CYPRUS: THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM AND
THE QUESTION OF A FEDERAL SOLUTION

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester

by

Zeliha Khashman  BA (M.E.T.U.), MA (Nottingham)

Department of Politics
University of Leicester

July 1997
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank Professor Jorg Monar for his supervision and invaluable advice and belief in my work over the course of this Ph.D.

Second, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Murray Forsyth for his supervision and guidance at the initial stage of this Ph.D. research.

Third, I would like to thank Ms. T.E. Connor for her invaluable advice during the preparation of this thesis.

Fourth, I would like to thank my parents for their moral support and encouragement over the course of this Ph.D.

Finally, my greatest gratitude goes to my husband Dr Adnan Khashman for his constant help, patience and care and to our baby son Rakan.
ABSTRACT

This study is an inquiry into the questions concerning the origin and causes of the Cyprus problem and is an attempt to provide an analytical solution for the problem. Since the 1950s, there have been attempts at establishing a partnership government between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. A partnership Republic, between the two communities in the island, was realised in 1960. However, this partnership lasted only three years and then was followed by the division of the island between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1974. After the division of the island, efforts at establishing a federation in the island have been continuing.

It is suggested here that the best possible political association, for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live under, is a confederal solution. This idea is based on the fact that in Cyprus there is no Cypriot nation but strong Greek and Turkish nationalities. This fact makes a political association such as federation much more difficult to achieve. A confederal solution will offer time and experience to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots before moving into a federal union. In addition, the confederal solution will offer prospects for both communities in the island to develop closer economic, political and cultural relations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................i
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................ii
Table of Contents ...........................................................................................................................iii
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................viii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

I. Overview ....................................................................................................................................1

II. The Origin And Conditions of A Federation .......................................................................6
    A- Federations: The Historical Background ........................................................................6
    B- Federalism and Nationalism .............................................................................................10
    C- Meaning of Federalism and the Requisites of the Federal Government ....................12
        C.1- The Legal and Constitutional Requisites ..............................................................15
        C.2- The Political and Cultural Requisites .....................................................................21

III. Research Framework ...............................................................................................................24
    A- Purpose and the Hypothesis .............................................................................................24
    B- Method and the Limitations of the Thesis .......................................................................26

IV. The Structure Of The Thesis ...................................................................................................29

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................32
CHAPTER TWO

IMPACT OF NATIONALISM ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. Introduction ................................................................. 38
II. The Concept of Nationalism ........................................... 40
III. Phases Of Nationalism .................................................. 50
   A- The First Period ....................................................... 51
   B- The Second Period .................................................... 60
   C- The Third Period ...................................................... 64
   D- The Fourth Period .................................................... 70
   E- The Fifth Period ...................................................... 76
REFERENCES ................................................................. 85

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL IMPACT OF NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY ON
TURKISH-GREEK CYPRIOTS' POLITICAL RELATIONS

I. Overview ................................................................. 90
II. Relations Of Turks And Greeks ...................................... 94
III. Formation Of National Consciousness Of Greeks And Turks .............................................. 100
IV. The Relations Between Contemporary Turks And Greeks ................................................. 114
V. The Impact Of Turkey And Greece On The Politics Of The Island .................................... 117
REFERENCES ................................................................. 133
CHAPTER FOUR
CYPRUS POLITICAL DISCORD AND THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

I. The Involvement Of Greece ................................................................. 138
II. The Turkish Involvement ................................................................. 144
III. The British Position ................................................................. 150
IV. Birth Of The Republic ................................................................. 180
REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 188

CHAPTER FIVE
CONTINUED NATIONALIST AGGRESSION 1962-1974

I. Major Areas Of Constitutional Tension ............................................. 196
II. The "Thirteen Proposals" And Its Result ........................................... 204
III. The Involvement Of External Parties And Search For A Resolution ........................................ 209
IV. Last Attempt To Search For A Constitution ........................................ 229
V. Reasons For The Failure Of The 1960 Establishment ........................ 242
REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 249
CHAPTER SIX
THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

I. Evaluation Of The 1960-1974 Period .............................................................256

II. Inter-Communal Talks 1975-1996 .................................................................261
   A- The Period Between 1974 - 1983 ...............................................................262
   B- The Period Between 1983 - 1992 ...............................................................276
   C- The Period Between 1992 - 1996 ...............................................................296

III. The Challenge Of The European Union In The Inter-Communal Talks ........307

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................314

CHAPTER SEVEN
DOES THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS LIE IN AN INTEGRATED POLITICAL ASSOCIATION?

I. Evaluation Of The Inter-Communal Talks .......................................................321
   A- Security and Guarantee Issues .................................................................322
   B- Territorial Arrangements .........................................................................323
   C- Equality ....................................................................................................325

II. Reasons For The Continuation Of The Problem .............................................327

III. Cyprus And A Federation ...........................................................................340
   A. The Causes of Failure or Success of a Federation ........................................342
   B. The Success of a Federation in the Case of Cyprus .....................................350
ABBREVIATIONS

- UN, United Nations Organisation.
- UNGA, United Nations Organisation General Assembly.
- UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
- NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
- EU, European Union.
- ECJ, European Court of Justice.
- US, United States of America.
- UK, United Kingdom.
- USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- TRNC, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
- DISY, Democratic Rally.
- DIKO, Democratic Party.
- EOKA, Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.
- TMT, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistant Organisation).
- UBP, Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Union Party).
- DP, Demokratik Partisi (Democratic Party).
- CTP, Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party).
- TKP, Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi (Communal Liberation Party).
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I. Overview

The Cyprus problem is one of those problems where different ethnic and nationalist communities live in one territory and struggle for a political association in which their cultural identity will be protected.

The Cyprus question, which brought not only the Turkish and the Greek communities in the island but also Greece and Turkey to very brink of war, has been and remains one of the most intractable problems in world affairs. Since the 1950s, despite all the peaceful and friendly efforts including the United Nations efforts, no just and lasting peace between the two Cypriot communities to live in peace and security under a Federal Republic has been attained. Since the Turkish intervention in the island on the 20th July 1974, which divided the island into Greek and Turkish Cypriot parts, there neither has been substantial progress nor a great crisis in the island. After the collapse of the 1960 partnership between the two communities, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots in the island, the Cyprus question till today revolved around a number of issues such as the structure of the possible political organisation to be established in the future, the delimitation of the borders between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot held territories, the establishment of a guarantee
system which would contribute to the physical security of both the communities, and
the establishment of a political system respecting the rights of the two communities.

After the 1974 division of the island, between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots
some important developments, such as the establishment of the Turkish Federated
State of Cyprus in 1975 followed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983
which received recognition only from Turkey, the continued presence of the Turkish
troops, are distressful developments for both the communities though from different
perspectives. Lack of international support and recognition for the Turkish Cypriots is
affecting the Turkish Cypriots both politically and economically\(^2\). The Turkish
Cypriots are unable to establish official ties with the international world. Furthermore,
they are under a heavy economic embargo which makes the economic growth in the
Turkish Cypriot economy very slow compared to the Greek Cypriot economy. On the
other hand, although the Greek Cypriots since 1964, are internationally recognised
and enjoy the benefits of being the only legitimate government of the Cyprus
Republic, they are still displeased with the current situation in the island\(^3\). The
reasons for their dissatisfaction are twofold: first of all they feel physically insecure
because of the existence of the Turkish army in the North part of the island (Turkish
Cypriot part of the island), secondly, they feel disgraced by losing their territory in the
North of the island to the Turkish Cypriots.

So, both communities, have some important reasons for demanding a solution
of the problem. The solution of the problem will benefit both communities- the
Turkish Cypriots will have the right to be treated as co-founder of a possible
association with the Greek Cypriots thus they will enjoy both the political and economic benefits: the Greek Cypriots with a new security arrangement will no longer be threatened by the Turkish army and most probably in a "give and take" procedure during the process of negotiations they will reacquire some of their lost territories: and the last but not the least important achievement of the solution will be, that the antagonism and separatism between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots will have a chance to be eased.

Finding a workable political system which suits the needs of the two communities in the island, will not only benefit them but will also benefit Turkey and Greece as the motherlands\(^4\). Apart from the Aegean problem concerning the territorial waters, continental shelf and the air space matters, the Cyprus problem has been the most important problem between Turkey and Greece which damaged the willingness of co-operation to solve their bilateral problems. From a security perspective as well, the Cyprus problem has been affecting the motherlands negatively by creating another volatile border between Greece and Turkey in the island. The balance of power between these two antagonistic countries has been damaged with the developments in the island\(^5\). Thus, the solution of the problem in the island, which needs the association of the two communities in some form of political system, will be very important in the future relations of Turkey and Greece.

Furthermore, the solution of the problem is important from the Western camps point of view, specially the United States as a world power in the post Cold War era. During the Cold War years, the south-eastern flank of NATO came to the edge of
collapse because both Turkey and Greece as NATO members were engaged in the 
Cyprus problem at opposite camps- Greece gave its support to the Greek Cypriots, 
whereas Turkey gave its full support to the Turkish Cypriots both morally and 
physically. Additionally, in the post Cold War era the interests of the West and the 
United States can be negatively affected unless a balance of power between Greece 
and Turkey is established over Cyprus as the area continues to be geographically vital 
for the Western needs (due to Cyprus' strategic location at the entrance to the oil 
routes in the Middle East and Asia). In this manner, a durable solution to the Cyprus 
problem is necessary and vital for the Cypriots themselves as it is for both the 
motherlands and the others too.

Federalism is often described as the best way to manage nationalistic problems 
of the two communities in the island.

The main subject of this thesis is the question of the suitability of a federal 
solution for Cyprus where there are two nationalist groups living in and sharing the 
same island. The aim is to make an academic contribution to the ongoing debate in the 
literature and the diplomatic and political circles, as to whether a federation is a 
suitable model for resolving the Cyprus problem.

In the twentieth century, multinational structures, communist and non 
communist, authoritarian and democratic societies have been affected by the 
emotional appeal of nationalism. There are many conflict regulation methods for 
ethnic and nationalistic problems such as arbitration and federalism, consociationalism, 
partition, hegemonic control, assimilation, forced mass population transfers, and even
genocide. Federalism and consociationalism look as the best way to moderate such nationalistic problems because they are based on the will of the people involved. It is a fact that some of the nationality problems have been managed successfully by federal arrangements. One of the most successful examples of a federal union which has been managing different nationalities and religious demands is the Swiss Federation. However, after the end of the Cold War era in particular, the world witnessed a rise in the ethnic and nationalistic insurgencies from Asia to Africa to Europe. Even though in Western Europe where they are moving towards a more integrated association possibly a federal union, the ethno regional communities such as Basques, Catalans, Scots and Flemish are demanding more and more autonomy. Furthermore, even the future of one of the well established federations, Canada, is uncertain as its French Canadians- the people of Quebec, are demanding independence. The situation of the relatively new federal state of Belgium's situation, which is built on mainly on two cultural communities, is uncertain as well because of their nationalistic problems. Many of the post-war federations have failed despite the high hopes of their creators, such as for instance Indonesia (1949-1950), Pakistan (1956-1958), Malaysia (1963-1965), Cyprus (1960-1963) and Mali (1959-1960). These examples bring to one's mind the question of appropriateness of a federal union as a form of governance in multiethnic societies, such as those of Cyprus, to respond to their nationalistic, political, social and economic needs. The support for such arrangements should depend on their feasibility and long term efficacy. I will discuss the theoretical framework in greater detail subsequent to a brief review of the literature on
Chapter One

Introduction

federalism. For analytical purposes, it is essential to look at the development and the meaning of the concept of federalism.

II. The Origin And Conditions of A Federation

A- Federations: The Historical Background

The seventeenth century had been the century when the nation-states, in the modern sense, i.e. states politically sovereign in their territory and exercising that sovereignty in the name of the people of those territories on an exclusive basis, came into existence. Since then, the major form of political organisations in the world has been the nation state. However, besides this kind of organisation, as Daniel Elazar writes, a second system of political building- federal arrangements has developed\[7\]. The existence of federal arrangements' go back to the antiquity. Yet the organisation of these early federations compared to modern federations was primitive, lacking the necessary administrative and political skills. Some historians saw the characteristics of something like a federal arrangement in the Hellenic world of religious, tribal and city-state alliances. For example, the Achean League is often presented as one of the most advanced examples of a Hellenic "federal union"\[8\].

The important development in the form of political associations (federations) and the theoretical interest emerged in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance and Reformation. At the beginning and in later stages of the "Holy Roman Empire" many leagues and coalitions emerged: the Lombard League, Helvetic League, the
League of Venice, the Swabian League, the Hanseatic League etc. Among these, Swiss Federation which was established in 1292 and known as Confederation Helvetique was the most important. And it is the only ancient federation which lasted till today through a network of multilateral and bilateral covenants renewed regularly. In the scholar world in this period, the federal idea started to be analysed more when the Reformation scholars thought about "who is to be the ultimate master and whether it is possible to have two claimants to the power". But in these centuries, "dual sovereignty" could still not be conceived. Therefore, in this period, duality proved impossible. However, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries some important scholars like Bodin (1577), Altusius (1603), Pufendorf (1667) and Ludolp Hugo have notably contributed to our federal thinking. Among all these scholars who contributed to our understanding of federal systems in the modern sense, Althusius is the most notable- the principal work which placed him as the father of federal theory was "Politics"- written in 1614. Althusius's difference from Bodin, who regarded sovereignty as indivisible, was the belief that sovereignty resides with the people. In Althusius theory there are three elements which relate to the historic evolution of the federal idea:

1. The notion of creating, in the tradition of the Hellenes, larger "units" out of the villages, towns, cities, provinces and estates of the Empire.

2. The notion of reciprocal covenant (foedus) to create, enlarge and bond units together for the advantages of greater co-operation and communality.
3. Foedus assures each incorporated member its inherent right to existence and its freedom to engage in those activities which are the rationale of its existence\textsuperscript{11}.

May be, as Carl Friedrich claims, these three elements can form "a full-bodied concept of federalism" but still they were only in the formulation of the concept of a federation\textsuperscript{12}.

Most of the thinkers in this era dealt with the idea of federation as a utopian order rather than an actual form of government. Contrary to the ancient times federalism was seen as an principle of the formulation of states rather than military security of the contracting states. But yet, the federations lacked the modern features of federalism such as the location of residual powers and significant powers between the federal and the constituent states or bicameralism and equal representation of unequal states.

The second transformation of the federal concept, which then became a political principle and technique, resulted with the freeing of some of the British colonies in North America and forming them into the classic federation- the United States of America. The "Federalist" written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in 1787-1788 in the United States, became the standard work on the principles of federation by creating competing centres of government within a framework that established a strong preference for decentralised power and autonomy. The US model is the first modern model which defines the conceptual starting point in the federal idea. Following the American example, many federations started to emerge like the Helvetic Confederation in 1815, the German Confederation
in 1834, the Brazilian federation and in 1901 the Australian federation. Thus, the most productive era of federalism and federations started with the birth of United States of America. Only then, federations became a second form of political organisation besides the traditional unitary state. With the American Revolution, limits on sovereignty were placed. But limits on sovereignty did not mean necessarily that it could be divided. The real aim of the American federal solution was to provide a way to circumvent the problem of exclusive state sovereignty so that more democratic political organisation than that of the British Jacobean state, could be achieved[13]. For the European fathers of the modern nation state, limits on the sovereignty of the nation states were an anathema. According to them the existence of more than one government over the same territory, each with its own powers, was the encouragement of anarchy.

In the twentieth century, followed by the dissolution of the great empires first and decolonisation second, many nationalities emancipated. These nationalities, however were faced with the challenge of sharing the territory they live on with other people. Under these circumstances the federal arrangements became an obvious way to accommodate demands for shared rule in partnership for several communities sharing a territory.

Today federal arrangements although in many different shapes, federal arrangements can to be found in every corner of the world, on every continent and among all races[14]. There are many people in the world who are living under a federal
form of government. Nevertheless, federations, in our era, are one of the predominant political systems in the world.

**B- Federalism and Nationalism**

At this point, the attention will be given to the relation between federalism and nationalism as it might help not only to enhance our understanding of the concept but it will also be relevant for the future analysis of our case- the Cyprus problem.

Nationalism has played a significant role in the federalising process. Although federal structures are accepted as the best possible way for the governance of diverse nationalities, still it is a problematic issue. As Hans Kohn describes nationalism it is "a state of mind" animating a national group to express itself in "what it regards as the highest form of organised activity, a sovereign state"\(^{[15]}\). So nationalism is a political movement as well as an emotional appeal in the modern world. According to the classical doctrine of sovereignty, a sovereign state could have one centre and that the power of that centre could not be divided\(^{[16]}\). On the other hand, the federal governments are based on the duality or co-ordination of sovereign power between central government and the constituent units (co-ordination is taken here as meaning as an equality of rank importance between the central and the constituent units)\(^{[17]}\). What this means is that each level of government is, in theory, autonomous within its allocated sphere of competence and it will be free from any non-agreed intervention from the other unit. Then, a federal system is regarded as a multiple government in a single state\(^{[18]}\). However despite that, as Duchacek observes; although "federal"
constitutions recognise and pay due respect to two separate jurisdictions" their respective powers nonetheless "are not and have not been meant to be equal" that the "national power is clearly favoured"[19]. Therefore, in federal systems one can speak about the limitations on state sovereignty but cannot talk about the existence of divided sovereignties. It is this issue that might cause problems between nationalism and federalism. As it is mentioned earlier, nationalism is a political phenomenon which includes the territorial integrity, national independence and national self-determination resulting in a sovereign state if desired by the people of a certain territory. In the case of federal governments the traditional conceptions of national independence and sovereignty does not suffice. So under a federal government secession is inconsistent[20]. Yet, this might arises problems. In November 1975 the General Assembly of the United Nations reaffirmed the importance of the universal realisation of the rights of peoples to self-determination- national self-determination and territorial integrity[21]. So everybody has the right of self-determination, to create exclusive state sovereignty over their people and territory. In the international sense this implies the recognition of each other as equals. Although federalism is an approach as to the task of co-ordinating national elements, a federation will arise only with the landing of sovereignty to people. If the two nationalities are able to interpret the right of self-determination in the same context and share the sovereignty and move towards a more democratic system than majority rule, then a federation might emerge and succeed. As Vincent Ostrom says if diverse ethnic communities accept the legitimacy of those who act on behalf of the larger community of interest, while
advancing the interests of each community then the federal structures will be expected to provide a solution for the governance of these diverse ethnic communities. Federal arrangement can serve to combine several nations or nationalities into one political order. But in many cases, federalism was tried and failed as the national constituent units saw their nationality and sovereignty in danger. In conclusion the nationality problem is at the heart of federations—both in the origins and the maintenance of the system. It should be understood by the parties to the federation that their security and sovereignty totally depends on the other's security and sovereignty. Only then the clash between the federal arrangement and nationalism can be prevented as the demands of nationalism, (sometimes in the form of the highest form of expression—national sovereignty) is still standing in the way of world politics and conflicts.

C- Meaning of Federalism and the Requisites of the Federal Government

As a word, the term federal is derived from the Latin word "foedus" which means covenant. Federalism is ideological in the sense that it is a principle of political action. Its main aim is to achieve a federation. Federations constitute the institutional and structural techniques for achieving the distinctive goals of a variety of forms of federalism. The definition given by leading authors vary as well: K.C. Wheare writes that the federal principle is the method of dividing powers so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent. R.L. Watts talks about it "as a political organisation by which concurrent desires for territorial
integration and diversity within a society are accommodated by the establishment of a
single political system within which central and provincial governments possess
co-ordinate authority such that neither level is legally or politically subordinate to the
other\(^{25}\). Daniel Elazar, sees the federal principle as the simultaneous perpetuation of
union and decentralisation\(^{26}\). According to Carl Friedrich, one can speak of
federalism if a set of political groupings coexist and interact as autonomous entities,
united with some common goals\(^{27}\). Whereas W.L. Livingston talks about it as a
process for transferring the federal characteristics of any given society into federal
instruments\(^{28}\). William H. Riker speaks where the dynamics of the division of power
between two levels of government depends on bargaining\(^{29}\). Vile describes federalism
as a cluster of techniques; constitutional, legal, political, administrative and financial
which serve to maintain or erode the balance between mutual independence and
interdependence between levels of government\(^{30}\). As seen from the given descriptions
for federalism, different scholars introduce different characteristics and criteria into
their definitions. They see federalism from different points of view. However, there
are two basic features of federalism, as Ivo Duchacek writes, on which all authors
seem to agree\(^{31}\):

1. In a federation the political authority is territorially divided between two
   autonomous sets of separate jurisdictions, one national and the other
   provincial, which both operate directly upon the people.

2. The existence of a single indivisible yet composite federal state is
   simultaneously asserted.
These two features mean that a federal state consists of communities which have agreed to join together and abide in future by a specific constitution. This definition brings us to the question: in what circumstances it is appropriate to adopt a system of federal government.

Prior to the establishment of a federal state people face a dilemma as they can neither set up separate houses of their own nor integrate into a complete union. They are pulled between two strong forces. On the one hand they are under the powerful influence of individual identities, pulled towards separate existence, on the other hand, they aspire to a united existence because of certain conditions. This dilemma between diversity and unity is the main characteristics of federalism. Federalism is a compromise between centripetal and centrifugal forces, in order to maintain diversity and unity together. If the feeling of regional isolation is higher than the sentiment for unity then a federal bargain ends. As Morton Grodzins spoke of federalism as "antagonistic co-operation"[32], the contracting parties should want unity despite their conflict. Only then a federal bargain can emerge and last.

As Dicey writes in his book "Introduction to the Study of the Law of the constitution", federalism rests on the peculiar psychology of the peoples of the political units involved, of desiring union without desiring complete unity[33]. There are two essential conditions for that:

1. The units involved must have many interests in common if they are to be convinced that their destiny lies in union. These common interests can be listed for instance military security, expectations of greater economic
benefits, prior existence of communities as parts of single, geographical neighbourhood, a realisation that only through union could independence be achieved.

2. The units involved will at the same time possess the elements of separation which are vital for their individual group identities. They will want to retain their individual identities in which they differ from the others in the union. These diverse interests can be: absence of common external threat, existence of competing nationalities, existence of units with independent or competitive economies or presence of conflicting threats to the different units involved.

C.1- The Legal and Constitutional Requisites

When one comes to the question of the requisites of a federal government, different scholars give similar or at least compatible answers. Elazar emphasises the need for a relatively rigid written constitution; Herman Finer argues that both a rigid constitution and bicameralism are part of federalism; Riker stresses only the latter point: the point of the second chamber as one of the special constitutional features of federalism; Duchacek lists ten yardsticks of federalism (exclusive control over foreign relations, immunity against secession, independent sphere of central authority, retention of veto over constitutional changes by a majority of but not all component units, indestructible identity and autonomy, residual and significant powers, bicameralism and equal representation of unequal states, two sets of courts, the existence of Supreme court, clear division of power); Wheare states that the supreme constitution
and the written constitution are essential institutions to a federal government\(^{[34]}\). The four most agreed upon features are the following\(^{[35]}\):

1. The first element of a federal system is the existence of a written constitution\(^{[36]}\).

This constitution creates two levels of sovereignty in such a way that legislative authority is divided between central and regional governments. In the constitution the powers delegated to the Federal state and the constituent states are defined (and should not be unilaterally changed or dominated). And the constitution can be altered by extraordinary procedures\(^{[37]}\). The most important point in the federal systems is that the constitutional changes should be made only with the consent of the component units. For example, in Switzerland a majority of the whole units must approve as well as majorities in eleven and a half of the twenty two cantons. In most of the constitutions of the federal states the amendment procedure is institutionalised yet there are exceptions like Canada. But as William Livingston says, whether the amendment procedure is institutionalised or not, the emphasis is placed on the word "process"- to the process of consulting the interests of the federal elements in the society itself\(^{[38]}\).

Nevertheless, delegating certain powers between the federal and the constituent units by a written constitution, might prevent the difficulties of power sharing. So there is the requirement that in a true federation.

\[
\text{"there must be some matter, if only one matter which comes under the exclusive control, actual or potential, of the general government and something likewise under}\]

\[
\]

16
Chapter One

Introduction

the regional government. If there were not that would be the end of federalism"[39]

For example, exclusive control of foreign relations by the central government is necessary in order to maintain the unity as a federal state and to represent the state as a sovereign power in the international relations vis a vis the other unitary states. A constitutional division of power between the centre and the component territorial units is therefore important for the maintenance of federalism. A written constitution is necessary to delineate all these powers.

2. The second important element is the territorial division of powers, which is the distribution on a territorial basis of the authority and powers within the political system that constitutes a federal state. In this way, the incorporation of the regions into the decision-making procedure of the centre is guaranteed. This also is the reaffirmation that "the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent"[40]. It brings us to one of the important features of a federation which is the territorial grouping of its citizens. Without the establishment of a specified area for the constituent units (the permanence of the boundaries of their constituent units), the representation of the regions will not be realised. The involvement of a division of powers between territorial entities leads to non-centralisation. According D.J. Elazar, non-centralisation means that the federal system of government in general assures the distribution and maintenance of authority or powers among several decision-making centres[41]. Maintenance of
non-centralisation is one of the most important elements of federalism. One of the reasons which can lead to the failure of federalism is the existence of a larger state in the federation dominating smaller states and leading to the excessive centralisation of power in the hands of the larger group (e.g. failure of Indonesia and Yugoslavia as a result of the concentration of power in the larger group). Under certain conditions such as war, the concentration of power in the hands of the centre may be necessary. But this is then only a temporary condition. On the other hand, too much decentralisation of the power puts some strain on the functioning of the federal system. Federalism should maintain non-centralisation in the form of a balance between centralisation and decentralisation unless the system results in absolutism and anarchism. In short non-centralisation is rather the condition whereby the constituent entities of a federation and the central government are interdependent yet allocated unlimited freedom in their own areas of jurisdiction—neither unity nor diversity should dominate. Although non-centralisation is supported and placed in the constitution, how can it be guaranteed? This can be achieved through representation of the constituent units in the federal political process. But to obtain this there are some essential organs needed in a federation to maintain it.

3. A bicameral national legislature is the third major element in the federal system. Both Duchacek and Wheare observed that a second chamber "is often essential if federal government is to work well"[^43]. Two governmental organs are needed; the Assembly and the Upper House. In this way, one chamber represents the population at large and the other represents the regional units. In most of the federations (such as
the US, Switzerland and Australia) there is an agreement on a proportional representation of unequal states in the lower house and an equal representation of unequal states in the upper house\textsuperscript{44}. In federations the equality of the regions is far more important than the individual equality. This might look contrary to the idea of democracy where majority rules. But somehow a sacrifice in equality of the citizen is necessary to secure regional equality. Federation, anyway, is not the rule of majority but of both majority and minority. This means that a federation will be based on a non-majoritarianism. In this case the decision making depends on a qualified majority which may range from "fifty percent plus two to unanimity"\textsuperscript{45}. The first organ, which is the Assembly, compromises a sizeable freely elected representatives of all the states. The election of the members to the assembly is done according to the population in every unit. In the second organ of the legal true, the Upper House or Senate, there are a fixed and limited number of equal representation of all the states. It might be thought that here an inequality of the citizen arises (for example in the US the same number of senators is allocated for the most populated and least populated areas, the Australian six unequal states are represented equally in the Senate and in Switzerland forty four councillors represent its twenty two cantons)\textsuperscript{46}. Yet, it is the only way to guarantee to the smaller and weaker states, the right to participate in the national policy decisions because both houses are equal in matters of legislation. This means that no law can be enacted unless both houses agree on the same text. However, this is not the case in many bicameral parliaments. And most second chambers are subordinate to first chambers meaning that their negative votes on proposed...
Chapter One

Introduction

legislation can be overridden by the first chamber. For example although Canada has a bicameral parliament as a federal system, its second chamber's power is inferior to that of the first chamber. Arend Lijphart bases a second chamber's role on the composition compared with that of the first chamber (the mode of election- appointment or direct election)\(^4^{71}\). But as Campbell Sharman says

\begin{quote}
Bicameralism is the natural ally of federalism: both imply a preference for incremental rather than radical changes, for negotiated rather than coerced solutions, and for responsiveness to a range of political preferences rather than the artificial simplicity of dichotomous choice\(^4^{8}\).
\end{quote}

4. The fourth element is the existence of independent judiciary\(^4^{9}\). This normally takes the form of a supreme court which is the essential watchdog of the constitution preserving the rights and liberties of the constituent entities. The supreme court is an arbitrator of certain disputes about the division of power between two juridical spheres- federal and the states. In federations, the impartiality of the supreme court is of paramount importance. For the judges to keep the impartiality, it might prove very difficult as they are human-beings with their own prejudices, preferences and social attitudes. However, judicial review is one of the devices that is used in federations to maintain the balance between the national and the federal governments\(^5^{0}\). In
Chapter One

Switzerland, this organ is replaced by the constitutional provision for a referendum. Here, not the judges but only the sovereign people of Switzerland have the power of questioning the validity of federal laws. One could also envisage a combination of referendum and supreme court as an agent of stabilising the disagreements in the federations.

C.2- The Political and Cultural Requisites

Having looked at the necessary elements and organs in a federation, we now have to look at the other issues which are important to the functioning of a federal system. All the above mentioned features are necessary conditions for the establishment of a federal union. These are constitutional and initial characteristics. However, there is another necessary dimension for the successful functioning of such a system, and this is the process dimension. As Dorff explains "structures alone are unlikely to create the necessary attitudes among political elites and masses that underline such relationship" (he gives the examples of Eastern European federal systems). Furthermore, Daniel Elazar observes this point in a similar way, stating that "many politics with federal structures were not all that federal in practice" and that federalism "is as much a matter of process as of structures". These processes are explained by Elazar as a sense of partnership on the part of the parties to the federal compact. However, in this thesis the "processes" will be identified as those factors which are important in the functioning of a federation (such as the political culture) besides the legal conditions. These factors can be listed as follows:
Chapter One

Introduction

1. The first important element is the issue of the attitudes of the participants to the federal union. Thus, if the willingness to negotiate and to compromise with the desire of accommodation is not present, then not only to achieve the federation but also maintaining it will be very difficult if not impossible. Ivo Duchacek argues that the federal structure of a country would not be enough to reveal the actual processes of decision making (whether it is federal or not- the processes of government should reflect federal principles). Then the success of a federation as a conflict regulation mechanism of the multi-ethnic tension can only be accomplished with the combination of federalist structures and processes. So federalism's future will likely be decided by the answer to one question; do the constituent entities and the citizenry, have the will and ability to run a federal union? Unless the answer is positive the federal union will be in jeopardy. As Carl Friedrich says, in successful federal regimes "there develops in time something that has been called the federal spirit or the federal behaviour". Unless this is present the maintenance of the system will not be possible. The case of Switzerland is the classic example of this as its people think federal; meaning that they are committed to the principles and ideals of a federal system.

2. Another factor which is important in the smooth functioning of the system is the "means and ends" issue. As Elazar, in particular, advocates of federalism many others have regarded the federal arrangements as both means and ends. What is meant by that is that some people see federalism and federations as the means to obtain other ends like political unification, democracy, popular self-government, the accommodation of diversity and so on. So their commitment to the arrangement
survives as long as their those larger ends pursuit. Elazar, on the other hand explains those who see federalism as an end itself in the following words\textsuperscript{[56]}:

\begin{quote}
They hold that the kind of relationship, which federalism is designed to produce, represent their acme of political and human relationship. To them federalism is not a tool for achieving other goals but embodies the goals themselves as well as the means for their attainment or realisation. Those who see federalism as an end minimise the distinction between means and ends... and the two are interdependent.
\end{quote}

To regard a federal arrangement as both means and ends, increases the chances of the success of a federation.

3. The other element which plays a vital role in the successful functioning of a federal system is the number of the constituent units in a federation. According to Geoffrey Sawer there should be a sufficient number of federating units in order to prevent continuos face to face conflict of one or two potential region rivals. He gives the necessary number as at least five\textsuperscript{[57]}. Furthermore, as J.S. Mill pointed out "for the stability of a federal experiment it is necessary that "there should not be one state so much more powerful than the rest"\textsuperscript{[58]}. So the presence of one unit numerically so large as to be capable of vying in strength with many or all of the others combined in a federation might have the higher risk of disrupting the system.
4. Many federalist scholars have paid attention to the role of the structure of party system (for example Riker, Wheare and so on) in the maintenance of centralisation or peripheralising of federalism. The specific point is that the vitality of federalism is dependent on the party system. Federalism and party systems interact with each other in the sense that they both organise conflict. Therefore, the political parties by maximising votes, building coalitions and by setting policy agendas, help to function of federal arrangements to control conflicts. As, in this way, the permanent national minorities may become regional majorities. In this way the possible dissatisfaction which might arise in the constituent units is minimised- peripheralising can be maintained. At the same time a kind of centralising can be sustained.

In short, the existence of these other features (than the legal ones), might avoid a number of difficulties that otherwise could weaken and perhaps destroy a federal union.

III. Research Framework

A- Purpose and Main Hypothesis

There are two main ideas which have determined the subject of this study. First of all, the Cyprus problem has been continuing since the 1950s. Second, perhaps more importantly, although many proposals have been envisaged for Cyprus, none of the proposals brought a break through to the problem of the island.
Chapter One

Introduction

The main purpose of this dissertation is to try to identify the obstacle to and the possibility for a workable political arrangement for the Cyprus problem. In order to find a comprehensive answer to the problem, it will first be tried to analyse the development of nationalism in the international relations and its impact on the Turkish-Greek Cypriots. This is important in order to understand what a "national feeling" is and what makes people feel they belong to a nation. Furthermore, the analysis of the development of nationalism is important and necessary if we want to understand one of the causes of the Cyprus conflict. Yet in order to find out whether a federal solution is suitable and workable in the case of Cyprus, an analysis of the past partnership will be carried out. Finally political analysis of the successful federations of today will be carried out in order to draw some conclusions of these for the Cyprus case.

My main hypothesis in this thesis, which I have constructed on the basis of the above outlined framework is that:

"The more developed nationalist feelings within the constituent entities have become, the more difficult it is to achieve a durable federal solution. The best alternative is a confederal solution."

In the case where two political entities, with high degree of nationalism, exist in common territory, we assume that the probability of success for a federation is low. According to our theory, there are high nationalistic feelings in Cyprus amongst both
the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots and, therefore, a federal system will most probably fail in Cyprus. This argument will be supported by the analysis of the past partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As the following investigation will show, the partnership did not work since both communities lack the necessary willingness to make it work.

The other aim of this study is to show the lack of willingness for a federal solution amongst both Cypriot communities. In this manner the thesis will try to explore answers to the following questions:

1. What are the causes of the non-solution of the Cyprus problem?
2. What were the reasons of the non-functionality of the 1960 partnership in Cyprus?
3. What is the role of Greece and Turkey as motherlands and the other third parties to the conflict?
4. Is a federal solution suitable to the needs of the Cypriots, if not, what kind of political association will serve best to the interests of all in the Cyprus problem?

B- Method and the Limitations of the Thesis

In order to explore the suitability of federal arrangement for Cyprus, I have taken into account a relatively long historical period which spans about five decades (1950-1996). Except for a chapter on the development of national consciousness in
Chapter One

Introduction

general and a section concerning the development of the Turkish and Greek national consciousness in the island, the thesis focuses on the development of a partnership government in 1960 between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots and the attempts of establishing a federal union till the end of 1996. However, a broad overview of the development of national consciousness in general is necessary to show the role and intensity of the feeling of national belonging in the international relations and its impact on a political association.

It is important to note that the scope of our theory on the relationship between nationalism and federalism is limited to a specific setting where the following factors are needed for the theory to hold:

1. Two distinct political communities (on cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious grounds) which inhabit a shared territory.

2. Involvement of outside motherlands in the affairs of the two communities.

3. Problems of the balance of power in both legal and political forms.

The political analysis of the Cyprus problem will be carried out through a historical exploration. The historical method is utilised as a systematic illustration of the historical development in our case to determine the plausibility of our theoretical arguments. We aim at to providing an empirical evaluation of our theory through the analysis of the past experiences and historical changes. This design will also sharpen our understanding of the unsuitability of a federal union in the case of two hostile communities sharing a territory.
Chapter One

Introduction

The material used consists of documents, official publications, newspapers and personal interviews with some political figures and a few diplomatic corps. I have benefited from unpublished British documents in the Public Record office in Kew/Surrey and published materials from the British archives. I have also used the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Further I have benefited from the Turkish Cypriot publications through their Public Information Office, Turkish Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Cypriot Archives. Although I was able to reach some Greek publications through the Greek Cypriot Embassy in London, I have not had access to its archives. The reason for that was twofold, first of all my lack of knowledge of the language and secondly my "limited time" permission to pass from the Turkish Cypriot sector to the Greek Cypriot sector. The only way to overcome this was to treat the evidence on the Greek Cypriot policy with the utmost care. I have also reached some United Nations documents through the Turkish Cypriot Foreign Ministry and the libraries.

I have also conducted a set of in-depth interviews in order to get contemporary insider's accounts of thoughts as far as possible. I have chosen interviewees both in the Greek and Turkish Cyprus communities from among the political leaders in order to be able to obtain the general trends of thoughts as to the solution and the causes of the conflict. However, the interviews with some of the politicians, specially in Northern Cyprus, were hindered because of their being unavailable due to the unexpected border clashes between the two communities in August 1996 and in 1997 due to the missile crises in the island. While on the Greek
Chapter One

Introduction

Cypriot side, some interviewees refused any request for an interview because of personal reasons, some of my interviewees asked to be kept anonymous.

In the survey of newspapers and periodicals, I have extensively benefited from the press cutting services of the Turkish Cypriot archives and newspapers kindly made available to me in English by the Greek Cypriot Embassy in London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

IV. The Structure Of The Thesis

The thesis consists of eight chapters including an introduction. The introduction has explored the main problem of the thesis by selectively surveying literature on federalism. I have then framed my own conceptual approach and developed the assumptions on which the thesis is constructed.

In chapter II, I will analyse the role of nationalism on international relations. In this chapter a historical account of the development of national consciousness and consequently its development as a major political factor will be explored. The effect of Reformation and Renaissance will be discussed in the evolution of nation state system in the world. After that I will try to answer the question of whether or not the role of national feeling is paramount in the international relations.

In chapter III, I will attempt to analyse the Turkish and Greek relations and the impact of nationalism on their relations. Within this part, the development of "Great Idea"- Megali Idea as a political force among the Greek people and its impact
Chapter One

Introduction

on the Greek Cypriots will be explored. The evolution of the Turkish Cypriot national consciousness also will be analysed.

Chapter IV will describe the involvement of the third parties (Greece, Turkey and Britain), in the Cyprus dispute. This chapter also will provide a historical analysis of the events which led to the independence of the island from Britain and the birth of the partnership government between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots.

In chapter V, the main areas of controversies in the partnership republic of Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be analysed. The attempts to solve the partnership and once more the involvement of the outside parties and the motherlands will be documented till the 1974 Turkish intervention. Furthermore, the analysis of the reasons for the collapse of the partnership of the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots will also be analysed in this chapter.

In chapter VI, the attempts for the establishment of a federation in the island in the post 1974 period will be reviewed in detail. The proposals of the third parties especially the UN proposals- and the Cypriots as to the establishment of a federation will be analysed. The conflicting issues constitutional, political and security issues between the sides will be explored. In a subsection of this chapter, the role of the European Union in the Cyprus issue will also be explored.

Chapter VII, will begin with a brief overview of the major areas of controversies which are preventing a solution in Cyprus. The chapter will examine the factors which are important in the functioning of a federal union. Some of the successful and failed federations have also been examined. In doing so, some
conclusions will be drawn for the Cyprus case. In this way, by providing the broad contextual framework, the hypothesis which is defined in chapter one, will be tested. Another important theme of this chapter is the proposal of a solution-"confederation".

The concluding chapter, chapter VIII, will consist of a brief appraisal and the conclusions of the previous discussions. It will review the research questions indicated earlier.
REFERENCES


[2] These facts have been obtained both from formal and informal interviews by the Turkish Cypriot officials: both politicians and ordinary people in the TRNC.

[3] The information is received from the interviews carried in the Greek Cypriot part of the island.

[4] This has been admitted by both the Greek and Turkish diplomats when an interview was carried out. The names, upon their request will be kept unanimous.


Chapter One


Chapter One

Introduction


Chapter One

Introduction


[38] Ibid.


[40] Ibid. p.222.


Chapter One

Introduction


Chapter One

Introduction


[56] Ibid, p.29.


[59] See chapter seven for more detail.

CHAPTER TWO

Impact Of Nationalism On International Relations

I. Introduction

One of the aims of the thesis is to find the main causes of the Cyprus problem. While doing so, the dissertation will mainly deal with the impact of nationalism on the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the development of the concept of nationalism and its role in international relations is necessary. This will provide the historical background against which we may examine and understand the impact of Greek and Turkish nationalism on the Cyprus problem and on the solution of the dispute.

Nationalism has been the driving trend in the modern and contemporary world. It may be said that it is one of the most significant emotional factors in public life today. Nationalism has become an ongoing feature of states and people not only in Europe and Americas but throughout the vast expanses of Asia and Africa, even advanced across the traditional civilisations of Muslims, Hindus, Confucians and Buddhists. Since the advent of "nationalism" there have been countless wars, revolts and conflicts. As a result of this natural feeling the big non-national empires of the Tsars, the Habsburgs and the Sultans and the overseas empires of the British, French, Portuguese broke down. While, on the other hand, the same feeling helped the
establishment of many sovereign independent and nationally united countries like in Italy, Germany, Finland, Greece, Turkey and many others. The two catastrophic world wars in the twentieth century erupted as a consequence of this intense feeling of patriotism and nationalism resulting in the loss of millions of lives. Moreover, since 1945 because of nationalist and ethnic violence many lives have continued to be lost and is still continuing to be lost especially after the collapse of communist regimes both in the Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe in 1989.

As Joseph Rothschild states "politicised ethnicity has become the most keen and potent edge of intrastate and interstate conflict, displacing class and ideological conflict and it asserts itself today, dialectically as the leading legitimator of delegitimating challenger of political authority"\(^{[1]}\).

Thus, in most conflicts of today's world (e.g. in the Middle-East between the Arabs and Israel, in Cyprus between the Cypriot Turks and Greeks, in Eastern Europe between Serbs, Muslim Bosnians and Croats, in Northern Ireland, in the Indian subcontinent and in many other places) the background reason is nationalism. It has proved that it has been more powerful than many other political beliefs, despite their rivalry for men's loyalties. This national ideal then has spread into the domestic politics and international affairs of the current age as intensely and universally.
II. The Concept of Nationalism

So what is this nationalism, this driving force in the world today which is now so universal?

The word nationalism derives from the Latin "natio" implying a common racial descent (birth or race), although very few of the modern nationalities consist of a distinctive race\(^2\). Most of the nationalities have been a melting pot, there is no pure nationality except, perhaps some of the tribes. For example, the French nation is composed of different types of people like Mediterranean, Nordic and Alpine or in the United States the blacks belong to American nationality but not to African nationality. Therefore, Professor F.W. Riggs' (of the University of Hawaii) explanation under the auspices of the International Social Science Council's Committee on Conceptual and Terminological Analysis will be useful in our understanding of nationalism and nation generally:

"Nationalism is both an ideology and a form of behaviour. The ideology of nationalism builds on people's awareness of a nation (national self-consciousness) to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. These may be cultural, economic or political. ...In all cases, nationalism seeks to defend and promote the interests of the nation. The political aspect of nationalism is seen most clearly in the demand for national self-determination ...while a
Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

A nation is a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry.

From these explanations it can be said that, nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state as a result of emotional synthesis of nationality and patriotism (love of country or native land).

But has not one's attachment to native soil, to local traditions and to established territorial authority existed throughout history?

Man is a social animal who naturally draws himself to a special group and showing a loyalty to it. In the ancient times the pre-eminent group was the tribe. Each tribe had a certain way of life where primitive men worked and warred together. Again in the ancient times, while Egyptians were united together giving their loyalty to the sacred River Nile and to the sun-sprung Pharaoh, the Romans had intense loyalty to the city of the Seven hills. The Hebrews and the ancient Greeks also had a clearly defined consciousness of being different from the Gentiles and Barbarians respectively. And they expressed their feeling of cultural and spiritual superiority over all other peoples.

Although men, for centuries and for millennia, felt affection for their soil, for their clan and tribes, showed pride for their soil and prejudice against enemies, they never felt their own life (culturally, politically or economically) dependent upon the fate of the national body. Some kind of national cohesion was established in times of
danger from the outside as in the case of Greece during the Persian wars or France in the Hundred Years war. But in many religious and dynastic wars of early modern times, many people of same nationality fought against each other, such as Italians against Italians or Germans against Germans. Thus, there was no unlimited loyalty to a national cause in the understanding of today. In Europe, the idea of the nation kept its non-political sense during the Middle Ages. Even after the two great revolutions of Renaissance and Reformation in both of which the seeds for a rising national consciousness could be found (those were the passing from the middle ages to modern times in Western Christendom) the rise of the national consciousness did not possess the same meaning as in modern times.

Nationalism then, which is taught to us starting from our childhood,- to love our country and the peculiar virtues of our nation and go into a fervent devotion to serve our patrie (fatherland), is a modern phenomenon. And it is based on a twofold doctrine in modern times which is the result of the French Revolution of 1789:

1. that each nationality should constitute a united independent sovereign state.
2. that every national state should expect and require of its citizens obedience, patriotism and faith in its excellence over all other nationalities.

So, the fact is that nationality has always existed in some way different from the one we understand now. The question at this moment is: what are the factors which help the emergence of modern nationalism in a sense understood today. In other words how has the spirit of nationality (national consciousness) created a group solidarity in regard to the pursuit of certain aims?
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

Some nationalists take the determination of nationality by race. But this biological factor cannot be taken as a base in the formation of nationality because there is no single nationality composed of a pure race. The other vague factor is the importance of geography in the determination of nationality. From similar geographic areas like, for example, England and Ireland, the one built up a great navy the other did not. Both of these factors, cannot form the attributes of nationality except to a very little extent. On the other hand cultural and historical forces have the capacity to formulate the bases of nationality. Only through the creation of social circumstances and cultural tradition, the distinctive characteristics of different nations would come into existence. Since the ancient times "Human societies generally devise methods of separating groups ... and giving them a formal character and a binding unity ... The mental evolution of men has therefore carried with it a growth of tribal feeling which is one of the properties which set him apart from his animal ancestors."[5].

Among the cultural characteristics of nationality one which gives a binding unity to the people is language. Language, since the primitive days of human beings, has great importance for national demarcation. In some cases, the citizens of the same state (as in Switzerland, Belgium or Canada) might be using different languages but this will not be a sufficient argument to put aside the importance of language as a factor in determining a nationality. Many modern nationalities have been established upon the development of particular languages. For example, till the fusion of Anglo-Saxon with Norman French to produce English language, no English nationality existed. Through the use of the same language like-minded persons will
develop thus they will have a group-consciousness to experience a sense of common interest to constitute a nationality. In this way language indicates the solidarity and the continuity of a people of a certain nationality. Language forms a tie between the present generation of a nation and the preceding generations. It can be said, as in the words of Ossian that: "language is the voice of years that are gone; they roll before me with all their deeds."

Through the use of language people have an access to the collective memory of their successful achievement or their distressing hardship or to their national literature, in short to their history. This brings us to the second attribute of nationality-historical traditions. These traditions tend to personify the group through the accumulation of remembered or imagined experiences of the past signifying the life or the spirit of a nationality. This personification, because it works on people emotionally, shows them the glorified picture of the spirit, the principle, the ideal of their group thus persuading them to the deeper loyalty to their common nationality. This historical tradition consists of several different traditions and backgrounds:

1. First of all, there is the religious past of the people despite the fact that, modern nationalists can find this difficult to accept. However, it is a fact that religious traditions not only have been able to maintain certain social mores, observances and habits, but influence literature and law also. So religion has an important place in every nationality symbolising its national spirit.

2. The other tradition is the people's territorial past. National territory is the country where by long tradition people feel connected as the homeland and a part of its
existence. National territory is not only a place of residence but a place where exclusive power over it could be demanded, in the name of self-determination. Affection for the territory is established in people's mind by a common history, by the force of public opinion, by education, by means of literature, the press, national songs, monuments and in other ways as well. In that territory, exists the remembrance of childhood and youth, of family life—forebears who lived and are buried, memories and contention of past victories and glories. As an example of that feeling one can give the appeal of Jerusalem and Palestine to Jews or the attachment of Greeks to Hellenic islands and isles. thus, the idea of the national territory which is regarded as an alienable sacred heritage, and its independence, integrity and homogeneity upon which depends the national security and independence, is an important element of every modern national ideology.

3. The next tradition is the people's political past. The political past means the type of political system the people of a country is governed with (e.g monarchy, democracy, totalitarianism etc.). The political experience of the people is important in shaping the national ideology.

4. There is also people's economic past and cultural past which is important in shaping their national identity. The economic past means the economic system of a country (capitalist or communist etc.), while cultural past comprises their achievements in literature, arts and music together with their literacy rate.

Therefore, it can be said that in John Stuart Mill's words:
Chapter Two \hspace{1cm} Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

"The strongest cause for the feeling of nationality... is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."\[9\]

All these would constitute the cultural bases of nationality. Cultural nationalism can exist with or without political nationalism (e.g. Jewish, Gaelic or Irish etc.). In order to transform from cultural nationalism to political nationalism, where each nationality strives for the establishment of an independent national state of its own, there is the need of another factor. This is the consciousness and will of the people. According to Hans Kohn in nationality "the most essential element is a living and active corporate will. Nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality"\[10\]. Thus, people should be aware of their conscious nationality through patriotism. Patriotism is love of country. This love of country (loyalty, fidelity to it) is an artificial effort which could be achieved through conscious education and training. In this way, the political loyalty to the nation has been created and the political nation has been crystallised. Unless a sufficient number of the population feel that the nation is the sole organ to command their political loyalty, they will stay as culture-nations. Nationalism in today's sense---state-nations, are the political nations. This political nation composes of territorial
consolidation and social assimilation. They combine their cultural, ethnic and linguistic characteristics together with patriotism to form the political nation in today's meaning.

At this instance, it might be helpful to look at some of the theories of nationalism which help us in understanding the evolution of the modern nationalism to some extent, but one has to keep in mind that there can be no absolute theory in the social sciences especially in the international relations.

Although there are many theories which explain the emergence of nationalism in the modern world, here more recent and well-known ones will be looked at briefly; Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith. These writers have enlightened us with a wide range of explanations for the rise of nationalism as a universal political force together with the emergence of the nation-states as a desirable form of the state in our contemporary world. Writers of nationalism try to bring explanations for nationalism from politics, economics and cultural points of view. Through the interactions of these three factors, the reason for the rise of nationalism today might be understood more clearly.

Karl Deutsch's theory of Nationalism as a starting point takes "social communication" as the basis of nationalism (he represents the modernisation school of thought). According to this school: social mobilisation which accompanies the growth of markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communication are important factors in the formulation of national consciousness. The trends in this underlying process of social mobilisation could do much to decide whether existing national trends in particular countries would be continued or reversed\textsuperscript{[11]}.
Chapter Two Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

On the other hand, Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism emphasises the importance of material conditions. He puts the reason for the rise of nationalism as economic development of industrial society. According to Gellner, nationalism "has very deep roots in our shared current condition..."[12]. This means that once industrialisation took place the old feudal system had withered away to give a rise to a homogeneous and more advanced polity. This theory, although it fails to give any explanation about the emotional appeal of nationalism, still talks about the necessary conditions (industrialisation) for the emergence of nationalism. And compared to other economist writers (for example Marxists) he does not see any future situation without nationalism.

The other major contributor on the study of the evolution of nationalism, with his book "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism" is Benedict Anderson. His focus is on the psychological appeal of nationalism. Anderson explains how and why people in certain circumstances come to "imagine" themselves of part of a nation and how they love and die for their nations[13]. In the creation of nations, he emphasises print-capitalism which strengthens the languages as a precondition for nationalism.

The last theorist to be mentioned is Anthony D. Smith. He discusses the importance of ethnicity in the creation of nations. Smith in his book, "The Ethnic Origins of Nations" put forward:

*It is clear that modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older...*
Chapter Two  
Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalised these structures and ideals, but modern "civic" nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or national sentiments... In terms of ends, as opposed to means, there is a remarkable continuity between nations and ethnic, nationalism and ethnicism; continuity but not identity.\textsuperscript{[14]}

However, none of these theories give a thorough explanation but they seek to help the understanding of nationalism and how it came to dominate the world politics. Table 2.1 gives us the brief conclusion of these theories\textsuperscript{[15]}.

Mass nationalism of modern times, however then, presents an interesting combination of irrational and rational elements. As "survival-school" thinkers define nationalism, it cannot be only explained through looking at the independence of it of the individual mind. Nationalism cannot be the result of only instincts and emotions. There are other elements which were offered by the progress of science and techniques (e.g propaganda) to formulate the national consciousness expansion of knowledge.
After looking at the bases and meaning of nationalism in general, it will help one to understand it more, if we learn in which phases nationalism has evolved itself to its modern version. In this respect it is essential to understand the political experience of Europe as nationalism had its rise in this continent through the quickening of national consciousness among European peoples towards the close of the middle ages.

### III. Phases Of Nationalism

As E.H. Carr, in his book "Nationalism and After" divided the phases of nationalism, as he did for the modern history of international relations, into three, it will be easier to do the same here as well. However, these phases will be divided into five in this thesis. Exploring the views on the nation as a political entity in those three periods will help us to understand how this universal force of nationalism in the modern sense came to our lives.
A- The First Period

The first period, which started with the slow disintegration of the mediaeval unity of the Holy Roman empire and church and resulted in the establishment of the national state and the national church (however it should be kept in mind that the word national used here does not have the same meaning as used in the modern sense) lasted till the French Revolution. In this period, there had been four important developments which started to restore the national feeling in Europe.

First one of these developments was the rise of vernacular literature and the decline of Latin. Latin (together with Greek) had been the official language of Eastern Orthodox and of Catholic Churches. In those periods people possessed a common literary tradition and mutual understanding which transcended the national differences among the people. But in the 14th-15th centuries onwards (because of the attempt to restrict the use of Latin by the humanists of Renaissance to certain areas like the ecclesiastical services) nationality started to be emphasised through the use of different vernacular languages. As early as the 14th century, for example, Dante wrote in Italian, Chaucer was also writing in English. Machiavelli, in his book "the Prince" in 1513 talked about Italy's glorious past and made national appeals to the Italians. Luther, in Germany, translated the bible into German. Therefore, national literature, in this way, began to show to people their nationality. While English writers stressed the distinctive characteristics of English, French, German and Italian writers did the same for their countries.
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The second development was the erection of sovereign national state as a political institution. This event came out as a result of a succession of monarchs in England, France, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia and in Netherlands, where these kings fought for their own interests in the name of their people and country or nation. But still, in this period, the nation had been identified with the person of the sovereign. The bishops and princes had been regarded as constituting the nation. Thus, the international relations (also wars) were not the relations between nation-states but between the mutual relations of these kings and princes. Nevertheless, this institution of monarchy encouraged the national traditions, national literature and maintained an army to fight in the name of the king and country. Therefore, monarchies of these individual kings were able to arouse a kind of national consciousness and national sentiment.

The third factor or development which aroused the feeling of belonging to a nation was accelerated by the transformation of the existing local economy into a national economy. The expansion of Europe outside the continent came about at the same time that the rulers of the Portugal, Spain Holland, France and England colonised distant places and profited through trade and exploitation\[16\]. Although the economic system which was called Mercantilism (lasted till the 18th century) aimed at self-sufficiency where the wealth and power of the nation should be sustained, it did not promote the welfare of the community and its people. What it did was to increase the power and wealth of the state, in other words the sovereign, through the trade and wars. On the other hand, while trade increased the power of the state and the
greatness of the nation it also increased the country's military, naval and financial strength. So the way for these sovereigns to expand their wealth and power came through the trade war. With this trade war, which arouse because of the national mercantilism, economic differentiation of nationalities and the growth of national patriotism were inevitable. Any economic undertaking abroad, despite the fact that majority of the people was excluded from this wealth, became patriotically applauded.

The last important development was the establishment of national churches instead of universal Catholic Christendom. There had always been rivalry between the ecclesiastical world and leaders both in the divergence of ideals and interests. The movement for nationalisation of the church which started in England would have impacts in other countries during the pace of the 17th century. When in England national monarchs established the Anglican Church, national patriotism of the English backed this national form of church. Maybe the most important reason for its acceptance in England was that Catholicism was despised as it was the faith of their enemy Spain. The same applied in the case of Scotland when they accepted Protestantism in 1557 easily because of their revolt against Catholic enemy "France", or when Netherlands was united with Reformed faith against an enemy again but this time, "Spain". Where in the case of Germany, when Luther started a revolution against Papacy, the motive was not national or political but religious[17], this delayed the national unity and led Germany back of the other Western States. However, Luther still made patriotic appeals to Germans influencing the German mind into complete surrender to the Government. In this way the rulers came to hold the power
of the church in their hands. Lutheranism not only affected Germany but its acceptance in the Scandinavians advanced the Protestant revolutions in those countries as well.

With the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century "the Protestant Revolution" the national spirit had been quickened. The two principles of the previous era; the unity of Christianity which took precedence over the national differences and the power of the church which was greater than the power of governments, had been challenged by the International Christianity. Thus, the medieval mind which, was influenced by St. Augustine's vision of the two States on earth "the community of God and the community of the Devil" lost its appeal. All these, the Protestant Revolution and the disruption of Catholic Church had special effects on developing nationalism. In this way, the Christian community had been subjected to the national differentiation and it resulted in the dissolution of the intellectual and moral cement holding them together in the name of the universal religion. The words of Pope Urban in 1095 "let no attachment to your native soil be an impediment: because, in the different points of view, all the world is exile to the Christian, and all the world his country" became obsolete as the world started to divide into individual nations.

In this first period then, with the developments mentioned above, in many parts of Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain, Portugal and England) politics, economics, religion and literature were nationalised. This process of nationalism transformed the old imperial states into national states, each possessing a clear-cut territory, with a local language and an independent economy. Regardless of
these developments, still the building of national consciousness in the minds of people was debatable. National patriotism existed in some way, coupled with the loyalty to a monarchical sovereign. Moreover, even if the respective sovereigns were at war, the civilians could pass to and fro doing their business. The mass population of civilians were not considered parties to the conflict- making this period in a way "international" and the international imperialism of Austria, Russia and Ottomans together with the localist institutions of Germany and Italy yet existed.

Only in the eighteen century would certain intellectual developments strengthen the nationalist process in Western Europe towards the modernisation of the phenomenon. And not only before the 19th century in many of the Central and Eastern Europe, the word nation had political significance except for linguistic and racial groupings.

To elaborate the process of nationalism in the second period compromising the time between Napoleonic wars and 1914, will show us the second phase of development of nationalism in the international context and history. But before coming to the Napoleonic wars as a starting point of analysis it will be more appropriate to dwell on some nationalist doctrines which arose just before the French Revolution in the 18th century.

The philosophy of nationalism emerged more intensely in the eighteenth century when this century was regarded as the "Century of Excellence" of serious thinkers. Thus, in this intellectual century of "Enlightenment" the first doctrines of nationalism started to appear.
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The first seat of modern nationalism took place in England before other countries like France or Spain. One of the most important English thinkers worth mentioning is Lord Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke believed that the British people had a distinctive nationality with a special spirit and he took the British constitution as the national expression of the British. His political philosophy depended on the glorification of these aspects. According to him, God had created human beings in such a way that they have an instinct to establish nationalities, distinct from each other with their geography, climate, language, character and government. He took nationalism as the most natural and reasonable way of achieving national interests. He believed that every nationality possesses a "genius" and could have such a political entity to live in. At this period, the popular loyalty to the national state took precedence over the loyalty to the king. The development of national patriotism with intellectual thinking on nationalism, made the English pioneer in the new popular nationalism.

In France, on the other hand, during this period, Kingship still constituted the nation or the state, but the intellectuals were falling under the influence of England as a country of liberty, toleration and humanity. They started to consider the words "nation" and "patrie" as slogans against the royal absolutism in France. It was at this time that J.J. Rousseau (1712-1778) began to exercise his influence over a great variety of thoughts. Rousseau who was the founder of modern nationalism had an ideological impact on the French and of the American revolutions. Despite having many other ideas of political philosophy, he was associated with the growth of the
modern ideas on nationality. He, under the influence of English ideas, shared the belief in the freedom of man. He, further more, believed that only with the establishment of collective personality of the nation could the justification of the society and social order be maintained. What he did was the rejection of the personification of the nation in the ruling class, he believed that to achieve this the whole people should express a unified will which could be achieved only through the feeling of affinity, common destiny and responsibility. This was the idea of the sovereignty of people.

In 1760, in his contract theory, he put forward that the state had no rights but rights of people against the state. And in 1762 when he wrote the social contract, he was assured that the true political community could only be achieved through the virtue and love of the fatherland of the people. And the only moral and rational way of founding a state was the active participation of its equal people by a feeling of brotherhood and mutual devotion\textsuperscript{[22]}. And as devices, for stimulating national feeling, he talks about the revival of national customs, honours of patriots, national games and plays and most important of all, public education. And Rousseau emphasises that:

\textit{"the first that we have to follow is the national character: each people has to have, its own character... if this is lacking, it is necessary to begin by creating it.\textsuperscript{[23]} 

A child in opening its eyes ought to see the fatherland... all should be educated in the "love of the country... in the love of liberty and laws. 

The national education ought}
Chapter Two  Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

to be gratuitous... In addition each citizen ought to be
soldier. ... will be always prepared to serve...[24] ... The
patrie rests of the relations of the state with its members;
when these change or are destroyed the patrie disappears".[25]

So Rousseau's political nation gave priority to the state.

In Germany, J.G. Herder (1774-1803) was interested in cultural
nationalism— what distinguishes one nationality from another. In his masterpiece
"Ideen Zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784)"[26] he talks about these
distinct characteristics which makes up every nationality. As to Herder, every group
of human beings have separated from each others by geography and climate and these
two factors results in their development of a national character (distinct language,
literature, education and manners...). And Herder considering national character as
natural and reasonable put forward that everybody should cherish it and should seek
to undertake its achievement. The most important way to achieve the rights of
nationality would be with the rights of language. He gave great emphasis to the
national languages as he believed that each man could be creative only in his own
mother tongue. Although Herder applied his principles on the German nationality, he
was not unwilling to apply his principles universally. Also, because of being against
imperialism, he asserted that every national state should comprise only one nationality.
In spite of the fact that for Herder nationality was not political or biological, in some
instances, as mentioned above, he talks about the political aspect as well.
Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The nationalist thought in Central and Eastern Europe would be influenced by Herder's cultural nationalism. Thus with Herder, in the northern Europe, there was a new definition of nation--- rather than the movement of democratisation of Rousseau.

Before the effect of cultural nationalism, there was the middle class nationalism which was a democratic, popular and alien to the 18th century--- and took place in 1789 France. The French Revolution which was inspired by the English model of constitutional liberty and limited government inspired by Rousseau, asserted the right of individuals not only to determine their form of government but to chose the state they wanted to live in. For the first time, popular sovereignty national self-determination became the important milestones in the new nationalism.

The year 1789 marked the birth of the French nation. The French revolutionaries announced national unity. The absolute sovereignty of the king was replaced by the sovereignty of the people with the common patriotism and national will. Furthermore, French abolished all the geographic and class barriers and achieved national unity.

In fact, French revolution did not have impact only in France but did contributions universally on the practice of nationalism. For example, it was not till the revolution that any government forced the use of national language by their citizens. Moreover, for the first time there was a national elementary education based on state direction where national patriotism and national duty would be taught. The advocating of national news which would inform citizens about the problems facing their countries was the other introduction by the revolution. And the other agent
which was brought about and has been used in the present century as well was the national military training.

B- The Second Period

While the nationalism of the European peoples- Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Russians might to some extent, have come from the French Revolution, the real teaching of nationalism came from Napoleon. The start of the Napoleonic wars marked the start of the second phase in the evolution of the idea of nationalism. The nationalist spirit among these people which was quite low had been aroused by incorporation of large areas like the Belgian Netherlands, the German Rhineland, the Italian districts of Savoy and Nice also allied territories of Italian peninsula, nearly half of Germany, Denmark, Poland, Spain, and Portugal, into France by Napoleon. Before the Napoleonic wars, the intellectual life in Germany, Italy and Russia was under the French influence (its ideas; French language used). But because of the emphasis of French nationalism, a patriotic reaction against the French militancy started among those foreign writers. Thus, cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment was replaced by the nationalism of the romantic movement. In this Romantic movement, the connection of nationalism and tradition took their strongest expression. German statesmen (e.g Fichte, Herder etc.), Italian statesmen (Vittoria Alfieri, Mazzini) fostered their nationalism as a weapon against Napoleonic imperialism. Having been emotional, this movement tended to emphasise the peculiarities of national life. In this way, it encouraged a popular worship of nationality.
When the Vienna settlement of 1815 terminated the Napoleonic wars in Europe, and condemned nationalism and individual liberty under its chief architect Prince Metternich, who was not a nationalist, it seemed that this would stop the advent of nationalism into other states. But the nineteenth century which begins in 1815 and ends in 1918, the time between the Congress of Vienna to the Treaties of Versailles, witnessed the struggle for national independence on the part of all nationalities in Central-Eastern Europe and consolidation of national power in Germany and Italy. So the history of the nineteenth century was the undoing of the work of the Vienna Congress by nationalism.

In the 1840s revolutions, the cultural nationalism had been accelerated by the politically-minded liberals arguing that every nationality as well as every individual, had the inherent right to freedom (self-determination and independence). The Italian thinker, Mazzini, being one of these liberal nationalists in that period, urged people to overthrow the existing states and establish their own nation-states. In 1850s and 1860s Italians and Rumanians were able to establish their national independence. Again, the advent of Napoleon the Third as a nationalist (1848-70) accelerated the formation of nation-states all over Europe—especially in the unification of Germany as a very nationalist state when she fought with Prussia. After the unification of Germany and Italy the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had quickened. Even in the 1820s Greece and Serbia were able to come out of the Ottoman domain in a limited way as national states. Furthermore, in 1831, the Greeks being dissatisfied with their existing borders had organised uprisings, backed by Great Britain and France, to
establish an independent national Greek state. The Ottoman Empire was not only suffering from the nationalistic aspirations of her subjects—Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Armenians and later, by Islamic subjects, but from the impact of Western nationalist ideology among Turks themselves. However, being inhabited by a great variety of peoples of different ethnic origin and religious belief would delay the establishment of a modern nation state till the end of Great War in Turkey.

In this time, the tide of nationalism rising steadily did not leave a place untouched in the European Continent from East to West and North to South. In the above pages, it has been looked at the main countries of Western Europe like England and France and the impact of intellectual developments in these countries on the growth of national consciousness in other areas of Europe.

Apart from the movement of Romanticism and the French Revolution in Western Europe which rekindled the national aspirations of the people the other circumstance, was the Industrial Revolution. In the last third of the 19th century, the societies of the Western Europe, following England were experiencing the development of technology and large scale machine industry which would strengthen nationalism. Till 1870s, the new economic system of laissez-faire of the 18th century under the British hegemony worked as a single world economy.

By 1870s Industrial revolution was making both the economic and political rivalry among the peoples more intense and would change both the economic system of laissez-faire and intensify nationalism. It was believed that a nation could only be a great power (like Great Britain and France) if it was an industrial nation as well. Thus,
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

to be a great power depended on the economic advantage. The first way to achieve such an economic advantage was through imperialism and expansion. Vast areas of Asia and Africa, in that channel, had been parcelled out among European powers. For their part the Europeans did not forget that, imperialism would not only increase their economic capability but also their national prestige (e.g France sought to recover her lost of territories in Europe and in Africa). The imperialism of Europe quickened the emergence and development of nations and national consciousness outside of Europe. At the last decade of the 19th century, both in Europe and outside of Europe nationalism became stronger with the Industrial Revolution which brought the economic competition into the political sphere.

The second way was the economic nationalism which was advocated by List (government manipulation in order to catch up with the competitors). It was firstly applied by Germans in the middle of the nineteenth century, when they introduced the first modern tariff against British hegemony. This can not only be explained in the economic terms but through nationalist challenge of Germans in the political sense. In this way, economic policy became the strong support of national identity of countries.

Between 1880-1910 many countries were using tariff protectionism to catch up with industrial development. So to speak, wherever Industrial Revolution had progressed so had the economic nationalism. Outside Europe, the imperialistic motives of Europeans, quickened the emergence and development of nations and also the national consciousness of the people in those colonies of Europeans.
Chapter Two Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The 19th century and early 20th century which was the second period of international relations in my analysis of the development of the nation and nationalism, was "the age of Nationalism". This century witnessed the emergence of political nation states in the modern sense under the impact of many varying factors as it is discussed in the above pages. The emergence of new national states of Germany, Italy, Greece and many others accompanied with the prolonged dissolution of the multiethnic empires of the Ottomans, Austria and Russians. Also in Asia and Africa both with the imperialism of Europeans and dissolution of empires the growth of national consciousness had been stimulated. Henceforth, the international relations started to be governed according to the modern rules of the time; not by the personal interests of the sovereigns but the collective interests of the nations.

Nationalism became a world wide phenomenon and reached its climax by 1914. The way to 1914 had been prepared by industrialisation, imperialism and with the attendant myths about one's superiority over other nations. Popular national hatreds, for the first time, became in a way the aim of the war. This war became the first war of nation states involving all European Great powers. Nationalism became the reason of international anarchy for both the already created and for those trying to be nation states.

C- The Third Period

Moving to the *third period* of the international relations which began in 1914 with the first World War and ended with the Second World War one would see that the
Chapter Two  
Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

dominant factor of the 19th century—"nationalism" was now by far the greatest force in Europe. The first great war of nations was fought for national solidarity, the need for national unity and the most important of all—patriotism.

The first of events which led to World War 1 was the Balkan War of the Ottomans, their defeat by imperialistic Italy in 1911-1912, then loss of Libya and of the Greek speaking Dodecanese islands in the Aegean. The second decisive test for nationalism was the war of national Serbia against Austria and involving Russia in the war with Germany and the involvement of all other powers in Europe. The result of these had been the victory of national states against the empires. The Great War which was fought on behalf of nationalism to realise the ideal of national self-determination, resulted in the creation of many new national states between 1914-1918. It was apparent that the old realities of the world (polyglot dominions of the Austrian Archduke, the Ottoman Sultan, the Russian Tsar, the rambling empires of China, India, Britain Portugal and Spain)\textsuperscript{[37]} could not satisfy the aims of modern nationalism and nation states.

Perhaps one of the most important actions taken, which would heighten the ideal of national self-determination in a short period of time, was the US declaration of war on the 6th of April 1917 against Germany, and the attempts of President Wilson of the US to establish a world with a League of Nations. He believed that the world could only become a safe place only if the map of Europe was redrawn along clearly recognisable lines of nationality. Having giving the right of choosing their way
of life to both great and small nations, he believed that only then democracy and peace would be achievable.

In the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 which took place after the defeat of the Central powers, the principle of nationality, unlike the Vienna congress of 1815 became the public law of Europe. After the war, the map of Europe was different than before—four great empires (Austria-Hungary, Ottoman, Russian and German) dissolved, six independent national states had been created (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland), six others were enlarged (Serbia, Rumania, Greece, Italy France and Denmark) and four states came to consist of a single nationality (Germany, G. Austria, Magyar, Hungary and Turkey). However, despite the attempts made in the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, the liberation of many nationalities did not bring peace and liberty into the international order. Because state boundaries of many states had been decided only upon the strategic rather than racial and cultural considerations. Some new and enlarged nation states like Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania composed minorities, and the real objective of the Allies became the suppression of some of the defeated powers (e.g Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia) in order to strengthen themselves. Germany, being excluded from the peace settlement and Italy, although one of the victorious groups, were not satisfied.

As a result of these, the most striking features of the post-war Europe were the rise of Fascism and Nazism. Thus, with the advent of these two ideologies which were both the extremism of nationalism brought the aggressive side of nationalism—nationalism as a religion. Also still outside Europe, nationalism was growing. Despite
one of the virtues of the Versailles Treaty--- tentative steps towards eliminating colonialism--- at the peace conference the imperial powers were unwilling in applying the principle of national self-determination outside Europe. So in many countries anti-colonial movements, showing a nationalistic character, started to flare up. For example, in Mexico the struggle against the American and British Oil companies became a national struggle. In the Middle East starting with the rise of Turkish nationalism and establishing a real nation state, in other Islamic states (especially in the Arabic countries) which were the part of Caliphate of Ottomans, nationalism, the desire of founding of nation states was very great. In spite of their Islamic affinity, nationalism overcame their religious ties resulting in the establishment of nation states (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria etc.). In the Far East also, repercussions of nationalism was felt by the ancient and non-national civilisation of China and India in Asia later.

With all this aggressive nationalism of the post-war era, nationalism gained a new form. The new nationalists placed their country above everything and aroused hatred against aliens. This kind of "integral" nationalism, which was used originally by Charles Maurras at the height of the "Dreyfus Affair"[28] in France started to be applied in the 20th century. After the 19th century, in this period also, nationalism had remained the dominant force as it expressed the emotions and desires of the great majority of people[29]. But on the other hand because it is emotional and could be used as "My country, right or wrong" nationalism became the main peril of the time.
Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The new aggressive shape of nationalism shaped the totalitarian character of this third period. But this did not imply that individuals became more vigorously nationalist in sentiment, what happened was that nationalism started to operate in new political and economic environments. That is why may be to some extent the success of the League of Nations was limited from the beginning. In this period the three underlying causes of the inflation of nationalism could be put forward:

1. The rise of the new social strata to full membership of the nation—began to affect the content of national policy in a revolutionary way. This brought the economic claims of the masses into the forefront making the states to take into consideration the welfare of the members of the nation.

2. The nationalisation of the economic policy— the functions of the nation states was not restricted by politics but with economics as well. There was no one world economy but a multiple of national economies. Between the years 1919-1940, with the certain measures taken by the governments (e.g. closing of national frontiers to large scale immigration) in the economic sense rendered the clash between nations inevitable. The 1930s had witnessed the growth of more protectionism thus leading to more exclusivist policies of nationalism.

3. Increase in the number of nations— (e.g. in 1871 there were 14; in 1914-20; in 1924-26 etc...). This multiplication of national frontiers in Europe and outside the continent was an impetus in the increase of economic nationalism so that each nation could claim its share in the profits of industrial production.
Chapter Two Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

All three of these factors influenced both the political and economical order of the period. And nationalism under the totalitarian regimes of Hitler Germany, Mussolini Italy and Lenin-Stalin Russia, became stronger and more aggressive than before. Especially with Hitler's new nationality in which the emphasis was on racial purity—"Non Germans living within the borders of the German state should be expelled or otherwise eliminated..." together with their dissatisfaction of their treatment after the war, nobody was able to stop their nationalist aggressiveness. Acton, as long ago as 1862, was able in a way to see the dangers inherent in the doctrine of nationality, which would be used by Nazi Germany and result in the most catastrophic war of nations in 1939:

"By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It can not admit them an equality with the ruling nation which constitute the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According... in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated or reduced to servitude or outlawed or put in a condition of dependence"\(^{(11)}\)
Chapter Two: Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

D- The Fourth Period

E.H. Carr, in his book "Nationalism and After" was not sure whether the world was passing into the fourth period as sharply differentiated in character from the third period from its predecessors. I think the world passed to the *fourth period* which I would take to be the period from 1945 to late 1980s and it was different than the previous period. In the international relations, there were other factors more dominant than nationalism--- like ideology, economic interdependence internationalism and Cold War between two internationalist powers US and Soviet Union. Not only the relations of the states had been carried out on a different dimension but the role of nationalism, to some extent, in their relations became more passive than the previous period. Still, however, nationalism was dormant compared to the previous times it was not absent.

World War II was the most powerful and destructive nationalist struggle fought among the nation states of the world. However, even during the war there were attempts to change the world order in such a way as to create one world. As Wendell L. Wilkie advocated the idea of "One World" by the abolition of the major prerogatives of national sovereignty, Henry Wallace (vice president of the US) on the other hand proclaimed that the new century should be "the century of the common man". Although the dictatorial totalitarian type of nationalism was discredited, nevertheless, it would not become the age of the common man either. However, where 1919 saw the violent upsurge of the new nationalism throughout the continent of Europe, 1945 saw what appeared to be its near demise. Especially in Germany, the
Chapter Two  Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

patriotic fervour of 1914, the hymn of hate had lost their power. National self-confidence not only among Germans but all over in Europe had never been at a lower ebb. The resistance leaders of the Europe were ready to implement a federal union in Europe believing that in this way nationalism could be held under control. When the United Nations, under the leadership of the US, was established this aim was, in a way was achieved. The UN represents the realisation of an entirely new situation. The international relations between states of an interdependent shrinking world started to take a different path—not so much dependent on a nationalistic basis.

But did all these new international relations mean that one's right to cultural and geographical location—right of self-determination was dead and the frontiers established in Yalta and Potsdam were fixed? For some time, the trend seemed that way, as if nationalism had disappeared. First reason, as mentioned before, was that after the experience of Nazism which resulted in a catastrophic war, it appeared inappropriate to speak of nationalism. The second reason was the emergence of the Cold War between the two non-national (in a way) states the US and the Soviet Union. Their competition involved a new ingredient which had been absent before, "ideology". Each superpower saw itself as the carrier of the universalist values and regarded the enemy as the embodiment of evil. Both US and the Soviets refused to commit themselves in support of nationalist movements, although in practice they could not manage to refrain from supporting ethnic/nationalist separatism covertly and manipulatively (e.g. at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute, when China and Pakistan
Chapter Two Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

had close relations at the time, the Soviet Union supported Baluchi nationalists in Pakistan, then the US support for UNITA in Angola against Soviet and Cuban assistance for MPLA, etc.). Although it seemed that supporting the principle of national self-determination as a tactical advantage was weakening the other side, these events showed that the world was not out of nationalism. It was covered by ideology and competition of two superpowers.

By 1960s nationalism was becoming a major force in Asia and Africa again despite the look of withering away of the nation state under the internationalist tide of superpower competition or ideology. The concept of colonial empire, which still existed in Asia and Africa under Western powers, after the World War II started to be de-legitimised (with the support of the Soviet Union in a way). In those areas, having been impressed with the success, of Japan outsetting the French from Indochina, the British withdrawal from Asia in 1947 by declaring India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma independent in 1948, Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt's success against British and France, accelerated native governments of colonial empires slogan "Asia for the Asians". Under this post-war tidal wave of nationalism, which was fed by both the US and the Soviet Union in order to spread their philosophies, European colonial powers were unable to hold their colonial possessions. However, more and more nation states emerged as a result of this anti-colonialism.

Nationalism was not only showing its strength in the previous colonies but even in Europe where internationalism seemed to take shape in the international organisation founded by the Western Europeans to decrease the aggressive effect of
nationalism after the second world war. In the years when attempts were made for a
burgeoning federal union in Europe, Britain was more inclined to look more to itself
than to a federal Europe (e.g. UK raised difficulties for OEEC in 1947). The advent of
Charles de Gaulle in 1958 also changed the atmosphere in France. The President De
Gaulle stressed the independence of France from West and East. Even in the German
Federal Republic nationalism grew compared to the first years after the war. In
Belgium, also, the mutual distrust and hostility between Flemish and the
French-speaking parts of the population started to come to the forefront again. Two
other countries Greece and Turkey, although both being under the Western-US
umbrella, faced each other as adversaries in December 1963 over the Cyprus problem.
So nationalism started to ride high again in Europe, in the western bloc.

Not only Western Europe, but also the communist countries, which were
thought to be welded under the universalistic concepts of Marxism, would try to go
their own way of socialism, a more nationalistic socialism than Soviet socialism or
communism. The two great communist powers, Soviet Union and China competed for
leadership to impose their policies among the other communist states. Nationalism
loyalty of Yugoslavia had alienated her not only from the Soviets but also from west
resulting in the neutrality in their foreign policy—pursued depending on their national
interests. Most probably, the other Eastern Bloc countries in Europe would follow a
similar way to Yugoslavia if they were not deterred by repression or even intervention
by the Soviet army (e.g. Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1970 - 76, Hungary in
1956 and Germany in 1950s).
Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

It cannot be denied that the climate at the end of the second world war was different from that of 1919. International relations (from 1945 - 1989) had been based on different criteria than the previous era. The ideology implanted into the international relations, and led by the two super powers, divided people into two different blocs. Till late 1980s the wars fought between countries or even within the same country between locals seemed to be fought for a universal ideology, making one believe that ideology had won over nationalism. A first view could suggest that, but a closer analysis would show that neither the US nor the Soviet Union could erase the existence of nationalism from their world view (although in the Soviet Union's communism, nationalism should be replaced by proletarian internationalism--- classes instead of nations). It was a fact that there was ideological war, super power rivalry on that basis and Cold War but even in their own blocs starting from the 1950s till 1990 there existed nationalist aspirations but under the existence of a twin may be a strong force (ideology). In 1980s, even when the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union came into its climax, with Reagan's coming into power besides ideology there were still nationalist voices to be heard (as given in the examples above). Above all these, though it was obvious that nationalism in this fourth period was different than the third period's aggressive and militant nationalism being more passive (may be to some extent it might be compared to the second period where nationalist feelings existed but still there was another force than nationalism, which was the existence of sovereigns) and not vigorously fought as an end in itself as in the early 19th and 20th centuries. Despite the bipolar world after 1945, nationalism was existent with a
different character—a less bellicose attitude: on the other hand the number of nation-states increased in the world together with ethnic nationalism in the already established states (e.g. in 1960s Quebec- in Canada, Basque- in Spain or Scots/Welsh in Britain).

The big change in international relations which would start to affect the nationalism all over the world came in 1985 with Gorbachev's advent to power. The New Thinking in Soviet's foreign policy was not simply the personal preference of a particular Soviet leader— Gorbachev. It was as a result of a crisis of the communist system. The crisis in the communist system was on many bases— to some extent the technological, military and economic factors had an effect on the breaking of the system but the most important inadequacy of the system was its lack of understanding of, or its incompatibility with nationalism. The economic factors had been acting as catalysts in the demise of Marxism and Leninism in the Soviet Russia.

Marxist theory which put emphasis on socio-economic classes rather than nations contended that as early as in the 19th century, French or German workers would come to their senses realising that much more significant than the bonds of shared nationhood were the bonds of proletariat\textsuperscript{[32]} and believed that history would witness the victory of internationalism over nationalism. Marxist-Leninist ideology which was practised in the Soviet Russia in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution (in the hope of creating one class society) regarded nationalism as a product of the uneven development of the world capitalist economy. During the Soviet regime, as once put forward by Lenin, they followed the logic that neither unequivocal support
for nationalism nor an unconditional rejection of its political aspirations could promote the logic of human unification. Thus, for tactical reasons they supported some nationalistic aspirations but kept in mind that the proletariat was the only revolutionary force, which deserved unconditional support and which would lead to internationalism. But in this internationalist doctrine, the sheer emphasis on economic interpretation of history, rather than psychological, cultural and historical elements which have a magnetic pull exerted on the ethnic groups, had been underestimated.

The events in 1989 (collapse of the Soviet led Eastern Europe) brought the competition between nationalism and Marxism to its peak point resulting in the victory of the nationalism over universalist Marxism-Leninism.

So, when one comes to 1990s, E.H. Carr's belief that the world could be a different world after 1945, in which loyalty to the nation state would gradually be eroded and replaced by a distinct, internationalist order[33] has not been realised. What was the real change in the world was the increase of interdependence and the growth of the international organisations, the UN and the European community among them—but not the nationalism and loyalty to it?

E- The Fifth Period

The fifth period which starts with the end of Cold War and is the third grand transformation of the organising structure and motivating spirit of global politics in the 20th century (according to Zbigniew Brzezinski) leaves the world between two opposing forces; the logic of economics and the logic of ethnicity and nationality.
Chapter Two Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The Cold War has ended, without a hot war, with the success of the US. The Soviets were not only defeated because of their exhausted economy but through the challenges by their vassal states, leading to the victory of Western concepts of democracy and free market considerations. Revolutionary internationalism then, which appeals to oppressed groups and classes in different societies, was shattered by the end of 1980s\[34\] under the durable power of nationalism fed by the Western economic power.

It can not be denied that there is a growing globalising culture which started with the last period. This includes: the rapid growth of vast transnational companies; the rise and fall of large power blocs based on one or other military "superpower" and forming a military-political network of client- states in an increasingly interdependent international system of states the vast increase in the scale efficiency, density and power of the means of communication\[35\].

Thus, together with the victory of the western bloc, does it mean that the boundaries of national states and ethnic communities would be transcended and may be a kind of internationalism (Liberal or hegemonic?) could be pursued?

It is obvious that in this new environment there are limits to what governments can achieve. While they have lost their power in some ways, for example to control transnational monetary flows, on the other hand, have enhanced their power in other areas such as the control of migration etc.\[36\]. And the other important area still concerning the independent nation-state is the concern of security. Although the United Nations Organisation is an actor in world politics and its influence should not
be underestimated it is not still operating above the arena of interstate relationships. Therefore, the UN as an international institution is not able to protect the security of individual states totally.

So to speak, through the processes of greater interaction and integration together with the end of the Cold War, we are living in a "global village" as symbolised by Marshall McLuhan. But to pass to a transnationalist period the world should have a common objective in political processes apart from the economic interests, only then peace, freedom and tolerance could be achieved. In its simplest term internationalism which compromises universal government and universal language is the idea of belonging to a broader community than that of the nation state. And only through transcending "narrow nationalism" into the growth of new lingua francae and a new world culture, would the world be a different world, -without allegiances to narrow national units. That kind of political integration (political integration-process by which villages become districts, countries, which in turn are combined into provinces into kingdoms the federations and world government) which could lead into one single government for the whole world is still out of sight. European nationalism, which moved towards integration is a very slow process. They are more integrated than they had been between the wars (after considering that Germans and French spent almost 900 years preparing against each other) and this is a noteworthy change\(^{37}\). But even without an obvious political hostility the attitudes of the people of a nation towards the others might become ethnocentric\(^{38}\). Table 2.2 shows the attitudes of two European countries towards other countries.
Chapter Two  
Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The disunity over foreign policy over the Gulf War and then over the Yugoslav conflicts which put the states of Europe into a difficult position was the different national interests of these countries. This shows that ethnocentrism has an important place in the international relations even in the cases of urgent need of solution of human misery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towards</th>
<th>In Britain %</th>
<th>In France %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>+ 76</td>
<td>+ 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+ 73</td>
<td>+ 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>+ 55</td>
<td>+ 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>+ 45</td>
<td>+ 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+ 31</td>
<td>+ 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>+ 26</td>
<td>+ 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>+ 24</td>
<td>+ 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>+ 30</td>
<td>+ 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>+ 25</td>
<td>+ 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>+ 8</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>+ 21</td>
<td>+ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>+ 11</td>
<td>+ 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>+ 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>- 48</td>
<td>- 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>- 24</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>+ 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: "net favourability" of attitudes in Britain and France towards other countries. (Source: surveys as above, quoted in Nancy J. Walker and Robert M. Worcester "Nationalism in Britain" unpublished paper for International Political Science Association Congress, Paris July 1985).
Chapter Two  Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The passing of bipolarity (together with German unification) also has some repercussions in the West European integration which is the first real attempt in the creation of a single identity for millions of people. In 1991 when the European Community committed itself to a breathtaking integrationist venture- The Maastricht Treaty (the last step before the political union) the 1992 showed that there were more things to achieve. Still the nation-states put their interests before any other international institution. After the crisis of Maastricht, when European community reached a compromise in GATT negotiations with the US the French government facing their elections (March in 1993) cared more about their peasants than the supranationalist Community. The French message in December was: "Our peasants are more important than Europe". Therefore, still, not only is there not an effective international authority to coerce national governments for certain things but also the national governments are reluctant to yield any measure of the power available to them to any external authority. The other reasons of delay in the unification process which induces national interests again can be cited below:

1. Dramatic regional developments (e.g. Middle East) into which European states may be drawn severally or together.

2. The dangers of ethnic conflict, separatism and large scale wars in other parts of the world such as the Indian subcontinent or Africa which may again involve one or more European states and so divide the interests of those states and even threaten, their stability and cohesion.
3. The impact of waves of immigrants and guest workers on the economies and societies of European states which may differentially affect their attitudes and priorities.

4. Larger problems of environmental pollution and ecological disaster, as well as epidemic disease, which may require both individual action by each European state and wider, perhaps global, responses which may pre-empt the integration of Europe.

5. Problems of large scale crime and terrorism, which may again call for immediate action by individual states or by bodies larger and more powerful than any European organisation[39].

In the 1990s then, there is soft-footed return of nationalism in the West and affecting Western European supranationalism. In the 1990s the most brutal and aggressive nationalism is taking place in the Eastern Europe and outside the European continent. Bipolarity of the previous period kept a system of order and unity to some extent—— whether voluntary or coercive. With the demise of the Cold War and bipolarity, many nations all over the world, especially in Europe, are trying to follow their own needs and interests but nobody's else. So, by 1990s a new picture of nationalism (more aggressive, more brutal) is emerging. In Eastern Europe now under a liberated atmosphere than communism now, with uneven regional development and cultural divisions, there is a fertile ground for nationalism. In those areas, the cultural aspects have been emphasised by linguistic nationalism, national religion in the numerous symbols of the nation such as the flag, national anthem, dress and myths of history, more than anything else.
Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

The breached Berlin Wall in November 1989, the reunification of Germany in October 1990 or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 did not enhance the security of the world or satisfied the people's independence and self-determination and their nationalistic aspirations. That saga of nationalism which was suppressed under a universalistic ideal since 1945, was revitalised more vigorously then before. And it has not been experienced as deadly as in the artificial nation-state of Yugoslavia in the form of ethnic cleansing since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Not only in Europe but in other parts of the world, in the developing world as well, the renationalisation or rebuilding of nations are on the agenda. Having been freed from the Cold War and from the grip of colonialism they are faced with not establishing new nations but failing in the already established ones because of ethnic violence. According to a recent UN report, apart from the Eastern Europe many countries in Asia and Africa are now on the verge of national collapse- for example; Somalia, Haiti, Zaire, Sudan, Niger, Angola, India and Rwanda. Among the major conflicts since 1989 in the world, only three of these conflicts had been between nation-states, 79 of these conflicts were internal (ethnic etc.)\[40\]. All these events, show us that the world is on the threshold of a new era. There is an apparent paradox that nationalism is flourishing in an era of internationalism. It is a fact that, despite the attempts at globalising, side by side with it, there is a rediscovery or continuation of national styles and values which were stimulated by political nationalism all over the world.
As Martin Krol wrote in the International Affairs in April 1990, the current situation in Europe is similar to the conditions which emerged as a result of the decisions taken at Versailles in 1919. All nations which possess an equal right to determine their own fate for themselves should be treated more carefully than the ones treated after Versailles. Having looked at the current international relations, it seems that the world before us will be a world of nation states for the next 30, 50 or may be more, years to come.

Hence, all the developments still could not kill the feeling of belonging to a certain group in human beings. Primitive tribes were nationalities; ancient city-states developed within nationalities; ancient empires included nationalities; medieval cultural areas embraced nationalities; modern states have been built of nationalities. So nationality and national consciousness have been existent with man's habitat and may be older than any written records. For centuries and centuries nationality has been consistent in expression of man's socialisation and loyalty to that special group. Therefore, some kind of nationality in the 20th century may be even in the 21st century, seems likely to continue together with the other trends. Having had the experience of blind nationalism and failure to achieve peace on earth and between people, we should use our past experience to understand the causes of such an increase in brutal and bloody nationalism. Nationality being more than a doctrine or a passing phenomenon but an instinctive attachment, can be formulated in other forms of conduct like federations or confederations leading to a more stable and peaceful world.
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

As a Jewish-American writer, Mr Alfred Zimmern says; "Men may change their clothes, their politics, their wives, their religion, their philosophies, they can not change their grandfathers"[41]. In conclusion, human beings are in favour of anti-universalist solutions that would not do away with their language, their old customs and their patriotism of their own nation. The increased nationalistic-ethnic conflicts both in the individual nation states and among nation states could be resolved only with compromise, not through suppression or war in the end of the twentieth century. Benevolent nationalism which will come with equality, security and prosperity then may be the way to greater unifications.

The attempt which has been made by the West Europeans, despite some setbacks, is not a hopeless alternative and might be a good example to take the challenge and try such a unification instead of conflicts and hatreds among ourselves. We can use the European Community's experiences. Such unifications could be made tolerable to mankind and be to the benefit of many nationalities. However, the passions, emotions and the rights of the nations while forming such political associations, like federations or confederations, should be taken into consideration. Only then their success of will be permanent and aggressive nationalism could be controlled.

In conclusion, nationalism plays a vital role in the international relations. The peace in the world is dependent upon the amicable relations of the nations. In the next chapter the role of the Greek and Turkish nationalism, as the main cause of the Cyprus problem, will be described.
REFERENCES


Chapter Two  Impact of Nationalism on International Relations


[18] Ibid, p.287.


Chapter Two

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations

[34] Ibid, p.195.
Chapter Two  

Impact of Nationalism on International Relations


CHAPTER THREE

The Historical Impact Of Nationalism And Ethnicity On Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

I. Overview

As mentioned in the previous chapter, nationalism seems likely to affect our individual lives and the whole international system for the coming century. It is undeniable that the capitalist-liberal world of the West emerged triumphant over the Communist East in 1989. For a moment, it might have even brought the thought that with the democratic wave in the East, we might move beyond nationalism, beyond tribalism, beyond the provincial bounds of the identities registered in our passports. And with the increased interdependencies, in every aspect of life, we might have thought that we are moving towards a global market culture. But as Michael Ignatieff puts clearly in his book "Blood and Belonging" we soon found out that we were wrong. With the break down of the Soviet Empire, ethnic nationalism became the key language of our age. However, ethnic nationalism, even during the Cold war era, has occupied an important place in the international relations. Only temporarily nationalism was of second grade importance to the East-West issues. Despite this, even in the most critical times of capitalist-communist struggle, nationalism brought two countries
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Greece and Turkey which belonged to the same block (NATO) into the brink of war over Cyprus.

In this chapter it will be suggested that the major cause of the problem in the island is the existence of two hostile nations- the Greek and the Turkish nations. Thus, the main aim of this chapter will be to analyse the development of the national consciousness amongst the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus.

Cyprus is a Mediterranean island, smaller than Sicily and Sardinia with a population of little more than half a million, at the cross-roads of Europe, Asia and Africa. Cyprus, during its four thousand year history, has been conquered and ruled by many empires, the most recent ones being the Ottoman and the British Empires. However, Cyprus in the last forty years has became a world problem threatening war and arousing deep national emotions. The case of Cyprus is one of the most complex cases dealt with. As one American analyst said "the conflict has resisted with tenacity the efforts of nations great and small to bring about a solution. It frustrates diplomats, amazes outside observers, irritates those who believe we have made progress in studying techniques of negotiation, ... has been a sore point with secretaries-general of the United Nations, ...(and) has caused sadness and bloodshed disrupting the lives of the people who live there"[2]. It will be useful to understand the intractability of the conflict if we put forward the comments of a British commentator as well:

The Cyprus conflict has exercised the United Nations

for some three decades for over two of which a UN
peacekeeping force has been stationed on the island.

But the UN is not the only body that has tried its hand at peacekeeping on the island. Both NATO and the Commonwealth have been involved as have other international organisations... Britain, Greece and Turkey, the three guarantor powers of 1960, have a significant role to play... Yet despite these various efforts (and sometimes because of them) the conflict remains as obdurate as ever. It has been a graveyard for the reputations of UN Secretaries General, such as Kurt Waldheim, and for some eminent statesmen.9

But why did Cyprus become a world problem threatening war and arousing deep national emotions with so many actors involved in the conflict including America, Great Britain, Turkey and Greece? What is the main reason for this regional conflict which threatens not only its own people but the region's stability as well. It is the existence of two nations in the island.

Cyprus has been divided by race, language and religion; where approximately 80 percent of the people speak Greek and are Greek Orthodox Christian by religion and approximately 20 percent are Turkish speaking Muslims. The present dispute between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots has been the continuation of a bloody struggle between Greek Christians and Turkish Muslims in the Near East which began
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

in the Middle ages with the gradual conquest of the Greek-speaking Byzantine empire by the Turks. And this dispute has been intensified during the nineteenth century with the attempts of establishment of independent nation-states in Turkey and Greece. With their historical experience and negative psychological conditioning, the coexistence of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots proved unattainable. Despite the mutual benefits which could be achieved from their coexistence, their national aspirations have been more strong than anything else in spite of all the efforts and urgings of friends and allies for togetherness. The Cyprus case is an illustration to anybody that nationalism is an inseparable factor from our lives. Nationalism which we attain from our childhood, learning about the past histories of our countries; the myths, glories and traumas we have experienced, develops us to belong to that "we-ness" (core of the ethnicity) and the neighbouring group to the "other". That is what has happened in Cyprus.

In Cyprus, Cypriotness has never existed. The two ethnic groups Turk and Greek Cypriots always felt affinity to their motherlands of Turkey and Greece respectively, before identifying themselves as Cypriots. Thus, in order to understand the national realities in the Cyprus problem, first of all one should understand the relations of mainland Turks and Greeks; their preoccupation with each other; then their impact on their respective Cypriot people. Turks and Greeks had confronted each others both in Anatolia and on the Balkan peninsula; from the Seljuks and Byzantium through the Ottomans and Byzantium and the Ottomans and Greece to modern relations between Turkey and Greece. To analyse the Turkish-Greco relations
Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

from the earlier periods to the establishment of their nation states will enable us to understand the Cyprus problem clearly.

II. Relations Of Turks And Greeks

In August 1071, in eastern Anatolia, Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes met Alp Arslan's Seljuk army near Manzikert. The Byzantine emperor Diogenes' aim was to keep Asia Minor safe from the Turcomans. But Alp Arslan had opened the way for the Turcomans to settle in Anatolia. The battle of Manzikert was a turning point both for Turks and the Byzantine history.

The Greek migration to Anatolia had started at the end of the Bronze Age. So when the Seljuk Turks arrived into the Anatolia, the predominant language of the area was Greek. Their process of settlement into this area and building their own political environments took generations. Although in the sixth BC there were other powers emerging in the Asia Minor, (for sometime the area was conquered by Persians), in 492 BC the Greeks won an important victory, the great classical age of Greece re-emerged. With the advent of Alexander the Great in 359 BC Greek culture spread to the valley of the Indus River in India. Despite the fact that Alexander, the son of Philip II of Macedon, carried Macedonian blood, he was proud of his Greek ancestors. He established Greek dominion outside the Greek mainland from Ionia to India. This era became known as the Hellenistic. In this era, Greek became not only the official language of government but also the language of the most of the people of
Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

the Near and Middle East. And it was during this period that the blood of the East and West mixed through the mass marriage of Alexander's troops to local women\(^4\).

With the emergence of Romans into the international arena, building an Empire which would extend over the Near East including the Asia Minor and gaining control from Egypt to the Black Sea, Hellenistic civilisation came to an end. In 324 AD the reunification of the Roman Empire (after the threat of disintegration) under the emperor Constantine who converted to Christianity, is one of the important historical events which affected not only the Romans but later the Turks. Constantine moved the centre of the empire to the old Greek colony of Byzantium. Here he erected a new capital which would bear his name, Constantinople. This city has been at the centre of the Greco-Turkish relations until the present day.

With the cultural and religious crisis that Rome passed through during the fourth and the fifth centuries, it divided into East and West empires. The Greek mainland, Constantinople and Asia Minor stayed under the name of East Roman Empire and the dominant language of the people became Greek and religion Orthodox Christianity. The Byzantine culture, which grew out of a combination of three influences- Christianity, Hellenism and the Orient- began in the sixth century to get exhausted. There were wars with Persians and Arabs in the East and with Slavs and Bulgars in the West. Apart from the wars there was a power struggle in the empire itself which put a great economic strain on the Asia Minor. It was against this background that the battle of Manzikert was fought and the Turks began to penetrate
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

into the Asia Minor. This was the first battle fought between Turkish and Greek people but not the last one.

By the tenth century the Turks, who were a nomadic people from the central Asia, and who had established an empire from the Jaxartes to Siberia and from the Altai to the Volga rivers, started to move westwards\(^5\). In this way, Turkic tribes who came into the Asia Minor established their sultanate in Anatolia with their capital at Konya. Both Seljuks and the Ottomans started their conquest of Asia Minor with a dual process; Turkification and Islamisation (as they were converted to Islam in the ninth century and adopted the Arabic script for their language). However, the advent of Seljuk Turks in the area had been curtailed by the start of the Crusades. The Latin conquest of the Byzantine Empire in 1204 and the defeat of the Seljuks in 1243 brought stalemate to the Asia Minor. But it was not long before there was another confrontation of Greeks and Turks as another Turkic tribe established itself in 1299 in the Asia Minor near Eskisehir. The Ottomans, established under the leadership of Osman, concentrated their operation at the Byzantine borderland of Bithynia and Mysia till 1326. They extended their territory, at the expense of the local Byzantine population, through the expansion of alliances with Greek war lords and through the conversion of local Greeks. In 1326, after ten years siege, Bursa (later the capital of Ottomans) had been conquered by Orhan, the son of Osman. Then the conquering of Iznik in 1331 and Izmit in 1337 by Orhan made the Ottoman emir a factor in Byzantine politics\(^6\). But the first Ottoman foothold in Europe did not come until 1354, when Suleiman, the son of Orhan seized Gallipoli and established a Turkish
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

settlement in that area. Further advances into Europe took place under Murat I, who put most of the Thrace under Ottoman rule. A decisive battle in front of Adrianople in 1361 later led them to Serres (1383) and Salonica (1387) on the left, Sofia (1385) and Nish (1386) in the centre, and the Black Sea on the right[7]. Therefore, the Turks started their centuries long occupation of the Balkans by the fourteenth century. With the Kosova victory in Yugoslavia over Serbs in 1389 Murat I confirmed his determination of staying in the Balkans. Even when the Ottomans were defeated by Tamerlane of Tartars in 1402, who occupied Bursa and most of the Asia Minor, it took them little more than a decade to overcome their Interregnum[8]. Although the Byzantine empire became a mere head without a body thorough the prolonged loss of land to Ottomans, the real death came on May 29, 1453 when Mehmet the conqueror took the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. Sultan Mehmet, the most commanding personality among the whole race of Ottoman sultans who set his heart on conquering Constantinople, brought an end to the holy city, the centre of Eastern Christendom signalling the end of Greek freedom. When the news of the fall of Constantinople reached Rome and other European centres, a great shock was experienced as it was regarded as a blow into the heart of Christianity and the Roman ideal of a single government of the civilised world. On the other hand, for the Greeks, as D.A Zakythinos said, in his book "the Making of modern Greece" the fall of Constantinople drew the dividing line between the two periods of their history. The ancient and the medieval world which depended on the Greek political thought had been shattered by this conquest. The unhappy memory of losing Constantinople to
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Islamic Turks influenced the relationship of Ottomans-Greeks and even the relations of contemporary Turks and Greeks as well (for example, even now Tuesday, which was the day when Constantinople was conquered by the Turks, is considered as unlucky among many Greeks)[9]. The Turkish victory of 29 May 1453 ended one era in history and began a new era with the establishment of Ottomans in Istanbul (new name given by the Turks to Constantinople).

The Ottoman Turks faced with the task of ruling a vast agglomeration of peoples and faiths which comprised much of the Balkan peninsula, North Africa and the Middle East. What they did was to group populations of different peoples into millets (literally nations) and these groups were constituted on the basis of religious confession rather than ethnic origin. Thus, besides the ruling Muslim millet, there was the Jewish millet, the Gregorian Armenian millet, the Catholic millet and the Orthodox millet which was the largest after the Muslim[10]. Every millet not only enjoyed a wide degree of administrative autonomy but by their religious authorities as well. Therefore, the power and the privileges of Orthodox Church under the Ottoman Sultans were quite extensive. As we shall see in the later stages that this power of the Church would be used in the formulation of national consciousness of the Greek masses. Even though, at the beginning of their togetherness (Turks and Greeks) the Church appreciated the freedom of religion given to them by their Islamic rulers. In 1798, Patriarch Anthimos of Jerusalem told to his fellow people that they "should not challenge the established order because the Ottoman Empire had been raised up by God to protect Orthodoxy from the taint of the heretical Catholic church"[11].
Chapter Three

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman rule which was established over most of the Greek lands and lasted until 1829 had been complicated but not short of togetherness in many aspects of the life. Periods of peace and reconciliation dominated their relations during the four centuries long Turkish rule of Greeks. So, it can be said that Turks and Greeks co-operated till the Greek independence movements. Many Christian Greeks retained their religion while serving the Ottoman state. Most of the Greeks preferred the rule of Turks than Latin at the beginning. The exclamation of the Grand-Duke John Notaras- "Better the turban of the Turk in Constantinople than the Pope's Tiara" shows the preference of the Greek community to the Turkish rule\(^{[12]}\). Many Greeks worked in very important positions in the Ottoman government; for example, Greeks from the Fener area of Istanbul served as translators (dragoman) of the Porte, as the governors of Moldovia and Wallachia. Having occupied such important positions, Greek came to be used in the international relations. Moreover, the Greeks' entrepreneurial advances under the Ottomans made Greek to be used as the lingua franca of Balkan commerce.

Nevertheless, it was not only the educated class of Greeks who enjoyed better treatment under the Turkokratia (Greek for Ottoman rule over the Greeks) but also the ordinary Greek peasants also. According to Woodhouse, the Greek peasant of fifteenth and sixteenth century was much better off than his counter part in Europe\(^{[13]}\). The Ottoman taxation fell less heavily upon Greek peasants than the traditional Byzantine system of the meta (or fifty-fifty division of the corps and labour dues exacted by the local lords), which helped them to improve their life standards. The
ordinary Greeks were able to enjoy their own language, their own traditions and
customary codes to Turkish and patriarchal law\(^{14}\). In short, the Ottoman millet
system supported the Rum (as they were known by the Ottomans and by Greeks
themselves) to preserve their own language and religion and to pursue their own civil
affairs\(^{15}\). As Vamik Volkan states when the Ottomans conquered the Greek heartland,
"they inflicted no blow to Greek national pride as no such a thing existed. Indeed the
idea of a nation was as yet unconceived\(^{16}\).

III. Formation Of National Consciousness Of Greeks And Turks

It was a fact that Greeks differed from the formal culture of the ruling class. Although
it was only in classical times that the Greeks had ruled themselves and their culture
was the formal culture of the dominant class during both the Alexander the Great and
the Roman period, under the Roman rule, the Greeks did have foreigners as their
rulers but still the culture of the ruling class was Greek. And when the Roman empire
divided and the East Roman became the Byzantine Empire, the Greek culture became
inseparable and vital part of the ruling classes. But since the national consciousness
was non-existent, the Greeks referred themselves as Romans instead of Hellenes or
Greeks, because to connect themselves to old Greece was regarded as infidelity as
there was no religion then. So, although Greeks did not have independent empires
they were the main elements in the empires they lived in. In this respect, the Ottoman
period was different as the ruling class was Muslim Turks. Furthermore, there were
(despite some of the privileges they enjoyed) certain restrictions on Christians compared to Moslem millet of the empire (for example dressing, land and services, carrying arms or riding a horse). It is also true that in the last century of the Ottomans the Greek peasantry suffered from economic improvishment, but it is also true that with the economic decline of the empire not only the Christian-Greek peasantry but all other millets including the Turkish peasants had suffered. Beside this, in some areas of life Muslims had been worse treated than their non-Moslem counterparts. The Muslim people of the empire divided into two classes; those who served the state and the religion and the ordinary people. Prior to the penetration of the Western ideas of equality and rights into the empire, it was the first class who benefited from the riches of the empire while the ordinary people lagged behind. The Christian-Greek community on the other hand had some more privileges than ordinary Moslems, for example in entering into the military which led them to higher posts later.

In the nineteenth century, under the influence of Western liberalisation and reforms, series of attempts had been made in the Ottoman empire for equal rights and freedoms for every Ottoman citizen (Tanzimat Reforms in 1839 and 1856). The Greek and Armenian Patriarchies were among the most vehement critics of these reforms because their political and economic positions would have been affected negatively. When the public reading of the reform edict of 1839 had been concluded and the document returned into its red satin pouch, the Greek patriarch comments-"God grant that it not be taken out of this bag again"[17] can show the unwelcome attitude of the Greek community to the concerned reforms.
Despite the co-operation of the Ottomans and the Greeks, there was always the potential of separateness. When the echoes of the French Revolution started to be heard in the Ottoman spheres, it was the right time for the Greek community to acquire their independence. Having established themselves with the help of the Ottoman system, both financially and intellectually, they were able to direct their energies for the establishment of national consciousness. After ten years of struggle between 1821-1830, the Greek population which was the most important non-Turkish element in the Ottoman Empire, was able to formulate the Greek mass consciousness, and became an independent nation-state under the British-French-Russian protectorate in 1830. Building their national consciousness took place gradually. As late as 1821 a Greek executed by Turks would say "A Romios I was born and a Romios I will die"\textsuperscript{[18]} which presents the fact that acquisition of a nationality is not an automatic process. Only after learning about patriotism the same Romios would refer himself as Greek. In the formulation of Greek nationality, as in many others, Western impact had been great. Greeks might be the heir of the Classical world as they occupy much of the soil of classical Greece and have the remains of those classical civilisation around them. But in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, it was the scholars and archaeologists of western Europe who accorded them their classical past. The most important people usually to awake the emotions of the masses are the poets, writers and politicians, in the case of Greece, Lord Byron, George Canning and then Gladstone, who under the influence of Romanticism, supported the formulation of pro-Hellenic consciousness. Their perceptions about how the Greeks should be or
who they were influenced the Greek community. Their admiration of ancient Greece and identification of the Ottoman Greeks as ancient Greeks resulted in the inclusion of the ancient Hellas world in the modern nationalism of Greece. Thus, after the establishment of Greek nation-state in 1830, Greeks themselves devoted themselves to the study of ancient Greece. Consequently, the heroes of the ancient world became the heroes of the modern Greeks. In the later stages of the development of their nation-state, the belief of ascending from the ancient Greece resulted in their pursue of irredentist policy, because of the desire of establishing the old Greek world. The other element apart from the ancient past which was important in the formulation of the Greek national consciousness was the Byzantine heritage. Both the religion and the language (the spoken language among the ordinary people was not from the ancient past but from the Byzantine as it was simpler) were inherited from the Byzantine times. At the early stages of the national awakening there had been a schism between the national (supported the unity of those who spoke Greek) and the ecclestical (supported the unity of all Christians only the ruling class be Greek) Hellenism. With the impact of the Western ideas and the Western scholars, the Greeks themselves started to develop a distinct identity. Having realised that the nation-building was the only way of emancipation of from the Ottoman rule as early as 1790s there were attempts to establish an independent Greece and Greater Greece. Under the influence of the French Revolution and Romanticism, Rigas was one of the first to print a map of "Greater Greece". According to Rigas, this "Greater Greece" would be the continuation of the Byzantium Empire where the language would be Greek and the
ruling class be Greek as well. The other two important men of religious origin, Loukaris and Koryadelus, through the encouragement of learning Greek and the printing of the first Greek newspaper were able to teach people of how to feel Greeks and to be proud of it. But when Greece became independent after the help of Russians only, on September the 14th, 1829 (with the defeat of Ottomans to Russians) the national aspirations of the Greeks were not satisfied yet. They formulated another idea during their process of nation-building which was "Megali Idea". What was sought to achieve with this irredentist idea was the liberation of the pre-Christian Hellenic civilisation which was in eclipse for two thousand years.

According to this idea, the borders of the modern Greece should not only comprise Greek mainland but all the islands in the Aegean Sea, the Asia Minor, Crete and Cyprus islands and Istanbul as their capital. This idea became the nostalgia of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Greeks, recreating the empire and the culture which Mehmet the Conqueror had defeated in 1453.

The term "Great Idea" was first introduced by Ioannis Kolettis who was an influential political figure of the newly independent kingdom of Greece. He, during the constitutional debates in 1844, said that not only Greeks of the kingdom but those who lived outside in any land associated with Greek history of the Greek race should be the inhabitants of the same kingdom[19]. In his speech in the constituent assembly in 1844 he furthermore said that there were two main centres of Hellenism; Athens, the capital of the kingdom; and the city of Constantinople "the dream and hope of all
Greeks ... In this way the Great Idea and the Greater Greece took its place in the agenda of the newly emergent Greece.

In the 1870s, not having been satisfied with the lands acquired Peloponnese, Southern Roumelia and a number of islands near to the mainland (see Map 1); they started to seek chances of applying their irridentist policy. In the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the international context was in favour of this idea, such as that Ottoman Empire was collapsing and the European powers were on the whole eager to help the collapse of the empire in order to share it. However, the Eastern Question with the gradual dissolving of the empire became an important issue in the foreign policies of Britain, France and Russia. The involvement of these powers in this area benefited the Greek ideals. Britain, France and Russia helped Greece according to the limits of their strategic needs (they were trying to control each others advancement in the area) which resulted in the enlargement of the Greek lands till their defeat in 1922. The first addition of land to Greece had been done in 1864 when Britain gave the Ionian islands to them in concession to the acceptance of George I as the kings of Hellenes. In 1878, again with the great powers mediation at the Berlin Congress, after the defeat of Ottomans by Russians, Greece was able to annex Thessaly with a part of Epirus. But some setbacks in the enlargement of Greece in 1897 after their defeat by Ottomans in Crete led to the period of introspection and self-doubt about the Great Idea. Nevertheless, it did not take long when Greece re-emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean with their aspirations of Greater Greece. It
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Map 1: The expansion of the Greek Kingdom.
was Eleftherios Venizelos who (the potential prime minister of Greece) suggested that
"Great Idea" was not in the realm of fantasy in 1909. The reign of Venizelos had been
one of both successful and disastrous era in the modern Greek history. In this era,
"Great Idea" had been applied most successfully, many areas which were included in
the "Greater Greece" map managed to unite (Enosis) themselves with their
motherland. Under this dynamism and optimism in the Greek public life, a Balkan
treaty was signed among Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria against Ottoman Empire. In this
way, Greece achieved a stronger military position against Ottomans. Thus, in a short
period of time Chios, Mytilini and Somas were annexed to the mainland Greece. The
most important of all the annexations was the Crete. Crete had become an important
struggle place between Ottomans and Greeks since the beginning of the Greek
independence. All these annexations increased the land area of Greece by 70% and her
population reached nearly to 5,000,000. Therefore, Venizelos' leadership showed that
they had moved beyond the vapourings of romantic nationalists to the realms of
possibility[21]. By the beginning of the twentieth century Greeks not only built their
national consciousness but also the ideal of establishing Greater Greece. The only
places left outside the "Greater Greece" map were Northern Epirus, the Ionnian
Islands of Aegean, Cyprus, Asia Minor, the old Pontus area of Black Sea Region and
finally Constantinople.

The chance of acquiring the rest of the Asia Minor came with the outbreak of
the First World War when the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of
Germany and its allies. While Greece was divided on the issue of entering the war
either on the side of Allies or neutrality at the beginning, they entered into the war on the 1st of July 1917 on the side of Allies. Having entered into the war on opposing sides, brought the sought eternal aim of Greeks (liberation and the annexation of Asia Minor) into an easy reach. Upon the agreement between Greece, Britain, France and America, Greek troops landed in the area on 15 May 1919. The other settlement which was agreed among the allies was the joint international occupation of the Istanbul. This was also an achievement for the time being for the Greece as she would be one of the powers in the city. The highest point on the policy of "Great Idea" was reached in 10th August 1920 with the Sevres Treaty\textsuperscript{[22]}. This treaty which was signed at the end of the World War, put the terms of peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire as well. According to this treaty only a portion of land was left to Ottomans while almost all the Greek populated territories on the mainland of Europe, almost all the Aegean islands, provisionally a large slice of Western Asia Minor (after five years this region with the acceptance of the local people could be annexed to Greece) was given to Greece. Venizelos had been applauded by many Greeks because Venizelos became the man who created a Greece of "the two continents and of the five seas" (the continents being the Europe and Asia and the five seas being the Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Ionian, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea). While, the treaty of Sevres was considered as an important achievement both for the national pride and the "Great Idea", for the Ottoman Turks it was considered as humiliation of their national pride. The result of this humiliation was the galvanising of their national feelings. The Turkish War of Independence which started soon after the Greek
landing on the Asia Minor was fought on two fronts; against the invading Greeks and the Ottoman Sultan who was still in Istanbul.

Therefore, when it is compared with the formation of the Greek national consciousness, the formation of the Turkish national consciousness took place much later than the Greek one. The major reason for this, was that the Turks themselves were the rulers of the Ottoman empire.

The Turkish nationalism, which also grew out under the influence of the liberal and romantic ideas of the West, did not come into the surface till the beginning of the twentieth century. The reason was that the Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic empire based on the "Millet" (nation) system[23]. This system divided the ethnic and national groups into different religious groups such as Moslems or Christians. Thus, the Turkish speaking subjects of the empire identified themselves with the Moslem group rather than Turkishness. As Bernard Lewis says, the Turkish national idea in the modern sense started to develop in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of Turkish exiles in Europe or European exiles in the Ottoman empire and through the reforms of Tanzimat[24]. The reforms which were shaped by the traditional policy of toleration and non-interference in the educational and cultural life of the many nationalities of the empire would later lead to the growth of nationalism among both Christian and Moslem subjects. But these ideas initially did not appeal to many Ottoman Turks. However, with the continuous decline of the Ottoman Empire in economic, military and cultural areas together with the impact of the West after the eighteenth century, there had been important developments in the formulation of the Turkish national
consciousness. This development started with the question of "why is the empire declining?" to the question of "why isn't there a Turkish domination?". The major views and answers that had been gathering momentum in the Ottoman Empire, during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries then could be summarised as: Ottomanism and nationalism, liberalism and conservatism, Islamism and Turkism, democracy and autocracy, centralisation and decentralisation. The Young Turk movement, which started in the beginning of this century (1908) as a movement to limit the despotism of the sultan and introduce the ideas of liberty and equality, had changed direction in the following years. During these years the Ottoman empire continued to lose more territories; for example Crete announced her union with Greece, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared her independence and finally the empire was drawn into the Balkan war in 1912. According to Shaw it was the Albanian revolt (Albanians demanded a united Albania) in 1912 which convinced the Turks that it would be impossible to satisfy different national interests and attain a unified empire. Furthermore, there was the spread of nationalism not only among the Christian subjects but also among the Moslem nationals of the empire. Under these circumstances, the Young Turks' transition to Turkish nationalism had begun in late 1911. The policies of the Young Turks started to become more oppressive towards the nationals of both Rumelia and the Asian provinces. They started to impose the policy of Turkification throughout the empire. Nevertheless, the efforts of the "Young Turk" movement, which was not successful, provided a springboard for the development of the modern Turks under the leadership of Ataturk. The last
consolidation in the blossoming of the idea of "Turk" came with the advent of the World War I which was followed by the Allied occupation of the remnants of the empire in 1918; especially the Greek occupation of the South West of Turkey on 15 May 1919. The Greek irredentist foreign policy had accelerated the formation of patriotism among Turks. They understood that in the twentieth century, no empires would be able to survive but only nation-states made of people speaking the same language and sharing the same historical background could live together[28].

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal the Turkish nation, despite their war weariness and broken-downness in every respect, rallied around him to save their pride, their Turkishness and their territory. Mustafa Kemal accomplished success by personifying the ambitions and efforts of the Ottoman Turks in the name of Turkish only which had been building up for sometime. A major offensive launched against the Greeks in March 1921 led the Greeks to declare their willingness to accept a British peace proposal (withdrawal of their forces and the establishment of a League of Nations protectorate over the Greeks of Asia Minor)[29] but having realised that the military situation was in favour of them, Turks launched their last offensive which resulted in their recovery of Asia Minor. This victory of Turks against Greeks signalised the collapse of the "Great Idea" once again. With the Turkish victory, the gains obtained in the Serves Treaty had been wiped out and that treaty was replaced by the Lausanne Treaty. And the present frontiers had been realised with this treaty between Greece and Turkey. When the influences of the French Revolution, Enlightenment and the Romanticism reached the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire
Turks did not expect that their empire would be defeated by the nation-states. The 29th of October 1923 was the finalising of this victory; establishment of the Turkish Republic—Turkey.

The new Turkish Republic contrarily to Greece has no irridentist policy. The new Turkish state which was founded in 1923, had renounced all foreign ambitions and all pan-Turkish, pan-Ottoman or pan-Islamic ideologies. This meant that all the aspirations of the new Republic would be based on the new national territory of Turkey as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne signed on the 24th of July 1923. The founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk summarises this aim in the following words in his Nutuk:

What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which is founded is the internal organisation of the State. Thus, it is necessary that the foreign policy should agree with the internal organisation... To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one... For us, there can be no question of the lust of conquest... The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy... To work within our national boundaries for the
real happiness and the welfare of the nation and the
country by, above all, relying on our own strength in
order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people
to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could
only bring them misfortune, and we expect from the
civilised world civilised human treatment[30].

However, the emphasis on the Turkish patriotism and nationalism has been
strong. The reason for this was that Turkey, which arose out of a multicultural and
multi-national Ottoman Empire, needed to emphasise the Turkish nationalism in order
to bring self-esteem and cohesive identity to her people. Phrases like "One Turk is
equal to the world" or "Turk! Be Proud!" had been used by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to
encourage the nation into modernisation instead of mourning over their once great
empire. This helped them to achieve their Turkishness without mourning over their
Ottomanism and not to preoccupy themselves with the old enemies. Instead they
diverted their energies into building up their country under the charismatic leadership
of Ataturk.
Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

IV. The Relations Between Contemporary Turks And Greeks

With the establishment of the nation-states of Greece and Turkey the complete separateness has been achieved, after centuries of togetherness and competition. Despite the war they passed through, Turkey and Greece signed a friendship agreement in 1930 with the efforts of two charismatic leaders Venizelos of Greece and Ataturk of Turkey. This event signalised the acceptance of the status quo and acceptance of the Lausanne Treaty. Although the three important problems; the minority problems (left on the other side in Istanbul and Thrace), the Aegean sea waters, airspace, continental shelf and the rivalry over the resources in these waters and finally the most important the Cyprus problem had not been solved, still there was a hope of overcoming the old hostilities and conflicts. But, by the 1940s the peaceful coexistence of two nations was jeopardised once again.

The post war era was different from the previous era. At the end of the World War II two competing blocs had emerged West under the leadership of US and the East under the leadership of USSR. Both Turkey and Greece took their place in the Western Bloc. They both became active members of NATO. Despite their alliances to the same bloc, it did not prevent their feelings of nationalism to overcome their more important attachments at the time being (the Western bloc responsibilities).

But why could these two countries, although the same interests not coexist peacefully and even came to the brink of war several times in 1960s and then in 1974 they launched their last war?
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

The reason was that the intense nationality of both Turks and the Greeks was preventing their peaceful coexistence. As it is discussed in the previous chapter, through education and society, human-beings start to build up their national identity from their early years. From early years of childhood, the feeling of patriotism has been built up by learning about past glories, traumas and historical events. And "the chosen traumas and chosen glories"[^31] affect the international relations of countries. In the case of Greece and Turkey, these traumas and glories, against each other, have been affecting their relations in an uncooperative way. Within a short period of time in 1930s they managed to establish a co-operative relationship, but their obsessive preoccupation and fear of each other ended this relationship. The inability to overcome the past and understand each other leads nations into more conflicts. As the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said in 1977, he believed that seventy per cent of the long-standing problems between the Arabs and the Israelis were psychological[^32]. In the relations of Turks and Greeks also the psychological phenomena plays an important role. Hundreds and hundreds of years old events have been passed from generations to generations and this has been affecting the perceptions of each other. When the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece met in 1988 in Davos, in an attempt of extending their mutual friendship, there was a hope of reconciliation. Under the Davos spirit, Ozal, premier of Turkey, in a speech when he visited Greece again the same year, he said:

[^31]: "the chosen traumas and chosen glories"
[^32]: seventy per cent of the long-standing problems between the Arabs and the Israelis were psychological
Chapter Three

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Both nations have a millenium-long common history. We have had good and bad times. Alongside our cultural differences have emerged profound common characteristics a rising out of a long interactive process. Our relationship has been passionate and volatile, and this has had as much to do with the founding of lasting friendship on the grounds of common cultural aspects and common memories of peaceful times as with hostile relations based on cultural differences and dark periods. Our disappointments can be as influential as our mutual affection, and can lead our two countries to extreme reactions. The mutual sympathy we feel in times of peace can become enmity because of some insignificant incident. We can fly over the peak of euphoria out of the abyss of struggle. It is not very easy to establish stable relationships on this sort of historical past.\(^{13}\)

Although as one see there were serious attempts of overcoming the obstacles in the Greco-Turkish relations, still it was not easy. And there is one most important issue, Cyprus, to be solved in order to normalise the Greco-Turkish relations.
Chapter Three
The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

V. The Impact Of Turkey And Greece On The Politics Of The Island

It cannot be denied that the Cyprus problem is "a problem of Greeks and Turks"[34]. It is the struggle of two nations in one island to exercise their own self-determination—highest form of patriotism and nationalism. The Turkish and the Greek national consciousness had been imported from the mainland motherlands to this island. If there was no Greek independence in 1820s and establishment of Greece there would be no Megali Idea and Enosis for the Greek Cypriots and no opposition from the Turkish Cypriots. Why is there a such a problem in Cyprus and which affects the relations of Greece and Turkey? The reason is that in Cyprus there is no Cypriot nation. No Cypriot national consciousness has been formulated, instead there are two distinct communities. Those two communities think themselves primarily as Greeks and Turks. Throughout the interaction between the two communities the "Cypriot consciousness" has never been formulated as a political ideology[35]. In this way, Turkey and Greece became involved in the Cyprus problem which has been one of the factors leading into deterioration of their relations. Whenever the relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots deteriorated both countries have been driven into the scene to protect the interests of their related ethnic communities.

Cyprus which lies at the centre of the cross-roads of the cultures of Europe, Asia and Egypt in the Mediterranean (see Map 2) became the battle field and meeting place of peoples and states because of its strategic position, of cultures and religions—of Hittites, Egyptians and Assyrians, Acheans, Phoenicians and Persians, Romans
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Map 2: Cyprus in the East Mediterranean Area.
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

and Arabs and crusaders, Genoese, Venetians and Turks, of pagans, Jews, Christians and Muslims. As far as it is known the first written records of Cyprus go back nearly fifteen hundred years before Cicero and 3500 before Durrel, and the first identifiable settlers were from the late Neolithic Age (4000 to 3000BC). In the eighth century (Bronze Age) Mycenean settlers came. This was followed by Phoenician penetration for about twelve hundred years Cyprus was a series of small independent kingdoms. The Assyrian domination which started in 709BC lasted one hundred years and was replaced by Egyptian domination in 560BC. Till the annexation of Egypt to Persia in 520BC the Cypriot kings and kingdoms remained in place. In 332BC Cyprus fell under the domination of Macedonian rule which would be followed with the death of Alexander the Great and the Egypt of the Ptolemies (in 294). Between 300BC and 1960, Cyprus was under seven sets of rulers; the Potelemies, the Romans, the Byzantine, the Lusignans, the Venetians, the Turks and the British. During the Roman period the island was converted to Christianity replacing the many religious cults. After the division of the Roman Empire Cyprus became a province of Byzantium. The Eastern Orthodox Church of Cyprus kept alive the Greek tradition throughout its history and promoted political awareness. For 800 years Byzantine rule was unchallenged. In 1191, Richard the Lion Heart on his way to his Third Crusade seized Cyprus. He then sold it to Guy de Lusignan. The feudal monarchy of Guy de Lusignan which was French in Language and culture lasted till the middle ages. After three centuries of Latin rule, the island so crucial to Mediterranean trade became part of the Venetian Empire in the fifteenth century. And finally in 1571 Ottomans would
conquer the island by beating the Venetians. In this way, they stopped the other Catholic states with ambitions in the Mediterranean. The conquest of the island by Ottomans ended Catholic rule in of Cyprus for good. Thus, in the sixteenth century the Turkish element came onto the island.

After the Ottoman's victory, Turkish settlers started to come to the island either voluntarily or by force from Anatolia. Sultan Selim II issued an imperial order for certain towns in Anatolia to send one family out of each ten who were engaged in trade in Cyprus. These settlers who came to the island were not only guaranteed protection but forgiven their taxes for two years. However, the original Turkish settlers were principally drawn from the Lala Mustafa Pasha's soldiers who was the commander of the Ottoman empire during the conquest of the island. By the end of the seventeenth century, this method of colonisation resulted in the establishment of a Turkish community with 30000 population[17]. Today, the Turks of Cyprus are the descendants of these settlers.

Similar to the mainland, the arrival of the Turks to Cyprus at the beginning were welcomed by the Greek Cypriots. Because the Latin clergy were expelled, their cathedrals turned into mosques and serfdom was abolished. Together with these the Orthodox Church in the island regained its position enabling the local population to enjoy more freedom than before. The head of the Orthodox Church as Sir Harry Luke, puts forward became the supreme power and authority over the island as he was controlling the Cyprus finances[18]. Despite the fact that Turks and Greeks kept their identities and did not intermingle they lived in harmony without much
competition. Sometimes even found common ground in their joint hostility to the harsh taxation imposed by the Sultan\textsuperscript{[39]}.

It was in the nineteenth century that the idea of uniting the island with Greece came into existence after the war of independence in Greece. The events in Cyprus followed a parallel path to the events in Greece. When in 1821 the Archbishop of Cyprus was hanged for giving help to the Greek war of independence, the relations between two communities started to deteriorate. The Greek Cypriot community were ready to follow in the steps of the other Greek speaking places which accomplished Enosis. The Western ideas of Romanticism and nationalism had been introduced into the island by the Greek War of Independence. This was inevitable. Although Cyprus has been a melting pot for many races which makes the existence of pure Greeks doubtful the main factors in the determination of nationality has been the language, history, culture, religion and political awareness. Therefore, why the war of independence affected and rose national emotions among the Greek speaking Orthodox could be explained. Having been ruled by Alexander the Great and Byzantium they acquired a sense of belonging to the Greek way of life and culture. As in the mainland Greece the Greek community in the island developed an obsession with Ancient Greece and Byzantium Empire. These were taught to them through the Church and their education which was followed after the Greek education system. Having been subjected to the same indoctrination as their kinsmen in Greece, they claim:
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Cyprus is in reality a Greek island inhabited by a European people of the Hellenic nation with a history of Greek civilisation and culture extending over thousands of years...[40].

Not only they developed the sense of belonging to the Greek world but under the impact of Hellenism they sought the unification of the island with the motherland. And as soon as the Greece had been recognised by the Porte as a sovereign state, a Greek Cypriot agent had been sent to the motherland to ask for the annexation of the island to Greece. At the time, the annexation of the island to Greece was beyond the means of the new state.

The struggle for Enosis in Cyprus could be divided into four stages:

1. The first period lasted from the beginning of the British occupation to the 1931 riots. Cyprus entered the domain of Britain in 1878 with the Berlin Treaty after the Ottoman defeat against Russians. In this period, Greek Cypriot nationalist aims were; union with Greece and acquisition of more rights. Till the completion of the First World War the Greek Cypriots, although never put the hopes of union with Greece high, did not feel as close as in 1918s. When Venizelos declared in November 1914; "... the annexation of Cyprus must be considered as the last stage towards the national restoration of this great Greek island. And according to private information in the possession of this Government, it may be considered that the Union of Cyprus with its Mother Greece will be realised in the near future" was encouraging the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, representatives of the Greek Cypriot people under the
leadership of the Church put forward this claim to the British. The church have been in many respects the backbone of national consciousness[41]. But it was during this period that the new Turkish state was born. The effect of this on the Turkish Cypriots had been profound. Although the Turkish Cypriots, who were Turks descended from the multiracial Ottoman Empire, were quick to establish their ties with the new Turkish state even long before the establishment of Turkish state Turkish Cypriots identified themselves with the Ottoman Turks thus every memorandum, resolution or manifesto demanding union with Greece resulted in Turkish Cypriots protests. As early as 1882 (long before the Turkish Republic's foundation) Turkish Cypriots presented a petition to the British government opposing a majority or proportional representation in the legislature upon the first constitution on crown colony. This demand of parity, fear of the domination by the Greek majority lasted till today.

With an interval between 1923-1931, after the Greek defeat by the Turks in the Anatolia and the Treaty of Lausanne, the campaign for Enosis in Cyprus was slowed down. However, the developments in Greece and Turkey directly influenced the situation in Cyprus. In 1931, an important riot under the leadership of the Bishop of Citium broke out. The bishop who led the revolution issued a manifesto calling for national liberation through union with Greece and declared that the foreign ruler "to whom and to whose illegal laws we owe no obedience must be forced to leave the island"[42]. The result of this riot was the application of harsh measures by British not only to Greeks but to Turkish Cypriots as well.
Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

2. In the second phase of Enosis which would last from 1931 to 1945, despite the normalisation and conciliation between Turkey and Greece, the aspirations of union could not be curtailed. The outbreak of war in 1939 rekindled renewed hopes for the recognition of the "historic national rights of the Hellenic people of the island to their national restoration". This ideal was shared by the Greek mainland as well. In 1941 the Greek prime minister said in London "I visualise Great Greece as including North Epirus, the Dodecanese, Macedonia and Cyprus", which shows the existence of the irredentist and unsatisfied national aspirations of Greece. On the other hand, Turkey which ceded rights over Cyprus in the Lausanne Treaty, till mid 1950s showed neutrality towards the events taking place in the island. The existence of Turkish Cypriot in Turkey helped the increase of interest in the problem. For example, in 1948 the foundation of Turkish Cypriot committee, which demanded the celebration of the Turkish Republic's foundations as a national holiday, demand over their education affairs parallel to Turkish system etc., started to increase the public attention in Turkey. Also the press accusations of the government and headlines like "Cyprus must not be given to Greeks" changed the attitude of Turkish government as well. Turkey started to give assurances to Turkish Cypriots showing that they were interested in the future of the Turks there. The reason why Turkey was slow to answer the Turkish Cypriots fears was that they underestimated the ability of Greek Cypriot nationalists to assert a serious challenge to Britain's hold on the island. Also the Turkish Cypriots themselves also saw the existence of a third power, Britain, as a guarantee against a Greek majority and Enosis. This resulted in a mild nationalism compared to Greek
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

nationalism in the first quarters of a century of British rule in Cyprus. The gradual reorientation of the Turkish Cypriots towards Turkey coincided with the third phase of the Enosis.

3. In the third phase of the Enosis which started with the end of the second world war and continued till the 1960 Republic, Turkish Cypriots started to assert their nationalism more aggressively against Greek nationalism. The militancey of the supporters of Enosis in Cyprus during this period made the Turkish Cypriots attach more importance to Turkish nationalism. The inevitable involvement of Turkey into the Cyprus problem made the Cyprus problem, openly, Greco-Turkish problem. In this way the Cyprus problem became a struggle between Turkish nationalism and the Megali Idea of Greeks. As Christos Doumas told:

"... no self-respecting Greek politician could afford to show scorn or even neglect (for Megali Idea)... the union of Cyprus with Greece appeared to the masses to be a step toward the realisation of Megali Idea. To be against it was tantamount to being against the idea of Greece itself and could spell one's extinction"[45]

Hence, the Cyprus problem was not only the problem of two ethnic communities in Cyprus sharing a small island but Turks and Greeks in a wider scale.
Chapter Three  
The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

With the election of Makarios as Archbishop in Cyprus the campaign of Enosis had been intensified. On his enthronement on October 18th, 1950 Makarios said "I shall not rest for a moment in my efforts to see union with Greece achieved" showing the determination for unification with their motherland. After the plebiscite in January 1950 where 96 percent of eligible Greek Cypriots voted for Enosis, the same year in April the Greek Cypriot organisation EOKA started their campaign of violence. In this way the struggle between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot nationalists had intensified. Although the first hostile acts of EOKA were against the British (under the name of freedom and liberation against a colonial power) later on, the real fight was against the Turks. At the beginning of the EOKA revolt Turkish Cypriots reacted against it with anti-union pronouncements and demonstrations and made appeals to Britain and Turkey to remain firm against Enosis. When the inter-communal killings started and six thousand Cypriot Turks became refugees as thirty three villages were destroyed by EOKA, the Turks established their own counter organisation Volkan. Having seen the developments in favour of the Greek majority Turkish Cypriots also declared that they favoured Taksim (partition). The adaptation of partition as a solution was the Turkey's decision to follow a tougher policy over Cyprus. The reason to decide to follow a tougher policy was because of two factors. First of all, the intensification of the inter communal clashes deteriorated the position of Turkish Cypriots. Second reason, there was a growing support for anti-colonialism in the UN which was in favour of Greeks, because when they brought Cyprus issue into the UN it was done under the name of self-determination, against
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

the British colonialism. Thus, they started to get support from the newly independent ex-colonial states in the UN. So the British hold of the island started to be seen as an impossible task. This meant that the establishment of an Hellenic island very close to Turkey's shores. Most of the sea routes to Turkey (Aegean and Black Sea ports) been controlled by Greece as it possesses many islands in a close proximity to Turkish shores. Therefore, the loss of Cyprus which lies across the shipping lanes from Mersin and Iskenderun, ports vital for the supply to Central Anatolia and the eastern frontier would virtually encircle Turkey. Under these circumstances Turkey was eager to support the partitions demands of Turkish Cypriots.

By the year 1958 firstly, there was an intensification in the civil war in Cyprus. This background was followed by the Macmillan Plan, according to which, the aspirations of the two communities should be met not by self-determination but by the association of Greece and Turkey with the government of Cyprus and, in time, with the decision on its final status, which might take the form of shared sovereignty. As J. Reddaway describes if Greece accepted the partnership offered, then partition could happen only with Greek consent (and British). And if Turkey accepted it Enosis could happen only with Turkish (and British) consent. In that manner, this last plan of the British put a pressure on both the Cypriot communities and the motherlands for a settlement. This plan also convinced the Enosists that unless they move to other ways for obtaining their goals (Enosis), they would lose it altogether. The second development which would pave the way for a settlement was the changed security and strategic needs of the British after the Suez crisis in particular. The British by the 1958
Chapter Three The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

were ready to grant independence to the island while keeping some bases on the island. The reason for this development was the role of the improvement of the nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons have the potential of securing the British and Western interests in the area without the hold of the whole island.

Despite the determination of both Greeks on Enosis and Turks on partition and British plans on various kinds of settlement (e.g. Macmillan plan), the outcome would come out very different than expected. Furthermore, not only the situation in the island seemed gloomy but also the international developments were strained, as Stephens explained the situation at the time;

The outlook was black not only on the island but internationally. Khruschev, flushed with the success of Russia's first sputnik, was putting pressure on the Western powers over Berlin. There was a call from Washington for a closing of the ranks in NATO to meet the new Soviet threat. Cyprus was drifting into a civil war which threatened to involve Britain, Greece and Turkey—all NATO members—in deepening conflict. All of the parties concerned found they had reasons for considering a compromise[49].
Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

Considering both domestic and international conditions the prime ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey together with the representatives of two Cypriots communities started to work out for a settlement and later on the 19th of February 1959 signed the Cyprus agreements in London. This was a treaty which declared that both Enosis and partition were outlawed. The result of this settlement was the proclamation of Cyprus as a sovereign state in 1960. As Maier says "for the first time since the days of Eurogas more than 2000 years ago, it would be governed by the people of Cyprus themselves"[50]. The aim was that to create a state of two nations in place of partition or Enosis which would enable them to live harmoniously together without losing their identities.

4. The fourth period for Enosis which fought against the Turkish Cypriot nationalism started in 1963 and lasted until 1974.

The president of the Republic Archbishop Makarios in 1962 showed his ideal was not the continuation of the new Republic by saying "until this small Turkish community that forms the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of EOKA cannot be considered as terminated"[51]. And the finalisation of this talk came into existence when in 1963 the Akritas plan was put into force- aiming the destruction of the copartners "Turkish Cypriots". Some passages taken from this secret plan displays the aggressiveness of Greek nationalism clearly; (subsequently published in 1978 as a UN document A/33/115):
"... to create panic among the Turks... to show our
strength to the Turks immediately... to break their
resistance; to do it so rapidly that no external
guarantees or intervention can help them"\cite{52}.

Makarios' obsession with the unification with Greece continued during the fierce
fighting in 1963, when he was saying:

Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece
or become a holocaust... The road to the fulfilment of
national aspirations may be full of difficulties but we
shall reach our goal- which is Enosis- alive or dead"\cite{53}

Thus, the megalı idea of Greece was again on the forefront challenging the
Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Cypriot nationalists fought against the domination
of the Greek Cypriot nationalism between the years 1963-1974. Nonetheless, the
consequence of this nationalist fervour resulted in the division of the island.

After 1922 failure of the Megali Idea in Asia Minor, 1974 Cyprus brought
another blow to this irredentist idea. But "1974" became another trauma for Greeks as
they were the losers more than the Turks at the end of 1974. Cyprus brought another
heavy blow on the Greco-Turkish relations. The misjudgement and underestimation of
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

the Greek leaders both in Greece and Cyprus about the Turkish feeling about Cyprus intensified the conflict between them.

In Cyprus the two ethnic communities who regard themselves belonging to their motherlands and share every chosen victory and trauma of their motherlands now have additional traumas resulting from sharing a small island. As Norma Salem says:

"The Cyprus conflict is in part the product of centuries antagonism between Turks and Greeks. It is also the unfortunate outcome of a more recent political history that did not deal well with the reality of two different peoples living in close geographical proximity on the same small island... How can culturally distinct groups of people, their location often determined by accidents of history, live in harmony within mutually respectful and beneficial relationship so that each is enriched rather than diminished through isolation or hatred? Isn't there a way of living together?"[54].

Togetherness of Greeks and Turks in the island would not only benefit the two Cypriot communities in the island but their motherlands as well. Because the Cyprus problem affected the Greco-Turkish relations more negatively than the Aegean
dispute. Taking into consideration the psychological issues as well as the real world issues will help to bring a solution to this small island. By removing the fear of each other, Turkish and Greek Cypriots will have a chance to live harmoniously together. In this way they can exhibit an example of how two nations live together respecting each others' identity and establishing a beneficial relationship, showing that if there is a will there is a way. However, in order to be able to evaluate today's deadlock on the island (and the inability of the two Cypriot communities to live in peace), the next chapter will analyse the developments which lead to the first Turkish and Greek Cypriot partnership in the 1960.

In conclusion, the main cause of the Cyprus dispute is the existence of two hostile nations- the Turkish and the Greek communities in the island. To identify this fact is very important as the practical and long term solution is dependent upon a proper understanding of the origin and the cause of the conflict.
Chapter Three  The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations

REFERENCES

[9] This information has been gathered from the informal interviews with some Greek people.
Chapter Three

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations


From modern Turkish, the word Millet can be translated as nation as in the case of Turkish nation. But in the Ottoman Turkish, it had a different connotation. It means religious community.


Chapter Three  

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations


[27] Ibid, p.289.


'Chosen Trauma' - it is referred to an event which invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimised by members of another group. And the hurt, shame and defences of this event pass from generation to generation. These become the vital makers of ethnic identity.


[33] Ibid, p.158.


Chapter Three

The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots' Political Relations


[40] Ibid, p.19.


[51] Makarios III., Speech in Ano Panayia, September 1962, Turkish Cypriot Archives, North Cyprus.
Chapter Three  
The Historical Impact of Nationalism and Ethnicity on Turkish-Greek Cypriots’ Political Relations


[53] Makarios III., Speech at Rizokarpaso, May the 26th 1965, Turkish Cypriot Archives, North Cyprus.

In this chapter, after examining the role of the main actors in the Cyprus problem, an attempt will be made to provide a historical commentary to Cyprus's independence in 1960. Viewing Cyprus's independence in this historical context will help us to analyse the conditions it has emerged under and also the principles it was built on.

I. The Involvement Of Greece

The interest of Greece in Cyprus originates from the fact that there is a majority of population in Cyprus who shares the religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural ties with the people of Greece. Still, open and direct involvement of Greece in the Cyprus problem did not come about till 1950s. Although Greece had influences in the development of Greek-Cypriot consciousness and had the will to exert strong efforts for Enosis, she could not carry it out at the time. The reason for this was that Greece was heavily dependent on the support of British which was the colonial ruler in Cyprus. First of all, Greece and Britain, for eight months in 1940-1941 fought against Axis powers which strengthened their political ties. Secondly, Britain again was
Chapter Four
Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

involved in Greek civil war against Communists. Moreover, in 1947 besides Great Britain the United States started to become involved in the Middle East in resisting Russian pressure in the area[1]. This was the start of a new phase in American foreign policy in which Greece became involved through the admission into NATO in the autumn of 1951. Thus, Greece had to take into consideration her alliance responsibilities and could not afford to harm her relation with either Great Britain or NATO in general for the sake of Greek-Cypriots' Enosis aspirations.

On the other hand, Greek Cypriots began to emphasise their demands for Enosis in the early 1950s more vigorously. The tide of decolonisation during 1950s increased the momentum for the Enosis struggle as well. On 15 January 1950, a plebiscite was organised by the Greek Cypriots (nationalists and the church) where out of 224,747 Greek Cypriots eligible to vote 215,108 or 96 per cent voted in favour of Enosis[2]. After the plebiscite Greek Cypriots' two-pronged attack against the British for the achievement of Enosis took shape. One way was to increase the cost of continued British rule over a hostile population through an armed struggle. For this end preparations started as early as 1952 but it would only escalate in the late 1950s. The second way was to promote Greek Government's interest over Cyprus. Only in this way the Cypriot demand for self-determination in the international arena could be heard. Thus, the result of the plebiscite was taken to Greece by the bishop of Kyrenia to present it to the Greek Chamber of Deputies. During this period, Archbishop Makarios began to make extensive contacts with Greek political leaders also to get backing for the cause of Enosis. The role of Makarios was of paramount importance
Chapter Four  

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

in arousing both public and government interest in the Cypriot call of Enosis. Although between 1950-1954, the Greek government wished for a peaceful solution and restraint over Cyprus there was an increase in national emotions both in Cyprus and Greece among the public. This rise in the national feelings had to be answered by the Greek government.

For the first time, the Greek official stand seemed to take shape when the Greek foreign minister replied to the British minister of state Kenneth Younger, when the latter said no official demand for Enosis had been received from the Greek government, that his country had by no means relinquished its interest in the future of Cyprus in March 1951[3]. And it was the same year when Greece raised the Cyprus question in November 1951 in the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations in Paris. Hence, between 1950-54 Greek governments began to take a more active role in confrontation with the British government but still Greece was cautious in her dealings over Cyprus. Because international world during that period was preoccupied with the urgent Cold War happenings. The Korean and Indo-chinese wars were fought between East and Western bloc where both Greeks and Turks fought for the Western camp. Therefore, the Cold War necessities were more important than the national ones. Yet, the effect of the international responsibilities (being a member of NATO and Western Camp) did not prevent Greek government and public to be completely dormant to the demands of their fellow men in Cyprus. The increased demands of Greek Cypriots coincided with this period[4].

140
Makarios' activities continued. He spoke on Athens Radio, in those years, urging more active Greek participation in the Enosis struggle. He travelled extensively to win support from many countries as possible especially from anti-colonial Afro-Asian countries. Makarios as early as 1951 tried to press Greek Government to take the Cyprus issue to the UN and unless they did so, he said that he would ask Syrian Government to appeal for Cyprus\(^5\). Also he took the initiative and tried to put his case in front of the UN. On August the 10th 1953 he wrote to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold;

\begin{quote}
An open unimpeachable plebiscite was held on January 15, 1950, the result of which was that 95.7 per cent of the Greek Inhabitants or the 80 per cent of the whole population of Cyprus by their vote expressed the determination to be incorporated into the Greek state by the organic union of the island with its mother country Greece\(^6\).
\end{quote}

But Greece till 1954 did not take the Cyprus case to the UN because of the reasons mentioned earlier. However, by 1954 Cyprus became a national issue in Greece and no Greek Government was in a position to afford the domestic pressures. At the end, in August 1954, the Cyprus issue was for the first time placed on the United Nations agenda.
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

The reason to apply to the United Nations was to treat the problem straight as a colonial question in a wrap of national self-determination rather than Enosis. The 1950s was the period of decolonisation. Thus, in the General Assembly there were many newly independent states (newly independent Afro-Asian countries) which could support the "self-determination" of Cypriots. In this manner, the Greek prime minister wrote to the United Nations Secretary General that Greece's request depended on the fact that Cypriots belonged to the Hellenic Nations and urged that "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people's as expressed in Article 1 (2) of the United Nations Charter be applied to Cyprus".[7] Although Greece succeeded in including the issue on the General Assembly agenda, on December 17, the General Assembly shelved the issue without any results. Following the 1954 failure the Greek Government took the issue to the UN four more times. And during all these sessions, the same argument was followed; the United Nations charter guaranteed to the Cypriot people the right of self-determination and United Kingdom was violating that right by maintaining sovereignty over Cyprus.[8] But no resolution which recognised the right of self-determination for Cypriots was adopted. The reason for this was the Anglo-Turkish opposition for Enosis and lack of American support in the General Assembly.

Being unable to achieve what they longed for by peaceful means, Greek Cypriots launched their military struggle with the help of Greek Government on first of April 1955. Although the EOKA terrorism was at first against the British, gradually, clashes between the two Cypriot communities started. One reason was the
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

Turkish opposition to EOKA and Enosis from the beginning. However till after the Greek Cypriots plebiscite in January 1950 (in which 96 per cent of eligible Greek Cypriots voted for Enosis) the Turkish Cypriots only demonstrated against the Greek Cypriots demands for union with Greece, and sent telegrams of protest to the president and the premier of Turkey. The reason for such a limited opposition was the belief that the Enosis movement would fail to bring any change in the status quo in the island. But in 1954, the Turkish Cypriots sent to Turkey a deputation to discuss the issue of Enosis and the future of the Turkish Cypriots demonstrating their determination to resists the Enosis demands of the Greek Cypriots. The other factor which contributed to the intensification of clashes were the replacement of Greek police by Turkish police from the summer 1955 as the British were almost totally dependent upon the support of the Turkish community to police the island (because many Greek Cypriots left the Police force after the launching of EOKA terrorism in order not to be seen as traitors to their own people)\textsuperscript{[9]} And when EOKA started to kill Turkish police, Turkish Cypriots started to retaliate with counter terrorism. For that objective they founded an underground organisation- Volkan (Volcano). This organisation later gave way to the better organised TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) in 1957. Moreover, the "Cyprus is Turkish Party" was established to fight against the Greek Cypriot objective of Enosis. These clashes later not only confronted Greek and Turkish Cypriots but their motherlands as well.

By the end of 1950s the Turkish factor in Cyprus was coming more to the forefront. At the beginning of their Enosis campaign Turkish factor was not in the
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

policy formulation of Greek and Cypriot communities, because they considered Turkish Cypriots as a minority without any saying in the future of the island. Having underestimated the Turkish reactions initially, they were brought to the brink of war in 1958. However, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots started to realise by the 1957 that their idea of self-determination could not be determined without taking Turkish interests into account. Thus, their insistence upon the idea that Cyprus was a Greco-British problem started to change.

II. The Turkish Involvement

The Cyprus issue did not become an important domestic and foreign policy factor in Turkey until the mid 1950s. Although Cyprus was not on the agenda of Turkey in the early 1950s, contacts between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as early as 1948 in cultural and educational areas existed. The reason for the late development of foreign policy on Cyprus was the belief that British sovereignty would continue unchallenged despite the Greek demand of Enosis. Gradually Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus developed as a response to the possibility of Enosis. Turkish interest in Cyprus were based on two factors; the presence of Turkish Cypriots in the island (around 20 per cent of the island's population) and the strategic location of the island to the Turkish coast. Turkey considered Cyprus strategically very vital to her interests. Cyprus being only forty miles away from Turkey was regarded as "the cork in the bottle of Iskenderun". Strategical importance of Cyprus depended on two beliefs; first of all,
it was believed that Greece had a potential of becoming Communist and if Cyprus was united with Greece, Turkey would be encircled by communist world. While the second and the traditional worry was the Megali idea of Greeks which was the aim of uniting all the old Greek lands (which once upon a time were under the Byzantine Empire) with the modern Greece including the island of Cyprus. From the Turkish point of view the prospect of Greek annexation of Cyprus would, to a great extent, tilt the bilateral strategic balance at Turkey's expense as the Italian ruled Dodecanese islands were granted to Greece in 1947 as part of the post war settlement. Turkey, having been encircled by Greek islands, thought that losing Cyprus to a potential enemy would affect the freedom of their only ports Mersin and Iskenderun which are open to any encirclement and, consequently, might endanger the national security of Turkey. So Turkish official statements usually stressed the geographical interest that island's close proximity to the Turkish mainland made it inevitable that Turkish security interests had to be taken into consideration in any decision over its sovereignty\[11\]. The second factor was the existence of a substantial Turkish community in the island and Turkey saw the protection of this community as her duty towards fellow Turkish people because this community looked upon Turkey for support to prevent any settlement threat contrary to their existence. Also Turkey regarded herself as having the historical right to be involved with the island's future because of Turkish presence since 1570. So Turkey psychologically, again like Greece, was bound to be involved with the island and the domestic political pressures to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus was inescapable as in Greece.
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and
the Tortuous Road to Independence

The statement given by Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu on August 20th, 1951 shows the position of the Turkish government clearly:

*It is only natural that we are closely concerned with Cyprus, considering its geographical proximity and importance and the presence of our compatriots who constitute an important community with whom we have maintained historical ties. We do not see any reason for a change in the legal status of the island. Should any changes in the existing arrangements be seriously considered, we shall not permit such changes to take place without our participation and due regard for our rights... the activation of the Cyprus issue was harmful especially at a time when serious threats to the very existence of the free world makes it imperative for all free and friendly nations to stand together unreservedly*.[12]

It can be said therefore that Turkey became concerned also with Cyprus as early as 1950s. But nevertheless, it continued inactive till the mid 1950s. The reason for this was that the Turkish government did not see the necessity of raising questions regarding the sovereignty of Cyprus as long as the status-quo-British sovereignty
continued. The Turkish government was more concerned with the Soviet threat which was shared by Greece as well, and her position in the NATO and membership both in Baghdad Pact and Balkan Pact (signed on August 9 1954). As stated previously, the belief that the strength and persistence of Greek demands for a change in the island's colonial status would be stopped by Britain, refrained Turkey to put Cyprus as an important policy in their policies up till the mid-1955[13]. Thus, Turkey was content to let the British take the lead in responding to the Greek application to the United Nations in 1954 and the EOKA activities. Britain was committed to keep the sovereignty of the island because of its strategical interests. This served the interests of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. However, again during the Cyprus debate in the General Assembly in 1955 Turkey did not hold herself in expressing her interest in the island;

Turkey is primarily concerned with the status of this island because of racial, historical and contractual reason... Nothing can be deemed to be based on justice and equity unless the co-operation and consent of Turkey is unequivocally obtained; for otherwise no decision can be lasting... Cyprus is important for the defence of Southern Turkey and of the Northern Mediterranean in general[14]
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

The discussion of the Cyprus issue in the UNGA was a turning point in the Turkish formulation of foreign policy over Cyprus. The failure of Greek attempt to obtain self-determination through a UN resolution resulted in fierce outbreaks of violence in Cyprus which accelerated the EOKA campaign. At the beginning of this campaign, Turkish Cypriot opposition to EOKA's enosist campaign was limited to verbal refutations and some demonstrations. By the 1955, there were direct clashes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. A fear of EOKA's success among the Turkish Cypriots led them ask help from the Turkish government. They feared that if Enosis succeeded they would be discriminated under a Greek rule. What happened in Greece in the early 1950s was also happening in Turkey- anti-Greek riots; arising of patriotic emotional feelings among the mainland Turks. Having the public became more aroused over the issue together with the strategic considerations, Turkey was encouraged to take more active role over the issue.

In conclusion, the developments in Cyprus, by the mid 1950s, can be summarised as follows; the Greek Cypriots and Greek leaders succeeded in making Cyprus an international issue and this brought Turkey on the scene to Greek surprise; the Greek Cypriots began an armed struggle and this provoked counter action by the Turkish Cypriots and this developed into a dispute between Greece and Turkey. Shortly, the conflict in the island was no longer between the British colonial government and the Greek Cypriots but between two major ethnic groups.

Britain on the other hand gave Turkey the first official standing in the Cyprus dispute by inviting them to a tripartite conference between Britain, Turkey and Greece
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

in London which opened on August 29, 1955. In this way, it became clear to the world that Turkey was interested in the future of Cyprus. In this conference, Greek and Turkish demands were opposing each other. On the one hand Greeks were asking for self-determination for Cyprus, while Turks claimed that if the British gave up sovereignty over Cyprus the island should go back to Turkey\(^1\). Towards the end of 1956, the Turkish government began to advocate another solution to the problem to replace the one proposed in 1955. This was a call for self-determination for Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government realised that the return of the island to Turkey, in the case the British gave up sovereignty over the island, was not achievable. However, the best achievable alternative which would benefit both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey was partition. In the United Nations sessions, the Turkish representative said that if self-determination was granted for the Greek Cypriots, the same should be applied for the Turkish Cypriots. This idea, which was partition, was raised for the first time in February 1956 in the Turkish Parliament\(^1\), and was then brought in front of the UN sessions. So by the beginning of 1957, partition became the practical answer for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots from then on. Till the 1958, the Turkish government official stand on Cyprus was partition. As in May 1957, the Turkish Prime Minister, said in a speech "the utmost sacrifice we can make consists of the partition of Cyprus"\(^1\) shows the determination of Turkish government not to accept any other settlement. The position of Turkish Cypriots were in favour of partition as well. The Turkish Cypriot position started to take shape in the end of the 1940's. By the mid 1950s pro-partionist Turkish Cypriots were united in Dr. Kutchuk's (the leader of the
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

Turkish Cypriots till he was replaced by Mr. Denktas later) Turkish Cypriot Popular Party which gave an expression to growing to nationalist sentiment. They believed that partition was the only solution which would put them on equal footing with the Greek Cypriots as the Turkish Cypriots believed that they were discriminated against by Greeks in every field of life[19] so they could not live together under the same government with Greeks and saw the partition as the only way out.

But despite the determination of both Turks on partition and Greeks on self-determination, no UN resolution passed for either end.

III. The British Position

By the late 18th century, Great Britain considered the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russia as vital to her own interests in the Asia. Disraeli who came to power in 1874 regarded Constantinople and the Straits very important in protecting the route to India. On the other hand, he was concerned with the Turkish Armenia as he believed that the control of that area as well by Russians would be a great concern for British interests in the Asia. Thus, assistance to Ottoman Empire was necessary according to Disraeli. But to achieve the control of the area and act against Russia a place- "colony" was needed in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was Cyprus which was under the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire since 1571. Disraeli expressed his views clearly to Queen Victoria: "If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte... the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely

150
increased in that region and your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia. Such an arrangement would also greatly strengthened Turkey in Europe and altogether she would be a stronger barrier against Russia than she was before the war[20]. Prime Minister Disraeli was given the approval of his government to make a defensive alliance with Turkey on two conditions:

1. The Sultan was to promise reforms in Asiatic Turkey.
2. Great Britain was to occupy Cyprus if Russia refused to return the Turkish territories seized in Eastern Anatolia.

Under such considerations, Britain signed a convention of Defensive Alliance with Ottomans in which she promised to help Sultan to defend his empire in Asia against Russian aggression, also to enable Britain "to make necessary provision for executing her engagement"[21]. The Sultan Abdul Hamid reluctantly agreed to cede the island of Cyprus for occupation and administration to Britain without sovereignty[22]. At the end, as part of Disraeli's strategy to protect the Ottoman Empire, Suez and ultimately Britain's Indian possessions from Russian expansion, Britain seized control of Cyprus.

The legal status of the island did not change till 1914. In 1914 when Turkey entered into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the status of the island underwent a change- Britain annexed the island "as part of the King's dominion"[23]. Finally, with the Lausanne Treaty, the British annexation of Cyprus was accepted by all participants and on the 10th of March 1925, Cyprus was officially proclaimed a
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

crown colony. Both Greece and Turkey were present at the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty and they did not object to this annexation.

However, Cyprus, until the last phase of British colonisation, did not fill the key strategic role which Disraeli had conceptualised. The Suez Canal built by Ferninand de Lesseps in which both Great Britain and France invested large sums of money was completed in 1869. And with its opening in 1882, the British military base was moved to Alexandria. Alexandria in Egypt as a harbour was much better situated in protecting the route to India. Thus, the British occupation of Egypt only four years after the signing of the Cyprus Convention, reduced the strategic importance of Cyprus immediately. The other factors were the establishments of British mandates of Palestine (with the harbour of Haifa) and Iraq, after the First World War which further lessened the value of Cyprus.

In the early 1950s momentous developments in the Middle East, to some extent, gave Cyprus the role Disraeli envisaged. The other important development in the area was the increasing importance of the Middle East Oil which further increased the position of Cyprus for the British interests in the area. The Middle Eastern supplies of oil after the second World War were considered of vital importance to the economic recovery of Britain and Europe. By the beginning of 1950s the power of balance in the area started to change. In areas like Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq which were under the British control, Britain started to lose its hold. The British firstly withdrew from Palestine in May 1948. In this way Cyprus was left as the only territory in the Eastern Mediterranean under British sovereignty. At the same time
there was an increase in Pan-Arab nationalism and neutralism. The leader of the Pan-Arab movement was Egypt under the leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1956 Jordan was lost as a military base as well. Jordan, being situated in the heart of the Middle East where British oil companies had great interests, dismissed Glubb Pasha. British military force in the area was under Glubb Pasha's control in Jordan, making Jordan a powerful satellite of Britain. But young king Hussein of Jordan brought this to an end through expelling Glubb Pasha in February 1956.

On December 1, 1954, the British government, being unable to reach any agreement with the Revolutionary Council of Egypt, decided to transfer the Middle East Command Headquarters from the Suez Canal to Cyprus. Furthermore, the Middle East Defence Organisation was to be stationed on Cyprus. After moving the headquarters Britain was hoping to improve her relations with Egypt. But on July 26, 1956 Gamal Abdul Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal declaring that the revenue from canal fees would be used to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. This was a heavy blow for the West as the Suez Canal was the great oil highway. This conflict reached its climax when Britain and France intervened at Suez in November 1956 together with Israel. And in this crisis Cyprus was used as a base by the British and French forces. By the late 1950s the pan-Arabic movement gained momentum. Early in February 1958 Egypt and Syria, despite the fact that they were not adjacent to each other geographically, decided to amalgate in a single state-United Arab Republic. This was followed by Iraq and Jordan and they united under the name of Arab Federation. In the meantime, civil war in Lebanon and Revolution in
Iraq took place. But Britain and America realised that their intervention would be limited as their heavy involvement in the region would only result in Russian Communist hold more firmly. Thus, the consequences of all these developments was the gradual British disengagement from the Middle Eastern affairs and more determination to keep the Cyprus sovereignty.

Although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis started as early as the nineteenth century after Greek independence, it was in the 1954 and onwards when it escalated. And it was during this time the Turkish factor came into the forefront to prevent Enosis which made the Cyprus struggle not a typical colonial issue but a nationalist war between the two communities of the island and their motherlands. Again, as mentioned before, one of the most tragic aspects of the Cyprus dispute was that it developed in a period of time when the prospects of improving relations between Greece and Turkey were better than ever before because both had joined the Western alliance- NATO and both countries had the will to improve their relations for the first time after the Ataturk and Venizelos détente. Nevertheless, Great Britain was in this vicious circle because of her sovereignty over the island.

Cyprus for Britain became too important after 1945 to release it into independence. In retrospect despite the emergence of sharper and more confrontational form of politics on the island after 1945 the British government could not estimate the potential appeal of Enosis for the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, the British countered Enosis demand of the Greek Cypriots and Greeks by the argument
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

that the strategic location of Cyprus necessitates them to have the sovereignty of the island in order to fulfil their obligations and interests in the Middle East. Together with British membership in NATO, the important role of Britain in the Baghdad Pact was stressed. The Baghdad Pact which was created by American and British backing in March 1955 between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Britain represented the "Northern Tier" concept forming a "ring of containment" around the Soviet Union\(^{27}\). One of the important aims of this pact for Britain was to strengthen Iraq's political stability in Iraq against communism and Pan-Arab nationalism. And Cyprus was an important air-base, for the deployment of Canberra bombers in support of the Baghdad Pact, for the operation of V-bombers and as a staging post for the military transport aircraft to the Far East\(^{28}\). Thus, what Britain wanted was the unfettered use of its bases in Cyprus. In his memoirs, Eden who was the Prime Minister till 1957 talks about Cyprus where he justifies his government's unwillingness to hand over sovereignty over Cyprus in the following words;

*Our military advisers regarded Cyprus as an essential staging point for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. There must be security of tenure. It was not thought enough to lease certain sites on the island from some future administration on whose policies we could not depend*\(^{29}\).
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

The general attitude of British governments (both conservative and labour) had been similar—strategic—as Eden put forward in his memoirs. Although strategic considerations were of paramount importance, political considerations were not excluded when Cyprus issue was discussed in Britain. One of these political considerations was to do with the position of Britain in NATO and Western Alliance. According to the British government, withdrawal from Cyprus could be interpreted as a sign of weakness in the eyes of the Western Allies in the area. For example, in 1956 retreat of Britain from Egypt (Suez) and Jordan were considered as a humiliating surrender in Britain. Especially when there was a strong imperialist group in the Tory party. Hence, Eden was trying to soothe the Tory backbenchers within his party by promising that Britain would not abandon her rule over Cyprus. Only in 1958, the position of backbenchers started to change which helped in bringing peace to Cyprus. Even Macmillan, who succeeded Eden in January 1957, was careful not to be charged within his Party of being too soft on the Cyprus issue. Thus, during the course of 1954 and onwards British governments had to tackle not only the Cyprus problem, but also the political and psychological atmosphere in their own parties.

From the British point of view, the other factor which had to be taken into consideration when dealing with Cyprus was Turkey. Turkey was becoming of increasing importance in the Middle East affairs specially in her role in the Baghdad Pact The Turkish government between 1950-1960 under Adnan Menderes was pro-Western which supported royalist and conservative governments parallel to British interests. As Eden writes in his memoirs again "regarded our alliance with
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world[^31], the importance given to Turkey was apparent. In this way, Turkey's interest in Cyprus both national and strategic, could not be overlooked by Britain. And when, at the beginning of 1950s, the Turks expressed themselves in favour of status-quo, this coincided with the British interests at the time.

It was under these developments that the Enosis demand had been fought, and the fight for it intensified with the EOKA activities. Over these years (between 1955-1959) Britain formulated certain policies and solutions concerning the island. The reason for the change of the policies was shaped according to the British interests and the international developments together with the developments in the island (e.g. intensity of the civil war). These stages can be summarised as below[^32]:

1. No compromise on British Sovereignty - 1954.
2. Recognition of the interests of both Greece and Turkey - September 1955.
4. Acceptance of self-determination not only to Greeks but to Turkish Cypriots as well- option of partition - December 1956.
5. Formal recognition that the Cypriots were part of the Greek and Turkish nations therefore to reconcile these demands they could be united with their motherlands as well as with the Britain and the British Commonwealth - 1958.

While these policies were being formulated accordingly, constitutional solutions were offered to the Cypriots as well.
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

In 1954, the British stand on the Cyprus question was quite firm. Although some constitutional offers were made in 1948 - Winster constitution - to improve the position of the Cypriots in the island - no sovereignty or any change in the future of the island was considered. According to this constitution, the Legislative council would consist of 18 Greek elected representatives, 4 Turkish and 4 official members. In this council finance, defence, external affairs, special minority rights and constitutional amendments could be discussed. However these proposals were rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The British view was that according to the Lausanne Treaty, Britain possessed the absolute sovereignty over the island and this could not be questioned. Furthermore, as can be seen in the words of Minister of State for the colonies, Henry Hopkinson, who indicated about Cyprus in the House of Commons on 28 July 1954: "There are certain territories in the commonwealth which owing to their particular circumstances can never expect to be fully independent" at the time no hope of sovereignty was considered to be granted to Greek Cypriots. The new plan was to create a legislature where official and nominated members would leave Cypriots in a minority. This plan was rejected at once.

On the other hand, it was inescapable to try to accommodate the situation in Cyprus, as the terror in the island started to escalate after the launching of EOKA on 1st April 1955. Turkish Cypriot involvement against EOKA started to turn the direction of the civil war. And the Greek involvement into the Cyprus issue seemed to continue through the UN. Furthermore, after 1954 because Cyprus was discussed in
the UN for the first time, Turkey started to reformulate her policy towards Cyprus as well. All these were resulting in a considerate concern in Britain towards Cyprus.

So the next important undertaking by Britain for a solution to the Cyprus question was the London Tripartite Conference\textsuperscript{[34]}. Therefore, Sir Anthony Eden invited Greece and Turkey to a conference in London on political and defence questions affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus. Turkey accepted the invitation. Greece although was tried to be stopped by the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios attending the conference, accepted the invitation and sent their foreign minister to London. The aim of Britain, as Eden explained in his memoirs, was to show the world that the Cyprus problem was not a simple self-determination or colonial problem but an inter-ethnic conflict. Eden said:

\begin{quote}
We knew how wide the difference of opinion was between the Greeks and the Turks, but the world didn't. Too many thought our troubles due to old fashioned British colonialism. By securing a precise definition of these differences we hoped to show the true nature of the problem. The exact terms of our proposals for the future could then be presented.\textsuperscript{[35]}
\end{quote}
Chapter Four  

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

In spite of the belief of Greek Cypriots and Greeks that this conference was a typical British policy in the line of "divide and rule", it was actually inevitable sooner or later to introduce the Turkish factor whether to the interest of the British or not. And for the first time London Conference did it. With this conference both Greece and Turkey showed their legitimate interest in Cyprus and its future.

However, the proposals in this conference did not include the future of the island or self-determination but a limited self-government. Because as Macmillan stated as the British Foreign Secretary in the conference, Cyprus was of paramount importance for the defence of the free world and that self-determination for the Cypriots was unthinkable.

What Britain proposed was an Assembly with an elected Greek Cypriot majority with certain numbers of seats for Turkish Cypriots. All cabinet posts were to be held by Cypriot ministers who would be responsible to the Assembly. The Turkish Cypriots were to receive a percentage of the civil service positions and some ministerial positions. The head of the proposed administration would be a Cypriot Chief Minister (a Greek Cypriot) who would be chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor. A British governor on the other hand, would be in charge of foreign affairs, defence and public security.

Britain apart from this constitution proposed a Tripartite Committee including Turkish, Greek and British representatives to examine the proposals and help in their implementation. Both Turkey and Greece rejected the British proposals. Greece having found the constitution inadequate asserted the right of implementing
self-determination. The Greeks pressed for self-determination instead of Enosis as it was a better way to present the Greek Cypriots' case to international opinion. On the other hand, Turkey was opposed to self-determination or to any changes in the sovereignty of the island. Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister insisted that any changes in the island's status would necessitate a revision of the Lausanne Treaty.

Just before the conference ended on 4 September 1955 a bomb explosion at the Turkish Consulate in Salonica, Greece, resulted in immense riots in Istanbul and Izmir against Greeks. Because of these violent riots in Turkey the conference came to an end on September 7, 1955. Although no possibilities of an accommodation seemed near, the following events worsened Greek-Turkish relations more.

Following the failure of London Conference, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Sir John Harding was appointed Governor of Cyprus on 25 September 1955. The objective of the new Governor while trying to halt the EOKA activities was to convince Greek Cypriots in achieving a settlement acceptable to all concerned in the Cyprus issue. In this respect Harding began talks with Makarios on the basis of granting a wide measure of self-government. The idea of self-government was identical to the previous plan suggested to Turkey and Greece but at the same time he kept the door to self-determination neither fully closed nor fully open. For Makarios there were two important conditions to be accepted by Britain. First condition was the recognition of self-determination and acceptance by Britain of a date for its implementation in the near future by. The second condition was the
exclusion of Turkish participation from talks on the Cyprus Constitution (these two aims of Makarios lasted till the late 1950s).

The British reply was to offer on October 20, 1955 a draft statement of policy. Together with this, Harding after consultations in London wrote to Makarios that it was not British policy that the principle of self-determination could never be applicable to Cyprus but that it was not a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the discussion of the future of the island could take place only after self-government had proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community. To some extent the British government retreated from their uncompromising affirmation of British sovereignty over the island compared to their early stand in the 1955. But there was one thing they rejected and this was the exclusion of Turkey from the Cyprus problem:

... we had in fact gone to Turkey's limit to find a basis for co-operation with the Greek speaking Cypriots on a plan for self-government ... The Cyprus dispute could never be settled until the importance of the Turkish position was understood and accepted. This meant that enosis must be ruled out as a solution for whether one was for it or against it Turkey would never accept that answer.
In the end, the Harding-Makarios talks ended in a deadlock. Some events followed the failure of the Harding-Makarios negotiations; the forced exile of the Archbishop to the Seychelles. The British government justified the deportation of Archbishop by the evidence of his involvement with the EOKA activists and the intensification of inter-ethnic clashes. But the deportation news of Makarios were not taken well in Britain. The Labour party's reaction was completely against it. Hugh Gaitskell denounced the deportation as an "act of folly"[43]. Also the liberal leader Clement Davies doubted the fact that whether Makarios was a real extremist[44]. The subject was discussed in the House of Commons on the 14th March 1956 and the opposition was defeated. But still there were certain circles which were sympathetic to the Archbishop Makarios, e.g. the Orthodox Church.

During the Harding-Makarios talks, a difference on the policy of Enosis arose between EOKA leader Colonel Grivas and Makarios. While Makarios in order to get more gains from Britain agreed in a way to self-determination and independence, on the other hand, Grivas sought to achieve total Enosis and this was seen as possible. So the deportation of Makarios enabled Grivas to take both political and military leadership of the resistance. That year, terrorist actions reached a new peak not only against British but Turks as well. With secret help from Turkey, Turkish Cypriots had created their own underground organisation "Volkan". Also, they established "Cyprus is Turkish" party under the leadership of Dr. Kucuk. In this way, Turkish Cypriots started to take reprisals against Greek Cypriots.
Despite, in July 1956 (during the Suez operation), the Governor at the time appealed to the terrorists to stop their guerrilla warfare and bloodshed, the killings did not stop\(^\text{[45]}\).

At the time no lasting solution to the final status of Cyprus seemed attainable. Somehow on 12 July 1956 Eden told the House of Commons that he accepted the idea of self-determination for Cyprus in principle but he added that he could not visualise how it could be put into practice with the existing circumstances. However, on the same day July 12 1956, Lord Radcliffe was appointed British Constitutional Commissioner with a mission to formulate a liberal constitution and at the same time safeguarding the British base rights on Cyprus.

Lord Radcliffe completed his report early in the winter. The new constitutional proposals for Cyprus were announced by Lennox-Boyd on December 19, 1956. A detailed look at these proposals is necessary because of its resemblance to 1960 Constitution both in substance and inspiration\(^\text{[46]}\).

Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals for Cyprus recommended a diarchy with two separate lawmaking authorities and two administrative bodies. There should be a legislative Assembly of thirty six members with twenty four Greek majority and all elected democratically. The six Turkish Cypriot members would be elected through a separate electoral roll. The remaining six seats would be filled by the Governor through nomination (one non-indigenous British subject, e.g Armenian and another one Maronite). Chief Minister would be appointed by the Governor who would be the
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

constitutional head of state, according to the largest support he gets in the Legislative Assembly.

Law making was to be practised by the Legislative Assembly but all the bills passed had to be approved by the Governor. Legislation concerning internal self-government would be passed by simple majority. On the other hand, any law which could change the existing laws of Cyprus regulating Turkish Cypriot domestic affairs necessitated the consent of two thirds of the Turkish Cypriot members. External affairs, defence and internal security were left to the jurisdiction of Governor. Rights guaranteed under the constitution would be safeguarded by the Supreme Court of Justice. The Chief Justice was to be a neutral from another country together with equal number of seats for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Any administrative or legislative acts which would violate specific rights guaranteeing educational, religious, charitable and cultural institutions were to be unconstitutional. There would be one Turkish Minister in the cabinet in charge of an office of Turkish Cypriot affairs who was to be elected from among the Turkish legislative members with an ex-offico seat in the Cabinet. The Governor would act upon the advice of the Chief Ministers where six out of seven ministries would be in Greek Cypriot hands.

Therefore, the Constitution assigned wide responsibilities to the elected Cypriot representatives for self-government along with specified minority rights with principle of eventual self-determination while Cyprus sovereign status was to continue to be British as long as the constitution was in force. Radcliffe on the other hand rejected both a federal solution and the idea of equal representation of the two
people in the legislature. Furthermore, he suggested that there was no need for a bicameral system. And the reasons were; first of all it might result in controversies between the two chambers, secondly there was no guarantee of it providing protection for minority rights. Radcliffe said that the proposed constitution was "appropriate to the state of affairs in which men may express their will by voting and their views by speaking without fear of terrorism or intimidation..."\textsuperscript{[47]}. The proposals were considered as providing built- in guarantees for the Turkish people and offered to give the Greek Cypriots majority more power than earlier proposals.

In the end, these new constitutional proposals were rejected by the Greek side. Greece rejected the proposals partly because the constitution failed to specify a future date for self-determination. But the main reason for the Greek rejection was the fear of partition. When Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons on December 13, 1956;

\textit{When the international and strategic situation permits...}

\textit{Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination...}

\textit{The Turkish community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status... the exercise of self-determination in such a}
it aroused violent hostility among Greeks against British and their proposals. As Averoff says in his memoirs, from the Greeks point of view, the whole thing would be a sheer self-delusion to go on, as now, Britain not only accepted the Turkish Cypriots as community rather than minority but as possessing the right of self-determination as well.\[49\]

However, it proved difficult to get a response from the Greek Cypriot point of view. The British government, in the absence of Makarios from Cyprus, discovered that no Greek Cypriot spokesmen would dare to enter into negotiations with them. So when the proposals came out, they took them to Makarios who was in Seychelles. But he refused to consider them while in detention. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots themselves didn't have the chance to vote on the proposal as the Greek government rejected the proposals before hand.

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government accepted the proposals as a basis for discussion. As expected there were two points that the Turkish government pressed: on equality of rights for the Turkish Cypriots to safeguard them from the rule of the Greek majority and the prevention of any act leading to Enosis. At the same time, in Turkey a change in the policy of Cyprus started to take place in the same period- idea of partition, and the British governments use of partition as a deterrent to Enosis encouraged the Turks in adopting it as an
official Turkish policy. Hence, Greek demand on self-determination and Turkish demand on extensive guarantees and partition prevented the finalisation of any solution.

After the failure of Radcliffe's proposals, the British aim was to have a tripartite talks between Turkey, Greece and themselves. Although this was favoured by Britain and Turkey, Greece wanted to resort to the UN. In this way, Greek government believed that the Turkish say over the future of the island could be overcome. During this time Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957. One of the first things he did was to release Archbishop Makarios in April 1957. Under the leadership of Macmillan, the British strategic requirements in Cyprus were reassessed. The main military, political and other considerations that led to the reassessment were: 

1. The civil war seemed to continue thus the continuing cost of controlling the island was high (e.g Almost 30000 British troops were required to control a few hundred EOKA terrorists).

2. The realisation that the British strategic military interests could be served through the maintenance of sovereignty over base areas instead of possession of the whole island. This assessment arrived in the wake of the Suez crisis and the Iraqi Revolution.

3. Turkish-Greek tensions, which were important for the Western alliance, were challenging the credibility of NATO. Thus, there was a great pressure from the United States and NATO on Britain to resolve the dispute as the sovereign of the island.
4. Anti-colonialism voices were strong throughout the 1950s. And they could help Greek demands of Enosis in the UN Assembly.

5. The position of the opposition in the House of Commons which were favourable to the independence of the island, resulted in the rethinking of the whole policy for Cyprus.

Till a plan was revised by the British government several more attempts had taken place.

Firstly, the Greek government brought the problem to the United Nations once more. In the UN while the Greeks insisted on self-determination, the Turkish government insisted on the existence of two peoples in Cyprus and the right of applying self-determination by the two peoples of the Cyprus. The British stand was parallel to the one of Turkey, and they added that the settlement should satisfy all three interested governments and the peoples of Cyprus. Greece could not make their resolution to be adopted because of the British and Turkish challenge, however a resolution of Krishna Menon (the powerful head of the Indian delegation) was adopted by the Political Committee (76 in favour 2 against). Menon's resolution which became known as Resolution 1013 (xi) was: "The General Assembly having considered the question of Cyprus and believing that the solution of that problem requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end".[51] This resolution, although it did not
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

satisfy Greek or Turkish aspirations, was well taken by the all parties because it did not rule out either partition or Enosis and urged the settlement of the problem by the parties involved.

Following the UN debate, Sir Hugh Foot, who had a liberal reputation, was appointed as the governor of Cyprus on December 1957. Sir Hugh Foot who declared that he had set himself the task of building two bridges: "a bridge of trust with the Greek community and a bridge of trust with the Turkish community"[^21], drafted a proposal based on unitary self-government for an interim period of five or seven years before any final decision and shelving of the sovereignty question. He also believed that lack of intervention from outside would enable the two Cypriot communities to work together. Foot suggested three more points; an end to the state of emergency and the return of Makarios to the island, negotiations with the Cypriot Turks and Greeks and an assurance that at the end of interim period no final decision would be taken which was not accepted by both Greeks and Turks[^31]. Furthermore, he was convinced that peaceful self-government would rule out both Enosis and partition.

Although Foot's plan was taken favourably by the Cabinet in London, the Turkish and Greek acceptance had to be assured. The plan was put to the Turkish government. The official Turkish reply to the British government contained strong objections. However, Turkey, while officially rejecting the Foot Plan, was privately willing to consider a solution based on a federal constitution which would give equal representation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in self-government and the establishment of a Turkish military base. The Turks in Nicosia, believed that the...
application of the Foot Plan during the interim years of self-government might pave the way to Enosis. Hence, there was no hope of getting the consent of both the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots to Foot's proposals.

The talks with Greeks concentrated on the question of independence and the idea of a Turkish military base in Cyprus as an alternative to partition. While both Makarios and Grivas were opposed to Turkey receiving a base, Greece was more receptive about the "Enosis-minus-a-Turkish base solution"[54].

In the meantime, communal tension was increasing in Cyprus while there was a strong opposition to Foot's Plan from Turkey and there was no guarantee of success with the Greeks either. With the American and British backing, Paul Henri Spaak attempted, as the Secretary-General of NATO, to propose a solution for the Cyprus as well; some form of limited independence for a fixed term of years, in which Enosis, partition and the triple partnership idea proposed by the Macmillan were excluded. However, the Spaak Plan of August 1958 was rejected by all[55]. In the meantime, after the set back to the Foot plan, the British government started searching for another formula. Having reached no solution, on 19 June 1958, the British government announced a set of proposals commonly referred as the Macmillan Plan[56]. This new initiative was taken on the brink of a serious civil war in Cyprus. In June the worst conflict between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots took place since the British rule began. The main task of the British became that of keeping the two communities apart while being accused of partiality towards the other. Under these developments in the island Britain had to give a lead out of the deadlock once more to prevent even a more
Chapter Four
Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

widespread war between two NATO allies; Greece and Turkey. As Macmillan says in his memoirs, Britain had no interest (under all the internal and international developments) except peace both in Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey, together with the preservation of the bases which were so essential to the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the resistance to Communist aggression. Thus, Prime Minister Macmillan on the 19th June 1958 presented the proposals to the parliament. These proposals embodied Governor Foot's plans for internal self-government and external solution of Tri-domonium. And the seven-year Partnership plan of Macmillan would begin to be applied with or without the agreement of the other parties (Greece and Turkey)

The outline of the partnership plan was:

"1. Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association not only with the United Kingdom, and therefore with the British Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey.

2. Since the three governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey all have interest in Cyprus, Her Majesty's government will welcome the co-operation and participation of the two other governments in a joint effort to achieve the peace, progress and prosperity of the island.

3. The Greek and Turkish governments will each be invited to appoint a representative to co-operate with the Governor in carrying out this policy.

4. The island will have a system of representative Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs."
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

5. In order to satisfy the desire of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be recognised as Greeks and Turks, Her Majesty's Government will welcome an arrangement which gives them Greek or Turkish nationality, while enabling them to retain British nationality.

6. To allow time for the new principle of partnership to be fully worked out and brought into operation under this plan in the necessary atmosphere of stability, the international status of the island will remain unchanged for seven years.

7. A system of representative government and communal autonomy will be worked out by consultation with representatives of the two communities and with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments.

8. The essential provisions of the new constitution will be;

(a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities and these Houses will have final legislative authority in communal affairs.

(b) Other issues would be dealt with by a nine-member Council of Ministers which would consist of the Governor (as President), the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments and six members of the House of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.

(c) Foreign affairs, defence and internal security would be reserved to the Governor who would however act after consulting the representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments.

(d) The later would have certain specific rights for the protection of the Greek and Turkish communities against discrimination.
9. Once peace was restored, the emergency measures would gradually be lifted and those Cypriots who were at present exiled from the island would then be allowed to return.

10. There followed a number of observations on the merits and expediency of the plan, which had been constructed imaginatively for the benefit of all concerned."

Furthermore, the plan concluded with a proposal that if the partnership and co-operation experiment went well, Great Britain would be prepared to share the sovereignty of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey, provided that Britain could keep military bases and facilities.

The Turkish government, although asserted on the applicability of partition, gave the plan conditional approval because the Macmillan Plan offered Turkey a voice as of right not only in international negotiations but in the actual government of the island. The plan postponing a decision on self-determination for an interim period gave Turkey a veto on Enosis at the end of that time. Moreover, there was no central legislature which could be controlled by a Greek majority. From the Turkish point of view, provision of separate communal assemblies and addition of separate municipalities could pave the way to partition in the future. Although Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu said that the Turks were willing to discuss the proposal he reiterated the desire for partition. However, Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey then, rejected Macmillan Proposals on 28th June 1958 because they did not settle the final international status of Cyprus.
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

From the Greek point of view as Averoff says in his memoirs there could have been no worse solution than the Macmillan proposals. Archbishop Makarios as well took the proposals as "wholly unacceptable" as violating every principle of morality and justice. And Greek government rejected the plan after an emergency cabinet meeting on the 24th of June 1958. The provision which Greeks found most objectionable was the one which recognised Turkey as a participant in the island's administration giving her the right of word on the permanent veto on Cyprus. In addition, the inclusion of separate municipalities with constrains on the will of the Greek Cypriot majority were the main concerns for the Greek side; threatening them with partition.

After visiting Athens and Nicosia, Macmillan felt the need of modify some of the provisions of the plan. These modifications were:

1. The idea of dual nationality- which was dropped.
2. The Greek and Turkish representatives would not sit in the Governor's council but they would be consulted by the Governor on external, defence and internal security.
3. The establishment of two separate Houses of Representatives was again proposed but a single House of Representatives was to replace it at a future date.
4. The two Cypriot communities were to have separate municipalities in those cities where it was deemed necessary.

Fighting during this period, between the two communities, was about to reach its peak and threatened to break into a full-fledged civil war. To Britain's surprise, during the Baghdad meeting at the end of July, the Turkish government (either

175
because on the increased fighting in the island or simply because of the appeal of the plan on second thought) accepted the plan in full. Now Turkey regarded the proposals "as fair, honourable, statesmanlike, well-balanced"[60]. Furthermore, they continued if the British will undertake to carry out the plan without amendment, Turks will co-operate -will call off violence- will abandon all their claims- partition, a military base etc. On the other hand, the Greek government despite their acceptance of two main principles (no more terrorism and a seven year provisional settlement) rejected the plan.

Meanwhile, the British government proceeded with its programme of implementing the Macmillan Plan -first of October 1958. The British imposed a de facto partition in the main towns. Separate municipal councils were established; British forces erected barbed wire barriers to separate the Greek and Turkish sectors in Nicosia and other towns. While the application of the Macmillan Plan was cheered by the Turkish Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios sent a message to the Greek Cypriots urging them to "react vigorously" against the implementation of the "arbitrary" British Plan which was leading the island to "perdition"[61]. Being desperate with the British insistence on the application of Macmillan Plan, Makarios told Barbara Castle (then chairman of the British Labour Party) that he was ready to accept independence for Cyprus under United Nations auspices after a period of self-government. Then the Paul Henri Spaak's attempts, as secretary general of NATO continued as Archbishop's plan of independence for Cyprus had been proposed to NATO by the Greek government as a permanent solution to the dispute. The Greek claim was that Greek
Cypriots had stopped demanding Enosis thus, unless the threat of ultimate partition was removed, no further talks could take place under the NATO auspices. Greece put two conditions for the participation to the Conference. (a) Prior acceptance that the negotiations would extend to cover the final status of Cyprus and (b) Participation to the Conference of France and Italy\textsuperscript{[a2]}. However, the British and the Turkish representatives in the NATO Council rejected the proposals. Hence, on the 25th of October, the Greek government informed Spaak that they were unable to continue negotiations for the holding of Conference to solve the Cyprus dispute.

After the unsuccessful attempt of NATO's Secretary General, the Greek government in a last resort attempt to stop the application of Macmillan Plan went to UN once more. The Greek aim was to induce the General Assembly to recommended the creation of an independent, sovereign and unitary Cypriot State, after a short period of genuine self-government. But the Iranian Resolution which was in the line of previous NATO proposals that Greece had refused to accept, was adopted in the Political Committee (by 31 votes, with 22 against and 28 abstentions). Thus, the Macmillan Plan was to stay in power despite the Greek refusals.

Immediately, after the voting took place, the Turkish foreign minister Zorlu extraordinarily approached Averoff, the Greek foreign minister, and said that he regretted what had happened. Furthermore, he added that he would prefer a resolution acceptable to both sides and then asked Averoff if he would have liked to meet him. This way, the two ministers agreed to find a solution for Cyprus through direct negotiations which Britain had been supporting all the way. But how did the
internal and international politics of the three countries (Britain, Greece and Turkey),
pave the way for modifications to find a settlement?

First of all, the modifications of objectives for both Turkey and Greece were
facilitated by their recognition of the risks of continued escalation of the conflict of
the island and the deterioration of their own relations. Turkey's foreign policy,
because of her geography and past experiences was built around her fear of the
USSR. Turkey's main objective since the Second World War was to be involved in
the Western Alliance (NATO, Baghdad Pact) to prevent Communist penetration. But
during this time Iraq's revolution took place which weakened the Baghdad Pact.
Furthermore, internationally there was a pressure on the Western Alliance- Russia's
first Sputnik, pressure over Berlin. Thus, a potential war between Greece and Turkey
the two NATO allies, could damage not only them but the whole western Alliance.
Therefore, pressure was exerted by Washington and other members of NATO on both
Turkey and Greece, who were concerned with the threat of a Greek-Turkish
confrontation in order to meet the new soviet threat. Under all these developments
Turkey had to reassess the value of her Western Alliance and her relations with
Greece. Apart from the worries of Alliance, the government might have feared that
the British would give independence to the island in order to break the deadlock. For
Turks this was tantamount to Enosis. Turkey was especially worried that a potential
Labour Government which supported independence and disregarded partition as a
solution, might pave the way to independence.
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

On the other hand, Greek anxiety was the possibility that Britain (because of the increased civil war) as a last resort might partition the island. For both Greeks and Turks also dependence on US for financial and military aid was another factor. Greece at the time was reorganising her administration, education and schemes of industrial development\(^{[63]}\) and depended heavily on the aid. So the solution of the Cyprus dispute was important for Greece to achieve these aims without interruption. Turkey also depended on the United States and European creditors to keep her afloat as she was overspending on imports for her development programme\(^{[64]}\).

After Britain had decided that she was prepared to relinquish her sovereignty over the island but only keep certain sovereign bases for her defence responsibilities, Greeks and Turks had more enthusiasm for compromise. For Britain to arrive at this decision took some years, because it was believed that the safety of bases could be guaranteed only by retaining sovereignty of the whole island in which they were situated. However, developments in both international and domestic politics of Britain, together with the situation in Cyprus led to the reassessment of their needs. This was a turning point in British policy which at the end of 1950's opened the way for the establishment of an independent Republic. Britain not only abandoned the exclusive sovereignty, but also Greece and Turkey had to abandon Enosis and partition respectively to reach an agreement.
Chapter Four

IV. Birth Of The Republic

As mentioned above, by the end of 1958, there were more reasons and incentives to search for a way out for all the parties involved in Cyprus. Thus, the reconciliation which began between Averoff and Zorlu at the end of the United Nations debate continued, and diplomatic exchanges prepared the ground for a summit conference in Zurich. On February 5, 1959, the two prime ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis together with Zorlu and Averoff met in Zurich. Here they drew up the outline of a settlement subject to the agreement of Great Britain. Although no Cypriot representatives were present in Zurich, the Greek government consulted Archbishop Makarios at various stages of the talks and the Turkish government consulted Rauf Denktas, a colleague of Dr. Kucuk and by then the most powerful man in the Turkish community. Finally, on February 11, 1959 the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey signed an agreement for the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus. The outline of the settlement was taken later to London for final ratification.

For Britain to consider any agreement for an independent Cyprus there were three main requirements:

1. A base in Cyprus.
2. Duty to see the new regime ran satisfactorily, and minority rights protected.
3. Cyprus being part of the free world.

In the London Conference which opened at Lancaster House on 17 February 1959, the supplementary issues of concern to Britain would be discussed and would be followed with the formal signing of all the Agreements. Britain, Greece and Turkey
were represented by their Foreign Ministers to complete the final agreement. In London, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were present as well. Dr. Kucuk, the political head of the Turkish Cypriot community and Archbishop Makarios as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community.

Although the London Conference was not for redrafting but ratification, Archbishop Makarios made some reservations about the Zurich Agreements. These were Vice-President's veto, Turkey's right of intervention, the defence Alliance which gave Greece and Turkey the right to station troops in Cyprus and the number of seats allocated in the National Assembly to the Turkish Cypriots which were 30 per cent of the total\[^1\]\[^67\]. All these were discussed previously and the Archbishop's approval was taken by the Greek government where these points were considered as the vital ones for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. As Turkish and Greek leaders had gone through the nerve-racking process of negotiations, they did not want to go over this difficult process once more. These were naturally not only the difficulty of modifications but they also believed that if this time no result came out and deadlock resulted, the agreement reached in Zurich would be a lost opportunity for everybody.

The Greek government was specially in an awkward position upon Makarios' insistence on modifications. It was generally believed that under the present military and political situation there could be no better agreement to be accepted by all parties. Thus, the Greek Prime Minister told Makarios if he did not sign the agreements, no further help from Greece could be expected as Greece did what she could. Furthermore, the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd told him as well that if he
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

did not accept the agreement reached by Greece and Turkey, he would be held responsible for the consequences\textsuperscript{68}. Also the Cypriot delegation who were with Makarios, although had some disagreements with certain provisions, they wanted the agreement to be signed\textsuperscript{69}. Actually what the Archbishop was trying to do as he confessed later was to get as much as he could to the benefit of the Greek Cypriots as he knew that at least for the moment there was no other way to settle the Cyprus problem than the one reached. In the end, despite the last minute setback, the documents for the final settlement of the dispute was signed at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959. The Conference were completed with the following statements upon the full agreement with the Cyprus settlement. The below citations of the parties after the signing of the agreements showed their satisfaction with the achieved settlement and their willingness to co-operate for the vitality of the peace in the island.

Mr. Karamanlis said inter alia;

\begin{quote}
It is my deep conviction that the solution we have reached meets in the best possible way the aspirations of the whole population of Cyprus which is now attaining freedom and can, I am sure, look forward to great prosperity\textsuperscript{70}.
\end{quote}

The Foreign Minister of Turkey said inter alia;
Turkey believes that the agreed solution represents an equitable and fair settlement of the Cyprus question. She is convinced that provided it is observed by all, this solution, which takes care of the legitimate interests of all concerned, will open an era of peace, friendship and sincere co-operations between the two communities of the island for the benefit of all our countries and the whole free world to which we are proud to belong[^1].

Archbishop Makarios said inter alia;

Yesterday I had certain reservations. In overcoming them I have done so in a spirit of trust and good-hearted good will towards the Turkish community and its leaders. It is my firm belief that with sincere understanding and mutual confidence we can work together in a way that will leave no room for dissension about any written provisions and guarantees[^2].

Also Prime Minister Macmillan in his report to the House of Commons said;
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

I regard this agreement as a victory for reason and co-operation no party to it suffered defeat it is a victory for all. By removing a source of bitterness and division it will enable us and our allies and the people of Cyprus to concentrate on working together for peace and freedom.

In the end, the agreements ended four years of civil strife, a conflict which took 601 British and Cypriot lives and wounded 1260. It brought many advantages to the parties which were involved in the Cyprus dispute. Firstly, it solved a colonial problem for Britain without an embarrassment. Britain was asked to give up an island—a colony, but a colony which was bringing more problems than benefits to British policymakers. Even the most pro-Empire Tories in the House of Commons welcomed the London-Zurich Agreements as it finished a complicated dispute which took the government's time and money.

Secondly, it ended the impasse in the Western Alliance. NATO's cohesion once more was strengthened as the dispute between three NATO members Britain, Turkey and Greece was resolved. Also the settlement was a great relief for the United States as a leader of the Alliance as it could only urge quiet diplomacy since three NATO allies were involved in the Cyprus dispute.

Both Turkey and Greece had made national sacrifices. Their past ambitions and slogans of the recent past—partition and Enosis not only had been put aside but
were made impossible by the agreements. Although giving up Enosis was a difficult
psychological phenomenon for Greeks, still there was much to gain that it should
make it easy to adopt the new arrangements. As the independent Conservative
newspaper Kathimeriní wrote after the London Agreement "The Cyprus settlement
will not only allow the Cypriots to lay the foundations of a better economic and
cultural future but will also enable Greece to move faster along the road of her own
domestic rehabilitation". Moreover, Cyprus became the second country with Greek
majority after the motherland Greece. Turkey on the other hand, having sacrificed
"Partition or Death" won a place for the Turkish minority in the new Government
structure. In addition, Turkey would serve jointly with Greece and Britain to ensure
Cyprus' territorial integrity and military security, and like Greece, Turkey could
continue to solve her own domestic problems. Finally, the agreements brought
advantages for Cypriots themselves;

1. It brought an end to many centuries of foreign rule in Cyprus.

2. It created an independent country which had all the characteristics of a sovereign
state.

3. It protected some national aspirations of both communities in the island.

Thus, despite some of the reactions both in Greece and Turkey as well as in
Cyprus there were powerful incentives to go on with the London-Zurich Accords.

It had been proposed that the final transfer of power would take place within a
year of the agreement. During that year, a joint constitutional commission was set up
and preparations for the hand over of power to the new Cyprus Republic took place.
Elections for the President and Vice-President took place in December 1959. Dr. Kucuk from the Turkish community was elected as Vice-President, while, Archbishop Makarios from the Greek Community was elected as the President of the Republic. In that year the negotiations on the British Bases occurred between Makarios and British as planned in the London Conference. These negotiations concentrated on two points; the size of the areas to remain under British sovereignty and the undertakings for the protection of their essential requirements\textsuperscript{17}. The results of negotiations came out after hard bargaining between Britain and Makarios; Britain retained a total area of 99 square miles which incorporated two Sovereign bases of Akrotiri and Dheklia. Administration was subject to the control of Air Officer Commanding, Middle East Air Force, RAF. Additionally, bypasses ensured the unbroken communications under British control inside the British Sovereign areas.

The founding of the Republic was delayed by six months because of the difficulties arisen in the preparation of the final draft of the constitution and over the British bases. At the end on 16 August 1960 the transfer of power from Britain to the Republic of Cyprus, formally took place. Cyprus became an independent state and took her place among the other states after centuries of struggle. On the same day, the last Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot left Cyprus for good thus, terminating the remnant of the British colonialism on Cyprus.

All parties concerned hoped that the Zurich-London Agreements between Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two communities of Cyprus would produce the
Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

basis for equilibrium and harmony between the Greek and Turkish communities while preserving the national interests of the three outside powers.

A detailed look into the 1960 Constitution will follow in the next chapter to see whether the new agreement solved the complex political issues to the satisfaction of all the Cypriots. There are important questions to be asked;

1. Would the new political arrangement work?
2. Did both Turkey and Greece refrain themselves from Cyprus and did the desires of partition and Enosis die out both in Cyprus and the motherlands?
3. Could Turkish-Greek animosity on the island be minimised?
4. Could Cyprus develop a unique national identity?

The answers to these questions can show the weaknesses of the 1960 arrangement while teaching us lessons which could be used in a future settlement. An analysis of the events which took place in the period between 1960-1974 can provide the answers to the above questions. This will be presented in the next chapter.
Chapter Four
Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence

REFERENCES


Chapter Four  

Cyprus Political Discord and  
the Tortuous Road to Independence


[22] Ibid, p.68.


Chapter Four  
Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence


[26] Ibid, Chapter 5.


Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence


[38] Ibid.


Chapter Four  
Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence


Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence


[59] Ibid, p.111.


Chapter Four

Cyprus Political Discord and the Tortuous Road to Independence


[71] Ibid, p.5.


SPECIAL NOTE

ITEM SCANNED AS SUPPLIED
PAGINATION IS AS SEEN
I. Major Areas Of Constitutional Tension

The Zurich and London Conferences which were thought to resolve the Cyprus conflict, restore the friendship between the two communities of the island together with Great Britain, Greece and Turkey depended on a political mission which arose out of a set of unique circumstances as explained previously. The aim of the 1960 constitution was to restore the bi-communal character of the state in order to ease the tension between the two ethnic groups in the island Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were struggling to achieve their separate self-determination. Thus, it was not a settlement between "a majority" and "a minority" but rather between "equal parties". In order to achieve this, multiplication of checks, balances and other devices were introduced in the constitution. The power of veto entrusted to the Turkish Cypriots had been the most important power sustaining the equality between the two communities. According to this power, the Turkish Cypriots could challenge the decisions or laws taken by the Greek majority in the parliament, president and the council of ministers. The document reflected the absolute ethnic duality, the bi-communal character of the island. The principle of equally divided responsibility applied in all the spheres of the government. Furthermore, the political rights of the
two communities were guaranteed by the international agreements such as the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and the Establishment as mentioned in the above chapter. This arrangement demanded an extra effort by the parties in order to succeed but as Glafkos Clerides, then the head of the Greek Cypriot delegation in 1960, said "perfection was humanly unachievable but the constitution which had been drafted would greatly contribute to the consolidation of the Cyprus Republic on healthy foundations if applied in a spirit of sincere and honest co-operation\textsuperscript{11}. Hence, it was believed that there was a chance for the workability of the arrived settlement. There was an inherent complexity of the Constitution. But the fundamental question was whether the participants to the settlement wanted it to work. And this will of the parties was put into test shortly after the independence of the Republic.

Accordingly, this chapter will examine the far-reaching implications of a prescribed partnership while focusing in particular upon the willingness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the running of the partnership Republic. However, before examining these, it is essential to review certain key constitutional tension areas during the first years of the partnership.

At the beginning there were some encouraging signs such as the cordial relationship between Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kucuk and co-operation between the governments in Ankara and Athens\textsuperscript{21}. Both Greece and Turkey had the will to co-operate and support the 1960 Accords between the years of 1959 until the early months of 1963. But such co-operation did not last for long either in the motherlands or in the island. The Greek leadership on the part of the Greek Cypriot community
began to raise strong objections to the established legal order as from the beginning they were not satisfied with the arrived settlement in 1960. Their argument depended on the fact that they were the majority of the people of Cyprus and despite this fact they had to share the power equally with a minority, Turkish Cypriots. Having considered the Zurich-London Accords imposed solution they regarded some of the major constitutional provisions as unjust and unworkable. Nevertheless, there was no willingness on the part of the Greek Cypriot community to preserve the constitution which gave the Turkish Cypriots extensive rights. While the Turkish Cypriots demanded the application of the constitution in full. And disagreement on the application of the basic provisions of the constitution resulted in a deadlock. The most important of these issues will be looked at as the failure to resolve them forms the prime factor in the break down of inter-communal government.

The most important of these tension areas was the municipalities issue. This provision was the greatest source of trouble in the 1960 Constitution. According the 1960 Constitution separate Greek and Turkish municipalities would be created in the five largest towns. And the president and the vice-president were to determine the municipal boundaries together and decide on the viability of it after four years. Under the 1960 constitution, Article 188(2) provided for the existing laws to be effective for six more months after the independence of Cyprus on August 16, 1960 in order to give time to the sides to a compromise solution. But Greek Cypriot leaders took a stand against the separation of municipalities as they believed that it was uneconomical and impractical to draw boundaries in certain areas, however the main
reason for such a move was most probably political (e.g. the unwillingness of the division of the island into Greek and Turkish sectors). On the other hand Turkish Cypriots insisted on separate municipalities as provided in Article 173 of the Constitution. Turkish Cypriot leaders feared that their needs would not be met under unified municipal authorities as they needed more facilities as a community than the more prosperous Greek Cypriots. Moreover, vice-president Dr. Kucuk emphasised that the implementation of separate municipalities would not be difficult because of the fact the Turkish Cypriot community in the large cities was already living in separate sectors from the Greeks. Furthermore, the Turkish side insisted that since 1958, the separate municipalities had been running smoothly. So there was no need at the moment to alter the position of the municipalities. The two sides continued inability to agree on a compromise resulted in the continuation of the application of the "Municipalities Law No. 10/1961" eight times between August 1960 and December 1962. However, this none resolution, continued the state of affairs which had existed since 1958 when the municipalities were separated during the communal conflicts. Negotiations continued but failed to reconcile the two opposing views of the parties. Later on in 1962 New Year's Eve, President Makarios issued a decree which was aimed at abolishing the municipal councils and giving their functions to district officers responsible to the central government. In this way the Greek Cypriots who controlled the voting in the Council of Ministers aimed to bring both Greek and Turkish sections of the municipalities under unified control. To this act of, Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots reacted by passing a Bill through the Turkish Communal
Chamber to set up their own municipalities- "Turkish Communal Chamber's Turkish Municipal Corporations Law". Although both Greek and Turkish Cypriot actions on the municipalities were contested in the Supreme Constitutional Court and were found unconstitutional both sides still disregarded the decision. The impartiality of the court during the trial of the issue was also put into question because the Greek judge in the court dissented the decision regarding the action of the Council of Ministers and the Turkish judge did the same on the action by the Turkish Communal Chamber. In this way, the unanimity of the court was lost, and its neutral President Dr. Forsthoff resigned. And this problematic issue could not be solved.

Although Averoff says in his memoirs that "it was the Archbishop himself who had forced us to accept the inclusion of this clause (separate municipalities), in spite of our strong opposition but now he was totally unwilling to put it into effect"[8], the question may be raised as to what was the main motive of action behind Makarios. Most likely it was the old fear of partition. To Greek Cypriots municipal separation was seen as a step toward partition which was detrimental to the Greek aspirations (Enosis). Whereas for Turkish Cypriots non-application of this specific provision was the evasion of their unalienable rights as co-partners which could lead to Enosis.

Another explosive issue arose over the application of the 70:30 ratio in sharing out civil service jobs. According to Article 123 of the Constitution the public service was to be composed of 70 per cent Greeks and 30 per cent of Turks. When the Turkish Cypriots insisted on the speedy implementation of this provision, controversy arose. For Turkish Cypriots 70:30 ratio was an essential provision "to secure adequate
Chapter Five  

Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

representation in all spheres of government activity. Somehow they believed that through the application of this article equity between the communities, in the civil service, could be sustained. On the other hand from Greek point of view this provision was clearly discriminatory as it bore no relation to the true ratio of the Greek and Turkish population of the island (80 per cent Greek Cypriots and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriots). Also Greek Cypriots believed that the constitution was drafted by the outside powers which did not take into consideration the majority will. Despite some efforts of resolution both sides views' stayed unchanged in this area of conflict as well.

The third area of dispute was over the organisation of the Cyprus army. Again according to Article 129 of the constitution the Republic should have an army of two thousand men and its composition was to be 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish Cypriot. But some major questions developed concerning the formation of the army. The problem centred on the issue of whether the Army would be formed on a separate or a mixed basis. Vice-president Kucuk on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots favoured separate units pointing to the fact that integrated contingents would face great difficulties because of the linguistic and religious differences between the Turkish and Greek communities. While Makarios opposed separate units on the basis that it is too expensive to have separate units for the two communities he urged the unification of the of the forces. As a result the Greek Cypriot majority in the Council of Ministers decided on unified contingents. Upon this decision, the Turkish vice-president in mid 1963 used his final veto power according to Article 50 of the Constitution and vetoed the Council of Minister's decision for a completely mixed
army. Afterwards, no effort was made to solve the problem and army deadlock stayed a dormant source of tension between the two communities. However, later President Makarios during a visit to US stated that "Cyprus will not have an army for the sole reason that Cyprus will remain neutral"[11].

The other problematic issue rose out of the separate majority voting rule. In the case of income tax, majority voting rule was used as a retaliation by Turks in respect to income tax legislation as they felt they were not getting the rights granted to them by the Constitution. According to Article 78 (2) of the Constitution "any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a separate simple majority of the Representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish Communities respectively taking part in the vote". From the Greek point of view, this provision denied them the most fundamental element of democracy—majority rule. Nevertheless, for Turkish Cypriots this provision was one of the important constitutional provisions where equal rights of the Turkish community were safeguarded against the majority. The effect of this provision was realised on the tax legislation. When the Republic came into being there was no agreement on a tax law. Furthermore, the inability of the two communities to reach a compromise on a tax legislation resulted in a stalemate. The Greek Cypriot Representatives asked that the maintenance of the income tax be under the control of the central government as otherwise the Republic would have three income tax systems operating at the same time resulting in ineffectiveness and financial burden, while the Turkish Cypriots suggested that the income tax laws should be implemented according to the constitution. As specified by the constitution under paragraph 2 of
Article 88, the Turkish Communal Chamber was to receive £400,000 out of the general revenue of the Republic and the Greek Communal Chamber was to receive £1,600,000. Also the Communal chambers, in order to meet their expenses were empowered by the Constitution to impose personal taxes and fees on their communities (para 1(f) of Article 87 and 88).

In March 1961 the Turkish members of the Parliament used their separate majority right which failed two new tax laws in the House of Representatives. But the main aim of the Turkish Cypriots was to pressure the Greek side for the implementation of 70:30 ratio in the civil service. The result of the continued tax crises resulted in the turn of the both communities to their Communal Chambers in order to fill the gap, especially after President Makarios on the first April 1961 issued a decree to collect taxes and customs which was opposed by the Turkish side, Communal Chambers gained more importance. At the end, the Republic was left without an income law. There was no machinery for the assessment of taxes. In the meantime, the two communities had financed themselves through the taxes collected by their own communal chambers.

Despite all the confrontations Dr. Ernst Forsthoff, the ex-Professor of Heiderberg University and the President of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus publicly stated that the constitution was not by its nature unworkable:

*Every Constitution has its peculiar problems. There is no Constitution in the world which has not got its*
Chapter Five Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

particular problems and difficulties. This is primarily a question of good will. If there is good will a constitution can be implemented and the Constitution of Cyprus is capable of being implemented\[12\].

Yet the differences between the parties in Cyprus on the main provisions of the constitution could not be reconciled even after three years of independence and the Constitution started to look unworkable.

II. The "Thirteen Proposals" And Its Result

As Glafkos Clerides writes in his book "Cyprus: My Deposition", Makarios was determined since his failure at the London Conference to remove the negative aspects (the external guarantees and the rights given to the Turkish Cypriots) of the Zurich Agreements which he signed in order to put an end to colonial rule.

These negative factors for him were the excessive rights given to the minority\[13\]. Upon the rise of difficulties in the implementation of the Constitution the Greek Cypriots came to the conclusion, especially President Makarios, that the constitution was unworkable. With the negative factors of the constitution in the back of his mind, President Makarios and the Greek Cypriots were determined to replace the existing constitutional order with a unitary order under the rule of majority, Greek Cypriots. President Makarios in November 1963 submitted his 13 Proposals in a
memorandum entitled "Suggested Measures to Facilitate the Smooth Functioning of the State and Remove Certain Causes of Inter Communal Friction" with a logic depending on the following conclusions: the constitution of the Republic was sui generis in many respects; its underlying concept of political administrative and constitutional segregation was wrong, its equalisation in political status and power of two communities unequal in size both unjust and impracticable, the un-alterability of its basic articles resulted in the arrest of all constitutional development and the right of outside powers to intervene and prohibit constitutional changes constituted a gross violation of the sovereignty of the Republic\textsuperscript{14}. And the thirteen point plan of Makarios was;

1. The right of veto of the president and the vice-president of the Republic to be abandoned.

2. The vice-president of the Republic to deputise for the president of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

3. The Greek president of the House of Representatives and the Turkish vice-president to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the president by the Greek members of the House and the vice-president by the Turkish members of the House.

4. The vice-president of the House of Representatives to deputise for the president of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

7. The administration of Justice to be united.

8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmarie to be abolished.


10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished[15].

Proposals one and nine were designed to break the deadlock on the army issue; ten to twelve were to by pass the problems over appointments to the civil service number six was to prevent ethnic partition in the towns; the fifth and also one were to annul the Turkish Cypriot veto which had prevented the passage of taxation legislation[16].

The thirteen points aimed at a wholesale revision of the constitution. In December 1963, Turkey rejected these thirteen points[17]. From the Turkish point of view seven revisions (including the vice-president's power to veto, the requirement of separate majorities in the House for passage of important legislation, separate municipalities, a limited security force, 30 per cent representation in the public service
and 40 per cent in the army) proposed by Makarios would have amended "unamendable" basic articles for which the Turks had fought hard at Zurich and London. Dr. Kucuk answered the 13 points proposal in a memorandum stating that the 1960 constitution contained many sui generis provisions, but this had been necessitated by the peculiar nature of the Cyprus...[18]. He also stressed that the experience of the constitutional life of the Republic did not prove that the constitution was unworkable... and that the proposed amendments were "of a sweeping nature... their ulterior intention was to leave the Turks at the absolute mercy of the Greeks"[19]. Thus, the Turks were defending the Constitution saying that it was well framed and any such amendment directed at those parts of the Constitution which recognise the existence of the Turkish community as a community in Cyprus would be the end of partnership. Under the light of these circumstances the 13 proposal scheme was unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand Greek Cypriots regarded as necessary of the revisions and the establishment of an independent unitary and integral form with all legislative power vested in a parliament elected by universal suffrage on a common electoral roll, the executive power vested in a council of ministers responsible to parliament and the judicial power vested in completely unified and independent judicial organs[20]. Thus, the Archbishop and the Greek Cypriots, despite the disagreements with the Turks over the 13 proposals, continued with the scheme. Finally, the constitutional difficulties and the inability of the leadership of the two communities to promote any genuine basis for co-operation brought the island into a civil war once again. On the 21 December 1963 the first fighting started between the
two communities in the island although accounts of the confrontation differ between the two Cypriot communities. Both sides, frustrated by the constitutional controversy and mistrust and suspicion of each other, paved the way for physical confrontation. It is known that there was some military preparation on both sides prior to the start of fighting. Both officers of Greek and Turkish contingents based in Cyprus, had secretly trained a number of their respective community men\(^\text{[21]}\).

According to some evidence the clandestine recruiting, training and organising of the Greek Cypriot secret army began as early as 1961\(^\text{[22]}\) and by December 1963, there were up to 10000 Greek Cypriots who had been under arms. On the other hand, according to Greek Intelligence there were 2500 Turkish Cypriots who were partly armed and trained\(^\text{[23]}\). The period from 21 December to 10 August 1964 was the most violent phase of the Cypriot conflict. And with the outbreak of fighting in the island in December 1963 the inter-communal government broke down completely.

During this period the government became de facto a Greek Cypriot organisation as most Turkish Cypriots were either not able or not willing to go to work in Greek Cypriot sectors because of the fear of being killed. Hence, with the continued fighting new de facto geopolitical fields started to evolve within Cyprus. Physical separation resulted in two governments operating in the island. On February the 3rd 1964, the Greek Cypriot controlled House of Representatives gave a vote of confidence to the Makarios government;

\textit{It [the House] expresses its full support to the Government of Republic, for its policy during the crisis, which is}
Chapter Five  
Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

directed to secure a unitary, independent and democratic state without any interference from outside forces\textsuperscript{[24]}

As a retaliation by the spring of 1964 a "General Committee" headed by the vice-president Kucuk was reorganised to administer the Turkish Cypriot Community. Later on December 28 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership formalised its de facto rule over Turkish zones through the setting up a "transitional administration" over all Turks living in areas where Turkish Cypriot authorities exercise their jurisdiction.

In conclusion, with the thirteen proposals of Makarios the established order of the Republic started to disintegrate. And new realities began to develop such as the existence of two distinct administrations on the island.

III. The Involvement Of External Parties And Search For A Resolution

The most important development in this period was the pull into the island of the motherlands Greece and Turkey once more. However, at the initial phases of the Republic, both motherlands showed their goodwill to abide by the agreements reached. Turkey's policy in Cyprus after independence was based on supporting the status quo. Although the acceptance of the Agreements were prone to prove difficulties because of the desire for Enosis in Greece support for the Accords were maintained in Greece as well. As Karamanlis advised Makarios in the London
meeting in February 1959, which was convened to ratify the Accords, "Father, take the agreements into thy hands and work patiently upon them. We shall all help" show that there was willingness at the beginning to make the partnership work. Even when Archbishop informed Greece about the changes to the Agreements Karamanlis government reported that they would honour the agreements and would not give their backing to such a move. Moreover, the Greek Foreign Minister Averoff warned Makarios in a letter... "we are determined to dissociate ourselves publicly from your policy if any move should be made towards unilateral denunciation of the Agreements or any part thereof"[25]. Unfortunately, the phase of events both in Cyprus and the motherlands changed this positive attitude.

First of all, even before the fighting began there were provocative statements made as early as September the 4th 1962 by the President of the Republic Makarios affecting the emotions of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the opposite ways. Makarios was saying:

Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun by the EOKA heroes... the struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we achieve our goal[26].

Advocation of Enosis in such an open way by the Greek Cypriot Leaders were raising the suspicion and fear of the Turkish Cypriots as to their real intention. Also, it
was strengthening their belief in partition. Greek Cypriots' demand for change (Enosis) gained more support when the eight year reign of Karamanlis came to an end on 11 June 1963 in Greece. It was not that Karamanlis had given up his hope of regarding Enosis when inter-communal partnership was established in Cyprus. But he was more realistic in his approach to Enosis as he visualised the danger of Turkish factor in the island. As Woodhouse stated:

*His (Karamanlis') advice had been that Makarios should seek to assuage the suspicions of the Turks, to co-ordinate his policy with the Greek government, and to join NATO as an independent state. Thus, the Greek nation would have two voices in all international bodies... and if Makarios would follow his advice, they should easily arrive one day at Enosis*[^27^]

But the new government in Athens which came to power on February the 16th 1964 led by George Papandreou reversed Karamanlis' cautious policy. The Greek government supported the Greek Cypriot bid for Enosis and promised the Greek help in case of a Turkish intervention[^28^]. On 27 October 1964, in Salonica, George Papandreou stated:

*Cyprus must become the springboard for the dreams of Alexander the Great in the Orient*[^29^]
Therefore, by 1963-64 the Greece was becoming openly involved with the Cypriot problem.

However, the Turkish Cypriots, after their heavy physical losses in the fighting had to turn to Turkey for help. Turkey on the other hand felt under a moral responsibility towards her fellow community in the island. On Christmas Day a "warning flight" of Turkish jet fighters was above Cyprus to stop the killings of Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots (EOKA). In all these developments the two communities tended to look to their respective mother countries for support in solving their problems and this would bring the two countries to the brink of war several times.

Unexpected events continued to take place in the island: on January 1 1964 Makarios announced that he had abrogated the treaties with Greece, Turkey and Britain. Later only after pressure by Duncan Sandys, the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Makarios had to change his words into a desire of abrogation with appropriate means in order not to provoke Turkey for intervention using her unilateral rights into the island to protect Turkish Cypriots. With all these changes going on there was an urgent need for the parties to meet and resolve the issues which formed the cause of conflict. The first attempt was the London Conference which started on January the 15th 1964. Although Makarios wanted to take the issue directly to the United Nations, rather than to discuss it with Turkey, he had to agree to attend the Conference under strong pressure from the Greek Ambassador. The reason for Makarios' demand for referring the Cyprus issue to the United Nations was the
possibility of obtaining a resolution for his cause Enosis under the name of "unfettered independence". When on January 15, 1964 the planned conference was held by Britain to bring the sides in the hope of finding a peace it became apparent that the two sides had completely opposing views for a resolution. While the Greek side insisted on a democratic constitution in accordance with the all accepted democratic principles where all citizens shall have equal political rights and the government be controlled by the will of the majority of its citizens, the Turkish side started to insist on physical separation of the two communities. The Turkish side proposed the conversion of Cyprus into a federal state with a Turkish administered canton into which the Turkish Cypriots would be concentrated. Partition and double Enosis was the Turkish Cypriot's second choice. These proposals were contrary to the Greek Cypriot proposal which was the demand for a united state which incorporates some minority rights and insisted on the fact that such rights would not be guaranteed by external intervention. Therefore, the conference ended in deadlock as both sides showed no flexibility for a compromise. Another factor which made it more difficult for the sides to reach an agreement was the support given by both Greece and Turkey to their respective communities during the Conference. In the meantime fighting in the island increased which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war as Turkey threatened of intervention unless the fighting was stopped. The possibility of the Cyprus conflict escalating to the point of direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey pulled the United States into the Cyprus dilemma. Till 1960's the United States was hardly involved with the Cyprus problem. The American government was interested in
Cyprus because the three guarantor powers of the London Accords are members of Nato. Thus, any potential hostilities between its members are a concern to Nato and America as the political leader of the organisation. The close relations of Makarios government with the non-aligned countries and with the Soviet Union also was a concern to America. It was believed that Soviet Union could exploit the situation in the island and acquire a foothold there making Cyprus, the "Mediterranean Cuba". Therefore, despite the wishes of the Johnson administration to remain uninvolved, developments between the two antagonistic nationalities Greek and Turk pulled America into the Cyprus tangle\[^{32}\]. To put it briefly, Nato had two interests in the Cyprus dispute. First of all, the Alliance was concerned to prevent an armed conflict between two of its allies Greece and Turkey so that a degree of co-operation between them was maintained. Secondly, Nato had a direct interest in the security of Cyprus itself as the British bases which have a strategic power for Nato are placed in the island\[^{33}\]. The crisis which brought American intervention was in November 1963 after the Makarios's 13 proposals. On December 26, 1963 President Johnson sent a joint letter to President Makarios and Vice-President Kucuk expressing the American willingness to assist the search for a peaceful solution\[^{34}\]. The reason for this direct involvement came when Britain wanted to refrain from peace keeping in the island. Since the outbreak of the hostilities it was 2700 British troops which acted as the peace keeping force in the island\[^{35}\] because no three party truce patrols could be established among Greece, Turkey and British after the outbreak of hostilities. But these forces having been unable to keep the warring parties apart, British proposed a
larger Nato force with the backing of the United States. This was the start of American involvement in trying to find a solution to the problem. But dealing with this problem it was a very delicate matter as United States had to be careful not to alienate either Greece nor Turkey. Although both Greece and Turkey gave their approval on February 4 1964, to the Anglo- American proposal, President Makarios' Government officially rejected the Anglo-American proposal. At this point the main task for the United States was to keep the Cyprus issue out of UN. According to Americans referral of the problem to UN would give a chance to Soviet voices. And the other disadvantage of the referral to UN was the slow working pace of the organisation which could give time to an open warfare between Greece and Turkey. However, despite this American will, events forced Britain to take the issue to the UN Security Council. In this way as Makarios desired the Cyprus problem to come on the UN agenda, and the Council agreed on March the 4th, 1964 to authorise a United Nations peacekeeping force (i.e UNFICYP) and a political mediator for Cyprus. The task of the mandate was to prevent a recurrence of fighting, to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of law and order and thus to facilitate a return to normal conditions. Anyhow, the inter-communal violence continued. The Cyprus Government continued importing large amounts of Russian and Czechoslovakian arms which convinced Turkey that only its own intervention could ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriots in the island. On the other hand on April 13 Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece announced a campaign for self-determination for Cyprus which would mean turning the island over to the Greek Cypriots. As the situation in
the island became grave Turkey once more threatened military action on 6 June 1964 because it felt bound by political and moral obligations to assist the Turkish community against the continued heavy bloodshed taking place in the Turkish villages. However, Turkey after notifying the United States of her intentions, was prevented from taking such action. Because on June the 5th President Johnson in a sharp note to President Inonu of Turkey indicated that a Turkish invasion of Cyprus would lead to war with Greece and possible Soviet Union involvement in the crisis, and continued;

I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies... The United States cannot agree to the use of any United State supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.[49].

As a reply President Inonu wrote to Johnson " We have upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Alliance"[40]. The Johnson letter had a negative impact in Turkey as Turkish leaders found it offensive. Despite the setback in the relations between Turkey and US, America continued the mediation efforts. After the 1964 crisis
Johnson met with both Premier Inonu and Premier Papandreou. Although the Johnson Administration's main aim was to persuade the Greek Cypriots to accept the role of NATO as mediator they declined to abandon the UN framework. So US efforts resulted in talks between Greek and Turkish representatives under the aegis of the UN Mediator with the participation of Dean Acheson. Acheson was the former American Secretary of State who was a legendary figure in Greece and Turkey. Therefore, Dean Acheson proposed a plan which he believed would reconcile the demands of all concerned parties. The key provisions of the Acheson plan was as follows:

1. Cyprus to be united with Greece in return for a 30 to 50 year lease of a military base to Turkey in the Karpass peninsula. The Turks would have sovereignty over the base.

2. The island would be divided into a number of districts two or three of which would have a Turkish majority and would be under Turkish administration. Castellorizon, a small island on the Aegean was also to be ceded to Turkey in exchange for Enosis.

3. A joint military command for Greece and Turkey would be set up.

4. Compensation would be paid to all Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island.

Both The Turkish and Greek governments accepted the plan at the beginning as a base for negotiation. Makarios however did not accept it and declared that he would seek self-determination with the backing of the non-aligned nations at the United Nations. In the United Nations, Makarios was using the term
Chapter Five

Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

self-determination or independence as it would be impossible to get support from the non-aligned countries and newly independent countries because the use of the term "Enosis" would be considered as annexation of a country by another stronger country. As early as 1964 then there was a divergence in the policies to be followed for the Enosis between Greece and Greek Cypriots. Makarios was always cautious about the governments in Greece because of the fear that Greece with the pressure from the Western allies and Turkey could settle the problem for less than the island's total Enosis with Greece. Thus, even though Greece was eager to accept the Acheson Plan for negotiations at the beginning, as Papandreou was quoted saying to his colleagues that "We are being offered an apartment building and subletting only one penthouse to our neighbours Turks", Greece could not proceed further without the approval of Makarios. Meanwhile Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot's policies were identical. Anyhow, with the start of the fighting in the island again, the most critical since December 1963, the spirit of compromise by the all parties was lost. In this way another American attempt failed.

At this point, it will be useful to look at the Soviet policy towards Cyprus. The main attempt of the Soviet Union was to exploit the unrest in Cyprus throughout the post World War II era. There had been some shifts in their tactics but their general strategic objectives remained constant vis a vis Cyprus and these were:

1. Exploit the dissension connected with the Cyprus issue in order to supplement other moves in their long-range campaign to intensify divisions within the NATO alliance,
2. Ensure the removal of all vestiges of British influence on the island, including the abrogation of UK military base and overflight rights, and

3. Keep alive the unrest and political instability in Cyprus thereby at least partially diverting the attention of the leaders of the US, UK, Greece and Turkey from other problems.\(^{[44]}\)

First in the 1960s, under the influence of above objectives, Soviet government's policy aimed at encouraging and supporting Cypriot independence in order to enlarge its influence and to diminish that of the other powers with interest in the conflict. In that manner Moscow supported the continued independence of Cyprus and expressed its opposition to both Enosis and partition. Therefore, the Soviet Union gave diplomatic support to the Greek Cypriots who seemed following a non-aligned policy with a demand for independence. Makarios' aim on the other hand was to use the Soviet support against the West and in the meantime to achieve his main aspiration for Cyprus (Enosis). Nevertheless, this tactical phase of the Soviets did not last long. By 1965 Soviet Union was talking about "two communities on Cyprus as having sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal rights."\(^{[45]}\) Moreover, the Kremlin was speaking of the election of a federated government by all the Cypriots. This had been the Turkish Cypriot argument in the island which was supported by Turkey. There had been two important factors for the change of tactics of the Soviet Union. First factor was the Cyprus Government's appeal to Greece for troops to defend Cyprus. Greek troops started to be sent to Cyprus under the command of Grivas who were anti-Soviet and fervent supporter of Enosis. The reason for such a move was
explained by Andreas Papandreou in his book "Democracy at Gunpoint" as follows; It was considered that Cyprus is far from Greece which meant that Greece's undertaking to assist Cyprus would not mean much in the event of Turkey's landing troops on Cyprus... only if such contribution were to be realised before the Turks launched an attack\textsuperscript{46}. Grivas was then in the charge of twenty five thousand Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen and fifteen thousand Greek troops from Greece on Cyprus.

Secondly, Turkish-Soviet rapprochement after the Johnson letter: Turkey was beginning to believe that the West was more sympathetic to the cause of Hellenism than to the suffering of the Turkish Cypriot Community and to Turkey's interest in the area. Prime Minister Inonu's belief was that Turkey's dependence on the West was costing her bargaining power over Cyprus. Hence, to improve relations with the Soviets and the Islamic Middle Eastern countries would be in favour of Turkish interests. Although the Soviets, as mentioned earlier, were against both Enosis and partition, under the ongoing developments the only way to ensure the instability was the change of policy in favour of Turkey. So change of circumstances affected the relations between Turkey and Soviets in a positive way.

By mid 1960s, not only Greece and Turkey were involved with the Cyprus dispute but United States and Soviet Union as well (as a result of the Cold War considerations). On the other hand diplomatic manoeuvring of the UN was continuing. Senior Galo Plaza Lasso, ex-President of Ecuador who succeeded Tuomioja as the new mediator of the UN, submitted his Report to the
Secretary-General on 26 March 1965. The report was intended to serve as the basis for a new solution. And its main points were;

1. The problem of Cyprus could not be solved by attempting to restore the situation which existed before December 1963, but that a new solution had to be found.

2. Cyprus should remain an independent state, renouncing its right to unite with Greece as long as the risk of opposition from the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey persisted. The report stressed that if Cyprus should become fully independent by being freed from the 1960 treaty obligations it would automatically acquire at the same time the right of self-determination.

3. The island should be demilitarised.

4. There should be "no partition or physical separation of the communities". Turkish Cypriots wished to be physically separated from the Greek community but establishment of a federal regime required a territorial basis which did not exist. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriot rights should be guaranteed by the UN and supervised by a UN commissioner in Cyprus.

5. A settlement should depend in the first place on agreement between the people of Cyprus themselves and talks should take place between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

6. The solution should be consistent with the provisions and principles of the UN Charter.[47]

Dr. Plaza's report was accepted by Greece and the Makarios Administration as a basis for negotiations although there was no sign that they would renounce Enosis as suggested in the Plaza Report.[48] On the other hand, the Plaza Report was
unacceptable to both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. From the Turkish point of view the report failed to reassure the Turkish rights and it left the door open for Enosis. Thus, the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the report on the grounds that the Mediator had exceeded the terms of his mandate, to promote an agreed settlement by setting out his personal observations and recommendations without first securing the agreement of all parties to the dispute[40]. After the Plaza Report, the United Nation's mediation came to an end and Galo Plaza resigned on December 22. But on 18 December 1965, the Makarios government secured the adoption of a United Nation General Assembly resolution (by 47 votes against 5 and with 54 abstentions; Britain and Russia were also abstained.) which supported its claim for the unfettered independence of Cyprus calling upon "all states in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations... to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus"[50].

From the Greek Cypriot angle, the international acceptance of unfettered Cypriot sovereignty meant the most effective means of preventing a Turkish intervention. Despite the fact that this resolution was considered by the Greek Cypriots as a success, it was weakened in a way as both Britain and Russia abstained and the United States voted against it.

Following the adoption of the UN resolution Turkey and Turkish Cypriots launched their own diplomatic offensive. These were their increased emphasis on their
important role in NATO, and more efforts to convince the non-aligned governments that the Greek and Greek Cypriot aim was not to ensure the independence of Cyprus but rather to foster the expansion of Hellenism\textsuperscript{[51]}. After Turkey's diplomatic offensive by June 1966 seven of those states which had voted for the Cyprus Resolution in the UN in 1965 made declarations against interpreting their vote as supporting Enosis. Meanwhile, Turkey was pressuring Greece for bilateral talks for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute. At the time there was a political instability in Greece which occurred in July 1965 when the government of Prime Minister George Papandreou was forced to resign. And caretaker governments were not able to enter into negotiations. The prospect of the talks were worsened also by the deteriorating situation on the island as well.

However, in the island, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots adhered to their Enosis and partition respectively as desired solutions to their problems. Apart from the violence continuing in the mid-1960s there were other developments taking place in the island worsening the situation. First of all, the conflict within the Greek Cypriot community -between Makarios and Grivas and between the Cyprus Government and the Greek Government took a more active form. Official Greek Cypriot and Makarios's way of achieving Enosis still followed the same path as before and it was as follows;

1. The ideal of Enosis is proclaimed to be the fundamental principle which guides the aspirations and long-term policies of Greek Cypriots.
2. The difficulty in the way of Enosis is the possible intervention of Turkey and a war between Greece and Turkey would lead to the partition of the island which is unacceptable.

3. As long as Enosis is not feasible the duty of the Greeks is to keep Cyprus an independent and undivided Greek dominated—meaning that Turkish minority must not be allowed to control either the functions of the state or territory.[52]

Thus, the Makariosist nationalist stand specially with the realisation of the Turkish threat depended more on political manoeuvres and economic sanctions rather than on an open warfare. On the other hand Grivas' nationalist stand depended on armed force. He believed that Greek nationalist feeling of Makarios was not genuine and that he should be removed. According to him Enosis could be achieved by military means immediately. Grivas was controlling the National Guard (formed mainly by the Greek troops from Greece) which was not responsible to either Greek or Cypriot Governments. However, Greece during these years favoured political means as well. In May 1965, when Makarios wanted to proclaim unilaterally Cyprus union with Greece if Athens pledged to support him, even then Papandreou recommended to Makarios that the best way to settle the Cyprus issue was through diplomatic ways, and he said;

1. To achieve Enosis a price would have to be paid in exchange to Turkey

2. If the price demanded by Turkey was too high Enosis
should be postponed and new constitutional agreements
for an independent Cyprus should be sought[53].

Under the developments mentioned above, the Greek Cypriot leadership started to apply economic sanctions against the Turkish Cypriots during the period of 1964-1967. The aim of these sanctions was to break the resistance of the Turkish Cypriots against the Greek majority. These sanctions included not only the blockade of vital economic needs (i.e. medicine, clothes, building materials etc.) to the Turkish sector but also freedom of movement was restricted together with the suspension of the payments to the Turkish Cypriot civil servants. After 1964, these sanctions started to impoverish the Turkish community as expected. Although from time to time either as a response to UNFICYP or to Turkish agreements (i.e as a response to allow Greek Cypriot traffic to pass along the Kyrenia-Nicosia highway) the blockade was eased it continued till 1974 on and off. Let us look at the consequences of this policy.

First of all, under these sanctions half of the Turkish Cypriot population lived on assistance which is confirmed by the UN[54]. On the other hand, by 1968 the Turkish government became the dominant economic supplier of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish government was supplying the Turkish Cypriot economy by £8,000,000 per annum[55]. Contrarily to Makarios' intentions Turkish Cypriots were drawn closer to Turkey as their motherland which gave them support and prevented the disappearance of their resistance. The other development was the Greek Army's coup which took place in Athens on 21 April 1967. But Turkey had the hope of solving the Cyprus problem
with this new regime because they thought that to do a deal with a regime that
controlled the press and opposition was much easier than democratic regimes as they
are more prone to the influences from the public. Thus, they were one of the first
governments to recognise the Junta as the new government in Greece. Nevertheless,
the Greek Junta also, had the will to make a deal with Turkey to facilitate Enosis with
minimal concessions. However, their willingness to bargain with the Turks showed
that the kind of Enosis which Makarios sought to achieve, which depended on
self-determination, was different from the Colonels' Enosis, and without Makarios'
acceptance a deal was very difficult. Accordingly the Greek-Turk dialogue took place
in September 1967. The Greek side offered concessions (a Turkish military base in
Cyprus) which the Turkish side rejected as insufficient. The package which was
worked on during the meeting was much like Mr. Acheson's scheme\textsuperscript{56}. Once more
hopes of settlement were shattered.

After the collapse of the talks, an unexpected crisis in the island almost
brought the Turkish intervention into being. On November the 15th 1967 fighting
broke out. According to United Nations Secretary General's reports\textsuperscript{57}, the heavily
armed Nationalist Guard, under the command of General Grivas attacked the Turkish
Cypriot enclaves in Bogazici and Gecitkale in order to permit the Greek Cypriot
police patrol without the Turkish Cypriots agreement. This was the largest offensive
carried out by the Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots since 1964. Considering
this attack on the Turkish Cypriots as offending national honour, the Turkish
Parliament gave the government special powers to deal with the situation and an
ultimatum was delivered to the Greek government. President Sunay stated that "we decided to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all" which gave the signs that Ankara decided to settle the problem by partition. In a formal note to the Greek government, Turkey demanded:

1. The removal of the Greek soldiers on the island who were in violation of the Treaty of Alliance.

2. The deportation of General Grivas from Cyprus.

3. The disarming of all Greek Cypriot irregulars and the National Guard.

4. Disengagement in the area where the fighting took place.

5. Authorisation for Turkish Cypriots to form their own local governments and police forces in their enclaves.

6. Compensation to Turkish Cypriots for losses resulting from the attacks.


8. The initiation of inter-communal talks on the constitutional structure of Cyprus.

At the same time, UN Secretary General U-Thant reported "Greece and Turkey are now on the brink of war". Johnson Administration, under the pressure of Turkey's military action and potential war between two NATO allies, dispatched the Under-Secretary of Defence Cyrus Vance to the area to diffuse the crisis. Greece was in a disadvantaged position: firstly, there was a two to one superiority of Turkish Armed Forces over those of Greece; secondly, the Great Powers (US, UK etc.) were not prepared to send their troops to stop Turkey, and lastly, the crisis started by a
premeditated Greek attack and an excessive number of Greek troops were in the island in violation of the Treaty of Alliance. Thus, at the end with the help of the Vance mission, the Greek government decided to accede to the significant demands of Ankara and Turkey halted its invasion preparations. General Grivas was flown to Athens, the Greek soldiers started leaving Cyprus. By the end of 1967 The Greek forces were out of the island. Although Makarios maintained his refusal to recognise the de jure existence of any Turk-Cypriot Government or police force, he was eager to undertake inter-communal negotiations on the constitutional structure of the Republic. In this way a military disaster was averted between Greece and Turkey. The incident of 1967 also resulted in the reassessment of the Enosis goal by the Makarios government. The Cyprus government's policy change was announced by President Makarios on 12 January 1968 as follows;

\[ A \text{ solution, by necessity, must be sought within the } \]
\[ \text{limits of what is feasible which does not always } \]
\[ \text{coincide with the limits of what is desirable}^{[61]} . \]

The desirable solution for both Greek Cypriots and Makarios was still Enosis but the feasible one was a unitary Cypriot state under general Cypriot control\(^{[62]} \). His re-election with a 95 per cent vote in his favour on 25 February 1968 marked the acceptance of this policy. As Nancy Crawshaw says "The Gecitkale crisis was a turning-point in the island's post colonial history"\(^{[63]} \). First of all, there was a significant
disengagement by the both motherlands Greece and Turkey from the affairs of the island. Also both communities had their own incentives to reach a negotiated settlement.

IV. Last Attempt To Search For A Constitution

Having been agreed by the two sides that Enosis or any solution based on the geographical separation of the communities (i.e partition or federation) could not form the basis of negotiations, formal negotiations were initiated on June the 24th 1968 by Denktas and Clerides. Between the years 1968 and 1974 the inter-communal talks compromised four phases. In the first phase which lasted between 24 June 1968 to July 1968, broad areas of agreement and disagreement were noted but no proposals were submitted. During the second phase of talks, from 29 August 1968 to mid 1969, the two negotiators exchanged concrete proposals on the executive, the police, the legislature, the administration of justice and local government.

The views and proposals of the Greek side were as follow; On the executive the Greek Cypriot proposals emphasised the presidential character of the regime to be set up. The President of the Republic was to be the head of state and all executive power was to be exercised by him through a Council of Ministers and omitted all reference to a Turkish Vice-President. The President would have the right to return a law or decision to the House of Representatives for reconsideration and on such
consideration he would promulgate the law or decision. However he was to have no right of any veto.

On the legislature, Mr. Clerides' proposals provided for a House of Representatives consisting of 60 members of whom 48 would be Greek Cypriots and 12 Turkish Cypriots elected on a basis of common electoral rolls. The House would have a President and two Vice-Presidents, one of the Vice-Presidents to be necessarily a Turkish Cypriot and all to be chosen from amongst the Representatives by majority vote. A two-thirds majority would be required for amendment of constitutional provisions except those conferring specific rights on the Turkish Cypriots in which case a specified number of votes from among the Turkish members would be necessary.

On the judiciary, Mr. Clerides proposed that Justice should be administered on judicial and not on ethnic criteria. The President and other judges of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the President of the Republic out of a panel prepared by the Supreme Council of Judiciary. Matters like appointments, promotion, transfer and disciplinary control over judges of inferior courts would be entrusted to this body. The individual recourse to the European Commission of Human Rights under 25 of the European Convention was recognised.

As to the police, a unitary force was suggested in which the Turkish Cypriots would be represented in proportion to their population.

The Turkish Cypriots' proposals can be summarised as follows;
On the legislative the Turkish side accepted that its participation might be brought down to 20 per cent of the total number of representatives but the number of Turkish Representatives should not be less than 15. The House should not be allowed to legislate on matters specially reserved in the Constitution, autonomy being one of them. Greek proposals concerning common electoral rolls could not be accepted.

On the executive, according to the Turkish proposal, the office of the Vice-President must be retained, but they consented to reduce the veto power of the Vice-President. In the area of Administration of Justice, Turkish and Greek Cypriots should have the constitutional right to have their case tried by a judge of their own language in matters more directly related to Turkish or Greek Cypriot interests. The proportion of Greek and Turkish members of the Supreme Court should not be below three and two respectively unless agreement was reached on the establishment of local administration courts.

On the whole the Turkish side was willing to reduce its participation in a central government, its civil service, police and armed forces to a level equal to the ethnic ratio (approximately 20 per cent). In addition, it was prepared to give up its formerly held veto powers in the House of Representatives, the Council of Ministers and the Public Service Commission. But in return, given the fundamental importance of security of Local Government to the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish side demanded:

1. Local government districts which would be autonomous, with such autonomy so written into a constitution that it could not be altered by the central government where Greek Cypriots would be in a majority.
Chapter Five  Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

2. The boundaries of the autonomous districts would be drawn primarily according to communal considerations.

3. These districts, depending on their ethnic character, would be directly responsible either to a Greek Cypriot or to a Turk Cypriot co-ordinating authority.

4. These co-ordinating authorities would in partnership form the basis of the central government.

The Greek side having regarded the local government which Turkish side visualised as an attempt at either a federal or cantonal system, an important disagreement arose between the interlocutors and the second phase of the inter-communal talks ended.

In the third phase of the talks which started in August 1969 and ended in 1971 other complications came about. Although on 30 November 1970 the Greek side's package deal modified some of their position with regard to the composition of the House Representatives (by accepting that the House could be composed of 60 Greek and 15 Turkish members elected on separate electoral rolls) and the communal grouping of villages, the Turkish side did not find it adequate. The Turkish side proposed the retention of the office of Vice-President of the Republic and his duties and powers as prescribed by the agreements with the exception of the veto power and the re-establishment of two communal chambers as separate legislative assemblies in charge of communal matters. The powers, duties and jurisdiction of the local authorities should be embodied in the constitution. These should be central authorities
or co-ordinating bodies for local government; they should be under the district officer\(^65\).

After the various exchanges (during the 1971) there were some points of agreement as to the village level of local government, courts, on legislative branch, numbers in the civil service and police. Even though there were some agreements it was not a complete one and the most important controversy continued in the area of local government. The Turkish Cypriot proposals were based on the complete mistrust of Greek Cypriot motives, on bitter memories of the events which occurred between 1963 and November 1967. Their fears were rekindled through the Greek Cypriots' continued backing of Enosis even during the talks. National Front extremists were intensifying their activities and political agitation within the Greek Cypriot community. Even Makarios who was considered by the Turkish Cypriots as moderate, compared to the National Front extremists, was saying on 14 March 1971:

*Cyprus is a Greek island. It was Greek from the dawn of history and it shall remain Greek forever. We have taken it over as a wholly Greek island and we shall preserve it as an undivided Greek island, until we hand it over to mother Greece*\(^66\).
Despite the fact that Denktas protested and asked for assurances that the Greek Cypriot side would agree to exclude Enosis as a future form of settlement the Greek Cypriot leaders could not close the doors to Enosis.

The other negative factor of the talks was the question of external guarantees. However, while the talks on local autonomy took place the question of external guarantees was left out. The reason for that was the Greek Cypriots were not willing to bind themselves with any form of guarantees till a final settlement was concluded. Yet it was a known fact that Greek Cypriot side argued for the removal of external guarantees because they considered external guarantees (especially the Turkish guarantee) as a threat to the very establishment of the state and its future destiny. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots viewed Turkey's guarantee as essential for their security as according to Turkish point of view it was one of the ways (apart from a local government) to prevent Enosis. Divergence of views on this issue, although not formally discussed, brought the end of the third phase of the talks.

During this time, Prime Minister Demirel in Turkey was replaced by Mr. Erim whose attitude towards Cyprus was less conciliatory than Demirel. This attitude of Turkey had an impact on the Turkish Cypriots in such a way as to harden their negotiation position. Contrarily, the Greek regime under Papadopoulos was making more conciliatory statements at the time as the Junta regime tried to improve their relations with Turkey. It was recorded that Papadopoulos even wrote to Makarios dated June 18 1971;
offer the Turkish Cypriots a "ministry of local government"
since this was virtually all that Denktas wanted.
Papadopoulus added that, far from weakening the fabric
of the Republic, the presence of such a minister in the
Cabinet would emphasise the unity of the state\textsuperscript{[67]}. 

Thus, Greece was more conciliatory because of her own security interests but
Makarios insisted on his plans. So by 1971 relations between the Makarios
government and the Greek regime were at their lowest ebb.

At this point a final observation on the 1968-1971 negotiations, which ended
in a deadlock, will be useful. Local government emerged as the most crucial issue of
the discussions and an accord on local government looked as if it would solve the
Cyprus problem but it proved to be the most difficult task.

After a stalemate, upon assuming the office secretary-general of the UN in
January 1972, Dr. Kurt Waldheim renewed the efforts for the activation of the talks.
Therefore, the last phase of the inter-communal talks started on June 8 1972 by
Messrs Clerides and Denktas, the Secretary General's Special Representative in
Cyprus Mr. Tafall and additionally the Greek and Turkish Constitutional experts from
the motherlands. Till the interruption of the talks by the coup of July the 15th 1974,
differences on the executive and the Judiciary were narrowed, and there was an
agreement reached on the legislature in the previous phase of the talks. In this last
phase of the talks, the thorny question was once again the local Government issue. It
was agreed that a kind of local government should be recognised in exchange for Turkish concessions in the area of central government but how much autonomy was to be granted, how the Regional Government was to be structured and what, if any, were to be the central governmental controls on the exercise and discharge of local functions were the main questions to be dealt with for an agreement on Local government issue\textsuperscript{[68]} Many documents and formulae were exchanged between the two sides on these issues yet there was not complete agreement but somehow there was a hope that a kind of "near agreement" might emerge. Such a "near agreement" was confirmed by Clerides. The following is an extract from a speech by Mr. Clerides as reported in the Cyprus Mail on 8 August 1976;

\textit{The former Greek Cypriot negotiator, Mr. Clerides has given details of what he called "a near agreement" during the inter-communal talks in 1971-1972 which the Greek Cypriot council of Ministers did not approve. He himself had recommended acceptance of the agreement he had then reached with Mr. Denktas but the Council did not take the same view\textsuperscript{[69]}.

However, from the above statement it can be concluded that there was no willingness on the Greek Cypriot side to offer concessions to the Turkish Cypriots on
Chapter Five  Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

the local government. As well as no concessions, pro-Enosis propaganda continued. Makarios as late as February 1973 was saying:

I have struggled for union of Cyprus with Greece, and

Enosis will always be my deep national aspiration as it

is the aspiration of all Greek Cypriots[70]

At the same period the internal political troubles of the Greek Community was getting worse. In 1971, Grivas who had left Cyprus in 1967 compulsory upon the deal between Turkey and Greece, returned to Cyprus. Grivas, who was the leader of EOKA-B, after his return to Cyprus was backed by Greece against the more independent minded Makarios. As mentioned earlier both men, Makarios and Grivas had the same aspirations but believed in different tactics. In November 1973 the Greek Junta, under the leadership of Papadopoulos, was replaced by the hard-liners led by security chief Ionnidis. The main reason for this coup in Ionnidis words was that "Papadopoulos failed to realise the goals of the April 21, 1967 Revolution"[71]. Also the new Junta was more determined to finalise the Cyprus issue on the basis of double Enosis, if necessary, as soon as possible. Because Makarios was considered as the main obstacle in reaching an agreement, the new Junta was also determined to remove Makarios from power.

Some political changes took place also in Turkey at the same time. In October 1973 Bulent Ecevit's "left of centre" Republican People's Party emerged as the winner
in Turkey's elections and a two party coalition government with the National Salvation Party was established. By 1974 the Ecevit government was becoming more in favour of federation. As one of Ecevit's principal foreign policy advisors wrote, in Cyprus the Ecevit government sought not sharing of land but a sharing of government duties and authority. Thus, the Turkish side was hardening its position as well. Turkish Cypriots' interlocutor Mr. Denktas was saying that the Turkish Community had to become totally autonomous and was justifying his hard line "with the realities in Cyprus, the suffering of the Turks and the deteriorating situation amongst the Greeks".

Finally, Archbishop Makarios having been alarmed with the ongoing violence among the Greek community and attempts of the plot to overthrow him by Greece, wrote a letter to President Phaedon Gizikis of Greece demanding the removal of the 650 mainland Greek officers (they were on the island as a result of an agreement with Makarios' Cypriot National Guard). The answer from Greece was the order to the National Guard to overthrow Makarios which marked the end of both the inter-communal talks and the hope to revise of 1960 partnership. As a result of this coup, fighting broke out between the National Guard and the Makariosists. On the same day of the coup Nikos Sampson (as Grivas died at the beginning of 1974), an ex-EOKA leader whom the British had sentenced to death, was proclaimed President of the Republic. Although Makarios was thought killed with the help of British, he escaped unhurt to London. Meanwhile, on the day of the coup again the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit flew to London on 17 July to seek British co-operation
under the Treaty of Guarantee, but British support could not be obtained. At the time it was not certain whether the Greek Junta would have ordered the National Guard in due course either to attack the Turks or seize the whole island. Turks and Turkish Cypriots were opposed to Sampson and Enosis from the beginning. They were afraid that Greece could seize Cyprus through de-facto Enosis. Under all these developments Turkey even without the help of the other guarantor powers was ready to intervene alone. US, having realised this possibility as soon as a new President Nicos Sampson was brought into power in Cyprus, sent Under Secretary Sisco to Ankara in order to persuade the Turks not to intervene. However Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit told Sisco:

Ten years ago... you committed an error and so did we. Your mistake was to tie our hands and stop us.
Our mistake was that we listened to you. We will not commit the same error as ten years ago.\(^{[74]}\)

showing Turkey's determination that Turkey this time was not going to take a chance of waiting to see what happens to her community in Cyprus. Somehow the coup offered an opportunity for Turkey to act to strengthen her security and the security of the Turkish Cypriots. At last on July the 20th 1974, the Turkish armed forces launched a sea and air borne operation against the island. Under the Treaty of Guarantee which states:
In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of these provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible each of the guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.[73].

Troops landed in west of Kyrenia and paratroopers were dropped in the central plain. The objective was to establish a bridge in the Kyrenia area and connect the large Turkish enclave in Nicosia by a corridor from the sea. In this way they had gained a foothold. By that evening the Security Council in New York adopted a resolution[76] calling for cease-fire and withdrawal without delay of foreign military personnel, end of foreign intervention and start of negotiations between Greece and Turkey for the restoration of peace and constitutional government. Ironically, the Greek military regime collapsed on the 22nd of July in Athens. This was followed by the collapse of the Cyprus government after the Turkish intervention. In Greece Mr. Karamanlis and in Cyprus Mr. Clerides took over the power.
Between 25th and 30th of July the foreign ministers of the guarantor powers met in Geneva where they agreed to the implementation of the cease-fire and for a return to constitutional normality in Cyprus as well as the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 353. During the talks Turkey wanted two assurances; a guarantee to protect minority rights and the majority community would not misuse its power as it was done in 1960. Depending on these assurances both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots proposed two plans. One was prepared by the Turkish foreign minister Mr. Gunes which proposed the establishment of six autonomous Turkish cantons. According to this plan the Turkish Cypriot autonomous administration would have its own police and its own security forces as they had since 1964. The second plan was prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktas which urges the establishment of bizonal federation with the Turkish administration in the north and the Greek administration in the south of the island. Both plans would have brought thirty per cent of the island under Turkish rule but the Greek side pressed for a unified Cyprus on the basis of the 1960 Constitution. The Greek side expressed readiness to return to the 1960 constitution with the Vice-President taking up his functions while negotiations continued from where the inter-communal talks had left off. They objected the Turkish plans.

After the breakdown of the Geneva talks on August the 14th Turkish army launched its second operation. On the 16th of August, the Turkish army completed its second operation by slicing the northern part of Cyprus from Morphou or Kokkina Bay through the Green line in Nicosia to Famagusta. On 16 August Turkey ordered a
cease-fire having occupied the greater part of Northern Cyprus as around 36 per cent of the island was now under her control.

Thus ended another episode in the history of the Cyprus problem which had started with the careless moves of the Junta under the leadership of Ionnidis in 1974. An new era started with the Turkish intervention with the total separation of the two nationalist communities. Ionnidis regime's mistake was the disbelief that Turkey would send military force to the island to prevent Enosis or expectation that the US would keep Turkey in check from intervention as it did both in 1964 and 1967. In spite of the favourable attitude or active encouragement of all the external actors (UN, UK and US) over the Cyprus issue, finally the hope of togetherness it was shattered by the events of 1974.

V. Reasons For The Failure Of The 1960 Establishment

It was asked at the end of the last chapter whether the new political arrangement would work or not and the experience between 1962-1974 had showed that it did not work. As put forward previously the new constitution was based on intricate system of checks and balances which required tolerance and understanding in all phases of administration. According to Averoff the arrangement was workable and he says:

*If the two sides eventually changed their minds and rejected the agreements after all, that does not mean*
that they were unworkable. The records shows that they were workable and did not work and their implementation brought prosperity... Of all the lost opportunities for finding a happy ending or at least a tolerable settlement of the Cyprus question, the tearing up of the Zurich and London agreements was the most tragic.

It was one of the facts that the successful working of the Cypriot constitution depended on the social and psychological interaction of the two communities. Somehow, both were inexperienced and psychologically unprepared for the give and take which the system required and the inter-communal establishment collapsed. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots started acting as the guardians of their own community's rights rather than considering the well-being and interests of the Cypriot state.

This point brings us to another question asked before, whether Turkish and Greek animosity was exploited to help the functioning of the 1960 settlement after the inter-communal fighting of 1950s. Unfortunately, Turkish and Greek animosity in the island could never be minimised. Both communities were suspicious of each other even in the early years of independence. A few factors can be cited for the continuance of this animosity. First of all, the New government of the Republic was formed by men who had led the Greek and Turkish nationalist movements in 1950s. These leaders were unable to unite in dealing with the problems of the Republic.
Secondly, Makarios as the President of the Republic could not direct traditional Greek nationalism into creative channels to help the Republic succeed. Roberts Stevens puts it very correctly;

*Makarios did not show great skill in handling the Turkish Cypriots after the establishment of the Republic*.[78]

Makarios during these years showed no proclivity to reduce the fears of the Turkish community. Turks viewed Makarios not as the head of a bi-communal state but as the leader of the Greek community who refused to accept their status as a separate community. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots viewed Kucuk and the other Turkish leaders as rebels whose interests conflicted with the interests of the majority Greek population. There would be more chance of success if a more gradual approach was followed by the both communities. For example, Turkish willingness to cooperate could be maintained by offering them substantive compensations in the economic field, but the opposite action, and the appeasing policies of Makarios for achieving the support of the extreme Enosist in the Greek community, instead deepened the traditional animosity between the two communities.

This animosity between the Turkish and Greeks in Cyprus was further intensified by the fact that the governments of Greece and Turkey entered the Cypriot scene after 1963 more vigorously. Both motherlands continuously gave their support both morally and financially to their own respective communities. In addition to their
assistance, neither Greece nor Turkey desisted in their Enosis and partition ideals. Although during the first years of the Republic both seemed to be refraining from the Cypriot politics it proved very difficult for both countries especially for Greece, as Enosis was the dream of all Greeks. The paradox of Enosis after the independence resulted in partitioning demands for Cyprus as previously asked for during the 1950s. And later in 1974 the continued aspiration of Enosis resulted in the Turkish intervention. But why could Enosis and partition be used by both the countries, Greece and Turkey?

The main reason for that was that there was no unique national identity in Cyprus to deter these ideals in the island. Although, the new Cyprus flag was neutral in colour and design, the two communities in the island still felt loyal either to Greece or Turkey. They were more conscious of their Greekness and Turkishness than their Cypriotism. As Salih says "after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus the objective of national self-preservation, the willingness to survive and the zeal to create a national homogeneity for the preservation of territorial integrity or independence did not become the common interest of the two communities". They became too preoccupied with strengthening bonds with their motherlands. They gave more importance to celebrations of their motherlands rather than their independence celebrations for example. As it is discussed during the course of this chapter there were many reasons which affected the course of events in the post independence Cyprus, whereas the most important affecting also the other reasons being the existence of two nationalities in the island. It was a fact that approximately 80 per
Chapter Five  
Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

cent of the Cypriots are Greek Cypriots in ethnic origin speaking Greek and approximately 20 per cent of the Cyprus population are Turks in ethnic origin, speaking Turkish. So two different nationalism in the island with different ethnic origin, religion and, the most important different language were the main reasons behind the failure of Zurich-London Settlement. The two communities in the island lived side by side and intermingled with each other but their fundamental values remained distinct and no diffusion of Turkish and Greek culture materialised.

As N.C. Lanitis wrote "to develop a proper frame of mind of the men in the street may at best take two decades of hard work"[79] and he continues;

*Inter-communal unity with the Greeks holding out a helping and co-operative hand to the Turks and both abandoning celebrations of homeland national occasions in favour of truly Cypriot occasions ... this is the recipe for overcoming the political and constitutional ills assailing Cyprus...*

He furthermore urges:

*that there should be an end to the habit of blaming the London and Zurich agreements for the Republic's difficulties and an honest attempt by both sides to*
honour their signatures and make the agreements work as far as possible. By so doing the communal unity which would follow would facilitate an agreed amendment of those parts of the constitution which might be found unsuitable and a new era of national co-operation would emerge.

Regrettably, the recommendations of N.C Lanitis did not work in Cyprus between the years 1963 to 1974. Both emotionally and politically prepared the two communities in the island lost another opportunity to live together in peace and harmony. The reason for the tragedy of Cyprus during this period has been summarised by Makarios' own words in the best possible way in an interview given to the Norwegian Newspaper Degbladet which was published on 12 March 1977: "It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed".

Despite the fact of the absence of the rudiments of nationalism which prevented the formation of a unique nationalism in Cyprus, still somehow there is a kind of Cypriotness in some form. This arises from the fact that the two communities share the same territory. Also both Cypriot communities suffered more than their motherlands during the troubled years which gives them the incentive in a way to manage their relations according to their needs rather than the needs of Greece and Turkey. So there must be a trend towards political awakening by the two peoples of the island to reach a consensus acceptable to all the Cypriots. Thus, the Cypriots can
enjoy peace and a kind of togetherness in one form or another, though the most important question is: what kind of coexistence could be achieved under the new circumstances, as at the moment there is complete separateness of two the communities.

In the next chapter, the attempts since 1974 for a future settlement in Cyprus will be investigated thoroughly.
REFERENCES


[7] PRO FO 371/169522, CT 1052/10 (Briefings for) Secretary of State's Visit to Ankara, (E), The Cyprus Municipalities Dispute, 23 April 1963.


Chapter Five  
Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974


Chapter Five  Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974


[28] Makarios' great worry has always been the Turkish intervention through the use of her unilateral intervention right.


[31] This account is based on confidential interviews with the Turkish Officials.


[44] The text of the reply of the Turkish government can be found in UN Doc. S/6267 and S/6267/Add. 1; that of the Turkish Cypriot side in S/6279.


[51] Patrick R., Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971, (Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 1976), p.117.


Chapter Five  Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974


[60] See UN Doc. S/8248 add.5.

[61] Cyprus Mail, 13 January 1968.

[62] The desirable solution for the Greek Cypriots now in 1990s contrarily to 1960s, is a unitary state however, now they consider a federation as feasible. This information is obtained from the interviews carried out by various Greek Cypriot officials.


Chapter Five  
Continued Nationalist Aggression 1962-1974

[69] Cyprus Mail, 8 August 1976.


[71] Ibid, p.265.


[75] HMSO, Cmnd. 1093, 1960, Appendix B.


[79] Lanitis N.C., Cyprus Must be United, Cyprus Mail Newspaper, 1963.
CHAPTER SIX

The Search For A Negotiated Settlement

I. Evaluation Of The 1960-1974 Period

In this chapter, the attempts of establishing a partnership government; a federal union, have been analysed since 1974. This chapter will clear the sides' interpretation of the causes and the type of solution which they see suit their interests and needs.

The inter-communal talks, which represent a third party approach to the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem under the auspices of the UN, will be analysed, but before moving on, it will be useful to evaluate the 1960-1974 period in order to be able to understand why no settlement was found in Cyprus despite the efforts of all concerned. Later on, it will be compared with present time efforts to see if these factors still exist.

From the historical analysis of that specific period, it is possible to identify four distinct factors that seem to be responsible for the breakdown of the 1960 constitutional order. The first reason is nationalism. As seen from the previous chapter the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were unable to develop a unique Cypriot self-identity of their own. They felt Greeks and Turks, thus they dealt with each other through their aggressive nationalistic feelings. The second reason was of a constitutional nature. The Cyprus Republic represented an example of the consociational
democracy. This system was designed to function in plural societies which has four main features:[1]

1. The government is formed by a grand coalition of political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society.

2. There exists a mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests.

3. Proportionality based appointment to all government and civil service positions reflecting the population ratio of each segment.

4. High degree of autonomy for the each segment of the plural society in their respective internal affairs. This is a logical corollary to the grand coalition principle.

On all matters of mutual concern, decisions are made by all segments together with roughly proportional degrees of influence. But on all other matters, the decisions and their execution are left to the separate segments.

When the Zurich and London Agreements were reached, the parties believed that this type of organisation of the government was the only way to end the civil strife in the island, and it was further believed that some form of national political integration would emerge on the island in the long run. However, in order to succeed this kind of organisation needs experience in a democratic system together with acceptance on the part of the people. Both these prerequisites were lacking in Cyprus in 1960s. In this way, institutional constraints imposed on Cypriots by this system, contributed to non co-operation between the Greeks and Turks of the island (e.g
conflicts over the veto powers of the vice-president, income tax legislation, application of strict ratios in civil service and security forces). The third reason was political. The Greek Cypriots were politically dissatisfied with the 1960 arrangements. Basing their claim on their majority in population (80%) they sought to achieve Enosis as a goal. During the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974, having understood that this kind of political solution was hard to achieve due to the reasons mentioned in the previous chapter (Turkish objections) they tried to safeguard full independence under a majority rule based on a unitarian state with minority guarantees. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots demanded a partnership as designed for them in the 1960 arrangements or partition. Although between the years of 1972-1974 some differences between the sides were thought to have narrowed. Mr. Clerides diagnosed the problem in the following sentences:

Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle which both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be to fight rather than to compromise.
These two political antagonistic political aims of the two communities left no room for compromise. The gap between a unitary and partnership systems was difficult to close. The main concerns underneath all these arguments were justice and security concerns which were interpreted by the two communities differently, the Greek Cypriots believed that they were fighting for justice and democracy as they were the most populous community in the island, while the Turkish Cypriots' emphasis was on security as they were the minority and demanded protection against the more populous community in the island.

The last reason for the breakdown in the island was of an international nature. First of all, there was continued interference of Greece and Turkey in Cypriot affairs. Both countries were the Guarantor Powers and they had contingents on the island making them involved with the island's affairs. Somehow the most important tie between Greece and Turkey and the Cypriots was their emotional national connections. This national connection prevented them from not getting involved when the civil war started in the island. The Prime Ministers and all other government officials of both countries dealt with Cyprus more in an emotional way than with reason and logic. On the other hand, the other powers which were involved in the Cyprus conflict like Britain and US analysed the problem from Cold War perspectives. Therefore, they were more interested in containing the conflict in order to avoid the risk of any major confrontation rather than solving the problem from humanitarian perspectives. In this way, they were unable to help to bring solutions to the two sides which would be acceptable by both.
Moreover, as an external power, the UN has been playing a vital and an important role in the Cyprus problem. The UN, since the beginning of civil strife, placed its troops in the island without which the damage of the civil war would be much higher. On the other hand the UN in a way affected the non co-operation between the two communities. On 27th December 1963, the beginning of the civil war in Cyprus, Vice-President Dr. Kucuk sent a cable to the Secretary General stating that the Greek Cypriot Representative who was sent by the President of the Republic, Makarios, to the UN was appointed unconstitutionally without consultation with the Council of Ministers or Vice-President. This cable, however, was ignored by the UN. This was a political mistake by the UN which led to the recognition of the Greek Cypriot community as the Republic of Cyprus in the following years\[3\]. The Cyprus Republic was a bi-national state based on the existence of two national peoples participating in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial organs of the state, but by the end of 1963 there was no such government operating in that manner. In the UN Secretary General's Reports\[4\] also this fact was acknowledged. Nevertheless, UN continued to deal with the Greek Cypriots and in a way encouraged the Greek Cypriots in believing in their righteousness. Dr. Christian Heinze\[5\] explains the recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the Cypriot government from the international law point of view in the following words:

*As long as Makarios government which since December 1963 has become responsible for the Greek Cypriot*
coup d'état aiming at the forcible suppression of the Turkish Cypriots, does not succeed in assuming governmental authority over the whole of Cyprus within the meaning of the principle of effectively under international law, its de facto recognition by the United Nations and certain states is dubious in international law.[6]

So, recognition of one side as the representative of the whole island discouraged the co-operation incentive on both sides. Somehow, it is not fair to blame one factor as the sole factor in the breakdown of the system. Many diverse criteria acted together and resulted in a deadlock in the period between 1963-1974. Later, with the Greek coup on 15th July 1974 against Makarios government and the subsequent Turkish intervention of 20th July 1974, new realities emerged in Cyprus and the sui generis Nicosia model collapsed totally.

II. Inter-Communal Talks 1975-1996

Before the 20th July 1974 Turkish intervention, which divided the island into two, there was already a de facto partition. As reported by Frank Giles in Sunday Times (23rd February 1974) the country had split into two- from the geographical point of view. Furthermore, during the period previous to July 1974, there were various options of solutions discussed ranging from partition to Enosis to federation and to
independence. None of these solutions were acceptable either to the parties concerned or to the international community. Thus, after Turkey intervened militarily it was agreed that fresh attempts should be made to solve the Cyprus Problem by means of a new series of talks between the two communities. Firstly, on the 20th July 1974 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 353 calling for Guarantor Powers to enter into negotiations in order to restore peace\[7\]. Later on the 1st November 1974 the UN General Assembly passed a Resolution 3212 (xxix) which recommended "the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing with the good offices of the Secretary General between the representatives of the two communities\[8\]. In this way the inter-communal talks started between the two communities of the island in the hope of finding an acceptable settlement to the two communities. For convenience these talks are here divided into three phases: (a) Period 1974-1983, (b) period 1983-1992 and (c) period 1992-1996.

A- The Period Between 1974 - 1983

The bilateral talks started taking place at the highest level between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Clerides since August 1974. These first talks continued till the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 13 February 1975. During this time, the talks started with a discussion on the powers and functions of the central government in a federal state. Greek Cypriot proposals of February the 10th 1975 which proposed a bi-communal multi regional federal state, central government with substantial powers and rights of freedom of movement and right to property were perceived by the
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

Turkish Cypriot's as being contrary to their interests as they demanded greater guarantees. The talks were fruitless and resulted in the Turkish Cypriots declaring their Federated State Of Cyprus in February 1975. However, the Turkish side insisted that the proclamation was not intended to prejudice a final settlement but they wanted the Greek Cypriots to follow suit by declaring their separate state. Then they sought to enter into negotiation over the federal solution[^9]. This act of the Turkish Cypriots resulted in both Greek Cypriot protests and in the Security Council Resolution No. 397 of 12th March 1975. This Resolution expressed regret about the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and paragraph 6 of Resolution 367, requested the UN Secretary General to undertake a new mission of good offices in order to assist the resumption of negotiations[^10]. The inter-communal talks resumed in the summer of 1975, in Vienna, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. At the end of the third round (between 31st July - 2nd August 1975) both sides agreed to exchange with UNFICYP's help populations of Turkish Cypriots wishing to leave the South to go to the North and of Greek Cypriots wishing to leave the North to go to the South. This first agreement between the two communities resulted in two regions- one in the south of the island comprising mostly the Greek Cypriot population and the other one in the north of the island compromising mostly the Turkish Cypriots. The talks between the two sides continued till mid 1976 on and off. Although there was extensive discussion on both the territorial and the constitutional issues reluctance on both sides to make concrete proposals ended this round of talks until 1977.
In 1977, Denktas suggested direct talks (as he realised that there could be no solution to the problem unless both communities' leaders meet face to face) with Makarios in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in order to be able to review the previous talks. Makarios accepted the invitation and two meetings took place in Nicosia on 27th January 1977 and on 12th February 1977. On the second meeting the two leaders agreed on four points which would form the basis for future negotiations. These four points which came to be known as the "Four Guidelines" were as follows:

1. An independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.

2. The boundaries of the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

3. Questions of principles, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.

4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the state[11].

After these initial agreements, the inter-communal talks continued in Vienna under the auspices of the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, to discuss the territorial
and constitutional aspects. Both sides presented their proposals. Turkish Cypriot side's proposals envisaged a federal government on the basis of a partnership in power between two equal political entities joining their resources in a central federal administration on a basis of equality, working together at first in a comparatively limited field, also co-operating in many spheres of administration. While the Greek Cypriot proposals provided for the setting up of a strong central government which included the lists of powers of the federal government and of regional administration together with 20 per cent of territory to be administered by the Turkish Cypriot Administration.

At the end of the last session of the sixth round of Vienna talks (7 April 1977) a communiqué was issued saying that "it has not been possible to bridge the considerable gap between the views of the two sides, but efforts would be continued to overcome the differences." Although various informal inter-communal talks continued after the death of Archbishop Makarios, on 3rd August 1977 the talks were stalled for sometime.

On April the 14th, 1978 the Turkish government put forward new proposals for a bi-communal Cypriot Republic. These proposals contained specific constitutional proposals- (a) Each state would have its own legislative assembly, central bank and defence force, (b) the federal assembly should be composed of 20 members, 10 from each legislative assembly and (c) the executive power of the Federal state should be vested in the federal executive under a joint Presidency. Turkish authorities made some proposals also on the territorial boundaries of the land but Mr. Kyprianou, the
new President of the Greek Cypriots, declared that the "philosophy and concept" of the Turkish Cypriot proposals were totally unacceptable\cite{16}.

After the rejection of 14th April 1978 proposals both sides in July 1978 presented new proposals upon which to resume the inter-communal discussion which were not discussed in great detail and were not different from the previous proposals. Following the collapse of the talks the Greek Cypriots started to try to internationalise the issue- took it to the UN General Assembly. Thus, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 33/15 on 9th November 1978 on the question of Cyprus\cite{17}. This resolution which was similar to the previous resolutions was criticised by both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as one sided. On the other hand, Turkey was under a tight American arms embargo which had been imposed on Turkey in February 1975. The Turkish side thought that the Greek side rejected the Turkish proposals of 1978 because they were in a position to pressurise the Turkish side to get what they want. However, the Turkish stand was becoming harder. Despite the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the two sides to the table to break the deadlock there was no progress. Therefore, to break this stalemate the US initiated a peace proposal. This 12 point plan for settlement of the crisis came to be known as "Anglo-American-Canadian" proposals of November 1978. Although the proposals were drafted by Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counsellor at the US State Department, they were presented as Anglo-Canadian to prevent the thoughts of partiality (especially the Greek's suspicions of American's partiality towards Turkey)\cite{18}. These proposals
provided for the establishment of a de facto Federal Cypriot Republic. The major features of this plan included:

1. Bi-communal federal state with two constituent ethnic regions (a principal Turkish Cypriot demand) and the incorporation of either into a third party being prohibited.

2. The federal government would be responsible for foreign affairs, defence, currency and central banking, customs, and other functions (labour, social services, health and local affairs being the responsibility of the regions).

3. Legal authority of the federal government would be vested in a bicameral legislature, with an evenly divided upper house, a lower house based on proportional representation, a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Vice-President who would jointly select a council of Ministers, with each region/minority having at least 30 per cent representation. The plan also addressed major Greek Cypriot concerns such as the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops, significant geographic adjustment, and three freedoms.

But the plan was received with little enthusiasm by the Turkish side and rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. Nevertheless, the deadlock in the talks came to an end when Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas met under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, on the 18-19 May 1979. The result of this summit meeting was a joint 10 point agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Ten Point Agreement together with the Denktas-Makarios "Four Guidelines" became and are acknowledged as basis of subsequent inter-communal negotiations. The Ten Point Agreement included the following main elements:
Chapter Six

1. Priority should be given to the resettlement of Varosha (suburb of Famagusta) by the Greek refugees.

2. Avoidance of any action prejudicial to the inter-communal talks.

3. The demilitarisation of Cyprus.

4. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non alignment of the Republic to be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other state and against any form of partition or secession.

Somehow due to mutual suspicion and distrust the talks were recessed after June 1979. During the deadlock months in November 1979, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 34/30 similar to the previous resolution and calling for the urgent resumption of the talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. Furthermore, the UN Secretary General reported on the 3rd April 1980 that no agreement had been reached on the question of calling for the creation of a bizonal political structure in Cyprus. In August 1980 Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary General appointed a Special representative, Hugo Gobbi to reactivate the inter-communal talks. On the 9th August 1980 the talks were resumed. As agreed in the UN Secretary General's "Opening Statement" of 9th August 1980 there were four subjects to be dealt concurrently in rotation during the talks. These were:

1. Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19th May Agreement.
2. Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter.

3. Constitutional aspects.

4. Territorial aspects.

As the talks went on by October 1981, the positions of both sides were made clear through the package proposals on a new constitution, on territory and on the question of security. The positions of the two sides on the federal solution were as shown in table 6.1.
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS
OF AUGUST 1981

1. Establishment of a bi-communal, bizonal Federal Republic consisting of two Federated States.

2. Each state to possess its own territory, people and government.

3. Turkish Cypriot Community to be the equal co-founder of the Federal Republic.

4. The Turkish Cypriots shall be represented in the Federal Government - the legislature and public institutions - on the basis of a 50:50 ratio.

5. Federal government to possess limited powers dealing with foreign affairs, tourism and information etc. All other powers to belong to the federated states.

6. Freedom of movement and settlement and the right of property subject to certain restrictions.

GREEK CYPRIOT PROPOSALS
OF 1980 AND 1981

1. Establishment of the Federal Republic to be independent, sovereign, non-aligned, bi-communal consisting of the Greek Cypriot Province and the Turkish Cypriot Province.

2. The territory of the Federal Republic to constitute a single and indivisible whole, with unified federal citizenship.

3. Juristic personality to belong to the Federal Republic only.

4. Fundamental rights and liberties to be guaranteed.

5. The federal legislature and Executive to be vested with such powers as to ensure that Cyprus is reintegrated to form a single economic unit.

Table 6.1*

*Source: Tamkoc, "The Turkish Cypriot State" (p.112)

On the territorial aspect, the Turkish side submitted two different maps. But they would be valid only subject to final agreement being reached on the constitutional aspect and on the question of security issues. According to the Turkish side, any
further reductions in size (as proposed on the attached map of the proposals) would
gravely erode security, economic viability and land ownership. According to Greek
Cypriot side, this proposed Turkish map offered to return 2.6% of Turkish territory
and allowed only about 31000 refugees to go back to their homes\[0023\]. The Greek
Cypriot side's proposals on the territory were similar to the map presented on the 31st
March 1977 and the 8th October 1980. According to these proposals the territory
under the Turkish Cypriot administration would not exceed 20 per cent\[0024\] whereas the
Turkish Cypriots offered around 29 per cent of territory to be under their
administration. And in 1981 the Greek Cypriots stressed that their proposals were
made subject to priority being accorded to the resettlement of Varosha in accordance
with point 5 of the 19th May 1979 high level agreement. The Greek Cypriots thought
that Mr. Denktas and the Turkish leaders should make concessions\[0025\]. But there were
two obstacles to that. First of all, Denktas was unlikely to be able to make such a
concession because of the local elections in that year. Secondly, the Greeks were
implementing an economic embargo on the Turkish side. The Greeks were (and still
are) blockading 3 major ports (Famagusta and Ercan airport and Kyrenia- vital for the
Turkish side), and the Turks saw a link between the refugees and the Greek embargo.

In view of the wide gap between the two sides the UN Secretary General
decided to present an evaluation of the talks in order to give a new momentum to the
inter-communal talks on November the 18th 1981. As the Secretary General
Waldheim pointed at in his Report\[0026\], there were on the one hand "points of coincide"
and on the other hand the "points of equidistance" in the negotiating positions of the
parties, particularly as regards the constitutional aspect. Waldheim's ideas were for a negotiating basis allocating 70 per cent of the island's area to the Greek community and 30 per cent to the Turkish community which would in addition gain 40 per cent of the public sector. The presidency would rotate annually between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot. There would be a six member federal council in which four seats would be reserved for Greek Cypriots and two for Turkish Cypriots. Finally, each community would preserve a large amount of autonomy together with a certain veto power over majority legislative and constitutional changes. Yet, despite the efforts of Waldheim the gap between the sides' views could not be bridged.

At the beginning of 1982, Mr. Waldheim was replaced by Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar as the new Secretary General of the UN. The New Secretary General had previously served in Cyprus as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative which had given him more experience with the Cyprus problem. The new UN Secretary General reassured the people of Cyprus (both communities) that he would make every possible effort to reach a fair and just solution of the Cyprus problem. He also expressed his support for the UN evaluation (or Waldheim ideas as they are called, see UN Doc. S/15149 para. 45, December 1982).

During this time some developments took place in the Greek Cypriot side. Presidential election was scheduled for February 1983 (Mr. Kyprianou had held the post of Presidency since the death of Archbishop Makarios in 1977- and re-elected for a full five year term in January 1978). When on April the 20th 1982 Mr. Kyprianou announced his candidacy once more with the support of AKEL (Progressive Party of
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

The Working People) and his own party DIKO (Democratic Party), Mr. George Ioannides who was the interlocutor since 1979 for the Greek Cypriot side resigned on the grounds that he could not support the President’s candidacy as "the unity of the people has been painfully affected, without any hope of being re-established during the period of Mr. Kyprianou's administration"[27]. Despite the criticism for Kyprianou's handling of the Cyprus problem in the Greek side of the island, he returned back to power in February 1983. Thus, the Greek Cypriot side followed their original plan of internationalisation of the problem as done previously in view of the lack of progress according to their wishes. Following this logic, the case was brought to the UN General Assembly at its resumed 37th regular session and adopted on May the 13th 1983 a Resolution (37/253) on Cyprus calling for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from the island as an essential basis for a speedy and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem[28].

One of the important factors which has always affected the Cyprus problem and the inter-communal talks has been the positions of the motherlands, Turkey and Greece. The positions taken by the individual politicians in these countries has a great influence on the parties in Cyprus. In those years the Greco-Turkish relations were deteriorating with the rise of Andreas Papandreou to Premiership. He had always been a sharp critic of the Turks. After the appointment of Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister of Greece, President Kyprianou flew to Athens to discuss the common foreign policy to be followed with Greece. Both expressed full consensus on the understanding of the Cyprus question. Papandreou had also said openly that there
Chapter Six  

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

should be no inter-communal talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides so long as Turkey occupied the Northern part of the island and the issue rather be internationalised\[29\]. On the other hand, Turkey was supporting the Turkish Cypriot side, and on May the 20th to the 23rd 1982, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu visited the Turkish side of the island to show the support of Turkey. The close involvement of the motherlands were affecting the stance taken by the Cypriots. In the continuing process of erosion, on the 1st June 1983 Secretary General attempted to strengthen his personal involvement within the framework of his mission of good offices\[30\]. Although he described it as positive and constructive, when Greek Cypriot side handed their response to him, Perez De Cuellar's initiative had caused tensions within the Cyprus Cabinet (for example, Mr. Rolandis, at the time foreign minister resigned as he favoured a resumption of talks on the basis of UN initiative). The Turkish side, however, as Mr. Denktas said to the Secretary General, considered this initiative as mediation and preferred the latter's good offices to resume the inter-communal talks.

The Secretary General's attempts in the second half of 1983 to outline parameters of the key issues within which the two sides could negotiate could not break the deadlock. During that year the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared on November the 15th 1983 with Denktas as its newly appointed President. According to Mr. Denktas, described in his book:
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

The world, looking at Cyprus, had been unable to see the facts and would never be able to do so as long as the notion persisted that there existed one government of Cyprus representing all its people. The way to make the world face reality was to assert our right of self-determination and declare our Statehood. Only then would the world realise that the two nations lived in Cyprus and that the Greek Cypriots had no mandate to speak for the Turkish Cypriots[31].

What Denktas meant was that the proclamation was considered essential for convincing the Greek leadership that "a genuine federation can only be established between equal partners having the same political status", i.e that of independent Statehood.

The United Nations declared the action of the Turkish Cypriots illegal and asked the world community not to recognise it. The then President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou reacted to the declaration immediately and said that "this action not only complicated further the Cyprus problem but made it clear that the intention of the Turkish side was always to create faits accomplis and to create conditions for the secession of the occupied area from the Republic of Cyprus"[32]. The declaration was condemned by Greece, US, UK and the European Community as well. The Security Council on November the 18th 1983 adopted Resolution 541 (submitted by the UK
adopted by 13 votes to one-Pakistan- with one abstention Jordan) which condemned
the declaration. The new Republic was only recognised by Turkey only.

B- The Period Between 1983 - 1992

Following the declaration, on the 2nd January 1984, Mr. Denktas, the President of the
New Republic announced as goodwill measures the turning over of a defined sector of
the city of Varosha and the international airport to an interim United Nations
supervision and administration\textsuperscript{[33]}. Together with Denktas's initiative, Turkey on
January the 3rd announced the withdrawal of 1500 of its troops from the island. These
proposals were rejected by the Greek Cypriot side on 6 January 1984. They were
regarded as propaganda measures aimed at misleading international opinion. After
their rejections of Denktas' proposals, President Kyprianou submitted on January 11th
1984 to the UN Secretary General "a framework for a comprehensive settlement to
the Cyprus problem". Premier of Greece, Mr. Papandreou issued a statement warning
of the great dangers of Turkish intransigence and gave his support for President
Kyprianou. The proposals made by the Greek Cypriots contained the following:
retention of 23-25 per cent of Cyprus land under Turkish administration, greater
devolution of powers to the local administration in the two parts of the island, demand
of return of Varosha and Morphou, demilitarisation with security entrusted to a UN
Force, withdrawal of Turkish settlers who had arrived since 1975. But Mr. Kyprianou
made it clear that unless the Turkish Cypriots first withdrew their declaration of
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

statehood there would be no direct negotiations\textsuperscript{[34]} . The result was the rejection of the proposals by the Turkish Cypriot side.

During the course of 1984, tension in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey increased which was thought could escalate into a hot war. Another UN Security Council debate over Cyprus (May 1984) took place which resulted in the Security Council Resolution 550/84. The resolution condemned the secessionist actions of the Turks, but it did not impose sanctions against them as demanded by the Greek side. However, this resolution was criticised by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Turgut Ozal said that any solution must start from acceptance of the equality of rights between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish communities and Turkey would support North Cyprus\textsuperscript{[35]} . This resulted in Greek Cypriot condemnation of Turkey as separatist and expansionist.

Meanwhile, on March the 10th 1984, The UN Secretary General Mr. Perez de Cuellar in an endeavour to bring the two sides together proposed, inter alia, a series of goodwill measures. This five-point plan as a proposed basis for negotiations was outlined to Mr. Denktas by the Secretary General on 16th March:

\textit{Both sides he suggested, should declare their opposition to any further step to internationalise the Cypriot problem. The Turkish Cypriots should agree to suspend any further action on the constitutional development of the TRNC and should not pursue initiatives currently under way. Both}
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

sides should give a commitment not to increase troops strengths. Varosha should be placed under UN control and high level talks should be held between the representatives of the two communities.\[156\].

Once again these goodwill measures of Perez de Cuellar did not manage to receive positive responses. Face to face meeting between the two communities leaders proved to be impossible as Mr. Kyprianou rejected meeting Mr. Denktas because of the fear that such an act would result in the recognition of an "equality of status" of the TRNC. Therefore, the only option for the UN Secretary General was to resume indirect (proximity) talks and if a settlement would be reached then to bring the sides face to face to sign a draft agreement. In September 1984, the proximity talks started in New York after the sides agreed for these talks. The way to the proximity talks were opened in August 1984 in Vienna when the Secretary General presented his "working points" (derived from the earlier negotiations) to the representatives of the two communities and these were accepted by them. According to the press leaks at that time (as they were not made public) these points were (see table 6.2 for details): (a) Political Confidence Building measures, (b) establishment and development of the governmental structure and (c) territorial adjustment. The aim of the proximity talks was to narrow the gap between the two sides in the three points mentioned so that an overall agreement could be reached and signed at a high level meeting. The positions of the sides during the proximity talks can be seen from table 6.2.
### The positions of the sides at the beginning of the proximity talks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Political Confidence Building</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A- Reopening of Nicosia international airport</td>
<td>Hesitation by the Greek side (question of sovereignty of the area). Accepted by the Turkish side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B- Re-admission of Greek Cypriots to the Turkish controlled city of Famagusta</td>
<td>Support by the Greek side. Conditional acceptance by the Turkish side (security reasons).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) Establishment and Development of the Government</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A- Legislature / unicameral - bicameral</td>
<td>Supported by the Greek side (70:30 ratio by Greeks and Turks). Supported by the Turkish side but equal representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B- Executive / presidential Council of ministers</td>
<td>Greeks fixed presidency and Turkish Vice President with 7:3 ratio in Council of Ministers. Turks rotating presidency, with equal number of ministers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Territorial Adjustment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A- Territorial Aspects</td>
<td>Greek side insisted on 25% territory be under Turkish administration. Turkish side accepted 30%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2

Also the views of the parties on the power of the central government differed. While the Turkish Cypriot view was that the powers of the central government should be defined and the residue of power should devolve on the federated states, the Greek Cypriot side thought that the central government of the provinces should be listed and the residue power should devolve on a strong central government. In the last agenda
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

for the third round of the Secretary-General's Proximity talks on Cyprus the matters which were agreed, were listed. The agreed matters were:\[38:\]


2. Indicate their determination to proceed to the establishment of a federal Republic that will be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the federal constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards the territorial aspect.

3. Reaffirm the principles that- (a) the Federal Republic of Cyprus shall have international personality; the federal government shall exercise sovereignty in respect of all the territory and (b) the people of the Federal Republic shall comprise the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community with a single citizenship.

In the draft agreement there were provisions concerning the powers and functions as well as the composition of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. Major issues which remained to be settled were: fundamental freedoms, the issue of a foreign guarantee and a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and a legislative veto. These were left to be solved in the working groups to be established after the agreement. On the settlement of Varosha and the International airport issues the date would be filled in the joint meeting between the sides.

During the third round talks, there was a certain shift in the position of the Turkish side-
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

1. The Turkish side accepted a permanent Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President option and gave up the rotating presidency option.

2. On the issue of the executive a 7:3 ratio (Greek and Turkish respectively) rather than 50:50 option were accepted.

3. To limit their veto on a future administration to issues directly relevant to their community.

4. On the issue of legislature a 70:30 ratio of Greeks to Turks in the lower house of parliament was accepted rather than a 50:50 ratio but the Turkish side insisted that 50:50 would only apply to the upper house.

5. On the issue of territory they accepted the reduction of their share of territory from the present 36% of the island to "29 plus" per cent of the island.

Furthermore, on 29 November 1984 Mr. Denktas announced that the Turkish side accepted all elements of the Secretary General's presentation. The more conciliatory stance which was adopted by Mr. Denktas was attributed to the fact that Turkey was putting pressure on him to reach an agreement. The reason for Turkish pressure resulted after America's pressure on Turkey to be more accommodating over Cyprus (see letter of President Reagan of US to Turkish President Evren dated on 22 November 1984)\(^{[39]}\). The reasons of America's pressure on Turkey were twofold\(^{[40]}\):

1. To be able to use the airfield the US has built at Lefkoniko on the Turkish side of the island in the early 1980s which would be very useful for moving a rapid deployment force into a Middle East trouble spot without objections from Greece.
2. To settle the dispute between the two NATO members Greece and Turkey in order to secure the south-eastern flank of NATO.

Turkey's obedience to American pressure was due to the flow of American weapons and defence material which were impeded by the American Congress under the influence of the Greek lobby (maintaining seven to ten ratio between Greece and Turkey).

Under these developments— the Turkish Cypriot proposals (territorial adjustments and constitutionals concessions)— the Secretary General considered that enough progress had been achieved to justify the convening of a high level meeting of direct talks between Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktas. The Secretary General, in paragraphs 50 and 51 of his Report of 12 December 1984 to the Security Council said:

*The Greek Cypriot delegation conveyed to me its position with regard to all elements of my presentation. As the gap was not yet fully closed, I had further discussions with both sides in the course of which I sought and received from the Turkish Cypriot delegation understandings that were helpful in further narrowing the gap. By 12 December it was my assessment that the documentation for a draft agreement could now be submitted to the joint high-level meeting. I expect that*
the interlocutors will at the high level meeting, conclude

an agreement containing the necessary elements for a
comprehensive solution of the problem aimed at
establishing a federal republic of Cyprus\(^{[41]}\).

So three rounds of indirect talks between the leaders of the two peoples of Cyprus held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Mr. Perez de Cuellar in 1984, brought a hope of success to many people\(^{[42]}\) for the final solution of the problem in the new year. However, this expected breakthrough did not materialise in the 17 January 1985 Summit meeting between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people. The cause for the failure was the different interpretation of the meaning of the summit meeting. As Denktas said on January the 17, 1985 "We are not here to negotiate what has already been negotiated\(^{[43]}\) but he saw the summit meeting as the place to sign the draft agreement. On the other hand, Mr. Kyprianou regarded the draft as a basis for negotiation and offered a new high level meeting to deal with the four basic issues, i.e. the withdrawal of foreign troops, the territorial issue, the fundamental freedoms and the guarantees. Thus, he refused to sign the draft in the January summit meeting of 1985. As Perez de Cuellar said after the failure of the summit talks "the gap has never been so narrow\(^{[44]}\), unfortunately the sides once more could not manage to end the deadlock. The result was not only surprise and confusion for the Turks and the UN officials but to the Greek Cypriots as well. The Greek Cypriot reaction to their President's hard-line was one of disapproval. The central
committees of the Democratic Rally (DISY) led by Mr. Clerides and left wing AKEL led by Mr. Papaianounu (representing 67 per cent of the Greek Cypriot electorate between them) issued a lengthy resolutions condemning Mr. Kyprianou's handling of the Cyprus problem and called on to him to abide by the views of the majority or else proclaim early presidential elections[^45]. The motion was carried out by both DISY and AKEL in the house of Representatives on 22 February against President Kyprianou, by 23 votes (12 of AKEL and 11 of DISY) to 12 (9 DIKO and 3 EDEK-rejectionist group). Furthermore, Kyprianou was criticised for paying more attention to the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou than to more moderate Greek Cypriot opinion[^46].

While on the Greek Cypriot side political crises over President Kyprianou's stance continued, on the Turkish side, the consolidation of constitutional arrangements continued, the constitution was adopted by the Turkish Cypriot Assembly on 12 March 1985, and a referendum was held on May 5th 1985[^47].

However, the Secretary General Perez de Cuellar continued his mission to overcome the difficulties which arose during the January 1985. By April 1985, he prepared another document. The document which was submitted to both sides was the amended version of his 1984 draft[^48]. This time the proposals were accepted by the Greek Cypriot side and rejected by the Turkish side. The Turkish side rejected the way in which the April document was prepared. Moreover, according the Turkish side there were some vital points which were removed from the April document- e.g January document stated that residual powers would be vested in the provinces and the consent of at least 30% of Turkish Cypriots in the upper house for a bill to
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

become law was necessary- were omitted. Apart from these there was still disagreement between the two sides over the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Cyprus. The position of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on this issue had not changed since January summit. Again to break the impasse once more and to bring compromise to the conflicting claims of both sides the Secretary General prepared the third draft- named as the "29 March 1986" draft.

The new Draft framework called for an independent, bizonal, bi-communal and non-aligned federal republic where the Turkish Cypriots would reduce the land under their control from 36 to 29 per cent. The acceptance of the agreement by the two sides would produce the following results:\[49\]:

1. The Federal Republic would include two provinces or federated states and would comprise the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community, all the members of units becoming citizens of the Federal Republic.

2. The official languages of the Federal Republic would be Greek and Turkish.

3. The federal Republic would have a neutral flag and anthem to be agreed.

4. Powers and functions of the federal Republic would be delineated.

5. The legislature of the federal Republic would be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representation and an upper chamber with a 50:50 representation.

6. The system of government of the Federal Republic would be a presidential system.

7. The president being a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President being of Turkish origin, would symbolise the unity of the country and the equal political status of the
two communities. They would separately or jointly have the right to veto any law or administrative decision.

8. The council of ministers would be composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio.

9. The constitutional court of the federal Republic would be composed of one Greek, one Turkish and one non-Cypriot voting member. The UN Secretary General, when he presented the parties with the draft framework of 29 March 1986, accompanied it by a letter in which he wrote,

Both sides have agreed on the matter that will be negotiated after the framework agreement is accepted... its ultimate implementation will depend on both sides being able to negotiate to their mutual satisfaction the matters on which agreement has yet to be achieved. Acceptance of the draft framework agreement will allow, for the very first time, all the outstanding issues to be tackled in earnest and in a decisive manner as an integrated whole.

The unsettled issues would be tackled in the working groups as envisaged in the letter and the draft. The Greek Cypriot side answered the UN Secretary General in a letter dated 20 April 1986. According to this letter the issues of: (a) withdrawal of Turkish
troops and settlers, (b) effective international guarantees and (c) application of the
three freedoms (movement, settlement and the right to property)\(^{52}\) should be dealt
within an international conference (the idea of an international conference was for the
first time communicated to the UN Secretary General and all interested parties by the
Soviet Ambassador at the UN, Mr. Troyanovsky on 21 January 1986)\(^{53}\). This issue
should be settled prior to the draft agreement. The Turkish side rejected the idea of an
international conference as they believed the issue should be tackled through
inter-communal talks under the auspices of the UN. On the other hand, President
Denktas informed the Secretary General that he was prepared to sign the draft
framework agreement after the blank dates had been filled in. Nevertheless, no
progress was achieved in 1986.

During the year 1987, no proximity talks took place despite the UN officials
efforts. According to the UN reports, there was an increase in the number of Turkish
troops in the island\(^{54}\). On July the 21st Mr. George Iacovou, the Cyprus Greek
foreign minister submitted a demilitarisation proposal to Perez de Cuellar which was
rejected by Denktas. Mr. Denktas said that the establishment of a federal bizonal
republic should be discussed before demilitarisation.

The most important development in the early 1988 concerning the Cypriots
took place in Davos- Switzerland when Greek and Turkish Prime- Ministers, Mr.
Papandreou and Mr. Ozal met with the aim of starting a dialogue for the friendly
settlement of disputes after long years of stagnation. This was an important
improvement for Turkish and Greek relations which could have had positive
repercussions on the Cyprus problem. The second development which gave the hope of reaching a settlement came about when George Vassiliou, a self-made millionaire businessman, ran for the presidency of the Greek Cypriot state. George Vassiliou promised that his first order of business, should he be elected, would be to launch a "peace offensive" and resume the inter-communal negotiations. Therefore, when in February 1988, Vassiliou was elected (with the backing of AKEL), it was the victory of the "non-rejectionist" group which had been in a clear majority since the failure of the high level meeting in January 1985. From the outset, he created the impression that his candidature and presidency were principally aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem in a different way than the more conventional politicians. With Vassiliou's coming to power in February 1988, the Turkish Cypriot side thought the way to be followed for a solution would be based on the UN proposals of 1986. However, on February 28, 1988 after assuming office, Vassiliou said that any solution to the Cyprus problem had to provide for: (a) the withdrawal of all Turkish troops and settlers from Cyprus, (b) the safeguarding of basic rights of all citizens to free movement, free settlement and the right of property and particularly the right of all refugees to return to their homes and (c) the securing of effective international guarantees which would exclude unilateral intervention rights. Also, Vassiliou described one of the new government's first priorities as defence, including a reorganisation and reinforcement of civil defence and close co-operation with Greece and non-aligned policy in foreign policy. The co-operation between Greek Cypriots and Greece was provided on the Cyprus problem as to the aims and methods needed.
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

to achieve them after consultations between Vassiliou and the Prime Minister Papandreou\[56\]. This talk showed that priority in the solution of the problem would depend on the achievement of these points. Also, Vassiliou, at the beginning of his presidency stated the need for meeting Turkish Prime Minister Ozal rather than Mr. Denktas. Mr. Vassiliou rejected the proposal of Mr. Denktas which requested that the meeting take place between the Presidents of two equal political entities which was unacceptable to Mr. Vassiliou as the international community recognises only one state. The opportunity to revive the talks came when Vassiliou had somehow agreed to meet Mr. Denktas without preconditions in June 1988. The reason for this decision was the further improvement in Greek-Turkish relations when Prime Minister Ozal visited Greece in June that year.

Under these developments, on 24 August 1988, the leaders of the two communities met in Geneva under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. In this meeting, both sides affirmed their commitment to the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979 and referred to the "opening statement" of 1981 and the 1984 Vienna "working points". Vassiliou and Denktas agreed to continue their regular meetings by "exploring... a wide range of options for each of the issues that make up the Cyprus problem and ... evaluating them in the light of interests and concerns of both sides and reach a solution on all aspects of the Cyprus problem by 1 June 1989"[57].

The first round of talks which took place in Nicosia between the 16th September to the 7th November 1988 helped both sides to learn each other's views. It was in the second round between 19th December to 28th March when;
(a) constitutional arrangements- including "the three freedoms", (b) territorial arrangements and the question of refugees- including settlers- and (c) security, demilitarisation and guarantees- including the establishment of balance of forces- were discussed.

On the 19th and the 30th of January 1989, Mr. Denktas presented six documents in New York. These papers contained issues of - three freedoms, deconfrontation, guarantees and the federal structure (constitution, on executive and on federal legislature) as part of an integrated whole. Mr. Vassiliou also presented, on January the 30th 1989 comprehensive proposals aimed at the establishment of a Federal Republic. After analysing the positions of the two sides on the solution of the problem during the 1988-1989, some fundamental differences were still there as can be seen in table 6.3[58].


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1988 - 1989</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot Position</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Constitutional Arrangement</td>
<td>Weak Federal Government- (more powers should be entrusted to the federal units than the federal government)</td>
<td>Strong Federation (the residue of unspecified powers should be entrusted to the federal government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotating presidency</td>
<td>Fixed presidency (two options of election)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equality in the Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Council of Ministers- 7 Greek and 3 Turkish Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bicameral legislature (equal representation in the upper house and constitutional safeguards)</td>
<td>Bicameral legislature (equal representation in the upper house)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veto power over legislation and separate majorities voting for certain legislations</td>
<td>No veto power over the central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. &quot;Three Freedoms&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freedom of movement</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freedom of settlement</td>
<td>After 18 years</td>
<td>Not accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freedom of ownership</td>
<td>Compensation and acceptance after 18 years</td>
<td>Implementation after practical difficulties dealt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Guarantees and Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Demilitarisation and settlers</td>
<td>Balance and timetable</td>
<td>Complete demilitarisation and return of settlers before a settlement *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Guarantees</td>
<td>To be discussed after the establishment of the federal structure</td>
<td>Only guarantee UN or multilateral and no rights of unilateral rights of intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3*

*In March 1989 a limited withdrawal of forces was agreed along the central Nicosia sector of the buffer zone separating the two communities.
By the mid 1989, there were not many areas of convergence in the discussions. Earlier on February the 13th, 1989 the Turkish Cypriot side submitted a memorandum which pointed out that in essence the Greek Cypriot proposals would leave the Turkish Cypriots even fewer rights than under the Constitution of 1960\(^\text{[59]}\). Also, the Greek Cypriot side was not satisfied with the Turkish proposals. However, The Secretary General remained optimistic and reported to the Security Council that the talks had "progressed to the point where the overall contours of a settlement were clearly discernible". Thus, at a third review (28th-29th June 1989) meeting the sides under the auspices of the Secretary General agreed to continue to draft an outline in order to reach an agreement on an overall settlement in 1989 despite the end of the 1st of June 1989 deadline.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar, in order to facilitate progress, prepared a paper- a "set of ideas" or "food for thought" as he described it. The objective of the paper was to identify areas of agreement and assist discussions between the two sides in order to achieve compromise between the two sides\(^\text{[60]}\). The set of ideas was a 100 point document that expanded on the issues addressed in the previous draft framework. This paper which was conveyed to the two sides on the 24th of July 1989 was criticised by the Turkish Cypriot side. Denktas explained that Perez de Cuellar did not have the authority to present proposals of his own as this would give him the role of negotiating partner in the talks. He insisted he would only consider documents prepared in direct talks between himself and Mr. Vassiliou. However, accepted the
authority of Secretary General as capable of making proposals as a basis for future negotiations but did not agree with all the points in these ideas.

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot government had been organising "spontaneous demonstrations" along the borders between the Greek and Turkish Cyprus which reached their climax in July 1989 when more than 100 Greek Cypriots were arrested by Turkish Cypriot police upon an incident on the green line. Also Vassiliou, continued the same policy of internationalising the problem as done previously by the Greek Cypriots, specially the new Greek Cypriot government tried to link the EC membership of Turkey to the solution of the problem. Apart from the border incidents and the ensuing escalation of tension between the sides, another development affected the continuation of the negotiations. Mr. Denktas with the support of the parliament of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, introduced a new concept to the picture. This was the demand of a separate sovereignty for each community. From the Turkish point of view to have the right of sovereignty was very important. They demanded the exercise of self-determination in the event of the break up of the federation.

In an effort to overcome the impasse, after consultations with both leaders, the Secretary General invited them to New York on the 26th of February 1990. This direct meeting between the two leaders was going to be the first one since July 1989.

The UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar opened the intercommunal talks on February 1990 as follows; "The relationship of the two communities is not of one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the state of Cyprus. In order to achieve the agreed objective, both sides should be prepared to take into account
each other's concerns and be willing to harmonise their respective interests[61]. During
the course of the negotiations the main difficulty arose over the issue whether the
Turkish Cypriots should be classified as a "people" or a "community"— (in the UN
parlance the former entailed the right to self-determination while the second one did
not). Having been unable to resolve the issue, no further development took place.
Nevertheless, the UN sponsored negotiations in New York between the leaders of the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities ended without any results on March the 2nd
1990.

Despite the fact that the deadlock in UN-sponsored efforts to end the partition
of Cyprus continued, in 1990, after the Secretary General's statement to the Security
Council on the 8th March 1990, Resolution No. 649 of the Security Council was
passed. This Resolution laid down the main elements of a proposed federal solution
for Cyprus. It also requested the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good
offices in assisting the two communities by "making suggestions to facilitate the
discussions"[62]. The resolution was received positively by the Turkish Cypriots as
there were no mention of reference to the "Government of Cyprus" to "occupation
forces" and to "Turkish settlers" rather it talked about the two communities and the
leaders of the communities. Nevertheless, there were other developments taking place
in the island which made the possibility of resuming the talks more remote. Firstly,
there were the elections in North Cyprus on 22 April 1990. Mr Denktas was
re-elected as President of the TRNC. He received 66.72 per cent of the votes cast.
Later on, on May 6 the parliamentary elections resulted in the victory of the ruling
National Party (won 34 seats in the 50 seat parliament). The other parties (Democratic Struggle Party and the Republican Turkish Party) which oppose the position taken by the president and the government towards "federation" continued their criticism of the status-quo. The other development in mid-1990 was when on July the 4th 1990, the Greek Cypriot government applied for full membership in the European Community on behalf of the Cypriot state. This was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots (the reasons of Turkish rejection to the application for EU membership and its effect on the problem will be discussed in section C in more detail). In July upon the Greek side's application to EU, as a response, the Turkish authorities announced their intention to settle the deserted Greek town of Varosha. Furthermore, in October 1990 customs union and a protocol to end passport restrictions between Turkey and Northern Cyprus was signed. Both actions had been denounced by the Greek Cypriot side as it was the sign of gradual annexation of Northern Cyprus to Turkey. Meanwhile, in the early part of September 1991 there were still hopes for a UN sponsored peace conference. The UN special representative for Cyprus, Oscar Camillon proposed a four party conference between the communities in the island and their motherlands. Although this idea was supported by both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, it was rejected by the Greek Cypriots rather than Greece.

By the end of 1990, the Cyprus problem started to attract more attention from three important outsiders once again, the EU, the Soviets and the US. The European Parliament passed resolutions in 1990 and March 1991, calling for a just solution to this problem[63]. During the course of 1990 the Cyprus problem was discussed in depth
by United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Boris Pankin. The determination to solve the problem by the US was more evident especially after the Gulf War. The President of the US, George Bush, presented the status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable and pledged that the United States would do whatever it could to help to settle the Cyprus problem in 1991\[64\]. Somehow, by the end of 1991, when UN Secretary General Cuellar submitted his final report on Cyprus to the Security Council there was no solution to the Cyprus problem despite the endless efforts of the UN. But he finished his report saying that "A solution is within reach if all concerned are willing to make their contribution to a compromise solution that will safeguard the legitimate interests and concerns of both communities\[65\].

C- The Period Between 1992 - 1996

In this phase of the Cyprus negotiations, a new approach is to be followed as no improvement between the two communities materialised in 1992 when they met with the new Secretary General of the UN Boutrous Ghali. We now have to look at the developments which led to the adoption of a different conflict resolution approach.

The first round of talks under the good offices mission of the new UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali started in June 1992 with the purpose of reaching an agreement on a "set of ideas" (known as the Ghali set of ideas) and a map for an overall framework of agreement\[66\].

During the second round of proximity talks, the negotiations focused on territorial adjustments and displaced persons. On the territorial adjustments the "set of ideas"
brought a map which delineated two federated units. According to this map the
Turkish Cypriot administration would compromise a territory of 28.2 per cent thus a
substantial number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons would be able to return to
their homes. Mr. Denktas showed his willingness to accept a territorial adjustment
which would result in the Turkish Cypriot federated state compromising "29 plus" per
cent together with the constitutional safeguards of the Turkish Cypriots. On the three
freedom issue, Mr. Denktas accepted them in principle. On the issue of settlement he
envisaged a list of categories of Turkish Cypriots residing at the moment in the former
residences of Greek Cypriots who should not be obliged to vacate the properties in
question in favour of returning proprietor where the latter would be compensated.

In the third round of proximity talks (August 1992) apart from the above
mentioned issues, constitutional arrangements were discussed as well. At the end,
both sides gave their opinions for the set of ideas. While Denktas accepted 91 out of
100 paragraphs, he raised concerns over the points that contradicted his new ideas
such as the separate sovereignties and self-determination right of each community. The Greek side stated that they accepted the "set of ideas" and the map but subject to
negotiation to reach an overall agreement. The main issues which resulted in
disagreement between the parties concerning the set of ideas are listed below:

1. The executive - the principle of rotation of the president and the vice-president and
their mode of election.

2. The numerical composition of the federal council of ministers, the rotation of the
ministers and the principle of consensus.
3. The transitional arrangements, with particular references to the establishment of a transitional government.

4. Elimination of economic disparities.

5. The participation of the federation of the federation in international organisations in which Turkey and Greece are not both members.

6. The modalities of the implication of the principle of "sovereignty" for both communities.

7. The issue of displaced persons.

Under these circumstances, when a third round of direct talks between UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali, President Vassiliou and President Denktas started, the talks went into a deadlock. At the beginning of 1992 there was a hope for success in resolving the Cyprus problem as the governments' attitude in both motherlands were encouraging. In Greece the conservative government of Constantine Mitsotakis, which came to power in April 1990, unlike his predecessor Papandreou, believed in the necessity of improved relations with Turkey for the stability of the region. Mitsotakis was eager to engage in bilateral negotiations with Turkey. On the other hand, Ozal government in Turkey seemed eager to pressure Denktas to make necessary territorial concessions as in turn Mr. Ozal hoped to get some concessions for the Turkish membership into the EU. But still it did not lead to the success of Ghali's set of ideas. The failure of these meetings, as Boutrous Ghali reported on 24 August to the Security Council "should an agreement not emerge from the talks that will reconvene in October, it would be necessary for the Security Council to give
serious consideration to alternative courses of action for resolving the Cyprus problem\cite{69}, resulted in a change of approach to the negotiation tactics. He stated in his report to the Security Council on November 1992:

\begin{quote}
It appears from the recent joint meeting that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails. There can be no doubt but that the prospects for progress would be greatly enhanced if a number of confidence building measures were adopted by each side\cite{70}.
\end{quote}

Meanwhile, on February 14, 1993, Glafkos Clerides was elected as the fourth President of Cyprus after winning the election with 50.3 per cent of the votes over George Vassiliou, by a margin of only 0.6 per cent. Clerides who was the President of the right-wing Democratic Rally (DISY) is the first head of state to be elected without the backing of AKEL since 1960. Before Secretary General met jointly with Clerides and Denktas on 24 March 1993 (first time since November 1992) Mr. Clerides consulted with the Greek leaders and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis in a Pan-hellenic Conference in Athens about the negotiation of radical changes to clauses of the "set of ideas" which had been put forward by the UN in 1992. On May 24, 1993 in a new round of UN sponsored Cyprus peace talks in New York under the
auspices of UN Secretary General Ghali, three UN documents which included a series of confidence building measures were presented to the sides. These proposals, which are believed to be likely to prepare the ground for a federal solution are as follows:

1. Expert co-operation on the short term and long term water problem in Cyprus will have the aim of increasing the water supply.
2. Expert co-operation on education, in particular to promote inter communal harmony and friendship.
3. Joint cultural and sports events, including the joint use of Cetinkaya field in the buffer zone near the Ledra Place Hotel.
4. Regular meetings of political party leaders of both sides.
5. Journalists of both sides may cross the lines by only showing the press ID cards issued by the UN. Open joint journalist meeting room at the Ledra Place Hotel.
6. Meeting of the Chambers of Commerce and industry of both sides to identify and develop joint commercial projects.
7. International assistance shall benefit the two communities in an equitable manner.
8. Expert co-operation in areas such as health and the environment.
9. Co-operative arrangements on electricity taking into account the electric generator in the north coming on stream soon.
10. Inter communal co-operation in Pyla, including the free movement of goods in the same manner as agreed in Varosha.
11. Co-operation between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of Nicosia controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other.

12. Varosha (opening of the fenced section of Varosha under UN administration for bilateral contact and commerce, a kind of free zone in which both sides could trade goods and services).

13. Nicosia airport (opening of the airport under UN administration for civilian passenger and cargo traffic).

14. Co-operate with UNFICYP in extending the unmanning agreement of 1989 to cover all areas of the United Nations controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other.

15. Representatives of the two communities will meet periodically to propose additional confidence building measures for implementation by both sides. Among these measures, items 12 and 13 were thought to represent the most critical points as the realisation of these would be an important step in the establishment of a future federation.

In July 1993, the UN envoys started a new round of consultations in Nicosia, Ankara and Athens to promote the acceptance of the confidence building measures. The Greek Cypriot side in principle accepted these UN measures, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect of directly or indirectly recognising the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"[72]. However, after the interviews of the Greek Cypriot political parties, it emerged that there was opposition to these
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

measures\textsuperscript{[73]}. The Turkish Cypriot side, after consultations with Turkey expressed their criticism of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package. This unwillingness on the part of Mr. Denktas resulted in his being accused by the Secretary General that he was not prepared to negotiate seriously on the basis of the "Set of Ideas" advanced by Boutrous Ghali. The UN Secretary General conveyed his dissatisfaction with the Turkish side, in his 14th September 1993 report to the Security Council in the following words; "I am obliged to report that the Turkish Cypriot side has not yet shown the goodwill and co-operation required to achieve an agreement on the package". But behind Denktas's unwillingness to accept these confidence building measures were some important reasons. First of all, Denktas believed that the Greek Cypriot side was not willing on the application of the confidence building measures.

The second reason was the heavy economic embargo on the Turkish Cypriots. Especially the negative decision of European court of Justice regarding TRNC exports to the UK had a negative economic and moral effect on the Turkish Cypriots. This decision brought trade restrictions (e.g on citrus fruit, potatoes etc.) on vital commodities which is vital for the Turkish Cypriot economy\textsuperscript{[74]}. The economic embargo applied to TRNC resulted in putting the precondition of lifting the economic sanctions before accepting the confidence building measures. Denktas in August 1994 indicated his displeasure by stating that the Greek Cypriots had caused a major defeat for the TRNC before the ECJ at a time when the two sides were to be working on the confidence building measure for progress\textsuperscript{[75]}. The other event which affected the Turkish side's intransigence was the adoption of a common defence policy between
Clerides and the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou in November 1993. While the Greek side realised the common defence policy with Greece, TRNC Parliament decided to abandon the federation as the sole form of settlement in Cyprus as a retaliation to the Greek action. Denktas, moreover, stated that if the Greek Cypriots pursued these efforts and also secure a membership for their side of the island in the EU then the Turkish Cypriots would have no choice but to integrate North Cyprus with Turkey. And lastly the application of the Greek side as the government of Cyprus for full membership affected the position taken by the Turkish Cypriots both to the confidence building measures and the Ghali ideas.

In October of that year five informal meetings between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas took place under the auspices of Mr. Feissel, the new Representative of the Secretary General in Nicosia. The topic of these meetings was the confidence building measures. Unfortunately, the two leaders had been unable to agree on the implementation of this package. During the informal meetings, while Clerides accused the Turkish Cypriot side of abandoning the principle of settling the dispute on the basis of bizonal and bi-communal federation, Denktas criticised the EU application of the Greek side as divisive. In this period both sides started hardening their positions against each other.

Following the meetings, both sides carried out joint military exercises with their motherlands. Furthermore, tension arose when electricity supply of the Turkish side through the south of the island was cut for long hours during 1994-95 by the
Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots believed that these power cuts had been used as a political weapon against them by the Greek Cypriots.

All these developments sent alarm signals throughout Europe and the US. In order to remove the deadlock and bring the sides to the negotiating table the US government increased its involvement in the Cyprus problem through the appointment by President Clinton, of Richard Bettie as his Special Emissary for Cyprus. Together with him, the US Assistant Secretary of state Richard Holbroke and State Department Special Co-ordinator for Cyprus, James Williams, shuttled between Athens and Ankara at the beginning of 1995. As a result the first round of secret proximity talks between the sides took place in London on May the 22nd-23rd 1995 under the joint auspices of the UK and the US. The talks started in a tense atmosphere. Just a few weeks ago to the talks, in a joint communiqué dated, May the 4th 1995, the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and President Clerides, had affirmed that "the Cyprus problem is mainly a problem of invasion and continuing occupation and creates conditions of instability and insecurity in the region." Direct talks between the sides did not come about in 1995 despite the attempts of the third parties as Clerides rejected the idea, and the militarisation of the island is continuing. Cyprus is listed as one of the most heavily armed areas in the world.

During 1996 increasing international concern over the deadlock in Cyprus peace talks continued to grow. The European Council of Ministers, on 28th January 1996 announced the appointment of Italy's former Permanent Representative to EU, Fredico de Repoto, to embark on a fact finding mission to the island in order to
Chapter Six The Search for a Negotiated Settlement
deliver a report on Cyprus. On the other hand, as Carry Cavanaugh director of the
Department of Southern European Affairs at the State Department, who visited
Cyprus from 18-20 February said, they were committed to work on this problem and
to push ahead in 1996 to find a solution[77]. At the beginning of the 1996 the efforts
were halted because of the internal political developments in Turkey and Greece. In
Turkey there was a political turmoil as a new government had yet to be formed, while,
after coming to power in mid 1996, the new Prime Minister of Greece Simitis was
pledging to keep Cyprus at the heart of Greece and was adding that "the constant goal
of our defence policy is the reversal of any military threat against Greece and
Cyprus"[78]. Also, clashes between Turkey and Greece took place over an Aegean
island which could have turned of into a hot war.

Despite these conditions and in order to reduce the tension in the island the
US sent Ms. Albright, Permanent Representative to the UN, to try to bring the
commander of the National Guard and the Turkish military commander together to
discuss the demilitarisation issue. This initiative was welcomed by Clerides while
rejected by the Turkish Cypriots as they were not included in the plan. The deadlock
in the meeting still continues because Mr. Clerides rejects meeting the Turkish Cypriot
military personnel. He is insistent on not meeting the Turkish Cypriots unless the
Turkish side abandons its demand for recognition and accepts a federal settlement
based on undivided sovereignty.

In the summer of 1996, the situation in the island has worsened. The Greek
Cypriot side planned a demonstration which resulted in the escalation of the tension in
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

the island not experienced since 1974. The demonstration was prepared by the help of the government and the Church in Cyprus. The aim of the demonstrators were to pass the Turkish border and arrive to the Turkish harbour of Kyrenia and in this way, as they said, the last border in Europe after the Berlin Wall would be demolished. The demonstration took place on the 10th of August. The attempts at crossing the Turkish borders took place. For Turkish Cypriots this was a breach of their sovereignty. The clashes between the two sides resulted in the killings (three Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot) both on the same day and during September[79]. During the course of border clashes, both motherlands showed their support to their respective communities. Both Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers visited the island to give support and attend the funerals of their blood relatives.

To ease the tension in the island the new UN Secretary's Special Representative on Cyprus, Han Sung-Joo was sent to the island to explore the prospects for narrowing the differences between the two sides. The buffer zone events generated new political momentum to solve the Cyprus problem. But no face to face talks have, as yet, come about between the two sides although the Turkish Cypriot side is willing to do so. It can be said therefore, that in 1996 people of Cyprus lived the highest of tensions since 1974 together with increased international concern for the dispute. Before turning our attention to the analysis of the inter-communal talks in the next chapter, it will be useful to look at the role of EU on the Cyprus problem.
III. The Challenge Of The European Union In The Inter-Communal Talks

It is widely acknowledged that the European Union has a prominent role to play in the future of Cyprus. The EU's policy over Cyprus has been cautious since 1974. As Van der Stoel, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, put it in the European Parliament "The role of the EC of acting as a mediator can only be effective if all parties concerned really want the Community to play it. If one of the parties concerned says please keep out of this, do not try and as mediator, then you will immediately appreciate there is little sense in forcing ourselves on the operation before it started"[80]. The EU's involvement has been through declarations and votes in the UN General Assembly. The reason for such a careful role was threefold: Firstly, both Turkey and Turkish Cypriots are unwilling to accept the EU as mediator. Secondly, the EU has to take into consideration its own interests in such a way as not to destroy its leverage on all the parties to the dispute. And thirdly, there was no common policy to be followed in Cyprus because of the member state's individual interests concerning the Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. For example France showed pro Greek attitude. The probable reason may be that Greece was the second most important trading partner of France after West Germany. Moreover, France's position on Cyprus was influenced by its pro-Arab policy (Arabs supported Makarios' regime and considered the Turkish intervention as a Nato attempt to undermine the non-aligned position of Cyprus.). On the other hand, Britain and Germany adopted a more or less neutral position as
they were more concerned with the Nato's position in the region. Thus they were

careful not to support either Greece or Turkey against each other.

However, by 1990 the EU has decided to start Cyprus accession talks at the

end of 1996, it means that now they are ready to take a more active role in the Cyprus

problem despite the Turkish objections. Although the EU officials express their

reservations about accepting a divided island to the Union, still there is the belief that

the accession process will act as a catalyst to the solution of the problem.

The Cypriot application for membership to the EU had taken place in 1962

following the British application in 1961. This decision was made with the consent of

the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives according

the constitution. Following the application, Cyprus obtained an association

agreement with the EU in 1972. According to this agreement all the quotas and tariffs

between Cyprus and the EU would be eliminated within five years. But with the 1974

problems in the island, this phase lasted till 1987. The second phase started in 1987,

when the Customs Union between the European Union and the Greek Cypriots was

signed. In this period, the two would move towards full customs union over the next

four or five years. Within this phase the Greek community on behalf of the "Republic

of Cyprus" tabled its application for full membership on 4th July 1990. The Greek

Cypriots believe strongly that membership to the community will help to end the

Cyprus problem. As Clerides said in 1993:
We shall give priority to actions which aim at promoting the accession of Cyprus to the EU. We shall undertake every effort to persuade the European Union that progress in Cyprus’s accession assist in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. If Europe wishes to solve the Cyprus problem, it should help by expressing its readiness to accept us as a member\textsuperscript{82}.

The Greek Cypriots believe that the accession process into European Union would act as a true catalyst for a solution of the Cyprus problem. For the Greek Cypriots this means that a pressure will be exerted on the Turkish side by the EU thus accelerating the finding of a solution in the island. And it is believed that a solution will be based on the EU principles and the ideals (e.g. free movement, free settlement, removal of the Turkish troops from the island etc.). Although both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkey are willing for the Turkish Cypriots' full membership into the Union, they emphasised that it will be acceptable only after the Turkish membership because of security reasons. The Greek side is disturbed about the link between Turkey's membership and Cypriot membership in the EU by the Turkish side. The linking of Cyprus accession to the solution of the problem for the Greek side would be equal to granting power of veto to a third party\textsuperscript{83}. According to the Greek Cypriot Minister Mr. Michaelides "it is Turkey that needs to be motivated towards facilitating
a solution and not the Greek Cypriots. And this motivation could be generated by
speeding the irreversible course of Cyprus towards accession

The Turkish Cypriot side has strongly objected to the application made by the
Greek Cypriot side on behalf of Cyprus. The objections put forward were as
follows:
1. Cyprus is a two community island thus the Greek Cypriots are not the
representative of the Republic of Cyprus to apply on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.
The idea is that both communities should consent to such a decision.
2. Membership of the EU is unworkable in a divided island. The country is divided
into two so the movement of goods, services, persons will be restricted contrary to
the EU policies.
3. Constitutionally the Greek Cypriots are banned from making such a move.
According to the 1960 constitution Art. 50 Par. 1 (a):

1. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic,
separately or conjointly shall have the right of final veto
on any law or decision of the House of Representatives
or any part thereof concerning: (a) foreign affairs,
except the participation of the Republic in international
organisations and pacts of alliance in which the
Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both
participate.
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

4. Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional ban on Enosis.

According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee and in Article 185 of the Constitution, the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken "not to participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever”. If the membership takes place against these articles, this means the realisation of Enosis with Greece. Because Greece is a member of the EU, accession of Cyprus would mean unification of Greece and Cyprus.

The different attitudes of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the accession procedure put the EU members into a difficult situation. On the one hand they want to solve the problem before the full membership of Cyprus, as the EU agreed to enter into the accession talks with the Greek Cypriots six months after the completion of the intergovernmental conference between the member states in 1996. The three significant members of the EU, Germany, Britain and France expect that before the accession talks start a solution will be found for the island. Both Britain and Germany are unwilling to accept Cyprus into the Union without the solution of the problem as they believe that this nonsolution of the problem will result in extra burdens for the EU. Most of the EU members (Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Holland etc.) are also insistent on the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation process for the membership, but the Greek Cypriot side and Greece are objecting to this idea. In spite of the willingness of the EU to help the solution of the problem, as Hans Van Den Broek, the EU foreign relations representative, has said the EU will not recognise an independent Turkish Cypriot state. Yet the EU is taking a more active role in the
problem and attempting to provide some assistance in resolving the Cyprus problem by trying to bring the representatives of the two communities into some form of pre-negotiation discussion. For example, in January the 16th-18th 1995, the European Commission, headed by Ivor Roberts sponsored an all trade union forum in Cyprus to promote better understanding between the two communities\[86\]. Despite these efforts of the EU (to accept Cyprus into the Union as a whole), the EU emphasises that with or without the Turkish Cypriots, the accession talks with Cyprus will go ahead as planned. Especially, Austria, which will provide presidency of the EU by the second half of the 1997, emphasises that Cyprus should be included in the EU with or without the problem. Although the EU initiative is supported by the US and UN all is aware of the sensitivity of the situation, they all agree that before bringing the two sides to the table, acceptable conditions should be arranged. At the moment both communities in the island, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, are under pressure as there are no clear signs of a uniformed plan by the EU to be followed in the coming months. Although the EU is showing strong signs that it is eager to include the Turkish Cypriots in the accession talks, on the other hand they are careful not to alienate Greece as it might use its veto against the membership, not only of Turkey but of the Central European and the Baltic states. The EU, actually, is made of individual states which have individual interests apart from the EU interests. For example Sweden is insistent on the membership of the Baltic states as it is important for its security interests against the Russia. Thus Sweden might be insistent on the inclusion of Cyprus in order to
prevent a Greek veto (Greece threatens to use its veto unless Cyprus is accepted as a full member into the Union) against these states.

Therefore, the Cyprus conflict has entered a very delicate period in its long and troublesome history. The way to a solution is a complex procedure. In order to understand the failures to solve the problem during the years of 1974-1996 an analysis of the inter-communal talks and the events, which took place both in Cyprus and outside Cyprus, is necessary. This will be carried out in the next chapter.
REFERENCES


[3] When an interview was carried out with Mr. Schmidt in Nicosia in January 1997 and the question of whether the UN did a mistake by the recognition of the Greek Cypriot community as the Republic of Cyprus was asked he answered it by saying that the UN consists of many states thus every member votes according to its interests.


[5] Dr. Christian Heinze was assistant to Prof. Forsthoff, the President of the Constitutional Court of Cyprus.


Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement


Greek Cypriots did not find 1977 proposals satisfying and asked for a draft constitution.

[13] The strong central government means that the residue of unspecified powers should be entrusted to the federal government.


[17] See UNGA Res. 33/15. The vote was 110 in favour to 4 against 22 abstentions. Opposing votes - Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.


[19] Yesilada B. and Bicak H., the European Court of Justice Decision on Trade with Northern Cyprus: Implications for the Cyprus Conflict, Paper, USA, 31 August- 3 September 1995, p.13.

[20] See UN General Assembly Resolution No 34/30- demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Republic of Cyprus and called for measures for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes finally authorised the appointment
Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

of an ad-hoc committee composed of no more than 7 member states. It was adopted by a vote of 99 in favour to 5 against (Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Djibouti) with 35 abstentions.


[22] See UN Doc A/35/385-s/14100.

[23] The Cyprus Problem, Press and Information office, Republic of Cyprus, 1995, p.29. There are around 180.000 Greek refugees.

[24] Greek Cypriot side reason their demand of returning 17 per cent land back to them by the Turkish side because of the population number. But there is no law stating that the land one holds should be equal to the population.


[33] See UN Doc. No A/38/770-s/16246.
Chapter Six  The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

[34] See Press releases of 6 and 12 January 1984- issued by the Cyprus High Commission in London.


[37] Necatigil Z., The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, Oxford University Press, USA, 1993, p.266.


Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

[50] Yesilada and Bicak, p.15.


[54] Although the UN declined to give figures, the Greek side claimed that the number was up to 36,000 men whereas TRNC officials maintained that there were only 20,000 Turkish troops. See Keesing, September 1987, p.35406.


[63] See The Cyprus Problem, Nicosia, 1995, Appendix 22-3-5.

[64] Ibid, p.47.

Chapter Six

The Search for a Negotiated Settlement


[67] See joint opinion of Mr. Lauterpacht and Mr. Leigh "On Sovereignty in Cyprus and its relationship to proposals for a solution on the Cyprus Problem along Federal lines", in: On the Lawful Representation of Cyprus At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Nicosia, 1992.


[69] Ibid.


[73] Yesilada and Bicak, p.19.

[74] See for more details ECJ, Judgement of the Court, p.16.

[75] Yesilada and Bicak, p.36.


[77] Cyprus News, issue No 78, 1-29 February 1996.

[78] Ibid, issue No 77, January 1996.

[79] The two Greek Cypriots had been killed during the border demonstrations by the Turkish soldiers. After few days a Turkish soldier was killed while on guard near Famagusta area. The Turkish Cypriots claim that the soldier has been killed by the Greek Cypriots while the Greek Cypriots deny it. The Greek Cypriots also claim that the soldier has been killed by the Turkish soldiers. However the case is still under investigation.
Chapter Six
The Search for a Negotiated Settlement

[80] See Speech of Mr. Michaelides on Tuesday 29 October 1996, At the Independence Dinner.


[85] See Turkish Cypriot Memorandum addressed to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, TRNC Information Office, 12.7.1990.

Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

CHAPTER SEVEN

Does The Future Of Cyprus Lie In An Integrated Political Association?

I. Evaluation Of The Inter-Communal Talks

In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to show the developments which took place between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots under the auspices of the United Nations during the inter-communal talks (1974-1996) for the reconstitution of a pluralistic Cypriot society. In this chapter, the suitability and the chance of success of a federation in Cyprus are presented. Finding a practical solution for the Cyprus dispute, that is both acceptable and viable for both Cypriot communities, is the main aim of the work presented in this thesis. This aim will be undertaken here through the presentation of the necessary conditions for the success of a federation and whether they exist in Cyprus.

In more than two decades of inter-communal talks significant progress has been made in establishing some of the characteristics of the federal state, such as bicommmunality and bizonality. Yet there are serious disagreements which remain over a number of issues that are vital for the solution of the problem. The non-solution of the problem since 1974, brings to mind the question whether a Cypriot federation is really the solution. But before moving to the suitability of a federation for the Cypriot case, it is necessary to look at the main issues which could not be solved and have
been raised over and over again during the inter-communal talks. However, it is believed that an analysis of these controversial issues between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots would enable us to make further proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem. These issues, which faced the negotiators since 1974, are security and guarantee (external guarantees), territorial arrangements and equality issues.

A- Security and Guarantee Issues

Security is a vital issue for both communities. Although both sides, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, are concerned about security, the two sides express their fear of insecurity from different points of view. The Greek Cypriots' concerns arise from the invasion and occupation of thirty six per cent of the territory of Cyprus by Turkey and the expulsion from their homes and properties of around 180,000 of the Greek Cypriot population. Secondly, Greek Cypriots fear that Turkey, with its overwhelmingly military superiority compared to Greece and Greek Cypriots, and with the existing Guarantee System which gives the unilateral intervention right has the potential will and means of expansion over Cyprus. Thus, the Greek Cypriots believe that their security can only be guaranteed through the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island as a precondition to any settlement because they are perceived as the invaders of the Greek Cypriot territory. Also, as they believe that Turkey is the main threat to their security they demand the abolishing of the existing Guarantee System. Instead they favour demilitarisation of Cyprus with external guarantees like UN, NATO or the European Union with no unilateral right of intervention.
On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots look at the security issue from a completely different angle. Turkish Cypriots recall the inter-communal strife they suffered between the years of 1963-1974 in the hands of the Greek Cypriots. They see the Greek Cypriots as a threat to their well-being. Therefore all the Turkish Cypriots welcomed the Turkish intervention in 1974 as a response to their fears of insecurity. Still the Turkish Cypriots believe and insist that Turkey should remain as a guarantor to protect them. Although both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have accepted, as part of an overall settlement, that a timetable for reductions in the number of the Turkish troops will take place, they have objections to the international guarantees. Even the guarantee which can be given by the EU membership of Cyprus into the union, is not considered as sufficient guarantee by the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots believe that they will not be effective to protect them in case of need as the member states will not have the power to intervene against the human rights violations in the island unless they were invited by the Cyprus Republic as a whole.

B- Territorial Arrangements

The settlement of territorial dispute is also vital to reaching an overall agreement by both sides. However, during the inter-communal talks, this has been an important issue of controversy between the two sides. During the inter-communal talks much of the argument over territory centres on the 1977 "Four Guidelines" of Makarios and Denktas, according to which; the territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability and land ownership.
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

The Greek Cypriots believe that the area under the jurisdiction of the Turkish Cypriots should not exceed the size of their population. The Greek Cypriots consider "occupation" of 36 per cent of the island by the 20 per cent of the population (Turkish Cypriots) as unjust. So they believe that justice can only be realised if the Greek Cypriot refugees can be resettled in their homes under the Greek Cypriot administration, especially with an immediate resettlement in Varosha.

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots have accepted that as part of an overall settlement there will be a return of some land to the Greek side. But they believe that it is injustice to return some of the land they live in now. They put the reasons for that as follows; there is no country in which each ethnic group occupies such portion of the land area as their numbers bear to the total population. The Turkish Cypriots argue that before 1974, the Greek Cypriots forced them to live in enclaves amounting in total less than three per cent of the land showing that the Greek Cypriots did not accept the principle of an equitable distribution of territory. Furthermore, they insist that although their population is around twenty per cent of the population, the amount of land which belongs to the Turkish Cypriots exceeds that percentage. In addition, there is one important difference between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots positions regarding this issue. While the Greek Cypriots want to return back to their original territories and homes, the Turkish Cypriots are unwilling to go back to South Cyprus. They want to live in the North of the island under the Turkish Administration. However, the Turkish Cypriots accept twenty nine plus per cent land (29+ means the land should not be less than 29 per cent) under their
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

administration. But the Greek Cypriot administration are still not satisfied with this number as the 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees demand to go back to their homes in the North.

C- Equality

At the heart of this discussion lies the difference between equality of community and equality of individuals. Both communities interpret equality from different angles.

The Turkish Cypriots believe that the right of equality was entrusted to them in 1960 but was overridden by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots understand equality as the numerical equality in participation and powers of the government. They ask for equality in presidency, voting and civil servants. They especially insist on the rotation of the presidency between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities symbolising the equality of the two communities. Besides these issues, they believe that the right of equality as Turkish Cypriot people should be guaranteed to them by accepting their right of self-determination.

The Greek Cypriots are also committed to the equality but rather from a different perspective- the individual equality of all Cypriots. They believe that equality does not mean equal numerical participation in the government. They reject a rotating presidency. The Greek Cypriots believe that as a majority of the population, they have the right of representing the country. They insist that the power of the majority should be reflected in constitutional arrangements. So they regard the individual equality of all Cypriots superior to the community's equality. Thus they don't recognise the
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

Turkish Cypriots' self-determination as it will give them a separate community and people's right.

These areas of controversy brings us to the conclusion that there are two different political, legal and psychological perceptions from the two communities' points of view for "what the Cyprus problem is" and "what kind of solution is needed". There are however parallels between the period of inter-communal talks (1974-1996) and the 1968-1974 negotiations. The two communities in both periods have had contrary views as to the cause and to the solution for the problem. Briefly, the Greek Cypriot side views the problem as one of invasion together with the violation of international law and human rights since the 20th of July 1974. While the Turkish Cypriot side sees the problem as the violation of their equal status by the Greek Cypriot side and the domination by the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish Cypriots.

As already mentioned, since 1977 the only officially negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem has been agreement in principle to the establishment of a bizonal and bi-communal federation. After putting forward the areas of controversies between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, it is necessary to analyse the reasons of the continuation of the problem in order to understand the lack of progress in the negotiations. Then let us analyse the reasons which stand in the way of resolving the problem in Cyprus.
II. Reasons For The Continuation Of The Problem

The reasons which stand in the way of a resolution to the problem in Cyprus can be attributed to three factors: the internal reasons, the external reasons and the emphasis on establishing a federation.

Although the impasse in the Cyprus conflict is a combination of all three factors mentioned above, the internal reasons are the most important among the three. Without the Greek and Turkish Cypriot initiatives to resolve the Cyprus conflict, a solution will not be possible and attainable. However, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, due to certain facts which will be explained below, are not able to provide the necessary initiative to resolve their problem.

First of all, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are to some extent satisfied with the present status-quo. For the Turkish Cypriots, as explained earlier, based on their experiences between the years 1963-1974, the security factor became the most important issue in their daily lives. Thus since 1974 their security have been achieved with the Turkish guarantee. Although they are only recognised by Turkey and have economical problems, these facts became of secondary importance in their existence. Somehow they show no sense of urgency for a settlement.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots although they show more signs of dissatisfaction, are also not totally dissatisfied. The Greek Cypriot administration is recognised since 1964 as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus. In this way, they are able to receive a great amount of aid from the international actors (especially US and Europe), and as a result the Greek Cypriots' economy has
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

progressed enormously since 1974, and their economic standards are now at the EU level.

The other reason for both Cypriot communities' reluctance of urgent change in the status-quo is attributable to UNFICYP's control of the buffer zone. The two communities have been physically separated and therefore the brutal killings by both sides such as in the period prior to 1974 have been prevented.

The second internal reason, which contributes to the impasse of the situation in Cyprus and the present political situations in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities that in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the majority of the present political elite are still under the influence of the recent past experiences. Both the government parties (UBP-DP) and the opposition parties are in conformity with the ideas of bizonality, political equality and effective guarantee by Turkey. The left parties CTP and TKP, the main opposition parties seem more flexible as to the powers of central government. Yet, as mentioned above they are committed to the principles of bizonality, equality and the Turkish guarantee.

In the Greek Cypriot side, the positions of the Greek Cypriot political parties show similarities to the Turkish Cypriot political spectrum. The four major parties in the Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus (DIKO, EDEK, DISY and AKEL) show disagreements over procedures of the handling of the inter-communal talks\(^2\), but they all share the same views as to the cause and the solution of the problem. They agree on the principle of a single sovereignty belonging to the centre of the federation, territorially integral and bizonal federation\(^3\). The most important force in the Greek
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

Cypriot political elections are the 180,000 refugees who moved from the North of the island to the South of the island. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot parties have to take into consideration the demands of these refugees in their election campaigns. For the refugees, as said earlier in the previous chapter, a viable solution can only be reached through their return to their own houses and properties. Among the Greek Cypriot community, sacrificing on this issue is equated by injustice, defeatism and lack of patriotism which pressure the political leaders to take into account the demands of the refugees.

The other element which is connected to this section is the existence of charismatic leaders who would have the courage to break this impasse. In Cyprus it cannot be said that there are no charismatic leaders, on the contrary there are very experienced and charismatic leaders like Mr. Denktas in the Turkish side and Mr. Clerides in the Greek Cypriot side. A great responsibility falls on the leaders of the potential units to a federation. The role of charismatic leaders to push the people in the direction of an association is important. As Pepin says Canada happened to have a fine collection of politicians in 1867\[4\]. And the same is true for the American and Swiss cases at the early stages of their associations (the 19th century). In the Cyprus case, despite the existence of some charismatic leaders the time factor has influenced them in a negative way. The ripeness of the time will facilitate the role of these leaders to push their people in the direction of a federation.

The third factor which causes an impasse, from an internal dimension, is the disparity in size between the Greek and the Turkish communities. As in many other
cases such as Canada and Belgium, the percentage of the two Cypriot communities is not fifty-fifty. The fact of disparity of population in Cyprus was one of the reasons for the collapse of the 1960 political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This fact still faces the interlocutors with a challenge since 1974. While the Turkish Cypriots feel vulnerable to the Greek Cypriot majority, the Greek Cypriot majority demands "one man one vote"- a majoritarian democracy, as their inalienable right. Moreover, they believe that being the majority they are making far more concessions than the Turkish Cypriots by accepting a federal system as a majority\(^5\). Thus, they insist that as a majority they should be satisfied by an acceptance of a fixed Greek Cypriot presidency rather than rotating presidency as Turkish Cypriots demand.

The last internal element which contributes to the impasse is the social-psychological behaviour of both communities in Cyprus. The social-psychological behaviour has developed through the perceptions, cognition, attitudes and values held by the parties towards each other\(^6\). These attitudes, values and perceptions might be positive or negative. They are the result of a learning process. Having regard to the fact that there are new generations growing up in Cyprus after 1974 one would think that it is easier for these new generations without the past experiences of their fathers and mothers, to live together. Yet this is not the case. The new generations have been indoctrinated through their schools and media system. In the Greek Cypriot side the Church plays an important role in shaping the national feeling of the community. As to some French Canadians they still feel the traumatic effect of the British conquest of 1760 of French Canadians\(^7\). It can be said
that a similar feeling was felt by the Greek Cypriots in 1974 when the Turkish army landed in Cyprus and 180,000 Greek Cypriots had to leave their homes and move to the South. The 1974 resulted in intense feelings of humiliation and victimisation for the Greek Cypriots. As Dodd says Turkish intervention in 1974 became the traumatic event in their history. These feelings have profoundly shaped their social and political attitudes.

For the Turkish Cypriots the events of 1974 brought the personal and social tragedies to an end. In their indoctrination arsenal they emphasise their suffering in the period between 1963-1974. As Volkan says the Turkish Cypriots believe that "they had suffered and now their adversaries would suffer in turn". As the Turkish Cypriots suffered a high degree of fear for their security and identity, the de facto separation from the Greek Cypriots for the time being, due to the Turkish intervention, became the only acceptable option for them. In this way both Greek and Turkish Cypriot interests continue to be defined in mutually exclusive terms.

Therefore, the interaction of Turkish and Greek Cypriots during the negotiations has been conflicting. According to Morton Deutsch, the approach that the parties take to their relationship in terms of perceptions, attitudes and communication will in large part determine the nature and outcome of their relationship. Both Cypriot communities have negative perceptions and attitudes with no communication between them. So during the inter-communal negotiations each party has been trying to impose its own solution on the other side without understanding each other's worries and fears. During the inter-communal talks each side evaluates the opponent's most
desired outcome as its own worst outcome. Thus, although negotiations several times reached the point of decision taking, one side or the other dropped out. Both sides believe in their righteousness and in that manner expect compromises and concessions unilaterally. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been failing to look at the conflict through the adversarial lenses. This has resulted in the deadlock of the negotiations.

At the moment the two Cypriot communities are unable to move towards a resolution as the respective positions of each side on important issues are incompatible. But the communities do not bear the exclusive responsibility for the deadlock. The other factor which complicates the solution in the island is the external involvement and influences. The most important external influences which have been decisive in Cyprus are the positions of Greece and Turkey. The interests of Greece and Turkey both helped to create and protracted the conflict. As it will be remembered, the 1959 London and Zurich agreements which established the partnership government between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not have been signed without the encouragement of the motherlands of their respective communities. At the time Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war over Cyprus but they had the leaders to find a way out of that situation. As in the past, little has changed in this respect in that in any future settlement the role of both Greece and Turkey is decisive. It will be difficult to contemplate a settlement without their support. After 1974, Greece and Turkey continued their diplomatic and physical assistance for their fellow communities in the island. During the post 1974 period, Greece's slogan has been "Cyprus decides, Greece supports"[12]. However the main concern and policy of the
Greek governments have been to bring about the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus. Specially during Papandreou's premiership, Greece followed a hard line towards Turkey which made a move towards a settlement more difficult. For example, in 1984 in Greece "Turkey was officially labelled the chief threat to Greek security and Greek forces have been re-configured away from the northern border and toward the eastern border with Turkey in support of this new strategy"[13]. On the other hand, Turkey has built up a strong hold in Cyprus after 1974. Turkey has been determined to protect her strategic advantage in Cyprus. Hence, Turkey is insistent on concrete arrangements for the Turkish Cypriots (separation of the two communities). Because such arrangements would not only guarantee the rights and security of the Turkish Cypriots but also their rights gained in the Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish officials believe that only in this way the balance between Greece and Turkey will be sustained[14]. Cyprus has become an important foreign policy issue in Greek and Turkish dealings with each other. As long as their main objectives are satisfied it will be more probable that they will urge their respective communities towards a settlement in Cyprus.

The other major outside players in the Cyprus dispute have been the US and Britain. The resolution of the conflict has been complicated with the Cold war interests of the US as both Greece and Turkey are Nato allies. The Cyprus issue became a topical issue in the US foreign policy (between the years 1964-1979) because Greek and Turkish physical involvement in the island threatened the cohesion of NATO. In the years after 1974, both Greece and Greek Cypriots considered the US
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

as the cause of "Turkish intervention". Moreover, they believed that the US lacks the will to pressure Turkey to make concrete concessions due to its geostrategic position in the Middle East. As the Cold War needs were the first priority in the US agenda, between the years 1979 till 1991 the Cyprus issue had taken a place of low to moderate importance in the American foreign policy. Somehow in this way, the US tried not to alienate their important allies Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, Great Britain which is the guarantor power in the island has been pursing a "wait and see" policy. The reason for that is the existence of their bases in the island. Although both the US and Britain, as the second group of interested outsiders after the motherlands, support the UN Secretary General's initiatives, they have been unable to bring about just and practical solutions.

At the end of 1989, new realities started emerging in the world power balance. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the defeat of communism, national and ethnic conflicts were at the forefront. Although national and ethnic conflict has been a persistent feature of modernity, these kinds of conflicts were in most cases dormant during the Cold War era. There are many nationalistic conflicts all over the world now, especially due to the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia multiple ethnic wars have resulted. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the only new world power. Hence NATO under the leadership of US is faced with re-identifying its raison d'être. Americans find themselves as the only superpower left with a challenge to resolving regional conflicts. This change in the world's balance of power, might imply that the US and the West without the urgent Cold War
necessities, will have more capability to act according to the humanitarian and moral needs of the parties involved in the regional conflicts. However, the states act according to their own interests, and their foreign policies are designed according to the achievement of these national interests. In addition, they should realise that they will have better mediators and international help than during the Cold war era but the achievement of a settlement rests on the parties to the conflict.

In the US, starting with the Bush administration and continuing with the Clinton eras, there has been an increased interest in resolving the Cyprus conflict. The stability in the area and a influence in the island is very important for the US needs and interests towards the end of 1990s. Nevertheless, continuing from this point, it will be useful to look at the few external developments which might affect the American approach to the Cyprus issue. First of all, the strategic importance of the island in the Middle East and Asia has increased in the eyes of the US. The reason for this is that the petrol reserves which are vital for US interests lie not only in the Gulf but also in the area reaching to Kazakhistan. Cyprus is at the cross-roads of these oil reserves. Moreover, there is the strategic importance of Turkey in an unstable Middle East region\cite{15}. As a secular country in the region, it played an important role as a Western ally during the Gulf War. Also with the emancipation of the Turkic nations from the Soviet Union, Turkey has strong ties in those areas of the world which places her strategically important in the eyes of the West. On the other hand for the stability of the Balkans and the Aegean, Greece's stability is important as well and this makes America take into account the Greek interests\cite{16}. There is also an active Greek
American lobby in the US. This lobby puts pressure on the US administration for a solution which supports the Greek Cypriot position on a settlement. All these facts have been restricting the American mobility on the issue as in the earlier periods. Therefore, there have been no sufficient foreign policy changes in the US administration which could break the impasse.

The other important external involvement especially after 1990 as a third party to the conflict is the role of EU. Although in the last two years, with the application for a full membership of the Cyprus Republic to the EU, the EU seems to be taking the initiative for resolving the conflict with the backing of US and the UN. Currently, the EU is putting pressure on both Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriots hope that they will be accepted into the union with or without the North part of the island. However, the EU members show signs of hesitation as they believe that to accept the South Cyprus without the solution of the Cyprus problem might bring with it extra problems into the union. Thus, there is no guarantee whether there will be a full membership for the South Cyprus when it comes to voting in the European institutions. On the other hand, however, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are given the signals by the EU that the European membership will offer the only chance to end the deadlock for Cyprus. Moreover, it is quite likely that the South part would accept membership without the North part as the "Cyprus Republic" have signed agreements between them (the EU and the South Cyprus in the name of the Cyprus Republic) in 1990s. It can be said that the EU at the moment is trying to provoke both Cypriot
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

communities to move forward for a settlement. However, there are some challenges for the European members.

It is a known fact that if the full membership of the south Cyprus into the EU is realised, there will be an integration of the North part of the island with Turkey. This integration will take the form of federacy. This means that the North Cyprus, in its internal administration will be independent while its foreign affairs and security will be carried out through Turkey. This assimilation process has already started in 1995 with the co-operation declaration signed on the 28th of December 1995 between Demirel, the President of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot President Denktas. Such integration not only will create extra borders between Greece and Turkey but also alienate Turkey from Europe. This eventuality will result in serious security dilemmas for the West and US in the Middle East and Asia Region. The other point which is believed by Greece and some EU members is that if the Cyprus issue is linked to Turkey's relations with the EU then more concessions might be obtained from the Turks. This however is a misconception according to Prof. Manisali. He argues that neither the Europeans nor Turkey is ready for full integration with the European Union[17]. So the possibility of linking the Turkish membership with the Cypriot membership will not give a way out of the impasse. Furthermore, the Cyprus issue is a question of national prestige for the mainland Turks and any concessions which would threaten the security of the Turkish Cypriots is out of question.

There are three possible scenarios which the European Union might design for the Cyprus problem. The first scenario is the unification of the island under a
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

bi-communal and bizonal federation before entering the EC. This option is considered to be the most desired option although it is not achievable yet. The second scenario is a confederal solution. According to this option there will be a weak central administration having the responsibility for the foreign affairs, central bank, customs and environmental issues. Whereas the autonomous units will have the responsibilities in areas of education, culture, security, jurisdiction and economy. But such an organisation is far from suitable for the European Union because of the need for more integrated economies and security. The EU is moving towards a single currency and political arrangements. Thus decentralised economies and arrangements (for example increase in the number of micro states with small populations and size, are beginning to be thought as unsuitable for the long term needs of the EU) are not suitable for the EU objectives The third scenario is the entrance of the two communities, Turkish and Greek Cypriots as independent states into the European Union. This option, however, has two problems. Firstly, there is no guarantee that this solution will be accepted by the international community. The second difficulty lies in the unsuitability of the Turkish Cypriot economy. Under heavy economic embargo and lack of economic aid, Turkish Cypriot economy has been depending on Turkey. Thus, no sufficient economic viability has developed to meet the challenges of the European Union in the north of the island.

By the end of the 1990s there are more powers than previously involved with the Cyprus problem. Until the 1990s powers like US, UK and to some extent both Greece and Turkey have had reasons of geostrategy and of balance of powers for
their involvement. These countries offered solutions which had short term goals as to end the partition or maintenance of balance between Greece and Turkey. As Gobbi says "the continuity of certain thought structures, traditionally held by others to be a serious obstacle, in that they hinder the radical changes necessary for the issue's analysis"[18]. The important thing is to keep in mind that the only way to help to bring peace to the island is through understanding the reasons of the problem and then make concrete proposals to that end. The time for the solution of the problem is ripe as both communities Greek and Turkish are under time pressure because of the prospect of EU membership. Both sides are now more vulnerable to carrots and sticks policies by the third parties than in previous times. Unless they move forward and make reciprocal concessions they will face an irreversible deadlock which will not only be to the detriment of the island but also to the region's stability as well. The Cyprus problem has become a protracted conflict. As Edward Azar explains; protracted social conflict is a unique category of social conflict in the Third World in which structural behaviour (ethnic, religious, linguistic and economic) has led to over hostile behaviour (interaction) creating a complicated casual network that makes these conflicts difficult to solve[19]. As explained there has been a third party intervention in Cyprus, but because of the type of the conflict no successful results have been achieved. Due to the changed realities (EU membership issue and international context) a higher success from the third party intervention could be expected. Nevertheless, there is one important issue which remains topical and this is the question- what kind of a political settlement would be more suitable for Cyprus.
III. Cyprus And A Federation

The primary objective of modern federalism is to create an integrated and fully functioning system. With the start of the post Cold War era federal arrangements have been characterised as the best means by which the state unity could be achieved. In the world there are many political problems whose sources lie in conflicting national, ethnic and linguistic claims, and federal arrangements have been used as a conflict resolution mechanism in order to accommodate ethnic and national diversities. As Wheare wrote:\(^{[20]}\):

*One of the most urgent problems in the world today is to preserve diversities either where they are worth preserving for themselves or where they cannot be eradicated even if they are not desirable, and at the same time to introduce such a measure of unity as will prevent clashes and facilitate co-operation. Federalism is one way of reconciling these two ends.*

Hence, it can be said that the federal structure provides an adequate basis for the governance of diverse ethnic communities. There are many examples of successful federations like the US, Switzerland, Australia and Germany. On the other hand there are also many which have failed such as the communist federations (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) or the federation of Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, there are
two important successful federations in the world that still face some challenges, Canada and the new federation of Belgium. These two federations somehow present a case of intensified conflict between two nationalities (such as in Canada: English and French, in Belgium: Walloons and Flemish). Their future depends on the success of handling their nationality problems. These last examples raise the question whether federalism is an appropriate response for conflict management and conflict resolution for Cyprus. Since 1977 the challenge in Cyprus has been the reconstruction of a federal constitution. At this point, there are two important issues that should be emphasised. First of all, having a federal constitution does not guarantee the effective working of a federal idea (e.g. the Cyprus constitution in 1960s). The second point is that the Cyprus problem is not a mere constitutional problem, it is a political problem as well. One should be aware of the limitations of constitutional solutions. In the 1960s when a constitutional engineering was deployed to overcome the division of the island between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, the experience showed that the constitution did not bring what was expected. The real question in Cyprus is not whether a constitution based on federal idea can be constructed but whether it will work.

There are many reasons for the causes of failure or success of a federation. In the following chapter an investigation will be carried out to find out the basic factors which can assess the causes of failure or success in federations. After finding out these factors, the aim is to analyse whether the conditions for a workable federation exist in Cyprus.
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

A. The Causes of Failure or Success of a Federation

Federalism, although a legal and constitutional condition, still as McWhinney explains, is an attitude as well. Edward McWhinney explains that federalism is "as much a social-psychological attitude on the part of government decision makers as a strictly juridical condition"[21]. As he suggests commitment and goodwill for the maintenance of federalism becomes one of the most important factors. With the existence of goodwill and commitment, federal spirit and federal behaviour develops over time. According to Carl Friedrich, with the development of federal spirit and federal behaviour "agreement on fundamentals is achieved and similar forms of doctrinaire rigidity" is avoided[22]. Thus, compromise and accommodation which is very important in the functioning of a successful federation can be achieved. The above analysis can be summarised by Wheare's words[23]:

*A desire for federal union among communities is a first and obvious factor which produces in them the capacity to make and work a federal union.*

There are other factors which affect the successful functioning of a federation. Federalism usually has been considered as the second best choice as a political association. It offers a balance between unity for common purposes and still remains separate for ethnic or other local reasons. People of a federation are generally torn between the feeling that they want to go and the feeling that they want to stay. These
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

dual feelings should be supported by a constitution and institutions. The institutions should be devised in such a way that there should be no danger of an over powerful central government. In most federal states even in Switzerland, there is a tendency of growth of this central government power. There is also the danger of the regions inspiring greater loyalty than the union. To devise a ready made constitution for a new federation is very difficult. As Hicks explains; unless all citizens recognise themselves as having double loyalty, the existence of proper institutions cannot guarantee the durability of a federation. Whether federal structures provide an adequate basis for the governance of local interests depends on the existence of several other factors.

One of these factors is provided by the so-called crosscutting cleavages. For example for the success of Swiss federalism the crosscutting cleavages play an important role. In Switzerland there are four linguistic groups (German, French, Italian and Romanche) and two main religious groupings. Although these cleavages might be expected to promote violence and instability, on the contrary existence of these different guarantees gives a unique success to their system. Before moving onto how these cleavages bring stability and success to the Swiss federation, we shall try to explain how these crosscutting cleavages work in general. In politics there are competing interests. These different interests represent majority opinions in different states of a federation. However, if there is one split in a country (such as religion or nationality or language), the country will be in a danger of being torn with violence. On the other hand if the member state alliances shift through the existence of more than one cleavage then the potential tensions will be cancelled out. Because in this
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

way the individual cleavage does not become entrenched in the system. In the Swiss case the religious cleavage cuts across the linguistic cleavage (of the eleven predominantly Catholic cantons, seven are German, two bilingual, one French and one Italian; while of the ten predominantly Protestant cantons, seven are German, two French and one bilingual). In this way cleavages of language and religion cut across each other. While on some issues the Swiss may divide on linguistic grounds, on others they may divide on religious grounds. These cutting cleavages prevents a permanent majority factor. As Ross explains:

A society, therefore, which is riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts.

By contrast to Swiss crosscutting cleavages, in Canada the English speaking Canadian majority also coincides with a Protestant majority and the French Canadian minority is predominantly Roman Catholic. Hence, there is no crosscutting in linguistic and religious issues which is a disadvantage for Canada's system. However, Canada has been one of the successful multiethnic federations despite the lack of these crosscuttings. The Canadian case shows the necessity of a substantial number of
member states in a federation. Only in this way, the competing interests of the units can be pacified. Therefore the size, number and relative homogeneity of the component units become important in the stability and the success of the system[29]. As Wheare writes it is not desirable that one or two should be so powerful that they can overrule the others (e.g. as in the case of Prussia in the German Empire of 1871). There are variations as to the number of states of which the federations are composed of. For example, Switzerland has 22 cantons, the US has 50, Pakistan had two units till its break up into Pakistan and Bangladesh and Canada has 10 provinces. The number of units in a federation usually has the potential to act as a crosscutting cleavage as well. In Canada the existence of more than two units in a federation which is composed of two ethnic national communities; French and English, helps its integration process. When Ivo Duchacek analysed the thirteen bi-communal polities he found out that the durability of bi-communal dyadic federations is more difficult than multi unit federations. Dyadic bi-communal federations mean that there are not only two dominant communities but also two separate local states as well. At the moment there is one bi-communal federation which is working and that is Belgium. However, even Belgium is not a classical bi-communal federation because of the capital Brussels situation. Brussels is considered as a separate region. So even in Belgium there are still three regions, the Walloon, Flemish and Brussels areas. As Duchacek explains[30]:

Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

The distinctive feature of a confrontation between only two communities have no opportunity to alter their power relationship by internal coalition shifting. They tend to confront each other within a rather narrow alley that endows their bargaining or frontal conflicts with a zero sum quality.

The absence of alternative coalitions in bi-communal systems results in the confrontation of the two communities in every issue. Many dyadic bi-communal federations like Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, pre Bangladesh Pakistan and Czechoslovakia have been aggravated by violence and disintegration. The other factor in the bi-communal states which might have destabilising effect on the system is the possibility of their relation to neighbouring national states or blood relatives. This kind of connection of the units of a federation decreases the willingness of the component units in the federation to cooperate. Instead they try to get support from outside. Examples of these can be seen in Greece and Turkey's relation to Cyprus, France with respect to Quebec especially during the rule of Charles de Gaulle, England with respect to Northern Ireland or India with respect to Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hence, it might be said that foreign reactions can be cited as one of the factors determining the failure or the success in a federation[31].

Another factor which is important for the success of such a system is the desire of the acceptance of a federation by the common people. It has to be a popular
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

ideology. There are four classical and successful federations in the world (Switzerland, Canada, US and Australia) and these federal models has been tried to be imitated (e.g in Nigeria, Malaysia and many others). However, every country has different historical and geographical circumstances. So they need different remedies than those "model" federal systems. At the end of colonial period, some colonial powers especially Britain had urged for federal solutions for her past colonial territories (e.g West Indies, Malaysia, Central Africa and Cyprus). But experience has shown that a federation imposed from above in the absence of popular approval is likely to experience difficulties and may well led to disintegration. These examples have shown that the federal system was not only an unpopular ideology but also it was a way out of colonial rule. Thus, the people under a colonial rule accepted the federal solution as a way to emancipate from the colonial rule. In this manner there was no real commitment to the federal idea and federation as an end itself. Contrarily, federalism has been taken as means to reach other ends. Federalism was introduced to Indonesia before the Dutch left it. This solution however, only provided a superficial unity for the limited purpose of freedom from colonial rule. When the freedom was achieved, the other divisive forces began to gain strength. The same can be argued for Cyprus. In the late 1950s when a consociational federal solution was offered to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, they accepted it, as at the moment there seemed to be no other alternative. However, after a short time, it became apparent that the main objective of the majority of the population (Greek Cypriots) was Enosis (unification.
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association  

with Greece). In short, the results of these superficial unions have been costly for the people involved in these kinds of systems.

Connected with the idea of popular support for a federal system is the length of time to achieve it. Most of the successful federations like the US, Switzerland, Canada and Belgium did not start their life as the federal states of today. The US, Switzerland and Canada had been confederations at the early stages of their system. It had taken decades for an integrated society to develop in these countries. After passing a learning process through loose associations they appreciated the necessity of a federation for their well being. On the other hand, Belgium which had been a unitary state till 1993 became a federation, with the publication of the revisions to the Belgian Constitution. In Belgium, from the beginning of the twentieth century, tendencies towards decentralisation began to take shape which resulted in a federal concept in 1988. Yet the institutionalisation of the system took some decades in Belgium as well. Consequently, a ready made federal constitution has not much probability of success. Instead this constitution should be designed gradually by the people of the country who will be involved in a process of increasing federalisation. The successful federations cannot simply be imitated, the reason for this being that the material conditions which existed for certain federations, lack in the others.

One of the other important factors in most federal states which gives them their success and durability is the role of political parties. The more disciplined and cohesive the parties, the more likely it is that there will be federal integrity. Wheare writes in his "Federal Government" that "a good party system is a primary
importance in the organisation of a federal government but cannot be ensured or provided for in a constitution. In addition, a good party system is one in which sectional differences of interest and opinion have their opportunity and their due weight but where also an integrated organisation can be created capable of effective political action on a nationwide scale\[35\]. According to Ivo Duchacek political parties are sometimes called centralisers or decentralisers of a federal system\[36\]. But the important task of the political parties is to stabilise the member state identity as well as unify them. In this way the proper functioning of federal government is sustained.

The party organisation, for example the number of the parties, in the federations are important for the success of the system. Wheare and Riker in particular considers the two party systems like the United States party system as the ideal party organisation for the federal systems. Riker states that the two party decentralised party system is the main protector of the integrity of states in the American federalism\[37\]. On the other hand Simon Bogdanor states that one of the uniqueness of Swiss federalism derives from their party system\[38\]. In Switzerland there are more than two parties (four parties). However, despite this fact the Swiss federation works successfully. By decentralising and segmenting partisan conflict in this way it becomes possible even for the permanent national minority to have access to power. Thus as Riker emphasise "the importance of the ability of federal politicians to overawe and overrule, but not annihilate, the rulers of the constituent units" is important for the federal integrity\[39\]. Nevertheless, the type of the party organisation of a specific country depends on its political past and culture. Yet in a federal system
the structure of party politics is paramount importance as parties may have to provide
the real battlefield for the reintegration of policy when the formal federal
arrangements foster division and disunity.

B. The Success of a Federation in the Case of Cyprus

The points made in the previous section as to the durability and success of a
federation are considered to be the most important ones, besides the institutional
devices. For the durability of federalism the most important factor is the maintenance
of both diversity and unity, and both diversity and unity will be realised through the
existence of goodwill and commitment, crosscutting cleavages, the number of the
units in a federation, the acceptance of a federation as an end in itself and the role of
the political parties. Consequently the question in the case of Cyprus should be: Are
there good solid foundations for establishing a federation? Will a federation be a
practical solution to resolve the problems between the island's two Greek and Turkish
communities?

First of all, in Cyprus there is mistrust and fear between the two communities.
In the evolution of federalism, the media especially television, radio and printed press
plays an important role⁴⁰. In Cyprus, the media are enhancing the mistrust and fear
among the people of the island. Apart from the media there is the role of the schools
and the church in the case of South Cyprus⁴¹. These two establishments have a
negative impact on the development of perceptions and ideals about each other. In
this way hostile attitudes, differing perceptions and misleading communication are
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

favoured. There are coercive attempts to address the problem. So the result is an unwillingness to reach a solution. Even with the conclusion of a federal constitution, there is no guarantee that a commitment will be guaranteed for the full acceptance and support of the system because the qualities of a co-operative relationship is not present. In 1960 as mentioned earlier, a partnership agreement was concluded between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. The suspicion of Turks of Greeks and the different idea of the Greek Cypriots ended the partnership with a civil war. After the de facto partition of the island, the main points of the Greek Cypriot side for a solution has been the return of the refugees and an end to the Turkish guarantee. Nobody can guarantee that after achieving these two objectives in the framework a settlement, the Greek Cypriots will be fully committed to the functioning of a federation or that the Turkish Cypriots will not suspect every move of the Greek Cypriots and feel threatened by them.

Yet there is another factor which raises a question about the communities' commitment to the federal idea. In the era after de facto partition both sides seem committed to the federal idea (though they talk about different kinds of federations). Yet there is no psychological condition which would foster unity in Cyprus. The positive social-psychological conditions can emerge but they won't emerge immediately even if a federal constitution is written. For the success of a federation a spirit of tolerance and compromise amongst both the leaders and among the communities is needed\(^{[42]}\). Unless co-operation and basic consensus exist the viability and the success of a federation will be doubted. As in the Canadian case the success
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

depends on "you give me this and I will give you that; repeated twenty times"[43].

Unfortunately this is probably not going to be the case in Cyprus at least in the near future.

The existence of crosscutting cleavages as said earlier gives stability to a federal system. In Cyprus there will be no crosscutting cleavages because there will be two homogenous groups. Duchacek talks about the Nth group factor which play the role of an integrative glue[44]. It means the existence of other communities outside the two territorial communities which makes the other two communities cooperate[45]. In the disagreements over certain issues in daily politics these disagreements have the potential to destabilise the system because it might lead to the dissatisfaction of the minority group. The disagreements could in theory to be settled by the Supreme Court as a conflict regulating mechanism. But in Cyprus, this mechanism which was tried in the 1960 partnership, was unable to resolve the conflicting interests between the two sides. Thus, it is not advisable to make a settlement dependent on such a mechanism in Cyprus as both sides will look at the issues from the two nationalist perspectives.

Connected with the crosscutting cleavage factor is the number of the units of the federation. In Cyprus, the ideal federation is considered to be bi-communal and bizonal which means that the number of the main actors is limited to only two communities. There will be no possibility for them to change their power relationship. Particularly, since both communities are very nationalist and lack the commitment to a common authority, they will find themselves in a zero sum game situations. Moreover, there is a numerical imbalance between the two communities in Cyprus. This fact
Chapter Seven Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

complicates the situation in the island. In federations the decision making depends on majoritarian mode. The minority group, the Turkish Cypriots in the case of Cyprus, will be expected to place their trust in this mode of decision making. In the near future, this does not seem to be achievable. To reduce any state to only two sectors, brings out spirit of intolerance and the ability to control tensions becomes more difficult.

The last question is the position of the political parties. The political parties in Cyprus on both sides, the North and the South, will have a higher probability of dividing along linguistic and regional lines in the coming years if a federal constitution is concluded. At least for a few years there will be no national political parties which would stand up for the interests of the country as a whole. Each politician from either communities, Turkish or Greek will be dependent on an electoral base that is situated in only one part of the country. In debates in the Parliament they will be caught between their national mandate and the desires of their voters.

The position of the political parties in Belgium is similar to what can be expected in Cyprus. Although in Belgium, this kind of party organisation seems successful, the future is not very clear yet, as Belgium is still a young federation. In the 1970s in Belgium, with the start of the regionalisation of the party system due to differential economic development in Flanders and Wallonia, the regionalisation of the country started as well. In Cyprus there are socialist oriented parties in both sides of the island as well. AKEL has been one of the well organised political forces with leftist orientation (communist till recently) in the Greek side of the island. In the
Chapter Seven Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

Turkish side, there are TKP and CTP with leftist orientation. Somehow all these parties which might be thought to bring national solidarity, still support the national cause. Especially the AKEL party, which has more support among the Greek Cypriots than the other two Turkish Cypriot parties in the Northern part of the island, has similar views as to the cause and the solution of the problem with the right wing parties. Yet the leftist parties in the North part of the island favour a federal solution (contrary to the right wing parties which support an independent state). They support, however, the Turkish guarantee and equality of the Turkish Cypriots like the right wing Turkish parties. In conclusion, the party system in the island will have rather separatist than integrative tendencies.

The main objective of this section has been to determine the conditions of durability and workability within a federal arrangement besides the constitutional basis. An analysis was carried out to find out whether the Cypriots should expect that federalisation will make it easier to resolve conflicts between them and will bring a long period of peace and stability to the island. As Covell argues for the Belgian case, she says that on balance it seems that federal institutions should ease the process of conflict resolution. Federalism is often advocated as a system which can defend the minority rights by bringing some limitations on the dominance of the majority. But the federal institutions like the supreme court or the charter of the rights in Canada or the School Pact and the Cultural Pact in Belgium on their own would not be able to ensure this. The successful federations benefited from other factors to defending minority rights like crosscutting cleavages, etc. The twenty three year old partition of
the two Cypriot communities left them without any contact and with deep rooted fears of each other. Apart from these facts, they also lack the necessary elements for the success of their federation. Furthermore, the 1992 "Set of Ideas" as the most elaborate work done by the UN since 1974 for the establishment of a bi-communal and bizonal federation was inadequate to bring about a compromise formula as to the decision making election of the President or for a proper conflict resolution mechanism or the issue of sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriots regard this set of ideas as inadequate as to their "equitable participation" in the governing process. The Greek side remained non-committed. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots have conflicting constitutional demands such as the mode of the election of the President and the issue of separate sovereignties for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the question of veto powers. Both Vassiliou and Clerides had refused to grant veto powers to the Turkish members of the cabinet because the Greek Cypriots believe that these veto powers granted to Turks will impede governmental efficiency as in the 1960 partnership. Clerides stated that "although the set of ideas included positive aspects it also was disadvantageous for "Cypriot Hellenism". The proposed solutions did not satisfy neither the Greek Cypriots nor the Turkish Cypriots. The proposals seem to offer superficial solutions to deep problems. The constitutional engineering which is hoped to overcome the Greek-Turkish Cypriot cleavage has not been achieved yet.

In conclusion, it may be said that in the present circumstances it will not be possible for federalism to be achieved and to work successfully in Cyprus. Even in the
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

light of a renewed interest in the Cyprus problem especially by the European Union the probability of a successful negotiated federal settlement looks very remote.

On the basis of the previous discussion, the following possible scenarios for the future of Cyprus can be identified.

IV. Cyprus And A Solution

Scenario I

Cyprus will keep on muddling through as it has done so since 1974. At the end de facto partition will become a full reality. The Turkish Cypriots will integrate with Turkey and Greek Cypriots will become members of the European Union. As long as a solution has not been found, this is the scenario most likely to happen.

Scenario II

A "standard" federal system (as in the case of the United States ). This is favoured by many Europeans and the Greek Cypriot side. In Cyprus, such a federal system would be in danger of failing, as is generally the case in a dual federalist arrangement. The present situation seems to discourage the prospects of successfully implementing the concepts of the federal idea.
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

Scenario III

The disappearance of Cyprus as an entity, together with the creation of two independent states- the Greek Cypriots on one side and the Turkish Cypriots on the other. Such a prospect encounters fierce resistance from the Greek Cypriot side.

Scenario IV

A split of Cyprus into two states with a confederal arrangement in the short run and then a move towards a federal union, is another possible scenario. This formula is rejected by the Greek Cypriot side as it would mean the partition of the island. However, its advantage is that it would maintain Cyprus as a single entity at least formally.

The main problem in Cyprus is how to blend each group's legitimate demands for autonomy or self-determination into a collective and economic system, that is some form of federalism at the national level\cite{Gobbi}. Furthermore, as Gobbi says "the aspect to be considered in this case is the day after the workings of unification are agreed"\cite{Gobbi}. There is no ideal perfect system for any country. The one which suits the needs at a particular time of its development is the one that should be adopted. The best possible way to resolve the conflict between the two communities is the last scenario (IV). Although this option doesn't bring the unity the Greek Cypriots desire, it does at least not result in the partition of the island as many Turkish Cypriots want. A confederal solution has the potential of providing the means of overcoming the ethnic cleavage in Cyprus in the short run. This solution does not only have more
Chapter Seven  

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

chances of working for the Cypriot needs, it also defeats the aspirations of militant nationalism (the partition option). In the next paragraphs we try to define what confederation means in the Cyprus case and how it could resolve the Cyprus problem.

In federations there is a wide spectrum of possible types of relationship between central and regional governments:- highly centralised to highly decentralised relationships. The polar ends of this continuum of federalism are the strong federations and the confederated forms of government\(^{[54]}\). In the case of a unitary government or constitution it is meant that the legislature of the whole country is superior to any other law making body, (e.g. the United Kingdom and France). From a historical perspective confederations are forerunners of federations\(^{[55]}\). A confederation is an entity based on a treaty composed of states (independent states) which together participate in an ordered and permanent way in the formation of the central entity\(^{[56]}\). There are certain differences between federal and confederal constitutions. These are as follows\(^{[57]}\):

1. Sovereignty remains an attribute of the constituent states in a confederation and passes substantially to the central government in a federation.

2. Citizenship in a confederation rests with its members, but in a federation it manifests a political obligation to both provincial and national authority.

3. Delegated powers in a confederation pass from its constituent parts to the centre and may be withdrawn, whereas in a federation the central government possesses a sphere of exclusive competence of enumerated and inherent power.
Chapter Seven  Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

4. Constitutional amendments in a confederation must be unanimous but usually require only a qualified majority in a federation.

5. Secession is a right reserved to the members of a confederation but not to those of a federation.

6. Foreign policy and control over military forces remain within the purview of the members of a confederation although they may, at times, be shared with the national government, whereas in a federation external relations and national security are the responsibility of the central government.

7. Taxation is a power of the members of a confederation but is usually shared by provincial and central authority in a federation.

8. A constitutional court exists to adjudicate disputes between members of a federation; a confederation has no need of such a body.

9. A supremacy clause in the constitution of a federation establishes the primacy of federal law and treaties, yet in a confederation the laws of constituent states take precedence.

Hence in a confederation the aim is not immediate integration but a kind of association. This is the only way to bring two hostile nationalities, as in the case of Cyprus, to some kind of togetherness with the non-majoritarian mode of decision making. The non-majoritarian mode of decision-making is that the decisions will be taken unanimously[^1]. The objection to this kind of decision-making might be that the weaker community will have a veto power on many issues that might paralyse the government. The Turkish Cypriots in the 1960 partnership had similar vetoes which in
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

some ways led the system into a deadlock, e.g. on the tax matters. However, the 1960 partnership in Cyprus was not a confederal system. There was a single sovereignty for all the Cypriots. Thus, for the weaker group, which was the Turkish Cypriots, there was no other way than using their veto power in order to protect their rights under the constitution. The ability to control tensions in the dualist system seems to be proportional to the degree of autonomy of its members\textsuperscript{59}. It means that the way to accommodate the pressures for diversity is to increase the regional autonomy so that there will be less competing interests between the parties to a federation/confederation. With a loose kind of federation/confederation, many powers and responsibilities will be left to the constituent states. The central government can have the power of co-ordination of external policy, monetary unification and co-ordination of customs. The local states, on the other hand, can have the power over education, health, police, municipalities, culture, civil laws, regulation of trade, industry, agriculture, lands and non-renewable resources and tax. Over time the states of a confederation, due to security, economic or political reasons, might realise that a closer association (federal union) will serve their interests better than a confederal union. Thus, they might choose to transfer more powers to the central government.

As Hadjipavlou- Trigeorgis writes\textsuperscript{60},

\textit{The only way to test each other's intentions in practice without risking ruin is precisely first to try an integrated solution on a limited scale with an option to expand in}
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

case of success and an option to contract/abandon with limited losses in the event of failure.

In the case of two antagonistic nationalities, to create a sense of solidarity will not be realised in a federation in a short period of time. For example Trudeau, the Canadian ex-Prime Minister, hoped in 1967 that the appeal of separatism (nationalism) could be offset through the logical reasoning. This logical reasoning meant that the whole citizenry must be made to feel that it is only within the framework of the federal state that their language, culture, institutions and standard of living can be protected. [61]. In this way a national consensus at the federal level may be developed which can sustain a federal union. But, contrarily, the Canadian experience (Quebec's demand for special status and independence) has shown that the reason alone could not create the cement for the Canadian state. So even if the advantages of staying integrated in a federal union is greater than the separatism still the emotional appeal of nationalism is great which may result in separation. Thus in many instances, as in Canada, what is logically acceptable does not become logically desirable at least for sometime. So in the case of Cyprus, where the sentiment of national belonging is intense, to expect that a national compromise (based on the Cypriotness of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) may be achieved through the logically acceptable incentives could not be attainable at least in the near future. Thus the best possible way for Cyprus is a limited integration. A confederal solution for the time
being is the only way for such an integration. On the basis of these facts, now a possible deal to arrive at a confederal solution will be considered.

The package of peace for Cyprus should be based upon exchange of land for guaranteed self-determination. During the inter-communal talks in various phases the Turkish Cypriot side accepted (29 plus) per cent of the land, which meant that they agreed on returning around seven per cent of the land to the Greek Cypriots. The twenty nine plus per cent of the land was the minimum percentage that was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots because decreasing this number was and is considered as an unacceptable loss in both power and wealth. The Greek Cypriots are insistent on the return of all their refugees back to the North of the island. In the case that all the Greek Cypriot refugees are returned, the homogeneity of the Turkish administrated area will disappear, which is unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. For the Greek Cypriots, the territorial adjustments and displaced persons issues are vital for a solution, and thus have to be satisfied. New border arrangements should be made in favour of the Greek Cypriot side. Varosha and some part of the Morphou region could be resettled by the Greek Cypriots. But the percentage left under the Turkish Cypriot administration should not be less than the twenty nine per cent. The funds should be supplied by the European countries, the UN and the US in order to resettle the displaced Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots having accepted to give up around seven per cent of their land will obtain in return their right of self-determination and recognition as a separate state. The freedom of movement can be applied with the exception of persons having a criminal record. But the freedom of
settlement and property should depend on the consent of the respective governments; the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots governments. There is a restriction on the mobility rights in Canada. This example could be applied as a model in Cyprus as well\(^2\). In this way the Turkish Cypriots can be satisfied by securing their complete equality with the Greek Cypriots. The acceptance of this by the Greek Cypriots will be the demonstration of their commitment to a future federal settlement.

The other issue is the sense of physical danger by the two Cypriot communities. The reconciliation of the opposing demands for security is of interest not only to the two communities in the island, but also to Greece and Turkey as well as to the international powers. The arrangement should be in such a way that the Greek Cypriots' fear of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots' fear of the Greek Cypriots could be eliminated. The ideal way to give security to both communities in the island and the motherlands would be their membership both in the European Union. This way neither the Greek Cypriots will have the cause to be threatened by the Turkish army nor the Turkish Cypriots will be threatened by their populous Greek Cypriot neighbours, as both communities in Cyprus and their motherlands will belong to one organisation and that is the European Union. Unless both motherlands, Greece and Turkey are members of the EU the security and guarantee of the two Cypriot communities cannot be assured by the EU. The reason for this is that the EU is still not able to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state unless an unanimous voting is assured for such an act including the concerned member state. Therefore, in the case of Cyprus, if a human right violation takes place against the Turkish Cypriots
(being the less populous of the Cyprus population) it will be highly unlikely that the EU will get the unanimity vote (both Greece and the Cyprus Republic will veto such an action) and intervene Cyprus to improve the conditions in the island. Although there is a belief in certain circles that in case of such a human rights violation in the island the conditions will be improved as there will be the chance to apply to the European Human Rights Court, this will not also have the capacity to stop the violations. The reason for this is that: firstly it takes long time for the court to complete the cases and arrive to a decision. Moreover, even if the decision arrived is positive (e.g. to stop the violation) there will be no sanctions applied apart from the verbal accusations. So, the conclusion is that the EU can not effectively guarantee peace and stability in the island. The only way where the EU can effectively guarantee peace and stability in the island is through the membership of all the concerned parties, the Cypriot communities and the motherlands. But this ideal arrangement can not be achievable in the coming years because of the low probability of the acceptance Turkey into the Union as full member, in the coming few years. Hence, the security plan should be applied gradually. At the beginning of a comprehensive agreement there should be a gradual withdrawal of both Greek and Turkish armies. The Turkish Cypriots having acquired their self-determination and separate status under a confederal rather than a federal arrangement will feel less threatened by the Greek Cypriots. This is because their insecurity does not come from a physical threat but also from a political threat. The Turkish Cypriots with a confederal solution will have the power to establish their own independent state in case of a threat or dissatisfaction.
Chapter Seven Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

with the ongoing situation. This way to some extent they can secure their physical security. Turkey's geostrategic needs in the region will be maintained as well, as an independent Turkish state in the island will prevent a hostile development against Turkey and, therefore, their south coast will not be threatened. Nevertheless, as the way to a peaceful settlement in Cyprus should be based on give and take, the Turkish side will be inclined to accept an international guarantee depending on a confederal solution. The international guarantee should be in such a way as to include both Turkey and Greece. This kind of security arrangement will assure the Greek Cypriots and Greece that Turkey has no interest in "invading" the whole island[63]. The issue of the membership of Cyprus to the European Union should be decided by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the solution of the Cyprus problem.

The confederal solution will be an evolutionary process invoking a learning process and the need for flexibility. The confederal solution will enable both sides to establish the necessary infrastructure for cooperation. The fears of insecurity and mistrust could be minimised and even eliminated. This will be the major task of the education system, media and the political elites. The confederal solution will give time to the Turkish Cypriots in order to build on their economy up to the European and Greek Cypriot standards. Such a settlement for the Cyprus problem will give an end to the recognition problem of the Turkish side and the economic warfare carried out by the Greek Cypriots against them. North Cyprus, with the lifting of economic embargo will be able to benefit from tourism. This will be an important element in helping to increase their economic standards. This would not only benefit the Turkish
Chapter Seven  
Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

Cypriots but also the Greek Cypriots as well. The reason for this is that the Greek Cypriots have already reached the European Union standards. Under a federal union they would have the burden of improving the economic standards of the Turkish Cypriots. More investments due to the safe conditions in the country will be forthcoming. The Greek Cypriots will be able to increase their tourism and agriculture products as they will acquire Varosha and the most fertile land in the island, Morphou.

To develop a functional integrating society several joint committees should be created. One of these joint committees should be responsible for educational matters and media. Instead of negative images and hostile teachings, positive sides of togetherness between the two Cypriot communities should be emphasised. This way, aggravation of emotions and passion will be calmed. The negative propaganda should be checked by the joint committees. The Cypriot church has been the main institution promoting Enosis and anti-Turkish feelings among the Greek Cypriot community[64]. Hence a restraint on the activities of the Church also is necessary, most probably by the political establishment. Somehow there is no active involvement of the Turkish Cypriot Muslim mosque in the political affairs of the community. This is due to the acceptance of secularism in 1920's in Turkey and, hence, the transfer of this principle to the Turkish Cypriots. Another task for the educational joint committee could be the establishment of a joint university based on the English language. This university could give an opportunity to the young generations to mix and learn about each other. A similar project can be applied for a high technology hospital which will give an opportunity for the doctors of both communities to work together.
should be a joint legal community. It should contain equal number of members from the two communities. The tasks of this community should depend on the legal issues and plans for a unified legal system in a federation.

The confederal solution will offer enough time to establish a positive social psychological attitude in both communities. It will give them a chance to develop the idea of fruitful cohabitation and cooperation[^65], and only in this way the deep scars of 1963-1974 can be healed. The Cypriots have to learn as the Swiss say "my neighbour has as much right to his opinion, however stupid, as I have and anyway I can't force him to change his mind or his vote, can I?[^66] A confederal solution will enable physical separation of the two communities in order to ensure security. At the same time it will teach the two communities the advantages of political and economic union. After the initial phase, depending on the developments, they might move to a federal testing stage. A joint area should be chosen like Famagusta port to experiment a federal union. Depending on the its success (for example after five years) the areas under a federal union can be enlarged, and if not they might be turned into something like a free trade zone under a neutral supervision[^67]. If there is success towards a federal union then the Cyprus federation, after a joint decision, can obtain a full membership in the European Union. For a federation the establishment of a slow pace should be followed. It should be negotiated gradually by Cypriots. At the end, a referendum should be carried out in both sectors of the island and then a decision to go forward with the establishment of a federation (or not) be taken. If a federal solution seems undesirable then a partition will be the only alternative. The two
communities; Greek and Turkish Cypriots, do not need to love each other for an integrated and peaceful future but then have to learn to live together.

In this chapter of the thesis, the hypothesis which was set up in chapter one has been investigated. It has been sought to determine whether the political situation in Cyprus lends itself to federalisation as a solution. The overall conclusion is clear: the confederal solution for the Cyprus problem has been shown to be far more suitable and viable for a durable peace in the island as no federal solution will resolve the disputed claims over equality, sovereignty, territory, security and nationality. The advantages and disadvantages of a federal solution have been described and the potential success of a confederal solution to overcome the past negative experiences between the two communities has also been demonstrated. In Cyprus, federal arrangements may emerge at some future time out of institutionalised forms of co-operation through piecemeal and pragmatic process rather than being the product of a bargain or treaty.

In the next and final chapter, the findings will be summarised and conclusions will be drawn about the establishment of a workable political association in Cyprus.
REFERENCES

[1] This fact has been obtained through the informal interviews with both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriots especially the older generation, live with the hope of returning back to their properties in the north. However this is not the case among the Turkish Cypriots (young or old).

[2] The ideas were gathered from the interviews carried out by the party officials in January 1997 (United Front, AKEL and DISY). However EDEK and DIKO were unable to give appointments for an interview.


[5] From an interview with some Greek Cypriot party officials. The names of the persons interviewed will be kept anonymous.


Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association


[14] The point has been obtained from an interview with a Turkish diplomat in Nicosia in January 1997. The name will be kept anonymous as to the request of the person.


[18] Gobbi H., Rethinking Cyprus, (Ha'Dfus Hejadash, Tel Aviv), p.4.
Chapter Seven  Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association


[29] Ibid, p.11.

Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association


[41] In the elementary and high schools in both sides of the island, both in the teachings and the books a negative indoctrination against the other party has been
Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association

carried out. See the Greek and Turkish history books, Public Information Office, TRNC. In the south Cyprus, the role of the church has been negative in the sense that they keep blaming the Turkish side for the division of the island. Moreover they emphasise that the only solution for the problem is the rule of the island by the Greek Cypriots, for this see the newspapers- e.g. Kibris newspaper August 1996- the Greek Cypriot Church was behind the organisation of the border demonstrations carried out during the summer of 1996.


[43] Ibid, p.130.

[44] Duchacek I.D., Publius: Journal of Federalism, Dyadic Federations and Confederation, Spring 1988 No 18, p.8. In Duchacek words the "Nth" factor described as follows: "Paradoxically, the third, the fourth or Nth group may occasionally and quite unwittingly play the role of an integrative glue that holds the two otherwise antagonistic communities together. That is, the two dominant groups may cooperate for the purpose of keeping the other small groups in a political penumbra. For example, despite their mutual antagonisms, the Czech and Slovak communities were able to establish and for nearly twenty years maintain a consociational cartel for the purpose of controlling their German (over three million), Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian minorities. And this was an Nth group cement of the Czech-Slovak union". See p.8.

Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association


[49] See Chapter VI for more details.


[51] Ibid, p.476.


[53] Gobbi H., Rethinking Cyprus, (Ha'Dfus Hejadash, Tel Aviv), p.18.


[56] Ibid, p.62.


Chapter Seven

Does the Future of Cyprus Lie in an Integrated Political Association


[64] Cyprus Newspaper, August 1996.


At the end of the 20th century the emotional appeal of nationalism has been universally acknowledged. In a world which has become more complex, man's sense of security lies in its local environment and land. Thus, it is very common for two nationalities to clash within the boundaries of a single state.

Since the nineteen fifties, the Cyprus problem has taken many different aspects; from a problem of self-determination over independence to a clash between the nationalism of Greeks and Turks. However, the real Cyprus problem has been the history of the two nationalities warring in the island for the preservation of their self-identity and rights. Yet no satisfactory solution to the problem of Cyprus has been found. Many solutions till this day have been proposed and tried in Cyprus. At the end of 1950s, a ray of hope for a negotiated settlement emerged when Britain (as a colonial power since the beginning of the century) was ready to secede its sovereignty while keeping two bases in the island. The motherlands of the two Cypriot communities, who complicated the situation in the island with their nationalistic interests, seemed also ready to give up their nationalistic claims (the ideas of Enosis and partition). Therefore, on the 17th of February 1959, with the presence of the foreign ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey and the two leaders of the two
Chapter Eight
Conclusions

Cypriot communities a negotiated settlement was reached. And on the 10th of August 1960, Cyprus was declared as an independent sovereign Republic. Unfortunately, the new partnership between the two communities lasted till 1963 and was followed by the Greek intervention and, hence, the Turkish intervention in July 1974. Since the division of Cyprus in 1974, there have been attempts to establish a bi-communal and a bizonal federation.

One of the ways to accommodate two rival nationalities alongside each other, has been through the establishment of federations. Federal arrangement is one of the ways to solve national and ethnic problems. Despite the efforts to establish a federation in Cyprus to solve the problem there is still a stalemate in the island.

The work that has been presented in this thesis has introduced an original approach to the solution of the Cyprus problem, while addressing the setbacks of a federal solution. The conclusions of each chapter in this thesis will be described individually and then summed up as a final conclusion.

Chapter I introduced the reader to the concept of federalism and federations in general. The prerequisites of a federal arrangement were outlined and the objectives of our research were clearly stated. The first objective was to show the unsuitability of a federal solution for the Cyprus case while tackling the non-existent conditions for a federation in the island. The second objective of the study is to show the unwillingness of the two communities for a federal solution. The final and the main aim of the thesis is to find a workable solution- a kind of togetherness for the two communities in the island.
In chapter II a literature search on nationalism was presented. The aim in this chapter was to show how nationalism plays an important role in the international relations. The research in this chapter showed that despite the hopes of universalists, who argue that the world is becoming a world village, the world is still a place of nation-states. The survey also showed that many conflicts in the world arise as a result of nationalism.

Chapter III presented the development of the Turkish and the Greek national consciousness in the island. This chapter showed that there was never a Cypriotness in the island. Instead, the islanders identified themselves either with Greek or Turkish nationalism. Cyprus became another confrontation area for Greece and Turkey. Thus, the Cyprus conflict became in part a product of centuries of antagonism between Turks and Greeks.

Chapter IV serves two purposes. Firstly it showed the interests of the motherlands in the island. Secondly it gave the conditions in which a partnership between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots came into being. The system which was established was described as a functional federation or a consociational democracy in the island based on equal partnership of the two communities. The detailed analysis of the period showed the impossibility of other alternatives for a solution rather than an equal partnership in the island due to the aggressive nationalism of the people in Cyprus.

Analysis in chapter V showed that the new political arrangement for Cyprus did not work. The reasons for that were: most importantly the unwillingness of the
Cypriots to make the partnership work, the absence of Cypriot nationalism, the Greek and the Turkish animosity on the island which could not be minimised and the direct involvement of Turkey and Greece with the islands' problems as they did not refrain themselves from the desires of partition and Enosis. These results showed that the most important reason for the failure of the Cyprus Republic was the strong national feeling of both communities in the island which prevented tolerance and goodwill towards each other.

In chapter VI the attempts for the establishment of a federation in the island, in the post 1974 period, have been reviewed. The analysis of the proposals and the negotiations between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots showed that the problem is not only legal but political- security as well. Moreover, in this chapter the analysis has proved that both sides are not ready yet for a federal union. The reasons are twofold: firstly, the Greek Cypriots are not willing to accept political equality with the Turkish Cypriots. For example, they do not accept a Turkish Cypriot as the President of a future federation. Secondly, the Turkish Cypriots are insistent on having their right of self-determination which means that they want the right of secession. However, this right is not recognised in federations. The other problems which prevent a settlement are the security and the political problems. Both sides have different and exclusive approaches towards the solution of the political and the security problems. The Greek Cypriots believe that the only way to feel secure in their country is the withdrawal of the Turkish army and the abolishing of the unilateral intervention right into the island. Politically, for the Greek Cypriots, the only way to solve the problem lies in the return
of their refugees to the North of the island. On the other hand, for the Turkish Cypriots, the only way for assuring their security is the existence of the Turkish guarantee and the presence of the Turkish troops in the island. The Turkish Cypriots are also unwilling to live in mixed cities or towns with the Greek Cypriots. So the Turkish Cypriots demand that only a small amount of territory is to be returned to the Greek Cypriot administration. Moreover, there is the problem of establishing a balance of power between the motherlands, Greece and Turkey so that their national and security interests are satisfied. The analysis of this chapter has shown that the Cyprus problem is a complex problem involving both legal, political and security remedies. The most important finding of this chapter has been the continued unwillingness of the parties, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, to live together under a federal union. The facts have also shown that both sides still possess very strong nationalistic feelings.

The main aim in chapter VII was to analyse the existence of convenient conditions for the successful functioning of a Cypriot federation. In this way our hypothesis, which was laid down in chapter one, has been tested in this chapter. The evaluation has proved that the appropriate conditions for the establishment of a federal system do not exist in the island. The only way to achieve peace and political association in the island can be through a confederal arrangement.

The conclusions of the individual chapters have been described. However, there is a need to compare the results to the initially proposed objectives in chapter I.
Chapter Eight

Conclusions

One of the aims, was to demonstrate the unsuitability of a federal arrangement for the Cyprus case. This objective has been achieved by the analysis of the successful and failed federations in order to show the necessary features for the success of the federations.

Another aim in this study was to show that the two Cypriot communities lack the necessary willingness for togetherness, where one of the most important requirements for the success of a federation is the willingness of the parties to have a federation. The reason for this unwillingness is the existence of aggressive and exclusive nationalism among both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, even if a federal constitution is written for the Cypriots, its success will not be guaranteed.

The final and the main aim of this study was to achieve a workable political arrangement for Cyprus. This objective has also been achieved by finding out that the most appropriate political system for Cyprus would be a confederation. As it will be remembered the Greek and Turkish relations are very much connected with the developments in Cyprus. Hence, a workable system is of paramount importance for these two countries as well. Another failure, similar to that experienced in the 1960 partnership in the island, will be detrimental for all, the motherlands and the Cypriots themselves. The confederal association will give every one a chance to test each other's intentions with smaller losses in the case of a failure than the federal arrangement would. The confederal solution also gives a better security arrangement for both the motherlands and the Cypriots. The facts in Cyprus show that if the Cypriots are pressured to form a federal arrangement in the name of a uniform model,
for example in order to acquire the requirements for the full membership into the European Union, such pressure might lead them to the point of eternal break up. Thus, it should be kept in mind that with a confederal arrangement both Cypriot communities will no longer live in a structure that does not fully recognise their national goals.

As Friedrich says in his book "Trends of Federalism and Practice" (p.128)

A dual regime compounded of two hostile groups one bent on domination and majority rule, the other preferring separation and secession provides no foundation for the operation of the difficult system that is federalism.

This still is the situation in Cyprus. Although, as this study illustrated, it is believed that a confederal venture, which will finally permit the Cypriots to work through and discharge the hidden psychological barriers and past bitterness among the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot peoples and possibly give them a chance to become one sovereign people in bi-communal country in the long run, is to be seen. However, the responsibility lies also with the outside powers who would understand the issues and the passions involved in the Cyprus problem. The Peace is a dear thing, but it also has to be durable.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources And Official Publications

A- INTERVIEWS.

Denktash, R.R., President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Diplomats, their names will be kept anonymous upon their request.

Ertekun, N., Advisor to the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on Political Affairs.

Michaelides, M., Former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus.

Mr. Schmidt, The UN Spokesman in Cyprus.

Necatigil, Z., Legal Advisor to the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Papapetrou, M., Vice-President of the United Democrats Party.

Tselepis, T., Member of the Central Committee of the AKEL party.

B- TURKISH-GREEK CYPRiot OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

The Public Information Offices and Foreign Ministries of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot administrations have been consulted to obtain published documents. However, unpublished documents, exchange of letters between the Cypriot administrations and the UN, press releases (of Greeks, Turks and UN) have been obtained through the Turkish Cypriot Foreign Ministry, Archives and Presidential Office for the period of 1974-1996. DS: 109/75 1-9, AET: DS: 24/75/1-19 have been
used extensively in the Turkish Cypriot Foreign Ministry Office. Keesing's Contemporary Archives have also been used.

- **Looking Back. An Official Briefing**, Published by the Turkish Communal Chamber, 1963.
- **The Turkish Case. 70:30 and the Greek Tactics**, Nicosia: Halkin Sesi Press, 1963.
- **Cyprus: The Problem in the Light of Truth**, Turkish Information Centre, Nicosia, September 1967.
Bibliography

- The Economy of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Community, Turkish Planning Organisation, Nicosia, September 1970.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum on the Background of the Cyprus Dispute, (an official handout for journalists, researchers etc.) Nicosia: mimeograph, n.d. 1971.
- The Paradox of Enosis, Public Information Office of the Turkish Cypriot Administration, Nicosia.
- House of Representatives, Outline of the Negotiations Regarding the Question of the Municipalities in the Five Towns, Nicosia, mimeograph, n.d.
- ----., The Problem of the 70 to 30 Ratio in the Participation of the Two communities in the Civil Service of the Republic, Nicosia: mimeograph, n.d.
- The Legal Aspects of the Question of Cyprus, Nicosia: Government Printer, n.d.
- Turkish Answers to Greek Charges on Cyprus, Nicosia, n.d.
- Cyprus: Makarios on Enosis?, Public Information Office of the Turkish Cypriot Administration, Nicosia, June 1974.
Bibliography

- **Explanatory Note of the Turkish Cypriot Proposals for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem**, Lefkosa, 1978.

- **Good Will Measures Proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Side**, 2 January 1984, TRNC Information Office.

- **Press releases** of 6 and 12 January 1984- issued by the Cyprus High Commission in London.

- **Cyprus Summit**, January 1985, Published by the Turkish Cypriot UN Association.

- **Kibris Halkına Klerides'in Onerisi**, (translated from Greek into Turkish), KKTC Milli Arsiv Dairesi.


- **Kibris Konusunda Son Gelişmeler ve Cerceve Anlama Taslaki**, KKTC Enformasyon Dairesi Yayınidir, Mayıs 1986.

- **Bir Rum Gazeteci Gözüyle Rumların Londradaki Propaganda Faaliyetleri**, KKTC Enformasyon Dairesi Yayınidir, Ekim 1987


- **Question of Cyprus**, The Turkish Cypriot UN Association, Nicosia, 1988.


Bibliography


- Turkish Cypriot Memorandum addressed to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities. TRNC Information Office, 12.7.1990.

- Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion- They make a desert and they call it peace. Cyprus High Commission, London.


- Answers by the President of the Republic Mr. Clerides, to questions put to him by Mr. Erguclu of Kibris Newspaper, 1.2.1996.


- Guvercinlik Incident- Talking Points. TRNC, 8 September 1996.

- Talking Points on the Nature of the Cyprus Question. TRNC Foreign Affairs Office.

- Address by the President of the Republic Mr. G. Clerides at the 51st Session of the General Assembly of the UN. 26.9.1996.
Bibliography


- Kibris Sorununda Son Gelismeler, Dis Isleri ve Savunma Bakanligi, Kasim 1996.

- Greek Cypriot Views and Comments, TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1996.

- Position Paper, European Union Membership, TRNC Representative Office in London.

- Speech of Mr. Michaelides on Tuesday 29 October 1996, At the Independence Dinner.

- Cyprus- European Union, Cyprus-European Union Relations, Cyprus High Commission, London.

- Cyprus Problem: Cyprus Towards the European Union, Cyprus High Commission, London.


C- UNITED KINGDOM.

PRO.FO.371, Public Record Office, Kew Surrey, FO371 is the main political registry for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A range of files dealing with Cyprus were consulted for the period 1950-1965.

COLONIAL OFFICE, Cyprus Report for the Year... (annual reports published after 1878 up to 1959), London: HMSO., last annual report published in 1961.

Bibliography


- ---. Correspondence Exchanged Between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios. (Cmd. 9708) London: HMSO., 1956.


- ---. The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus: A Record of the Complicity of the Greek Orthodox Church in Political Violence. n.p, n.d.

Bibliography

- PRO FO 371/169522, CT 1052/10 (Briefings for) Secretary of state's Visit to Ankara, (E), The Cyprus municipalities Dispute, 23 April 1963.


D- UNITED NATIONS.

The files in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Foreign Ministry, concerning the United Nations Secretary DS: 109/75 1-8 have been investigated for collecting relevant information. The United Nations Security Council Index published annually has been used as a source as well.


- UNGA, 1514 (XV) of 14 Dec. 1960, "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples".

- S/5575 (S/RES/186), 4 March 1964.

- S/5593, 12 March 1964.


Bibliography

- S/5625, 26 March 1964.
- S/5679, 2 May 1964.
- S/6253, 26 March 1965.
- S/6267, 2 April 1965.
- S/6275/Add.1, 12 April 1965.
- UN General Assembly Resolution 2077 of 18 December 1965.
- Para. 111 of UN Secretary-General's report S/7350 of 10 June 1966.
- S/8242, 16 November 1967
- S/8323, 3 January 1968.
- S/9233, 3 June 1969.
- S/10005, 2 December 1970.
- Resolution 353, Adopted by the Security Council on 20 July 1974, adopted unanimously at the 1781st meeting.

- Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 3212 (xxix) 2275th plenary meeting, 1st November 1974.

- UN General Assembly Resolution 3382 (XXX), 10 November 1975.

- Security Council Resolution 367, 12th March 1975, Adopted at the 1820th meeting.


- Statement by the Spokesman for the UNSG, 23 November 1988.


- Opening statement of the UNSG of 26 February 1990.

- S/21183, 8.3.1990.

- UNSG's suggestions in the Report A/35/161 on Cyprus.


- UN Doc. A/36/702.

- UN Doc. No. A/38/770-s/16246.

- UN Doc. S/ 24472.


- S/25912, June 1993.


- UN Doc. S/8248 add.5.

- UN Doc. A/35/385-s/14100.

- UN General Assembly Resolution No. 34/30.

- UN S/15182 par 60-61 and 63.


- UNGA Res. 33/15.
Bibliography


- UN Doc. S/6267 and S/6267/Add. 1; that of the Turkish Cypriot side in S/6279.


E- EUROPEAN UNION.

The files in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Foreign Ministry, AET DS: 24/75 1-19 have been used selectively.

- EC Commission Office, EEC-Turkey Relations, p.117-119.


- Statement on Cyprus by the Ministers of foreign Affairs of the Nine, Information Bulletin of Community Spokesman no. 188 of 23.7.74.

- Commission of the EC, information, External Relations: The European Community, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, 603/X/74-F(E), 12-74.


- Commission of the EC, Bulletin of the European Communities, 6-1975, Brussels: Office for official Publications, 1975, points 1.2.01-1.2.12.

Bibliography


- COM(93) 313/final, the opinion of the commission on Cyprus Application For Membership, 30 June 1993.


- Applications for Membership by Cyprus and Malta- A4-0156/95 (PE 192.559/53).

- Welcome for Cyprus and Malta (A4-156/95- Bertens and A4-159/95-Malone).

- EC-Cyprus Association Council- 18th Meeting at Ministerial level (Luxembourg, Monday 12 June 1995).

- Common Resolution on the establishment of a structured dialogue between the EU and Cyprus and the certain elements of the strategy to prepare for Cyprus's accession to the EU, 251/2 (source: TRNC Foreign Ministry Office-AET D.S 24/25-18).


Bibliography

F- USA.


II. Newspapers

Cyprus Bulletin.

Cyprus Mail Newspaper.

Cyprus News.

Cyprus Newsletter.

Cyprus Newspaper.

European Union News.

Kibris Newspaper.

Monthly New Cyprus Magazine.


News Alert.

News Bulletin.

Observer.
Official Journal of the European Communities.

Official Gazette (TRNC).

The Economist.

The Newsweek The International Magazine.

The Times.

The Times Newspaper.

The Financial Times.

The Observer Foreign News Service.

The Sunday Times.

The Wall Street Journal.

UN Weekly News Summary.

III. Books And Articles


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bitsios D., Cyprus, The Vulnerable Republic, (Institute For Balkan Studies 152, Thessaloniki, 1975).


Bolick C., European Federalism Lessons From America, (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1994).


Bruce L., Cyprus A Last Chance, Foreign Policy, Spring 1985, No 58.

Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Dobell W.M., A Respite for Cyprus, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, February 1965, Vol XXIV, No 4.


Doder D., Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds, Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, Number 91.


Bibliography


Frenkel M., Federal Theory, (The Australian National University, Australia, 1986).


Gazioglu A.C., The Basic Principles Taken into Consideration for the Establishment of the Cyprus Republic, CYREP, No 9, April 1993.


Bibliography

Glass E.H., Ethnic diversity, Elite Accomodation and Federalism in Switzerland,


Gobbi H., Rethinking Cyprus, (Ha'Dfus Hejadash, Tel Aviv).


Gurr T.R., Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World

Haas R., Managing Nato's Weakest Flank the United States, Greece and Turkey,


Hadjipavlou M. and Trigeorgis L., Cyprus An Evolutionary Approach to conflict

Halliday F., Internationalism in International Relations, Three Concepts of
Internationalism, International Affairs, 1988, Vol 64.

Harding Lord., The Cyprus Problem in Relation to the Middle East, International
Affairs, 1958, Vol 34.

Hare P.A., Cyprus Conflict and its Resolution, (Inagural Lecture, University of Cape
Town, No 25, 7th May 1974,).

Hayes J.H., Carlton, Essays on Nationalism, (The Macmillan Company, New York,
1941).

Hayes J.H., Carlton, Nationalism: A Religion, ( The Macmillan Company, New York,
1960).

Hayes J.H., Carlton, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, (Russell and
Heinze C., *The Cyprus Conflict the Western Peace System is Put to Test*. (Public Information office of the TFSC, Nicosia, 1977).


Bibliography


Laforest G. and Brown D., *Integration and Fragmentation: the Paradox of The Late Twentieth Century*, (Reflections Paper No:12, Institute of Intergovermental Relations, Canada, 1994).


Lewis G., Modern Turkey, (Ernst Benn Limited, London& Tonbridge, 1974).


Oman C.W.C., *The Byzantine Empire*. (Putnam's Sons, USA, 1892).
Bibliography

Orek O., *The Question of Cyprus*, (Cyprus Turkish Information Office, Nicosia, 1971).


Bibliography


Bibliography


Smith A.D., Theories of Nationalism. (Holmes and Meier, New York, 1983).


Spyridakis C., A Brief History of Cyprus. (Publication Department Greek Communal Chamber, Nicosia-Cyprus, 1964).


Bibliography


Tsardanidis C., The European Community and the Cyprus Problem Since 1974, 


Bibliography


Yesilada B. and Bicak A., the European Court of Justice Decision on Trade with Northern Cyprus: Implications for the Cyprus Conflict, *Paper*, USA, 31 August 3 September 1995.


IV. Ph.D. Dissertations


