The Military Functions of the Office of Lord Lieutenant, 1585 to 1603, with Special Emphasis on Lord Burghley

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by

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Abstract

This dissertation is an investigation of the military functions of the office of lord lieutenant in the years 1585 to 1603. The lieutenants commanded the county militias, and the main goal of this study is to determine whether or not they were vital to military efficiency in the late-Elizabethan years. By vital, it is meant did the lieutenants make a noticeable difference in a county's performance in preparing sufficient men and arms for service. Emphasis is placed on William Cecil, first Lord Burghley, lieutenant of Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire because he was typical of many lieutenants in that he was involved in national government as a privy councillor and Lord Treasurer in addition to being an absentee lieutenant. Like all lieutenants, he relied on his deputies to oversee the actual work of mustering and levying men in the counties. Many of those deputies would later become members of the commissions of musters that replaced lieutenants in many counties after 1590. The fact that many lieutenancies were not renewed calls the importance of the office into question. Burghley's approach to the job is explored and his deputies compared to those of several other counties. Then other lieutenants, including Sir Christopher Hatton, George Talbot, William Brooke, Charles Howard of Effingham, Henry Carey and Roger North, are compared to Burghley. The musters and levies, the chief military functions, which took place under Burghley from 1587 until his death in August 1598 are compared with those in other counties. Burghley's former counties had no lieutenant from late 1598 through the rest of Elizabeth's reign in March 1603. During these later years, a commission of musters supervised the militias in those counties, making it possible to compare the difference, if any, the two types of command had on military competence. The findings here are that there are no major differences between counties with lieutenants and those without them. The office of lord lieutenant had no major impact on military efficiency.
Abbreviations

Add MSS – Additional Manuscripts
A.P.C. – Acts of Privy Council
B.L. – British Library
C.S.P.D. – Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
D.N.B. – Dictionary of National Biography
H.M.C. – Historical Manuscripts Commission
L.D.C.C. – Library of Dean and Chapter of Canterbury
PROB – Prerogative Court of Canterbury
P.R.O. – Public Record Office
S.H.C. – Surrey Historical Centre
S.R.O. – Staffordshire Record Office
STAC – Star Chamber Records
V.C.H. – Victoria County History
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Chapter I: Introduction

The Tudor dynasty, while maintaining the ancient county militia as the backbone of the English military system, introduced the office of lord lieutenant. Its purpose was that of a military commander and it was first instituted late in the reign of Henry VIII. Due to uncertainties brought about by the religious reformation the Crown decided it needed to control every part of the country and the lieutenancy was expanded to achieve this goal. From the beginning other county officials were subordinate to the new lieutenants, who were a key link between central and local governments.¹

The objective of this thesis is to assess whether or not lords lieutenant were essential to late-Elizabethan (1585 to 1603) military administration. By essential, it is meant were the lieutenants necessary for an effective militia? Did they make a substantial impact on the ability of a county to raise men and equipment for war? The focus is on the years 1585 to 1603 because of the country’s almost continuous involvement in war during that time and because 1585 is the year lieutenants were first commissioned on a permanent, and not ad hoc, basis. The stopping point of 1603 is not only the end of Elizabeth’s reign, but it also marks a time when military activity receded. In order to answer these questions, special emphasis will be placed on William Cecil, Lord Burghley, one of the most prominent men of his time. Like many of his fellow lieutenants, he was a privy councillor as well as being Lord Treasurer, and had duties that required his presence at the capital and away from the counties under his command - Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire. This situation was quite common in other lieutenancies and much of the

active supervision of the militias was undertaken by deputy lieutenants, men who resided within their assigned shires. This leads one to wonder if Burghley really made a substantial difference as a lieutenant or if the position was merely another title for an important man. By examining Burghley's lieutenancy and comparing the promptness of musters and levies and the quality of men and arms presented with that of other counties it is possible to render a judgement on the importance of the lieutenancy from a military perspective. The emphasis here is on the lieutenants' role in the functioning of the militias. As the lieutenancy was a military office in origin, duties such as policing recusants and maintaining the grain supply will not be addressed in any depth. Just as vital, the performance of the county militias with lieutenants must be judged against those without one, as Elizabeth often omitted to replace lieutenants on their deaths after 1590.

Comparing efficiency in musters (a review of men, horse and arms) and levies (the raising of men for service) for the period from 1587 to 1598 when Burghley was lieutenant of the three counties, with the rest of Elizabeth's reign, a time when the commission of musters was responsible for the forces, offers an indication of whether or not there was a difference between the two kinds of leadership. Contrasting these three counties with others, both with and without lieutenants, will further add to our understanding of the influence that lieutenants may or may not have had.  

Queen Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors, took the throne upon the death of her half-sister Mary in November 1558. The country was nominally Catholic and weak both militarily and financially. Without any expansionist or dogmatic passions, Elizabeth was a moderate religious reformer. She was Protestant but was governed by prudence, and the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, a via media between Mary's Roman Catholicism and

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2 The counties discussed in this thesis besides those of Burghley include Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Kent, Norfolk and Suffolk, Northamptonshire and Surrey. Lancashire, Sussex, and
Edward VI’s overt Protestantism, restored the Church of England in 1559. The country itself numbered just under three million people in the late 1550s with wealth and population concentrated in the South and Southeast, the most urbanised and agriculturally productive regions. In contrast, the North and West were the poorest and the four counties closest to Scotland were probably the poorest of all. London was a dominant urban area of at least 200,000 people, which was taxed ten times as much as the next wealthiest city - Norwich (with a population of about 15,000) - throughout the sixteenth century. Overall, England was ninety percent rural and overwhelmingly agricultural with woollen textiles for the Antwerp market being the main commercial export. Perhaps forty percent of the population lived on the border of subsistence.

It was this realm that Elizabeth inherited and had to protect against the encroachment of foreign powers. France, with a population three or four times that of England, had just seized Calais, the Crown’s last continental possession, and had an alliance with Scotland. Spain ruled the Netherlands, large portions of Italy as well as settlements in the Americas. These were the two main powers with which Elizabeth had to contend. Fortunately both were exhausted after numerous wars, largely in Italy, with each other and England did possess a strong navy.

Elizabeth, working through her Privy Council, and specifically with her Principal Secretary, William Cecil, sought to strengthen her position by supporting Protestant

Huntingdonshire are also included, though not to the extent of the others.


revolts in Scotland and made an ill-fated intervention in the French civil war on the side of the Huguenots during 1562 to 1564. One positive result of the affair was that France was open to the idea of friendly relations with England once peace returned.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 26-28.}

Meanwhile, relations with Philip II of Spain were deteriorating and by the mid-1580s Philip had reduced the French King Henry III to a pawn of the Catholic League and devoted all his resources to crushing the rebellion in the Low Countries. Spanish victory in Holland would put Spain on England’s doorstep and the Privy Council was divided on what should be done. One side favoured direct military intervention while the other wanted to strengthen the country’s defences while avoiding involvement on the Continent. Yet both sides feared a Spanish invasion if the Netherlands fell. Thus August 1585 saw 2,000 English soldiers land at Middleburg, Holland.\footnote{Elton, \textit{England Under the Tudors}, p. 296; J. Guy, \textit{Tudor England}, p. 286.} So by the mid-1580s England came into direct conflict with Spain, the most powerful country in Western Europe. This situation persisted for the remainder of Elizabeth’s reign. Coupled with military campaigns in Ireland, in which thousands of men were involved in the suppression of Tyrone’s Rebellion, England was burdened with substantial obligations, ones that were entrusted to the venerable institution of the militia.\footnote{D. M. Loades, \textit{Politics and the Nation 1450-1660 Obedience, Resistance and Public Order} (Trowbridge, Wiltshire, 1974), p. 301.}

The county-based militias, in which every male between the ages of fifteen to sixty was obliged to serve, remained the backbone of the English military system until the Civil War. Spain had a professional army by the time of Elizabeth, as evidenced by the Duke of Parma’s men in the Netherlands, as did Europe’s other great power, France. Militias were in a state of decline across the Continent and the sixteenth century
witnessed the rise of standing armies to a far greater extent than before; they became a separate and permanent entity.\(^9\) Part of the reason for England's lack of a standing army may be due to its separateness from Europe, where nations were more susceptible to invasion. Also, attitudes toward such an army were not positive, and were reputed to be populated by 'low lives' who were a threat to people and property. As matters turned out, somewhat fortuitously, the country was able to survive with the militia.\(^10\)

The militia's lineage can be traced back to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, which consisted of individuals who owed assistance to the Crown. Units served on the basis of a land assessment, which varied from region to region. The institution continued after the Norman Conquest despite the establishment of feudalism. The force was reorganised by the Assize of Arms of 1181 and the Statue of Westminster of 1285, both of which set the type and number of weapons each man had to provide according to his wealth. The latter act obligated all men between the ages of fifteen and sixty to enroll.\(^11\) The right of men not to serve outside their own counties short of invasion was reaffirmed by Henry IV in 1402. Thus, legally militiamen were not to be sent overseas, yet in the next century Henry VIII sent conscripts to Boulogne.\(^12\) This fait accompli set a precedent that was duplicated time and again under Elizabeth.

Foreign service was never popular and the solution as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries was to use mercenaries. They proved unpopular and their expulsion was

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demanded in the Magna Carta. They were little used for the rest of the thirteenth century yet remained in wide use across the Continent through the 1500s, particularly those from Switzerland and Germany. Edward I introduced the commission of array to raise troops, a practice in which individuals had royal authorisation to recruit a given number of men.

Edward III raised men for campaigns in Scotland in 1346 and 1355 as well as for those of the Hundred Years War by using indentures, or contracts. The shire militias were largely levied for defensive purposes. The War of the Roses, 1450 to 1485, saw all three methods used: levies, commissions of array and indentures. The first of the Tudors, Henry VII, relied on the traditional method of indentures for service overseas while using the militias against domestic enemies as in the Perkin Warbeck Rebellion of 1497. It was Henry VIII who helped usher in a unified military system. In 1511 he ordered sheriffs, the heads of the militias, to see that the Statute of Westminster was rigorously followed, that men were supplying the arms under which they were obligated by law. The next year saw the end of the indenture system and the beginning of what J. J. Goring calls a ‘quasi-feudal’ one in which privy signets were issued to principal landowners to supply their tenants for military service. Thus a two-tiered system existed: the militia, or national force for defence and the signets for service abroad. Despite the progressive reforms, the general muster of 1522 revealed a laxity in following the statutes, as many ignored their burden to supply arms. In Rutland, to which the best surviving documents

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pertain, only a third of those mustered had any type of weapon. Surviving documents show that of over 128,000 men in twenty-eight counties, only a third were the most capable type of men - archers.\textsuperscript{17} Efforts were made to strengthen the defects and from 1535 commissioners of muster inspected arms every three years. The biggest problem of the mid-Tudor years was a lack of organisation. The two methods of recruitment resulted in a competition of soldiers, of which there were not enough. The 1558 Militia Act under Queen Mary was an attempt at military unity.\textsuperscript{18}

The Marian statute, ‘The Act for Having of Horse, Armour and Weapon’, divided citizens into ten categories according to yearly income. At the bottom were those worth £5 to £10 a year, who were to keep a coat of armour, a bill or halberd, a longbow and a steel helmet. At the top were those worth £1,000 or more, who had to furnish sixteen horses, eighty suits of armour, forty pikes, thirty longbows, twenty halberds, twenty harquebuses (a type of musket) and fifty steel helmets. It was part of the government’s effort to ensure military obedience, but it did not specify how the value of land and goods was to be assessed. Usually the parish subsidy books were used, documents that were inflexible and did not keep up with changes in land ownership. The act also was not equitable due to absentee landowners.\textsuperscript{19} A person could own land in several different counties and only be assessed in the one in which he or she claimed residence. So the statute was far from perfect, but it did help achieve a unified method of recruitment in

\textsuperscript{17}Beckett, \textit{Amateur Military Tradition}, p. 18; J. Cornwall, ed., \textit{The County Community Under Henry VIII: the military survey, 1522, and lay subsidy, 1524-25, for Rutland} (Rutland Record Society, vol. 1,1980), passim.


which the militia forces were levied, though quasi-feudalism persisted to a lesser degree until the end of the century. Contingents of men raised by individuals were used to put down the Northern Rebellion of 1569 as well as for defensive purposes in 1588 and 1599.20

Another aspect that the statute did not take into account was the need for training that was necessary in a changing military environment. Emphasis was on traditional weapons such as bows at the expense of firearms.21 One of the most important military achievements of the Elizabethan age was the replacement of the revered longbow with guns. Encouraged by support for the new weapons from officials across the country, the Privy Council sought to increase their use. Its efforts were successful and by 1589 the Council decided there was no longer a need for archers in the standard militia company, though some had reservations about giving guns to ordinary soldiers.22

Though there were no militia statutes under Elizabeth, the trained bands were established.23 There was a growing need for some professionalism in the ranks following the Northern Rebellion of 1569 and the idea of a smaller, highly trained group of men

20 Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline’, pp. 196-97; British Library (hereafter B.L.) Lansdowne MS 104, f. 25; B.L. Additional (hereafter Add) MS 48162, f. 53 (iii): This 1599 document is a declaration of the nobility to use ‘all the powers ther bodyes ther lyves lands and goods to serve hir majesty as well by offensyve wars as defensyve’.

21 Smith, ‘Militia Rates and Militia Statutes’, p. 94.

22 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pp. 102, 109, 114; B.L Lansdowne MS 67, f. 46: In a letter to Lord Burghley dated 9 November 1591, Ralph Lowe, the muster master of Ireland, said he did not want common men to have guns until they marched against the enemy. One can only assume he was worried about the possibility of insurrection and by what they might do to themselves or others with the weapons. Microfilm of the Leveson-Gower of Trentham, Dukes of Sutherland Papers in the Folger Library, Washington D. C. in the Staffordshire Record Office (hereafter S.R.O.), D 593/S/4/11/1: A Kent deputy, William Lambarde, was also concerned about armed men, saying ‘I take it dangerous to arme men first, and then to offend them’.

23 D. Dean, Law-Making and Society in Late Elizabethan England The Parliament of England, 1584-1601 (Cambridge, 1996) pp. 75-76: Parliament discussed the problem of arming and training the militia. A 1584-85 bill concerning the proper use of small arms did not get more than one reading, and in 1589 a bill concerning ‘Horse Armour and Weapons’ passed the Lords but failed in the Commons.
was a popular one. As a result the trained bands were established in 1573. Each county developed a force of the most able men for intense training amounting to about a third of the overall militia. Counties paid for this additional training and in an effort to keep local resentment to a minimum, well-to-do members of the community who could better afford the arms and training were preferred as soldiers. The trained bands were to be the anchor of national defence and not to be used overseas, but as will be shown, they were often used to fill the ranks for foreign levies. By 1575, almost 12,000 of the roughly 183,000 men registered in the national musters were in the trained bands. They were an enduring innovation of the Tudor monarchy, much like the commander of the militias, the lord lieutenant.

The origins of the post of lord lieutenant were strictly military. The holder of the office would become a key man in county government, and by the end of the sixteenth century the office was on its way to being institutionalised as the most important position in the shire, following in the footsteps of the sheriffs and justices of the peace. County forces during the time of Henry III (1216-1272) fell into three categories. First were the armed vassals of the tenants-in-chief who served their lords, then the minor-tenants-in-chief. Finally, there was the body of freemen sworn under the assize of arms. The last two groups were headed by the sheriff, the most powerful man in the county at that time, who had been responsible for calling and commanding the militia since before the Norman Conquest.

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The Crown, perhaps fearing the power of sheriffs, began to appoint justices of the peace in the fourteenth century. They would soon become the principal officials in local government and had the power to arrest, indict and hear felony cases at quarter sessions - legal proceedings before justices (together known as the commission of the peace) which met four times a year. Justices were also responsible for implementing laws regarding economic and social affairs as well as military ones through their role as muster commissioners.27

The number of justices grew with the expansion of the gentry order and that of Tudor policies. A. H. Smith's example shows that in 1462 a commission of the peace in Norfolk usually had no more than ten or fifteen justices. By the late 1500s membership had risen to between fifty and sixty. John Guy provides similar evidence of the growth of the bench. Under Thomas Wolsey, on average twenty-five justices served each county, by mid-Elizabethan times the number was forty to fifty, and by 1603 there were sometimes as many as ninety. A higher workload alone cannot account for this increase. Being a justice became a status symbol, a necessary position to further one's career and gain influence in the localities. Efforts were made to tighten standards and purges made, but the numbers continued to grow.28 So the Crown governed the shires through the justices, who were the most influential men in county government by 1558. They effectively took control of the counties and militias from the sheriffs, men reduced to


28 A. H. Smith, County and Court, p. 61; Guy, Tudor England, p. 386; J. H. Gleason, The Justices of the Peace in England 1558 to 1640 (Oxford, 1969), p. 4: A similar situation to that of Norfolk took place in Kent, where there were fifty-five justices in 1584 and ninety-two by 1608.
doing at the behest of others. A. H. Smith says they had become ‘everybody’s servants
and nobody’s master.’

It was the lords lieutenant who would eventually challenge the justices for
primacy in the county. The government wanted more central control, a link between
Westminster and the shires. As Diarmaid MacCulloch said, the lords lieutenant were the
Tudor solution to curb local power through a trusted intermediary, preferably one of
noble lineage. The origins of the lords lieutenant go back to the thirteenth century,
when Edward I placed levies under the command of captains, yet it was not until after
Henry VIII’s break from Rome, when the government, possibly fearing a threat from
abroad or internal unrest due to the religious divide, appointed the first lieutenants in
1545. Southern England was divided into three parts and a lieutenant named in each
district with authority over all county officials. Further lieutenants followed under
Edward VI. In 1547 the Earl of Shrewsbury was made lieutenant of the North without the
consent of Parliament for a Scottish expedition. It was not until November 1549, under
the stewardship of the Duke of Northumberland, that the office received Parliamentary
consent; lieutenants were to be assigned to a county or counties in the event of an
emergency, such as the threat of invasion. This ad hoc nature of the lieutenancy
continued well into Elizabeth’s reign. Northumberland wanted to make the posts
permanent, but Mary commissioned lieutenants only sporadically and responsibility
largely went to the muster commissions. These early lieutenants seemed to have caused
some resentment. They lacked local deputies as well as threatening the power of

29 A. H. Smith, *County and Court*, p. 49.

30 D. MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors Politics and Religion in an English County 1500-

established officials. Therefore, a lack of co-operation meant they were often ineffectual. Despite this fact, the lieutenant was established as the commander of the militia forces.\(^{32}\)

Under Elizabeth the position grew from an *ad hoc* posting into a force that Penry Williams calls the most important development in county government during the sixteenth century. They would become the key link between Privy Council and local magistrates.\(^{33}\) Though it would not be until 1585 that commissions would change from their *ad hoc* nature, with the exception of 1561, when Elizabeth, ‘finding our realm in quiet both at home, and abroad . . . forbeare the making of any commision of lieutenancy’, lieutenants were commissioned every year during the first thirty years of Elizabeth’s reign.\(^{34}\) The lieutenant list for 1559 shows a high number of privy councillors, as was usually the case in late Tudor and Stuart times. In her seminal book *Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century*, G. S. Thomson states that lieutenants who were also councillors were ordered to ‘repair at once’ to the district to which they were appointed. This does not seem, at least not always, to have been the case.\(^{35}\) So it is not surprising that deputy lieutenants were becoming increasingly important.

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\(^{34}\) Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.) State Papers, 12/18/36; Goring, ‘The Military Obligations of the English People 1511 to 1558’, p. 46.

\(^{35}\) G. S. Thomson, *Lords Lieutenants*, pp. 46, 48-49, 60-61; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic* (hereafter *C.S.P.D.*), 1547-80, p. 181; Thomson uses an example found in State Paper 12/97/2 to demonstrate how councillor lieutenants left London and returned to their charges when military activity was at hand. This document from June 1574 is addressed to the Earl of Bedford, lieutenant of Norfolk and Lincolnshire, and orders him to ‘direct to them [deputies] such orders . . . and take order for the defence of our said counties and cities’, but despite Thomson’s claims, it does not specifically tell the earl to actually go to the counties himself.
It is not clear exactly when deputy lieutenants were first employed. There are some references to them under Edward VI and Mary, and they were appointed sometime before the Northern Rebellion of 1569. They were picked from among the country gentry and were well acquainted with the area. It was they who oversaw the raising and training of men and horse. Most of them had served as sheriffs and were justices of the peace, so they had experience in local administration. Their commissions were concurrent with the lieutenants and terminated at the same time as that of their superiors. But unlike lieutenants, deputies were never assigned to a jurisdiction of more than one county; they were confined to their own shire.

The office of deputy became a permanent position along with the lieutenants in 1585, meaning there were always deputies in those counties that had lieutenants. Originally, two deputies were appointed by the Crown after consultation with the lieutenant for each shire. By the time Burghley became a lieutenant in 1587, three was seen as the minimum number required. Deputies sometimes received communication directly from the council which recognised their importance, as exemplified by its letter to the Earl of Arundel commissioning him lieutenant of Sussex and Surrey sometime early in Elizabeth’s reign. It states that since the earl was one of the Queen’s councillors and could not reside in either of those counties ‘he may nominate some of the chefest of the same countie in his absence to take the speacall care and regarde therof . . . ’ and the earl would return to his command if necessary. This acknowledged early on that many


37 Ibid., p. 155.

38 As it was dependent on a lieutenant by its very nature, deputies became a permanent fixture at the same time as lieutenants did, in 1585.

lieutenants had other obligations and could not always be with their charges and needed assistance - they left the deputies to perform the day-to-day tasks. Similarly, when the relatively young (twenty-nine-years-of-age) William Bourchier, third Earl of Bath, became lieutenant of Devon in 1586, he was instructed to ‘from time to time use the advise and counsel of his deputie lieutenants, followinge therin such instruccions and direccions as were heretofore sent unto the said gentlemen’. Henry Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke, told his deputies in Shropshire to call upon all persons ‘as you thinke hable men’, and to arm them and muster them from ‘time to time as by your good discrescons shalbe thought requysite’. Time constraints and the fact that the lieutenants were often not in their counties also necessitated giving much discretion to deputies, as Pembroke did in June 1588. After commenting that ‘time is so shorte and the services presentlie so needfull’, he authorised his deputies to choose provost marshals, an early type of military policeman.40 It is one of the objects of this thesis to determine if the deputies really needed the lieutenants to perform their duties effectively.

In June 1585 an important change took place in the office of lord lieutenant. As a consequence of war with Spain, commissions of lieutenancy were issued for the potentially vulnerable maritime counties, with the exception of Yorkshire, as well as those of Derbyshire, Hertfordshire and Staffordshire.41 More appointments would follow and they were issued not on an ad hoc basis but permanently, as most of those chosen


41 J. C. Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, 1585-1642 (Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, No. 8, 1970), passim; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/179/53: Lieutenants were commissioned in Cheshire and Lancaster, Cornwall, Derbyshire, Devonshire, Dorset, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, Somerset, Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, and Wiltshire. Also see appendix ii.
held the title until death. Though not always immediately replaced, and in some cases not for decades, from the summer of 1585 there were continuously some lieutenants in some counties.

Responsibilities of the lieutenants were quite specific; they were to give instructions for the mustering and training of the militia and to see that the deputies took view of all able men in the county. Places of defence were to be found and readied and beacons built and maintained. Among their other responsibilities was the naming of able captains, disarming of recusants, seeing that justices provided horse and that enough gunpowder was on hand.  

There were, however, no precise qualifications for being a lieutenant. Most had land in the county over which they held command. Some, like Burghley, were assigned more than one. However, the vital factor was royal favour, or confidence. It was the one absolutely necessary thing to being a lieutenant. The Council's attitude toward a particular lieutenant was most likely dictated by confidence in his ability. It was these lieutenants who were on their way to being dominant in the county by the end of the Tudor dynasty.

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42 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/179/47, 12/179/48: Lord Burghley issued similar instructions to the commissioners of muster in 1572; B.L. Lansdowne MS 104, f. 9; Also see appendix i.

43 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 73-75, 141.
Chapter II:  
Burghley Takes Command

William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the most powerful man in Elizabethan England, was the lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire and eventually Essex and Hertfordshire from 1587 until his death in 1598. The office was that of a military commander as the lieutenant was in charge of the county’s militia forces. This thesis explores the impact that Burghley and other lieutenants had on military efficiency and the role they had in helping localities meet the demands of war. Did they make a substantial difference themselves in the mustering and raising of troops or were the deputy lieutenants the key to efficiency? Special emphasis is placed on Burghley because he serves as a prime example of an important man with many responsibilities in the service of the central government who was also a lord lieutenant. Included in this chapter is a section on the backgrounds of the various deputies in this study. They will be analysed in terms of military experience and offices held, namely that of MP, knight of the shire, sheriff and justice of the peace. The purpose of this chapter is to examine Burghley’s attitude to command and the way in which he pursued the task of being a lieutenant.

Born in Lincolnshire in 1520 the son of a minor courtier, William Cecil left for St. John’s College at Cambridge in 1535 where he displayed the strong work ethic he would maintain for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, he left university without a degree and by 1547 entered government service as the secretary of Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset and de facto head of state as Protector of the young king, Edward VI.¹ He was able to survive the Earl of Warwick’s regime and that of Mary to thrive under Elizabeth, whom he

served as secretary of state from 1558 until 1572, playing a key role in diplomacy and the religious settlement of 1559. After stepping down as secretary, Lord Burghley (a title he was awarded in 1571) became Lord Treasurer, a position he would hold until his death. Elizabeth consulted him on important matters of state and his anonymous biographer comments that Burghley ‘left scarce time for sleep or meals or leisure’. He continued regular attendance at Privy Council, being present at eighty percent of sessions as late as 1592-93 despite his poor health. Gout kept him bedridden during the winter of 1585-86, yet he still wanted to be a lord lieutenant.

That Burghley wanted the lieutenancy there is no doubt. In September 1586 he informed Francis Walsingham that he felt hurt that Elizabeth refused to entrust Essex and Hertfordshire to him and that he would have been more upset if he failed to get the lieutenancy of Northamptonshire, where he was ‘no new planted or feathered gentleman’. Christopher Hatton was put in command of Northamptonshire and it could not have helped Burghley’s pride that the Essex and Hertfordshire jobs went to his rival at court, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. A lieutenancy could certainly be used to enhance one’s stature. Robert Manning has pointed out that Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, used the lieutenancy in Sussex to consolidate his power in that county by influencing the gentry and controlling elections. Likewise, Eugene Bourgeois has shown that Lord Roger North did

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4 R. B. Colvin, *The Lieutenants and Keepers of the Rolls of the County of Essex* (London, 1934), p. 50: Burghley owned land in Essex and his second wife, Mildred, was the daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke of Romford, *custos rotulorum* from 1571-76, so he did have some connection with the shire.

5 *C.S.P.D.*, *1581-90*, p. 352.
much the same thing in Cambridgeshire to counter his rival, Richard Cox, Bishop of Ely.\textsuperscript{6} Thus it is not surprising that Burghley turned his attention to his native Lincolnshire in 1587, denouncing another aspirant, Henry Clinton, Earl of Lincoln, who may have been mentally unstable, ‘that all feare his government if there be a lieutenant’.\textsuperscript{7} This time his wish was granted and he succeeded to the post late that year.\textsuperscript{8}

The position may have appealed to Burghley’s preoccupation with status. He was apparently sensitive to being thought of as an arriviste and wanted to be seen as a traditional aristocrat. The marriages of his sons indicates that he wanted to move among the highest levels of society. His elder son, Thomas, married the daughter of John Nevill, Lord Latimer, and Robert Cecil married into the Cobham dynasty of Kent. Burghley was one of the great builders of Elizabethan times with the huge homes of Theobalds in Hertfordshire, Cecil House in London and Burghley house in Stamford. The lieutenancy added to the prestige he had in Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Rutland.\textsuperscript{9}

Lieutenancies were highly sought after and valued. Several offices became quasi-hereditary and in 1595 a worried Lord William Chandos, lieutenant of Gloucestershire, wrote to Sir Robert Cecil in response to a rumour that he would lose his lieutenancy or have some other join him as co-lieutenant in a shire ‘hither to hath been committed to his ancestors only’.\textsuperscript{10} A family’s primacy in a county often resulted in a lieutenancy. The Herbert family


(Earls of Pembroke) held the position in Wiltshire almost constantly whenever it was issued from 1551 until the Civil War. Other examples include the Stanleys (Earls of Derby) in Cheshire and Lancashire and the Hastings (Earls of Huntingdon) family in Leicestershire and Rutland. Many lieutenants were also powerful men in central government, which enhanced the status of the position. Sir Christopher Hatton, lieutenant of Northamptonshire and Middlesex, was the Lord Chamberlain, a position later held by Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, lieutenant of Norfolk and Suffolk. The lieutenant of Surrey and Sussex, Lord Charles Howard of Effingham, was the Lord High Admiral. Eighteen of the forty-four men that served as lieutenants from 1585 until Elizabeth’s death in 1603 were Privy Councillors at some point during those years, and eighty percent (thirty-six of forty-four) were peers. Hatton, Sir Walter Ralegh, Sir Francis Knollys and Sir William Knollys were the only non-peers to be lieutenants for any great length of time under Elizabeth. As Joel Hurstfield has said, Elizabeth preferred to reserve major offices for noblemen. By the early seventeenth century the prestige of the position was further enhanced, and for the years 1625-42, over ninety percent (fifty-nine of sixty-four) of those who were lieutenants under the Stuarts were of the peerage. According to G. S. Thomson, its value grew greater as fewer replacements were made towards the end of Elizabeth’s reign.


12 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, p. 50; A.P.C. vols. 1586-87 to 1601-04, passim; Hurstfield, Freedom, Corruption and Government, p. 301; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 12, 14: Cornwall had four non-peers who briefly served as joint-lieutenants in 1586 and 1587: Sir Francis Godolphin, Sir William Mohun, Peter Edgcumbe and Richard Carew. Sir William Knollys was created Lord Knollys in May 1603 and Earl of Banbury in 1626.

Usually the lieutenant was a major landowner in the county or counties of his charge. As mentioned above, Burghley certainly had substantial holdings in Lincolnshire and the East Midlands as a whole. Besides his great estate of Theobalds located in Hertfordshire near the border with Essex, Burghley had additional lands in those two counties in which he would be lieutenant by the end of 1588. One notable exception is Lord Hunsdon, who had no lands in Norfolk but did have estates in neighbouring Suffolk. Also, there is no evidence that Henry Hastings, Earl of Huntingdon and President of the Council of the North, owned lands in Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland or Westmorland, but he had large holdings in the North Riding of Yorkshire.

From the standpoint of military efficiency it seems desirable for a lieutenant to have had military experience, though it certainly was not always the case. Burghley had one brief first-hand encounter with war in 1547 in a campaign in Scotland where he was employed as a judge in the Marshal’s Court, which enforced military discipline. He took no actual part in combat though he was close to the fighting at the battle of Pinkie. B. W. Beckingsale states that it gave him an insight into the logistics of war and its hazards and limitations as an instrument of state policy. Burghley retained an interest in military affairs and during the Northern Rebellion of 1569 called for an increase in arquebusiers and their training, though his fellow councillors rejected his pleas. With an increased threat from Spain, in 1584 he

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15 MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors*, p. 103; Smith, *County and Court*, p. 50.

16 W. Parge, ed., *V. C. H. Yorkshire North Riding*, vol. ii (1923), pp. 182, 557. The President of the Council of the North was also the lieutenant of the counties of Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland, Yorkshire and Westmorland.

17 H. M. C. Salisbury MSS, vol. v, p. 69; Read, *Mr. Secretary and Queen Elizabeth*, pp. 38-39; Beckingsale, *Burghley, Tudor Statesman*, p. 27.
suggested an idea to have all county musters supervised by royal experts, though this also fell on deaf ears. However, he was most likely quite influential in the appointment of lieutenants and the determination of their duties through his role on the Privy Council. That same year, he was appointed a special commissioner to the county commissions for breeding and equipping horses. Yet like many others, he most likely had a sub-commissioner do the work, as he did not have time to do it himself. Elizabeth even appointed him Deputy Lord High Admiral in the spring of 1588, though he took no action in that capacity. In reality, his efforts were mainly in the diplomatic sphere rather than the military one. Of the forty-four men who served as lieutenants from 1585 until Elizabeth’s death in March 1603, twenty-one had military experience of a substantial nature - they had served in combat or were career military men, such as Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy and Lord High Admiral Charles Howard. There were fourteen others, such as Hatton, who had no experience at all before becoming lieutenants. The remaining nine, including Burghley, had very limited experience before they became lieutenants. They had never been in battle but had been involved in the militia before as muster commissioners or captains. Whatever their own military background, all lieutenants relied on their deputies, as will be shown.

Given his numerous other responsibilities and lack of experience, Burghley required able deputies in Lincolnshire due to the county’s lack of good roads and general isolation. It

18 An arquebus was an early type of musket. Also see the glossary.

19 Beckingsale, Burghley, Tudor Statesman, pp. 167, 260; Boynton, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 81; Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, pp. 414, 417, 424; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/168/3, 179/46-49; Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, p. 74.

20 Lord Howard, in addition to being commander of the fleet against the Armada in 1588 also gave advice on defence against Spain.

21 See appendix iii. These figures were compiled by checking the volumes of the Dictionary of National Biography (hereafter D.N.B.), S. T. Bindoff, ed., The House of Commons, 1509-1558, vols. i-iii (London, 1982); P. W. Hasler, ed., The House of Commons, 1558-1603, vols. i-iii (London, 1981); The Complete Peerage; and Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, passim.
was the most north-easterly shire ruled directly from London and was divided into the three regions of Lindsey, Kesteven and Holland. The main points of contact with the rest of the country were the towns of Stamford, Grantham and Newark located in the western division of Kesteven while the south-eastern region of Holland was dominated by the fens.\footnote{J. W. F. Hill, \textit{Tudor & Stuart Lincoln} (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 1-2, 7-8.}

Burghley inherited two deputies from his predecessor, Edward Manners, Earl of Rutland: Edward Dymoke and Anthony Therold. Dymoke had been a deputy since 1585 and was the nephew of a former lieutenant, the aforementioned Henry Clinton, second Earl of Lincoln, with whom he would later become involved in a bitter feud.\footnote{P.R.O. Star Chamber Records (hereafter STAC), 5/L10/4, L33/3, D34/1; 8/91/23, 123/15: The feud was largely over Dymoke’s inheritance of the manor of Horncastle in Lincolnshire and degenerated into violence.} Previously he had been a knight of the shire as well as sheriff and justice of the peace. Given his family’s status and land holdings it was natural that he had influence in Lincolnshire and would be chosen as a deputy, despite the fact that there is no evidence that he had any military service before being appointment. Anthony Therold was elderly (sixty-seven, the same age as Burghley) by the end of 1587, had been plagued by illness for years, if not decades, and appears to have been too ill to have served except briefly under Burghley.\footnote{Hasler, \textit{Commons, 1558-1603}, vol. ii, pp. 70-71, vol. iii, pp. 488-89; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. iii, p. 297, Anthony Therold, Edward Dymoke, Charles Willoughby of Parham and Thomas Cecil were confirmed as deputies on 14 November 1587 but Therold does not seem to have done much after 1588; See appendix iv for information on Burghley’s deputies.}

Burghley appointed two deputies with the approval of the Privy Council - Lord Charles Willoughby of Parham and his son, Thomas Cecil. Willoughby of Parham was a rarity, a deputy who was also a peer. Willoughby had long been involved in local administration, including having been on the muster commission for the city of Lincoln. He had also married the daughter of the aforementioned first Earl of Lincoln. A man of his high
standing was a natural choice as a deputy. The appointment of Thomas Cecil looks a clear case of nepotism, yet he was an experienced soldier who had served in the suppression of the Northern Rebellion in 1569-70, and at the siege of Edinburgh in 1573. In 1585-86 he distinguished himself in the Netherlands intervention. He was a Lincolnshire deputy for only a few months before taking the same post in Northamptonshire in 1588. Later he became President of the Council of the North, lieutenant of Yorkshire, and eventually, of Northamptonshire too in 1603, under James I. Yet his life was overshadowed by that of his younger brother, Robert. His own father held him in low esteem and they were never close. According to Burghley’s anonymous biographer, the elder man’s fortune was divided into various parts, ‘wherof his oldest son had not one penny’. Conyers Read labels Thomas Cecil ‘quite undistinguished’ and had nothing positive to say about him other than he did not dishonour the family name. Yet being a lieutenant and President of the Council of the North as well as a Privy Councillor might be thought to be a considerable distinction.

George St. Poll was eventually chosen to replace Cecil in October 1595. He lacked military training, but he had been an MP and sheriff, and he was well known to Burghley. In a letter dated 1 September 1598, less than a month after Burghley’s death, St. Poll wrote to Robert Cecil claiming to have served his father ‘near 20 years’ and was obviously trying to


26 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i, p. 579; Wake, ed., Musters, Beacons, Subsidies, p. xx; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 28, 37; Cecil’s desire for the Lincolnshire lieutenancy is evident in P.R.O. State Papers, 12/268/97: In a letter dated 30 October 1598 Cecil tells his brother Robert “If Her Majesty shall grant it to any but myself, I should take it very disgracefully, being deputy in my father’s lifetime.” He had to be content with Yorkshire and Northamptonshire.

stay in the family's favour. Despite later complaining about having to provide horse for Ireland, there is no evidence that St. Poll did not fulfil his obligations as a deputy.\textsuperscript{28}

These deputies all had similar backgrounds and credentials, they were local men who with the exception of Parham had all served in the House of Commons and were knights of the shire. They were all on the bench, and all but Parham had been sheriffs. Parham, as a muster commissioner, and Thomas Cecil, who served in the Low Countries, had military experience prior to becoming deputies; and Therold and Dymoke were in place as deputies before Burghley's arrival.\textsuperscript{29}

Soon after the Earl of Leicester's death in 1588, Burghley succeeded him as lieutenant in Hertfordshire and Essex, both of which were relatively prosperous counties. Agriculture and the cloth trade made Essex the seventh richest county by 1535, while Hertfordshire, located directly north of London, ranked tenth with most of its more affluent residents residing close to the capital in the south, an area Elizabeth frequented. Though inland, Hertfordshire was reclassified as a maritime county in 1583 so that more soldiers and weapons could be raised to defend the coast in event of invasion.\textsuperscript{30}

Burghley took charge of the counties' forces by 31 December 1588.\textsuperscript{31} One Essex deputy that he inherited from Leicester was Sir Henry Grey, who had first been appointed in 1569. Grey was a courtier and the cousin of Lady Jane Grey. His father was the younger


\textsuperscript{29} See appendix iv.


\textsuperscript{31} Sainty, \textit{Lieutenants of Counties}, pp. 20, 23.
brother of the disgraced Henry Grey, Duke of Suffolk and son of Thomas Grey, Marquis of Dorset. Thomas Mildmay was also first chosen in 1569. He succeeded to the estates of his influential father (also named Thomas) in 1571 and was not above putting county interests ahead of the country's. In February 1596 the council had to remind him and the other deputies to supply the cattle for a naval expedition as they had been told. The council also expressed its surprise that such a large and plentiful shire could not provide more. Mildmay was also interested in using his position for his own gain as he unsuccessfully tried to petition Burghley to support him in his suit for registering strangers in 1591.

Burghley appointed Sir John Petre deputy in 1590. Despite coming from a Catholic family, Petre had long been active in county administration, having previously been captain of a band of infantry. His appointment looks to be a case of pragmatism and possible patronage by Burghley, who was godfather to Petre's son. Burghley understood the importance of the Petre family in Essex and outward acceptance of the new religion was enough for an important man. The fact that Petre later sat on commissions against seminaries and Jesuits is evidence of his allegiance to the Queen. Burghley also had a relationship with the family and he certainly would have been eager to further his influence by placing a friend in such an office, but primacy in the county is probably the bigger factor in the choice of Petre.

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33 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/59/61; Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. ii, p. 52; A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 195-96; B.L. Lansdowne MS 66, f. 156; Thomas Heneage was a deputy in Essex from 1585-87, but does not appear to have been one under Burghley. P.R.O. State Papers, 12/213/26: In July 1588 he was appointed treasurer of war for the armies levied to defend against foreign invasion.

34 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, pp. 209-10; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/224/63; B.L. Lansdowne MSS 33, f. 60; 103, f. 66; P.R.O. Prerogative Court of Canterbury (hereafter PROB), 11/112/108 Windebanck: Petre was also close to Thomas Mildmay, who remembered him in his will and described him as 'my auntiect freinde'. Also see appendix iv.
The three Hertfordshire deputies were more experienced still; they were all in place before Burghley's lieutenancy - Henry Cocke, John Brockett and Philip Butler. Burghley would have been well aware of their families, as he had been monitoring the homes of the county's gentry at Theobalds since the 1570s. They were quite knowledgeable in the affairs of the militia and Burghley relied on them quite heavily.

Sir Henry Cocke was an extensive landowner and an experienced county official as well as Burghley's client. Cocke appealed to his patron for support in a land dispute with his neighbour, William Purvey. Burghley surely must have made the peace because Purvey's father had been a client of his. As well as being the provost marshal in Hertfordshire, Cocke was a deputy by 1584. Sir Philip Butler's family had been established in the shire since at least 1450 and Sir Philip himself resided in the great manor of Woodhall in Watton. The ability of these two men to oversee the militia in the absence of a lieutenant is exemplified in a letter from Cocke to Burghley dated 16 November 1587. While Leicester was away, Cocke reported that the deputies arranged for the gentlemen of the county to contribute petronells (horses and equipment). Cocke then went on to advocate the use of muskets over calivers, a less advanced firearm.

Burghley re-appointed the supposedly Puritan Sir John Brockett in January 1589, just days after Brockett had written to him telling how pleased he was that the Lord Treasurer was

35 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/59/61; J. B. Calnan, 'County Society and Local Government in the County of Hertford, c. 1580-1630, With Special Reference to the Commission of the Peace' (University of Cambridge, D. Phil. 1978), p. 78.

36 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i, p. 621; Calnan, 'County Society and Local Government', pp. 151-52; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/218/39; King, Master Books, p. xvii; Also see appendix iv.

37 B.L. Lansdowne MS 52, f. 28; Another letter showing Cocke's knowledge is Lansdowne MS 56, f. 48; Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, p. 520; W. Page, ed., V.C.H. Hertfordshire, vol. iii (London, 1908), p. 55; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/214/69.
named lieutenant. He came from a leading family and had served on the commission of musters as well as that of commander of a hundred men that helped guard the Queen during the Armada crisis. Additionally, he was the commander of a trained band and had been a deputy since 1585. The fact that he had clashed with Cocke in the past over the aforementioned parliamentary election of 1584 and was still a deputy is to Burghley’s credit. He did not ignore the rival of his client, Cocke, but instead kept him in the job because he was well qualified and to satisfy the ambitions of a powerful family.

Despite their qualifications, these gentlemen were tainted by the suggestion of corruption in activities undertaken during the 1588 Armada crisis. The Privy Council addressed a letter dated 25 August 1588 to the Earl of Leicester as lieutenant of Hertfordshire and his deputies informing them that ‘ther hathe ben greater collections made in that countie for armor coate conducte money and like furnyture. . .than hathe ben employed in the present service’. The deputies were to examine the collections made and to investigate ‘certen captens’ who accepted money for the release of soldiers. Furthermore, some men at Tilbury claimed that captains pocketed their pay. The council ordered Leicester to see that the men were contented and all alleged abuses investigated and action taken. Hertfordshire was not unique, an almost identical letter was addressed to ‘divers shires’ that same day. Similar accusations


39 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i, pp. 486-87; B.L. Lansdowne MS 56, f. 166; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/179/46, 12/224/88; J. E. Neale, Elizabethan House of Commons, (London, 1949), pp. 28-30, Brockett supported Edward Denny to fill his vacant seat in parliament and claimed fraud when Cocke won instead. In 1590, as will be shown, he had another dispute with Cocke over the command of this former band.

40 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/215/50.

41 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/215/53.
were made against Devonshire, where ‘dyvers of the said poore soildiers were payed
no wages for that tyme’, as well as Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. Writing to
Burghley in 1590, soldier and military historian Sir John Smythe complained about
corruption: ‘your lordship I think doth verie well knowe that ther were some fewe
captains of some shiers of England, that did a little begin to imitate them [captains in
the Low Countries] in defraudinge their soldiers of partie of their pay at such time as
the campe was at Tilburie’. It is not clear what was actually done in Hertfordshire,
but the matter was not quickly restored - Cocke pleaded his innocence in the affair in
a letter to Burghley’s secretary, Henry Maynarde, in February 1590. Still, there is no
evidence that the deputies were ever disciplined for anything that may have taken
place.

Once Cocke was established in the office of Cofferer of the Household he
spent more time at court. Therefore another deputy was needed to help with some of
Cocke’s duties. Burghley chose Arthur Capell, scion of a Suffolk family that settled
in Hadham Manor in Hertfordshire during the reign of Henry VII. Burghley refers to
Arthur Capell as a gentleman of good discretion with a ‘dwellinge and residence
begine that partie of the shire as is fytt to execute the place’, and he was appointed
deputy on 18 July 1597. There is no sign that he had any military experience, yet he
was very close to the Cecil family and often wrote to Robert Cecil.

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Overall, nine of the twelve deputies who served Burghley were MPs, with the same number having at various times been knights of the shire. All were on the bench and nine had previously been sheriff in the counties in which they were deputies, while eight of the twelve had experience as deputies prior to Burghley’s appointment as lieutenant. To see if these deputies were typical, it is necessary to compare them with their counterparts in other counties. Forty-one deputies from ten other counties are considered here. They range from Kent, Surrey and Sussex in the south, to Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire in East Anglia, to Northamptonshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire in the Midlands and Lancashire in the north-west.

Sir Christopher Hatton’s deputies in Northamptonshire were Sir Richard Knightley, Sir Edward Montagu, Thomas Cecil and Arthur Throckmorton. Knightley and Montagu were deputies well before Hatton arrived on the scene. Both had served under William Parr in 1570. Another deputy, John Spencer, died shortly after Hatton took office. Knightley and Montagu had served on the muster commission, Knightley was largely responsible for the western division of the county and Montagu oversaw the eastern portion. Knightley was a friend of Hatton, who supported his successful bid to become a knight of the shire in 1589, as well as a devout Puritan. He was imprisoned from November 1589 to February 1590 because of his involvement in hiding the printing press for the Marprelate Tracts. After his release, he returned to his duties as deputy, an indication of his worth in the post. Again in 1605 he was in trouble for Puritan activities and was stripped of his office by the Star Chamber and

393; vol. x, pp. 135, 190-91, 394; vol. xi, pp. 103, 239, 420, 457, 532; vol. xii, pp. 136, 319, 462; vol. xv, p. 175: For details of Capell’s correspondence with Robert Cecil, see appendix iv.

46 See appendix iv.

banished from the bench. Yet he was reinstated as a muster commissioner by the end of that same year. Even though he was over seventy, his services were still valued and he was listed as a deputy again in 1612. Edward Montagu's family benefited greatly from the dissolution of the monasteries. Edward succeeded to the family lands in 1557 and latter served as sheriff and MP besides being a deputy. His son, also named Edward, commanded a foot company by 1587 and would later become a deputy during the reign of James I.

Thomas Cecil, formerly a deputy in Lincolnshire, was named to the same post in April 1588, for the Soke of Peterborough. But Cecil was often absent and in February 1590 Sir George Fermor was appointed, partly to cover for both Cecil and Knightley, who was imprisoned for the Marprelate affair. Fermor was one of the wealthiest men in the county and had, like Cecil, served in the Netherlands. In addition, he was close to Knightley and would remember him in his will. Nevertheless, he had defaulted in 1589 on his contribution to the loan for the Armada levies - an example of the reluctance that people had towards extraordinary taxation and subsidies.

All of Hatton's deputies, unlike Burghley's, had military experience. The experienced Knightley and Montagu were the chief deputies, and along with John Spencer, were empowered by Hatton on 8 October 1586, less than a month after he became lieutenant, to act 'as if my self were present in persone', telling his deputies they were 'better acquainted then my selfe with the state of the shiere', and Hatton's sent him the names of various candidates for positions for his approval, as was the case with Burghley's Deputies.

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Derbyshire and Staffordshire were under the lieutenancy of George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, and his chief deputy in Derbyshire was his brother-in-law, John Manners. He was appointed by Shrewsbury and despite his lack of military experience was in effective control of the county militia. Certainly the fact that he was Shrewsbury's brother-in-law must have been a factor in his selection, but Manners oversaw much of the work while the earl was distracted by family problems, a point illustrated by Shrewsbury's comments to him in July 1586, saying he wanted to be in Derbyshire 'but my wieffs cause hath troubled me verie muche'. Shrewsbury trusted his judgement. John Zouche was one deputy Shrewsbury did not trust. Zouche had all the usual credentials - influential family, stints as sheriff and knight of the shire, and membership on the bench. He had helped Shrewsbury with his custody of Mary Stuart in 1569, yet the earl eventually turned against him. Denounced by Shrewsbury, Zouche was only made a deputy to 'please others'. His death in 1586 was surely no great sorrow for Shrewsbury.

The chief deputy in Staffordshire was Richard Bagot, of an old Staffordshire family. Like his fellow deputies, Sir Walter Aston and Thomas Trentham, he preceded Shrewsbury's appointment in 1585. By July 1590 Bagot was the only deputy still alive, prompting the appointment of Sir Edward Aston and Sir Edward Littlejohn. Aston was recommended to the council by Shrewsbury himself, as Burghley had done with Capell in Hertfordshire.

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52 P.R.O. PROB 11/118/82 Wood; J. C. Cox, *Three Centuries of Derbyshire Annals, as Illustrated by the Records of the Quarter Sessions of the County of Derby from Queen Elizabeth to Queen Victoria*, vol. i (London, 1890), p. 149; H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, pp. 201, 205.

53 Hasler, *Commons, 1558-1603*, vol. iii, pp. 686-87.

54 Ibid., vol. i, p. 385; S.R.O., Bagot Papers, L.a. 714; *A.P.C. 1590*, p.349; See appendix v for more on Shrewsbury's deputies.
Kent’s lieutenant was William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham and the primary deputies, besides Cobham’s son, Henry, were John Leveson, Thomas Walsingham, Thomas Scott, Peter Manwood and Thomas Fane. All were members of Parliament, and four were knights of the shire. All were on the bench, while three of the four – Scott, Fane and Manwood – had been sheriffs, and all but Walsingham had previous military experience. Leveson had served as a captain in France, Scott had helped organise coastal defences, and Fane was lieutenant of Dover Castle.55

Lord Charles Howard of Effingham was lieutenant of Surrey as well as co-lieutenant of Sussex with Thomas Sackville.56 In Surrey, Howard named his brother William, Sir William Moore and Sir Thomas Browne as his deputies on 23 July 1585, claiming the Queen ‘hath given full power, and authoritie unto me . . . to apoint assigne and constitute deputies within the said shires’.57 Howard must have meant that the Queen and council accepted his choices for deputies, as they had to have conciliar approval.58 The three men chosen were experienced - all had been deputies before - so though the appointment of William Howard may appear a case of nepotism, it is also that of a qualified man fulfilling an important position. All were predictable choices from prominent families and had extensive histories as county servants. Francis Carew was appointed in 1587, and was in favour with the Cecils and Elizabeth. His father, Nicholas, had been attainted and executed in 1539, but Mary restored most of the Carew lands in Surrey and Sussex and he was a prominent man but had no military experience. In fact, none of the three men appointed after the deaths of the

55 J. N. N. McGurk, ‘Lieutenancy in Kent c. 1580-1620’ (University of London, M. Phil. 1971), pp. 40, 244; J. N. N. McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland, the 1590s Crisis (Manchester, 1997), pp. 82-83; Page, V.C.H. Kent, vol. iii, p. 304; Also see appendix v.

56 Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 33-34: Lord Howard was created Earl of Nottingham on 22 October 1597; Buckhurst was created Earl of Dorset on 14 March 1604.

57 Surrey History Centre, Woking, Surrey (hereafter S.H.C.) Loseley MS 992, f. 2.

58 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 63-64.
original three deputies seem to have had much experience at all besides George Moore, the son of William Moore, who had been on the commission of musters since 1580. Sir Matthew Browne was probably chosen in 1600 because he was Thomas Browne’s son. Sir William Howard was Lord Howard’s son and upon becoming a deputy at the age of twenty-three there is no sign he had any military qualifications. This favouritism can also be viewed as a rational reaction to reality. The Brownes and Moores were leading families and Howard was certainly going to put his son in a position of power for the sake of continuity. Perhaps it was fortunate that it was the elder deputies who were in office during the Armada crisis when Howard was at sea.

The Sussex deputies were led by Walter Covert and Thomas Palmer, who had managed the militia since 1569. In 1587 they were joined by Sir Nicholas Parker, Buckhurst’s nephew, who had been sheriff but possessed no military credentials. Yet he went on to raise men for the Cadiz expedition in 1596, and in 1597 it was decided that he would be put in command of Sussex in the event of invasion. Therefore one could say he was certainly competent despite the fact that his appointment seems to have been for political reasons. Thomas Shirley, was first a deputy in 1569. Originally a client of Leicester, whom he accompanied to the Low Countries in 1585, in 1587 the earl secured for him the post of treasurer at war in the Netherlands, a position he would hold for English forces in France in 1591. Due to his long absences, another deputy - Henry Nevel - was added. It seems that with all his other


60 See appendix v.
offices, Shirley was not a primary deputy and not able to exert too much of an influence on the militia.

Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, was the lieutenant of Norfolk and Suffolk from 1585 to 1596. An outsider to Norfolk, he was there to enforce the Crown’s wishes regardless of any local objections. His deputies in Norfolk were Sir William Heydon, Sir Edward Clere and Sir Thomas Knyvett. Though without a military background, Heydon was an easy choice given his family’s prominence. But Heydons tended to live beyond their means and William inherited a £2400 debt. Apparently he tried to make financial gain from the office of vice-admiral of Norfolk and Suffolk, using his informants to make charges of smuggling that were dropped in exchange for payment. As a deputy he used his stature in a feud with Thomas Farmer, a Justice who also was not above dubious methods of financial gain. In 1586 Farmer tried to have one of Heydon’s servants arrested and Heydon used his authority as a deputy to have Farmer imprisoned. Using his access to Hunsdon and therefore to the council, Heydon eventually had Farmer dismissed from the bench. Heydon’s illicit methods did him little good and in 1594 he died £11,000 in debt.\(^6\)\(^2\)

Sir Edward Clere was also seen as a suitable choice because of his indifference to the rest of the county gentry. Despite his family having huge tracts of land and himself being listed among the ‘knights of great possessions’ in 1588, Clere’s income was not great and he was also in debt. Often he feuded with his neighbours and tenants and was very unpopular. This unpopularity would have appealed to Hunsdon,


\(^{62}\) Smith, *County and Court*, pp. 241-45, 163-64.
making him a natural to implement the council’s orders over local objections because of his lack of county interests.\textsuperscript{63}

Sir Thomas Knyvett, also a leading member of the gentry who was nonetheless in debt, was a scholar and not a county administrator. The council must have influenced his selection, as Hunsdon wrote that he was ‘especiallie appoynted by the Queen Majestie,’ though he also told Knyvett, ‘if I had thought otherwise then well of you, you may be sure, there should no man shall have procuraed you or have persuaded me to have appointed you one of my deputie leiutennantes’. However, Knyvett was soon at odds with Hunsdon and his fellow deputies over levies for the Low Countries. Knyvett claimed the militia was corrupt and was against a more professional force on the grounds that it hurt the poor, to whom he was something of a patron. Previously he resigned as a captain in 1584 and it is not at all clear why he was made a deputy in the first place. Hunsdon wrote to Knyvett telling him ‘you shall doo well to be better advised what you wryte and to wryte more trulie’. Apparently, he had implicated Hunsdon in corruption, though he had never mentioned him by name.\textsuperscript{64} The council confirmed his resignation, ostensibly on the grounds of poor health, on 23 February 1588, replacing him with Sir Arthur Heveningham.\textsuperscript{65}

Heveningham was consistent with Heydon and Clere in his ambition, disregard for others, and his willingness to use the office for his own ends. The Heveninghams were a long-resident family in Suffolk and began emerging in Norfolk’s affairs in the 1570s. Eager to help him establish himself, Hunsdon’s endorsement contributed to Heveningham being named a commissioner for overseeing road repairs throughout

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., pp. 160-63: Clere was in Fleet Prison because of his debts by 1594.

\textsuperscript{64} B.L. Harleian MS 4712, fos. 356 r-v, 357.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., pp. 173-75; \textit{A.P.C. 1587-88}, p. 385.
Norfolk and Suffolk. Hunsdon was more than willing to back his ambitions as long as he could rely on his support.

John Peyton also became a deputy in 1588 while serving as a colonel in the Queen's bodyguard. He was an experienced soldier and a newcomer to the county, having arrived only in 1578. This could be interpreted as an extreme case of Hunsdon's desire to satisfy the council's demands at the expense of the county. Peyton had no influence in Norfolk before Hunsdon made him a deputy. Therefore, Hunsdon had a military man totally beholden to him.

The last deputy in Norfolk appointed was Robert Southwell, who was appointed on the death of William Heydon in 1594. The Southwell family had been influential under the middle Tudors but Elizabeth looked unfavourably at its service to Mary and they lost all power until 1585. That year Robert married Elizabeth Howard, daughter of Lord Howard of Effingham, Lord Admiral and lieutenant of Surrey and Sussex. Suddenly, Southwell had backing at court and was soon vice-admiral of Norfolk (replacing William Heydon) and had similar ambitions as that of his fellow deputies. His entire career is a tribute to the power of court patronage. In total, only three of the six deputies were MPs, and only one was a knight of the shire, a very low total. Perhaps, as an outsider, Hunsdon wanted men of lesser status in that county to act in his and the Crown's interests, and not those of the county.

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66 Smith, County and Country, pp. 157-58, 243, 254-55; MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, pp. 262-63: Hunsdon's son, John Carey, was also on the commission; A. Hughs and J. Jennings, Lists of Sheriffs for England and Wales from the Earliest Times to A.D. 1831, Reprint (New York, 1963), p. 88: Heydon, Knyvett and Heveningham are not listed in Hasler's House of Commons, 1558-1603, but they had all been sheriffs.

67 Smith, County and Court, pp. 69, 287.

68 Ibid., pp. 65-66, 324; See appendix v.
In Suffolk, the deputies were probably at least partially chosen for Hunsdon by the council, he himself probably did not pick them for conciliar approval. Sir Robert Wingfield was an obvious choice, having been knight of the shire and a member of an affluent Bury St. Edmunds family. Sir Philip Parker joined Wingfield as a deputy in western Suffolk and had similar credentials, though he had not been an MP. Diarmaid MacCulloch calls the choice of Sir Robert Jermyn and Sir John Higham, who were responsible for the eastern half of the shire, strange, despite Jermyn having served in the Low Countries. MacCulloch thinks several men were bypassed, including Sir Arthur Heveningham, whose family base was still in Suffolk. Both Jermyn and Higham were devout Puritans and perhaps their appointments were backed by Puritan elements, or in the case of Jermyn, by his patron, the Earl of Essex. All four of the men, with the exception of Parker, were MPs, so they seem fairly typical.69

Lord Roger North was lieutenant of Cambridgeshire from 1588 to 1600, and his initial deputies were Francis Hinde and Sir John Cotton II. Of the other men who would serve as deputies at one point or another under North - Sir John Cuttes, who captained the trained bands in Hertfordshire in 1588, Sir John Peyton, Henry North and Sir William Hinde - all had families with a long history of county service, and three of them - Henry North, Peyton and Hinde - had military experience.70 Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby, was lieutenant in Lancashire from 1585 to 1593. The

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main deputy was Richard Sherborn, a knight of the shire who had military experience. Apart from not having been a sheriff, he was very typical of the deputies of his time.\textsuperscript{71}

Of the forty-one deputies considered in these ten counties, thirty-seven, or ninety percent, were at one time MPs. Three-fourths of Burghley's deputies had been or were MPs, and the same ratio were knights of the shire in the counties in which they were deputies, which is almost identical to the ratio for the other ten counties: seventy-six percent. Norfolk, where only three of six deputies had been MPs, had the lowest percentage.\textsuperscript{72} All of the deputies from all the counties in this study were justices, and three-fourths of Burghley's deputies were sheriffs, while thirty-four of forty-one of the deputies from other counties served in that office. Only two of twelve of Burghley's deputies had military experience before becoming deputies, but eight of the twelve had experience as deputies by the time he became a lieutenant. Of the other forty-one deputies, eighteen had military experience by the time they were appointed.\textsuperscript{73} Norfolk seems to have been the most unique county. Only one of the six deputies was a knight of the shire. This seems to indicate that some other men, such as Nathaniel Bacon and Edward Coke, were bypassed. Bacon was the chief Puritan in the county, and a faction led by Hunsdon and his deputies did their best to eradicate puritan influence in Norfolk.\textsuperscript{74} In other regards, the counties were consistent, no place stands out above the others to any great extent, and Burghley's deputies were very comparable to the others.

\textsuperscript{71} See appendix v.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} See appendices iv and v.

\textsuperscript{74} Hasler, \textit{House of Commons}, vol. i, pp. 206-10.
In comparison with lieutenants, deputies can be said to have been landowners and very high-ranking local men, whereas lieutenants were usually large landowners in a county, but often absentee, as exemplified by Burghley. As mentioned above, it was common for lieutenants to be privy councillors, but no active deputies were on the council, and only two deputies – Henry Brooke and Thomas Cecil – later became lieutenants. In contrast to the eighty percent of lieutenants that were peers, only one, Lord Charles Willoughby of Parham, in Lincolnshire, was a deputy. Deputies could also be removed from office, as Thomas Shirley of Sussex was in 1601. There were no lieutenants removed between 1585 and 1603. As far as military experience is concerned, only twenty of the fifty-three deputies in this study had any before taking their posts. This is slightly fewer than in the case of the lieutenants, of whom, as mentioned above, twenty-one of forty-four had substantial previous experience. But this can be misleading, as in the case of Essex, where all the deputies were established in the office before Burghley’s arrival. Though they may not have ever served abroad, they were experienced deputies. In some cases, the deputies were related to the lieutenants they served, i.e. Burghley’s son, Thomas Cecil, Cobham’s son, Henry Brooke, Lord Howard’s brother, William, and Lord North’s son, Henry. Though they could not usually hope to become lieutenants or councillors, some deputies were courtiers, as in the case of Henry Grey of Essex, or held positions in the Queen’s Household, as did Henry Cocke of Hertfordshire and Thomas Walsingham of Kent.

75 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i. p. 577; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 25, 28, 37: Henry Brooke became lieutenant of Kent, and Thomas Cecil that of Yorkshire, and later Northamptonshire, though he did not go directly from being a deputy in Northamptonshire to being the lieutenant. Cecil did eventually become a privy councillor, though he was not an active deputy by that time.

76 See appendix v.

77 See appendix iv.

78 See appendices iv and v.
Arthur Capell was a good friend of the Cecil’s and John Manners was a friend and the brother-in-law of Shrewsbury. Expedience and pragmatism were employed in selecting deputies. Puritans such as Richard Knightley, Robert Jermyn and John Higham were chosen along with Catholic sympathisers Richard Sherborn and Thomas and Matthew Browne. Emphasis was placed on getting the right kind of man for the task, and they were usually drawn from the highest orders of their respective counties.

So Burghley had deputies from among the best men in those three counties that he could reasonably rely on to see to the day-to-day administration of the militia. His first act after accepting the lieutenancy of Lincolnshire was to issue orders to his deputies. He stated that the previous lieutenant, the Earl of Rutland, had employed Sir Edward Dymoke and Sir Anthony Therold as deputies ‘and did delyver certain directions and instructions unto you, the said Sir Edward and Sir Anthony’ for training, mustering and arming soldiers. Procedures remained as they were, as Burghley stated ‘there is yet no other order taken, for any alteracion or increase of numbers to be trayned or mustered in that countie then heretofore hath bene in the tyme that you, the sayd Sir Edward Dymock and Sir Anthony Therold did execute this charge under the sayd Erie of Rutland there’. Being unfamiliar with the situation, Burghley was satisfied with the status quo. On 18 December 1587, when troops were to be readied in response to a potential Scottish invasion, he told his deputies, ‘I am not so well acquainted with the state of all parts of the said county . . . I do therefore refer the same wholly to the good consideration of your Lordship [Willoughby of Parham] and

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79 Ibid., Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, p. 575: Walsingham was also a distant relative of Sir Francis Walsingham.

80 J. Bruce, Report on the Arrangements which were made for the Internal Defence of These Kingdoms, when Spain by its Armada, projected the Invasion and Conquest of England, appendix vi, (London, 1798), pp. xxx-xxxi.

81 Ibid., p. xxxi.
others my deputies for the assigning and proportioning therof as you shall think each division of the shire may well bear with good and equal indifference to all parts.\textsuperscript{82} This is consistent with what he said in his instructions to the deputies when he emphasises that procedures are not to change: ‘no other direction is given [by] me, different from the former instructions sent to the sayd Erle, the late Lieutenant . . .’\textsuperscript{83}

The only changes he did make were to add the two new deputies, Lord Charles Willoughby and Thomas Cecil. Perhaps because of the threat of war, Burghley found it necessary to have more deputies in the division of Lindsey so he assigned Willoughby to assist Dymoke, a sound policy in which the new man was to learn under the one with knowledge of that particular area. Thomas Cecil was assigned to the divisions of Kesteven and Holland with Therold. As well as being placed with someone who was familiar with the territory, Burghley may have considered the fact that Cecil was physically able to do things that the older and unwell Therold could not. Burghley then goes on to repeat that foot and horse were to be readied on the same guidelines as they had done previously, and that once the deputies had met to implement his orders they were to notify him of the condition of the county and he would disperse advice and direction ‘as I shall think nedeful in this service’. He then said that, though each deputy was responsible for his particular area, all ‘should have care and regard to the whole body of the shyre, as any generall cause shall be gyven’.\textsuperscript{84}

Burghley’s reliance on local men who knew the county well appears to be a sensible approach given his own circumstances.

Burghley had little direct role in Lincolnshire’s preparations for the Armada in 1588. In July of that year, Willoughby and Therold wrote to Burghley telling him the bands were

\textsuperscript{82} H.M.C. \textit{MSS of Earl Cowper}, vol. i, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{83} Bruce, \textit{Report on Arrangements}, appendix VI, p. xxxii.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., appendix vi, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.
complete in the three parts of the shire and that everything was in order. On 20 August the
deputies informed Burghley that they had decided to place 700 men under the three captains
‘furthest from the danger of invasion here’.\(^8\)\(^5\) They did not want to hold other men near the
coast in case of invasion there; they wanted to hold them in reserve. This decision was made
and then communicated to the lieutenant. It was the deputies, and not Burghley, who made
the decision.

As mentioned above, Burghley became lieutenant of Essex and Hertfordshire by the
end of 1588. As in Lincolnshire, he had some experienced deputies who had previously
displayed their independence and knowledge of musters and training. In October 1587, the
council wrote to the deputies of both counties directly telling them to prepare for an invasion.
Later that month, deputies Henry Grey and Thomas Mildmay of Essex reported to the council
that they had carried out the orders. A few months later, deputy Henry Cocke advised the
Hertfordshire bands on training, so these were men who knew their jobs and had the trust of
the council.\(^8\)\(^6\) T. G. Barnes, who noted that precise control by lieutenants was waning by the
time of James I, claims Burghley ‘exerted a remarkable degree of control over
Hertfordshire’s routine lieutenancy affairs’. Burghley or his son, Robert Cecil, did spend a
not insubstantial amount of time at Theobalds during the 1590s, but there is no evidence that
either exerted a great deal of influence over the day-to-day business of the militia.\(^8\)\(^7\)

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\(^{85}\) H.M.C. *MSS of Earl Cowper*, vol. i, pp. 10-11.

\(^{86}\) P.R.O. State Papers, 12/204/11, 12, 42; Thomson, *Lords Lieutenants*, pp. 69-70; B.L. Add
MS 40629, fos. 48, 70.

\(^{87}\) T. G. Barnes, *Somerset 1625-1640: A County’s Government During the ‘Personal Rule’*
(London, 1961), p. 101n: Trying to explain how lieutenants oversaw their counties, Barnes cites
H.M.C. *Salisbury MSS* vols. iv and v as a whole to support his claim of Burghley’s control. His
assertion that Burghley exerted a large degree of control in Hertfordshire may be based on the copy of
Burghley’s March 1590 orders to his deputies in *Salisbury MSS*, vol. iv, pp. 15-18, which are discussed
below. Otherwise, besides mentioning that Robert Cecil, and sometimes Burghley, were at Theobalds,
these documents do not show that the lord treasurer exerted a great deal of control over the
Hertfordshire militia.
Burghley largely passed on muster and levy orders and was not overly familiar with the workings of Hertfordshire or Essex. This is evident when he appointed a Mr. Walgrave to command fifty lances (a horse band) in January 1589. The choice was almost certainly that of the deputies, since Burghley told Walgrave that he had previously served 'to your great commendacions as I have herd'\(^8\). Often the questions asked of Burghley were those in which the deputies proposed something seeking his approval. Such was the case in February 1589 when the Essex deputies wrote to him offering five of the fittest men in the county to take over a band formally commanded by John Petre, since promoted to deputy. They, not Burghley, were best informed as to who were the most suitable candidates. Six months later those same deputies informed him that John Wentworth was not acceptable for the captaincy of the lances. Apparently this man was Burghley's choice, but his deputies considered him 'not a man meet for that charge for divers weapons' and he was not considered any further.\(^9\)

For Burghley's part, as in Lincolnshire, he did not change procedures in the two counties, though he did appoint new deputies. On 24 May 1589 he wrote to his Essex deputies saying that the men who had served as captains under Leicester would continue in their posts, though he did name three captains for the 600 footmen formally entrusted to Petre. At that point, Burghley had been in office for five months and it seems odd that it took him so long to make such a decision. One of the men appointed captain, Sir John Smythe, complained in January 1590 that the quality of the Essex bands had deteriorated, claiming that two years earlier knights, esquires, gentlemen and yeomen filled the ranks. In June 1596 Smythe appeared at a muster in Colchester and denounced Burghley as a traitor for allowing troops to be sent overseas without parliamentary consent and tried to raise a rebellion. He

\(^8\) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vols. iv and v, passim; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/222/11.

\(^9\) P.R.O. State Papers, 12/222/58; 12/225/54; Hasler, *House of Commons, 1558-1603*, vol. iii, pp. 595-96: It is not clear why the deputies disapproved of Wentworth, who was a sizeable landowner and would go on to be a knight of the shire and a sheriff. It seems he took little part in county affairs.
was arrested, placed in the Tower and eventually released in 1597 after pleading drunkenness.⁹⁰

It is interesting that Smythe complained about the lack of well-bred men in the militia, because Burghley’s instructions for Essex of 15 March 1590 include comments about how the affluent were not the most adept at soldiering. The poor conditions of the Tilbury encampment in August 1588, where thousands of soldiers were encamped awaiting a possible invasion, prompted Burghley to conclude that despite the council’s call for the wealthiest farmers to be in the trained bands because they could better bear the cost, they were ill-suited to be soldiers. Rich men were ‘daintely fedd and warme lodged’, and were not prepared to ‘lie abrode in the field, [and] were worse able to endure the same’. The crops also suffered in their absence. If possible, Burghley thought the wealthier should be exempt from personal service if they could pay for a replacement, ‘either with one of their sonnes, or else with some other such able men’.⁹¹ Burghley’s comments have justifiably been called naive. That such a high-ranking member of the government had no conception of the hardships of war does seem incredible.⁹² His anonymous biographer claims that Burghley was particularly concerned about ‘relief and maintenance of the poor soldier’, yet as John Morris says, he was certainly not the first person to send men to war under horrible conditions and he did nothing to improve their lot.⁹³ This is a fair statement. Burghley was


concerned with other matters of state, and despite his comments, there is nothing to indicate he ever attempted to change the sort of conditions that existed at Tilbury.

The rest of Burghley's instructions of March 1590 are nothing out of the ordinary and follow a lieutenant's responsibilities as set forth by the council in 1585, of which he was a member.94 There was to be a view of all forces at the end of April and the justices of the peace were to assist the deputies. No soldier was to be excused unless he was the household servant of a nobleman and absentee landlords were to pay their fair share for the raising and arming of men. Captains were to view their bands 'once in a quarter of a yeare, at the least', and were not allowed to leave the shire unless given permission by Burghley. Soldiers were not to be released without the permission of a deputy. The meticulous civil servant in the Lord Treasurer is revealed by his rational comment written in the margin of the manuscript that all muster rolls should be in the same format. Conyers Read says these instructions 'reveal careful and intelligent discussion of the problems involved' and that Burghley had learned from the experience of 1588.95 Though he did offer insight by calling for standardisation of the muster rolls, for the most part his orders are not original ideas. Sensibly, he was following sound and established procedures, which allowed the deputies to use their expertise to the militia's benefit. As for Read's comments about Burghley having learned from his experiences in 1588, one can only assume he is referring to the naive observations mentioned above.

One area in which Burghley's authority and active intervention was needed was in the resolution of disputes, as in the rift between John Brockett on one side and Henry Cocke and Philip Butler on the other. As mentioned above, Brockett and Cocke had clashed before over the latter's election to parliament. No doubt acting on information received from Cocke and

94 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/179/47; See appendix i.
Butler, Burghley wrote to Brockett in December 1589 telling him that his division ‘might be better looked unto then I understand as yet it hath been’. This animosity continued in 1590 over the command of Brockett’s former band of 300 men. Cocke and Butler favoured Ralph Coningsby, their political ally, as a replacement and Brockett wrote to Burghley claiming that he had never consented to Coningsby taking command. He suggested that Ralph’s father, Sir Henry Coningsby should take the charge instead with his son’s assistance. He complained strongly that the Cocke and Butler intended ‘to lett me be used in matters of charge and humble for services here in the countye and to seeke to take anye place of credyt from me and any of myne and converte it to suche as they like better of’. Brockett wanted Burghley to decide the matter but said the other two ignored him. Apparently, Brockett wanted his nephew to be an officer in the band as he was seeking ‘successe herin for my kinsmen’.

Cocke and Butler made their case in a letter dated 19 March 1590, saying there was a meeting attended by all three of them in which a Mr. Heydon was nominated but discarded because he was leaving the county. It was then that Ralph Coningsby was mentioned ‘by one of us’ and Brockett replied that the ‘contrey wolde not like it well that ther sholde be a meanor man appoynted for it then him seilfe’. Cocke and Butler responded that Sir Henry Coningsby could assist his son. Brockett then wanted Sir Henry himself to take command, and then departed with the matter still unresolved. The next day Cocke and Butler met Sir Henry and they agreed that Ralph Coningsby would take the charge with his father’s assistance. The two deputies then insisted that the decision was made then because ‘some haste was to be used’ as ordered by Burghley and that no attempt was made to offend.

95 Bruce, Report on the Arrangements, Appendix LXV, pp. cccii-cccv, cccix, cccxii; Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, p. 414.

96 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/229/21; Calnan, ‘County Society and Government’ p. 138.

97 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/231/30.
Brockett. Though he never said so directly, it is likely the Brockett wanted the band divided between Sir Henry and his own nephew, the younger John Brockett. Cocke and Butler were against dividing the company, saying it should remain intact under a single commander.98

Burghley's solution was that Sir Henry should take the captaincy, which Brockett would prefer over Ralph Coningsby. Failing that, the band should be divided between the younger Coningsby and the younger Brockett. The end result is that Sir Henry eventually took command.99 It must be mentioned that Sir Henry was a supporter of Burghley’s candidate in the disputed 1584 election.100 Brockett appears to have come out of the matter the worse off, for it was Cocke who was succeeded in putting his ally in office. Cocke and Butler’s assertion that they were forced into a decision because of shortness of time seems quite cynical, and Burghley made a compromise that both sides could accept if not wholly agree on. In this regard, his decision was prudent and a major split avoided. Burghley put the Crown’s interests first and maintained county harmony - faction was a threat to those interests.

Though Sir Henry commanded the company, he did so for only a year. On 4 March 1592 the deputies informed Burghley that the band had been without a captain for about a year and that one was needed. Yet Coningsby had died roughly a year earlier.101 The position was vacant again in October 1595, when Ralph Coningsby, who briefly succeeded his father, begged to be excused on financial grounds.102 On the face of it, this does not

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98 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/231/31.
100 Neale, Elizabethan House of Commons, pp. 29-30.
101 P.R.O. PROB, 11/75/5 Sainberbe: There is no exact date given for Ralph Coningsby’s death.
102 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/241/91; 12/254/11: Cocke and Butler got their original wish after all, though the younger Coningsby could not have been captain for very long as in January 1596 the deputies described the office as having been vacant for over four years.
speak well of Burghley as a lieutenant. He left an important position largely vacant for over four years. Yet filling such a vacancy was not always easy. The deputies recommended John Colt as Ralph Coningsby's replacement. Routinely, Burghley accepted their advice and offered Colt the job, though Colt was less than enthusiastic. Pleading poverty, he said he was only twenty-one-years old, had just married, had little experience and was 'charged with many debts and legacies by my father'. By 18 January 1596 the deputies told Burghley that they had failed to persuade Colt and the position was still vacant after many refusals (along with another captaincy in the south-west of the shire) for the most part for 'above four yeares . . . There is very small choice of able and meete gentlemen for thos places within the hundreds of Cayshoe and Dacom'. They then specifically urged Burghley to use his authority to fill the jobs or they 'will verie hardly be supplied'. The following May, Cocke and Brockett wrote to Burghley saying Colt would still not accept the charge. Burghley must have failed to persuade him despite the power he held as lieutenant; though Boynton's view on the affair, that he 'made a habit of favouring people by excusing them service', seems harsh. It is not clear whom, if anyone ever became captain of that company. Despite the apparent unpopularity of being a captain, a vacancy of five years must be held against Burghley. Perhaps it can be partially attributed to a general laxity in militia affairs between the first Armada and the massive Irish campaign at the turn of the century. Yet Burghley must take a great deal of the blame; it seems he did not use his influence as a powerful member of the central government as well as he might have.

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103 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/253/101; 12/254/34; Another example of Burghley accepting his deputies' nominee is found in C.S.P.D., 1595-97, p. 98. In this case the Hertfordshire deputies nominated Henry Gill, who had been a captain for twenty years, to train soldiers.

104 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/256/20.

105 B.L. Lansdowne MS 81, f. 12; L. Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 178-79.

Besides appointments, a common request made by Burghley's deputies was to delay mustering and certification. Essex deputies Mildmay and Petre wrote on 9 October 1595 asking that viewing be delayed and training postponed because of Henry Grey's absence and Petre's illness. They also mentioned that the bands had not been properly viewed since 1592. Though the slackness was typical, this fact does not speak well of Burghley's ability to deal with the problem of local foot dragging. He replied on 13 October that musters could be certified on 10 November as suggested, though most shires would have their certificates in by 20 October. He also agreed to their suggestion of a change in captains of a horseband but refused to delay training, saying only that it was demanded 'by the Queen, to all the counties for present training'.

Guidance was also sought in November 1595 when Brockett, who was in London, asked for Burghley's direction on improving the trained bands, which by then had become depleted through overseas levies and death. Officers were needed before training could begin. Brockett said that two captains were needed, the same two mentioned above, and that one person had already refused to serve, so Brockett put young John Brockett's name forward. Unfortunately, Burghley was ill and he did not meet with Brockett, who awaited written guidance on the matter. Whether or not he ever got it is unknown. Burghley's illness became progressively worse: 'I am newly vexed with gout' was a common complaint. He was often bedridden and, given his other responsibilities, it may not be surprising that this had a negative impact on his lieutenancy.

Deputies also took the initiative on military reform, principally in the replacement of bows with firearms. Commenting on muster returns in April 1590, Cocke called the shire’s
one hundred archers weak and unserviceable owing to lack of practice, and asked that archers be turned into musketeers as the ‘bands woulde be very much strengthened’ by an increase in the number of firearms employed.\footnote{B.L. Lansdowne MS 65, f. 18.} In Lincolnshire, Lord Willoughby informed Burghley in October 1595 that on the advice of a captain, many of the bows and bills had been replaced by swords, muskets and calivers, ‘which maketh the bandes muche fairer and stronger heretofore’. Cocke and his colleagues in Hertfordshire had similar ideas and they told Burghley in June 1594 that many bows were being converted to firearms.\footnote{P.R.O. State Papers, 12/254/15; B.L. Lansdowne MS 76, f. 37.} By November 1595 Cocke suggested those that were by statute required to provide a corslet, bow and caliver instead should furnish two corslets, or a corslet and a musket, since bows were worthless. He goes on to suggest that each band’s armour be stored together near the place of training. Because of the distances required armour could not be checked every six weeks as Burghley had ordered back in 1590. Central storage would allow more frequent inspections and better maintenance, a task which the Hertfordshire deputies felt the ‘constables and other simple men’ entrusted to keep the furniture were not capable of and ‘hath byne a meanes of verie great loss’.\footnote{P.R.O. State Papers, 12/254/69; B.L. Lansdowne MS 79, f. 14.} There is no record of Burghley’s reaction to these ideas, but because he had previously been willing to follow his deputies’ advice, it is probable that the measures were at least partially implemented.

Burghley’s approach to the lieutenancy was that of a distant commander who let his subordinates make most of the decisions. He was valuable as an arbitrator of disputes and he gave official sanction to his deputies’ ideas and requests. Though he did issue instructions, they were largely standard practice: justices were to assist the deputies, no soldiers were to be excused from duty without permission, and everyone was to pay their fair share for clothing
and arming soldiers. As vacancies in offices and gaps in musters can attest, he did not always
pay close attention to detail. His position in government, age and illness may have hindered
him, and though he seems to have done a competent job, his impact on military efficiency
appears to have been limited. Yet there is no indication that anything more was expected of
Burghley. Perhaps he was to be the link between the central government and the locality. In
a figurative, if not literal sense, he was the government’s man in the county.
Chapter III:
Burghley's Peers

Burghley's peers varied in their styles of command. Like Burghley, many had other responsibilities, and Jeremy Goring and Joan Wake put forth the notion that non-privy councillor lieutenants, such as Lord John St. John of Huntingdonshire, had more time to dedicate to their shires, and that men in government had to rely more on their deputies.¹ The aim of this chapter is to establish the various ways that selected lieutenants approached the job in the years 1585 to 1603. Among Burghley's contemporaries there were those - most notably Sir Christopher Hatton in Northamptonshire and George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury in Derbyshire and Staffordshire - who had a very similar and distant style of command. William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham, was a resident lieutenant in Kent who was more involved, yet he still relied on his deputies a great deal. Surrey and Sussex were under the charge of a career naval man, Lord Charles Howard of Effingham, and in the case of Sussex, a local and relatively inexperienced peer, Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst. Norfolk and Suffolk were also the responsibility of a military man, Henry Carey, first Lord Hunsdon, who had few ties to East Anglia and acted without consideration of local politics. Finally, the greatest contrast to Burghley comes from Lord Roger North in Cambridgeshire, a local lieutenant who was immersed in the daily details of the militia. He is the closest comparison that can be made with St. John of Huntingdonshire, whose performance is scrutinised in an effort to test the validity of Goring and Wake's statement.

¹ Goring and Wake, Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, p. xxxi.
With the exception of the St. Johns, all the men listed above were privy councillors. If one looks at council records for Burghley and the other four men that served as both councillors and lieutenants from the end of 1587 until the lord treasurer’s death in August 1598 - Cobham, Hatton, Howard, Hunsdon and Shrewsbury- it shows that Burghley easily had the highest attendance. This was consistent with his status as a key figure in government. But were the others also affected by burdens elsewhere? Could they trust their deputies as Burghley did?

An obvious comparison to Burghley is Sir Christopher Hatton. He was a privy councillor, Lord Chancellor and non-resident lieutenant of Northamptonshire. Though born in Holdenby, Northamptonshire in 1540, Hatton left for Oxford University as a teenager. He became a courtier and converted to the Anglican Church when the Catholicism he was raised with became a political liability. Soon he became one of Elizabeth’s court favourites, which led to grants of substantial lands, and was appointed to the post of lieutenant on 12 September 1586. The following April he was to become Lord Chancellor as well as chancellor of Oxford University in 1588. Like Burghley, his responsibilities were numerous and he relied on his deputies a great deal.

One of Hatton’s first acts as lieutenant was to pass on the council’s instructions for the selection of 1,000 footmen to be trained. The deputies, Richard Knightley and Edward Montagu, were to pick the men, with Hatton, like most lieutenants, playing no part in the decision. He never offered military advice as Burghley did in 1587 and 1590, though that

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2 A.P.C., 1586-87-1601-04, passim: Burghley attended 1,186 sessions during the period, Lord Howard 1,014, Hunsdon 741, Cobham 566 and Hatton 540. Shrewsbury attended only five sessions from late 1587 until his death in November 1590.

3 E. St. John Brooks, Sir Christopher Hatton: Queen Elizabeth’s Favourite (Oxford, 1946), pp. 24, 29, 57, 61, 332; S. Lee and S. Stephens, eds., D.N.B., vol. xxv (London, 1891), pp. 159-61; Sainty, Lieutenant of Counties, pp. 27-28: Hatton was also lieutenant of Middlesex in 1590-91, but Northamptonshire was the main focus of his attention in lieutenancy matters.
advice was largely established procedure. He seldom visited Northamptonshire and his experienced deputies were very capable of carrying out their duties.  

Hatton did have an impact when it came to reducing the county’s commitments. In 1586 the council had called for Northamptonshire to provide 200 horsemen as part of an army to guard the Queen. Many of the prominent people, such as Knightley, had their burdens reduced at the expense of the less well off. In April 1587 Hatton informed his deputies that ‘upon my persuassion’ the rate was halved to one hundred horse. Thus Hatton was willing to balance the county’s ability and willingness to contribute against the central government’s interests. Despite imploring his deputies to consider the ‘common danger of the Realme’ in July 1588, just the month before he had eased the county’s burden when only 400 men were to be provisioned, a figure that was soon raised to 600 but still the same as the much smaller county of Huntingdonshire was obliged to supply. Embellishing his achievement, he inaccurately claimed that every other county had to ‘supply allmoste thrice the double of that number’, or over 2,000 men. Most notably, Hatton persuaded his fellow councillors to reduce Northamptonshire’s share of the 1589 Armada loan from £5,000 to £3,500, a figure that was further reduced to £3,000. Perhaps to Hatton’s discredit, only £2,025 was collected, a total less than half of the £4,125 raised under Burghley’s supervision in Essex. Referring to the subsidy seals, Montagu wrote to Knightley telling him that if they and the justices, both or which were more familiar with the county than Hatton, had chosen those eligible for payment, as in other counties, ‘halfe this trubble would have beene saved’. 

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5 Ibid., pp. xx, 38; Wake, *Musters, Beacons*, p. lxiv.
7 Goring and Wake, *Northamptonshire, 1580-1614*, pp. xxv-xxvi, 60, 73-75; Wake, *Musters, Beacons*, p. xciv; T. C. Noble, *The names of those persons who subscribed towards the defence of this country at the time of the Spanish Armada*, (Huntingdon, 1886), pp. 19-21, 28-30, 47-48; Schofield, ‘The Geographic Distribution’, p. 504: It should be noted that the £2,025 raised in Northamptonshire is
Montagu did write to his lieutenant in March 1590 asking him what to do with the supply of gunpowder, to which Hatton replied that he wanted the powder stored centrally. He did strongly rebuke his deputies in July 1591 over coat money, the funds raised to clothe recruits for foreign service. Very little money was raised and Hatton and his fellow councillors told his deputies ‘We cannot but lett you playnly understand of the want we have just cause to note of your doinges above all other counties of the realme’. But largely the deputies were left to their own devices while Hatton, like Burghley, but maybe more so, kept his distance. Hatton was not replaced when he died in November 1591; Queen and council obviously considered a lieutenant unnecessary for Northamptonshire.

George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, was another prominent lieutenant who gave most of his orders from afar. A great landowner in the area, Shrewsbury took part in a Scottish campaign under Somerset and had been a member of the Council of the North since 1549. He first became a lieutenant in 1565 for Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, and would again be assigned lieutenant of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire during the Northern Rebellion. By 1571 he was a privy councillor, and ostensibly, his experience was considerable by the time he was commissioned lieutenant in Derbyshire and Staffordshire on 3 July 1585. Inclined toward Roman Catholicism, the earl was the keeper of Mary Stuart from 1569 to 1584. His notorious wife, Elizabeth Hardwick, about whom he said, ‘no curse

more than was raised in Hertfordshire - £1,875. Dr. Schofield’s comparable wealth table for 1535 ranks Essex seventh, Hertfordshire tenth and Northamptonshire fifteenth among English counties.


9 A.P.C. 1591, p. 308; Goring and Wake, Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, p. xxx.

10 The issue of why lieutenants were not replaced will be discussed in Chapter VI.

11 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 49, 54; S. Lee, ed., D.N.B., vol. Iv (London, 1898), p. 314; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 17, 29, 32: Shrewsbury was also appointed lieutenant of Nottinghamshire on 31 December 1588 but the great bulk of information relates to Derbyshire and Staffordshire.
or plague in the earth could be more grievous’, and with whom he often feuded, insinuated that Mary had given birth to Shrewsbury’s child as an attempt to play on Elizabeth’s fears that the earl was too lenient with his prisoner. Confrontations with his wife and affliction with gout were a hindrance to his lieutenancy.12

Like Burghley and Hatton, Shrewsbury was seldom actually physically involved with any militia functions. In a letter to his deputies in Staffordshire dated 9 October 1585, he complained that recent musters had yielded so few men and horse ‘as to deserve her majesty’s censure’ and that he intended to travel down from Sheffield Castle to investigate the situation himself. The following November he told his deputies he would take view of the light horse of both Derbyshire and Staffordshire. Yet in a letter the following 5 December he says he intended to take view of the troops but because of extreme cold, bad roads and shortness of daylight he deferred it until March.13 The weather may have been poor, but it did not prevent Derbyshire from returning a muster certificate by mid-December.14 That following March, he reported that his deputies, and not himself, had taken view of the men. He relied totally on his deputies to see that the task was completed, and a similar situation took place in 1589 when Shrewsbury again said he was going to view the Staffordshire horse bands on 6 and 7 August. But on 8 August he informed Bagot that the view would be postponed until 22 October due to hot weather. There is no record of him reviewing troops that October, but it does appear that Shrewsbury may have been to at least one muster two years earlier. He wrote to Manners on 30 October 1587 complaining about


13 S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 783-86.

14 Ibid., L.a. 787-88.
defaulters in arms and those who tried deception, stating 'what do they intend to do but
delude me with furniture borrowed from others'. Surely he must not have known that the
previous week Manners had written his nephew, also named John Manners, the earl of
Rutland, begging him to lend him 'a great horse for a demi-lance to armour, to show at this
time, as I am not so well prepared as I hope to be hereafter'. Shrewsbury’s wording leads one
to believe that he could have reviewed the men himself, though the information might have
been relayed to him.¹⁵

Shrewsbury was not unlike Burghley and Hatton in deferring to deputies like Bagot.
In 1587 he told him to attend to the matter of a Mr. Erdeswicke’s armour, ‘for as much as you
are best acquainted herewith and knoweth better the willingnes and forwardnes of the
gentlemen then I do’. He may have also used such language to distance himself from
controversy, as when sub-standard men were raised for Ireland in 1590. His reaction was to
tell the deputies to remedy things while insulating himself: ‘And forasmuch as I am
altogether ignorant of the procedings in (execution) of that service witch was wholie comitted
to your trust’.¹⁶ He could also be very critical of his deputies. If he was sympathetic to
Catholics it did not show in his reaction to his deputies’ perceived slackness in registering
recusants in the two counties. Writing to Bagot and Aston in 1588, Shrewsbury told them
they had neglected their duty and threatened to turn them into the council so it could judge
‘howe thes matters are handled’. He was not pleased with Derbyshire’s efforts either, though
his remarks were not quite as harsh, telling Manners, ‘I see the service in Derbyshire is but
slenderly performed. I wish everyone would do their duty’.¹⁷ There is nothing that indicates

¹⁵ P.R.O. State Papers, 12/187/31; S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 817-18; W. Page, ed., V.C.H.

¹⁶ S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 798, 824.

¹⁷ S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 802-03; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/208/37; H.M.C. Rutland MSS,
vol. i, p. 240.
that anyone was reported, but Shrewsbury took the Staffordshire deputies to task again in June 1588, claiming they had been negligent in raising and training troops and that only six horsemen were certified in the entire county.\textsuperscript{18}

Unlike Burghley, Shrewsbury did issue some detailed orders, such as when he listed by name six Staffordshire gentlemen that had been overlooked in the assessment of horse. On another occasion in May 1588 he ordered a muster in Derbyshire, calling for 400 trained men of whom 200 were to be armed as follows: eighty calivers, twenty muskets, fifty corslets and pikes, thirty corslets and halberds, and twenty archers in addition to sixty pioneers. Another time he specifically named recusants in Staffordshire.\textsuperscript{19} Burghley never indulged in such details. Yet the earl’s deputies still oversaw the daily tasks. For example, in 1596 Edward Sutton, Lord Dudley, asked Bagot, and not Shrewsbury, if some of his servants could be dismissed from duty. A similar request came from Sir Gilbert Gerard. In return, Shrewsbury could be accommodating to his deputies. In June 1589 Shrewsbury told Bagot he had written to the council and ‘prayed your discharge’ from paying the privy seals.\textsuperscript{20} It is not clear whether or not Bagot’s service had anything to do with this, but it is a possibility.

Like Hatton, Shrewsbury balanced county interests against national obligations. On 25 June 1589, the earl was petitioned by gentlemen in Staffordshire for a reduction in their assessment in view of the demands and their perceived poverty of the shire. This could have influenced a decision he made the next year. He told Bagot on 8 June 1590 that the 200 troops sent to Ireland were not properly armed and that the county was to be taxed to make the deficiency good. A month later on 6 July he told Bagot that, though the county was to blame for lack of armour, he would send the council as favourable a report as possible.

\textsuperscript{18} S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 807-08r.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., L.a. 809; H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, p.249; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/208/37.

\textsuperscript{20} S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 432, 506, 816.
Shrewsbury's letter to the council said that the £500 rated for the 200 men was a 'heavy burden because of the poverty of the county, therefore no additional assessment ought to be made'. Deputies often used the excuse of poverty, and Shrewsbury could have been concerned for the county's welfare, but it appears this may have been an attempt to shift the blame from his own shoulders.

Shrewsbury died in November 1590 and in Derbyshire his estranged son, Gilbert Talbot, seventh Lord Shrewsbury, succeeded him. The younger Shrewsbury was not named lieutenant in Staffordshire, and there was no new lieutenant until after Elizabeth’s death. The elder earl’s lieutenancy was typical for a man of his stature. He was largely absent, yet unlike Burghley and Hatton, he was at times involved in the details of the militia. He had been a lieutenant much longer than them and had a great deal of general military experience. But his deputies, for the most part, were entrusted to carry out the council’s orders.

William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham, first became lieutenant for Kent in 1559, following the unpopular lieutenancy of Sir Henry Jermington, who had little influence in the county. Many of the Kent gentry refused to support him, and the local nobleman, Cobham, was appointed. He was chosen again in 1569, and on a permanent basis in 1585. He had also at various times held the offices of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Constable of the Tower and Lord Chamberlain of the Queen’s Household. Despite having been briefly imprisoned in the Tower in 1572 on suspicion of plotting with the Duke of Norfolk, Cobham, a favourite of Elizabeth’s, was made a Privy Councillor in 1586. Furthermore, his daughter Elizabeth married Robert Cecil, making him an in-law with possibly the most powerful

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21 Ibid., L.a. 824-26, 1040.


family in the country. The lieutenant split his time between Cobham, Kent and Blackfriars, London.24 Yet he showed knowledge of Kent early on, as he wrote the council in August 1570 urging increased defences at Dover and Sandwich and included an estimate of the cost, though nothing was done for a decade. Nonetheless, like many of his colleagues, he largely left the county in control of his deputies and there is no evidence he attended musters.25

The six lathes of this prosperous shire, as mentioned in Chapter II, were entrusted to Cobham’s son Henry, Sir Thomas Fane (the elder), Peter Manwood, Thomas Walsingham, Sir Thomas Scott, the primary deputy from 1577 to 1589, and John Leveson, chief deputy from 1590 to 1597. Henry Cobham relayed orders to Leveson and others, letting them supervise the actual work. Lord Cobham certainly trusted them, for he told his son and the elder Fane in October 1586 to administer things ‘in that part of the shire wher you doe dwell’. They were to divide the western forces (Thomas Scott was responsible for the eastern division) as they saw fit and if anything else needed to be done Cobham left it to ‘your good conswyderacons’.26 But Cobham was a very experienced lieutenant who voiced his opinions on war with Spain in the Netherlands, and in August 1586 wrote to Leveson on the mustering and training of men in great detail. He discussed such things as how the men should be trained by corporals on holidays and after evening prayer, and that those should be chosen that could well afford the cost of training. Also in 1586, the lieutenant told his deputies to convert a proportion of the trained bands’ archers into musketeers. In 1590 he ordered two of his captains to increase the six muskets they each had in their companies, a degree of management not seen from Burghley or Hatton. Cobham even commented on the coats to be


worn by troops raised for France in January 1591, claiming there was ‘better choice of coates readie made in London’. The previous October he told Leveson that he wanted coats of black or grey ‘... as you and the rest of lieutenancy shall thincke it conveinent’. In the same letter he recommended a captain Raines for command of a band of 150 men an that deputies should meet in Maidstone to discuss the situation and come to a decision.27

Nevertheless, the deputies still maintained a high degree of the initiative, as is shown in their preparations for the Armada in July 1588. Henry Cobham and Fane listed twelve things for putting the shire in readiness. They ranged from the general, for instance that captains were to have their charges prepared, to the more specific. For example, each shot was to have two pounds of powder and two rolls of matches, and fifteen pioneers were required for every hundred of those from the trained bands. The Earl of Leicester, the commander of the army, demonstrated the deputies’ importance when he wrote to them directly and ordered them to discharge men from the harvest for service.28 It was probably more efficient to write to the men who actually carried out the orders. The questions deputies had for Cobham were similar to the ones asked of Burghley. A letter from the deputies dated 30 March 1591 asks whether eight pence a day, the standard rate for the period, would be allowed each soldier for conduct money and should a person be appointed to distribute the funds.29 The deputies knew what to do; they put their ideas forward for Cobham’s approval. On 29 December 1595, Cobham admitted to Leveson that he did not know how the light horse should be furnished. He must have been asked this question by Leveson

27 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/181/69; S.R.O. D 593/S/4/11/1; D 593/S/4/11/6 (ix); D 593/S/4/22 (i).


29 S.R.O. D 593/S/3/11/6 (vii).
and similarly left it to the deputy’s discretion. Two years earlier he allowed Leveson to decide where the levied men were to meet.³⁰ Though Cobham was more active and less distant than Burghley or Hatton he still relied on local men to make things function properly.

From Cobham’s death in March 1597 until the succession of his son Henry in October 1597, Leveson seems to have been in de facto charge of the militia. In May of that year Thomas Scott and Samson Lennard asked Leveson and the muster commission about a levy of men. They were not sure whether to enrol 450 men or 600, having received conflicting information, and requested ‘a sufficient dyrection and worront’. Leveson answered that 450 was required in three companies to be levied at Canterbury, Sevenoaks and Dartford.³¹ As mentioned above, Henry, eleventh Lord Cobham, did succeed his father as lieutenant of Kent. Cobham was that rare case of a person having been a deputy then became lieutenant of the same shire.³² As mentioned above, he mainly passed on orders, and he derived power from being the son of a lieutenant. His arrogance was evident in a letter he wrote to Robert Cecil in 1602, saying that he was responsible for authorising levies and that he did not wish to be ‘joined with mayors and sheriffs, who have nothing to meddle in this kind, but as inferior officers to receive direction’.³³ The younger Lord Cobham largely left his


³¹ S.R.O. D 593/S/4/10/36 (i, ii); D 593/S/4/19/16 (i); Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, p. 416: A deputy’s job could be quite time consuming as a member of the bench, Michael Sondes, discovered in September 1597. Leveson had been ill and Sondes took the view of the bands in his place. Sondes, who was a former captain, said he would ‘not casilie be drawn to take that place again’, adding that he would assist Leveson but not do it on his own.

³² Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 25; This is the only instance found for 1585-1603 when somebody was promoted from deputy to lieutenant of the same shire. See also p. 39, note 76.

³³ H.M.C. Salisbury MSS. vol. xii, p.126.
deputies, led by Leveson, to see to the county. He forwarded the council’s orders and gave proposals official approval. So it is the elder Lord Cobham who had the greater impact on the Kent lieutenancy in the late 1500s, a lieutenancy that can be characterised as more personal than Burghley’s tenure. Like Shrewsbury, Cobham did give attention to some of the fine points, but the local deputies made the real difference.

The neighbouring southern counties of Surrey and Sussex were under a lieutenant for the entire period of 1585 to 1603. Besides being lieutenant of Surrey, Charles Howard of Effingham was also co-lieutenant of Sussex with Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, from 1586. The Howard family was one of the country’s most distinguished. Charles Howard was a cousin of the Queen and his father, William, first Lord Howard, was the son of Thomas Howard, first Duke of Norfolk. William Howard was also a councillor and Lord Chamberlain as well as lieutenant of Surrey. Charles succeeded his father in 1573 and was also Lord Chamberlain. He helped put down the Northern Rebellion and became a naval commander in 1570. By May 1585 he was Lord Admiral and would go on to play a pivotal part in defeating the Armada, despite his supposed Catholicism.

Thus, the lieutenancy of Surrey was in the hands of a professional military man. Howard put his military knowledge to good use by ordering Surrey to be

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34 L. Stephen, ed., *D.N.B.*, vol. vi (London, 1886), pp. 423-24: Cobham was relieved of command under James because of his alleged role in the Main Plot. See appendix v.


36 Ibid., p. 43; S. Lee, ed., *D.N.B.*, vol. xxviii (London, 1891), pp. 1-2, 5: There is no real evidence given to support the claim of Howard’s Catholicism. His father was Catholic, but probably converted. It could have something to do with his distant relationship with the Catholic third Duke of Norfolk, who was executed in 1572.
divided into eight or twelve parts. Under the command of his deputies, William Howard, William Moore and Thomas Browne, justices in each division were to see that able men were ready at an hour’s notice. However, he left many details to the judgement of the deputies. It was their decision whether Surrey would be divided into eight or twelve parts depending on the ‘quality of the saide shire’, though it is not clear what they decided. Many of his orders were quite routine - a list of all available men, arms and horse were to be tabulated. The Lord Admiral’s opinion on martial matters was certainly valued. In June 1588 he advised the council on defending against the Armada, recommending 12,000 soldiers to guard the Queen. He claimed ‘10,000 that be practised and trayned togeather . . . shall doe her majesty more service than any 40,000 whitch shall come from any other parte of the realm’. Yet like other lieutenants, Howard relied on his deputies and was inclined to shift responsibility to them if anything went wrong. In the summer of 1585, all maritime counties were ordered to certify their powder and match. After hearing from the council on 31 March 1586 that they had not been certified, Howard waited until 12 April to relay this message to his deputies in Surrey and Sussex, telling them ‘I have alredie written unto you about that matter and therfore require you to have a better regarde in performunige their Lord’s pleasure with what expedicioion you maie’. Though not overly harsh, certainly not compared with some of Shrewsbury’s correspondence, it shows that a professional like Howard, who took twelve days to pass on the instructions, was not above inefficiency. He had other responsibilities, but one can

37 S.H.C. Loseley MS 995; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/211/45.

38 Library of Dean and Chapter of Canterbury (hereafter L.D.C.C.) These are folios containing letters and orders from the council to Lord Howard and from him to his deputies. Documents 38-39.
only guess when he would have seen to the certification if the council had not intervened.

Howard was at times involved in the minutiae of the job. In October 1586 the Surrey deputies asked several questions about a muster, including when and where it would be held, who should be the captains of the horse and whether or not several people should be discharged from providing a light horse. Howard answered that the view should be held in December, named captains and exempted seven people from their obligations. Though mostly basic questions, they were not ones asked of Burghley, and he may not have known about such detailed matters. In his case, the deputies nominated men for an office and Burghley approved them. Howard actually gave the names himself. He again demonstrated his knowledge of Surrey in May 1588, when he wrote to his deputies that a Mr. Evelin was to be discharged as captain of a footband because he was a maker of gunpowder and knew little of training infantry. Howard concluded that there were other gentlemen in the shire younger and better qualified to command troops. Burghley and Hatton may not have known people that well while Shrewsbury and Cobham may have possibly had such knowledge. Howard, though usually not present, generally knew about his charges. Having a shire so close to London must have helped, but then Hertfordshire is close to London as well and Howard appears to have been more familiar with Surrey than Burghley was with his counties.

As mentioned above, Howard was co-lieutenant of Sussex with Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst. Sussex was predominantly rural and the poor roads meant

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39 L.D.C.C. Document 43.
40 Ibid., Document 72.
most commerce was dependent on maritime transport, making the coastal belt the
most populous region. Inland, the central region was dominated by sparsely populated
hills, the Downs, and the north was part of a heavily forested area known as the
Weald. There were five resident noble families - Browne, Arundel, West, Lumsley
and Sackville. Historically the lieutenancy had been divided. The Earl of Arundel
and Lord Lumley, both Catholics, had at times been co-lieutenants until the Northern
Rebellion of 1569 when the job was shared by Lords Buckhurst, Montagu and De La
Warr (William West). Montagu was Catholic but very loyal while Buckhurst was a
moderate Protestant, and between them they commanded large followings of both
religions. This arrangement persisted until 1585 when the Spanish threat resulted in
an increase in anti-Catholicism and Montagu was discarded. From 1586 Lords
Buckhurst and Howard shared the office for the rest of the reign.

Sussex had many wealthy gentry and resident peers seeking power, as well as
deep religious divisions, so Buckhurst seems to have been a wise choice in such an
atmosphere. The former poet and writer held land in both east and west Sussex,
allowing him to influence both regions. As mentioned above, he was a moderate
Protestant, not an extremist, and therefore had a broad base of appeal. According to
Roger Manning, he also had a respect for the legal process and a sense of decency in
carrying out the Queen’s orders. The more active of the two lieutenants, Buckhurst
was a Privy Councillor and succeeded Burghley as Lord Treasurer in 1599.

41 Manning, *Elizabethan Sussex*, p. 3.
42 Ibid., pp. 222-23; A. Fletcher, *A County Community in Peace and War: Sussex 1600-1660*
44 Manning, *Elizabethan Sussex*, pp. 120, 146-47, 230; S. Lee, ed., *D.N.B.*, vol. 1 (London,
Buckhurst's political career was shaped by his struggles with the Earl of Leicester. In 1587 the Queen sent Buckhurst to the Netherlands to report on the situation. He concluded that money was needed to pay the soldiers and that the Leicester should be sent to provide some authority. Leicester interpreted this as an attempt to remove him from court and used his influence with the Queen to have Buckhurst put under house arrest for nine months. Earlier, it was Leicester's efforts that got him removed from his lieutenancy from July 1585 to August 1586. Buckhurst was back in favour after Leicester's death in 1588 and continued to use the post to extend his local power by controlling parliamentary elections.\(^4\)\(^5\) Despite having first been appointed in 1569 and having been trusted to assess the forces in the Low Countries in 1586, he was no military commander and did not really see to the military aspects of the county.\(^4\)\(^6\)

In July 1588 Buckhurst informed Sir Francis Walsingham that Walter Covert and Thomas Palmer had managed the militia for years and asked that they not be called out of the county. When Buckhurst was appointed lieutenant in July 1585, he gave them both 'full power and authority in myne absence'.\(^4\)\(^7\) Thus, Buckhurst largely left the militia in the hands of his deputies and issued no real military instructions. He was a bit like Hatton - militarily he left things to his deputies. Lord Howard, not


\(^5\) B.L. Cottonian MSS Galba cix, f. 230v; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/203/14; B.L. Harleian MS 703, f. 80: These manuscripts are the lieutenancy book of Sir Walter Covert. In August 1587, Buckhurst noted that he had talked to Howard about the defences of Sussex, so he probably relied on him for military advice. On 30 July 1595, following a Spanish landing in Cornwall, Howard seems to order Buckhurst to have the bands certified, saying he grants full authority to place 'some speciall men of vallere dwelling nere ther unto [the sea] to have the charge of some convenent numbers under the rule of particular capaines who may have authoritie to assemble the said members upon any doubtfull occacon and to leade them to the places doubtful there to withstand the landing of any enemies'.

\(^6\) Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, p. 177; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/213/77; B.L. Harleian MS 703, f. 34; Fletcher, *County Community*, p. 176; Manning, *Elizabethan Sussex*, pp. 82-83, 269; Also see appendix v.
Buckhurst, signed the general procedures for mustering and training soldiers.\textsuperscript{48}

Though not a military matter, Buckhurst did strongly admonish his deputies when he thought they exceeded their bounds in arresting a suspected recusant, Anthony Kemp, telling them 'for my parte I am not privie of mye warrant or authoritie geven unto you'.\textsuperscript{49} Shirley wrote to Buckhurst saying that Kemp was an honest gentleman and a 'faithfull servant to her Majestie'. Confirming his reputation for fairness, Buckhurst thought a trial should be held before deciding that Kemp was a 'dangerous man'.\textsuperscript{50}

Buckhurst's ignorance of some of the day-to-day activities of the militia is illustrated by an incident that occurred in 1596. Buckhurst rebuked Covert, Palmer and Parker on 18 April for what was reported by Sir John Wingfield, a professional soldier who may have been a commander, of slackness in raising troops. Buckhurst passed on Wingfield's findings that of 1,000 men levied in Sussex for Calais, only 300 were armed and they were all so 'insufficent as he was ashamed to see them'. He then said that if Sir John's report was false he would 'undertake the vindication' against him. But then in a 7 May letter to Covert he says that Wingfield denied having said anything negative about the Sussex men and commended the deputies' efforts.\textsuperscript{51} Obviously Buckhurst had no first-hand knowledge of the situation, but relied on others and reacted accordingly. This certainly did not make him unique. In truth, it was typical for an absentee lieutenant like Burghley or Hatton. Unlike Shrewsbury and Cobham he did not show any familiarity with the details of the militia and made no real impact from a military standpoint.

\textsuperscript{48} B.L. Harleian MS 703, fo. 36.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., fo. 52v.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., fos. 52v-53.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., fos. 97v, 98.
From 1585 to 1596 Norfolk and Suffolk were under the lieutenancy of Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, a military man like Howard. In February 1570 he defeated an army of 1,500 near Carlisle, helping to crush the Northern Rebellion. He spent much of his professional life on the Scottish border and in 1580 was made Captain General of the forces deployed there. Eventually he would lead the army protecting the Queen’s person in 1588. Hunsdon was a man well versed in the martial arts. He also had influence - he was the Queen’s cousin, a Privy Councillor and Lord Chamberlain.52

However, he was not a Norfolk man. He held no property in Norfolk, but he did possess the important manor of Huntingfield in Suffolk. A. Hassell Smith calls him a stranger to both counties, but he had been on the muster commission in Suffolk since at least 1579. Still, he was not a local magnate, something the region had not had since the execution of the Duke of Norfolk in 1572.53 Smith also proclaims him a ‘bluff, ill-educated soldier’ and says that his deputies oversaw Norfolk. Conyers Read is more charitable, referring to Hunsdon as a ‘bluff, honest soldier’ but no courtier and not much of a statesman.54 The fact that he had no great allegiance to the area may well have been one reason for his appointment. The Crown wanted someone loyal to its demands. As Smith says, he was not likely to be sympathetic to the local gentry of Norfolk if he had no interests there, the result of which was increased central


53 Smith, County and Court, p. 50; D. MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors Politics and Religion in an English County 1500-1600 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 245-46.

54 Smith, County and Court, pp. 50, 242; Read, Burghley and Elizabeth, p. 465.
control. In Suffolk there had previously been clashes between the council and muster commissioners. In the 1570s Suffolk failed to deliver the muster certificates and the 1580s saw the commissioners petition the government on the grounds that they were too heavily burdened in having to equip a militia of 5,000 men. Such incidents probably prompted the council to place a man in the region they could rely on to act in its interests.

Hunsdon’s initial choice of deputies in Norfolk included Sir William Heydon, Sir Edward Clere and Sir Thomas Knyvett. These deputies served Hunsdon’s and the Crown’s needs. The council was confident in their abilities and during the Armada crisis of 1588 wrote them directly. That same year, they were given authority to appoint the commander in defence of Lynn if the council’s choice, John Peyton, was unavailable. Besides appointing a soldier like Peyton as a deputy, in 1596 Hunsdon tried to divide the large companies into smaller ones. A deputy appointed by Hunsdon in 1588, Sir Arthur Heveningham, seeing a chance to make his acolytes captains at the expense of the more powerful gentry, supported those efforts. The idea of revamped companies lasted until Hunsdon’s death in July 1596. The disgruntled gentry were eventually able to gain influence in the subsequent muster commission and the reforms were minimised. In the realm of reforms Hunsdon was quite important. He initiated them and they were able to withstand opposition as long as he was lieutenant.

55 Smith, County and Court, p. 242.
56 MacCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, p. 272.
57 B.L. King’s MS 265, fos. 264, 266v-267r, 268v-269r.
58 Smith, County and Court, pp. 287-88.
In Suffolk, as mentioned in Chapter II, Hunsdon's deputies were Robert Wingfield, Philip Parker, Robert Jermyn and John Higham. The biggest problem was over county contributions, which were common, especially for coastal communities not wanting to provide ships for defence. Disagreement with the central government was led by some of the deputies. Jermyn and Higham petitioned the council in 1596 to limit Suffolk's rate of ship money to no more than £400. The rate was set at £900 and Hunsdon strongly supported the Crown's demands. When he died that July the county was put into commission, and Sir Nicholas Bacon, a strong supporter of local opposition, joined the four deputies as commissioners. On 2 April 1596, the council wrote to the deputies calling for Jermyn and Bacon to answer charges that they acted against the national interest in not collecting the money as they were ordered. The dispute dragged on throughout the next year and eventually the matter was dropped.\(^{59}\)

It seems that Hunsdon did not have as compliant a group of deputies as he did in Norfolk. They owed less allegiance to him and had more loyalty to their county.

Overall, Hunsdon's philosophy was to fulfil the Crown's demands without regard for the localities. He wanted deputies that were loyal to him and in Norfolk at least, that was the situation. Hunsdon is a prime example of how the government was able to put a man in a powerful position in the county whose first, and in Hunsdon's case, seemingly his only, priority was its wishes. Though an absentee lieutenant, he did attempt reforms, which reflected his vocation as a soldier. Change was possible as long as he was lieutenant, without him, it was not.

Lord Roger North was the lieutenant of neighbouring Cambridgeshire from 1588 to 1600. He was the only resident peer in the county and was more directly

involved than most. North’s involvement in his native Cambridgeshire is extensive.

Through his father Edward, first Lord North, he was elected knight of the shire in 1555, 1559 and 1563 and would become a Privy Councillor in 1596. He succeeded to his father’s estates in 1564 and began widening his local influence. He became a lieutenant in 1569 and his deputies were his political allies - Francis Hinde and Robert Peyton - who had previously overseen the musters with North. Obviously North used his influence to have his backers placed in the jobs, yet they, like North, had previous experience. As Eugene Bourgeois has said, North wanted power in Cambridgeshire and the government was willing to accommodate him. The council was confident in his abilities. Elizabeth herself made him a justice of the peace in the Isle of Ely, a corporate entity traditionally granted a degree of autonomy from the rest of the county, in an attempt to further the Crown’s power over the area. During the 1570s North was also made High Steward of the town of Cambridge and became involved with the town’s militia. By the end of 1580, Cambridgeshire, Cambridge town and the Isle of Ely were combined into one militia unit under North.

North left the county in 1585 as part of the English forces dispatched to the Low Countries before returning in 1587. The next year he was commissioned as lieutenant of Cambridgeshire, this time permanently. His initial deputies were the familiar Hinde and John Cotton II. Hinde, along with John Hutton, was a captain of the trained bands, but fearing Hutton to be too old and unhealthy, North replaced him

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60 Bourgeois, *Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy*, pp. 5-6.


62 Ibid., pp. 277-78, 302.

with Cotton. North also had a captain Cheston, whom he knew personally from his time in the Netherlands. This is in stark contrast to Burghley, who certainly never served with any captains. By 1588 the bands had not been inspected for several years and North was eager to correct the defects. He offered at his own cost to provide thirty lances (heavy horse) and twenty petronells (light horse), something else that Burghley never did. North also set the rates to be levied from each part of Cambridgeshire. In June 1595 he wrote to his deputies concerning a levy of forty men for Ireland, telling them that seventeen were to be taken from the west division, twelve from the east and eleven from the Isle of Ely. This was not at all unusual, and after North’s death in December 1600, his deputies did the rating, even after Lord Thomas Howard was commissioned lieutenant in 1602.

North was adept at balancing local interests with those of the Crown. During the 1588 crisis five Cambridgeshire justices refused to contribute extra weaponry. Rather than having them threatened by the council, North wrote to Francis Walsingham that he himself should reproach them in private. He did not want to lose the goodwill of his magistrates. Two of the reluctant five were his deputies, Hinde and Hutton. Later North implied that they all made the extra contribution. Though he sought power and wielded patronage - he had his sons elected to parliament, one of which, Henry, would became a deputy in 1598 - unlike Hunsdon, North took the shire into consideration. North was not furthering his own fortunes at the expense of the county by filling posts with sycophantic lesser men. His tenure is marked by an

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64 See appendix v.


66 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/210/24; Bourgeois, Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp. 14, 16, 54-55.

attention to detail that most others lacked and a lack of internal shire opposition.

Perhaps the best comparison is to that of adjacent Huntingdonshire.

Huntingdonshire's lieutenancy was dominated by the St. Johns of Bletsoe for the Elizabethan and early-Stuart period. John St. John was the lieutenant from 1585 to 1596 and was followed by his son, Oliver, who held the office from 1597 to 1618. The St. John family was from Bedfordshire, where John St. John's father was lieutenant in 1559, and was quite new in Huntingdonshire. J. E. Neale claims John St. John 'was not a landowner with much electoral influence'. His chief deputy, Henry Cromwell, certainly was a man of influence. The Cromwells held one of the great estates in the shire, Hinchingbrooke, and were related to Henry VIII's minister, Thomas Cromwell. It is probably the case that St. John was the lieutenant only because Cromwell was not a peer.

Goring and Wake's theory of a non-councillor and resident lieutenant being more attentive to the lieutenancy is true to a point, as preparations during the 1588 Armada crises show. St. John attended a meeting concerning the trained bands and in May 1588 ordered a muster postponed because he had to go to London and wanted to be there in person. This shows a major difference between a local lieutenant like St. John and a national one like Burghley: detailed face-to-face communication. Other responsibilities and physical separation prevented Burghley from seeing his deputies with any frequency. On 20 June 1588, St. John wrote to Cromwell that he wanted the musters certified by 'Tewsday next' so he could decide what else was needed. In Burghley's case the deputies always decided what needed to be done in the case of

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69 B. L. Additional MS 34394, fos. 6-7, 21r-v.
arming the militia. When it became apparent that there were not enough corslets and
calivers St. John ordered some who had been obligated to provide a light horse to
contribute corslets and calivers instead.  

Yet, as was always the case no matter if the lieutenant was local or national,
the deputies still actually did the work and were the key. Cromwell was the one
actually in the shire during the Armada preparations. St. John was in London at least
through late July. He asked for training to be deferred until his return, but it does not
appear as if he ever left the capital during the crisis. After the threat passed St. John
told Cromwell he could discharge those who manned the beacons. Cromwell wrote
back saying he had already done so, to which St. John replied that he already had
 guessed that and was only giving their dismissal official sanction. Concerning the
1589 Armada loan, which had been ordered on 16 December 1588, St. John said on
23 January 1589 he would have sent it earlier but he had hopes of having it discharged
or at least reduced. He then says ‘through myne owne ignorance of mans estates’ he
thought it best to have those who were living in the shire and knew the abilities of the
inhabitants - the deputies - to make the list of those liable. Apparently he did not
live in Huntingdon at that time. As with most lieutenants, the deputies were more
knowledgeable about local affairs; St. John’s comments concerning his ignorance of
the county could have been written by Burghley or some other national lieutenant.

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70 Ibid., fos. 22, 24v, 29.
71 Ibid., fos. 32, 34-35; W. M. Noble, Huntingdonshire and the Spanish Armada (London,
1896), pp. 6-7, 14, 19.
72 B.L. Additional MS 34394, fos. 37, 38r-v.
73 Ibid., fos. 42v, 43.
Still, Goring and Wake's assertion about local lieutenants is true in that St. John, like North, was a much more of an involved lieutenant than Burghley, whose philosophy was consistent with that of Hatton and Buckhurst - that of a distant leader giving approval to deputies' ideas, acting as a mediator and answering general questions. They left the details for others. Lords Shrewsbury and Cobham were a bit more involved in the details, perhaps because they had more experience. Howard and Hunsdon were experienced in military matters and knew how to raise and train men for war but were not usually directly involved. Hunsdon in particular was able to serve the Crown better because of his outsider status, which meant he cared little for local concerns. A thought about the institution as a whole comes to mind when reading a complaint by captain Thomas Kemp in Kent. In 1595 he told John Leveson that a deputy was needed to replace Sir Thomas Scott, who had died. (His son, Thomas Scott the younger would eventually replace him.) Kemp found the men unprepared, 'for thise partes ys without a deputy leatenant'. There were no such complaints when Lord Cobham died in March 1597. There appear to be no instances of slackness being blamed on the lack of a lieutenant. The loss of a deputy must have had much more of a negative impact. Efficiency was most important in the matter of musters and levies, the most important undertakings from a military perspective. It is here that a lieutenant's contribution is best measured.

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74 S.R.O. D 593/S/4/37/7; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 25.
Chapter IV: Burghley’s Musters and Levies, 1587-1598

A lieutenant’s prime military responsibility was the supervision of musters and levies – the main militia activities. Musters were reviews of troops, horse and arms, while levies were the raising of men for service – both foreign and domestic. It is these two functions through which one measures the efficiency of the militia and a lieutenant. This chapter examines the musters and levies of Lord Burghley’s three counties – Lincolnshire, Hertfordshire and Essex - from 1587 to 1598. Promptness and adherence to orders will be considered as well as the quality of men, horse and arms drafted for service. Burghley’s role and that of his deputies will be considered to determine who had the biggest impact on effectiveness.

The term ‘musters’ refers to the assembly of men, horse and arms for inspection, and by the mid 1570s, training was also involved. The authority for musters came from Mary’s ‘an acte for the taking of musters’ in 1557, which stipulated that all able-bodied men between sixteen and sixty inclusive were to assemble and show their arms or face a fine of 40s. or ten days in jail. The general muster was a formal inspection of forces and resulted in a ‘perfect certificate’ listing the numbers of men – trained and untrained – along with a list of the types of arms and horse involved. It gave the council an idea of the strength of each county and could be used as a basis for the rating of men in the future.1

The procedure started with the council sending a letter to the lieutenant or commissioners for musters calling for a review. Copies were then given to the deputies – sometimes the lieutenant would include his own points such as when and where to

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assemble — and they in turn ordered the high constables of each hundred, who would alert all those who were obligated to attend — all able-bodied men from sixteen to sixty. The prime military duties of constables were related to musters and levies, they were to see that people were equipped.² In the 1590s it became common for only the trained bands to be regularly mustered. Armour — both public and private — was prepared and the soldiers finally rendezvoused at a central location in the shire for viewing, with the certificates being sent to the secretary of state in London.³

Training costs were the responsibility of the county, and the local officials tried to concentrate on those that could afford it rather than bothering with the poor. Each man was given eight pence a day, the same as a soldier on active service. Training took place over two days, usually in the summer, and every shot was to have three pounds of powder.⁴ Every captain was to pick ‘four or more’ of the most skilled shots within the bands to train the rest, and each band of eighty to a hundred shot had four of these corporals. Previous muster rolls were checked to see that each man had the weapon he was obliged by law to own. If not, replacements were to be found.⁵

Musters were far from ideal, there were no standard forms to record the returns, some showed all available men, while others only concerned on the trained bands, and as with the rest of militia activities, the quality of the local men was the key factor. Some were diligent while others did as little as possible. The office of muster master,

² J. Kent, The English Constable 1580-1642: A Social and Administrative Study (Oxford, 1986), pp. 39-40, 82, 177: Constables were often among the richest men in a community and were usually assessed as landowners. They were also responsible for storing and cleaning the communal armour.

³ Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 14-16, 20-21, 26, 43: The certificates were stored in the council chest and the secretary had copies for easier reference. B.L. Cottonian MS Titus, B. V. f. 53; Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 132.

⁴ ‘Shot’ refers to anyone with a firearm. Also see the glossary.

⁵ Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pp. 133-34; B. L. Harleian MS 703, f. 36.
who was appointed by the lieutenant, was established by the 1580s to upgrade
efficiency, with firearms training being especially emphasised. The muster master was
a professional soldier whose duty it was to ‘...view and peruse as well the soldiers of
every of the Captains’ bands, as also all the armour and weapon, with other warlike
furniture, whether the same be serviceable and allowable in every point ... wherein if he
shall find any fault, then presently he shall inform one of the deputy-lieutenants ...

Despite these efforts, slackness continued to be a problem, as noted in a muster
from December 1590 in which there is a reference to ‘many gross and manifest frauds
and deceits daily practiced and committed by captains and officers in the ordinary views
and musters of their bands in service under her majesty’s pay’. All officers were told to
follow and perform orders with ‘all care and industry’, captains were to refrain from
presenting anyone at a muster who was not in active service – such as vagrants, and
soldiers were specifically told to have only weapons and armour that were their own
and not to borrow from anyone else.7 So the task of mustering soldiers could be a
difficult one that required a strong foundation at the county level. How did Burghley’s
charges perform?

After Burghley became lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire in late 1587, he first
mustered the county’s forces in the spring of 1588 in anticipation of a possible Spanish
invasion. The muster certificate, signed by deputy Lord Charles Willoughby of Parham,
included 1,500 trained and armed men, as well as 650 armed and untrained ones. In
total, there were 6,400 ‘hable men’, all the men between sixteen and sixty that were fit

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6 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, p. 134; Boynton, *Elizabethan Militia*, pp. 45, 106; Thomson,
Lieutenancy Under the Tudors and Stuarts* (Manchester, 1859) p. xliii.

7 P. L. Hughes and J. F. Larken, eds., *Tudor Royal Proclamations 1558-1603* vol. iii (New
to serve, in the shire. Following the national trend, the number of armed men in
Lincolnshire was on the increase; returns from 1575 listed only 1,308 armed men.8 Yet, the muster did not pass without incident, as the council wrote to Burghley on 2 April
1588 informing him that no certificates had been sent from Lincolnshire - apparently it was late in certifying. Burghley then called a muster for 24 April; it is not known why he failed to call one as soon as he had been appointed the previous December. The council listed the county as deficient because the names of the soldiers were not listed. It was only on 20 June 1588 that a complete certificate was submitted.9

A general muster order was issued for the country on 29 May 1589, but those returns are unavailable.10 On 2 January 1590, Burghley was told to have his forces ready for a possible invasion by 1 March, yet it was not until 25 January – over three weeks later – that he sent copies of the instructions to his deputies in Lincolnshire, Hertfordshire and Essex. The Lincolnshire deputies wrote to Burghley on 13 March 1590 telling him that the bands were readied but that some charged had died or moved away.11 Obviously, the troops were not mustered on time, and as for some having died or moved, that was a common occurrence as muster records were slow to react to changes in the population. The deputies did seek Burghley’s directions concerning the supply of powder and match, and though it is not known what his response was, it shows that he was occasionally needed to do more than simply pass on orders.

8 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/124; B.L. Add MS 48167, ff. 161-62; See also appendix v.
9 H.M.C. MSS of Earl of Cowper, vol. i, pp. 9-10; P.R.O. State Papers 12/209/125, 12/211/39; B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236.
Sometimes he was needed to answer questions or arbitrate a dispute, as discussed in Chapter II.

A further muster was called for on 31 August 1590, and though the returns are unavailable, Lincolnshire was not listed as deficient, so it must have certified. The certificate from 1591 shows an increase in able men from 1588 – 7,369 compared to 6,400. The trained bands remained constant at 1,516, with 688 of them having firearms – almost identical to the 690 from 1588. Bows were gradually being replaced with muskets and calivers (a smaller version of the musket) in the militias, and in 1589 the council decided that archers were no longer needed in a standard company alongside those with guns, pikes and bills. Though the numbers of men, arms and horse were provided, in March 1592 the council sent a letter to Burghley telling him that ‘the certificates for the counties of Essex, Hertford and Lincoln there is no mention made of any provision of powder match bullet which ought to be had in store’. This can be construed as a mild rebuke to Burghley, but as a councillor he had, of course, been a signatory to the letter. The information must have eventually been provided, because Lincolnshire and the rest of Burghley’s counties were not listed as deficient in late 1592.

There was not much activity in Lincolnshire again until 1595. In its muster orders of 17 August 1595, the council stated ‘whereas there hath not bin these late yeares received anie certificate from your Lordship of the state of the trained bands’, it doubted

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13 B.L. Add MS 48167, f. 168; Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 114; See the glossary for the definitions of various arms.

14 P.R.O. State Papers 12/241/89; A.P.C. 1591-92, pp. 301-02: The counties of Chester, Cornwall, Devon, Huntingdon, Leicester and Rutland, Somerset, Sussex, Wiltshire and Yorkshire also failed to submit information on bullets, powder and match. The fact that they all had lieutenants apparently made no difference. A.P.C. 1592, p. 278.
that the forces are in readiness.\textsuperscript{15} Deputies Willoughby and Dymoke proved the council correct when they found many defects in the armour - much of which had been sent abroad to France and not returned. In a letter dated 7 September 1595, the council urged Burghley to have the musters ready by the twentieth of the month, but no returns were sent in until 21 October. Willoughby had wanted to postpone the musters until the following spring on the grounds that people would have more time to provide the missing armour, but his request was denied. Also, he said that Dymoke, who had the previous muster rolls for Kesteven and Holland, was temporarily absent. Muster rolls were used as a reference for those who were obliged to serve. Thus the county was still listed as uncertified in December 1595.\textsuperscript{16} The horses were mustered with no defects, but the overall state of the militia seems to have been poor, and the muster for the next year was also late.\textsuperscript{17} The deputies wrote to Burghley on 1 December 1596 seeking more time, saying they had viewed the horse and foot of the shire and ‘do fynde them not so well furnished as were expected’, but that defects would be corrected ‘with all expedition’.\textsuperscript{18} Burghley’s overall impact on the musters in Lincolnshire was minimal. He rarely did more than relay orders from the council to his deputies. The fact that he was most likely never actually in the county during his lieutenancy, could have been a factor in some of the slackness that occurred. Things were no different in Hertfordshire and Essex.

\textsuperscript{15} B.L. Add. MS 48162, f. 29.  
\textsuperscript{16} P.R.O. State Papers 12/253/100, 104; 12/254/15,31; B.L. Lansdowne MS. 79, f. 35; P.R.O. State Papers 12/255/25.  
\textsuperscript{17} B.L. Royal Collection 7CXVI, f. 263v.  
\textsuperscript{18} B.L. Lansdowne MS 82, f. 22
We know Burghley took command of Hertfordshire and Essex at the end of 1588. Interestingly, on 10 December 1588 the council gave instructions to the future mutineer, Sir John Smythe, to assist the deputies in the mustering and training of troops in Essex and Hertfordshire, even though he was not the muster master. Burghley had become the lieutenant by the end of that month, but the fact that the two counties were temporarily without a lieutenant was not a factor in Smyth’s appointment since Norfolk, where Lord Hunsdon had been established since 1585, received similar assistance. Nonetheless, on 16 May 1589 the aforesaid general musters were ordered across the country. Showing an apparent lack of urgency, Burghley waited four days before passing the orders to his deputies. The certificate for Hertfordshire showed 1,347 men in the trained bands, 650 with firearms, a figure that compares favourably with the 336 from 1577. Essex had a total muster of 4,000 men with 200 light horse.

As in Lincolnshire, Burghley took no physical part in the musters. There is nothing to indicate that he ever personally viewed any troops. As previously mentioned, he took over three weeks to inform his deputies of a muster in January 1590. The men were to be ready by 1 March, but possibly because of Burghley’s casualness, the muster was late. On 15 March, he emphasised that the forces were to be viewed by 26 March, saying that ‘henceforth no person or persons whatsoever except prelates and Lords of Parliament, shall be for borne of any charge’. Notably, he also displayed some leadership and innovation in addressing the reluctance of soldiers to carry their armour to views and training by ordering every man to be given in addition

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19 Sainty, *Lieutenants of Counties*, pp. 20, 23; B.L. Add. MS 48167, fos. 52, 56. For more on Smythe, see pp. 43-44.

20 A.P.C. 1588-89, p. 186; C.S.P.D. 1581-1590, pp. 600, 617; P.R.O. State Papers 12/225/19, 20; B.L. Stowe MS 1083, f. 7; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/141/2: A muster certificate from August 1580 lists 13,062 ablemen for Essex. The change can probably be attributed to the existence of a higher standard in later years, as Boynton has stated in *Elizabethan Militia* on p. 45; See also appendix vi.
to his eight pence a day wages a pence for every mile travelled for the wearing and carrying of his armour and weapons. Hertfordshire certified on 27 April with 1,500 men in the trained bands and 3,000 overall. Besides the trained men, there was ‘very little [armour] amongst the yeoman and farmers of the sheare’. Henry Cocke apologised for being the last county to send in its returns, blaming the delay of one company as the main reason. His comments were not encouraging, citing ‘wantes and decaie of armour in sundry townshippes’. Some of it was due to the death of soldiers, as ‘their wiffes and children are not able to continue that charge’. Others had left Hertfordshire ‘leavinge none of abilitye to supply their places’. The Essex deputies claimed on 7 March to have viewed the foot bands by the first of the month as ordered, but that the horse bands were not ready as many people did not appear, possibly due to the winter weather. The deputies ordered everyone to have their horse and equipment ready, but apparently not everyone obeyed, and on 2 May those who had not provided light horses were told to appear before Burghley to explain themselves, though as far as can be told, no one was ever sent before him. The musters were finally returned on 13 May, totalling 4,000 trained men and 8,000 overall. To his credit, Burghley tried to improve the musters by means of paying travel money, and the scarcity of armour was certainly not confined to his charges. Thus, it would be wrong to judge him too harshly in this case. The general muster of 1591 went well, with the exception of the aforementioned failure to note the amount of ammunition in store, and both counties’


22 B.L. Lansdowne MS 65, f. 18; P.R.O. State Papers 12/231/91.


24 Bruce, Report on Arrangements, p. cccxii; The wants of various other counties besides Burghley’s will be discussed in the next chapter.
returns showed their trained bands remained the same size as the previous year, with over forty percent of the men armed with guns — a mark of their growing importance as a weapon.\textsuperscript{25} There are no returns for the musters of 1592; the Hertfordshire militia was plagued by a lack of a captain in two companies as well as by missing armour due to service abroad.\textsuperscript{26}

The years 1593 and 1594 were devoid of general musters despite the fact that one was ordered in January 1594. The letter from the council to the lieutenants and commissions of musters says that ‘Her Majesty thinks that for two or three years past, an intermission has been made of the musters, causing decreas of numbers, a diminution of horses, and decay if armour and weapons’. All defects were to be corrected and the forces trained. Burghley waited until February to inform his deputies in Hertfordshire of the matter and clearly expected shortcomings: ‘I doubte not but there will be manie’. This time he remembered the powder and bullet, emphasising that there was to be a sufficient supply of both. He also displayed both his lack of familiarity with Hertfordshire and a willingness to listen to his deputies by asking them for the names of suitable candidates to fill the two vacant captaincies.\textsuperscript{27} But, there is no record of a muster having taken place in any of Burghley’s three counties, and it is certain that none took place in Essex. The Council wrote to Burghley on 30 July 1595 ordering a muster and saying, ‘we have not these later years received any certificate from your good lordships at the state of the trained bands of horse and foot in that county of Essex’, and doubted that they were in a state of readiness. Those doubts were confirmed by the

\textsuperscript{25} B.L. Add MS 48167, fos. 168, 170; Also see appendix vi.

\textsuperscript{26} A.P.C. 1591-92, p. 301; P.R.O. State Papers 12/241/89, 12/243/108; In 1592 there was a total of 145,250 foot soldiers and 10,230 horsemen mustered in England and Wales.

\textsuperscript{27} B.L. Lansdowne MS 75, f. 86.
deputies, who said no view had taken place since 1592 and that the bands were in disorder. Hertfordshire certified by 6 October, and as in Essex, there were many defaults due to the usual reasons of foreign service, death and people having moved out of the shire. The deputies also used the common complaint that according to its size, Hertfordshire was the most heavily burdened county in England, though they offered no proof of their claim. As will be shown, they were not alone in pleading poverty. After having their request to postpone training refused, the Essex deputies told Burghley on 18 October that they would commence with training on the ‘Frydaie next’. It was not until 9 November that they completed the review.28 At least Essex and Hertfordshire certified, unlike Lincolnshire, which as stated above, was listed as incomplete at the end of that year.29 Overall, this muster does not appear to distinguish Burghley, and he seems to have acted like other absentee lieutenants – he passed orders to those below him, and not always with a great deal of conspicuous urgency.

In March 1596, as a reaction to the poor state of the militias, the council ordered all the imperfect returns rectified by 31 May. Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire were among those instructed to re-certify. On 29 May the deputies in Hertfordshire again complained of being overburdened and that they could barely ‘gett the wantes of our trained bandes to be supplied. For besides the smaleness and barrenes of our sheare we have daylie founde menye decaies therin’.30 As negative as this letter is, it does say that the defects in the trained bands were supplied, so at least in Hertfordshire, it seems

29 P.R.O. State Papers 12/255/125.
30 A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 302-05; B.L. Lansdowne MS 81, f. 15.
they performed the assignment on time. There was a further muster in the autumn of 1596 owing to the possibility of a Spanish invasion. Bands in Essex were to be viewed by 17 November. Troops were certified in North-eastern Hertfordshire on 12 November, and in all 6,000 men were readied in Essex, 1,000 in Hertfordshire and 3,000 in Lincolnshire. Based on the available evidence, these musters would appear to have gone as planned. There is a further general muster listed for February 1598, with the trained bands of Hertfordshire listed at a strength of 1,500 men, Essex at 4,000 and Lincolnshire at 3,000, but there are no details of the proceedings.

Burghley's approach to the business of musters was not surprising: he kept his distance. They were carried out, more or less as they should have been, though the fact that there is no evidence of the ordered muster of 1594 is a glaring omission. It could have been cancelled; if not it must be held against Burghley's performance as a lieutenant. Besides that, there were late certifications and defects, but those, in truth, were quite common. His participation was very similar concerning the levying of men for service.

The raising of men and equipment for a specific military assignment constitutes a single levy. There were two types of service for which men were levied: domestic and foreign. Levies for domestic purposes were relatively rare and were defensive in nature, the most famous one being the response to the 1588 Spanish Armada. Apart from this, troops were raised in 1595, 1596 and 1599, but foreign levies were much

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31 There are no records for Essex and Lincolnshire.

32 B.L. Add. MS 48162, f. 30; A.P.C. 1596-97, pp. 287, 290; King, Muster Books, 1580-1605, pp. 152-64.

more common. Troops were sent to France, the Low Countries, and especially at the turn of the century, to pacify a rebellious Ireland.

The lieutenant had responsibility and control over levies, and as G. S. Thomson has stated, the high rate of martial activity during the late-Elizabethan period is a likely reason that lieutenants took a permanent status. Standard procedure was for the council to notify the lieutenant (or commissioners), who, as in the case of musters, gave a copy to his deputies. They in turn enlisted help from the justices of the peace and the sheriff. Finally, it was the chief constable, with the help of the petty constables in the hundreds, who actually chose the men. For foreign service, a distinction was made between trained and untrained troops. Men from the trained bands usually made up a portion of the overseas contingent, and often the bands’ supply of armour was depleted as a result. Besides the trained men, there were a few volunteers, but conscripts, including rogues and vagabonds, made up the bulk of the men. The use of ‘masterless men’ to fill out the ranks of overseas levies persisted throughout the period, and the council was not above specifically requesting their use, probably as a form of social control, as it was ordered that any if any person was to ‘withdraw themselves from the publick servis, ther shalbe a note taken of them to the ende they may be imployed in forrein service when ther shalbe any cause to use them’. Often a provost marshal, a


35 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 79-80, 107.


37 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 24; Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 166, 168.

38 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, pp. 26-27; A.P.C. 1597, pp. 309-10. In July 1597, the council informed several counties near London, including Hertfordshire, that the city was full of ‘masterless men’ and those counties only needed to send money to arm them, not actual troops.
proto-military policeman, was involved in dealing with vagrants and enforcing
discipline. He dealt with suppliers and maintained some semblance of sanitation when
recruits were on the march.39 Troops were often chosen using the dead-pay system,
which was firmly established by 1585 and usually meant that only ninety of every
hundred men requested were actually raised.40 It originated with forces serving abroad,
and in Holland ten dead pays in every hundred were awarded to the captains.41

A good example of a foreign levy is the one in Sussex in September 1589. That
county was to raise 1,000 men for Normandy, and the lieutenant, Lord Buckhurst,
received the orders dated 8 September that very same evening. The next day he met
with several justices of the peace to devise how to carry out the task.42 On the night of
9 September he received another message telling him the troops were to be ready by the
twentieth of that same month, and the next day he told his deputies to return to their
divisions and sent their letters of authority, with their orders, on 11 September. In those
orders he said that 'the shortness of time was suche that without wonderful speed and
diligence to be used by the said justices it was not possible for them to perform the said
service by the xxth day'. The deputies issued warrants to the constables for levying
soldiers on the next two days, and by 16 September, the recruits were marched to the
port of Rye, fifty miles away.43 If the levies were late, it seems the deputies did the best

444; B.L. Harleian MS. 703, f.36; Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, p. 48.
40 If 200 men were called for, only 180 would be sent.
41 C. G. Cruickshank, 'Dead-Pays in the Elizabethan Army', *English Historical Review* vol. 53 (1938), pp. 93-97; Sometimes the rates varied, but unless it was specified in the orders, and for small
contingents of under thirty, all levies in this study are adjusted by ten percent.
42 He refers to justices, and though he did not name them specifically, no doubt some of them
were deputies, as all deputies were on the bench.
43 Kent, *English Constable*, pp. 41, 175; B.L. Add MS 26886, f. 50v-r: Constables acted as
'pressmen', they picked, forced if necessary, men for service. Sometimes the quality of men they chose

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they could in the little time available, though Buckhurst was no help to them, having said that if they did not accomplish their duties on time ‘that is their fault and not myne’. This levy provides a good example of how the chain of command worked, and indeed, how levies were not always on time. Not least, it also shows how lieutenants were not above blaming others for shortcomings.

Of Burghley’s counties, the most heavily rated was Essex – which sent over 3,000 men abroad from 1588-98 – over twice as many as Hertfordshire’s total and six times that of Lincolnshire. Including defensive levies, Essex was charged with over 23,000 men. Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire only raised 5,600 and 7,200 respectively. That Essex was the most burdened of the three is not surprising. It had the most men enrolled in its militia, implying a large population, and was among the wealthiest counties. Along with Hertfordshire, it was a southern shire, meaning it was more likely than Lincolnshire to be called upon to supply men for the Continent. Ireland was to become a much bigger theatre of war after Burghley’s death, but in the early to mid 1590s, France and the Low Countries were the principal destinations of southern troops.

Indeed, Lincolnshire was only called upon for overseas service on four occasions during Burghley’s tenure, one of which was for horses only. The first levy Burghley was concerned with as a lieutenant took place in August 1588 during the Armada crisis. Lincolnshire contributed 700 men and thirty horses to the 3,400 men left much to be desired and the council ordered the justices to pick the men and arms, as was done in Lancashire in 1599.

44 B.L. Cottonian MSS, Galba DV, f. 149; Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 290: Between 1585 and 1602 there were over 100,000 men levied in England and Wales for foreign service.

45 See appendix vii.

footmen and 170 horsemen raised for the forces of the North under the Earl of Huntingdon – the largest contribution of those counties involved, which included Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Cheshire, Lancashire and Salop. Burghley’s role in that undertaking was typical. He forwarded the council’s orders on to his deputies, who saw that they were carried out. As with musters, he was probably not ever physically present when levies took place.

It was not until 1591 that Lincolnshire sent soldiers out of the county. On 24 June, 300 men were called upon to serve in Normandy, and there is no evidence of complaint or tardiness. Burghley did get involved in some of the details of this undertaking, saying that of the 300 called for, thirty were to be spared due to dead pays. Of the 270 men, Burghley stated that the area of Lindsey could yield 135 of them, Kesteven ninety, and Holland ‘the 3rd part’. He went on to say ‘I am of opinion for avowdying of a new charg to the countie and for more expedition of this service that those new numbers would be taken of the formar bands trained, or at the lest on half therof and the other of new furnished men, as you shall thynk best’. So he does deserve some of the credit for the undertaking, he did more than simply act as a go-between the government and his deputies.

It was another four years before the county had to contribute four horses for Ireland, and they proved to be insufficient because two of the geldings were unsuitable and the pistols and furniture were deficient. The end result was that replacements were ordered. In November of the same year, 3,000 men were put in readiness to assist the

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47 A.P.C. 1588, p. 231.

48 A.P.C. 1591, pp. 220-21; B.L. Lansdowne MS 66, f. 77.

maritime counties in the case of invasion. The ‘most principall and habliest men’ were
to be ready to go to Devonshire, Dorset and Hampshire upon request. On 31 October
1596, the council, making reference to the men readied the previous year and fearing
another Armada, renewed its call for the chosen men to be put in readiness. Yet they
never left the shire.50

Lincolnshire did have an overseas levy in 1596. At the end of August, Burghley
received orders to have a hundred men readied for Ireland. On 26 September, deputies
Willoughby, Dymoke and St. Poll reported that they had furnished the ninety-four men
(six dead pays) as ordered by ‘your letters dated the 11 of this instant’.51 It looks as
though it took Burghley two weeks to relay the information. In that case, it is to the
deputies’ credit that the men were prepared in a timely manner. If the levy had been
late, and in the absence of any mitigating information, Burghley’s sluggishness would
have to be considered a factor. The last levy during Burghley’s time as lieutenant was
ordered on 18 July 1598, only two weeks before his death, so he would not have been
involved in preparing the 150 men for Ireland.52 In Lincolnshire, a somewhat distant
place, Burghley had no real impact on the raising of men, arms and horse. The forces
were seldom called upon and he was not always quick to respond when they were. The
situation was different in the more heavily rated counties of Hertfordshire and Essex.

In the first place, the two counties contributed defensive forces during the 1588
crisis, with the deputies directing the militias in the absence of the Earl of Leicester.53

53 A.P.C. 1588, pp. 171, 190-91, 195, 222; B.L. Sloane MS 835, f. 1v, P.R.O. State Papers
12/214/69.
On December 30 of that year, the council wrote to Burghley, the newly appointed lieutenant, telling him to draft 250 soldiers in Essex and one-hundred in Hertfordshire for the Low Countries, which were to depart from London on 20 January. It seems Burghley gave the orders to his deputies in a timely fashion, as Philip Butler of Hertfordshire informed him on 3 January that he had received his instructions and John Brockett, also of Hertfordshire, said that same day that a meeting would be held the following Tuesday to take order for the levying of the troops. Thus the first levy under Burghley’s command, as far as one can tell, went well. Again, he was not asked to do more than order the levies and act as a link between the government and the deputies. There is evidence of a levy in Essex in October 1590 when 1,000 men were ‘to be transported for our service in to some parts beyond the seas’, though their destination is unclear and it is unknown whether or not the men were actually raised.

The rest of the early 1590s saw many troops sent to France, and Essex and Hertfordshire were called on to provide 150 men each on 10 January 1591. On 18 January, the Hertfordshire deputies told Burghley that most of those assessed for the loan to furnish the troops were very poor and asked ‘that the sum laid on that poor shire may be as favourable as possible’, and they wanted permission to join two or three people together to bear the cost of one privy seal. Burghley’s answer is unknown, but it is likely, given other evidence, that he probably followed his deputies’ advice. On 31 January the council told Burghley to raise fifty men each from Essex and Hertfordshire for Normandy, half ‘new charge’ and the other half out of the trained bands; furthermore, they wanted men who had served before. Despite the hardships and the

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55 H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. iv, pp. 66, 80.
56 C.S.P.D. 1591-1594, p. 3.
new orders by the council, there is no evidence that the levies were not carried out on
time.\(^{57}\) It was only weeks later, on 27 March, that both counties were told to conscript
150 men for Brittany. This was followed on 24 June by a further French levy of 150
men from Essex and a hundred from Hertfordshire.\(^{58}\) Burghley had no particular
insight to offer, simply telling his deputies to follow the council’s orders to put men in
readiness and to have them fully furnished and prepared. The deputies did the rest and
Hertfordshire’s men for the latter levy were indentured on 17 July.\(^{59}\)

The following February more troops were sent to Normandy – on the twentieth
the council told Burghley that 300 men from Essex and 150 from Hertfordshire were to
be chosen and ‘sorted out of the most efficient trained bands with all expedition’ and to
be delivered on 27 February.\(^{60}\) The deputies carried out the assignment with efficiency,
and both counties sent the men to port. The Hertfordshire deputies wrote to Burghley
with an indenture for 135 well-armed men (150 less the dead pays) delivered to a
captain Grimston on 27 February, as instructed. On this occasion the deputies may well
have felt aggrieved, as they state it was the third levy sent out of the shire since the
previous April – a total of 355 men, 214 ‘of their best corslets’, eighty-five muskets and
fifty-six calivers, greatly impairing the trained bands.\(^{61}\) There must have been reports
of unfit men for Essex, because Thomas Mildmay and John Petre told Burghley they
had viewed the men at Colchester and that they were all furnished, though contrary to


\(^{58}\) A.P.C. 1591 pp. 25-26, 220-21; C.S.P.D. 1581-1590, p. 567: Essex was also called upon to
send 250 men to the Low Countries on 17 March 1591.

\(^{59}\) B.L. Lansdowne MS 66, f. 78; King, Muster Books, 1580-1605, p. 212.


directions, they were not of the trained bands. They claimed they were 'greatly
wronged by the information delivered to his Lordship of the general dislike of men',
and that only six men were unfit, all out of the band of a Mr. Wroth, who also was a
captain in Middlesex and thus had been unable to see to both bands at once. Begging
Burghley’s forgiveness for any shortcomings, the deputies did show some dependence
on their lieutenant, saying it would be necessary to ‘procure some allowance’ as the
wind prevented the men from leaving Harwich and that they had allotted six pence a day
per man for sustenance. But the men must have been sent on their way, because there
was no intervention on Burghley’s part. This reinforces the view that Burghley’s role
as a lieutenant was to assist his deputies if there was a problem or dispute; otherwise, he
largely remained in the background.

The levies for French service in 1593 prompted a whole range of reactions. On
18 February the council complained about the slackness of several counties, including
Hertfordshire, commenting that ‘but 35 sufficient and the rest being 14 are verie
defective and ill-apparelled.’ Henry Cocke claimed the men were in reasonable
condition, generally, but most were only in doublets and hose, which was not
appropriate for cold weather, and speculated that other shires were better furnished, a
fact which he seems, at least partially, to blame on Burghley. He says that other
soldiers were furnished with ‘cassokes, swords and daggers . . . a matter of soe greate a
value, as in respecte of other dayelye and necessarye charges, we your honor’s deputye
lyuetenantes, havinge noe warrante, therefore dare not our selves resolve any thinge
therin without your good Lord’s advice and direction’. Cocke finished by saying a
cassock, sword and girdle were ‘but of a smale price’, a hundred men could be

62 Ibid., pp. 200-01.
furnished for £100. Interestingly, all complaints are addressed to the deputies, the lieutenants, many of whom were councillors, were not directly criticised by the council. On the other hand, the Essex men were without defect, all described as well armed and apparelled, and the letters of commendation for that county as well as Buckinghamshire and Middlesex (which actually had no lieutenant) were addressed to the lieutenants, thanking them for ‘their pains and care taken’ in providing fit and well-furnished men. It looks to be a case of the lieutenants getting all the glory and the deputies all the blame, yet, certainly in Burghley’s case, it is doubtful that he made any great effort in the Essex levy other than ordering his deputies to carry it out.

In July 1593, the council demanded an additional 150 men from Essex and fifty from Hertfordshire for France, adjusted to a dead-pay rate ‘of 10 in the 100’, and to be ready by 13 August. By 1 August, Sir Henry Cocke and his fellow deputies in Hertfordshire had drafted forty-five men for service – thirty of them armed with calivers. So it appears the deputies fulfilled their duties most ably on that occasion. The two counties were again obliged to contribute men for France in 1594. Both were ordered to raise fifty troops for Normandy on 18 January, in addition, Hertfordshire was told to prepare one-hundred soldiers for the Low Countries in just five days. Despite having to carry out two levies almost simultaneously, the Hertfordshire men from the hundreds of Edwinstree and Odsey were prepared for transport to the Low Countries on 6 February. On 2 May the council demanded troops from Essex and ten other counties for Brest. They must have been held back, because on 21 July Burghley wrote

63 A.P.C. 1592-93, pp. 14-16, 62-63, 65-67; B.L. Lansdowne MS 75, f. 82; 73, f. 5. The other counties accused of slackness were Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Cambridgeshire and Northamptonshire.

64 A.P.C., 1592-93, pp. 414-16; B.L. Lansdowne MS 73, f. 54.

to his son, Robert, saying that the troops were ready to depart for their various ports but
that the captains had not been given orders to send them, and that the Lord Admiral
(Charles Howard) should be notified of this fact. A week later the Essex levy, which
initially was 250 men, was reduced to 150. All these delays and changes appear to be
due to the council changing its mind, and though there is no evidence of any
shortcomings in Essex, any inefficiency in that undertaking must at least in part be
attributed to the central government's indecisiveness.

The first levy for Irish service out of the two counties under Burghley started
well; fifty men from Hertfordshire were to be sent to Chester. Curiously, fifty men, not
the standard forty-five, were expected. One captain, Edward Pulter, refused to
contribute to the subsidy for furnishing the recruits, probably resentful that he was
obliged to contribute money as well as his time to the militia. Whether or not he ever
paid is unknown. Furthermore, on 10 August 1595 the council told Burghley that some
men for Hertfordshire had deserted on the way to Chester and that he was to apprehend
and punish them. Desertion was not at all uncommon, and in May 1596, Henry Cocke
spoke of those who run away carrying 'great charges utterly loste and caste awaye'. He
wanted an example made of some offenders 'to the terror of others', or 'verie fewe
wille hadd to doe her majesty's service'. Burghley's response is unavailable, but
desertion continued across the country as people showed a general disinclination to
serve.

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66 C.S.P.D. 1591-1594, pp. 497, 529; B.L. Salisbury MS 27, f. 55.
67 B.L. Lansdowne MS 78, f. 52; King, Muster Books, 1580-1605, pp. xix-xx, p. 147.
68 H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. v, p. 312; B.L. Lansdowne MS 81, fos. 13, 31.
Despite the mood of reluctance, the remaining events of 1595 passed without incident. In November, both countries sent men to Ireland as well as preparing men for defence. Just one week after Burghley received orders to send forty-four and thirty-four men to Ireland out of Hertfordshire and Essex respectively, on 12 November both were to ready the 'most principall and hablest men' to meet any Spanish landing force. Essex was to put 8,000 men in readiness while Hertfordshire was to do the same for 1,500. The tasks were carried out despite the poor conditions of the bands. John Brockett of Hertfordshire told Burghley that in addition to the aforementioned lack of captains in two bands, some of the best armour was employed in foreign service and many people responsible for supplying furniture were dead, had moved away or were unable to afford the cost. Still, he promised to remedy the defects and have the bands readied by the end of December.\(^6\)\(^9\) Other than recommending new captains, Brockett did not involve Burghley in the process. He simply told him the procedures the deputies were going to follow to upgrade the bands.

The burdens increased in 1596 as troops were called far more frequently than in the previous year. Conditions had apparently not improved, since on 23 January the Hertfordshire deputies complained that London merchants who had holdings in the county refused to pay anything towards equipping the militia, claiming to be charged in London. The deputies sent the absentee landlords Burghley's orders from 20 March 1590 dealing with a similar situation. At that time Burghley simply stated that merchants of London who held property in Essex were to pay their fair share.\(^7\)\(^0\) He may well have done the same in 1596, though whether or not it was effective in that


\(^7\)\(^0\) B.L. Lansdowne MS 83, f. 11; J. Bruce, Report on the Arrangements, Appendix LXV, p. ccciv, The order of 20 March 1590 also applied to Hertfordshire, See also Chapter II, p. 18.
particular case is not known. In March, fifty-five men from each county were called upon to serve in Ireland. This was followed in May by demands for Boulogne – 180 from Essex and 135 from Hertfordshire. Henry Cocke complained that fewer people were paying for service, as the tenants of the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul claimed to be exempt by ancient charter, and concluded that 'nowe in easing of themselves they laye the burthne uppon others which are worse able to beare it'. Yet the levies were carried out without complaint from the central government. There was no respite, as on 25 July seventy soldiers from Essex and fifty from Hertfordshire were demanded for the Low Countries. By 5 August it was confirmed that twelve men from the Hertfordshire hundreds of Edwinstree and Odsey had been pressed and were ready for transport to Flushing despite the general shortages and problems, so the levy was completed expeditiously. More troops for Boulogne were demanded in September 1596 – 150 from Essex and one-hundred from Hertfordshire. The only possible evidence as to how the levy was carried out in Hertfordshire is a document dated 3 October, which says that forty-five men were delivered out of that county. There were no other levies ordered during that period and this could be a partial listing or the burden may have been reduced. There were some problems in Essex, a warrant was issued to a Benedict Blomfield, one of the Messengers of Her Majesty's Chamber, to persuade those who refused to pay towards furnishing the 135 men from France to do so or go to London to answer for themselves.

71 A.P.C. 1595-96, p. 263; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. vi, p. 193; B.L. Lansdowne MS 81, f. 65.


The two counties were again put on alert because of a possible invasion in the autumn of 1596. Essex and Hertfordshire were ordered to mobilise 6,000 and 1,500 men respectively, similar to what had been done in November 1595. Burghley showed some military interest during that time, commenting in general on defending the realm – lieutenants were to raise forces for defence, warships were to be sent out, armies should be raised from the west and east with persons of knowledge to review the arms and recusants were to be disarmed and committed. But once again, he had nothing to add to the activities going on in the places under his command. On 26 May 1597, Burghley was consulted in a defensive muster in Essex because Thomas Mildmay and John Petre needed direction on what to do with the 400 men they had raised as ordered on 29 April. They said they had the money to pay the men through 3 June, but would need to raise more if the troops were kept past that date. It is likely, but not certain, that Burghley ordered the men dismissed. There were other overseas levies in the last year of Burghley’s life, but this was the last time he was involved other than relaying the council’s orders.

Overall, Burghley was only peripherally involved in levies and musters. He was consulted when a problem arose, usually to use his authority to force someone to pay or to dismiss a levy or postpone training. Otherwise, he passed along orders and occasionally sanctioned his deputies’ ideas. Whether or not musters and levies were completed in those shires was largely due to the local men in authority, not a distant and ageing lieutenant in poor health. Burghley did what was asked of him – he acted as a

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75 A.P.C. 1597, pp. 104-05, 163; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. vii, pp. 179, 215; Hertfordshire also raised a hundred men for defence in May 1597.

figurehead in a prestigious office. Between them, Burghley's three counties raised 4,929 men for overseas service under his tenure, or eight per cent of the men sent abroad from England and Wales between 1588 and 1598. They also account for over twenty-two per cent of the more than 22,000 men raised from all the counties in this study between 1585 and 1603. Thus, Burghley's charges made a substantial contribution; it is those other counties that must now be assessed.

77 Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, p. 290; Also see appendices vi and vii; The other counties in the study are Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Kent, Lancashire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, and Surrey.
Burghley’s peers, as mentioned in Chapter III, ranged from those similar to himself in their approach to the lieutenancy – Christopher Hatton and the Earl of Shrewsbury – to the much more involved Lord Roger North in Cambridgeshire. In order to compare their performances with Burghley’s, the others will be divided into the absentee lieutenants: Hatton, Shrewsbury, the Earl of Derby; the more local ones: Lord Cobham in Kent; the lieutenants with substantial military backgrounds: Lords Howard in Surrey and Hunsdon in Norfolk and Suffolk; and finally, Lord North. The musters and levies of those lieutenants and counties will be examined from the mid 1580s until the time of Burghley’s death in August 1598. Their lieutenancies will be assessed according to how effectively levies and musters were carried out.

Promptness and the quality of men and arms raised are the key elements of efficiency. Some lieutenants passed away before 1598 and were replaced by commissioners of musters, whose performance will be compared to that of the lieutenants. The heaviest rated of these counties for overseas troops were Kent, Surrey, Lancashire and Norfolk. Overall, over 22,000 of the 68,000 men Cruickshank lists as levied for overseas duty come from these nine counties.\(^1\) Burghley’s efficiency is to be judged by comparing his counties to those of the other lieutenants and commissioners.

Sir Christopher Hatton, Lieutenant of Northamptonshire, was quite similar to Burghley in that he was a figurehead lieutenant who was rarely in the county. The first muster in Northamptonshire under Hatton took place in October and November 1586. Hatton may not have had much to do with that muster except ordering it,

\(^1\) Cruickshank, *Elizabeth’s Army*, p. 291; See also appendix vii.
because he had just taken command that September. Returns for the west division show a sum total of 2,063 men with 201 corslets and eighty-eight calivers.\textsuperscript{2} As mentioned above, Hatton's lieutenancy was marked by his accommodation of local interests.\textsuperscript{3} On 20 February 1587, the council told him that Northamptonshire was to have 480 calivers and 240 each of bowmen, corslets and bill in the trained bands. Each band of one hundred was to have forty shot, twenty pikemen and the rest furnished with bills and bows. Yet by 19 April of that year, Hatton, responding to complaints from deputies Richard Knightley and Edward Montagu that the county could not afford to arm so many men, said ‘uppon my perswasion they [the council] are pleased I sholde signifie unto you that for this firste yeare you sholde leavie and putt in readiness the number of six hundred foote onely’.\textsuperscript{4} Hatton thus emphasised his role in changing the council’s mind, and his role in the reduction of Northamptonshire’s bands is probably the biggest impact he had during his five years as lieutenant. Though in that same letter he did mention men he thought fit for command, though he told his deputies he would abide by their choices in the matter as they were ‘better acquainted then my selfe with the state of the shiere, the disposicion of the gentlemen, bothe for healthe and otherwise, and anie other thing fitt to be considered herein’.\textsuperscript{5}

In 1588, the musters in Northamptonshire were not carried out on time, and on 2 April the council wrote to Hatton saying ‘contrarie unto her Majesties and oer expectacion, it is found that no suche certificate hath ben sent upp you’re your


\textsuperscript{3} See p. 54.

Lordship', and that the muster was to be completed with all speed. Hatton did not show a great deal of haste, waiting until 5 April to order his deputies to certify the forces. He acknowledged that he feared that ‘we shall be founde sumwhat behynde the rest’, though he was ‘loathe we sholde be founde (for the number) inferiour to anie other shiere, so far as the habilitee of our countrie maye afford it’.6 It might be thought that if he had been interested in the county’s reputation, he would not have waited three days to order a muster that was already overdue. But circumstances beyond Hatton’s control also intervened. The deputies informed him that to carry out the muster, they needed a new warrant of deputation. On 13 April, Hatton sent them a renewed deputation ‘under my hande and seale’, and urged them to proceed with the muster. Nevertheless, the county eventually did certify with 1,240 able men – including the aforementioned 600 in the trained bands.7 As previously mentioned,8 besides using his influence to reduce the size of the county’s militia, Hatton also helped persuade the council to reduce Northamptonshire’s 1589 Armada subsidy from £5,000 to £3,000 – though only £2,025 was ever collected.9 So his main contribution was using his position on the council to see that the county was not overburdened.

There were further levies ordered in 1589, 1590 and 1591, but Hatton took no direct role other than acting as a link between the council and his deputies. His letter of 5 September 1590 is typical; he tells Knightley, Montagu, Thomas Cecil and George

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5 Ibid., p. 38.

6 Ibid., pp. 48-50; A.P.C. 1587-88, p. 253: Northamptonshire was also late in certifying in 1587.

7 Goring and Wake, eds., Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, pp. 51-52; B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/25.

8 See p. 54.

9 Goring and Wake, eds., Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, p. 77; Noble, Persons who subscribed towards the defence, pp. 47-48.
Fermor to take the musters and see that everything is 'performed in the best manner according to their Lordshippes presente direccion'. He had no insights to offer. That the forces were mustered on time must largely be credited to the deputies. Like Burghley, Hatton made a minimal contribution to the musters, and the same was to hold true for the levies as well.

The first levy under Hatton took place in June 1587 and involved 200 men for the Low Countries. Hatton was originally ordered to ready the men on 7 June, but it was not until 11 June that he sent the orders to his deputies. In his letter, he stated by the council's orders 'you shall particularly understand the wholl course of that direccion, it shall not be neidfull for me to make any further repeticione therof by theis letters'. Hatton participated no further in that successful levy. He is a perfect example of a figurehead lieutenant.

The largest undertaking of Hatton's lieutenancy involved the defence preparations of the summer of 1588. All captains were ordered to stay in the county and the bands to be readied on 15 June. Reflecting the importance of the situation, Hatton informed his deputies of the orders on the same day. A week later, Hatton passed on instructions from Secretary Francis Walsingham (three days after receiving them) calling for a certification of the forces and indicated his lack of knowledge, saying because he knew 'not in what sorte your soldiours have ben hitherto trained, I must in anye wyse requier you to see them trained . . .'. The following month – 18 July – the council ordered 400 men to court to guard the Queen. The postscript,

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10 Wake, ed., Musters, Beacons and Subsidies, pp. 21, 36-53; Goring and Wake, Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, p. 84; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/240/129.


12 Goring and Wake, eds., Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, pp. 52-56.
presumably written by Hatton, (it was in his hand) says that the number has been increased to 600, but that he would do his best to see that ‘400 may content them’.

Even in a national emergency, he still retained his county loyalties, though he did relay the orders by the next day. He did display a higher degree of involvement than he had previously. He asked Richard Knightley, who conducted the men to London, which besides the 600 foot (Hatton’s efforts to reduce the number were unsuccessful), included seventy light horse and twenty lances, that if he needed any help finding lodging for the troops, that he would use ‘all good meanes I maye for your ease and relief therein’. But then again, he would only have been involved if his deputy had had a problem and required his intervention – the main purpose of the figurehead lieutenant. The levy was performed to the council’s satisfaction, because on 25 August Hatton received a letter of commendation, thanking him and his deputies for their service in the matter.13

Hatton was not greatly involved in the final levy of his lieutenancy – 200 men for Normandy in June 1591 – though, as we have seen, he did rebuke his deputies over the lack of coat-and-conduct money.14 The Armada crisis was the height of his involvement in the levies and the militia as a whole. His death in November 1591 allows for an assessment of the Northamptonshire militia without a lieutenant. Overall, there was much activity after Hatton’s death.15 Six overseas levies took place

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13 Ibid., pp. 57, 62, 69; B.L. Sloane MS 835, f. 1b; Wake, Musters, Beacons and Subsidies, p. 21.


15 Only events up until Burghley’s death on 4 August 1598 will be considered in this chapter. Events after that will be discussed in the next two chapters.
between February 1593 and July 1598. The former deputies Richard Knightley, Edward Montagu, Thomas Cecil and George Fermor headed the commission of musters which oversaw the militia. The county was late in certifying in 1596, but other than that, there is no evidence that Northamptonshire did not consistently certify as ordered under the muster commission. Hatton used his authority to further local interests, but there is no discernible difference in the militia with or without a lieutenant.

After not sending any men abroad in 1592, in January 1593, the council ordered 150 men from Northamptonshire for French service. It was not a success; on 18 February it was revealed that only 123 troops were delivered, and thirty-two of them were rejected as unsuitable. Thus only ninety-one were deemed acceptable as opposed to the ideal figure (adjusted for dead pays) of 135. Though negligent, Northamptonshire was not alone, as only 755 of 979 men from all counties were deemed acceptable. Oxford, which had a lieutenant, had deficiencies, while Middlesex, which did not, had all its men accepted and was rated 'very good' in its performance.

Several levies for Ireland followed in the ensuing years. After sending thirty-nine and fifty-five soldiers in November 1595 and March 1596 respectively, the county was obliged to raise ninety-four men by orders dated 10 September 1596, a

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17 Wake, Musters, Beacons, Subsidies, pp. 34-36.

18 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/261/58.

19 A.P.C. 1592-93, p. 16; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/244/38.
levy that was completed by 1 October. So on this occasion the levy was carried out quickly and without complaint, and more men were drafted for Ireland in 1597 and 1598 without incident; thus the commission acquitted itself well in those years after the poor performance of 1593. The council clearly felt it could rely on the commission as it had earlier depended on Hatton. It was willing to take the commissioners' advice concerning the replacement of a captain who died in August 1598, saying 'we trust so much unto your judgements'. Nothing had really changed in Northamptonshire; the men who had guided the militia under Hatton – the deputies – were still doing the same as commissioners.

George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, also tended to conduct his affairs from a distance. As lieutenant of Derbyshire, Staffordshire and for a brief time, Nottinghamshire, he left much of the job to his deputies. Though he did talk about reviewing men in person, there is no conclusive evidence that he ever did so.

The first general levy after he became a permanent lieutenant took place in October 1585 and was less than successful. As noted above, Shrewsbury chastised his deputies in Staffordshire for a poor showing of the horse bands, and said he would investigate the matter himself. The deputies did return a certificate of the horse before the end of that December, but Shrewsbury took no part, claiming the weather was too poor for him to attend. After telling his deputies to certify the foot bands in January 1586, Shrewsbury was told in early February that a true certificate was not yet


23 See p. 58.
possible (Shrewsbury’s reply does not include the deputies’ reasons) and he responded that if necessary, another review would have to be made. When no certificate was forthcoming by 27 February, the earl said that if one was not completed he would send his own and lay the blame where it belongs – with the deputies. This pressure on the deputies may or may not have made the difference, but Shrewsbury reported to the council on 11 March that men in Derbyshire and Staffordshire were certified.  

Another muster was called for on 2 August 1586, though there is a copy of Shrewsbury’s orders to his deputies concerning this muster dated 5 September. Unless it was dated incorrectly, he gave earlier instructions, or the entire matter had been postponed, this is an extraordinarily long delay in relaying orders. But the deputies told Shrewsbury the men were mustered and trained on 19 October.  

In October 1587 the Staffordshire and Derbyshire bands were to be readied against a possible Spanish attack. Shrewsbury complained to his brother-in-law and chief deputy in Derbyshire, John Manners, that people were trying ‘to delude me with furniture borrowed from others’. His wording makes it sound as if he had actually viewed the troops himself, though it is far from conclusive. He went on to tell Manners that he was disappointed in the county’s performance and that ‘I will not be dishonoured by being forbearing with a people so negligent of their preservation of their estates and the commonwealth’. Duly rebuked, his deputies in Derbyshire and

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24 S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 783-88.


Staffordshire returned certificates by 28 November, with Derbyshire’s bands totalling 400 men, 160 of which had firearms.\textsuperscript{27} 

The following May, Shrewsbury showed an attention to detail lacking from both Burghley and Hatton when he explained to his deputies in Derbyshire how they were to equip the men of the trained bands.\textsuperscript{28} The previous March, Shrewsbury had told deputies in Staffordshire — Edward Aston and Richard Bagot — that another muster was required and that all deficiencies were to be supplied. The muster was completed and the earl’s charges were never cited by the council for being uncertified under his leadership. However, Shrewsbury was not impressed by the lack of training his men had received in June 1588, and wrote to his deputies to right the problems and report anyone who did not cooperate. He also listed several gentlemen in Staffordshire that had been overlooked in the assessment for light horse, something Burghley never did. By 20 July, at the height of the Armada crisis, the bands were in readiness.\textsuperscript{29} Yet Shrewsbury retained some local interests. He told the council that men in his counties agreed to an increase in the number of lances and light horse ‘on condition that it should not be taken as a precedent’. So he compromised with the locals, getting them to agree to provide more on a strictly \textit{ad hoc} basis in a time of emergency.\textsuperscript{30} 

Shrewsbury’s forces were mustered again in the following two years, and there is no indication that they did not certify as ordered.\textsuperscript{31} Shrewsbury’s charges were

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{27} H.M.C. Rutland MSS vol. i, p. 231; C.S.P.D. 1581-90, p. 440; V.C.H. Derbyshire, vol. ii, p. 113.
\item \textsuperscript{28} H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, p. 249; Also see p. 58.
\item \textsuperscript{29} S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. MSS. 804, 806-09.
\item \textsuperscript{30} C.S.P.D. 1581-1590, p. 503.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
generally efficient in mustering during his lieutenancy, from 1585 to November 1590. Like Burghley and Hatton, he worked from afar, but he did pay more attention to detail. He could be forceful with his deputies if he perceived any slackness, but his subordinates usually served him well.

Derbyshire and Staffordshire, no doubt because of geography, sent all their foreign levies to Ireland. The first was ordered in February 1587; one hundred men from each shire were required and none were to be from the trained bands.\textsuperscript{32} Apparently it went well, and though it is not known for certain, Shrewsbury likely took no direct part. The next levy was during the 1588 Armada situation, when 700 men from Derbyshire and 400 from Staffordshire were to reinforce the defences. Despite claims of an inability to provide weapons and furniture for service, the men were raised.\textsuperscript{33}

On 16 September 1589, the two counties were ordered to be in readiness for Irish service, yet Shrewsbury waited until 30 September to tell his deputies. The fact that is was not a full-fledged levy at that point might partially account for his apparent sluggishness. On 18 January 1590 he informed them to prepare the men for departure on 23 February. By March, the number was increased to 200 from each county and they were sent to port. They were not well prepared, a Thomas Woodhouse in Chester complained to the earl that the troops delivered to him were 'the scum of this world' and that of the 200 men for Staffordshire, ten ran away and he could not use the rest. The council also complained to Shrewsbury about the men, saying 'We cannot but

\textsuperscript{31} A.P.C. 1588-89, p. 186; S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 815, 817, 818, 827; A.P.C. vol. xix, pp. 414-16;

\textsuperscript{32} H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, p. 212.

attribute to the foul oversight and abuse of your Deputy Lieutenants, Justices of the Peace or others to whose your Lordship gave the same in charge'. Again, the deputies received the blame. Shrewsbury told Richard Bagot that he would send as favourable a report to the council as he could, and complained of the heavy burden of the £500 required for the 200 men. As with the musters, Shrewsbury showed some bias in favour of the shires, but it appears to be a feeble excuse, and does not enhance his reputation as a lieutenant. This last muster before Shrewsbury’s death in November 1590 tarnished his lieutenancy, but overall, his record was commendable. His counties consistently certified on time, and the other levies he oversaw were successful as far as one can tell. He was much like Burghley and Hatton, though he was somewhat more involved, and like Hatton, sympathetic to local concerns.

After Shrewsbury’s death, his son, Gilbert Talbot, the seventh Earl of Shrewsbury, replaced him as lieutenant in Derbyshire, but there would be no replacement for Staffordshire. A review of the muster records shows no real difference between the two counties at all. Between 1591 and 1598, there were musters in 1591, 1592, 1595 and 1596. Neither county is listed as late in certification, and both were to send in perfect certificates in March 1596 (along with most other counties). There is no real difference for the entire 1585-1598 period. Staffordshire performed its musters well without a lieutenant.

As for levies, both counties were rated roughly the same after the elder earl’s death: Derbyshire raised about 750 troops while Staffordshire contributed over 580 under the leadership of a commission of musters headed by former deputies John

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Byron, and Ralfe and Richard Ashton. No men were sent abroad until 1593, when each shire sent 138 troops to Ireland. There was no further activity until 1595, when each shire sent ninety-four men to Ireland. In September 1596, the Derbyshire deputies levied forty-seven men in Shrewsbury’s absence; he had left in July for France in his capacity as ambassador to that country. He was back by the end of September, but things appear to have gone well without him. It was not until April 1597 that any negligence is found. After promptly reporting a levy to his deputies, Shrewsbury’s men from Derbyshire deserted in mass – eighteen of twenty-three ran away, while in Staffordshire, ten escaped. Having a lieutenant made no difference in this case, and it does not seem to have mattered for levies from 1585 to 1598 any more than it did for musters. The deputies in the shires were present throughout (as deputies or muster commissioners) and they made the difference.

Overall, the absentee lieutenants Burghley, Hatton and both Shrewsburys had little input on musters and levies from 1585 to 1598. But Kent, where William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham, held the lieutenancy from 1585 to 1597 provides an example of a lieutenant that resided in the county under his command. He was a more local figurehead, and that could have influenced his command of Kent’s militia. Cobham did concern himself with the details more than Burghley when ordering a muster, as was the case in August 1586. Saying ‘as harvest nowe draweth on, it is mete by the Lordships that the viewe and trayinge of the foote bandes, should be performed by apt choice of tyme’, Cobham stated that the bands would be trained by corporals on holidays after evening prayer and with men able to afford the training to

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36 A.P.C., 1592-93, p. 326; H.M.C. Rutland MSS vol. i, p. 326.

spare the county taxation. As we have seen, in October 1586 Cobham was needed in London and entrusted the county to his deputies, telling them to put the trained bands in readiness and that they should call in the captains to 'have a conference upon this service'. Thus while he entrusted much to his deputies, he also gave them precise instructions on how to do various tasks, including musters.

Kent again certified on 29 November 1587, meeting the deadline of the end of November imposed by Cobham just over two weeks earlier. The deputies sent in the returns, but said they could not account for the bullet, powder and match until they had the money to provide for them. Using hardship as an excuse, they said there was little powder because 'our division falleth dailie by degrees into povertie'. That December, deputy William Lambarde asked for the county's burden to be lessened, saying some had fallen into 'flatt beggerie' and that levies and purveyance had taken their toll. He claimed there was not enough money to pay the 350 armed men in his division. He did not want to alienate the soldiers in the trained bands, saying 'I take it dangerous to arme men first, and then to offend them', so he did not want to overcharge them. As far as one can tell, Cobham did not lower the county's burden, but this kind of complaint in one of the richest shires in the country illustrates the difficulties in maintaining the militia. Perhaps these factors contributed to the fact that Kent's muster returns were late in the spring of 1588; on 2 April the council ordered a view of foot and horse 'with all the speed that possibly maie be to couse a viewe of all the horsemen and trained men'.

38 S.R.O. D 593/S/4/11/1(x); D593/S/4/11/15; Also see p. 60.
40 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/125; 12/209/166: The certificate for eastern Kent was completed on 22 April 1588; S.R.O. D/593/S/4/11/3(i).
There are no complaints from the council about Kent’s musters in 1589, but on 25 September of that year, Thomas Willoughby complained to Cobham about a company he inspected at Sittingbourne. He found it to be very substandard, and when he demanded improvement, his letters ‘were refused to be read or receyved’ by the officers of the band. He claimed that a captain Clifford and constables refused to supply horses, and urged Cobham to intervene. It can only be assumed that Cobham did use his authority in the situation, it also shows the difficulty faced in keeping the militia up to standards.

The county mustered in the spring and summer of 1590. On 31 July Cobham ordered a muster to be completed by 29 September. On 27 August he wrote to captains Chapness and Edward Style, telling them he understands from John Leveson that their bands are not properly furnished, commenting that ‘I much marvell considering that was warning given you for the supplying of all defectes by the end of march last’. The band had been sent to France, and like bands everywhere, foreign service meant a loss of arms and furniture. He ordered the captains to give the names of those who refused to contribute to Leveson, who would deal with the matter. By 6 September Cobham told his deputies to take the muster as ordered, but that he was hoping to have it completed by the end of October, not September as he had originally planned to do. Despite this fact, there were no complaints from the government and the forces are also listed as certified for 1591.

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41 It is not the Thomas Willoughby from Lincolnshire, as he was referred to as Lord Willoughby of Parham.


43 Ibid., D/593/S/4/19/4 (i,ii,iii,iv).

However, in May 1594, Cobham told deputies Leveson and Thomas Scott that there had been no musters since 1591, and that there were probably numerous defects, which he wanted remedied by the end of September. On 14 June, Scott and Leveson informed Cobham that some captains had left since the last certification and others had 'growne so farre in yeares and impotencye as they are unable to doe such service as is needfull'. They decided to appoint new captains. Captain Style said his band was thirty-seven men short due to people leaving and dying, and that he himself was too old and infirm for the job. Other captains wrote similar letters, and the forces were not certified in 1594.45

On 26 August 1595, the council ordered a muster to be completed by 20 September, saying 'there hath not been this latter yeares received any certificat from your Lord', which was typical across the country. Showing some urgency, Cobham forwarded the letter on the same day. Again he wanted Leveson to persuade those who failed to contribute to do so or be sent to face the council. Captains of footbands were not to be exempt from providing a horse, a practice which must have been common, because captain Style insisted that he was exempt from such a charge 'by reason of my place of captayne and my inablitye to beare the same'. On 7 January 1596, Thomas Duke claimed the same privilege, and Thomas Engeham said they had never been charged before and did not expect to be charged now. This differed from Burghley's orders for Essex in 1590 state that 'no person or persons whatsoever, except the Prelates and Lords of the Parliament, shall be forborne and excepted out of any charge or taxation for or towards setting forth of soldiers, reparing of arms, or any such other public ordinary charge and service in the country'.46

45 S.R.O. D/593/S/4/36 (i-v).
Kent is listed as certified for 1595, though there were many defects. The following March, another muster was taken, and Thomas Scott wrote to Leveson about this fact, complaining about the condition of the militia and how he hoped that Cobham 'will use some means to redresse their to much slackness'. What Cobham may have done is unknown, but the county did certify in 1595 and 1596 despite the aforementioned problems, and the deputies have to be given much of the credit, though their lieutenant must be commended as well. 47

Overall, the elder Lord Cobham (there were no musters from the time his son Henry, eleventh Lord Cobham, succeeded him in October 1597 to August 1598) did well in overseeing musters despite the late certification in 1588 and the non-certification in 1594. There were many obstacles, but the county consistently certified and Cobham did get involved in some of the details, though his involvement was quite similar to Burghley’s in that he left most things to his deputies and intervened when asked to use his authority to enforce the Crown’s will.

Kent was largely obliged to send men to the Continent. All of those sent abroad between 1585 and 1598 were sent to either France or the Low Countries. Early in the period there were two levies for the Low Countries that passed without incident.48 The 1588 Armada resulted in a huge levy in Kent. Cobham sent out instructions, some of which was general information – captains were to have their companies well furnished and serviceable and anybody who did not pay their share was to be imprisoned. However, some points were quite specific. Each shot was to

46 Ibid., D/593/S/4/38/1(iii, viii, xi-xii); J. Bruce, Report on Arrangements, Appendix LXC, p. ccciv.


have two pounds of powder and bullets as well as two rolls of match. Pioneers were to be furnished with bill, dagger, axe, shovel and spade, as every hundred soldiers required three carriages and smiths. In total, Kent sent forth 5,000 footmen, 330 light horse and sixty-four lances. In large part, Cobham’s contribution was like Burghley’s or Hatton’s, except he was more detailed.

During the next year, Kent sent 900 soldiers to France and over 200 for the Portuguese expedition without incident. Documents from October 1590 to March 1591 show how levies must have worked under Cobham. On 16 October, 150 men were to be put in readiness for the Low Countries. Presumably after receiving his instructions from Cobham, John Leveson wrote to the justices in the lathe of Sutton at Hove, telling them to draft fifty-four men – twenty-four completely furnished, with four halberds, twelve muskets and fourteen calivers. Leveson made all the detailed decisions, and Cobham was not involved. On 31 January, the council informed Kent that they must now send 200 men instead of the previously stated 150, half of them from the trained bands. Cobham did get involved at this point, saying that coats for the recruits should be bought in London since there was more choice and they were less expensive. Two months later, the deputies had questions to be resolved concerning the rate and distribution of coat-and-conduct money. As was the case with Burghley, the deputies referred to Cobham when they had a problem or needed official sanction. They wanted him to approve their ideas, and the men were indentured on 3 April, so the levy was a success.

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49 S.R.O. D/593/S/4/12/1; H.M.C. Savile Foljambe MSS, pp. 45-46.
51 Ibid., D/593/S/4/11/6 (iii-v, viii, ix-x).
The following February Cobham reacted quickly to a call to levy 270 men for Dieppe, sending the orders to his deputies on the same day and ordering fifty-four men from each lathe. They were to be ready in just five days, so to save time, men from the trained bands were used. The men must have been raised on time, because Cobham complained about some of them on 2 March, saying the bands were badly furnished – 'thear wilbe found neither good armour nor shot' – and they were trained 'onlie in name'. But Cobham did show some local bias, saying the fault was not so much with the men, but with their arms, 'which might be excused in regarded the countrie could afford no better'. A dispute over who was responsible for the ill-armed men erupted with Thomas Willoughby saying a captain Johnson had received the men 'without any dislike at all', and then complained afterwards, even though the men were as sufficient as any in the country.\textsuperscript{52} No matter who was at fault, the levy gave nobody in Kent any credit.

There was another levy in October 1592, and this time Cobham took five days to inform his deputies to prepare fifty men for Brittany. Again, Leveson saw to the details – ordering ten men to be taken from each lathe, eight pence a day conduct money and that Sitingbourne would be the rendezvous point.\textsuperscript{53} There were no complaints about this levy despite Cobham's slow reaction. With the exception of a few shortcomings, as in the case of the poorly armed men in March 1592, men were consistently raised in Kent under Cobham's leadership. Most of the credit must go to the deputies and those directly involved, though Cobham was involved at times. The deputies were capable of functioning without a lieutenant – a fact they proved by

\textsuperscript{52} S.R.O. D 593/S/4/22 (xix-xxv).

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., D/593/S/4/22 (xxxi-xxxiv).
successfully completing three levies in between the time of Cobham’s death in March 1597 and the appointment of son, Henry, eleventh Lord Cobham, in October 1597.\textsuperscript{54} There were to be no more levies until late 1598.

On balance, Kent was not much different from those counties headed by distant, absentee lieutenants. Cobham was praised by the council and did contribute to the musters and levies, as did Shrewsbury, but it was still the deputies who were key, and there seems to have been no loss in efficiency in his absence.\textsuperscript{55} Kent was no more or less proficient in its musters and levies than were Burghley’s counties. Perhaps having a military background was helpful.

Charles Howard, second Lord Howard of Effingham, had such a military background, being the Lord High Admiral and having helped defeat the 1588 Armada. He served as the lieutenant of Surrey and co-lieutenant of Sussex from 1585 to 1624. It is Surrey, in which he held sole command, that will be discussed here.

A relatively prosperous shire, the pleas of poverty started early, there is a document from 1584 arguing that Surrey should not be charged with many horse because it was one of the ‘leaste shires in England’ and was not suitable for raising horses as well as the popular claim that it was the ‘most charged’ county in the country. Despite such attitudes, the forces would grow from 1,000 men, 200 of which were trained, in 1584 to over 2,000 trained men in 1591.\textsuperscript{56} Though he possessed extensive military knowledge, Howard largely left the musters to his deputies. As

\textsuperscript{54} A.P.C. 1597, p. 301; B.L. Salisbury MS 50, f. 109; S.R.O. D/593/S/4/10/36; D/593/S/4/46/3; Sainty, \textit{Lieutenants of Counties}, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{55} P.R.O. State Papers, 12/259/8: On 8 June 1596, the council addressed a letter to Cobham saying ‘we have long had proof of your faithful service, as Lieutenant of Kent, and Warden of the Cinque Ports, by you continual directions to your deputy lieutenants, and your lieutenant of Dover Castle, for mustering, furnishing, and the training of horse and foot’.
noted earlier, he was not above slackness, as in the case of his failure to have the powder and match certified in the spring of 1586. But, like Cobham, and to an extent, Shrewsbury, Howard did become involved in some of the particulars, telling his deputies when a muster would take place and appointing captains.

The county was mustered consistently, but there is no reason to believe that Howard ever viewed any of the men personally. The county successfully mustered in 1588 and 1589, though only £1,625 of the ordered £2,000 for the Armada loan was collected; perhaps the county's quota was lowered. In February 1590, the town of Southwarke claimed to be overburdened and the council ordered a delay in musters until it could be found out whether or not this was true. Howard said he would investigate the matter, but what he found is unknown, although a general muster was ordered for everyone, including Surrey, on 31 August 1590. The shire certified on 29 October, not quite achieving the ordered deadline of mid-October. It was a better showing than the following year when Surrey was listed as failing to have certified at all. In March 1592, a muster was ordered, and there is no record of any protests from the council, so in this instance, the muster may have been carried out despite the fact that there is no certificate.

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57 L.D.C.C. Documents 38-39; Also see pp. 64-65.

58 L.D.C.C. Document 43.


As was the case almost everywhere, the county did not muster again until August 1595, and it did so again the following two years without incident.\textsuperscript{61} It is unlikely that Howard did any more than pass on orders, though he could have been involved, he was pre-occupied with naval matters and at sea on the Cadiz operation for part of 1596. But his deputies, despite the omission of 1591, were capable of mustering without him.\textsuperscript{62} Howard had more military knowledge and was familiar with Surrey, but there is no real difference in the musters between his charges and those of Burghley.

The levies were quite similar – Howard had little involvement with the procedure that mainly sent men to France and the Low Countries. There was a levy for the Low Countries in 1585, and the trained bands were not to be used, instead, the council ordered vagrants and ‘masterless men’ to be rounded up and shipped off. It took Howard five days to respond. But he relayed the orders to his deputies, who completed the task.\textsuperscript{63}

It was another two years before Surrey was called upon again, this time 150 men were sent to the Low Countries, the council again banning the use of trained men and ordering the deputies to make the choice of troops. In December 1587, 500 foot and fifty horsemen were levied for defence, the county’s largest undertaking up until that time. Howard did share his knowledge in May 1588 during defence preparations, saying that a certain Mr. Evelin should be discharged as a captain because he was a


\textsuperscript{62} Dictionary of National Biography, vol. xxviii, p. 3; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/125; 240/71; 255/125; 261/51: Sussex, in which Howard was co-lieutenant with a military novice, Lord Buckhurst, was late mustering in 1591 and 1592 whilst Surrey was late in doing so in 1588, 1591, 1592 and 1595.

\textsuperscript{63} L.D.C.C. Documents 32, 24, 35.
better maker of gunpowder than a leader of men. In reaction to the Armada, Surrey sent 1,500 infantry and 106 horse to London and Brentwood, Essex.64 The council had no comment on these levies, which took place in July while Howard was at sea.

In the early 1590s, Surrey continued to provide men for the continent without any hint of protest or intervention by the council. Then there were two massive defence levies in 1595 and 1596, which involved readying 6,000 and 3,000 men respectively. Finally, after sending more recruits to France and Ireland, another 6,000 men were prepared for defence in February 1598.65 Again there is no indication that the council was ever dissatisfied.

Howard was a career military professional, but it made little or no difference in the mustering and levying of troops in Surrey. His record is not substantially different from Burghley’s, there was a late muster, but on the whole, as with Burghley’s counties, the Surrey militia performed well. Though Howard may have been knowledgeable about the shire and occasionally gave more detailed instructions, there is no real difference between Surrey and Burghley’s counties or evidence that the Lord Admiral regularly involved himself with the militia.

Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, was also a military man – a soldier who had commanded armies. He also had few ties to the counties under his lieutenancy – Norfolk and Suffolk. His martial knowledge and lack of local prejudice could have had a positive impact on the musters and levies. The first recorded muster return under Hunsdon took place in October 1587 in Norfolk. Deputies Edward Clere and

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64 A.P.C. 1587-88, pp. 118, 169, 171, 195, 297; L.D.C.C. Documents 52, 72; H.M.C. Foljambe MSS vol. i, pp. 45, 48, 57; Also see p. 65.

William Heydon declared the shire’s forces to be ready and certified and identified the most likely landing places an invader might use. Curiously, they had some queries for the council concerning fortifications and the supply of ordinance at Lynn and Yarmouth as well as various other places on the coast.\textsuperscript{66} It seems they would have asked the lieutenant such questions and he would have either answered them or passed them on to the council himself. But one gets the impression the deputies bypassed Hunsdon and went straight to the council. The following spring, both Norfolk and Suffolk were late in sending their returns, though they eventually did certify.\textsuperscript{67} Neither county is listed as deficient for 1589, yet there were complications in the 1590s. In a letter dated 28 February 1592, Norfolk is listed among those counties, which had not certified its musters since 1590. Suffolk had certified, and Norfolk eventually sent in its return for 1591 on 25 March 1592.\textsuperscript{68}

Both were compliant in the general muster of 1595, and during that year there was a muster of horse in which Suffolk had no defaults and Norfolk only one. Burghley’s counties, with the exception of Lincolnshire, which had no defects, did not perform nearly as well. Essex had thirteen defects and Hertfordshire twelve. Yet the lieutenants involved probably had little, if any, impact on the performance of their charges. Of the fifteen counties listed, eleven had lieutenants and four did not, but there is no correlation between lieutenants and enhanced efficiency. The four counties headed by commissions – Buckinghamshire, Middlesex, Northamptonshire and

\textsuperscript{66} P.R.O. State Papers, 12/204/38.

\textsuperscript{67} P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/125; 12/241/71; B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236; Also see appendix ix.

Nottinghamshire — had only thirteen defects in total, while seven counties with lieutenants had a total of fifty-six defaults. 69

In June 1596, probably in response to orders from the previous March, Norfolk had a muster and 4,000 men were certified, as follows: 1,395 corslets (piques), 799 muskets, 1,421 calivers and fifty-nine haliberds. Deputies Arthur Heveningham and John Peyton wrote, ‘His Lordship’s [Hunsdon] directions in 1588 were that only 2,000 men should be trained and the rest merely enrolled’. Saying that groups of 400 to 600 men were too large for a single captain to command, the deputies’ plan was to increase the number of companies from seven to thirty-three by making them smaller, an idea A. Hassell Smith claims was influenced by Heveningham’s desire to satisfy some lesser gentry and military professionals at the expense of the county magnates. The plan, which made sense militarily, had Hunsdon’s backing, but he died on 23 July 1596, and opponents of the reforms gained seats on the muster commission and effectively killed the idea in 1599. 70 Thus it can be said that Hunsdon’s greatest influence on the militia was not on the musters, which he had little to do with, but on the size of the units within the bands. As long as he lived, the planned reduction of companies could move forward, but his death effectively ended any chance of its implementation.

The new Norfolk muster commission, headed by Arthur Heveningham, John Preston, Edward Clere, Robert Southwell and Nathaniel Bacon, received notice in January 1597 to finish their certificates so another muster must have been ordered in

69 B.L. Royal MS 7c16, fos. 259-267; Also see appendix x.

70 A.P.C. 1595-96, p. 304; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. vi, pp. 222-23; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 28; Smith, County and Court, pp. 287-89.
That the muster was late was nothing new – certification had been late before under Hunsdon, as they at times were under Burghley. As was the case in Surrey with Howard, Hunsdon’s military background made no real difference in the musters.

Norfolk and Suffolk were rated almost equally for troops levied during Hunsdon’s tenure. They each sent 135 men to the Low Countries in 1587,72 and the Armada levies of 1588 provide an insight into the workings of the militias. Both counties were late in certifying, and on 7 June 1588, the council sent the deputies of both shires a letter expressing its dissatisfaction with their levies, saying they did not supply all the fortifications required. Hunsdon was not mentioned – an indication of who was held responsible when things went wrong as well as who actually oversaw the procedure. The very fact that the council was writing to the deputies directly is testimony to their importance. Nevertheless, each county was required to deliver 3,000 troops to the Tilbury camp. On 16 July, orders were set down for Norfolk at Norwich – every hundred was to make provision for calivers, match, and bullets for which the deputies would collect the charge. It is not clear if Hunsdon was involved in the process, but he was commanding the army protecting the Queen’s person, so it is unlikely he had any involvement.73

The deputies undertook the task, but apparently it was not without corruption. In November 1588, the council complained to the Earl of Bath, lieutenant of Devon,

71 A.P.C. 1596-97, pp. 51-53, 388, 411-12; A.P.C. 1597, pp. 154-55: There was some jurisdictional disputes in Norfolk. A letter from the council dated 29 May 1597 rebukes the commissioners for trying to interfere with the mustering of men in the liberties of Christ Church Cathedral in Norwich. Sir Christopher Heydon was High Steward of those liberties and had the lawful right to oversee the mustering of men within his jurisdiction. In their defence, the commissioners were mustering the entire county as they had been ordered to do.

72 A.P.C. 1587-88, p. 118; Also see appendix vii; A.P.C. 1597-98, pp. 307, 483-84: The Suffolk commission was led by Phillip Parker, Robert Jermayne, John Higham and Anthony Wingfield.

73 A.P.C. 1587-88, p. 118; B.L. Sloane MS 835, f. 1b; B.L. King’s MS 265, f. 264, p. 268; Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth, p. 465.
that money for training soldiers had been collected and that in some parishes ‘there
hath ben money exacted and never a souldiour trained . . . yt is thought farre greater
sommes have ben gathered than have ben imployed and disbursed in that service’, and
that great abuses were committed in the levying of 2,000 troops the previous August.
Offenders were to be punished, and the lieutenant was to assign someone to
investigate the matter. It also stated that a like letter had been sent to Hunsdon
concerning Norfolk.74 There is no record of any deputies being disciplined for any
violations, though there was an inquiry into the collection and disbursement of county
funds. In January 1589, the chief constables were told to find out how much money
had been collected since 24 September 1587 and for what purpose.75 A document
from 24 March 1589 lists twenty-seven matters to be accounted for, from wages for
soldiers to money for armour, ammunition and clothing as well as an inquest into
money taken by captains for discharging men. All the justices were to give an account
of the money they collected. The results of the inquiry are not known, but it was not
be the last charge of corruption levelled against Norfolk.

On 20 November 1594 the council wrote directly to the justices in Norfolk
about an inquest into money collected for levies, saying, ‘divers sommes so collected
doe yet remayne in the handes of such as had authoritie to collecte the same’. The
inquiry was completed by January 1595, and it showed widespread corruption. In
1590, 201 soldiers were supposed to have been sent out of the county, yet in reality,
there were only 182, meaning that the shire was charged for nineteen more men than it
should have been. In 1591, Norfolk was charged conduct money for 147 men instead

74 A.P.C. 1588, pp. 352-53.
75 Baker and Smith, eds., Papers of Nathaniel Bacon, pp. 63-65, 78-79.
of the actual 135 that were deployed. The greatest abuses took place in 1594, when conduct money was collected for 242 men, but only '130 & odd persons' were delivered, and the rest were either discharged or ran away. Also, 'men of good sort' were 'discharged underhande' and others taken, who had to be apparelled 'to the extra ordinary charge of the contrey'. Yet no deputies were punished and nothing changed, even after the council commented that 'many there are backward in the performance of their dutie' in May 1596.

Before the end of July 1596, Hunsdon was dead. Neither county received a new lieutenant, and the muster commissions readied 6,000 men in Norfolk and 5,000 in Suffolk as well as 150 each for France. After a defensive levy in May 1597, both again were implicated in abuses similar to the previous ones: 'taking summes of money or other compasiciones of diverse persons to keepe them from being imprest and in changing or dismissing others for bribes that were leayved.' Coupled with the continuing ship money controversy in Suffolk, in which two deputies – Sir Nicholas Bacon and Sir Robert Jermyn – were called before the council to answer questions that they had acted contrary to the Crown's wishes, there was much controversy, but that was not a new development. Things had been the same under Hunsdon.

The two lieutenants with the most military expertise – Howard and Hunsdon – were not much different from military novices like Burghley and Hatton in their dealings with their militias. Hunsdon's was quite corrupt, though his situation certainly was not unique. The deputies, for better or worse, were the ones doing the

76 Ibid., pp. 281-84, 305-07.

77 A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 404-05.

real work. Hunsdon's lack of sympathy for local interests manifested itself in his support of the plan to create smaller companies in Norfolk, but his disregard did not make the musters or levies any more effective.

The northern county of Lancaster was under the leadership of Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby, from July 1585 until September 1593, continuing the Stanley dynasty in Lancashire and Cheshire (where he was also lieutenant). The family dominated the lieutenancy whenever it was issued between 1551 and 1640.79 Lancashire was poor, ranking thirty-sixth in wealth, as well as remote, making it resistant to change. Christopher Haigh comments that it still retained feudal tendencies in the 1590s as wardships were still being sold and bastard feudalism persisted. This sparsely populated shire was ruled by a small gentry class from which the deputies, which included John Byron, Richard Sherborn and Richard Molyneux, were chosen, and its proximity to Ireland meant it that was to be the main destination of its recruits.80

Lord Derby, like Burghley and many of other lieutenants, was also a privy councillor and an active member of the Council of the North,81 so he was also a figurehead lieutenant who was not involved in musters in any way other than ordering them, and at times the council sent instructions straight to the deputies, a fact that annoyed Derby and got Henry Molyneux briefly imprisoned in 1593. Apparently,


81 D.N.B. vol. liv, p. 70.
Molyneux was charged in Star Chamber with keeping council letters at his house and not sharing them with Derby as he had been instructed. He apologised to the council in May 1593, saying ‘I wil by al meanes endeavour my self here after in al my accions to deserve the good wil, opinion and favor of the said Earl’. He returned and served for many years to come,\(^8\) and the entire episode is an example of the importance of the deputies and the potential for lieutenants to be marginalised.

Lancashire’s militia grew throughout the first half of Elizabeth’s reign, from just under 4,000 men in 1560 to 6,000 (3,600 of them armed) in 1575. By 1591, there were 7,655 able men listed for the county, so the forces were growing with the increase in military activity during Elizabeth’s latter years.\(^9\) There is no evidence that the county was ever late in certifying under Derby in 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590 or 1591,\(^1\) a commendable record, but probably one that has more to do with the men in the county than an often absent lieutenant, because there is also no evidence that Derby had much input.

It was much the same situation for the levies. Being in the north-west, Lancashire was not obliged to send men south in anticipation of an invasion, but to stay in readiness in case of Scottish intervention. From 1585 until Derby’s death in September 1593, levies were infrequent – occurring in 1586, 1588 and 1590. There were three in all; all of them for Ireland, for a total, after adjusting for dead pays, of


\(^9\) J. Harland, ed., *The Lancashire Lieutenancy Under the Tudors and Stuarts* (Chetham Society, vol. xlix, 1859) pp. 21, 57; Also see appendix ix.

270 men. Again, there is no record of any complaints about lateness or the quality of the men recruited. But the levies were infrequent and it appears that Derby had nothing to do with them. He was much in the same mould of Hatton – he let his deputies do all the important militia work.

After Derby’s death, his son, Fernando, succeeded him as earl, but he died in April 1594, which is most likely the reason there was a break in the lieutenancy until William Stanley, sixth Earl of Derby, was appointed in 1607. The muster commission was responsible for the militia for the rest of Elizabeth’s reign. On 20 August 1595, the council ordered a muster for Lancashire and commented that since some counties did not have lieutenants, ‘her majesty hathe this present years thought convneiente to committee suche charge to you here Sheriffe [Thomas Talbot] as her principall officer and certayne other persons of speciall truste and knowledge in that countie to bee executed so they are made responsible for the Duties formerly held by the Lieutenant’. Besides Talbot, the high sheriff, the commission consisted of former deputy Byron, as well as Molyneux and Richard and Ralphe Ashton. The muster was to be completed by 20 September. On 17 September, Talbot wrote to the council saying he had ordered the muster of all trained soldiers, saying that people had to travel great distances to Wigan, where the view took place. Also, the muster master, a captain Lathone, was not pleased with his pay – three shillings per diem – and Talbot wanted the council to tell him ‘what would content him’. On 26 September the council responded that all able-bodied men were to be viewed, not just the trained bands, and that Lathone required ‘better satisfaction unto him’, without mentioning a

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85 Harland, ed., *Lancashire Lieutenancy*, pp. 174-75, 199-200, 212-14, 226-34; For more on the vacant lieutenancy of Lancashire, see Chapter VI.

So the council assumed the role a lieutenant like Burghley or Cobham had – an arbitrator of disputes and an authority figure who was asked the occasional question. By mid-October, the horse bands, which previously had been difficult to muster, were certified. On 4 November, the foot were also complete; 3,263 of them were furnished, 600 trained and 3,200 unfurnished. Though there were delays, part of that can probably be accounted for by the fact that the forces had not been viewed for years until then, and some of the trained soldiers had died or moved out of the county.

In January 1596, the council granted the ‘sheriffe for the tyme beinge’, instead of a specific person, the authority to oversee musters and levies so there would be no confusion, as they doubted whether the ‘new sheriffe for this presente yeare have lyke authoritie for the execution of the said service by reason that the former sheriffe was mentioned by name’. The high sheriff, whoever held the office at the time, was the head of the muster commission. As in other counties, on 21 March 1596 Lancashire was again ordered to muster. The council’s letter stated they understood that the defects had largely been supplied but that poor weather had prevented proper training, which was to take place later, and certification was to be completed by 31 May. A month later, specific orders stated that each band was to train twice in May as four separate units and then once together. Marginally late, on 1 June, Richard Molyneux informed the council that the defects were supplied.

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87 B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 1-5.
88 Ibid., fos. 7-8, 16-17, 23-24.
89 Ibid., f. 26.
90 Ibid., fos. 27, 30-32, A.P.C. 1595-96, p. 305.
After the successful spring muster, in November 1596, forces were to be readied and certified in response to another invasion threat from Spain. On 30 December the commission wrote to the council saying the bands had been weakened by death and sickness and that those responsible for providing a horse had not done so because of shortness of time, but they hoped to quickly redress the problem, having already warned the offenders. How effective it was is not known, but these problems were quite common at that time for counties with and without lieutenants.

The levies were much the same, between October 1594 and June 1598. Lancashire sent four contingents to Ireland totalling almost 400 men. In addition, 200 were raised for the Earl of Essex’s Portuguese expedition in the spring of 1596. There were no objections to the levies, and the last two in 1597 and 1598 were especially efficient. On 9 April 1597, the council told the Lancashire commission to provide fifty-six soldiers for Ireland, and less than a month later, on 7 May, the men were on their way to Chester. On 14 July 1598, 200 troops of good quality, half armed with shot, were prepared and sent out the county in less than a month. Derby’s absence is not noticeable for musters or levies. The muster commission composed largely of men who had served as deputies, just continued to do as they had done before.

The lack of a lieutenant had no noticeable effect in Lancashire, as was the case in many places where the office was occupied by a largely distant, uninvolved figure. But Cambridgeshire’s resident lieutenant, Lord Roger North, was more aware of local conditions. At first glance, this appears to have made little difference on the musters, because Cambridgeshire was not properly certified in April 1588. On 9 May North

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91 B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 37-38.

told the council that the shire was badly furnished with armour and munitions, but that
he would see the defects made good. It must be pointed out that North was only
formally re-appointed as lieutenant on 8 April of that year, so the county’s unreadiness
cannot be blamed on him. As already mentioned, North, at his own cost, provided for
thirty lances and twenty petronells, and on 24 June he promised to have the bands
certified by 1 July. Thus, on 2 July, he sent the completed certificate to the council –
1,000 armed men, over half of whom had firearms.93

There are no records for the 1589 and 1590 musters pertaining to
Cambridgeshire, but there are also no complaints. In 1591 the county mustered on
time and is listed as having sent in a perfect certificate by the end of February 1592, as
the council told North that he had until March to certify the quantity of powder and
match.94

The next muster was ordered on 21 May 1595 and completed by that October,
the council calling Cambridgeshire’s numbers ‘compleat and furnished’. Despite
Lindsey Boynton’s claims, the shire was not deficient in 1596. The council stated on
9 May of that year that it had received the certificates from North ‘wherin your
Lordship is so farr from having erred anie whit from our meanings . . . commend your
Lordship’s great diligence in her Majesty’s service’.95

93 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/125; C.S.P.D. 1581-90, pp. 482-83, 497; Sainty, Lieutenants of
Counties, p. 13; B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236; Also see p. 73. It should be noted that Huntingdonshire,
which has been mentioned by some as an example of a county with a non-councillor and local
lieutenant, John St. John, was also deficient in April 1588.

again, Huntingdonshire was listed in State Papers 12/240/129 and 12/241/71 as not having certified in
1591 or 1592 respectively.

95 Bourgeois, Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp. 50-51; A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 30, 379-80;
Boynton, Elizabethan Militia, pp. 173-74: Boynton most likely got his information from State Papers
12/261/58, which lists Cambridgeshire as not having certified in 1596.
Two years later, on 19 March 1598, new musters were called for in reaction to an invasion scare, and 500 trained men were to be available to assist Norfolk and Suffolk if any landings took place in East Anglia. Curiously, North did not tell his deputies until 28 March, meaning a nine-day delay, which is very odd under the circumstances. But, his letter included details; it listed the locations and dates at which the various bands were to muster. These orders were passed on from the deputies to the captains of bands on 3 April, and by 7 May the deputies reported to North that the levies were completed.96

The musters in Cambridgeshire from 1588 to 1598 were very successful and some of the credit must go to Lord North. The deputies did the work, but unlike Burghley, North provided details and was more personally involved. A local lieutenant does not always mean better efficiency, as shown in Huntingdonshire, which under lieutenant Lord St. John, was consistently negligent in its musters, but North, though not perfect, was diligent throughout his tenure and his county’s performance on musters is certainly among the best.97

Levies were repeatedly performed on time during North’s lieutenancy. The first levy was defensive, 700 of the 1,000 men of the trained bands were sent out of the county during the 1588 Armada crisis.98 Following this apparently effective levy, men were shipped to France and the Low Countries in 1591 without incident. The following year four out of fifty recruits for Brittany ran away, but a total of sixty-three men deserted out of the 600 raised in all counties, so Cambridgeshire’s situation was


97 P.R.O. State Papers, 12/209/125; 12/240/129; 12/255/125; 12/241/71: Huntingdonshire is listed as not having mustered in 1588, 1591, 1593 as well as 1595 and 1596.

not out of the ordinary. A levy in which there was genuine slackness occurred in
February 1593, when only forty-nine troops were put forth for Brittany instead of the
required fifty, ten of which were insufficient. Other counties – Bedfordshire,
Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Berkshire and Burghley’s Hertfordshire, had as many
or more deficiencies, but this was a legitimately poor levy.99

An Irish levy during the summer of 1595 provides a good example of the
process in Cambridgeshire. On 14 June, the council gave North details of the levy;
fifty men were called for, half of them armed with shot and the rest with corsets and
pikes. On that same day, North sent instructions to his deputies, telling them to
deliver warrants to the justices of the peace. He also told them to take eleven footmen
out of the Isle of Ely, eleven out of the east of the shire and seventeen out of the
Westside, a degree of management certainly not seen from Burghley or other
figurehead lieutenants. North had consolidated the county from four divisions into
two areas of seven hundreds each, further testimony to his more personal brand of
leadership. On 18 June, deputies from the Isle of Ely called for the eleven men to be
ready by 2 July, and the troops were to be of some quality, not vagrants. The entire
contingent of forty men was indentured on 30 June.100 That same day, the Queen
ordered fifty-four more men to be prepared for Ireland. That following November the
charge was renewed and North informed his deputies of this fact two days later,
telling them that the men should be ‘armed out of my storehouse’ and that ‘I nowe
thincke I will have to conduct the souldiers to Chester’.101 Whether or not he actually

99 A.P.C. 1590-91, pp. 206, 248, 363; 1591, p. 221; 1592, pp. 135, 213-15; 1592-93, pp. 14-
16, 65; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/244/38.

100 B.L. Harleian MS 6599, fos. 1-4; Bourgeois, ed., Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp. 50-59;

acted as conductor is unknown, but it is extraordinary when compared with other lieutenants, most of whom never even attended a muster.

A further Irish levy was called for on 10 September 1596, and two days later North instructed his deputies on choosing the forty-seven soldiers. Fourteen were to be taken from the Eastside, twelve from the west and thirteen from the Isle of Ely; though that comes to only thirty-nine, he must have made an error, because a letter from 18 September shows the Westside responsible for twenty men and Isle of Ely for thirteen, which along with the east’s fourteen men makes forty-seven. Still, he again rated the levy and made decisions a deputy would have been responsible for under Burghley, and the levy was completed by 23 September.102 North was equally specific in his orders for preparations against a possible invasion in the autumn of 1596, telling his deputies that Gyles Arkenstall should be captain of the footbands in the Isle of Ely, saying ‘consideringe the tyme of the yere I thincke it convenient yu trust the justices of the Isle with Giles Arkenstall to muster the foote, to arraie them and have them readie’. He also dictated the proportion of powder, bullet and match, deciding how much money should be collected for each division of the shire.103 The following spring, North informed his deputies of a defensive levy of one-hundred soldiers one day after he had received his own orders from the council. Again, he was precise, saying how many soldiers should be taken out of each company. On 30 May 1597, those one-hundred soldiers were ordered to be at London by 10 June for foreign service, most likely as part of Essex’s Ferrol expedition. In fact, the Cambridgeshire troops were ready by 6 June.104

102 Ibid., pp. 69, 71-73.
103 Ibid., pp. 81-82, 89-90.
All told, North’s Cambridgeshire consistently levied men promptly, and overwhelmingly, they appear to have been of good quality as the council had very few criticisms. North gave valuable instructions; he did not just pass along orders to his deputies. He is without a doubt, the most involved lieutenant included in this study, and perhaps the most effective as well.

Of the absentee lieutenants, none of them seems to stand out as more effective than Burghley. Hatton, Shrewsbury, and Derby never attended musters or levies, and though Shrewsbury was a bit more involved at times, Burghley’s record stands up to all of them. Cobham, and Shrewsbury, did contribute to the proceedings, though there is no evident loss of efficiency in his absence, mirroring McGurk’s opinion that lieutenants were becoming increasingly distant figures during the 1590s. The two military commanders – Howard and Hunsdon – had little impact on efficiency. Norfolk and Suffolk were repeatedly late in certifying during Hunsdon’s tenure and Surrey did not suffer during Howard’s time at sea. North, the local peer, had the greatest impact on his charges in the time up until Burghley’s death in 1598. Though certainly not perfect, his county responded well to his personal style of command. But Burghley’s lieutenancy, when judged against the bulk of his peers, has to be assessed favourably. He did what was asked of him and by and large his shires did as they were told. It remains to be seen how they performed during the rest of the Queen’s reign.

104 Ibid., pp. 95-97, 103-07.

Chapter VI:

Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire after Burghley, 1598-1603

Lord Burghley’s death in August 1598 marked the end of the lieutenancy for Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire until the reign of James I. Simply stated, Burghley had no immediate successor in those counties. Instead the commissioners for musters, gentlemen assigned to oversee the militia, were in command. The last years of the Elizabethan age were far from peaceful – a major rebellion took place in Ireland and invasion by Spain was still a real threat. So militias were certainly active, but as in the case of Burghley, lieutenants were not always replaced when they died. There seems to be no obvious reason why, but the possibility that Elizabeth’s government thought them unnecessary given the availability of deputy lieutenants will be explored. Also, family dynasties and location cannot be ignored when speculating on the reasons a lieutenant was or was not appointed. Commissions of musters will also briefly be discussed before examining each of the three shires that were under Burghley’s leadership. The aim is to find out whether or not there is a substantial difference in the musters and levies during and after Burghley’s lieutenancy. Such a comparison will help us judge the degree of Burghley’s impact on militia administration, and that of the institution of the lieutenancy as a whole.

After Burghley’s death there would be no new appointments to the lieutenancy in Essex and Lincolnshire until the summer of 1603. Hertfordshire would not have one again until 1605. This was in no way unusual, because eighteen counties did not have lieutenants at the time of Elizabeth’s death in March 1603.1 Instead, the

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1 Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 20, 23, 26; Also see appendix xi.
commissions of musters, which were composed of the former deputies and other leading gentlemen of the county, were responsible for the militias.

G. S. Thomson has stressed the value of the deputy lieutenants, saying how the council had at times bypassed the lieutenants and communicated directly with them. It is her opinion that as time went on, the idea of lieutenants fell out of favour: 'The Crown of set purpose did not issue new Commissions of Lieutenancy, but reverted to the system of Commissions of Musters'. Using a council letter from 2 December 1596, in which the counties of Middlesex, Buckinghamshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Chester, Lancaster, Yorkshire, Cumberland, Northumberland, Durham, Leicestershire and Rutland are mentioned as having had their lieutenants die, Thomson comments 'very few, if any' of these counties had lieutenants again. In fact, lieutenants were commissioned in Yorkshire, Leicestershire and Rutland before the end of the century, but Thomson is correct in her assertion that most of these shires did not again have lieutenants under Elizabeth. She goes on to conclude that the reason many lieutenants were not replaced was not because of a lack of military activity or that levies were exceedingly efficient, but that the Crown had no particular fondness for the lieutenancy when it could do without it.² Though the office remained a prestigious one despite, or possibly partially due, to the fact that it was not always renewed, deputies had become the most important figures in the county for actually seeing that the militia's work was done. As has been shown in previous chapters, many lieutenants were away from their districts and did not have time to do the work themselves. Thomson has even said that in letters referring to

² Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 69-71; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 26, 37: George Hastings, fourth Earl of Huntingdon, was appointed lieutenant of Leicestershire and Rutland on 2 October 1596 Thomas Cecil, second Lord Burghley, was named lieutenant of Yorkshire on 10 August 1599.
county administration, that the lieutenant 'tends to sink somewhere into the background, and the Deputy-Lieutenants come more and more into the foreground'.

Though this was by no means always the case, it largely holds true for lieutenants like Burghley and Hatton, and Lindsey Boynton agrees, saying the lieutenants had become remote figureheads and that many deputies had acquired administrative expertise.

The deputies were paramount in organisation, while the muster masters, captains and the junior officers were responsible for training.

In discussing Northamptonshire, Wake and Goring state that the establishment of the Hatton lieutenancy in September 1586 did not greatly change the way the militia was administered. Deputies Knightley and Montagu had been muster commissioners and would be again after Hatton’s death in November 1591. Thomson claims that the deputies offered the government an alternative to commissioning lieutenants, something for which it had no special affection. Agreeing with Thomson, Wake and Goring call the decision of non-replacement ‘in line with the general policy of the Crown’, saying Elizabeth had abandoned the policy of appointing lieutenants over each county, and that the ‘experiment’ of the lieutenants might not have been an unqualified success. They conclude that the Crown was returning control to the leading local families.

But many lieutenants were from large land-owning families in their districts. Even distant ones such as Burghley and Hatton owned land in the counties of their lieutenancy. Lord Hunsdon, who held no land in Norfolk at all, was an exception.

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There were also other places, such as Cambridgeshire, with the well-chronicled local lieutenant Lord North, and Huntingdonshire, with the Lords St. John of Bletso, that had had local lieutenants for some time by the 1590s. Thomson said Elizabeth and the council might have feared that lieutenants might become too powerful and did not want them to be hereditary. Yet this is exactly what happened in some places, the Grey family dominated Bedfordshire until the Civil War, and the Knollys were pre-eminent in Berkshire. The Brydges in Gloucestershire, the Hastings in Leicestershire and the Cobhams in Kent all held lieutenancies as if by right. These were local families in command of the militias. Some, like the Cobhams, had other duties and perhaps were not as pre-occupied with the lieutenancy as others, but the fact remains they were from local families and that these lieutenancies were often replaced. For example, in 1596 George Hastings, fourth Earl of Huntingdon, replaced his father, who died that previous year, as lieutenant of Leicestershire and Rutland but not in Durham, Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmoreland or Yorkshire, where his father had also been lieutenant. Of those counties, only Yorkshire, in 1599, was placed under a lieutenant again before 1607. Leicestershire, the family's home county (which was coupled with Rutland), was the important position, and it was filled. Victor Stater has noted how the Earls of Huntingdon had used the office to perpetuate their family's interests in Leicestershire and how they came to regard it as their birthright. Other examples include the Earls of Pembroke in Somerset and Wiltshire as well as the aforementioned Howards in Surrey. Even Robert Cecil eventually

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6 Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, pp. 44-45.
7 See pp. 18-19.
8 Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, passim.
9 Ibid., pp. 15, 19, 26, 37.
succeeded his father in Hertfordshire in 1605, though that would hardly qualify as
dynastic, given that his father was the only one in his family to previously hold the
office. 10 By keeping lieutenancies within the families, the Crown was keeping them
content and reducing the chances of unrest since the position came to be expected.

Sometimes dynasties were not continued, as was the case in Kent, where
Henry Brooke, eleventh Lord Cobham, was imprisoned for his involvement in the
Main Plot in 1603. Besides being disgraced, he was imprisoned in the Tower. In the
case of Fernando Stanley, Henry Stanley's son and the fifth Earl of Derby, in Chester
and Lancashire, he died shortly after his father. His brother, William, who was born
in 1561 and therefore old enough for the position by 1593, did not replace him before
1607. William had previous military service in the Low Countries, but in 1594 he
was accused of wanting Elizabeth murdered.11 In a similar case in Derbyshire, George
Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, was replaced by his son, but not in the earl's other
counties' of Nottinghamshire and Staffordshire. Perhaps it was because Derbyshire is
close to the family seat of Sheffield Castle, but that is only conjecture. In Somerset,
the Herbert line was interrupted after the death of Henry Herbert, second Earl of
Pembroke, in 1601. His son, William, was twenty-one at the time and probably
considered too young, though he did become lieutenant of Cornwall in 1604 and

11 Complete Peerage, vol. iv, pp. 212-13; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 13-14; Bindoff,
House of Commons, 1509-1558, vol. iii, p. 372; C.S.P.D. 1591-1594, pp. 227, 435-37, 442, 475-76,
546, 548, 559: Many members of the Stanley family remained Catholic, though it is unknown if that
had anything to do with the fact that several soldiers claimed William Stanley was present when they
were offered money to assassinate the Queen. Apparently no action was taken against Stanley
concerning the allegations.
Map I: Replacement of Lieutenants 1590-1603

Key

- No vacancy
- Not replaced
- Replaced

Source: Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, passim
eventually took the same post in Somerset in 1621.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, sometimes there were interruptions, but quasi-hereditary lieutenancies were usually replaced. Though the peerage was low in number during the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, fifty-five in all, there were still candidates available for lieutenancies. In 1590 six nobles were between twenty and twenty-five-years old. Twenty-five were between twenty-five and thirty-five, and ten were between thirty-five and fifty. At the time of her death in 1603, more than half the peerage – thirty – were between thirty-five and forty-eight, and only five of them were lieutenants.\textsuperscript{13} Overall, twenty-two counties had lieutenants at the time of Elizabeth’s death in March 1603, and eighteen did not.\textsuperscript{14} Seventeen of the eighteen had been vacant for three years or more, and eight of those had had no lieutenant for over a decade.\textsuperscript{15} As Map I shows, eight counties consisting of seven commands (Oxfordshire and Berkshire were paired together) had lieutenants continuously from 1590-1603. Fifteen counties in eleven lieutenancies had vacancies that were filled from 1590 or later, and seventeen counties in thirteen commands were not replaced. This is in marked contrast to the years 1585 to 1589, when all vacancies were filled. Maybe this has something to do with reluctance on the part of the government to replace a lieutenant after the 1588 Armada crisis. It is definitely true that lieutenants were no longer always replaced. The more remote shires in the North

\textsuperscript{12} DN.B. vol. vi, p. 423; Wall, ‘Historiographical’, p. 956; Complete Peerage, vol. x, p. 412; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 15, 17, 29, 31, 32.


\textsuperscript{14} See appendix xi; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, passim.

\textsuperscript{15} Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, passim: The counties that had been vacant for three or more years were Buckinghamshire, Chester and Lancashire, Cumberland, Durham, Essex, Hertfordshire, Lincolnshire, Middlesex, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Northumberland, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Warwickshire, and Westmoreland. The eight counties with vacancies for over a decade were Buckinghamshire, Chester and Lancaster, Middlesex, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, and Warwickshire.
almost never received new lieutenants; Yorkshire is the only northern county in which a replacement was made. Conversely, all vacancies in the southern-coastal shires from Cornwall to Kent were replaced. This is probably related to the fact that any invasion would most likely happen somewhere in this area. If one looks at all the counties classified as maritime, twenty-nine in all\textsuperscript{16} in twenty-two commands, six of which – Berkshire, Cornwall, Devon, Hampshire, Surrey and Sussex – had lieutenants continuously from 1590-1603, nine of the sixteen vacancies, or fifty-six percent, were filled during those years.\textsuperscript{17} The remaining eleven inland counties were divided into ten commands, two of which – Oxfordshire and Bedfordshire– had a lieutenant throughout 1590 to 1603. Of the eight vacancies, only two, or one quarter, were filled.\textsuperscript{18} This means that overall, eleven of twenty-four commands (forty-six percent) with vacancies were given new lieutenants between 1590 and 1603. Judging from the statistics, a lieutenant may have been considered more necessary for a maritime county, which was more vulnerable to attack, especially in the south, as well as ones most likely to be called upon to provide men and arms for overseas service in Europe. One can go further and look at the southern maritime counties from Gloucestershire to the Wash. Of these fifteen counties in fourteen commands (Norfolk and Suffolk were together) only three\textsuperscript{19} were not replaced, none from the most likely landing areas

\textsuperscript{16} King, \textit{Muster Books for North and East Hertfordshire}, pp. x, xxviii: In addition to coastal counties, in December 1583 the council named Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Surrey and Wiltshire as maritime in an effort to have some soldiers available in case of invasion; also see appendix xi.

\textsuperscript{17} The seven commands not replaced are Chester and Lancashire; Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmoreland; Durham; Essex; Hertfordshire; Lincolnshire; Norfolk and Suffolk.

\textsuperscript{18} The six commands not replaced are Buckinghamshire, Middlesex, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire and Warwickshire. Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Rutland received new lieutenants.

\textsuperscript{19} Essex, Hertfordshire, Norfolk and Suffolk.
stretching from Cornwall to Kent. So there was definitely a division in replacement
between inland and maritime counties, especially between the southern maritime ones
and the rest of the country. The fact that so many lieutenants were not replaced raises
questions about their importance. Though under James I, appointments were made in
fourteen of the eighteen counties without lieutenants at the start of his reign, the
remaining four did not all have lieutenants until 1626. The fact that there were those
against the idea of lieutenants may have been a factor as well. Early in James’ reign, a
petition was given to him of ‘things grievous and offensive to the commonwealth’.
The lieutenancy was described as an office ‘thought unnecessary and inconvenient in
time of peace’, and could be better performed by the justices of the peace. Thus for
decades there were counties that were under a commission of musters rather than a
lieutenant.

The commissioners for musters were selected from among the justices of the
peace and the leading gentlemen of the county. From 1535, these appointed
commissioners oversaw musters that took place every three years, a practice, which
continued under Mary in the 1550s. In the 1550s and 1560s, the membership of the
muster commission and the bench were often identical, as John Morris says, ‘the
offices of justices of the peace, deputy-lieutenants, commissioners for musters and
commissioner for subsidies were often combined in the same person’. Early in

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20 Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 3-4, 14, 21: The four remaining counties received
lieutenants as follows: Staffordshire in 1612, Durham in 1615, Middlesex in 1617 and Nottinghamshire
in 1626. Sainty refers to sixteen counties that had been vacant at the time of Elizabeth’s death, but he
did not include Lancashire, as he should have done. With the addition of Gloucestershire, which was
temporarily vacant from November 1602 to August 1603, there were a total of eighteen counties
without lieutenants when James I took the throne.

21 P.R.O. State Papers, 14/1/68.

22 Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 132; Goring, ‘Social Change and Military Decline in
Mid-Tudor England’, p. 192; Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, p. 36; Smith, ‘Militia Rates and Militia
Elizabeth’s reign, in 1559, commissioners were called upon to take the musters since issues with France and Scotland were still ‘uncompounded’. At the same time, all justices were to be in the commission, but in each shire ‘a less number is to be chosen to be in more special charge’. In 1573, the council officially decided to entrust the militia to fewer members, based on their reputation and standing in the county as well as their military knowledge. Care was taken to select the men and getting the right number, as too few meant a heavy burden and too many might result in corruption. Though according to Boynton, it was often difficult to gather enough gentlemen to act as commissioners. This was certainly true for Huntingdonshire, where only one commissioner was in the county for a 1569 levy. In 1577, Lord Darcie complained to the council that he was unable to take a muster ‘for want of sum other Commissioners to joine with him in that service’. That same year, the council admitted that there were too few commissioners to take the musters ‘in every parte of the shiere’, and ordered all justices to assist in the process. Still, by the late 1570s, most justices had no authority on the commission and were simply to do as they were told, a similar situation that existed under a lieutenant, when only a small number of deputies were responsible for militia administration.

Indeed, after the death of a lieutenant, the deputies almost invariably served as commissioners of musters, and as noted earlier about Northamptonshire, the deputies

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had served as commissioners before Hatton’s lieutenancy.\footnote{See p. 141.} The sheriff and the ‘principall men of the county’ headed commissions, often there were no more than six men in all.\footnote{B.L. Add MS 26886, f. 2: On 20 August 1595, the council called for a muster, ordering Lancashire and all other counties without lieutenants that ‘you her sherrife as her principall officer and to certayne other persons of speciall truste and knowledge in that county . . . are made responsible for the duties formeely held by the lieutenant’; Goring and Wake, *Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Papers, 1580-1614*, p. xxxii; Bourgeois, *Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy*, p. 186; A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 155-57; A.P.C. 1597, p. 109.} The high sheriff always, at least nominally, headed the commission, and the council was eager to make it clear that the office retained the authority, not whoever was sheriff when the commission was initially issued. The council’s commissions for Kent in 1597 and Cambridgeshire in 1601 both refer to the ‘high sheriff for the tyme being’. When Lancashire had a new sheriff in January 1596, the council wrote to the commission saying since the authority granted last August was to a different, specifically named sheriff, ‘it may bee doubted whether the new sheriffe for this presente yeare have lyke authorite for the execution of the said service by reason that the former sheriffe was mentioned by name’. The council then went on to clarify that the authorisation is always for the ‘sheriffe for the tyme beinge’, not any one particular individual.\footnote{A.P.C. 1597, p. 169; Bourgeois, *Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy*, p. 186; B.L. Add MS 26886, f. 26.} The commissioners had the same authority to order musters and raise troops as lieutenants, as is stated in a Norfolk commission document for December 1597: Soldiers were to be raised, equipped ‘and all other services to be executed in the said severall counties as our said lieutenants had authoritie by theire commissions to do’.\footnote{B.L. King’s MS 265, f. 281r.} The commissions were also reissued yearly, an example being the council’s letter to the Northamptonshire commissioner in December 1596

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25 See p. 141.

26 B.L. Add MS 26886, f. 2: On 20 August 1595, the council called for a muster, ordering Lancashire and all other counties without lieutenants that ‘you her sherrife as her principall officer and to certayne other persons of speciall truste and knowledge in that county . . . are made responsible for the duties formeely held by the lieutenant’; Goring and Wake, *Northamptonshire Lieutenancy Papers, 1580-1614*, p. xxxii; Bourgeois, *Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy*, p. 186; A.P.C. 1595-96, pp. 155-57; A.P.C. 1597, p. 109.


28 B.L. King’s MS 265, f. 281r.
referring to the ‘tyme lymitted in our former letters is expiered’ and the commissioners are ordered ‘to take chardge and government as was before committed unto youe’. Similar letters of commission were issued exactly a year apart, on 2 December 1596 and 1597 for all counties without lieutenants, so they must have been on a twelve-month basis.29

The council reserved the right to appoint new members and did so periodically, as will be shown, yet the councillors would listen to the commissioners, as they did in May 1601 when the Suffolk commission successfully put forth Sir Robert Mansell to fill a vacancy.30 Confidence was shown in the Northamptonshire commission in September 1598, the council remarking that ‘wee trust so much unto your judgements as that wee holde ourselves assured you would not have speciall likinge of any person but such a one is fitt for her majesty’s service’.31 The objective is to find whether or not there was any overall significant difference in the performance of those counties with a commission and those with lieutenants. Specifically in this chapter, the goal is find if there was a substantial difference in Burghley’s former counties.

Ten days after Burghley’s death, 14 August 1598, the former Lincolnshire deputies wrote a letter to Robert Cecil asking him to be their lieutenant.32 No doubt it was an effort to maintain good relations with a powerful family, but apparently, Cecil declined their offer. So like the rest of Burghley’s former charges, Lincolnshire was

29 Wake, *Musters, Beacons, Subsidies*, p. 34; Also see appendix xii; B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 39v-40; B.L. King’s MS 265, f. 281r.

30 B.L. Egerton MS 2714, f. 140; *A.P.C. 1598-99*, p. 128; *A.P.C. 1600-01*, p. 227.


without a lieutenant. There had been concern over the decay of forces for several years at that point, and a council letter from January 1594 states that 'consideration is to be had as to what counties lack lieutenants, by death or otherwise, and Her Majesty moved to appoint others with the same authority as the former had, with note of vacant lieutenancies'. These 'others' were the muster commissioners, and the earliest evidence of a formal commission being made for Lincolnshire was on 8 May 1599, by which time Burghley had been dead a full nine months. But a levy was carried out within weeks of Burghley's demise, as on 27 August 1598 an order for 150 men for Ireland went out. On 10 September the number was reduced to one hundred, and the council's correspondence for that date names the 'sheriff for the tyme being' as well as former deputies Lord Willoughby of Parham, Sir Edward Dymoke and Sir George St. Pole as being commissioners for the musters. Three days earlier, in a letter concerning coat-and-conduct money for Lincolnshire, it said that the funds were to be raised by 'the late Deputy Lieutenants of that countie', by which they must have meant the commissioners, because the former deputies were all on the commission. In the original levy order there are complaints of neglect in the 'late leavyes' as 'idle and loose people' were chosen, many of who ran away at port. But there is no mention of Lincolnshire not fulfilling its obligations, and a letter of 12 September indicates that the soldiers were levied on time. There was also something new in this levy; the council told the shires they 'may forbeare to be at the charge to provide the coates until you have further dyreccion from us'. The men were to be given their coats at the port of embarkation. This was an effort by the government to improve efficiency by

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34 A.P.C. 1598-99, pp. 94-95, 230.

35 Ibid., p. 96.
implementing a centralised supply system.\textsuperscript{36} Two more levies took place early in 1599, 200 and one hundred men were ordered for Ireland in January and February respectively. The orders must have been carried out because on 25 March 1599 a request was made for payment of coat-and-conduct money for 300 men levied in Lincolnshire.\textsuperscript{37}

As mentioned above, the original commissioners of musters for Lincolnshire were former deputies Willoughby of Parham, Dymoke and St. Pole. The council would add others. On 25 March 1600, Sir William Wray was appointed to the commission. He was from an important local family and owned considerable estates. He had served on the bench since 1583 and was in Parliament the next year. He was also sheriff in 1594-1595 and became a knight of the shire in 1601.\textsuperscript{38} In other words, he had similar credentials to those of the deputies, and could well have been chosen as one if there had been a lieutenant. In January 1601, Lord Thomas Clinton, the future Earl of Lincoln, was named to the commission. Without a doubt, being a peer must have helped in his being chosen, though his aforementioned father, the seventeenth Earl of Lincoln, who has been described as mentally unstable and with whom Dymoke

\textsuperscript{36} Bourgeois, \textit{Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy}, pp. 27, 139-40: Cambridgeshire received instructions on 28 August 1598 to raise 40s. per man to pay for coats supplied by merchants. \textit{A.P.C. 1598-99}, p. 328: A similar order was made to eight counties concerning apparel on 4 December 1598. Complaining that many men were often 'very evil armed and so nakedly appareled as they daylie fell into sickness and infirmytie', the council told each county to send £3 per man to London for arming, clothing and conduct. Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth's Army}, pp. 99-100: Many soldiers still received poor clothing because of corrupt merchants. In the winter of 1598-99, the merchants claimed to have supplied Ireland with enough coats, but only 2,500 were sent. \textit{C.S.P.D. 1598-1601}, p. 167: There were roughly 16,000 men in Ireland at the time. The fraud was to continue well into the seventeenth century; \textit{A.P.C. 1598-99}, p. 281: In another innovation, counties were sometimes obligated to pay for the apparelling of troops levied elsewhere; \textit{A.P.C. 1601-04}, p. 77: Lincolnshire would help equip 300 recruits form outside the county in July 1601.


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{A.P.C. 1599-1600}, p. 190; Hasler, \textit{Commons, 1558-1603}, vol. iii, p. 655.
feuded, may not have been an asset. Later in 1601, the council selected several other commissioners: Valentine Browne, Robert Dallison, William Pelham and Sir John Bolls. Only Pelham seems a curious choice, since he inherited his father's substantial debts (over £9,000), yet he had been a justice of the peace since 1584 and was knight of the shire in 1597. As with the deputies, the council seemed to have carefully selected the members. The council chose the officers as well, which was the case in February 1600 when the Lord Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, in a letter addressed, like many of them, to 'Lord Willoughby of Parham and the rest of the comissioners for the muster', said that he had named Sir Thomas Mownson a colonel of the horse the previous summer and that he would remain in that role.

So it was this commission that was in charge of Lincolnshire's musters and levies during a time of which Wake and Goring say 'as the danger of invasion receded, the shires of England became increasingly neglectful of their military responsibilities, regular musters and training were abandoned'. It is true that there were few musters after Burghley's time, and in fact we know of only one, on 7 June 1601. For that muster the council ordered shorter training periods, telling lieutenants and commissioners of all counties 'wee did understande that you had omitted to view and muster them [the bands] these late yeares, looking to have expresse direction from hence', and to train as 'heere tofore yu have used, which wilbe a great charge unto the countrey and our desire is by all meanes to avoide the same'. The solution was for

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39 A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 133; Hasler, Commons, vol. i, pp. 620-21: Despite having his differences with his father, the younger Clinton took his father’s side in his feuds. In 1595 he was accused of attempting to stab Dymoke. Yet there is nothing to indicate that the two clashed on the commission of musters.


41 A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 74.
‘one or two daies training at the most for the sommer tyme’ and those with guns were to use ‘false fires’. So the council believed that performance had been substandard, and may well have reduced training, and therefore costs, due to reluctance in the shires for military service and spending. This might have been true for musters, but the Lincolnshire commission was called on regularly to prepare men for service during the last years of Elizabeth.

In early 1600, 200 men were raised in the county. They must have been readied promptly and without incident because there is an indenture for 200 men dated 20 February 1600. There were three more levies during that year, one of one hundred men for Ireland, another for nine light horse and in December, another forty-five infantry for Ireland. There is no record of any complaints from the council for the men levied, though five people that were to supply a horse are listed in default. Though that is certainly not to the county’s credit, it is comparable with other shires. Another of Burghley’s former counties, Essex, has eight men listed in default, while Norfolk, Northampton, Middlesex and Suffolk have six, five, four and three respectively. None of the counties had lieutenants but Sussex, with six defaults, and Surrey, with two, both did, leaving one to think that a lieutenant had little or no bearing on the issue. Levies continued in 1601. In April Lincolnshire sent six petronells to Ireland, but the following October, 200 more men were to be levied for that country, though the following month, nineteen were reported to have fled and the commissioners were to apprehend them. The ones that were delivered were found to

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44 H.M.C. Salisbury MSS. vol. xiv, pp. 148-49: One of those Lincolnshire men in default was Edward Dymoke.
be deficient and discharged. The council stated that there could be ‘some fault in
the conductor’, who may have let men leave for a price. Further slackness followed
in 1602. On 30 May of that year, a captain Berry wrote to Robert Cecil from Chester
telling him that 200 men expected from Lincolnshire were late and that he had sent
the ship without them and was still waiting for them to arrive. When they did arrive
is not known. This was indeed inefficient, but as will be shown, far from uncommon.

The years after Burghley’s death were busier than those from 1587 to 1598,
when the Lincolnshire militia only sent four levies overseas, one of which was only
for horses. There were cases of inefficiency then as well, such as when Burghley took
two weeks to relay the levy orders or when two of the four horses required were
substandard. Overall, eighty-two percent of the men sent out of the county for
Ireland did so under the commissioners. For overseas levies as a whole from 1587 to
1603, two-thirds of the men were levied after Burghley. Though there was less
activity in mustering the bands, that fact is countered by the eleven levies that took
place between August 1598 and November 1601. Most credit or blame must be put
on the deputies and commissioners, as they, and not Burghley, were the ones who saw
that the various tasks were completed. Basically, there was no difference in
Lincolnshire from when they had a lieutenant and when they did not.

45 A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 313; A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 242, 280, 359-60: In October 1601,
Lincolnshire was also told to prepare eighteen horses for Ireland, and one can only assume that it was
done.


47 See p. 92.

48 See appendix vii: Of those troops sent to Ireland, 1,055 of 1,284 were sent after Burghley’s
lieutenancy. For all overseas levies from 1587 to 1603, 1,055 of 1,554 were sent under the
commission.
Hertfordshire’s militia was also very active in the years after Burghley’s lieutenancy, with the former deputies taking a leading role. As in Lincolnshire, there were letters to Robert Cecil urging him to be their new lieutenant, and Henry Cocke asked him to continue the kind favours of his father. Nonetheless, Hertfordshire also received no new lieutenant and commissioners were in place by September 1598, as the high sheriff and Richard Spencer, Henry Cocke, John Brockett, Philip Butler and Arthur Capell are listed in an order rescinding a levy.

The first undertaking of the newly established commission was less than successful. Instead of sending fifty men for service in Ireland, as was originally called for in August 1598, Hertfordshire was to provide £150 to arm fifty men from elsewhere. By that November they had not paid the entire charge, and whether or not they ever actually made the whole payment is unknown. It would have been due to a general reluctance to serve, which will be discussed later, but whatever the reasons, things did not start well. The first full-fledged levy took place in January 1599 when the commissioners were told to ready one hundred men for Ireland. This was quickly followed by orders for an additional fifty more men on 18 February. Writing to Robert Cecil, Cocke suggested that carts be used to haul equipment, ‘as was twice done in your father’s time’. Cecil’s response is not available, but almost certainly Cocke mentioned Burghley to influence his thinking. This time both levies were

49 B.L. Salisbury MS 63, fos. 50, 81.

50 A.P.C. 1598-99, p. 156; C.S.P.D. 1598-1601, pp. 96, 110: In September 1598 Brockett was said to be near death, and he died the following month.

51 Ibid., pp. 96, 156, 286.

52 See Chapter VII.
carried out in an efficient and timely manner, and they were confirmed complete by mid-March. 

There was no further activity in Hertfordshire in 1599, but in March 1600 the council spoke to the commission about the evasion of burdens. They had received complaints from ‘those countyes neare to the cytte of London’, especially Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Surrey and Kent, in which ‘divers Londoners, her Majesty’s servants, and other officers of courtes, lawyers and persons of sundry sortes do withdrawe themselves and have their habytacion and dwelling, and do refuse to contribute with the rest of the inhabytantes towards those publique charges that theis times do more often give occasyon to be leavyed’. The result was that the task fell ‘very heavily on the meane inhabytantes’. Saying that some people had pretended to be privileged and exempt from charges much to the detriment of her Majesty’s service, the council decreed that ‘no such excuses of any person whatsoever, except Lords of the Parliament, that have dwellings, landes or leases in theis countyes should be admitted, but that they should contribute according to the landes or houses they hold and do use’. The council then said ‘wee have seene a very good order and discreete course sett downe by your late Lord Leiutenante, the Lord Burghley, late Lord High Treasurer of England, which in our opinions is done with so good judgement and indifferencye as ought to content all parties’, and that the ‘same should againe be renewed and duly observed’. The letter finished with the usual threat that anybody not complying would be called before the council to answer for themselves.

Thus, a great tribute was made to Burghley and his handling of a difficult situation,

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54 *A.P.C. 1599-1600*, pp. 150-51.
that of absentee landlords' contributions to the arming and training of the militia.

Burghley does not seem to have made any great efforts in this area. He simply stated in his orders of March 1590 that absentee landlords were to pay their fair share of the burden for raising troops in Hertfordshire and Essex. Perhaps his authority as lieutenant as well as one of the most powerful men in the country persuaded people to do as he said. On the other hand, there is no evidence that things had deteriorated appreciably since Burghley's time, and the council may have wanted to speak well of someone who had been one of its own. As for burdening the lesser men of the county, the next year the council instructed provost marshall Ralph Coningsby to round up the 'great nomber of loose and masterlesse men that are about the cytty of London and the confynes' and to imprison them at his discretion. Later, the mayor of London was authorised to levy 'idle and vagrant' persons for the Low Countries, so it is not beyond reason that some of those men were eventually sent abroad. At least as far as the soldiers are concerned, their quality does not seem to have increased and the burden fell on those at the bottom.

There were only two actual levies in 1600: Six light horse were sent to Ireland in June and fifteen men were wanted in December, also for Ireland. The coat-and-conduct money was paid for the fifteen men by 10 March 1601, and one can only assume that both levies were successfully carried out since there is no trace of any rebuke by the council. However, there is a listing of men by county who were deficient in providing for the light horse. Hertfordshire had five deficiencies,

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55 See p. 45.

56 A.P.C. 1600-01, pp. 164-65; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. xi, pp. 331, 441: Masterless men were also drafted in Suffolk in October 1601. The issue is further discussed in Chapter VII.

including ones by Butler, Capell and another commissioner, Rowland Lytton. The following year witnessed more activity; on 14 February 1601, 300 men from the trained bands were sent to London for defensive purposes due to the Essex rebellion. Along with bands from Essex, Buckinghamshire and Surrey, they were stationed in the suburbs guarding the Queen’s court. This would be the only time from 1598 to 1603 that Hertfordshire troops were levied for any place other than Ireland. After being called upon to supply twenty soldiers in April, three months later, as part of the new policy of spreading the onus of military spending, Hertfordshire was given the responsibility of arming fifty men from London destined for the Low Countries. The council addressed a letter to the commissioners in August informing them that the hundreds of Caisho and Dacorum (in north-east Hertfordshire) were heavily burdened in providing carriages for treasure and munitions destined for Ireland, because ‘those which have commissions to take soch carriages doe compel the said inhabitants whose cartes are take up for the service to goe from St. Albane’s unto Donstable, [Bedfordshire] where they are not being discharged and where the county officers of Bedfordshire did not have carts and horses ready to move the cargo as they should have done’. It also states that some officials were accepting money in return for releasing people from service and that such behaviour would not be tolerated. The rest of the shire was to share Caisho’s and Dacorum’s burdens in such a way that the commissioners ‘shall thincke yt reasonable they ought to be partakers’. A similar letter was sent to Bedfordshire, a county that had a lieutenant. So Bedfordshire having a lieutenant did not make any difference in this matter, and the letter was not


even addressed to the lieutenant, the Earl of Kent, but to the justices. Maybe the council thought it would get a quicker response from them.

In October 1601, sixty men, an increase from the original order of twenty-five, were demanded from Hertfordshire. The following month, just as it had twenty months earlier, the council complained of inhabitants of London who owned land in the county refusing to contribute to the militia. The council said that ‘wee lytle did expect that any person whatsoever upon any coulour or pretence would go about to be exempted herein’, and that they deplored the ‘backwardness and evill example of theis menn’. It was ordered that ‘here after no person of anie sort under the degree of a nobleman or a Privy Councellor shalbe exempted in their occasions of publique service’. Obviously, things had not improved sufficiently since the council’s first admonishment. As for the levy itself, a letter dated 15 November says that the men were levied and sent to Rochester as ordered. Things were certainly not improved when that November the county provided ten horses for Ireland, six of which were found to be insufficient. The last levy of the era, in August 1602, seems to have gone well. The twenty soldiers were certified as having been sent on their way to Bristol that same month.

Overall, 250 troops were levied in Hertfordshire for overseas duty under the commission from 1599 to 1602, along with 300 for defensive reasons. This total of 550 men is appreciably lower than the combined overseas and defensive totals of 4,166 men that were raised under Burghley. Also, 1,416 of 1,666 men sent overseas, almost eighty-five percent, were levied during the earlier time. There were also only

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60 A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 225-26, 241, 397-98; King, Muster Books, 1580-1605, p. 214: The October levy itself, at least in north-eastern Hertfordshire appears to have gone well enough. Twelve men form the area were indentured on 12 October 1601, and the document refers to ‘threescore soldyers sente out of the Countye of Hertford’.
two musters during the later years, in 1601 and 1602.\textsuperscript{62} Certainly the militia was busier during Burghley's tenure, and there were definite cases of slackness in 1600 and 1601, but as for the refusal of absentee landlords to contribute, the deputies had complained about that in 1596 as well, so the problem existed much earlier.\textsuperscript{63} However successful or not Hertfordshire was in carrying out its military obligations was largely the responsibility of Burghley's deputies, the same men that dominated the muster commission after he was gone.\textsuperscript{64} There are cases of failure to perform tasks correctly in both eras, and Cocke, Brockett, Butler and Capell were the primary men in the county throughout the period. Therefore, it is primarily to them that the credit or blame must be attributed, and not as much to Lord Burghley.

The commissioners of musters for Essex, as in Hertfordshire, were established soon after Burghley's death. Former deputies Sir Henry Grey, Sir Thomas Mildmay and Sir John Petre are listed as commissioners in September 1598 when the council told them to discharge the fifty men it had originally called for Ireland.\textsuperscript{65} As was usual, the deputies were left in control when there was no lieutenant. Essex levied almost three times as many men, over 1,500, as Hertfordshire did from 1598 to 1603. Overall, as it was during Burghley's time, Essex contributed the most recruits of the

\textsuperscript{62} See appendix vii; A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 408; King, \textit{Muster Books, 1580-1605}, pp. 175-89.
\textsuperscript{63} B.L. Lansdowne MS 83, f. 11; Also see pp. 98-99.
\textsuperscript{64} Hasler, \textit{House of Commons}, vol. ii, pp. 508-09; C.S.P.D. 1598-1601, pp. 83, 282, 441; 1601-03, pp. 45, 121; A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 155: Rowland Lytton is a good example of some of the other members of the commission. He was certainly an experienced captain and a prominent man, having led the Hertfordshire contingent at Tilbury in 1588 as well as having been an MP, justice and sheriff. In February 1601 he was specifically ordered by the council to muster and lead the 300 members of the trained bands demanded for defence during Essex's rebellion while other counties' orders were addressed in the usual manner to lieutenants and commissioners.
\textsuperscript{65} A.P.C. 1598-99, p. 156.
three counties in the last years of the Elizabethan age, sending 1,114 men overseas from 1599 to 1602, so the commission was quite active.66

There is a reference to an order for 2,000 soldiers for the Low Countries in November 1598. Essex is listed, but there is no indication of how many men it was obliged to furnish. It could be related to a similar request that December for 400 men. This first documented levy under the commissioners was successful, as a letter from 14 January 1599 says that the men were assembled and sent to port by 30 December.67

The following January the shire was called on to supply twenty-five horses for Ireland. Four days after the orders were issued on 9 January, the council addressed a letter to 'the High Sheriff of the Countie of Essex, Sir Thomas Mildmay and Sir John Petre', saying it understood the horses 'are not in so good readynes to be sent fourth as wee supposed and as they ought to have bin'. The commissioners were ordered to have Sir Anthony Cooke provide the horse and warned, 'wee do praie and require you that this may not make you the more slacke or careless in mustering and furnishing the companies of horse in that countie, but that they may heereafter be in such readiness as they ought to be'. On 22 January the council again wrote to the commissioners, telling them it understood that all of the money had not been levied to furnish the twenty-five horse and they desired help in righting the situation. Adding that 'wee cannot but marvaile because your selves do signifie that the cheife cause is the disorderlie proceeding of the Justices in setting the rates, as for example in taxing men that are unsufficient and others that are deported out of the countrie and somme also that are dead', the council found it odd that the commissioners had not redressed the

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66 See appendix vii.

situation themselves, especially since Cooke offered to provide the horses. As usual, those required to contribute were to do so or appear before the council to answer for it. 68 This is a similar state of affairs that existed under Burghley. Though less than exemplary, this episode was not new or uncommon. It is a case of slackness, but Burghley’s absence had nothing to do with it. 69

The first levy of soldiers for Ireland under the commissioners took place on 18 February 1599 when 150 men were to be prepared. By 12 March the coat-and-conduct money was levied and on 19 March the troops were certified as being sent out of the county, so the commission asserted itself quite well in this instance. 70 In April 1599, one of only two general musters from 1598 to 1603 took place (the other was in June 1601). In the orders for the muster, the council appointed Henry Maynard to the commission. 71 There is no record of the muster returns, but there is also no trace of any complaints either.

In February 1600, there was some further laxity, as £180 to equip six horses was not raised on time. But the money must have been provided soon afterwards since a listing of counties delinquent in their payments was made in May 1600, and Essex is not included. 72 Also in February 1600, Francis Barrington was added to the commission, and changes were also happening within the militia. According to the council’s letter from May 1600, the commissioners had written to them on 18 February ‘touchinge the reducinge of the trained bandes in that countie unto smaller

69 See p. 83 for a similar episode from 1590.
71 A.P.C. 1598-99, p. 701; A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 408;
72 A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 32, 305-06.
numbers of men in every bande', and how certain captains wanted to retire. The
council asked the commission to choose replacements and to 'be careful (as wee
doubt not but you will) in the choise of such other meete gentlemen' and to certify
them to the council when all the captains are in place.73 As was the case under
Burghley, when deputies were responsible for nominating officers, it was the
commissioners, largely consisting of ex-deputies, who were entrusted to do the same.
There was essentially no difference between the two situations other than instead of
being approved by a lieutenant, the candidates were sanctioned directly by the council.

The summer of 1600 saw one R. A. Wiseman of Essex refusing to provide a
light horse, claiming to 'have ben extraordinarilye charged from time to time more
than divers others of as great ability and greater then myself'. His son had also
recently been made a captain, which added a further burden to the family. He asked
the council to spare him the light-horse charge until he was better able to pay it.
Wiseman was not the only one who was in default for providing a horse. Essex had
eight defaulters in all, the most for the eight counties listed as containing defects for
Ireland.74 Suffice it to say, it was not a proud occasion for the commissioners, but
they were by no means alone. The council seemed to be getting desperate in its battle
against non-compliance and desertion, witnessed by its letter of August 1600, like
Cocke's suggestion in May 1596, it called for the execution of deserters.75 Referring

73 A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 110, 128, 292-93, 304; Hasler, House of Commons, vol. i, p. 399;
Barrington inherited extensive lands in Essex. In 1588 he served as a captain of the trained bands. He
was also a justice from 1583 and would go on to be a knight of the shire on seven occasions between
1601 and 1628 as well as a deputy in 1603. So his background is very similar to Burghley's deputies
and indicates that the newer commissioners had similar credentials.


75 See p. 97.
to six recent Essex men that had fled service, 'being of late a practyse frequent as in
all sheeres of the realme divers lewd people after they have bin imprested and have
receaved her Majesty’s pay do runne away', the council concluded that 'it more then
necessary that some example should be made by their persons worthily condemned to
the terror of others'. Thus, two of the six men were to be executed 'on some markett
day, in suche as it may be publiquely knowne also in those partes for what offence he
doeth suffer'. A letter of pardon for three of the others (no record of the fourth man)
from January 1601 confirms that the other two were executed. So the problems of
non-service, which were persistent throughout the 1587 to 1603 period, prompted a
strong reaction. Maybe this is an indication that things were particularly bad at the
turn of the century.

But the truth is, for much of 1601, the Essex militia performed reasonably
well. That February, as in Hertfordshire, men from the trained bands were sent to
London during Essex’s rebellion, in this case, 400 of them. Two months later, on 28
April, the county was told to prepare three petronells for Ireland. Both of these
levies seem to have been completed without incident. They were followed in July by
a demand of 300 soldiers for the Low Countries. A 30 July letter states that the Essex
men were at the port, but were delayed because the captain who was to take command
of them there, referred to only as Croftes, 'is not as yeat comme thither nor the armes
in readynes there for the men'. The council told the other captain, Sir Edward Reade,
to billet the men until Croftes arrived with the arms, 'where wee have sent unto to
hasten him awaie with all speede', and to see that none of the men tried to run away.

76 A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 590-91; A.P.C. 1600-01, pp. 100, 133.
77 A.P.C. 1600-01, pp. 155, 313.
By the next month, coat-and-conduct money was sent forth, so there was no fault with the Essex commissioners, they levied the men and money and sent them out of the county. The delay was caused by the failure of the captain, who was assigned by the government, to arrive promptly with the prescribed arms.

However, in the instance of the general muster of June 1601, Essex was late in certifying. The two reasons for this were the refusal of some men to take command of the smaller bands 'then they were wont to have', but that were assigned to them, and the failure of some people to contribute to the charge. Evidently, some captains feared a loss of prestige or perhaps, they disliked the reduced chances for graft. The council's response was to have the commissioners let the captains know that 'these things are to be ordered and governed not as they may best serve for the particular men's advantage but as may be most behooval for the service of the state'. If the captains continued to refuse service, their names were to be sent to the council to which they would have to answer to. Those refusing to contribute were to be put in prison if they continued 'untill they shew themselves more conformable according to their duetie'. The council added 'wee will trust unto your judgements and discretion that the punishment may especiallie laied on suche persons for example sake as are the cheefe offendours and whose correction may best serve to amend others'.

Despite executions the year before, people were continuing to shirk their responsibilities. Though to be accurate, it was nothing that did not happen under Burghley.

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80 See Chapter IV, pp. 84, 86.
The last levies in Essex were better performed than the last general muster. Originally in late September 1601, 150 men were to be prepared for Ireland. On 6 October, that number was increased to 300. Despite the suddenness of the new orders, by 26 October the conduct money had been collected, meaning the men must have been raised promptly.\(^8^1\) The last levy of the era, in March 1602, involved the rounding up and deportation of men to the Low Countries. Masterless men had been sent to Ostend the year before, and Essex, Surrey, Middlesex and Kent were to do so again.\(^8^2\) Despite protesting about a lack of quality men in the levies, the council was not above calling for their use as soldiers in an attempt to rid the country of them, and one would assume, as a way around the reluctance of the better off men to serve abroad. There is nothing to contradict the belief that Essex sent an unspecified number of vagrants overseas as ordered.

As mentioned earlier, overall, 1,114 Essex men are recorded as having been sent overseas between August 1598 and March 1603. There were cases of under achievement, but those happened throughout the years 1587 to 1603, the commissioners in Essex managed militia affairs as the deputies had done before. As in all of Burghley’s former shires, it was the local men that were relied upon. Burghley gave orders and tried to use his influence. But as in the case of the John Colt affair in Hertfordshire, it did not always make a difference.\(^8^3\)

On the whole, many more men were levied during Burghley’s command than afterwards. Of almost 32,000 men raised in the three counties from 1588-1602,


\(^{82}\) Ibid., pp. 491-92; *A.P.C. 1660-01*, p. 145.

\(^{83}\) See pp. 47-48.
almost 29,000 of them were levied during Burghley’s tenure, but that total is distorted, as it includes almost 24,000 men conscripted for defence. The 2,419 men levied under the commissioners account for almost a third of the overseas total of 7,348.84 There may have been more men drafted under Burghley due to greater English commitments on the Continent, and the bands were definitely mustered more often, yet there was no shortage of activity for the commissioners during the latter years and they managed to do their duties reasonably well under difficult circumstances. The militias around 1600 were perceived to be in decline. An anonymously written document entitled ‘Reasons for the decayage of the bands and unwillingness of men of warre 1580-1600’ blames the decline on everything from the people being ‘weaned from the naturall love they have to the warres’ to corrupt captains and sub-standard soldiers. Tellingly, one thing that is not mentioned is a lack of lieutenants.85 In the case of Burghley, his absence was not vital, from a military point of view he was not missed. Little had changed, instead of the deputies being the chief officers in the county, it was the same men as commissioners who oversaw the militias.

84 All the figures are available in appendix vii; Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army, p. 291: The 7,348 men levied for service abroad from Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire from 1588-1602 accounts for just over ten percent of the 68,331 troops that Cruickshank says were drafted in English counties for overseas destinations between 1585-1602.

85 B.L. Add MS 61728, ff. 141-45.
Chapter VII: Other Counties’ Musters and Levies, 1598-1603

Apart from Burghley, there were other lieutenants who were not replaced. Among the counties studied here there were no successors for Hatton in Northamptonshire, Shrewsbury in Staffordshire or Hunsdon in Norfolk and Suffolk. For other counties included in this survey there were successors: William Brooke, Lord Cobham, was replaced by his son, Henry, in Kent; Shrewsbury by his son in Derbyshire, and North was eventually followed by Thomas Howard in Cambridgeshire. Charles Howard served as lieutenant in Surrey for the entire time from 1585 to 1603. Therefore, the shires examined here include every possible situation that that could have existed: a lieutenant serving the entire period, one being replaced, and finally, no replacement being made at all. Were there substantial differences between the musters and levies of the counties under the two forms of leadership? As was shown in Chapter V, the absentee lieutenants like Hatton, Shrewsbury, Derby and indeed, Burghley, had little or no effect on their respective militias. It was the deputies, many of whom went on to become commissioners, that were really important in those, and other, counties. Now it is necessary to see how these shires performed in the last years of Elizabeth from 1598 to 1603, a time when there were numerous cases of discontent and inefficiency in a war-weary country. We want to know if Cambridgeshire’s record was as good after the loss of North, how Kent and Derbyshire changed under new leadership and if the lack of a lieutenant had any impact in Northamptonshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Staffordshire and Lancashire.

There are certainly many examples of the reluctance of people from around the country to support the military campaigns in Ireland and elsewhere between Burghley’s death in August 1598 and that of Elizabeth in March 1603. In 1598,
Oxfordshire gentlemen refused to contribute towards the charge of light horse for Ireland and London recruits received poor armour and furniture. Certain places in the city claimed to be exempt from providing soldiers, the same as Coventry refused to recognise the authority of the Warwickshire commissioners to collect money in that city. Commissioners complained to the council that Coventry refused to arm seven of the hundred men raised. Coventry’s mayor responded that Warwickshire had 200 parishes and his city had but two, and that it was ‘greatly pestered with poor’, and ‘not the fortieth part of the county at large’. The council urged the commissioners to use ‘moderacion in demaundinge reasonable helpe of them’, and stated that the mayor was to collect the charge. People in Dorset complained of being overburdened as ‘great abode and partialitie’ was shown to some of the wealthier residents who had their rates lowered. Rutland protested to Robert Cecil that it was rated to furnish half as many men as Cheshire, a county five times its size.\(^1\) Poor levies and equipment were not uncommon in counties with and without lieutenants. Slackness was reported from Wales, Nottinghamshire, Huntingdonshire and Hampshire, and mutinies took place amongst London troops at the port of Bristol. Recognising that the problem was widespread, the council wrote to the Chester commissioners telling them to take precautions against the ‘disorders and runninge awaie of soldiers that have bin appointed to repaire to Chester’.\(^2\)

There were positive outcomes, as in October 1601, when the Earl of Bath told Robert Cecil that most of the 1,000 men in a levy were ‘well armed and willing to serve’, but the complaints of Sir Edward Winfield, a commissioner of Bristol, who


said of recruits in that port that they were ill-clothed and armed as 'they continually brail and mutiny', reflected a wider unsatisfactory state of affairs. Sir Matthew Arundel, speaking of the late lieutenant of Dorset, William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester, and his deputies in December 1598, said 'if aught were well done, the Marquis had the praise and thanks, though all travail was borne by them [the deputies]; but if any business had ill success, the blame was laid upon them'. He went on to say that the best men were not levied, 'much to the hindrance of her majesty's service and disgrace'. Lieutenant Edward Seymour, ninth Earl of Hertford, echoed those sentiments in November 1602 when discussing abuses in his county of Somerset. He noted that trained bands, which were to contain yeoman farmers, instead consisted largely of 'inhabitants of the meanest sorte', and claimed 157 of 300 men in a levy were not acceptable for service. Coupled with corruption, which Hertford also found in Somerset, reluctance to contribute and low motivation presented quite a challenge to lieutenants and commissioners in all parts of the realm. The goal is to determine how they reacted to such problems.

There was much military activity from September 1598 to March 1603 in the counties considered here. Northamptonshire sent almost 750 men overseas, or forty-eight percent of the 1,557 troops sent out of that county from 1585 to 1603. Norfolk and Suffolk's total of 1,963 troops levied for overseas duty accounted for three fourths of the number raised in those counties for the entire 1585 to 1603 period, and a similar situation existed in Lancashire. There were fewer musters than in previous years, but

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4 B.L. Salisbury MSS 66, f. 48; 185, f. 67; Complete Peerage, vol. vi, p. 505.

5 See appendix vii: In Lancashire, 1,087 men, or fifty-seven percent of the 1,910 total from 1585 to 1603, were levied between late 1598 to the end of 1602. Men raised in Kent from 1598 to 1603 accounted for over thirty-two percent of the total (1,585 of 4,864) number of men sent abroad.
lieutenants and commissioners still faced a formidable challenge in overseeing the
militias during the late 1590s and early seventeenth century.⁶ The commissioners of
Northamptonshire, as mentioned in Chapter V, had been in command of the militia
since the death of Sir Christopher Hatton in 1591. The experienced deputies Sir
Richard Knightley and Sir Edward Montagu headed the commission immediately after
Hatton’s death and would continue to do so with Sir Thomas Cecil and the former
deputy, George Fermor, for the rest of the century.⁷ Former deputies Richard Bagot,
along with Edward and Walter Aston, led the Staffordshire commission. It also
included Sir Humphrey Ferrers, Sir Christopher Blount, Sir John Bows, Sir Edward
Littlejohn, and eventually, Sir John Egerton.⁸ In Lancashire, former deputies John
Byron, Ralfe and Richard Ashton along with Richard Molyneux and the later
additions of Thomas Talbot and Thomas Parker dominated the commission in the
years that followed.⁹ These counties were like Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire
in that they were not placed under a lieutenant again in Elizabeth’s reign, but they all
responded well to the commissioners’ leadership. But Norfolk and Suffolk, formerly

from 1585 to 1603. In Derbyshire and Staffordshire, 484 and 430 troops respectively, out of a total of
2,150 were raised between 1598 and 1603. In Surrey, just over a quarter (465 of 1,815) of the troops
were raised for foreign service between 1598 and 1603. Just over 200 soldiers of Cambridge’s total of
916, were levied in the last years of Elizabeth’s reign.

D/593/S/46/39; D/593/S/452/1 (iv); S.H.C. Loseley MS 1330 fos. 57, 59; B.L. Add MS 48591, fos.
222, 236; B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 51-55, 69-70, 80v; Bourgeois, Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp.
183-84, 188-90, 234-36: Northamptonshire had just one muster (with no evidence of certification)
between late 1598 and March 1603, while Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Surrey had two each.
Cambridgeshire, Kent, Lancashire, Norfolk and Suffolk had three each.


was typical of the commissioners, like the deputies he was a member of the bench in Cheshire and
Staffordshire before becoming a commissioner in the latter in 1601. Originally from Cheshire, he
bought the Winehall manor in Staffordshire and would thence be a knight of the shire.

had a very similar background to those of the former deputies; despite Catholic sympathies, he was

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under the command of Lord Hunsdon, continued to generate controversy and inefficiency under the muster commissioners. Former deputies Sir Arthur Heveningham, Sir John Preston, Sir Edward Clere, Sir Robert Southwell along with Sir Nathaniel Bacon headed the Norfolk commission. Sir Philip Parker, Sir Robert Jermayne, Sir John Higham and Anthony Wingfield, also former deputies, headed the Suffolk commission.\(^\text{10}\)

There was little activity in the last months of 1598 except for a poor Irish levy by Norfolk and Suffolk, but the council ordered additional men for Ireland from all five counties in January 1599. Northamptonshire sent 150 men, as payment for coat-and-conduct money was requested on 23 March, indicating that the men had been sent. Staffordshire sent the same number without a hint of trouble.\(^\text{11}\) Lancashire’s levy included some confusion. The Queen’s letter of 16 January called for 200 men to serve. On 12 February, the commissioners wrote to the council saying they could not complete their duties because they had not received specific directions from the council to do so. However, there are directions from the council dated 31 January telling them to take special care in choosing fit and able men and to not leave the choice to the constables ‘as usually they doo’, because, the council said, too many unfit men were chosen by them. Finally, the letter ended by saying the men were to be sent to Chester by 20 February. Besides offering an example of the government’s desire to improve the quality of soldiers sent abroad, it is evidence that the council did


indeed, if belatedly, give Lancashire express orders for the levy.\textsuperscript{12} That the commission did not receive them is certainly a possibility as they could have been misplaced or lost. Whether it was the commission’s fault or that of the central government is not known, but in any event another hundred men were called for by the Queen on 17 February. This time the council’s orders for the Lancashire commissioners went out the next day, and they emphasised that ‘extraordinary paynes are to be taken by the justices themselves’, in choosing men of quality. There were also no dead pays, there were to be thirty men each with pikes, muskets and calivers with the rest having ‘short weapons’.\textsuperscript{13} It is not clear if the men were at Chester by 10 March as ordered, but there were no letters of rebuke from the council, despite the confusion.

Norfolk and Suffolk were less successful. Norfolk soldiers intended for Ireland deserted, and both shires were late in providing money for the clothing and arming of the men. The failure of Suffolk to provide £90 to furnish three light horse was referred to as ‘careless negligence’ by councillors who went on to say ‘evidently you affect more that tytle to have authority to deale in theis matters for your private credites and respectes in the contry and not for anie regard or care you have of her Majestie’s service’. The commissioners were told to either send in the money they owed or face the council in London.\textsuperscript{14} The slackness that took place under Hunsdon was continuing, and each shire was to provide twenty-five horse and 200 men for

\textsuperscript{12} B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., f. 50r-v.

\textsuperscript{14} A.P.C. 1598-99, pp. 96-97, 156, 224, 275-76, 343, 394-95; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/260/111; 12/262/71; McCulloch, Suffolk and the Tudors, pp. 273-78: the comments about private credit and respect in their own county could have been alluding to the ongoing ship money controversy when some of the commissioners, notably, Sir Nicholas Bacon, supported the local opposition. Also see p. 71.
Ireland. The council’s orders for Norfolk stated that the men were to be evenly distributed from across the county, including the city of Norwich, ‘without exemption’. The outcome of these levies is not known, but in March 1599 the government ordered a muster. Saying the trained bands and horse in Norfolk were ‘greatly decayed’, the council wanted reduced bands for better training. It also warned against shifting arms from one company to another for inspection, noting that ‘there is abuse comitted in lendage of said of these armes from one band to another’. Norfolk was mustered (there is no record for Suffolk) and there were five bands of 600 men each and two of 500. The council wanted companies reduced to 200 men at the most. But as Smith demonstrated, that was not a popular idea and apparently, the orders went unheeded, because the council again stressed that it wanted the bands reduced in the summer of 1601. Without Hunsdon’s support the reforms were doomed.\(^\text{15}\)

The abuses and reluctance to serve were not limited to Norfolk and Suffolk. Orders for a general muster were issued to all counties on 9 May 1599. Troops were to be certified by 10 June, and the council stated that ‘in dyvers countyes the certificates of the musters ys pass very lately unto us, and in some place not at all’. The government hoped to counter such carelessness by giving detailed orders for the musters. Companies were to consist equally of pikes and shot, the former to ideally consist of two thirds muskets and one-third calivers. After each company divided into three parts, a sergeant would help train them in the use of weapons.\(^\text{16}\) In Lancashire at least, the orders seem to have been taken seriously.\(^\text{17}\) On 2 June the commissioners

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{15} A.P.C. 1598-99, pp. 447, 490, 543-44, 665; 1600-01, pp. 372-74; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. ix, p. 44; B.L. Add MS 48591, fos. 3, 4, 8; Smith, County and Court, pp. 287-88; Also see p. 70.

\footnote{16} B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 51-53.

\footnote{17} There are no records for Northamptonshire or Staffordshire.
\end{footnotes}
informed the council that it had appointed replacements for those who had left or died and required those who were to keep horses to have them ready to view. On 1 August, the council indicated it was satisfied, so the bands must have been certified. The militia was to maintain its readiness because of the possibility of invasion.\(^{18}\) A month later, in response to a general complaint about those of means avoiding payment and passing the burden to the less able, the commission told the council the ‘better sort’ pay their share towards arming and clothing recruits. As for the assertion that justices failed to set an example by freeing themselves while ‘levyinge the saide charges upon others’, the commissioners denied that they deferred charges, and if accused they ‘not onely desire tryall thereof but moste willingly will submit ourselves to suche reproache or punishment as our transgressions therin deserved’.\(^{19}\) Whatever the truth of the commissioners’ assertions, a horse levy in early 1600 lends support to their contention that assessments were fairly distributed. Four horses were to be outfitted at £30 each, and the commission said they had imposed the charges on those they felt capable of paying them. Documents from 1600 say of Lancashire that ‘horse and men [are] complete and well furnished, and so all the rest of that shire’.\(^{20}\)

Not everyone was as thorough as Lancashire about providing horse for Ireland. On 11 May 1600 the Northamptonshire commissioners, along with officials in twelve other counties, with and without lieutenants, received a letter informing them they still

\(^{18}\) B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 54-55.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., f. 55v.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., f. 58r-v; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xiv, pp. 148-49.
owed £40 for the outfitting of horse for Ireland. Originally they had been ordered to make payment on 6 January, and the council 'did suppose that longe before this tyme the same should have bin provided and sent up according to the direction by our said letters given wee cannot but much mervaile to find it so longe delaid'. Also in 1600, the shire had five defects in horses sent to Chester en route to Ireland. Among the five gentlemen who were delinquent in their payments were commissioners Montagu and Fermor, so the commission was certainly not setting an example for others to follow. Staffordshire also had five men who refused to contribute, and another of Shrewsbury's former counties, Derbyshire, had three gentlemen who failed to pay, among them was John Manners, the chief deputy, and another deputy, Francis Lear. The fact that Derbyshire had a lieutenant and Staffordshire was without certainly made no difference in this instance. Commissioners Basingbourne Gawdy and Anthony Wingfield, in Norfolk and Suffolk respectively, were also deficient. Of the twenty-five shires listed here, only two – Cheshire and Salop – had no defects. Indeed, the positive effects of the lieutenancy are hard to see at this time: of the remaining twenty-five counties whose musters were said to be defective almost half (eleven) were in the hands of lieutenants.

More controversy followed concerning 150 men levied in Northamptonshire in February 1600. The council protested that the £300 to outfit the men had not been

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21 A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 305-06: The twelve other counties were Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cheshire, Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Kent, Lancashire, Somerset, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex and Worcestershire.

22 See p. 57 for another case of Manners failing to live up to his obligations.

23 A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 305-06; S.R.O. Bagot Papers, L.a. 743; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS vol. xiv, 148-49; H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, p. 393; B.L. Add MS 48591, f. 39: Gawdy was a commissioner by early 1600, he signed a letter to the council dated 13 February 1600; Hasler, Commons, vol. ii, pp. 176-77: Gawdy would go on to be a deputy under Henry Howard, first Earl of Northampton, in 1605. He had the credentials; he had been a knight of the shire, captain of a company, sheriff and justice as well as a muster commissioner.
raised. Ten other counties were also rebuked, all but one of which had a lieutenant.

In Northampton's case, the commission protested that it could not raise all the money; the council said people would pay their rates or it would take action against them.\(^{24}\)

At that same time, Staffordshire was ordered to send a hundred men to Chester for passage to Ireland. The council ordered the county to pay the city of Chester for the outfitting of its men and presumably, the recruits were equipped at the port. In March 1600, the council spoke of 'lewde and seditious behaviour' of soldiers in Chester, whose mayor was told that 'because the counties of Lancaster and Stafforde are nere unto you, yu shall by vertue . . . require the commyssioners of the Musters in those counties to repaire with all speed their defectes in their men, and to supplie new in place of those that are insufficient or rann awaie'. However, Staffordshire was sceptical, and wanted official sanction, as was evident in a letter from the council dated 30 March. It stated, 'Althoughe wee gave direction to the commyssioners of Chester to require you to supplie the defectes founde in the men you sent thether, yet wee perceave by your letter you doe looke for expresse order from us to doe that which of you selves in all dyscrecion you should have done unrequired'. Having received official orders, Staffordshire, along with Derbyshire and nine other counties, was still behind in its payments in May.\(^{25}\) The fact that both Staffordshire and Derbyshire were late in paying, along with Leicestershire, Worcester and Wales, all three of which had lieutenants, demonstrates that the presence of a lieutenant had no impact on the situation.\(^{26}\)

\(^{24}\) *A.P.C. 1599-1600*, pp. 305-06, 317-18, 357.

In Norfolk, one hundred men were to be at Chester by the end of February. Reference was made to 'inconveniences and abuses' committed in various counties in the recent past, and men of ability and not those 'addicted to idlenes' were required. Norfolk was to have forty men with calivers, twelve with muskets, twelve bastard muskets and twenty with pikes. By 12 February, £484 5s. of the £500 required had been collected and the men levied, a substantial improvement over previous efforts. Yet the next day the commission wrote to the council concerning those who refused to pay £240 to furnish eight horses. Fifty men were assessed to do so, 'many [of them] beinge unwillinge (as it seemeth) to contribute the somes required'. But they had raised £212, a not unreasonable total. The council responded in the usual way of threatening those who refused to pay with an appearance at Whitehall. The fact that Lynn and Yarmouth refused to pay because they were liable for sea duty is also mentioned. In a concession, the council decided to make the towns pay for foot soldiers, but to redistribute the horse assessments to the rest of the county. Suffolk was also overdue in providing horses, having two defects to Norfolk's six. As in several other places, including Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, commissioners were deficient; in this case it was Basingbourne Gawdy in Norfolk and Wingfield in Suffolk. Again, this obviously set a poor example, which could not have encouraged others. Lancashire was the only county to complete a levy without controversy in early 1600. Demanding 200 men for Ireland, the Queen spoke of poor

26 H.M.C. Rutland MSS, vol. i, p. 357: The younger Earl of Shrewsbury did inform deputies Manners and Sir Humphrey Ferrers on 8 December 1599 that a Mr. Gresely wanted to be 'eased of the charge', and recommended a Mr. Rodes to take his place. It was certainly more than Burghley ever did, but for the most part, he had to be considered a distant lieutenant who relied on his deputies.

27 B.L. Kings MS 265, fos. 290v-291v; B.L. Add MS 48591, fos. 28, 30, 38.

28 B.L. Add MS 48591 fos. 39, 49; A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 124.
levies in the country as a whole, saying ‘careleseness hath been a great occasion of soe manie defaulters’, and the council emphasised that no vagrants were to be used, and that the men would be supplied with arms at port. On 30 January, the commission reported that £120 for the new horse and £400 for the 200 men had been collected, so the levies were a success.30

The following June, Northamptonshire was ordered to ready a hundred more men for Ireland and were to be at Chester by 25 July, where, it was noted, ‘they may be more orderlie conducted and restrained from running awaie (as many heretofore have done)’. This was a general statement, and not directed specifically at Northamptonshire. Three months later, on 14 September, the council wrote to the commissioners requesting the names of those who had refused to contribute to the June levy. The commissioners had asked the council to intervene that 27 August, which it did in its usual manner of threatening the offenders. Most of the people must have paid, because none were sent to the council. But, one Thomas Robinson paid and then presented himself, saying he was outraged by a high constable named Thomas Barker, who pocketed much of the payment. The council ordered the commission to investigate the matter.31 The refusal of one man in Norfolk to provide arms and pay his assessment for that same levy provides an example of the kind of resistance that lieutenants and commissioners often faced during those years.

Thomas Lowell, a member of the Norfolk bench, was reported by the commissioners for contempt on 9 July. Eight days later a warrant was issued for him to appear before the council. He owed six shillings for the levy and was charged with

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30 B.L. Add MS, 26886, fos. 59-61.

twice refusing payment and not showing his armour. The commission was also asked
to send a witness as proof of the charges. An unsigned letter to Secretary Robert
Cecil, perhaps written by Lowell's attorney, claims that the defendant did have the
required arms, though a high constable disagreed. It then spoke of his past service and
how he had volunteered armour and his servants to be used in defence against Spain a
year earlier. He personally contributed three lances and four light horse. Lowell
himself wanted to be pardoned on the grounds of ill health. Two chief constables
tested against him, saying he did not show his arms and that his servants did not
attend the musters. Finally, after the appearance of numerous witnesses, on 26
October 1600 the council found Lowell guilty and had him imprisoned. Four days
later Lowell wrote a letter of submission, saying 'I doe worthily stand in the
displeasure' of the commission for musters and he claimed he would do his best to
make payment if he were released. Indeed, he was freed on 2 November after
admitting his faults and promising to abide by his service responsibilities.

There were several cases of poor men and arms raised along with corruption
among the counties under commissioners: Norfolk and Suffolk, Lancashire,
Northamptonshire and Staffordshire. Norfolk and Suffolk had more than their fair
share of slackness, and a reluctance to provide for military undertakings as
exemplified by Thomas Lowell also existed, but it must be stressed that there were
many efficient and successful levies among these five counties under the commissions
of musters. Northamptonshire successfully carried out levies in late 1600 and the
following spring, and sent 250 men and fifteen horse to Ireland in two levies in the

32 B.L. Add MS 48591, fos. 105-08; A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 554.
33 B.L. Add MS 48591, fos. 109-13.
summer and autumn of that year. The council showed its trust on 7 October by agreeing with the commission’s request that Gregory Isham be made commander of the western foot bands. As was the case under Hatton and Burghley, local men put forth their candidate and their opinion was deemed sufficient for acceptance.\(^{34}\) Lancashire and Staffordshire also carried out a levy without incident in 1600, and Lancashire sent a hundred men to Ireland in July and an additional 150 in October. Despite the fact that fifteen of the Lancashire recruits deserted, though they did so after leaving the county, the commissioners of these counties were certainly doing a reasonable job of levying men and equipment.\(^ {35} \)

However, Norfolk was again the scene of controversy in 1601. After both Norfolk and Suffolk were ordered to send 200 men to the Low Countries, many defects were found among Norfolk’s contingent. The bills were all unserviceable, the swords broken and the captains who were to take delivery of the troops refused to do so until the defects were made good. The council demanded that the Norfolk commissioners raise money for new arms and told them to ‘take soe many [weapons] as should be useful out of the sheares of the trained bands’. But many people refused to pay, and the commissioners said they had ‘used the best care wee could in regard to the shortnes of the tyme we had lymitted us to see that the men were armed well’.

They shifted the blame on to the muster master, a Mr. Chotte, saying he assured them that the men were fit for service. There may have been some confusion here since the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{34}} A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 790; 1600-01, pp. 318; 1601-04, pp. 83, 241, 249, 281; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xii, p. 164; Wake, Musters, Beacons, Subsidies, p. 53; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 37; Hasler, House of Commons, vol. iii, pp. 68-69: The Northamptonshire commission changed somewhat early in the seventeenth century. Edward Montagu, who died in 1602, is not listed amongst the commissioners in October 1600. He was seventy at that point and most likely ill. Knightley and Fermor were mainstays of the commission. Sir Robert Spencer, the son of the former deputy John Spencer, and Sir Arthur Throckmorton joined them while Cecil left to become the lieutenant of Yorkshire in 1599.\]
council told both the Norfolk and Suffolk commissioners that the recruits would be armed when they arrived at port, though apparently this was not the case. Suffolk also performed poorly, on 22 October, captains at Chester reported that instead of 200 men the county sent only 163.\(^\text{36}\) In response to this debacle, when ordering a levy the following January, the council stated it would ‘send downe persons sufficient that may take the charge of conduction upon them’, and that they would check arms and apparel before anyone left the county. Yet two days later the men were levied and sent to Bristol, so the inspectors can hardly have been involved.\(^\text{37}\)

Unfortunately, there were incidents in the other counties, such as the May 1602 levy in which the hundred Northamptonshire men were described as ‘very ill’, and supposedly there were ‘not 40 good ones’ among them.\(^\text{38}\) Reluctance to pay remained a problem in Staffordshire, and this was accompanied by allegations of corruption. In June 1601, the council wrote to the commissioners saying that ‘divers persons in that countie of Stafford do refuse to contribute and paye such reasonable summes of money as have by order bin required of them for her Majesty’s service’, and that others are overburdened as a result. Also, there were allegations that money raised was pocketed instead of being used to arm men. The council demanded an account of all funds raised in the past five years, though the result of any investigation

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\(^\text{35}\) A.P.C. 1599-1600, p. 790; B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 62-65, 66-67v, 68-71, 72v-75r.

\(^\text{36}\) A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 79, 225-26, 241-42, 263-64, 304, 314, 343, 353; B.L. Add MS 48591, fos. 157, 182-85; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xi, p. 441: With dead pays, 180 men were actually expected from Suffolk.

\(^\text{37}\) B.L. Add MSS 48591, fos. 199, 207, 208, 214, 220, 222, 236, 241, 247: In May 1602, Norfolk sent 150 men to port without any controversy, and there was no mention of anyone sent by the government to inspect soldiers. Nor is any hint of an inspector for levies that took place the following August.

\(^\text{38}\) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xii, p. 164.
is not known.\textsuperscript{39} Obviously, this entire incident must be held against Staffordshire, though as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, such things were far from unknown. Though it is certainly a mark against the commissioners, who were ultimately responsible for anything that went in their charge.\textsuperscript{40} Events in Lancashire in 1602 showed that the county’s performance could be uneven. On 26 April, the Queen wanted a further hundred men from Lancashire for Ireland. In an attempt to ‘abolish former abuses’ in arms sent to abroad, a merchant – Edmund Micholson – was assigned to provide the armaments. On 21 May, the commissioners reported that they had dispatched the hundred men to the town of Warrington for delivery ‘this night’ to Chester and that £350 had also been raised. The levy was marginally late, but only by a day. During that same time, on 30 April, the county was ordered to muster and certify its bands by 20 June. By 14 June, the commission had viewed the foot soldiers and supplied the defects, though some of the gentlemen charged with keeping horses did not show them, meaning the horse bands were not certified. One captain of a horse band was away, probably in London. The last levy of the period was late, as the council demanded that fifty men by ready to leave Lancashire by 15 August, but they did not do so until five days later.\textsuperscript{41}

Overall, Northamptonshire, Staffordshire and Lancashire performed their obligations reasonably well under the commissioners of musters. There were several incidences of tardiness in payment for horses and equipment, but many counties with lieutenants had the same problem, as is shown by the Derbyshire deputies’ failure to

\textsuperscript{39} A.P.C. \textit{1600-01}, pp. 419-20.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 467; A.P.C. \textit{1601-04}, pp. 82-83, 242; H.M.C. \textit{Rutland MSS}, vol. i, p. 378: Staffordshire and Derbyshire did carry out a levy of sixty men for Ireland in July 1601. Derbyshire raised an additional twenty-five men in September, all without any complaints from the government.

\textsuperscript{41} B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 77-79, 80-82.
provide for horse in 1600. There is no substantial difference between the musters and levies under the commissioners and those under the lieutenants. There may have been a slightly higher rate of slackness in Northamptonshire in the later years, but that has nothing to do with the loss of an absentee lieutenant like Hatton. The distant lieutenants were not missed in the other two counties either, and in Lancashire’s case, the commissioners effectively supervised a militia that was deployed much more than it had been under a lieutenant. Even in Norfolk and Suffolk, which were not very efficient at all, there is no major difference when compared with the militia under Hunsdon. If he had remained, the government’s plans for reduced bands may have been possible, but there was slackness and corruption under him that was to continue. These counties from 1598 to 1603 paint a picture of continuity, not change.

Kent and Cambridgeshire received new lieutenants in 1597 and 1602 respectively, while Lord Howard of Effingham remained the lieutenant of Surrey. They offer an opportunity for comparison with the counties above that were under commissioners. Kent was for many years under the lieutenancy of William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham. He delved into the minutiae of the job more than Burghley or Hatton did, but the deputies were still essential, and there was no real difference in performance. Men such as Sir John Leveson, Sir Thomas Fane and Sir Thomas Walsingham continued to administer the militia after the elder Cobham’s death and under his son and successor, Henry, eleventh Lord Cobham, who despite having been a deputy, largely adopted the ways of a distant lieutenant after his appointment in

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42 Under Lord Derby, Lancashire sent only 270 men abroad as compared to the 1,087 under the commissioners. See appendix vii.

43 See Chapters III and V.
October 1597. 44 Very little changed in Surrey during the years from 1598 to 1603. Lord Admiral Charles Howard was still the lieutenant, as he would be for nearly forty years, from 1585 to 1624.45 Howard, the military professional, gave orders to his deputies, though admittedly, there is not a great deal of information available. In late 1598 the county had three experienced deputies: the lieutenant’s brother, William Howard, William Moore and Francis Carew.46 Cambridgeshire’s lieutenant, Lord North, was very much involved in the county’s militia, for instance, giving detailed instructions on how many men should be chosen from each division. He continued to be a lieutenant after his inclusion on the council in 1596 until his death in December 1600.47 For the next nineteen months, his former deputies, Sir John Cuttes, Sir William Cotton and Sir John Peyton, were mainstays of the commission of musters. On 7 July 1602, Lord Thomas Howard of Walden was commissioned a lieutenant, and he continued to rely on these men of experience.48 There was less military activity in Cambridgeshire than in Lancashire from 1598 to 1603, partly because it was further from Ireland, the main theatre of war in those years. In all, 205 men were levied between August 1598 and March 1603, all of them between 1600 and 1602.49

44 A.P.C. 1597, p. 109; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 25.

45 Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 33: Howard was created Earl of Nottingham in October 1597.

46 See appendix v.

47 A.P.C. 1588-89; 1591-92, 1595-96; 1598-99, 1600-01; 1601-04: The proportion of lieutenants in the council varied. In 1588-89, nine of sixteen councillors were also lieutenants. By 1591-92, the ratio was seven lieutenants out of thirteen councillors. By the mid nineties, the number had fallen to five out of thirteen. It remained fairly consistent for the rest of Elizabeth’s reign: four of ten in 1599, five out of fourteen by the time of North’s death in December 1600 (if North is included), and five of thirteen at the time of Elizabeth’s death.

48 Bourgeois, Cambridge Lieutenancy, pp. 6, 16, 186; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, p. 13: Howard was created Earl of Suffolk on 21 July 1603.

49 See appendix viii.
A levy in September 1598 illustrates the efforts that were made by the council to increase military effectiveness. Kent levied ninety-four men as instructed, fifty with calivers, twenty with muskets and twenty-four with pikes. Controversy erupted when the London merchants of Babington and Bromley were chosen by the government to provide the coats for the recruits at Chester. Among others, deputy Thomas Walsingham complained, saying ‘wee thought good to signifie unto you that we and others the gentlemen of these partes doe greatly mislike of that choese’, and that the gentlemen had agreed ‘with sundry tayllors’ to provide clothes and make ‘cotes to be always reddy’. This was the county’s first brush with the councillor innovation of centralised supply, and as far as can be told, the government did not relent. The levy did proceed as planned and the men were ready by mid September.50

The central supply system, an effort to provide troops with quality and relatively uniform weapons and clothing, was unevenly implemented and caused confusion in other places as well. In Northamptonshire the commissioners supplied men with coats, forgetting they were to be issued at the port, and had to return them.51 On another occasion, Norfolk and Suffolk commissioners were told that men were to be armed at port, but apparently they were not. As mentioned above, the council’s levy orders to Lancashire in 1600 emphasised that men were to be supplied at the port of embarkation in response to the generally poor arms presented previously.52 The results of the council’s efforts were not totally successful because poor arms continued to be a problem, but they do show that the government was making an


52 B.L. Add MSS 48591, f. 185; 26886, f. 60; Also see p. 180.
effort at modernisation. But the early efforts resulted in some confusion and resentment that London merchants were benefiting at the expense of local manufacturers.

There was no activity in Surrey until 1600, but Kent was able to raise and supply 400 men for the Low Countries to replace veterans needed for Ireland. Cobham wanted 'speciall care to be had in choyce of the men for abilities and aptnes for service', while adding that the men should be armed as 'our privie cowansell shall by their letters geve yow direction'. He did not really add anything specific, and just merely told his deputies to await further orders. The men embarked from Margate as planned, at the same time, twenty-five horses were ordered for Ireland. Under Leveson's leadership the task was undertaken, but as McGurk has noted, there was squabbling about the assessments and some refused to pay.\footnote{S.R.O. D/593/S/4/66/5(iii); McGurk, \textit{Elizabethan Conquest}, pp. 87-88.} This was becoming a common occurrence across the country, both in counties with, and without, lieutenants.

Two levies in 1598 and 1599 demonstrate the Cambridgeshire's efficiency. The county, under North's command, was charged with providing fifty infantry for Ireland on 26 August 1598. Two days after hearing from the council, North informed his deputies, saying that fourteen men were to be levied in the eastern division, fifteen out of the Isle of Ely and eighteen from the western division, a total of forty-seven men after dead pays. He also ordered the soldiers to be set forth in good durable doublets, hose, shoes and shirt with a hat or cape. Ultimately, the levy was cancelled, but this example shows that North continued to pursue high standards.\footnote{Bourgeois, \textit{Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy}, pp. 137-40, 142.} The council
ordered 500 men to be prepared for an invasion on 25 July 1599. North forwarded those orders on the same day, and fifty-seven extra horses were to be provided by various gentlemen. On 5 August, North ordered the 500 soldiers and fifty horse to be sent to London. In a postscript, he ordered captain William Hindes’s bands to provide the soldiers and that the fifty horse were to come from those ‘wee have certified always to the Councell’. Two days later the council called for a delay until 17 August, but the men were told to proceed to London on 10 August. More equivocation followed, as on 22 August the Lord Admiral, the Earl of Nottingham, ordered Cambridge’s forces to return home, but three days later they were ordered to return to the rendezvous site. Finally, on 26 August, the previous day’s orders were reversed and the men told to return home.\textsuperscript{55} North displayed urgency and organisation throughout a difficult and potentially confusing time, and his deputies responded.

In contrast to North, Henry Cobham’s approach to command in Kent was much more that of the distant and uninvolved lieutenant. This is demonstrated by a muster in May 1599. The council ordered a nation-wide muster, saying that ‘intermission hath followed ordynarie musters’, all defects in equipment were to be supplied and the men trained ‘according to such instructions as your Lord shall receave herein’. Thus the lieutenant – Cobham – was to just pass along the instructions, he had no input on the matter. He did not react quickly, and the deputies did not receive their orders until 15 May, twelve days after the council’s letter. Cobham remarked that the shire was to certify by 3 June, to which he says, ‘I fynd yt cannot be convenyentlie don so sone’, but it was to be completed ‘as nere the tyme as may be, for the Lords better contentment’. The muster master, captain Wyatt, referred

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 143-46, 148-49, 158-60, 163-66.
to the 'general default of the county', but returns for three lathes muster
d that summer show a total of 2,203 men armed with an impressive 678 muskets, 628
calivers and 897 pikes.\footnote{S.R.O. D/593/S/4/52/1(i, ii); D/593/S/4/68/7(i); S/4/68/8(i, iv).} Cobham's lack of expedience certainly did not help matters,
but the county is not listed anywhere as late in certifying. That same month, Cobham
did instruct his muster master on the arming and training of the bands. He said the
bands should consist of half pikes and half shot, with half the latter being muskets,
though two-thirds would be better. He said every company should be divided into
'corporall shippes', or squadrons, and once divided they should be taught the use of
arms and the march and motions to the different sounds of the drum.\footnote{Ibid., D/593/S/4/52/1(iii).} The letter is
quite detailed, and one wonders how much of it, if any, were Cobham's original
thoughts. Some of the more detailed information could have been the result of his
own insight, though there is no record he had any far-reaching military experience,
though he had been a deputy.

After the forces were readied in August 1599 in response to the re-appearance
of the Spanish fleet, the next levy was not until early 1600, when a hundred men were
required for Ireland. Again, Leveson oversaw events, and an indenture confirms that
ninety men were sent to Chester on 15 February, as ordered. Leveson gave detailed
instructions; forty men were to have calivers, twelve to carry 'bastard', or smaller,
muskets, twelve to have regular muskets, along with twenty pikemen and six
haliberdiers.\footnote{McGurk, \textit{Elizabethan Conquest}, pp. 88-89; S.R.O. D/593/4/68/1(viii); D/593/4/69/1(i).} Again, Cobham had no real role in the undertaking other than to relay
the council's orders to Leveson. Another levy followed that June when a further fifty
men were called upon for Ireland. The troops were raised quickly, and Cobham
conveyed the directions to deputies Leveson, Walsingham and Sir Peter Manwood within a day. As McGurk has stated, the levy was ably done despite a strong possibility that Leveson defrauded the county out of coat-and-conduct money. Still, the council commended the county on its performance in August 1600.59

During that same time, Cambridgeshire also completed a levy. After raising £120 in lieu of four horses, the council ordered fifty men to be prepared for Ireland on 14 January. The men were to be at Chester by the end of February. After three days, North instructed his deputies to carry out the levy and to enquire about the price and availability of arms. Delegating responsibility, perhaps because he was temporarily out of the county, North ordered his deputies to 'come hether on Saturdaye' with prices of arms and a schedule of where the men would be levied. At North's behest, the men received bonus money of five shillings a head, which may have been one reason for the county's low desertion rate.60 Deputies Cuttes and Cotton prepared the armour and the men were sent out of the county on 20 February.61 Surrey did not fare as well. There were complaints from the council in March 1600 about people in London who had property in Surrey and failed to pay their assessments. The usual

59 McGurk, *Elizabethan Conquest*, pp. 90-92: Instead of eight shillings per man coat money provided by the government, Leveson recorded it as four shillings. Also, conduct money for fifteen days was collected at the rate of 8s. *per diem*, even though the council said the county would be spared this expense; S.R.O. D/593/4/69/1(i-ii): The council's letter of 21 August 1600 said 'As wee are ready to note the neglects and faultes that are committed in the exercion of the services . . . so wee do not forget to observe the good indevours of those lieutinantes and countyes' in the performance of their duties.

60 Bourgeois, *Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy*, pp. 166-76, pp. 33-34: This is not the only time bonus money was used. It was also distributed in September 1596 and May 1597. Dr. Bourgeois thinks it may have helped keep Cambridgeshire's desertion rate down. *Salisbury MSS*, vol. xiv, pp. 148-49: Five Cambridgeshire gentlemen, including a deputy, John Cotton, and a future commissioner, Giles Allington, were delinquent in providing for horses in 1600, so there was slackness, as in other places.

threats were issued: those failing to comply were to face the council.\textsuperscript{62} Yet reluctance continued. In May 1600 Surrey was listed as £11 behind in its payments for the supply of horse in Ireland, which were originally ordered the previous January.\textsuperscript{63} The following June, the county was obliged to provide two light horse for Ireland. As with the counties under commissioners Kent, Surrey and Cambridgeshire had deficiencies. In Kent, no fewer than eighteen of the nineteen gentlemen obliged to contribute are listed as delinquent, including a deputy, Peter Manwood.\textsuperscript{64} In Cambridgeshire there were five men deficient, including a deputy, John Cotton, and a future commissioner, Giles Allington. Surrey only had two gentlemen in default, yet they were the only two ordered to do so.\textsuperscript{65} This is a telling example of the reluctance of people to contribute to military affairs. The Kent deputy John Leveson is not listed, though a letter to Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, in December 1601 details his deteriorating financial situation. He complained of 'my father's torn estate' and his own 'want of credit': his lands were 'long since extended, and now by forfeitures brought in to the hands of strangers'. He wanted the Queen's and the council's assistance in the matter due to his service to the county.\textsuperscript{66} Military obligations could only have compounded his problems, and it is not surprising that others, perhaps in a similar situation, would try to avoid payment. Frequent levies probably brought a good deal of war-weary reluctance in their own right, and orders for further musters from April 1601 seem to acknowledge this.


\textsuperscript{63} A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 305-06, 434-40.

\textsuperscript{64} A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 434-40; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xiv, pp. 148-49.


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The council commented in its orders to Kent that 'in that countie, as in others of the Realme of late yeres there hath ben no musteringe and traynynge of the inrolled bandes', and 'one orr two daies training at the most' were to take place and 'false fires' were to be used instead of gunpowder in an effort to reduce costs. The men were to be mustered in separate groups from late May until the end of June, but there is no full certificate available. In July, Kent was told to send 300 men to Ostend to relieve veterans for Irish service. Cobham gave deputies Leveson and Walsingham directions about levies in general on 23 July. Perhaps feeling a sense of urgency due to the government’s quest for quality soldiers, he told the justices to personally supervise the choice of men made, those of 'other inferior office, [constables] ignorant or indiscrete persons whereof there hath been many complaints heretofore made' were not to take the justices' place. There are no reports of defects for that levy, and on 6 October the government wanted 200 men for Ireland. They were to be at Rochester by 14 October and Cobham showed proper urgency by forwarding the orders to Leveson on the same day he received them. On 19 October the council wrote to Leveson directly, informing him they had received his letters saying the men were arrayed. The full 200 men, not the dead-pay rate of 180, were levied, half with pikes, eighty-eight with firearms and twelve with bills.

Another tactic the government used in the face of the growing resistance to military funding was to defer costs. This was done for an Irish levy in January 1602.

66 C.S.P.D. 1601-1603, pp. 133-34.
67 S.R.O. D/593/S/4/54/5 (i-ii).
69 Ibid., D/593/S/4/69/6(i, ii, iii, iv); S/4/69/7(iii).
The localities were not liable for costs of the arms and apparel. However, in return, the shires did have to do something they found unappealing: they were to send men from the trained bands. This no doubt weakened the bands and contributed to their decay. In Kent, Cobham told his deputies to find other able-bodied men from outside the bands. The result is not certain, but McGurk states that of the men listed in the levy, none of them appears on the county muster rolls of 1601. Lancashire was told to take 'a good part out of the trained bands' of the eighty men it was to provide or the same levy, but its not known whether they were or not. Cambridge's orders specified that its thirty-five soldiers were to be of the trained bands unless, 'in their stead of like sufficiency for service' could be provided. The commissioners told the justices to find 'hable sufficient and serviceable bodies as the souldiers of the trained bands be'. If that was not possible, 'rather than fayle', they were to take the 'said nomber out off the trained bandes of suche as maye best be spared'. The council could defer costs without asking for men from the trained bands, as happened in Kent in the spring of 1602. The council's tone was apologetic, saying 'her Majesty doth by her owne letters make known unto you how much it is against her will and gratious disposicion to impose any trouble or charge upon her subiectes', and the cost of arming and clothing the men was deferred. How this levy proceeded is not known, but that July Kent was asked to provide another fifty men for Ireland at its own cost. Cobham again notified

70 McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, pp. 96-97; S.R.O. D/593/S/4/69/9(i-iii, v): The Kent men were still assembled and left the county on 18 January; B.L. Add MS 26886, fos. 75v-76v; Bourgeois, Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp. 218-28: Cambridgeshire also completed its levy on time. Also see p. 182 for another example; the council ordered the Norfolk commissioners to take arms out of the bands to supply a levy.
his deputies the same day he received his orders from the council, and the men departed on 8 August.  

Another strategy of the Crown was to use vagabonds, or ‘masterless men’, to fill the ranks of levies. In July 1601, Surrey was to round up all ‘masterless men’, who were to be sent overseas, this time to Ostend. The orders, which were addressed directly to the justices of the peace, underlining the social as well as military aspects of the endeavour, required ‘perfect searches in all alehouses, innes and such places where those loose people do judge [sic] and to keep standing watches in all the waies and endes of the streetes toward the fieldes for the apprehension of all idle, vagrant and masterless men’. The government wanted 1,000 vagrants in total, but neither county originally contributed more than twenty. The council demanded more men, ‘not doubting but you may afford somme hundreds’. Eventually, Kent was also called in to help, and the cost of arming and clothing the men was deferred. Once again, the benefits were stressed. The council said such a levy would ‘ease the countie of so many badd members and good choise maie be had amongst them of able men to serve in the warres’. How many were actually impressed is unknown. Just days before Elizabeth’s death in March 1603, the council requested vagabonds from Kent, ‘as many as can be gotten’, for service in the Low Countries. It was the council’s opinion that ‘the countries are generallie burthened everywhere with great numbers of roagues

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71 S.R.O. D/593/S/4/52/2(iii-iv); S/4/52/1(vi); D/593/S/4/69/10(i-iv); McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, pp. 97-98; S.R.O. D/593/S/4/52/1(iv-viii): Cobham was not always so diligent. On 30 April 1602, the council complained to Cobham that the county’s muster certificates for the previous two years had not been submitted and that Kent was to certify ‘betwixt seade tyme and harvest’. Three days later Cobham commented on the general decay of the horse and ordered all defects redressed and substandard equipment destroyed so it could not be shown at musters in place of acceptable arms and apparel. Yet, on 1 July, Cobham informed his deputies about a general muster, not just that of the horse. It was a full two months after the council’s letter. The musters began on 12 July, but there is no record of any certificates.
and vagabonds', and that sending them overseas would provide a 'double benefitte',
as men of means could remain at home while the rogues are eliminated.\textsuperscript{73} This is a
prime example of the council using the militia as a means of social control by sending
what it considered potentially dangerous individuals overseas. Despite its claims of
wanting fit and able men for service, the council was not above calling for vagrants
when it served its purpose. Surrey was also called upon to provide clothing and arms
for London men bound for the Low Countries in 1601 in an attempt by the council to
spread the burden of military provision.\textsuperscript{74} All of these methods employed by the
government show that the situation was not at all ideal for levying men and arms for
overseas service during the late-Elizabethan years.

Cambridgeshire generally performed well under North’s leadership, but his
death in late 1600 meant his former deputies were temporarily in command as
commissioners. Their first major task was a general muster, which the council
ordered on 28 April 1601. The former deputies were deemed to 'have sufficient
authoritie as well by her highness comyssion under the great seale (as by our letters)',
and the commissioners sent warrants for a general muster to every hundred by 20
June. A schedule running from 13 to 20 July was devised, saying when each hundred
would present its arms, and eight gentlemen were to provide horses to make up for the
deficiencies in bands. The certificate, dated 28 July 1601, lists 1,000 able or furnished
men, including 700 trained. Over half of them (526) had firearms, and there were

\textsuperscript{72} A.P.C. 1600-01, pp. 155-56; 1601-04, pp. 27-28, 36, 74-75; A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 491-92:
The last levy ordered for Surrey in the Elizabethan era involved vagrants for the Low Countries in
March 1602.

\textsuperscript{73} S.R.O. D/593/S/4/52/2 (i, vii); A.P.C. 1599-1600, pp. 567-68: On 5 August 1600,
Middlesex and Surrey were also told to apprehend 'hable men that live idly and lewdly, having neyther
masters nor any trade of living and are better to be imploied in service then to live so loosely'. They
were to be sent to Ireland.
also 107 horses – sixty light horse, thirty-five petronells and twelve lances.\textsuperscript{75} There is no noticeable difference from North’s command here, or indeed in the summer, when £175 was required in lieu of fifty soldiers for Ostend. After receiving the council’s instructions on 21 July, the commission issued a warrant to the constables for collecting the money from those ‘persons of the better sorte be of habilitie to beare the said charge’. The money was paid by 30 July, two days after the imposed deadline. It should be noted that seven days notice is a very short time in which to raise £175, and the commission still came close to doing it despite the time constraints.\textsuperscript{76} The next levy was not as successful. The county was originally ordered to raise twenty-five men for Ireland on 29 September 1601. After a four-day delay, the commission issued orders to the constables to find ‘able menn beinge of healthfull and sounde bodies’. Cambridgeshire’s charge was increased to sixty men on 6 October. Two days later the commissioners informed the other justices of the new orders. Despite the changes at such short notice, the troops were sent out of the county on 11 October, thirty-eight of them armed with either muskets or calivers.\textsuperscript{77} However, on 31 October the council complained about the poor arms of the Cambridgeshire men, which were ‘lately levied’. Instead of sending them away with unserviceable arms, replacement was made at Rochester at the cost £30, for which the shire was liable.\textsuperscript{78} If and when it was paid is not known.

\textsuperscript{74} A.P.C. 1601-04, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{75} Bourgeois, Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy, pp. 183-85, 187-91, 197-200.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp. 192-96, 201.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., pp. 201-15.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., pp. 217-18; A.P.C. 1601-04, p. 325.

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The biggest change in Surrey occurred in December 1600; of the three
deputies of two years earlier, only Carew remained. Howard and Moore both died
that year, so Sir William Howard of Effingham (son of the lieutenant), Sir George
Moore (son of William Moore) and Sir Matthew Browne (son of former deputy
Thomas Browne) were appointed deputies. These new deputies oversaw a muster in
1601 and additional levies later that year and early 1602, with no noticeable difference
from anything that had taken place since 1585. The final Cambridgeshire levy of the
Elizabethan era took place under a new lieutenant – Lord Thomas Howard of Walden
– on 30 July 1602. The day after receiving the council’s directions, Howard told his
deputies, all of whom had been on the commission – Cuttes, Cotton, Peyton and Sir
Henry North – to proceed in the matter, commenting that ‘I knowe your acquaintance
therwith is suche as I need saye no more butt leve itt to your discretions’. The deputies
saw to the rating of the county and the levy was completed by 9 August, though two
men later ran away while in transit to Bristol.

The final years of Elizabeth were difficult ones for military service. There
were numerous cases of slackness, but as a whole, there is little difference in the
performance between counties with lieutenants and those without them. In places
such as Northamptonshire, there seems to have been more slackness in the later years,
but refusals to pay and reluctance to serve were factors for the entire period from 1585
to 1603. Experienced deputies like those in Northamptonshire, Kent and

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79 A.P.C. 1600-01, p. 11; See appendix v.

80 S.H.C. Loseley MS 1330, fos. 57, 59; A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 244, 285: There were 6,300 men,
compared to 6,520 in 1597, and 1,500 of them were in the trained bands. All in all, not much had
changed. Another certificate was made on 18 June 1602, but its accuracy must be questioned since it
has the same numbers as the previous year. The only difference is the 106 cavalry listed as opposed to
one hundred for 1601. Unfortunately, the documents do not mention whether or not the forces were
greatly decayed, as was often the case.
Cambridgeshire continued to be vital. A county heavily rated for Irish service - Lancashire - performed well without a lieutenant, while the corruption and inefficiency in Norfolk and Suffolk that took place under Hunsdon continued after his death. A county that experienced no interruption in leadership – Surrey – carried on as it had done before. People were tired of war and overseas service was very unpopular, as illustrated by the council’s call for vagrants, and demands for men from the trained bands for overseas duty. That feeling of war weariness is reflected in some of the findings here. The lieutenants and commissioners did the best they could, and there is no pattern of one form of leadership being superior to the other, just as it had been in earlier years. Also as it had been earlier, the deputies proved to be key factors to the success or failure of musters and levies. For those counties without lieutenants, many of the former deputies were prominent members of the commissions of musters. Thus, this relatively small group of local gentry exerted a great deal of influence in military matters.

81 A.P.C. 1601-04, pp. 234-36, 243-45, 248-50: There was a muster ordered in late April 1602. It was completed on 20 June, but there is no record of the county’s returns.
Chapter VIII: Conclusions

Lord Burghley performed his duties as a lieutenant in the manner one would expect from such an important man in government: he was a distant figure who left the job to his deputies. He relayed orders and was there to arbitrate disputes and give approval to his deputies’ ideas and various choices of candidates for command. His philosophy is illustrated by his actions upon becoming the lieutenant of Lincolnshire. After admitting his ignorance of that shire, he left things unchanged apart from appointing two new deputies.¹ The instructions Burghley gave to his Essex deputies in March 1590 included the rather naïve comment, influenced by the poor conditions at Tilbury during the 1588 Armada crisis, about affluent men not being rugged enough to serve as soldiers. Otherwise, his instructions were nothing extraordinary: forces were to be viewed, everyone was to pay their fair share for outfitting and arming new recruits, and soldiers were not to be released without the permission of a deputy.² Burghley did rather astutely manage the dispute in Hertfordshire between John Brockett on one side, and Henry Cocke and Philip Butler on the other. Though the fact that a captaincy was allowed to remain vacant for years does not enhance his reputation as a lieutenant. He failed to use his considerable influence to persuade John Colt to take the post.³

In the area of musters and levies, Burghley was also largely reactive – he passed on the council’s orders and occasionally made a decision when his deputies wanted to delay training or used his authority in an effort to make somebody pay for

¹ See pp. 40-42.
² See p. 44.
the raising and arming of troops. His advanced age – he was sixty-seven when he
became a lieutenant – along with his poor health, must have been a hindrance to him.
He was the oldest active lieutenant when he died in 1598, just short of his seventy-
eighth birthday. Yet Sir Christopher Hatton was twenty years younger than Burghley,
and there was no substantial difference between the performances of the two men.4
Using timely musters and levies as the criteria for effectiveness, Burghley’s three
counties raised almost 5,000 men for overseas duties under his leadership. As Goring
and Wake said of Hatton, Burghley was probably as effective a lieutenant as anyone
else would have been in his situation.5 A lieutenant was expected to be the central
government’s agent in the county. He was to favour national interests over local ones,
though he usually held land in the county under his command. His military
responsibilities were to see that the militia, through his deputies, was in a state of
readiness to deliver sufficient men, horse and equipment when called upon. Burghley
generally managed to achieve this and gave as much attention to his counties as time
and his health permitted. His appointment as a lieutenant may have had more to do
with his position as a high-ranking member of the government than any military
expertise he may have possessed. As will be discussed below, at times lieutenancies
appear to have been rewards or an aid in maintaining a family’s primacy in a
particular county. It is possible that by making many members of the council
lieutenants as well, that the Queen was consolidating a great deal of power in the

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4 Complete Peerage, vols. i-xii, passim; D.N.B. vols. i-lxiii, passim; Hasler, House of
Commons, 1558-1603, vols. i-iii, passim: Lord Henry Norris, the lieutenant of Oxfordshire, who would
have been about seventy-three when Burghley died, was second in age of the lieutenants at that time.
The average age of lieutenants in 1587 was roughly fifty-three. By the time of Burghley’s death it was
about fifty-five. Sir Francis Knollys, a lieutenant in Berkshire, was eighty-four when he died in 1596.

5 Goring and Wake, Northamptonshire, 1580-1614, p. xxxi.
hands of a select group of men that she trusted. The fact that there was no replacement for Burghley is not a reflection on him, but because his counties were not deemed important enough, as will be discussed.

In assessing Burghley's fellow lieutenants included in this study, one immediately sees the similarity between him and Christopher Hatton. Both were councillors who held high positions in government. Both epitomised the absentee and distant lieutenant who depended upon his deputies. Burghley did offer military advice, even if it was, for the most part, established procedure, which is something Hatton never did. Another difference was that Hatton seems to have been more sympathetic to local interests, as when he helped reduce Northamptonshire's share of the 1589 Armada loan. Goring and Wake comment on Hatton's involvement with government and his ill health, things he shared with Burghley, and claim that his biggest drawback as a lieutenant was his lack of military service. They then compare him unfavourably to Burghley, saying he was not capable of issuing orders, as Burghley had done in 1590, and that he was seldom in the county. By contrast, they noted that Burghley was often at his estate of Theobalds, in Hertfordshire. Finally, they say that Burghley was more adept at supervising the levying and training of troops, though it is difficult to see why, and that he may well have had better success

6 It is also possible that by making a lieutenant out of a powerful courtier and councillor that Elizabeth was increasing her control of the military by having many of its commanders close at hand and immediately answerable to herself. One could also speculate that by having many of the lieutenants spending a great deal of their time in the proximity of London, that Elizabeth could better watch over them. But this is nothing more than pure speculation.

7 Though councillors signed letters critical of their performance as lieutenants (See p.81 in Chapter IV.), there seems to be a clear separation of roles. Those lieutenants on the council also signed letters of rebuke against other lieutenants. The fact that they were also lieutenants did not keep them from acting decisively in their roles as councillors.

8 See pp. 44-45.

9 See p. 54.
in raising loans. Yet in Hertfordshire, a richer county than Northamptonshire, Burghley’s supervision resulted in £1,875 being collected for the Armada subsidy. Northamptonshire raised £2,025.\(^{10}\) In fact, the two lieutenants were very similar in their style of command and performance in levies and musters. Both lieutenants’ counties performed reasonably well under them, and Goring and Wake’s conclusion that Hatton was probably ‘no more or no less effective as a lord lieutenant than anyone else in a similar position’, seems accurate.\(^{11}\) There is not a compelling case that Burghley was a superior lieutenant to Hatton, though he did exhibit less local favouritism, thus fulfilling the Crown’s wishes for an agent to see to its own interests above those of the localities.

George Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, and William Brooke, Lord Cobham, are also comparable to Burghley, but with some differences. Both issued detailed orders from time to time. Shrewsbury gave the names of men overlooked in assessment as well as precise instructions on how he wanted the trained soldiers armed. Cobham was more experienced than Burghley, and commented in depth about mustering, training and arming soldiers.\(^{12}\) Both of these men, displaying a trait of all lieutenants, let their deputies take the initiative on the day-to-day administration of the military, though they may well have actually reviewed some troops themselves. In the undertaking of musters and levies, Shrewsbury displayed some local favouritism, but Derbyshire and Staffordshire consistently, for the most part, fulfilled their obligations. Kent also did

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\(^{10}\) Goring and Wake, \textit{Northamptonshire, 1580-1614}, pp. xxviii-xxix, xxxi, 71; Noble, \textit{the names of those persons}, pp. 19-21, 28-30, 47-48; Schofield, ‘Geographical Distribution’, p. 504; Also see pp. 54-55n: It should also be remembered that Essex raised £4,125 for the Armada loan. Goring and Wake may well have based their claim about Burghley’s efficiency on this fact.

\(^{11}\) Goring and Wake, \textit{Northamptonshire, 1580-1614}, p. xxxi.

\(^{12}\) See pp. 58, 60-61.
well under Cobham, though both he and Shrewsbury, like Burghley and Hatton, relied heavily on their deputies. In the end, there is no real difference in the performance of the militias in Burghley’s counties and those in Shrewsbury’s or Cobham’s.

Charles Howard in Surrey, and Henry Carey, Lord Hunsdon, in Norfolk and Suffolk, both offer a glimpse into the lieutenancy of an practised military commander. Yet both also had other responsibilities. They were also privy councillors, and Howard was the Lord Admiral. Their tenures bore a resemblance to that of a national, distant lieutenant such as Burghley. Though Howard did at times become involved in the details of the office, such as when he informed his deputies of when and where a muster would be held and who the captains should be, he generally entrusted Surrey to his deputies.\(^{13}\) Hunsdon was an outsider with no interests in Norfolk, though he did own land in Suffolk. He is the purest example in this study of a lieutenant whose loyalty was to the central government and not to the counties.\(^{14}\) He deployed men as deputies who were often ruthless as well as corrupt in carrying out their duties.

Hunsdon’s influence was apparent in the choice of these deputies as well as in his support of reduced bands, a plan which stood no chance after he was gone. Levies in Norfolk and Suffolk were often marred by inefficiency and controversy, both during and after Huntingdon’s lieutenancy. Surrey’s record is comparable to that of Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire. Howard displayed knowledge of the shire, but his (and Hunsdon’s) military knowledge made little impact. In fact, the performance of

\(^{13}\) See p. 65. Howard’s lieutenancy in Sussex was very similar, with him and Lord Buckhurst largely relying on their deputies.

\(^{14}\) Smith, *County and Court*, p. 336: Smith comments that Hunsdon was a man who ‘had no roots in Norfolk and who was therefore untrammelled in his implementation of Council orders’.
Norfolk and Suffolk is inferior to that of Burghley's charges. So it can be said that Hunsdon did not use his military knowledge to good effect.

Cambridgeshire is the best example of a county with a local and heavily-involved lieutenant. Wake and Goring name Lord St. John in Huntingdonshire as an example of a non-councillor lieutenant who was able to devote more time to the office. However, despite being a councillor, North was at least as involved, as is shown by contrasting his orders with those of St. John. North was familiar with Cambridgeshire, and often decided how many men should be levied from which particular area, and the county was seldom negligent in its duties. In contrast to Burghley, he did not just relay the council's orders to his deputies. His efforts helped make Cambridgeshire very effective in carrying out levies and musters, the primary undertakings of the militia.

As stated earlier, none of the absentee lieutenants seems to have been any more effective than Burghley. North appears to be the most effective lieutenant in terms of efficiency, but Burghley's counties compare quite well with the rest of those presented here. Another question this thesis attempts to answer is how counties with lieutenants compare to those without them. Lancashire provides a good example of a shire that was heavily rated and reacted to the burden well without a lieutenant. There were very few troops levied under Henry Stanley, Lord Derby, who died in 1593 without being replaced, but many men were sent to Ireland from 1598 to 1602. Though far from perfect, the county under a commission of musters dominated by


16 See pp. 72-75. Admittedly, in this study St. John's lieutenancy is only chronicled during the 1588 Armada.

17 See p. 138.
former deputies did well. That is the case throughout the counties examined here. Deputies turned commissioners in Burghley’s former counties readied men for service no less efficiently than they had under a lieutenant. Some counties, such as Northamptonshire, might have experienced more slackness towards the end of Elizabeth’s time than they had in earlier years, but it does not appear that the lack of a lieutenant was a contributing factor. People were tired of war. Where there were replacements for deceased lieutenants, as in Cambridgeshire and Kent, the deputies performed well as commissioners in the transition periods, and they continued to dominate proceedings under new commanders. Norfolk and Suffolk were fairly inefficient and corrupt under Hunsdon, and they would continue to be under commissioners. The idea that the lieutenancy was a superior form of leadership to the commissioners is not supported by the fact that many counties did not receive new lieutenants when one died.

As Map I shows, there were numerous vacant lieutenancies after 1590. As mentioned above, all the coastal counties from Gloucestershire to Kent had their vacancies filled for the entire 1585 to 1603 period. Cornwall, Devonshire, Hampshire and Sussex had the same lieutenants throughout those years, while Somerset and Gloucestershire were both under Henry Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke, and in 1601, Edward Seymour, ninth Earl of Hertford, both of whom also held the lieutenancy of Wiltshire. Viscount Thomas Howard of Bindon was appointed in Dorset after the death of William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester, though there was a two- and-a-half-year gap between Winchester’s death in November 1598 and

18 See Chapter VII.

19 See p. 144.
Howard's arrival in April 1601. It is not clear why it took so long, though the shire may not have been thought to be as strategically important as Kent, in which the younger Cobham officially succeeded his father after seven months. Its geography may have made it special, but Kent also had a dynastic lieutenancy. In the three coastal counties between Kent and the Wash: Essex, Suffolk and Norfolk, were not given new lieutenants. It seems that the east coast was not considered as likely a landing place for Spanish invaders, a logical conclusion, nor was it close to Ireland, which was the most common destination for troops in the late 1590s and early 1600s.

Of the other shires in the prosperous south-east, Middlesex only briefly ever had a lieutenant, in 1590-91. A lieutenant was probably not considered necessary for London, as it was the seat of government and not a distant shire. In Hertfordshire, there was no replacement for Burghley and his presence was not particularly missed. The commission, headed by his former deputies, was deemed capable of administering this land-locked county. The same applies to Buckinghamshire, which was vacant from 1593.

East Anglia includes two counties in which replacements were made: Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. The latter was a case of a hereditary succession, as that lieutenancy was in the St. John family from 1588 to 1636. Cambridgeshire is a more peculiar situation. The office in that county did not have a dynastic character, indeed, North’s son, Henry, had been a deputy under him, and unlike the younger Cobham in Kent, he was not promoted to lieutenant. Also, the

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21 Ibid., p. 12.

22 Ibid., p. 24: There was a brief interruption from 1627 to 1629, but then the fourth lord St. John was reinstated lieutenant until 1636.
office was vacant for nineteen months, from December 1600 to July 1602. The man who was appointed, Thomas Howard of Walden, had served at sea against the Armada and commanded a naval squadron before becoming an admiral in 1596. But his appointment may not have been due to his practical military experience, but because he had won Elizabeth’s favour. North’s former deputies were at least as capable of heading the militia as the commissioners in other counties, and the shire was not heavily rated during that time. So there were not any pressing problems to be addressed. Whatever the reason for a new lieutenant, it does not seem to have had anything to do with an attempt to increase military standards.

In the Midlands, only Leicestershire, Rutland and Derbyshire received new lieutenants. The Hastings family, the Earls of Huntingdon, dominated Leicestershire and neighbouring Rutland, but Derbyshire is a different case. Gilbert Talbot, seventh Earl of Shrewsbury, followed his father as lieutenant of that county in 1590, though he did not succeed his father in Staffordshire. Derbyshire was no more important a county than Staffordshire from a military point of view. Perhaps the question should not be why the younger Shrewsbury was appointed in Derbyshire, but rather, why he was not made lieutenant of Staffordshire as well. It is odd that he did not follow his father in both shires. Since there was not a particular dynastic aspect to the lieutenancy of either place, it would be less surprising if both had been left vacant.

As in Cambridgeshire, the reason for a replacement appears to have had nothing to do with

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23 Ibid., p. 13.

24 _D.N.B._, vol. xxviii, p. 71: Howard was also steward of Cambridge University and lord chamberlain of the household. This source also states that he was sworn in as lieutenant of Cambridgeshire on 8 April 1598, but there is no evidence to support this claim.

25 The elder Shrewsbury was also lieutenant of Nottinghamshire, which was left vacant after his death.
with military matters. Of the other counties in the Midlands: Herefordshire, 
Shropshire and Worcestershire received a new lieutenant, along with Wales, after the 
death of the Earl of Pembroke. The lieutenancy of those counties went to the 
president of the Council of Wales, a post in which Pembroke was followed by Lord 
Edward Zouche.26 Warwickshire, which was not dominated by a single family or 
associated with any other counties, had no lieutenant from 1590 to 1603. 
Lincolnshire, though coastal, like Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, must not have been 
considered a likely place for invasion. Though the county contributed substantial 
numbers of soldiers after Burghley’s death, a new lieutenant was not considered 
necessary.

The North had fewer replacements still. Yorkshire is the only Northern county 
to receive a new lieutenant from 1585 to 1603. Cumberland, Durham, 
Northumberland, Westmorland and Yorkshire were under lieutenant Henry Hastings, 
third Earl of Huntingdon, from 1586 until his death in 1595. Cumberland, 
Northumberland and Westmorland remained vacant until 1607, and Durham until 
1615.27 Yorkshire also remained vacant until 1599, when Thomas Cecil, second Lord 
Burghley, became lieutenant. He was the president of the Council of the North, and 
the Yorkshire lieutenancy was associated with that office.28 This may be the reason a 
replacement was finally made for that shire, though it did send substantial numbers of 
men abroad, the only Northern county to do so other than Lancashire and Cheshire.29

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27 Ibid., pp. 15, 19, 37.
These two counties were vacant after the death of Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby, in 1593. The Stanleys were the leading family in both counties, and the lieutenancy would eventually go to William Stanley, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury, in 1607. Fernando Stanley died only months after his father, and William, the younger brother was considered potentially dangerous to the Queen, which probably accounts for the fact that he did not succeed his father until the reign of James I.

It appears that in the southern maritime counties, which were considered most vulnerable to invasion, there was an effort to replace lieutenants when they died, though four of the eight counties from Gloucestershire to Kent only had vacancies before 1590, a time when replacements were made for deceased lieutenants across the country. Yet the fact that replacements were made after 1590 does suggest that the council may well have made a conscious decision that those shires were important enough to be given lieutenants. In other places, such as East Anglia and the Midlands, only the quasi-hereditary lieutenancies were continued, with the exception of Cambridgeshire and Derbyshire. This raises the question of the order of importance in which counties were held. Based on the replacement of lieutenants, the southern-coastal counties seem to have been held in highest regard by the council. The northernmost were not levied at all, though that can partially be explained by the necessity of keeping men at home as a guard against Scottish incursions. For overseas levies, the destination was very important. The south-east, particularly London, Kent, Sussex and Essex, were large contributors of soldiers for France and the Low Countries. Lancashire, Gloucestershire, Devonshire and Worcestershire increased in

\[29\] Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, p. 291: Yorkshire sent 2,610 men abroad between 1585 and 1602, over 1,800 of them to Ireland. Cheshire sent 1,052 men abroad, while Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland and Westmorland were not levied at all.

\[30\] Sainty, * Lieutenants of Counties*, p. 14; Also see Chapter VI, p. 143.
importance once the shift was made to sending larger numbers of men to Ireland. The fact that Lancashire raised substantial numbers of men for Ireland because of its proximity to that island without a lieutenant calls into question the importance in which the government held that office. The replacement of lieutenants did not follow the change in focus from the Continent to Ireland in the late 1590s. The North-western and Midland counties that were sending large numbers of men west, were largely without lieutenants. For a relatively distant war like the one in Ireland, the council may have been glad to keep the commissions of musters in command. But given the threat of an invasion and war at home, a real possibility at the time, it may have been considered prudent to have a lieutenant in the most likely landing area, the south coast.

As for the lieutenants themselves, one has to wonder if there was a policy to have younger and fit men in certain areas. The average age of a lieutenant in 1598 was roughly fifty-four. The lieutenants in the South, in the most likely landing sites, had an average age of just less than fifty. The lieutenants of Derbyshire, Leicestershire and Rutland, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Hereford, Worcestershire, Shropshire and Wales, had an average age of about fifty-eight. This is a fairly significant difference, but more than likely not a conscious effort by the council to have younger men in particular places. Indeed, by 1603, the overall average age of lieutenants was just under fifty-five, or almost exactly the same as it was for the southern shires. The average for Cambridgeshire, Wales and the Midlands

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33 This includes ten counties: Berkshire, Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Kent, Somerset, Surrey and Sussex.
counties listed above had actually dropped to fifty-three, so there does not seem to be any basis for thinking the council had any type of policy to keep younger lieutenants in the South.\textsuperscript{34}

There were enough young and able peers available to fill the vacancies, so the policy of non-replacement was not due to a lack of candidates.\textsuperscript{35} It is likely that the council came to the conclusion that the deputies could be trusted to oversee the militias. Thomson concluded that the military administration of counties had passed from a single nobleman to a group of squires.\textsuperscript{36} The council, on more than a few occasions, communicated directly with the deputies, bypassing the lieutenant completely. From a military point of view, lieutenants seem to have made a less than significant impact from 1585 to 1603. Many were councillors themselves, and like Burghley and Hatton, were often not in their districts. Once those two lieutenants were gone, their deputies became commissioners of musters with no noticeable difference in results. This is a scene repeated throughout the country. A county's musters and levies do not seem to have been affected by whether or not they were under a lieutenant. During the later years of the reign, the country grew increasingly war-weary and reluctant to contribute to military service; demands for men and money were often resented.\textsuperscript{37} This almost certainly affected efficiency, and the government

\textsuperscript{34} Sainty, \textit{Lieutenants of Counties}, passim; Hasler, \textit{Commons, 1558-1603}, vol. i, p. 579: There were no northern lieutenants in 1598, as Yorkshire, the only northern county (i.e. Cheshire, Cumberland, Durham, Lancashire, Northumberland and Yorkshire) to have a lieutenant replaced in the 1590s, was not assigned Thomas Cecil until 1599. He was almost sixty-one when Elizabeth passed away in March 1603. \textit{Complete Peerage}, vols. i-xii, passim; \textit{D.N.B.}, vols. i-lxiii, passim: The average age of lieutenants highlighted in this thesis in 1598 is approximately fifty-eight (including Burghley), and fifty-three in 1603.

\textsuperscript{35} See p. 145.

\textsuperscript{36} Thomson, 'Origin and Growth', p. 166.


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made concessions such as reducing training, deferring costs and establishing a form of centralised supply, though it was not used consistently across the country under Elizabeth. Despite the numerous shortcomings in levies and refusals to pay for men and arms, the lieutenants and commissioners both did as well as they could in often adverse circumstances. Lord North in Cambridgeshire stands out among the lieutenants studied here as having been the most effective. Cambridgeshire consistently levied suitable troops in a timely manner and fulfilled its military obligations. Norfolk and Suffolk's levies were among the worst. There was not much difference at all among most counties, whether headed by an absentee councillor like Burghley, a military professional like Howard of Effingham, or a commission of musters. Even in Cambridgeshire, after North's death, the county went on as before, though possibly he deserves some of the credit for having helped create effective deputies who could continue after him. There are no clear-cut cases of a lieutenant being assigned to a place after 1590 to increase military preparedness and prowess. The replacements on the south coast do appear to be a case of making an extra attempt to insure some kind of readiness, but some of them were quasi-hereditary posts, the same as the ones in Huntingdonshire and Leicestershire. Perhaps the office of lieutenant was not an 'experiment', because it did continue after Elizabeth. But it may have been an experiment to commission lieutenants for the great majority of counties. From a military aspect, they generally did not have a great impact on musters and levies, and the government may well have come to the conclusion that instead of one, often distant, man commanding a county's forces, a group of local men

38 Goring and Wake, *Northamptonshire, 1580-1614*, p. xxxii: Goring and Wake refer to the lieutenants as an experiment that was not totally successful.
could do the job themselves. For the deputies had been doing the bulk of the work for years, regardless of whom the lieutenant may have been.
Appendix I:

Orders to be Observed by the Lord Lieutenants P.R.O. State Papers 12/179/47 June
1585:

Imprisis to take order with the Deputies for the publishing of the commissioners.

To give direction for the muster ing and excercising in martia ll feats such as were last yere trained and reduced into bandes.

To cause a generall view to be taken by their Deputies of the hable men within their severall charges and to see how manie of them maie be armed with suche armor as is presently to be had in the severall counties within their charges.

To cause a view to be had of all places of defense and to consider what s____ses [not sure of the word] or other kynde of defense maie be had that without anie great charges to the contrie and howe the enemy may be impeached in landing.

To take a view of the horsemen and to appointe captains over them allot ting to everie captain and colonell 50 horse with their severall cornetes witch are to be clad with cassocke of one couler.

To consider how if the landing places should be taken from them what straignt the and other apte places there are to make head against them.

To appoint by waie of distribucion certaine of the trayned men and other trayned men to repaire to the said places.

To make choice of certane pioners to resorte into the places of defence.

To appointe certaine cariages for victualls and other necessarie things for everie one of the said bands as also cariages for the pioners.

To take order that there maie be 300 or 400 shotte sett vppon ordinarie nagges on horseback.

To move the justices of peace that everie justice of the quorum maie yeld to finde 2 petronells [The number is unreadable, but document 12/179/48, which is very similar clearly states that 2 petronells are required.] on horseback and the other justices that are not of the quorum one petronell on ordanaire gildinge, to attend vpon the lieutenant to be clad in cassockes of one couler at the charges or the said justices and to be led by same captains as by the said lieutenant shalbe thought mee te.

To see the Beacons erected and well kept.

That especiall care be had to disarme all papists and other suspected persones.

It shalbe also necessarie that an oathe be ministered aswell to the trained soldiers as to the captains.
That suche as are Farmers and owners be enrolled as newe as maie be in the trained bandes.

To see that the privileged townes maie allwaies have a porcion of powder in store witch shalbe delivered them at the Queen’s price.
Appendix II:

Lords Lieutenant under Elizabeth I

Bedford
1569 - first Lord John St. John of Bletso
1586 - 1615 - Henry Grey, sixth Earl of Kent

Berkshire
1551 - Edward Seymour, first Duke of Somerset
1559 - Sir William Fitzwilliam
1586-96 - first Lord Henry Norreys and Sir Francis Knollys
1596-1601 - Lord Norreys and Sir William Knollys
1601-32 - Sir William Knollys and Henry Rich, first Earl of Holland

Buckinghamshire
1551 - William Parr, first Marquis of Northampton
1569 - Lord Arthur Grey of Wilton
1586-93 - fourteenth Lord Arthur Grey of Wilton

Cambridgeshire
1551 - William Parr, first Marquis of Northampton
1569 - second Lord Roger North
1588-1600 - second Lord Roger North
1602-26 - first Lord Thomas Howard of Walden

Chester and Lancaster
1551, 1569 - Edward Stanley, third Earl of Derby (Lancaster only)
1585 - 93 - Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby

Cornwall
1551 - John Russell, first Earl of Bedford
1559, 1569, 1585 - Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford
1586-87 - Sir Francis Godolphin, Sir William Mohun, Peter Edgcumbe and Richard Carew
1587-1603 - Sir Walter Raleigh

Cumberland, Northumbria and Westmorland
1586-95 - Henry Hastings, third Earl of Huntingdon

Derbyshire
1551, 1559 - Francis Talbot, fifth Earl of Shrewsbury
1585-90 - George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury
1590?-1616 - Gilbert Talbot, seventh Earl of Shrewsbury, It seems that he was probably lieutenant by the end of 1590.

1 Taken from Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 11-40; Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, passim.
Devon
1551 - John Russell, first Earl of Bedford
1559, 1585 - Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford
1586-1623 - William Bourchier, third Earl of Bath

Dorset
1551 - John Russell, first Earl of Bedford
1559 - James Blount, sixth Lord Mountjoy
1569 - sixth Lord Mountjoy and Sir William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester
1585 - Francis Russell, second Earl of Bedford
1586-98 - William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester
1601-11 - Thomas Howard, third Viscount of Bindon

Durham
1586-95 - Henry Hastings, third Earl of Huntingdon

Essex
1551 - first Lord Richard Rich; John Devere, sixteenth Earl of Oxford; first Lord Thomas Darcy of Chiche and Sir John Gates
1559 - John Devere, sixteenth Earl of Oxford
1569 - second Lord Robert Rich and second Lord John Darcy of Chiche
1585-88 - Robert Dudley, first Earl of Leicester
1588-98 - William Cecil, first Lord Burghley

Glamorgan and Monmouth, 1602-28
1602-28 - Edward Somerset, fourth Earl of Worcester

Gloucester
1559, 1569 - Edmund Brydges, second Lord Chandos
1586-94 - Giles Brydges, third Earl of Chandos
1595-1602 - William Brydges, fourth Earl of Chandos

Hampshire
1551 - Edward Seymour, first Duke of Somerset
1569 - William Paulet, first Marquis of Winchester
1585-93 - William Paulet, third Marquis of Winchester and Henry Radcliffe, fourth Earl of Sussex
1593-95 - William Paulet, third Marquis of Winchester
1595-97 - Paulet and Charles Blount, eighth Lord Mountjoy (cr. Earl of Devonshire
27 July 1603)
1597-98 - Blount, Paulet and George Carey, second Lord Hunsdon
1598-1603 - Blount and Carey

Hertford
1551 - William Parr, first Marquis of Northampton
1559 - Henry Parker, eleventh Lord Morley; Sir Ralph Sadler
1569 - Sir Ralph Sadler
1585-88 - Robert Dudley, first Earl of Leicester
1588-98 - William Cecil, first Lord Burghley
Huntingdon
1551 - Mr. Robert (?) Tirwhit and Mr. Audley, It’s not certain exactly who they are.
1569 - Sir Walter Mildmay and Sir Robert Tirwhit
1588-96 - John St. John, second Lord St. John of Bletso
1597-1618 - Oliver St. John, third Lord St. John of Bletso

Kent
1551 - Sir Thomas Cheney
1559, 1569, 1585-97 - William Brooke, tenth Lord Cobham
1597-1603 - Henry Brooke, eleventh Lord Cobham

Leicestershire and Rutland
1587-95 - Henry Hastings, third Earl of Huntingdon
1596-1604 - George Hastings, fourth Earl of Huntingdon

Lincolnshire
1551 - Henry Manners, second Earl of Rutland
1559 - first Lord William Willoughby, Sir Robert Tirwhit the younger, and Sir Edward Dymock
1569 - Lord Edward Clinton (cr. first Earl of Lincoln 4 May 1572)
1585-87 - Edward Manners, third Earl of Rutland
1587-98 - William Cecil, first Lord Burghley

Middlesex
1551 - first Lord William Paget and Sir Thomas Wrothe
1569 - William Paulet, first Marquis of Winchester
1590-91 - Sir Christopher Hatton

Norfolk
1551 - Henry Radcliffe, second Earl of Sussex, Sir Roger Townsend, Sir William Fermour and Sir John Roberts
1559 - Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk
1569 - Thomas Wentworth, second Lord Wentworth
1585-96 - Henry Carey, first Lord Hunsdon

Northamptonshire
1551, 1569 - William Parr, first Marquis of Northampton
1586-91 - Sir Christopher Hatton

Nottinghamshire
1551 - Edward Clinton (cr. first Earl of Lincoln 4 May 1572)
1569 - George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury
1587-88 - John Manners, fourth Earl of Rutland
1588-90 - George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury

Oxfordshire
1551 - John Dudley, first Duke of Northumberland
1559 - Sir Francis Knollys and James Blount
1569 - Sir Francis Knollys
1586-96 - Sir Francis Knollys and Henry Norreys, first Lord Norreys
1596-1601 - Sir William Knollys (cr. first lord Knollys 13 May 1603; Viscount Wallingford 7 November 1616; Earl of Banbury 18 August 1626) and Henry Norreys, first Lord Norreys
1601-28 - Sir William Knollys

Somerset
1551 - John Russell, first Earl of Bedford
1559, 1569 - William Herbert, first Earl of Pembroke
1585-1601 - Henry Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke
1601-1621 - Edward Seymour, first Earl of Hertford

Staffordshire
1551 - Walter Devereux, first Viscount Hereford and first Lord William Paget
1569 - Walter Devereux, second Viscount of Hereford (cr. first Earl of Sussex 4 May 1572)
1585-90 - George Talbot, sixth Earl of Shrewsbury

Suffolk
1551 - second Lord Thomas Wentworth and Sir Anthony Wingfield
1559 - Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk
1569 - second Lord Thomas Wentworth
1585-96 - Henry Carey, first Lord Hunsdon

Surrey
1551 - William Parr, first Marquis of Northampton
1559 - Henry Arundel, twelfth Earl of Arundel
1569 - William Howard, first Lord Howard of Effingham
  1585-1621 - Charles Howard, second Lord Howard of Effingham (cr. Earl of Nottingham 22 October 1597)

Sussex
1551 - Henry Arundel, twelfth Earl of Arundel and Thomas West, ninth Lord de la Warr
1559 - Henry Arundel, twelfth Earl of Arundel
1569 - William Howard, first Lord Howard of Effingham
  1585-86 - Charles Howard, second Lord Howard of Effingham (cr. Earl of Nottingham 22 October 1597)
1586-1604 - Charles Howard and Thomas Sackville, first Lord Buckhurst (cr. Earl of Dorset 13 March 1604)

Warwickshire
1551 - John Dudley, first Duke of Northumberland
1569, 158?-90 - Ambrose Dudley, first Earl of Warwick; It is not clear but he was in office by 6 October 1587 according to A.P.C. 1587-88, p. 254.

Wiltshire
1551, 1559, 1569 - Sir William Herbert, first Earl of Pembroke
1585 -1601 - Henry Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke
1601-21 - Edward Seymour, first Earl of Hertford

Yorkshire
1586-95 - Henry Hastings, third Earl of Huntingdon
1599-1603 - Thomas Burghley, second Lord Burghley

Wales, Hereford, Monmouth, Shropshire and Worcester
1559 - William Herbert, first Earl of Pembroke (twelve shires of Wales only)
1569 - Robert Dudley, first Earl of Leicester (Hereford, Worcester and twelve shires of Wales only)
1587-1601 - Henry Herbert, second Earl of Pembroke
1602-07 - Edward Zouche, eleventh Lord Zouche
Appendix III: Military Service of Lord Lieutenants

Lieutenants with Substantial Experience

1. Dudley Ambrose, first Earl of Warwick, Warwickshire, 1599-1603.
2. Charles Blount, eighth Lord Mountjoy, Hampshire, 1595-1606.
5. George Carey, second Lord Hunsdon, Hampshire, 1597-1603.
6. Henry Carey, first Lord Hunsdon, Norfolk and Suffolk, 1585-96.
7. Thomas Cecil, second Lord Burghley, Yorkshire, 1599-1603.
17. Roger North, second Lord North, Cambridgeshire, 1588-1600.
18. William Paulet, third Marquess of Winchester, Hampshire, 1585-98; Dorset, 1586-98.

Lieutenants with Limited Experience

2. William Cecil, first Lord Burghley, Lincolnshire, 1587-98; Essex and Hertfordshire, 1588-98.
5. Thomas Howard, third Viscount Howard of Bindon, Dorset, 1601-11.

1 The three lists were compiled by checking the volumes of the Dictionary of National Biography; The House of Commons, 1509-1558, vols. i-iii; The House of Commons, 1558-1603, vols. i-iii; The Complete Peerage; Thomson, Lords Lieutenants, passim; Bourgeois, 'A Ruling Elite', passim and Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, passim.
Lieutenants with No Experience

1. Giles Brydges, third Lord Chandos, Gloucestershire, 1586-94.
2. William Brydges, fourth Lord Chandos, Gloucestershire, 1595-1602.
4. Peter Edgecumbe, Cornwall, 1586-87.
7. Christopher Hatton, Northamptonshire, 1586-91; Middlesex, 1590-91.
Appendix IV: Burghley’s Deputies

I. Lincolnshire

A) Lord Charles Willoughby of Parham (b. 1536/37 d. between October 1610 and 26 October 1612)

He was the only son and heir of William Parham, the former lieutenant of Lincolnshire. Lord Willoughby was employed in local administration in Lincolnshire, having been on the muster commission for the city of Lincoln since at least as early as 1580. He was married to Margaret, the third daughter of Edward Clinton, the first Earl of Lincoln, a connection that probably helped him get a deputyship.

B) Thomas Cecil (1542-1623) The second Lord Burghley was educated at Cambridge and after military service in the Northern Rebellion he was appointed governor of Brill, Netherlands in 1586. He also represented Lincolnshire in Parliament in 1584 and 1586. He later represented Northamptonshire as well as being a deputy for that county. In 1588 he was a colonel in Lord Hunsdon’s forces to protect the queen at Tilbury. He was President of President of the Council of the North and lieutenant of Yorkshire from 1599 to 1603. Later, he was a lieutenant in Northamptonshire from 1603-23.

C) Edward Dymoke (1557-1624) Dymoke served as a knight of the shire in 1584, 86, 89 and 93 as well as a justice of the peace from 1583. After being sheriff in 1582-83 he became a deputy in 1585. His father died in prison for his Catholicism, but the younger Dymoke was apparently not Catholic. He was listed as one of the twelve knights of ‘great possessions’ in 1588. He was not above asking Burghley for favours, as he did in July 1593. After referring to the ‘many favors shewed’ in the past from Burghley to himself, Dymoke asked for help in his suit for registering aliens, though how Burghley responded in not known.

D) Anthony Therold (1520-94) Therold was an MP for Grantham in 1558 and 1559. He was a justice of the peace in Lincolnshire from 1554 and Nottinghamshire from 1559 as well as sheriff for the former in 1571-72. Though never a member of the bar, Therold had a legal background and was the Recorder for Lincolnshire from 1559-70 in addition to being the Queen’s attorney in the north form 1561-70. In February 1570 it was reported that he

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2 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i, p. 579; Sainty, Lieutenants of Counties, pp. 28, 37.
3 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. ii, pp. 70-71.
4 B.L. Lansdowne MS 75, f. 107.
was too ill to carry out his duties, so he quit and retired to the estates he had inherited the previous year.  

E) George St. Poll (1562-1613) St. Poll was an MP and a sheriff in Lincolnshire and was involved in a dispute about providing a horse for Ireland in 1601. In October of that year, he wrote to Robert Cecil telling him that he had sent a man with horse to Bristol for Ireland as he did the year before at a cost of £30. 'When others more able than myself [He did not specify who.] were not remembered, as there now also nay such not called again'.

II. Essex

A) Henry Grey (1542-1614) Grey was a justice of the peace from about 1573 in Essex and from 1583 in Leicestershire. He served as a knight of the shire for Essex at the behest of the council. Burghley had dealings with the Grey family previous to becoming a lieutenant. On 29 January 1563, Henry's father, Lord John Grey, wrote to the then William Cecil thanking him for delivering his niece, Lady Katherine Grey, from the Tower, where she was presumably imprisoned in connection with the Lady Jane Grey affair. Henry succeeded to his father's estates in 1564, and on 21 July 1603 he was created Baron Grey of Groby, Leicestershire.

B) Thomas Mildmay (1540-1608) Mildmay, whose father was the influential auditor of the Duchy of Cornwall, served in Parliament in 1563 and 1571. He was a justice of the peace in Essex from 1571, the sheriff from 1572-73 and Custos Rotulorum in 1576 before becoming a deputy under the Earl of Leicester in 1584.

C) Sir John Petre (1549-1613) John Petre was on the bench in Essex from 1573 and sheriff in 1575-76. Despite being Catholic, the Petres benefited from the dissolution of the monasteries. John inherited his considerable estates in 1574 and was listed among the 'knights of great possessions' in 1588. His mother and wife had been charged as recusants in 1581, but Petre himself attended church and presumably took the oath of office. In 1595 he had an income of £4,280 from rents, £2,900 of which was from his Essex properties. He appears to have had no military experience before becoming a deputy.

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5 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, pp. 488-89.
6 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, p. 331; H.M.C. Salisbury MSS, vol. xi, p. 446.
7 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. ii, pp. 222-23.
10 Halser, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. ii, p. 52.
III. Hertfordshire

A) **Henry Cocke** (1538-1610) Cocke was an MP in 1571, 77, 84, 86 and 93. He was also a justice of the peace from 1569 and sheriff in 1574-75 before becoming a deputy in 1585. He was eventually appointed Cofferer of the Household in June 1597. Cocke was close to the Cecil family, and was a tenant of Burghley's on lands near Broxbourne, Hertfordshire. His campaign for Parliament against Edward Denny in 1584 was successful in no small part because of Burghley's support. In July 1593, Cocke and Robert Cecil, serving together as knights of the shire, had been assigned to collect the fifteenth. Cocke compiled a list of those most able to pay. Shortly thereafter, on 7 August, he wrote to Cecil saying he had received his letters of thanks for sparing one of his nurses's brothers from service, calling it a 'small trifle', and saying it was 'a thing very fit for me in duty to have done'. There is further evidence that Cocke guarded the Cecil's interests from March 1596. Cocke informed Robert Cecil that he was holding someone suspected of killing a dear on Cecil land until receiving instructions on what to do with him. On 20 March 1597, Cocke wrote to Cecil again, this time to enlist his help in gaining the officer of Cofferer of the Household, an office that he secured that June. Finally, shortly after Burghley's death in August 1598, Cocke asked Cecil if he could continue to be a tenant on the land and how he hoped to stay close to the family.

B) **John Brockett** (1540-98) The Brockett family established itself in Hertfordshire during the reign of Henry VII. John Brockett was an MP for the county in 1572 and a justice on the bench from 1561. He served as sheriff on two occasions, in 1566-67 and 1581-82. He was also a friend of Francis Walsingham and commanded a group of Hertfordshire men in Hudson's forces that protected the Queen. Thus, he had military experience by the time of Burghley's arrival.
C) **Philip Butler** (d. by 1608) Not a great deal is available on Butler, whose will is in the Court of Wards by 1608. His family had been established in Hertfordshire since at least 1450, but apparently he did not serve in Parliament, though he was a deputy before Burghley’s tenure as lieutenant. He also had several large estates, including the manors of Aston Bury, Woodhall, Sacombe, Baxbury and Temple Chelsin.

D) **Arthur Capell** (1558-1632) The Capell family settled in Hertfordshire during the reign of Henry VII, and by the 1560s, Arthur’s grandfather, Sir Edward Capell, was one of the leading gentry in the county. Arthur’s father, Henry, was a captain in the Hertfordshire bands and served in the Scottish campaign of 1560. Arthur built on his family’s position by establishing close ties with Robert Cecil. On 21 June 1600, Capell suggested to Cecil that a Richard Wilson of Hertfordshire be made a captain of a company. The following November he strongly recommended one John Shirley be made a sergeant at law. The following March, Capell thanked Cecil for his ‘favourable letter unto Sir Francis Vere on the behalf of my son Edward Capell, the bearer here of, who is desirous to serve under his government’. Three months later Capell presented Cecil with a stag in thanks for Cecil’s intervention on his son’s behalf in the matter. That October Capell wrote to Cecil requesting that his son be put in command of company if he is sent to Ireland. By May 1602, Cecil had procured Edward Capell a company to command. Arthur Capell’s wife visited Theobalds that August and Cecil’s continued to receive gifts.

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15 P.R.O. Ward 7/33/103.

16 Hasler, *Commons, 1558-1603*, vol. i, p. 520.

17 *V.C.H. Hertford*, vol. 3, pp. 54, 107, 137, 155, 162, 425.


Appendix V: The Most Active Deputies of Other Counties

I. Northants

A) Richard Knightley (1533-1615) The Knightleys were an old Staffordshire family that settled in Northamptonshire and acquired wealth. Richard inherited property worth £13,000 a year. He served in Parliament in 1584, 1586, 1589, 1597 and 1601. He was also a justice of the peace from 1573 as well as sheriff in 1569-69 and 1581-82. He had previous military experience, having been on the muster commission from 1571-86, and he was involved in military matters from 1569, when he first became a deputy, until his death.

B) Edward Montagu (1530-1602) The Montagu family acquired monastic lands in Northamptonshire, eventually gaining eleven manors, one castle and one baronial residence. Edward Montagu inherited these lands in 1557 and was knight of the shire in 1559. He was sheriff of the county on four occasions and was a justice from 1559. He became a deputy in 1570 and was on the muster commission from 1571-86.

C) Arthur Throckmorton (1557-1626) Throckmorton inherited estates in Northamptonshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire and was the brother-in-law of Sir Walter Raleigh. He attended Oxford and served in the Low Countries and had the support of Francis Walsingham. In 1596, he went on the Cadiz Expedition. A staunch anti-Catholic, Throckmorton served as a justice of the peace as well as an MP, and was captain of the horse in the west division in 1601.

D) Thomas Cecil See Appendix IV under Lincolnshire.

II. Shrewsbury's Deputies

A) John Manners (1536-1611) Manners was the chief deputy of Derbyshire. He was raised in Shelford, Nottinghamshire and twice represented it in Parliament. He inherited property in Derbyshire through his marriage, including Haddon Hall, and lived in that shire by 1571. His brother-in-law was his lieutenant, the earl of Shrewsbury, who trusted him. Previously, Manners had been on the bench in both counties and had been a sheriff in Derbyshire. He was appointed a deputy in 1585.

B) Richard Bagot (d. 1597) The Bagot family had lived in Staffordshire throughout the Middle Ages and are listed in the Domesday book. Richard was a sheriff, as was his eldest son, Walter, a deputy in the county under James I and husband of Elizabeth Case, a niece of William Cecil, first Lord Burghley.

1 D.N.B. vol. xxxi, p. 268.
2 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. ii, p. 405.
3 Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 68-69.
4 Ibid., pp. 490-91
5 Ibid., p. 7.
III. Kent

A) **Henry Brooke** (1564-1619) The son of the tenth lord Cobham, Brooke was a knight of the shire, justice and eventually, Warden of the Cinque Ports, lieutenant of Kent and the eleventh Lord Cobham. He was attained in 1603 for his alleged role in the Main plot. He was eventually sent to the Tower, where he died in 1619.7

B) **John Leveson** (1556-1615) Leveson was the son of a newcomer to Kent, but he married into the prominent Manwood family and was a friend to the Cobhams. Besides being a member of the bench, he was an MP on four occasions. He also had impressive military credentials and took a leading role in county defence arrangements in 1588. Previously he had served in France. He became a deputy in 1590 after serving as a captain with another future deputy, Sir Thomas Fane (the younger). J. M. McGurk calls him the outstanding deputy of Kent during the 1590s.8

C) **Peter Manwood** (d. 1625) Manwood was an MP on six different occasions, and was once knight of the shire. He was also a justice and sheriff before being appointed a deputy in 1597.9

D) **Thomas Walsingham** (1561-1630) Walsingham’s father, also named Thomas, was the first cousin of Francis Walsingham. The younger Thomas inherited estates on the death of his brother Edward which had been built on since the reign of Edward III. He was a justice from 1592 and an MP in 1597, 1601, 04, and 14.10

E) **Thomas Scott** (c. 1535-1594) The Scott family had owned lands in Kent since the 1300s and had been in Scotts Hall since the time of Henry VI. The family was quite wealthy and was said to rule over a part of Kent ‘like a reigning monarch’. In 1569, Thomas Scott served on a commission to organise coastal defences. In 1588 he was a colonel in charge of 4,000 men at Northbourne, near Dover. He had previously been named to the bench and an MP. He was first appointed a deputy in 1582.11

F) **Thomas Fane** (d. 1607) Fane was the lieutenant of Dover castle, an office that provided him with some military experience, as he helped arrange for the embarkation of supplies and military goods for the Continent. He was also a JP, sheriff and knight of the shire.12

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8 McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest, pp. 82-83; S.R.O. D 593/S/4/11/1 (vii, viii, x); P.R.O. Prob., 11/126/97 Rudd: In addition to Kent, the Leveson family had lands in Shropshire, Staffordshire and Wales.


10 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, p. 575.

11 Ibid., pp. 356-57.
IV. Surrey

A) William Howard (1538-1600) His brother was Lord Thomas Howard of Effingham, the lieutenant. He served in the military organisation of the county and was an MP on nine different occasions, including knight of the shire. He was also a justice of the peace from 1580 and resided in the manor of Lingfield. In 1596 he took part in the Cadiz expedition.13

B) William Moore (1520-1600) William Moore represented Surrey and Guilford in Parliament fourteen times between 1539 and 1597. The House of Commons, 1509-1558 states that he was generally held in ‘high esteem’, and Moore has a long record of county service. He was on the muster commission in 1597, 58, 69 and 80 as well as sheriff of Surrey and Sussex in 1558-59 and 1579-80. In addition, he was on the bench by 1558 and first appointed a deputy in 1569.14

C) Thomas Browne (d. 1597) The Brownes were prominent Catholics and Thomas was a distant relation of Lord Buckhurst. He had vast lands and was an MP, including a knight of the shire, a justice of the peace from 1559, twice sheriff and first made a deputy in 1569.15

D) Francis Carew (1530-1611) Carew was first appointed a deputy in 1587. Before that he had been sheriff in 1567-68 and a justice of the peace from 1573. His father, Nicholas, had been attained and executed because of his alleged involvement with the Marquess of Exeter’s conspiracy with the Pole family; but his mother was given an allowance by the Crown because she was the sister of Henry VIII’s favourite, Sir Francis Bryan. Thus, Carew was fairly comfortable and entered service under Mary and became a courtier under Elizabeth. He was active in the 1588 Armada crisis, though he never saw any fighting during his life.16

E) George Moore (1553-1632) George Moore was the son of the deputy Sir William Moore and was appointed to that same position in 1600. He had previous military experience, as he was on the commission of musters by 1580. He was on the bench by 1582 and sheriff in 1597-98 as well as sitting in Parliament twelve times between 1584 and 1626.17

F) William Howard (Younger) (1577-1615) He was the son of Lord Howard, the lieutenant. His father arranged a place for him in Parliament in 1597, and he was twice knight of the shire. He was also a justice from 1597 before becoming a deputy in 1600. He had no previous military experience and his appointment appears to be a case of family continuity.18

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12 Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 103-04.
13 Ibid., p. 347.
15 Hasler, Commons, 1558-1603, vol. i, p. 505.
16 Ibid., p. 537.
17 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 80.
G) **Matthew Browne** (1563-1603) He was the son of the deputy Thomas Browne and had served in the Cadiz expedition in 1596 before becoming a deputy in 1600. The following year he sat in Parliament.\(^{19}\)

V. **Sussex**

A) **Walter Covert** (1549-1632) The Covert family had lived Horsham in north-central Sussex since the early-thirteenth century. By the end of the sixteenth century they had land throughout the shire. Walter Covert was an MP for Sussex on four separate occasions as well as a JP and sheriff in 1583-84 and 1592-93. He played a substantial part in preparing the county for the Armada in 1588.\(^{20}\)

B) **Thomas Palmer** (1542-1616) The Palmers had been in Sussex since at least the beginning of the fourteenth century and some of them were Catholic, though Thomas followed the new religion and was an MP in 1571 and 89. He was also on the bench from 1572 and sheriff in 1572-73 before being made a deputy in 1585.\(^{21}\)

C) **Nicholas Parker** (1547-1620) In addition to being Lord Buckhurst's nephew, Parker was a justice in the county from 1580, sheriff in 1586-87, and a knight of the shire in 1597. He was suspected of being a recusant in 1583, but proved his loyalty in 1584 when he arrested a Catholic, and in 1592 he was appointed recusant commissioner.\(^{22}\)

D) **Thomas Shirley** (1542-1612) The Shirleys were descendants of a Warwickshire family that acquired Sussex properties in the late 1300s. By the mid 1500s, the Shirleys had established themselves by marrying into leading Sussex families like Dawtreys and Shelles. Thomas was an MP four times, including having been a knight of the shire, and a justice from 1569 as well as sheriff in 1577-78. Shirley may have shifted his loyalty to Buckhurst after the Earl of Leicester's death, though Buckhurst had successfully backed him for knight of the shire in 1584, an effort supported by Walter Covert. In 1585 Shirley accompanied Leicester to the Low Countries with a troop he raised himself, so he had military experience. J. E. Mousley says he carried out his office as treasurer at war in a manner which did 'great discredit to himself and ultimately great financial loss to his family'. He speculated with soldiers' pay, sold contracts to victuallers and became a money lender. Letters from 1597 indicate his financial misconduct, including the failure to pay five garrisons in the Netherlands a total of £1855. Shirley made huge land purchases in Sussex, but his financial fortunes faded and he was dropped as a deputy and from the bench in 1601. He sold his estates and died in debt in 1612.\(^{23}\)

\(^{19}\) Ibid., vol. i, p. 501.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., vol. i, p. 665.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., vol. iii, p. 168.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 173.

VI. Norfolk

A) Edward Clere (1536-1606) Clere had substantial estates in the Thetford, Norfolk area, and was one of the greatest landowners in the county. He was also a second cousin of Elizabeth and Hunsdon. He was a sheriff, justice and knight of the shire, and by 1570 he was collector of the forced loan in Norfolk, where he was alleged to have committed fraud and extortion.24

B) John Peyton (1544-1630) Peyton served in Ireland as a young man from about 1564-76, and he was later in the Netherlands in 1586. He inherited lands in Cambridgeshire and later married into a prominent Norfolk family, the Beaupres. He was an MP on five occasions, and he was a knight of the shire for Middlesex, and sat on the bench in both the Isle of Ely and Norfolk. He was also sheriff in Norfolk in 1588-89.25

C) Robert Southwell (1536-98) He succeeded to his father’s properties in Norfolk at the age of four and was raised by Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk. He regained favour after Norfolk’s fall when he married Elizabeth Howard, daughter of Lord Howard of Effingham, Lord Admiral and lieutenant of Sussex and Surrey, in 1583. He was a justice from 1584, sheriff in 1589-90 and was made a deputy in 1594.26

VII. Suffolk

A) Robert Wingfield (d. 1596) Wingfield had land in Suffolk, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Leicestershire, Middlesex and Norfolk. He was twice a knight of the shire for Suffolk, a justice from 1559, sheriff, and his father was vice-chamberlain to Henry VIII. He became a deputy in 1585.27

B) Robert Jermyn (d. 1614) The puritan Robert Jermyn was on the bench in Suffolk from 1577 and sheriff in 1578-79. He served in Parliament three times, and was a knight of the shire. His uncompromising puritan beliefs saw him removed from the bench for two years due to a dispute in ecclesiastical matters. He was a staunch supporter of the war in the Netherlands, and he travelled there in 1585 before returning because of ill health.28

C) John Higham (d. 1626) His Catholic father, Sir Clement Higham, was the Speaker of the House of Commons, a privy councillor and Chief Baron of the Exchequer under Mary. Yet his son commanded 500 men at Tilbury in 1588 and held strong puritanical beliefs. His father’s Catholicism did not hurt his standing in the county, where he was on the bench by 1573 and sheriff in 1576-77 before becoming a deputy in 1585.

25 Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 212-13; Smith, County and Court, pp. 69, 287.
26 Hasler; Commons, 1558-1603, vol. iii, p. 422; Smith, County and Court, pp. 65-66, 324.
27 Ibid., p. 640.
28 Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 376-77.
VIII. Lancashire

A) Richard Sherborn (1552-94) Sherborn received patronage from the Earls of Derby, and was the executor of the estate of Edward Stanley, the fifth earl. Despite his Catholic sympathies he was a knight of the shire, a JP, on the council of musters in 1577 and 1580.29

IX. Cambridgeshire

A) Francis Hinde (1530-96) The Hinde family owned land in Cambridgeshire, Essex and Lincolnshire. Francis Hinde was active in Cambridgeshire, serving three times as knight of the shire and on the bench from 1559. He was twice sheriff and on the muster commission in 1576.30

B) John Cotton II (1543?-1620/21) The Cotton family was established in the county in the county in the fifteenth century and became more prominent under John Cotton II's father, also named John. Cotton II was twice knight of the shire and a justice by 1582. After serving as sheriff in 1591-92, Cotton was a deputy by 1596.31

C) John Cuttes (1545-1615) Cuttes was active in Essex and Hertfordshire, where he backed Henry Cocke's opponent, Edward Denny, for Parliament in 1584. He was in command of a trained band in Hertfordshire, though he was seldom in the shire. Later, he concentrated on Cambridgeshire, where his father had been active. On three occasions he was a knight of the shire as well as a justice of the peace and sheriff. He became a deputy by 1596.32

D) Sir Henry North (1556-1620) North was the third son of Lord North, lieutenant of Cambridgeshire from 1588 to 1600. He was a captain in Ireland and served in the Low Countries. He was also a justice of the peace for Suffolk in 1591 and the Isle of Ely from 1592. He was a knight of the shire in 1597 and appointed a deputy for Cambridgeshire in 1598.33

E) Sir John Peyton (1561-1616) A puritan, whose father had also been a deputy, Peyton was twice knight of the shire and had been a justice for the Isle of Ely from 1584 and for Cambridgeshire from 1591. He was also sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire and was made a deputy in 1596.34

29 Bindoff, Commons, 1509-58, pp. 313-14.


31 Ibid., vol. i, p. 662.

32 Ibid., p. 690.

33 Ibid., vol. iii, pp. 140-41.

34 Ibid., vol. iii, p. 214, 215.
### Appendix VI: Musters for Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Essex</th>
<th>Hertfordshire</th>
<th>Lincolnshire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1574-75</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td>1588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ablemen</td>
<td>12,771</td>
<td>9255</td>
<td>13,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Men</td>
<td>4284</td>
<td>2602</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained Bands</td>
<td>4042</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calivers</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>1159</td>
<td>1170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskets</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsetts</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bows</td>
<td>1071</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikes</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bills/Halberds</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demi-Lance</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Horse</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. B.L. Add MS 48167, ff. 161-62, 168; B.L. Stowe MSS 570, f. 236; 1083, f. 7; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/225/19,20.

2. B.L. Add MS 48167, ff. 161-62, 168; B.L. Stowe MSS f. 236; 1083, f. 7; P.R.O. State Papers, 12/225/19,20.

3. B.L. Add MS 48167, ff. 161-62, 168; B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236; 1083, f. 7.
## Appendix VII: Levy totals for Essex, Hertfordshire and Lincolnshire, 1587-1603

### I. Essex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Under Burgley (December 1588 - August 1598)</th>
<th>Post-Burghley (5 August 1599- March 1603)</th>
<th>Footmen Totals</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1287 footmen and 4 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>359 footmen and 4 horsemen</td>
<td>464 footmen and 25 horsemen</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>468 footmen</td>
<td>630 footmen</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (Oct. 1590)</td>
<td>900 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>3014 footmen and 8 horsemen</td>
<td>1114 footmen and 25 horsemen</td>
<td>4128</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>14, 400 footmen and 250 horsemen</td>
<td>400 footmen</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Total</td>
<td>17,414 footmen and 258 horsemen</td>
<td>1514 footmen and 25 horsemen</td>
<td>18,928</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. Hertfordshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Under Burgley (December 1588 - 4 August 1598)</th>
<th>Post-Burghley (5 August 1599- March 1603)</th>
<th>Footmen Totals</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>900 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>179 footmen and 2 horsemen</td>
<td>250 footmen and 6 horsemen</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>237 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown (Feb. 1595)</td>
<td>100 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>1416 footmen and 2 horsemen</td>
<td>250 footmen and 6 horsemen</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>2750 footmen and 80 horsemen</td>
<td>300 footmen</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Total</td>
<td>4166 footmen and 82 horsemen</td>
<td>550 footmen and 6 horsemen</td>
<td>4716</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### III. Lincolnshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Under Burgley (November 1587-4 August 1598)</th>
<th>Post-Burghley (5 August 1599- March 1603)</th>
<th>Footmen Totals</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>270 Footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>229 Footmen and 4 horsemen</td>
<td>1055 footmen and 33 horsemen</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>499 footmen and 4 horsemen</td>
<td>1055 footmen and 33 horsemen</td>
<td>1554</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>6700 footmen and 30 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6700</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Total</td>
<td>7199 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>1055 footmen and 33 horsemen</td>
<td>8254</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. Totals for all three Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Under Burgley</th>
<th>Post-Burghley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>4929 footmen and 16 horsemen</td>
<td>2419 footmen and 64 horsemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>23,850 footmen and 360 horsemen</td>
<td>700 footmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Total</td>
<td>28,779 footmen and 376 horsemen</td>
<td>3119 footmen and 64 horsemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix VIII: Levy totals for the other Counties included in this study

### I. Cambridgeshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under North (April 1588 - December 1600)</th>
<th>Post-North (4 December 1600 - March 1603)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Levies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>330 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>191 footmen and 12 horsemen</td>
<td>155 footmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>90 footmen</td>
<td>50 footmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex's Expedition</td>
<td>100 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>711 footmen and 12 horse</td>
<td>205 footmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>1200 footmen and 107 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>1911 footmen and 119 horsemen</td>
<td>205 footmen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overase Levies</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex's Expedition</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>916</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. Shrewsbury's Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under the Sixth Earl of Shrewsbury (July 1585 - November 1590)</th>
<th>Post-Sixth Earl of Shrewsbury (19 November 1590 - March 1603)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Levies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>300 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>660 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overase Levies</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>400 footmen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. Derbyshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>300 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>660 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>756 footmen and 3 horsemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Staffordshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Horsemen Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>674 footmen and one horse levy, totals unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>360 footmen</td>
<td>674 footmen and one horse levy, totals unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>400 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>400 footmen</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

236
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Totals</th>
<th>760 footmen</th>
<th>674 footmen and one horse levy, totals unknown</th>
<th>1434</th>
<th>unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>for Derbyshire and Staffordshire</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>3 plus one other levy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>720 footmen</td>
<td>1430 footmen and 3 horsemen plus one other levy</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>720 footmen</td>
<td>1430 footmen and 3 horsemen plus one other levy</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37 plus one other levy</td>
<td>375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>1420 footmen and 34 horsemen</td>
<td>1430 footmen and 3 horsemen plus one other levy</td>
<td>2850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| III. Kent                                 |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Under the tenth Lord Cobham (July 1585 - March 1597)** |     |                                                |      |         |
| **Post-tenth Lord Cobham (2 March 1597-March 1603)** |     |                                                |      |         |
| **Footmen**                               |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Horsemen**                              |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Overseas Levies**                       |             |                                                |      |         |
| France                                    | 1220 footmen| 495 footmen                                    | 1715 | 0       |
| Ireland                                   | 0           | 810 footmen and 25 light horse                 | 810  | 25      |
| Low Countries                             | 1219 footmen| 865 footmen                                    | 2084 | 0       |
| Miscellaneous                             | 180 footmen and 75 pioneers                  | 0                                             | 255 (75 are pioneers) | 0 |
| **Overseas Totals**                       | 2619 footmen and 75 pioneers                 | 2170 footmen and 25 light horse               | 4864 | 25      |
| **Defensive Levies**                      |             |                                                |      |         |
| 5100 footmen, 64 lances and 330 light horse |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Combined Totals**                       | 7719 footmen, 75 pioneers, 64 lances and 330 light horse | 2170 footmen and 25 light horse | 9964 | 419     |

| IV. Lancashire                            |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Under the Earl of Derby (July 1585 - September 1593)** |     |                                                |      |         |
| **Post-Derby (26 September 1593 - March 1603)** |     |                                                |      |         |
| **Footmen**                               |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Horsemen**                              |             |                                                |      |         |
| **Overseas Levies**                       |             |                                                |      |         |
| France                                    | 0           | 0                                              | 0    | 0       |

237
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex's Expedition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Totals</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Hunsdon Counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(July 1585 - July 1596)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Lord Hunsdon's Under Hunsdon Post-Hunsdon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24 July 1596 - March 1603)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A. Norfolk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Levies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Totals</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>11,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Suffolk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Levies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive Levies</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Totals</td>
<td>9,360</td>
<td>10,453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Combined Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Levies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

238
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defensive Levies</strong></td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Totals</strong></td>
<td>19,720</td>
<td>2563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VI. Northamptonshire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>360</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defensive Levies</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>1557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Totals</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>1197</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VII. Surrey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>810</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>585</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defensive Levies</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Totals</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Countries</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas Totals</strong></td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIII. Totals for all the counties, 1585-1603**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overseas Levies</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>3,608</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>7,818</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Totals</th>
<th>Footmen</th>
<th>Horsemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>13,115</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ireland</strong></td>
<td>13,115</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>Overseas Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3934 footmen and 4 horsemen</td>
<td>15,360 footmen and 133 horsemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

240
### Appendix IX: Musters of Various Counties, 1574-75, 1577, 1588, 1591

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Ablemen</th>
<th>Armed Men</th>
<th>Trained Bands</th>
<th>Demi-Lance</th>
<th>Light Horse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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1. B.L. Add MSS 48167, ff. 161-62.

2. B.L. Stowe MS 1083, f. 7.

3. B.L. Stowe MS 570, f. 236.

Appendix X: Deficiencies in horsemen raised and comparison of counties with and without lieutenants, 1595

Bedfordshire – Twenty-six lances, twenty-two light horse, one defect in all; lieutenant sixth Earl of Kent

Berkshire – Eighteen lances, twenty-three light horse, no defects; lieutenant Lord Norris

Buckinghamshire – Twenty-nine lances, sixteen light horse, seventeen petronells, no mention of defects; no lieutenant

Cambridgeshire – Eighteen lances, twenty-two light horse, eight defaults, lieutenant Lord North

Essex – Twenty-two lances, forty-three light horse, thirteen defaults; lieutenant Lord Burghley

Hertfordshire – Twenty-six lances, twenty-two light horse, twelve defects; lieutenant Lord Burghley

Lincolnshire – Twenty-four lances, thirty-five light horse, no defaults; lieutenant Lord Burghley

Middlesex – Fifteen lances, twenty light horse, three defaults; no lieutenant

Norfolk – Fourteen lances, eighteen light horse, one defect; lieutenant Lord Hunsdon

Northamptonshire – Thirty-one lances, fifty light horse, nine defaults; no lieutenant

Nottinghamshire – Fourteen lances, twenty-one light horse, one default; no lieutenant

Oxfordshire – Seventeen lances, seventeen light horse, no defaults; lieutenant Lord Norris

Suffolk – Forty-eight lances, forty-five light horse, no defaults; lieutenant Lord Hunsdon

Surrey – Twelve lances, fourteen light horse, a general defect of armour ‘they have given their worde that they have it in readiness but were not camanded to bring it.’; Lieutenant Lord Howard of Effingham

Sussex – Twenty-three lances, twenty-nine light horse twenty-one defects; lieutenants Lords Buckhurst and Howard of Effingham

Overall – Eleven counties had lieutenants and four did not. There were only thirteen defects among the four counties without lieutenants.

1 B.L. Royal MS 7c16, fos. 259-267.
Appendix XI: Counties with and without lieutenants at the time of Elizabeth’s death in 1603 and a comparison of replacement of such between maritime and inland counties

I. Counties with lieutenants upon Elizabeth’s death in March 1603:

Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Cambridgeshire, Cornwall, Derbyshire, Devonshire, Dorset, Hampshire, Huntingdonshire, Kent, Leicestershire and Rutland, Oxfordshire, Somerset, Surrey, Sussex, Wiltshire, Yorkshire, Wales, Hereford, Shropshire and Worcestershire (twenty-two in total)

II. Counties without lieutenant upon Elizabeth’s death:

Buckinghamshire, Chester and Lancashire, Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland, Durham, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire, Lincolnshire, Middlesex, Norfolk and Suffolk, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire (eighteen in total)

III. Maritime counties in which lieutenants were replaced between 1590 - 1603:

Cambridgeshire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1602.
Dorset – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1601.
Gloucestershire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1595.
Huntingdonshire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1597.
Kent – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1597.
Somerset – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1601.
Wales, Hereford, Shropshire and Worcestershire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1602.
Yorkshire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1599.
Wiltshire – A new lieutenant was appointed in 1601.

Totals: Twelve counties in nine commands received replacement lieutenants during the period.

IV. Maritime counties that did not receive new lieutenants from 1590 to 1603:

Chester and Lancashire – no lieutenant after 1593
Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland – no lieutenant after 1595
Durham – no lieutenant after 1595
Essex – no lieutenant after 1598
Hertfordshire – no lieutenant after 1598
Lincolnshire – no lieutenant after 1598
Norfolk and Suffolk – no lieutenant after 1596

Totals: Eleven counties in seven commands did not receive replacements during the period.

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1 Sainty, *Lieutenants of Counties, passim.*

2 Six maritime counties had lieutenants without interruption from 1590 to 1603: Berkshire, Cornwall, Devon, Hampshire, Surrey and Sussex.
V. Inland counties in which lieutenants were replaced from 1590 – 1603:

Derbyshire received a new lieutenant in 1590.
Leicestershire and Rutland received a new lieutenant in 1596.

Totals: Three counties in two commands received new lieutenants during the period.

VI. Inland counties that did not receive new lieutenants from 1590 – 1603:

Buckinghamshire – no lieutenant after 1593
Middlesex – no lieutenant after 1590
Northamptonshire – no lieutenant after 1591
Nottinghamshire – no lieutenant after 1590
Staffordshire – no lieutenant after 1590
Warwickshire – no lieutenant after 1590

Totals: Six counties in six commands did not receive replacements during the period.³

Overall for all counties, there were twenty-four vacancies between 1590 and 1603, of which eleven, or forty-six percent were filled. Fifty-six percent of openings in the maritime counties were filled as compared to twenty-five percent of those in the inland counties.

³ Two inland counties had lieutenants without interruption from 1590 to 1603: Bedfordshire and Oxfordshire.
Appendix XII: Deputising Commissioners of Musters

A Letter from the Councell for the continuance and proceedinges of such orders concerninge the musteringe and puttinge in reddiness her Majesties forces as by her Majesties former Leuitennates or theier deputies have bene executed. Dated the xxxiii [sic.] of December: 1596:

After our verye hartye commendation wheras we directed our letters unto you about August was twelve moneth au thorizinge you accordinke to a commission granted unto us from her Majestied under the greate scale of England to take the mustars of that countie of Northampton wherof ther is no leuietenante for one yeare forasmuch as the tyme lymitted in out former letters is expiered and her Majestied hathe renewed the same commission unto us under the greate scale bearinge date the second of this monethe of December, therbye au thorizinge us the lorde and others of her Majesties Pryvie Councell to will and command you, the high shirife for the tyme beinge of that countie of Northampton and such as be joined with you to take chardge and gouerment as was before was committed unto yowe for the orderinge and strengtheninge of her people in that countie in this sorte followinge. First by virtue of her Majesties commission and her highness name we requier you the highe shreefe for the tyme beinge of that countie, Sir Thomas Cecil, Sir Richard Knightleye, Sir Edward Mountague, Sir William Hatton, Sir George Farmor, and Sir John Spenser, knightes, and Roberte Wingfeilde esquire, w tramher Majestied upon speciall trust hath named for this purpose to assemble yourselves in conveniente places within that countied and to make choice of all such persons under the degree of Lordes of Parliament as heartofore have bene ther appointed and that by the lawes of the realme ought to find and keepe horses or geldings, fitt for service as well in privilidged places as in others. And of all such as have bene appointed to have bene captaines of bandes, and the same to cause to be mustered at tymes and places convenient. And to make choice of other meete persons to supplie the defecte that by you shalbe found bothe of horse and footemen, and of captaines and other officers sithence the last mustars made by the former au thoritie of the leuietenantes or other deputies. And of the same numbers bothe of horse and foote beigne put in companies or bandes to make perfect roles in writtinge and the same to be sent unto us by the last Januarie next to be presented to her Majestie. And generallye we requier you in her Majesties name to cause all such orders to be observed as heretofore we directed to be executed by her Majesties former leuietenantes or theyr deputies in all places within that countie for the puttinge in a reddynesse, with armor weapons and other necessaries one horsbacke and one foote the forces of that countie as the same was and ought to have bene for the service of her Majestied and the Realme and specyallye the former directions yow received from us. And for your au thoritie and warrante to execute the same we doe lett yowe understande that by her Majesties commission under the great seale of Englanede, ther is by especiall wordes in the same sufficient warrant given bothe to us thus to command you in her highness name, and to yow and everye of yow to execute the same. And so requieringe yow to proceed hearin with that care which is fitt to be used in service of this weighte. So fare you well. From the Court at Whithale this xxiiithhe of December 1596.

Glossary

Bands. Refers to the trained bands of the militias.

Bill. A weapon with a wooden handle, having an axe and ending in a spear-head.

Bow. They generally had shooting ranges of 350 to 400 yards and the arrows could be retrieved during lulls in fighting.

Caliver. A small gun, lighter and shorter than a musket and fired without a rest.

Corslet. A piece of body armour worn by pikemen.

Demi-lance. A lance with a short staff; a light horseman armed with a demi-lance.

Halberd. A combination spear and battle-axe mounted on a shaft five to seven feet in length.

Light Horseman. A lightly armed cavalry soldier, generally, more numerous than demi-lance.

Musket. A gun similar to a caliver, but with a longer barrel and usually fired with a rest. A Bastard Musket is a slightly smaller version of the standard musket.

Petronel. A type of pistol, usually carried by a horseman.

Pike. A pole twelve to sixteen feet long with a pointed end, it was often driven into the ground for defensive purposes.

Shot (Shott). Refers to any soldiers carrying firearms.

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