TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION’S SECURITY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1953-60

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Muhammet Faruk CAKIR
Department of Politics
University of Leicester

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M. FARUK CAKIR
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ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses how the Eisenhower administration (1953-60) saw Turkey's
position in relation to the defence of Western Europe and the Middle East. It argues
that the administration’s cold war strategy, which envisaged that the US should prevail
over the Soviet bloc in the long-term while avoiding a war with the Soviet Union,
affected US-Turkish collaboration in security and defence matters in two ways. On the
one hand it constituted the basis of US-Turkish co-operation against the perceived
Soviet threat. In this context, Washington granted a security guarantee to Turkey,
helped it to improve its economic and military posture, preferred that the country’s
regime remained pro-Western, tried to organise a defence system among the 'northern
tier' countries of the Middle East in which Turkey played a leading role, and utilised
Turkey’s territory, military power and diplomatic service for the attainment of
American objectives in the cold war. On the other hand, the American cold war
strategy led the US to pay a particular attention to the Soviet security concerns. In
American thinking, if US-Turkish collaboration in military and political fields upset the
regional status quo, this might provoke a strong Soviet reaction in Europe or in the
Middle East. Considering this, the US exercised restraint in its security collaboration
with Turkey. Utilising principally declassified American governmental documents, this
study reaches the conclusion that the single most important factor that shaped US-
Turkish security relations was the American strategic interests in the cold war.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSP</td>
<td>Arab League Collective Security Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>CNU</td>
<td>Committee of National Union, Turkey</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party, Turkey</td>
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<td>EL</td>
<td>Dwight David Eisenhower Library, US National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Mutual Assistance Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Middle East Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDO</td>
<td>Middle East Defence Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAPMA</td>
<td>Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, EUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>OERA</td>
<td>Office Of European Regional Affairs, EUR</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Policy Planning Staff, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party, Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command, US</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANSA</td>
<td>White House Office, Special Assistance to the President for National Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1. Subject, Purpose and Scope of the Thesis

The politico-strategic collaboration between Turkey and the United States, which originated simultaneously with the inception of Soviet-American rivalry after World War II, was marked by the coincidence of interests in its early years.¹ Both countries perceived that the Soviet Union posed a grave threat to their vital interests. For Washington, Moscow represented a challenge to the new order which it sought to impose in the post-war era. When the Soviet Union saw the American design as against its interests, the stage was set for the confrontation between the two great powers. The US sought to prevent the spread of Soviet influence beyond the areas that were already under the Kremlin’s control, what became known as the policy of ‘containment’. Turkey, because of its strategic position, was one of the countries that could significantly augment the American position vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. Similarly, Turkey, having ideologically affiliated itself with the West, preferred to align with the United States in the post-war era after being the object of several Soviet notes in 1945 and 1946, which asked for Turkey to return Kars and Ardahan provinces and to accept Soviet participation in the defence of the Turkish Straits. The Turks also saw the US as the source of economic and military aid.²

The post-war era until the mid-1960s was regarded as a ‘honeymoon’ period in Turkish-American relations. The US helped Turkey economically and militarily after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and committed itself to Turkey’s security as a result of the country’s inclusion in NATO in February 1952. As George Harris observed, the NATO connection ‘served as the general foundation for the whole range of political, military and economic relations’.³ During the Eisenhower Presidency co-operation between two countries further improved. The new

² Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, pp.174-75; French A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporos, (Baltimore, 1971), pp.115, 120.
³ Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.49.
administration's understanding of containment envisaged that the West should prevail over the East in the long-term. This approach made it more important than before to implement the policy of containment in the geographical areas adjacent to the Communist bloc. In the 1950s, the US helped Turkey to improve its political, economic and military standing as a member of NATO. In addition, the period saw a strong US-Turkish collaboration in defence of the Middle East. Turkey took an active part in bringing about defence arrangements for the region and provided the US with a basing and staging area for operations. Against this background, this study analyses and explains the issues relating to Turkey's security, and the part the country played in the European and the Middle Eastern defence as seen by the Eisenhower administration in the period between 1953 and 1960.

The study as a whole seeks to answer three major questions. First, what were the reasons for the American interest in Turkey's security, and how was this interest reflected in different occasions throughout the 1950s? Second, the Eisenhower administration's cold war strategy aimed at preventing the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and the Middle East while avoiding a direct conflict with the Soviet Union itself. In what ways did the American competition with the Communist bloc in the rigid bipolar international system of the 1950s affect US-Turkish collaboration in defending Western Europe and the Middle East? Third, and related to the previous questions, whose concerns and preferences were reflected more in US-Turkish security relations in the 1950s? Answering this question helps us to decide which side was more influential in determining the scope of their relations.

In approaching the above questions this research highlights the importance of two points. First, it attempts to understand American relations with Turkey in the context of the global conflict between the East and the West. Putting relations into their wider context may help us to discover the reasons, motives and aims behind US

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5 This idea was inspired by Hans Morgenthau's observation that the value of an alliance relationship should be assessed 'in the context of over-all policies within which it is expected to operate.' Politics Among Nations (revised edition by Kenneth W. Thompson), (New York, 1993), p.201.
attitudes towards Turkey in different developments and episodes. Second, it draws attention to the necessity of analysing Turkey's contribution to the Western European and Middle Eastern defence in the light of the fact that the defence of the Middle East can augment the Western European defence.

The scope of this study is limited in several ways. Firstly, it deals with those security interactions between the US and Turkey relating to their collaboration against the perceived common threat from the Eastern bloc. Consequently, there are a number of security interactions which are not included in this study. The dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, for example, is excluded because, although it was a regional security problem in which the Americans were involved to a degree as the ally of the both sides, it was not directly related to meeting the communist threat. Secondly, since a full account of US-Turkish collaboration against the communist threat is impossible given space restraints, this research restricted itself to the examination of the rationale behind key developments and the important trends in American policy. For example, the technical details of aid programmes and of arrangements over the use of American military facilities in Turkey are not included. Instead, the reasons why the economic and military needs of Turkey became a security concern for the US are analysed. Thirdly, US-Turkish security co-operation has been examined primarily from the American point of view. This is a practical necessity given the fact that, whereas a wealth of American governmental documentation is available for research, Turkish national archives are not open to researchers. Un fortunately the necessity of relying heavily on the American sources with their inevitable bias makes it difficult to produce a complete, balanced account.

The period in question (1953-1960) holds a particular significance. It has been chosen to coincide with the Eisenhower presidency. The 1950s witnessed the intensification of Soviet-American rivalry. In response to the Soviet bloc challenge, Eisenhower's

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6 Other authors also pointed out the problem of access to Turkish archives. For example, see Bilge Nur Criss, 'U.S. Forces in Turkey', in Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe, (Boulder, 1993), p.333 and editors note on sources, p.400; Hamit Ersoy, Turkey's Involvement in Western Defence Initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (Durham University, 1994), p.6.

7 For the works referred in this paragraph, see the bibliography.
national security policy heavily relied on nuclear weapons and an elaborate alliance system as a means of deterrence. In this period, Turkey actively involved in the Western defence efforts through its membership of NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Examining Turkish-American security relations in a period of heightened superpower confrontation provides an opportunity to understand better the value of a small, but strategically located country for its powerful ally. In most of this period, the Democratic Party, led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was in power in Turkey and managed to establish close relations with the United States. But the military ousted this government on 27 May 1960, and consolidated its hold on power during the remainder of that year. So the period of our study also provides an opportunity to compare the US position towards civilian and military regimes. Furthermore, the period in question saw an increase in American involvement in the affairs of the Middle East. Until the Suez war of late 1956, Britain was still regarded as the leading Western power in the region and the US was mainly interested in the defence of the countries in the north. In this period, major Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria were politically unstable. To destroy Israel and to end the residual influence of the United Kingdom in the Arab world were the principal objectives of the Arabs. After the Suez War the United States in particular sought to mobilise the region against communism regardless of Arab doubts. Studying the 1950s is important in terms of observing how Turkey's pro-Western stance, especially its role in the Baghdad Pact and in the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine, was evaluated by the Americans.

2. Literature and Sources

The motives that led to the US commitment to Turkey's security in the period between 1945 and 1952 have been covered in works by Bruce Kuniholm (1984) and Melvyn Leffler (1992) who draw mainly upon archival sources. They convincingly argue that the Truman administration, in its security interactions with Turkey, sought to promote the position of the Western bloc vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc in both the European and the Middle Eastern theatres. But the studies on later periods generally concentrate on the analysis of the policies of major Western powers towards the Middle East. In works by such authors as Nigel Ashton (1996) and David Devereux (1990), the policies of the US and the UK received extensive coverage. Wyn Rees' work (1996) also provides a
comparative analysis of the British and American approaches to NATO and the Baghdad Pact in the period between 1955 and 1960. In addition, Turkey’s role in the Baghdad Pact has been treated in detail in various studies which utilised British governmental records. But, in the specific area of US policy towards Turkey there are no comparable studies. David Lesch (1992) analysed the role of Turkey in the Syrian crisis of summer 1957 in relation to American policy towards Syria, and Philip Nash (1997) analysed the deployment of American medium range missiles in Turkey as part of wider deployment programme in NATO controlled Europe. Apart from them, earlier studies on US-Turkish relations by French Vali (1971), George Harris (1972), and the Turkish author, Oral Sander (1979), are still the major sources in which American policies towards Turkey are analysed in some detail. Because these studies were done in the 1970s, they have not made use of American archival material. For this reason, there seems to be a need for re-evaluation of the factors that shaped the American view of its security interactions with Turkey in the 1950s in the light of recently available documents. This study seeks to provide this and it therefore may make a contribution to the existing literature.

This study is mainly based on archival material which has been gathered from various US sources. The records of the National Security Council (NSC) were consulted in order not only to determine what the details of the course of action which the American government intended to implement (the planned policy) were, but also to know the views of the participants of the Council meetings. It is important to point out that the NSC decisions provided guidance on national security matters to be followed by all US official departments and the Eisenhower administration attached particular importance to this body in the decision making process. In addition, the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided the views of the military authorities on major policy issues. The files of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Lauris

8 Ersoy, Turkey’s Involvement; Huseyin Bagci, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dis Politikasi (Foreign Policy During the Democratic Party Period), (Ankara, 1990). Bagci also consulted some documents from American archives until the end of 1954.

9 In addition to the material which was gathered from the US National Archives in College Park, Maryland and the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, the Foreign Relations of the United States series are the main sources of the US government documents. The ‘Declassified Documents Reference System’ also contains some important documents.
Norstad (1956-63), was another source of information about the details of some military matters. On matters relating to the implementation of policy, a variety of State Department records were consulted, including correspondence between the Department and relevant US diplomatic posts, the records of the Secretary of State, John F. Dulles (1953-59), and the records of such State Department agencies as the Policy Planning Staff, the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. On the Turkish side, because of the non-availability of archival records, information is derived from public documents, secondary sources and a few memoirs. References in American documents to the views of the Turkish authorities and reviews of developments in Turkey by the American Embassy in Ankara supplied additional valuable information.

3. Structure of the Thesis

The first chapter reviews the historical development of American foreign and security policy with a special emphasis on the US policy of containment, and will be used as a framework for reference in the subsequent chapters. It also provides information about President Eisenhower’s style of leadership.

The second chapter examines American policy towards Turkey in the 1945-1952 period. Its focus is on why the Truman administration supported the Turkish position against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1946, included the country in the Truman doctrine and supported the Turkish bid for NATO membership in 1951.

The third chapter investigates the development of the northern tier concept and Turkey’s role in its implementation in the period before the Suez war of late 1956. It seeks to explain why the US made a distinction between the ‘northern tier’ countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan) and the rest of the region, a distinction which particularly affected the US perception of Turkey’s contribution to the regional defence.

The two subsequent chapters have two objectives. The first is to discover to what extent strategic imperatives shaped the US view of Turkey’s role in the East-West conflict in the 1950s. The second is to investigate the reasons for the US interest in
Turkey's economic and military position and its internal political developments. The fourth chapter will also examine why the US administration established good relations with the military regime after May 1960. Chapter five is devoted specifically to an analysis of the politico-strategic aspects of the American decision to deploy IRBMs in Turkey.

The sixth chapter analyses Turkish-American security relations in the light of Middle Eastern developments in the post-Suez war period until the end of 1960. It deals with US efforts to remedy the weakness of the Baghdad Pact after the Suez crisis of late 1956 and the military coup in Iraq in July 1958. It also gives an account of Turkey's role in the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine. In this context, both its active role (as in the Syrian crisis of 1957) and its passive role (as a base for US Middle East operations) will be studied.

The concluding chapter contains the summary of the findings of the research and evaluates them in the light of the questions raised in the introduction.

4. Security and Its Related Concepts

The problem of security is the principal concern of this study. The term security is broadly related to freedom from fear for individuals, society and the state. In our case it is studied at state level, it implies some or all of the following: 'that a state is free from the threat of war; that it is able to pursue its 'national interests' and preserve its 'core values'; and that it feels safe against potential aggressors.' Kenneth Waltz observed that 'security is the highest end' for a state operating in an international system composed of sovereign nation-states. The circumstances peculiar to the cold war period made it common to view security from a state perspective with a particular emphasis on the defence of a nation from internal and external threats.

10 An alternative perspective was presented by Berry Buzan, who attempted to account for behaviour of states in international system with the concept of security. His argument took it as a starting point that 'the changing character of international environment necessitates a broader view of security', and offered a holistic model which deals with the problem of security on individuals, society, and state levels. Buzan, People, States and Fear, (London, 1982), pp.3-4,12-13.
National security aims at the protection of national interests by all means including the use of military force. As the realist tradition\(^\text{13}\) in international relations has suggested, the political actions of a nation-state should be guided by national interests. It is claimed that the use of force is moral, and thus just, only if it is used for the protection of national interests. Which interests of a nation can provide such guidance? To identify such interests, the term ‘core values’ (or vital interests) has generally been used. The context of core values of a nation cannot exclusively be defined, but it certainly includes ‘the welfare of the nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial integrity, and self-preservation.’ No state, even the most powerful one, has resources enough to realise its all national interests; all nations therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible.\(^\text{14}\) Therefore, the prioritisation of national interest is a practical necessity. The protection of core values is the first priority of a nation. For their promotion, nations are ready to make great sacrifices in terms of their material and human resources. Nations also have interests other than vital interests which are not directly related to the national survival (such as access to certain markets and strategic materials), but have the potential of becoming the first priority of a nation depending on the circumstances. As Hans Morgenthau has pointed out, in democratic states the advocates of the attainment of such interests try to present them as vital interest. Apart from vital and second order interests, nations are conscious about the threats that may cast shadow over other interests. Their prevention from becoming serious threats certainly enhance national security.\(^\text{15}\)

An effective promotion of national interests, which entails for the great powers the creation and preservation of a favourable international environment in which they can feel secure, requires an elaborate security policy which reflects national priorities. To


be successful, it should also take into account the ability of a nation to have an impact on particular events and conditions abroad. Otherwise, a nation may face the danger of over-extension because of the scarcity of resources available for the promotion of national interests. In an effort to reduce any security risk to an acceptable level, security policy defines priorities according to the judgements about known and unknown threats to national security. As vulnerabilities arise from a variety of sources, security policy also deals with the implications of a nation's weaknesses in the economic, social and political fields for its security. In this sense, national security policy can be regarded as a comprehensive security policy.16

5. Theoretical Study of the Great/Small Power Security Relations

According to Rothstein's definition, a small (weak) power is 'a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so'.17 In the literature of international relations, ideas on the alliances, patron-client state relations and foreign aid help us to understand aspects of great-small power security relations. Seen from great/small power relationships perspective, these ideas are interrelated. Economic and military co-operation between a great power and a lesser power usually take place within the framework of an alliance. The shape that alliances among unequal powers would take according to the degree of the interdependence of the parties involved, is dealt with by the patron-client state relationships model.

5.1 Alliances

An alliance can be defined as 'a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.' Military collaboration is the focus of mutual effort in alliances,18 which is mainly concerned with meeting potential threats and repelling aggression should it occur. However, as national security issues are not


confined to military collaboration, nations also expects that their alignments would lead to continuing political and economic co-operation. In short, an alliance includes 'a whole web of relationships (for example, joint exercises, sharing of intelligence, economic preferences, cultural exchange, and so on).'

Nations aim to maximise their capabilities by pooling resources and continued co-operation through a policy of alignment. They feel that this may help them to offset their fear of insecurity stemming from perceived threats. As will be seen, the objectives of strong states and weaker ones may vary, but it can be said that a small state is primarily concerned with preserving and protecting its territorial integrity and independence, while a great power wants to oppose the ascendancy of a rival power or bloc of states in the international system. For this reason, alliances are traditionally used as a method of safeguarding against the domination of international system by any nation or a combination of countries at different times in history.

Parties to an alliance try to maintain the cohesion of the alliance as long as they obtain security benefit from it. The willingness of alliance members to undertake alliance commitments is closely related to their perceptions of threat. Therefore, the cohesion of an alliance is strengthened by the persistence of the common threat that brought the member states together in the first place and it is weakened by its reduction.

It is not necessary for an alliance that all member states should have common or identical interests. Different states benefit from an alliance for different reasons. Alliances between great and small powers are generally based on such parallel interests. Country A (great power) may be interested in securing military facilities from country B (weaker state) as part of its security plans while B may principally be interested in military and economic assistance that she would receive from A against a

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neighbour. Historical record, however, shows that if the members of an alliance share identical or common interests, then this alliance is more likely to be successful in its aims. The identity of interest felt by the NATO members, for instance, is the key to the success of this alliance.  

Ideology (social and political values) also affects the formation and cohesion of an alliance to some extent. States are likely to align with partners with whom they share common or identical institutions, social and political values. Ideological congruity also reinforces the internal solidarity of an alliance. However, ideology is generally considered as of secondary importance to security needs. Purely ideological alliances have a little prospect of continuity when national interests of a party or parties confronted with ideological principles. As George Liska put it, the reasons of ideology or historical biases may not constitute a rational basis for alignment.

Alliances burden their members with some liabilities. First, an effective alliance relation tends to limit political options of a member state and to affect the whole range of their policies more than an ordinary military co-operation agreement. Within an alliance, member states expect each other to support common policies and fulfill alliance requirements. Therefore, they ‘feel entitled to continual assurance of each other’s fidelity and their own net benefit.’ In the process of doing that they may interfere in the affairs of each other to an extent that was not desired when the alliance was formed. Second, alliance policies may cause counter alliances or arms races. The polarisation of international politics may in turn further increase the dependence of a weak nation of an alliance on the alliance reader for its security. Furthermore, in the modern age, mutual defence effort consumes a large amount of money. In alliances between great and small powers, most of the financial burden falls on the great powers


23 O. R. Holsti et.al., Unity and Disintegration, pp.12, 54.

24 O. R. Holsti et. al., Unity and Disintegration, p.30; Liska, Nations in Alliance, p.27.


It is generally acknowledged that weaker members of international system who are confronted with a threat from a strong power often seek alignment with another strong power.\footnote{K. J. Holsti, \textit{International Politics}, p.110.} Notwithstanding the existence of a common external threat that brings a strong and a weaker state together, they may have different expectations from their alliance relationship. By aligning with a small state, a strong power generally aims to obtain military facilities, and to prevent its adversary from gaining the resources of a small state and advancing its influence in strategic places.\footnote{O. R. Holsti et.al., \textit{Unity and Disintegration}, p.97.} On the other hand, as George Liska has identified, there are three motives that lead a small nation to ally with a great power: 'security, stability, and status.'\footnote{George Liska, \textit{Alliances and the Third World}, (Baltimore, 1968), p.27. Also see Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, pp.24-25,29,49-50.} For small states, the great powers are the guarantors of their security. To make sure of a great power's commitment to its security, a small state may urge the great power, especially a geographically distant one, to station troops and maintain bases on its territory.\footnote{Michael Handel, \textit{Weak States in the International System}, (London, 1981), p.126.} Small states also consider great powers as the source of sophisticated weaponry and defence systems that are needed to deter external threats, and of economic assistance that is necessary to fulfill their plans for economic development. Small powers also enter into alliances to ensure their domestic stability. Obtaining political, military and economic support of a powerful ally strengthens a small power's position vis-à-vis its potential and actual enemies and bolsters its prestige at home.\footnote{Liska, \textit{Alliances and the Third World}, pp.14, 28-29; Handel, \textit{Weak States}, p.148.} A small state’s alignment with a great power against the other one, however, entails some costs and dangers. The small state may face new and unexpected threats from the rival great power itself or its regional small allies. It may also become involved in great power conflict unnecessarily. The military facilities that a small state provides to its ally may lead to the employment of pressure on it by the rival great power. To meet such threats and pressure, the small state needs more external protection and economic and military resources which in turn increases the small state’s dependence on its powerful ally.\footnote{Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, pp.44, 48, 61-62; Liska, \textit{Alliances and the Third World}, p.28; Handel, \textit{Weak States}, p.129. Rothstein argues that a small power may better guard their independence in a multilateral alliance than a bilateral alliance. pp.124-26.}
5.2 The Nature of the Alliances among unequals

The relationship between small powers and their great power allies is one of among unequals, given disparities between them in terms of military and economic power. Although such relations may take many forms, the post-war relations of the United States with its small allies (and the Soviet Union with such Third World countries as Egypt, Syria and Cuba) have shown that even a superpower may face problems in transforming its resources and capabilities into political influence. This means that great powers need to use not only coercion but also consent to rule their alliance system. As far as America’s relations with its small allies are concerned, they bear the characteristics patronal leadership, as distinguished from empire relationship (Europe’s relations with its formal colonies in the nineteenth century), or satellite relationship (the Soviet Union’s relations with its European neighbours) in which the compliance of the small states are taken for granted. To explain the nature of the relationship between the strong and weak states, it is useful to look at the patron-client concept and the phenomenon what is called the ‘big influence of small allies’.

5.2.1 The Patron - Client State Relationship

The patron-client state relationship is in essence a reciprocal one involving ‘an exchange of resources across a broad range of issues including economic, strategic, military and political.’ Some distinguishing features of the patron-client interactions are as follows. First, the patron (the great power or superior state) provides the client (the small state) with material goods and protection in return for services, loyalty, and deference to the patron. As the relationship was valued by the both sides, power asymmetries are not translated into a one-sided (command or hegemonial) relationship. In other words, patron-client relationship is not the one which is based purely on the use of coercive influence by the patron. In Michael Handel’s words, ‘coercion, manipulation and authority can exist in the background but are not dominant. ...

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33 Patron-client relationships are not confined to relations between a great and a small power. Some regional powers can act as patrons. India’s relations with Nepal or Turkey’ attempts to play a regional role in the 1950s can be seen in this context. There may also be a patron-client relationship between a superpower and a middle power such as US relations with Australia during the cold war. Handel, Weak States, pp.137, 139.

34 If a state’s choices are restricted by another state’s use of its economic, military, political, etc. power and threat of punishment, we can say that the latter exercises coercive influence over the former. Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth, (London, 1973), pp.3-5.
relations are a balance between voluntarism and coercion. Second, there is a sizable disparity between the patron and the client in terms of their respective military capabilities. This means that security transactions from the patron to the client are more pre-eminent in the relationship. Third, the client plays an important role in patron (superpower) competition. This rationalises the perpetuation of such a relationship in spite of the fact that security transactions are mainly unidirectional.

The patron’s and the client’s goals, their willingness to prolong, and their ability to control, the relationship can vary according to the degree of client’s dependence on the patron, the client’s importance for the patron, and the type of international milieu. Most often the client’s main goal is to obtain protection and security at relatively low cost against the other superpower or its allies. The degree of a client’s dependence on the patron for its security is determined by the client’s threat environment. ‘[T]he larger the threat to its existence and the more the client sees its salvation’s in the hands of the patron, the more likely will the client be to accept the relationship on the patron’s terms.’ If the client is able to find alternative patrons and the international system is suitable to do so, the client can have relatively more control over the relationship. The importance of client’s service to the patron can also augment the client’s position in the relationship. But if the client faces a high threat environment and is heavily dependent on the patron for material resources, it is likely to accept the relationship on the patron’s terms.

The patron may expect more complicated objectives from the relationship: Ideological goals (demands for political, economic, and social structure), international solidarity (voting cohesion in the United Nations, signings of bilateral agreements, visits between senior statesmen, client’s announcement of international support for the patron),

38 Shoemaker and Spainer, Patron-Client State, pp.182-85; Knorr, Power and Wealth, pp.27-29.
strategic goals (demand for bases). The patron’s goals may change over time and it may seek several goals simultaneously. In general, and strategic goals are dominant. From the patron’s viewpoint, the more the client has the ability and willingness to meet the patron’s goals, the more the relationship is valuable. Ideological goals may sometimes dominate the patron’s international agenda. In such circumstances the patron may vigorously encourage changes in the client’s political, economic and social structure, even in some cases attempting to establish direct control over the client’s domestic or security policies.\(^3\) In some cases, the patron ‘will seek to present the client to the outside world as a showplace of the patron’s ideology and political system.’ Such a client state can be a model for regional states to emulate. However, if and when patron’s need for international solidarity and/or strategic goals prevail, ideological goals will become secondary to the other goals.\(^4\) The more valuable the client for the patron (if the patron faces a high threat environment and the client had strategic assets that give the patron a substantial advantage in its competition with other patrons), the more likely the patron be willing to pay more for maintaining the relationship.

5.2.2 The influence of small states on their great power allies

A study of the patronal relationships in the post-war international system shows that there were factors that restrained the ability of superpowers to exploit the relations with their client states to their favour. As a result the compliance of the client states was to be secured more ‘through a complicated exchange of favours and resources’ than through coercion. As far as the Western alliance is concerned, what Robert Keohane has termed the ‘big influence of small allies’ can be observed in the intra-alliance relationships even in the 1950s, at a time when the economic and military supremacy of the US within the alliance was much more evident.\(^4\) How can one explain the emergence of a less unequal relationship between the United States and its small allies?

\(^3\) Handel, *Weak States*, p.188. For the limitations imposed by international system on small states, see ibid., pp.136-37, 172.


As Thomas Risse-Kappen has observed, the possibility that small allies could exert disproportionate influence was analysed by the traditional realist approach in the international relations from several perspectives. First, it was believed by the American policy makers that the management of intra-alliance relations on the basis of consensus might be profitable in the long term. This made it easier for the small allies to have their concerns heard in Washington (hegemonic stability). Second, the small allies obtained direct or indirect protection through their alliance relationship (bilateral or multilateral) with the United States, although they made relatively little contribution to the collective security (collective good). Third, as ‘political influence is rarely directly proportionate to material power capabilities’, non-material resources such as national morale and quality of diplomacy are at times equally, if not more, important variables in the process of the attainment of political influence. The outcome is dependent on the ability of actors to activate their available power resources (realist bargaining theory).

It should be noted, however, that in the realist approach, the power of small state is an exceptional situation rather than rule. So any analysis of the great-small power relations should bear in mind the major difference between the two groups of states: the small power requires great power protection due to its military weakness. Pointing out the dependency of small powers upon great powers for most of the sophisticated weapons they needed, David Vital asserts that it is difficult for a small state to achieve military modernisation without compromising its independence. Thus it is widely believed, as Michael Handel put it, ‘much of the strength of weak states is derivative rather than intrinsic. The diplomatic art of the weak states is to obtain, commit and manipulate, as far as possible, the power of other, more powerful states in their own interest.’

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42 In his work, Risse-Kappen claims that the traditional realist theory fails to explain the European allies’ influence on the United States emanating from the social and transgovernmental ties across the Atlantic. However, because US-Turkish security relations in the 1950s were mainly confined to the government-to-government relations, it is difficult to apply this way of interpretation to this case study. Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, pp.204-10.


Within the above theoretical framework, the bargaining positions of the America’s allies can be ascribed mainly to the following factors which will be explained in turn: the nature of international system and the American perception of the cold war; the American political system; the intensity of small powers’ motivation; and the possession of certain resources by small states. First, among many consequences of bipolar system international system of the postwar era, two are particularly important with regard to the relations between the superpowers and their small allies: the constrains acting on the superpowers in the nuclear age, and the competition for the allies. The Soviet Union and the United States, physically distant powers, engaged after the World War II in an intense global competition for leadership and influence. The introduction of nuclear weapons, however, made it vital for both sides to avoid a general war. In other words, the risk of a general war diminished the use of military power as a source of influence compared with preceding ages. As a result, given the rigidity of the bipolar system, each superpower becomes concerned about relative gains and loses vis-à-vis each other. It was considered that the loss of even one small ally may diminish ‘the capability to fight non-nuclear wars successfully, and this loss constitutes a political defeat which cannot be easily redressed by military or other counter action’. This led the competing superpowers to maintain an alliance system for symbolic as well as strategic reasons, which burdened them with a moral and political obligation to protect their respective client states regardless of their real importance.45

Indeed, the Americans embarked on a major effort to assemble a global alliance system against the USSR. Most of the Soviet efforts to extend its influence in the Third World was seen as a direct threat to the American national security. This conviction was reinforced by the fear that any Soviet success in expanding in one place would lead to the loss of other small allies (domino theory). As a result, the US became, as Hans Morgenthau put it, ‘on principle, in favor of all alliances’, and the perceived importance of protecting small allies increased considerably, regardless of their real importance to the American interests or their costs. It was for this reason that Robert Keohane has rightly thought that the big influence of small allies was a natural result of

American globally active foreign policy.' The small states have taken advantage of the high value put on maintaining the alliances mainly in two ways, by manipulating their weakness and by stressing their loyalty to the alliance. By stressing that its fragile position may undermine the alliance itself, a small ally may enhance its position vis-à-vis the leader of the alliance. This is because no superpower does tolerate the defeat of its client at the hands of the rival great power or its clients. Similarly it cannot be pleased by the collapse of a friendly regime as a result of economic crisis and/or social unrest. Indeed, the small allies of the US (particularly those Washington perceived their territory to be of strategic importance and was prepared to commit conventional military forces to their assistance, like Taiwan, South Korea, Greece and Turkey) tried to extract benefits from the US by manipulating their weakness. To the same purpose, the small allies also liked to stress their contribution to the common defence effort as a loyal and reliable ally.

Second, the democratic and open political system of the United States also gives the America’s allies the opportunity to exercise influence they would otherwise find difficult to attain. A client state may appeal to the American public opinion and exercise a variety of pressures on decision makers. For example, Israel, Spain, South Korea and Taiwan achieved their influence by ‘developing close cooperative ties with powerful elements of American society and [by] taking advantage of the fact that US policy is largely outcome of clash and compromise among separate interest groups and bureaucratic units.’ The dependence of some government agencies on the small ally for the performance of their missions (such as the Navy’s and Air Force’s need for bases, overflight rights, and other facilities abroad) may lead them to take favourable views of the small allies’ position. The organised group support in the US for a client state (for example, the support given to Israel and for ethnic and religious reasons, and to Taiwan for its anti-communist regime) enhances the small ally’s bargaining position.

47 Another option available for a small state is to defect unless its demands are not satisfied by the alliance leader. As the threat to defect was not considered by the Turkish leaders in the 1950s, this means of small power influence is not further evaluated.
Third, a small state pursues limited number of aims in its foreign policy, whereas the interests of a great power are varied and extensive. A small state may regard a regional development as a vital interest and focuses its attention on the relations with the great power. For its great power ally, however, this issue may be of secondary importance and it had to take into account the impact of its regional policy on the other allies or friendly countries in the region. For this reason, it is assumed that 'the motive would often be stronger in a small state with a bilateral or unilateral focus than in a great power with a multilateral focus.' This was also the case as far as America’s relations with its small allies were concerned.\(^5\)

The power of the weak also stems from its control of material resources that the great power needs under the circumstances and that cannot be provided otherwise. Granting or holding such valuable assets, as Hans Morgenthau has stated, may give small states within an alliance ‘a status completely out of keeping with the actual distribution of material power.’\(^5^1\) Indeed, small states’ possession of such power resources as military bases and facilities or oil that America needed for its national security or economic prosperity, created such an effect. With regard to NATO bases in Europe, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen has noted that the US needed them, particularly in the 1950s, to fight a war with the Soviet Union.\(^5^2\)

5.3 Foreign Aid and the United States as a Donor of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid can be defined as ‘a transfer of money, goods or technical advice from a donor to a recipient.’\(^5^3\) In foreign aid, as distinct from foreign trade and the investment of foreign capital, the transfer of resources from one government to another is not economic, that is to gain profit or to fulfill the need for markets and products.\(^5^4\)


51 Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, p.24; Morgenthau was quoted in Bar-Simon-Tow, 'Alliance Strategy', p.208.


54 Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations*, (New York, 1975), p.168. Foreign aid may be in the form of grants or loans. Grants are the assets that are transferred to the recipient by the donor in return for any material benefit; as such they are purely a form of foreign aid. In the case of loans, the donor country lends its financial resources interest
Foreign aid creates an asymmetrical relationship between the donor and the recipient. Almost all the weaker states are much more dependent militarily and economically upon the great powers than the great powers upon them.\textsuperscript{55} Given its 'potential advantage' over the recipient in the aid relationship, the donor nation wants, in most cases, to use foreign aid as an instrument of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{56} One of the central objectives of foreign aid is 'to create a condition that would induce or consolidate a relationship which in turn would generate desirable acts.' The shortage of economic and military capabilities on the part of weaker nation enables the donor country to affect the policies of the recipient.\textsuperscript{57}

Foreign aid affects, more or less, the domestic politics of a recipient country. To begin with economic aid, it tends to support indirectly the regime in power in a weaker state because it provides resources for the purchase of good and services that are urgently needed by the people. Economic aid is also crucial for the stability of weak states in the longer term. In the majority of less-developed countries, the main economic activity is agriculture, which is generally insufficient to accumulate excess capital necessary for economic development. There is also a popular desire in these countries for the purchase of more consumer goods and the provision of welfare services. Since they cannot meet such goods and services from their own resources, they need foreign currency to purchase them. Economic aid can provide foreign resources both for economic development and for the purchase of goods from abroad. Therefore, it

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makes the hold of a regime on governmental positions more secure to the extent that it helps to meet the requirements of a recipient country.⁵⁸ Indeed, it has been used occasionally by the donors in order to 'consolidate the position of a regime that is subject to economic pressure, or domestic or foreign policy pressure, but whose preservation is politically and militarily favorable.'⁵⁹ Similarly, military aid enhances the security posture of a recipient country. As K. Holsti has noted, military aid can 'help create a modern military force to deter external aggression, to establish military forces trained to put down internal riots and disorders against established authorities, and to raise the prestige of local regimes and military elite.'⁶⁰

Not rarely foreign aid is given to create specific short-term political effects. First, financial subsidies for commodity import give to the recipient government extra time to formulate its programmes to control the economy. Second, aid funds can be used to cope with specific economic or political problems, such as unemployment. Third, foreign assistance can be given at a crucial time so as to influence, for example, the outcome of an election.⁶¹ Foreign aid is also designed to create specific long-term results. Occasionally donor countries promise to reward a regime through increased aid allotments if it promises to institute political reforms, and threaten it with a reduction in aid if the reforms are not fulfilled.⁶² For donor countries, aid should encourage development in the long run, 'but development along the lines proven successful in their own countries.' In other words, if the recipient wants to remain qualified for assistance, it should fulfill at least some demands of the donor to improve its political and economic system in a way instructed by the donor. Otherwise, the donor may feel that aid is vested.⁶³

How far is foreign aid a useful instrument for a donor country to realise its political objectives? The value of foreign aid as an instrument of donor's objectives is different

⁵⁸ Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, pp.251-53.
⁶¹ Quoted in K. J. Holsti, International Politics, p.267.
⁶² K. J. Holsti, International Politics ibid., p.266.
in each case. In the short term, extending or withholding aid is unlikely to bring about a change in a particular policy of the recipient. However, it is a quite useful instrument for supporting a friendly country or government against internal and external adversaries, gaining access to decision makers and creating a favourable atmosphere for diplomatic activities.\textsuperscript{64} In the long term, foreign aid is generally considered as an inadequate instrument, unless reinforced by other techniques, to initiate and sustain economic development and to change political institutions of an underdeveloped country. Some reasons for this are related to the nature of foreign aid. It generally does not come at a required time or its amount is not sufficient for development, for example. Others are related to the recipient country. In many cases the recipient’s economic and social organisation obstruct the use of foreign resources sufficiently for the purpose of development and of social change. In fact, in most underdeveloped countries, foreign funds are used to finance uneconomic state owned industries or to strengthen government’s position against legal opposition. In these societies, corruption is an important problem, and aid is mainly spent for the aggrandizement of certain groups, such as the military, rather than for economic development.

The Americans perceived foreign aid as a ‘peculiarly appropriate’ instrument of the American cold war objectives.\textsuperscript{65} To be more specific, because the United States was almost exclusively preoccupied with anti-communism during the cold war, it was crucial for Washington to persuade other countries to collaborate with and accept the American lead in the global struggle against communism. The value of American aid, both military and economic, in terms of collective defence effort was particularly appreciated. It was supposed that there was a close relation between assistance to dependable allied nations and their ability to contribute to the collective defence effort. At least until the early sixties American aid can be seen from this perspective.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} Knorr, \textit{The Power of Nations}, p.187; Walters, \textit{American and Soviet Aid}, p.245.

\textsuperscript{65} For example, see ‘A Report to the NSC by the Executive Secretary: NSC 68’, 14 April 1950, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States} (hereafter cited as \textit{FRUS}), 1950:1, p.258.


It should be noted that as international system became more stable from the mid 1950s with the advent of nuclear weapons, the economic means of sustaining national power attracted more attention of the great powers. Creating ‘economically healthy and politically stable world ‘in the
A great amount of American aid was given to support anti-communist countries in the Third World, most of which are located along the periphery of the Soviet bloc. The historical record demonstrates that American aid was given for almost all proposes explained above, from short-term political objectives of supporting a regime to long-term objectives of stimulating economic development and encouraging political reforms. In general, foreign aid programmes objected to get sympathy of the recipient towards the United States, to gain easy access to the decision makers of the recipient, to persuade the recipient to adopt American position on specific foreign policy issues, to change the alignment of a country, and to affect certain internal developments such as elections. Aid programmes were also designed to bring about structural changes in the recipient country. It was believed that there was a strong relationship between economic and social development and the prevention of the spread of communism. Economic development would ease economic hardships, so reducing the threat of violent revolution and unrest, and encouraging resistance to communism in less developed countries. It was also expected that American aid would lead to the adoption of Western attitudes and structures. It was even believed that increasing prosperity would reduce the incentive for war to pursue political objectives, leading towards a more stable international system.

American aid during the cold war suffered from defects similar to those faced by all aid giving countries. Not surprisingly, there were conditions placed in the aid programmes that limited freedom of actions of the recipient countries, what is known as ‘strings’ of aid in the literature. They were generally considered by the US as ‘indispensable to the success of aid objectives’. American economic aid, for example, was strongly tied to light of American ideas gradually replaced extreme anti-communism as the pre-eminent objective of American foreign policy. Accordingly, anti-communism and military security became relatively less important motivations of American aid programmes. Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front, (New York, 1992), p.115; Walters, American and Soviet Aid, p.24.

67 Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, p.261; Walters, American and Soviet Aid, pp.12-14; Emerson, ‘American Influence’, pp.215-17; Joan M. Nelson, Aid Influence and Foreign Policy, (London, 1968), p.32. One should bear in mind that the emphasise of an aid programme may be on different purposes in different times and places. It may also serve different purposes even within a single country in different phases of the programme.

68 Walters, American and Soviet Aid, p.22; K. J. Holsti, International Politics, p.263; Padelford, Dynamics of International Politics, p.137.
the implementation of economic reforms in favour of liberal economic policies. The conditions laid down by International Monetary Fund and other agencies, if aid was given through them, caused resistance to them and provoked nationalistic sentiments.

In terms of the promotion of American political principles and institutions (liberalism and democracy) in less developed countries through aid programmes, the main obstacle was the strong anti-communist rhetoric that dominated American foreign policy. At that time the United States assisted many authoritarian regimes in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere merely because these regimes were anti-communist and their opponents, both legal and illegal, were not pro-American. Evidence suggests that the American military assistance to such authoritarian countries promoted military regimes rather than democratic politics.69 Another problem was that American aid programmes helped economic development in less developed areas,70 which in turn stimulated the demands for political reforms. In many instances it was feared that the demands for political reforms would undermine the political position of the conservative elements who sided with the United States.71 However, American aid programmes were quite effective in achieving short term political benefits. Indeed, aid was successfully used in such efforts as to obtain and support friendly governments around the world, to attain military facilities on the territories of the recipient countries and to facilitate American diplomatic efforts.72

6. US-Turkish Security Relationship as a Great/Small Power Relationship

By aligning with Turkey in the postwar era, the US mainly sought to obtain Turkish support for the American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. The objectives of Turkey, a small power73, were to obtain American security guarantee against the external threat


70 Robert Walters has suggested that American aid contributed to economic development because its duration, scope and diversity. Walters, *American and Soviet Aid*, pp.237-39. However, such aid has accomplished little in less-developed countries in terms of economic development, compared to what the Marshall Plan did in Western Europe.


73 Klaus Knorr implies that a state's dependence for its security on external assistance rather than its own resources is enough to count it as a small (weak) power. Knorr, *Power and Wealth*, pp.25-26.

Facts about Turkey's capabilities in the 1950s point out that Turkey was a small state. It was a country that had a low GNP per capita and very low energy consumption, lacked heavy industry and depended largely on the export of agricultural products for earning hard currency. Its dependency
as well as economic and military assistance. The resulting patron-client relationship between the two states took shape according to such factors as the American perception of Turkey's strategic importance, Ankara's dependence on Washington for economic and military aid, and Turkish leader's threat perceptions and world view. This will be evaluated in the concluding chapter. However, it should be noted at the outset of this study that America's reasons for seeking and maintaining the alliance with Turkey can be understood in the context of its globally active security policy, which will be analysed in the next chapter. The reasons for Turkey to align with the US, and to maintain the alliance once it was established, were as follows: the insecurity being felt vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the ideological affiliation with the West, and the need for external sources for economic and military modernisation.

First, even during the period of neutrality (1923-45), which was based on good relations with Moscow, Turkish leaders believed that the weakness of the revolutionary Soviet government facilitated such relations and that a strong Soviet Union was potentially the greatest threat to Turkey’s security. The legacy of the past antagonism and the Turkish dislike of the Communist ideology hindered the establishment of much closer relations. As will be seen, Ankara regarded the Soviet proposal of the joint defence of the Straits after the war as a threat to its territorial integrity and sought security guarantee from the US. Turkish efforts culminated in the membership of NATO in 1952. Anti-communism and the fear of Soviets were combined to determine the Turkish threat perception in the post-war era. The Menderes administration viewed international developments in terms of struggle between the free nations (the West) and the forces of evil (the Soviet bloc). Such leading figures as President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu regarded Turkey as a bulwark against Communist expansion.

\[\text{Footnote: } 74 \text{ For particular points has been raised so far in this paragraph about Soviet-Turkish relations, see Edward Weisband, } \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945}, \text{ (Princeton, NJ., 1973), pp.21, 43-45; Danwark A Rustow, 'Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic', } \textit{Foreign Policy in World of Politics}, \text{ Roy C. Macridis ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1958), p.301; Robinson, } \textit{The First Turkish Republic}, \text{ p.169; Vali, } \textit{Bridge Across Bosporus}, \text{ p.67.}\]
They favoured a dynamic and assertive foreign policy practice, thus they were ‘willing and ready to take greater risks’ when they deemed it necessary.\textsuperscript{75} Not surprisingly, they attached a great importance to the bilateral relations with the US.\textsuperscript{76} The subsequent military government (after 27 May 1960) maintained Turkey’s pro-Western, pro-American orientation in foreign policy.

Second, the domestic political objective of the Turkish Republic (that is, to reform society so as to create a nation state on the European model) not only helped the alignment with the West but also provided a strong impetus for Turkish support of the policies of the Western bloc.\textsuperscript{77}

Third, the realisation of economic development through external relations has been one of the principal objectives of Turkish foreign policy. The Democrats put a special emphasis on obtaining economic assistance from the US to fulfill their election pledge of rapid economic development. It was thought that Turkey’s pro-American international stance would be instrumental in obtaining economic, as well as military, assistance. As a Turkish scholar has observed, the Turkish leaders believed in the 1950s that ‘the more a bipolar perception was emphasized and more closely the lines of American foreign policy were adhered to, the greater the certainty that American economic and military assistance would be forthcoming.’\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{76} Prime Minister Menderes particularly valued the relations with the US. He even established informal relations with the high ranking officials of the American Embassy. On one occasion, which showed the extent of his personal ties, he wanted to obtain the American view, through the Embassy, about the appointment of Fatin Zorlu to the post of Foreign Minister in 1957. ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State’, 13 Nov. 1957, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:24, pp.745-46.

\textsuperscript{77} The details of the Turkish modernisation programme can be found in Bernard Lewis, \textit{The Emergence of Modern Turkey}, (London, 1961), pp.234-287. For the effects of the modernisation efforts on the foreign policy, see Weisband, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy}, pp.14-15.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

1. Introduction and background

This chapter deals with the evolution of American foreign and security policies in the period 1945-60 from the strategic viewpoint of national security and the global balance of power.1 Hence particular attention will be given to US perception of external threat posed by the Soviet bloc and the American way of meeting such a threat. To this end, first the adoption of the doctrine of containment by the Truman administration as the basis of its strategy and its implementation until January 1953 will be analysed. The following section will concentrate on how the American cold war strategy was understood and implemented by the Eisenhower presidency. By doing so, this chapter aims to show why almost the entire globe became an area of strategic concern as a result of America’s view of its role in the world affairs. It is this globalisation of American security concerns that helps us to understand Turkey’s role in American security policy in Europe and the Middle East in the post-war era. Thus, this chapter also provides a framework for reference to be used in analysing particular events in the rest of this study.

After World War II, the United States was actively involved in shaping the post-war international order, which meant the abandonment of its traditional policy of avoiding political and military entanglements with other nations, what was called 'isolationism'.2

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1 As explained by Halford MacKinder, the theory of heartland claims that the power who controls the Eurasian land-mass, what he has called ‘the pivot area’ of the world politics, commands the World Island (the joint mass of Europe, Asia and Africa). From this perspective, Soviet-American rivalry can be viewed as a struggle for domination in Eurasia. For a detailed account of MacKinder’s opinions, see G.R.Sloan, Geopolitics in the United States Strategic Policy 1890-1987, (Brighton, 1988), pp. 6-15.

2 John Spanier and Steven Hook, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 14th ed., (Washington, 1998), p.342. In the history of the US, isolationism was only applied to Europe. Isolationism did not come to mean the severance of all ties with other nations. Sustaining its economic and cultural relations with Europe as strong as possible was one of the major goals of the American foreign policy during the isolationist period. In addition, the Monroe doctrine of 1823 proclaimed that the European powers should not intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, which in fact amounted to a declaration of exclusive rights for the US in this region. In the Far East, the US tried hard to get access to markets and sought competition on equal terms in Japan, Korea, and China (the Open Door policy). Michael H. Hunt, "Traditions of American diplomacy: From colony to great power", Gordon Martel ed., American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1993, (London, 1994), pp.6-10.
Although the US emerged from the war as the most powerful state in the world, Washington policy-makers were concerned about the emergence of a hostile, probably totalitarian, power with the capability to inflict damage on the American mainland. This fear was also aggravated by other such major problems as the political and economic weakness of Western Europe, the power vacuums left by the defeat of Germany and Japan, the presence of Soviet army in Eastern Europe, and the rise of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. Given the uncertainties resulting from a devastating war, it was desirable, in American view, to seek protection through the creation of a system of overseas bases, the balance of power in Eurasia, and a global economy in the America’s image and interests. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, sought the establishment friendly regimes on its periphery and demanded an equal share in shaping the post-war international system. The conflicting interests of the West and the Soviet Union made it difficult to reach a settlement about the shape of post-war Europe, particularly on the status of Germany, at the Postdam Conference of July 1945. The year 1946 proved that solutions acceptable to both East and West were hard to find. Almost daily crises in Germany among the occupying powers, the disagreement over the international control of atomic energy, tension in the Middle East -reaching its peak in Iran (March-May 1946) and Turkey (the crisis over the Turkish Straits), the signs indicating that Moscow was disinterested in the development of a global economic system based on free trade (the rejection of membership in the World Bank and in the International Monetary Fund, and the announcement of a new plan designed to make Russia self-sufficient economically); these were some of the developments that fed into the atmosphere of mutual distrust. Soviet-American rivalry, initially bearing the characteristics of a classical great power struggle, rapidly turned into an ideological, political, economic and cultural confrontation between the two opposing blocs (the


East and West led by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively). This was the cold war.

The international system during the cold war was basically a bipolar one, which was distinct from a classical balance of power system in that there was no one power or group of powers preventing either superpower from attaining hegemony, as Britain had done in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the ideological dimension of the conflict gave the system an additional rigidity. Anders Stephanson has observed that the cold war system, largely in effect by the end of 1947 and lasting until the aftermath of the Cuban crisis of 1962, had born the following characteristics:

(a) warlike hostility, carried on by means short of war;
(b) diplomacy, consequently, being turned into militarized thinking and a kind of warfare itself;
(c) denial of opponent's legitimacy as a regime, resulting in intense propaganda attacks;
(d) an increasingly bipolar structure of international politics through the superimposition of the conflict on the rest of the world;
(e) intense military build-up in the arms race;
(f) suppression of internal dissidents.\(^5\)

The East-West relations underwent a gradual change after Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953. In the 1950s, the awareness that a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences for mankind led the superpowers to exercise restraint. Yet basic attributes of the system remained intact and the scope of the cold war spread to the new areas in the Third World.

Because such a complex phenomenon as the cold war embraces geopolitics, political economy, culture, bureaucratic politics, etc., one can explain its origins and the responsibility of each antagonist in it from each perspective. However, as the current study deals with the execution of American cold war policies in relation to Turkey's role in the European and Middle Eastern defence, this problem will not be dealt with here. Still it should be noted that the US vigorously pursued its cold war objective of strengthening the non-communist world. The result was the establishment of what is

called the American empire or ‘Pax Americana’, within which the US provided the leadership particularly in political and military fields. It came into being through, as Thamos Paterson has observed, the ‘willing compliance’ of the nations in Europe and the Near East who looked to Washington for protection against the Soviet bloc, and the ‘quite persuasion’ by the United States.6

There basic observations can be made about American cold war policies during the Truman-Eisenhower administrations. First, the so called foreign policy Establishment (a small, civilian-led elite within the inner circle of closed politics just below the level of the President)7, who opposed the isolation of the United States from world affairs, played a leading role in the formulation and execution of the policy of containment. They did not differ significantly about the ends of the containment, however much they disagreed over the ways and means of carrying out the struggle. Thus the role played by the elite provided an element of continuity in American cold war policy.8

Second, taking advantage of American military-industrial capacity and technological advances in the implementation of cold war military strategy was a belief that embedded itself in the American thinking. This was reflected in American policies throughout the cold war. The importance given to air power and nuclear weapons in the military strategy can be viewed in this context.9

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6 Paterson, ‘On Every Front’, pp.44-45. John L Gaddis and Geir Lundestad have attached particular significance to the fact that the US was invited by the leaders of Western European and other pro-Western nations to extend economic and assistance, thus they called the American empire an ‘empire by invitation’. According to Gaddis, the original objective of the initiatives to revive Western Europe was to build it as a Third Force in the world politics. John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New York, 1982), pp.201-04; idem, Long Peace, especially pp.57-61; Geir Lundestad, The American Empire, (Oxford, 1992), p.55.

7 According to C Wright Mills, there existed at the highest levels ‘a unified elite sharing a common social background and moving from command post to command post through an easy interchangeability of positions’. Barnet identified that ‘seventy of the ninety one people who held the very top jobs between 1940 and 1967—Secretaries of Defense and State, Secretaries of the three services, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the CIA—have been businessman, lawyers for businessman, and investment bankers.’ Both quoted in John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors: A Policy Making Elite, (Lexicon, Mass., 1974), pp.16 and 268.


9 Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp.120-125; As a result of the Truman administration’s rearmament efforts, its successor inherited an overwhelming air power. Mervyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: national security, the Truman administration and the cold war, (Stanford, Calif., 1992), pp.488-89.
Another element of continuity in American cold war policy was the concern for credibility on the part of decision-makers. It was believed that 'just as threats need to be credible to deter potential aggressors, so too must promises be credible to assure friends.' Therefore, friends and foe alike should have no doubt about America's strength, determination and reliability. In the cold war context, it was feared that allowing a successful Soviet challenge in any part of the world might embolden Moscow elsewhere, resulting in the collapse of American deterrence (the Munich syndrome). This also might call into question the dependability of the United States in the eyes of its allies, leading to the loss of allies one after another (the domino theory). Throughout the cold war, the fear of the loss of credibility had been the most important factor in explaining American commitments to the areas that had little strategic and political value.  

2. American Security Strategy during the Truman Administration, 1945-52

The Truman administration was deeply involved in the establishment of political, social and economic stability in the postwar world. With the rise of the belief that the Soviet Union posed a threat to the multilateral order that the US set out to create, American policy had a specific purpose: the containment of the Soviet bloc through strengthening the economic and political order of the non-communist world. By which means the Soviet challenge was met was closely related to the perception of American policy makers of the Soviet bloc capabilities at any given time. In the period of 1945-52, it was not perceived that Moscow would resort to the use of arms to obtain its political objectives. However, it was widely believed in Washington around 1949-50 that the increase in Soviet power might make it feasible in the future for Moscow to use its military power for its political objectives. This change in the perception of threat gave rise to the idea that the US should have capabilities to meet its responsibilities. As a result, the policy of containment, which initially was carried out by mainly economic instruments, became heavily militarized. This section will analyse the evolution of American security policy along these lines during the Truman presidency.

10 For a detailed analysis of credibility factor in American foreign policy, see Robert J. McMahon, 'Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar A Diplomacy', *Diplomatic History*, 15/4 (Fall 1991), 455-71. Quotation appears on page 455.
In the years 1945 and 1946 Washington policy-makers addressed two major problems: how to protect the American mainland in a future war and how to deal with the Soviet Union. Towards the end of the war, in the absence of a clear antagonist, the issue for military planners was that of anticipating the nature of a future war. It was thought that a military colossus, like Germany and Japan, could unleash a lightning attack over great distances given advances in weapons technology. This aroused the conviction that ‘threats had to be met early and overseas.’

Protection against aggression was possible in two ways. First, the military planners and civilian leaders were convinced that it was impossible to mobilise after a threat had materialised, so they required a military structure in peacetime capable of responding aggression immediately. The Air Force, and to a lesser extent the Navy, was given priority in the new military structure. The second response was the establishment of overseas bases system and the acquisition of transit rights with a view to providing an effective defence for the American mainland. It was not possible to create the system of bases to the extent that the military planners envisaged because of budgetary restraints and the problems with the host states. However, it should be noted that bases were planned to set up at such diverse places as the islands in the Pacific formerly under Japanese protection, the Philippines, Okinawa (Japan), Canada, Greenland, the west coast of Africa, and many places in Latin America, especially the Pacific coast. In creating a bases and transit rights system, one objective was to realise American control over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in order to keep hostile powers far from American territory. But given the fact that the overseas military presence became an integral part of American cold war strategy, Washington policy was also concerned with the overriding American strategic objective, that was, to ensure that no single state dominate Eurasian landmass. From this perspective, the objective was, as Melvyn P. Leffler has observed, ‘to secure wartime access to the resources of southeast Asia as
well as a firm line of communications from the West Coast to the Asiatic mainland,
plus denial of this line to any potential enemy'.

The Americans inferred from post-war Soviet actions that Moscow wanted to create
an exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. By early 1946 it was believed in
political as well as military circles that 'the consolidation and development of the
power of Russia is the greatest threat to the US in the foreseeable future.' In 1946,
on the one hand Washington tried to understand the motives behind the Soviet actions,
and on the other hand continued to try to reach a comprehensive settlement with
Moscow. There were two interpretations of the Soviet actions. The thesis of insecurity
viewed then as an effort to secure avenues of invasion by consolidating Soviet position
along its periphery, while the opposite view regarded them as part of Soviet desire to
overthrow all capitalist governments. Specifically, a speech by Stalin in February 1946
resurfaced 'latent but persistent' American suspicions about the ideological dimension
of Soviet foreign policy. From their reading of Russian history plus their experience
with Germany and Japan, most American policy makers concluded that there existed a
connection between autocratic rule at home and aggression in foreign affairs. By the
end of 1946 the insecurity theory become more and more difficult to sustain. One
major reason for this was the ideas set forth in so called the 'long telegram' of
February 1946 by George F. Kennan, then the Chargé d'Affaires of the Moscow
Embassy, the other one was the role that the Soviet Union was believed to play in the
Iranian and Turkish crises of March and August 1946 respectively. Kennan's telegram
dwelt in length on an elucidation of the Soviet threat and its policy recommendations
were vague, but Washington policy makers found in it the basis of a tougher stance
against the Soviet Union, a new approach became visible in the Iranian and Turkish
crises.

16 For this specific policy implication of the long telegram, see Gaddis, Strategies, pp.21-22.
The Iranian crisis broke out when Moscow failed to withdraw its troops from Iran in accordance with a wartime agreement. Faced with a strong American objection, especially in the UN, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops in April, even before the main Soviet demand, an oil concession in the north of the country, was secured. The Turkish crisis was much more complex. It was over the Soviet demand that Turkey should permit the joint Soviet-Turkish defence of the Straits. Washington not only did encourage Ankara to resist against the Soviet pressure, but also decided on August 15 to oppose to any possible Soviet aggression against Turkey by all means at its disposal, including the use of force. What alarmed the Americans to such an extent was the conviction that the real purpose of Soviet policy was to assume some role in the administration of the Straits, leading to the domination of Turkey plus the disruption of the British Empire’s lines of communications in the Middle East. Any Soviet success in these objectives, it was thought, might lead to the disintegration of the British empire, which was effectively the elimination ‘from Eurasia the last bulwark of resistance between the United States and Soviet expansion’. The Soviet expansion towards the Middle East also threatened the flow of oil to Western Europe from the region. This, together with the psychological impacts of the Soviet gains on the morale of the West, adversely affect the American efforts to bring economic and political stability to Western Europe. The American decision to oppose Stalin on the Straits was based on the premise that a Soviet aggression could be deterred if Moscow knew that the US would fight itself for defence of Turkey. A Soviet miscalculation was considered as highly likely because the Russians might think that they had a free hand in the Near East as regards the United States. According to Eduard Mark, Moscow had learned from a well-placed spy that the US might fight for its vital interests in the


19 In 1946 Washington had received numerous intelligence reports that the Soviets were preparing for the invasion of Turkey, though many times they included exaggerated information about the Soviet troop movements in the Balkans and Caucasus. Mark, ‘The War Scare’, pp. 396, 402-405; and Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy’, pp. 810-11.
Near East and therefore modified its policy. The crisis faded in October when Washington received reports that 'the USSR was not planning to invade Turkey.'\textsuperscript{20} The cumulative effect of the two crises in 1946, but most notably the Turkish crisis, on American strategy was that the US 'could effort no further gains in territory or influence for the Soviet Union anywhere' including its immediate periphery where it might erroneously think it had a free hand.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1946, while the review of American policy was going on, the mood in Washington was that it was imperative to use American resources 'to build up a world of our own before the Soviets won by default'.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to the tension in the Near East, the energy shortage and economic stagnation in Western Europe, which became more acute in the winter of 1947, provided yet another catalyst for affirmative action. Indeed, the US took the initiative in this respect with the decision to 'cultivate situations of strength'\textsuperscript{23} in early 1947. This new strategy for dealing with the perceived Soviet threat was embodied in the doctrine of containment, the intellectual basis of which was best explained by George F. Kennan.

In his analyses of Soviet ideology and its relation to foreign policy\textsuperscript{24}, Kennan argued that Soviet hostility towards the West, which aimed at the destruction of capitalist system, stemmed not from the realities of foreign antagonism but from the structure of politics inside the Soviet Union which was shaped by the Russian tradition and ideology. The Soviet communists had the impression of a hostile outside world because they saw world events from an ideological perspective and the history of Russia provided them with ample evidence to sustain their sense of insecurity. Kennan believed that Moscow possessed enough capability to carry out its hostile foreign

\textsuperscript{20} For the points raised in the last three sentences, see Mark, 'The War Scare', pp.387, 415, and 412 respectively.

\textsuperscript{21} Gaddis, \textit{Strategies}, p.23. The impacts of the two crises on the role of the Middle East in American strategic thinking are noted in chapter two, below.


\textsuperscript{23} LaFeber, \textit{America Russia}, p.83; Leffler, \textit{Preponderance}, p.506.

\textsuperscript{24} The generalisations in this paragraph and the next are based on George F. Kennan's 'Long Telegram', 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct [the 'X' article]' both reprinted in Gaddis and Etzold eds., \textit{Containment: Documents}, and 'Reflections on Containment', in Terry Deibel and John L. Gaddis, \textit{Containing Soviet Union}, (Washington DC., 1987), pp.15-19; Gaddis, \textit{Strategies}, chapter 2, unless otherwise stated.
policy towards the West. However, he was optimistic in that the Soviet challenge could be overcome in the long term if it was contained ‘by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force’. As reconstructed by John L. Gaddis, Kennan’s containment had three stages. First was the adoption of an active policy by the US to maintain the world balance of power in the special circumstances following World War II. That meant preventing the Soviets from acquiring control of three centres of world industrial capacity, all of which greatly weakened by the war: the industrial heart of Western Europe, Japan, and the UK. Second, since ‘containment’ was intended to limit Soviet influence outside the regions Moscow already controlled, a main element of any US policy must be that of dividing and weakening the world communist movement. Finally, ‘containment’ aimed at modification, over time, the Soviet view of world politics to permit a negotiated settlement with the West and a modus vivendi between the superpowers.

Kennan’s analyses were based on the assumption that Moscow would not use its military power to attain its foreign policy objectives. He thought that the superior economic and potential war making capabilities of the West together with American strategic air power and atomic monopoly would deter a Soviet Union which was still recovering from its wartime loses, had limited air and naval capabilities and possessed no atomic weapons. Therefore, he proposed that the policy of containment should employ mainly economic and political means in an effort to create viable non-communist societies along the periphery of the Soviet Union. In his view, the most exposed area to Communist expansion in 1946 and 1947 was Western Europe and Japan. Communist ideology itself, Kennan argued, could not appeal to the nations of these areas, but because of economic and social problems there, Moscow might be successful in taking over any of those major Western countries and Japan by ideological-political intrigue and penetration. So the United States must provide them with economic and political support with a view to restoring confidence in their democratic institutions. Kennan recognised the necessity of safeguarding selective non-industrial regions around Western Europe and Japan, such as Greece, the Middle East, South Korea and island strongholds in the Far East such as Okinawa and Philippines,

25 For this specific point, see Gaddis, Strategies, p.36.
either because they had raw material resources, lines of communications, and strategic defensive points or because their loss might have a devastating psychological impact on other areas that were critical.26

In the period between 1947 and 1949 American efforts to strengthen the non-communist world along the periphery of the Soviet Union resulted in the proclamation of the Truman doctrine (March 1947) and the Marshall Plan (March 1948), the establishment of NATO (April 1949), and the rehabilitation of the German and Japanese economies. Although the defence of certain areas (the strong-point defence) mainly by economic means was preferred, there was an increasing tendency to have military capabilities to underwrite American policy.

The Truman doctrine was designed to deal primarily with the situation in the north of the Near East. Since the Iranian crisis, the emerging thinking in Washington with respect to Greece, Iran and Turkey had been that the communist seizure of power in any of these countries would have catastrophic consequences. Particularly alarming was the loss of Greece and Turkey, which would bring about the Soviet domination of the eastern Mediterranean. Following the Straits crisis of August 1946 it was worrying that the burden of maintaining large military forces might exhaust the underdeveloped Turkish economy, given the fact that nearly a half of the Turkish budged went into defence. Therefore, it was recognised that some sort of assistance was needed if the country was to maintain its defence effort without bankrupting its economy.27 The situation in Greece was also closely followed in 1946. There were preparations in Washington to help the royalist Greek government, considering that the communist rebels, drawing supplies from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, might overthrow the government if the British pulled out.28 In the spring of 1947, American officials

26 For Kennan’s views about non-industrial areas, see Gaddis, Strategies, pp.41 and 60. How far "Kennan’s ideas were influential on the Truman administration’s policies has been analysed in detail in Gaddis, Strategies, chapter 3 and Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, (Chicago and London, 1994), chapter 3.

27 Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp.251-53; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp.375 and 405; Kuniholm, Near East Connection, pp.7-8.

28 Bruce R.Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp.383-410; Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, p.125. When the British decided to withdraw help to Greece (including British forces stationed there) in February 1947, the Greek guerrillas were in control of the most of the countryside and the Greek economy was in ruins.
thought that the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East were areas into which Moscow would project its power if the United States failed to support the Western position there. Therefore, they decided to replace Britain as the donor of aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum in the area.\(^{29}\)

However, American people and the Republican-dominated Congress were sceptical about the extension of American commitments, fearing that the money needed to support them might prevent tax cuts and increase inflationary pressures in the economy. That is why, it was not an easy task for the administration to get the people’s and the Congress’ approval of American involvement in the affairs of far away places in peace time. The administration preferred to inform public about the region on the one hand, and to put the issue before the Congress as a matter of life and death on the other. The latter was very explicit in the rhetoric of the Truman’s address to the joint session of the Congress on March 12 which presented the situations in Greece and Turkey as a struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. The message particularly asserted that it was a moral responsibility for the United States to assist ‘free peoples’ to maintain their freedoms, the same objective to which the United States contributed by entering World War II.\(^{30}\) The strategic argument in favour of the doctrine was similarly exaggerated: if Greece fell under the control of communists, Turkey might follow suit. This would inevitably cause confusion and disorder throughout the Middle East, which would have profound effect on the morale and economies of the Western Europeans.\(^{31}\) Given the well-known Russian historic interests in the region and the decline of British power, it was imperative not to permit the Soviet domination of the entire Near East step by step, as the Nazi’s did in central Europe before the war.\(^{32}\)

\(^{29}\) President Truman expressed the significance this choice by saying that ‘he was faced with a decision more serious than had ever confronted any president’. Quoted in Walter Millis ed., *Forrestal Diaries*, (New York, 1951), p.250.


\(^{31}\) See, for example, Truman’s message quoted in the previous note. Washington implied Soviet involvement in the Greek case, like in Iran and Turkey where Moscow’s involvement was unequivocal. But there was no evidence of direct Soviet involvement, although the Greek rebels were believed to receive support from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

However exaggerated its rhetoric was, the doctrine served, in the short term, 'as a precursor and catalyst for the Marshall Plan and its military counterpart, ...NATO.' In a wider sense, the doctrine was the first official proclamation of American commitment to the security of nations beyond Europe, as such it set the precedent for further American involvement in the affairs of other parts of the world.33

The revival of the Western European economies through a massive aid programme, the Marshall Plan (announced in June 1947), was the most important step in strengthening the Western bloc. The situation of heightened tension following the Truman Doctrine and the collapse of Foreign Ministers meeting on German peace treaty in April 1947 stimulated Washington to take positive action for, what Secretary of State George Marshall saw, as restoring the balance of power on the Continent.34 By giving priority to Europe’s rapid recovery under the Plan, the American government acted on the assumption that the issues of security and economic development were linked, as proposed by Kennan. It was assumed that the prospect of a war in Europe was very remote, except by miscalculation on Moscow’s part, but the Russians ‘might successfully exploit European psychological demoralization resulting from war damage and the discouragingly slow pace of reconstruction, whether by means of external intimidation, internal subversion, or even the possibility that Europeans might vote their own communist into office through free elections.’35 Therefore, the plan was designed to restore self confidence in Europe through economic means. However, in 1948 the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav challenge to Soviet domination in the Balkans, the Berlin crisis, and the intention to reconstruct western Germany as a political entity, all helped to the tension between East and West to reach new highs. Washington sensed that the restoration of confidence among Western Europeans required an American military guarantee against Soviet threat as well as an


34 Marshall was quoted in Gaddis, Long Peace, pp.56-57.

assurance that a resurgent Germany would not dominate Europe again. The search for
security along these lines resulted in the establishment of NATO in 1949.36

In the 1947-49 period, American policy-makers increasingly felt that the policy of
containment should be supported by military capabilities. This was partly related to
their perception of Soviet threat. For example, The first detailed review of American
cold war policy, NSC 7 (dated March 1948), described a somewhat exaggerated view
of threat by stating that the failure to hold Soviet expansion might put the very
existence of the West at stake. Therefore, it called for the denial of the ‘areas of great
political power’ in Europe and Asia to the Soviet bloc.37 Although this document
recommended no additional military commitment, it was accepted by the summer of
1948 that military aid be used as an instrument to accomplish the objectives of
containment.38 Having more military capabilities was also encouraged by the
perception on the part of the Americans that the initiatives they deemed imperative to
augment Western strength (such as military assistance to the peripheral states, the
reconstruction of Germany and Japan, and the establishment of NATO), might cause
the East-West tension to rise, thus increasing the risk of war. This in turn led the policy
makers to seek more funds for the improvement of military capabilities.39

Despite the increased importance of underwriting American policies with military
capabilities, however, the Truman administration ruled out exercising maximum
defence effort to attain its political objectives.40 It was cognizant of the adverse effects
that excessive military spending would inflict on the economy, values and institutions

36 As stated in Washington talks between the US and Western European nations in the fall of the 1948
leading to the formation of NATO, the main objectives of military co-operation were to draw a line
in Europe that the Soviet Union should not cross and to ‘restore confidence among the people of
Western Europe.’ ‘Washington Exploratory Conversations on Security’, 9 Sep. 1948, Etzold and
Gaddis, Containment: Documents, pp.146-47.

37 ‘NSC 7: The position of the US with respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism’, 30 March

38 ‘NSC 14/1: The position of the US with respect to Providing Military Assistance to Nations of the
non-Soviet World’, 1 July 1948, Etzold and Gaddis, Containment: Documents, p.129.

39 Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, pp.181-82; Leffler, Preponderance, 237, 444; idem, ‘The
American Conception’, pp.377-78.

40 ‘NSC 20/1: US Objectives with Respect to Russia’, 18 August 1948, Etzold and Gaddis,
Containment: Documents, p.176; ‘NSC 20/2: Factors Affecting the nature of Defense Arrangements
of the country. During this time, it was deemed feasible to pursue the objectives of containment by mainly non-military means, given the fact that the American atomic capability to cripple the Soviet power in the event of war probably deterred Moscow from starting a war in order to gain its objectives.

The first Soviet atomic explosion and the communist victory in the Chinese civil war in the fall of 1949 eroded confidence in American deterrence which was based on the America's latent military-industrial capacity and the monopoly on the atomic bomb. The two events were seen in Washington as evidence of the fact that 'power had shifted in Moscow's advantage' in the Eurasian land-mass. So it was imperative that the national security policy be revised in order to take into account the increases in the power of the Eastern bloc as well as the availability of American resources to deal with the new situation. To this end, a study carried out by an ad hoc committee of State and Defense Department officials produced a comprehensive national security policy statement (NSC 68) with its emphasis on not allowing for any further substantial extension of the area under Soviet influence.

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41 NSC 20/4, for example, recommended that 'in pursuing of [the objectives of containment] due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life. 'NSC 20/4: US Objectives with Respect to the USSR', 23 Nov.1948, Etzold and Gaddis, Containment: Documents, p.209.

42 Gaddis, Long Peace, p.117. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal regarded 'the years before any possible power can achieve the possibility to attack [the US] with weapons of mass destruction [as the] years of opportunity.' Quoted in Gaddis, Strategies, p.62. The Truman administration avoided a heavy reliance on the nuclear weapons, but emphasised their function as deterrent. Hence, they were reckoned as the backbone of military planning. 'NSC 30: US Policy on Atomic Weapons', 10 Sep.1948, Etzold and Gaddis eds., Containment: Documents, p.343.

43 Gaddis, Strategies, p.90. According to Secretary Dean Acheson, the Russian detonation of a nuclear device 'changed everything, and [Truman] realized it ten seconds after it happened.' Quoted in Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, p.183.

44 The objective of the policy review was to find the means to make the containment strategy work, rather than to pursue unconditional surrender of the Soviet Union. Reflecting this, NSC 68 put it as its objective: 'Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish.' 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, NSC 68' [hereafter 'NSC 68'], 14 April 1950, Etzold and Gaddis eds., Containment: Documents, p.391.
The authors of NSC 68 viewed containment as ‘a policy of calculated and gradual coercion’ that could be implemented by a ‘superior aggregate strength’. To this end, a rapid and sustained improvement in all kinds of Western strength, especially the military one, was required for two reasons. First, there was no reason to make a distinction between peripheral and vital interests. For the drafters of the document, changes in balance of power could occur ‘not only as a result of economic manoeuvres or military action, but from intimidation, humiliation or even loss of credibility.’ If any such developments took place, the mere existence of the Soviet threat could cause ‘psychological insecurity’ to spread along the periphery and ‘upset the entire structure of post-war international relations.’ So the protection of all points along the perimeter of the Soviet bloc was necessary because all were of equal importance. To deal with local situations, a substantial increase in American conventional forces was seen as a prerequisite for an effective implementation of containment. The drafters of NSC 68 dismissed a policy based on atomic deterrence as ineffective in local contingencies, not only because of political considerations on the use of atomic weapons but also because their use would unnecessary escalate a local conflict. Second, the policy posture recommended in NSC 68 was designed not only to deal with present balance of power but also with future conditions. It was supposed that the Russians would not provoke a war because they lacked the assurance of winning it. The document, however, predicted that they would have enough capability to destroy the US by 1954, so when they reached that point they might intend to win a war by a surprise attack. Thus America should build superior forces than that of the Soviets, otherwise both national defence and the policy of containment would collapse.

NSC 68 settled, for the time being, the question of how much the United States should spend for military purposes, for it recommended a dramatic increase in defence expenditures. This was possible, the document noted, without causing higher taxes

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46 Gaddis, *Strategies*, quotations are from pp.92, 109, and 91 respectively.
or budget deficits, since increasing level of economic activity would create, in the long run, the extra financial resources needed to sustain the level of military expenditure. Drawing evidence from the experience of World War II, it claimed that the American economy could provide resources simultaneously for both extensive military production and consumer goods at times of crises.\footnote{50} It contained no estimate of the amount the US could allocate for the increased military commitments, but it implied that 'in 1950 the country could tolerate at least a tripling of defense expenditures without impairing current standards of living.'\footnote{51}

The North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 seemed to ensure the approval of NSC 68, which had been issued in April of that year, by an administration thus far sceptical about the cost of its implementation. As viewed from Washington, the attack showed that American nuclear superiority could not prevent Moscow from resorting to war by proxy on the periphery. Such a war might become a test of American resolve; thus failure to respond to it might call American credibility into question elsewhere. This understanding confirmed the need, envisioned by NSC 68, for having all sorts of military capabilities to defend non-communist world, leading to the approval of the document in September 1950.\footnote{52}

In short, in the early post war era the Truman administration adopted an activist foreign policy which envisaged the development of an international community based on American ideas, and the containment of the Soviet system. It was perceived that the Soviet Union posed a threat to the very survival of the western civilisation since it sought to dominate the world. The international communist movement was regarded as a 'monolith', and each communist gain as a lost to the Western world.\footnote{53} NSC 68 recommended that the US should support the policy of containment by using all means available, including military power. The result was a vigorous application of the

containment in all areas around the Soviet bloc, or as seen by some, the imposition of American order around the globe.\textsuperscript{54}

3. The Eisenhower Administration: National Security, the New Look and the Challenges of Nuclear Age

When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed office in January 1953, he inherited a global foreign policy as embodied in the NSC 68. Not surprisingly he, the candidate of ‘internationalist’ rather than ‘isolationist’ faction of the Republican Party, advocated the continuity of America’s global responsibilities.\textsuperscript{55} But he and his team wished to pursue the political objectives of the containment policy by employing better methods than their predecessors, so they did not follow the line of policy recommended in NSC 68. In addition, his eight-years long presidency had to deal with rather different international developments than the Truman era. First of all, the increasing Soviet capabilities, especially in the nuclear field, had profound effects on the defence of American mainland as well as America's relations with its allies.\textsuperscript{56} Second, the period witnessed a shift in the focus of the main antagonism to the conflicts in the Third World particularly in the second half of the 1950s. Third, the new Soviet leadership which succeeded Stalin (who died in March 1953), adopted a more moderate path in relations with the West. The change in the Soviet approach reduced tensions by paving the way for the agreement over Korea, and made the high-level contacts between the superpowers possible in the mid and late 1950s. Against this background, this section will discuss how the Eisenhower administration molded its national security strategy in the 1950s. Before discussing the main characteristics of the new policy, however, a brief inquiry into Eisenhower’s style of leadership is helpful.

Like any other American president, Eisenhower as the Chief Executive was the most influential person in the decision-making process, thus his choices and preferences, his approach to how to conduct business, shaped to a great extent the policies of his

\textsuperscript{54} For the critical perspective, see LaFeber, \textit{America Russia}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{55} LaFeber, \textit{America Russia}, pp. 141 and 147.

\textsuperscript{56} Raymond L. Garthoff has observed that Eisenhower ‘steered the United States through a transition from strategic invulnerability to mutual deterrence based on mutual vulnerability.’ Garthoff, \textit{Assessing the Adversary}, (Washington, DC., 1991), p. 52.
administration. He envisaged the threat from the world communism as a long-term one, as opposed to short-term threat analysis of the previous administration based on the notion of the year of maximum danger. In order to meet such a long-term challenge, a president, he thought, should be able to obtain different opinions from various quarters with a view to reaching a subtle decision. To this end, he believed the importance of team-work, and of exercising presidential power in a restraint fashion. That understanding manifested itself clearly in three areas. First, he consciously delegated responsibility to trusted subordinates to a great degree, and accordingly, his staff formulations were designed to maximize responsibility in each department. Second, he valued a great deal the formal ways of consultation within the administration; in particular he sought vigorous participation and debate at the cabinet and staff meetings. The National Security Council was the major platform where all principal foreign policy issues debated in detail and the president received alternative views from his staff. More importantly, he actively participated in the Council’s debates, where he ‘often guided the exchange by asking pointed questions or clearly enunciating his own position.’ Eisenhower had also streamlined the organisational structure of the Council. The Planning Board and Operations Coordinating Board were created to help to prepare and monitor the implementation of policy. Because of his deep concern about the economic implications of national security programmes, the team was expanded to include the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the Bureau of the Budget in addition to the statutory members—the President, vice-president, Secretary of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Defense

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60 Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of Eisenhower, pp.77, 81.

61 The principle missions of the Board were ‘to ensure that actions were consonant with the policies decided upon by the President [and] that they were coordinated with each other’. Richard Melanson, ‘The Foundations of Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy’, in Melanson and Mayers, Reevaluating Eisenhower, p.56.
Mobilization. And last, Eisenhower wished to ensure the approval of his policies by the Congress. He believed in the virtues of co-operation between the executive and legislative bodies especially in matters the use of military force was involved. Congressional support was also sought for the policy of collective security through alliance co-operation.

Eisenhower’s style of decision making led his critics to charge him of failing to assert his leadership. For them, the domination of decision making process by his aides resulted in inertia and confusion in the business of the administration. His aides, for example, adopted a tough stance against communism despite he preferred to put more emphasis on negotiations. Recent documentary accounts of the Eisenhower presidency, however, have indicated that the criticisms of his style of leadership can not be substantiated to a great extent. Most observers have come to agree that ‘the president exerted decisive control over his administration’s foreign policies.’ It is widely believed that he successfully defined, in the words of H.W.Brands, ‘a common philosophical framework’ within which his administration operated. The essence of this framework was the desire to see through the cold war by increasing American power while reducing the cost of global responsibilities. Such major features of American cold war policy as the reliance on the nuclear deterrent and the emphasis on the collective security were, one way or another, the products of this understanding. It is true that he wanted his administration’s polices ‘reflected a diversity of opinions and beliefs.’ However, the guidance provided by him ensured the adoption of a coherent strategy which merged different strands of opinions within his team. Whether the team managed to adopt the best course of action is another matter.

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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the most influential person in the process of formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. Dulles and Eisenhower had established a close working relationship which lasted until the former's death in 1959. Much of the foreign policy advice the President received was routed to him by Dulles. In view of this contemporaries held the impression that the foreign policy decisions were actually made by the Secretary of State. This view, however, has been revised in the light of recent documentary evidence. The emerging consensus points out that it was the President who decided policy. As significant as this is, it became evident that the two men had identical views over the major foreign and security policy matters such as anti-communism, nuclear policy, relations with allies, and the necessity of preparing for a long haul. Although Dulles was portrayed in public as a zealot cold warrior who presented the administration's tough choices (such as massive retaliation and the brinkmanship) and Eisenhower earned the reputation for the man of peace, in private Dulles was more pragmatic than his public image suggested whereas the President was a man of firm convictions.

Eisenhower himself criticised the Truman administration's foreign policy of being in a state of 'stagnation'. Therefore, he proclaimed in his first state of union address that there was a need for 'a new, positive foreign policy', one that could seize the initiative from Communist aggressors and make 'the free world secure'. The criticism of the national security strategy of the previous administration focused on the following points. First, it failed to understand the nature of direct threat to the Western security. It was correct to presume that 'the Soviets were deeply hostile to the non-communist world and were dedicated to expanding their area of control and influence' but it was

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67. Brands, *Cold Warriors*, p.25. Eisenhower himself refuted the claim that Dulles dominated the process of decision making. Dulles, once Eisenhower commented, "never made a serious pronouncement, agreement or proposal without complete and exhaustive consultation with me in advance and, of course, my approval." Quoted in Cook, *Declassified Eisenhower*, p.151.
wrong to see that the main source of threat was Soviet military power. The hostility that Moscow posed through its control of international communism and its use of various means of subversion was not addressed sufficiently by the Truman policy. Second, and related to the first point, the previous administration's military strategy was neither coherent nor flexible. Instead of linking the massive military build-up following the outbreak of the Korean war to clearly defined political ends, it erroneously aimed at matching Soviet military power in every field. In addition, the notion that the Soviet threat would reach a peak in a given year and the failure to drive political benefits from American superiority in nuclear forces made that strategy rather inflexible.  

Third, the indirect threat to the American economy, and thereby American way of life, posed by excessive military spending for a long time was not adequately addressed by the Truman strategy. Therefore, there was a need 'to discover a reasonable and respectable posture of defense' which would provide security without bankrupting the country.  

During its first months in office, the new administration realised that achieving reductions in the cost of containment at the same time as ensuring the nation's security required that decisions should be made on such basic issues as the reduction of defence expenditures, the reliance on nuclear deterrence, and the impacts of such choices on American foreign policy. On the issue of defence expenditures, for example, the Department of Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget were in favour of a large reductions in the defence budget and in the aid programmes, while the Defense and State departments were of the view that substantial cuts would be harmful in terms of national defence. The president reconciled the two approaches: he expressed his administration's commitment to a balanced budget but refused 'to make a sudden cut

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72 'Memo, of Discussion at the 131th Meeting of NSC', 11 Feb. 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-54:2/1, p.236.

It should be noted that the new administration realised from the start that some of these problems even raised in the policy papers of its predecessor. They inquired the visibility of maintaining current high-level of military expenditures for containment policy, the credibility of relaying threat of global war to protect periphery, and the possibility of achieving desired changes in the nature of the Soviet regime by placing greater emphasis on the avoidance of war. 'Memo. by the Executive Secretary of Policy Planning Staff', 12 May 1952, FRUS, 1952-54:2/1, p.14.
to achieve that objective now'. Although this approach made some reductions possible in the proposed defence budget for FY 1954, what impact the administration’s goal of striking a balance between economy and security would make on national security policy as a whole remained to be investigated. To this end, a comprehensive reappraisal of American policy was carried out in the summer and fall of 1953, which produced what is called the ‘New Look’ strategy. 

The first stage of the policy review was a planning exercise known as ‘Project Solarium’. The project included three high-level study groups, each charged with making the strongest possible case for its assigned option. The first group headed by George F. Kennan advocated essentially the policy of ‘containment’ which he had advanced in the late 1940s. In their report for the Project, the group regarded the Soviet threat as neither a short-term one nor exclusively military in nature, but a long-term, political and psychological one. Soviet military strength, including its growing nuclear capabilities, posed a great treat to the security of the West, but America’s superior capability was adequate to deter the Kremlin from starting a general war. Therefore, it was essential to pursue American objectives without resort to hostilities. It should also be taken into account that Moscow would probably use non-military methods rather than a direct involvement in peripheral wars to expand its influence. To address this kind of Soviet challenge, Kennan’s task force recommended economic, political and psychological programmes designed to promote stability and development in the non-communist world, to stall communist attempts to exploit nationalist aspirations, and to sow dissent between Moscow and its dependents. It was especially important to build on previous achievements in this respect in Western Europe. Yet Kennan’s panel placed more emphasis on the military aspect of the Soviet threat than Kennan had written in 1946 and 1947. Group ‘A’ were ‘aware of the problems that high levels of military spending would inflict on American economy’, their report stated, but such problems did ‘not seem comparable to the Soviet threat.’ They believed the United States had ‘the economic capability’ to spend at least $40 billion annually for defence even after the end of Korean War. The group hoped, like NSC 68, that the recommended course of action would eventually lead to deterioration of

73 Dockrill, *Eisenhower’s New-Look*, pp.29-33
Soviet power ‘to a point which no longer constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and to world peace.’

Group ‘B’, headed by General James McCormack, analysed the option of drawing a ‘line of no aggression ... beyond which the United States will not permit Soviet or Satellite forces to advance without a general war’. This task force argued that any Soviet attempt to expand its influence into the existing non-communist world, stretching from the NATO area to the western Pacific, would be met by an all-out American attack on the Soviet Union. As the threat of general war would deter Moscow, it was thought to be a solution to US vulnerability. However, the group’s report admitted that such course of action would increase the risk of war, because the American warning could be regarded as bluff. It was also recognised that America’s allies would be reluctant to support a deterrent policy. But the assurance that the US would not start a war and the American leadership in strengthening economic and political institutions of the West would eventually win their support. Regarding cost, task force ‘B’ recommended no reduction in the defence spending, given the need for maintaining the military capability to meet the Soviet Union in general war. However, it was noted that as the recommended policy ruled out peripheral wars. No longer would money be wasted fighting such wars.

Group ‘C’, led by Vice Admiral Richard Conolly, dealt with the option of devising a method to dissolve the Soviet bloc by liberating peoples and resources within it, what was called the strategy of roll back. Task force ‘C’ presumed that time was working against the West because of steadily growing Soviet nuclear capabilities. To eliminate this threat, it was necessary for the US to adopt ‘a forward and aggressive strategy in all fields and by all means’ (military, economic, diplomatic, and psychological). Among the distinctive feature of the proposed strategy were the fuller integration of the non-

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communist world; the maximum use of psychological and clandestine techniques in order to harm the Soviet bloc economically, to weaken its political institutions, to support pro-Western governments against covert activities, etc.; the widening of America's technological lead over the adversary, including nuclear weapons; and the maximum use of military power as a means to support American cold war goals. Such policy would increase the risk of general war, the report by task force 'C' predicted, but the seriousness of the threat justified this risk. It was acknowledged that because America's allies would oppose this policy, the US should carry it out unilaterally. The report predicted a high cost, around $60 billion a year during the initial phase in which maximum effort should be made to roll back the Soviet influence, but it noted that the cost would reduce over time as the Soviet bloc weakened.76

After hearing the presentations of the Solarium study reports at the July 16, 1953, meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower commented that he was not in favour of 'any policy that could not win the support of allies, that cost too much, and that accepted a greater risk of general war because of the belief that the United States could survive one.' Then he asked the study groups to bring about a synthesis of their studies in the light of his expectations, so that it could be presented to the NSC as the basis of future policy. However, the three groups failed to produce a unified text. The task force reports and other reviews and studies (such as the recommendations for a new policy produced by the Joint Chiefs in July 1953) were incorporated into a draft statement of policy by an inter-departmental committee.77 It was endorsed by the NSC in the form of NSC 162/2 (the key document of the New Look), which was an eclectic document in that it embodied the philosophical foundations of the containment policy as explained by the group 'A', the atomic enforcement as proposed by the group 'B', and the necessity of covert activism as recommended by the group 'C'.78 More generally, NSC 162/2 and the implementation of its key features by the administration in the


77 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, p.137. The JCS study has been analysed in Wenger, Living With Peril, pp.31-35. The JCS study proposed a strategy based on nuclear deterrence and the redeployment of American forces overseas. Dulles objected it on the grounds that the impacts of such strategy on the morale of America's allies should further be studied. The President agreed.

78 Gaddis, Strategies, p.146.
1950s, reflected the view which saw the cold war a 'a historical struggle of social systems that would be determined in the long run'. The Soviet threat was regarded as manageable provided that the US had adequate military power to deter Moscow from resorting war as an instrument to achieve its political objectives. What was important was to ensure that the US was able to meet the communist threat with non-military means with the help of America’s allies. The main characteristics of the New Look policy merit elaboration at some length.

The politico-military aspect of the New Look was based on the premise that America should win the cold war without seriously damaging its political institutions. It was thought that the US could obtain basic security and at the same time reduce the burden of the struggle by taking greater risks in exchange for lower costs (an asymmetrical response). In practice this strategy meant reliance on nuclear weapons as the means of deterrent. NSC 162/2 made it clear by noting that a ‘strong security posture [for the United States] must be based on massive atomic capability.’

There was a consensus at the top of the US administration that the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter general as well local aggressions, what was called the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’, would provide economy and flexibility. In terms of economy, heavy reliance on nuclear force suited the objectives of both those who advocated fiscal orthodoxy (Budget and Treasury representatives) and those who favoured a strong military establishment (State and Defense representatives). For State and Defense, nuclear weapons were a major component of a strong military posture, while for Budget and Treasury they were preferable because their overall cost was less than maintaining conventional forces. The focus on nuclear deterrent would also bring about flexibility for two reasons. First, it was thought the US could utilise its technological superiority in the nuclear field. Second, a superior nuclear deterrent

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79 Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, 205. Also see Gaddis, Strategies, pp.131-32; Wenger, Living With Peril, p.15.
capability would ensure that the US could retaliate instantly at times and places of its own choosing.  

The central premise of nuclear deterrence was that the Soviet leaders' paramount objective was to protect their regime, so when they faced the prospect of total devastation in a nuclear war they would act reasonably. The important thing, therefore, was to make them to realise that the US had adequate nuclear power to retaliate even if the Soviets attacked first.  To increase the efficacy of the deterrent strategy, it was pronounced in public that nuclear weapons were treated like any other munitions, yet in which circumstances the United States would resort to using these weapons was not specified. The reason for this was that Moscow, left uncertain about which of its actions would provoke American response, 'might reasonably expect only of its probes would meet the ultimate response', which meant in practice 'all levels of potential East-West violence would be excluded' through the threat of nuclear response.  

Secretary Dulles was confident that an asymmetrical strategy would work because it would:

convince potential aggressors that they could not always prescribe conditions of competition to suit themselves. [It would make possible for the Western coalition to respond an aggression] “at places and means of its own choosing.” Such an approach would allow shaping “our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy’s many choices.” The result would be “a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means,” and as a consequence, “more basic security at less cost.”

The New Look placed a greater emphasis on the ideological aspects of the cold war than ever before. This was a logical conclusion of the assumptions on which it was based. First, the cold war was believed to be a protracted conflict. The idea, that in order to win the struggle the protection of the American way of life over a long period was necessary, was explained in ideological terms. Second, the New Look proposed that the intentions of adversary, not solely its capabilities, made it a threat to the Western security. This provided the justification for a tough ideological stance. It was

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85 Quoted and paraphrased in Gaddis, *Strategies*, p.147. Although the doctrine of massive retaliation was mostly explained by Dulles, he received a full support from Eisenhower. For the President, it was not desirable to 'counter communist tactics with their own weapons'. Metz, ‘Eisenhower and the Planning’, p.55.
further reinforced by the belief in Washington that, given the America’s massive military power, Moscow would not ‘start a deliberate war’; instead it would wage a ‘political warfare’ that included propaganda, subversion, and exploitation of Western weaknesses in the Third World such as the colonial past of the Western powers. The Eisenhower administration remained a staunch advocate of the belief that the Soviet Union would seek to achieve ‘world domination, using force, if necessary’, and this view did not change at times of relative thaw in superpower relations as in 1955 and 1959. Accommodation with the communists was not seen possible as long as this Soviet view of international relations was not abandoned or substantially modified. Viewed from this perspective, the administration concluded that every nation had a moral duty to support Western cause against communist expansion. As will be seen in later chapters, this ideological rigidity put the administration at odds with nationalist movements in the Third World.

A major feature of the New Look policy was its emphasis on achieving security and peace in ‘cooperation with other like-minded nations’; that is, collective security. NSC 162/2 stated that in a long-term struggle with the Soviet bloc, the US could not ‘meet its defence needs, even at exorbitant cost, without the support of allies.’ One reason for such categorical statement was the requirements of American defence strategy. The contribution of allies to American nuclear deterrent by providing overseas bases, noted an intelligence estimate, was ‘an important additional element of US strategic air capability and essential [for many years] to the conduct of the military operations on the Eurasian continent in case of general war’. To this end, holding ‘the vital outpost positions around the periphery of the Soviet Union’ was particularly of

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88 Secretary Dulles, for example, dubbed ‘neutrality’ as ‘immoral’. Brands, Cold Warriors, p.17.

89 John F. Dulles, ‘Challenges and Response in United States Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 36/1 (October 1957), p.28. The 1950s saw the creation of two regional alliances in the Western bloc, namely the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization. The US also concluded bilateral security pacts with South Korea and Taiwan.

crucial importance. Secretary Dulles seconded this view, writing that ‘without the co-
operation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively. 91
Another reason was that of perceived need for waging the cold war at more bearable
cost. It was expected that sharing defence burden with allies would help to achieve
maximum security at a minimum cost. American power, as Dulles put it, was ‘not
omnipotent’, thus, as Eisenhower made it clear, ‘the United States could not afford to
prepare all kinds of wars and still preserve its free economy and its basic institutions.’92
The priority of the New Look policy was to ensure the co-operation of the major
industrialised non-communist states, particularly in Western Europe, given their
manpower resources and economic resources. Less developed areas were also deemed
to be of crucial importance, because of their material resources, for security as well as
prosperity of the West as whole, so it was feared that the absorption of such areas
within the Soviet system would ‘alter balance of power to the detriment of the US’.93

Another field of allied co-operation was thought to be in deterring the Soviet bloc
expansion into peripheral areas, where the New Look policy proposed a division of
labour between the US and its allies. NSC 162/2 regarded the US as the centre of
military supply and industrial strength and saw America’s role as to provide capability
for strategic deterrence, while allies were responsible for conventional defence of
peripheral areas. The onus of the US in local situations would be supporting the allied
forces with limited air and naval operations (including the use of its tactical nuclear
weapons), if necessary.94

The emphasis of the New Look on allied co-operation led the Eisenhower
administration to put premium on maintaining the cohesion and building the strength of
the Western coalition. It was particularly worrying that the strategy of nuclear
deterrence and American involvement in the defence of Korea, Taiwan and Indochina

92 Dulles, ‘Challenges and Response’, p.25; ‘227th Meeting of the NSC’, 8 Dec.1954, FRUS, 1952-
54:2/1, p.804.
93 Gaddis, Strategies, p.152; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, p.213
created fears among European allies that American policy would bring about war; the prospect of atomic devastation in such a war would force them 'to adopt more neutral position in a cold, or especially in a hot, war.' For this reason, the same paragraph of NSC 162/2 which stipulated that nuclear weapons would be available as other munitions in a general war, stressed the necessity for the US 'to seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations.' In this context, it was necessary to assure European allies that the US genuinely wanted to reduce the cold war tensions and that their interests would not be sacrificed during crises or any talks with the Soviets. Other major sources of weakness in the Western coalition were political and economic instability, historical hostilities between certain allies, differing views on the nature of the Soviet threat, and the differing approaches to colonial problems. It was acknowledged that the American policy should be vigilant about the exploitation of such weaknesses by Moscow for 'creeping expansion' of Soviet power.

As for building-up the strength of the Western coalition, the main attention was given to reducing strains, bolstering confidence, and fostering economic progress in Europe. This included shoring up NATO defence, supporting European economic integration and the creation of the European Defence Community project (aimed at ensuring full a West German contribution to European defence within a supranational framework), the liberalisation of trade with Western Europe, and economic and military aid. The last was the chief instrument for strengthening America's allies beyond Europe. Despite its cost, such assistance was seen as the cheapest way of buying security. Still such assistance was to be extended 'according to calculated advantage of [it] to the US world position.' What was particularly important was that such aid was expected to bring about economic and political stability; thus it would counter the Soviet expansion in peripheral areas through non-military means.

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95 'National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 99', 23 Oct. 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:2/1, p.552; this feature of NSC 162/2 was noted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp.209-10.


Although the New Look policy pointed out the need for seeking the concurrence of American policy by allies, its emphasis on nuclear deterrence and on the provision of conventional forces for local conflicts largely by allies caused at times strains in the intra-alliance relations. For example, early in 1954 the US wanted to apply the New Look’s approach to the defence of Europe. However, major European allies, except for Britain, were reluctant to base NATO strategy on nuclear weapons. In the summer of that year, as Saki Dockrill has observed, 'in the light of allied suspicions about American global strategy, the administration tried to de-emphasise its massive retaliation rhetoric'.\textsuperscript{98} NATO’s decision of December 1954 to adopt nuclear strategy for military planning and preparations purposes only, reflected this change of approach. Another source of disagreement was the European unwillingness to provide more conventional forces for common defence. The collapse of European army project in August 1954, for example, frustrated the Americans to the extent that Secretary Dulles talked about reappraising American policy towards Europe.\textsuperscript{99}

The New Look also incorporated covert operations and psychological warfare into the American strategy with the objective of the regaining initiative from the communists in the cold war. As a result the US engaged in highly controversial activities to support friendly governments or to overthrow the ones perceived to be unfriendly as in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954).\textsuperscript{100} Another aspect of the New Look was its recognition of the value of negotiations as a way to ease cold war tensions between the East and West. As it ascribed a great importance to avoiding a general war with the Soviet Union, the search for a negotiated settlement to the outstanding cold war issues was desirable. During the Eisenhower presidency, however, negotiations were pushed sidelines by other cold war issues. Although covert operations, psychological warfare, and negotiations were important parts of the administration’s strategy, here there is no need to cover them in detail since they are not central to the main subject of this study.

\textsuperscript{98} Dockrill, \textit{Eisenhower’s New-Look}, pp. 94-95.


\textsuperscript{100} In its covert operations and propaganda activities, the Eisenhower administration showed restraint because of the fear of overreaction not only by the Soviet leaders but also by ‘anxiety-ridden Western Europe’. It should also noted that the New Look policy adopted in principle to conduct American efforts to weaken the Soviet bloc, as Saki Dockril wrote, ‘in a cautious but determined fashion.’ Bowie and Immerman, \textit{Waging Peace}, p.220; Dockrill, \textit{Eisenhower’s New-Look}, p.46.
The efficacy of the New Look as an American security strategy depended on the continued relevance of the assumptions on which it was based. Two major factors weakened the strength of the New Look’s assumptions and raised fundamental questions about their relevancy especially in the second term of the Eisenhower presidency: growing Soviet capabilities and the difficulties the US faced in making the nuclear deterrence credible in peripheral areas.

At the time the New Look was adopted, the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a crippling strike on the United States was limited, although it already possessed nuclear weapons. But it became apparent that Moscow would have a credible first strike power by the end of 1957. This caused serious problems for the policy-makers in Washington since it created a climate of distrust to the American policies at home. The administration faced the prospect of doing more to enhance America’s security, which would mean spending more on conventional forces in addition to the existing nuclear armament programmes. This was a threat to the central objective of the New Look; that was, maintaining maximum security at minimum possible cost. Making a substantial increase in defence spending would also undermine the political objective of the New Look, the protection of ‘American way of life’ from devastating effects of the cold war. Therefore, a change in spending policy was not contemplated.

In fact, the main features of asymmetrical strategy remained largely intact, with relatively minor adjustments, by the end of Eisenhower administration. This was possible for two reasons. First, although the American strategy faced strong challenges, the internal and external factors forcing change were relatively weaker.
compared to those of the late 1940s. Second, when the forces of change pressed harder, the administration shifted slightly the focus of its deterrent strategy. Indeed, when the fear of a Soviet pre-emptive strike on American targets was raised in the US with the improvement of delivery vehicles, the administration did not relinquish its heavy reliance on nuclear power for deterrent purposes. Instead, it adopted the doctrine of 'sufficiency', as opposed to maintaining 'superiority', in nuclear weapons. For the administration, the American retaliatory power was sufficient to perform its deterrent functions since the US had already possessed an 'overkill' capability. The actions demanded by 'missile gap' critics or by official investigations such as the Gaither Committee of 1957 (set up to study the vulnerability of American mainland in the light of the prospective Soviet intercontinental missile capability), were mainly rejected on the grounds of sufficiency.103

Although the sufficiency doctrine saved the New Look from collapsing, it fell short of providing a reliable answer to the questions regarding the use of nuclear weapons in local crises. Among the New Look's premises was that nuclear deterrence would work as a mechanism to protect America's allies against local aggressions, because the prospect of facing a nuclear response would persuade a potential aggressor that it would not gain its objectives by military means. This strategy indeed worked in Korea and in the dispute between Taiwan and China over the off-shore islands, where there was a clearly defined enemy. But most of the local disputes grew out of internal instability in allied countries and therefore there was no enemy to deter with nuclear weapons. The nature of local wars presented a dilemma. On the one hand, it was highly unlikely that the United States would engage in local wars over a territory whose value for its security, or for the security of its local ally, was not inherently vital. On the other hand, it was keen to defend such areas lest loosing a territory to Communists had adverse psychological impacts over their allies.104 The style of the administration's

103 Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look, p.194-95; Gaddis, Strategies, pp.187-88; Garthoff, Assessing the Adversary, p.14. The doctrine of sufficiency should be viewed in the context that by 1957 'Eisenhower believed that mutual vulnerability had become a formula for stability' because each superpower had adequate nuclear power which prevented them from taking advantage of attacking first. Wenger, Living with Peril, p.143.

crisis management, which was to press for American advantage until the brink of war (the ‘brinkmanship’ policy), together with strong anti-communist rhetoric, only served to compound the problem.

Despite its growing awareness, over time, of the dangers of resorting to nuclear force in local situations, the Eisenhower administration never admitted this in public in order not to undermine the credibility of American deterrence. In private, however, the dominant view was to find some ways to reduce the dependence on the use of nuclear weapons. But this never amounted to a radical change in the order of priorities; thus, for example, efforts to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them continued as usual. Instead, it was agreed in 1957 that tactical nuclear weapons would provide the flexibility required, because with advances in technology they can be used more accurately against selected targets. The experience of the late 1950s, however, showed that even their use in a local war would finally lead to a full-scale nuclear war. One alternative way of making American policy more flexible was to strengthen America’s allies against subversion and economic penetration as well as to help them to improve their military forces. Believing that most troubles in underdeveloped areas would stem from the weakness of allies, Dulles wrote that the allied governments should have sufficient strength to ‘maintain order against subversion and to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggression’. This was to be achieved through economic and military aid. The other option was to increase American conventional capabilities to deter, if necessary to repel, any Soviet bloc conventional aggression in peripheral areas, the very thing the New Look sought to avoid. The

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105 Gaddis, Strategies, p.175; idem., ‘Unexpected J. F. Dulles’, p.50. In April 1954 Dulles wrote that a strategy must be flexible enough to respond a local aggression without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. But his article implied that the emphasis of the current American strategy on local defensive strength and reinforced by the American air and naval power provided the flexibility required. NSC 5422/2 (the first review of NSC 162/2) made the point clearer by stating that ‘the US should be prepared to defeat [local] aggression without necessarily initiating a general war’, although this was qualified by the statement of American determination to carry out its nuclear strategy, unilaterally if necessary. Dulles, ‘Policy for Security’, pp.358, 362; ‘NSC 5422/2’, 7 Aug.1954, FRUS, 1952-54: 2/1, p.718.


108 Dulles, ‘Policy for Security’, p.359. Saki Dockrill has observed that in the late 1950s Washington increased its efforts to extend more economic aid to such areas in an effort to stall the Soviet bloc economic penetration. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look, p.224.
administration acknowledged the importance for the United States ‘to have versatile, ready forces to cope with limited aggression.’ However, it did not rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in local wars and opposed a comprehensive conventional armament effort partly because of the cost involved and partly because of the belief that limited wars only broke out in underdeveloped areas, not in such vital areas as Europe, so that the US was unlikely to become involved in them. No final decision on the concept of limited war, and how it should be fought, had been made until Eisenhower left office.109

4. Conclusion

In the postwar era, the United States took the lead in creating an international system based on the values of liberal democracy and capitalism. The emergence of the Soviet bloc was seen as a treat to this effort with its emphasis on dominating the Eurasian continent. The Truman administration sought to contain, and eventually roll back, Soviet influence (the doctrine of containment). Initially the chief instrument of American policy was economic and military assistance to Western Europe and to other allies in areas perceived to be vital, such as Greece and Turkey. However, in the late 1940s it was thought that the US needed to improve its own capabilities substantially in order to shore up the Western confidence (especially after the loss of China and the Soviet atomic capability in 1949). After the outbreak of Korean war in 1950, it became the essence of American security policy (NSC 68) to build up the American and its allies’ military power before Moscow reached the capability to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States.

The Eisenhower administration saw the non-military aspects of Soviet threat being just as important as its military aspect. Therefore, it sought to contain and weaken the communist bloc without damaging American economy and society. To achieve this, its national security policy (the New Look) put a heavy emphasis on strategic deterrence and co-operation with America’s allies, and to a lesser extent on propaganda, covert activities and negotiations. It was believed that if American military-industrial power

and the non-communist world's material and political assets were used properly, the West could win the cold war. As Soviet atomic capabilities grew in the 1950s, American security policy increasingly emphasised the necessity of deterring the Soviet bloc expansion without resorting war. As a result, developing the political unity, strength and determination of the non-communist world by a range of political and psychological measures became more important.

In the following chapters, US security relations with Turkey in relation to Middle Eastern and European defence will be analysed. As will be seen, the importance attached by the Eisenhower administration to a healthy economy, allied solidarity, nuclear weapons, and anti-communist ideology all affected US-Turkish collaboration in one way or another, shaping the level of American assistance to Turkey and the American view about the role Ankara could play in the regional affairs.
CHAPTER TWO

AMERICAN STRATEGIC CONCERNS AND TURKISH ROLE IN THE DEFENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE: 1946-52

1. Introduction

The United States manifested its interest in Turkey’s security for the first time by supporting the Ankara government in resisting the Soviet proposal for the joint defence of the Turkish Straits in August 1946. This interest grew with the passage of time to the point that the Truman administration decided to give formal security guarantee to the country, preferably through NATO, in May 1951. This chapter focuses on the reasons for the development of the security ties between two countries in the 1946-52 period.

In explaining the American interest in Turkey’s security, attention will be given to the strategic considerations on the part of the United States. As explained in the previous chapter, in the postwar era the Americans came to the conclusion that the expansion of Soviet influence in the Eurasian landmass should be checked. As a result, American strategic interests in those countries located on the periphery of the Soviet bloc had grown substantially. In the period between 1946 and 1952, the looming strategic importance of the Middle East, the area roughly stretching from the Mediterranean to India, was particularly significant. As will be illustrated in this chapter, the recognition that the security of Europe should take account of what was going on around the periphery, led to the growth of security ties between Turkey and the West. Equally significant from a strategic point of view was the perceived importance of Turkish territory in Western defence planning against the Soviet bloc. In addition, a host of other factors affected the degree of American willingness to collaborate with Turkey in

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1 On the whole, in the period from 1946 to 1952 the Truman administration first came to view that there existed vital US interests in the Middle East and redefined several times the scope of these interests. The policy papers towards the region in this period repeatedly emphasised two basic American objectives: to guarantee as far as possible the western access to petroleum resources and air fields of the region, and the denial of the region and its resources to the Soviet Union in peace as well as in wartime. See, for example, 'Department of State Policy Statement', 5 May 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1949:6, p.1660.
security matters during the period in question, such as the Soviet inclination to exploit the problems that the West encountered in the Middle East, the decline of the British power, and Turkey's strong desire to become a part of the Western World. The subject-matter of this chapter will be explained around two major issues. First, how the US saw Turkey's strategic and political role with respect to the defence of the Middle East will be analysed. Second, the matters pertaining American security guarantee to Turkey (including the American support for Turkish entry into NATO and the Western assessment of Turkey's position with respect to the Middle East Command proposal) will be explained in some detail.

2. The United States, Turkey and the Defence of the Middle East, 1946-52

In the post-war era, the Americans explained their strategic and political interest in Turkey as part of their objective of promoting 'peace and stability' (i.e., preserving the status quo) in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. During World War II, they considered the Middle East (including Turkey) to lie in the British sphere. After the war, instead of committing themselves to the defence of the region, they preferred to support Britain's political and military presence there and directed their limited resources to Western Europe. Yet the post-war British weakness (demonstrated by economic crisis in the UK and the rising nationalism in the Middle East) indicated that a power vacuum might emerge in the region. The Soviet Union, the historical rival of the British, was thought to be eager to capitalise on this very weakness in order to expand its influence there. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, Soviet policy towards Iran and Turkey in 1946 was seen by Washington as part of Moscow's attempt to dominate the entire Middle East step by step. For this reason, the Americans sensed that they should do more to preserve status quo in the region, especially along the 'northern tier'.

2 For example, see 'Department of State Policy Statement', 5 May 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.1660.
4 This was mainly because the British Empire was seen by the US as 'the last bulwark between the United States and the Soviet expansion in Eurasia'. James F.Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol.1 (1945-1947), (Washington DC., 1979), pp.109-110.
5 For details of these matters, see Bruce R.Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, (Princeton, 1980), pp.381-82; Mervyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: national security, the Truman administration and the cold war, (Stanford, 1992), pp.77-80. It should be noted that
As far as the defence of the Middle East was concerned, American determination not to allow the expansion of Soviet influence in Iran and Turkey provided the catalyst for the initiation of American strategic studies and contingency planning for the region. The Western allies regarded the Cairo-Suez area as the most important place for the defence of the Middle East. They knew at this time that the Soviet Union was vulnerable to an attack that was launched from bases in the south. The industrial and petroleum producing areas of southern Soviet Union were within the range of American B-29 bombers, if they operated from the Suez base. Given the fact that Western defence plans of the time envisaged the evacuation of the allied troops from Europe if war erupted, an air assault on Soviet targets from this area became more significant than ever before. From this perspective, Turkey was seen as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Middle East as it was located on the major air, land, and sea routes from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and to the Middle East oil fields. In other words, Turkey's prospective role in a war would be to provide a cushion, absorbing the initial Soviet blow and deterring Soviet advances, while the United States prepared to undertake the counteroffensive, particularly from the Cairo-Suez area. The strategic studies and emergency plans of the time confirmed this role. The Pincher studies (started in March 1946), for example, stressed that the longer that country was able to resist a Soviet attack, the longer American B-29s based in Egypt

Moscow regarded the Middle East to be in the British sphere at the end of the war. So preserving the status quo in the region meant in practice to keep the Soviet Union out of the region. Moscow regarded the Middle East to be in the British sphere at the end of the war.

6 The military base complex around the Suez Canal in Egypt included, among other things, supply depots, ammunition dumps, repair facilities, command and control facilities, and numerous airfields. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.77.

7 Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from The Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans 1945-1954, (London, 1997), pp.19-20. A JCS regional study codenamed Caldron explained in November 1946 the importance air attacks on the Soviet Union as follows: 'The USSR had displayed the centre of gravity of her industry to the eastward. This industry, together with Caucasian oilfields are vital to her war potential.' Quoted in ibid., p.19.

8 Michael Cohen has observed that all of the contingency plans in the 1940s 'conceded the loss of Western Europe to a Soviet onslaught, and stressed American reliance on the atomic offensive to delay the Soviets. Cohen, Fighting World War, p.21.

9 Leffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War', Journal of American History, 71 (March 1985), p.813-14. The Suez base, however, needed at the time runway extension and the installation of a special refuelling system so that it could take American medium-range bombers, B-29s.
would be able to bomb targets in the Urals, beyond the range of bombers in Britain.\textsuperscript{10} In short, because of the strategic importance of the facilities in Egypt, American strategists noted the vital need to retain ‘certain strategic facilities in Egypt during peacetime and rights of re-entry to make full use of these facilities in the event of a threat to the security of the Middle East.’ And, because the Western access to this facilities would ‘depend upon the extent and efficacy of Turkish resistance to a Soviet offensive’, the JCS believed that ‘Turkey held the key to the defence of the Middle East.’\textsuperscript{11}

Following the crisis of 1946, the US was involved in the affairs of the Middle East more than it was before. By the end of 1947 the administration’s policy in the region endorsed using American political, economic, and, if necessary, military power in an effective manner in cooperation with the British.\textsuperscript{12} It was thought that the Middle East was an area into which the Soviet Union would project its power if the United States failed to support the Western position in there. The evolution of US policy along these lines began with the proclamation of the Truman doctrine in March 1947. The significance accorded to the Middle East considerably grew in 1947 and 1948. The value of the region was defined in terms of its possible contribution to the security and prosperity of Western Europe. American policy makers knew that Western Europe, the most important area on earth, was also the most vulnerable area to Soviet influence, particularly given the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. They did not predict that Moscow would initiate a military action to capture Western Europe.

\textsuperscript{10} Eduard Mark, ‘The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences’, \textit{Diplomatic History}, 21/3 (Summer 1997), pp.393. It was planned in Washington that ‘the American air offensive against the Soviet industrial and petroleum areas would be carried out by six B-29 bomber groups which would take off from bases in England and Egypt’. Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, p.40. It should be noted that such an offensive was beyond the British capabilities because at the time only parts of southern Soviet Union was within the effective range of British medium-range bombers operating from the bases in Egypt. John Kent, ‘Introduction’, in John Kent ed., \textit{British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, vol. 4, Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-1949}, (London, 1998), part I, p.xivii. The British bases were to be used by the American forces according to a common user agreement between the US and Britain. David R. Devereux, \textit{The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948-56}, (London, 1990), p.12.

\textsuperscript{11} Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, pp.40 and 51.

However, they were anxious about the fact that Western European economies were only slowly recovering from the war, the power of indigenous communists was growing in certain countries, and political and economic control of Western Europeans over their colonies was getting weaker. Under such circumstances, the additional expansion of Soviet influence towards the Middle East would adversely affect the American efforts to bring economic and political stability to Western Europe.13

The State Department gave special attention to the possible knock-on effects of the expansion of the Soviet power in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East after the Truman doctrine. The Near Eastern division of the Department (NEA), for example, stated in 1948 that ‘any further extension of Soviet power ... would have the most disheartening effect on all the free nations of the world, including those of Western Europe.’ Two points came to ahead. First, the link between the Middle East and Western Europe was established in terms of the importance of the Middle Eastern oil for Western Europe. It was supposed that the economic and political stability in Western Europe was closely related to the continuity of the flow of cheap oil from the Middle East. The crises in Central Europe in the spring and summer of 1948 and the outbreak of the Palestine war in that year seemed to increase the importance of the Middle East oil for the economic recovery of Europe.14

Second, strategic concerns continued to be the most important determinant that shaped American policy towards the Middle East. In January 1947 the British government decided in favour of retaining ‘exclusive British responsibility for defending the Suez Canal and the rest of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean’, mainly for preserving Britain’s prestige and influence as a great power, at all costs. The British strategy of the time valued the region as second only to Britain itself.15 Following the Truman doctrine, the American military planners, on the other hand, regarded the Middle East as one of the two main avenues of approach by air and

13 Leffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy', p.815
14 ‘Memo. by the Director of the NEA (Satterthwaithe) to the Under Secretary of State (Lowett)’, 26 Oct. 1948, FRUS, 1949:6, p.173 (quotation is from this document); ‘Memo. by the Politico-military Advisor of NEA’, 14 Nov. 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.58; Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War, pp.410-414; Cohen, Fighting World War, pp.35-37.
15 Kent, 'Introduction', pp.xliv-xlvi.
surface to the industrial areas of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{16} It was particularly important that by the end of 1948 Washington agreed to commit American forces to help to repulse a Soviet offensive as well as to carry out strategic offensive from the Suez base (in addition to the airfields in Britain and Okinawa) against the Soviet Union in general war. The Americans saw that the Western forces could not long resist a Soviet land offensive in Western Europe. However, a Soviet invasion of the Middle East was expected to last much longer, so the base in Egypt could be used by the Strategic Air Force to bomb industrial and petroleum areas of the southern Soviet Union even after the loss of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{17}

American involvement in the Middle Eastern defence had a distinctive feature. It did not seek exclusively to supplant the British power but to complement it. Washington was aware of the difficulties that British problems, such as the shortage of manpower, financial resources, and military hardware, especially aircraft. Between 1945 and 1948 the American estimates of British ability to defend the Middle East, including the Suez base, ‘grew progressively more pessimistic.’ By mid-1948 Washington came to the view that the Soviets would occupy Turkey, the Middle East oil fields and the Suez base within four months after the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{18} The Palestine problem and the British failure to reach an agreement with Egypt over the status of the Suez base further complicated the problem of Middle Eastern defence. American policy concentrated on the countries in the north of the region, where the British ability to help them was rather limited. Indeed, the Truman doctrine showed that the focus of Washington policy was the security problems of the northern tier countries rather than


\textsuperscript{17} The British emergency war plans expected that American contribution would be one infantry division, one airborne regiment, and one group of 30 strategic bombers by D+30 days; and by D+6 month the American force would be three divisions and 350 aircraft. The American emergency war plan codenamed \textit{Halfmoon} noted that minimum ‘two US infantry divisions and six and two thirds fighter groups’ were to be sent to the Middle East by D+6 months.

The British plan \textit{Sandown} has emphasised the significance of American contribution by noting that the use of American nuclear weapons was essential for the defence of the Middle East. The text and this note were based on ‘DEFE 4/16, COS 145 (48), annexes: report by the JPS to the COS’, 11 Oct. 1948 and ‘DEFE 5/9, COS (48)210, annex: Digest of Plan “Speedway”’, 16 Dec. 1948 both in John Kent ed., \textit{British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, vol.4, Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East, 1943-1949}, part 1, pp.290-96 and 299-305; Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, pp.22-23.

\textsuperscript{18} Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, pp.30-32.
the entire Middle East.\footnote{Kuniholm, \textit{Origins of the Cold War}, p.373.} For the Americans, it was an American responsibility to provide assistance to the countries bordering the Soviet Union in line with their cold war objective of creating ‘healthy and viable’ non-communist societies on the Soviet periphery,\footnote{This observation was made in ‘Agreed Conclusions of the Conference of Near Eastern Chiefs of Mission Held at Istanbul, November 26-29, 1949’, undated, \textit{FRUS, 1949:6}, p.169.} which was the essence of the policy of containment. This being the case, countries like Greece, Turkey (together dominating the sea approaches from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean) and Iran served as a bulwark before the Soviet advance towards the Middle East. Therefore, the State Department, with the support of the JCS, adopted the idea that the security of northern tier countries was closely related to the security of each other. In other words, building up their strength was a policy geared to meeting and retarding a Soviet offensive towards the Cairo-Suez area, retention of which was seemed essential from the onset of a prospective war. So it was important that neither country should fall ‘under the control or domination of the USSR.’\footnote{‘Memo, by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense’, 24 Nov. 1948, \textit{FRUS, 1948:4}, p.191. In 1949, the State Department put Italy in the same category with the northern tier countries in terms of American defence efforts in the Mediterranean area. ‘Memo. by Gordon Merriam of the PPS’, 13 June 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949:6}, p.31.}

But the most important country in terms of delaying the Soviet advance on the Egyptian base area and Middle Eastern oil fields was Turkey. The JCS viewed military aid to Turkey from this perspective by stating that ‘aid makes it possible for it to resist Soviet aggression to the extent of imposing appreciable delay and eventually, with continued US aid, to offer strong resistance to invasion.’\footnote{‘Memo. by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense’, 24 Nov. 1948, \textit{FRUS, 1948:4}, pp.191-92. It was thought that without US support, both material and moral, Greece and Turkey would succumb to Soviet pressure. ‘Department of State Policy Statement’, 5 May 1949, \textit{FRUS, 1949:6}, p.1668.} Accordingly, the long-range US strategic interests in Turkey were defined as follows:

A Turkish military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure Turkey’s continued resistance to Soviet pressure; the development of combat effectiveness to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression can be delayed long enough to permit the commitment of US and allied forces in Turkey in order to deny certain portions of Turkey to the USSR.\footnote{‘NSC 42/1: US Objectives With Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to US Security’ (hereafter cited as NSC 42/1), 22 March 1949, \textit{FRUS 1949:6}, p.272.}
It was also an element of evolving American strategic thinking regarding Turkey that the country could be used, if denied to the Soviet Union, 'either as an allied base area or as cover for a base area from which the allies could not only attack Soviet vital areas, but could also sever Soviet overland lines of communications leading to the oil resources of the Middle East and to the Cairo-Suez area'.\(^{24}\) After building up Turkey militarily as a strategic base (the major reason for the country's inclusion in the Truman doctrine), a NSC policy paper stated in 1949 that the long-term American interest in Turkey was the 'possible utilization of [the country] for US strategic purposes in the event of war with the USSR.'\(^{25}\) A State Department Policy Statement later noted that the aid to that country would help to this end: 'any effect which US aid may have in building up Turkey's military strength will ... tend to make available to the US and to our allies the use of this vitally strategic area as a base of operations in the event of war'. The emphasis on the military build-up came to mean that, in addition to their role of delaying a Soviet offensive towards the Middle East, the Turkish forces should have a limited offensive capability. To this objective, American aid programme to Turkey accorded priority to supplying the air force with medium range jet aircraft, improving ground facilities, and arranging military training programmes for the effective use of the equipment supplied by the United States.\(^{26}\)

As noted in the previous chapter, with the Soviet atomic capability, the loss of China and the prospect of hydrogen bomb, tension between the East and West rose considerably in 1949, so did the risk of war as a result of accident or miscalculation. Although the establishment of NATO boosted Western morale, the Soviet land armies were thought to be capable of overrunning most, if not all, of Western Europe.\(^{27}\) When the US became formally committed to the defence of Western Europe with the formation of NATO, the JCS believed that the US policy should concentrate on

\(^{24}\) 'JCS 1725/1: Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning', 1 May 1947, Etzold and Gaddis eds., Containment: Documents, p.308.


\(^{26}\) Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.239; 'NSC 42/1', 22 March 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.273.

\(^{27}\) In 1949 the American emergency war plan codenamed Offtackle presumed that the combined forces of the United States and its Western European allies were not able to hold Western Europe at the initial stages of a war. Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949 vol. II, (Washington, DC., 1979), p.301.
strengthening Europe. In the summer of 1949 military planners stressed the importance of retaining a substantial bridgehead in Western Europe, on the Iberian peninsula, in order to avert the need for an amphibious reconquest of the continent. They also pointed out the necessity of having bases in French North Africa to provide air support for the Allied forces in Europe. The Americans informed their British and Canadian allies in October 1949 that they accorded priority to the western Mediterranean-North Africa area over the eastern Mediterranean-Middle East area. As a result, those forces earmarked for the defence of the Middle East were to be transferred to the bases in North Africa. The defence of the region would be the British responsibility in a war, at least initially.

The shift in the American policy was largely related to the lack of resources to match the increases in American commitments in the late 1940s. But the strategic and political developments provided justification for the continuity of the new policy. In the early 1950s, ‘the development of American aircraft with longer range [B-36s] permitted a strategic offensive … contemplating heavy bomber air facilities in the UK, Alaska, and Okinawa rather than less secure bases in the Middle East.’ The improvements in nuclear bombing capabilities of the SAC also made it possible to slow down considerably a large-scale Soviet attack against the region. Meanwhile, the inhibiting effects of economic problems on the British presence in the Middle East continued. Furthermore, the Egyptian opposition to the British peace-time presence in the Suez and to the re-entry rights in case of an international crisis (as demonstrated by the Egyptian abrogation of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and by the protests and disturbances which took place in Egypt in the winter of 1951 and 1952), left the status of the facilities in Egypt uncertain.

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28 ‘Memo from the JCS’, appendix to SNACC 360/14, 24 March 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.29.
29 Cohen, Fighting World War, pp.46-47.
After American strategy had changed, the British government tried to secure a renewed American military commitment to the region. This was closely related to Britain’s strategic perspective at that time. The preservation of the informal British Empire was seen as vital for 'the preservation of Britain’s prestige and status as a world power'. The defence of the Middle East and the protection British imperial communications through the Mediterranean were of vital importance from this imperial point of view. It was in this context that military planners pointed out that 'Britain needed the US air force to be employed the US navy to be used to help keep the Mediterranean open.' The JCS, however, was reluctant to assume any responsibility for the region, other than the northern tier countries, believing that the US could not fulfill any additional commitment in time of war. This was the main reason that led to a gradual change in the British strategic thinking. Without American support, the concept of strategic offensive from the bases in Egypt 'appeared increasingly impractical', given that Britain faced severe economic problems after the outbreak of the Korean War. As a result, Britain was obliged to give serious consideration the American interest in the forward defence concept. By the end of 1952, the British strategy first accept to defend the inner ring (December 1951), then paid attention to the defence of the Middle East as far to the north and east as possible. One important assumption of this shift in the British strategy was that forward defence would require less British military contribution in the long term since Turkish forces would carry the main burden. In the early 1950s, the British interest in the Suez base was also diminishing, which was explained by the advent of nuclear weapons.

As already noted, the US refused to take on obligations for the defence of the Middle East because it would not meet them in time of war. However, this did not mean that the disinterested in this region. With the outbreak of the Korean war in the summer 1950, it was feared that the Middle East would be the next region where Moscow would stir up trouble. The JCS pointed out that the defence of that region should not


be abandoned. Although this line of thinking did not lead the Americans to make a military commitment to the region, they felt obliged to act more ‘positively’ there.\textsuperscript{33} One aspect of America’s dealing with Middle Eastern defence was the attention paid to the forward defence of the region. It was envisaged that the ‘American role would consist of aid in keeping open British line of communication through the Mediterranean, and of delaying, as far as possible, any Soviet advance through Turkey, Iraq and Syria.’\textsuperscript{34} The focus on the forward defence concept showed that Turkey’s role of delaying a Soviet offensive and the countries importance as a base for attacks on the Soviets became more significant. As will be seen, the Americans tended to see their building up of that country as a military bastion in terms of European defence. However, they also stressed that with a ‘Turkey that was able to hold against a Soviet offensive ... it would be virtually impossible for Russia to attack successfully the Cairo-Suez-Levant area.’ In the light of the growth of Turkish military power with American aid, it was predicted that Moscow now had to concentrate on the conquest of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, rather than by-passing Turkey.\textsuperscript{35} It was agreed by the allies that provided Ankara cooperated with the West, Moscow would face with ‘the potential threat of undefeated Turkey on the flank’.\textsuperscript{36}

The other aspect of the positive approach to the defence of the Middle East was the promotion of political stability in the region. A State Department document noted that to maximise American interests the US policy should seek ‘the development of stability-in-depth in Arab states and Israel’ at a time when political, economic, and social instability was a major security problem in the area.\textsuperscript{37} American policy makers sensed that regional problems created an environment which would facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the region. Attainment of Western objectives in the Middle East, however, depended heavily upon the political commitment to the Western cause on the part of regional states. The United States faced some serious

\textsuperscript{33} ‘Memo, by the Assistant Secretary of State for NEA to SoS’ [SoS denotes the Secretary of State], 27 Dec.1950, \textit{FRUS}, 1951:5, p.9.

\textsuperscript{34} Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, p.47.


\textsuperscript{36} Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War}, pp.276 and 300.

setbacks in its effort to subscribe them to the Western cause. At the root of the problem lay the fact that many regional countries saw the Soviet Union as a remote threat. For them, the immediate threat to the area came from Britain and Israel, both of which were the allies of the United States.\footnote{Paper Drafted by Officer in Charge Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, 24 Oct. 1950, \textit{FRUS}, 1950:5, p.223.} To minimise the disadvantages of associating with the British, the Americans favoured an orderly transition of power from the British to the regional countries. They thought that Britain’s failure to do so further complicated the regional problems.\footnote{Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey, Iran, 28 Dec.1950, \textit{FRUS}, 1950:5, p.259; for Soviet motives, see the same document, p.275.} Under these circumstances, ‘neutralism’ appealed to many nationalist leaders of the region as the best political option to follow. The Americans reckoned that if nationalism had grown, the result would have been the denial of the Middle East to the West, the most serious danger to the American interests.\footnote{FRUS, 1951:5, p.103, editor’s footnote no.6.} To avert the negative trend, the State Department strongly advocated the view that the United States should do more in the Middle East to win the cold war.\footnote{The State Department came to see in 1951 that deteriorating economic and social conditions in the region and Britain’s negative impression on local people were the main sources that reinforced the anti-Western forces. ‘US Policy Towards the Arab States and Israel’, 14 March 1951, \textit{FRUS}, 1951:5, p.103; ‘The Deputy SoS to Assistant to Secretary of Defense for International Affairs’, 4 May 1951, \textit{FRUS}, 1951:5, p.125.} From this perspective, it was a very important political asset for the West that the Turks, unlike many Middle Eastern nations, were fully committed to the Western objectives in the region. In fact, they expressed on many occasions their desire to iron out Western difficulties in such places as Egypt. In addition Turkey’s secular political system would provide a model for the regional countries to emulate.\footnote{It has been pointed out that Turkey’s alignment and co-operation with the West ‘provides a valuable medium through which Western ideas and methods can be transmitted and made understandable to those countries whose link with the West is more tenuous.’ ‘Working Paper Prepared in the Dep. of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meeting’, 28 Aug. 1951, \textit{FRUS}, 1951:3, p.571.}

Stimulated by the above-mentioned factors, Turkey’s political role in the region was given greater attention.\footnote{The Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs of the State Department, for example, proposed that Turkey should assume ‘more interest in and influence among the Near Eastern countries as a stabilizing force in the region and as a means of strengthening their orientation toward the West.’ ‘Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey, Iran’, 28 Dec.1950, \textit{FRUS}, 1950:5, pp.257 and 260.} The State Department even conducted a study as to whether
Turkey could play the role of leadership in the Middle East. Its findings, however, pointed out that Turkish leadership was not a feasible objective for political, military and psychological reasons. First, the Arabs and Turks did not trust each other because of lingering memories of Ottoman rule and World War I. Second, the Turkish stand on specific international issues, such as its relations with the West and Israel, were regarded inimical to the Arab interests. Some Arab States even regarded Turkey as 'an instrument of the West attempting to win the Arab states away from a position of neutrality without an adequate quid pro quo'. Third, there was a strong rivalry between Hashemite dynasties (ruling Iraq and Jordan) and Egypt for the leadership of the Arab world. Turkey's close relations with the former did not facilitate closer relations with the rest of the Arab world. And lastly, Turkey was not expected to shoulder defence responsibilities beyond its borders given its limited military capabilities. As a result, the idea of Turkish leadership was discarded in 1951, but it was not ruled out for the future.

3. The Question of Formal American Commitment to Turkey's Security, 1948-52

The question of a formal American security commitment was raised by the Turks for the first time in August 1946, but it was not pursued actively until the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948 and 1949. In subsequent years, obtaining an American commitment became identical with the issue of Turkey's inclusion in NATO. This section will focus on explaining how and why the American perception about granting security guarantees to Turkey changed in the period from the fall of 1948 and the summer 1951.

The matter of formal security guarantees to Turkey was treated with utmost care in Washington by both civilian and military authorities. In the fall of 1948, committing the US formally to the Middle Eastern security was not advisable from a military perspective. The basic US strategic objective in Turkey was, as noted earlier, to seek, through military aid and other military programmes, the possible utilization of the

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country for the US strategic purposes in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. This objective could be fulfilled, according to NSC 42/1, by the fortification of Turkey as a barrier to the Soviet expansion towards the Middle East, which did not necessarily require a formal security commitment. The option of setting up a regional organisation was also ruled out at that time because the regional countries were regarded as militarily too weak to fulfill the requirements of a security arrangement.

The expansion of NATO to include Greece and Turkey was also rejected mainly on the grounds that this would result in the over-extension of the NATO area of responsibility. Due to Turkey's strategic importance, however, the Americans rejected the idea of leaving the country to its fate. They agreed with the Turkish argument that an exclusively Western European security arrangement might be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of the lack of US interest in the Middle Eastern security. The State Department in particular was seeking to find a formula by which other friendly regimes could be ensured that the US was no less-concerned with their security than with that of Western Europe. In this context, Ankara was particularly assured that its security would not be compromised by its remaining outside the North Atlantic Treaty, as American political support and assistance programmes had indicated. The Turks were also told that their country 'holds a special place in US foreign policy', but it should not be inferred from this that a revision of American policy should be expected soon, given Washington's new commitments to Western Europe. Ankara seemed to be convinced with the American reasoning for the time being, nevertheless it did not rule out the option of pressing for membership in the future.

As the cold war intensified after the fall of nationalist government in China and the Soviet atomic explosion in 1949, Turkey began to feel increasingly the disadvantages of its close relations with the West. Since 1947, Turkey's military capabilities had

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46 The State Department did not advice to Turkey and Iran in November 1949 to proceed the proposed Turkish Iranian Pact since lacking American guarantee, 'the pact would merely provoke the USSR without gaining any tangible benefit for the participants.' 'Memo. of Conversation by the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs', 13 Oct. 1949, *FRUS*, 1949:6, p.1684.
grown as a result of American assistance and it was to continue to grow at an increasing rate in line with the amount of assistance given. However, the problem was that the Soviet Union perceived this military build-up along its southern borders as threatening, which in turn alarmed the Turks and caused them to be concerned about their position in the cold war. For this reason, Washington feared that Turkey might drift towards neutralism, however unwillingly, as it had during World War II. In fact, Turkey’s priority was not to be neutral but to obtain formal American commitment through NATO membership. To get American support for this end, the Turks continued to argue that the American priority of building up Western Europe first ‘left the security of Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East wide open and it [was] unsafe for the West to prepare its own defence while leaving Turkey in the air.’48 They suggested that their country should be given a security guarantee as evidence of Western solidarity with them. To the Ankara authorities, allowing the utilization of their country for US strategic purposes was meaningless unless Washington made it clear that the United States would fight if the Russians attacked Turkey.49 The US failure to reach a decision about Turkey’s inclusion in NATO alarmed Ankara particularly in the summer of 1950, as evident from information received by the State Department about the growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the Turks.50

The Americans, for their part, repeatedly said that they were not indifferent to Turkish security concerns.51 Furthermore, the State Department and the JCS believed, in autumn 1950 (after the outbreak of the Korean War) that something should be done to secure the cooperation of Turkey with the West. They were concerned that Turkish neutrality would lead to the collapse of their effort to strengthen the northern tier


49 ‘Memo. of Conversation between Secretary Acheson and Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak’, 15 April 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.1653, editor’s footnote no.13.


51 The Turks were informed that their case was treated as ‘special’, in other words, Turkey was considered ‘to be on a very different basis, in its relationship with the United States, from Iraq or other Arab states.' ‘Memo. of Conversation [between John Jernegan of the Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs and Turkish Ambassador F. Erkin]’, 13 Oct. 1949, FRUS, 1949:6, p.1683.
countries as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. The JCS pointed out the prospect that the admission of Greece and Turkey in NATO would enable this organisation to coordinate 'military planning in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East with those already in progress in Western Europe.' But it was feared that their full membership would adversely affect the further progress of the NATO arrangements. Therefore, the option of associate membership was seen as the best way 'to obtain the benefits of [their] participation in a coordinated defense of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and to some extent the Middle East', and to avoid at the same time the responsibilities that a formal commitment would entail.

To obtain Turkish consent, Ankara was assured that the associate membership status would open the way for full membership in twelve to eighteen months. Turkey accepted this offer in October 1950.

1951 saw a substantial change in the American perception of Turkey's position for two main reasons. First, although Washington avoided from a military commitment, it showed more interest in the defence problems of the region in the wake of the Korean War. This was clearly demonstrated by the support given to the British position in Egypt (including in the establishment of a Middle East Command) and by the efforts to set up a defence line as close as possible to the frontiers of the Soviet Union (the northern tier concept). Such an interest in the security of the region explains the value assigned by Washington to US-Turkish security ties in the early 1950s.

Second, at a time when the US capabilities had improved with the implementation of NSC 68, Washington was more confident that Turkey might be integrated with the European defence. This become more important in view of the strategic role of the country at that time. In 1951, it was unequivocally regarded as a forward base for the

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US air force in the event of a general war. A strong hint about Turkey’s defence role was also given by the developing conception of Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), which emphasised the significance of the northern and southern flanks of Europe in defence of central Europe against the numerically superior Soviet bloc forces. The bodies of water controlled by the West on either side of Europe (the North Sea and the Mediterranean), and land on the other side of the water (Britain and North Africa), were regarded as the most appropriate for placing bases. SACEUR’s defence strategy sought to capitalise on this advantage. Accordingly, it was proposed that a Soviet attack in the centre could be responded to by air and naval assaults from both flanks, allowing the centre to hold and forcing the enemy to pull back. As far as the Mediterranean was concerned, the strategy meant giving arms to Turkey and Yugoslavia and supporting them with a great fleet of air and sea power. This assessment was in line with Washington’s plans for a conflict with the Soviet bloc in 1951 and 1952. It was thought that the United States:

could count for critical resources, and as military bases, only on the Western Hemisphere, Africa (if plans are made now to hold it) and the islands now held in the Pacific. In addition, for the first -and possibly decisive- period of such a war, there would possibly be England and her bases, if plans to hold the British Isles are accelerated; and Spain, if that country is included in United States defence plans; and also perhaps Norway and Turkey.

There was, however, a main obstacle. The Turks were not satisfied with their associate status in NATO, believing that this did not provide corresponding guarantees to the risks emanating from the growing US-Turkish cooperation in political and military fields. First, in the absence of a formal American security commitment, they were slow to respond to the increasing American demands. For example, they were reluctant to carry out the US Navy’s proposal to mine the Straits as part of joint defence planning programme which was designed to block the exit from the Black Sea. In 1951, the American view of the value of the Turkish airfields also changed because

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the Air Force desired ‘far-reaching Turkish commitments on airfields.’ In 1949, the construction of airfields and stockpiling of aviation gas in Turkey was regarded to be provocative to the Soviet Union. Similarly, existing Turkish airfields were still far from meeting American requirements in 1951. But it was thought that the prospect was encouraging, because the reconstruction of existing airfields and building new ones according to a US-sponsored aid programmes would ‘result in considerable improvement within one year.’ Moreover, if Turkey was included in NATO, it would improve its military capabilities according to the NATO programmes. Second, American officials sensed that the Turkish government was inclined to limit its opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence in neighbouring countries unless the US committed formally to Turkey’s security. Such a relaxation of Turkish opposition would weaken the resistance against communism in the region as a whole and even would result in the encirclement of the country by hostile powers. This eventuality would impede Turkey’s fighting power and diminish the prospect of Western access to its military facilities in wartime.

Given the aforementioned factors, the most crucial issue that needed to be addressed by Americans in 1951, was Turkey’s dissatisfaction with its status within the Western alliance. From February 1951, the Turkish government pressed for a quick decision by Washington about the desirable form of security arrangement with Turkey. By late April, a decision on the matter became more urgent. On April 22, for example, Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Feridun Erkin, conveyed a message of the Turkish government to the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asking the US government to clarify its position about Turkish request for a reciprocal security arrangement, even if such a reply might be negative. He also mentioned, on another occasion, that his country ‘might be forced to take security measures of its own’, a clear reference to neutrality. A message from American Embassy in Moscow confirmed that, lacking US

61 ‘NIE-9’, 26 Feb. 1951, predicted that if Turkey was fully encircled, it ‘would probably shift to neutrality’ unless firm security guarantees were given to Turkey. *FRUS*, 1951:5, p.1120; ‘Memo. by the Assistant SoS for NEA to SoS’, 27 Dec.1950, *FRUS*, 1951:5, p.4.
guarantees, Turkey was unlikely to cooperate fully with the West.\textsuperscript{63} All in all, there were convincing reasons to induce American officials to believe that ‘maximum cooperation’ from the Turks can be obtained by means of a ‘written guarantee’.\textsuperscript{64}

Although the US had committed itself to Turkey’s economic and military development with the Truman doctrine, the extension of security commitment required political decision at the highest level of the security establishment. The revision of US policy with this objective in early 1951 produced a new policy paper, NSC 109, which was endorsed by the President on 24 May 1951. During the discussions of this decision, the JCS urged on the NSC the necessity of ‘insuring that Turkey and Greece are on the side of the Western powers at the outset of a general war.’ The JCS objected to a delay in the two counties’ inclusion in NATO on the grounds that this would jeopardise their orientation with the West in wartime. If such a delay was inevitable, the Chiefs argued, it would be advisable from military point of view to conclude mutual security arrangements with these countries.\textsuperscript{65} In the light of these considerations, NSC 109 stated that the United States should support Turkey’s inclusion in NATO in order ‘to assure [its] full cooperation in international security measures, and in the event of war its co-belligerency, the use Turkish bases and other facilities, and the closure of the Straits to the USSR.’ These were in conformity with the long-term American military interests in the country (to the attainment of which the military aid since 1947 had been directed) that NSC 109 defined as follows:

development of sufficient military power to prevent Turkey from capitulating to communism during the ideological conflict; in the event of war, to retain for the United States and its allies base areas in Turkey, to delay materially any USSR advance, and with allied support, to assure control by the Western powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the security of base areas in Egypt.\textsuperscript{66}


\textsuperscript{65} For JCS views, see \textit{FRUS}, 1951:5, pp.1148-49, editor’s footnote.

\textsuperscript{66} ‘NSC 109: The Position of the US With Respect to Turkey’, 11 May 1951, \textit{FRUS}, 1951:5, quotations from pp.1161 and 1153 respectively.
The US administration took up the task of obtaining the agreement of other NATO allies for Greek and Turkish membership as well as the acceptance at home of this policy decision. Their admission to NATO was resisted by the British, who demanded that Turkey should participate in the proposed Middle East Command [MEC] first, and by the smaller states, who were worried that the extension of NATO commitments would work to their detriment. In an effort to allay the concerns of Western Europeans and of sceptics at home, the administration highlighted the strategic benefits that the Western alliance would obtain from an unconditional association of those countries. This was the only way, it was argued, 'to secure the Southern flank of Europe and to lend substance to a [MEC]'. It was emphasised in particular that the defence of Turkey was 'essential' to the defence of the Middle East; its attitude towards co-operation with the West depended on its membership; and its military contribution would be substantial in the event of a war. As will be seen, the British agreed to Turkey's membership in NATO in the summer of 1951 in return for Washington's promise to convince Ankara authorities to join the MEC. American diplomacy also managed to convince the small European allies to the benefits of the Greek and Turkish membership. The North Atlantic Council endorsed, at its Ottawa meeting on 15-20 September 1951, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO. The two countries joined the alliance in February 1952.

The main obstacle to Turkey's admission of into NATO in the summer of 1951 was the disagreement between the US and Britain over Turkey's position with respect to the Middle Eastern defence. When the Americans sought British concurrence in Turkish membership in May 1951, London proposed that a MEC should be established to settle the ongoing Anglo-American dispute over the command arrangements in the Mediterranean and to integrate the US and Turkey into Middle East defence planning. Since the summer of 1950, the British had been trying to resolve their conflict with the Egyptians by replacing their own base rights in a new organisation, in which British,

American and Egyptians would defend the Canal base under a British supreme commander, Middle East (SACME). But now they envisaged a link between the MEC and NATO, and they wanted to make Turkey’s admission into the latter conditional upon its participation in the former. Having already decided to give Ankara some kind of formal security guarantee, Washington authorities opposed the British proposal but at the same time they thought that the MEC might be a vehicle for settling Anglo-Egyptian differences over the Canal Zone on terms that preserved Western access to Egyptian facilities in time of war or a serious international crisis. In short, the three issues (the problem of the base, American and Turkish involvement in the regional defence planning, and the Mediterranean command arrangements) became connected in one way or another.

It should be noted that the US involvement in the Middle East defence schemes was made possible when the State Department persuaded the JCS that a limited American commitment to the regional defence would be of American interest. Prior to October 1950, the American policy dismissed any regional initiative on the grounds that the US should give priority to the NATO area, the defence of the region was a British responsibility, and there was no regional power centre necessary for a defence pact to succeed. In late 1950, in the wake of the Korean war, however, the Americans paid more attention to the importance of the Middle East in terms of American commitment to contain the Soviet power. Thus they became more concerned with the fact that Britain lacked the manpower and resources to defend the region. The State Department (especially the NEA, headed by George McGhee whose proposals received support from Acheson) particularly stressed that the US itself lacked sufficient forces to take over the British responsibilities in the region and that the Arab states might defect from the Western orbit if the West failed to help them. For this reason, a regional approach to the problem of defence should be developed in cooperation with the British. The military authorities agreed to a limited American

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involvement in the Middle East theatre, leading to the approval of the MEC proposal in May 1951.\textsuperscript{70}

The British and Americans had, as already noted, diverging priorities with respect to the defence of Europe and the Middle East, and they were reflected in their approaches to the issues stated above. As far as the Americans were concerned, their global strategy accorded priority to Western Europe over the Middle East. Washington saw the command arrangements in the Mediterranean, and Turkish participation in NATO and in the proposed MEC from this perspective. With the announcement of the appointment of an American admiral as Supreme Allied Commander, North Atlantic (SACLANT) in February 1951, the British were bitterly upset. They proposed an exact reversal of roles in the Mediterranean: the creation of a single naval command, headed by a British, independent of SACEUR. The Americans strongly opposed this, insisting that their own naval vessels in the Mediterranean came directly under SACEUR. Believing that a bridgehead must be held in Southern Europe, they wanted to use their forces in the Mediterranean to support European land campaign, rather than for the Middle East. The defence of the latter theatre was responsibility of the British and Commonwealth forces, which was planned to be under command of a British SACME. Washington authorities also made it clear that a direct link between NATO and the MEC, extending NATO's commitment to the Middle East, was not acceptable to them. Mainly because of the paucity of resources, their priority was Europe. So, no NATO forces would be involved in the fighting in the Middle East, except for Britain and Turkey.\textsuperscript{71} It was also because of the primacy of the European theatre, that the Americans tried to make sure the availability of Turkish forces for European campaign, and thus they preferred Turkey's entry into NATO before the establishment of the MEC.

The British, on the other hand, valued the Middle East theatre as second only to the British isles. As already noted, in view of their declining capabilities, they were eager

\textsuperscript{70} Hahn, \textit{The United States, Great Britain,} p.246; Hahn, 'Containment' p.25; Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War,} pp.259-60. For McGhee's views, see Cohen, ibid., especially pp.247, 252-53.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{FRUS,} 1951:3, editorial note, pp.522-24; Cohen, \textit{Fighting World War,} especially pp.266-68; Kent, 'Introduction', p.lxii.
to re-establish a US military commitment to the Middle East theatre. They thought that a single allied command in the Mediterranean would ensure American naval support for the Middle East. When faced by a strong US objection, they wanted to obtain American support through the appointment of an American representative to the SACME headquarters. For them, the MEC project would serve not only to bring about a solution of the Suez base problem on the terms favourable to them, but also 'as a channel for American military involvement' in the Middle East.\(^2\) The British also wanted to mobilise Turkish military potential (by the early 1950s it had improved considerably as a result of the American aid) for the Middle Eastern, as opposed to southern European, defence. This was largely because British strategy paid attention to the defence of the Middle East 'further north and east on the inner or outer ring' in the early 1950s which would 'require support from the Turks who were ... defining their defining their role as supporting NATO's southern flank'.\(^3\)

After intense negotiations in the summer of 1951, the allies agreed a package deal over the command and membership issues. The British dropped their demand that Turkish entry into NATO be made conditional on its prior agreement to join the MEC. In return, the Americans agreed to join the British as co-sponsors of the MEC and to persuade the Turks to take part in the Command. It was also accepted that the MEC, headed by a British SACME, would not be made a NATO command; instead, there would be 'close but informal ties' between them. The US would appoint a representative to its headquarters (as requested by the British) to join the others from the UK, the Commonwealth, France and Turkey. But there would be no American forces assigned for service in the Middle East theatre. The facilities in the Canal Zone would be returned to Egypt with the understanding that Egypt would place them under SACME. Egypt would also take part in the multilateral force responsible for running the base. Given that the MEC proposal basically wanted to ensure the availability of the Suez base to the Western powers, the US was prepared to offer Egypt economic and military aid as well as technical assistance to ensure the approval

\(^{2}\) Cohen, *Fighting World War*, p.239.

of the project by this country. The MEC proposal also included a defence board, which was open to the participation of the Arab States and Israel on an equal basis.\textsuperscript{74}

In the fall of 1951 however several factors brought about the failure of the MEC project: Egyptian rejection of the MEC, Turkish insistence on being integrated into the NATO command first, an American refusal to make a direct contribution to the Middle East theatre, and the diminished need for the MEC after the admission of Turkey and Greece into NATO. The successor of the MEC, the Middle East Defence Organisation (proposed by the British in the summer of 1952), also failed for similar reasons.\textsuperscript{75} As will be seen in the next chapter, the American attention was shifting more and more towards the forward defence of the Middle East and keeping the Arab states on the side of the west in the cold war, in both of which Turkey played a key part.

4. Conclusion

In the period between 1945 and 1952, US-Turkish security relations had developed along lines compatible with the preferences of American global strategy which accorded priority to the defence of Western Europe. Throughout this period, the US was gradually taking over the security responsibilities in the Middle East relinquished by the British due to their weakness. As the proclamation of the Truman doctrine in March 1947 showed, American policy was particularly concentrated on the northern tier countries. In accordance with this doctrine, Washington invested in the security of the region by granting substantial amount of economic and military assistance. In the case of Turkey, the US supported politically the country's anti-Soviet stance, helped it to improve its economic and military posture, saw it as a bulwark against the perceived Soviet expansion towards the Middle East, and finally contemplated using its military resources and facilities in the event of a war with the Soviet bloc. In particular, Turkey made steady progress in enhancing its military capabilities with American assistance in a way that can be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes, and which could be further developed through more assistance. In addition, the military installations of the


country (constructed or modernised in accordance with the American assistance programmes), were of crucial importance in terms of carrying out planned air attacks against the industrial and military areas of southern Russia. But the Soviet Union regarded such developments as inimical to its interests and this in turn provoked concern in Ankara. If Turkey chose neutrality because of Soviet hostility to its collaboration with the West, the utilisation of American investment there in war would become quite difficult. In a climate where the United States engaged in a world-wide struggle with the Soviet Union, Turkey’s neutrality seemed unacceptable to the Americans. The country’s political orientation towards the West also underlined its value as an ally. Its admission to NATO in February 1952, which institutionalised Western strategic coordination with Turkey, guaranteed the integration of its military potential into the Western war effort.

US policy also took account of Turkey’s being the strongest anti-communist country in the Middle East. The importance of its territory, in terms of preventing Soviet domination of the region, captured American attention as early as August 1946 when Washington firmly supported the Ankara government against the Soviet claims. American contingency planning in the early cold war supported British strategy, which assumed that the strategic offensive against industrial and petroleum centres of southern Soviet Union would be launched from bases in Egypt. Given the shortage of British capabilities, the US planned in 1948 to reinforce the British forces in a war. At that time, Turkey’s role as a buffer state which would help to delay the Soviet advance on the Suez base, was particularly emphasised. However, in April 1949 the US formally committed itself to Western European security with the formation of NATO. In view of rapidly expanding American commitments, the US authorities realised the need to use limited American resources in more effective way. At the same time, military planners saw it as more important to maintain a bridgehead into Europe that to hold the Middle East. As a result, a direct military commitment to the region was ruled out by the end of 1949. Following this shift in the strategic thinking, American policy emphasised more the need for the forward defence of the region, so that it did not lead to the lessening of the value of Turkey’s contribution to the regional defence. Nor did it mean that the US interest in Britain’s position in the region diminished.
The Korean War and Britain’s declining capabilities convinced American policy makers to do more to prevent Soviet penetration in the region by promoting neutralism and anti-Western nationalism. In this context, the US hoped that the formation of a MEC, with the participation of Western powers, Egypt and the other regional states, would help to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez base on the terms favourable to the Western interests. American policy also paid attention to winning the support of the regional countries in the cold war with a view to protecting status quo in the region. In terms of establishing the MEC and orienting the Middle East westward, Turkey was one of the key countries.

From a geo-strategic perspective, it became clear in the 1946-52 period that the Middle East periphery (including Turkish territory, all but a small portion of which is located in the Middle East) would augment Western European security. US officials saw the two areas as interdependent in peace and wartime. In peacetime, this was particularly evident from the importance of the Middle East oil to European economic recovery; but the The loss of the area, it was believed, would also have grave effects on the European morale. The area was seen militarily as important in terms of protecting the southern flank of NATO as it had valuable strategic bases and other military facilities. The American decision to support Turkey’s membership in NATO and the proposed MEC confirmed that the country was expected to serve as the linchpin between Europe and the Middle East. \(^{76}\) How this dual role was seen by the Eisenhower administration will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND US-TURKISH SECURITY COLLABORATION, 1953-56

1. Introduction and Background

Turkish-American security collaboration in the 1950s was, it was believed, based on the coincidence of the interests of the two countries. Indeed, the Turkish government held the view that its security interests were identical with the West as far as the Middle East was concerned, and adopted an 'active or dynamic' policy in pursuit of such interests. Turkey's strategic position in relation to the Middle East (as outlined in the second chapter) guaranteed that the country be included in defence planning for the region, and the Menderes government's willingness to cooperate with Washington enhanced its political value for the West. American officials, for their part, came to believe that Turkey's policy contributed substantially to the stability in the region. To them, it was politically the most stable and militarily the strongest country of the Middle East, and as such an asset for the defence of the region. At times, it was even noted that US policy relied on Turkey assuming the political leadership in the region. However, the US, a great power with responsibilities worldwide, had wider objectives in the region than those of Turkey. Consequently, there was a scope for disagreement between the two countries in their approaches to the regional issues. Considering this, chapter three will examine in what ways American objectives affected Washington's assessment of Turkey's value in terms of the implementation of American Middle East policy in the period from January 1953 to October 1956.

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1 Hüseyin Bagci, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dis Politikası (Foreign Policy during the Democratic Party Period), (Ankara, 1990), pp.41-43. The main motive for the Menderes government in co-operating readily with the West was its concerns over the effects of the regional developments on Turkey's own security. Ankara always feared from the encirclement of the country by hostile powers, i.e. the rise of communists into power in the neighbouring Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Iraq and Syria).

The American view of Turkey's service in the Middle Eastern context was closely related to their threat perception to the region and the state of the Western position in the region at a given time. Post-war American policy was determined to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the Eurasian land-mass. From this perspective, the Middle East, because of its strategic location on the line of containment and of its oil stocks, was seen as a crucial area for European defence. In Washington's view, the danger to the Western security interests stemmed not so much from Soviet military power as from political turmoil in the region. There existed, it was believed, unfavourable trends in the Middle East which caused a visible decline in the prestige and the position of the West and paved the way for Soviet peaceful penetration. Among these were the rising tide of Arab nationalism; the British disputes with Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia; the resentment of Arab nations of the American and British policies towards Israel; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the military and economic weakness of the regional states; and the rivalries among Arab states.

Being aware of the strategic importance of the region for Western security, the Eisenhower administration mainly concentrated on bringing about stability in the region by encouraging pro-Western states (with the promise of economic, military and technical assistance) to take part in regional defence arrangements. The ultimate objective was the formation of a region-wide defence system through which the Middle East countries could co-operate with Western powers in defence of the region against Communist threat. However, as will be seen in this chapter, taking into account the failure of the MEDO project, Washington considered that it was more feasible to concentrate on a regional initiative among the countries in the north of the region (the northern tier concept) until conditions improved. American interest in the region was on the increase throughout the period. Encouraged by the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal Zone in late 1954 and by its relatively impartial

3 NSC 162/2 (the New Look) reiterated that the Western objectives in the Middle East were 'to assure during peacetime for the US and its allies the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc.' 'Basic National Security Policy', 30 Oct. 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:2/1, pp.592-93.

4 This assessment of the Middle East situation is based on a report by the NSC, that is 'NSC 5428: US Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East', 23 July 1954, FRUS 1952-54:9, pp.525-27.
position vis-à-vis the Arab states and Israel\(^5\), the US administration shifted its attention to the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict (the other main obstacle before a regional defence system), roughly from the beginning of 1955, and continued to do so until the outbreak of the Suez crisis in the summer of 1956. For this reason, the part played by Turkey in the Middle East\(^6\), will be analysed here from the perspectives of both American efforts to create defence structures against external threat and to iron out regional problems.

This chapter will firstly analyse American involvement in Middle East affairs in the context of the Northern Tier concept, and then will deal with Turkey’s role in the realisation of the concept in the cases of the Turco-Pakistani agreement, Turco-Iraqi agreement and Baghdad Pact. After that, an assessment of Turkey’s position in relation to the American policies in 1955 and 1956 will be provided. Before focusing on these matters, however, it is useful to remind ourselves briefly of the major political developments in the Middle East in the 1953-56 period and the positions of the leading countries in relation to the Western defence proposals.

In general, in the 1950s the Middle East was marked by instability. This decade saw, as Nigel John Ashton has observed, the growth of Arab nationalism and the replacement of the ruling elite (particularly landowners and their supporters in bureaucracy) with new social and political forces in countries like Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Almost all Arab states of the region were struggling to emerge from the effects of the British and the French imperial legacy and of the Arab defeat in the Palestinian war of 1948-49. The non-Arab states mentioned in this chapter (Israel, Pakistan and Iran) were feeling a

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\(^5\) Eisenhower and Dulles, unlike their predecessors, did not feel that they had to favour Israel in its dispute with the Arabs. Eisenhower neither owed much to the support of American Jews for his election in 1952 nor had close associates who had strong sense of commitment to Israel. The communist threat was the most single important factor that governed their policy towards the Middle East. This meant that they saw this region ‘primarily in the context of Western defence.’ T.G. Fraser, The USA and the Middle East Since World War II, (London, 1989), p.61; John Nigel Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, (London, 1996), p.19.

\(^6\) Although there are different views on whether it was Britain or the US who sponsored the major defence initiative of the decade (namely the Baghdad Pact), there is an agreement that the practical initiative was undertaken by Turkey. An assessment of different view-points was given in Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, pp.41-42.
sense of insecurity about the Arab states, India and the Soviet Union. In addition, the situation was made even more complicated by intra-Arab rivalries.\(^7\)

The most significant development in the 1953-56 period was Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power in Egypt. In foreign policy, he was not only opposed to the British influence in his country but also promoted the idea of Arab unification and neutralism.\(^8\)

The existence of the British base in the Suez Canal zone was a constant source of tension in the early 1950s. Britain wanted the establishment of a regional defence organisation (first the Middle East Command, MEC, and then its modified version called Middle East Defence Organization, MEDO) and offered to handle the base issue within the framework of such a body.\(^9\) But both attempts failed in the face of nationalist opposition to them in Egypt. The talks over the Suez base finally produced an agreement in October 1954, which proposed the British withdrawal by mid 1956 but allowed the British access to the base in wartime. The base accord, however, failed to instigate a period of good relations between Egypt and the West. Its gains were washed away by the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in the spring of 1955 which Egypt regarded as a hostile action designed to break up the solidarity of the Arab world and to weaken the position of Egypt. To Nasser, the Pact served the interests of Western imperialism and weakened Arab determination to eliminate Israel.\(^10\)

Following the announcement of an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia at the end of September 1955, the country's relations with the Western powers gradually deteriorated and reached breaking point when the US decided to withdraw its offer of financing the Aswan Dam project in July 1956. Egypt's response to this was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company which sparked the confrontation with Britain and France leading to the joint British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October-November 1956.


\(^8\) A general survey of Arabism and neutralism in Egyptian foreign policy can be found in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'The Foreign Policy of Egypt', in Joseph A. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson eds., *Foreign Policy in a World of Change*, (New York, 1963), pp.334-47.

\(^9\) For details of the MEDO initiative, see David R. Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948-56*, (London, 1990), chapter two, pp.43-74.

The Egyptian policies received active support from Syria and Saudi Arabia. Syria had witnessed many coups and counter-coups since it gained independence from France in 1946 and the March 1955 coup resulted in the replacement of the relatively moderate government with a pro-Nasser one. Furthermore, the emergence of leftist political parties in the mid-1950s increased internal instability. Both Egypt and Iraq tried to gain ascendancy over Syria in their struggle for the leadership in the Arab world. The opposition to the Baghdad Pact in general and to Iraq in particular brought Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia together in an informal alliance in 1955, known in short as the ESS pact. It was remarkable that, Saudi Arabia, despite its pro-American orientation, sided with Egypt in opposition to the Iraqi ruling family.

Among the major Arab countries, only Iraq and Jordan established a friendly relationship with the West. Iraq saw itself as a rival to Egypt for the leadership of the Arab nations. The powerful Iraqi leader, Nuri al-Said, who was prime minister several times and who had a firm grip on power until the military coup in July 1958, tried to achieve this by pursuing pro-Western policies. But his policies failed to attract popular support even in Iraq itself. Although Jordan was effectively under British influence at that time, popular opposition towards the West, particularly among the Palestinian citizens of the West Bank, prevented King Hussain from fully supporting Western policies in the region. His regime relied heavily on the British and American economic and military support for its survival in the 1950s.

British and American initiatives in the Middle East received a quite favourable response from most of the non-Arab countries of the region. In Iran, a covert operation planned by the American intelligence organisation, the CIA, ousted the nationalist Mosaddegh regime (which confronted Britain over the assets of Anglo-Iranian oil company from 1951 to 1953) and restored Shah Reza Pahlavi to the throne in 1953. This paved the way for an agreement which rearranged the sharing of petroleum revenue and strengthened the American position in Iran. After this incident, Iran turned definitely towards the West for support and joined the BP in late 1955.

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11 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, p.32.
Israel had special ties with the West and gradually abandoned its neutrality in the 1950s. However, Israel had little value for the implementation of Western defence policies since it was perceived by the Arab countries as the main source of threat. It adopted an uncompromising stand regarding its borders and the return of Arab refugees displaced by the 1948-49 war. Israel was discarded by both the UK and US as the basis for an alignment in the region. Pakistan was a member of SEATO and was demanding American aid in 1954. However, it was geographically located on the flank of the region and was only briefly associated with Middle East security by the Americans. The only non-Arab nation in the region whose government's domestic support for its pro-Western policies was undisputed for the time being was Turkey.

2. Turkey's Position in Relation to the Northern Tier Concept

2.1. The Forward Defence of the Middle East and Turkey, 1951-53

Two major developments led the US to pay more attention to the forward defence of the Middle East: the difficulties that the MEC project had faced in the fall of 1951 (especially its refusal by the Egyptian government in October), and NATO's decision to admit Turkey as a member in September of that year. As will be seen, the political and strategic value of forward defence concept increased as a result of Turkey's willingness to cooperate with the Western powers. When an intelligence report in March predicted that Egypt would not join the MEC unless it included the complete evacuation of the Suez base and that no Arab state was likely to join it without Egypt,

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12 Wildfird Knapp classified the US-Israel relations as a 'special relationship'. Although the Eisenhower administration declared its impartiality in Arab-Israel dispute, it continued to commit itself to the existence of Israel. It remained loyal to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by the UK, US and France, which was designed to preserve the territorial status quo in the region by controlling the level of armaments. Knapp, *The United States and the Middle East: How Many Special Relationships?*, in The Middle East and the United States, Haim Skahed and Itamar Rabinovich, eds., (New Brunswick, NJ., 1980), pp.11, 18.


14 It should be noted in this specific context that the US refused to make Turkey's participation in the proposed MEC as a condition for Ankara's entry into NATO, but neither British nor Americans ruled out Turkey's co-operation with the West in the regional defence matters. The American view, as expressed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash in July 1952, was that 'the Turks should be willing to accept responsibilities in the Middle East' as the US, UK and French governments had responsibilities outside NATO area such as in Korea, Malaya and Indochina respectively. And, despite the Turks refused to serve under a British Supreme Command, Middle East, they agreed that Ankara 'would help in the establishment of a Middle East defence system'. 'Memo. of Conversation', 2 July 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-54:8, p.899; Bülent Ali Riza, *Turkish Participation in the Middle East Defence Projects, May 1950-June 1953*, unpublished PhD thesis, (University of Oxford, 1982), p.73.
the belief in an Egyptian-centred defence strategy further failed in Washington. The result was more emphasis, both militarily and politically, on the co-operation of the countries located in the north of the Middle East (the northern tier concept).

Militarily the concept was based on the defence of the 'outer ring', the line running from southeastern Turkey along the Zagros Mountains in Iran to the Persian Gulf. This forward defence approach was highly different from the 'inner ring' approach on which the British defence plans for the area in 1952 were based (the inner ring was 'a natural defence line near the Mediterranean coast, running along the Taurus Mountains in Turkey, then curving southward through Aleppo to the Jordan Rift and the Gulf of Aqaba'). Although the US refused to commit forces for the defence of the region, Washington was critical of the British defence strategy, as became more obvious in the summer of 1952. To the State Department, a strategy based on the 'inner ring' concept 'would permit enemy occupation of the greater part of the Near East and of virtually all of its oil resources.' It was desirable, however, 'to protect at least a portion of the oil and give greater protection to [Western] strategic bases' in the area. Therefore, military planners were asked in August to provide an estimate of the feasibility of forward defence in relation to competing defence needs in other parts of the world. It was also presumed that forward defence should muster the support of allies of the US particularly Britain. Such a plan, however, was not completed during the Truman presidency.

Politically, the American interest in the forward defence indicated that Washington was eager to have more say in the affairs of the Middle East in the face of the growing importance of the area for the West and of the weakening position of other Western

17 Watson, The Joint Chiefs, p.324. For defensive lines in the Middle East, see map 1, p.132.
18 The American military planners were of the opinion that the British were more interested in the defence of Egypt than the entire Middle East. John Kent, 'The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945-54', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21/3 (Sept. 1993), p.49.
19 'Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to Secretary of Defense (Lovett), 15 Aug 1952, FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.266-67.
powers there. A policy paper dated April 1952 (NSC 129/1) recommended that 'the
United States should take an increased share of responsibility toward the area' against
the background of British disputes with Egypt and Iran, together with the general
military and economic weakness of Britain. In July 1952, the State Department
proposed the reappraisal of US policies in the light of 'the lessened capabilities of
France [in North Africa] and UK to supply leadership in the area... because of their
reduced military, material and personnel resources.' It was also recognised that US
influence in the Muslim world was on the decline mainly because of America's
continuing 'moral, material and military support of Israel.' To the Arab countries,
Israel and Britain, rather than the Soviet menace, were the threat to their security and
American support for both countries was the main stumbling block before
improvement of relations with the Arab world. Given these circumstances, it was
concluded that unless the US should do something fundamental, it was difficult to
maintain the Western position in the area. However, no independent policy towards
the region was offered. In Washington's assessment, the US was not ready to take
primary responsibility for its defence before the existing commitments to Korea, Indo-
China and NATO had been adequately met. The American policy remained that the
British presence in the area should be supported.

The most important outcome of the review of the American policy in 1952 was that,
although American support for MEDO project was not withdrawn, more emphasis
was given to the formation of an indigenous defence organization. A French and a
Turkish proposal, both suggesting that the MEDO should proceed without Arab
participation, were refused by Washington in the fall of 1952 on the grounds that the
success of a regional defence organisation depended on Arab consent. But, as the
American-Embassy in Egypt reported, Egypt's participation was doubtful, unless the
British agreed publicly to the evacuation of the Canal Zone and actually began the

20 'NSC 129/1: US Objectives and Policies with respect to Arab States and Israel', 24 April 1952,
FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.222-23.
22 The military establishment was particularly in favour of MEDO from military point of view. 'DoS
23 'Editorial note', FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.276-77; 'Tel. from Embassy in the UK to the DoS', 20
evacuation of their troops from the Zone. The State Department concurred with this point of view and hoped that the offer of material support might persuade the Egyptian government to co-operate with the West.

It was clear in 1952 that the main stumbling bloc, at least in the short term, to the establishment of an indigenous organisation was the lack of a regional leader. Washington regarded the Turkish leadership (the preferred-option by the West over the leadership of Egypt or Iraq), as unacceptable to the Arabs in 1951 (as explained in the second chapter), and this view remained unchanged in 1952. Turkish leadership, however, was not totally dismissed, given that a modified MEDO scheme (including the outer ring countries) was regarded as feasible in the long term. There was also rather wishful thinking that the Arabs would co-operate with Turkey against the communist threat when their disputes with the West (the Canal Zone problem in particular) were resolved. This line of thinking increased the importance of Turkey’s contribution to the outer ring defence, militarily in particular, as the only Muslim country in the region which had a sizable military establishment. For example, the Chairman of the JCS, General Omar Bradley, predicted that with the accession of Turkey to NATO the outer ring concept became militarily more feasible, provided Iran did not go communist. In his view, with the Turkish Army, plus US and UK air power working on the flank, ensured that any invading force approaching the Middle East through Iran would be impeded if not prevented from conquering the region.

26 'Tel. from Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in France', 15 Oct. 1952, FRUS, 1952-54:9: 290. It was pointed out in a State Department document that Turkish prestige in Arab circles was surprisingly low because of Turkey’s strong support for the Western initiatives and her efforts to be part of Europe by joining NATO. He thought that any idea that had Turkish support was regarded, at least in the short term, by some Arabs as almost the ‘kiss of death’. Memo. from Hoskins to Byroade’, 25 July 1952, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.257. For more on this issue, see chapter two above.
27 British military planners also agreed that the Turkish armed forces, reequipped with American weapons, would make a significant contribution to the regional defence. See Kent, ‘The Egyptian Base’, pp.53-54.
Based on the UK estimates, Turkey was expected to provide 9 infantry and 1 armoured divisions out of 17 infantry and 2 armoured divisions that were required for forward defence of the Middle East. ‘DoS Minutes of State-JCS Meeting’, 28 Nov. 1952, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.321.
2.2. The Adoption of the Northern Tier Concept, 1953-54

The coming of the Eisenhower administration into power in 1953 reinforced the tendency towards a forward defence of the Middle East and as a result the course of American policy shifted from the MEDO concept to a loose alliance system (bilateral or multilateral if possible) among the northern tier countries. Forming an alliance system was in conformity with the new administration’s global policies. The aim in the Middle East was to fill the vacuum between NATO’s eastern and SEATO’s western points before the Soviet Union filled it by default. The focus on institutionalizing the northern tier concept came to mean the pursuing of a more independent American policy in the region than it was before, although co-operation with the British as far as possible remained a part of this policy.

The first important step in the new administration’s search for a Middle East policy was the dispatch of a fact-finding mission, headed by Secretary of State John F. Dulles, to the region in the spring of 1953. At the end of this trip, Dulles reached briefly the following conclusions:

(1) that any sound regional defence organization must spring from the desires of the people and governments of the area in question; (2) that most of the Middle Eastern peoples and governments, as of that time, were unwilling to be associated with the West in a defence organization; (3) that the states of the northern tier of the Middle East were the most aware of the Soviet threat, the most likely to do something about it, and the best situated to provide protection to the area as a whole.29

His further evaluation of his findings at the meetings of the NSC in July 1953 and then in a letter to the Secretary of Defence, stressed four main points. First, every effort should be made to prevent the loss of the Near East, which would have ‘terrible repercussions on Europe.’ Second, Western prestige in the region was very low but the US had a reserve of good will despite its links with Britain, France and Israel. Therefore he thought that a fresh effort should be made by the US. Third, as most of the regional people and governments, as of that time, were reluctant to associate themselves with the West in a defense organization, he was convinced that the tacit understanding that ‘the Arab nations would eventually cooperate with the West’ was

29 Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, p.49.
simply unrealistic. Alternatively, he thought that the countries of the northern tier could be developed in time, through American assistance, into 'dependable allies'.

Finally, 'separate bilateral arrangements with the states of this area were preferable at the moment to arrangements modeled on NATO.' Given the circumstances prevailing at the time, he suggested, the developing of 'plans for the Middle Eastern defence through informal, unpublicized arrangements, such as those currently in effect for consultation between NATO's Southern European Command and the UK Middle East Land Forces were more desirable.'

By October 1953, most of the Dulles' proposals were approved by the security establishment. A policy statement on the Middle East, NSC 155/1, proposed in late June that the United States should seek to create a political basis for a collective security organization, with the participation of those countries who could 'contribute to the security and stability of the Near East.' According to this paper, the US should 'take leadership' in the region for the establishment of a regional organization which would help to 'influence political orientation, increase the internal stability, and strengthen the defense of the area', but the 'political base for such an organization must first [be] brought into being.' The paper avoided naming MEDO as the kind of organization envisaged for the Middle East. Another characteristic of the proposed policy was that military assistance programmes should concentrate on those nations 'who are most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and who are geographically located to stand in the way of aggression.' The relevant provisions of NSC 162/2, the overall national security statement known as the New Look, confirmed these conclusions. It noted that 'in the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to [safeguard Western interests in the region], the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran.'

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30 'Memo. of Discussion at 147th Meeting of the NSC', 1 June 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-54:9, pp.384-86.
The immediate result of the shift of policy towards the northern tier was the abandonment of the MEDO project. At the beginning of 1953, it was completely deadlocked anyway in the face of difficulties caused by Egyptian opposition to it. Because of the political atmosphere prevailing in 1953, it was not possible that a regional country (Egypt or Turkey) could undertake the role of leadership for the formation of a defence system. As for Egypt, Washington was concerned that it was hard to reconcile Egyptian and British positions over the Suez issue. Indeed, the Egyptians were against the British wartime access to the Canal base, and regarded any British peacetime presence there as tantamount to the perpetuation of Western imperialism. The Americans were not in a position to offer an alternative acceptable to the both sides. Although Secretary Dulles found the British plans for military response to any Egyptian guerrilla activity against the Canal ‘very tough’, he also thought that the British access to the Canal base did not violate Egyptian sovereignty. As important as the Suez problem was, Dulles predicted, the larger problem of political and economic stability in Egypt would continue to be an obstacle for years to come, even after the settlement of the problem.33 Similarly, Dulles noted that Egypt was ‘planning to adopt [a] neutral attitude and while willing and eager [to] receive Western assistance [it] would refuse [to] make any public or private commitment in return’.34 He was also pessimistic about the prospect of Turkish leadership, because the Arabs were at best reluctant to co-operate with Turkey within the framework of MEDO. Turkey was seen by most Arabs as a Western, rather than a Middle Eastern, power and was feared greatly by the countries that once it controlled.35

The Eisenhower administration refused the Turkish proposal (supported by the British and French) of pressing the MEDO project without Egyptian participation because Egypt should not be considered as secondary to Middle Eastern defense since the Suez base was there. This was consistent with the American view that Arab co-operation

33 ‘Memo. of Conversation’ (between Byroade and Ahmet Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador), 4 May 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.374; ‘Memo. of Discussion at 147th Meeting of the NSC’, 1 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.380-81.
34 ‘Tel. from SoS to Embassy in Egypt’, 30 April 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.363-64.
35 ‘Memo. of Discussion at 147th meeting of the NSC’, 1 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.385.
could be secured when the political situation of the region improved.\textsuperscript{36} Cognizant of the scarcity of the means to realise the MEDO proposal on the ground, the administration first put it on the shelf, and then concentrated its efforts to search for whether it was possible to create dependable allies, through military assistance and bilateral arrangements, along the northern tier.\textsuperscript{37} Such an initiative was thought to be advantageous as it would reduce Western involvement, it would not be embroiled in the Arab politics, and Turkey could take a leading role in it.

In line with the political developments surrounding the northern tier concept, the focus of military strategy also switched to the forward defence of the region. To this end, the JCS began a study in October 1953 to estimate force requirements 'with the aim of defending the region in mid-1956 as far to the north and east as practicable and defending at least one oil-producing complex in time of war.' It was the Zagros Mountain line (extending from a point near the junction of Turkey, Iraq and Iran to the head of the Persian Gulf) concept that was central to military planning. (See map 1, p.132.) It was assumed that Turkish forces would succeed in defending her eastern flank, thereby blocking all ground approaches through eastern Turkey into Syria and Iraq. It also envisaged halting an enemy advance on the major oilproducing centres, for which air power was a crucial factor. It was planned that successful air operations could be launched from the various airfields of the region against the enemy.\textsuperscript{38}

Further studies of the required force-levels were needed to make it a realistic military strategy. In November 1953, the JCS came to the view that, at least initially, Middle East defence depended upon an effective arrangement for the co-operation of the forces of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Therefore, it was desirable to have 'an association of indigenous forces under an indigenous command advantageously located with relation to the current threat.'\textsuperscript{39} Another JCS report dated April 1954 recommended that the United States, in order to implement the northern tier concept,


\textsuperscript{39} Watson, \textit{The Joint Chiefs}, vol. V, p.338.
should take such immediate measures as to strengthen American air and naval forces in
the region; develop plans for air and naval support of the Cairo-Suez area; and
continue to develop existing plans for the defence of Turkey. The objective of these
measures should be the defence of the following areas: (1) NATO’s right flank, (2)
air base sites, (3) the Turkish straits, (4) the eastern Mediterranean, (5) the Cairo-
Suez-Aden area, (6) the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-producing areas. All these
areas could be held if Turkey and the Zagros Mountain line were successfully
defended. To the JCS, the US policy in the long run should be to ‘encourage the
development of a regional defense organization capable of conducting the ground
defense of the line of Zagros Mountains utilizing indigenous ground forces.' Such
recommendations provided the military logic for political efforts to build up a regional
defence system based on a forward defence concept.

The northern tier alliance was increasingly considered in 1954 as the first step in the
formation of a region-wide security system, particularly to help to create the political
basis on which such a system could be developed. An intelligence statement of the time
(NIE 30-54) noted that a northern tier grouping would:

(a) tend to create a favorable climate for development of greater awareness of the
Soviet threat and closer regional defense cooperation; (b) possibly encourage
participating states to cooperate more closely on other matters, both with the
Western allies and among themselves; and (c) strengthen the position of Western-
oriented elements in participating countries.  

Two other benefits of the northern tier approach were important for the Americans.
Firstly, such a grouping would facilitate at least some arrangements for a Western base
and operating rights during peacetime. Secondly, Washington did not expect that the
creation of a loose defence system along the northern tier would provoke the Soviet
Union to undertake military action against the most vulnerable states of the region,
such as Iran and Afghanistan. Even if US bases were involved, Moscow might keep its
reaction confined to political warfare activities because the use of base rights were to
be restricted to the purposes announced by the provisions of the regional defence
arrangements.

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41 'NIE 30-54', 22 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.519.
In 1954, the US administration was optimistic about the success of American efforts. Although most regional countries were on bad terms with the West, it was predicted that 'all of the states in the area desire to improve or expand their military establishment'. Therefore, American assistance would be a real inducement for them to cooperate with the West, though of course this largely depending on the nature, scale, and terms of the US aid offered to them. Another positive development was that the focus of the British defence strategy shifted from the inner ring concept to the forward defence of the Middle East, paving the way for closer Anglo-American co-operation.

It should be noted that the northern tier alliance was part of a wider American policy towards the Middle East and thus should not be evaluated in isolation. Washington was under no illusion that northern tier developments would 'materially affect the internal weaknesses which ... undermined Middle East strength and stability, and would ... eliminate the tensions and fears which ... alienated much of the area from the West'. This was the root cause why NSC 5428 dwelt at length on the need for 'increasing responsibility, initiative, and leadership by the United States' to help the settlement of the outstanding political disputes of the region. US-UK co-operation was seen as essential for the success of this policy, but it was noted that Washington should exert its influence in a way that would 'convince the Arab states [that the US] is capable of acting independently of other Western states and Israel', particularly through extending economic and military assistance to the region. Part of the independent approach was the emphasis on the regional states taking the initiative in forming the northern tier alliance. As will be seen, the Americans neither encouraged nor discouraged the states of the area to participate in the northern tier alliance. The formal link between the planned grouping and Western powers, it was proposed, should be established through Turkey, which would be the only member of both NATO and the northern tier alliance.

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45 NIE 30/54, 3 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.519.
3. Turkey and the Implementation of the Northern Tier Concept

3.1. The Turco-Pakistani Agreement of April 1954

Creating an axis between Turkey and Pakistan was the first initiative undertaken by the United States in the organisation of the Middle East defence.47 Although the immediate American objective was to ‘provide a satisfactory context for the extension of military aid to Pakistan’, the agreement itself, dated 2 April 1954, proposed ‘consultation and co-operation between the Contracting Parties in the field of defence’, and was open for the participation of any interested country.48 Clearly, the American administration wanted to achieve the two aims simultaneously. This section will assess how Washington and Ankara co-operated in this initiative, concentrating mainly on the link between the Turco-Pakistani pact and the defence of the Middle East.

Pakistan informed the US about her intentions to take part in the MEDO initiative in the dying days of the Truman administration. Neither the outgoing nor incoming administration was, however, ready to support this initiative. Secretary of State Dean Acheson preferred not to disturb the Indo-American relationship on that matter for reasons discussed below. He also pointed out the fact that the discussions on the Middle East defence arrangements were in their early stages. Pakistan also preferred in early 1953 to delay further contacts with the US on that matter until the two governments were ready to discuss it bilaterally.49 In September 1953, when the Pakistani government unofficially approached the US for economic and military assistance, Washington was, in principle, positive about extending military assistance in

47 It was not consulted initially with the British in detail until the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes agreed with the American plan, because, according to the State Department, the whole project was depended on the Turkish concert on tactics. As such it was the first step of the independent American approach to the Middle East defence matters. US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File (Hereafter cited as CF. The date is the sequence of numbers following the '/ 'in any reference, arranged in the order of month followed by day, then year.) 682.90 D/1-1254, ‘Memo. from Raynor (NEA) to Merchant (EUR), 18 Jan. 1954; CF, 780.5/12-2953, ‘Tel. from the Embassy in Turkey to DoS’, no. 658; ‘The SoS to the Embassy in Pakistan’, 29 Dec. 1953, FRUS, 1952-54: 11/2, pp.1837-38.


return for Pakistan’s co-operation in defence matters. NSC 155/1, for example, related the country to Middle East security as follows:

We should select certain key states for [limited military] assistance, choosing those who are most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and who are geographically located to stand in the way of possible Soviet aggression. In this regard, special consideration should be given to Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Pakistan.50

Despite American sympathy for Pakistan, American officials were worried about its adverse effects on India and, to a smaller extent, on Afghanistan, because of the country’s disputes with them over Kashmir and Pashtunistan respectively. In particular, India, a leading neutralist country, regarded such aid as an act of bringing the cold war into the subcontinent.51 It was also possible that Afghanistan might feel intimidated and go to the Soviet Union for help. Despite the risk of alienating these two countries, the Americans were willing to help Pakistan in late 1953 because its pro-Western government was in internal trouble resulting from food shortages due to crop failure, creating a need for an urgent economic assistance. At the same time it was in search of military assistance to modernize its army. Taking these facts in account, an intelligence report even concluded that the refusal of aid would ‘weaken the position of pro-Western moderate elements now in control’.52 It was also very difficult for the US to ignore an appeal for aid by a country such as Pakistan that occupied such an important position in the cold war struggle due to its location close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In return for military assistance, Karachi could make available manpower, resources and strategic facilities for the attainment of American objectives.53 In short,

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50 ‘NSC 155/1’, 14 July 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p. 403, para. 16-d.
52 CF, 790 D.5 MSP/1-1854, ‘Memo. for the Under SoS on the Special NIE 50-54’. A report to the President by the Secretary of State wrote that ‘Our Ambassador to Pakistan believes, and I concur, that we can gain a great deal by going ahead and that failure to do so at this juncture would be disastrous to both our relations with Pakistan and to the position of the present pro-American Pakistani government.’ CF, 790 D.5 MSP/1-454, ‘Memo. for the President’.
53 ‘Tel. from Acting SoS to Embassy in Pakistan’, 16 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9: 495. In September 1953, Ayub Khan, Pakistan Head of State, indicated that his country was willing to offer the use of military bases. US officials had been quick to appreciate the military value of cooperation with that country. As early as November 1953, it was a matter of public knowledge that the United States was considering an agreement along the lines suggested by the Pakistanis, involving base rights in exchange for US aid. Watson, The Joint Chiefs, vol. V, pp.336, 343.
the US administration recognised that there was a need to find a way to meet Pakistan's requirements without disturbing Indo-American relations over this issue.54

The American administration came up with the idea of tying the aid issue to the conclusion of defence arrangements between Turkey and Pakistan, with the other countries in the region for potential additions, as part of a region-wide security project. The Turco-Pakistani agreement was to be presented as a Turkish initiative, with the United States remaining as far in the background as possible as the provider of military assistance when requested by Pakistan at a later stage.55 The immediate objective of doing so was to 'allay the apprehensions of people that [the US was] trying to help Pakistan against India.' However, because this measure in itself was not totally convincing, the administration tried hard to calm down Indian objection with extra confidence building measures, such as a public statement by the President and a letter from the President to the Indian Prime Minister promising that the aid would not be used for purposes other than it was given.56 Therefore, the regional defence aspect of the proposed agreement was no less important than its value as a face-saving formula.

In American thinking, the Turco-Pakistani Pact, as an example of defence co-operation initiated by the regional states themselves, would have some advantages. First of all, it would provide justification for the administration, both domestically and abroad, in extending military aid to additional states.57 Secondly, a regional initiative would help to overcome the mistakes of the previous MEDO project, that is 'an over-emphasis on Western initiative and direction', thus making it easier for regional states to participate. It was thought that 'Iran, Iraq and even Pakistan would be more hesitant to join an

54 Aid to Pakistan was firmly supported by the military establishment. The JCS came to the view that 'a satisfactory solution could be found if some method of indirect aid could be devised.' Watson, The Joint Chiefs, vol.V, pp.338-39. Similarly, Secretary Dulles commented that working out the right procedure was 'so important that it might have bearing upon the decision itself.' 'Tel. from SoS to Embassy in Turkey', 24 Dec.1953, FRUS, 1952-54:11/2, p.1835.

55 CF, 782.5/2-1354, 'Tel. from Acting SoS (Smith) to the Embassy in Iran', no.1722. The participation of the US and other Western powers to this agreement was not in question. The US pledged to 'assist such [an] arrangement rather than participate [in] it.' The State Department was convinced that the 'US should remain as far in [the] background as possible.' 'Tel. from SoS to Embassy in Turkey', 24 Dec.1953, FRUS, 1952-54:11/2, p.1836.


organization which had a direct link with the West.' Thirdly, as the Turkey-Pakistan initiative would make it possible to concentrate on the external threat to the region, it might strengthen the awareness about the communist threat in the region as a whole.58

Turkish-American collaboration in devising a framework by which American military assistance could be extended to the Middle East showed that Turkey, the most Western oriented country in the region, could provide the essential link between the regional states and the West, if it was on good terms with the country on the receiving end. Turkish collaboration was also valuable for two other reasons. First, given that Ankara was impartial in the Arab-Israel dispute and made it known that there would be no change in the Turkish position because of the conclusion of an agreement with Pakistan, Turkish involvement reduced Israeli fears about an anti-Israeli grouping in the region.59 Second, Turkey, a secular state, blocked Pakistani attempts to present the agreement as an example of Muslim solidarity.60

It was proposed that defence co-operation in the Pact should be confined in the first instance to the consultation and joint defense planning. This might make it politically more acceptable for those states who wanted to join and could help to reduce the reaction of opponents because it did not include commitments involving the deployment of military forces in mutual defence. It was also a practical necessity given that Turkey and Pakistan did not constitute a geographical or strategic unit, that neither country had the capability to commit forces for mutual defence, and that further eastwards extension of NATO commitments (because of Turkish involvement) was not desirable.61

59 CF, 782.5/1-2854, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to the SoS', no. 782; CF, 782.5/2-1854, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no. 865.
60 CF, 782.5/2-2254, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.878; 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', 25 Feb.1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.488.
3.2. The Turco-Iraqi Agreement of February 1955

From the beginning, both the Turkish and American governments considered the Turco-Pakistani Pact as the first step towards the formation of the northern tier alliance. In fact, to the Menderes government the main inducement for entering the agreement with Pakistan was that it could be the core of a regional alliance with Iraqi adherence. Major American policy documents towards the region envisaged that Iraq, then the most Western-oriented Arab country in foreign policy, would co-operate with other northern tier countries in defence matters. Iraq itself began to seek American military assistance as early as March 1953. To Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, it was the responsibility of the whole free world to safeguard Iraqi oil fields from aggression on its northern and eastern boundaries (a clear reference to the Soviet Union) as Iraq had no means to do that alone. Iraq, he explained, was seeking ways of strengthening its armed forces, but there was a need for aid from the US and UK as the country lacked the resources to finance numerous items required for a proper defence establishment. This argument was convincing to Washington, as US interests in the region were at stake. However, when Iraqi request for aid was made, the American policy towards the area as a whole was under review. As a result, although the aid issue to Iraq remained on the administration's agenda, it did not come to ahead until Washington sought to extend military assistance to Pakistan within the framework of a northern tier defence arrangement at the end of 1953.

The American position regarding the inclusion of Iraq in the northern tier Pact in the period from December 1953 to February 1955 was shaped principally by four factors: the line of the general policy which favoured the northern tier alliance, the nationalist Arab reaction to the alignments between the Arab and non-Arab states, the American willingness to preserve the status-quo in the region as a whole, and the ambiguity of the Iraqi position particularly in the second half of 1954. As will be seen, Washington,

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62 'Tel.from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', 30 Nov. 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.434.

63 According to Chargé in Iraq, strengthening Iraqi defence would 'be of direct service to American interests in the Persian Gulf.' 'Chargé in Iraq to DoS', 28 March 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.357-58.
in co-operation with the Ankara authorities, exerted behind-the-scenes pressure on Iraq in late 1954, which culminated in the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact in February 1955.

By August 1954, however, American policy was in favour of Iraqi co-operation with Turkey and Pakistan on a voluntary basis. Therefore, the Americans rejected the Turkish view that US assistance should be used specifically in a way to influence the Iraqi position in favour of aligning with Turkey and Pakistan. This was evident in the decision to extend to Iraq 10 million dollars of military aid in March 1954, regardless of whether it would adhere to the northern tier alliance. Washington realised that a token amount of aid was necessary so that Iraqi leaders could show their people that their pro-Western policies were paying dividend. But Iraq was not informed about this decision before the conclusion of the Turco-Pakistani Pact. This was because Washington feared that military aid to a non-committed country might be interpreted by other pro-Western states that a country could qualify for American aid even if it was not a party to a regional alliance.64 However, although the Turco-Pakistani agreement had been signed in April 1954, Washington continued to reject the idea of giving Iraq military aid, except for a token amount, in order to convince Baghdad to align with Turkey and Pakistan. It was in this setting that Prime Minister Menderes, anxious to make the new Pact an effective force in the regional politics, was critical of the American policy in May 1954. The Assistant Secretary of State, Henry Byroade, responded to him by saying that ‘the attachment of conditions to the granting of aid gives rise to undesirable interpretations that the US is intervening improperly to secure the extension of the Turkish-Pakistani Pact’.65

The American approach can in the main be explained by the concerns about the impact of Iraqi participation on the regional politics. From the MEDO experiment Washington was aware of the difficulties that bringing an Arab country into an agreement with non-


Arab states would involve, especially given the problems relating to Arab unity and the Arab-Israeli dispute. As for Iraq, as a report from the Embassy in Baghdad warned the State Department, ‘the participation of [the country] in a regional defence organization was unlikely until the US established a military assistance program, the Middle East political atmosphere improved, especially in respect to the Suez Canal Base, and the Palestine problem was not stirred up.’ Indeed, Egypt was particularly concerned about the possibility of Iraqi participation in the Turco-Pakistani pact prior to the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Canal Zone, considering that it might develop into an instrument ‘to destroy [the] degree of Arab solidarity’. It was also very difficult for the Iraqi government to ignore the accusation of being a traitor of the Arab cause. In a wider context, US interest in extending military assistance to those regional states who agreed to join the Turkish-Pakistani Pact raised suspicions about the American motive. Even a moderate Arab state like Lebanon felt obliged to inquire whether the American encouragement of the Arab countries to co-operate with Turkey could eventually mean that the Americans would ask the Arabs to come to terms with Israel as the condition of military assistance. The Americans took such concerns very seriously, so they did not want to push the matter hard. This was the reason why the Assistant Secretary of State Byroade remarked Menderes in their above-mentioned meeting that ‘the conclusion of [the Turco-Pakistani] agreement had an electric effect throughout the Arab world that, [we] had thought, we would not really take the decision to conclude an aid agreement with any Arab state.’

The Iraqi government, anxious to obtain American military aid on the one hand and apprehensive about provoking external and internal opposition on the other hand, failed to produce a coherent policy. Uneasy with the ambiguity of the Iraqi position, Prime Minister Menderes took the initiative in July 1954, with Pakistani support, in urging Baghdad to decide quickly whether it would join the northern tier pact. Although the Americans appreciated the Turkish concerns about the vagueness of the

68 RG 84, ‘Memo. of Conversation’, 10 March 1954, box 64, 320 MEDO 1953-54.
Iraqi position, they did not want to force the matter at a time when the newly elected Iraqi Parliament was hostile to the Turco-Pakistani Pact and Iraq was already partly isolated from the rest of the Arab world because of its relations with the Western powers. The Americans also knew that nationalist elements in Iraq were exposed to the anti-Western opinion in the Arab world, which prevented the Iraqi government from any move towards the northern tier alignment.

Nevertheless the cautious approach adopted by the American authorities did not mean that they were indifferent to the Iraqi position. It should be borne in mind that the Americans, in conformity with their regional policy, were always in favour of Iraqi association with the Turco-Pakistani Pact, believing that it offered, unlike MEDO, an indigenous way forward. In July 1954, Dulles went one step further by reminding his Iraqi counterpart, Fadhil Jamali, that the US had concluded the present military aid agreement with the expectation that ‘Iraq ... soon move[d] towards association with Turkey and Pakistan.’ Dulles was willing to help Iraq, but he wanted to make sure, as in the case of Pakistan, that the country receiving the American assistance should not use it to advance its regional objectives. In the case of Iraq, it was essential that the aid should not be used against Israel.

American policy towards Iraq dramatically changed at the end of August 1954. In general, the US hoped at this time that three factors might help Iraq to forge closer relations with the West: the return of Nuri al-Said to the post of prime minister, the prospect of an improvement in the Anglo-Egyptian problem and the perception that America was impartial in the Arab-Israel dispute. The State Department also believed that, although the Iraqi government was Western-oriented, Baghdad was still interested in promoting its own local objectives through its membership of the northern tier alliance. The Iraqi insistence on the creation of an anti-Israeli coalition and on the union of Iraq with Syria under the Hashemite royal house were cases in point. The

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70 RG 84, 'Tel. from Embassy in Iraq to Embassy in Turkey, no.1, 10 July 1954, box 64, 320 MEDO 1953-4; 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', 15 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9, pp.515.
71 'Memo. of Conversation, between Dulles, Foreign Minister of Iraq Fadhil Jamali et al.', 12 July 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:9, p.523
most disturbing development for Washington, however, was Nuri's proposal of developing the Arab League Collective Security Pact [ACSP or ALCSP] as a basis for the regional defence organization at the end of August 1954. For these reasons, the US administration concluded that undesirable developments might be prevented by bringing Iraq into the northern tier alliance and that Turkey could take an active role in this respect.

The Americans hoped that Turkish diplomacy might prevent the establishment of an anti-Israeli coalition on the basis of religion by the pro-Western countries of the region. This idea was first put forward by Pakistan during the negotiations of the Turco-Pakistani agreement and Turkey strongly opposed it. In May 1954, Jordan promoted the idea of a Muslim states conference on Palestine and obtained Iraqi and Saudi Arabian support. It was designed to improve the prestige of the moderate Arab states in the eyes of their people and of the Arab world. However, both Washington and Ankara agreed that the Turks should try to prevent the proposed conference from taking place, because such a venture sought the settlement of the Palestine problem by excluding Western powers and Israel. The Turkish government was particularly anxious about the possibility that this project might deflect Iraqi attention from the Turco-Pakistani Pact, which Ankara believed 'should provide the firm axis around which the countries of the Middle East should rally.'

The Iraqis, however, found in this proposal a face-saving formula which would neutralise Arab public opinion on the Palestine issue, thereby allowing them to improve relations with the northern tier alliance. Iraq also expected that its ties with the northern tier countries might bring some benefits to the Arabs in the struggle against Israel, and as a result could reduce the degree of opposition in the Arab world against the Baghdad regime. In April 1954, Nuri al-Said (then not in the government, though he had been made the Iraqi envoy to talk about defence issues with Pakistan) proposed a change in the Turco-Pakistani Pact to allow Pakistan to help the Arabs if Syria was attacked by Israel. He believed this was necessary because at that time, he argued, Israel felt itself militarily confident against Arabs while Arab states had no such confidence in their military strength.

73 RG 84, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', no.1214, 20 May 1954, box 63, 320 Arab Israel relations 1953-4; RG 84, 'Memo.of Conversation, Menderes, Byroade et al', 15 May 1954, box 63, 320 Turkey.
Pakistan was willing to accept this proposal but demanded that it should first be suggested by the US and Turkey.\textsuperscript{74} The Iraqis did not give up hope that their accession to the northern tier alliance would help to secure Pakistani support, one way or another, for a pro-Muslim, anti-Israel line. In November 1954, they proposed that Iraq should first reach an agreement with Karachi then with Ankara. The Turkish government, with American encouragement, successfully argued that the Turco-Iraqi agreement should proceed before any other arrangement.\textsuperscript{75}

Regarding the Iraqi objective of a union between Iraq and Syria (the Fertile Crescent concept), the US administration, despite not taking a direct stand against it, hoped that the promotion of an agreement between Turkey and Iraq might prevent it from happening. The Iraqi leaders were enthusiastic about the union, for it would boost their prestige in the Arab world. They were hopeful that Washington would support their plan because it would make Syria part of the area defence and help to stabilize the situation in that country.\textsuperscript{76} When Foreign Minister Fadhil Jamali brought the issue to Secretary Dulles’ attention at their July 1954 meeting, Dulles found it hard to argue against, though he made it clear that he was not enthusiastic about the idea because it would further complicate the Arab-Israel problem.\textsuperscript{77} Although Iraqi interest in the Fertile Crescent concept remained unchanged, it was difficult to put into practice in the face of American, Turkish and Syrian opposition. Turkey’s own border problems with Syria made a joint US-Turkish approach easier in an effort to deter a move towards the union. Furthermore, it was difficult for Iraq to forge a special relationship with Syria in late 1954 in the face of the Syrian Army’s opposition and the political uncertainty in that country, which further diverted Iraqi attention from the issue.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} ‘Tel. from Embassy in Iraq to DoS’, 5 April 1954, \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54:9, p.492; also see RG 84, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Iraq to Embassy in Turkey’, no.19, 20 April 1954, box 64, 320 MEDO 1953-4.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{CF}, 682.87/11-854, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS’, no.505.


\textsuperscript{78} RG 84, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Iraq to Embassy in Turkey, no.5’, 30 Oct.1954, box 64, 320 MEDO 1953-4.
The most disturbing incident from the American perspective, as noted earlier, was the Iraqi proposal to develop the ACSP as the basis of regional defence. Anxious to receive a substantial amount of Western military assistance, Nuri al-Said knew that it would not be forthcoming unless some form of defence arrangements between Western powers and Arab states were developed. To this purpose, he approached Egypt with the proposal of a modified ACSP in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter, with a view to removing the Pact's article forbidding the member states from aligning with non-Arab states, thus making Western participation possible. Despite this proposal being pro-Western in nature as it aimed at bringing Egypt into agreement with Western powers\textsuperscript{79}, the US administration strongly opposed it. Secretary Dulles was furious about the proposal and he wrote to Henry Byroade that 'We bought the idea of military aid to Iraq on the theory that it was going to tie up with the northern tier countries and not merely build up the Arab League ... against Israel.'\textsuperscript{80} His contention on the objective of the American aid to Iraq and the Arab League showed exactly what Americans understood from indigenous defence co-operation in the region. It was the Turco-Pakistani Pact (or any bilateral agreement between Turkey and Arab states), not the Arab League, that the US should promote as an indigenous defence effort. In fact, the American position was negative towards the League from the beginning and it received full support from Turkey on this. Both countries were aware of the fact that even Turco-Pakistani Pact, as an alternative attraction in the region, created 'strains in the relations of the Arab League countries', and Menderes and Dulles agreed in June 1954 that 'the weaning away of a state such as Iraq from the negative Arab League was a good goal in itself.' NSC 5428 confirmed this view by stating that the northern tier concept might have 'aroused resentment on the part of certain Arab states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but [might] provoke a desirable pull away from the negative Arab League.'\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} It is remarkable that the Embassy in Iraq informed the State Department that the Iraqi proposal had some advantages in itself if Western membership was accepted by other Arab states. He also stated that outright rejection of the proposal would cause high resentment in the region. 'Tel. from the Chargé in Iraq to DoS', 23 Aug. 1954, \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54:9, p.544.


Although the Americans adopted a negative stand vis-à-vis the Arab League, they avoided opposing it publicly, as a State Department document bearing Dulles’ signature stated, ‘because of Arab sensitivities and genuine if latent yearning for unity.’ Along this line, the Department came up with the idea that ‘the Turk-Pakistan Pact and ALCSP should be regarded as complementary rather than mutually exclusive arrangements’, and that pressure should be exerted on Iraq not to abandon its efforts to search for an agreement with Turkey. In this effort, the US-Turkish collaboration was of crucial importance. Secretary Dulles instructed Avra Warren, Ambassador in Turkey, to tell the Turks that the above-mentioned views should be presented to the Iraqis as the Turkish, not American, views during the Turco-Iraqi talks. The Ankara authorities, seeing the Arab League as an obstacle to the further development of the northern tier concept, readily accepted to approach the Iraqis on the basis suggested by the State Department.

In the absence of American political support or of the promise of aid by the Western powers, together with the Egyptian unwillingness to co-operate with Iraq, Nuri’s efforts did not produce any tangible result. Therefore, Iraq had to turn to Turkey for an agreement. At the end of December 1954 Iraq was already at odds with the Arab League over its relations with non-Arab states. Taking advantage of the situation, Dulles instructed the Embassy in Baghdad to ‘use every suitable opportunity discreetly [to] encourage ... earliest Iraqi association with [the Turco-Pakistani] Pact or [the] conclusion of bilateral arrangements with either party.’ The prospect that Iraq could renew its agreement with the UK over the status of the British bases, within the framework of an agreement with Turkey, provided a material reason for the speedy conclusion of an agreement. The Turco-Iraqi Pact, which initially was signed for five years on February 24, 1955, was open for accession to any member of Arab League or any country concerned with Middle Eastern affairs. It included a provision which allowed the participants to ‘conclude special agreements with other parties to the

pact', which was designed specifically to provide a cover for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi agreement when Britain joined the pact at a later date.

4. American Policy Towards the Middle East from February 1955 to October 1956 and Turkey's Regional Role

Following the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact in February 1955, the Americans pursued a policy towards the Middle East that had different preferences to its allies about promoting security in the region. This continued to be so until US-Egyptian relations reached a breaking point with the American refusal to finance the Aswan Dam project and the subsequent nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt in July 1956. The crux of the American policy was the belief in the primacy of the settlement of the outstanding disputes, the Arab-Israeli one in particular, with the objective of improving stability in the whole region. According to the Washington authorities, this line of policy was not inconsistent with the northern tier concept, so during the period in question the realisation of the northern tier alliance was another component of the American policy. 85 In the military field, the Eisenhower administration refused to allocate extra resources for the area, as a result of which the defence authorities were against undertaking new regional responsibilities. Western defence plans continued to be based on the forward defence of the region which, as explained above, relied on British forces stationed in the region plus the forces of the regional allies. 86

Washington's emphasis on regional-stability-first was not a deviation, in substance, from the policy put forward in the summer of 1954. This policy prioritised a regional initiative for the creation of a defence system, envisaged the delay of Western participation in a prospective regional organisation until the resolution of the intra-regional problems, and was suspicious, in principle, of Iraqi involvement in the northern tier alliance. 87 Yet the actual policy in late 1954 did not conform with the

85 In State Department's view, while the northern tier concept intended to meet aggression from outside area in co-operation with the states in the north of the region, the broader Middle East policy also included the resolution of intra-area problems with a view to creating a sound basis for a defence structure for the whole region. 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Jordan', 8 Sept. 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, p.153.


87 'NSC 5428', FRUS, 1952-54:9, especially see pp.525-32.
policy objectives stated above. This can be explained by the fact that the summer 1954 policy was designed to serve American interests in the middle and long term. In the short term, however, Washington adopted a very pragmatic approach which produced a course of action inconsistent with the objectives of the planned policy. Indeed, as analysed above, the Americans actively promoted an agreement between Turkey and Iraq in the fall of 1954, believing that this would strengthen the Western position in the region. Similarly, they not only tacitly endorsed the British intention of joining the proposed pact between Turkey and Iraq in January 1955, but also exerted pressure on Ankara to convince Nuri al-Said to include a clause in the agreement which would permit the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi agreement if and when Britain joined the pact.

At that time, the State Department believed that Egypt, the leading opponent of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, could be coaxed into moderating its opposition. The Department officials were even hopeful that Egypt would co-operate with Western powers and with Turkey for the defence of the area against outside aggression. A Department document reflected American optimism more clearly by noting that the new Pact was a significant step towards a broader security co-operation, from which Egypt could also benefit. For this reason, it 'can provide more quickly and effectively for real area strength without impairing or conflicting with [the] role of [the] Arab League.'

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88 Evelyn Shuckburgh, then Assistant Under Secretary of the State in the British Foreign Office, stated in a meeting to the State Department officials that the Turk-Iraq pact would help the British position in the Middle East as it would provide cover to regenerate the base agreement with Iraq. The Americans did not oppose this idea. 'Meeting of the State Department and Foreign Office Officials', 27 Jan. 1955, US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Lot file [hereafter cited as Lot file] Miscellaneous Lot Files, 57 D 321, 323&324, Office files of Leonard Ungen 1951-56 [hereafter cited as Lot Files 57 D 321, 323&324], box 4, Middle East defense-Northern tier 1954-55.

From the flow of information within the Department it can be judged that the British adherence to the Pact was seen as a step in the right direction since it would pave the way for the British to maintain their bases in Iraq. 'Letter from Joseph Palmer to Frederick Reinhardt', 26 Feb. 1955, Lot Files, 57 D 321, 323&324, box 4, Middle East defense-Northern tier 1954-55.

89 CF, 682-87/2-955, 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Turkey', no. 913; CF, 682-87/2-1055, 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Iraq', no.497.

90 'Meeting of the State Department and Foreign Office Officials', 27 Jan.1955, as note 88. American optimism was also noted by the British. Shuckburgh, for example, observed that the State Department believed that the Iraqi accession to the northern tier pact would not result in 'the worsening of relations between Egypt and Iraq, or between Egypt and the West. See 'minute by C A E. Shuckburgh on the difference of emphasis between the British and American approaches', 11 Jan.1955, John Kent ed., Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East, part III, 1953-1956, (London, 1998), p.354.

91 'Tel from DoS (Murphy) to the Embassy in Egypt', 14 Jan.1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, p.5.
By the time Britain adhered to the Pact on 4 April 1955, the administration had come to realise that its position was untenable in the face of hostility to the pact within the region, particularly from Egypt. In fact, the signing of the Pact increased instability in the area by stirring up the regional rivalries. British and Turkish support for Baghdad initially strengthened the Iraqi position against its rivals in the Arab world, but by doing so caused a sharp division in the Arab camp. Even moderate Arabs, such as the Lebanese Ambassador to the US Charles Malik, told Secretary Dulles that Iraq's co-operation with Turkey and Britain meant for the Arabs 'the disappearance of the influence of the Arab League in Middle Eastern affairs', so was seen in the Arab world as a tool of Western imperialism. In response, Egypt took the lead in the Arab League with the aim of isolating Iraq in the Arab world and secured Syrian and Saudi Arabian support in March 1955 against an Arab state concluding agreement with non-Arab powers. Israel also strongly opposed the idea of Western powers joining with Arab states in the Pact. In addition, the Pact not only marked the end of the Turco-Egyptian détente of late 1954 but also caused the deterioration of Turco-Syrian relations in March 1955 to the extent that Washington felt obliged to express its concerns over, in State Department's words, 'Turkish intemperate criticism of Arabs.' All in all, the Pact became the source of greater problem, rather than a vehicle to stimulate awareness against outside threat to the region. This was one of the major reasons why Washington gave preference to the resolution of the regional disputes after the British accession to the Pact in April 1955.

It should also be noted that the political rationale for the American policy was that regional disputes might make the Middle Eastern countries more susceptible to Soviet

For the view that the US administration was at this stage uncertain about the effects of the Turk-Iraq agreement on Egypt and the Arab League, see Nigel John Ashton, 'The Hijacking of a Pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958', Review of International Studies, 19/2, (April 1993), pp.129 and 131.

92 British officials believed that the strength of opposition to the Pact caused the Americans to reexamine their position: 'outward tel. no 1349 from Mr Eden to Sir Makins', 31 Mar 1955, Kent ed, *Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East*, pp.412-13.


94 Syria and Saudi Arabia were at bad terms with Iraq; the former because of the Iraqi intentions to unite the two countries and the latter because of rivalry between the Saudi and Hashemite dynasties.

95 *CF*, 682-87/3-2655, 'Tel from DoS to the Embassy in Turkey', no.1261.
activities at a time when international tension lessened elsewhere. It was believed that
the Soviet Union exploited anti-colonialist and nationalist demands for a neutralist
foreign policy in an effort to reduce Western influence in the region. Therefore, it was
essential that the United States should not associate itself closely with Britain and
should show some sympathy to Arab grievances in order to avoid the risk of alienating
the people of the Middle East. The result of such considerations was to put less
emphasis on the further realisation of the northern tier concept.

The policy based regional stability and the northern tier concept required for its
successful implementation that the US should poise neatly the two components of its
policy, which proved quite difficult given the complexities of the regional politics. The
efforts to balance them caused differences between Washington and Ankara authorities
as to which methods should be employed in achieving the common security objective,
which was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the region. The Menderes
government firmly believed that the Americans and British should create conditions for
the success of Turkish initiatives in the region, which came to mean American
assistance to the pro-Western Arab countries, political support for the Baghdad Pact
and, if possible, the American adherence to the Pact. Turkish demands were in
conflict with the objective of resolving regional disputes first.

As a result of American preoccupation with stability in the wider Middle East, rather
than the northern tier, Egypt gained a prominent role in the American regional policy.
It was thought that Nasser was the most powerful leader who could bring the Arab
states together and lead them towards peace with Israel. With this consideration in
mind, American diplomacy in the area sought to prepare the ground for long-term co-
operation with Egypt. Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador to Egypt, observed
in March 1955 that Nasser was 'basically pro-Western and certainly anti-

97 For general characteristics of the Menderes government's Middle East policy, see Bagci, *Demokrat
Parti Donemi*, pp.42-43. Menderes' remarks to this effect quoted in *CF*, 682-87/4-155, 'Tel.from
Embassy in Turkey to the SoS', no.1170.
At that time, Dulles was optimistic that in the long-term a ‘three-pillared defense arrangement could eventually develop including Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan.’ Therefore, it was desirable, in the Department’s assessment, to extend American ‘support and assistance -political, economic and military- to Egypt.’ Sympathy to Egypt grew to such an extent that the Near Eastern section became concerned about the trend that ‘the United States should and could offer Nasser effective US assistance in asserting or restoring Egypt’s position of leadership in the Arab world.’ Although US policy never reached that point, the hope of Nasser’s cooperation with the West was quite high at least until Egypt turned to the Eastern bloc for military equipment and announced an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. One of the main reasons for American contentment was the assumption that the Egyptian government, as an intelligence report put it in June 1955, was ‘aware of its dependence on the west for economic aid, for military supplies, and some measure of protection against Israel.’ It was also expected that Moscow would oppose Eastern bloc arms to Egypt, given the risk of upsetting the East-West relations in the wake of the July 1955 superpowers summit. Even after the arms deal, the US administration rejected the idea that it should write off Egypt, fearing that the country’s isolation, and the denial of Western assistance for its urgent economic and military requirements, might push it further towards the Soviet bloc or at least might strengthen its neutralist tendency. Part of the US response to the arms deal was the renewed emphasis given to the project ‘Alpha’, alongside with the offer of Western financing of the Aswan Dam project in July 1956. However, he rejected to severe relations with the Soviets and to make peace with Israel in return for aid. Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, (London, 1972), pp.63, 64-71.
Dam project in return for Nasser's co-operation. However, the project failed to score any success by the end of March 1956, despite a secret mission by the US special envoy Robert Anderson in an effort to bring Egypt and Israel together on the negotiating table. Although American hopes of a constructive approach by Nasser considerably waned in the wake of Nasser's firm anti-Israeli public speeches in January 1956, Washington did not rule out the possibility that he might co-operate with the West until the nationalisation of the Suez Canal at the end of July 1956.

The role attributed to Egypt in resolving regional disputes made the American administration lukewarm towards the Turkish diplomatic efforts to persuade Arab states to join the Baghdad Pact. The connection of northern tier to the rear area should await, according to Washington, the lessening of Arab-Israeli tensions. To facilitate this, it was advocated that the US should avoid involvement in the regional politics, what was then called 'the hands-off attitude'. The Americans mainly kept to the 'hands-off' policy in respect to the expansion of the Baghdad Pact. They were not against any voluntary adherence by an Arab or non-Arab country, but they eschewed to exert diplomatic pressure or to extend military assistance in an effort to bring additional Arab states into the Pact, believing that it would mean 'involvement in intra-Arab politics.' They simply ruled out the Baghdad Pact as the kind of northern tier organization they wanted to build in collaboration with the Turks. This was the point where the American and Turkish opinions differentiated, even though there was a convergence of opinions in terms of preventing the spread of Soviet influence into the region. After the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, Ankara sought to expand it to

103 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, p.57. Project 'Alpha' was a joint UK-US effort to encourage Arab-Israel peace through negotiations and the promise of Western assistance, which began in December 1954.


105 'Tel.s from DoS to Embassy in Egypt', 30 March 1955 and 31 March 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, p.45 and p.47 respectively. The Department came to this conclusion after the Embassy in Egypt had reported that Egyptian hostility towards the Baghdad Pact was understandable given the fact that 'Iraq's challenge to Egypt came as surprise and shock' and that the pact represented the opposite of what Egypt thought for Arab unity and that what Nasser was hostile to was neither the 'northern tier approach nor Turk-Iraqi Pact itself', but the idea of expanding the Pact 'by picking of one by one' the other Arab states. 'Tel. from Embassy in Egypt to DoS', 8 March 1955 and 20 March 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, p.30 and pp.41-43 respectively.

include Syria, Lebanon and Jordan as well as Iran and Pakistan, considering that the northern tier pact could be an effective force in the Middle East only if it proved that it could attract other Arab states into its ranks.\textsuperscript{107}

Two test cases manifested clearly the divergence of opinions between Washington and Ankara (before and as well as after the Egypt-Czech arms deal) over how to deal with the matter of enlarging the Baghdad Pact. The first one, as noted above, was the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Syria in March 1955. Turkey exerted a heavy-handed diplomatic pressure on Syria and massed troops along the common border in order to force Syria to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact, or at least to prevent it from signing an agreement with Egypt. This approach failed to attract American support for it was thought to prejudice the aim of maintaining co-operation with Egypt. The Americans also considered that a weak regime in Syria, feeling threatened by both Israel and Turkey, would turn to the Soviet Union for help, which might bring Moscow out into the open in support of Syria, the very thing that the US most wanted to prevent.\textsuperscript{108}

In the case of Jordan, the Americans informed their allies at the time of the British accession (April 1955) that other Arab states, especially those bordering Israel (notably Jordan), should be discouraged from joining the Pact.\textsuperscript{109} In the summer of 1955 the Turkish government continued to seek active support from the US for its efforts to reinforce Iraq as well as to win a more favourable reaction from Lebanon and Jordan, but they saw that the Americans were firmly against the southwards expansion of the BP before the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. Menderes let the Americans know his resentment over this issue by saying that he felt that Turkey was left ‘somewhat in midstream in its efforts’ and hoped that the ‘consolidation of loyalty already won

\textsuperscript{107} Mahmut Dikerdem, \textit{Orta Dogu ' da Devrim Yillari} (The Era of Revolutions in the Middle East), (Istanbul, 1977), p.163.


should not be left in abeyance by US.  

The Egyptian arms deal in September 1955 caused the Turkish authorities (as reported by their Ambassador in Washington, Haydar Gork) to believe that the gains of the last one and a half years were at stake if the Egyptian policy succeeded, for they regarded it as equal to the Soviet domination of the Arab Middle East. In their view, the arms deal gave stimulus to the pro-Nasser elements in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, as it was very popular in the Arab world. At this critical juncture, they were doubtful ‘whether Nuri could withstand the pressure unless additional Arab states [were] brought to the Pact soon.’ The Ambassador told State Department officials that when President Celal Bayar visited Jordan during the first week of November, he planned to urge Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact. At a meeting with Dulles, Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu further argued that the ‘foundations [of the] Baghdad pact [were] not yet very deep’, thus American assistance to Iraq and Iran was needed to indicate that the policy of neutralism pursued by Egypt did not pay. Although Dulles showed his sympathy for Zorlu’s views on Jordan and the Baghdad Pact, he reiterated that American policy up to that time had been to refrain from antagonizing Egypt and from complicating the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute by encouraging the expansion of the Pact, even though the former point was, in his words, ‘perhaps less important now.’ The State Department made it clear a few days later that the Jordanian membership should be contingent upon an agreement with Israel and Jordan (or preferably with other Arab States bordering Israel) on borders, which effectively amounted to the rejection of the Turkish initiative, which was backed strongly by the British.

Another effect of the ‘balance’ policy was that the US administration found it impractical to answer Turkish proposals that American assistance should be extended to Lebanon and Jordan, and that the existing amount of assistance to Iraq should be increased, with a view to reinforcing pro-Western inclination of their governments.

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112 ‘Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Turkey’, 2 Nov. 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, pp.181-82; ‘Tel. from Embassy in Jordan to DoS’, 1 Nov. 1955, ibid., p.181. According to the latter telegram, such an agreement was ‘presently unattainable’, given the popular hostility in Jordan to any Western-sponsored initiative. The State Department supported this view.
From the beginning, the State Department was of the view that substantial military assistance to the Arab states might 'encourage an Arab-Israel arms race with a resultant increase in area tensions', unless it followed the improvement of Arab-Israel relations.\footnote{Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Lebanon', 4 Feb. 1955, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:12, p.13.} There was a strong case in favour of extra military aid for Iraq after the Egyptian arms deal. But this was a problematic issue not only because it was opposed by Israel but also because it was feared that a strong Iraq might use its power to force Syria into a union with Baghdad. In fact, at the end of September 1955 the Iraqis were asking Washington to permit them a freehand to intervene in Syria. Dulles told the members of the NSC that the Iraqi absorption of Syria might destabilise the entire region because it might provide Israel with a reason for a preventive attack as it would give Iraq a common border with Israel; it might provoke a strong political reaction by Saudi Arabia; and it might be presented as a proof that military assistance might be used for aggressive purposes.\footnote{\textit{Memo of Discussion at 260th meeting of the NSC}, 6 Oct.1955, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:12, pp.160, 168; 'SNIE 30-3-55: Probable Consequences of the Egyptian Arms Deal with the Soviet Bloc', 12 Oct. 1955, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:14, p.585.} This incident led the US administration to believe that military aid to the Baghdad Pact countries, other than Turkey, should only be extended to give them sufficient strength for maintaining internal security and, in the case of Communist aggression, for a holding action until outside assistance arrived.\footnote{Discussion with Secretary', 13 Dec.1955, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:12, p.213.} Clearly, the Turkish argument in favour of extending further military assistance to the pro-Western countries of the region, including the Bagdad Pact members, in order to strengthen their orientation was not a feasible option for Washington.

The Turkish government also received a lukewarm American response in its efforts to play a leading role in bringing about peace between the Arab states and Israel. When Menderes proposed in late 1954 that Turkey should take the initiative in bringing more Arab countries into northern tier alliance and to seek a solution to Arab-Israeli dispute within this context, Dulles did not like this idea. He found large scale Turkish involvement in this business undesirable for two main reasons. Arab resentment of Turkey's pro-western policy and lingering Arab sensitivities carried over from Ottoman days. At present it was preferable for Turkey, Dulles argued, to 'direct its
main efforts at area defense matters leaving in abeyance ... [the] Arab-Israel problem.' From this perspective, he observed, Turkey’s participation in the northern tier alliance was desirable because not only might it lessen Israeli apprehensions about the intentions of this alliance, but also might ‘help allay [the] real Arab feeling of weakness vis-à-vis Israel and lessen intra-Arab pressures based on [the] fears of Israel.'

Differences between the American and Turkish approaches to the problem became more apparent in the fall of 1955. Turkish diplomacy at that time intended to eliminate the Arab-Israel problem as an obstacle both to American adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to the military assistance to its members. The Turks tried to convince the US administration that their tactics would pave the way for progress in the Arab-Israel dispute along the lines of American proposals, and in the process, would prove that the Baghdad Pact itself would be a ‘very useful instrument in bringing about settlement’. Considering that Arabs did not constitute an immediate danger to Israel, the Turkish government first tried to convince the Arab states that their association with Ankara would provide them with necessary protection against aggression from Israel.

According to the Turkish government, there was enough evidence to prove Turkey’s sincerity in that matter such as the letters exchanged with Iraq referring to ‘aggression ... from within or without [the] region’, President Bayar’s public statement given during his visit to Jordan promising Turkish assistance in case of unprovoked Israeli aggression and the assurance, given to the Syrian government, that Turkey would oppose to Israeli aggression if the Syrians gave up their intention of buying Soviet arms. At the same time, the Turks argued to the American authorities that the provision of American arms to the pro-Western countries could be handled in a controlled way through the Pact and that Turkey would do everything it could to prevent Arab ‘aggression against Israel.’ In a similar vein, the Israelis were informed

117 Judged from an American intelligence report of the time, the Arab fears of Israel was not unfounded. It showed that the Egyptian army, the most powerful Arab force, was ‘no match for Israel’s from any point of view’, and that Israel was capable of waging an attack against Egypt at the same time meeting an attack from other Arab states. The report was confident that the information given was accurate. ‘Memo from Armstrong (INR) to Allen (NEA)’, 8 April 1955, Lot file, 58 D 776, Subject files of INR 1945-60, box 10, Near and Middle East 1955-56. For the source of the Turkish views, see the next note.
that the Turkish efforts did not mean a change of Turkish policy towards Israel. But the Turkish efforts to moderate the Arab attitude had little chance of success without active American support, particularly in the absence of the promise of American assistance. The Washington authorities were not convinced that the Turks had an advantage in dealing with the Arabs (as they, like the Americans and British, were seen as imperialists by nationalist Arabs); neither did they consider that the Baghdad Pact would provide the framework through which the region-wide problems could be settled. Moreover, the Turkish efforts came at a time when the Baghdad Pact was increasingly seen as a vehicle of the British policy towards Iraq and when Turkish-British efforts to secure Jordanian membership were scuppered by anti-Pact riots in December 1955. It should also be noted that Washington's general policy in the 1955-56 period was against Turkish political involvement in matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The way in which the American policy was perceived by the regional allies helps to explain from another perspective why the US and Turkish governments differed in their responses to regional matters. For Turkey and other members of the BP, it was particularly difficult to comprehend why the US paid so much attention to Egyptian, Israeli and Soviet opposition to the extension of the Pact, and why it did not adhere to the Pact while endorsing the policies pursued by it. It was also believed that neutralist countries like Egypt received better treatment in terms of aid than the US allies who bore the risks of association with the West. All in all, they were confused as to what exactly the US policy was. Not surprisingly, similar views were expressed by the supporters of adherence to the Pact within the US administration, particularly by some diplomats in the region, the Defence Department and the JCS. Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the JCS, for example, said following his trip to the area in February 1956 that 'he found confusion throughout the Middle East due to lack of a clear, definite US policy.' This confusion about the American policy had negative effects on the US-
Turkish co-operation at times. A dispatch from the Embassy in Turkey, dated May 1955, precisely captured the mood in Ankara:

[Turks] are becoming discouraged, and increasingly perplexed, by what seems to be them an inexplicable indifference on our part toward [the] Middle East defense. ... Discouragement mainly arises from "hands off" attitude, on the one hand, towards extension Turco-Iraqi pact, as [with] regards [to] both our participation and use of our influence with others, and on the other hand towards frustration [about the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia] rival pact. Puzzlement arises from contrast our present indifference with [our] earlier fervent support [of the] 'northern tier' concept, as demonstrated by our active role in [the] development [of the] Turco-Pakistani and Turco-Iraqi pacts, which they regard [as] practically disowning our own child; and from even greater contrast our disinterest in [the] present political developments with our willingness [to] participate actively in [the] less realistic ...MEC and MEDO projects.\textsuperscript{122}

It can be claimed that the ambiguity of the American policy contributed one way or another to the differences in approach to the regional problems between Washington and Ankara. Because the differences over the expansion of the Baghdad Pact and the role of Turkey and the Pact in the settlement of regional disputes were stated above, it is sufficient here to explain further one of the points highlighted in the above-quoted text, that is the difference over how to deal with Egypt. American officials were cognizant of the fact that the Turkish government did not understand why Nasser’s co-operation was so important for the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict in the American thinking. Therefore, they did not expect that Ankara was ready to improve its relations with Egypt ‘on the basis of coexistence’ proposed by the State Department. Indeed, to the Turks, priority should be accorded to the strengthening of the Baghdad Pact countries against the rival ESS pact development. The Ankara authorities argued that, as quoted in a report by the American Embassy in Ankara, any 'benevolent attitude' by Turkey, especially towards Syria, should be regarded as a 'victory for Moscow menace to their security along [the] 500 mile Turco-Syrian border.' For this reason, they made it clear that Turkey would review its relations with ESS members if the formation of the proposed pact went ahead.\textsuperscript{123} In short, Turkish-American co-operation in terms of carrying out the hands-off approach was not satisfactory because its objectives were confusing for the Turkish government.

\textsuperscript{122} 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', 21 May 1955, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57.12, pp.55-56.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{CF}, 682.87/7-2255, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS’, no.100 and 682.87/8-955, ‘Desp. from Embassy in England to DoS’, no. 348.
The rather cautious approach to the Baghdad Pact and to its expansion for the sake of regional stability, however, did not mean that the US had abandoned the northern tier alliance. Out of concern over regional stability, the Americans preferred to remain indifferent to the adherence of non-Arab countries at critical times (as in the case of Iran in October 1955), and discouraged the accession of Arab states, notably those bordering Israel, but they never took a position which totally objected to the extension of the Pact. They were particularly careful not to give the impression that the US interest to the Baghdad diminished as a result of the efforts to settle the Arab-Israel dispute. Similarly, the American adherence was not rejected but delayed until there was a relaxation of tension between the Arab states and Israel. The US administration believed, as a matter of principle, that the northern tier could 'make a sizable contribution to NATO security, i.e., protect the NATO flank, Persian Gulf oil, the Cairo-Suez-Aden area, and deny Soviet access to the Mediterranean.' The administration always extended its support to the Pact publicly and joined its economic Committee as an associate member. As a logical conclusion of this approach, the rival Egyptian, Syrian, Saudi Arabian pact was seen as 'essentially negative in character, in other words, it was not expected that it could 'make a realistic contribution to the defense of the area.' For this reason, the rival pact never became an alternative to the Baghdad Pact, although the US did not publicly oppose it, in line with its policy towards Egypt. Equally important, American officials did not fail to recognize the political value of a pro-Western regional grouping even in the shape of the Baghdad Pact. In 1955 and 1956 they were of the view that Moscow wanted the spread of neutralism rather than of communist regimes in the region and that the Soviets were really worried about the political potential of the Pact, as evident from

124 Lot file, 61 D 417, 'Disp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS, no.84, Annex 1, Memo.of Conversation between Menderes and Warren, 24 Aug.1955, box 53, Alpha vol.8, doc.349; CF, 682-87/3-2955, 'Memo. from Hart to Allen.'
127 'Tel.from DoS to Embassy in Egypt', 30 March 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:12, p.45.
the case of Iran’s denunciation of neutralism after joining the Pact.\textsuperscript{128} In brief, the Baghdad Pact provided, in the American eyes, a platform on which regional countries (with the support of the West) co-operated against the communist threat.\textsuperscript{129} The US administration, therefore, appreciated the Turkish diplomatic efforts to urge its regional members to the dangers of neutralism and gave support to the efforts to strengthen its posture to the extent that this did not conflict with the other political objectives in the region.

5. Conclusion

An examination of the aspects of US-Turkish security collaboration in the Middle East in the 1953-56 period shows that it is hard to reach a sweeping conclusion that Turkey was assigned the leadership role in the region or the American regional policy relied on Turkey. This statement, however, does not deny that it was the key country in terms of Western defence planning for the region as well as the attainment of a northern tier alliance. Rather, it pays attention to the fact that the Americans did not envisage a leading role for Turkey in their initiatives to resolve regional disputes, particularly the Arab-Israeli one.

The lessons learned from the failure of the MEDO project led the Americans to focus on the northern tier in 1953 and 1954, which in turn increased the value of the contribution Turkey could make. They thought that the MEDO project was difficult to apply because of nationalist Arab opposition to it, Egypt’s problems with Britain, and the lack of a regional country who could take the leading role. They expected that switching to the northern tier alliance as proposed by Secretary Dulles would minimize outside involvement, thus making it easier for the regional states to join it. This might bring stability to the north of the region, which was otherwise in turmoil. Turkey

\textsuperscript{128} ‘Memo. of Conversation’, 13 April 1956, \textit{FRUS}, 1955-57:12, 278-79. To the supporters of the American membership of the Pact [the Defence Department and the JCS], the possible disintegration of the pact, as Admiral Radford once told Dulles, ‘would be viewed in the area as a Soviet victory and a major defeat for the West.’ Dulles responded that ‘if particularly Iraq withdrew from the Pact, the US might replace it.’ ‘Memo. of Conversation’, 9 April 1956, ibid., p.276

readily accepted a part in the project, hoping that it would prevent the spread of communist (or neutralist) regimes on its southern borders (i.e. alleviate its fear of encirclement by hostile regimes), and would help to convince the US to extend more assistance.

Whatever the problems surrounding it, the magnitude of the US-Turkish collaboration in the northern tier context was remarkable. First, Ankara’s contribution was particularly helpful in creating a framework through which the pro-Western regimes of Pakistan and Iraq could be supported. One of the main sources of American influence in the region, and at the same time the principle inducement for regional states to cooperate with the West, was American economic and military aid. As in the cases of Pakistan and Iraq, there was a need to make sure that aid should not be used for the regional purposes of the country it was given. The American administration envisaged that the bilateral agreements between each country and Turkey served this purpose. Second, Turkey accepted that it should present the American demands to both countries as Turkish views during the negotiation stage of the agreements in an effort to make them appear regional initiatives. Third, it was also important that pro-Western countries of the region should co-operate along the lines preferred by the West. In the given cases, both Pakistan and Iraq were inclined to organise an anti-Israel platform and wanted to get Turkey involved in it. Ankara and Washington agreed that such development should be prevented. More importantly, the US administration expected that Turkey’s co-operation with Iraq would convince Baghdad to give up its idea of promoting the security arm of the Arab League as the basis of a region-wide defence system. To the State Department, even if this organization was modified as proposed by Iraq, Western influence on it would be minimal. Indeed, the Turco-Iraqi agreement came to mean the abandonment of the idea by Iraq once and for all. The two developments showed that no indigenous defence effort was considered in Washington to be worth supporting unless it was sponsored by the West. All in all, Turkey was the country to provide the link between a regional organisation and the West, and in the initiative of the northern tier alliance, the US administration envisaged a leadership role for Turkey.
The Americans reached two basic conclusions from the developments of early 1955. Firstly, after the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October 1954, they thought that the US, an impartial country, could take the initiative in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Secondly, having seen the scope of the reaction to the Baghdad Pact in the region especially from Arab nationalists, they did not regard it as the kind of organisation they envisaged for the northern tier countries. The corollaries of these conclusions were the American indifference to the enlargement of the Pact to include other Arab states, a mild opposition in public to the activities of the anti-Pact grouping, and confusion on the part of the allies about the nature of the American policy.

This change of emphasis in American policy had profound effects on the depth of the US-Turkish collaboration in regional security affairs. Ankara’s insistence on more political and military support for the Pact countries did not receive a very favourable response from Washington. The Menderes government spoke of the need for a more active Turkish role in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute but Americans were against a political role for Turkey in this matter. Even Turkish efforts to get the US to consult them on the matter fell on deaf ears. All in all, it was evident that when the US administration prioritized the settlement of regional disputes, it neither relied on Turkey’s diplomatic service nor envisaged a leadership role for the country.

Despite the emphasis on regional problems, the northern tier alliance remained the one component of American policy in the Middle East. Politically, the Pact provided a framework for co-operation between its regional members and the Western countries in 1955 and 1956. Without membership of such a pact, it was very likely that the pro-Western countries of the region might adopt neutralist policies. When it became clear in the summer of 1956 that the American policy had failed to secure Egyptian collaboration with the West, the political functions of the Pact became more important. From this perspective, Turkey’s service in encouraging solidarity within the Pact was as valuable for the US as it was before.

MAP 1. The Middle East and Its Defensive Positions

CHAPTER FOUR

AMERICAN MILITARY-STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD, WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TURKEY, 1953-60

1. Introduction

US-Turkish security collaboration was institutionalised with Turkey’s accession to NATO in February 1952 and it was further progressed during the 1950s along the lines that the Truman administration formed. To recall what was said in the second chapter, the US sought in the postwar era to keep Turkey oriented towards the West in the cold war and to ensure the mobilisation of its military potential in the event of war. To this end, it guaranteed Turkey’s territorial integrity and extended military and economic assistance. As will be discussed in this chapter, the Eisenhower administration pursued similar objectives in the 1950s. The strategic collaboration was not remained narrowly confined to the utilisation of the country for defence of the West. Washington saw such collaboration from a broader perspective which included the support for Turkey’s economic development and the promotion of its political stability as well as the improvement of its military capability. Considering this, this chapter deals with the following issues. First, it assesses how the American policy makers viewed Turkey’s position in relation to the defence of NATO area. The factors that imposed limitations upon the scope of US-Turkish military relations in peacetime will also be pointed out. Second, it examines why and how the US sought to strengthen Turkey’s defence posture. And finally it addresses the issues relating to the internal stability and political alignment of the country, with a special emphasis on why they became such important security concerns for the Americans.

Following points will be taken into consideration in analysing the American position with respect to the above mentioned issues. First, the Eisenhower administration’s strategy emphasised the need for strengthening the non-communist world; especially improving the military posture of the allies in need of external help, creating cohesion within and among non-communist nations, destroying the effectiveness of communist forces in them, and combating the effectiveness of communist block diplomatic and
economic activities. Second, in dealing with local conflicts, the administration's strategy either heavily relied on the allied contribution or needed facilities overseas for America's own rapid reaction forces. The need for a non-nuclear response to local aggression, which became more important as a result of advancements in the weapons technology, seemed to increase the value of the mutual defence effort. Third, Washington saw the East-West struggle as a long-term phenomenon, hence wanted to tackle it without bankrupting the US economy. The reduction of the cost of mutual defence effort (which consumed roughly between five and eight percent of the defence budget) was important in this respect. The Treasury Department as well as Congress tended to see aid as a giveaway. It was also argued that the US could buy more security by financing economic development in the less developed areas rather than by financing military buildup in a few countries. Indeed, the economic aid component of mutual security was emphasised more in the late 1950s in the wake of fresh Soviet attempts to help many Third World countries to develop their economies.

The nature of America's relations with its European allies should also be borne in mind. After the Korean War, the US policy wanted that 'the local defence of Western Europe would have to be strengthened, to deter possible Soviet attack and re-moralise the allies.' This effort included, among other things, the creation of an integrated NATO command structure in Europe and financial aid for an allied military buildup. But problems emerged when the Eisenhower administration showed reluctance to carry the heavy cost of the rearmament and chose the cheaper option, the reliance on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. The increasing American vulnerability to a Soviet nuclear attack and diminishing European dependency on American aid in line with the economic recovery of the continent, began to expose the differences within the Western alliance. It was particularly important that European allies raised questions about the credibility of nuclear protection provided by the US, the so called extended deterrent. Judging from European eagerness to reduce tensions with the Soviet bloc, some academics of the time observed that increasing political, economic and military

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1 For details of the Eisenhower administration's policies, see chapter two above.

power of the Western European nations allowed them to pursue, to some extent, their separate national interests 'regardless, and sometimes at the expense, of the common interest' of the Atlantic alliance. It was even the case that the reappraisal of NATO membership became feasible at least for some European states.3

The economic and military aid aspect of US-Turkish security relations continued to weigh heavily in the 1950s. As noted in the introduction, to obtain economic and military assistance from the US was the principle incentive that induced Turkey to ally with the West, rather that remain neutral, in the post-war era. Considering this, the Truman administration decided to continue to help Ankara (the Truman doctrine allocated $100 million of military aid to Turkey on a temporary basis) in order to modernize its military forces as well as to improve its military infra-structure with a view to mobilizing them in time of war. The country’s perceived role in organising a regional defence system in the Middle East and the objective of making it a regional power centre were other main factors for the continuation of American aid. With Turkey’s inclusion in NATO, the objective of aid was expressed in terms of bringing the country’s military strength up to NATO standards. It was also recognised that its living standards, and education and cultural level of masses were significantly less than that of Western Europe. Unless improvements were made in these fields, there was the ever present danger that the country would drift towards neutrality or internal chaos.

The Eisenhower administration shared these views. It dealt with a Turkey that was as enthusiastic as before to receive aid. In the 1950s, the Menderes administration wanted to modernize rapidly the country’s economy and armed forces with American help. It staunchly advocated a bipolar world view and gave support to US policies globally, considering that this would be instrumental in obtaining more aid. Indeed, strategic and political significance of US-Turkish collaboration was appreciated in Washington to a certain extent. Economic and military assistance to Turkey had been viewed in terms of the security benefits that the US would obtain. Against the opposition within the

administration, the majority (including the President and the Secretary of State) argued that Turkish aid programme would buttress US strategic interests in the Near East, Eastern Mediterranean and Balkans. It was seen as a cost-effective way of buying security, because, President Eisenhower put it, 'it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their armed forces than to create additional US divisions.'  

As a result, Turkey was reckoned as one of the certain European countries that the US should help 'in achieving [economic] stability and growth while maintaining necessary military forces.'  

Particularly important was that Ankara received $181 million of American military aid on average over the eight-year period (1953-60) which accounted for 38 percent of its total military expenditure.  

It should be noted, however, that the desire to reduce the cost of mutual defence on the part of the US had implications for Turkey. Washington wanted from its allies to do enough to provide for their defence from their own resources, especially from Western Europeans.  

It was also argued that America's allies should take account of the benefits accrued to their security by the growing US deterrence capability and the modernization of their armed forces in their claims on the American resources. As will be seen, Turkey was not an exception.  

2. The Continuing Relevance of the Strategic Imperatives: Turkey's Position in Relation to the Defence of NATO Area  

In this section, the issue of the defence of the NATO area and Turkey's contribution to it will be analysed within the context of the American view of global conflict with the Communist bloc, which rested on a particular geo-political conception. That the Soviet bloc derived its strength from its geopolitical position was central to measuring this
strength, constituted the basis of the American geo-political perspective. A State Department document, which based on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates of the dimension of external threat to American security, emphasized the following points. One aspect of the threat posed by the Kremlin 'relates to the geography, the peoples, the economic organization, and the military machine controlled by the Kremlin regime'. It was these attributes of Soviet power, fuelled with its aggressive ideology, that gave the Soviet Union a greater capacity to project its influence beyond its borders. In military terms, its geography was a great advantage. As the paper put it, 'the geography of the Soviet Union gives it a span from the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait, so that it is poised to press outward against Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Korea and Japan.' It was the responsibility of the US, as the centre of power in the anti-communist bloc, to contain the Soviet expansion with the help of its partners and friends. Of all geographical areas, the most significant ones for fulfillment of this task were mainland America and the periphery of the Soviet Union. The document proposed that the US 'must project itself across the intervening oceans and must utilize its strength from the territories of other nations around the Soviet periphery.  

Indeed, the US established strong economic, military and political ties with Europe and showed close interest in the history of the European balance of power, and accorded priority to Western Europe in the post war era. NATO, the main politico-military organization of the Western bloc, was thought to be the cornerstone of the Western military strength, and as such served as 'a shield for the free world'. Militarily, the success of NATO was closely related to the credibility of its military strategy, which was measured by its capability to deter an attack on the home territories of all member

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8 'Notes For Use of Under Secretary Smith at White House Briefing for Congressional Leaders', 14 April 1953, US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Lot file (hereafter cited as Lot file) Miscellaneous Lot files 57 D 321, 323 & 324, Office files of Leonard Ungen 1951-56 (hereafter cited as Lot files 57 D 321, 323 & 324), box 4 Miscellaneous. The American view over the position that geography and manpower superiority gave the Soviet Union remained almost unchanged during the 1950s. The emphasis given to the US access to bases around the Soviet Union as a means of containing communism was clear evidence that the geopolitical approach prevailed in the US security thinking. Another document emphasized this point by saying that 'the military manpower superiority of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the dominant central position of this expansionist block within the Eurasian land mass pose grave problems for the security of the free world.' Memorandum from Marshall Green (FE) Philip Clock (G), 8 January 1959, Lot file, Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), Office of European Regional Affairs (OERA), Politico-Military numeric files 1953-62, box 2, Bases-General.
nations. If the US, the leader of the Western bloc, failed to provide NATO with this capability, it could hardly maintain the integrity of the anti-communist coalition which would mean the loss of initiative to the Soviet Union in the cold war. Being aware of this, the United States took the main responsibility for maintaining the integrity of Western alliance in the 1950s.9

Following Turkey's inclusion in NATO, this organization provided a multilateral platform on which Turkish-American security relations was conducted.10 As a member of NATO, Turkey's army was placed under the command of SACEUR, which meant in practice the country 'for the first time assumed the obligation to coordinate defense plans with those of a European army under an international command.'11 In addition, the Americans in general preferred keeping their military relations, particularly those relating to the base rights, within a NATO context.12 Therefore, it is appropriate to explain the military dimension of the relations in the light of strategic thinking that prevailed in NATO circles. One should bear in mind that because the US was the dominant power in the alliance, its perception of a threat to the West and its views how to meet this threat were the major factors in determining the course of changes in NATO's defence strategies.

Before looking at Turkey's contribution to the security of the NATO area, it is desirable to assess briefly the Western position on global and limited war situations. To

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9 'Memorandum from Wolf (RA) to Adair (RA):US Talking Points on NATO Problems', 3 July 1953, Lot files 57 D 321, 323&324, Office files of Leonard Ungen 1951-56, box 4, NATO problems. Rees, Anglo-American Approaches, p.47 and also see chapter one, the section on US foreign policy.

10 It should be remembered that Westernisation has always been an objective of Turkish foreign policy and that in the 1950s it was reinterpreted as 'intimate co-operation with the Western countries at all costs and under all conditions.' Relations with NATO was viewed by Turkish political circles within this context and NATO was regarded as 'an extension of the United States'. As Karaosmanoglu has rightly noted, 'The containment of the Soviet Union was the major preoccupation.' Mehmet Gulubol, 'NATO, US and Turkey', in Kemal H. Karpat ed., Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974, (Leiden: E.J. Berill, 1978), pp.14 and 25; Ali Karaosmanoglu, 'Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Context', in John Chipman ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges, (London, 1988), p.297.


12 US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, (Hereafter cited as CF. The date is the sequence of numbers following the '7' in any reference, arranged in the order of month followed by day, then year.) 711.56382/4-158, 'Memo. from William M. Rountree to the Under Secretary: Staging and Pre-stocking Rights at Adana for Other Than NATO Purposes'.

begin with general war, when Turkey entered NATO in February 1952, the NATO authorities were working on what came to be known as the Lisbon goals which symbolised NATO's preference in favour of conventional defence. At this time it was still to be decided what kind of role nuclear weapons could play in a war with the Soviet bloc. The North Atlantic Council adopted at Lisbon the forward defence of the NATO area as the alliance's policy and agreed that the basic way of doing this was to increase the conventional forces of the allied countries. To this end, Lisbon force goals proposed the creation of 96 combat ready divisions on the central front by 1954, the year of maximum danger according to NSC 68. However, it soon became clear that these goals were not attainable given the economic difficulties and lack of political will on the part of the Western European allies.

Soon after taking office, the Eisenhower administration came up with the idea of reducing defense costs by shifting from conventional to nuclear defence, as envisaged in the doctrine of massive retaliation. This also had profound implications on NATO strategy, which was constantly revised with the view to accommodating nuclear weapons from December 1953. In December 1954 SHAPE was authorized by the policy statement on nuclear strategy known as MC 48 'to base military planning on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used in a future conflict' from the outset. It was envisaged that a war in the nuclear age would be a short one, in the initial (and probably decisive) stage of which thermonuclear weapons were used. The policy paper introduced in the alliance's strategy the use of tactical nuclear weapons with the aim of holding up a Warsaw Pact attack until the Western strategic counter-offensive became effective. The paper also accepted the importance of surprise as a way of reducing the risk of enemy retaliation and the importance of forces that could be used in the atomic phase of a war. It was dominant in NATO strategic thinking that conventional force

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13 On nuclear weapons Lisbon decision only said that they would be used in defence of NATO area. At that time, the US administration regarded nuclear weapons as the weapons of last resort. Wampler, Robert A., NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons, (Nuclear History Program, Occasional Paper, no.6, 1990), p.8.


15 Kaplan, A, 'NATO Forty Years', p.57. Beer, Integration and Disintegration, p.64

16 Wampler, NATO Strategic Planning, pp.15-16; Rees, Anglo-American Approaches, p.51
capabilities would complement the alliance’s nuclear forces in that they would be instrumental in forcing the enemy ‘to concentrate forces in order to achieve superiority at a particular point’, thereby making them vulnerable to a nuclear attack. It was also considered that conventional forces would assure the European allies that everything would be done to avoid devastation of their homelands in a nuclear war.  

However, rapid developments in military technology undermined the deterrent function of the threat to use nuclear weapons from the outset of a war. With the prospect of the Soviet Union achieving a second strike capability, which meant it would respond even if the West carried out a nuclear attack first, the US policy makers faced the dilemma of doing nothing or starting a general war in local situations. This was the basic reason why the American strategy gradually recognized that ‘military conflict short of general war’ was a possibility for which the US should be prepared. The search for flexibility did not mean that conventional defence became the priority, for the US administration assumed that tactical nuclear weapons could be used selectively against military targets in limited wars. Nevertheless, Washington acknowledged the fact that limited wars in which tactical nuclear weapons were used could escalate to general war. At that time, those scholars who called for having limited war capabilities for the US, also pointed out that lesser aggressions would carry with them risk of escalation and would diminish the credibility of extended deterrent for the American allies and friends.

The recognition of the dangers posed by the use of nuclear weapons reinforced the argument that America should be capable of fighting local wars with conventional forces. It was concerned that the threat of a nuclear response was not an appropriate method to meet the communist challenge in the cold war. With the success of deterrence in denying general and limited war options to the Soviet bloc, the conflict was likely to turn into a political, psychological and economic struggle. It would

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17 Rees, Anglo-American Approaches, pp.51-52.
encourage communists, for example, to increase their efforts to overthrow pro-Western regimes, especially those on the periphery of the Soviet bloc, 'through infiltration and subversion'. In such cases, the threat of an atomic response would be 'either ineffective or politically disastrous.' In short, the situation of not having adequate means to meet a limited Soviet or satellite probing aggression, or other forms of threat short of war, would lead to 'a progressive and cumulative loss of position [that] could eventually reduce the US, short of general war, to an isolated and critically vulnerable position.' Therefore, it was thought, conventional power would provide the flexibility needed in such circumstances. The administration was interested in two forms of conventional capabilities in the 1950s. The first was 'flexible forces capable of coping with peripheral aggression' and the second was developing indigenous forces of the allied and friendly countries. The former required staging areas along the periphery, while the latter was to be achieved through extending economic and military assistance to the allied countries.

The quest for flexibility on the part of the United States had a profound impact on strategic thinking in NATO. The alliance had never adopted the concept of limited war, but the views that called for limited military operations were received favourably in its decisions. The revised version of the alliance's strategic policy document (MC 14/2), for example, pointed out the need for being prepared to deal with those Soviet bloc actions with limited objectives, 'such as infiltration, incursions or hostile local actions in the NATO area ... without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.' To fulfill this policy, it was proposed by the Supreme Commanders, Alfred Gruenther and his successor Lauris Norstad, that NATO should accord a renewed emphasis to the 'shield' forces. General Norstad predicted that adequate 'shield' forces, armed with both tactical nuclear and conventional weapons, would

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21 'Memo, from Parsons (FE) to Smith (S/P)', 11 July 1958, Lot file, EUR, OERA, Records Relating to NATO: 1947-64, box 1, limited war.

22 'Military Concepts for Opposing Communist Limited Aggression', undated, Eisenhower Library (EL), White House Office (WHO), Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Department of Defense Subseries, box 6, Military Planning 1954-5 (2). Also see Rees, Anglo-American Approaches, p.34.

23 'Military Concepts for Opposing Communist Limited Aggression', undated, as note 22.

24 Wampler, NATO Strategic Planning, pp.41 and 50.
enable NATO not only to respond to local aggression without facing the dilemma of responding massively with nuclear weapons or doing nothing, but also to create a ‘pause’ during a Soviet attack in which the enemy would have to reconsider the implications of escalating the war to the nuclear level. Along these lines, NATO reviewed the alliance force requirements in 1958 and approved a 30-division-strong allied forces for defence of the European NATO area.\(^{25}\) NATO’s endorsement of a flexible approach amounted to a new emphasis on building up the conventional forces of the European allies and increased the importance of areas close to the Soviet bloc.

The American view of Turkey’s contribution to the defence of Western Europe was a product of the American perception of global conflict with the Soviet bloc. As pointed out at the start of this section, a spatial perspective dominated to a certain extent the American view of Soviet power and of how to prevent the projection of this power beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc. The most striking point in the major policy papers on Turkey produced during the Eisenhower administration was that they put the strategic importance of the country at the centre in their assessments. Repeatedly emphasized points were as follows: ‘Geographically Turkey is located strategically astride the water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean ... [and] borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. ... Turkey lies within striking distance of important targets in industrial areas of southern Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.’ The value of geography was further enhanced by the extensive military facilities which Turkey granted to the United States. The most important of all were the Strategic Air Command of the US Air Force (SAC) facilities which ‘extended US capabilities to mount extensive air strikes in the event of hostilities with the USSR.’ Under NATO arrangements, the headquarters of the NATO Command Allied Forces South East Europe and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force were located at Izmir, on the Aegean coast. In addition, Turkey was ‘a link in the chain of US global military communications’.

The communication and monitoring facilities were gradually modernized, with American assistance, after Turkey had become part of the Allied Common Air Defence System.\(^{26}\)


\(^{26}\) Two previously-mentioned points were also repeatedly noted in American documents. First, the economic and military aid substantially improved Turkey’s military capabilities, which in turn
Although the geo-strategic importance of Turkey for the West was clearly stated, in what ways the country contributed to Western defence efforts was not elaborated upon, particularly in relation to the nuclear stage of a general war. As explained above, the US and NATO envisaged that a war with the Soviet Union in Europe would be a general war fought with atomic weapons. Such a war was predicted to be a short one and the use of conventional forces was to be very limited, at least at the initial stages. Turkey, situated on the southern flank of NATO, was not in a position to play a direct part in the war effort in central Europe.\(^{27}\) In addition, it had a limited conventional capability which was not suitable for large-scale military operations. Viewed from this perspective, the idea that it would take up the attention of around 20 Soviet bloc divisions which otherwise would be used on the central front, had little value in a general war.\(^{28}\) Rather, as will be explained later in this section, its contribution to American deterrence would be through making military facilities available for the SAC. Turkey also helped in the efforts to diversify American nuclear deterrence by allowing the stationing of American IRBM\(s\) in accordance with NATO’s decision of December 1957. Due to the significance of this issue, it will be treated in a separate chapter.

Despite the prime importance of Western Europe as the central front in a general war and the strong likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in such a war, American decision makers considered that the defence of Turkey’s own territory and its utilisation for the Western war effort would be a significant contribution to the defense of Western Europe in terms of conventional defence. As noted in the second chapter, General Eisenhower’s defence concept for the NATO area regarded Turkey and the adjacent areas of Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa as an important air approach

\(^{27}\) NATO defence plan of April 1953 (MC26/2) implicitly ruled out direct Turkish contribution to the Western European defence in the initial stage of general war. ‘Background Paper: NATO Force Requirements’, 9 Apr.1953, Lot file, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files 1949-63, box 23, CF150.

\(^{28}\) See, for example, Kuniholm, ‘East or West ?’, in Ali Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan eds., Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, (Ankara:1987), p.135.
to the Soviet Union from the south. Similar views were later expressed in NATO’s strategic guidance (SG 13/25), which saw Thrace, the Straits, and Anatolia as a single strategic environment. It was proposed that Turkey should be defended ‘as far to the north and west as possible provided that this does not impair the defense of Anatolia and the Straits [and called for] holding as much of Thrace as possible.’ The document also singled out three areas in the Southern flank of NATO, namely the North Italian Plain, Thrace, and Anatolian Plateau, which would allow large scale land operations and the use of mechanized forces. Of these areas, Turkey was a major force in Thrace and the only force in Anatolia. American views also focused on the denial of Turkish territory to the Soviet bloc. It was thought that the conquest of Turkey by the Soviet bloc forces, followed by invasion of the Middle East, would:

(a) result in the loss of the Bosporus and Dardanalles; (b) provide the USSR valuable defense in depth and offensive base sites; (c) deny to the allies the use of important air bases; (d) deprive the West of oil fields which provide about 90 percent of Western European requirements; (e) threaten the major communication lines running through the Suez area; (f) prevent the build-up of NATO forces in these areas.

American views about the role Turkey could play under limited war circumstances were stated more clearly than those about general war. As noted earlier, two ways of combating limited hostilities were proposed: indigenous forces of friendly countries, supported by the US forces if necessary; and mobile reserve forces stationed in the US, capable of intervening local conflicts in short notice. The former was very important for the administration’s cost cutting strategy, in addition to its politico-military value. The requirements of flexibility, as noted earlier, forced Washington to put more emphasis on such indigenous forces. It was pointed out, for example, that deterrence of the local conflicts outside Western Europe ‘should depend’, as Secretary Dulles remarked in a NSC meeting, ‘effective forces being developed by our allies elsewhere in the Free World, such as in Turkey and in Korea.’ The development of worthwhile Turkish forces was seen as a deterrence against a satellite attack in the Balkans, and

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29 ‘Comments on SG13/25, Strategic Guidance’, attached to Memorandum from Moore (RA) to Perkins (UUR), 20 Nov. 1952, Lot files 57 D 321, 323&324, box 4, NATO Problems. ‘Holding as much of the broad area of Southern Balkans as possible for use of offensive operations in the future’ was a new point introduced by this document.


had a stabilizing value in the Middle East together with Turkish diplomacy. In the case of reserve forces, the deployment of them in strategic areas was required for their success. If this happened, they would ‘be in position to apply military pressure on Communist moves at the earliest practicable time, and also ... generate the development of and favorably influence the employment of local politico-military resources.’ To perform this function was one of the main purposes of the creation of the US overseas bases system.

Acquiring basing rights around the world became increasingly important from mid 1950s in line with the Eisenhower administration’s search for a flexible approach in dealing with local conflicts. It was thought that US overseas bases and facilities would augment the Western position in all possible types of conflict with the Soviet bloc, particularly in the case of limited hostilities. President Eisenhower himself saw them as ‘a vital element in deterring aggression and in the security of [the US] and that [of its] allies and friends’. Bases around the periphery of the Soviet bloc in particular would give the US ‘an enormous advantage in terms of delivery vehicle costs, flight times and, for some delivery systems, accuracy.’ Equally important was that bases could be used to support any of the emergency situations which might arise in both limited and general war. Thus areas that facilitated basing near the Soviet frontiers, such as NATO and the northern tier countries, continued to play an important role in general war strategy. Similar views were expressed in a comprehensive report, dated December 1957, compiled by Frank Nash (former Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs) on Eisenhower’s request. According to the report, a system of overseas bases and facilities was needed for general, limited, and cold war contingencies. In general war, this system was essential to maintain a deterrent since it increased by a great deal the capacity to deliver a strategic counter-offensive. The manned bombers of SAC and the Navy’s carrier and submarine striking forces

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35 *FRUS*, 1955-7:19, p.709 editorial note.
supplemented by tactical forces at forward bases, constituted the chief delivery vehicle of the US long-range striking force and were expected to remain so for the foreseeable feature. Furthermore, the existence of such a system assured, as it provided necessary dispersal, that the Soviet Union could not eliminate the US retaliatory power through surprise attack with one blow.36

In local situations the paper recommended, because of the need for flexibility, the maintenance of tactical forces in areas of particular strategic importance and sensitivity. ‘Strong mobile forces, supplemented by tactical air forces, must either be located in positions from which they can readily respond to local aggression, or also be rapidly transportable to these critical areas.’ Overseas bases and facilities were necessary for logistic support of these areas. The report pointed out that these forces were an important supplement to the main retaliatory forces. ‘The increased Soviet bomber and missile threat’, it stated, ‘calls for maximum dispersal of air unity on our part, and improved air defence deployments.’ SAC requirements of fighter and interceptor aircraft, which should be placed in forward areas because of their shorter range, made it indispensable to have a base system.37

According to the Nash Report, the base system can be seen as a ‘tangible evidence of political solidarity’ with the US allies and friends in the cold war. It emphasised that although their existence generated political friction and resentment in certain places, ‘US military presence has provided concrete evidence of US support in case of attack and has served to strengthen resistance to internal and external Communist pressure in many areas.’ The report was very clear about the political benefits of having an overseas base system: ‘In certain places ...the existence of US bases has provided us with leverage for the promotion of US political objectives which would not otherwise have existed.’38 Maintaining support of certain allies and friends, assuring their contribution to the common defense effort and furnishing bases for the use of US


37 Nash Report, p.11.

38 Nash Report, p.12.
military forces remained the essence of American security policy during the Eisenhower administration.\textsuperscript{39}

Politically and militarily, Turkey was one of the best locations on the periphery of the Soviet bloc that bases could be established. Politically, both the governing party and the main opposition party gave strong backing to the deployment of American forces. From the geo-strategic perspective, the country’s geographical proximity to the industrial areas of southern Russia and to many potential trouble spots in the Middle East, rendered it not only an ideal place for SAC operations, but also a key country in terms of affecting local developments. The stationing of American forces, particularly in southern Turkey, was considered to have dual objectives from military perspective. In the view of the JCS, ‘the security of NATO’s right flank [was] one of the US military objectives in the Middle East’; therefore, in such emergency situations as the Suez Crisis of 1956 it was feasible to deploy some forces from Western Europe to bases in Turkey such as Incirlik, Adana, close to the Syrian border. This was considered as a deployment of NATO forces within the NATO area\textsuperscript{40} and thus did not give the Soviet Union an opportunity for propaganda and threat. The JCS also considered that these bases could be used for rapid operations in the Middle East if circumstances warranted US intervention.\textsuperscript{41}

American views on Turkey’s importance for the Western security objectives can also be evaluated in terms of the country’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Control of the Mediterranean was seen as an essential element of the Western strength from the late 1940s, as exemplified by the presence of the sixth fleet of the US Navy there and by the US efforts to obtain transit and flight rights in surrounding areas. On the whole, the US administrations assessed the Mediterranean in terms of the protection it provided for the European theatre as a sea and air approach to the Soviet Union. It


\textsuperscript{40}‘Memorandum for the Secretary of Defence’, 29 Nov. 1956, annex to JCS 1887/319, \textit{US National Archives}, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [hereafter RG 218], Geographical file 1954-56, box 15, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), sec.50.

\textsuperscript{41}There was an implicit but strong tendency within the US official circles to see the Middle East contingencies that the US involved as a matter of Western security, therefore a concern for NATO. For more on this matter, see chapter six.
was ‘an area of defense in great depth around a central line of communications unfavorable to the movement of a land power but permitting a mobile, rather than static, type of strategy as exemplified by naval or air operations.’ That is why, it was thought to be ‘of crucial importance in the prosecution of all types of war - cold, restricted, or general.’

A study compiled by the Policy Planning Staff in 1957, which summarised the administration’s policy regarding the Mediterranean defence, saw the US as a Mediterranean power by virtue of the presence of the Sixth Fleet there. In addition, the chain of ‘strategic and other [Western] air bases ranging from Spain to Morocco through Libya to Turkey constitute the ground elements of the most powerful strategic air force in the area’. It predicted that the strategic importance of the Mediterranean would increase as a result of political changes around it and of future trends of warfare. The decline of British power in the Middle East and of French power in North Africa reinforced the feeling that the US strategic responsibilities should be increased if a power vacuum was not to be allowed to develop in this area. As new weapon systems developed, the paper pointed out, there was a need not only ‘for the classical defense in depth but for a new concept of attack from depth’, for which the Mediterranean and surrounding areas were particularly of significance.

The chief political objective of the US was to maintain the dominant position of the West in the Mediterranean, and further strengthen it if possible. To this end, it was essential to ensure the access of the US and friendly states to this area and denial of access to present and potential unfriendly states. In peacetime, the task was ‘to project US influence into the area and create or contribute to the stability and development of the area in a manner to further US interests.’ In case of a limited conflict, the task was


43 Nash Report, p.22.

to assure the US or allied involvement in the conflict in order to create a favourable situation for the West. Under conditions of general war, the task was to use the area to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The defence of the Mediterranean area was not planned separately but in connection with the contingent areas. It would be used in a military conflict in order to:

(a) support the Allied Air Offensive,
(b) assist NATO in defending Italy, Greece and Turkey as far as possible and to control the exits from the Black Sea,
(c) support allied efforts in the Middle East territory to secure the NATO right flank, the Cairo-Suez-Aden area, and the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil bearing areas.45

In the Mediterranean context Turkey was considered in terms of both defensive and offensive purposes. It controlled access to the Mediterranean from the northeast and its loss to the communist block would ‘open the most direct land and sea route from the Soviet bloc to the Mediterranean, Near East and North Africa, and could seriously hamper U.S. and NATO operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.’ At the same time Turkey could provide strategic access to the heartland of the Soviet Union and so could be used ‘as a base for operations against USSR and other Communist bloc targets.’ Those airfields assigned to SAC were ‘one of the most forward operating positions’ for the US. Turkey also provided access to the Straits and Black Sea in which ‘some submarine, anti-submarine and mining operations to be conducted by NATO.’ In addition, the facilities of the country could be used ‘for communications, intelligence, air patrol and reconnaissance, and staging operations both for NATO and the US’. All in all, the strategic importance of material and human resources of the country, coupled with its political role in the Middle East as envisaged in the Baghdad Pact, made it for the US ‘the most useful and strategic ally ... in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean’.46

Turkey’s contribution to the common defence effort by the West was also proved in the case of effective control of the Turkish Straits. For the American administrations, such a control would enhance the Western position in the Middle East and North Africa. When the issue was first raised by the Truman administration in 1951, defence

planners held that success against anti-submarine warfare in the Mediterranean depended on the positive control of the Straits. The closure of the Black Sea in the early stages of war, which could be achieved through the provision of a controlled mine field in the Straits prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The plan was found 'politically inadvisable' in March 1951, because it might not have been approved by the Turks who feared that Moscow might exert heavy pressure on Ankara if the plan was carried out. However, the JCS considered the project to be feasible, given Turkey's inclusion in NATO and high military importance of it as part of the general build up of the military posture of the SACEUR, and recommended the Defense Department in May 1952 to reopen the issue for discussion. The new administration pursued the issue to its conclusion and negotiations resulted in the approval of the project by the Turkish Ministry of Defence in May 1955. Turkey undertook the construction of shore installations (storage and handling facilities) and the US supplied mines, crafts and other technical equipment and provided training for operating the project. Later in 1957, the defences in the Straits were reinforced by the deployment of atomic capable US Army units, armed with short-range Honest John rockets.

The availability of facilities in Turkey and Turkish consent to use them, did not necessarily mean that the US made the maximum use of them. The Soviet Union's perception of threat to its southern region, which constantly affected the American strategic thinking in the 1950s, caused the US to exercise self-restraint in this area. It is evident from the State Department and intelligence documents that Washington knew that Moscow was very cautious about the changes in the balance of power in the south. In line with their general strategy, American decision makers considered that an excessive military build-up in Turkey would provoke the Soviet Union to take drastic measures which would potentially lead to a general war, the very eventuality that the US strategy wanted to prevent. It was also the general line of US policy that 'base system and military developments should carefully be planned to avoid miscalculation on the part of Soviet Union that the US is aggressive.' Thus balance of power

47 'Memo. From Bradley to the Secretary of Defense', annex to JCS 1704/48, 23 May 1952, RG 218, Geographical file 1952, CCS 810.5 Turkey, box 33, (1-22-51) sec.1; 'Memo. on Controlled Mining of the Turkish Straits', 5 June 1956, RG 218, Geographical file 1954-56, CCS 810.5 Turkey, box 33, (1-22-51) sec.1.

considerations determined the limits of US action in the region. The construction and use of American military facilities in Turkey can be assessed in this context, because implicit in all base arrangements between Turkey and the US was the tacit understanding that they would make no radical changes in the regional balance of power. When the publication of base arrangements was considered in late 1953, for example, the American Ambassador to Moscow, Charles Bohlen, reported to the State Department that what mattered to the Soviet Union was how these facilities were used by the US rather than the mere publication of the base arrangements. For him, the bases in close proximity to the Soviet frontiers (and this was particularly the case for those facilities on the Black Sea coast) were especially a 'matter of concern to the Soviet Government'. He thought Moscow would protest for the record these base arrangements with Turkey and use them for propaganda purposes by presenting them as examples of America's aggressive intentions. However, he believed, the Soviets would strongly object to base arrangements if they included 'operational training flights by US heavy bombers in such close proximity to Soviet frontier' because such deployment of heavy bombers would give the US a great strategic advantage. As this case clearly indicated, it was not desirable for Washington to engage in any military activities that might provoke the USSR to put pressure on Turkey and thus lead to an escalation of tension. Therefore, the Americans were careful to present their base arrangement with Turkey as a low level affair. According to the State Department officials, military programs for Turkey were kept at a 'relatively modest scale', which implied that Soviet sensitivities were taken into account. As will be analysed in the next chapter, when the deployment of IRBMs in Turkey was discussed at the highest level of the US security establishment in 1958 onwards, again the issue was assessed in view of Moscow's sensitivities to the US military activities in peripheral areas.

Another example for this point can be drawn from the US position regarding the development of the northern tier alliance, which was examined in the previous chapter. One of the main reasons for American reluctance to take the lead in the northern tier's extension was the fear that this would provoke the Soviets to act, although there were other considerations such as the nationalist Arab and Israeli opposition to the Baghdad Pact, and the cost of military buildup in the region. It was accepted that the military facilities agreement with Turkey carried with it 'a definite implication of political risk in view of Soviet sensitivities [the US] military activities in peripheral areas.'

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50 CF, 711.56382/12-2453, 'Tel. from the Embassy in Moscow to the Secretary of State', no.705.
51 It was accepted that the military facilities agreement with Turkey carried with it 'a definite implication of political risk in view of Soviet sensitivities [the US] military activities in peripheral areas.' Lot file 61 D 417, Records of State-JCS Meetings, 1951-59, box 52, Substance of Discussions, vol.5, file 1, meeting no.103', 7 May 1954.
Although US officials took the possible Soviet reaction into account, they tended to evaluate each case individually. When they thought the time was ripe in a particular place, they favoured an increase in US military activity there. Indeed, the second half of the 1950s saw the further development of US bases and facilities in Turkey, as well as a more extensive use of them by the US forces. The Nash Report, for example, was in favour of more American military activity in the country, such as the deployment in Adana base of US Air Force all-weather intercepter aircraft supported by US radar elements from time to time on a rotational basis in about squadron strength, and the deployment in the Turkish Straits of an atomic capable US Army Task Force.

These increasing US military efforts in Turkey were evaluated within the context of having more flexible forces for defense of the NATO area. They were also designed as a response to the growing military and political influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, particularly the beginnings of a Soviet naval presence, however small-scale, in the eastern Mediterranean in the mid 1950s. As a result, some actions previously not undertaken on the grounds of balance of power considerations now seemed necessary because circumstances had changed.

3. American Military Aid to Turkey

Both Turkish and American officials agreed that the improvement of Turkey’s own strength was the most salient element in the effort to deny the country’s territory to Communist forces and to guarantee the US access to the military facilities there. However, just as they differed over the size and shape of the military establishment, so

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52 Nash Report, p.174. It should be noted that in February 1957 (before the Nash Report) America decided to deploy strike aircraft, assigned to NATO and equipped with nuclear weapons, in Turkey in accord with a tactical rotation agreement. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 94. When the Turks claimed in November 1956 that the Soviets were flying over their country, Washington considered sending radar groups, intercepter squadrons as well as the SAC bombers to Turkey. The Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, again objected to the dispatch of the atomic-capable bombers because it would ‘provoke a convulsive [Soviet] reaction.’ Bohlen, Witness to History, (Weidenfield and Nicolson: London, 1973), pp.435-36. Indeed, initially only radar equipment and intercepters were sent. But the February 1957 decision, and the constraction of new and the enlargement of the existing military facilities in the late 1950s showed that Washington was determined to strengthen Western position in the long term. For more on this issues, see chapter six, pp.226-27, 244-45.

they differed too about the level of American aid. To the Turks, because their country had a strategic position in the world, and their government strongly supported American policies towards the region and firmly opposed the Soviets, they should receive ‘preferred treatment’ in aid programmes.\(^\text{54}\) As Avra Warren, Ambassador to Turkey from September 1953 to February 1956, put the Turkish view quite vividly: ‘what we have is yours’ but they ‘concurrently felt that what the United States has (in the form of credits, matériel, etc.) [sic] should be the subject of discussion by the United States with Turkey.’\(^\text{55}\) The Americans, on the other hand, thought that global assistance programmes were to be reduced in line with the administration’s cost-cutting policy and that similarly this would apply to the Turkish programmes, although consideration was to be given to the country’s special position.\(^\text{56}\)

Throughout the 1950s, the level of assistance remained a source of controversy between the US and Turkey which was best exemplified by the issue of NATO approved force goals for Turkey. The two countries agreed that NATO force level predictions, which were subject to renewal annually by NATO authorities, could be used as a benchmark in determining the level of military preparedness. Theoretically, NATO force goals were assumed to be the ideal level of defense preparedness by a NATO nation which it would obtain from its own as well as external sources. But in the case of Turkey, since the country’s own resources were not sufficient, and allies other than the US had little or no capability to help, the US was expected to meet most of the cost of improvement in its defense posture to reach these goals. In general, as will be seen, the Turks pressed for higher levels of force goals believing that it was fair to expect that the US was to help them to achieve their NATO responsibilities as a *quid pro quo* for the great political and military risks they had taken by allowing the use of their country by the American military. For the Americans, however, their


responsibility in this respect was a limited one. As will be explained in detail below, the US officials argued in principle that the exact amount of assistance should be based on some objective criteria such as availability of funds from global assistance programme and Turkey's ability to utilise the modern military material given. However, they also found the relaxation of the Turkish defence effort undesirable, therefore they felt obliged to indicate that American interest to the country's defence matters did not diminish. On the whole, Washington tried to strike a balance between principles and urgent security requirements depending on the circumstances at any given time.

The US approach to military assistance to Turkey between 1953 and 1956 was characterized in general by what can be called 'realism' on the part of the United States. By realism we mean that the Americans perceived that any increase in the Turkish defence effort should be financed mainly by their own resources and American assistance should be supplementary. In this context, it was argued that the focus of foreign aid should be on increasing the firepower of the military forces, and thus manpower reductions should be made to cover the operation and maintenance cost of modern military equipment.

The Eisenhower administration realized during its first months in the office that reaching a decision on the Turkish case was not an easy one. It was a fact at that time that Turkey required external assistance even if there was no increase in its defence effort. The Joint American Military Mission to Turkey (JAMMAT) or what is known as the 'Country Team', for example, held the view that the Turkish defence budget deficit for the year 1953 should be financed by the US government 'if there is to be no diminution in the Turkish military effort.' The Menderes government's constant demands for increased American assistance further aggravated the problem. Considering the political and military implications of the matter, Washington was

57 In addition to the high level officials in Washington, the officials of Joint American Military Mission to Turkey and American officials in NATO Headquarters at Paris, took an active part in determining American position as to aid to Turkey.

reluctant to make an early decision. It was to be dealt with through diplomatic contacts in the course of time.

The controversy over the 1952 annual review, the first planning exercise in which Turkey took part as a member of NATO, had been a test case that revealed the American approach to military assistance. The Turks wanted to create four armoured divisions, two in 1953 and two more in 1954, as an expression of what they called their 'desire to make maximum contribution to NATO defense'. It was estimated that the total cost of the proposed increase would be around $2.5 billion, which, in JAMMAT's view, could not be meet from Turkey's internal sources, and hence should be financed by the US which would mean the sixfold increase in the existing level of aid for two years. Given the size of the cost involved, they thought that the matter required a policy decision in Washington. Ambassador George McGhee outlined American position in detail in two long telegrams. First, he observed, the crux of the problem was 'the reconciliation of [Turkish] military requirements, which stem largely from their NATO responsibilities, and [their] capability to meet those requirements.' Any proposal for manpower increase, he wrote, should consider first and foremost the availability of external and internal resources. He pointed out that because of the new administration's intention to reduce the global assistance programme (as evident from its request from Congress for the 1954 fiscal year), a substantial increase in the Turkish programme was not expected. It was also a fact that Ankara's defence budget was already in deficit and the government's ability to raise internal revenue to finance additional expenditure was quite limited. In addition, the operation and maintenance cost of additional equipment would worsen foreign exchange and budgetary problems. Second, the revision of the tax policy would hinder economic development and further reduce the already low standard of living. Finally, Turkey's internal facilities, infrastructure and available trained personnel were not sufficient to raise, operate and maintain the level of forces proposed. In the Country Team's judgment, the Ambassador noted, the US assistance during the last five years did not provide Turkey

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59 NATO's work on force levels for Turkey had not been completed before April 1953. Hence the first NATO paper that contained such force levels for Turkey had been the 1953 annual review.

60 CF, 782.5/2.2453, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS’, no.1063, section one.
with such a capability. He predicted that, unless a political decision was made in
Washington to allocate more funds for Turkey, demands for increased force levels
would 'constantly be in excess of combined Turk-US ability to meet them.' Therefore,
the 'Turks would inevitably look to US', he warned, 'to cover [the] increased [costs],
which would be difficult for us to refuse once proposed new forces are created.'

For the 1953 annual review, NATO ministers agreed to the figure submitted by
Turkey, 19 10/3 divisions for Turkish Army. But taking the points put forward by
Ambassador McGhee into account, American representatives at Paris concluded that
this figure was not feasible, a view that obtained the State Department's concurrence.
As a result, they registered an American reservation about the expansion of Turkish
military on the grounds that further study was needed about the financial and
equipment implications of the proposed plan.

Regardless of American reservation, however, Turkish officials continued to press for
more American aid. For this reason, the Turkish government was repeatedly informed
by JAMMAT and Washington authorities that the proposed large-scale build-up was
not possible in the light of US foreign aid planning. The Country Team even proposed
that the present misunderstanding could be corrected if 'a clear and forceful statement'
was delivered to the Turks explaining the difference between 'NATO requirements
based on NATO objectives and National goals which actually can be achieved.'
Continuing efforts to reach an understanding culminated in the Country Team's
approval of the figure in the 1953 annual review provided that there would be no
attempt by the Turks to have additional army units. The main argument of the Country
Team was that:

the policy on future MDAP should be a continuance of the past policy of equipping the
presently activated forces within the growing capabilities of the Turk defense
establishment to absorb it. This policy does not preclude replacing present on hand

61 CF, 782.5/2.2453, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', no.1063, section one and section two;
CF, 782.5/4-853, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to the Secretary of State [SoS]', no.1233.

62 CF, 782.5/4-1153, 'Tel. from Paris to SoS', no.Polto 2020, CF, 782.5/4-953, 'Tel. from Paris to
SoS', no.Polto 1988, CF, 782.5 MSP/5-1953, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.1386.

63 RG 84, 'Tel. from Embassy in Ankara to DoS', no.1442, 28 May 1953, box 62, 320 NATO 1953-
54; 'Aide-Mémoire' from Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May
equipment with more modern equipment where increased effectiveness justifies the expenditure, but it does preclude large scale supply of additional equipment which for many reasons the Turks could not utilize nor maintain. Therefore the understanding reached did not affect the American position. The Turkish Foreign Ministry was again informed that NATO figures were for illustrative planning and represented maximum, rather than minimum, force levels to be achieved by a member nation. Turkey was expected to submit more realistic figures for the 1954 annual review.

The US administration did not give any hint until mid-1954 that the level of aid might be increased. However, with an aide-memoire presented to Premier Adnan Menderes on 4 June 1954 in Washington during his visit, the US recognized that Turkey’s defense effort placed ‘heavy strains upon its resources’, so a substantial increase in assistance was necessary. Accordingly, it was agreed to expand the presently approved assistance programme ‘by an amount to meet one-fourth of unfunded US screened requirements of the Turkish armed forces to achieve NATO goals.’

As the July 1954 aide memoire manifested, the realist approach did not amount to American indifference to Turkish defence problems. First of all, it was always understood in Washington that Turkey lacked internal resources to realise force levels approved in NATO plans, which were supported by the US as ‘an important part of that organization’s defensive strategy.’ It was also recognised that Turkey’s failure to meet its NATO commitments in terms of manpower targets, because of the shortage of necessary equipment, would be a fatal blow to its defense effort if war started in the immediate future. Secondly, the American Embassy and JAMMAT’s emphasis on the need for eschewing the Turkish government from adopting what they regarded

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65 RG 84, ‘Tel. from Embassy to DoS’ no.33, 8 July 1953, box 62, 320 NATO 1953-54; CF, 782.5 MSP/10-2053, ‘Desp. from Embassy in Ankara to the DoS’, no.229; CF, 782.5 MSP/12-2153, ‘Letter From Ambassador (Avra Warren) to Mr. Byroade, (NEA)’.
66 The appropriation for 1955 was increased from $87 million to approximately $200 million. ‘The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey’, 5 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-54:8, p.949-50.
67 CF, 782.5 MSP/10-2053, desp. no.229, as note 65; CF, 782.5 MSP/1-455, ‘Desp. from Embassy in Ankara to DoS’, no.297. It was always recognised that the defence burden was excessively heavy for the Turks to bear. See, for example, ‘Memo. of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the NSC’, 31 March 1953, FRUS, 1952-54:2/1, p.267.
‘unrealistic force goals’ was a result of their concerns that giving Turkey unrealistic expectations would lead to frustration when unrealised. Their reports did not recommend reduction of assistance but warned that a substantial amount of assistance was not possible unless a political decision was made in Washington. Otherwise, they were even in favour of increased funds ‘to permit the creation in the shortest possible time of an economic base which will support the defense establishment.’

Thirdly, the Turks, being dissatisfied with the amount of aid, would see the American position as evidence of reduced interest to Turkey’s security, which would in time lead the Turks towards neutrality. Given increasing American military requirements in the Middle East and the growing Turkish role for the attainment of the northern tier concept, which was discussed in the previous chapter, Ankara’s neutrality was particularly undesirable. All of these points were reiterated in a memorandum presented to the Secretary of State to explain the reason why the US should help to resolve Turkey’s military and economic problems:

the US would have to keep in mind our commitments to Turkish defense build-up, our acceptance of NATO force goals, unilateral Turkish commitments to the US, our encouragement of Turkey to assume leadership in the Balkans and the Near East, and efforts made by Turkey to become independent of aid.

It became clear in 1955 that the July 1954 document intended to galvanize cooperation with Turkey rather than to express long-term American commitment to a Turkish military build-up. At a time when antagonism between the Eastern and Western blocs had relatively subsided with the so called Geneva spirit, it was easier than before to adopt a rather realist approach, as did NSC 5510/1, the first full policy paper on Turkey prepared by the Eisenhower administration. At the NSC meeting in which the paper was discussed, the President himself favoured the strengthening of the Turkish armed forces rather than creating additional US divisions assigned to the region. He did however reject the view put forward by Harold Stassen, Director of the Foreign Assistance Administration, who drafted the July 1954 document, that the US had made a firm commitment to Prime Minister Menderes. Instead, he tended to

68 ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, 17 June 1953, Lot files 53 D 468, Records of George McGhee 1945-53, box 8, Memoranda; CF, 782.5 MSP/12-2153, Deps. no.297, as note 67.
69 CF, 782.5 MSP/ 10-2053, desp.no.229, as note 65.
support the views that the aid programme for Turkey should be within limited sources available for worldwide assistance programme and 'the Turks were trying to move ahead too rapidly ... in modernizing their armed forces.' He also agreed with the view that the July 1954 commitment was made before necessary consultations with other related departments had been made.\(^7\) The document agreed at this meeting, noted that three factors should be taken into account in determining the amount of mutual security funding and equipment to Turkey: (a) US global military commitments; (b) the extent of the ability of the Turkish armed forces to absorb increased military assistance; and, (c) the ability of the Turkish economy to support the increased costs of a modernized army.\(^7\) The NSC also decided that to determine the exact figure, high level missions were to be sent to Turkey.

In line with the new policy statement's decisions, American officials informed their Turkish counterparts that the US had no obligation to underwrite the cost of bringing Turkish armed forces to NATO standards. In this context, they dismissed the Turkish view that the US committed itself in July 1954 to a four-year programme, estimated to cost $200 million per year, for the modernization of the army. According to the Defense Department, for example, such a scheme was militarily unfeasible because Turkey could not effectively operate a modernized army equipped with the additional material it would obtain. The dominant view within the administration was that the Turks should be persuaded to take necessary measures to improve their economy before a comprehensive modernization of their armed forces in order to create extra resources to support such a modernization.\(^7\) Again when the Prochnow Committee (an inter-departmental committee surveying Turkey's military problems) predicted in a report, dated May 1956, to the NSC that a five-year modernization programme might cost around $2 billion, the Council was reluctant make a decision about it. In the very meeting the issue was discussed, the President reminded the Council members that

\(^7^1\) *CF, 782.5 MSP/2-2555, 'Memo. from Baxter (GTI) to Allen (NEA)'; FRUS, 1955-57:24, p.608, editorial note; 'Memo.of Discussion at the 238th meeting of NSC' 24 Feb.1955, ibid., p.614.


\(^7^3\) 'Memo. of Conversation', 18 May 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.632-37; 'Memo. of Discussion at the 285th meeting of the NSC', 17 May 1956, ibid., p.681. From the early 1955 to the late 1956, international tensions subsided considerably. At that time, the US priority had been to strengthen periphery economically rather than militarily.
Turkey was only one of many claimants on the United States. All in all, the Washington authorities concluded that as long as the Turks lacked the capability to support a modern military establishment, the US contribution would remain limited. However, it should be noted that the American position only meant the refusal of the demands above current programmes, which were approximately $190 million annually in 1955 and 1956. There was no intention in Washington to make cuts in them lest the Turks cease co-operation and embrace neutralism.

In the period between 1957 and 1960 realism continued to mark the American approach in determining the level of military aid. But the revision of US policy towards Turkey by the NSC from late 1956, which produced NSC 5708/2 in July 1957, added two new elements to the American approach. First, the introduction of certain advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces was adopted as an objective. Second, it was recognised by the Council that the US should have an illustrative programme for the further build-up and the maintenance of Turkish forces totaling $780 million for the four year period starting in 1957. The Department of Defense proposed that from this amount $187 million could be allocated for advance weapons (such as F-100 aircraft, and Honest John, Nike and Corporal short-range missile systems for deployment in the Straits), and the rest could go to the modernization conventional equipment, spares, ammunition and consumables.

The change of attitude by US policy makers can be accounted for by several reasons. The immediate one was the resentment of the Turkish leaders over the way the Americans treated the military aid issue, which was expected to grow even more after such incidents as the alleged flights of Soviet aircraft over Turkey during the Suez crisis which exposed the country’s vulnerability. It was thought that refusal of Turkish requests would be seen as evidence of diminishing US interest in Turkey’s security, which would have severe implications in the relations between the two countries. It

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74 Memo of Discussion at the 285th meeting of the NSC, 17 May 1956, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.682-83.
75 Memo of Conversation, Department of State, 18 May 1955, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.634-45. Also see, CF, 782.5 MSP/10-856, 'Desp. from Embassy in Ankara to DoS' no.206.
76 Dept of Defense Comments on NSC 5708/2, undated, RG 273, Records of the NSC, NSC 5708 series, box 44.
was this reason that prompted Ambassador Fletcher Warren, who arrived in Ankara in March 1956, to warn Washington in April 1957 that constant refusal of such demands would lead to 'deterioration in relations to the point where the US will not be able to obtain what it wants from Turkey when it wants it.' He particularly drew attention to the possibility that Turks would begin 'placing a price tag' on the facilities that they offered to the US. The approach of the new policy paper was expected to help to ease the problem. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, for example, pointed out that the provision of advanced weapons to Turkey might help to 'remove the feeling of disappointment' held by the Turks regarding US military assistance. Secondly, as will be seen in chapter six, the US became more fully involved in Middle Eastern politics with the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine in January 1957. For its implementation, Turkey's political support and the access of US forces to the country's military facilities were regarded as crucial. Thirdly, as a part of NATO's overall defense policy, the US saw it in its interest to provide Turkey with those advanced weapons deemed to be essential to accomplish NATO missions. Finally, the findings of the Prochnow Committee found that Turkey could not reach, for the foreseeable future, a capacity to substantially reduce its dependence on foreign assistance. Therefore, a reasonable amount of assistance was necessary in order for Turkey to fulfill her basic tasks.

The approach adopted by NSC 5708/2 did not, however, alter the realist characteristic of the American policy. First, Washington continued to believe that the Turks requested so much material that they could not even meet their running costs. Therefore, it was agreed in principle that the Turks should be discouraged from demanding unrealistic force levels which current level of US assistance and their own

77 'Memo. from Jones (GTI) to Rountree (Assistant SOS for NEA), 12 April 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.716-17.
78 'Memo. of Conversation with the President', 26 July 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.731-32.
80 'Memo. of Conversation with the President', 26 July 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.731-32.

Another example for this can be drawn from the discussion of NSC 6015 before the NSC. Paragraph 42 of the proposed paper implied that any US military assistance which Turkey itself could not support should not be given. The State Department feared that this provision would lead to excessive reduction of assistance. The NSC then agreed that this paragraph was to be corrected, but the Turkish force levels should be under constant scrutiny of the JCS. 'Memo. of the discussion at the 461st meeting of the NSC', 29 Sep.1960, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, pp.886-87.
resources could not support. Second, the US sought a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey through the integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces. For US decision makers, the provision of modern weapons represented a compromise between the need to prepare Turkish armed forces for its NATO tasks and the US willingness to pay the costs. A letter from President Eisenhower to General Norstad, which explained the rationale for reductions, made it clear that the general philosophy that applied to all US military assistance programs was also valid for Turkey. The letter emphasised that development of an American flexible nuclear capability and provision of advanced weapons enabled the allies to develop ‘smaller yet more powerful forces’ to enhance collective security. Similarly, the letter argued, ‘Turkey has reaped significant benefits in terms of the overall security provided by NATO, modernization under our military assistance efforts, and protection offered by the growing United States nuclear retaliatory power’. Indeed, as a result of American initiative, a NATO plan called MC-70, Minimum Essential Force Requirements Plan for the Period 1958-1963, included reductions in force levels for Turkey. Third, Washington refused to finance any defence effort that the US strategic concepts did not specifically identify, even if they were consistent with general policy. For example, Turkey pressed for additional naval vessels to implement a forward strategy in the Black Sea and equipment to deploy a mobile corps of two divisions supported by an armoured brigade and three squadrons of aircraft in southern Turkey. US officials thought that there was no need for such forces, so they recommended Ankara to concentrate its limited resources on achieving MC-70

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83 MC-70 envisaged 16 8/3 army divisions, 65 naval combat vessels and 20 squadrons combat and support aircraft, a reduction of four divisions and one squadron aircraft from the previous force levels. These figures however indicated a more apparent rather than real reductions. In 1958, Turkey had 18 8/3 divisions in total but they were below strength. Therefore, substruction of four divisions represented in reality a reduction of some 500 men. Numbers of naval vessels and aircraft were already below the MC-70 requirements. ‘OCB Report on Turkey, 12 Nov.1958, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2: pp.769-71; ‘Memo of Discussions at the 430th meeting of the NSC’, 7 Jan.1960, ibid., p.829.
requirements rather than creating supplementary forces. The American policy continued along these lines until the end of 1960.

4. The Politico-Strategic Aspects of American Economic Aid to Turkey

An improvement in the economic situation of the non-communist world was one of the long-term objectives of American strategy in the cold war era. Since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine, the Americans had acknowledged that the burden of military effort put serious strains on the Turkish economy and that there was a gap between Turkey and Western Europe in terms of economic development which should be bridged in the interests of Turkey and the United States.

From two perspectives the economic capabilities of Turkey were related to US security objectives. First, as mentioned above, Washington accepted its responsibility to help Ankara to improve its armed forces to the level envisaged by NATO plans. But it was a fact that almost all financial costs of any increase in the Turkish military effort, from military end-items to maintenance costs and the military budget deficit, were to be paid by the US due to Turkey’s lack of economic base to support them. Unless Turkey’s economic capabilities improved, it was thought, increase in military aid would harm its economy because of the additional maintenance and operational costs involved.

Second, there was a need for a functioning economy in the country to meet the basic needs of the people. Economic crises would not only cause internal disorder but also make it more susceptible to Soviet bloc economic blandishments which in turn might potentially affect its external orientation.

The Menderes government achieved rapid economic growth between 1950 and 1953, particularly in the field of agriculture, thanks to mechanization and a succession of good crop years. To stimulate growth, its economic programme included high subsidies for agriculture and politically motivated industrial investments, both of which increased domestic demand substantially. The Turkish economy could not meet this

demand and the gap was filled by imports. Crop failure in 1954 and 1955 deprived the country of its main source of foreign currency, the export of agricultural products, which in turn aggravated economic problems. As a result, by mid the 1950s the deterioration of the foreign exchange position reached a point where at times Turkey could not import essential goods such as petroleum products.85

For most of the 1950s the two countries took quite separate position over Turkey’s economic problems. For Americans, the Turkish economy was developing at a faster rate than it could be financed without inflation. Turkish leaders had to understand that ‘development through inflationary means retards overall expansion of production, diverts resources to uneconomic and less essential uses’. It was particularly important that government investments and agricultural subsidies should be reduced to reasonable levels, and currency should be devaluated in order to increase the competitiveness of Turkish export goods.86 The Turkish government, on the other hand, believed that the economic problems were temporary setbacks and could be overcome by additional American aid. In particular, Prime Minister Menderes refused to conclude that there was significant inflation in Turkey and claimed that the reason for economic problems was crop failure.87 In addition, there had always been in the background in all Turkish aid requests that the US should extend extra assistance given the high cost of Turkey’s military effort and the country’s political and military importance for the West. However, the American view prevailed when Washington turned down in July 1955 a Turkish demand of $300 million economic aid on the grounds that it was not based on economic reforms, which, in America’s view, were the sine qua non for justifying a long-term programme.88 In 1956 and 1957, Americans tried to influence Turkish leaders to take economic austerity measures, or, what

85 See Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.71-72; ‘Letter from the President’s Special Consultant (Randal) to the Sec. of Treasury (Humphery) and Under SoS (Hoover)’, 17 April 1956, FRUS, 1955-57:24, pp.675-76.


became a catchword among American officials, 'to put their economic house in order.'\(^9\) But the Turkish government was particularly reluctant to recognize the need for devaluation. As a result, it was considered in Washington that Turkey's failure to take at least some steps in the direction of economic reform would reduce its value as an ally of the United States.\(^{90}\) In March 1957, the NSC decided that Ankara should be let know that 'the entire US assistance program ... is based on the assumption that Turkey will make progress toward economic stabilization and a realistic rate of exchange'. The new policy paper, NSC 5708/2, included the US premise to provide Turkey with a special supplementary aid and then assist it to maintain its economic development at a reasonable rate.\(^{91}\) In the face of a deteriorating economic situation, the Turkish government had no choice but to agree with the American terms by accepting a $359 million economic stabilization plan proposed by the IMF (mainly sponsored by the US), in August 1958.

It is difficult to argue that economic considerations always determined the US approach. The American administration often came forward to provide essential assistance to keep the Turkish economy afloat\(^{92}\) even if the course recommended by the US, and the IMF for that matter, was not exactly followed by the Turkish government.\(^{93}\) In extending such supplementary assistance, the effects of economic crisis on Turkey's internal stability (which will be explained in the next section) and on external orientation were particularly taken into account. The latter merits examination in some detail.

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\(^{90}\) In the NSC meeting of 14 March 1957, some members expressed their scepticism regarding Turkish intentions by pointing out that Ankara, after indicating to the IMF its intention to devalue, obtained $25 million to help in cushioning the impact of devaluation but the government shortly thereafter reversed its position (July 1956). Lot file 62 D 430, Records Relating to State Dep. Participation in the OCB and NSC: 1947-63 (hereafter Lot file 62 D 430), 'Memo. from Rountree (NEA) to Under SoS', 18 Oct. 1957, box 33, OCB file: Turkey.


\(^{92}\) Harris, \textit{Troubled Alliance}, p.73.

\(^{93}\) For example, $30 million economic emergency aid was given in June 1955 and NSC 5708/2 recommended up to $100 million economic aid even if Turkey failed to take necessary measures. \textit{FRUS, 1955-57:24}, pp.649 and 726 respectively.
American policy had paid particular attention to the Soviet economic relations with the non-communist world following the thaw in East-West relations in 1955. NSC 5501, for example, predicted that serious disagreement might emerge in relations between the US and its major allies in the years ahead, two of the principle causes of which were 'growing fears of atomic war on the part of the allies' and 'greater receptivity by the allies to Soviet overtures.' US officials believed that Turkey's anti-communist posture and its strategic position made it one of the main target countries for, what they called, the Soviet 'peace offensive', and therefore they were apprehensive about further development of its economic relations with the Soviet bloc, which potentially would cause some relaxation in its strong anti-communist position.94

In the mid-1950s a new tendency emerged in Turkish-Soviet relations. Soon after Stalin's death, Moscow attempted to normalize its relations with Ankara first by renouncing its claims over parts of Turkey. Particularly due to Turkey's close relations with the West, this initiative did not produce any tangible results. On December 28, 1955, however, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchew admitted in the course of his speech to the Supreme Soviet Council in Moscow that some mistakes on the part of the Soviet Union contributed to the present unfavourable state of Turkish-Soviet relations. On the same day the Charge of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara told Turkish officials about the possible benefits of Turkey's 'demonstration of greater friendliness' towards the Soviet Union. Among other points, referring to Turkey's financial difficulties, he said, 'the Soviet Union could help Turkey on terms which no other country in the world could or would offer. There would be no strings attached, no conditions and no interference in Turkish affairs.' Ankara described the Soviet offer as a positive development but also emphasised that an improvement of bilateral relations was out of the question except in the context of a general improvement in East-West relations.95

95 CF, 661.82/1-1256, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS: Turkish Soviet Relations', no.304; CF, 661.82/3-2656, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', no. 459.
Between 1956 and 1960, Turkish-Soviet relations were interrupted by recurrent crises in the region, such as the Suez crisis of 1956, the Turkish-Syrian dispute of September 1957, and the Lebanon crisis of July 1958. The American evaluation of Turkish-Soviet relations also followed these ups and downs. At times of political tranquillity, they paid more attention to the possible implications of economic relations between the two countries. In the period from Khruschev’s speech to the Suez crisis, in the face of Turkey’s economic problems (particularly foreign exchange problems and the refusal of Turkey’s $300 million economic aid request), American officials thought that the Turks would ‘turn increasingly to barter deals with the Soviet bloc.’ Taking advantage of the plight of the Turkish economy, it was observed, the Soviet bloc had intensified their efforts to expand into Turkish markets. Indeed, trade with the Soviet bloc had increased significantly since 1950, and in 1958 accounted for 20 to 25 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade, as compared to eight percent in 1950. All assessments in Washington pointed out that unless the US IMF reform programme was implemented, the pressure for trade with the bloc could increase. It was believed at that time that the Menderes government could not be moved by the Soviet persuasion. However, it was worrying that because the Soviet offers of commercial credits were very attractive, public opinion would come to the conclusion that the improvement of relations with Moscow would help Turkey to overcome its present economic difficulties.

It was in this setting that commercial contacts between the two countries, such as the contract signed in July 1957 for the construction of caustic soda and glass factories in Turkey (the US turned down previous Turkish requests to finance them), were noted by Ambassador Warren as symptoms of ‘a new political orientation’. The Menderes government was, in the Ambassador’s words, ‘indicating that the Turk-United States honeymoon [was] over and it [was] not impossible for Turkey to find elsewhere its political and economic requirements.’ His chiefs in the State Department, however,

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97 'Turkey as an Ally', 21 Feb.1956, EL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, box 56, OCB 091 Turkey (2-21-56); ‘Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Turkey and Recommended Action’, 7 June 1956, EL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers 1948-61, box 56, OCB 091 Turkey 2 (5) (6-7-56). Another document stated that offer of economic and financial aid might influence Turkish public opinion and cause the Turkish government some difficulty. CF, 661.82/1-1256, Desp.no.304, as note 95.

98 CF, 611-82/8-257, 'Desp.from Embassy in Turkey to the DoS: Is This a Slight Case of Anti-Americanism', no 64. The Ambassador believed that this departure from Turkey’s consistent policy in the past might be attributed to the interference of Fatin R.Zorlu, then the Minister of State.
thought that the recent developments could be seen, in the absence of more significant evidence, as ‘superficial tactical shifts designed primarily to increase Turkey’s bargaining power with the United States.’ For them the Menderes government’s commitment to an ambitious economic development programme forced it ‘to accept almost any offer that will provide needed capital and equipment.’

After Turkey’s adoption of the August 1958 stabilization programme, the Americans again grew in confidence. Since Turkey’s anti-Soviet policies enjoyed widespread public support, there was little likelihood that Soviet economic gestures would seriously affect the country’s western orientation. This conviction was further reinforced by the fact that the Eastern bloc’s share in Turkey’s trade fell dramatically after August 1958. Yet there were reasons to remain vigilant. Moscow, through propaganda which emphasized the benefits of broader economic relations with the Soviet bloc, could provoke doubts among leaders and the educated elite about the value of economic co-operation with the West. Following the military coup in Turkey in May 1960, Soviet offers of extensive economic assistance were seen as an attempt ‘to become a factor in Turkish economic life’. But the Americans soon discovered that the new regime was reluctant to enter into close economic relations with the Soviet bloc and therefore its limited economic contacts with the bloc countries would not have any considerable effect on Turkey’s co-operation with the West.

Nevertheless, policy papers of that time continued to emphasise the need for discouraging Turkey from accepting large Soviet loans or engaging in trade with them at levels which would create economic dependency on the Soviet bloc.

99 'Memo, from the Secretary’s Special Assistant for Intelligence to the SoS', FRUS, 1955-57:24, p.733.
100 ‘National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): NIE 33-58’, 30 Dec. 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.785. Until November 1959, the share of trade with the bloc had fallen from 23 percent in the previous year to 13 percent ($48.4 million).
5. Turkey's Internal Stability

It was one of the general characteristics of US foreign policy to foster political stability in non-communist countries, considering that it was a precondition for 'maximum freedom from external threat and maximum opportunity for internal growth.'\textsuperscript{105} In the case of Turkey, American authorities identified three situations that would potentially upset the country's internal stability and affect its external political orientation.

First, it was pointed out that the most severe internal problems for Turkey in the 1950s were economic ones.\textsuperscript{106} Like their effects on Turkey's external relations, the possible effects of economic problems on internal stability were given serious consideration in Washington. Economic aid was extended to relieve the urgent needs of the country as well as economic development with a view to help internal stability. Emergency economic aid was particularly important during such critical times as early August 1958 when the spectre of change in government in a violent fashion was raised within Turkey soon after the revolution in Iraq.\textsuperscript{107} For economic development, it was noted that the inevitable changes the development engendered in the traditional structure of less-developed countries would cause internal stability because of social mobility and the increasing demands of people from their governments. It was exactly this phenomenon that Turkey experienced when its economy failed to meet the demand stimulated by the economic growth of the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{108} The deteriorating economic situation, which had largely grown out of the shortage of some imported commodities, caused a government crisis in December 1955 following severe criticism by the dissidents in the governing party. At that time, the opposition was too weak to capitalize on the situation.\textsuperscript{109} However, after the September 1957 elections, which returned the governing Democratic Party (DP) to office with a considerably reduced majority, economic problems fuelled the antagonism between the government and the

\textsuperscript{105} 'Report: Programming and Evaluating military and Economic Aid', 17 Aug. 1959, p. 7, EL, Records of the Draper Committee, box 17, the Research Task Ahead (1).
\textsuperscript{107} According to the Embassy’s observation, such danger was not imminent but economic aid would help to reduce the temperature. \textit{CF}, 782.00/81358, 'Desp. from Embassy in Ankara DoS, no. 111'.
\textsuperscript{108} 'NIE Estimate: Turkey as An Ally', 21 Feb. 1956, as note 97.
\textsuperscript{109} RG 84, 'Desp. from Embassy to DoS no.277', as note 88.
opposition, leading to the destabilisation of Turkey in the late 1950s. As noted earlier, to eradicate the economic causes of instability the US administration encouraged the Menderes government to slow down economic growth and adopt austerity measures as proposed by the IMF. Until such measures were agreed, Ankara’s demands for long-term aid were rejected. When the IMF proposals were endorsed on August 17, 1958, the US provided the bulk of the $359 million aid package to help their implementation. The programme scored some success in rehabilitating the economy by early 1960 although the problems in servicing short-term debt continued. According to US officials, economic problems were not the principle cause of internal strife, which intensified in early 1960.110

The second source of instability was subversive activities by communist groups. Although the US regarded communist subversion as a serious security threat in many underdeveloped countries, it was thought that this was not the case in Turkey. An intelligence document made it clear, for example, that ‘Communist subversion in the orthodox sense of seeking to overthrow a system of government in order to install a new system, does not appear to be a significant problem in Turkey.’ Washington observed that the government and opposition parties were all fully aware of the communist threat. So, even if the present government was replaced by the opposition, the possibility of a change in policy towards communism was remote.111

The last source of instability was the growing antagonism between the government and main opposition party, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) of former President Ismet Inonu,112 which culminated in the military coup of May 1960. Considering that internal


112 Although the two parties agreed over the principles of Kemalism and the Western orientation of foreign policy (see chapter one, the section on Turkish foreign policy), they adopted different social and economic policies. The DP gave priority to the liberalization of economy, to the production of agricultural goods and to a liberal application of the principle of secularism. These policies received support from entrepreneurs, merchants, large land owners, and peasants (formed around 70% of the electorate in the fifties). The RPP, on the other hand, was seen as the representative of ‘an ideology which seemed to emphasize government control and regulation’ and advocated more strict application of secularism. As such it had more support among the intelligentsia, and civil and military bureaucracy than the governing party. These groups opposed strongly the restrictions
stability was essential in order for Turkey to continue its present role in the anti-communist bloc, American policy-makers constantly observed developments and tried to find out what was the best for US interests in the circumstances.

In the period between the announcement of the economic stabilization programme in August 1958 and the intensification of internal strife in April 1960, US policy had been to show impartiality in Turkey’s internal matters.113 Three factors helped US officials to be flexible in their approach. First, they were aware of the fact that the chance of the opposition coming to power in the next election, due in late 1961, was growing, given the incumbent government’s inability to solve the outstanding problems of the country. Second, they did not approve, at least in principle, such strong measures taken by the Menderes government as restrictions on parliamentary discussions, freedom of assembly and press with a view that, in the event of further restrictions, the opposition might resort to covert activity. An Operations Coordination Board report, for example, recommended in November 1958 that the ‘US feeling that a strong democratic process should be permitted to develop in Turkey should be conveyed to the leading Turkish officials by the Embassy officials at suitable occasions.’114

The third factor was the realisation that the RPP would be as co-operative with the West in major security issues as the incumbent government was. This does not mean that American officials were unaware of the fact that the opposition was critical of American policies. But the Embassy in Ankara observed that the RPP’s views were increasingly sliding towards favouring a close association with the West. On the RPP criticisms over the American use of the Adana base in the Lebanon operation, for

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113 As Harris noted, the US failed to remain impartial according to the majority view within the opposition, but, as will be explained, it is difficult to claim that Washington visibly favoured the Menderes government. For the opposition view, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.81-82.
example, the Ambassador commented, following his recent contacts with the senior opposition representatives, that 'had RPP been in control of [the government] as DP now is, RPP would probably have acted as did Menderes regime.' 115 Inonu’s criticism of Turkey’s relations with the Arab world was also seen as a ‘reflection of classic Kemalist principles’, rather than ‘something approaching neutralism’. At the highest levels of the US administration, it was known that Inonu’s main criticism was based on the argument that ‘Turkey is not getting as great a quid pro quo from the United States under Menderes as it should be receiving.‘ 116

When the internal struggle intensified in Turkey on April 19, 1960, following the establishment of a parliamentary committee to investigate alleged subversive activities by the RPP, both parties sought American support for their cause. The government side thought that the US administration would support their party as the opposition adopted neutralism in foreign policy. The RPP, on the other hand, requested the termination of American aid to Turkey until the Menderes regime stepped down, because they thought that aid was used for partisan purposes. 117 The US tried to avoid involvement with either side of this controversy, although it closely observed the situation. On the one hand, American concerns about the suppression of opposition political activities were expressed to government officials by the Embassy staff. 118 On the other hand, the opposition leaders were assured that the US was siding with neither party in this conflict. 119 The main American fear was the possibility of a protracted

115 'Memo from Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the President', 22 Jan. 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.790; CF, 682.00/3-1858, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS' no.591; CF, 782.00/7-2958, 'Tel. from Embassy to DoS' no.424; and CF, 782.00/8-1858, 'Memo from Jones (GTI) to Mr. Berry (NEA)'.

116 CF, 782.00/8-1858, 'Memo from Jones (GTI) to Mr. Berry (NEA); 'Memo from Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the President', 22 Jan. 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.790; CF, 682.00/2-2960, 'Tel. From Embassy to SoS', no.1894.

117 'Memo, from Hart to Hare', 26 April 1960, Lot file, NEA, GTI, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, box 3, GTI-conference file.

118 CF, 611.82/4-3060, 'Tel. from Embassazy in Ankara to DoS', no.2386, section two; 782.00/4-2360, 'Tel. from Embassy in Ankara to DoS', no.2313, section 1. The Department of State had given Ambassador Warren full credit in his dealing with the issue. Secretary Herter, for example, praised him for his ‘excellent personal relations with the leading personalities of Turkey’ and the OCB found it appropriate to take action about the Turkish situation when and if he recommended that ‘it would be likely to be productive.’ CF, 611.82/1-1860, 'Letter from Herter to Warren; and 'Memo from Hart to Hare', 26 April 1960, as note 117.

119 According to Robert Barnes, Counselor of Embassy, Warren told Inonu in private that 'the US did not take sides in the internal political affairs of Turkey and that ... did not support either political party.' 'Memo. of Conversation [between Barnes and Metin Toker (Inonu's san-in-law)]', 25 April
internal conflict with the 'RPP going underground and promoting civil disobedience'. It was also feared that the 'frustration of unsatisfied elements which now [identified the] US with [the] DP might in [the] event of [a] future uprising turn against [the] US.' The benefit of avoiding any action implying involvement by the US would be to assure that the 'US relations with the present Administration or a new successor government will not be jeopardized.' The evaluation of the situation by the administration along these lines seems quite prudent when it was understood in the context that at that time the CIA estimates gave the Menderes government 'about a 50-50 chance of surviving.' Indeed, a small band of mostly middle ranking officers, enjoying wide support within the military establishment, seized power in the name of national unity on May 27.

By looking at US relations with the military regime at the beginning, one can judge that the Americans were not worried about the military takeover because it recreated a semblance of stability in Turkey. A major reason for US contentment was the military junta's announcement that Turkey would fulfill all international commitments, especially those to NATO and CENTO. One week after the coup, the Americans were convinced that the junta, or the so-called Committee of National Union (CNU), did not intend to change foreign policy. As the new regime consolidated its position in the following months, it became more evident that it wanted to co-operate strongly with the West. The net assessment of the post-revolution period from the US perspective

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1960, Rec. of the Turkish Affairs Desk, box 3, GTI-conference. For Department's view, see 'Tel. from DoS to the SoS Herter, at Istanbul', 1 May 1960, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.835.

120 CF, 611-82/ 4-3060, 'Tel. from Embassy in Ankara to DoS', no.2386, section two.

121 'Memo. from O'Connor to Jones:Minutes of the OCB Meeting of 5 May 1960', 12 May 1960, Lot file, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, box 1, Turkey-1960: OCB file. In other words, the objective was to make sure the 'future operations [of the] US missions in Turkey as well as US access to Turkish facilities.' 'Tel. from DoS to SoS, at Istanbul', 1 May 1960, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.835.

122 'Memo. from MacDonald to Rivinus: Board Meeting of May 25, 1960', 26 May 1960, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, box 1, Turkey-1960: OCB file.

123 Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.82-83.

124 'Memorandum of Discussion at the 446th Meeting (31 May 1960) and at the 447th meeting (8 June 1960) of the NSC', FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, editorial note, pp.848-49. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.86.
was that the change of government did 'not damage the fundamental unity of view which [had] increasingly existed between the two countries over the last few years.'

The period of transition, however, did not pass without problems. It was thought that the Army's involvement in politics would be destabilising in the long run, and in the short term there was economic stagnation and a general lack of confidence in the new regime. It was also worrying that Ankara adopted authoritarian methods such as the ban on the political activities of the DP, the harsh treatment of its leaders and pressure on the press to report favourably about the new regime. The most important problem in terms of US-Turkish relations, however, was the struggle for power among the CNU members. Some younger members in particular were suspicious of the US relations with the DP government in the past and critical of American military activities in Turkey. In addition, the argument that the policy of neutrality would enable Turkey to benefit from both Eastern and Western blocs, particularly in terms of economic aid, received wider support both within the CNU and among the people of political influence within the country. The US administration supported moderate elements who wanted the continuity of close relations with the West.

In the view of the American authorities, in order to perpetuate a pro-Western foreign policy, the Head of State, General Cemal Gursel, and the Foreign Minister, Selim Sarper, a career diplomat, should be supported in every possible way. This support was given principally in two ways. The first was extending assistance for the immediate financial needs of the new government as in the case of $5.8 million for the payment of government employee's salaries one week after the coup. The second way was the

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125 CF, 661.82/1-1661, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', no.378.
127 As Harris noted, one of them, Captain Orhan Erkanli, even declared that 'Turkey became an American colony.' Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.87.
128 'Office Memo.:Trend of US-Turkish Relations', 22 Nov.1960, Records of Turkish Affairs Desk, box 3, Grand National Assembly.
129 CF, 782.00/6-1060, 'Tel.from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.2903.
130 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to the DoS', FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.848.
declaration of political support for the policies of the new regime as in the case of President Eisenhower's message to General Gursel on June 11, 1960. The real intention of the message was to help Foreign Minister Sarper to maintain his position vis-à-vis the cabinet and the CNU members. According to Sarper, Ambassador Warren reported from Ankara on June 6, he was assigned by Gursel to deal with the Soviet proposals for political dialogue and economic assistance. He was 'determined [to] hold [the] usual Turkish position with [the] USSR', but he felt that he needed a clear statement of Turkish-American solidarity to maintain his position successfully.131

In the following months, the State Department and the Embassy tried carefully to influence developments in a way to discourage the tendency among the CNU members towards establishing closer relations with the Soviet Union.132 When the power struggle within the CNU terminated in favour of moderate elements in September 1960, the military regime made its preference clearly in favour of maintaining strong ties with the West.133 This satisfied Washington enough to further develop relations with Ankara. The revised policy paper towards Turkey (NSC 6015/1), approved on October 5, indicated that close relations with the military regime similar to those relations with the Menderes government had been established. The only difference was that the Americans felt themselves obliged to make some adjustments relating to the use of military facilities in Turkey as a response to sensitivities to this issue within the new Turkish administration.134

6. Conclusion

Turkey and the US were partners in an effort to achieve what Washington regarded as the 'primary common objective', that is 'security against the threat of [the Soviet

131 CF, 661-82/6-660, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS, no.2863', the section one and two; for the text the President's letter to Gursel, dated 11 June 1960, see FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.850.
132 'Letter from Warren to Jones', 11 Aug. 1960, as note 126, quotations are from pp.873 and 877; CF, 782.00/8-1660, 'Memo. from INR Howard Elting to the Acting Secretary'; 661.82/8-360, 'Tel from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.207.
134 'NSC 6015/1', FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, see especially para 4, p.889; 'Office Memo Trend of US-Turkish Relations', 22 Nov. 1960, as note 128; Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.88.
Union] in every form. The American evaluation of threat paid special attention to the advantages that its geographical position gave the Soviet bloc. Seen from this perspective, the political and military contribution that Turkey could make to the common defense was very significant due to its strategic position on the periphery of the Soviet bloc.

Turkey's contribution to the common defence was manifested first and foremost through its participation in the NATO defense effort. In a general war fought with atomic weapons, the kind of role the country could play was not very clear, but would include the use of military facilities by the SAC. The NATO decision to station atomic weapons in Turkey, with which we will deal in the next chapter, showed that Turkey could make a contribution to American atomic deterrence as well. In terms of conventional defence (both in general and limited war situations), Turkey occupied an important position in NATO's forward defense strategy. Increasing acknowledgement of the need for limited war capabilities, especially in peripheral areas, heightened this importance. In this context, the importance of the country for the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern defence was emphasized by civilian as well as military authorities in Washington. In particular, attention was paid to the defensive dimension of Turkey's contribution to the common defence, that is the continuing access of allied powers to its territory and the denial of it to the access of the enemy. Turkey's territory provided a forward defensive position for NATO, controlled exits of the Black Sea and served as an important barrier to a Soviet advance against the Middle East.

Although Washington reaped great benefits from military co-operation with Ankara, the maximum use of Turkish facilities for the attainment of American security objectives was not contemplated. This was simply because of the fear that American military activities in Turkey, if it reached sufficient magnitude to upset the regional balance, would provoke Moscow to take countermeasures. Forcing the Soviet Union

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135 CF, 782.00/10-1855, 'Briefing Paper on Turkey', enclosure to Desp.from Embassy in Turkey to DoS', no.153.

136 The role Turkey played in development of Middle East defence arrangements was another manifestation of Turkey's contribution to the common defence effort.
to do that was considered to be self-defeating. But the US did not shrink from taking the opportunity of changing circumstances to increase its military activity there.

American policy-makers acknowledged that there was a correlation between the degree of Turkey's co-operation with the West and its defence posture, economic position and political stability. It was thought that an economically, politically and militarily strong, rather than weak, Turkey would prefer to remain allied with the West and perform the tasks expected from her. The extent of economic and military assistance, however, became a source recurrent disagreement between the two countries in the 1950s. From the Turkish perspective, they were equal partners in the struggle against common enemy, so they should share the burden of common defense. They believed that Ankara took very high risks by letting the US military presence in the country and made great economic sacrifices for common defence. In return, they thought that Turkey should get rewards in the form of more American military and economic assistance. On the other hand, Americans rejected, as a matter of principle, the argument that they should underwrite all costs of the modernization of Turkey's military because of the country's strategic importance. Strategic imperatives, however, continued to be one of the principle factors in determining the volume and timing of the US assistance. The economic dimension of US-Turkish security relations was mainly designed to create an economic base which could support an increasing defence effort. The US administration dissuaded the Menderes government from pursuing a rapid development policy which increased its dependence on external finance, and encouraged it to take economic austerity measures once the economic situation deteriorated in the mid 1950s. The US also tried to eliminate possible effects of trade with the Soviet bloc on Turkey's external orientation. The evidence shows that US officials firmly believed that Ankara would not abandon its pro-western policy, but they never discounted the possibility that it could reach an accommodation with the Soviet bloc and, as a result, become less co-operative with the West.

Internal stability was another US objective in its security relations with Turkey. First of all, American policy-makers knew that the continuity of the Turkish government's firm anti-Soviet policy required the continuity of popular support for the government's
policies. This in turn was closely related to Turkey's obtaining its basic economic and security needs from the West. Therefore, economic and military assistance were seen as a means of supporting the country's foreign stance through strengthening its internal stability. Secondly, they criticized restrictions on basic freedoms and urged both the Menderes government and military regime to improve democratic practices believing that this would strengthen, in the long term, political stability. Thirdly, they closely monitored internal political developments with a particular attention to their effects on the country's external orientation. They observed that the two major political parties held similar views about relations with the US, NATO and CENTO. This enabled them not to prefer one side over the other in the bitter political dispute between the two parties in the late 1950s, which intensified in the months proceeding the military coup in May 1960. Projecting impartiality in this struggle was believed to help the US to keep good relations with the present government, and, should it be forced out of office, with its replacement. After the coup, American policy makers were particularly sensitive about the dangers of Turkey's shifting towards neutrality. They encouraged the military regime to resist Soviet overtures and continued to meet its urgent financial needs and supported what they considered as moderates within the new regime in an effort to prevent anti-Western elements from gaining control. It is not possible to measure precisely the effect of the US influence on the military regime's preferences. However, the result was a great success for the US policies because political turmoil in 1960 did not result in the change of Turkey's political alignment.
MAP 2. Turkey's Position with respect to Eastern Europe and the Middle East
CHAPTER FIVE

THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF IRBM DEPLOYMENT IN TURKEY, 1957-60

1. Introduction

When the Soviet Union announced the launch of the first artificial earth satellite (the Sputnik) into orbit in early October 1957, the first generation intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), namely Thor and Jupiter, were already on the production line. These weapons had technically very similar characteristics: both were one-stage land based missiles, fuelled with liquid oxygen, with a range of 1,500 nautical miles. Because of their limited range, they had to be deployed around the periphery of the communist bloc. At the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1957, the NATO Heads of Governments accepted the American offer to station IRBMs in NATO Europe. In principle, missiles and warheads were to be provided by the US, and the land for the sites by the host country. But the issue proved to be much more complicated than this because most Western European nations were reluctant to host the missiles. In the end, only three countries accepted them: Britain, Italy and Turkey.

This chapter deals with the issues regarding to the political and strategic aspects of the decision to deploy the Jupiter IRBM in Turkey. Although the IRBM offer was theoretically made to all European members of NATO, in early 1958 there were six possible candidates to host them, namely Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and West Germany. From the very start, the Menderes government was very anxious to obtain these weapons. But priority was given by the US administration to their deployment in Western Europe. Hence, no formal contact for deployment in Turkey was made until April 1959 when it became almost certain that the planned number of missiles could not be stationed elsewhere in Europe. This suggested that the Turkish case had some different aspects from the deployment in other NATO countries. The

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1 Although the US and Turkey had concluded an agreement on missile deployment in October 1959, the actual deployment began in the summer of 1961 and launch positions achieved operational status, with US crews, between November 1961 and March 1962.
differences as well as similarities will be explained here with an emphasis on the reasons why the decision was delayed initially, and why the decision to deploy was made despite the US administration being sceptical about the military utility of the IRBMs. To this end, it is appropriate first to look at the strategic and political considerations in producing IRBMs and in offering them to NATO.

2. The Politico-strategic Context of IRBM Production and Deployment

The first generation IRBMs were probably the most controversial weapons system ever produced during the Eisenhower administration. Their production and deployment were affected to a great extent by international political developments, interservice rivalry within the American military establishment and American internal politics. The Thor of the Air Force and the Jupiter of the Army were designed and developed simultaneously as a result of rivalry between the two departments over the control of nuclear delivery systems. The technical specifications of these missiles also made them controversial. Because they were based on fixed sites above ground and their reaction time was relatively slow (as they needed refuelling before launching), they were vulnerable to a Soviet pre-emptive attack, which in turn made them suitable only for striking first. They were produced despite evidence from the beginning that first generation IRBMs would become effectively redundant when the second generation solid-fuelled Polaris IRBM and Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) became operational. But their deployment in Europe as part of NATO modernization programme proved to be much more complicated because of the political considerations involved. At that time, the successful launch of the Sputnik implied that Moscow might achieve operational ICBM capability sooner than expected. As will be seen, the Americans presumed that the IRBM offer would stiffen allied cohesion in the wake of the Sputnik incident, but it received a cool response from the Europeans who sought to have more say in alliance nuclear strategy and the reduction of the East-West tension.

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2 A full account of this matter was provided by Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation*, (New York, 1969), especially chapters 3-5.


Political considerations weighted heavily both in the production and the planned deployment of IRBMs in Europe, although military logic was apparent in the early stages of the production decision. What kind military benefits were expected to be derived from IRBM production and deployment? The decision to produce was prompted in early 1955 by the Killian Report, compiled by a committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Robert Killian. The committee concluded that 'a ballistic missile with a seventeen-hundred-mile range could be developed with greater ease, speed and certainty than could its intercontinental counterpart'. However, although the IRBM systems became increasingly obsolescent because of developments in missile technology, the programme went ahead for mainly political considerations, which was particularly evident in the decision to produce both IRBM systems in late October 1957.5

The military circles were more enthusiastic about IRBM deployment, but the civilian authorities also believed that these weapons had some military value. Eisenhower himself, for example, accepted the argument that intermediate-range missiles would add to the US deterrent (for IRBM coverage of the Soviet bloc, see map 3, p.210), although he was convinced that the major retaliatory power of the US for the foreseeable future would be provided by the long-range air force.6 One reason for his later endorsement of their deployment in selected areas around the Soviet periphery, though it was not among the principal causes, was their contribution to the US strategic deterrent.

The administration appreciated the position of the IRBMs relative to the US strategic air force as well as to the more advanced weapons systems such as solid-fuelled IRBM and US-based ICBMs. The Thor and the Jupiter were expected by both civilian and military authorities to be militarily useful only during the interim period until the others

became operational. Essentially, these missiles were seen as *counterbalance systems* to the prospective Soviet early ICBM capability as well as to the present Soviet IRBM threat to Western Europe. The NSC approved this view in March 1958 by stating that 'In view of the prospective Soviet ICBM capacity and the resulting increase in the vulnerability of the continental United States, our continued ability to deter a general war will be better ensured by the positioning of IRBMs in selected areas around the Soviet periphery.' This mirrored Eisenhower's view, recorded in his memoirs, which regarded 'IRBMs stationed around the Soviet periphery in effect ... [as] equal to ICBMs stationed in the continental US'. The Department of Defense added some other arguments in favour of the military value of the IRBMs. Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Quarles, for example, put it as a Defense view that the first generation IRBMs were 'of the same kind that the Soviets have deployed against Western Europe.' He personally was of the opinion that 'these IRBMs are the only kind of [guided missile system] the United States is likely to have for some years in the future.' Therefore, 'he thought it important not to write off these liquid propellant IRBMs with the idea of waiting for a second generation of IRBMs which is probably optimistic to think we could get in five years time.'

Another indication of the strategic value attributed to the first generation missiles was that the review of US overseas base requirements in the late 1950s paid attention to the deployment of these weapons at appropriate sites overseas. The Nash Report,

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7 *US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Lot file (hereafter cited as Lot file), 'PPS-JCS Joint Staff Meeting', 3 July 1958, Lot 67 D 548, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1957-61 (hereafter cited as Lot 67 D 548), box 133, Defense-State Relationship. Similarly, SACEUR was convinced that his programme for deployment of the IRBMs was a limited effort which aimed at filling the gap until a second generation, solid-propellant, land based IRBM was developed. Indeed, he was engaged in drawing up the requirements of this system in the late 1958. 'Working Paper: US Policy on IRBMs for NATO', 24 Nov.1958, Lot file, Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), Office of the European Regional Affairs (OERA), Records of the NATO Advisor, 1957-61, box 1, IRBM's.

8 Memo. of Discussion at the 358th Meeting of the NSC, 13 March 1958, *FRUS* 1958-60:3, p.46. Another document further clarified this point: 'deployment of IRBMs was important to minimize the possibility that US and NATO Strategic power might fall behind that of the USSR by virtue of Soviet achievement of an operational capability for ICBMs before the US developed its own ICBMs'. 'US Policy on IRBMs', 24 Nov.1958, Lot file, EUR, OERA, Records of the NATO Advisor, 1957-61, box 1, IRBM's.


prepared by Frank Nash (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) and presented to the President in December 1957 argued that ‘in view of the assumed ICBM capability and the resulting vastly increased vulnerability of the continental United States, our ability to retain the edge in the deterrent race requires the positioning of IRBMs at widely dispersed bases around the Sino-Soviet periphery’. Inspired by this report, the NSC came to the view later, in March 1958, that although rapid changes in weapons technology and other factors would alter the US needs for overseas base system in the long term, ‘a small net expansion of [US] base system may be required, at least initially, to accommodate new weapons and to meet the Soviet offensive techniques.’ This reference to new weapons clearly meant the IRBMs. It was embodied in the strategic thinking of the time that the dispersal of American strategic forces around the Soviet periphery would complicate Moscow’s calculations about a surprise attack and compound Soviet defence problems.

The deployment of the IRBMs around the Soviet periphery, however, did not intend to alter the overall balance of power between the East and West, and it was presumed that the Soviets would take this fact into account in their reaction to the deployment. An intelligence report, National Special Intelligence Estimate number 100-4-58 (dated April 1958) concluded that, although the Soviet leaders would view the deployment ‘as a substantial addition to Western capabilities’, they were not likely to regard it as a ‘change in US intentions’ or to think that it ‘would basically alter the relative military strength of East and West.’ The report anticipated that the execution of the US IRBM programme would be assessed by the Soviet leaders ‘as an effort to offset [their] ICBM capabilities during the interim period before American ICBMs became available in quantity.’ The Soviet leaders were also supposed to see that, by the time a substantial US IRBM threat developed, the corresponding Soviet capability would


12 Commenting on the Nash Report, the Planing Board of the NSC stated that the IRBM deployment in selected places around the Soviet bloc 'would represent essentially a modernization of our strategic forces and would be designed only to maintain present strategic balance between the US and the USSR.' 'Memo. for the NSC Planning Board', 12 Feb. 1958, US National Archives, RG 273, Records of the NSC, Executive Office of the President-NSC, Mill 191, box 4.
have reached considerable proportions. Moreover, they would consider the fact that 'even if the assumed IRBM deployment did not occur, a similar threat would later develop from naval-launched IRBMs and US-based ICBMs.' As a result, it was expected that there would neither be a major shift in the Soviet policy nor a Soviet 'attempt to prevent IRBM deployments by such risky ways as the use of force.'

Since IRBMs were not regarded as the principal element of the US nuclear deterrent, their production in excessive numbers, as some have claimed, had never been planned. Although initial figures were around the 16 squadrons of 15 weapons each, these numbers subsequently were revised. This was done for several reasons. First, both civilian and military quarters of the administration agreed that the objective of the deployment was to meet the needs of an interim period. Second, the administration's general approach to the issues relating the East-West balance which, from the beginning, took into account the effects of a vigorous US military effort in areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union. In conformity with this approach, it was thought that the deployment should be planned carefully in order to 'avoid pressing the [Soviet leaders] to the point that may incline them to miscalculate [American] objectives and conclude that the [US] objectives have become aggressive, thereby making them feel obliged to react violently.' Third, arguments against their deployment in continental Europe within the State Department, such as the Policy Planning Staff's view that the number of missiles planned for the UK were adequate for deterrent purposes, and other political and military problems associated with their deployment, as discussed below, would also have been contributed to a downward revision of numbers planned for deployment.

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15 'Memo. for the NSC Planning Board', Feb. 12, 1958, RG 273, Records of the NSC, Executive Office of the President-NSC, Mill 191, box 4; and SNIE, 100-4-58.

16 'Memo. from Fuller to Bowie', 8 March 1957, Lot file, 67 D 548, box 160, Europe.
Political considerations weighed heavily in the American IRBM offers to Britain in March 1957 and to NATO in December 1957. The former was part of effort to set relations with Britain, which had been disrupted by the Suez war of 1956, back on intimate course. In the latter case, the special circumstances surrounding the offer magnified the political and psychological benefits that would follow.\textsuperscript{17} The launch of Sputnik in October 1957 had implied two things, the loss of the US competitive edge in weapons technology and the possibility of an early Soviet ICBM capability. The European allies began to see that the Soviets’ acquisition of a better means to deliver their nuclear warheads was to increase US vulnerability, which in turn might make Americans reluctant to honour their commitments to the defence of Western Europe. This caused the Americans to think that something should be done in order to prevent the alliance from beginning to fall apart. Pointing to the problems created by the growing Soviet capabilities, Secretary of State Dulles predicted in December 1957 that the issue of control over the use of nuclear power would leave those allies who did not possess nuclear power ‘in a state of considerable uncertainty and bewilderment’, since they would ‘feel that they would have no choice in the decisions as to whether to use nuclear power if the decisions had to be made in their interest.’ To restore alliance confidence in the US, he thought, two things were needed: first, the allies should be convinced about the superiority of the US strategic bomber force over the Soviets; and second, they should be given some sort of control over the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, there was a process within NATO, since the adoption of MC 48 in 1954, allowing for alliance co-operation in the control of nuclear weapons devoted to Western European defence. The launch of Sputnik and the nuclearization of NATO ‘pushed the United States’ according to Wampler, ‘to accelerate the process.’\textsuperscript{18} The only weapons at that time available for the US realistically to share with the Europeans were the first generation IRBMs. By offering them to NATO, the Americans thought that they provided the means to restore the allied confidence in the United States.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Nash, *The Other Missiles*, pp. 9, 32. Technically, it was impossible in December 1957 that the offer would make an immediate strategic effect, because both the Thor and the Jupiter were not operational.

\textsuperscript{18} Robert A. Wampler, *NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons* (Nuclear History Program, Occasional Paper 6, July 1990), pp. 44-45, previous quotations in this paragraph are from this source.

\textsuperscript{19} A working paper drafted for the Secretary of States’ use in NATO December 1958 Ministerial Meeting emphasised that the US considered that ‘IRBM deployment in Europe would be a
Regarding the military aspect of the IRBM offer to NATO, it should be noted that providing these weapons for the allies was in conformity with the trends in Western cold war strategy since the adoption of the New Look by the US administration in the late 1953. Massive retaliation, the New Look's military doctrine, contemplated the first use of nuclear weapons and proposed having all kinds of nuclear weapons at the disposal of Western forces. In explaining the reasons to Congress for proposing changes to US laws on nuclear co-operation with other nations, the Eisenhower administration made it clear that the IRBMs aimed at providing 'the NATO shield forces with nuclear-capable weapons', as part of efforts to achieve 'a balanced and flexible defense posture for NATO.' However, the IRBM deployment represented a contradiction since it implied that the Alliance would increasingly rely on deterrent function of the nuclear weapons at a time when it reinvented the importance of having adequate conventional forces.

Assessing in what ways the launch of the Sputnik affected the US administration, Michael Armacost wrote that 'there was an understandable element of confusion, panic and haste in the initial decision to deploy IRBMs overseas.' The main reasons for this, Armacost maintained, were the Sputnik incident and the opportunism on the part of those who wanted to take advantage of the Sputnik launch in order to ensure IRBM deployment overseas. To him, the Americans expected an immediate success but they misjudged the reaction of the allies. He claimed that 'the possibility of encountering difficulties with other allies was ... [not] entirely discounted but it was minimized.' This view was supported by the Secretary of Defence McElroy's remarks.
before a House sub-committee: ‘We don’t think we will have much difficulty in getting them deployed overseas.’ These points, however, need some clarification.

The US administration’s haste in making the IRBM offer to NATO was not caused by the fears that Moscow had achieved a military breakthrough. The President himself, equipped with the information (collected by the covert U2 reconnaissance operations over the Soviet Union) that the Soviets faced similar problems to those the US experienced in ICBM development, never believed that a ‘missile gap’ existed. For this reason, he also rejected the calls within the US in the wake of the Sputnik incident for increasing defence spending dramatically so as to reduce US vulnerability to a Soviet missile attack. It should also be noted that the administration was aware, from the beginning, of the problems might be caused by an overseas deployment. Besides, the problem of deployment was studied at the mid-levels of the administration before the Sputnik. For example, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) recommended in March 1957 that IRBMs should be offered as part of a NATO modernization programme, rather than put under unilateral control, because it would prove that the US treated all allies as equals. The Soviet success in launching the Sputnik, however, forced the administration to take hasty measures for political and psychological reasons. It convinced the otherwise sceptical Eisenhower to make the IRBM offer as the centre-piece of the counter-measures designed to stiffen allied confidence in the United States. However, the Europeans were less than enthusiastic to take up the offer.

23 The Politics of Weapons Innovation, p.76.
25 ‘Memo. from Fuller to Bowie’, 8 March 1957 and 9 March 1957, both from Lot file, 67 D 548, box 160, Europe. According to the Policy Planning Staff, of the three options considered (namely unilateral control, NATO control and UN control), the most palatable one was the second one. For them, NATO control on an element of nuclear determent was to improve the co-operation and therefore to reduce those forces threatening the integrity of the alliance.

Despite concerns were expressed within the State Department about the location problem, the prevailed view within the administration before the Sputnik was that ‘for the time being it was not pressing.’ Jan Melissen, ‘The Thor Saga’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 15/2 (July 1992), pp.175-76.
As to why the IRBM offer fell short of restoring confidence within the Western alliance, a variety of reasons can be given, ranging from the limited technical capabilities of the IRBMs to the international developments of the time. In general, the prospect of a limited nuclear war on their territories was a matter of grave concern to the Western Europeans. Although US policy-makers did not assume in theory that a nuclear war would remain confined to Europe, this argument failed to impress the European allies. In addition, problems relating to the sharing of nuclear material and to the physical and formal control of missiles proved to be very complicated. The Americans favoured a strict control over IRBMs by NATO. It was presumed that bilateral nuclear relations would contribute to nuclear proliferation. Washington was markedly against it at that time, as the NIE 100-2-58 clearly stated: 'With more and more countries possessing nuclear capabilities, the chances become greater that a war will occur in which forth countries initiates use of nuclear weapons.' In the late 1950s it seemed that the technical backwardness of the IRBMs should be blamed for the failures. To one observer, for example, because the marginal utility of the first generation missiles deployed in Europe was 'low', the US offer was not enough to mitigate the ‘crisis of confidence’ within the Western alliance. However, later it became clear that NATO problems in nuclear sharing did not remain confined to the IRBMs; especially the problems about nuclear control proved difficult to overcome, irrespective of the technical specifications of the systems involved.

There were also some problems specific to each country that would potentially host IRBMs. France, having expressed an early interest in NATO offer, insisted on a number of conditions, the major ones of which were French control over missiles and technical assistance from the United States necessary to produce, ultimately, their own delivery systems. The French interest in cooperating with NATO on IRBMs

30 Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, p.81.
diminished after Charles de Gaulle became president in July 1958. His further demands about control and technical assistance matters, which were unacceptable to the US, finally led to the collapse of the efforts to make France a host for IRBMs.\textsuperscript{31} In some countries, like Belgium and Holland, governments failed to master necessary public support for deployment. In Norway and Denmark, it was already the established policy to ban the stationing nuclear weapons on their territories. The Soviet Union was especially hostile to the establishment of missile sites in West Germany. In Greece, because of domestic political situation, the otherwise sympathetic government was hesitant about accepting the missile offer.\textsuperscript{32} Even in Italy (eager to elevate its position within NATO and improve its relations with the US), domestic constraints and the fear of becoming a more attractive Soviet target in a war, delayed the agreement on deployment. In addition, the offer to NATO and the search for hosts took place against the background of a barrage of Soviet anti-IRBM statements, speeches, and diplomatic notes aimed at disrupting the NATO efforts. Moscow not only warned the potential recipients about the grave consequences for them but also called for East-West dialogue on nuclear matters, and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe. Although the Soviet complaints and diplomatic offensive were, as Philip Nash noted, ‘either rejected or ignored’ by NATO allies in the final analysis, they at least forced the prospective hosts ‘to consider the offer and then, if they accepted in principle, negotiate details without ever being certain how they might be punished, or what gain might be denied them, by the Kremlin.’\textsuperscript{33}

By late 1958, the American and allied interest in IRBM deployment further diminished for several reasons. According to a working paper by the PPS these were the ‘lessened ... likelihood of early Soviet ICBM capabilities, rapid obsolescence of Thor and

\textsuperscript{31} Nash, \textit{The Other Missiles}, pp.14, 45-49. Schwartz, \textit{NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas}, pp.69-70, 75. Like France, for the UK government, as Jan Melissen noted, ‘there was ... an important link between Thor’s introduction and the quest for technical nuclear cooperation.’ Melissen, ‘The Thor Saga’, p.169.

\textsuperscript{32} Schwartz, \textit{NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas}, pp.69-74; US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, (Hereafter cited as CF. The date is the sequence of numbers following the ’/’ in any reference, arranged in the order of month followed by day, then year.) 740.5611/10-1659, ‘Tel. From Embassy in Ottowa to DoS’, no.259; Jan Melissen, \textit{The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership}, (Groningen: Styx Publications, 1993), p.105.

\textsuperscript{33} Schwartz, \textit{NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas}, p.74; Nash, \textit{The Other Missiles}, pp.36-41, quotation appears on pp.36-37, for the Italian position, see pp.49-53.
Jupiter, and the imminent development of "second generation" missiles.\textsuperscript{34} The problem of obsolescence was a particularly serious one. The PPS argued to Secretary Dulles that investment in these weapons would be wasted and that if the US pressed for their early deployment in Europe, the Europeans would blame Washington for 'having saddled them with an obsolete weapon.' This kind of warning partially affected the US thinking, as demonstrated by the reluctance some top officials to take great political risks for IRBM deployment.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, as will be seen in the Turkish case, the President questioned American policy in the summer of 1959. Yet it should be noted that although the pros and cons of the deployment programme was carefully weighted by the administration, the cancellation of it had never been an option. As Philip Nash observed, Washington decided to proceed with the deployment mainly because of such factors as the need to avoid 'the appearance of giving in to Soviet threats', the possible disappointment of the allies expressed interest in having IRBMs (Britain, Italy and Turkey), and the accumulation of expensive missiles.\textsuperscript{36}

Taking into account the above-mentioned difficulties, the President approved NSC Action no 2013 in December 1958, which settled the amount of weapons planned for deployment. According to this decision, the production of land-based IRBMs was to be limited to the five squadrons of Thor and three squadrons of Jupiter for which production commitments had already been made.\textsuperscript{37} Finally, the problem of finding host countries was resolved in September 1959 with the agreement to place a Jupiter squadron in Turkey in addition to those squadrons which had already been planned for Britain and Italy.

\textsuperscript{34} 'Plans for NATO Ministerial Meeting', 26 Nov. 1958, Lot file, 57 D 548, box 151, Europe 1958.

\textsuperscript{35} Secretary Dulles and General Norstad, for example, agreed that the US 'should not pay too high price in order to get first generation IRBMs deployed in France.' 'Memo. of Discussions at the 384th Meeting of the NSC', 30 Oct. 1958, \textit{FRUS}, 1958-60:3, p.146. The PPS view is from Lot file, 67 D 548, 'From Smith to the Secretary', 24 July 1958, box 151, Europe 1959.

\textsuperscript{36} Nash, \textit{The Other Missiles}, p.64.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{FRUS}, 1958-60:3, p.168, editorial note. The deployment of the fifth Thor squadron was dropped in the fall of 1959 after the Greek programme had been cancelled.
3. The Decision to Deploy IRBMs in Turkey and Its Implementation

The decision to deploy in Turkey was the culmination of an extensive review process within the US administration which started in late 1958. By the time Washington began considering Turkey's position in respect to IRBM issue, the military logic for deployment had weakened, making political factors even more salient in any decision. This allowed such branches within the State Department as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and the PPS to come up with more compelling arguments which created doubts about having IRBMs deployed in Turkey. But the decision to instruct the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to initiate formal negotiations with the Turkish government, at the end of April 1959, showed that the US administration was interested in putting missiles in Turkey against all odds. How and why this decision was made at that time deserves attention.

It should be stated at the outset that the delay in deployment did not stem from the Turkish position. Consistent with its posture in NATO and its relations with the US, the Turkish government had welcomed the December 1957 decision of NATO enthusiastically. As stated in the previous chapter, the Turks were always willing to receive whatever military equipment they could obtain from US sources, and this was the case for IRBMs. Indeed, Prime Minister Menderes made it clear, at the very meeting where the American offer to NATO was made, that his country was ready to provide sites for IRBMs.38 Turkish officials thought that the missiles would not only bring them greater international prestige, but also provide some leverage in economic aid negotiations with the Americans. More importantly, they would increase the security of their country, which had already become Soviet military target because of the military facilities it provided for NATO and American use.39 There was also no significant opposition in the country to entering missile arrangements with the


Americans. The main opposition party and later military government saw the presence of the missiles, as one observer noted, ‘as a natural part of Turkey’s commitment to NATO’. The US administration, however, did not take up any initiative for deployment in Turkey before January 1959.

The delay of decision was not because the deployment in Turkey was militarily undesirable. On the contrary, as early as December 1957 Defense authorities preferred to station IRBMs in Turkey, Okinawa and Alaska, and later they added France to the list. The JCS was eager to get these weapons deployed in Turkey as soon as possible considering the country ‘the easiest place to get them in.’ Moreover, General Lauris Norstad, SACEUR, saw Turkey as the ‘logical location’ in terms of ‘certain deep strategic targets’. But political considerations changed the order of priorities in the early 1958. Even Norstad ‘preferred French and Italian deployment first’, and proposed to approach Ankara for talks at least a few months later. To him, this course of action was necessary, because some NATO countries, especially Northern Europeans, would object to the Turks as missile hosts, presuming that the Turks were ‘too warlike’. General Norstad also raised the political volatility of the Middle Eastern situation as an issue to be reckoned with when deciding about Turkey. Neither were State Department officials late to register their concerns, predicting that the Soviet reaction to missile deployment so close to their borders would be strong. Furthermore, the PPS was against making any US undertaking on the continent other than to France (with whom negotiations were already under way), arguing that the Western deterrent did not rest on these weapons anyway. The US administration favoured Norstad’s gradual approach in the spring of 1958 and decided to postpone engaging the Turkish authorities on deployment for the time being.

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40 Bilge Nur Criss, ‘Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963’, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20/3 (September 1997), p.98. In this article she argued that the missile deployment did not actually improve Turkey’s security. On the contrary, it increased regional tensions and caused unnecessary strains in the country’s relations with Moscow. For her, the reluctance of successive Turkish governments to bring the issue into the public domain allowed the deployment to go ahead without objections. See especially, pp.100-102.

41 ‘Memo. of Conversation with the President’, 3 Dec.1957, *FRUS*, 1955-57:19, p.702. SNIE 100-4-58 put it unequivocally that ‘IRBMs in Greece and Turkey would considerably expand IRBM coverage.’

When difficulties in the French programme became apparent in the fall of 1958, the Turkish case was again considered at the highest levels of the administration. At that time, the State Department was still far from being convinced about going ahead. Secretary Dulles remarked to the NSC on October 30, 1958, that the Turks were ‘almost eager to have these missiles deployed’ on their territory. However, he also talked of ‘certain political implications vis-à-vis the USSR making us a little cautious about introducing IRBMs into Turkey at the present time.’43 This reasoning of the Secretary later proved to be the most compelling argument against the introduction of the missiles in Turkey. Indeed, as will be seen, the probable strong Soviet reaction against it always remained a factor.

The Turkish case entered a new stage when General Norstad first implied at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1959 that the Turks were to get IRBMs and then, on January 2, 1959, sounded out Greek and Turkish officials about his intention to initiate formal talks on deployment. Although the Washington authorities instructed him not to take any action on Greek and Turkish situation pending further advice, they initiated an inter-departmental study in an effort to reach a joint State-Defense position on the issue. The complications of the Turkish case, however, made it almost impossible to reach a quick decision. There were conflicting concerns, interests and expectations in different branches of the administration to be satisfied. Major themes in the ensuing interdepartmental review were continuing doubts about the military usefulness of the missiles, Turkish demands to have them quickly, the possible Soviet reaction, control of the weapons, and the cost of the construction and maintenance of missile sites. Answering all these problems involved striking a fine balance, as Jan Melissen has noted for the wider issue of IRBM deployment in Europe, between what was ‘politically desirable, militarily necessary and financially acceptable.’44

44 Nash, The Other Missiles, p.66; Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership, p.103.
In the early stages of the inter-departmental review, such services within the State Department as the PPS, the NEA and to some extent the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) tried to show, by bringing forward political and financial considerations, that Turkish deployment should not be contemplated for the time being. First, they demanded that special emphasis should be placed on the political repercussions of deploying first generation missiles close to the Soviet frontiers in the light of Dulles’ remark at the NSC meeting on October 30, 1958. The PPS urged the Secretary that, because of their technical capabilities, the effectiveness of these weapons depended very much on their ‘being fired on a strike first rather than retaliatory basis.’ Therefore, the Soviets might take ‘preventive action against ... bases’, in Turkey, in a crisis situation, if they realised that ‘these weapons were only useful as strike first basis’. Second, State officials pointed out that the cost of basing these missiles was to be financed from Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) funds which were already short of meeting NATO-approved modernization programmes for conventional forces in Greece and Turkey.

This was not the first time that these concerns were raised within the US administration. As was noted before, SNIE 100-4-58, dated April 1958, predicted that the Soviet Union would take some political and psychological measures in order to make IRBM deployment politically costly for the United States. This document particularly singled out Turkey as a place where Soviet pressure would take the shape of a blunt threat. What was new in January 1959 was that much more attention was paid within the State Department than it was before to the possibility that the missiles in Greece and Turkey would ‘serve as a magnet for a Soviet preventive attack.’ What is more, Soviet propaganda, it was pointed out, might exploit popular fears in these countries about nuclear weapons which might make it very costly for their governments to follow a ‘staunch pro-United States and pro-NATO course’.

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46 'Memo. from Smith to the Secretary of State', 29 Nov. 1958, Lot file, 67 D 548, box 151, Europe 1959.

47 CF, 711.56382/2-559, 'Memo. for the Record'.

The scope of the review exercise, however, widened at the beginning of February 1959 because of the strong pro-deployment stance taken by the Defense Department and SACEUR. To begin with General Norstad's position: while he was on the balance more sympathetic to the proposed programme for joint US-European production of second generation IRBMs, he did not want to write off the existing IRBM plans before a firm decision had been made on the second generation. For him any decision on Turkish deployment should consider allied cohesion before any thing else. Along this line (after he had been stopped by Washington in early January), he attempted to persuade the Turks that the introduction of sea-based nuclear missiles in the US Navy in the Mediterranean in a few years time would provide Turkey with sufficient guarantee against Soviet aggression. But he found the Ankara authorities very enthusiastic about proceeding with the Jupiter deployment. Therefore, he was strongly in favour of deployment and found it disturbing being stopped by Washington on the ground that there were new political factors justifying delay. The Department of Defense was also uneasy about the further postponement of a decision on Greece and Turkey. On January 17 Defence Secretary Neil McElroy wrote to Dulles that his Department did not agree with State that there were serious technical and financial problems justifying delay in proceeding with the arrangements proposed by General Norstad. Apparently having been unable to reconcile sharp differences of opinion within the administration, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy, who was assigned to co-ordinate the inter-departmental review, decided to ask Dulles to clarify the Department's position on the issue in early February. In a letter dated February 3, Dulles wrote to McElroy that the State Department was now 'weighing the political implications of deploying IRBMs in Greece and Turkey.' Likewise, Murphy planned to ask Defense in a joint State-Defense meeting, which was due to take place on February 6, to state their opinion regarding control of the weapons, to


produce exact cost figures for each squadron, and to make suggestion about the possible locations for missile sites.\textsuperscript{52}

The control of weapons, a sensitive issue in the Turkish case as in others, came to ahead as soon as deployment was contemplated. Unlike other cases, however, the US administration paid much more attention to the potential dangers of stationing the missiles in Turkey. On February 2, Gerald Smith of the PPS asked Murphy to present it as the PPS view to the Secretary that 'the loss of control and the consequent increased risk of accidental war' was a major concern that any decision on IRBM deployment in Turkey should take into account. According to Smith it was certain that the missile launching positions were to be manned by Turkish crew sometime in the future when they completed their training. Then the US, he maintained, could retain control over the missiles either through a 'key system' which would be used to fire the missile or render the warheads unusable or through the retention of 'US range data to fire the missile accurately'. But he did not believe that either method would be effective. The Turks would seize the key forcefully, he argued, 'if they had decided to fire the missile without US approval'. The Turks could also fire some missiles at the Soviet Union in a crisis situation 'regardless of where such missiles landed', which in itself would trigger off a Soviet nuclear response. Therefore, he concluded that giving the Turks these weapons was equal to giving them 'the power to commit [the US] to general war by firing [them] in haste or error', especially in a crisis whose scope America might wish to contain. Furthermore, an irresponsible government in Turkey might come to power in the future, in which case the missiles could not be easily recalled. 'The loss of control', he argued, 'to a relatively unsophisticated country bordering on and deeply hostile to the USSR is a major element of political problem posed by deploying IRBMs in Turkey'. He added that these views were supported by the Secretary of State, who expressed his concerns over deploying IRBMs close to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} *CF*, 711.56382/2-559, 'Memo. for the Record'.

\textsuperscript{53} 'Memo. from Smith to Murphy', 2 Feb. 1959, Lot file, 67 D 548, box 142, Turkey.
To Defense officials, however, the State Department exaggerated the control problem. When they were asked by Murphy at a joint State-Defense meeting on February 6 to evaluate on the effectiveness of US physical control over missiles and their warheads they made it clear that ‘the control key could be developed into a complicated coded mechanism’, and that ‘the Turks probably could never take over the control of mechanism for the missiles’. They also informed the meeting that Turkish launch control officer was the last to be trained. Making an analogy to other modern weapons the US had already given to the Turks, Defense representatives concluded that ‘there was no risk involved ...[and] that the command and control problem for IRBM’s [was] the same as for the other weapons’. On another occasion, General Norstad proposed that, in order to eliminate the theoretical risk about the Turks misusing IRBMs, US personnel could always be kept present by dragging out indefinitely the arrangements regulating those matters about the handover of the control of weapons. He thought, however, there was no need to take such a drastic measure since the Turks were ‘not ready to move into any situation of full control over the IRBMs immediately’. Assurances given by Defense officials and SACEUR were not enough to persuade the PPS and NEA thoroughly about the effectiveness of control system. They continued to believe that the US ran the risk of causing a war as a result of the firing of these missiles by the Turks in haste or error. The assurances, however, strengthened the pro-deployment view to the point that problems regarding control of the missiles ceased to be a factor obstructing a decision by the end of March 1959.

Attention was also paid by the US administration (especially in the State Department) to the impacts of introducing IRBMs in Turkey on the Middle Eastern countries. It was thought that deployment would create extra difficulties in pursuing US objectives.

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54 CF, 711.56382/2-659, ‘Memo. of Conversation [of the meeting between State and Defense officials]’.

55 CF, 740.5/2-559, ‘Memo. of Conversation between Norstad, Dulles, Whithey and Merchant’. Referring to his conversations with the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, Selim Sarper, SACEUR concluded that the Turks agreed with the probability that IRBM unit in Turkey would have to be US -manned for long periods’. ‘Tel. from Thurston to SoS’, no. 2613, 17 Jan. 1959, EL, Norstad Papers, box 89, IRBM General (2).

in the Middle East. To begin with, allies of Turkey in the Baghdad Pact, namely Iran and Pakistan, would ask more American aid claiming that they took risks alongside Turkey in the common defence effort and that they should receive corresponding protection. Failure to fulfill this demand would lead them to believe that the US treated them 'as second-class members of the Free World defense system.' This was particularly the case for Iran whose representatives in the Pact’s military committee had recently accused the US of 'being interested only in Iranian forces for the protection of NATO’s right flank' rather than the defence of Iran itself. Worse than that, Arab countries might see the nuclear weapons in Turkey as an offensive weapon. Therefore, they might regard these weapons as a means of bringing 'the threat of nuclear war into that area' which would eventually 'accelerate trends toward ... neutralism' and thus widen the gap between the US and the Arabs. Furthermore, under the influence of Soviet propaganda, regional countries might regard these weapons as an actual threat to them, and, for this reason, seek Soviet protection to the extent that they might even demand similar weapons from Moscow.

Although the location of the missile sites was a technical question, it proved to be another potentially problematic issue. The State Department feared that deployment in some particular places would exacerbate the relations between American troops and local inhabitants, which were already strained. It was estimated that the deployment of two squadrons in Turkey would increase by 50 percent the number of American military personnel in that country. For the NEA of the State Department, personnel concentrations at particular places would become a pretext for the neutralist elements to increase pressure on the Turkish government, which in turn would result in the

57 ‘Memo. for the Record’, 2 Feb.1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO 1957-64, box 1, IRBM-1957-1960; SNIE 100-4-58. Mohamed Heikal’s evidence casts doubts about the accuracy of American assumptions that the Soviets might give medium range missiles to the Middle East states. He recorded a letter from Krushchev to Nasser which implied that even if Egypt asked for such weapons, Moscow would have rejected it because the recipients of them ‘might have undertaken some desirable action leading to war.’ Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, (London, 1972), pp.133-34.

It should be noted that even after the signing of the deployment agreement with Turkey in September 1959, similar concerns were raised in the State Department. See pp.202-203 below.

58 Technically, the missiles had to be located near the airports which capable of handling large cargo aircraft in such places in Izmir and Adana where there were already large American concentrations. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles’ proposed that missile sites could be located in mountainous areas deep in Turkey but this was rejected because of the technical difficulties involved. ‘Memo. of Conversation’, 6 Feb.1959, Lot file, 67 D 548, box 142, Turkey.
weakening of the position the US enjoyed on base rights in the country. This issue should be resolved in a way which ensured that it did not impair Turkish-American relations in the future. After careful consideration, State and Defense officials reached a common position that concentrations of American personnel in one area should be avoided and that the decision on the location of sites should be left to the negotiation stage.59

The financial cost of deployment was another reason for the US administration's hesitation to go ahead with the Turkish programme. Although the Defense Department tended to play down the importance of it, State was very keen to solve financial issues prior to the final decision. The PPS and NEA urged Dulles that the funds to be spent on the IRBM programme might induce corresponding reductions in the funds allocated for the modernization of conventional forces, as proposed by the NATO strategic guidance document known as MC 70. To them, US failure to support the present conventional force levels for Greece and Turkey would create further political problems. Therefore the 'pros and cons of IRBM program should be carefully weighted.' They pointed out that the cost to the US would be around $120 million per squadron, which was quite high by the standards of the time, and Turkey was expected to contribute only land and construction costs.60 Defense circles however were against the cancellation of Turkish deployment because of the lack of funds. They came up with a flexible way of financing in which the Air Force (the Department responsible for the execution of the IRBM programme) was to carry all cost initially, and later be reimbursed by the Mutual Security Program (MSP) for some of this cost. The Office of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs objected to the Defense formula of funding, stating that it would have adverse effects on other high priority MSP requirements.61 State and Defense officials finally agreed that a presidential request

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59 'Memo. of Conversation', undated [25 April 1959], FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, pp.800-01; 'Memo. from Rountree to Murphy', 20 March 1959, Lot file, NEA, GTI, box 1, Modern weapons and training.

60 CF, 711.56382/2-559, 'Memo. for the Record'. Cost of IRBM programme included the 'production cost in the US, construction and support costs in the host country, and annual maintenance costs'. 'Memo. for the Record', 2 Feb. 1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO 1957-64, box 1, IRBM-1957-1960.

61 'Letter From McElroy to Dulles', 17 Jan. 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.788; CF, 711.56382/2-659, 'Memo. of Conversation [of the meeting between State and Defense officials]'; CF, 711.56382/2-1859, 'Memo. from Merchant to Murphy'.
could be made to the Congress for a supplementary appropriation to cover the costs of
IRBMs for Greece and Turkey, which was later approved by the President. Despite
this development, Defense officials continued to seek alternative ways of financing,
acknowledging that the requested amount was unlikely to be made available by the
Congress.62

Under mounting pressure for a decision, State Department officials lifted their
reservations pending further clarifications by the Defense Department and SACEUR
on political and financial issues. Defense agreed in principal that the IRBM
deployments in Greece and Turkey were to be carried out at no expense to the MSP.63
The inter-departmental agreement paved the way for the authorization to SACEUR on
April 24 to begin talks with these countries.

It can be deduced from the arguments outlined above that favourable and negative
military and political factors hung in the balance. It remains to be answered, then,
which factors did tilt the balance in favour of deployment. Several factors seem to
have driven the State Department to act quickly and as a result facilitated a favourable
decision. First, American officials were cognizant of the fact that the Turkish case
fitted exactly into what they originally expected from IRBM deployment in Europe: to
bolster allied confidence in the US and to strengthen Western defense against the
communist bloc.64 The former point was particularly important. The American
Ambassador to Turkey, Fletcher Warren, for example, reported to Washington that,
although no overriding political reaction was foreseen, there would be a ‘great
disappointment in official Turkish circles’, if the Department’s overall assessment was
against deployment in Turkey especially because of the likely Soviet reaction. The
effects of delay or cancellation, he stated in another report, might particularly be felt in
terms of military relations because the Turks considered the deployment as ‘a firm

62 'Memo. from Dillion to Herter', 3 April 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, pp.788-89, ‘Memo. of
Conversation’, undated, ibid., pp. 800-01; ‘Memo. from Merchant to the Acting Secretary of State’,
16 April 1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO, box 1, IRBMs Turkey I.

63 'Memo. of Conversation', undated, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, pp.800-01.

64 ‘Memo. for the Record’, 2 Feb. 1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO 1957-64,
box 1, IRBM-1957-1960.
SACEUR (and American) promise. A State Department report later underlined similar concerns: for the Turkish government the deployment marked not only ‘a net strengthening of Turkey’s defense’ but also ‘evidence of firm US commitment to the defense of the country’. It was also pointed out that assurances given by McElroy, with State consent, to Menderes made it politically essential to proceed as soon as possible with formal talks for deployment. The State Department also acknowledged the fact that when IRBMs in Greece and Turkey were put under NATO control as envisaged by December 1957 decision, this would bring about a net improvement to the US position. After all, it would have been difficult for State officials to ignore the concerns expressed by SACEUR, that he would find a prolonged delay or cancellation of the Turkish program embarrassing because he had committed himself to the deployment by announcing it in NATO December 1958 meeting.

Second, the state of NATO IRBM deployment plans in the early 1959 put pressure on American officials to look at other countries to host the missiles. In February 1959 it became evident that there would be no deployment in France and Germany and that further delays were inevitable in the Italian programme because of the domestic political situation there. Meanwhile, the Turkish government let the Americans know that it intended to adjust its relations with the Soviet Union according to the American decision. In January 1959, for example, Turkey was under strong Soviet pressure because of its readiness to receive American weapons. The Turks were disposed to take ‘a firm stand’ with Moscow on this question if the US intention was to base the missiles in Turkey, but otherwise their intention was to take ‘a consolatory position’. American authorities also anticipated in April 1959 that progress in the Italian deployment might induce the Ankara authorities to know the American response as soon as possible.

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65 *CF, 711.56382/1-1359 and CF, 711.56382/1-2359*, both ‘Tel. from Ankara to the Secretary of State’, nos. 1998 and 2104 respectively. Brackets in the source text.


67 Nash, *The Other Missiles*, pp.49, 51, 60.

Finally, developments in the Middle East at that time, which will be analysed in the next chapter, made the US officials more susceptible to Turkish concerns. In early 1959, the Baghdad Pact was undergoing a process of reconstruction following the July 1958 military coup in Iraq. At a time when Turkey’s political support was crucial in this organization, especially given the Turkish role in concluding bilateral agreements between the US and each regional member of the Pact, it was clearly undesirable for Washington to be regarded by Ankara as indifferent to its security concerns. Under these circumstances, the most palatable option for State officials might have been to agree with Defense to allow SACEUR to engage the Greek and Turks, despite the fact that the political, military and financial considerations that had been raised during the review had not been fully answered.

Having been authorised by the US government, SACEUR undertook the responsibility of coordinating with the appropriate authorities on those aspects of deployment which were of NATO interest. Before recommending to the NATO Council that at least one IRBM squadron be stationed in Turkey, SACEUR had obtained the Turkish concurrence on the following principles:

In view of the fact that these weapons are being placed at the dispersal of SACEUR for NATO collective defense, for the execution of approved NATO plans and policies, the Turkish IRBM unit should be under the operational control of SACEUR in peace as well as in war. The decision to launch these weapons will be taken by SACEUR only in agreement with the Government of Turkey and the United States. ... In principle, the operational control vested in SACEUR directly to the IRBM squadron. ... [In determining the location of missile units] Allied Command Requirements should be considered.

Although the Turkish government was very anxious to proceed quickly, the US administration failed to produce a draft agreement until September 1959. The main reason for this was the political and financial problems left unresolved during the review stage earlier in the year. At a time when the US government employed a stringent budgetary policy, it proved difficult to provide extra funds for deployment...

69 CF, 711.56382/4-1059, ‘Memo, from Merchant to the Acting Secretary’. For the bilateral accords, see chapter six below.

70 CF, 711.56382/5-1359, ‘Letter from Norstad to the Turkish Minister of Defence’, enclosure to ‘Letter from Norstad to Ambassador Sarper’.
and the problem regarding the location of missiles needed lengthy consideration because it was to affect both community relations and construction costs. But the central reason for delay was the looming question of the political value of IRBM deployment as a whole.\textsuperscript{71} The President himself began questioning the Greek and Turkish programmes from mid-1959. He particularly pointed out Soviet concerns about them. On one occasion he likened IRBM deployment in Greece to a Soviet and missile deployment in, say, Cuba and Mexico, and asked what the US would do in such a case. To him, the US would have to stop this happening by every means including use of force if necessary. It is unknown why he did not cite Turkey together with Greece, but ‘he saw the commitment to [Greece] as a liability rather than an asset.’\textsuperscript{72} However, he also tacitly acknowledged, by taking no action for cancellation of the deployment in these countries, that reversing the existing IRBM deployment plans was out of the question. In the summer of 1959, in the face of a Soviet denuclearization proposal, the Turkish government again pressed for progress on the deployment issue.\textsuperscript{73} Despite this pressure, however, the US authorities delayed negotiations until the Greek government had informed them about its unwillingness to host the missiles.

Negotiations with the Turks for a missile agreement started on September 10 and came to a surprisingly quick conclusion in one week, as the Turkish government accepted the American draft without any change. The State Department, with the President’s approval, instructed the Embassy in Ankara to sign the agreement despite the fact that it coincided with the Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev’s visit to the United States.\textsuperscript{74} But, this time the Turkish side, although having signed the agreement on September 19, proposed the postponement of the exchange of notes and the public announcement of the agreement for several weeks. This was because it was felt

\textsuperscript{71} An office memo of the Bureau of the Near Eastern Affairs indicated that all major problems relating to location and finance were still unresolved at that time. ‘Memo, from Jones to Rountree’, 17 June 1959, \textit{FRUS}, 1958-60:10/2, pp.807-09.

\textsuperscript{72} Melissen, \textit{The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership}, pp.104-05.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘Memo, for the Files’, 27 July 1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO 1957-64, box 1, IRBMs-Turkey I.

undesirable by the Turkish government to conclude the missile agreement just before the CENTO meeting which was due to take place in Ankara early in October.\textsuperscript{75}

The construction of IRBM sites did not take place in 1960 despite the agreement on their location (Izmir on the Aegean coast of Turkey) and the availability of some funds. It was obstructed by growing doubts about the first generation weapons in general and political turmoil in Turkey in particular. In addition, lingering concerns within the US administration about the control of Turkish IRBMs also slowed the progress. The NEA of the State Department warned that 'special care' should be taken to prevent the creation of an independent Turkish IRBM capability. For the NEA, there were 'basic ethnic and cultural differences between Turkey and other members of the Atlantic Community' (a reference to the warlike nature of the Turks), and therefore giving Turkey such a capability would amount to giving it the ability to influence 'adversely ... the United States freedom of action in pursuing its own foreign policy within and through NATO.' At regional level, it was argued, the Turkish IRBM capability would upset the balance of power in the Near East and might lead the Soviet Union to provide such countries as Iraq and Egypt with similar weapons. Furthermore, it would provide Moscow with a propaganda point to prove the Middle Eastern nations that the West had aggressive intentions.\textsuperscript{76} Concerns resurfaced within the State Department following the coup d'état in Turkey in May 1960. For instance, a PPS document argued that, as the first generation weapons were useful only for first strike purposes, in a crisis situation 'any government having [them] would be somewhat trigger-happy' and unstable governments, like the one in Turkey, 'might be more trigger-happy than the most'. Therefore, it was recommended that the US should inform the Turks that the first generation missile programme would be replaced with

\textsuperscript{75} 'Memo. from White to the Secretary of State', 25 Sept. 1959, Lot file, NEA, GTI, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk 1958-63, box 1, Modern weapons and training; 'Memo. from Jones to the Secretary of State', October 2, 1959, Lot file, EUR, OAPMA, Records Relating to NATO, box 1, IRBMs-Turkey I.

Bilge Nur Criss commented that it was the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, who eagerly wanted to conclude and announce the agreement as soon as possible, calculating that he could 'impress upon Khruschev that Turkey could not be bullied' at the UN General Assembly meeting starting on September 20. Criss, 'Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey', p.106. However, her interpretation does not conform with the documentary evidence.

\textsuperscript{76} 'Memo. from Lewis Jones (NEA) to the Acting SoS', 12 Jan. 1960, Lot file, NEA, GTI, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk 1958-63, box 1, IRBMs.
the second generation one in the near future. The military regime could probably be persuaded about this from a technical point of view.\textsuperscript{77}

Ironically, despite mounting evidence that the first generation IRBMs were about to become obsolete, political developments turned into in favour of deployment in 1961 and as a result the Kennedy administration decided to carry out the Turkish programme. At that time, the JCS and SACEUR recommended that deployment should proceed as planned and obtained the concurrence of the State Department. It was feared that any cancellation on the grounds of obsolescence would put the British and Italian programmes in jeopardy and reduce the credibility of the US assurances to support Turkey against the Soviet blackmail.\textsuperscript{78} General Norstad gave his support in a manner which had political rather than military connotations when he declared: ‘this is the time to create strength, not reduce it. I believe therefore that this project should continue.’\textsuperscript{79} It is important to note here that the new administration had no intention of allowing the Turkish control over the weapons. To this end, it was decided, on General Norstad’s advice, to formulate a programme which would deny the Turks to ‘obtain operational knowledge of the entire system during its effective lifetime.’\textsuperscript{80} Deployment finally went ahead, then only after the questions over the control of weapons which were raised by the previous administration had been answered.

\textsuperscript{77} ‘Memo. From Smith to Merchant’, 22 June 1960, Lot file, NEA, GTI, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk 1958-63, box 1, IRBMs.


\textsuperscript{79} CF, 782.56311/5-2361, ‘Memo, from Fessenden to Kohler’. General Norstad also pointed out the military merit of deployment. He thought that as ‘the critical shortage of missiles delivery systems’ was anticipated to continue up into 1963 to 1965, the Jupiter programme was important militarily. For him, Jupiter squadrons plus Polaris submarine assigned to Eastern Mediterranean would create ‘greater strength than submarine alone’. But he saw the real significance of Jupiter programme from ‘a psychological and political’ standpoint. ‘Tel. from Thurton to SoS’, no. 4669 (included verbatim text of Norstad’s message to the Defense Secretary and Chief of JCS), 26 April 1961, \textit{EL}, Norstad Papers, box 90, Turkey-General.

4. Conclusion

The decision to approach Turkey for IRBM deployment took sixteen months to make after IRBMs had been offered to NATO in December 1957, and the conclusion of the agreement took another six months. This happened despite the belief in military circles in the United States that the weapons to be stationed on the Turkish soil were to provide an extended coverage of the Soviet territory, and that as such they were an important addition to the Western deterrent power. Although Turkish deployment faced similar problems to those which emerged in other NATO countries (such problems as command and control, finance and choosing the location of sites), they were made more complicated by Turkey’s proximity to the Soviet Union, the presumed characteristics of the Turks, the political situation of the country and political developments in the Middle East. It proved to be difficult to find convincing answers to all the concerns raised within the administration at a time when confidence in the technical capabilities of the first generation weapons was rapidly fading. Given the magnitude of the political and financial problems involved, some agencies within the Department of State, the PPS and NEA in particular, regarded the Turkish IRBM capability as a liability rather than an asset. They were anxious to clarify all political and financial problems before any decision was made on deployment and their concerns were voiced on several occasions at the top of the administration. As a result, the pace of progress was rather slow. Even after the September 1959 agreement, some in the State Department were still uncomfortable with Turkey as a host of missile sites. The volatile internal political situation of the country throughout 1960 further obstructed the progress and actually nothing had been accomplished on the ground before the Eisenhower administration left the office in January 1961.

In the Turkish case, the Americans paid much more attention to the possible Soviet reaction to the missile deployment than they did in other NATO countries (with the exception of West Germany where Moscow threatened that the deployment might stall negotiations on the German unification for ever). To minimize Soviet antagonism, they preferred to approach France and Italy first. They were also rather cautious about the
possibility that the Soviet Union might exploit the introduction of IRBMs in Turkey in order to persuade neutral countries in the Middle East that the West had aggressive intentions, and step up its pressure on such Western-oriented countries in the region as Iran and Pakistan. The problems relating to the control of weapons were also assessed in the light of the Soviet concerns. The Turkish programme did not involve wider technological co-operation in the production of nuclear delivery systems, as in the cases of Britain and France, but there was a possibility that the Turks, at some time in the future, would gain the physical control of the missiles as the arrangements on deployment proposed eventually the indigenous manning of IRBM squadrons. What was different in the Turkish case was that the US administration unequivocally stated that America could be dragged into a war as a result of Turkey’s firing these weapons in haste or in error. If the control of weapons was lost to the Turks, it was likely that in a crisis situation, the Soviet Union (fearing that they would be used by the Turks), would take preventive action against them, which would potentially escalate into a wider crisis. Furthermore, it was pointed out that an unfriendly government might come to power in Turkey and that in this case it would be too difficult to withdraw the weapons quickly.

The issue of how to finance the missile programme also added to the difficulties. The principal concern was that unless extra financial sources were made available, the funds used for the construction of missile sites might hinder the modernization of Turkey’s conventional capabilities. At this juncture, it should be noted that the main thrust of providing the Turkish military with sophisticated weapons, as noted in the previous chapter, was to help Ankara to reduce its manpower requirements. The US administration did not consider at any time that the IRBM deployment might have such an effect.

The issue of IRBM deployment in Turkey indicated the limits of Washington’s action in terms of its relation with a junior partner in NATO. Turkey could have been excluded from the December 1957 decision or the plan for deployment in Turkey could have been cancelled in 1959. But this was not desirable for political reasons. The Menderes government saw the IRBM deployment in Turkey as evidence of America’s
commitment to the country’s security. Therefore, exclusion or cancellation would have weakened American credibility in the eyes of Turks and led them to believe that they discriminated against within the alliance. This could have had far reaching implications for the cohesion of NATO, which was regarded as the backbone of the Western collective security system. Following a revision of Turkish programme in April-May 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to proceed because of similar concerns. This time the reasons given were the adverse effects of any cancellation on the British and Italian programmes, and the need to reinforce Turkish confidence in the United States. All in all, the American worries about the Turkish deployment and increasing obsolescence of the first generation IRBMs neither prevented the Eisenhower administration from concluding the missile deal in the fall of 1959 nor induced the Kennedy administration to cancel the plan in the summer of 1961. This clearly showed that if American credibility was at stake, it was difficult for the US administrations to abandon a commitment even if it was made to a lesser ally within NATO.
Aim of coverage is based on assumed IRBM range of 1500 n.m.
Launching sites are arbitrarily chosen; effective sites within various
countries could give up to several hundred miles deeper coverage.

MAP 3. IRBM Deployments around the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Source: SNIE 100-4-58, Probable Soviet Reactions to US Deployment of IRBMs on
the Soviet Bloc Periphery', 15 April 1958, US National Archives, Records of the CIA,
CHAPTER SIX

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE POSITION OF TURKEY, 1956-60

1. Introduction

In the period between the Suez war of late 1956 and the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the primary American objectives in the Middle East were the denial of the region to the Eastern bloc and continued Western access to its oil resources. However, this time additional commitments were made to achieve these objectives. Assuming that the Western position in the region had weakened as a result of the Suez war, the US administration adjusted its Middle East policy immediately after the war. The result was the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine in January 1957, which pledged American economic and military aid to the pro-Western countries of the Middle East, as well as the use of American military forces 'to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.'

It was designed to curtail the influence of anti-Western elements in the region, particularly that of Arab nationalists led by Egypt. While the new policy succeeded in attaining its principal objectives, this did not mean that it rightly diagnosed the problems of the region. As to the net result of the doctrine, John Campbell observed that 'at the close of the year 1959 the United States had perhaps less direct influence in the Arab Middle East than at any time in the past five years'. Such an outcome clearly showed that the central assumption on which the doctrine was based (the principal source of threat to the region was international communism), was difficult to sell in the region. In overcoming the difficulties the US faced, having

regional allies, such as Turkey, was very helpful. Indeed, Turkey at this time was in a position to contribute to the implementation of the US Middle East policy by offering her political, diplomatic and logistic support in return for increased US economic and military assistance and US backing of Turkey's position on the international stage. ³

The aim of this chapter is to analyse and assess US-Turkish co-operation in the Middle East context by explaining how the US policy makers considered Turkey's position in relation to the Eisenhower doctrine, both as one of the countries it was supposed to protect against aggression and as a contributor to the implementation of the doctrine. The period from the end of the Suez war to the end of Eisenhower administration's tenure in office witnessed such major crises in the Middle East as the Syrian crisis of September-November 1957, the military coup in Iraq on July 14, 1958, and the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively soon after the coup in order to shore up the pro-Western regimes. There were also some lesser crises such as the ones on the Syrian-Turkish border in November 1956 and again in April 1957, and the crisis in Jordan in April 1957. In 1959 and 1960 there were no major crises in the region thanks to reduced international tensions in general and the US decision to accommodate with what was called 'constructive Arab nationalism'. In these years the US also faced the task of revitalising the Baghdad Pact which after the Iraqi revolution had lost its main purpose, which was gathering the Arab and northern tier states together in a pro-Western alliance. In this effort, the inherent weakness of the Iranian monarchy was a particular problem. Taking these developments into account, the subject matter of this chapter will be organised around the following issues: US efforts to bolster the Turkish and Iraqi confidence soon after the Suez crisis; Turkish pressure on Syria from the late 1956 to the end of 1957; the Turkish position regarding the events in Iraq and Lebanon in July 1958; and the transformation of the northern tier alliance after the coup in Iraq. In an effort to better understand the complex issues involved, reference will be made to the US conception of Arab nationalism, neutralism, communist penetration and threat to the Middle East.

The Eisenhower administration identified three major sources of threat to US security interests in the region, namely international communism led by the Soviet Union, Arab nationalism, and the neutralist foreign policy pursued by the Arab nationalists. As noted in the first chapter, the administration acknowledged the importance of nationalism for the emerging Third World nations but judged it from the cold war perspective and was prone to see links between nationalism-neutralism and international communism. Third World nationalism was, in general, anti-Western in nature and adopted an independent foreign policy stance that was against alignment with either bloc. The US policy makers found it quite difficult to accept these two features of Third World nationalism. For example, referring to Stalin's lecture on the 'Foundations of Leninism', Secretary Dulles concluded that nationalism was seen by Soviet teaching as a means to weaken the Western position in the Third World.4

As stated in the third chapter, the American approach towards Arab nationalism before the Suez crisis was quite pragmatic. Although Washington did not like Soviet support for nationalist Arab regimes, Arab sensitivities were taken into account (as in the case of US reluctance to encourage the expansion of the Baghdad Pact to include Arab states other than Iraq). But the Suez crisis tilted the balance in favour of more stronger ties with the traditional regimes. The review of US policy, carried out following the

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4 'Minutes of Cabinet Meeting', 18 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.79. Evidence shows that the President agreed in general with the ideas that established linkage between communism and nationalism. For example, in a letter to the Ambassador James P. Richards, who was about to set off a mission to explain Eisenhower doctrine to the Middle East countries, the President endorsed the idea that a government which 'determined to avoid taking any stand in the cold war in fact tolerates the growth of communist influence.' US National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File (Hereafter cited as CF. The date is the sequence of numbers following the '/ 'in any reference, arranged in the order of month followed by day, then year.) 120.1580/2-957, 'James P. Richards to the Secretary, Tab B, Letter from the President to Ambassador Richards Setting Forth the Terms of Reference for his Mission to the Middle East'.

Suez crisis and involving the State and Defense Departments, was indicative of the prevailing cold war mentality within the administration. It was repeatedly emphasised during this review that the Soviet Union would probably not undertake military intervention in the region. However, it was believed that Moscow had recently encouraged nationalist regimes to adopt a neutralist stand and supplied them with economic and military assistance. In this sense, Arab nationalism facilitated communist bloc penetration into the region. This reasoning led Americans to see nationalist regimes as the proxies of international communism and thus rendered it useless to make a distinction between Arab nationalism and communism. Nationalist dissidents within the pro-western countries were also put in the same category. In short, Washington tended to devise, in the words of William Stivers, 'an anti-Communist rationale for anything the United States did in the region, whatever the Soviet involvement, or lack of it.'5

However, the administration had not always been so strict on nationalism and neutralism. Consistent with its general policy, it did not give up the idea of promoting them where this served US interests. Thus it was thought that the Third World nations could serve as a counter-balance to Communist penetration if they were opposed to communism. The course of events following the successful intervention in Lebanon in July 1958 presented an opportunity to review the US policy towards the nationalists which thus far had not been very successful. The immediate reason for the review was the realisation that Egyptian President Nasser had become involved in a dispute with Moscow over communists in Iraq and also restricted communist influence in Syria, which formed a union with Egypt in February 1958. As early as January 1958, however, the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department pointed out that the prestige of the US and that of the West was on the decline whereas Soviet influence was on the increase. It was concluded that this was mainly because the US was opposed, in the eyes of the majority of Arabs, ‘to the realization of the goals of Arab nationalism, and that the Soviet Union managed to convince the Arabs that it supported the attainment of Arab objectives without a quid pro quo’. After the Iraqi

coup, Americans thought that accommodation with Arab nationalism would help to restore the prestige of the West. What the elements of moderation in Egyptian policy did was to facilitate this accommodation.⁶

The emerging US policy did not, however, mean a complete US recognition of Arab nationalistic objectives. It was selfish to the extent that it wanted to divert Arab nationalism to the channels more acceptable to the Western interests, hence only those nationalistic objectives which were dubbed ‘positive’ received American support. A memo presented to the NSC Planning Board, for example, recommended that ‘the United States accept the goals of Arab nationalism’, describing them as ‘independence, self-determination, the right to choose neutralism, social and economic reform, and equitable arrangements of oil resources’.⁷ By establishing a working relationship with Arab nationalists, the paper claimed, the US could ‘constructively influence and stabilize the movement and to contain its outward thrust’. Accordingly, it was proposed that US policy should endorse ‘neutralist policies of states in the area’ as long as their relations with the Soviet bloc were ‘reasonably balanced by relations with the West’.⁸

Although Washington tried to adopt a more positive approach, two other factors in American policy hindered the further improvement of relations with nationalists. Firstly, the value of the Middle East was assessed in terms of its contribution to the security and prosperity of Western Europe. There was a strong conviction in Washington that the Soviet Union concentrated on weakening ‘the West economically and strategically, notably through the reduction of Western access to Middle East oil’. The US, therefore, should act firmly if the Soviets were to be prevented from

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'controlling Europe through oil'\textsuperscript{9} This understanding inevitably led to the US support for American and West European oil interests in the region in general, and for the British position in particular.\textsuperscript{10} Secondly, support for the security of Israel remained one of the main pillars of the US policy despite Washington exerting pressure on Israel to evacuate the territory it occupied during the Suez war.\textsuperscript{11} Under these circumstances, whether the Soviet Union was involved in Middle Eastern affairs or not, it was hardly possible for the US to formulate a policy which would please Arab nationalists. Nevertheless, the policy of accommodation with Arab nationalism brought about some improvement in US-Arab relations in 1959 and 1960.

3. The Eisenhower Doctrine

When the abortive Anglo-French military action on Egypt ceased on the evening of November 6, 1956, there was a general perception that the influence of old colonial powers in the Middle East had been seriously weakened. Eisenhower and Dulles firmly believed that the Suez crisis created a power vacuum in the region which the Soviet Union could easily fill, since it supported the Arabs before and during the crisis against the Western powers and Israel. This conviction led to the review of American Middle East policy in November and December 1956. Its outcome was presented to the Congress on 5 January 1957, which became a reality in the form of a Joint


\textsuperscript{10} The existence of American and Western interests in the region narrowed the space for manoeuvre for the US administration particularly at times of crises. At the height of Lebanon intervention, for example, Eisenhower told the Cabinet that the US can do little to please nationalists in the Middle East 'in view of the interests [they and their Western allies] have there.' Sharmen Adams, First Hand Report, (London, 1962), p.233 and 'Minutes of Cabinet Meeting', 18 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.79.

William Stivers argued that the belief in the precedence of Western Europe over the Middle East, what he called 'Euro-centric tunnel vision', was embraced firmly by the Eisenhower administration. For him, the President 'was concerned with problems only to the extent they affected direct Western interests.' In this context, the protection of oil interests was of utmost importance. Stivers, 'Eisenhower, p.216. Nigel John Ashton, however, came to view that the cold war perspective was very dominant in the American approach. As a result, although US and UK policies towards the Middle East were in harmony in general, they differed from each other in detail. For example, the Americans sought to improve their relations with the nationalists while the British opposed this fearing that it would weaken their oil interests in the Persian Gulf area. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, pp.208-09.

\textsuperscript{11} ‘NSC 5801/1 Statement by the NSC on Long-Range US Policy toward the Middle East', 24 Jan. 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.19.
Congressional Resolution on Mach 9, what is known as the Eisenhower doctrine. The Resolution authorised the President to use, at his discretion, up to $200 million for the fiscal year 1957 as economic aid to any Middle Eastern country which requested it. In addition, in a major deviation from previous policy, it gave the President the power to employ US armed forces, whenever necessary, 'to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.'

During the policy review, three alternatives were considered: US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the creation of a new grouping, and dealing on a nation-to-nation basis under authority that would be granted to the President by the Congress. The first alternative came to a head soon after the Suez crisis which enabled the proponents of the Pact to put forward their ideas more forcefully than before. US adherence to the Pact, they argued, would bolster defence in the region, would fill the vacuum created by the weakening of British prestige and influence, and would be welcomed by the members of the Pact. In addition to the JCS and Defense Department, US representatives in the regional members of the Pact were urging the State Department for immediate membership. They argued that if the demands of existing friends of the West were rejected, this would result in their political and military isolation. To them, adherence to the Pact was simply the best way to bolster their resistance against Soviet expansionism. The Secretary and the Near Eastern section of the Department had never been responsive to these ideas. Their main consideration was that adherence to the Pact would limit the flexibility of the US in dealing with the regional issues. Firstly, the image of partnership with the British in the wake of Suez crisis would 'pose [an] especially difficult problem'.

Secondly, it would antagonise King Saud of Saudi Arabia whom the US was recently trying to build up as a counter to Nasser. Thirdly, to negotiate with Egypt over the status of the Suez Canal could be more difficult after joining the Pact. But most important of all, it was believed that the Senate was unlikely to approve a proposal of membership without an accompanying security guarantee to

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13 Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, pp.104-05.
Israel. Giving such a guarantee was totally undesirable given the strong opposition it would receive from Arab countries and even from some of the Pact countries.

Assuming that the Baghdad Pact could never be a suitable vehicle for the promotion of US influence in the Middle East, some in the State Department advocated the idea of creating a broadly based organisation involving the Afro-Asian countries to replace the Pact. It was expected to be a forum for co-operation between these countries and the West on the basis of Western respect to their nationalist aspirations. These views ran counter to the Euro-centric vision that dominated the Eisenhower administration. Not only the proponents of the Baghdad Pact, but also the European Affairs section of the State Department, was against the creation of a new organisation on the grounds that it would further weaken the position of European allies in the region.\(^\text{14}\) Given the circumstances which prevailed in the region, it was thought that a new grouping was at best not feasible.

The last option, dealing on a bilateral basis under the authority granted by Congress, was preferred since it would allow flexibility in dealing with the nations within and outside the Pact, and in the process would help to develop a new kind of relationship without destroying the old one. Eisenhower and Dulles agreed on a ‘package deal’ that combined economic, political, and military features with the aim of not only improving regional defence against communism, but also creating an opportunity to resolve the outstanding regional problems.\(^\text{15}\) They also decided to tie the resolution to ‘communist imperialism’ rather than to relate it simply to ‘possible hostilities between the states of the Middle East’. It was thought that the Congress was unlikely to approve a resolution that was giving such a sweeping power to the President (particularly the authority to employ the US armed forces in the region at his discretion) unless it specifically aimed at international communism, which the Congress and the American people perceived as a ‘clear and present danger’.\(^\text{16}\)


\(^{15}\) ‘Telephone Call From the President’, 8 Dec. 1956, *FRUS*, 1955-57:12, pp.395-98,

To the US administration, there was a need to prevent 'the establishment by international communism of control or decisive influence over any Middle Eastern state', and the Eisenhower doctrine was designed to this end. Central to this doctrine was the belief that the regional status quo should be preserved because it was, as Robert W. Stokey pointed out, 'vital to the American national interests and world peace.' Clearly, the US was ready to take any action that the situation required.

Various evidence supports the conclusion that the doctrine aimed at the protection of the regional status quo. First of all, the doctrine was seen as a means to bolster the confidence of the Baghdad Pact countries, the cornerstone of status quo in the region. Similarly, the continuity of the British role in the region was a part of US policy. As Wyn Rees has observed, the role of Britain in the Baghdad Pact and in the entire area was not challenged by the US after the Suez crisis; it continued as it was before.18

Secondly, as mentioned at the outset, it was estimated that the Soviet Union would not take direct military action because of the risk of its spreading into a global war. But the Soviet penetration into the region was expected through economic and other means such as the exploitation of anti-Western feelings. Under these circumstances, such a challenge 'could be met successfully', as Dulles put it, 'by restoring confidence of security against any direct aggression and protecting against indirect aggression through economic programs of a size not much larger than previously in being.' Despite its diminishing influence, the Baghdad Pact was performing this function for its members. It was also desirable to encourage other pro-Western regimes outside the Baghdad Pact, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to adopt Western policies and give them support similar to those enjoyed by the Pact countries. Thus, the economic aspect of the doctrine was designed to do more than registering the participation of nations already committed to the West, its focus was on 'winning over


the waverers whose determination and ability to resist international communism was weak.¹⁹

Thirdly, it was predicted that, as the President himself observed, the doctrine would function as a deterrent because it was to ‘put the entire world on notice that [the US was] ready to move instantly if necessary.’ As this determination would prevent further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, he did not expect that the US would need to use its military force against international communism. From this perspective, the Congressional authorisation was helpful in meeting possible indirect Soviet moves because it gave the administration the option to ‘negotiate agreements - not necessarily treaties - to help the Middle East countries economically and militarily.’²⁰ Clearly, the doctrine was designed to score political gains in the cold war.

Finally, the doctrine neither intended to establish closer links with the nationalist regimes of the region nor to resolve regional disputes; these issues were to be dealt with through regular diplomatic methods. Countries such as Egypt and Syria were not expected to support the doctrine since they did not recognise international communism as the paramount danger for the Middle East. They were likely to see it as a ‘politically inspired cold-war step’ and American support for the Baghdad Pact. The administration also made it clear that the doctrine did not represent the entirety of the US policy to the Middle East and did not seek the solution of area problems.²¹ On the whole, the doctrine was a blueprint for preserving the status quo in the region by supporting, both economically and militarily, those regimes sharing the American position on international communism.

The doctrine was criticised mainly on the ground that it was not relevant to the realities of the region which was plagued by rivalries among Arab states and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It asked for the regional countries to divert their attention from the regional

¹⁹ CF, 120.1580/3-157. ‘Memo from Rountree to the Secretary of State’, 9 March 1957.


²¹ ‘Memo from Murphy to SoS’, 15 Dec. 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:12, 411; CF, 780-5 MSP/1-357, ‘Memo from Ware Adams to Mr. Wilcox’. 
problems to the communist threat, despite the fact that communism was seen by the majority of the regional states as a distant threat. In practice, it led the Americans to see any development which was inimical to Western interests as Soviet, or Soviet inspired, aggression. Thus it was, as Townsend Hoopes put it, 'a form of rhetorical deterrent directed towards the Soviet Union, [and therefore it was] an abstract, inflatable, ideological device.'

As the administration was to discover later, the doctrine was not a particularly suitable tool for practical intervention in the region because it could be invoked only when economic or military help was requested by a nation or group of nations. As will be seen later, in the Syrian crisis of 1957 it could not be invoked even though the developments in Syria were regarded as communist inspired. This difficulty was one of the principal factors that led to the US-Turkish co-operation in the realisation of the main objective of the doctrine, the maintenance of the regional status quo.

4. The New US Policy Towards the Middle East and Turkey

4.1 Turkish Security Considerations after the Suez Crisis

Turkey was one of the countries in the Middle East on which the repercussions of the Suez crisis had immediate security effects. At that time, the Turks believed that the rising spectre of nationalism and neutralism in the region resulted in a corresponding decline in their position. To compensate for this, they requested from the US more military assistance and its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and from NATO more support against Soviet activities and the establishment of formal links with the Baghdad Pact. The US response to these requests can be explained in the light of its policy of taking a more active role in the region, as envisaged in the Eisenhower doctrine.

The conviction that the Soviet Union was seeking to weaken Turkey through a 'policy of encirclement and isolation' was the principle security concern in Ankara soon after

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22 Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, (London, 1974), p.407. As one critic observed, the doctrine turned in time to be 'the creation of formal restrictions on the Arab states' freedom of action.' Stookey, America and the Arab States, p.148.
the Suez crisis.\textsuperscript{23} As evidence for their apprehension, the Turks cited what the Minister of Defence regarded as a Soviet attempt to turn Syria into a Soviet ‘stronghold’ and to create in this way ‘a dangerous threat against Turkey’.\textsuperscript{24} Reports that Soviet aircraft had flown over Turkey en route for Syria marked the beginning of a new crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations. There was no hard evidence to verify these reports because of the lack of radar equipment in Turkey for detecting high altitude flights. Even if they were detected, the Turkish Air Force had no capability to intercept the type of Soviet aircraft which would be involved in such a flight. It was decided, at a cabinet meeting held on November 14 (presided over by President Celal Bayar instead of Prime Minister Menderes because of the seriousness of the matter), to send a memorandum to the US government describing the dangers which the country faced. It basically asked for the ‘coordination of efforts and exchange of information to meet the Soviet threat’ and unequivocal American support for a warning that Ankara planned to give to Moscow on the question of overflights. Reporting the Turkish note to the Department, Ambassador Fletcher Warren advised that Washington should cooperate with Ankara ‘as fully as possible’, given the ‘great value [of the] Turks as steadfast US ally [who were] committed to [the West] unqualifiedly’.

The Washington authorities expressed their agreement, in principle, as to the dangers posed by the weakness of the Baghdad Pact countries and growing Soviet influence in the region. They were concerned about the increasing power of the pro-Soviet wing of the military over the Syrian government, which forced the latter to look increasingly to the Soviet Union for support.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, the fact that the Turks lacked the capability

\textsuperscript{23} Oral Sander, \textit{Turk-Amerikan İlişkileri} (Turkish-American Relations) 1947-1964’, (Ankara, 1979), p.156. Reflecting Turkish mood in the winter of 1956-57, Turkish diplomat Zeki Kuneralp, then Political Assistant to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, wrote in his memoirs: ‘The Communist empire had already enveloped us in the north and now it was about to encircle us in the south’.


\textsuperscript{26} \textit{CF}, 684 A-86/11-1456, ‘Tel. from DoS to the Embassy in Turkey’, no.1339.
to respond to alleged Soviet overflights was taken seriously, as it created doubts about the credibility of American guarantees to its allies. But when it came to practical measures, the US response was slow. The provision of Turkey with more advanced radar equipment and aircraft was discussed and the JCS made it clear that such material was 'needed if there [was] to be an adequate defence for Turkey and other areas in the Middle East.' However, there were obstacles to the provision of the equipment required. The Secretary of Defense was of the view that Presidential approval should be given before any commitment to Turkey over and beyond existing military assistance programmes, and this involved a lengthy procedure. Furthermore, the State Department believed that the Turkish reports on the extent of Soviet penetration into Syria were exaggerated. As a result, the US administration committed itself initially only to 'explore ways to contribute to the solution of Turkey's air defense problem', which the Defense Department was assigned to study.27

Another question raised by the Soviet flights concerned NATO's guarantee to Turkey, and the co-operation and coordination within NATO over Middle East issues. The Turkish government maintained that these flights constituted an attack against Turkey and thus Article 5 of the NATO treaty on security guarantees to member states should be invoked. This view was rejected by US officials on the grounds that the overflights might only be considered as a violation of air space rather than armed aggression. Ankara also asked that the responsibility for Turkey's air defence should be assigned to NATO. This was not desirable to such members as Belgium, Norway and Portugal because they thought that it would trigger NATO action in a case 'which might be based on some local situation rather than on a NATO-wide issue.'28 Furthermore, the alliance was preoccupied at that time in restoring solidarity among its members which had been undermined by the American reaction to the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt, what the Secretary General of the organisation called 'the biggest rift in the

27 'Memo of Conversation: Defense of Turkey', 10 Nov. 1956, FRUS, 1955-57:24, p. ; 'Tel. from DoS to the Embassy in Turkey', 10 Dec. 1956, ibid., p.706. When the President was briefed by the State Department officials about the measures taken to enhance Turkish confidence, he demanded a study on the availability of additional interceptor aircraft to them. CF, 782-5/11-2056, 'Memo from MacArthur to Hoover'.

Atlantic Alliance since its inception. In the absence of clear support from the US, the Turks failed to turn Syria into a NATO issue, but they attempted to convince other members of the alliance to establish closer and more effective relations with the Baghdad Pact in December 1956. At a NATO Council meeting acting Foreign Minister, Ethem Menderes, informed the participants about the ‘potential danger’ to NATO, Turkey and the Baghdad Pact posed by growing Soviet influence in Syria. To meet this threat, he suggested, NATO and the Baghdad Pact should work more closely although there was no contractual relationship between them. The Council then agreed on an evaluation of threat to the southern flank of the alliance. On the issue of formal relations between the two pacts, the Americans objected to the establishment of such ties lest ‘it might imply extension of NATO commitments’. For them, such a move might prompt Moscow to take countermeasures which could potentially spark off tension in the Middle East. However, they encouraged indirect contacts between the two organisations through Turkey and the UK, common members of both pacts, with a view to ensuring that regional plans were consistent and mutually supporting.

Turkey also sought to have the US adhere to the Baghdad Pact, believing that this would improve regional stability, helping to allay her security concerns. At a Pact meeting in Tehran on November 9, 1956, Prime Minister Menderes told to representatives of the member states that he thought that the American:

- reasons for not joining ... were now invalid: (1) US no longer under obligation guarantee Israeli territorial integrity because of (A) Israel’s attack on Egypt and (B) her pretensions ... to territorial expansion. (2) Heretofore US public opinion has not been prepared for US adherence Baghdad Pact but now clear BP is instrument for peace in Middle East area. (3) No necessity trying Egypt or Syria which had aligned themselves with Communist camp. (4) Conversely every reason encourage non-Communist Arab nations join Pact since they would find it in their best interests once they realized Pact ... was instrument for peace and stability.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister made it public that he did not understand why the US, the ‘guiding genius for NATO and SEATO and foster father’ for the Baghdad Pact,

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30 Cf, 780.5/11-2856, ‘Tel. from Embassy in France to SoS’, no. Polto 1252, section one and two.
31 Cf, 780.5/2-1557, ‘Tel. from DoS to Embassy in France’, Topol 1794; CF, 780.5/2-2757, ‘Embassy in France to DoS’, Polto 1990 and CF, 780.5/3-357, ‘Embassy in France to DoS’, no.Polto 2040.
thus far refused to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, which he considered as the 'essential link between those two pacts.' The arguments put forward by Menderes continued to be the basis for Turkish views over the following months.

Given that the regional members of the Baghdad Pact needed urgent external support soon after the Suez crisis, the US no longer had the luxury of keeping itself at a distance from them. Washington feared that the failure to take some measures to prop up Turkey, Iran and Iraq would seriously weaken their confidence in the United States. The deterioration of relations between Syria and Turkey in November 1956, which rekindled Turkish fear of encirclement by hostile powers, was the first case that forced Washington to come out openly in support of the Baghdad Pact. Although US officials did not conclude that Syria was about to become a Soviet satellite, they were worried that 'continuation of present extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet trend in Syria' would, among other things, potentially threaten Western oil supplies from the region, and 'further weaken the military position of the Baghdad Pact countries and increase the defense problems of Turkey and Iraq.' Taking the wider implications of the Syrian issue into account, the US preferred to announce its support publicly for the Baghdad Pact rather than for Turkey alone. To this end, a press release by the Department of State, dated November 9, declared that a 'threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members' would be viewed by the United States 'with the utmost gravity'. This guarantee however impressed neither the member states, who kept on asking for US adherence to the Pact, nor the proponents of the membership within the administration such as the JCS, who argued that it did 'not go far enough to assure the end result which is required.'

American relations with the Baghdad Pact countries entered into a new stage with the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine. Washington expected that, because the doctrine embodied open political support for the regional allies of the West, the

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33 'SNEI 11-10-56', 'Soviet Actions in the Middle East', 24 Nov. 1956, as note 9.
pressure on the US for adherence to the Pact would lessen. But, as far as the Turkish government was concerned, it turned out to be a fresh opportunity to convince the US to do more in order to meet the security concerns of the Baghdad Pact countries in general and of Turkey in particular.\textsuperscript{35} Although the Turks acknowledged that the issue of military assistance to their country was dealt with in the context of the modernisation of NATO forces, they nevertheless expected to receive aid over and beyond present assistance programmes as a result of the implementation of the doctrine. Their argument was based on the conviction that, in granting aid, US ‘must distinguish between friends on the one hand and enemies and neutrals on the other.’ This demand was totally justified according to Fletcher Warren, the US Ambassador in Ankara, because, among others, Turkey’s prestige in the Middle East depended on the US treatment of her as an ally and the success of new American Middle East policy needed all Turkish assistance possible.\textsuperscript{36} Although Washington officials accepted these views in principle, their position on what to do in practice was different. For them, the essence of the new US policy was the ‘use of US armed forces under certain circumstances’; the local economic and military aspect of it envisaged ‘broader cooperation’ in the area but was mainly directed at non-pact countries with whom the US had little or no bilateral aid programmes. It was noted that the current military aid programme for Turkey was larger than the $200 million figure allocated for the entire area for 1957 under the Eisenhower doctrine.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35}‘Memo. from Owen T. Jones to William Rountree: Appointment of Ambassador Gork’, 15 Jan. 1957, Lot file, 58 D 610, Subject Files Relating to Turkey, box 2, Field Correspondence.


\textsuperscript{37}CF, 120.1580/2-2257, ‘Tel. From DoS to the Embassy in Turkey’, no.2005. This counter-argument was accepted by the Turks less than wholeheartedly. However, it should also be noted that the Turkish argument for extra assistance was weakened by a study conducted for the JCS which revealed that the Turkish air defence systems were not so poor as initially appeared in terms of modern equipment. Turkey was given seven radar systems having the same capability as those used in continental United States. According to the Department of Air Force thus far the Turkish Air Force had failed to install and utilise these systems effectively. Despite this conclusion, action had been initiated to increase the number of systems to eleven in the near future. ‘Memo for Admiral Radford, enclosures A and C’, 22 April 1957, \textit{US National Archives}, RG 218, Records of the JCS, Chairman’s File (Radford) 1953-57, box 14, 091 Turkey.
Despite this reservation, Washington did take some practical measures to show continuing US interest to the Turkish case. For example, Ambassador Richards, the President’s Special Representative who was on a fact finding mission to the Middle East countries to explain to them the purposes of the Eisenhower doctrine, was instructed to tell the Turks that they would receive a squadron of advanced aircraft (F-100) and a submarine, which was later incorporated into the general military assistance programme. As further evidence of US interest in Turkey’s air defence, US aircraft and a supporting radar unit were deployed at Adana in April 1957, in what the State Department considered to be ‘a significant contribution to [the] defense of Turkey’.38

It should also be noted that the Middle Eastern developments coincided with ongoing American planning to provide the Turks with more modern weapons so that they could reduce the manpower of their army. One option was the deployment of combined US-indigenous atomic capable ground forces to defend the Turkish Straits, which initially consisted of two battalions of Honest John short range missiles for 1957. The JCS recommended carrying out the programme ‘at the earliest practicable date’.39 Before committing the US politically, however, the Department asked the view of the Embassy in Ankara amid Soviet propaganda which implied that those countries receiving US atomic units might become an ‘atomic battleground’ in the event of nuclear war. Ambassador Warren replied that the Turkish government and military was ready to take such a risk and therefore they would look favourably on this offer.40 The deployment went ahead in the following years on the basis that atomic war-heads remained in US custody. US officials tried to give the impression that there was no

38 ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to the DoS’, 22 March 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:24, p.712; CF, 711-56382/4-2257; ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS’, no.2431 and 711-56382/4-2257; ‘Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Turkey’, no.2539. It was significant that this deployment was planned just before the meeting of the Baghdad Pact so that Menderes could demonstrate regional members of the Pact its meaning ‘in relation to the President’s programme. CF, 782.5/3-2857, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS’, no.2236.

39 The US Army Missile Command in Turkey was to be assigned to SACEUR, proving that authority to expend weapons remained in the US command channels. ‘JCS 2073/1411: Ground Atomic Support Command Forces for the Defense of the Turkish Straits’, 13 May 1957, RG 218, Geographical file 1957, box 26, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2) s 81.

relationship between this deployment and the defence of the Middle East. However, given the importance of the Straits, and the tacit understanding that any increase in the Turkish defence capability would also serve to augment Middle East defence, such a relationship was strongly implied.

4.2. The Syrian Crisis of 1957

The first major case in which the applicability of the Eisenhower doctrine was tested was the Syrian crisis of the summer 1957. It started in August when Syria accused the US of plotting a coup against her government and turned into a regional crisis between Syria and Turkey by the end of the month. The involvement of the superpowers from September through November made it a textbook example of a cold war crisis. An attempt will be made in this sub-section to illustrate to what extent Turkey helped to realise US objectives in the Middle East.

To restate the points already made in this study about Syrian-Turkish relations, mutual antagonism had marred relations between the two since the return of Sanjak of Alexanderetta (a province of Syria during the French occupation) to Turkey in 1939. In the 1950s, while Turkey allied with the West, there was uncertainty about Syria’s political orientation. By the end of 1954, the emerging political trend in Syria was ‘markedly leftist in orientation, manifested in a committed neutralist and ... anti-Western foreign policy.’ Turkish efforts in January 1955 to persuade Syria to join Turkey and Iraq to form the Baghdad Pact weakened the moderate regime in Damascus, and by the end of February a pro-Nasser, leftist coalition had formed a new government. In March 1955, Syria leant towards the anti-Baghdad Pact grouping led by Egypt. At that time the US, believing that the Soviet Union had not yet won control

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41 'Memo of Conversation [Defence-State Department]', 13 March 1957, Lot file, 67 D 548, box 144, Turkey.

42 To the JCS, the 'Turkish military forces and their potential must be considered in the development of any defense plans for the Middle East.' 'JCS 1887/363: Report by the Middle East Planning Committee to the JCS, section D', 29 May 1957, RG 218, Geographical File 1957, box 5, EMMEA (11-19-47) s.59A.

over the Syrian government, preferred to influence the course of events in Syria through Saudi Arabian diplomatic efforts, rather than heavy-handed Turkish diplomatic and military pressure. Washington was worried about Soviet penetration into Syria soon after the Suez war, but any Turkish involvement was not desirable at this stage. The American position, however, began to change gradually from late April 1957.

A short-lived constitutional crisis in Jordan at the end of April (which broke out when King Hussein dismissed his pro-Nasser Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, who both opposed the Eisenhower doctrine) was the first occasion when Turkey served the purposes of the new American policy towards the Middle East. There was concern in Washington that Syria, taking advantage of the crisis, might intervene overtly in Jordan. In order to create pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces from Jordan, which had been sent there during the Suez crisis, Secretary Dulles urged the Turkish government to disclose their interest in developments in Jordan 'by strengthening their forces near Syrian border'. Conveying this message, Ambassador Warren told Menderes explicitly that the US government was 'not asking and would not like to see the Turks go beyond their borders. To do so would be a great disservice.' Despite this warning, the Turkish response was stronger than Washington suggested. Dulles clarified the US position and suggested Turkey should 'not ... penetrate [into] Syrian territory.' An element of restraint was clearly visible on the part of the US in April, therefore; but the lack of it was largely responsible for widening the scope of the crisis in September-October 1957. Meanwhile, thanks to the US-led diplomatic and military

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45 In November 1956, Britain and Iraq, with American blessing, attempted to overthrow the Syrian Government (what came to be known as the Operation Straggle). Turkish involvement in this action was ruled out by London and Washington. Lesch, *Syria and the United States*, p.83.
46 *CF*, 782.54/4-2457, 'Tel. from SoS to the Embassy in Turkey', no.2501. By the time this suggestion was made, military preparations had already begun. But American Ambassador was told by the Ankara authorities that the Embassy would be informed about future moves and be consulted as necessary. 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.2458.
47 *CF*, 782.54/4-2557, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.2464; *CF*, 782.54/4-2657, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no 2457. According to the Turkish Garrison Commander in Iskenderun (Alexenderatta) approximately three divisions and several brigades massed on the Syrian border on April 28. More importantly, 'Turkish jet aeroplanes had been flying back and forth from Gaziantep [Turkey] to Aleppo [Syria].' Evidently, the Syrian air-space was penetrated. *CF*, 782.54/5-1057, 'Despatch from Embassy in Turkey to DoS: Movements of Turkish Troops', no.724.
efforts, particularly the presence of the US Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Turkish military pressure on Syria, King Hussain was able to consolidate his position. 8 Although Syria withdrew its troops from Jordan without much resistance, the Americans concluded from the Jordan crisis that a leftist government in Syria might destabilise pro-Western Arab regimes.

The fear that the Syrian government was under communist influence had been the most important determinant of the US policy towards Syria in the summer of 1957. By-elections of May 4, which produced three additional leftist members in the parliament, further illustrated that pro-Western elements in the country were constantly loosing ground. Reporting these developments, the American Ambassador to Syria, James Moose, noted that the country 'wilfully became [a] base for anti-American propaganda, leftist penetration of labor, sabotage and Communist activity throughout the area.' It was therefore a strong possibility that the Soviet Union would soon dominate its economic, military and political affairs. In a similar vein, Secretary Dulles told the NATO foreign ministers at their May meeting that the Soviet efforts to 'establish Communist domination in [the Middle East] may have succeeded in one case [Syria].' 49 This effectively meant the approval of Turkish views previously expressed on NATO platforms. NATO itself later acknowledged that Syria might become a Soviet satellite in the near future and that the strengthening of its armed forces with Soviet assistance presented a threat to the alliance's southern flank. From the end of May, until the US was accused of plotting against the Syrian government on August 12, it became the American position to 'maintain minimum official contacts ... while endeavouring discreetly' to encourage the opposition against the Syrian government.50

50 'JCS 2073/1420: Report to the JCS: SACEUR Request for Intelligence Information on Syria and Egypt', 9 July 1957, RG 218, Geographical File 1957, box 26, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2) sec.82; 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Syria', 28 May 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:13, p.619.
The State Department not only categorically denied any involvement in a plot, but also presented the Syrian accusations as evidence of the Syrian government’s intention ‘to do anything to advance the case of the Soviet Union in the Middle East’ (a reference to the economic and military co-operation Syria signed with the Soviets on August 6). Consequently, they instructed American representatives in Arab capitals to inform their hosts of this line and to ‘say nothing beyond the printed State Department release.’ At the same time the administration was trying to judge whether Syria might become a Soviet satellite in the Eastern European style. Secretary Dulles was of the view that charges of an American plot were a step in this direction but he was not sure how far it had gone along this line. He informed the President that the best policy would be to avoid any statement or implication that would mean the US had determined that ‘Syria [was] controlled by International Communism within the meaning of the Middle East resolution’. He also noted that ‘I will avoid any statement that you think it is not so controlled’. But it was certain that the situation was, as Dulles remarked, ‘wholly unacceptable.’ To him, whatever action the US might take in future, one thing was certain: ‘all...effort should be directed on the basis that we [the US] could not afford to have exist a Soviet Satellite not contiguous to the Soviet border and in the mids of the already delicate Middle East situation.’

The Syrian crisis showed that the Eisenhower doctrine was not easily applicable to all cases in the Middle East. Although it was believed that Syria was about to be controlled by communism, it was not possible to invoke the doctrine because the Syrian government neither believed in the existence of a communist threat nor asked for US assistance to combat it. US officials were not slow to realise this. Answering a question about Syria, the President said publicly, departing from the position he agreed previously with Dulles, that this was ‘not one of these instances that at present justify


any kind of action at all under the ... [Eisenhower] doctrine.' But this public
acknowledgement did not mean that the US was not seeking other ways to influence
the developments there. What Dulles wrote to British Premier Harold Macmillan made
the US position clear: 'It seems to us that there is now little hope of correction from
within and that we must think in terms of the external'. 54 The administration's
approach consisted of two elements, to assure the concerns of friends and allies in the
region (particularly those bordering Syria), and if possible to persuade them to exert
pressure, including military pressure, on Syria.

In accord with this approach, the neighbours of Syria, including Turkey, were informed
that they would receive full American support as envisaged in the Eisenhower doctrine
in case of a Syrian attack against them. Those countries whose governments were
likely to feel most the affects of the Syrian situation, namely Lebanon and Jordan, were
given particular attention. 55 On August 24, Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Secretary of
State, was sent to the area for consultations with the Muslim neighbours of Syria. His
mission was to explain the dangers posed by a communist Syria. The Turkish, Iraqi and
Jordanian leaders, who were at a conference in Istanbul, agreed with this analysis.
However, when it came to taking some action to contain Syria, they were reluctant for
one reason or another. Jordan and Iraq were in favour of giving priority to diplomatic
means. They wanted to 'secure at least moral support [from] other non-communist
Arab states against Syria becoming [a] Soviet satellite'. 56 Furthermore, King Hussein
not only declined to commit Jordan against Syria but also cautioned Turkey not to take
military action 57. The Iraqi Crown Prince, Abdul Ilah, was willing to exert military
pressure on Syria but his prime minister was against it, fearing that Syria might
retaliate by cutting the pipeline connecting Iraq to the Mediterranean coast, thereby

54 ‘Extract from a Press Conference by the President Eisenhower Regarding the Situation in Syria’ 21
57 According to Mahmut Dikerdem, the Turkish Ambassador in Jordan, the King in fact was happy
with the Turkish pressure on Syria but he felt that he should register in public his allegiance to
Arab solidarity. Dikerdem, Orta Dogu’da Devrim Yillari (The Era of Revolutions in the Middle
East), (Istanbul, 1977), pp. 175-76.
wrecking Iraq’s economy.\textsuperscript{58} Public opinion in the pro-Western Arab countries was also overwhelmingly against such an action. The leftist and nationalist press presented the Henderson mission as evidence of American aggressive intentions. Even the moderate media were critical of it and, as the Embassy in Beirut informed Henderson, the crisis caused moderate Arabs to believe that the ‘West’s real aim is more preservation of Israel than combating communism.’\textsuperscript{59}

Early September 1957 saw a gradual toughening of the Turkish and American position towards Syria. For the Turks, the events of August 1957 vindicated their conviction that Syria had succumbed to international communism, and for this reason, they were in favour of external pressure to reverse the situation there. But Menderes was initially hesitant about acting before the Arabs did (notably Iraq). By September 3, however, the Turkish government came to believe that the ‘existence of [what they saw] a Communist-controlled Syria’ was intolerable and therefore they would take action if the Arabs failed to do so.\textsuperscript{60} On the other hand, the Americans gradually inclined to encourage an increase in the Turkish pressure on Syria. They were convinced that Moscow would try to enhance its influence in the entire region by rendering economic and military aid to Syria. It was feared that Soviet collaboration with a nationalist Arab state might destabilise pro-Western Arab countries, as it would be seen as example of the benefits of Soviet friendship by anti-Western elements in those countries. With this in mind, the American administration decided, on September 7, neither encourage nor discourage any regional country in taking a unilateral action against Syria.\textsuperscript{61} However, the American inaction came to mean in practice the tacit approval of an action. As will be seen, a series of Soviet warnings to Turkey, the first of which was delivered on

\textsuperscript{58} ‘Tel. from Consulate General in Istanbul to DoS’, 3 Sept. 1957, \textit{FRUS, 1955-57:13}, p.672; ‘Memo. of Conversation with the President’, 7 September 1957, ibid., p.685; Ashton, \textit{Eisenhower, Macmillan}, p.130. Iraqi Prime Minster Nuri al-Said resigned on 8 June, and his replacement, Jawdat al-Ayyubi, was more sympathetic to the public opinion in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{CF}, 110.13 HE/ 8-2757, ‘Tel. from Embassy in Lebanon to SoS’, no.554.

\textsuperscript{60} ‘Tel. from Consulate General in Istanbul to DoS’, 3 Sept. 1957, pp.670-72.

September 10, further convinced Washington that a closer association between Damascus and Moscow should be prevented.

Soviet warnings contained the accusation that Turkey had taken part in an American conspiracy to overthrow the Syrian government, which was organised by Loy Henderson during his trip to the area. A letter from Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin to his Turkish counterpart emphasising the massing of Turkish troops followed this trip, claimed that American arms to Turkey were shipped 'to effect an attack against Syria.' He warned that 'the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent' to Turkish military action.62 Designed as a response to Soviet warnings, the State Department transmitted a series of telegrams to the Embassies in Israel, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, containing messages to be delivered orally to the officials there. They underlined the American commitment to the security of these countries in accordance with the Eisenhower doctrine in case of Syrian aggression. To make this assurance more credible it was stated that the US would give extra economic and military aid to those countries which needed it the most, that the Sixth Fleet would continue its mission in the Eastern Mediterranean and the British government fully supported the US position. The message to Menderes requested that Turkey should not act unilaterally. However, it also stated that:

If ... Turkey should feel compelled to react to armed provocation which implied a serious threat to its own national integrity and independence, or if Turkey should come to the aid of any of Syria's Arab neighbors engaged in hostilities with Syria, the United States would support Turkey in the UN. The US also would not stand idly by if the Sino-Soviet Bloc should attack Turkey, directly or by organized volunteers. In that case the US would honor its obligations under the NATO Treaty, and the Middle East Resolution would also be applicable.63

In addition, the Soviet reaction presented an opportunity for the administration to get Congressional support for its policy towards Syria and for US commitments to Turkey, which Secretary Dulles had found difficult to obtain previously.64

The crisis entered a new stage in mid-September with the initiation of intensive diplomatic efforts at both regional and international level. While the US took the issue to the United Nations, Saudi Arabia advocated solving the problem among the Arabs. Syria had taken a conciliatory approach towards the US and her neighbours except Israel and even Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon declared that Syria posed no threat to them. But the US deemed ‘it necessary to take initiative’ in the UN, and this came in the shape of an American accusation that the Soviet Union was seeking domination of the Middle East and harbouring aggressive intentions against Syria and Turkey. To this Moscow responded in kind. As David Lesch has written:

the superpowers ...were not yet ready to put their guns in their holsters. ... In Washington and Moscow, the only thing mattered was the perception of claming victory over the other. Dulles switched venues to the UN in an attempt to do this, and in the process had unwittingly reignited at the international level what was a diminishing crisis. The Kremlin, in turn, could not take Dulles’ onslaught in the UN lying down, and it subsequently added more fuel to the fire with equally bellicose remarks in early October. This diplomatic confrontation correspondingly spilled over into the regional arena and resulted in a heightening of tension between the superpower’s client-states, Syria and Turkey, which, in turn, could have led to a direct superpower confrontation.

As for Turkey’s role in the crisis, which was to continue to exert military pressure on Syria, it could hardly be maintained without firm American support. Indeed, Dulles’ speech in the UN bolstered Turkish confidence. However, what encouraged the Turks more than this was that the US raised the Syria affair in NATO in an effort to obtain maximum allied support for the Turkish position. In a message to the Secretary General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, the State Department expressed the view that Syria had become or was about to become ‘a center for military and subversive activities in the ME [Middle East]’, and that Syria’s neighbours considered this situation as a threat to their security. To the Department, certain precautions taken by Turkey were fully justified, given that the Soviet Union had publicly warned Turkey that it would mass troops on the Turkish border. Spaak was also informed that the US

would 'come to [Turkey's] assistance with armed force' in the event of aggression against her by Sino-Soviet bloc.\(^{68}\) After a request by Spaak for clarification, the Department responded that the 'US has not objected to [the] movement of Turkish forces.'\(^{69}\) Indeed, following these assurances, Turkey not only continued its military manoeuvres in defiance of the Soviet warnings, but also accused Syria firmly of being 'on the way becoming a bridgehead for destructive ends and aggressive ambitions'.

When Moscow warned Turkey again on October 7 that, 'if the rifles fired the rockets could start flying', and accused the US of conspiring with Turkey against the Syrian government, the US went even further by announcing publicly that it would honour its obligations to Turkey under NATO agreement and the Eisenhower doctrine.\(^{70}\)

On October 16, when Syria requested that the UN General Assembly should debate the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border and called for an investigation of the situation on the ground on behalf of the Assembly, attention shifted to diplomatic efforts once again. Before this debate, King Saud of Saudi Arabia offered to mediate between the two sides, and this was immediately accepted by the US. It came as a relief for the Americans, because by the time it was made, US officials realised that if the UN inspection went ahead as proposed, this would mean the inspection of sensitive American sites in southern Turkey, which was totally unacceptable.\(^{71}\) Fortunately for the US, the majority of the Arab states were inclined to give a chance to the Saudi mediation and the debate in the Assembly was suspended on October 22, pending the outcome of this initiative. This time both superpower were willing to let the crisis fade away, resulting in the removal of the issue from the UN agenda on November 1.

Washington might now have secured a UN decision against Syria and the Soviet Union by taking advantage of the Saudi initiative, but feared that this might provoke Moscow

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\(^{68}\) 'Tel. from the DoS to the Embassy in France', 17 Sept. 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:13, pp.706-07.

\(^{69}\) CF, 782.54/9-1957, 'Tel. from SoS to Embassy in France', no. Topol 793. It was later expressed in a NATO meeting that the US 'concurred in the movement of forces', CF, 782.54/9-1957, 'Tel. from Embassy in France to SoS', no.Polto 644.


\(^{71}\) 'Telephone Call to Ambassador Lodge ', 20 Oct. 1957, EL, Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Memoranda of Conversation, box 7, Tel.con.-General Sept. 2, 1957 to Oct. 31, 1957 (1).
to take counter-measures in such places as Europe. The Soviets also wanted to end
the crisis in the wake of their weakened position in the UN, before they lost most of
what they had gained during the crisis, namely deterrence of active intervention in
Syria by the Turks (and the US). This had brought them a ‘rise in prestige and
popularity in the Arab world and increased influence in Syria’. Despite the
agreement in the UN, the crisis lingered on for a while since the Turks were against a
hasty withdrawal on the ground because this would not only refute their initial
argument that the troop concentration was a necessary defensive action but would also
amount to admission of guilt on their part. The Americans continued to support
Turkey’s position in public but in private they favoured gradually relieving the pressure
on Syria. The crisis was finally over when most of the Turkish troops were
withdrawn from the border area in early December.

It is difficult to determine which side gained the most from the crisis. To understand
this, one should explore why the US-Turkish military pressure on Syria (the presence
of the US Sixth fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish troop concentrations)
was exerted. The available evidence does not indicate that American military
preparations were a prelude to an intervention in Syria. Nor did the Americans request
Turkey to initiate a military operation to overthrow the Syrian government. The US
administration was rather pragmatic in its approach to this matter. The Henderson
mission reported to Washington that all the pro-Western countries of the region agreed
‘that no military action would be taken unless there were provocations by the Syrians
giving a basis for invoking self-defense’. The President readily endorsed this finding.
‘We should caution against anything that isn’t sure. That would be the worst thing that

72 Even before the tension rose in the region, the State Department was informed that ‘Syria itself was
not vital to Soviet interests’. But if the Soviets faced a dramatic setback there as a result of Western
counter-measures, the Soviet officials might ‘believe that their interests in Europe, which they do
presently consider vital, would be threatened.’ This view was given a careful consideration in

73 Lesch, Syria and the United States, pp.200-201.

from the Embassy in Greece to SoS’, no.1272; William Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, wrote in similar vein to the Charge in Syria. ‘Letter from Rountree to the
Charge in Syria (Strong)’, 29 Oct. 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:13, p.736; ‘Memo of Conversation:
could possibly be happen [sic]', he said to the Secretary Dulles. 'We should not rush anybody', he continued, 'until they felt perfectly confident we were fulfilling our commitments to the strength of these people.' The administration was also reluctant, in principle, to recommend that any neighbour of Syria (except Israel) should hold back from taking what they saw as necessary measures to protect their vital interests. This was particularly the case for Turkey. Dulles found Turkish action attractive, but to him the political difficulties involved outweighed the expected benefits. On the same subject the President pointed out 'the difficulty of rationalizing the support of Turkey if there was no real provocation.' Top level State Department and intelligence officials assessed that a Turkish move, 'particularly if overt and convincing aggression on the part of Syria cannot be shown', would put the US politically in a difficult position for two reasons. Firstly, if it was taken to the UN, the US would have to choose between either 'spearheading a resolution asking Turkey to withdraw or finding ourselves squarely aligned with Turkey against the Arab world and many other nations.' Secondly, it might force the Soviet Union to attack Turkey 'for prestige reasons', thus leading to 'an open, full scale confrontation' between the superpowers, which was a real possibility given the recent Soviet threats and the US determination to meet them.

There were other reasons for not encouraging a Turkish move as a first resort. There were, for example, misgivings about the likely success of Turkish military action, given the Arab and Soviet reaction against it. Furthermore, as time passed, it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain firm support from Western Europeans, who found the prospect of a superpower conflict particularly alarming. SACEUR's

76 'Memo. of a Conversation With the President [Dulles, Henderson, et al]', 7 Sept. 1957, FRUS, 1955-57:13, p.687; 'Memo. of a Conversation With the President', 1 Oct.1957, EL, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda series, box 5, Meetings with the President 1957 (3).
77 'Memo. of Conversation', 14 Oct.1957, EL, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series, box 5, Meetings with the President 1957 (2).
objection to the Turkish manoeuvres, and to the movements of the Sixth Fleet, was a reflection of their view. For him, it was ‘ridiculous to think of Syria attacking Turkey.’ To Dulles, however, the Western European viewpoint was ‘selfish and unacceptable.’

In the final analysis, however, weakening the cohesion of the Western alliance for the sake of a gain in the Middle East was not desirable.

Military pressure on Syria might have been applied to encourage pro-Western elements to subvert the present government there. However, Washington knew from the outset that opposition groups in Syria were very weak and that US policy could not be based on an assumption that they would take action against the government.

The rationale for exerting a sustained military pressure on Syria can best be explained in terms of US opposition to the establishment of a communist regime in the Middle East. If that happened, in the American view, it would pose an immediate danger to the inherently weak conservative Arab regimes such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and in the long term threaten them militarily with weapons acquired from the Soviet bloc. In short, as Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree put it, the Americans expected:

> that Syro-Soviet relationship may prove disadvantageous to Syria as compared to the relationship of Syria’s Arab neighbors with the West. In other words, a Soviet-oriented Syria should not be allowed to serve as a successful example of benefits of “positive neutralism” which is really “pro-Sovietism”. We should ... use every effective means at our disposal to achieve the above objective.\(^8\)

In this sense American and Turkish objectives were almost identical. Exaggerated or not, the Turks believed that the prospect of increasing Soviet military ties with Syria compounded their security problem, and therefore felt obligated to take countermeasures. The Americans, on the other hand, in view of the above-mentioned objective, encouraged the Turkish military measures since, as Dulles told General Norstad (SACEUR), it ‘would tend to cool off Syrian hotheads.’ Although the Americans put emphasis on the military threat from Syria to its neighbours in public, intelligence reports pointed out that the Syrian forces could not match their Turkish

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counterparts. In fact, they were ‘incapable of defending their country against an invasion by Turkey.’ In order to produce the desired outcome, military pressure was to continue until the Syrians felt its disadvantages. All in all, the US and Turkey strongly asserted that the establishment of a satellite, or near-satellite, relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. Seen from this perspective the outcome of the crisis was a success for the Western camp because Syria remained outside the communist bloc. If this aspect of the Syrian affair is not taken into account, the outcome was a victory for Damascus and Moscow because, from their perspective, the Turkish military threat was thwarted, their bilateral relations were reinforced, and Soviet influence among the Arabs increased.

4.3. The Iraqi Revolution and the Interventions in Lebanon and Jordan

The military coup in Iraq on July 14 was followed by US and UK intervention in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. The fall of conservative Iraqi regime, whose pro-British and anti-Egyptian policies caused a popular discontent, was seen as a harbinger of a tide of revolutionary fervour that could soon engulf the whole area. The pro-Western governments of the region were inherently unpopular, and some of them, such as Lebanon and Jordan, were particularly vulnerable to any political change around them. Considering that the unrest in the region threatened their survival, the Americans and the British decided to intervene in Lebanon and Jordan. Washington’s support for the Lebanese president Camille Chamoun (whose unconstitutional bid for presidency as a second time prompted an internal uprising led by Arab nationalists), was justified on the grounds that the US inaction would result in the loss of US prestige and the military position in the area, as well as calling into question the ‘dependability of

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82 Indeed, American propaganda succeeded to stimulate awareness against the communist activities in the region. When the tension subsided, even Nasser came to the view, for his own reasons, that communist elements in Syria should not be allowed to gain more ascendancy in the government. He approached to the US through an intermediary that if the Americans took their hands off the Syrian affairs, he could eliminate communists within maximum three months. Indeed, in February 1958, when Syria joined Egypt to form United Arab Republic, the communist domination of the Syrian politics was over for the time being. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan, pp.131-33; Lesch, Syria and the United States, pp.202-04.
United States commitments for assistance in the event of need ... throughout the world. \(^{83}\) US officials also believed that support for these two governments was necessary for the stability of the region because Israel, surrounded by pro-Nasser regimes, might attack Jordan if it fell to the radical forces, thereby starting a new Arab-Israel war. The interventions in Lebanon and Jordan were successful in that both achieved their immediate objective of saving the existing regimes in these countries, which created an atmosphere of optimism on the part of the Western powers. Indeed, this success allowed the US to buy time and retain some control over events in the area. This section will explain both the American and Turkish positions vis-à-vis Iraq and US-Turkish collaboration during the intervention in Lebanon.

Among the Baghdad Pact partners, Turkey and Iran were particularly affected by the change of government in Iraq. As in the case of the Syrian crisis, the prospect that Iraq might switch to the communist bloc compounded Turkey’s external security problems, but, unlike the Syrian case, the Iraqi revolution raised rumours in Ankara that the Menderes government could be removed from power in a revolutionary fashion. For these reasons, it was generally believed in Washington and in the region that the Turks would intervene in Iraq. \(^{84}\) This time, however, there was lack of political will on the part of US to reverse the situation in Iraq. Washington was preoccupied with cushioning the potential impact of the Iraqi revolution in the region in the first place, as indicated by the landing of American troops in Lebanon on July 15. American policy makers perceived the Lebanon operation as defensive and were confident that ‘the danger of escalation beyond [the] Lebanese context’ was minimal, so there was little risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union. But, if Turkey intervened, this would prompt a superpower tension as had occurred during the Syrian crisis. \(^{85}\) The US was


\(^{84}\) 'Telephone Call From Secretary Dulles to Selwyn Lloyd', 19 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:11, Microfiche Supplement, document 227.

\(^{85}\) Alan Dowty, Middle East Crisis, US Decision Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973, (Berkley, 1984), p.61; The US was against a British intervention in Iraq because, as Secretary Dulles said to Lord Hood, it ‘would induce problems that we have not even considered.’ 'Memo. of Conversation: US Statement in Support of British Move to Jordan', 17 July 1958, FRUS, 1950-60:11, p.318. Dulles apparently bore in mind the danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union. As expected the Soviet
also more receptive than before to the views of its Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, who saw a Turkish military intervention as an excursion into the Arab world. Furthermore, the knowledge that the new government in Baghdad was not communist-dominated and that a reliable opposition in Iraq was absent facilitated the decision not to back any military action to retake Iraq.

It is difficult to claim that US opposition was the main reason why Turkey did not take action against Iraq. It is true that, in the absence of full US support, a unilateral operation on the part of Turkey was too risky to undertake because of the Soviet reaction it would provoke. Nevertheless, it should also be considered that there was no intention in Ankara to carry out a hasty operation against Iraq. One reason for that was the need for lengthy preparations because of logistical difficulties and the mountainous terrain on the Iraqi border. George S. Harris has rejected the argument that a Turkish move against Iraq was forestalled by Washington, claiming that even if it was intended, Turkey was not prepared militarily to carry it out. In addition, there was silence in Ankara as to what to do about the Iraqi situation in the first two days after the coup.
which further indicated the absence of preparations for a hasty operation. It was predicted by the Americans that Turkey would not act unilaterally without consulting them. By July 20, they certainly knew the Turkish view that ‘an entry into Iraq ... would be folly’, so there was no need to do something on this matter. It is a moot point whether the US and Turkey would have acted if the situation in Iraq further deteriorated. Still it was clear for the policy makers in Washington and Ankara that the threat to use Turkish military force against any Arab state would be counter-productive unless an extreme situation was reached.

A Turkish scholar, Oral Sander, has provided another explanation of how Turkey attempted to invade Iraq. He claimed that Turkey, together with Iran and Lebanon, exerted pressure on King Hussein to assume the powers of head of state of the Arab Union (the loose federation between Iraq and Jordan established in February 1958) so as to produce a pretext for an attack against Iraq. This plan was abandoned when it was learnt that the King of Iraq and other leaders of the old regime were dead. This claim can be refuted on several grounds. First, documentary evidence shows that the real intention of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (not Lebanon) was to encourage the US, not Turkey, to take action against Iraq. Second, the Turkish Embassy in Amman sent a message from King Hussein to Ankara on 14 July, urging that Turkey move against Syria or Iraq and promising Jordanian military support for such an action. Ankara did not reply to it, but a message from Ankara on July 16 asked Ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem to inform the King that the US and UK were asking him to request

89 Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp.65-66. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, found present silence from the Turks ‘disturbing’ at a time when more action was expected from them. ‘Memo. of Conversation with the President’, 16 July 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-60:12, p.75.


92 In a message to the Eisenhower on July 16, the Heads of State of these countries appealed the US to support King Hussein and demanded ‘the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine in the case of the Iraqi-Jordanian Union’s situation’. The next day, Carlos C. Hall, the Minister of Embassy in Turkey, asked Foreign Minister Zorlu whether Turkey and Iran were planning action against Syria and Iraq. In his reply, Zorlu made it clear that Turkey ‘would support any possible US Government action’ by giving ‘moral support’ and making available to the US all of its facilities. On this occasion, Zorlu tacitly ruled out a unilateral action. ‘Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS’, no. 207, 16 July 1958, *EL*, Whitman file, International file, Turkey (2), box 41, and *CF*, 787.00/7-1758, ‘Tel. from Istanbul to the Secretary of State’, no.41.
Western assistance as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{93} Third, there was no evidence of diplomatic activity on the part of Turkey to obtain the US approval of and support for a move against Iraq\textsuperscript{94}; rather it was Israel that lobbied for the US support for a Turkish intervention. According to the Israeli intelligence sources, a joint Turkish-Iranian military action would be welcomed by sections of both the Iraqi Army and civilian population. This claim was not substantiated by the American information and so had no effect on the American position.\textsuperscript{95}

During the Lebanese operation, Turkey tolerated the use of the Adana airbase by the US\textsuperscript{96} as a staging area for troops and equipment transferred from Europe to Lebanon. The use of facilities in southern Turkey to support Middle East defence was not a new idea. Before the Suez war, the American military planners were interested in the stationing of fighter aircraft (with a small nuclear capability) in Adana during peacetime with a view to using them to defend the Baghdad pact area at the outset of general war.\textsuperscript{97} After the promulgation of the Eisenhower doctrine, however, the American focus shifted to having a rapid reaction capability for 'intervention in the Middle East in contingencies short of general war'. To realise this, facilities close to the theatre were of crucial importance, given the fact that most of the American strategic bombers were deployed in Spain and Morocco and the necessity of supplying

\textsuperscript{93} Dikerdem, Ortadoğu ‘da Devrim, pp.183-84, 188. No reference has been made to Dikerdem’s memoirs by Sander.

\textsuperscript{94} According to Zorlu Turkish diplomatic activities, including the proposal to intervene in Iraq, were designed to show that Turkey would fully support an American action. CF, 787.00/7-1758, ‘Tel. from Istanbul to SoS, no 41’.

\textsuperscript{95} The Minister of Israel Embassy in Washington informed the State Department twice on July 14 and again on July 16 that Israeli government suggested that ‘the US encourage Iran and Turkey to take military action immediately in Iraq’. CF, 787.00/7-1458, ‘Memo of Conversation: Israel reaction to situation in Iraq’; and CF, 787.00/1658, ‘Memo of Conversation: Situation in Iraq and Jordan’.

\textsuperscript{96} As Harris pointed out, ‘the troop movement was carried out on notification, rather than consultation with the Turkish authorities.’ Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.67. However, it should also be noted that Turkey welcomed the Lebanon operation politically and indicated that all Turkish facilities would be available if the US decided to take further action in the Middle East. CF, 787.00/7-1758, ‘Tel. from Istanbul to SoS’, no.41. For an idea about the theatre of operation on a typical day (17 July 1958) at the height of this operation, see Map 4, p.256.

troops and equipment from bases in Europe. Washington authorities envisaged that the only place where US forces could be deployed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East was the base at Adana. It was in this context that the Americans considered in the summer of 1957 that the base could be used for intervention in Syria if communist elements seized power in the country.

Efforts to make the Adana base a proper staging area for Middle East operations gathered pace after the Lebanese intervention. One lesson learned from this operation was that the base did not have adequate facilities to support a large-scale operation and therefore the US should seek extra base rights in order to prevent a heavy concentration at Adana during a future Middle East intervention. American military planners also pointed out that essential combat support items required during the initial phases of any operation involving airborne troops, could be pre-stocked in the Adana area in an effort to reduce the amount of air-lift presently needed to move such items from depots in Europe. In the late 1950s, the US administration sought to expand the pre-stocking capacity of the Adana base and to establish new depots in Malatya and Izmir (Cigli). However, it should be noted that the acquisition of the new bases was a slow process, which took into account, as noted in chapter four, Soviet security concerns and the regional situations prevailed at the time.

5. The Transformation of the Northern Tier Alliance, the US and Turkey

During the October 1956-September 1958 period, the political landscape of the Arab Middle East changed considerably. The military coup of July 1958 brought a nationalist regime into power in Iraq, leaving Western oriented Jordan and Lebanon

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98 'Memo. for General Cutler from Robert R. Bowie', 29 July 1957, Lot file, 67 D 548, Records of the PPS 1957-61, box 160, Near and Middle East; Dowty, Middle East Crisis, pp.59-61.


politically in a precarious position. Another pro-western Arab country, Saudi Arabia, did not dare publicly to support the US Middle East policy. In these circumstances, American policy makers saw that the prospect of US intervention in the area as envisaged in the Eisenhower doctrine was quite remote. This was a major factor which led them to review the US policy towards nationalist Arab states as from late 1958. In this period, the utility of the Baghdad Pact was a platform for political consultations among the pro-Western regional states was particularly emphasised. The US favoured strengthening the Pact rather than letting it dissolve itself quietly. To this end, the US restated its commitment to the security of the member states in the event of direct or indirect aggression against them, first in the London Declaration which was proclaimed following the Ministerial Meeting of the Pact on July 28, 1958, and then in bilateral agreements with each of the regional states in March 1959. The Menderes government, for its part, perceived the survival of the Pact as a national interest because it was preferable to have Western oriented regimes, rather than nationalist or leftist ones, around Turkey. Its collapse would also be a ‘psychological blow’ to the government which was susceptible to criticism because of its role in forming the Pact.102 The Turkish response to the developments in the September 1958-December 1960 period was twofold: first, to press for maximum US participation in the Pact’s activities by adhering to the pact and/or by extending more military and economic aid to the regional members; second, to try to convince Iran and Pakistan that they would benefit from co-operation with the US on terms offered by the Americans.

Among the immediate US reactions to the Iraqi coup was the determination to strengthen the northern tier countries, particularly Turkey and Iran. It was assumed in Washington that the coup dealt a ‘psychological blow’ to these countries and therefore it was essential to do whatever necessary to bolster their confidence.103 To this end, the London Declaration manifested the US intention to come to the aid of a member country subjected to covert aggression, similar to those which had occurred in Lebanon and Jordan. But going one step further, it proposed the conclusion of bilateral

102 CF, 780.5/7-2159, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS' no.216.
103 FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.74, 'Memo. of Conversation with the President', 16 July 1958; 386.1-LO/8-458, 'Memo. of Conversation between William Rountree and Paul Koth (Norwegian Ambassador)'.

agreements to underpin these commitments. To Americans, such proposals were put forward as a response to the appeal of the members states that the US should adhere to the Pact 'in order to give it a new life', and they were in conformity with the established US position. Although membership was ruled out in the London declaration, the review of the US position in this respect had already begun in Washington by that time.

The backbone of the US policy towards the Middle East was the desire to 'give unequivocal support to [any country who was] willing to take a firm stand against Communism.' At a time when US prestige had already been reduced, the review of policy assessed the prospect of asserting the US position in the region by joining the Pact, should Iraq desert it. However, membership was not the most attractive option. It was particularly disadvantageous that the regional members were inclined to utilise the Pact 'to serve their national interests rather than to oppose Communism' as in the cases of Turkish-Greek or Pakistani-Indian disputes; and that therefore US membership could provoke a strong reaction from Greece and India. In addition, Congressional opposition to it was still very strong. Nevertheless, it was thought that the advantages of membership could outweigh its disadvantages provided that the negative factors were eliminated and that the plan was not pursued immediately. As time progressed, however, the administration concluded that adhering to the Pact was too risky an option and gave priority to the signing of a bilateral accord with each member.

Discussion and negotiation of the bilateral agreements dragged on for several months because of differences of opinion over their substance. While the US was ready to undertake only those commitments within the authority granted by the Middle East

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104 Rees, *Anglo-American Approaches*, p.95 and CF, 396-1 LO/7-3158, 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in France', no.504. Before the London Declaration was made, the President had instructed Secretary Dulles not to 'go beyond what was already in [the Middle East] Resolution' and to make it clear to the participants of the London meeting that the declaration was 'defensive, not aggressive in nature.' Memo. of Conversation Between Dulles and the President', 28 July 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-60:12, pp.113-14.

Resolution, its regional partners kept on requesting American military involvement 'in case of aggression, direct or indirect, from any quarter', and a substantial increase in economic and military aid. Since the revolution in Iraq, Iran had become more unstable and thus more exposed to outside pressure, which was aggravated by the lack of a formal guarantee to its security by the US, similar to that which Turkey and Pakistan enjoyed under NATO and SEATO treaties respectively. The Iranians argued that the advantages of joining a Western defence organisation did not outweigh the disadvantages of abandoning neutrality. However, the Americans were confident that the Iranian regime would see, in the final analysis, that alignment with the West was the best option and therefore would sign a bilateral agreement on the terms offered to them. Soviet diplomatic pressure on Iran in January 1959 prompted the US to do more to bring about an early conclusion of a bilateral accord so as to reduce the lure of the Soviet offer to Iran of neutrality in return for Soviet guarantees of Iranian territorial integrity.

Turkey acted as a promoter of American efforts to keep Iran in the Baghdad Pact for several reasons. First of all, having been compelled to abandon the hope of persuading Arab states to join a pro-Western alliance, she was concerned that the alliance with Iran, protecting her eastern flank, would also be lost. To Prime Minister Menderes, a Soviet-Iranian agreement 'represented a crisis of the greatest magnitude', because it would render the Baghdad Pact insignificant and pave the way for Soviet domination in Pakistan, Afghanistan and, most probably, Iraq. Secondly, Iranian neutrality would mean the growth of Nasser's influence in the Arab world because it would have a negative effect on the pro-Western Arab states. Turkey traditionally opposed a strong, nationalist Arab state in the south. Lastly, Iranian neutrality and growing Arab

107 Shah and military leaders were not convinced that Eisenhower doctrine met their security aspirations. 'NSC 5821/1: Statement of US Policy Toward Iran' 15 Nov. 1958, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.608; 'Tel from DoS to the Embassy in Iran', 16 Jan. 1959, ibid., pp.622-24. Iranians continued to felt that their country 'over-extended' itself by membership of CENTO which involved 'the abandonment of traditional neutrality without the greatly increased military aid' which they anticipated. 'NSC 6010: US Policy Toward Iran', 6 July 1960, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.685.
108 Vali, Bridge Across Bosporus, p.286; 'Memo. for the Record: Conversation With Mr. Adnan Menderes', 2 March 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:10/2, p.791.
nationalism would foment disorder among the Kurds resident in Turkey and Iran, about which Turkey was particularly vigilant after the change of regime in Iraq. Turkish and American efforts to finalise negotiations on bilateral agreements before the Karachi Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact at the end of January 1959 failed because Iran requested a formal American guarantee to its territorial integrity. But, the Soviet initiative also failed in February 1959 partly because the Soviets were reluctant to accept the terms the Shah put forward for an agreement and partly because Western efforts persuaded him to accept a bilateral accord.

The text of the bilateral agreements signed on March 5, 1959, between the US and each regional member of the Baghdad Pact represented in essence a compromise between the conflicting demands of the parties. In the bilaterals, the US agreed to assist the signatories against direct and indirect aggression, whether armed or non-armed, but this guarantee was only to be effected against communist or Communist-inspired aggression, not against aggression from any quarter. In addition, the bilaterals did not contain any US commitment beyond the authority given to the US administration by the Middle East resolution. In practice, they afforded the US the ability to co-operate with the Baghdad Pact countries more closely in security matters without becoming a member of the organisation, thereby keeping it away from involvement in regional quarrels which formal membership, in American thinking, would inevitably entail.

Although the bilateral agreements were designed to improve stability along the northern tier, it had a destabilising effect on Turkey in that it started the biggest row to date between the government and opposition over the conduct of foreign policy, which centred around the question of US intervention in Turkish politics. The main opposition party (RPP) objected principally to the wording of the bilateral agreement, claiming that the clause in it on co-operation against indirect unarmed attack reflected

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110 For the text of agreement with Turkey, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.221-23.

111 CF, 780.5/1-2059, 'Tel. from DoS to Embassy in Iran', no.1836.
the Menderes government's intention to suppress the opposition with American help. It was also claimed that the government had no authority under the constitution to make executive agreements which come into force at signature. When agreement was brought before the parliament for ratification almost one year after it had been signed, the government argued that the disputed phrase was included in the text on the request of the Iranian government. But the opposition was far from being satisfied. In the RPP's view, the 'lack of [a] precise definition [of indirect aggression] would permit an unscrupulous Administration to call [the] United States forces to help in the suppression of a legitimate internal opposition party' and the present Democrat Party (DP) government was 'just [sic] unscrupulous to do so.'

Given the seriousness of these allegations, it is worth examining whether the term 'indirect aggression' was really put into the agreement with the intention of stifling the opposition with US assistance. The term in question first appeared in the London declaration to support the Iranian government and it was included in the bilaterals on request by this government. From the American perspective, in the case of indirect aggression, be it communist or non-communist, the US responsibility to the other party was to 'provide military (i.e. equipment or materials) and/or economic aid', and therefore the use of US armed forces was out of the question. In the particular case of Turkey, the US ambassador to Turkey, Fletcher Warren, assured the leader of opposition, Ismet Inonu, that 'there was no possibility of the United States being a party to any use of its armed forces to intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign countries.' Indeed, the opposition was not against co-operation with the US in NATO and the Baghdad Pact. A RPP representative told the US ambassador in private that the opposition was 'upset with [the government's] presentation and explanation [rather] than in terms [of] actual wording of [the] agreement.' It was evident that

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112 CF, 611.827/2-1560, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.G-407.
114 CF, 780.5/1-2859 'Tel. from Embassy in Pakistan to SoS', no.1801; CF, 780.5/3-2059, 'Tel. from SoS to Embassy in Pakistan', no.2267. The possibility of non-communist aggression was not included in the text of bilateral agreements.
115 CF, 782.5/3-860, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no 59; CF, 611.826/2-1560, 'Tel. From Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no.G-407; CF, 780.5/3-959, 'Tel. from Embassy in Turkey to SoS', no. 2567.
the Menderes government signed a similar text with Iran and Pakistan to encourage solidarity among the members of the Baghdad Pact rather than to plot against opposition, and the opposition was aware of that. In the end, the agreement was ratified by parliament on May 9, 1960, in a vote boycotted by RPP members.\textsuperscript{116}

In late 1959 the Baghdad Pact, renamed CENTO in August, was still far from realising its original aim of becoming an effective force against the perceived Soviet threat, despite the fact that it was strengthened by the signing of the bilaterals. The American position at that time was increasingly to de-emphasise the military dimension of the Pact (as its objection to the establishment of military command structure showed), and instead, to encourage political and economic co-operation, inasmuch as they were consistent with the 'overall area interests' of the US.\textsuperscript{117} On military matters, Washington argued that the regional members of the Pact should rely on American nuclear power in case of a general war. To develop the military forces of Iran, and to some extent Pakistan, beyond internal security requirements (i.e. to create forces in these countries capable of resisting a major Soviet attack) was not practical mainly because of the cost involved.\textsuperscript{118} Politically, there was now a semblance of stability in the Middle East and the influence of the US in the Arab world had improved because some Arab nationalists, such as Nasser, clearly opposed communism. It was therefore deemed appropriate in Washington 'to associate with CENTO only a little at a time'. The effect of US membership of CENTO in the region, according to the State Department, would be:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} The government tended to show the public that only DP could establish such an excellent relationship with the US and therefore refused to make the clarification demanded by the opposition which could be seen as a climb down. The opposition on the other hand argued that the wording of the bilateral agreement was irrelevant to Turkey and presented it as a case of mismanagement of foreign affairs. The opposition also used the occasion as an opportunity to show the US representatives how bad the DP regime was. \textit{CF}, 782.5/3-860, 'Desp. from Embassy in Turkey to DoS :The RPP and the Turkish-US Bilateral Agreement', no.592.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} \textit{CF}, 780.5/10-759, 'Letter From Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs (Knight) to Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)'; 'Memo. From Jones to Murphy', 28 July 1959, \textit{FRUS}, 1958-60:12, p.230.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} 'Memo. from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs (Irwin) to the SoS', 28 Feb.1958, \textit{FRUS}, 1958-60:12, p.43; 'Memo. From Bowling to Hart', 21 Nov.1960, ibid., p.710.
\end{itemize}
unfulfillable expectations, [a possible diminution of NATO], the interpretation in Arab countries of the US assuming more military activity in that area, and false deductions which [Arab countries and the Soviet Union] might make of this step and [probable] increased pressure on Iran.119

Given the American reluctance to strengthen CENTO militarily, it became a platform for political and economic co-operation among its members. The diminishing interest of the regional members also contributed to this transformation. Firstly, it was increasingly viewed as a device to bolster the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.120 Secondly, after the military coup in Turkey, it became evident that the new government would not take as active a part in the CENTO affair as the Menderes government did.121 In the light of global and regional developments, the JCS pointed out that if CENTO was to live, there was a need for more US support, which prompted the Defence Department to demand a review of US policy towards CENTO in October 1960.122 This review was not completed before 1961, but it was already evident that the northern tier alliance was in the process of becoming primarily a framework for enhancing political and economic co-operation among the member states, rather than a military alliance.

6. Conclusion

In the post-Suez era, the US took the de facto role of leadership on behalf of the West in the Middle East. The principle US objectives were the denial of the area to the Soviet Union and the maintenance of the flow of oil from the region to Western


120 ‘Memo. from Matthews (S/P) to Jones (NEA)’, 27 July 1959, FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.227.

121 Ayesha Jalal dates back the lessening of Turkish interest to the Pact to the Iraqi Revolution. But, given the active part Turkey played in the signing of bilateral agreements, it is more appropriate to say that Turkish interest to the pact began to diminish in early 1960 when Turkey plunged into political turmoil. A. Jalal, ‘Towards the Baghdad Pact’, International History Review, XI/3, p.432.

Europe. To this end, it would be of necessity to circumscribe the influence of the anti-Western elements in the region. On the whole, US policy favoured the status quo and objected to any radical political change. The difficulty was that the regional allies of the West, particularly pro-Western Arab states and Iran, were governed by conservative elites who were unpopular in their respective countries, and therefore needed external protection, particularly against forces of nationalism. The US tried to meet this need through the Eisenhower doctrine. In this period the combined military forces of the US, UK and their major regional allies were relatively superior to those of anti-Western states. Actually, the Soviet Union did not pose an immediate military threat to the Middle East, with the exception of the northern tier countries. Still it was a preoccupation of US politico-military thinking that the Soviet Union had the ability to influence the Middle East developments through its political, economic, and to some extent, military connections with nationalist Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. Having pro-Western regimes in the Arab countries of the region was also important in terms of the political stability of the northern tier countries, since a change of regime, as in Syria and Iraq, had a debilitating effect, both politically and militarily, on the northern tier alliance and on its individual members. The Eisenhower doctrine aimed to prevent the spread of nationalist, and consequently Soviet, influence in the Arab world, and of the influence of anti-Western forces in the northern tier countries.

Turkey, one of the countries the Eisenhower doctrine was supposed to protect against aggression, became subject to the doctrine in two ways. Firstly, the Ankara authorities came to believe that developments in the Middle East, particularly the Suez and Iraqi crises, posed a grave threat to Turkey’s security. So the US sought to address Turkish security concerns by reaffirming its commitment to the security of the Baghdad Pact members in general and to Turkey’s security in particular. But it should be noted that the Americans also tended to see each regional development in terms of its implications for East-West relations at a given time and for the stability of the wider Middle East.

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123 In the late 1950s, there was no Soviet land bases in the region and Soviet naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean was, compared with the West, insignificant although it was gradually increasing. Kaplan and Robert Clawson, ‘NATO and the Mediterranean Powers in Historical Perspective’, pp.22-23; Mariano Gabrielle, ‘Mediterranean Naval Forces’, pp.66-67, both in Lawrence Kaplan et al eds., NATO and the Mediterranean, (Wilmington, Delaware, 1985).
Such a broad approach explains why the US response to some developments were more restrained than Turkey proposed. For example, US policy makers did not like the prospect of Turkey acting unilaterally against Syria in November 1956 and in April 1957. Similarly, they responded negatively to Turkish efforts to get the US involved more in the affairs of the Baghdad Pact. However, in the case of the Syrian crisis of summer 1957, they gave political and moral support to the Ankara government at unprecedented levels bilaterally, as well as on international platforms such as NATO and the UN General Assembly, because they feared, like the Turks, that Syria was to become a communist bridgehead in the region. With full US backing, Turkey asserted itself so forcefully in the region in the summer of 1957 that it could only be balanced by the Soviet intervention. After this event, the fear that the policy of brinkmanship might cause a regional crisis to escalate into a superpower conflict, had great impact on both Washington’s and Ankara’s approaches to the regional problems, as their response to the change of regime in Iraq indicated. In July 1958, the Menderes government did not consider swift action against Iraq nor did the Eisenhower administration encourage Ankara to this effect.

Secondly, Turkey, a major regional power, was involved in the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine by offering its political and military service as well as its real assets to the attainment of the US regional objectives. When Washington exhausted all options, except for military action, in an effort to prevent Syria becoming communist in the summer of 1957, this was to be attained through the Turkish troop concentrations along the Syrian border. Although Soviet involvement forced the US and Turkey to climb down on this occasion, the crisis made it clear that the US had no intention of allowing any Middle East country to go communist easily. The use of the Adana air base by the US forces during the Lebanon operation was another important example revealing the extent of military co-operation. On the political front, Turkey’s service in keeping the northern tier alliance intact after July 1958 facilitated the signing of bilateral agreements of March 1959. The discontinuity of this role in 1960 contributed significantly to the diminishing military value of CENTO. In short, Turkey’s political, military and diplomatic power was valuable for the implementation of Washington’s
Middle East policy between 1957 and 1960, and US policy makers capitalised on it so far as regional and global circumstances allowed them to do so.
MAP 4. The Theatre of Operation on a Typical Day during the Lebanese Intervention
Source: Situation Report no.4, 17 July 1958, US National Archives, RG 218, Records
of the JCS, Central Decimal File 1958, CCS 319.1 (7-17-58), sec 1, box 29.
CONCLUSION

This study has analysed several aspects of US-Turkish security relations in the period of 1953 and 1960, as seen from the American perspective. It has shown that American cold war strategy in the 1950s sought to overcome the Communist bloc's challenge by peaceful methods in the long-term, and that the US needed allies in peripheral areas for the success of this strategy. This affected US-Turkish security collaboration in two ways. First, because of Turkey's strategic location in the Middle and Near East, Washington concluded that Ankara should remain as an ally of the West. To ensure this and to enable Turkey to perform its functions within the Western alliance, the US not only provided the country with a substantial amount of assistance but also showed close interest in its political stability. Second, the American cold war strategy was designed to project American power world-wide while avoiding a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the US had wider, and different, objectives and priorities to Turkey. Washington was particularly careful that its actions should not cause a radical change in the balance of power around the Soviet periphery (including the Middle and Near East), fearing that this might provoke Moscow to take strong countermeasures. The findings of this research can be evaluated from the perspective of these two points.

It was the globalization of the American strategic perspective, simultaneous with the emergence of the cold war, that paved the way for a close political and military relationship between Ankara and Washington. The cold war was an all-encompassing conflict with military, political, economic and ideological aspects; and it was in full force when the Eisenhower administration entered office in January 1953. Advances in the technology of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the 1950s brought about the prospect of mutual destruction and, as a result, a nuclear war was undesirable for the superpowers. American policy makers, for their part, considered that their Soviet counterparts would act rationally, and thus a nuclear war would break out only by accident or miscalculation. However, there was an ever-present danger that a local war, even if great powers were not initially directly involved, might escalate into a general war. Anxious to avoid such prospect, the superpowers gradually
shifted their attention from the military to the diplomatic, economic and psychological aspects of international conflict in the 1950s.

The strategy of containment, the American way of confronting the Soviet bloc during the cold war, envisaged among other things having and maintaining friendly regimes along the periphery of the USSR. If explained in the terminology of geopolitics, the objective was to maintain 'a margin of superiority over the Soviet bloc.' As far as the implementation of the containment in Europe and Middle East was concerned, it resulted in the establishment of NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Due to its geographical location, Turkey was of crucial importance for both alliances. In this context, Washington gave a security guarantee to Turkey, helped it to improve its economic and military posture, preferred that the country's regime remained pro-Western, tried to organise a Middle Eastern defence in which Turkey took an active part, and utilised the military facilities of the country for defence purposes against the Soviet threat, as well as for other Middle Eastern contingencies.

Turkey gradually became part of the European defence system in the post war era, as confirmed by its inclusion in NATO in February 1952. From the outset, Turkish leaders were very enthusiastic about a close politico-military relationship with the West. Three factors facilitated this: Turkey's ideological affiliation, its historical enmity with the Russians, and its need of foreign resources to modernize its economy and military forces. However, the problem was that, in the absence of formal security guarantees, collaboration with the West in defence matters would increase Turkey's vulnerability because this would provoke an adverse Soviet reaction. This initially made neutrality the best option for Ankara. Once the Americans understood that the neutrality option would hinder Western access to Turkish territory in the event of a crisis, they supported Turkey's full membership of NATO. This came to mean that the integration of the country's military potential, which was being improved through American aid, into European defence within the framework of this organisation. Particularly important in terms of common defence was the denial of Turkey to the enemy and the provision of its facilities for the West, particularly the use of airfields by

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the American Strategic Air Command (SAC). Turkish membership of NATO also confirmed the importance of the Mediterranean as an approach to the Soviet Union from the south. The US decided to withdraw its commitment to support British forces in the Middle East in the summer of 1949. With this decision, American forces in the Mediterranean Sea were considered in terms of supporting primarily the European theater. After Turkey’s inclusion into NATO, Washington sought to strengthen the defence of the Straits in an effort to deny Soviet naval forces access to the Mediterranean in the event of hostilities. It should also be noted that, Turkey made a significant contribution to common defence effort because it provided local forces to deter aggression against NATO’s southern flank and the Middle East. Furthermore, the facilities that Turkey made available to the United States were considered in term of out-of-area operations in the Middle East.

In the Middle East, combating with external threats to the area was the main priority of the American policy. To this end, a practical distinction was made between the countries of the northern tier and the other Middle Eastern states in terms of organising defence efforts. The idea of a northern tier alliance was fervently promoted by the Eisenhower administration in the summer of 1953, assuming that it would subsequently attract the support of major Arab states. Turkey took a leading role in the development of co-operation between the US and the northern tier countries along the lines envisaged by the American policy. Its efforts to bring about the Turco-Pakistani agreement of April 1954 and the Turco-Iraqi agreement of February 1955, which formed the basis of the Baghdad Pact, served among other things to prevent Iraq and Pakistan from taking part in pro-Arab or religiously-based groupings and set the stage for the extension of American military aid to them. However, the American policy concentrated, at the same time, on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, thereby bringing stability to the region, from early 1955 to the outbreak of the Suez crisis in the summer of 1956.

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2 The principle objectives of American policy in the Middle East were, as major policy statements towards the region indicated, to deny control of the region and its resources to the Soviet bloc and to assure their availability to the West. See, for example, NSC 5428 (23 July 1954) and NSC 5820/1 (4 Nov. 1958), both in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-54:9, p.528 and FRUS, 1958-60:12, p.189 respectively.

3 American policy was not flexible enough to tolerate the establishment of a regional defence organisation unless it was sponsored by the West. The American opposition to the Arab League Security Pact was a case in point. See chapter three, pp.111-115.
of 1956. For the success of this initiative, being on good terms with nationalist Arab countries like Egypt (the key country to an Arab-Israeli settlement) was very important. This was one of the main reasons for the American ambivalence about the inclusion of such Arab states as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in the Baghdad Pact. Consequently, Washington’s support for the Menderes administration’s efforts to persuade Arab countries to join the Pact was quite weak. In a similar vein, the Americans were reluctant to cooperate with Ankara in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In their thinking, Turkey could only contribute indirectly to the resolution of major Middle East problems by supporting US initiatives politically and by strengthening its economic and cultural ties with the Arab countries. This also made it clearer that no leadership role was envisaged for Turkey in the region as a whole.

With the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine in January 1957, the US asked all regional countries to see communism as the principal threat to the region. To such nationalist Arab countries as Egypt and Syria, however, it was a very distant threat at best, while Israel and the West posed an immediate threat to them. Nationalist appeal was so strong that even pro-Western Arab countries were hesitant to support publicly the central assumption of the Eisenhower doctrine. For the members of the Baghdad Pact, on the other hand, it meant the reaffirmation of the US guarantee to their security, and additional economic and military assistance. Although it immediately proved very difficult to apply the doctrine in the wider Middle East, the US still resolutely sought its implementation. The Turkish government enthusiastically welcomed the doctrine and assisted in the realisation of its objectives even in the cases where American action was not possible according to the terms of the doctrine. The Syrian crisis of summer 1957 was a case in point. The increasing influence of leftist nationalist elements in the Syrian government was regarded by the US as an attempt by international communism to obtain a bridgehead in the Middle East. Turkish troop concentrations along the border with Syria (after the US plot against this government had been uncovered in August 1957) aimed at achieving what the US failed to do. Turkey had long considered the domination of Syrian government by the left as a threat to its security, because it would amount to the virtual encirclement of the country by hostile powers. The involvement of the Soviet Union in this crisis as a
protector of Syria forced Ankara to climb down. But the crisis indicated that the US and its allies would not tolerate a radical change in the regional balance of power.

Following the success of the interventions in Lebanon and Jordan by the US and UK respectively, which indicated that the perceived destructive effects of the loss of Iraq (through the July 1958 military coup) had been diffused, the US tried to improve its relations with the Arab nationalists. The defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact allowed Turkey, and the US for that matter, to concentrate on the northern tier alliance again, this time without receiving severe criticism from the Arab nationalists, the objective of seeking the adherence of Arab countries to the alliance having been dropped. In 1959 the US and Turkey were concerned about the position of Iran, which was a source of weakness in the northern tier alliance. Yet Washington rejected adherence to the Baghdad Pact and its successor, CENTO, as a way to strengthen them. Instead it increased co-operation with their regional members by signing with them bilateral agreements which contained a US guarantee of their security in case of both direct and indirect aggression. In a sense, these agreements were the reaffirmation of the Eisenhower doctrine exclusively for the northern tier countries. Turkey played a leading role in persuading Iran and Pakistan of the benefits of bilateral arrangements.

One of the key themes of US-Turkish security collaboration was the American aid to Turkey. In general, the chief factors that the Americans took into account in determining the amount of assistance were as follows. Firstly, there was a need to keep Turkey aligned with the West in order to ensure the continued Western access to its military facilities in the event of war. Secondly, Turkey's ability to defend itself and to play an active role in the region was closely related to its economic and military capabilities and the stability of its government. Thirdly, the Turks were prone to take advantage of services which they provided for the West in order to ask for more assistance from the US. Central to their argument was that such assistance would help Turkey to fulfill its defence responsibilities to NATO and the Baghdad Pact organisations. Concerning military aid, although all of these factors were taken into account in determining the amount of aid, Washington was unwilling to finance an excessive Turkish defence effort. In the American view, Turkey would certainly need
outside support in a general war, or in a local war in which the Soviet Union was involved, despite improvements in its military capabilities through NATO modernization programmes. Still, the continued modernization of the Turkish armed forces would provide enough power to deter any regional aggression, even it was waged by a Soviet satellite. So it was not logical to support demands for further armament where it was beyond the ability of the Turks to meet the extra costs that the maintenance of new weapons might bring. The Eisenhower administration maintained this position firmly throughout the 1950s, with the exception of emergency situations. In a sense, this was the application of US cold war mentality to the Turkish aid programmes. For the Americans, the cold war was a protracted conflict and it could only be won if the US economic power base remained strong. So, the global responsibilities that the US had undertaken should not be allowed to weaken the American economy. At times of crisis, however, this principle was liberally applied to the Turkish aid programmes, both military and economic. If Turkey’s pro-Western policies prompted a reaction by the Soviet Union (as in the cases of the Syrian crisis, the IRBM deployment and the signing of the co-operation agreement of March 1959) the case for more aid was particularly strong.

Economic aid was mainly given to support Turkish defence efforts but it served two other major purposes. First, it was presumed that the basic necessities of Turkish people should be met to prevent a social unrest. Such an occurrence would not only be harmful for internal peace but also cause the people to see the defence efforts as the reason for the hardships they endured, which in turn might induce the government to reduce those efforts. Thus, economic aid was a very useful instrument to bolster political stability at particular times: for example, the $359 million worth of economic stabilisation funds of August 1958, which was mainly financed by the US, came at a politically volatile time soon after the Iraqi revolution and was intended to improve the political as well as the economic situation. Second, Washington feared that the Turkish government, under the pressure of economic difficulties, might attempt to forge a closer economic relationship with the Soviet bloc, which might in time affect the degree of Turkey’s commitment to the Western cause. However, it was not considered that such economic relations would have an immediate effect on Turkey’s external
Furthermore, the development of such economic ties were disrupted by various international crises.

The internal politics of Turkey was closely monitored by the Americans, because the pro-Western orientation of the country was considered a *sine qua non* for Turkish-American strategic co-operation. In the 1950s, both the governing Democratic Party (DP) and its major opponent, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), adopted a firmly pro-Western stance in foreign policy. This study has clearly shown that this allowed the Americans to be flexible in their dealings with both sides. It should be noted that the DP was more liberal in its economic policy than the RPP and developed a good working relationship with US official circles. The Americans recognised that it would take some time to establish a similar relationship with a new government, but this did not mean that they preferred the DP over the RPP. They tried to avoid direct involvement in the bitter political rivalry between the parties in the late 1950s and encouraged dialogue, rather than confrontation, in the interest of the political stability of the country. Being on good terms with both sides was believed to be helpful for maintaining close relations with both the Menderes government and, should it be forced out of office, with its replacement. Yet Republicans accused Washington in public of playing into the hands of the incumbent government, indicating that the DP leaders used American assistance and the ‘Cooperation Agreement’ of March 1959 to foster the impression that they received American favour. However, the opposition did not question in principle Turkey’s being on good terms with the US. For example, after talks with some officials from the American Embassy, the opposition representatives were convinced, in private, that the ‘Cooperation Agreement’ was not directed against them. For this reason, Washington was optimistic that Turkish foreign policy would remain Western-oriented, no matter which party was in power. The military coup of May 1960 initially raised some doubts about the prospect of Turkey’s external orientation and this study has noted that in the summer of 1960 the US

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4 The only major exception was in the summer of 1960 when the Americans feared that the Soviet aid might persuade the military regime to take a neutralist stand in its foreign policy.

5 It should be noted in this context that there is no evidence of covert American action during the political turmoil in 1960, which can be accounted for by the American confidence that a communist take-over was a remote possibility given the weakness of the communist elements, the consensus on foreign policy orientation of the country, and popular distrust of anything Russian.
administration assisted the supporters of close relations with the West in the new
government in gaining ascendancy over the advocates of neutralism in foreign policy.
It can be concluded from American relations with the Menderes government and the
opposition in the late 1950s, and with the military regime after May 1960, that the
issue of who actually held power in Ankara was not a serious concern for Washington,
as long as they were pro-Western.

The US did, however, encourage to a certain extent the improvement of democratic
practices in Turkey, believing that good governance would contribute to political
stability. In this respect, the easing of political pressure on the labour movement, the
press and the opposition was recommended to both the Menderes government and the
military regime. Yet, as the early recognition and establishment of good relations with
the military government showed, the improvement of democratic practices never
became a central issue in Turkish-American relations; in other words, politico-strategic
considerations took precedence over any other ones.

Having analysed US interest in Turkey's security and the co-operation of the two
countries in defence matters in the context of the globalization of American security
policy, it may seem contradictory to say that America's global security outlook also
limited the scope of the co-operation between the two countries. But it should be
observed that the nature of US relations with its main rival, the Soviet Union, within a
bipolar international system which was characterised by a balance of terror, and
affected to a great extent US-Turkish security interactions. In a bipolar system, as
Stanley Hoffmann says, 'not only are [the superpowers] obliged to be cautious when
they create risks with which they hope to force their adversary to give into their
ambitions, but often they must also give top priority to minimization of the risks they
incur for their own survival; indeed the imperative to reduce such risks tends to
dominate their policies and strategies.' As far as US-Turkish relations were
concerned, this research has indicated that Washington paid particular attention to
those aspects of its co-operation with Turkey in the military and political fields which

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6 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations,
might cause a change in the status-quo, or which Moscow might consider a threat to the status-quo. In the American ‘New Look’ policy, Kremlin policy makers were assumed to act rationally. Similarly, they were expected in their dealings with Turkey to avoid resorting to military means unless their vital interests were at stake, for they knew that such a military solution would spark off a NATO response, thus carrying with it the danger of escalation into a nuclear conflict. The possible negative effects of a tougher American policy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc on Western Europeans, who were in fear of an atomic confrontation, were also paid attention. All in all, it was important that American co-operation with the Turks should not reach such a magnitude that it would disturb the present balance of power, which in turn might provoke Moscow to take countermeasures.

American restraint in its security relations with Turkey can be observed in three areas. First, defence co-operation with Turkey was kept limited with a view to not provoking Soviet action. For example, Turkey’s adherence to NATO had been delayed until Washington became convinced that this would not mean a revision of the status quo in that part of the world, because its principal military implication was to confirm that the West could get access to Turkish territory in case of a conflict. As expected, Moscow objected to it, but did not consider it as an immediate military danger. Another example was that US authorities wanted to tie the amount of military assistance to

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7 Thomas Risse-Kappen has observed that European allies exerted a significant influence on American foreign policy, which can be explained by the strength of societal and transgovernmental relations across the Atlantic. For example, European fears of nuclear war was an important factor shaped American policy during the Korean War, though at the time overall European influence was relatively weaker because of European economic dependence on the US. Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies*, (Princeton, NJ., 1995), p.206.

8 The term ‘security dilemma’ was used in the international relations literature to explain this process of escalation. It refers to the situations in which measures adopted by one side to improve its security, even if they were solely defensive in nature, might provoke the opponent state to take countermeasures, which in turn lead the first state to respond with additional measures. In the nuclear age, the mutual fear of nuclear war (for example, the cardinal objective of the American cold war policy was to avoid global war) was the single most important incentive for the superpowers to seek some ways for crisis prevention and crisis management. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the superpowers imposed upon themselves some limit to their actions, expecting that the opponent would reciprocate, what is called ‘tacit understanding’. To prevent a crisis from developing into a direct military conflict, they recognised particularly the need for not exploiting ones ‘advantage in a crisis to impose on the other a policy dilemma between backing down in defeat or desperately initiating the use of force’, and for not allowing a regional ally to engage in a war with the other superpower. Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under Security Dilemma’, *World Politics*, 30/2 (Jan. 1978); Paul Keal, *Unspoken Rules of Superpower Dominance*, (London, 1983), pp.45-61, 225; Alexander L. George, ‘US-Soviet Efforts in Crisis Management and Crisis Avoidance’, in Alexander L. George et al. eds., *US-Soviet Security Cooperation*, (Oxford, 1988), pp.583-84.
Turkey's economic capability to support the maintenance cost of the modern
equipment given through the modernisation programmes. It was also recommended
that the Turkish army should reduce its manpower in line with the modernisation. This
meant in effect that, since a dramatic increase in Turkey's economic capability was not
expected at least in the short term, the modernisation of the Turkish military would be
slow and take long time, so that the growth in Turkey's military capability would not
make an immediate effect on the regional balance.

Second, the US also kept the scope of its military activities in Turkey limited. For
example, American assistance for the construction of new military facilities continued,
but the use of them by the SAC for the stationing of long-range aircraft in peacetime
was avoided as much as possible. Another example was that the Americans proposed
arming the Turkish Straits with short range atomic weapons only after being convinced
that these weapons were for defensive purposes and therefore would not provoke a
strong Soviet reaction. Similarly, in the case of the deployment of American IRBMs in
Turkey, one major delaying factor was the anticipated Soviet reaction to them. When
the agreement over deployment was concluded in October 1959, these weapons were
expected to be soon obsolete in the face of the development of both solid fuelled, sea-
based IRBMs, and of long-range ballistic missiles. The military significance of them
was certainly minimal when their deployment began in late 1961. The Kennedy
administration decided to go ahead with the deployment programme due largely to the
fear that its abandonment might harm Turkish confidence in the US. However, as
illustrated in this study, if Americans officials were convinced that the military facilities
in Turkey were used for defensive purposes, or for limited-purpose operations such as
the Lebanon intervention of 1958, they did not hesitate to use them. Similarly,
Washington undertook additional military activities in Turkey when circumstances
allowed. For example, the US sought to obtain new base rights in southern Turkey, in
addition to the one in Adana, after the Lebanon operation in an effort to enhance its
intervention capability in future Middle East contingencies.

Third, any politico-military move by the US and/or Turkey which would have an
important bearing on the regional balance was also assessed by the Americans in terms
of cold war considerations. It was thought that if Western policies brought about serious gains along the northern tier and in other parts of the Middle East this would result in increased Soviet pressure on Turkey and/or other pro-Western states of the region. For example, one of the major reasons why Washington refrained from joining in the Baghdad Pact was the possible Soviet (together with nationalist Arab and Israeli) reaction to it. For the same reason the US dissuaded Turkey from actively seeking the adherence of additional Arab countries to the Pact, when Turkish government tried to persuade Lebanon and Jordan to adhere to it in late 1955. With the exception of the summer of 1957, the US was also in favour of restraint in Turkish-Syrian relations and did not encourage Turkey to intervene in Iraq after the military coup of July 1958. Furthermore, it was thought that public frustration of Soviet policy in the region might lead the Kremlin policy makers to think that they should act more vigorously to protect their vital interests in places such as Eastern Europe. In the Syrian crisis of 1957, one of the reasons that led the US to seek a compromise solution was the fear of a Soviet response elsewhere. However, it should be noted at this juncture that these objective were given to show in what ways the international milieu placed limitations on American actions. They do not refute the fact that the US was actively involved in Middle Eastern politics after the Suez crisis of 1956, or that Turkey provided an important politico-military service for the implementation of the US policies towards the region. In fact, the US was vigorous in preserving the status quo, particularly along the northern tier. When Iraq deserted the Baghdad Pact, for example, it signed bilateral agreements with each regional member of the Pact despite the fact that this would lead to increased Soviet pressure on them, particularly on Iran. Washington also encouraged military co-operation among the northern tier states, believing that it was a defensive effort by the countries already aligned with the West.

The findings of this study can also be used to decide the relative influence that the US and Turkey had over each other in their security relations in the 1950s. Before explaining this, it should be remembered that US-Turkish relations in that period were satisfactory to both sides as the previous works pointed out; and this study confirms this. Indeed, Turkish policy makers, for their part, believed that the US would defend Turkey when an occasion arose, hence they never questioned the credibility of
American security guarantees. And, the Americans satisfied Turkish expectations for that matter on two grounds. First, in cases where the Soviet Union had taken a hostile attitude towards Turkey as a response to US military activities in the country, or to US-supported Turkish actions, American officials did not hesitate to back Turkey. For example, they saw the construction of military facilities and deployment of IRBMs as a contribution to the US deterrence capability, and regarded the fortification of the Turkish Straits as a necessary step to strengthen the Western position in the eastern Mediterranean. Similarly they strongly supported Turkey’s stance against Syria in the summer of 1957 by giving assurances against the Soviet threats, because they thought that this was necessary to deprive the communists of gaining a foothold in the Middle East. In the latter case, the Americans supported Turkey in NATO discussions despite it was seen by most of the allies as a Middle East, rather than a NATO, case. Second, Washington sided with Ankara in cases where Moscow objected to the Turkish participation in the Western-sponsored political initiatives in the Middle East. The firm US support for Turkey’s role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and in the signing of bilateral agreements between the US and each of the regional members of the Pact in March 1959 were cases in point. However, emphasizing the fact that the two countries shared a similar outlook on what they perceived as a common threat from the Eastern bloc, does not give much idea about whether their concerns and preferences were equally reflected in their relationship.

It is the contention of this study that, as the majority of the cases studied in this dissertation indicate, whereas Turkey had some leverage in influencing American policy, their relationship in the 1950s was mainly shaped by American concerns and priorities. American policy makers came to understand the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish side vis-à-vis the United States. They appreciated the value of Turkey’s strategic assets, its role in the Middle East, the necessity of strengthening its economy and military, and the importance of the country as a loyal ally (all of these point were made by the Turks to obtain political and material support from the US). For this reason, the US policy was designed to preserve Turkey firmly allied with the West. In order to reduce the risk of Turkey’s neutrality and to improve its capabilities, more than $2 billion (a substantial amount by the standards of the time) economic and
military aid was given during the Eisenhower presidency. Nevertheless, Ankara’s heavy reliance on Washington for security guarantees, for weapons and for economic assistance, substantially reduced its bargaining power.\(^9\) The Americans were aware of the fact Ankara’s need for American political, economic and military support was more imperative than Washington’s need for Turkish co-operation with the West.\(^10\) This enabled the Americans to take into account the preferences of their overall and regional policy before they considered Turkish demands, except for crisis situations where Turkey acquired special status. For example, the US avoided from endangering international balance of power as a result of its collaboration with Turkey, fearing that this would provoke Moscow to take counter-measures to redress the balance.

America’s relative strength was also reflected by the fact that Turkey found it difficult to maintain its position when its policy in the Middle East began to differ from those of the US in such cases as the extension of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the Turkish offer to mediate between the Arab states and Israel in 1956, the Syrian crisis of March 1955, and the Jordanian crisis of April 1957. Furthermore, Turkish leaders, fearing encirclement by communist states, willingly supported the American position in regional crises, as in the summer of 1957 (the Syrian crisis) and 1958 (Iraq and Lebanon incidents), and they participated in Western sponsored diplomatic efforts such as the creation of the northern tier alliance and the Eisenhower doctrine. This lack of co-operation problem weakened Turkey’s bargaining position in the relationship. All in all, the Americans were in more advantageous position than the Turks in influencing the nature of US-Turkish security relations during the Eisenhower years.

\(^9\) For the effects of a small power’s dependence on great powers, see the introduction chapter, the section on great/small power relations.

\(^{10}\) This conforms with America’s general assessment of its position vis-à-vis its allies. While the key policy document of the New Look policy (NSC 162/2) the importance of allies for the success of American policy, it also noted that the allies needed the US for their security (especially for nuclear protection against the Communist block) as much as the US needed their cooperation. ‘NSC 162/2: Statement of Policy by the NSC’, 30 Oct.1953, \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54:2/1, pp.584-85.
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