Andrew Hopper, ‘The Armies’

The military history of the civil wars has long attracted a wide public audience, despite languishing as an unfashionable, marginalized sub-discipline in universities. Many academics unhelpfully stereotype the campaign and battlefield aspects of civil war history to be sterile, peripheral, and the narrow preserve of enthusiasts intent on assessing the competence of rival commanders. Despite such condescension, civil war military history has been popularized over the last forty years by historical re-enactment. This has increased knowledge about soldiers’ clothing, equipment, drill, and ranks, but has tended to avoid the wider questions of army organization, funding, and maintenance, as well as the processes by which armies engaged in politics. Army histories need to develop broader conceptual appeal and significance. The sub-discipline of military history has yielded many new findings, but the time is now ripe for military history to be reconnected to wider debates about the causes, course, consequences and experience of the mid-century crisis and, indeed, to the wider history of early modern England. In recent years there are encouraging signs that such a process is already underway. For example, battlefield studies are increasingly informed by topographical reconstruction, field-walking and landscape archaeology.\(^1\) There have also been advances in
studies of the funding, supply, and care of the soldiery, whilst the politicization of the military, in particular, the New Model Army continues to produce vibrant debate.

Military mobilization and popular politics

One means of widening military history is to examine the social composition and organization of armies from the bottom up. Determining the soldiers’ origins and recruitment leads us to the interaction between elite and popular allegiance. Numerous problems remain in reconstructing popular allegiance based upon patterns of military support. Analysis of contemporary reactions to events does not necessarily uncover their motives. Outward behavior might not accurately reflect an individual’s mindset and standpoint. Many in arms were reluctant or coerced, so historians ought to be wary of deducing political allegiance merely from military service. Rachel Weil has advanced such views further by arguing that contemporaries ‘did not adhere to a uniform or coherent understanding of allegiance’. Instead, allegiance was more about outward and visible actions, and how individuals presented themselves to those in authority. In 2008 Michael Braddick’s God’s Fury, England’s Fire developed these arguments conceptually to suggest that it ‘might be better to think in terms of
the responses to particular mobilizations rather than a fixed allegiance to one of two sides’. These ‘mobilizations’ required an ongoing process of attracting support, or ‘continuous coalition-building’ against a backdrop of changing political circumstances. In short, maintaining armed support was just as critical as attracting it in the first place because military personnel frequently deserted or changed sides. Inspired by these developments, the process by which parliament maintained support in southeast England has recently been subjected to closer scrutiny, with stronger emphasis upon studying the external actions of individuals in contributing resources rather than attempting to unpick internal beliefs and motives.

Yet more might still be learned about the identity of the soldiers themselves. They are worthy of closer study because they risked their lives, whether as volunteers or conscripts, to decide the civil wars’ outcome. Angela McShane has recently quipped that: ‘Historiographically, the position of the ordinary rank and file soldier has not progressed much further than the 1644 report which listed ordinary military casualties (other than those of officers and colors) after the horses.’ Indeed, Ian Gentles once maintained that knowing much less about soldiers than their officers was ‘not a serious drawback since it was the officers who stamped the armies with their distinctive character.’ Yet the rank and file influenced army identities too, and historians ignore them at
their peril. Soldiers’ mounts, equipment, training, diet, medical care, pay, discipline, and social background influenced their fighting capacity, as well as the strategic and tactical choices available to their commanders. For example, during 1643 the strategies of both the Earl of Essex and the Fairfaxes revolved around avoiding champion landscapes where the royalists could unleash their superior cavalry. Essex did so by keeping his army close to enclosed country during the Newbury campaign, while the Fairfaxes gave battle on urban landscapes at Tadcaster, Leeds, and Wakefield, where their musketry could be deployed most lethally. Short of cavalry, the Fairfaxes’ reliance upon clothworkers armed with muskets and clubs meant their success ended once they were compelled to give battle outside their urban strongholds.

Closer attention to the processes of recruitment should enhance our understanding of soldier identities. Soldiers might volunteer for religious, political, adventurous or deferential reasons. They might volunteer out of desperation and necessity, or from hopes of maintenance and survival; as Micheál Ó Siochrú has recently indicated, from 1649 even native Catholics were recruited into Cromwell’s army in Ireland, thereby participating in their own conquest. Recruits might be inspired, bribed, coerced, or impressed. Bonds of deference might remain an influence. In dealing with royalist recruitment, historians used to rely upon Clarendon’s emphasis on magnate
influence. Whilst historians now suspect there might be more to royalist recruitment than this, Gerald Aylmer remained sceptical about the possibilities of investigating popular royalism. Nevertheless, Malcolm Wanklyn suggested the bulk of rank and file royalists in the west were artisans, whilst Ronald Hutton cited Ian Roy’s doctoral thesis to argue that the ‘horse regiments were always an assembly of troopers from all over the kingdom and the foot regiments were never the homogenous local units of the sort Clarendon describes.’ Whilst the processes of social mobility and promotion on merit are more usually associated with the New Model Army, P.R. Newman considered that as the war lengthened ‘lesser men entrenched themselves even more firmly as first-rate active royalists.’ More recently, Lloyd Bowen has investigated the nature of such popular royalism through utilising legal records generated in cases of seditious speech.6

The old ‘deference model’ of English and Welsh landowners raising regiments from their tenants and dependents in 1642, while remaining true in some instances, is now acknowledged to be far from universally applicable. For instance, the Marquis of Hertford, the Earl of Bath and Sir William Savile failed to enforce the commission of array in Marlborough, South Molton and Halifax respectively, despite the location of these towns in a countryside dominated by their family estates.7 In Yorkshire, contrary to the unsubstantiated
claims of Sir Clements Markham and C.V. Wedgwood, the Fairfax family did not raise an army from their tenants. Rather, they recruited most heavily among the populous clothing towns in the centre of the West Riding which had demonstrated a conspicuous popular parliamentarian politics by spring 1643. One of their officers, the ironmaster Christopher Copley of Wadworth, recruited his troop from these clothing districts despite them being thirty miles distant from his seat. By 1646 only one of his troopers was from Wadworth. In places such as the Warwickshire Arden, north Devon, and parts of the West Riding, the recruitment of parliamentarian forces ran counter to the inclination of the majority of gentry, pushing these landowners towards a more authoritarian position.8

Whilst major landowners shaped initial mobilizations in many places in 1642, once it became clear the war would last longer important structural changes in the nature of recruitment followed. For landowners who derived most of their income from rents, recruiting their tenants would deprive them of income. Two-way processes of negotiation emerged as leaders appealed to vested interests to attract recruits. For instance in 1642 the king raised hundreds of volunteers among Derbyshire’s lead miners by offering them exemption from lead tithe. Mark Stoyle has argued royalists continued to recruit volunteers
in Cornwall en masse late into 1645 by harnessing the cause of Cornish
particularism to that of preventing parliamentarian victory.\textsuperscript{9}

The link between the clergy and military mobilization also merits
further attention. Preaching and sermons inspired men to take up arms, whilst
clergymen retained important roles thereafter in the moral instruction of the
soldiery. Most garrisons and regiments employed a chaplain in an official
capacity, but more comparative research is needed, not just on clerical
allegiance, but on the specific role and functions of clergymen in the British
and Irish armies of the period. There were even some occasions where ministers
were commissioned as captains of horse, such as the Warwickshire rector,
Benjamin Lovell. Preaching, psalm singing, catechizing, and fasting might all
strengthen a unit’s cohesion, morale, and fighting capacity.\textsuperscript{10} During 1642 the
Protestation was usually tendered after the delivery of Godly sermons, which
were eventually intended to stimulate military recruitment. That spring at Otley
in Yorkshire, parishioners were prepared for armed resistance by sermons that
did not espouse rebellion but nevertheless clearly blamed the king and his
advisers for the nation’s troubles. In York and Hull, John Shaw’s sermons
encouraged his hearers to intervene politically to carry out God’s will, whilst
Shaw’s preaching to Fairfax’s army at Selby encouraged the soldiers to see
themselves as persecuted saints. In some places, entire congregations were
directly exhorted to rise in arms and resist the king, such as those contacted through the written notes placed in Calderdale’s chapels in October 1643. Soldiers were exposed to sermons to remind them of the justice of their cause, whilst fiery preaching appears to have sparked some into iconoclasm.\(^{11}\)

The Scots clergy also played a prominent role in recruitment, urging many to volunteer. At Burntisland in 1640, the minister drew up a list of recruits based on the communion roll. Likewise, in rural parishes ministers listed those eligible for service, and each Covenanter regiment contained a beneficed minister drawn from the locality of its recruitment, along with a Kirk session of elders selected from the officers. In 1648, many of the Kirk’s ministers hampered royalist recruitment by attacking the Engagement in their sermons, whilst after 1649 the clergy were again prominent in the army purges and the drive to eradicate sinfulness in the military.\(^{12}\)

Considering that much of the royalist infantry were recruited in Wales, the treatment of the principality in the fashionable ‘three kingdoms’ historiography has been surprisingly muted. In military topics, Wales is either lumped in with England, or largely ignored. Yet historians such as Mark Stoyle and Lloyd Bowen have explained Welsh royalism as a reaction to the hostility of London’s press towards the principality. Godly parliamentarians considered Wales full of idolatry and superstition. A series of pamphlets scorned the Welsh
as being motivated by a dangerous politics of subsistence. Welshness, religious backwardness, and royalism were linked in parliamentarian mentalities. Welsh royalism therefore had an ethnic dimension, seeking to preserve its cultural distinctiveness from the hostile Englishness represented by puritan Westminster and the New Model Army. However in explaining the royalist mobilization in south Wales, Stephen Roberts has downplayed ethnicity and instead stressed the aristocratic dominance of the royalist peers the Marquis of Worcester and Earl of Carbery, as well as the largely unchallenged implementation of the Commission of Array. Whatever ethnic pressures may have come into play in recruitment during 1642–4, they faded thereafter as the complicated politics within south Wales made allegiance in the region especially fluid and prone to side-changing.13

Mark Stoyle has argued for similar ethnic influences in Cornwall, where the forces of ‘Cornish particularism’ ranged themselves against an Anglicizing and aggressively puritan Westminster bent on the destruction of Cornish separateness, in what he terms ‘the war of the five peoples’. For a time, the king permitted Cornish-only regiments. The Cornish royalist army originated with a popular uprising that ejected the parliamentarian gentry from the county. These insurgents were later recruited into royalist regiments in substantial numbers, on multiple occasions, and as late as December 1645. Stoyle has also stressed
the ethnic diversity of the armies employed within the English theatre, and that they included English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Cornish, French, Dutch, Walloons, and other Europeans. He argues that while both royalists and parliamentarians procured foreign military assistance, the king grew more dependent upon ethnic diversity in his armies, just as parliament’s armies became more exclusively English. In parts of the three kingdoms, ethnicity clearly became at least an additional factor in shaping the recruitment and identity of armies.

In Ireland, the nobility played a greater role in recruitment. Initially, most Catholic peers were reluctant to join the rebels in 1641, but were compelled to take action by the government’s backlash and in an attempt both to save their estates and exercise control over the insurgency. Their familial networks enabled them to call on personal armies as many Catholic commanders were heads of Gaelic septs, with their company officers often being their kinsmen and followers. Whilst the Marquis of Antrim recruited heavily from native Irish in Ulster, the capacity of his Protestant counterparts was equally impressive; Jane Ohlmeyer estimates that Protestant baronial networks in Ulster raised over 10,000 men by 1643. Irish peers such as Antrim and Viscount Inchiquin were able to mobilize considerable resources, embed themselves into coalitions and change sides whilst carrying considerable
support with them as and when necessity required. The Confederates established an administrative structure to support the war effort: county and provincial councils were established as well as a national General Assembly, in order to maintain four armies, one for each province, together with one smaller ‘running’ army. As with parliament’s regional associations in England, this structure led to rivalry between commanders and hampered strategic co-ordination. Another similarity with England was that impressment was utilized for recruitment, with each county required to produce quotas of men aged between eighteen and sixty. From 1643, the return of continental veterans such as Owen Roe O’Neill did much to ensure Confederate armies became more disciplined, trained, and regularly equipped with pike and musket. Garret Barry wrote a military manual and introduced Swedish tactics to the Army of Munster, yet Confederate armies seem to have preferred sieges to battlefield engagements, whilst their commanders were rarely comfortable leading their ill-mounted cavalry on the field. After the defeat of the regular Confederate armies, guerrilla bands emerged, living off the land and striking from hideouts in woods and bogs. Often led by former Confederate officers, they became known to the English as Tories and continued the struggle against the Cromwellian conquest.15
This proposed blending of social and military history by giving due attention to an army’s regional origins and the identity of its soldiery will broaden our understanding of the factors influencing campaign narratives. In turn, huge networks of support, transport and mobilization were required for an army to even reach the battlefield. This process invites historians to build upon recent advances in the understanding of how armies were funded, supplied, and maintained.

Financing the armies

All protagonists throughout the three kingdoms experienced tremendous difficulties in funding their armed forces. Despite these problems, the Scots Covenanters enjoyed remarkable success in funding their military during the 1640s, considering that for much of 1644–48 they were simultaneously maintaining armies in England, Scotland, and Ireland. From 1639, the Scots were the first to succeed in raising a national army based upon conscription. Its officers, sergeants, engineers, gunners, and muster masters were largely Scots veterans returning from Swedish service. Initially, local communities bore the burden of supplying and equipping the Covenanter units as the Edinburgh government lacked the resources. For example, many towns offered volunteers
the freedom of the burgh and supplied their contingents with coat and conduct money to convey them to the borders. Yet gradually the government increased control in order to field a modernized, national army. The Covenanters quartered troops on their own civilians, raised forced loans and expected civilian communities to provision the soldiery. Assessments, customs duties, and excise were collected with some efficiency, with shire war committees supervising the local war effort, and the Scottish mercantile community raising loans in Zeeland. Between 1644 and 1647, the £816,089 that the Earl of Leven’s Covenanter army received from Westminster enabled the Scots to intervene in England on favourable terms, and on a scale that would otherwise have proved impossible. The Scots produced a national, conscripted, standing army sustained by central government that anticipated the formation of the New Model Army by several years. The Scots in Ulster also enjoyed a measure of financial support from Westminster. Meanwhile the Scots themselves became more adept at extracting national wealth towards paying for their armies, and introduced new taxes such as the tenth penny and the twentieth penny. Laura Stewart has argued that this amounted to a fiscal revolution, which survived into the later seventeenth century despite the chaotic financing and supply of Hamilton’s Army of the Engagement in 1648.17
In Ireland, the Confederates were unable to emulate these successes. At its height, the Confederation might have gathered taxation from most of Ireland, save for the localities around Dublin, the Munster towns, and those districts of East Ulster and Derry occupied by the Scots. The Confederates ordered that every man grant a quarter of his estate towards the war effort, whilst they developed a financial system based on county contributions, and tried to implement an excise. Their funding also partly depended upon large sums received from the papacy, France, and Spain. Having failed to capture the arms magazine in Dublin castle, the insurgents became heavily reliant upon munitions imported from continental Europe. Peter Edwards has argued that their victory at Benburb in 1646 owed as much to advancements in their pay and supply as to Owen Roe O’Neill’s generalship. Despite the Confederates’ shortcomings, until 1649 the pay and supply of Protestant forces were scarcely superior. From summer 1642, Ormond’s royalists in Dublin received very little munitions from England. In Ulster, Robert Monro’s campaigns were poorly supplied and this alienated the civilian population, provoking Alaisdair MacColla into joining the Marquis of Montrose’s campaign in Scotland against the Covenanters. Not until Cromwell’s arrival with the New Model in August 1649 was there a decisive logistical breakthrough. Cromwell’s success was underpinned by sound financial preparation and seaborne supply which freed
his men from reliance upon local resources. This conquest has been calculated at costing the English government about £3,800,000 from May 1649 to November 1656, an average of about £37,000 per month.\footnote{18}

In England, it has long been recognized that parliament enjoyed a critical advantage in the funding and supply of its armies because of its control of the navy and the city of London. By contrast, the royalists are depicted as having struggled, with many of their infantry armed with cudgels and pitchforks at Edgehill. Thereafter, periodic deficiencies in the supply of the king’s Oxford army were strategically decisive and do much to explain the royalist failure during the first Newbury campaign. As the war lengthened the funding of royalist armies grew more difficult because the territories under their control tended to be more wore-torn and exhausted than those which supplied parliament.\footnote{19}

However, it does not follow that all royalist military finance was feeble or haphazard. From April 1643 the Earl of Newcastle imposed upon Yorkshire what became known as the ‘Great Sesse’. It was designed to raise £30,000 per month to support his army. Subdivided into the county’s Ridings and wapentakes, it was collected by parish constables. Its surviving documentation is fragmented, but its collection continued until Newcastle’s flight into York in April 1644. This was supplemented by the raising of loans, formalized by the
Yorkshire Engagement, a document popularly known as the Yorkshire Magna Charta. Lenders were promised reimbursement from the Engagement’s signatories, who pledged to repay loans according to their estates’ size. By this means £19,445 was raised very quickly. Many were forced to make contributions or sign the Engagement against their will, under threat of plundering, or to procure their release from imprisonment. So rather than maintaining his forces merely by plunder and free quarter as suggested by parliamentarian propaganda, Newcastle developed effective financial mechanisms to support his forces on a long-term basis. Furthermore, Ian Atherton’s study of the Lichfield garrison accounts has questioned the old notion that as the territory controlled by the king contracted, royalist military administration crumbled. Instead, Atherton demonstrates that in late 1645 the Lichfield royalists were better maintained and more disciplined than they had been two years earlier.  

There have also been advances in understanding the mounting, funding and supply of the main parliamentary armies by subjecting the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers to ever closer scrutiny. Recent studies of pay warrants have done much to illuminate how the Earl of Essex’s army was raised in summer 1642. It has been suggested that during the Edgehill campaign a funding crisis emerged because the localities had no representation in its constituent units.
This has provoked a counter-argument relocating the crisis to after Edgehill, with the claim that parliament initially developed an effective system for paying Essex’s army. Yet with the realization that the war might prove lengthy, parliamentarian activists from November 1642 did much to diversify their efforts into raising separate armies and organizing regional military defence.21

Here, the process of funding the armies fed directly into factional politics and infighting. Disputes, inflamed by unclear command structures, often escalated between allied commanders in conflict over honour, money, and provisions. This was aggravated by the tendency of governors of towns, castles, and fortified houses to jealously guard their commands and territorial jurisdictions, and be quick to suspect plotting and treachery among their comrades. In this way the internal politics of the regional military associations established on both sides would merit further attention, along with how they maintained support in the localities and built interests at Oxford or Westminster.

For instance David Scott has demonstrated how the supply and funding of the Scots army in northern England in 1645–6 invited resentment, first among parliament’s notoriously ill-funded Yorkshire forces and then the Northern Association. As the Scots lacked an English network of civilian administrators, committees and sequestrators, their forces were compelled into
taking free quarter and raising illegal assessments to supplement what they received from Westminster. The resulting antipathy towards the Scots’ presence weakened the Northern Association forces and made them prone to mutiny, but bolstered the anti-Scots Independents at Westminster and developed for them a northern powerbase.\(^{22}\) This in turn translated into much-needed political support for the New Model Army from within the parliamentarian coalition.

The civil wars increased the recognition that armies needed to be professional in order to succeed, with higher standards of drill, organization, equipment, discipline, funding, and supply. Whether or not the New Model was particularly novel and distinctive at its creation in 1645, it must be conceded that it was the army that eventually came closest to consistently meeting these higher standards. Its superior finances and maintenance, together with the strategic freedom enjoyed by its commanders marked it out as different. These improvements were reflected by its record of extraordinary successes not just on the battlefields at Naseby, Langport, Preston, Dunbar and Worcester, but also in its largely prosperous conduct of siege operations throughout the three kingdoms. In addition, it developed a clout unparalleled by armies elsewhere in its ability to accelerate political change. Even before the second civil war was settled, perceptive contemporaries recognised that the New Model had been distinctively successful. Bulstrode Whitelocke cautioned the Earl of Holland in
June 1648 that ‘the Parlements Army was in a formed body of old soldiers prosperous in their actions, & well provided of armes & ammunition, & that it would be a desperate and rash attempt for any to imagine to make a head against them with a new body.’ These advances were part of a wider, European ‘military revolution’ in which the ability of a regime to pay and supply its soldiers became more critical than ever. For example, in December 1659 George Monck’s prime advantage over John Lambert’s force marching north against him was that Monck had up to £50,000 available to pay his men, whilst Lambert had very little, obliging his troops to live off free quarter. This advantage contributed not a little to the restoration of the monarchy, and it brings us to our third key theme of military interventions in politics.

Armies and politics

Merely by their existence, armies influenced politics. They constrained the terms under which peace negotiations could be made and they contributed to the factional infighting to which both sides were prone. Despite their victory in the first civil war, by 1647 parliament’s armies had grown odious to the people because of the crushing burdens imposed for their maintenance. John Morrill has suggested the cost of billeting the troops probably exceeded the cost of
direct taxation. By 1647 parliament owed approximately £2,800,000 to the New Model Army, as well as its garrison forces and provincial armies under Edward Massey and Sydenham Poyntz. Faced with increasing civilian hostility and little prospect of receiving their arrears, many soldiers questioned why they remained unpaid. Some perceived a conspiracy among those MPs seeking to disband the army before arrears were settled. Despite the usual focus on the New Model, soldiers from parliament’s provincial forces were equally capable of organized political activity in response to issues of pay and indemnity. County committee men, excise officers, and sequestrators were seized and ransomed, whilst General Poyntz was arrested by his own soldiers. 24

Yet the political intervention of parliament’s soldiers stretched far beyond their personal and professional grievances to embrace wider issues such as liberty, the franchise and the king’s fate. As Ian Gentles has reminded us, the purge of parliament, the trial and execution of the king, and the establishment of a republic would have been unthinkable without the political interventions of the New Model Army. The exhilaration of continued victories gave them confidence to organize politically and demand outcomes from the war that recognized their sacrifices. The soldiers did not need John Lilburne to teach them political principles, as the election of representatives by mutinous soldiers was a common enough military practice elsewhere in Europe. The General
Council of the Army, the Declaration of 14 June 1647, and the Vote of No Addresses all represent occasions where the New Model intervened in politics, whilst the strength of the soldiers’ challenge to their generals at Putney may have been underplayed. Indeed, Philip Baker and Elliot Vernon have recently argued that the first *Agreement of the People* presented to the General Council of the Army at Putney on 28 October 1647 was not drafted by Leveller leaders such as John Lilburne, Richard Overton or William Walwyn, but was rather collated by John Wildman in consultation with the Army’s new agents and its civilian counsellors such as Maximilian Petty. Of these, even Wildman himself was likely to have been a former trooper in the Eastern Association. So rather than seeing the Levellers as ‘infiltrating’ the army, there are now powerful arguments to envision ‘a thoroughly politicized army that was capable of thinking for itself’.25

The concerns of parliament’s soldiers were also a crucial factor in driving the regicide, despite the hesitancy of many of the trial commissioners. Sean Kelsey has postulated that a capital sentence against Charles was far from a foregone conclusion, even once the trial was underway. He has stressed reluctance to impose the death penalty, as well as divisions among the trial commissioners and army officers over the nature of the charges. Yet his claim that the decision to execute the king was only taken at the eleventh hour has
been criticized for downplaying the implacable hostility of the army. Despite only eighteen out of fifty-nine regicides being army officers, the military played the leading role in forcing the king’s execution. Military pressure for ‘justice’ against Charles I came from petitioning units dispersed all across England, not just the New Model regiments in and around London. Consequently, the generals must have feared a collapse in discipline if the king was spared.

The Army’s political interventions thereafter remained no less critical in accelerating regime change, so much that Austin Woolrych highlighted ‘climacterics’ around each time the army intervened against parliament in his structuring of the period. The legacy of these military interventions in 1647, 1653 and 1659 was the speed by which the army that restored Charles II was disbanded, to prevent it from meddling in politics again. Thereafter, during the later seventeenth century, standing armies were frequently equated with military tyranny and oppressive regimes. It was dark memories of the New Model, not the Army of the Covenant, or the Irish Confederacy, that were conjured when discussing the advisability of a standing army. This reflects that no Scottish or Irish force achieved the same degree of influence within the state that the New Model achieved in England during the 1650s. Considering the internal divisions within the Covenanting and Confederate movements, as
well as the provincial-based organization of the latter’s military this is scarcely surprising.

Nevertheless, despite the New Model’s retrospective pre-eminence, the soldiers of other civil war armies frequently intervened politically in ways that their masters would not have approved, suggesting that an overview of army mutinies in the war of the three kingdoms needs to be written. Political interventions from soldiers shaped the shifting coalitions and at times dictated events. For instance, Alasdair MacColla’s invasion of Argyll in 1645 and Cornish attempts to separate themselves from mainstream royalism were overtly political acts that proved highly damaging to the royalist cause. Other examples include the deployment of Roman Catholic Irish soldiers in England, an outcome that proved to be very difficult even for some bellicose royalists to stomach. Finally, the prospect of further Irish landings in 1649 had important political consequences in England. When Charles I refused to order Ormond to desist from his preparations, he narrowed the political options available to his enemies, making regicide far more likely.28

Future research
There have been several other recent developments in the study of civil war armies. Firstly, greater attention has been paid to the historical terrain over which armies moved and fought. This has sparked a major rethinking of the traditional battlefield narratives that were once fashioned largely from textual primary sources alone. Historians are now rightly more wary of speaking about a battle without having closely studied its historical terrain. There is increased recognition that walking battlefield landscapes is as important as documentary study, and that it often opens up interrogation of traditional sources from new perspectives. This approach was pioneered by P.R. Newman in his walking of Marston Moor from 1978, and advanced further by Glenn Foard’s study of Naseby in 1995. The application of written sources to landscapes and the understanding of how human land use has altered the terrain are now integral to reinterpreting civil war battlefields. Battlefield archaeology, artifact recovery projects, and shot-fall analysis have enabled major new re-interpretations of documentary sources, in particular for the decisive civil war battles of Marston Moor and Naseby. This kind of archaeology does not involve excavating trenches, but rather a disciplined use of metal detectors for mapping finds close to the surface. By mapping the recovery of battlefield debris, especially that of lead shot, historians can with more confidence link particular locations to flashpoints within a battle. Following in the footsteps of Newman and Foard,
David Johnson has reconstructed the historical terrain at Adwalton Moor, built from references in the primary source accounts, antiquarian maps, battlefield visits, archaeological evidence, and landscape studies. This kind of collaboration between disciplines is now being advanced by the Battlefields Trust. Founded in 1991, it is pledged to ‘the presentation, interpretation and conservation of battlefield sites as educational and heritage resources.’ The trust campaigns to prevent development of battlefields and improve public access. It provides interpretational panels and visitor facilities. Its website includes maps, archaeological plans, pictures and aerial photographs of many civil war battlefield sites.

Another recent development has been the increased attention paid to military care. Only the day after Edgehill, Parliament recognized a duty of care to its maimed soldiers, their wives and children. This was the first time such recognition had been made by the English state and led to considerable improvements in military hospitals, nursing and care. The Long Parliament, Rump and Lord Protector were bombarded with petitions for pensions and relief by their maimed soldiery, war widows and orphans during the 1640s and 1650s, whilst similar petitions were made to Charles II in the 1660s by former royalists. In the provinces, justices of the peace distributed military pensions to claimants at meetings of the quarter sessions. Another related issue is the
afterlives of the New Model’s soldiery following their disbandment at the Restoration, a topic currently being investigated by David Appleby. These issues of aftercare have begun to be explored but much further research is needed as they retain massive contemporary resonance with western governments continuing to indulge in costly warfare during economic recession.

Much more is now known about how the civil wars were fought, thanks to Barbara Donagan’s well-researched publications, which have inspired a flurry of works dedicated to explaining atrocities and the infringement of codes of conduct. There have also been advances in more specialized fields such as a recent study of how parliament developed superior structures for the gathering and dissemination of military intelligence.31 Greater attention has been paid to the practice of military side-changing, its representations in print, and the self-fashioning of the side-changers themselves, either on paper, in the court-room, or upon the scaffold. This cultural turn in military history raises exciting possibilities in studying how martial culture was depicted in literature, on the stage and in the cult of honour among officers and soldiers. Iconography, banners, portraits, medals, engravings of commanders, ballads, broadsides, and propaganda woodcuts in newsbooks all offer ways in which art history, print,
and material culture might contribute to developing a new, much broader military history.\textsuperscript{32}

The military history of the civil wars needs to be reconnected to the fields of social, political and cultural history, and recent works provide the means to do so. Future research might focus on the social profile, geographical origins, and recruitment of civil war armies. With advances in computer software and genealogical techniques it might become possible to document soldier identities, and kinship networks within military units in greater depth, particularly for garrison forces where both muster rolls and local parish records survive. A thorough analysis of the certificates for the sale of crown lands, which list details of soldiers’ debentures, would also illuminate the lives of those soldiers who rose through the ranks in parliament’s armies.\textsuperscript{33} The operation of provincial armies and regional military associations on both sides requires further scrutiny. How effective these associations were at mobilizing men and resources merits more attention, especially once it is considered that the personnel of the main field armies under Charles I, Rupert, Essex and Fairfax, which have received the most attention from historians, represent only a minority of the men under arms. Such research would inform ongoing debates about the complex relationship between the centre and localities, and uncover how local rivalries impacted upon policy at Oxford and Westminster. Army
histories might explain how the process of arming the people impacted upon political developments. They should also explore in what ways the social composition of armies influenced their commanders’ strategies and their soldiers’ battlefield behaviour. After all, the civil wars were decided by a combination of the mobilization of resources and the battlefield achievements of the armies. It should be remembered more often that these two factors were closely connected.

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33 By January 1648, Ian Gentles argues that over 15 per cent of the New Model’s officers ranked captain and above had risen from the ranks: The National Archives, E121, Certificates for the Sale of Crown Lands; Ian Gentles, ‘The New Model Officer Corps in 1647: A Collective Portrait’, *Social History* 22, no. 2 (May 1997), 137, 141.