BROADCASTING FOR NATION-BUILDING IN CAMEROON:
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRAINTS

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ABSTRACT

This study examines broadcasting in Cameroon within the framework of nation-building, and against the background of failure by post-colonial Africa to make culture and polity congruent and to attain socio-economic development following the Western example. Applying the Centre-Periphery framework as an alternative to the conceptual inadequacies of the Modernisation perspective, the study investigates the internal and external factors affecting nation-building and the role of broadcasting in this connection. It argues that political centralism and inadequate participation for rural and traditional Cameroon; the marginalisation of ethnic Cameroon cultural values by the powerful Westernised few; and the failure to attain 'balanced', 'self-reliant', 'participative' and 'just' socio-economic development; have made the pursuit of the 'modern nation-state' more of an 'ideology' and 'illusion' than a reality.

The state's policy of using broadcasting to foster 'nation-building' as defined by the government, is affected by the same factors. Excessive government involvement and interference, the centralisation of decision-making and broadcast facilities, the inadequate cultural and linguistic participation for 80% or more of the population that is rural, the excessive dependence on foreign technology and expertise, the failure to contextualise or free local professional training of Western perspectives, and the heavy presence of foreign programmes and attitudes, have greatly impaired broadcasting for nation-building.

This study questions the relevance of the Western 'nation-state' in Cameroon, and argues that in a plural society genuine 'unity' and 'integration' cannot be imposed from above. It agrees with the suggestion by researchers on nation-building and communication, that only a broadcast system which guarantees cultural continuity for the masses, ensures popular participation and horizontal communication, and is ready to mobilise the populations for autocentric socio-economic development, in a state that is politically democratic, popular and participative, can contribute positively towards nation-building.
TO MY BELOVED MOTHER,
WHO DIED 10 APRIL 1989,
WAITING IN VAIN FOR AN ILLUSION.
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INTRODUCTION

This study, titled "Broadcasting for Nation-building in Cameroon: Development and Constraints", is the result of fieldwork conducted from December 1987 to May 1988. The main objective was to identify and examine the broadcast system in Cameroon by looking at its history and development, policy structure, organisation and operation; as well as to discuss the factors that have influenced Cameroonian broadcasting in general.

It is worth noting that when the study began, radio and TV existed as two separate institutions: the one (Radiodiffusion Camerounaise - RDC) as a department in the Ministry of Information and Culture (MINFOC), and the other (Cameroon Television - CTV) as a public corporation with some administrative and financial autonomy vis-à-vis MINFOC. But certain structural changes took place during the fieldwork, which although not affecting the study as such, have somewhat influenced the way the findings are presented; thus for example, the change of tenses from time to time. The major change was the creation in December of a single corporation for radio and TV, known as Cameroon Radio Television (CRTV). However, despite the administrative changes, in practice both institutions continued to function separately during the fieldwork. That clarification made, the following presents in brief the thesis, which comprises ten chapters and a conclusion.

The first three chapters constitute an intellectual introduction intended to provide the study with the necessary conceptual framework. In this respect, chapter one deals with the on-going debates on 'nation-building', especially as concerns Africa. It discusses two distinctive trends in the study of this process in the Third World: the Western perspective based on the 'Modernisation theory', and the non-Western perspective inspired mainly by the 'centre-periphery framework'. Its importance lies not only in contributing towards a framework for a study of Cameroon, but also in portraying how the same basic phenomena ('nationalism' and 'nation-building') in Africa have been perceived, understood and explained differently by social scientists.

Along the same theoretical basis, chapter two looks at the different conceptual issues in broadcasting. It discusses the various broadcast philosophies, debates, and typologies, especially as these are presented in Western societies, where the bulk of research in broadcasting has been carried out. Its significance is the fact that by providing the pace-setting debates
in the West, it lays the framework for a comparative analysis of the situation in the developing world. Thus, chapter three is interested not only in equal philosophies, debates and typologies, but also in how autonomous from the developed world the developing countries have been in choosing their broadcast systems. In addition, it examines the successes and failures of the purposive use of broadcasting, and highlights the major constraints involved therein.

This study of broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon, therefore has as its intellectual basis the debates on nation-building in Africa or the Third World, the conceptual issues on broadcasting, and the trends or tendencies in the development and use of broadcasting in the Third World. In the light of the respective arguments for and against the 'Modernisation theory' and the 'Centre-periphery framework' as explanatory models, chapter four presents the framework chosen for this study, in the form of a research problem, the design and methodology adopted, and the actual operationalisation in Cameroon.

Chapter five investigates the political, cultural, and economic aspects of nation-building in Cameroon, against a background of general failure by African states to make culture and polity congruent, and to develop economically. It provides the context necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the role of broadcasting in Cameroon's attempts to build a 'nation-state' from a polyethnic, multicultural, multilingual territory, and to promote 'balanced', 'self-reliant' socio-economic development that is 'just' and beneficial to all and sundry.

In chapter six the role of broadcasting as defined by the state through history is examined, and attention paid to the vital distinction between declared intentions and real achievements. Distinguishing between the 'formal' and the 'real' states, it deals with how the colonial and post-colonial governments each justified state monopoly, and examines some of the strategies (overt or covert) used by the various regimes to control the broadcast media.

Using fieldwork experience or participant observation, chapter seven fosters the argument that actual practice is not always compatible with declarations of intent, and that the daily operation and content of the broadcast media are subjected to constant pressures and interferences from the government. The absence of equal pressures or interferences from the public not only reinforces government's "monopoly over speech, reason, feeling or
patriotism", but also points to the fact that the rest of society has been socialised into acquiescence. Like the previous chapters, it discusses the possible effects on the nation-building ideal, of the conflict between the expectations of the formal state on the one hand, and those of the real state on the other.

The effects of centralism (a noted tendency in the developing countries) on broadcasting for nation-building, especially in a polyethnic, multicultural and multilingual society like Cameroon, are examined in chapter eight. This chapter contends that centralism results in cleavages between majority and minority interests, and to bureaucracy which adversely affects creativity, causes delays and encourages mediocrity; and examines how this is true of Cameroonian broadcasting by looking at decision-making, accessibility of broadcast facilities, programme contents and languages of broadcast. The general aim being to determine the degree of accessibility and popular participation, seen as vital for successful nation-building in plural societies.

Chapters nine and ten are based on the argument that African or Third World states are part of a world capitalist system where states might either play 'central' or 'peripheral' roles; and that as such, the study of nation-building in any developing country necessarily has to pay attention to the external factors which influence this process. The centre-periphery framework demands that we also investigate how foreign involvement has affected broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon. This is because, following the logic of the world capitalist system, the countries of the centre have no real interest in the development of strong, economically independent and culturally autonomous 'nation-states' at the periphery. Thus while chapter nine examines whether or not and how broadcasting for nation-building has been affected by foreign technological involvement, chapter ten is about the foreign cultural influences.

Based on the view that nation-building is an attempt to unite culture and polity, and given the disparity between the cultural values of the powerful minority and those of the powerless majority in Africa, what cultural values are the broadcast media promoting? Is broadcasting working towards its incorporation into the metropolitan cultural system shared by the powerful minority, or does it guarantee the cultural integrity needed for nation-building? To answer this question in full, chapter ten looks at programmes and training, the argument being that a country which intends to
use its media for nation-building, would be expected to determine content by producing programmes of its own that are well thought out and seen to be most relevant; and that to do this properly, it has to train its own media practitioners, and to inculcate in them only those media values and practices which best foster its aims and aspirations.

Chapter eleven concludes the study with a recapitulation of the various summary-conclusions reached in the ten preceding chapters, and considers the hypotheses against these conclusions. In the light of the Cameroonian experience, it also reexamines the question of nation-building in plural peripheral societies, and provides some suggestions on how the identified constraints to broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon could be alleviated both in the short and long terms.
CHAPTER ONE

NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA: THE DEBATES

INTRODUCTION

This study being concerned with the role of broadcasting in nation-building in Cameroon, it is only appropriate to start with a presentation of on-going debates on nation-building, especially as concerns Africa. There are two distinctive trends in the study of nation-building in the Third World, which might be broadly referred to as the Western and non-Western perspectives. Researchers who employ the Western perspective are influenced by models developed from a study of the European experience, and which together constitute what is generally known as the theory of 'Modernisation'. They were the dominant current in the 1960s and 1970s, and still largely are, albeit criticism of them has increased over the years in both the West and the Third World.

Proponents of the non-Western perspective accuse modernisation theorists of basing their analysis of Third World phenomena on parochial European theories, and on the assumption of a unilinear progression, which with the necessary internal political, ideological, and social adjustments, would lead to a developed modern nation-state, regardless of cultural or historical differences. Generally (but by no means totally) influenced by the 'centre-periphery' framework, advocates of the non-Western perspective stress the importance of contextual variations as essential for comparative analysis, and maintain that nation-building in the Third World cannot be explained by the same set of factors which obtained in Europe, if only because of the historical, political, economic and cultural differences that the global spread of capitalism has imposed.

Much has been written about the modernisation theory expounded in one form or another by theorists such as Lerner (1964) and Deutsch (1969), and which Portes considers "a latter-day counterpart" of the early "bipolar theories" developed for apprehending the evolution of European societies by Western sociologists who were "less concerned with encompassing the entire history of mankind" (1976:62). Our concern is to illustrate with some of the vast literature available on nation-building, how the modernisation theory has conditioned the way many researchers have tended to appreciate African
realities, and to discuss some of the alternatives suggested by critics of the theory.

I.) MODERNISATION THEORY AND NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

According to Lerner who studied the Middle Eastern societies of Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran, nation-building can only mean one thing: the evolution from a "traditional" to a "modern" society. This transformation process which he terms 'Modernization' – "a secular trend unilateral in direction" and involving physical, social and psychic mobility "from traditional to participant lifeways" (1964:89) – entails the infusion of "a rationalist and positivist spirit" (1964:45). If Lerner speaks of 'Modernization' rather than 'Westernisation' ('Americanization' and/or 'Europeanization'), it is solely to placate the sensitivities of certain Middle Eastern leaders, who while advocating and indeed pursuing the Western model, do not hesitate to denounce the West for their own diplomatic convenience (1964:46-7). He argues that the Western model is Western only in history, but global sociologically; and that this is so much the case that "The emerging nations have hastened to become new states and emulate the ways of modern societies" (1964:vii-viii). He has no doubts whatsoever that "What the West is" (1964:47) or "What America is" (1964:79), the Middle East and all other emerging nations seek to become.

In order to Westernise or Americanise, there are certain unilinear steps to be followed, which are exactly the same as those followed by Western societies in their progression towards 'modernity' or the 'participant society'. These steps, which are also indices for measuring each individual country's progress on the unique path for nation-building include secularization, urbanization, industrialization and popular participation. As Lerner observes,

\begin{quote}
Everywhere ... increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting) (1964:46).
\end{quote}

This process of modernisation, Lerner maintains, follows "an autonomous historical logic", through which "each phase tends to generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independently of cultural or doctrinal variations" (1964:61).

However, modernisation is constricted by the traditional universe
and the conservatism of those who are opposed to change. To overcome this hurdle, Lerner advocates the mobilisation of individuals towards the cultivation of 'empathy' for Western economic, cultural and political values. By 'empathy' he means "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation" or "the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world" (1964:49-50). This is particularly important since "high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant" (1964:50). Lerner advocates the development of mass media in order to facilitate empathising, for it was the mass media that "disciplined Western man in those empathic skills which spell modernity", and "portrayed for him the roles he might confront and elucidated the opinions he might need" (1964:54-5).

Even with the necessary empathy, the "voyage" towards the modern society is still a difficult one, for the path remains "replete with hard bumps and unsuspected detours." It is a journey which "entails a sustained commingling of joyous anticipations with lingering anxieties, sensuous euphoria with recurrent shame, guilt and puzzlement" (1964:73). These are difficulties facing even the modernist intellectuals, "shaped in the Western system of thought and valuation" and who "look and act - and were trained to think - like modern men" (1964:408). But whatever problems faced on this unique path to the participant society, the emerging nations must not think they can succeed by trying to do things their "own way" or by resorting to the sort of ethnocentrism which manifests itself through "extreme nationalism" and "passionate"/"primitive" xenophobia (1964:47, 77). For the participant society cannot be attained in a system where: "Wanted are modern institutions but not modern ideologies, modern power but not modern purposes, modern wealth but not modern wisdom, modern commodities but not modern scant" (1964:47). Also the emerging nations must not be "societies-in-a-hurry" to attain an ideal that even the West has not yet achieved fully, despite many centuries at it. Rather, they must be meticulous in avoiding imbalances amongst the phases of development, because any imbalances can only "accelerate social disorganisation rather than self-sustaining growth" (1964:88).

Thus according to Lerner, since the purely participant society is more or less a utopia, it is only appropriate that the societies of the West, which happen to be the most modern, serve as models or pace-setters for the emerging nations. Westernisation is therefore his prescription for difficulties in nation-building or development in the Third World. By assuming
a unilateral path in nation-building, Lerner implies that the problems of political instability, cultural pluralism, and socio-economic underdevelopment in the Third World can only be overcome through the infusion of "rationalist and positivist" Western policies, institutions, and values. The Third World's only chance is in seeking to become like the West, since "modernism, dynamism and stability tend to go together" (1964:84). The implication for the Third World countries of taking their political, cultural and economic cues from the West as Lerner suggests, is the risk of losing any political autonomy, cultural identity, and economic independence that they may have. Yet as others argue below, political autonomy, cultural identity and economic independence are the necessary preconditions for genuine nation-building.

Like Lerner, Deutsch (1966) underlines the importance of social communication facilities (mass media) for nation-building ("national assimilation or differentiation"). His theory of cultural assimilation and social mobilisation is based exclusively on Western experience, and his basic unilinear assumptions are similar to Lerner's. It was the processes of social mobilisation and assimilation that "eventually turned ... into consolidated peoples and nations" various Europeans "speaking similar dialects and closely connected by geography, economic life, and culture" (1969:67). His treatment of nationalism in developing countries reflects this Western bias (1969:67-91).

The indicators he uses to measure modernisation are identical to Lerner's. He observes that the modernisation of Western Europe was "early, slow and integrative"; that of Eastern Europe "late, quick and secessionist"; while Africa's and Asia's was "still later and still faster" (1969:68-70). In Africa, he remarks that because colonialism ended rather fast, "the rise of the unassimilated populations" has been "particularly strong". But this poses a serious problem because social and national assimilation is more effective when the process of social mobilisation is gradual. On the other hand, "the more social mobilization is postponed, the more quickly its various aspects - language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting, urbanization, industrialization - must eventually be achieved". But the chances of assimilation succeeding are greatly reduced "when all these developments have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations" (1969:73).

Thus Deutsch thinks the more likely outcome would be the precipitation of people "into politics with their old languages, their old outlook on the world and their old tribal loyalties still largely unchanged".
thereby making it extra difficult for them to "think of themselves as members of one new nation". But he thinks the countries of Africa are being very unrealistic, for: If "It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen ... How are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malavians in one generation?" (1969:73). But like Lerner, he considers nation-building a stage by stage evolution towards modernity, one identical to the West's and requiring neither rush nor leaps if the emerging nations are to do it well. But before the developing world eventually mould themselves into viable nations, they must learn to live with the chaos of their heterogeneous societies, because according to Deutsch, localism is infeasible within the modern world (1969:168-9). In fact, he is convinced that in today's world no form of government other than the nation-state "can administer the broadening scope of politics and public services", provide the best "governmental responsiveness to the needs and wishes of the governed that people now demand" and "get the broad popular support that governments need to endure in our time" (1969:171-2).

Like Deutsch and Lerner, Gellner sees nation-building as a modernisation process. He identifies "the three great stages" in the social evolution of man as "the hunting-gathering, the agrarian and the industrial" stages (1983:114), and considers nationalism as a product of industrialisation (1983:40). In Gellner's words,

As the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the world, it makes sure that almost everyone, at some time or other, has cause to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the culprits as being of another 'nation'. If he can also identify enough of the victims as being of the same 'nation' as himself, a nationalism is born. If it succeeds, and not all of them can, a nation is born (1983:112).

Defined as "the striving to make culture and polity congruent" (1983:43), nationalism, nation-building, or the creation of a modern (industrial) society, entails "the erosion of the multiple petty binding local organizations and their replacement by mobile, anonymous, literate, identity-conferring cultures" (1983:86). Its key characteristics are centralised power and a modern high culture to which most have access through education and literacy (1983:88-9). Thus the degree to which nationalism is productive of a modern nation-state, depends on how successful nationalism is in bringing about "entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population" (1983:95). In short, "Homogeneity, literacy, anonymity" (1983:138), characteristics of the industrial societies of the West, are the qualities which the emerging nations of Africa and the Third World must strive
for in their attempts to build modern nation-states - that is, to establish a "congruence of culture and polity" (1983:111).

Inspired by the theory of three stages of development (slavery, feudalism, capitalism), Potekhin categorizes human societies into tribes, 'narodnost' (ethnic with common territory, language and culture, but no common economy) and nation. He takes issue with those who use the term "nation" to refer rather indiscriminately to entities at different levels of "social development" (1966:559), and agrees with Joseph Stalin that a nation's main characteristics must be a common territory, common language and culture, common economy and common psychological make-up (1966:560-1). And once defined in this way, "it becomes clear that a nation can only come into existence under the capitalist system, and that nations are the product of capitalist development" (1966:561).

Since "there was no capitalist society" in Africa at the beginning of the 20th century, Potekhin reasons, "there was not and could not be any nation in Africa at that time" (1966:563). It was therefore colonialism which, though admittedly disrupting 'tribal' Africa's natural process of evolution, provided the African tribes the opportunity for nation formation. These are the criteria adopted by some African researchers such as Diop (1967), Lahlou (1967) and Zghal (1967, 1971) in their respective examination of nation-building in Senegal, Morocco, and Tunisia and the Maghreb. They, although recognising the difficulties involved, neither question attempts by the countries they study to imitate the West, nor the Western concept of a nation. Lahlou even talks of how nation-building in Morocco "must follow the same evolution path as that of the industrialised nations", and of the need to discard traditional beliefs and archaic practices that hinder modernisation (1967:293).

Writing in 1962, Rotberg argued that earlier anti-colonialism protests in Africa could not be classified as nationalistic, since there was no sense of "devotion to one's own nation" amongst the protesters, given that "the borders of colonial Africa were artificial and often divided tribes indiscriminately." Thus while the demands for independence came much later, what existed before was nothing other than "a common protest against white or alien rule" (1966:505-6). Through the associations they formed, and through participation in schematic sectarian movements, the indigenes in the various colonies, sought amelioration of "their colonial condition" not "change" as such (1966:517). His assessment is shared by Francis (1968:342), who maintains
that "mere resistance against conquest and foreign domination does not constitute nationalism" since the term 'nationalism' "refers to political aspirations concerning the relationship of a modern society and the modern state." However, the very proliferation of such forms of protest "helped to make possible the rapid rise of modern nationalist parties" led by Western educated indigenes (Rotberg, 1966:15).

Implicit in Rotberg's argument is the view that nothing qualified as nationalism unless it was "modernist", meaning, in agreement with Western definition of nationalism. His uncritical acceptance of the terms "tribe" and "tribal" in reference to African societies and organisations, prevented him from seriously re-examining a view of nationalism limited by Western experience. His reasoning is in tune with the prevalent colonial belief that "European civilisation was the culmination of all human progress and that the new African nations could have no better pattern and should aim at nothing different" (Ajayi, 1966:606).

Kilson argues along similar lines, seeing the acquisition of European structures and values as essential for the modernisation of Africa, "this once isolated part of the world" (1966:539). Colonialism to him was "the matrix" that gave rise to African nationalism. Thanks to certain distinct policies and practices of the colonial powers, "African tribal communities" were able "to embrace nationalism" rapidly. The policies and practices included: the creation of "rigid political boundaries" that helped unify "diverse tribal and ethnic communities within specified politico-territorial formations"; the providing of a lingua franca (English, French, etc.) to a "significant segment among the tribal communities", thus making it possible for them to communicate among themselves and with the outside world; and the providing of a common culture (mainly through Western education) through which certain colonial subjects could eventually "surmount the parochialisms characteristic of the different, and at times antagonistic, tribal cultures." It was thanks to this common Western culture, Kilson argues, that the "West African middle class" for example, despite their "heterogeneous tribal backgrounds", succeeded "in the mobilization of large numbers of their compatriots around the values of nationalism" (1966:533-4).

Again, like Rotberg, Kilson does not critically examine the possibility that "tribes" could indeed be unifying and mobilising politico-territorial formations with a common language and culture, just like or even better than the European societies he projects as models (Abdel-Malek,
This oversight on his part permits him to conveniently see colonisation at worst as a necessary evil, that contributed 'positively' to nationalism in Africa through providing otherwise heterogeneous groups with the common set of values and sense of oneness that eventually led them to demand "full national self-determination and self-government" (1966:540).

Their concept of a nation is more rigid than Seton-Watson's and Anderson's, for example. Seton-Watson sees a nation in any "community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness" (1977:1); and whenever "a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one" (1977:5). While on his part, Anderson considers a nation to be "an imagined political community ... imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1983:15). Seton-Watson is aware of the fact that "Those who use the word 'tribe' of others" are often convinced of their cultural superiority to the latter, and finds the differentiation between 'nation' and 'tribe' arbitrary (1977:5).

Nationalism to Seton-Watson means both "a doctrine about the character, interests, rights and duties of nations" and "an organised political movement, designed to further the alleged aims and interests of nations." The aims of nationalism are generally independence ("creation of sovereign state in which the nation is dominant") and national unity ("the incorporation within the frontiers of this state of all groups which are considered, by themselves, or by those who claim to speak for them, to belong to the nation"); and for some, nation-building ("extending down to the population as a whole the belief in the existence of the nation, which, before independence was won, was held only by a minority") (1977:3). After examining Africa's attempts at nation-building, Seton-Watson wonders whether the Western type of nationhood "has any relevance to the future of Africa", and feels the question ought to be raised without any "former European sense of 'superiority' or 'optimistic self-deception'" (1977:353).

The indiscriminate use of the term "tribe" by Western anthropologists in reference to societies in the developing countries, has been questioned not only by Third World academics. According to Cohen the term "ethnic" or "ethnicity", while abundantly employed in the West by sociologists, was quite rare in the work of anthropologists before the 1970s. "Led by theoretical concerns", anthropologists tended "to underplay the multiethnic quality of the societies" they studied, often accepting without
questioning labels "arbitrarily or ... inaccurately imposed" by the colonial administration (1978:380-3). But as Cohen points out,

In ideological terms, 'tribes' are a fundamentally colonial concept derived from the Latin term tribus meaning barbarians at the borders of the empire. This etymology reflects and explains the significance of the word in Western culture, its link to imperialist expansionism and the associated and overgeneralized dichotomisation of the world's peoples into civilized and uncivilized - the 'raw' and the 'cooked' of human historical experience. Unfortunately, anthropology has become the Western technical-scientific vehicle for the development of this invidious distinction, describing, tabulating, and generalizing about the 'raw' side of the dichotomy (1978:384).

Thus even though "multiethnicity is a quality of all societies", the Western bias of the anthropologists led to the imposition of a false dichotomy between the "tribal" societies of the Third World, and their "ethnic" opposites of the developed world (1978:399).

Also writing on nation-building in Africa, Francis finds an analogy between absolutism in Europe and colonialism in Africa, as the "transitional stage of nationalism." He identifies three tendencies in European nationalism - demotic, ethnic and restorative, and finds African equivalents to all three. Demotic nationalism in Europe, aimed at the democratic homogenisation of culturally heterogeneous peoples under an arbitrary political unit, was facilitated by absolutism. The African parallel to it is represented by the Western-educated pro-modernisation leaders whose objective is to forge a nation within the framework of the territorial state inherited from colonialism, and in accordance with the "Western democratic model." The force behind the demotic tendency in Africa was the colonial society: this type of nationalism resulted from "the interplay of the new masses and the new elite responding to conditions created by colonialism and to ideologies spread by Western education" (1968:343).

Ethnic nationalism in Europe, aimed at moulding a state from each major ethnic group, has Pan-Africanism as its African equivalent. Accordingly, in the same way that ethnic societies bring together into a larger whole many tribal and subtribal units, "race assumes the character of a super-ethos which embraces all the ethnic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, and paves the way for a national union on a continental scale." Pan-Africanism thus offers itself "as a remedy for the difficulties with which demotic nation-building has to cope, and as an antidote against the disruptive forces of tribalism," which perhaps explains its exceptional appeal not only as a factor for solidarity and eventual political unity, but also "in view of technological and economic
development requiring the integration of very large territories" (1968:345).

Finally, restorative nationalism in Europe, aimed at the restitution of lost autonomy and independence of political units "submerged in super-national and multi-ethnic political structures", and often initiated (albeit seldom completed) by conservative (traditional) forces, has "tribalism" as an African equivalent. Its chief characteristic of localism or regionalism, is according to Francis, the "main challenge to nation-building" or modernisation in Africa. While the demotic elite faced few problems "activating" or making the masses "aware of their own political relevance, arousing in them a sense of common purpose and organizing them into political action groups", as long as colonialism was the common enemy, tribal differences were to resurface once independence was won. So much so that the integration of the tribal populations into a single nation remains a problem. Demotic nationalism, Francis maintains, can only succeed if modernisation is "pushed far into the rural hinterland in order to weaken tribal authority, to soften tribal structures and to incorporate mobilized tribal members directly into a homogenized national society" (1968:341-4).

Writing almost twenty years after Francis, Hadjor recognizes tribalism as a major impediment to nation-building in Africa. Tribalism, he argues, is one of the reasons why African leaders have failed "to give the concept of nationhood more than a semblance of reality." These leaders "are so steeped in ethnic considerations that they cannot imagine any other mode of operation" (1987:60). But as Hadjor explains, tribalism in Africa does not imply that the continent has a monopoly over ethnic consciousness, but rather, that it is a victim of a divisive colonial legacy. He traces its origin back to the colonial era when the policy of divide and rule was consciously used to spread ethnic hostilities, by the authorities who "understood that it was easier to control a dozen ethnic groups than a united people" (1987:60-61). Such policy and practice inevitably led to political parties being organized on regional rather than national basis (1987:62).

Despite its colonial origin, post-colonial African leaders are to blame for perpetuating tribalism through a similar policy of divide and rule (1987:62-3). As Hadjor argues, the nationalist movements which won independence, disintegrated soon afterwards, as "Leading politicians sought to strengthen their position by consolidating their links with their region of origin." Hence, while "Those in power could afford to declare their loyalty to the nation state", the opposition "sought compensation in building a base of
support in their regions" (1987:63). He holds "the narrow self-interest" of African political leaders "responsible for the crisis of African nationhood." It is clear that even though Western in taste and outlook, the leaders "make a living out of promoting ethnic differences" (1987:63-64). They have drawn behind "the ethnic banner", "millions of ordinary people" who, in their daily lives, "have little scope of being tribalistic". But by making tribalism "the only route for gaining access to the ears of civil servants and politicians", the leaders have forced "even ordinary Africans [to] become all too conscious of the importance of their ethnic identity" (1987:64). Hence his conclusion that the leaders are the real tribalists, and everyone else a victim, and that "tribalism has become a most powerful ideological weapon for perpetuating exploitation" of the workers and peasants by the rich and powerful few (1987:65).

Wallerstein summarises African nationalism as a protest against political, economic and cultural inequality, and a claim for equal treatment in these respects (1964:34-38; 1968:253). In his study of nationalism in Ghana and the Ivory Coast - a study he admits was "based on the assumption that the nation is the most significant unit of social structure, the only complete social system existing in the modern world" (1964:4) - Wallerstein recognises and employs the same indicators that facilitated the transformation of Europe from a traditional to a modern society. These are urbanisation, a move from the subsistent to a market economy, the substitution of "a democracy based on rational-legal authority" for "an oligarchy based on traditional authority", and the transformation of the value system from those of a society "based on status" to those of one "based on contract." Their only difference, he argues, was the fact that the change in Africa "occurred later and faster than the change in Europe"; thereby implying both the existence of a model for African societies to follow, and the possibility for them "to change more rapidly." But for rapid changes to take place, there was the need for "a stronger state machine to hold together the nation during the transition" (1964:7).

The assumption by colonial administrators, educators, missionaries and African intellectuals, Wallerstein observes, was that Africa needed "to be taught Western values, to adopt Western styles of life, in so far as it was able to do so" (1964:71). Thus the reasoning that in order to transform Africa rapidly into modern nation-states, initial emphasis had to be placed on unity not democracy. As he remarks, "Democratic institutions seem to flourish best where authority is stable, the state is homogeneous and integrated, the economy abundant, and the wealth differentials minimized", all of which
criteria Africa is still to acquire (1964:168-9). As we are going to see, if African states are undemocratic today, the reason often advanced by the modern political elite is that in the absence of a homogeneous culture or a dominant ethnic group, ‘unity’ is far more important than popular democratic participation for national integration and the socio-economic advancement of the state.

In a study of the politics of unity in Africa, Wallerstein realised that the nationalist leaders, although broadly inspired by pan-Africanism, tended to differ in how they perceived African unity. Some saw unity as an alliance and others as a movement. The former were those "who wanted entry into the world community as equals but did not seek to transform the nature of this world, nor the nation-state that was one of its essential elements" (1968:3-22). As Seton-Watson has pointed out, this group of leaders felt that all attempts to improve existing frontiers, either by seeking greater African unity or through secession, "were likely to raise more difficulties than they solved." Thus once independent, they "did their best to unite their subjects in loyalty to a single nation which they set out to create; and to pursue political centralisation, economic modernisation and mass education" - objectives which often "involved hostility to traditional hierarchies" (1977:340), and which, as others argue below, but for political centralisation, have not been realised after almost three decades of independence.

Proponents of unity as a movement on the other hand, believed that for Africa to develop rapidly, especially in the economic domain, there was the need for "a basic alteration in the world system of exchange, a redistribution of resources, and a major shift in the terms of trade"; alterations which could only be assured by a large, politically strong, sovereign state (Wallerstein, 1968:3-22). As Wallerstein explains, their concept of unity as a precondition for modernisation is based on certain assumptions, namely: that only through substantial "self-discipline and self-denial" can African states invest adequately towards catching up with the developed countries; that foreign powers will oppose "self-discipline and isolation" wherever possible; that since ideology reflects interest, it is essential to develop one that is coherent, and that will legitimate and foster the ultimate goals of freedom and equality for Africa (1968:223-4). These radical advocates of African political, cultural and economic equality with the rest of the world, were most influential between 1957 and 1965, and considered neo-colonialism the greatest obstacle to an Africa genuinely united
beyond the territorial boundaries imposed by colonialism (1968:25-82).

Such proponents consisted of radical-nationalist states (Algeria, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and the UAR), the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), radical opposition parties in independent states (Swaba of Niger, UPC of Cameroun and the UNFP of Morocco), and of radical liberations movements (CONCP of Portuguese Africa, ZAPU of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), SWAPO of South West Africa (Namibia), and the ANC of South Africa) (1968:226-8). Their encouragement came from the political fragility, dependent economies, and social problems of the independent African states (1968:247:8). Although their formal objective remains a continental union government, Wallerstein believes the movement for African unity would have succeeded in its real goal, if it is able to secure the equality Africa seeks at the world level, in the spheres of politics, economics and culture; a revolutionary change which is not easily attainable, especially as neither the developed states nor their collaborators in Africa would allow it to happen (1968:249-53).

Ajayi contrasts European nationalism in the nineteenth century with African nationalism. First, while the former aimed at bringing under a single nation-state "people who shared the same culture and language", the latter's goal has been to "weld people speaking different languages and having different traditional cultures into one nation state." Second, whereas European nationalism was characterised by the Romantic Movement, African nationalism drew its inspiration from "the iconoclastic spirit of the French Revolution and the universal values of the philosophes". Third, unlike European nationalism which started with a cultural renaissance, African nationalism has been criticised for disregarding the traditional cultures of Africa, shared by most of the peoples (1966:606). In this way, the unifying force in African nationalism has been "a shared exclusion, not a shared culture" (Gellner 1983:82); thus making of it "primarily a political movement" based on a pre-existing state artificially imposed by alien rule (Cobban, 1969:234), and having as its spokesmen "lonely bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeoisies" (Anderson, 1983:127).

Ajayi challenges the claim that the culture imposed by the colonial powers was unifying, by arguing that all it succeeded to do was create a gap between the Westernised Africans and the masses. It infused into the former a certain disdain for the African "cultural heritage", as well as subjected them to the "mental slavery" that made them seek to "win recognition and esteem
abroad" rather than amongst their own people. Thus acculturated, such Africans were incapable of promoting genuine nation-building. However, it was neither the intention of the colonial powers to foster Africa's economic and technological development nor to create African nations. Culturally, where the colonialists appeared to accept the African, "it was because they wished to destroy his culture", and where they pretended to accept his culture, "it was because they could not accept him as an equal" (1966:607-12).

The nationalists' only chance of succeeding where the imperialists had failed, Ajayi argues, would be to realise that they could not "reach the people effectively except in the language, the symbols, the culture" which the people understood; thus the need to reestablish their self-confidence, reassert their cultural pride and promote consciousness of their own heritage through education and increased knowledge. He recognises the difficulty in achieving "common loyalty to a large political unit" within a culturally plural environment. Like Gonzalez Casanova (1965), he is aware of the possibility of 'internal colonialism'. There is the danger that "a cultural group might in the name of national integration colonise the others and deny them their self-government, or that the self-consciousness of the different cultural groups might tear the nation asunder" (1966:13-15).

To overcome such "localism" or "tribalism", Ajayi suggests Pan-Africanism, which would encourage all Africans to sacrifice parochialism for national, Pan-African and inter-national loyalties. While Pan-Africanism is "still a dream and a hope of the intellectual élite", ameaningless abstraction to the masses, Ajayi is confident that "education and increased knowledge can deepen and widen ... consciousness" about the socio-cultural and political values in Africa's heritage that are valid for its nation-building process (1966:13-15). To him, only such transcendence would ensure an end to the continuous "rape of traditional social and cultural systems by Western Civilization" (Dov, 1968:332).

Kilson summarizes the political, economic and cultural aspects of African nationalism, as perceived by the pre-independence nationalist leaders. Accordingly, in their quest for national self-determination and -government, "the middle class nationalists were primarily concerned with undoing the dominant power position held by the European ruling class" as a prelude to the political autonomy they needed in order to attain economic, social and cultural independence (Kilson, 1966:540-1). The socio-cultural aspect of nationalism took the form of demands for "full social equality" and an end to
the "socio-racial discrimination" allegedly practised by the European elite. The quest for symbols of national unity led the nationalists leaders to seek the revival or renaissance of "many of the old cultural patterns of African societies", and to "rediscover" the cultural history of Africa. Economically, the nationalists argued that the colonial economic system "hampered the implementation of any effective, thorough-going policy of industrialisation and of general socio-economic development for the welfare of the peoples", and that only through the removal of colonial rule could Africa develop economically. "African Economic prosperity was viewed as a function of the control of political power" (Kilson, 1966:540-4).

However, as Eisenstadt aptly remarked in 1954, while clamouring for political independence, the nationalist leaders "did not make any special efforts to transform other spheres of institutional life and to solve the problems" created by an uneven colonial development (1966:578) that put the colonies in "an inferior, dependent, and unbalanced position in relation to European powers" and created an imbalance between the 'central' and 'local' levels within the colonies (1966:573-4). Like Nkrumah (Dov, 1968:334), they merely assumed that "all of these problems would be more or less automatically solved once political independence would be achieved" (1966:578). But as events were to prove, this was a most mistaken assumption to make.

II.) ALTERNATIVES TO MODERNISATION THEORY

A) A Western Alternative by A.D. Smith

According to Smith, despite their political and cultural differences, societies the world over have three common elements that make a comparative study of them possible. These include "the rise of the modern state, the emergence of national communities and of nationalist ideologies and sentiments, and the formation of new strata, notably bureaucrats, bourgeoisie and intelligentsia" (1983:1). Since these three elements first occurred in Western Europe and were "transported and transplanted" into other regions of the world by Westerners, and since non-Western leaders have subsequently modeled (overtly or otherwise) their political and cultural institutions and styles à l'occidentale, Smith thinks this justifies the use of "Western experience as a baseline for comparisons with African and Asian developments" (1983:1-2).

This recognition notwithstanding, Smith is critical of the West-centred perspectives ('Europocentrism') of researchers such as Shils,
Deutsch and Lerner, whose nation-building theories "are impregnated with Western cultural assumptions" and for whom 'modernisation' is synonymous with 'westernisation' (1983:2-13; 1986:231). He is also critical of Deutsch and Lerner for simply assuming rather than ascribing "any real role for the state and state elites" in their communications theories on the 'national participant society' and the educative and mobilisation role of the media (1986:231). He however endorses Deutsch's theory, albeit based on European experience exclusively, that nations and nationalities are formed by means of "cultural assimilation and social mobilisation". Although as far as Africa and Asia are concerned, modernisation has generally turned out to be "an agent of 'state-destroying' through cultural differentiation, rather than 'nation-building' through any cultural assimilation" (1983:9-13). Smith argues that state-making in Europe is "unique" in that it was conducted at a period in history (1500 to 1900) when there was no major "external interference", and thus cannot be used as a model for other continents that experienced political and economic domination by "a militarily superior Europe" (1983:16-17).

Concerning Africa and the rest of the Third World, Smith, while agreeing in part with those who regard nationalism as a movement for national liberation against relations of dependency, criticises them for placing too much emphasis on the economic causes, and for underplaying the political and cultural causes (1983:38-9). To him, "there is no real reason to single out capitalist penetration or uneven development for special causal treatment" when trying to explain the rise of nationalism anywhere, especially as "the origins and force of given nationalisms tend to correlate more closely" with "the strength of bureaucratic control and territorial definition, as well as educational impact" (1983:58). He argues that from the very beginning, African nationalism "had 'positive' programmes and ideals, which went beyond a simple opposition to colonial European authority, or to imperialism or capitalist (or any other) exploitation." Rather, like nationalists everywhere, their aim was and remains "to set up 'nations', autonomous, unified and with a clear cultural identity, but on the pre-existing basis of the territorial 'grid' of states imposed on Africa by the colonial powers" (1983:55-6).

Smith sees five phases in the development of African nationalism: There was the 'primary resistance' to European incursion by the traditional political elite of various ethnic groups, and there were the 'millennial' protest movements against colonial rule; but neither qualified as nationalist movements because they had no concept of a nation or ideology. By nation Smith means, "the whole collectivity of territorially contiguous and culturally
unified citizens claiming a common origin and history" (1983:40). The third phase was the period of gestation and 'adaptation' of the new urban strata, whose frustration and resentment for "occupational and political exclusion" by whites, gave rise to the first waves of nationalism. The fourth phase marked the rise of nationalism after the Second World War, one characterised by "territorialism, democracy and pan-Africanism." And the fifth phase consisted of the adoption of social programmes for the masses by nationalism (1983:39-50).

The pan-African culture aimed at reasserting and unifying authentic African cultural values as opposed to Western heritages, gave African nationalisms their distinctive, unique flavour (1983:54-5, 90-2); while European democratic ideals and thinkers on the other hand, "inspired the goals and programmes of the nationalist elites (1983:51-3). But Smith believes the 'territorial' feature was probably the most durable and far-reaching of the three. To him, this indicates how successful the colonial state was in "imprinting itself on the popular consciousness" and in "its capacity for homogenising diverse peoples into a single political community." The European state-makers, Smith observes, were most successful "in imposing the territorial aspect of the Western state on the African demographic and political map," thereby drawing sharp boundaries in political and economic reality, and also in "the psychic identity and cultural vision of the new elites" (1983:50).

This was so much the case that what nationalism eventually challenged was neither the state nor the territorial boundaries the colonists had imposed, but "merely the right of those who controlled that territorial state." Also, the African nationalisms that arose were structured along similar lines as the highly centralised interventionist colonial state. They emulated the latter's "coercive monopoly" and intolerance to "rival power centres within its territorial domain" (1983:50-1, 87). The party was like a 'counter-state' ('embryo state') waiting to take over from the colonialists at independence and to 'build' or 'repair' the nation. Party organisations alone had the capacity to "incorporate and mobilise large numbers of people for popular participation", which explains why the African nationalists sought the "judicious combination of State and Party organs" or the harmonisation of "mobilisation with social control" (1983:53-4).

The frustrated professionals or intelligentsia (lawyers, doctors, journalists, academics, school-teachers, economists, architects, planners,
engineers, and other kinds of experts) who led the nationalist movements that brought independence, constitute the "stratum from which political leaders are recruited, and which the latter tend to represent and whose interests they support." Together with the military they make up the modern political elite of the post-colonial states, where Western education remains "the chief criterion distinguishing those with political power" (1983:81-3). While the Western professional intelligentsia "are still struggling to be accepted in many public institutions run by old-line bureaucrats", their African counterparts, mainly due to "the sudden departure of the colonial bureaucrats, were able to seize most of the top positions and eliminate their rivals for political power at independence" - thus their "position of unparalleled power" (1983:88). A position which Smith seems to justify with the statement that the intelligentsia "alone of all the groups that make up the new states of post-colonial Africa, can make any claim to act on behalf of the whole community, and lead to an 'African people' duly constituted as a nation-state" (1983:96).

Smith identifies four major patterns of nation-formation - the Western, the immigrant, the ethnic and the colonial (1971, 1986), and argues that in all of them "ethnicity not only played a vital part, but provided the point of departure for the first three ... and the opposition motif in the last." This, he concludes, shows the importance to state and nation formation of the common meaning, identity, and sense of purpose that result from belonging to the same ethnic group (1986:240-4). His thesis is that the central difficulties of both state-making and nation-building stem from the nature and intensity of ethnic ties and sentiments, and that lack of ethnic foundations and resilience can unmake states and dismantle nation-states as much as any inept elite activities or geopolitical calculations (1986:243).

He recognises that state and national formation in the West was a simultaneous, continuous, mainly spontaneous and internal process; one both ethnic and territorial. As he explains,

At each step, the 'nation' was being formed within the 'state'; each advance in state-making produced an equivalent step towards nation-formation. National identities were formed in and around the dynastic state, which moulded those identities in its own image, at the cost of cultural minorities within the state (1983:123).

This process which occurred in "a pre-democratic era", he notes, resulted in "a special kind of plural state ... in which a large ethnic community forms the core of the state and, overtly or not, dominates the other communities which were forcibly incorporated long ago" (1983:124). But the
African situation has been quite different. Not only has there been outside interference and lack of spontaneity, but territorial state-making has occurred without national formation, mainly because of the polyethnic nature of Africa and the arbitrary boundaries imposed by colonialism. The absence of "any shared historical mythology and memory" is both an impediment to nation-building ("the dual goal of creating nations and of ensuring self-sufficient growth"), and a threat to "the very fabric of state power and the territorial basis of its jurisdiction" (1986:252-62).

As Smith observes,

With the significant exception of Somalia, African states today fall into the category of polyethnic state-based territorialisms, since they contain a host of ethnic communities of varying size and antiquity, and possess no common cultural base for what is, consequently, an essentially territorial type of community. Applied to Africa, the Western model has produced something of an anomaly, a state which aims to turn itself into a nation, and a set of old ethnic communities and nations aspiring, it is hoped, to become one new nation (1983:124-5).

Alien though the boundaries of African states are, Smith claims their existence is justified by their being able to endow these states "with concrete meaning" since only through the "location and format" such boundaries provide, can African states "enjoy international recognition and standing." The boundaries alone give legitimacy at an international level to states "which possess no other basis, whether it be in popular assent or cultural community." It is a legitimacy which like the origin of the states itself, is conferred "by aliens for alien purposes" (1983:125). Thus, despite claims to nationhood by the territorial state, "there is no 'nation' that is, in any way, co-extensive with the state's boundaries, or congruent with the state's culture." Such a nation, Smith, like Anderson (1983:105) and Doumou (1987:57), concludes, remains "a mere project ... a 'nation of intent' to be forged out of the territorial state" in the minds of African rulers and the intelligentsia (1983:126).

However, as Smith remarks, it is a dream "which requires the substance of popular solidarity to turn it into a reality"; but how the ruling intelligentsia can "tap the sources of popular zeal and commitment" without jeopardising "the stability and integrity" of states that "have no real basis in popular assent", is a difficult question to answer. He is nonetheless convinced that the intelligentsia would face cultural and ethnic divisions that would imperil both their position and that of the territorial state, if they attempt to extend democratic participation to the populace, the peasantry
in particular (1983:128). Thus he finds no cause for optimism, as the intelligentsia have clearly "preferred the evils of curtailing freedoms through excessive bureaucracy, to the dangers of class struggle and ethnic schism which hasty but divisive mobilisation so easily brings" (1983:131).

In other words, not only has the territorial state in Africa failed to 'build' a nation, but it is "having to work hard at just keeping its various ethnic groups together." In this way 'nation-building' as used by the Third World elites generally, is more of an "ideology and project, rather than a tool of analysis" (1986:232). Even the 'federal-nation' model which Smith thinks is "perhaps the only hope" for "effective state-making and nation-building" in polyethnic Africa (1986:263), has little chance of succeeding since the very fact of a federation entails a considerable reduction in central state power, a concession the ruling intelligentsia are unlikely to make.

Despite his recognition of the fact that the current territorial state in Africa is both alien in origin and purpose, that the powers of the intelligentsia in it are unparalleled, and that there is no single dominant ethnie to facilitate nation-building, and despite his criticism of Western-centred perspectives, Smith comes short of a fundamental questioning of the raison d'être of the 'modern' state in Africa. Instead, he appears to justify its very existence with the argument that alien and repressive though the state might be to the African populace at large, what matters more than anything else (even more than nation-building and democracy, it would appear) is international legitimacy (i.e. the fact that the state is able to secure for the intelligentsia recognition from Westerners and other nonAfricans). Does not the fact that the intelligentsia "suffer social isolation and a crisis of cultural identity" as a result of their acceptance of Western models, as Smith (1983:133) aptly points out, put in doubt the competence of the African intelligentsia to lead their societies in the process of nation-building by "cultural assimilation and social mobilisation"?

Smith's general position on the question of 'nation-states' is vital for an understanding of his conclusion on the African situation. Like Deutsch (1969:171-2) and Wallerstein (1964:4), Smith is categorical that the nation-state is the only form of political unit that "is recognized and permitted" in "the modern world". Not that any more than 10 per cent of of so-called nation-states in the world today are "genuine", but simply because "the majority of educated and politically aware men and women are committed to
'nationalism'" and are "no longer really aware of any other viable mode of culture and political existence", given that "there is certainly no possibility of returning to a prenationalist era" or of "turning back and re-erecting those rambling, polyethnic empires of which anti-nationalists dream" (1986:230).

In this connection, it is perhaps worth referring to Cobban as a researcher who took an early exception to the widespread rejection of the multi-national state as a possible form of political organisation in the 'modern' world. It is his view that while common political loyalty may be needed "to hold the state together", "this does not necessarily involve the assimilation of the different national cultures included in the state" (1969:128). There are many examples, he argues, "of the failure of cultural and political nationality to coincide", and of the fact that wherever attempts have "been made, in modern times, to force them both into the same mould, the result has usually been disaster" (1969:124-5). Thus his point that nationalism might either manifest itself politically, culturally or a mixture of both, and that "The attempt to make the culturally united nation state the one and only basis of legitimate political organisation has proved untenable" both in practice and in theory (1969:129).

The theoretical precepts defining a nation-state in terms of common territory, homogeneous ethnic community and cultural identity, do not apply to 90 per cent of nation-states today. As Smith observes, "In practice, we are content with a formal declaration of intent, while our societies assume all manner of shapes" (1986:229-30). In this connection, Francis (1968:339) has argued that apparently "democratic institutions often conceal the fact that the participation of large sections of the people in national affairs is rather fictitious", and therefore, that "what is perceived as a nation may be confined to those sections of the people which actively support the nation-state." What this means, Smith contends, is that the Third World, by trying to follow an identical model with the West, have found themselves "pursuing a Western mirage", in "a fruitless and destructive quest for something unattainable outside a few blessed regions of the earth" (1986:230). This notwithstanding, Smith thinks it is an illusion worth pursuing, because only by so doing can African and other Third World societies win international recognition and esteem.
B) A NonWestern Alternative: The Centre-Periphery Framework

It is the above belief in and quest for homogeneity, the expressed or implied assumption that other societies should reproduce Western systems and institutions, regardless of feasibility or contextual variations, which proponents of the nonWestern perspective have criticised in the theories of modernisation (homogenisation) (see Abdel-Malek, 1967; Kothari, 1971; Silva Michelena 1971; Walton, 1972; Portes, 1976; Gareau, 1987). As Abdel-Malek has argued, by restricting the rise of nations to the birth of capitalism, Western researchers have developed concepts and theories that extrapolate the parochial European experience (considered as "normal"), and that "reduce" the experiences of Africa, Asia and Latin America to those of the West (1967:250). Instead of restructuring, modifying, enriching and remodeling their concepts and theories in order to accommodate the broader experiences and contextual variations of the contemporary world, these researchers have preferred to safeguard Western intellectual hegemony (Abdel-Malek, 1967:259; Portes, 1976:55-6; Gareau, 1987:596-7; Riggs, 1987:607-9). As Abdel-Malek puts it, "the European origins of the social sciences lead to Europocentrism: the world is conceived in the image of Europe" to which others are expected to conform, and where exceptions are not tolerated. But it is only by creating concepts and formulating theories that seek "to explain, not to legitimate, nor to denounce", that the social sciences can attain universality (1967:250-64). A universality or consensus which, following current trends, Gareau (1987) and Halloran (1988) consider very unlikely.

As Kothari reports, in August 1970 Unesco organised a meeting of experts on state formation and nation-building, with the aim of critically examining existing theories and exploring ways of developing "a more satisfactory model for comparative research" (1971:339). Although no "clear alternative proposals" resulted from the meeting, it did serve to open a "frank dialogue" between theorists from the developed and underdeveloped countries on "the importance of contextual variation in the growth of comparative theory" (1971:352). In their presentations and discussions, almost all the Third World researchers criticised the Europocentric theories of 'modernisation', and accused their Western counterparts of sacrificing contextual relevance in conceptualisation for the sake of exemplifying pre-existing theories based exclusively on European modernisation experience (345-54), and advocating "a transition from a fictional stage to an impossible one" (Portes, 1976:74).
Empirical studies in Latin America and India, for example, led Silva Michelena and Kothari to question the social mobilisation theories of Lerner, Deutsch and others. Silva Michelena criticises the assumption by modernisation theorists of "a unilinear mode of evolution of societies", the implication of which is that "if the necessary reforms are done internally, any society can evolve toward higher levels of development". On the contrary, he argues that to treat underdeveloped societies "without reference to the global context in which they exist", is to omit "the most important variable for understanding" their economic, cultural and political realities. As he maintains, "identity, rationalization of authority, structural differentiation, political participation and centre-formation", useful in describing the process of state formation and nation-building though they may be, do not explain nation-building, being in themselves only "manifestations of other processes that, within specific historic frames, are altering the structure of society" (1971:385-6). In other words, such indices "provide no theoretical guidance for inquiring into determinants and constraints of developmental processes" (Portes, 1976:64).

The basic reasoning is that since Western powers neither favoured "the maintenance of the traditional political unity" of the colonies, nor "their rebuilding in modern form" (Watanuki, 1971:431), but preferred their destruction and substitution with Western models (Dunn, 1978a:2), no theory is adequate that fails to take this into consideration when dealing with nation-building problems in the Third World. The very fact that Latin America or the Third World in general has failed to develop despite the homogenisation prescriptions, calls into doubt the modernisation theory (Silva Michelena 1971:388; Amin, 1985:17), and calls for a radical reconsideration of the "entire historical process that brought about the underdevelopment of Latin America" (Silva Michelena, 1971:388) or the Third World (Amin, 1985:11-73).

Treated within the global context, Silva Michelena argues, state formation or nation-building in Latin America cannot be understood according to the theories used to understand the same phenomena in Europe. This is because in societies with "outwardly oriented" economies such as Latin America, the State and the bureaucracy are not seen as necessary instruments to improve the national position in the world competitive market; on the contrary, it is the world market, by means of the dominant powers, which imposes the conditions of existence on a given country. No internal class is able, therefore, to see the nation as a project or economic development as a reason of State (1971:393).
Kothari echoes this criticism with a description of 'modernisation' or 'political development' theories as ...

empty concepts, empty of socio-economic content, not informed by any historical points of reference, and always underplaying the structural constraints operating on the political process - social-class structure, the structure of agrarian and industrial relationships, and above all the international structure of dominance and dependence. Lacking a clear theory of the relationship between operating political and economic structures and developmental causation for specific national and international constellations, the modernization paradigm fails to provide an adequate general, or even comparative theory (Kothari, 1971:347).

Kothari asserts that the gap between theory and data, or differences in theoretical perspectives result from differing backgrounds of experience, learning and ideology, and calls for their systematic explication and comparative analysis. He suggests a move away "from highly inclusive and all-encompassing theory and research models to an emphasis on specificity of phenomena, distinctiveness of concepts and the testability of theories through a series of observable and measurable relationships." Only in this way can the "psychological hiatus" likely to result from "the defensive affirmation of a 'world culture'" on the one hand, and "the charge of 'ethnocentrism'" on the other, be bridged (1971:353).

During the meeting, Kothari reports, the centre-periphery model not only dominated the discussions, but was also the most widely accepted, albeit "there were no clear agreements on its usefulness as an explanatory theory" (1971:342). Drawing largely from his application of the model in the study of political development in India, Kothari observes that: (a) large size and cultural heterogeneity call for the development of a 'centre' that is territorial, that has a political-organisational locus (dominant party), and that is capable of bargaining with and accommodating many 'intermediate centres'; (b) the network of centres ensures that the conception of the 'national integration' process is neither linear nor centralised, but that it reflects "a complicated interplay between the persisting autonomy of cultural centres ... and the primacy of the political centre"; (c) democracy exists not only as an "ideological choice but also as a pragmatic necessity"; and (d) that new conceptual formations evolve as integration progresses (1971:343-4).

All this allows for the concepts of 'centre' and 'periphery' to become more of political than territorial notions, and for the concept of 'nation' to be identified less from cultural and linguistic notions and "more from a transcendent notion of statehood which coincides with nationhood." But
as Kothari himself admits, all this is based on the assumption that the 'centre' in question is "genuinely independent" politically, economically and culturally. For "to the extent that such independence is not to be found, the transcendent centre may lie outside the national territory" (1971:344). However, Kothari, taking into consideration "the meaningful controversy and dialogue it generated", thinks the centre-periphery framework is well suited for distinguishing between different experiences in state and nation-building. For it draws attention to "the role of political and intellectual élites in nation-building, as autonomous and dynamic agents and not just as simple responding mechanisms to some basic 'inputs' from other segments"; permits the value-free study of "many policy and ideological issues"; and is "amenable to a variety of methodologies." Despite these advantages, the centre-periphery framework "raises more questions than it answers" and is unlikely to become a unified theory (1971:344-5). But that has not stopped the approach being referred to as 'the dependency theory'; a term which Amin considers ambiguous (1985:37), and which he thinks has given rise to "passions or too easy rejections" (1985:23-4). Thus according to Amin, while Canada is evidently 'dependent' on US capital, it cannot be qualified 'periphery' because the same "social alliances" which govern development in the US operate within Canadian society (1985:37-38).

In any case, as Tussie acknowledges, the centre-periphery framework has been appreciated as a valid alternative by researchers on development and social change, for long frustrated by the "consensual perception of 'modernising societies' proceeding autonomously through the universal 'stages of economic growth', with the advanced nations extending a benevolent hand in the form of aid, trade, finance, technology or investment so as to reduce the time span required to reach the last stage of modernisation." Its contribution according to her, is the shift of emphasis "from single modernising societies as the principal units of analysis to relations between societies" (1983:3). This notwithstanding, Tussie, like Portes (1976:77-9) and Medard (1978:36), points out that by placing so much emphasis on macro analysis, proponents of the centre-periphery model have tended to deprive concrete situations of "their particularities." Thus not only is dependency "reduced to an unrelenting condition in which differences of degree do not modify the underlying essence", but also, the cyclical explanations of past and future change, "entails the double danger of smothering national particularities by over-homogenisation as well as relegating political conflict to an automatic outcome of the rhythms of the world economy" (1983:4-5).
As Dunn has argued in connection to West Africa, the fact that its states "are direct continuations of the colonial state power, an external apparatus of control created for the express purpose of dominating the local society as a whole and keeping it firmly subordinate to the purposes of those beyond its borders" (1978a:5), in no way implies "that West African societies do not as yet make their own history" (1978a:16). The fact that "the human will is scarcely the master of historical process", does not take away the human ability to choose; in which case the rulers of the periphery, no matter their powerlessness vis-à-vis the centre, remain "responsible agents" who should be held and made accountable for their political actions. Thus West African rulers cannot be said to bear no responsibility for their authoritarian governments, the exclusion of democratic popular participation, and the "savagely uneven internal development" of their countries (1978b:211-16).

In what concerns Africa, where nation-building is perceived as a precondition for national development, a group of researchers co-ordinated by Samir Amin, and working with the United Nations University's Project on "Transnationalization or Nation-building in Africa" since 1982, started publishing their findings in 1987 under a series titled Studies in African Political Economy. As the general editorial note (see Gabou, 1987 or Nyong'o (ed.) 1987) explains, the project was aimed at studying "the possibilities of and constraints on national autocentric development of African countries in the context of the world-system into which they have been integrated." Given the serious and unprecedented crisis facing the world-system since the 1970s, the Project set out to examine the impact of this crisis on the political, economic and cultural situation of present-day Africa, with an especial focus on transnationalization and nation-building. The various contributors discussed below, all admit Africa to be in a crisis as a result of its association with the world system, and outline "possible alternatives to the prevailing development models which have proved to be inadequate."

Amin's employment of the centre-periphery concepts in relation to nation-building and development in Africa and the Third World in general, provides insight to the model's richness as a tool for comparative analysis. He disagrees with proponents of the thesis of three successive modes of production (slavery, feudalism and capitalism), for being West-centred in their "overgeneralization of the specific characteristics of the history of the West" and in their "rejection of the history of other peoples in all its particularities" (1980:250). In place of their thesis, he proposes one which
he believes provides a more universal account of the evolution of all human societies. Accordingly, there are four necessary stages in the evolution of human societies, namely: primitive communism, the tributary mode of production, capitalism and communism. The evolution from each stage to the other is marked by a transitional phase, of which there are three respectively - communal societies, the transition to capitalism, and socialism. While every society in the world is currently at the stage of capitalism (with some already in the socialist transition), communism is yet to be attained (1980:3-15).

Amin contradicts those who have claimed that capitalism and communism are either accidents or exceptions, by contending that these are indeed objective and necessary rules. He challenges the West-centred perspective which suggests capitalism could only have originated in Europe and by chance, thereby implying "that only Europe could have brought about the progress of humanity" (1980:206). His thesis is that "Capitalism was not destined to be invented in Europe", and that it might well have originated elsewhere in Asia or Africa. The sole reason it was not invented anywhere else, "is that its prior development in Europe led to its impeding the other continents' normal evolution". Secondly, the fact that Europe was less developed at the stage of tributary societies, made it "the motive force of history" into the capitalist stage (1980:6). His view is shared by Wallerstein (1976:30-1), who maintains that Eurocentrism is partly as a result of the mistaken perception of the worldwide "expansion of the capitalist mode of production" as the "expansion of Europe".

Within the capitalist system Amin recognises two types of states: the Centre and the Periphery. The central states are societies where capitalism exists in "its completed form", while the peripheral states are those in which capitalism has not yet attained completion. His binary opposition is between 'centre', 'autocentred', 'complete' or 'developed' on the one hand, and 'periphery', 'extraverted', 'incomplete' or 'underdeveloped' on the other (1980:16-17; 1985:25-34). Like Emmanuel (1972:263) who argues that in a world unified and limited in resources, "the enrichment of a minority would be impossible without impoverishing most of the rest of mankind", Amin sees development and underdevelopment as two sides of the same coin (1980:252; 1985:20, 108). Thus because the economies of the periphery are dominated by those of the centre, Amin argues that such domination blocks and stops the peripheral economies from "catching up". The cause of their backwardness is thus basically external, even if "it is internalized through
Like Wallerstein (1972:95-6), Amin recognises the existence of intermediate cases ('semi-peripheries') which he compares to the middle classes, but maintains that the world capitalist system "is moved by a strong tendency to polarisation" between centres and peripheries (1987a:1-13; 1985:17-25). In societies of the centre, there is a separation between civil society and the state, which though "only relative, is portrayed in bourgeois ideology as absolute"; thus making "it possible to eliminate the very existence of the state from economic theory" or what he terms "economistic ideology". Civil and economic life are thus presented as if their existence and functioning were quite independent of the state. Like Goulbourne (1987:29-35), he contends that in reality the state is present and its intervention decisive, even if such presence is only indirectly experienced (Amin, 1987a:1-13; 1980:25-8).

In the peripheries on the other hand, "civil society is feeble or even non-existent" and "Economic life is sickly and seems little more than an appendage to the exercise of state functions, which directly and visibly occupies the front of the stage." But Amin points out that the power of the state in the periphery is only illusory, because the "true strong state" is "the state of the developed centre". He sees all economic activity at the periphery in terms of "a process of adjustment to the demands of accumulation at the centre", to which the periphery is only an appendage. To him the intolerance of African governments (who "see in enrichment outside their control a threat to their own stability") to national 'private enterprise' is proof of "the real weakness" of peripheral states vis-à-vis the centre (Amin, 1987a:1-13). As Tussie puts it, "The state in the periphery must be strong enough in relation to its internal forces to assure the constant outflow of economic surplus from across its boundaries" to the centre, but in relation to which "it must be weak enough to be incapable of blocking such flows" (1983:4).

Amin shares Smith's conclusion that the nation and the state in the centre are more or less the same, thanks to the final imposition of the nation-state "by a twofold process of assimilation within the nation and destruction of multinational forms" (1980:28). But in the periphery the state is different from the nation. This is because, while "the constitutions of central capitalism allows the national formation to take shape", "capitalist development in its peripheral forms destroys society and hinders its possible
The reason being that capitalism is not founded on "the systematic strengthening of the local commodity, capital, and labor market as the axis of its development, of autocentred development" (1980:174). This is a position shared by Gutkind and Wallerstein, who blame the subjugation of Africa by the world capitalist system for "the destruction of varied and culturally rich polities and social structures" (1976:9), and for the loss of legitimacy and autonomy by indigenous economic structures (1976:11).

The fact that the integration of peripheries into the world system often occurred within a context of basically heterogeneous ethnic groups and communities, Amin argues, made it "even more difficult for a national state to crystallize, as contradictions among the people could be and were exploited both by the different segments of the local hegemonic alliance and by external forces." Such a situation gave rise to national liberation movements without nations, which on failure to find adequate solutions for internal contradictions amongst peoples, remained weak and as such, empowered the hegemonic blocs, however fragile, to ensure greater penetration for imperialism (1980:239). So that today in Africa for example, "the brutal Euro-American neocolonialism to which Africa is subjected, its split into non-national states, the manipulation by the powers in place of ethnic, religious, etc., heterogeneity, render the continent extremely fragile" (1985:106). In general, the peoples of the periphery are not only separated by mostly arbitrary and artificial boundaries, but often "constitute neither one nor several nations" within the states that define their existence internationally (1980:175-6).

The absence of a national construct is compounded by the basically foreign nature of the culture of the local bourgeoisie, whom Amin describes as 'denationalized' and 'acculturated', and who

"... progressively take on the look of strangers in their own country due to their daily lifestyle, modeled on that of homo consumens universalis. In extreme cases, a caricature of bilingualism obtains: the ruling class uses the language of the old colonial masters while the people continue to speak the vernacular. How can we speak of nation and national culture under such conditions?" (1980:175).

Culturally, Amin argues that while imperialist development "accelerates real homogenization" in the centre, it blocks a similar process in the periphery, thus allowing only a minority of the people of the periphery to become modern consumers (1980:31-2). Accordingly, it is precisely by
marginalising the masses that the minority are able to afford the "growing income" that encourages it to adopt Western models of consumption, the extension of which "guarantees the profitability of the luxury production sector and strengthens the social, cultural, ideological, and political integration of the privileged classes" (1980:138). Within this context of ethnic, cultural and social pluralism, only the liberation movement that explicitly puts into its programme "the immediate and real struggle against all forms of discrimination, inequality, and oppression based on ethnicity, language, religion, or customs," has any hope for the people of the periphery (1980:177).

In peripheral systems where economic life autonomous from state power is virtually nonexistent, and where autonomy of expression for the social forces vis-à-vis the state power is equally absent, it is totally meaningless to talk of democracy. In the light of the weakness of the periphery in relation to the centre, and of the impossibility for democracy to exist under such circumstances, Amin advocates 'delinking' or the reconstruction of the world following an alternative social system initiated and imposed by the people of the periphery, who by virtue of their current subjugation are well placed to serve as the motive force of history (1985:74-145). By this he does not mean "economic autarchy" as some have thought (1985:5, 108), but "the refusal to submit the national development strategy to the imperatives of 'globalisation'" (1985:108), by creating "a popular national state", an instrument of "national protection and affirmation" without which peripheral societies have no hope "of achieving anything significant economically" (1987a:1-13, 1985:38-41).

The fact that no 'semi-peripheries' over the last four centuries have acceded to centres, could only be understood to mean that the external unfavourable conditions imposed by the central monopolies are so strong that they thwart all "attempts by 'semi-peripheries' to raise themselves to the rank of 'centres'", "even when the internal conditions are relatively favourable." To ensure effective delinking, the popular national state would have to be strong and democratic, and capable of resisting "negative pressures" from the world capitalist system and its internal ramifications (Amin, 1987a:1-13). For "dependent capitalism ... is incapable of realizing the goal of national liberation" (1980:201).

This alternative social system is particularly important towards the resolution of Africa's current socio-economic crisis, where "development by
progressive stages within the world system of unequal division of labor" (1980:142) has failed to lead to economic independence. Under the capitalist system in which Africa's development has been subordinated to "the demands of the redeployment of globalised capital, by means of so-called adjustment policies advocated by the West", the continent has neither succeeded in beginning the agricultural revolution - essential prerequisite to all other forms of development, nor has it entered the industrial era. Where there has been any at all, industrialisation has been limited to the "import substitution" and "export-oriented" industry types favoured by the World Bank and its auxiliaries. While responsibility for the "African tragedy" might stretch back to "the brutal and primitive forms of colonial pillage", independent Africa is to blame for having pursued the policies at all, even if it did so "with the blessing and on the urgent advice of all those who, today, from the World Bank to the agencies of Western states, deplore its wretched results, foreseeable though these results were" (Amin, 1987a:1-13; 1982).

Africa's development problems are a challenge to be taken up only by the African people themselves, through the creation of the popular national state aimed at delinking "their development from the demands of transnationalization" (Amin, 1987b:xi-xii). For, "popular development can only be national and auto-centred" (1980:144; 1978:17); where 'auto-centred' does not mean 'anticapitalist', nor is it synonymous with 'delinking' - the principle of dissociating "the rationality criteria of internal economic choices from those which govern the world system" (1985:39). As he argues, the need to form large economic, political and military units as the Third World's only chance of effective intervention in the world today and of winning respect as real partners (1978), calls for a break with "the narrow ideology of the nation" inherited from 19 century Europe. For

The idea of a unification by force starting from local Prussia and Piémont, ignoring regional differences and imposing, even to minorities, homogeneity notably linguistic and administrative, does not correspond to the reality of Africa and the contemporary Third World. The right of peoples and nations to decide for themselves, including their right of separation, must be tempered by perspectives opened by an effective struggle in favour of the constitution of big 'multinational' states, democratic and respectful of differences, in the appropriate forms. That is the only way to ensure the failure of imperialist projects which, always, aim at dividing (1985:107).[translation mine]

In his call for the creation of such popular national states, Amin is inspired by the fact that "for a century the primary tendency has been for the national liberation struggle to be the motive force of history"
He sees national liberation movements in the periphery not as "a stage in the development of capitalism on a world scale", but as "a moment in the socialist transformation of the world" (1978:6; 1980:131). As he argues,

To the extent that the periphery offers different degrees of resistance - the highest being liberation, that is, the exit from the imperialist system - to the extent that the movement for national liberation under proletarian leadership spreads, really engaging the great mass of exploited peasants, there exists the possibility of a qualitative break. This is not socialism but only a break toward socialism, the end of imperialist exploitation but not necessarily of the development of indigenous capitalist forces (1980:194).

Doumou shares Amin's basic conceptual position on nation-building in Africa. He rejects the West-centred approach which, by "extrapolating historical criteria ... whose place of birth, form and content are the particular product of European experience", relates "the birth of capitalism to that of the nation" (1987:56), and treats Third World countries either as variants of European nations or as emerging nations (1987:53). To him, the concept of 'nation-state' which fails to give an adequate "account for the reality of the state in dependent social formations" (1987:52-3), and whose insistence on understanding African social formations in terms of 'nation', does not do justice to the nation/state dichotomy in the periphery. He points out that the relationship between the 'state' and 'nation' in the Third World is not the same as in the West (1987:57).

The state in the West "appears as the emanation of the nation as a result of the existence of a system of generalised identification, civil society being wholly integrated economically ... and culturally." There, "the construction of the national state was based on a mode of social self-perception imposed by a minority ... and internalised by the population as a whole" (1987:56). Whereas in the Third World, state-building seems divorced from "the 'state-nation' dialectic"; there, contrary to what took place in the West, "it is the state which elaborates and presides over the realisation of the 'project-nation' in 'a-national socio-cultural formations." Thus while "the juridical existence of the African state" may not be in doubt, the concept of 'nation-state' is unrealistic in the African situation (1987:57).

Given this, Doumou agrees with Amin that "the construction of a 'nation-state' remains an incomplete and reversible process, the 'nation' being, still, a project to realise." However, given the "insurmountable obstacles" which attempts at nation-building have faced over the last twenty
five years, Doumou calls for "a break with the capital-centred definition of the nation", for one which sees the nation not as the result of capitalism, but as a social phenomenon capable of manifesting itself at every stage of history. For being "a reversible process", the nation

... can develop and grow stronger or, on the contrary, it can break up and disappear, according to whether the social class in question reinforces its unifying power or loses it altogether. In the latter case, the homogeneity of the society declines and a conglomerate of ethnic groups comes into being; these ethnic groups may aspire to constitute one or several nations if the historical conditions allow one social class to realise its 'project-nation' (1987:57).

Like Amin, Doumou favours a popular national state democratically agreed upon by the people, not imposed by a ruling minority.

Gabou argues along similar lines as Amin (1981:24-5), who has made a strong case for the delinking of African Agriculture from the world capitalist system, and for an alternative industrialisation (to import substitution and export oriented industries) genuinely in the service of agriculture, and which can lead to its modernisation and to food self-sufficiency for the marginalised peasants and the country at large. Like Amin, Gabou concludes that African agriculture is in a state of serious crisis, which he explains by examining earlier contacts between European capitalists economies and the economies of precapitalist Africa. He maintains that the colonial period brought about the disintegration of peasant economies, that the first post-independence decade was characterised by a policy of increased extraversion, which "precipitated the crisis by systematically orienting the national economies to the world market"; and criticises the "useless and illusory" solutions put forward in the 1970s (also see Amin, 1978, 1981, 1982). The crisis, he argues, calls for more than just an economic solution, because it is political and social as well. It "calls into question the whole of the existing structures in African states, and the type of relations linking them to the world capitalist system." Despite the numerous differentiating factors that makes it difficult to envisage an alternative solution that extends beyond the framework of a single country, Gabou still stresses the importance of such a solution (1987:76-7).

He envisages the creation of a popular national state, and recognises that this can only be possible if the popular strata, who have suffered and continue to suffer "the exploitation of capital in various forms of subordination", attain freedom of organisation and effective control of all powers. Since autocentred autonomy or self-sufficiency has proved unattainable under the present system and structures of dependency, Gabou proposes the
breakdown of borders inherited from colonialism, in order to "open up far-ranging perspectives for the economic development of Africa." By delinking he does not mean "a total break" with the capitalist system, but a situation where "the socio-economic structures of Africa would no longer be organized and oriented in terms of the interests of this system as is currently the case, but in terms of the interests of the toiling African masses" (1987:76-83). Gabou is clear that the developed countries are able to control price-fixing in the world market thanks to their ability to "provoke isolation and rivalry" among the cash-crop and mineral producing countries. It is his conviction that the popular governments would at least be capable of creating "a degree of balance between the various parties in the world market", if not the complete reversal of the direction of dependence in favour of Africa.

Goulbourne regrets the little importance given the questions of democracy and active participation in general discussions on Africa, central though these were to the struggle for independence. "In the making of a new Africa in the post-independence period, questions relating to the continuation and strengthening of active participation in national or local affairs have been too easily elbowed out of the legitimate frame of urgent and immediate concerns", and priority has been given to "The refining of methods of control" instead. The result has been a state that is "highly centralised, overbearing and restrictive in its operations"; one with an "overwhelming presence" in almost all areas of social, economic and political life (1987:26-8). In fact, so great has been the failure of "the first generation of post-colonial leaders in Africa" to develop "democratic institutions and modes of conducting public affairs" (1987:30) that:

The view that citizens have rights separate and apart, independently of the state, and that the government derives its legitimacy from the people, are not sufficiently ingrained into the social, ideological and political fabric of many societies, at least not to the extent of ensuring that in general the government respects the necessary space between the state and civil society. But, if in some societies the rights of citizens need to be defended, in too many countries the very wherewithal of either the means to establish or defend democratic participation is absent (1987:29-30).

He interprets this failure as a missed opportunity because the first generation of leaders were in a unique position to foster the "development of democratic institutions, practices and conventions". Accordingly, the popular enthusiasm to build a new social order, generated by the nationalist struggles during colonialism, maintained its momentum for several years after independence. Like Dow (1968), Goulbourne points out that the authority
enjoyed by the leaders was more than that normally "derived from popular elections"; it was something closer to the Weberian "charismatic authority", because the people saw their leaders as those who had actually "challenged the colonial power and forged the path to political independence." Had these leaders seized the opportunity to encourage the creation of democratic institutions and practices, such institutions and practices would have persisted in the same way that other political institutions and modes of behaviour tend to perpetuate themselves once fully established in any society. This opportunity wasted thus, "the possibility of a tolerant, participatory political tradition emerging and developing in the continent as a whole seems very bleak indeed" (1987:30).

Such state interventionism as exists in Africa today, Goulbourne argues, has given the state far more importance than is healthy for the attainment of any individual country's development objectives. Not only does this lead to the dispersal of energies, but division of labour, seen to be crucial in the building of modern societies, becomes impossible, and efficiency gets lost as the businessman increasingly becomes more of a politician and vice versa. He describes the implications as follows:

In its attempt to intervene in all aspects of social life, the state not only becomes increasingly menacing, it also becomes crucial for any person and group with a project of any kind. Having no clearly defined boundaries beyond which it would be reluctant to exercise its authority or interference, the state becomes a major hurdle or obstacle in nearly every walk of life. It is not only that the boundaries between state and civil society are thereby blurred, but the expected space between institutions within the state disappear and the determined individual or group must be prepared to face the state in a hostile manner, even with the most innocent project. The depressing results are either that the individual or group must become outlaws, men and women operating outside the (arbitrary) framework of the law and bureaucratic politics, or they challenge the legitimacy and authority of the ruling group through one or the other of the very state institutions (usually the military) (1987:30).

Goulbourne distinguishes 'présidentialisme' as the main characteristic of the interventionist state in Africa. Accordingly, the tendency is to concentrate power in the hands or office of the president, who has the duty to represent the people in almost everything relating to the country. But such presidents do not always have the legitimacy they need, because they either are never elected into office, or are elected in very undemocratic circumstances. The ubiquitous preference for monopartyism makes it possible for the unique party candidate to claim a 'democratic' victory at elections where opposition candidates are not tolerated. The rise of
presidentialism can be traced back to the dawn of independence when the various leaders of the nationalist movements, once flag independence had been gained, declared themselves presidents, and set about "abolishing any distinction there may have been in the transition to independence between different institutional sources of power," and thereby becoming no different from kings. It is worth noting that African leaders "have generally opted for the types of regimes which promise to provide effective control over political life as well as society in general", and that in this respect, military rule and monopartyism have had the most attraction. But both types of regimes have proven themselves inadequate solutions to Africa's development impasse. The military governments have all tended rather to compound the problems they took power with promises to resolve (1987:31-3).

Despite its structures and philosophy which are designed to "effect control and limit democratic participation", the single-party system, Goulbourne claims, is the regime that has "so far come closest in some particulars to effecting a modicum of democratic participation in some of the countries on the continent." It has shown itself capable of developing into an organisation by means of which astute individuals and groups might "achieve a very slight degree of active participation", especially in matters not perceived as threatening by the senior leadership. His major argument is that:

... the one-party system provides leaders with a relatively democratic organisation which may be used to rouse, exhort and encourage people towards desired ends and also allows for a limited degree of participation in public affairs by ordinary citizens. In these ways the contradictory urges on the one hand of the people for democratic participation and on the other hand of leaders to effect tight control may be accommodated in the same body. The party comes to express the contradictory nature of politics whilst at the same time establishing a framework within which leaders need not feel too threatened, especially since the party is usually fashioned in the image of the leadership (1987:33).

He sees the single-party in Africa as being innovative in design and spread; in its rhetoric and broad intentions at least, it is neither restricted to any specific area of politics nor social life, but "reaches out in all directions". In this way, were it to function efficiently, the single-party would be "more than a political party in the sense that it is not restricted to what would be ordinarily regarded as the political sphere". Because of its demonstrated ability to adapt to changing circumstances, the political party in Africa has distinguished itself as perhaps the only institution of state capable of claiming any significant indigenousness, or "the organisational capacity to integrate diverse contradictory elements". In
which case its usefulness to nation-building could be unequalled (1987:34). Dow reached a similar conclusion twenty years before, when he wrote that the one-party state "probably represents the most workable pattern for the early period of independence", given that "the artificial imposition" of multi-party systems "would only have accentuated regional and tribal hostilities and prevented effective nation-building" (1968:335).

This notwithstanding, the post-colonial state in Africa has destroyed the birth of democracy, and made it impossible for their people to conduct open, free discussions on matters of general interest. Instead, "The public tends to hear of decisions reached behind closed doors but presented as being democratic." Not only does such excessive control force the people to rely on "circumstantial rumours", but it makes African political phenomena very difficult to analyse" (Goulbourne, 1987:34-5). Goulbourne argues that instead of using the extensive authority they had to foster democracy, "the first generation of post-independence leaders threw their weight behind the construction of a variety of repressive systems" which they then tried to justify with "spurious arguments" using their authority (1987:35).

Goulbourne examines the various arguments tendered in justification of the interventionist state in Africa. First, the first generation leaders argued that as new states concerned with nation-building, there was an overriding need to maintain the unity achieved during the struggle for independence. But as he remarks, "It was as if, whilst the people wanted to advance to the aims of that struggle, leaders wanted to consolidate whatever they thought they had won for themselves and wanted the people to be less demanding." The issue of national unity was presented as incompatible with democracy and active popular participation in politics, so much so that 'unity' was nothing but an imposition "from above through the repressive state institutions". Such unity which "served to hide real and substantial differences" was justified by false identification with socialism. But this was only "a convenient way of sidestepping questions regarding democracy, participation and genuine nationbuilding" (1987:35).

The second spurious argument was that the institutions and beliefs normally associated with democracy were of a colonial and imperialist origin, and therefore not to be accepted. But this argument "conveniently" fails to take account of the fact that since colonial Africa did not have the privilege "to enjoy the democratic forms and practices of the former imperialist countries," such institutions and practices can therefore not be described as
'colonial'. Furthermore, democracy is the result of a universal struggle, and therefore not exclusive to the centres of imperialism; moreover, nothing should be rejected out of hand, merely because it hails from the imperialist countries. "Bourgeois freedoms and democracy" he argues, are not entirely the product of the bourgeoisie, and therefore, not wholly unacceptable to socialism (1987:35-6).

The third argument was that, to ensure "rapid development it was necessary first to put controls in place", because any political differences were likely to divert attention from development, the main national pursuit. This view gives the impression that the leaders intended to tackle the issue of national development with total seriousness, and that it was only appropriate to "consider putting aside some less pressing issues" for its sake. It was unwise for a country with limited resources, "to dissipate its energies in the niceties, or luxuries, of allowing all and sundry to put their views about national matters when the task of prosecuting development is the national project over which independence was fought." But while sympathetic with the leaders who at independence were suddenly faced with a series of very pressing nation-building problems, Goulbourne nonetheless maintains that their very exclusion of the "high degree of popular democratic participation" which brought them that independence, is in itself an obstacle to national development. If democracy were indeed the problem, why then has its suppression failed to bring about rapid economic development for over twenty-five years? (1987:36-7). It is true that the continent's "extreme dependence" on external forces "imposes severe limitations on the leaders" (1987:40-43), but this in no way diminishes the leaders' blameworthiness for merely reverting to the undemocratic and repressive "example of the former colonial executive system as the model from which to build a new political order" (1987:39).

By way of an alternative, Goulbourne makes clear that only the African people themselves "will have to make the necessary difficult choices for Africa's future." He however believes that the continent's greatest problem is "the nature and quality of political leadership". His first suggestion, which in fact is nothing new (the pan-Africanists having expressed something similar), is the abolition of the 'false' national boundaries inherited from colonialism. If achieved, problems of refugees, inter-tribal linkages, international smuggling, the separation of peoples from one another, and many others currently facing Africa would disappear as well. The nationalism which led to independence in the various territories is no longer
relevant in present-day Africa, especially as it was founded "on false boundaries and premises." Goulbourne compares this "false nationalism" to the spent booster rocket in space flights, and stresses that in an era when most major blocs of the world are uniting to "overcome minor differences in order to confront larger ones", it is time Africa abandoned "a spent force" (false nationalism) that is no longer in its best long-term interest (1987:43-5). In this respect, Goulbourne's position is similar to that of Cobban (1969:124-9), Amin (1985:107), Doumou (1987:57) Gabou (1987:76-85), and Hadjor (1987:139), who prefer popular multinational states to attempts by a minority to impose 'nation-states' on essentially plural societies.

The question of democratic participation is an even more pressing one, and deserves immediate attention by the present states. However, this call for popular democratic participation does not mean the substitution of current structures with borrowed ones from other societies in the West or East. What Goulbourne envisages is a new democratic order that is spontaneous, and that is not forced; and in this respect the Tanzanian experience under Nyerere is closest to an example. But whatever forms of popular democratic participation do get established, they must be such that guarantee the basic and universal rights won in the struggle against inhumanity:

- In this respect I do not hesitate to say that the right to hold and express opinions contrary to those of the state, or regimes and leaders; to assemble freely and organise within the framework of the law; to publish contrary opinions about public affairs, to suggest alternative political strategies, and to expect the protection of the state itself from arbitrary arrest and abuse of power are rights to be upheld (1987:46).

Failure to seek greater cooperation or unity and failure to ensure democratic popular participation, Goulbourne concludes, "may well mean that Africa will continue along the downward slide to further underdevelopment as the rest of the world moves in the other direction" (1987:47). Especially as unlike the interventionist state elsewhere in the world, the state in Africa "lacks the technological basis for an efficient participation in the social and economic life of society" (1987:29).

Hadjor's examination of leadership and popular democratic participation in Africa is very similar to Goulbourne's. Like the latter, he argues that African leaders and politics in general "have an existence that is external to the lives of the vast majority in society", and that until these leaders are able to "work concretely in the interest of the African masses - even with the best intentions - they will remain obstacles to African economic
progress and social justice" (Tipoteh, 1987:xiii). It is his view that independence failed to bring about the changes desired, because the leaders have preferred "conservation" to "transformation"; so that without its own institutions, Africa has lost control of its affairs, and has become the world's most dependent continent "on external forces" (1987:5). But this is so because at independence, instead of replacing the repressive colonial institutions with new popular ones, even the most radical leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere "attempted to combine governing through the old colonial institutions with a degree of political mobilization" (1987:14-15).

Generally the leaders found the masses "unpredictable", and less reliable as a power base than the civil servants and army that constitute the state machinery. In this way, the mass movement hitherto "seen as the source of authority ... increasingly began to be defined as the problem" (1987:14-15). It became clear that the leaders "needed political institutions, not to activate, but to control"; which to Hadjor "is the secret behind the emergence of a one-party system", and "a growing concentration of power" in the hands of "the omnipotent president." But as he argues, "Leadership that relies not on mobilisation, but on the curbing of mass involvement, necessarily rules by declaration or force", and consequently, "breeds passivity and cynicism" amongst the masses (1987:16-17).

The only way to change lies in finding a radical alternative to the current bureaucratized exclusive leadership of a handful of politicians, the civil servants and the army. But in making this call, Hadjor warns against the mistakes of Nkrumah and Nyerere, who despite their profound commitment to the plight of their people and to change, could be criticised for basing their ideas on "fine philosophical considerations but not on real possibilities." As he puts it, "Their vision of a new society came from their head rather than from the realities of everyday life", and that it was "personal rather than social ... intellectual rather than practical" (1987:34-8). Only through "an intimate acquaintance with everyday life and the experience of the masses", can the leaders recognise "what people want and how much they want it", and so be able to act in the direction of change (1987:38-40). There is a need for African unity in order to achieve "a major break with the old structures" (1987:139). Such unity is certainly unachievable through the OAU, which lacks both power and legitimacy, whose only role is perhaps that of "clearinghouse for Western debt collectors." Rather, it must "be developed through involvement and the common experience of struggle" (1987:111-19). Only a pan-African unity that goes beyond the "irrational" boundaries imposed by
colonialism can liberate Africa economically and culturally, and make it "the master of its destiny" (1987:139).

Nyong’o is critical of the US government’s distinction between "traditional and revolutionary autocracies" in Third World countries. Such distinctions, he argues, are irrelevant as far as the masses of these Third World states are concerned, for they are merely intended to foster US national interest goals on a global scale (1987:15). In other words, his argument, like Goulbourne’s (1987:31), is that governments should not be judged by labels, but by the socio-economic and political realities of the people under them. For:

... as far as the people are concerned, an autocracy or an authoritarian government are basically the same thing: they both deny the people their basic human rights; they are both a bunch of no-gooders who have very little respect for people’s needs; they both undermine the legitimacy of the state and endanger social progress; they are both kept in power by the might of foreign powers (Nyong’o, 1987:15).

He maintains that such labels are not going to make the people’s socio-economic life any worse or any better, and that only “organised and systematic efforts to get rid of such regimes and replace them with consciously designed democratic ones”, can guarantee "basic human rights and viable socio-economic development in the interest of the popular classes" (Nyong’o, 1987:15).

Nyong’o is of the opinion that the modern African state remains a colonial heritage in many ways. In terms of institutions of power and modes of production, he sees very little difference between the modern state and its colonial predecessor. He observes that in Africa today, the state is either in the process of losing or has indeed lost "the ability and the capacity to undertake the socio-economic programmes necessary for the continued reproduction of the capitalist mode of production" (Nyong’o, 1987:17); and argues that so far as the current structures remain unchanged, no amount of privatisation or improved management of the public sector would bring about development (1987:19).

If Africa is in a state of crisis, its policy-makers are to blame for failing to understand the structural character of the national and international milieu in which they have operated for more than twenty-five years, and for the rigid suppression of the contending social forces in their own societies. Dependency notwithstanding, Nyong’o believes that the lack of accountability on the part of those in power, has exacerbated the failure to
bring about "more positive social transformation and more auto-centred processes of accumulation". He finds "a definite correlation between the lack of democratic practices in African politics and the deteriorating socio-economic conditions" (1987:19). He criticises African governments for ignoring the relationship between socio-economic development and politics by wrongly "asserting that political stability and order - not democracy - are the preconditions for economic growth and prosperity" (1987:20).

To him accountability is a categorical imperative because:

If governments are not accountable to the people they govern, then they are very likely to engage in socio-economic practices which are not responsive to people's needs. Questions of development and problems of economic crisis cannot therefore be meaningfully discussed without discussing problems regarding the nature of state power, the form of popular participation in the processes of government, and the question, therefore, of democracy. The state cannot just acquire or re-acquire the capacity and ability for positive socio-economic transformation; it has to be somebody's state. It must be a state responsive to the demands of the social forces that provide it with its power base, its legitimacy, its ability to hold social conflicts in check and its capacity to ensure the reproduction of society as a whole" (1987:19-20).

He stresses the need for a state capable of planning an "inward-looking, self-centred and self-sufficient development" (1987:24); but one which at the same time must be controlled by and accountable to the popular forces marginalised in the contemporary political arena, even though they made such enormous contributions to "the national democratic struggles for independence" (1987:20). Past experiences, he argues, have shown that such a state can neither come about through military intervention (see Goulbourne, 1987:33), nor by the incorporation of "popular politics" into "state-organised politics", with the hope that "the state will champion popular causes even though the popular forces do not control state power". Nothing short of the radical replacement of "the inherited state machinery" with "a new state commensurate with the demands of the revolution" would suffice (1987:21-25).

CONCLUSION

There is no consensus of perspective amongst researchers studying nation-building in Africa. But as Gareau has argued, social scientists and their disciplines being essentially determined by "the societies in which they are created and function", even the most critical amongst them "escape only with difficulty from being apologists for their respective establishments"
The fact that researchers undergo "divergent professional socialization processes, reading different bodies of literature, and often coming to contrary conclusions" (1987:598), Gareau contends, makes it extremely difficult for them not to belong to different "social science sects" (1987:596). He therefore considers differences in perspectives amongst social scientists as a matter of course, and argues that if for a long time there appeared to be some consensus between Western and non-Western researchers, it was because of the ability of Europe and the US to export their 'sects' to the Third World. But as the Third World revolts against such impositions and calls for indigenous and more contextually relevant alternatives, the future of social sciences would become even less consensual than it is at present (1987:603-4).

This notwithstanding, the researchers examined above, especially those writing about post-colonial Africa, are clear on one thing: that Africa's attempts at nation-building for nearly thirty years have failed to succeed. They are agreed that the reasons for this failure are both internal and external to the continent, even though they might differ in the attribution of blame. While some blame it mainly on internal forces, others consider the peripheral role of Africa in the world capitalist system to be mostly responsible. However, they all recognise the importance of democracy and popular participation in the development process of any contemporary nation (irrespective of how this is defined), and stress the need for change in this direction, if Africa is to attain the goals it set itself at independence, namely: to build viable national states capable of ensuring auto-centred national development.

However, very few of them have any practical reason to be optimistic about the future. Their realistic conclusions offer less hope than their theoretical alternatives to the current situation. The pessimism of those commissioned by the UN to investigate nation-building in Africa, is summarised by Gabou as follows: "As for the African peoples, they will only find salvation the day they build the Africa of the peoples. Unfortunately, we do not seem to be getting much nearer to that day" (1987:91). Thus despite their interesting theoretical models, these researchers are still faced with the practical problem of how African people of today, plagued by a chronic lack of freedom, information and prosperity, can mobilise themselves and overthrow a system sustained by powerful forces both within and outside their various countries.
CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN BROADCASTING

INTRODUCTION

Though studies have been carried out on broadcasting in the developing world, these are nothing compared with the vast amounts of research done in the developed world (Halloran, 1988:16). This chapter, which provides a brief examination of the pace-setting debates in the West, lays the framework in which the review of literature on the development of and constraints to broadcasting in the Third World that follows, must be understood. In this way, we are better able to substantiate any similarities or differences between Western broadcast systems, and those of the various developing countries; especially as our review in chapter one of the major debates on nation-building, has shown that the dominant political, economic or cultural institutions found in the latter countries, are shaped after similar institutions in the developed world.

I.) PHILOSOPHIES OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

Even though broadcasting is the youngest of the mass media, it is the most attention catching; its rapid rise to prominence in academic, social, economic and political debates is most spectacular (Halloran, 1970:9). No sooner was it introduced anywhere than the political and economic elites began to worry about its ownership, control and uses. The current debates on it and other media are, as in the past, about the roles the public and private sectors should play towards these institutions. While some researchers, politicians, businessmen and ideologues, advocate a privately owned and operated broadcast system, others argue in favour of public ownership and control. Taking a more conciliatory stance are those who believe the answer is neither exclusive state monopoly nor total commercialisation, but a balance between the two.

Whatever the case, the whole debate is centred on how best the interests of the public could be served by the broadcast media. And as Adkins briefly states (1985:54), the two basic philosophies hold quite opposite views. The public service view is one in which broadcasting is seen as "an enriching and limited resource" that should be employed most judiciously to
serve the needs and aspirations of "the entire spectrum of society". Such broadcasting should be informative and educational; capable of stimulating thought, developing latent tastes for good art of all kinds, and encouraging a proper sense of values, as well as enhancing wisdom (Beadle, 1963:93). The position of the public service advocates is that collective interests cannot be served, if broadcasting is left entirely in the hands of the private sector; they see the need for partial or total state regulation (Curran, 1988:292).

On the other hand, says Adkins (1985), the business view is that only when operated as privately owned business can broadcasting satisfy the whole of society. The free competition among the forces in the marketplace inevitably brings the public more services and pleasure. Only if government interference and manipulation can be avoided, would broadcasting be free from undesirable influences, and to serve the public more effectively. Despite Adkins' deliberate reference to these extreme positions as "philosophies", it is not uncommon for people, researchers inclusive, to sound as if there are countries in the world where absolute freedom is guaranteed, or where there is no attempt by the state to regulate the media (Hamelink, 1983b:111-12; Downing, 1986; Wells, 1987:34).

II.) TYPES OF BROADCAST SYSTEMS: SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

In every country where the people have had the basic freedom to choose for themselves, the broadcast system that eventually got established, was highly determined by the political, social, economic and historical context which obtained. But as some researchers have argued, in most developing countries where broadcasting was introduced during colonialism, the system was more of an "imposition" than a choice. Though as de Sola Pool (1977:142) would argue, this should normally not be the case, given that countries differ from one another in their political and social organisations, and in their economy and cultures. But in a colonial situation where the exploited territory is not only dominated politically, but also denied the right to a culture and a history, its subjects cannot be said to be responsible for the broadcast system in place.

In the case of the West and other societies, it was their internal realities and experiences that guided the options they made. Thus initially, while Britain freely opted for public service broadcasting, while France, Italy and other Western European states chose a system of direct state
regulation, the USA decided to go commercial. Even where subsequent changes were made as a result of changing political and economic circumstances, the decisions were again made independently, and bearing in mind the national and cultural interests of the countries in question. For example, when the USA decided to set up The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) in 1967, the Carnegie Commission was committed to an "indigenous American system arising out of our traditions and responsive to our own needs," rather than simply establishing an "American BBC"; BBC which was not considered to be local enough in its programming and station management, whose programming was rather "too elitist and failed to respect the norms of local diversity and responsiveness," and worst of all, BBC which was more like another national network competing with the commercial network for audiences (Mulcahy et al., 1986:44-45).

A second example is Italy, where Parliament, though accepting to introduce private broadcasting at a local level in 1974, confirmed the monopoly of the state owned RAI at the national level, and over news and information, because the Italian context was and largely remains such that the state sees itself as best able to safeguard the public interest by protecting the nation from the monopoly or oligopoly that is likely to go hand-in-hand with private operation of broadcasting (Rando, 1986:40-42). But as we maintain in chapter two, there is no evidence that the developing societies in which the USA, Britain, France, Italy and others saw the need for a broadcast system, were given the opportunity to choose among alternative systems, or to set up systems that arose out of their own traditions and responded to their own needs.

As far as the establishment of public service broadcasting in Britain is concerned, Williams (1979:265) gives three factors which according to him, facilitated the process. First, Britain's early development into an industrial society, with an elaborate communications network, helped to bring about a national culture. Second, the fact that a dominant version of this national culture became established in Britain's "unusually compact ruling-class" early enough, did much to bring about a consensual set of values, and "an effective paternalist definition of both service and responsibility"; all of which led to a better understanding and administration of public service broadcasting. Third, the fact that the British political system was such which "proceeded in many matters by appointment and delegation rather than by centralised state administration", "permitted the emergence of a state-regulated and state-sponsored public corporation which was not subject
to detailed state control". Elsewhere in Western Europe, reaction to the new technology of broadcasting was "the more typical solution", to use Williams' expression, of direct regulation of broadcasting by the state. In the USA, the idea of the democratic marketplace and the laissez-faire model of the economy, led to the establishment of competitive or commercial broadcasting.

Williams identifies two types of broadcast institutions. One which is capitalist and commercial, (but whose proponents, for rhetorical purposes, prefer to describe as 'free' and 'independent', as opposed to 'monopoly' and 'state control'), and the other which is public service or noncommercial. His distinction is between institutions which are privately owned, operated and funded with advertising revenue, and which have as "their primary aim the realisation and distribution of private profit on invested capital"; and other institutions whose concerns are not to make profit, but which devote revenue "almost wholly to production and development of the broadcasting service" (1979:266).

In the USA, unlike their commercial counterparts which are funded with advertising revenue, public service television not only has its production funds subject to central control, but is "member-supported, and survive with great difficulty only by constant local fund-raising" (Williams, 1979:266). Mulcahy and Widoff (1986:31) find the use of the term "public" rather misleading in the American context where unlike in France and Britain, such broadcasting is independent of the state financially, administratively, and in the elaboration of its policies. Furthermore, juxtaposed with commercial television, public broadcasting in the US, despite its "significant presence, ... has a decidedly minority share of viewership".

Attractive though the idea of public service broadcasting may be, affirms Williams, it can only function effectively if there is no "ambiguity about the public interest", and if "its relation to the state" is clearly defined; given that in every country, it is not always easy to say with required precision, what in effect constitutes "public interest", and the relationship between the public institutions charged with promoting such interest, and the state. Though Williams is in favour of public service broadcasting, he does not think that state monopolies as are found in some Western societies, the Soviet Bloc and developing countries, are the best way of ensuring this. The reason for his scepticism is that whenever that is the case, ...

... the state can be correctly identified with a partisan version
of the public interest (whether approved or not, by those subject to it and by observers, is another question) and state control of broadcasting is a function of general state control of information and ideology. Where competitive versions of the public interest have in effect been eliminated, the situation is simple, if also dead. But where such competitive versions are active, as for example in France and Italy, the equation between state and public interest is especially vulnerable, and this leads not only to internal conflicts but, in modern conditions, to complicated international pressures ... (1979:267).

Williams can thus be said to argue for pluralism, though not commercialism in broadcasting. To him it is possible for the broadcast media to be plural without being commercial, and public service without becoming the mere mouthpiece of the government, or being reduced to a mere state monopoly. He is apprehensive of any other form of political organisation but that which Schlesinger (1978) terms "democratic pluralism", wherein power is shared by "competitive political parties", in a way that is balanced, and that allows no particular interest to weigh too heavily upon the state. The BBC which supposedly subscribes to the very same democratic pluralism (Seaton, 1988:263-72), is Williams' example of an independent public service broadcasting institution. It is "supposed to be ... a marketplace for ideas and competing viewpoints, endorsing none, admitting all, a national institution above the fray" (Schlesinger, 1978:166).

However, though Williams endorses the BBC as a public institution that is free and independent from direct and blatant state interference and manipulation, he cautions against any uncritical acceptance of the institution's independence. Although direct pressures by the state are rare, the fact that the government appoints the public authorities that oversee the institution, is enough for a certain measure of long term influence on the part of the government. Coupled with the fact that any attempts to introduce the direct election of the institution's authorities, and to bring about "democratic representation or control by actual producers and broadcasters" within the corporation have continued to be "very vigorously opposed", this points strongly to the possibility that the authorities appointed are all part of "a complicated patronage system on which the real state, as distinct from the formal state, effectively relies" (Williams, 1979:267).

Curran (1988:300) provides evidences of how the Thatcher administration has appointed BBC officials on a partisan basis, and how the government has exerted pressure on its board of governors for the suppression of certain programmes of which it disapproved. But Williams thinks that no
matter the amount of pressures which might be brought to bear on the BBC, no interference by the government or state can be as rigid as the formal control through a ministry of information, as applies elsewhere. The fact that there is political pluralism (epitomized by "competitive political parties"), makes any rigid or formal control a virtual impossibility (Williams, 1979:267).^1

Without picking a quarrel with Williams' stance, it is worth remarking that the presence of "competitive political parties", does not automatically mean a multiplicity of voices and outlooks (Westergaard, 1977:110-111); for these parties, competitive though they might appear, could in effect be just like team 'A' playing against team 'B' of the same football club. Furthermore, political pluralism does not guarantee cultural pluralism. Important though political pluralism might be, it by no means provides the whole solution to the question of dominant interests which a truly plural broadcast system is supposed to guard against in a heterogeneous society. Even though Williams introduces the polemic of a consensus that is "assumed" rather than "openly arrived at", he fails to pursue the issue by showing how misleading such assumptions could be to the whole idea of public interest or public service broadcasting.

Recent developments in British broadcasting have revived debates about how public interest can best be served. In May 1988 for example, the government created a Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC) to monitor "taste and decency" on radio and TV, under the chairmanship of Sir Rees-Mogg. The BSC was charged, inter alia, with previewing imported programmes in order to watch against excessive "sex and violence" on British TV. The move attracted criticism, not least from the BBC and IBA who considered the BSC's right to preview as an interference with their traditional "systems of self-regulation". Opposition politicians on the other hand, criticised the government for using sex and violence as a pretext to ensure its political convenience, and to "inhibit those who dare to criticise" it. In the right to preview, is the presupposition that a single group of people appointed by the ruling government can determine morality for a country of over fifty six-million people.^[2]

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^1 For another view of how the authorities and business interests control television in Britain, see Ian Taylor's article in the Socialist Worker No. 1056 3 October, 1987.
The second development was the publication in November 1988 of the government’s White Paper on broadcasting, which although allowing for more terrestrial and satellite TV channels, was heavily criticised inter alia, for making the BBC dependent on subscription fees. By taking away public funding for the BBC, it is argued, the government has forced it to rely on market forces just as any other commercially funded station. As The Independent puts it, the reform implies that "the BBC could only transmit programmes which either a lot of people would pay to see or which a few people would pay a lot to see". This, it maintains, implies that while the BBC’s most popular programmes - soap operas and game shows - would easily find an audience, its minority programmes - arts, news and current affairs - would be seriously affected (The Independent, 24/6/88). The argument here is that a public service broadcast institution that is exclusively commercial in its funding, would only produce programmes it believes can guarantee its continuous existence; which almost always means the sacrifice of "quality" or "richness".

However, the White Paper brings an end to the BBC and ITV duopoly, and to the co-existence of publicly and commercially funded broadcasting in Britain; thus marking the beginning of an era wherein "funding is based on purely commercial considerations". But whether or not it would lead to monopolies, duopolies, or oligopolies of a commercial nature is a matter for future investigation. But as is evident below, such is the tendency in highly deregulated systems.

Proponents of commercial or competitive broadcasting in Britain or elsewhere, do more than just share Williams’ pluralism and stance against state monopoly over broadcast institutions. It is their contention that the state must not interfere in any way with the free market forces that shape the state of affairs. They are firmly convinced that when ownership is private, free and open to competition, the audiences who "are sufficiently sophisticated" are the sole judges of what is good or bad in the television and radio programmes that should be freely available (Wells, 1987:31). Thus, in order to guarantee a free marketplace of entertainment, ideas and serious

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5 The government’s White Paper on broadcasting - titled, "Broadcasting in the ’90s: Competition, Choice and Quality", generated a lot of debate in the Press, the broadcast media and amongst academics. It was seen as a real revolution in British broadcasting, which as Curran (1988:293) remarks, some have always believed to be the best in the world. For more details and reaction, see the press of Tuesday November 8, 1988, and the programme "The Television Revolution: The Channel 4 Debate" broadcast November 13 1988.
information, public service, in short, monopolistic tendencies must be guarded against.

To Seiden (1974:15-16) this involves the elimination of public ownership of any kind, which he seems to see as the only real threat to a free and open marketplace. His position is that government supported media must not be tolerated, for such "support necessarily goes hand-in-hand with government control" or 'big brotherism', to borrow a popular American phrase. He argues that it is precisely the absence of government financial support and/or interference in the selection of the persons involved in media operation, that has given the American communication system a unique position as champion of press freedom. He cites France and Britain as states where the government interferes either directly or indirectly with the media.

It is important for the American communication system to reflect the general economic structure of the American society, Seiden argues. But this can only happen if government ownership and interference is minimized; given that such involvement on the part of the government, inevitably leads to attempts by the latter to conceal and falsify information. Hence the need to maintain a permanent state of tension between the government and the media, making sure that the sharp lines separating their interests are reinforced. Though he is rather worried that this ideal might be compromised by a new breed of media practitioners who, to paraphrase him, see themselves, most elitistly as educators rather than informers; thus making the distinction between "news" and "editorials" less clear.

Seiden makes certain assumptions that others would find to be rather uncritical and therefore difficult to swallow. There is nothing wrong with his seeing the media as watchdogs against political or economic control and manipulation. But one wonders why he should think that such control or manipulation is only possible by the government. Perhaps this is the result of his view of monopoly as possible only when there is state intervention or public control. Finally, if the American communication system is really the free and open marketplace Seiden claims it is, there is apparently no reason why he should be worried about the new breed of journalists who blur the distinction between news and editorials. For one should normally think that audience sovereignty would overrule in the long run. For, who else than the audience can decide what it wants?

As he himself argues, the fear that owners and employees of the mass
media possess the power over the audience is quite unjustifiable in a free
market situation. He claims that:

It is with the audience and not the media that the power resides.
In the everyday, operational sense, the American audience
influences the type of entertainment, consumer products and even
political programs, that are brought before it by the mass media.
[...] the democratic character of America's mass media is a natural
outgrowth of its economic structure. Our media system operates on
the premise that the audience is the customer and those who own and
use the system are salesmen. This relationship permeates the mass
media, affecting its financing, the nature of its content, and even
the character of political advocacy (1974:5).

Seiden maintains that audience sovereignty is being assured by means
of constant audience polls. Through polls the audience determine television
and radio programmes; and through the circulation figures newspapers and
magazines learn the audience's desires. But as Halloran (Unesco, 1970:11) and
Westergaard (1977:108) remark, the quality of any research, investigation or
polls depends on the type of questions asked, the way they are asked and to
whom these questions are asked. Even then, polls are not a very reliable
research tool because they rely on superficial and incomplete observations to
make far reaching though often misleading conclusions.

Apart from these shortcomings of polls in general, research by
Schlesinger (1978:115-120), at the BBC points to the contrary. Schlesinger
observed that the journalists or broadcasters are seldom aware of the audience
as a problem, but rather, they believe that their training, professional
competence and experience endow them with the ability to select what is good
for the audience. They tend to rely on comments and reactions from family
members, friends, acquaintances and a handful of letters and phone calls from
some listeners or viewers; all of which generally reinforce their belief that
they do not really need an audience research to be in a position to determine
what the audiences want or not. Even when audience research is carried out, it
is more for the BBC to reassert its position in front of other broadcasting
institutions than to determine how well the audience could be satisfied.

Granted that these audience studies are constantly carried out, and
that they are constantly consulted by the journalists and broadcasters, how
sure is Seiden that as consumers, the audiences have not come to want only
what the media owners and employees have made them to want? Furthermore,
Seiden does not say how one should distinguish between the audience who
rejects a media product because he does not want it, and the other who does so
because he cannot afford it. For, as far as the argument in favour of
commercial broadcasting goes, it seems to imply that in the American society the consumer's problem is not that of means, but that of deciding on what to spend the means. However, the fact that the media are available does not necessarily imply that they are affordable.

Seiden's position is echoed by Hirsch (1985), Mulcahy et al. (1986), and Cantor et al. (1986). According to Hirsch (1985:116), people have a natural preference "to exercise more rather than less control and to be more certain than less certain about how things will turn out." But unfortunately for them, "external conditions of their environment" do not always allow people to have their way. These external conditions of the environment include competition and democracy. The less these external conditions are tolerated, the less sovereign the audience becomes. However, in America where these external environmental conditions are essentially structured by the free and open market situation, it ceases to matter who owns the media, as long as it is not the state. It does not even matter whether there is a change of owner or not. The situation is simply too competitive and democratic to allow any single owner or group of owners the power to manipulate the audiences.

Thus, as long as the market structures remain fundamentally free, competitive and democratic, there is little room for owners, old or new to manoeuvre in seeking to bring about any changes at all. As with Seiden, freedom to Hirsch seems to narrow down only to absence of government ownership and interference. Still one remains worried why these proponents of free and competitive media should worry about government interference and its ability to manipulate, when they all agree with Seiden that "In a creative, free and open economic environment, power is transitory, almost fleeting, indeed perhaps nonexistent" (1974:30).

Another point made in favour of privately owned media is the importance of using advertising revenue to finance these institutions. According to William G. Harley, communications adviser to the US delegation to the Unesco General Conferences in the 1970s (Wells, 1987:26), such a form of funding is advantageous in that it helps the media to withstand pressures from the government and "private interest groups", at the same time as it permits the establishment of a plethora of newspapers, magazines and broadcasting stations, which, thanks to their multiplicity, freedom and independence, "guarantees that no single voice or group of voices can ever achieve predominance." Motivated by profit though they may be, the private media safeguard the rights of people and pose as constructive critics of government.
Seiden, Hirsch, Harley and others see these factors as pointing to the indubitable superiority of the system of private ownership in the media, and legitimising the political and economic organisation which has made this possible. Thus, it was no surprise, as Schiller (1977) explains, when the US used its doctrine of "Free Flow of Information" as a "highly effective ideological club" to promote its political and economic values by whipping "alternate forms of social organization" into a ridiculous defensiveness. And for two decades and more, thanks to the doctrine, the US imposed itself at the centre of the world political and economic stage, and flooded the international community with its cultural material (Schiller, 1967, 1977).

Schiller's point, when made in the form of an accusation, is contestable by other researchers. Thus, for instance, in a recent study, Cantor et al. (1986) argue against what "critics from the left imply" about the domination of the world TV by US culture, in the form of American-made programmes. They invoke the argument that the audiences are sophisticated and powerful enough to determine or choose what appeals to them, and thus do not need anyone to plead their case for them. However, the method Cantor et al. use to reject the argument for US "cultural imperialism" is by no means adequate. For one does not find out how the audiences react to various US-made entertainment programmes by interviewing only those who produce, sell or buy these programmes for rebroadcasting in other parts of the world. One interviews above all, the audiences who actually consume these programmes; which unfortunately, Cantor et al. recommend only at the end of their article, after making their point.

In a study of the very same American society that has permitted Seiden, Hirsch and others to argue the way they do, Bagdikian (1983, 1985) comes out with strikingly different but more critical conclusions. The focus of his argument is that the media, in addition to providing entertainment and selling merchandise, must be in a position to create "a rich marketplace of ideas and serious information". Along with Gans (1971:96), Seiden and Hirsch, Bagdikian considers diversity and richness in the media as the most essential ingredients for the survival of democracy. But unlike the latter two, he does not think that the absence of government ownership, support or intervention is enough to guarantee this diversity and richness in the marketplace of freedom and open competition. He is very aware that diversity and richness or freedom and democracy are much easier to talk about than to actually implement. As he remarks, "public acceptance of a full range of public ideas does not emerge solely from exhortations for tolerance. It comes from experiencing diversity."
A public used to a narrow range of ideas will come to regard this narrowness as the only acceptable condition" (1985:99).

It is Bagdikian’s firm conviction that only those who sincerely have a personal faith in diversity and richness can bring about change in this direction. His study of media monopoly published in 1982, and subsequent work have revealed that the situation in America is far from what Seiden and Hirsch depict. This study led him to conclude that the media in the USA were becoming more and more homogeneous in content and structure even though the population was growing larger, more diverse and confronted with fast changing circumstances (1985:98). This, according to him, is a direct consequence of the growth of control by a relatively small number of corporate hands. If private ownership were all there is to ensure richness and diversity in the media as it as been argued, one may well ask why in a supposedly diverse society as America, the media are so homogeneous in content that "most newspapers and broadcast programs [are] uniform in basic content, tone and social-political values" (Bagdikian, 1985:100)?

Bagdikian provides a statistical support to his assertion that the US media have become more homogeneous over the last two decades than ever before (1985:100–101). As his statistics reveal, this development can be explained by concentrated ownership – a phenomenon which is by no means exclusive to the US (Murdock, 1982). He remarks that in the US, there seems to be a double standard which though sensitive to failures in public bodies, is quite insensitive to failures in the private sector, particularly as concerns big business (1983). A point which is reiterated by Schiller (1983) and Downing (1986), both of whom argue that in the name of national interest and security, military, corporate and political interests are privileged to the detriment of social public development. The interconnection between the corporate and power elites is such that it ultimately undermines the public interest which both government and the doctrine of pluralism are supposed to protect.

This is a fact which leads Aggarwala to conclude that "the danger to press freedom inherent in the domination or control of the media by big business may be less obvious than that arising from government subsidy or control of the media but it is not any the less insidious" (1985:50). An argument which others have countered with the assertion that no matter how concentrated ownership of media in private hands might be, it is certainly less dangerous to the free flow of information than state monopolies and
bureaucratic controls (Wells, 1987:27).

It has been argued that with few exceptions, most owners who buy and set up private broadcasting institutions, are motivated by the drive to make profit than by a genuine desire to promote richness and diversity in the public mind. The mere fact that commercial broadcasting relies on advertising revenue imposes certain limitations to the type of programmes produced or broadcast. As early as the 1960s academics were already seriously concerned with the problem of the media’s widespread dependence on advertising revenue. This, to Halloran (1963:40), reduces broadcasting and the other media to mere profit-making organisations for those whose major purpose is to sell. In such circumstances, he argues, the main aim of a paper or a programme in the radio or television is, "to get a large audience as quickly as possible so that advertisers may be attracted and held". These commercial pressures, together with pressures of a political, organisational or professional nature, constitute "the complex of constraints" to the media’s role as ‘autonomous ‘watch-dogs’", and with which the media and practitioners must constantly negotiate (Gallagher, 1982; Head, 1963).

Adkins (1985:55) sees three major undesirable effects of commercialism in broadcasting. First, the pressure to build up large audiences in order to satisfy the advertisers, causes programmes that appeal to the smaller interest groups to be eliminated or given less attention. "The complete spectrum of public interests and needs can no longer be served," and the programme types that survive are those that appeal to "the largest shares of audience and the specific age and socio-economic groups wanted by the advertisers". Second, emphasis is placed not on educative and informative programmes, but on those with "the strongest appeal to most basic human interests" such as violence and sex, in order to retain the attention of the audience. Third, any programme content likely to bring about a significant drop in audience figures must be avoided. Thus, because emotion is "more gripping than fact," the news programmes tend to focus on the sensational and to shelve aside "the heavier items involving complicated explanations, little action or comparative numbers". The stories which are preferred become those with exciting visual content; and "oversimplification of complex issues seems necessary to avoid the risk of boring and losing the audience".

However, Adkins fails to say whether these characteristics are exclusive to the commercial media, or they simply tend to be more pronounced here than elsewhere in the noncommercial state-owned systems. But like
Aggarwala, he is equally aware of the shortcomings of a state dominated broadcast system, where noncommercialism, it must be noted, is not synonymous with public service. This is evidenced in his argument that the answer for a free broadcast system is neither exclusive state monopoly nor total commercialism, but a balance between the two (Adkins, 1985:55). A point which is echoed by de Sola Pool (1977:32), who argues that a country which opts to develop broadcasting either as "an entertainment medium to serve advertisers" or as "a propaganda medium for the government", is bound to fail to meet the other needs of its plural society. Though de Sola recognises that a mixed system is probably the best, he however advocates that in looking for alternative ways of funding, control, and organisation of broadcast systems, each country must do well to determine how broadcasting ought to relate and interact with other social institutions, and what role it must play in propagating the richness, diversity, and aspirations of the society.

Aware that press freedom is threatened by the control or domination of the media by the government, as well as by the media's ownership by or dependence on big business, and that in both cases public interests are relegated to a back seat, Aggarwala advocates "free media", independent of big business and/or government control or domination" (1985:50-51). But how these "free media" can be brought about remains the unanswered question, though he does not hide his admiration for BBC's "excellent, top-quality television and radio fare". Concluding his observation of the Italian situation where there is a mixture of state and private broadcasting, Rando (1986:39) is less optimistic. Attractive though the idea of free and unrestricted broadcasting might be at a theoretical level, says Rando, in reality governments are most unlikely to surrender regulation, and the economics of broadcasting (especially in television) are such that a "genuine pluralism of content" is out of the question, even where there is a plethora of stations. In this way, a democratic and free broadcast system appears to be possible neither in exclusive private control, nor in total state monopoly, or a mixture of both state and private enterprise.

III.) CATEGORISATION OF BROADCAST SYSTEMS

Like the journalists and broadcasters they study, media researchers seek to "reduce all phenomena to constructed classifications" (Tuchman, 1977:45), which help them make sense of the various institutions and practices they observe. Thus, the various positions and tendencies we have briefly presented, would appear to fit into one or the other of several such models,
categories, theories or paradigms constructed by some researchers.

The first such models to emerge were by three American researchers (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm) in 1956, and are summarised by Golding et al. (1979:45-46) as follows: First, there is the Authoritarian model, in which the media are controlled by a ruling elite in the service of state power; the second is Libertarian, and wherever it is practised, the media of that society are supposed to serve as a free marketplace for competitive political information and ideals; third is the Social Responsibility model, which advocates freedom of the press and access to privately owned media over which the state should have no control other than to check excesses and ensure that they serve the public interest; and the fourth and last is the Totalitarian model, where the media are supposedly state-owned and serve as an instrument of dictatorship.

Golding et al. also present the models constructed by Williams, which are four in number as well. Williams equally talks of an Authoritarian model, by which he means a situation where the media are intended to protect and enhance the power of the ruling minority. But his second is called the Paternal model, and depicts a situation of authoritarianism with a conscience, where there is a lot of censorship and deliberate diffusion of values considered by the ruling minority to be good for the masses. He also talks of a Commercial model, where control of the media is supposedly determined by forces in the marketplace; and of a Democratic model, which is based on the principle of free and universal access to the means of transmission and reception of information, but which is yet unachieved anywhere in the world.

To this lot, McQuail (1986:94-96) contributes two more models or "normative theories" as he calls them: "Development Media" and "Democratic-participant media" models. In the first, the media and journalists are subordinated by the overriding and all-involving objective of national development; while in the second, emphasis is laid on horizontal rather than vertical communication, which is seen as the major shortcoming of the commercialisation and monopolisation of broadcasting through private ownership, or the bureaucratisation and centralism of the public broadcast institutions (also see Servaes, 1983; Boyd-Barret, 1982).

These models, classifications or paradigms, which are originally intended to serve as ideal types (Portes, 1976) are not always seen or used as such. Helpful though they may be, these paradigms "can be misleading ...[and]
can lead to a stilted static view of things" (Halloran, 1986:4). The danger is that taken out of a rigorous academic context, such ideal types risk being seen as representative of reality; and might thus be used ideologically to legitimate or denounce, rather than simply to explain what actually obtains (Abdel-Malek, 1967:259; Portes, 1976:55-6; Gareau, 1987:596-7; Riggs, 1987:607-9). It is mostly in this way that concepts such as "Libertarian" and "Totalitarian" have been used in the past, or that "Free" and "Unfree" systems are employed today; the fact that "nowhere is the press ideally free" or that "Journalists everywhere have to work within certain confinements, whether of law, custom or economics" (Head, 1963:595; Gallagher, 1982), notwithstanding.

The problem with the social sciences is that, categories developed to serve as ideal types have increasingly been taken as reflections of reality, and have come to serve more like ideological tools than scientific concepts. Perhaps this tendency can partially be explained by the fact that in the West where these disciplines have largely originated (Abdel, 1967; Gareau, 1987; Riggs, 1987; Halloran, 1988), their concepts are often part of everyday language, and as such their simplistic or ideological employment by the general public and political leaders, could colour the perspective given them by the social scientists who, as Gareau (1987:596-7) and Halloran (1988:14-16) have pointed out, are determined by the establishments of which they all form a part.

However, the consequence is that, despite the differences inherent in the broadcast institutions of the West (with varying degrees of state interference and regulation), these have generally been presented to the rest of the world, as free and unrestricted systems that operate in an environment where there is "free flow of information"; and for which reason, the Western countries have posed as pace-setters for the rest of the world. Theirs is a position which is hotly contested by the Soviet Bloc and the Third World, where the free flow of information is generally said to be hampered through state regulation of media content (Wells, 1987:24-42). Thus, thanks to their researchers and thanks to the looseness and commonplace nature of social science concepts, most Western countries tend to leave the impression that the regulation of information is carried out only in the Soviet Bloc and the developing world. They argue as if their various governments were entirely aloof vis-à-vis the media.
CONCLUSION

We have discussed the various philosophies, debates, and typologies in broadcasting, especially as these are presented in the works of researchers in the West. It is clear from the discussion that researchers differ as to the form of ownership, control or funding best able to serve public interest. The extreme philosophies of state or private monopolies are presented as equally harmful, and although it is difficult to find an alternative satisfactory to all tendencies, researchers are aware of the need for a system that ensures richness and plurality in the marketplace of ideas.

The diversity of options in the West is a reflection of the fact that in creating broadcast institutions in their various countries, Westerners have been guided more by their internal economic, cultural, political and social realities, than by some sort of 'imposition' or 'imitation'. The debates that have often surrounded the adoption of new technologies or strategies, are further testimony to their autonomy and independence. In our examination of broadcasting in the developing world which follows, we are interested not only in equal philosophies, debates and typologies, but also in how autonomous they have been in choosing their broadcast systems.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines literature on broadcasting in the developing countries. It deals specifically with the main factors that have influenced the introduction, development and uses of the broadcast media in different regions of the Third World. The purpose is to bring out the major trends and characteristics, which together with the debates on nation-building in Africa and on broadcasting in general, provide the conceptual framework for our study of broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon.

I.) BROADCASTING AND THE THIRD WORLD: WESTERN INFLUENCES

The introduction and development of broadcasting in the developing world have been highly influenced by Western societies and models (Golding, 1974, 1977; Servaes, 1983, 1986; Halloran, 1988). In their capacity as colonial or economic powers, Britain, France and the USA for example, have been very instrumental as standard-setters for the Third World (Schiller, 1967). By so doing, they have not only made broadcasting an African, Asian and Latin American reality as well, but have equally universalised the values, attitudes and practices identifiable with radio and television in the West. Many researchers have argued with much conviction that, from the outset the overruling factor in the introduction of broadcasting in most developing societies, were the interests of the Western powers and not the concerns of the indigenous population (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:109; Bebey, 1963:10, 36; Browne, 1963:114; Lightfoot, 1965:27; Gibbons, 1974:108-10; Ekaney, 1976:118; Golding, 1977:294; Head, 1977:85; de Cardona, 1977:60; de Sagasti Perrett, 1977:136; Katz et al., 1978:7-8; Golding et al., 1979:40; Hamelink, 1983b:107-8; O'Brien, 1985:187; Eone, 1986:249-50; Iyimoga, 1986:264-5). In almost every case, not only were the indigenous people denied the right to choose their broadcast system, but also they were equally denied access, and/or the right to determine content and use.

In Africa for example, France and Britain set up radio stations to provide their citizens with information from home, to disseminate their culture and values among the natives, or, as was the case during World War II,
for propaganda purposes against the Nazis, as well as for the massive conscription of natives to help in saving "the free world" from Hitler’s totalitarianism. As Gibbons aptly remarks, Africa was little more than "a pied-à-terre" for most of these stations whose broadcasts were not aimed at the local audiences (1974:109). Long before the colonists ever saw the need to develop broadcasting stations in their various colonies, they were already transmitting to these territories from Europe. France started broadcasting in French to its colonies in 1931, and the BBC launched the British Empire Service in English a year later, while as early as 1927 the Netherlands began making regular transmissions in Dutch to the East Indies (Wasburn, 1985:38).

The aim was to consolidate their positions in the colonies by promoting the use of their languages and selling their cultures to the natives, as a foil to the forces of dissidence. It is partly for the same reason that the programmes in the colonial media were mainly rediffusions of metropolitan versions (Browne, 1963:114; Gibbons, 1974:108-10; Uche, 1985:20); as even in the case where the urban based natives stood to benefit from the entertainment offered the European settlers, it was the hope of the colonists that the entertainment "might divert possibly dissident tendencies" (Golding, 1977:294). In this way, the nationalists heavily depended on the folk media in their struggles for independence, despite the presence of broadcasting facilities. They had little or "no access to radio, which remained a tight government monopoly" (Head, 1977:86-7). Thus in Nigeria for instance, when Awolowo criticised the "MacPherson Constitution" and was accused on NBS “of being unfaithful", by the British Governor-General, he was denied equal access to the radio to defend himself (Uche, 1985:22). Broadcasting in the colonies can therefore be said to have acted as a catalyst in the acculturation process needed for colonisation to continue unopposed.

In Latin America, despite the political independence of a large number of the countries, broadcasting still served foreign interests at the initial stage of its introduction. The American influence was overwhelming, and dates as far back as the 1920s when there was a proliferation of commercially owned and operated local radio stations (Tunstall, 1977:10; Lins da Silva, 1986:100-1). But as de Cardona notes, the American network TV and multinational companies readily supplied the capital and broadcasting equipment for the first television stations to be established, with the hope of making an easy entry into the commercial and cultural worlds of the region. The price most Latin American countries were to pay for having broadcasting introduced à l’américaine, was the unavoidable influence of US culture and
commerce, as shortage of trained local personnel and programmes became an immediate problem (1977:60-1). As a result of its purely commercial motivation, such broadcast stations, no matter how multiple their channels, tended to limit their coverage to the urban areas where the people were potential consumers (Verthein, 1977:131).

Gradually, 'trapped' by what Roncagliolo terms "the production-financing pincer" of the transnational corporations, broadcasting and other media in Latin America have become merely "the means of distributing messages" produced elsewhere, rather than acting as "exclusive centers for their production". In this way, Roncagliolo argues, the separation between the production and distribution processes, "provides a kind of shield against any attempt to deprive radio and television"; thus legitimating the transnational corporations, who though not always directly involved with ownership of the media, control content by producing and/or financing what is broadcast (Roncagliolo, 1986:82-4).

Much has been published about the broadcast systems which the newly independent states of Africa and Asia inherited from the colonists. Researchers, (Golding, 1977:293-301; Movlana, 1977:73; Katz, 1977:112-16; Tunstall, 1977:4-7; Katz et al., 1978:3-14; Golding et al., 1979:40-44; O'Brien, 1985:192-4; Omar, 1985:16-17) have written extensively on how broadcasting in the former colonies has followed the style, formats and practices of similar Institutions in the West. They have used adjectives such as "borrowed", "transplanted", "extension and imitation", "imposed" and "inherited" to express the fact that broadcasting started elsewhere in the West, and was then introduced into the developing world. But my reading in this area points to an aspect of this "inheritance", "extension and imitation" or "borrowing", which has tended to be inadequately stressed, if at all: that is, the double standard of preaching pluralism and freedom of information back home in the West, but clamping down on nationalists who were struggling for exactly the same rights in the colonies; or enlisting a dominated people to fight against possible domination of Europe by Hitler.

As Head (1977:87) recognises, "colonial administrations exercised much more control than would have been tolerated at home". By so doing, the colonists appeared to make it clear to the leaders of the would-be independent states of Africa and Asia, that governments are most vulnerable if they fail to maintain rigid control over the media, broadcasting in particular. Having thus been made to see broadcasting as a most sensitive institution, the
African and Asian nationalists, I should think, once in power as a government, were going to seek exclusive ownership and control of radio and television.

Perhaps because they were unaware of this unintended effect of their rigid control of broadcasting, the former colonial powers would increasingly find that their doctrine of free flow of information and political pluralism fell on deaf ears among the leaders of the newly independent states. Ironically, once out of the colonies, the Western societies began to criticize the very political and media repression and rigidity, that as colonial masters they had worked so hard to validate, and had found to be particularly useful in crushing opposition to domination and exploitation.

The contention here is that by the time the colonies became independent, equally power hungry 'natives' had sufficiently learnt from the example of the colonial authorities, about how indispensable total control of broadcasting is, if a government wants to remain in power willy-nilly. As Halloran rightly remarks, "Some of the most interesting consequences of any given act of communication need never have been intended and, needless to say, on the other side, what is intended is not always a clear guide to what actually takes place" (1986:7). In brief, there is every indication that the former colonies inherited both the colonial pattern of broadcasting (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:116), and the metropolitan system which was introduced just before (or after) independence when things were falling apart, and the centre of colonial power and exploitation could no longer hold.

A careful look at the literature on broadcasting in Africa, reveals that all the colonists did in the domain of radio and television was for their exclusive interests. So, just as the French and the British tended to introduce new radio stations during World War II (Bebey, 1963:36; Lightfoot, 1965:27; Ekaney, 1976:118; Bone, 1986:249-50), so too was the idea of a less centrally controlled broadcasting system, coupled with that of the free flow of information, introduced only when the pressures for independence could no longer be resisted (Golding et al., 1979:42); or when threatened by the alternative political and economic organisation offered by communism at the dawn of the Cold War, the former colonial masters strove "to maintain their preferred status [in Africa], while staving off the efforts of the Communist Bloc to gain footholds on the continent" (Head, 1977:85).

As Head explains, during the Cold War era the media systems of the new 'nation-states' of Africa became "prized targets" in the power struggle
between East and West. This was when more than ever before, France and Britain
for example, saw the need to encourage the establishment of "free",
"independent" and "plural" broadcasting systems, that would stop the Soviet
Bloc from setting up "repressive" state monopolies. Everywhere, now joined by
the USA (incidentally the chief proponent of the free flow of information
doctrine), France and Britain were to promote and support the development of
replicas of metropolitan broadcast institutions.

Head states the situation as follows:

Western governments encouraged private media interests to fill the
gap left by removal of colonial control. Lord Thomson of Fleet set
up not only a Commercial Subsidiary to contract with developing
countries, but also a charitable foundation to train African
personnel—admittedly maneuvers designed explicitly to counter
communist media influences (1977:85).

In other words, now that the Western governments no longer had the need to
keep the media in Africa under rigid control, no one else should, least of all
the Soviet Union. Again, it was their interests that mattered, not
consideration of the importance of a free and plural media system to Africans
as Africans. Thus, wherever they met with radical opposition, their reaction
was typical and predictable. For example, the French did not hesitate to
remove, send back to France or destroy much of their broadcasting equipment
from the radio station in Conakry, when Guinea dared to vote "No" to the idea

The establishment of broadcast stations during the Cold War period
largely reflects this attitude and climate. Whether it had to do with the
introduction of radio in francophone Africa (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:108-11;
Bebey, 1963:30-51; Gibbons, 1974:110-111), the bringing of television to
Liberia (Grant, 1965), Western Nigeria (Katz et al., 1978:11) and Ghana
(Kruger, 1965:32-3), or radio and television to Northern Nigeria (Diamond,
1965), Western companies and agencies (SORAFON, RCA (Boyd, 1984:383-4), EMI,
GRANADA, MARCONI, THOMSON, SIEMEN, etc.) were always ready to help out with
the equipment, the training, and the experts. It was taken for granted that TV
programmes for example, should be like in America, Britain and France (Peters,
1970:21); or, that "cooperation agreements" meant a one-way flow of
programmes, technicians and equipment from the West to African radio and
television stations (Eone, 1986:191-7).

Like in Liberia television everywhere in Africa was expected to
start off with "international film material and local live entertainment"
capable of satisfying "a critical audience composed of Africans, Americans and
Europeans with widely diverse views and interests" (Grant, 1965:22). Like in Northern Nigeria, it was not uncommon for the television experts to bring along some Western TV films which they showed to the local population, with the aim of getting "a fair idea of the type of programme that would be popular" (Diamond, 1965:27).

Again, the general idea was to make as many African countries follow the example of pro-Western states like Liberia, which Grant describes as follows:

With a dollar economy and highly-developed tastes, Liberia is in step with Western ideas on everything from architecture and agriculture to mass communication and mass education. It is far ahead of most countries on the African continent in its receptivity to progress (Grant, 1965:21).

In other words, if the other African countries were interested in catching up not only with Liberia but with the West, they had to establish a Western-type economy, develop the same tastes as Westerners, and be generally in tune with Western ideas on every aspect of life. In short, they had to cultivate an "empathy" (Lerner, 1964, 1977) towards Liberia and the West. To be modern was to be like Liberia, which was, to be Western.

II.) THE GOVERNMENT AND BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD WORLD

The literature points to a tendency by the developing countries towards more centralised broadcast systems. But in view of what we have said about the colonial situation, this tendency must not simply be seen like Katz and Wedell have done, as an abandonment of "the element of autonomy from government control which was explicit in most models of broadcasting structures transferred from the West" (1978:vii). To see it thus is to ignore the reality under which these states lived as colonies, which in no way was a reflection of the European situation. Instead, the option for rigid state control has to be seen as an indication to which of the two models of broadcasting inherited, appealed more to the post-colonial leaders of these states. They have preferred the rigid highly centralised colonial model to the freer and more accessible metropolitan one, of which as colonies they experienced next to nothing, and which was "transferred" just a little before or after independence, in order "to fill the gap left by removal of colonial control", to quote Head.

In opting for state ownership and control, these governments have, like the colonial administrations that preceeded them, equally sought to
justify why broadcasting needs to be controlled. Though the two have one reason in common - power, they tend to differ in the others. Today, like in the past, it is common for governments of the developing countries to claim that centralism is necessarily the better of the two legacies in the process of nation-building. It is justified as less wasteful of the limited resources, and as guaranteeing the political stability badly needed for rapid development. Generally, they claim that once their countries have become more mature and stable, they would loosen their hold over broadcasting and the other media (Aggarwala, 1985:52). Again, just as the colonists saw the importance of free and private initiative in broadcasting only when colonisation came (or was about to come) to its end. These similarities generally point to how much the post-colonial leaders learnt (both formally and informally) from their colonial predecessors.

Just as the colonial administration was most rigid about broadcasting and less so with the press, so too are the governments of the developing world. Broadcasting has been singled out as the media which need to be watched at close range. This is also because it is largely considered the most "mass" of all the media, and as capable of hypodermic effects (see Bebey, 1963:10). If well harnessed, its contribution towards nation-building and development can be enormous (Schramm, 1964:127-44; Lerner, 1964: 54-5; Deutsch, 1966; Bebey, 1963:5-14; Schiller, 1967:63). According to the theorists of modernisation discussed in chapter one, in the Third World the media can facilitate the strive to unite culture and polity, as well as the social and psychic mobilisation necessary for socio-economic development; in the same way that they did in the West, resulting in 'modern' nation states (see Golding, 1974; Servaes, 1983, 1986; McQuail, 1986).

Thus Katz sees the role of broadcasting in all developing countries to be threefold: (a) to contribute "to the process of integration, helping to forge a nation from regional, tribal and ethnic loyalties"; (b) to promote "socio-economic development, helping to motivate and to instruct in the problems that beset the peasant population"; and (c) to "promote the continuity of traditional culture" (Katz, 1977:109-11). Since "what is broadcast may determine, in a large measure, the cultural outlook and social direction of the new nations for generations", it is important, Schiller argues, that programmes are produced locally according to national development objectives; foreign programmes being generally "irrelevant" in outlook and character, and often "injurious" to such objectives (1967:64-5). All governments, whether elected or brought to power by popular coups d'etats and
revolutions, have emphasised the need for broadcasting and the other media to contribute towards nation-building and development in this manner.

Examples of the purposive use of broadcasting in the above way abound in Asia, Africa and Latin America; but a few would suffice to illustrate what leaders mean when they talk of broadcasting for nation-building and development. Lowry (1970) gives an account of how radio and TV have been successfully used for instruction and literacy campaigns in Mexico, which cannot afford the large number of literacy instructors expected to cover the entire population. In Cuba where radio and television were nationalised after the revolution, the government has carried out a highly successful student and adult education programme as well. Werthein (1977:132-3) recounts that this policy was aimed at bridging the rural-urban dichotomy, and at adapting the educational system to Cuban national needs and realities. Thus, for example, in 1973 the national forum on Educational Television (ETV) recommended the use of TV "as a massive means of carrying out the pedagogical principles of the Revolution and that ETV programming should contribute permanently and systematically to the pedagogical, ideological, and political training of students".

Peru, like Mexico, though not changing the "essentially capitalistic role of publicity in the mass media", effected measures which would ensure that content was more in accord with the political philosophy and goals of the revolutionary military government of 1968. The contents had to be sufficiently national, humanistic, and educational in character. Radio and television were expected to play a leading role in the dissemination of the values and goals of the revolution amongst the adult and the young. Sixty minutes daily of each radio and TV station's time, was to be used for educational and cultural broadcasts, centrally coordinated by the Ministry of Education (de Sagasti Perrett, 1977:142-3).

Elsewhere in Asia and Africa, the practice is similar. Thus for instance, as early as 1956, India, with the help of Unesco, introduced Radio Rural Forums of the Canadian farm forum model, as an attempt to establish a two-way contact between villagers and development planners. It involves what Singh (1977:151-2) has described as "a listening-cum-discussion-cum-action group of village leaders", and provides regular feedback reports of decisions and questions of clarification to the broadcaster. Though he recognises that the radio forum made a promising start with the number of forums increasing from 900 to 12,000 by 1965, Singh criticises it for failing to cover the whole
spectrum of the rural populations, and for encouraging a form of elitism in the rural areas, that is similar to and just as dangerous as the urban type. A criticism which is confirmed in a more recent study of village communication in Bihar in India, where Sinha discovers that the television messages aimed at the villagers fail to bring about the expected rural development.

According to Sinha, the socio-economic structures in place are not conducive to change. Thus he found that people at different levels of the economic hierarchy, reacted differently to the same TV message. The "Landless Labourers" for example, regarded "the moving pictures ... like fairy tales" that failed to help them attain a better living; and as far as they were concerned, the TV messages directed at them were nothing but "high sounding ideas without any practical consequence". On their part, the small cultivators in the village considered "most of the agricultural practices and innovations" to be "capital intensive", and therefore "meant for rich and large cultivators". On the other hand, the rich cultivators "viewed television as an instrument of instigation of the poor against the rich. To them, the TV message was "an evil force for destroying the existing status quo and the so-called harmony of the village" (Sinha, 1985:122-3).

In Africa, Ivory Coast has been like a pace-setter to the whole world, as far as ETV is concerned. It has pioneered and heavily researched into how ETV could be used to improve upon the school systems, and in reducing the degree of illiteracy among the adult and largely rural population (Grant, 1971; Head, 1977:95; Lenglet, 1985). In fact, the examples are many, but the efforts are often inadequate, and the successes few. Bankole for example, believes that the effective use of television for educative purposes is often marred by the "prestigious ambitions" of many leaders who are more desirous of using it "to secure political points" (1967:7).

Malaysia (Guimary, 1977; Omar,1985), India (Singh, 1977), Tanzania and Algeria (Katz et al., 1978:29-30), and Somalia (Haibeh, 1987:62-71) are all examples of countries which have used broadcasting in solving their multiple linguistic problems. The unique thing is that each of them has succeeded in replacing English, French or Italian as the official languages. In the case of Malaysia, Bahasa Malaysia has replaced English, though Omar criticises the uncommitted manner in which radio and TV have been used to teach the national language to the other ethnic groups. Programmes continue to be diffused in English, as well as in Cantonese and Tamil, but all three languages are secondary. Swahili and Arabic have replaced English and French
in Tanzania and Algeria respectively. In India, though Hindi replaced English as the national language at independence, its linguistic problems are far from solved, as it remains a country with 14 major languages and 800 dialects. Guinea was about the first country in Africa to use all its six major national languages in regular broadcasts to the people (Browne, 1963).

Nigeria is another example of a country which is fast seeing the importance of the local languages in broadcasting to the masses of its population. In a study conducted between 1970–1974, Ugboajah (1977:185–7) gives an account of how the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation in Benin broadcasts news in six indigenous languages, and carries out popular magazines and agricultural programmes in these and many other local languages. The people enjoy these programmes, because they are better able to make sense of a message that is delivered them in a language which they can speak and understand. Nigeria, Ugboajah remarks, is broadcasting more and more in the languages that make sense to the people, though English continues to be dominant. Accordingly (Head, 1977:84), Nigeria is an exceptional case in the whole of black Africa, in the fact that 30 of its 178 local languages are used in regular broadcasts in various parts of the country. As far as the rest of black Africa is concerned, French, English, Spanish and Portuguese are still the dominant languages of transmission, though on the average, each of them makes additional broadcasts in four of a plethora of local languages.

In sum, all these functions and many others, fall into general and often broad prescriptive statements made in the statutes or policy papers of the various broadcast institutions of different countries. With the exception of Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Lebanon and a few other countries where broadcasting is largely in private hands, these roles and expectations are often defined by and under the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (or Culture). In Malaysia for instance, the government has broadly defined this role to comprise supporting "efforts to build a united Malaysian nation through goodwill, solidarity and racial harmony" (Guimary, 1977:161). The wordings may vary, but the fundamental expectation remains the same: that broadcasting should contribute to nation-building and development through a faithful interpretation and dissemination of government policies. It is a role of animation, orientation and control of the national development effort, or of making people participate actively in the task of nation-building; but it is one plagued with problems resulting from the polyethnic and multilingual nature of most countries (Smith, 1983, 1986), the lack of popular participation in government (Goulbourne, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987;
III.) CONSTRAINTS TO BROADCASTING IN THE THIRD WORLD

Broadcasting in the developing world is constrained by factors that are both inherent in or extraneous to radio and television. Though these constraints are common to Latin America, Africa and Asia, the degree to which they impair broadcasting varies according to the particular situation in which each region or country finds itself. It is generally recognised that at the base of everything else, is the relative poverty of most developing countries. Poverty is used as an explanation for centralisation, to account for the paucity of communication, dependence on imported programmes and know-how, and the failure to harness radio and television. What follows is a brief review of some of these problems of broadcasting in the Third World.

A) Centralism

Even though some researchers have argued that certain countries are in fact often so poor that broadcasting would not be possible without government financing (Bebey, 1963:75; Browne, 1963:117; Golding, 1977:299; Aggarwala, 1985:49), it is apparent that poverty alone cannot explain government ownership everywhere in the developing world. Instead of bringing about nation-building or development, it is argued, such financing by the government has led to highly centralised broadcast systems, that only reflect the tastes and views of the civil service or of the class or group in power (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:116; Singh, 1977:153; de Sola Pool, 1977:145; Head, 1977:88). Regional or provincial services are unavailable in many countries, and where these are present as in Nigeria, the services often reflect the same pattern, and hardly serve the interests of the masses, for fear of the consequences of "embarrassing the state government" (Ugboajah, 1977:187). So heavy is the central control by government, that broadcasting and politics in Nigeria and elsewhere have been likened to "Siamese twins" on whom "Any surgical operation aimed at separation ... could lead to the death of either, if not both (Uche, 1985:28). Too much central control has brought about excessive bureaucratisation which has been harmful to broadcasting in many ways (Head, 1977; O'Brien, 1985; Oduko, 1985; Iyimoga, 1986; Eone, 1986).

In India for example, centralism has meant that for a very long time the rural populations have been fed with irrelevant material designed originally for the urban populations (Bashiruddin, 1979; Gupta, 1981). It has perpetuated the same linguistic variations, economic problems, and colonial
hangovers which impede the effective use of radio and TV for mass communication. Only a new communication strategy in India and the rest of the developing world where conditions are similar, can, according to Bashiruddin (1979), guarantee the democratic and accessible media necessary to bridge the gap between the "have" and the "have-not", or, at least, to stop it from growing much bigger. Gupta on his part calls for a complete overhaul of the existing media structures, which have failed to identify with the masses and what he terms the "invisible majority" (1981).

The fact that broadcasting is often part of the civil service, means that civil servants or politicians with little or no knowledge about the media, are often charged with overseeing the way radio and television are operated. Professional broadcasters become subservient to these bureaucrats who determine appointments, salary scales, promotions, and who are expected to approve every initiative before hand, no matter how technical or urgent. This is unduely harmful to creativity, and frustrating to talented broadcasters who are likely to give up entirely, or to become absorbed by the bureaucratic machinery. In Head's words,

"Rigid civil service criteria for clerks, accountants, and other bureaucrats take little account of the creative qualifications needed in broadcasting. Usually talented personnel soon find themselves at the top of their civil service career ladders and so become administrators or shift to other employment to obtain advancement. One advantage of corporate status in some cases is freedom from civil service constraints (1977:88)."

Placed within the context of the theories and debates discussed in chapter two, excessive centralisation could lead to the situation which Williams (1979) fears; that is, where broadcasters simply serve as the mouthpiece of the government, and by so doing, lose credibility with the audience. "Evidence of this abounds in many Third World countries" (Hamelink, 1983:111), even though popular democratic participation as we remarked in chapter one, is a necessary condition for successful nation-building in the contemporary world. In such a situation, it has been observed that the broadcasters are not motivated to carry out research about the tastes and preferences of the audience, and that even where this motivation exists, it is often frustrated by bureaucratic bottlenecks (Teheranian et al., 1977:8-9; de Sola Pool, 1977:135-7; Ugboajah, 1977:187; Gupta, 1981:191). The general conclusion is that the lack of feedback through constant systematic audience research, has rendered the prefix "mass" in reference to radio and TV, a misnomer (Atal, 1985; Singh, 1977). The absence of such systematic research has also made it impossible for allegations of cultural imperialism through
consumption of foreign-made programmes to be substantiated (see Boyd-Barrett, 1982; Uche, 1987); without studies of how the audiences perceive and relate to the, say, American programmes they consume, it is difficult to establish the effects these programmes can have on them (Boyd, 1984).

B) Programmes

The problem of dependence on foreign programmes has probably caused far more ink to flow than any other issue about broadcasting in the developing world. The literature on "cultural imperialism" is simply inexhaustible (Uche, 1988:2), because people from all walks of life have joined the researchers to say something about it. However, some of the methods used in studying the phenomenon are highly questionable (Boyd-Barrett, 1982; Uche, 1987). Despite all the writings and incantations, these countries continue to be highly dependent on imported programmes (Smith, 1980). In their study of broadcasting in eleven developing countries, Katz and Vedel (Katz, 1977:113) remarked that the range of imported programmes is 30-75%, and averages 55%. But Katz does not think that "imperialism" alone explains the high proportion of imported programmes. With almost every other person who has written on this issue (Hislop, 1981:239-40; Lins da Silva, 1986:106; Hamelink, 1983b:3, Schiller, 1967:65, for example), he agrees that these programmes might also be solicited because they are cheaper to obtain than the often astronomic costs of producing local programmes.

As he explains:

All things considered, it costs at least $1,000 to produce even a rudimentary programme of one hour, while the cost of buying an hour of foreign programming is a function of the number of sets in the country, and of whether other countries in the same language or geographic region have adopted it. Thus Iran can buy "Ironside" for $300-400, Thailand for $250-350, and Peru can buy it for $250. Even if these figures are doubled to make allowances for extra costs such as subtitling, the fact is that they are able to broadcast "Ironside" for less than the cost of producing the most modest of their own programmes and for a small fraction of the price it costs to make originally in Hollywood (about $200,000). Even if the money were available for so many hours of local production, the talent is not, nor is the infrastructure in the other arts - film, theatre, graphics - well-developed. For the same reasons it is not unusual for small countries in Europe to import as much as 50 percent of their programmes (Katz, 1977:113-14).

In a word, financial problems, lack of talent or institutions for training personnel, lack of vital technical equipment, in addition to the complexity of programme production, are, to Katz what bring about cultural imperialism. It presents a sort of vicious cycle where the country that
provides the original technology is equally responsible for the engineers to operate and repair the equipment, as well as the programmes to be broadcast (Schiller, 1967:64-8; Hislop, 1981:235-7; Haque, 1984:150). Teheranian et al. (1977:7) agree, but believe "the accumulation of knowledge and experience will correct the imbalance".

According to Boyd (1984:382), in addition to the above inadequacies, developing countries have often been forced to rely on imported programmes when the broadcasting day has expanded, when competing commercial stations have been introduced, or when second channels have been added in government operated systems. He also concludes that the reasons for which developing countries use US television products "are too complex to suggest that American interests alone account for the telecasting of these programmes" (1984:389). But it is worth bearing in mind that the programmes do not have to serve explicit "American interests alone", in order to be culturally alienating to those who view them in the different developing countries.

However, researchers equally recognise that this problem of cultural imperialism is further exacerbated by the failure of the developing countries to harness broadcasting to answer to their own specific needs. Instead of accommodating broadcasting, they have been assimilated by it, and instead of borrowing the technology alone, they have imbibed Western values and assumptions about it as well. Thus, for instance, despite the fact that Rede Globo of Brasil has gained international acclaim and received awards for producing programmes which are exported to both the developing and the developed countries, and despite what Lins da Silva sees as "an undeniable nationalization of content and themes", the style and format of its programmes continue to be "heavily influenced by North American models" (1986:104-5). But as Hislop argues, if only because each society has its own unique historical, social, cultural and economic structures,

a national broadcasting system which is designed to serve as an instrument of development must also be unique; this means that the technology and techniques deployed should be suited to the specific local situations and problems, which calls for a high degree of innovatory ability (1981:245).

The failure to harness broadcasting, has instituted a universal characteristic to it, which should normally not be the case. Only this tendency towards "universalism" can explain why there is no difference in the professional values between broadcasters in Nigeria, Sweden or Ireland (Golding et al., 1979), or between Ethiopia and Liberia who escaped
colonisation on the one hand, and the rest of Africa who did not (Head, 1977); despite the fact that all of these countries have economic, political, social, cultural and historical differences. It alone can also explain why even when attempts are made to produce programmes locally, ('telenovela' in Mexico and 'novela' in Brazil), the format and style are Western. Quizzes, variety shows, soap operas are produced locally according to Western models (Katz, 1977:114; Tunstall, 1977:5; Hamelink, 1983b:2-3; Haque, 1984:150; Matterlart et al., 1984:18; Lins da Silva, 1986:102-5). Other aspects which are equally Western include the programme schedules, the proportional distribution of programmes by categories, and the "Stop-watch culture" (Katz, 1977:113-14, 120).

Golding explains these similarities by looking at media professionalism in the developing world. According to him, one of the contributory factors is the fact that most broadcasters in the developing countries have, and continue to be educated, trained, and offered refresher courses in the West, where they imbibe Western media values, attitudes, and professional ideologies, as well as a certain "receptivity to the men and machines they have learned to work with" (1977:295). This, together with cheap programmes from abroad, endow broadcasting with "a global uniformity of style and content, creating that very universality of standards preached by the 'professionalizers', and in turn the audience expectations which reinforce demands for more of the same and thus the security of the market" (Golding, 1977:300). Even in local training centres in the developing world, Matterlart et al. (1984:75) argue, "the texts used by Anglo-Saxon or French communications theorists serve as points of reference without any questioning of their relevance to a different framework". Here, sufficient time has not been given towards making the necessary distinction between training as "cultural exchange" and training as "the simple transmission of technical know-how" (Matterlart et al., 1984:71).

Judging from the subtle manner in which these professional values, attitudes and styles are inculcated into the journalists and broadcasters, I wonder if "borrowed" (Tunstall, 1977; Katz, 1977; Katz et al., 1978) is an appropriate adjective to describe the process. In the context in which it is employed, this concept gives the impression of a conscious, deliberate effort by journalists and broadcasters of the developing world to "accept" Western values, attitudes and styles. Whereas, the process of professionalisation as described by Golding (1977) and Sternberg-Sarel (1961:111-16), is much more subtle, and comparable to the process by which a baby is socialised into a conformist member of the society. Just as it is absurd to say that the child
has borrowed its values from its parents and the rest of society, so too is it equally absurd to say the same thing about broadcasters from the developing world, vis-à-vis Western media culture. The broadcasters have been socialised into a Western 'profession' or 'sect' whose values and practices they do not question, because these appear 'natural' or 'inherent' to broadcasting.

Again, it is worth recalling that the quarrel here is with the concept, and not the fact. For if this were as conscious an effort as the term "borrowed" seems to imply, broadcasters and journalists who now operate in various media institutions in the developing world, would by now have dealt away with these attitudes and values, ever since researchers began preaching to them about cultural imperialism or media imperialism. The very fact that most of them are among those who defend these values, is an indication that it would be incorrect and misleading to continue using the term "borrowed", in describing a more profound process of socialisation or "familiarisation". As Schiller aptly points out, "cultural patterns, once established, are endlessly persistent" (1967:64). In his 'cultural triangulation' model, Uche argues that while initial Western cultural penetration of Africa might have been imperialistic, "the process of familiarisation" ("an evolved affinity and various symbiotic relationships") has not only resulted in a tendency to prefer particular Western media products and practices, but has also rendered unjustifiable the perception and treatment of African media practitioners and audiences as reluctant victims of "exotic cultural invasions that could simply be halted and reversed, leaving behind a subject newly returned to the 'pure' state of cultural freedom" (1987:32).

C) Communication

One of the major problems of broadcasting in the developing countries is the inadequacy of the factors that make television and radio "mass" media in the West. There is a general paucity of telecommunication facilities, which in conjunction with inadequate electrification, make even coverage by radio highly uneven: "with satisfactory signals available in the capitals and other major cities, but with smaller towns and rural areas covered by domestic services only spottily, if at all" (Head, 1977:92), in many parts of Africa, for example. This poor coverage, places these countries at risk from International Radio Broadcasts (IRB) by foreign countries who are not always sympathetic with their policies and doctrines (Mowlana, 1977:77-8; Wasburn, 1985:34).

Television has also remained a largely urban medium in virtually
every developing country. Examples such as the effort by Egypt to manufacture its own sets, and to encourage buying through longterm credits, in order to increase television coverage to the rural areas (Kowlana, 1977:79), are rare. Often when the will is there the means are not, and vice versa. Worst of all, the fact that there are no direct telecommunication links between, say, different African capitals, makes these countries excessively dependent on their former colonial masters for information on one another. This is not only very expensive, but it also forces them to accept news about Africa from foreign agencies, news which is not often seen from an African perspective (Head, 1977:84; Mehr, 1981:10).

This problem is further exacerbated by multilingualism in many countries; a problem which affects African states most of all the developing countries. The masses of Africa are largely illiterate, and cannot understand the messages that continue to be addressed to them in French, English, Portuguese or Spanish. Like Mehr rightly remarks, "The continuing use of European languages perpetuates the underdevelopment of native African languages and creates also sharp cultural cleavages between the elite and the masses" (1981:11). Mehr also admits that it might not be completely out of the question to argue that there are some African leaders who use the multilingualism of their states, to their personal advantage - a sort of divide and rule policy; and who are therefore, very likely to prefer the situation as it is, rather than work to change things through developing a common language that is acceptable and accessible to all. Thus not only do African states lack a common language (seen by many as essential for nation-building), but attempts at social and psychic mobilisation are mainly in alien languages spoken and understood by a very small minority.

Elsewhere in Malaysia, a study by Omar (1985:16-17) has revealed that the simple replacement of the foreign colonial language with a national one does not solve the linguistic problem either. Omar discovered that the language used in the media for news, advertisement and other programmes, is highly incompatible with the traditional Malay culture and expectations. Despite the fact that Bahasa Malaysia has replaced English, it has retained the "crisp and abrupt" style of Western media. Apart from the ambiguity which this might bring about, it "differs from the traditional style of Malay discourse where lengthier sentences were preferred". Accordingly, "Another feature of traditional discourse is that it is less direct in making a point," but in the language of broadcasting and advertisement, this means greater cost in space and time. This accounts for the direct and crisp style, despite the
fact that "in traditional Malay discourse, as it was in traditional Malay life, directness of expression was considered rude and uncouth, even in admonishing a child. Directness was then correlated with low breeding".

Furthermore, Omar argues on, by failing to discriminate in its use of pronouns, the language of broadcasting sounds rather impersonal in its attempt to generalise all its audience into a single category. But in the traditional Malay way of life, to be impersonal was synonymous to being impolite. The practice of advertising in the radio and TV, is also out of place in the Malay way of life, where such practices would be seen to be boastful, conceited and ignorant of the genteel traditions. Thus Omar concludes that despite the fact that broadcasting and the other media face many constraints, and although language and culture have many complexities, it is possible to solve the language-use problem "without ignoring the cultural sensitivities of the people". For, "To be simple and direct is one thing, but to be able to make the audience feel good is another".

IV.) HARNESSED BROADCASTING

It is fifteen years since Golding (1974), like other researchers on nation-building and development in the Third World (Abdel-Malek, 1967; Kothari, 1971; Silva Michelena, 1971; Portes, 1976; Amin, 1981, 1985, 1987a; and Doumou, 1987), rejected the paradigms of modernisation, and expressed the need for rethinking by researchers. He recommended that the relationship between traditional communication patterns and the new media in the developing countries be researched into, and the theories reappraised. But little research has yet been reported. Instead, researchers have continued reiterating the need to harness broadcasting to the realities of the developing countries. Clearly, it is easier to suggest than to do, and to prescribe than to administer. As Servaes rightly remarks, "in the social sciences, paradigms tend to accumulate rather than to replace each other"; which explains why the modernisation paradigm is still in use in real life, even though it has been disposed of in the world of academics (1986:129).

However, before reviewing some of what has been said about harnessing broadcasting in the developing world, it is worth noting that researchers can only know what they recommend, if they know what they are talking about, and that they cannot talk with any seriousness about folk media when they have not researched into them. And by research, I mean the critical questioning of certain basic assumptions that tend to reinforce particular
values and positions, much to the detriment of others. I mean "alternative forms of thinking" that are most unlikely to be welcomed by conventional researchers, and by those in positions of power, because they are suggestive of "alternative systems" (Halloran, 1986:15).

While Tunstall (1977:11) concludes with conviction that there are only two communication models in the world - the Anglo-American and the Soviet - and gives five reasons why the "media are [and would remain] American", other researchers are more pluralistic, and believe that more than two media systems are possible. Katz is one of those who argues strongly and richly for the domestication of broadcasting in the Third World. As far as he is concerned, broadcasting has failed to ensure cultural continuity in these countries, where "indigenous broadcasting is often little more than a copy of metropolitan models". Like Golding, he asserts:

> There is a need to link the media with other arts, traditional and modern, from which ideas will flow. There is a need to create programmes that will give authentic expression to the culture in the process of its confrontation with modernity. But more than this, there is the need to employ broadcasting in ways which will better fit the moods and styles of the national heritage of its special occasions. Perhaps the luxury of immersing producers in their own cultures, and forming creative groups of broadcasters, scholars and carriers-of-the tradition to plan schedules and invent programmes together holds out a fragile hope that broadcasting might live up to its promise of contributing to cultural continuity.

> ... rapidly developing societies must steer a practical course which refuses to sacrifice authenticity to modernity and refuses to sacrifice freedom to authenticity (Katz, 1977:127).

If Katz is arguing for a blend between the modern and the folk media forms, as I think he does, there is always the risk of reducing the traditional media to a mere appendage of the new media. In which case it would not be the same thing as a truly harnessed broadcast system. One could say that instead of the new broadcast media adapting to suit the folk media, the latter would be adapted to suit the former. This is precisely the policy in India, where the traditional media are merely seen as capable of playing a significant role in national reconstruction and non formal education particularly in the rural areas.

In 1981 the Indian Institute of Mass Communication published the results of a seminar in which fourteen recommendations were made on how the traditional media could be adapted to suit radio and television. Thus, it was recommended that TV should be used for folk forms where visuals are involved,
and purely oral information should be reserved for radio. Secondly, though it was recommended that TV and radio programmes should be localised and produced in the language of the locality, and though the need for research into how more authentic and effective programmes could be produced was expressed, there is no indication that the fundamental assumptions about programme formats, style and the concept of time were questioned. In India, as elsewhere in the developing world, it looks as if what is being changed in effect are the folk media, not the new. It sounds as though changes are being made only for the sake of the illiterate peasants, not really because the leaders and development planners think broadcasting in its present form is ill-adapted to their realities.

In Latin America, many researchers have expressed the need for an "alternative communication" system that is democratic, participatory and decentralised, and that is rooted in the masses who are currently marginalised by a communication system that serves the preponderant interests of the transnational corporations and the dominant internal economic and political power groups (White, 1980; Díaz Bordenave, 1977; White et al., 1983; Reyes Matta, 1986; Simpson Grinberg, 1986). It is a type of communication that would serve the interests of "the oppressed sectors of society at the national level, and the dominated countries at the international level"; "a process of dialogue and widespread creativity" (Reyes Matta, 1986:190-1).

To attain this alternative communication, Simpson Grinberg for example, reiterates Golding's call for research, by stressing "the need to study the current extent and impact of native communication systems that predate the coming of the mass media to Latin American countries" (1986:183). The "marrow of alternative communication", he writes, "is the decentralisation of communication power, which implies a decentralisation of the technological know-how" (1986:184). Writing about the whole of the developing world, Hamelink, like Amin (1980, 1985, 1987a), Doumou (1987), Abdel-Walek (1967), Kothari (1971) and Silvia Michelen (1971), calls for an emancipatory science (1983a), and prescribes "dissociation" as the only real alternative to the process of "cultural synchronization" perpetuated by the industrialised states, and as the sole guarantor of the autonomy and self-reliance "essential for a process of independent development" (1983b).

In Africa, equally preoccupied with communication to the rural masses are Bebey (1961:9, 1963) and Ugbojah (1985), who write about the need for a more horizontal and participatory communication. Ugbojah, for instance,
uses the term "Oramedia", to denote media that "are grounded on indigenous culture [sic] produced and consumed by members of a group. They reinforce the values of the group. They are visible cultural features, often strictly conventioned, by which social relationships and a world view are maintained and defined. They take on many forms and are rich in symbolism" (1985a:167). Oramedia may be seen to be interpersonal, and as "great legitimisers", if only because "they are highly distinctive and credible, unlike the electronic media which can be elitist, mighty, vicarious and urban" (Ugboajah, 1985b:32).

Accordingly, the distinctive feature of Oramedia is their capacity to speak to the common man in his language and idioms, and in dealing with problems that are directly relevant to his situation (Ugboajah, 1985a:167). Though Oramedia are the prime disseminators of culture in Africa, Ugboajah argues, many African countries tend to pay less interest to cultural development in their plans - which is probably why their broadcasters have largely represented cultural imperialism. He writes:

The non-emphasis on cultural orientation is visibly manifested in the broadcast stations of various African countries where traditional music is transmitted in non-peak hours or presented without regard to a multilingual and multi-cultural audience or classified as a specialist subject - non-newsworthy ethic derived from Western concepts of what is relevant. Without enlisting culture and its artifacts, village people, the very soul of the African nation, may not be involved in the process of decisionmaking. They should be enabled to see and experience changes as bringing benefits to them within their own world view (Ugboajah, 1985a:174).

In view of nation-building as a major objective, I would add that broadcasting should be domesticated not simply as a show of concern to the plight of the rural masses, but because it has been carefully studied and concluded that that is the right thing to do. Only in this way can domestication mean more than the mere addition of a few 'traditional' programmes to a plethora of others, conceived and produced according to the same 'universal media culture' known to originate from the exclusive experiences of Western media institutions and practitioners. In White's words, "Comunicación popular" does not consist merely of an incorporation of "many elements of the folk culture", but must be seen above all, as "an attempt to set up communication channels independent of the hierarchy of intermediaries" (1980:3). This entails a system of communication that is managed by the people, is horizontal, decentralised at every level, participatory, and free from the shackles of domination by either external or internal forces. In short, it entails a broadcast system in harmony with "the democratic popular
national state", advocated as an alternative to westernisation and centralisation by the researchers (Amin, 1987a; Goulbourne, 1987; Doumou, 1987; Gabou, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Hadjor, 1987) of nation-building and development in Africa.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have argued that the introduction and development of broadcasting in the developing world, has been influenced more by external than internal forces. Unlike in Europe and America where internal political, socio-cultural, and economic factors were largely responsible for the sort of broadcasting system initially adopted, external colonial or commercial interests mostly accounted for the situation in Africa, Asia or Latin America. The tendency to create state monopolies and centralised systems in the developing countries, analogous to the colonial situation though it may be, is allegedly justified by "poverty" and "nation-building". But whatever their merits, state monopoly and centralism, the lack of cultural continuity for the masses and the dependence on Western cultural products by the powerful minority, together with the inadequate technological capacity, are amongst the major constraints to broadcasting for nation-building in the developing world.

It is thus within the above framework of the pressing need for nation-building on the one hand, and the internal (state monopoly and Centralism) and external (dependence) factors that tend to affect broadcasting in the developing world, on the other, that the following study of broadcasting in Cameroon has been conducted.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH PROBLEM, DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK

INTRODUCTION

Based on the debates on nation-building in chapter one, the conceptual issues on broadcasting discussed in chapter two, and the review of broadcast development and trends in the Third World in chapter three, I elaborated a conceptual framework within which my study of broadcasting in Cameroon had to be conducted. This chapter presents that framework in the form of a research problem, the design and methodology adopted, and the actual operationalisation in Cameroon.

I.) RESEARCH PROBLEM

A) Objective

This study is titled "Broadcasting for Nation-building in Cameroon: Development and Constraints". The aim or objective is to identify and examine the system of broadcasting in Cameroon by looking at its history and development, policy structure, organisation and operation; as well as to discuss the factors that have influenced Cameroonian broadcasting in general. It is hoped that this research will contribute towards a better understanding of the African situation in the area of broadcasting, and that it might serve as an impetus towards greater comparative research - particularly between the industrially advanced societies and the developing world.

B) Background

It is clear from a look at the literature in chapters two and three, that the bulk of the studies and publications on the ownership, control and operation of broadcast institutions, focuses on the developed world. Even the limited number of studies available on the developing world, have largely been done from perspectives that do not always take adequate account of the historical experiences, and the internal socio-cultural, economic and political realities of these countries (Halloran, 1988:16-18). As we observed in chapter one, the stress on homogenisation through 'unilinear evolutionism' and the failure to consider contextual variations, have been highlighted as the major shortcomings of the modernisation theory as an explanatory model (Abdel-Malek, 1967; Kothari, 1971; Silva Michelena, 1971; Fortes, 1976; Dunn, 1978a; Tussie, 1983; Amin, 1980, 1985, 1987a; Gabou, 1987; Doumou, 1987).
Researchers "for long frustrated" by the modernisation perspective (Tussie, 1983:3), have adopted the centre-periphery framework as a more explanatory and more suitable model for comparative analysis.

As an alternative, the centre-periphery framework, unlike the modernisation theory which studies each single society as if it were indeed autonomous and free from external pressures and influences, considers developing countries as part of a world system of capitalism, in which the developed countries are not only dominant but are also intent on keeping the Third World peripheral. As used by Amin (1980, 1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b) and the other researchers commissioned by Unesco to study nation-building in Africa (Gabou, 1987; Goulbourne, 1987; Doumou, 1987; Nyong’o, 1987, etc.), the centre-periphery framework does not ignore that internal obstacles to nation-building exist, but argues that the very peripheral role of Africa within the world system, ensures that such a process cannot succeed, because it is not in the interest of the developed countries to have strong and viable nation-states in Africa.

Though Amin and the others would agree with Dunn that no matter how powerless vis-à-vis the centre, African leaders remain "responsible agents" and must be held and made accountable for their political actions (1978b:211-16), they would however argue that the very weakness of these leaders vis-à-vis their counterparts in the centre, means that the only way they can ensure political stability is by being authoritarian and by excluding democratic popular participation. In this way, nation-building as the search for political, economic and cultural equality for Africa with the rest of the world (Wallerstein, 1968:223-4), can only be achieved by means of a radical break with the world capitalist system; a break which would ensure the autonomy, democracy and popular participation needed for its attainment.

This, coupled with the work of Latin American, Indian, and other Third World communication researchers examined in chapter three (Katz, 1977; Diaz Bordenave, 1977; Singh, 1977; Katz et al., 1978; White, 1980; White et al., 1983; Hamelink, 1983b; Sinha, 1985; Lins da Silva, 1986; Reyes Matta, 1986; Roncaglilo, 1986; Simpson Grinberg, 1986, etc.), call for a broadcasting system that is equally autonomous, democratic and popularly participative. Only a system that guarantees cultural continuity for the masses, ensures popular participation and horizontal communication, and is ready to mobilise the populations for autocentric socio-economic development, in a state that is politically democratic, popular and participative, can
contribute positively towards nation-building. Monopolistic tendencies (private or state) that are productive of centralism and dependence, are in principle deplored. But whether such a system in practice is best guaranteed by private, public or mixed ownership and control is still, as we noted in our discussion of conceptual issues in chapter two, a point of contention amongst researchers.

In this study, if I have opted for the centre-periphery framework, it is because, as we have seen (chapters one and three), most Third World researchers including those commissioned by Unesco to study nation-building in Africa, have found the modernisation theory an inadequate model for explanatory or comparative studies. However, opting for the centre-periphery framework does not imply turning a blind eye to any internal constraints to broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon; rather, it simply means avoiding to make the a priori assumption that the constraints to this process are exclusively the result of causes internal to Cameroon, and that a solution to them lies in imitating the Western experience.

This exercise should provide a balanced view; but if it fails, perhaps this would be because, as Gareau aptly remarks, in the social sciences - comprising "different sects" all seeking to understand the world following their particular cultural, political and economic experiences - it is difficult if not impossible to have a consensual perspective. If in the past there was any illusion about the existence of such a consensus, it was mainly because, thanks to American post-war power and wealth, its 'sects' were able to spread and to receive "a wide and 'unfair' competitive edge" in the West and the Third World. But the very failure of such American sects to penetrate the Soviet sphere, or to prevent the recent rise of "critical sects" in Western Europe and the Third World, shows that no sect can become "truly global", and that the influence of American sects would further "decline as the relative power position of the United States vanes" (Gareau, 1987:601-4).

C.) Relevance

It is hoped that the study, in addition to helping bridge the research gap between the developed and the developing societies, would contribute in making the latter more aware of the need to have institutions that are well adapted to their own context or realities. In this way, my interests can be said to be in line with the ongoing debates on nation-building and the role of the media in this connection, economic and cultural imperialism, media ownership and control, and professionalism amongst
media practitioners. The main argument is that by examining the broadcast media as institutions that relate and interact with other social institutions in a state that is part of an international system, we can know the factors both in and out of these media that influence how they work and what they produce or offer their audiences.

II.) RESEARCH DESIGN

As already mentioned, this research proposes to examine the role of broadcasting in nation-building in Cameroon by looking at the history and development, policy structure, organisation and operation of broadcasting; as well as to discuss the factors that have influenced Cameroonian broadcasting in general. In order to attain this objective, I intend to bring into play the centre-periphery framework, which our review of the relevant literature and studies has shown to be the Third World alternative to the Western modernisation perspective. This is because, Cameroon being a developing country, and given the weaknesses of the modernisation model, I consider the centre-periphery framework the more appropriate to apply in its situation.

From the literature in chapter one, we note that: a) nation-building has its cultural, socio-economic and political dimensions; b) African states have so far failed in their attempts at nation-building; and c) according to the centre-periphery researchers, this failure is largely accounted for by the fact that as part of the world capitalist system, Africans lack the autonomy and independence to decide what is culturally, socio-economically and politically good for them. I therefore intend to examine the part the doctrine of nation-building, and the fact of being peripheral in the world capitalist system, have each played in bringing about the system of broadcasting in Cameroon, and in determining its cultural, socio-economic and political aspects. In each of these three major areas, I have asked the following key questions, in view of making a distinction between statement and practice:

(a) What is the state policy in the said area?
(b) What role is broadcasting expected to play?
(c) What role does broadcasting actually play?
(d) What evidence is there of foreign influences?
(e) What accounts for (a), (b), (c) and (d)?

From the reviewed literature on nation-building in Africa over the past three decades, it is apparent that:
1.) The post-colonial state in Africa has not transformed but accommodated the repressive colonial structures and institutions it inherited. Despite the recognised weakness and dependence of peripheral states vis-à-vis states of the centre within the world capitalist system, the African state, researchers are unanimous, is in the words of Goulbourne (1987:26-8), "highly centralised, overbearing and restrictive in its operations", and overwhelmingly present in almost all areas of cultural, political and economic life. It is a state dominated by the Western educated minority ('intelligentsia'/'modern political elite') who are in a "position of unparalleled power" (Smith, 1983:88), and who have chosen to impose unity from above rather than encourage popular democratic participation within their polyethnic, multilingual and multi-cultural territories.

2.) The intelligentsia or modern political elite are not linked to the majority of people they govern by a shared culture. Said to "suffer social isolation and a crisis of cultural identity" (Smith, 1983:133), the intelligentsia have remained basically Western in outlook and taste, and have largely failed to translate into practice, their declared intent to reassert the African cultural heritage rendered dormant since colonialism. According to Amin (1980:175), the essentially foreign nature of their culture has 'denationalized' and 'acculturated' the intelligentsia; "their daily lifestyle, modeled on that of homo consumens universalis, increasingly makes strangers of them in their own countries. However, being in a "position of unparalleled power" has in practice enabled the intelligentsia to impose (political and ideological declarations of intent notwithstanding) their foreign, minority culture over the African mainstream cultures shared by the bulk of the population. So that while themselves dependent on foreign cultural values and products, the intelligentsia have not created the conditions necessary for genuine cultural renaissance and continuity for the majority of their people who are mostly rural.

3.) The colonial economy of uneven development, social injustices, exploitation and extraversion - one of the major reasons for the rise of African nationalism, has not been transformed; neither has the post-colonial state realised its objectives of balanced, self-reliant and self-sufficient economic development. Thus, the same basic position of inferiority, dependence, and imbalance relates the African state to the Western states internationally, and the 'region' to the 'centre' nationally.

From the above observations, the political, cultural and economic
aspects of nation-building in Africa could each be said to be affected in one way or another by: state monopoly, centralism and dependence.

In what concerns broadcasting, the literature reviewed in chapter three indicates that when broadcasting is said to serve the nation-building process in a Third world country that is peripheral within the capitalist system, it tends to be affected by the same three phenomena: state monopoly, centralism and dependence.

This study being on nation-building and the use of broadcasting in this connection, it is only appropriate therefore that we examine the phenomena of State Monopoly, Centralism, and Dependence in relation to Cameroon and to questions: (a) What is the state policy in the said area?, (b) What role is broadcasting expected to play?, (c) What role does broadcasting actually play?, (d) What evidence is there of foreign influences? and (e) What accounts for (a), (b), (c) and (d).

HYPOTHESES

In the social sciences, the application of the term 'hypothesis' has tended to be limited to quantitative research, because of the assumption that the more mathematical or statistical research is analysed, the more objective it becomes. This restrictive definition or usage, ignores to a large extent the aspect of human life which cannot be reduced to or stated in simple mathematical or statistical equations or formulae. In this study however, the term is used in a much more flexible manner, to refer to any guiding idea or statement informed by the review of literature on nation-building and broadcasting, with the aim of accepting or rejecting what we have observed to be the general situation or tendency in Africa and the Third World.

In chapters one and three, it was also remarked that state monopoly, centralism and dependence tend to go with the lack of autonomy, self-reliance and participation. Thus the impact of nation-building or foreign involvement in Cameroonian broadcasting can be measured by the degree of political, cultural, and socio-economic: (a) Autonomy - defined as freedom and independence, as opposed to dependence; (b) Self-reliance - defined as depending on one's own resources or efforts to attain one's goals and objectives; and (c) Participation - defined as the chance to share in, to be involved, to partake, to contribute towards, or to help bring about. Using these criteria under the categories of state monopoly, centralism and dependence, the following hypotheses, inspired by the African experience in
That in Cameroon,

1.) broadcasting promotes an alien culture for the elites, and an elitist concept of traditional culture, still for the elites;

2.) in matters of broadcasting like in other areas, there is political autonomy neither for the state as a whole at the international level, nor for the various localities within the state. The situation is that of international and state centralism;

3.) broadcasting is characterised by dependence at both the state and the local or regional levels.

Where:

a) **State Monopoly** is determined by the part played by the state or government in facilitating or hindering the realisation of broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon;

b) **Centralism** deals with the place of the broadcast media in a plural society, by trying to determine whether decision-making, participation, content, and broadcast facilities are limited only to particular regions, people, groups, and languages or not, and with what effect;

c) **Dependence** examines foreign involvement with broadcasting in Cameroon, in order to establish the part played by foreign countries and bodies in the construction, equipment and maintenance of broadcast institutions, as well as the part they play in limiting the attainment of cultural and political autonomy: By looking at the proportion of foreign-made programmes, or programmes produced according to foreign formats, styles and values, and also by looking at the impact of foreign values on the practitioners.

The argument here is that, if in principle nation-building in Cameroon is seen to imply the promotion of a cultural identity and integrity; the mobilisation of the populations for self-reliant socio-economic development that is beneficial to all; as well as safeguarding 'national' sovereignty by advocating political stability and unity - as the literature indicates to be the main trend in Africa and the developing world, then the above questions and criteria would permit me to determine the successes and failures of broadcasting for nation-building. Also, by examining foreign involvement at all three levels, I would be in a position to say how foreign influences have affected the nation-building process. That is to say, the part foreign countries and multinational companies play in fostering cultural and technological dependence (through donations of programmes, offers to help
train personnel, by providing technical assistance, by constructing, equipping and carrying out maintenance in the stations, by sponsoring programmes, and by advertising).

III. METHODOLOGY

To answer the five key questions posed above, this research consisted of three empirical components:

1.) A critical analysis of official documents, histories, regulatory provisions, papers, policy statements, reports and other material related to radio and television in particular, and the Cameroonian media as a whole. This exercise was to permit an understanding of the history and development, policies, organisation, goals and expectations in matters of broadcasting in Cameroon; and to provide the necessary background information with which to proceed to the next two stages of the empirical exercise. The use of documentary information in research is common practice, and with the necessary critical questions and attentive reading, this can be a vital source of data. However, in doing this, I was not unaware of the fact that some key documents are often difficult to obtain, and that what is stated on paper and pieces of legislation is not always what is actually practised. Thus the need also for interviews and participant observation.

2.) The second level of the empirical exercise had to consist of interviews with officials of the Ministry of Information and Culture, journalists, broadcasters, producers, technicians and others involved both directly and otherwise with radio and television in Cameroon. The aim was to understand how the policies, goals, and expectations spelt out in the documents examined at the first instance, are implemented; what the media practitioners and officials in question think of the said policies, goals and expectations; and what they consider to be the factors that hinder or facilitate the process of broadcasting for nation-building.

3.) The third level of the empirical exercise, which incidentally has much in common with the second, had to involve a period of participant observation with Cameroon Television (CTV) and the National Radio Station (both of which are situated at Yaoundé, the capital city) together with some provincial stations, in view of understanding the circumstances under which the broadcast practitioners work, as well as becoming aware of the factors that influence media content. Conscious of nation-building as a major
objective of the state in developing countries, I had to look out for instances of direct pressures by government or other (social, cultural, economic or political) pressure groups, and how the media practitioners respond to these. Because there is always the possibility that some of these pressures might have occurred before the participant observation, I saw the need to reconstruct any such instances through in-depth interviews where possible, with the aim of showing how they have affected broadcasting, and the changes that have resulted.

Secondly, in matters of foreign involvement, participant observation was to permit me to understand the influence foreign media culture and values, attitudes, styles and practices have on television and radio output, as well as the part played by imported programmes.

Like every other method in the social sciences, participant observation has its merits and demerits (see McCall et al., 1969; Smith, 1975:229-53; Hammersley et al., 1983). Amongst its disadvantages are: a) the fact that participation may interfere with the observational process or that observation might obstruct participation; b) the possibility that the selection of cases for observation might be biased and unrepresentative; c) the fact that the presence of the researcher might influence the situation under study, or that close involvement with the environment might result in loss of detachment ('objectivity'); d) the risk of losing comparativeness by studying immediate situations which could indeed be unique and unrepresentative; e) the fact that the method is so qualitative, that validity becomes questionable as results could always be seen as expressing the personal views of the researcher; and f) "its ability to discriminate among rival hypotheses is weak by comparison with the experiment; and, in contrast to the social survey, it is poor at dealing with large-scale cases such as organizations or national societies" (Hammersley et al., 1983:237).

However, these methodological problems are not exclusive to participant observers. As Hammersley et al. point out, in every situation, "the social researcher, and the research act itself, are part and parcel of the social world under investigation" (1983:234); so that 'meaning' or 'truth' is negotiated through the continuous transactions between the observer and the observed (Schwartz and Schwartz, quoted in Smith, 1975:243-4). Being aware of these limitations, proved very useful. Also, using interviews and documentation in addition to participant observation, permitted me to overcome the limitations imposed by immediacy. Equally, CTV and RDC are not very large
organisations, in addition to being mainly situated in Yaounde. These points, together with the recognised advantages, account for my choice of the method.

These advantages include: a) the fact that participant observation "generates descriptive accounts that are valuable in their own right and ... greatly facilitates the process of theory construction"; b) "Ecological validity of the findings produced is probably better on the average than that of other methods"; c) "the diversity of data sources allows triangulation, enabling some check on, and perhaps control over, the effects of various aspects of the research process on the data" (Hammersley et al., 1983:237); d) it provides an eyewitness account that is both detailed and placed within perspective; and e) it involves a face-to-face situation that is often informal and allows for in-depth and multifaceted observation.

Thus, despite its limitations, participant observation offers an opportunity to explore the physical and social setting within which the practitioners work, and permits me to situate the findings: (1.) from the examination of the documents, and (2.) from the interviews with officials and practitioners.

In using participant observation, I will be borrowing from the experiences and work of structural anthropologists such as Jean-Pierre Warnier of the Sorbonne, Mike Rowlands of the University College London, and Nigel Barley; all of whom have done ethnographic research in Cameroon. Nigel Barley is renowned for his: Symbolic Structures among the Dowayos (1983) and The Innocent Anthropologist (1986), two accounts of his participant observation in Northern Cameroon. Mike Rowlands and Jean-Pierre Warnier are both known for their publications on the ethnography of Mankon and the Grassfields of Bamenda. Such anthropological fieldwork as they have undertaken in Cameroon, ... is participant observant in the sense that it emphasises means of overcoming a sense or experience of difference as a means of gaining a perspective on reality different from those that live it. In this sense the subject retains the analytical commitment to developing the conceptual tools for understanding modes of behaviour that those practising them need not be aware of. To be an outside observer is therefore relevant as long as it is tempered by a commitment to get inside as much as is possible. It is the tension between these two positions of outsider observer and insider participant that generates insight (Rowlands, unpublished notes).

Their fieldwork and stay in Cameroon have allowed them to situate the merits and demerits of certain methods of enquiry, participant observation inclusive.
As Mike Rowlands observes (unpublished notes), anthropology has developed in opposition to the methodologies of most of the social sciences by emphasising the role of long term fieldwork in host communities. This is based on the belief in "the importance of understanding over explanation" in the kinds of knowledge anthropology produces. In this connection therefore, fieldwork becomes ideally a matter of penetrating the ways of thinking and the forms of practice of the people and institutions under study. The aim of fieldwork is nothing other than "to hold or proffer value judgments about different cultural logics and their practices". However, Rowlands, like Warnier and Barley, is aware of the difficulty of adequately representing other ways of thinking.

Rowlands argues that unlike other social sciences which have developed a considerable battery of techniques for separating the objectivity of the results of analysis from the particular researcher, anthropology admits the subjectivity of its findings and the levels of criticism that it can be exposed to. Hence the individual fieldworker is in a sense communicating his/her experiences of a situation firstly to those who have shared similar experiences in the same area (including hosts) and a consensus of interpretation emerges out of shared communication.

In this sense a shared representation is that which those involved agree to be reality for the time being. It also emerges that more than one may be contested based on different experiences and perceptions of what is important. This does not need to imply a "let all flowers bloom scenario" but it emphasises discussion rather than methods of source criticism as the final arbiter.

In their accounts, these anthropologists in question have emphasised the complexity of detail of all facets of the society (a holistic approach) rather than problem oriented studies or writing. However, while it may not be easy "to be a participant observer of the state, the modern world system or such other abstractions", it is by studying "the way people appropriate or make their lives meaningful in the context of such larger forces", Rowlands points out, "that participant observation can make most sense."

In the field of Communication, I will not be the first to carry out participant observation. Tuchman for instance, has practised it since 1966 in her study of American media institutions and practitioners (1977, 1978). Tom Burns used it in his exploratory study of the BBC in 1963 and 1973. Philip Elliott was a participant observer when he did his famous study of the TV series "The Nature of Prejudice" in the ITN. Schlesinger spent ninety days studying how BBC news producers tried to put "reality" together (1978); while Elliott and Golding published their study on News Making (1979) that consisted
mainly of the results of their participant observation exercises in Nigeria, Sweden and Ireland. Oduko (1985) and Iyumoga (1986) who both studied broadcasting in Nigeria, are amongst several former students of the Centre for Mass Communication Research, who found participant observation useful in their research. In fact, communication researchers are increasingly turning to participant observation in order to have a more profound understanding of the media institutions in which they are interested. However, this has not diminished the differences in approach and conclusion that stem from "divergent professional socialization processes" and from "reading different bodies of literature" as members of different "social scientific sects" (Gareau, 1987:596-8; Halloran, 1988:16-18).

IV.) INTERVIEW GUIDE

In order to examine the relevant documentation, interview officials and practitioners, and conduct participant observation, I constructed an Interview Guide in the areas of Culture, Socio-Economics and Politics, following questions (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), under the three categories of State Monopoly, Centralism and Dependence. It was intended to provide the data needed to substantiate in what way nation-building and the fact of being a peripheral state influenced the history and development, policy structure, organisation and operation of broadcasting in Cameroon. Both the drawing up the design and the elaboration of the interview guide, were guided by Halloran's maxim that no research findings can be better than the questions asked in the first place, no matter how sophisticated the research techniques employed (Unesco, 1970:11).

V.) FIELDWORK (OPERATIONALISATION)

The fieldwork lasted from December 1987 to May 1988. During this time I collected data according to the outline given in the design, and following the methodological techniques and steps equally outlined therein, and discussed in the interview guide elaborated.

A) Initial Contacts with Local Officials

Formal contacts with the administrative authorities started with the Director of Research at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, who authorised the study. The next contacts were at RDC and CTV. The Director of RDC, once he had verified my papers, asked for a formal application which enabled him to grant me access to the Radio House from 6
January to 6 April. He being Director of the entire network, there was no need for another authorisation to visit the provincial stations of Buea and Bamenda from March 20-28. At CTV, it took a little longer to obtain permission, but I was eventually allowed access for a month. Given this, I decided to spend the first month exclusively with CTV, interviewing broadcasters and producers, technicians and clerical staff, and doing participant observation. So that my work with RDC did not really begin until after the 6 February. Also, although in principle my admission into CTV came to an end on 6 February, in practice I continued to take advantage of the contacts I had created there, and often went to them for certain issues to be clarified. In addition, were informal meetings in clubs and bars or at the homes of some of the journalists who remained primary informants until I left Cameroon.

B) Interviews

In view of understanding or substantiating some of the issues raised in the interview guide, interviews were conducted with 72 people as follows:

(i) CAMEROON RADIO (RDC):
- National Station, Yaounde ........ 22
- The Provincial Station, Buea...... 4
- The provincial Station, Bamenda ... 4
Total ............ 30

(ii) CAMEROON TELEVISION (CTV):
- TV Production Centre, Yaounde .... 32
- TV Training Centre, Yaounde ...... 2
Total ............ 34

(iii) SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION (ASMAC/ESSTI):
- Director and staff, Yaounde ...... 4

(iv) CAMEROON POST:
- Proprietor, Bamenda ............... 1

(v) CAMNEWS:
- Director, Yaounde ............... 1

(vi) MININFOC:
- Director, Cultural Affairs ........ 1

(vii) MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION & SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH:
- Service for Statistics on University Education, Yaounde ......... 1

Some of those interviewed at CTV had worked with RDC before the
introduction of TV in 1985, and therefore had a lot to say about their experiences with the radio as well. At the National Radio Station in Yaounde where about 490 people are employed, a significant number of broadcasters had worked in the provinces as broadcasters, or with the Delegation of Information and Culture, as administrators. These too had much to say about the situation in the provinces, and were best placed to make some comparisons between the national and provincial stations. This was quite helpful, as the lack of funds did not permit a visit to all ten provincial stations of RDC. In fact, the visits to the Buea and Bamenda stations were more to get an on-the-spot appraisal of the provincial situation of RDC, than to learn anything new and different from what I had gathered in Yaounde already. An advantage of doing research in a highly centralised system like Cameroon, is the possibility of getting almost all the "official" information one needs right there at the centre.

Regarding the interviews, the idea was to interview as many people as possible on the same topics and the same general questions, in order to come by the main tendencies and trends, beliefs and values, as well as what the practitioners perceive to be the preponderant pressures brought to bear on them. All interviews were tape recorded, except for one instance when an interviewee refused. The transcription of the taped interviews was done at home through audio-typing. I opted for taping because taping creates an atmosphere of continuity, intimacy and confidence. In this way, I was better able to interpret hesitations, change of tone, and mannerisms, on the part of the interviewee; which certainly made the interview a lot richer.

The need for in-depth and rich interviews, and the need to check out for any inconsistencies or contradictions in the declarations of the interviewees, meant that very few of the interviews were less than 30 minutes in length; many were an hour or more long, especially with those practitioners I interviewed more than once. The idea that interviews in social scientific research must not go beyond a certain length because they tend to suffer from diminishing return, is very relative; it really depends on the skills of individual researchers and on the amount of interest the subject matter generates in the interviewee. In Cameroon, media practitioners are used to doing the interviews, and it is quite uncommon to have someone interview them instead. Moreover, the study dealt with issues dear to them.

C) Participant Observation

Once a researcher has been allowed into the establishment or
institution of his intended study, interviewing and participant observation become complementary; and are really two sides of the same coin. Thus, throughout my stay at CTV and RDC, I read the notices and took down notes, attended the news conferences and observed what went on, overhead conversations and eavesdropped on telephone calls, and took note of how people interacted with their hierarchical inferiors, equals or superiors. Whenever a major decision was taken that affected the broadcast practitioners, I tried to sample their opinions about it. A great deal would never have been properly understood or placed in perspective, and a lot more might never have come to my knowledge, had I not been allowed into the two broadcast institutions.

D) Official Documentation

Cameroon has a very strong oral tradition; little is put in writing, even by the literate minority. Amongst the civil servants, preference for oral communication is motivated by the need for self-protection. In a political system where people do not always owe their positions to merit and professional competence, but to the ethnic and political ties with those in command (Medard, 1978; Bayart, 1985), officials feel safer speaking rather than writing. This has produced a situation where it is difficult to find any specific guidelines or policy statements for those appointed into certain offices. Each person is then forced to take the line of action he thinks would best serve the situation, without risking his position and prospects. There is little documentation on communication and information policies; but because this does not imply the inexistence of policies, I sought alternative ways of knowing these policies.

I decided to rely on the speeches and declarations by political leaders of extremely high standing (such as the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Minister of Information and Culture), and on the speeches and declarations of the management of the various state-owned media institutions, as well as on symposia and publications by academics in the University of Yaounde. As far as the written word is concerned, Cameroon Tribune (the official newspaper) served as an invaluable source of data. Other papers and publications were also useful.

Concerning programmes, in addition to the interviews, I photocopied the registers (incomplete though these were) of the programmes received (bought/aid) in RDC or CTV from abroad, the countries or bodies from which they were got, and the type of programmes involved. From the copies of Teleguide collected (dating from December 1986), I calculated the proportion
of local/foreign programmes scheduled at this period; although we must note that to schedule does not necessarily mean to present. Often, schedules were disrupted for one reason or another. I did much purposive TV viewing, in order to get an idea of the programmes before interviewing their producers and presenters. As concerns RDC, most of its programmes have stayed the same for several years, so that I had little difficulty identifying what programme a broadcaster was describing.

Also analysed were the programme schedules for the National Station, and for three provincial stations - Buea, Bamenda and Garoua. The other stations were still operating on temporary schedules, awaiting authorisation from the National Station to draw up new schedules. So said the Subdirector of Programmes for RDC.

E) Studies by Journalism Students at ASMAC/ESSTI

The library of ASMAC/ESSTI proved to be useful not only in that it contained studies of interest to my work, but also, and more importantly, because of the opportunity to assess from the literature available, the amount of contextualisation ('indigenization') that had taken place. For, given that the bulk of research and writings in communications are produced in the West, and that most Third World researchers and media professionals are either trained in the West or according to Western values, indigenization becomes more than a mere question of replacing foreign experts with nationals (Halloran, 1988). To quote Gareau once more, the literature we read and the professional socialization we undergo, identify us with particular perspectives or outlooks (1987).

Quoting from relevant studies on the Cameroonian situation, I hope to make my work as complete and up-to-date as it should be. The fact that I can read and understand both English and French is going to make the study more comprehensive, and truly about the whole of Cameroon. Often, largely because of linguistic barriers, anglophone and francophone researchers in Cameroon tend to limit their work to the areas, regions, informants and publications that share the same linguistic expression like themselves; thus giving an incomplete and perhaps biased picture of what actually obtains.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has extrapolated from the on-going debates on nation-building in Africa or the developing world and the role of broadcasting
in this connection. Applying the centre-periphery framework as an alternative to the conceptual inadequacies of the modernisation perspective, I drew up a research design to investigate the internal and external factors influencing the development and use of broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon. Using a combination of social scientific methods (documentation, interviews, participant observation), I examined the political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions of such influences, under three categories: state monopoly, centralism and dependence. The following chapters present the results obtained.
CHAPTER FIVE

CAMEROON: THE 'NATION' AND THE 'STATE'

INTRODUCTION

In chapter one, researchers were agreed on the fact that the attempt by African states to build 'nation-states' à l'européenne have been unsuccessful. As Smith says, the nation-state as a "Western mirage" is "unattainable outside a few blessed regions of the earth" (1986:230). But the pursuit of this illusion has been conducted at the expense of democratic popular participation, cultural continuity and autonomy, and economic independence and self-reliance, by states alien in origin and purpose (Seton-Watson, 1977; Dunn, 1978a, 1978b; Smith, 1983, 1986; Amin, 1987a, 1987b; Dounou, 1987; Goulbourne, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Myong'o, 1987; Gabou, 1987). In this chapter we are not only interested in the similarities and differences between Cameroon and the general African situation highlighted by the researchers on nation-building, but also in providing the political, cultural and economic background necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the role of broadcasting in the nation-building process.

I.) A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY

The name Cameroon, is said to have come about when Portuguese sailors discovered a countless number of prawns ("camaroes") as they sailed into the estuary of the River Wouri roundabout 1472. However, although it turned out that "what the Portuguese saw were crayfish, not prawns" (Le Vine, 1964:288), the name "Cameroon" has been maintained. As with many political, cultural and social institutions imposed by Europeans during colonialism, the leaders of post-colonial Cameroon have failed to question a name that resulted from mistaken identity.

A brief political history of Cameroon is necessary to clarify certain misconceptions. It is common to find foreigners who not only think Cameroon an ex-colony of France, but who are quite ignorant of Britain's pre-independence involvement with the territory. The French heritage might be preponderant (partly because of the greater proportion of francophone Cameroonians, but largely because of the effects of France's colonial policy of assimilation), and some Cameroonians might actually be guilty of wittingly
or unwittingly promoting such an incomplete image of their country (Fonlon, 1964:9-12); but Cameroon officially recognises both the French and English legacies. Consequently, it is neither to be identified exclusively with francophone nor with anglophone Africa, but with both. The sooner we grasp this important fact the better; for what we would otherwise perceive as redundancies or contradictions in the Cameroonian media, might be meaningful if treated within the proper context.

For a long time, influenced by philosophers such as Hegel, Europeans tended to present Africa as a continent without "a history". By extension, Africa had neither the complex socio-political organisation, nor the cultural dynamic that creates history. An idea which anthropologists took up and wrote as though Africa was a part of the world where nothing stirred until Europeans came with a mission to civilise (Cohen, 1978). In the case of Cameroon, the social anthropologists not only accepted the "tribe" and "tribalism" categories of the colonial administrators, but also tended to conceive such patterns as "permanent crystalline structures" belonging to a "fixed stage on the path from tribe to nation" (Ardener, 1967:297-8). Ardener criticises this assumption, and points out that the ethnic pattern in Cameroon is a "process of continuous creation" in which at one point Pidgin-English (creole) became the main determinant of ethnicity, uniting people beyond so-called tribal boundaries (1967:297-9). Others such as Cairns (1965:248-9) praised imperialism for bringing about that 'civilisation', and for creating an African political elite that was in tune with Western culture and political manière de faire. As a consequence of all this, most of what is available as history today, is the history of European involvement in Africa, and not the history of Africa during European involvement. Although belied by researchers such as Diop (1987), the above view of Africa is far from dead.

In what concerns Cameroon, the political history is often treated as if its existence started with the German occupation in the 19th century; the common excuse being that very little is known of Cameroon before then. Sufficient significance is not given to the fact that before it became a German Protectorate in 1884, Cameroon consisted of "organised states and kingdoms" ruled by monarchs who had as much right to their crowns or positions as did their European counterparts; monarchs who as far back as 1472, "signed treaties of amity and of commerce on terms of equality with the representatives of kings and rulers of other nations". And who, even with the advent of Europeans, continued to negotiate and deal with them on an equal footing. Thus the treaty signed between King Bille Losenge of Bimbia and a
representative of Queen Victoria to abolish slave trade in 1826; and the 1856 commercial agreement between King Manga Bell of Douala and Captain Walker of Messrs Horsfall of the UK. Dr Natchtigal himself started off by signing a commercial treaty (Kale, 1967:1-3), and it was not until balkanisation was agreed upon at the Berlin Conference in 1884, that Cameroon was proclaimed a German Protectorate.

Colonisation means domination and exploitation, justifiable or not. If Germany declared Cameroon a protectorate, it was not because the latter could not rule itself, but rather, because Germany, like the rest of Europe was too powerful and too expansionist to respect Africa's right to self-determine. Consideration not for the welfare of Cameroonians, but for German prestige, traders and planters was the determining factor (Rudin, 1938:222-96). German administrators are remembered for "the barbaric depths" to which they "descended in bringing civilization to the 'primitives'" (Joseph, 1977:21). The period under Germany was marked by warfare, as "the natives" fought against conquest and subjugation "to the white man's rule" (Rudin, 1938:414). Thirty years after the occupation, World War I broke out. Germany fought and lost both the war and its colonies in Africa. The latter became "Mandated Territories" of the League of Nations, who assigned them "under mandate" to some of the victor-nations.

The Cameroonian territory was arbitrarily divided between Britain and France; with the former having one-sixth, and the latter five-sixth of the whole. The idea behind the mandate was that although Germany had lost the war, its colonies were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" (Kale, 1967:7-8). Ignored was the fact that Africa had not exactly asked to be made part of 'the modern world', or to be helped to its feet by Europe. Although Cairns (1965) would argue that at the time Europe colonised Africa, it was incapable of controlling its own future, and would inevitably have been colonised by the Arabs if Europeans had failed to do so.

As we will realise below, there is no doubt that most of "the present ambiguity and ambivalence towards local authorities" (Rowlands et al., 1988:120-1) in Cameroon and Africa at large, were created during colonialism and subsequently inherited by the 'modern' leaders at independence. The history of colonialism was one of fundamental structural and institutional changes; changes which failed to be undone at independence. Hitherto empowered institutions either saw themselves radically deprived of their powers or
merely adapted to serve as instruments of colonialism. Thus, though Kings and their councils often escaped total destruction, they were supposed to act as "reliable intermediaries between their people and Government" (Bridges, 1933:107). As Lloyd (1965:73) remarks, though the colonial native administration preserved vestiges of the traditional administrative process, the traditional policy-making process was often lost as rulers took their lead more from the administrative officer than from their own "political elite".

In Cameroon, the French and English, like their German predecessors, acknowledged "an organised system of government" in the different ethnic groups. These so-called 'tribal societies' had complete social structures which they had elaborated in order to sustain societal life and provide them with a collective logic and consciousness. The colonists, conditioned by European theorists on Africa, were surprised by the fact that "these pagan natives" had been able to develop such complex social structures without help or advice from "the outside world". In his first administrative report on the Bum in north west Cameroon, Pollock (a British colonial officer) described it as a "powerful, self-contained and independent kingdom, with a complete social structure and an effective system of administration, fully competent to safeguard its own interests and to oppose any interference from without" (1927:245). "It may be that other clan organisations are as complete but it is doubted if the organisation of any native community surpasses that in existence at Bum before the advent of Europeans" (1927:36), he concluded.

In the light of his assertion, any attempt at changing such a "complete" organisation should not be seen as an effort to raise it up to that of "any native community", but rather, to make it look like the European social organisation which was henceforth to serve as model. In other words, from an entirely native standpoint the Bum social organisation was complete, but it however needed to be changed because Pollock considered it inferior to that of European states. Equally complete though the Bum judicial system was, he advocated its replacement because there was "no authority nor Government approval for the continuation or execution of the decisions arrived at or judgement given" (Pollock, 1927:54). Only those without a proper understanding of colonialism would wonder why it needed the approval of British authorities for judgement rendered by the Bum judicial apparatus to Bum elements, to be accepted by the latter.

My study of the changing concept of power amongst the Bum further revealed that the colonists rejected the institutions which contradicted their
purpose, and retained only those in tune with colonialism. Bridges (1933:23) recommended that the Bum king be allowed to "continue to constitute the Native Authority" because, having a "hereditary position", he was well placed "to receive and issue executive orders; and to exact the willing obedience of all". The king was therefore recognized as an auxiliary, but he could not command the same amount of authority because the colonists had failed to recognise the Kwefon - the body of councillors that governed with him, and that had until then acted as a check against his possible abuse of power.

The Kwefon which had legitimated the King's authority in pre-colonial Bum, was replaced by the "Native Authority" which conferred colonial authority, but not the legitimacy he needed to exact obedience from his subjects. It was a situation which placed the king in a predicament, made him perpetually at loggerheads with his councillors and people, and led to untold conflicts of values. Hitherto used to living under the joint leadership of the King and the Kwefon, the Bum suddenly found themselves being forced to choose between the two (Nyamnjoh, 1985:100-21). Other states in British Cameroon went through similar experiences (Nkwi et al., 1982; Rowlands et al., 1988:120-1). As Lord Raglan remarked, essentially democratic political institutions were replaced all over British Africa by despots who were guaranteed by the colonial government "against any fear of deposition by their subjects" (Kale, 1967:9-10).

Elsewhere in French Cameroon the situation was much the same (Balandier, 1963; Gardinier, 1963; Le Vine, 1964). France created 'varrant chiefs' in acephalous societies in the southern half of the territory, a region without a tradition of central government. In areas with kingdoms such as the North and the Bamileke region, it tried to turn their kings into auxiliaries of the central administration. Where it met with resistance, France was quick to depose the kings in question, and to replace them with leaders of its own. Under this system, many kings "lost their prerogatives", including the Sultans of Bamun and Ngaoundere. The policy everywhere was the introduction of "a French created system of local control" through "a gradual erosion of the power of indigenous political authority" (Le Vine, 1964:91-98).

Like Britain, France ran into problems of legitimacy with its appointed 'chiefs' who although imbued with authority and backed by the central administration, were not accepted by the people. So were the French created 'conseils de Notables' - instruments of French administration. The legal system was such that "encouraged differential treatment" of Cameroonians
"according to a cultural rather than a legal yardstick (Le Vine, 1964:91-104). It is evident that the ‘chieftancy reforms’ carried out by the French (Le Vine, 1964:97-98), were adopted with very little alteration by the post-colonial state (Nkwi, 1979; Geshiere, 1982; Nyamnjoh, 1985), and that the traditional political elite of today are as dependent as they were under France and Britain.

At the end of World War II, Cameroon became a Trusteeship of the United Nations, but remained under the British and French. From the outset Britain had decided against an independent administration for British Cameroon. It divided the territory into the Southern and Northern Cameroons, which it respectively administered as integral parts of Northern and Eastern Nigeria (Ardener, 1962; Kale, 1967). According to Kale, its administration of the territory prior to World War II was "haphazard and full of misgivings". "There was an apparent lack of administrative interest" which he thinks was due to "the fear that Germany might suddenly demand a return of her former African possessions". For this reason, Britain might have thought it "preposterous spending, and possibly wasting, British tax-payers' money and talent on what was not, strictly speaking, a developing British country" (1967:12-13). In Whitehall Cameroon was often regarded "as somewhat of a colonial liability", and administered all the way from Lagos, with hope of its "eventual integration with Nigeria". It had neither a separate budget, nor separate public accounts; all its government revenues were treated as part of a common fund (Le Vine, 1964:194-201).

France on the other hand administered French Cameroon as an independent entity, making it benefit totally from its policies of paternal 'association' and of 'assimilation' (Ardener, 1962; Gardinier, 1963; Le Vine, 1964; Joseph, 1977). However, the winds of change that blew across the continent in the 1950s and early 1960s did not leave Britain and France unaffected, reluctant though they were to grant independence. Many political parties were developed, some of which militated for independence and for the reunification of the Cameroons. Prominent amongst them were the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), the Kamerun People's Party (KPP), and the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNNDP) of Southern Cameroon, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), the Démocrates Camerounais (DC), and the Union Camerounaise (UC) of French Cameroon (Ardener, 1962, 1967; Gardinier, 1963; Le Vine, 1964; Kale, 1967; Joseph, 1977; Mukong, 1985).

These parties were modeled after European ones; the idea was for the
territory's leaders to learn "the essentials of political and parliamentary life" (Le Vine, 1964:142). At the beginning, it was just a question of metropolitan parties creating branches in Cameroon. Le Vine (1964:145) remarked that French parties and organisations such as SFIO, RPF, MRP, RDA, and CGT each had local branches. No wonder, for a long time parties remained "the playground of the political elite" with programmes "created elsewhere and clumsily adapted to Camerounian conditions". Party politics "struck little popular response" and "enthusiasm" before the creation of UPC, "The only true nationalist party with a dynamic organization, an ideological commitment, and a militant leadership". After independence, with the UPC in disarray, the existing parties which "behaved much more like local interest groups than organisations conscious of broader national obligations", could do little to stop the collapse of multipartyism. It has been argued that had the UPC not "dissipated its vitality in a premature attempt to seize power", it would have "grown into an all-Cameroun movement" (Le Vine, 1964:221-3), and might have effectively challenged the creation of a one-party state.

In January 1960 French Cameroon became independent with Ahidjo as its first President, who was already Prime Minister in 1958, taking over from Mbida, and in accordance with the terms of the limited autonomy granted all French colonies by the 'Loi Cadre' of 1956. So limited was the autonomy that France retained jurisdiction over almost every sphere of importance, including finance, diplomatic representation, commercial law, external commerce, penal code, and external defense (Le Vine, 1964:162). Dissatisfied with French involvement, and with the way France had manipulated things in order to maintain its influence, the UPC was determined to continue its fight against "French imperialists" and their "puppets" the government, even after it was forced to go underground (Ardener, 1962:347-8); Le Vine, 1964:145-61; Joseph, 1977:239-350; Bayart, 1980:159).

After independence, UPC leaders continued to mobilise support and to contest Ahidjo's legitimacy; but committed backing from the French authorities, together with ruthless repression by Ahidjo, eventually crushed their resistance (Medard, 1978:40). With Um Nyobe assassinated by French forces in 1958 and Dr Moumié killed by French agents in 1960, the rest of the UPC leadership was forced either to continue their guerrilla warfare, flee the country, or betray the party and its ideals by making a pact with Ahidjo. France, Mbida, Ahidjo and other enemies of the UPC, exploited the fact that the latter received support from revolutionary governments the world over, some of which were communist, to accuse it of Communism.
Proof of the legitimacy of its cause is the fact that even those who were so violently against UPC, ended up borrowing from its manifesto, albeit halfheartedly. By opting for "cooperation with France in an atmosphere of reciprocal cordiality and confidence" (Le Vine, 1964:167), Ahidjo was seen by the French as the moderate they had to support in order to guarantee France's post-colonial political, economic and cultural involvement in Cameroon. The first constitution of the Republic of Cameroun "bore a remarkable similarity to that of the French Fifth Republic", despite the historical and political differences of the two countries (Le Vine, 1964:224-7). This was an indication as to how far Ahidjo was ready to go in his 'cooperation' with France. It was therefore unrealistic to think that France who had fought so hard to resist the radical independence advocated by the UPC, would, under a moderate and without pressure, agree to the political, cultural and economic autonomy needed for authentic nation-building in Cameroon.

With Nigeria and French Cameroon both independent, there was a pressing need to define the future of the British Cameroon. Under the auspices of the UNO, a plebiscite was conducted in the territory in February 1961. Due to what was largely seen at the time as the result of manipulation of votes by Britain, the Northern Cameroons voted to become part of Nigeria. On its part, the Southern Cameroons opted for a federation with La République du Cameroun, despite the voices which advocated a union with Nigeria. Inspite of a "popular" disinclination for an "early reunification after session from Nigeria" (Ardener, 1967:302), the UN never gave the people that option; the only choice was between Nigeria and French Cameroon (Ardener, 1962, 1967; Le Vine, 1964:206-14). Also, the boundaries of the reunified territory "were not willed by those who wished for reunification", but were imposed on them; consequently, these boundaries were much narrower than they would have been "if a simple reconstruction of German Kamerun had been achieved" (Ardener, 1967:288).

Some have argued that from a legal point of view, Cameroon was never colonised by France and Britain. This is an argument which fails to take account of the fact that Europe’s scramble for Africa was in itself illegal, both under their individual constitutions and in the eyes of the African states whose say was ignored. Moreover, Cameroon experienced the same colonial realities as did the so-called 'legally' British or French colonies.

Following a conference held at Foumban in July 1961 by Foncha (KNDP) and Ahidjo (UC), the unified territory became known as the Federal Republic of
Cameroon, and comprised two states – West and East Cameroon – each with its own Prime Minister and Assembly (Ardener, 1967). Ahidjo became the Federal President, but soon began to think the idea of a federation expensive and wasteful. He started scheming for a single unified party which he obtained in part in 1962 by stifling East Cameroonian multipartyism, and in full in 1966 by merging the UC with West Cameroonian parties to form the Cameroon National Union (CNU); and for Reunification which a combination of political intrigue and manipulation brought him in 1972 (Medard, 1978:41; Bayart, 1985:109-38). In May of that year, the federation was replaced by a United Republic which was to last until two years after his resignation in 1982. This change, which the authorities termed "The Peaceful Revolution", also involved the division of the country into seven administrative units (Littoral, Central-South, East, North, West, North-West and South-West) known as provinces.

Like his counterparts elsewhere in Africa (Goulbourne, 1987; Dunn, 1978a, 1978b), Ahidjo spent more than twenty years consolidating his supremacy as President and as chairman of the party, maximizing his personal powers, and centralising government (Medard, 1978; Etonga, 1980; Bayart, 1980; Bayart, 1985:141-82). Having initially been forced to adopt a federal constitution in order to facilitate reunification with Southern Cameroon, Ahidjo was to gear his politics towards increased centralisation aimed at assimilating anglophone Cameroon, and at weakening all opposition, including the authority of the traditional political elite. He succeeded so well in this quest that he virtually dominated all public and political institutions: he held executive power as head of government and state, controlled legislative power as chairman of the party, and subdued the judiciary through direct appointments. In this way, he was able to impose his authority over the party, government, parliament and administration. As Medard observed, "President Ahidjo is an absolute monarch: not only does he concentrate all powers of a very centralised and authoritarian state, but in a certain way the state is him" (1978:40-42).

On November 1982, Ahidjo resigned, and was constitutionally succeeded as President by Paul Biya, who promised to build a more democratic, free and just society. In 1984 President Biya effected a series of constitutional changes, which embodied, interalia, the creation of three new provinces – South, Adamawa and Far North; and the change of name to the Republic of Cameroon – a move which attracted criticism from certain anglophone academics, who saw it as an attempt to influence history in favour of the French heritage. The critics argue that the only change of names
acceptably neutral, would be a return to the German Kamerun, when the country
was one to all Cameroonians. As Ndina (1980) argues, Cameroonians look up to
the German era not because Germany left behind any sense of 'Kamerunianness'
as such, but rather because it provided the framework for the future
concretization of what Ardener (1962) has termed the 'Kamerun Idea' - the
idea of a people united by the common feeling of facing the same challenges
under German colonialism.

Despite this criticism, the country today is simply known as the
Republic of Cameroon; which does not mean that it has ceased to be "united",
nor does it imply that "national unity" is no longer a government
priority. In 1985 the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) was created
to replace the CNU, which Paul Biya's New Deal administration identified with
the past. However, like the latter, the CPDM remains the sole party, with Paul
Biya its chairman, also acting as Head of State and Head of government. Under
the Cameroonian system, the presidency is an all-power institution in front of
which the legislature and the judiciary are most incapable, and to which the
constitution can be as adaptable as a working-paper (Medard, 1978; Etonga,

The so-called "modern political institutions" of today have more in
common with those of the colonial state and Europe, than with the institutions
of pre-colonial Cameroon. Although at independence Ahidjo promised to "draw
the basic principles of African democracy" from "our traditional
chieftainship" (Ahidjo, 1964:31-3), the role traditional rulers were
eventually asked to play has remained as peripheral, ambiguous and ambivalent
as under France and Britain. The various kings (called "chiefs" by the
colonists and today's 'modern' leaders) were only seen as useful if they could
serve as effective instruments for the implementation of government policies
amongst their people; policies elaborated centrally by the 'new elite'.

In this light the government took a series of moves to ensure the
attainment of their objectives. These included establishing criteria for the
award of a "Certificate of Official recognition by the Government" in 1967; a
1969 presidential warning to all chiefs who were seen to be reluctant to
change; an invitation in 1966 to rally round the unified party; and a decree
in 1977 defining their role within the new 'nation-state' (Nkwi, 1979:111-115;
Nyamnjoh, 1985:102-5). Thus while the pre-colonial autonomy of Cameroonian
societies has not been restored, the Kings remain mere auxiliaries of the
government, subservient to their Divisional Administrative Officers (D.O. or
As Nkwi argues,
While the state guarantees the protection of chiefs and the defence of their rights while they are in office, it also lays down sanctions for those chiefs who fail to live up to the laws of the nation-state. They can be made destitute or thrown out of their traditional office by government. They must carry out their traditional duties within the limits of the laws of the state. Their powers have been completely eroded and they can only survive if they recognize and function according to the dictates of the new political elite (Nkwi, 1979:115).

From these observations, it is clear that despite "a disquieting variety of types of political organisation" (Rowlands et al., 1988:120) in pre-colonial Cameroon, nothing was done by the new leaders to question the alternative systems grafted onto the country by France and Britain, and which were most unfamiliar with local ideas of democracy and government. Today, as in colonial Cameroon, the power of the traditional Kings "is undermined by the central authorities while that of the 'Warrant chief' has to be constantly propped up by demonstrations of force against the local populations. The state is hardly in gear with village communities" (Rowlands et al., 1988:120). As Bayart (1980) argues, in the name of political unity, the various ethnic groups have seen their local and sectional loyalties and interests suppressed, and have been forced into a relationship of dependence on "a highly centralized" government. For the same reason, the "ordinary Cameroonian" has little impact on "his most pressing problems and interests", as the socio-economic changes which he is supposed to help bring about, are "planned and carried out entirely without reference to him".

In the University of Yaounde, customary law is not taught; but French and English Legal systems are the basis of the curriculum. Local lawyers follow legal proceedings in France and Britain with keen interest, because every verdict reached there, is seen by them as relevant and applicable in Cameroon. There does not seem to be any difference between the realities of these countries, and those of Cameroon. Quite typically therefore, the Cameroonian legal system dismisses allegations of witchcraft and sorcery as unscientific, although the majority of people whom it supposedly serves continue to believe in and feel threatened by these phenomena. It would appear that just because France and Britain dismissed witchcraft and sorcery during colonialism, or perhaps because these practices are not problems in contemporary French and British societies, there is no reason why the Cameroonian legal apparatus should recognise these as problems
In a move which some are likely to interpret to mean further marginalisation of rural and traditional Cameroon by the central authorities, the CPDM party chairman issued a circular prohibiting all traditional rulers from contesting the legislative election of April 1988. This implies that only the 'modern elite' who barely understand them and their fundamental problems, are allowed to raise and deliberate issues of concern to them in parliament. Henceforth the King, like in the colonial period, can only address himself to or through the D.O under whose jurisdiction he falls. A situation which leaves rural and traditional Cameroon with little direct power to influence decisions supposedly made in their name, and concerning their political, economic and cultural development. As we shall see when dealing with the economy, the government, despite its political power, is almost exclusively dependent on the agricultural efforts of the peasants for the food and export crops it needs to sustain its bureaucrats and to obtain foreign exchange.

II.) BRIEF LOOK AT THE CULTURAL POLICY

After Independence and Reunification, Cameroonian researchers joined politicians in the search for the best way forward. Amongst those who took an early look at the cultural problems of Cameroon were Mbassi-Manga (1964) and Fonlon (1964). They acknowledged three cultural currents in Cameroon at the time: the Cameroonian mainstream, which Fonlon describes as the cultures of the land or the masses, and the French and British tributaries, or "the cultures of the Westernised few". They advocated an integration or marriage of the best of these three, that would create a culture essentially African. Given the dormancy of the traditional culture during colonialism, they recognised that the illiterate masses lacked the power to "initiate cultural policy or bring significant influence to bear on cultural progress". The initiative towards cultural harmonisation should come from the modern elite who had such power and authority. This group alone was capable of laying the framework for "the merging of the modern technical civilisation with the traditional African way of life" (Fonlon, 1964:9-10).

Concerning education, Mbassi-Manga and Fonlon called for a review of the curricula and the languages of instruction. The systems of education inherited from France and Britain were not the best for Cameroon, and needed readapting. They prescribed an alternative that would mould Cameroonians, and not Frenchmen and Englishmen in black skin. Although they found nothing
particularly wrong with using French and English for instruction, they were concerned about the preponderance of these languages, and the marginalisation of the national languages, especially in francophone Cameroon. They wrote in favour of the adoption of Cameroonian languages for the promotion of "National Culture", for instruction, and for linguistic degree courses in the university.

Mbassi-Manga presents the argument thus:

Education for Cameroon must have for its centre "the Cameroon child." It must be based upon, and grow out of, his nation's past, but the Cameroon child's chief link with the past is his mother-tongue. To exclude his own language from his own school, is to make a great mistake, and to be guilty of as much injustice as to separate him from his own land. Because of it, he would become a stranger in his own family, a foreigner in his own village, and would feel at home neither among his own people nor among those of another race. Particularly would this be true if he is led to despise his own tongue and with all that he has inherited from his race (Mbassi-Manga, 1964:140).

Were Mbassi-Manga and Fonlon to revise their articles taking into account the current situation of Cameroon, they would not have much rewriting to do. For today, twenty-five years after they wrote, very little of their advice has been heeded. The cultures of the Westernised few remain as dominant as they were in the early 1960s; the struggle for integration has continued between the French and English tributaries, as though the cultures of the land or the masses were not part of the process. Despite declarations to the contrary, the Westernised few have shown themselves incapable of undoing the "cultural grilling and indoctrination" (Fonlon, 1964:12) they underwent under France and Britain. On-going debates amongst intellectuals (Minfoc, 1985) and prescriptions by politicians (Biya, 1987; Onambele, "Dimanche Midi", 17/10/88), show that forging a cultural identity for Cameroon remains a pressing problem. The following discussion of Cameroon's cultural policy attests to this.

The cultural policy of Cameroon is made by the government and implemented by various ministries, including those of Education, Youth and Sports, and Information and Culture. While the others are involved with certain aspects only, the latter ministry is concerned with culture as a whole. Its Department of Cultural Affairs is responsible for: Ensuring that national culture plays its role as an instrument for strengthening and consolidating national unity; carrying out an inventory of the cultural, artistic and literary heritage of Cameroon and ensuring the protection,
presentation, enrichment, promotion and popularization thereof; encouraging the creative spirit in all artistic, literary and technical fields; ensuring the demonstration of national cultural values by appropriate means and the cultural organization of the masses at all levels; promoting Cameroonian artistic and literary prestige abroad (exhibitions, lectures, tours by drama and traditional dance groups, cultural festivals and weeks); spreading knowledge, in Cameroon, of the artistic and cultural heritage of foreign, particularly African countries (tours, shows, exhibitions, museums, libraries, cultural weeks); controlling throughout the territory, organizations of a cultural nature whether public or private, Cameroonian or non-Cameroonian; managing the national library.

These guidelines, spelt out when the Ministry was reorganised in 1978, summarise the resolutions made by the National Council for Cultural Affairs at its first session held from 18 to 22 December 1974; resolutions which in turn were based on speeches and declarations by President Ahidjo (Bahoken et al., 1976:19-57). They, according to the government, constitute the cultural policy of Cameroon, and like the presidential statements and the council’s resolutions which inspired them, are not widely disseminated even amongst those responsible for applying them. At the Department of Culture itself, apart from the guidelines, there are no other official documents explaining what 'culture' is all about, or how the stipulated objectives are to be met. As the Director of Cultural Affairs (interviewed, 31/12/88) explains, the absence of "well elaborated and documented" cultural objectives, leaves him with no precise sense of direction. He, like his predecessors, is forced to use personal judgment, which could be ill-informed, and therefore dangerous for "a country in search of a cultural identity". In an attempt to change the situation, "I prepared a policy document and forwarded, but it hasn’t been returned to me ever since."

Although both post-colonial governments have recognised the need to reassert the ‘Cameroonian cultural patrimony’, largely dormant during colonialism, they have each come short of the radical structural changes needed to ensure success. They have failed to distance themselves from the passive prescriptiveness of academics through providing the cultural initiative called for by Fonlon. After independence President Ahidjo (like Fonlon and Mbassi-Manga) called for "the rediscovery of the African cultural patrimony" and the study of "The cultural and social features common to African countries", in view of asserting "the African Personality" (Ahidjo, 1964:98). A call he reiterated at the Garoua CNU party congress in March 1969,
and in his address to the Council for Higher Education and Scientific and Technical Research in December 1974 (Bahoken et al., 1976:19-31). President Biya (1986:97-107), who defines Cameroonian culture not to mean "the traditional dances at airports" or "the occasional exhibitions of protocol ceremonies", advocates the promotion of "all the original, positive and constant factors which have enabled Cameroon's ethnic groups to live in communities and guaranteed their survival in the course of history".

In both cases no inventory is given of the cultural features or factors mentioned; declarations of intent have been matched by very little real action. Both Presidents have equally stressed the importance of the national languages, and of school curricula that are not "merely Cameroonised but Cameroonian". However, the predominance or nigh-exclusive use of French and English as languages of instruction has evaded fundamental questioning, and textbooks and the system of education as a whole remain highly ill-adapted to national needs and objectives. The Westernised few still perpetuate the belief that the national languages are 'primitive' and unsuited for 'science' (Bayart, 1980:163); and students at all levels continue to be taught more about the West than about Cameroon and Africa. In this way, the authorities have not acted differently from the academics; they have failed to take the initiative needed for traditional cultural continuum in Cameroon.

The government's ambiguous approach to culture reflects its very inability to determine or situate the latter. Under President Ahidjo, the cultural department was first attached to the Ministry of Education and later to that of Information. Today matters of culture are dealt with in several ministries. The failure to create a separate ministry for it - despite its stated importance, has led to culture either being treated as secondary to education, information and sports, or being reduced simply to its educative, informative or entertaining functions. For some time President Biya seemed to differ when he created a vice-ministerial position for cultural affairs at the Ministry of Information and Culture; but the abolition of this post after the 1988 presidential election, contradicts any importance he might have been seen to accord the issue.

It is clear that nothing has been done to give more meaning to the expressed need for cultural renaissance in Cameroon. The National Council for Cultural Affairs created in 1973 and headed by the President himself, is only remembered (if at all) for its 1974 resolutions and recommendations; apart from which its existence has remained on paper only. Supposed, in Ahidjo's
words, to

... study the different ways of life of our people, and consider
how to restore - starting at once with our children's education -
their rightful value to our tales, legends, games and languages,
but without prejudice to the government's principle of preserving
our age-old pluriculturalism, founded on the wealth of our cultural
diversity" (Bahoken et al., 1976:30),

the council lacked the funds and structures necessary to go beyond mere
resolutions and recommendations. This, coupled with the absence of a real will
for change, excessive centralisation of decision-making, and poor
coordination, brought the council to a virtual standstill.

Today, although anthropological, sociological, historical, and
linguistic research aimed at a better knowledge of Cameroonian cultural values
continues under the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
(MESRES), there is little evidence that their findings are being employed to
foster the cultural policy as defined by the government. The French and
English heritages remain dominant, but most of the latter's particularism has
been eroded, because the demographically superior francophones have been less
interested in cultural harmonisation than in assimilation (Fonlon, 1964;
Bayart, 1980:165). Bayart believes that a cultural personality or synthesis
for Cameroon, as called for by the government, is "an illusion", so far as the
authorities, in the name of unity, continue to suppress particularisms and
forcibly impose an acculturation on Cameroonians (1980:166).

Frustrated by the continuous marginalisation of authentic
Cameroonian cultural values, and the absence of genuine participation for the
masses, National Assembly Speaker Solomon Tandeng Muna, called for the
creation of a truly independent national cultural orientation commission in
March 1988. As I argue in relation to the broadcast media in chapter six, only
such a commission, one that is independent of the party and government, can
guarantee the impartiality necessary to ensure the Cameroonian cultures and
peoples the participation they need; participation for long denied them by the
Westernised few, despite its alleged importance in nation-building.

III.) THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON

A lot has been written on the economy of colonial Cameroon, and it
is beyond the scope of this work to give more than a brief resumé. Like
politics and culture, the colonial economy was structured not with the
development of Cameroon in mind, but to serve metropolitan economic interests.
If Germany set up over fifty-eight plantations (Joseph, 1977:23) and
encouraged the cultivation of and trading in cocoa, tobacco, cotton, rubber, banana and palm oil (Rudin, 1938:222-96), if France constructed a hydroelectric complex at Edea and created FIDES to finance development projects in Cameroon and elsewhere, the real concern was with solving German or French economic problems "with the assistance of Cameroonian capital and natural resources" (Joseph, 1977:103-23).

This explains why under Germany, Cameroonian-owned production in 1913 "contributed a mere 2.2 per cent of the value of exports and in 1912 only 715 tons of cocoa out of 4,511 produced" (Joseph, 1977:23); or why Cameroon's participation in the investments and expected profits in the Edea hydroelectric complex was limited to a meagre 8 per cent (Joseph, 1977:111-12), and domestic consumers denied the benefit of cheap electricity (Joseph, 1976:3). Be it in agriculture or in industry and commerce, those who benefitted were invariably white; even 'les petits blancs' (whites with a lesser claim to the myth of racial and cultural superiority on which colonialism was based) were preferred to the best qualified 'natives' (Joseph, 1977:148-151). This made many Cameroonians frustrated and bitter, particularly as they could neither influence the use of their resources, nor curb the massive practice of forced labour, porterage, and marginalisation.

It is true that in the process parts of Cameroon were developed infrastructurally, but the fact nonetheless remains that the roads, bridges, ports, railways, government buildings, and telecommunications equipment were there to facilitate economic exploitation than for the welfare of Cameroonians. As Joseph (1977:110) argues, the bulk of colonial infrastructural investments was devoted "into the construction of facilities for the evacuation of cash crops and the importation of industrial products" rather than "to the development of Cameroun into a workable economic unit". Not surprisingly therefore, in 1910 "the Germans were induced ... to seek the expropriation of the indigenous inhabitants" of the city of Douala because it had grown to assume the status of Cameroon's economic centre (Joseph, 1977:22). Neither is it a surprise that France limited infrastructural development to the "fertile crescent" or "le Cameroun utile" of the South, where the agricultural products it most needed were grown, and most of whose infrastructure Germany had already provided. The region's cocoa, coffee and bananas alone accounted for 70% of the value of exports, and its timber (5.6%), rubber (2.8%), palm nuts and oil (2.8%), and Tobacco (1%) swallowed up the best part of the remaining 30%, with only Cotton (3.6%) and groundnuts (1.8%) coming from the north (Joseph, 1977:104-18).
At independence therefore, Cameroon inherited an economy structured on human inequality, regional imbalances and massive exploitation; one that was basically agricultural as well, with only a few industries (Ndongko, 1980, 1982, 1985). In this section, as in those on politics and culture, I am concerned with the efforts made by Cameroon to free itself from the economics of exploitation and marginalisation as practiced during colonialism.

The post-colonial state of Cameroon was both aware of the limitations of the colonial economy it inherited, and of its urgent need to develop. Like most other African countries, it turned to planning, which President Ahidjo understood to mean "rationally using the available resources, reducing the part of chance in the economic venture and deliberately orienting development towards calculated and predetermined targets" (Political Bureau CNU, 1968:81). As a country of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and geographic diversities, it opted for "a liberalized approach to planning with a view to attaining self-reliant development, a balanced distribution of investment resources as well as the fruits of economic progress" (Ndongko, 1984:8). This policy, known as Planned Liberalism (Libéralisme plannifié) advocates a 'mixed economy' in which "the private sector has significant leeway, but must operate within priorities laid down by the state" (Besong, 1985a:9). It is meant to safeguard "the general interest while reconciling the necessity for planning with the freedom of initiative" (Political Bureau CNU, 1968:90-96).

Planned Liberalism was first implemented in the Second Five Year Economic and Social Development Plan (July 1966 - June 1971), and subsequently in the Third (July 1971 - June 1976), Fourth (1976 - 1980) and Fifth (1980 - 1985) plans. The Sixth plan (1986 - 1991), though drawn up under President Biya and following the New Deal philosophy of Communal Liberalism (Biya, 1987; Cameroon Tribune (daily), 9/3/1987), is in tune with the same basic idea of self-reliance, balance and participation for all. Far from being a policy à part as some have suggested, Communal Liberalism merely complements and reinforces Planned Liberalism (Ndongko, interview, Cameroon Tribune, December 1, 1987).

Ndongko observes that African countries, in order to offset the economic difficulties arising from the lost of foreign capital and manpower after independence, tended to create "favourable investment conditions in order to attract foreign private capital". This was particularly the case with Cameroon where the government was unable to rely on its predominantly agricultural sector for the resources necessary "to guarantee meaningful
industrialization and the achievement of balanced and self-reliant development objectives." Its first investment code, approved by parliament on June 27, 1960 and extended to cover West Cameroon by Law No 64/LF/6 of April 6, 1964, remained in existence for twenty four years unrevised, until June 1984 when a new one was adopted (1984).

The task of the first code was to promote "rapid" industrialisation and economic development, and to "reduce the regional inequalities that had been allowed to develop during the colonial period as a result of the neglect of certain parts of the country, mostly the hinterland". It consisted of four major categories or "schedules" (A, B, C, D) that reflected the government's priorities, and which were all guaranteed "tax holidays and exemptions from duties for periods varying from ten to twenty five years". Investment was encouraged in Forest, Agro, Manufacturing, and Basic industries (Ndongko, 1984:8-9), although agriculture clearly remained the basis of the whole economy. The people were and have continued to be made to understand the importance of the latter, through Agro-Pastoral Shows, the 'Green Revolution' policy launched in 1973, and repeated statements by the President and other members of government. Despite the discovery and exportation of oil, Cameroon has avoided using oil revenue to weaken the contribution made by agriculture, and thus has been able to avoid Nigeria's mistake of over-dependence on oil revenue. Thus although oil money has been used to salvage the economy from time to time (The Economist, 1987:70), Cameroonians know little about how much revenue oil actually brings, as this is kept secret by the government (Besong, 1985b:8).

During the twenty four years when the first National Investment Code was applied, government laid claim to economic progress, and were often supported by international opinion. The average growth rate of incomes was estimated at 4.4% for 1960-1966, 9.8% for 1967-1973, 9.9% for 1974-1975, and 10.1% for 1976-1978 (Besong, 1985a:9). As Johnson points out, in the 1960s Cameroon "enjoyed one of Africa's highest rates of growth" in GNP, with an annual average rate of about 7%. In the 1970s despite global economic crisis, its growth rate remained high, and it was actually booming by 1980 (Johnson, 1980:xvii-xviii). The World Bank commended Cameroon’s development efforts, which had succeeded in raising it from the low-income country that it was 25 years back to one of the fastest growing economies (7%) in Africa, with one of the highest incomes ($880) per head (Cameroon Tribune (daily) 3/1/1984). From 1980 to 1985, Cameroon, Botswana and China had the fastest growing economies in the world. Despite low oil and cash crop prices, "Cameroon's economy grew
Throughout this period Cameroon repeatedly prided itself for being able to balance its operational budget entirely from its own resources. There were dramatic budget increases every year. For example, the 410 billion FCFA budget adopted for the 1982/83 fiscal year was double that of three years before and 100 billion FCFA greater than that of 1981/82 (Cameroon Tribune (weekly) 5/1/1983). The 1983/84 budget which stood at 520 billion FCFA (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 3/1/1984), and that of 1984/85 balanced at 620 billion FCFA (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 11/7/84; Besong, 1985b:8), were even higher. This trend continued for sometime after the code was replaced in 1984, with the amount rising from 740 billion FCFA in 1985/86 to 800 billion in 1986/87 (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 14/1/1987). However, when the Biya government suddenly declared the country in a state of crisis in 1987, the trend suffered a reversal. For the first time since independence a finance bill was passed in June 1987 that reduced the budget from 800 billion in 1986/87 to 650 billion FCFA in 1987/88 (Africa Confidential, September 23 1987; Cameroon Tribune (daily), 7/1/1988; West Africa, 1988:829). The 1988/89 budget fell even further to 600 billion (Azonga, 1988:2139).

The above figures and growth record can blur our sense of purpose if we fail to relate them to the government’s policies of "planned liberalism", "self-reliant development", "balanced development" and "social justice" (Ndongko, 1985:232). After a systematic examination of investment trends and tendencies in Cameroon since its inception, Ndongko concludes that although many firms benefitted from the liberal nature of the National Investment Code, and obtained financial support from the Cameroon Development Bank and the National Investment Corporation between 1960 and 1984, their location was not "guided by any conscious or deliberate policy of achieving a rationally distributed pattern of economic activities among the provinces" (Ndongko, 1980:246, 1984:9).

His analysis of the implementation of the investment code up to June 30 1975 are summarised in Table I, from which it is clear that the Littoral and Centre South Provinces were the largest beneficiaries of Cameroon’s investment policies and incentives; with the cities of Douala and Yaounde having the greatest number of investments. The Littoral alone had more than three times, and the Central South almost twice, as many companies as the East, West, North, South West and North West provinces put together. The West and North with 7 firms each, together with the North West, had the least...
number of investments.

### TABLE I

SECTORAL & REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES AS OF JUNE 30 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre South</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sect. Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>29.35</td>
<td>14.65</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ndongko, 1984:9

Table II shows that by 1984 when the first investment code was replaced, the situation was much the same as in 1975, if not worse. Thus while the total number of investments in the Littoral rose from 116 (53.2%) in 1975 to 262 (58%) in 1984, in the East it fell from 15 (6.8%) to 3 (0.6%) in the same period. On the other hand, there was general improvement for the North (now subdivided into three administrative units) from 7 (3.3%) to 36 (7.9%), the West from 7 (3.3%) to 20 (4.4%), the South West from 14 (6.4%) to 19 (4.2%), and lastly the North West which barely added two more investments to its 1975 total of two. Despite the significant increase in the number of investments from 218 in 1975 to 452 in 1984, the dominance of the Littoral and Central South regions remained unaffected. Thus while these three provinces alone totaled 370 undertakings, the rest of the country could only afford 82.

From the above analysis, it is clear that the First National Investment Code "was of little help in the accomplishment of the objective of reducing regional inequalities inherited from the colonial period or the attainment of 'balanced' and 'self-reliant' development" (Ndongko, 1984:9). For more than two decades the government contradicted its economic development policy by failing to develop or apply an industrial location policy. By allowing economic calculus alone to determine the pattern of investment
TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES BY PROVINCES AS AT JUNE 30 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>NO. OF UNDERTAKINGS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littoral</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far North</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>452</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Ndongko, 1984:9

location, it had failed to prevent the further concentration of firms in the Littoral and Central-South provinces, thus reinforcing the already dominant position of these areas. It could therefore be said that between 1960 and 1984, the economy of Cameroon largely maintained its colonial structure, and that the government's policy of balanced regional development remained mere rhetoric.

The decision in 1984 to adopt a new investment code is further testimony as to the limitations of the first. Responsibility for the latter's failure is attributable to, inter alia, the unnecessarily long and cumbersome procedure of approval; the lack of any clearly defined criteria for scheduling business undertakings; not enough incentives given to small and medium-size undertakings and the Cameroonisation of jobs; the period of tax breaks and exemptions for schedules 'C' and 'D' undertakings are too long (20 to 25 years); and the absence of control mechanisms to enforce obligations entered into (Ndongko, 1984:9). The new code corrects all of these shortcomings, at least in print. Regarding categories for example, although their number is maintained at four, the duration of tax holidays and duty exemptions for new enterprises has been much reduced - 10 years each for A and B, 10 or 15 for C, and 15 years for D. It also gives special incentives to small and medium-size enterprises (see Law No 84-03 of 4 July 1984).

However, despite these modifications, and inspite of its promises of
much stricter government control and superintendence, the code basically
remains "a persuasion addressed to foreign and domestic investors" (Ndongko,
1980:246); one which has led to Cameroon being described as "a businessman's
paradise" (Ndongko, 1985:231). But like the first, this code offers paradise
mainly to the foreign investors. As Ndongko remarks, "Opportunities for local
businessmen to accumulate capital and lead this country along the path of an
independent industrialization are simply not present" (1985:239). While the
code allows "foreign firms [to] import machinery on a tax free basis, this
same privilege is refused to Cameroonian businessmen". "Foreign economic
agents do not only win contracts that are financed by international
organizations but also projects that are sponsored by the state's own
revenues". The code fails to define the areas of the economy where private
capital can be invested, "with the result that domestic public investment and
foreign private capital have given rise to financially unstable business". Even
the provisions that foreign firms should provide jobs and training for
Cameroonian "are rarely enforced". Equally, "Even joint ventures with
prospects of local ownership have not led to the power structure passing into
local hands" (Ndongko, 1985:244). The bulk of the industries (97%) are managed
by foreigners who evacuate most of their earnings and profits back to the
metropole (Joseph, 1976:4). Thus Ndongko's conclusion that, "indigenous
capitalists are yet to provide an effective challenge or even to supplant
foreign capital" (1985:246). This situation is similar to that of other
African states, whose governments are generally intolerant to indigenous

As Ndongko argues, the only way the government can realize the
objective of balanced regional development, is by regarding and treating the
less developed provinces as "infant industries" deserving "special investment
incentives and attention". Only this would minimize "the adverse effects of
rapid economic growth of richer regions on the poorer" in Cameroon (1980:247).
It is true that the code promises "balanced development and increased
competitiveness of all sectors of the national economy", stipulates that "The
location of undertakings shall be consistent with the requirements of regional
development and planning", and specifies penalties for whoever fails to
conform with its provisions; but like every other policy statement, its
success depends on the commitment and goodwill of those who are called upon to
implement it. For if the first National Investment Code failed, it was not so
much because of insufficient prescriptiveness, as to the sheer failure of the
National Investment Committee to be consistent even where the code was most
unambiguous.
The attempt for rapid industrialisation in Cameroon has not only failed to take root regionally, but has come short of the self-reliance and takeoff generally predicted at independence and as recently as when Biya came to power (see Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 6/11/1985). Inspite of Cameroon's claims of being self-sustaining in operational budget matters, there has been little self-reliance in its general development strategy. All along, it has remained "dependent on foreign sources for the great bulk of its development financing" (Johnson, 1980:xxi; Dessouane et al., 1986); sources with whom, in "the absence of an independent industrial bourgeoisie", bureaucrats have formed an alliance using the state (Ndongko, 1985:246-7).

France, whose community in Cameroon estimated at 18,000 and 16,000 in 1982 and 1987 respectively, the third largest in black Africa after Ivory Coast and Gabon (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 14/11/1985, 5/5/1987), is involved in all sectors of the economy. The French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) for example, from 1982 to 1987 invested not less than 113,7 billion FCFA in the order of 35.5% for agro-industry, 32.6% for water and power, 17.6% for transport and communications, and 14.6% for other industries (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 3/4/1988). At the beginning of 1987 "Twenty-six per cent of the total capital invested in Cameroon, amounting to 67 per cent of investment in the country", was of French origin (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 5/5/87). West Germany's public investment in Cameroon, second only to France's, totaled 660 million DM (about 99 billion FCFA) by July 31 1986, plus an additional 5 million DM (9.5 billion FCFA) in November 1987 (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 13/11/87), rose by 16% (92 million DM or about 14 billion FCFA) from 1988 to 1989 (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 7&8/2/88).

Johnson (1980) and Ndongko (1985) each summarise this dependence for the first twenty years of independence as follows:

Direct foreign subsidies will cover about 4% of the current [fourth] plan, and foreign borrowing an additional 45%. The private sector, also almost all foreign, is expected to provide about 29% of the total funds needed. Thus foreign sources account for nearly three quarters of the total funds.

The foreign sources account for about the same proportion of financing for the Fourth Plan as for the Third. In the previous plan direct subventions were up to 10%, loans another 16% and private investment an additional 48%. For the plan prior to the one, the Second Plan, the foreign component was probably even higher, inasmuch as the proportion of foreign funding for just the publicly supported components was about 65% (Johnson, 1980:xxi-xxii).

In 1980, of 100 largest enterprises in Cameroon, foreign
capital contributed 28.58 million francs CFA or 48% of the total social capital of 59.56 billion francs CFA. Although total plan investment has grown since 1960, the continuous reliance on foreign public and private capital is falling (57.5% at the end of 1976). In 1980 for example, 34.3% of total investment commitments were derived from French public and private capital compared to 45% of similar investment in 1976 to 52% in 1980 [sic], and these 44% of the capital came from the public compared to 39% at the end of 1976 (Ndoungko, 1985:237).

Johnson concludes that Cameroon is "more generous to foreign capital than normal business practices require"; which could be explained either by Cameroon's lack of experience, its deliberate leniency, or pressures from its aid and diplomatic partners, especially France (1980:xxii).

Under the current economic crisis, such dependence could only exacerbate. Already, the government has had to turn to the IMF, despite President Biya's initial reluctance. This could be seen as a desperate move after the structural readjustment measures introduced since June 1987, have proved inadequate. The austerity measures - which included: reductions in public sector salaries and allowances; the selling of official cars; curbing the abusive use of public facilities especially telephones; new taxes which raised the prices of petroleum products, home brewed beer and soft drinks, and of a host of imported (mostly luxury) items; and generally cracking down on corruption (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 19/2/1988, 22/4/1988; (daily), 18/2/1988, 21/4/1988) - failed to bring about the expected recovery. Despite the creation of a special ministry for the stabilisation of the economy in December 1987 (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 21/12/1987), Cameroon found it virtually impossible to solve its economic crisis self-reliantly.

In October 1988 the IMF announced a $150 million aid package for Cameroon, followed by the World Bank with a structural adjustment loan of $150-250 million, and the CCCB with 20 billion FCFA. Totaling 175 billion FCFA, this falls short of the 250 billion FCFA which in July 1988, parliament authorised the government to negotiate for. This implies that Cameroon would have to look elsewhere for the rest; possibly the African Development Bank, the UK, the European Development Bank and, France and West Germany who are claimed to have told the Cameroonian authorities that their "assistance was contingent on an agreement with the IMF". Also, "The fact that the IMF loan will be disbursed in 18 instalments means that the government may not be able to rely on it to solve immediate problems", including an external debt of $3 billion (Asonga, 1988:2139).

Today the economy remains predominantly agricultural, with Cameroon
relying for most of its foreign exchange on the very same cash crops whose production was encouraged by the colonists. Oil aside, cocoa and coffee alone represent 75% of Cameroon's exports (Nzekoue, 1988:16); just like the colonial administration, today's government pays far more attention to the farming of export crops than food crops (see Cameroon Tribune (Hors-serie) January 1988 for details). Industrial products do not figure significantly on the list of exports, "and of those which do, especially to the central African region, many are products that simply have passed through Cameroon with virtually no value added there" (Johnson, 1980:xix).

That notwithstanding, Cameroon is relatively more industrialised than other Central African states. Its trans-shipping for example gives its industrial export a strong base, while its more general industrial 'strength' "is based on cheaply processing imported bauxite for the European market or import substitution for consumer items". Although it produces aluminium, little of it is "oriented" to the local market, which has to depend on the "slight spill-over" that takes the form of building materials, kitchen ware and other small utensils. As a whole, Cameroon manufactures mostly "luxury or general consumption goods, such as cloth and clothing, shoes, cigarettes, and bottled drinks, especially beer" (Johnson, 1980:xxi). Import-substitution accounts for 80% or more of all industrial activities (Ndongko, 1985:246), and "Foreign capital is dominant in the basic and final consumption industries: Food (81%), drinks (69%); tobacco (75%); textile (73%); timber and wood processing (80%); metal processing (76%)" (Ndongko, 1985:237).

Inspite of the importance accorded cash crop farming, Cameroon is self-sufficient in food, although not as much as officially claimed (Dessouane et al., 1986). Officially only 8% of its total imports are foodstuffs, of which a significant proportion comprises alcoholic drinks, flour and other nonessential foods (Fondi, 1988:9). Although certain foodstuffs (rice, frozen chicken and beef, mineral water, alcohol, etc) have for long been imported despite local surpluses (Joseph, 1976; Dessouane et al., 1986), the current economic crisis has forced the government to limit and in some cases ban their importation (see Law No 87/001 of 1 July 1987, Arrêté No 039 and Ordonnance 88/001 both of 15 January 1988). It would limit the amount of unnecessary dependence on foreign products.

Eighty per cent of the population is rural and directly involved with agriculture. It is in the government's interest to curb rural exodus and encourage the production of export crops (Biya, 1987:59-62) which are of
little nutritive utility to the peasants who are sometimes obliged by the

tasking nature of the latter to sacrifice food crop cultivation. The Peasants'

involvement in cash crop production is not always a decision freely taken by

them (Ela, 1982; Dessouane et al., 1986). The Sixth Plan (1986-1991) estimated

at 6000 billion FCFA, has consecrated 26.1% of its resources to the

modernisation of agriculture and livestock (which generate 2/3 of total

export) and the countryside (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 7/1/1988); but it is

doubtful if this would be attained under the present atmosphere of crisis.

However, the government is well aware that without the active support of the

peasants, Cameroon would neither be self-sufficient in food, nor able to

export such great quantities of cash crops as it has done so far. It is such

awareness that obliges the government to pay "reasonable prices" to farmers,
even when world market prices are exceedingly low (Africa Confidential, September 1987).

Interviewed in the programme "Cameroon Report" on 20 April 1986,
Professor Adebayo Adedeji - Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for

Africa (ECA), made similar remarks about the entire continent. Like Ela

Africans to reexamine their development strategies, and to reduce their

excessive dependence on the production of raw materials, in which demand tends
to lag behind supply. Scientific advances, Adedeji remarked, had made it
possible for industrialised countries to invent laboratory substitutes for
such natural commodities as rubber and certain vegetable oils; and work was in
progress for cocoa to be laboratorily produced as well. The consequences for
African countries were frightful to think of, should they fail to device
strategies of reducing over dependence in export products. To him, Africa's
major tragedy is that "We produce what we don't need and consume what we don't
produce". But if they could produce food crops such as rice, these could
always be reverted for internal use whenever world prices fell too low.1

Such, in brief, is the picture of the Cameroonian economy. Operated
in the interest of Europeans during colonialism, the economy was structured in
favour of the exploitation of Cameroonian natural and human resources towards
solving metropolitan industrial and commercial problems. Dissatisfied with
their marginalisation under the colonial economy, Cameroonians hoped and

1 For details of the Yaounde reviews, discussions and resolutions on
the state of African economies, see ADB & ECA, 1986; ECA, 1986a, 1986b;
Cameroon Tribune (weekly), April 23, 1986.
sought for change once they became independent. However, despite promises and plans of self-reliant and balanced regional development, successive post-colonial governments have failed to redress the limitations of the colonial economy. Instead, these have been exacerbated, as investment and development has increased along the same lines as during colonialism; thus retaining and promoting the privileges of a few regions and people only, while the bulk of the country continues to receive very inadequate attention. In the light of its unbalanced and dependent economy, it would be incorrect to think that Cameroon's economic crisis started in 1987 when President Biya declared so; rather, what started then was not a new phenomenon as such, but just an extension of the general plight of the peasant majority, of the neglected parts of the country, to those hitherto untouched or only mildly affected (see Joseph, 1976:5-13).

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the above presentation that Cameroon has retained most of what it inherited from its European colonisers. Despite declarations and statements emphasizing the need to reassert, authenticate or institutionalise the Cameroonian, the country seems overwhelmed by its colonial heritage. Politically, like the rest of Africa (Goulbourne, 1987; Dunn, 1978a, 1978b; Smith, 1983, 1986; Nyong'o, 1987; Hadjor, 1987) the 'new elite' and their 'modern institutions' have more in common with colonial Cameroon, than with the pre-colonial traditional political elite and institutions. Although the government would argue that the Cameroonian traditional political system is recognised, the role played by the local kings or leaders remains as peripheral, ambiguous and ambivalent as it was under Germany, France and Britain. The fact that these traditional leaders are reduced to mere auxiliaries of the central government and party, means that for most of the time, they are expected to enforce decisions taken neither with their participation nor consent. They and their people are far away from the centres of action and decision-making. Political power is firmly centralised in the hands of the Westernised few, who, by limiting the authority of the traditional leaders, have destroyed the only real link that could have kept them in touch with 80% of the people they govern.

Culturally, the statements and documents examined above leave no doubt that the Westernised few are aware of the cultural problem of Cameroon. The academics and modern political elite have both stressed the need to revalorise the ethnic cultures overpowered by the colonial version of English
and French ways of life. However, they have failed to take the initiative towards reducing the dominance of foreign cultural values, albeit they are in a position to do so. The rural people who daily live the ethnic cultures, lack the political authority to bring about change, because power is centralised in the hands of the Westernised few. Thus because the modern elite have more in common with Western ways than with truly Cameroonian ones, education for example, has continued in English and French, and is more about the West and its experiences than about Cameroon, local life and experiences.

Economically, Cameroon inherited a system the strong point of which was the exploitation of indigenous human and natural resources for the industrial and commercial advantage of Europe. Motivated by extreme self-interest, the colonists had invested infrastructurally only where they were sure to make the most economic gain. At independence the Cameroonian government adopted the policies of planned liberalism, and of self-reliant and balanced regional development, with the aim of correcting the imbalances of the past and bringing the fruits of success to everyone. The government has failed to achieve this goal; failure due largely to the lack of an active industrial location policy. Also, Cameroon failed to question its role as provider of raw materials and cash crops whose prices are determined elsewhere, and which were of very little local utility. Finally, self-reliance as a goal has not been attained; since independence, most of the investment capital remains foreign. The lack of adequate encouragement for independent indigenous capitalists, has compounded foreign involvement and turned bureaucrats in the government and civil service into businessmen. The current economic crisis has made Cameroon even more dependent on foreign capital; the claim of being able to balance its operational budget without outside assistance was last made justifiably in 1986.

This political, cultural and economic picture is very similar to that painted of Africa in general, and which led the researchers in chapter one to conclude that nation-building as practised for the first twenty-five years and more of independence, has failed. As Hadjor writes, the absence of original institutions of their own has made it impossible for African states to control their own affairs, thus making of the continent the most "dependent on external forces". Yet unless political, cultural, and economic institutions truly relevant to the African peoples are created, genuine progress would remain unattainable. Major decisions concerning the continent would continue to be taken in London, Paris, Washington or Moscow, not Yaounde, Lagos, Addis-Ababa or Nairobi (1987:5).
It is therefore against a background of political centralism and inadequate participation for rural and traditional Cameroon, the marginalisation of its cultural values by the acculturated or Westernised few, and an economy that is neither developed, balanced, nor self-reliant, that we proceed to examine the place of the media - broadcasting most especially, in the process of nation-building.
CHAPTER SIX
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE
AND BROADCASTING IN CAMEROON

INTRODUCTION

In Cameroon broadcasting is and has always been a state monopoly, depending entirely on the authorities in place for its very existence. Whether under the colonial administration between 1940 and 1960, the Ahidjo regime from January 1960 to November 1982, or the present Biya government, the relationship between the state and the broadcast media has stayed basically the same. Throughout the 49 years that broadcasting has existed, those in power have sought total ownership and control of the broadcast media. They have continued to consider such ownership and control as best for the state and their people. For the colonial regime the state was France, and for the Ahidjo and Biya administrations, Cameroon. The laws and regulations in force have always been such that exclude every other form of ownership and control. Unlike some developing countries, Cameroon is one of many where the legislation has never given alternative (Private/mixed) ownership and control the opportunity, if only to prove itself economically, politically or culturally incapable in the 'demanding task of nation-building'. That, in spite of the fact that the constitution guarantees all sorts of freedoms, including those of expression, the press, and enterprise.

This chapter is on the role of broadcasting as defined by the state through history. It deals with how the colonial and post-colonial governments each justified state monopoly, and examines some of the strategies (overt or covert) used by the various regimes to attain the said objective – that of controlling the broadcast media.

I.) BROADCASTING AND THE COLONIAL STATE

Since TV did not make its debut in Cameroon until 20 March 1985, only radio existed during colonisation. Even then, radio did not come into existence until the last twenty years of colonialism; and that was when France needed it for war propaganda purposes. But as early as the 1920s, radio transmission for the general public was already a reality in Europe and America (Hytton, 1983:2-3). However, Cameroon among other African countries
had to wait for a long time for the advent of the radio as a medium for mass communication. Between 1940 and 1942 the first radio station was opened in francophone Cameroon at the littoral city of Douala. The French state did not intend it for Cameroonians as such, but to keep the French community informed about World War II, and to serve as a means of French War propaganda (Bebey, 1963:36; Ekaney, 1976:118; Biyiti Bi Essam, 1984:24; Eone, 1986:249-50; Fonye, 1988:13). Just like many other radio stations opened in Africa in the 1940s the aim was the same with Radio Douala: to serve the exclusive interests of the colonists. Thus when the British opened Radio Lusaka in Zambia in 1941, it was "primarily to keep the local population informed of the progress of the war, to stimulate their war effort and to convey orders in the event of grave emergency arising" (Lightfoot, 1965:27).

At the end of 1944 when the war ended, Radio Douala also ceased to broadcast. In the words of its former Director, Deletre, Radio Douala was a "child of war" who died when "war information" ceased to be necessary (Biyiti Bi Essam, 1984:24). When local amateurs decided to reopen it two years later, the French were disinterested enough not to give them the support they needed; so they made all sorts of improvisations in order to sustain an essentially musical station that relayed French music. But when in 1955 the French felt they needed the radio again, probably to contain the rising spirit of nationalism and clamour for independence in the colonial population, they immediately made available the necessary technical facilities (weak though these were) and brought qualified staff from Paris to take charge of radio broadcasting (Bebey, 1963:36-37; RDC report for 1986).

It is worth remarking that in its entire history, the period between 1946 and 1955 was the closest radio came to being privately operated in Cameroon. With the French state disinterested, the amateurs of Radio Douala, keen on making use of the abandoned transmitter and other facilities, were obliged to turn to advertising in order to survive, asking interested local businesses to sponsor the station's programmes, albeit essentially music from France. Through such private funding, these amateurs (who normally had other jobs and who knew little or nothing about radio) were able to put in 2 hours 30 minutes of broadcasting each day. The fact that in July 1963 France signed a convention with the Cameroonian government authorizing the latter to take over the broadcast facilities and personnel it had left behind, is not an indication that France was in favour of private ownership and operation of broadcast institutions. Yet France has often been presented as one of those Western countries that criticise state interference with the media in Africa
...and the Third World. A thesis which Fonye rejects with the argument that, "under French rule broadcasting had no pretensions to autonomy and so made a fairly smooth transition from an arm of French colonialism to being an arm of the new African governments" (1988:3).

In 1955 and 1957/58 two new radio stations were opened in the centre-south and northern cities of Yaounde and Garoua respectively, by La Société de Radio-diffusion de la France d'outre-mer (SORAFOM); which remained in charge of radio broadcasting in the territory even after three years of independence, in accordance with the terms of a convention signed between the new Republique du Cameroun and France in July 1960. Francophone Cameroon had twenty years of radio broadcasting before independence, but this was an entirely urban elitist medium - which for fifteen years was the exclusive privilege of the colonists in Douala and its immediate environs. The networks almost always consisted of low-powered transmitters with barely 1KW to nourish the privileged in the major cities and their immediate environs or 4KW to serve the entire country (Bebey, 1963:154; Ekaney, 1976:118). Colonial radio was a strategic medium to facilitate the task of the French colonists in their wars and against the rising pressure from Cameroonian nationalists militating for independence.

In British Cameroon, radio was much slower at establishing itself. Having decided to administer it as part of a larger colony - Nigeria, the British had little particular interest in providing a separate radio service for the territory. Not until nationalism was at its peak, and Nigeria was about to obtain political independence, did the British consider the future of British Cameroon. Not surprisingly therefore, a recording studio, financed by the Nigerian Government and forming part of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), was constructed in 1957 at West Farm, Buea in the Southern Cameroon. The recording studio which was equipped with mobile recording facilities and two recording cars, produced local programmes that were subsequently flown to Lagos for broadcast (Nkwo, 1975:14-15).

Accordingly, this was a strategy to woo Southern Cameroonians who were used to tuning to then Congo Brazzaville or Congo Leopoldville for "popular Congolese music" (Fonye, 1988:3). A strategy which failed for technical reasons; for although "Southern Cameroons was administered as part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, its people were barely affected by Nigerian broadcasting facilities", mainly "because of weak transmitters" (Nkwo, 1975:14). However, this studio operated until 1961 when it became part of...
Radio Cameroon at the birth of the Federal Republic, and when "A 1kW transmitter was dispatched from Yaounde" to remedy the situation (Fonye, 1988:3). But Radio Buea was to wait for more than a decade to be improved upon.

When we take into consideration the short history of radio in francophone and anglophone colonial Cameroon, its low-powered transmitters (although the colonial powers were capable of installing high-powered transmitters), the languages of broadcast (mainly French and English) that were alien to most of the people, the low incomes of the majority of the population, the alienating contents of the medium, and the circumstances surrounding its creation, it can hardly be said that radio was a mass medium in Cameroon before independence. Communication among the masses remained largely traditional and interpersonal. But how much has the situation changed after independence, under new governments with new priorities?

II.) BROADCASTING AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

A) Broadcast Policies under the Ahidjo Regime (1960 - 1982)

When francophone Cameroon became independent in 1960, France did not automatically give up its ownership and control of the radio, which continued to be operated and managed directly from Paris by SORAFOM. On 1 July 1963 however, a new convention was signed with France, whereby the Federal government of Cameroon was formally allowed to take over ownership and control of radio, its personnel and equipment, on condition that France will continue to provide technical assistance, especially through OCORA (new name for SORAFOM) (Ahidjo, 1980:305). But once in power, Ahidjo was quick to see the importance of the media in general, and radio in particular towards the attainment of his government's objective.

"Nation-building", he declared in 1964, is "our supreme mission"; so important a mission that he was absolutely convinced Cameroon could not attain it outside the stability of a presidential regime (Ahidjo, 1964:24-5), or the dynamism of his party, the CNU, which he described as "the union of all Cameroonians without any exclusion whatsoever" (Ahidjo, 1964:28). Nation-building which entails socio-economic, political and cultural development, remained a most recurrent theme in Ahidjo's writings and declarations until he left power in 1982. As we are going to see with reference to radio, he never missed an opportunity to stress its importance, and the obligations of all Cameroonians towards its attainment.
The following review of his speeches on the role of information, and the need to use radio and other media for mass mobilization and education of the population, provides a further insight to his idea of 'Nation-building', 'Development' and 'Participation'. His declarations as well as subsequent statements by Biya, could rightly be considered as the information policy of the state under each of them. This is all the more reasonable since one seldom finds any other statements on information or general matters of policy in any area of national life independent of declarations by the President or echoes of these by other members of government and the party.

As the President of an 'emerging nation state' and as a keen disciple of Western prescriptions for the problems of development in Africa, Ahidjo and his government had important political, economic and social tasks to undertake; tasks in which the media were expected to play the leading role prescribed by Lerner (1964), Schramm (1964), Deutsch (1966), Gellner (1983) and other modernisation theorists. The radio in particular, by virtue of the broadness of its appeal, was singled out for the mobilization of the population - both rural and urban, through mass education and information, with the aim of consolidating the national personality and cohesion. As early as 1962 President Ahidjo saw the need to replace or enhance the low-powered colonial transmitters, in view of making radio signals accessible to a wider audience. As chapter eight reveals, subsequent stations were opened and more powerful transmitters installed during his presidency, all with the aim of making the radio translate the national life in all its forms, the evolution of the institutions, technics, and ways of life, and to stimulate the population and its adhesion to the communal effort (see RDC report for 1986).

Speaking during his inauguration of the new 30KW transmitter of Radio Yaounde on 29 May 1962, President Ahidjo was unequivocal about the role he wanted radio to play:

... radio is not an exclusive medium. It is necessary for us to reach the entire population and take the voice of the government to the remotest regions, we must ... conjugate the resources of the spoken and the written. [...] The absence or the insufficiency of information leads to the passivity of the individual. This passivity, we cannot accept at the time when the task of national edification demands the collaboration of all and sundry.

I presume ... that it is primordial to keep the populations of the federation in general and most particularly informed of the efforts deployed by the government to attain the goal which it has assigned itself: the making of the Cameroonian nation (Ahidjo, 1980:185). [translation mine]
Thanks to quality information provided by the radio, President Ahidjo continued, the citizen will be able to cultivate his faculties, increase his knowledge, and nourish his intellectual curiosity. The citizen would above all, become aware of the Cameroonian realities, aware of himself as part of a nation, and aware of his duties to the state. Cameroonian throughout the territory would know one another better, when information circulates faster and more abundantly. Thanks to such information, each Cameroonian will understand the role he must play in the economic and political life of the country. And thanks yet to information, the citizen will constantly be conscious of the fact that he must participate in the building of a better future. He will know that his work does not benefit him and his children alone, but that it is also beneficial to the entire fatherland, and that the destiny of Cameroonian is inseparable from the destiny of Cameroon. For it is only when the people are seriously and profoundly informed that they are better able to play their role within a democracy. Inversely, the degree of maturity of a democracy is measured by the quality of information dispensed by its press and its radios (Ahidjo, 1980:185).

A year later, while inaugurating another 30KW transmitter in Garoua on 23 July 1963, President Ahidjo reiterated the special interest his government had for the national radio and for increasing its potential within the framework of the country’s development plan for information. The fact that radio could be used with flexibility, and that it possessed great possibilities of being adapted to suit different audiences, allowed for the sensitisation of the audiences by appropriate broadcasts and programmes. An aspect which was particularly relevant to Cameroon whose federal nature, differences in colonial heritage, and ethnic diversity constituted a real field of experience. It was with this linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity in mind, that Cameroon had opted for a radio network instead of a single highly powerful transmitter with multiple programmes and overcharged schedules. In its capacity as a provincial station, Ahidjo pointed out, Radio Garoua had the essential task of conceiving programmes well adapted to local needs, and participating most effectively in the communal tasks of nation-building (Ahidjo, 1980:303).

Four years afterwards on 3 June 1967, Ahidjo went to West-Cameroon (formerly, Southern Cameroon) to inaugurate the new transmitter centre of Radio Buea. There, as if paraphrasing Schramm (1964) or Lerner (1964, 1977) on the role of the media in the transformation of ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’ societies and in the creation of ‘empathy’ for ‘modern’ values in ‘tribal’
people, he had this to say:

The contribution each of us makes to the sacred task of nation-building is necessarily in relation with his training, by this I mean with his preparation to play his role as citizen, his ability to understand the problems that face the nation and the solutions which these problems call for.

To give to all the men and women of this country all the possible chances to accomplish themselves, to become aware and efficacious citizens, is in consequence one of the major preoccupations of the government. In brief, this is about the transformation of mentalities, this transormation of mentalities whose decisive impact on the best development programmes, economists and experience show from day to day. Development, in effect, does not come about without the disruption of structures, habits, traditions and values. Men must be prepared to accept these disruptions to avoid these structures, habits, traditional values becoming, in the case where they can be in contradiction with new exigences, constraints, obstacles to progress.

In the present circumstances, what other instrument better than the Radio can assure these essential tasks the failure of which to succeed there would be no harmonious development of the Cameroon society? (Ahidjo, 1980:768). [translation mine]

Again he stressed what he first stated five years back: His government expected RDC in general and Radio Buea in particular, to help in mobilizing the energy and goodwill indispensable for the success of the national development enterprise that was the goal of his government. It was the place of the radio to mobilize the people for nation-building, prepare them mentally for the changes which accompany development, and reinforce national unity. For there was no doubt that information certainly made it possible for the different regions of Cameroon, a country whom history had bestowed with a rich diversity, to better understand themselves, to determine their collective aspirations under the guidance of the party and the government; in short, "to become aware of what united them, and to further consolidate national unity and the stability of institutions, essential conditions for the survival of our young nation and of its harmonious development in a world of turmoil and in an Africa that is shaken by crises of growth" (Ahidjo, 1980:768).

Two years later in an address to the CNU party congress in Garoua on 10 March 1969, he came back to the same issue and made a statement that has become a cliché amongst government officials and media practitioners. In fact, the role assigned broadcasting and other media in the statute of the Ministry of Information and Culture following its November 1978 reorganisation, is a mere reproduction of all what Ahidjo said at the congress, which again, is
nothing different from his previous statements since 1962. The famous maxim was that the media are supposed to "inform and educate within; expose and persuade without." To him, the media's task was threefold: Inform, Educate, Entertain. These words and the maxim were repeated by broadcast practitioners and administrators, whenever I asked what the country's broadcasting or information policy was. Everyone interviewed acknowledged the absence of a blueprint, but repeated the above statements whose very vagueness is a constant dilemma to many.

Concerning information, the essential objective is: "to open bit by bit the minds to a just understanding of the problems of the modern world and to the joy of an authentic national culture; [and] ... to develop in our compatriots an awareness that is as clear as possible of the role which everyone can and must play in nation-building" (Ahidjo, 1980:918). In order to achieve the animation of the masses, and to make them participate more actively and more closely in the management of communal affairs, it was important for government officials and media practitioners to work in harmony. Only through such collaboration, could national unity be best consolidated, and Cameroon's social democracy best reinforced.

Ahidjo explained what he meant by 'animation'. It did not mean 'to amuse', for Cameroonians were too geared towards their economic and social development to have any time for amusement. "To animate the population of Cameroon did not mean "making them dance" either. Rather, it meant, "to furnish them with programmes, articles and films adapted to the necessities of our development, to explain our actions to them, in order to obtain their active participation in nation-building." It was to such an exalting task that he was inviting officials and technicians concerned with the media. He promised the media practitioners the total support and confidence of his administration, and assured them that thenceforth the Ministry of Information and Culture would be associated with the activities of the different departments, with the aim of properly mobilizing the media institutions in charge of the information and education of the masses. Then he promised them all the resources needed to achieve their mission (Ahidjo, 1980:919-20).

Regarding propaganda abroad, Ahidjo explained: since Cameroon's development depended heavily on foreign aid, it was important for the media to assume an active persuasive role in this direction. It was the place of the media to expose honestly, the multiple factors of progress in Cameroon; to explain the reasons for the government's policies and to persuade on the
The final speech under examination, is one President Ahidjo made while inaugurating the Radio house and production centre of the Bertoua Station on 13 December 1978. This particular speech which came barely a month after the reorganisation of the Ministry of Information and Culture, and four years before he left power, is important in that it summarises all he ever said on the issue, and stresses more than ever before the idea of "responsibility" in broadcasting; an idea which was to be used more often by President Biya and his New Deal Ministers of Information and Culture. The speech could be summarised as follows:

The Bertoua Radio station, said President Ahidjo, was going to unite the East Province with the rest of the country, stop the people from tuning to foreign stations in a desperate quest for information, and reinforce and consolidate national unity. This would be in line with the mission of Radio Cameroon as a whole, which remained that of informing the citizens on what went on in Cameroon, as well as elsewhere, in view of promoting and intensifying the links of solidarity amongst them on the one hand, and between the people of Cameroon and other peoples of the world on the other. However, this information mission had to be carried out "in a spirit of responsibility", in a way that relates the facts in an objective manner, thus permitting everyone to better appreciate and with full awareness make their contribution to the common task of nation-building." By responsible broadcasting, Ahidjo implied "the rejection of the sensational and the spreading of unconfirmed news that risks misleading" (Ahidjo, 1980:2130-31).

He also reiterated the role of radio as an educative and entertaining medium. On education, he expected radio to contribute through appropriate programmes, towards raising the national conscience of the citizens and towards their sense of responsibility and duty to themselves, their families and the nation. It was radio's place to provide for "the growth of knowledge of the citizens in view of making them active agents of development within the perspective of our fundamental philosophy of
self-reliant development which is, surely, development for the people, but also and above all by the people who must, I never stop repeating, by their determined efforts and assiduous work, take charge of their own progress. Finally, radio had to make its programmes attractive enough to be entertaining, so as to be able to contribute to the spiritual and moral enrichment of the individual. Then he urged the broadcast practitioners, technicians and auxiliary staff to work as a team and in an atmosphere of collaboration and healthy competition, in order to best realise these goals. For "More than all other state agents, they must show proof of their sense of responsibility and professional consciousness" (Ahidjo, 1980:2131).

I have postponed the critical examination of Ahidjo’s broadcasting policies until after the presentation of President Biya’s, because little or nothing has changed in the regulation of broadcasting. Although Law No 87/020 of December 1987 created the Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV) with some amount of financial autonomy, the ownership, control and regulation, of broadcasting is still done in the name of the state by the government in place, and through the very same Ministry of Information and Culture as under Ahidjo. If only for this reason, the policies of the two regimes merit being examined together.

B) Broadcasting Policies under President Biya (November 1982 - )

When President Biya came to power in November 1982, he was not satisfied with the Cameroonian society he took over. He found that freedom and democracy were rare, injustice and corruption widespread, and that the party and state had lost the confidence of the people. Leaders and directors of national institutions had become detached from those they claimed to serve, using the name of the state to fight for private interests. That, President Biya did not like, and sought to bring credibility back to the institutions of government and public life. His immediate concern was to reassure Cameroonians "that they need not go underground or into exile or desert their families to be able to express their opinions" (CPDM, 1985:35); an alternative which by implication, Cameroonians had been forced to take in the past. During visits within and outside the country, he invited Cameroonians of all political and ideological leanings to join him in moulding a new Cameroon. Describing himself as one without claim to "any monopoly over speech, reason, feeling or patriotism", he made his aim clear at the Bamenda CNU party congress: To bring about "a more open, more free, more responsible society, a society that is more just and hence, a more pleasant society" — a "New Deal" society (CPDM, 1985:19).
To achieve this objective President Biya, his party and government adopted the principles of "rigour and moralization": He centred his action around "rigour in management, moralization of behaviour, liberalization and democratization of public life and self-reliant and self-sustaining economic, social and cultural development which is accelerated and improved under a new style and a new dynamism" (CPDM, 1985:45). By rigour in management, he meant the sound and proper conduction of state affairs and nation-building; the sort of management that sought to avoid any wastage, to economize resources, streamline procedures and save time. Such management that is "geared towards efficiency, greater output and profitability and is more liberal in the rendering of services." That was Biya's idea of Public Service; a service which while doing all it can to "bring the administration closer to the people, ... should avoid excessive centralization which, under the pretext of ensuring the necessary controls, can only further burden the system, slow down the action and reduce the level of service"; thus only making the people more frustrated, and further portraying the civil servants to be irresponsible, "albeit involuntarily" (CPDM, 1985:43).

Like Ahidjo his predecessor, President Biya had a special place for the media in his agenda from the outset; and just like the former, he has continued to reiterate the role of the media in his subsequent declarations, speeches and publications. As is to be expected, the French word "Presse" is often used by the President and his collaborators to mean both the print and the broadcast media. However, this poses no fundamental problem as both presidents expected the print and broadcast media to make similar contributions to nation-building. Thus what Biya says in the following instances about the "Press" or the "Media" is no less true for broadcasting as it is for the print media.

One of President Biya's first systematic statements on the role of the media came during an interview with Cameroon Tribune on 6 July 1984, in which he defined the place of the media in the era of the New Deal:

In the context of the New Deal, the role of the Cameroonian press, within, must be to contribute to the emancipation and the fulfillment of the Cameroonian, to make it possible for him to live his freedom as a true citizen, conscious of his political, civic and social responsibilities. The Cameroonian press would have succeeded in its mission if it shows itself capable of stimulating creativity and participation, speeding up the emergence of the national culture rich and proud of its diversities, promoting an economic activity that is source of prosperity and solidarity. The Cameroonian press shall equally have succeeded in its mission if it proves itself capable of galvanising the feeling of brotherhood within the framework of national values as well as that of order
and the legality but also that of the property and rights of others." [And concerning the outside world, the Press was expected] "to make our voice heard within the concert of nations of the world, to bear witness to our presence and active participation in the elaboration of a new universal order and to contribute towards giving Cameroon a better image" (Ndongo, 1985:29). [translation mine]

Biya used the Bamenda CRU party congress of 1985 to remind the media of their responsibilities towards the state and the people of Cameroon. Convinced that "a well-informed citizen is necessarily better enlightened about the actual life of his environment", and that such a citizen "is also more aware of the major stakes in national development, more conversant in his behaviour and better capable of performing his duties to the Nation," President Biya urged the media to animate, orientate and control the national development effort. For information, above everything else, provides the people with the "additional moral and intellectual arms in the performance of their tasks." He made it clear that the duty to disseminate information aimed at fostering nation-building was not limited to the official media alone; the private media were just as involved. He hailed "the new dynamic spirit of the private press whose numerous and varied titles have come, encouraged by liberalization, to supplement the efforts of the official press" (CPDM, 1985:31).

President Biya is convinced that his administration has brought about greater media freedom. In his speeches and interviews, and in the speeches of his various Ministers of Information and Culture (François Sengat Kuo, Prof. George Ngango, and Ibrahim Mbonbo Mjoya, in that order), one is given the impression that there has certainly been some opening up; and that the winds of freedom and liberalisation have left a great impact on the media. Quite a number of media practitioners tend to think in a similar manner. If greater freedom is seen to mean that more newspapers or publications are allowed to circulate now than before (Nga Ndongo, 1987), it could well be true what they claim; but if on the other hand, they mean freedom to determine content, to participate in, or to own and control any medium of one's choice and interest, there is little evidence of such freedom in the Cameroonian media. For even if they were right that the media are freer today, this freedom is not institutionalised; it has no legal underpinnings. The repressive press laws of 1959 and 1966 (Bayart, 1973; Fonye, 1973; Vongo, 1977; Ndogo, 1980; Mytton, 1983; Nga Ndongo, 1987) have not been repealed (Tataw, 1984; Nji, 1985; Lukong, 1987; Vongibe, 1987); and journalists are still subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.
However, during the Bamenda Congress, President Biya expressed the hope that the "favourable abundance of information media" which came about as a result of his 'Glasnost' would not be abused by media practitioners. Rather, he expected them to "use the freedom of speech thus regained with an acute sense of responsibility and exercise it in the best interest of the emancipation and development of the Cameroonian people." He and his administration were in "support of any medium of expression that is capable of stimulating creativity and participation and channelling the emergence of a national culture that constantly derives its wealth from its diversity"; as well as in any "medium capable of promoting an economic activity that would serve as a source of prosperity and solidarity" (CPDM, 1985:31-2).

While appreciating the part each medium could play in bringing about national integration, he saw the coming of television in 1985 as particularly timely, and suited for the task:

This is therefore a particularly good opportunity for us to hail the advent of national television which translates into concrete terms our ambition to become modern. There is no doubt that it will more appreciably consolidate the basis of our ideals of stringency and moral rectitude, liberalization and democratization, further testifying to our efforts to build our country in unity, freedom and social justice. It will also demonstrate our love for peace and our determination to cooperate with all nations in the world in ensuring respect for human rights, our identity and our national sovereignty (CPDM, 1985:32).

He concluded with the hope that

... by using as much as possible the high dissemination techniques now available, our information and propaganda media would increasingly help to make the message of unity, fraternity and peace of our great national Party heard, shared and hearkened to both in Cameroon and abroad (CPDM, 1985:32).

The above, in brief, is Biya's information policy, which is as true for broadcasting as it is for the print media. Further declarations such as his televised interview with Eric Chinje of CTV in February 1987, are commented on in the section that follows. Lots of statements and speeches have been made by his different Ministers of Information and Culture, but most often, they are paraphrasing him, and saying basically nothing new. (Ibrahim Nkomo Njoha's 1987 and 1988 New Year addresses to his staff, are cases in point.) In Cameroon the President decides what direction to take, which everyone else follows; he makes policy through his speeches, not through Parliament. Apart from these speeches, very little else is written down or published, that could serve as source of inspiration for aspiring media professionals or for researchers.
In our examination of Ahidjo's broadcasting policies, we remarked that from 1962 to 1978 his message to the media remained invariably the same - the mobilization of the masses for national unity and development through a faithful interpretation of government's policies and actions. The same is true for Biya, who came to power in November 1982 with an appeal to the media to help in the destruction of the old order, then to contribute towards the consolidation of his New Deal by mobilizing the masses for national unity and integration. In the light of the failures noted for Africa in chapter one, and for Cameroon in chapter five, one may well ask how long it takes to build a 'modern' nation, to become developed, united or nationally integrated? Or how much repetition the broadcast practitioners need before they can understand the role government expects them to play? How long does it take to eradicate injustice and corruption, or to tell the media how to help towards this?

It would appear that the former President of the National Assembly Solomon Tandeng Muna, was preoccupied with these same questions when he made his last but one address in parliament on 15 March 1988. Talking about the just created CRTV, he reminded the members of the Board of Directors, the Directorate General and all the staff of its different services of "the high expectations of the Cameroon public". "Yes, the Nation really expects much from C.R.T.V.1.", he stressed. It was the desire of the government and the people of Cameroon to have Radio and TV carry out an effective campaign

... against the subversion of our social norms, and our economy through a reckless quest for ill-gotten wealth, embezzlement of public funds, corruption, wastage, and poor maintenance of equipment and public buildings. The Radio and Television must carry out this crusade with a high sense of objectivity and responsibility. And they must at the same time cultivate and inculcate those high spiritual values that gave birth to the principles of rigour, integrity and moralization.

Considering how much hard-earned money the Cameroon tax-payer invests in the information media of our country, the population expects to see the Official media reflect the fact that we are a developing country and that we need to take the best care of Radio, Television and other equipment, and make the best use of these media by giving more time on these networks to creative education, to inspiring information, and to cultural programmes that are specially designed to inspire creativity and inculcate a genuine passion for excellence.

As I indicated last December, the population wants to see cultural and social integration programmes which have healthy depth, programmes which foster socio-economic progress, and programmes that embrace the entire nation. And this can best be done where there is a National Cultural Orientation Commission which should take full note of the goals and objectives of the Nation within a changing world, so as to spell out the responsibilities of the media in furthering the national and higher
interests of all (Muna, speech, 15 March 1988:A/7-B/1).

Muna's speech is more than just another prescription by another prominent member of government or the party. It is different from any of Biya's or Ahidjo's in that it also looks at the media from the point of view of the people of Cameroon. He is aware of the fact that Cameroonians equally have their expectations of the broadcast media, and that they are not there, simply to imbibe all that these media take to them from the government. It is the first time in a public statement on the broadcast media, that the people are seen as capable of having a say. So Muna's speech is an implicit recognition of the fact that the media are there to serve both the people and the government.

Only when seen in this light can his call for a National Cultural Orientation Commission be given its true importance. He blames past failures by the broadcast media to satisfy the Cameroonian public on the lack of such a commission, that is capable of objectively defining and seeing to it that national broadcasting policies are effectively carried out. Yet, if the media are there to serve both the government and the governed, there is most certainly the need for policies to be defined by a recognisably independent body; and not by presidential speeches and declarations as has so far been the case. That is why Muna's speech can be considered revolutionary; one that if followed, could make broadcasting independent of government, without necessarily being independent of state. An example of such a system would be the BBC (Schlesinger, 1978:166; Williams, 1979:267; Curran, 1988:300; Seaton, 1988:263-72), where government's influence of policy is at best indirect and long term, and where broadcast practitioners consider themselves to be directly responsible to "the public" or "nation".

It is worth noting before the next section that, in a highly centralised political system where many beautiful statements are made by members of government in the name of the state, it becomes extremely difficult

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1 Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, in his speech on Wednesday 25 November 1987 at the Conference Centre, during the graduation ceremony of the second batch of Broadcast Technicians trained in Yaounde, did express the wish for broadcasters to take into consideration the needs and expectations of the Cameroonian people, at the same time as they strove to faithfully interpret and explain government policy and action. But he failed to see that the expectations of government are not always harmonious with those of the governed, especially when he sees nothing wrong with having the state's Information policies and goals defined exclusively by the President of the Republic - as is evident in his 1987 New Year address to his staff.
to criticise individuals without being seen to be criticising the state as well. But when such criticism comes from a member of the government or from another government, it is something to be capitalised upon, to be used by researchers to make a point; for it is not always that governments are criticised in public in Africa (Goulbourne, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Hadjor, 1987). There is a difference between the 'formal' and 'real' state. The first is the state in whose name all the beautiful statements and declarations of intent are made, whereas the real state is actually the one in whose interest actions, which are not always in conformity with declared intentions, are undertaken.

Thus, President Paul Biya's criticism of the lack of democracy and freedom, the suppression of information, and the widespread injustices and corruption in the Ahidjo era, is of great significance to Cameroonians and researchers, in that it calls for greater awareness and for the need to avoid treating declarations of intent as 'fait accompli'. In a highly centralised presidentialist system (Goulbourne, 1987:30-3; Dunn, 1978b:211-16; Medard, 1978; Bayart, 1980, 1985:141-82; Etonga, 1980) such as Cameroon, only another President or government, would have pointed out Ahidjo's weaknesses without the risk of being branded a "subversive to the state". Coming from President Biya, who held several positions under Ahidjo, including the post of Prime Minister, such criticism confirms that in Cameroon, in spite of official declarations, the interests and goals of a government (the real state) are not always compatible with those of the formal state or the rest of society.

C) A Critical Appraisal of Media policies under Ahidjo and Biya

Despite the absence of publications on communication policies, it has been possible through an examination of the public statements of Presidents Ahidjo and Biya, to know their expectations of the media. Apart from the statute of the Ministry of Information and Culture following its 1978 reorganisation, Cameroonians and researchers alike must follow with keen interest the public statements of the President and his Minister of Information and Culture, to know what direction the government is heading. However, as Unesco has pointed out, communication policies do not always exist in writing or in an organised form:

Communication policies exist in every society, though they may sometimes be latent and disjointed, rather than clearly articulated and harmonized. They may be very general, in the nature of desirable goals and principles, or they may be more specific and practically binding. They may exist or be formulated at many levels. They may be incorporated in the constitution or legislation of a country; in over-all national policies, in the guidelines for individual administrations, in professional codes of ethics as well as in the constitutions and operational rules of particular
Ideally, still according to Unesco (1974:5), Cameroon’s information or broadcasting policy, would comprise those sets of principles and norms which have been shaped over time in the context of its general approach to information or the broadcast media, that are established to guide the behaviour of its broadcast system. They emanate from its political ideologies, social and economic conditions, and values, and strive to relate all these to the real needs for and the prospective opportunities of broadcasting.

Until 26 April 1986 when CTV became a corporation, broadcasting was a department directly under the Ministry of Information and Culture. While CTV enjoyed some financial and relative administrative autonomy for twenty months (even carrying out its own advertising to supplement its revenue), RDC remained entirely dependent on the Ministry until the creation of CRTV in December 1987. But as mentioned earlier, even though the broadcast institutions thenceforth are free to draw up an independent budget of their own, and send it directly to the Presidency for approval, they still remain

During the period of fieldwork, advertisement at RDC was done through the state agency Cameroon Publi-Expansion (CPE), and the revenue paid directly into the state Treasury, not to RDC. However, RDC receives a lot in the form of advertisement revenue; in fact the amount is constantly increasing: From 132,147,594 in 1976 to 325,000,000 F CFA (estimate) in 1983 (Eone, 1986:204). Still according to Eone (1986:203), in principle a licence fee of 1500 F CFA is paid by everyone who owns a radio set. But in practice the collection of this licence fee which incidentally dates back to 1958, is inefficient, and does not always reflect a true picture of the total number of people with sets. None of the money collected as licence fee or as advertisement revenue is used directly in running RDC, which has all along been budgeted for in the general annual budget of the Ministry of Information and Culture.

RDC has long criticised its relationship with CPE, but has sought in vain to conduct its own advertising. On its part, CTV refused to have anything to do with CPE from the outset, deciding to conduct its own advertising instead. Mr Kapche of the finance control department of CTV, provided the following figures: Because advertising on TV did not start before August 1986, the revenue for the 1986/87 financial year was only 60,000,000 F CFA. But since July 1987, that is to say, for six months, CTV realised the sum of 180,000,000 F CFA from advertising.

He expected these figures to rise even further for the financial year which started in July 1988, especially as more and more Cameroonians were becoming aware of the importance of publicity. But there are some people who claim that the advertisement revenue would have been much higher for the preceding period, was there enough accountability in CTV. Under CRTV however, the whole advertisement department has been restructured, and from the bitter complaints made by RDC staff about CPE, CRTV is very unlikely to let the latter play any further part in its advertising.
under the control, be it indirect, of the Minister of Information and Culture - in his double capacity as Minister and chairman of the Board of Directors of CRTV. But despite the recent structural changes, the role of the media remains more or less as examined above.

We have seen that today as in the past, the broadcast media have the task of implementing government policies. They have to ensure that national unity and/or integration is/are consolidated, and that Cameroon develops economically, socially and culturally. To succeed in this, uniformity and conformity are expected from the media and cultural organisations of every nature and origin. Despite their statements to the contrary, when pursued to its logical conclusion, the argument tabled by Ahidjo and Biya is the same: that one cannot afford fundamental differences of opinion and options in a society that is not only underdeveloped, but also divided culturally and linguistically.

Like their counterparts elsewhere in Africa (Wallerstein, 1964:168-9, 1968:3-22; Smith, 1983:128-31; Dunn, 1978b:211-16; Goulbourne, 1987:35), both leaders have seen political unity as a precondition for socio-economic development and the renaissance or reaffirmation of the ‘Cameroonian cultural personality’. But as Goulbourne points out of Africa in general, such unity has merely been imposed "from above through ... repressive state institutions", and has excluded the very democracy and popular participation vital to "genuine nationbuilding" (1987:35). In Cameroon, instead of leading to the creation of genuine social, economic and political institutions, such imposed unity has only succeeded in creating "pseudo-institutions" that hinder "the process of integration" (Medard, 1978:37-9).

The basic reasoning behind Ahidjo’s and Biya’s assumption is that being "Africa in Miniature" (as the country is often referred to), Cameroon has as many differences as it does similarities; but in order to make development possible, the similarities must be stressed while the differences are ignored. But the best way to solve a problem is not by pretending the problem does not exist; rather, it is by diagnosing the problem and eliminating its root causes. Any other solution can but be a temporary measure which if prolonged, can only exacerbate the issue. Eone (1986:220) thinks the government’s preoccupation with development media is nothing but an alibi that masks a much deeper concern by the state to reaffirm and consolidate its authority, even to the detriment of individual liberties. Thus instead of
tackling the "real and substantial differences" (Goulbourne, 1987:35) of the society, successive Cameroonian governments have preferred to hide them, and have opted for a repressive centralised state in their pursuit of the "Western mirage" (Smith, 1986:230) called 'nation-state'.

In Cameroon, the Ministry of Information and Culture is the official watchdog against all the forces that would rather exploit the country's differences; or those who stick so much to the belief that there is more than one way of achieving national unity, integration and development. Former Minister of Information and Culture under President Biya, Prof. George Ngango told his staff during a Seminar that he would not tolerate the misappropriation of the media by "those who fish in troubled waters, who only speak of diversity in order to hinder our march towards independence" (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 2/10/1985). To succeed in its task to unify the political, the social, the cultural and the economic, the government has sought either direct ownership and control of the media, or indirect control through rigid laws and repressive strategies devised to make the private media conform. In his report on broadcasting and information in Cameroon, presented to the Minister in 1980, Tchienehom (1980:13) accused the Ministry of Information and Culture of being more eager to play the police than to encourage creativity amongst media professionals.

Since broadcasting has always been a state monopoly under the government's direct supervision, the authorities have few problems ensuring that their policies are rigorously adhered to. It is forbidden by law for any individual or group of persons to own and operate a radio or television network; there is a heavy fine, imprisonment or both for whoever questions the state monopoly by creating private broadcasting stations (See Law No 78/496 of November 1978, presidential ordonnance No 86/001 of April 1986, Law No 87/019 of 17 December 1987, Law No 87/020 of 17 December, and Decree No 88/126 of 25 January 1988). The importance government attaches to broadcasting is apparent from the way it is made part of the Ministry of Information and Culture, even as a corporation which ought to enjoy total financial and administrative autonomy. Administrators, journalists, producers and other employees of the broadcast institutions, are civil servants who naturally, must pay total allegiance to the government that employs and dismisses in the name of the state.

As President Biya said in his February 1987 interview with Eric Chinje of CTV, if journalists and other civil servants "absolutely insist on
total freedom, they are not obliged to remain in public office. But if they do stay, they must accept the post's obligations and constraints (AfricaAsia, No 41, 1987:29). (Some journalists were certainly mistaking the freedom to criticize Ahidjo and the old order, for "total freedom".) Of course, the argument that paying allegiance to the government is the same as doing so to the state and the public whose interests are the government's duty to protect, can always be evoked. But when the government also claims to know these interests better than the people it is there to serve, the argument ceases to pull any weight.

However, with a unified party whose chairman is Head of State and Head of government, one must confess that it becomes very difficult to distinguish among the government, the party and the state. The state can be embodied in a single individual (Medard, 1978; Goulbourne, 1987), whose dictatorial or authoritarian ways exclude the popular democratic participation essential for nation-building. The fact that RDC and CTV broadcasters talk more of "the government's airwaves" than "the state's airwaves", is an indication of how far as they are concerned, the distinction between state and government is more in theory than in practice. Shasha Ndimbie, like all the other broadcasters interviewed, recognises that in Cameroon as elsewhere in Africa,

... the government is the state, and the government can make or break the state; they can choose to represent the people, who are in effect the state, or they can choose not to. So in any case the two are interlocking, one becomes the other, and so on. There is not really any difference; maybe administratively and legislatively there is a difference, but in practice, all is the same (Shasha E. Ndimbie, interviewed, 25/2/88).

Despite President Biya's attempts to bring out the contradictions between statement and practice in his predecessor, he has not exactly avoided making the same presumptions either.

Like Fonye (1988), Tchienehom (1980) and Bone (1986) see in the monopolisation of broadcasting by the Cameroonian state a powerful French colonial heritage. The French established radio in Cameroon that was totally under the control of the colonial administrators, in the same way that the broadcast media in France were the exclusive affair of the French state. Accordingly, Cameroon inherited the French system of centralisation and monopolisation by the state of all broadcasting activities (Tchienehom, 1980:23; Bone, 1986:250). An understanding of the relationship between the state and the media in metropolitan France therefore, offers an indispensable framework for a better understanding of the Cameroonian situation.
As William (1979) remarked in chapter two, monopolisation of broadcasting by the state could lead to all sorts of complications in a multiparty state such as France. Although France has carried out "a rapid and confused process of deregulation which has led to an explosion in the number of radio and television networks" in the country (Betts, 1988:3), the tradition in the past has been for every government that comes to power, to seek total control of broadcasting by placing its own people at the head of the broadcast institutions. Accordingly, there have been ten regulatory structures since World War II, each replacing the other to reflect changes in the political arena. Betts describes the nature of the struggles by various governments to control broadcasting in France, and uses Mitterand and Chirac as examples.

According to Betts (1988:3), the tradition after every general election in France has been for "heads to roll" in the broadcasting sector - "with the new government appointing its supporters and friends to the key jobs". Thus following the 1981 elections, the victorious Socialists not only "placed their cronies at the head of the public networks", but also reformed the broadcasting authority in order to secure the necessary influence over the regulation of broadcasting. The Socialists were "anxious to ensure that the right would find it hard to regain control of the broadcasting sector when it came back to power". To do this, they decided to emulate Britain whose public service broadcasting is "flanked by a private sector".

The Socialists then proceeded "to create two new private commercial networks and one private pay television channel to compete against the existing three public television networks". But as Betts points out,

The dice were heavily loaded in favour of Socialist supporters in the allocation of the new private network concessions. The pay television channel Canal Plus was launched by Mr André Roussillette, a personal friend of President Mitterrand. The new fifth channel, La Cinq, went to a partnership between Mr Jerome Seydoux, also regarded as a friend of the left, and Mr Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian television magnate. The third new private network was launched as a specialised music channel with no real political affiliation (Betts, 1988:3).

However, immediately the right came back to power after the 1986 elections,

Mr Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist Prime Minister, set about dismantling the broadcasting structure set up by the Socialists. The heads of the public networks were replaced and the concessions granted to the new private channel operators were cancelled. The broadcasting authority was replaced by a new Commission Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés (CNCL), a supposedly
independent body dominated by Gaullist representatives.

The highly successful Canal Plus pay television network was treated as a case apart and left alone, the concession for La Cinq was given to Mr Robert Hersant, the right-wing French press baron owner of Le Figaro Newspaper, and the music channel came under the control of the Lyonnaise des Eaux water distribution group and the Luxembourg RTL broadcasting group and transformed it into a new general programme private commercial network called M6 (Betts, 1988:3).

Prime Minister Chirac did not stop at that, but proceeded to the privatisation of TF-1, France's "oldest and most influential network". Thus scoring a further political victory over the Socialists, who favour nationalisation and more central control.

This struggle speaks for itself; it brings out the demerits of excessive central control, and clearly points out how governments might use their positions as custodians of the public interest, to secure and consolidate power for themselves and their supporters. Unlike Cameroon, the situation in France is chaotic because of the plurality of political parties, and the differences in their policies. But like Cameroon, French broadcasting is heavily controlled and influenced by the government of the day. A broadcast system that is free of excessive government intervention or of control by big business, is the most likely guarantor of public interest (de Sola Pool, 1977:32; Williams, 1979:266-7; Aggarwala, 1985:50-1; Adkins, 1985:55; Rando, 1986:39).

It is important to remark that today, certain Western countries often criticise state ownership, interference with, or control of the media in Africa, as if this was not the way these institutions were operated during the colonial era, or, as if contemporary Western states are totally free of similar tendencies. The argument here is that centralisation and state monopoly in colonial France was directly responsible for a similar state of affairs in at least, the immediate post-independence Cameroon. Of course, as we saw in chapter one, the colonists had succeeded in establishing themselves as the standards by which the newly independent African countries had to measure their political, economic, cultural and social development.

In conclusion, the Cameroon government has national unity/integration and development as its main objectives. The former is essential in order to achieve the latter which is necessary to ensure higher standards of living for Cameroonians. The government equally believes the media have a major part to play in the attainment of these objectives. But it
believes that the best way the media can contribute is through a faithful interpretation and dissemination of government policies; policies which, thanks to Biya's criticism of Ahidjo, are not always pursued with the best interests of Cameroonians in mind. Given that the government does not always act in the interest of the formal state and people of Cameroon, is it not presumptuous of anybody to expect the media to faithfully and uncritically do whatever the government expects them to do in the name of the state? In other words, can the media be totally loyal to the government and to the people of Cameroon, at the same time? If not, what are the strategies employed by the government to have its way with the media, willy-nilly? These questions are examined in detail in part III.

There is no evidence that the broadcast media in particular have any choice with the government. Be it under Biya or Ahidjo, the government has always claimed to know the interests of the state better than the people they are supposed to represent. The message to the media has always been that of explaining government's actions and policies to the people; but not once in any of their speeches, has it been a question of explaining to the government what the people's real needs and aspirations are. The assumption has been that the people are ignorant and need information, that they need to be educated on how to transform their 'constrictive' mentalities, traditions or ways, and to be mobilised and set firmly behind the government's programme of change or modernisation. But it has hardly been a question of the government listening to the people in turn.

Under President Biya, the media have the "role of animation, of orientation and of control of the national development effort" (quoted in Eone, 1986:208). Under President Ahidjo, the media were expected to animate the Cameroonian population, not by making people dance, but by providing them with programmes, films and articles well adapted to the nation's development effort, and above all, by explaining the government's actions to the people, with the aim of winning their active participation in the task of nation-building (Ahidjo, 1980:919). In both cases, the people are expected to participate in something decided by the government, but not vice versa. The assumption is that it suffices to listen to the media for the government's message, which if followed without questioning, would bring about development and national unity/and or integration.

It is subversive to question these policies by suggesting alternative ways of going about nation-building and development. There is room
only for "constructive criticism"; and criticisms are deemed to be constructive when they are done from within the system, not from without. This derives from the famous cliché about "agreeing to disagree": As long as one accepts the basic precepts of the "United" republic, the "Unified" party and the "presidential" system of government, then and only then might one's criticism qualify to be considered constructive.

The government is against the propagation of "unconfirmed news"; but as Eone remarks, such unconfirmed news would generally be anything reported or broadcast without its prior authority (1986:210). Yet the situation is such that the government is unlikely to authorise the broadcast or the printing of any stories or ideas that differ fundamentally with its official tenets, policies and doctrines. Marsh aptly sums up this tendency amongst governments as follows:

The withholding of information, and, what is equally important, the power to release information at an opportune moment, are very powerful weapons in the hands of the politician in office, and his staying in office may indeed depend on the maintenance of that power (Marsh, 1987:12).

In the case of Cameroon, this inevitably paints a picture of omniscience and infallibility on the part of the government, and prescribes a monolithic society in a situation of glaring pluralism. The case here is not so much of being against "unity" and "unifying", "national integration or development", as to the belief that these goals are achievable through a hypocritical suppression of differences that would always be there (Goulbourne, 1987; Medard, 1978). A genuinely united 'nation-state' is achievable only by way of fundamental change of attitudes, and through popular democratic participation; it cannot be a mere matter of legislation by the central authorities or of media propaganda conceived by the government and directed at the governed, with little attention paid to feedback. If African countries have failed in their attempts to create genuine 'nation-states', it is partly because the leaders have tried nation-building through a strong, highly centralised state, and in the absence of popular democratic participation (Smith, 1983:128-31; Goulbourne, 1987:34-39; Hadjor, 1987:14-17; Nyong'o, 1987:19-25).

III.) HOW THE GOVERNMENT HAS ITS WAY WITH THE BROADCAST MEDIA IN CAMEROON

So far we have by way of studies, interviews, speeches and pieces of
legislation, attempted to establish the policies that have related Cameroonian broadcasting to the state since the colonial era. The exercise has enabled us to know the official position; the role each of the three governments examined has expected the broadcast media to play under them. Even more importantly, the exercise has permitted us to conclude that the goals and aspirations of a government are not always compatible with those of the governed; and that even with the best of intentions for the state, excessive centralisation of the decision-making machinery, as well as too much personal ambition and self-interest on the part of officials, might make a government unpopular and illegitimate. Given this possibility, our understanding of the relationship between broadcasting and the state would be incomplete if we fail to look beyond declarations of intent, policy statements or legislation, into actual practice.

Having dealt with the role assigned the broadcast media by government, our next exercise becomes finding out how the latter actually ensures that the broadcast practitioners do exactly what is convenient for or favourable to the government. In other words, apart from ownership and direct regulation of the broadcast institutions, what other strategies or mechanisms are employed by the government to guarantee total allegiance from the broadcast practitioners? The following data were obtained from interviews with practitioners and from participant observation.

A) Strategies Employed by the Colonial Government

By supplying very low-powered transmitters and minimally equipped studios, the colonial administration was able to achieve its objective of broadcasting in and around the cities, where the European community, its target audience were based. Secondly, by ensuring that the professional staff as well as the programmes came directly from Paris, colonial broadcasting had no option but to be a mechanism for the propagation of French cultural values, tastes and language; so that those Cameroonian évolués, who despite all odds, could still afford the privilege of listening to the radio, might be further alienated culturally and otherwise. Also by making funds unavailable, the colonists were very able to effectively prevent Cameroonians from contextualising the radio. Earlier in this chapter, we saw how simply by withdrawing their support for Radio Douala between 1944 and 1955, the French colonial authorities left broadcasting in total disarray; in the hands of amateurs desperate for support from any angle, even if only to further disseminate French music amongst Cameroonians. Thus, by making broadcasting technically and professionally dependent on the French state, the colonial
government was able to determine the political and cultural contents of radio.

B) Strategies Employed under Presidents Ahidjo and Biya

Following the 1 July 1963 convention signed with France, the Cameroonian state took over ownership and control of broadcasting. President Ahidjo, whose government signed for Cameroon, decided to make the broadcast personnel thus inherited, part of the civil service (Ahidjo, 1980:305). Thenceforth, the broadcast practitioners were to be treated in exactly the same way as all other state employees; they were to be subjected to the same restrictions, even more at times, given the "sensitive nature of their job". But as most broadcasters indicated, they find it difficult to reconcile their professional beliefs with the role government expects them to play. Not only is the civil service insufficiently remunerating financially (when compared with the private sector, or with parastatals in their heydays before Decree No. 87-1141 of 20 August 1987), but also the smooth practice of their profession often runs against political and administrative barriers either willfully set up by the government, or simply the unexpected consequence of excessive centralisation. Just how then, does being part of the civil service adversely affect the free practice of broadcasting in Cameroon? The following is an attempt to show how the government has taken advantage of the fact that broadcasting is part of the civil service, to institute all sorts of barriers for the broadcasters who would want to be professional willy-nilly.

Belonging to the civil service has left the Cameroonian broadcasters in a predicament: They are in a situation of competing allegiances - whether to serve as the uncritical mouthpiece of the government for the sake of their daily bread and for the sake of peace, but at the risk of being unpopular with the majority of Cameroonians; or to risk their jobs and lives by practising their profession with necessary "objectivity" and "a clear conscience". This conflict, which is understandably most difficult to resolve in a satisfactory manner, has forced many Cameroonian broadcasters either to quit the profession entirely, or to opt for a Jekyll-and-Hyde personality. They propagate and defend the official policies and stances, and generally broadcast what the authorities want to hear. But this is just because the broadcasters find

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Decree No. 87-1141 of 20 August 1987 has made substantial cuts on the remuneration and perquisites of the staff of state corporations, public establishments and semi-governmental corporations; so much so that their salaries and allowances are no longer very much higher than those of their counterparts directly under the Public Service, as was hitherto the case. This implies that the financial incentive that used to pull potential civil servants towards the parastatals is no longer there.
themselves in a very delicate situation.

As civil servants employed by the state, and controlled and paid by the government, in fact, like employees in any given news establishment - public or private (Head, 1963:595), the broadcasters have little choice. As Gallagher argues, "The complex of constraints" facing media institutions and practitioners, impede their role as "autonomous ‘watch-dogs’" (1982:170). Just as a British journalist employed by The Sun newspaper can never be allowed to write like another employed by the Socialist Worker, so too is the broadcaster in Cameroon expected to follow the general ideological and policy stances defined for him and his fellows by his paymaster. Again, just as the BBC broadcasters are expected to be nonpartisan, to pretend to have no political opinions or leanings (Schlesinger, 1978), so too are the broadcasters in Cameroon expected to suppress their personal opinions, feelings or beliefs, and to serve as vehicles through which the government can reach the masses with ideas, policies and schemes. So much so that in Cameroon, many broadcasters who would normally take a more critical stance vis-à-vis the authorities, find themselves serving merely as the mouthpieces of the official version of things. All but a handful of journalists fall into this category. But as we remark below, those who manage to filter through this net of conformism once in a while, are sanctioned in one way or another.

However, their conflict of allegiances lasts for as long as the broadcasters are actively playing their role as disseminators of information, education and entertainment. That is to say, when they are either in front of the microphone, with the authorities, or in the company of strangers or people they do not really trust. But while in the company of friends or those who sympathise with them and their awkward position, the broadcasters show the critical side of themselves, they become professional. In other words, they are true to self, and would express such opinions and critical insight that they would not dare make known over the official airwaves, for fear of reprisals. They criticise and ridicule the behaviour and actions of certain persons in power, in the same way that other Cameroonians not directly involved with the propagation of the ‘positive’ image of the government would.

Thus it is not uncommon for a broadcaster who is just from praising (on the air) the government’s efforts to redeem the critical economic situation of "our country", to observe to a colleague or friend once out of the studio, "They have stolen all the money, and now they are asking us to make false statements" ("Ils ont volé tout l’argent, et maintenant ils nous
demandent de faire des fausses déclarations." It is also common during a recorded interview for a broadcaster to ask the researcher to switch off the tape and receive an off-the-tape remark, comment or insight into a story, an event or issue, which if ordinarily included, might be incriminating to him or her. For example, it was indicated to me by some journalists that the reason why President Biya never created a radio/TV corporation the first time parliament approved a bill permitting its creation, was because certain individuals, acting purely for their own self-interests, had advised him not to.

There is no doubt that the government has always used the civil service as a check against "tendentious" broadcasters. Thus at RDC, the administrative titles of "Chief of Service for Editing" and "Assistant Chief of Service for Editing" ("Chef de Service de la Redaction" and "Chef de Service Adjoint de la Redaction") are used in place of the more conventional "Editor in Chief" and "Assistant Editor in Chief". At CRTV the "Editor in Chief" was known to the administrators as "Le Coordinateur des Nouvelles et des Informations", in the same way that the heads of the technical departments were called. At first I could not understand why the administration preferred the nomenclature of the civil service to that generally accepted in the media world. Particularly when the professional apppellations are shorter, more precise and easier to use. For example, it is easier to say "Rédacteur en chef" than to say "Chef de service de la Redaction". By the end of the fieldwork, I had come to the conclusion that the preference for administrative jargon is not a coincidence, but one of several strategies employed by the authorities to bureaucratise the media professionals by treating them just like one of the many tentacles of the civil service.

It is an attempt to make the broadcast practitioners consider themselves more as part of the central administration than as a separate entity, nor as media professionals pure and simple. Like other civil servants, they are employed by the government, appointed to positions of responsibility by the President, and given titles identical to titles of civil servants in other departments of the public service; and as such, are expected to pay total allegiance to the government by respecting the canons of the civil service, not those of journalism. And there are lots of things which a civil

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4 Today in CRTV, the titles are just the same as they have always been in RDC.
servant must not do in Cameroon; amongst them, he must not go on strike nor betray what President Biya (in his February 1987 televised interview with Eric Chinje) called "La déontologie professionnelle". That is the reason why when the broadcasters of RDC protested against government's failure to make them part of a Radio/TV corporation on Monday 28 April 1986 - despite parliament's approval of a presidential bill to that effect in its second plenary sitting in 1985 (see Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 4/12/1985) - Prof. George Ngango, then Minister of Information and Culture, termed the strike "wild and illegal", and ordered the forces of law and order to invade the Radio House in Yaounde, and reestablish republican peace (See Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 30/4/1986).

The implication of such a state of affairs on the practice of broadcasting or journalism, is easy to imagine. By choosing for example, to say "le Chef de Service de la Redaction", instead of "le Redacteur en Chef", the government intends to see and treat the journalist in question in the same way as all other officials in the civil service, or like any other auxiliary of the administration. The broadcasters are seen as belonging first and foremost to the central administration, before being broadcasters or editors; administrator-broadcasters and not professional-broadcasters. The editor in chief is therefore an administrator-editor, and not the ideal professional-editor which he or she learnt was possible while in training for journalism. He can only have sparks of professionalism in addition, so long as these do not interfere with his role as broadcaster for the political system. In short, the broadcaster must first of all accept the political system and its ideologies, or at least pretend to do so, to be able to conduct his mission without endangering himself or embarrassing the government. This makes of him "an apologist or a public relations man" for the government, not "a newsman ... employed by the public to serve the public" (Head, 1963:598).

Like Ivory Coast, Senegal and other francophone states in Africa (Howard, 1980), Cameroon has an established pattern of socialisation into the system, of broadcasters just out of school or already in practice. Until the arrival of TV, it was difficult for a journalist to leave school and be sent directly to the field to practise. All budding broadcasters were first sent to the Ministry of Information and Culture for a sort of orientation exercise.

5 Unlike other professional groups in the civil service (e.g. Medicine, Law, Architecture, etc), journalism is the only one whose practitioners have so far not been allowed by government to create an association in which they can show professional solidarity towards one another. (see Wongibe, 1987)
"Stage d'imprégnation"; and for a number of years, they were told what to do or not to do by senior journalists turned administrators. It is an exercise intended to make journalists used to the "purely political" role which the authorities expect them to play. Only when the authorities were satisfied with the progress made by the broadcasters-to-be could the latter be posted to start work in any of the stations of the network. Such orientation exercises used to be encouraged even when the radio stations suffered from chronic staff shortages. That was the case in 1985 when five anglophone graduates from ASMAC/ESSTI, were asked to stay in the ministry and be drilled on the government's information policy. They remained there for a year, until George Tanni, in his capacity as Assistant Chief of Service for News, complained to the Minister about the shortage of staff at the English Desk of BDC (George Tanni, interviewed, 5/1/88).

Even when they effectively start broadcasting, the young journalists have to follow certain laid down rules and regulations. Most of them are stunned by the gap there is between the theories of journalism inculcated at school, and the political demands and administrative constraints that affect their practice. According to a circular issued by René Ze Nguèl on 22 September 1976, and another by Guillaume Veule on 3 July 1982, both in their capacity as Ministers of Information and Culture, all programmes are expected to be censored and approved for broadcast, not necessarily by editors as such, but by each broadcaster's immediate administrative superior. The circulars spell out that studio technicians have the right to reject any material brought for broadcast that do not contain the official stamp of approval. The immediate boss is held responsible, should his subordinates present anything considered by the authorities to be unpalatable. Yet, apart from the vague statements we discussed under Presidents Ahidjo and Biya, there are no detailed lists of what is likely or not to breach the government's sense of palatability.

Such vagueness, however, plays to the government's favour, providing it with a catch-all net that can afford to be capricious without being totally unjustifiable, and that leaves many journalists with no alternative but severe

6 Speaking to graduating journalists from ASMAC/ESSTI in March 1986, Minister of Information and Culture, Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya was unequivocal about the purely political role of the official journalists. This political role means that journalists are obliged to carry out the wishes of government and party. They have to be guided by the principle that "Truth comes from above, rumour from below" ("La vérité vient d'en haut, la rumeur d'en bas"), as prescribed by President Biya in 1984.
self-censorship. And to show that these rules are more administratively and politically motivated, than professionally and journalistically so, the ultimate source of reference on the hierarchy of credibility is the Minister himself. He, for example, must know well beforehand the headlines of the news of the day. As George Tanni explained, the Minister is usually informed by a phone call from the Director of RDC, the Subdirector of News, the Editor in Chief, or even the senior journalist on the desk, in the case of the delegation of powers. Sometimes, especially during sensitive times like the period after the foiled coup attempt of 6 April 1984, the Minister might suggest "the angle from which we are going to handle a particular story which he considers controversial" (George Tanni, interviewed, 2/1/88). He might even ask for the scripts of a critical programme such as "Cameroon Report" to be submitted to him. Sam Novala Fonkem (interviewed, 4/2/88) recalled how for about three weeks after the 6 April 1984 failed coup attempt, the Minister of Information and Culture, François Sengat Kuo, personally censored their scripts.

As mentioned earlier, despite the political socialisation and repressiveness of the civil service, not all broadcasters do conform; not everyone employs self-censorship ('auto-censorship') to a degree satisfactory to the authorities. Consequently, the government has developed additional strategies to seek conformity from recalcitrant and tendentious broadcasters. These include:

(i) The Suppression of Information

The broadcaster might be asked not to treat a particular story, or to do so from a dictated angle. For example, in 1976 there was a train accident around Japouma, between Douala and Yaounde. According to eye-witnessed reports, there were many deaths. Concerned Cameroonians rang up the radio house in Yaounde asking to be kept up-to-date on the issue. Foreign stations such as the BBC, VOA, RFI were talking about 300 deaths, and Cameroonians wanted to know if these figures had been inflated or were more or less true. First, RDC was not allowed to report on the accident, then they received a communiqué from the Ministry of Transport instructing them to announce that only four people had died from the accident. As Meombo (interviewed, 21/3/88) and Eric Chinje (interviewed, 16/1/88) admit, this was preposterous — a gross underestimation, and a deliberate attempt to keep the truth from Cameroonians. Mbida (1973:27-33) gives a series of events, both national and foreign, which were not reported by RDC when they happened, and of which Cameroonians were obliged to learn from foreign radio stations.
The second example is not as serious as the first, but it underscores the same point. In March 1988, S.T. Muna announced his retirement from parliament and active politics to *Cameroon Tribune*, in an interview which might have been broadcast on radio and TV, had the paper been allowed to publish it when it planned to. However, the reaction of the Director General of CRTV to news of the interview, is an indication of what he might have done, had Muna’s interview been with either of the broadcast media. He said to the editor in chief of English language news in RDC, "I’ve heard that one of your boys has had an interview with Muna. Make sure you have nothing to do with it. Do not diffuse it, and who ever has interviewed him is entirely responsible for anything that happens. Watch out!" What the Director General ignored at the time was that the interview had been with *Cameroon Tribune*, and that all copies of the Friday 25 March 1988 English language edition had been seized and destroyed, and that the authorities had ordered the journalists to come out with a new edition that same Friday in the afternoon, one without the interview.\(^7\) The suppression of the interview consequently affected a

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\(^7\) The story is that S.T. Muna, Speaker of the National Assembly, granted an interview to *Cameroon Tribune*, which was published in its Friday 25 March 1988 English language edition. In it he announced his retirement from parliament and active politics, giving reasons for doing so. Apparently, President Biya was not pleased with the interview, so all copies of the paper were withdrawn from circulation and burnt.

I did in fact go to the *Cameroon Tribune* office to find out more about the incident. There I met the staff who had been personally involved in the production of that particular edition that was seized and destroyed. All they told me is that, not having seen anything ‘subversive’ about the interview, it never occurred to them that the paper would not be allowed to circulate, so they had not thought of keeping aside any copies for themselves in anticipation of a ban. So it would appear that when the orders came for all copies to be destroyed, none was saved. Whatever the case, the interview which was subsequently published, was not different from the original; although they would not swear to the fact that it was a faithful reproduction of the first, since copies of the latter had not been saved. Should this be true, then President Biya might simply not have approved of Muna’s timing, not the contents of the interview itself. He might have felt that allowing *Cameroon Tribune* to go ahead and publish the interview even before the CPDM party had made known the list of candidates selected to contest the legislative elections scheduled for 24 April 1988, would have been a great embarrassment to the government. So he might have thought that he needed some time to prepare the public, then release the interview. Which is what he did.

When copies of the English edition of the Friday 25 March 1988 *Cameroon Tribune* were seized and destroyed, the government ordered another issue to be printed that same day in the afternoon. I obtained and kept a copy of that extra-ordinary edition. And for the first time in the history of the paper, there is an advert on the first page: an advert on mineral water. I was told by the *Cameroon Tribune* staff that the advert had replaced Muna’s photograph which had occupied the same spot in the destroyed edition.
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retrospective programme on the National Assembly, as the journalist in charge of it was asked not to use excerpts of any speeches by S.T. Muna, the retiring Speaker.

During the Ahidjo regime, there was a board in the radio house in Yaounde on which were listed forbidden foreign news items. Eric Chinje (interviewed, 16/1/88) talked of how between 1974/75 and 1978/79 when he worked with RDC, broadcasters were not allowed to report on the coup d'état that overthrew Tombalbaye of Chad, nor were they allowed to mention a strike that was going on in a university in neighbouring Nigeria in 1976, another coup d'état somewhere else in Africa, or an earthquake in the Philippines round about the same time; all of which events were being reported on by the VOA, the BBC and RFI — stations to which Cameroonians regularly tuned. As Eric Chinje observed, the authorities had to determine when those news stories would be broadcast over RDC, "As if we could tell our audience ... 'don't listen to any news from any other station, and wait until such and such a time, when we decide to let you know what has happened in the world'".

Locally, broadcasters and other journalists are aware that no matter how venturesome they are prepared to be, certain institutions must not be given critical examination (Massaga, 1980:41). The members of the "Cameroon Report" — a critical programme that was most daring, and which Fonye (interviewed, 2/1/88) describes as "a very important programme, an eye opener to everybody, a checker, a kind of inspector of society" — production team cited the Presidency and the University as taboo institutions that must never be investigated, for the authorities would not hesitate to crack down on anyone who dares. These were very sensitive areas in national life.

According to Charles Landzeh of RDC (interviewed, 31/12/87), "... topics like the GCE examinations [over which students struck in 1984, and on which the results of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry are still awaited] and the University of Yaounde were completely kept under embargo" throughout the history of "Cameroon Report". "For quite a long time, we would not handle topics on our news analysis on the GCE or the University of Yaounde, because nobody would give us the green light. Of course, we are a state radio." And concerning the green light, most journalists closely follow the President's speeches, ready to speak against social ills when he does so, and to criticise sections of the administration only when he does so. That, say the broadcasters, is the safe thing to do: being a follower, not a pacemaker. In April 1988 when the President ordered the detention of certain top ranking
officials of the Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles (ANACAM, part of the Ministry of Agriculture) for embezzlement, broadcasters immediately came up with news talks denouncing corruption and self-seeking administrators who enriched themselves at the public's expense. So did Cameroon Tribune (see daily, 21/4/88; bi-weekly, 22/4/88). The fact that they take their cue from the President most of the time, means that they are limited by how far he can go in his criticism of the system.

(ii) Sanctions on Failure to Conform

- Transfers:

The broadcasters consider transfers from the National Station in Yaounde to any of the provincial stations as being taken out of the limelight, a sort of punishment. The government seems to think in the same manner; it considers the national station to be most sensitive of all the stations in the network. Thus when it feels threatened by a journalist or group of journalists in Yaounde, it might try to silence him/them through transfer(s) to the province. That is what all the members of the "Cameroon Report" team claimed happened in 1981 when the government, increasingly embarrassed by the programme, transferred its key members from Yaounde to the provincial stations. In the same transfer decree Julius Wamey was transferred to Radio Bamenda, Victor Epie Ngoe to Radio Douala, Asonglefack Nkemleke to Buea, and Akvanka Joe Ndifor to Bafoussam. However, this particular transfer failed to "kill" the programme, because "the authorities made the error of dealing with individuals" rather than with "the spirit", with the result that those broadcasters who were brought to replace transferred colleagues, continued in the same vein, even receiving contributions from them in the provinces. In the words of Sam Novala Fonkem, "You can kill a man, but you don't kill ideas". (Interviews with Julius Wamey, 13/1/88; Akvanka Joe Ndifor, 11/1/88; Sam Novala Fonkem, 4/2/88).

There is however another form of transfer which does not necessarily involve changing station. In this particular form, a journalist might be given an administrative job within the radio house, one which occupies him totally and makes it almost impossible for him to partake in active broadcasting. Some journalists who have been appointed to posts of responsibility of this kind, did say that they would have preferred to be active on the microphone. They saw their appointments as a way of keeping them silent because they had been very vocal with the microphone. But since appointments and dismissals in Cameroon are more politically than professionally motivated, it is difficult to substantiate these allegations. However, Shasha Ndimbie (interviewed,
25/2/88), amongst others, thinks that in general, the system of rewarding journalists in Cameroon is detrimental to the profession: Promotion almost always means being given an administrative post; which in itself "means that you end up doing more bureaucracy than journalism". Within the system, "If I get better, I would just get more paper work to do, and less journalism to do."

- Interrogations by the police:

  Journalists can be arrested and taken for interrogation by the secret police, without the prior knowledge or approval of management. Although this is common with journalists of the private press (see Nji, 1985:41-7; Lukong, 1987:63), some broadcasters report being repeatedly taken for interrogation, mostly when they have said something which the special branch of the police believes to be subversive or to be in any way critical of the government. Akwanka Joe Ndifor of CTV (interviewed, 11/1/88) recounts his personal experience, and also remembers how police stormed the TV production centre barely 20 minutes after the broadcast of an edition of Keye Ndogo's programme "Temoins de L'Histoire", that dealt with the UPCists, members of the banned UPC political party. The following statement by Prof. George Ngango, Minister of Information and Culture at the time RDC broadcasters protested against the creation of CTV, speaks for itself:

  Following a wild and illegal strike by certain functionaries and other employees of the Radio, broadcasts of Monday, April 28, 1986 were interrupted, depriving Cameroonians of the morning and mid-day news bulletins.

  The government finds it difficult to tolerate a behaviour that gravely undermines the public interest and that of the state.

  The President of the Republic has ordered a speedy enquiry in order to determine the roles played by the different actors.

  Those found guilty will be punished accordingly (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 30/4/1986).

  Although as civil servants the broadcasters were legally wrong to have protested, it is not entirely true that their behaviour was against public interest, since according to parliamentary records issued after the second plenary session of 1985, parliament approved a bill for the creation of a Radio/Television corporation, and not for the establishment of a Television corporation on its own. However, here the 'strike' is mentioned as another example of police involvement, since the Minister invited the forces of law and order to bring the situation back to normal. Also, the fact that the Director of RDC was replaced soon after the said strike, might be a pointer to
government's dissatisfaction with the way he had handled his staff (see Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 7/5/1986).

- Suspensions:

  When a broadcaster is too critical or says things on the air which the government considers threatening or embarrassing, he might be taken off the air until he is judged repentant enough. In 1980 Muema Meombo (interviewed, 21/3/88) was suspended from using the microphone for six months, lost his salary for eight days, and had his duty post withdrawn; because he had dared to tell his listeners the truth that his programme had started later than usual because the RDC bus which was supposed to take him to work had suffered a breakdown, forcing him to look for alternative transport. Demands by his fans amongst the students of the University of Yaounde to have him immediately re-instated were ignored. Muema Meombo however thinks that by trying to punish him, the authorities had in effect punished his audiences instead: For, "when you take a broadcaster off the air, you are not just punishing him, but punishing those at the other end who have become fond of that broadcaster and his programme".

  In 1985 Eric Chinje, Editor in Chief of CTV was put off the air for two months, for allowing one of his staff, Boh Herbert, to present a programme on cancer just when President Biya was visiting President Reagan, who was only just recovering from an operation to remove a cancerous growth. A member of staff at the American Embassy (deputising for the ambassador) is said to have expressed concern to the Cameroonian authorities, who immediately decided to appease him and his government by sanctioning Eric Chinje. He explains:

  ... the authorities ... felt that somebody had to be sacrificed; they had to show the Americans that they had taken the matter seriously, and had to do something about it. To everybody, I represented TV more than everybody else. The fact that I was the main news reader and at the forefront of the public, I was Mr TV, kind of. So they didn't think it necessary to sacrifice the head of TV or any of my administrative superiors, no. When I was put off the air, it was evident to everybody that something had happened, and that calmed the troubled spirits at the time (Eric Chinje, interviewed, 16/1/88).

  In April 1986 there was the suspension and subsequent imprisonment for nine months without trial of three newscasters namely, Sam Novala Fonkem, Ebssiy Ngum and Johnny MacViban, for presenting a news talk on democracy, seen to be critical of certain members of parliament. Finally released from prison, none of them was sent back to broadcasting; instead, Ebssiy Ngum and Johnny MacViban were transferred to Cameroon Tribune to work as print journalists,
while Sam Novala Fonkem was sent to teach in ASMAC/ESSTI. In April 1986 also, "Cameroon Report" was suspended indefinitely for being a constant embarrassment to the authorities. The said programme was later substituted by a less critical and more conformist one, "Cameroon Panorama"; a substitute which Sam Novala Fonkem describes as "a fake ... a counterfeit". Neither in the transfers of the three broadcasters, nor in the suspension and subsequent replacement of "Cameroon Report", was the opinion of the Cameroonian public sought, let alone that of the broadcasters involved. (Interviews with Sam Novala Fonkem, 1/2/88 & 4/2/88; George Tanni, 5/1/88; Charles Landzeh, 31/12/87; and Akvanka Joe Ndifor, 11/1/88).

Jean-Claude Ottou, an experienced Cameroonian broadcaster, was also arrested and imprisoned from April to December 1987, for broadcasting something unpalatable to the government. As Africa Confidential explains, Ottou had been commissioned by Cameroon Television (CTV) to interview leading personalities on the eve of the municipal elections, including Jean-Jacques Ekindi, one of the party leaders feared by Biya because of his popularity. The interview was interrupted after ten minutes broadcasting and a few days later Ottou found himself in prison with no explanation.

However it appears that one of the reasons was that Ottou asked Ekindi about the repression he suffered under Ahidjo's government. Ahidjo got the news that the television was referring to his 'bloody regime' (although the only reference made was about the interrogation, arrest and sometime exile of Ekindi). Ahidjo called Senegalese president Abdou Diouf in Dakar to tell him to inform Biya that the reunion they were expecting to have in Morocco was no longer possible (Africa Confidential, February 1988).

Both private and public journalists do not approve of the arbitrary arrests, interrogations and detentions, and would like to be tried and condemned in a court of law, to be proven guilty in public and not sentenced in stealth. Some are arrested, detained without trial and then released without knowing the nature of their offence. This might be because the police or gendarmes who often conduct these arrests, are not always adequately informed, and have been known to victimize broadcasters merely on the weight

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8 The Minister at the time Prof. George Ngango, was questioned in Parliament, why he allowed "his journalists" to use the airwaves so abusively. Angered, he came back and wrote a note suspending the programme. It is not common for the authorities to seek the opinion of civil servants before transferring them, nor do they sample public opinion often enough. Not surprisingly therefore, as Sam Novala Fonkem explained, around 1980/81 Ewle Guillaume, in his capacity as Information and Culture Minister, wanted the schedule of "Cameroon Report" to be changed, not because the people wanted it that way, but because he was used to going jogging Sunday mornings, and therefore did not always have time to monitor the programme.
of hypothetical statements which they might have overheard on radio or TV, and
taken out of the context of the original programmes. Whatever the explanation,
any broadcaster is likely to be quite intimidated by the whole matter, and, on
his release, to avoid saying or writing anything he deems the authorities
might consider unpalatable. Especially as the government has reserved for
itself the right to define such terms as "l'ordre public", "déni
grement",
"sabotage systematique" (Bayart, 1973:51), "subversion" and "public interest".

CONCLUSION

This chapter has dealt with the relationship between broadcasting
and the state in Cameroon under the colonial administration, Presidents Ahidjo
and Biya. We have looked at the ownership, control and uses of the broadcast
media in all three periods. Through a critical review of literature on
colonial broadcasting, and of the speeches, policy statements and publications
on post-colonial broadcasting, and through interviews with broadcast
practitioners, we have been able to understand the strategies and mechanisms
employed by the various governments to ensure their effective control of the
broadcast media.

We have seen how under colonialism France, just by supplying very
low-powered transmitters and minimally equipped studios, was able to achieve
its objective of broadcasting for the French community - its target audience,
which lived in and around the cities wherein the transmitters were installed.
By ensuring that the radio staff and programmes were directly from Paris, the
French were able to control the cultural contents of the broadcasts. In that
way even the évolués with radio sets of their own could only be further
acculturated by these contents. We remarked how France's lack of interest in
the radio after the war, meant the withdrawal of staff and funds, so that it
was impossible for Cameroonians to operate it in any way that could
significantly jeopardise the French 'mission civilisatrice' in the colony.
Hence our conclusion that during its twenty years of existence, colonial
broadcasting in francophone Cameroon was an entirely urban elitist medium used
to facilitate French domination, wars and to crack down on radical
nationalism. In a word, colonial broadcasting was a total state monopoly,
heavily centralised, and culturally and technologically wholly dependent on
France.

Independent Cameroon on the other hand came with promises of
nation-building and development, and of the need for broadcasting to serve as
mobilizer, informer and educator. Nation-building, as we realised, is as much a priority under President Biya as it was under Ahidjo his predecessor. Like the former, Ahidjo defined Cameroon's broadcast policies in his speeches as President or Chairman of the sole party. Their policies are however similar in that while emphasizing the media's role as disseminators of government policies, plans or messages amongst the masses, they fail to accord a place to feedback or messages originating from the masses and intended for the government, which is of no less importance. Such a forum for equal and balanced exchange is especially necessary when, thanks to Biya's criticism of Ahidjo, the goals of the government are not always compatible with those of the governed. By calling for the creation of a national cultural orientation commission, Muna is aware of the importance of having the broadcast policies of Cameroon defined by an independent collectivity, and not simply by one individual, no matter how justifiable the individual's claims to the custodianship of the state might be.

We compared both Presidents' monopolisation of decision-making to that of the colonial administration, and showed in what way government involvement with broadcasting in Cameroon was similar to that in France and colonial Cameroon. The similarity is clear in their excessive central control of the broadcast media. The reason behind such centralism in both cases, is for the government to be able to appoint into positions of responsibility only persons sympathetic with government stance and policies.

By placing broadcasting directly under the Ministry of Information and Culture, and by making it part of the civil service, the government has deprived the broadcasters of the "professional objectivity" they think they need to practise journalism in a plural society. The broadcasters are in a predicament; torn between acting as the mouthpiece of the government, and being professional journalists as they understand it. However, their predicament is more of a mental process than a day to day experience, as the government constantly employs a number of strategies to make them conform willy-nilly. Strategies which range from the "dos and don'ts" of the civil service, to the overt suppression of information, and sanctions on failure to conform: transfers, interrogations by the police, suspensions and detention without trial.

While this chapter points to the government's total ownership and rigid control of the broadcast media and practitioners, the government's position, as chapters nine and ten reveal, is not as strong as that of the
French colonists, who by being able to rely on their own technology, experts and programmes, were better able to control the situation and to attain their objective of promoting French economic and cultural interests.
CHAPTER SEVEN
BROADCASTING FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN CAMEROON:
FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE (DECEMBER 1987 - MAY 1988)

INTRODUCTION

In chapter six we came to the conclusion that actual practice is not always compatible with declared intentions, and that as researchers we needed to supersede legislation and official speeches, by constantly opposing these with the real situation of media practitioners and institutions. The participant observation exercise described in chapter four, was partly aimed at detecting any such contradictions. We also discussed some of the strategies employed by the government to socialise broadcasting and to seek political conformity from its practitioners; but the degree of government presence in or interference with the daily operation and content of the broadcast media is still to be illustrated. That is the subject matter of the present chapter.

During the fieldwork, I sought to understand this daily relationship in view, interalia, of determining the importance RDC and CTV accorded the government and government related issues in the News and other programmes, as opposed to issues of concern to Cameroonians at large. This exercise was aimed at establishing the degree of direct and active government involvement with media content, and how such involvement affects the political, cultural and socio-economic aspects of nation-building.

I. BACKGROUND STUDIES UNDER PRESIDENT AHIDJO, 1960-1982

Already, the situation during the Ahidjo years has been well summarized in a series of interesting studies conducted in ASMAC/ESSTI. Amongst these are two internship accounts by Malam (1978) and Massaga (1980) with the national station of RDC in Yaounde. Malam observes that there is a world of difference between the Cameroonian journalist just out of school, and the one who has had a few years of experience. The first is bubbling with enthusiasm, full of ideas and sincere in his journalistic convictions: he wants a conducive atmosphere in which he can best serve his audience, the people of Cameroon. But once he starts to work, his disappointment is boundless, and soon, forced by technical problems, bureaucracy and political constraints, he gives up the hope and zeal for improvement, and seeks merely to earn a living. In the final analysis, it is the journalist that changes,
and thenceforth becomes a hinderance to other budding journalists with new ideas and similar enthusiasm. An observation confirmed by Howard who, writing about journalists and national development in Ivory Coast, Senegal and Cameroon, remarks that journalism as a profession in those countries is "badly" in need of "enthusiasm" (1980:5).

Such a journalist as Malam describes, has come to doubt the usefulness of the journalistic skills he acquired in school. He has realized that one does not need to have been trained to be able to do the sort of work that he is often called upon to do. He is expected to broadcast in their entirety and with no critical examination whatsoever, every single speech by the President or the President's collaborators; presidential decrees and ministerial communiques are mostly what make news at the national level. He has not got sufficient means at his disposal nor the official encouragement to go news-gathering. The authorities who employ him are satisfied to hear their speeches broadcast and their communiques read, unedited. The journalist is aware of the delicate nature of his job, and that the slightest error on his part would lead to him being sanctioned by those in power. He realizes that he is serving the authorities to the detriment of the Cameroonian public, with whom he has lost all credibility. In an atmosphere where the authorities have no confidence in the journalist, and where the later cannot practise without fear, Malam concludes, broadcasting in Cameroon cannot be in the service of the people.

Two years later, Massaga realizes that little has changed; his conclusions confirm Malam's initial observations. The broadcaster is still plagued by numerous problems. News is about the people in power, be it at the national level or in the provinces. But such is not news journalistically gathered, processed and delivered by the broadcaster. Rather, the broadcaster is obliged to read out official communiques handed down to him from the Presidency, the Ministries or other government departments; and to paraphrase without the least critical commentary, the declarations of the powerful. Not only is the journalist forbidden from investigating into certain national institutions (such as "fraud in the University" and "the reforms of national education"), but information is generally very difficult to obtain. Massaga gives the example of the programme "La Tribune des Auditeurs", in which the producer might go as far as the Presidency for information which a Chief of Bureau in the Ministry could have made available. The consequence is that producers are forced to stick to areas where they find the least problems: the very simple sort of programmes, such as inviting someone into the studio and
asking him to make an expert statement in a chosen non-political area. The public, says Massaga, unaware of all these complications, is likely to accuse the journalist (unfairly, but justifiably) of not doing his work.

Massaga also deplores the practice whereby different ministerial departments are allowed to get directly involved with certain programmes at RDC. Although he can understand that such involvement is as a result of the lack of creativity and productivity in RDC, he criticises it because external collaborators from the ministries are often unconscious of the impact of their broadcasts upon the audience. The language used in such external broadcasts is ill-adapted, and the journalist, even when present, plays a very peripheral role. He equally deplores the practice by the ministries to appropriate certain journalists for themselves, by arranging for them to be detached permanently to their ministries. Like Malam, he concludes that RDC needs more facilities, and that the broadcaster needs greater access to information, if broadcasting is to attain its nation-building objective. The solution to the problem is in the hands of the government, and RDC can only succeed if the authorities really want it to.

Both conclusions are validated by Tchienehom (one of Cameroon's most experienced broadcasters), who in his report to the Minister of Information and Culture in 1980, portrayed RDC to be plagued with problems that ranged from inadequate technical equipment and poorly thought-out programming, to structures that failed to operate, as well as keen competition from foreign stations (also see Sah, 1985). He deplored the fact that RDC was part of the civil service, and the repressiveness of the Ministry of Information and Culture, which was more concerned with policing the journalists than with promoting professional creativity. His conclusion was that such problems had forced the Cameroonian public to turn increasingly towards foreign stations for satisfaction, and that mediocrity and the suppression or manipulation of the truth, had made them to nickname RDC "Radio Confusion". The poor state of affairs had above all discouraged many journalists, forcing them to seek professional satisfaction elsewhere; proof of this being that the average age amongst practising journalists had fallen to about 23 years.

From the above accounts, it is clear that broadcasting under Ahidjo suffered from three major problems: Technical inadequacies, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and political constraints. While the first two are dealt with in detail elsewhere, this chapter is about the third. It would appear that under
Ahidjo, the technical problems and the bureaucracy only made the government's domination of the airwaves even more pronounced; that is to say, it made broadcasting politics the number one concern of RDC. Thus, as long as official communiques and visits, statements and speeches could be covered, it was alright, even if other RDC programmes had to be sacrificed in order to do this. Again, as long as the journalist broadcast the 'handed out information' from the authorities, there was no reason why he had to go looking for more information.

Nana (1981:38) argues that whenever such handouts were unavailable or too few for one reason or another, the national page of the news bulletin was "desperately skeletal". Such ought not to be the case since there was always something newsworthy happening amongst the rural or urban masses of Cameroon. During this time, writes Obam (1980:91), there was so much secrecy and information was so inaccessible that Ahidjo himself became worried, and issued a circular on May 2, 1972 advising his collaborators to open up a bit. Excessive secrecy, he told them, could be counterproductive, especially when information of a very general nature intended to be disseminated as much as possible, was withheld from the press.

With the leadership change of November 1982 and President Biya's call for greater openness and democracy, increased freedom for the media, and participation by all and sundry, how much has the situation changed? Has direct involvement by the government with the day to day running of the broadcast media diminished? Are the media content still dominated by government political activities, or have radio (and TV since 1985) broadened up to include the activities of more ordinary Cameroonians - the masses, so to speak? Without pretending that all these questions can be answered here, this chapter deals in detail with government interference and presence, while leaving the rest of the issues for chapter eight, on pluralism and broadcasting.

II.) FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE (DECEMBER 1987 - MAY 1988)

Following my participant observation exercise with RDC and CTV, there is no doubt that broadcasting in Cameroon is still essentially in the service of the government. Despite the political changes and the advent of TV, the content of the broadcast media continues to be dominated by the government, whose members either individually or collectively, bring all sorts of pressures to bear on the broadcast practitioners. From December 1987 to May
1988 when I was closely involved with the activities of RDC and CTV, the importance accorded government and government related events became apparent, and so did the daily pressures to which the practitioners are subjected. These observations could be summarized as follows:

A) The Broadcast Media and the President

A lot of importance is paid to the President and his activities in the news. Whenever the President features in the news, that particular news item automatically constitutes the lead. Sometimes the news is almost entirely on and about him, especially when he makes a speech (like in Maroua on January 6 or Bertoua on March 25) or accords an interview (like the one to CRTV on March 18). News can come from the Presidency at any time, even just minutes before the newscast; either in the form of communiques or in the form of direct reports by correspondents. Given this possibility, every other lead is always temporal until the very last minute. So for example, for the 8.30 p.m newscast at CTV on Tuesday 26 January, at the news conference in the morning, Eric Chinje the editor in chief decided that the item discussing the creation and statute of CRTV would be the lead, except if the special correspondents at the Presidency came up with something before the news that evening. And in fact, Thomas Essono did indeed come up with something on the meeting between the President and a foreign dignitary, that replaced CRTV as the lead.

The normal schedule of the news might even be manipulated for the convenience of a presidential interview or speech. This was the case on Friday March 18, when the CTV newscast, which normally took place at 8.30 p.m, was brought forward to 8.00 p.m, so that RDC and CTV could broadcast President Biya’s interview with Chinje and Ngniman of CRTV at the same time. The interview was on the Presidential and Legislative elections scheduled for 24

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1 Examples include the CTV and RDC News editions of: Wednesday 6/1/88, in which the lead was the President’s speech at the Agro-Pastoral Show in Maroua; Friday 8/1/88, in which the lead was the President’s return to Yaounde from Maroua; Tuesday 26/1/88 in which the lead was the President’s meeting with a foreign dignitary at the Presidency; Tuesday 23/2/88, in which the lead was the President’s meeting with Jean-Christophe Mitterand, France’s Minister of Cooperation, at the Presidency the previous day; Friday 18/3/88, in which the lead was the President’s interview with Eric Chinje of CTV and Zacharie Ngniman of RDC; Friday 25/3/88, in which the lead was the President’s visit to the East Province.

Such as that sent to CTV and RDC on Saturday January 16, asking them to explain to the public why the government had taken the decision to raise custom duties on certain imports; or like the decrees signed by the President on February 12, increasing prices for oil and certain local drinks.
April 1988. In it, the President defined the electoral role he expected the media to play.

Apart from simply featuring in the news, the President and his activities are given priority coverage, as a matter of principle. Laws promulgated by the President, presidential decrees, circulars, appointments and dis-appointments are read in their entirety on radio during the news bulletins; and mentioned on TV if not all read. Examples include the laws and decrees creating CRTV and/or regulating the audio-visuals in Cameroon; the decrees appointing the management team and members of the Board of Directors of CRTV; and the circular (Cameroon Tribune, (daily) 16/3/88; (weekly) 18/3/88) - which he issued in his capacity as Chairman of the CPDM party, laying down the necessary conditions for eligibility to contest for the April 24 legislative elections.

These texts are usually commented upon by the journalists who, as expected, almost always defend the official stance. Thus for instance, following the signing of several texts on February 12 by the President raising taxes for a variety of items amongst which petrol, CTV, RDC and Cameroon Tribune (see (daily) 18/2/88; (bi-weekly) 19/2/88) all did the same thing; which as the Subdirector of News RDC (interviewed, 25/2/88) explains: was first to disseminate the message, then to explain "to the masses the wellfoundedness of the move", by saying how necessary it was for resolving the economic crisis. All three official media quoted oil prices in other African (Gabon, Central African Republic, Tchad, Senegal, and Ivory Coast) countries to illustrate that even with the latest price increases, oil in Cameroon remained relatively cheap. The public's reaction was not sampled; neither was the question raised why high prices in other countries should justify price increases in Cameroon which produces its own oil.

If the President is visiting any of the provinces, special teams of broadcasters, technicians and equipment are dispatched from the National Station to reinforce the provincial stations (characterised by an acute lack of personnel and equipment), which then become the coordination centre for the network for as long as the President's visit lasts. Every effort is made to give the President a successful coverage wherever he goes in the country. This was the case when President Biya went to Maroua for the National Agro-Pastoral Show that took place from January 6 to 8; and when he visited HEVECAM at Nyete in the South Province on March 4, and the East Province on March 25.
The practice of reinforcement gives the impression that the broadcast media are there to serve the President above all; that the best team of journalists and technicians, or the best equipment and technical facilities stay with the President at the national capital in Yaounde, and that they follow him round the country, making sure that his moves and declarations are captured and diffused to the masses who must be educated on the President and his policies, informed about the President and his activities, and possibly entertained with the President's tastes or what he approves of as good for them. And in that way, only in that way, are the broadcast media said to be contributing effectively in the process of nation-building.

However, although no journalist overtly questions the fact that the President and his activities must be given priority treatment, they would like to be able to do this with some amount of creative imagination, in a professional manner. That is why on Friday 8 January, some CTV broadcasters were cross with their colleagues dispatched to cover the Agro-Pastoral show in Maroua. Instead of focusing on the farmers and the foodstuffs they had brought along to exhibit, or on the livestock breeders and their animals, the Cameraman had kept his lense on the President's person all through the ceremony. These CTV journalists were concerned that Cameroonian viewers must have been disappointed, because they had failed to be shown what the occasion was all about. "We didn't want politics, we wanted the Agric Show," said the one. "Even the President himself wants to see his activities, not only his head," remarked another.

Given the circumstances under which they operate, it is somehow delusive for the rest of the CTV broadcasters to have expected more professional awareness from their colleagues in Maroua. I do not know how many of them would have differed considerably had they been sent in place of their colleagues. Perhaps a few, but the majority certainly would still have focused more on the President.\(^3\) I would hesitate to think that the colleagues in

\(^3\) In fact, one of the most vociferous critics of the Maroua team was later to side strongly with the official position on a matter that caused much dissatisfaction amongst the public. On January 18 1988 the Mayor of Yaounde, Mr Emah Basil took the highly controversial decision of chasing hawkers off the streets of the city; with the explanation that they made parking difficult and kept the streets dirty (See Cameroon Tribune (daily), 31/3/1988). But when the dissatisfied hawkers subsequently presented themselves at the Labour Office, there was no employment for them. In the CTV programme "Tam Tam Weekend" of 31/1/1988, the broadcaster in question recommended that the hawkers return to the villages and do some farming, or that they go to the
Maroua were necessarily professionally unaware of the fact that they ought to have focused on the show rather than the President. On the contrary, I am inclined to think that the political socialization of the Cameroonian broadcaster has been so effective that the only way a broadcaster can do the 'right' thing, something that would be appreciated by his colleagues and perhaps the public, is by daring to do the unconventional, to shift from talking about the President and his merits for a while, to talking about the things that really matter to the majority of Cameroonians, or to nation-building and development. In other words, they have to indulge in an alternative sort of broadcasting that deals with issues because they matter generally, and not necessarily because they are afraid or because such issues have the ability to impose themselves politically.

Without themselves being aware, the journalists at the CTV news conference that Friday morning, were accusing their colleagues in Maroua of being mainstream, of being conformist, or of not being daring enough. And perhaps if the latter had dared to focus less on the President and more on the show, nothing might have happened. But what would that have meant? Nothing really, apart from making the situation of the broadcaster even more ambivalent, more difficult to define with categorical certitude. For the decision by the authorities to ignore a wrongdoing, does not necessarily imply that the law defining that particular activity as a wrongdoing, has been abrogated. It simply means that the authority in question, for one reason or another, has failed to act legally.

Thus, in the context of broadcasting in Cameroon, this means that since the practitioner never knows what might happen if he dares, he prefers not to dare. Particularly when memories are still fresh of sanctions meted out to colleagues who have dared in the past. It is better to be mainstream rather than lose one's daily bread by trying to please colleagues and the public in the name of professional competence or objectivity. For, to quote Massaga (1980) once more, if the authorities really want broadcasting to be relevant to Cameroonians and to nation-building, they know what exactly to do. But it is not for the broadcaster to decide whether or not to focus on the President,
especially when the laws and policies in place do not give him the right to make such a decision.

All presidential visits are covered from departure to arrival and throughout the speech making ceremonies. If the visit is foreign, like the one to Zaire in February, the departure is covered and his arrival back home is covered as well; but while he is out, special correspondents continue to file in stories for the news. Coverage in this context does not imply just saying a few words for a few minutes, but actually living through the entire ceremony. This of course entails great disruptions in the programme schedule. For example, the Sunday 28 February edition of the programme "Dimanche Midi" was interrupted from time to time in order to provide for reports from Yaounde Airport, where journalists and 'Traditional Dance Groups' were welcoming President Biya back from Kinshasa Zaire where he attended an ECCAS meeting of Central African Heads of State.

Equally, the normal RDC programme schedule of Friday morning March 25 was disrupted in order to provide live coverage for President Biya's visit to Bertoua in the East Province. On the same day at CTV, an impromptu broadcast was scheduled at the same time to provide live television coverage for the ceremony as well. This was an abnormal broadcast because on Fridays TV broadcasts did not normally start until 6 p.m. Once more, this is another indication of the powerful influence the President has on the broadcast media. He and his activities are not only capable of upsetting normal schedules, but are also in a position to bring about impromptu schedules at non-broadcast hours.

When the President makes a speech or addresses the 'nation', the entire speech is supposed to be broadcast live, unedited; it also has to be re-broadcast in its entirety in the news. At the CNU party congress in Bafoussam in 1980, former President Ahidjo, in his capacity as chairman, made a marathon speech of more than four hours long; a speech which of course was broadcast live on Radio. At the CNU party congress in Bamenda, President Biya made a similar speech of about three hours long, which was given live coverage on Radio and TV. Furthermore, all presidential addresses and speeches are retransmitted over the entire network; this means that all the stations are obliged to relay the ceremony, the event. Since the President's speeches and addresses are almost invariably in French, they have to be translated and then broadcast in English, or, alternatively they can simply be related and commented on by the English-speaking broadcasters. In the case of major
addresses to the 'nation' or parts of it, the translations are done at the Presidency by professionals. During my fieldwork, the translated addresses were read on TV by a journalist in the name of Adamu Musa, and on radio by another called George Tanni. That was what happened when the President addressed the 'nation' on New Year eve, and when he spoke to the Youths on the eve of the National Youth Day which was celebrated on Thursday February 11.

CTV and RDC also organise what is known as "Special Broadcasts", which are still largely about propagating the achievements of the President, his government, and/or the party. They may be scheduled during visits by foreign dignitaries, high-level diplomatic activities such as the presentation of letters of credence, national festivities, party anniversaries, or politically sensitive times such as in 1984 after the foiled coup attempt, 1987 when the economic crisis was declared, and during my fieldwork when the government decided to educate the public about the IMF after abandoning its initial reluctance to turn to it, and to organise the presidential and legislative elections of April 24 1988. The last example is used below to further prove the degree to which the President as an institution dominates the broadcast media.

Although there was only one contender in the presidential election, as opposed to the 324 candidates contesting for 180 seats in the legislative elections, the presidential candidate had almost all the airtime allocated to himself. While the 324 legislative candidates were left with not more than a total of 30 minutes a day to sell themselves to the electorate. As Joseph Marcel Ndi, Director of News in CRTV told Week-End Tribune of 16 April 1988, the special broadcasts were to feature in RDC at 12.30 p.m and 2.30 p.m in French and English respectively, and in CTV, from 8.30 p.m onwards in both languages. This had to be done, although he did not for a moment doubt the "onerous" nature of the operation, and the fact that CRTV was materially limited. He admitted dispatching a team of five to each of the ten provinces, with each team having a bus of its own.

George Tanni, editor in chief for RDC news in English explained the nature of the special broadcast for the radio as follows:

Last Monday April 11, Radio Cameroon started a special edition of the news bulletin aimed at covering and reporting on the election campaigns. These special bulletins which will go on till Saturday 23 April are scheduled at 12.30 p.m in French and 2.30 p.m in English each day. They are each coordinated by the editors in chief for both languages. The special bulletin is supposed to last for 10 minutes, but sometimes it goes up to 15 minutes. The idea is
to share airtime between presidential campaigns and the legislative campaigns. Full and normal bulletins all day carry presidential election campaigns only. The 12:30 and 2:30 bulletins have been created to provide coverage for the legislative elections which otherwise are not covered in full bulletins (George Tami, interviewed, 13/4/88).

Thus while the 324 candidates contesting the legislative elections had between 10 and 15 minutes (20 and 30 minutes a day) to sell themselves to the electorate, the only candidate for the presidency had at least 15-20 minutes [the length of the normal news bulletin] multiplied by 6 normal bulletins a day all to himself. No wonder on the 24/4/88 some of the electorates could barely distinguish one legislative contender from the other.

It is clear that President Biya wanted things that way. In his interview on Friday March 18 1988 with Chinje and Mgniman of CRTV, he stated that he did not want the media to be heavily involved with the legislative campaigns: "We have to be prudent because the candidates who are going to stand elections are members of the same party. We don't want to create an atmosphere of division and wrangling." But that was only as far as the legislative elections were concerned. On the other hand, "we would solicit the participation of the press in the presidential elections", said President Biya. Subsequently, special broadcasts were organised in RDC and CTV, which together with a series of editorials highlighted the achievements of President Biya, the New Deal government and the CPDM party, and gave reasons why he needed to be reelected; but only barely touched on the legislative campaigns where there was some competition. The same was true of Cameroon Tribune, which suppressed some columns in order to provide more space for the presidential campaigns especially (See Cameroon Tribune, (daily) and (bi-weekly) 5/4/88).

The coverage of presidential visits, national manifestations, diplomatic activities, and presidential addresses are normally never planned beforehand, since these are not always foreseeable occurrences. But whenever there is such an event, the normal programme schedule is greatly disrupted, and many programmes are affected. Since the practice is to retransmit

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4 Take President Biya's visit to HEVECAM on Friday March 4 for example. The official programme published in Cameroon Tribune (daily, Thursday 3/3/88) the previous day, stretched from 7 a.m to 3 p.m when the President would return to Yaounde. This means that the RDC programme schedule for that period (CTV broadcasts on Friday started at 6 p.m) would be affected. First, between 8 and 9 a.m, programmes would be interrupted in order to report on preparations by the President to leave for the airport; then between 10 a.m (Footnote continued)
everything live, particularly the President's activities, every programme originally scheduled to take place around the time of the ceremony suffers. The news never suffers, but it might come up later than usual, and it might be longer than usual as well (also see Nuvala Fonkem, 1989:31-32); other types of programmes suffer, as the main activity of the day eats up the time that normally should be theirs. What is affected most in these circumstances is the foreign page. Through out 1987 RDC alone covered 18000 minutes of such unscheduled occasional events. (Jean-François Nebenga, Subdirector of programmes, interviewed by Ferdinand Tewafo, 19/1/88).

B) The Broadcast Media and other Members of Government

Although broadcasting for the President is the first priority of RDC and CTV, he is not alone as newsmaker. After him are his close associates: Speaker of the National Assembly, Chairman of the Economic and Social Council, the Ministers, the provincial Governors and high ranking civil servants. Together with the President they make news at the national and provincial

4(continued)

and 12.30 p.m, live coverage would be provided for the welcome ceremony, the speeches, decorations, and so on. At 1 o'clock would be the news in French, during which the whole ceremony would be treated again, especially the President's speech, which would have to be rebroadcast entirely. The 3 p.m news in English is going to include a report on the President's departure from HEVSCAM for Yaounde, where once more, he would be given full coverage. Thus it is clear that whenever the President visits within the country, the broadcast media are entirely pre-occupied with him and his activities; and that other programmes suffer as a consequence.

A typical example took place on Friday March 25 1988 on CTV. First of all, the President's visit to the East Province imposed an impromptu schedule in the morning, an unusual period for TV broadcasts in Cameroon. After the live coverage in the morning, the following is the way the 6.30 p.m newscast on CTV went: It consisted of an unedited retransmission of President Biya's speech at Bertoua; a speech which was first broadcast live earlier that day. The second broadcasting of the speech which was in French, was followed by a commentary on it in English by Eric Chinje, and by an on-the-spot report by Willie Niba still in English. Then Thomas Basono and Joseph Anderson Le gave two reports in French on Bertoua and other parts of the East Province.

The news was longer than usual. (Normal length is maximum of 30 minutes). The item on the Bertoua visit alone took 43 minutes. It was followed by yet another item on the President; this time a report by Jean Effouba Onana, on an interview he accorded Cameroon Tribune. Only two items on the national page did not deal directly with the President: One was a Conference on Agro Research held in Yaounde and presided over by the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Abdoulaye Babale. The Minister's address to the various African Experts attending, was commented upon. The other was on a three day seminar in Yaounde on dental problems. After these two items was a report by Ful Peter on the CPDM party's 3rd anniversary celebrated all over the country the previous day.

(Footnote continued)
levels. Throughout the fieldwork, contributions to the national news bulletin by provincial reporters was either about the activities of the governor, a visiting Minister or a CPDM Central Committee delegation dispatched from Yaounde to sensitize the masses.

In a content analysis of RDC news in English from 25 to 30 April 1988, Nuvala Fonkem reached a similar conclusion. After examining 68 news items, he concluded that

The main sources of news are the administration, the party, the legislature, the parastatal corporations and government agencies or foreign agencies working in relation with the government. It was observed that all the newsmakers involved in this study except one, were members of government and politicians.

The exception was a visiting professor whose public lectures on a new world information order were given the official blessings of the authorities (Nuvala Fonkem, 1989:36).

He also observed that 42 of the 68 items (61.76%) analysed, "dealt with politico-administrative matters", and that economic news constituted "a mere 11.76%" of the total (1989:34). The broadcaster, Nuvala Fonkem pointed out, was however not accountable for the situation, having been forced by government ownership and control into "a position where he is unable to use his initiative to widen the scope of his coverage of national news as well as deepen the content of the news" (1989:31).

However, dominated by political and administrative activities though the national news is, none of the subsidiary newsmakers, not even the Speaker of the National Assembly or the Chairman of the Economic and Social Council, is given half as much the coverage that the President receives. For example, special teams of journalists and extra equipment are not dispatched from Yaounde to reinforce a provincial station, when the Speaker or Minister is visiting.

Neither RDC and CTV nor the official paper Cameroon Tribune, would normally broadcast or print in their entirety speeches by the Speaker or anyone else. The practice is to broadcast or print the highlights of such speeches, then to comment upon them. Only the President’s speeches are broadcast in full and unedited; they could be commented on later, but first, they must be broadcast in their original form. However, the broadcasters did

5(continued)

The foreign page came in at 9.20 p.m and lasted for exactly 11 minutes (till, 9:31 p.m). The News bulletin ended at 9:37 p.m, not before the viewers were told that President Biya had officially announced his candidacy for the Presidency in Bertoua that very day.
think that their treatment of speeches by other members of government was more in line with normal journalistic practice, than was the case with the President's own speeches. This selective discrimination in the treatment of the powerful, has the following effect on the availability of information: Unlike the President's speeches which could be obtained directly from the relevant editions of the daily version of Cameroon Tribune, speeches by the Speaker, Ministers or other top ranking officials are difficult to find in full, unless of course one goes to them personally.

All cases of direct daily pressures by outside forces on the broadcast practitioners of RDC and CTV, were from members of government or the higher ranks of the civil service. Not one single instance of pressure was recorded outside this group. The Ministers most especially, each wanted to make news, to be covered as they presided over meetings, conferences and so on; but it was not the people that they wanted to serve when they invited the microphones and the cameras. On the contrary, in their speeches attention was almost always focused on the President, whom they want to impress with signs of hard work and loyalty. Of course, their letters and phone calls asking for coverage, did not reflect this at all. But although they spoke and wrote of the importance to national development of the ceremonies they wanted covered, there was always a contradiction somewhere.

C) Some Cases of Such Direct Pressures

The following instances of pressure are probably the tip of the iceberg only, but they do indicate that the daily operation of broadcasting in Cameroon is influenced not only from within the institutions, but by outside forces as well. More often than not, it is not the so-called "Chefs de Service de la Redaction" of RDC or CTV who decide what is 'news-worthy' (see Gans, 1971; Tuchman, 1977, 1978; Schlesinger, 1978; Golding et al., 1979, for example of how journalists determine newsworthiness) but their bosses, the administrators both within and without the institutions. Thus, unlike their counterparts at the BBC (Schlesinger, 1978), in America (Gans, 1971; Tuchman, 1977, 1978) or in Ireland, Sweden and to a lesser extent Nigeria (Golding et al., 1979), the Cameroonian broadcasters lack the opportunity to exercise their professionalism through the 'objective' gathering, processing and dissemination of news. News might be the construction of reality as Schlesinger and Tuchman argue, but as far as Cameroon is concerned, the putting together of this reality is seldom decided by the professional broadcasters.
The first case of pressure I recorded was on 29/12/87 at CTV. A military officer from the Ministry of Defense personally came to the CTV Production Centre to ensure that the team of reporters he requested to accompany his Minister on a tour of certain provinces, had been dispatched to the Yaounde airport. Neither Eric Chinje the editor in chief nor Denise Epote his assistant was around the secretariat of the News Department, so the officer telephoned Denise Epote who gave him the information he needed. His familiarity with the Centre suggested this was not his first visit.

On 31/12/87 I went to see the Director of Cultural Affairs in the Ministry of Information and Culture. Also present in the Director’s office was Robert Abunaw, journalist with CTV, and producer of the programme “Looking Back”. The Director (who comes from the Meme Division in the South West province) attempted to persuade Robert Abunaw not to use material he had gathered about the Meme Division. The Director’s reason for intervening was that he had received complaints that the people Robert Abunaw had interviewed for his programme, had failed to present the situation as it really was. In his opinion, the latter should not use the information in its present state, for it was controversial and the public reaction was likely to be unsatisfactory.

On 4/1/88 Julius Wamey, Journalist with CTV talked to me about some of the pressures they faced from members of government and high ranking civil servants. He recounted how members of this group would personally come to the CTV production centre, or ring to find out if such and such an event could be covered. Normally, the final decision whether to cover or not to cover rested with the Director General (DG) or the Deputy Director General (DDG), and not with any one at the Department of News and Information. Shortly after he had said this, the phone rang. It was the DDG, wanting to know if it would be possible to have a team to cover the ceremony of the presentation of New Year Wishes at the Ministry of Mines and Power. The Minister had called demanding that the event, over which he would preside, be covered.

On 18/1/88 at the secretariat of the CTV News and Information Department, I saw a note, a communique addressed by Minister Ze Nguele, through the Minister of Information and Culture, expressing the wish to have Cameroon Tribune, CTV and RDC cover a certain occasion scheduled to take place in the conference hall of his Ministry, which he was to preside over. In his words, taking into account the importance of the ceremony in the process of National Development, these organs of Information should take all the
necessary dispositions to cover it.

Communiques or phone calls such as the above two, are quite common practice, and therefore deserve an early comment. If national development was truly and the only reason why a Minister might ring or write for coverage, is it really necessary for him to urge the media practitioners about what ought to be their duty as 'development' journalists by now? The argument is that, left to decide for themselves, the broadcasters would determine what is relevant or not to national development, without any prompting or reminder by any Minister. They, the broadcasters, would be able to decide whether filming and commenting on speeches made in conference halls contributes more to national development than actually going out and covering the people ('masses') in their real life setting, facing real socio-economic and cultural problems.

On Monday 18 January 1988, I arrived the CTV production centre to find policemen everywhere. They were controlling, checking, and asking everybody, including the CTV workers for identification badges, cards or papers. I presented the research permit and was allowed in; but this, I was to keep doing for the next ten days. Later I learnt why the police had come. The President was to inaugurate the CTV Production Centre on Thursday January 28, so the police had been invited to guard the centre ten days beforehand. This was further proof of how the practitioners are constantly made to see and give the President priority treatment.

At the CTV Production Centre on Tuesday 19/1/88, I stood in conversation with Patience Esoka, an announcer. The phone rang, and since the receptionist was not there, she received the call. It was a call from the Presidency; the person in charge of presidential security wanted to know from Eric Chinje the editor or Denise Epote his assistant, which broadcasters they had assigned to cover the President's visit to the Production Centre the following week. Patience tried to make the caller understand, since neither Eric Chinje nor Denise Epote were there, that everyone at the centre was important, and will have an indispensible part to play on that day; and that it was therefore counterproductive to try to keep some of the staff away on that day, because of presidential security. Then she reminded the person, that the coverage would be similar to the one accorded Helmut Kohl who visited the TV centre in November 1987.

On Monday 21/3/1988, I attended the seminar organised by Camnews for
its correspondents based in the South West province. The broadcaster who was supposed to cover the event failed to arrive on time, due to some conflict of responsibilities between his boss the Chief of Station, and himself as the Chief of Bureau for News. The boss who insisted on doing everything, had forgotten to programme for the event until the very last moment. For which reason the Chief of Bureau arrived after the Delegate of Information and Culture's opening speech. At the end of the seminar he explained why he was late, but was still "obliged to accompany the Delegate back to his office so that he can read his speech out again for me to tape." The press had covered the event, but what the Delegate wanted above all was to hear his voice on radio. Other broadcasters recounted similar experiences with provincial dignitaries, who are not content with making news locally, but want to feature in the national news read in Yaounde, the centre of activity and decision-making.

But pressure is not always to make news. Sometimes the members of government threaten certain journalists whom they see as a thorn in their flesh. Akwanka Joe Ndifor recounted how the former Minister of Industry and Commerce Edward Nomo Ongolo, threatened him for repeatedly showing a programme in which the Minister had blundered immensely. Interviewed for the programme "Minute by Minute" the minister had defended the importation of rice with the claim that foreign rice was four times easier to cook than Cameroonian rice. Seeing this as a grave misjudgement from a member of a government with a policy of self-reliant development, Akwanka criticised the Minister on TV; a thing the latter was not ready to stomach. He threatened "to kill" Akwanka, but lost his post before he could do so. (Interviews with Akwanka Joe Ndifor, 11/1/88; Boh Herbert, 19/1/88; and Charles Ndichia, 12/1/88).

The second example of this kind of pressure was provided by Fai Henry Fonye (interviewed, 2/1/88). Some years back as broadcaster in Radio Buea, he partook in the production of a programme titled "Variety Show", one that was "hypercritical of government action" and that "exposed social ills". The different individuals appointed as governors to the province, reacted differently to the programme. But there was one particular governor - Mr Tanjong, who "wanted the programme to die", because some of its criticism "pointed the finger at him for apparent inefficiency". The governor, Fai argues, acted in self-interest when he tried to stop an article he wrote for

6 Cameroon Tribune (daily, 17/11/1987) contains a report on Kohl's visit to the production centre on Monday November 16.
"Variety Show" and "Cameroon Report", criticising the governor for encouraging the use of the Nigerian Naira in Cameroon, especially when there was a border crisis between the two countries. Apparently, the governor had rewarded the Nigerian inhabitants of the West Coast Limbe with Nairas, when during his visit to the area they danced to welcome him. Fai's argument was that by using the Naira instead of the Franc, the governor was in a way encouraging the Nigerian claim over the territory. But as he says, "the governor took offence, and wrote a query to me, describing me as subversive."

In the light of the above observations, it is evident that broadcasting the President and government are the foremost priority of radio and TV in Cameroon. It is also clear that members of government interfere most with the daily operation of the broadcast media. Although the Ministers and high ranking civil servants can always claim that their requests for greater media attention are for the good of the state, complaints by media practitioners against such a form of journalism belie those claims. Moreover, commonsense would reveal to everyone that speeches alone have never been responsible for development anywhere in the world.

As Fai Henry Fonye (interviewed, 2/1/88) remarks, "we are an underdeveloped country, and as journalists, if allowed to be independent, tie our stories on action." But such independence is never allowed, because the authorities are constantly "forcing you to give more attention to prominence than to action." Illustrating his point with the example of a governor who goes to open a fish pond somewhere in his province, Fai Henry Fonye says: "Normally, if one were to write a story on a fish pond, in the context of development journalism, he should lay stress on agriculture, we shouldn't lay stress on the presence of the governor. He has nothing to do. There you find us having problems from the ethical point of view". It is clear that if the journalists were allowed to do what they judged professionally okay, very few of them would think that covering meetings, reproducing or paraphrasing speeches is the right way of bringing about nation-building or development.

A review of the press in addition to interviews conducted with broadcasters, point to the fact that Cameroonians had hoped TV would be more plural than it has turned out to be. When Television was first introduced in March 1985, there was a general public feeling that it could not have come at a better time. Most Cameroons believed it marked the end of a repressive political regime and the beginning of an era of hope, democracy, openness and freedom of information. Speculatively, television was seen as a challenge to
politicians who had kept away from the sanctioning eye of the public for a quarter of a century; henceforth they would be directly accountable to the people in whose name they always claimed to speak.

Yet the very first signals of TV, which were received in Bamenda on 20 March 1985 at 8:30pm on the occasion of the fourth ordinary congress of the now defunct GNU, left no doubt that like radio, TV was going to serve politics above everything else. Still staggering in infancy and amateurism, it succeeded in covering the whole congress. TV withdrew into its cocoon for further metamorphoses, only just coming out from time to time to cover occasions of great political significance (Nyamnjoh, 1988); therefore confirming the idea that news in Cameroon is about the great, who are those in government and the higher ranks of the civil service.

Thus it is no surprise that the next broadcast by Cameroon Television was in May during the National Day celebrations. Nor is it a coincidence that in August 1985, it appeared again to cover Pope John-Paul II's maiden visit to the country. CTV was not fully operational yet; but despite its handicaps which included, interalia, having to transmit from a mobile van, it endeavoured to cover such major political events like the abovementioned. Unable to stand on its legs yet, CTV had already impressed the politicians as a prestigious medium of communication with the public. From 23 December 1985, CTV started broadcasting twice a week: Saturdays and Sundays, while continuing with coverage of such politically significant events as National Day celebrations, Presidential activities and visits, and sporting events like the Mexican World Cup and the African Nations Cup in Egypt. Sports, as we shall see, is given much attention in CTV and RDC.

In fact, even long before the March 1985 TV debut, as far back as 1981, a TV unit was created and attached to the National Station of RDC. Headed by Mr Emmanuel Nguianba, and equipped with two Thomson colour Cameras and Umatic 3/4 equipment, the TV Unit was charged with recording all important national events, especially the political ones, in view of eventually presenting them on TV. Between 1981 and 1983, the TV Unit had succeeded in recording 40 cassettes, each of 1 to 2 hours long (BEA-RDC, 1983:52).

Equally, on March 7 1988, following the creation of CRTV, Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya wrote a circular letter (No 003/MINF0C/DIPA) urgently inviting all Ministers, Secretaries of State, Director Generals and Directors of public and para-public organisations, to negotiate for airtime on radio and
TV. Not until they had done this, would CRTV be in a position to draw up
definite programme schedules for these media. The importance of this, the
Minister explained, was that it would enable these officials to better explain
to the population the government's development efforts through their various
departments, as well as to promote creativity. However, the Minister's
circular tendered no similar invitation to the general public that could
enable them say what they thought of these efforts of the government's;
neither did it invite the political elite of rural or traditional Cameroon to
negotiate for airtime as well. Yet, as we remarked in chapter five, the
government depends heavily on the rural population for the food and cash crops
it needs to feed the urbanites and earn foreign exchange.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter we set out to understand at a more practical level
the relationship between the government and the broadcast media, and to deal
with some of the daily pressures exerted on the broadcast practitioners.
Drawing largely from fieldwork experience, I have examined the political
atmosphere wherein broadcasting operates. It is one dominated by the President
and the members of his administration, one in which neither the traditional
political elite (as discussed in chapter five) nor the rest of the plural
society features significantly. Such political centralism has led to the
domination of the broadcast media by the modern political elite. News is not
only dominated by this group and their activities but touches on the rest of
society only through them.

The President and his activities are not only capable of upsetting
the normal programme schedules of RDC and CTV, but can also impose impromptu
schedules at non-broadcast hours. Although the media everywhere in the world
are accessible to the powerful and the socially well placed but remarkably
difficult to penetrate by the powerless poor (Head, 1963:597; Tuchanan,
Bashiruddin, 1979; White, 1980; Gupta, 1981; Ugboajah, 1985; Reyes Matta,
1986, etc.), in Cameroon, like elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, the
situation is different in that the broadcasters are seldom given the
professional opportunity to determine accessibility. There is little evidence
in support of Head's assertion that "there is no situation in which a Newman
finds himself in which he does not have some degree of freedom to develop the
professional point of view" or "to report whatever he, in his professional
judgment, recognizes as news in the manner he, in his professional judgment,
considers the most effective way of reporting (1963:594-8).

Our examination of the daily pressures exerted also revealed that no one of these came from the traditional political elite or the rest of society. What we remarked was constant interference by the members of the administration with the daily operation of the broadcast media. Yet, as we said above, even though the modern political elite can always claim their requests for greater media attention are for the good of the state, complaints by the media practitioners against these interferences belie any such claim. Moreover, as we remarked in chapter five, speeches, especially when the majority of the people are excluded from the speaking, have failed to result in the necessary political, cultural and economic changes envisaged at independence. The insistence on the dissemination of official statements and declarations, instead of the information or education necessary for the 'transformation of mentalities' is most unlikely to fulfill Cameroon's self-reliant and balanced regional development objectives. Neither would it bring about the desired cultural renaissance, when the traditional political elites who share the cultures of the rural masses, are denied participation in decision-making and access to the media.

Thus it could be argued that radio and TV are there to serve a political cause for the modern leadership, first and foremost; which accounts for the excessive attention paid to the President and his government, and for the daily pressures exerted by the latter on the practitioners. Such heavy concentration on and interference from the government and its activities means that the broadcast media and practitioners have little time and space for anything or anyone else. Notwithstanding the fact that the government depends on mass participation in order to succeed in the "supreme mission" of nation-building. Without provisions for feedback, it is impossible for the government to know how the masses in question are reacting to its messages of nation-building and development. As Bayart aptly remarks, unless the media are allowed the political, cultural and economic autonomy they lack, their "contribution to socialisation and communication within the Cameroonian political system" is bound to remain "an illusion" (1973:61-2).

In chapter eight which follows, we investigate how the call for full participation and balanced regional development has been realised in the area of broadcasting. Participation and balance, which so far have proved neither to be present in the economy and the political process of decision-making, nor in the accessibility of the broadcast media.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PLACE OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA IN A PLURAL SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

In chapter six we dealt with the state's concept of nation-building and the role of broadcasting in this connection. We learnt of the strategies employed by the government on media practitioners to ensure conformity with expectations not always compatible with public interest. Chapter seven indicated how broadcasting for the President and government is the greatest priority in RDC and CTV, and examined some of the daily pressures exerted on broadcasters by the authorities. The present chapter is interested in the effect of centralism on broadcasting for nation-building, especially in a polyethnic, multilingual and multicultural society like Cameroon.

We would recall that in chapter one some researchers noted that the polyethnic, multilingual and multicultural nature of most African states was a major hindrance to the process of making polity and culture congruent through assimilation and social mobilisation (Smith, 1983, 1986; Seton-Watson, 1977; Gellner, 1983), while others argued that attempts by powerful centralised governments or states to impose unity and integration from above without democratic popular participation had only compounded the problem (Goulbourne, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Doumou, 1987; Amin, 1987a, 1987b; Gabou, 1987). Thus the recognition by most communication researchers in chapter three (Golding, 1974; Katz, 1977; Singh, 1977; Diaz Bordenave, 1977; Katz et al., 1978; Bashiruddin, 1979; White, 1980; Gupta, 1981; White et al., 1983; Hamelink, 1983b; Servaes, 1983, 1986; Sinha, 1985; Ugboajah, 1985a; Aggarwala, 1985; Lins Silva, 1986; Reyes Matta, 1986; Roncaglilo, 1986; Simpson Grinberg, 1986; etc.) that only a truly decentralised, participative and democratic broadcast system could play an effective role in the process of nation-building in plural societies.

In view of this, the present chapter seeks to investigate centralism in Cameroonian broadcasting. The contention being that centralism results in cleavages between majority and minority interests, and to bureaucracy which adversely affects creativity, causes delays and encourages mediocrity. Centralism here is understood to mean, the tendency to concentrate decision-making, control, resources or broadcast content in a few hands and
places; as opposed to spreading out to include as many people, groups and regions as is useful to nation-building. To establish the effect of centralism on broadcasting therefore, this chapter looks at (a) the decision-making process at various levels of the broadcast institutions, (b) the distribution of broadcast facilities throughout the country, and (c) the content (messages) broadcast. The general aim being that of determining the degree of participation by various groups, people, and regions within the territorial state. This is done by looking at the Administrative, Locational, Content and Linguistic aspects of centralism.

I.) THE CREATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF BROADCAST FACILITIES

A) Radio

The creation and distribution of radio facilities during the colonial era has already been described in chapter six, so there is very little to add, apart from reiterating the conclusion we reached that the transmission facilities, weak though these were, remained the privilege of the cities of Douala, Yaoundé, Garoua and to a lesser extent Buea; and that very few indigenes could afford radio sets of their own. It is therefore the situation at the dawn of independence that remains to be examined in detail.

Unesco publications (1964, 1965) indicate that the number of radio stations which operated in Cameroon remained at three for quite some time after independence. These stations, located in Yaounde, Douala and Garoua, were all state operated. However, Unesco fails to include Radio Buea (comprising a mobile transmitter) which became part of RDC after unification in 1961. There are two possible explanations to Unesco’s omission of Radio Buea: Either those who provided Unesco with the information thought of Cameroon to be limited only to the francophone part which obtained independence in 1960, or, they were simply not well informed of the changes that took place in the country. Whatever the case, in a speech at Garoua on 10 May 1969 President Ahidjo unveiled plans to increase the number of stations from four (Yaounde, Douala, Garoua and Buea) to six, by creating radio stations at Bafoussam and Bertoua (Ahidjo, 1980:919).

It can be argued that immediately after independence and unification, Ahidjo’s administration had more pressing things to occupy itself with than setting up more radio stations whose operation he was unlikely to supervise closely. He had growing political opposition to crush, a ‘unified’ party to bring about, and a united republic to forge; all of which he achieved
in one way or another by 1972. Quite understandably therefore, the first real indication for an improved radio network came in the Third Five Year Development Plan (1971–1976). Under the terms of the plan, the government allocated over 1,030 million F CFA for the realisation of the Bafoussam and Bertoua radio projects (Ekaney, 1976:118); albeit Radio Bertoua alone cost 1,347,943,980 F CFA to construct (Ahidjo, 1980:2130). The plan also envisaged a new 100KW transmitter in Yaounde and the modernisation of the networks at Douala, Garoua and Buea (Ekaney, 1976:118). Prior to this plan the government had only succeeded in acquiring a new 30KW transmitter for Yaounde in 1962, another 30KW transmitter for Garoua in 1963 and a new transmitter centre for Buea in 1967. The idea behind these changes or planned improvements was to have a powerful network that would effectively contribute towards the task of nation-building as defined by the government.

Before the official opening of Radio Bertoua in 1978, Cameroon was still served by the only four stations it had in 1961 with a total of 10 transmitters hardly totaling 100KW. However, by the time Ahidjo resigned as President in 1982, there was a radio station in each of the then seven provinces, a National Station, an International Service, an Urban Service, and two mobile stations; which consisted of transmitters totaling 300KW. The latest station was Bamenda’s, which in 1981 benefitted from one of Douala’s old 1KW transmitters; until 1981 Bamenda was simply a recording studio that contributed to or participated in network programmes only through Radios Buea and Bafoussam. Such was the situation with Bertoua and Bafoussam before their respective stations were opened in 1978 and 1980. For a period of twenty two years, the post-colonial government of Ahidjo succeeded in establishing three new stations and in ‘modernizing’ four.

The present government created three new provinces which automatically called for new stations as well. Barely a year after it came to power in 1982, President Biya’s administration was able to decree the creation of three more radio stations at Ngaoundere, Ebolowa and Maroua, the respective capitals of the new provinces of Adamawa, South and Far–North. It also built a new 300KW MW transmitter for Bamenda, which was launched on 28 July 1986. This brings the number of provincial radio stations to ten (the National Station, the International Service, and the Yaounde Urban Service apart), and enables 85% of the territory to be covered by radio, with a total of 867KW in medium and short wave transmitters (Omgba Etoundi, 1985:8; Mkaa, 1986:18).

For political expediency, each provincial station is established in
the provincial capital city. The idea is to satisfy more a political need than
a social or cultural one. It is more a question of leaving the inhabitants of
the province with the feeling that they too have a radio station. The policy
is to create a station in each provincial capital, irrespective of how close
to another a capital might be, or how far away from the rest of the province
the capital is. A case in point is Radio Bamenda, which is only 80 km from
Radio Bafoussam, but which is expected to serve places like Nkambe and beyond,
which are more than 200 km away. Another example is Yaounde, which alone has
four stations, namely: the National Station, the Urban Station, the
International Service, and the Central Provincial Station, for no other reason
but the fact that politically, the National Station must be located in the
national capital, or that the provincial station has to be in the provincial
capital.

These two examples are ample proof that what the government seeks
more than anything else is political stability. The stations are first to
serve a political purpose, and any other thing is just secondary. So long as
the government can give political satisfaction to the inhabitants of each
province by creating even a recording studio (e.g. Bamenda before 1981), or by
equipping the station with a weak 1KW transmitter - a relic of French
colonialism (e.g. Buea 1961, Bamenda 1981), that is okay by the government.
Thus, for a long time the inhabitants of the North West province felt that
"they too had a radio station", even though their 1KW transmitter which could
barely serve the city of Bamenda and its immediate environs, was so weak and
so unpredictable that they eventually nicknamed it "Radio One Battery" (Pul,
1985). No wonder an effort to ameliorate the situation of the provincial
stations, is most likely to be made only when the President is visiting; for
example, during the Bamenda Agro-Pastoral Show and the CNU party congress in
1984 and 1985 respectively, when mobile transmitters and other equipment were
brought from Yaounde to reinforce the 1KW station.

Another point which reinforces the argument that stations are
created more for political expediency than anything else, is the question of
sets. In his study of the role of radio in national development, Ekaney
(1976) examines, interalia, the economic, linguistic and sociological factors
which hinder radio's ability to make its development information broadcast
understood and appreciated by the rural masses. Accordingly, but for a few
affluent urban dwellers, the majority of Cameroonians, especially peasants in
the rural areas cannot afford a radio set. Though a cheap transistor radio
would cost about 5000 FCFA, "in a country like Cameroon where the average
annual per capita income of an agricultural worker with a family of four is about 44,000 CFA francs (U.S.$178), owning a radio set is a luxury which entails sacrificing other basic necessities of life" (1976:125).

In 1986 Cameroon was estimated to have 1,500,000 sets or 15 sets per 100 people (IBAR-BBC, 1987:9), as opposed to 10,000 (0.3 sets per 100 people) in the early sixties (Unesco, 1965). However, the bulk of radio sets and audiences remain in the cities and urban areas. Cameroon must have been aware of this financial handicap when along with other African countries at the meeting of experts in 1962, it accepted the Unesco recommendation to "encourage the establishment and operation of group listening centres and radio ‘Farm Forums’, and be prepared to meet the additional costs of equipment and organization" (1962:26). But there is no evidence that the Cameroonian government ever saw to it that such centres and forums were set up. It is one thing to make public statements about the importance of group listening, but another to ensure that such groups are actually created and equipped.

Commissioned by Unesco to prospect on the possibility for the development of a rural communication policy in Cameroon, Gahungu (1981) identifies as problems to broadcasting, multilingualism and poor receptivity caused by lack of FM and the rather indiscriminate use of short wave. He advocates the adoption of FM which has the advantage to offer stable and permanently localised listening, as well as makes the rural audiences faithful listeners. Without this, Gahungu warns, local audiences would continue to listen to faraway stations (even foreign ones) which they find easier to receive than local stations operating on SW, or that have very weak MW. Examples of overpowering foreign stations are Africa No.1, BBC, VOA and RFI.

The problem of receptivity is of course an old one which has been discussed many times before. For instance, at a meeting of experts on the development of information media in Africa, organised by Unesco in 1962, the issue was deliberated upon by some 200 participants, among whom was a Cameroonian delegation. It was recommended that African countries use FM particularly in thickly populated areas, and that they reserve SW primarily for programmes designed for international broadcasting. Despite the higher cost of receivers equipped for FM, African countries were still advised to adopt it because of "its ability to transmit programmes of good sound quality

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1 Cameroon was represented by Mr Moutongo-Black and Mr Joseph Foalem-Fotso, then respective Director and Technical Director of RDC.
which is especially important for educational purposes”. Furthermore, “FM radio broadcasting constituted the first step towards television reception” (Unesco, 1962:24).

However, as Gahungu confirms in his report, until 1981 there were no signs of the Cameroonian government having heeded the Unesco recommendation it helped to bring about, even though Cameroon was one of 16 countries with plans to introduce television in the near future. A survey carried out in urban Cameroon in 1983 showed the SW set to be most common, as 85% of the 89% households with radio sets, had SW facilities (Mytton, 1986:35). In another survey three years later the figure was even higher, with 88% of the 94% households with sets having SW facilities (IBAR-BBC, 1987:23). As Mytton notes (1986:35), due to the excessive cost of national coverage using FM and MW radio stations, most countries even in the developed world rely heavily on SW for domestic broadcasting.

Receptivity is possibly going to improve as the constructed transmitters of Cameroon Television (CTV) are said to include provisions for two FM radio transmitters as well (Etoga, speech, 28/1/88). Already, according to a Report by former Director of RDC Emmanuel Kome Epule (February 1988), Cameroon is currently equipped with a total of 13 FM transmitters.

As technicians would say, powerful transmitters are one thing, maintaining or making them function properly quite another. Biyiti Bi Essam (1984:107-110) argues that the Cameroonian authorities have placed more emphasis on the purchase of technology than on its maintenance and usage. He thinks that the authorities are guided more by a reflex, a spontaneous buying of transmitters, than by a conscious policy of any sort. He maintains that they have tended to behave as though it suffices to buy powerful transmitters, and maintenance and good programming would take care of themselves automatically. His concern is validated by another look at Emmanuel Kome Epule’s 1988 report, which gives an account of the rather poor state and paucity of broadcasting facilities in RDC. I have summarised the Director’s data in Table III.

Apart from air conditioning, clocks and mobile stations which do not work, some of the other items declared in working order are capable of breakdowns at any moment. This, the report spells out, is due to the fact that some of the equipment is almost 50 years old, dating as far back as 1941 when Radio Douala was started. Amongst such equipment are the following
TABLE III
Current State of Technical Equipment in RDC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Item</th>
<th>working order</th>
<th>nonworking order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Transmitters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 SW</td>
<td>7 (53%)</td>
<td>6 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 MW</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>6 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 FM</td>
<td>9 (69%)</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cabin</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>19 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Stand-by Generators</td>
<td>10 (61%)</td>
<td>4 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Air Conditioning Centres</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wall Clocks</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Telephone Exchange</td>
<td>2 (28%)</td>
<td>5 (72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Modulation Centres</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mobile Stations</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Light OB Vans</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Light Service Cars</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cable Links of Centres</td>
<td>3 (42%)</td>
<td>4 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- PTT interconnection system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100%)* but defective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transmitters:
- 1KW MW of the National Station,
- 60W FM of the National Station,
- 2 X 5KW MW of Radio Douala,
- 2 X 4KW SW of Radio Buea, and
- 1KW MW of Radio Bamenda.

It is evident that technically, RDC is not at its best (BEA-RDC, 1983:44-5). The equipment is aging very fast, and the absence or difficulty (discussed in chapter nine) to obtain spare parts is partly due to the obsolescence of some of the equipment. This paucity of technical facilities leads
to the overuse of available facilities, and consequently to their rapid depreciation. Examples are the MW and SW transmitters of the National Station, which function 20 hours a day, seven days a week.

These technical problems can lead to all sorts of hiccups, including the suspension of broadcasts for as long as it would take to obtain the spare parts needed to resolve the problem. And this can go on for years, as was the case with Radio Bertoua whose SW transmitter did not function for two years because of the unavailability of a synthesizer. The International Service has also not been able to function since the end of 1986 because of a breakdown of its transmitters, and because, instead of repairing these transmitters, parts of them were taken out and fitted into the National Station transmitters that were equally faulty (Interviews with André Kwa Mbangue, 11/1/88; Sam Nualma Fonkem, 4/2/88). Albeit there would still be the problem of sufficient funds to produce relevant programmes, were the transmitters to be up again.

The link between the national and the provincial stations is very unpredictable, because of the frequent problems that the network's HF transmission runs into. The consequence is a constant interruption of the "network programmes", which every station is supposed to relay. Stations rely on SONEL, a state corporation which enjoys a monopoly over the supply of electrical power. But SONEL is notorious not only for constant power failures, but also (and most dangerous to broadcast equipment) for the tendency to supply voltage that is higher than authorised (sometimes as high as 450 V (20%) instead of the 330 V (10%) variation authorised). Radio Buea, one of the two provincial stations I visited, had an especial problem with power supply because the SONEL transformer in Buea was very faulty. In Bamenda the 300 KW MW transmitter inaugurated in 1986 could not function properly because it was not built near a water source, or rather, because another state corporation SNEC, had not yet brought water to the site. Thus a transmitter that cost 3,000 Million F CFA (Cameroon Tribune, Tuesday 2/2/88) to install three years ago, is not yet fully serving the purpose for which it was bought.

Concerning studio equipment, the situation is no different. Interviews with and observation of practitioners at work revealed the working conditions are far from perfect. The studio facilities are grossly insufficient. Take the "Nagra" (professional outdoor recorder) for example; there simply are not enough of these, not even at the National Station. The journalist, Thomas Babi Koussana, said how he was obliged to ask the University of Yaounde to be allowed to use its Nagra in the production of his
programmes at RDC. Radio Buea had three Nagras only, and Radio Bamenda one. Both stations had only one service car each, while Radio Buea was operating without a standby studio. Olive Shang, producer and presenter of the programme "Calling the Women", explained how she used her personal funds to purchase the professional tape recorder she needed for a Women's conference at Nairobi in 1986, because RDC had none and would rather she carried a "cumbersome" Nagra along. But although the inadequacy of facilities is general, not every station benefits equally from the little made available. The National Station has the lion's share of everything: from number of stations and transmitters, to studio equipment, service vehicles and technical staff. The provincial stations are less well off, and more often than not, barely succeed in making ends meet.

Everything is centralised in Yaounde where both the Ministry of Information and Culture and the National Station of RDC are situated. The provincial stations depend entirely on the National Station for equipment and finance. They each compile a list of technical needs, which they send to the Director of RDC in Yaounde for consideration. At the National Station an overall list is compiled. Until the creation of CRTV in December 1987, such a list used to be forwarded to the Ministry for consideration; but henceforth, everything would have to be sent to the CRTV headquarters in Yaounde. As the former Deputy Director of RDC Mr Maka Eteh Nee acknowledged, the procedure is so long and complicated that an order can take as long as a year to materialise. Mr Francis Bongha Ndze, Assistant Chief of Station for Radio Buea (interviewed, 21/3/88), confessed very few problems reported to the Directorate in Yaounde ever take less than six months to be resolved.

Summary

There are altogether thirteen radio stations in Cameroon, ten of which are provincial, four of which are based in Yaounde alone, but none of which is rural. The distribution of radio broadcast facilities is limited to the provincial capitals. Stations are created more for political expediency than for their socio-cultural relevance to the inhabitants of the provinces where they are created. Perhaps that accounts for the exceedingly low level of maintenance, and for the centralisation of resources or their acquisition in Yaounde. The provincial stations depend entirely on the National Station for equipment and finance, and often go through long, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to obtain these. Although there is a general inadequacy of broadcast facilities, stations fail to benefit equally from what is available; the National Station is the largest beneficiary and the provincial stations
The preponderance of the political motives, in addition to technical problems of all sorts, greatly impair the effectiveness of radio as a tool for nation-building. Thus, if rural Cameroon is excluded by the mere fact that broadcast facilities are urban centred, the urbanites themselves are equally alienated by the technical difficulties and slow bureaucratic procedure that act as an impediment to creativity and richness, and that forces RDC to use the barest minimum with which it is provided in broadcasting the essential, politics.

B) Television

Television did not make its debut in Cameroon until March 1985, but it had existed as an idea and as a plan for a long time. This section of the work deals with a critical history of TV from inception to materialisation, with a special focus on the technicalities. Some of the things touched on here are raised again in chapters nine and ten in connection with foreign technological and cultural involvement in Cameroonian broadcasting.

Although in 1962 Cameroon was one of sixteen African countries with plans to introduce television (Unesco, 1962:23), Cameroonians were to wait for more than twenty three years for the medium to make its maiden appearance. In his study of TV drama in Nigeria, Oduko speculates on the conspicuous absence of TV in Cameroon even though neighbouring Nigeria has had it for over 25 years. According to him, party politics have been a strong force in both countries, and he would expect politics to have stimulated the introduction of TV in Cameroon as it did in Nigeria. Perhaps this can be partly explained by Cameroon's lack of a population as large as Nigeria's, and not having the oil wealth that Nigeria has, he suggests (1985:185).

If party politics helped bring about TV in Nigeria as Oduko claims, in Cameroon this failed to happen before 1966 when multiparty politics ceased to exist. Though the "unified" CNU party was created in 1966, Oduko writes as if party politics have been as strong a force in post-colonial Cameroon as they have been in Nigeria. Cameroon has been and continues to be a single party state since the birth of the CNU. It is incorrect for Oduko to claim in 1985 that Cameroon lacks oil wealth, when the latter was already highly dependent on oil revenue as far back as 1975 (Africa Confidential, June 1987).

This introduction made, we should look into the question why it took
Cameroon so long to introduce TV as indicated in 1962. There is evidence Cameroon was quite ready to realise its planned introduction of TV. The government not only talked about it, but actually commissioned a number of studies to be carried out. While inaugurating the new 30KW transmitter of Radio Garoua in 23 July 1963, President Ahidjo stated that Cameroon was not unaware of the great potentials and possibilities of TV, by declaring that studies were already underway towards its introduction.

However, the government was later to reject the conclusions of a study by Menard, a French expert who advised that a single transmitter be installed at the summit of Mount Cameroon, to serve the entire country; first, as being too costly, and second, as risky, given the volcanicity of the mountain (Nkaa, 1986). There were similar studies in subsequent years, but none seemed satisfactory enough to move the government into action. Instead, in a speech on 10 March 1969, Ahidjo expressed his wish to concentrate focus and resources on making the radio more available by creating more radio stations. He revealed his intentions to build new radio stations at Bafoussam and Bertoua.

About TV, Ahidjo expressed the government’s reluctance to rush into it before a full grasp of how it could be used and of its possible implications. His position was that,

... nothing shall be done in Cameroon as far as television is concerned, so long as our needs are not very clearly defined by a systematic study, the objectives which we intend to pursue, and the material and financial means available for us to ensure its operation and maintenance.

We hope in this way, to identify ourselves more particularly, and that from the outset, with the educative role that Cameroon TV would have to play, and to avoid the hasty installation of expensive equipment whose cost of maintenance would not have been accurately evaluated, thus doing irreparable damage to our budget (Ahidjo, 1980:304). [translation mine]

It is clear from Ahidjo’s speeches and declarations that Cameroon was not yet ready for TV in 1969, though it had allowed itself to be counted among the prestigious sixteen with plans for television in the near future. One can always argue on the nearness of "the near future", but there is every reason to believe that when Cameroon expressed its desire for TV in 1962, it was in no way prepared for it, not even if the near future was taken to mean the next twenty years. This does not imply that the government slept on the issue for twenty years and more, but that CTV would have been established long before 1985 if the political will had been strong enough on the part of the
previous regime, which retained power under the same President for twenty-two years after independence.

Feasibility studies continued to be made, even if they invariably ended up forgotten in the drawers of politicians. According to Nkaa (1986) Cameroon became serious about the establishment of a TV network only from 1975. The issue is mentioned, though without much elaboration in the 3rd and 4th Five Year Development plans. In 1975 the then Ministry of Plan and Industry signed a contract with EUROSPACE, in which the company agreed to carry out feasibility studies on how Cameroon could use audiovisual techniques for mass education.

The project, aimed at an educational TV that would serve both urban and rural Cameroon, was known as ESOPÉ I (Etude de Système Opérationnel pour le Développement). Studies on it commenced on November 15, 1974 and ended on May 15, 1975. These were carried out in the Littoral, Centre-South and North Provinces. All was to culminate in an experimental transmission of TV signals on Friday May 7, 1976 with the help of a Franco-German satellite, "Symphonie", operated from French Guyana (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 4/5/1976). But as Nkaa (1986) reports, the government was forced to abandon the ESOPÉ I project when the abrupt closure of the Guyanain station made it difficult for Symphonie to proceed with its experimental transmission in Cameroon. Thus all the equipment installed for the transmission and dissemination of programmes were simply abandoned (Biakolo, 1979:14).

In a way, Cameroon compensated itself for this failure when it participated in a world satellite technology demonstration. According to Warr, the USA National Aeronautic and Space Administration’s applied technology satellite (ATS-6) was used to transmit colour TV pictures from Washington DC to Yaounde and two other towns on 5 October, 1976. The aim of the demonstration was relevant to the government’s preoccupation with educational TV; for it was to "illustrate how satellite technology could help developing countries in the fields of educational broadcasting, disaster prediction and remote sensing" (1976:23).

The failure of ESOPÉ I did not mark the end of feasibility studies; it called for more. Probably freshly inspired by the American demonstration, President Ahidjo asked the Minister of Information and Culture to start another systematic study. Five Cameroonian engineers were commissioned to start work on 27 December 1976. They were concerned with the technical aspects
of TV. All through these feasibility studies, little or no attention was paid to the socio-cultural aspects of TV (BEA-RDC, 1983:52–3). The assumption seemed to be that what mattered were the technical equipment, their cost and maintenance.

Despite President Ahidjo's concern with educative TV, no studies were carried out on how this could be realised. It seemed to be taken for granted that the right type of programmes and personnel would appear once the country was through with technical preparations for TV (Nyamnjoh, 1988:36). How the government intended to realise an educative TV capable of appealing to over 80% of the population which was rural (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 4/5/1976), remained unexplained. Yet the government's major reasons for not making a blind rush into TV were the content and availability, and not just the technicalities of the medium (Biakolo, 1979; Unesco, 1980:59). Not surprisingly therefore, when TV finally arrived, the original idea of a rural or an educative TV whereby 50 persons could sit and watch educative programmes together, was abandoned; in fact, rather conspicuously absent (BEA-RDC, 1983:52).

The fact that government neglected this vital aspect of preparing for TV has not only brought about CTV's present operational problems (Nyamnjoh, 1988:36–9), but is clearly indicative of how unprepared for the medium Cameroon has always been. For how can Cameroon claim that TV has actually been realised, when in effect CTV does not respond to the government's original intentions of bringing about a largely rural and educative TV, characterised by group watching and dominated by rich cultural programmes of Cameroonian and African origin?

Meanwhile, the commission of five engineers compiled and tendered their findings to the government in November 1977. Their study had considered the type of network to adopt, the best colour system, and the most adapted equipment and maintenance facilities to opt for (Biakolo, 1979:14–15; Omgba Etoundi, 1985:8–9; Nkaa, 1986:24). Throughout 1978 nothing happened TV-wise, although yet another radio station was opened in Bertoua; the government was probably gathering momentum to launch the TV project, which it did in 1979.

As BEA-RDC (1983), Omgba Etoundi (1985) and Nkaa (1986) recount, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was invited in 1980 to help in selecting suitable candidates from a group of seven international companies competing for the contract to establish TV in Cameroon. After an initial
examination of applications, four candidates were preselected: Thomson of France, Siemens of West Germany, Pye of Britain and Elinga of Canada. These were then asked to re-apply, clearly stating their propositions regarding the production of programmes, signal transmission and the dissemination of the broadcasts, as well as what they considered to be the most essential equipment.

On the basis of these propositions, Thomson and Siemens were finally selected in December 1981. The government found it difficult to make any further choices between the two companies, which each had something special to offer. The government, says Nkaa (1986), realised Thomson had an attractive broadcast proposal, and that Siemens' proposal in studio equipment and transmission was the best. So it retained both, each to do what it was best in. Thomson subtreated Sodeteg its traditional partner, and together they have been in charge of the construction and equipment of the broadcast centres; while Siemens and TRT in a consortium with other firms such as Fougerolle, were charged with the construction and installation of production equipment, the transmission networks and the buildings. The contracts were signed for Thomson and Sodeteg on 25 November 1982, and for the Siemens consortium on 10 January 1983 (Nkaa, 1986:28). At last, the introduction of TV planned over twenty years ago, was about to be actually realised.

The choice of TV system did not fail to spark off some controversy. France, who for political and economic reasons, normally expected Cameroon to choose the French system SECAM, was angry with the government for preferring PAL. Cameroon opted for PAL following the advice of ITU and some local experts. To Omgba Eboundi (1985) and Nkaa (1986), the choice of PAL was a bold step by the government to free Cameroon from the shackles of neocolonialism and exploitation. As Emmanuel Ngufamba (one of Nkaa's informants) confesses, the choice of PAL was motivated by both technical and political considerations. It is common for countries and international organisations (who should know better) to identify Cameroon as a francophone country. Following one such case of mistaken identity in 1963, an international conference held at Geneva had listed Cameroon among the francophone countries who would normally adopt SECAM when it came to choosing a TV system. However, in the same conference Cameroon and Zaire were given the choice to opt for a different system if they so desired.

Apart from the political desire not to allow other countries to shape its destiny, Cameroon found PAL to be technically superior and less
costly than SECAM. Nguiamba explains this advantage as follows:

Both systems are good, although PAL is slightly better in production and picture quality, while SECAM is more skilful with transmission. The difference is at the level of cost. French labour is costly; thus all that is produced in France is as a result more expensive. From the point of view of industry, PAL is more common to find than SECAM; which makes it easier to deal with (Nkaa, 1986:28-29). [translation mine]

In principle all construction work is either finished or just about. In order to give the population a better service, the government decided in 1984 to build 30 broadcast centres instead of the 14 originally scheduled. By the end of January 1988, Siemens was through with the construction and equipment of the TV Production Centre at Mballa II in Yaounde. Thomson was practically through with the construction and equipment of the broadcast centres as well. Speaking during the inauguration of the the Production Centre on Thursday 28 January 1988, CTV Director General (DG) Eily Florent Etoga, summarised the situation thus:

CTV comprises 30 broadcast or transmission centres (Band III, PAL) of which are:
- 4 ........... 20KW
- 9 ........... 10KW
- 8 ........... 1KW
- 9 ........... 100KW.

Of the 30 centres, 22 were transmitting regularly already, while the rest had been completed and awaited testing and approval. What the DG failed to mention, but which Mr Abosuo Lereh, an engineer in charge of broadcasting in CTV (interviewed, 18/1/88) did, is that there are in effect 28 broadcast centres, and 4 transposer centres in Limbe, Dschang, Mvomeka'a and Bangou. (A transposer centre relies on the nearest broadcast centre for its signals.) According to the DG, 55% of the 'national' territory and 88% of the total population was to be covered within the first half of 1988.

With radio we remarked that stations are limited to the urban areas. The same is true of TV whose regional broadcast centres are equally urban-centred, as the idea is to constrcut transmission and broadcast centres in and around the cities, where the population is dense. Due to massive rural exodus the rural areas, although populous, usually have very low population densities. They are therefore consequently most hit by a policy of distributing broadcast facilities according to population density. At the moment there is only one channel, which broadcasts from the CTV Production
On the other hand, even if the villages were well covered, more by coincidence than design, there would still be the problem of the unavailability of sets. A 1986 survey put the total number of sets at 300,000, 3 per 100 people (IBAR-BBC, 1987:9). Although the figure is definitely higher today, the situation in the rural areas has not improved, for obvious reasons. First, sets are too costly (Biakolo, 1979:16; Dueunou, 1987:33-4); and second, like many other amenities, urban electrification is privileged over the rural. It was not until 1980 that a tardy attempt at rural electrification was started with the help of the Canadians (Tanyi-Tambe, 1987:23-6). And the government has neither indicated that it is ready to reconsider the idea of collective viewing, nor that it is willing to subsidize the efforts of the rural peasants.

The CTV project is so far the most expensive single public investment in the history of Cameroon. Neither the construction of the oil refinery in Limbe, the building of the TransCameroonian railway, nor the erection of the Presidential Palace, was as expensive as CTV. As Nkemden Forbinake puts it (Cameroon Tribune, (Bi-weekly) 2/2/88), all other investments "whose elevated costs raised eyebrows across the country, have been dwarfed by our television project." The total cost stands at 82 billion, 91 million, 112, 698 F CFA, according to Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, former Minister of Information and Culture. But unlike Nuna who thought of this colossal sum as an investment by the Cameroonian taxpayer (see speech, 15/3/88), Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya considered it the President's gift to Cameroonians, one which translated the President's idea of the greatness of Cameroon and symbolized his "infinite generosity for our dear and beautiful fatherland" (see speech, 28/1/88). The following sections on administration, content and language examine whether the "taxpayer's money", or "the President's gift", has been well utilized.

Even before then, it can be argued that had the government thought things over properly, some of the expenditure would have been avoided and consequently, the taxpayer or the President would have spent less. For example, while awaiting the construction and equipment of its production centre and studios, CTV, since 1985 operated from a temporary studio got by transforming the RDC theatre studio in Yaounde. The latter, fully equipped by Siemens was later abandoned for Mbala II at the completion of the present production centre in October 1987. Although the authorities can always
rationalize that the temporary studio could still be put to use, it could be argued that such a studio was uncalled for in the first place. Much more than a temporary studio is expected of a country that has postponed introducing TV for over 25 years, until it could have the best.

It is worth remarking that while the government delayed the introduction of TV, the well-off of the society were less patient. They started to import video sets and screens from the West and from neighbouring Nigeria and Gabon, and to purchase programmes made to suit the exclusive tastes of the audiences of their countries of origin. Between 1976 and 1978, there was an influx of video equipment and programmes into the country (Djuidjeu, 1988:165-6). The rich set up video clubs to serve their friends and others with a penchant for movies, soap operas, comedies, game shows, and other entertainment programmes made primarily for Western audiences. Those who were too poor to afford videos of their own, but who frequented nightclubs, snack bars and beer parlours, could watch video while they danced, drank or ate. The French and American Cultural Centres served as video clubs of a kind, where journalists, students, and others could go to watch Western news reports, films, soap operas, comedies, sports, and other types of programmes (Ndasi, 1983; Meboe, 1984:76-8; Djuidjeu, 1988:64).

This definitely made Cameroon one of the few countries where video preceded TV, and at a time when the government had neither a comprehensive video policy nor a rigidly enforceable guideline binding the importation and consumption of foreign cultural products. Even today, the government has little control over what is imported in the form of foreign video products. Laws regulating the situation are inadequate (see Law, No 87/019 of 17 December 1987), and have never really been rigorously enforced. Customs are not so rigorous in their control of foreign video cassettes, there are clandestine importations across the borders from Nigeria and Gabon, and the authorities have not been successful in stopping illegal video clubs (Meboe, 1984; Djuidjeu, 1988). In 1986, Yaounde alone was estimated to have more than 10,750 Video sets (Djuidjeu, 1988:65-6); a figure which might not be the highest in the country (Minfoc, 1986:106). Douala, Bamenda, Bafoussam, Garoua and other major cities each have video clubs, both legal and illegal. The official papers frequently carry articles on video cassette seizures by provincial Delegates of Information and Culture; an indication of how prevalent the video has become.

Like Television today, video not only benefitted a limited few, but
was also largely the advantage of the urban communities where electricity is not as scarce as in the remote rural areas. Also, since Cameroon does not produce its own video programmes, the early arrival of a totally dependent video culture further jeopardised the chances of a rural television. Those who had become used to video were urban-based, some of whom were amongst the decision makers; their idea of TV was what the video had fed them for more than a decade, which was Western. They would be most impatient with a rural TV, just as they had been with the delays in the introduction of TV. It is therefore not exactly surprising that the authorities made no further mention of ESOP 1, and that TV in Cameroon today is urban with most of its programmes foreign, as we learn in chapter ten.

Summary

The government delayed the introduction of TV until 1985 because it wanted a system that would be rural and educative, characterised by group watching and dominated by rich cultural programmes of Cameroonian and African origin. Illustrious though these goals are, no serious preparations were made towards their attainment during the study-phase of the TV project. Consequently, when finally introduced, CTV fell far short of its objectives.

There is only one channel which broadcasts from Yaounde. Like radio, the 30 TV broadcast or transmission centres are equally urban-centred; the original idea of rural TV has been ignored, and these centres have been constructed in and around the cities, where the population is dense, and where electricity and sets are largely available. There is yet no practical indication that the government is ready to reconsider the idea of collective viewing, or to subsidize the efforts of that 80% of the population which is rural.

Thus despite being the single most expensive public investment in Cameroon, less than 20% of the population are in a position to benefit from CTV. But with only 3 sets to every 100 people (BBC-IBAR, 1987), only a small proportion of these potential urban-based beneficiaries can actually afford to watch TV. Most urbanites can only watch, either thanks to the hospitality of the few with sets, or because of their own ability to impose themselves as 'unwanted' guests. These technical inadequacies, together with the excessive pressure exerted by the powerful, have greatly diminished CTV's potentials as an instrument for nation-building.
II.) THE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF RDC AND CTV

Much of what could be said under administrative centralism has already be mentioned when we dealt with state monopoly and government interference with the daily operation of radio and TV. There is no need delving into all that we have discussed already, for, dividing a work into chapters is more for convenience than because these chapters are necessarily distinct and unconnected with one another. Monopoly and centralism are in many ways synonymous concepts, and any overlapping should be seen as reinforcing rather than contradicting what we identify to be their various characteristics. However, here we are more particular about the internal working of the broadcast institutions through a look at decision-making, organisation and atmosphere. The main question remains that of determining how broadcasting for nation-building is affected by administrative centralism or the lack of it.

To answer this question, I will treat RDC and CTV separately, because I studied them in different institutional settings. The creation of CRTV in December 1987 notwithstanding, RDC and CTV did not merge in practice until the end of my fieldwork in May 1988. In fact, by the end of the study, the newly appointed Directors, Subdirectors and Chiefs of Service were just about settling down to their new positions within CRTV. However, an examination of the texts creating and structuring CRTV is given at the end of our treatment of RDC and CTV.

A) RDC

Before the creation of CRTV, RDC was administered by a Director and his deputy, under whom were three subdirectors for News, Technical Affairs, and Programmes. Under each subdirector were chiefs of services and their assistants, followed by the chiefs of bureau, and finally by those without any posts of responsibility. Such is the typical hierarchy of credibility in the administrative system of Cameroon, where it is characteristic for bureaucrats to shift responsibility away from themselves either downwards onto their subordinates or upwards onto their bosses, mostly because no duties or policies are ever clearly defined. Following such hierarchy, everybody is responsible to their administrative superiors, and must constantly refer upwards, especially in matters of controversy. Usually, the lower down the hierarchy one is, the more likely one is to bear the brunt. When applied in the context of RDC, the following observation can be made:
That the ultimate decision on what is wrong or right for broadcasting does not lie with the "Chef de Service de la Redaction", but with his administrative superiors. The hierarchy of credibility is such that when pursued to its logical conclusion, ends with the President as the sole determiner of the "dos" and "don'ts" in broadcasting. Perhaps it was in recognition of this that in 1984 President Biya told Cameroonians "Truth comes from above, and Rumour from below". Following the same hierarchy, on the event of 'subversive' or 'unpalatable' broadcast, the President would ask the Minister for an explanation, who in turn would ask the Director, and so on and so forth, until the tendentious broadcaster is sanctioned along with some of his superiors in certain cases.

The situation is delicate, and both ordinary practitioners and administrators know it. There is no blueprint of the "dos" and "don'ts" in broadcasting, and nobody in a position of responsibility wants to risk persecution by setting the professional standards for subordinates to follow. This implies that in reality, excessive self-censorship is recommended and practised as the only way out of possible trouble with the authorities. In the official rhetoric, individual practitioners are told that they are free to say whatever they want to say, so long as they do so "responsibly". Yet responsibility is never ever defined with categorical certitude and precision. The consequence being that, guided by fear and personal insecurity, uncertain of what exactly is right or wrong to the government in any given circumstance, the broadcaster prefers to under-do, just in case. The result, as we have seen, is such a high degree of conformism that sometimes startles even the authorities responsible for the system.

The hierarchy of credibility within the central administration at the Ministry or in the National Station of RDC, can be extrapolated to explain the relationship between the provincial stations and Yaounde. Thus the Director of RDC used to be in charge of the entire network, although resident in Yaounde with his office at the National Station. However, his interests in the provincial stations were catered for by a chief of station, who could consult directly with him on purely technical and professional matters, but who was administratively under the Provincial Delegate of Information and Culture. This makes sense, since not every Delegate was necessarily versed with the technicalities of broadcasting or the media in general. But apart from a few exceptions, the practice has been to appoint media practitioners to the post of Delegate in the provinces. Thus when Emmanuel Kome Epule was dis-appointed as Director of RDC with the creation of CRTV, he was appointed
and on April 6 1988 installed Provincial Delegate for the North-West.

Normally, the provincial stations send their programme schedules for approval to the subdirector in charge of programmes for the whole network. All new ideas intended for approval or inclusion in the various schedules are discussed at the annual coordination meeting, attended by all provincial chiefs of station and certain officials of the National Station. At this meeting the basic programme structure for the stations is decided and then submitted to the Minister for approval. Thenceforth only slight modifications are allowed at the provincial level, with the approval of the Delegate; no major changes in the schedules can be made without prior authorization by the Minister through the subdirector. It is essential for provincial schedules to be sent to the National Station for approval, since it is on the basis of the time the latter decides for network programmes (whose relay is compulsory) that the provinces can know where to fit in what.

Generally, in an institution like RDC where most depends on the character and good-will of the persons appointed into posts of responsibility than on any well-elaborated policies, success can be very difficult to predict. An over zealous Director or a politically ambitious subdirector, can discourage subordinates; he can kill their instincts for creativity and investigative journalism. Moreover, the widely held belief in Cameroon that civil servants are appointed into high office first and foremost as representatives of their provinces and ethnic groups, is responsible for infighting, mutual suspicion and witch-hunting, all of which are quite detrimental to broadcasting for nation-building.

There were instances during my investigation to confirm that these attitudes are widespread. The point here is not whether the following allegations are true or false, but the very fact that practitioners think and believe these things, is detrimental to broadcasting for nation-building. For such attitudes poison the interpersonal relationships of the staff, and discourage team spirit. It is not by coincidence therefore, that one of the greatest weaknesses in RDC and CTV today is the lack of team spirit. But although these attitudes are the immediate antecedents to lack of team work, and to mediocrity and poor output, they certainly are not the root causes; the system is, the fact that journalists have been made to rely on nonprofessional values for reward.

At one instance Kenneth Asobo, the then desk editor for English
Language news, complained the English desk was "like sheep without a shepherd". His point was reiterated by Sharon, who claimed they were "without role-models". When asked to explain what they meant, they recounted their problems, which were subsequently confirmed by other broadcasters. Although there is an evident problem of severe staff shortage, it would appear from complaints made by the broadcast practitioners, that the situation is often compounded by practices of 'tribalism', 'regionalism' or 'sectionalism', by those in positions of authority; the consequence being, as Medard (1978), Bayart (1985), and other researchers have noted of the Cameroonian political system or civil service in general, that some broadcasters might owe their positions more to their ethnic and political ties with those in command than to merit and professional competence. In this respect, it was not surprising that broadcast practitioners of North-West provincial origin felt antagonised by the Director of RDC, Emmanuel Kome Epule (a South-Westerner), who conducted a series of staff reshuffles on his appointment in 1986.

Naturally, the North-West broadcasters affected by this move, claimed that the Director's reshuffles were motivated by 'tribalism' or 'regionalism', and that he had transferred them from the newsroom despite their excellence as newscasters, in order to secure their positions for "mediocre" South-Westerners, with whom he shared the same provincial origin. They also alleged that the list of transfers had been drawn up by the Director and other South-West elites in Limbe, then taken for approval to Prof. George Ngango, Minister and good friend of the Director's. Whether such allegations are true or not is irrelevant, because no journalists who believe their Director to practise 'tribalism', 'sectionalism' or 'regionalism' in their disfavour, would put in their best or work in harmony with the said Director. Neither would they take him seriously when he urges them to help combat such divisive tendencies in the masses.

There was evidence of infighting as well. Generally, infighting is taken not to mean healthy competition, but a sort of rivalry that goes hand in hand with eye-service and the desire to please through cajoling and blackmailing colleagues, in order to be recognised and rewarded by those higher up in the hierarchy. Thus for example, on Friday 4 March 1988, one of the subdirectors told a chief of service to my hearing that, although 8 million FCFA were allocated RDC for coverage of the Agro-Pastoral Show in Maroua, only 2 million had been spent. The Director had not accounted for the remaining 6 million.
According to the chief of service however, it was not to the subdirector that the Director had to render an account, but to the Minister. For in the civil service one was responsible to one's superiors, not to subordinates. Later the chief of service told me that although the subdirector had exaggerated, and even though he might have been motivated by his own selfishness and jealousy for the Director, the situation he depicted was a common one at RDC and the civil service as a whole. Once money is allocated for certain projects, there is always the tendency to misappropriate it, and not to do the work intended. Again, this points to an unhealthy lack of harmony amongst colleagues in RDC.

The third example is what I have termed 'Witch-hunting'; and is about journalists who are embarrassed going out to interview people for their programmes, lest they are accused of taking bribes. There is the widespread suspicion amongst members of the management team that journalists might come to a secret understanding with businessmen and others, to publicise their businesses or activities in exchange for a given sum of money. In Circular No 146 of 13 December 1986, the Director deplores any such illicit deals, and promises to sanction whoever indulges in them. In Radio Bamenda, Chief of Station John Ndahne wrote Circular Letter No 01/321/RBDA/MINFOC/B of 19 March 1988, accusing Oyewa Francis and Tumenta Mange Tony of extorting money from artists and of promising them "all sorts of publicity over radio".

Again, whether these witch-hunts are founded or not, there is no doubt that such an atmosphere is detrimental to creativity and efficiency amongst broadcasters. Thomas Babi Koussana (interviewed, 22/2/88) recounts two instances when he has been accused of taking bribes, but when in effect, he ought to have accused RDC for forcing him into a position whereby he had to use his own personal resources just to be able to produce his programmes. According to him, RDC was more concerned with tracking down broadcasters who allegedly took bribes, than providing them with the funds and equipment they needed to produce their programmes.

The final example concerns authority and legitimacy in RDC. On Monday February 15 1988, I arrived the National Station to find Circular No 023/MINFOC/DR in which the Director was deploring a sudden upsurge of laxness, negligence, lack of professional consciousness, lateness to work and excessive freedom amongst his staff; and imploring them to respect the hierarchy and to take their work seriously. But the fact that his circular came barely a week or two after the appointment of the DG and DDG of CRTV, shows the importance
Cameroonian functionaries attach to presidential appointments, and just how much centralisation of decision-making there is.

Thus, as soon as the personnel of RDC realised that their Director had not been appointed into CRTV as a major member of the management team, they adopted a relaxed attitude towards their work and a disregard for his authority. In their thinking, one is only really in authority if personally appointed by the President. On the event of change like the creation of CRTV and the appointment of the DG and DDG, the personnel cease to respect those who have not been re-appointed, not even if they have not been officially dis-appointed either.

Does not this attitude indicate that broadcasters in RDC (and CTV as we are soon to see), for one reason or another, work not for the love of their job or profession, but because they want to impress the President's ears and eyes which until the creation of CRTV were personified by the Director? In other words, if a broadcaster is obeying the Director of RDC, it is more because he wants the Director to put in a good word for him to the Minister his boss, who might also speak well of him to the President; or because the broadcaster wants to avoid the President's wrath, which might be expressed through the Minister and Director if the broadcaster is disrespectful of authority. But if he can afford to ignore the authority of the Director, perhaps because he has 'Godfathers' higher up the hierarchy than the Director, the better for the broadcaster and the worse for the internal cohesion of RDC.

Otherwise, why should civil servants suddenly feel like not working, just because there is no authority to ensure that they work? Authority in this case is not valid unless it is legitimated by the President, whose position as head of government, party and state, makes him the most powerful individual in the country. For once an appointment is by the President, it is not to be questioned, whether the broadcasters approve of it or not. This is an indication of how concentrated decision-making is, and of how there is little real delegation of powers. In the case of CTV, which we are to examine next, many broadcasters refused to recognise Eric Chinje as editor in chief, not because he was incompetent, but because he was never really directly appointed by the President. One would like to know why a DG appointed by the President cannot in turn appoint an editor in chief capable of the respect of those under him? Thus we see that both the Director and his subordinates look up to the President as the one and only source of authority.
RDC has a hierarchy of credibility typical of the civil service and administration. It is a system where the power to decide is ultimately concentrated at the centre or summit. The final decision on professional matters concerning the provincial stations is taken at the National Station in Yaounde. But the ultimate decision on the "dos" and "don’ts" in broadcasting lies not with the professional, but with the administrator or politician, who in Cameroon could be anybody employed by the government on behalf of the state.

The major characteristic of the system is that it is possible for bureaucrats to shift responsibility away from themselves either upwards to superiors or downwards to subordinates. This is particularly the case in RDC where the absence of texts clearly defining policies and duties makes it hard for broadcasters to determine how best to act, especially in matters of controversy. Often, afraid to jeopardise their jobs, positions and prospects, broadcasters prefer to avoid doing anything which the government might perceive as subversive or unpalatable. Such a situation invariably replaces professional aspirations with political ambition, which in turn is productive of infighting, mutual suspicion and witch-hunting; all of which are not conducive to broadcasting for nation-building.

B) CTV

Cameroon Television is like a day-old baby whose real history is little more than its conception and birth. CTV is not only a young institution, but a very unusual one as well. When it started broadcasting in 1985, Cameroon TV had neither a name nor a statute, let alone policies. Nothing about it was clear from the beginning; it not only lacked a studio, but was devoid of a central administration to guide its virgin steps. All that makes an institution and TV for that matter came only later, and is still coming. During this study the essential was there; it could at least be said an institution named Cameroon Television (CTV) existed, albeit illegal and unconstitutional.

However, it was not until April 1986 that things actually started to take shape. In the presidential ordonnance No 86/001 of 26 April 1986, the institution was given a name, a status, and policies. Article 1 of the ordonnance is about the name, and reads as follows:

1.) A National Television Corporation Known as CAMEROON TELEVISION, abbreviated "CTV", is hereby set up to ensure the production and broadcasting
of television programmes.
2.) The National Television Corporation shall be under the authority of the Minister of Information and Culture.

Article 2 defines the status of CTV as: A public establishment of an industrial and commercial nature endowed with a legal personality and financial autonomy, that undertakes to produce and broadcast television programmes; and, whose organisation and operation are determined by decree.

On its part, Article 3 stresses the public service aspect of CTV. As part of its service to the public CTV has to define, programme and produce the broadcasts. It is also charged, in collaboration with partners selected for that purpose, to oversee the installation of the national TV network. More importantly, this article makes it clear that television broadcasting to the general public is a state monopoly. But exceptions may be made by presidential decree in any of the following cases: (i) For the broadcast of programmes intended for specific audiences, (ii) For the broadcast of closed-circuit programmes on private premises, (iii) For scientific research and educational experiments, and (iv) In the interest of national defence or state security.

But Article 11 warns that whoever violates the state monopoly of TV as prescribed above, either by setting up a private station or by broadcasting without authority shall be punished with imprisonment of 5 to 10 years and a fine of 10 to 20 million FCFA (£20,000 to £40,000), or one of these sanctions only. In the case where the accused is guilty, the court can order the confiscation of the installations, equipment, appliances and products used for the broadcast.

Article 4 deals with government expectations of CTV. In the performance of its tasks, CTV must give priority to the public interest and must promote government policy objectives; satisfy the people's needs and aspirations as in the area of information, culture, education and entertainment; relay and highlight government's achievements in the area of education and training; ensure the development of national audiovisual creation that is competitive, sound and in keeping with ethical and moral values.

Article 5 defines the duties of CTV to include: Designing and producing, on its own or within the framework of co-productions, news programmes, audiovisual material or sound programmes of a didactic, cultural
or recreational nature; acquiring by purchases, exchanges, donations and gifts, audiovisual material or sound programmes that are in line with its policy on programmes; ensuring the preservation of the national audiovisual heritage; carrying out research on audiovisual creation; ensuring vocational training for some categories of workers and installations; and ensuring the protection of television signals reception by the public.

Article 6 says that CTV may rent broadcasting time for commercials, as well as sign agreements against payment, to broadcast information from public and para-statal services, from associations or from individuals. But it equally makes it abundantly clear that the government retains the right to ask CTV at anytime to broadcast statements or messages that it deems necessary.

On the same day that the ordonnance was released, the presidential decree No 86/384 of 26 April 1986 was signed defining the structures and operation of CTV. In summary, Article 1 names CTV headquarters to be Yaounde; and Article 2 entrusts the administration of CTV to a board of governors and a board of management, both of which are under the Minister of Information and Culture. The board of governors should ensure that CTV accomplishes the tasks it is assigned, and respects its obligations as defined by the laws and regulations. The Director General is in charge of CTV’s financial, administrative, and technical management.

The board of governors comprises 13 members, and a chairman who is appointed by presidential decree. Apart from the chairman and a member who are both chosen by the President, all the board members represent various ministries and the Presidency. The only chance that members might come from areas not directly involved with the central administration are 2/13. The composition of the Board is as follows: The Presidency and the Ministry of Information and Culture have two representatives each. The President appoints the chairman and an extra member. The Ministries of Posts and Telecommunications, Finance, Women's Affairs, Higher Education and Scientific Research, Public Health, Agriculture, and National Education, have a representative each.

The ministers propose their representatives whom the President confirms. In a way, therefore, it can be said that all board members are directly appointed by the President, since he would not confirm the choice of a candidate of whom he does not approve. The Board meets when need arises and when the chairman convenes it. Decisions are taken on the basis of a simple
majority of votes, but in the case of a deadlock, the chairman's vote is the one that counts.

Among other things, the board of governors draws up the statute, defines the size of the personnel and remuneration; can recruit personnel up to the 10th category; draws up the budget and the timetable for CTV; adopts, together with the Ministry of Information and Culture, the general policies for programmes defined by the board of management; accepts gifts and assistance, and authorises loans; together with the ministries concerned, proposes for appointments to various posts of responsibility created at CTV; and adopts the organigramme of CTV drawn up by the Director General.

The board of management is headed by a Director General (DG) and a Deputy Director General (DDG), both of whom are appointed by presidential decree. Heads of the various services are equally appointed by the President; propositions are made to him, and he acts upon them. It is a system of reference upwards. If you are not recommended to the President by your superiors (immediate or distant), you cannot hope to be noticed for promotion, no matter your professional merits. CTV's first and only DG and DDG respectively were Eily Florent Etoga and Ndifontah Myamdi, both appointed on April 26 1986. When CRTV was created in December 1987, the former was eventually appointed its DG, while the latter was made DG for the Conference Centre. However, this study took place under their management, and so did what follows shortly.

According to the decree, the DG employs personnel as recommended by the board of governors; audits the working budget of CTV and keeps accounts of receipts and expenditures; coordinates the different departments of CTV; represents CTV legally and in other areas of life, and in its relationship with foreign or international TV organisations; and follows the problems of the professional training centre, the management of which is regulated by separate texts. The DG can, as it pleases him, delegate some of his duties to the DDG. In the case where he is absent or unable to perform his duties for one reason or another, the DDG assumes full responsibility. Following the text, the DDG would have nothing to do, should the DG not feel like delegating some of his duties, or should he fail to be indisposed. The DG is also charged with preparing the meetings of the board of governors, to which he is secretary and responsible for executing the decisions taken.

CTV has four possible sources of finance: licence fees, government
grants, private donations and advertising revenue. Whether chosen separately or as a combination, each system of financing has its merits and demerits (Halloran, 1963; De Sola Pool, 1977; Williams, 1979; Gallagher, 1982; Adkins, 1985; Aggarwala, 1985; Rando, 1986). The saying that the one who invites the piper calls the tune, is as true today as it has always been. So far there is no evidence that the business interests who advertise in CTV are posing preconditions incompatible with government's interference with TV. But for how much longer is CTV going to enjoy this privilege?

Not for long, I think. For Article 11 of the abovementioned decree is an indication that such pressures are likely to be real in CTV. It defines the sources of finance or resources to include: products of CTV's own activities, state grants for running and equipment, loans, gifts and assistance of all kinds, and advertising revenue. This reveals that the government is quite aware of the extremely expensive nature of TV, and that consequently, CTV cannot function entirely on state subventions alone. Soon CTV (or CRTV) would have to think seriously about how best to reconcile its roles as government mouthpiece and as commercial organisation ready to make money through advertising. It is true that Cameroon, like many other African countries, would not want TV to serve "as a toy of prestige and commercialism" (Cassirer, 1963:377); but the reality of the expensiveness of TV is such that the government cannot have its cake and eat it (Nyannjoh, 1988:38-9).

Finally, the board of management consists of a central administration and many external services. According to presidential Arrêté No 324/CAB/PR of 19 June 1986, the central administration comprises: A technical adviser; the departments for administrative affairs and the budget, programmes and information, production, and technical affairs; two heads of studies; and a department of accountancy. The external services are made up of interprovincial TV centres, and the Centre for professional training at Ekounou, Yaounde.

During this investigation however, things did not exactly go on as defined in the texts above. For one thing, the President made no further appointments after appointing the DG, DDG and Financial Controller in 1986. This implies that between then and the massive appointments on March 11 1988 in CRTV, CTV was virtually run by three recognized appointees only. Of course, the DG went ahead and made some internal appointments, but these were never taken seriously by the staff, and in certain cases by the appointees themselves.
There was a widespread feeling that because such appointments had not been by the President, they could not be valid. In the News and Information Department for example, some journalists totally refused to attend the news conferences presided over by Eric Chinje. Although some of the reasons for this were personal, the general argument was that Eric Chinje did not really have the authority to head the department, or to impose his schedules on them. Thus although the journalists would execute what he assigned them, they did so more because they feared being sanctioned by the DG than because they recognised Eric Chinje’s authority.

The board of governors created in 1986 never met, not even once, until CTV was dissolved by the December 17 1987 law that created CRTV. This implies that all those employed by the DG during his term of office were illegally employed. The text clearly states that the DG can only employ with the approval of the board; but there is no provision for him to employ if the board of directors fails to meet. Although it was an open secret that the board did not meet because of personal differences between the Minister and DG, I never had the opportunity to interview either of them on the issue. Neither did I have the chance to validate or reject the claim that most of the auxiliary staff (secretaries, cleaners, drivers, etc.) and the practitioners employed in the two Production Departments, were of the same ethnic origin as the DG. Complete lists of employees were unobtainable.

In any case, the failure of the board to meet meant only the three presidential appointments made in April 1986 were valid. It also meant the accounts were never audited, and that the personal styles of management of the valid three could not be formally checked. We would recall how it was up to the DG to assign the DDG. There was the case where a female reporter employed by the DDG had to be dismissed when the DG learnt of it; the reason being that the reporter had been employed without the DG’s knowledge. The lack of adequate collaboration between heads of public and semi-public establishments, is a widespread phenomenon in Cameroon; since power is heavily concentrated in the President’s hands, top ranking official seek to impress him directly rather than collaborate with one another. In August 1986 President Biya issued Circular No 5/CAB/PR, deploiring the fact that public establishments were "threatened with paralysis" because of misunderstandings or inadequate collaboration between Directors or General Managers on the one hand, and the Chairmen of, or the Boards of Directors on the other.

Concerning their relationship with management, broadcasters had much
to complain about. Here too, it is less a question of an allegation being true or false than the fact that it is made at all. As with radio, the argument is that TV for nation-building can be most effective only if management and broadcasters work in harmony, collaboration, and mutual respect.

All broadcasters complained of the lack of communication between the management team and themselves. They could not understand why they should work together in the same premises, yet deal with one another only through circulars or queries ('Demandes d'explications'). Elie Pokam (interviewed, 15/1/88) complained he was neither informed nor told why his programme was taken off the air. Jean-Lambert Nang (interviewed, 14/1/88) told of the queries that had been sent him about the coverage of a match where wittingly or unwittingly, some publicity material had been included. He would have liked to meet the DG or DDG and personally explain his situation; but he never had the chance. All he could do was write back. There are many other examples, all making the same point.

It was clear that the practitioners disliked the distance between themselves and management. Their feelings were summarised by Herbert Boh as follows:

I think that the Management could meet with us from time to time to congratulate us; we need a pat on the back, and when it doesn't happen, there is no motivation.

The DG has held two meetings with us in two years, meetings of a maximum duration of ten minutes altogether. The first of them was about three and half minutes, and could best be termed as an acquaintance meeting. During that meeting he read a little speech to us. No questions were authorised though there were questions to ask. The second meeting was as the result of rumour that there was going to be slight disturbances because of no pay. So he came and spent four minutes reading a speech to calm spirits down, then left. No questions still, not because there wasn't any, but because they weren't allowed. We are in a communication house, yet can't communicate.

I really think we should hold meetings at least once a month. If he doesn't want the whole staff, he can meet with those he puts in positions of responsibility. It should be once a week, but if he doesn't have time once a month would do (Herbert Boh, interviewed, 19/1/88).

Marguerite Mfegue (interviewed, 20/1/88), considered it absolutely essential that management should do more than just meet with Eric Chinje and his assistant. Despite her respect for the hierarchy, she felt it would be important for the DG to meet them frequently, understand some of their problems and see how these could be resolved. It was true that all of them in
the News and Information Department directed their problems through Eric Chinje to management, but these problems did not always get solved. And they could not say whether the fault was with Eric Chinje or at a higher level.

In order that they might know if there was constant communication between Eric and management, the latter should endeavour to meet with them regularly. For it was not uncommon for some broadcasters to blame Eric Chinje for certain things, when perhaps he was not at fault. She gave the example of cassettes which were sometimes used and reused over ten times. Such abusive usage made the quality poor, but it also made some broadcasters think that Eric Chinje might not be taking their plight seriously, since he did not have to go out reporting himself. Thus she thought that such feelings of suspicion and dissatisfaction might be minimized if the DG and his team started having regular meetings with the staff. They, the broadcasters had been told that the Financial Controller was in charge of the purchase of blank tapes, but they hardly met with him, except perhaps when they had to talk about their salaries. How then could someone like that come to know about the problems that faced the broadcasters?

The broadcasters felt that by staying apart, the DG and DDG were trying to portray themselves as demi-gods. They pointed out other attitudes (some of which I observed myself) which had led them to think in this way. The most famous was the idea of the lift which the DG and the DDG had reserved for their exclusive use. No one else was allowed access to the lift. Yet in his Speech (28/1/88) the DG said the CTV Production Centre had three lifts, each of which was capable of a total load of 800 KG. As one of the broadcasters remarked, "I have seen the DG use the central lift once when he called for his lift in vain. His, the third to the right, was probably on the 11th floor. I thought that he might pick up some microbes by using the central lift. It was on a Saturday morning, that I remember very well."

Secondly, according to the broadcasters, when the Germans constructed the TV Production Centre, they built offices for the DG and the DDG on the ground floor, next to the section where the daily news conferences were held. The DG, according to their German view of things, was not supposed to take the lift. His office was down for the sake of convenience, one would normally suppose. But when the DG came, he rejected the offices provided him, and chose to redefine things to suit his idea of power and greatness. Thus he chose to have his office on the 11th and last floor, and to allocate the 10th floor to his assistant; making it look as though the higher up into the skies
one seemed to climb, the more control over others and over situations one had. He wanted a sort of physical domination to reflect his authority over the whole place, and to show how much above the ordinary downtrodden, marginalised masses he was, and, most of all, that he sat above everybody in the CTV production Centre.

Again, it is difficult to know if these explanations were actually the DG's reasons for rejecting the offices on the ground floor or for reserving a lift for himself and his assistant; but the fact that his behaviour provoked such a reaction amongst the broadcasters, is the important thing. A broadcaster who thinks that his DG is motivated by selfish reasons cannot take the DG seriously when he turns round to speak 'of public interest' or 'the importance of nation-building'.

It is taken for granted amongst practitioners that there is less bureaucracy in a state corporation than in the central administration. In RBC one of the reasons broadcasters gave in favour of CRTV was their conviction that things would certainly work faster, leading to improved creativity, quality and production. But although their counterparts who have had some experience with CTV would agree, they are also quick in pointing out that the level of bureaucracy is still higher than expected. For example, they failed to see the reason why the DG or DDG insisted on having their signature on every document before coverage; or why working in the same premises, it could not take less than three days for mission papers to be ready. Such bureaucracy, they argued, was unnecessary and particularly harmful. "News does not wait for you to sign your papers. An accident would not wait for CTV to come before it can happen," Julius Wamey told me. However, the broadcasters thought that they were only saved by the fact that most of what they broadcast as news, were official events which are always a priority, both to management and to themselves. But their individual programmes were affected by the bureaucracy, and they were often forced to rebroadcast past editions.

There was witch-hunting of the type carried out at RDC. The Management, some claimed, had gone as far as to suspend certain broadcasters from the air, for daring to include the faces or names of members of the public whom the DG disliked, or for 'inadvertently' including what management perceived as advertisement in their pictures or programmes. How, the journalists concerned did wonder, could they be expected to cover and report on the Cameroonian public, and at the same time be expected to avoid filming the public, lest management perceived it as publicity for bribery?
In addition to conflicts with management, was infighting of the sort experienced in RDC. Akwanka Joe Ndifor (interviewed, 11/1/88) talked of a colleague who had written to management trying to blackmail him, and asking to take over production of the programme "Minute By Minute". It was also alleged that a francophone broadcaster had written to management questioning why Eric Chinje, a broadcaster of minority anglophone origin, should be made editor in chief. Again, here, like in RDC, such infighting is detrimental to broadcasting for nation-building, and for the same reasons.

In October 1988 Eily Florent Etoga was replaced as DG of CRTV by Gervais Mendo ze. No reasons were given for the change, although the broadcasters were apparently pleased with it. According to some, Eily Florent Etoga was not in good terms with Henri Bandolo, Minister of Information and Culture since May 17 1988, whom he considered "too young to be his boss". This would not surprise anyone who read an earlier report by Africa Confidential, according to which

Etoga Florent, Director of CTV, is one of the most disliked men in administrative circles. He is a close friend of the President, always referring to him as Paul, and is godfather to Biya's son Frank.

Etoga fell out with Minister of Information George Ngango. Ngango had invited a Belgian team to provide technical cooperation to CTV. Etoga had his own candidates for the contract and, despite his officially inferior position, forced them through. Ngango was replaced by Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya who has attempted without success to make Etoga present his financial accounts for publication. Etoga has reacted strongly to anyone who dares question his management such as respected television staff Daouda Mouchargou and Ngopemou (Africa Confidential, February 1988).

Summary

As a corporation CTV has relatively more financial and administrative autonomy than RDC, vis-à-vis the Ministry. But the hierarchy of credibility is very similar. Our examination of the statute and internal organization has further revealed the excessive centralisation of decision-making. Although ultimately relying on recommendations by his closest associates, the President alone has the authority to make appointments that are seen as valid. The CTV broadcasters, like those of RDC, in fact, like the entire civil service, have been socialised not to take seriously anyone whose authority has not been directly validated by the President. Once more, this places the political above the professional, and makes politicians of broadcasters. Such a purely political consideration of professional legitimacy could have all sorts of disruptive effects, especially where, as in CTV, the
President fails to make all the necessary appointments, or to ensure that the statute is respected.

The organisational structure of CTV reflects the same hierarchy and centralisation of decision-making as in RDC. The DG and DDG insist on the same bureaucratic procedures practised in the rest of the civil service. By insisting to sign every document before coverage or mission, management has instituted the same administrative constraints which the broadcasters thought might be absent in a corporation. Thus, while mission papers take not less than three days to prepare, broadcasters can only cover events in time because these are mainly political activities to which management, like everyone else in the civil service, are extra-sensitive.

The lack of constant consultation between management and broadcasters has created a big communication gap between them. This, coupled with ill-feeling about the DG's personal style of leadership, the infighting resulting from the politicising effect of the civil service, and the witch-hunting, have led to disharmony and mutual disrespect – qualities which can only affect nation-building adversely.

C) CRTV

To state that in Cameroon there are no broadcast institutions but that radio and TV are all in the making, is not to be very wrong in many ways. Structurally, there have been some significant changes of late. At the start of this study, radio and TV existed as two separate institutions: RDC as a department in the Ministry of Information and Culture, and CTV as a public corporation with a significant degree of administrative and financial autonomy vis-à-vis the said ministry. Then came Law No 87/020 of 17 December 1987 creating the Cameroon Radio Television corporation (CRTV) by merging RDC and CTV. But it was a long time before the structural arrangements were made for the new institution to function properly. Thus despite the law, RDC and CTV continued to exist and function as separate institutions for the duration of my fieldwork, by the end of which the various appointees were still trying to settle down in their new stations and offices. The following is the rather gradual manner in which CRTV started its existence:

Following its creation in December 1987, was the presidential decree No 18/126 of 25 January 1988 defining CRTV's structure and operation. In almost everything but name, the text is identical to decree No 86/384 of 26 April 1986 which we discussed under CTV. CRTV comprises seven different
directorates, namely: General, Administrative and Financial Affairs, Programmes, News, Production, Technical Services, and Professional Training; in addition to ten different provincial services. Under the directorates of Programmes, News, and Productions are separate subdirectorates for radio and TV. Each directorate is headed by a Director and a deputy, who are both in charge of radio and TV. The provincial stations of CRTV are headed by chiefs of station, while the technical facilities are maintained by research officers.

The hierarchical structure is similar to that discussed above under CTV and RDC. CRTV is definitely a huge organisation. Much of the criticism in the local press has focused on its manageability, particularly as CTV, a much smaller body, has not been exactly easy to manage; especially as broadcasters and administrators, tend to be more interested in appointments than in doing what they are appointed for (see Le Messager, 11/4/1988). The fact that each directorate deals with radio and TV together, does not augure well for efficiency; particularly as these media neither share the same specificities, nor the same amount of attention from the government. TV being the newer and more prestigious medium, it is likely to attract greater managerial focus and financial attention than would radio under the same directorate.

The decree was followed by the President's inauguration of the Yaoundé-based CTV Production Centre on 28 January 1988, ironically the same day URTNA began meeting in Yaoundé to discuss the future of Private Radio in Africa. Mr Ibrahim Mbombo Njosa, in his capacity as Minister of Information and Culture, was by Presidential decree No 88/152 and with effect from January 29, appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors of CRTV. Decree No 88/155 also appointed Messrs Florent Eily Etoga (former DG of CTV) DG and Emmanuel Nloutsiri Nguiamba as DDG of CRTV. But though the former DDG of CTV was made Director of the Congress Centre, the Director of RDC was not officially dis-appointed yet; nothing was said about him, so he continued in his normal functions, though certainly at the risk of a conflict with the new DG. After the appointment of the Chairman, the DG and DDG, there was a long wait until March 2 for further appointments to follow.

Meanwhile at the 28 ordinary session of the general assembly of URTNA holding in Yaoundé from 28-30 January 1988, Eily Florent Etoga was elected URTNA's President for the next two years. On March 2 1988, presidential decree No 130 appointed members of the Board of Directors: Ten in number, as opposed to the 13 for CTV; but like the latter, they all represent
one branch or another of the central administration. On March 11 was the installation of the new DG and DDG by Ibrahim Mbombo Njowa, as Minister and Chairman. In the afternoon of the same day, the Board of Directors held its first meeting, during which appointments into CRTV were made and immediately taken to the radio and TV for broadcast, and to SOPECAM to be published (see Cameroon Tribune (daily), 14/3/1988; bi-weekly, 15/3/1988).

It is not possible that for a couple of hours or less, the board of directors, meeting for the first time, would have been able to draw up a list of nearly 250 appointments into places of responsibility in CRTV. It is possible, and rumours attest to this, that the Chairman and the DG might have drawn up the list themselves, and simply asked the members of the board to approve. It was apparent that they were in a rush to get things going and be over with. Following what one of the board members told me, the list of appointments was not validated by a presidential signature before broadcast that evening; a rare occurrence as far as appointments are concerned in the civil service. Perhaps the President, before leaving for Gabon earlier that day, had authorised the Minister and Chairman to go ahead and announce the appointments.

On March 17, the DG of CRTV installed the Directors, subdirectors and chiefs of service appointed. Subsequent installation of provincial chiefs of station was conducted by Francis Wete, Director of Programmes, with the authority of the DG. On April 6, the former Director of RDC Mr Kome Epule Emmanuel, was installed as North West Provincial Delegate of Information and Culture; his appointment having been made the week before (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 19/4/1988). Before his appointment, without being officially dis-appointed, he was obliged to continue in his post, albeit his authority was no longer respected by his staff (see Note de Service No 023/Minfoc/DR).

Finally, on April 18, I obtained and photocopied the 70 paged organigramme, which though not yet public, was certainly official. It specifies in a somewhat general manner, the functions of every directorate, and the duties of each post. Hardly distributed in its entirety to every official, there is the danger that very few of the appointees would be able to relate their duties and positions to those of others, and to the overall structure. This is likely to affect the amount of importance they individually attach to what they do.

Given that CRTV has adopted the very same administrative structure
typical of the rest of the civil service, it is doubtful if it would be able to avoid the problems resulting thence, as is apparent from our discussion of RDC and CTV. But it is going to be some time before CRTV can be judged on its own merit. However, from the rather slow pace CRTV has taken to establish itself, it could be argued that at the time parliament approved its creation, the authorities had not yet taken the necessary dispositions to ensure its launch. Further proof being that barely three months after his appointment as Chairman, Ibrahim Wombo Njoya was replaced by Henri Bandolo, in his capacity as the new Minister of Information and Culture; and that Eily Florent Etoga was replaced by Gervais Mendo ze in October 1988, after serving as DG for nine months only. The fact that the chairmanship of CRTV is given to the Minister of Information and Culture, and that members of the boards of directors and management are all appointed by the President, makes CRTV too dependent on the government, and like CTV and RDC, equally susceptible to political pressures and the preponderance of political content.

III.) PROGRAMME CONTENT IN RDC AND CTV

The political, administrative and technical problems discussed above have a great negative effect not only on the type of programmes produced, but also on the contents of such programmes. Whether in RDC or in CTV, more than 90% of programmes are produced in and around the cities in which these media are situated. Serious productions are very few; and often, these so-called productions are a simple question of tendering the microphone to an invited guest in the studio, or summarising official activities, or conferences and seminars holding in the national or provincial capitals. The professionals complain of a lack of the financial and technical means in certain cases, and of tight political control in others. Whatever way, the result is mediocrity, and the domination of the airwaves by political and entertainment (Sports and Music) broadcasts.

Closely related to the above-mentioned impediments to broadcasting, is a chronic shortage of qualified personnel. At the National Station of RDC for example, out of a total of 295 staff, there are only 43 qualified journalists and 12 junior journalists (Director's Report, 1988). In CTV there are 43 qualified journalists, 29 producer-directors, 15 assistant producers, 14 film editors, and 15 Cameramen, out of a total of about 500 employees.2

2 The Chief of Service for personnel in CTV was unable to provide (Footnote continued)
However, not all the qualified journalists and producers are involved in active broadcasting. As Becky Ndive of RDC (interviewed, 23/2/88) explains, "professionals are turned into bureaucrats and asked to work at the radio or elsewhere, while the real job for which they are trained - broadcasting, suffers from the hands of unqualified staff".

The reason why there are unqualified staff at all, Francis Wete (interviewed, 1/2/88), Olive Shang (interviewed, 24/2/88) and John Ndahne (interviewed, 25/3/88 & 28/3/88) explain, is that the authorities think so lowly of broadcasting that they believe everybody who happens to have a school leaving certificate can do it. That, they argue, is wrong, and can only account for mediocrity. To them, journalism calls for a certain amount of dedication; it is a vocation like any other. But the recruitment policy in Cameroon is not adapted to the exigencies of the broadcast media. The authorities have made the mistake of organising public service type competitive examinations for broadcasting, as though it were a purely administrative affair like most other departments of the civil service.

As Olive Shang argues, "The writing and passing of a public service examination doesn't automatically make one suited for radio or TV. I have a colleague who though having sought to come here, never ceases to complain that radio isn't the right place for her at all." Francis Wete recalls with nostalgia his days as chief of station for Radio Buea; his process of selecting broadcasters was rigorous, and one of his major criteria was "a voice test". But his was more an individual initiative than a matter of policy.

The shortage of staff, particularly of qualified broadcasters, is even more chronic in the provinces. In Buea for instance, the chief of station was the only real qualified broadcaster when I visited; and in Bamenda there were only two. While I do not endorse the idea that to be a good broadcaster one necessarily has to have graduated from a school of journalism, it is curious why after spending time and money to train broadcasters, the authorities ask them to perform tasks most of which are only remotely related to their training.

For obvious reasons therefore, active broadcasters in RDC and CTV

2(continued)

figures or a list on the exact number of personnel. This estimate is based on what he told Ntemfack Ofegue (interviewed, 15/3/88) at one point that there were about 500 to 550 employees in CTV.
find themselves working singlehandedly on programmes that require team effort. Although broadcasters tend to blame the absence of team work exclusively on individuals, I think the structures and circumstances in which they operate play a big part. The consequence of working singlehandedly on programmes is that broadcasters, the administration, and the public have tended to identify some programmes with certain individuals. In fact, the administration has succeeded in killing (by design or accident) certain programmes in the past either by promoting the producer-presenter into an administrative office (e.g. "Dominique" by Henri Bandolo (Massaga, 1980:25)), or through transferring the producer to another station (e.g. "Culture and Society" by John Ndahne). On the other hand, certain programmes have simply disappeared with the deaths of the individual broadcasters who used to produce them (e.g. "Cameroon Yesterday" by late Mark Nibo).

Programmes are therefore made to appear as though they belong more to individual broadcasters than to the network. Of course, young broadcasters who join the profession follow the established pattern, albeit unwanted. They believe, although mistakenly so, that programmes are the property of the individuals that produce and present them; so much so that they are more interested in starting their own programmes and making a name for themselves as well, than in co-productions. Hence, it is not at all surprising when no one at the National Station is interested in taking over the production of "Calling the Women" for the short time that Olive Shang, its usual producer-presenter is going to be away for her husband's funeral. RDC has to go as far as Buea to get Ms Nkuku Nwigwe, a free-lance journalist interested in replacing her for that while. And it is surprising neither that for all the time he worked and tried to get a co-producer in Yaounde for "Culture and Society", John Ndahne failed.

All these problems heavily affect the nature and content of programmes in RDC and CTV. But they provide the indispensable background we need in order to understand what exactly is meant by "programme" in Cameroonian broadcast parlance. This section deals with programmes locally produced. The intention is to say what conscious efforts if any, are being made within the context of the problems just outlined, to produce and broadcast material relevant to the whole idea of nation-building. The proportion of airtime occupied by foreign programmes is dealt with in chapter ten.

A study of the programme schedules, interviews with broadcasters,
together with watching and listening, facilitated the classification of the programmes analysed. A more complete way of doing this exercise would be to include actual audience reactions to the programmes. But my work did not involve an audience study as such, and neither RDC nor CTV has carried out any serious audience research. All the same, an audience study bureau exists in RDC, and according to Ferdinand Tevafo the chief of bureau, the reason for the lack of serious studies is mainly financial. Once in a while however, the bureau conducts polls in and around the capital cities.

The dilemma, Tevafo explains, is that:

What the public wants is often incompatible with what the authorities would like to have. For example, the public would like to see us work like RFI, the BBC, the VOA; but they forget that our radio is a government radio, which is the difference with the other radios. Here we are obliged to apply the government policy. They say that we are not critical and that we are praise-singers, 'les griots'. We sing the praises of those in power, we are handclappers, they say (Ferdinand Tevafo, interviewed, 5/1/88).

This does indicate that even if there was sufficient money to do audience research, the results of such studies would hardly be implemented in the case where the public's attitudes, needs or aspirations are anti-government.

However, despite the fact that few audience studies exist, broadcasters know about the public's reaction to their programmes from letters, casual meetings with members of the public, and comments by colleagues, close friends and relations. As Thomas Babi Koussana (interviewed, 22/2/88) most sensibly puts it, the broadcasters in RDC and CTV, being Cameroonians who live amongst the people, were born in a village or town and grew up together with the rest of the public - attending the same football matches, buying from the same markets, and drinking in the same bars, are bound to know how Cameroonians think, feel, and act in general. "We live in an environment and we cannot detach ourselves from that environment. Even if we don't have official figures, we can't say we entirely ignore our public because of that."

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3 RDC has carried out a few surveys or public opinion polls, amongst which are: Etude Media, done in 1983 with the help of the German GTZ group, who were particularly interested in determining the future TV audiences; the Surveys and polls conducted between January 1987 and February 1988 - including one on what the urban public thought of RDC programmes and broadcasters, one on suggestions for change, and another on Radio News. On the other hand, the only study on CTV was conducted with the help of Harcomer-Gallup International, Paris. Titled Sondage sur la Future Audience de la Télévision Camerounaise, this study was published in February 1986 by the Ministry of Information and Culture. It would appear that no serious study has been carried out without the assistance of foreign agencies.
On the basis of the broadcaster's knowledge of what he is doing (or would like to do), together with observations made while on the field, it could be said that certain programmes would have been most useful to nation-building, were their production not impaired by the difficulties highlighted. But first, a brief look at earlier studies and conclusions.

A) Some Background Studies

Earlier work of particular relevance to this section includes studies by Nkwo (1975), Ekaney (1976) Bandolo (1977), Massaga (1980), Nana (1981), Kouleu (1985), Gvet (1985), Ful (1985) and Owona (1987). They all deal with the various technical, financial and political problems facing broadcasting in Cameroon, and attempt to relate actual programme content to the purposive use of the broadcast media to foster nation-building. Their conclusions are gloomy, and legitimately so, given the general situation of the broadcast institutions.

Ekaney's analysis of programmes in four radio networks (Yaounde, Garoua, Busa and Douala) makes him conclude that radio is a medium with a preponderant urban character, and as such, remains largely unavailable to the majority of the population. Its content deficiencies, together with "the economic restrictions inhibiting the average Cameroonian from purchasing the radio, and the medium's use of colonial languages serving only about 15% of the masses", makes radio a mainly elite medium (1976:128). The latter point is echoed by Domatob (1985:128-9). In addition to discussing its problems in general, Kouleu takes a much closer look at the cultural content of RDC, and concludes that despite political declarations to the contrary, culture is highly marginalised. RDC, he argues, has failed to make a clear distinction between "Culture" and "Education", and to provide what is culturally relevant to Cameroonians, the peasants most especially. Even the little that passes for cultural programmes are of very poor content (1985:93-122).

On his part Massaga devotes a large portion of his dissertation (1980:19-27) to a study of programming in the National Station of RDC. Comparing the programme schedules of 1973 and 1977-1980, he remarks that broadcast time has consistently increased over the years. However, such increases have seldom benefitted serious educative, cultural or informative programmes. Instead, musical programmes have increasingly taken the lion's share of airtime. He observes that educative programmes which occupied 15% of airtime in 1973, had fallen to 9% in 1980. Equally, information which stood at 30% in 1973 occupied only 20% of airtime in 1980. Meanwhile entertainment,
essentially musical, had risen from 30% in 1973 to 60% in 1980. In fact, music was given such prominence that at the Documentation Service Massaga found a dictionary on "British Folk Music", albeit he found no similar document on "cocoa growing in Cameroon". "A real paradox, for a station whose assigned role is essentially that of vulgarizing our development strategy", he comments.

Massaga also remarks that the really serious programmes of RDC have had a very short life span. Quoting from a study carried out by ESIJY in April 1980, he observes that to be the trend since 1972. Examples of critical, in-depth, educational and highly informative programmes that have disappeared include "Dominique" by Henri Bandolo, "RDC Panorama" by Joseph Marcal Ndi, "Le Club des Noctambules", "Magie du Chant Noir" by Jean-Paul Nanga, "Mélodie et Symphonies du Cameroun" by Michel Essang, "Big Music" by Anne-Märthe Kvod" and "Conférences et Débats" by Tjade Boné. To this list may well be added "Cameroon Report" by the English Language Desk, which in April 1986 became the latest casualty. Although Massaga does not discuss in detail the reasons for such disappearances, they range from political suppression, through technical and financial pressures, to mere exhaustion due to the singleminded zeal and enthusiasm of individual producer-presenter.

Finally, Massaga looked at what might bring about changes in programme schedules. He remarked that such changes might involve the total replacement of old programmes by new ones (e.g. all programmes in the 1959 schedule were replaced in the 1973 schedule), or the replacement of some only, and the change of airtime or time of presentation for others. But curiously enough, neither in the 1973, nor in the 1977 and 1980 schedule changes, were the wishes of the public taken into account. Instead, everything was bureaucratically drawn up and implemented. In the same way, in a meeting held on July 10 1980 and presided over by then Minister Bvele Guillaume, no ordinary member of the public was amongst those invited to discuss further changes in the schedule. Typically, mostly representatives of various ministries and state bodies attended.

Writing a year after Massaga, Nana (1981) reached similar conclusions. He found that programming in RDC lacked orientation, that educative programmes were not given the place they deserved, and that creativity and investigative journalism were grossly lacking. All the reporting which journalists were familiar with concerned official ceremonies or international conferences. There was no doubt that RDC had failed to take
advantage of radio's potentials, and that it was more to blame for the ignorance amongst Cameroonians about themselves, their compatriots and their country. Although his own percentages were different from Massaga's, they still pointed to the fact that entertainment dominated the airwaves (47.23%), followed by information (28.18%) and education (24.59%). The general idea is that radio which was supposed to give priority to education and information relevant to national development, had turned out to be more of an entertainment medium.

Another look at official statistics as presented by the Director of RDC in his February 1988 report, is necessary here. According to the Director, music is not as dominant as it used to be; a statement which can be seen as an implicit validation of the studies discussed above. Thus, the authorities, like the practitioners and the public, were quite aware that RDC was dominated by music. But then, why did the authorities fail to do something about it? What else could this mean, apart from that they had failed to match declared intents with actual practice? Certainly President Ahidjo did not mean a music-dominated RDC when he talked about a medium that would educate and inform Cameroonians about his government's development policies and objectives. Table IV shows the official statistics presented by the Director of RDC in February 1988, according to which music still occupies the highest amount of airtime, 45h39 (33%). Perhaps the only difference today is that most of the music played is Cameroonian.

The Director acknowledges that the situation has improved since his appointment in 1986. Thus for example, the news and current affairs programmes "Dimanche Midi" and "Cameroon Panorama", which used to treat both international and local issues, have "become essentially national", while a new programme "7 jours dans le monde" has been created to cater for international issues. He also observes there is less and less foreign music in RDC, a point confirmed by all other broadcasters. The problem with the Director's figures is that they are limited to the National Station. I overcome this by analysing the schedules of Garoua, Buea and Bamenda as well. Second, he fails to pay attention to the fact that certain programmes (e.g. "Sport et Rhythm" and "News flashes") are done simultaneously in English and French; and therefore that any calculations on language of broadcast must take this into consideration. Finally, like Massaga's (1980) and Nana's (1981), his categories are just not broad enough.

B) A Closer Look at Local Programmes in RDC and CTV

It is evident that in all previous studies, the conventional
### TABLE IV

**PROGRAMME STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL STATION OF RDC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News: French/English</td>
<td>21h45</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>16h10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educatve &amp; Cultural</td>
<td>40h26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (Politics)</td>
<td>02h25</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>01h10</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment (sports)</td>
<td>05h45</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>45h39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>03h10</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>136h30</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programmes in English        42h00  31
Programmes in French         72h45  69
Foreign Programmes           8 to 10h 7 to 9

* Table originally in French, translation mine.

Official categories (educative, informative and entertainment) have been used rather uncritically. As we have seen, the Director of RDC and the students of journalism have employed the same system of categorisation. But this system is rather vague and insufficient, since in reality the boundaries between education, information or entertainment can be very thin, almost nonexistent. I therefore employed a different system that consists of such categories as: Documentary, News and Current Affairs, Drama, Series and Serials, Children’s, Party, Music and Light Entertainment, Sports, Culture, Socio-Economics and ‘Public Service’. Amongst these categories only one – Public Service, is outside the normal academic terminology, and therefore needs explaining. In Cameroon there are specific programmes (e.g. "Luncheon Date", "Le Grand Déjeuner de RDC"/"Cameroun Magazine", "Radio Titbits", "Contact", "SOS") in which public service announcements (job opportunities, examination results, transfers of civil servants, official appointments and dis-appointments, contact with relatives and friends at long distances, births and obituaries) are made. That is what I mean by Public Service programmes.

(i) Programmes in RDC

Every RDC station has a single weekly programme schedule which they follow for the whole year. There might be slight modifications here and there, now and again, but generally the schedule remains the same. The following data is based on an analysis of the schedules for the National Station in Yaounde,
and for the provincial stations of Garoua, Buea and Bamenda. Although to schedule does not imply actual presentation, it does at least indicate the intention to do so. The analysis included classifications according to country of origin, programme type, language of programme and length in minutes. Since we have to deal with language in section IV of this chapter, and with foreign programmes in chapter ten, here I will concentrate on the different types of programmes and their lengths.

1.) The National Station

A computerisation of the information presented on the National Station programme schedule, gave the following results: A total of 372 items are programmed per week, with 57 (15%) and 44 (12%) respectively as the highest and lowest number of items per day. Monday and Wednesday have 57 (15%), Thursday and Friday 55 (15%), Saturday 53 (14%), Tuesday 51 (14%) and Sunday 44 (12%) items each. However, the number of items actually broadcast depends on the political, technical and financial pressures that heavily affect broadcasting in Cameroon.

Of the 372 items, 362 (97%) are Cameroonian, while 10 (3%) are foreign. The low percentage of scheduled foreign items is partly because most of what is received from abroad is incorporated into programmes locally produced, and under different names. Thus, in reality, most of the so-called Cameroonian programmes contain a large proportion of foreign material. However, this is an issue we deal with in greater detail in chapter ten.

Presented according to programme types, top of the list comes news and current affairs with 132 (35.5%) items, followed by music and light entertainment 95 (25.5%), public service 70 (18.8%), socio-economics 33 (8.9%), culture 16 (4.3%), children's 8 (2.2%), sports and documentary 6 (1.6%) each, and lastly party 4 (1.1%). Of the six documentaries scheduled, only 1 (16.7%) was Cameroonian, which in a way validates the point made earlier about the lack of serious productions in RDC.

Bearing in mind that news and current affairs are dominated by the government and its activities, that public service announcements are also dominated by government activities and communiques, and given that party broadcasts are centralised on the activities of the leaders of the CPDM; it goes without saying that the airwaves in the National Station are dominated by programmes centred on and around the political authorities. Also, sports might have only 1.6% of the total number of items scheduled, but it is the single
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item with the maximum time - 150 minutes, and that, for the Sunday afternoon "Sports and Music" programme alone. None of the remaining 5 Sports programmes are less than 30 minutes long.

About length, the 372 items have a total broadcast time of 8190 minutes per week. The mode or most recurrent programme length is 5 minutes, with a total of 85 (22.8%) items having that length. Thus in real terms, Sunday afternoon Sports alone can be replaced with 30 different programmes, each 5 minutes of length. The mean time is 22.016 minutes, the median 15 and the standard deviation 17.444 minutes.

2.) Provincial Stations

The same system was used to analyse provincial programme schedules, except that there was an additional column distinguishing between "network" and purely local programmes. The provincial stations are compelled to relay certain programmes broadcast in the National Station. Such include all the major and minor news bulletins, all the current affairs programmes, public service programmes such as "Luncheon Date" and "Le Grand Déjeuner de RDC"/"Cameroun Magasine", all party programmes (e.g. "CPDM Magazine and "Unité, Progrès, Démocratie") and broadcasts organised on special occasions, and the National Station's sports programmes (e.g "Sports Panorama", "Vive Le Sport", "Sports and Music"). While their relay is obligatory, the relay of others such as "Calling The Women" or "Entre-Nous Headames", and "Our Changing Rural World" or "Le Magazine du Monde Rural" is optional.

(a) Radio Garoua

An analysis of the Garoua schedule produced the following results: A total of 368 items are programmed per week; with 59 (16%) and 48 (13%) respectively as the highest and lowest number of items per day. Saturday has 59 (16%), Monday and Tuesday 53 (14%), Wednesday and Friday 52 (14%), Thursday 51 (14%), and Sunday 48 (13%) items each. We remark that Garoua schedules 4 items less than the National Station per week. But since staff shortages, technical difficulties and financial hurdles are much more chronic at the provincial level, it also follows that the Garoua, Buea and Bamenda schedules are more perturbable by such constraints than the National Station.

Of the 368 items programmed, 363 (99%) are Cameroonian and 5 (1%) foreign. Much more foreign items are used in their original form in the National Station than in Radio Garoua. This might be because the foreign items are received in Yaounde first, then dispatched to interested provincial
stations. It might also be because of insufficient airtime, since in addition to being obliged to broadcast "network programmes", Garoua and other provincial stations have the practice of closing down for certain hours of the day in order to allow the equipment some rest, and also to provide for the recording of future programmes.

Presented according to programme types, top of the list comes public service with 126 (34.2%), followed by news and current affairs 94 (25.5%), music and light entertainment 52 (14.1%), socio-economics 30 (8.2%), culture 23 (6.3%), commercials 20 (5.4%), documentary and party 8 (2.2%) each, Sports 6 (1.6%) and lastly drama 1 (.3%). Although there are 8 documentaries, only 1 (12.5%) is Cameroonian. Commercials are included here, Buea and Bamenda for no other reason but that unlike the National Station, these stations give commercials specific time slots, which allows for systematic analysis.

The high number of Public Service programmes can be explained by three things: First, Garoua, like Buea, Bamenda and other provincial stations, do broadcast most of the public service programmes of the National Station, through the network programmes. Second, operating in a highly centralised system where most of importance seems to take place in Yaounde, these stations have many announcement programmes just to keep their audiences in touch with the Centre. And lastly, unlike the National Station which uses only English and French, the provincial radios broadcast in national languages as well; and with only a few exceptions, all the programmes in the latter languages are public service.

The 368 items have a total broadcast time of 6975 minutes per week, which is 1215 minutes less than the National Station. Of this, network programmes occupy a total of 2570 minutes, and provincial programmes 4405 minutes. The mode or most recurrent programme length is 15 minutes, with a total of 92 (25%) items having that length. The mean is 18.954 minutes, the median 15 and the standard deviation 15.620 minutes. The maximum and minimum lengths are 150 minutes (followed by 120 minutes) and 1 minute respectively. For the daily lengths, Monday to Friday each has 945 minutes, while Sunday and Saturday each has 1125 minutes. This makes sense since Sundays and Saturdays are the only days of the week when Radio Garoua closes down once, rather than twice as is normal.

A crosstabulation intended to distinguish between network and local programmes resulted as follows: 98 (26.6%) items scheduled are network, while
270 (73.4%) are provincial in origin. The single drama item is in Fulfulde, one of the local languages used in Radio Garoua. Garoua is a rare exception where major party broadcasts are also organised in the local national languages. Elsewhere, English and French remain the chief languages of the party. But like Dr Tatoh Mentan (interviewed, 30/1/88) and Zacharie Ng尼国 (interviewed, 23/2/88) affirm, Radio Garoua for long after independence, remained largely autonomous, despite President Ahidjo's appeal for a network service. They acknowledge it was not until after vigorous persuasion and scheming that the local authorities accepted to relay English Language News from Yaounde, for example. In terms of programme types, Table V summarises the findings.

**TABLE V**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prog. Type</th>
<th>No. of Items</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Docu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7 (87.5%)</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>69 (73.4%)</td>
<td>25 (26.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P S</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>14 (11.1%)</td>
<td>112 (88.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4 (50.0%)</td>
<td>4 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &amp; L Enter</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 (66.7%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3 (13.0%)</td>
<td>20 (87.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Eco.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3 (10.0%)</td>
<td>27 (90.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>368</td>
<td>98 (26.6%)</td>
<td>270 (73.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Radio Buea

A similar analysis of the Radio Buea schedule produced the following results: A total of 404 items are programmed each week, with 62 (15%) and 46 (11%) respectively as the highest and lowest number of items per day. Thursday has 62 (15%), Friday 61 (15%), Monday and Wednesday 60 (15%), Tuesday 59 (15%), Saturday 56 (14%) and Sunday 46 (11%) items each. (Same remark as for Radio Garoua.)

Of the 404 items programmed, 398 (99%) are Cameroonian and 6 (1%) foreign (similar percentage to Garoua's). In terms of programme types, top of
the list is news and current affairs with 157 (38.9%), then public service 110 (27.2%), music and light entertainment 69 (17.1%), culture 27 (6.7%), socio-economics 17 (4.2%), commercials 12 (3.0%), sports 6 (1.5%), party 4 (1.0%) and children’s 2 (.5%). Unlike Garoua, there was no drama and no documentary. The absence of English language drama is as a result of BBC’s decision to demand money for its programmes to Africa and other countries (see Njomo’s "Dash Show" interview of Tutle and Jaye of BBC, 5/3/88). Otherwise, same remarks as for Radio Garoua.

The 404 items have a total broadcast time of 7275 minutes per week, which is 915 minutes less than the National Station, but 300 minutes more than Radio Garoua. Of that airtime, network programmes occupy a total of 2743 minutes, and provincial programmes 4532 minutes. The time occupied by network programmes is different from that of Radio Garoua because there are certain optional relays by Radio Buea. For example, "Calling The Women" and "Our Changing Rural World" are among the optional programmes relayed by Buea from the National Station. The mode or most recurrent programme length is 15 minutes (same as for Garoua), with a total of 98 (24.3%) items having that length. The mean is 18.007 minutes, the median 15 and the standard deviation 16.605 minutes. The maximum length is 150 minutes (followed by 120 minutes), and the minimum length is less than 1 minute. The latter length is explained by the fact that station openings, brief transition signals were counted as programmed items, because duration is indicated. The 150 minutes maximum time still stands for Sunday afternoon sports. For daily lengths, Monday to Friday each has 1007 minutes, while Saturday and Sunday each has 1120 minutes. Again, it makes sense because Saturdays and Sundays are the only days Radio Buea broadcasts nonstop until its final close down after midnight. Every other day, the station closes down in the morning to give the equipment some rest and to allow for recordings.

A crosstabulation intended to distinguish between network and local programmes resulted as follows: 134 (33.2%) items scheduled are network, while 270 (66.8%) are provincial in origin. There is a clear indication here that Radio Buea relays more programmes from the National Station than Radio Garoua. Perhaps this is related to the recognised severity of staff shortage in the English Language Service of RDC. In the News Department of the National Station for example, for every one broadcaster in the English Desk, there is an equivalence of seven broadcasters in the French Desk. In terms of programme types, the distinction between programmes relayed from the National Station and provincial programmes, is summarised by Table VI.
### TABLE VI
Network and Provincial Programmes in Radio Buea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prog. Type</th>
<th>No. of Items</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Docu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>104 (66.2%)</td>
<td>53 (33.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P S</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>16 (14.5%)</td>
<td>94 (85.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (75.0%)</td>
<td>1 (25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &amp; L Enter.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1 (01.4%)</td>
<td>68 (98.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 (66.7%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2 (07.4%)</td>
<td>25 (92.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Eco.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4 (23.5%)</td>
<td>13 (76.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (100 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>404</strong></td>
<td>134 (33.2%)</td>
<td>270 (66.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Radio Bamenda

Analysed in a similar way, the Radio Bamenda schedule produced these results: A total of 368 (same as Garoua) are programmed each week, with 57 (15%) and 43 (12%) respectively as highest and lowest number of items per day. Tuesday and Wednesday have 57 (15%), Monday and Friday 56 (15%), Thursday 54 (15%), Saturday 45 (12%) and Sunday 43 (12%) items each. (Same remarks as for Buea and Garoua).

Of the 368 items programmed, 366 (99%) are Cameroonian and 2 (1%) foreign (similar percentage to Buea's and Garoua's). In terms of programme types, top of the list is news and current affairs 149 (40.5%), then public service 88 (23.9%), music and light entertainment 72 (19.6%), socio-economics 19 (5.2%), culture 18 (4.9%), commercials 10 (2.7%), sports 6 (1.6%), party 4 (1.1%), and children’s 2 (.5%). Like Buea, there was no documentary and drama; the same possible explanation applies. (Same remarks as for Buea and Garoua.)

The 368 items have a total broadcast time of 6980 minutes, which is 5 minutes more than Radio Garoua, but 295 and 1210 minutes less than Radio Buea and the National Station respectively. Of that airtime, network programmes occupy a total of 2645 minutes, and provincial programmes 4335 minutes. The time for network programmes is slightly higher than for Radio.
Garoua but slightly lower than for Radio Buea, which means that like Buea, it relays more programmes from the National Station than Garoua. Again, this is most probably accounted for by the relatively worse staffing situation in the English Language Service of RDC.

The mode or most recurrent programme length is 5 minutes (different from Garoua and Buea), with a total of 92 (25.0%) items having that length. The mean is 18.967 minutes, the median 15 and the standard deviation 17.243 minutes. The maximum length is 180 minutes (followed by 120 minutes), and the minimum length is less than 1 minute. (Same explanation as for Buea.) For daily lengths, Monday to Friday each has 975 minutes, Saturday 980, and Sunday 1125 minutes. Unlike Garoua and Buea, Bamenda still closes down on Saturday mornings. Being a new station without a Radio house, and often having to rely on a 50 year old 1KW MW transmitter despite the availability of a 300 KW MW transmitter, it cannot do otherwise.

A crosstabulation intended to distinguish between network and local programmes resulted as follows: 132 (35.9%) items scheduled are network, while 236 (64.1%) are provincial in origin. Bamenda relays about the same number of items from the National Station as Buea, and for the same possible reasons. In terms of programme types, the distinction between programmes relayed from the National Station and provincial programmes, is summarised by Table VII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prog. Type</th>
<th>No. of Items</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Docu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>102 (68.5%)</td>
<td>47 (31.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P S</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>16 (18.2%)</td>
<td>72 (81.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &amp; L Enter.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1 (1.4%)</td>
<td>71 (98.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 (50.0%)</td>
<td>3 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Eco.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6 (31.6%)</td>
<td>13 (68.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>368</strong></td>
<td><strong>132 (35.9%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>236 (64.1%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From all three tables, it is apparent that news and current affair programmes are the most relayed. Far less news is produced in Garoua, Buea and Bamenda than is relayed from Yaounde. Such excessive centralisation accounts for the marginalisation of the provincial stations, even by the local authorities such as the Governors, who are more interested in making news at the national level than in just being heard locally. Their attitude is understandable since by implication, compulsory relays mean that 'real' or worthwhile news comes from the centre, not the periphery. The next most relayed items from the National Station are the public service programmes, which again confirm the dependence of the provinces on the decisions that are made in Yaounde. On the other hand, relays of music and light entertainment from the centre is almost nonexistent; which is quite understandable, since music is generally available.

(ii) Programmes in CTV

The programme schedule of CTV was analysed in a similar manner, except that by the very nature of TV, there are bound to be certain differences in categories. Again, although the foreign content in CTV is very high, we are going to dwell on locally produced programmes here, while leaving foreign influences for chapter ten. The CTV schedule is different from those of RDC in that it changes every week. For this reason I analysed all programmed items effectively scheduled for the period that stretched from December 1986 to the first week of May 1988, and for every month on which I could find a Teleguide - the monthly publication started in November 1986 in which weekly schedules appear. But for February and September 1987, every other month within this period has been included in the analysis.

A total of 3444 items were scheduled between December 1986 and the first week of May 1988, of which January was the month with the greatest number of programmed items 469 (13.6%), followed by April 468 (13.6%), December 433 (12.6%) and March 417 (12.1%). While all the other months had between 200 and 300 items. In terms of years, the 3444 items were subdivided as follows: 1986, 186 (5.4%) (understandable since December alone was included from 1986); 1987, 2248 (65.3%) (which would have been even higher if the two missing months had been included); and 1988, 1010 (29.3%) (quite high, especially when we consider that it is only for the first four months of 1988). However, the figure is understandable because of the January 1988 extension of the number of broadcast days to five a week, and also because of the special broadcasts scheduled (e.g. during 28 ordinary session of URTNA and at the occasion of the inauguration of the CTV Production Centre in January.

A crosstabulation of country of origin by programme type, gave these results: Of the 3444 programmed items, 2292 (66.6%) were Cameroonian (probably more if all special or impromptu broadcasts are included), and 1152 (33.4%) were foreign. But following an analysis of programmable items received from various countries over that same period, only 378 (19.7%) of such items were recorded from Cameroon. How therefore do we explain the high percentage of scheduled items? It could be explained by the fact that neither local news items nor special broadcasts were recorded amongst programmes received. News for example is an instant production for instant consumption.

Equally accountable is the fact that CTV uses many foreign items to produce programmes with local names; this happens in sports most especially, where programmes like "Téléfoot", "Sports Parade", "Sports Vision" and "Fou Fou Foot" are highly dependable on foreign items for their very existence. Finally, technical and financial difficulties force many producers out of productivity, and brings about a high rate of rebroadcasts ('rediffusions') of locally produced programmes especially. Thus it is for these reasons, and not because of high productivity, variety or abundance, that Cameroon has a high percentage of scheduled items.

During this period, a total of 614 (17.8%) documentaries, 589 (17.1%) news and current affairs, 1235 (35.9%) series and serials, 53 (1.5%) drama, 220 (6.4%) children's, 179 (5.2%) films, 297 (8.6%) music and light entertainment, and 257 (7.5%) sports were scheduled. Of these, 158 documentaries, 578 series and serials, 20 drama, 167 children's, 178 films, 37 music and light entertainment, and 14 sports items were foreign. There was no foreign news and current affairs item scheduled on its own, since what the broadcasters receive in this category are incorporated into local programmes.

An important observation is that of the 2292 items of Cameroonian origin scheduled, there is a preponderance of documentaries 456, and documentary series 657. News and current affairs is the single largest category 589, with music and light entertainment coming fourth with 260, and sports fifth with 243. Children's programmes (no cartoons) is next with 53 items, then drama with 33, and finally only 1 film out of the 179 scheduled was Cameroonian. There are no comedy series, nor any series at all that is not based on some real aspect of national life such as agriculture, health, education, economics, culture and history. One would have expected CTV to
schedule many more films of Cameroonian origin, given the number of local productions, and given the government's policy of nation-building.

The preponderance of documentary programmes is indicative of a desire amongst broadcasters to produce programmes that could inform and educate; although what about and how extensive are the information and education remain the crucial questions. As mentioned earlier, more than 90% of the programmes are realised in and around the capital cities. All CTV broadcasters did express that they would like to reverse the order, to go beyond the capital cities for material on programmes about health, agriculture, culture, or other vital aspects of society; but unfortunately the means were not always there. But these are the desires of the practitioners, whom as we have seen, do not make the policies. Thus well-thought-out programmes such as "Agriscope", "Province À la Une", "Looking Back", "Afri Sanaga", "Minute By Minute", "Cooking Time", "Tam Tam Week-End", and "Inter College" do not achieve their purpose. The broadcasters in charge of them frequently have to rebroadcast past editions, not because of popular demand, but because for one well-known reason or another, they are unable to meet the deadline for the next edition.

In CTV like in RDC, news and current affairs tops the list as a single category. We arrived at the conclusion that news was mostly about the authorities. So are news and current affairs programmes such as "Headline", "Première Ligne", "NewsDrill", "The Presidency", and "Echos du Palais". The government is their concern, and Yaoundé their setting. Like News, they might deal with other parts of the country if and only if the central authorities are involved there.

Although music and sports respectively consist of 260 and 243 items, they occupy a lot of airtime. Sports for example occupies not less than 25% of the airtime of all scheduled programmes in CTV, with programmes such as "Téléfoot", "Foufoutoufoot", "Sports Parade" and "Sport Vision". But Bob Herbert, head of the sports section, (interviewed, 19/1/88) does not think consecrating 25% of airtime to sports alone is too much, because "Cameroonian are sports lovers". Yet, nation-building and development have often been presented not necessarily as what Cameroonians are lovers of, but as what they need, love it or not. Why then does sports appear as an exception to this rule?

I cannot claim to know the answer to the question, but I do know that the importance given to sports in the broadcast media is second to none
but that accorded politics. Sports, football most especially, is almost as
great a form of pressure on the broadcasters as is the President. Even though
certain programmes tend to suffer in the face of technical and financial
deficiencies, sports, music and politics thrive, and not always because
programmes on them are cheap to produce. The coverage of local football
encounters in the provincial or state capital city may be cheap, but it
certainly is very expensive to cover matches outside the country, be it on
radio or TV. The same is true about a musical programme like "Telepodium"
where artists are invited (sometimes from without the country) and paid huge
sums of money to perform, so that Cameroonians may be entertained.

Like politics, sports has a secure place in the news of the day; it
can only fail to feature if there is nothing to say or show. Again, like the
President, Football must be given priority even in the greatest of financial
and material difficulties. In 1986, barely struggling to set itself up, CTV
provided live coverage of the Mexican World Cup, and at a great financial
cost. Football and the President are the two elements most capable of imposing
themselves on the normal programme schedules of RDC and CTV. For example,
Monday March 14 1988 was not a normal broadcast day in CTV, but the matches of
the African Nations Cup were scheduled and retransmitted live from Morocco. To
show the importance of football, RDC and CTV did not only retransmit the
matches involving the Cameroon National Team, but also all the other matches.
That, for sure is a big bite off the airtime of a country with development
broadcasting as a priority.

Furthermore, Tuesday March 29 1988 was declared a public holiday in
order to celebrate the victory of the Indomitable Lions of Cameroon against
the Eagles of Nigeria, at the finals of the African Nations Cup in Rabat,
Morocco. That evening CTV decided to rebroadcast in its entirety the
Cameroon-Nigeria final, watched live when it took place earlier. CTV and RDC
also broadcast live the arrival of the Lions from Morocco. On Wednesday March
30 1988 there was the retransmission of the reception accorded the Lions at
the Douala International Airport, in Yaounde and at the Unity Palace by the
President. And despite that, football still dominated the evening's televised
news at 8.30 p.m, as well as news in RDC. Later the Minister of Youth and
Sports Dr Joseph Fofe, together with some members of the team, took the cup
round the country, moving from one provincial capital to another, presenting
it to the people, as an achievement of the President and his New Deal
administration.
Summary

At RDC and CTV programme production and content are heavily affected by the political, administrative and technical problems discussed above. Along with severe staffing problems, especially the inadequacy of qualified and active broadcasters, these problems have led to mediocrity and the domination of the airwaves by political and entertainment broadcasts. More than 90% of programmes are produced in and around the cities where radio and TV are located, programmes which, because of the above constraints, are often just a matter of tendering a microphone to an invited guest in the studio, or recording the proceeding of conferences and meetings in the cities. Few of the programmes are cultural or socio-economic in nature. Programmes richly conceived and with potential for promoting nation-building have often been victims of inadequate financial attention; some have simply disappeared, either because of political suppression, technical inadequacies, financial pressures, transfer and deaths, or mere exhaustion due to the single-minded zeal and enthusiasm of individual producer-presenters.

CTV and RDC are dominated by programmes centred on and around the political authorities. In RDC, the provincial stations, despite their supposed autonomy, are compelled to relay certain programmes broadcast from the National Station, including all the major and minor news bulletins, the current affairs programmes, and the major public service programmes. Far less news is produced in the provinces than is relayed from Yaounde. Such excessive centralisation accounts for the marginalisation of the provincial stations, even by the local authorities such as the Governors, who are more interested in making news at the national level than in just being heard locally. Such an attitude is understandable, especially as compulsory relays mean that 'real' or worthwhile news comes from the centre, not the periphery. Even public service programmes are dominated by items resulting from decisions centrally reached by government and in Yaounde.

In the light of their financial and technical problems, and the political pressures and presence in RDC and CTV, there is little time and resources left for them to produce programmes of significant cultural or socio-economic relevance, thus leaving only sports and music - entertainment - to compete with politics for airtime. Sports and Politics are closely related in Cameroon. Some researchers have termed sports the "opium of the masses". Whether right or wrong, one thing is clear: the President and football are constantly presented by the media as symbols of Cameroonian unity. Hence, it is politics and entertainment, not culture or socio-economics, which dominate
the airwaves. Yet policy-makers have never relented stressing the point that nation-building has cultural and socio-economic dimensions to it, and that it is such a demanding task that education and information must take precedence over entertainment in the media. The preponderance of politics and entertainment in the broadcast media seems to imply that education and information have somehow been reduced to their political dimension alone, and that together with sports and music, politics has confiscated the place that ought to be given to culture and socio-economics.

IV.) LANGUAGES OF BROADCAST IN RDC AND CTV

With over 200 national languages in addition to French and English (Chumbow, 1980:281; Povey, 1983:7; Biya, 1987:104), Cameroon stands out as one of the most linguistically mosaic countries in Africa. In such a multilingual society, the languages in which broadcast messages are sent tend to have a particular importance. We are well aware that the essence of communication is to be understood, and that despite one's colossal investments in broadcast technology or software, communication would have failed if it is not delivered in the language that makes the greatest meaning to one's audiences. Motivated by this argument, and also by the fact that 56.4% of Cameroonians are totally illiterate (BCR, 1980:72), that the National Literacy Campaign started in 1966 was concluded a failure several years back (Essang, 1978; Lizarzaburu, 1983), and that only 15% of Cameroonians can effectively speak and understand French and English (Ekaney, 1976:128), I decided to investigate into the languages of broadcast in RDC and CTV.

(A) In RDC

(1) National Station, Yaounde

In the National Station programmes are either in French or in English. Such have been the official languages for the station since the 1977 reorganisation of the programme schedule. An analysis of the languages in which all 372 programmed items are presented, gave these results: 173 (46.5%) items are programmed exclusively in French, 123 (33.1%) exclusively in English, 63 (16.9%) in both French and English, while 13 (3.5%) are unclassified. In an officially bilingual state like Cameroon, it is normal to have certain programmes (e.g. "The Bilingual News", "The News Flashes", "Sports and Music") which are simultaneously presented in both languages. Previous studies failed to take this element into account.
A crosstabulation of programmes by language, gave the results in Table VIII. Finally, when the total length of 8190 minutes per week was broken down by language, French was first with 4760, then English with 2825, and 475 minutes for programmes in both languages, while 130 minutes were used up by the missing cases. The conclusion is that programmes in French occupy almost twice the airtime occupied by programmes in English.

**TABLE VIII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FCH</th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>FCH &amp; ENG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132 N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>38 (28.8%)</td>
<td>32 (24.2%)</td>
<td>62 (47.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 P &amp; S</td>
<td>46 (65.7%)</td>
<td>24 (34.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Children</td>
<td>7 (87.5%)</td>
<td>1 (12.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Party</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95 N &amp; L.E</td>
<td>40 (42.1%)</td>
<td>42 (44.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sports</td>
<td>3 (50.0%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Culture</td>
<td>9 (56.6%)</td>
<td>7 (43.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 SocioEco</td>
<td>21 (63.6%)</td>
<td>12 (36.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372 TOTAL</td>
<td>173 (46.5%)</td>
<td>123 (33.1%)</td>
<td>63 (16.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* 13 (3.5%) unclassified cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) In Radio Garoua

In Radio Garoua, like in other provincial stations programmes are supposed to be both in the national languages and in French and English. Thus in addition to the two official languages Radio Garoua also broadcasts in Fulfulde, Hausa, Toupouri, and Arabe Choa. The analysis of the languages in which all 368 items were programmed, produced these results: 170 (46.2%) items are programmed exclusively in French, 86 (23.4%) in English, 14 (3.8%) in both English and French, and 98 (26.6%) in the four national languages. It is apparent that the airwaves are still dominated by French and English together, and that four national languages share only 26.6% of the airtime. This notwithstanding, Garoua is recognisably the station with the most systematic and consistent national language policy. An approach that is commendable for a province where 82.6% of the male population and 94.2% of the female population are totally illiterate (BCR, 1980:87).

A crosstabulation of programmes by language gave the results in Table IX. Finally, when the total length of 6975 minutes per week was broken down by language, French was first with 3380, the national languages
second with 1819, then English 1516, and lastly French and English with 260 minutes. Garoua is the only station in the network where the airtime given to programmes in the national languages (26.6%), is slightly higher than the airtime of any of the official languages, in this case English (23.4%). As we remarked with the National Station, and would soon observe with Buea and Bamenda, the tendency is for French and English to dominate the airways at every level.

**TABLE IX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FCH (62.5%)</th>
<th>ENG. (12.5%)</th>
<th>FCH&amp;ENG.</th>
<th>NAT.LANG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 doc.</td>
<td>5  (62.5%)</td>
<td>1  (12.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2  (25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 N&amp;G.A</td>
<td>41 (43.6%)</td>
<td>30 (31.9%)</td>
<td>12 (12.8%)</td>
<td>11 (11.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126 P &amp; S</td>
<td>63 (50.0%)</td>
<td>28 (22.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35 (27.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Drama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Party</td>
<td>2 (25.0%)</td>
<td>2 (25.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 M &amp; L.E</td>
<td>26 (50.0%)</td>
<td>17 (32.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (17.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sports</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Culture</td>
<td>7 (30.4%)</td>
<td>2 (8.9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14 (60.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 SocioECO</td>
<td>12 (40.0%)</td>
<td>4 (13.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14 (46.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Commer.</td>
<td>13 (65.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (35.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 170 (46.2%) 86 (23.4%) 14 (3.8%) 98 (26.6%)

(iii) Radio Buea

Like Radio Garoua, Buea broadcasts in national languages as well. But unlike Garoua, in fact, unlike any other station in the network, Buea schedules as many as 28 national languages.\(^4\) The analysis of the languages in which all 404 items were programmed, gave these results: 100 (24.8%) items are in French, 246 (60.9%) in English, 46 (11.4%) in both French and English, and lastly 12 (3.0%) in the national languages. From these figures alone it is apparent that Buea is dominated by English, with almost two and half times the number of items in French. But the 3% of airtime accorded programmes in the national languages is exceedingly low for a station that purports to broadcast in 28 such languages. However, the reasons are largely political, as we are

\(^4\) National Languages used in Radio Buea include: Bakweri, Mbo, Bafaw, Bamunka, Bakossi, Nweh Mundani, Kenyang, Bali, Bafut, Kedjom, Ngemba, Oroko, Ejagham, Noni, Membre, Otu, Metta, Moghamo, Nge, Ngwaw, Menka, Bausa, Fulfulde, Yamba, Aghem, Nso, Vincum and Kom. Amongst these, 18 are of North-West origin, 1 of the West Province, and 2 of the North. This implies that were the policy well applied and coordinated, Radio Buea might in reality have only 7 languages of South-West origin to broadcast in.
soon to find out.

The crosstabulation of programmes by language produced the results in Table X. Finally, when the total length of 7275 minutes per week was broken down by language, English was first with 4340 minutes, almost two and half times the length in French which followed with 1995 minutes, then the national languages with 525 minutes, and finally both French and English with 415 minutes. There is no doubt that the national languages are greatly marginalised in Buea, where 28 of them are expected to broadcast in 525 minutes a week. No wonder, they can do nothing else but light public service broadcasting.

Buea being an anglophone station, it is normal for English language programmes to occupy more airtime than programmes in French. In Garoua a francophone station, the same applies, and so it does in every other provincial station in the country; the official language (French or English) spoken more in the area has greater airtime. The real issue however, is what should be the degree of difference in airtime, for a country with bilingualism as an official option; an issue which the authorities have not resolved. The National Station on the other hand, represents no region in particular; it stands for the unity and pluralism of the country. As far as the two official languages are concerned, none, according to the logic of official bilingualism, ought to have more airtime than the other. In terms of pluralism and effective communication, no language which is not mastered by a majority of Cameroonians ought to dominate airtime.

(iv) Radio Bamenda

Like Buea and Garoua, Bamenda broadcasts in both the official and national languages. It closely follows Buea with broadcasts in 23 national languages.5 Perhaps it is appropriate to remark here that the North-West and South-West provinces are the most linguistically fragmented in the entire country; they each have more national languages than any other province. But most ironically, it is they who have failed to seriously consider Pidgin-English (a language spoken by over 90% of the anglophone population) as a "lingua franca" (Koenig et al., 1983; Vamey, 1984).

5 Radio Bamenda broadcasts in the following 23 National languages: Ngemba, Mungaka, Baufut, Nkwen, Mendankve, Wimbum, Nso, Oku, Iboni, Mgbili, Pinyin, Yamba, Netta, Ngie, Menka, Ngatav, Nbenbe, Kom, Aghem, Hausa, Fulfulde, Kedjom, Mubaka. Here we notice the re-occurrence of certain languages, whereas others do not feature at all.
TABLE X
PROGRAMMES CROSSTABULATED BY LANGUAGE, BUEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FCH</th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>FCH&amp;ENG</th>
<th>NAT. LANG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 doc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157 N&amp;C.A</td>
<td>41 (26.1%)</td>
<td>72 (45.9%)</td>
<td>44 (28.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 P S</td>
<td>36 (32.7%)</td>
<td>62 (56.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (10.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Drama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Party</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Children's</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 M &amp; L.E</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>61 (88.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sports</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Culture</td>
<td>1 (03.7%)</td>
<td>26 (96.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 SocioECo</td>
<td>4 (23.5%)</td>
<td>13 (76.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Commer.</td>
<td>6 (50.0%)</td>
<td>6 (50.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>404 TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (24.8%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>246 (60.9%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>46 (11.4%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 (3.0%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, an analysis of the language situation of Radio Buea gave the following results: Of the 368 items programmed, 91 (24.7%) were in French, 224 (60.9%) in English, 47 (12.8%) in both English and French, and 6 (1.6%) in the national languages. The percentage is lowest not only for the three analysed stations, but for the whole network. Like Buea, Bamenda deals with national languages in a very peripheral and disinterested manner. Garoua on the other hand tries to distinguish and to give details of what programmes are scheduled for which of its languages. With such little time, it is not surprising that Buea and Bamenda have chosen to talk generically of "Broadcasts in the National Languages", where four or five languages are stringed together in a thirty minutes slot.

A crosstabulation of programmes by language produced the results in Table XI. Finally, when the total length of 6980 minutes per week was broken down by language, English was first with 4130, which is almost double the length in French which was 2115 minutes, then both French and English with 445 minutes, and finally national languages with barely 290 minutes. The same general argument about Radios Buea and Garoua holds true for Bamenda.

(B) In CTV
The analysis produced the following results which confirmed the dominance of French and English in general, and the preponderance of French language programmes in particular. If the national languages are marginalised
TABLE XI
PROGRAMMES CROSSTABULATED BY LANGUAGE, BAMENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FCH</th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>FCH&amp;ENG</th>
<th>NAT. LANG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 doc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149 N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>39 (26.2%)</td>
<td>66 (44.3%)</td>
<td>44 (29.5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 P S</td>
<td>36 (40.9%)</td>
<td>47 (53.4%)</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
<td>4 (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Drama</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Party</td>
<td>4 (50.0%)</td>
<td>5 (50.0%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (100 %)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 M &amp; L.E</td>
<td>8 (11.1%)</td>
<td>62 (86.1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sports</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>2 (33.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Culture</td>
<td>1 (5.6%)</td>
<td>17 (94.4%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 SocioECo</td>
<td>3 (15.8%)</td>
<td>16 (84.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Commer.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (100 %)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

368 TOTAL 91 (24.7%) 224 (60.9%) 47 (12.8) 6 (1.6%)

In RDC, they are completely excluded in CTV, thereby making television the more linguistically centralised of the two broadcast media. Of all the 3444 items scheduled, 2135 (62.0%) were in French, 802 (23.3%) in English, and 507 (14.7%) in both French and English.

When programmes were crosstabulated by language, the results in Table XII were obtained. According to the figures, French comes first in every type of programme except drama and sports where English has a slight lead. In fact French has 62% + 1/2 of 14.7% of the airtime to itself. It means that about 3 out of every 4 programmed items in CTV are in French. (In April 1987, the students of ASMAC/ESSTI, after analysing the schedule for one week-end, came to the conclusion that French had 61.31%, English 29.31%, and music 9.35% of the total airtime (Ndongo, 1987:22-3). Although they failed to make the same distinctions I have made, it can still be observed that the gap between programmes in both languages is very wide.) More news and current affairs are broadcast in both languages than any other category of programmes. That is especially the case because the 8.30 p.m news cast (the only bulletin) is bilingual. Next to news is sports, 32.7% of which are programmed in both languages. Here again, the reason is the practice of giving live commentaries in both languages. The significance of these statistics is further discussed in chapter ten.

(C) Language and Broadcasting: A Critical Appraisal

There is no doubt that Cameroon is a multilingual society. Although
TABLE XII

PROGRAMMES CROSSTABULATED BY LANGUAGE, CTV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FCH</th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>FCH &amp; ENG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>614 Doc.</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>144 (23.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>589 N &amp; C.A</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>342 (58.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1235 Series</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>285 (23.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Drama</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28 (52.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 Children’s</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>68 (30.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179 Film</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>39 (21.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297 M &amp; L.E</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>25 (08.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257 Sports</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>98 (38.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3444 TOTAL 2135 (62.0%) 802 (23.3%) 507 (14.7%)

Chumbow (1980:281) puts the total number of national languages at 225, Biya (1987:104) at 236, and Mbassi-Manga (Povey, 1983:7) at 285, the fact remains that with more than 200 national languages, Cameroon is one of the most linguistically mosaic countries in Africa. Research into the transcription of these languages is fairly well advanced but there is a problem at the level of the alphabet to adopt; so far the system of transcription remains as diversified as it was during colonial times and only a timely intervention by the public authorities could prevent anarchy (Bot Ba Njock, 1978). From our statistics, it is clear these languages are grossly marginalised in the broadcast media. French and English dominate the airwaves at every level of the network; even in Garoua, where the airtime occupied by the national languages is exceptionally high at 26.6%, priority is still given to French and English combined (73.4%). In this section we intend to discuss Cameroon’s broadcast language policy, its implementation and effects on the idea of using the broadcast media to foster nation-building.

Relevant studies related to the use of national languages include those by Ekaney (1976), Essang, (1978), Epie Ngome (1979), Belibi (1981), Wamey, (1984), Sah (1984), Ful (1985), Gvet (1985) and Amougou (1985). These studies generally agree that too little airtime is given to national languages. In Radio Douala these languages are entitled to only 8.1% of the airtime as opposed to 58.4% for French and 26.5% for English (Gvet, 1985:37); in Radio Bertoua French and English alone occupy 71% of the total airtime (Belibi, 1981:20); in former Radio Centre-South 22h25 out of 96h per week were occupied by national languages, a situation which according to Amougou (1985:74), pushed more than 74% of the village of Ondong-Adzap to listen to such foreign stations as Radio-Bata and Radio-Malabo both of which
broadcast in Fang, a language similar to Bulu in Cameroon, and therefore understood by the villagers; and in Radio Bamenda the minimal airtime given to Hausa for example, has forced many members of the province's Hausa community to tune to Radio Garoua and Northern Nigerian stations on linguistic grounds (Ful, 1985). These studies confirm that the situation in the rest of the network is similar to that of Radios Garoua, Buea and Bamenda which we have analysed.

Cameroon's broadcast language policy is clear. Like every other aspect of national life, it is defined by the President. While inaugurating Radio Bertoua in 1978, President Ahidjo stressed the importance of the national languages in reaching a greater proportion of the largely illiterate masses. He called upon the provincial stations to use more and more of these languages. Following the construction of the new National Station in 1978, the task of broadcasting in them became the exclusive affair of the provincial stations. Before then there was a whole service in charge of national languages at the Subdirectorate of Programmes in RDC. The service comprised two bureaus, and according to Belibi (1981), was well organised. But as he argues, no such structures exist at the provincial level today, where broadcasts in the national languages are run by the department of programmes, which also happens to be in charge of French and English language broadcasts.

Although a bureau to coordinate programmes in the national languages was created in January 1981, very little coordination is being done. The bureau ended at creation, as the authorities came short of providing those in charge with the means they needed to operate. The result is that today every station does as it pleases; languages are included or excluded, no longer for reasons of demography and popularity, but depending on who can exert the greatest political pressure. The lack of coordination and respect for the government's policy has brought about chaos in the selection process, and a situation in which broadcasts in these languages are handled by volunteers lacking media training (Ful 1985:45-9; Belibi, 1981:27-43). This has led to or helped to maintain a situation whereby some provinces broadcast in national languages that are not of that province. Such is the case with Radio Buea which broadcasts in 18 languages of the North West province as opposed to only 7 of South-West origin, Radio Centre which broadcasts in Bamileke and Bamoun - languages of the Western province, and Radio Douala which broadcasts in Evondo - a Central province language. In this way some languages are broadcast in more than one station, while others are not given a single chance (Belibi, 1980).
Belibi feels that by making national language broadcasting exclusive to the provincial stations, the government has betrayed a lack of genuine interest in these languages (also see Epie Ngome, 1979:3-6, 53). His fieldwork experiences confirmed this attitude amongst the authorities and broadcast practitioners. He describes how he was received with disinterest and indifference; even media practitioners did not appear concerned whether or not national languages were given airtime. They failed to see why Belibi was making all the fuss, when French and English were just as important for communication. He argues against this attitude that gives priority to "imported" languages, and calls for a revalorization of the national languages, not only for the purpose of communicating with the so-called "analphabetes", but as a sort of self assertion and identity for all Cameroonians (Belibi, 1980:3-4). His is a position shared by many, amongst whom Mpoudi (1985:15), Nguie (1987:16), Tantoh (1987:12), and Wang (1987:8). Mpoudi for example, advocates not only for the increased use of the national languages, but also for the creation of an authentic Cameroon language capable of replacing French and English as the instrument of national culture; a view earlier expressed by Mbassi-Manga (1964:140-4).

Ekane stresses the need for the establishment of a "lingua franca" in Cameroon, and calls for a recognition of "The general consensus" which is that "the radio networks should increase vernacular broadcasting and also broadcasting in Pidgin-English which is widely spoken by an estimated 2,000,000 Francophones and Anglophone Cameroonians" (1976:127). Ngono (1982:8-9) thinks same, while Nuvala Fonkem reiterates the "importance for the authorities to consider the use of Pidgin English, by far the only viable lingua franca in Cameroon, in news programs directed towards the rural audience such as 'Our Changing Rural World'" (1989:40). Their point is endorsed and validated by Wamoy (1984), who in a remarkable survey of Radio Bamenda audiences, arrived at the following conclusions:

- That despite the government's policy of official French-English bilingualism, French is far from being part of daily life in Bamenda; but that instead, the inhabitants of this city showed a high degree of trilingualism in Standard English, Pidgin-English and a national language, with the first being the least used;
- That Pidgin-English is the most widely spoken of the common Cameroon languages, and that as a language it appeals even to "those who know enough Standard English not to need it";
- That the inhabitants would prefer their health, agriculture,
public-service, emergency advice or advertisement programmes in Pidgin-English, not because it was necessarily more popular than their individual mother-tongues, but because of their sense of community.

Wamey then suggests the use of Pidgin-English for broadcasts intended for mass consumption. He argues that "Broadcast in the official languages, programmes on subjects like politics, advice, adverts and slogans take on a formal, distant and altogether elitist aspect which the ordinary listener finds difficult to empathize with. Such a listener cannot feel addressed by the broadcaster or involved in the programme" (Wamey, 1984:97).

About Pidgin-English, it is quite surprising that the government has failed to realise how important a solution this could be for some of the country's language problems. If advantage could be taken of the fact that almost everybody in the former Southern/Vest Cameroon speaks and understands Pidgin-English, the linguistic problem would have been solved for the North-West and South-West provinces. Even more, according to findings by the Department of Linguistics at the University of Yaounde (Koenig et al., 1983; Hoilman, 1985), every Cameroonian can speak and understand either Pidgin-English, Ewondo, or Fulfulde; and is very unlikely to face linguistic problems communicating anywhere in the country should s/he command a mastery of all three languages. It is obvious that French and English, official languages though they may be, have no basis for their continuous domination of the broadcast media. As Hoilman argues, "Cameroon's official bilingual policy was originally predicated upon certain linguistic assumptions that have, heretofore, never been adequately investigated" (Hoilman, 1985:216).

However, the authorities have tried to justify their presence and usage by arguing that French and English are necessary for Cameroon's dealings with other nations (Chumbow, 1980). But as Wamey argues, important though Cameroon's international prestige might be, it ought not "to be acquired at the cost of its own internal satisfaction", especially as every evidence points to Pidgin-English, Fulfulde and Ewondo as the veritable "lingua francas" of Cameroon. "Ironically the broadcasts received abroad are meant not for foreign, but local consumption, so that what foreigners hear on Radio Cameroon does not have much meaning to them, while the Cameroonians for whom it is meant do not even understand it" (Wamey, 1984:93). The rural audiences for example, criticise programmes such as "Calling The Women", "Our Changing Rural World" and "Le Magasine du Monde Rural" which, revelant though they are, come to them in Standard English or French. According to one farmer in the
South-West province, "Instead of speaking to us in Pidgin the radio people
speak in big English, in grammar that we the farmers do not understand". In
the francophone region the complaint is the same about French (Ministry of

Granted that French and English are as important for national unity
as they are alleged to be for Cameroon's international prestige, what efforts
are being made to promote genuine bilingualism in the media and in the
population as a whole? Studies (Nkwo, 1975; Nkendem, 1978; Epie Ngome, 1979;
Chumbow, 1980) have pointed to the lack of a conscious effort by the
government to make bilingualism part of the daily lives of Cameroonians and of
the media. Nkendem (1978:71) argues that despite the legalities, there have
been no rigorous policies to promote bilingualism in the official media, where
"French has enjoyed considerable predominance over the English language." My
contact with broadcasters confirmed this observation. Anglophone practitioners
constantly require translations of the communiques, speeches, and other
official documents which are sent to RDC and CTV in French. In fact, almost
every official document received in the broadcast media is in French. That is
because the bulk of the decision makers being francophone and monolingual,
their anglophone colleagues or staff tend to write in French to enable them to
understand. Thus although the Director of RDC during this study was
anglophone, neither his circulars nor his reports were written in English.

The government has the policy of employing translators to facilitate
the task of the broadcasters; but in reality, most of these translations are
done by the broadcasters themselves. For one thing, there are not enough
translators. There are none in CTV for example, while the National Station of
RDC has only three, and the provincial stations none. But Mr Augustine Ayuk,
senior (anglophone) translator (interviewed, 25/2/88), confessed that his two
francophone colleagues were hardly around; for "It is usually the anglophones
who need to have things translated, since basically everything that comes here
is in French." Unable to do all the translation himself, he admitted
journalists are forced to do some of it themselves, although their attempts
are poor and they are not always through in time to include these texts in the
intended bulletins.

The problems of bilingualism account for many shortcomings in
Cameroonian broadcasting, including the distortion of the very official
messages which the government has judged to be of cardinal importance to
national development and unity (Nkwo, 1975:36). Perhaps the only thing that
has made such distortions less pronounced, and therefore least harmful to the
authorities, is the fact that the masses towards whom the messages are geared
understand them least.

Yet despite the encouraging findings that we have referred to above,
there is no indication that the authorities are ready to act as Ekaney and
Wamey suggest. Instead, as Wamey acknowledges, Pidgin-English is being blamed
for many things in Cameroon. He writes:

Cameroon Pidgin English [CPE] has been at the centre of an
ongoing public controversy for a long time. Banned from the public
and private schools at independence, discouraged from the home by
literate parents concerned about the level of their children's
Standard English and discouraged implicitly from the mass media,
the language has continued to thrive (Wamey, 1984:68).

Pidgin-English has also been blamed for the falling standards in
schools and for the francophones' inability to learn English as fast as their
anglophone counterparts learn French. But as Wamey recognises, because of the
political difficulties involved in choosing one or some of the plethora of
national languages either for national or regional broadcasts, and because of the
limitations of both official languages, CPE stands out as the best
alternative, especially as the areas in which it is spoken include five of the
ten provinces (North-West, South-West, West, Littoral and Centre). If the
media must truly fulfill their task of informing and educating in "a language
that the greatest number of the population understands", Pidgin-English stands
out as their best bet (Wamey, 1984:76-82). And statistics truly support Wamey
by presenting Pidgin-English as a language for the whole country, not only for
the anglophone regions. Summarizing the findings of Koenig et al. (1983),
Hollman (1985:214) writes: "97% of children entering anglophone schools use
Pidgin; 83% of Douala's population [a francophone city] use Pidgin for
shopping; and about 50% of the adults in the southern half of the country can
communicate in Pidgin."

Summary

French and English are the dominant languages of RDC and CTV
programmes, despite the fact that barely 15% of the population can communicate
in them without difficulty. In RDC, this is the case at every level of the
network; even in Garoua, where the airtime accorded the national languages is
exceptionally high at 26.6%, priority is given to French and English combined
(73.4%). In the National Station of RDC, and in CTV, broadcasts are entirely
in French and English, primarily the former. Thus if the national languages
are marginalised in RDC, they are completely excluded in CTV, thereby making
television the more linguistically centralised of the two broadcast media. Although the government has a policy that encourages the use of national languages in broadcasting to the illiterate masses, it has failed to ensure the proper implementation of the said policy. This has led to chaos in the choice of broadcast languages, and to a situation where broadcasts in the national languages are handled by volunteers lacking media training.

The excessive centralisation of broadcast messages in French and English defeats the government's own idea of taking its messages of development and nation-building to as many people as possible. Yet the importance of the national languages was foreseen and stressed as far back as the early 1960s, not least by the government itself.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter it has been our aim to examine the decree of centralism in Cameroonian broadcasting. Looking from four different angles, namely: (i) the creation and distribution of broadcast facilities, (ii) the process of decision-making, (iii) the contents of programmes, and (iv) the languages of broadcast, we have noted (as in the summary conclusions) that:
(a) Radio and TV facilities in Cameroon are entirely urban-centred, and that the broadcast media are plagued with technical difficulties of all sorts;
(b) Decision-making in matters of broadcasting is centralised in Yaounde, in the hands of politicians and administrators rather than the professionals;
(c) Programmes are preponderantly political, in tune with the government's idea of what is right or wrong, and that together with sports and music, the political content has usurped the time and resources that would otherwise be dedicated to culture and socio-economics in order to attain the nation-building objective; (d) While broadcasting is dominated by French and English, the former is more dominant than the latter, and that with the exception of Radio Garoua, the national languages play a most peripheral role.

This centralism has adversely affected the government's objective to make polity and culture congruent and mobilise Cameroonians for 'self-reliant', 'balanced', 'participative' and 'just' socio-economic development. It has ensured that the government is served, but has failed to provide access or feedback from the public, especially the rural masses who constitute 80% of the population. With the lack of regional particularism and balance, the concentration in a few hands of decision-making on matters related to broadcasting, and the absence of pluralism in its content and
languages, radio and TV cannot be said to be in gear with Cameroon's nation-building ideals.
CHAPTER NINE

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN CAMEROON

INTRODUCTION

The centre-periphery framework as used in this study, demands that we also investigate how foreign involvement has affected broadcasting for nation-building. This is because, following the logic of the world capitalist system, the countries of the centre have no real interest in the development of strong, economically independent and culturally autonomous 'nation-states' at the periphery. Rather, it is in the cultural, political and economic interest of the centre to keep the periphery "firmly subordinate" to its purposes (Wallerstein, 1968, 1976; Silva Michelena, 1971; Cutkind et al., 1976; Dunn, 1978a; Hadjor, 1987; Amin, 1980, 1981, 1985). According to this framework therefore, the less dependent on the centre Cameroonian broadcasting is, the greater its autonomy in the pursuit of genuine nation-building.

In chapter three we reviewed literature substantiating the thesis that colonial broadcasting served the exclusive cultural, entertainment and information interests of the colonists. We noted that Western companies (EMI, RCA, GRANADA, MARCONI, THOMSON-CSF-SODETEG, SIEMENS) and agencies (BBC, SORAFOM/OCORA/ORAFCOM) have readily helped out with the equipment, training and the experts needed to make broadcasting possible in Africa. But we also noted that because the companies are motivated more by the need to make profit than just the desire to help out, developing countries have often found themselves in a situation where the country that provides the original technology is equally responsible for the engineers to operate and repair the equipment, as well as for the programmes, and at great expense (Schiller, 1967; Katz et al., 1978). As we are well aware, in economics monopolies, be these technological or otherwise, are not only very costly but leave the consumer with little else to choose from.

Given the preponderance of the commercial motive or self-interest, it is evident that a country which intends to use broadcasting for nation-building must strive to have as little foreign involvement as possible. For no state that depends largely on another for its plans to succeed, can claim to have the sort of autonomy and self-reliance that genuine
nation-building calls for (Amin, 1985, 1987a; Hadjor, 1987; Gabou, 1987; Doumou, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987). Technological dependence on foreign companies or agencies is bound to be economically detrimental to the country in question, particularly if the companies involved have no local representatives, and therefore invest all the money they make back in their countries of origin. Economic development, which is one of the dimensions of nation-building, cannot be very effective if the 'limited resources' of the developing countries are not only invested in foreign companies, but are done so in foreign countries as well (Joseph, 1976:4; Johnson, 1980:xxi; Ndongko, 1985:239-47; Dessouane et al., 1986). It is with this premise, and against the background of a primarily agricultural economy dominated by foreign capital and the Cameroonian government or state (Joseph, 1976; Johnson, 1980; Ndongko, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985), that we proceed to examine whether or not and how broadcasting for nation-building has been affected by foreign technological involvement.

I.) TECHNOLOGY AND COLONIAL BROADCASTING

From the previous chapters, it is apparent that knowledge of the past is crucial to understanding the present situation in Cameroon. To appreciate the relationship between the government and the broadcast media today, we investigated into how these same institutions related with the authorities under President Ahidjo and during colonialism. Cameroon's relationship with foreign technology today is not uninfluenced by the past either.

Colonial broadcasting was under France and Britain. But unlike France, Britain failed to invest technologically in the British Cameroons. Apart from the recording room equipped with mobile facilities and two cars provided for Southern Cameroon by the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) in 1957, there was no other technological involvement by Britain. This as we explained earlier, was due to the fact that the latter had decided to administer the territory as part of a larger colony, Nigeria. The failure on the part of Britain to administer the Southern Cameroons separately led to the takeover and subsequent domination of the region by French broadcast technology. We remember how immediately after unification a French-made IKV transmitter was dispatched from Yaounde to remedy the situation in Buea. Thus because British Cameroon did not inherit much in terms of broadcast technology from Britain, its people had little to argue for after unification when their francophone counterparts increasingly gave France the upper hand in matters of
technology and cooperation in general.

However, the lack of a British technological heritage alone cannot totally explain why France was and continues to be given priority by Cameroonian governments in the areas of "technological and cultural cooperation". The traditional differences in approach to colonial or economic domination have a lot to do with it too. From the very beginning France decided to monopolise and centralise all aspects of broadcasting, making sure that French economic and cultural interests dominated the broadcast media in the colonies. It felt economically and culturally threatened by other Western states, especially Britain (Blin, 1957:138; Bone, 1986:191; Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:81-3); and therefore sought a strengthened grip over its overseas territories. The cultural strategies employed by France are dealt with in chapter ten. Here the concern is to depict the steps France took to establish itself as a dominant technological partner, both in colonial and post-colonial Cameroon.

Where other colonists like Britain thought private companies could achieve the same aim of promoting metropolitan economic and cultural interests, France preferred a more centralised approach under an agency and minister. Its overseas investments in the field of broadcasting were first conducted by the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (FIDES), an agency created in 1946 (Bone, 1986:201) to finance interalia (Ndongko, 1981/82:16-20), the construction of transmitters and the equipment of overseas stations. According to Blin (1957:136-7), FIDES was responsible for the construction of stations in Dakar, Saint-Louis, Konkry, Bamako, Niamey, Abidjan, Cotonou, Lomé, Brazzaville, Fort-Lamy, Yaounde, Douala, Caroua, Tananarive, Nouméa, Djibouti, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, and Papeete.

Consistent with France's idea of centralisation, all the above stations formed part of a network, and each was directly connected with the respective territorial assemblies. The link between the administration and broadcasting was undeniably close; central control was direct from FIDES (and later SORAFOM) in Paris. Thus just as the territories were politically coordinated from Paris the centre, so too were the stations professionally and technically managed by the "échelon central" situated in Paris (Debever, 1963:30-1; Gibbons, 1974:108-10; Golding, 1977:294). As we saw in chapter eight, the Cameroonian idea of a network service is modeled exactly after the French: Yaounde is to the Cameroonian network what Paris was to the French
colonial 'Reseau', albeit unlike Paris Yaounde depends totally on foreign
technology to perform its role as the nerve centre.

The colonial transmitters provided by France were exceptionally
low-powered; so much so that in 1957 all 18 "France-Overseas" stations totaled
no more than 142 KW and 46,000 hours of airtime (Blin, 1957:137). In 1953,
Radio Dakar was the most well-equipped with 25 KW, followed by Radios
Tananarive and Abidjan with 1 KW each, then Douala and Cotonou with barely 2
to 300 watts (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:109). Although the reason given for the
weakness of transmitters is the fact that these stations were meant primarily
to serve the interests of the colonists, French researchers admit things were
by far technically better off in the English colonies.

Sternberg-Sarel (1961:109-15) acknowledges that initially African
radio in French was ten to twelve years behind radio in English, and that even
though France was doing much to cover the gap, it was doing so with less funds
than were generally put at the disposal of anglophone Africa. As he explains,
not until 1953-54 did France, at a government level, decide to "improve and
africanise the network". Consequently, Funds were voted in 1954, and in 1955
effort at equipping the stations was begun. A Studio-Ecole was created in
Paris, charged with training the technicians, producers and journalists needed
for the Overseas stations.

Even though France recognised its late start and the technical
inadequacies in its colonial broadcasting, it refused to let any other
country, Britain most especially to interfere with its monopoly in French
territories. Blin admits that French colonial broadcasting suffered not only
from low-powered transmitters, but also from an acute shortage of sets. But
although he recognises that the British Saucepan radio, invented in the 1950s
could be useful to French Africans because it was cheap and easy to handle, he
admits at the same time that France would not allow British-made sets in its
territories.

Instead of advocating the adoption of the Saucepan, Blin
unequivocally sounds a note of warning to France. As far as he is concerned,
"The question of popular sets must ... be resolved by French industries, if
not we shall be obliged to negotiate with foreign industries". For as he
rightly remarks, "If it were not for the import duties, it is certain that
French Africa would already have been equipped with the help of the said
English sets" (Blin, 1957:137-8). Once more, this is a glaring reminder that
French involvement with radio in Africa was never an altruistic affair, devoid of French economic interests. Colonialism has never been an altruistic enterprise, albeit France's claim to a "mission civilisatrice" in L'Afrique noir would seem to suggest otherwise.

Created on January 1956, La Société de Radio-diffusion d'Outre-Mer (SORAFOM), took over the activities of FIDES. Its creation was probably a direct result of the interministerial commission comprising agents of France d'Outre-mer and Radio Télévision Française (RTF), which since 1951 had studied the problems of the establishment of an African network. With an annual budget of two billion former French Francs, SORAFOM constructed, equipped and administered overseas stations. This was at the time of intense clamour for independence, and it has been argued that renewed interest on the part of France was not unconnected with concerns about its economic and cultural interests in post-colonial francophone Africa (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:109-11; Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:87-8).

France wanted to maintain its traditional monopoly over the territories, once they were independent; as we remember, independence was fought for, not freely delivered on a silver platter by the French. It is curious to remark that although SORAFOM continued to furnish African stations with 1KW or 4KW transmitters as late as 1959, the situation was to change immediately after independence, when the very SORAFOM would be ready to supply high-powered transmitters, only this time paid for by the African governments.

Writers are not very exact on the date of SORAFOM's creation. Bebey talks of 20 January 1955 (1963:32), but it is possible that either Sternberg-Sarel (1961:111) or Bebey might have got the last figure wrongly. However, I have decided to use 1956 on the basis that Sternberg's article was published before Bebey's book. Generally, writers on the history of radio in francophone Africa tend rather to contradict one another in matters of dates.

It would appear, and typically so, that anxious to make France's contribution to radio in the developing world known in the international arena, some writers (Blin 1957, for example) treated planned projects as though these were already accomplished. Few of these writers for example, seem to agree when Radios Douala, Yaounde and Garoua actually started operating. According to Blin, the latter two were already operational by 1957, but others talk of 1958/59.

In Cameroon, the December 1987 law creating CRTV was treated as a fait accompli, but the structure did not start functioning as such until May 1988. It is characteristic for presidential statements or declared intents to be treated as though they had already been realised. Here we find a common element between France and Cameroon, which perhaps explains the contradiction in dates in both societies.
Sternberg-Sarel gives Senegal, Mali and Ivory Coast as early examples. But this only confirms once again what Ela (1982) and Bone (1986) say, that colonialism was worthwhile only as long as it made economic sense and gave French culture the international 'brilliance' that France needed to sustain its prestige in the concert of nations.

There is much evidence that SORAFOM was created to ensure the continuance of France’s predominance in 'France d'Outre-mer' even after independence. As Sternberg-Sarel (1961:111) writes, SORAFOM was "created very rapidly", and in a rapid manner too, it set about bringing radio into French Africa. For ten to twelve years, France had lagged behind Britain in matters of broadcasting, and the radical demands for independence seemed to have taken it totally by surprise. SORAFOM came into existence at a time when even France was starting to think of independence for francophone Africa as inevitable.

Its role was to reduce French Africa's chances for economic and cultural independence, and to ensure France's monopoly; this, despite the inevitability of Africa's political independence. Sternberg-Sarel (1961:115-16) attests to this when he remarks that SORAFOM continued to act as the technical and professional mentor of the African stations, although the African political leaders had wanted a total break from the beginning. As these leaders became absorbed by their daily tasks, he observes, they were less fussy about the need for alternative partners in matters of technology, or about their past preoccupation with finding "a unique style" for their individual stations. But that was the result of a careful strategy on the part of France and SORAFOM.

Soon after SORAFOM was created, it started retreating vis-à-vis the direct control and running of African stations. It was wise, if France were to survive demands for radical independence, for SORAFOM to keep a low profile, at least until things had calmed down. Faced with this situation, it tended "to become just adviser to the respective governments"; "Its doctrine" being "to maintain in the process of retreating, French cultural influence" (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:115), and French economic interests as well. A strategy which paid off. As Sternberg-Sarel (1961:110-11) notes, at the dawn of independence, some African leaders had become less rigid about the idea of a total break. So that not all of their new governments were interested in taking over management; some of them were quite "satisfied with the management by SORAFOM". Ahidjo’s Cameroon was one of these 'satisfied' countries, and as we noted in our discussion of the economy in chapter five, France has stayed
on as the dominant foreign influence ever since, providing aid and capital in order to strengthen its foothold and secure its economic and cultural interests. In broadcasting, France's technological involvement has been as dominant as in every other aspect of the economy.

As I have argued elsewhere, the creation of SORAFOM and other things was a carefully calculated move by France to maintain its presence in post-colonial francophone Africa. Everything which took place between 1955 and 1960 was carefully orchestrated by France to have this desired effect:

As the wind of change swept across L'Afrique Noir, and the smell of independence became more and more pungent, France began to prepare for the unavoidable and for the post-independence era. It was no coincidence that France waited till 1955 to begin seriously considering the equipment of radio in her colonies, or to open the Studio Ecole - "destiné à former des techniciens et des animateurs de programme africains". It was not by chance either that La Société de Radio-diffusion d'Outre-Mer (SORAFOM) was established in 1956. Neither was it a coincidence that at the same time black administrative officers began to be a reality in Africa, nor that in 1956 the so-called 'Loi Cadre' was passed, giving limited autonomy to colonial territories (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:109). This was part of France's strategy to continue to exert influence in Francophone Africa after independence. Last Africans mistook this softening up as a signal for real change, the Guinea experience was meant to serve as a warning for those who advocated total independence and a radical break with metropolitan France (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:87).

Thus it was from a France determined to stay on and to be dominant, a France out to protect its economic and cultural interests, that Cameroon, a country with nation-building as its "supreme mission", took over broadcasting at independence. With such divergent interests, could there really be any genuine cooperation between the two? Could Cameroon opt to rely on France technologically, knowing that what interested the latter above everything else was French economic and cultural interests? The argument here is that nation-building and dependence on foreign technology (particularly where those who supply the latter make no secret of the fact that they are out to make economic or cultural profits) are incompatible; the first cannot be attained if nothing is done to greatly limit the second. What has Cameroon done to this effect? That is our next concern.

II.) BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY AFTER INDEPENDENCE

A) Introduction: France and French Africa Today

The relationship between France and francophone Africa today, shows that the former has maintained its influence thanks both to the effectiveness
of its colonial policy of assimilation, and to a series of conventions signed at the dawn of independence. The conventions most especially, provided for French economic, military and cultural involvement in francophone Africa. They have resulted in "pervasive French assistance and French aid" (O’Brien, 1983:198). Stokke (Gibbons, 1974:111-12) notes that between 1960 and 1970, France, in addition to a yearly supply of 18,000 hours of radio programmes and the training of Africans, "participated in the establishment of 28 radio stations in Africa". In her study of broadcast professionalism in Senegal, O’Brien observes an excessive dependence on French companies, equipment, aid and experts. Such pervasive French presence is as true about broadcasting in Senegal as it is about most other things there or elsewhere in francophone states. As Anyadike (1988:161) writes, France is not only "a godfather" to these states, but the links between them are so close that French presidential contenders are sometimes funded and politically supported by certain African leaders.

On France’s involvement in Africa today, Arnold (1979:52-3) observes that "France has maintained especially close relations with its ex-colonies in Africa: partly through residual links of the imperial-cultural kind; and partly because of a strong economic involvement in their development." Keen on further strengthening its hegemony, France has encouraged a policy of "privileged co-operation" with its former colonies, and has generally tended to show little interest in nonfrancophone Africa.² Arnold also believes that

² France is so restrictive in its aid policy that according to an editorial in Le Figaro in 1987, the dismissal of the Socialist Minister of Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot, was partly due to his attempt to diversify French aid away from the francophone States. The editorial (quoted by Anyadike, 1988:161) says this of Jean-Pierre Cot: "He wanted to 'adjust the balance of funds' in favour of countries previously colonised by others, in other words to the detriment of our former colonies ... The result of this was drastic reductions in aid and a series of crises (with the francophone states). It is in our interest for all French-speaking countries to join together to form a bulwark against the universalisation of English".

However, for purely economic considerations, France’s close relationship with Nigeria, an anglophone state, offers a conspicuous exception to its general preference for francophone Africa. Although hostile to Nigeria at first, for fear of the latter's political and economic prominence in Africa, France changed its attitude in order to consolidate its own economic position. According to Anyadike, France’s "adversarial approach was dropped as the oil-boom got under way". Actively backed by the government, French firms became involved with the Nigerian economy, rising from 13 firms in 1975 to 150 in 1988.

Today, French trade with Nigeria alone "is greater than that with (Footnote continued)
at a level unmatched by any other major power today, France has "demonstrated a willingness... to become physically involved in the affairs" of Africa. It has shown a reluctance to guarantee economic and cultural independence for francophone Africa, albeit France is not alone in promoting dependence in these domains. Quoting from an EEC document on Africa, Arnold (1979:15-16) remarks a general recognition amongst Western states that "The drive to independence was essentially a movement for political emancipation"; and that perhaps because of this, "The developing countries have only a marginal capacity to manoeuvre in the economic spheres".

In the light of the above and the arguments in chapter one of researchers such as Wallerstein (1968, 1976), Gutkind et al. (1976), Dunn (1978a), Amin (1980, 1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b), Gabou (1987), Hadjor (1987), and Nyong'o (1987), it is obvious that Africa did not achieve economic independence. However, francophone Africa is said to be more dependent on France than ex-British colonies are on Britain. Arnold explains the situation as follows:

When, in 1958, Sekou Toure's Guinea voted 'No' to the French Community and opted for complete independence, de Gaulle's reaction was to end all relations between the two countries. This deliberate action had a salutary effect upon other Francophone states which, at that time, were looking to the prospect of substantial and continuing French aid. One result was to be the remarkable and sustained French influence in Francophone Africa throughout the 1960s and 1970s, during which time Franco-African relations were unmarred by the quarrels that constantly affected Britain's relations with its ex-African colonies. Over issues such as the sale of arms to South Africa France simply ignored all protests and continued these sales until the imposition of the mandatory United Nations arms embargo in November 1977. Indeed, most Francophone states have known better, in terms of the aid they need and receive, than to make any protests at all (Arnold, 1979:51).

The need for aid might explain the silence by francophone African states over France's sale of arms to South Africa, but it does not account for France's 'pervasive' presence in these territories, especially if we are to accept Arnold's idea that aid has become a big business like any other. If francophone Africans need aid, why cannot their states exercise their

\[\text{continued}\]

all of francophone Africa combined", with the "ubiquitous Peugeot car assembled in Kaduna ... accounting for over 70 per cent of the market" at the same time as it poses as "The symbol" of Franco-Nigerian cooperation (Anyadike, 1988:160). The Nigerian exception further proves the argument that France's so-called "privileged cooperation" only masks its real intention which remains the consolidation of its economic and cultural hegemony, regardless of the interests of its underdeveloped partners.
'consumer sovereignty' or freedom to choose amongst competing donors? When asked in this way, it becomes clear that these states are victims of a colonial socialisation, which, thanks to the policies of assimilation and centralisation, has tethered them almost sheepishly to France. Such socialisation has produced a result that startles many (Anyadike, 1988:161), and that makes others see a clear reluctance on the part of francophone Africa to break their colonial association with France.

In an article titled "French take controls as Air Afrique stalls", in The Independent of October 1 1988, Gerald Bourke gives one of many examples of French Africa's startling dependence on France. "Unlike their English-speaking counterparts", he remarks, "Francophone African governments have long shown an inability - even a reluctance - to shake off their colonial associations". In 1987 alone, francophone African "ministers made no less than two thousand trips to Paris", which shows how they (the periphery) are constantly consulting with France (the centre). Instead of diminishing, French influence is increasing.

Bourke explains: "Now, after almost three decades of independence, the French connection is about to be further strengthened. Ten West and Central African countries have agreed to hand over control of Air Afrique, the largest company in the region, to a Frenchman." True to the French spirit of central government involvement, the "Frenchman" in question, a certain Yves Roland Billecart, "for the past nine years [served as] head of the French government's overseas aid agency, Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique". Air Afrique had been set up "as a symbol of political and economic solidarity", but by allowing France to take over it, the francophone Africans have failed to attain their objectives, and consequently have strengthened French influence and monopoly in the area. If dependence is harmful to nation-building, dependence on a monopolist is even more so.

B) Radio Technology in Cameroon

At independence Cameroun inherited three radio stations from France, none of which was stronger than 4KW. Despite the technical inadequacies of these stations, France did not automatically hand them over to the Camerounian authorities. It sought to maintain its influence through SORAFON; a task which was facilitated by the successful crushing of the radical UPC party, and the fact that Ahidjo, a moderate who had little of the radicalism of Sekou Toure of Guinea, was President. Ahidjo proved to be very conciliatory towards France, and accepted the latter's idea of "privileged co-operation" instead of
a total break. A first sign of his commitment to France came on July 27 1960, barely six months after independence, when his government signed a convention with France allowing SORAFOM to continue managing radio in Cameroun.

It was SORAFOM that constructed the 30KW transmitter of Radio Yaounde which Ahidjo inaugurated on May 29 1962. But it was not the French government that paid for it, although Cameroon had French financial assistance. In a speech during the inauguration of the transmitter, Ahidjo acknowledged French technical and financial involvement. "It is thanks to France's technical and financial support that this project was able to be realised. I seize this opportunity to reaffirm our gratitude to the French authorities and to all those who conceived and realised this transmitter" (1980:184). For about twenty years of colonial radio in Cameroun, France had been unable to provide powerful transmitters; but two years after independence, it was ready to do so through SORAFOM and for payment by the Cameroonian government.

The construction of subsequent transmitters shows a heavy, almost exclusive French involvement. France was just as involved with the construction of the new 30KW transmitter of Radio Garoua inaugurated on July 23 1963. During the inauguration, Ahidjo declared that the realisation of the transmitter was made financially and technically possible, "thanks to the support given us by the government of the French Republic". He seized the opportunity "to ask the French Minister for Cooperation, here present, to kindly transmit our sincere gratitude to the French government, as well as to those who in different capacities helped towards this important realisation" (Ahidjo, 1980:303).

In the same speech Ahidjo revealed that as far as radio was concerned,

... the old convention which linked the government of Cameroon to SORAFOM known subsequently as OCORA, has just been replaced by a new convention on cooperation between the French and Cameroonian governments, as from July 1 1963.

According to the terms of this new accord, the whole of the Cameroonian national radio is under the control of the federal government, in what concerns the personnel as well as the material, technical assistance would continue to be graciously made available to our network by France, notably through OCORA (Ahidjo, 1980:305). [translation mine]

From Ahidjo's declaration it is evident that the French government
did not hand over control of the Radio to Cameroon until July 1963, although the Cameroonian state was financing it since 1960. This means that SORAFOM controlled content while Cameroon paid for the strengthening and maintenance of the network. In chapter ten, we discuss how programmes were produced in Paris and dispatched to Cameroon and other francophone African states. Under SORAFOM France was able to promote its culture and strengthen its economy at the expense of Cameroon. Under the Office de Coopération Radiophonique (OCORA), the idea of "privileged co-operation" was further stressed and encouraged as a post-independence substitute for colonial direct rule or for the "independence with interdependence" that had guided SORAFOM's relationship with France d'Outre-mer. The outcome remained the same, as France never masked its desire to define and pursue cooperation to the best of its economic and cultural advantage.

In principle Cameroon gained control of the radio in July 1963, but in reality France and French companies continued to dominate the scene. Speaking during the inauguration of the new transmission centre in Buea on June 3 1967, Ahidjo still singled France out for thanks, albeit he also talked generally of "aid and cooperation" from friendly countries:

You could be assured that with the aid and cooperation of friendly countries, and notably of France, to whom we owe the installation which we are inaugurating today, and to whom we are addressing, once more, the sincere thanks of the Cameroonian people, the government will spare no effort to provide the radio with the necessary means for the happy accomplishment of its great national mission (Ahidjo, 1980:770). [translation mine]

As French companies became more and more sophisticated in broadcast technology, the activities of the central government agencies became more specialised. Gradually OCORA (later replaced by ORTF, in turn replaced by RFI), restricted its involvement to the cultural sphere, while public and private French firms largely took care of France's economic interests. Such division of labour is aimed at better consolidating France's foothold in a world of intense economic competition and threats to French hegemony by Britain and America. Cantor et al. (1986:517) write of how France has staked out certain television territories as its own, and Boyd (1984:380) talks of increased French activity in international programme sales and in foreign TV and cable operations; all in view of protecting its cultural and economic interests. Like many other developed countries, although more so than any other, France regards all its private investments as aid. It speaks "more and more of private flows as though these are designed to help development in the recipient country rather than earn profit" for French companies (Arnold,
However, following this division of labour, France has continued to dominate radio technology in Cameroon, not through OCORA, ORTF or RFI, but through French companies - Thomson-CSF most especially, the state-controlled defence and electronics group. Thus on May 28 1974 the government of Cameroon signed a contract with THOMSON-CSF-SODETEG (Société d'Etudes Techniques et des Entreprises Générale)-SCHLUMBERGER, a group of French firms for the construction and equipment of the National Radio Station, and the International Service in Yaoundé, as well as the stations of Garoua, Bertoua and Bafoussam. Also envisaged was a station in Bamenda and the improvement of Radio Douala.

In short, with the help of France and under the monopoly of French firms, Cameroon was to improve and extend the network. All of these improvements and extensions have not be done; Bamenda for example still does not have a broadcast centre, neither do the new stations in Maroua, Mf gumere and Ebolowa. Although 300 million F CFA were reserved for the reconstruction of Radio Douala in the 4th Five Year Development Plan (Kerim et al., 1980:29), very little has been done to that effect. The main reason being that these projects often tend to cost more than originally estimated, and also that planning is not synonymous with doing. Radios Bafoussam and Bertoua were both estimated to cost 1.030.000.000 F CFA, but the latter alone cost 1.347.943.980 F CFA. The national station, inaugurated January 3 1980 by President Ahidjo, alone cost 3.6 billion F CFA (Babi Koussana, 1980:25), although today, less than ten years after the inauguration, the building and equipment have deteriorated immensely due to inadequate maintenance.

Once in a while there is a rare exception to the French monopoly; thus STUDEI and BBC of Switzerland. Studei has supplied some studio equipment, and BBC constructed the 300KW MW transmitter in Bamenda, which cost a total of 3.000 million F CFA. But even though the broadcasters might appreciate the technical superiority of STUDEI's studio equipment, as well as the latter's promptness of service, the administrators remain attached to Thomson and other French firms. According to Francis Bongsha Ndzee (interviewed, 21/3/88), Thomson does not supply spare parts in time. But with Studei, "once you telephone them that you need this part, it is on the way the next morning ..." Also, "Their [Studei's] equipment, I think, can work well in Cameroon. The studios they have installed in Cameroon - the mini studios and the ones with about 16 or 32 outputs, they have worked very well. For example, there is one
This confirms the point made earlier that if Cameroon could exercise much more autonomy and participate more actively in deciding its technological concerns, things could be a lot better even in its dependence. Nation-building is more likely to succeed where there is competition amongst foreign countries to supply the broadcast technology needed, than in a situation where a single foreign country dominates.

Expensive though the abovementioned projects have been, little of the money spent has remained in Cameroon. There are two reasons for this. First, few of the firms involved have been Cameroonian; and few have representatives in Cameroon. The construction and equipment of all RDC stations have been done by foreign multinational companies - most especially French, with the exception of Radio Bafoussam where Nanga Company Ltd, a local construction firm, did the building. If Nanga and other local companies had been involved with the construction of more stations, Cameroon might have had more economic benefits than it has done so far. But not only is Cameroon's investment code more attractive to foreign investors, but foreign firms are sometimes awarded government contracts to the detriment of indigenous firms (Ndongko, 1985:239-47). Second, it has been established that the foreign companies prefer their own experts, and that they over-exploit and underpay the unskilled local labour force, and therefore make their profits to the detriment of Cameroon (Joseph, 1976; Ndongko, 1985). This issue is discussed in detail later. Now it suffices to say that Cameroon has relied almost exclusively on French companies, even in situations where local companies could have taken part.

C) TV Technology in Cameroon

Although TV did not make its debut in Cameroon until 1985, studies on it date back to the 1960s. As usual, foreign involvement has been enormous. Speaking in Yaounde in July 1963, Ahidjo expressed Cameroon's preoccupation with TV, and revealed that French experts from SORAPOM had already "studied in detail the possibilities of bringing television into this country" (Ahidjo, 1980:185). If we take a quick look at our discussion on the introduction of TV in chapter eight, we immediately realise the enormous degree of foreign involvement.

First there was the study by Menard, a French expert who advised that a single transmitter be set up on Mount Cameroon, but whose advice was
rejected for being too risky. The second foreign involvement came in 1975 when
the Minister of Plan and Industry signed a contract with EUROSPACE, asking the
latter to explore the possibilities of using audiovisual techniques for mass
education in Cameroon. Most involved in this particular venture were France
and West Germany, whose satellite "Symphonie" was expected to transmit
programmes to Cameroon. As we remember, the scheme was abandoned because of
sudden difficulties in French Guyana. In 1976 America involved Cameroon in a
world satellite technology demonstration, during which Yaounde and two other
towns were to receive colour TV pictures transmitted from Washington DC, by
the USA National Aeronautic and Space Administration's Applied Technology
Satellite (ATS-6).

The first involvement of Cameroonian technical experts came in
December 1976, when the Minister of Information and Culture commissioned five
engineers to study the technicalities of TV: the type of network to adopt, the
best colour system, and the most adapted equipment and maintenance facilities
to opt for. Led by Emmanuel Nguiamba, present DDG of CRTV, the commission
reported their findings to the government in November 1977. This was a
significant departure from previous total dependence on foreign experts as
though there were just no Cameroonians to study what concerned them. Quite
significantly too, the final options made by the government were in line with
the conclusions made by the commission.

In chapter eight we mentioned how at one point, Cameroon seemed to
depart from the colonial shackles that in the past had tethered it rather
unduly to France. Following the advice of its experts, the government opted
for PAL instead of SECAM, the French system. For once, the government had
placed its own interests before "privileged co-operation" with France. As
Emmanuel Nguiamba explained (Nkaa, 1986:28-9), French technology is very
expensive; also, it is less common to find than technology from elsewhere. The
implication of this is that Cameroon has spent more by associating itself with
French technology in the past, than it would have done otherwise. This also
means that once Cameroon has adopted French technology, it has only France to
turn to for the spare parts or maintenance it needs.

Although this attempted move away from France was hailed, subsequent
occurrences have shown that French influence is far from diminished. I do not
share Katz et al.'s position that "dependence on French business concerns for
financial, technical, and administrative expertise" is diminishing in favour
of increased "multilateral relationships with a range of developed countries"
There may be more aid and assistance from other countries than there was before, but French presence and influence in Cameroon and the rest of francophone Africa remain as pervasive as ever. Thus Ivory Coast, even after cutting the number down by half in 1986, still employed about 1600 French experts despite widespread unemployment amongst Ivorians (West Africa, 1987:1200). I agree more with Bourke (1988) that French Africans have shown an inability or a reluctance to free themselves of their historic cultural and economic bondage to France.

Thus for example, Cameroon has maintained its economic ties with France through a series of conventions, trade and financial agreements, and joint economic commissions that meet in Paris and Yaoundé alternately. We remarked in chapter five that 67% of investment in Cameroon is of French origin, and that France is responsible for 26% of the total capital invested in the country. In 1986 alone "French financial aid on investments in Cameroon totalled CFA 15,6 billion while direct and indirect technical assistance summed up to CFA 11,8 billion" (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 5/5/1987). As we said in chapter five, such massive investment makes France Cameroon's first financial partner in the world, with West Germany in second place. French technical assistance involves the supply of technical experts or coopérants to Cameroon. In 1982 the latter was said to be receiving over 700 technicians including 76 military advisers, to have 528 French teachers teaching its schools, and to be entitled to an annual French assistance of 500 million CFA for its university and higher institutions (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 14/7/1982). In 1986 France offered scholarships to Cameroonian students worth 600 million CFA (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 5/5/87).

In external trade, France is just as important. Official figures (Cameroon Tribune (bi-weekly), 5/5/1987) had Cameroon at the beginning of 1987 as France’s first trading partner in Africa south of the Sahara. Cameroon exports mostly raw materials and agricultural produce to France, and imports a range of finished products which include electronic equipment, textiles, chemicals, fabricated steel products and pharmaceuticals. In 1985 French imports from Cameroon amounted to 362,650 billion CFA, and its exports stood at 269,450 billion CFA. The following year the figures were 158,150 billion CFA and 247,900 billion CFA respectively. Despite the significant decline in figures, an overall increase in bilateral trade was forecast for 1987. Thus far from diminishing, France’s economic involvement in Cameroon as a whole has increased. With the part France has played towards assisting in Cameroon’s current economic crisis, there is no indication that France’s
position as the primary force in the Cameroonian economy is in jeopardy.

In 1980 the ITU was called upon to assist Cameroon in the selection of suitable candidates from a group of companies competing for the contract to bring TV to the country. There were seven companies altogether, but none of them was Cameroonian. Following a preliminary examination, Thomson of France, Siemens of West Germany, Pyre of Britain and Klinga of Canada were pre-selected. The final selection produced two winners instead of one: Thomson and Siemens. The official reason was that the government had found it difficult to make further choices between the two companies, which each had something special to offer. Thomson is said to have had an attractive broadcast proposal, and Siemens, a better proposal in terms of studio equipment.

However, as Emmanuel Nguiamba, one of the five local experts admits (Nkaa, 1986:28-9), the differences between the two systems are very slight. Given that, and given his argument that French technology is more expensive and less commonly used than technology from other Western countries, one would have expected Cameroon to opt for Siemens through and through. On the contrary, as we mentioned in chapter eight, France expected Cameroon to choose French technology exclusively. And when this failed to happen, France was angry with Cameroon for not toeing the line by opting for SECAM, the French TV system. In chapter ten we deal with similar anger expressed by France because Cameroon signed a co-production agreement with BELGAVOX of Belgium, and how France eventually persuaded the Cameroonian government to revoke the agreement in favour of another with SFI, a French firm. When Cameroon succumbed, the Belgians took the issue to court.

France had taken it for granted that Cameroon would opt for French technology, because of their traditional ties and the series of conventions that tied them together. It had succeeded in other francophone countries, and to a large extent as far as radio was concerned in Cameroon. In Senegal for example, when the Unesco TV project closed down in 1970, Thomson-CSF was one of the groups that pressured President Senghor to introduce TV after the Munich Olympic Games of 1972. According to Katz et al. (1978:87), "Thomson-CSF even undertook to install a system free of charge on a trial basis and to supply a number of receiving sets for community reception in Dakar". President Senghor eventually gave in and the company installed TV in Senegal. "The elite of Dakar ordered sets by air freight, and ORTF supplied free programs and films to fill in the gaps between sporting events". It was a victory for
French economic and cultural interests.

In Gabon France faced no problems either. French involvement with TV in the country started as early as March 1963. The first images and personnel were French, the project itself was largely financed by France, with salaries, allowances and mission grants coming all the way from Paris. But during the first year, hardly more than ten programmes were broadcast. In 1971 Gabon signed a contract with Thomson-CSF for the installation of transmitters and broadcast centres in the provinces. On December 30 1975, President Bongo officially inaugurated Gabonese TV, of the French SECAM system. Equally present at the inauguration were Jean-Paul Benoît, then Director of Cabinet for the French Minister of Cooperation, and Austin, the Managing Director of French Television. Meanwhile, since April 1973 Gabon was receiving satellite pictures from the third French Channel TVFR3 (M'ba, 1977:11-14). Today, the Gabonese broadcasting scene, with the advent of African No.1 in 1981 - a commercial station jointly created by France and Gabon, is a typical example of the pervasive French technical aid and assistance which O'Brien (1985) observed in Senegal.

In Gabon (M'ba, 1977:19), like in Senegal and Algeria (Katz et al., 1978:85-6), the coming of TV was largely influenced by France. Algerian TV which is the oldest in all francophone Africa, was French both in technology and culture; not more than fifteen minutes of daily programming was local when it started. Such was the pattern which France wanted to maintain, a pattern which Cameroon, for a very brief moment, appeared to question.

The government of Cameroon signed its contract with Thomson on November 25 1982, and with Siemens on January 10 1983. Both companies then subcontracted others. But even though some Cameroonian companies could have been involved with the construction work at least, none of those subcontracted were local. In his speech at the inauguration of the CTV Production Centre on Thursday 28 January 1988, Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya expressed his gratitude to certain firms and organisations for their contribution towards the realisation of CTV. These included Thomson-CSF-SODETEG, TRT, Fougerolles, Paribas, BNP and Credit Lyonnais of France; Siemens Consortium, Bosch, Nickel, KFW, DlVI, and Ueberchars and Partners of West Germany; La Société Générale de Banque au Cameroun; and finally ITU. He was equally grateful to the governments of West Germany and France. In the entire list, apart from SGBC, there is no other company that is Cameroonian or that is locally represented in Cameroon.
The Minister also revealed that the whole project of bringing TV to Cameroon had cost a total of 82 billion, 91 million, 112 thousand, 698 F CFA. Of this amount, only 55% was provided by the Cameroonian budget; 45% came from loans and foreign aid. Among all the foreign contributors, the West Germans appear most involved. Following my interview on 9/3/88 with Hans Heber, German representative of the GTZ group and also in charge of the training school for TV producers and technicians, the German government signed a cooperation agreement with the government of Cameroon in the area of production. Within the framework of the agreement, the West German government had contributed the sum of 1 billion, 500 million F CFA. The fact that financial groups such as Paribas, Société Générale de Banque au Cameroun, and Credit Lyonnais were singled out for thanks by the Minister, is an indication as to where Cameroon must have borrowed most of the funds it needed for the construction of CTV.

In his speech the Minister had a special word too for international cooperation, which he hailed thus:

... the new production centre for Cameroon Radio Television bears witness today under our eyes, and will bear witness tomorrow for future generations, of the reality of a confident, dynamic and mutually beneficial international cooperation, between people of different traditions, pooling their efforts in order to promote a humanity with ever more solidarity in its common destiny (Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, 28/1/88). [translation mine]

Few would share the Minister's view that the fruits of international cooperation are mutually beneficial. Even some of his fellow ministers, past and present, would disagree with him. A brief word on cooperation agreements or contracts is appropriate in order to understand why others would disagree with Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya.

D) Contracts with Multinationals: A Critical Look

The two post-colonial governments of Cameroon have not been totally unaware that the multinationals are motivated by the drive for profit. They have each expressed concern at one time or another; but like most of their counterparts elsewhere in the developing world, they have come short of taking appropriate action. They have proved themselves incapable of doing anything to offset the "crushing grip" by the transnational corporations on technology, knowhow, management, markets and the ability to mobilize financial resources. A grip which is "further compounded by inadequate manpower and the want of economic, financial, legal and fiscal institutions and mechanisms" needed to "regulate ... the operations of TNCS into line with the economic objectives" of the country (Cameroon Tribune (weekly), 14/7/1982). Albeit, as Thomas Helone (*Dimanche Hidi*, 28/2/88) argues, Cameroon does not make sufficient
use of its technical and legal experts.

In July 1982 for example, the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) organised a two week workshop aimed at identifying Cameroon's technology needs and at determining how best the country could deal with multinationals. The workshop was attended by Cameroonian experts and senior officials involved in negotiations with transnationals. The Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs and Planning, Pierre Désiré Engo, in his speech, recognised the fact that the profit-making objectives of transnationals did not always coincide with those of Cameroon, which were the well-being of its people. To him, the transnationals "use their dead brute weight" on Cameroon's economy, "to squeeze out more profits, crowding out the well-being of the local population, whose lowly-paid manpower is preferred to the latest and sometimes too expensive technology" (Njowo, 1982:3).

At the end of the workshop, Pierre Désiré Engo expressed his satisfaction as follows: "Our experts now appreciate better the tight corner our governments find themselves in their dealings with TNCS." But as Njowo rightly points out, the Vice-Minister failed to say whether or not this awareness enhances "our experts' ability to manoeuvre" Cameroon "out of this tight corner and onto the rails of industrial and commercial progress" (Njowo, 1982:3). The failure on the part of the authorities to find a lasting solution to the problem posed by multinationals and foreign assistance in general, has been severely criticised by researchers on Cameroon (Joseph, 1976, 1977; Johnson, 1980; Ndongo, 1980, 1984, 1985). Prominent amongst them is Melone, former Dean of the Faculty of Laws and Economic Sciences in the University of Yaounde.

During my fieldwork a seminar was organised in Yaounde from 22 to 27 February within the framework of the 19th congress of L'Institut International du Droit d'Expression Française (IDEF). It was about "Key-in-hand" projects, and was attended by jurists from Africa, Europe, Asia and America. Amongst the Cameroonian legal experts who attended was Thomas Melone, later invited to

Key-in-hand projects ("Ouvrages clé-en-main") are those in which a contract is signed between two parties, whereby the one agrees to construct and equip say, a hospital, school, TV or Radio production centre, industrial complex, etc; and to hand it over to the other on completion, and with everything ready for use. Thus the idea of "Key-in-hand", meaning that the owner of the project would need to do no further work, once the keys are handed over to him. See RDC's "Disanche Midi" and "Cameroon Panorama" programmes, of Sunday February 28 1988 for further insight.
take part in RDC's "Dimanche Midi" of 28/2/88, where he discussed the implications of contracts and Cameroon's experience in key-in-hand projects. According to him, Cameroon signs a lot of Key-in-hand contracts, and has been disappointed quite a few times by its foreign partners. As examples of important projects which failed to give the results expected, he gave SOCAME and CELLUCAM - two industrial complexes that have folded up. He also referred to several projects which are started, but which never get completed.

In either case Cameroon has ended up the loser, not the foreign firms involved. Sometimes it has taken legal action against certain firms, but expensive though this has been, Cameroon has ended up losing. The reason for this, Melone argues, is its failure to master the legal aspects of signing business contracts. The contracts it has signed in the past have been vague and rather general, thus permitting the multinationals to interpret them to their advantage. But Key-in-hand projects are often very expensive; they require the transfer of technology and expertise, and any country that wishes to manage its meagre resources carefully, must take time to negotiate and to protect its interests, and must be wary about the contracts it signs. For, given that the multinationals are out to make profit, it is always prudent to believe that they would stop at nothing to attain this objective. Unfortunately, Cameroon has often acted as though their foreign commercial partners are some sort of philanthropic organisations, who are genuinely interested in its development. The Cameroonians governments have treated these contracts as though they are simply an affair for politicians and bureaucrats.

Instead of getting its own legal experts involved as do Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria for example, Cameroon has intrusted its negotiations into the hands of unqualified officials within the central administration, people who know little or nothing about international business or commercial law. Its own legal experts have hardly been consulted, and for most of the times, have only learnt through the media that Cameroon has signed such and such a contract with this or that firm. This, according to Melone, is the major cause of all problems regarding Key-in-hand projects.

He argues that while Cameroon chooses to have amateurs negotiate for it, the foreign firms conduct their own negotiations with deserving seriousness, through their legal, economic and commercial experts. In the signing of contracts each party has to work hard to defend the best of its interests. But taking unqualified people to conduct the negotiations, leaves foreigners with the opportunity to manipulate things to suit their purpose.
Thus unable to defend the interests of their country in front of professionals, the unqualified bureaucrats negotiating on behalf of Cameroon, have been known to tell their foreign counterparts: "we have confidence in you, as regards the structuring of our accord". But they forget to realise that in business as elsewhere, there are no sentiments, and that everyone is fighting to secure the best advantage over the other.

Melone rejects the thesis that Cameroonian jurists are inexperienced, and therefore cannot be involved in such negotiations. First, because an inexperienced jurist is better than an unqualified amateur; and second, because after twenty-eight years of independence, there is really no reason why Cameroon still does not have its own jurists. His point is that if Cameroon had really wanted, it would have insisted from the early years of independence that some of its qualified nationals be included in the discussions leading up to the signing of key-in-hand contracts. As he rightly points out, Cameroon has legal experts of international standing who, like himself, are willing to serve their country, to contribute towards development; but who cannot force themselves upon the state, if they are not invited to render their services. A similar concern was raised in Ivory Coast by Ivorians critical of Antoine Cesarea (French engineer), whom President Houphouët-Boigny has made head of the government public works agency (DCGTX) in charge of overseeing all government projects and negotiations with multinationals. As some said, "After 26 years of independence Côte d'Ivoire should be able to confide its agencies to Ivorians" (West Africa, 1987:1200).

Particular about the legal aspects of a contract though Melone is, he remains conscious of other areas as well. Again, if Cameroon had professionalised such negotiations, the negotiators would ensure that it benefits as much as possible from the contracts signed. There would for instance be a clause that Cameroonian technical experts be involved. But due to amateurish negotiations, local technical experts are hardly employed by the contracted firms, who prefer to bring their own experts over from their

An example would be the acceptance without questioning by the Cameroonian government, of only a year's guarantee for a TV project which has cost it the colossal sum of 82 billion, 91 million, 112 thousand, 698 F CFA. During my fieldwork at the CTV Production Centre, there were four white technicians looking after the interests of the concerned companies for the period of the guarantee. They were also there to repair everything that went bad. The guarantee period over, they would cease being responsible and Cameroon would take over total control. The technicians and broadcasters did agree that a year's guarantee is rather too short a time for so expensive a project.
countries of origin (also see Ndongko, 1985). Suddenly, the project completed and the guarantee period over, problems develop, problems which might have been foreseen and forestalled by the keen local expert.

Not having been involved during the construction, the local technician might be quite incapable of doing a thing now, because he is unfamiliar with the particular technology in place. The administrator has no other choice but to return to the foreign firm, where once again the country pays dearly for services rendered. But were negotiations with foreign firms systematic and professional, Cameroon would not continue to rely on foreign technical expertise, while its own experts, trained all over the world, in schools that are as good as any, are either unemployed, underemployed or employed to do what they were not trained to do.

Melone's conclusion is that Cameroon should be more assertive and professionally involved in the signing of contracts with foreign partners. It should emulate the Arab countries who are known in the business world for being tough in their negotiations with Western multinationals. The country's resources are too few and too dear to the people of Cameroon to be wasted in futile projects by unqualified bureaucrats and politicians. As he says, "One has the right to make a mistake once, but once that big mistake has been made, one no longer has the right to continue with the same mistake." He would like Cameroon to be like the people of his village when he was a child:

In my childhood I saw people who drank palm wine. They would arrive somewhere, would find people that were drinking, and would be given some wine. But in my own family people used to make their own drinking cups out of coconut shells; they would clean the shells and carry around, and when they were served they would use their own cups. And in that way they avoided being poisoned and on top of that, they were sure to drink from a clean cup. Why cannot our states use the same technique? (Professor Thomas Melone, "Dimanche Midi", 28/2/88). [translation mine]

E) How Technological Dependence Affects RDC and CTV

Cameroon does not produce any of the broadcast equipment used in RDC or CTV. All of the technical facilities, ranging from studio equipment to transmitters have continued to be imported from Thomson of France, Siemens of West Germany or Studel and BBC of Switzerland. RDC and CTV might have the qualified staff capable of maintaining the equipment, but they depend entirely on foreign firms for the spare parts needed. Sometimes it takes months or even years for the spares to come, and they may not be in good working order when they arrive. Some might work barely for a few months, then break down. "At one time you might really get hooked up, and you want the foreign supplier to come
round. You can call him and say let him send an expert with such and such equipment, to come down for particular repairs" (Robert Lereh Abosuo, interviewed, 18/1/88). Studel and BBC of Switzerland have good quality equipment and are quick to respond as well, but Thomson of France is notorious for its defective equipment and for its slowness to respond (Francis Bongsha Ndze, interviewed, 21/3/88). But it also happens that the company which sold the original technology folds up, or that it simply stops producing the spare parts needed for the outdated equipment.

On June 15 1986 "Cameroon Report" gave the example of an RDC official who "went to France to buy spare parts for our transmission equipment" but was "mockingly told by a French company expert that France had stopped the production of such equipment twenty years ago". Mr Maka Eteh Noe, the official in question, did confirm the report on Friday March 4 1988, although he blamed it on certain Cameroonian officials who had deliberately purchased cheap outdated technology for RDC, so that they could have enough money left over for them to misappropriate. An accusation which was echoed by many broadcasters.

Massaga for example, blames the technical problems of RDC on the dishonesty of those in positions of responsibility:

It is a problem of dishonesty. Technology is advancing: you know that, the technicians and engineers know it as well. I was telling you about the case of CTV, of television, where we have tried to adopt the most advanced technology possible, so that for the next twenty years, we will no longer need to run after spare parts. Which is very good, for we are a poor country. If we were in the USA or in France, there would not be any problem for, as soon as the technology changes, we would also change our equipment. For us, it is necessary to choose the equipment that can last for the longest time possible, and for which spare parts can easily be got.

Unfortunately in the past, there was the problem of people who were not entirely honest, who knew that the equipment they opted for was spoiled and obsolete - equipment dating from the 1920s, but who went right ahead and ordered it. I don't mean to say that they wanted to make profit, but they were dishonest in that they allowed the installation knowing that it was equipment which wouldn't last. I will take for example the case of the National Radio Station which is hardly ten years old since it was constructed, but whose equipment are already outmoded; because the equipment was at least twenty years old when we bought them. The result is that we have stations which break down precisely because of this dishonesty (Massaga, interviewed, 6/3/88).

However, responsible though dishonesty amongst officials might be, we must also not lose sight of what a "French business tycoon" once
recommended, that France should go ahead and "sell old and almost obsolete equipment so that our clients in the Third World would keep on making orders for new equipment" ("Cameroon Report" 15/6/86). A recommendation which once again reveals the real nature of the 'privileged cooperation' France advocated with its former colonies. France's definition of cooperation is peculiar, and does not imply a 'give-and-take' situation that could be beneficial to all partners involved (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:81-2). When carefully examined, only one meaning could be read into it's whole idea of 'privileged cooperation'; and that is, the privilege to be dominated and exploited without complaining - something which perhaps the 'assimilation' or 'acculturation' of the modern political elite in francophone Africa makes easier to tolerate.

As we pointed out in chapter eight, one of the major problems facing broadcasting in Cameroon is the lack of funds. This further exacerbates matters, as broadcasting might either be affected because the suppliers of the technology have failed to respond in time, or because there are no funds to pay for the spare parts ordered. Like Ndongko's (1985), Malone's argument indicates that the Cameroonian authorities rely rather excessively on amateurs or foreign experts, and not always because the country lacks experts or professionals of its own. Far from that; on the contrary, the civil service employs a substantial number of local technicians, trained both at home and abroad in France.

However, it would appear that the authorities do not have confidence in the very technicians it trains or helps train. According to Eyebe Tanga (interviewed, 18/1/88), "it is in the African mentality to think that the White knows everything; even if his African counterpart was in the same school as him, and as a matter of fact, worked harder and performed better than he the White. L'Europeen inspire la confiance; ça c'est dans la mentalité africaine". The Cameroonian technicians and professionals need the confidence that has so far been denied them. With the necessary equipment, and "with the confidence of the authorities", Eyebe Tanga is "optimistic that we can succeed in our task of operating and maintaining the equipment".

Lereh sees a double wastage in the continuous employment of foreigners.

We don't want to be like Gabon where the government employs French technical experts on a permanent basis. We want to be able to call upon them from time to time; that is to say, only when we are really hooked up. Our technicians have a lot of bookwork in their heads, and they want to put it into practice. If you bring in foreigners, they would be very cross. And it would be very
uneconomical anyway, otherwise you would still pay them, and still be forced to pay foreigners and so on (Robert Lereh, interviewed, 18/1/88).

He has a point since the French technicians employed are paid European rates, not Cameroonian; which undoubtedly is a significant loss for any country to whom nation-building is a "supreme mission".

Dependence on foreign technology, the lack of funds, together with the dubiety of certain administrators, have affected the daily operation of RDC and CTV. Thus for instance, because Cameroon does not manufacture tapes of its own, and because it does not always buy enough, there are all sorts of problems. In CTV for example, 46,357,000 F CFA was spent on blank tapes during the 1986/87 financial year; and about 5000 tapes are used a year, although Mr Eyebe Tanga thinks that 3000 would suffice were it not for the misusage that goes on. As we mentioned in chapter eight, it is not uncommon for a broadcaster's tape to be erased by another desperate for a tape to produce his/her own programme. Broadcasters carry tapes home or around in their cars, and store them under deplorable conditions, because they are afraid to have their programmes erased by others. Tapes are sometimes recircled ten times, and the quality is heavily affected. At certain times even important programmes like the news are not recorded for archival purposes because of lack of blank tapes. And according to Mr Eyebe Tanga, his bosses at the financial control make matters worse by insisting on buying from local suppliers who are more expensive.

At RDC things are no better. Broadcasters have resorted to using tapes containing foreign programmes to produce their own programmes. Becky Ndive explains:

Most of the times it's the foreign tapes that we receive which we reuse about two or three times. That affects the quality of the programmes that we produce locally; because these tapes come in with programmes in them, which we use. Sometimes we edit them to suit our local needs and then we, after broadcasting them in the original form, we use them again to do our own recordings. So you see that in the long run after two or three times of usage the quality becomes very, very poor (Becky Ndive, interviewed, 23/2/88).

CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to investigate the degree to which Cameroonian broadcasting depends on foreign technology and expertise, and how such dependence has affected broadcasting for nation-building. By examining broadcasting since colonialism, we have noted the following:
Cameroon depends entirely on foreign suppliers for the technology and equipment it needs for broadcasting. This has been the case since 1941 when radio was first introduced. Although Cameroon has been training its own technicians since independence, it still is unable to produce the broadcast facilities it needs; neither does it fully utilise its own experts in order to foster the idea of self-reliance in nation-building. Furthermore, in its dependence, Cameroon has long allowed France a monopoly, even in situations where local companies and experts could have taken part, or where greater competition amongst foreign suppliers could have been healthier and more profitable for its development efforts. It could be argued that this is a monopoly which France does not deserve, since France has never made a secret of the fact that what matters above everything else, are French economic and cultural interests. Thus, although the French monopoly has benefitted France, it has seriously impaired broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon.

As Melone has pointed out, some mistakes can be forgiven, but there are others which are hard to forgive. Although it is common for Third World countries to turn to the developed world for the technology they lack, there is something fundamentally contradictory about a state relying on foreign technical expertise or local bureaucrats and amateurs, even though it has spent colossal sums training technicians and professionals of its own. A government which has a policy of autocratic development, but tolerates a pervasive foreign presence, is hardly to be taken seriously. Everything discussed in this chapter reveals a degree of foreign technological involvement that is not conducive to the nation-building objectives of "self-reliance" and "the judicious management of our limited resources", in order to ensure "balanced development" and the "equitable distribution of the fruits of progress".

Cameroon has failed to harness its technical and professional resources for its own betterment, yet as chapter ten makes clear, the authorities have never relented stressing the importance of technical education and self-reliance. With such a degree of technological dependence as discussed, one cannot realistically talk of a successful experience in nation-building. Faced with such foreign involvement, nation-building is bound to remain only a promise, a goal that successive governments state and restate, but that none ever achieves; because to attain it means to make fundamental choices, to back declarations of intent with real action. Action which for reasons discussed above and elsewhere in this thesis, is not so forthcoming. It is certainly this inability by present-day African states or
governments to translate into practice their 'nations of intent', that has forced certain researchers (Amin, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b; Doumou, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Gabou, 1987) to question the possibility that congruence between polity and culture, as well as socio-economic development are attainable in peripheral states within the world capitalist system.
CHAPTER TEN
FOREIGN CULTURAL INVOLVEMENT
IN CAMEROONIAN BROADCASTING

INTRODUCTION

Although researchers on nation-building have stressed the importance of a dominant culture with which everyone in the polity identifies, they are aware that total assimilation is impossible in practice. As Guha puts it, "a complete merger has not been found possible" even in countries with very limited linguistic and cultural differences (1958:150). In their study of nation-building in Africa however, researchers are unanimous that there is a big gap between the culture of the leaders or intelligentia with Western education, and the culture(s) of the illiterate rural masses (Ajayi, 1966:606; Cobban, 1969:234; Seton-Watson, 1977:340; Amin, 1980:175; Gellner, 1983:82; Anderson, 1983:127; Smith, 1983:133; Hadjor, 1987:63-64). Smith talks of African leaders suffering "social isolation and a crisis of cultural identity" as a result of their acceptance of Western cultural values (1983:133), while Amin refers to them as "strangers in their own country due to their daily lifestyle" modeled after Western values (1980:175).

Given this disparity between the cultural values of the powerful minority and those of the powerless majority, what direction ought cultural assimilation to take? As Smith would argue, while "a pre-democratic era" might have facilitated cultural imposition by the ruling minority in the European experience, contemporary attempts at nation-building have to take place in a democratic, participative atmosphere (1983:124-62). In other words, "congruence of culture and polity" (Gellner, 1983:111) in Africa today is best guaranteed not by attempts to impose a minority "high culture" ('modern' or otherwise), but by allowing the mainstream cultures of the masses to freely live their similarities, while negotiating their differences.

In chapter five we presented a critical review of Cameroon's cultural policy, and stressed the need for an identity which would guarantee the autonomy, self-reliance and participation needed to ensure success in the cultural aspect of nation-building. In chapter six we treated Muna's call for a national cultural orientation commission as an indication of the failure by the authorities to translate their cultural declarations into practice. In a
country described as "a crossroads" or "a meeting point for Africa's cultural mainstreams" (Biya, 1987:97), the problem of cultural autonomy and popular participation is certainly most crucial. For cultural assimilation to be democratic, popular and participative, its basis has to be the mainstream cultures lived by the majority, and not the cultures of the Westernised few (Fonlon, 1964).

In Cameroon a genuine solution to the cultural problem would entail going beyond the simple bureaucratic prescriptions of elitist administrators or the theoretical conclusions of academic debates noted in chapter five. It would have to take into account the cultural needs and values of the masses, the illiterate rural masses most especially. Although the authorities have sometimes talked meaningfully of the need to reassert Cameroonien cultural values, their actions have often left observers wondering if all traditional Cameroonien has to offer are folkloric dances. Even the media have adopted the same restrictive definition of Cameroonien Culture, whereby musical shows, dances and manifestations by traditional groups are overplayed, while the linguistic, social and material aspects of culture are greatly underplayed in favour of alien substitutes.

As the Director of Cultural Affairs (interviewed, 31/12/87) pointed out, a true cultural policy would have to involve the population as a whole, taking into account the almost forgotten and often downgraded values of "our forefathers and traditional societies"; it would have to cease being a mere matter of the authorities telling the people what government thinks is "culture", or the academics sitting in round table conferences to discuss in abstraction the need for a Cameroonien cultural identity.

One of our hypotheses was that in Cameroon broadcasting promotes an alien culture for the elites, and an elitist concept of traditional culture, still for the elites. While there is evidence enough in previous chapters to substantiate the latter half of the hypothesis, our concern here is to establish whether or not foreign culture is being promoted in Cameroonien broadcasting, and to what degree. To determine the degree of foreign cultural presence, it is appropriate to take a look at programmes and training. The argument being that a country which intends to use its media for nation-building, would be expected to determine content by producing programmes of its own that are well thought out and seem to be most relevant; and that to do this properly, it has to train its own media practitioners, and to inculcate in them only those media values and practices which best foster
its aims and aspirations. In other words, such a country is expected to harness its broadcast technology and expertise to best respond, not to an alleged "universal culture" (Amin, 1980:34-5; Hamelink, 1983b; Boyd-Barrett, 1982; Schiller, 1967), but to needs locally determined and agreed upon by all and sundry.

From our literature review, we noted that a programme, be it foreign or local, "carries a message capable of influencing viewer/listener perceptions and attitudes, especially their conception of development" (Hislop, 1981:231). The origin of a programme and the media culture shared by its producer, affect its content (Schiller, 1967:64-5); because far from being neutral, every message is always "linked to a type of society, a social structure, a cultural model and an economic and political system" (Ela, 1974:15). As part of different establishments or cultural systems, journalists or researchers are socialised into perspectives that make it almost impossible for them not to be "apologists" for these establishments or cultural systems (Gareau, 1987:597; Golding, 1977:293-301; Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:114). Depending therefore on the cultural values that have influenced the practitioners or the production of programmes, "broadcasting may either assist the less developed country's more rapid economic, social and cultural incorporation into the metropolitan system, or it may help it to resist this type of pressure and maintain a degree of economic independence and cultural integrity" (Hislop, 1981:231). Concerning Cameroon, is broadcasting working towards its incorporation into the metropolitan cultural system, or does it guarantee the cultural integrity needed for nation-building?

Again, like in previous chapters, only a historical view would place our findings within the proper perspective. Just as in chapter nine we used the colonial situation to explain present tendencies in foreign technological involvement, an examination of foreign cultural involvement in colonial broadcasting, would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the situation today.

I.) PROGRAMMES AND TRAINING DURING COLONIALISM

For the same reason as before, the history of colonial cultural involvement with broadcasting in Cameroon is essentially French. Anglophone Cameroon having received minimal interest from Britain, there were little or no British programmes broadcast in the territory; and few anglophone Cameroonians bothered to tune to NBC stations, first because reception was
poor, and second because the programmes were hardly of any interest to them. In 1961 francophone Cameroon did more than rescue the station with its 1kW transmitter; it took over management, and for a long time the station was run by francophone Cameroonians "who hardly knew a word of English". But although the population failed to be influenced directly by British programmes, they were indirectly affected by British broadcast practices and values through practitioners who went to Nigeria (and later to Britain) for their training, and who eventually returned to take over the English Language Service of RDC after reunification.

Amongst such early anglophone broadcasters were David Endeley and Thomas Abanda, who both recorded two programmes namely, "Southern Cameroon Calling" and "Cameroon Music" which they dispatched to Nigeria for broadcast. By the end of 1958, the NBC opened a training school in Lagos, which offered courses on broadcasting, the press and law. In the first batch of eight students were two Southern Cameroonians (Nkwo, 1975:14-17). More people went for training, and eventually, a media culture identical with that in Nigeria, Britain, and other anglophone countries, but different from the French in certain aspects, was established. We treat this in greater detail where we deal with current practices in the broadcast media of Cameroon.

Elsewhere in anglophone Africa, British influence was both through metropolitan programmes and the training of personnel. In 1963 Bebey remarked that African radio stations were insufficiently staffed and that their staff were poorly qualified. Very few radio services totaled 300 staff or more. However, he did notice a great difference between anglophone and francophone radio stations. The anglophone stations in territories such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya had far more qualified technicians and programme presenters than did similar stations in francophone territories such as Niger, Upper-Volta (Burkina Faso), and Tchad. The reason was the differences in policies and approach between the two colonial masters. Both France and Britain had as policy, the promotion of their language and culture in Africa; but quite unlike the latter who chose to do so indirectly through its African representatives, France preferred a more direct and centralised effort by Frenchmen and from Paris (Nyamjoh, 1988/89:81-4). That is perhaps the reason why even after independence France's desire to be physically present in Africa has been unmatched by any other major developed country (Arnold, 1979).

Although their major training centres for overseas radio staff remained the BBC and Studio-Ecole respectively, Britain, unlike France,
encouraged the establishment of local training centres in its colonies. "The policy of the British government in matters of radio," Bebey writes, "has always been that of a maximum africanisation of the personnel of the stations". Thus it was with africanisation in mind that Britain took an early step to set up training centres in Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania, for example. An exercise in which the BBC played a leading role, sending staff and experts to gradually initiate Africans into the technicalities of broadcasting, and to prepare them to eventually take over control and management of the stations.

It was therefore not a coincidence that at independence a lot of the stations and broadcast organisations in former British colonies were directed by Africans. A good proportion of the personnel as well was local. The policy was for BBC experts to train staff of a certain level on the spot, while only those qualified for higher training were sent to Britain to follow courses. Again unlike Studio-Ecole, the BBC courses were not limited to anglophone Africa; scholarships were even granted to francophone citizens, notably from Senegal and Ivory Coast for training in Britain. In addition to such courses, the BBC had the practice of sending its experts to go from one country to another, helping out with problems related to broadcasting; and from 1956 Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana benefitted immensely from such roving expertise.

France’s policy and approach was totally different. It is true that all colonial masters were technologically and culturally involved with broadcasting in their different territories, but their approaches and strategies were not the same. Unlike Britain, France did not aim at africanisation, at least, not until this had become inevitable. There was no on-the-spot training either, because no local training centres were set up or encouraged before 1965 (Mattelart et al., 1984:72-3). As Bebey (1963:159) writes, both the average and senior radio staff were trained in the Paris-based Studio-Ecole, where they could return for refresher courses after some years of practice. To make up for the paucity of personnel, people were often recruited locally, but they had no prior training; neither could they benefit from local refresher courses, because there were none.

This was in line with what we have already discussed to have been France’s policy, assimilation and centralisation. The rapid creation of SORAFON had been to ensure that French technological and cultural influence was maintained even after independence. To realise the cultural dimension of
its mission, SORAFOM was endowed with the Studio-Ecole, opened in 1954/55 with the aim of training the technicians and programme presenters for African radios. At first the training lasted eight months, then it was extended to a year; everything was done in a hurry, because there was a severe shortage of personnel. The consequence being a shallow training (Sternberg-Sarel, 1963:114), the overseas territories, on gaining independence would continue to send their less qualified staff to France for further courses; thus maintaining French cultural links with their broadcast institutions.

The Studio-Ecole trained three hundred African broadcasters within its first year of creation (Golding, 1977:296; Katz et al. 1978:85). By 1963 more than two hundred and fifty Frenchmen and Africans had graduated from the school (Bebev, 1963:161). But most of those trained were based in Paris where they produced programmes intended for overseas stations. Most of them were employed under the Agency for Production, Information and Documentation (APID), created by SORAFOM. APID procured recorded material and written documents for the stations.

As Sternberg-Sarel explains, the division of labour between Paris and the overseas stations, took as a "matter of principle to furnish from the centre what can only be produced with difficulty at the periphery". With such a principle in mind, programmes on drama, music and education were produced in Paris. A daily news bulletin was equally transmitted from Paris through shortwave transmitters. Scientific news, together with items on French political and intellectual life were dispatched each week to the stations. Although SORAFOM produced a dozen or so programmes per week, it constantly turned to RTF for approximately forty programmes each week, to send abroad (1961:115-16). Right from the beginning SORAFOM was producing all the way from Paris, "more than half the programmes" used in these stations; but following its policy of tactical withdrawal, the proportion had fallen to just a third by independence (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:111).

It is because most of the Frenchmen trained were employed by SORAFOM in Paris, that in 1961 Sternberg-Sarel (1961:112) could only count a total of thirty nine trained Africans and thirty three Frenchmen working in the various francophone African stations. Out of that total, were six Cameroonians\(^1\) who

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\(^1\) The six Cameroonians according to Denise Epote (1980:23) were Pierre Mabe, Auguste Moutongo Black and Daniel Amiot Priso of Radio Yaounde; Bitchoka and Mouasso Priso of Radio Douala; and Jacques Moudiki of Radio Garoua.
together with two Frenchmen operated the stations of Douala, Yaounde and Garoua. With only six trained Cameroonians after more than twenty years of radio, it is no surprise that for a long time RDC was directed by Frenchmen only. Not until 1961 did Auguste Moutongo Black, a Cameroonian and former pupil of Studio-Ecole become Director. In 1968 Daniel Amiot Priso, yet another product of Studio-Ecole, took over from him (Epote, 1980:23). But as Bebey (1963:159-60) argues, France never really had a genuine intention to africanise its colonial stations in a similar way as Britain. It wanted to maintain its influence through Frenchmen, a strategy which often resulted in misunderstanding between the latter and their African colleagues.

The very fact that the entrance examination into the Studio-Ecole was opened to both French and African students, greatly disfavoured the latter. The fact that the average French candidate always performed better than his African counterpart in the said examination, meant that the former was always going to occupy the top positions in the overseas stations, while the African would have to content himself with the subordinate or less pronounced positions (Bebey, 1963:159-60). But their poor performance did not mean that the African students admitted into Studio-Ecole were necessarily less intelligent; but rather that they were forced to compete with French candidates who had a natural advantage, by virtue of the fact that the examination was in their language, based on their cultural values, and on their day to day realities.

Although created to train the staff necessary for overseas radio stations, the Studio-Ecole was essentially French; the entrance examination, teachers, language of instruction, and working environment was French. Concerning the entrance examination most particularly, all the candidates had to write a composition in French, do papers on general knowledge and current affairs, on how to analyse a dossier about audience correspondences, reports on radio listening and do a psychotechnical test (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:111). But unlike their French counterparts, the Africans who sat for the said examination had little prior training or broadcast experience; most of them had been to secondary school, but few had pursued studies up to the advanced

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level. The French candidates on the other hand were very well placed right from the beginning, and often performed so well that they would have taken all the places, were not special concessions granted the African candidates by the administration of the school. Standards were lowered so that some African candidates could make it too. In fact, the 'brilliant performances' by the French candidates made the administration consider exempting them from the examination (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:112).

As maintained elsewhere, it was no surprise "the French performed well in an examination set in their mother-tongue and about their day to day experiences and national way of life" (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:88). Sternberg-Sarel (1961:112) himself writes of how about two thirds of the African radio staff in 1961 had spent their childhood in African villages ("en brousse"), far removed from pressing metropolitan influences. Fresh from remotest Africa, the young candidates were unlikely to understand the socio-cultural reasons for their mediocre performance, and could very mistakenly be made to believe in their 'natural inferiority'.

I have argued that such a state of affairs could easily facilitate France's policy of disseminating its culture in Africa, and of making Africans believe in the superiority of the French:

... the impression such examination results were likely to create in the minds of the unsuspecting African candidates, was sure to be devastating. Not only were they made to believe in their inherent inferiority vis-à-vis their French counterparts, but these African students were likely to find themselves burning the midnight candle in an effort to 'catch up' with their French classmates - whose cultural realities and outlook were all that mattered in the realm of knowledge. Just how could African students trained in a French school by French teachers and on French values, about techniques whose origin they could barely understand, behave differently from their French masters and counterparts on their return to Africa? Just how could this be possible when France never made a secret of its dream to see its language and culture dominate all others? (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:88-9).

A similar concern is expressed by Golding (1977:295-306) and Sternberg-Sarel (1961:112-14). Writing about African intellectuals as a whole, the latter talks of how they were gradually made to believe in the universality of the French culture. Accordingly,

In France African intellectuals are trained on an equal basis with French intellectuals, but not without the wish to assimilate. French culture is universal, and this statement is understood to mean that this culture is good for everyone and that intellectuals can be trained à la française, without paying attention to their country of origin (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:114). [translation mine].
Thanks to such "cultural grilling and indoctrination" (Fonlon, 1964:12), these intellectuals returned to Africa, to help not in reasserting the cultural values of their various nations, but as "faithful disciples" of "this universal culture" (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:89). The broadcasters in particular, four fifths of whom in 1961 had gone through the Studio-Ecole, returned to the latter from time to time for refresher courses. "The style imprinted by a training common to all stations is thus reinforced" (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:116). They are tied to this training for the rest of their lives, and feel endeared to Studio-Ecole, where "blacks and whites" were taught to work with "love" and in a "generous and human atmosphere" (Blin, 1957:144). As Sternberg-Sarel observes of all African broadcasters, "trained professionally in Europe, their future - and to a large extent that of their countries - depends on this training" (1961:114). The reason being that such training has endowed them with professional values and a broadcast culture which they take back home with them, and which are going to guide their every decision, colour their outlook, and determine the format of their programmes (also see Golding, 1977).

But as was pointed out in chapter two, these values developed to suit Britain, France and other colonial masters, were passed onto the unsuspecting African students as though these were ‘universal’ and could apply in any country, irrespective of context. The African students were taught to read news, conceive and produce programmes, edit, do interviews, present programmes, write reports, analyse correspondences, and measure audience expectations and reaction; but it failed to be spelt out to them that they were taught how these things are done in France or Britain say, and not necessarily how they ought to be done everywhere else. Thus media culture and professional values developed by France and Britain for their convenience and in conformity with their world view, were uncritically imbibed, used and often defended by African practitioners as being universal. One of our aims in this chapter is to see the degree to which Cameroonian broadcasting is affected by what we observed to be the general trend in this domain in chapter three.

II.) TRAINING IN POST-INDEPENDENT CAMEROON

A) Local Training: From ESIJY to ASMAC/ESSTI

Although Cameroon gained independence in 1960, the first school for training local media practitioners was not built until 1970. This implies that Cameroonians continued to be trained abroad. Francophones went to France, Canada, Tunisia and other French speaking countries for their training, while the anglophones sought to be trained in Nigeria, Britain, Ghana, the USA and
Canada. The determining factor was language, but bilingual exceptions like Francis Bebey were able to receive training both in France and the USA. Most of Cameroon's early broadcasters started off as junior staff or continuity announcers, and either went abroad or eventually gained access into the local school to be trained. Starting off in this way in 1963 were Henri Bandolo – today's Minister of Information and Culture, Abel Mbengue – prominent Sports broadcaster, Agnès Biaye, Germain Essomba, Jean-Emile Mba and others; all of whom were initially selected from amongst 3000 candidates (Cameroon Tribune (daily), 28/1/1988).

On May 15 1970 a decree was issued creating a regional institute - L'Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Journalisme (ESIJY) in Yaounde, following a convention signed April 17 the same year by the Republic of Central Africa, Gabon, Tchad, Rwanda, Togo and Cameroon. Soon after its creation, the school could not function properly because of budgetary problems. The other states failed to pay in their contributions, and for most of the times, Cameroon funded ESIJY singlehandedly. In 1980 Cameroon issued an ultimatum to the other states asking them to pay their quotas or it would be forced to repudiate the convention and create a school of its own. The states did not respond, so on September 4 1982 ESIJY ceased to exist, and was replaced by the Advanced School of Mass Communication/L'Ecole Supérieure des Sciences et Techniques de L'Information (ASMAC/ESSTI), which became attached to the University of Yaounde. Although sponsored completely by the Cameroonian state, the school continues to receive foreign students, but on Cameroon's own terms. Students come from many other states including Burkina-Faso, Zambia, Angola, Botswana, Zaire, Ivory Coast and the original signatory-states of the convention (Fame Ndongo, interviewed, 2/2/88). Between 1970 and 1986, 357 all-round journalists were trained, of whom 224 were Cameroonians (Week-End Tribune, 19/12/1987).

According to decree No 82/404 of September 4 1982, ASMAC/ESSTI was to consist of three sections namely: Division I, which since December 1987, trains information technicians for a period of two years, and who are intended to serve the provinces and divisions on completion of their course; Division II, which since the creation of ESIJY in 1970, trains all-round journalists for a period of three years; Division III, which since December 1987, trains in two years, specialised journalists intended to understand and analyse the complex economic, sociological, psychological, legal and political aspects of modern-day journalism. Until 1982, only all-round journalists were trained, even though the original idea behind a regional school was to train journalists sophisticated enough to distinguish between journalism as a
profession, and the Western media values that tainted it.

Admission into ASMAC/ESSTI for Cameroonians is by a competitive public examination, and for foreigners by simple study of a dossier submitted by their home governments. For Cameroonians to qualify for the said examination, they must: a) as far as Division I is concerned, have their ordinary levels and at least an advanced level paper, and must be less than 33 years old; b) for Division II, be holders of at least two advanced levels, and must be less than 32 years of age; c) concerning Division III, be holders of a Masters degree from any university, and must be less than 33 years old, or be all-round journalists with three years of experience. The general registration requirements that apply for other Public Service examinations in Cameroon, also hold true for ASMAC/ESSTI. Students graduate as civil servants, and are employed by the government (Week-End Tribune, 19/12/1987; Profile de L'ESSTI, 1988).

Before the creation of ESIJY in 1970, Cameroonians had no choice but to practise the media profession as they had learnt it, with all the values and beliefs that went with it. Even if they or the authorities felt that the training they received abroad was not adapted, there was little they could do to change things without a training centre of their own. The creation of ESIJY was precisely the result of a general feeling of dissatisfaction with foreign training. As Fame Ndongo the Director (interviewed, 2/2/88) explained, it was realised that Cameroonians trained abroad were "extraverted and ill-adapted" to the context where they were called upon to serve. Accordingly,

When the journalists returned home from their training, they were not suited to the local realities. They were a little de-rooted because they had been trained for a Western audience following Western canons, with Western reflexes - where as you very well know, criticism is preferred to education (Fame Ndongo, interviewed, 2/2/88).

The creation of ESIJY translated the desire to contextualise training in Central Africa, Gabon, Tchad, Rwanda, Togo and Cameroon, by substituting Western values with African ones, and by emphasising education, not criticism. The priorities of the West were not identical to those of Africa. For one thing,

... in our countries what is important is education: People have a very low level, an intellectual level that is very low. In Europe, in the West, in America etc., the public is already sufficiently awake; thus the journalist can afford to content himself with informing, and with informing according to universal aesthetic canons - for example, insisting on what is wrong, or capitalising on the sensational (Fame Ndongo, interviewed, 2/2/88).
However, the creation of a local school must not be seen to mean a rejection of the 'universal canons' or norms of journalism. According to Fame Ndongo and the broadcasters, these are the same everywhere in the world. The West might have different priorities from Africa, but the basic principles of journalism apply everywhere. They indicated that what they questioned was not the universality of journalism as a profession, but the Western perspectives. Thus in creating ESIJY the abovenamed countries wanted an African school capable not only of giving the journalist the universal reflexes ... canons of the profession, but to have these rooted into the African realities. For example, African history, African geography, African sociology, African psychology or social psychology are not the same as those of the Western public. And that is what motivated the creation of a school of journalism in Yaounde (Fame Ndongo, interviewed, 2/2/88).

Despite their intentions, the ambition to free themselves of Western perspectives was thwarted by the inability of the countries concerned to provide the relevant staff or to understand the real nature of the problem. Initially, the lack of local experts forced them to turn for support from the very Western states whose influence they sought to avoid. When the University of Yaounde was opened in 1962, there were no local staff, so Cameroon was obliged to seek assistance from France, Britain, Canada, America and other Western states. The case was the same for ESIJY, where for twelve years it was dominated by French staff. Directing the school during the first six years of its creation was Hervé Bourges, Frenchman and former Managing Director of TFI. Not until he had laid the foundation for the school, did Jean-Paul Nyalendo a Gabonese take over in 1976. Fame Ndongo of Cameroon - a former student, took over in 1981, barely a year before ESIJY ceased to exist (Week-End Tribune, 19/12/87).

Even after 1982, and although more Cameroonians are qualified to take over the teaching, the foreign presence is far from over. Of a permanent teaching staff of nineteen, there are three Frenchmen, including the Deputy Director of the school, Jean Paul Gauch; one American and fifteen Cameroonians, nine of whom are former students of ESIJY. In addition to these are certain part-time lecturers from other faculties of the university. Of course, the physical presence of foreigners is just one level of foreign cultural involvement. Nevertheless, the francophone states which created ESIJY could not expect Western perspectives to disappear merely by employing French people to teach Africans in Africa instead of Paris, Lille or Strasbourg. Complex though the problem of cultural dependence is (Boyd-Barret, 1982), an elementary solution would entail replacing foreigners with nationals. Although
as Halloran remarks, such indigenization is only useful if the nationals seem able "to free themselves from the ideological shackles of their educational and professional socialization", without which they are no better than "a national seal of approval" for Western values and models (1988:17).

Another aspect of cultural dependence completely escaped the notice of the governments of the six countries that created ESIJY; a problem which persists in today's ASMAC/ESSTI. These governments failed to pay sufficient attention to the psychological effects of studying in the West or of being taught by Westerners (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:112-14; Abdel-Malek, 1967:250-64; Golding, 1977:295-306; Gareau, 1987:596-8). That is why like their West African counterparts - Senegal, Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso - who created Centre d'Édutes des Sciences et Techniques de l'Information (CESTI) of Dakar (Hovard, 1980:3-6), they failed to see the contradictions involved in sending final year students of ESIJY to Montreal in Canada and Lille in France for eight months to complete their training. It is a practice which is continued by ASMAC/ESSTI, and which the Director defended with the argument that it is only intended to give the students an idea of what goes on elsewhere in the developed world.

Neither the library nor the teaching has been restructured enough to guarantee the 'desired break' with the West. Researchers have argued that such training or practices are a sort of professionalisation, through which the African students become socialised into a particular outlook or culture - a way of thinking, doing or saying, that is identical with that of his tutor or professional alter ego in the West (Sternberg-Sarel, 1961:112-14; Golding, 1977:295-306; Katz, 1977:113-20; Tunstall, 1977:5; Haque, 1984:150; O'Brien, 1985). An argument which is proven by the fact that there are no real differences in professional values, beliefs or practices, between the over 250 journalists trained in Cameroon, and their counterparts trained exclusively abroad.

The implications of such intellectual socialisation are that, being national or local ceases to be synonymous with being authentic or in cultural harmony with the rural majority of Cameroon. The real litmus has therefore to be a carefully reflected policy and course programme that takes into consideration what is truly Cameroonian in terms of culture, and social organisations. A policy and programme which could then be applied following a method and approach locally and collectively defined, not internationally determined by so-called 'universal norms'. As Golding (1977), Sternberg-Sarel
(1961) and others argued in chapter three, the media practitioners of the Third World have become sympathetic with a certain view of their profession, a belief in neutrality or objectivity; one which in itself is strongly rooted in the Western intellectual tradition (Mattelart et al., 1984:75). By their training alone, these practitioners are, to borrow Ahidjo's expression (Unesco, 1980:58), "doomed to take their intellectual cues" from the West.

Thus, despite ASMAC/ESSTI's original aim of providing an alternative to foreign training and Western media values, it subscribes only to AFP (through Camnews) for news about Africa and the rest of the world, although FANA (which is African) would appear to be more relevant. Such are the beliefs and practices which the authorities have failed to question, and which the broadcasters themselves continue to take for granted. As long as nothing is done to undo them, it would not really matter (culturally) whether it is a Westerner or a Cameroonian teaching in ASMAC/ESSTI, or whether local broadcast practitioners are trained at home or abroad.

What the authorities were and still are most concerned with, are the political implications of allowing their practitioners to take advantage of so-called "Liberal Western" media traditions. They have succeeded in keeping media institutions and practitioners under firm control, through rationalising upon the differences between their societies and the West. 'Illiteracy' and 'ignorance' in the population are used to justify rigid government control of the media, and to socialise the journalists into willing supporters of the government and party. That is why despite the expressed need to "educate" and "inform" and to eradicate "illiteracy" in the 'unsophisticated' masses, ASMAC/ESSTI trains none of its students in the local languages or in traditional aspects of communication.

Yet, in 1980 Ahidjo was telling Unesco communication experts meeting in Yaounde of the need "to reassert the value of our traditional cultures and national languages, and also to make judicious use of traditional means of communication" (Unesco, 1980:59). The government's strategies are no different from the "mission civilisatrice" rationalisation used by France to justify colonisation. It is because they have failed to see Western culture as a real threat (similar to "liberal ideas about the media") that these governments have not acted strongly enough to counter it. Again, like the colonists, the post-colonial leaders are most concerned with their interests, which in the case of culture, are more in tune with Western tastes and outlooks than with the values and ways of their rural masses (Amin, 1980:31-2, 175; Hadjor,
1987:63-4). As Rowlands points out, in Cameroon, Western education and "an imaginary Western lifestyle absorbed through magazines, films and TV, form both a system of credentialism on which access to the state bureaucracy depends and a prestige culture of consumerism" (1988:3).

B) Training for TV: An Unforeseen Problem

Given the fact that not more than 300 Cameroonian journalists are trained locally, that until recently few of the teaching staff were Cameroonians, and that final year students have to go to France and Canada to complete their courses, we understand the intensity of foreign involvement in Cameroon journalism. Such involvement is equally strong in the area of technical training, where apart from local schools as L'Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique (ENSP), and L'Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Postes et Telecommunications (ENSTP), Cameroon has had to rely almost exclusively on foreign training. The particular difficulties faced in the introduction of TV illustrate how an oversight in relation to training can enhance the amount of dependence on foreign schools, technical aid or expertise.

CTV started off with a great deficiency in the competent personnel it needed to operate properly. When it launched its bi-weekly broadcasts on 23 December 1985 for instance, it had as Cameroonian personnel only 32 journalists, 8 Cameramen, 6 announcers, 2 sound technicians and about 15 producers (Nkaa, 1986:37). As we have remarked already, more emphasis was placed on the technological aspects than on TV's eventual operators. Although in 1969 Ahidjo expressed the need for "a systematic study" of Cameroon's needs, and the careful definition of "the objectives which we intend to pursue", all feasibility studies seemed to have been about types of equipment, costs of acquisition and maintenance, systems to adopt, bands and frequencies of operation.

Even though the government was further reminded in 1977 of the need to start training the necessary personnel, nothing was done between 1977 and 1982. Interviewed by Nkaa, Nguiamba blamed the government for delaying, despite the fact that CTV, in order to start operation, was estimated to need a work force of not less than 1050: 400 technicians, 450 programme producers and 200 administrative staff. A figure which was expected to rise to 1150 with the addition of 18 more transmission stations with a network of about 4500km.

It was a target not attained six years later; during this study the total work force of CTV was only between 500 and 550. In fact, the total work
force of RDC and CTV combined in 1988 could barely equal the first estimate, and by no means in the same proportions. With the creation of CRTV, an even larger organisation, the problem of personnel is far from solved. For a long time, the government's efforts towards the training of audio-visual technicians and other TV personnel, remained tentative. With the consequence that when the need for trained and competent staff arose, intensive foreign involvement could not be avoided.

The technicians and broadcasters that left the radio for TV, or that came home from France, Britain, USA, Canada and Nigeria, did not resolve the staffing problem. Desperate and anxious to keep TV going, the Cameroonian government could not ignore foreign offers of help. Among the countries who announced their intentions to help with the training of personnel were: West Germany, which set aside 6 million DM for this; France which offered to use 12 million FF; and Canada which was ready to accept Cameroonian students for training. The ITU pledged to continue giving its assistance. The interested companies included Thomson and Siemens, who accepted to train Cameroonian technicians in their factories, so as to familiarise them with their technology; and also the SOFRATEV/INA/TDF group of firms. Quoting official sources, Nkaa (1986:39-43) talks of the possibility of further help from other countries, including Spain, Italy, Japan, and the UK whose BBC offered an emergency month-long initiation course to 12 CTV employees in 1985.

Serious local training of any kind began in 1983, when in May 70 candidates were admitted to be trained as TV technicians at the national TV training centre temporarily situated at Tsinga in Yaounde. The centre was later to become L'Institut National des Arts et Techniques Audio-visuels (INATA), to be located at Ekounou once Siemens and GTZ were through with the construction work. The 70 candidates were later joined by 138 more in 1985; they are expected to master various technical aspects of TV production. Each course was to last for two years, and the centre was expected to train competent personnel in the conception and realisation of programmes, sound and vision technics, the operation and maintenance of equipment, and the management of televisual products.

The West German government (through its Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation – BMZ, and Technical Cooperation – GTZ) has been most involved with this particular training programme. Contributing 9 000 000 DM or about 1 500 000 000 F CFA (more than the 6 Million DM originally pledged) as technical aid, it signed a convention with the Cameroonian government on 22 August 1985.
to help out in the area of TV production. Starting in April 1986 the first phase of the training programme was to last until September 1988. The West German government sent six long term experts, four for a three year period and two for a two year period each; and twenty four short term experts for a total period of 39 months. These experts who were totally in charge of designing and delivering the courses, were assisted by eight Cameroonians.

According to Hans Heber, technical expert and coordinator of West German involvement with INATA (interviewed, 9/3/88), being in charge of production meant that the Germans were helping in the training of assistant production managers and production directors on the one hand, and of cameramen, soundmen and maintenance technicians on the other. By November 1987, 13 assistant production managers had graduated and were working, and in March 1988 11 production directors graduated, making altogether a total of 24 production staff. By the end of March 1988, a total of 30 cameramen, 29 soundmen and 29 maintenance technicians had been trained by INATA.

In the training emphasis was laid on the importance of teamwork. The course consisted of three levels: Theory, practical introduction to equipment, and application in a real production situation. However, this third level of training was not applied consistently. Although INATA had the practice of sending the student technicians and producers to CTV for two months of practice, Hans Heber confessed that those on the maintenance and programme direction courses had not had this practical experience. But he felt that the experience of the assistant directors would give an idea of how the former would perform once in the field. In his words, "From the experience of the assistant directors, it can be deduced that the studio directors would fit in quite well on leaving the centre."

Part of the convention signed between Cameroon and West Germany was to send Cameroonians to Siemens factories for training. Such training was to be financed entirely by the Cameroonian budget. "However," says Hans Beber, "we have scholarships for those working at CTV or for our Cameroonian colleagues. This is in order that our counterparts can take over from us when we are leaving. We have a total of 18 scholarships for Cameroonians, part of which have already been signed. Some Cameroonians left last Saturday for our Berlin Training Centre which is specialised in advanced techniques in different areas.

These scholarships are for a period of three months, and the courses are partly theoretical and mostly practical; with equipment that is similar to the equipment in Cameroon TV. Most of those on scholarships are coming from CTV. Our counterparts at the training
centre at Ekounou have scholarships to improve their teaching skills, their techniques of training know-how (Hans Heber, interviewed, 9/3/88).

Following negotiations between the governments of Cameroon and West Germany in February 1988, a second phase to their cooperation in the field of TV was scheduled to start in October 1988. As Hans Heber pointed out, the phase was intended mainly towards the cultivation of a team spirit and a style of work that could be identified with CTV. For this reason, the second phase had to consist of specialisation and improvement of knowledge for those who were already working at CTV, but who had received no training at INATA.

The importance of the second phase was to institute a team spirit amongst the staff of CTV; for as an institution, CTV had employed people trained in different schools, countries, and therefore with different backgrounds. An aspect which made it difficult for them to see things in the same way, and consequently, difficult for them to work as a team. But there was the need to have a similar sense of professional values, without which the team spirit would be difficult to attain. Hans Heber explained: "The course would be be much shorter. The number of students would also be much reduced. For it won't be a course for beginners, but for those with field experience, but who need to add something new in order to cultivate team spirit".

Over the last five years the government has given some amount of attention to students of Mass Communication in its scholarship programme for training abroad. The number of Cameroonians training in different aspects of TV has increased considerably, albeit statistics are difficult to obtain. Dr Timothy Tabot Mac Ojong of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (interviewed, 29/2/88) explains why. First, the Ministry was only created in 1984, and second no studies anterior to this time are available. Consequently, he had statistics only for the 1986/87 academic year, but even then, these were incomplete. For, of a total number of fifteen cultural services in foreign countries, only five were able to provide the statistics asked of them. Of the five, the USA had 29, France 29, Canada 14, Nigeria 7, and Belgium 4 Cameroonians studying under the general heading of "TV Journalism". That gave a total of 83, comprising both the government and the privately sponsored students. Amongst countries without statistics but with Cameroonians students in this area, were Britain and West Germany.

Hans Heber is right in recognising the fact that the practitioners currently employed in CTV have neither a common background, nor a team spirit.
However, one must not think the lack of team spirit necessarily results from the different backgrounds or countries of training, but that the organisational structure and the political system in which the practitioners operate are such that discourage team spirit. It is a similar argument to that made in chapter eight. However, granted that the lack of team spirit was directly caused by the differences in background, and that training in one place tended to make the broadcast practitioners see things differently from their colleagues trained elsewhere, I do not think that by making everyone in CTV develop the INATA style would be the best way of solving the problem for Cameroon.

Were that to happen, which is what Hans Heber and his West German team intend to do, they would have succeeded in replacing French, American, British and Canadian influences with a German influence or style; but not with a Cameroonian style. For in INATA, the eight Cameroonian are merely assisting the thirty long and short term West German experts in a training programme neither conceived nor coordinated by them. Instead, the Germans consider their Cameroonian 'counterparts' not sufficiently qualified, and who should benefit from the scholarship scheme aimed at enhancing their professional competence in Berlin. Once again, the Cameroonian authorities have failed to see the importance of determining the direction that such training should take, because they have taken for granted that there is nothing culturally different in the way an American or a European would conceive and deliver a TV programme compared to the way in which a Cameroonian would. This, from a government with a policy of national cultural renaissance, is a serious oversight.

C) Refresher Courses

Another form of foreign involvement with the training of media practitioners is through refresher courses. Such courses may either take place abroad or in Cameroon; but either way, Cameroonians are trained by foreign media experts on how various Western broadcast organisations function, paying little attention to contextual differences. Cameroonians have attended refresher courses in many different broadcast institutions in the West, including: RFI, the BBC, the VOA, Deutsche Welle and Radio Netherlands. But two local refresher courses that occurred during the fieldwork, would suffice to make our point.

The first course was jointly organised by the Goethe Institute and CRTV, and lasted from Wednesday February 24 to Friday March 4 1988. It was titled "Stage de formation sur les Techniques de l'Enregistrement Musical en
Studio Multipiste", and was coordinated by Messrs Joseph Yankeu, Jacob Nkembe and George Tanni of RDC. But their role ended at coordinating, as Messrs Burkhard and Leppel, two West German technical experts, did the actual teaching of the 10 technicians and 5 journalists who attended. As Professor Thomas Melone argued in chapter nine, if the government took time to involve local technical and legal experts in the drawing up of contracts with foreign countries or firms, situations like this would not arise. Instead of inviting the West German suppliers to teach Cameroonians operate a newly installed multichannel studio, it would be Cameroonians teaching fellow Cameroonians. Accordingly, the authorities should have insisted that Cameroonian technicians be admitted and trained in the West German firm involved, way before the actual installation of the 16 outlet multichannel studio.

The second example was a course jointly organised by the BBC and the Ministry of Information and Culture. Pushed by falling standards in the English Language Service of RDC, the Director turned to the BBC for assistance. The latter responded by sending two broadcast experts: John E Turtle, former Head of Radio Training Department, BBC Radio; and P R (Bobby) Jaye, former Head of Light Entertainment, BBC Radio and senior tutor, overseas. Attending the course which lasted from February 29 to March 25 were twenty four untrained journalists selected from the provincial and national stations. To coordinate were George Tanni and Judith Ngale of RDC, but like the previous case, they did no more than coordinate.

According to the BBC, the aim of the course was "to meet the training requirements listed by Radio Cameroon management in form & SPTI dated 8.9.87, and others which may be requested and are apparent to the tutors as the course progresses". Following their scheme of work, the experts intended to introduce the twenty four freshmen to the basic techniques involved in broadcasting or broadcast journalism. News gathering, news writing and microphone presence, were singled out as areas of priority. For the first week, there was a course on the use of portable tape recorders, tape editing, interviewing, the news and general magazine, writing news and short reports, the news talk, the use of spoken English, writing links, reading at the microphone, broadcasting ethics, studio production, programme material and news gathering, research methods.

For the second week, there was further work on interviewing, package making, the minidoc-featurette, further work on news and script writing and reading at the microphone; use of music, music balance in the studio, music
balance in the open air, the documentary, and the feature. The third week consisted of: Further work on the documentary and feature, dramatisation for promotions and reconstructions, further work on personal performance and writing, survey for and planning OBs, introduction to commentary, developing commentary skills. And finally on the fourth week, there was preparation of final coursework; which meant that each participant had to prepare a half hour programme and take part in the playbacks and analysis, topped up by individual coaching on weak points.

The above is the standard BBC approach, and Messrs Turtle and Jaye would use it in every other country with problems similar to those faced by RDC. Once again, the course is conceived and delivered according to BBC standards and understanding of the basic techniques of broadcast journalism. For a country with specific goals and objectives such as Cameroon, to accept without questioning all such basic techniques and conceptions, is to sacrifice the very autonomy and self-reliance which it has singled out as necessary for nation-building.

Furthermore, it is contradictory for the government to reject what the West claims to offer in terms of "press freedom" in the name of political expediency and nation-building, yet decline to reject a similar offer in terms of "cultural synchronisation" for the same reasons. Finally, it is difficult to understand how after 28 years of broadcasting for nation-building, Cameroon still cannot afford experts of its own, sufficiently grounded in basic broadcast techniques, to be able to pass them over to freshmen. Were ASMAC/ESSTI well organised and carefully staffed, with the country's collectively determined nation-building priorities and options in mind, such difficulties would hardly arise.

D) Western Media Culture and the Cameroonian Broadcaster

(i) Anglo-Saxon Versus French Media Cultures

Although trained in the same national institute (ESIJY 1970-82, or ASMAC/ESSTI since then), the anglophone and francophone broadcasters do not develop a common style of presentation, be it in news or current affairs programmes like the defunct "Cameroon Report" and "Dimanche Midi". The anglophones have continued to be inspired by Anglo-Saxon media traditions, while the francophones have remained French or "Latin" in style. All journalists interviewed recognise this, and also have an explanation for it. According to Bovard, when Senegalese, Ivorian and francophone Cameroonian
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journalists talk of themselves as having been socialised into the "Latin" system of journalism, they are referring "to the tendency to wait for events to happen before they are reported", as opposed to the "Anglo-Saxon" style of "investigative reporting à la Watergate" (1980:6).

The francophones have different ways of presenting news, reports, and current affairs, from the anglophones. With news for example, the first remarkable difference is the number of people involved with each bulletin. While the English Language bulletin might be presented by a single news reader only, the French Language news is done by a team of presenters, who may sometimes total six or more. Although some would argue that this is because francophone broadcasters outnumber anglophones in both RDC and CTV, Fai Henry Fonye (interviewed, 2/1/88) gives the real reason to be that French news tends to take the form of a news magazine, "where there is everything, not only the news". The bulletin is often punctuated by music or jingles, and hardly distinguishes between news and commentary.

He describes French Language news as "integrated news", where it is common for the newscasters to

... begin for instance with features, then go to magazines, editorials, then the hard news, and sometimes they can even end up with the soft news to amuse. In their headlines, if you are bilingual, you would realise that they are usually dramatic. They exaggerate. The individuals give the information, then the hard news; and the duration of their own bulletin is 15 minutes, and sometimes they can give a bulletin for about 45 minutes or 50 (Fai Henry Fonye, interviewed, 2/1/88).

Writing about RFI and French broadcasting in general, Gaillard (1986:66) complains about the cold composure ("la froide sobriété") of the BBC style which does not appeal to the "Latin" audience. This point of view is shared by the Subdirector of News for RDC (interviewed, 25/2/88) who not only believes the French format is the best, but also recommends it for adoption as the national system for Cameroon. To him, any news without music or jingles is nothing more than a news flash, a no-news. The music or jingles are intended as the little breaks necessary to retain the interest of the audiences, for whom a 30 minute news bulletin is difficult to follow "without a little rest in the form of music". The harmonisation of the news services in his opinion, would entail the total abandonment of the anglophone style, which is dry and uninteresting. The Director of ASMAC/ESSY (interviewed, 2/2/88) agrees that English Language news is monotonic, and does not at all find it surprising, since "that is the Anglo-Saxon style", which to him inspires the anglophone
journalists of RDC and CTV. But as he further points out, news in French cannot be that monotonic because "The francophones want to attach, to attract the audience, the viewer, the reader, whereas that is not always the case with the anglophones".

The English language news on the other hand "deals only with the facts"; the Anglo-Saxon audiences are interested in the facts, not opinions. As the editor in chief for RDC news, a francophone (interviewed, 23/2/88) says, "let the audience make their own opinions, but present them with the facts without commenting". That is why unlike the French language news, it is usually fifteen minutes long. But George Tanni (interviewed, 2/1/88) feels that a fifteen minute bulletin can be too long. As he says,

... in news broadcasting, it isn't the length of the bulletin that makes for assimilation. Even the 15 minutes, I think is still too long for a news bulletin, if you intend to give just the raw news. Take something else in which you want to do an analysis, a news magazine; there is room for all that. But a news bulletin is supposed to give the raw news, and end it at that. You may want to comment afterwards in a different news style. There is, it exists.

Now, I thought that 15 minutes is even too long. Take BBC for example. BBC news is 10 minutes, 9 minutes 30 seconds, to be precise. And they carry virtually everything the French bulletin would have here in 30 minutes. In 10 minutes they carry everything and a bit more than we would have here in 30 minutes in French. There lies the difference (George Tanni, interviewed, 2/1/88).

Fai Henry Fonye (interviewed, 2/1/88) reiterates the point by arguing that one cannot but "go down to playing jingles", if one makes the news bulletin unduely long. Although the news is a programme like any other, "it is too serious, very important and too formal, that we don't have to bring in that type of dramatisation and amusement like playing jingles and music in the middle of a bulletin." He even recommends a "studio perspective" where the reverberation time of the news room is ideally less than one minute. That has the intention of making the atmosphere "formal and dead", so as not to bring the audience "that type of intimacy" which gives "the impression that the news bulletin itself is a musical piece".

These differences in style are related to the different media systems of the Western countries which have most influenced the situation in Cameroon. The level of direct government involvement with the broadcast media is not the same in Britain and France. The BBC for example, is more detached from central government control than RFI (Williams, 1979). In fact, the ability of each successive French government to manipulate broadcasting in its
favour makes it difficult to distinguish between RFI as the voice of France and RFI as the mouthpiece of the government; most of the times, all it does is propagate 'the good official word' ("la bonne parole officielle"), receiving directives from the Presidency and the Ministries (Gaillard, 1986; Betts, 1988).

Tatah Mentan (interviewed, 30/1/88) provides an illustration with the reporting of the assassination of Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. According to him, there is "a world of difference" between a report by a BBC correspondent and another by an RFI correspondent. In reporting the death, it was apparent that

... the French journalist was trying to play off the idea that Thomas Sankara was somebody who had already been very rude, very impolite. Why? Because of the misunderstanding he had with Mitterand. While the BBC reporter settled down to tell the story as it was (Dr Tatah Mentan, interviewed, 30/1/88).

Such differences are reflected in Cameroonian broadcasting, where respective broadcasters consider the BBC and RFI as role models. The BBC's preference for news without commentaries is guided by the principle that in a plural society, everyone is entitled to make what they want out of an impartial account of events. On the other hand, the RFI is operated on the basis that the people are not only to be related the events, but that their understanding of these events must be guided by commentaries and editorials reflecting the official position. Once more it is a difference between the British policy of indirectness and delegation on the one hand, and the French policy of direct involvement and centralisation on the other; both of which as we know, produce the same long term effects.

The management, staff, students (former and present) of ASMAC/ESSTI admit the school has failed to develop a distinctive style of its own, one which is Cameroonian and in tune with the whole idea of nation-building. The following explanation by the Director is in a way an admission of his school's failure to attain its original objective, which was to train truly Cameroonian media practitioners, well grounded in the local reality, and culturally in harmony with the majority of the people. To the Director, the courses are taught by media professionals or parttime lecturers who all have different backgrounds. Both the anglophones and francophones are taught the basic techniques of the profession by professionals who share their respective languages (English or French) and their different media and intellectual traditions.
Whether intended or not, the effect is the perpetuation of French and Anglo-Saxon media cultures. For as Dr Tatah Mentan rightly points out, "just the fact that a student speaks English as distinct from French as the first language, already puts him in a specific perspective. His own view of the world and issues is very different", and he selectively refers only to those sources or practices that would consolidate that perspective or outlook, and further distinguish him from his francophone counterparts (also see Gareau, 1987). The anglophone students of ASMAC/ESSTI would tune to the BBC and the VOA to listen to the way they read their news and do their reports. The francophones would in turn listen to RFI. Such practices make them all the more conscious of their differences. At the national level the differences are further stressed where correspondent reports by the VOA or RFI are monitored and reproduced during the respective news bulletins in English and French.

The differences in colonial heritage are blamed for the lack of a Cameroonian style, but the very fact that such differences have persisted is an indication to the lack of a cohesive and enforceable cultural policy capable of providing a local alternative to inherited Western values. If ASMAC/ESSTI can be said to have succeeded in moulding media practitioners that are especially socialised or conditioned to the political system, it cannot claim a similar success as concerns breaking away from so-called international norms of journalism, be these French or Anglo-Saxon.

(ii) General Beliefs on Journalism and Media Practices

One cannot talk with the Cameroonian broadcasters for long, without remarking their strong sense of distinction between the POLITICAL and the PROFESSIONAL. It is common to hear such statements as "Professionally the creation of a Radio station in each province isn't necessary, but politically, it is because it brings about stability" (Peter Ngong Ful, interviewed, 29/12/87); or "Professionally she [the assistant editor] was right but politically, she was wrong. She should have allowed him [the Director of RDC who made a 'worthless' 6 minute-long editorial on the occasion of the Maroua Agro-Pastoral Show] to ridicule himself if he preferred" (George Tanni to Moses Nyo, 5/1/88); and "While I am struggling to defend my professional integrity in programmes such as 'Cameroon Report', I am at the same time invited to play a political role by coordinating a panel discussion on the activities, policies and merits of those in government. The members of the panel are not chosen by me" (George Tanni, interviewed, 5/1/88).

Such distinctions or oppositions are significant in that they point
to the broadcasters' recognition of a gap between professional ideals and the practice of journalism in real life. The broadcasters, in almost every interview conducted, never ceased to indicate that nowhere in the world, be it in America or Europe, would a journalist not respect the policies of his employers. To them it was foolhardy for anyone "to try to bite the finger that feeds him". Generally, they reason that being employed by the government, they must follow its policies, and do as it pleases; to use the government's airwaves to attack it, is imprudent. This is a confession to the fact that journalistic values are nothing but ideals which could only be realised when the societal conditions are most favourable. It also indicates that if the government is in a position to exact political conformity from the journalists, there is no reason why the same pressures cannot be applied on the journalists to reassert the mainstream cultures shared by 80% of the population.

The absence of pressures by the government in the domain of culture, has encouraged the perpetuation of foreign media traditions and the marginalisation of traditional Cameroonian values. It has also discouraged the systematic exploitation of the different instruments of communication that are authentic, traditional and ethnically meaningful within a plural and largely rural Cameroon (Tanni, 1979:21-6). If the broadcast media have been well contextualised politically, the only explanation why a cultural contextualization has failed to take place, is the absence of a real will for cultural change. Like their counterparts elsewhere in Africa (Amin, 1980:175; Hadjor, 1987:63-4), the Cameroonian leaders are more in tune with Western tastes and outlooks than with the cultures of the rural majority of the population. No wonder why some broadcasters can afford to operate under a political situation that is far from their "liberal" ideal, yet stick to and vigorously defend so-called professional values à l'occidentale.

To the question whether the broadcasters thought there is a difference between being trained abroad and training within the country, they tended to answer as follows: Those trained abroad claimed that although journalistic canons were the same everywhere, they had an edge over their home trained colleagues. They had been exposed to different ways and practices of the profession, and they were used to a wider range of equipment. Through being trained in Europe, America and African countries such as Nigeria and Tunisia, they had had an idea of TV prior to their employment with CTV. They were more used to working as a team than their counterparts trained at home, who preferred to work as individuals. However, they did recognise the fact
that having got their training in Cameroon, their colleagues were more suited to work within the political system.

On their part, the home trained journalists did not see any differences at all. They too had spent the last year of their training in France and Canada, getting themselves acquainted with foreign media values, techniques and practices. While abroad, they watched Canadian and French TV, and were even inspired by some programmes and styles of presentation. They argued that one did not need to be trained abroad, to know how TV was operated elsewhere. For long, the American and French Cultural Centres in Yaoundé have organised video shows where journalists and student journalists could go to watch and learn about TV, way before the medium was ever introduced. Ndasi (1985:43-4) writes of how a special session of video watching reserved exclusively for journalists, is organised at the American Cultural Centre every Friday at 5.30 pm. Before 1983 tapes of CBS news were presented, but since then ABC has taken over. In ASMAC/ESSTI itself, news tapes shot by L’Hexagone and furnished by Télédiffusion de France (TDF) are used in the training of student broadcasters (Meboe, 1984:76-8). All this, they argued, confirm their point that colleagues trained abroad in North America or Europe were not necessarily more exposed to TV journalism.

Whether trained abroad or at home, the Cameroonian broadcast practitioners have been inspired by foreign broadcasters and programmes. At RDC broadcasters complain of the conflict between the 'americanisms' of the American-trained or the VOA inspired on the one hand, and the Standard English of the BBC World Service, which the majority of broadcasters would like to serve as the model for Radio Cameroon. Broadcasters in CTV all refer to American, French, Canadian or British TV stars whom they admire, and whom they strive to emulate. These include Dan Rather and Peter Jennings of America, Peter Sissons and Trevor MacDonald of Britain, Yves Morosy, Passy Pois Darvord, Anne Sinclair and Sadlier of France, and many others. As Ntemfack Ofegue (interviewed, 15/3/88) puts it, Cameroon came into TV about fifty years after the medium was started, and it is natural for the CTV practitioners to look elsewhere for inspiration. The broadcasters have copied from the Americans, French, English and others, because "we came into TV somewhere in the middle".

As he says, all a viewer has to do is spend a few months in America, France and Britain, to see how much CTV programmes resemble what he has watched there. The viewer would for example realise that:
... 'Minute By Minute' is our own version of '60 Minutes', 'Telepodium' is some kind of a blend between 'Solid Gold' - the American Solid Gold, and the old format of 'Danse Cameroon Dance' which used to be 'Soul Train'. There is our 'Tell A Word' which is the '$25,000 Pyramid', and 'Thinking Time' is our edition of a programme called 'Hot Potatoes' - which you know is a kind of game show where you select questions from a particular domain, then give answers to. There is 'Coco Rosi' which is a revision of a French children's programme. Then there is 'PouPou Foot' which is the exact copy of 'TeleFoot'. Even programmes such as 'Première Ligne', 'Headlines' or 'Signature' are in one way or another versions of foreign programmes (Ntemfack Ofegue, interviewed, 15/3/88).

This summarises the prevalent situation in CTV. Locally produced programmes have maintained a format and style that are largely foreign. Given that TV is new in Cameroon, the broadcasters believe it perfectly normal to borrow from elsewhere. 'Cameroon did not start TV, why should it digress from the normal practice?', so the broadcasters reasoned. The formats are questioned neither by the government nor the broadcasters. The latter make no secret of the fact that such and such a programme or presenter seen in Canadian, US, French or British TV, have inspired them in this or that way, for this or that purpose. There are no restrictions by management on the cultural content and quality of what is presented. Unlike in politics, the broadcasters have not been pressured to reassert and respect the cultural context in which they operate.

Consequently, they have found no reason to question beliefs and practices which do not really seem to bother their 'paymaster', the government. This accounts for the abundance of what Katz has termed the "stop-watch culture" (1977:113-120), or the tendency to conceive, produce and schedule programmes following Western examples (Katz, 1977:114; Head, 1977; Golding, 1977:295-300; Katz et al., 1978; Golding et al., 1979; Tunstall, 1977:5; Boyd-Barrett, 1982; Haque, 1984:150). They find a great need to respect the international norms as regards the length of programmes, partly in order to avoid problems of programme exchange with fellow URTNA member countries. Thus it is important to make a documentary 13, 26, and 52 minutes long or there abouts. Even when it is suggested that these lengths were devised in order to provide for advertising in commercially funded stations, they still see adherence to these time limits to be crucial.

Unless otherwise made impossible by technical hiccups or urgent political news from or by the President (speeches, decrees or appointments), the broadcasters would ideally like the news to last exactly for the scheduled time: 15, 20 or 30 minutes. The editors ideally want the news to start and end
on time, and insist that reporters respect the time limits set out for them. Thus, for instance, during the 28th ordinary assembly of URTNA in Yaoundé in January 1988, the editor in chief of CTV called upon his news team to be at their best, and to respect time above everything else. It was "a golden opportunity for CTV" and he wanted them to ensure that the news started at 8.30 pm (just as scheduled), and not a second later. Reports are precise to the second, and early editing is emphasised in order to ensure that they are not a second longer.

Generally, the length of programmes should be precise to the second. In CTV, for example, Wednesday January 6, Memouna's programme on the mountain dwellers of northern Cameroon ('Les Montagnard du Nord Cameroun') had a problem getting scheduled before or during the Agro-Pastoral Show in Maroua, because it was 31 minutes 47 seconds long. It was only saved by the fact that it dealt with the Far North Province, host of the show. On the same day during the News Conference, another programme was only included in that morning's special schedule, after an assurance that it respected the time limits for a documentary. When the editor in chief asked over the phone: "ça dure combien de minutes?", and was told "26 minutes", he replied "that's okay" (ça va), and the programme was scheduled. At the news conference of Monday January 25, Charles Ndichia raised the question whether a programme on "philanthrophic organisations" which he had produced out of his own initiative could be scheduled. The editor's immediate reaction was to ask for the length, and when he heard the programme was exactly 30 minutes, he said there would be no problem having it scheduled.

Another explanation given for keeping programmes within their conventional lengths is that this prevents the audience getting bored. A reason which is rather strange within the Cameroonian context where audience studies are almost nonexistent, and where the interests of the audiences are hardly ever taken into account when decisions are made. It is evident that these media concepts have simply been picked up during theoretical courses in school, or from alter egos elsewhere in France, Britain, the USA and Canada. This is more the case since only one audience study has been carried out on CTV: a public opinion poll commissioned by President Biya in April 1985, but the results of which had to be sent to France for analysis by the Paris-based Marcomer-Gallup International. This was done probably because Cameroon lacks competent personnel, equipment or both; or because of lack of faith in Cameroonian academics and researchers. Whatever the reason, the level of dependence in this area is no different from that in the early 1960s when
Cameroon turned to French experts from OCORA to carry out studies on Radio Garoua and its role in nation-building (Ahidjo, 1980:303-4).

However, the broadcasters believe that given Cameroon’s uniqueness as a bilingual state, Cameroonian radio and TV can never be exactly the same as elsewhere. The bilingual nature of the programme schedules both at RDC and CTV were singled out as a symbol of this uniqueness. During this study CTV broadcasters repeatedly referred to the 8.30 pm bilingual newscast as a unique experience in the world of TV. "Where else have you seen that?", they would ask. But that symbol of uniqueness ceased to be when the single bilingual bulletin was replaced by a 7.30 pm and 8.30 pm bulletin in French and English respectively when CRTV became operational.

Finally, trained in the West or according to Western media traditions, the Cameroonian broadcasters also tend to be more sympathetic with Western news agencies or sources. Asked how they selected their foreign news items from the dispatches they received daily, the RDC news team thought that Western agencies such as AFP were much more reliable than Eastern bloc ones such as TASS. "Tass doesn’t give you straightforward news. You take their news and it contains all the propaganda. So you have to select the news from the propaganda. That is why many people don’t use it" (Kenneth Asobo, interviewed, 19/3/88).

It does not imply that AFP or Reuters are necessarily "sufficiently furnishing", argues George Tanni (interviewed, 2/1/88); but rather that the Cameroonian broadcasters are ideologically more sympathetic with Western than Eastern media practices. He admits that because of the "conflict between the two blocs, very many things that come from the Soviet Union in the way of news tend to have an ideological angle of approach, which I think the authorities see as contradictory to the government’s information policy." Yet the government is supposedly nonaligned, and subscribes to TASS and XINHUA in

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3 CTV had no teletex machines during my fieldwork, although there were plans to have some installed. However, satellite pictures were received each day from two foreign news services. For the daily purchase of ten minutes of foreign news items from the London-based VISNEWS, CTV must budget over 300 million CFA Francs annually. A similar accord exists with Radio-France Outres-Mer (RFO) for news stories in French. But although CTV does not pay for what it receives from RFO, those come already commented by French TV journalists, because they are initially produced for local TV channels in France. Visnews dispatches are sent separately and not incorporated into the pictures; its pictures are also more varied than pictures from RFO which are mostly about internal happenings in France.
addition to AFP and Reuters, as a sign of its nonalignment. Camnews pays heavily for all the foreign news it receives; news which is only selectively used because Cameroon is not as nonaligned as it claims.

From the above attitudes, it could be said that the sympathy for Western news agencies is more ideological than the result of any proven absence of propaganda in Western treatment of news. The very RDC journalists have accused Reuters and AFP of being biased in their treatment of Cameroon and Africa. However, their preference for Western news sources, can in a way be seen as sympathy for Western propaganda. Their outlook in general, reveals the not always perceivable yet tremendous power of socialisation into specific ideological camps (see Gareau, 1987). How could journalists in a country which for long was colonised by Western powers, and whose leaders chose to maintain strong ties with the West, be expected to think otherwise about TASS and AFP? But even if such journalists were critical enough to actually question AFP and other Western agencies, presenting them as being just as propagandist as TASS, the policies of the broadcast institutions where they work, are carefully and not always wittingly elaborated with a bias for Western models and outlooks; and it would be risky for the journalists to go against such so-called "independent" national media policies.

III.) FOREIGN PROGRAMMES IN RDC AND CTV

The second aspect of foreign cultural involvement is the proportion of foreign programmes in RDC and CTV. Again, the argument is that broadcasting for nation-building as a "supreme mission" cannot be attained if RDC and CTV programmes are not well thought out, culturally relevant and plural in content, or if the broadcast media are dominated by foreign programmes, produced neither with the Cameroonian public in mind nor in accordance with perspectives that reflect their context, realities and objectives. In order to determine this aspect of foreign cultural presence, I carried out an analysis of the programme schedules just as described in section III of chapter eight. Also analysed were records of foreign programmable items received in RDC and CTV. In both cases the categories used are identical to those given in chapter eight.

A) Foreign Programmes in RDC

In chapter eight we discovered that 10 (3%) out of 372 items, 5 (1%) out of 368, 6 (1%) out of 404, and 2 (1%) out of 368 items, scheduled each week at the National Station, Radios Garoua, Buea and Bamenda respectively,
are foreign. We explained the low percentages with the fact that most of what is received from abroad is either incorporated into local programmes, or used to produce new programmes with local titles. Our analyses of recorded foreign programmable items validate this explanation.

The register analysed, contained a recording of foreign programmes received from the beginning of 1986 to November 1987. No records were available for programmes received before this period. As the Chief of Bureau for Programme Exchange (interviewed, 23/2/88) confessed, RDC is very poor at keeping records. The registration ended in November 1987 not because foreign programmes ceased to arrive, but simply because he was away on holiday and no one else would keep the records in his place. However, on the basis of what records were available, a total of 660 programmable items were received from nine foreign sources within that period: 217 (32.9%) in 1986 and 443 (67.1%) in 1987. Table XIII gives the nine foreign sources, which apart from the UNO are all Western countries. Although included in the records, no items seemed to have come from the Soviet Union.

**TABLE XIII**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>VALUE LABEL</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
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<th>PERCENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>99.4</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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**TOTAL** 660 100.0 100.0 100.0

Amongst the nine sources France provided the highest number of items 390 (59.1%), followed by the UNO 69 (10.5%), the USA 65 (9.8%), West Germany 64 (9.7%), Britain 24 (3.6%), Sweden 19 (2.9%), Holland 13 (2.0%), Belgium 12 (1.8%), and Canada 4 (0.6%). The lead by France is by no means coincidental, but the consequence of the cultural conventions signed with the Cameroonian
Following the conventions of 1960 and 1963 for example, France was to supply RDC with programmes and technical assistance. Anxious to maintain its cultural influence, and in line with the terms of the agreement, France has dominated the scene of foreign involvement with RDC ever since. In 1974 the cultural convention was further revised. While that of 1960 insisted that both signatory countries should each export and propagate its culture, the 1974 convention was to lay more emphasis on 'cultural cooperation', meaning that France was to help Cameroon discover its own culture (Ndasi, 1983:13). But these pledges have remained on paper, as French cultural products continue to dominate the scene.

Stokke (Gibbons, 1974:111-12; Golding, 1977:299) estimates that France (through SORAFON, OCORA and ORTF) provided francophone African radio stations with a yearly total of 18,000 hours of radio programmes between 1960 and 1970; and that in 1970 alone, ORTF made available to Africa thousands of news items by short-wave, materials for reference libraries, packaged programmes, 90 hours of TV "film magazine" material, and 500 hours of French TV programmes, as well as helped in the co-production of 13 documentaries (Gibbons, 1974:112). The number of French-made radio programmes sent by RFI to RDC and other francophone radio services has continued to grow. According to Eone (1986:191-7), programmes broadcast directly from Paris and recorded and rebroadcast in over 45 francophone territories worldwide, totaled: 19,573 hours in 1981, 21,368 hours in 1982, and 22,200 hours in 1983. The programmes are all aimed at promoting French cultural interests. He is not only critical of the fact that this cooperation agreement is entirely one-directional, but also sees in it a clear failure by Cameroon and other francophone states to become truly independent.

To Eone cultural cooperation like that between RFI and RDC, is just like colonisation in providing France with the opportunity it needs to carry out its 'mission civilisatrice', which consists of the dissemination of French culture and language. Worst of all is the fact that RFI packages the same programmes to be broadcast in different overseas countries, irrespective of cultural, political, social, historical and geographical differences; a clear indication that France is interested in spreading its ideologies than cooperating with Cameroon in matters of radio broadcasting.

France's definition of 'cultural cooperation' is too selfish to be
mutually beneficial (Ndasi, 1983:11-15; Nyaamjoh, 1988/89:81-2). Although in 1982 France (through Jack Lang its Minister of Culture, and through its media), decried "financial and intellectual imperialism" by American multinationals, and despite its appeal for all peoples and governments to carry out a "genuine cultural resistance" against any such domination (Mattelart et al., 1984:14-18), it has continued to flood Cameroon and other African countries with its programmes, as if to say the only form of cultural imperialism possible is Anglo-Saxon in origin.

Table XIV shows the categorisation of foreign items according to different programme types. Accordingly, music and light entertainment had the highest number of items 214 (32.4%), followed by documentaries 184 (27.9%), news and current affairs 98 (14.8%), series and serials 96 (14.5%), and drama 21 (3.2%). There were 47 (7.1%) uncategorised programmes, because the records were not sufficiently informative in their regard. The preponderance of entertainment material is not very conducive to Cameroon's nation-building objectives; a situation which is further aggravated by the fact that the documentaries, educative though they might be, are not particularly relevant to the majority of Cameroonians faced with more pressing national issues.

When origin was crosstabulated by programme type, the following findings were made:
- all 69 items provided by the UNO fell under news and current affairs, of which it had the highest number;
- France had the highest number of items under the documentary (111), series...
and serials (80), drama (19) and music & light entertainment (147) categories; but it had provided very little in terms of news and current affairs (2). Table 16 in Eone (1986:193) confirms this finding. Also, France was the only source to have programmes in every category:
- Britain had items in every category except drama, which RDC stopped having when the BBC started demanding payment for its African Play series. Unlike France, more documentaries (14) and news and current affairs (7) were provided by Britain than was music and light entertainment;
- West Germany provided everything else but news and current affairs and drama, with documentaries (23) topping the list, followed by music & light entertainment (21), and series and serials (14);
- Sweden provided documentaries (8) and news and current affairs (3);
- Belgium provided documentaries (8), news and current affairs (3), and music & light entertainment (1);
- Holland provided documentaries (5), drama (2) and music & light entertainment (6);
- The USA provided documentaries (15), news and current affairs (12) and music & light entertainment (36); making it the second biggest supplier of the latter.
- Canada supplied news and current affairs (2), and music and light entertainment (2). For a crosstabulation of language by type, see Table XVI.

As Table XV reveals, the irrelevance of the foreign programmes is further compounded by the fact that every single item received is either in French or English, languages which 85% of Cameroonians can hardly speak or write correctly, and which very few can understand with little difficulty.

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<th>LANGUAGE</th>
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<td>VALID</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VALID CASES 644 MISSING CASES 16
Following Table XV, there are 487 (73.8%) items in the French language, more than double the number of items in the English language which totaled 157 (23.8%). The unclassified items totaled 16 (2.4%). The high percentage of items in French can be explained by the fact that far more programmes are received from RFI than any other radio service, and also by the fact that almost every programme sent to RDC from France is in French. France has a policy of promoting the French language abroad; it feels threatened by English, and does its utmost to protect the 250 million French speakers all over the world. For this reason, RFI broadcasts to francophone Africa exclusively in French; quite unlike the BBC which also broadcasts to its former colonies in Hausa, Swahili and Somali, in addition to English (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:82). Technical improvements in RFI (Gaillard, 1986:65; Africascope, 1985:250) have not resulted in France changing its language policy towards francophone Africa.

Although RFI broadcasts a weekly total of 871 hours, and although it is ranked eighth in the World, after the Soviet Union, China, the USA, Great Britain, West Germany, Albania and East Germany (Gaillard, 1986:65), it has the least number of different language services. In fact, amongst the 25 leading international broadcasters in the world, RFI is third to the last in terms of the different languages offered. Unlike the BBC which offers 38 different language services in 743 hours per week, RFI can only afford 6/7 different languages, and for more than half the time (Wasburn, 1985:34; Africascope, 1985:250).

Thus, "whereas Britain is prepared to seize the opportunity to spread its values and culture even in the language of the recipient country, France is adamant in thinking that the French culture can only be propagated in the French language" (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:82). In fact, unlike all the other suppliers of foreign programmes to RDC, France is the only one that does so exclusively in one language (Antoine Ntchao, interviewed, 23/2/88). Perhaps it is because France, like Michèle Cotta, Director General of RFI in 1982, has never stopped regarding French as the "universal language of poetry ... eternal language of cultures" (Ndasi, 1983:11). A view which francophone African states have accepted to the point where they are actually more concerned with "the quality of French spoken on radio and television", than with the promotion of their own national languages (A.I.P.L.F., 1987:46). As Gibbons remarked in 1974, the highest qualification francophone African broadcaster can earn, was and still is "perfect mastery of classical French" (1974:108).
Finally, in addition to supplying programmes produced exclusively abroad, some countries undertake joint productions with RDC. An example would be the programme on a regional development authority known as MIDENO, produced by the Voice of Germany in collaboration with Radio Bamenda, which benefitted from some of the equipment left behind after the production (John Ndahne, interviewed, 25 & 28/3/88). Another example is "Decouverte '87", jointly organised in Yaounde by RDC and RFI (See Cameroon Tribune (daily) 30/11/1987 & 1/12/1987; (bi-weekly) 1/12/87). This particular co-production which took place in November 1987, involved the broadcast of certain RFI programmes (Déclic, Canal Tropical, Carré d'As, Taxi-Brousse, Plein Cap and Livre d'Or) by Espace France International, a special RFI mobile studio brought to Yaounde for the purpose. No RDC programme was co-produced as such; instead, the programme schedule was disrupted in order to create space for the abovementioned RFI programmes to be broadcast by French journalists assisted by Cameroonians. Everything culminated in two galas at the Conference Centre - an 'official' and a 'popular' one, during which Cameroonian musicians performed and were recorded.
The whole project was estimated to cost Cameroon not less than 10 million F CFA, and was greatly hailed by the authorities who treated it as an example of 'genuine' cooperation between "a radio of the North and one of a country of the South" (see report by Mbajum). Accordingly, Cameroonian music abroad in RFI would help to promote the country's image and culture. Again, while RFI was promoting French culture through its programmes, and encouraging the use of the French language by giving the 'Livre d'Or' to Jean-Marc Ela - a francophone Cameroonian writer, RDC could only contribute airtime, music, and in sharing the expenses; as though to say that all Cameroon has as culture is music, most of which is after all in French (see report titled Gala Decouvertes 87).

B) Foreign Programmes in CTV

CTV did not start keeping records of programmes received until 1986, even though TV broadcasting first started tentatively in March 1985 and systematically in December of the same year. The reason, as we have seen, was the failure to structure and organise TV early enough. Despite the absence of records, interviews and early studies by students of ASMAC/ESSTI have provided us with an idea of programming before 1986. It has been argued that because Cameroon failed to train its own TV personnel in time, it was forced to rely heavily on foreign programmes (Nkaa, 1986; Nyamnjoh, 1988). Starting off with hardly any programmes of its own, CTV found itself broadcasting mainly political ceremonies, and relying on foreign sources for over 90% of its programmes. Between 23 December 1985 and December 1986, CTV had a bare two-day week of broadcast - Saturdays and Sundays; then it started broadcasting on Thursdays and Fridays as well, and followed the four-day week until January 1988. But all along, the programmes were hardly enough to fill its original schedule. The consequence was more cheap foreign programmes, more repeats, and more coverage of political activities.

According to Nkaa (1986:55), Cameroonians did not appreciate a lot of what was offered during the first year of TV. They criticised CTV programmes for being alienating. The examples given were the sports programmes, films, series and serials which were almost entirely foreign. Concerning sports, while appreciating the effort CTV made to cover the world cup and the African nations cup in Mexico and Egypt respectively, some Cameroonians were critical of the fact that CTV sometimes spent hours showing football championships in France and West Germany to a Cameroonian audience who would prefer their own local championships that were seldom covered. About the films, series and serials which were of French preponderance, some members
of the public were equally critical. They claimed these were too boring to be appreciated by the French themselves. The major contention however, was that more programmes of greater relevance to Cameroon should be produced.

In January 1988 CTV further increased its broadcast week to five days, by including Wednesday. Questioned on the change, broadcasters were sceptical, albeit they understood the political importance of a longer broadcast week. It was politically important to 'please' the public with more TV, be it professionally feasible or not. They were not responsible for the change, which was simply communicated to them from above.

The analysis which follows was intended to establish the exact level of foreign involvement with programmes in CTV. The statistics are based on programmes received and recorded from 1986 to May 1988. Each element recorded was counted as one programme, although in reality it could be part of a series or serial with many episodes (e.g. "Dynasty", "Partners" "Only Fools and Horses", "Richard III", "Yes Prime Minister", "The Africans", "Follow me", "River Journeys", "Château Vallons", "Virginia", "Isaura", "Vacances à Venise", "Sérieux Comme le plaisir", "Pas si Méchant que ça", "mort d'un pourri", "le toubib", "les oies sauvages", "la chair de l'orchidée", "le gitan", "le train", "espionne et tais-toi", "le prix du danger", etc.) or a complete programme in itself (such as the documentaries, films, musical concerts, etc.). The analysis involved the same categories used earlier above and in chapter eight.

The following findings were made: A total of 1920 programmable items was recorded from 1986 to May 1988, and according to the proportions shown in Table XVII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>LABEL</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
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<th>PERCENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td>591</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>65.2</td>
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<td>95.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VALID CASES</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>MISS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table XVII it is apparent that in 1987 CTV recorded more than twice as many programmable items as it did in 1986. In 1987 TV was in its second year; not only were local efforts being made to live up to the challenges of the new medium, but Cameroon increasingly turned to external sources for programmes. The 4.1% of 1988 is perfectly understandable since the figures are for the first four months of the year only.

### TABLE XVIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE LABEL</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
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<th>PERCENT</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
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<td>484</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>86.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>91.9</td>
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<td>.3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>23</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URTNA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table XVIII indicates, programmes were received and recorded from 16 different countries, and from URTNA and the UNO as well. It reveals that the highest number of programmable items 532 (27.7%) was provided by France. West Germany came second 484 (25.2%), Cameroon third 378 (19.7%) and Britain fourth 270 (14.1%), out of a total of 18 suppliers. The fact that Cameroon occupies only a modest third position amongst the suppliers of programmes to its own TV, is further indication of how unprepared it was, and of how strong
the foreign influence is: supplying only 19.7% of all programmes recorded, is far short of the 80% target the government bureaucratically set itself. We have already noted how during the first year of broadcast, more than 90% of programmes presented were foreign.

When we bear in mind that France (through Thomson-CSF-SODETEG) and West Germany (through Siemens) were largely responsible for the realisation of TV in Cameroon, we can understand why they contributed most, of all the foreign suppliers. The link between technological and cultural involvement is well established; where the one is present, the other tends to follow. The cooperation agreement signed on August 22 1985 with the government of West Germany to help in the training of TV producers, was a direct consequence of an earlier contract with Siemens of West Germany. It was a cultural follow-up to West Germany's economic presence in the country; and ensured that thenceforth, Cameroon would have to rely on German technology, expertise, and cultural products. Today Transtel of West Germany is a major supplier of programmes to CTV, which pays it about 4 million F CFA for 300 hours of programmes. Unlike French, each West German programme comes in both French and English.

France expected Cameroon to follow up its contract with Thomson by signing a cultural agreement as well. Instead in 1985 the Cameroonian government signed a co-production agreement with Belgavox of Belgium. France's dissatisfaction was boundless, and resulted in open pressure. Cameroon was forced to change, as President Biya later cancelled the agreement in favour of another with Société Française de Production (SFP). Dissatisfied, the Belgians complained that economic, diplomatic and political pressure was brought to bear on the Cameroon authorities by France. They threatened to take the matter to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. But as Nkaa (1986:61) reports, Cameroon was ready to compensate the Belgians financially and to settle the matter peacefully. Before the intervention by France, Belgavox had already helped in the production of 29 documentaries and a sports programme locally with CTV.

Once more France was successful in stalking a cultural place for itself. It was going to dominate CTV just as it had done RDC since independence. For instead of helping in the production of local programmes, SFP specialises in furnishing CTV with foreign programmes, mainly French. However, the pervasive French presence here is not exactly the same as in RDC, in that not all programmes received from France are French. In fact, American,
Canadian, and Brazilian programmes are not acquired directly from their various countries, but through French firms or agencies. Canadian programmes, although produced by Multimedia, are not purchased directly but through SFP and France Media International (FMI) of France.

Deeply fearful of the fact that English might replace French as the main language of Cameroon and other francophone regions of Africa, France has become increasingly active in "international television program sales and in foreign television and cable operations" (Boyd, 1984:380). It has also made it very difficult for programme producers in America, Europe and elsewhere to sell their programmes directly to francophone states. "Rather, they must sell the programs first to the French, who then dub them for resale to Francophone nations" (Cantor et al., 1986:517). The consequence is that France succeeds in making these programmes both more expensive and seemingly French. By opting for dubbing instead of subtitling, "France succeeds in giving the programmes a French 'colouring'; that is to say, they 'de-Americanise' and 'frenchify' the programmes", thus safeguarding French language and culture (Nyamnjoh, 1988/89:91).

The CTV experience is a good illustration of all we have said about France. Marc Omboui (interviewed, 7/1/88) the person in charge of foreign programmes in CTV, recounted the difficulties he faced trying to obtain American programmes directly from American producers. At first he thought the Americans did not have confidence in Africans, hardly was he aware of the French connection in his difficulties. He related his experience as follows:

I think Americans don’t have confidence in us, in Africans. Maybe they had a problem with a TV station in Africa; because we were in a TV programme market in France, Cannes - one of the biggest TV markets in France - in Côte D’Azur. We met producers; there were so many American producers, Australian producers, so many people - Japanese, everybody was there.

We tried to meet these people, but we noticed something. They didn’t want to deal with us directly. We were telling them that we are a new TV station in Cameroon. ‘Yes, it’s nice,’ they said. But when we asked them if we could deal with them, they would say, ‘If you want to start dealing with us, go and see such and such a man in France who is in charge of Africa. So we were a little disappointed. That’s why we have to get American programmes such as Partners, Roots, Dynasty . . . through France, dubbed or original (Marc Omboui, interviewed, 7/1/88).

There are many examples of ‘frenchification’ of programmes produced in America, Brazil, Britain, Canada, and elsewhere. At the beginning of 1988, the management of CTV readily accepted a proposal from HAVAS (a French
advertising agency), to advertise Nescafé in exchange for "Dynasty" which was dubbed in French. Talking about the arrangement on the eve of the commencement of the series on CTV, Marc Ombouï, said:

We are not going to pay for Dynasty. Havas will give us an advert which we will insert before and after each episode. We'll have it free. This is an advantage for us .... We don't have enough money to buy programmes. If a programme could be given to us like that, with adverts before and at the end, that's okay. I would say that we are even negotiating with the same agency to give us another series, a cartoon; and we are trying to see if we could have the African Football Cup matches in Morocco in March, free, in exchange for adverts (Marc Ombouï, interviewed, 7/1/88).

In the case of "Dynasty" the French are doubly successful; they succeed in selling Nescafé to the detriment of Café Camerounais, and also in promoting the French language and cultural interests, at the expense of English and the American culture. Few are the Cameroonians who think that "Dynasty" is not French. The latter argument also applies to "Isaura" and "Virginia", two Brazilian series, produced by TV Globo, but impossible to obtain directly except through France and dubbed in French. Even if Marc Ombouï is right when he claims that FMI is quite considerate in its prices, and that it sometimes supplies CTV with "about 200 hours of programmes" free of charge, dubbing does not appear to be the right option for a country that claims to be bilingual. Subtitling is not only cheaper, but is definitely more convenient in a supposedly bilingual Cameroon.

(1) Programme types supplied in CTV

As Table XIX indicates, of the 1920 items recorded: documentaries were highest 781 (40.7%), followed by Series and serials 447 (23.3%), sports 184 (9.6%) and film 171 (8.9%); while drama, music and light entertainment, children's programmes, and news and current affairs came last in the same order. The high number of documentaries is largely accounted for by local productions, which tend to take the form of documentaries.

When programmes were crosstabulated with suppliers, it was noted that:

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4 It has been acknowledged that when "Dallas" was introduced in English at the end of 1988, francophone Cameroonians, used to having many series and serials dubbed in French, wrote complaining about the language, unable to understand why unlike a similar and preceding series - "Dynasty", "Dallas" should be presented in English. This incident, minor though it might seem, is actually indicative of how France's policy of dubbing instead of subtitling can help reinforce feelings of complacency amongst francophones, further frustrate anglophones, and impair the process of bilingualism.
### TABLE XIX
Types of programmes in CTV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE LABEL</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
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<th>PERCENT CUM</th>
<th>PERCENT CUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Documentary</td>
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<td>40.7</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 1920 100.0 100.0

**VALID CASES** 1917  **MISSING CASES** 3

1.) No news, series, children's programmes or films were recorded from Cameroon. The absence of news can be explained by the fact that it is an instant production for instant consumption. The absence of series, serials and films points to the lack of any serious production, and reiterates the country's unpreparedness for TV. But given that CTV spends not less than 250,000 F CFA on each foreign film, and that one such film could cost about 1,500,000 F CFA (Marc Omboi, interviewed, 7/1/88), there is no reason why the money used in acquiring 171 foreign films could not be used to produce or acquire local films. In chapter eight we noted that not more than one local film was scheduled in three years; albeit there are over 60 films by Cameroonians. Despite the absence of series, children's programmes and films, Cameroon had 361 (95.5%) documentaries, 13 (3.4%) music and light entertainment, 2 (.5%) sports and 2 (.5%) drama;

2.) France was the only country to have provided programmes in every category, with the series and serials having the largest number of items (201), and news and current affairs, the least (1). It was the leading supplier of series and serials (201), drama (8), children's programmes (52), films (118) and music and light entertainment (41); and the third largest supplier of documentaries with 78 items, after West Germany (249) and Cameroon (361). Finally, in sports, France was third 33, after Britain (37) and West Germany (107);
3.) No drama, children's programmes, films or music and light entertainment were recorded from Britain, and that it had the highest number of news and current affairs items. It had altogether 44 (16.3%) documentaries, 113 (41.9%) news and current affairs, 76 (28.1%) series and serials, and 37 (13.7%) sports. Britain had the highest supply of news items, was the second largest supplier of sports, and the third largest supplier of series and serials after West Germany (88) and France (201);

4.) No news and current affairs or drama were recorded from West Germany, who amongst all the foreign suppliers provided the highest number of documentaries (249) and of sports (107). Of the 484 items it provided were 249 (51.4%) documentaries, 88 (18.2%) series and serials, 22 (4.5%) children’s, 3 (.6%) film, 15 (3.1%) music and light entertainment and 107 (22.1%) sports. Top of the list were documentaries and sports, while at the bottom were film and music and light entertainment;

5.) Nothing but a single film item was recorded from Italy;
6.) From Switzerland only 2 documentaries and a film were recorded;
7.) 4 documentaries came from Austria;
8.) The USA had a record of 4 documentaries and 3 news items;
9.) Canada supplied 36 series and serials, 26 children’s programmes and 5 films;
10.) Japan supplied 8 documentaries, 1 children’s, 5 films and 3 sports;
11.) 5 documentaries and 1 music and light entertainment came from China;
12.) With 37 films the USSR was second only to France as the biggest supplier. In addition, 7 documentaries, 1 music and light entertainment and 2 sports came from the Soviet Union;
13.) All recorded from Cuba were 23 music and light entertainment;
14.) All recorded from Brazil were 46 series;
15.) Nothing but 1 documentary came from Egypt;
16.) Ivory Coast provided 1 documentary, 1 drama and 2 sports;
17.) URTNA sent 5 documentaries, 2 drama, 1 film and 6 music and light entertainment;
18.) UNO sent 12 documentaries and 1 news and current affairs.
C) Languages of Items

According to Table XX and a crosstabulation of supplier by language, there were almost twice as many items in French as in English. The 453 (23.6%) programmes received in both languages were mainly from Transtel, which has a rigorous bilingual policy. Thanks to such a policy, of the 484 items from West Germany, 445 (91.9%) were in both languages, and only 32 (6.6%) and 7 (1.4%) were French or English respectively. On the contrary, of 532 items received from France, 523 (98.3%) were exclusively in French, and only 9 (1.7%) in English. All 270 items received from Britain were in English, but that is because CTV deliberately buys from the BBC and Visnews, in an effort to make up for the otherwise exceedingly limited number of foreign items in English. Other foreign suppliers such as Italy, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Egypt and the Ivory Coast had their programmes all in French. URTNA had 7 items in each language, while 4 (30.8%) of the UNO's programmes were in French, as opposed to 9 (69.2%) in English. Switzerland had 2 (66.7%) items in French, and 1 (33.3%) in English. Australia had 2 programmes in each language. Finally, 226 (59.8%) of Cameroon's 378 items were in French, and 144 (38.1%) in English.

| TABLE XX |
| Languages of programmable items in ctv |
| VALID | CUM |
| VALUE LABEL | VALUE | FREQUENCY | PERCENT | PERCENT | PERCENT |
| French | 1 | 959 | 49.9 | 50.5 | 50.5 |
| English | 2 | 486 | 25.3 | 25.6 | 76.1 |
| English & French | 3 | 453 | 23.6 | 23.9 | 100.0 |
| 0 | 22 | 1.1 | MISSING |
| TOTAL | 1920 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

A crosstabulation of programmes by language provided the results in Table XXI.

Only in news and current affairs does the English language have a significant edge over French, which otherwise dominates in every other programme type. It is clear that French is the dominant language in which programmes arrive CTV, with more than 50.5% of the total number of items to itself alone; in addition to the 453 (23.9%) items in both languages. Such domination by French contradicts the government's bilingual option, and
<table>
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<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>FRCH &amp; ENG</th>
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</thead>
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<td>213 (27.3%)</td>
<td>217 (27.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News &amp; C.A</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1 (0.8%)</td>
<td>117 (99.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>281 (62.9%)</td>
<td>78 (17.4%)</td>
<td>88 (19.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12 (92.3%)</td>
<td>1 (7.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>53 (52.5%)</td>
<td>26 (25.7%)</td>
<td>22 (21.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Film</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>166 (97.1%)</td>
<td>2 (1.2%)</td>
<td>3 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music &amp; L.E</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>60 (72.3%)</td>
<td>8 (9.6%)</td>
<td>15 (18.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>35 (19.0%)</td>
<td>41 (22.3%)</td>
<td>108 (58.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1898 | 959 (50.5%) | 486 (25.6%) | 453 (23.9%) |

Missing cases = 22

TABLE XXI

Crosstabulation of type by language

Hissing cases - 22

further limits the number of Cameroonianians actually served by Television. Apart from the 82% rural majority excluded by virtue of the fact that English and French are the only languages of CTV, are those anglophone Cameroonianians who still cannot benefit enough from the medium because of the preponderance of the French language.

CTV spends much on foreign programmes. According to Mr Kapche of the Financial Control (interviewed, 25/188), it spent 108,904,450 F CFA on foreign programmes for the 1986/87 financial year. To this figure perhaps could be added the cost of having the CTV journal and programme guide Teleguide, produced in Paris. The journal which came into existence in November 1986, was first printed by SOPECAM, the national state-owned publishing company. But from October 1987 CTV's management decided to have it printed in Paris by Groupe Seprod. If the argument for changing in favour of a Paris-based printer is better quality, the constant delays and greater expenses make one doubt if the change was worth the while; moreover, printing abroad when possibilities for doing so locally exist, contradicts the very idea of self-reliance and economic development. Furthermore, it does not make sense for a country in serious economic crisis.

However, not all foreign programmes in CTV are bought; some come as gifts and others in exchange for acceptance to advertise certain products. The highest incidence of gifts is from France, followed by West Germany. For example, while the English language Desk pays dearly for news items and pictures from London-based Visnews, the French language Desk receives free
news items and pictures from France. However, the broadcasters acknowledge that the French gift is not without strings; for not only is the news from France's OFRON typically about French domestic issues, but it comes already commented by French TV journalists. Following the dismantling of ORTF in 1974, the number of French TV and radio correspondents abroad has fallen, leading to inadequate coverage of events outside France; with Latin America and South-East Asia having no correspondents at all (Mattelart et al., 1984:31-3).

The consequence is that in the name of "aid" or "cooperation", CTV and other African broadcast institutions are fed largely with French domestic news gathered by individual TV channels for local audiences in France. Such is the form that France's 'gifts' of programmes have invariably taken. In August 1976 for example, there was "a violent polemic" in Gabon when its TV dedicated several hours of broadcast to one of such gifts - tapes on French domestic politics (N'ba-Bekale, 1977:43-4). In Senegal the gifts, which take the form of "French intellectual debates and university lectures", have easy access to the broadcast media (O'Brien, 1985:191).

Although my fieldwork did not involve an audience study, it did include finding out what the broadcasters think of foreign programmes. While some found nothing at all wrong with importing them, others felt the huge sums of money spent on foreign items could be used to produce more relevant educative and informative programmes. However, even the most critical of them did not believe that it was possible to totally eliminate foreign programmes. But they accepted it with conditions. The general argument was that no TV can depend entirely on its own national programmes, and that even French and British TV import a significant number of the programmes presented; implying that if France and Britain can, what more of Cameroon.

The broadcasters argued that being aware of themselves as part of an international community, Cameroonians need to be informed about other societies, cultures and attitudes. It is for this reason that CTV has as one of its sources of revenue, gifts and assistance from friendly countries and organisations; "as long as it does not become a dumping ground for inferior or ideological programmes". The latter check is easier promised than effectively carried out, since pressures of all kinds could always push CTV into abandoning any such stance. The political scuffle that took place in 1985 between Cameroon, France and Belgium, together with the current economic crisis, are an indication that the domination of CTV by foreign programmes, especially French, might just be starting, the tip of the iceberg.
In this chapter we have discussed evidences of foreign cultural influences on Cameroonian broadcasting, by looking at broadcaster training and professional beliefs on the one hand, and at programmes on the other. Concerning training, we have examined its nature during and after colonisation, in view of establishing whether or not there has been any significant rethinking for the purpose of nation-building. During colonisation and before the creation of ESIJY (later ASMAC/ESSTI) in 1970, Cameroonians were all trained abroad at the Studio-Ecole in France, the BBC in Britain, or other training centres modeled after or similar to these. It was training founded on a foreign culture, and that endowed them with professional values and a broadcast culture which they took for granted, but which shaped their decisions, coloured their outlook, and determined the format of their programmes.

The official reason for creating ESIJY in 1970, ASMAC/ESSTI in 1982, and INATA in 1983, was to train media practitioners devoid of Western perspectives and adapted to local realities. On paper the idea was great, but in practice it has not been attained. First, by continuing to rely on the very Western experts whose influence they sort to diminish, the authorities appeared to think that Western perspectives would disappear merely through the creation of local training centres, irrespective of who teaches or what is taught.

Second, by failing to re-examine and restructure the curricula, the government has facilitated the perpetuation of so-called 'universal' media practices and the underestimation of traditional Cameroonian media values. But although the government has successfully socialised the media practitioners into respectful servants of the political system, it has failed to socialise them into propagators of the Cameroonian mainstream cultures shared by 85% of the population which is rural. Instead, the authorities appear to have taken for granted that there is nothing culturally different in the way an American or a European would conceive and deliver a programme compared to the way in which a Cameroonian would. This, from a government with a policy of national cultural renaissance, is a serious error of judgment.

It is contradictory for the government to reject what the West claims to offer in terms of "press freedom" because of political expediency and nation-building, yet decline to use a similar argument against Western
offers of "cultural synchronisation" or "the universal culture". However, the absence of pressures by the government in the domain of culture, has encouraged the perpetuation of foreign media practices, and the marginalisation of traditional Cameroonian media values. It has also discouraged the systematic exploitation of the different instruments of communication that are supposedly authentic, traditionally and ethnically meaningful within a plural and largely rural Cameroon.

The fact that the government has succeeded in the political contextualisation of the Cameroonian journalists, but has failed to do so culturally, can be seen as indicative of a lack of will for cultural change amongst the Westernised few; although given their centralisation of power, they alone have the authority to diminish the dormancy of what is truly Cameroonian in matters cultural (Fonlon, 1964). This explains why some broadcasters can afford to operate under a political system that is far from their "liberal" ideal, yet adhere to and rigorously defend so-called professional values à l'occidentale.

Although clearly influenced by Western media practices and traditions, the Cameroonian broadcasters do not exactly share the identical Western inspirations. This is accounted for by Cameroon's French and English heritages, whose cultural differences are reflected in their different media styles. Thus, although trained in the same national institute, the francophone and anglophone broadcasters do not develop a common style of presentation, but respectively model themselves after French and Anglo-Saxon broadcast institutions. Their differences in style reflect similar differences between the BBC and RFI for example, and by extension, between the British and French policies that respectively advocate guided devolution, and strong centralisation.

Finally, while locally produced programmes are coloured by beliefs and practices identifiably Western, the broadcast institutions are heavily dependent on foreign-made programmes. In RDC, foreign programmes were recorded from nine suppliers, of which France was the biggest with 59.1%. In CTV, on the other hand, programmes were supplied by eighteen sources, Cameroon inclusive. But France was still the biggest supplier 27.7%, followed by West Germany 25.2%, then Cameroon 19.7%, and Britain 14.1%. The fact that Cameroon occupies only a modest third position amongst the suppliers of programmes to its own TV is further indication of its unpreparedness for the medium, and of the strength of foreign influence. Cameroon’s 19.7% contribution falls far
short of the 80% target it allegedly set itself at the planning stage. During the first year of TV, more than 90% of programmes broadcast were foreign. The relatively low percentages of scheduled foreign programmes in RDC and CTV are explained by the fact that most of what is received from abroad is incorporated into local programmes, or used to produce new programmes with different titles.

Educative or informative though certain foreign programmes might be, the fact that these are produced neither with the Cameroonian public in mind nor in accordance with perspectives that reflect their context and realities, makes them not particularly relevant to the majority of Cameroonians who are faced with more pressing national issues. This irrelevance is further compounded by the fact that the items received are in French and English, languages which was the majority of Cameroonians cannot speak or write correctly, and which barely 15% can understand with little difficulty.

To this majority should be added the anglophone Cameroonians who still cannot benefit enough from the media because of the preponderance of the French language. Accordingly, 73.8% of foreign programmes received in RDC are in French, while only 23.8% are in English. In CTV, 50.5% of programmes recorded are in French, 25.6% in English, and 23.9% in both languages. However, as has been argued, the dominant position of French, far from being a coincidence, is a deliberate matter of policy by France, and with the collaboration of the Cameroonian authorities.

These linguistic difficulties, the marginalisation of the indigenous cultures, the failure to contextualise or free the curricula of Western perspectives, and the heavy presence of foreign programmes and attitudes, have adversely affected broadcasting for nation-building. The fact that for one reason or another 80% or more Cameroonians cannot participate in or benefit from broadcasting, diminishes the latter's potential in the process of making culture and polity congruent.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSION

This chapter recapitulates the various conclusions reached in the ten preceding chapters, considers the hypotheses in the light of these conclusions, reexamines the question of nation-building in plural peripheral societies, and provides some suggestions on how the identified constraints to broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon could be alleviated.

I.) RECAPITULATION

We set out to examine the system of broadcasting in Cameroon by looking at its history and development, policy structure, organisation and operation; as well as to discuss the factors that have influenced Cameroonian broadcasting in general. In order to provide a framework to the study, we started with three introductory chapters based on a study of relevant literature.

In the first introductory chapter, we examined related aspects of the Modernisation theory which although based exclusively on the experiences of the West, were used by certain researchers to explain nation-building in Africa and the Third World. Frustrated by its conceptual limitations and lack of contextual variations, other researchers have sought alternatives to the Modernisation theory, amongst which is the centre-periphery framework. Thus we remarked that there is no consensus of perspective amongst researchers on nation-building in Africa. However, as Gareau has argued, such consensus is not to be expected, given that social scientists and their disciplines are essentially determined by "the societies in which they are created and function", and that no matter how critical they may be, these scientists or disciplines almost always remain "apologists for their respective establishments". Social scientists he maintains, belong to and are most likely to continue as members of different "social science sects", reading mostly the books they agree with, and rejecting views basically alternative to theirs (1987:596-604).

This notwithstanding, researchers tend to agree on one thing: That Africa's attempts at nation-building for three decades have failed to succeed, and that reasons for this failure are both internal and external to the
continent, even if they may differ in the attribution of blame. While some would see internal contradictions as largely responsible for these unsuccessful attempts, others blame mostly the peripheral role of African states in the world capitalist system. However, they all recognise the importance of democracy and popular participation in the development process of any contemporary nation (irrespective of how this is defined), and stress the need for change in this direction, if Africa is to attain the goals it set itself at independence, namely: to build viable national states capable of ensuring autocentred national development.

This recognition notwithstanding, not many researchers have any practical reason for optimism about the future. Their realistic conclusions offer less hope than their theoretical alternatives to Modernisation or Westernisation. Even the African researchers inspired by the centre-periphery framework, are aware that the creation of an autonomous, democratic popular national state is not a matter for the near future. Thus despite their interesting theoretical models, these researchers are still faced with the practical problem of how African peoples of today, plagued by a chronic lack of freedom, information and prosperity, can mobilise themselves and overthrow a system sustained by a powerful minority both within and outside their countries.

Chapter two discussed the various philosophies, debates, and typologies in broadcasting, especially as these are presented in the works of researchers in the West. Although they all advocate a broadcast system that is genuinely public service, researchers differ as to the form of ownership, control or funding that best serves the public interest. The extreme philosophies of state or private monopolies both have their shortcomings, and although it is difficult to find an alternative satisfactory to all tendencies, researchers are aware of the need for a system that ensures richness and plurality in the marketplace of ideas. In any case, the diversity of options in the West is a reflection of the fact that in creating broadcast institutions in their various countries, Westerners have been guided more by their internal economic, cultural, political and social realities than by some sort of 'imposition' or 'imitation'. The debates that have often surrounded the adoption of new technologies or strategies in Western states, are further testimony to the latter's autonomy and independence.

Chapter three was interested not only in equal philosophies, debates and typologies, but also in how autonomous the developing countries have been
in choosing their broadcast systems. It was also a question of examining the successes and failures of the purposive use of broadcasting. We argued that the introduction and development of broadcasting in the developing world, have been influenced more by external than internal forces. Unlike Europe and America where internal political, socio-cultural, and economic factors were largely responsible for the sort of broadcast system initially adopted, external colonial or commercial interests mostly accounted for the situation in Africa, Asia or Latin America.

We also noted a tendency to create state monopolies and centralised broadcast systems in the developing countries; a tendency which although analogous to the colonial situation, is allegedly justified by "poverty" and "nation-building". But whatever their merits, state monopoly and centralism, the lack of cultural continuity for the masses and the dependence on Western cultural products by the powerful minority, together with the inadequate technological capacity, are amongst the major constraints to broadcasting for nation-building in the developing world.

Chapter four extrapolated from the on-going debates on nation-building in Africa or the Third World and the role of broadcasting in this connection. Applying the centre-periphery framework as an alternative to the conceptual inadequacies of the modernisation perspective, a research design was drawn up to investigate the internal and external factors influencing the development and use of broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon. Using a combination of social scientific methods (documentation, interviews, participant observation), the political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions of such influences were examined under three categories; state monopoly, centralism and dependence. Three hypotheses were adopted, namely:

1.) That Cameroonian broadcasting promotes an alien culture for the elites, and an elitist concept of traditional culture still for the elites; 2.) That in matters of broadcasting like other aspects, there is political autonomy neither for the state as a whole internationally, nor for the various localities within the state; and 3.) That Cameroonian broadcasting is characterised by dependence both at the international and local or regional levels.

In chapter five which dealt with Cameroon’s political, cultural, and economic policies and institutions, we argued that the post-colonial state has retained most of what it inherited from its European colonisers. Despite
declarations and statements emphasizing the need to reassert, authenticate or institutionalise the Cameroonian, the country is overwhelmed by its colonial heritage. Our review of policy statements and studies led us to the following conclusions:

Politically, like the rest of Africa (Goulbourne, 1987; Dunn, 1978a, 1978b; Smith, 1983, 1986; Nyong'o, 1987), the 'new elite' and their 'modern institutions' have more in common with colonial Cameroon than with the pre-colonial traditional political elite and institutions. Although the government would argue that the Cameroonian traditional political system is recognised, the role played by the local kings ('chiefs') remains as peripheral, ambiguous and ambivalent as it was under Germany, France and Britain. The fact that these traditional leaders are reduced to mere auxiliaries of the central government and party, means that for most of the time they are expected to enforce decisions taken neither with their participation nor consent. They and their people are far away from the centres of action and decision-making. Political power is firmly centralised in the hands of the Westernised few, who, by limiting the authority of the traditional leaders, have destroyed the only real link that could have kept them in touch with 80% of the people they govern.

Culturally, although the Westernised few show some awareness of a cultural problem in Cameroon, especially through their declarations and statements, they have made little concrete effort to resolve it. The academics and modern political elite have both stressed the need to revalorise the ethnic cultures overpowered by the colonial version of English and French ways of life. However, they have failed to take the initiative towards reducing the dominance of foreign cultural values, albeit they are in a position to do so. The rural people who daily live the ethnic cultures, lack the political authority to bring about change, because power is centralised in the hands of the Westernised few. Thus because the modern elite have more in common with Western ways than with ethnic Cameroonian ways, education for example, has continued in English and French, and is more about the West and its experiences than about Cameroon, local life and experiences.

Economically, Cameroon inherited a system the strong point of which was the exploitation of indigenous human and natural resources for the industrial and commercial advantage of Europe. Motivated by extreme self-interest, the colonists had invested infrastructurally only where they were sure to make the most economic gain. At independence, the Cameroonian
government adopted the policies of planned liberalism, and of self-reliant and balanced regional development, with the aim of correcting the imbalances of the past and bringing the fruits of success to everyone. The government has failed to achieve this goal; failure due largely to the lack of an active industrial location policy. It has also failed to question Cameroon’s role as provider of raw materials and cash crops whose prices are determined elsewhere, and which are of very little local utility. Finally, self-reliance as a goal has not been attained; since independence, most of the investment capital remains foreign. The lack of adequate encouragement for independent indigenous capitalists, has compounded foreign involvement and turned bureaucrats in the government and civil service into businessmen. The current economic crisis has made Cameroon even more dependent on foreign capital; the claim of being able to balance its operational budget without outside assistance was last made justifiably in 1986.

This political, cultural and economic picture, we noted, is very similar to that painted of Africa in general, which led the researchers in chapter one to conclude that nation-building as practised for three decades, has failed. Understood in relation to our hypotheses, chapter five provided a general situation of: Political centralism and inadequate participation for rural and traditional Cameroon; the marginalisation of ethnic Cameroonian cultural values by the Westernised few; and an economy that is neither developed, balanced, nor self-reliant. Thus without specific reference to broadcasting yet, and mainly from a review of available literature and policy statements, it could be said that Cameroon is dominated by foreign cultures, that it is neither self-reliant politically nor economically, and that there is very little political, cultural and economic regional autonomy, participation or self-reliance.

In chapter six we investigated the relationship between broadcasting and the state in Cameroon under the colonial administration, Presidents Ahidjo and Biya. The ownership, control and uses of the broadcast media in all three periods was examined. Through a critical review of literature on colonial broadcasting, and of the speeches, policy statements and publications on post-colonial broadcasting, and through interviews with broadcast practitioners, we were able to understand the strategies and mechanisms employed by the various governments to ensure the effective control of the broadcast media.

Under colonialism, France, just by supplying very low-powered
transmitters and minimally equipped studios, was able to achieve its objective of broadcasting for the French community – its target audience, which lived in and around the cities wherein the transmitters were installed. By ensuring that the radio staff and programmes were directly from Paris, the French were able to control the cultural contents of the broadcasts. In that way even the évolués with radio sets of their own could only be further acculturated by these contents. We noted how France’s lack of interest in the radio after the war, meant the withdrawal of staff and funds, so that it was impossible for Cameroonians to operate it in any way that could significantly jeopardise the French ‘mission civilisatrice’ in the colony.

Hence our conclusion that colonial broadcasting in francophone Cameroon was an entirely urban elitist medium used to facilitate French domination, wars and crackdown on radical nationalism. In a word, colonial broadcasting was a total state monopoly, heavily centralised, and culturally and technologically wholly dependent on France.

Independent Cameroon on the other hand came with promises of nation-building and development, and of the need for broadcasting to serve as mobilizer, informer and educator. Nation-building is as much a priority under President Biya as it was under Ahidjo his predecessor. Like the former, Ahidjo defined Cameroon’s broadcast policies in his speeches as Head of State or as Chairman of the sole party. Their policies are however similar in that while emphasizing the media’s role as disseminators of government policies, plans or messages amongst the masses, they fail to accord a place to feedback or messages originating from the masses and intended for the government, which are of no less importance. Such a forum for equal and balanced exchange is especially necessary when, thanks to Biya’s criticism of Ahidjo, the goals of the government are not always compatible with those of the governed. By calling for the creation of a national cultural orientation commission, Muna is aware of the importance of having the broadcast policies of Cameroon defined by an independent collectivity, and not simply by one individual, no matter how justifiable the individual’s claims to the custodianship of the state might be.

We compared both Presidents’ monopolisation of decision-making to that of the colonial administration, and showed in what way government involvement with broadcasting in the post-colonial state was similar to that in France and colonial Cameroon. The similarity is clearly in their excessive central control of the broadcast media. The reason behind such centralism in
both cases, is for the government to be able to appoint into positions of responsibility only those sympathetic with government stance and policies.

By placing broadcasting directly under the Ministry of Information and Culture, and by making it part of the civil service, the government has deprived the broadcasters of the "professional objectivity" they think they need to practise journalism in a plural society. The broadcasters are in a predicament; torn between acting as a government mouthpiece, and being professional journalists as they understand it. However, their predicament is more of a psychological than a day to day experience, as the government constantly employs a number of strategies to make them conform willy-nilly. Strategies which range from the "dos and don'ts" of the civil service, to the overt suppression of information, and sanctions on failure to conform: transfers, interrogations by the police, suspensions and detention without trial.

While chapter six points to the government's total ownership and rigid control of the broadcast media and practitioners, the government's position, as chapters nine and ten reveal, is not as strong as that of the French colonists, who by being able to rely on their own technology, experts and programmes, were better able to control the situation and to attain their objective of promoting French economic and cultural interests.

Chapter seven examined at a more practical level the relationship between government and the broadcast media, and dealt with some of the daily pressures exerted on the broadcast practitioners. Drawing largely from fieldwork experience, we examined the political atmosphere wherein broadcasting operates. It is one dominated by the President and members of his administration, one in which neither the traditional political elite (as discussed in chapter five) nor the rest of the plural society features significantly. Such political centralism has led to the domination of the broadcast media by the modern political elite. News is not only dominated by this group and their activities but touches on the rest of society only through them.

The President and his activities are not only capable of upsetting the normal programme schedules of RDC and CTV, but can also impose impromptu schedules at non-broadcast hours. Although the media everywhere in the world are accessible to the powerful and the socially well placed, but remarkably difficult to penetrate by the powerless poor (Head, 1963:597; Tuchman,
1978:4-5; Westergaard, 1977; Singh, 1977; Katz, 1977; Katz et al., 1978; Bashiruddin, 1979; White, 1980; Gupta, 1981; Ugboajah, 1985a; Reyes Matta, 1986, etc.), in Cameroon, as elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, the situation is different in that the broadcasters are seldom given the professional opportunity to determine accessibility. There is little evidence in support of Head's assertion that no situation can be too repressive for a journalist "to develop the professional point of view" (1963:594-8).

None of the daily pressures exerted, came from the traditional political elite or the rest of society. But there was constant interference by the members of the administration with the daily operation of the broadcast media. Even though the modern political elite can always claim their requests for greater media attention are for the good of the state, complaints by the media practitioners against these interferences belie any such claim. Moreover, as we remarked in chapter five, speeches, especially when the majority of the people are excluded from the speaking, have failed to result in the necessary political, cultural and economic changes envisaged at independence. The insistence on the dissemination of official statements and declarations, instead of the information or education necessary for the 'transformation of mentalities' is most unlikely to fulfill Cameroon's self-reliant and balanced regional development objectives. Neither would it bring about the desired cultural renaissance, when the traditional political elites who share the cultures of the rural masses, are denied participation in decision-making and access to the media.

Thus it could be argued that radio and TV are there to serve a political cause for the modern leadership, first and foremost; which accounts for the excessive attention paid to the President and his government, and for the daily pressures exerted by the latter on the practitioners. Such heavy concentration on and interference from the government and its activities mean that the broadcast media and practitioners have little time and space for anything or anyone else. Notwithstanding the fact that the government depends on mass participation in order to succeed in the "supreme mission" of nation-building. Without provisions for feedback, it is impossible for the government to know how the masses in question are reacting to its messages of nation-building and development. As Bayart aptly remarks, unless the media are allowed the political, cultural and economic autonomy they lack, their "contribution to socialisation and communication within the Cameroonian political system" is bound to remain "an illusion" (1973:61-2).
Chapter eight examined the degree of centralism in Cameroonian broadcasting. Looking at four different aspects, namely: (i) the creation and distribution of broadcast facilities, (ii) the process of decision-making, (iii) the contents of programmes, and (iv) the languages of broadcast, we noted (as in the summary conclusions) that: (a) Radio and TV facilities in Cameroon are entirely urban-centred, and that the broadcast media are plagued with technical difficulties of all sorts; (b) Decision-making in matters of broadcasting is centralised in Yaounde, in the hands of politicians and administrators rather than the professionals; (c) Programmes are preponderantly political, in tune with the government’s idea of what is right or wrong, and that together with sports and music, the political content has usurped the time and resources that would otherwise be dedicated to culture and socio-economics in order to attain the nation-building objective; (d) While broadcasting is dominated by French and English, the former is more dominant than the latter, and that with the exception of Radio Garoua, the national languages play a most peripheral role.

This centralism has adversely affected the government’s objective to make polity and culture congruent and mobilise Cameroonians for ‘self-reliant’, ‘balanced’, ‘participative’ and ‘just’ socio-economic development. It has ensured that the government is served, but has failed to provide access or feedback from the public, especially the rural masses who constitute 80% of the population. With the lack of regional particularism and balance, the concentration in a few hands of decision-making on matters related to broadcasting, and the absence of pluralism in its content and languages, radio and TV cannot be said to be in gear with Cameroon’s nation-building ideals.

On its part chapter nine investigated the degree to which Cameroonian broadcasting depends on foreign technology and expertise, and how such dependence has affected broadcasting for nation-building. By examining broadcasting since colonialism, we noted that:

Cameroon depends entirely on foreign suppliers for the technology and equipment it needs for broadcasting. This has been the case since 1941 when radio was first introduced. Although Cameroon has been training its own technicians since independence, it still is unable to produce the broadcast facilities it needs; neither does it fully utilise its own experts in order to foster the idea of self-reliance in nation-building. Furthermore, in its dependence, Cameroon has long allowed France a monopoly, even in situations
where local companies and experts could have taken part, or where greater competition amongst foreign suppliers could have been healthier and more profitable for its development efforts. It could be argued that this is a monopoly which France does not deserve, since it has never made a secret of the fact that what matters above everything else, are French economic and cultural interests. Thus, although the French monopoly has benefitted France, it has seriously impaired broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon.

As Melone has pointed out, some mistakes can be forgiven, but there are others which are hard to forgive. Although it is common for Third World countries to turn to the developed world for the technology they lack, there is something fundamentally contradictory about a state relying on foreign technical expertise or local bureaucrats and amateurs, even though it has spent colossal sums training technicians and professionals of its own. A government which advocates autocentric development, but tolerates a pervasive foreign presence, is hardly to be taken seriously. Everything discussed in this chapter reveals a degree of foreign technological involvement that is not conducive to the nation-building objectives of "self-reliance" and "the judicious management of our limited resources", in order to ensure "balanced development" and the "equitable distribution of the fruits of progress".

Cameroon has failed to harness its technical and professional resources for its own betterment, yet as chapter ten makes clear, the authorities have never relented stressing the importance of technical education and self-reliance. With such a degree of technological dependence as discussed, one cannot realistically talk of a successful experience in nation-building. Faced with such foreign involvement, nation-building is bound to remain only a promise, a goal that successive governments state and restate, but that none ever achieves; because to attain it means to make fundamental choices, to back declarations of intent with real action. Action which for reasons discussed in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, is not so forthcoming. It is certainly this inability by present-day African states or governments to translate into practice their 'nations of intent', that has forced certain researchers (Amin, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b; Doumou, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Gabou, 1987) to question the possibility that congruence between polity and culture, as well as socio-economic development are attainable in peripheral states within the world capitalist system.

Lastly, in chapter ten we discussed evidences of foreign cultural
influences on Cameroonian broadcasting, by looking at broadcaster training and professional beliefs on the one hand, and at programmes on the other. The nature of training during and after colonisation was examined, in view of establishing whether or not there has been any significant rethinking for the purpose of nation-building. During colonisation and before the creation of ESIJY (later ASMAC/ESSTI) in 1970, Cameroonians were all trained abroad at the Studio-Ecole in France, the BBC in Britain, or other training centres modeled after or similar to these. It was training founded on a foreign culture that endowed them with professional values and a broadcast culture they took for granted, but which shaped their decisions, coloured their outlook, and determined the format of their programmes.

The official reason for creating ESIJY in 1970, ASMAC/ESSTI in 1982, and INATA in 1983, was to train media practitioners devoid of Western perspectives and adapted to local realities. On paper the idea was great, but in practice it has not been attained. First, by continuing to rely on the very Western experts whose influence they sort to diminish, the authorities appeared to think that Western perspectives would disappear merely through the creation of local training centres, irrespective of who teaches or what is taught.

Second, by failing to reexamine and restructure the curricula, the government has facilitated the perpetuation of so-called 'universal' media practices and the underestimation of traditional Cameroonian media values. But although the government has successfully socialised the media practitioners into respectful servants of the political system, it has failed to socialise them into propagators of the Cameroonian mainstream cultures shared by 80% of the population. Instead, the authorities appear to have taken for granted that there is nothing culturally different in the way an American or a European would conceive and deliver a programme compared to the way in which a Cameroonian would. This, from a government with a policy of national cultural renaissance, is a serious error of judgment.

It is contradictory for the government to reject what the West claims to offer in terms of "press freedom" because of political expediency and nation-building, yet decline to use a similar argument against Western offers of "cultural synchronisation" or "the universal culture". However, the absence of pressures by the government in the domain of culture, has encouraged the perpetuation of foreign media practices, and the marginalisation of traditional Cameroonian media values. It has also
discouraged the systematic exploitation of the different instruments of communication that are supposedly authentic, traditionally and ethnically meaningful within a plural and largely rural Cameroon.

The fact that the government has succeeded in the political contextualisation of the Cameroonian journalists, but has failed to do so culturally, can be seen as indicative of a lack of will for cultural change amongst the Westernised few; although given their centralisation of power, they alone have the authority to diminish the dormancy of what is truly Cameroonian in matters cultural (Fonlon, 1964). This explains why some broadcasters can afford to operate under a political system that is far from their "liberal" ideal, yet adhere to and rigorously defend so-called professional values à l'occidentale.

Although clearly influenced by Western media practices and traditions, the Cameroonian broadcasters do not exactly share identical Western inspirations. This is accounted for by Cameroon's French and English heritages, whose cultural differences are reflected in their different media styles. Thus, although trained in the same national institute, the francophone and anglophone broadcasters do not develop a common style of presentation, but respectively model themselves after French and Anglo-Saxon broadcast institutions. Their differences in style reflect similar differences between the BBC and RFI for example, and by extension, between the British and French policies that respectively advocate guided devolution, and strong centralisation.

While locally produced programmes are coloured by beliefs and practices identifiable with the West, the broadcast institutions are heavily dependent on foreign-made programmes. In RDC, foreign programmes were recorded from nine suppliers, of which France was the biggest with 59.1%. In CTV, on the other hand, programmes were supplied by eighteen sources, Cameroon inclusive. But France was still the biggest supplier 27.7%, followed by West Germany 25.2%, then Cameroon 19.7%. The fact that Cameroon occupies only a modest third position amongst the suppliers of programmes to its own TV is further indication of its unpreparedness for the medium, and of the strength of foreign influence. Cameroon's 19.7% contribution falls far short of the 80% target it allegedly set itself at the planning stage. During the first year of TV, more than 90% of programmes broadcast were foreign. The relatively low percentages of scheduled foreign programmes in RDC and CTV are explained by the fact that most of what is received from abroad is incorporated into local
programmes, or used to produce new programmes with different titles.

Educative or informative though certain foreign programmes might be, the fact that these are produced neither with the Cameroonian public in mind nor in accordance with perspectives that reflect their context and realities, makes them not particularly relevant to the majority of Cameroonians who are faced with more pressing national issues. This irrelevance is further compounded by the fact that the items received are in French and English, languages which the majority of Cameroonians cannot speak or write correctly, and which barely 15% can understand with little difficulty.

To this majority should be added the anglophone Cameroonians who still cannot benefit enough from the media because of the preponderance of the French language. Accordingly, 73.8% of foreign programmes received in RDC are in French, while only 23.8% are in English. In CTV, 50.5% of programmes supplied are in French, 25.6% in English, and 23.9% in both languages. However, as has been argued, the dominant position of French, far from being a coincidence, is a deliberate matter of policy by France, and with the collaboration of the Cameroonian authorities.

These linguistic difficulties, the marginalisation of the indigenous cultures, the failure to contextualise or free the curricula of Western perspectives, and the heavy presence of foreign programmes and attitudes, have adversely affected broadcasting for nation-building. The fact that for one reason or another 80% or more Cameroonians cannot participate in or benefit from broadcasting, diminishes the latter's potential in the process of making culture and polity congruent.

In the light of the above recapitulation, and the data discussed in preceding chapters, it is apparent that nation-building and broadcasting for this purpose in Cameroon are affected by internal and external political, cultural and economic factors. However, these factors discussed under the categories of state monopoly, centralism and dependence, have impeded rather than fostered the process of making culture and polity congruent and of mobilising the masses for socio-economic development that is 'balanced', 'self-reliant' and beneficial to every Cameroonian. In other words, excessive government involvement and interference, the centralisation of decision-making and broadcast facilities, the inadequate cultural and linguistic participation for rural and traditional Cameroon, and the excessive dependence on foreign technology, expertise, and culture, have greatly impaired broadcasting for
II. LINK BETWEEN FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES

The various summary-conclusions recapitulated above, have permitted us to examine the validity of our hypotheses, which, as was apparent in chapter four, complement one another.

The first hypothesis was that Cameroonian broadcasting promotes an alien culture for the elites and an elitist concept of traditional culture still for the elites. It was based on the observation in chapter one by researchers on nation-building in Africa, that the modern African political elite and intelligentsia are culturally divorced from the majority of the population. In that chapter we noted that, although the aim of nation-building is to make polity and culture congruent, the modern political elite in Africa have preferred the promotion of their minority tastes and outlooks of Western origin, to the ethnic cultures shared by the rest of the population.

Our study shows the above observation to be just as true of Cameroon, where the French and English colonial heritages shared by the Westernised few have remained dominant over the ethnic cultures of the rural majority, despite official declarations and statements of intent on the importance of the renaissance of the Cameroonian cultural heritage. The task of nation-building is rendered more difficult if not impossible by the fact that congruence is sought between polity and the minority cultures of the Westernised few, and not between polity and the majority cultures shared by 80% and more of the population. The centralisation of power and decision-making in the hands of the modern political elite, has meant that for three decades only they have had the political authority to effect change. However, the fact that this cultural renaissance has not come about, is an indication that the modern elite have clearly preferred their Western cultures to the cultures of ethnic Cameroon.

This preference for cultural values, outlooks and tastes of foreign origin by the modern elite, is well reflected in broadcasting. First, the modern authorities have reserved for themselves the right to define the broadcast policies of the state, denying participation to both the traditional political elite and the general public. The complete exclusion of the ethnic authorities (who share the cultures of the rural masses) from active participation in decision-making at the central level, coupled with the fact
that no provision is made for popular feedback in the government's expectations of the media, have made radio and TV inaccessible to the cultural needs and expectations of 80% or more Cameroonians.

In this way, French and English have been imposed as the main languages of broadcast, even though barely 15% of the population can communicate in them without difficulty. While the national languages are used only minimally by Radio Cameroon (with maximum airtimes of 26.6%, 3% and 1.6% in Radios Garoua, Buea and Bamenda respectively), they are completely excluded by Cameroon Television. Pidgin-English, a much more accessible language than French and English, is banned from being used on radio and TV.

Broadcast practitioners follow a local training programme in French and English exclusively, which although socialising them into respectful servants of the political system, has failed to socialise them into propagators of the Cameroonian mainstream cultures shared by 85% of the population which is rural. It is a training founded on foreign cultures and foreign professional values, not on the ethnic cultures of Cameroon. The curricula might question Western ideas of press freedom politically, but culturally neither the idea of textbooks written for Western societies on Western experiences nor that of the universality of Western journalistic values and practices, is critically reexamined. Thus instead of having the exigences of the ethnic cultures of Cameroon shape their professional decisions, colour their outlooks and determine the format of their programmes, these practitioners, thanks to their training, are little different in style and approach in the conception and delivery of programmes from their American and European counterparts, the supposed difference in cultural contexts notwithstanding. Trained and socialised according to Western professional values and culture, it is not surprising that in their daily practice of broadcasting the Cameroonian broadcast practitioners appear as "apologists" (Gareau, 1987) of Western lifestyles and outlooks.

With regard to programmes, few of those produced locally are cultural even in the minority sense of the term; the stress on the political and the paucity of technical facilities make it impossible for this not to be the case. Local programmes of a cultural nature such as music, are mostly modern Cameroonian pop music in either French and/or English, or at best a blend between these foreign languages and one or the other of the national languages; little traditional music in the national languages is programmed, although once in a while a glimpse of traditional dance groups might be seen
on TV welcoming the President at the airport, celebrating the National Day in the capital city, or performing at the Presidential Palace during the visit of a foreign dignitary.

Thus monopolised by a political elite whose culture is of a foreign nature, and operated by practitioners trained to excel in Western professional values and techniques, it is not the least surprising that the broadcast media are dominated by foreign media attitudes and beliefs, or that they are heavily dependent on foreign-made programmes. Nearly 80% of programmes supplied to CTV are foreign (with France, West Germany and Britain supplying 27.7%, 25.2% and 14.1% respectively), while 25 years and more as a nation-building radio have not made RDC less dependent on foreign programmes, especially French which account for almost 60% (59.1%) of all material received.

Seen in the light of the modernisation theory and centre-periphery framework both discussed in chapter one, and on which this hypothesis was based, it is apparent that in reality, despite declarations to the contrary, the cultural dimension of nation-building in Cameroon has continued to be pursued along lines similar to Western experience - that is, in accordance with the prescriptions of the modernisation theorists. In practice, the modern political elite have opted for the sort of 'participant society' or 'nation-state' prescribed by theorists of modernisation such as Lerner (1964), Deutsch (1969) and Gellner (1983). In Lerner's words, they are seeking to become "What the West is" (1964:47) or "What America is" (1964:79) in matters cultural; which involves the replacement of traditional or ethnic Cameroonian values by Western alternatives. In this connection, the Western professional values and attitudes of the broadcast practitioners, the domination of radio and TV by French and English, the marginalisation of ethnic languages and cultures, and the heavy dependence on foreign programmes, are all necessary in creating the needed "empathy" for Western cultural values.

True to the precepts of the modernisation theory therefore, the modern leaders have in practice ignored the ethnic cultures (albeit shared by the majority) in favour of what Gellner has termed "a literate high culture" (1983:95), and have used broadcasting not to facilitate congruence between polity and ethnic cultures, but between polity and Western cultures. Accepting the 'industrialised', 'urbanised', and 'literate' society as the model to pursue towards the eventual attainment of the 'participant society', has, as far as broadcasting in Cameroon is concerned, meant a bias for the literate minority in the cities or against the illiterate and rural majority. According
to the modernisation theory, it is only in suppressing traditional cultures and values in favour of Western alternatives, that Cameroon and its broadcast media can be seen to be on the "unilateral path" to the 'nation-state' or 'participant society'. The theory assumes not only that the traditional universe of ethnic Cameroon is lacking in "a rationalist and positivist spirit" (Lerner, 1964:45), but that it is necessarily "conservative" and therefore "constrictive" to the nation-building process. Accordingly, broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon has largely ignored what Deutsch, speaking of the need for Westernisation in Africa, referred to as the "old languages ... old outlook on the world and ... old tribal loyalties" of the African people (1969:73).

Thus, as far as culture is concerned. Westernisation as understood in the modernisation theory is a reality in Cameroon. But it is a reality experienced or shared by a small minority only. It is however in seeking to explain this reality (Westernisation/modernisation/nation-building), to assess its successes and failures over the past three decades, that the centre-periphery framework is seen to offer a more comprehensive tool of analysis. Thus, while the modernisation theory would attribute Cameroon's failure to unite culture and polity mainly to internal factors (illiteracy, polyethicnicity, and lack of popular participation, for example), the centre-periphery framework would look at both internal and external factors, especially the fact that the ruling minority depends heavily on cultures and values of foreign origin.

The contribution of the centre-periphery framework therefore, lies first in exposing the inadequacies of the modernisation theory, and in giving a less restrictive definition of nation-building. Defined simply as the strive to unit culture (not necessarily "Western" or "a literate high culture") and polity, nation-building in Cameroon is, it could be argued, more likely to succeed if unity is sort between polity and the ethnic cultures of the majority than between polity and the Western cultures of the minority, as attempted in vain for the past thirty years. Thus although modernisation is very much part of real life in Cameroon, the centre-periphery framework offers a more comprehensive and realistic explanation to modernisation's failure to bring about the 'nation-state' than does the modernisation theory.

The second hypothesis was that in matters of broadcasting like in other aspects, there is political autonomy neither for the state as a whole internationally, nor for the various localities within the state. Equally
inspired by the nation-building debates in chapter one, this hypothesis set out to examine in relation to Cameroon the contention by researchers of the centre-periphery persuasion, that peripheral African states within the world capitalist system are powerless and dependent vis-à-vis states of the centre, and that they are authoritarian, highly centralised, and exceedingly interventionist within their territorial boundaries.

With no access to confidential documents, the real magnitude of the external political pressures on Cameroon by states of the centre can only be inferred most of the times. In this study however, while there is evidence that France has applied the most pressures on the Cameroonian government (such as that which led the latter to revoke a co-production agreement signed with Belgavox of Belgium for one with SFP of France), there is little indication that the Cameroonian authorities would not have resisted such pressures if they really had wanted to. Instead, there is much to support our conclusion in chapters nine and ten that as an economically and culturally dependent state, Cameroon has long allowed France a monopoly, even in situations where local companies and experts could have taken part, or where greater competition amongst foreign suppliers could have been healthier and more profitable for its development efforts.

Thus although France has never made a secret of the fact that it is out to promote and defend French cultural and economic interests above everything else, and although such monopoly has benefitted France and seriously impaired broadcasting for nation-building in Cameroon, the government has done little to change the situation. If such excessive dependence is a sign of Cameroon's weakness in relation to France, there is however no indication from this study that the Cameroonian government is not responsible for the state of affairs. As Dunn (1978a, 1978b) has argued in relation to West African states, no matter how powerless Cameroon is vis-à-vis France and other Western states, its authorities owe its people the duty to act as "responsible agents" and to be accountable for their political actions.

This noted lack of political assertiveness on the part of the Cameroonian authorities in relation to their Western partners - France especially, is compounded by the internal political situation of Cameroon. Like the rest of Africa, the modern elite and institutions of politics have more in common with colonial Cameroon and the West than with the ethnic or pre-colonial traditional political elite and institutions. With the traditional rulers or kings ('chiefs') made to play very peripheral roles
within the modern political system, and with popular democratic participation excluded by a highly centralised, interventionist and repressive state, the government lacks a firm power base within that can guarantee political stability.

Consequently, the government has no alternative but to be conciliatory towards its Western partners and allies on which it counts for 'international legitimacy'. As such, the authorities cannot risk major differences of opinion and approach with their Western counterparts and allies without equally risking internal instability and their positions. In the absence of internal legitimacy (popular assent and participation), they cannot afford to lose the international legitimacy (recognition and esteem) conferred by the West.

It is in this sense that Amin talks of the power of the state in the periphery being illusory, and of the "true strong state" being "the state of the developed centre" (1987a:1-13). For, while the Cameroonian state must be strong enough vis-à-vis ethnic and other internal forces in order to guarantee the dominance of Western economic and cultural interests, it must also be weak enough to be incapable of promoting and defending indigenous economic and cultural interests vis-à-vis the West. This alone could explain the apparent compliance of the Cameroonian authorities with France's detrimental economic and cultural monopolisation of broadcasting and other economic and cultural activities in Cameroon. It would also explain the noted gap between government economic and cultural policies or declarations of intent, and what in effect is practised or realised.

The modernisation theory and the centre-periphery framework might agree on Cameroon's dependence on the West, on its highly centralised, repressive and interventionist state, and on the absence of popular democratic participation, but diverge considerably in their explanation of these phenomena. As Tussie has remarked, the modernisation theory treats "'modernising' societies as proceeding autonomously through the universal 'stages of economic growth', with the advanced nations extending a benevolent hand in the form of aid, trade, finance, technology or investment so as to reduce the time span required to reach the last stage of modernisation" (1983:3). Accordingly, this theory not only assumes that France and other advanced countries do Cameroon a great (almost selfless) favour by assisting its modernisation effort, but exempts them from blame or responsibility for any difficulties (economic or otherwise) that Cameroon might have faced in the
process of following the Western example.

In practice however, Cameroon does not always appear to behave as an autonomous state, neither is the 'hand' extended by the advanced states, always 'benevolent'. France, we have noted, has a policy of promoting and defending French economic and cultural interests regardless of Cameroon's own interests; a policy that does not exclude the exertion of overt pressure. In this regard, the modernisation theory proves itself to be wanting. The centre-periphery framework appears the more flexible of the two models. As used here, it considers neither Cameroon's 'autonomy' nor France's 'benevolence' as a given, but treats both as relative by observing what actually obtains. The reality is Cameroon's dependence and lack of assertiveness vis-à-vis its partners in the West, France especially; a dependence that is not conducive to its nation-building objective.

The third and final hypothesis was that Cameroonian broadcasting is characterised by dependence both at the international and local or regional levels. It was based on the observation by Third World communication researchers in chapter three that: Broadcasting in the developing world is dependent on Western technology and expertise, and on Western cultural products and professional values; and that either because of technical and financial difficulties or because of political control, the broadcast media tend to be urban-based and accessible mainly to the modern political elite and the intelligentsia.

Our study shows this to be largely true of Cameroon, which for three decades has depended entirely on Western sources for the broadcast technology and equipment it needs, and which, as we remarked above, has and continues to be very dependent on Western cultural professional values and programmes. Internally, we noticed that radio and TV facilities in Cameroon are entirely urban-centred, and that the broadcast media are plagued with technical difficulties of all sorts; that decision-making in matters of broadcasting is centralised in Yaoundé, in the hands of politicians and administrators rather than the professionals; that programmes are preponderantly political, in tune with the government's idea of what is right or wrong, and that together with sports and music, the political content has usurped the time and resources that would otherwise be dedicated to culture and socio-economics in order to attain the nation-building objective; and finally, that while broadcasting is dominated by French and English, the former is more dominant than the latter, and that with the exception of Radio Garoua, the national languages play a
most peripheral role.

Thus as we concluded in chapter eight, such administrative, locational, content and linguistic centralism has ensured that the government is served, but has failed to provide access or feedback from the public, especially the rural masses who constitute 80% of the population. With the lack of regional particularism and balance, the concentration in a few hands of decision-making on matters related to broadcasting, and the absence of pluralism in its content and languages, radio and TV cannot be said to be in tune with Cameroon's nation-building ideals. This conclusion reinforces the remarks made under our first two hypotheses, concerning the modernisation theory and the centre-periphery framework. Modernisation as practised for the past three decades has tended to favour dependence, centralism and state monopoly, all of which phenomena both the modernisation theory and the centre-periphery framework recognise and explain differently.

In conclusion therefore, it could be said that the situation in Cameroon is similar to that painted of Africa and the Third World in general by researchers on nation-building in chapter one and of communication in chapter three, respectively. In Cameroon the political, cultural and economic aspects of nation-building have for the past three decades been adversely affected by state monopoly, centralism and dependence; and so has broadcasting for nation-building.

Opting for modernisation à l'occidentale by the Cameroonian government and intelligentsia, has led to the marginalisation of ethnic cultural values and political institutions, and to the denial of active democratic participation for 80% and more of the population which is rural. The broadcast media have continued to be used not to unite polity with the ethnic cultures of Cameroon, but to promote congruence between polity and the minority cultures of the Westernised few. Consequently, social and psychic mobilisation seen as necessary for socio-economic development, has not been possible for 80% or more of the population to whom radio and TV have remained inaccessible, largely because facilities are urban-centred, the languages of broadcast alien, and programmes irrelevant. Clearly, this situation raises the question of the relevance of nation-building as defined by the theorists of modernisation, and expresses the need for a more suitable alternative.
For three decades Cameroon has attempted with little success to build a 'nation-state' according to the Western experience. Like others in Africa and the Third World, its post-colonial leaders have been persuaded by arguments which present the 'nation-state' as the only form of political unit "recognized" and "permitted" in "the modern world" (Smith, 1986:230; Deutsch, 1969:171-2; Wallerstein, 1964:4). We have noted how in Cameroon, the pursuit of this 'nation-state' - especially the use of broadcasting to foster a congruence of culture and polity, and to mobilise the population for socio-economic development - has been greatly impaired by excessive government involvement and interference, the centralisation of decision-making and broadcast facilities, the inadequate cultural and linguistic participation for rural and ethnic Cameroon, and the excessive dependence on foreign technology, expertise, and culture. Today, researchers are unanimous that the attempt by African states to build 'nation-states' à l'européenne have been unsuccessful. Like Seton-Watson (1977:353), Doumou has argued that the 'nation-state' concept is totally unrealistic in the African situation, and that it fails to do justice to the nation/state dichotomy that characterises African countries (1987:57). Even in Europe where the idea of the 'nation-state' first originated, very few polities are genuinely united in culture. Researchers are not unaware of this; Smith talks of the nation-state being a "Western mirage" that is "unattainable outside a few blessed regions of the earth", and argues that barely 10% of so-called 'nation-states' today are genuine (1986:229-30).

Given that in practice societies "assume all manner of shapes" (Smith, 1986:229-30), what reason have researchers to continue using the nation-state as an explanatory model? Smith maintains that "the majority of educated and politically aware men and women are committed to 'nationalism'" and that apart from the nation-state, they are "no longer really aware of any other viable mode of culture and political existence" (1986:230). But this does not justify the continuous use of the term to describe what, in fact, are multinational and multicultural societies. How can the progress of "the emerging nation-states" be measured, when not more than 10% of the world's nation-states are genuine? As Cobban argued two decades ago, "The attempt to make the culturally united nation state the one and only basis of legitimate political organisation has proved untenable" both in practice and in theory (1969:129). The concept thus tries to "reduce" rather than "reflect" the realities of various societies in the world (Abdel-Malek, 1967:250-64). In Cameroon, its application has meant that 80% and more of the population have
not only had their cultural, political and economic institutions and realities ignored or marginalised in favour of Western substitutes, but have also had to take their cues from the Westernised few, who in turn have looked to the West for inspiration. But as Deutsch aptly remarks, "a balance between theory and data" is needed "for the intellectual health and vigor of investigators in any field of knowledge" (1969:130); since, as he (1969:130-1) and Halloran (Unesco, 1970:11) have pointed out, the quality of every investigation is determined by the quality of questions asked.

Given that the nation-state is a "Western mirage", does Cameroon or Africa have any reason to pursue it? Smith admits it would be "a fruitless and destructive quest", but still thinks the mirage worth pursuing, not only because it gives them international recognition and esteem, but also because of the impossibility "of returning to a prenationalist era" or of "re-erecting those rambling, polyethnic empires of which anti-nationalists dream" (1986:230). Thus, as far as Cameroon and Africa are concerned, Smith sacrifices two real alternatives for an illusion. But the pursuit of this illusion by Cameroon and other African states, based neither on "popular assent" nor "cultural community" (Smith, 1983:125), has not met with success for three decades. Whereas the congruence of culture and polity in Europe might have been facilitated by the "predemocratic era" during which it occurred, contemporary attempts, researchers agree, can no longer be imposed from above. The recent upsurge of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and the popularity of the politics of 'tribalism' (ethnic-based) with the Westernised few in Africa (Hadjor, 1987:63-5), both attest to the fact that genuine unity or integration are not the result of an imposition by the state.

However, instead of questioning the feasibility of the "Western mirage" in their polyethnic, multicultural and multilingual countries, the post-colonial leaders in Cameroon and Africa have conducted their 'nation-building' at the expense of democratic popular participation, cultural continuity and autonomy, and economic independence and self-reliance, under states alien in origin and purpose (Seton-Watson, 1977; Dunn, 1978a, 1978b; Smith, 1983, 1986; Amin, 1987a, 1987b; Doumou, 1987; Goulbourne, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Gabou, 1987). Faced with the impossibility of this task, these leaders have imposed unity and integration from above, rather than jeopardise "the stability and integrity" of states that "have no real basis in popular assent" (Smith, 1983:128). Without popular democratic participation, nation-building has become more of an "ideology and project ...

The fact that the nation-state is an illusion, calls for possible alternatives, especially in Cameroon and Africa where its pursuit has meant the exclusion of the rural majority from political and cultural participation, and from the benefits of economic 'development'. The assumption encouraged by the Modernisation theorists, that the majority of Cameroonians or Africans are "ignorant" and "irresponsible" people needing "information" and "education" on how to "transform" their "conservative" and "constrictive" traditional societies, has resulted in an unjustifiable "superior attitude" on the part of the government and Westernised few. Unity and integration arise not through an attempt by the state to suppress ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences, but by allowing the people the freedom to live their similarities while negotiating the best way possible out of their differences. This implies neither rejecting nor legitimating certain possibilities *a priori*, but letting the people decide which form of cultural and political existence unites or integrates them best. While cultural and political participation by the populace - the peasantry in particular, might indeed jeopardise "the stability and integrity" of a state that is "alien in origin and purpose", as Smith (1983:128) has argued, it is certainly not by excluding 80% or more of the population that cultural and ethnic divisions would disappear.

Inspired by an understanding of the 'centre-periphery' relationship between the developed and developing states, some researchers (Amin, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b; Gabou, 1987; Hadjor, 1987; Doumou, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987) have recognised that as part of a world system of capitalism in which the developed countries are not only dominant but are also intent on keeping the Third World peripheral, any alternative short of total dissociation would not guarantee Cameroon and Africa the autonomy and independence needed for genuine unity, integration and development. However, while the weakness of Cameroonian and African vis-à-vis states of the centre might compound the difficulties of pursuing the "Western mirage", it does not diminish the leaders' accountability for their political actions (Dunn, 1978a, 1978b; Goulbourne, 1987; Nyong'o, 1987). As Dunn rightly points out, African leaders remain essentially "responsible agents" no matter their weakness internationally (1978b:211-16).

On the other hand, if the weakness of Cameroonian and African leaders in relation to the centre, means that the only way they can ensure
political stability is by being authoritarian and by excluding democratic popular participation, then nation-building as the search for political, economic and cultural equality for the majority of Africans with the rest of the world (Wallerstein, 1968:223-4), can only be achieved by means of a radical break with the world capitalist system; a break which would ensure the autonomy, democracy and popular participation needed for its attainment. Thus while rejecting an idea of nation-building based "on false boundaries and premises", Goulbourne (1987:43-5), Cobban (1969:124-9), Amin (1985:107), Doumou (1987:57), Gabou (1987:76-85), and Hadjor (1987:139), unlike Smith (1986), Deutsch (1969) and others, prefer democratic popular multinational states to any attempt by a minority to impose 'nation-states' on essentially plural societies. In the case of Cameroon, this entails that 'cultural renaissance' and 'popular democratic participation' for the different ethnic groups, exist not only as declarations of intent or ideological choices, but as pragmatic necessities.

IV.) A CALL FOR HARNESSED BROADCASTING IN CAMEROON

Communication researchers equally interested in nation-building in plural peripheral societies, have reached similar conclusions regarding the role of broadcasting and the other media in this connection. These researchers, mostly from Latin America, Asia and the West (Golding, 1974; Katz, 1977; Singh, 1977; Díaz Bordenave, 1977; Katz et al., 1978; Bashiruddin, 1979; White, 1980; Gupta, 1981; White et al., 1983; Hamelink, 1983b; Servaes, 1983, 1986; Sinha, 1985; Ugboajah, 1985a; Aggarwala, 1985; Lins Silva, 1986; Reyes Matta, 1986; Roncaglilo, 1986; Simpson Grinberg, 1986; etc.), have recognised the failure in the developing countries to harness broadcasting, and have called for alternative systems that are truly decentralised, participative and democratic.

Only a broadcast system that guarantees cultural continuity for the masses, ensures popular participation and horizontal communication, and that is ready to mobilise the populations for autocentric socio-economic development, in a state that is politically democratic, popular and participative, can contribute positively towards nation-building. Monopolistic tendencies (private or state) that are productive of centralism and dependence, are in principle deplored. While researchers might differ on how such a system can be attained in practice, there is no doubt as to its importance.
In what concerns Cameroon, there is a pressing need for harnessed broadcasting, given the fact that nation-building remains the "supreme mission". It is evident broadcasting has failed to attain its objective as defined by the state; and even radio which is generally taken to be the most extensive of the media, has failed to break the linguistic, cultural, social, geopolitical and economic barriers that inhibit successful communication. The technical limitations of radio as a medium are not more blameworthy for this failure than are the political decision-makers.

Applied to the Cameroonian situation, the above recommendations by researchers on communication and nation-building, would entail a broadcast system that might be state regulated, but certainly not a government mouthpiece (e.g. the BBC). This could be attained by divorcing broadcasting from direct government supervision and placing it under an independent body such as the national culture orientation commission, whose creation Muna, the former National Assembly Speaker, advocated in March 1988. But for this to be successful, there has to be real political pluralism, which once again does not necessarily imply the replacement of monopartyism with multipartyism à l'occidentale. Rather it implies that the people, especially ethnic and rural Cameroonians, be given the opportunity to participate fully in making decisions that concern them, hence the need to recognise and reinstate neglected traditional political institutions.

There is also a need for Cameroon to implement the prescriptions its political leaders and academics have made in the area of culture since independence. The need for Cameroon to reassert and authenticate itself culturally has been stated and re-stated, but followed by little concrete action. A starting point would be to review the curricula, which are principally acculturating, and to give priority to what is Cameroonian in matters cultural. To achieve this, the modern political elite would have to turn to rural or ethnic Cameroon for inspiration, for as we have observed, the Westernised few are more at ease with Western cultural values than they are with ethnic Cameroonian ones.

Equally important is the need for Cameroon to implement its policy of self-reliance. In the case of broadcasting, Cameroon would either forgo radio and TV altogether, given that it does not manufacture any of the hardware, or it would have to greatly limit its dependence. The majority of Third World countries turn elsewhere for the technology they believe to be indispensable for development, but such dependence must not be
counter-effective. In Cameroon's case, this has so far been the case. To reverse the trend, Cameroon must start having faith in its own experts, in its own cultures, and in local alternatives to expensive foreign technology. In every dealing with foreign partners, Cameroon has to understand that there is no such thing as unalloyed altruism, and must therefore act to defend its best interests. Real self-reliance would, however, demand a radical reexamination and rejection of the economic structures inherited at independence, and which have subsequently defied all attempts at government reform.

However, as fundamental structural changes in favour of viable alternatives are long-term, more immediate though temporary solutions would include:

Giving more air space to local languages at the provincial stations, while considering how Pidgin-English, Fulfulde and Ewondo could be used to free the country of its linguistic impasse. A good idea would be to offer more air space to each of these three languages at the provincial radio stations, and to create space for them in the national stations of CRTV in Yaounde. News bulletins in each of them on RDC and CTV could be a good starting point; in which case an urgent effort would have to be made to include the activities of rural and ordinary Cameroonians in the news.

The careful selection and processing of information which is relevant and answers to the special needs of the rural community, and, delivering this information in a way that fits in with the world view, rhythm of life and manière de faire of the communities concerned. This of course is difficult to achieve by one who does not share or understand the cultural values and social experiences of the communities in question; or, one who thinks that he can achieve his purpose without the active participation of the majority of people concerned. To succeed in this connection, the broadcasters and government must abandon what Head has termed, "an unconsciously superior attitude" which tends "to underestimate the native intelligence of the people, to undervalue their natural human interests" (1963:595).

Improving the living standards of Cameroonians by offering better prices for the coffee, cocoa, cotton and foodcrops produced by peasants for export and to feed the urbanites; paying well those who are employed in factories and plantations; and offering better social welfare services (hospitals, education, farm to market roads, electricity, water), so that they may not only afford radio or TV sets, but do so because they believe in the
plural and enriching qualities of the country’s broadcast media.
Research Topic:

**BROADCASTING FOR NATION-BUILDING IN CAMEROON: DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRAINTS**

**GUIDING IDEA:** NATION-BUILDING in PERIPHERAL SOCIETIES.

**Areas of investigation:** CULTURE, SOCIO-ECONOMICS, POLITICS

**BROADCASTING FOR NATION-BUILDING**

The literature indicates that the tendency in the Developing World is to broadcast for Nation-Building (i.e. the strive to unite culture and polity, and bring about socio-economic development that is beneficial to all and sundry). It also shows that in such broadcasting, emphasis is placed on:

1. **AUTONOMY**: Freedom and Independence, as opposed to Dependence.
2. **SELF-RELIANCE**: Depending on one's own resources or efforts to attain one's goals or objectives.
3. **PARTICIPATION**: The chance to share in, to be involved, to partake, to contribute towards, or to help bring about.

The literature review equally shows that if broadcasting for
Nation-Building has failed elsewhere in the developing world, it is not only because the countries concerned have been dependent on foreign states and multinational companies, but also, and often more importantly, because autonomy, self-reliance and participation have not been extended to include the whole spectrum of their various national societies. Therefore, a study of broadcasting for Nation-Building in Cameroon can only be complete, if the international and national dimensions of autonomy, self-reliance and participation are given due consideration. In doing this, I take as my starting point the premise that broadcasting for Nation-Building anywhere can only be successful if and only if:

1.) Cultural, political and economic autonomy are sought for the nation at the international level, and for different groups, regions and localities within the national society.

2.) Self-reliance is encouraged both at the international and regional or local levels. Thus at the level of the national society, self-reliance would mean a deliberate effort to produce one's own broadcast equipment, to train one's own experts and produce one's own programmes according to one's own needs and realities. At the local levels, self-reliance would mean the use of local communication systems or techniques in order to adapt broadcasting even further to the particular needs and aspirations of the various localities.

3.) While the nation would be seeking participation for itself at the international level in deciding what
The general situation should look as follows:

1.) CULTURAL AUTONOMY:

- Uphold traditional "authentic" Cameroonian values (This would normally include those values that have not resulted from colonialism.)
- Preponderance of local programmes grounded on those traditional values and the local realities, so as to appeal to the majority of people concerned. This would imply that the broadcast media be adapted to suit the traditional or folk ways of communication (those systems of communication that existed before colonial contact, and which remain the main form of communication for the 80% of the population that is rural).
- Preponderance of national languages, as opposed to those introduced during colonialism. This can be achieved by giving more airtime to programmes in the local national languages.
- Preponderance of broadcast practitioners versed...
with the local cultures, values and ways (as defined above).
- Participation by all, including
  (political/demographic) minorities. (Determined by comparing and contrasting the airtime given to various programmes for various groups (Cultural, Socio-Economic, and Political). And also by seeing the distribution of broadcast facilities in the various localities all over the country.)

**Hypothesis:** Promoting an alien culture for the elites, and an elitist concept of traditional culture, still for the elites.

2.) **Political Autonomy:**
- Preponderance of political structures that are based on the system before colonialism
  (To determine this, compare and contrast the decision-making process now and before colonialism. This could be done by looking at centralisation and delegation.)
- Preponderance of freedom to choose amongst alternatives (both internationally and regionally). Such alternatives include: technology (equipment and experts), media content, broadcasting system, etc.
- Participation for all at the central and local levels.

**Hypothesis:** Political autonomy neither for the state as a whole at the international level, nor
for the various localities within the state. The situation is that of international and national centralism.

3.) SOCIET-ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE:
- Preponderance of locally manufactured or adapted equipment (hardware and software).
- Preponderance of locally trained experts and staff, that are versed with the particular needs and concerns of those involved.
- Preponderance of horizontal communication (speaking to one another on equal terms: using common language, shared concerns, active participation - two-way communication.)

HYPOTHESIS: Dependence at both the international and local levels.

In order to determine to what degree the above criteria have been realised by broadcasting for Nation-Building in Cameroon, the following will be examined:

A.) The Cameroon Cultural, Socio-Economic, and Political policies.
B.) The Cameroon Broadcasting Policy.
C.) The ownership, operation and control of the broadcast media.
D.) The availability of broadcast facilities.
E.) The source, content and consumption of broadcast messages.
All five areas of concern could be treated under state monopoly, centralism and dependence, three phenomena which according to the literature review, affect both the process of nation-building and the role of broadcasting in its connection:

1.) **STATE MONOPOLY**: aimed at establishing the part played by the state or government in facilitating or hindering the realisation of broadcasting for Nation-Building in Cameroon.

2.) **CENTRALISM**: To determine whether decision-making, participation, content, and broadcast facilities are limited only to particular people, groups, languages, etc. or not; and with what effect.

3.) **DEPENDENCE**: To establish the part played by foreign countries and bodies in the construction, equipment and maintenance of broadcast institutions in Cameroon; as well as the part they play in limiting the attainment of cultural and political autonomy. (By looking at the proportion of foreign-made programmes, or programmes produced according to foreign formats, styles and values. Also by looking at the impact of foreign values on the practitioners - Training:— to what degree does it matter where and how one is trained?).

According to all outlined above, the following Key questions in
relation to the Nation-Building policy, and the role of broadcasting, are worth asking:

(A) What is the (Cultural, Socio-Economic, Political) Policy of Cameroon?

(i) How is this policy spelled out?
   - Written/ not written?
   - Well documented/not well documented
     (policy statements, charters, official Pub.)
   - Detailed/Sketchy
     (Exhaustive in the treatment of issues/briefly stated in general terms only)
   - Consistent/inconsistent
     (Clear & Logical/ambiguous & contradictory)

(ii) Who defines this policy? Why?
     (Blue Print determined for all by one central authority.)
   - Not Centrally: Private individuals or groups, Regional, local or provincial authorities. (At various levels and by delegation.)

(iii) How comprehensive is the policy?
   - What areas are covered/not covered.
   - Who are those involved/not involved.
   - What definitions are adopted/as opposed to
     - What does it take/fail to take into account

SOURCES OF INFORMATION: Policy statements, charters, statutes, official papers and declarations,
statistics and studies, publications of a cultural, socio-economic, or political nature that can be of relevance.

(B) What role is broadcasting expected to play?
- Included are: Radio & Television and those directly/indirectly involved with their operation.
- Are radio & TV expected to play the same/different roles? Why?
- How have the expectations been modified through the years?

(i) How is this role spelled out?
(Same set of questions or indicators as above for the cultural, socio-economic, and political policies).

(ii) Who defines this role? Why?
(Same as (ii) in (A))

(iii) How comprehensive is this role?
(Same as (iii) in (A))

(iv) Why is broadcasting expected to play this role?
- What reasons are given? From whose standpoint? To what effect?
- What is taken/not taken into account in defining the said role?

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Policy statements, charters, statutes, official papers and declarations, statistics and studies, publications on radio and television in Cameroon. At a second
level, interviews with policy-makers in
the area of broadcasting.

(C) What role does broadcasting actually play?
- To determine this, I will look at:

(i) The Broadcast Practitioner
- What personal attitudes, beliefs and prac­
tices (Professionalism);
- What organisational structures, beliefs and
practices (Institutional ideology, manage­
ment & decision-making process);
- What external factors (cultural, economic
political) (Interference/ pressures);

favour or constrain the playing of the role
expected of the broadcast practitioner and
broadcasting?

(ii) The Broadcast Message:
I will determine the Cultural, Socio-Economic,
Political:
- Origin (Source) of the messages; as
well as the type of programmes
broadcast (Educational, Informative,
entertaining)
* As classified by the broadcasters &
policy-makers, unless I find cause to
adopt an alternative system of classi­
fication.
- I will also examine the language of the
message (in view of establishing what
languages are used/not used, and to
what effect.

*This exercise will provide me with data (statistics), which will permit me to establish whether or not, as far as content is concerned, broadcasting plays the expected role.

It is also hoped that the entire exercise at this level would permit me to determine how near to/far away from the expected on the one hand, and the ideal on the other hand, is the role actually played by broadcasting? (How big is the gap between ideal and policy on the one hand, and between statement and practice on the other?)

**SOURCE OF INFORMATION:** Participant Observation and Interviews with broadcast practitioners. During this time I will compare and contrast the proportion of various contents, the sort of influences on the practitioners, etc.

(D) What evidence is there of Foreign Influences in:
(i) the way the policy is defined?
(ii) determining the role of broadcasting?
(iii) the failure of broadcasting to perform this role?
(iv) the shortcomings of broadcasting in general?

*FOREIGN INFLUENCE can be determined by looking at how DEPENDENT Cameroonian broadcasting is:

1.) **Economically on:**
   - Foreign Technology
   - Foreign Technical Assistance
2.) Politically & Culturally on:
- Foreign-made programmes
- Foreign Models: technics, styles, formats, etc.
- Foreign Training: socialisation to accept foreign media culture.
- Cooperation agreements with Foreign states and bodies: to provide programmes, Technical assistants, coopérants, offers to help train, etc.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Participant Observation and Interviews with broadcasters to establish the influence of Foreign Models, to see what proportion of staff are foreign technical assistants or coopérants. To look at documents (official publications and economic statistics, etc.) in order to establish the part played by foreign technology, technical experts and hardware.

*Need to look at Cameroon’s Information policy as a whole

The above clarifications made, the following is a more detailed look at how the phenomena of state monopoly, centralism and dependence can either facilitate or constrain the attainment of autonomy, self-reliance, and participation, which are cardinal to broadcasting for Nation-Building:

(1) STATE MONOPOLY:
I will consider a broadcast system to be a state monopoly if the state is in exclusive control of the media institutions, and the way they are operated.
To determine the level of influence on broadcasting by the state of Cameroon, I will have to examine ownership, aim, funding, and control of broadcast institutions. And discuss the implications of the situation which the exercise would reveal. It is possible that ownership and funding may not be totally by the state or government; in such a case, how are the institution's aims defined? And with what effect on Nation-Building? What are the conflicts over control in such a case? These are the sort of questions which the following exercise sets out to answer.

(a) Ownership:
- Private, Public, or Mixed?
  (i) Private - individual, groups of individuals or firms - free from direct state regulation.
  (ii) Public - State, Government, Ruling Party - direct or indirect Government regulation
  (iii) Mixed - coexistence of public and private
        (e.g. Britain's BBC and IBA)
* If public, is private ownership provided for under the law?

(b) Primary aim:
  (i) Private- commercial, profit-making (capitalist)
  (ii) Public- Educate & inform, nonprofit-making
         (Public service)

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Documentation (policy papers, charters,
statutes, official publications and declarations, studies etc.) and observation of actual practice. Is there compatibility/incompatibility between what is stated in the documents and what is actually practised? (Determined by means of interviews and participant observation)

(c) Funding (main source):
(i) Private - mainly advertisement revenue
(ii) Public - licence fees, state subsidies, government.
* What other sources of funding are available, and on what terms? If public service, what is the proportion of broadcast time given to commercials, or programmes funded by commercial interests? With what effect on broadcasting for Nation-Building? (proportion of commercials and related programmes, would show to what degree the commercial enterprises determine content.)

(d) Control:
(i) Private- Big Business (Board of directors)
What is the relationship between Board of Directors & Management?
(ii) Public- State - direct or indirect?
Direct: Is it under a Ministry of Information, culture, etc.; and/or directly responsible to the government or ruling party?
Are there competing political par-
ties or interest groups to check against direct gov’t interference? How successful are they in doing so?

**Indirect:** Is it independent of the government/ruling party? How?
- Corporation with a Board of Directors who are answerable to the state (e.g. parliament) not government.
- The political system is such that the distinction between state and government is clear, accepted, and unambiguous—because of competing political parties, for example.

*What is the implication of any form or combination of forms of control on broadcasting for Nation-Building?*

(e) **Ideology:** The literature review has tended to show that with every form of broadcasting system, goes a particular justification or ideology. As we are aware, ideologies are to do with belief systems than a reflection of what is. How is the broadcasting system that obtains in Cameroon, justified ideologically? This level of would reinforces whatever is established in the early stages of the exercise. However, it does serves as a guide for what to look for.

(1) **Private:** Consumer Sovereignty
- Free marketplace
- Freely available alternatives

*Emphasis: Plurality of Sources

(ii) Public: Social Responsibility

State Monopoly: Nation-Building
- Political stability
- National unity
- National socio-economic Development
- National Culture

*Emphasis: Singularity of source

Public Corporation: Democratic Pluralism
- Rich marketplace for ideas
- Competitive political parties
- Competing viewpoints

*Emphasis: Plurality of political content

2.) CENTRALISM:

This is the tendency to concentrate (decision-making, control, resources) in a few hands and places; as opposed to spreading out to include as many people and places as possible. In the case of broadcasting, centralism could be measured by looking at (a) The decision-making process at various levels of the broadcast institutions, (b) The distribution of broadcast facilities throughout the country (c) The content (messages), in order to determine the degree of participation by various groups of people within the national society. Centralism has to be identified at all three levels (cultural, socio-economic, Political): Cultural centralism, Socio-Economic centralism, Political centralism.
Concerning Broadcasting, centralism might be: administrative, locational, linguistic, and at the level of the content or the messages.

(i) Administrative - Aimed at measuring centralisation/devolution/delegation in the decision-making process. And showing the implications of either situation on broadcasting for Nation-Building.

What to look for:
- Under ministry?
- Are all managing directors subservient to Minister?
- How are appointments and promotions made?
- If there are provincial or regional services, how autonomous (localised) are they? (Participation, and deciding what is good for them. Not only that, but also how much do they look like/differ from the central services?
- What is the hierarchical relationship or structure that links them to the central network, and the ministry of information?

(ii) Locational - Aimed at establishing coverage of the entire territory by broadcast facilities; the distribution of broadcasting. Accessibility, so to speak.

What to look for:
- Are stations urban-centred?
- How regional are the regional stations?
- How similar in pattern are regional stations to the central or national stations?
- How is coverage and receptivity? (How developed and extensive are the telecommunication services?)

(iii) **Content** - Aimed at establishing participation, self-reliance and autonomy; that is to say, Relevance to Nation-Building, of what is broadcast. What to look for:
- How plural (politically and culturally) are the messages broadcast?
- What proportion targets the urban population and what proportion is intended for rural communities?
- Which of them are elitist, and which are for the masses? Which are for (political/demographic) minorities?
- Which are for (political/demographic) majorities?

(iv) **Linguistic** - Aimed at establishing participation, self-reliance and autonomy in a linguistically plural society. Because broadcasting for
nation-building cannot succeed in a situation of linguistic dependence, centralism or monopoly.

What to look for:
- What are the languages of the programmes?
- What proportion of the airtime is occupied by what language?
- What is the percentage of the total number of languages available in the country that are used/never used for broadcasting? etc.

To establish the impact (negative/positive) of Centralism on broadcasting for Nation-Building it would be necessary to look at the following:

(a) The Audiences/Broadcasters relationship:
- To what degree do broadcasters take account of their audiences?
- What are broadcasters more preoccupied with? – pleasing their audiences? Or avoiding the wrath of the authorities?
- How do their declarations reconcile with their actual practices?
- Are there instances of overt intervention (pressures) by the central authorities?

* (If there have been some such conflictive situations in the past, it would be worthwhile reconstructing them, in view of seeing in what way they helped to bring about the present attitudes
(caution, self-censorship, etc.) and behaviour of the broadcasters, vis-à-vis their audiences and those in power.

- What provisions are made for audience participation and accessibility?
- Is there feedback?
- How is this feedback expressed? (Audiences research, Correspondences, etc.) If there is an inadequacy of audience studies, what accounts for this? (Is it due to lack of motivation, professionalism, bureaucratic bottlenecks (Centralised decision-making, hierarchy of credibility, etc.)? Why?)

(b) Broadcasters' Creativity & Excellence: Creativity and excellence can be measured by looking at productivity. The broadcasters would be termed productive if they are able to write scripts and realise programmes of their own, make shows of their own, realise documentaries, and be generally in a position to provide the audiences with a variety of programmes devised and realised by themselves.

What to look for:
- How productive are the broadcasters?
- What accounts for successes and failures? (creativity & excellence/insufficient creativity & excellence (mediocrity)
- How do they react to success and failures? (What they consider to be success & failure)
- How does bureaucracy facilitate or impair
creativity and performance?
- If system is part of the civil service, what part does one's status as civil servant play to promote or impair productivity and performance? (incentive)
- What do the personnel think to be the advantages or disadvantages of being a civil servant, as opposed to the private sector?
- If there is mediocrity in services, programmes, and facilities, what do the personnel say this is due to?

* HYPOTHESIS: Centralism brings about cleavages between majority and minority interests, as well as excessive bureaucracy- which in turn is responsible for lack of creativity, for delays and mediocrity.

3.) DEPENDENCE:

(A) PAUCITY OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES AND RESOURCES:
To determine this, I will look for evidence of technological inadequacy in the broadcast institutions, and at the influence of foreign technology.

How to determine Technological dependence:

(1) MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES:
The construction and equipment of stations.
- Which firms have been involved?
- Which of these firms are national, and which are international?
- How is maintenance carried out? By whom?
Why? Are Cameroonians being trained in this domain? Where? By whom? Why?
- Does Cameroon manufacture sets and equipment of her own? If yes, who owns the firms which produce this equipment? (Here it would be necessary to compare cost of locally produced equipment with cost of imported ones).
  If no, from which countries does it import these sets? Why? Is it to the best of Cameroon's advantage? How?

(ii) FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS:
The construction and equipment of stations.
- What offers of equipment, and gestures of friendship (cooperation) are made by foreign governments and states? How? With what implications?
- Has Cameroon signed technical cooperation agreements with any countries or organisations? To what effect? What is the nature of these agreements? Implications?
* - Is there evidence of pressures, covert/overt brought to bear upon Cameroon by foreign states/organisations, firms?
  Reconstruct where possible.

(B) CULTURAL DEPENDENCE: To identify this, I will look at:

(i) PROGRAMMES:
  - Foreign programmes
    What proportion (%) of programmes are foreign? How are these obtained? -
Bought, Aid, Cultural exchange?

From what parts of the world are these programmes? - Classify them: country of origin, type of programme, bought, aid, cultural exchange, etc.

Are there any significant conclusions from this piece of exercise? Do the findings confirm or question the idea of the preponderance of Western programmes?

What category of foreign programmes are available? Entertainment, Informative, Educative? How? Why?

- Local Programmes

What proportion (%) of programmes are local? What categories of local programmes are available? entertainment, informative, educative? How? and why?

- What proportion is urban, and what proportion is rural? Elitist/ masses, Government/governed, literate/illiterate, adults/Children, men/women, francophone/anglophone, etc. (Binary Oppositions).

- What is the cost (in time, money, human and other resources) to produce a typical local programme? What are the constraints involved therein?

- What are the languages of the locally produced programmes: French and English—proportion of programmes in each, and in both together - Does this reflect the
political divisions of majority/minority interests? Any programmes in other languages? What percentage of over 200 languages?

- What differences or similarities is there in style, format, language, between home-made and foreign-made programmes? Why?

- How is the broadcast of these programmes scheduled? Is priority given to any? How? Why? What is the attitude to time? Are schedules rigorously respected? What are the sort of programmes, if any, that have the potential to disrupt the schedule at any time? Which are the programmes most vulnerable and most likely to be affected when there is interference with the normal schedule?

- What do the producers think of different types of programmes?

- What are the foreign programmes which they fancy, but which they can’t have for one reason or another?

- What audience studies are available showing ratings of home-made & foreign-made programmes? How are these studies conducted? By whom?

(ii) BROADCAST PRACTITIONERS:

- What proportion of staff are trained abroad? Where? and in what? What are the similarities/differences between staff
trained in different foreign countries?
- What proportion of staff are home-trained?
What difference, if any, is there between foreign trained and home-trained staff?
- How many foreigners work in TV & Radio in Cameroon, or teach in the school of communication and the training centres?
(classify them according to country, profession and terms of his/her contract in Cameroon - e.g. technical assistant or coopérants)
- What are the professional attitudes, values and beliefs? How similar or different from Western?
- Do the producers and broadcasters (e.g. newscasters) see themselves in the image of Western counterparts? - e.g. Comparing themselves to foreign TV and radio stars in Britain, America, France, etc.? As far as this particular point is concerned, I would also reconstruct the early stages of TV by looking at what was written in the papers, evaluating the staff and performance of CTV in the light of foreign stars and standards. In other words, how have the local stars been measured against foreign counterparts? How do these local stars react to this? Why?
- How many Cameroonians are currently being trained abroad in broadcasting? Where?
How many are trained at home? by whom?

How is the training at home similar or different from foreign training?

How do the foreign-trained perceive their locally trained counterparts, and vice versa?

Does the internal organisation reflect an unwitting bias for foreign diplomas or qualifications? Or is it the other way round?
APPENDIX B

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

ASMAC/ESSTI, YAOUNDE
1.) Dr Tatah Mentan, (Lecturer) interviewed, 30/1/88.
2.) Dr. Francis Uete, interviewed, 1/2/88 as Lecturer. Now Director of Programmes, CRTV.
3.) Sam Novala Fonken, (Lecturer) interviewed, 16/2/88.
4.) Dr. Fame Ndongo, (Director, ASMAC/ESSTI) interviewed 2/2/88.

RDC NATIONAL STATION, YAOUNDE
1.) Charles Landzeh, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 31/12/87. Now Assistant Chief of Service for English Language Production (RDC), CRTV.
2.) Fai Henry Fonye, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 2/1/88. Now Chief of Service for Educational Broadcasts in English (RDC), CRTV.
3.) George Tanni, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 2/1/88 & 5/1/88 as Chief of Service for Copyright and Maintenance. Now Chief of Service for English Language News (RDC), CRTV.
4.) Ferdinand Tewafo, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 5/1/88 as Bureau Chief for Audience Studies. Now Chief of Service for Programmes, CRTV Ngaoundere.
5.) André Kwa Mbangué, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 11/1/88 as Chief of Service for International Service. Now Chief of Service for Copyright and Studio Management, CRTV.
6.) Gideon Takah, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 17/2/88 as Chief of Service for Documentation RDC. Now Subdirector of Production (RDC), CRTV.
7.) Jean François Nebenga, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 17/2/88 as Subdirector of Programmes RDC. Post retained under CRTV.
8.) Thomas Babi Koussana, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 22/2/88 as Chief of Bureau for Programmes. Now Chief of Service for Recreational Programmes in the French Language (RDC), CRTV.
9.) Kevin Kandem Njom, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 22/2/88 as Assistant Chief of Service for programmes. Now Chief of Service for Recreational Programmes in the English Language (RDC), CRTV.
10.) Zacharie Ngimnan, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 23/2/88 as Chief of Service for News Editing RDC. Now Chief of Service for French Language News (RDC), CRTV.
11.) Antoine Nchao, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 23/2/88 as Chief of Bureau for Programme Exchange RDC.
12.) Becky Ndive, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 23/2/88 as Chief of Service for Programmes RDC. Now Chief of Service Programmes CRTV.

13.) Olive Shang, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 24/2/88 as Assistant Chief of Service for Copyright and Studio Management RDC. Now Assistant Chief of Service for English Language Eduative programmes (RDC), CRTV.

14.) Evelyne Shasha Ndimbé, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 25/2/88 as Assistant Chief of Service for News RDC. Now Chief of Service for English Language Programmes (RDC), CRTV.

15.) Emmanuel-Blaise Mintamack, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 25/2/88 as Subdirector of News RDC. Now Subdirector of News (RDC), CRTV.

16.) Augustine Ayuk, (Translator) interviewed, 25/2/88 as Senior Translator RDC.

17.) Michel Noundou Njinta, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 1/3/88 as Chief of Bureau for Publicity RDC.

18.) Romain Roland Eto, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 1/3/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Newspaper and Magazine Editing.

19.) Paul Bernard Mbouet Massaga, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 4/3/88 as Chief of Service for Productions RDC. Now Chief of Service for the Urban Station Yaounde, (RDC) CRTV.

20.) Maka Eteh Nøe, (Engineer) interviewed, 4/3/88 as Deputy Director of RDC. Now Director of Professional Training CRTV.

21.) Stephen Nfor, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 15/3/88 as producer-presenter of "Our Changing Rural World" on detachment with the Ministry of Agriculture.

22.) Kenneth Asobo, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 19/3/88 as Desk Editor for English Language News RDC. Now Assistant Chief of Service for English Language Programmes (RDC) CRTV.

RDC RADIO BUEA

23.) Sammy Anguh, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 21/3/88 as MINUPC Delegate for South West Province. Now Chief of Station for CRTV Buea.

24.) Nuema Meombo, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 21/3/88 as Chief of Bureau for Coverage.

25.) Victor Vimombi Gui, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 21/3/88 as ordinary broadcaster.

26.) Francis Bongsha Ndze, (Technician) interviewed, 21/3/88 as Assistant Chief of Station. Now Assistant Chief of Technical Service for CRTV Bamenda.

RDC, RADIO BAMENDA

27.) Joseph Ondobo Manga, (Technician) interviewed, 24/3/88 as Assistant
Chief of Station.

28.) Hortentia Fohtung Ngang, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 24/3/88 as Chief of Bureau for Programmes. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Programmes for CRTV Bamenda.


30.) John Ndahme, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 25 & 28/3/88 as Chief of Station. Now Chief of Service for Programmes for CRTV Bamenda.

CTV PRODUCTION CENTRE, YAOUNDE

1.) Peter Ngong Ful, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 29/12/87 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for English Language News (CTV) CRTV.

2.) Anne Nsang, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 6 & 12/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Magazine programmes in the English Language (CTV) CRTV.

3.) Marc Ombou, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 7 & 20/1/88 as Chief of Programmes. Now Chief of Service for Programme Purchase and Exchange (CTV) CRTV.

4.) Memouna Njilie, (Producer) interviewed, 7/1/88 as Assistant Chief of Production. Now Chief of Service for Women and Children’s Programmes (CTV) CRTV.

5.) Dieudonné Tine Piqui, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 7/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Chief of Service for French Language Magazines (CTV), CRTV.

6.) Carol Ijang Akutu, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 8/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Chief of Service for English Language Magazine Programmes (CTV) CRTV.

7.) Anne Ngu, (Producer) interviewed, 8/1/88 as Chief of Production. Now Chief of Service for Educative and Religious Programmes (CTV), CRTV.

8.) Veronique Ngouang, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 8/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster.

9.) Charles Pythagore Ndongo, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 9/1/88 as Assistant Editor in Chief. Now Editor in Chief for French Language News (CTV), CRTV.

10.) Joe Akwanka Ndifor, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 11/1/88 interviewed as ordinary broadcaster. Now Chief of Service for English Language Programmes (CTV), CRTV.

11.) Thomas Essono, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 12/1/88 as Permanent correspondent at the Presidency. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Coverage and Outdoor Reporting (CTV), CRTV.

12.) Jean-Pierre Biyiti Bi Essam, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 12/1/88 as
technical adviser. Now official at MINFOC.

13.) Charles Ndichia, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 12/1/88 as ordinary Broadcaster. Position unchanged (CTV), CRTV.

14.) Julius Herman Vaneey, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 13/1/88 as official with News and Information department. Now Assistant Chief of Service for the Coordination of Provincial News (CTV), CRTV.

15.) Emmanuel Nganje Jackai, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 13/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for English Language Programmes.

16.) William Che Mba, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 13/1/88 as permanent correspondent at the Presidency. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Coverage and Outdoor Reporting (RDC), CRTV.

17.) Jean Lambert Nang, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 14/1/88 as ordinary Broadcaster. Position unchanged (CTV), CRTV.

18.) Patrice Mbianda, (Administrator) interviewed, 14/1/88 as Chief of Advertising. Now Chief of Service for Advertising.

19.) Elie Poka, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 15/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster.

20.) Eric Chinje, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 16/1/88 as Coordinator of the News and Information Department. (Otherwise Editor in Chief). Now Subdirector of News (CTV), CRTV.

21.) Adamu Musa Amos Shey, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 16/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Briefly Subdirector of News (CTV), CRTV. Now ordinary broadcaster.

22.) Robert Abosou Lereh, (Engineer) interviewed, 18/1/88 as Coordinator of Broadcasting Department. Now Chief of Service for the Maintenance of V/UHF transmitters CRTV.

23.) Jean-Pierre Kouannang, (Engineer) interviewed, 18/1/88 as Assistant Coordinator of Broadcasting Department. Now Assistant Chief of Service for the Maintenance of Video Cameras, CRTV.

24.) Herbert Bob, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 19/1/88 as Chief of the Sports Section. Now Assistant Chief of Service for Sports (RDC), CRTV.

25.) André Ayissi Essomba, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 19/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster.

26.) Marguerite Mfegue, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 20/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for the Coordination of Provincial Production.

27.) Jean-Marie Nkaa, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 20/1/88 as ordinary broadcaster.

28.) Eyebe Tanga, (Engineer) interviewed, 21/1/88 as Coordinator of the Technical Department. Now Subdirector of Video Equipment, CRTV.

29.) Joseph Anderson Le, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 25/1/88 as ordinary
broadcaster. Now Assistant Chief of Service for the Coordination of Provincial Programmes, CRTV.

30.) Aloysius Ntemfack Ofegue, (Broadcaster) interviewed, 15/3/88 as ordinary broadcaster. Now Chief of Service for English Language News (CTV), CRTV.

INATA, (EKOUNOU) YAOUNDE
1.) Hans Heber (GTZ Coordinator) interviewed, 9/3/88 at La Foire of Tsinga, Yaounde.
2.) Etienne Fomba (Student) interviewed, 14/1/88.

CAMNEWS
1.) Jean Ngandeu, (Director) interviewed, 18/4/88

MINFOC
1.) Dr. Hansel Ndumbe Ryoh, (Director Department of Cultural Affairs) interviewed, 31/12/87.

PRIVATE PRESS
1.) Mr Ngailim, (Proprietor of Cameroon Post) interviewed, 28/3/88


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1.) CAMEROON TRIBUNE (WEEKLY, ENGLISH):
   Wednesday, 14 July 1982
   Wednesday, 28 July 1982
   Wednesday, 05 January 1982
   Wednesday, 11 July 1984
   Wednesday, 25 July 1984
   Wednesday, 24 October 1984
   Wednesday, 03 July 1985
   Wednesday, 06 November 1985
   Wednesday, 04 December 1985
   Wednesday, 30 April 1986
   Wednesday, 07 May 1986

2.) CAMEROON TRIBUNE (BI-WEEKLY, ENGLISH):
   Friday, 27 February 1987
   Tuesday, 05 May 1987
   Tuesday, 01 December 1987
   Tuesday, 01 December 1988
   Tuesday, 02 February 1988
   Friday, 19 February 1988
   Tuesday, 15 March 1988
   Friday, 18 March 1988

3.) CAMEROON TRIBUNE (DAILY, FRENCH):
   Tuesday, 22 March 1988
   Tuesday, 05 April 1988
   Tuesday, 19 April 1988
   Friday, 22 April 1988
   Friday, 04 November 1988
   Tuesday, 04 May 1976
   Sunday, 01 July 1984
   Wednesday, 02 October 1985
   Wednesday, 14 January 1987
   Tuesday, 24 February 1987
   Monday, 09 March 1987
   Monday, 11 May 1987
   Thursday, 17 September 1987
   Friday, 13 November 1987
   Tuesday, 17 November 1987
   Thursday, 19 November 1987
   Tuesday, 19 November 1987
   Monday, 30 November 1987
   Monday, 21 December 1987
   Thursday, 07 January 1988
   Monday, 18 January 1988
   Thursday, 28 January 1988
   Monday, 08 February 1988
   Thursday, 18 February 1988
Thursday, 03 March 1988  
Monday, 14 March 1988  
Wednesday, 16 March 1988  
Friday, 25 March 1988  
Thursday, 31 March 1988  
Monday, 04 April 1988  
Tuesday, 05 April 1988  
Thursday, 14 April 1988  
Friday, 15 April 1988  
Thursday, 21 April 1988  
Friday, 22 April 1988  
Tuesday, 17 May 1988  
Friday, 24 June 1988  
Saturday, 01 October 1988  
Friday, 28 October 1988  
Tuesday, 08 November 1988  
Monday, 28 November 1988  

8.) FINANCIAL TIMES:  
Tuesday, 11 October 1988  

9.) THE GUARDIAN:  
Tuesday, 17 May 1988  
Tuesday, 08 November 1988  

4.) WEEKEND TRIBUNE, FRENCH:  
Saturday, 16 April 1988  

5.) CAMEROON TRIBUNE, HORS-SERIE:  
January, 1988  

6.) LE MESSAGER:  
Monday 11 April 1988  

7.) THE INDEPENDENT:  
Tuesday, 17 May 1988  
Tuesday, 08 May 1988  

UNPUBLISHED SPEECHES  
1.) Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya’s Address at the graduation ceremony of journalist from ASMAC/ESSTI, March 1986.  
2.) Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya’s New Year Message to his staff, 1987.  
3.) Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya’s address at a meeting with the journalists, announcers and producers of CTV, 13 April 1987.  
4.) Minister Ibrahim Mombo Njoa’s address on the occasion of the graduation of the first batch of the broadcast technicians trained in the TV Training Centre at Ekounou, Yaounde, Wednesday 25, November 1987.  
5.) Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya’s New Year Message to his staff, 1988.  
6.) Minister Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya’s speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the Television Production Centre, Thursday 28 January 1988.  
7.) Eily Florent Eto’s Speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the Television Production Centre, Thursday 28 January 1988.  

CIRCULAR LETTERS  
1.) René Ze Nguele, Note de Service No 45/Minfoc/SG done in Yaounde, 22 September 1976.
2.) Guillaume Bwele, Note de Service No 114/Minfoc/SG done in Yaounde, 3 July 1982.
3.) Circular No 5-CAB-PR of 22 August 1986 by the President of the Republic deploring the lack of adequate collaboration between heads of the public and semi-public establishments.
4.) Circular No 6-CAB-PR of 24 October 1986 by the President of the Republic on Observance of Professional Secrecy.
5.) Emmanuel Kome Epule, Note de Service No 146/Minfoc/DR 13 December 1986.
7.) SDP, Gala Decouvertes 87: Rapport General, Minfoc/DR/SDP/Prod, 18 December 1987.
8.) Hans Heber, Contribution de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne à la Formation du Personnel de la télévision camerounaise. GTZ 18/1/88.
9.) Emmanuel Kome Epule, Note de Service No 023/Minfoc/DR 15 February 1988.

PROGRAMMES
1.) "Cameroon Report" of 20 April 1986
2.) "Cameroon Report" of 15 June 1986
3.) "Dimanche Midi" of 17 January 1988
5.) "Dimanche Midi" of 7 February 1988
6.) "Cameroon Panorama" of 28 February 1988
7.) "Dimanche Midi" of 28 February 1988
8.) "Dash Show" of 5 March 1988
9.) "The Television Revolution: The Channel 4 Debate" of 13 November 1988, Channel 4, British TV.

LAWS AND DECREES
a) On Information and culture:
1.) Loi No 67/LR/19 du 12 juin 1967 sur la liberté d'association.
2.) Decree No/78/496 of 20 November 1978 to reorganise the Ministry of Information and Culture.
3.) Decree No 79/390 of 22 September 1979 to Institute the Cultural Charter of the United Republic of Cameroon.
4.) Décret No 77/250 du 18 juillet 1977 portant création de la Société de Presse et d'Éditions du Cameroun.
5.) Loi No 77/17 du 6 décembre 1977 accordant à la Société de Presse et
d'Editions du Cameroun l'exclusivité de la captation, de la distribution des informations mondiales, ainsi que des avantages fiscaux.

6.) Décret No 80/185 du 6 juin 1980, and Décret No 82/228 du 16 juin 1982, modifiant le Décret No 77/250 du 18 juillet 1977 portant création de SOPECAM.


b) On Broadcasting:

1.) Decree No. 84/262 of 12 May 1984 to set up a Television Project Co-ordination Committee.

2.) Ordonnance No 86/001 du 26 avril 1986 portant création de L'Office de la Télévision Nationale.

3.) Decree No 86/384 of 26 April 1986 on the organisation and functioning of the National Television Corporation.

4.) Order No 324 of 19 June 1986 on the Set up, organisation and functioning of the Services of the Directorate-General of Cameroon Television.

5.) Decree No 87/57 of 17 January 1987 to set up a Television Transmission Unit.

6.) Law No 87/4 of 15 July 1987 to retroactively ratify Ordinance No 86/1 of 26 April 1986 to set up the National Television Corporation.

7.) Loi No 87/019 du 17 décembre 1987 fixant le régime de la communication audio-visuelle au Cameroun.


9.) Décret No 88/126 du 25 janvier 1988 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la CRTV.

10.) Décret No 88/152 du 29 janvier 1988 portant nomination du Président du Conseil d'Administration du CRTV.

11.) Arrêté No 130 du 2 Mars 1988 Portant désignation des membres du Conseil d'Administration de la CRTV.

12.) Organigramme de la Direction Générale de L'Office de Radiodiffusion-Television Camerounaise, CRTV.

c) Others:

1.) Law No 84-03 of 4 July 1984 to institute the Investment Code of Cameroon.

2.) Decree No 87/1141 of 20 August 1987 to fix the remuneration and perquisites of the staff of State corporations, public establishments and semi-governmental corporations.