South Africa’s foreign policy.’ Although this is not unique to South Africa, the Constitution serves to codify the central role of the executive. In terms of powers and functions, the Constitution sets out that the President receives and recognises ‘foreign diplomatic and consular representatives’ in addition to ‘appoint[ing] ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives.’

Moreover, the President is responsible for appointing, ‘the Deputy President and Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may dismiss them’, as well as appointing the Deputy Ministers. In addition, the Constitution stipulates that the President is responsible for ‘developing and implementing national policy’ and ‘co-ordinating the functions of state departments and administrations…’.

Although the president’s primacy may be supported by the Constitution, there is also an underlying expectation that the president should assume a leading role in directing foreign policy. In discussing the challenges facing Mbeki as he assumed the position of president in 1999, Evans placed the impetus on Mbeki to ‘address [the] problem of

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113 Ibid.


policy drift or incoherence... Similar expectations exist for Mbeki’s successor. Even though there is a general consensus that the future president will have to overcome the issue of centralisation, Butler continues to emphasise the leadership role of the future president in providing direction on aspects of ‘moral authority’, building support for economic policies, defusing racial tensions and to ‘find ways to mobilise the efforts and knowledge of the wider society, conducting an orchestra rather than trying to play its instruments by remote control.’

Both Mandela and Mbeki have occupied a central, even pivotal, role in the foreign policy process in terms of their input on foreign policy principles and actions, a position facilitated by the context surrounding the presidency. However, the idea of an ‘imperial’ president in the foreign policy process is overstated. This is a description suited for states with an autocratic leadership and an autocratic political culture, indicating a predominant leader who is ‘insensitive’ to the opinions of others and ‘whose orientations appear to predispose them to be relatively insensitive to information that does not conform to what they want to do.’ Hermann and Hermann’s analysis indicates that an ‘insensitive’ predominant leader represents a ‘self-contained decision unit.’ Along with Gaddafi (Libya) and Castro (Cuba), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) represents this form of ‘imperial’ president. Mugabe is in command of foreign policy direction and implementation, as evident in his highly personalised attacks on former United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Tony Blair, his unilateral decisions in seeking alliances with ‘renegade’ states like Iran, and his move towards developing closer ties with China.

As indicated above, ambiguity concerning Mandela’s position in the foreign policy process already exists within the foreign policy analysis, while Chapter 1 highlights that

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120 Ibid, p. 366.
the criticism regarding Mbeki’s tenure as president covers a relatively narrow time frame. The subsequent chapters reveal that in addition to the president, there have been a number of influences in decision-making throughout the development of South Africa’s foreign policy. Indeed, as the ‘new’ South Africa has developed, so too has the capability of the various government departments in fulfilling their objectives. As Mbeki embarked on his second term as president, there have been number of examples that indicate his sensitivity towards incoming information and the opinions of others, including his immediate circle of trusted advisers, technical experts from within civil society, Big Business, and external actors. While Mbeki may have commenced his role as a president gravitating towards the ‘imperial’ side of the leadership spectrum, he has not assumed a position as an ‘imperial’ president.

Scope for participation: Mbeki the Virtuoso Soloist or Conductor

Schlesinger warns that a middle ground needs to be found between the President as ‘czar’ and the President as a ‘puppet’. Despite efforts to facilitate active participation in foreign policy decision-making following South Africa’s first democratic elections, Mandela occupied centre stage in the foreign policy process. Indeed, his foreign policy performance could be compared to that of a virtuoso soloist, which in effect saw foreign policy created ad libitum, from the podium, rather than through sustained engagement with domestic foreign policy interests. As deputy president, Mbeki indicated that “government which is empowered at all levels and which is able to ensure the active participation of citizens in decision-making is critical.” However, criticism has linked Thabo Mbeki to the autocratic decision-making approach of an ‘imperial’ president. Indeed, he has been portrayed as ‘a man who is prepared to sacrifice his comrades to realise his ambitions... who is ultra-sensitive, unable to accommodate others and who is impatient with differing opinions... and unable to accept he could be mistaken, and conveniently surrounds himself with sycophants.’

In 2006 the ANC’s alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), thrust the questions surrounding Mbeki’s predominant role into the media spotlight in associating the concept of ‘dictatorship’ with the president. Although this is a hyperbole, it does indicate the depth of SACP and COSATU disillusionment with Mbeki. The SACP warned that Mbeki’s presidency dominates both the state and government, while COSATU voiced its own concern that the ‘ANC leadership “was drifting towards dictatorship”’. Although it may be a reflection of the ANC’s organisational culture (as noted above), Mbeki’s defence has come from within the party. ANC secretary general, Kgalema Motlanthe pointed out that, “[s]tatements about tendencies towards dictatorship and the centralisation of powers within the ANC and government presidencies … are not borne out by reality.” In addition, the ANC’s parliamentary caucus supported Mbeki stating that “its “first-hand experience” on the practical role and function of the presidency and the president was that of “consistent provision of effective leadership” to the country and government “in general”.” Shortly after, COSATU admitted that the media had ‘sensationalise[d] the serious issues we were raising by falsely suggesting that the statement was some kind of attack on President Mbeki as a person.’ Moreover they went on to highlight that “[a]t no stage has the ANC secretary general called on the alliance to ‘refrain from making baseless statements [as reported in the media] … If anything, the ANC NEC statement and the ANC secretary general reaffirmed the right of Cosatu and the SACP to think and hold independent views.”

The exchange between the alliance partners, carried out on the pages of the *Mail and Guardian*, highlights the deep-seated suspicion regarding the role of South Africa’s president as a virtuoso soloist in the wider policy making process. Richard Calland’s (2006) description of Mbeki continues to reflect the perspectives offered by Chothia and Jacobs in 2002, when he notes that as president, Mbeki is perhaps too ‘hands-on’ and too ‘engaged’. In addition, Nicola de Jager notes that, ‘he [Mbeki] has reduced the role of all but a few within the government apparatus to managers, marketers and implementers of policy handed down from the highest echelons of government. And those that maintain policy-making powers are accountable to the President alone.’

Despite the centrality of the president in the foreign policy machinery, depicting Mbeki as an ‘insensitive predominant’ or ‘imperial’ president, obscures the complex role and influence that a number of other actors have played in the foreign policy decision-making process. Mbeki does not represent a self-contained decision unit. As the discussion below notes, while he may remain in a predominant position, Mbeki has shown a ‘sensitivity’ to external influence which counter-acts the notion of his position as an ‘imperial’ president.

Venter is perhaps more accurate in his description of an elite driven foreign policy in which there is a strong presidential presence but one that includes ‘an inner-loop of senior ministers’. In this respect, Mbeki’s relationship with the Office of the President, consultants and key advisers becomes noteworthy. While pointing out the primacy of Mbeki, Calland highlights a number of individuals (and institutions) that play a role in advising the president including, Mojanku Gumbi, Joel Netshitenzhe, special advisers to the president Titus Mafolo and Cunningham Ngcukana, Wiseman Nkuhlu, deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka along with Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel, the former Minister of Trade and Industry Alec Erwin, Essop Pahad and Rev Chikane in the presidency. Moreover, Landsberg has pointed out the role of cabinet lekgotlas, or workshops, in the foreign policy process. He notes that cabinet lekgotlas in combination with cabinet meetings, have become ‘the most important theatres for decision making and for crafting coordinating strategies. These policy-making processes and platforms involve the presidency, ministers and deputy ministers

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134 Calland (2006), pp. 8-9; 33 & 61
and directors-general.'135 Even on those issues where it has been noted that Mbeki adopted a very personal approach, there is evidence that he takes into consideration the advice of close and trusted advisers. For example, during the HIV/AIDS debacle it was through pressure from Joel Netshitenzhe and Bheki Khumalo, that he was persuaded to ‘disengage from the debate.’136

These interactions depict a willingness to engage with other actors in the decision-making process. Indeed, it represents a presidential foreign policy, or a foreign policy led by the executive.137 When it comes to international relations, Hill notes that it is often expected that there will be a high level of involvement from the head of government along with the foreign minister as the area specialist, and the economic minister who is often involved in direct international trade and finance negotiations.138

Insofar as foreign policy, therefore, seeks to integrate the various strands of external relations, it will be conducted by what can be termed the ‘foreign policy executive’, consisting in the first instance of the head of government and the foreign minister, but often widened according to circumstances to include defence, finance, economics and trade ministers.139

In the South African context the president as an individual occupies a central position in the foreign policy machinery; however, the executive (the office of the president and deputy president, the cabinet and the PCAS) along with other key advisers have adopted an increasingly active role in the foreign policy process. For instance, South Africa’s burgeoning international interactions and commitments have seen members of the executive selected as ‘presidential agents’,140 in representing South Africa abroad. For example the Rev Frank Chikane accompanied Thabo Mbeki and the Minister of Foreign

137 Barrett uses the concept in his examination of the role of the US presidency in indicating ‘the significant foreign policy bureaucracy that attends to the President at the White House.’ Barrett (1997), p. 84.
139 Ibid.
140 For a discussion on the role of the presidential agent along with advantages and disadvantages of this position see Plischke (1979), pp. 176-177.
Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, to the 57th UN General Assembly (2002),\textsuperscript{141} while in 2005 he was appointed as the contact person for South Africa’s own submission process to the APRM.\textsuperscript{142} Essop Pahad ‘addressed the Wilton Park Conference in London on the Challenges for Governance in Africa [1999], attended the Berlin [2000] meeting on Progressive Government in the 21st Century\textsuperscript{143} and led the South Africa delegation to Bolivia (2006),\textsuperscript{144} while it was rumoured that Mbeki had selected Ronnie Kasrils for a mission to Zimbabwe in 2006.\textsuperscript{145}

Mbeki’s approach to leadership in foreign policy decision-making represents a complex mix between the more formalistic ‘pyramid’ approach to advice, which sees the president located at the apex of the decision making structure with a limited number of gate-keepers transmitting the advice of others, and the ‘hub in the wheel’ approach, with a number of different advisers having direct access to the person at the centre of government, the President.\textsuperscript{146} While there is still a hierarchical structure in the decision-making process (with the president at the centre of the concentric circles), South Africa’s burgeoning international relations have seen an increase in the number and diversity of actors necessary in defining and implementing South Africa’s foreign policy. It has seen the president drawing directly on a number of advisers from across government departments, civil society, and business. In other words, Mbeki has assumed a position similar to an orchestral conductor, although he is still at the centre of the foreign policy process, he has assumed the role of quiet coordination, negotiation and bargaining as opposed to the position of virtuoso soloist.

Unlike the concept of an ‘imperial’ president, a presidential foreign policy and a multistakeholder foreign policy are not diametrically opposed. Although the concept of a multistakeholder foreign policy implies the existence of a complex network of

\textsuperscript{141} President Mbeki to lead SA Delegation to the 57th UN GA New York accessed 04/10/06 http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02091009461002.htm
\textsuperscript{143} Chikane (2001), p. 45.
\textsuperscript{146} Barrett (1997), p. 67.
participants and their interactions within the decision-making process, it does not
preclude a leadership role for one or more of the participants. There are strategic
advantages to be had from the president leading foreign policy from the front. In the
first instance it has a particular significance in light of the worldwide increase in the use
of summits, and it allows for quick policy decisions where time is of the essence. There
are, however, a number of disadvantages. In South Africa’s case the strategic ability to
mobilise support for a foreign policy position has been tempered by examples of
foreign policy failings directly linked to limited consultation and engagement, including
the decision to intervene in Lesotho (1998), which excluded the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Parliament.\(^{147}\)

Just as a framework existed enabling the development of a predominant president,
longitudinal analysis reveals developments that facilitate participation in the decision-
making process. As Mbeki’s presidency reaches the midway point in his second term,
these factors have become central in shaping a multistakeholder foreign policy. As
Hermann and Hermann point out, the decision making ‘unit may change with the issue
under consideration or with the evolution of the regime.’\(^{148}\) As the subsequent chapters
indicate, there are a range of actors within the concentric circles of the policy decision-
making structure, their positions changing in relation to interests and the issues under
discussion.

The dynamics of foreign policy decision-making have seen a number of changes
following the development of the state’s own internal capability. While the limited
capability of the DFA during Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999) created the scope for a
predominant president, South Africa’s bureaucracy has undergone significant
transformation. Chapter 3 highlights these developments, pointing to the growing role
of the DFA and an ‘intergovernmentalised’ foreign policy process, particularly in
addressing South Africa’s foreign policy interests in economic diplomacy and
peacekeeping. The expansion of South Africa’s international interests, obligations and
participation on the international circuit has seen the increased involvement of the
reformed foreign policy bureaucracy. Furthermore, the Minister and Deputy Ministers

\(^{147}\) T. Mathoma (1999) ‘South Africa and Lesotho – Sovereign Independence or a Tenth Province?’ South
of foreign affairs have undertaken active roles in representing South Africa abroad. Following French President Jacques Chirac’s dismissal of Mbeki’s mediation efforts in the Cote d’Ivoire, Mbeki withdrew from the role of mediator at ‘his own request’ and by the start of 2007 it was South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, representing South Africa at the International Working Group (IWG) on the Cote d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{149}

The changing domestic and international context has necessitated the involvement of actors outside those traditionally associated with foreign policy. As le Pere and van Nieuwkerk point out, Mbeki’s incumbency has seen the development of a number of structures representing stakeholders in the foreign policy process including, ‘the Consultative Groups, which represent non-state sectoral interests (trade unions, black business, big business, agriculture, youth, academia, and a national forum of religious leaders); and Advisory Groups, such as the President’s International Investment Advisory Council and International Advisory Council on the Information Society and Development.\textsuperscript{150} Paradoxically while pointing out the creation of these structures, le Pere and van Nieuwkerk highlight the perception of the diminished influence of civil society under Mbeki’s tenure. However, as Chapter 4 points out, this is a generalisation based on the perception of civil society (including NGOs) and business as homogeneous entities. Within each group there are a number of different interests, technical expertise and ideological stand points, which has an impact on their role in the changing dynamics of foreign policy decision-making. For instance, while it is true that some domestic actors have been marginalized, others have been drawn into the centre of the decision-making structure. An example is the Big Business Working Group (BBWG), which consults regularly with the presidency on issues of investor perception and government performance.\textsuperscript{151} Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk go on to note that although direct participation from civil society is excluded, ‘the Presidency uses the various consultative and advisory groups in a structured dialogue.’\textsuperscript{152} The concept of


\textsuperscript{150} Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004), p. 130.


\textsuperscript{152} Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004), p. 131
direct participation, however, represents the ideal. Although there have been experiments in direct participation in some of the more developed democracies, following developments in information and communication technology, direct participation has proved elusive.\textsuperscript{153}

Concerns regarding domestic politics are increasingly occupying Mbeki's focus. As the ANC's 2007 National Executive Committee (NEC) elections approach there has been growing tension within the organisation, particularly on questions regarding Mbeki's stance on assuming a third term as leader of the ANC, participants in the leadership contest, and questions regarding the 'two centres of power'.\textsuperscript{154} As Malala points out, '[t]he truth is that there is a major war going on between ANC leaders. The national executive committee of the ANC is not a congregation of colleagues. It is now a meeting of bitter enemies.'\textsuperscript{155} In addition, Mbeki's statements reflect a focus on issues of corruption within the ANC.\textsuperscript{156} This follows a number of scandals involving the highest echelons of ANC power, including former ANC Chief Whip Tony Yengeni and his successor Mbulelo Goniwe, former Deputy President Jacob Zuma and his successor, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, 2007 has seen growing pressure from within South Africa, and the international community, for Mbeki to adopt a more proactive stance in the government's approach towards crime. Indeed, analysts have been quick to highlight the link between his position of denial regarding HIV/AIDS and his denial on the current level of crime.\textsuperscript{158}

It is not only the changing domestic context that has provided the latitude for participation in the making of South Africa’s foreign policy. Chapter 5 highlights that the growing linkage between domestic and international affairs has seen the influence of a number of external actors, state and non-state, in the foreign policy process. The emphasis on multilateralism has itself necessitated interaction with numerous networks and actors. Mbeki has displayed an understanding of, and concern for, the centralisation of power in international relations. Moreover, he has been at the forefront of international calls to establish a stronger UN in order to avoid the unilateral actions of powerful states, particularly the US. In the world of multilateral summits he courts leaders from both the developed and developing world in order to achieve South Africa’s foreign policy objectives in relation to the reform of international institutions, trade and development.

Changes within the external environment have themselves constrained the position South Africa’s president has been able to pursue in foreign policy. As Hocking and Smith point out, a number of networks and systems have developed alongside the traditional state actors in foreign affairs. The volume of international interactions, and the technical nature of many of the negotiations, leads to the inclusion of advisers and ‘experts’ in a particular field. For instance, in the case of South Africa’s trade negotiations, although both Mandela and Mbeki have been vocal on the need to establish greater equality between the developed and developing world, it is often officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the DFA who play a leading role South Africa’s international negotiations. For example, it was Trade Minister Alec Erwin who played a central role at the 1999 World Trade Organisation (WTO) Summit in Seattle; Mandisi Mpahlwa, Minister for Trade and Industry, who led South Africa’s delegation to the 2006 talks at the WTO; while foreign minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was responsible for the 2006 talks with the European Union on the Joint Co-operation Council (JCC) aimed at ensuring ‘increased market and trade

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160 For a details on the use of multilateral institutions in Mbeki’s reformist position see Taylor (2001a), pp. 63-67.
access with a view to faster and shared economic growth in South Africa." South Africa’s position within the international arena has its own influence on foreign policy decisions. Chapter 5 notes that pressure and expectations from other African countries have had an impact on the president’s foreign policy actions and decisions. Indeed Mbeki has been criticised for preferring ‘to settle for week compromises and procrastinate rather than challenge or overrule aberrant fellow African leaders.’

Conclusion

In their introduction to *Thabo Mbeki’s World*, Jacobs and Calland point out that ‘[i]n the absence of hard facts, fables grow. Popular myth, propagated by the local and international media, suggest that Mbeki’s power was all-pervasive; that he had the ability to ruthlessly sideline internal opponents and challenges to his leadership; that his leadership was unpredictable; and that his sensitivity to criticism bordered on paranoia.’ The idea of Mbeki’s ‘imperial’ presidency gathered support in foreign policy analysis. As this chapter points out, there are a number of presidential initiatives, actions and decisions highlighting the centrality of South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents in the foreign policy process. This has been facilitated by an enabling framework that has traditionally seen strong leadership and nominal public participation in foreign policy decision-making.

The primacy of South Africa’s president in foreign policy is, however, not unique. History is replete with examples of presidential predominance including the US, one of the world’s foremost democracies, where the president has occupied a central role in the foreign policy machinery. As South Africa moves beyond its first decade of democracy, it has undergone significant developments in terms of state capability. As Mbeki himself commented, ‘I trust that those who believe they have discovered what they describe as ‘an imperial presidency’ will take some time to study both what we are doing and the very active international discussion about precisely the same matters we

164 Olivier (2003), p. 816.
166 Barrett (1997), pp. 54-84.
are addressing.\textsuperscript{167} Although Mbeki's first presidential term was characterised by the centralisation of power within the executive, as the subsequent chapters indicate, a reformed foreign policy bureaucracy is carving out a pivotal role in the foreign policy structure, particularly in light of South Africa's growing foreign policy agenda and international commitments. Moreover, there have been a number of non-state actors drawn into key positions within the 'black box' of foreign policy decision-making. Certainly as Mbeki's presidency has progressed, the position of president has not developed into the closed policy decision unit of an 'imperial' president. Rather, Mbeki's incumbency has seen the development of a presidential foreign policy. In other words, although the president continues to occupy a predominant position in the foreign policy process, he is not 'insensitive' to other foreign policy inputs.

The president thus remains at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy, however, there are a number of stakeholders within the 'concentric circles' of foreign policy decision-making that play a role in shaping foreign policy. In considering the role of the US president, Richard Neustadt remarks '[u]nderneath our image of Presidents-in-boots, astride decisions, are the half-observed realities of Presidents-in-sneakers, stirrups in hand, trying to induce particular department heads, or Congressmen or Senators, to climb aboard.\textsuperscript{168} Although Mbeki has yet to tie his laces, improvements within the foreign policy bureaucracy, growing international connectivity (with its multiple actors and interests), along with burgeoning international agreements and negotiations on a range of subjects, has given rise to the participation by a number of stakeholders in the making of South Africa's foreign policy.


Chapter 3

First Among Equals? The DFA and Foreign Policy Making

Introduction:

There have been a number of studies highlighting the changing composition of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (M. Muller 1997, 1998; G. Mills 1997b, 2000; C. Alden and G. le Pere 2003). There has however, been little critical analysis of the developing role of the Department and the impact of these changes on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. In defining a position in the making of foreign policy, the DFA has faced a number of challenges from within its structure. This chapter highlights the initial, and necessary pre-occupation with internal reforms, including the demanding task of incorporating a number of different groups, with different levels of experience, training, and perceptions of what South Africa's international role should be. This pre-occupation with internal reforms created an insular focus within the Department, placing constraints on the adoption of a more central role in the foreign policy process. While the DFA may have played a marginal role at the outset of post-apartheid foreign policy, internal reforms have been critical in defining its current and future participation. Although Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo and Director General (DG) ‘Rusty’ Evans were criticised for the slow pace of departmental reforms, the successive leadership including the Minister, Deputy Ministers, and Directors-General, have played a part in shaping the position of the Department in the foreign policy process.

As this analysis highlights, it has not only been internal factors that have had an impact on the prominence of the DFA within the concentric circles of foreign policy. In carving out a position near the centre of the decision-making structure, the DFA contends with a plurality of foreign policy stakeholders, including the greater involvement of other government departments in the ‘black box’ of foreign policy
decision-making. This ‘intergovernmentalized’ foreign policy has had a direct effect on the dynamics of post-apartheid foreign policy. As this chapter concludes, in order to develop and maintain a significant position in foreign policy decision-making, the DFA has prioritised the development of its role as a centre for the co-ordination and facilitation of foreign affairs while actively seeking to engage in the growing networks of a multistakeholder foreign policy.

Democratic Transition and Capacity Building: Reconstructing the Department of Foreign Affairs

With the transition to democracy secured in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) of the early 1990s, attention turned to the restructuring of governmental departments and the related tasks of integration, rationalisation and restructuring. Tracing the development of the DFA during Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999) highlights a department that frequently found itself on the fringes of foreign policy design and implementation. Indeed, the Department faced criticism for the ‘lack’ of foreign policy emanating from within its structure, a point emphasised by the Mail and Guardian in its depiction of the DFA as the “Department of Floundering Affairs”. This was a period where the internal challenges facing the DFA acted as constraints on participation in the foreign policy process. In his analysis, Anthoni van Nieuwkerk notes that the department was beset with ‘bureaucratic struggles and personality clashes’. Indeed, although South Africa’s international relations were expanding exponentially post-1994, the Department’s position in the making of foreign policy remained inchoate.

The DFA was under pressure to enact considerable internal reforms, reforms that specifically targeted the demographic composition of the Department. This proved a demanding task from the outset, accommodating and integrating staff with varying skills and perceptions of South Africa’s international role, from six different ‘Foreign Affairs Sections’. The figures translated into over 1,900 staff from the DFA, 139 ‘overseas trained officials’ including member of the ANC, and approximately 400 staff members from the former TVBC states (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei). Staff from the former TVBC states were among the least experienced in foreign affairs. The ‘independent’ homelands, created under the apartheid regime, were recognised solely by Pretoria and each other. While training was offered to these ‘diplomats’ by South Africa’s own diplomatic training centre, they receive limited exposure to the international arena as a result of their status. However, their employment, along with the other members of staff within the new DFA, was protected. Even the inept could not be removed from their position due to the protection afforded by the ‘sunset clause’, negotiated as part of the constitutional settlement. The problems of integration and rationalisation were further compounded by procedural confusion, particularly regarding the integration of staff from the ANC’s Department of International Affairs (DIA). Those within the DIA were advised not to apply individually for posts in the DFA as they were to be treated as a collective. This was however, ‘contrary to the PSC’s [Public Service Commission] intention,’ and as the former DG Rusty Evans remarked ‘the DFA was also not aware of it.’ Moreover, a moratorium was placed on appointments with the PSC providing procedures for future employment.

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10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, p. 70.
For the DFA the period 1994-1999 was characterised by an emphasis on getting “the numbers” right. The policy of affirmative action added to an atmosphere of tension and suspicion with fears of job losses and employment based on political lines. It also served to raise questions regarding the shortfall in skills and knowledge created by the attempt to rectify the race disparity within the Department.  

Alden and le Pere note that by 2000 the composition of career diplomats within the Department remained skewed at 40% black and 60% white, despite the diplomatic training of approximately 300 potential candidates sent abroad in 1993 to countries as diverse as Egypt, India, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). By 2005 the legitimacy of the Department, as representative of the ‘new’ South Africa, had progressed with African employees constituting 59%, Coloured 5%, Indians 5%, and White 31%.  

In terms of representation, emphasis has been given to South Africa’s distribution of diplomatic missions abroad. As the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA) noted, the DFA has spent a ‘disproportionate amount of its resources on representation in the advanced west...‘, despite a foreign policy focus on Africa. This shortfall is acknowledged as an area for development in the Department’s Strategic Plan 2005-2008, where the need to strengthen representation in Africa is being met with new missions scheduled or recently opened. Added to this is the recognition that South Africa’s diplomatic personnel lack key skills that would enhance relations, and the Department’s effectiveness in terms of conflict resolution in Africa. To this end there has been an emphasis on teaching French at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), intended to help relations with Francophone Africa, the AU and the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). While there

have been developments within the FSI, and its position has been consolidated within
the DFA, there is a feeling among staff that many of the more practical aspects are still
'learnt on the job'. The FSI is itself relatively new, and there is a shortage of
experienced staff to pass on the practical knowledge gained in the field, issues that will
be resolved with the passage of time.

Despite the emphasis on statistics and quotas, the challenges relating to integration and
reconstruction were not only restricted to the racial composition of the staff and the
distribution of missions. It also included the reconciliation of skills and perceptions
brought into the new department, particularly in the value accorded to bilateral and
multilateral relations. For instance, following South Africa’s withdrawal from the
Commonwealth (1961) and suspension from the UN (1974), the apartheid regime’s
international affairs were conducted primarily through bilateral relations. Although
the apartheid government may have overstated its successes, South Africa’s bilateral
diplomacy cultivated support from the West (particularly the US and Great Britain) and
saw limited success in establishing bilateral relations in Africa, particularly through
Vorster’s ‘outward movement’. In contrast, the international approach adopted by the
ANC and the work done in building support through anti-apartheid movements, gave
those working in exile exposure to multilateral forums.

With the banning of the ANC in 1960, the external mission became the focal point of
the organisation; international diplomacy became the pursuit of the armed struggle by
other means. It led to the development of the ANC’s Department of International
Affairs (DIA), established in 1969 at the Morogoro Conference (Tanzania), to ‘improve
the efficiency of the international struggle against apartheid’. The ANC was
particularly active in the UN, using its ‘observer’ status in lobbying the Security

20 Ibid. 
Council to keep the issue of apartheid on the international agenda. Engaging in multilateral forums such as the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) meeting in Khartoum (1969), provided the opportunity to form an alliance with neighbouring liberation movements in Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Angola (MPLA), which paid dividends in support for the ANC as the primary liberation movement in South Africa among the other Front line States, and the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) training camps within their territories.

South Africa’s first democratic term (1994-1999) saw the Department’s focus predominantly on internal reforms, with less emphasis given to its position in foreign policy decision-making. As Mbeki assumed the position of president (1999), there were still a number of shortcomings evident in the ministry of foreign affairs. Certainly Schraeder questioned whether diplomacy was a necessary prerequisite for becoming a diplomat. This followed a number of dismissive remarks concerning other African contenders for a position on a reformed UN security council, despite South Africa’s foreign policy sensitivity towards Africa. Indeed, at the start of Mbeki’s incumbency the DFA was in a position of playing catch-up in developing its own foreign policy guidelines and principles following the focus on internal reforms and a number of changes in the Department’s leadership.

The Leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The interaction between the individuals occupying key positions within the DFA (Director General, Deputy Foreign Ministers and the Foreign Minister) along with the changes in these positions, particularly the high turnover experienced in the position of Direct General (DG), have played a part in shaping the role of the Department in the

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foreign policy process. As Wendt points out, it is not just organisations that shape decisions, but the agents (actors) within the organisations.29

Figure 1: The President and Key Individuals in the Department of Foreign Affairs

- The Directors-General

It has emerged that during South Africa’s transition to democracy, ‘the new ministers were almost entirely dependent on their DGs to run the government, whether they cared for them and their politics or not.’30 Relying on such advice had its impact on foreign policy decision-making. For instance, although publicly supported by Aziz Pahad, former Director General ‘Rusty’ Evans was criticised for advising the government to vote with the US on a decision to blockade Cuba, despite the ANC’s own historic ties with the country.31 The DFA has seen a remarkably high turnover of staff in the position of Director General, attributed to conflicts between personalities within the bureaucracy. Not only did this add to perceptions of instability within the department, the uncertainty regarding the capability of the department saw the creation of the additional posts of ‘special advisers on legal, political, and economic affairs in the presidency.’32

31 Ibid.
Jackie Selebi’s appointment as Director General (1998), laid the foundations for redefining the Department’s focus, internal functioning and overall accountability to the taxpayer. Although he had run a diplomatic mission as ambassador to the UN, and had been actively involved in the negotiations regarding the ban on landmines, Selebi’s background was not one of managing a government department. His appointment, however, ushered in a new period of optimism about the future of the DFA with the Mail and Guardian hailing him as the ‘the fire-starter at foreign affairs’. Selebi played a key role in launching an appraisal of the department that ‘critically reviewed our methods of work, internal structures and cost factors with the view to a fully revamped Foreign Ministry.’ The idea was that greater attention would be paid to involving all the staff in reviewing activities, placing the emphasis on ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ and the linking of ‘resources to outputs’. While Selebi proved to be a master of management-speak, how these reforms would improve the approach of the DFA in foreign policy is vague.

Despite the focus on internal reform, Selebi played a key part in adapting the department’s foreign policy emphasis, providing the impetus for the DFA’s developing role in the foreign policy structure. While he was adamant that there was no reason to change the guiding principles of the country’s foreign policy, he placed a new emphasis in the department’s objectives and priorities, particularly in terms of economic development and wealth creation. This was reflected in the move to include ‘security and wealth creation’ as the primary objectives of the DFA. In other words, human rights and democracy were to remain at the centre of foreign policy, but the attainment of objectives would be tempered by a pragmatism that involved giving priority to the expansion of trade relations for missions abroad. This is reflected in his address to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) where there is a brief section (one paragraph) given to South Africa’s role on human rights, democracy, good

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37 Ibid, pp. 210-211.
governance and transparency, and only after the significantly longer section on the creation of wealth and ensuring the state’s security. While Selebi’s approach and reforms did help refocus attention on the potential value of the Department in terms of economic development, it was still marginal as part of the foreign policy process. This was confirmed in the case of the decision to intervene in Lesotho (1998), a decision taken without due consultation with the DFA and Parliament. Soon after, Selebi left to assume the role as Police Commissioner under speculation that there was a conflict of personality with the Minister of Foreign affairs, Dr Dlamini-Zuma.

In 1999 Sipho Pityana left the Department of Labour to take up the position as Director General of foreign affairs. Under Pityana, the focus on addressing the capacity of the Department remained a concern; however, his tenure as DG saw the DFA on the margins of the foreign policy process. In the first instance, Mbeki, who had recently assumed the position of president, placed an emphasis on further structural and procedural changes. This entailed a focus on ‘integrated governance’, aimed at providing “efficient and effective management of government by the president together with the deputy-president and cabinet”. Although this saw the centralisation of government functions within the executive, the position of the DFA within the foreign policy process was effectively marginalized by Pityana’s own perception, that ‘[f]oreign policy must be driven by the president, because it reflects the totality of government policies and programmes in relation to the world.

Pityana continued to maintain an emphasis on economic development in the DFA’s priorities and objectives; indeed “pure diplomacy” was to be replaced with economic diplomacy focusing on ‘amongst other things ‘mutual economic principles’ and trade.’ Pityana’s 2001 address to the SAIIA places economic development at the

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41 Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 31.
42 Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1999-2002 at which time he was also Chairman of the Johannesburg World Summit Company and Chairman of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. http://www.inyathelo.co.za/about/trustees/spityana.html accessed 05/03/06
centre of South Africa’s policy with the emphasis on economic and trade diplomacy.\footnote{S. Pityana (2001) ‘Bridging the Divide: Main Thrusts of South Africa’s Diplomatic Endeavours.’ Address by the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Wits Branch of SAI\textsc{i}A 2001 http://www.racism.gov.za/substance/speeches/pityana010620.htm Accessed 17/07/07}

However, by not actively seeking to carve out a critical role for the DFA, Pityana’s tenure (1999-2002) saw the Department’s influence dissipate in terms of foreign policy decision-making. This period was significant for Mbeki’s high-profile negotiations surrounding the launch of NEPAD in 2001 and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) during 2001-2002.\footnote{E. Sidiropoulos and T. Hughes (2004) ‘Between Democratic Governance and Sovereignty: The Challenge of South Africa’s African Policy.’ Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004. Johannesburg, SAI\textsc{i}A, pp. 67-76.} By 2002, Pityana had announced his intention to leave the Department to pursue his interests in the private sector, once more under speculation regarding the tension between him and foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.\footnote{D. Forrest (11/01/02) ‘Foreign affairs’s Pityana heads for private sector’ Mail and Guardian online http://www.mg.co.za/article?articleid=221635&area=%2farchives\_print\_edition%2f Accessed 18/01/06}

Ayanda Ntsaluba (appointed in September 2003) transferred from the Department of Health where he had been Director-General under Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (1998). His role in the DFA has not been as high profile as that of his predecessors; however, it has been a period of consolidation and development, focused on defining and undertaking a more strategic role for the Department in the foreign policy process. Not only has it been a period within the DFA that has seen an improved relationship between the DG and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it has seen the development of a central role for the DFA in terms of coordinating foreign policy with other government departments (OGDs). This has been necessary in light of the range of policy areas that Ntsaluba has identified for the Department’s attention including: a central focus on poverty eradication along with ‘socio-economic development, global governance, security, consolidation of the African Agenda, South-South Cooperation and improved political and economic relations.’\footnote{A. Ntsaluba (2004) An Annual Address of the Director-General of Foreign Affairs at the 70\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Celebrations of SAI\textsc{i}A. Accessed 19/10/05 http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2004/ntsa0521.htm}

The Directors-General have played a part in shaping the reform of the Department’s structures, aims and objectives. However, the high turnover of DGs coupled with the
range of personalities, from the prominent Selebi to the behind-the-scene work of Ntsaluba, has had an impact on the changing position of the DFA within the concentric circles of the foreign policy process. In addition to the DGs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the two Deputy Ministers have played their own part in shaping the role of the DFA in the foreign policy process.

- **The Minister and Deputy Ministers**

With Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma assuming the role as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999, the position has seen more consistency than that of Director General.\(^5\) She inherited a role in which former incumbent, Alfred Nzo, was ‘perceived to be less effective than he could be … in the way he wields the bureaucratic machinery that has been put at his disposal.’\(^5\) This was reflected in a question raised by a member of the PPCFA; “Will the real minister of Foreign Affairs please stand up?”\(^5\) In her position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma has not escaped questions regarding her role. As the *Mail and Guardian* observed,

> With a capable team of deputy ministers and a director general on the one side and a president with a clear interest in foreign relations on the other, it is hard to identify what the minister herself brings to the table. Some attribute South Africa’s critical role in structures like the Non-Aligned Movement to Dlamini-Zuma’s dynamism, while other describe her as a “glorified messenger”.

This highlights the problems facing the Minister both in defining her role in the foreign policy process and that of the department. In some respects Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s energetic efforts to carve out an instrumental role in her position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, has eclipsed the Department. For example, she has served in the position of

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\(^5\) See the profile of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma – Department of Foreign Affairs [http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/profile_minister.html](http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/profile_minister.html) accessed 03/05/07


President of the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) and of the Ministers’ Council at the UN World Summit Sustainable Development (WSSD), as well as Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Ministers’ Council.⁵⁴ Although this ministerial diplomacy may provide a ‘flexibility’ in negotiations as ‘foreign ministers have wider discretion than ambassadors’,⁵⁵ it can create distance between the Department and Minister as well as between the Minister and ambassadors leading to potential failures in communication and understanding.⁵⁶

While the DGs have focused on South Africa’s economic diplomacy, foreign minister Dlamini-Zuma has pursued an active role in directing a foreign policy emphasis on Africa. She has been involved in, and led, a number of peace initiatives to central Africa and assumed the position as the first chair of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) launched in 2004.⁵⁷ Her address, at the Budget Vote for the DFA in 2006, consolidates the importance of Africa with reference to the conflicts and challenges from across the continent.⁵⁸ In line with improving the DFA’s position in this regard, Dr Dlamini-Zuma has played a key role in combating perceptions among staff that a posting to Africa is a ‘demotion’. Indeed, Dlamini-Zuma has made it necessary that staff across the DFA have a better understanding and knowledge of Africa as an integral part of an effective African agenda.⁵⁹

Despite the foreign minister’s efforts in creating a central position for the Department, particularly in the context of the African Agenda, as Chapter 2 observes, the president has maintained his predominance on the key issue of Zimbabwe. Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma has, however, been at the forefront of events shaping South Africa's position towards Zimbabwe remarking that South Africa would "never" condemn its Zimbabwean counterpart so long as the current government was in power. In her capacity as Foreign Minister, Dlamini-Zuma has played a central part in the foreign policy response to the crisis in Zimbabwe through her condemnation of Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth (along with questions concerning the relevance of the Commonwealth), and actions regarding the African Union's (AU) report on Zimbabwe. Phimister and Raftopoulos indicate that in the case of the AU's report, despite denial from the Foreign Minister 'that she had supported Zimbabwean attempts to shelve the report, [she] apparently succeeded in having discussion postponed until such time as the Harare government formally responded. The report, as a result, was neither adopted by the African Union's foreign ministers, nor was it included on the agenda of the summit of African leaders in Addis Ababa later that same week.'

In addition to the Minister, the DFA has two Deputy Ministers. It is one of only two governmental departments to have two deputy ministers (the other being Trade and Industry). The Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs have been tasked with the coordination of activities within the Department, as well as the interaction between the DFA and other government departments. In terms of promoting greater interaction and coordination between various foreign policy stakeholders, deputy minister Aziz Pahad has indicated a commitment to broader participation in the foreign policy process. In 1998 he lamented that there was 'still no system whereby major foreign policy issues are taken to Parliament, even to give information only.' Any expectations that he would be involved in establishing a good communication network between the DFA and Parliament was lost when he 'declined' to share policy information with members of the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs. Indeed Pahad is cited as stating that the role of opposition parties should be limited to comments on foreign policy, aggravating

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60 C. Dempster (05/03/2003) 'South Africa's 'silent' diplomacy' BBC News. Accessed 19/03/04
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2818297.stm
63 Deputy Ministers per Portfolio – Government Information
the gap between Parliament and the DFA.65 Despite this, Pahad continued to emphasise the importance of inclusion. In the ‘Forward’ to the book *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy*, Pahad states, ‘I believe that it is essential that the Department of Foreign Affairs has an open and productive dialogue with academics, institutions and other bodies concerned with South Africa’s foreign policies ...’.66 Although there are still misgivings from within civil society regarding interaction with the Department,67 the period 2006-2007 has seen Deputy Minister Pahad assume a greater role in media briefings regarding South Africa’s foreign affairs.68

In terms of influence in the foreign policy process, Pahad has been singled out for his access to the president as a key adviser. As Calland observes, ‘Aziz Pahad is, in fact, the more influential of the two brothers, contrary to received wisdom. Aziz Pahad and Mbeki speak often about foreign policy issues, and they go back a long way.’69 On the international stage, Pahad has undertaken high-profile talks on behalf of the state. For instance, he has played a prominent role in South Africa’s relations with states in the Middle East, representing South Africa’s position (2006) on Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. In the lead up to the February 2006 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board in Vienna, the Department received representatives from Iran and the UK. Both held talks with Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad (and Abdul Minty, Deputy Director General of the DFA) in an effort to win South Africa’s support for their respective positions. This coincided with mounting pressure from the US on South Africa to ‘use moral judgement’ in helping to influence the direction of the Iranian leadership. Ultimately South Africa abstained from any action in putting the case forward to the UN Security Council.70

67 Interview with Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, Former International Affairs Editor. Business Day. (25/07/07)  
Sue van der Merwe took up the second position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004. Like Aziz Pahad, she has close ties to the presidency through her former position as the President’s Parliamentary Counsellor, and as part of the Advisory Forum for the Presidency.\textsuperscript{71} The impetus for establishing the second deputy minister position was to develop and maintain good relations with foreign embassies, allowing the Department to assume a more central role in facilitating foreign policy networks. The DFA has faced a number of complaints relating to its slow response to enquiries and the general disorganisation within the Department.\textsuperscript{72} There is still a considerable amount of unhappiness among foreign envoys regarding access to the government. As Jonathan Katzenellenbogen reveals, there is a general sense of frustration felt by diplomats as a result of the ‘inefficiency and shallow insight offered by the foreign affairs department.’\textsuperscript{73} He goes on to note,

\[\text{A}n\text{ endless complaint from many diplomats is the failure of foreign affairs officials promptly to return calls and deal with routine matters. And when there are talks, many complain that they are all formality and no insight. Binational commissions, SA’s favourite way of dealing with many foreign countries, are boring and achieve little, says one, who, not surprisingly, prefers to remain unnamed.}\textsuperscript{74}

Until this element of network coordination is developed, the DFA is constricting its potential role in the foreign policy process.

Although the current Minister, Deputy Ministers and Director General have established an amenable working relationship, the foreign affairs ministry faces restrictions when it comes to the appointment of senior staff. During Mandela’s tenure DGs reported to their respective minister, however as president, Mbeki has undertaken the appointment of the DGs himself. Furthermore DGs are expected to sign employment contracts with

\textsuperscript{71} Chikane (2001), pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
the executive rather than their minister.\textsuperscript{75} According to the new democratic constitution, the president is responsible for the appointment of ambassadors who are directly accountable to him (or her). \textsuperscript{76} In other words, while the individuals appointed in positions of leadership within the DFA have an influence and impact through their own particular initiatives, the president maintains the capacity to play a prominent part in foreign affairs, particularly if these positions are given as political appointments or rewards.

Chapter 2 points out that the predominance of the president does not preclude influence from other sources in the making of foreign policy. Indeed, it is not just individuals that have an influence in foreign policy decision-making. The Department, and its relationship with other stakeholders in the foreign policy process, adds to the changing dynamics within the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making. As Allison maintains, "[w]here you stand depends on where you sit".\textsuperscript{77} In other words individuals are themselves influenced by the framework within which the work.

\textbf{An ‘Intergovernmentalized’ Foreign Policy}

The \textit{Essence of Decision} Model II, or ‘Organizational Behavior’, notes that the ‘government is not an individual. It is not just the president and his entourage, nor even just the presidency and congress. It is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own.’\textsuperscript{78} The concept of organisational behaviour highlights the constraints on decision-making emanating from the organisation itself. As indicated above, the organisational capacity of the DFA has created limitations on the role it has been able to play, particularly during the transitional period. However, while Model II explanations look only at the organisation, and not specific individuals, Model III or ‘Governmental Politics’, points out that

\textsuperscript{76} Department of Foreign Affairs (1996) \textit{South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document}. Section 9.5
government behaviour can be viewed ‘not as organizational outputs but as results of bargaining games.’ In other words the ‘pulling and hauling that is politics.’ The government is not a single monolithic entity, neither are the departments that compose the bureaucracy. Instead it is a mix of individual, organisational and national interests interacting within the confines of a system. In the South African context there has not only been ‘pulling and hauling’ between the DGs and Minister, there are a range of other government departments, each with their own interests in the country’s international relations, that play a part in shaping foreign policy decisions. In other words, the DFA is not the only source of foreign policy influence from within the governmental bureaucracy. Rather, South Africa’s foreign policy has become increasingly ‘intergovernmentalized’.

The creation of the Policy Coordination and Advisory Service (PCAS), based within the Presidency, is designed to achieve better coordination between departments in achieving policy objectives. In order to define a central role in South Africa’s international relations, the ministry of foreign affairs needs to assert its position in the coordination and communication of foreign policy. Pretoria’s international ambitions, expanding foreign policy agenda, and the growing number and technical nature of negotiations, has seen an increased presence of government departments in the foreign policy process whose primary concern has not traditionally been foreign affairs. As foreign policy analysis highlights, the ‘foreign policy bureaucracy is no longer confined to ministries of foreign affairs, but extends horizontally across most governmental departments, provoking new problems of coordination and control.’ So for instance, the Minister of Transport represented South Africa in assisting Grenada with their own truth and reconciliation process (and transport links), the South African Police Services have joined the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation, the Department of Arts and Culture are involved in UNESCO, and a Memorandum of Understanding between Lesotho and South Africa was signed by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. In this respect the DFA not only faces challenges

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80 Ibid.
in developing its own internal capabilities, in order to play a central role in the foreign
policy process it needs to consolidate its position within an ‘intergovernmentalized’
foreign policy. As Allison and Zelikow observe, ‘[t]o explain why a particular formal
governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior
emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions,
bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.’84 Although
written in relation to a particular crisis, this description of the decision-making process
is not far off the coalitions, bargaining, and compromise between the networks of actors
in the everyday process of policy making.

South Africa’s foreign policy agenda lends itself to wider participation from across
government departments. As Deputy Minister Sue van der Merwe indicates,

        Our agenda is to promote our interests through dialogue, through conflict
resolution and negotiations, through post conflict reconstruction and through a
permanent peace reinforced with sustained economic and social
development.85

Achieving these objectives means considerable resources and support from a range of
governmental and non-governmental actors, a point given further elaboration in the
following chapters. In addition to the DFA, two departments have stood out for their
level of participation in South Africa’s foreign policy machinery. Although other
government departments, for example Health, Environmental Affairs and Tourism,
Agriculture, and Minerals and Energy, have an interest in the country’s foreign affairs,
in comparison to the involvement of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
the Department of Defence (DoD) their role is, on the whole, still fairly marginal
(although growing). The development of the foreign policy agenda, along with the
achievement of foreign policy objectives like conflict resolution and economic
development, has opened up the space near the centre of the foreign policy decision-
making structure for the DTI and DoD.

85 S. van der Merwe (2006) Address by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Ms Sue
van der Merwe on the Occasion of the Budget Vote of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town. 29
By 2000, the importance of facilitating coordination between departments was reflected in the 'modification' of the DFA’s mission statement to include the idea of 'integrated governance'. In addition, collaboration with other government departments has received emphasis within the DFA’s annual reports, which highlight the need to assist 'partner Departments in navigating complex international dynamics.' A good example of the growing interdependence between departments in foreign policy is the 2005 report detailing the Government’s Programme of Action for the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster. It emphasises the move towards an inclusive approach in achieving policy objectives. Key actions have been delineated followed by an identification of those departments that are responsible for overseeing implementation. For instance, in consolidating the African Agenda a range of departments are listed according to various actions including the DFA, the Presidency, the Department of Defence, the Department of Trade and Industry, Parliament, the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

- **The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Foreign Policy**

Part of the challenge facing the successful coordination of foreign affairs is overcoming any perception of inter-departmental rivalry. The high-level role of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), particularly at the outset of the new democratic government, created tension between the DTI and the ministry of foreign affairs. Within the governmental bureaucracy, the DTI was viewed as the primary actor in the country’s overseas trade development and economic diplomacy. Through former Minister of Trade and Industry (1996-2004) Alec Erwin’s own enthusiasm and connection to the executive, the DTI played a significant role in South Africa’s policy decisions. As Calland points out, ‘[w]hether it was the notorious arms deal, the controversial and fundamental switch to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy …

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89 Ibid
90 Hill lists the *rivals* to the foreign ministry as the military, economic ministries, intelligence services – people ‘who reside in the prime minister’s office and/or cabinet secretaries …’. Hill (2003), p. 84.
Erwin's imprimatur can always be found. Under the leadership of Alec Erwin, the DTI assumed a prominent position in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) IX (1996), formulating and drafting the Midrand Declaration. Certainly Alec Erwin's perceptions of South Africa as a bridge between the developed and developing world saw the DTI pursuing an active international role. As Minister of Trade and Industry Erwin moderated the round table discussions at the 1998 Durban Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, and undertook the high-profile free trade negotiations with the European Union (EU). Moreover, in the negotiations regarding the Southern African Development Community (SADC) free trade protocol, the DFA was once again marginalized in favour of the DTI.

The overlap of functions between the DFA and the DTI led to calls for their integration to ensure a more co-ordinated approach. In his analysis Greg Mills questioned the viability of maintaining the distinction between foreign affairs and trade and industry. Selebi, however, opposed calls for the merger of the two departments despite giving recognition to the need for greater interaction between the two in attracting trade and investment. As Barber points out, it was Selebi who 'suggested that on overseas trips the President and cabinet ministers should be accompanied by business and trade delegations, and that all DFA staff (including Heads of Missions) should be trained in seeking trade and aid, and in business promotion.' Pityana’s focus on economic development resulted in his call for further integration; "[a]s regards trade, we need one department that deals with both foreign affairs and international trade." This was not a view shared by then DG of trade and industry, Alistair Ruiters, who indicated that he

93 Barber (2004), p. 158.
“could not promote trade through diplomatic channels”. Countries that had already moved towards the integration of foreign affairs and trade were called upon as examples of its potential success, including the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. However, uncertainty surrounding the usefulness of integration still persists in light of the Canadian decision in 2004 to separate the departments of the Canadian MFA into two distinct agencies, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and International Trade Canada (ITCan), to ensure a greater concentration on their respective core functions.

Economic diplomacy, as one of the ‘cornerstones’ of foreign policy, has necessitated greater coordination between the DFA and DTI. The DTI has offices within the DFA’s missions abroad subdivided into East Africa and SADC; West Africa and Middle East Region; Asia East Region; Asia West Region, Europe 1 Region; Europe 2 Region; Americas Region. The advantage this holds for the DFA’s staff within the overseas missions has been recognised, particularly in answering technical economic queries. While the DTI maintains its technical expertise, offices within South Africa’s overseas missions fall under the authority of the head of mission. In an effort to ‘beef up its business and financial intelligence capability to help give South African companies a competitive edge in international markets’ the idea has been floated that the trade attaches should report to the DG of foreign affairs and not the DTI, as is currently the case.

Following Alec Erwin’s departure, the DTI has been criticised for playing an unsatisfactory role in foreign affairs. South Africa’s opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has questioned the new minister, Mandisi Mpahlwa’s, ‘apathy’ towards

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100 ‘Minister Pettigrew Introduces Foreign Affairs Act’ (2004) http://w01international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=381864&Language=E&docnumbere 146 accessed 23/02/06
104 Muller (2002), p. 16.
106 Ibid.
his ministry, particularly his ineffective handling of the Chinese clothing and textile import quotas, the ‘[i]naction and incapacity in the international trade arena’, and ‘his silence during many junctures at which the now-defunct Doha trade negotiations faltered and many debilitating setbacks suffered by the Companies and Intellectual Property and Registration Office (CIPRO).’\textsuperscript{107} The ‘pulling and hauling’ between the two departments continues as each seeks to protect its own ‘turf’ as well as its perception of what is considers to be in the national interest. The PCAS cluster system, designed to lend greater coordination and discussion between departments, could itself become the centre of future bureaucratic struggles for influence in foreign policy. The previous five subcommittees within the IRPS cluster have been rationalised into just two, the economic development committee and the peace security and stability committee. The former headed by a representative from the DTI and the latter from the South African Secret Service.\textsuperscript{108}

There has been mounting tension between South Africa’s economic expansion within Africa and the foreign policy focus on the African Agenda. Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma has revealed that between 1994-2006 the number of companies doing business in Africa has more than doubled with South Africa as “‘the greatest contributor’ of foreign direct investment to the rest of the continent …’.\textsuperscript{109} The challenge for foreign policy is that while South Africa is pursuing a sensitive approach towards Africa, in light of its own relative strength and past apartheid interventions, South African businesses have been in the spotlight for their aggressive approach towards trade and employment. Indeed, they have been marked as “abrasive and exploitative ” or as “corporate imperialists”.\textsuperscript{110} However, while business may rush ahead in foreign affairs in an effort to gain market access (see chapter 5), when problems emerge they turn to the DFA for assistance.\textsuperscript{111}


\textsuperscript{108} Van Nieuwkerk (2006), p. 44.


\textsuperscript{111} Interview with Dr Genge, Chief Director Policy, Research and Analysis Unit. Department of Foreign Affairs South Africa, Pretoria 12/09/2006
The Department of Defence (DoD) and Foreign Policy

Just as the foreign policy focus on economic diplomacy has seen a wider role for the DTI in South Africa’s foreign policy machinery, so the growing emphasis on South Africa’s role in peacekeeping has carved out a prominent role for the Ministry of Defence, particularly in light of the country’s wider international (UN) ambitions and emphasis on Africa.112 Unlike the DTI, which played a significant international role at the outset of the ‘new’ South Africa, the Department of Defence (DoD) faced numerous challenges in its own internal rationalisation and integration, particularly in bringing together former belligerents in the South African Defence Force, the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), those from the former homeland (TVBC states) armies, and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA).113 In addition, the defence sector’s involvement in international affairs faced concerns from South Africa’s immediate region, following numerous cross-border interventions during the apartheid era. As Hamill indicates, ‘[i]n the 1994-1997 period, South Africa was predictably cautious about the projection of force beyond its borders due to the legacy of apartheid era cross-border activity, coupled with the ongoing project to create a new integrated defence force.’114

The newly formed South African National Defence Force (SANDF) perceived its primary role as one of defence against aggression while ‘peacekeeping and support of other government departments were considered as secondary duties . . . ’.115 This coincides with the initial foreign policy emphasis on negotiated settlements, political solutions and diplomacy.116 Moreover, as Chapter 2 points out, President Mandela occupied a prominent role in South Africa’s international affairs. This included the

peace negotiations in Zaire/DRC (1996), continuing after he had left the presidency in the case of Burundi in 2000. Although Mandela assumed a prominent role in the negotiations in the former Zaire, the crisis served to highlight the problems of communication between the ministries of foreign affairs and defence. At the outset South Africa was approached to contribute to a multinational force for deployment within the region; however, while the DFA supported the idea, there was less enthusiasm from the DoD who highlighted problems associated with the limited training for such an operation. Problems in communication between the Presidency, the DFA and the DoD were particularly prominent in the decision to intervene in the Lesotho crisis of 1998. Not only were both the DFA and Parliament bypassed, the intervention served as an indication of the SANDF’s limitations. As Nathan points out, it was an operation ‘riddled with strategic and tactical errors and was widely viewed as a military and political disaster.’

The different centres of decision-making drew attention to the need for better communication between the DoD and DFA. The result was the *White Paper on Defence* (1997) which saw the creation of the National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NOCPM), tasked with organising peace support missions. Initially it was housed within the DFA’s Africa Multilateral desk; however, the limited capacity within the DFA during the late 1990s saw the DoD assume a more prominent role in NOCPM. The greater need for ‘partnership’ also saw the development of the *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions* (1998), compiled by the DFA. Analysts have indicated that this document was significant for South Africa’s foreign policy as it ‘forced the South African government to outline the nature of its national interest and to clarify both how this interest interfaces with its philosophy

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5. Williams (2006), p. 188.
on conflict resolution and its general approach towards the rest of the African continent.\textsuperscript{122}

Mbeki's presidency has seen an increased focus on South Africa's participation in peace missions. Bischoff points out that policy-makers are moving from a position of relying 'solely on diplomacy and humanitarian assistance to achieve its foreign policy objectives...\textsuperscript{123} This has seen wider participation from the ministry of defence in South Africa's international affairs, leading to a necessary shift in perception of its foreign policy role.\textsuperscript{124} For instance, at the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the Angolan armed forces, South Africa was represented by both its Ambassador in Angola (Mr Tony Msimanga) and the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (General Siphiwe Nyanda), while the Minister for Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, served as a facilitator in the Burundi Peace Process.\textsuperscript{125} In other words, the DoD and the SANDF play a necessary part in delineating South Africa's foreign policy objectives in international peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In an address at the opening of the Defence Foreign Relations Course (2007) the Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, highlighted the growing role for his department in foreign affairs by stressing the importance of 'military diplomacy'.\textsuperscript{126} Lekota characterises military diplomacy as a key component in achieving the government's international objectives and goes on to point out that '[m]ilitary diplomacy is a valuable asset to the South African government. The purpose of the military diplomacy function is to dispel hostilities, build and maintain trust and contributes to the development of democratic defence forces.'\textsuperscript{127}

The problem facing South Africa's foreign policy in terms of its peacekeeping ambitions, is the DoD's own capacity. Evans' analysis points out that South Africa did


have some experience in peacekeeping, particularly within the domestic context, and had participated, although in a supportive context, ‘in multinational peacekeeping efforts in Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho.’ However, as Neethling indicates, the newly formed DoD was ‘cautious’ in allocating troops to fulfil peace missions. In the first instance, the department was still undergoing its own internal transformation. Secondly, the ‘new’ SANDF and DoD had no prior experience in peacekeeping, and finally, the DoD had experienced significant cuts in its budget, particularly in light of the pressure on the newly elected government to provide housing, health care, schooling and a range of other key social programmes.

Despite limitations on the DoD’s capacity, South Africa has been involved in the 2000 UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the Organisation of African Unity/African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE). In 2001 an agreement was reached to send ‘specialised units’ to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the Observer Mission in the Union of the Comoros (OMIC). By 2003 troops were deployed in the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), one of the country’s largest roles in peacekeeping. In addition, 2003 saw the DoD ‘provide 1268 soldiers (in addition to the technical personnel already deployed) to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC).’ While engaging in UN peacekeeping missions has placed pressure on resources, it provides an indication of the international role South Africa is set on pursuing, particularly on the continent. Kent and Malan point out that, “South Africa’s recent engagements in the UN and regional peace missions have undoubtedly enhanced the country’s image in the eyes of the international community. ...This role will also provide more weight to South Africa’s opinions and views on the continent as well as in the international realm.”

The growing importance of the DoD in South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making has seen a number of complications arise between foreign policy principles and the

129 Neethling (2004), pp. 138-139.
bureaucratic interests of the security sector, especially in relation to the policy principles of human rights and arms control. Within six months of the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) there was speculation that South Africa’s arms sales to Yemen were being directed on to Lebanon. Concern over South Africa’s arms trade record saw the creation of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) in 1995 under Kader Asmal, then Minister for Water and Forestry. It was tasked with ensuring that decisions concerning the sale of armaments take into consideration ‘the recipient country’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, its security situation in relation to regional security, its record of compliance with international arms control agreements and the degree to which the proposed deal is supportive of South Africa’s national and foreign interests.’ However, despite these criteria cabinet gave approval for the arms sale to Syria following a referral from the NCACC. The reaction from Joe Modise was that South Africa should pursue a policy of ‘evenhandedness’, in other words ‘given the special alliance between Israel and the apartheid state in the past and the fact that South Africa continued to honour old arms sales contracts to Israel, selling arms to Israel’s Arab neighbours was the best way of levelling the playing fields.’ As Bischoff notes, the NCACC ‘intervened in the foreign policy process, sometimes articulating a vigorous concern for access to markets and overriding at times the human rights concerns of the DFA and others.’

In achieving the foreign policy priorities and objectives of peace, ‘conflict prevention, management and resolution’, the DFA is dependent on the capacity of the Department of Defence and the South African National Defence Force. Nevertheless, bureaucratic politics often sees departments pursuing their own fairly narrow purpose

138 Ibid.
and interests. In other words, the department’s needs are placed before the state’s needs, which can ‘encourage the sacrifice of national interest to bureaucratic interests.’\textsuperscript{141} When it comes to foreign policy, South Africa’s arms sales and acquisitions have raised questions regarding the country’s moral principles. South Africa’s arms trade found support from former Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and members of cabinet ‘captivated by the arms sellers’ promises of offsets amounting to R111 billion and the creation of 65 000 jobs …’.\textsuperscript{142} However, in 1997 questions were raised regarding arms sales to Rwanda, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Rwanda, Colombia, Pakistan, Congo (Brazzaville) with weapons sold to Uganda surfacing in conflicts like Sudan.\textsuperscript{143} Additionally, the period between 2000-2001 saw China, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe all receiving military equipment from South Africa.\textsuperscript{144}

Continuing the arms trade is in the strategic interests of the Ministry of Defence, particularly in light of the increasing international missions and declining defence budget. Denel, South Africa’s major arms manufacturer, has faced serious losses in recent years with 2004-05 seeing a net loss of R1,6bn.\textsuperscript{145} As Bischoff observes, the SANDF is overstretched, ‘[d]omestic military analysts suggest that its lack of troop size ..., aircraft carrier capacity, and naval sealift capacity, and the unsuitability of its armaments for peacekeeping, make further unplanned-for deployment unsustainable.’\textsuperscript{146} The trade in arms is ‘at odds with the holistic approach to security, the pacific posture and the absence of any remotely foreseeable military threat.’\textsuperscript{147} Moreover the DFA’s \textit{Strategic Plan 2006-2009} continues to emphasise that ‘peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and non-

\textsuperscript{142} Nathan (2005), p. 370.
\textsuperscript{146} Bischoff (2006), p. 156.
\textsuperscript{147} Nathan (2005), p. 369.
violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, should be employed.

Nevertheless, the 2007 Budget provides an indication of the growing part played by South Africa’s defence force.

In a short period of time, our defence force has already assisted significantly in helping reduce a number of conflicts on the continent. We now have peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan and the Ivory Coast.

The increase in international commitments may be adding to South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, but it is placing a strain on the country’s defence capacity. While Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma was approached by the AU’s Peace and Security Council to provide troops to Somalia, in light of the country’s “currently stretched” capacity, Defence Minister Lekota made the announcement that South Africa would ‘not contribute to an African Peacekeeping force in Somalia, but will study other ways to help stabilise the war-ravaged country ...’.

• Parliament and the Foreign Policy Process

In addition to government departments, the 2005 report detailing the Government’s Programme of Action for the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster listed the role of Parliament in supporting the Pan-African Parliament. From the outset of the ‘new’ democratic South Africa, Parliament had the potential to play a significant part in the foreign policy process. Indeed, Parliament’s mandate includes the ratification of treaties, the evaluation of draft policy documents, and responsibility for

the appropriation of funds for the DFA’s budget, allowing for an element of control over the DFA.\textsuperscript{153} Nevertheless, Jo-Ansie van Wyk highlights the limited nature of parliament’s involvement and the ineffective use, by decision makers, of the ‘existing avenues of influence’.\textsuperscript{154} As the new government’s body for democratic accountability, participation and transparency, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA) was to play a central role in facilitating wider public participation in the making of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{155} At its inception the ANC had hoped that it would serve as a place where, those elected to represent the people, civil society and non-governmental parties, could find a platform to interact with the DFA.\textsuperscript{156} Under the first Chair, Raymond Suttner, this body did play an active role in stimulating debate on issues like arms trade, human rights and the recognition of China over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{157} However, as South Africa’s democracy develops the PPCFA has occupied less than the central role envisaged for it.

In the first instance, this has been blamed on the structural nature of the system where parliament and the executive overlap, with the executive in the predominant position (see Chapter 1).\textsuperscript{158} For example, Bischoff indicates, ‘[d]espite the fact that parliament is meant to be the ultimate arbiter of whether or not to deploy peacekeeping missions, it was not involved in the decision to send troops to Burundi. This was taken by the Presidency with little input from other government departments, parliament, and civil society.’\textsuperscript{159} Secondly, Parliament’s ‘diminishing importance’\textsuperscript{160} rests with the public’s growing scepticism, a reaction to the various scandals played out across the media including cases of sexual harassment and ‘Travelgate’.\textsuperscript{161} Tim Hughes highlights Parliament’s shortfall in his observation that,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{155} Nel, van Wyk and Johnsen (2004), p. 45.
\bibitem{156} Ibid.
\bibitem{157} Ibid.
\bibitem{158} Calland (2006), p. 10.
\bibitem{159} Bischoff (2006), p. 155.
\end{thebibliography}
For parliament, 2006 was a lamentable year. During the year it passed a mere 13 pieces of legislation, by far the least productive of the democratic parliament. … The Executive branch’s disregard for parliament was exemplified by the fact that 177 written questions posed by the Democratic Alliance were left unanswered by year end, and some of these dated back to February.162

Parliaments own limitations have created circumstances in which its role in the foreign policy process has been marginal at best. As part of their preparation for the 52nd National Conference in December 2007, the ANC has itself taken issue with these circumstances, calling for a focus on parliamentary diplomacy in the discussion document on international policy. This entails ‘[b]uilding capacity of oversight for Portfolios/Select Committees’ and ‘[a]ctive participation in Regional, Continental and World parliamentary structures, forums, bodies, associations and unions as part of influencing role of parliaments and representing the voters as public representatives.’163

Despite the limited role played by parliament, the ‘intergovernmentalization’ of international affairs has opened up participation in the foreign policy process to a number of other government departments. The importance of facilitating and coordinating these expanding networks has been given recognition by the DFA’s leadership in achieving foreign policy objectives.164 For instance, the DFA’s Strategic Plan 2006-2009 sets out that it ‘will be leading a process during 2006 to develop a national strategy for NEPAD that will be designed to provide guidance to local, provincial, and national government entities, as well as Parliament and other stakeholder such as civil society and business.’165

Defining a Role in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

As the preceding section indicates, the DFA faces increased pressure from other government departments in the foreign policy process. In addition, as the subsequent chapters indicate, the foreign policy bureaucracy is facing competition from a growing number of stakeholders within civil society, business and the external milieu. While the Department points out that they do engage with the public, the subsequent chapter reveals that there is room for development in this relationship following the growing privatisation of foreign policy. This chapter highlights that the initial limitations on the DFA’s capability restricted its role in the foreign policy process. Questions continue to be raised on the efficacy of the Department following criticism from foreign envoys that it is ‘remote and unresponsive’. The DFA’s Diplomatic competencies have also been under the media spotlight following questions of sexual harassment against South Africa’s former ambassador to Indonesia, Norman Mashabane, and envoy to Palestine, Sisa Ncwana, while 2006 saw the return of a senior diplomat from the UK following discussions between the respective governments. Even the physical aspects of the Department have not facilitated a cohesive network for its staff with the current offices spanning across 7 different buildings, though plans for a new head office have been implemented and are waiting on completion.

There has been a concerted effort to provide a more accountable and transparent department through performance and annual reports as well as strategic plans, which have been made available to the public. This has been a response to the growing demands for accountability and performance measures of the public service, an influence from the corporate world. Kishan Rana points out that the openness and

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166 Interview with Dr Genge Chief Director Policy, Research and Analysis Unit 12/09/2006 Pretoria.
issues discussed within a report are indicators of the importance that foreign ministries attach to informing and mobilising the public support for foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{172} Attracting wider public support for the foreign policy bureaucracy is increasingly important. Peter Vale maintained that, ‘a central threat to South Africa’s ‘new’ foreign policy may well be the absence of a clearly-defined public profile. This promises to be important in South Africa where budgets and efficacy of government departments will be closely watched’.\textsuperscript{173} The DFA’s Strategic Plan allows for the publication of objectives and priorities, provides an account of the long term and medium term objectives, and details medium term objectives. Nevertheless, while the objectives, performance indicators, and critical issues are given definition in the medium term, they continue to represent the ideal with little reference to specific targets.\textsuperscript{174}

In addition to the role of coordinating and facilitating an intergovernmental foreign policy, the DFA has set out to define its position in supporting South Africa’s multilateral and international trade and development agenda. The foreign policy emphasis on multilateralism, coupled with the development of the Department’s multilateral capability, creates the opportunity for greater participation in decision-making. The first completely separate Multilateral Affairs division (from Branch Overseas Countries) was created in March 1992.\textsuperscript{175} Today the department not only has a Multilateral section with officials for issues such as ‘human rights and humanitarian affairs’ as well as ‘economic and social affairs’, there is also ‘Branch Africa Multilateral’ with divisions focused on the AU, SADC, NEPAD and the National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions.\textsuperscript{176} The multilateral division has demonstrated its value in the role of policy formulation in the cabinet approved comprehensive policy on disarmament. Furthermore, this branch is at the centre of

\textsuperscript{172} Rana (2004), p. 12.
\textsuperscript{176} http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/officials.doc accessed 02/02/06
South Africa’s policies on terrorism, conflict resolution, human rights, reform of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, the Kimberley Process and trade negotiations.\textsuperscript{177}

To fulfil South Africa’s multilateral ambitions, the DFA has been involved in hosting numerous international conferences covering a range of issues including: the UNCTAD IX 1996, the NAM 1998, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 1999, the UN Aids conference 2000, World Conference on Racism (WCAR) 2001, the founding Summit of the AU 2002, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002.\textsuperscript{178} This not only signalled South Africa’s role as an active international player, but allowed the Department to display its capability in organising such large-scale events.\textsuperscript{179} However, while the country has achieved some success in the multilateral setting, it has not proved a ‘foolproof’ approach in delineating a central role in the foreign policy process. Proving a capacity to host an international conference is not the same as having an influence over conference proceedings. As Mills remarked, ‘[t]his implies that profile and spin, not substance and statistics are the measure of success.’\textsuperscript{180}

Budget constraints have provided a number of financial challenges in sustaining an extensive multilateral network. The latter part of 1997 saw discussions regarding the merging of missions with member states of the SADC as a viable measure to cut costs.\textsuperscript{181} As an idea, ‘joint ambassadors’ or ‘co-location’ for sharing costs and logistics, has taken root in other regional organisations including the Caribbean states (Caricom), the EU, the Nordic group.\textsuperscript{182} This initiative was, however, never pursued. In light of South Africa’s steadily improving exchange rate, it has been estimated that the DFA was able to save approximately R136m in 2004-05, which has in turn been put into funding NEPAD (R45.5m) and the Pan African Parliament (R42m).\textsuperscript{183} However, the cost of multilateralism continues to affect foreign policy ambitions. By 2006 there were

\textsuperscript{177} Wheeler (2004), p. 87 & 92.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{181} ‘Foreign Affairs May Merge Overseas Missions with SADC states’ (01/10/1997) Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=283829 accessed 18/01/06
\textsuperscript{182} Rana (2004), p. 22.
cutbacks on spending, with the UN World Food Programme receiving nothing since 2003/04, while South Africa’s membership subscription to the AU was expected to rise from R80m to R155m by 2006/07.\textsuperscript{184}

The focus on the economic diplomacy rather than ‘pure diplomacy’, as highlighted by former DG Pityana, has had implications for the DFA’s overseas representation. While the rhetoric may remain focused on issues of democracy and human rights, the vision and objectives of the DFA have been refocused on the economic. Certainly, South Africa’s representation in South America was criticised because it did not reflect business interests. Although there were five full embassies representing South Africa in the MERCOSUR region (the South American Common Market), there were ‘none in the Andean region where South African private sector organisations, especially mining houses, were becoming increasingly active.’\textsuperscript{185} The suggestion by Mills and White, after the difficulties experienced by both the DFA and DTI in achieving the goals of economic diplomacy, is the possibility of being represented by business chambers. Business chambers offer a source of experience and insight specific to the business sector. For example, the decision to close the trade office in Chile in favour of Cuba, despite Cuba being the weaker trade partner, saw the South African embassy in Chile (Santiago) inundated with business requests and queries with support for these queries coming from the well-established SA-Chile Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{186}

The interpretation in 1995 that ‘[t]he business of foreign policy is finding business’\textsuperscript{187} is a reality for the DFA, creating new problems in aligning principles with policy. An example, highlighted by van Nieuwkerk, is ‘the apparent choice to discount the human rights record of Equatorial Guinea’s president, Brig.-Gen. Nguema Mbasogo in favour of cementing strong commercial and trade relations.’\textsuperscript{188} In setting out to achieve its economic priorities and objectives, the DFA’s \textit{Strategic Plan 2005-08} outlined a new

\textsuperscript{184} ‘Foreign affairs allocation to double.’ (16/02/06) \textit{Business Day} http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/budget2006/business.aspx?ID=BD4A155977 Accessed 27/02/06
\textsuperscript{187} Vale (1995), www.africafiles.org

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training regime for its staff noting that, ‘the Foreign Service Institute has been strengthened and training will be geared towards economic diplomacy and the building of concrete relations in these areas.’\textsuperscript{189} As deputy minister Aziz Pahad has highlighted, the value of the DFA lies in its representation of South Africa in the major economic regions of the world, enabling it to promote the country’s foreign policy aims centred on reforming the world economic order.\textsuperscript{190} Certainly the Department’s \textit{Strategic Plan 2006-2009} includes a number of references to the role of business in foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{191}

Although South Africa’s liberation ‘big-names’ still occupy prominent positions within foreign policy, evident in the role played by the leadership of the DFA and other government departments,\textsuperscript{192} the foreign policy bureaucracy has made significant inroads in defining a key role in foreign policy decision-making. As Kegley and Wittkopf observe, ‘unlike heads of state, whose roles require attention to the crisis of the moment, bureaucracies can consider the future as well as the present.’\textsuperscript{193} Developing an \textit{institutional memory} is an essential part of ensuring the future success in South Africa’s international relations. Hill points out that ‘every system needs continuity in its external relations … Without the capacity to relate myriad past commitments and treaties to the present, and to each other, decision-makers would be left floundering in chaos, given the complexity of the contemporary international system.’\textsuperscript{194} The significant role accorded to the ministry of foreign affairs in the India-Brazil-South African (IBSA) Dialogue Forum (signed in 2003) is to effectively ‘institutionalise’ the process in an attempt to provide some insulation against the ‘vagaries of changing political fortunes or individual interest.’\textsuperscript{195} Within the DFA there has been emphasis on improving performance and coordination with the Policy, Research and Analysis Unit tasked with

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{189} Department of Foreign Affairs (2005) \textit{Strategic Plan 2005-2008}
\bibitem{190} ‘Pahad defends Mbeki’s travel schedule’ (07/05/05) \textit{Mail and Guardian} online.
# Accessed 06/02/06
\bibitem{191} Department of Foreign Affairs (2006) \textit{Strategic Plan, 2006-2009}
\bibitem{192} It was the minister of local government Sydney Mufamadi, who, for over a year was responsible for bringing aggressors together in the DRC. A. Habib and N. Selinyane (2004) ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century.’ \textit{Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004}. (ed) E. Sidiropoulos. Johannesburg, SAIIA, p. 57.
\bibitem{194} Hill (2003), p. 77.
\end{thebibliography}
overseeing, and providing direction in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. In other words its mandate is to consider the overall foreign policy picture, in contrast to the individual sections, which have a more specific focus. The result is that policy gaps can be identified and filled, as was the case with IBSA. Nevertheless, the ongoing challenge for the Department is in securing a central role in the complex networks of a multistakeholder foreign policy.

Conclusion

Internal reforms occupied the focus of the Department of Foreign Affairs during South Africa's first democratic term, particularly in terms of the representative composition of staff and the distribution of external missions. Although the changing nature of the DFA has been discussed in analysis, this has centred primarily on the immediate post-apartheid changes covering a comparatively brief time period. While the DFA may have been a work-in-progress during Mandela's presidency, under Mbeki's presidency the Department has been actively developing its role as a pivotal actor in the foreign policy process. Although, as the previous chapter notes, Mbeki occupies a central position in the foreign policy process, developments within South Africa's foreign policy agenda and governmental structures have seen a reformed foreign policy bureaucracy playing a more integral role in decision-making. Indeed, the Minister, Deputy Ministers and Directors-General have played an influential role in guiding the focus of the Department in terms of economic trade and development and the African agenda. As Schraeder observes, despite continuing challenges '[t]he Department of Foreign Affairs has regained a substantial portion of the influence that it lost during the apartheid years'.

This chapter accounts for the growing 'intergovernmentalization' of foreign policy, which has seen other government departments actively engaging in the foreign policy process. Although Mbeki has acknowledged the value of departmental specialisation, the importance of inter-departmental coordination has been raised as a priority. This is reflected in the DFA's own evolving emphasis on playing a key role in the

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196 Interview with Dr Genge Chief Director Policy, Research and Analysis Unit 12/09/2006 Pretoria
facilitation of South Africa’s foreign policy, evident in the annual reports which list coordination and cooperation ‘with other government departments and stakeholders with regard to the pursuit of South Africa’s international relations’, as part of the DFA’s mandate.\(^{199}\) Indeed, in carving out a central position in the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making, the DFA not only confronts growing pressure from the ‘pulling and hauling’ of bureaucratic politics, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, there are increasingly complex networks of actors (domestic and international) seeking a position of influence in the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making.

\(^{199}\) Department of Foreign Affairs (2006) *Strategic Plan, 2006-2009*  
Chapter 4

On the Periphery? Domestic Participation and South Africa’s Foreign Policy

Introduction:

In a survey conducted on South African’s foreign policy beliefs, Philip Nel notes that ‘[b]y and large South Africans are much more concerned about domestic problems than they are about foreign policy issues...‘1 Despite the parochial interests of many South Africans, there are a number of stakeholders within civil society and business organisations that actively seek an influence in foreign policy decision-making. Dramatic changes in post-Cold War international relations and the development of multiple channels of communication and interaction have had a direct impact on the number and type of actor involved in the foreign policy process. In an observation relating to US foreign policy, Sharp notes that “[t]here is every indication of a new dynamic at work, one that redefines the relative roles of the public and leadership in the formulation of foreign policy, with the public assuming a larger role than some leaders may be comfortable with.”2 Certainly within the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) there is an emergent focus on domestic sources of influence. As Cohen and Küpçü point out, ‘[i]n reality, even states as powerful as the United States lack the necessary resources, bureaucratic interest, or even political motivation to address the ever increasing range of crises on the global agenda.’3

The end of apartheid and the wider changes in world politics, have contributed to the changing dynamic in the making of post-apartheid foreign policy. Despite the identification of the central role adopted by the president in South Africa’s foreign policy analysis, there are indications throughout the literature of the role played by

actors from within South Africa's domestic context. Rosenau points out that the "foreign policy of governments is more than simply a series of responses to international stimuli, that forces at work within a society can also contribute to the quality and contents of its external behavior." This chapter sets out to address two questions; to determine 'who' the actors are within domestic society that have an influence on foreign policy, and just how great that influence is. Although studies of the actors (or agents) involved in South Africa's foreign policy have attracted attention in foreign policy analysis, discussion surrounding civil society and business organisations tends to view the actors within these groups as homogeneous. As this chapter points out, not only is there a diverse range of actors, but their particular interests, objectives, and perspectives, create different opportunities for influence in the foreign policy process. In other words, the following analysis illustrates not only the plurality of actors within foreign policy decision-making, but also the dynamics between these actors and the foreign policy process.

A New Beginning: Participation in South Africa's Foreign Policy

Historically, South Africa's early prime ministers 'sharply discouraged' public participation in the foreign policy process. As the apartheid regime consolidated its hold on power and key opposition parties (SACP, ANC and PAC) were banned, pressure on the government emerged from a number of domestic and international sources. As Naidoo observes, '[t]o a large extent it was civil society organisations around the world that succeeded in changing governments' policies towards the apartheid state.' The subsequent chapter indicates that external sources had their own particular impact in shaping South Africa's foreign policy; however, in terms of domestic civil society, resistance to the apartheid regime was forthcoming from a number of organisations including among others, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the Black Sash, and organised labour groups like the Congress of

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South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Indeed, the period 1960-1990 was
caracterised by the mobilisation of civil society with the primary focus of securing the
end of the apartheid regime.7

With the negotiations for transformation agreed, and the Government of National Unity
(GNU) formed, participation from civil society played a central part in the new
government’s development. Adam Habib notes that following South Africa’s
transformation, the state displayed a ‘willingness to partner with NGOs in the policy
development and service delivery areas. This opened up a whole new avenue of
operations for NGOs and fundamentally transformed their relations with the state.’8 The
period 1994-1998 saw a particularly high-level of movement in human resources from
the realm of civil society to government, so much so that the acronym NGO became
synonymous with the idea of “next government official”.9 The reality was that there
was a shortage in terms of capacity in creating new governmental structures. This
created a space for domestic participation within areas traditionally guarded by the
state, for example, the participation of civil society in the creation of the White Paper
on South African Participation in Peace Missions.10 The general enthusiasm in
providing for greater participation in the ‘new’ democratic South Africa spilled over
into foreign policy. In defining South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, the skills
and knowledge brought in by actors external to the formal governmental structures,
were welcomed in policy workshops held within the Department of Foreign Affairs,
particularly in the formulation of the South African Foreign Policy Discussion
Document (1996). In addition, as Chapter 3 indicates, the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA) was established with the aim of stimulating
wider public participation in foreign affairs. The appointment of parliamentary liaison
officers from civil society organisations like the South African Institute of International

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8 Ibid, p. 678.
24/04/06. For the movement of key members of the public to government positions see P. Nantulya
Affairs (SAIIA), was viewed as a positive indication for future participation in the foreign policy process.\textsuperscript{11}

As the previous chapter highlights, international demands on the country continued to rise before the necessary governmental structures had been consolidated. Since elements within civil society were relatively more developed in terms of their organisational capability, they played a central role in some of South Africa’s early international achievements. For example, the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL) was able to place pressure on a reluctant government, which did not want to distance itself from the stance taken by its SADC counterparts, leading to one of the country’s most outstanding foreign policy success stories.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, in the area of South Africa’s multilateral diplomacy, Alden and le Pere note that civil-society representatives were integral in developing the agenda for the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Commonwealth, as well as negotiating the free-trade deal with the European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{13} In his analysis Kenkel points out that civil society actors had attributes that gave them an advantage in a period of governmental uncertainty including: specialised knowledge, institutional prestige, and an advantage in terms of capacity, ultimately leading to their inclusion in the policy making process.\textsuperscript{14}

During this period of high-level participation, the general willingness of society to assist in the construction of the government’s capabilities was tempered by the increasing inability to criticise government actions and policies without being classed as “unpatriotic” or worse, “racist”. It was not always a perfect working relationship between government and civil society actors as Mandela’s sporadic condemnation of


the “critical watchdogs” in society proved. However, despite critical comments, the rhetoric emanating from both the executive and the foreign policy bureaucracy has continued to highlight the importance of domestic participation; an indication at least, of a commitment to the idea of a democratic foreign policy. For instance, Thabo Mbeki highlights the need for the participation of civil society in government initiatives including the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), where he calls for the inclusion of the different sectors of society; ‘I am confident that by systematically working together – government, business, civil society – we can as Africans, begin to realise the goals of NEPAD.’ Mbeki has continued to place an emphasis on the importance of ‘social partnerships’, particularly in response to socio-economic challenges.

In addition to the president, the importance given to participation has been forthcoming from a number of sources. In an address to SAIIA (2005) the head of the ANC Presidency, Smuts Ngonyama, continued the theme of participation in re-affirming the importance of the ANC’s Freedom Charter in guiding the strategic goals of the country. He notes that at the heart of the Freedom Charter lies the principle of governance by the people and crucially that ‘[a]ll people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country.’ Moreover, within the foreign policy bureaucracy, under the leadership of Jackie Selebi, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) committed itself to participation from a broader base of people (academics, business, and media) in the foreign policy process. Selebi highlighted that ‘[t]here is a need to widen and deepen the debate on the issues facing us, inter alia, the democratisation of international relations.’ The importance given to the cultivation of relations between the DFA and civil society saw South Africa’s High Commissioner to the UK (1998), Cheryl Carolus, convene a meeting to solicit the views of civil society actors on her new role. She

stated that she saw herself as the ambassador not solely of the government, but of all South African society, and invited CSOs [Civil Society Organisations] to contact her for any assistance if required.  

Reflecting on the importance of engagement in the foreign policy process, the DFA’s Director General, Ayanda Ntsaluba, gave a particular commendation to SAIIA. He notes that they not only assisted ‘in the development of national positions and initiatives, but also stimulated debate and understanding’.  

Chapter 3 indicates the growing emphasis within the DFA on defining a central role in coordinating and facilitating foreign policy. To this end, Deputy Foreign Minister Sue van der Merwe’s address at the NEPAD strategy workshop finalising the National Implementation Strategy (2006), is quick to highlight the importance of developing relations between foreign policy stakeholders highlighting that “[w]ithout a framework document guiding the work of all stakeholders, including the provincial and local levels of governments, as well as business and civil society, we will continue to act without proper coordination and integration.” Nevertheless, although the rhetoric emanating from the Presidency and foreign policy bureaucracy continues to stress the importance of civil society and business participation, as South Africa’s post-apartheid government consolidated its position the role of civil society within foreign policy has become increasingly opaque. Garth le Pere and Brendan Vickers are particularly critical of the impact that the initial high-level participation of civil society has had on future inclusion in the policy process. They note that ‘NGOs have played too dominant and irresponsible a role in the transitional period. Policy was often developed without the necessary oversight by and accountability to parliament and the cabinet.’

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On the Periphery? Determining Civil Society's Foreign Policy Role

A primary concern regarding the participation of civil society has been the predominant role of the president and the centralisation of power within the executive. The ANC’s alliance partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), noted that the government is ‘setting a dangerous precedent in barring civil society organisations from international forums because they have disagreed with them from time to time.’

COSATU has itself been actively engaged in drawing attention to the authoritarian regime in Swaziland through the use of border blockades (2003), and has increasingly been following its own policy line in opposition to the government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach towards Zimbabwe. Between 2003-2004 COSATU orchestrated protests at Zimbabwe’s border posts and arranged an independent fact-finding mission (members of which were promptly refused entry or forcibly removed), all without the support of the government. COSATU occupies a complex position between government and civil society. As part of the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance it is in a position to influence policy decisions from within the alliance structure, as well as lobby the government from its position as a civil society organisation. However, as the government’s failure to adopt a prominent position on Zimbabwe and Swaziland indicates, pressure from COSATU has not affected substantial policy adjustments by government.

In the main, the general perception is that South Africa’s NGOs are finding it increasingly difficult to engage the government, especially when there is divergence of opinion. For instance, the government quickly distanced itself from the Anti-corruption Forum, which included Business Unity South Africa, the Institute for Security Studies, SA National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), COSATU, and the Public Services

24 T. Eetgerink (04/04/06) ‘Barring TAC from Aids session ‘attack on society’’ Mail and Guardian online
/ accessed 05/04/06

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Commission, after a leaked report concerning justice for corruption during apartheid. Additionally, the debate concerning HIV/AIDS and the provision of anti-retroviral drugs has seen some of the most public displays of the division between Mbeki and civil society (and within the ANC). The high-profile disagreement that surfaced in 2006 saw the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the Aids Law Project (ALP) barred from attending the UN General Assembly’s special session on Aids. The reason provided by the Director of Health, Thami Mseleku, was that the TAC and the ALP had ‘on previous occasions used such global platforms to vilify the government and, particularly, President Thabo Mbeki.’ In response to pressure, the government did invite the TAC general secretary, Sipho Mthathi, to attend but only in her personal capacity. She later criticised the government noting that ‘it was “unbecoming” of a democratically elected government to exclude organisations just because they held opposing views.

Although there have been disagreements between government and civil society on particular issues, even where support for initiatives has been forthcoming, greater participation has not always followed. In the African Civil Society Statement (2005), the government found backing for the pursuit of its ambitions in redressing the imbalance of power in international institutions, however, there was criticism regarding the peripheral position accorded NGOs. The government report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is a particular source of discontent.

To date there has been no real consultation with any social partners by government in the drafting of the report, despite numerous frustrated attempts by civil society. We believe this goes against the spirit of the entire Millennium Project, and unless corrected through the adoption of a transparent participative partnership with civil society for the remained of the Millennium Project, this

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28 ‘Call for justice on apartheid corruption.’ (23/04/06) Sunday Times http://www.sundaytimes.co.za/articles/article.aspx?ID=ST6A179547 accessed 26/04/06
unilateral approach of government will threaten the successful attainment of the MDGs.\textsuperscript{31}

This is not the first time there has been a division between government and civil society on issues relating to South Africa's foreign policy agenda. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), driven forward by Mbeki, was initially criticised by South Africa's civil society for concentrating efforts on 'raising external resources, appealing to and relying on external governments and institutions', as well as its top-down approach, driven by 'African elites and drawn up with corporate and institutional instruments of globalisation...'.\textsuperscript{32} The response from Mbeki was that the NGOs had made "all manner of unfounded and ill-informed accusations" and that democratically elected leaders were behind NEPAD.\textsuperscript{33} While wider debate continues regarding the 'democratic' credentials of NEPAD's members,\textsuperscript{34} within South Africa, recognition has been given to the role of business and civil society actors in an attempt to redress the tension. Nevertheless, Bond highlights the restrictive nature of NEPAD, which 'contains no concrete actions to be taken by the African peoples, no offer of organisational resources, and no civil society implementation plan. The policy document itself has only been made available to African civil society via the internet – and then very obscurely.'\textsuperscript{35}

The centralisation of power within the executive has created further tension between civil society and government regarding the status of these non-state actors in the policy process. Krista Johnson points out that, 'Mbeki ascribes to the state the role of knowledge producer, able to develop policy and set the agenda for social transformation. He restricts the role of civil society organisations to that of

\textsuperscript{33} J. Katzenellenbogen (01/07/02) 'Mbeki accuses NGOs of being 'ill-informed'' \textit{Business Day} http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=559056 accessed 03/05/06
\textsuperscript{34} I. Taylor (2005a) \textit{NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?} Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 47.
mobilisation, and the implementation of directives from above. Analysis reveals that within government, perceptions remain concerning the central position of government in guiding foreign affairs, 'This is in part because governments see themselves as the only actors with a negotiating mandate where transitional issues are concerned.' This is a position reflected in Valli Moosa's approach to the Great Limpopo project (2000) where representatives from the community had little access to the top-level International Technical Committee (ITC) meetings.

In addition to criticism regarding the marginalisation of civil society actors, South Africa's foreign policy analysis highlights the changing nature of civil society/government relations. Instead of playing a central role in foreign policy decision-making, the position of civil society has been increasingly linked to that of 'service provider' in the implementation of foreign policy decisions. In other words, the period of 'in-sourcing' during policy formulation (the use of experts during the period of participation) has been transformed into 'out-sourcing' aspects of foreign policy implementation. As Nicola de Jager observes, 'pluralism, as demonstrated in and expressed through the multiplicity of civil society organisations, is too, being restrained with attempts to institutionalise the role of these organisations, and with civil society's function largely being confined to implementers of governmental policy.' This coincides with a more prominent emphasis by the Mbeki administration on 'implementation and service delivery' as opposed to the drafting of new policies. This point was corroborated by Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma's statement at the Annual Heads of Mission Conference (2005) where the importance of 'an integrated approach in the implementation of foreign policy' was revealed to an audience that included 'the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank, as well as South African

38 Van Amerom and Buscher (2005), p. 175.
Airways, SA Tourism and South Africa the Good News.” Mashile Phalana of Earthlife Africa has remarked that, “Government doesn’t want NGOs which advise, only NGOs which do things like feeding Aids orphans”. Indeed, the government has been criticised for its perception of NGOs as service providers who produce ‘research reports as and when requested to do so’.

While concerns have been raised regarding the growing distance and changing context of civil society/government relations, there is apprehension that some civil society groups may become too close to government, constraining their ability (and autonomy) to influence foreign policy, particularly in light of the ‘government’s desire to co-opt civil society into its ruling bloc’. In the US, President George W. Bush has already challenged the independence and value of business and civil society organisations. Not only were corporations given ‘non-bid contracts’ for the reconstruction of Iraq, he informed NGOs that they were in fact ‘an arm’ of the government and that those receiving funding from the government should not speak to reporters or publicly express a critical opinion of US foreign policy. For civil society organisations, being admitted to the inner circles of decision-making is an enticement, but it comes at the price of not appearing too critical of official government policy, effectively restricting foreign policy influence apart from in a supportive context.

Questions regarding the independence of civil society organisations have been raised, especially in relation to funding received from government. Adam Habib notes that while funding from government sources provides an element of financial stability to civil society organisation, it has ‘come at a cost.’ He goes on to observe that ‘[t]he commercialization and professionalization have blurred the nonprofit/profit divide, and

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have led to questions around the lines of accountability of these organizations.\textsuperscript{49} However, receiving funding from international sources has not added to perceptions of independence. Certainly Mbeki has raised questions regarding the scale of foreign donor influence on setting South Africa’s foreign policy agenda, and whether ‘NGOs in South Africa are being manipulated by foreign donors’.\textsuperscript{50}

A key debate regarding the position of civil society in the policy processes has been in identifying the distinction between engagement and influence. Habib notes that civil society may have an impact on foreign policy making through institutional influence like lobbying government or protest (for instance the protest at the Seattle round); however, he goes on to question the level of civil society influence as far back as 1994. He maintains that while there might be engagement between the ANC policy-making elites and people in academia and research organisations, engagement does not equal influence.\textsuperscript{51} This is a similar position to that argued by Le Pere and Vickers who note that government is the final decision-maker in the policy process, and while open to ‘input’ from domestic sources, ‘participation’ is not guaranteed.\textsuperscript{52} They go on to assert, ‘it bears repeating that NGOs do not make policy and “participation” presupposes much closer cooperation than merely making “inputs.” Under the present government, there is ample room for making inputs but whether these are taken into account is another matter.’\textsuperscript{53} The distinction between ‘input’ and ‘participation’ is, however, not so cut-and-dried. Indeed, while this analysis recognises the definitive role of government in making the final foreign policy decisions, ‘input’ itself may be viewed as a form of participation, and even pressure as in the case of the SACBL, ultimately shaping foreign policy decisions.

Setting aside any debate regarding the use of terminology, the analysis by le Pere and Vickers indicates a distinction in degrees of involvement. In other words, within the

\textsuperscript{49} Habib (2005), p. 680.
\textsuperscript{53} Le Pere and Vickers (2004), p. 75.
'black box' of foreign policy decision-making, the role of civil society is not a constant. Rather, the levels of engagement within civil society/government relations are continually changing. In the analysis of the interaction between civil society and government, however, it is insufficient merely to highlight the varying degrees, or levels of participation within the foreign policy process, without identifying the complex composition of civil society. Although Nicola de Jager highlights the 'plurality' and 'multiplicity' of civil society, a particular shortfall in post-apartheid foreign policy analysis has been the study of civil society as a homogeneous group. Civil society is comprised of a number of diverse organisations each with their own interests, agendas, resources, perspectives and ideologies. In this regard civil society/government relations may be conflictual or supportive, and even this may change on an issue basis. In terms of civil society and business Cohen and Küpcü note, 'what is most striking about NSAs [non-state actors] today is that while some collaborate intimately with states, others tend to operate by their own rules, and are often guided by their own parochial interests - interests that may run counter to those of their home governments.'

The concept, 'civil society', is often used as a generalisation, an all-inclusive term without consideration of the broader debates within the field. While it is not the purpose of this section to go into detail, it is necessary to point out the problems in the usage of the term. There is debate on the actual value of the concept, with proponents advocating the range of definitions as pointing to the 'richness' of the idea, while sceptics argue that it is too abstract to have any meaning. Traditionally it has been used to denote the more general 'political society', while the more modern usage is in defining the area between the state and private property (economic society). In other words, an area separate from political society. Moreover, not all civil society groups have a direct

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56 Cohen and Küpcü (2005), pp. 35-36.
interest in influencing foreign policy. For a majority, the primary focus is on pressurising the government on domestic issues and service delivery.\(^{59}\)

In the context of foreign policy, civil society involvement is drawn primarily from a 'small stratum of the public whose occupational responsibilities require them to pay attention to the international scene, or whose self-image of their role and interests lead them to feel involved in foreign affairs.'\(^{60}\) In other words, while foreign policy rhetoric may place an emphasis on wider public participation, in reality it is a minority, usually the elite within society, who are able to organise and voice their positions. The outcome is that foreign policy tends to reflect elite interests. In South African foreign policy analysis, Vale and Taylor are particularly critical of the failures in linking foreign policy to the wider public interest.

It is remarkable that in South Africa today talk of water policy is linked to how it will help the poor; discussions of the country's housing policy reflect a similar concern; even legal matters and how they pertain to the 'ordinary citizen' are publicly explained and debated. Yet discussions of the state's foreign policy are divorced from any meaningful linkages with the population – as if Pretoria's interaction with the world (and vice versa) are privileged above and beyond its effects on the nation's constituents.\(^{61}\)

Wider public opinion has been sidelined in favour of what Masiza refers to as the 'experts' on South Africa's foreign policy.\(^{62}\) However, within the (elite) civil society strata actively seeking to influence foreign policy decision-making, there are a variety of actors, each with their own particular character and interests. While the general analyses points to the increased marginalisation of civil society in the foreign policy process, if the composite parts of civil society are considered separately, a more complex network of interactions becomes evident. Indeed, while elements of civil

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\(^{59}\) For instance the Soweto People's Delegation, which negotiated on behalf of Soweto's residents to write off the arrears owed to the local council. E. K. Zuern (2001) 'South Africa's civics in transition: agents of change or structures of constraint?' *Politikon*. Vol. 28(1), p. 13.


society may be on the periphery, others are drawn into a more central role in the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. Take for instance the trade negotiations between South Africa and the European Union (EU). The protracted nature of the South Africa/EU trade negotiations was attributed to the ‘time that the South African government took to consult various domestic policy elites over its response to the initial negotiating mandate adopted by the EU’, however, as Hurt points out, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), which brings together government, business, labour and civil society, had ‘little significant influence over the direction of the negotiations with the EU’.

**Developing a Foreign Policy Niche**

Although, as Chapter 2 indicates, Thabo Mbeki continues to play a predominant role in the foreign policy process, South Africa’s expanding foreign policy agenda and increased national-international linkages have seen a number of stakeholders from civil society, business, and even sub-national government (local and provincial authorities), drawn into the foreign policy process. The report, *Integrated Democratic Governance: A Restructured Presidency at Work* (2001), highlights the ‘bold promotional role’ of the Office of the President in foreign affairs while giving recognition to the multiple networks developing between South Africa’s government departments, non-state actors, business, and the international environment. Moreover, during South Africa’s hosting of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, Mbeki was responsible for opening ‘up an unprecedented avenue for civil society dialogue with government holding two three-hour consultations with some 40 civil society networks from around the world.’

The growing presence of non-state and sub-national government actors in international relations creates conditions that have seen national governments contending with ever

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64 Hurt (2006), p. 112.
more numerous and complex international networks. This reflects what Hocking and Smith describe as a ‘mixed actor’ approach, a concept used to indicate the diverse and multi-layered nature of world politics. These multiple actors and layers within international relations have a direct impact on foreign policy decision-making. As this section indicates, despite generalisations that civil society has been marginalized, changes within the wider international context coupled with the growing foreign policy interests and resources held by elements of civil society, has provided for greater inclusion in the foreign policy process. For instance, while NEPAD may be driven from within the presidency, its inclusion in the country’s foreign policy agenda has created space near the centre of the foreign policy machinery for those sections within the domestic constituency who possess good international connections along with key financial and technical capability. In other words, through their particular expertise, interests, and resources, sections within civil society have begun to define a particular niche in influencing the foreign policy process.

In contrast to NEPAD there are issue areas, like Zimbabwe, which the government has insulated from even its closest allies. When it comes to the recognition and development of relations with countries that have dubious human rights records, participation from civil society has been peripheral. Alden and le Pere note that ‘[a]s South Africa appeared to jettison its human-rights emphasis in favour of a more pragmatic position, the voices of civil society became still more muffled.’ Facing isolation, civil society and business actors have mobilised from outside of the formal foreign affairs machinery, bypassing government. This contrasts with the historical approach, which saw the foreign policy bureaucracy acting as gatekeepers, channelling and interpreting the interaction between the domestic and the international; a position reflected in Cohen’s analysis (in the early 1970s), that ‘[t]he opportunities for the public to have an impact on foreign policy reside in the mechanisms within the foreign policy establishment for understanding public opinion and for dealing with it in a policy-

relevant way'.\textsuperscript{70} Rather, as Hocking points out, greater interdependencies have reduced the 'capacity of foreign policy managers to maintain their claim to regulate the points of contact between domestic and international societies.'\textsuperscript{71}

Remarking on the impact of non-state international networks on diplomacy, Riordan notes that the 'entrepreneurial spirit' of public diplomacy has advantages as diplomats may not always have a detailed knowledge of key areas, or the specific skills required in international negotiations.\textsuperscript{72} In terms of participation in the foreign policy process, the 'entrepreneurial spirit' offered by civil society and business actors presents an advantage where the ministry of foreign affairs, or the presidency, may not have all the necessary skills and knowledge needed in an international environment that is witness to a growing technical emphasis. This changing balance in terms of resources and international networks has allowed, and in some cases enhanced, the ability of domestic actors in establishing their own niche in foreign policy. Landsberg observes that in the context of promoting the values of good governance, democracy and the protection of human rights, 'civil-society organizations are better able to do the unpopular democratization work that the South African government itself cannot be seen to be doing.'\textsuperscript{73} Within South Africa’s civil society framework, a number of research institutions and NGOs have come to the fore in carving out a particular niche in the foreign policy process.

There has been an extraordinary growth in South Africa’s international policy research community since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{74} Although they may present a wide range of ideological approaches and perspective, South Africa’s foreign policy research institutions maintain credibility in terms of their research output. Not only was an Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) publication listed as required reading within the

\textsuperscript{70} B. C. Cohen (1973) \textit{The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy}. Boston, Little Brown Company, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{74} Accord (1991), ISS originally the Institute for Defence Policy was established in 1991, IGD (1994), SANGOCO (1995), the Centre for Policy Studies started operating as an autonomous entity in 1996, IJR (2000), Brenthurst Foundation (from the Brenthurst Initiative, 2003)
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), there are frequent meetings convened between research institutions and visiting government delegations, highlighting the perceived value of these institutions as a source of information. As Nantulya points out ‘[i]t has become a tradition that whenever overseas dignitaries visit South Africa, part of their itineraries more often than not include a briefing session at one or two policy-related NGOs.’

South Africa’s research institutions have been particularly active in the country’s foreign affairs. For instance, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has been engaged in programmes for disarmament and demobilisation in Africa, and, in collaboration with the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), launched a major new project in 2006 called ‘Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect in Africa’. The project focuses on finding solutions to the crisis in Darfur with the aim of setting a precedent for the resolution of similar conflicts in the future. With support from actors including, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ford Foundation, Foreign Affairs Canada, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (mention of the South African government noticeable by its absence), it is hoped that the ‘project will set out policy proposals for strengthening national, regional and international responses to conflicts and large-scale human rights abuses on the continent.’

In addition, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) played a part in the mediation efforts in Burundi in the mid 1990s, while the IGD was active in assisting with the democratisation processes in Nigeria and re-developing and improving dialogue with Lesotho’s civil society actors following South Africa’s military intervention in 1998. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has been active in conflict management in the Congo and Sudan, conducted training (through the Foreign Service Institute) on conflict management and negotiation as part of the Heads of Mission orientation programme. Moreover, ACCORD has addressed the United Nation Security Council, and, in association with the University of Pretoria, hosts an

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78 Alden and le Pere (2003), pp. 18-19.
African Day Series aimed at the diplomatic community and the DFA. According to Nantulya, the underlying belief guiding the actions of these NGOs is that the problems facing the government (particularly in Africa) are so ‘multidimensional and complex that they need fulltime attention, technical expertise and finess; serious analytical capacity; and strategic engagement.’

In some respects South Africa’s civil society organisations have done more in cultivating relations within the country’s immediate region, and advancing South Africa’s African centred foreign policy, than the formal government structures. As Chapter 2 indicates, division within the multilateral forum of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has hampered South Africa’s interactions with the immediate region. Civil society actors have, however, made some policy progress. For example, the SADC – Water Division (SADC-WD) turned to NGOs in its formulation of policies appropriate to the shared watercourses within the region, including the World Conservation Union (IUCN); the southern African Global Water Partnership (GWP); the International Water Management Institute (IWMI); the Namibian based Desert Research Foundation (DRFN), and the Johannesburg based Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM).

Conservation has proved a major centre for the involvement of NGOs and business in international affairs. The idea of ‘Peace Parks’, like the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), draws on the African Renaissance principles guiding South Africa’s foreign policy, in highlighting the importance of participation by ‘the people’ in the regeneration of Africa. Indeed, a year after his hesitation in including civil society organisations in negotiations, the Minister for Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Valli Moosa, commended the work of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for its role in the establishment of the Maluti-Drakensburg Transfrontier Conservation Area in Lesotho. He acknowledged that “[w]ithout the

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support of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) the development of the transfrontier conservation and development area would have remained a pipe dream."82

Greater international interdependencies and common areas of interest, have given rise to the growing transnational nature of a number of civil society organisations like the SACBL, which as the following chapter points out, included a number of international NGOs (Oxfam, GEM, and church groups).83 Naidoo highlights the growing number of South African civil society groups on the international conference circuit including the World Social Forum and participation in a number UN sponsored conferences, while the South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) allied itself with the World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) in 1997.84 The growth in these transnational connections places additional pressure on government. As Collingwood points out, '[d]uring the past couple of decades, the transnational non-governmental sector has expanded markedly in some aspects. Indeed, certain analysts have hailed an international 'power shift' towards non-governmental actors, and a 'global associational revolution'. The number of non-profit organisations engaged in border-crossing activities and issues is now significantly larger than in previous decades.'85

Setting out to define a role in South Africa's foreign policy has not only been the preserve of civil society organisations. South Africa's provincial and local authorities have their own stake in the foreign policy process and are increasingly taking the initiative when it comes to international relations. Of the country's nine provinces, seven have an international border, and as such, have undertaken the establishment of international liaison offices and been involved in the signing of international agreements.86 Each province is now in effect competing with the other, and with the rest

of the international environment, for international recognition and the all-important foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1999 the City Council of Durban established a unit for 'international relations' while the province of the Western Cape established an official agency, WESGRO, to represent and promote the Cape's trade and investment in order to make the region and the city 'the most competitive business destination in the world by 2014.' In addition, the Western Cape government and the City of Cape Town Metro Council are playing an instrumental role in achieving South Africa's energy ambitions in acquiring 'a larger share of the supply side of the African energy industry, a sector currently dominated by non-African corporates.'

The implication of provinces, or sub-national regions, as international actors independent from central government has been a concept that Pretoria has had to grapple with. In 1998 surprise was expressed when the South African government took the decision to close its diplomatic mission in California, a state with 'the world's seventh largest economy and a global leader in high-tech and bio-tech along with the media and entertainment industries.' In the developed world, the international affairs of these sub-national regions are often distinct from that of the national government. In other words, as Mills points out, it cannot be taken for granted that Washington speaks for the business interest in California. Moreover, the divide between actions taken by government and those taken by provincial and local governments has led to increased problems of foreign policy coordination. In certain instances there has been a diametrical opposition between the two. For example, the actions taken by the provinces of Gauteng, Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal digressed from national policy on 'the provision of care and medication' for HIV/AIDS patients, after they entered into their own agreements 'with large pharmaceutical companies for the provision of free medication, much to the chagrin of the national state.'

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90 Ibid, p. 331.
Elements within South Africa's civil society have thus been actively engaged in South Africa's international affairs. However, in terms of their position in the making of foreign policy, there has been mixed success. While research institutions like SAIIA, the ISS and the IGD have been singled out for their contributions to foreign policy debate,92 and the SACBL succeeded in steering South Africa's policy on landmines, other groups, like NEDLAC, have found themselves insulated from the foreign policy process. Important questions remain regarding the disparity between involvement and influence. While certain actors have developed a niche within the foreign policy process, there are those whose inclusion is marginal. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the DFA's involvement in the multilateral conferences did not necessarily mean an influence in decision-making. So while Naidoo notes the inclusion of SANGOCO representatives in the preparatory conferences before the 2001 World Conference against Racism (WCAR) and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD),93 inclusion does not necessarily lead to greater influence in the policy process. Within the analysis of civil society's role in foreign policy there is, however, a tendency to disregard the influence that groups engaged in 'implementation' have on the decision-making process. As South Africa seeks to define its position in world politics, the successful attainment of foreign policy objectives will require wider consultation and cooperation in foreign policy decision-making. In other words, the knowledge and skills acquired through the implementation of foreign policy feeds back into the decision-making process, influencing future policy decisions.

The influence of civil society groups in foreign policy should not be under-emphasized, nevertheless their position within the decision-making structure should not be over-emphasised. After all, they compete with a number of stakeholders in attracting attention from the centre. For instance, instead of encouraging international public involvement, the idea of 'Peace Parks' has been seized by political elites as a product ready to be exported in providing solutions to ongoing border conflict throughout the world.94 Not only was the idea of 'public participation' diluted, divergent interests among the elite placed further pressure on coordinating policy. In the final instance the Limpopo Transfrontier Park has contributed to an increase in tensions between states,

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particularly the dominance of South African business and the problem of the inequitable division of profits between the three countries, which have only served to reinforce perceptions of imperialist business tendencies in an already sceptical region.95

Civil society groups are often described as altruistic, autonomous, cooperative, efficient, empowering, participatory and transparent, but as Igoe and Kelsall observe, “small scale” could mean “insignificant”, “politically independent” could mean “powerless” or “disconnected”, and “low-cost” could mean “underfinanced or poor quality”.96 While the collapse of the old regime heralded a new and inclusive role for domestic contribution in policy formulation and implementation, it also saw the fragmentation of focus and organisational interests. Just as there is ‘pulling and hauling’97 within the foreign policy bureaucracy, so elements within civil society compete for attention and influence in the foreign policy process. Naidoo notes that, ‘[o]ne of the weaknesses of civil society’s attempts to inform foreign policy in many countries around the world that has a resonance in South Africa is the uncoordinated efforts of different parts of civil society. While there has been a growing alignment of some sections of civil society domestically, this has not translated into more unified approaches to foreign policy.’ In other words, with multiple actors seeking inclusion in the making of foreign policy, limited co-ordination between these groups has affected their ability to play a significant role foreign policy. Indeed, government’s ability to co-ordinate contributions from a range of civil society actors consumes additional capital and human resources not easily spared. In the more developed states like Canada, avenues have been created for direct public participation in foreign policy through developments in information and communication technologies, as well as the creation and financing of forums for consultation including the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD). However, as Black points out, this still costs millions of tax dollars and raises the question of the ‘transferability’ of this sort of system for states in the developing world where there is often a shortfall in both finance and technology.99

96 Igoe and Kelsall (2005), p. 16.
Competition for a central position in the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making is not merely limited to civil society and sub-national authorities. These actors face additional rivalry from well funded, and generally more organised business interests. As Johnson observes, '[i]n many government departments, economically and politically powerful interests such as big business have had the largest input into the policy process.'

The following section notes that business in particular has carved out a central role in the foreign policy process. Indeed William Gumede reveals that, '[t]he director of the South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO), Abie Ditlhake, has bemoaned the strong influence of business on government policymaking', while 'Mbeki's economic adviser, Wiseman Nkuhlu, has stated that Mbeki has gone to great pains to understand business concerns.'

**Foreign Policy Inc**

Chapter 3 indicates that over the course of South Africa’s first decade of democracy there has been increasing emphasis on the importance of economic trade and development. A criticism of the ANC led government is that it 'displays some features of corporatism, that is an arrangement in which the state grants exclusive opportunities for organized interests such as trade unions and organized business to take part in bargaining with the state on specific functional issues, thus in effect guaranteeing a bargaining monopoly.' As this section points out, on the whole, foreign policy stakeholders from within the business community have had remarkable success in carving out a position near the centre of foreign policy; more so than organised labour despite its apparently privileged relationship with the ANC.

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102 Ibid.

Unlike civil society, the business sector’s record during the apartheid era is more ambiguous. While civil society organisations earned their struggle credentials, which played a key role in their inclusion in the transformation process, the literature indicates different interpretations of the role played by business. Proponents of business’s role in bringing an end to apartheid point to examples of the challenges made against apartheid law, for instance the action taken by Harry Oppenheimer to redress the migratory labour laws and establish a permanent labour force on the Free State Goldfields (overturned by Dr Verwoerd). Moreover, advocates point to the role of business in meeting with the ANC in exile. Those that adopt a more sceptical position highlight the use of business in the continuation of apartheid rule. For De Klerk’s government, the ‘back door of commerce’ was a significant instrument in their African policy during the late 1980s early 1990s. In a bid for Africa’s support, a large business delegation accompanied the president on his trip to Nigeria (1992). With the visit declared a ‘breakthrough for Pretoria’s African strategy’ it was hoped that Nigeria’s recognition of the regime would pave the way for the acknowledgement of the government by the rest of Africa.

The immediate post-apartheid period was one of insecurity between the new government and the economic sector. The distance between the new ANC led government and commerce was further compounded by the decision to leave key sectors of the economic ministry (Finance and Mineral & Energy) under the direction of members from the former government in order to appease the more conservative interests from both local and international sources. Following Mbeki inauguration, there was growing speculation that relations between government and business had worsened. Indeed, business itself complained about the general lack of access to key policymakers. However, over the course of South Africa’s democratic development,

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and particularly during Mbeki’s incumbency, business has assumed a more central position in the foreign policy process.

Business, like civil society, is composed of a range of different actors each with their own interests and objectives. Apart from particular tension between government and the tobacco and pharmaceutical companies, on the whole, actors from within South Africa’s business community have had success in developing a prominent role in the making of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. They offer technical expertise, financial resources, and hold a certain amount of sway over investment and trade from the international arena through their cross border connections. Gumede sets out the direct nature of business engagement in his observation that,

Mbeki draws heavily on business advice. He has gathered around him a select group of prominent people, mostly business leaders, divided into five working groups (dealing with black business, ‘big’ business, labour, agriculture and religion) and three councils (dealing with information technology, international investment, and international marketing) which he consults on key economic and social policy issues.

The growing need for technical economic expertise in foreign affairs, particularly in trade negotiations, was behind the significant role played by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as opposed to the DFA in post-apartheid South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations, including the EU free-trade negotiations. The development of the three councils, including the International Investment Council, International Marketing Council, and International IT Council, coupled with the Big Business Working Group (BBWG) represent the business elite and the CEOs of leading multinationals respectively. Dlamini indicates that the significance of these groups is that they meet with the president for the express purpose of sharing views on

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111 As Antoinette Handley highlights, the term ‘business’ is used to refer to big business rather than small or medium sized business. Handley (2005), p. 212.
114 Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 16.
government performance 'and provide insights on how the foreign investor community is likely to respond to these.'

It is not only technical expertise that has led to the inclusion of business in foreign policy decision-making. Their transnational connections, linked to the foreign policy emphasis on economic development and trade, place the commercial sector in a favourable position. Chapter 3 drew attention to the suggestions regarding the use of business chambers, rather that DFA or DTI, in representing South Africa’s economic diplomacy. The business community, and particularly the mining sector, have established ties and representation in regions where there is limited official diplomatic representation. In addition commercial interests have shaped South Africa’s approach towards foreign affairs; in particular, the commercial incentives behind South Africa’s enthusiasm for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to join the SADC (1997).

By 2004, and Mbeki’s state visit to the DRC, the president was accompanied by a large business delegation (including 20 senior executives) with a focus on setting up ‘joint ventures in mining.’ As South Africa’s foreign affairs spokesmen remarked, the DRC holds ‘enormous economic potential for South Africa’s private sector in general and the mining sector in particular.’

The importance of business/government partnerships is represented in a number of South Africa’s bilateral relations within the immediate region. Agreements signed include significant components that will rely on the country’s commercial sector including: business investment in Mozambique through the development of the Maputo Development Corridor Project; the Mozal II Aluminium Smelter; and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) who committed R20 billion for the development of

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agricultural projects. Business was also included in the 2003 donor meeting in Lesotho in support of funding projects in mining, tourism and the development of infrastructure, while the establishment of a Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JPCC) between South Africa and Botswana included interests in mining, tourism, monetary and financial arrangements as well as the development of infrastructure. The inclusion, and growing participation, of business in South Africa’s foreign affairs has seen the adaptation of the foreign policy bureaucracy in taking these actors into account. As Chapter 3 points out, the foreign policy bureaucracy has placed renewed emphasis on facilitating and coordinating policy decision-making. In the DFA’s Strategic Plan 2006-2009, it was noted that ‘South Africa’s business interests need to be promoted in order to rectify the trade imbalance that presently exists in favour of many Latin American countries’, while 2005 saw the conclusion of ‘[t]wo successful South African/Turkish business summits and exchange visits, contribut[ing] to bilateral trade during 2005 totalling over eight billion Rand.

The inclusion of NEPAD in South Africa’s foreign policy objectives allows greater participation for elements within business in foreign policy decision-making. The section above demonstrates that the rhetoric emanating from the executive has increasingly focused on cultivating involvement from within South Africa’s domestic society. The importance of broad-based participation in NEPAD is highlighted in Mbeki’s statement at the ‘Stakeholders Dialogue’ (2004).

[I]t is also very important that we assess the level of participation by Africans in the programmes of NEPAD, particularly the involvement of the different sectors

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126 Ibid, p. 27.
of our African people – the women, youth, workers, intelligentsia and others as well as the many Africans that are now in the Diaspora.\(^{127}\)

However, it was the business sector that was singled out for its role during Mbeki’s presentation.

Clearly, the private sector has a key role to play in the future development of the continent. We need increased participation by the private sector in the NEPAD programmes such as infrastructure development, the diversification of production and in the drive to add value products.\(^{128}\)

To this end there has been a focus on the active development of a partnership with the private sector including the establishment of the NEPAD Business Group, which represents the views and interests of South Africa’s corporate sector and acts as an intermediary between NEPAD and approximately one hundred and fifty companies including, local, international and multinational businesses.\(^{129}\)

In 2000 Mills lamented that ‘South African based business is a necessary fundamental, yet seldom employed asset in Pretoria’s African policy’.\(^{130}\) Growing business ties within the region and corporate involvement in NEPAD have gone some way to amending this shortfall. The corporate sector has gone on to achieve success in drawing together international actors and the South African government in the Kimberley Process. The role of ‘blood diamonds’ in maintaining civil conflicts within Africa was originally highlighted by an NGO (Global Witness) in 1996, but has subsequently been taken up by a range of actors. The process called for a particularly close interaction between business (especially De Beers in their unique position as the worlds leading supplier), the DFA, and Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. Although there was no legally binding agreement, the outcome of the process was increased pressure for social responsibility in the diamond trade as well as the heightened public awareness of


\(^{128}\) Ibid.


the atrocities been committed within these conflict regions.\textsuperscript{131} In this context, the involvement of business in the Kimberley Process added to South Africa’s foreign policy pursuit of a key role in world politics.

The Kimberley Process is a good example of business affecting the decisions of government and being employed as an asset in Pretoria’s foreign policy. However, as in the case with other non-state actors, business aims and objectives do not necessarily coincide with that of government. South Africa’s foreign policy places an emphasis on the country’s African identity and role as a pivotal member of the global South. In contrast, business is primarily driven by a profit motive. Failures in communication, coordination, and integration between business and government have borne witness to foreign policy embarrassments. In the case of the DRC, Williams highlights that

\begin{quote}
Despite the continuing violence, commercial opportunities have attracted a variety of South African multinationals to the DRC. Fourteen such companies, including Anglo-American, De Beers, ISCOR, Saracen, Banro and Mecantille CC, gained notoriety for their activities in the DRC when they were named by the UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC (2002) as having violated the ethical guidelines on corporate accountability and human rights formulated by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

Furthermore, business is often a source of tension between South Africa and Africa. There is deep-seated suspicion from the rest of Africa towards South Africa’s business sector. Criticism has been levelled at the involvement of South Africa’s businesses in NEPAD with Nigerian Academic, Jimi Adesina, remarking that it gave the corporate sector the “opportunity to drape themselves in the South African flag and take over markets across the continent”.\textsuperscript{133} This is not without good reason. In trade with Africa, the surplus is in favour of South Africa with an aggressive move northwards by South Africa’s leading corporations. As analysts observe, ‘South African corporates now run the national railroad in Cameroon, manage power plants in Mali and Zambia; control

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\textsuperscript{133} Jimi Adesina, quoted in Sturman (2004), p. 35.
\end{flushright}
banks and supermarkets in Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya; dominate the huge telecommunications market in Nigeria, Uganda and Swaziland; and hold a majority share in Ghana’s flagship mining house, Ashanti Goldfield.134

While business may have ‘the ear of the president’, limitations in foreign policy influence continue to exist. In other words, like civil society organisations, the position of business is not a constant in foreign policy decision-making. As Handley points out, ‘business is also handicapped by its profile and political past (specifically its association with the political and economic programme of apartheid). The racially exclusive nature of the business community, historically at least, continues to affect its broader political legitimacy and policy profile.’135 In comparison with the less organised interests of civil society, foreign policy stakeholders from within the business community continue to be drawn into more central position within the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. As Joel Netshitenzhe notes, “[a]ny state has limitations, especially in the realm of economic policy. … Capital lies in private hands and so, in some areas of social activity, we have also to depend on the cooperation and even the leadership of others.”136

The Media and Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy

Within the analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy the participation of both civil society and business has been addressed, however, an area that has not received detailed critical analysis is the influence of the media (both print and electronic) in shaping foreign policy decision-making. In noting the significance of the media, Hill points out that the media ‘seem to be the key to influence over public opinion, and they have the ear and eye of government.’137 Within the South African context however, when it comes to foreign affairs public opinion is fairly parochial.138 In his survey of South African foreign policy beliefs, Nel remarks that ‘[f]or all practical purposes, there is no

public opinion on foreign policy in South Africa."\(^{139}\) While Nel’s survey adds to the analysis of ‘what’ South African foreign policy opinion is, in the broader foreign policy literature there is very little analysis into ‘how’ these beliefs are informed.

The media’s position between government and the public allows for influence in two key directions, ‘over public opinion, and then over decision-makers, including indirectly via the political class.’\(^ {140}\) In the first instance, the media guides what the public is exposed to, and their perceptions regarding a specific issue. Hastedt points out in relation to the US, ‘[t]hat the American media does not care equally about all areas of the world or types of international relations problems is seen as a major source of bias in its impact on American foreign policy.’\(^ {141}\) The selectivity of international issues covered in South Africa’s media shapes public awareness. As van Nieuwkerk queries, ‘[i]s the public aware, and supportive of, South Africa having 3 000 SANDF troops deployed in crisis situations that might require peace enforcement (combat operations) as opposed to peacekeeping?’\(^ {142}\) While the ongoing crisis in the Middle East receives media coverage, South Africa’s involvement in the DRC and Angola, including the key issues and players, have not been addressed to the same extent.\(^ {143}\)

In terms of influence over decision-makers, as the discussion above highlights, foreign policy influence from within South Africa is still dominated by the elite. In other words, those papers serving this readership will have more influence in foreign policy debates. Within South Africa’s media, in terms of foreign policy influence the black news media is peripheral. The focus is primarily given to domestic issues with little significant coverage of foreign affairs. The Afrikaans media is fighting its own parochial constraints while debate continues on its influence. The Afrikaans press faces stagnation in its readership numbers and often finds itself ‘at loggerheads with the government on contentious issues such as crime, black economic empowerment and the changing of street, institution and municipal names.’\(^ {144}\) However, the editor of Beeld,
Peet Kruger, points to the continued significance of the Afrikaans press in ministerial circles. Nevertheless, the limited readership has forced a reconsideration of the position of the Afrikaans press. Indeed, as Robert Brand highlights, “[t]hat is why Naspers, the biggest publisher of Afrikaans media, has expanded into English-language media as well as media beyond South Africa’s borders.” Richard Calland singles out the English-language *Business Day* as ‘the most influential daily newspaper in the country, as its readership cuts across elites in both the political and corporate spheres, and because its economics is so close to that of the president and his minister of finance’.* Business Day is perceived as a means of guiding foreign policy debate. As Jonathan Katzenellenbogen notes, within the pages of *Business Day*, foreign policy positions are staked out and key members of the foreign policy elite express their analysis and opinion.

President Mbeki has himself been very sensitive to media criticism. While the black news media have provided more sympathetic coverage of Mbeki, on a number of occasions he has lashed out at the wider domestic press for their ‘European mindset’. Jacobs and Calland note, ‘Mbeki’s tendency to cling to the most vegetative patterns of the ‘romantic’ past has affected, very negatively, his relationship with the media’. Furthermore, he has adopted a particularly critical stance towards the international press for their coverage and portrayal of Africa. Calland notes that following the spat between Mbeki and the media, the president stopped reading the local press. Relations have since been reconciled with concerns regarding media access to the president leading to the establishment of the Presidential Press Corps (2002), however, questions remain concerning its success in developing improved ties between

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148 Interview. Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. (25/07/07) Former International Affairs Editor, Business Day
the media and the presidency. Indeed, Mbeki only gives one post-cabinet media briefing a year.\textsuperscript{154} Nevertheless, it has been noted that staff within the presidency take careful note of opinion pieces written by analysts ‘from “reputable institutes such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and Idasa” (according to one senior manager there), on the grounds that it may shape public opinion around a particular issue.’\textsuperscript{155}

There are, however, a number of limitations on media influence in foreign policy. In the first instance, coverage of foreign affairs is often a very distant second to domestic events. Indeed, on average the media only gives between 33-45 percent of coverage to foreign affairs, and even then if a late breaking story comes in it is usually the foreign affairs article that is replaced.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, foreign policy issues are usually a ‘difficult sell’ to editors, which often limits their coverage. Moreover, like business, the media is governed by profit margins. This not only affects the stories covered, but limits the number of correspondents a newspaper may employ around the world. Indeed, papers like Business Day do not have the capital to employ large numbers of correspondents.\textsuperscript{157} Certainly, the influence of papers like Business Day, the Financial Mail, and the Mail and Guardian, should not be over-emphasised.

The perceived independence of the media has an impact on its ability to influence public opinion and decision-makers. As Hill indicates, ‘[n]ot only do the media often fail to rise to the occasion, but they can be more easily manipulated by policy-makers than the general public realizes.’\textsuperscript{158} The SABC faces particular criticism in this regard. Pippa Green laments that ‘the 1999 Broadcasting Act, which committed the broadcaster to the “highest standards of journalism” and “fair and unbiased coverage”, finds little reflection in today’s SABC.’\textsuperscript{159} The independence of the SABC is under the microscope following allegations of media bias and corruption. For example, it was reported that the acting TV political editor (Sophie Mokoena) received a ‘generous gift of shares

\textsuperscript{154} K. Brown (31/07/07) ‘Spin doctors should at least keep Mbeki in the loop.’ Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/opinion.aspx?ID=BD4A528190 accessed 02/08/07
\textsuperscript{156} Hill (2003), p. 275. Interview: J. Katzenellenbogen 25/07/07
\textsuperscript{157} Interview. Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. (25/07/07) Former International Affairs Editor, Business Day
\textsuperscript{158} Hill (2003), p. 277.
from Tokyo Sexwale and proceeded happily to file a story on his presidential candidacy, without mentioning that she had benefited from his munificence.\textsuperscript{160}

In the United States, the media is increasingly singled out for its role in influencing public opinion, which in turn has produced a growing number of studies evaluating its impact on foreign policy decision-making.\textsuperscript{161} In South Africa, analysis on the influence of the media and public opinion on foreign policy are still fairly underdeveloped. However, as South Africa's media develops its position in relation to the state and growing issues of national-international linkages permeates the public's consciousness, the press will play an increasing role in shaping public opinion on foreign affairs, ultimately impacting on foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, as Leonard and Alakeson observe, 'without public debate, the government cannot win much needed domestic support for its foreign policy objectives, and will eventually meet resistance domestically and disbelief abroad.'\textsuperscript{162}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Although the president has been singled out as occupying a central position in the foreign policy process, this has not precluded a number of civil society actors from seeking an influence in foreign policy decision-making. Following South Africa's democratic transformation, elements from within civil society played an active role in supporting the transformation of the state. Moreover, with the principles of democracy still in the spotlight, the focus, at least in the rhetoric, remained on the importance of public participation. While there were significant achievements for civil society in shaping the state's foreign policy in the immediate post-1994 period, its continued importance has been mixed in light of the centralisation of foreign affairs within the executive, and more recently the Department of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, this chapter highlights a number of questions regarding the role of civil society.

\textsuperscript{160} P. Green (29/07/07) 'The rise and fall of the SABC.' \textit{Mail and Guardian} online. Accessed 30/07/07 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=315133\&area=/insight/insight\_comment\_and\_analysis/


While it has been noted that even relatively strong associations like COSATU (with close links to government) do not seem to be able to influence government positions, a number of civil society actors have developed a means of exerting pressure in the foreign policy process through the development of key specialisations and resources. This means that while elements of civil society have found themselves languishing on the periphery of the foreign policy process, there are a number of NGOs and research institutes that have taken the initiative when it comes to foreign policy, not only in developing a niche in contributing to foreign policy decision-making, but in undertaking their own international affairs. The result has seen the development of multiple channels of interaction between civil society, government, and the international environment, which has not always resulted in a coordinated foreign policy approach.

In carving out a position in the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making civil society faces competition from other foreign policy stakeholders. There are a number of complaints from civil society organisations that ‘Thabo Mbeki ‘the business-friendly president’ has given business leaders unprecedented scope to shape government policies.’ ¹⁶³ However, while elements within civil society and business have had some successes in defining a foreign policy niche, broader public opinion on foreign policy remains underdeveloped. As a tool in the dissemination of information and the education of public opinion, South Africa’s media still face a number of limitations. Nevertheless, with growing interdependencies and South Africa’s own international ambitions, the media will play an ever more important role as an influence on foreign policy.

This chapter draws out the plurality of actors within civil society, business, and the media. By taking into account the diversity within domestic sources of foreign policy influence, new dynamics in the making of foreign policy are exposed. While there are generalisations regarding the peripheral role of civil society, elements within civil society have re-defined a position closer to the centre. The same is true for business, when viewed as a homogeneous unit, business may have adopted a more prominent position in the foreign policy process, however, individual business elements may be on

the periphery. Although domestic participation in foreign policy decision-making should not be over-romanticised, the localisation of international issues will see a growing number of domestic stakeholders involved in the country’s international affairs. However, it is not just an array of actors within the state that seek an influence in foreign policy decision-making. As the subsequent chapter indicates, not only have international issues become localised, local issues have become internationalised.\textsuperscript{164}

The development of transnational linkages between civil society, business, and the media, have given rise to a growing number of actors from the international milieu that play a part in shaping South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{164} Hocking (1993), pp. 9-10.
Chapter 5:

‘No man is an island!’: International Influence and South Africa’s Foreign Policy

Introduction:

Acknowledging the role of external realities in shaping the direction of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, Thabo Mbeki, in his weekly Letter from the President, highlights the ‘importance of developments in the rest of the world to what we are striving to achieve in our own country.’ Up to this point the thesis has focused on the impact of domestic actors in determining South Africa’s foreign policy. However, as Wallace points out, ‘[t]he characteristic which distinguishes foreign policy from domestic policy is that it is intended to affect, and is limited by, factors outside the national political system as well as within it.’ Nevertheless, there is ongoing debate within international relations regarding the ‘explanatory primacy of external or internal factors for understanding the relationships among states.’ In South African foreign policy analysis, the emphasis has primarily been on domestic sources of influence in explaining foreign policy decisions. Apartheid in particular, was typically viewed as a source of frustration for the state’s international ambitions. However, to accept that ‘foreign policy was a product of, or response to, internal events’, is to overlook the constraints on foreign policy decision-making from the international milieu.

The previous chapters indicate the growing number of domestic foreign policy stakeholders, however as Rosenau observes ‘foreign policy does not occur in a

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2 Ibid.
vacuum. Nor does it arise exclusively out of the demands that originate within societies. This chapter highlights the diversity in the sources of international influence. Not only are there a myriad of international actors, foreign policy decisions face a range of constraints emanating from physical location, and subsequent regional interactions, to the structure of the wider international system. Moreover, influence from the international environment is not uniform. Elements from the international environment are involved at varying degrees within the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making. Admittedly the question of exactly how much influence elements within international society have in shaping the country’s foreign policy is a complicated area of analysis, not least because it is not an aspect that governments willingly divulge in light of preoccupations with state sovereignty. Nevertheless, through the analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy ‘counterresponses’ to the external milieu, it is possible to identify elements of policy adaptation. Certainly post-apartheid foreign policy has been responsive to, and indeed adaptive to, the pressure from the international environment, although some influences have assumed more prominence than others.

**International Influences in a Period of Isolation**

This analysis focuses primarily on external influences on post-apartheid foreign policy; however, South Africa’s current international relations are not disconnected from the past. Foreign policy decisions by the ‘new’ democratic government reflect past international relations of both the apartheid regime and the African National Congress (ANC). As this section indicates, despite debate regarding the weight of international pressure in ending apartheid, even at its most isolated, South Africa’s foreign policy was subject to external influence. International involvement in South Africa’s foreign policy is one of historic record. Although the Union of South Africa (1910) had ‘Trade

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Representatives’, South Africa’s foreign affairs were channelled through ‘the British Foreign Office, via the Department of the Union Prime Minister and the governor-general…’.\(^\text{10}\) It is no surprise therefore, that the establishment of the Department for External Affairs (1927) and the Union’s own overseas representatives was described by Hertzog as ‘an absolute necessity for the Union’ in order to signify the country’s sovereign independence and ensure that its own interests were given paramount attention.\(^\text{11}\)

The values underpinning the apartheid regime’s domestic policies had a direct bearing on its foreign policy principles. Nevertheless, responses from both state and non-state actors towards apartheid South Africa, coupled with the realities of the international system, played a part in shaping foreign policy. Certainly the international isolation of the apartheid regime served to affect the choice of allies. This saw relations develop between Pretoria and other ‘pariah’ nations, including Israel, Paraguay, Chile and Taiwan.\(^\text{12}\) Israel was particularly important in ‘providing South Africa with modern technology and equipment with which to modernise its security forces’,\(^\text{13}\) while support from the Taiwanese proved useful in contributing to the regime’s capacity in ‘low-intensity warfare, particularly that of psychological operations.’\(^\text{14}\) Moreover, there was growing speculation that Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan had ‘shared nuclear technology’ and ‘worked together in the production of a nuclear bomb.’\(^\text{15}\) Isolation, coupled with Africa’s decolonisation played a role in shaping South Africa’s policies towards the continent. It led to foreign policy initiatives aimed at establishing relations with the newly independent black African states including Strijdom’s ‘hand of friendship’, and Vorster’s policy of ‘Detente’, both of which sought rapprochement with Africa.\(^\text{16}\)


\(^\text{11}\) Muller (2005), p. 10.


\(^\text{13}\) Ibid.


Changing international norms generated further international pressure on South Africa's foreign policy. Audie Klotz notes, '[t]hat the global shift towards racial equality left the Afrikaners beyond the normative bounds of international society is evident in the increasingly isolationist views among Afrikaners and their attempts to justify the apartheid system.'\(^{17}\) The US, in particular, assumed a leading role in championing the right to self-determination (Atlantic Charter) and saw pressure on South Africa as an important part of its own policy. As Chester Crocker remarked, '[t]he United States has an inherent and proper interest in purposeful change in South Africa towards a non-racial system; the possible failure of such a change is a threat to our own values and interests.'\(^{18}\) Growing international condemnation of apartheid had a direct impact on foreign policy decisions relating to South Africa's membership of international organisations.\(^{19}\) Chapter 2 drew attention to Verwoerd's unilateral move to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth; however, behind this decision was wider pressure from the organisation, where the 'National Party government was forced to resign by colleagues [within the Commonwealth] who found it impossible to reconcile continued membership of the apartheid state with postwar commitment to "non-racialism" as the primary value underpinning the Commonwealth's role in international society.'\(^{20}\)

The unfolding Cold War, and the divisions within the international system, played a part in shaping Pretoria's foreign policy. The perceived communist threat\(^{21}\) saw the government adopt the 'Total National Strategy' by the end of the 1970s, providing the 'blueprint for both domestic and foreign policies.'\(^{22}\) The independence of the former Portuguese territories, Angola and Mozambique (1975), brought an end to the colonial buffer between South Africa and independent black Africa. It also saw the growing

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\(^{17}\) Klotz (2004), p. 18.


\(^{19}\) Klotz (2004), p. 18.


\(^{21}\) Also known as the 'Rooi Gevaar', or the red peril, which was viewed as 'a Kremlin-manipulated war waged against Pretoria', which included the ANC and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). Mills and Baynham (1994), p. 19. Moreover, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola only made it easier for the government to justify its anti-communist position.
presence of (communist) Cuban forces in Angola. Mills and Baynham note that "[t]he sudden collapse of Portuguese control in Mozambique and Angola set in motion a chain of events which considerably altered Pretoria's foreign policy options, forcing a policy retreat to within the boundaries of Southern Africa." The importance of the end of the Cold War for South Africa's international relations is highlighted by Geldenhuys as "a final and perhaps crucial consideration that weighed with the South African government." Rapprochement between the East and West created conditions in which the National Party government could no longer justify its military response to a 'communist threat'. As Pik Botha remarked, '[t]he ideological war is over. The world has changed. Our challenge is to adapt; to craft new policies which promote the kind of change which will bring our country into line with the freest and most successful in the world's industrial democracies.'

The international question concerning the status of South West Africa/Namibia had important implications for South Africa's foreign policy decision-making. Negotiations saw Pretoria in contact with a range of different international actors both from within the region and further afield. These interactions served to demonstrate that negotiations with an adversary in high-risk political circumstances could bring positive results. This provided momentum within South Africa towards furthering negotiations between the apartheid regime and the major liberation movements including the ANC, the UDF and the IFP. The successful outcome in the form of the Namibian-Angola settlement, created a climate of reduced security risks within the region. As Crocker points out,

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The Namibia-Angola settlement of 1988 ended one historical phase and opened the door to the best opportunity that regional leaders have ever had to build a constructive future. ... The Namibia-Angola settlement has given fresh impetus to the search for peace elsewhere in the region, with political logic now prevailing over reflexive military action.\(^{30}\)

International actors and changing international circumstances not only served as an influence on South Africa. After being driven into exile by the apartheid regime, the African National Congress (ANC) was itself a source of international pressure on the apartheid regime whilst being subject to changes in the international environment. Mbeki indicated that since the formation of the ANC, it has 'been involved in efforts to influence [apartheid] South Africa's international relations and the world context in which the country has had to operate and survive.'\(^{31}\) In order to affect pressure on the apartheid government the ANC (along with other groups) was actively involved in activities aimed at raising international public awareness and opinion against apartheid and briefing prominent visitors going to South Africa.\(^{32}\) Chapter 2 points out that the ANC was particularly active in multilateral fora and achieved some success, although it did not manage to secure the regime's total isolation. There were periods where the ANC became disillusioned with international organisations as a result of the limited support they received; however, these organisations, including the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN, proved an important part in projecting the ANC's message to both the wider international community and 'the white national government at home.'\(^{33}\)

Just as isolation limited the choice of allies for the apartheid government, the international system imposed constraints on the ANC's own choice of allies. The failure to convince Western states to impose mandatory sanctions on South Africa, and the marginalisation of the organisation up until the 1980s, helped shape the organisation's

choice of allies. As some ANC members have indicated, the choice of allies became a case of following the ‘path of least resistance.’ 34 For this reason relations with the USSR (and later China) became a central part of the ANC foreign affairs.35 The end of the Cold War and the rise of the ‘new world order’ had an impact on the ANC as much as it had on the South African government, particularly in terms of support from its former allies such as Cuba, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.36 Indeed, during South Africa’s transitional negotiations (in the early 1990s) analysts highlight the role of ‘powerful international interests’ in pressurising the ANC into ‘moderating its aspirations’.37

International actors continued their involvement in South Africa, particularly in the run up to the democratic elections of 1994. The early 1990s saw an increase in direct involvement from the international community, particularly in financial and technical assistance.38 The period 1994-1999 saw donations from a number of countries, the largest from the US, followed by the European Union, with other donors including ‘the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Germany and the UK’.39 As Thabo Mbeki observed in the early 1990s, ‘international relations have a greater or lesser impact on the domestic situation of each country’,40 a point which the following sections build on in highlighting the role of international actors in shaping South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy.

35 Relations with China were never as significant as those with the USSR. The ANC established itself in the ‘pro-Moscow camp’, while the PAC had closer ties with China. However, as the Soviet Union faced collapse ties between the ANC and China improved. S. Naidu (2006) ‘South Africa’s relations with the People’s Republic of China: mutual opportunities or hidden threats?’ State of the Nation 2005-2006. (eds) S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel, R. Southall and J. Lutchman. Pretoria, HSRC Press, p. 461.
National-International Linkage

The general approach in South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy analysis has been to focus on the role of the country in international affairs (inside-looking-out), rather than the influence of international affairs on the country’s foreign policy (outside-looking-in).\(^\text{41}\) Indeed, in highlighting constraints on South Africa’s foreign policy Alden and le Pere point to ‘domestic strength and resources’, deficiencies in human resources, and Mbeki’s particular worldview.\(^\text{42}\) Claudia Mutschler adopts a similar position in pointing to ‘pressing domestic needs’ and the catchall notion of the ‘national interest’ as the key elements in explaining foreign policy formulation.\(^\text{43}\) Former Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Jackie Selebi, typified this approach in noting that “[f]oreign policy is nothing other than the pursuit of domestic policies and priorities internationally”,\(^\text{44}\) while the *Foreign Policy Discussion Document* (1996) has been criticised for ‘undervalu[ing] the limitations of the external environment …’\(^\text{45}\)

In addition to the foreign policy stakeholders within South Africa, who pursue a role in shaping policy decisions (foreign policy bureaucracy, civil society, and business), there are a number of external factors that condition foreign policy decisions. Rosenau’s concept of national-international ‘linkages’ not only highlights that ‘international political systems, like all interdependent groups, are shaped by and are responsive to developments that occur within the units of which they are comprised’,\(^\text{46}\) he also point to the role of external influences, indicating that ‘national political systems, like all organized human groups, exist in, and are conditioned by, and respond to a larger environment.’\(^\text{47}\) As South Africa rejoined the international community, Pretoria faced a number of competing influences from the external milieu on its foreign policy

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47 Ibid.
decisions. As Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen observe, ‘[t]his [international] institutional order on the one hand legitimated the ‘new South Africa’ by endorsing its liberal constitutional principles and the peaceful nature of its transition, and thus constituted it as a new and respected member of the society of states. On the other hand, this order also imposed a behavioural pattern on South Africa that constrained it in its expressed desire to contribute to significant global change.’

Soon after the 1994 democratic elections, post-apartheid South Africa came under pressure from the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) to assume a key role in pursuing economic sanctions against Abacha’s authoritarian regime in Nigeria. To begin with the ‘new’ government followed a line of ‘quiet diplomacy’. Following the execution of the nine Ogoni activists, Mandela assumed a more direct approach using the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in New Zealand to call ‘for tougher measures including the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth and the imposition of an oil embargo.’ Despite Mandela’s efforts to place pressure on Nigeria, an oil embargo was not imposed and international (Western) companies continued to extract oil. Moreover, South Africa faced growing hostility from African states who perceived Nigeria as ‘less an offender against human rights than as a continental leader which had been a doughty opponent of apartheid, a strong supporter of liberation movements, and which contributed up to a third of the OAU’s [Organisation of African Unity] income.’ The lack of international support coupled with negative pressure from Africa, which criticised the South African government for undermining African solidarity, saw Pretoria’s decision-makers hastily perform a policy u-turn. South Africa left the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), established to determine what measures should be taken against Nigeria, as soon as was politely possible.

49 Alden and le Pere (2003), pp. 21-22
50 Ibid, p. 22
The United States has, on a number of occasions served as a constraint on Pretoria’s foreign policy choices. South Africa’s role in the NPT renewal negotiations may have been touted as one of the ‘biggest multilateral successes...’\textsuperscript{54}, however, South Africa faced considerable pressure from the US on the question of the treaty’s extension. Pretoria received warnings from the US ambassador in South Africa indicating that a position contrary to US wishes would negatively affect ‘mutual interests’ and change Washington’s perceptions of South Africa’s non-proliferation credentials.\textsuperscript{55} Alfred Nzo went on to comment that the ‘realpolitik of the global order helped move Pretoria’s position and acted as a constraint indicating that “there are certain realities we cannot ignore. [The West] constitute the undeniable economic power base of the world today.”\textsuperscript{56} It was only after the re-negotiation of the treaty and criticism from the developing world that Pretoria assumed a stance perceptibly less in-line with the dominant powers in an effort to appear ‘independent’. However as Taylor points out, by this time it was too late as the government had already assisted in establishing the rules of the game.\textsuperscript{57} South Africa also came under pressure from the US following the 1997 decision to sells arms to Syria. As Jack Spence points out, in addition to domestic opposition which drew attention to Syria’s human rights record, South Africa faced international hostility from Israel, and ‘protests from the US government, which threatened to cut off Aid...’.\textsuperscript{58} Ultimately the government announced that the arms deal with Syria would not go ahead as ‘peace is in the interests of everyone in the Middle East.’\textsuperscript{59}

Wider international realities have played a part in conditioning post-apartheid foreign policy decisions. This is particularly apparent in the case of South Africa’s ‘Two Chinas’ question. Although Chapter 1 highlights Mandela’s role in taking the final


\textsuperscript{57} Taylor (2006a), p. 176.

decision regarding the question of recognition, there was significant external pressure aimed at affecting policy outcomes. In the run up to the final pronouncement, both the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) placed considerable pressure on governmental decision makers. Taiwan's 'chequebook' diplomacy offered the government substantial benefits in terms of investment. In addition, as Alden points out, 'Taipei sought in particular to influence the incoming ANC Parliamentarians. Over 200 MPs were flown to Taiwan where they were provided with an official visit that reportedly included a substantial per diem.'

Pressure was also forthcoming from the PRC on a number of high-profile diplomatic meetings including, former Foreign Minister Nzo's visit to Beijing in March 1996, a visit by the PRC's minister for Trade and Economic Cooperation, Madame Wu-Yi, to the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] in March 1996, and President Jiang Zemin's tour in May 1996. The investment and economic potential of China in South Africa, as well as investments by South African companies in China, added to the pressure on the government, particularly from companies like ISCOR and South Africa's arms industry. Although dual recognition was floated as an option, the Chinese emphatically rejected this position, with recognition ultimately awarded to the PRC. As Naidu points out 'in the ultimate analysis, Pretoria could not ignore the rise of China in the global system and the attendant benefits that establishing formal ties with Beijing would bring, especially with regard to the new regime's aspirations in the reformed Security Council and in the context of South-South co-operation.'

In highlighting the impact of the 'larger environment' on South Africa's foreign policy decisions, and the government's subsequent response, the examples above primarily indicated the external pressure originating from states. Each of these policy decisions, however, drew the attention of international non-state actors, including those NGOs and business interests that had a stake in the foreign policy process. It is insufficient merely to note the role of states as an external influence on South Africa's foreign policy

decision-making. External pressure is not a homogeneous entity; rather, there are a number of non-state actors actively engaged in foreign affairs. National-international ‘linkages’ have facilitated a more penetrative role for international actors, blurring the distinction between domestic and international influences on policy making. For example, in the US international pressure on think tanks and research organisations has been used to influence policy, particularly in light of Washington’s strong lobbying culture. In his study, Judis highlights the influence of Japanese investments on US foreign policy think tanks,

The Japanese are especially interested in think tanks because they play a critical role in Washington, translating academic research into policy recommendations. Think tankers like the Brookings Institution’s Robert Lawrence frequently testify in congressional hearings on U.S.-Japan issues. Think tank reports also carry considerable weight in policy debates.64

The concern for governments is that these ‘transnational relations’ are beyond the control of the state’s foreign policy organs.65 Just as state sponsored institutions face questions regarding their independence, international support (financial or otherwise) for domestic institutions raises questions regarding their ‘interest’ and independence. As Habib and Kotze caution, foreign donors ‘wield enormous power over the political and economic development and direction of recipient organisations and countries.’66 For instance, following South Africa’s political transition, concern was raised over the European Union’s democracy assistance fund, whereby those organisations ‘not welcomed by the ANC government could be excluded from getting financing or hindered in pursuing their activities.’67

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Although South Africa has not reached the levels of foreign policy lobbying present in the US, as civil society organisations and business develop their niche in the foreign policy process (see chapter 4), those international organisations who actively engage these actors will stand to play a more significant role in indirectly shaping South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa’s own foreign policy research organisations have a range of international connections. For example the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) lists one of its four roles as ‘international networking’, which sees the Institute ‘linking with international organisations and governments through the staging of joint research projects and publications …’ \(^68\) Research programmes also receive (necessary) international funding. The research programmes, ‘Business in Africa’ and ‘Consolidating Parliamentary Democracy in the SADC region’, receive funding from the Danish government, while ‘Democracy and Political Party Systems’ and the ‘Asia Pacific’ projects receive funding from the Ford Foundation and Taipei Liaison Office respectively. \(^69\) The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) hosts regular events in cooperation with international actors and undertakes ‘country programmes’ with international support. For instance the Department for International Development (DFID) funds the Angola Country Programme, while the Burundi Programme is being conducted in partnership with the UK based *International Alert*. \(^70\)

There are key examples where international campaign groups, in coalition with domestic civil society organisations, have served to influence South Africa’s foreign policy. This includes the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL), working in partnership with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The campaign for the ban on landmines included a range of domestic and international non-state actors; the Ceasefire Campaign, ACCORD and the Centre for South-South Relations, working in coalition with international groups like Oxfam (UK and Ireland),

\(^68\) South African Institute of International Affairs. ‘About SAIIA: Who we are’  

\(^69\) South African Institute of International Affairs. ‘Research’  

\(^70\) African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. ‘Angola Country Programme.’  
http://www.accord.org.za/angola/intro.htm Accessed 15/04/07, and ‘Burundi Programme’  
international church groups, and the Group for Environmental Monitoring. The South African government itself had not been fully supportive of the complete ban on landmines. In 1996 it was still pursuing the idea of a negotiated 'compromise' through support for the use of 'smart' mines. Explanations for South Africa's subsequent change in policy, to support a full ban on anti-personnel landmines, highlight the pressure from these transnational coalitions in motivating the government to assume a more active role in the Ottawa Process.

In growing recognition of the value of national-international linkages, South Africa has placed an emphasis on cultivating relationships with the African Diaspora (although the benefits of these linkages are still to be determined). The DFA's Strategic Plan 2005-08 provides for the role of the African Diaspora in promoting Africa and NEPAD in an effort to 'redress power relations, to defeat poverty and to stop the marginalisation of Africa and the African in the world.' The Strategic Plan 2005-08 goes on to note,

The Challenge exists to mobilise these communities to support the goals of the African Agenda and to assist the Continent in the development of skills and technological transfers. Linkages need to be created with the African Diaspora in order to explore opportunities for further collaboration.

In addition to the transnational linkages between international and domestic civil society organisations, cross border business linkages have rapidly intensified. As Handley remarks, '[t]he relatively open and internationalised nature of the South African economy also boosts the influence of international opinion and capital.' This influence on policy choices has been evident from the outset of the 'new' South Africa,
particularly in the decision to leave prominent ‘figure[s] from the *ancien regime*’ in control of key economic ministries in order to ‘reassure the financial markets…’. Moreover, ‘international financial institutions, foreign business school and economic policy think-tanks’ were actively engaging the ANC elite through training and courses in the run-up to the 1994 elections. As Chapter 4 indicates, Mbeki’s presidency has seen business, especially international business, maintain a position near the centre of the policy-making process. Indeed, at the 1999 SA/USA Business Finance Forum, Mbeki pointed to ‘selling strategic stakes to international players’, in the restructuring of South Africa’s state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the president consults regularly with the International Investment Council (IIC), which is itself composed of multinationals like Citibank, Siemens and Unilever. The developing linkages between the state, business, and international capital, has played a determining role in the position of the private sector in the policy making process. In her analysis, Donna Lee notes that ‘[a] key feature of the ANC government is the rich array of public-private partnerships that serve to embed the business community within the formal governance structures.’

While both state and non-state actors play a part in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy decisions, international interactions are conditioned by the fundamental nature of the international system and perceptions of the state or non-state actor’s role within it. This includes public opinion, as well as the perceptions of key individuals positioned within the formal policy making structures. Previous chapters have highlighted that South Africa’s foreign policy public opinion is still in a state of development. Rather, the perception of the international system, held by key individuals in both government and non-government institutions, shapes policy decisions. As Neack posits,

78 Handley (2005), p. 222.
sometimes these expected relationships even guide individual and collective decision making, serving as explanation or justification for particular foreign policy behaviors.\textsuperscript{82} Following his appointment as president, Mbeki has given particular emphasis to the imbalance of power within international affairs. In an address as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Meeting (1999), Mbeki observed

We need to debate and challenge anew, many of the assumptions made in the past about the rules of engagement of the international relations system. We must continue to be the conscience and voice of the weak and the powerless in the face of the dominant hegemony of the strong and powerful.\textsuperscript{83}

Mbeki has cast the international system in terms of a ‘global apartheid’.\textsuperscript{84} As the DFA’s Strategic Plan 2006-2009 sets out, ‘South Africa conducts its foreign policy within a global order that is characterised by political and economic marginalisation of Africa and the South in general.’\textsuperscript{85} Furthermore, on the assumption of a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (2006), Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma drew attention to the potential contributions South Africa could make while reiterating the constraints facing South Africa from within the organisation; ‘[t]he permanent members wield a lot of power in the UNSC so our contribution is in an environment where there is this power imbalance.’\textsuperscript{86}

Recognition of the international imbalance of power has seen a foreign policy emphasis on pursuing a position of ‘bridge-builder’ between the developed and developing world. As former minister of foreign affairs, Alfred Nzo, indicated,

The position in which South Africa finds itself is that it has features both of the developed and the developing world. It is truly at the point of intersection between both worlds – an industrialised state of the South which can communicate with the North on equal terms to articulate the needs, the concerns and the fears of the developing world. Conversely we can interpret the concerns and the fears of the developed world.\(^8\)

This position is echoed in the *Strategic Plan 2006-2009* which indicates, ‘[w]e shall continue to build bridges between people and nations, initiating dialogue and helping to set and assert a developmental agenda in a multilateral fora.’\(^8\) The perception of South Africa’s ‘special’ position within the international system has led to discussion on the country’s role as an emerging or middle power.\(^9\) Nel, Taylor, van der Westhuizen observe that ‘this role conception is both a function of a deep-rooted internationalist commitment among the ruling party, as well as a reflection of responsibilities being foisted upon South Africa by its peers who perhaps have an inflated expectation of what South Africa’s actual capability is.’\(^9\) Needless to say adopting a position as a middle power within the international system creates opportunities and limitations on the state’s foreign policy objectives. South Africa has reaped the rewards of ‘middlepowermanship’ in its role as facilitator in the successful resolution of the Lockerbie crisis.\(^9\) Nevertheless, Hamill and Lee indicate that in terms of the ‘managerial role’ of middle power states, South Africa has faced limitations from within Africa; ‘South Africa’s complex and problematic interaction with Africa since 1994 has frustrated its ability to play the typical middle power role of regional and sub-regional manager, orchestrator and leader.’\(^9\)

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‘Pro-core’, ‘Anti-core’, and Foreign Policy ‘Counterresponses’

As the discussion above notes, multiple actors, along with the environment in which they interact, affect South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making. Singling out the role of the international milieu in shaping foreign policy decision-making is, however, a platitude. Certainly the patterns of external influence are more complex than is often portrayed. Within the multifaceted framework of national-international linkages, the relations between actors create a number of actions and subsequent reactions. John Rothgeb sets out that ‘the behavior of any one actor tends to elicit counterresponses from other actors. These counterresponses redefine circumstances and confront actors with the need for new policy selections.’93 Following the establishment of South Africa’s foreign policy principles, post-apartheid decision-makers have found themselves increasingly trapped between competing ethical commitments, Western pressure, and African solidarity. As Northedge observes, ‘[t]he eternal experience of Ministers is to find that their choices are predetermined’, above all by ‘the intractable facts of international life.’ ‘Effective freedom in foreign affairs ... is capacity to choose between relatively few options.’94

South Africa’s foreign policy decision-makers have been confronted by the ‘intractable facts’ of the international economic order. In addressing the internal socio-economic challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa, the government has given particular attention to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade, allowing international capital a significant role in shaping post-apartheid foreign policy.95 By 1998 economic networking had received such an emphasis that Cooper suggested, ‘South African foreign policy is up ‘for sale’.’96 A point supported by Venter who notes that ‘economic interests hold sway over political principle in policy formulation.’97

Ian Taylor and Patrick Bond are particularly critical of South Africa’s ‘counterresponse’ to pressure from the international economic order. Their analysis highlights the ‘pro-core’ elements within South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making, whereby ‘consensus’ among elites in the periphery and core leads to foreign policy alignment.98 Taylor notes that ‘the GNU [Government of National Unity] elite are at one with the wider project as propagated by the transnational elite (indeed, the elite within the GNU’s leadership are part of this global class).’99 He goes on to criticise South Africa’s reformist (pro-core) foreign policy response to pressure from the international milieu, highlighting the post-apartheid government’s willingness to ‘iron out problems affecting the global order’,100 a theme Patrick Bond highlights in his analysis of Mbeki and the New Partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD). Bond’s analysis points to the burgeoning association between South Africa’s emerging black bourgeoisie and transnational elites. He goes on to conclude that ‘if international capital and its various institutional foundations, including the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO [World Trade Organisation], represent the chains of global apartheid, it is evident that Mbeki’s project [NEPAD] is shining, not breaking, those chains.’101

South Africa’s ‘pro-core’ economic diplomacy has drawn criticism from the developing world, particularly following Pretoria’s performance at the WTO summit of 1999 (Seattle). These negotiations demonstrated the ‘new’ government’s willingness to work within the current international economic order. Regardless of rhetoric, South Africa pursued a position of alignment with the larger economic powers, although couched in the language of ‘bridge-building’. Pretoria’s support for its developing world ‘partners’ came under the spotlight following the government’s apparent willingness to abandon them in favour of assuming a negotiating position in the ‘Green Rooms’, which allowed South Africa’s policy makers access to ‘the special meetings organised by the United States out of the public eye’;102 meetings renowned for their lack of transparency and

democratic participation. By 2002 South Africa had risen to the position of 'Greenman' or 'Friend of the Chair' at the Doha Ministerial Conference. In the final instance South Africa's approach to the Seattle negotiations resulted in a no-win position for Pretoria. As Donna Lee notes, South Africa's inclusion in the WTO deliberations was the result of US and EU pressure on the WTO Director General in the hope that South Africa's links to the geo-political South would ease negotiations between the developed and developing world. The failure of South Africa's bridge-building strategy at the Doha talks 'damaged its credibility vis-à-vis the US and the EU as well as damaged the trust of the G20+ and the Africa Group.' South Africa was subsequently omitted from the post-Cancun mini-ministerial meeting.

Moreover, Pretoria concluded a separate trade agreement with the European Union (EU) raising further questions regarding South Africa's commitment to its 'partners' in the South. As Hurt observes, 'the BLNS states [Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland] were not seriously consulted during negotiations. The EU financed the only impact study that was conducted on their behalf after a request was made by the BLNS states in January 1998.' Analysis highlights the neo-liberal position of the central participants, including South Africa's big business and the international financial institutions, who did not give much consideration to wider regional interests. Although the predominant emphasis has been on South Africa's 'pro-core' international economic policies, South Africa has drawn on international norms in justifying its more controversial policy decisions. For instance, Mandela observed that 'there are countries where there are human rights violations, but these countries have been accepted by the United Nations, by the Commonwealth of Nations and by the Non-Aligned Movement. Why should we let ourselves depart from what international organizations are doing?'

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105 Ibid, p. 70.
106 Ibid.
In his analysis Ian Taylor concludes that South Africa's foreign policy receives 'its cue from positions taken by the dominant global actors, and although independent flourishes are not entirely absent, Pretoria’s diplomacy is well within the bounds of 'acceptability'. While Pretoria may have assumed a reformist stance towards the international economic order, Taylor perhaps underplays the significance of the 'independent flourishes', particularly as a reflection of South Africa’s political international ambitions. Certainly as South Africa places a growing emphasis on relations with the developing world, and particularly on generating greater support from Africa, there have been increased efforts to demonstrate Pretoria’s ‘independence’ from the dominant international powers. Hill notes that, '[t]he hierarchy of states presses strongly down from the top, and rebellion against its ordering is difficult', however, he goes on to indicate that despite the growing interdependencies between states, and the conformity of foreign policy behaviour, there are still countries that exert an 'independent capacity for agency.' While Taylor highlights the influence of the dominant global actors on South Africa’s foreign policy choices, he also notes that it would be too simplistic merely to identify the country as a “lackey” of the West. There have been a number of ‘anti-core’ foreign policy decisions emanating from Pretoria as the country searches for its role in world politics. As Hey observes, ‘anti-core behavior may be a hostile reaction to the state’s dependence’, leading to ‘rebellion’, or ‘lashing out’, in an effort to redress the imbalance in state relationships.

South Africa’s ‘anti-core’ policy decisions include the resolve, during Mandela’s incumbency, to maintain ties with ‘rogue’ states like Cuba, Libya and Iran despite pressure from the US. Furthermore, there have been a number of actions within the United Nation (UN) that depict an ‘anti-core’ element in South Africa’s foreign policy decisions. The policy emphasis emanating from Pretoria has been on addressing the global imbalance of power, with particular attention given to the structure of the

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113 Ibid, p. 183.
organisation. As Scarlett Cornelissen points out, ‘[o]verall, South Africa’s UN involvement is strongly shaped by its desire to increase its global stature as a progressive and African power. This has resulted in an opportunistic orientation to the world body and as a consequence, several misapplied strategies.’ Although they may be viewed as ‘misapplied strategies’, they do however, represent ‘anti-core’ policy decisions within South Africa’s foreign policy.

The post-apartheid government has come under pressure for aligning itself with undemocratic regimes, particularly for its vote of “no action” on the crises in Sudan, Belarus and Zimbabwe. In the case of South Africa’s UN voting record, in a response to questions raised from South Africa’s vote on Myanmar/Burma, Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma responded,

\begin{quote}
We are of the view that there is a growing tendency to undermine multilateralism and other institutions of the United Nations by taking issues to the Security Council that should be handled by the relevant United Nations institution. The UN Charter gives primary responsibility to the UNSC [Security Council] for the maintenance of international peace and security. The adoption of this resolution would have set a precedent for the work of the Council, because any member of the council could bring any country for consideration, even though it might not pose a threat to regional and international security.\end{quote}

Although the foreign minister expressed concern regarding the human rights abuses in Burma, the decision to vote against the UN Security Council’s resolution is a position at odds with South Africa’s foreign policy commitment to human rights and democracy. South Africa has, however, increasingly employed its vote within the UN as a means of visibly demonstrating its position vis-à-vis the dominant powers. By preventing a ‘precedent’, Pretoria deflected the possibility of a number of African states with questionable human rights records from being brought before the Security Council

\begin{itemize}
\item[117] Cornelissen (2006b), p. 27.
\item[118] ‘SA’s UN voting record under fire’ Mail and Guardian online http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=236838&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news_national
 orative accessed 04/04/07
\end{itemize}
including Zimbabwe, which Pretoria has thus far managed to keep from the UN Security Council agenda.120

There are few policy decisions that demonstrate an explicit ‘pro-core’ or ‘anti-core’ character. Foreign policy ‘counterresponses’ to external influence are not so definitive. As decision-makers grapple with competing national and international pressures, foreign policy reflects a mix of consensus with the dominant international paradigm as well as decisions designed to signify a strategic position in world politics. Laura Hey points out that ‘the association between the two concepts [pro-core and anti-core] is complex and subject to influences at the individual, domestic, and international levels of analysis.’121 Certainly, at the international level South Africa’s foreign policy decision makers face the complex task of reconciling competing pressure from the developed and the developing world, particularly from Africa.

Competing International Influences

South Africa’s pursuit of economic trade and development has given rise to a significant influence from international capital within the ‘black box’ of foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, there are occasions where South Africa’s foreign policy has been ‘sold’ for economic advantage. For instance, as indicated in Chapter 3, questions regarding Equatorial Guinea’s human rights and democratic record were disregarded in favour of establishing ‘strong commercial and trade relations.’122 Nevertheless, international economic interests compete with other elements in shaping Pretoria’s foreign policy decision-making. Pretoria’s rebuff from Africa, following Mandela’s unilateral condemnation of Nigeria (1995), coupled with the focus on an African agenda, has led to a greater sensitivity towards Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy. Alden and le Pere point out that South Africa has been particularly mindful of the criticism that it is “‘pro- Western” and “un-African” in the eyes of other African


While international capital plays a significant role in shaping elements of foreign policy decision-making, the 'counterresponses' from Africa, following South Africa’s reintegration into mainstream international affairs, also plays a key role in redefining South Africa’s foreign policy choices. As Cornelissen highlights, '[i]ts activism on the ICC notwithstanding, on the whole South Africa’s participation on human rights at the UN has been informed and constricted by its larger political ambitions in other multilateral fora such as the AU, and as a consequence it has been ambiguous and has not enhanced its claim as an ethical leader.'

The government has clearly articulated the importance of Africa in South Africa’s foreign policy from Mandela’s Foreign Affairs article and the Foreign Policy Discussion Document, to Mbeki’s emphasis on the ‘African Renaissance’ and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In his address to parliament (2005), Mbeki remarked that government should be ‘conscious of the responsibility that we have not only to our own citizens, but also towards the rest of humanity in pursuing the goal of a better world. In the first instance, our greatest challenge in this regard is to consolidate the African agenda …’. However, circumstances have arisen where South Africa has found itself caught between wider (Western) international expectations regarding the foreign policy principles of democracy and human rights and an African emphasis on solidarity and sovereignty. As Hamill points out, ‘South Africa’s democratisation campaign has clashed head on with other African imperatives, most notably ‘solidarity’, ‘unity’ and ‘consensus’, and has, in effect, been subordinate to them.’

The weight accorded to African solidarity, unity and consensus has seen South Africa face a number of constraints on foreign policy decisions from within its immediate

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123 Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 22.
region. The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1998) saw a division between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on the best means to proceed in conflict resolution. The ‘pro-Kabila’ states not only ‘boycotted a variety of peace talks convened by Pretoria but also accused the Mbeki [sic] government of double standards with regard to its use of force in Lesotho but not in the DRC.’129 The failure of South Africa’s ‘negotiated settlement’ approach coupled with rising tensions within the SADC ultimately saw South Africa perform a policy U-turn. From Mandela’s public criticism of military intervention and the promotion of dialogue between the belligerents, South Africa moved to the declaration that the SADC ‘unanimously supported’ the military intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe.130 As Alden and le Pere point out, South Africa was ‘outmanoeuvred’ by other regional actors. Despite its initial opposition to military intervention, Pretoria ultimately ‘endorsed the intervention as being in the interests of the region’.131

South Africa’s greatest challenge in reconciling external pressure from Africa and the wider international community has been in response to the crisis in Zimbabwe. In light of the flagrant abuse of human rights and the principles of democracy, Pretoria faces growing criticism from the West (and a number of international and national non-state actors) regarding its policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’. The official position adopted by South Africa is that the problems facing Zimbabwe are of a domestic nature and therefore require domestic solutions.132 Mbeki has been particularly critical of international pressure noting,

These same detractors, who have their own partisan agendas, which they dress in the language of high sounding principles, are firm in their conviction that we have some divine right to dictate to the people of Zimbabwe what they should do about their country.133

131 Alden and le Pere (2003), p. 23.
accessed 15/08/07
133 Ibid.
While this policy of non-interference has been described as 'directly at odds with its stated foreign policy principles of speaking up for liberal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law', the policy emphasis on 'quiet diplomacy' and multilateral solutions reflect efforts to remain within the bounds of African solidarity and African consensus. Indeed, South Africa remains committed to the general position emanating from within the SADC. The SADC, for its part, met in early 2007 to consider the ongoing crisis within Zimbabwe but have been reluctant to place any 'pressure' on Mugabe. The official communiqué following the March 2007 SADC summit was watered down following protests from Mugabe, who continues to 'lay blame for his country's woes at the doors of the West'. In an ongoing act of solidarity, South Africa has joined with other African states in insisting on Zimbabwe's attendance at the Africa/EU summit (2007). Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, went on to state that "I think Africa will not move on its position of what constitutes the African delegation, ... Today, it is Zimbabwe [under pressure], tomorrow it could be us."

The anti-imperial rhetoric emanating from Zimbabwe has had an impact on elements within South Africa's own domestic constituency. Phimister and Raftopoulos indicate that 'at the heart of President Robert Mugabe’s offensive against the array of forces opposed to his rule are repeated attempts to place the Zimbabwe problem at the centre of a larger anti-imperialist and Pan-African position.' Support for Mugabe's approach from within South Africa was evident in his appearance at the funeral of the ANC's Walter Sisulu (Soweto), and the University of Fort Hare (Eastern Cape Province), where he was 'greeted with thunderous applause.' Moreover, Mugabe's defence of his policies from the West, and his attack on Britain and the US as 'agents of


135 B. Bosire (29/03/07) 'SADC leaders tackle Zim crisis.' *Mail and Guardian online.*

136 G. Marawanyika (30/03/07) 'Mugabe 'being pushed into a corner', ' *Mail and Guardian online.*

137 P. Simao (05/07/07) 'SA insists on Mugabe invitation.' *Mail and Guardian online.*

imperialism’ met with applause at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 2002); a theme continued in his address to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, October 2005. Mugabe’s aggressive land reform policies have found support, and resonance, with those in South Africa frustrated by the slow pace of South Africa’s own land reforms. This was a sentiment highlighted in the comment made by South Africa’s Minister for Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana, who pointed out that there was ‘a lot to learn from President Robert Mugabe’s programme of land reform.’

Mugabe along with other autocratic leaders from the continent, are increasingly looking east towards China’s ‘no-strings-attached’ loans and support. As Naidu indicates, Zimbabwe has already secured both military hardware and software and concluded a $600 million electricity deal, with ZANU-PF receiving support for its 2005 parliamentary campaign. Mbeki has adopted an ambivalent position towards China’s influence in Africa. In the first instance he notes China’s role in counteracting the dominance of the West in the global political economy. Indeed, he notes that there are those, ‘with regard to the China-Africa Partnership’ who will ‘do everything possible to project what is manifestly good as inherently evil’. However, soon after the 2006 Summit Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa (FOCAC), Mbeki is cited warning against the development of an unequal partnership and the ‘potential danger in terms of the relationship that could be constructed between China and the African continent’. He goes on to note that, “China cannot just come here and dig for raw materials and sell us manufactured goods.” Although Mbeki may welcome ‘the Chinese commitment to avoiding a neocolonial relationship’, his subsequent warnings indicate that he is...

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141 M. Soggot and A. Meldrum (11/01/2003) ‘South African minister hails Mugabe land grab.’ The Guardian (UK) http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,872558,00.html accessed 10/04/07
145 Ibid
cognisant that the Chinese offer of ‘no-strings-attached’ loans may serve to undermine the South African led NEPAD initiative with its focus on good governance and democracy.147

South Africa’s foreign policy decision-makers are confronted by the reality that while South Africa is part of Africa, it is not typically of Africa, which, as Hamill points out, ‘will complicate any attempt by Pretoria to “unequivocally project itself as an African country”, as some have suggested it should.’148 In an effort to overcome continental constraints and wider international pressure, while fulfilling South Africa’s ambitions as a ‘bridge-builder’ between the developed and developing world, Pretoria has given particular attention to multilateralism. Nel highlights that the recourse to multilateralism can itself be construed as a means of adapting to the international system in response to questions on the failure to adhere to foreign policy principles and the unilateral blunder in Nigeria (1995).149 By 1999 Jackie Selebi indicated that multilateralism is ‘the cornerstone of this country’s [South Africa’s] foreign policy.’150 In the period 1994-2000, South Africa ‘acceded to about seventy multilateral treaties and joined or re-joined more than forty inter-governmental institutions’,151 as well as playing a leadership role in SADC, AU, UNCTAD, NAM while chairing various conferences and initiatives. 152

South Africa’s multilateral approach to foreign affairs has raised a number of questions regarding policy decisions. As Nathan argues, ‘[p]aradoxically, multilateralism, which is intended in part to overcome South Africa’s constraints of limited capacity and influence, is itself a significant constraint in the pursuit of its objectives.’153 Multilateralism is by design a collective process based on cooperation and coordination. These complex structures, with their own organisational culture, norms, and political ‘pulling and hauling’, add their own set of constraints to South Africa’s foreign policy. There were initial expectations from the international environment that South Africa

151 Ibid.
would play a rejuvenating role in multilateral forums, particularly in its position between the North and South. However, Pretoria was soon exposed to the complexities of multilateralism as the host country for the World Conference against Racism, Intolerance, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR) 2001, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 2002. The WCAR saw problems arise over compensation for slavery and the definition of racism, and despite South Africa’s best efforts, diplomatic tensions reached a climax when the US and Israeli delegations withdrew after disagreement between the Arab states and Israel.

The WSSD was regarded as more successful although international tension was apparent in relation to perceptions on the fundamental purpose of the talks and the concept of ‘sustainability’. Multilateral forums are themselves subject to the changing dynamics of world politics. In other words, South Africa’s foreign policy decision makers need to take into consideration discrepancies between multilateral organisations and their ability to effect international reform. As Cornelissen indicates, the UNCTAD has seen a reduction in its ability to influence international trade negotiations with the organisation ‘eclipsed by other, emerging alliances among developing countries’. This has given rise to greater emphasis on other multilateral organisations including the G20+ and the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) trilateral grouping.

Multilateral platforms have provided a means for South Africa to shore up support from the developing world in addressing the inequality of the international order. In a statement to the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership Thabo Mbeki noted,

Furthermore, everyday the process of globalisation emphasises the gross imbalances in the global distribution of power, making it imperative that we use

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156 Ibid, p. 31.

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our collective strength urgently to achieve the restructuring and democratisation of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations.159

While working within the confines of multilateralism addresses South Africa’s sensitivity towards continental perceptions of the country as a hegemon, these forums have seen Pretoria in a position of ‘retreat’ in successfully pursuing its own foreign policy principles.160 This has been particularly evident in South Africa’s role within the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). From the outset Pretoria was faced with reconciling pressure from Africa, particularly Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and the need to attract international capital. Indeed, Alden and le Pere note that ‘strenuous efforts were made by South African officials to keep the NEPAD initiative administratively apart from the AU, as it was feared that the association with Gaddafi would damage support from G8 countries hostile to Libya.’161

NEPAD offered a new approach for the African continent based on the principle of peer review. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was designed to survey and monitor African leaders commitment to democracy, good governance and human rights. However, while Mbeki has been at the forefront of efforts to promote NEPAD and its objectives, South Africa has distanced itself from the peer review programme leaving Ghana and Rwanda to lead the way in becoming the first countries to complete a peer review in 2005.162 As Hamill points out, ‘[t]he promise of a thoroughgoing process of external peer review has since been watered down to a voluntary ‘self-assessment’ arrangement, assessment which rulers may ‘consider’ but are not obliged to act upon.’163 South Africa’s own Peer Review report has been criticised for being a ‘watered down’ version that was subsequently dropped from the APRM forum in January 2007 and delayed by a further six months.164

Despite the earlier condemnation of Africa’s autocratic regimes and the importance of good governance for development, Mbeki declared that the political governance of African countries would not be under review.\textsuperscript{165} Taylor provides two explanations for the adjustment of South Africa’s policy position, both highlighting the consideration of external pressures on decision-makers. In the first instance it was feared that ‘an effective NEPAD would split the continent politically’, \textsuperscript{166} which would be contrary to the pan-African unity espoused by the African Union. Secondly, on a political level, Pretoria has had to take into account the suspicions and misgivings from Africa’s leaders regarding its political and economic ambitions on the continent. \textsuperscript{167} These concerns have subsequently seen a split between economic and political principles, with NEPAD retaining an economic focus and the AU receiving the responsibility for aspects such as the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{168}

Defining a position as a ‘bridge-builder’ in world politics has faced considerable constraints from the international environment. These constraints have led to questions regarding South Africa’s ability to fulfil its role as ‘a “niche player”, based on a sound strategic understanding of what is going on, aided by its own experience and concomitant moral weight.’\textsuperscript{169} As Richard Calland reveals, although South Africa has purported a position of solidarity with the Palestinian people and indicated that “our principles can talk to everyone, and we do”, Pretoria has resisted calls for boycotts and sanctions against Israel.\textsuperscript{170} Following Pretoria’s adoption of a ‘realpolitik’ approach towards Israel, Calland refers to South Africa’s international role as ‘shadow-boxing above its diplomatic weight.’\textsuperscript{171} In the final instance, in reconciling competing international pressures, South Africa’s foreign policy ‘counterresponses’ to the international milieu play to a number of international audiences. In terms of the international economic order, South Africa has primarily adopted a position of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{Taylor2006b} Taylor (2006b), p. 165.

\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid, p. 166.

\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid.


\bibitem{Calland2006} R. Calland (25/07/06) ‘Is Pretoria shadow-boxing above its diplomatic weight?’ \textit{Mail and Guardian online} \url{http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=278548&area=/insight/insight_columnists/} accessed 02/02/07

\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid.

\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid.

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consensus with the dominant economic powers; however, Pretoria has been active in highlighting the global imbalance of power between the developed and developing world, particularly Africa, in an effort to secure a prominent position within the geopolitical South.\textsuperscript{172} As Taylor and Williams observe, '[a]broad, Pretoria has tried to appeal to both the powerful Western states by selling itself as a pro-Western bridge-builder capable of smoothing the differences between the North and the South, while simultaneously seeking to champion the values of the weaker Southern states in general and of an 'African Renaissance' in particular.'\textsuperscript{173}

\section*{Conclusion}

As Thabo Mbeki indicates in his \textit{Letter from the President}, South Africa is not isolated from international affairs.\textsuperscript{174} External factors do play a role in shaping foreign policy decisions; the question is just how significant their influence is in the foreign policy process? As this analysis indicates, there has always been a level of international involvement in South Africa’s foreign policy. Even at its most isolated, external influence was apparent in guiding South Africa’s foreign policy decisions. Although the apartheid regime’s domestic policies may have served as the starting point for policy formulation, ‘counterresponses’ from the external milieu created limitations on foreign policy choices. The successful transition to democracy and the re-entry into the international system saw the delineation of a new foreign policy. However, as Mills points out, it soon became apparent that ‘normalised relations did not necessarily equate with preferential relations.’\textsuperscript{175} In the making of post-apartheid foreign policy, decision-makers contend with a growing number of national-international linkages, particularly in light of the transnational character of non-state actors, which has seen an increase in the number of direct and indirect influences on foreign policy decision-making.

This analysis highlights that pressure from the external milieu varies in means and level, from direct pressure emanating from states or international capital, to the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{172} Taylor and Williams (2006), p. 6.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
developing transnational linkages between civil society organisations. In terms of the significance of external influence on post-apartheid foreign policy, South Africa’s policy decision makers have found their decisions limited by ethical commitments and competing Western and African expectations. These contending pressures and subsequent constraints have elicited a number of counterresponses from Pretoria demonstrating both consensus (pro-core) with, and opposition (anti-core) to predominant international actors and paradigms. Counterresponses to international pressure are not always easily identifiable as distinctly pro-core or anti-core. What the South African experience demonstrates is that the majority of foreign policy decisions reflect ongoing efforts to balance competing international pressures from a changeable external milieu.

Conclusion

- **The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making**

Following the end of the Cold War international relations witnessed a rapid increase in the number of non-state actors engaged in world politics. The changing context of foreign affairs, with its greater interdependencies and porous state borders, challenged the realist paradigm; however, the pluralist 'mixed actor' character of the international system also raised questions regarding the study of foreign policy. On the one hand analysts argue that "there is a steady erosion of a separate concept of foreign policy".\(^1\) Transnational actors have gained significant ground in their ability to affect world politics; for example, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) with its network of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) from a range of countries, 'accomplished [in just six years] what the United Nations had struggled to achieve for decades.'\(^2\) Nevertheless, Christopher Hill points out that '[s]tates and their foreign policies have a crucial role to play in knitting together the burgeoning activities of the international system.'\(^3\) He goes on to note that while non-state actors may develop policies delineating their engagement with the international milieu, with a few even having greater resources at their disposal than some states, 'their capacity to take responsibility for actions, structures and consequences is profoundly limited. ... To see the two phenomena as rivals is to make a category mistake.'\(^4\) In other words, while there may be a number of sub-national and non-state actors involved in shaping foreign policy decision-making, the state is still a primary actor in the foreign policy process.

As foreign policy analysis (FPA) sits at the boundary of both domestic and international affairs, research needs to consider the changing dynamics within both spheres. Indeed, Douglas Foyle notes that, 'FPA will need to further integrate into its examination of

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foreign policy formulation the expanded opportunities that exist for pressure from the public, world opinion, and globalised citizens.⁵

In contrast to ‘first generation’ foreign policy research, or comparative foreign policy (CFP), foreign policy analysis (FPA) pays considerable attention to multi-causal explanations and domestic sources of influence in the foreign policy process.⁶ In addition, analysts highlight the multi-layered nature of foreign affairs. Indeed, Hocking and Smith’s ‘mixed actor’ approach points to the ‘diverse and multilayered’ character of world politics.⁷ As Chapter 1 indicates, although the study of South Africa’s foreign policy has been preoccupied with interstate relations and performance analysis, there has been a growing emphasis on examining domestic sources of foreign policy influence. There are also analyses that depict the multi-layered nature of South Africa’s policy decision-making process. In the study of South African foreign policy Graham Evans’ (1999) brief (state-centric) analysis highlights the distinction between two-tiers of government actors. The first-tier comprises the President and Deputy President, key departments within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA), while the second-tier includes national and local governmental authorities.⁸ Although Evans notes the ‘plethora of organizations, agencies, interest groups and personalities involved in foreign policy projection’,⁹ they have not been included within the tiers of the foreign policy process leaving a significant shortfall in the analysis, particularly in the South African context where the limited capacity of the ‘new’ democratic government witnessed greater participation by non-state actors in the policy process (Chapter 4).

Richard Calland’s later analysis (2006) depicts a hierarchy of power, or structure, within South Africa’s decision-making process inclusive of non-state actors.

⁹ Ibid, p. 625.
Thus, the batting order of political power is: Mbeki, Netshitenzhe, Manuel, Gumbi, Erwin, [Essop] Pahad and, now, in 2006, the deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Beyond these top seven, the picture becomes more complex, with parallel lines of influence running at dissecting angles from the epicentre. One line comprises big business. The other, the new intelligentsia. There are overlaps between the three groups: government business and the intelligentsia. ... A third line is civil society, headed by COSATU leader Zwelinzima Vavi, which also consists of other skilled political campaigners, such as Zackie Achmat.  

While both the ‘two-tier’ and ‘parallel lines’ of influence highlight the structure within the decision-making process, the shortfall within these discussions is that they do not adequately account for the changing degrees of influence, or dynamics, within decision-making. For instance, Evans places the foreign policy bureaucracy on the first-tier of government actors. However, as Chapter 3 reveals, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Defence (DoD) played a marginal role at the outset of the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy process (following a focus on internal reforms), while the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and to some extent the PPCFA under Raymond Suttner, played a more prominent role at the outset, later drifting from a position of influence. While the DTI has since improved its position within the foreign policy bureaucracy, the PPCFA remains peripheral. Furthermore, the longitudinal analysis in Chapter 1 reveals that the role of the Deputy President has progressively moved towards the periphery of foreign policy decision-making following Thabo Mbeki’s assumption of the presidency and its incorporation into the Office of the President.

In demonstrating the plurality of actors and multiple layers of influence within the ‘black box’ of post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making, the thesis has utilised the ‘concentric circle’ model of the foreign policy process. Although Roger Hilsman and Allison and Zelikow’s representation is used in depicting the multiple actors and

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successive layers in US foreign policy,\textsuperscript{11} it provides a useful model in highlighting the complex layers and plurality of stakeholders evident in South Africa's own post-apartheid foreign policy. Nevertheless, like the 'two-tier' and 'parallel lines' approach, while the concentric circle model accounts for multiple actors and layers, it does not adequately provide for the changing dynamics, or movement of actors, between the successive concentric circles within the foreign policy structure. Moreover, the model is focused primarily on explaining the impact of domestic sources of foreign policy influence, neglecting the impact of greater national-international linkages.

Taking these limitations into account the thesis has built on this model through the concept of a multistakeholder foreign policy which recognises the mixed-actor multi-layered character of the foreign policy process while indicating the movement of stakeholders between the concentric circles of foreign policy influence. These stakeholders, including both state and non-state actors, may be drawn into the centre (or remain on the periphery) of the foreign policy process by virtue of their particular agenda, interests and objectives as well as their resources. The result is the fluid movement of actors within the centre-periphery structure of foreign policy. Moreover, a multistakeholder foreign policy accounts for both domestic and international sources of influence. As Cooper notes, '[o]nly through an appreciation of the mix of competing international and domestic pressures may the complexity of South African foreign policy be appreciated.'\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, Hocking highlights the 'diminishing utility of distinctions between domestic and international actors',\textsuperscript{13} and the increasingly blurred 'distinctions between state and non-state actors as each interact in a variety of ways and can become allies and agents of the other.'\textsuperscript{14} This has had a direct impact on the composition of the actors within foreign policy's central circle. Certainly, as Dumbrell observes, '[t]he 'intermestic agenda', debates over immigration, the new prioritisation for trade and economic foreign policy, the opening of global markets: all these factors

tend to weaken the argument that national interests will always be best aggregated in a competent executive.\textsuperscript{15}

The composition of the foreign policy process and the interplay between stakeholders thus plays a significant part in shaping foreign policy output. In their analysis of the making of foreign policy Hermann and Hermann recognise that the structure of the ‘ultimate decision unit’ will vary in accordance with the nature of the problem, with ‘issues of vital importance to a country, the highest political authorities probably will be part of the ultimate decision unit. In the case of more routine problems, the ultimate decision unit may actually be at a lower level of government.’\textsuperscript{16} In considering the future of foreign policy research Charles Hermann anticipates a greater emphasis on the ‘incorporation of change and dynamics in theories of foreign policy.’\textsuperscript{17} By pursuing explanations that illustrate the changing dynamics within South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making, the thesis is moving forward in the field of foreign policy studies, going beyond the identification and explanation of domestic sources of influence associated with the ‘second generation’ of foreign policy analysis.

The concept of multistakeholder foreign policy, with its pluralist approach, multi-layered structure and incorporation of the changing dynamics within the foreign policy process, offers an alternative to the discussion of the democratic qualities of South Africa’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{18} Rather than considering the ideal of a democratic foreign policy, a multistakeholder foreign policy accepts that not all actors are involved at the same level in all foreign policy decisions. In the context of US foreign policy John Dumbrell notes that,

Democratic foreign policy is one where Presidents generally lead, but where they also share power and respect legal constitutional constraints. One where the CIA, executive branch bureaucrats and the military are subject to control by

elected civilian politicians. It is one where Congress controls the purse-strings and exposes the executive to public inspection. It is one in which the US obeys international law, and where open, informed public debate is the norm. Defined in such terms, democratic foreign policy will remain a necessary aspiration rather than a reality.\(^{19}\)

In practice some foreign policy decisions may not leave the more central circles of decision-making, particularly if there are constraints on the time available for generating a response and/or the decision requires initial secrecy. On the other hand, decisions may be undertaken only after prolonged engagement with a number of actors who have a stake in the foreign policy decision. Instead of pursuing an analysis examining the democratic nature of post-apartheid foreign policy, which also neglects the changing dynamics within the decision-making process, the thesis draws attention to the changing influence of actors in the multi-layered process including coalition building and the bargaining networks that occur within the 'black box' of foreign policy decision-making.

- **South Africa’s Multistakeholder Foreign Policy in Practice**

In the analysis of US foreign policy the ‘concentric circle’ model begins with the ‘innermost circle’ of decision-making, including the President and key individuals from the President’s staff in the White House, along with departments and agencies such as the Department of State, Defence, and the Central Intelligence agency (CIA).\(^{20}\) Progressing outwards from the centre are other government departments and agencies, followed by what Hilsman describes as the public arena, ‘involving Congress, the press, interest groups, and – inevitably – the “attentive publics.”’\(^{21}\) Using this model as a basis in determining the influence of stakeholders in the making of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, Chapter 2 notes that as President, Thabo Mbeki has assumed a, and at times the, central position in foreign policy decision-making. This is, however, not the whole story. Over the course of South Africa’s post-apartheid development, both non-state and sub-national government departments have been drawn in to a

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\(^{19}\) Dumbrell (1997), p. 212.


\(^{21}\) Ibid, p. 543 & 542.
position near the centre of the foreign policy process. Indeed, in discussing the anatomy of power and influence in post-apartheid South Africa Richard Calland notes that there is ‘a network of influential people and forums, such as the presidential councils’, which play a key part in shaping policy decisions. In addition Buhlungu highlights the role of Mbeki’s informal advisory group or ‘kitchen cabinet’, which draws on the advice from individuals within government as well as ‘business people, lawyers, academics, and unionists, many of whom were drawn from outside the normal network of ANC activists’.

Although criticism has been levelled at South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents for their predominant position at the centre of the foreign policy process, no alternative has been suggested. Even within the democratic structures of the US Barrett argues that it is difficult to visualise an alternative to the leadership of the president with ‘the public and foreign policy elites look[ing] to the White House to shape the agenda.’ Indeed, many of the stakeholders actively engaged in shaping foreign policy simply do not have the incentive, ability, or willingness to assume a position of leadership with its related responsibility for the final policy decision. Rather than pursuing a critical analysis on the predominance of the president, Chapter 2 argues that a distinction needs to be drawn between the president as a closed unit of decision-making, and a president who is sensitive to external influences. In highlighting this distinction, and indicating the president’s ‘sensitivity’ to external influences, the thesis opens up the analysis of a range of influences on foreign policy decision-making. As Chapter 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate there are a number actors vacillating between the centre and periphery of the foreign policy machinery.

The significance of a multistakeholder foreign policy for South Africa is that where more than one actor has been involved in, or elbowed their way into, the centre of the of the foreign policy process, Pretoria has seen a number of positive outcomes. Chapter 4 drew attention to the example of the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines.

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25 Ibid.
(SACBL), which as van der Westhuizen notes, is one of the ‘first instances of an NGO/social movement coalition moving South Africa as an ‘emerging’ middle power towards taking a leading multilateral role ...’  

Another positive outcome for South Africa’s foreign policy came from the inclusion of a number of state and non-state actors, from both the domestic and the international environments, in the Kimberly Process. It saw interdepartmental cooperation and coordination between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs as well as coordination and cooperation with business, including South Africa’s mining houses, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada and the intergovernmental organisations, the United Nations (UN) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

While these two examples have drawn acclaim in foreign policy analysis as a result of their international success, there are other less high-profile (but equally positive in terms of their outcome) cases where stakeholders typically associated with being outside the centre of foreign policy decision-making have played a key part in the success of South Africa’s foreign policy. This is particularly apparent in South Africa’s environmental diplomacy within the region, including agreements on shared watercourses, nature reserves and conservation areas. As van der Lugt notes, non-state actors are usually excluded from negotiations concerning multilateral environment agreements, however South Africa has included a number of stakeholders from government, business, and civil society in its delegations to these multilateral environment agreement meetings.

There have, however, been instances where the more negative aspects of plurality have had an impact on foreign policy decision-making. For instance Evans criticised the ‘profusion of decision-making centres and actors each equipped with separate agendas

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and operating in competition with others', for contributing to the shortfall in the making of foreign policy during Mandela's incumbency. In addition, Bischoff has criticised the plurality in South Africa's foreign policy for holding back the creation of a more assertive foreign policy position, particularly in Africa. Competing interests have also been highlighted in leading to ineffectual policy decision-making in the case of South Africa's arms trade, resulting in questions of consistency within the country's foreign policy. As Barber notes, 'In the arms sale case the decision - based on principle - to try and limit sales by strict controls ran into opposition from a mix of principles and interests.'

Although there are challenges in including multiple stakeholders in the foreign policy process, where influence in decision-making has been restricted, or undertaken by a closed decision unit, South Africa has seen fewer positive foreign policy outcomes; a notable exception being Mandela's successful role in the resolution of the Lockerbie crisis (1999). The analysis in Chapter 2 indicates that as president, both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki have been responsible for unilateral foreign policy decisions, including Mandela's personal calls for Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth and the imposition of sanctions following the murder of the Ogoni Nine, and Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' approach towards Zimbabwe.

In assuming a predominant 'insensitive' leadership approach in the case of Zimbabwe, Mbeki has sealed off and rebuffed any possibility of foreign policy debate on the ongoing crisis in South Africa's neighbour to the north. As Phimister and Raftopoulos note, an appeal to Mbeki from the South African Council of Churches to send a delegation to Zimbabwe in order to 'rekindle talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC drew only the blandest of non-committal replies'. This approach has attracted criticism from both domestic and international sources, with South African foreign

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policy analyst Gerrit Olivier highlighting Mbeki’s failure to use ‘South Africa’s formidable array of diplomatic instruments to exploit Zimbabwe’s vulnerability, its dependence on South Africa, to break the impasse.’

The development of a ‘closed unit’ of foreign policy decision-making in the case of Zimbabwe was particularly evident in Pretoria’s position on the 2002 Zimbabwean presidential elections, where South Africa’s parliamentary observer group was the only one declaring Mugabe’s re-election free and fair. As Gumede reveals,

Mbeki had carefully selected the members of the South African group, and they knew going in that the president expected a final report that would vindicate the inevitable result. However, as insurance, Mbeki also sent a second, secret observer team, consisting of high court judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Khampepe, to report on conditions in Zimbabwe before elections. When they turned in an account of widespread violations, Mbeki simply ignored their report.

While critics argue that Mbeki has gravitated towards and ‘imperial’ presidency, particularly in terms of Zimbabwe, as Chapter 5 points out, even this foreign policy decision was not isolated from all sources of influence. Pressure from the external milieu, particularly from the region in terms of African solidarity, has shaped South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe. Indeed Gumede notes,

Mbeki was totally opposed to the freezing of Zimbabwean assets or imposing travel restrictions on Mugabe and his officials. Any form of economic sanctions would hurt ordinary Zimbabweans the most, he reasoned, and since it would be all but impossible to muster the support of regional leaders for such drastic measures, South Africa could once again find itself going out on a limb, as with Saro Wiwa.

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Despite the attention and criticism that the above examples of closed-unit decision-making have attracted, assuming a unitary role at the centre of foreign policy decision-making has not only been limited to the President. As Chapter 3 pointed out, following the South Africa’s democratic transition (1994) the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was primarily focused on internal reforms while the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), under the enthusiastic leadership of Alec Erwin and through its particular technical expertise, was actively engaged in South Africa’s economic diplomacy. However, the predominance of the DTI, and particularly Alec Erwin, led to what Patrick Bond describes as the ‘débâcle’ at the 1999 ministerial summit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle, which nearly led to South Africa’s refusal to join with the African bloc countries in protest against their treatment by the United States (US).  

A multistakeholder foreign policy thus provides a challenge in reconciling a wide range of disparate interests and objectives; however, it also offers a number of advantages. As Chapter 4 indicates, states no longer hold the monopoly on power, expertise and resources, particularly following greater interdependencies and expanding foreign policy agendas. Through the inclusion of multiple stakeholders (sub-national government authorities, civil society and business), the foreign policy process draws on an expanding pool of resources, both human and material. This is increasingly important not only in defining foreign policy, but in its successful implementation. It is also worth reiterating Leonard and Alakeson’s point highlighted previously, ‘without public debate, the government cannot win much needed domestic support for its foreign policy objectives, and will eventually meet resistance domestically and disbelief abroad.’

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Looking Forward

In determining ‘who’ makes South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, the thesis highlights the plurality of actors, each with varying levels of influence within the concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making. Although particular issues have remained within the Presidency at the apex of the decision-making process, the research demonstrates that changes within the domestic and international environments have facilitated the development of a multistakeholder foreign policy. As Calland observes,

The growing influence of social movements has added lustre to the policy think tanks and non-governmental organizations, which punch way above their weight. South Africa enjoys a vivid, textured, pluralist civil society – again something that sets it apart from many emergent democracies. Together with COSATU and the SACP, and the Churches, this vast array of civil society organizations represents the alternative chakra or energy centre of the anatomy of the new South Africa.42

In detailing the composition of South Africa’s concentric circles of foreign policy decision-making the thesis has exposed a number of shortfalls in the current literature. Although research addresses aspects of domestic and international sources of foreign policy influence, there has not always been a critical analysis within a defined theoretical framework. As Chapter 1 indicates, US foreign policy analysis includes substantial research on domestic sources of foreign policy influence (media, public opinion, interest groups), the Presidency (political psychoanalysis, presidential bureaucracy), the foreign policy bureaucracy (the Departments of State, Defence and the Intelligence Community), as well as the international environment (the international system). In comparison South Africa’s ‘second generation’ foreign policy analysis remains underdeveloped. For instance, South Africa’s post-apartheid presidents have been criticised for their predominance in the making of foreign policy; however, there has been very little discussion on the role of the president’s character, world view and style.43 In addition, although the individual departments that comprise the foreign

policy bureaucracy have been the subject of analysis, there is scope for detailed research on the bureaucratic politics, or the 'pulling and hauling' between departments and the subsequent impact on South Africa's foreign policy.

The literature on the role of civil society and business is more detailed in accounting for their respective influence in the foreign policy process. Nevertheless, elements such as the media and public opinion are still neglected areas within the research. Although Nel highlighted the parochial nature of South African interest in 1999, greater national-international linkages have broken down the traditional division between domestic and foreign policy. As Jack Spence observes, ‘decision-making elites now have to cope – especially in an era of accelerating globalisation – with the impact of external developments on key aspects of domestic policy and its manifestation in a host of economic and social circumstances.’ Indeed, within South Africa there is growing concern regarding international issues such as the crisis in Zimbabwe, the movement of migrants, and international trade.

The focus of this thesis has been on delineating the actors and complex dynamics within the South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy process. Future research, however, will need to consider the implications of a multistakeholder foreign policy for South Africa’s decision-makers, along with developments that allow for, or constrain the consolidation of a multistakeholder foreign policy. In supporting the development of a multistakeholder foreign policy, South Africa’s vibrant civil society and business community continue to actively engage the formal foreign policy bureaucracy in an effort to influence foreign policy decision-making. In addition, the foreign policy bureaucracy has itself pursued strategies enhancing its position within the concentric circles of the foreign policy process (Chapter 3). With Mbeki’s second term as president reaching the midway point (2007), attention needs to be drawn to those elements constraining the development of South Africa’s multistakeholder foreign policy. As Chapter 3 indicates, parliament has been singled out for its unconvincing role in the policy process, particularly the ‘feeble performance of many of its committees - though there are noble exceptions – and the strategic impotence of a chronically weak set of

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opposition parties. In terms of foreign policy, a weak opposition and parliamentary process places limitations on the public’s scope for participation. Although opposition parties may eventually serve as an influence on foreign policy decision-making, in the immediate future their role remains peripheral.

In contrast to South Africa’s opposition parties, the African National Congress (ANC), with its significant majority, dominates the policy arena. The ANC as organisation should not, however, be confused with the ANC as government. This distinction is particularly significant for South Africa’s policy decision-making processes. Indeed, the ANC as government has in effect ‘displaced the ANC as organisation’. As a result meetings with the ANC’s alliance partners (SACP and COSATU) have lost some of their importance. In addition, over the course of 2007 the ANC as government, and particularly Mbeki’s response to the First National Bank’s (FNB) planned newspaper campaign on crime (February 2007) and the firing of deputy health minister, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge (August 2007), have raised concern regarding the centralisation of power within the presidency. Not only did the FNB debacle highlight divisions within Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA), it also proved that despite criticism from the Left that big business ‘hold[s] government policies to ransom’, there are limitations on their ability to influence policy. In the case of the deputy health minister, Michael George points out that Nozizwe’s dismissal ‘handed political ammunition to critics who accuse him [Mbeki] of purging opponents as he tries to hold on to political power.’

In the run up to the ANC’s party conference (December 2007), speculation regarding the succession battle and questions regarding the ‘two centres of power’ have dominated South Africa’s political analyses. Raymond Suttner is particularly critical of this mounting hearsay noting that ‘[t]oo many people are making predictions about how

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events will unfold, when there is insufficient information about organisational dynamics and personal support or political orientation, in particular whether the former has supplanted the latter. Although at the time of writing there are still insufficient details emerging from within the ANC to draw any concrete conclusion on who the organisation’s future president will be, the outcome of the December conference will have an impact on South Africa’s foreign policy process. This is linked to the expectations that the President of the ANC will become the next State President following the 2009 general elections. Future research will undoubtedly examine the full impact of the new president’s role in the foreign policy machinery. Nevertheless, as a democracy, South Africa’s impending president will inevitably find that he/she faces varying levels of pressure from multiple stakeholders (domestic and international) as the country grapples with the processes of globalisation in defining a foreign policy.

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