THE ROLE OF NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)

UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER

JUNE 1981
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance, scholarly supervision, and unfailing courtesy and consideration of Prof. Jack E. Spence. I am also grateful for the kind and willing assistance of the staff of the University of Leicester Library; the Royal Commonwealth Society; the School of Oriental and African Studies; the Institute of Commonwealth Studies; the British Library of Political and Economic Science (LSE); the Centre for West African Studies and the Library of the University of Birmingham; the Nigerian High Commission in London and the Ministry of Information of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Lagos.

I am further indebted to friends, family and mentors who have sustained my idealism, and it is with affection that this work is dedicated to them and, with deepest love and and gratitude, to my parents — without whom all would most surely be nothing.

ERRATA

P106, Para 3, Line 7, for President read Resident.
P369, Para 1, Line 5 and Para 2, Line 5, for triumvirate read triumvirate.
P444, Para 1, Line 6, for Accidentale read Accidentale.
P591, Para 2, Line 11, read...interests at stake...
P602, Para 2, Line 5, read...systemic role is dependent upon the interests of the other members of the regional or global system.
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is man.
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride,
He hangs between, in doubt to act or rest;
In doubt to deem himself a God or Beast;
In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
Born but to die, and reason'ning but to err.

Alexander Pope,
"An Essay on Man"
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CHAPTER ONE

THE NOTION OF ROLE PERSPECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The traditional purpose of viewing a particular state's foreign policy actions within a certain designated role perspective is to enable those with an interest in foreign policy to capture the general trend and direction of the policy of a specific state. Such a role perspective is generally vague and abstract, and the result of the ex post facto analysis of a series of foreign policy actions of the state concerned. For example, one way of analyzing British foreign policy during the nineteenth century is to focus on Britain's role as 'balancer' restraining the 'power struggle' between the contending European alliances. Similarly, the role of the United States has been more recently defined as that of a 'world policeman'.

One alleged advantage of the role perspective approach derives from its usefulness as a method of analyzing a state's present and future foreign policy. This predictive notion makes the role perspective particularly relevant in contemporary terms, since underlying assumptions about the world political order are based on the past and projected actions of states. However, as the number of states active in international politics has multiplied and the destructive capacity of the major world powers has escalated, the arbitrary description of role perspective solely on the basis of hindsight cannot suffice. We argue that the role perspective, in so far as it seeks to conceptualize a state's external interactions in contemporary terms, must seek to delineate the causal sequence of events and procedures which serve to determine and regulate external interaction. This it must do if it is to be of more than limited historical value.
In seeking the core explanation of the concept of 'role' in international politics, we propose to develop a dynamic model of the sequence of causation in international interaction. (These interactions occurring over time constitute a state's international role.) The notion of a dynamic process, series of interactions, or mutually influential interacting variables suggests a degree of dynamic systemic order and continuity. It is primarily for this reason that we consider it appropriate to develop a model employing the concepts of general systems analysis, as these apply to international politics, and foreign policy analysis.

The proposed model is a derivation of the "free-flow" model of foreign policy analysis suggested by Brecher, Steinberg and Stein in their article, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior" and the improvements to it suggested by A. I. Dawisha in his book, Egypt in the Arab World.

This theoretical model will then be used to provide the framework for the analysis of the role of Nigeria in the international political system.

We, therefore, begin with an analysis of the nature of the contemporary international system in the hope that this preface will clarify the concept of a state's role in international politics.

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1. The nature of the contemporary international system

The concept of the international political system has its origin in the notion of a 'social system', as an arrangement created when a number of operating units (individuals or groups) so regularize and pattern their relationships with one another that system-centered behaviour becomes to a larger extent predictable. Although it can be included within the general definition of a social system, the international political system lacks the essential aspects of a more highly organized and articulate community. An indispensable element in either a society or a community is acceptance of a common set of goals and a common value consensus. The international system has neither common values nor any mutual goal other than survival within the system.

The functional unit within the international system is the individual nation-state, and the motive force of the international system flows from the individual nation-states themselves.

The 'climate' of world politics — the general atmosphere within which relations are conducted and which is subject to change over time — is neither a cosmic force nor any accident of history, but stems from the prevailing patterns of assumptions and action accepted by the dominant states of


the system. Any basic change in the system will find its initial expression in modifications in the way states conceive of their international roles. 5)

The environment of international politics and the cohesion of the international system, therefore, evolves from the general patterns of power, dominance and influence that persist among the units comprising the system. Furthermore, it should be noted that no state exists in a complete vacuum and that all states are units or actors within the international political system and as such, are subject to similar international environmental influences.

The contemporary international political order is essentially a product of the European state system which emerged in the wake of the collapse of feudalism. Whereas the Renaissance laid the foundation for the secularization of medieval European thought, the Reformation served as the catalyst for the nationalization of the earlier universal concept of Christendom.

In conjunction with the laissez faire commercial philosophy, which had usurped feudal commercial practice, these forces served to inspire the modern idea of the state which subsequently gave rise to the European nation-state system. 6)

Prior to World War II, international politics was largely synonymous with the politics of Europe and European-based culture. The colonial


scramble of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, during which the European states sought to expand their national possession and prestige by encompassing within their sovereignty underdeveloped areas of the world, may be seen as marking the advent of global power politics and the expansion of the Euro-centric state system to its contemporary global proportions. Colonial expansion was further accelerated by the industrial revolution and the need for raw materials so that by 1900, the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, and international law and organization, which had originated in European institutions during the fifteenth century, had become a global system incorporating the political values and structures of Western Europe. 7)

The nature of the international system at the beginning of the century may be typified as a "balance of power", implying a relatively stable equilibrium between the contending European powers.


But since World War II we have seen more than (thirty) years of a multistate, bipolar, heterogenous (SIC) system, with no general war and a constant real possibility of one, with the same two key powers, with recurrent regional crises and limited wars, and with a broad spectrum of plausible interstate violence whose most destructive levels are most carefully prepared for and whose lower levels are most frequently used. 8)

The development of the contemporary international system has been characterized by the large increase in the number of national actors, the development of nuclear technology and the advent of an era of extreme technological sophistication, with the prime developers and manipulators of this technology being ideologically opposed in their role as super-


powers. The contemporary international political milieu has radically altered from the pre-World War environment in scale, scope, and in time focus. In the past, wars were fought between two or more European powers and their allies for the acquisition of territory and were settled ex post facto, that is to say, only after an often prolonged clash of forces, in the contemporary era, because of the universally destructive capability of the ideologically opposed, nuclear superpowers, international politics is largely pre-emptive in nature: that is to say, based on contingency planning and the anticipation of future circumstances. The vastly diverse and heterogeneous scale of contemporary political interaction and the annihalative scope of modern technology, motivated by an ambition for ideological hegemony has of necessity transformed the nature of international interaction into a futuristic, complex and delicately orchestrated exercise.

At the same time, within the international system are sub-systems which are mostly regional in nature. The concept of sub-systems within the larger international system is distinctive, in that such sub-systems are not ordinarily marked by the kind of competition (the assumption of 'mutually assured destruction' in the nuclear arms race, for example) which is inherent in the international system. Furthermore, sub-systems are more inclusive than the international system because even the smallest state, with limited national goals, is likely to affect and be affected by regional problems. States that form sub-systems, however,


are not free of the influence of the greater international system and are rarely free to settle their problems among themselves. Issues that involve substantial economic or political questions will usually draw the attention and involvement of one or more of the major powers in the international system and which may attempt to impose a solution.\textsuperscript{12}

The patterns of behaviour in the system are generally determined by the proportionate power of the states or actors in the system and numerous attempts have been made to typify and categorize the state of the varying patterns of interaction in the international system at any one given time. Several models of systemic interaction have been identified: first, a 'balance of power' system, which implies the maintenance of a delicate equilibrium between contending powers in international affairs; secondly, a bi-polar system comprising a system of military and diplomatic power centred around two blocs; thirdly, a multi-polar system, implying a more flexible pattern of bloc allegiance with possibilities for short-term alliances and coalition shifts; and fourthly, an hierarchical system in which power and influence are concentrated in one unit. This system may be of a directive or non-directive nature; the directive hierarchical system is seen as authoritarian in character, while the non-directive system functions according to the political rules generally operative in a democracy.\textsuperscript{13} Other systemic models which have been suggested include the universal or diffuse bloc system, encompassing all states as actors of influence of a greater or lesser


\textsuperscript{13} Kaplan, MA, \textit{op cit}, PP36-45 distinguishes between a "loose"bi-polar system and a "tight" bi-polar system to illustrate the difference in cohesion and rigidity between the two systems. See also Singer, JD, \textit{op cit}, PP78-80 where suggested prescriptions for model analysis are set out.

\textsuperscript{14} Kaplan, MA, \textit{op cit}, PP48-50.
and what has been termed as a unit veto or deterrent system, which envisages all actors having the nuclear capability (either individually or as an ally of a nuclear power) to destroy any other actor which might attack it, even though it does not have the capability to prevent its own destruction. 16)

The contemporary international environment has evolved in a relatively short period of time from the narrow base of the European centred system of the colonial era to an all encompassing global 'community' (dominated by two ideologically opposed super-powers). All states exist within the confines of this global 'community' and no state can succeed in isolating itself completely from the pressures of a dynamic system. 17)

It is thus possible, as indicated above, to typify, for the purpose of macro-analysis, the general status of the international system at a particular time. The crux of such a typology usually focuses upon the nature of the forces which maintain the equilibrium within the system and would logically, therefore, also be primarily responsible for systemic discord. Such analysis obviously has value in that it facilitates the study of international political interaction as a whole, although it is inclined towards a generally exclusive, universal orientation and focus. Such universalistic macro-analysis largely

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16) Kaplan, MA, op cit, PP50-53 and Kaplan, MA, "Variants on Six Models of the International System" in Rosenau, JN, (ed), op cit, PP300-303 adds four variant models to those described in his earlier work, namely: a very loose bi-polar system; the detente system; the unstable bloc system; and the incomplete nuclear diffusion system. Kaplan suggests that these additional models represent political lines of possible development from the existing situation. See also Bull, H, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan Press, London, 1979, PP240-243.

17) The terms 'international system' and 'international environment' are used interchangeably. Whereas distinction is often drawn between the 'system' and the 'environment', the two terms will be considered mutually inclusive, in that the nature of the system determines the nature of the environment, and vice versa, in which international interaction takes place and is, therefore, one and the same thing.
denies the capability of individual small powers and lesser nation-states to play a role which may greatly influence the milieu of international interaction without necessarily changing or affecting the standard parameters of the prevailing systemic balance and which, in short, are the dynamic variables within the system. The parameters of the system may be relatively stable and may only change over some considerable length of time, but within the boundaries of this broad system the individual actors are in a state of continual agitation; the international system is, therefore, far from being a static structure — it is a dynamic system which is in a state of almost continuous internal flux. The internal impetus is provided by the interaction of individual states.

A state may determine upon an altruistic role with the collusion of one of the super-powers and act, therefore, largely as a surrogate force under the security umbrella of its sponsor (Cuba in Africa, for example), but the motivation, determination and momentum comes from the individual state itself and may almost wholly arise from the animus (i.e.; psychological motivation for action) of the political leadership. Such animus, in turn, is inspired by what may be loosely termed the national interest. Similarly, many states have the capability, given their inherent potential or their national objectives, to exert considerable influence upon the environment of international politics.  

18) General systems theory appears to largely negate the independent ability of the individual state to determine its course in international politics in favour of an essentially mechanistic view of state behaviour.

It has been suggested that the concept of an international system provides a broad framework for the characterization and macro-analysis of the general equilibrium and prevailing power patterns in international politics. Yet, although the international system serves to delimit the scope and range of world politics, it is the individual members of the system which are the key actors and which are the lifeblood of what would otherwise be a static structure. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the nature of the foreign policy formulation process in an attempt to establish a causal explanation for individual state systemic interaction.

2. The foreign policy formulation process.

Until some two decades ago, foreign policy was generally regarded as a set of responses to externally generated stimuli, apparently lacking in any distinctive conceptual clarity. The nature of a state's external relations was explained by concentrating, almost exclusively, on the action-response pattern in state relations over a specific time span. However, in an effort to understand the cause-effect relationship in contemporary state behaviour, a number of theorists\(^{19}\) have more recently been concerned with formulating explanatory theories of foreign policy behaviour intended to establish linkages between political processes and perceived stimuli.\(^{20}\)

State behaviour was no longer seen as exclusively a reaction to external stimuli and emphasis was placed on the domestic origins of foreign policy.

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Foreign policy came to be described as the composite of:

...activities of individuals and groups within states, and involving the governmental machinery of states, which are designed to have an impact on the policies of other states, or on individuals and groups within them. 21)

Emphasis was thus placed on the domestic political decision-making process; 22) Frankel's model, for example, distinguished between the so-called international and domestic environments and sought to explain the interaction between the two by contending that decision-makers are representatives of societal values, and as such, arrive at their foreign policy decisions by assimilating these values into their image of the international environment. 23)

Numerous authors have identified the wide spectrum of ends, means and capabilities, as well as the motivational role and organizational variables which operate as determinants of foreign policy. But there has, until recently, been a dearth of theories linking these components of external behaviour in causal sequence. 24)

21) Sondermann, PA, op cit, P15.
24) Rosenau, JN, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", op cit, PP32-35. It should be noted that Modalski, G, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, P101 distinguishes between: (a) power-input, power-output, interests and objectives; and (b) the foreign policies of other states as the point of departure for the dynamic analysis of foreign policy. This may be seen as one of the first attempts to conceptualize the dynamic cause-effect sequence in foreign policy formulation. Other major contributions are Kissinger, HA, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in Rosenau, JN, (ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy, Revised edition, op cit, PP261-277 and Wilkinson, DO, op cit, PP26-31.
To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. 25)

This gap was not effectively bridged until it was recognized that;
"... the concept of system is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in the study of domestic politics." 26)

The concept of representing foreign policy formulation as a free-flowing, dynamic system of processes, responding to a spectrum of inputs and outputs, introduced a reactive element or notion of feedback and thus shifted the emphasis of foreign policy analysis from the static action-response focus to one of action-response-reaction. Brecher likened the foreign policy system to a flow into and out of a network of structures or institutions which perform certain functions and thereby produce decisions. These decisions are fed back into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on policy, policy process, and products of policy. 27) The elements of the foreign policy system consist of an environment or setting, a group of actors, structures through which they initiate decisions and respond to challenges, and processes which sustain or alter the flow of demands and products of the system as a whole. The boundaries of the foreign policy system are seen as essentially vertical, in that they encompass all inputs and outputs which affect decisions, the content and scope of which lie essentially in the realm of inter-state relations. 28)

25) Rosenau, JN, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", op cit, P31.


28) Ibid, PP81-88. Also Dawisha, AI, op cit, PP67-69 suggests that the model, by concentrating on the macro concept of policy rather than on one foreign policy decision at a time, fails to highlight the homeostatic capability a foreign policy system must possess in order to endure the action-response-reaction process embodied in inter-state relations.
Thus the analysis of a state's external behaviour has evolved from that of single-cause deterministic explanations, to schematic structures representing a dynamic interaction between internally and externally operative variables. The significance of tracing such theoretical progression is that theories on the nature of the foreign policy formulation process represent a continuing search for causal explanations of state action in international politics. Whereas it has been established that 'causation in international politics' is a multifaceted and dynamically variable concept, foreign policy analysis, as a causal explanation, remains generally retrospective and concentrates its explanation on micro-(single decision) or macro-(general policy) dimensions of established state interaction.

It is arguable that this ex post facto approach to the analysis of external interaction, in the nuclear era, is of little more than historical significance and that foreign policy formulation, due to the nature of the contemporary international system, is of necessity futuristically oriented and based primarily on contingency planning and the anticipation and perception of threats to, and opportunities for the enhancement of the national objective or interest. It may be too, that simple foreign policy analysis as a causal explanation for contemporary state interaction is inadequate, in that in order to ensure survival in the nuclear age, foreign policy has become but an integral part of a trilogy of foreign, domestic and military policies which comprise the wider concept of national security policy or national strategy.29)

29) Modern strategy can be described as the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation; including armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed. Earle, ME, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1943, P111. Also Baylis, J, et al, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc, New York, 1975, P3.
At the end of World War II the notion that war and peace, military and political goals were separate and opposite was deeply entrenched in strategic doctrine. "In every concrete instance, even in the matter of the regulation of the atom, ... we found ourselves stalemated by our perceptions." and further; "The gap between military and national policy was complete. Our power was not commensurate with objectives of our national policy..."

Comprehensive efforts were made to incorporate strategic doctrine as an integral part of foreign policy, strategy being defined as the transformation of power into policy.

Whether the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve or prevent a transformation, its strategic doctrine must define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them.  

Similarly, Frankel has contended that;

One of the most frequently employed divisions is that into strategic, political and economic dimensions. This distinction... has been frequently and rightly attacked for its tendency to lead to three distinctly conceived policies. These separate policies being formulated and pursued in their individual contexts and insufficiently co-ordinated, do not serve and often even damage the national interest... 

In short, it is no longer possible to draw clear cut distinction between the fields of strategic studies, foreign policy, national power or the wider subject of international politics, for they are all integrated fields and distinctions arise from differences in emphasis rather than differences in subject matter. Strategic doctrine has thus come to be a concrete input in the decisionmaking process, giving rise to policies.


31) Ibid.


of national security embracing foreign policy, military policy and
domestic policy. Contemporary state action thus (and hence the notion
of a state's 'role'), is a product of this interaction and integration
of previously distinctly separate policy areas within a comprehensive
national strategy which identifies the objectives of state action and
the required means to achieve desired ends.

3. The concept of role perception

Relatively few states have either the potential capability or will to
aspire to orchestrate their external relations in so specific a way as to
seek to influence the regional or global system. Yet the individual
state is the dynamic variable within the international system and as
such contributes to systemic equilibrium or discord. In the contemporary
era of largely pre-emptive international politics, in which the time lag
between action and reaction has virtually been eliminated, understanding
of the causal sequence of external interaction has become imperative for
effective contingency planning, and thus, the survival of the individual
state. All states are actors within the system, and as such it is
necessary to assess reliably, any state's latent or manifest ability
to influence regional or global systemic conditions at any given time, in
order to establish clear patterns of probability and capability upon
which national strategy may be based.

Simplistic personifications and vague categorizations of the motives and
objectives of a state's external interaction have become commonplace.
Such images (Red China, Russian Bear, for example) may represent certain
core values for statesmen, seeking to isolate and conceptualize state
behaviour, but they are arbitrary and unreliable. Similarly, many
observers rank the potential influence of states in the international
system according to the extent of foreign commitment or military, economic
and technological capability. Then again, actors are generally categorized as super-powers, medium-powers or small-powers; or with specific reference to the level of economic and industrial development, as industrialized, developing or underdeveloped. \( ^{35} \)

Wilkinson distinguishes between the roles of first, second and third parties in international relations. These positions are defined by the relationship of their holders to the main international issues of the time, and by the ability of the states in question to pursue independent and self-determined policies.

First parties are independent powers, of the first rank or below, whose activities produce and sustain the major conflicts (and alignments) of the day. Their roles are defined by their goals and the resistance to them. Second parties are lesser powers who act as allies, and whose world role is defined by the kind of relationship which they have to their principal ally. Third parties are major and minor powers which stand outside the prime conflicts of the time, but whose world role is defined by the relation which they have to such conflicts. \( ^{36} \)

Several authors have suggested similar patterns of stratification reflecting differentials of involvement and influence in the affairs of the system. \( ^{37} \) Either by deliberate preference, or the lack of viable alternatives, or through the drift and force of circumstances, a state's external interaction tends toward activity or passivity. A passive role


\( ^{36} \) Wilkinson, DO, op cit, P5. Also Bernstein, RA and Weldon, PD, "A Structural Approach to the Analyses of International Relations" in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, NO12, June 1968, PP169-173 develop a series of matrices incorporating the total number of roles or lines of communication among nations and rank states numerically according to their number of apparent linkages or roles.

may vary from non-alignment to subservience. An active policy may be independent, isolationist and intransigent, or it may be co-operative and collaborative. Choice of role is essentially influenced by perceptions of capability and opportunities. A state's international role reflects adjustment to both external, and to domestic conditions and events.  

This emphasis on degrees of activity or passivity, on distinctions between power and weakness serves to identify general policy orientations but largely deny the individuality of state actions. A more comprehensive typology, however, seeks to rank states so as to reflect; "... basic predispositions, fears, and attitudes toward the outside world as well as systemic, geographic, and economic variables." Such roles may be usefully arranged as follows:


40) This classification of role types first appears in Holsti, KJ, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", op cit, P255.
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<tr>
<td>1. Revolutionary leader-</td>
<td>system transformation; change of power distribution</td>
<td>ideologies: rising capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imperialist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bloc leader</td>
<td>bloc cohesion; protection of bloc members; opposition to other bloc(s)</td>
<td>external threats; ideology; structure of system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Balancer</td>
<td>balance unequal blocs; international integration</td>
<td>power distribution in system; location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bloc member; ally</td>
<td>increase capabilities of bloc; support bloc leader</td>
<td>threat perception; location; ideological affinity; structure of system; insufficient capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mediator</td>
<td>interposition into bloc conflicts; integration</td>
<td>location; traditional policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Non-aligned</td>
<td>possible mediation of bloc conflicts</td>
<td>location; threat perception; socio-economic needs; nationalism; insufficient capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Buffer</td>
<td>separate bloc leaders or major powers</td>
<td>location; insufficient capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Isolate</td>
<td>latent function of neutralizing potential conflict areas</td>
<td>location; threat perception; insufficient capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Protectee</td>
<td>serve economic and/or security interests of major power</td>
<td>insufficient capabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification of a state's role or influence in the international system is preferable to the arbitrary three tier capability ranking and general policy orientation syndrome which has found such common usage. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the analysis of international interaction is a multifaceted and complex enterprise and that simple categorization, in short, is not conceptualization.
Yet arbitrary as it may be to regard causation in international interaction as solely determined by capability and directly proportionate to its level of technological and economic sophistication, it is the case that in order to aspire to a position of systemic significance a state needs to be endowed with a certain capability potential. A state's international position is to a large measure determined by itself, in that the state, through the mobilization and manipulation of the total spectrum of its national capability resources (not merely technological or economic), is the architect of its world role. The state's national capability, therefore, may be described as the composite of resources available to support the state's, or its leaders' perception of its systemic role.41)

States which perceive themselves as playing a role significant to global or regional systemic interests need not necessarily have any substantial degree of influence. Because the concept of capability is entirely relative, the validity of such a perception of systemic significance is dependent largely on the other members of the regional or world community (most especially the major powers) perceiving the state concerned as in fact being of real or potential significance and influence.42)

Thus, it is possible to describe the notion of role in international politics as a three dimensional concept. The primary and most basic dimension and

41) Singer, JD, op cit, PP82-89 and Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, PP75-76. See also Ferris, WA, The Power Capabilities of Nation States, DC Heath and Co, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1973, PP6-8. Also Hösti, KJ, "The State and International Stratification" in Barber, J and Smith, M, (eds), The Nature of Foreign Policy, The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1974, P41. "... policy makers today judge other countries primarily on the basis of three criteria, each reflecting values that generally command esteem throughout the world. These include (1) a nation's level of technology...(2) immediately available military capabilities, and (3) the reputation that it can generate abroad through its day-to-day diplomatic conduct and political, economic, and social behaviour at home."

determinant of the concept of role is the state's resource capability; that is, the determinant of a state's inherent potential or the lack of it. The realization of such potential depends first, upon the political leadership's perception of the ends of policy (as encompassing national values, objectives and interests) and the state's capability resources as the means of attaining those ends.

Secondly, there is the dimension arising from the leadership's image of the external environment and the decisionmaker's perception of threat and opportunity. Hence the notion of ego-role perception, that is the global or regional role to which the state aspires in the light of the state's perception of its capability and the external environment. Thirdly, there is the perception of the members of the external environment of the significance of the real or potential role of the state concerned to the regional or global system, or what may be called alter-perception.

Thus the concept of role perception in international politics is a dynamic concept based upon the three criteria of national capability, ego-role perception and the perceptions of the members of the external environment. The interaction of these three dynamic variables may provide useful insights into the causal determinants of contemporary state interaction and each of these three criteria will be discussed individually.

4. The concept of national capability

Many authors on the concept of national capability prefer the use of the term 'national power' and indeed it is possible to substitute the term 'power' in almost all instances in which the term 'capability' is used and vice-versa. Power is loosely defined as the general capacity of a state to control the behaviour of others. This notion of a 'capacity to control behaviour' embraces two essential elements, namely influence and capability.
Whereas influence can be viewed as being essentially a means to an end, capability is defined as the essential capacity needed to make the wielding of influence effective.\textsuperscript{43) } Wolfers distinguishes between influence and power: influence is defined as "the capacity to move others through promises and grants of benefits", while power means the ability to move others by "the threat of infliction of more or less serious deprivations".\textsuperscript{44) }

We propose to use the term 'capability' as defined above, as power is too synonymous with coercive capacity, that is, military force. Furthermore, the term 'power' overlooks the link between policy and action, which is preserved by the use of the term capability.\textsuperscript{45) } Therefore, although reference will be made to the term 'power', its use will be confined to its significance as a means, that is, capability.

A broad definition of a state's capability describes it as the capacity to effect change in international systemic conditions in its own interests. Change in systemic conditions is the core of the concept's rationale.

By means of its capability, therefore, a state "does what it can and suffers what it must".\textsuperscript{46) } Further, capability may be described as any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement, to persuade, reward, threaten or punish.\textsuperscript{47) } Deutsch describes

\textsuperscript{44) } Wolfers, A, \textit{Discord and Collaboration}, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1962, P103.
\textsuperscript{46) } Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, P60.
the ability of a system to impose a specified amount of change on its environment as "gross" power, and "nett" power is described as the cost of change to the system concerned. 48)

Modalski in defining power as; "... the community's present means to obtain the future desirable behavior of other states" 49) draws a distinction between "governmental power" and "national power"; governmental power may be described as the means that are put at the disposal of the policy-makers by the community and that are currently employed in actions aimed at altering the foreign policies of other states. National power on the other hand, is more difficult to indicate with certainty. Governments do not have at their disposal, at any one time, all the powers they could possibly mobilize; rather governmental power is the power that the government has succeeded in obtaining from the community for foreign policy aims and that the community has consented to devote to those aims. 50) Governmental power may, for example, coincide with national power in such instances as when the national survival is at stake, that is to say, when the total effort exerted is the maximum that could possibly be brought to bear. Such occasions are obviously rare and governmental power, therefore, operates on a level well below the maximum attainable. National power can, therefore, be described as a "limiting concept", a concept indicating the; "... magnitude of effort that a community can bring itself to produce in the gravest of emergencies". 51)

50) Ibid, P22.
51) Ibid.
Governmental power is subject to fluctuations in accordance with the urgency of devoting resources to national policy, whereas national power is of a more subtle nature. National power valuations figure in longer term estimates of a state's ability to exert influence on its environment. Power estimates also usually focus attention on means that are positively and actually at the government's or community's disposal. The weaker, more vulnerable points of government are revealed by implication only, by the fact that power is lacking.  

Classically national power has been regarded as "power tested in war"; yet many nations have greatly augmented their influence in international affairs without possessing a large military establishment or even aspiring to one. "We often think of national power as a composite of resources and skills, which can be symphonically orchestrated into some grand national design." Such national power, however, is usually latent and does not necessarily comprise forces in being. In order, therefore, to clearly establish the comprehensive bounds of national capability it is necessary to identify the components of the national capability spectrum and to arrange them in a workable classification.

4.1 Identification and classification of the sources of national capability

Numerous authors have set about identifying composites of resources and skills, which serve as a kind of checklist of disparate sources from which a state, in a particular situation, may draw resources with which to support its policy and in terms of which the capability of a state may

52) Ibid, PP22-23.
be estimated.

Morgenthau, in identifying the components of national capability of a state vis-a-vis other states, stresses that national capability is a relative concept and that no capability or "power" assessment can be absolute, in that the actors in the international system do not exist in isolation and that capability assessments are also of a transitory nature and any calculation which ignores this factor will err in its estimation.54)

The elements of national power are classified as comprising the factors of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national morale and the quality of diplomacy, and it is suggested that they be ranged in order of stability.55)

Most authors recognize a two part division of capability determinants; for example, in a further classification distinction is drawn between natural and social determinants, the former including the geographical determinants, natural resources, and population, while the latter division includes elements of economic development, political development and national morale.56) A similar division may be drawn between tangible and intangible factors. The list of tangible factors includes geographic location, population and manpower, natural resource endowment, and military power. The intangibles include political, economic and social structures, educational and technical levels, national morale and the international strategic position as perceived by the state itself and the other systemic actors.57) On the other hand, the division may be classified

55) Ibid, PP112-149.
56) Organski, AFE, op cit, P124.
57) Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, P68.
as physical and non-physical. The physical division is described as containing four categories, namely military strength (actual and potential), geographic features, demographic features and the overall performance of the national economy. The effectiveness of the physical elements is dependent on the nature and quality of the non-physical aspects, which include the factors of national character, internal cohesion and leadership. 58)

A further classification also recognizes a two part division of the operational environment, but introduces the notion of the external environment in which states must exist and which ultimately gives meaning to internal capability resources. This classification provides a useful index:

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT:

EXTERNAL ——— GLOBAL
SUBORDINATE
SUBORDINATE OTHER
DOMINANT BILATERAL
BILATERAL

INTERNAL ——— MILITARY CAPABILITY
ECONOMIC CAPABILITY
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
INTEREST GROUPS
COMPETING ELITES

A three part index can be equally as effective in its assessment. A division may be drawn, for example, between the relatively permanent material elements, including geography and natural resources; the less


permanent material elements, including industrial development and
military capability; and the human factors, including the quantity and
quality of the population, the quality of leadership and the role of
ideology and information.\(^{60}\) A more comprehensive three part classification
distinguishes between first, the geo-demographic base, which in turn is
divided into spatial, material and population elements; secondly, the
military, economic and political means; and thirdly, the "capacity for
collective action" which includes the social elements of national cohesion,
character, morale and leadership.\(^{61}\)

Most attempts at classification resemble each other. All include
geographical factors, material data, economic and technological data and
lastly, human data, such as political organization, moral unity and the
quality of leadership. However, in order to comply with the requirements
of theory, such classifications should, in the first instance, be
homogeneous, that is to say, situated on the same level of generality.
Secondly, the list must be complete, which implies that the elements must
be expressed by concepts which cover the concrete diversity of phenomena
variable from period to period. Finally, the classification should be
such as to permit a comprehension of why the factors of capability are
not the same from century to century and why the measure of capability
is in essence approximate.\(^{62}\)

\(^{60}\) Thompson, KW and Macridis, RC, "The Comparative Study of Foreign
Policy" in Macridis, RC, (ed), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*,
Fourth edition, Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1972, P5.

\(^{61}\) Wilkinson, DO, *op cit*, PP33-34.

\(^{62}\) Aron, R, *op cit*, PP52-54.
It is necessary, therefore, to view the elements of national capability in their individual and combined effect on a state's total capability potential. Consequently, it would appear appropriate to consider the elements of national capability within the framework of a two part division of first, the more or less stable physical determinants of national capability and secondly, the less stable social determinants, so as to be able to gain a clear impression of the effect of both the constants and variables of national capability on a state's external interaction.

4.1.1 Physical determinants

The physical environment of a state has been defined as; "... the earth as modified by man and nature". It is traditional in international law to divide the physical environment into three categories namely land, sea and air, with space now included, but the physical environment does not only include purely geographical factors but also natural resources, population and manpower, industrial technology and agricultural productivity as well as military power. A capability analysis should logically begin with the most obvious of the physical factors, such as geographic characteristics which are not only the most easily observable, but also the most stable features.

4.1.1.1 Physical geography

The political-strategic implications of a state's physical geography

63) Frankel, J, The Making of Foreign Policy, op cit, P57.
64) Ibid.
are among the most important capability limitations; the more immediately
evident are such characteristics as the size and shape of the state,
its topography, location and climate. More subtle geographic influences
include the nature of the state's frontiers, its neighbours, its insular,
peninsula, littoral or landlocked condition, its internal penetrability
and the distribution of its population. None of these factors affect
any state in the same way, yet any capability analysis must take such
geographical factors, which are relatively fixed conditions of state
existence, into account.65) The ideal norm would include; (a) a size
large enough to support a population with an adequate military establishment;
(b) a climate which is uniform and conducive to physical vigour and
productivity; (c) a topography offering boundaries with natural defence
barriers such as mountains, forests, swamps, rivers, deserts and oceans;
(d) a shape which is compact rather than elongated or disjointed and thus
easier to defend in conventional war.66)

Size does not automatically imply superior capability, but it is
fundamental to potential capability. Great size commonly implies the
presence of large expanses of arable land, a considerable variety and
quantity of raw materials, and thus the possible capacity to maintain a
large population, itself a major component of capability.67) The area
must be able to support a large population for it to be a positive element,
and this capacity depends on factors other than size.

In terms of military strategy, territorial area was in the past a

65) Lerche, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P69.
66) Rodee, C, et al., Introduction to Political Science, Second edition,
considerable advantage, in that it allowed room for retreat and manoeuvre and further, once conquered, a large area is difficult to occupy and difficult to maintain effective control over. In the nuclear era, size of territory determines to what extent the nuclear power is able to disperse its industrial and urban centres, scatter its offensive missiles in protection against surprise attack, and organise regional defences, thus in turn enhancing the credibility of the state's nuclear threat. However, mere space can just as easily be a source of weakness and a temptation to invasion as well as a source of strength.

There is a point at which great size may impair efficiency. There may, for example, be difficulties in developing an efficient transport and communications infrastructure, size may easily multiply the number and the complexity of the problems with which the government must deal, and this may lead to a burgeoning, overbearing governmental bureaucracy. If additional size means that diverse nationality groups will be incorporated within the borders, this too could add to internal instability and thus detract from potential capability.

Before the advent of the modern military machine, topography and terrain, particularly in respect to natural barriers, were great assets in maintaining national security. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans made American isolationism possible. The great African deserts protected

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68) Organski, AFK, *op cit*, P129.


Egypt for centuries, and the Alps on the border between France and Italy have served as a protective barrier for both states through the ages. Similarly, the Pyrenees range has isolated Spain from the principal trends of the rest of Europe. The topography of the terrain has an influence on the size and shape of a state and offensive and defensive potentialities. Where expansion occurs, it tends to occur along the lines that nature makes easiest and to stop when serious natural obstacles are encountered. Historically thus, states have sought frontiers that they regard as strategically desirable and their capacity for defence and offence has presumably been affected by the degree of success achieved. (For example, the fact that the plains of Poland and East Germany are a natural continuation of the Soviet plains, necessitated the creation of a zone of buffer states - Warsaw Pact countries - for defence of the Soviet Union against Western Europe.) The location of mountains, valleys, rivers and plains may, furthermore, affect the establishment of an effective communications network and infrastructure, inhibiting thus political unity and stability.

Topography has a decisive influence on climate: wind, rainfall, temperature and consequently soil conditions, are all influenced by the lie of the land, sea and mountains. The capability significance of climate is self-evident; clearly all polar, desert and tropical regions are handicapped in their capability potential. Climate is closely related to a nation's productivity. Climatic conditions have much to do with both the formation and the use of soils; extreme cold or dryness precludes agricultural or pastoral production in large enough quantities.

72) Van Dyke, V, op cit, P207.
73) Organski, AFK, op cit, P133.
to sustain large populations. Similarly, the climate of the equatorial zone or the polar regions severely handicaps the potential for industrial development of states in such regions. In inhibiting productive capacity, both industrial and agricultural, climatic conditions inhibit the necessary basis of a significant national capability. 74)

A further climatic consideration is the fact that certain areas of the world are either so hot or so cold that human beings are unable to function optimally, with the result that these areas can never produce states with significant capability. It has been argued that a great power cannot exist outside of the temperate zones. 75)

Similarly, the geographic location of a state has a substantial influence upon a state's strategic significance in international affairs and thus upon the state's ability to exert a degree of leverage over its external environment. A state located remotely from the centre of world politics and away from the main friction zones of international politics may be able to pursue its own national interest without external (Big-power) interference. By the opposite logic, states situated close to the epicentre of world politics or located in regions of the world where the interests and ambitions of Big-powers prevail, are more likely to become involved (willingly or unwillingly) in the interplay of power politics, and are thus more likely to be of strategic significance to the powers concerned 76) (states located in the Middle East, Horn of Africa or southern Africa, for example).


75) Sprout, H and M, op cit, P278.

Certain regions of the world are traditionally recognized as being strategic and geographic locations relative to them, therefore, influence a state's potential significance. Such areas include narrow passages between two seas (the Bosporus Straits, Straits of Hormuz or the Straits of Malacca, for example), or artificial passages such as the Suez or Panama Canals, or littoral states adjacent to major trade routes (South Africa), or location near the world's major commercial centres, or level plains which form the easiest invasion route.  

The element of geographic location is of further importance to capability in that it determines a state's neighbours. Bordering states usually have the most extensive mutual relations; a state which falls in the shadow of a dominant power, for example, may be totally eclipsed. The relative power of neighbouring states is often more significant than that of states separated by great distances, particularly if the states concerned are of more or less equal capability. Geography does not necessarily determine the relative power of neighbours, but it does determine who the country's neighbours are, that is, it determines the countries with which a state has to compete and the adaptation of its political and military posture accordingly. (Chad and Libya, or Finland vis-a-vis the USSR, for example).

The geographical elements of the physical environment are the most persistent characteristics of a state.

The location of continents, islands, rivers and harbors, and the soils, minerals, plants and climate of a particular area change only in geological time. Through the centuries these factors are thought to exert a continuing influence on civilization and policy.

77) Organski, AFK, op. cit., PP135-137.

78) Ibid., P137.

The specific influence of the various geographical factors on capability appears to be uncertain and various schools of geographic theory differ in their interpretation of the basic assumptions of the influence of the geographic factor. They differ, for example, as to the importance of geographical factors in determining the character of states, their policies, the location of their boundaries, and the location of the power centres in the world. They also differ as to the relative significance of individual geographical elements such as location, terrain, resources, climate in influencing the capabilities of states. Furthermore, they differ as to the degree of persistence of the influence of geographic factors in time and the degree of uniformity in the importance of geographical influences in all situations. 80)

The physical dimensions of our planet remain the same as ever. The geographic layout of lands and seas has not changed significantly during the past generation. What has changed, and changed almost beyond recognition, is the political value and significance of these geographic realities. This is not to argue that geographic variables no longer have political significance. In many situations the mountains, deserts, oceans, and other geographic realities still present obstacles to political undertakings both military and nonmilitary. 81)

Regardless of theoretical controversy as to the exact influence of geographical factors on national capability, it cannot be disputed that in dealing with the geographic characteristics of a state attention is being given to the basic form and shape of the state concerned; as such, it may be concluded that the geographic characteristics of a state provide the basic foundations upon which any state must build its capability. It is, therefore, self-evident that the degree of influence which a state may exert on systemic conditions is intimately connected with the size, shape and location of the state. Thus elements of climate,

80) Ibid.

topography and adverse location, while in their combined interaction may possibly militate against the establishment and endurance of a significant capability, do not deny the state its basic potential for accomplishing a status of significant capability and systemic influence should other factors be favourable. While the geographic elements of the capability matrix provide the irrefutable physical dimensions within which the state must operate, its influence is not irreversible and depends to a large extent on the interaction and nature of other elements in the capability matrix.

4.1.1.2 Population

The basic premise in considering the element of population in capability estimation, is a consideration of the gross number of human beings which the state incorporates. Assuming that other factors are equal, greater population means greater capability to perform more tasks at a higher level of effectiveness. But seldom are other factors equal, and population data, therefore, ought to be qualified by such factors as age and sex distribution, racial and tribal diversity, and spatial dispersion. 82 While it is not possible to draw an unqualified correlation between population size and capability, it is nevertheless, true that no state which does not rank among the more populous states of the world can remain or become a first rate power. 83

In terms of capability analysis, the term 'manpower' is probably a more meaningful notion than population. This concept implies that all individuals who are politically useless, as well as those needed simply

82) Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, P70.
83) Morgenthau, HJ, op cit, P125.
to keep the society functional (such as food producers), must be subtracted from the gross total. The result is the so-called manpower quotient that with appropriate direction, manipulation, leadership and administration can be mobilized to contribute to the military, productive and political capability of the state. 84)

Capability estimates involving manpower over a specific time span must take into account trends of evolution and development within the population. A comparison of birth and death rates, will suggest an insight into the net growth rate of the population, as well as age level and life expectancy trends. Population trends are of constant concern to governments, as a large population only becomes a capability asset when it is a population of maximum potential usefulness for military and productive purposes. 85) (A population clustering heavily in the upper age groups or with an imbalance of females, for example, may be of lesser significance than might be estimated from size alone.) While the ready availability of the services of an efficient and experienced organization of manpower resources is an indispensable capability advantage, the importance of these resources lies in the fact that the formation, or the changing of any distinct pattern or trend in human behaviour, is a process which can only be applied over time and with consistency. 86)

The element of population as a capability determinant depends, for its effectiveness, on the number of people falling within the most productive age group. Thus, while a large population does not necessarily guarantee a large and capable armed force or a high productive capacity, it is a prerequisite for these important parameters of capability. Without a

84) Lerche, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P70.
85) Ibid.
large population it is hardly possible to establish and maintain the
industrial plant necessary for the successful conduct of modern war,
to put into the field the large number of combat groups to fight on
land, sea and in the air, and finally to fill the cadres of the troops,
considerably more numerous than the combat troops, which must supply
the latter with food, means of transportation and communication, ammunition
and weapons. Although the advantage of a large population to military
capability is obviously significant, this notion is really only appropriate
in the instance of a conventional war conducted over some length of time
and does not necessarily hold any significance for, or relation to the
development and maintenance of a nuclear capability. Similarly, modern
tactics of insurgency and guerrilla warfare involve the deployment of
small bands of armed fighters, and a particularly large defence force is
not necessarily an effective defence against such tactics.

A large population is, however, essential for the development and
maintenance of a modern state economy of sufficient capability to be of
international significance. Without a sufficiently large population
there cannot be the quantity of human talent and manpower necessary for
the highly interdependent, specialized and technologically advanced
industrial systems of the world. A large population would, further,
provide a cheap supply of labour which would increase a state's economic
competitiveness and hence its overall capability and similarly, ensure
a large domestic consumer market.

In considering population as an element of the capability matrix the

87) Morgenthau, HJ, op cit, P125.
88) Wendzel, RL, op cit, P91.
89) Ibid, P92.
population density and spatial dispersion of the people must be borne in mind. A state which is overpopulated to the point where it cannot support its own nationals is obviously at a considerable capability disadvantage (in much the same way as a state which is scantily populated). Disporportionate population growth is, therefore, hardly an advantage; if population increases at a rate faster than that at which the increment can be absorbed into useful employment, the result would be a slowing of economic growth and an increase in the potential for political instability. Excess population, relative to the economic, political and social capacity of the country, is a fertile ground for conflict and will be a drain on other resources, preventing the state from exerting capability influence. In the same way, extreme tribal diversity or heterogeneity may hold a potential for conflict and political instability.

The element of population, therefore, both qualitatively and quantitatively, does not appear to have a precisely measurable effect upon capability estimation but is obviously of importance as a factor in the total milieu in which capability analysis takes place. The above consideration is concerned only with the physical and tangible notion of population (as human beings occupying a geographic area) and whereas the population of a state is the effective dynamism of the state, such factors as educational levels, national morale and character are intangible elements which have a direct influence on national capability in themselves, and not only on population. The inhabitants of a state are a relatively constant element in the existence of a state and are thus of considerable significance in any capability assessment.


91) Wendzel, RL, op cit, P95.
4.1.1.3 Natural resources

Natural resource endowment is a further essential component of capability. While it does not necessarily follow that a state which is richly endowed with natural resources will automatically be a great power, natural resources provide a base on which capability depends. That is to say, that the economic, military and political capability of a state is largely relative to the capacity of its industrial base, which in its turn, is dependent on an unlimited supply of raw materials. Resource endowment may, therefore, be described as a limiting factor upon capability, as no state can function at a level beyond that permitted by the adequacy of its resource endowment or the security of its access to scarce raw materials. 92)

The large catalogue of raw materials contains commodities of vegetable and animal origin as well as minerals. It includes the sources of man's food, clothing, shelter, of the feed for his animals, of heat, light and power, and of all sorts of industrial goods. 93)

Furthermore, a distinction is drawn between raw materials and natural resources, because a 'natural resource' may be termed a 'raw material' depending on whether there is a specific demand for the raw material, available through exploitation of the resource, and whether a sufficient amount of skill and technology for the exploitation of the resource has been developed, if only in the form of equipment and labour supply. For a natural resource to be of any significance to capability, therefore, it is necessary that there be both the demand and the means available for its exploitation. 94) Resources, therefore, contribute to capability as they are developed. The mere knowledge of their existence, however,


93) Ibid, P369.

94) Ibid, P370. Also Wendzel, RL, op cit, PP96-98.
may indeed provide the state with a degree of leverage over its external environment.

The most basic natural resource is food supply, as a state which is self-sufficient or near self-sufficient in agricultural production has a considerable advantage over a state that relies upon the import of deficient foodstuffs. Self-sufficiency in food supply enables a state so endowed to channel its national energies into primary policy objectives without having to divert energy in order to ensure that their population will not starve. Conversely, permanent scarcity of foods is a source of permanent weakness in international politics; the increase in demand outstripping the supply of food creates a particular vulnerability which places an insuperable handicap on the objectives of the state concerned, as it is forced to act from a base of weakness rather than strength. Self-sufficiency in food supply is a relatively stable factor in capability assessment, although it might be subject to decisive changes, as a result of improved agricultural techniques, changing patterns of consumption or nutritional values. 95)

What holds true of food is also true of those natural resources which are important for industrial production and more particularly for military capability. The absolute and relative significance of raw material endowment for a state depends on the technology of industry and warfare practiced during a particular period of history. Through the ages the three most basic mineral resources have been coal, iron and oil. These three minerals have formed the basis of an industrial and military capability and a state must either possess them or acquire them through international arrangements if it is to exert influence in international politics. 96)

96) Padelford, NJ and Lincoln, GA, op cit, P34.
A point frequently overlooked is the large number and diversity of raw materials, particularly minerals, required to support a modern industrialized economy. Besides the basic coal, iron and ferro-alloys, modern industry requires huge quantities of non-ferrous minerals. These include a long list of metals headed by copper, aluminium, tin and lead. Equally important are many non-metallic substances: sulphur, potash, nitrates, chlorides and other ingredients of the chemical industry which produce a vast array of commodities from munitions to fertilizers, from drugs to plastics.\(^{97}\)

A state which lacks sufficient supply of any strategic material and seeks to supplement such a capability deficiency need consider four aspects, namely; time, distance, mass and political action required to supplement capability needs. Overcoming raw material shortages requires time, due to the fact that new sources cannot be brought into production overnight; elements of distance separating the location of additional sources of supply from the industrial centres in which they are processed must also be considered, as added transportation distances mean increased costs. Similarly, the increasing demand for ever larger masses of material requires consideration. Furthermore, since the transportation facilities needed to ferry resource imports are of critical importance, control of these facilities becomes vital. (The Suez Canal, for example, and the vast sums invested in supertankers during its closure.)\(^{98}\) In their efforts to overcome shortages, many industrial states rely heavily on stockpiling and synthesising, revising their checklist of important stockpiles in the light of changing political-strategic conditions.


\(^{98}\) Wendzel, RL, op cit, PP96-100 and Padelford, NJ and Lincoln, GA, op cit, PP31-33.
Two direct consequences of the politics of resource endowment may be identified: first, the uneven distribution of essential resources inspires corrective policies on the part of the 'have nots'; and secondly, that a state's resource endowment affects its war-making ability and thereby, its international political position. The first proposition can be illustrated by the pre-occupation of the developing nations in securing adequate food supplies and the depletion among the industrialised powers of supplies of long-standing resources, necessitating increasing dependence on foreign sources of supply. The latter is borne out by the fact that through the ages, as the technology of warfare has progressed so the strategic value of resources has changed; the state not possessing the appropriate resources of the time, being put at a strategic disadvantage (the rise in importance of uranium deposits in the nuclear age, for example). Raw materials may further be wielded as a 'cold war' tactic, the rationale of such a strategy being the assumption that an embargo of strategic minerals would hamper a state's industrial and military capability (the Arab oil embargo, for example). 99)

No state is totally self-sufficient in raw material supplies and furthermore, almost all raw materials are expendable. All states have, therefore, to consider the security and endurance of their raw material supplies if the state is to maintain a significant level of capability. Obviously states which are richly endowed with natural resources and are able to export large quantities of raw materials are at a distinct advantage over the state which is dependent on imports. Nevertheless, in assessing capability, attention must be given to both the short-term exploitation and the long-term usage of resources so as to determine the influence of the particular resource upon the overall capability of the producer and the importer.

4.1.1.4 Industrial capacity

The so-called industrial capacity of a state may be seen as a direct function of the preceding elements of 'manpower' and natural resources; industrial capacity is measured in terms of production, which has been described as the application of human effort to the transformation of resources from raw materials into finished products. Thus the level of industrial capacity is determined in part by the initial resource endowment, and in part by the amount and quality of manpower committed to the production process.

Mere possession of raw materials is not sufficient to enhance a state's capability; it must command the expertise for the exploitation of its resources. India, for example, cannot be classified as a first rank power comparable to the United States or the Soviet Union, despite India's considerable potential. The reason for this lag between actualities and potentialities is compounded by the lack of an industrial capacity commensurate with the availability of resources.

The quality and productive capacity of the industrial plant, the know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist, the managerial organization — all these are factors upon which the industrial capacity of a nation and, hence, its power depend.

We have argued that from the point of view of military capability, the technology of modern warfare and communications has made the overall development of heavy industries indispensable. This, however, is perhaps an over-simplification in that it could be argued that for the development of a nuclear capability, for example, a relative degree of industrialization is obviously necessary but not determinative, because a moderately

100) Lerche, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P71.

101) Morgenthau, HJ, op cit, P119.
developed economy with technological expertise and a sound financial base might be sufficient (India is once again a case in point). Besides the fact that industrialized states often export their technology to less developed states, many of the uses of the military instrument involve insurgency and guerrilla warfare for which a sophisticated industrial base is hardly an essential prerequisite.102) (The Vietnam War provides a relevant illustration.)

The increase in the importance of industrial capacity for capability has also accentuated the traditional distinction between great and small powers. What distinguishes super-powers from other states is their industrial self-sufficiency and their technological capacity to stay abreast of other states. Similarly, the dependence of powers of the third and fourth rank upon the powers of the first rank has also been greatly increased. The military power of the former depends to an almost decisive extent upon the willingness of the latter to supply them with modern weapons and the means of modern communications and transportation. Without this supply many of them would be defenceless in confrontation with an enemy thus supplied.103) The high cost and sophisticated nature of modern, conventional or nuclear equipped armed forces has resulted in the fact that states with a substantial military capability are generally those industrialized states which have the technological infrastructure with which to maintain a considerable and effective modern military capability.104)

Productive capacity not only contributes to national capability as it relates to the actual or potential military capability of the state

103) Morgenthau, HJ, op. cit., P120.
possessing such a capacity, but is also significant because industrial
development is basic to economic well being and provides, in its own
right, a lever for exerting influence on other states. The discriminatory
treatment of states in economic matters has proved to be a major weapon
of those states which seek to wield influence in international affairs.
(For example, the perennial threats of the US to place an embargo on
economic interaction with the USSR, or the US/EEC embargo on trade with
Khomeini's Iran.) The production of manufactured goods gives a state
an opportunity to manipulate international economic relations for the
purpose of political advantage, but taking effective advantage of the
opportunity depends on human purpose and ingenuity. 105)

In a balanced economy, which is not overly dependent on the production
of raw materials or primarily dependent on the export of manufactured
goods, a sound industrial base is a stabilizing and rationalizing base
and an asset to overall capability. (As opposed, for example, to an
economy overly dependent on a limited mineral or agricultural commodity
base, subject to the vagaries of world demand.) States which lack any
manufacturing capacity or industrialized states which, on the other hand,
depend on the import of raw materials are at an obvious capability
disadvantage in relation to the former. (Japan's almost total dependence
on the importation of raw materials, is one of the best examples.)
Industrial capacity may be seen as a manifestation of the mobilization
and implementation of natural and population resources. A highly
developed industrial capacity, therefore, while an obvious capability
asset, can be seen as more of a limiting, rather than a decisive influence
on capability and is basically dependent upon natural factors, beyond
the limits of which it cannot easily be developed.

105) Van Dyke, V, op cit, PP204-205.
4.1.1.5 Military capability

Capability judgements must of necessity pay attention to military forces in being, for military capability is the central element of all capability estimations, due to the fact that the military remains the ultimate sanction in international politics. 106)

In modern world politics, where there exists nothing approaching a world state, world law, a monopoly of coercive force, a consensus on justice, or political order generally recognized as legitimate, military means are central to the attainment of goals by most states. 107)

There are at present three categories of military capability, dependent on different technologies and vastly different cost, which a state may have at its disposal. States that lack capability in one of the three areas are at times very capable in another. The first is a nuclear capability, which implies the ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence; secondly, a conventional force capability; and thirdly, a subconventional force capability; that is to say, guerrilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency forces.108)

In the estimation and assessment of a state's military capability various criteria may be applied, the first of which relates to size; that is, how large is the military establishment in terms of manpower? A second criterion is an assessment of equipment and arms with regard to modernity and sophistication, as well as the capacity to produce or acquire more. Thirdly, attention is given to development, examining both the relative allocation of men and material among the various arms

106) Lerche, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P72.

107) Wilkinson, DO, op cit, P36. See also Wendzel, RL, op cit, PP110-111 where it is suggested that there are situations in which the utility of military power is much less than one would expect from the mere assessment of its components.

and services, and the pattern of their deployment within the state's territory and (where applicable) its overseas bases. Finally, the full military capability of a state is comprehensible only against the background of, and in relation to the terms of whatever strategic and tactical doctrines are current at the time of analysis; these principles will govern the way in which the armed forces are actually used in support of state objectives.

Because assessments of military capability must be made largely on the basis of contingencies that cannot be foreseen, three errors in judgement are possible. First, military capability is largely dependent upon the sum total of the body politic for its force. Therefore, while troops are an important determinant of military capability, without other foundations they will not suffice. Secondly, the military element is often viewed in more static terms than is appropriate, that is to say, that latent peace-time military potential may be mobilized into a vastly under-estimated military force during time of crisis. Thirdly, it is difficult to foresee and analyse in advance of a particular war, the most effective distribution of the components of military force; that is to say, will a nuclear capability be necessary or will a small highly trained conventional force suffice?

Furthermore, a distinction may be drawn between putative and actualized military power. Putative military power is described as having three components: first, military force (that is to say military strength); secondly, military potential or the capacity to expand or improve


110) Thompson, KW and Macridis, RC, op cit, P10.
existing military forces; and thirdly, military reputation, that is, the expectation of the other actors, derived from past experience, that the state concerned has a greater or lesser disposition to resort to military threats when its vital interests are crossed. There are three mechanisms through which military strength may be actualized, namely; war, military threats or lastly, through the anticipation or anxiety of other states that the state concerned may resort to military force should a serious conflict of interest arise.  \(^{111}\)

Although ostensibly the primary purpose of military capability is to defend and protect the state against offensive incursions and to be deployed in military conflicts, an extremely significant role of military forces is the capacity to prevent domestic, social and political unrest from overthrowing the existing governmental regime. The role of military forces in ensuring internal stability is equally as significant as their defensive role. On the other hand though, a military force which becomes too strong domestically, poses a threat to the incumbent regime, as exemplified by the countless military coups in South America. Troops may also be used in time of natural disaster, but in assessing military capability the significant issue is the degree to which a state's military capacity might be inhibited by the threat of internal instability and civil disorder.  \(^{112}\) (The crucial significance of the divided loyalty of the Iranian Armed Forces in the Iranian revolution, for example.)

Military capability is subject to numerous contingencies and variables. Thus, for example, it is possible for underdeveloped states to acquire

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112) Coplin, WD, op cit, PP116-117.
advanced military equipment from the developed states, while lacking sufficiently skilled and trained men to handle the equipment. Furthermore, training is not merely a matter of technical skill in handling the weapons of warfare, but is also a matter of developing the capacity of men to fight well and to make strategically correct decisions under battle conditions. The more a state depends on foreign suppliers of military hardware, the more vulnerable that state is to constraints on its use of military force and the less independent is its capability, because foreign dependence involves the acquisition of spare parts for maintenance, as well as the use of foreign advisors to deploy the equipment correctly. (The need for large contingents of Soviet technicians to accompany the supply of Soviet weaponry to client-states, for example.) In a number of ways then, states that supply military equipment can exert influence over those states which receive the hardware. 113)

States which have the ability to produce their own military equipment are not completely independent in their military capability. Besides the dependence that might grow out of alliance commitments (NATO, Warsaw Pact), for example, these states still depend on others for raw materials and logistical support. (Both the US and USSR are dependent on the maintenance of military facilities in areas considered of strategic interest to either or both, throughout the world.) States with global interests are obviously more dependent upon others for logistical support than those with narrow interests. Examination of contemporary military capability indicates that very few states are totally independent in their military capability, and military capability is obviously relative to the threat. 114)

113) Ibid, P115.
(Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan and Israel are examples of lesser states with a high level of self-sufficiency in weapons supply for their particular defence contingencies, but it is an unstable proficiency, relative to the escalating nature of the military threat and the sophistication of the equipment of the enemy.)

In an unstable world organization of states, where international law recognizes the right of self-defence and self-help, the ultimate means of defending the body politic is by military means, and the larger the military capability of the state, in relation to the above criteria, the greater will be the state's capability potential in international affairs. 115) Military capability is indeed the essential sanction of a state's role, whether defensive or offensive, in international politics and is, therefore, a most basic element in the assessment of national capability. Military capability is a highly variable notion and cannot be considered in isolation. Attention must be given to attendant circumstances such as conditions of war and peace, military tradition and prowess, the domestic role of the military and the nature and circumstances of the conflict, plus the numerous additional elements of the capability matrix, which in their interaction, either directly or indirectly influence military potential.

4.1.2 Social determinants

The social determinants of capability concern the less concrete, more intangible elements of the environment, that is to say, elements which are qualitative in nature and empirically generally difficult to measure.

The social environment has been described as comprising an interest in "... mankind and its subdivisions". Elements included in this subdivision are the levels of economic development, educational and technological levels, political organization, national character and morale, and the nature of leadership.

4.1.2.1 Economic capability

The level of economic development of a state may be described as the product of the level of technological development and the available resources, and is of importance to overall national capability first, because economic strength may contribute to military capability, and secondly, because it is an important tool of capability in its own right.

Any assessment of a state's economic capability and capacity should include detailed analysis of the economic wealth of the state per se; the degree to which this wealth satisfies the needs of the society; and the growth patterns of the economy. To this end economists have developed the concept of gross national product (GNP) to measure the value of all goods and services produced by a nation in any one year. Since GNP figures can be converted to a single currency standard, it is possible to use them to compare the wealth of one state with the economic wealth of another. GNP can be examined from two perspectives; from the perspective of production output or from the perspective of the allocation of output. The second perspective is particularly significant.


in the context of international affairs, in that although not all of the aggregate capacity of states is available for the generation of military strength, the ratio of military expenditure as a percentage of the total GNP is an effective measure.\(^{118}\)

While GNP provides a general indication as to a state's overall economic strength, it should not be used to infer the capacity of the economy to satisfy the economic demands of the populace. A more useful indicator of to what extent the goods and services produced are distributed among the people in the state is that of GNP per capita (that is, the total amount of goods and services produced divided by the number of people in the state).\(^{119}\) However, it should be noted that production per capita figures do not automatically reflect economic strength for foreign policy objectives because different economies allocate economic resources differently. Thus in a tightly controlled economy, for example, per capita figures may be of lesser significance in indicating general economic capability.\(^{120}\)

In addition to the absolute and relative capacities of the state to produce quantities of goods and services, the types of goods and services produced should be considered. Given different geographical, historical and cultural backgrounds, states tend to have different capacities to produce different types of goods and services. States with poorly developed economies produce the most limited variety of goods and services, usually limited to agricultural products and raw materials.


\(^{119}\) Coplin, WD, *op cit*, P104.

\(^{120}\) Wendzel, RL, *op cit*, P105.
These states are thus most susceptible to fluctuations in demand on the international market and have their economic capability severely inhibited by their dependence on one, or only a small variety of goods. Whereas most of the highly developed states do not produce sufficient agricultural goods and do not have sufficient raw materials to meet demand, the wide base of manufactured goods produced ensures a more stable economic capability.\(^{121}\)

A third dimension of economic capability is the state's potential for economic growth; clear distinction is usually drawn between states that are economically developed, states that show signs of sustained economic growth and are thus developing, and those states which are classified as being economically underdeveloped (the so-called less developed countries or LDC's).\(^{122}\) Measures of economic development include the level of a state's energy production and consumption (an industrialized economy obviously requires a large energy supply) and the percentage of a state's labour force engaged in non-agricultural production. The process of economic development may be viewed as the shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy. This shift cannot be accomplished, however, unless and until each agricultural worker produces enough food to allow others to be set free to participate in the economic modernization process.\(^{123}\)

In this context we must also consider a state's ability to maintain a favourable balance of payments. All foreign transactions, including foreign purchases and sales, overseas investments, military expenditure

\(^{121}\) Coplin, WD, _op cit_, P105.

\(^{122}\) Wendzel, RL, _op cit_, PP104-105.

\(^{123}\) _Ibid_, P101 and PP105-107. Also Coplin, WD, _op cit_, P107.
in other countries, and other expenditures and receipts comprise the
called balance of payments. 'Balance' refers to the net difference
between debits (payments) and credits (receipts) and indicates whether
a state is able to meet its international financial obligations or is
forced to draw on reserves; or whether exports (and hence wealth coming
into the country) balance or surpass imports or the amount of money
leaving the country. 124)

National economic capability and power, in its own right, can be wielded
with much the same objective as military power. It may be used coercively
by threatening or damaging a state economically, for example, by means
of the imposition of unfavourable tariff and quota control, trade boycotts
and embargoes, and by means of credit and currency manipulation. It
may be used as an adjunct to military operations in a conflict situation,
the objective being either to hold or conquer strategic resources so
that military forces can operate at maximum capacity, or deprive the
enemy of these resources so that its capacity to continue the struggle
will be weakened. The techniques of economic warfare include blockades
of supplies, blacklisting of trade relations, pre-emptive buying and the
promise of rewards for certain prescribed economic actions. 125)

Positively, economic power can be used to influence foreign governments
by means of aid and assistance programmes. There are four main types of
aid programmes: first, military aid which is among the oldest techniques
of bonding alliances; secondly, technical assistance which is the least
costly of all types of aid programmes and is designed to disseminate
knowledge and skills rather than goods or runds; thirdly, grants and

125) Holsti, KJ, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis,
op cit., PP245-257.
commodity import programmes which imply the granting of financial or material assistance without expectation of repayment or the granting of a favoured trading status; fourthly, development loans, which represent a transfer of funds on an agreed basis of reimbursement. Economic dependency on foreign investment and loans or aid may severely inhibit a state's total economic, military and political capability and limit the decisionmaker's freedom of choice.

It is evident that the level of economic development of a state acts as an important variable in the state's ability to achieve its national objectives and to fulfill the potential capability bestowed by its physical endowment and thus the state's overall ability to exert influence on systemic conditions. The more developed the economic structure, the larger is the proportion of its GNP that is available for external purposes, whether military ventures, economic aid programmes or diplomatic commitments. The larger a state's GNP and per capita GNP, the more highly flexible an economic capability it has and the more variety it can introduce into its actual means of action. Economic capability is indeed a most crucial element in a state's overall national capability. The pursuit of stable economic well being must of necessity be one of any state's prime national objectives and is, therefore, one of the most basic and significant determinants of international interaction.

4.1.2.2 Educational and technological levels

The general educational and technological level of a nation is another societal characteristic that bears directly upon capability.

126) Ibid, PP259-262.
Military effectiveness, industrial productivity, and social cohesiveness are all major functions of the extent to which educational and technical facilities are dispersed within the society. Fundamental to the matter of educational and technological levels is the question of literacy. No state can muster a significant national effort if the basic communication skills are lacking among any significant proportion of its people. Effective consensus building and efficient administration, basic necessities for the realization of state objectives, are dependent upon a literate population; the massive efforts made by China and India, for example, to bring minimal literacy to their people, underscores its importance. 128)

A second basic capability element is what might be called 'tool' skill, which means orientation toward, and facility in the employment of the tools and techniques of modern industrial civilization. This involves emotional adjustment and acculturation as much as the actual learning of skills and procedures. A third factor refers to the quantity and quality of the higher stratum of educated specialists; does the nation have enough specialists of the right sort? Is their level of performance and maintenance of technological and scientific standards adequate for the potential demands a state may make of them? These and related questions may even in short-run situations (such as 'crash' programmes of weapons development) be the real determinant of the state's working range of capability. 129)

Technology as a discipline of international relations, has been described as the science of relating invention and progress of material culture to world politics; "... the art of developing mechanical devices

129) Ibid, P74.
for, and utilizing them in, war, diplomacy and international trade, travel, and communication.\textsuperscript{130) From a military strategic point of view, an innovative technological capability may alter the power position of a state with relative rapidity. (The twentieth century has thus far witnessed four major innovations in the technique of warfare — armour, air power, supersonic and nuclear capabilities — which gave at least a temporary advantage to the side that possessed them first.) Viewed statistically, a state's technological capability consists of its stock of knowledge of how to produce goods and services, and the diffusion of this know-how through the labour force by means of education, training and experience. Seen dynamically, technological excellence reflects the rate at which this stock of knowledge is enriched.\textsuperscript{131)}

The value of technological innovation is thus not limited to weapons alone, for technological improvement in industrial know-how and increasing productivity is a continuing feature of modern times.\textsuperscript{132)}

In short, the level of education clearly affects the population's skills levels, both quantitatively and qualitatively; without a reasonably literate population an industrial economy cannot begin to function. In fact, the differentiation, specialization and interdependence of all modern governmental, social and economic systems probably could not occur (at least not efficiently) without mass education and certainly there cannot be advanced technological development without advanced education. One cannot change the educational level of a country overnight and the lack of a high grade educational performance has handicapped states with large populations and the potential of being of

\textsuperscript{130) Wright, Q, \textit{op cit}, P369.}

\textsuperscript{131) Knorr, K, \textit{The Power of Nations}, \textit{op cit}, P55.}

greater influence (India and Brazil, for example).

In examining the element of educational levels as an important factor in the assessment of a state's national capability, it is necessary to consider both prevailing educational and technological standards as well as long-term provisions for the maintenance and improvement of such standards. The educational and technological levels may be said to be the factors which determine to a large extent, the efficiency with which physical potential may be maximized and actualized as capability in international affairs.

4.1.2.3 Political organization

Central to capability are the forms, structures and processes of government which comprise the political organization of the state. A political system comprises three broad divisions; political culture, political socialization and political structure. The notion of political culture embodies the set of beliefs or ideas espoused by the decisionmakers. Such beliefs and ideas are derived from values and norms embodied in the society and may be shaped by history, ideology, public opinion, pressure groups and competing elites. The carriers of political culture are invariably the political parties. Political socialization refers to the sense of identity with, and degree of participation in the political system; while the political structure comprises the constitutional matrix in which decisions are authorized, the institutions of government and the electoral system.133)

In order to measure the effectiveness of the particular political organization of any state in contributing to capability, it is necessary to assess

133) Brecher, M, *Foreign Policy of Israel*, op cit, PP117-118.
the organization's efficiency in mobilizing the national effort.

Political efficiency may be measured in terms of the performance of the bureaucracy and of the political parties. Both are crucial, for it is through them that the central government reaches and mobilizes its citizens for national purposes. In states with underdeveloped political systems, bureaucracy and party do not extend their influence out into the mass of the population, which in turn makes for inefficient administration and a lack of rapport between government and the mass consensus. 134)

A government may be highly centralized and authoritarian or relatively decentralised and democratic or lie at any point on the spectrum between the two extremes. Authoritarian governments tend to define loyalty in terms of obedience and conformity and are inclined towards coercion to maintain consensus. More democratic regimes allow for criticism as one of the criteria of an effective system. 135) It has sometimes been assumed that policymakers in authoritarian governments automatically possess major advantages compared to those in more democratic systems; they are not, for example, subject to the constraints of public opinion and are able to act in secrecy and with speed and decisiveness using whatever means are deemed appropriate. The public accountability of democratic policymakers makes them relatively less free to formulate and implement policy as they desire (these constraints have sometimes led to vast governmental efforts to deceive and mislead the populace). 136) It could be argued that responsive policies will engender more spontaneous

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134) Lerche, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P73. Also Organski, APK, op cit, PP170-171.


support and will require less direct governmental mobilization endeavours to carry them through.

In assessing the nature of the political organization and its influence on national capability it is necessary to consider the actual institutionalized components, formal and informal, within which the policymaker must act. Secondly, the extent to which the particular system is flexible and able to adjust to changing conditions. Also, whether there are certain historical precedents that will dictate options and decisions, or prevailing ideological influences. Thirdly, the adequacy of the information gathering system is vital if the policymakers are to be responsive to public opinion. The notion of feedback is of the utmost importance in any political process. Finally, we must establish whether the government is organized in such a way that policymakers are able to provide the specific means of policy implementation that are appropriate for given objectives.137) In other words, to what extent are they able to translate potential into real power or prevented from doing so by the mere non-existence of correct instrumentalities. Suppose a particular state has a highly diversified and differentiated modern economy with a strong industrial base. The mere existence of these characteristics gives the state a certain potential for action. If, for example, this economic potential cannot be utilized in its contribution to military and economic instruments of international statecraft, and is devoted instead to higher levels of domestic consumption, its contribution to the state's capability is inevitably limited.138)

Whatever the particular political organization of the state, if it is to be stable over the long-term it ought to represent the existing balance

137) Ibid, P120.
138) Ibid, Pp120-121.
of forces in the society and can be judged in its contribution to capability according to the criteria of effective control over its entire territory; the degree of loyalty which it commands and the ease with which it can mobilize mass support; the extent to which it is able to maintain internal cohesion and prevent factional or party strife which may impede governmental effectiveness; and the extent to which the branches of government are co-ordinated so as to facilitate the utilization and exploitation of the state's capability assets to the maximum advantage. 139)

4.1.2.4 National character and morale

The notions of national character and national morale have a decisive influence upon capability yet they remain elusive determinants and are difficult to measure.

National character has been described as the fundamental intellectual and moral traits which give each nation its unmistakeable distinctiveness and which set one nation apart from others and which generally display a high degree of resilience to change. National character consists of a national stereotype, that is to say; "... national likes and dislikes, do's and don'ts, idees fixes and what the psychologists call favourable and unfavourable 'associations'." 140) These characteristics are largely the product of the historical interaction of the natural and social environment and the physical and political geography of the country, its world role and its relations with its neighbours. 141)

139) Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, P73.


141) Ibid, P139.
National character cannot fail to influence national power; for those who act for the nation in peace and war, formulate, execute, and support its policies, elect and are elected, mold public opinion, produce and consume — all bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellectual and moral qualities which make up the national character. 142) Failure to take national character into account in assessing capability may lead to errors in judgement (the underestimation of German recuperative ability after the First World War is a case in point). It is important to know how an ally or enemy on the basis of national character, whether determined by previous history or inherited, might react in an adverse situation. A particular national stereotype is an influential element in capability assessment (the patriotically inspired fighting capability of the Israelis, for example).

National morale, in its turn, has been described as the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government and its objectives in peace and war. 143) Thus a state can be said to have a high morale when the government feels itself supported by an active, well informed, articulate and involved consensus. Such a condition requires that politically conscious people constitute the bulk of the society; that these individuals be convinced that the foreign policy enterprises in which the government is involved are derived from the prevailing mass values of the society. 144) In analyzing the extent to which the population supports the government and its policies, and hence the degree of societal unity, certain questions require answering: Is the general populace supportive, in opposition or largely indifferent? What is the attitude and strength of the various groups that are in a

142) Morgenthau, HJ, op cit, P132.
143) Ibid, P139. Also Duchacek, ID, op cit, P142.
144) Lercne, C0 and Said, AA, op cit, P75.
position to influence policymakers? How intensely are the various opinions held, and how susceptible are they to change? If there is compliance with the government's policies, is it largely voluntary or primarily the result of sanctions or fear? If sanctions are being used will they be effective in the long term and to what extent will they eventually drive the target group into more concerted opposition to the government? 145)

If a government concludes that the state of the national morale is sufficiently questionable as to raise doubts about the durability of the consensus upon which decisionmakers must rely, improvement of morale becomes a primary charge of government. What strategies the government may employ depend upon its judgement of the nature of the deficiencies and peculiar dynamics of the society and its controlling values. 146) Every government, to some extent, responds to domestic demands placed upon it by its electorate. The more responsive it is, the more likely it is to be supported. Every government has certain priorities among its objectives. The more important the objective, the more intensive will be the government's efforts to obtain popular support, and the more critical for that government that it be obtained. Thus the more the government's objectives and policies are consonant with the state's traditions, norms, belief system and historical experience, the more likely that government will enjoy unified support. Furthermore, the smaller the discrepancy between the people's expectations of the government and governmental achievement, the greater the unity of support it may enjoy. 147)

A state lacking internal political cohesion or possessing a disgruntled opposition to the government's policy objectives, or a realization on the

145) Wendzel, RL, op cit, P123.
146) Lerche, CO and Said, AA, op cit, P75.
147) Wendzel, RL, op cit, P123.
part of the population that it has been deceived by the government,
may hinder a state's capability however formidable its physical capability
may appear statistically. Generally speaking, the more a society is
fragmented the more attention, effort, and resources are required to
deal with this problem and the less available for the pursuit of foreign
policy objectives.

4.1.2.5 The nature of the leadership elite

The extent to which available capability resources are mobilized to
their fullest potential or capability deficiencies are overcome, in
short, the role which a state fashions for itself is determined by the
nature of the leadership elite. Leadership groups have been described as
being the products of at least three factors: their experience during
their rise to eminence; the structure in which they must operate; and
the values of their society. 148)

Three contemporary leadership types have been identified. First, the
bureaucratic, pragmatic leadership type; that is to say, a leadership
shaped by a society in which there are no fundamental social schisms,
and the product of an environment in which most recognized problems have
proved soluble. Its approach to policy is ad hoc, pragmatic and within
bureaucratic traditions. Secondly, the ideological type of leadership,

which implies a more personalized leadership shaped by ideological fervour and often motivated by a messianic desire to propagate its ideology. Thirdly, the charismatic - revolutionary type of leader, characteristic of so many of the new states of the world. Such leadership types have usually been shaped by overwhelmingly hostile conditions and a protracted struggle for power, sustained by a political vision of independence or liberation. This leadership type is characterized by a centralization of decisionmaking and is often dependent for its effectiveness upon the specific personality of the leader.149)

A strong leadership is a considerable capability asset in that it may engender a unity of action in society, which might otherwise be lacking.150) But whereas leadership may often have an overwhelming influence on the shaping of the attitudes of people, any leadership elite is generally representative of the norms, values and beliefs of the majority of the members of the society. Such values are the standards which the society consider desirable and political action is driven both by and toward them.151) The objectives of this national value hierarchy constitute, what may be loosely termed, the national interest and it falls to the leadership or decisionmaking elite to seek to reconcile the objectives of the national interest with the means available.152)

149) Ibid, PP267-273. See also Snyder, RC, et al, (eds), op cit, PP112-115. The authors describe such biographical factors as suggested by Kissinger as constituting the decisionmakers competence; "... we are dealing with the interaction of the actor and his competence."

150) Wilkinson, D0, op cit, PP73-78.


The leadership is thus responsible for the mobilization and manipulation of the capability resources which the state has at its disposal, in pursuit of the maximization of values. This balancing of value oriented ends with tangible realities is manifest in a programme for political action, or policy. Such policy is founded upon, and interpreted within the framework of societal values and goals of which leadership is a product.  

Atitudes and beliefs together define the values men hold and the ends they seek. Common experiences and shared beliefs and values also condition the ideas men have about their institutions, loyalties and interests; and these affect men's observation of the behavioral characteristics of others.  

Such values may be ascribed to the interaction of many processes and experiences; upbringing, political socialization in various contexts, indoctrination, religion, economic system, ideology; but nearly all are deducible to historical background, tradition and precedent. The shared historical experience engenders a common loyalty and purpose and is overwhelmingly influential in determining the attitudes and beliefs to which a society generally adheres.  

Although policy is the product of a comprehensive process encompassing the diverse demands of bureaucracy, political parties, and special interest and pressure groups, it must be essentially responsive to the societal values, and is in the last instance, dependent on the value  


oriented image of the leadership. The leadership's perception of the means and ends of policy and the external milieu in which such ends must be actualized constitute what has been called the decisionmaker's psychological environment.\(^{156}\) The implication is that the perception of a state's role in international politics is essentially a product of the decisionmaker's belief system and image of the environment. The extent to which a state perceives itself capable of influencing global or regional systemic conditions depends upon the nature and animus of the political leadership elite.

National capability has been identified as the most basic element in any assessment of a state's projected role in international politics. The resources of a state determine the ability of the state to exert pressure on the international system, in pursuit of the objectives of policy. National capability resources encompass the essential means which a state has at its disposal for realizing the ends of policy. The matrix employed here is intended to illustrate the all encompassing range of the resource spectrum, which if it is to be meaningful must encompass all the elements that characterize the state. These elements are not exclusive and in their interaction have a mutual influence on each other to the extent that the one is only relevant in relation to the other. Some of these elements are constant and fixed conditions of the state's existence, while others are highly variable and may be

\(^{156}\) Brecher, W., Foreign Policy of Israel, op cit, PP11-13. See also Milbraith, LW, "Interest groups and foreign policy" in Rosenau, JN, (ed), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Free Press, New York, 1967, PP231-245.
manipulated to the benefit or detriment of the total capability of a state.

To illustrate the combined effect of the stable and unstable elements of the matrix on capability, the physical and social determinants were considered separately. While the physical determinants of geographical features, population, natural resource endowment form the basic foundations upon which a state is built and determines the immovable characteristics and inherent potential (or lack of it) of the state, it also though, has a decisive influence on the nature of the state's industrial infrastructure and military capability, in that the latter cannot easily be developed beyond the limits of the potentiality of the former. (Although the factors of industrial and military capability are indeed changeable in time, they are tangible characteristics of a state's capability and are, therefore, categorized as physical determinants.) While the physical factors determine the tangible characteristics and infrastructure of the state, the social determinants represent the dynamic element in the assessment and determine the extent to which latent physical capability is effectively operationalized.

In the last instance, the degree to which the physical and social determinants of capability, however abundant or scarce, are co-ordinated and orchestrated in pursuit of the ends of policy, depends on the nature of the political leadership. The extent to which the leadership is able to maximize capabilities and manipulate deficiencies determines the
nature of the role in international politics to which the state concerned may aspire. This perception of capability potential on the part of the political leadership thus determines the nature of the state's interaction with the international system.

5. Ego-role perception

The notion of ego-role perception has been identified as the second criterion in the assessment of any state's potential role in international politics, as an endeavour to effectively conceptualize the causal sequence of international interaction. It is argued above that the state, through the mobilization and manipulation of the totality of its capability, may aspire to influence systemic conditions, or perceive itself as being of significance to systemic interests and thus fashion its policy accordingly. However, it has been further established, that just as the leadership or decisionmaking elite is responsible for the formulation of policy, the actualization of this policy in the form of a national strategy is dependent upon this same leadership elite's perception of the opportunities and threats arising from the state's interaction with the international system (bearing in mind that the international system is not exclusive and that no state can be isolated from systemic influence). The product of this perception of threat and opportunity is what has been termed 'ego-role perception', that is to say, the state's (as embodied in leadership) perception of its role in the regional or global system.
Perception has been described as;

• a confrontation between an inward-directed vector of external reality compelling awareness and an outward-directed vector of physiological, cultural, and psychological transformation. Where these vectors clash, where they balance each other, is what we perceive.  

Furthermore, it has been suggested that each being, or state (as a composite of beings) has an image not only of its own role, but of a great many roles around it. These roles are constantly being changed by messages received. They are changed by confirmations and disappointments; they are perpetuated by ritual observances and established lines of communication.

The images which are important in international systems are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.

The image being described as the; "... total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe". It may be deduced from the above that ego-role perception, as the product of the decisionmaker's image or perception, is a dynamic concept shaped by numerous variables. The process from which ego-role perception is crystallized may be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

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157) Rummel, RJ, Understanding Conflict and War, Vol 1, John Wiley and sons, New York, 1975, P82.

158) Boulding, KE, op cit, P105.


160) Ibid, PP120-121.

161) The seminal contribution of Prof. Michael H. H.Louw to the concepts discussed below is acknowledged.
The most central element (and obviously the principal operative) is the decisionmaker, or what has been referred to as the leadership elite;

... a decision involves the selection of the most preferred position in a contemplated field of choice. Both the field of choice and the ordering of this field by which the preferred position is identified lie in the image of the decisionmaker.162)

The determinants of the image or perception of the decisionmaker are manifold and have been subsumed, for the purposes of this explanation, in the notion of policy; policy being loosely described as a composite of historical legacy, societal values, national capability and objectives. The decisionmaker's perceptions (and logically also his decisions) are

thus essentially the product of these influences. 163) In confronting
the systemic environment in which policy must be actualized, therefore,
the decisionmaker analyzes the 'objective' systemic reality within the
framework of this image or perception and perceives within a linear
spectrum of probability, threats to, and opportunities for the maximiz-
ation of policy.

Rummel has described perception as a balance of power between inner- and
outer-directed vectors and indeed, in assessing the perceived spectrum
of threat and opportunity confronting the state, the decisionmaker needs
to strike a balance between perceived threats and perceived opportunities
so as to strike, and maintain a balanced and 'realistic' reaction. 164)
However, it is possible that certain elites might be overly attuned to
the perceived threats, perhaps either as leaders of a beleaguered people
or for the maintenance of particular domestic political advantage, unity
or internal stability (the Israelis or the Afrikaner elite in South Africa,
for example). Such elite paranoia gives rise to a hyper-reaction which
perceives the systemic environment (either rightly or wrongly) as being
inherently hostile. By inverse logic the same would apply to an elite
whose attention span is attuned solely to the perceived systemic
opportunities without perceiving the negative factors prevalent in any
given situation in which a choice must be made.

Ego-role perception is, therefore, the product of the balanced attunement

163) Cottam, RW, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory, University
of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1977, PP60-61 gives a good exposition
on the individual value system which substantiates this point. See
also Holsti, OR, "The belief system and national images: a case
study" in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol VI, N03, 1962,
PP244-245.

164) Rummel, RJ, op cit, P82. Also Edwards, DV, International Political
of the leadership elite to a spectrum of perceived threats and opportunities confronting the state in its endeavour to actualize policy. The nature of the role which the leadership perceives the state capable of playing depends to what degree the systemic threats and opportunities are attuned to an equilibrium. A state, for example, which does not perceive itself to be threatened and at the same time perceives itself as having little opportunity for influencing systemic conditions could only aspire to a minimal role. Furthermore, the concept of ego-role perception, due to the number of operative variables, is a dynamic concept subject to the dialectical confirmation or negation of perceptions of threat and opportunity. (This dynamic element has been diagrammatically illustrated by a broken line so as to indicate the dialectically intermittent nature of the feedback.)

Much has been written about the interacting variables described above and the concepts have been described in various ways. Thus, for example, the perceptual milieu of the decisionmaker has been referred to as a psychological state of motivation in which energy is mobilized and selectively directed towards aspects of the setting. Hence, this psychological state is characterized by a disposition to certain actions or reactions.165) Discussing this notion of motivation it has been suggested that;

... the simple notion of threat and/or opportunity has at this stage much to offer in political value analysis. A particular politically relevant value becomes salient for an individual if he perceives either threat or opportunity associated with it. Does the individual perceive a serious threat to the survival of a nation-state community with which he intensely identifies? Does he see a magnificent opportunity to expand national influence and thereby enhance greatly the nation's world prestige? 166)

165) Snyder, RC, et al., (eds), op cit, P140.
166) Cottam, RW, op cit, P61.
Every decisionmaker operates within a context of psychological predispositions. These comprise: (a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy; and (b) personality factors — the idiosyncratic qualities of decisionmakers. "Together, these influences constitute the screen or prism through which elite perceptions of the operational environment are filtered." 167)

Similarly, Holsti has suggested that the relationship of national images to international conflict lies in the fact that decisionmakers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states. These images are in turn dependent upon the decisionmaker's belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of 'reality'. 168) Image and reality may coincide or may diverge. To the extent that they differ, as noted above, policy acts will be unsuccessful — in the measure that decisionmakers misconstrue, distort, or deviate from the 'reality' of the environment within which they must act.

Their images may be partial or general. They may be subconscious or may be consciously stated. They may be based on carefully thought out assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgements. 169)

In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour, the belief system has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences. Thus it actually has a dual connection with decisionmaking. The direct relationship is found in that aspect of the belief system which tells us "what ought to be", acting as

167) Brecher, M, Foreign Policy of Israel, op cit, P11.

168) Holsti, OR, op cit, P245. Also Wright, Q, "Design for a research project on international conflict and the factors causing their aggravation or amelioration" in The Western Political Quarterly, NO 10, 1957, P256. It is suggested here that international conflict is not between states per se, but rather between distorted images of states.

169) Brecher, M, Foreign Policy of Israel, op cit, P12.
a direct guide in the establishment of goals. The indirect link — the role that the belief system plays in the process of "scanning, filtering, linking, reordering, organizing, and reporting", arises from the tendency of the decisionmaker to assimilate new perceptions to familiar ones, and to distort what is seen, in such a way as to minimize the clash with previous expectations.\textsuperscript{170} This notion has been neatly summed up as follows; "Perception as a dialectical confrontation between ourselves and reality involves opposing vectors and a reality of potentialities, dispositions, powers, and manifestations."\textsuperscript{171}

Thus ego-role perception comprises a number of closely related perceptions: 
(a) of the operational milieu — that is to say, the decisionmaker's perception of the global and regional systemic conditions in which the decisionmaker must seek to reconcile perceived actualities and potentialities so as to ensure the success of policy; and (b) the totality of the state's national capability resources. From these perceptions flow the decisionmaker's or the leadership elite's definition of the state's desirable role in international politics. Ego-role perception then, refers to the state's perceived identity, but it is a fact that identity can only manifest itself through overt action over a period of time and manifestation then lies in the eye of the beholder.

\textsuperscript{170} Holsti, OR, \textit{op cit}, P245. Also Jervis, R, \textit{The Logic of Images in International Relations}, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, PP13-15. Jervis suggests that a state's policy is influenced by factors other than its perception of its external environment. These include its goals, the risks it is willing to run, its belief about its own military and diplomatic capabilities, and its beliefs about what is domestically feasible and popular, thus substantiating the notion of national capability as a prime element. See also Zinnes, D, et al, "Capability, threat and the outbreak of war" in Rosenau, J, (ed), \textit{International Politics and Foreign Policy, op cit}, P47 where the perception of injury is described as outweighing perceptions of capability deficiencies in a state's decision to go to war.

\textsuperscript{171} Rummel, RJ, \textit{op cit}, P89.
Such overt state action is deliberate and purposeful, and responsive to conditions and events. The interactions that characterize international political systems (global or regional) originate usually as demands or claims and responses thereto on the part of the authorized spokesmen of the member states. Statesmen implement or back up their demands by various strategies, or patterns of action over time, utilizing a spectrum of varied tactics. These tactics are, likewise, operationalized to resist adverse demands, pressures and attacks from abroad. All such operations are undertaken and carried out within a milieu or set of environing conditions and events, that may affect both what is attempted and what is accomplished. The concepts of national capability (as the means) and ego-role perception (as the end) thus jointly comprise the basic rationale or motivation for the state's national strategy for the actualization of role perception.

6. The external environment

National capability and ego-role perception are essentially relative concepts and by no stretch of the imagination could they be described as absolute. Discussion of capabilities always takes place within some framework of policies and/or operational contingencies, actual or postulated. That is to say, the environment in which all states must function, the milieu of international interaction; an environment which has been described as limitless and embracing the whole universe; "... even outer space and the moon are now included." It is, therefore, necessary to

172) Sprout, H and M, Towards a Politics of Planet Earth, op cit, P81.

consider the external environment as the third dimension of the notion of role in international politics.

National capability, and ego-role perception, as the calculation of the opportunities and limitations implicit in the milieu, cannot exist in a vacuum any more than a state is able to isolate itself from international systemic influence. No state can feasibly be of significance to itself, and assessments of capability, and hence the state's perception of its systemic role, are determined essentially in relation to systemic circumstances and conditions.

The military, demographic or economic value of a territory varies with the techniques of combat and production, with human relations and institutions; the same positions are not strategically important depending on the state of international relations, and on armaments. 174)

Furthermore, the congruence or discrepancy between expectations and the operational milieu cannot be conclusively established until after overt interaction with the system has taken place.

A state's ego-role perception, therefore, gains relevance and importance in relation to its overall influence on, and contribution to regional or global systemic conditions. Indeed, the entire credibility of a particular state's perception of its systemic role is dependent upon the other members of the regional or global system perceiving the state concerned as in fact fulfilling (or having the capability of fulfilling) a role of relevance to their regional or global interests. (The strategic vacuum in which South Africa finds itself is a case in point.) It is conversely possible that a state may be perceived by the international system to have a significance to systemic (generally big-power) interests or the capability of playing a decisive systemic role (globally or regionally), quite beyond the parameters of the ego-role perception of the state concerned

(Afghanistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia provide contemporary examples); a
land or sea area which becomes of significance not because it is inherently
so, but as an object of Big-power rivalry, or a state which does not
aspire to influence systemic conditions, but has a leadership role
imposed upon it by the perception of the international environment, of
the state concerned, as the most capable in the particular systemic
circumstance.

Furthermore, while a state's role in world politics is subject to the
sanction of the members of the international system, it is also the case
that the international system gains its dynamism from the individual
states who are members of the system and that any change in the system
will find its initial expression in modifications in the way states
conceive of their international roles. We may argue, therefore,
that the environment of international interaction is derived from the
composite of roles in the international system; that is to say, that just
as the individual state seeks to balance the perceptual image of self
and environment this process (to a lesser or greater degree) may be
multiplied by the number of individual members of the international
system, who in seeking to actualize policy are each confronted by the
perception of the role of the other. In the final instance, therefore,
a state's role in international politics is subject to the confirmation
or refutation of the members of the international system with which the
state interacts, according to their perception of the significance of
the individual state's role to their systemic interests (the super-
powers being the most significant owing to their domination of the system).
The external environment may, therefore, be described as comprising a
composite of perceptual 'role images'. This composite is far from
homogeneous as each unit relies upon its own definition of interests as
standards for action; states are inherently ego-centric.\textsuperscript{175}) Such mutual apperception has come to be seen to be of considerable significance in international politics and it has been argued that it represents an important clue to the dynamics of international relations.\textsuperscript{176})

This process of perceptual action and reaction in external interaction is stimulated by inputs or specific external stimuli to the perceptual hierarchy of the leadership elite and interpreted within the parameters of this preconceived elite image or belief system.

In the image of the United States today, for instance, possessed by the majority of its people, there is a strong overtone of insecurity produced by their image of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expanding power. Because of this image, the United States undertakes policies and performs actions which lead to the establishment or the reinforcement of an image in the Soviet Union, mistaken as it may be, of the United States as an aggressive, expanding power.\textsuperscript{177})

If national strategy depends mainly on the present image of the state concerned and not on the changes in the image which may be perceived as a result of the consequences of action for example, a highly unstable situation may develop;

... state A — correctly or incorrectly — perceives itself threatened by state B, there is a high probability that A will

\textsuperscript{175}) Holsti, KJ, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", \textit{op cit}, P243 substantiates this notion by referring to the concept of "alter-role prescriptions" in the international context, but points out that they do not form an integrated composite. "The component units of the system must rely primarily on their own definitions of interests as standards for action."


\textsuperscript{177}) Boulding, KE, \textit{The Image}, \textit{op cit}, P112.
respond with threats of hostile action. As state B begins to perceive this hostility directed toward itself, it is probable that B too, will behave in a hostile (and defensive) fashion. This threatening behavior by B will confirm for A that its initial perceptions were correct, and A will be inclined to increase its hostile (and defensive) activity.  

(The Cuban missile crisis is a classic example; similarly, the situation which existed between the Soviet Union and the United States immediately prior to and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.)

The subjective interpretation of the situation by each party may differ greatly from that of the other, and also from the interpretation by an impartial observer. It has been suggested that in every controversy there are at least six parties — A and B, A as conceived by B and B as conceived by A, and A as he believes he is conceived by B, and B as he believes he is conceived by A. The last four are images which may be remote from reality yet they constitute the basis on which the parties act. A does not behave in response to what B really is or intends, but in response to A's concept of B. It may even be true that A does not behave in accord with his own character, but in accord with what he believes B thinks and expects of him.  

"It may often be the case that an international conflict is not in reality between states, but between distorted images of states."  

Authors have sought to illustrate circumstances in which state behaviour might be expected to deviate from the subjective pattern of threat and


179) Wright, Q, "Design for a research project on international conflicts and the factors causing their aggravation or amelioration", op cit, P266.  

opportunity interaction.\textsuperscript{181}) Assuming that all state leaders are motivated by their conception of the ego-centric national interest, this shared priority has a decisive effect on the actions or reactions of statesmen, and creates a degree of conformity as if by a kind of inner compulsion.

Thus the competition between the states of the international system, all striving for the same, but diverse end, creates a condition of constant agitation, and in its turn, a degree of external compulsion. "The real question is whether internal and external pressures are strong enough everywhere and at all times to transform the actors into something like automatons lacking all freedom of choice."\textsuperscript{182)

Three kinds of situation in which state B does not react to a threatening stimulus from state A have been suggested. It might be expected that B's response will be mildest when it believes that A did not expect, intend or approve of the outcome that resulted. In a second case, an identical amount of harm inflicted on the state will lead to a stronger, but still restrained, response if the state believes that although the other did seek a goal that conflicted with the state's interest, the other does not generally seek to harm the state. The other is not perceived to have a stake in weakening the state, it is not believed to value negatively the state's well being. A third situation may exist where state A trusts B in a particular situation when it believes that B will not further its own interests at the expense of A, usually because A believes that B values the prospects of long-run co-operation between the two countries more than it values the short-run gains that would accrue by exploiting its immediate power over A.\textsuperscript{183)}


\textsuperscript{182) W}olfers, A, \textit{Discord and Collaboration}, \textit{op cit, P13.}

\textsuperscript{183) J}ervis, R, \textit{Perception and Misperception, op cit, PP39-44.}
The above illustrations serve to substantiate the contention that international interaction takes place essentially between individual actors, but that all states are concerned in varying degrees with the equilibrium of the system and that the influence of these individual systemic interests, the composite of which constitutes the environment of international politics, is a determinative variable in international interaction. This process of infinite interaction has been seen to be highly dynamic and can be described as having a circulatory input/output effect on any state's external actions and is thus a basic element in any notion of causality in international politics.

7. Conclusion

In considering the notion of a state's role in international politics it has been suggested that a state's role or identity can only be established and substantiated by actions over a period of time. State action, though, is deliberate and purposive, and far from being a random manoeuvre is responsive to conditions (both external and internal) and specific events. Therefore, in seeking an explanation of the concept of 'role', attention has been focused on the phenomenon of international interaction. We have established that international interaction takes place within an international system; however, analysis of the contemporary nature of the international system suggested that pure systems theory does not provide an insight into the rationale of individual state action. The international system is a composite of individual states and is sustained by the very state action for which a causal explanation is being sought. Thus, while basic models of international systems theory present the essential assumptions and power configurations, and the systemic equilibrium prevailing at a given time, notions of balance of power, polar or multi-polar models do not adequately illuminate the purposiveness of individual state actions, which in series constitute
the systemic equilibrium.

Purposive action must logically be directed toward the attainment of a specific end or purpose, and the response to specific stimuli (either internal or external), in that any action in international politics is merely a specific point in a dynamic continuum or series of action and reaction, as indicated above. External interaction has, therefore, been described as the product of a dynamic process of interaction between a number of variable, and mutually influential components. To assess a state's potential or actual role in international politics it is necessary to consider the influence of the individual variables on externally directed state action and the nature of the process which determines a state's role in international politics.

The interaction of the operative components may be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

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   NATIONAL STRATEGY
     ↓
   EGO-ROLE PERCEPTION (GLOBAL & REGIONAL)
     ↓
   NATIONAL CAPABILITY
     ↓
   POLICY
     ↓
   MILITARY ECONOMIC DIPLOMATIC PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION
   EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
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This model does not seek to examine individual levels of decisionmaking, but rather to establish the causal sequence in which these variables interact in determining external interaction. It is essentially concerned with the principal mechanisms of international interaction with the object
of presenting a dynamic framework for the explanation and analysis of any single state's real and potential role in international politics, and in this instance it is proposed to demonstrate the viability of the proposition in the specific context of a Nigerian case study. It is with this objective in mind that the notion of 'role' in international politics has been described as a basically three dimensional concept.

Thus there are three criteria which are fundamental to any comprehension of a state's motivation for action; all are mutually influential, inter-dependent and dynamically variable, and each is only of relevance in relation to the other.

The first, and most basic element in any consideration of a state's international status is the criterion of national capability. The spectrum of national capability resources represent the physical and non-physical characteristics of a state, which are the very essence of the state's being. A state's basic power capability, or the lack of it, is determined by the interaction of the elements of the capability spectrum, and thus, although military strength is still central to any notion of capability in international affairs, national capability per se can only be assessed by consideration of the total capability spectrum. Strength in one facet may be negated by extreme weakness in another and vice-versa. National capability resources, thus, are the means available for the pursuit of the ends of policy.

Policy in the context of this model is a summation of those norms, values and objectives which constitute what is known as the national interest. National interest is an abstract and notoriously vague concept and is the product of a highly generalized value synthesis which is generally personified and given form in the political leadership or decisionmaking elite. Policy, on the other hand, may here be defined
as the national interests and the objectives of the national interest as translated into a framework for action by that political leadership. The nature of the national interest and the form of policy is overwhelmingly influenced by historical background and precedent, and the decision-maker must act within the parameters of this national value hierarchy.

Therefore, just as the leadership or decisionmaking elite is responsible for the formulation of policy, the realization of this policy in the form of a national strategy is dependent upon this same leadership elite's perception of the opportunities and threats arising from the state's interaction with the international system. No state can feasibly isolate itself from the influence of the international system and all states, whether active or passive in their interaction with the system, are part of the dynamic whole. These perceptual stimuli are interpreted within the parameters of the value hierarchy mentioned above and give rise to a perception of probability and capability which has been conceptualized in the notion of ego-role perception — the second criterion basic to a role assessment. That is to say, that the decisionmaker, being aware of the ends of policy and the capability means available in pursuit of these ends must seek to balance these actualities with his image of the external environment. The formulation of a national strategy for the realization of policy depends, therefore, on the decisionmaker's perception of the state's capability and of the external environment.

The national strategy is an all inclusive concept incorporating domestic, foreign and national security policy and represents the orchestration of all the means which a state has at its disposal for the actualization of the ends of policy. National strategy is essentially futuristic and based upon contingencies and the anticipation of events. The congruence or discrepancy between expectations and reality cannot be established until
after some overt action has been taken. The national strategy makes provision for various patterns of action, utilizing a varied array of instrumentalities and techniques ranged in a linear continuum of activity and passivity. The most common instrument of international interaction is diplomacy, although military force remains the ultimate sanction. The tactics adopted for the operationalization of the strategy would depend upon the nature of the objectives of the state and the extent to which the strategy is a reaction to counter a threat presently perceived or at some future stage, and on capability.

However, it has been established that no state can effectively isolate itself from the international environment and that notions of capability and ego-role perception are essentially relative concepts. Furthermore, the process by which states arrive at their perceptual image and rationale for action, may be multiplied by the number of states in the international system resulting in an infinite and dynamic process of action and reaction. Therefore, in the final instance, a state's perception of its role in the international system depends on the perception of the members of the international system, with which it interacts, perceiving the state as being of actual or potential significance to their systemic interests (either global or regional). External interactions are obviously manifold and for the purposes of role assessment it is sufficient to examine the nature of the perception of the principal states and international organizations with which the state concerned interacts.

We have argued that the external environment is a composite of role images. It is this dynamic process of adjustment-readjustment, action-reaction between individual states which determines the systemic equilibrium. The super-powers obviously determine the parameters of the environment, but it is the individual nation-states, motivated by egocentric self interest who form the substance of that environment and
which provide the impetus which maintains the system as a recognizable process of action. It is the nature of the contemporary international system which has made national strategy (as the plan for international interaction) largely futuristic in nature, in that it is imperative for effective contingency planning (and thus for survival) that a state's strategic planners be able to reliably assess any state's latent or operative ability to influence regional or global systemic conditions.

Any assessment of a state's role in the world must consider the dynamic interaction of the above variables if it is to be of value to strategic planners. The process itself is never static and thus is subject to fluctuation in role consistency. Similarly, an unexpected turn of events may overnight radically alter the reliability of a previously sound role designation, thus role assessment is a continuous process. Although it may probably be argued that the role perspective is at best a generalization, it is argued here that the role perspective effectively represents the nature of the causal sequence in international interaction and is able to provide insight into future and probable state action, within the bounds of human predictability. As such, it is a most valuable key to the comprehension of that complexity of variables which is the state in action.

The formulation of theory requires that the relevant hypothesis should be of universal applicability and validity, and we argue that the model suggested here may be utilized, with equal success, in seeking to determine and analyze the role of any state. In this instance the validity of the hypothesis is to be tested in an analysis of the real and potential role of Nigeria in world politics.
Three criteria have been identified as the basic variables influencing the nature of any state's external action and constitute, therefore, the essential dimensions of any analysis of a state's role in international politics. Each of these three criteria is substantially influenced by, and largely the product of historical factors and experience. National capability potential is influenced by historical development, in that the physical foundations upon which capability is built and depends, are determined by the course of history. Size, shape, heterogeneity, military tradition, in short, the very nature of a state's being is the product of interacting events and circumstances which constitute the state's historical background. So too, the belief system and imagery upon which ego-role perception is based are shaped by the historical legacy and national tradition arising from the shared national historical experience.

Similarly, the perception of the members of the external environment is determined largely by historical precedent, in that long-standing historical ties are the basis for a higher level of state interaction and mutual affinity than would be the case with states historically remote. Indeed, it has been suggested that;

Contemporary foreign affairs are heavily conditioned by views and precedents inherited from the past and projected through the present into the future. They are influenced by ties and conflicts of former years as well as by principles of interstate relationships that have grown up through long use. 1)

The contemporary nature of these three criteria relies heavily upon

historical factors and it is, therefore, a logical deduction that a state's real or potential role in international politics is founded upon the historical background and foundation of the state.

The fact that inter-state relations are substantially influenced by historical legacy is particularly pertinent in the case of African states. These states do not have a long history of diplomatic interaction and the key to the understanding of the contemporary nature of African states as such, and the rationale of external interaction in particular, is founded upon the shared historical experience and legacy of colonialism. 2)

In seeking to analyze the role of Nigeria in the international system, therefore, it is necessary first to establish the course of historical development, in order to identify the pervading influences and historical experiences which constitute the physical and psychological genesis of the contemporary Nigerian state. That is to say, influences which have not only shaped national institutions, but which constitute basic tenets of the Nigerian value hierarchy and form thus, the essential background to Nigeria's contemporary international role.

1. A resume of the history of the pre-colonial era

The earliest of Nigerian history is the record, largely preserved in legend, of human migrations, incursions, displacements, intermixtures or successions of peoples, and of the impact of these upheavals on the beliefs, attitudes and social organization of the various people who

today inhabit the region. The principal evolutionary catalysts of the
time may be found in the encroachment of the Sahara desert on the nomadic
pastures and the consequent migration; trade (initially trans-Saharan
but eventually trans-Atlantic); the spread of the Islamic faith and a
later European Christian missionary zeal. 3)

1.1 Historical demographic dispersion

Powerful 'market empires' which had evolved complex systems of government
and administrative organization, facilitated by the adoption of Moslem
law and administrative custom, upon which the trade of these 'empires'
with the Egyptian and Middle Eastern civilizations was based, dominated
the areas north of the Niger, and indeed most of West Africa, long
before the advent of colonialism. 4) The northern regions of present day
Nigeria were lorded over by the predominant Hausa-speaking people and
their legendary city-states of Kano and Katsina. 5) The Hausa were
gradually to be subverted by the Fulani, who although numerically inferior
were culturally more advanced; they are said to have migrated from the
Northern Sudanese empires which were heavily influenced by the great
North African and Middle Eastern civilizations. 6) The gradual integration

3) Mabogunji, A, "The land and peoples of West Africa" in Ajayi, JFA and
P1, PP7-8 and PP15-32. Also Schwartz, W, Nigeria, Pall Mall Press,
5) Hunwick, JO, "Songhay, Bornu and Hausaland in the sixteenth century"
in Ajayi, JFA and Crowder, M, (eds), op cit, PP212-218. Also Page, JD,
A History of West Africa, Fourth edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1969, PP31-54.
6) Morel, ED, Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems, Third edition,
of Fulani and Hausa is estimated to have commenced during the thirteenth century and over a period of four centuries progressed to the point where the Fulani were eventually to engage in a Jihad, or holy war, against the Hausa and to unify the area under a formidable theocratic empire embracing the Islamic faith. 7)

The Fulani were unable to subvert all the inhabitants of these northern regions and many smaller tribal groups maintained their independence. Probably the most significant of which was the ancient empire of Karnem-Bornu and the Kanuri speaking people which encompassed Western Sudan and parts of present Northern Nigeria. The Kanuri were able to defend themselves against the Fulani through alliance with powerful Sudanese rulers. 8) Other tribes which inhabited the region and were considered 'pagan' and inferior by the Fulani included the Jukun, Igbirra, Tiv, Gwarri and Nupe. Most of these people had, prior to the Jihad, formed a series of lesser, vassal states which had complimented the great Hausa empires of the time. 9)

South of the Niger river the Yoruba empires, centred around Ife and Oyo, and to the west the ancient kingdom of Benin flourished, largely independent of the north. The central, tsetse fly infested areas formed a barrier which the Northerners could only penetrate by camel with difficulty. The

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8) Page, JD, op cit, PP31-34.

Yoruba empire encompassed an estimated one million people under the constitutional monarchy of the Alafin of Oyo and his council. Similarly, the Alake of Abeokuta ruled over an Egba kingdom of comparable size; a system of political organization and control generally considered more sophisticated than many of the European systems of the time. The Yoruba were a largely urban people and had a considerable propensity for town planning and building; the cities of Ibadan, Ogbonosho, Ife and Iwo, and later Lagos being among the principal Yoruba urban settlements.

Occupying the south-western regions, the Yoruba were the first to come into contact with the European influence and their sophisticated administrative organization and astute commercial sense made them an important element in early European activities in West Africa. The Yoruba empire was later to disintegrate, leading to a proliferation of smaller Yoruba factions and whereas a few of these lesser chieftains engaged Fulani assistance in overthrowing their traditional rulers, any significant southern advance by the Fulani was effectively checked by the Ibadan sub-tribe of the Yoruba. The independent Kingdom of Benin dominated the western regions and initially included Lagos. However, the power of the Oba of Benin was gradually wittled away by the European incursions and the activities of the more numerous Yoruba.


11) Johnson, S, op cit, PP90-94.

12) Burns, AC, op cit, PP34-36. Also Crowder, M, op cit, PP108-123 and Ajayi, JFA, Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964, PP63-75 presents an insight into the political ramifications of Yoruba society with which the British could hardly be expected to have come to terms. Reference has also been made to Smith, R, Kingdoms of the Yoruba, Methuen and Co. Ltd, London, 1969, PP155-174.

The eastern regions of contemporary Nigeria were largely peopled by a proliferation of subdivisions of Ibo-speaking people. Whereas the Ibos spoke a common language and occupied a contiguous land area, they were not united in any encompassing administrative system or clan. Principal allegiance was to the family unit, resulting in numerous small villages, and a cultural and dialectical diversity. These factions fiercely guarded against external subversion and their close knit nature isolated the Ibos from many of the prevailing evolutionary influences.

These various upheavals cover a period of some centuries and the time during which European influence began to manifest itself.

1.2 Initial European influences

As a result of the awakening of European interest in the world beyond the Mediterranean and the exploratory zeal of the Portuguese monarch Henry the Navigator, expeditions along the North West African coast (the coastline contiguous with the Mediterranean) were undertaken during the early fifteenth century. By the time of Henry's death in 1642 the entire West African coast is said to have been open for trade; the principal commodities being gold, pepper and ivory.

Although Portugal was the first, and for a very considerable time the only European country to have a permanent footing (in the form of several littoral forts) in West Africa and is said to have exchanged emissaries with the King of Benin, their absolute monopoly was challenged by irregular British, French, Dutch and Castilian trading forays. With

15) Burns, AC, op cit, PP73-74.
The discovery of the riches of the West Indies and the New World the principal West African commodity shifted from pepper to slaves (around 1530), needed as labourers in the initially Spanish dominated exploitation of the new found wealth of the West Indies and South America.  

The trans-Atlantic slave trade became highly competitive and the Portuguese-Spanish monopoly was soon usurped by the British, French, Dutch, Swedish and Danish traders; the latter three, not being great colonial powers, engaged in the buying and selling of slaves primarily for commercial benefit rather than for the filling of labour cadres in the manner of Britain and France.  

Trade was officially restricted to the monopoly companies, most of whom operated in terms of Royal charter. The Dutch West Indies company 1621, the Royal African Company 1672, French West Indies Company 1664, Company of the Royal Adventurers 1660 to name but the most notorious, trace the expansion of the trafficking in human beings. Between 1620 and 1750 a large number of European forts and trading posts were established along the West African coast. However, this struggle among European powers for a monopoly of the West African slave trade was secondary to the primary competition between the nations for the colonizing of the Americas and providing sufficient labour for the vast colonial undertakings in this New World. The real prizes in the European imperial wars of the period were not bases in West Africa, but colonies and trade in the Americas.  

Britain emerged from the European wars of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which time the principal adversary had been France, as the predominant world power and subsequently dominated West Africa from Senegal to the Cameroons and so too, the African slave trade.
In the period following the American War of Independence (1778-1783), however, there arose a conviction in Britain that Britain's commercial interests would be best served if the number and extent of her colonial possessions were kept as small as possible. The administration and defence of colonies absorbed money which could be more profitably invested in trade; the only colonies that were really useful were those which provided strategic bases from which the British navy could protect the expanding stream of British merchant shipping. The British reluctance to further extend British rule to non-European territories coincided with the dawning of an age of philanthropism, which eventually brought about a ban on British trade in slaves during 1807 and a few years later it was determined that the West African slave trade should be terminated altogether. The other major slave trading nations soon followed the British example.

Britain established a permanent naval patrol in West African waters specifically for the purpose of enforcing the prohibition of the export of slaves. Although British ships (previously the most active) no longer carried slaves, the number of slaves exported did not drop comparably. In 1817 Spain and Portugal, who had proved to be unable to police their own merchant shipping, reluctantly granted British officials the right to search ships sailing under the Spanish or Portuguese flags. It was not, though, until France (1833), Spain (1835), Portugal (1842) and the United States (1862) had signed a Reciprocal Search Treaty, granting the

22) Dike, KO, *op cit*, PP15-16.


signatories the mutual right to convict the captain of a ship which showed any vestige of being a 'slaver', let alone actually transporting slaves when searched, that the number of slaves exported from West Africa began to drop.  

Furthermore, the British endeavoured to stop the flow of slaves from the hinterland, and as the recruitment of slaves had always been undertaken by African middle-men a "positive policy" was required to convert and educate the peoples of West Africa to the Christian morality and to develop a healthy trade in commodities other than slaves.  

1.3 Initial British interests

The movement in Britain to stamp out the slave trade, and the new missionary zeal and philanthropic morality of the British, was accompanied by the need to find markets for the products of Britain's new manufacturing industries. At first the marketing of these goods was handled by the middle-men of the coastal kingdoms, who secured their monopoly on the basis of their exclusive knowledge of conditions in the interior and the fact that the climate was too unhealthy for Europeans to penetrate beyond the coastal fringe.  

However, as Britain's trading interests in West Africa grew, so did the need and desire of merchants to trade directly with the markets of the interior. Thus much of the history of Nigeria during the latter eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century concerns the resistance of African kings and intermediaries to penetration of the interior by pioneer explorers, missionaries and

25) Burns, AC, op cit, PP111-112. See also Crowder, M, op cit, PP124-133.

26) Dike, KO, op cit, PP9-11. Also Crowder, M, op cit, P129. The old trading organizations were taken over unmodified to cope with the new trade in palm oil.

burgeoning British colonial administration.28)

Britain's economic well being depended on the securing of markets for her manufactured products and it was against this background that the Africa Association for the exploration of the African hinterland was formed in 1788.29) Britain had just lost her American colonies, and was looking to India as an alternative outlet for her economic expansion. British influence had recently been extended to Australia and the Far East, geographically Africa lay in the path of the main axis of British trade and it was thus of high strategic interest.30) The pioneers of inland trade sponsored by the African Association were legendary explorers such as Mungo Park, Clapperton, Lander, the German Barth, and Baikie.31)

By 1850 British trading interests in West Africa were concentrated at Lagos and the Niger delta ports, the prime export being palm oil. As the trade flourished the African politics of the delta ports became increasingly unstable in the face of Western commercial influence, and deputations were repeatedly made to the British Government for greater governmental intervention, that the controlling authority should be the British Government and not the African chieftains.32) Furthermore, the flourishing coastal trade had led to the increased usage of slave labour

28) Fage, JD, op cit, PP128-131.
29) Burns, AC, op cit, P87.
in the interior and by the delta middle-men for porterage, thus denying the purpose for which the palm oil trade had been encouraged in the first place. It was, however, not until 1861 that the British Government intervened by annexing the politically troublesome slave market fortress of Lagos;\textsuperscript{33} thus came into being the British Crown Colony of Lagos.

After the initial annexation of Lagos the colonial occupation of the hinterland took place relatively quickly. In Lagos the trading requirements of the merchants of the Colony led to constant interference by the Governor in the affairs of Yorubaland. In the delta bitter feuding between the states in competition with the European traders pushed direct British intervention even further. The period was further characterized by the opening up of the hinterland along the Niger and Benue rivers, (the notable initial expedition being led by MacGregor Laird during the 1850's) and the activities of missionaries in the interior.\textsuperscript{34}

The 1870's saw a sudden resurgence in French and German competition for the Niger trade, which motivated one Sir George Goldie to amalgamate all the lesser Niger trading companies under the Royal Niger Company. In anticipation and response to the French and German challenge to this monopoly, Goldie concluded treaties with the delta chieftains and formed the National African Company with the view to receiving a charter from the British Government to establish a British Protectorate over the

\textsuperscript{33} Geary, \textit{WNM}, \textit{op cit}, PP38-42 records that; "Lagos had been the ideal colony from the Downing Street point of view, self-supporting and self-protecting". See also \textit{Letters Patent Constituting the Colony of Lagos, 13 January 1886 in Newbury, CW}, (ed), \textit{British Policy Towards West Africa: Select Documents 1875-1914}, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, PP252. "Our Colony of Lagos ... shall, until we otherwise provide, comprise all places, settlements, and territories belonging to us in Western Africa, between the second degree of east longitude and the sixth degree of east longitude."

\textsuperscript{34} Dike, KO, \textit{100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria 1851-1951}, \textit{op cit}, PP153-165.
area.\textsuperscript{35) The competition between the three European powers took on the appearance of a scramble for Africa and when in July 1884 Germany annexed the Cameroons, the three decided to settle their claims diplomatically.\textsuperscript{36) }

At the subsequent Berlin conference of 1885, Britain was granted sole protectorate over the territories on the line of coast between the British Protectorate of Lagos and the western bank of the Rio del Rey and the territories on both banks of the Niger, from its confluence with the river Benue at Lokoja to the sea, as well as the territories on both banks of the river Benue up to and including Ibi.\textsuperscript{37) The zones of influence which had been established in the coastal districts became the Oil Rivers Protectorate and were placed under the charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1886.\textsuperscript{38) The scramble had only just begun though, and in a series of largely pre-emptive and forestalling manoeuvres by means of treaties, deception and coercion, the Company expanded its authority, and thus in 1893 the Oil Rivers Protectorate became the Niger Coast Protectorate and encompassed all Yorubaland.\textsuperscript{39)}


\textsuperscript{36) Geary, \textit{WMN}, \textit{op cit}, PP93-95.

\textsuperscript{37) \textit{Ibid}, PP95-97.

\textsuperscript{38) Dike, KO, \textit{100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria: 1851-1951, op cit}, P27.

The largely punitive means of establishing its authority had led to the increasing unpopularity of the Royal Niger Company and its consequent inability to administer the southern regions effectively. Furthermore, there was difficulty in establishing British authority in the northern Fulani Empire, which had been ceded to Britain at Berlin. The Niger Company's charter was withdrawn and the whole territory was reorganized into three administrative areas, under the Colonial Office (as opposed to the Foreign Office) in April 1899, namely; the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (formerly the Niger Coast Protectorate), the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (the Fulani Empire) and Lagos.

Sir Frederick Lugard was appointed High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, but effective British administration was not secured in the Fulani Empire until 1906. In 1906 Lagos was incorporated in the Southern Protectorate, the first step towards amalgamation of the three territories. Co-operation between the Northern and Southern administrations deteriorated from 1906 to the point where the consequent administrative inefficiency was a threat to hard won British interests. Thus, during June 1910 the British Secretary of State for Colonies proposed the merger of the two Nigerias. Nigeria officially became one entity on January 1, 1914.


41) Geary, WNM, op cit, P122 and PP205-207. "The company may have been a hard master to its employees and the Natives under its control, and there does not linger about its rule ... mellow memories."

42) Kirk-Greene, AHM, Adamawa; Past and Present, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, PP55-69 gives an extensive account of the measures needed to "pacify" the North.

43) Geary, WNM, op cit, P123. Also Hailey, WK, op cit, P111.

and Lugard was appointed Governor General.\textsuperscript{45) The colonial occupation of Nigeria was effectively complete.}

The above resume of historical evolution, which culminated in the British colonial annexation of a large area of West Africa eventually to constitute the modern Nigerian state, suggests that this area stood on the periphery of the great historical influences of the time. This period of West African pre-history may be described as an era dictated by external factors, during which Nigeria was influenced by events in the main historical arena without it being the prime historical interest or concern.

The initial peopling of the West African territory today known as Nigeria was greatly influenced by the powerful and sophisticated North African and Middle Eastern civilizations which pressed on the north east reaches of the territory. The evolution of administratively and culturally advanced empires, sustained by trade with the agents of these northern civilizations was the consequence of the cultivation of the Islamic faith. Islam was not just a religious doctrine but a comprehensive philosophy which encompassed and prescribed the entire way of life of its adherents. Followers of Islam are required to propagate the faith and to convert and 'civilize pagans'. The influence of Islam provided the philosophical base upon which the peoples of this area built entities of considerable cultural and political sophistication and so too, greatly facilitated the mode of trade with the northern civilizations whose prosperity depended largely on the supply of gold and labour from these hinterland territories. It was, therefore, not religious zeal alone which motivated the missionary aptitude of the propagators of Islam.

The Portuguese exploration of the West African coast had been coincidental to their search for a viable sea route to the far greater riches of the West Indies; evidenced by their rather insubstantive attempts at establishing a permanent foothold in the area. It did, however, bring the inhabitants of the coastal regions into contact with new European influences and Christianity. The Portuguese in their turn, besides the common trade commodities, were able to import the first black slaves to Europe, more for their novelty value as domestic servants at that time than anything else. Slavery had been an accepted domestic practice among the civilizations of the territory for centuries and indeed, the North African and Middle Eastern empires relied heavily on the tradition of slave labour.

Slavery was not a European innovation, but it was the European colonization of the America's and the subsequent trans-Atlantic trade in slaves which was to scar the people of this West African territory and indeed to manifest European influence in West Africa. Yet West Africa was of significance (at this time) to the Europeans merely as the most geographically proximate supply of labour and was coincidental to the richer prize of the New World.

So too, the ultimate manifestation of British colonial rule was an unplanned and largely unco-ordinated evolution of events dictated by panic measures on the part of Britain, to secure supplies and markets for a burgeoning British industrial capacity in advance of its chief European rivals. The fact that British colonial rule was not effectively manifest over the entire modern day Nigeria until a time when British colonial territories in southern Africa and other parts of the Empire were already being granted self-rule would seem to indicate that the eventual British colonial occupation was largely dictated by circumstance and international political expediency, rather than preferred choice.
2. The colonial era

In an analysis of the historical evolution of present-day Nigeria the era of colonialism is of most singular significance, not as a denial of the existence or influence of pre-colonial history, but as that historical experience which is held in common by all Nigerians (as opposed to the ethnically divergent pre-colonial histories) and which is logically basic to the practical construction of the modern Nigerian state.

It is probably of little significance to state that Nigeria was apparently occupied by Britain with general official reluctance but as a necessity of British international prestige and economic well being. However, the 'official reluctance' accounted for the comparatively late colonization of Nigeria and the fact that Nigeria was subject to less than sixty years of direct British administration, at a time when Britain had sufficient experience of colonies and a large enough shortage of resources, to favour leaving indigenous political organizations intact as useful adjuncts to British administration. The history of the colonial era in Nigeria, therefore, is significant in the contemporary analysis in as far as it is the account of the institutionalization of British influence and the British endeavour to maintain the constitutional initiative in competition with an emergent Nigerian nationalism.

2.1 Amalgamation: the manifestation of British administration

When the new Government of Nigeria came into being on January 1, 1914 under Sir Frederick Lugard as Governor-General46 the administrative

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46) The title of 'Governor-General' was personal to Lugard, his successors went under the title of 'Governor' until the constitution was later changed.
system approved for the amalgamated Nigeria was essentially federal in character, in that it recognized the existence of two autonomous regions, to be known as Northern and Southern provinces. The boundary (between north and south), except for a few minor rectifications in the interest of divided tribes, remained the same as that between the former Northern and Southern Nigerian protectorates. While this was a natural and historical division of the territory, it took little heed of socio-cultural or regional geographic divisions. The main concern was that the North was poor and peaceful, while the Southern territory was prosperous and unstable, and amalgamation was considered long overdue.

With some degree of prophetic foresight an "unauthorised scheme for amalgamation" had been suggested prior to the Lugard amalgamation blueprint, suggesting that inter-tribal and inter-regional hostility would be inevitable unless the territory was redivided. Morel, an Africanist and then editor of the *African Mail*, suggested that Nigeria should be subdivided; "... into provinces corresponding as far as possible with natural geographic boundaries and existing political conditions..." He proposed a four provincial division.

Under the Lugard amalgamation formula each part of the country was placed under the charge of a Lieutenant-Governor responsible for the direct

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administration of the area to which he was appointed. 51) Lugard had explained that this was to avoid too great a dislocation of the existing administrative authorities each of which was under a different system of law and which had developed under a different administration. 52) Each Lieutenant-Governor was to produce an annual budget for incorporation in the General Budget. He was provided with a Secretariat and various necessary departments such as Political, Medical, Public Works, Forestry, Agriculture, Education, Police, Prisons and Mines. Marines and customs were regarded as belonging to the South. Certain departments common to both territories were centralized under the Governor — Railways and Collieries, Military, Audit, Treasury, Post and Telegraphs, Judicial and Legal. 53) The provincial system prevailing in the North was extended to the South, which for administrative purposes was divided into nine provinces. The Colony of Lagos was regarded as a separate entity from the Southern provinces and placed under an administrator. 54)

From 1862 the Colony of Lagos had a small Legislative Council to advise the Governor. The composition of the Council varied from time to time but the majority of members, up until the Council's dissolution in 1922, were Colonial officials. 55) At the time of amalgamation a larger


advisory body called the Nigerian Council, including representatives of all Nigeria, was set up. In addition to the Governor-General, it consisted of nominated representatives, European and African, representing different communities and interests. It met once a year, mainly to discuss the Governor's speech which reviewed developments in the territory. The traditional chiefs formed the majority of nominated Nigerian members and they rarely attended the Council. Members could propose for debate any matter relating to the affairs of Nigeria subject to ten days notice being given. A resolution carried by the Council had no legislative or executive authority and the Governor had unfettered discretion as to whether a matter should be discussed.

2.1.1 Indirect rule

When Lugard was appointed High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria in 1900 he had experience of the system followed in the Indian states and of the Bugandan Kingdom, as well as Nigeria; already in 1893 he had outlined for Uganda a system under which its internal control should be carried on through existing chiefs and traditional structures of authority. Lugard's guiding sentiment had been stated thus:

The British Empire ... has only one mission — for liberty and self-development on no standardised lines, so that all may feel that their interests and religion are safe under the British flag. Such liberty and self-development can be best secured to the native population by leaving them free to manage their own affairs through their own rulers, proportionately to their degree of advancement, under the guidance of the British staff, and subject to the laws and policy of the administration.

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56) Perham, L, op cit, P66.
59) Lugard, FD, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, op cit, P94.
In Northern Nigeria Lugard encountered circumstances unusually favourable to the adoption of these principles because there existed already, a sophisticated administrative and taxation system and the Moslem courts of law. Furthermore, Lugard with his limited colonial staff could not hope to administer this vast territory without the co-operation of the traditional ruling Emirs. Practical expedience, therefore, left him with little alternative other than to institute a system of indirect rule, the basis of which was the traditional chiefs and Native Authorities.  

The Native Treasuries were the focal point of the organization, conducted by a native treasurer and staff under the supervision of the chief at his capital and they handled all revenue and expenditure. The Emir was allowed full sway in the administration of his emirate. Lugard, however, improved the system by appointing British officials (Residents) to advise and guide each of the more important Emirs.  

Lugard described the system of indirect rule in the Government of Northern Nigeria as being based on the authority of the Native Chiefs. The policy of the Government was that these Chiefs should govern their people, not as independent but as dependent Rulers. The orders of Government were not conveyed to the people through them, but emanated from them in accordance, where necessary, with instructions received through the President. While they themselves were controlled by Government in matters of policy and of importance, their people were controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves. The courts administered native law, and were presided over by native judges. Their punishments did not conform to the Criminal Code, but on the other hand, native law could not be in opposition to the Ordinances of Government, which were operative everywhere, and the courts were under the close supervision of the District


61) Perham, L, op cit, P202-205. Also Ezera, K, op cit, P35.
Staff. The taxes were raised in the name of the native ruler and by his agents, but he surrendered a fixed proportion to the Government, and the expenditure of the portion assigned to the Native Administration, from which fixed salaries to all native officials were paid, was subject to the advice of the Resident and the ultimate control of the Governor. The attitude of the Resident was that of a watchful advisor not of an interfering ruler, but he was ever jealous of the rights of the peasantry, and of any injustice to them. 62)

With the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria in 1914, this system was applied to the Yoruba kingdoms and the chiefdoms of the south west. However, whilst the Emirs of the Northern Provinces were effectively the rulers of their emirates, the Yoruba oba was circumscribed in his authority by a large number of checks and balances, effectively only giving voice to a decision that had been arrived at after an intricate process of negotiation and consultation. Whilst the Hausa had accepted the Ruler's right to taxation for several centuries, no Yoruba oba had ever collected taxes from his subjects on a regular basis. The lack of centralized tribal organizations did not facilitate the propagation of indirect rule in Southern Nigeria. 63)

Lugard had difficulty in establishing his system of native administration in the Yoruba territories and opposition to taxation led to rioting in the Oyo town of Iseyin and in Abeokuta, where opposition to the extension of indirect rule to Egbaland ended in a violent confrontation with the


63) Hailey, WH, An African Survey, op cit, PP417-422. Also Lugard, FD, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, op cit, PP44-46, 47-49 and PP51-58. See also Crowder, M, op cit, PP244-245 and Morel, ED, op cit, PP76-81 for an account of the status of British administration in the South prior to amalgamation.
rebels of the region and Nigerian troops. The riots, however, were quelled with a speed which prevented their repetition in other parts of Yorubaland. In the absence of any clearly defined indigenous and traditional political organization in the south eastern provinces, non-traditional warrant chiefs were chosen. The arbitrary choice of these agents led to a deep suspicion of the British rulers among the Ibo and a consequent recalcitrance and reluctance to co-operate with the system.

Lugard was able not only to build a system, but to initiate a 'school of native administration'. He left behind him such a clear formulation of his principles, and so much enthusiasm for them among his officers, that it would have been difficult for his successors to reverse his policy. Yet this policy was not without its critics and in time became increasingly unpopular. It was contended that;

"Indirect rule" is direct rule by indirect means. The Emir's position and salary are secure. His sway, backed by British authority, is rendered absolute, while his people become his serfs, or those of the British Government. Their life is thus robbed of all initiative or desire for progress — intellectual, social, moral, religious, or political.'

It was further alleged, that there was insufficient supervision and that the system lent itself to malpractice executed in the name of the British Government. Most significant, though, it was blatantly obvious that the system was totally inadequate and unacceptable to the increasing


68) Bishop Tugwell, as quoted in Lugard, FD, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, op cit, P223.
number of Western educated and urbanized Africans. Indeed, it was alleged that 'indirect rule' was a strategy to thwart the ambitions of any évolues colonial politicians. 69)

While it is generally acknowledged that indirect rule provided a continuity of administration and an efficient and economic instrument for the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes, which under the prevailing conditions would have been almost impossible to secure by any alternate system, the policy had definite weaknesses. 70) First among these was the lack of accountability of the Colonial Service. It was virtually impossible to call it to account from any quarter. Africans were almost wholly unable to criticize the way in which they were being governed, except by the crude protest of disorder. The Colonial Office did not impose or even guide policy with regard to most questions. Parliament could exercise only an intermittent and rather clumsy intervention. The decision upon questions of Native Administration was left largely to successive Governors. 71)

Secondly, it was contended that the District Heads were in many cases recruited on an unduly narrow basis in point of qualification and experience; 72)


70) Hailey, WM, Native Administration in the British African Territories, op cit, P96.


72) Hailey, WM, Native Administration in the British African Territories, op cit, P96.
The most meritless Chief is pampered ad nauseam by the Administrative Officer, who at the same time shows some unfriendliness towards educated politicians. The fear is growing fast that the Chiefs are being maintained as buffers between the progressive forces in the country and the British Government. 73)

Furthermore, in spite of Lugard's amalgamation of North and South and his endeavour to unite the country under a standard administrative system, the divergent policies and conceptions of the Colonial Administration which had been evolved in each protectorate persisted. Land policies in the two areas differed considerably and contact among the people of the two territories was infrequent, only the higher officials ever encountering one another at the annual meeting of the Council. 74)

Separate development of the North was even advocated by the Northern bureaucracy who favoured the severance of the North from the South. 75) The official language of the two areas was not the same; in the North it was Hausa while the South adopted English. 76) The disunity was further aggravated by the institution, during 1922, of a reformed Legislative Council which legislated for the Lagos Colony and the Southern Province but excluded the Northern Province from its competence. 77)

Educated Nigerians resented this system which gave them no place in the running of their country and which they regarded as undemocratic. Within this discontent were the seeds of a nascent political nationalism.

Besides the 1922 constitutional reforms, which most importantly allowed

73) Awolowo, O, op cit, P65 and PP66-76.
74) Odumosu, OI, op cit, P14.
76) Odumosu, OI, op cit, P14.
for four elected African members of the 20 member unofficial minority in the Legislative Council, there was no concerted endeavour to liberalize the Lugard system of Native Administration until Sir Donald Cameron became Governor of Nigeria in 1931, and in 1933 issued a restatement of the principles of indirect rule as conceived by Lugard. Cameron declared that if the system was to continue to be effective the Native Authorities which the Government recognized must be the authority supported by the people. Cameron saw the primary duty and object of the Administrative Officers as being to educate the Native Authorities in their duties as rulers of their people according to civilized standards. Cameron sought to foster a degree of Nigerian political unity so as to counteract the exclusiveness arising from the application of the Lugard founded policy of developing North and South on separate and parallel lines and thus abolished the office of Lieutenant-Governor and created the position of Chief Commissioners. He encouraged Northern rulers and members of their staffs to travel to the South and to the United Kingdom so as to widen their experience, which was parochially inhibited in comparison with the South. The prevailing judicial system was also reorganized by the abolition of the unpopular provincial courts in which


lawyers could not appear and the substitution of a 'Higher Court' for the
Protecerate and below this Magistrates Courts, in both of which lawyers
were permitted to appear. A system of Native Courts of Appeal was
inaugurated and all types of courts in the country were made subordinate
to the authority of the Supreme Court. 81)

The era of doctrinaire indirect rule in Nigeria is of particular
significance to this account, in that for more than 20 years the Nigerian
system was considered a model of ideal colonial administration. Indeed,
the effective administration of so vast a territory by any other means
would have proved impossible. Lugard had learnt from experience that
effective colonial rule was possible only as long as the traditional
order was able to give structure and form to the society, and in Nigeria
the relatively sophisticated organizational structures of Emirs, chiefs
and clans gave discipline and order to the lives of most of the people.
It was thus only necessary for colonial administrators to have to deal
with a small elite at the top of an indigenous hierarchy of authority.

However, given that colonial rule in general (and specifically in the
case of Nigeria) was intended to introduce the infrastructure of a modern
nation-state in the form of Westernized administrative structures (in
the strategic or diplomatic interest of the colonial power concerned)
to previously unmanageable societies, the incorporation and preservation
of the basic fabric of traditional Nigerian societies as an adjunct to
the colonial process represents a curious anomaly. The contrasts between
the process of modernization and Westernization (represented by colonial-
ism), and tribalism and traditionalism (as the basic tenet of indirect
rule) were incompatible. Thus the principle of indirect rule as
developed in Nigeria incorporated the essence of its own inevitable demise,

81) Crocker, WR, A Critique of British Colonial Administration, Allen
in that the central (and indeed only readily available) means were contrary to the implied ends of colonial occupation.

As the colonial impact continued to weaken the traditional order (merely through the pressure of superior resources and the gradual subversion of traditional authority by the supremacy of British Authority) the inevitable consequence was a rise in the need for the formal, legal system of government and administration to provide the basis of social order. The eroding of the one system placed greater demands upon the other as manifest in the process of administrative reform initiated by Clifford and Cameron, and hastened by the cataclysmic effect of world war.

Indirect rule in Nigeria may be said to have had the consequence of complicating an already uneven historical experience. The southern coastal regions had been exposed to Western influence far longer than the hinterland and the North, and the institution of indirect rule served to isolate these regions from the southern influences for even longer than might otherwise have been the case. Indirect rule served to drive a wedge between the Westernized urban elite and the tribal elite and eventually between the different tribes themselves. This wedge emanated from the contradictions between modernization and traditionalism which the system represented.

2.2 Constitutional development toward self-government

In seeking to maintain constitutional authority and political initiative in the post-war years, Nigerian officialdom struggled with two inter-related problems. The crux of the issue was how to reconcile the Native Authority system, as the primary unit of indirect rule and African self-government, with a fast evolving parliamentary system of government at the central territorial level. The second, and related problem was how
to give the centrally minded nationalists a larger role in the government without relinquishing ultimate imperial authority. 82)

A policy of gradual development through local self-government had customarily been advised. Perham had suggested in 1937 that;

In so far as the political ambitions of the educated are centred upon the Legislative Council, they should be met not by giving them an extension of power over the backward masses, but by increasing their responsibilities, and therefore their sense of political realities, in the Colony, and in urban and other advanced areas. 83)

It was, in short, a question of how to maintain a balance between authority and responsibility. Officials had to decide whether post-war political development in Nigeria should be directed toward the creation of a modern Nigerian state with parliamentary institutions, or toward the continued development of the Native Authority system with the ultimate co-ordinating or cementing link (at the level of central government) left unspecified. Nigerian nationalists and a few colonial officials pressed for the former; British imperial traditions and interests, the inertia of the Nigerian masses, the conservatism of chiefs and traditionalists, and the persuasion of most colonial officials pointed to the latter. 84)

Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor from 1935 to 1943, had indeed recognized the dilemma in the trend of British policy as applied to Nigeria, and laid the groundwork for a process of constitutional innovation intended to speed up the development of local government authorities, by the institution of Regional Councils with a Central Council in Lagos, and to

82) Coleman, JS, op cit, P271. Awolowo, O, op cit, P102 wrote thus; "The question is: how is local self-government to be attained? The answer is: by eliminating all the Administrative Officers from the Native Administrations."

83) Perham, M, op cit, P362.

foster a political assimilation of North and South in consultation with Nigerians.\textsuperscript{85}) Bourdillon's endeavours, however, were delayed and retarded by the exigencies of the war effort.

2.2.1 The Richards constitution

Sir Arthur Richards succeeded Bourdillon during 1943 and within a year submitted proposals for the review of the constitution as amended in 1922. Although these proposals declared it to be his objective to promote the unity of Nigeria; to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which make up the country; and to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs,\textsuperscript{86}) the passing into law of these proposals on August 2, 1946 took place without consultation with Nigerians and without being subjected to debate in the British Parliament.\textsuperscript{87})

The new constitution made provision for a Legislative Council, with jurisdiction over all Nigeria,\textsuperscript{88}) (as opposed to the exclusion of the Northern Province from jurisdiction of the Legislative Council instituted

\textsuperscript{85}) Bourdillon, B, \textit{op cit}, PP9-13. "(The Legislative Council) ... is an unnatural excrescence and its removal and replacement cannot be altogether natural processes ... In our deliberations we should take the people of the country fully into our confidence, and we should not tie ourselves down too closely to existing models, ..." See further Bourdillon, B, \textit{The Future of the Colonial Empire}, SCM Press Ltd, London, 1945, PP55-66 and Ezeres, K, \textit{op cit}, PP64-65.


in 1922) consisting of the Governor, 16 official members, 13 of whom would be \textit{ex officio} and three nominated, plus 28 unofficial members of whom only four would be elected and 24 nominated.\textsuperscript{89}

The constitution recognized that Nigeria falls naturally into three regions, the North, West and East\textsuperscript{90} and introduced a concept of regionalism by the institution of Regional Councils for the Northern, Eastern and Western Provinces. (See Appendix II.) The Regional Houses were primarily intended to forge a link between the Native Authorities and the Legislative Council at the centre. In addition, the Regional Houses were to consider and advise, by resolution, on any matter referred to them by the Governor or introduced by a member, in accordance with the provisions of the Order-in-Council.\textsuperscript{91}

The method of drawing up the Richards constitution and the timing of its institution were ill conceived, being introduced in the atmosphere of post-World War II nationalism and at a time when the nationalist spirit in Nigeria had reached a high point. The new constitution did little to meet the challenge to post-war colonial administration, and nationalists rejected it as a stratagem of divide and rule.\textsuperscript{92}

Prompted by this challenge, a strategy for the future political and economic development of Britain's African colonies was discussed at a
conference held in London during 1947, attended by all African Governors and Governors-designate. The conference emphasized the importance of the development and democratization of local government in the various African territories with devolution of responsibility from central to local government as the latter increased in efficiency. This was no radical departure and found its origin in the premise of indirect rule and the Colonial Office policymakers' belief that progress could only be achieved by an administration in touch with the people and their needs. The official policy of the post-war years, therefore, was to democratize the Native Administration system as a matter of urgency and to make it more efficient.\(^{93}\) It is pertinent to note that all the Governors in the British West African territories were in fact changed during 1947-48, so as to ensure that this policy would be carried out effectively.

2.2.2 The Macpherson constitution

Sir John Macpherson was appointed the new Governor of Nigeria in April 1948 and stated on assumption of his office that it was his specific intention to democratize the Native Authority system so as to make it attractive for educated Nigerians to enter the system; this in accordance with official colonial policy.\(^{94}\) The Native Authority systems of the Eastern Provinces were soon transformed into Local Councils; elected councils from the villages, district and county levels were accorded self-government status within the limits of their allocated powers, with the Administrative Officer acting as advisor.\(^ {95}\)

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During May 1948 a Special Commission, to advise on the recruitment and training of Nigerians for the senior civil service, on which leading nationalist politicians were nominated to serve, was appointed. Furthermore, during August 1948 it was announced that the Richards constitution, which was to have endured for a period of nine years, was to be revised in consultation with the Nigerian people "straight away". A period of intense constitutional negotiation was initiated with consultation and participation at all levels of the hierarchy. The prospect of a new democratic constitutional dispensation also initiated a period of intense internal political manoeuvring and nationalistic rivalry during which most of the political parties, which were to be prominent in the future constitutional process, were crystallized.

In drawing up a new constitution public opinion was to be thoroughly canvassed and negotiations were conducted from March through to September 1949 on three levels; village and district meetings, provincial and divisional conferences and at regional conferences the recommendations of which would be considered by a general conference, which representatives from the regional conferences and all unofficial members of the Legislative Council would attend. It would be the function of the General Conference to study the statement, prepared by a Drafting Committee, derived from the proposals of the regional conferences, to suggest any changes or amendments which it considered necessary and to submit its recommendations regarding constitutional reform for debate in the Regional Houses and the Legislative Council and then for submission to the Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The General Conference was convened at Ibadan during January 1950, to consider the Drafting Committee's proposals for a federal system and the division of Nigeria into three regions. The inter-tribal and inter-regional animosity had reached fever pitch by the time of the conference as each group fought to preserve its perceived interests against the demands of the other. The conference was bedevilled by tribal-nationalistic fears of domination and unfair advantage. The basic proposals of the Draft Committee were eventually accepted by the Conference, albeit with considerable amendment.

The new constitution established a Central Legislature and a Central Executive for the whole country. The Central Legislature, comprised of a single chamber, to be known as the House of Representatives consisting of; a President, six ex officio members, 135 representative members elected from the Regional Houses, six special members appointed by the Governor to represent interests or communities not adequately represented in the House. The Central Executive, to be known as the Council of Ministers, consisted of the Governor (as President) six ex officio members and 12 ministers. Nigeria was to be divided into three Regions; Northern, Western and Eastern Regions and each of these three Regions was to have a Regional Legislature and a Regional Executive. (See Appendix II.) Elections were held throughout Nigeria during the latter half of 1951, and the new constitution came into effect in January 1952.

102) Ibid, Para 68-80, P4.2-45.
In the Western Region, the Action Group party won the election, while in the Eastern Region the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) won an overwhelming majority and in the North the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) made a clean sweep. Thus no political party emerged from the election holding a country-wide majority of support and so the inter-regional rivalries were to be complicated by party political fractures.

The inability of political parties to work together and the lack of inter-regional unanimity led to the collapse of the Macpherson constitution when the House of Representatives split over a motion presented to the House proposing self-government for Nigeria by 1956. The issue which precipitated the constitutional crisis was merely the last straw in the continuing rivalry and antagonism between the Regions, which indicated inadequacies in the Macpherson constitution. The parties were invited to a conference in London at which the constitution would have to be redrawn.

2.2.3 The Lyttelton constitution

The conference was convened on July 30, 1953 under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton and was charged to consider constitutional reform within the following terms of reference; (a) the defects of the Macpherson constitution; (b) changes required to remedy these defects; (c) steps to be taken to put these changes into effect; and (d) the question of self-government in 1956. Contrary to expectations, agreement was reached with relatively little difficulty and the resolutions of the conference turned Nigeria away from central power.

105) Ibid, PP153-167. Also Odumosu, OI, op cit, PP88-90. The "self-government in 1956" motion was precipitated by certain weaknesses in the Constitution which are discussed below.
toward confederated power.

All delegations at the conference considered that the Regional Governments should, in the sphere of activities assigned to them, be more independent of the Central Government, and hence that Regional legislation should not have to be submitted to the Central Executive. 107) The conference also determined, with the dissension of the National Independence Party (a dissident splinter group from the NCNC in the Eastern Region) that residual functions should henceforth be vested in the Regional Governments. 108)

The Central Legislature was to be composed of a Speaker, three *ex officio* members, and 184 representative members elected on the basis of single member constituencies. 109) Further, the Lieutenant-Governor of each Region was empowered to appoint as Premier, the person who is the leader of the party which commands a majority in the Regional Assembly. 110) There was, however, no provision for a Premier at the Centre, largely due to the fact that there was no single political party commanding a national majority in the Central Legislature. 111)

Before the crisis which gave rise to the Conference developed it had been contemplated, on recommendation from the House of Representatives, that the Macpherson constitution should be amended so as to confer upon

Ministers general direction and control of, and individual responsibility for the departments within their portfolios. The conference agreed that this change should be made at the same time as the other proposed changes, and that it should operate in the Regions as well as at the centre. In addition, the issue of self-government by 1956, which had precipitated the constitutional breakdown, was referred to the Secretary of State for Colonies who determined that no fixed date could be set. The conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty's Government would grant, to those Regions who so requested, full self-government within the competence of the Regional Governments. It was resolved, furthermore, that a conference consisting of delegations from each Region of the Federation, chosen by their respective Governments and representing all shades of political opinion should be convened in Nigeria not more than three years from August 31, 1953 for the purpose of reviewing the constitution and re-examining the question of self-government. In the final instance, the Colonial Secretary determined in arbitration, that Lagos should become a separate federal territory and not retained within the Western Region as had been suggested. Final details relating to fiscal, judicial and public service matters were ratified at a resumed session of the conference at Lagos during January and February 1954 and the revised constitution came into effect in October 1954.


2.2.4 The 1957/58 constitutional conferences

Spurred by the knowledge that the constitutional dispensation was to be subject to review within three years and that full regional self-government had been promised to those Regions which desired it, the years preceding the conference were preoccupied with a process of intense politicking and regional political development, with a view to laying claim to the undertaking for self-government in the respective regions after 1956. The Western Region had openly declared its readiness to receive regional self-government in 1956, while the NPC government of the Northern Region stated that it would seek self-government in 1959. Accordingly the question of self-government had been transformed from a vague aspiration to one of time and means. The Constitutional Conference did not convene, however, until May 23, 1957 as postponement had been forced by the appointment by the Secretary of State for Colonies of a Commission of Enquiry into alleged fiscal malpractice by Dr. Naamdi Azikwe, Premier of the Eastern Region.

The Constitutional Conference met in London under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary, and was attended by ten delegates and five advisors from each of the three Regions, five delegates and three advisors from the Southern Cameroons, the Governor-General, the three Regional Governors, the Commissioner of the Cameroons, two leading Federal Ministers, the leader of the Opposition in the Federal House and two

119) The German colony of the Cameroons was divided under British and French mandate after the First World War. See Schwarz, FAO, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race — The Politics of Independence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1965, PP124-125.
delegates representing Lagos, the federal capital. When both the Western and Eastern Regional Governments asked for regional self-government in accordance with the 1953 undertaking, the conference agreed that they should become self-governing at an early date immediately after the conference and also agreed on the details of the constitutions for these self-governing territories. The conference also agreed on the institution of a Commission of Enquiry to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill founded.

The conference resolved that after dissolution of the existing House of Representatives there should be two Legislative Houses for the Federation, a House of Representatives and a Senate. The Senate would consist of 12 members from each Region and the Southern Cameroons, four from the federal territory of Lagos, and four special members appointed at the discretion of the Governor-General. The House of Representatives would consist of 320 members elected from single-member constituencies to be determined by an ad hoc Delimitation Committee appointed by the Governor-General. Notably, the conference also agreed to the institution of the office of Prime Minister of the Federation. The Prime Minister would be the person appearing to command a majority in the House of Representatives. In the Regions the title of Premier would be retained. The Prime Minister would be free to recommend

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124) Ibid, Para 28 (a) - (c), P15.
to the Governor-General the appointment as Minister of any member of
the House of Representatives, including any member of the Senate, when
established.\footnote{127)}

At the beginning of the conference the three Regional Premiers and the
Leader of Government Business in the Southern Cameroons submitted a
memorandum containing joint proposals that the United Kingdom Government
should undertake to grant independence to the Federation of Nigeria in
1959.\footnote{128)} The question was deferred for consideration at the end of the
conference. When dealing with the issue the Colonial Secretary declined
to commit Her Majesty's Government, on the grounds of the uncertainty
of the constitutional status of the Federation in 1959, owing to the
fact that two of the Regions were only just embarking on regional self-
government and that the Commission of Enquiry into the position of
minorities might recommend the establishment of more states in Nigeria.\footnote{129)}

He assumed, however, that following normal practice the House of
Representatives might be dissolved before its extreme term was reached
and that the next Federal elections might be expected to be held during
the dry season of 1959/60 and that if at that point the people of Nigeria
remained broadly united then; "... the United Kingdom Government would
be able to feel with a good conscience that its trusteeship was drawing
to a close".\footnote{130)}

The non-committal attitude of the British Government was an humiliating
disappointment for those political leaders who had staked much of their
political reputation on the drive for independence by 1959. Nevertheless,
in the interim the conference resolutions were implemented. Thus both

\footnote{127}{\textit{Ibid}}, Para 36, P18.
\footnote{129}{\textit{Ibid}}, Para 48-51, P24.
the Eastern and Western Regions formally became self-governing on
August 8, 1957 and on September 2, 1957, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa was formally appointed Nigeria's first Federal Prime Minister.
On first appointment he formed a 'government of national unity' composed
of a coalition of the three major parties and two members of the opposition.
The political parties found themselves temporarily united in their
determination to achieve independence by 1960.\(^{131}\)

The constitutional conference was reconvened in London during September
and October 1958; attended by 114 delegates and advisors on the same
proportional basis as the initial conference, its main purpose was to
consider the report of the Minorities Commission.\(^{132}\)

On the recommendation of the Minorities Commission\(^{133}\) the resumed
conference agreed on the drafting of a substantive code of fundamental
rights, based on the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, for inclusion in the constitution.\(^{134}\) Furthermore,
under a bulk of recommendations from the Minorities Commission\(^{135}\) the
conference resolved that there should be constitutional provision for a

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\(^{131}\) The Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council, NO 1362,
1957, Statutory Instruments, 1957, Vol II, Her Majesty's Stationery
(Amendment NO 2) Order in Council, 1957, PP3030-3051.

\(^{132}\) The Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, September/October
1958, CID 569, Para 4 and 5, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London,
1958, P3.

\(^{133}\) Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of
Minorities and the Means of Allaying them, July 1958, CID 505,
Chapter 14, Section 5, Para 37-44, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

\(^{134}\) The Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, September/October
1958, op cit, Para 7, sub para (a) - (c), PPL-9.

\(^{135}\) Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of
Minorities, op cit, Chapter 14, Sec 2, Para 12-25, PP90-94.
single police force under an Inspector-General responsible to the Federal Government. The major portion of this force would continue to be stationed in the Regions, each regional contingent being under the control of a Commissioner and being recruited by the Commissioner under the general supervision of the Inspector-General, as far as practicable from within the Region. It was agreed that, as far as possible, constables should be posted to an area where they understood the language spoken.136)

The conference discussed at length the Minorities Commission finding that a case for the immediate creation of new states encompassing minority groupings had not been made out, and accepted the Colonial Secretary's statement that Nigeria could not aspire to independence by 1960 if new states were to be created at that late stage.137) Further, provisions were approved for the Northern Region to become self-governing on March 15, 1959.138) At the conclusion of the conference the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that Her Majesty's Government would not be able to complete the drafting of the Act of Independence before October 1, 1960 and it was agreed that Nigeria would become a fully independent state on that day.139)

The final pre-independence hurdle was the federal election of 1959. Voting patterns followed a largely tribal basis with no party gaining a clear majority in the Federal House; the NPC winning 148 of the 312

139) Ibid, Para 84, P38.
federal seats, the NCNC 89 and the Action Group 75. Prime Minister Balewa continued in office at the head of an NPC/NCNC coalition.  

The independence constitution had evolved after a gestation period of nearly four decades. The bi-cameral system was designed, in the Regions, to balance the political power of the lower houses with the traditional influence of the Houses of Chiefs. At the centre, the Senate had an equal number of appointed senators for each Region and was thus intended to provide a safeguard against domination by any party or alliance through its majority in the House of Representatives. The division of power between the Federal and the Regional Governments was based on the 1954 dispensation.

A list of 'federal powers' reserved to the Federal Parliament covered 44 items, including foreign affairs, defence, customs, currency, higher education, postal services and trunk roads. A 'concurrent' list of powers shared between the centre and the Regions had 28 subjects, including police, judiciary, labour and industrial development. All other powers were vested in the Regions. Special provisions to safeguard parliamentary democracy included clauses which specified that: the Director of Public Prosecutions was specifically exempted from political control; Public Service Commissions at the centre and in the Regions were to control all civil service appointments and promotions; the Supreme Court was to adjudicate in any dispute between federal and regional authorities; a Federal Electoral Commission, with a chairman and one member for each Region plus one for Lagos, was to arrange federal

140) Schwartz, n, pp cit, PP111-113.
elections, while regional commissions were to arrange regional elections.\textsuperscript{143)}

Furthermore, the constitution guaranteed freedoms of conscience, expression, association and movement in entrenched clauses that could not be altered except by a two-thirds majority of both Houses at the Centre and in at least two of the Regions. Nor could the boundaries of existing Regions be altered, except by a two-thirds majority in each Federal House and by a majority of Regional Legislatures.\textsuperscript{144)}

An evaluation of this tedious process of constitutional development spanning a period of almost four decades is significant, in that it not only represents the gestation of the basic formal political institutions from which the modern Nigerian political machine has evolved, but also the genesis of the generally humanistic and popularistic political values of the évolues national political elite in interaction with Western democratic constitutional institutions.

The negotiated evolution of formal political institutions in Nigeria was characterized on the one hand, by a division between the need for Britain to be seen to rule and yet be responsive to the pressures of popular politics (internal as well as external) and on the other hand, the need to find a balance between the emergent urban political elite at the centre and the traditional rulers as the authorities of indirect rule. Indeed, at the centre of the process lay a conflict between the need for order and the need for continuing change; a need to balance authority and responsibility; and the need to bridge the societal cleavages expanded by indirect rule.

\textsuperscript{143)} \textit{Ibid.}, Chapter X, PP2455-2457.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that initial endeavours (in the form of the Richards constitution) arbitrarily sought to centralize the regional native authorities within three Regions and to bolster administrative control at the national centre with token participation by the urban political elite. Whereas the Richards constitution was to be of short formal duration, it established the basic structural assumptions and determined the political premises within which future constitutional development was to take place. The balance between centre and region was reinforced by the lengthy process of 'grassroots' level consultations preceding the Macpherson constitution, which ultimately set Nigeria on a federal course; the basic assumptions were not changed throughout the constitutional process and indeed, came to be jealously guarded.

The general assumption guiding administrative rule in most of the British Empire was that development could best be furthered by arbitrarily imposing an administration which facilitated the rule of law and then patiently waiting for the attitudes of the people to come around to an appreciation of such an enlightened system of government, and it is undoubtedly within this context which Richards acted. In so doing, he initiated a psychological commitment towards regional federalism among the traditional rulers who undoubtedly at that time held the wider base of support (coerced, if not spontaneous) at the expense of the centrally inclined and nationally oriented urban political elite. The result was that in order to seek political legitimization (which was the prime goal of the administratively and politically unincorporated urban political elite) the latter had to regionalize its campaign. Thus it was that the means unto legitimacy and ultimately self-government (regionalism/federalism) unwittingly became an end in itself.
It is contended further, that contrary to basic assumptions of modern political science, the political institutions as developed in Nigeria were not based on expressions of particular indigenous values or cultures of the society. The federal system found its roots in the Lugard amalgamation scheme and became administratively institutionalized and gained momentum through successive colonial administrations, to the point where the historic colonial emphasis on the development of administrative and bureaucratic structures locked the Nigerian constitutional process into a framework of regionalism. Constitutional negotiations were not conducted on the basis of indigenous political values, but from the confinement of colonially evolved and arbitrarily imposed bureaucratic necessity.

The Nigeria of the 1950's, into which a system of federal representative government was introduced, had not developed the social conditions in which institutions of this kind could succeed. Three premises are traditionally accepted as prerequisites to a viable federal dispensation: a degree of mutual affinity among the respective populations, the inability of one region to exist independently of the others, a balance of power (economic and political) between the regions. It is evident that the federal dispensation in Nigeria at independence could hardly have complied with these provisos. Acknowledgement of regionalism/federalism became a prerequisite to self-government and within that context was accepted as the basis of constitutional advancement. It was only when independence was imminent that doubts about the viability of the regional/federal dispensation were more clearly voiced. (Witness, for example, the investigation into the political grievances of minority groups during 1957.)

The significance in contemporary terms of the era of constitutional development in Nigeria, is that by locking the emergent indigenous
politicians in an extended process of constitutional negotiation the process of indigenous political development was truncated. Indigenous party political power bases were regionalized. Constitutional negotiations were conducted on the basis of three Regions seeking to find a balance of central administrative compatibility — a compatibility which because of the proponderant uneveness between the Regions could at best be contrived and lacked in any national commitment.

Further, the emergent political elites evolved political values and objectives at the negotiation table where the British democratic tradition was the rule of the game; this was significant on the one hand, in that these new political leaders readily espoused these values as a means to an end, while on the other, they contrived to assimilate indigenous values, resulting in a value conflict between the parochial and universal, which must surely reflect on the sincerity of the commitment to the federal constitution and political institutions so long debated.

2.3 The development of the indigenous political organization: the nationalist experience

The evolution of an indigenous political organization is a phenomenon of political development and may be divided into four phases. First, the phase of factionalism, where both political institutionalization and participation are limited. Individuals and groups break with the traditional patterns of political organization and behaviour but the arising associations and groupings usually lack organizational continuity and structure. Secondly, the phase of polarization, which is brought about by the broadening of political participation under the pressure of social forces, and the consequent linking of political factions in broader groupings. Thirdly, the phase of expansion, during which political
parties seek mass support in their bid for power and in the final
instance, the period of institutionalization of the emergent political
organization.

Whereas the evolution of the indigenous political organization in
Nigeria conforms to this identified traditional pattern of political
development, the inherent divergence in historical experience of the
different regions of Nigeria resulted in an unevenness of social and
economic development and hence of political awakening. The history of
political development in Nigeria, therefore, is the record of several
different and often overlapping developmental and time phases. Thus,
for example, the incubator of political awareness and Nigerian national-
isim was Lagos and the Southern urban centres, while the Northern Region
and the rural areas were far less politically progressive.

2.3.1 Factionalism

Despite the fact that Nigeria has a long history of resistance to
British administration, tangible evidence of an emergent phase of
factionalism can be traced to the period between the First and Second
World Wars. The sentiments of "self-determination for all people" and
Wilsonian democracy which gripped the post-war international mood had
a significant impact upon the thoughts, aspirations and activities of
the literate and articulate Nigerians. Racial consciousness and
nationalist sentiment were further stimulated by the convening of the
first Pan-African Congress in Paris during 1918-1919 and the emergence
of the militant and race conscious Garvey Movement. (Marcus Garvey,

145) Huntington, SP, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale
the founder, sought to unite all Negro people of the world into one body so as to establish a state and government absolutely their own. Within four years he had become the acknowledged leader of one of the largest Negro mass organizations in modern times.) The Garvey Movement was greatly influential in stimulating the level of racial and national consciousness of Africans under colonial rule.\textsuperscript{146}

The period of factionalism in the evolution of an indigenous political organization in Nigeria may be described as falling within five different spheres of development: first, the emergence of an elitist organization in Lagos; secondly, the activities of students at home and abroad; thirdly, the emergence of professional and tribal associations; fourthly, the development of an indigenous press; lastly, the effective unionization of labour. These spheres are overlapping and hardly independent of one another but nevertheless, form the basis of the emergent political organization and historical nationalist experience.

In Lagos on June 24, 1923 the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) was founded by one Herbert Macaulay.\textsuperscript{147} The fact that the first political party in Nigeria should be founded in Lagos is in accord with the fact that Lagos was the first area in West Africa to be colonially annexed by the British and as such had, had a Legislative Council since 1862 and had been the most 'directly' ruled of all the Nigerian


\textsuperscript{147} Sklar, RL, \textit{Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation}, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1963, P46. Buell, RL, \textit{op cit}, P743-744, quoting from the Constitution, Rules and Regulations of the NNDP records; "The first object of this party is to secure the safety or welfare of the people of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of the British Imperial Commonwealth and to carry the banner of 'Right, Truth, Liberty and Justice', to the empyrean heights of Democracy..."
 territories.\textsuperscript{148} The founding of the NNDP had been preceded during 1920, by the formation of the National Congress of British West Africa, an association of urban West African intellectuals with a branch section in Lagos, who dispatched a delegation to the Colonial Secretary in London making representation for a measure of participation by Africans in the existing government.\textsuperscript{149} At the same time there existed at Lagos two other prominent associations; the Reform Club (founded by so-called "gentlemen of high standing" in opposition to the National Congress) and a branch of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (a Garveyist movement).\textsuperscript{150}

The National Congress had begun to languish after the failure of its London mission, and when in 1922 the Clifford constitution for the first time enfranchised a limited number of Lagosians (those with an income in excess of £100 per annum) for election of three representatives to an enlarged Legislative Council, the NNDP dominated the ensuing political awakening.\textsuperscript{151} Macaulay was able to fire his supporters with imaginative journalism in his newspaper the Lagos Daily News, and the NNDP occupied the three Lagos seats on the Legislative Council through the election of 1923, 1928 and 1933. Although the NNDP confined its activities to Lagos, it frequently took a 'national' stand on issues and


\textsuperscript{150} Sklar, RL, \textit{op cit}, P45. Also Coleman, JS, \textit{op cit}, P194.

\textsuperscript{151} Theare, J, \textit{op cit}, PP55-57. The elective principle was limited to the coastal towns of Lagos and Calabar on the assumption that because of their long association with British trade and government these were the only places that had sufficiently large numbers of sophisticated Westernized citizens to be able to use the franchise responsibly.
thus fostered a consciousness, among Lagosians at least, that Lagos was part of a larger territory called Nigeria. Its influence did not extend much beyond the city, however, and its basic support came from the urban elite.  

After the First World War there was a sharp increase in the number of Nigerians studying abroad. These Nigerians were most profoundly affected by the play of external influences. United in their physical remoteness from their traditional environment, they formed attitudes and made resolutions that were crucial to the growth of racial consciousness. The most significant of the student organizations abroad was the West African Students' Union (WASU), founded in London in 1925 with the object of promoting an understanding abroad of African culture and political ambitions, and to foster a spirit of national consciousness and racial pride among its members.  

In Nigeria itself, the Lagos Youth Movement was founded in 1934 by a body of students opposed to the government's educational policy. The organization later changed its name to the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). Despite its elitist character and predominantly Yoruba complexion the NYM was not exclusive or sectarian in conception and branches of the movement were established in urban centres throughout Nigeria. The NYM emphasized inter-tribal amity as a condition of national unity.  

153) Ibid, PP202-211.  
NYM gained national recognition very largely from the support pledged to the movement by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

Azikiwe was an Ibo who had been educated in the United States and had returned to Nigeria during 1937 to found a newspaper called the *West African Pilot*, which was to be the main outlet for his nationalist ideals and through which Azikiwe was to become one of the most prominent political figures in Nigeria. Azikiwe who had experienced the full impact of discrimination, black consciousness and Garveyism in the United States, was greatly influenced by the sensationalism and pugnacity of American 'yellow journalism' whose journalistic style he adopted, and was the first non-Yoruba to gain prominence. He became thus, a symbol of achievement among the historically less socially progressive Ibo people and was able to mobilize their political support and loyalty.

It was these political assets which Azikiwe pledged to the NYM and enabled the NYM to unseat the NNDP by winning the 1938 elections for the Lagos Town Council and the three Lagos seats on the Legislative Council.

A third feature of this general phase in the development of political organization in Nigeria, was the emergence and proliferation of professional organizations and tribal association of a primarily non-political nature. New economic forces accelerated the tempo of social


157) *Ibid*, PP221-224. The main thrust of Azikiwe's philosophy was the emancipation of the African from his servile mentality. "Africans have been mis-educated. They need mental emancipation so as to be re-educated to the real needs of Renascent Africa." Azikiwe, N, *Renascent Africa, op cit*, P135.

mobilization throughout the inter-war period. As the members of new occupational and professional groups became increasingly aware of the links that bound them together, organizational activity was bound to increase. These professional associations, the Nigerian Law Association and the Nigerian Producers and Traders' Association for example, reflected the growth of new ties based on the common interests which developed in the urban centres and were thus of importance in the divergence from traditional interests which they represented. Many of the leaders of professional groups played a significant role in formal nationalist organizations. 159)

Perhaps symptomatic of the breach between traditionalism and modernization, numerous kinship and tribal unions, intended to give organizational expression to the persistent feeling of loyalty and obligation to the tribal lineage, which has been a striking characteristic of African social organization, emerged during this period. 160) Although the level of participation was extremely limited, they represented a link between the Westernized elements in the socially, economically and politically progressive centres and their traditional environment in which the educated elite felt they no longer had a part.

A fourth highly significant element in the political awakening and broadening of political participation, was the role of the indigenous Nigerian press. While newspaper activity in Nigeria could be dated to the turn of the century, the first militantly nationalist newspaper, the Lagos Weekly Record, was not founded until 1921. This was followed in 1925 by Macaulay's, Lagos Daily News which was shortly followed by the influential, European backed, Nigerian Daily Times. 161) However,

Azikiwe, with the *West African Pilot*, introduced the vitality and vigour of the American journalistic tradition to the Nigerian press. Azikiwe started a chain of daily newspapers in the more important provincial towns and concentrated on heightening political awareness and national sentiment beyond the urban confines of Lagos.  

At the time when there was no national political organizational structure through which the nascent nationalism and political spirit in the various urban centres throughout Nigeria could be nurtured and sustained with any continuity, the indigenous press filled the breach. It provided the link between the hub of national political activity at Lagos and the extended centres, and thus contributed to the growth of political and national expectation during the inter-war period.

A fifth stimulus to the manifesting of political organization and participation, was the evolution of labour organized into trade unions. Unionization, due to the lack of official sanction and worker enthusiasm, had been slow to evolve in Nigeria and it was not until 1938 that trade union legislation dealing with the registration of unions was passed. Amendments were later made granting labour unions the right to strike and immunity from civil proceedings in certain circumstances. But it was not until 1941 that labour ordinances, modelled along British lines, were passed, establishing provident funds for employed persons and providing an arbitration tribunal and a board of enquiry to examine economic and industrial disputes in Nigeria.

The earliest and most influential of the Unions was the Nigerian Union

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of Civil Servants and the Nigerian Union of Teachers, and during July 1943 an umbrella organization, the Nigerian Trades Union Congress was formed.\textsuperscript{165} Although the Unions only encompassed a relatively small number of Nigerians, their significance lay primarily in the hierarchical and organizational discipline which they introduced among a strategically vital sector of the Nigerian population (as was to be demonstrated by the calling of a 37 day long general strike during 1945, which all but paralysed the country).\textsuperscript{166} Furthermore, labour unions cut across tribal and regional differences and linked together members in the first pan-Nigerian organization to emerge during this period.

These various organizational activities served to manifest the need for expression of new interests and new values among an emergent class whose aspirations could no longer find fulfilment within traditional structures. The proliferation of organizations, mostly of an institutional and only semi-political nature, were symptomatic of emergent political modernism but lacked the social support or organizational continuity that is the essence of the political party. These various factions were little more than cliques of common interests, which find expression in individual associations, but which lacked any clear expression of political sentiment or social stimulus which could have bound them together above the parochial functionalism which they represented.

2.3.2 Polarization and expansion

The expansion of political participation and the polarization of factional elements in the development of a national political organization in Nigeria was precipitated principally by the influence of the Second World War. The course of this developmental phase was, in its turn, to be

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, P256.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid, P259.
shaped by the endeavours of the Colonial Administration to meet the
dilemma of a burgeoning political awareness and to channel it through
consitutional reform.

The Second World War greatly accelerated the processes of traditional
societal disintegration and social mobilization which had manifested
itself during the inter-war years. Nigeria's economic significance as
a supplier of vital raw materials to the Allied forces led to the rapid
expansion of the wage-labour force, a consequent rapid expansion of
the urbanization movement, and the extension of the communications
infrastructure. Besides which, the Second World War exposed a
considerable number of ordinary Nigerians (as distinct from the educated
elite) to outside influences, and there dawned an awareness among
Nigerian soldiers serving alongside white soldiers of their own rank
that not all Europeans were from the privileged colonial administration.
Furthermore, the commitment of the Allied powers to the Atlantic Charter
signalled the dawning of a new era in the history of colonialism. The third clause of the Charter declared that the signatories; "... respect
the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which
they will live", and fired the zeal and aspirations of colonial
nationalists everywhere, to be free of colonial rule. So too, the
wartime propaganda machine exhorted Nigerians to join in the crusade
for freedom, democracy and a better post-war world.

Nigerians out of a colonial backwater into a modern world in which,
because of the exigencies of war, Nigeria became suddenly important..."
Crowder, H, op cit, PP270-271.

168) Orizu, AiN, Without Bitterness, Frederick Praeger, New York, 1944,
P271.

169) The Atlantic Charter, August 16, 1941, Para 3 in Keesings Contemporary

170) Ezera, K, op cit, P41.

171) Coleman, JS, op cit, P254.
The founding of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) on August 26, 1944 may be suggested as the first specific development in the national expansion and polarization of political organization.\(^{172}\) Jointly founded by Azikiwe and Macaulay, after Azikiwe had split from the NYM, the NCNC declared itself to be a nationalist movement and succeeded in incorporating existing political and non-political associations, professional organizations, labour unions and over 100 tribal and village unions. Among the most important organizations which retained their independence of the NCNC was the Nigerian Union of Teachers (the country's largest trade union) and the NYM.\(^{173}\) Although the NCNC lacked any large scale Hausa support, by subsuming a proliferation of minor organizations in opposition to the NYM, it represented a complete polarization of national politics as developing at that time.\(^{174}\)

It was just at this stage that the Richards constitution was presented; for the first time people, other than colonial administrators, were to be in a majority in the only national legislative body, the Legislative

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173) Coleman, JS, op cit, P265. Also Awolowo, O, Awo, op cit, P235-137 "... I was certain in my own mind that Dr. Azikiwe was not a conscientious member of the Nigerian Youth Movement, and that, for some reasons best known to himself, he was bent on destroying this nationalist organization. At the same time, it seemed clear to me that this policy was to corrode the self-respect of the Yoruba people ..." See also Azikiwe, N, The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria, op cit, PP9-12.

174) Sklar, RL, op cit, P64 records that although Azikiwe referred to the NCNC as a party, press reports indicate that the members of the National Assembly and their supporters viewed the NCNC as an alternative government, or "dual state".
Council. But the Richards constitution was greeted with almost universal disapproval from the Nigerian nationalists, who objected to the Mosaic approach to the drawing up and institution of the constitution, which offered no real advance toward Nigerian control of the administration. Indeed, the principal objection was that the constitution sought to expand the authority of the traditional tribal chiefs and the instruments of indirect rule, ignoring the new nationalist movements.  

Azikiwe and the NCNC made their protest against the constitution a national platform and toured the country rallying support for the NCNC around militant opposition to, and rejection of the so-called "obnoxious ordinances". (That is, those ordinances which designated all minerals, rivers and land acquired for public purposes as possessions of the Crown and those which delegated more authority to tribal chiefs.) The tour was a political highpoint, both for the NCNC and for the growth of political awareness in Nigeria and was followed by an NCNC protest delegation to London. The protest delegation failed in its mission and was advised by the Colonial Secretary to return and seek reform through constitutional means; internal dissension between militants and those who wished to follow the Colonial Secretary's advice eventually reduced the NCNC to little more than a moribund organization.

Impatient militants within the NCNC had formed during 1946 an activist branch known as the Zikist Movement, and couched their frustration in calls for "positive action" against the administration. After the attempted assassination of a high government official the movement was

176) Odumosu, OI, op cit, PP53-56.
The British administration was able to defuse the increasing militancy of nationalist sentiment in Nigeria by the appointment of Sir John Macpherson as Governor and the era of constitutional reform which he ushered in. By the end of 1948 great strides had been made toward eliminating several of the nationalist grievances, either by outright concession or by the declaration of revised objectives and the establishment of the procedure for their appointment. For the following three years much of the political energy of the country was channelled into protracted discussions and consultations concerning the revision of the Richards constitution. This temporary lull in nationalistic fervour and the programme of constitutional consultation, which was extended from the centre to the village level, led to a shift in focus from the national to the regional and the emergence of 'tribal nationalism' fueled by apprehension among the various regional and tribal groups as to the role each would play in the Nigeria being planned. The regionalization of the political development process may be said to have advantaged a far higher level of politicization than might otherwise have been the case, in that the various groups felt that they were organizing to protect their very cultural existence. Thus the tribal unions which had blossomed during the inter-war period formed the basis of the emergent tribal political polarization.

In the South the unevenness of social and economic development between


the Yoruba and Ibo tribes led to a large degree of tribal antagonism. Of all the Nigerian tribes the Yoruba had, had a much earlier contact with the Western influence and thus had the advantage of earlier education. Thus it was inevitable that Yoruba not only controlled the majority of higher positions in the African civil service, but had almost complete control over the business, professional and political activities of the country.\(^{181}\) In an endeavour to narrow the gap between the Yoruba and themselves the Ibo established the Pan-Ibo Federal Union in 1944.\(^{182}\) The Ibo-Federal Union was the foremost supporter of the NCNC.\(^{183}\)

In reaction to the Ibo campaign, Yoruba students in London during 1945 founded a group known as the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. Although the organizations objectives were declared to be purely cultural, the movement soon became the chief vehicle for Yoruba political opposition to the Ibo. One of Azikiwe's chief rivals for national political power, Obafemi Awolowo emerged from the Ibo-Yoruba tension as the champion of Yoruba nationalism.\(^{184}\)

Awolowo and a small group of Yoruba intellectuals, with the full support of the Yoruba obas, set about organizing a political wing of the movement. During March 1951 the existence of the political Action Group was announced and so emerged one of the most effectively organized political parties in Nigeria.\(^{185}\)

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\(^{181}\) Ezeria, K, *op cit*, P90.


Also Awolowo, O, *Awo, op cit*, PP165-166.


and PP218-219.
In the North there had been no comparable degree of social and economic mobilization. There had been little progress toward the evolution of a middle class, and official policy had sought to sustain the authority of the traditional Emir rulers over the bulk of illiterate craftsmen and peasantry. The basic system tended to be monolithic and totalitarian and lacking in the freedom of the more loosely organized counterparts of the Western and Southern Regions.  

Nevertheless, during 1943 the Bauchi Improvement Union was founded by three Northerners and was replaced during December 1949 with the founding of a pan-Northern Nigerian cultural organization known as the Northern People's Congress (NPC); one of its founders and leaders was Abubakir Tafawa Balewa. At its first conference the organization declared that it did not seek to usurp the authority of the natural rulers but to help the traditional authorities enlighten the masses. The excessively moderate approach of the new organization soon led to the formation of a splinter group known as the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which demanded political and social reform in the North to counter Southern domination of the constitutional planning and later legislative process. Northern nationalism had been awakened and as a result of the formation of NEPU the NPC was forced to reorganize itself along more efficient party-political lines. Thus the process of political development had been effectively tribally polarized — the Ibo Union supporting the NCNC, the Yoruba, Egbe Omo Oduwa supporting the Action Group and the Northerners rallying around the NPC and NEPU.

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186) Ezeri, K, _op cit_, P94.
189) Niven, R, _op cit_, PP242-244.
A deep seated antagonism between North and South emerged during the 1950 Ibadan General Conference to consider the proposals of the Drafting Committee on the Constitution, in the uncompromising negotiating tactics of the representatives of the Regions. Whereas the conference agreed to a federal system for Nigeria, it ended in deadlock and dissatisfaction.  190)

The struggle was over the relative power of the three Regions and, more particularly, over the power to be given the Northern Region as opposed to the East and West (or Southern half). The Northern delegates (18 of the 53) insisted that their Region, which had more than half of the country's population, should be allocated one half of the members of the proposed Central House of Representatives. It was suggested that if the conference did not accede to the demand the North would ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria and a return to the division existing before 1914. 191) The conference, however, adopted a resolution proposing that the North be allocated 45 members as compared to the 33 each for the Western and Eastern Regions. The Northerners then unanimously recorded their determination to dissociate themselves from all other recommendations of the conference. The North contended, further, that tax revenue should be divided on a per capita basis, thereby giving it more than half, rather than according to its derivation, which would give it substantially less than half. The conference could not resolve the issue and it was eventually left to a commission of fiscal experts. 192)

The commission eventually compromised, but did much to meet the demands of the North by making a substantial portion of the annual grants depend upon the number of adult male taxpayers within each region and by recommending a grant of £2 million to the North to make up for past deficiencies. A further issue which divided North and South was also left for outside decision and again the North won the advantage. The Yoruba dominated Western Region Conference had resolved that the boundary between Northern and Western Regions should be redrawn to include the Northern Yoruba within the Western Region. The North was opposed to any revision of boundaries and the issue which was eventually referred to the Governor was decided in favour of the North.

Whereas East and West were united against the Northern Region on the above issues, the Western Region found itself more strongly in accord with the Northern premise that Nigeria should be governed as a federation of ethnic groups; the Easterners were less willing to accept this premise. So too, on the roles of the Emirs and traditional authorities the Eastern delegation disagreed more radically than its Western counterpart with the Northern delegations endeavours to ensure a measure of continuity in the traditional system. After the conference ended with the North still adamant in its demand for half of the seats in the Central House of Representatives the British decided to refer the issue to the Legislative Council, which decided in favour of the North. Thus was the stage set and the issues primed for the elections under the new constitution and the first national party-political elections in Nigerian history, held during 1951.

193) Odumosu, OI, op cit, PP60-61.
This phase of polarization and expansion in the development of an indigenous political organization in Nigeria is significant to the present analysis in that, in the first instance, it emphasizes that the key to Nigeria's contemporary political awakening lay with the urban educated elite. The disintegrative effects of the Second World War loosened social forces and traditional loyalties, which enabled this elite to formulate a common objective namely, democratic political participation. The polarization of the urban elite between the moderate NYM and more militant NCNC, and the rapid expansion of political participation heralded a period during which the British administration lost the political initiative and was races with increasing nationalist militancy.

This phase is also significant in that through regionalization and the insistence that constitutional consultations should be conducted from village level up, the British perpetuated the legacy of indirect rule and sought to legitimize the tribal chiefs at the expense of the urban elite. As a result the nationalist fervour, which was yet in its infancy and limited almost exclusively to urban areas, became tribally oriented. The subsequent tribal political polarization, while on the one hand, facilitating a far wider national political awakening, precluded the development of any mass national political organization which could unite the country above tribal cleavages.

2.3.3 Institutionalization

The way in which political participation and organization is expanded obviously shapes the institutionalized party system which subsequently develops. The regionalization of the political development process in Nigeria nurtured by official policy and the evolution of tribally-based political organizations made the institutionalization of a multi-party
system inevitable. However, as the majority parties in the three Regions would dominate the central legislature the constitutional dispensation tended to favour the development of a dominant tri-partite system.

In the Western Region the Action Group won a majority over the NCNC, and when the outcome became known, a good many NCNC supporters crossed the floor of the Western House of Assembly to swell the majority of the Action Group to 60 members, to the NCNC's 13 and seven independent members. In the Eastern region the NCNC won an overwhelming majority of 72 seats, with the remaining eight going to the NCNC's opposition party in the Eastern region, the United National Party. In the Northern Region, however, the NPC won all 80 seats and thus the NEPU was excluded from representation in the Northern House of Assembly. 196 Therefore, the Central House of Representatives, being a collection of regional representatives elected from the Regional Houses, was wholly composed of members of the Action Group, the NCNC and the NPC, as the regional majority parties.

The emergent political parties had indeed been constitutionally institutionalized but the Macpherson constitution was to be of short duration, partly because of its own deficiencies and partly because of the prevailing regional political circumstances. From the party-political point of view there was a fundamental difference between the NCNC on the one hand, in which important elements agitated for a constitution that would give greater powers to the central government, and the Action Group and NPC on the other hand, both of which wanted to retain as much power in the Regions as possible. 197 In effect the Macpherson constitution

197) Bello, A, op cit, PP110-112.
was a compromise between these two positions and apportioned power effectively neither to the centre nor to the Regions, and since on its promulgation it was stated to be only a step toward further constitutional development, the various parties, despite an initial willingness to make it work, all were anticipating future change.

A particular defect of the constitution was the position of Ministers; there was no real ministerial responsibility under the constitution since Ministers were not directly responsible for their departments, but merely acted as spokesmen on departmental affairs in the Legislature and Council of Ministers. They had no responsibility for the formulation of policy in their own departments. Furthermore, Ministers were held collectively responsible for all decisions made in the Council of Ministers. In an ordinary party or coalition government this would be a reasonable proviso, but in a council where Ministers were elected not by the national legislature but from the Regional Houses, and where four African Ministers from one Region together with six European officials could outvote the eight Ministers from the other two Regions, deadlock was inevitable. 198)

The actual collapse of the constitution was precipitated by the combination of the above two factors. The NCNC had been disillusioned with the constitution from the outset and when Azikiwe, its leader, failed to gain a seat on the national legislature, due to the fact that he was from Lagos which fell in the Western Region where the Action Group had won a majority in the election, the party was divided. 199) The members of the NCNC holding ministerial office in the Eastern House and national legislature wanted to make the constitution work, while those who were

198) Ezera, K, op cit, PP154-156.
199) Ibid, PP156-158.
disillusioned with Azikiwe's exclusion from the national legislature wished to engineer the withdrawal of NCNC support for the constitution.  

At an NCNC convention in Jos during December 1952, three NCNC central Ministers were expelled from the party and when it became apparent that most of the Eastern Ministers sympathised with their colleagues, a meeting of the Eastern parliamentary committee of the NCNC asked for the resignation of all nine Ministers so that a cabinet reshuffle could take place. The Ministers duly signed resignations, but when six of them learnt that they were not to be included in the new cabinet they withdrew their resignations. The Legal Secretary accepted their right of withdrawal and so they were able to remain in office only to have every Bill they introduced in the Eastern House of Assembly, including the annual Appropriation Bill, defeated by large majorities. To pass the Appropriation Bill the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Clem Pleass, was forced to use his reserve power of proclamation. The East thus had a minority government, led by the National Independence Party formed by the dissident Eastern Region Ministers and the expelled central Ministers.

As far as the NCNC was concerned the position was intolerable, yet it was the Action Group which precipitated the final breakdown of the constitution. On April 1, 1953 an Action Group backbencher, Anthony Enahoro, introduced a private members Bill in the Central House of Representatives demanding self-government for Nigeria in 1956. It was clear that the Northern members would not support this motion as they did not feel themselves ready for self-government, and in the Council

200) Ibid.


203) Bello, A, op cit, PP110-112.
Ministers the four Northern Ministers together with six British administration officials voted that no Minister should participate in the debate. This was opposed by the four Action Group Ministers who felt that they could hardly dissociate themselves from so important a motion from a member of their own party. The NIP Ministers abstained. However, in accordance with the doctrine of collective responsibility the Council was required to present a united front in the House, so the Action Group Ministers resigned. The North tried to push a milder motion asking for self-government as soon as practicable, but both the members of the Action Group and the NIP and NCNC walked out of the House. 204)

The inter-regional animosity escalated to such an extent that campaigning for "self-government in 1956" by the Action Group and the NCNC in the Northern Region led to four days of violent rioting in Kano during May 1953 which ultimately merely served to accentuate the extent of regional separatism. Shortly after the riots the Northern House of Chiefs and the Northern House of Assembly approved an eight point programme which in effect demanded the dissolution of the Federation. 205) Almost at once the Colonial Secretary announced that the Nigerian Constitution would have to be redrawn to provide for greater regional autonomy and for the removal of powers of intervention by the centre in matters which could, without detriment to the other Regions, be placed entirely within regional competence. 206)

At the subsequent constitutional conference convened in London during July-August 1953, the NCNC and the Action Group entered into a working

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204) Crowder, M, op cit, P284.


alliance in opposition to the Northern NPC.\textsuperscript{207} However, accord was reached relatively easily and the self-government dilemma was resolved by agreement that self-government by 1956 would then be offered to those regions that wanted it, but not to the Federation as a whole. The alliance between the NCNC and the Action Group broke over disagreement on the issue as to whether Lagos should remain part of the Western Region or become federal territory.\textsuperscript{208} The NPC pressed for the latter solution, since it was anxious to ensure that the main outlet for its goods should not be under the control of any other region of the Federation. The NCNC which had many members in Lagos also felt that a federation should have a truly separate federal capital. The Action Group, on the other hand, argued that Lagos was a Yoruba city and did most of its trade with the Western Region and was thus an integral part of the West. The Colonial Secretary, in arbitration, did not accept the latter argument.\textsuperscript{209}

The constitution of 1954 transformed the structure of the political organization from unitary foundations toward a basis of federalism. The basis of the modern-day political organization in Nigeria had been set and the nationalist struggle was essentially over with the British guarantee that independence would be granted within a matter of time.\textsuperscript{210}

In the federal elections that followed the introduction of the new constitution, the NPC won 84 of the 90 seats in the North, in the West the NCNC (contrary to tribal expectation) won 23 seats to the Action Group’s 18 and in the East, stronghold of the NCNC, this party won a further 35 seats. However, since the NCNC’s ally in the North had not won any seats, there was still no party with truly national support.\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{207} Awolowo, \textit{O., Awo}, op cit, PP240-241.

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Ibid}, PP243-244.

\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Ibid}, PP244-245.

\textsuperscript{210} Crowder, \textit{\&}, op cit, P289.

\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Ibid}. 
The nationalists were now aware that their battle for self-government had been won and that if they wanted to force the issue they could do so. However, on the other hand, the prospect of impending independence from Britain induced a unity of spirit and constraint among the nationalists lest their differences should delay the advent of complete self-rule. This spirit characterized the constitutional conferences of 1957-58 and after the 1959 election the proportional status of the parties vis-a-vis the Regions remained essentially unchanged.

The most significant feature of the emergent Nigerian political organization was the fact that it did not produce a national party which did not have to exploit sectional sentiments in order to win support in any part of the Federation. Its strongest political party, the NPC, was not a national party, indeed, it did not even permit Southerners to join. It was not possible to become a Northerner by settling in the North, one had to be born into a Northern tribe. No matter how long a non-Northerner had lived in the North, he was treated in certain respects as an outcast since his tribe was not indigenous to the North.

The regional nature of the NPC and the discriminatory nature of the policy of the Northern Government toward Southerners constituted threats to the unity of the country. The NPC policy was understandable though; the North was still much behind the South, and special privileges for her people were necessary if it was not to remain a permanently backward area. Despite the political power of the NPC, Northern backwardness still placed the Region at a disadvantage. Thus, while the NPC had the largest number of ministers in the Government, at the time of independence only one per cent of the Federal civil service was from the North, and those mostly of the lower grades. The fact that the nation's largest and strongest political party was regional and not national would perpetuate regional, ethnic and religious jealousies.
To a lesser extent the other two major parties were also regional and ethnic. While they were in fact national in aim and admitted people from any Region or ethnic group as members, and during elections had won support in all three Regions, the elections had shown that both found their most solid support in a single cohesive ethnic group. The fact that the three parties had a strong ethnic and regional cast reflected the difficulty Nigeria was having in breaking down barriers between her people, and in turn made it more difficult; whether or not it is their intent to do so, such political parties keep alive the fears of minority groups. Minority group fear leads to agitation and accusations that in turn tend to make the majority more cohesive.  

2.4 The influence of Christian missionaries

One of the most enduring historical experiences has been the influence of the Christian missionaries. The horrors of the slave trade had perturbed the consciences of Christian Europeans and fired the missionaries with a messianic zeal for the conversion of this society in which such barbarous activities could be rooted. The missionaries came to identify the evils of the trans-Atlantic slave trade with the tribal and traditional customs, very different from anything European, and their mission became one not of the mere establishment of Christianity but the transformation of traditional society.  

Neither the economic nor administrative policy of the Colonial Administration set out deliberately to upset the traditional social structure. Indeed, the core of the philosophy of indirect rule, as it came to be practised in Nigeria from 1906 onwards,


213) Burns, AC, op cit, PP255-257. See also "Zik on the Church Missionary Society" in Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikive, op cit, PP335-344.
was the ensurance of minimum interference with 'native society'. In short, it has been suggested that Christian missionaries were fired by the idealism of a faith to which they ascribed the enlightenment, progress and technological achievement of their own countries and thus perceived no wisdom in compromising with indigenous customs and institutions.\textsuperscript{214}

Furthermore, the Christian missionaries were fired by an apprehension regarding the spread of Islam. Northern Nigeria was one of the most thoroughly Islamized areas in tropical Africa, and Islam had also made significant advances among the peoples of central and south-western Nigeria. Missionaries were, however, excluded from the Moslem areas of the North by an agreement between the Sultan of Sokoto and Frederick Lugard that; "Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion ..."\textsuperscript{215} This \textit{quid pro quo}, whereby the Sultan of Sokoto was to subject himself to British authority, together with factors of historical incidence, geographical accessibility, and resistance to Christian activity among Islamized groups combined to create an unevenness in missionary influence.

Catholic missionaries had worked in Benin and Warri during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries but their efforts were limited and their impact negligible.\textsuperscript{216} They were followed more than a century later by


\textsuperscript{215} See "High Commissioner Sir F D Lugard to the Sultan of Sokoto: Northern Nigeria", 21 March 1903 in Newbury, C, (ed), \textit{op cit}, P345. Burns noted that ten heathens embrace the doctrines of Islam for every one who becomes a Christian. "Unless the Christian Church can exhibit a brotherhood as real as that of Islam, we cannot be surprised if the latter is more successful in winning the allegiance of pagan peoples." Burns, AC, \textit{op cit}, P257.

Protestant evangelists who were established on the Gold Coast by 1752. Wesleyan missionaries were established at Badagri and Abeokuta during 1841 and members of the Church Missionary Society landed at Badagri during 1842 and reached Abeokuta in 1846. In 1846 the Presbyterians began work at Calabar and by the end of World War I some 15 different missionary societies were active in Nigeria, claiming some 600 European missionary workers and 3000 missionary stations. Thus the Christian missionaries were most influential among the Yoruba and Efik peoples around Abeokuta, Lagos and Calabar, of delayed influence among the Ibo and Ibibio and least influential in the Muslim Northern Regions.

Allied with, and indeed often inseparable from the British secular arm, at least until the beginning of the twentieth century, missionary enterprise resulted politically, in the supersession of Nigerian chiefs by 'Christian' white officials. Missionary enterprise set in motion the disintegrative process towards which British administrators and to a lesser extent traders, were to contribute; it laid the foundation of a new era in which the dynamics of social, cultural and political evolution were to be progressively more external than internal.

The early missionary objective was total religio-cultural conversion, in accord with the prevailing evangelical dogma of the nineteenth century. Conversion implied for the African a complete rejection of

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his society. Renunciation of the old order of things was a prerequisite to acceptance of the new. The convert was necessarily alienated from his community and indeed, was taught to look upon its every aspect with contempt. Since chiefs or elders were invariably resentful of these intrusions on their authority, missionaries were often forced to turn to the socially low placed or outcast who had no deep vested interest in traditional society. In accepting Christianity he accepted the individualism implicit in its doctrine, which conflicts radically with the corporate concept of African life. The convert was also taught to believe in the equality of man, which in many instances led to a degeneration of strongly patriarchal tribal authority and facilitated the expansion of British administration.

Africans were ultimately bound to protest or revolt against several aspects of the early missionary approach. In the first place, the attitude of many missionaries toward African customs and institutions tended to perpetuate such ethno-centric preconceptions as the suggestion that the African had no indigenous history or culture. The Nigerian had been taught that the European race was superior because it was Christian. As Nigerians became increasingly more exposed to Western influences they were bound to become increasingly disenchanted by the white community's indifference to Christian precepts, and Nigerians returning from abroad were cynical and critical of all white pretensions.

The Nigerian reacted not only against the attitude of missionaries, but also against their aim of total Europeanization, especially when the abandonment of many meaningful customs and institutions was made a

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precondition for entry into the 'Kingdom of God'.\textsuperscript{223} Resistance to these colonial preconceptions appeared quite early and represents the religious strand in Nigerian nationalism, in the form of the secession of African groups from the white-dominated Christian churches in Nigeria.

The first of these indigenous church groups was the United Native African Church which seceded from the Anglican Church in 1891, declaring that it was their resolve that a purely native African church be founded for the evangelization and amelioration of our race, to be governed by Africans. In 1901 another large secessionist group formed the African Church and during 1917, a large group seceded from the Methodist Church, and most other churches were similarly affected.\textsuperscript{224} Furthermore, Islam continued to expand at a faster rate than Christianity, due to the fact that it was more akin to traditional African customs and beliefs.\textsuperscript{225} Growing concern at the apparently disintegrative consequences of past missionary activity gave rise to a new approach to the Christian mission. The new attitude was also attributable to an increased knowledge of African cultures and the growth of new interest and sympathy toward the meaningful and useful aspects of those cultures.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid, PP175-176.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. Also Maxwell, JL, \textit{op cit}, PP84-85 "The masses of new Christians in the Southern Provinces are still in tutelage, but they will not long continue so, and even now are breaking away."

\textsuperscript{225} Burns, AC, \textit{op cit}. P257. Also Morel, ED, \textit{op cit}, PP214-216.

\textsuperscript{226} Coleman, JS, \textit{op cit}. P99. Also Westermann, D, \textit{The African Today and Tomorrow}, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, PP221-224 suggests that there were two schools of thought; one which saw Christianity and Western Civilization on the same plane and the other which did not feel called to bring the civilization of a European nation to the African, but to bring the Gospel.
This new evangelical orientation provided the instruments for reintegration, stimulated African culture and played an important role in the rise of nationalism in Nigeria. Besides innovations such as the use of the vernacular in religious and educational work, missionary societies were the first to undertake the systematic study of African languages. They financed and sponsored not only the development of a system of orthography, but also the translation of the Bible and of Christian and educational literature into the vernacular. Furthermore, due to the ever increasing shortage of European clergy willing to undertake missionary work and the shortage of funds, the Africanization of the priesthood and encouragement of the indigenous church became part of the missionary objective. This was a significant (albeit probably unwitting) stimulus to African culture and later political nationalism.

The policy of Africanizing the priesthood gave the educated Nigerian an avenue to a professional career with a high measure of social status, dignity and leadership at a time when Africans could not aspire to senior positions. Furthermore, it provided this new elite with a powerful platform and captive audience from which to claim that Africanization in one sphere of European controlled enterprise should by ethical right be extended to other spheres. The promotion of the indigenous Christian church, in its turn, provided a new focus of loyalty and interest apart from the tribe. African Christians were united in a common cause and the church trained them for common action, thus creating an organized following for Nigerian leaders. Christianity became an

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229) Coleman, JS, *op cit*, PP103-104.
integrative force in that it provided a trans-tribal bond uniting individuals of different and formerly hostile traditional communities. Annual church conferences attended by African churchmen and lay clergy of diverse tribal backgrounds helped to breakdown parochialism and awaken a national perception and a consciousness of racial identity.  230) Christianity was perhaps more directly politically consequential because it exposed many Africans to Christianity and Christian precepts (especially through the educational system) without necessarily converting them. It was among these disaffected Africans, who had been detached from their traditional interests and loyalty, that the Church was identified with the government and gave rise to the conviction that all white men were allied in someway against Africans, and that even if they became Christian their worldly status of economic and political subordination would not be improved. 231) This attitude contributed to the uncompromising and often militant nature of the nationalist struggle, most especially among young student groups who sought to establish values and a racial identity free of all 'white' influence.

Further, within a narrow framework, missionaries in Nigeria were vigorous critics of the government on behalf of Africans, both behind the scenes and on government advisory committees. The absence of open public criticism of the government did not necessarily indicate missionary acquiescence or indifference. In large measure it simply reflected the

230) Ibid, P104. Also Westermann, D, op cit, PP236-240.

231) Westermann, D, op cit, P235 suggested that the multi-denominational nature of Christianity was a root cause of societal disintegration. "It is unfortunate that Christianity comes to Africa split into sects... It may happen all too easily that the missionary warns his flock against intercourse with those of another creed because they might be weakened in their own belief, and thus he sows the seed of mistrust and estrangement."
widely held concept of the proper role of the missionary vis-a-vis political issues; the missionary should never appeal to outside public opinion for the righting of what he considers to be a public wrong, until he has first brought it privately to the attention of the responsible authorities. The strong pro-African orientation of missionary groups in the post-war era and the espousing of the African cause positively contributed to national emancipation.²³²)

The historical experience of the missionary influence can be equated in significance to the spread of Islam — but whereas islamization was invariably a far more subtle process, far more in accord with African traditions which could be readily adapted and indeed enhanced by Islamic custom and civilization, Christianity was alien to Africa. In much the same way as Islam was a prescriptive way of life, initial missionary objectives sought a complete conversion of the traditional way of life and submission to the Christian ethic. The difference was though, that Christianity was essentially non-African and the missionaries were Europeans with preconceived notions as to the wisdom of their ways, and were further, readily identifiable with the British colonialists.

Missionaries were initially instrumental in opening up many areas of the South through their penetration of the furthest reaches of the territory and by preparing the people of the areas (psychologically if not physically) for colonial penetration, by the weakening of traditional patriarchal structures of authority and thereby engendering a confusion and disillusionment with tribal custom. However, the primary historical significance of the missionary influence is a psychological one — Africans were taught of their equality before God, came to realize their individuality

²³²) Coleman, JS, _op cit_, P111.
which projected a racial confidence and consciousness and which accounted for the fact that the secessionist church groups may be seen as the first organizations of an emergent nationalism. The later missionary emphasis on African language and custom as an integral part of religion constituted a significant reintegrative force which was above secular ethno-tribal cleavages.

However, the influence of Christian missionaries was historically uneven and limited to the Southern Region, and while it was able to hold its own, was not able to effectively counter Islam. The advent of Christianity, therefore, complicated the tribal and territorial cleavages between North and South. The Christian ethic constituted a powerful and progressive social force which greatly facilitated and inspired the emergence of national consciousness in the South and as such, consciously or unknowingly, came to be inculcated as an integral element of the Nigerian value hierarchy.

2.5 The influence of European education

The historically most radical influence introduced to Nigeria by the British was the Western system of education; its broad scope, systematic nature and continuity during the crucial formative years made it far more effective and penetrating in its influence than the more superficial economic and social aspects of cultural contact.233) Until the end of the nineteenth century education had been conducted at various levels among the indigenous Nigerian communities. In the Moslem societies of the North academic education of the Koranic type was widespread. In other tribal societies education of children was essentially directed towards enabling them to take their proper place in the tribal communities.

There were no societies in the South where reading or writing were understood, so that traditional education was primarily directed towards the acquisition of skills in crafts and agriculture.234)

From the very beginning education was a monopoly of the Christian missionary societies, since they had the means (through their zealous penetration of the remotest areas) and the motive, since a modicum of literacy was necessary for an understanding of the Christian doctrine. Education remained the direct premise of the missionaries until 1898 and as late as 1942 they controlled 99 per cent of the schools, and more than 97 per cent of the students in Nigeria were enrolled in mission schools. Thus by 1945 there were comparatively few literate Nigerians who had not received all or part of their education in mission schools.235) The North, however, was almost entirely insulated against the effects of western missionary education by Lugard's promise that missionaries would not be allowed in any Moslem emirate. Since the British administration in the first years of occupation had neither the will nor the money to provide education, the only form of education available in the North was that of the Koranic school, except for small schools provided by the Christian Missionary Society at Zaria and Bida, and the government school opened at Kano in 1912.236)

234) Westermann, D, op cit, PP215-217. The individual must conform to the type recognized as normal, and deviations from it are looked at askance, for they threaten to break through the framework of tradition and so become a danger to the community; "... the group has built for itself a well-protected but small and never enlarged house, and the air in it has become close and is apt to smother any fresh initiative."


The real significance of the missionary monopoly over education lay in the evangelical approach of mission schools. The schools taught young Nigerians to aspire to the virtues of white Christian civilization; they consciously encouraged the emulation of European culture and unwittingly fostered disdainful feelings toward the 'heathen' brothers of their students. Consistent with their preconceptions regarding African culture, the missionaries tended to disregard African forms of education because they considered them either evil or non-existent.\(^{237}\)

As a result the educational programme was essentially academic, as opposed to a technical education. The missionaries always emphasized that they were not undertaking the industrial education of the country. All they needed to do as pioneers was to show the light in a few selected spheres of life and the demands of commerce and economic development.\(^{238}\)

Early suspicion of education was soon overcome when it was seen that education was the key to success in the new economic order.\(^{239}\) It was not a demand for a general education as such; the trading chiefs who wanted missionaries to teach their children English had their own way of bringing up their children to fit into the life in the family compound and tribal hierarchy. What they expected was a supplement, a system of apprenticeship by which the children acquired additional arts

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239) Crowder, M, \textit{op cit}, P240. See also Burns, AC, \textit{op cit}, P265 where he wrote that; "It will take some time to combat the idea that has grown up that manual labour and agricultural pursuits are undignified, and that the scantiest amount of book-learning confers upon its possessor a social status and a claim upon the Government that would otherwise be lacking."
and skills, reading, writing, gauging palm oil, manufacturing gun powder
or sugar, or building boats.\textsuperscript{240)}

Missionary education in Nigeria, however, was limited to learning to
read, write and calculate in the English language. African history and
crafts were considered irrelevant and historical lessons illuminated
the great monarchs of England and Europe and the superior civilization
of the colonial power. The inevitable result of this concentrated and
institutionalized indoctrination was the creation of a new class of
Nigerian; conversion to Christianity, knowledge of and preference for
English, imitation of European behaviour and post-school employment in
an urban milieu all helped to isolate the educated African from his
traditional environment. There arose an inherent contradiction between
the role expected of the young Nigerian in accordance with tradition
and custom, and the role expected of him as a result of his Western
education.\textsuperscript{241)}

Indigenous education focused attention on the group and not on the
individual, while the European educational ideal placed primary stress
upon the individual as an autonomous personality. The resulting
incompatibility between African tribal life and Western education made
reintegration into the tribal community very difficult.\textsuperscript{242)} The education
system established English as the \textit{lingua franca} and gave the new educated
elite a common bond and trans-tribal cohesion.\textsuperscript{243)} This elite was

\textsuperscript{240)} Ajayi, JFA, \textit{op cit}, P133.

\textsuperscript{241)} Coleman, JS, \textit{op cit}, P115. Burns, AC, \textit{op cit}, P264 suggests that
perhaps the worst effect of education in Nigeria has been the
manufacture of bad imitations of Europeans instead of good Africans.

\textsuperscript{242)} Coleman, JS, \textit{op cit}, P115.

\textsuperscript{243)} Westermann, D, \textit{op cit}, P245 and PP261-265. Also Ajayi, JFA, \textit{op cit},
PP126-127.
equipped with the knowledge and insight upon which ambitions and aspirations were founded, and which ultimately enabled them to challenge the Nigerian colonial government and to become the key elements in the nationalist struggle. By the latter achievement the Western-educated elements placed themselves above the traditional African authorities in the new Nigerian political system.  

The quantitative and qualitative inadequacies of the education system was one of the first issues in the awakening resentment to colonial rule. It is said that the agitation for educational reform became an intellectual right for political emancipation.  

The schools equipped the African with little more than an elementary knowledge of the English language for an economic future in which a senior clerkship was the upper limit of his permissible advance. Nigerian resentment over British educational policy was one of the principal stimulants for later organizational activity.

Nigerian educated critics of the system resented the de-Africanizing tendencies of an exclusively Christian - European curriculum and they lamented the nature of the anglicizing literary training, which merely produced a disaffected clerk class, and instead advocated a more practical education which would teach the vernacular, agricultural skills and handicrafts. Education for citizenship in, and responsibility toward the old tribal community seemed unreal, if not diversionary from a broader racial or national sentiment. The objective of the education policy was construed as entrenching the status of political and social

244) Coleman, J3, op cit, P116.
245) Ibid.
246) Scott, H, op cit, PP697-698.
inferiority of Nigerians under colonial rule.\(^{247}\)

There was no clear policy on British colonial education until 1925, when in that year the Advisory Committee on Native Education, established in 1923, published a comprehensive statement of imperial policy. It emphasized the need for greater government activity in education, closer co-operation with missionary societies, expanded technical and vocational training, maximum use of the vernacular, and acceptance and utilization of useful and healthy elements in the traditional culture.\(^{248}\) The post-1925 education policy endeavoured to link education with the system of indirect rule — "education should strengthen the feeling of responsibility to the tribal community".\(^{249}\) It was, however, not until after World War II that a beginning was made in substituting a rural and vocational emphasis for the academic and literary bias in Nigerian school curricula.\(^{250}\) During the late 1930's the Nigerian Government inaugurated

\(^{247}\) "The constant temptation in the past has been for the European to regard the native as a tabula rasa on which may be written the rules of a new system of civilization." Ibid, P693. Also Hriley, WA, An African Survey, op cit, PP1231-1233.

\(^{248}\) Lugard, PD, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, Para 168, op cit, P153 where, as early as 1912, he stated that education should be focused on three areas; "... literary training ...; the technical and manual training of mechanics, and other workshop hands; and the teaching of crafts ... suitable to those who purpose to live their own village life". See further Memorandum by the Advisory Committee on National Education in the British Tropical Dependencies 1924/25, Cmd 2374, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1925, P4. "Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations, and traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their social life ..."

\(^{249}\) Memorandum by the Advisory Committee on National Education in the British Tropical Dependencies 1924/25, op cit, P4.

a programme of granting scholarships for study in the United Kingdom
and as has already been seen, this so-called "talented tenth" played a
crucial role in the drive for independence from colonial rule. 251)

2.6 The historical influence of early military organization

Although only affecting a relatively small percentage of the population,
the imperial military factor is considered to have been an organizational
and experiential influence of some significance in the historical
evolution of contemporary Nigeria.

The Nigeria Regiment traced its origin to several small local forces
raised during the second half of the nineteenth century to carry out the
pacification, on behalf of the British, of what is now Nigeria. The
earliest of these forces was the Lagos Constabulary (or "Glover's Hausas"
as they were known) organized from a band of runaway slaves at Lagos
during 1836 by Lt. John Glover, to whom they had pledged their allegiance.

After the proclamation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885, a force
known as the "Oil Rivers Irregulars" (renamed the Niger Coast Constabulary
in 1891) was raised to defend the protectorate and was based at Calabar.

In the North, Sir George Goldie's Chartered Company had organized the
"Royal Niger Company Constabulary" in 1886. These soldiers were subsequently
reorganized by Frederick Lugard in 1900 and amalgamated as the Northern
Nigerian Regiment and took part in the expedition against the Sultan
of Sokoto in 1903, which led to the formal British annexation of the whole
of Northern Nigeria. In 1914 all these military units were combined to

251) Coleman, JS, op cit, P119 and Report of the Commission on Higher
Education in West Africa, op cit, PP185-188.
form the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force.  

Between 1900 and 1914 the regiment participated in 43 punitive actions as British control over the territory was consolidated; the most notable of which was the suppression of the Egba around Abeokuta, who had rebelled against the imposition of indirect rule. During the First World War the regiment was expanded and took part in the conquest of the German Cameroons and the East Africa campaign. In the Second World War, Nigerian troops formed part of the force which liberated Ethiopia from the Italians and Nigerian troops later played a significant role in the Burma campaign. In all, 28 battalions and supporting troops were raised in Nigeria during the Second World War.

After the war there were five infantry battalions, each of about 750 men, stationed at Abeokuta, Enugu, Ibadan and two at Kaduna. There was also an artillery battery and an engineers squadron at Kaduna and the regimental depot and recruit training centre at Zaria. All these units were commanded by a Major-general from his district headquarters at Lagos.

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254) Miners, NJ, op cit, P15. The Nigeria Regiment was renamed the Queen's Own Regiment after the Royal visit to Lagos during 1956. See Haywood, A and Clarke, FAS, op cit, P430.
The function of these military forces was described as the defence of Nigeria from outside attack and aid to the civil power in the maintenance of internal security. The military, however, were never required to take action in support of the police during the pre-independence era and for the most part, the military forces were only seen on ceremonial parades. 255)

Up until 1939 the Nigerian military forces had been under the authority of the Government of Nigeria subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State for Colonies, but at the outbreak of the Second World War the Nigerian Armed Forces were placed under the authority of the Army Council in London and this arrangement persisted until 1958. 256)

Administrative control was exercised in West Africa through the Command Secretary, who was the local representative of the Permanent Under Secretary of State for War. The cost of the armed forces was born by the budget of the United Kingdom with Nigeria making only a token fiscal contribution. While this was a financially beneficial arrangement, it precluded the Nigerian legislature from any influence in the way the military budget was spent. 257) The whole organization was completely self-sufficient and independent of the Nigerian Colonial Government. Primarily as a result of this arrangement, the historical development of

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256) Miners, NJ, op cit, P17. Also Report by the Nigerian Constitutional Conference May/June 1957, Para 67, op cit, P29 whereby the Conference agreed that the control exercised by the United Kingdom Army Council over the Nigerian Military Forces should be relinquished on April 1, 1958.

257) Miners, NJ, op cit, P17.
the military forces was at odds with the general trend of Nigerian historical evolution.

The first of the anomalous characteristics may be found in the composition, both from the point of view of staffing and recruitment. By 1956 (at the height of the drive to Nigerianize the Civil Service and the negotiations for self-government) only 15 of the 250 officers in the Nigerian Armed Forces were Nigerians.258) About 25 per cent of the officers were newly commissioned and completing their compulsory two years national service and rarely spent more than a year in Nigeria. The rest of the expatriate officers were regulars, serving with the West Africa Command on secondment from their British regiments and corps, and expected to spend approximately three years on a tour of duty abroad. This relatively short spell of duty in Nigeria for most army officers contrasted with the careers of officers in the colonial service, who expected to spend all their working life in the colonies and often all in the same territory. The colonial service officers closely identified with Nigeria and the responsibility of their trusteeship over the territory in preparation for eventual self-government. The same attitude could hardly be expected from the army. The military officials considered it their prime liability to maintain the standards accepted by the British Army all over the world to the satisfaction of the War Office in London.259) In the matter of the Nigerianization of the armed forces the British military authorities were hardly motivated to keep progress in line with progress in other government departments.

Furthermore, there was some considerable disparity between the pay

258) Ibid, P18.
and privileges of British NCO's and their Nigerian counterparts. British NCO's received their British Army rate of pay plus substantial overseas allowances, while the African soldier was paid at the lowest rate that the War Office considered adequate to attract recruits. Separate messes were provided for British and African sergeants and army schools were maintained exclusively for the children of white servicemen.  

As far as recruitment was concerned, in the initial stages of the development of the Nigerian armed forces soldiers were recruited almost exclusively from the inhabitants of the Northern Region, whose warlike traditions and apparent physical strength made them ideal material for training in the predominantly infantry forces. However, during the Second World War the army required skilled men (mechanics, drivers) and attention was turned to the educated men in the South. This practice of recruiting skilled personnel from the South and infantrymen from the North came to be entrenched in recruitment requirements (a recruit in the South was required to have at least a primary education without any similar requirement of Northern recruits) and created a cleavage within the armed forces which was perpetuated in practice long after the Second World War.  

This position was further complicated by the army's initial inability to attract recruits from the South for officer training. This may be ascribed to the fact that the military mentality and military way of life was far more familiar to Northern youth and many of the first Northern officers were following a family military tradition. Southerners were inclined to view military service as menial and the profession of the less well educated.

262) Liners, NJ, op cit, PP41-42.
The historically anomalous and isolated circumstances of the military organization, in the second instance, was reinforced by the traditional reputation of the armed forces in Nigeria. Originally constituted from bands of runaway slaves, they were identified with repressive activities and the memory of the punitive expeditions in which they had participated as an extension of the British colonial machine. The Hausa soldiers were in many instances forced by the administration to recover debts for individual favours, an action often accompanied by outrages on the part of the soldiers. In Southern Nigeria there were universal complaints against the Hausa troops for commandeering food and burning down villages. During the Second World War the large expansion of the army meant that temporary training camps were set up in areas where soldiers had not previously been known and their behaviour did not commend them to the local population. The soldiers' low rate of pay also detracted from the army's prestige. The Nigerian public were estranged from the military and viewed it as an organization divorced from the broader, national developments in Nigeria.

In 1958 control over recruitment and promotion in the army was transferred from the British Army Council to the Nigerian Government. The Colonial Government had after 1956 already started to indigenize the officer corps in preparation for independence, but the results were meagre. Only 29 Nigerian officers had been commissioned by January 1958 and at independence only 61 of the 283 officers were Nigerians, a lower proportion of Nigerians than in any other branch of the public service. The commander was a British officer seconded from the British Army and it was thought that the withdrawal of expatriate officers could not be completed in

The Nigerianization of the officer corps was essentially a development subsequent to political independence; the only candidates available to turn into officers before independence were experienced NCO's, who were in the nature of things, thoroughly imbued with British methods and traditions. The result, as Nigerianization advanced, was that most senior officers were separated by background, outlook and rank from their junior officers. The ranks below them were often better educated, better trained and most important, from the same peer groups that had been exposed and were susceptible to the nationalist fervour and had little regard for British traditions.

Action to increase the supply of potential officers included a lowering of the academic admission requirements, salary and service condition improvements, establishment of cadet units and the practice of granting short service commissions was introduced, whereby soldiers could be commissioned after attending the sixteen week course at Lions and Eaton Hall, instead of two and a half years at Sandhurst. The main effect of these measures was a great increase in the number of officers from the Eastern Region, accounting for 68 per cent of the officer corps by 1960, where Northerners had formally been overwhelmingly predominant.

The reasons for this shift lay in the fact that candidates for the short service commission had to have higher educational qualifications and the majority of candidates came from the ranks of the NCO's and Warrant Officers who filled the technical cadres and were predominantly


266) Ibid, PP164-168.

Southerners. There were very few Northern graduates and most of these found better opportunities in the public service of the Northern Region than in the army. 268) Anxiety had already been expressed about the implication of this tribal imbalance during 1959, but the Prime Minister had refused to consider introducing a quota system because the army needed all the officers it could get, from whatever region. When a quota system for proportionate regional recruitment was introduced during 1962 it was only effective among the newly commissioned lower ranks and the imbalance persisted in the upper ranks. 269)

The army and its future development was a prominent feature of the 1959 general election in Nigeria, with parties vying for support from the military by campaigning for improved service conditions, and the size of the armed forces was a matter for electoral debate. 270) The military links with Britain were further enhanced at independence by the ratification of a Defence Agreement whereby Nigeria would provide air-staging rights and military facilities for Britain. 271) In the first years of

265) Ibid. Also Kennedy, G, op cit, P77.

269) Miners, NJ, op cit, P53 quotes a Northern member; "I am appealing to the hon. Prime Minister, that we in Nigeria should be united in diversity. I think it would be a good idea if we equalized our army officers... so that the officers in the Eastern Region, the Northern Region and the Western Region are equalized." See also Luckman, AR, "The Nigerian Military" in Panter-Brick, SK, (ed), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to Civil War, The Athlone Press, London, 1970, P72-76.


independence this agreement became a controversial political issue and a 'tangible' symbol of the Federal Government's colonial attachments for the Government's opponents, and was eventually abrogated by mutual agreement in January 1962.272)

The armed forces were from their very inception conceived of as an organization apart; an indigenous appendage of British imperialism, institutionalized in its isolation by control from, and responsibility to the War Office in London. This gave the influence of the military an inevitable socio-political significance. The military were curiously aloof from the trend of nationalist agitation and influence until the late fifties and tended to develop an autonomy which was perpetuated after independence by differentiation of the officer corps (who formed an elitist clique) from the middle class elite who controlled the political institutions.

The military influence is of contemporary significance, due to the fact that its exclusiveness of organizational and coercive resources provided the foundation for the evolution of an indigenous elite, sharing the nationalist sentiments and objectives of the middle-class intelligentsia, but aloof from the struggle for the legitimization of authority in which the political institutions were engaged.

The second important feature of the Nigerian military organization was its nascent tribalistic tensions. The colonial army had been recruited tribalistically, resulting in an imbalance in which the Northern Region provided the infantry and general troops, while the majority of officers and skilled forces were provided by the other Regions. This factor was

272) Schwartz, W, op cit, PP117-120.
complicated by the rapid indigenization of the officer corps, leading to a distorted age and promotional structure. With the exception of eight or nine ex-NCO's at or near the top, virtually all combat officers fell within the age group 20-35.\(^{273}\) Promotion for the small group of officers commissioned prior to independence was rapid in relation to those middle ranks commissioned in the drive to replace the expatriate officers. Furthermore, while most of the officers at the highest levels were superior in age and experience, their authority tended to be undermined, in relation to the middle ranks, by their general lack of academic qualifications. These factors resulted in cleavages between peer groups and an inter-group rivalry, complicated by tribal and ethnic connotations.

Thus the armed forces formed a self-contained organization with a legitimate authority and the resources to enforce it, providing for a disciplined nationalism which set them apart from the political nationalists; yet it was a force characterized by inherently divisive structural weaknesses, which could only with difficulty be divorced from the political, tribal and regional antagonisms.

In as much as a nation's historical experience is the most fundamental influence on the contemporary character of the state, the colonial era in the Nigerian historical experience is the most contemporarily significant in its influence and represents the genesis of the modern state rationale.

It has been suggested that the policy of indirect rule introduced a contradiction into Nigerian colonial history, in that classical colonialism sought to introduce a process of Western socio-political

modernization to replace traditionalism and tribal structures whereas indirect rule, as a colonial policy, sought to preserve traditional society as an adjunct to the classical colonial purpose of Westernization. Furthermore, the legacy of indirect rule precluded the 'natural' process of political development and parallel social modernization from which most colonial territories emerged as nation-states, and may be seen as the most fundamental influence in the further course of Nigerian colonial history and its contemporary significance.

Bourdillon wrote after over 25 years of indirect rule in Nigeria that;

"...there is no other territory in the British Empire in which we have as good a chance of guiding a subject people along the road to responsible self-government with the minimum friction and the maximum of contentment. This is, in my opinion, due almost entirely to the fact that there has been, in Nigeria, as little dislocation of traditional and familiar methods of administration as is compatible with the introduction of civilized methods and the welding of the whole country into one economic and political unit."

It was indeed naive to assume that political and administrative modernization could be carried out while preserving traditional and familiar methods, for the concentration of powers in the agents of modernization inevitably undercut traditional social forces, customs and institutions. Indeed, indirect rule, in which the superiority of British authority was inherent, created cleavages in political legitimacy between modernizing groups and those conserved traditional authorities.

Modernization is classically associated with a redistribution of power within the political system from the tribe, clan and village, and the centralization of political ambition and power in national political institutions. However, indirect rule resulted in the evolution of

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274) Bourdillon, B, Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria, op cit, P1.
central, national oriented, political groupings parallel and in direct competition with the trumped up traditional native authorities. The cleavage between central modernism and regional traditionalism was institutionalized by the Richards constitution which perpetuated the legacy of indirect rule by regionalizing Nigerian politics. In so doing, the loyalty of the central nationalists was ethnically divided and the process of political development diverted from the national to the regional and parochial. This effectively precluded the natural development of indigenous national political values and the broadening of parochial loyalties and identifications.

The result was first, that Nigeria entered into a process of constitutional negotiations within the framework of regionalism/federalism as the legacy of indirect rule and not as a product of indigenous social pressure or clearly defined political values; the consequence was apparent in the lack of concomitant indigenous commitment to the federal or national unity and the emergence of a federal constitution as a compromise between Southern haste and Northern reluctance in the drive for self-government. Secondly, there was the failure to develop mass political parties with national bases of support; and this was further complicated by the lack of a sufficiently large and clearly distinguishable trans-tribal and trans-regional class which could have been a cementing link and a sustaining force in the nationalist drive. The implication was an inherent instability in the national/federal unity, (contrived and orchestrated by the British through the succession of constitutional conferences) which had a degree of artificiality about it and was not a response to any clearly articulated national sentiment, but largely a means to an end.

The influence of the colonial era in the history of Nigeria is one of Western acculturation and modernization, Christianity, European education, the emergence of urban educated political elites and native authorities.
Other consequences of colonialism were the tribal polarization of emergent nationalism, the institutionalization of regionalism and ethnic party political allegiances, constitutional negotiation and the advent of constitutional instruments without the social conditions for their endurance. Finally, we note the unwitting evolution of a military elite with an authority independent of the disputed authority of the central polity.

3. A resume of recent historical development

Having discussed the basic historically formative influences of the modern Nigerian state, it is necessary to give an account of recent historical developments, since obviously the historical evolution of Nigeria continued after independence. Indeed, it was in the wake of independence that the legacy of colonialism became most apparent and pertinent.

The Nigerian polity, united by a singular purpose in the drive for self-government, was faced with the uncontested realities of the Nigerian political and social order which had been forged during the colonial experience and the many inadequacies, so willingly glossed over in consultations with the British, now proved to be major tensions in the new order. The shallow commitment of the parties to the federal dispensation, which had been accepted in the prolonged stages of constitutional development, became apparent in a disregard for the federal balance and a disloyalty to the national unity. The pursuit of national political power, effectively spiked by the British-imposed regional basis for constitutional development, now became the prime party political objective. In pursuit of this end, maladministration, mistrust and antagonism distorted the euphoria of freedom from British rule and destroyed the carefully British orchestrated balance.
political authority was weakened to the point of collapse and the almost inevitable projection of the military organization as an autonomous authority and a stabilizing factor.

In effect, this phase, the causes of which could be traced back to Lugard, is the account of Nigeria's struggle to come to terms with the reality of its historical legacy — an integral part of the development process which had largely been evaded in the central wrangle for self-government.

3.1 The Action Group crisis

After the 1959 election the Action Group, which had been voted into opposition in the Nigerian federal legislature, made a concerted effort to broaden its base of support. In an endeavour to become a national party with specific appeal to the youth of all ethnic groups the Action Group, at the instigation of Chief Awolowo, vociferously espoused a policy of so-called "democratic socialism", as a solution to Nigeria's post-independence economic difficulties and as a means of truly exerting Nigeria's independence of its colonial mentors. 275

Awolowo's political opportunism eventually led to a political estrangement between Awolowo (party leader and leader of the opposition in the Federal House of Representatives) and Chief S. L. Akintola (deputy party leader and Western Regional Premier) who is said to have rejected these policies both on practical and ideological grounds. Furthermore, the Action Group was dependent in its support on a balance between the business and economic sector on the one hand and the chieftains and obas on the other. Neither of these groups was inclined toward radical political innovation and tended to support the Akintola faction. 276

275) Awolowo, O, Aw, op cit, Pp 301-316. Also Schwarz, FAO, op cit, P117.
The split between the Awolowo and Akintola factions came into the open at the Annual Congress of the Action Group held during February 1962, when agreement could not be reached and the Akintola faction withdrew from the convention. The convention then suspended Akintola's office of deputy leader and endorsed Awolowo's presidential policy proposals.

A subsequent committee of the federal executive of the Action Group voted Akintola guilty of maladministration in his refusal to endorse and carry out party policy. On petition from the House of Assembly the Governor dismissed Akintola as Premier on the grounds that he did not enjoy the support of the majority of the House. An Awolowo stalwart, Alhaji Adegbenro was invited to become Premier of the Western Region. 277)

The Akintola faction, in its turn, with the support of the NCNC opposition in the Western Region, having failed in a High Court Action and in petitioning the Queen to prevent their ousting, succeeded through their deliberately disruptive conduct in having the Western House of Assembly dissolved in disorder. The Federal Parliament was summoned in emergency session and in a controversial move, later construed as a deliberate attempt to neutralize finally the opposition Action Group, declared that a state of emergency existed in the Western Region in pursuance of section 65 of the Constitution of Nigeria. 278) The Western Region was placed under the authority of an Administrator, whose task it was to attempt to restore constitutional order, and a commission of inquiry was appointed to investigate allegations of malpractice. In the interim, Akintola formed the United People's Party (UPP) and during July 1962 Nigeria's Federal Supreme Court determined by a three-to-one


majority, that the Governor of the West had exceeded his constitutional powers in removing Akintola from the Premiership without a vote of the House.\(^{279}\)

The Coker Commission of Inquiry into allegations of malpractice found that there had been; "reckless and indeed atrocious and criminal mismanagement and diversion of public funds..." \(^{280}\) Further, that substantial sums of money had been appropriated by the Action Group through the offices of public companies and statutory organizations and that there had also been personal misappropriation of party funds. However, despite the fact that Akintola had been Premier and thus constitutionally responsible, he was exonerated of any blame.\(^{281}\)

Hard on the heels of the Coker Commission report came Awolowo's inclusion in a list of 31 Nigerians accused of plotting to overthrow the Federal Government by force. After a long trial, during which much detailed evidence of planned violence and substantial corruption was defended with broad contentions that the plans were a consequence of the deteriorating position in the Western Region since 1959 and not a strategy for the overthrow of the Federal Government, Awolowo was convicted and imprisoned during July 1964 for seven years on Appeal.\(^{282}\)

Akintola was reinstated as Premier in terms of the Supreme Court decision

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279) Schwartz, W., op cit, P135.


282) Mackintosh, JP, op cit, PP453-456 wrote; "After a nine-month trial, twenty one of the original twenty-five were found guilty and no one could doubt that men had been sent for military training abroad and that arms had been smuggled in ..."
and formed a coalition government between his UPP and NCNC. In a final effort to neutralize the Action Group, the Government of the Western Region succeeded in gaining regional and federal parliamentary approval for the division of the Western Region by creating a Mid-West Region. The NCNC easily gained control of the new Mid-West Government. It thus became the only party in Nigeria to control two Regions. (See appendix III.)

The series of events from the emergency through to Awolowo's conviction weakened the Action Group, but by no means marked the end of opposition to the Federal Government on the ground that it was too conservative in its economic and foreign policies. The revelations about the internal workings of the party added to the cynicism and disillusionment of many people, particularly the young elite, about all the existing political parties. In investigating a corruption inquiry against Awolowo and the Action Group, his opponents both inside his own party and in the Federal Coalition Government, chose an ever-ready weapon which might in different political circumstances have been used against themselves. An essential attribute of political power is the ability to finance one's party and reward one's followers. Nigeria provides few means of doing this other than through the spoils of office, precisely the same conditions would have been unearthed in any other Nigerian political organization.

Most of the causes of the Action Group crisis are related in one way or another to the dangerously close association between each of Nigeria's political parties and the dominant ethnic or religious group of a

283) Schwartz, W, op cit, P151.
particular region. The Action Group crisis precipitated a chain of political events which was to culminate in a major realignment of Nigeria's party political factions. Inevitably, with the Action Group incapacitated the coalition NPC and NCNC found themselves in open confrontation. The tri-partite balance envisaged in the constitution had effectively been destroyed.

3.2 The period of political crisis

On October 1, 1963 Nigeria became a republic, relinquishing its constitutional ties with the British throne. While there had been initial support for the idea of an executive President, it was eventually decided merely to substitute the ceremonial office of Governor-General for the ceremonial office of President, as it was feared that national elections to choose one man as President would have been an intolerable burden upon the already shaky Nigerian unity. The primary significance of the transition to a republic was that it served to purge the Nigerian constitution of the last vestiges of colonialism.\(^ {285}\)

After the demise of the Action Group, political power at the federal centre was held by an apparently 'impregnable establishment'. In the Northern Region the NPC was virtually unchallenged, in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions its coalition partner the NCNC was in power, while the NPC's new political ally, Akintola's coalition of UPP and Western NCNC, controlled the Western Region. However, this new found solidarity was achieved against a background of burgeoning political discontent and disillusionment with the Federal Government's performance since independence.\(^ {286}\)


The first crisis to be faced by the ruling establishment was the general strike of May-June 1964 called in protest of the government's failure to publish the recommendations of the Morgan Commission, instituted during 1963 to inquire into the wages and conditions of service among junior employees. The labour movements were able to flex considerable political muscle by bringing the country to an almost complete standstill.\(^{287}\)

A second crisis was precipitated by the publication of the results of the November 1963 census, according to which electoral constituencies were to be delimited. Results entrenched the predominance of the Northerners, which showed that of the 55.6 million Nigerians, 30 million were inhabitants of the Northern Region. An earlier census held during 1962 had been cancelled after fierce behind the scenes disputes over the accuracy of the figures. The new figures showed blatant discrepancies in their feasibility — such as the fact that the population in the North was shown to have increased by 77 per cent since the 1953 census. A recount was ordered but the important political implications appeared to make accuracy impossible. The revised figures were no less incredibly inflated.\(^{288}\)

The results of the census were a great disappointment to the Southerners, for they feared the North, which by extension implied the NPC, would be perpetually in control of the Federal Government. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the Northern Region accepted the census results, while

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the NCNC in the East rejected them, as did the Mid-West Regional
Government. Akintola in the West, however, owed his political survival
to the NPC and accepted the figures, a move which subsequently precipitated
the breakdown of the UPP/NCNC alliance in the Western Region and the
formation by Akintola of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP).
When the census dashed the one major hope of the Southern politicians of
challenging Northern hegemony by redressing the population imbalance their
aspirations centred on the forthcoming elections.289)

The federal coalition did not survive the strike and census controversies.
The NPC discarded the predominantly Ibo, NCNC and went into alliance
with Akintola's predominantly Yoruba, NNNDP and together with the minor
opposition parties of the East formed the Nigerian National Alliance.
The NCNC and the Action Group, formerly arch-rivals, allied under the
United Progressive Grand Alliance. The National Alliance adopted an
election platform of progressive conservatism, while the Progressive
Alliance canvassed for a programme of moderate reform on mildly socialist
lines. The campaign was marked by inter-regional and tribal animosity
and there were declared fears of election rigging from the start.290)

A crisis was precipitated when at the close of nominations it was
announced that 61 NPC members in the North, 15 NCNC members in the East
and 2 NNNDP members in the West would be returned unopposed. Opposition
parties claimed that 'unopposed' in this context implied that their

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PP161-163 and Schwarz, FAO, *op cit*, P141. "Since the mere publication
of the census figures precludes a leader of a major political party
from aspiring to the leadership of the nation, something must be
wrong with the set-up in Nigeria where one can already know that
he has won and his opponent lost a general election on the basis
of census figures", quoted in Sircar, PK, "The Crisis of Nationhood
in Nigeria" in *International Studies*, VOL 10, NO 3, January 1969,
Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 1969, P236.

candidates had been effectively neutralized. This was confirmed by the chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission six days before the election. Three days later the Progressive Alliance with the support of the labour leaders produced sworn affidavits alleging malpractice in 65 Northern constituencies and despite frantic negotiation attempts the Progressive Alliance announced that it would boycott the election. The National Alliance allied themselves with the armed services and declared that the election would proceed. This was confirmed by Prime Minister Balewa and the chairman of the Electoral Commission just the night before election day.

Nigeria went through the motions of an election under conditions of complete chaos. The Progressive Alliance boycott was in force, scores of polling booths had been destroyed, in the East there was no election at all. In the West voting took place in most constituencies but the results later showed that the boycott had been effective in all but the remotest areas. In the Mid-West, after an initial boycott, halfway through the day the NCNC Premier in the Region ordered polling to proceed. In the North voting proceeded smoothly. Inevitably the National Alliance won a resounding victory — in the North the NPC won 162 of the 167 seats contested, in the Mid-West the NCNC won all 14 seats, in the West the Progressive Alliance won six seats, despite its boycott, and the IND, 36.

Customarily Balewa, as leader of the NPC, should have been invited by the President to form a government. However, in view of the nature of


293) Schwartz, W, op cit, PP171-172.
the elections there followed a constitutional impasse during which time
the President attempted to win sufficient support, invoking also his
authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to assume
executive power himself in an attempt to overcome the political crisis
which was threatening to tear the country apart. The balance of
power in the country was being further complicated by the discovery of
oil in the minority areas of the East. From the poorest region seeking
a centralized constitution under which natural resources could be
jointly shared, the East became potentially the richest Region and its
leaders threatened secession. After seven days the President
declared that he had no alternative but to subordinate his personal
feelings to the Constitution and Balewa formed a broadly based
government of 54 ministers, 22 from the NPF, 16 each from the NCNC and
NIDP. The Action Group was unrepresented.

By 1965 politics in Nigeria were even more regionalized than in 1960.
The National Alliance had been held together during the election by a
common belief in regionalization. The Progressive Alliance was formed
because of Southern antipathy toward the North. During the election
though, its senior partner the NCNC showed that it was willing to sacrifice
the coalition for the interests of the NCNC, the East and the Ibo people.


*Oduomou, OI, Constitutional Crisis: Legality and the President's Conscience, op cit*, PP20-46 gives a detailed analysis of the
constitutional legality of the actions of the President, the Federal
Electoral Commission and of the elected Parliament and concludes
that the constitutional provisions were flouted and circumvented
and that the only solution was a redivision of the Provinces.
Moves toward less particularistic politics were scarcely made easier by the increased entrenchment of the NPC and NCNC power in the North and East. The Mid-West was also very much the bastion of the NCNC. The West, after three years of turmoil remained the one relatively open region, but regionalism and Yoruba nationalism became increasingly dominant themes.  

Regional elections were held in the Western Region during October 1965. Under the Progressive Alliance it was determined that the NCNC would contest 30 and the Action Group the remaining 62 seats, and the NIDP championed the Yoruba cause against the threat of Ibo domination. The electoral process was farcical, with blatant rigging, from illegally obtained ballot papers to murdering electoral officers. After the count both the Progressive Alliance and the NIDP claimed victory; officially, however, victory went to the latter.

Popular disillusionment with the political process and democracy, already far advanced after the federal elections, was now almost total. Tribal antagonism had reached acute proportions. In the West in the wake of the elections a wave of riots, arson and political murders engulfed the Region. Army units were deployed in the Region but the presence of soldiers, many of whom were Progressive Alliance supporters, merely increased the tension. Now that law and order had effectively broken down in the West, Balewa was curiously hesitant and appeared to play for time in the hope of negotiating a solution without declaring a state of

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298) Schwartz, W, op cit, PP178-183. Kirk-Greene, ABF, (ed), Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, op cit, P15 suggests that for the Easterners the NIDP/NPC victory in the West was the last straw. "Here was a new political phenomenon. For the first time the NPC showed itself prepared to risk its reputation ... in the rough-house of an electoral campaign outside its home base."
emergency. However, on January 14, 1966 Bialewa, Akintola and the Sardauna of Sokoto were shot in a military coup d’etat carried out by five Ibo majors, and Nigeria was catapulted to the brink of civil war.299)

3.3 Military rule

The Federal Government conceded their inability to maintain effective government and conferred authority to the General Officer commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi, to head a Federal Military Government. All constitutional provisions were suspended and military governors, directly responsible to the Federal Military Government, were appointed to each Region.300) The military rulers set out to build an image as a reforming government. There were three main aspects to their programme: first, the restoration of conditions of law and order; secondly, the army set out to rid the state of political patronage and corruption; and thirdly, to transform Nigeria into a unitary state.301)

The leaders of the coup had been Ibo's and Ironsi was an Ibo. The South had been jubilant at the results of the coup, but the reaction in the North was understandably less supportive and when it was announced that the former Regions were to be abolished and Nigeria grouped into a number of small territorial areas called provinces, mass demonstrations and large scale murder of Ibo broke out in the North.302) The Northern

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emirs determined upon a course of secession. Disintegration was not confined to the North though, both the army and the administration were rife with tribal mistrust and patterns of control were on the verge of collapse. Ironsi was unable to rely on the loyalty of the armed forces and on July 29, 1966 a counter coup was launched by a group of Northern junior officers and NCO's; apparently motivated by an envy of Ibo success, fear for their own future and the desire for revenge. 303)

The July coup brought about a radically different situation. Following the January coup, the military had led the movement for national unity conceived in terms of a more unitary form of government, but in July the army itself was a casualty of the organizational disintegration. The army ceased to be a cohesive force obeying a single command, and so ceased to be an integrating force for the country as a whole; 304) its dislocation under the impact of the July coup unleashed widespread political demands for regional autonomy, in all Regions of the Federation. The disintegration of the army was twofold; first, many troops were obliged to decamp for their own safety — surviving Ibo soldiers sought refuge in their home areas and there was a reverse flow of Northern troops out of the Eastern Region; secondly, Lt. Col. Gowon (a Northerner) who succeeded Ironsi as Supreme Commander was not in fact recognized by the Military Governor of the Eastern Region. 305)

With the army in disarray and unitary government shown to be impossible, the decisive influence over political and constitutional development tended to shift from Lagos to the Regions. It also tended to shift away from


304) Panter-Brick, SK, "From Military Coup to Civil War" in Panter-Brick, SK, (ed), op cit, P27.

305) Ibid. Also Oyinbo, J, op cit, Pp62-66.
the military toward the politicians, for by August almost all political
detainees, including Awolowo, had been released. Gowon determined to
restore the federal structure and convened a meeting of regional
representatives at Lagos to discuss the constitutional future of the
country. Proposals tended to favour a confederal dispensation. However,
action was pre-empted by the outbreak of large-scale fighting in the
North and thousands of Ibos were massacred and their property destroyed. 306)

The Military-Governor of the East (Lt. Colonel Ojukwu) summoned all
Easterners to return home and ordered all non-Easterners, except mid-
Western Ibos, to leave the Eastern Region. Efforts at compromise,
including the intercession of Ghana, were unsuccessful in halting the
escalation of the dispute. Gowon eventually proclaimed a state of
emergency, assumed full powers and announced sweeping proposals to
abolish the Regions, divide the country into 12 states, and bring civilians
into the Federal and State Governments. The creation of 12 states was
a major attempt to find a fresh basis for Nigerian unity. (See appendix
IV.) In the short term it was calculated to ensure support for the
federal cause from minority groups, especially in the East, from whose
territories most of the oil came. In the long run, it was intended to
remove the rear of domination of the Federation by the North on account
of its preponderant size. 307) However, two days later the Eastern Region

306) Panter-Brick, SK, op cit, P29. Also Schwartz, W, op cit, P230 and
Kirk-Greene, AHM, (ed), Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, op cit,
Pp56-62. Four alternative constitutional arrangements which
excluded a break-up of the country and also a unitary form of
government were presented as options; (a) Federal system with a
strong central Government; (b) Federal system with a weak central
Government; (c) Confederation; or (d) an entirely new arrangement
which will be peculiar to Nigeria and which has not yet round its
way into any political dictionary. Quoted in Operation Reconstruction:
Policies and Objectives as outlined in Public Speeches by His
Excellency, Lt. Col. Yakubs Gowon, Federal Ministry of Information,
Lagos, 1966, P22.

declared itself the independent Republic of Biafra.\(^{308}\)

This has often been referred to as the third coup — the coup of the minorities. Nigeria was no longer to be disputed by the major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo) it was the Nigeria of the Tiv, Ejau, Benin, Kanuri and Ibibio.

3.4 Post-war developments

What started out officially as police action to maintain the authority of the Federal Military Government against the Eastern secessionists rapidly escalated to full-scale civil war when Ibo officers in the Nigerian Army attempted to launch an invasion of the Mid-West Region. Faced with that, other groups in Nigeria sank their differences and rallied to defend the existence of the Federation. Against the preponderant odds of the Federal resources the Easterners, sustained by just sufficient external assistance to ensure the continuance of the struggle but without the means of victory (notably from Portugal, France, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast), endured a most devastating war until finally overcome by Federal forces during January, 1970. The state of Biafra had been reduced to an enclave in the heart of Ibo territory, while the recaptured areas were earlier formed into the Rivers and South-Eastern States.\(^{309}\)

The Federal Military Government embarked on a post-war policy of reconciliation (both domestically and internationally) and reconstruction measures were introduced intended to prepare Nigeria for a return to civilian rule by 1976. The most significant of the measures were the

\(^{308}\) Schwartz, W., _op cit_, P230.

National Development Plan for 1970–74, the National Census of November 1973 and the formation of the National Youth Service Corp for compulsory inter-regional national service by Nigerian graduates.\(^{310}\)

While the post-war Military Government was largely successful in its reconciliation endeavours, it found it difficult to give plausible assurances of a return to civilian rule, to work out an acceptable basis for the redistribution of federal revenue, to control corruption among its officials. These disquieting issues were complicated by controversy over the 1973 census, which recalled the earlier census crisis, a dramatic rise in inflation following unrealistic salary increases in the public service, disproportionate extravagance in arrangements for the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture, and the announcement of the indefinite postponement of civilian rule together with the simultaneous introduction of the Third National Development Plan 1973–80 (which by implication precluded a return to civilian rule during that period) combined to precipitate the ousting of General Gowon in a bloodless coup on July 29, 1975.\(^{311}\)

General Murtala Ramat Muhammad became Supreme Commander and, with political decisiveness, detailed a political programme specifying 1979

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as the new date for the change to civilian rule. The 12 states created by Gowon in 1968 were reorganized into 19 states (see appendix V) and power was effectively centralized in the Supreme Military Council, facilitating sweeping reforms on corrupt civil service practice and the increasing economic chaos.\footnote{312}{Dent, MJ, "Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective" and Yahaya, AD, "The Creation of States" in Pantzer-Brick, K, (ed), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, Frank Cass, London, 1978, PP114-133 and PP201-211.} On February 13, 1976 Muhammad was assassinated but was succeeded without incident by Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo. A 50-man Constitution Drafting Committee, under the chairmanship of Rotimi Williams, published a draft constitution in October 1976 for widespread discussion in the country, and debate by a Constituent Assembly before being promulgated. It was announced that elections would be held during 1979 under new political parties.\footnote{313}{Yahaya, AD, "The Struggle for Power in Nigeria", op cit, PP264-275. See also Sunday Times, Lagos, February 15, 1976 and Lagos Daily Times, Thursday, February 19, 1976 which contain the Government's account of the coup attempt, the main purpose of which was said to be (i) re-establishment of policies of non-alignment; (ii) opposition to recent promotions in the top military hierarchy; (iii) the return of Gen. Gowon to power; (iv) to restore to office all the former provincial governors.}

A specific proviso for the registration of new political parties was adequate proof that they had a nation-wide base of support and offices in at least two thirds of the States of the Federation. The registered parties were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the United Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the Greater Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), and the People's Redemption Party (PRP). Elections were held during July 1979 and Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the presidential
candidate of the NPN, was elected President. 314)

4. Conclusion

In considering the historical background of Nigeria as the most fundamental influence on the contemporary political rationale, it is necessary to accept the premise, stated at the outset, that states generally base their contemporary actions upon historical experience and precedent, and that in the case of African states this generally dates from the advent of European influence and most specifically from the colonial era. Indeed, colonialism represents the genesis of the modern African state and it may thus be asserted that the colonial experience, in particular, and cumulative historical development in general, are inextricably part of modern state analysis. This assumption, on the basis of which the above resume of Nigerian historical evolution derives its significance for the present analysis, has been succinctly expressed as follows;

A purely contemporary view of any problem is necessarily a limited and even distorted view. Every situation has its roots in the past ... the past survives into the present; the present is indeed the past undergoing modification. 315)

The course of historical events in Nigeria is detailed and diverse, but serves to distinguish those basic, recurring influences which remain fundamental in the modern Nigeria.

314) Yahaya, AD, "The Struggle for Power in Nigeria", op cit, P274-275. Also Nigeria Today, NO 82, August 1977, Nigerian High Commission, London, PP5-6 and P13. Shagari (NPN) polled 5,688,857 votes and Obafemi Awolowo (UPN) received 4,915,651; in accordance with the proviso of majority support in each of at least two thirds of the states Awolowo challenged the result. The Election Tribunal and Supreme Court on appeal upheld the result and Shagari took office as President on October 1, 1979 with Dr. Alex Ekueme as Vice-President. See Read, JS, "Four New African Constitutions" in Commonwealth Law Bulletin, Vol 6, NO 1, 1980, PP274-275 and Graf, WD (ed), Elections 1979, Daily Times Publication, Lagos, 1979, P53.

Nigeria was in fact never colonised, in the strictest sense of the word, unlike so many of its African counterparts, and was subject to a comparatively short period of colonial occupation. It has been seen that Nigeria, in its West African geographic location, was peripheral to initial outward sorties by European nations in search of the riches of the West Indies, and eventually the slave trade, vital to the exploitation of the New World. The relevance of the peripheral nature of Nigerian pre-history vis-a-vis the principal historical trends of the time lies in the fact that the civilizations in the hinterland, influenced by the North African cultures, were able to develop to a level of indigenous socio-political sophistication and organization so effective that the British saw in its retention the only means of effectively ruling Nigeria; it entrenched a level of ethnic and tribal cohesiveness and loyalty which is a continuing Nigerian characteristic. Furthermore, the fact that Nigeria was never viewed as a destination for expatriate Europeans left Nigeria free of the political complications concomitant with large white settler societies and facilitated Nigeria's relatively smooth transition to independence.

Nigeria was eventually annexed by the British as a matter of economic expediency and international prestige, and the nature of the geographic and topographical characteristics of this vast territory led to the division of the country into North and South along rather rigid, geographically defined lines. These factors led to the uneven penetration and influence of modernizing forces and served to complicate the many ethnic cleavages, resulting in the country being divided, not only physically and ethnically, but religiously and psychologically; the South being exposed to more progressive Christian education and the North retaining traditional Koranic teachings and custom. These cleavages were politicized with the emergence of Southern dominated
nationalist movements, and effectively polarized and institutionalized in the British federal constitutional dispensation.

The legacy of indirect rule is one of truncated indigenous political development and the evolution of formal political institutions without regard to social evolution and value commitments, which have been suggested as essential prerequisites for the stability of the federal polity. Indirect rule froze social and political development at the precise point it had reached at the time of British annexation; from being an expedient it blossomed (almost inadvertently perhaps) into an administrative principle pursued with reckless vigour. This is not to say, however, that indigenous institutions, which were capable of sustaining the government of a modern nation-state, existed or were developing. There was no clearly defined national sentiment among Nigerians and mutual affinity between the Regions extended little further than the need to maintain unity as a necessary precondition for progress toward self-government. The Northern territory maintained a preponderantly dominant position vis-a-vis the East and West and was at all times a reluctant partner to the Federation, threatening secession on several occasions.

The significance of the lack of any clearly defined national sentiment among Nigerians and the minimal degree of affinity between the Regions is distinguished by the inevitable failure to evolve a Nigerian national political party which could command support over and above tribal and regional cleavages. Similarly, the socio-political circumstances of Nigeria's developmental process precluded the emergence of any single nationalist leader who might have united the country in the nationalist struggle, as happened in so many other emergent African states. Socio-political divisions weakened the emergent political elite and effectively
prevented its members forming a cohesive trans-tribal class as a unitary mobilizing force.

Much attention has been given in the foregoing account to the evolution of political institutions because it is contended that it is important to comprehend the origin of contemporary political institutions as the basic organization from which stem all subsequent developments. However, synonymous with the evolution of formal political institutions is the development of a political culture or value hierarchy which assumes the basic premises of political action. The preponderant political influence was that of the British political tradition, and the conventions and rules implicit in the traditional British political value hierarchy were assumed to be the most appropriate for Nigeria. There was, however, no social or historical basis for such an assumption, and while the nationalist politicians found themselves obliged to pay lip service to traditional Western political values, they found it difficult to assimilate such conventions into indigenous political culture.

Thus, whereas in Western democratic systems there is the assumption that certain rules of procedure to be followed in winning power are as important as the victory, in Nigeria such limitations had no basis. The legacy of traditional rulers, and indeed, the autonomy of the British colonial administration as well, made it hard for Nigerians to imagine that anyone having power should not use it to its utmost. Nigerian society has undergone so many changes and there has always been such an element of insecurity, of dependence on those in power, that holding political power in Nigeria tended to acquire a definite meaning and significance of its own. At independence Nigeria lacked the political tradition and cumulative political conventions to compliment the formal Westminster institutions.
Furthermore, attention has been given to the anomalous development of
the military organization. Administered as a separate entity, aloof and
apart from the development of political institutions, yet hardly
isolated from conflicting tribal tensions and nationalist pressures.
The army emerged as an autonomous organization with an apparently stable
authority, in strong contrast to the instability inherent in the emergent
political institutions. The officer corps formed a disciplined elite
to rival the divided political elites.

The composite influence of these features of Nigerian historical
development became immediately apparent in the collapse of the federal
balance under the pressure of ethno-regionally inspired party political
controversy; the desperate and corrupt measures adopted in an endeavour
to secure national political predominance and power, against and largely
at the expense of the other Regions; the effective collapse of central
authority and governmental legitimacy; the transfer of political
authority to the armed forces as a stabilizing force in the wake of a
tribal/factionally inspired coup d'état; the polarization of cleavages
within the military hierarchy itself; civil war; and the redivision of
Nigeria into first 12, and eventually 19 provinces.

Nigeria's composite historical legacy is one of political instability
and national disunity. The socio-political realities obscured by
British constitutional preconceptions could not support the high premiums
which had been placed on national unity and the federal balance. The
vacuum left by the withdrawal of superior British authority removed the
unnatural restraints on the socio-political development process and in
order to preserve the vestiges of statehood, the intercession of the
military, as a breach in the vacuum, was perhaps inevitable. Whereas
political authority was effectively transferred to the armed forces
(albeit virtually at gunpoint), the military have never attained political legitimacy, due to the fact that each successive regime has stood or fallen on the grounds of its ability to mobilize resources for a return to civilian rule, an objective now achieved. Nevertheless, the armed forces, having once assumed the mantle of superior political authority, arbiter and guardian of the body politic and political order, will continue to be of ultimate political consequence in Nigeria.

The central influences which have characterized and largely determined the historical evolution of Nigeria, and which must accordingly form the basis of any analysis of the modern Nigerian state, tend to become confused in the multiplicity of specific historical events. However, three perennial influences operate throughout Nigerian history and still have contemporary relevance: (a) The ethnically heterogeneous and geographically-divided nature of the country, complicated by religious divisions and divergence in Westernizing experience; (b) political instability, the result of a contrived process of political development, from indirect rule to the federal constitution, and the post-independence endeavours to reconcile indigenous political values with Western convention; (c) the autonomous authority and pivotal political significance of the armed forces. Such is the nature of the Nigerian historical experience, and the criteria identified above as the elements basic to an assessment of a state's real or potential international role are very largely derived from, and heavily influenced by this legacy.

Having established the characteristics of the historical development and foundations of the modern state with which this study is concerned, it is now proposed to examine the nature of the contemporary Nigerian state within the framework of the suggested model for international role analysis. This model is based upon three fundamental criteria
namely, national capability, ego-role perception and alter-perception, and in the following chapter we propose to examine the actual and potential capability of contemporary Nigeria as the first (and most fundamental) consideration in role analysis.
CHAPTER THREE

THE NIGERIAN RESOURCES OF NATIONAL CAPABILITY

Having considered the historical development of the modern Nigerian state it is now possible, within this historical perspective, to examine the nature of the capability of contemporary Nigeria, as the first criterion in this three-dimensional analysis of Nigeria's role in the international system. We have argued that the elements of the capability spectrum are the most fundamental determinants of external interaction, in that by obvious implication, a state's capability endowment delimits the parameters of the feasible and the possible in any state's international role perception; that is to say, that capability essentially implies potential for action. Thus, whereas capability is generally concerned with the means aspect of the ends-means continuum, the possession of a significant capability or the lack of it is fundamental to the perception and definition of attainable ends (i.e.; means for feasible action). A state, for example, which lacks capability in one sphere must seek to augment such weakness by manipulation of strength (or capability) in another sphere (or range of spheres). Capability is thus an all embracing concept, and while the elements may be individually identified and considered in their separate influence on overall national capability potential, any assessment of capability as a causal determinant of international interaction must of necessity consider the total spectrum of capability elements in their combined effect on the overall national capability.

National capability, therefore, implies a balance between negative and positive capability resources. The effectiveness with which the balance
is contrived and maintained depends upon the leadership's ability to actualize the resources at the state's disposal (or overcome the lack of them) in the pursuit of the ends of policy. This direct asymmetry between state capability and state action underscores the notion that the criterion of national capability is the most basic determinant of a state's real or potential international influence. As such, the elements of national capability are to be considered within a two-part matrix of first, the physical determinants and secondly, the social determinants of national capability (as set out above), so as to illustrate the interdependence and interaction of the totality of the capability spectrum in forming the basis of the potential international role of a state. While certain static assumptions are inevitable in any capability analysis, it is of significance to note that capability is a relative notion, in that capability within a void is of no significance, and thus, as a standard of measure, national capability is dynamic and variable in relation to circumstance.

1. The physical determinants

The physical determinants of Nigerian national capability comprise those inherent and fundamental characteristics of the country which are endowed with a degree of relative stability and which constitute the country's tangible infrastructure and physical environment. Such physical elements are the fixed conditions of a state's existence and are not easily changed in time.

1.1 Physical geography

The elements of the physical geography of Nigeria are the most stable and enduring in their influence upon that country's capability potential and
must be considered in their spectrum of influence, from the obvious
influence of location and size to the more subtle influence of climatic
conditions. It must also be noted, however, that the nature of a country's
topography and terrain has a substantial influence upon the degree of
development of the country's communications and transport infrastructure,
thus necessitating the inclusion of physical infrastructure as an integral
element of physical geography just as, for example, the location of cities
is a factor of geographic consequence.

1.1.1 Size and location

The Federal Republic of Nigeria encompasses a land area of 356,669 square
miles (923,773 sq. km.) located between the 4° north and 14° north
latitudes and the 13° east and 15° east longitudes within the geographically
contiguous area of the African continent which (in as much as it is set
by the Cameroon-Adamawa Highlands in the east, the Sahara Desert in the
north and the Atlantic Ocean in the west) is distinguishable as a
geographic entity from the continental whole.¹) Nigeria occupies only
some 14 per cent of the total West African land area (the greatest east-
west distance being approximately 750 miles and the north-south distance
approximately 700 miles) and is the fourth largest in geographical area
of the 15 states generally defined as constituting the West African
geographical region.²)

Nigeria is a physically artificial political unit, its borders not being

¹) Udo, RK, A Comprehensive Geography of West Africa, Heinemann, Ibadan,
1978, Pxi. Also Harrison Church, RJ, West Africa, Seventh edition,

²) Udo, RK, op cit, P225. The 15 states comprising the West African
geographical region are Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo and Upper Volta.
geographically defined or physically distinguishable, the product of arbitrary colonial manoeuvring and political treaties. It is bordered in the east by the Federal Republic of Cameroon, and for a short distance in the north-east by the Republic of Chad (on Lake Chad). The north and north-west are bounded by the Republic of Niger, and the western border is set by the Republic of Benin. The country’s south-eastern littoral opens on to the Gulf of Guinea and is washed for a length of 500 miles by the Atlantic Ocean.3) Nigeria thus has four neighbours on its immediately proximate inland boundaries, only two of which (Chad and Niger) are landlocked and the same two of which cover a larger land area.

Whereas, size or geographical area, which in the case of Nigeria is considerable by any standard, is an important capability asset, it must of necessity be qualified by considerations of the nature of the climate and terrain. However, it is possible to assert at this point, that Nigeria’s lack of physically defined international boundaries and geographic independence makes it inextricably part of a very large geographic whole, in relation to which Nigeria is by no means geographically predominant.

1.1.2 Terrain and climate

Four major topographical divisions characterize the Nigerian terrain:

(a) the great river valleys of the Niger entering Nigeria from the north-

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west, and the Benue from the east, meeting at Lokoja, a little to the south-west of the centre of the country, and flowing south to a vast swampy delta pushed out into the Bight of Benin; (b) the rolling hills of the northern part of the area to the south of the Niger river — with altitudes of less than 2000 feet above sea level; (c) the plateau area rising sharply to 4000 feet to the north of the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers — with a gradual descent to the plateau of Hausaland, much of which drains eastward to Lake Chad in the extreme north-east; (d) the Cameroons Highlands which form a fairly clearly defined mountain barrier to the eastern side of the country with summits reaching to heights of 8000 feet. 4)

Within these general divisions variations occur, forming separate geographic regions. At least 12 such regions are generally recognized and in the southern part of the country consist of the Low Plains, the Lower Niger Valley, the Niger Delta, the South-eastern Scarpland, the South-eastern Lowlands and the Western High Plains. The topography of the central part of the country is dominated by the Niger-Benue River Valley, and the north by the Northern High Plains, the Jos Plateau, Sokoto Plains and Chad Basin region, while the twelfth identifiable geographic region within Nigeria is the Eastern Highlands. 5) (See Appendix VI.)

The exceptional diversity in physical terrain makes for a diverse and varied climatic pattern. Differences in the principal weather components — temperatures, humidity and rainfall, are governed mainly by the movement


and interaction of the three major airmasses that affect all of West Africa. These include the Harmattan — a north-easterly continental trade wind that originates in the Sahara region and is hot and dry. A second tropical maritime airmass, originates from the south-west and blows across the Gulf of Guinea; monsoonal in character, it is composed of moist, relatively cool air. The third airmass consists of the cool equatorial easterlies that are found at high altitudes. There are two major seasons — the rainy season and the dry season. The length of the rainy season decreases from about nine months in the south (March to November, usually broken by a dry period during August) to only four and a half months (mid-May to September) in the far north.

Nigeria is generally divided into four main climatic zones: (a) the coastal belt, extending some 50 miles inland from the coast, is hot and humid with a high average rainfall. Temperatures range from 70°F - 90°F, except for a cooler season from June to September. Relative humidity ranges from 100 per cent to 60 per cent (depending on the time of the year) and rainfall varies from 60 inches per annum in the west of the zone to 130 inches in the east; (b) the hinterland, comprising the remainder of Eastern and Western Nigeria, where the climate is drier with greater seasonal variations and less rainfall (from 35-100 inches per annum); (c) Northern Nigeria, where there is a marked seasonal variation in climate. During December and January temperatures range from 70°F in the south to below 55°F in the north-east, rising to 75°F over most of the territory during May and June. In the south of this zone relative humidity averages 80-100 per cent. Rainfall varies from 50 inches per


annum in the south to 25 inches in the north; (d) the Plateau, in its turn, an area of central Northern Nigeria lying at an altitude of 2,500 feet, shows significant variations of climatic conditions (being generally cooler and less humid), with an average annual rainfall of 60 inches.\(^8\) (See appendix VII.)

The diversity in rainfall, temperatures and topography make a large diversity of vegetation inevitable. Seven principal types of vegetation have been distinguished namely, swamp forest, rain forest, derived savanna, Guinea savanna, Sudan savanna, Sahel savanna and montane vegetation. The first six of these vegetation types lie in roughly east-west zones, that progress inland from the coast to the country's northern limits, while montane type vegetation is limited to the Eastern Highlands.\(^9\) (See appendix VIII.)

Nigeria is well drained, its principal watercourse being the Niger river, which is the third longest river in Africa and rises in the mountains to the north-east of Sierra Leone. From its source in the west it traverses Nigeria in a south-easterly direction until it joins its main tributary, the Benue, at Lokoja about 340 miles from the Atlantic. From this point the Niger flows due south dividing into numerous interlacing channels which form its delta mouth. The Benue river, which has its source in Cameroon, flows in a south-westerly direction until it meets the Niger. It is intersected in its course by several large rivers the most significant of which are the Sokoto, Kaduna, Anambra, Katsina Aba and Gongola rivers. A second drainage system flows north and east from the

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9) Nelson, HD, et al, *op. cit.*, P57. Montane vegetation is described as high altitude woodland with grass cover and isolated trees at the highest levels.
central plateau into the Yobe river which eventually flows into Lake Chad. The coastal region is characterized by many rivers and streams, the most significant of which are the Ogun river (which flows into the Lagos lagoon and creates the calm waters of the port of Lagos), the Benin river, the Excavos, Forcados, Sombreiro, Bonny, Cross and Opobo all form substantial river systems. 10)

Two large bodies of fresh water are found within the country. In the north-east a portion of Lake Chad protrudes into the country, while in the far western areas is the Kainji Lake, formed during the latter 1960's by the damming of the Niger River. Lake Chad is subject to great seasonal variations in water level and area. These conditions result in its alternately advancing and receding over considerable distances in the flat plains area on the Nigerian side of the lake. Little water is drained to the lake from Nigerian sources, its principal source is the Chari river in the Republic of Chad. The Kainji Lake was developed as a combined hydro-electric power and river navigation project. The lake extends for about 85 miles along the Niger River valley, from Kainji to beyond Yelwa and has a varying width of between 9 to 15 miles. 11)

1.1.3 Physical infrastructure

Topography and climate are significant not only in their natural influence upon vegetation and agricultural patterns, but are of decisive influence on the development of the physical infrastructure of the country — the location of ports, urban centres and transport systems. (See appendix IX.)

10) Stapleton, GB, op cit, PP1-2.

Nigeria's lengthy coastline and numerous river inlets have facilitated the development of a number of major and lesser port facilities — Lagos, Tin Can Island Fort (adjacent to Lagos), Port Harcourt, Warri, Sapele, Bonny, Forcados and Calabar being the most significant in terms of the number of vessels and bulk tonnage handled. The port of Lagos received approximately one third of all cargo tonnage destined for Nigerian ports, under the administration of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), during 1978/79 (a total of 2108 vessels and total national registered tonnage of 8800977). During the immediate post-civil war years some 75 per cent of all cargo tonnage passed through Lagos and about 16 per cent through Port Harcourt. The high concentration of traffic at Lagos led to the periodic occurrence of serious congestion in the port. The completion of recent extensions to the berthing facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt, and the completion of new harbour facilities at Tin Can Island (completed during 1977), Warri and Calabar (both completed during 1979) have done much to alleviate the notorious handling delays at Nigerian ports. Lagos has 22 deep-water berths, Tin Can Island has 10 deep-water berths and Port Harcourt has berthing facilities for 12 vessels of lesser displacement. In addition a large number of anchorages for vessels is provided in all ports. Besides the self-evident economic advantages (and indeed necessity if economic development, both in Nigeria and regionally, is to be sustained) of the extensive shipping facilities of Nigeria, consideration must be given to the naval-strategic potential of such facilities. The Soviet Union has expressed interest in developing


military/naual facilities at Lagos which, in view of the location of Lagos and other Nigerian port facilities vis-a-vis the North Atlantic and the West African region as a whole, cannot fail to be of significance.

Nigeria has an extensive inland waterway system embracing the Niger and Benue rivers, the Katsina Ada and Gongola tributaries of the Benue, and the Cross River. In addition the creeks and lagoons of the southern part of the country interconnect to form a continuous waterway from the western border with Benin and eastward to the Niger delta.

Regulation of water levels in the Niger River by means of flow control at the Kainji Lake allows for continuous river traffic by larger craft throughout the year to Yelwa in the north-west. The Benue River is navigable to Yoba by shallow draft boats for about three months during the high water season. The Cross River is navigable only by small vessels for a limited distance. Although seasonal fluctuations in the water level make the waterways of somewhat unreliable significance, the locations of Nigeria's inland waterways are such that if developed, Benin, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and Cameroon could be linked, with some considerable advantage to regional economic co-operation. Development of these waterways and inland river port facilities would reduce cargo distribution pressures at Lagos and Port Harcourt, as consignments could be directed from the sea ports through the waterways to inland ports for delivery.

The road system in Nigeria is the most important transport system.


carrying the bulk of Nigeria's produce and passenger traffic (some 80 per cent of imports are distributed by road). Road development has received much attention by both the Federal and State Governments; there being a total of 59,609 miles of primary and secondary roadway of which approximately 45 per cent is tarred, with a total of N4,355,960 budgeted for improvements and expansion between 1975 and 1980.  

Because of difficult topography, especially in the south-eastern, central and north-eastern parts, the cost of road construction is generally high. The nature of the soils, the heavy rainfall in the coastal regions and the poor drainage conditions make road maintenance facilities difficult and expensive. This, together with the fact that colonial development of the road transport system tended to be vertical (that is to say, running from the coast inland so as to secure the interior economically and strategically) instead of horizontal, thus resulting in the lack of regional interconnecting routes, has left Nigeria with a largely inadequate transportation grid. It has been reported that inadequate road transport facilities account for between 20 and 40 per cent of the total marketing cost of goods in Nigeria.

Nigerian railways provide an example of how colonial policy worked against the creation of an integrated transport system. The two major railway lines, serving Lagos and Port Harcourt, both go north. There are no rail links across the southern part of the country nor any linking the eastern and western commercial centres. Neither is there any rail route which

18) Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, op cit, P200. The Nigerian monetary system is the Naira (N) and Kobo (k); US $1 = approximately 0.641 Naira or 64.1 Kobo. Sterling $1 = 1.326 Naira.


traverses Nigerian borders providing links with her neighbours. The varied terrain makes for steep gradients and extensive distances of curved track (which increase the need for maintenance and significantly reduce speed) and together with the inadequacy of the rolling stock and allied rail facilities, have made the railway system uncompetitive and economically unvi able, thus in turn, increasing pressure on the road system. Although an extensive reconstruction project, involving the re-laying of existing tracks was announced in 1975, this is a long-term undertaking and will not be completed until the latter 1980's.

The difficulties of terrain, climate and colonial legacy (in itself largely influenced by the former) have influenced the present inadequacy of the Nigerian transport infrastructure, with serious implications for Nigerian and regional development. The establishment, during 1975, of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) underlined the lack of trans-national highways of any kind. The development of the whole area must hinge upon the extent to which communications systems from Nigeria (the economic hub) connect the country with the other regional states.

The Trans-African Highway proposed by Japan in 1969 to link Kenya (from the port of Mombassa), Uganda, Zaire, Central African Republic, Cameroon and Nigeria through the development and linkage of existing routes, could provide the rudimentary basis of a trans-continental growth net-work.

22) Chalki, F, et al, op cit, P91. Also Third National Development Plan 1973-1980, op cit, P212-215. It may be noted that the Statement of Policy on Transport, Sessional Paper NO 1 of 1965, incorporated these same objectives, yet little seems to have improved in 15 years.
23) Arnold, G and Weiss, R, op cit, P139.
However, the co-ordinating committee meeting at Lagos during April 1974 declared that economic and political self-interest had made realization of the scheme virtually impossible.24) Similarly, Nigeria has a vested interest in the mooted Trans-Saharan Highway linking Algeria to Nigeria. Access to Algerian ports could be of strategic significance to the northern parts of Nigeria (historically, Northern rulers have regretted their dependence on Lagos for access to the sea and this fact probably deterred the North from secession on the several occasions which it had been threatened). In an economic context it is suggested that the long delays at Nigerian ports and the high cost of transportation make the importation of goods, destined for the northern Nigerian states, through the ports of Algeria economically viable.25)

There are two international airports in Nigeria, at Lagos and Kano, and domestic airports at Calabar, Port Harcourt, Benin City, Ibadan, Kaduna, Jos, Enugu, Sokoto, Yoba and Maiduguri. These airports are manned and operated by the Civil Aviation Division of the Federal Ministry of Transport. Air services are provided by the state-owned Nigerian Airways Corporation and recent improvements in runway and maintenance facilities have increased the operational efficiency of the service, which because of the vast size of Nigeria is of some considerable significance.26)

Lagos is the federal capital of Nigeria, although the recent phenomenal expansion and overcrowding of the metropolitan area and the generally unsuitable nature of both the site and the climate to accommodate further

24) Ibid, p159.
25) Ibid.
expansion, influenced the decision to construct a new federal capital at Abuja. Construction commenced during 1980 and the Federal Government is scheduled to move to the new site by 1990. Other major cities include Ibadan, Kano, Benin City, Port Harcourt, Jos, Onitsha and Calabar all of which are focal points for the densely settled areas surrounding them and most of which pre-date European influence.27)

We suggested at the outset that the individual elements of physical geography, in the context of national capability, constitute the fundamental and unchangeable environmental framework, basic (although not exclusive) in their influence upon the total capability matrix. In assessing the capability significance of the nature of the physical geography of Nigeria, it is evident that while Nigeria has the implied capability advantage of a substantial geographic area, such advantage as may accrue from the sizeable proportions of the country alone, is somewhat overshadowed by the country's lack of independent physical geographic definition and the large variation in the nature of terrain and climate, creating a physical diversity which complicates the definition of Nigeria as a geographic whole. The fact that Nigeria is not a homogeneous geographic expression has made for the inclusion of a multiplicity of lifestyles, cultures and economic traditions which historically have complicated notions of political unity and socio-economic development and which consequently permeate the entire capability spectrum.

So too, the significance of the dimensions of the geographic area which a particular state might encompass is relative to consideration of the size of neighbouring territories, or continental and global comparisons. Thus it has been seen that in terms of pure size Nigeria can scarcely claim regional or continental predominance (although this is not to deny

27) Udo, RK, op cit, P239-241.
the significance of the sizeable proportions of the country as a factor fundamental to potential capability). However, by the same standard Nigeria cannot be said to have been overshadowed by any substantially more powerful neighbour, (although it has been suggested that events in neighbouring states, particularly Ghana, have influenced political developments in Nigeria from time to time) or that it has been influenced in its capability options. Furthermore, it may be noted that despite the fact that Nigeria shares contiguous territory with most of its regional neighbours, no irredentist claims of any significance appear to have been recorded.

In terms of geo-political location it is difficult to attribute any inherent significance to Nigeria that might be drawn upon as a capability asset, in the form of the potential regional or global political leverage which such an inherently strategic location might imply. However, it is not beyond the realm of strategic and geo-political reality to suggest a degree of latent significance in the geographic location of Nigeria.

Twelve of the 15 states identified as belonging to the West African geographical region have coastal frontiers with a large number of relatively well developed ports. In assessing the significance of location in relation to capability, therefore, one cannot say that Nigeria's littoral locality makes it of indispensable regional significance, because the landlocked hinterland states are not solely dependent upon Nigerian ports for access to the sea (not, for example, in the way that Uganda is dependent upon Kenyan ports or the central African states upon Dar-es-Salaam). However, in as much as the Gulf of Guinea offers easy access to both the south and north Atlantic and falls within the periphery of the sphere of influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(NATO), the facilities of the entire coastal region must be of significance in any contingency planning. Indeed, the slave trade flourished in West Africa, and Nigeria was first colonized because of the country's geographic proximity and accessibility *vis-a-vis* Western Europe and the Americas. So too, during the World Wars, Nigeria as a British colonial possession, was of substantial significance in relation to the military theatres of the Middle East and North Africa.

However, a degree of significance does not automatically imply a positive capability advantage, as international political leverage is dependent upon a degree of exclusiveness and indispensability. In terms of geographic location (versus regional or global interests) Nigeria is neither exclusive nor indispensable. However, Nigeria is perhaps of marginally greater potential significance in relation to the southern Atlantic and southern Africa, due to the fact that Nigerian port facilities offer the southern most naval facilities, of comparable significance, along the West African coast; other than the Angolan ports of Luanda and Lobito, which fall within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Similarly, it might be suggested that Nigeria derives a degree of significance from the fact that it is a major oil exporting country, which in its geographic location *vis-a-vis* the United States and Western Europe, is at a considerable strategic advantage over those oil-exporting countries which rely upon the strategically insecure Suez Canal and Straits of Hormus. The advantage is derived from the fact that in the event of international transit through either of these two narrow waterways being impeded, the dependence of the Western industrialized states on Nigerian oil supplies, due to Nigeria's geographic proximity, would apparently be greatly increased. Thus it may be concluded that Nigeria's geo-political location is of relative significance and a potential, if somewhat speculative, capability asset.
Historically, the great variations in Nigerian terrain and climate have been fundamental in their influence; limiting European settlement to the coastal regions by geographic and climatic inaccessibility, determining the settlement patterns, cultures and diverse characteristics of the indigenous inhabitants. Topographical features have divided the country into three separately definable territories (as manifest in the Northern, Eastern and Western provinces of colonial conception), providing a degree of natural insularity which divorces the parts from the whole and militates against the unity of a single Nigerian national geographic entity. This lack of geographic interdependence and continuity is a negation of potential capability in as much as it fosters psychological insularity and parochialism as opposed to the essential capability asset of national unity. The diverse terrain has similarly been of negative influence in the establishment of any comprehensive transport infrastructure, thus (in conjunction with colonial legacy) perpetuating inter-regional insularity and impairing economic development to the extent that the transport infrastructure is inadequate in providing inter-regional mobility.

1.2 Population

Population as a capability factor draws its significance from the fact that it is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. That is to say, that while it is possible to consider the more tangible factors of size, distribution and ethnological characteristics of the population as physical determinants of capability, the qualitative nature of population (national character, educational levels etc.) is of consummate influence upon national capability in its own right. However, this is a largely intangible factor and is deemed to have more relevance to the social determinants considered in the second part of this two part capability matrix.
1.2.1 Size and distribution

Demographic statistics in Nigeria are a notorious source of political controversy, with politicians throughout the country traditionally placing much emphasis on the linkage between numbers counted and parliamentary representation, as well as the financial advantages for area development of a large local population (leading to inflated claims of regional demographic predominance). The outcome is that the results of the two population censuses conducted in Nigeria since independence (one in 1963 and 1973) are unreliable, with the latter having been officially repudiated during 1975. Consequently, populational statistics for Nigeria are essentially estimates, and those quoted below are primarily derived from the estimates and projected growth rates presented by United Nations agencies as the most non-partisan source.

The November 1963 census recorded that the population of the Federal Republic of Nigeria totalled 55,670,055 although the United Nations estimated that the population as of 1963 did not exceed 46.3 million. Thus if one is to accept the results of the official 1963 census, on the basis of an estimated annual birth rate of 49.3 per 1000 and an annual death rate of 22.7 per 1000 during the period 1970-75, it is estimated that the total population as of 1975 was 62,930 million, which at the United Nation's estimated rate of increase of 2.8 per cent per annum put the estimated total population as of mid-1977 at 66,628 million. These estimates assume a steady rate of growth of population and do not


30) Ibid.
take into account the effects of the civil war. Nevertheless, they may be compared with the recorded 1973 census total of 79.76 million and the total of 47,710,680 eligible voters recorded by the Federal Electoral Commission in 1978.\(^{31}\) Considering that 40 per cent of the Nigerian population is under 14 years of age,\(^{32}\) on the basis of eligible electorate (those over 18 years of age) the true total might feasibly be in excess of 90 million.

Life expectancy ranges from 37.2 years for males to 36.7 for females with 43.1 per cent of the population under 14 years of age, while 54.9 per cent were between 15 and 65 years old and only 2 per cent over 65 years of age.\(^{33}\) Infant mortality is relatively high with about 187 per thousand live births.\(^{34}\) Furthermore, there is a greater proportion of males to females in the Nigerian population and the ratio is larger in the urban centres (many males migrating to the urban centres in search of employment). Nigeria has an overall population density in excess of 72 people per square kilometre.\(^{35}\)

In order to place this data in regional and continental perspective the primarily significant statistics of total population and population density may be compared with a selection of African states of comparable size and


rank, including three of Nigeria's regional neighbours.

**COMPARATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL (MILL. AS PER 1977)</th>
<th>AREA (SQ.KMS.)</th>
<th>DENSITY (PER SQ.KM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>38.741</td>
<td>1001,449</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>28.981</td>
<td>1221,900</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>10.475</td>
<td>238,537</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVORY COAST</td>
<td>5.152</td>
<td>322,462</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
<td>14.337</td>
<td>582,646</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>4.559</td>
<td>1267,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>66.528*</td>
<td>923,768</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>22.465</td>
<td>1221,037</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
<td>26.313</td>
<td>2345,409</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of 1970.

SOURCE: UN Statistical Yearbook 1978, Thirtieth issue, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1979, PP68 and 69.

It is clearly evident from the above table that the Federal Republic of Nigeria encompasses by far the largest number of people of any other state in Africa (close on double that of Egypt, the second most populous state, and encompassing two thirds of the total population of West Africa) and has the highest population density on the continent. In unqualified analysis this would imply that Nigeria is endowed with some substantial capability asset, in that no state which does not rank among the more populous states of the world can aspire to international influence.

While the size of population is certainly basic to potential capability, like geographic size, it is a largely relative factor and it is, therefore, not possible to draw an unqualified correlation between the size of Nigeria's population and capability.

However, population or human resources are of direct significance in the context of national capability for the productive capacity which they represent. It is estimated that about 78 per cent of the potential
Nigerian labour force (those between 15-55 years of age) are economically active (that is to say, engaged in the production of goods and services) and the potential labour force is estimated to grow at a rate of 2.3 per cent annually. Nigerian's manpower quotient as of 1980 is estimated at 32.74 million. Approximately 88 per cent of the potential male labour force and 27.7 per cent of females of economically productive age are economically active. Although it may be directly deduced that Nigeria has an impressive potential production capacity, the above estimates are inconclusive in as much as quantitative analysis does not reflect the necessary qualitative nature of the available manpower; a consideration which is self-evidently determinative in its significance.

About 22.8 per cent of the Nigerian population live in urban areas (that is, towns with populations in excess of 10,000 inhabitants); the remainder living in predominantly small rural settlements. Urban life has a long history in Nigeria, with centres like Kano (399,000), Zaria (224,000), Ife (176,000) and Benin (136,000) dating from the Middle Ages. However, recent economic development has greatly stimulated the rural-urban migration and has led to the phenomenal growth of such cities as Lagos (with an estimated metropolitan population in excess of three million and a projected growth rate of 11 per cent per annum), Ibadan (over one million), Kaduna (500,000) and Port Harcourt (over 300,000).


rapid growth in urban centres has led to crises in housing and urban planning, and led to Lagos recently being listed as one of the unhealthiest cities in the world.  

The general distribution of the Nigerian population is highly uneven. More than 44 per cent of the population live in densities of above 160 people per square kilometre while occupying only 13 per cent of the country's total land area. Much of the population is concentrated in the southern part of the country with the greatest area concentration to be found in the eastern states (in parts of Iboland and Ibibioland the population exceeds 580 persons per sq. km.), and the Lagos metropolitan district of the western states. In the north, the area of highest population concentration is to be found around the Kano and Sokoto regions, but population densities are generally well below the national average. Smaller pockets of densely concentrated population occur in the Jos plateau region, southern Tivland and Okene district, but by far the greater part of the country is very sparsely populated. Indeed, vast areas of the Cross River district, the Niger Delta, the Chad Basin and parts of the Middle Belt are virtually uninhabited.

The pattern of distribution does not appear to necessarily correspond to the agricultural productivity of the soil, but can perhaps best be attributed to historical factors. The fact, for example, that the three largest tribal groupings possessed sophisticated organizational structures and as such provided a strong ethnic cohesiveness, which generally precluded the uncontrolled spread of the members of each group from the

42) Harrison Church, R, op cit, PP419-422.
organizational realm. Furthermore, expansion of the traditional groupings were largely inhibited by natural obstacles; the Hausa-Fulani by the encroaching Sahara desert, the Yoruba by the Niger River and the Atlantic Ocean, and the Ibo by the Benue River. The central river areas were also less healthy and because of the transport access routes from the coast provided by the rivers, were the main routes of the slave traders, which may account for the sparse populational distribution in the centre of the country.

In contemporary terms, this uneveness in the distribution of population results in the 19 federal states varying considerably in population size, a fact which holds the inherent implication of predominance by the more populous states and is not conducive to long-term political stability. So too, the uneven distribution of core areas of population implies an uneven location of productivity, economic development and growth, factors which militate against national integration and unity, and which may ultimately impair capability potential.

1.2.2 Ethnological characteristics

Although racially homogeneous, the Nigerian population exhibits extreme ethnic diversity. Most sources identify well over 200 different ethnic groups, some numbering less than 10,000 people and hardly distinguishable as separate groupings. Ten different ethnic groups account for nearly 80 per cent of the population namely, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Kamuri, Tiv, Edo, Nupe, Ibibio and Ijaivi.43)

The Hausa are the least closely knit of the three major ethnic groupings

43) Mabogunji, AL, op cit, P732.
which bear the characteristics of a common language (Hausa) and a common religion (Islam) and occupy the north-western most reaches of the country. The second major grouping occupying the northern parts, the Fulani, came to Nigeria from the north-west Sudanic regions and the majority are nomadic cattle herders, but they also provide the rulers or Emirs of the former Hausa states and have done so since the Fulani 'Jihad'. The north is also inhabited by the numerically less significant Nupe tribe, whose numbers seem to be diminishing due to assimilation into the Hausa and Yoruba tribes, between which its traditional territory is sandwiched, and the small, but ethnically distinct Kanuri and Tiv tribes.  

The Yoruba people dominate the western regions and form a closely knit ethnic group and many lesser groups have been assimilated into the Yoruba tribe in recent years. This process was largely facilitated by the influence of the Europeans and Christian missionaries, which was preponderant in this region from earliest times and contributed to the weakening of ethnic rigidity. To the east of the Yoruba live the Bini of Benin and other Edo peoples. However, the Ibo and Ibibio dominate the eastern region and have encroached on the Bini and other lesser tribes.  

While all Nigerians are of Negroid extraction, the range of individual variation within the Negro race is as great as that within European races and is manifest in the many variations of physical characteristics, lending false credibility to suggestions of racial diversity. Nigeria is not racially divided and has no expatriate European or Asian population which might complicate its racial homogeneity. Such divisions as occur are of ethnic origin perpetuated by linguistic and cultural cleavages.  

44) Stapleton, GB, op cit, PP48-53.  
45) Ibid.  
Three major language groups (with numerous parochial dialectical variations) may be identified within Nigeria: languages of Sudanic origin (Kwa, Camba, and Takum dialects); semi-bantu languages (Fulani, Efik and Ibibio being the major dialectical variations); and the Hamito-Semitic languages (Kanuri and Hausa dialects). The most widely used indigenous language is Hausa, while English is the official language of government.\textsuperscript{(47)} The most rigid cultural division in Nigeria is of a socio-religious nature, in that the northern tribes are predominantly Islamic while the people of southern tribal origin are more likely to be Christian. Unlike denominational divisions within the Christian religion, the distinction between Christianity and Islam is of fundamental social significance and is a source of socio-cultural distinction and cleavage.

It has been established that the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the largest population in Africa and in theory, this fact should be of substantial significance to that country's capability potential, and indeed it is. The fact of so vast a population distinguishes Nigeria from all other African states; as a state encompassing two-thirds of the total population of the West African region (despite the fact that it is only fourth largest in geographical area), Nigeria is of self-evident regional predominance and significance. However, it is not only the size of the Nigerian population that is of positive significance to capability potential, but also the potential manpower resources which so large a population represents, production capacity potential, size of the consumer market and the military advantages of virtually unlimited armed personnel resources.

\textsuperscript{(47)} Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, op cit, Para 51, P23 establishes English as the official language of government, but government affairs may be conducted in either Hausa, Ibo or Yoruba.
However, whereas the unqualified size of Nigeria's demographic resources is a most singular capability asset, it is curiously anomalous that the population element, in this analysis of capability potential, is the source of Nigeria's greatest vulnerability and weakness. This is due to the fact that, whereas the population of Nigeria is of hugely diverse and heterogeneous ethnic composition, three ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo (each occupying a separate geographically definable traditional land area) have been traditionally preponderant and dominate all other ethnic groups, to the extent that ethnic heterogeneity is limited to a consideration of these three groups. As has already been described, the historical influence served to perpetuate the traditional ethnic cleavages and to politically polarize these three main tribal groupings. The politicization of ethnicity and the political definition of traditional ethnic land area, inevitably led to the political translation of socio-cultural cleavages to the extent where individual ethnic origin became of vital political significance.

The politicization of ethnicity effectively precluded the evolution of any trans-tribal nationalism, with the inherent implication for national unity and its well documented outcome. The fact that each of these three major ethnic groups traditionally dominate a clearly identifiable and self-contained land area made individual ethnic loyalty far more realistic than any vague notions of Nigerianism. The redivision of the three former federal provinces into 19 states must certainly go a long way to bridging the gap between loyalty to the traditional ethnic realm and Nigeria as a whole. However, ethnic distinction, suspicion and animosity, as strong as it has been between these three groups, cannot be discounted that easily, and here in lies the most serious anomaly in the nature of the demographic capability asset.
The present lack of any, but superficial, trans-tribal national unity, the lack of any mass political party and the inclination toward ethnic oriented party-political support (despite the statutory necessity for political parties to prove a national organizational base as a prerequisite to registration), and the lack of any single political figure, who might unite the populous over and above ethnic cleavages, are the root cause of political instability, and thus represent a potential negation of the positive capability element of population size. Whereas the present constitutional dispensation strives to eliminate the rigid ethnic socio-political cleavages, the bitter legacy of two, apparently ethnically inspired, coups d'état and the civil war will not be easily overcome, and ethnic recrimination, suspicion and fears of discrimination and domination must be considered as inherent socio-political characteristics of the contemporary Nigerian population. Thus, whereas it may be argued that ethnicity as a basic source of political instability has been defused, until the present constitutional dispensation has stood the test of time and a largely new generation, that has not experienced the sharp end of ethnic rivalry, has arisen, the factor of ethnicity in Nigeria, and its inherent potential for socio-political instability, is fundamental in its negative national capability connotations.

The element of population in the context of Nigerian national capability is yet further complicated by the fact that the population is religiously divided; the population growth rate is very high by contemporary standards; urban migration (as much a result of 'rural push' as 'urban pull' due to the declining fortunes of the traditional agricultural sector) is increasing at a rate faster than that at which any reasonable housing can be provided; the vast population requires considerable quantities of foodstuff to keep it fed, continued economic growth at a rate comparable
to population growth to ensure adequate employment, massive expenditure on education and manpower training, large (and often unwieldy) bureaucratic administrations. The high fertility together with the disruption of demographic trends by the effects of the civil war have resulted in an increasing youthfulness and dependency ratio in the population, thus increasing the burden of the economically active population and creating a bias in favour of consumption and social services, particularly education. This implies that relatively less resources are available for investment in directly productive activities, such as agriculture and industry. As long as Nigerian fertility rates are high (and this is entrenched by traditional social attitudes) the prospect is that the proportion of the population who are children will continue in excess of 40 per cent, with the concomitant adverse effect on the size of the labour force and development priorities.

1.3 Natural resources

Natural resources are generally divided into categories of vegetable and mineral, that is to say, both the resources necessary for efficient agricultural production and a quantitatively and qualitatively varied mining capacity. While the mere possession of natural resources is not of implicit capability advantage, it is fundamental to potential capability, since any state which seeks to be of international influence must either possess the necessary resource base or seek to secure supplies, due to the fact that certain resources are basic to any notion of capability — foodstuffs, oil, iron ore, coal, for example, and a state cannot develop beyond the extent to which it is able to mobilize essential resource supplies.

Before evaluating the element of natural resources as a determinant of potential Nigerian capability it is necessary first, to consider those
resources which are agriculturally based and secondly, the extent of the country's mineral resources.

1.3.1 Agricultural resources

Agricultural production is a major consideration in the analysis of national capability because a sufficient agricultural capacity is necessary to ensure adequate food supplies for internal (domestic) consumption and is basic to economic development, in as much as such development represents a shift from an agriculturally based to an industrially based economy. However, a generally accepted prerequisite of such a shift (of relevance specifically to developing countries as many industrialized economies are not self-sufficient in food supply) and the primary capability relevance of agricultural productivity, is self-sufficiency in basic domestic food production. Of secondary significance is the production of commercial agricultural commodities for export, internal consumption and local manufacturing.

The recent trends in the production of staple food crops in Nigeria may be illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RICE</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIZE</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILLET</td>
<td>2865</td>
<td>2950</td>
<td>3100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORGHUM</td>
<td>3690</td>
<td>3700</td>
<td>3800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTATOES</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASSAVA</td>
<td>10500</td>
<td>10600</td>
<td>10844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PULSES</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMATOES</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident from the above table that agricultural production in Nigeria during the period for which statistics are available is either static or declining and where increases have been recorded they are very slight. Production rose by 2.5 per cent per annum during 1969-74, and whereas the Third National Development Plan envisaged an overall growth rate of 4.6 per cent per annum, it is quite evident that the overall increase in production output is limited and hardly keeping pace with the rapidly increasing population.\(^{48}\)

Available evidence shows that production of basic food crops is of a very low level and that food shortages, with a so-called "hungry season", are perennial in many areas of the country.\(^{49}\) Consequently, there are marked seasonal variations in the intake of principal staple and supplementary foods and widespread underfeeding and malnutrition; the quantity and quality of diet varying to extents which can be related to local farming practices and economic pressures. Projections of demand and analysis of production trends extending to 1985 show that Nigeria will not be able to meet the increasing demand of its population for basic staple foodstuffs now or in the future and that negative surpluses for all staple food crops is likely to be a long-term characteristic.\(^{50}\) This assertion is lent credibility by the fact that the cost of importing


essential foodstuffs has risen from N 80 million in 1970 to an estimated N 900 million in 1978.  

The adequate size of the Nigerian land area and the diversity of climate provide the basis for a broad agricultural resource potential. It has been suggested that about 75.3 per cent of Nigeria's total land area can be brought under cultivation; since about 10 per cent is under forest reserves and the remaining 14.7 per cent is assumed to be made up of permanent pastures, built up areas and uncultivatable waste. However, only about one third of Nigeria's total land area (or 34 million hectares) is presently under cultivation. This gross under-utilization may be ascribed to the fact that only about 37 per cent of the available agricultural land is capable of supporting medium to high productivity cultivation without the addition of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs.  

Not only does the country under-utilize its agricultural land in a quantitative sense, but institutionalized traditions of land-tenure and practical cultivation pose considerable constraint on the qualitative productivity of the land, mechanization and endeavours at modernizing agricultural production techniques. The traditional land-tenure system, which embodies the principle of the inalienability of land, is a communal usufructuary system in which rights to use the land are held by individuals  


but disposal and distribution rights are held by traditional authorities, leading to the fragmentation of holdings into low productivity and uneconomic units. However, the Land Use Decree of 1978 has vested future authority over land distribution and consolidation in the state governments, thus opening the way to the initiation of large-scale farming operations.53

Large land holdings are virtually unknown in Nigeria, almost the entire output of Nigerian agriculture coming from smallholders working on small plots, with very little capital investment and employing relatively primitive techniques. There are several different traditional techniques: first, a system of bush rotation whereby the fields are cleared of their original vegetation cover, cultivated briefly for a year or two and then abandoned to fallow; secondly, a system of sedentary cultivation based upon simple crop rotations and the use of manure; thirdly, a system of terrace agriculture to be found in the hilly areas; fourthly, a system of rudimentary mixed farming involving a balance of crops and stock on individual holdings; and finally, a system of intensive, irrigated cultivation arising from unfavourable siting of farmlands in relation to rainfall and water resources.54 Each one of these systems of traditional farming practice is the product of adaptation to location, availability of resources, socio-cultural and ethnic characteristics, and impede effective land utilization through difficulties in maintenance of soil fertility, the unwillingness of farmers to accept innovations


which require deviations from this pattern, inability of the system to keep pace with increasing demand and the consequent shortening of fallow periods which has led to the erosion and leaching of the soil. 55)

For agricultural purposes it is possible to divide the country into three macro-regions: the rainforest south, the northern savanna and the middle belt. 56) Crop production in Nigeria is limited in extensiveness and intensiveness of cultivation by the ecological considerations peculiar to each of these different zones. Thus, for example, yam and cassava cultivation predominates in the humid southern forest belt or southern edge of the savanna regions, while maize and rice are the predominant crops of the middle belt. The grain belt, where sorghum, millet and cowpea cultivation predominate, lies farther to the north. Although the forest zone in the southern parts of the country is suitable for tree crops, small-scale food cropping is carried on for subsistence consumption. The savanna zones are more suited to surplus food production and the bulk of northern surplus production is marketed in southern urban areas. 57)

Food crops are produced almost entirely by peasant farmers whose prime concern is subsistence production, market supply being determined by the total harvest less the quantity retained for home consumption and seeding. Marketing of the effective surplus is a traditionally complicated procedure involving a large number of transactions and engaging numerous middlemen and agents. This traditional pattern, with


its gross marketing inefficiencies has remained almost unchanged for decades and contributes significantly to food shortages and food price levels.\(^58\)

An integral part of a country's food resources is the nature of the livestock resources, which in Nigeria are varied and include cattle, sheep, goats, poultry, horses, donkeys and camels. The areas of suitable livestock rearing environment are limited by the availability of pasturage and the prevalence of tsetse-fly; consequently, 90 per cent of the country's livestock herd is to be found in the northern savanna regions. Small herds of indigenous (sleeping-sickness resistant) cross-breeds of cattle, sheep and goats are found in the southern parts.\(^59\)

Livestock production in Nigeria is still carried on largely under traditional systems. About 90 per cent of the country's cattle herd is husbanded by the traditional nomadic practices of the Fulani and other Sudanic tribes, such as the Shawa Arabs and Layans. This age-old 'cultural' method of livestock production reflects long-term adjustment to limits imposed by climate. The principal climatic constraint is the fluctuating and seasonal nature of the rainfall, resulting in a scarcity of all year round pasturage and a low carrying capacity of the rangeland and the periodic shortage of water. Some modernized commercial ranching and cattle feed-lots has been undertaken by state governments, but the considerable expenditure required for the establishment and maintenance of effective range management and the inadequate supply of supplemental feeds are limiting factors. Tsetse fly too, remains a

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59) FAO: *Agriculture in Nigeria*, op cit, PP240-266.
limiting factor and a programme for its eventual eradication is underway. 60)

The livestock production output in Nigeria has been estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION TRENDS</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEEF</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUTTON</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOATS MEAT</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIGMEAT</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POULTRY</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COWS MILK</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUTTER</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEESE</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTLE HIDES</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEP SKINS</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOAT SKINS</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Probably the most inhibiting element in the productivity of this sector is the inefficient and inadequate marketing structure. Some 57 per cent of the stock is driven southward on hoof (covering distances of 1000-1300 kms.); the remaining 43 per cent being transported by road and rail. 61) Marketing of live cattle takes place on the traditional haggling basis and the marketing of beef by retail is not on any standard weight basis. The traditional role of the middleman in cattle marketing results in complexities and exploitative practices. 62)

The extensive coastal and inland waters of Nigeria provide a rich source

62) Ibid.
of fish (and thus protein) for Nigeria. However, internal demand far
outstrips supply (only 69 per cent of total demand being met in 1977)
and the resulting deficit necessitates large-scale importation of fish.
Lack of adequate transport facilities limits the fish supply to the
port cities and fish is thus rarely available at inland centres. 63)

Despite the characteristically low productivity and inadequate performance
of Nigeria's food producing capacity, agriculture remains a most basic
strut in the socio-economic structure of Nigeria. Its contribution
to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is placed at 27.9 per cent for
1976/77, which is the largest contribution other than that of the
mining sector. However, agriculture was estimated to engage the labour
of 72 per cent of the Nigerian population in 1970/71, and although
the percentage engaged in agricultural production has declined over the
last decade, the Third National Development Plan declared that in absolute
terms the agricultural sector is the primary source of employment in
the country. 64)

The basis of the agricultural sector's contribution to economic capacity
may be primarily ascribed to those commercial agricultural commodities
which were described at the outset as being of secondary relevance to
capability analysis. The most important commercial agricultural
commodities produced in Nigeria are cocoa beans, groundnuts, palm kernels,
natural rubber and cotton, as well as timber. Recent production trends

63) Food and Agriculture Organization Yearbook of Fishery Statistics
1978, Vol 46, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Rome, 1979, P12. 8783 metric tons of fish were landed in 1978.
See also Aboyade, O, op cit, P742.

64) Federal Republic of Nigeria, Third National Development Plan 1975-
1980 Second Progress Report, Federal Ministry of National Planning,
op cit, P63 and Times, W, op cit, P77.
may be illustrated as follows:

**COMMERCIAL CROP PRODUCTION**
**IN NIGERIA (ooo metric tons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CROP</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUND NUTS</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEED COTTON</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALM KERNELS</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALM OIL</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGAR CANE</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOBACCO</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTTON LINT</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATURAL RUBBER</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOA BEANS</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Until 1973, Nigeria was the world's second largest producer of cocoa (after Ghana); however, unfavourable weather conditions, poor financial returns due to depressed world market prices and consequent labour shortages, together with the decreasing output of the ageing trees have since combined to relegate Nigeria to fourth place among the world's cocoa producers. Higher producers' prices and more favourable weather conditions during recent years has led to a significant increase in output. Furthermore, under a rehabilitation scheme of the World Bank over 15,400 acres of new cocoa plantations have been established and seedlings of high yielding strains are being distributed to farmers.

Until 1972, Nigeria was Africa's leading groundnut producer (and third largest in the world after India and China). However, between 1973 and 1976 output showed a marked decline due to the combined effects of

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drought, pestilence, the smuggling of groundnuts into neighbouring territories where prices were higher, and the switching of land to the cultivation of yams and maize for local sale. No groundnuts were exported during 1975 and small-scale exports were only resumed in 1977. Major problems with respect to the production of groundnuts lie in the movement of the commodity from the interior to the ports; deterioration in their quality due to long storage; inadequate labour supply during the peak seasons; lack of credit facilities; and a defective produce inspecting and marketing system.66)

Similarly, the production of palm produce has been steadily declining in recent years, particularly following the widespread destruction of plantations during the civil war. Palm oil is the main source of fat for the Nigerian population and the major portion of production is consumed locally, while palm kernels are the major export commodity of the palm produce sector.67)

Nigeria is the second largest producer of natural rubber in Africa; some 91 per cent of Nigerian output being produced on small holdings in the mid-Western Bendel State. Large-scale cultivations are being encouraged by the growth in rubber processing industries in Nigeria. Similarly, the expansion of the domestic textile industry has increasingly stimulated cotton production in Nigeria which is confined largely to the northern states. So too, the cultivation of kenaf, for use in fibre bags and sacks has become economically attractive with the growth of manufacturing industry.68)

About 39 per cent of the land area of Nigeria may be classified as forest land and roughly 10 per cent or 9.6 million hectares designated as forest reserves (made up of mangroves, high forest and savanna woodlands), and little timber of quality remains outside of these resources. 69) The Nigerian forests contain over 560 species of trees, which attain a moderately large size. These include the mahoganies, Iroko and other decorative hardwoods for which West Africa is well known, but only some 10 per cent of the species are used in manufacturing.

Nigeria produced 68,883 million cubic metres of wood from forestry removals in 1975 of which 93.3 per cent is fuelwood, 2.3 per cent sawnwood, 0.1 per cent wood panels and 0.6 per cent paper and paperboard, 2.5 per cent poles and 1.3 per cent exports. 70) Excessive exploitation and destruction of forests for farming have greatly reduced the supply of valuable timber trees and Nigeria is at present a net importer of wood-based products. The depletion of resources and the increasing demand, require the increasingly efficient utilization of Nigeria's forest resources, as well as the expansion of plantations using high-yielding and fast-growing species in an attempt to bridge the growing demand-supply gap.

This macro-survey of the agricultural resources of Nigeria clearly illustrates the anomaly between potential and actuality. Nigeria's agricultural potential is rich and diverse, both in the extent of the available land area and in the varying ecological conditions which

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facilitate the cultivation of a large variety of crops. However, the factors which at present impose serious limits on this self-evident potential have been set out as follows: (i) shortage of qualified manpower in key areas; (ii) inadequate supplies of agricultural inputs; (iii) inadequate extension services; (iv) the poor condition of feeder roads and other transport facilities; (v) inadequacy or lack of effective supporting services, such as farm credit and marketing facilities; (vi) the problem of land ownership imposed by the land-tenure system in most parts of the country; (vii) the problem of diseases and pests; (viii) growing labour shortages in the rural areas in consequence of rural-urban migration; (ix) lack of appropriate technology for many food crops; (x) drudgery of farm work and low returns from agriculture which force rural youth to migrate to urban areas, rather than go into farming; (xi) inadequate harvesting procedures due to unavailability of surplus labour during peak seasons. 71)

These factors are no new phenomena and are largely inherent to the socio-cultural nature of Nigeria, but have contributed to the steady decline in productivity of all sectors of agricultural enterprise over the last two decades because of the low priority accorded to agriculture in past development planning, as opposed to the considerable emphasis on the mining and industrial sectors. This, no doubt, springs from an erroneous notion adopted by many developing nations in the immediate wake of independence that development, and hence international capability, lies essentially in the level of industrialization (the industrialized - industrializing, developed - developing dichotomies which are used to distinguish 'North' from 'South', contribute in no small way to the creating of psychological blinkers in development planning). Thus,

agriculture and an agriculturally based economy (distinguished by classical development theorists as the mark of underdevelopment) was assigned low priority in national development planning. Whereas it cannot be denied that industrialization and mining are obviously of profound significance to economic and national capability, this cannot be acknowledged at the expense of the fact that one of the most fundamental considerations in any analysis of capability potential is self-sufficiency in food supply. (It is, of course, possible to supplement the economic drain of food importation with manufactured and industrial exports, but in so-called 'developing' countries, where the industrial base is limited, this is hardly a feasible option, neither does it reduce the vulnerability of the state to food embargo, and agriculture must thus be of singular priority.)

In recognition of this fact (established in a succession of extensive reports on Nigeria's agricultural trends) the Nigerian Government initiated with the Third National Development Plan and subsequent measures, projects which seek to rectify the present negative trends in agriculture, and most recently a so-called "green revolution" has been declared the cornerstone of future economic policy.\(^{72}\)

During 1975 the Federal Military Government initiated the National Accelerated Food Production Programme, the basis of which was a nationwide integrated research and extension service designed to enable Nigerian farmers to increase crop production. The programme included fertilizer procurement and distribution, and seed multiplication projects.\(^{73}\) A


A number of large-scale agricultural projects were launched, among these are schemes established under the Sokoto-Rima Valley Development Authority and the Chad Basin Authority aimed at producing much needed food crops, such as rice and wheat, as well as cotton. Nine river-basin authorities were established during 1976, to supervise these schemes, to stimulate integrated agricultural development, set up agro-industries, reclaim land and improve agricultural productivity; they involve both small farmers and large commercial businesses. (National Grains and Root Crops Production Companies were established to manage large-scale government farms for the production of staple crops.)

Seven state governments (Kaduna, Sokoto, Bauchi, Benue Plateau, Kwara and Niger) with assistance from the Federal Government and the World Bank have introduced "Integrated Agricultural/Rural Development" pilot programmes. The projects involve socio-economic activities such as agricultural development, rural road construction, dam construction, water supply and improving livestock. The scheme aims at providing improved services on a parochial basis, in the form of an integrated package to existing family communities, with the objective of increasing productivity, raising farmers' incomes and bringing overall socio-economic development to the specific rural areas. A key feature of the scheme is the establishment of Farm Service Centres in each area from which farmers could obtain items such as farm inputs (fertilizers, agro-chemicals, planting materials and farm machinery); extension services and training in the use of improved methods of farming; credit facilities through a co-operative system to enable farmers to purchase inputs; and marketing facilities. Another component of the scheme is the provision of water for irrigation, human consumption and livestock

production through the construction of dams and boreholes. (5)

A single price fixing authority has been established and Commodity Marketing Boards covering cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, palm produce, rubber, grains and rootcrops have been called into being. These boards are responsible for organizing on a national basis, the marketing of food and cash crops for local consumption and processing, and for guaranteeing local prices to farmers. The Nigerian Agricultural Bank established in 1973, together with an Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme, has improved the credit facilities available to the farmers, agricultural companies and co-operatives. During 1976 the government launched "Operation Feed the Nation", designed to encourage as many individuals and institutions as possible to become involved in the growing of food crops, if only for individual subsistence. The scheme also made available huge quantities of subsidised inputs to farmers in an endeavour to boost production. (6) However, serious problems as to distribution and correct application created severe complications.

Despite these endeavours and some considerable international assistance, notably from the World Bank and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), a recent statement by the Nigerian Minister of Agriculture confirmed that well over half of Nigeria's food requirements are at present being imported and that; "Agriculture is now in a deplorable condition. It is you might say, in a state of near-crisis". (7)

 Whereas current government policy aims at self-sufficiency in food supply within five years, it is quite evident that the limitations on potential are of so fundamental a socio-cultural nature that the present predicament is likely to be a long-term characteristic.

The linkage between socio-cultural (and other non-economic factors) and agricultural productivity is a basic factor in the negation of endeavours at agricultural modernization. The agricultural sector is subject to the pressures of a modernizing market economy, while the producers structure remains bound to culturally dictated agricultural practices which have been passed down from one generation to the next, and a land use system restricted by the adherence to varying forms of tenure and inheritance practice, and traditional marketing procedures, which by force of custom, demand adherence to inadequate and corrupt procedure. The political sensitivity of such issues and the reluctance of government (as well as the discontinuity and lack of commitment of past governments) to take radical action to transform the structure, in addition to the suspicion of the farmers and traditional authorities of the motives of central government, reinforce and add to the magnitude of this fundamental dilemma. (As substantiated by the very gradual way in which the Land Use Decree is to be implemented and the failure of any of the National Development Plans to recognize the urgency of socio-cultural transformation, for fear of reactivating primordial antagonism.)

Furthermore, the necessary infrastructure for the "green revolution" is sorely lacking; the lack of national, regional or even state integration is reinforced by the inadequacy of the transport and communications structures, and the fragmented and isolated nature of the rural communities.

thus inhibits the effectiveness of modernization schemes. The majority of rural farmers remain apparently ignorant as to the proper usage of agricultural inputs, basic landholding infrastructure such as boreholes, dams and irrigation systems are extremely limited, storage is primitive and inadequate, mechanization requires large-scale capital investment which, with ever diminishing returns, is becoming further and further beyond the means of any of the traditional rural farmers, which have been estimated at 44 per cent of the Nigerian population.\(^79\) The unsophisticated and the increasingly less profitable nature of rural farming and the colonialist connotations attached to manual labour, encourage urban migration, and labour thus becomes increasingly scarce. The smaller the number of labourers (invariably family members) available to work the land, the less the land is able to support those remaining, resulting in a 'rural push' as great as the 'urban pull'.

Basic to any transformation in Nigeria's agricultural production capacity is a transformation of the traditional socio-cultural structure and the eradication of the resultant inadequacies. However, the political linkage and salience of these issues is self-evident, and it is unlikely that Nigeria could for some considerable length of time co-ordinate an integrated transformation of basic agricultural practice (akin to the "Green Revolution" in India or the Tanzanian "Ujamaa" schemes) without considerable risk to a tenuous political stability.

The implications for national capability are self-evident due to the fact that the Nigerian population is increasing at a rate completely out of proportion with the increase in agricultural productivity. The supply of basic foodstuffs must of necessity be of primary significance to any

\(^79\) Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, op cit, P64.
government, and the scale of the Nigerian dilemma has negative implications for national capability potential.

1.5.2 Mineral resources

A state’s mineral resource endowment is a relatively fixed condition because (unlike agricultural resources) no human endeavour can multiply the variety or extent of mineral deposits beyond the restrictions of geological structure. However, it has been established that certain minerals are of greater strategic significance than others and within those limits mineral resources, in the context of capability potential, are of variable value. Thus, until 1956 the mineral endowment of Nigeria was varied, but not of any marked significance (the most notable being tin ore, columbite, coal, limestone, gold, lead, zinc and marble). However, the discovery of commercially exploitable crude oil in that year has grown to completely dominate all other mining (and logically economic) activities, due to the primary international strategic value presently accorded crude petroleum. The increased importance of mining in Nigeria is illustrated by the sharp growth in the share of the mining and quarrying sector in the GDP, rising from less than one per cent in 1950 to 45.5 per cent in 1974/75 and contributing an estimated 19.2 per cent in 1978/79. Oil alone, accounted for 15.9 per cent of GDP in 1972 and is presently estimated to account for close on 25 per cent of the mining sectors contribution to GDP and over 90 per cent of foreign exchange earned.80)

The first commercially viable deposits of crude oil were discovered by Shell-BP at Oloibiri in the Niger delta, and exportation from Port

Harcourt was commenced during 1958; in the wake of this initial discovery, exploration by most major international oil companies increased dramatically. Exploration and production is centred on the southern part of the country in the Rivers, Cross River, Anambra, Imo, Bendel and Lagos States and on off-shore fields. 81) (See appendix X.) Shell-BP are responsible for nearly two-thirds of total production; the other main producers include Gulf, Mobil, Agip-Phillips and Elf-Aquitaine. Since 1974 the Federal Government has had a controlling share in all the main oil producing companies; however, during 1977 the Government share in the five major expatriate companies (Shell-BP, Gulf, Mobil, Agip-Phillips and Elf) rose to 55 per cent, while during 1978 the Government acquired a 55 per cent stake in TEXACO. 82) During 1971 the state-owned Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was established and charged with the management of government investments in the oil companies operating in Nigeria. In addition, the NNOC initiated the Government's direct participation in exploration and geological surveying, the construction of the necessary infrastructure (pipelines, storage tanks etc.) for improved export and domestic distribution, and the purchasing of petroleum for internal usage. During 1977, so as to ensure a "more virile public sector participation" and to prevent the proliferation of agencies controlling public sector interests in the industry, the NNOC was amalgamated with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and the joint body became known as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 83)

Crude oil types produced in Nigeria vary considerably according to their


place of origin. However, characteristic of all Nigerian crude oils is the low sulphur content, which amounts to an average 0.1 per cent and makes Nigerian oil most suitable for use in heavy industry and power generation. Moreover, Nigerian crude is basically paraffinic and consistently waxy, making it most usable in the petro-chemical and plastics industry. On the other hand though, production costs of Nigerian crude oil are an estimated three to seven times higher than those of Middle Eastern producers. The high gas content, characteristic of Nigerian crude, creates a high gas pressure in the oil deposits causing the crude oil to erupt from great depths under the pressure. However, the gas (which amounts to an average 780 cubic feet per barrel) must be separated from the crude oil, in several costly stages, by gas separators. Certain oil wells have the additional cost disadvantage of an unfavourably high water to crude oil ratio; the cost of separating the water affects the cost of crude oil production. Furthermore, crude oil deposits in Nigeria generally occur at a depth of between 5,800-13,500 feet, in highly porous and loose sand formations which require sophisticated soil stabilization, drilling and extraction techniques so as to bind the loose sand particles and diminish permeability. However, additional production costs are offset by the quality of the crude produced and Nigeria's favourable location in relation to Western Europe and the Americas, both as regards lesser shipping charges and security.

Nigeria accounts for 3.1 per cent of total world crude oil production and as of 1978 was the second largest producer in Africa, as illustrated by the table below:

84) Schatzl, LH, op cit, F37 and Times, W, op cit, F69.
85) Schatzl, LH, op cit, F37.
Comparison of African Oil-Production Statistics

<table>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>13,350</td>
<td>54,725</td>
<td>88,430</td>
<td>102,960</td>
<td>104,050</td>
<td>93,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBYA</td>
<td>58,700</td>
<td>159,320</td>
<td>72,210</td>
<td>92,540</td>
<td>98,780</td>
<td>95,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>26,480</td>
<td>45,800</td>
<td>44,760</td>
<td>50,140</td>
<td>53,280</td>
<td>53,780</td>
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<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>11,250</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,110</td>
<td>8,920</td>
<td>6,920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,640</td>
<td>4,210</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>6,540</td>
<td>20,755</td>
<td>16,030</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>22,100</td>
<td>25,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Production levels are subject to fluctuations in world demands, which in turn is subject to numerous international economic and political pressures. Thus during 1978, for example, production varied at between 1.52 million barrels per day to 2.2 million barrels per day and the average for 1979 is estimated at 2.4 million barrels per day. 86)

Until 1964 the entire output of Nigeria's crude oil was exported; however, the first oil refinery at Port Harcourt came into production during 1965 and production capacity has been expanded from an initial 60,000 to 75,000 barrels per day. A second refinery (built by a subsidiary of the Italian State Oil Company) at Warri came on stream during September 1978. Wholly owned by the NNPC, it has a projected production capacity of 100,000 barrels per day. A third refinery, at Kaduna, with a projected output of 70,000 barrels per day is due for completion during 1980. 87) Nigeria is reported to have a total annual refining capacity of 7.750 million metric tons at present. 88) Great Britain was traditionally the

86) Aboyade, O, op cit, P742.


largest importer of Nigerian crude oil; however, since the discovery
of low sulphur crude oil in the North Sea this position has fallen to
the United States (between 1972 and 1973 American imports of Nigerian oil
increased by 84 per cent and Nigeria is presently supplying 16 per cent
of total annual US requirements), followed by the Netherlands, France
and West Germany. In 1972 Nigeria became a member of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and has followed the trend toward
higher royalties and higher prices set by the organization.

Nigeria itself suffers severe shortages of refined petroleum products,
due to the country's relatively low refining capacity. In 1976, for
example, the Nigerian Government signed an agreement with Shell, in terms
of which Nigerian crude oil would be refined at Curacao in the Netherlands
Antilles and shipped back to Nigeria for internal use. The major obstacle
is the poor distribution infrastructure, and the first section of a
network of distribution pipelines from Warri to Kaduna, from Warri to
the Ibadan/Abeokuta area, and a refined product pipeline from Port
Harcourt to Enugu and Mankerdi was completed during 1978.

Mention has already been made of the large accumulations of natural gas
in the porous sediment of Nigerian crude oil deposits. According to
their origins, these can be subdivided into 'associated' and 'unassociated'
natural gas reserves and in themselves represent a potentially valuable
resource. At present the largest production sites of oilfield gas
(associated) are the crude oil fields at Bornu, Umuechem, Imo River,

90) Tims, W., op cit, P73.
91) Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, op cit, PP142-143. Also
Korokoro and Okam. The unassociated natural gas reserves are concentrated on the island of Bonny and in the area around Ughelli and Escravos.

However, only about five per cent of the gas is used at present (mostly as fuel for generation of electricity), the rest being flared-off. An extensive petro-chemical and gas liquefaction plant is under construction at Port Harcourt and natural gas is to be used in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers in processing plants at Warri.\(^{92}\)

Although it is government policy to seek to diversify the mineral base through exploration and regeneration of other mining activities, the extent of the other mineral resources (quantitatively and qualitatively) in Nigeria, pale into insignificance in comparison with oil. Prior to the discovery of crude oil in Nigeria the mining of tin ore was the backbone of the country's mining industry; the most important deposits of tin ore are centred on the Jos Plateau, while new deposits at Riniwari in Kano State are to be exploited. However, a large area of the major ore deposits at Jos is covered by a thick layer of volcanic rock complicating accessability and together with the ageing of the mines, leading to a declining production output (from 9804 metric tons in 1968 to 3257 metric tons in 1977 and 2750 metric tons in 1978).\(^{93}\) However, revenues from tin ore remain reasonably high due to the fact that tin supply by the world's producing countries is effectively controlled by an International Tin Control Scheme, using a quota system. Thus the Nigerian Mining Corporation, in partnership with the firm of Gold and Base of Nigeria Limited, has recently initiated an underground tin mining

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project, which may be expected to improve output. 94)

A lucrative by-product of tin ore is columbite, of which Nigeria supplies 95 per cent of the world's requirements (for use in the production of heat resistant steels). The dumps of tin mines have proved to be remunerative sources of columbite, but world demand (complicated by competition from Brazil and Canada) and prices fluctuate considerably, and the rate of production has declined from 1,248,000 metric tons in 1973 to 700,000 metric tons in 1976. 95)

Nigeria's principal coal resources are located around Enugu in Anambra State, Lafia, Okaba, Ogboyoga and Orokpa, and is of the sub-biterminous class, which has a high ash content and is suitable for the production of tar and synthetic fertilizers. It can also be used for ordinary steam-raising purposes, including the generation of electricity and for the manufacture of chemicals and liquified fuels (as a result of a characteristic richness in hydrocarbons, waxes and resins). A high temperature coke, suitable for smelting purposes, is obtained by blending about 15 per cent pitch with locally produced coal. Notwithstanding these qualities, Nigerian coal is susceptible to weathering and does not stand up well to bulk handling or lengthy periods of storage. 96)

The Nigerian coal industry has been in serious decline since 1950 because of the heavy cost of rail transport to Fort Harcourt, where it is trans-shipped to Lagos and transported by rail again to inland


destinations. Furthermore, with the discovery of oil the domestic demand dropped from 70 per cent in 1950 to two per cent in 1974, largely due to the dieselization of the Nigerian Railways in the early 1960's.\(^{97}\)

Production was halted during the civil war and consequent flooding has posed problems for resumed production. The principal consumers of coal are the Nkalagu cement industry and the Oji Power Station, near the deposits at Enugu, while the Lafia coal mine is to supply coal required by the iron and steel complex under construction at Ajaokuta. Total demand for coal during the period 1975-1980 was projected to grow from one million tons per annum to 2.45 million tons and exports were expected to advance from 16,000 tons to one million tons per annum (mostly to Ghana and Sierra Leone). However, total production during 1976 was 310,000 metric tons.\(^{98}\) Probably the greatest obstacle confronting the Nigerian Coal Corporation is the evacuation of output from the mines to the ports and to the centres of local demand, and the possibility of pumping coal in slurry form to tankers is being considered.\(^{99}\)

Production of limestone commenced during 1960 and is used entirely in the local cement industry. The recent expansion of the Nigerian cement industry has led to an increasing output and reserves are estimated to be in excess of 500 million tons.\(^{100}\) The principal gold deposits are located in Niger and Sokoto States, with lesser deposits around Ilorin, Kebba and Ibesha; most of the very small output coming from alluvial and detribal deposits.\(^{101}\) High grade iron ore deposits have been


\(^{101}\) Olalaku, FA, et al, op cit, P62.
discovered at Itakpe and are to be exploited in conjunction with the 
Soviet Union, and there has been suggestion that small uranium deposits, 
known to exist in the north-west of the country, might be exploited 
in the development of nuclear technology. (The exact location and 
extent of the uranium deposits is the subject of much speculation and 
secrecy.)

The fact that Nigeria's inventory of exploitable mineral resources 
includes substantial crude oil deposits has created the generally accepted 
image of a state rich in mineral wealth. While it obviously cannot be 
denied that the possession of large deposits of the current most 
strategically important mineral is of considerable significance to 
Nigeria, both domestically and internationally, in seeking to assess the 
significance of the mineral resource endowment of the country in the 
context of national capability, the relative weakness of the wider 
mineral resource base cannot be overlooked. That is to say, that this 
analysis would be inconclusive if the apparent capability potential 
which is accredited to Nigeria because of its deposits of the world's 
most sought after mineral was left unqualified by a failure to recognize 
the direct asymmetry between the possession of one rich mineral resource 
against the complete lack of another (or range of others). In terms of 
capability, crude oil is not equivalent to iron ore, and tin is not 
equivalent to chromium ore, and so on across the entire spectrum of 
minerals in demand in the modern world.

Since 1974, the possession of crude oil has been generally accepted as 
the ultimate capability determinant of contemporary times because it was 
found that the vast industrial complexes of the 'developed' world were

102) Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, op cit, P136 and Iroh, E, 
totally dependent on a relatively small number of producers in possession of a rapidly diminishing commodity. States which lacked power in any other sphere were able to hold the major powers of the world to political and economic ransom by withholding the oil supplies without which modern industrialized nations could not function. The projected scarcity value of oil was used as rational justification for a price rise commensurate with the scarcity of oil. Oil producing states were able to accrue vast wealth from exhorbitant prices, secure in the knowledge that the industrialized states (the main consumers of their precious commodity) would be forced to pay to keep the metropolitan world functioning and so too, through the capability notions of indispensability and international dependence, are accorded considerable strategic significance.

Such is the theory of the capability advantage that befalls the state which possesses large oil reserves. However, capability is a comprehensive concept, and whereas the states which possess oil resources have reaped considerable capability advantage (both financially and politically), in most instances oil is their only asset of any comparable international consequence. The majority of oil producers are thus politically and economically vulnerable (or lacking in international capability) to an extent in direct proportion to the measure by which the state concerned derives its national capability from the possession of crude oil resources. (This is deduced from the asymmetrical linkage between the possession of one strategic resource against the lack of any or all of the other strategic materials of the mineral resource spectrum.) This degree of vulnerability is due to the fact that the capability derived from possession of oil (or any other strategic mineral or spectrum of minerals) is dependent first, on the continued exploitation and sale of the resource (unexploited possession is of little value), and secondly, in seeking to exercise the capability thus possessed, (either by demanding higher prices or by withholding supply for some political/strategic advantage)
the state concerned is in fact putting its resource derived capability at risk. Besides the pressure for consumers to seek alternate sources, to stockpile or produce synthetic substitutes (which would completely negate the value of the mineral and its associated capability, particularly oil) the producers re-import the inflated scarcity value in the vast range of industrial and economic goods and services upon which the world is completely interdependent. (All states operating in the modern world economy are subject directly or indirectly to the main pressures of the international economic system - inflation, recession etc.)

The above is of direct consequence to an assessment of the capability which Nigeria derives from the possession of crude oil resources, because while it is obvious that Nigeria is at a considerably greater capability advantage than were it not to possess crude oil resources, it is a tenuous capability and can only substitute for the quantitative or qualitative meagerness of the wider Nigerian mineral resource base so long as the Nigerian oil resources are exploited and sold, and revenues used to balance the economic deficit resulting from the inherent narrowness of the resource base. The degree of international capability and leverage generally accredited to Nigeria in its possession of crude oil is, therefore, much exaggerated, because Nigeria is far more dependent upon world consumers buying the crude oil than the consumers are dependent upon Nigeria selling crude oil (Venezuela and Mexico are far closer to the US than Nigeria, and Alaska produces low-sulphur crude oil of a quality as good as Nigerian crude, for example).

An analogy may be drawn with the position of South Africa, which possesses a very rich and varied mineral resource base but lacks any oil deposits. Whereas South Africa produces substitute energy from high grade coal and uranium, and is able to use revenues from gold sales to purchase petroleum
on the open market, none of this substitutes for the fact that it does not possess any oil resources and to that extent, its industrial and defence complex is vulnerable, and its capability is impaired to a commensurate degree. Nigeria in turn, lacks most resources (in any strategic quantity) except oil, and the narrowness of its resource base is of relative strategic disadvantage.

In assessment of the natural resource element as a determinant of the potential national capability of Nigeria, we conclude that whereas Nigeria possesses the singular advantage of large resources of crude oil on the one hand, on the other end of the scale is the fact that the country's agricultural productivity (despite considerable potential) is incapable of keeping pace with the growth in population. Nigeria is thus dependent on foreign supply and assistance in supplementing its food stocks and will become increasingly so for the foreseeable future. In addition, its bulk of commercial agricultural commodities cultivated for local manufacture and export are in serious decline and Nigeria lacks a sufficiently broad mineral resource base upon which to found a significant industrial capability. Furthermore, oil is a wasting commodity and Nigeria's failure to broaden its capability structure on the wealth of oil, makes for the conclusion that the balance between resource impoverishment and present capability rests upon the income from crude oil and substantiates the notion of a tenuous and vulnerable capability.

1.4 Industrial capacity

It is self-evident that the industrial capacity of a state is the direct product of the available human and natural resources. The industrial capacity of Nigeria is, therefore, founded upon the vast human resources which the country encompasses (both as regards potential labour supply
and consumer market) and the country's agricultural and mineral resources considered above. However, in the post-World War II era industrial capacity has not only become a basic strut of any notion of economic capability, but has almost usurped military power as the most significant and influential element of capability in international affairs (this is not to deny its obvious domestic significance). Indeed, in an age when the morality of disproportionate military power in a specific state is questioned, industrial capacity (and by logical extension overall economic capability) is probably the most potent overt means of national capability. (The direct linkage between industrial capacity and military capability should not be forgotten.)

The development of an effective industrial capacity (which must of necessity be pursued in a manner compatible with other economic, societal or political goals) is a far slower and more cumbersome process than improvement of agricultural output or the expansion of the armed forces as a capability means. For example, long-term industrial development strategy has become an integral part of modern government. As an instrument of achieving clearly defined targets of industrial development and structural adaptation, most especially in the developing countries, industrial development strategy is basic to the consideration of the industrial capacity of any state.

1.4.1 Industrial development

The classical process of industrialization is generally described as constituting three principal levels of industrial development, delineated by the predominance of a specific level of industrial activity, that is: (a) domination of a consumer goods industry; (b) characteristic
rise of capital goods industries in terms of net output of more than 50 per cent of consumer goods industries; (c) a balance of consumer goods industries and capital goods industries. ¹⁰³)

Industrial development policies in Nigeria since 1947, may be viewed as having passed through four inter-related, though distinguishable phases. The initial 'open door' phase remained inevitably a consequence of the British colonial legacy of 'barter' import substitution. ¹⁰⁴) This phase was distinguished by a policy of welcoming and encouraging any industrial development undertaking, along with frequent overseas industrial investment inducement campaigns, backed by liberal industrial legislation which greatly favoured the foreign entrepreneur. ¹⁰⁵)

The private investor's choice of a particular industrial activity depended on several related factors including; import content, the complexity of techniques, the cost of transportation, legislative protectionism, monopolistic discretion, and the extent of domestic market relative to plant size. These factors inevitably biased industrial investment in the early phase toward basic consumer goods processing, to the neglect of producer's or capital goods. ¹⁰⁶)

The second phase is distinguished by the advent of the First National


Development Plan during 1962, which although hardly deviating from past industrial development policy recognized that earlier policies and industrial development trends represented obstacles to the development of private Nigerian enterprise. An undertaking of the Plan was to seek to mobilize (indigenous) Nigerian capital and to encourage a shift into processing and manufacturing industries. 107) Thus, for example, in 1965 the share of foreign capital in Nigeria's manufacturing industry was 61 per cent and fell only slightly to 58 per cent by 1971, with an absolute increase of 123 per cent. During the same period the share of private Nigerian capital also declined from 12 to 9 percent (an absolute increase of 75 per cent), whereas that of the Nigerian Government increased from 27 to 33 per cent (an absolute increase of 186 per cent). 108)

During the above closely related phases, policy hardly perceived the ownership and control of industrial enterprise in its aggregate form as being essential to planning nor by implication took account of the difference between the objective of foreign private enterprise and that of the Nigerian economy. However, the Second National Development Plan, introduced during 1970, recognized these weaknesses and introduced a short transitional phase in the evolution of industrial development policy in Nigeria. While, for example, the private sector had hitherto led the public sector towards industrialization, the Second National Development Plan sought to bridge the gap between the two sectors.


A truly independent nation cannot allow its objectives and priorities to be distorted or frustrated by the manipulations of powerful foreign investors ... To this end, Government will seek to acquire, by law if necessary, equity participation in a number of strategic industries ...\textsuperscript{109}

It was further declared that nationalization of certain industries had become a necessity in certain instances so as to; "...ensure that the economic destiny of Nigeria is determined by Nigerians themselves..."\textsuperscript{110}

The policies thus intimated were given effect by the proclamation during February 1972 of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. This Decree is the first of four features of the fourth and present phase (that of indigenization or 'gradualist nationalization') in the evolution of industrial development policy. The stated objective of the Decree was to raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investments more rapidly. To this end the establishment and operation of 28 different industrial and commercial enterprises were exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens and associations listed in Schedule I of the Decree (including non-departmental retail trading, banking, rice milling, bottling of soft drinks, hairdressing, road haulage, newspaper publishing and printing, radio and television broadcasting). Schedule II of the Decree nominated 25 activities in which Nigerians were henceforth to have an equity participation of not less than 40 per cent. (Notable among the items on this list were wholesale distribution, beer brewing, soap and detergent manufacturing, fish and shrimp trawling and processing, and paper conversion.)\textsuperscript{111}


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.

The Federal Government established three new institutions to implement this policy; the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (NEPB), the Capital Issue Commission and the Bank of Commerce and Industry. Apart from its overall responsibility for the implementation of the policy and the provisions of the Decree, the NEPB also supervised the transfer of Schedule I businesses from aliens to Nigerian citizens and organizations. The Capital Issue Commission was responsible for the transfer of shares of public companies listed in Schedule II of the Decree. Furthermore, the advent of direct participation by the government in the mining of both liquid and solid minerals was marked by the establishment of the Nigerian Mining Corporation and the Nigerian National Oil Corporation. 112

The second feature of this fourth phase was the announcement of the Third National Development Plan 1975-80, which sought to further (albeit in a more liberal and less rigid vein) the industrial development policy objectives delineated by this fourth policy development phase. First, private enterprise, both indigenous and foreign, would be encouraged by the removal of administrative bottlenecks, the improvement of infrastructure and the liberalization of industrial policy. Secondly, the Federal Government itself was committed to unprecedented involvement in the establishment of basic industries which would draw to the maximum extent on locally produced raw materials, with the object of providing a sound framework for further industrialization. 113

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112) Third National Development Plan 1975-1980, op cit, P20. During October 1971 an Industrial Training Fund was launched, with a view to generating a pool of indigenous trained manpower. In 1965, for example, the expatriate manpower quota in Nigerian industry was 2.8 percent and it declined by 40 per cent to 1.7 per cent by 1971. See Berger, M, op cit, P244.

objectives were based on the assumption that judicious use of current oil revenues to build social and economic infrastructures and to transform the nature of economic activity with a 'big push' toward heavy industrialization, represents the quickest and most effective means of development. 114)

However, the third feature of this fourth phase of industrial development policy is to some extent at odds with the relatively liberal projections of the Third National Development Plan. During January 1977 a second decree was promulgated, giving effect to the provision of a second phase of the indigenization programme. The decree sought to close the apparent loopholes in the operation of the first phase of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972, and extended the scope of the exercise. The new decree included the addition of a third schedule to the existing two. As in the 1972 decree, Schedule I contained the list of economic activities which must be owned entirely by Nigerians; Schedule II enterprises require a minimum of 69 per cent Nigerian equity participation (instead of 40 per cent previously), while Schedule III enterprises include a number of other commercial activities not included in the former schedules in which Nigerian participation is expected to be at least 40 per cent (most notably agriculturally based businesses and food producing companies). So as to ensure a wider spread in the ownership of shares, the decree specified five per cent as the maximum level of shares to be owned by an individual in any indigenizing enterprises and at the same time reserved ten per cent of the shares to the Nigerian employees.

of the affected businesses. 

The fourth feature of the current phase of industrial development policy in Nigeria is the central theme of a concerted drive toward self-sufficiency in industrial production (as opposed to the objective of basic industrial development of the former features) announced as the prime concern of the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985. Policies are to seek an increase in the local resource content of manufactured products, with an emphasis on expanding the nation’s technological capability. Specific measures to ensure the development of the capital goods industry are projected to include further development of agro-allied industries and services for the processing of agricultural products, many of which are currently being exported in their raw form for processing abroad. Specific areas for attention, in addition to agro-allied industries, are the manufacture of building materials, metal and woodwork machinery, engineering industries (including the manufacture of agricultural and industrial machinery and equipment), electrical machinery, construction machinery, electrical motors, railroad and other transport equipment. Efforts to ensure the dispersal of industries, and thereby promote even development of the country, will be intensified through a strategy of area incentives.

If the four phases of evolution of Nigerian industrial strategy are to be measured against the three classical phases of industrialization suggested

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115) Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, NO 7 of 1977, Schedule I, II and III, Government Printer, Lagos, 1977. Since 1972, some 500 million shares, valued at N472,000 million have been transferred to Nigerians, from foreign shareholders. The number of companies affected is 1858 and their operations cover the entire range of economic activities. See HE Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, Budget Broadcast, March 31, 1979, op cit, P xvii.

at the outset, it can be argued that the 'economic age' of Nigerian industrial development is in a state of transition from the first (that of a purely consumer industry) to the second classical stage (predominantly capital goods industry). However, the transition from one phase to the next (and this is common to most industrializing states) is not marked by a definite turning point (of the nature of the industrial revolution in Britain, for example). The development of an effective base industrial capacity is a slow process and over the last two decades industry has moved from the periphery of Nigeria's growth mechanism to a dominant position as a most important means of economic transformation.

1.4.2 Industrial processing

Industrial processing in Nigeria has expanded since 1960 at an average annual rate of 11 per cent at constant prices (18.3 per cent during the first three years of the Third National Development Plan), increasing its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current factor cost from 4.8 per cent in 1974 to 7.8 per cent in 1976/77 and 7.5 per cent in 1977/78. 177)

The development in the industrial processing sector in Nigeria may be illustrated by the following table:

# RESUME OF NIGERIAN INDUSTRIAL PROCESSING CAPACITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tinned Meat</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarine</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>5,066</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnut Oil</td>
<td>'000 metric tons</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuits</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>17,690</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>28,989</td>
<td>32,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Sugar</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Confectionery</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>8,634</td>
<td>16,501</td>
<td>22,840</td>
<td>31,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared Animal Feed</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,758</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>18,083</td>
<td>18,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>'000 hectolitres</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>3,161</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Drinks</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>7,370</td>
<td>9,356</td>
<td>11,596</td>
<td>10,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Yarn</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>7,265</td>
<td>7,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven Cotton Fabrics</td>
<td>'000 sq. metres</td>
<td>275,677</td>
<td>276,000</td>
<td>367,885</td>
<td>398,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitted Fabrics</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>2,344</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>5,156</td>
<td>6,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Footwear</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6,288</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>6,284</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic Footwear</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>14,643</td>
<td>19,096</td>
<td>13,178</td>
<td>24,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plywood</td>
<td>cubic metres</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap and Detergents</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>47,146</td>
<td>75,240</td>
<td>97,741</td>
<td>137,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Spirit (Petrol)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>623,000</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>632,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>372,000</td>
<td>294,000</td>
<td>356,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distillate Fuel Oils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>665,000</td>
<td>509,000</td>
<td>703,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Fuel Oils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>976,000</td>
<td>835,000</td>
<td>986,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubricating Oils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle and Motor Cycle Tyres</td>
<td>'000</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>2,962</td>
<td>3,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Road Vehicle Tyres</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Footwear</td>
<td>'000 pairs</td>
<td>3,217</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>'000 metric tons</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>1,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin Metal</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>7,374</td>
<td>4,829</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nails, Screws, Nuts, Bolts etc.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3,554</td>
<td>8,547</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Receivers</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>122,579</td>
<td>127,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Receivers</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6,822</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>13,626</td>
<td>26,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles Assembled</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>5,463</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>41,309</td>
<td>68,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Energy</td>
<td>million kWh.</td>
<td>2,282</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>4,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Considering the linkage between resources and processing, it is self-evident that the Nigerian manufacturing sector is predominantly agriculturally based. From the above table several features of the nature of the Nigerian industrial sector may be deduced. First, it is evident that low technology, light industries of the import substitution type are dominant; secondly, that the share of the petroleum refining subsector...
is relatively high; and thirdly, that although considerable progress has
been made in recent years, engineering and high technology industries
remain rather weak in their contribution to overall industrial capacity.

By far the most important incentive and stimulus to investment in
industry and industrial development in Nigeria is the large size of the
internal market, compared with that in other African countries. It is,
therefore, inevitable that consumer goods industries such as textiles,
brewing, cigarettes, cement, rubber, aluminium and tin products, extruded
plastics, paperboard, wire rope, refrigerators, air conditioning
machinery, bicycle assembly and fertilizers should predominate. Furthermore,
the motor assembly industry has recently witnessed considerable expansion.

Peugeot and Volkswagen, in production at Kaduna and Lagos respectively,
both produce 22,000-24,000 cars per annum. During 1976 Nigeria imported
100,000 passenger cars. Nissan of Japan is constructing an assembly
plant at Ilorin for the production of Datsun cars and some commercial
vehicles. A joint Nigerian-British Leyland commercial assembly plant at
Ibadan, which will eventually use local components, opened in March 1979.
There is also a tractor assembly plant at Iganimu and other vehicle
assembly plants at Bauchi (Steyr of Austria), at Kano (Fiat, as Nigerian
Truck Manufacturers), Enugu (Daimler-Benz) and Honda manufacture small
motorcycles in Lagos. 118)

However, unlike consumer goods industries in which internal demand was
the factor which favoured their early establishment and growth, demand
for capital goods (from industries of economically viable size) is quickly

118) Hakan, AN, "The location pattern of foreign private industrial
investments in Nigeria" and Teriba, C, and Asiodu, FC, "Industrial
Policy and incentives in Nigeria" in Teriba, C and Kayode, NO, (eds),
Industrial Development in Nigeria, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan,
saturated and cannot be satisfied by internal market alone. Furthermore, no significant external markets for Nigerian manufactured capital goods have developed because of high production costs in terms of the world market. 119)

The major constraints which have hampered development in the manufacturing sector have been described as: (a) Infrastructural constraints — an inadequate infrastructure increases both the initial and operational costs of projects thereby compromising the commercial feasibility of economically desirable projects. Both the availability and cost of water, communication and transport facilities (especially railways and ports), and electricity constitute serious obstacles for manufacturing enterprises; (b) Restrictive industrial policy and administrative practice — unnecessary restrictions and administrative bottlenecks have frustrated a number of industrial undertakings. In particular the multiplicity of authorities from whom various permits, licences etc. have to be procured and the lack of streamlined procedure for getting them, combine to confuse the intending entrepreneur and to create the possibility of abuse. In recent times the lack of clarity on government policy on the future of private investment in industry, on the payment of royalties, licence fees, technical/managerial fees etc. have added to difficulties associated with the transfer of technology from abroad; (c) Shortage of industrial manpower and the relative unattractiveness of manufacturing to indigenous businessmen; (d) Slow implementation of the public sector manufacturing projects. The public sector manufacturing programmes are generally in those areas which form the foundation for the growth of the sector as a whole. Delay in implementing the public sector programme, therefore, leads to delay in the implementation of other projects. 120)


The Third National Development Plan sought, through the subsectoral distribution of manufacturing projects, to begin to rectify the structural imbalance in manufacturing. Public sector projects for the period covered by the Plan concentrate on the establishment and expansion of three specific industrial subsectors. First, the iron and steel industry: Nigeria's steel requirements are considered likely to exceed 3.5 million tons per annum during the 1980's and provision has been made for the construction of a 1.5 million tons per annum blast furnace at Ajaojuta in Kwara State and a direct reduction plant at Warri.\(^{121}\) Construction of the plant at Warri is being undertaken by West German and Austrian firms and is expected to produce one million tons a year of molten steel and 500,000 tons of billets. Two direct reduction plants had originally been envisaged, but one has been shelved because of financial difficulties. Final negotiations (with the Soviet Union) for the construction of the Ajaokuta blast furnace were only concluded during March 1979 and of the N800 million originally budgeted in the Third National Development Plan, only N30 million had been expended at the time of the Second Progress Report (1978) — an indication of the extremely slow progress in accomplishing the projected goals.\(^{122}\)

Secondly, the Plan included a drive toward self-sufficiency in cement supply (domestic requirements over the five year period of the Plan being projected at 20 million metric tons, while domestic production during the same period was not expected to exceed ten million metric tons at best). Expansion of the cement producing factories at Ukpila, Nkalagu, Calabar and Sokoto from a joint capacity of 880,000 tons per annum to 2,020,000 tons per annum and the construction of new factories at Ashaka (in the


North-Eastern State), Yandev (in Benue Plateau State) and Shagamu (in the Western State) each with an annual production capacity of 600,000 metric tons were priorities of the Third Plan. The completion of these projects has manifested a very high level of proficiency in the Nigerian cement industry with almost complete self-sufficiency.123)

The third industrial subsector is that of the agro-allied and petrochemical industries; the former including the expansion of sugar growing and refining projects (only 20 per cent of Nigerian sugar consumption is presently supplied from domestic production). Three major projects; the Savannah Sugar Company, the Sunti and Lafiaji projects, involving a public investment of N120 million, have made slow progress and the projected joint refining capacity of 50,000 tons per annum will not be attained for some time.124) Further, priority was given to expansion of the paper and pulp, and the fish and shrimp industry with good progress being achieved.125) An extensive petro-chemical industrial complex sight at Port Harcourt, producing ethylene, polyethylene, chlorine, vinyl chloride monomer, polyvinyl chloride and methanol was due to start production during 1978. In addition, two plants for the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers using natural gas have been constructed at Warri. An initial joint output of 700,000 tons per year was projected.126)

One of the primary tasks of industrial planning on a national basis is that of industrial location and spatial dispersion so as to ensure balanced

national economic development and optimal land and labour force usage. While this factor is acknowledged as a prime concern of future industrial development in Nigeria, the present spatial dispersion pattern of industry reflects high concentration in a few areas. The two main determinants of industrial location are proximity to a large population (both as a market and source of labour) and the level of infrastructural development. Thus industry is mostly concentrated in areas such as Greater Lagos, the Kano-Zaria-Kaduna triangle and the Abu-Port Harcourt area. Despite efforts of the Federal Government and former Western Regional governments to encourage industrial location in so-called industrial estates at Apapa, Ikeja, Iganmu, Oshodi, Isolo, Ibasamaja, Matori and Gbagada, the effectiveness of this endeavour was very limited. There are only a few modern manufacturing industries in the rural areas and most of these are agro-allied industries or raw material processing industries: cement industries at Nkalagu, Ewekoro and Sokoto are located near the limestone quarries; the woodworking industries are located adjacent to the forest belt of Oyo, Ondo and Bendel States. Similarly, the rubber processing industries are concentrated in Bendel State, particularly around Benin, Warri and Koko where the bulk of Nigerian rubber is produced.127)

Central to industrial development theory is the notion that general economic development and capability is marked by a transition from an agriculturally based economy to an industrialized economy, and it was suggested at the outset that industrial capacity is a most potent contemporary instrument of capability. This notion is based on the fact that the major powers of the world (the so-called 'developed' world) are highly industrialized. However, what is invariably overlooked is the

fact that it takes more than industry to industrialize, and basic to
the industrialization process is a food producing and agricultural
capacity of sufficient surplus to allow this sector, thus freed from
the burden of subsistence food production, to participate in the
industrial sector. Only then can a sufficient industrial capacity be
developed on the basis of manufactured exports, subsidizing food and
raw material production, and imports. (This has been the general trend
of development in the industrialized states.)

However, in seeking to emulate the industrialized states, developing
states tend to adhere to the principle expounded in development theory,
namely, that in the early stages of development greatest emphasis should
be placed on industrial development as a means of creating alternative
sources of employment and higher levels of per capita income for an
increasing population, and of correcting whatever imbalance may occur
in the balance of payments as a result of increased imports of food and
raw materials due to shortages in production in these sectors during the
transition. This principle is the basis of the Nigerian policymakers' 'big push' towards industrialization as the firmest foundation for self-
sustained growth and development.

The relative merits and demerits of this strategy may be argued at
length. However, two factors would (in the light of the fact that this
is an assessment of overall capability potential) appear to be of
relevance. First, the fact that the major aim in creating a manufacturing
industry is the production of goods to substitute for imported goods.
The second factor is that when the developed states were in the early
stages of industrial development they were surrounded by a virtually
unlimited market for their manufactured goods and sources of raw material
supply. The point is that the products of the new industries must be
cheaper, or as cheap as similar imports and that average per capita income must be sufficiently high to sustain the market, while supplies of raw materials must increase at a pace akin to the increasing industrial demand.

If the above facts are applied to the reality of the Nigerian situation — that is to say, the fact that any industrial capacity in Nigeria must be agriculturally based; that agricultural production capacity is in steady decline; that three-quarters of the economically active population are engaged in agricultural allied activities; that the increment displaced by declining returns in agriculture and the failing ability of the land to support them is far greater than that which can be absorbed in industry, resulting in an overall decline in per capita income roughly commensurate with the decline in agricultural output. It is self-evident that these factors must have an adverse effect on the cost-structure, market-size, raw material supply and ultimate profitability of any emergent industry. In view of the fact that the Nigerian manufacturing base is an essentially agricultural one and that the majority of incomes are agriculturally derived, it is clear that the Nigerian programme of industrial development cannot be sustained without effecting radical measures to achieve greater output of agricultural products and rising real incomes rooted in increased agricultural activity.

A high level of industrial capacity might be a particularly significant mark of capability, but in the light of the interdependence and linkage between the components of the capability spectrum, it is hardly a substitute for a hungry population. Nigeria's industrial capacity is of no significant consequence to national capability potential and is unlikely to be so for some time. In as much as industrial development has constituted a greater development priority than food production
(30 per cent of expenditure appropriated for 1980 is budgeted in the industrial sector as opposed to 10 per cent in the agricultural sector) it probably has a negative value in the context of overall Nigerian capability potential, in that industrial proficiency is not a substitute for self-sufficiency in food production.

1.5 Military capability

Because of the historical importance of military capability as the ultimate means of international coercion, the possession of a strong military force is a traditional mark of international status; "Reconciling policy considerations to the threat, initiation, conduct or avoidance of war has long been one of the major concerns of the statesman".128) So too, in contemporary political interaction, military capability remains the essence of any notion of influence in international affairs. However, the assessment of a state's military capability tends to be largely arbitrary and essentially relativistic. Hence, while it is possible to describe military tradition and military capacity (i.e.; weaponry etc.), the confirmation of military capability relies upon the actualization of military capacity in a specific operational context.

The military organization in Nigeria is historically of considerable socio-political significance, and because our primary purpose here is to examine the physical dimensions of Nigeria's military capacity, analysis of the politicization of the military will be limited to consideration of the influence of this political role on Nigeria's overall military capability potential.

1.5.1 Military capacity

As has already been noted, the Nigerian Defence Force has a long history

and evolved from its beginnings as a mercenary force refuge for runaway slaves to a professional military organization modelled on the British Army in organizational format and professional training. The Nigerian Military Forces at independence totalled 7,500 with an officers corps of 278 of whom only 50 were Nigerians, the remainder being seconded British officers. However, in the immediate post-independence era 'Nigerianization' of the officers corps was rapid with 100 per cent indigenization being achieved by early 1966.

The exigencies of the Nigerian civil war necessitated the sudden and rapid expansion of the Nigerian Armed Forces to an estimated 250,000 at the height of the war. Since then, Nigeria has commanded the numerically strongest standing force in Africa. After the civil war, recruitment into the armed forces was temporarily halted and the Second National Development Plan announced a programme of gradual forces reduction. However, successive military regimes have for understandable reasons been reluctant to demobilize the armed forces. At present the Nigerian Military Forces have a total armed strength of 173,000; this comprises an army of 160,000, an air force of 7000, and a navy of 6000.

The personnel strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces has always been maintained by voluntary service. All army recruit training is conducted

131) Demobilization is a most sensitive issue as any appearance of discrimination against any section whatsoever, is likely to precipitate civil, as well as military unrest. See Transcript of television interview with HR Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, October 26, 1975, in Call to Duty: Speeches by His Excellency Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1978, PP7-8.
at the Recruit Training Centre at Zaria. The initial period of training is of 28 weeks duration and emphasizes physical fitness, military drill, organized sport and fluency in English. Upon completion of this basic training the soldier is assigned to a unit. Advanced military training is conducted at unit level; further specialist training in all three arms of the force is provided at the Nigerian Military Training College and the Nigerian Defence Academy at Kaduna or abroad. Traditionally this took place in the United Kingdom, but more recently training assistance has also been received from Canada, Australia, West Germany, United States, India, Pakistan and Ethiopia.  

The National Youth Service Decree of 1973 introduced a period of one year's compulsory national service for both male and female university graduates, designed to instil in the youth of the country the opportunity to; "... develop those highly valuable qualities of discipline, industry at work, patriotism, loyalty and dedication to the national cause." While this is not akin to conscription in the armed forces, it must be assumed that these graduates would form a leadership corps in the event of national mobilization.

The Nigerian Army is organized into four infantry divisions. The divisional headquarters are at Kaduna (1st Division), Ibadan (2nd Division), Jos (3rd Division) and Lagos (4th Division). Brigade headquarters are to be found in other larger towns; the 1st Infantry Brigade at Minna, the 3rd Brigade at Kano, the 13th Brigade at Calabar and the 23rd Armoured Brigade.


at Bauchi. There are four reconnaissance regiments, four artillery
brigades and four engineers brigades. The division of the army into
arms of service closely follows the British pattern; that is infantry,
artillery, reconnaissance, engineers, signals, electrical and mechanical
engineers, supply and transport, pay and ordinance. A Chaplains' Corps
of military priests, ministers and imams exists and there is also an
Army Medical Corps.\footnote{135}

The establishment of the navy was authorized by the Nigerian Naval
Forces Ordinance of 1956 and it became a statutory organization forming
part of the military forces in early 1958. The original objective in
establishing the naval service (apart from prestige and as an adjunct
to impending sovereignty) was to develop an anti-submarine and minesweeping
force to operate off the country's coastline in time of war. With foreign
training assistance, notably from Canada and the United Kingdom, the
naval force developed an efficient wartime capability and succeeded in
maintaining an effective blockade of the Nigerian coastline during the
civil war to prevent supplies from abroad reaching the Biafran forces.
It also conducted amphibious operations with units of the Federal Army
and Air Force.\footnote{136}

\footnote{135} Keegan, JC, (ed), \textit{op cit}, P517. After the Civil war the three infantry
divisions were redeployed so that each stretched from North to South,
straddling the old regional frontiers incorporating several of the
newly created states to insulate them from political pressure. See
Dudley, 5O, \textit{Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in

\footnote{136} See: "Exchange of notes concerning the provision of a British
training team to assist in the training and development of the
CIC 5048, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1969, Pars 2,
F14-5. Also "Military Training Assistance to Nigeria" in \textit{External
Affairs}, Vol 15, NO 7, 1963, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa,
F1295-296.
The air force was formed shortly after independence and was initially trained and supervised by a mission of the Indian Air Force with additional pilot and technical training being provided by West Germany, Canada and Ethiopia. During the civil war assistance was received from the Soviet Union in maintaining and training Nigerian pilots in the use of Czechoslovakian armed trainers. During 1968 the Egyptians lent the Nigerian Air Force several light jet bombers of Soviet design.\textsuperscript{137}

Because few of the trained Nigerian Air Force pilots were competent in flying jet aircraft, the Nigerian Government procured the services of mercenary pilots from Egypt, South Africa, Rhodesia and the German Democratic Republic. The mercenary and volunteer pilots attached to the Nigerian Air Forces assisted Nigerian pilots in their attempts to prevent the delivery of supplies and equipment to Biafra. Operations were mounted in support of Nigerian ground attacks, and bombing and strafing raids were conducted against Biafran targets.\textsuperscript{138}

The present inventory of arms and equipment of the Nigerian Armed Forces is estimated as follows:\textsuperscript{139}

\textbf{ARMY:}

- 50 Scorpion bt tanks: 20 Saladin, 15 AML-60-90 armd, 25 Ferret,
- 50 Fox scout cars; 8 Saracen AIC; 32 105 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm guns/hcw; 84 mm mortar; 76 mm ATK guns; 20 mm, 40 mm AA guns.

\textbf{NAVY:}

- 1 Nigeria ASW frigate,
- 3 Hippo corvettes (1 Vosper Thornycroft MK, 2 Mk 3)
- 8 large patrol craft (4 Brooke Marine, 4 Abeking and Rasmussen)

\textbf{AIR FORCE:}

- 21 combat aircraft (there are apparently additional unserviceable aircraft).
- 2 F/L/interceptor sqns: 1 with 3 MiG-17, 1 with 15 MiG-21 MF.
- 2 tpt sqns with bo-105, 27-27, 17-28, 1 Gulfstream II.
- 1 SAR helicopter sqns with 10 Bo-105 C/D, 10 Tuma, 10 Alouette III.
- 3 trg/service sqns with 2 MiG-15 UTI, 2 MiG-21U, 32 Bulldog,
- 15 DO-27/28, 3 Naiajo, 20L-29, 5AM-3c.
- AA-2 Attoll AAM.

(on order 12 Alpha jet F3A, 6CH-47c hel.)

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{The Military Balance 1979-80}, \textit{op cit}, F52.
Nigeria has no independent weapons producing capability, save for the Defence Industries Corporation established during 1970 for the supply of basic spare parts on a small scale, and at independence was exclusively dependent upon British supplies. However, after 1963 and the abrogation of the defence treaty with Britain a more determined programme of diversification in sources of armament supplies was pursued. Nigeria's relatively modest imports of major weapons, averaging $2.4 million per annum prior to the civil war, came from no fewer than 20 countries. The primary sources were Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, United States and Italy. 140)

With the outbreak of the civil war, arms sales to Nigeria became a controversial issue in international politics, with most of Nigeria's established sources of weaponry refusing overt supply or assistance. Thus between May and June 1968 the governments of France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and the United States imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to the Federal Government. 141) However, the United Kingdom had sizeable interests in the preservation of the Nigerian federation, as a British colonial creation and as an area of considerable British investment. As such the United Kingdom determined (not without controversy) to continue the supply of equipment viewed as 'traditional' (i.e.; material supplied before the conflict began) and at a total cost less than that of equipment supplied by other major weapons suppliers. This arrangement enabled the

140) Second National Development Plan 1970-1974, op cit, P91. "... one of the cornerstones of the defence policy of the present government is to promote and develop our defence industries so that in time to come Nigeria will be able to produce the bulk of her defence requirements." Interview with Prof I Abubakar, Federal Minister of Defence, in West Africa, May 1980, P873. The Arms Trade with the Third World, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1975, PP246-247. Keegan, JC, (ed), op cit, P518 and Dudley, BJ, op cit, P206.

Nigerians to purchase all they required of the material they needed most — infantry weapons and ammunition. However, at the time of the initial controversy practical expedience necessitated the purchase of artillery pieces (76 mm and 122 mm guns), for the first time from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also agreed to supply Soviet MiG-17's with Soviet technicians to assemble and maintain them. The Federal Government captured Soviet interest and support because it controlled one of Africa's most important countries not because of any ideological infatuation. The Soviets like most observers, believed the war would be over quickly, and sought to take advantage of the unsettled conditions to advance Soviet interests in what it perceived to be one of the most important states in sub-Saharan Africa.

Nigerian defence expenditure has risen from the N59.47 million allocated in the 1962-68 Plan period, N156 million in the 1970-74 Plan and N2.827 billion during the 1975-80 Plan period. The Defence allocation of N602 million for the 1979-80 financial year represents a reduction of N104 million on the preceding financial year — this saving being ascribed


to progress made in the construction of barrack accommodation.\(^{145}\)

Approximately 43 per cent of defence expenditure is allocated for the acquisition and maintenance of arms, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft, the major sources of supply being the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France and West Germany.\(^{146}\)

The vast increase in defence expenditure has obviously been brought about by the enormous expansion of the army at the outbreak of the civil war (estimates as to the level of military expenditure during the 30 months of the war are put at 45 to 50 per cent of the total national budget).

The intractable problems created by the sudden increase in the size of the armed forces, the characteristic lag in the implementation of the programmes of the Second National Development Plan (Defence achieved only 35 per cent of projected performance) and the continuing failure to substantially reduce the size of the armed forces in the post-war era endure to the present time. The most acute problem is the inadequacy of the basic military infrastructure required to support so large a military force. Another basic and apparently continuing difficulty is the shortage of barrack and other accommodation (hospital and office space, for example).

Despite considerable effort, the backlog has proved difficult to breach, in that it serves to reinforce acutely the inflationary pressure in the

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\(^{145}\) Federal Republic of Nigeria, Recurrent and Capital Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979-80, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1979, Fxxxviii. The 1981 budget, published subsequent to writing, indicates an increase in defence expenditure of approximately 25 per cent. Nigeria is apparently concerned to modernize its defence equipment in the short-term, the urgency perhaps being attributable to the increased militancy of Libya, although developments in southern Africa should not be overlooked. Indications are that India and Brazil will join the traditional European suppliers of weaponry to the Nigerian Defence Force. It is also possible that Brazil will assist Nigeria in the establishment of a weapons industry. The development of the Nigerian Defence Industries Corporation is a major priority of the current Development Plan.

housing sector of the Nigerian economy. The national housing shortage is a political dilemma and thus the tendency which poor accommodation may have in weakening discipline among the military becomes a secondary consideration. The Third National Development Plan made provision for the construction of new Defence Headquarters at Lagos, Nigerian Army Brigade Headquarters at Jos, Kaduna and Ibadan, as well as the construction of two 500 bed Armed Forces Military Hospitals at Yaba and Kaduna.147)

1.5.2 Operational capability

The relative operational military capability of a specific state largely depends on the nature of the conflict, the tactical capacity of the enemy, the intensity with which the causus belli is supported by the ranks and general populace, and the operational logistics of the conflict (length of supply lines, for example). Operational capability is, therefore, relative to the nature of the particular military conflict, and in the case of the Nigerian Armed Forces can only be the result of speculation with reference to past operational engagements and future conflicts.

In purely statistical terms the capability of the Nigerian Armed Forces is best illustrated in comparison with the nominal strength of a selection of neighbouring states and sub-Saharan states of comparable status.

147) Ibi, P325.
| Country           | Total | East | West | I/A | State | Any | Army | Navy | Air Force | Expansion | Paramilitary | Reserve |
|-------------------|-------|------|------|-----|-------|-----|------|------|----------|------------|-------------|-----------|--------|
| Nigeria           | $1,470,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| NIGERIA           | 2,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| South Africa      | 63,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| South Africa      | 1,959,500 | 0,000 | 0,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |          |            |             |           |        |
| Tanzania          | 70,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| Kenya             | 80,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| Togolese          | 14,000 | -    |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
| Cameroon          | $125,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 | 17,000 |          |            |             |           |        |
| Angola            | $200,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 | 35,000 |          |            |             |           |        |
| TOTAL STRONGEST 1,470,000 = 404,000 |       |      |      |     |       |     |      |      |          |            |             |           |        |
Nigeria possesses, numerically, the largest standing armed force in Africa, a factor facilitated by Nigeria's vast population, which provides an almost unlimited manpower resource (the present ratio of population size to military personnel is approximately 1:400). The Nigerian Armed Forces are rivalled numerically and in proportionate defence expenditure only by South Africa. However, while the size of the standing force and the available manpower resources give Nigeria an awesome military potential (in an African context), more perhaps than any other African army, the transfer of the colonial army model proved very difficult.

The ethnic diversity of the Nigerian population, reinforced by longstanding inequalities in the recruitment ratios among the three principal ethnic groups has made internal cohesion within the armed forces a difficult issue. Such weaknesses in internal cohesion are complicated by rivalry between peer groups of soldiers of different levels of education, or soldiers who have passed through different training systems abroad and those who have been trained in Nigeria, by different age groups and experience (new recruits having not experienced the nationalism of the 1960's or the civil war), and politically influenced promotion practices. Furthermore, whereas prior to the 1966 coup d'état the military were generally perceived by the civil as an expensive elite or ceremonial appendage, aloof and hardly an integral element of the civilian body politic, the assumption of the political mantle by the military has entrenched the gulf in relations between the military and the civilian.

The military in Nigeria, whether rightly or wrongly, has come to regard itself as the repository or custodian of the national conscience. Like all other armies which have assumed a governmental role, the Nigerian Armed Forces are caught in the dilemma of neither being able to govern legitimately nor to entirely relinquish their political role. The
politicization of the officers corps (through the appointment of officers
to various civil political posts during the period of military rule)
makes military political neutrality or passivity, in the face of inept
or politically disagreeable civil administration, impossible. The armed
forces in Nigeria have come to constitute thus, not only an elite
distanced from, and above civilian political organization and the mass
populace, but guardians of the continuum of the machinery of state and
the body politic.148)

The implication of the above in the assessment of operational capability,
is that the internal cohesion of the Nigerian Armed Forces, which is of a
notoriously low order, is further complicated by inevitable political
factionalism within the armed forces and the enduring danger that ethnopolitical cleavages might have for hierarchical and disciplinary stability
within the armed forces. Paradoxically thus, while the armed forces
have become the guarantors of political stability, the internal stability
of the military organization itself is at best doubtful and the operational
capability thus seriously impaired.

The capability which may be inferred from the numerical size of the
Nigerian Armed Forces is further impaired by the continuing unwillingness
on the part of the governmental authorities to reduce the size of the
armed forces, due to political sensitivities. The result has been a
policy of "reduction by retirement" where soldiers leaving the force are

148) Ukpa bi, SC, "The changing role of the military in Nigeria 1900-1970" in Afrika Spektrum, NO 1, 1976, H70-75. Also Enloe, CH, Ethnic
disengagement: The Nigerian case" in Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol 16, Part II, July 1974, 3229-30 and Finer,
not replaced. However, this suggests that Nigeria commands an ageing force.\(^{149}\) While this is probably open to debate, it is a fact that few of the officers and NCO's trained by the colonial military authorities at the time of independence now remain\(^{150}\) (most having been killed during the civil war) and the present ranks have been largely trained and hardened on the battlefields of the civil war and are thus unlikely to take kindly to demobilization efforts or any large scale infusion of new blood through renewed recruitment. The Nigerian Armed Forces can thus perhaps best be described as an apparently static and closed institution with an almost exclusive self-perpetuation.

Since independence the Nigerian Armed Forces have participated in several operational fields abroad: in 1963 with the United Nations' forces in the Congo; in 1964 a battalion served briefly in Tanzania after the army mutiny there, and one army battalion currently serves with the United Nations' forces in the Lebanon.\(^{151}\) The organization of the Federal Army during the civil war has been described as a bizarre mixture of professional skill and chaos.\(^{152}\) It could hardly have been otherwise in view of the lack of trained officers and NCO's, the raw recruit soldiers, and the nature of the terrain and climate.

Militarily, much of the fighting followed very conventional patterns with the opposing forces confronting each other from fixed positions. An attack was invariably signalled by a barrage of artillery and mortar, followed by a movement of infantry soldiers which forced one or the other of the opponents to retreat, but only rarely was the advantage gained followed up. More often than not, a successful attack was followed by

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\(^{149}\) Keegan, JC, \(\text{ed}\), \(\text{op cit}\), P516.

\(^{150}\) Ibid.

\(^{151}\) Military Balance 1979-80, \(\text{op cit}\), P92.

\(^{152}\) Keegan, JC, \(\text{ed}\), \(\text{op cit}\), 1976.
a lull, lasting in most cases for weeks, during which the men 'consolidated' their newly won positions, regrouped and restocked with fresh supplies of ammunition, preparatory to another move. Much of the fighting was over control of the main towns, and military 'successes' were enumerated in terms of the number of towns captured, some of which had little, if any, strategic military value.\(^{153}\)

There was little, if any, co-ordination of movements, with the three divisional commanders operating more or less independently of each other, maintaining rival staffs at ports to commandeer newly arrived equipment and even maintaining rival purchasing missions abroad. Only in the latter stages of the civil war was a certain degree of rationalization introduced; first, by subsuming sections of the Second Division under the First, and secondly, by the replacement of the divisional commanders. The situation of the rebel forces was not much different, with mercenary led units operating independently of Biafran units.\(^{154}\)

While excesses and atrocities undoubtedly occurred, particularly in the heat of battle, there was apparently no deliberate genocidal policy. The army on the march was supported by women camp followers, towns occupied were looted, officers and NCO's were corrupt, selling stores and loot, and on occasions drawing the pay of soldiers killed in action. However, despite the confusion, the Federal Military Command did work; there was an overall strategy and divisional commanders conformed to it for most of the time.\(^{155}\)

The functions of the armed forces are constitutionally prescribed as:

\(^{153}\) Ibid. Also Dudley, BJ, op cit, PP203-204.


\(^{155}\) Keegan, JC, (ed), op cit, P516.
(a) defending Nigeria from external aggression; (b) maintaining the
country’s territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation
on land, sea and in the air; (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in
aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by
the President; (d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed
by an act of the National Assembly. The President of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria is commander-in-chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces
and appoints the Chief of Defence Staff and Heads of the Army, Navy
and Air Force.¹⁵⁶)

In a recent interview the Nigerian Minister of Defence described Nigeria’s
present defence posture as follows:

So the defence posture of Nigeria is to repel any aggression or
invasion on her territory and to punish the aggressor to the
extent that he will regret his reckless adventure and be
deterred from future mistakes. So our primary objective is to
ensure that our combat worthiness and combat readiness is such
that we can ward off any external aggression or invasion and
retaliate with a devastating punch.¹⁵⁷)

However, the three fields of conflict in which the Nigerian Armed Forces
might at some future time be engaged are internal, regional or continental
in nature. The present and primary role of the Nigerian military is
undoubtedly the maintenance of internal unity, law and order. While no
serious frontier threats are perceived by Nigeria (except for some concern
at the civil unrest in Chad and Libyan intervention in the conflict) and
none of its neighbours have the capability, without external support
and instigation, to threaten Nigeria militarily, military confrontation
between Nigeria and its neighbours could arise from real conflict of
interest as exemplified by possible Libyan expansionism, boundary disputes
between Chad and Cameroon or the mistreatment of Nigerian citizens in

¹⁵⁷) Interview with Prof I Abubaker, Federal Minister of Defence, in
Equatorial Guinea (there is some internal pressure from the Ibo to occupy the island of Macias Nguema, formerly Fernando Po, which is inhabited mainly by Ibo who have been poorly treated there), Ghana and Zaire. 158)
Neither is it inconceivable (in view of the rapid growth of population and the overshoot of Nigerian ethnic groups into neighbouring territory) that _lebensraum_ motivated irredentist claims might provide a neighbourly _causus belli_. However, no matter what the level of Nigeria's military capability, resort to force against its neighbours would most likely provoke military confrontation with external powers, particularly France or Cuba, with whom these neighbours maintain close political or ideological ties. 159)

In the continental sphere Nigeria has a vested ideological and psychological commitment to the conflict within southern Africa and has often threatened to intervene on behalf of the so-called 'frontline states' (Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and now including Zimbabwe) in the event of an invasion by South African forces of any one of these states. 160) However, unilateral action in this regard would be impractical, as illustrated by the failure of Nigeria to rush troops to Angola at the time of the South African invasion of that country during 1975 or the

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159) Kamanu, CS, _op cit_, P31.

160) Cyeediran, C, (ed), _Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975_, Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1978, P13. "Nigerian policy-makers saw the invasion of Angola by South African forces as an attempt by South Africa to... push the confrontation line between herself and free Africa as far beyond her physical boundary as possible... it was not just the credibility of Nigerian anti-apartheid feeling that was at stake: prevention of South Africa from acquiring a taste for destabilization of African governments, through military or other means, became vital." A more recent reiteration of this theme was uttered by Prof I Audu, Federal Minister of External Affairs in _East Africa_, March 3, 1980, P414.
numerous subsequent incursions by South African forces deep into Angolan territory in 'hot pursuit' of forces of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). Rather, assistance has been limited to diplomatic and financial aid.

So too, assistance to the struggle in Zimbabwe was limited to the training of guerrilla forces and Nigeria remained physically impassive to repeated and extended incursions by Rhodesian Security Forces into both Zambia and Mozambique during the latter years of the war in Zimbabwe. Whereas it is not completely improbable that Nigerian forces may at some future date be committed to the struggle in southern Africa—either in Namibia/South West Africa or against South Africa itself, it cannot be considered that Nigeria has the capability to undertake such an operation unilaterally. (Given the attendant logistical problems, to confront South Africa successfully in southern Africa, Nigeria would have to be considerably stronger than South Africa militarily. To achieve that level of military capability in the next decade would call for a level of military expenditure that would impose an intolerable burden on the Nigerian economy and create internal social instability.) 161

Further, in the light of Nigeria's failure to fulfil its threat of unilateral intervention on behalf of the 'frontline states', the deterrent effect of the largest military force in Africa is parochialized and discredited, and such threats have a minimal credibility as a consequence. It is also doubtful whether the often mooted combined African force could be raised or deployed and sustained for any length of time without large-scale super-power assistance.

Nigeria has recently expressed determination to develop a nuclear capability; this in the wake of the discovery of uranium deposits in Nigeria and South African advances in the nuclear field. Whereas Nigeria is a signatory to

161) Kamanu, OS, op.cit, p33.
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its motivation is left in little
doubt by the reasoning of the Nigerian Minister of Defence; "Moreover,
as long as protagonists of apartheid have access to nuclear capability
Nigeria should, as of necessity, endeavour to acquire it at any price". 162)
On a visit to Nigeria during July 1980, the Vice President of the United
States declared that a Nigerian request to America for access to nuclear
technology would be eligible for consideration. 163) Warfare in Africa
is hardly akin to that of Europe where nuclear weaponry might be construed
as an asset to a state's arsenal; thus even were Nigeria to develop a
uclear military capability (which is unlikely and at best a very long-
term possibility because of the lack of any basic nuclear technological
infrastructure, as opposed to the known sophistication of the South
African nuclear infrastructure and expertise) it is unlikely to be of any
great consequence to military capability or deterrence, due to the
minimal operational credibility in the use of such weapons by either of
the potential nuclear aggressors. (South Africa and Nigeria are the only
aspirant nuclear powers in sub-Saharan Africa at present.) In the last
instance, Nigerian economic realities are hardly conducive to any
significant financial commitment to a nuclear capability development
programme at present.

162) Interview with Prof I Abubakar, Federal Minister of Defence in
was drawn up during April 1978 at the summit of Heads of State of
ECOWAS, meeting in Dakar, Senegal. However, the treaty still has not
been ratified due to fears on the part of lesser members (Mali, Benin,
Cape Verde and Guine Bissau) of domination by the larger, particularly:
Nigeria and Senegal. See Africa, No 107, July 1980, p35. Also

nuclear power aspirations were vociferously condemned by the leader
of the UPF opposition party; "We should never dream of, let alone
attempt, to use nuclear power for military purposes ... When ordinary
leaves move, our soldiers think it is an enemy... Are these the sort
of people you are going to send to South Africa?" quoted in
In terms of traditional strategic theory then, it may be concluded that the operational capability of the Nigerian Armed Forces is inconsonant with Nigeria's military capacity. The vast size of the Nigerian Forces appears to be a political obstacle. Lack of internal cohesion and the lack of any trained reserve force which could be drawn from the vast manpower resources which Nigeria has at its disposal were mobilization to be necessary (compared to the large conscript reserve in South Africa, for example), detracts from the apparent capability significance of the numerical strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The numerical size of the Nigerian military has long been an issue of political controversy and rationalization of the personnel structure in the interest of improved military efficiency and capability will not be easily achieved.

Furthermore, while Nigeria has a relatively impressive array of weaponry at its disposal the apparent lack of homogeneity or logistical foresight in the inventory of arms and their sources of origin, raise doubts about the strategic suitability of the armory as a whole. While practical expedience forced the purchase of armaments from radically diverse sources, without the necessary maintenance undertakings during the civil war, rationalization and uniformity in purchase of weaponry should now be of high priority. It is a logistical truism that diversification of weapons supply requires the equal diversification of spare parts supply and maintenance training, and Nigeria can hardly afford the consequent duplication. Furthermore, much of the weaponry purchased for the armoured battalions during the civil war is in need of constant repair due to encroaching obsolescence, and the bulk of defence expenditure has necessarily concentrated on the basic military infrastructural backlog (accommodation and transport) at the expense of updating practical weaponry. Further, many of Nigeria's arms purchases (Mi3 squadrons
and naval vessels, for example) are motivated by a greater prestige value than considerations of practical deterrence. The necessary programme of weapons refurbishment is likely to be an excessively expensive, long-term project.

While it cannot be denied that Nigeria possesses vast and impressive military potential, such potential is greatly impaired by the lack of a sufficient basic infrastructure essential to maintain so large a force on an efficient military footing. We may conclude that while the Nigerian Armed Forces have a vital internal security role to play and are indeed a most powerful regional force, continental significance and capability is largely impaired by the lack of a sufficient military infrastructure or sufficiently stable economic capability to support continentally extended military commitments.

Thus, in conclusion, the physical determinants of the national capability of Nigeria present an apparent degree of paradoxical discrepancy between potentialities and actualities, discernible in the alternating positive-negative dualism established in most of these capability elements. Nigeria, for example, possesses a land area of some considerable proportion and this, in theory, is of some considerable capability significance. Whereas the physical dimensions of the Nigerian state represent positive capability attributes, the legacy of historical circumstance constitutes a potential obstacle, due to the fact that Nigeria is a politically contrived entity, lacking in geographic definition and encompassing topographically diverse terrain and three geographically autonomous regions. Similarly, the vast size of the Nigerian population represents the singular capability of a large supply of human resources, but such capability potential is complicated by rigid ethnic cleavages and historically stringent communal patronage. A rich agricultural potential is retarded by adherence to socio-cultural traditions engrained in
primordial loyalties, and the lack of a sufficient food supply. The narrowness of the general mineral resource base detracts from the richness of the Nigerian oil deposits and inhibits the capability significance of the developing industrial capacity, while ethno-political cleavages characterize the continentally dominant size of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

This dualism may be ascribed to the fact that the Nigerian state is an aggregation of three geographically distinguishable territories, each occupied by a predominant ethnic community of diverse lineage and custom. This fact is fundamental to any analysis of Nigerian capability and permeates every facet of the state's being, to the extent that the range of physical capability data present conflicting images of national capability potential.

The realities of Nigeria's physical capability complicate conventional assumptions about its potential. For example, the often mooted assumption that Nigeria's considerable geographical size and large population are of unqualified significance in distinguishing Nigeria from its continental counterparts, and thus bestowing some superior degree of capability potential on the country, is no more than a bald assertion. The realities of geographical divergence and ethnic heterogeneity complicate these two characteristics, which in themselves are the most basic foundations of the Nigerian state and, therefore, dominate the entire state structure. Similarly, the degree of capability significance generally attributed to the Nigerian oil resources is limited in overall capability effectiveness by the inability of the Nigerian agricultural sector to produce even a subsistence food supply.

The fundamental potential cannot be denied, but neither can the implicit
capability weaknesses of the characteristic realities. The extent to which both positive and negative potentialities are actualized in capability strength or weakness depends on the interaction of a spectrum of influences which have been termed social determinants, which collectively represent the mobilizing engine of national capability. Effectiveness is therefore measured by the degree of balance between capability strength and weakness, and the ability of the social determinants to maximize latent capability potentialities.

2. The social determinants

The second division of the matrix of the elements of national capability comprises those elements which may be described as being of a less stable and more intangible nature than the elements of the former division of physical determinants. The social determinants of national capability are obviously to a large extent the product of the physical determinants. However, the social environment may so transform physical capabilities or limitations so as to be of greater significance in their influence upon national capability than the former.

2.1 Economic capability

The element of economic capability gains its significance in the context of general capability analysis from the fact that economic capability represents an aggregation of factors, which in themselves are independent elements of the capability matrix (resource endowment, industrial capacity, political organization, being the most fundamental) and the extent to which these diverse elements are mobilized in asserting the country's economic potential. The standard measure of a state's economic capacity and strength is usually designated by key levels of development
and modernization. Central to these notions is the measure of overall economic growth in production capacities. Economic strategies and objectives are virtually inseparable from the political, and in developing states the necessity of basic socio-cultural transformation in mobilizing the nation for economic modernization make political and economic objectives almost synonymous. Thus economic objectives and economic capability are a basic determinant of political action and profoundly influential for capability assessment.

2.1.1 The nature of the Nigerian economy

The nature of the economy and economic structure of any state is shaped by several internal and external influences: resource endowment, manpower potential, industrial capacity and governmental economic strategy being those of fundamental concern. Thus, whereas the parameters of the Nigerian economy are largely the product of the preceding matrix of physical elements, economic capability is essentially a reflection of the extent to which the state has succeeded in mobilizing available resources and overcoming shortages in pursuit of overall economic goals and wider policy objectives.

The Nigerian economy has, from colonial times, been dominated by the trends and fluctuations in its major export commodities, and the agricultural sector is thus of traditional predominance. In more recent times, the mining sector has come to dominate all facets of the economy. However, owing to the narrowness of the mineral base, agriculturally allied activities constitute the major portion of economic activity and the broad base of the Nigerian economy. Export agriculture undoubtedly provided the impetus of growth in the Nigerian economy from 1940 to the mid-1960's, determining the growth rate of income,
investment and the balance of payments. 164)

One of the most significant characteristics of Nigeria's economic capability since the Second World War has been the integration of the economy into the world market. From 1945 to the mid-1960's the volume of Nigeria's exports increased almost threefold, while imports increased eightfold. By far the largest growth in export volume came from groundnuts, which increased from 100,000 tons in 1945 to over 600,000 tons in 1963, making Nigeria the world's major exporter of the product. Exports of cocoa, timber, cotton and rubber also increased rapidly over the period, leading to a diversified export economy. However, as the internal demand has grown and the agricultural supply has declined, and development strategies have emphasized a shift towards an industrially based economy, there has been a marked shift from a structure in which growth originated largely in the agricultural export oriented sectors to one which draws its impetus increasingly from production for domestic demand; the revenues from the oil-producing sector have generated domestic resources for economic growth and provided the necessary foreign exchange to stave off balance of payments difficulties. 165)

Similarly, the major growth impulses of the Nigerian economy have traditionally been dominated by foreign capital. Historically, capital inflow constituted the most effective way to earn foreign exchange and the primary means of increasing total supply of money in circulation. However, contradictions between the objectives of foreign capital, and the general political and economic strategy of Nigeria largely determined the general assumptions underpinning the changing Nigerian economic structure.

Recent trends in the Nigerian economy may be illustrated by an examination of the performance of the three principal sectoral variables of economic growth in the Nigerian economy (mining, agriculture and industry) as components of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); that is, the aggregate of goods and services produced in the state.

*GENERAL TRENDS IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>62-63</th>
<th>66-67</th>
<th>71-72</th>
<th>72-73</th>
<th>73-74</th>
<th>74-75</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROWTH</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATE</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
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<td>2.8%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINING</td>
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<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
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<td>27.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRY</td>
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<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These statistics have been compiled from several sources which in certain instances conflict in the data given, therefore, they should be viewed merely as illustrative indicators of trends in the Nigerian economy.*


It is evident that the structure of the Nigerian economy has changed quite fundamentally in the last two decades in which the oil producing (mining) sector has grown from being of negligible consequence in its contribution to overall GDP, to a peak of 45.5 per cent during 1974/75 (largely as a result of the Middle Eastern oil embargo). Despite a recent leveling off in this sector, due to unfavourable world prices and a decline in output, the oil sector is the basic strut of the economy. The

agricultural sector, on the other hand, already suffering from the setbacks of the civil war, was further adversely affected by prolonged drought during the early seventies. More recently, substantial government subsidies have marginally increased output, which is entirely for domestic consumption, with the supply falling far short of the demand. (It should be noted that as the public sector is the primary source of investment, growth in contribution to GDP does not necessarily reflect sectoral development.) Industry, in its turn, has continued its gradual but perceptible growth in its contribution to GDP; this is largely the result of government participation in the sector and the emphasis on growth of the industrial base as a fundamental tenet of Nigerian development planning.

The GDP is estimated to have grown from K12,790.9 million in 1974-75 to K17,182.2 million in 1978-79, implying an average annual growth rate of about 8.5 per cent over the past four years (as compared to an average 3.2 per cent growth rate for Africa in general during 1975-78). The Gross National Product (GNP), (being the total amount of capital generated by the country) stood at about K28.7 billion. The apparent high savings ratio is accounted for by the fact that a substantial proportion of GNP (approximately 51 per cent in 1978/79) accrues to the government by way of oil revenues (other than from direct sales), from licence fees and royalties, along with the government participation in the banking...


and industrial sectors. The value of exports grew at an annual average rate of 3.2 per cent over the same period (1974-79); however, imports increased fivefold, resulting in a deficit of N2380.4 million in the balance of payments account for 1978/79. 169)

Nigeria's perennial balance of payments problems are attributed to the oil bonanza. With comfortable foreign exchange earnings from oil exports, there was an uninhibited and rapid monetization of foreign exchange for domestic expansion and development, which led to a rapid increase in money supply as a result of the increase in money income, which in turn, provided the impetus for a rapid increase in demand for import of goods and services. Against the background of apparently abundant foreign exchange reserves and projected earnings arising from oil, the post-civil war government budgetary measures liberalised exchange and trade restrictions, encouraged massive importation and placed a ban on the exportation of certain locally produced goods in an attempt to curb inflation. The combined effect of the huge increases in government expenditure and imports led to severe balance of payments constraints, 170) and it is estimated that external reserves at present could barely finance the bill for two months importation. 171)

The average annual per capita income is estimated at about N205. 172) Whereas this figure in itself is relatively low, the large discrepancies in the distribution of income make the figure misleading and the larger


proportion of the population has an income well below the projected average. This is complicated by the fact that a considerable proportion of the population are not in wage employment and that the oil producing sector, which provides the momentum of growth in the economy, involves a very small proportion of the population and thus the direct impact of the oil industry on the bulk of the population is small. The Third National Development Plan declares quite frankly that: "... the masses of the people continue to be in abject poverty and lacking in the basic necessities of life ..."\textsuperscript{173)}

Unemployment is a serious socio-economic problem in the urban centres, resulting from the flooding of unskilled workers and young school leavers into the urban labour market. It is estimated that eight per cent of all people between the ages of 15-55 years living in urban communities could be regarded as unemployed. Some 70 per cent of the unemployed are estimated to fall into the 15-23 years age group. Persons with formal education of primary, but below school leaving certificate account for 59 per cent of the total unemployed. Accuracy is difficult because urban migration trends are influenced by several diverse factors, and the fact that a large proportion of the population is not part of the wage economy.\textsuperscript{174)} A similar constraint on national development is provided by inflation, which in the wake of inordinately large public sector salary increases during 1974/75 and the huge increase in importation and infrastructural congestion (ports, railways, administration) reached a high of 34.1 per cent in 1975 (this figure was also largely influenced by the increase in world inflation at that time, in the wake of the oil crisis). The Federal Military Government set up an Anti-Inflation Task

\textsuperscript{173)} \textit{Ibid}.

Force in 1976 and the measures adopted, including a temporary ban on the importation of certain goods and government subsidization of food, housing and transport sectors, have succeeded in reducing inflation, to what in world terms would be viewed as a manageable rate. Yet in view of the severe financial constraints on the Nigerian economy, it further inhibits development efforts. 175)

The resilience of the Nigerian economy is clearly illustrated by the significantly high and relatively stable economic growth rate which the economy has sustained over the past two decades. However, it is equally evident that such economic growth is largely dependent (and latterly almost exclusively dependent) on the economic impetus generated by the oil industry. The decline of the agricultural sector of the economy and the slowness of industrial development efforts necessitate ever larger sums of public (oil derived) expenditure merely to balance the economy and leaving thus proportionately less for development investment. The allocation of public expenditure in accord with the overall economic objectives of the state is a fundamental element of economic development planning.

2.1.2 Economic development

The need for economic development planning, whether of the centralized control or the mixed economy type, arises largely from the fact that productive resources are scarce relative to the demand for them and has been generally described as; "... the attempt to effect by direct and indirect means the greatest volume and the best possible allocation of

resources for economic growth in order to reach the goals set by the people through their governments". In Nigeria the history of economic development planning can be traced to 1944 when the Secretary of State for the Colonies proposed a "Ten-year Plan of Development and Welfare" which came into force during 1946. In 1951, the initial plan was followed by a revised plan covering the period 1951-1956. However, these were not development plans in the modern sense of the word, but were more a series of projects, which lacked co-ordination and any overall economic target. The majority of the individual schemes proposed no more than the expansion of the existing departmental activities.

It was not until the first post-independence National Development Plan for the period 1962-1965 was formulated that any serious attempt was made to relate planning to clearly laid down national objectives and goals. The basic objective of economic planning in Nigeria was described in general terms as being of a threefold nature: to accelerate, (a) the rate of economic growth; (b) the rate at which the standard of living of the population can be raised; and (c), to give Nigeria an increasing measure of control over her own destiny. The objectives were defined in very broad terms and there was in addition, a lack of organizational co-ordination in the Plan itself.

The political upheaval of the mid-sixties and the subsequent civil war disrupted the projected duration of the Plan, and in the post-war era the principal planning orientation had to be reconsidered in the light


of the national experience of the previous five years and the need to set fresh goals and objectives for the socio-economic reconstruction and transformation of Nigerian society. These objectives were incorporated in the Second National Development Plan 1970-74, the aim of which was to establish Nigeria as a "united, strong and self-reliant nation", "a great and dynamic economy", "a just and egalitarian society", "a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens", and "a free and democratic society". Besides the necessary post-war reconstruction, the Second National Development Plan accorded highest priority to agriculture, industry, transportation and manpower development. 179)

The most significant move towards fulfilment of these rather more political than economic objectives was the promulgation in 1972 of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree and the initiation of government participation in mineral exploitation and exploration and in industrial undertakings. The period was also marked by the announcement of the Government's intention to expand educational facilities as a preliminary to the introduction of free compulsory universal primary education. However, the generally bold projections of the plan were thwarted by prolonged drought, which left the agricultural sector in decline, adverse world influences in the mining sector (complicated by uncertainty as to the ultimate extent of the government 'indigenization' of foreign interest objective), infrastructural inadequacies (port congestion etc.), and huge increases in recurrent expenditure due to the establishment of the new 12 state structure and the attendant administrative institutions. Thus even though the average growth rate for the period of the Plan was 6.5 per cent per annum as opposed to a projected growth rate of 7 per cent, the nation did not move any closer to the 'national' objectives of the Plan. 180

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Third National Development Plan 1973-80 sought to revalidate the original five objectives, but as qualified by seven more specifically economic objectives; that is, increase in per capita income, more even distribution of income, reduction in the level of unemployment, increase in the supply of high-level manpower, diversification of the economy, balanced development and indigenization of economic activity. The basic strategy appeared logical enough: the use of current oil revenues to build social and economic infrastructures, and to transform radically the nature of economic activity, as the quickest and most effective means of development. Top priority was assigned to manufacturing in the belief that an industrial base is the firmer foundation for self-sustained growth.\footnote{181}{Ibid, F29. Also Wolgin, JN, op cit, F687.}

The Third National Development Plan was prepared against a buoyant financial background facilitated by an upsurge in the country's earnings from petroleum. The favourable financial situation was expected to continue more or less throughout the Plan period. Finance was not expected to constitute much of a constraint to Plan implementation and this prompted the authorities to embark on a large number of infrastructural projects. However, less than a year after the initiation of the Plan both the volume and price of the country's oil production had suffered significant deterioration and the lack of financial resources once again imposed a serious constraint on the country's ability to implement projects.

The net achievements of the Plan have been described as a largely urban based construction boom; continuing agricultural stagnation; acute shortages of labour and materials; and a high rate of inflation and of importation of goods and services. The Plan failed to move the economy any closer to the objective of self-reliance.\footnote{182}{Guidelines for the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985, op cit, F20.}
The transition to a civilian government afforded the opportunity to reconsider development strategy, objectives and achievements during the period of military rule and has resulted in a change in development emphasis in the objectives which are to constitute the parameters of the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-85. The main thrust of the development strategy remains the transition to increased self-reliance. But there has also been an awareness that Nigerian economic advancement has been overly dependent on the oil sector. This has proved to be an unreliable and restricted base for continued growth and development.

Secondly, there has developed an emphasis on 'grassroots' (local government and village level) development as the basis of sustained economic development. The new emphasis on self-reliance and the direct involvement of the people in the process of development — identification of goals, their planning and implementation — is a product of experience. In our previous plans, we seem to have focused attention primarily on strategies for economic growth, rather than development. It is time we asked the fundamental question: what kind of society, are we evolving? ... development must mean the development of man — the unfolding and realization of his creative potential, enabling him to improve his material conditions of living through the use of resources available to him.  

Two guiding values are thus basic to the Fourth National Development Plan, namely, emphasis on self-reliance and self-sustaining development, and democratization of the development process. Self-reliance for self-sustaining development has been described as implying in practical terms, the development in the individual as well as the society as a whole, such attitudes as "the will to succeed in life", through productive labour, to experiment, to be resourceful and "to conquer new frontiers". Democratization of the development process, in its turn, implies the active participation of the people in the conception, planning and implementation of the

183) Ibid.
184) Ibid.
development goals. These value orientations are intended to sustain a socio-economic transformation of the Nigerian people. 185)

In terms of short-term objectives the Plan is projected to include four specific objectives in addition to those included in the Third Plan. These are: (a) greater self-reliance; (b) development of technology; (c) increased productivity and a reduction in the level of unemployment; (d) the promotion of a new national orientation "conducive to greater discipline, a better attitude to work and a cleaner environment." 186)

It is recognized that some of the main constraints on the economy have stemmed from an overdependence on the petroleum sector, which generates funds rather than developmental goods and services, and long-term efforts to diversify this dependence must be sustained. Agricultural production and processing is to enjoy first priority in the Plan and the expansion of the economic infrastructure and the industrial base are to be viewed as secondary priorities. 187)

In conclusion, it is clear that Nigeria shares with many other developing countries the common characteristics of low savings and investment rates, with a clear concentration of those efforts in the public sector. The dynamics of economic growth are often provided first by agricultural exports, gradually strengthened by the expansion of domestic construction activity in infrastructure and the establishment of an industrial base concentrated on the manufacture of import substitutes. If industries


187) Ibid, P26. It is interesting to note that the allocations of recurrent expenditure in the 1980 budget accord nearly double the sum allocated for expenditure in the agricultural sector to industry.

AGRICULTURE: N 260,044,000.
INDUSTRY: N1242,299,000.
DEFENCE: N 500,000,000.
EDUCATION: N 694,232,000.
HOUSING: N 452,650,000.

are permitted to be established outside the public sector, private investment activity accelerates at this second stage of development. Simultaneously, imports of investment goods and of materials begin to rise faster than exports, the latter remaining undiversified and consisting largely of primary agricultural products. Consequent reductions in foreign exchange reserves and persistently rising balance of payments deficits may lead to import controls and higher tariffs, which provide additional incentives to import substitution. At this stage, balance of payments considerations become of overriding importance in development policy. The expansion of private investment and production combined with a growing demand for social services and an increasing need to finance the operating and maintenance costs of economic and social infrastructure tend to put pressures on government expenditure. The requirements of national administration after independence add to these pressures which are then less easily resisted. From a narrow and unbalanced tax base, it is difficult to raise the revenues to meet these demands, leading to erosion of the budgetary position. The difficulties of generating adequate resources are compounded by a lack of institutions capable of preparing and implementing public sector development programmes, and by insufficient skilled and experienced staff to build these institutions.\textsuperscript{188)}

This general hypothesis is of direct relevance to Nigerian economic capability in as much as the country is endowed with rich oil resources which should theoretically alleviate any of the balance of payments constraints common to economies at a similar stage of development. However, development mobilization is largely retarded by the weakness of developmental institutions which have tended to succumb to the persistent pressure to increase current expenditure with little or no priority in terms of projected development objectives.\textsuperscript{189)} Since the

\textsuperscript{188)} Tims, W, op. cit, P95.

\textsuperscript{189)} Ibid.
early seventies public expenditure, through monetization of the oil revenues, has been the main engine of investment, growth and development in the Nigerian economy. The infrastructural nature of public sector investment and expenditure has led to high importation rates (because the country produces few of the goods on which the massive expenditure is spent and because of the high liquidity which public expenditure generates in the economy).

A survey by the Central Bank of Nigeria revealed that: (a) government revenues are accounted for mainly by oil sector exports, so that government receipts are dependent on foreign sector receipts; (b) government oil revenue and prior period government expenditures were the significant explanatory variable accounting for up to 98.6 per cent of total variability in government expenditure; and (c) the demand for imports is heavily dependent on government expenditures. Government expenditure is the significant explanatory variable, accounting for up to 97 per cent of the changes in imports. Although the bulk of the actual imports appear in the private sector, such importation is government expenditure induced, because of the high import content of government spending.190)

Thus, the inventory of Nigerian imports has come to be dominated by capital goods, which presently account for some 70 per cent of total imports (reflecting the expansion of manufacturing industries and the increased demand for heavy equipment, generated by the government's commitment to capital projects). Consumer durables now account for about 9 per cent of imports, while foodstuffs account for an estimated...

10 per cent of the total import bill. Significance diversification of the direction of Nigerian international trade has taken place since independence, characterized by a relative decrease in the predominance of the United Kingdom in both the Nigerian import and export trade, and an increase in the share of the member countries of the European Economic Community and the United States. Nigeria's principal customer is the United States, which imports 47 per cent of the goods marketed for export by Nigeria, followed by the Netherlands (8.3 per cent), Federal Republic of Germany (8.2 per cent), France (7.4 per cent) and the United Kingdom (4 per cent). However, the United Kingdom is the market for 26 per cent of all Nigerian non-oil exports. It is also Nigeria's main supplier, providing 21.3 per cent of all Nigerian imports (as compared to 45.3 per cent in 1945), followed by West Germany (15.2 per cent), the United States (11.4 per cent), Japan (11.2 per cent) and France (8.1 per cent). Lesser import/export markets include Italy, People's Republic of China, USSR, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, India and Poland.

The inherent potential of the Nigerian economy (most notably its vast labour resources, domestic consumer market and oil generated wealth) has concentrated in Nigeria the second largest foreign capital investment in sub-Saharan Africa, other than South Africa. The largest foreign investor in Nigeria is the United Kingdom, with capital commitments totalling some £1,200 million in 1970, followed by the United States with an estimated $900 million capital investment in Nigeria. Other major sources of foreign investment in Nigeria include West Germany, France,

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Canada, Japan and the Netherlands. Nigeria at present, has a total external debt on long-term loan and aid projects totalling N 676,480,431.\(^{193}\)

On June 2, 1975 the Federal Military Government formally ratified the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). The establishment of the Community was first mooted by Nigeria and Togo during 1972 and the essence of the treaty which eventually emerged provides for:

(i) the establishment of a customs union among the member-states through the progressive elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers; (ii) the establishment of a common external tariff against third countries; (iii) the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital; (iv) the gradual harmonization of monetary policies and; (v) the joint development of transport, communications, energy and other infrastructural facilities. Members presently include Nigeria, Togo, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Mali, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Liberia, Benin, Upper Volta, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Ghana. Although several intercommunal projects have been initiated and ECOWAS has brought about a degree of regional affiliation, infrastructural impediments have limited any degree of regional integration. The measure of regional solidarity is further inhibited by the rivalry and suspicion between the larger members (dominated by Nigeria) and the lesser members.\(^{194}\)

We may conclude from this macro-analysis of the economy that in spite of the rapid pace of modernization, Nigeria is still underdeveloped. As in most developing countries, a major, though diminishing, part of economic activity is carried on within the framework of the traditional sector and

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hence does not lend itself to easy estimation. Thus, for example, while oil exploitation is not the major source of the country's wealth, it is a highly capital intensive industry with a low labour absorptive capacity, providing employment for only about two per cent of the Nigerian labour force. Thus it is pertinent to note that although the percentage of the population engaged in agriculture has declined, there is no doubt that; "... in absolute terms the agricultural sector is the primary source of employment in the country". 195)

The agricultural sector of the Nigerian economy has been seen to be in steady decline over the last decade, due to development priority neglect, in the belief that the manufacturing and mining sectors were of greater significance to long-term development. While this basic notion cannot be denied, it is vital that the transition from an agriculturally based economy to an industrialized economy be carefully orchestrated. The availability of an adequate food supply is absolutely fundamental to economic development in its cause-effect influence on the entire Nigerian economic structure. For example, food shortages lead to higher prices, which in turn lead to demands for higher wages; this in turn affects the cost of local production; the rate of returns on investments and thus, the level of investment and ultimately the rate of economic growth. Additionally, inadequate local food supply requires the massive importation of supplemental staple foods, with the consequent divergence of public expenditure from development projects and capital equipment, and the eventual constraints on the country's balance of payments. In the extreme scenario the continuing food shortages may have political implications in the form of workers' agitation which could disrupt economic development programming.

The fact that the Nigerian economy has maintained an average growth rate in excess of eight per cent in recent years (despite the adverse performance of the agricultural sector which previously provided the main impetus of growth) is indicative of the resilience of the Nigerian economic capability. Whereas, the overdependence of the Nigerian economy on the oil-sector has produced balance of payments constraints, the basic potential of the Nigerian economy has attracted a large concentration of foreign investment. While the merits and demerits of foreign investment is a contentious issue, in terms of capability potential, the degree of potential international leverage which so large a foreign investment commitment implies, is self-evident.

Clear evidence of the capability potential in international affairs which Nigeria may derive from the dependence of metropolitan economies on investments in Nigeria, was provided by Nigeria's nationalization of British Petroleum holdings in Nigeria in reaction to the mooted lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia by Britain. This was a move calculated to strengthen Nigeria's bargaining position on the eve of the Lusaka summit of Commonwealth Heads of State during 1979. Whereas such a strategy is obviously to some extent a two-edged sword, in as much as overuse could create an effective deterrent against future foreign investment, it cannot be denied that the inherent capability which Nigeria derives from the scale of foreign investment in the Nigerian economy is a most singular asset. In wielding this asset as an instrument of international pressure, Nigeria must be aware of its own economic vulnerabilities, specifically the lack of food supply and the overdependence on the sale of crude oil. The United States, for example, has recently committed itself to assisting Nigeria to attain self-sufficiency in food supply by 1983 providing thus, a quid pro quo which

effectively negates (or raises the cost) of the Nigerian ability to exercise a degree of denial control on American investment, in pursuit of national objectives. Thus greater capability might be derived from the latent potentiality of this degree of international leverage rather than from the actualization of the capability.

2.2 Education and technology

The elements of educational and technological development, in the context of capability potential gain their significance from the fact that unless the levels of educational and technological proficiency are of a reasonably high standard, the inherent potential of the population will remain underdeveloped. The inevitable consequence of such social underdevelopment constitutes an impediment to political organization and sophistication, and socio-economic development, to the extent that physical capability potential remains under-utilized and latent.

From colonial times, education in Nigeria has been a contentious issue with far-reaching socio-political consequence. While the educational system has long since been indelibly imprinted, many of the elements of colonially-nurtured socio-political bias still prevail, to the detriment of full manpower utilization and the consequent impediment of national capability potential.

2.2.1 The nature of educational development

Historically, education has enjoyed a high priority in Nigerian development planning. Since independence the number of primary school pupils has increased from 2,912,618 to a projected total of 11,521,500 in 1980. Proportionate increases in the number of secondary school pupils (from 135,364 in 1960 to 1,555,160 in 1980) and students enrolled at tertiary
education institutions (from 29,393 in 1960 to 287,680 in 1980) have been recorded. The most rapid expansion has taken place during the last ten years with student numbers increasing at an annual average rate of ten per cent. Expansion in enrolment has been facilitated by the considerable expansion of educational facilities such as classrooms, libraries, laboratories and equipment, concomitant with the increasing budgetary expenditure on education during the period covered by the Second and Third National Development Plans. For example, during the 1970-71 fiscal year, the total actual Federal Government recurrent and capital expenditure amounted to N 530 million of which N 16 million, or three per cent, was appropriated by the Ministry of Education. In 1975-76 expenditure in the education sector amounted to 19 per cent of total, while expenditure on education during 1980 is budgeted at approximately ten per cent (N 1,148,607,000) of total state expenditure.

Despite this record of rapid expansion, national enrolment ratios (generically linked with a high illiteracy ratio) have remained low for all levels of education. For example, while one in three children of primary school age is in school, the corresponding figure for secondary schools is one in 16 (an estimated 50 per cent of Nigerian children of schoolgoing age were not in school in 1969 and this is now estimated at 23 per cent). This situation is greatly complicated, first by a

considerable shortage of trained teachers (it is estimated that one-third of primary school teachers has no more than a school-leaving certificate and that 50 per cent have less than a Grade II teacher's certificate), which is an obvious impediment to any accelerated expansion programme or enrolment drive. Secondly, owing to the nature of the historical development of Nigeria, there is considerable unevenness in the geographical distribution of educational facilities across the country. The result has thus been one of differing standards and regional rates of growth. It is also increasingly recognized that there is maldistribution of enrolment between the sexes. Evidence would seem to suggest that enrolment is heavily weighted in favour of the male population, tradition dictating a more conservative domestic role for females.

Education ... is the tool with which modern nations are made and a poor handling of the tool will result in an imperfect product. It was unexpectedly handled in the pre-independence period of our history and the result is problems of imbalance in development, social inequalities and consequent threat to national unity and social peace.

In seeking to come to terms with these facts and in recognition of the vital role of education in the socio-economic development of the country, the Federal Military Government introduced major long-term guidelines for the rapid development and improvement of the educational sector at all levels.


levels. These policy pronouncements were contained in the Third National Development Plan which was complimented by the publication of The National Policy on Education during 1977, and define the parameters and national objectives of current and future educational development.

2.2.2 Educational policy

The National Policy on Education bases Nigeria's "philosophy of education" on the integration of the individual into a sound and effective citizen and the objective of equal educational opportunities for all citizens of the nation at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Furthermore, this comprehensive policy statement lists a set of values which the Nigerian education system should seek to inculcate in the youth of the country: (a) a respect for the worth and dignity of the individual; (b) faith in man's ability to make rational decisions; (c) moral and spiritual values in inter-personal and human relations; (d) shared responsibility for the common good of society; (e) respect for the dignity of labour; and (f) promotion of the emotional, physical and psychological well being.204

The national objective in seeking to have these intangible values "inculcated" in the country's youth is listed as: (a) the inculcation of national consciousness and national unity; (b) the inculcation of the right type of values and attitudes for the "survival of the individual" and the "Nigerian society; (c) the training of the mind in the "understanding of the world around"; and (d) the acquisition of appropriate skills, abilities and competences, both mental and physical, "as equipment for the individual to live in and contribute to the development of his

society". Such formulations are vague and intangible and it is difficult to imagine them providing but limited motivational guidance in the selection of curricula. However, most significant is the commitment of the educational development policy to the equalization of educational opportunity.

The Third National Development Plan declared the Government's recognition of universal primary education as a prerequisite for equalization of opportunities for education and announced the introduction of free universal and compulsory primary education throughout the federation. The scheme for free universal primary education (UPE) was initiated during September 1976, and from September 1979, six years primary education (commencing in the child's sixth year of age) was initially scheduled to become the compulsory norm. However, unprecedented pressure on the entire educational system (generated by the marked success of the enrolment drive combined with a considerable lag in the completion of physical projects — particularly the expansion of classroom facilities and increased training of teachers) made indefinite postponement of the 'compulsory' clause inevitable.

The launching of the Universal Free Primary Education scheme ... marks the dawn of a new era in the history of educational development in this country; it also demonstrates the determination of the Federal Military Government to provide equal educational opportunities for all children of school age irrespective of the circumstances of their birth. Every Nigerian child should regard basic education as his natural heritage, a right and not a privilege. The UPE is, therefore, the cornerstone in our determination to produce a literate and educated society which will accelerate the tempo of our socio-political, cultural and economic development.


207) HE Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, Speech on the Occasion of the Formal Launching of the Scheme for Universal Primary Education November 17, 1976 in Call to Duty: Speeches by His Excellency Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, op cit, P71.
The UPE scheme initially necessitated the building of over 150,000 extra classrooms at existing schools and an increase of 6,600 classrooms at teacher training colleges for primary school teachers at a total cost in excess of the N 500 million originally budgeted.\(^{(208)}\) The provision of primary education and the development of facilities for this purpose are primarily the responsibility of the state governments, local government authorities and local communities; however, the Federal Government provides both for the capital and recurrent expenditure.\(^{(209)}\)

A primary school enrolment figure of 14.1 million pupils is projected for 1982\(^{(210)}\) with the implication that (together with the effect of inflation on available funds) the basic educational infrastructure will continue to lag behind demand unless especial efforts are made during the next two years to bridge the gap.

The introduction of the UPE scheme will have an obvious long-term spiralling demand effect on the educational pyramid, with the number of potential enrolments at all levels increasing in proportion to the increase in primary school enrolments (over a period of six years for secondary schools, for example, and 11 years for tertiary institutions). The greatest handicap to secondary education was the inadequacy of facilities in terms of both quantity and quality. Thus the Third National Development Plan undertook a programme of construction and expansion involving some


800 schools throughout the country. To encourage a rapid increase in enrolment consistent with the anticipated increase in physical facilities, tuition and boarding fees were fixed at the lowest levels pertaining in federally subsidised secondary schools. It was also an explicit policy objective to locate new facilities in such a way as to attain a better spatial distribution with a view to improving access.

The Government also embarked on the introduction of a parallel system of secondary technical schools, entailing a system of five-year secondary technical colleges existing side by side with secondary schools, intended to provide the primary school leaver with a clear choice between an academic or technical career, while retaining enough flexibility in the system for the transfer of pupils at a later stage in their education.

Steps were taken during 1977 to streamline technical education to make it more responsive to the national manpower needs. To this end the National Board for Technical Education was established.

The abolition of tuition fees for tertiary technical institutions and universities was announced during November 1976. The result was an unprecedented increase in the demand for university education at a time when, despite the establishment of four new universities (bringing the total to 13), available facilities fell far short of requirements.

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Attention has also been given to adult education with the object of eliminating mass illiteracy which has been estimated at about 60 per cent (an official figure of 68.4 was given in 1972,216) but owing to the political sensitivity of population statistics and literacy rates in particular, accuracy is difficult). While the National Policy on Education anticipates the initiation of a ten year literacy campaign as a matter of urgent national priority, recent financial constraints and emphasis on the UPE have limited the endeavours in this direction.217)

The objectives and priorities of the Nigerian educational development policies underscore the generally accepted theoretical assumption that educational policies need to relate to the wider political and economic objectives of developing societies. The question that arises, however, is to what extent educational policy in Nigeria (regardless of common objective) is likely to outstrip lagging economic development. In the context of national development it is of primary concern that education and relative socio-economic development go hand in hand, for if on the completion of formal education it is found that the socio-economic system cannot accommodate the acquired skills and cannot provide the expected status, education instead of providing for advancement and self-satisfaction in society, will be nurturing discontent and dissatisfaction, the exact opposite of its intended purpose — a situation hardly conducive to development.

In so much as education in Nigeria has traditionally nurtured elitism and current policies have introduced an equality of opportunity for education (and by assumption in society in general), the negative implication of a


discrepancy between educational output and economic demand appears somewhat paradoxical. It is, nevertheless, undeniable that the growth in educational enrolment (most especially at primary school level) is not being matched by a commensurate growth in the socio-economic base and that it is not likely (barring, of course, an unprecedented economic boom) that by the time the students first enrolled in the UFE scheme have passed through the educational pyramid (next six to ten years) that the economic system will be able to accommodate their aspirations. This may be deduced from the fact that three-quarters of the primary school teachers are hopelessly underqualified, not to mention the dearth of secondary school teachers, and that the general quality of education is consequently inhibited. The implication is that in the light of the attendant elitist and historical socio-political ramifications of education in Nigeria a class of educated unemployed is being produced, through the over-rapid and unco-ordinated expansion of growth in primary education; that is to say, that the Nigerian educational dilemma would appear to be one of quality and not quantity.

Thus, whereas a literate population is an indispensable prerequisite for social, political and economic development, the inherent contradiction in the Nigerian situation is the fact that traditionally a primary school education has implied a degree of some status superior to that of the agrarian traditions of most Nigerians and aspirations well beyond the limits of primary school literacy. Therefore, it seems that present educational trends do not coincide with societal trends and this imbalance, in as much as it nurtures potential unemployment, political disaffection and instability, has implications for potential capability.

In the context of the above it is necessary to assess the nature of manpower development trends in Nigeria, in as much as manpower represents
the aggregate of skills and attitudes resulting from education plus training.\textsuperscript{218)}

2.2.3 Manpower development

Whereas the shortage of skilled manpower has constituted a serious constraint on Nigerian national development for at least two decades, attention has only very recently been given to the training and development of manpower to meet the needs of the economy and particularly the problem of unemployment through lack of salable skill. The major manpower development priorities have been listed as: (a) the need to meet the skilled manpower requirements of the economy through the expansion of existing educational and training facilities and the establishment of new ones in identified areas of need; (b) the strengthening of educational and training quality through improvements in curricula, methodology and course content; (c) upgrading of the efficiency and productivity of employed manpower through regular in-service training and retraining courses; and (d) reduction in the level of unemployment through the implementation of employment oriented programmes designed to provide the unemployed with skills which will enable them to obtain gainful employment.\textsuperscript{219)}

While there is a general dearth of statistical data (in itself a factor which militates against effective development planning), recent surveys indicate that technical and engineering skills are of a very low order, with only one fifth of school-leavers in 1977 having credits in either


mathematics, chemistry, physics or biology, with a consequent shortfall in excess of 65 per cent of manpower requirements in fields such as medicine, engineering, architecture, town planning and quantity surveying. There is an estimated shortfall of 45 per cent in such skills as stenographers and confidential secretaries. At the same time, only 15 per cent of senior management posts were occupied by non-university graduates, while 75 per cent of intermediate level management had no post-secondary school education in 1975. 220)

In recognition of the enormous manpower requirements of the economy a number of short-term policy measures have been undertaken. There has been a substantial expansion of educational and training facilities; the number of Colleges of Technology/polytechnics has increased from eight in 1973 to 13 at present, with a student enrolment of 8000 in 1973-74 and 17,000 in 1978-79. At the same time, over 5000 Nigerian students have been placed in a number of overseas institutions to pursue various technical courses. Considerable impetus has been given to in-service training by the establishment in 1971 of the Industrial Training Fund (I.T.F.) to provide finance and other assistance in establishing training programmes in its member firms. Middle and top level management courses have also been undertaken by the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria and the Centre for Management Development was founded in 1973 for this purpose. 221) The Third National Development Plan lists a requirement of some 245,000


skilled and semi-skilled workers such as masons, carpenters and electricians, constituting a shortfall of 56.6 per cent of anticipated requirements for the period 1975-80. Recent efforts have been made to increase the supply of skilled personnel in the construction sector including the expansion of facilities in the universities and colleges of technology for training senior and middle-level personnel. Provision has also been made for the establishment of a construction and building training complex; this consists of a number of centres and the complex would be charged with training and retraining, and the development of various levels and types of construction and building courses appropriate for the industry. The facilities of the complex are to be made available to the trainees and students from trade centres and colleges of technology as is to link the formal and informal training systems. However, in the light of the immediate shortfall of skilled artisans (mechanics, draughtsmen, machinists, for example) existing training efforts appear to be grossly inadequate and unlikely to be of any short or medium-term benefit.

Working on a ratio of one medical doctor to 10,000 population, there is a shortfall of approximately 50 per cent in the case of general practitioners and 75 per cent in the case of nurses. Similarly, in the agricultural sector there is a serious shortage of veterinary surgeons and skilled agricultural specialists, although recent university enrolment trends in this field have shown an approximate increase of 50 per cent over the last five years. The expansion of centres for the training of low-level agricultural personnel will also relieve the shortage of trained manpower in this sector.

Effective manpower development and utilization in Nigeria is subject to

223) Ibid, P780.
224) Ibid, P381.
numerous constraints, including the general lack of past analytical and statistical research into projected manpower requirements, (although improved in recent years by the intensified efforts of the National Manpower Secretariat and the State Manpower Committees): for example the fact that skilled manpower considerations were rarely applied as a criterion in the selection of development projects; lack of co-ordination of the various manpower-development efforts, including university education, technical education, managerial training, industry-based training activities; the shortfall in suitably qualified teaching staff in the educational institutions; lack of science or mathematical content in school curricula; lack of career guidance and the lack of labour market information. 225)

The shortages of skilled manpower in Nigeria is of a very high order and has always constituted a serious impediment to the country's productive and technological capacity. The recent concentrated efforts to improve technical training facilities, will be of some considerable long-term significance, but in the medium-term, will do little to alleviate the situation as the increased supply of skilled labour must not only bridge the present gap between supply and demand, but must stay ahead of the projected growth in skilled manpower requirements. The lack of technical or skill aptitude is a fundamental social characteristic nurtured by concepts of colonial education for clerical/bureaucratic requirements and is an impediment to ultimate capability, since the country's physical capability cannot be developed beyond the limits of the educational and technological capacity of its population. Of equal relevance to capability is the fact that in the ideal situation economic and educational development should go hand in hand; however,

this ideal balance is rarely attained thus increasing the possibility of socio-political instability during the development process.

2.3 Political organization

The prime concern of the political organization in any state is the maintenance of effective political control. Therefore, the more stable the political organization, the greater the support the political organization enjoys, the more effective is the political organization's national mobilizing ability and consequently the greater is the political organization's contribution to national capability.

In analysis of political organization as a social determinant in the capability matrix of Nigeria, it is necessary to consider the influence of this element on national capability against the backdrop of the Nigerian legacy of constitutional instability and political impasse. The fact that Nigeria has had six different constitutions over the last 60 years, (which is a large number by any standards) and three coups d'etat, is indicative of a lack of socio-political cohesiveness and national affinity which might be conducive to constitutional stability. The collapse of constitutional authority after only six years of independence, military government and civil war could hardly be more vivid manifestations of inherent political instability. (The underlying ethno-regional and socio-political pressures have already been alluded to.)

However, during October 1979, after four years of constitutional consultation and negotiation the Constitution of the Second Republic of Nigeria was promulgated, signalling the return, after 13 years, to civil administration, and a political organization which deviates considerably from Nigeria's initial constitutional inheritance, and yet is undeniably
a product of the historical political turmoil. This constitution is, therefore, hardly a political innovation at all, but merely an endeavour to come to terms with the Nigerian historical legacy and its inherent socio-political instability.

Analysis of the significance of the most recent constitutional dispensation, in the context of national capability, must at this early stage be largely speculative and perhaps arbitrary, in as much as the workability and enduring stability of the present dispensation has yet to stand the test of time. In the interim, reference to past political history (as the substance of Chapter Two made clear) cannot be denied. It is, therefore, necessary to first consider the formal governmental structure of the present Nigerian political organization and secondly, to assess the prospect for political stability and the continuity of the political organization as an element central and fundamental to national capability.

2.3.1 Governmental structure

The Constitution of the Second Republic is essentially a further step in the evolution and adaptation of the federal government structure instituted in 1914, and shaped by the prolonged constitutional negotiations which pre-dated Nigerian independence. Influenced by the post-independence political upheavals, during which it became clear that the colonially contrived constitutional dispensation could not constrain the inherent regional and ethnic factionalism, the new constitution was intended as an innovation which would ensure the stability of the Nigerian polity. Structurally the Constitution of the Second Republic displays many similarities with the governmental structure of the United States and thus the impression of a radical departure from the colonial, 'Westminster' institutions which prevailed at independence has arisen. Furthermore, the
suspension of constitutional government for 13 years makes comparison between the independence constitution and the new constitution less immediate and apparent — as compared to rule by military junta the return to constitutional government is indeed an innovation. However, while the federal structure has undergone considerable change since independence (for example, the number of states has been increased by subdivision to 19), the new constitution does not represent any 'radical' departure from the constitutional pattern initiated by the British, but merely an attempt to find a democratically acceptable formula for political stability.

The present constitutional structure of government in Nigeria may be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:

As an instrument of reform, it is not surprising that the present constitution deviates most significantly from the Westminster constitutional inheritance in the institution of an executive presidency. Political leadership in Nigeria has traditionally been elitist, highly personalized
and thus, by definition, rather 'limited' in terms of access or responsibility. The exclusivity of political leadership has been influenced by the political favour and superiority accorded the so-called "talented tenth" by the British colonial administration, and complicated by the primacy of ethno-regional loyalties. These factors were the fundamental influences which gave rise to the political corruption and administrative ineptitude which weakened government authority to the point of collapse. Thus reform of the executive level of government was an obvious imperative.

The Constitution of the Second Republic vests the executive branch of government at federal level in the Presidency, and at regional level, in the 19 State Governors. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is elected to a four year term of office (renewable for a second term only) by universal adult suffrage in a national constituency. 226) The President is subject to a complex pattern of checks and balances which on the one hand, seek to ensure the 'representativeness' of the incumbent. (Thus, for example, a successful Presidential candidate is required to win an overall majority of the votes cast at an election, as well as at least one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of the 19 States of the Federation.) 227) On the other hand, the pattern of checks and balances extends to the constitutional requirement that executive appointments (and/or indictments)

226) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, op cit, Para 130-131, P44. A Vice-President is nominated by the Presidential candidate prior to the Presidential elections and is elected on the same electoral ticket.

227) Ibid, Para 125-126, P42-43. The 19 State Governors are similarly elected to a four year term of office and have complete sovereign executive authority within their State, subject to the authority of the President and the prescriptions of the constitution.
by the President have the support of the majority of the Senate,\(^{228}\)
and to the fact that the legislature may override, by a two-thirds
majority vote of both Houses, the constitutional requirement which
subjects the passage into law of all Bills emanating from the National
Assembly to Presidential approval.\(^{229}\)

However, this is not to imply that the President is lacking in authority,
on the contrary the new constitution has centralized executive authority
to a far greater degree than has previously been the case. For example,
besides the customary authority to conclude foreign treaties, distribute
honours and exercise the prerogative of mercy, the President is
Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Defence Force and is responsible for
national security, public order, the National Population Commission and
the Federal Electoral Commission (the latter two being issues of primary
political controversy). But most importantly, the President is responsible
for the tabling in both Houses of the National Assembly, of budget
estimates (in an Appropriation Bill) of the revenues and expenditure
of the Federation for each successive financial year.\(^{230}\)

It is clear that the constitution seeks not only to impose a system of
checks and balances on the executive and to clearly separate the
executive and legislative branches of government, but also to ensure
the continuity of government in the event of a repetition of the political
impasse of the early sixties. That is to say, that in theory the executive
is elevated to a position distinctly above the party-political rivalries

\(^{228}\) Ibid, Third Schedule, Part I, Para 1-2, PP105-106.


\(^{230}\) In the event of the National Assembly failing to approve the Bill,
the President may authorize the appropriation of funds to meet the
expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government
of the Federation for a period not exceeding six months. Ibid,
Para 122, P41. Also Para 144, Art 3, P49, Para 75-76, P29 and Third
Schedule, Part 1, Para 1-2, PP105-106.
which are liable to paralyse the legislature. In practice, however, the President needs to enjoy a majority of support in the legislature so as, in the most obvious examples, to gain approval for the appointment of executive ministers or to ensure the passage into law of the annual Appropriation Bill. In effect, unless the President is a member of the party holding a majority of seats in the legislature, or can rely on the support of a majority coalition, the legislature could make the exercising of executive authority extremely difficult, if not impossible.

In the light of these facts it is clear that much depends on the personal character and stature of the President and his ability to command respect and loyalty above political, ethnic and regional rivalry in the national interest. Thus, while the new constitution exposes the executive to unprecedented public accountability, it also centralizes unprecedented responsibility in the office of President. We argue, therefore, that in seeking to maintain a balance between accountability and responsibility the freedom of action of the President is inhibited to the point where only moderate, 'middle of the road' measures could be taken without fear of endangering either legislative support for the President or the political stability itself. This apparent conflict between the need for a 'strong' President and the limits (constitutional and practical) imposed on the office may prove to be a weakness in the national socio-political reform which the new constitution seeks to realize.

The new constitution retains the bi-cameral structure of the legislature, but deviates from the Westminster tradition by instituting an elected upperhouse. The Senate of the National Assembly consists of 96 Senators elected from five single-member senatorial constituencies in each State and one from the Federal Capital Territory. The House of Representatives
consists of 450 members elected nationally from single-member constituencies delimited by the Federal Electoral Commission on the basis of population quota.\(^{231}\) Elections are to be held every four years.\(^{232}\) Both Houses of the National Assembly have equal power to initiate legislation and all Bills require the approval of both Houses.\(^{233}\) The practical purpose of an elected bi-cameral legislature is that of mutual control and regulation. It also prolongs and retards the legislative process, which has the purpose of exposing proposed legislation to longer debate and closer public scrutiny, on the assumption that this will improve the nature (or wisdom) and the public acceptability of legislation — whether this is in fact so, is debateable. We argue that the longer the legislative debate the greater the chances of invoking public disagreement and discontent, the more members of the legislature will seek (for party-political advantage) to arouse public reaction to disagreeable legislative proposals, and the greater the chances of political impasse. Furthermore, although it is unlikely, it is not beyond possibility that the Senate could come to be controlled by one political party and the House of Representatives by an opposing party, thus raising the possibility of complete legislative paralysis and the breakdown of legislative authority.

The legislative authority at State level is vested in the Assembly of the State, consisting of three times the total number of members which the State concerned has in the House of Representatives.\(^{234}\) The State

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\(^{233}\) \textit{Ibid}, Second Schedule, Part I, P96-99. The legislative authority of the federal legislature is carefully defined and includes; Aviation, Banking, Census, Citizenship, Customs and Excise, Defence, Diplomatic and external affairs, Labour, Maritime activities, Mining, Police, Post and Telegraphs, Prisons, Press, Political Parties and the Railways.

\(^{234}\) \textit{Ibid}, Para 85, P33.
Assemblies are charged with the making of laws "for the peace, order and good government" of the State with respect to any matter not reserved to the National Assembly. The constitution also makes provision for the election of local government councils which are similar in function to municipalities. These councils are specifically entrusted with the provision and maintenance of primary education, the development of agriculture and natural resources, the maintenance of health services, and the economic development of their designated areas.

The constitution provides further, for an independent judiciary.

Ultimate judicial authority is vested in the Supreme Court of Nigeria, which has exclusive jurisdiction in any dispute between the Federation and a State or between the States, in so far as the dispute involves any question (of law or fact) on which a legal right depends. The Supreme Court also hears appeals from the Federal Court of Appeal.

The Federal Court of Appeal, in its turn, is vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State of the Federation, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State (i.e., Islamic Courts) and the customary State Courts of Appeal.

Furthermore, the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the revenues of the Government of the Federation. As

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235) Ibid., Para 4, Art 6-9, P2-3.
236) Ibid., Fourth Schedule, Para 1-2, PP111-112.
237) Ibid., Para 212, Art 1, P70.
238) Ibid., Para 213, Art 1, P70.
239) Ibid., Para 219, P72.
240) Ibid., Para 230, Art 1, P75. The result of the 1979 presidential election was contested in court by Chief Awolowo and the opposition UPN. Since losing their appeal this party has consistently cast aspersions on the independence of the judiciary.
the distribution of revenue among the States of the Federation is historically a politically controversial issue, it is the latter function which is likely to prove the most significant in maintaining political stability and the durability of the constitution.

In considering the nature of the governmental structure of a state in the context of national capability it is not necessary to consider the merits or demerits of a particular governmental system, but merely the effectiveness of the system in maintaining political control, authority and stability within the polity. As stated at the outset, in the case of Nigeria this is difficult, as the effectiveness of a particular political dispensation can only be established over time, and the Constitution of the Second Republic has hardly been in effect for long enough to prove its durability and effectiveness or otherwise. It is clear from our examination of the principal features of the new constitution that the branches of government in Nigeria have been most clearly separated and defined in their authority, and are subject to a complex pattern of checks and balances, and mutual regulation, which exposes government in Nigeria to an unprecedented level of public accountability. The rationale for this large and sometimes cumbersome process of regulation and public scrutiny clearly derives from the corrupt and 'closed' nature of the post-independence governments — a factor which has contributed to Nigeria's notorious political instability. However, the full cause of Nigerian political instability is far wider, but a most fundamental factor is the degree of ethnic and regional cleavage. The real function of the new constitution then, at this early stage, is that of defining the objectives and parameters of socio-political reform.

We argue, therefore, that the large measure of public political participation instituted by the new constitution could prove to represent a degree of 'over democratization'. All adult Nigerians, for example, have at
least six votes. This is a large number by any standard of democracy, but even more remarkable when it is considered that all party-political activity in Nigeria had been suspended for 13 years. The threat to constitutional authority, at this stage, lies in the assumption that the greater the degree of political participation, the more prolonged the election process and the greater public political debate and potential controversy, the greater are the chances of evoking primordial cleavages, leading to the maintenance of the long established patterns of political and factional domination. This would be quite the reverse of the constitution's intended purpose. The real test for the constitutional authority lies in its ability to withstand the inevitable rigours of such large-scale public participation and scrutiny after such a long period of political inactivity. However, the degree of success cannot be measured over the short-term.

2.3.2 Political culture and socialization

The political structure of the state comprises the institutions of government, the division of authority, the system of checks and balances, public accountability and the constitutional parameters within which decisions are authorised and from which government legitimacy is derived. The sustaining dynamism of these structures stems from the nation's commitment to, and identification with, values, norms, ideals, objectives and issues as shaped by history and tradition; these are conceptualized, vocalized and politicized by political parties, labour unions, pressure groups and competing elites, which in sum-total constitute the political culture.

241) That is; the President, State Governor, members of Senate, House of Representatives, State Assembly, Local Government Council — all these elections are held independently of each other raising the spectre of extraordinarily prolonged political campaigning.
In Nigeria, however, the ethno-regional cleavages, political polarizations and parochialism have given rise to an historically diffuse political culture. Values, norms and ideals are traditionally ethnically oriented, objectives and issues are historically parochial. Nigerian society has never been united in a nationalism which might have given rise to a mass political party, ideology or nationally identifiable value hierarchy. This inherent lack of a common value system or overriding nationalism was basic to the collapse of the post-independence constitutional structure, the intervention of the military, the suspension of the electoral system and the prohibition of party-political activities — the very essence of political culture. The political culture of Nigeria has not found spontaneous expression for 13 years, and in as much as the constitution of a state is projected to reflect the values and objectives of the society as a whole, the Nigerian constitution is based upon contrived ideals with which it seeks to shape the national value hierarchy and to inculcate the political culture.

This constitutionally prescribed political value hierarchy is founded upon so-called principles of democracy and social justice. Sovereignty is declared to be vested in the people of Nigeria and the primary purpose of government is accordingly perceived to be the security and welfare of the people.242) The political objectives to this end are enshrined in the motto of the Federal Republic — "unity and faith, peace and progress". In accordance with these objectives all governmental and political activity is constitutionally required to be carried on in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity and command national loyalty.243) It is

242) Ibid, Para 14, Art 1, P7 and Art 2(b), P8.
deemed imperative that all governmental activity should actively encourage national integration, while combatting discrimination of any nature. To this end the free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation must be promoted; all citizens of Nigeria shall enjoy full residence rights in all parts of the Federation; integration between different ethnic, linguistic and religious associations is to be encouraged; a national loyalty over and above sectional loyalties must be actively fostered; and the abolition and prevention of all corrupt practices and abuse of power is articulated as a further political objective.\(^{244}\) A comprehensive list of fundamental rights seeks further to ensure that sovereignty is vested in the people and closely prescribes the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the State and vice-versa.\(^{245}\)

The liberties of political associations, political parties and all extra-parliamentary activities are most closely prescribed. Thus, for example, no association (or individual) other than a registered political party may canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election.\(^{246}\) A 'political party' is defined as including any association whose activities include canvassing for votes in support of a candidate for election to any executive or legislative office.\(^{247}\) Thus effectively, any individual holding elected office must be a member of a registered political party. The registration of any political party must be approved by the Federal Electoral Commission and is dependent upon that party being open to membership of every citizen of Nigeria; its


emblem and/or motto may not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association concerned are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria and the head-quarters of all political associations must be located at the capital of the Federation.248)

The programme and political objectives of a political party must conform to the political objectives as set out in the Constitution. Furthermore, the constitution and rules of a political party (which must be lodged at the principal office of the Federal Electoral Commission) must make provision for the periodic election, on a democratic basis, of the principal officers and members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party. So too, it must ensure that the members of the executive of the party reflect the federal character of Nigeria. (The members of the executive shall be deemed to reflect the federal character of Nigeria only if the members thereof represent at least two-thirds of the different states comprising the Federation.)249)

Every political party is required to submit an annual statement of income and expenditure, and analysis of its source of funds and other assets to the Federal Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Federal Electoral Commission has the power of access to, and inspection and audit of all books and records of financial transactions, and is required to submit an annual report on the accounts and balance sheet of every political party to the National Assembly.250)

As has been indicated above, Nigeria is governed at present by a working

250) Ibid, Para 205-206, P68.
alliance of two political parties; the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigeria People's Party (NPP), while the remaining three of the five registered political parties in Nigeria — the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the People's Redemption Party (PRP) and the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), form the parliamentary opposition.

While a review of the election manifestoes of the above parties reveals in each a strong adherence to the constitutionally prescribed framework of political objectives, each of the five has an individually dominant political objective. Thus, for example, the UPN espouses the provision of social and welfare programmes as the primary responsibility of the state; the PRP stands for an independent national economy which will uphold the dignity of labour and ensure that the people enjoy the fruits of economic development; the GNPP is traditionalist in its objectives; the NPP and the NPN are ideologically closely allied, with the principal appeal of the NPP arising from the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and his traditional political stature.²⁵¹)

The NPN which is the dominant (although not majority) party in government and whose leader, Shehu Shagari is President, is most closely committed to the existing social order in Nigeria and the political objectives of the Constitution. Many of the executive leaders of the NPN have been in government either during the civilian political era or during the military regime. (Both Shagari and Akinloye (the party chairman) were members of the NNI which controlled the federal government during the 1964-1966 crisis years.) Electoral contest within the NPN was not based on individual standing. The party adopted a conscious zoning policy toward the distribution of party officials and government nominations, which

institutionalized the diversity in the country. Specific party positions were allocated to specific sectors of the country. For example, the office of the party chairman was allocated to the western sector of the country and so the contest for this office was open only to members from this sector. The presidential candidate was to be selected from the northern sector and no member of the party was entitled to stand for party presidential nomination if he/she was not from the northern sector of Nigeria.  

The extent to which the new political parties reflect those political alliances and ethno-regional factions which predated the military regime is an issue of some controversy. It is significant to note that all five political parties are led and controlled by politicians who had actively participated in politics and risen to prominence prior to the intervention of the military. The expectation that old politicians would be replaced by a 'new breed' has not materialized and indeed, the old political cliques have displaced many aspiring political groups, as evidenced by the application of 19 political associations for registration as political parties of which only five were found acceptable. Furthermore, analysis has shown a distinct ethno-regional bias in the support ratios accorded the five political parties: the NPN is supported mostly by the Hausa-Fulani and Northern people; the UFN by the Yoruba; the NIP has a predominantly Ibo support base; the FRP finds its majority support in Kano state; and the GNPP fosters the support of minority groups.

Whereas political parties are the major vehicles of the political culture and socialization of a nation, their values and objectives in an open political system are shaped by a spectrum of influences and pressure groups. Owing to the nature of the Nigerian political system and the

impediments placed upon the political process, it is difficult to precisely describe the nature of the civic culture. Rather we argue that the civic culture in Nigeria is in a process of transition and conversion from the regionalistic to the nationalistic, in which a delicate and most tenuous balance between past and future is the sustaining force. The principal determinants of this balance are the military, the bureaucracy and the labour unions. (It is possible to suggest that the political parties should be included as determinants of the balance; however, in as much as the stability of the civil polity is at issue here, it is contended that the political parties represent the fulcrum of the balance and not variables.)

Military intervention in politics sets a precedent for the future stability of the civil polity in as much as the military can only be expected to refrain from intervention in the political system if some degree of political order can be maintained. The influence of the Nigerian Armed Forces in the political process in Nigeria is of paramount importance, due to the fact that the military came to power (apparently with great reluctance) in the wake of the collapse of the political order under the weight of economic and political corruption and ethno-regional feuding on a scale which threatened the national survival. The military forces (three coups, one attempted coup and a civil war later) are seen as the saviours of the nation, the custodians of the national conscience, not because their performance in political office has been any better than might have been expected from a civil regime, but from the nature of the armed forces as a corporate disciplined body with the power to impose their authority without responsibility to anybody but themselves, as opposed to the vicissitudes of the civil body politic. As a consequence, no future

political system in Nigeria will endure without the approval of the military.

As a military man, I have no political ambition. My task is not to impose any form of Government on the people but to pave the way for the people to determine the form of Government they wish for ensuring stability and unity of the country.\textsuperscript{255)

Our purpose is to instill a new sense of public morality among all classes of Nigerians. Let me, therefore, here and now serve notice that we shall not tolerate indiscipline. We shall not condone corruption. We shall not allow inefficiency or improper conduct on the part of any public officer ... The Federal Military Government will continue to ensure the smooth running of essential services.\textsuperscript{256)

The fact that these two statements are separated by an elapse of ten years underscores the assertion that a military government, in as much as it has the physical means (force of numbers, weapons, transport etc.) and is able to credibly present itself as a disciplinary authority deriving its legitimacy from the need for socio-political reform and to safeguard the continuity of the nation state, finds it very difficult to transfer authority back to a civilian regime. It is notoriously easier for the armed forces to seize political control than to give it up.\textsuperscript{257)

This may be ascribed to several reasons, among them the fact that in the wake of the suspension of normal political association the political culture is unable to find spontaneous expression and it is difficult to ensure that there will not be a reversal of the principle in the name of which they made the intervention. The military on the other hand, is actively concerned with politics through the act of governing and develops a separate political culture within which it seeks to structure future

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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civil order; thus evolves a degree of responsibility (and the need to justify its actions) to the politicized factions within the military itself, upon whom a military government becomes just as dependent for support as a civilian regime. It is for these reasons that the military can never entirely relinquish its political role after the transfer of authority to a civilian political system. The stability of the politicized military hierarchy itself, would be threatened if it were to remain impassive to disagreeable action by a civilian political authority. The politicized military has developed its own type of political consciousness, 'class interest' and political values, and although there are no credible mono-causal explanations for a military putsch, it can be assumed that government will be required to function within the parameters of political acceptability.

The administrative continuity of any governmental system is provided by the bureaucracy, and the role of the civil service in Nigeria has been described as follows:

The members of the Civil Service are often the only concrete manifestation of government for the citizens... Collectively, therefore, the Civil Service is a crucial factor for stability, and for the direction and speed of economic and social progress... The Higher Civil Service ... participates fully in the formulation of policy and at the same time is responsible for the execution of agreed policy ... it can be argued that the policy formulating role of the Higher Civil Service has expanded or has been given greater recognition, under the Military Regime.

No government is able to govern effectively without the co-operation of the civil service; however, under a military regime the civil service is


elevated to a position of far more direct political consequence than under a civilian government. Indeed, it has been suggested that the civil service; "...cossetts the new regime in its shaky first hours and makes sure it survives".\(^{260}\) The civil service is able to fill the vacuum left by the displacement of the civilian political authority, in as much as the military is dependent upon the bureaucracy for the legitimization of its claim to government. The military substitute an 'administered society' for a 'political society' and depend upon the bureaucracy to administer.

The military wants to be in politics but it is inept; it doesn't know how. It has no talent for politics... and the army can't administer anything. So it makes a marriage of convenience with the civil service. It gives them substantive power and administration in exchange for being able to stay in. The military doesn't want to rule with the gun so it needs the civil service.\(^{261}\)

The implications are self-evident, in that the bureaucracy in Nigeria has developed a self-contained autonomy, and a corporateness almost akin to that of the military elite, free from political interference or responsibility. The Nigerian civil servant, in the freedom of initiative and freedom of action in the administrative and political spheres accorded him under the military regime, has become a most significant political actor. The politicized bureaucracy can only be expected to refrain from seeking alliance with the Nigerian Armed Forces in pursuit of a mutual 'political interest' as long as the civilian polity remains within the bounds of the bureaucratically acceptable. The civil


service can create the conditions and opportunities for military intervention and in this newly conferred power, sets significant limits to political control and authority.

Political parties in Nigeria have from earliest times sought alliance with labour unions, and the latter were a significant element in the nationalist drive for independence. Nigeria thus has a long history of trade unionism and the labour movements through industrial action have in recent times proved to be a most significant pressure group. The trade unions of Nigeria have traditionally been organized into a number of national trade union centres; the most important since independence have been the United Labour Congress of Nigeria (ULC), the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), the Labour Unity Front (LUF) and the Christian Nigerian Workers' Council (NWC). During 1963 the major union centres formed a Joint Action Committee (JAC) in alliance against the government. Widespread strike action during September 1963, timed to coincide with the inauguration of the first President of the Republic, caused serious disruption throughout Nigeria and embarassed the Government in the presence of foreign government representatives and the international press. Internally the strike served to dramatize the political discontent and to polarize the conflict along class lines. This strike was followed during early 1964 by a general strike, which brought the country to a standstill, and the decision by the JAC to boycott the 1964 elections. Although the latter action was not entirely successful, the concerted opposition of the labour movements paved the way for the subsequent collapse of the federal government;
The General Strike of 1964 and the subsequent election fracas had helped to delineate a popular enemy, a political class apparently hell-bent on preserving their power and appropriating the lion's share of the available wealth against all comers.  

The coup of 1966 was motivated by the same contempt for the corrupt politicians which was basic to the agitation of the trade unions. While conscious of the possibilities of co-operation with the military authorities, the union centres made no sustained attempt to forge labour unity or to adopt a common programme. The NTUC heads apparently made it clear that they expected the military leaders to act as a "corrective" regime whose task was to bridge the disparity in incomes, and that failure to act on this issue would, at some later state, produce "industrial upheaval".  

During the civil war the union leaders tacitly agreed to refrain from industrial action which might impair the war effort. However, the burden of special war taxation and the effects of war shortages produced widespread grassroots agitation during early 1968. As a result the Federal Military Government promulgated a decree (Decree No. 21 of 1968) effectively outlawing the right to strike. The effect of the Decree was to temporarily restrain industrial action for the duration of the war, but on the cessation of hostilities the pent-up dissatisfaction broke loose in a period of unprecedented union turmoil (for example, there were 143 official strikes in 1971 alone, not counting walkouts, stoppages and industrial sabotage). The Government set up the Adebo Commission to advise on the labour predicament. The first report of the Commission recommended substantial back-dated salary increases for both public and private sector workers, which the Government, under pressure from employers associations, declined to make obligatory. The resultant union action was predictable, 

265) Ibid, P278 and P228.  
266) Ibid, P235.
with widespread industrial sabotage and smashing of factories, with self-evident consequence for an economy battling to overcome the setbacks of the civil war. When the final report of the Commission recommended an average 30 per cent increase in salary levels the Government was forced to accept the findings without question. 267)

The most remarkable demonstration of the direct political influence of labour unions came during 1975 when the Federal Military Government announced its intention of delaying the scheduled transition to civil rule. Widespread strikes and industrial action forced the Government into accepting wage settlements amounting, in some instances, to a 100 per cent increase. The inflationary spiral and socio-economic disruption initiated by the unions is seen as having substantially prepared the way for the ousting of Gowon. 268) The unions' success in forcing government accession to their demands, over an extended period of time, has set an important precedent.

In the absence of political parties the trade unions constituted one of the few associations through which public attitudes could find expression and the unions developed an independent corporate consciousness, a confidence of action and an effectiveness of organization in dealing with the military regime. The increased coherence of the trade unions, the measure of past popular support extending well beyond the ranks of union members, public acquiescence in industrial action as a tool of political pressure, and the unions' traditional ability to organize across ethnic lines make the trade unions indispensable allies to the legitimacy


268) Lawson, K, "Nigeria's future Constitution" in Journal of African Studies, Vol 3, Part 1, Spring 1975, Los Angeles, P31. It is important to note that a general distinction is made between 'elected politicians' (members of the Assembly) and 'leadership'. 
and stability of any government in Nigeria.

Political stability is assumed to ensue from an alliance of socio-political forces institutionalized in organizational procedure over a period of time, and structural changes within the alliance are seen to proceed from the rules governing the organizational process. The balance of socio-political forces in Nigeria is an extremely delicate one in which there is no stabilizing social or political value hierarchy, central political cohesiveness or national loyalty (that is to say, those elements basic to theoretical notions of political socialization; the institutions of the Nigerian polity do not proceed from a national political socialization). The ethno-regional cleavages which characterize the Nigerian nation and which have been fundamental to the historical political incapacity of the country, are complicated by elite group polarizations and professional political factionalism, which makes the organization of power for political stability dependent on a spectrum of volatile variables, each with a political 'self-interest' and self-sustaining corporate legitimacy independent of government. The mutual tolerance and compromise between socio-political factions and segmental interests fundamental to social alliance and government capability is constitutionally contrived in Nigeria, and the authority and capacity of the Nigerian Government is confined within the stricture of this unnatural balance.

The fundamental concern in the consideration of political organization as an element in national capability analysis is the notion of political stability. Political stability is a necessary pre-condition for the effective mobilization of national capability potential, political control and authority. Nigeria has a legacy of political instability which is basic to any analysis of the potential capability of the country. However, as has been emphasized, capability is a relative concept, and so too, as a determinant of this capability, is the notion of political stability. In drawing conclusions from the examination of the notoriously
unstable political organization of Nigeria, a measure of the relativity of Nigerian political instability must be sought.

Political instability is often considered to be inherent to developing nations; instability is generally defined as changes within a society which do not conform to, or proceed from the rules governing organizational processes in the society. The methodological concern derives from the requirements of structural theory, the need of an ordered pattern and predictability, and this political stability is generally equated with political order; the yardstick for political order being the 'modern democratic' system.\(^{269}\) Using this measure it is possible to draw up a comparative matrix of political order by comparing the pattern of political change and the extent to which such change stems from the established 'democratic' or constitutional order in a selection of African states. The intention is simply to cover a span of anglo-phone and franco-phone African states of comparable status and historical background.

\(^{269}\) Dudley, BJ, *op cit*, PP3-10.
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<th>NATURE OF EXECUTIVE AT INDEPENDENCE</th>
<th>NATURE OF LEGISLATURE AT INDEPENDENCE</th>
<th>PARTY STRUCTURE AT INDEPENDENCE</th>
<th>&quot;DEMOCRATIC&quot; EXERCISES SINCE INDEPENDENCE</th>
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* INCLUDES REFERENDUMS, LEGISLATURE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

SOURCES: KEEPS, CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, VARIOUS VOLS. 1960-1979, LONGMAN, LONDON
It is evident that the ratio of change in the political structures of the states considered is of a high order; all (except the Ivory Coast) have undergone fundamental changes in the nature of the political organizations which prevailed at independence. The ratio of political order to political instability may be roughly calculated at 3:1 — political order being determined by the number of 'democratic' exercises (an average of 3.1) and instability, by the number of changes which do not proceed from the rules governing the organizational process (the average being 1.03). Taking this ratio as a yardstick of the relativity of political instability of Nigeria at 2:3, it may thus be concluded, that in relation to a cross-section of Nigeria's contemporaries (albeit a generalistic equation) the level of Nigerian political instability is exceedingly high and far outstrips the average measure. It is also pertinent to note the large average ratio of structural resilience to extra-procedural change, in that only two of the seven states (Zambia and the Ivory Coast) have never experienced attempted coups, yet four of the seven have never in fact had the political order overthrown by force. Nigeria's record of instability is only challenged by that of Ghana, but even in this instance it may be contended that, on balance, the ratio of order to instability at 4:4 reflects a more favourable average.

Deutsch has developed a "stability index" which has as its variables the ratio of government income to total national income, the percentage level of literacy, the degree of political participation, the total national income and the income received by the top ten per cent of the population. On this basis, given the total national product, political stability would vary with the level of literacy and participation in decisionmaking, the latter being measured in terms of the ratio of the voting population to the total population.270) (This formula would be

most suitable in measuring the political stability of South Africa, for example, but the index employed here is intended to illuminate relativity). Huntington and Lucian Pye, in turn, relate stability to the ratio between the levels of political institutionalization and political participation. While these analyses all have relevance, the nature of the Nigerian dilemma is far more fundamental.

The ethno-regional cleavages complicate every facet of the Nigerian milieu. The fundamental inability of the colonially inherited political structures to maintain a balance between order and change (which is characteristic of all developing societies) may be directly related to that same legacy's inability to transform the parochial to the universal or the tribalistic to the nationalistic. The balance of forces upon which the civic order in any state is necessarily based is weighted in Nigeria by traditional ethno-regional bias, the elitist segmentation and corporate factionalism of the military and bureaucracy, and the institutionalized political influence of the Nigerian labour unions. The extent to which the present constitutional dispensation may bridge these cleavages is limited by the independent legitimacy of these factions (most especially the military and civil service). The institutions of the Nigerian political structure do not arise from a spontaneous political socialization, but are structures which seek to balance the disparate factions. The instability implicit in so tenuous a balance clearly negates national capability potential.

2.4 National character and morale

The national character of a nation is of significance to national capability analysis in so far as the national character is deemed to represent a summation of the societal values, norms and attitudes of the nation. This national value hierarchy is the product of a combination

of influences including the physical environment, socio-cultural origins and the shared historical experience, and political interaction is very largely shaped by specific national value orientations. The values and attitudes of a nation determine the national loyalties and interests which are fundamental to national objectives.

National morale, in turn, represents the degree of acquiescence which exists among different groups in society in the government’s (leadership) pursuit of the national objective. Indeed, the extent to which the value derived national objectives reflect an aggregate of societal norms will largely determine the inclination of the national morale. While both national character and morale are elusive, intangible concepts, their influence in the context of national capability potential is of significance in as much as they represent the fundamental motivation and genesis of political action. National character delimits the socio-political value structure within which political action is assumed to be determined and the more responsive the political action to the national values, the greater will be the national morale and the greater the degree of popular mobilization in pursuit of the objectives of policy.

2.4.1 National character

The national character of Nigeria is diffuse and ill-defined, and is the almost inevitable consequence of the diverse origins and ethnic heterogeneity of the Nigerian nation. The arbitrary nature of the borders of the Nigerian state led to the encompassing of some 200 different ethnic groups within the national entity, of which three predominate almost to the exclusion of all others. The diversity of ethnicity and ancestral origin was complicated by an uneveness of colonial influence. Topographical characteristics restricted European
intrusion and facilitated the political manifestation of the ethno-regional segmentation within a colonially contrived political entity. The Nigerian colonial experience was transitory, and beyond the immediate limits of colonial influence there was no national acculturation drive (unlike the 'assimilados' in the Portuguese colonies or the colonial policy pursued in the franco-phone territories, which regarded the territories as provinces of metropolitan France and sought to closely integrate the colonials into the French-system). The result is a conflict between a superficial Europeanizing influence and fundamental traditional cultures which forms the basis of the contemporary Nigerian national character.

The socio-political values of the different ethnic groups diverge radically, running the gamut from those that derive from adherence to the rigid caste structure and the traditionally powerful emirs of the North to those consonant with government run by village meetings. Even within individual ethnic groupings, great differences exist between the forms of society in different areas. For example, the social mobility of commoners varies greatly among the traditional Hausa states, and the more than 200 independent Ibo village groupings include monarchical governments as well as those conducted by town meetings. Nevertheless, the great majority of the people hold values broadly characteristic of one of three sets of values, conforming with the traditional ethnic divisions. To the traditional ethnic divisions pertaining in Nigerian society must be added the educated elite and increasing urban-dweller class who have in widely varying degrees, broken their ties to the traditional order. Also in varying degrees, they have adapted to their needs the social and political values brought to the country by contact with European and American cultures. 272)

The adherence of groups already separated by ethnic differences to varying sets of values has the impact of creating ideological barriers between major elements of the society. The Ibo and most of the eastern ethnic groups come from societies that have traditionally subscribed to a concept of individualism, competition, personal aggressiveness, and freedom from rigid class differences. The Ibo believe that status must be bargained for and regarded as a measure of worth. Concomitant with the Ibo philosophy of self-improvement, great emphasis is placed on education overseas and outward signs of wealth and prestige, as well as participation in community affairs. The origins of political power among the Ibo are reflected by the dictum that "no-one knows the womb that bears the chief", indicative of the open nature of their traditional society in which any man may become leader by displaying superior ability.

The Yoruba value system places high regard on individual effort, but within a formally stratified traditional order. Among the Yoruba only the kingship itself is hereditary and although commoners are not in a position to challenge the king's chiefly supporters, the commoners are the ones who elect members of their tribal compound or village to the chieftainship.

Among the Hausa and their associate groupings the lines of class distinction are generally rigidly drawn; traditional authority is exercised by an hierarchical court structure and ultimate traditional power lies in the hands of an ethnically distinguished elite — the Fulani. Leadership is primarily based on inherited dynastic position rather than on personal achievement, and little room exists for personal upward mobility in either the socio-political or economic order.

In all ethnic groups, however, the communal spirit is strong and the extended family is the most important and basic element in the social
structure. Common values which derive from the primordial ties of blood and lineage include a respect for age, the high value set on fertility and differentiated social roles for the sexes (the accent on male dominance is greater among the Muslims). Marriage is regarded primarily for procreation, and sterility or celibacy are regarded as social taboos and constitute a legal ground for divorce. Polygamous marriages are commonplace and the tie between husband and wife is generally much weaker than the tie between either parent. Furthermore, groups bound by common ancestry form the principal or exclusive basis for the organization of social life, land-tenure and roles of traditional authority in most traditional systems. Religion too, has broad social dimensions alongside its spiritual value. The interplay between the indigenous traditional religions and the foreign imports of Islam and Christianity has created a complex range of beliefs and practices.  

Members of Nigeria's educated elite and urban classes have been subject to the influence of several conflicting sets of values, deriving in part from their ethnic background and in part from the impact of Western values and norms. Many of the educated elite were born into ethnic groups characterized by rigid systems of social stratification. Some of the principles and practices introduced by the British supported the traditional patterns, some were in conflict with the patterns and with each other. Thus the British tended to support the traditional patterns of authority in the North, but also accredited superior positions and status to those with higher education and wealth. The emphasis on education gave priority to achievement, but for many Nigerians the acquisition of the appropriate credentials (degrees) meant that they alone were fit to rule. This notion is more compatible with some

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traditional political systems and values, but hardly in keeping with the notions of popular rule and parliamentary democracy, also nurtured by the British. For many of the new educated power elite there arose a clear conflict between their belief that only they had the right to make political decisions and the premise that a democratically functioning parliamentary system is the most desirable form of government — with the well annulled outcome. 274)

The expanding urban classes in Nigeria, in the post-independence era, have increasingly come to be seen as consonant with the Nigerian national character. While this is not necessarily true, the urbanized population of Nigeria has been central to the conflict between traditional values and loyalties, and the values of the metropolitan world. Western political and socio-economic values have been institutionalized in Nigeria by the educated elite in power at the national level. Such values are customarily used as the yardsticks of modernization and development, but generally fail to make provision for the evolution of consonant values during the transition from status quo to 'modernization'. (That is to say, that the developed-developing dichotomies are pernicious, in as much as the levels of democratic or industrial sophistication by which the standards are set, developed over several centuries and sprang very largely from the spontaneous and gradual evolution of socio-cultural values and attitudes.) The effects of this distortion of values in Nigeria have been several.

While Nigerian people have a long history of ethno-political organizational sophistication, the federal constitutional structures formulated prior to independence did not arise from any consonant value commitment, other

than a desire to be free of colonial occupation. The subsequent collapse of the structures do not, however, detract from the commitment of the politicised elite to the concepts and ideals of democratic forms of government. It is significant to note that the first concern of each successive military regime has been a commitment to a speedy return to democratic rule.\(^\text{275}\) The decision of the Federal Military Government in 1974 to postpone its programme for a return to civilian rule came as a direct challenge to the accepted political values of the politicised elite, but most were apparently willing to subordinate their desire for an elected government to the primary values of national unity and stability. General Murtala Mohammed in an address to the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee expressed the sentiments of the power elite thus:

... I trust that you will keep it in mind that the Constitution which we need has to reflect our past experience, while at the same time paying attention to the equally important fact that a good Constitution must also be capable of influencing the nature and orderly development of the politics of people ... We are committed to a ... free democratic and lawful system of Government which guarantees fundamental human rights; ... to the emergence of a stable system of Government through Constitutional law.\(^\text{276}\)

The Constitution which subsequently emerged embraces this commitment and whether it endures or not the basic value orientation cannot be denied.

A review of the submissions made by the Nigerian public to the Constitution Drafting Committee and the extended press debate preceding the publication of the Draft Constitution provides further insight into the most significant value orientations among the politicised elite of

\(^{275}\) Lawson, K, op cit, Pp3-29 establishes in a survey of academics and Nigerian intelligentsia that civilian democracy is among the highest political values.

Nigeria. The themes are several. Thus, for example, the notion of greater socio-economic equality resulted in intense debate as to the merits of socialism as the national objective for Nigeria:

Within the context of a participatory democracy informed by the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Justice, the state shall, as a long-term goal, strive towards a socialist order based on public ownership and control of the means of production and distribution.\(^{277}\)

This is where the constitution should play an important role: to provide the State should not use its position to suppress individual private ownership where such ownership is to give greater services and goods to the people with a greater efficiency.\(^{278}\)

There was even a suggestion that no Nigerian should be permitted to hold more than one piece of land in private ownership. The majority committee of the Constitution Drafting Committee eventually accepted the argument that a 'mixed economy' was the most acceptable to Nigerians as a whole.\(^{279}\)

A similarly recurrent value orientation is the commitment to self-reliance and the revulsion for discrimination or neo-colonialism:

> We must do away with this dependency syndrome and emphasise home grown technology. Even if in their early attempts our managers or engineers (SLG) fail or make mistakes ... so what? We have a right to make our own mistakes after all.\(^{280}\)

> It is evident... that the destiny of Nigeria is linked with that of all progressive forces in the world seeking to create a new

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279) Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Vol I, op cit, Para 3, Subpara 7(1) and (2).

world of justice and social progress, and against Imperialism and all forms of exploitation.\textsuperscript{231)\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{}}}}

Akin to these sentiments is a strong commitment to pan-Africanism, which finds its roots in the 'Africa consciousness' awakened by the nationalist struggle and evoking a commitment to the; "...total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa".\textsuperscript{282)}

It is an unfortunately notorious fact that one of the primary economic and political goals of the modern urban elite in Nigeria has become the acquisition of material wealth and personal power. In recent years corruption has become a hallmark of Nigerian society. Referred to as the "boom mentality" it has been suggested that corruption has replaced communalism as the principal socio-political dilemma.\textsuperscript{233)}

The wealthy are accorded precedence in everything. They are given the best seats in the church or at social functions; they are able to get their children into the best schools; they have the influence to secure employment for their children and the children of their relations; they are able to assert their rights through the law courts and, in many cases can get the police to turn a blind eye to their misdemeanours and there is no doubt that the wealthy have a good edge over the poor in the competition for the good things of life.\textsuperscript{234)}

Explanation, of what to the observer seems to be morally indefensible, refers to the notion that all relationships whether political, social or simply administrative are affected by the traditional culture, in which all relationships are part of the complex network of family, clan and ethnic group ties. This has two effects: it makes people expect to see one of their own group in any position of authority with which they deal; it also causes them to regard a political leader in terms at least

\textsuperscript{282) Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, Vol I, op cit, Paral.}
\textsuperscript{233) Enloe, CH, op cit, P158.}
\textsuperscript{234) Bolaji, L, Anatomy of Corruption in Nigeria, Daystar Press, Ibadan, 1970, P9.}
analogous to the holder of a traditional position of authority. In the emirates, for example, traditional officers had fiiefs assigned to them, which were to produce income for a person as a reward for filling the office. Stewards on these fiiefs collected taxes, supplies and labour forces on their master's behalf. These stewards, in turn, drew reimbursement for their work by retaining a portion of all taxes and by accepting gifts from favour seekers. A similar situation apparently prevailed among other ethnic groups.

During the colonial era, many officeholders regarded the salaries as a replacement only for that portion of the collected taxes that traditionally they would have been permitted to retain as compensation from their employer. They continued to expect and receive the other half of their income in the form of gifts and payments from subordinates and the public. Such gifts were regarded as recompense for granting requests and favours even though these acts involved the performance of official duties. New office-seekers expected to pay such a gift in return for assistance in obtaining a civil service appointment. Civil servants expected to pay for promotions, and the general public expected to pay for small administrative services by government officials. What appears to be bribery is thus regarded by most Nigerians as a legitimate act of recognition due to a superior.\textsuperscript{285}) Corruption has become so fundamental a dilemma that the new constitution includes a code of conduct for public officers, to be enforced by a Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal.\textsuperscript{286})

A similar conflict between the traditional and modern has arisen with regard to the work ethic. The psychological impact of slave labour and the colonial connotations of master and servant have given rise to the

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notion among the growing number of educated youth that manual labour is degrading and humiliating. In a predominantly agricultural community, the socio-economic implications of this value orientation are serious, and recent policy objectives have emphasized the need for a reorientation of the value attached to work. "The promotion of a new national orientation conducive to greater discipline, better attitude to work and cleaner environment."267)

The ethno-cultural heterogeneity of the Nigerian nation and colonial influence have effectively precluded the emergence of any cohesive national value hierarchy; this is a factor basic to the large degree of socio-political schism and elite stratification (relations between the military, bureaucratic and political elites, for example) which bedevils the contemporary Nigerian socio-political milieu.

Ethno-regional loyalties, indigenous culture and colonialist values could not be assimilated within the political structures created at independence in accord with British socio-political precepts. In the wake of the collapse of the structures previously held together by the bridging euphoria of pre-independence nationalism, the elite—non-elite, regional-national, indigenous-European, socio-cultural and political cleavages have been vastly complicated by the stratification of self-reinforcing elites, growing urbanization, greatly increased educational opportunities, disaffection for agricultural and manual labour, and a growth in the consciousness of the urban working classes. The withdrawal of the colonial authorities at independence left a socio-cultural vacuum which was filled by rapid Nigerianization and the consequent expansion of the "talented tenth" power elite (institutionalized in political power) to include a broader urbanized bourgeoisie (including bureaucrats, academics, labour

leaders, military, media, and a small commercial bourgeoisie). The refraction of the bourgeoisie by the displacement of the governmental elite facilitated the rise of the military and the bureaucracy as self-reinforcing and independently legitimate elites. The resultant power-elite 'triuvirate' (military-bureaucratic-politicians) shaped by historical experience and sustained by the apparent cohesiveness of the elite — non-elite dichotomy, has become the progenitor of the national socio-political value hierarchy.

Unless the goals and the fundamental attitudes and values that should inform the behaviour of its members and institutions are clearly stated and accepted, a new nation is likely to find itself rudderless, with no sense of purpose and direction. By defining the goals of society and prescribing the institutional forms and procedures for pursuing them, a statement of fundamental objectives and directive principles in our constitution seeks to direct and concert the efforts and actions of the people towards the achievement of those goals. In this way it seeks to unite the society into one nation bound together by common attitudes and values, common institutions and procedures, and above all acceptance of common objectives and destiny. 283)

It has been suggested that the Nigerian national character is in a process of metamorphosis 289) in which a plethora of indigenous, ethnic, acquired and aspired values and attitudes are to be assimilated into the idealistic hierarchy of values and attitudes deemed by the elite-triuvirate to constitute the aggregate. Such a value structure, which is both formative and regulative, is centred upon the ethic of discipline, self-reliance and patriotism, 290) and subsumes the values of liberty, justice, democracy, egalitarianism, the dignity of labour, the abhorrence of racial discrimination, pan-Nigerianism and pan-Africanism. 291) In as much as such values are deemed to represent a summation of the societal

values and aspirations of the Nigerian nation they are fundamental to the national objective and thus to capability (in as much as capability is the fundamental measure of a state's capacity to fulfil national objectives).

2.4.2 National morale

The inherent lack of a cohesive national value hierarchy, the lack of any mass political party and the notorious lack of Nigerian national unity make the national morale of Nigeria almost unidentifiable. National morale is synonymous with the national identification with the nation state. In view of the historical parochialism, segmentation and party political entrenchment of ethno-regional diversities, it is self-evident that the national morale of Nigeria is historically of a highly fragmented nature.

Although the concept of a united federal republic has the apparent support of the majority of the politically informed population, only a small number of Nigerians — even among the modernized elite, see the national entity as the object of their primary political attachment or allegiance. Rather, most Nigerians pay primary loyalty to a much smaller unit, usually a traditional ethnic entity, or a regional amalgam of related ethnic units. For many, this may not necessarily conflict with the broader concept of the nation or national entity as the whole, of which the object of their primary allegiance is a part.292) On the other hand though, secession and the civil war are manifestations of the divisiveness of this fractured national loyalty. The civil war did have the effect of bridging ethno-regional polarizations in the major part of the country and effected a large degree of national mobilization on behalf of the Federal Government. It served to clearly identify the federal parts as

a national whole and to create a deterrent to any future contemplation of regional secession.

The war and the experience of the majority of Nigerians during the darkest days of the long drawn-out crises have demonstrated that Nigeria is no longer a mere "geographic expression". She has indeed emerged from the war as a united country.²⁹³)

National unity has been the primary concern of government since the collapse of the central political authority in 1966, and in the wake of the civil war the Federal Military Government sought to sustain and cement the degree of national unity which has been effected by the military mobilization. Policies of national reconciliation did much to reunite the secessionists. The ethno-sociological facts peculiar to Nigeria make national unity a very tenuous issue, in as much as the experience of the civil war, in which Nigerians pitted strength against each other, affected the lives of all Nigerians in a lesser or greater way, and the animosity of the experience inevitably runs very deep, especially among the Ibo. Thus, whereas the state structure has been completely transformed, there is no overlooking the fact that the country is still divided into three distinguishable regions and that ethnic and regional cohesive ness traverses any federally constituted boundaries. (Nigeria is at present divided into 19 states of which ten are in the North, four in the East and five in the West.) In short, Nigeria does not display the high level of psychological integration characteristic of a political community, as the federal state structure has instituted little other than administrative reorganization.²⁹⁴)

The basic engine or mobilizing agent of the national morale is the political culture and as the political culture among the broader mass of Nigerians has been moribund for 13 years and limited very largely to

²⁹⁴) Graf, TD, op cit, PP71-74.
a politicised elite, the spontaneity of public resolve on policy issues, identification with national and party-political symbolism, and the political traditions of lobbying, demonstrations etc. (all facets accepted as part of an open-ended political culture) are hardly features of the broader political participation in Nigeria. This inherent lack of national political assertion and identification is evidenced by the order of the Federal Military Government that all primary and secondary school classrooms should contain the national flag and that the pupils should twice daily pledge their allegiance to the flag as a symbol of national unity. 295

... it is a matter of great concern that not many... can recite the words of our National Anthem and it is no exaggeration to say that many... may not be able to recognise the design and colours of our National Flag... the time has come for conscious efforts to develop in our people... attitudes of mind conducive to the realisation of a great, and united and prosperous country which they should always be proud of and whose symbols — the National Anthem and Flag — they should respect and honour. 296

National integration is a central objective of the new constitution and the state is constitutionally bound to foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the various peoples of the Federation, to the end that loyalty to the nation shall override sectional loyalties. 297 Such an undertaking is of a long-term nature and the results largely intangible; however, the degree of national mobilisation which the state-leadership may effect is an indication of the extent of its authority and capacity, and in the absence of a political culture based upon a hierarchy of national values and attitudes, the state-leadership's role needs to be of primary formative significance, given the need of a national morale

295) HE Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, Speech on the Occasion of the Formal Launching of the Scheme for Universal Primary Education, op cit, P77.


derived from a spontaneous national sentiment.

In view of the above, it is clear that there are four independent variables in the determination of the national morale in Nigeria, namely the political, military, bureaucratic and trade unionist; failure to strike an accommodation with at least three of these variables will leave any two of the variables free to collude to subvert the political leadership — the bureaucracy, for example, cannot bid for political power without the collusion of either the military, trade unions or the elected politicians to bring down political institutions. Similarly, the military cannot rule without bureaucratic collusion, and the trade unions can bring about the collapse of political authority only in conjunction with military, bureaucratic or political impasse. Political leadership on the other hand, needs to maintain support in at least three of these constituencies in order to maintain political stability and the inclination of the national morale, thus, may be gauged from the degree of support accorded political action by these four variables. The balance will indeed determine the political leadership's ability to mobilize the broader Nigerian nation in pursuit of policy objectives and is absolutely fundamental to the maximization of political action.

2.5 Political leadership

The nature of the political leadership of a state determines the nature of the role which a state 'fashions for itself; that is to say, that the leadership echelon serves as the catalyst in the mobilization and utilization of a state's potential capability. If a state, for example, has considerable capability potential, such potential would remain latent if forceful and determined leadership were lacking (the same would be equally applicable if the reverse were true). Leadership is responsible
for the mobilization and manipulation of the capability resources which a state has at its disposal in pursuit of the maximization of national objectives founded upon and interpreted within the framework of societal values and goals, of which the leadership elite is a product. The role to which a state aspires in interaction with the regional and global environment is fashioned and determined by leadership.

2.5.1 The nature of leadership

The leadership elite in any state is the product of various socializing influences which extend through the national historical experience to determine the animus and the nature of political leadership. In Nigeria the leadership elite that emerged to take over control from the colonial praeutors was the product of the colonial experience — a clique of urbanized, educated men united by a nationalist purpose, but separated by individual ethnic loyalties and an unwillingness to subordinate regional power to central authority. This leadership clique was characterized by an ethnic messianism and personal characterization of leadership which has been described as bordering on "excessive heroworshipping and mass sycophancy"; hence Azikiwe was known as "Zik the Saviour", Awolowo as "Leader of the Yorubas" and the Sardauna as the "Incarnation of the Hausa". The almost mystical personification of leadership evoked an intolerance of dissent or opposition and fragmented the leadership elite along the lines of their individual, distinctively

298) Dudley, BJ, op cit, P41. Also Ayandele, EA, The Educated Elite in Nigerian Society, op cit, P44.0-145. There are obviously several levels of 'leadership' and 'decisionmaking', but our study is concerned with the highest eschelon of the executive hierarchy. It is argued that since all levels of the leadership hierarchy are the product of the same socio-historical influences they share the same values and limitations,

299) Bolaji, L, op cit, P36.

300) Dudley, BJ, op cit, P42.
ethnic, power bases. The consequence was that Nigeria has produced no 'father-figure' which could unite the nation, either charismatically or ideologically, over and above the ethno-political cleavages. Nigeria has traditionally lacked that charismatic leadership which is a symbol of the nation and which unites disparate forces into a single personalized whole and is seen to embody the values and aspirations of the nation (of the stature of a Nyerere, Kenyatta or Nkrumah).

The fragmented and corrupt nature of the political leadership elite facilitated the collapse of the political authority and the subsequent military intervention. The military had the physical means and corporate cohesiveness of enforcing their authority, and the military leadership elite saw their political role as one of modernization and stabilization for the preservation of the national unity. "The military Government ... is a corrective government designed to remove the abuses of the old regime..." and furthermore; "we are going to make civilians of proven honesty and efficiency who would be thoroughly hand-picked do all the governing... We would stand behind them with our fingers on the trigger".

The military-political elite sought to align the military with the national interest and with the belief declared by a leader of the January 1966 coup, that only in the army "do you find true Nigerianism". Thus Gowon could state with credibility when he first came to office that, "as a military man, I have no political ambition". The self-image of the leadership


elite was thus apparently one of soldier-reformer, and not politician. This dichotomy between soldier and politician, civil and military enforced the notion that the leadership's role was formative and disciplinary, but not participatory. The leadership elite maintained an image of corporate aloofness in which they had no role to play in the civil political institutions other than that of ordering and ensuring the continuity of the new civil political order.

We consider it our responsibility to lay the foundation of a self-sustaining political system which can stand the test of time in such a manner that each national political crisis does not become a threat to the nations continued existence as a single entity and which will ensure a smooth and orderly transition from one government to another. 305)

This style of leadership has been called "declaratory" 306) and indeed the military leadership elite was able to obtain an initial mandatory legitimacy through its declamation of general goals of political stability, national unity, elimination of corruption, discipline and a return to civilian rule. However, such political goals as the military-political leadership elite saw as the objective of their political leadership, were too general and poorly articulated to invoke a specific code of political conduct, leading to factionalism among the broader politicized military elite, the development of conflicting sub-goals together with a political inertness, resulting in attempts at reform appearing largely half-baked and symbolic. The military-political leadership elite thus faced the dual dilemma of the inability to sustain even a modicum of political legitimacy on the one hand, and having to be reactive to a factionally politicized military corps on the other.

It was not until after the civil war that any endeavour was made to


articulate national objectives in policy. These national objectives of national unity, self-reliance, egalitarianism, liberty and democracy as formulated in the Second National Development Plan were intended to guide the "utterances and actions" of all individuals in a position of authority and to inspire the Nigerian people "at all times". So too, these objectives were translated and made applicable to the wider African milieu. Thus Gowon declared during 1972:

We in Nigeria are determined to spare no efforts in the task to rid this great continent of ours of all vestiges of colonialism, racism and human indignity.

No outside help can liberate Africa unless Africa is prepared to take the initiative... One way of demonstrating that independent Africa is fully decolonised is to stop putting too much emphasis on outside help. We must place a higher premium on the virtues of self-reliance.

Thus, while the military-political leadership elite extolled the virtues of unity, liberty, equality, democracy, self-reliance and pan-Africanism the leadership's patent inability to mobilize the resources of the nation for short-term projections in pursuit of these perceived objectives led to stagnation, corruption and inefficiency. The military-political leadership elite was unable to muster the political managerial or organizational skills to bridge the gap between its illegitimacy in the eyes of the national civic constituency and its own factionalized power-base. The failure of the leadership elite to 'dirty its hands' in seeking to reforge political values and institutions made Nigeria a state


310) An example of this was the inability of the military to demobilize the extended armed forces, for fear of reactivating primordial ties.
administered by the bureaucracy and governed by a 'militocracy', aloof from the machinations of civil politics. The inability of the military-political leadership to use political means (public institutions, pressure groups etc.) to attain political objectives left the country as far from the leadership's objective of creating political stability as at the time of the coup. The objectives remained intangible and unattainable.

Thus when the political control was forcefully usurped by a different military elite clique in the coup of 1975, the emphasis on the disciplinary objective of military rule was forcefully expressed. The reasons were twofold: first, in order to legitimize (or at best justify) the intervention of the new regime sweeping purges of the public sector were undertaken, both as proof of the extent of the corruption and of the regime's bona fides; and secondly, to seek to discipline the factionalized military support base.

It is our intention to adopt a military posture in all our actions... This military administration intends to carry out its programme of economic, social and political activities with maximum dispatch... Leaders at all levels, past and present, will be held accountable for their deeds. The ills of the past are too well known and these we intend to cure.  

The objectives of the new military-political leadership remained unchanged, save in as much as the leadership elite was aware that it would be tolerated as long as it maintained its 'legitimacy'. A Constitution Drafting Committee was charged with producing a constitutional document which would provide;

"... a sound base for the continuing existence of a united Nigeria".  

The military leadership's charge included the elimination of "cut throat

311) Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, "Our Philosophy", An Address to the Press, August 22, 1975 in Call to Duty: Speeches of His Excellency Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo, op cit, P7-3.

politics", a firm adherence to the principle of public accountability, the evolution of "national political parties", and the emphasis of the federal character of the country in all public institutions. In broad terms the value aspirations which the elite sought to nationalize remained national unity, liberty, democracy, self-reliance and egalitarianism. However, while the leadership certainly sought to found a national value hierarchy upon these objectives, there were few illusions as to the limitations of superficially contrived political doctrine:

The evolution of a doctrinal concept is usually predicated upon the general acceptance by the people of a national political philosophy and, consequently, until our people, or a large majority of them have acknowledged a common ideological motivation, it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular philosophy or ideology in our Constitution.

After considerable public debate these values were endorsed by the Constitution Drafting Committee as representing the aggregate of aspired political values of the Nigerian nation, and were entrenched in the new constitution as the guiding values and objectives of all political action; unity, freedom, equality, justice, African unity, as well as;

... total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and States, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.

The new civilian political leadership elite in Nigeria has its value orientations and objectives most clearly defined and constitutionally controlled. In the pursuit of the maximization of these values the

313) Ibid, xlii - xliii.
314) Ibid, xliii.
political leadership (that is, the executive) is constrained by three constituencies; the political, the military and the bureaucratic, and the leadership's perceptual image must thus, of necessity, be responsive to such constraints. (Whereas trade unions were described as a variable determinant of national morale, they cannot independently and directly censure leadership initiative (although they can obviously express their disapproval) — the issue of political censure, and not possible collusion to undermine government authority, is of relevance here. Thus the 'legitimacy' (or 'freedom of action') of the political leadership rests upon the balance which can be maintained between these three constituencies in leadership's pursuit of national objectives, in that the delimited sovereignty and independent legitimacy possessed by the elected political representatives, the military and the bureaucracy accredit each with the power of censure (whether tacitly or overtly expressed) of leadership (executive) initiative.316)

In Nigeria, therefore, the objectives determining political action and the values influencing the perception of the present leadership elite are of necessity, more the product of consensus than constitutionally provided or intended. Political expedience demands a leadership's responsiveness to the main engines of political mobilization and presents thus, the paradox of a tenuous balance and resultant political instability on the one hand, and a most positive mobilizing capacity in pursuit of objectives formulated upon the broad consensus of the fundamental instruments of state, on the other. Political leadership is of primary significance in the context of national capability potential, in that

316) The institution of an executive Presidency has emphasized the traditionally personalized and 'limited' nature of political leadership in Nigeria. The President personifies executive responsibility and is therefore synonymous with our conception of the leadership or decisionmaking elite.
leadership is responsible for the mobilization and manipulation of resources in pursuit of national objectives. In as much as such national objectives are founded upon a broad consensus, (even though political stability depends upon it) the mobilizational capacity of leadership in Nigeria is proportionately greater and the overall capability potential of the country positively influenced.

The degree to which the social determinants of national capability are influenced by, and dependent upon the physical determinants is clearly evident from the above. The socio-political consequences of the ethno-regional cleavages identified as characteristic of the Nigerian physical geography and demography, dominate the social determinants of Nigerian capability potential. The fear of reactivating primordial ties and communal loyalties has inhibited to some degree, the conventional patterns of socialization, resulting in a contrived process of socio-cultural transformation being the central feature of the spectrum of social determinants of potential Nigerian capability.

The essentially long-term, intangible and evolutionary nature of this process of socio-cultural metamorphosis for national integration, makes difficult, specific assumptions about the mobilizing capacity of the social determinants for Nigerian national capability. Consequently, analysis must concentrate on prevailing and perceived socio-cultural and political characteristics, and past national historical experience. Thus the socio-political stability, and hence the mobilizing capacity of the social determinants of Nigeria, is subject to the interaction and mutual influence of several independent social factions or elite groups: military, political, bureaucratic and trade unionist. The extent to which there is consensus among these constituencies is the basic operative in the consideration of Nigeria's capacity for action. Implicit in this fact
in the notion that consensus facilitates greater national commitment to action and thus an extraordinary capability potential, but equally as evident is the fact that disequilibrium will result in socio-political instability sufficient to negate the effectiveness of political action and severely inhibit (if not entirely prevent) realization of capability potential. The national character, morale and political leadership are shaped by, and responsive to these influences, to the extent that political action must necessarily represent an aggregation of their specific interests.

The genesis of the pervading values, aspirations and objectives of the process of socio-cultural transformation lies in the national historical experience of Nigeria, overshadowed as it is, by socio-political instability and ethnic communalism. To this end innovative political structures have been forged and a philosophy intended to educate the Nigerian youth to these values has been conceived. The significance of the social determinants in national capability analysis thus largely depends on the durability of socio-political structures designed to restrain historical divisiveness and facilitate national integration and cohesiveness for national purpose.

3. Conclusion

This chapter has considered the variety of elements which constitute the national capability potential of the Nigerian state. National capability in turn, has been identified as the most fundamental of three basic causal factors governing the external action of any state, and therefore, of central significance to the concept of role in international politics. National capability, in modern terms, is not merely a matter of whether one state can impose its will upon another but represents the
orchestration of diverse elements of strength and weakness, physical and intangible, in pursuit of national objectives, which are in themselves largely a product of capability or the lack of it. The inclusive nature of the concept of national capability has been illustrated by the mutual interdependence of the physical and social divisions of the matrix used in this analysis. Thus the national capability resources of Nigeria per se have been seen to be varied and diverse, and generally defying unqualified analysis of their contribution to overall capability potential.

The foundation of Nigerian capability potential rests upon the geographic area encompassed by the Nigerian state entity; an area which through historical colonial circumstance is politically delimited from the larger geographically contiguous West African region, in terms of which Nigeria is neither geographically distinguishable nor preponderant. The politically defined boundaries of Nigeria encompass, as a result, a topographically diverse terrain which falls into three geographically distinguishable and politically defined regions, thus subordinating consideration of the capability connotations of Nigeria's land area to the lack of geographic cohesiveness or homogeneous geographic definition. The politically contrived nature of Nigerian physical geography is complicated, and the regional distinctiveness reinforced, by the inclusion within the bounds of the Nigerian state of a culturally diverse and ethnically heterogeneous population, dominated by three separate ethnic groups each traditionally occupying one of the three separately defined land areas. The de facto size of the Nigerian population as a capability resource is secondary to considerations of traditional ethno-regional communalism and the clearly established lack of national loyalty, cohesiveness or political stability.

The extent and diversity of the Nigerian land area results in a diversity of climate and soil types, conducive to a rich and varied agricultural capability. However, agricultural productivity is retarded by a politically
sensitive, traditional agricultural practice and custom, to the extent
that Nigeria needs to import more than half of its staple food requirements
for mere subsistence. The natural resource endowment of Nigeria is
completely dominated by the rich resources of oil to be found in the
country, almost to the point where the relative quantitative and
qualitative weakness of the wider mineral endowment is of negligible
consequence except in as much as the combined capability weakness of an
insufficient food supply and a relatively weak mineral resource base
creates an industrial and economic overdependence on a wasting resource,
heavily dependent on the vicissitudes of foreign markets and international
pressures.

The apparent anomaly between potentiality and actuality may be ascribed
to the composite of socio-political influence and national experience
which has perpetuated the notorious instability of the Nigerian polity.
The ethno-regional political polarizations, nurtured through colonialism,
reached crisis proportions in the collapse of the central political
authority, military government and civil war, the result of which was the
subordination of the conventional open-ended socialization processes to
the interest of praetorian civic order, stability and national unity.
The inherent instability of the Nigerian national polity has effectively
prevented and complicated the mobilization of Nigeria's full capability
potential. The lack of a national value commitment, charismatic leadership
or mass political association, which might unite the Nigerian nation over
and above political parochialism and primary primordial loyalties, has
resulted in institutional weakness and political factionalism within those
very groups upon which the civic order depends, and which are the vehicles
for the realization of capability potential. Such is the apparent nature
of the Nigerian capability resource spectrum in which physical potential
is retarded by psychological predisposition.
It has been emphasized that national capability is a relative concept and capability potential is, therefore, actualized in relation to a specific national objective. The formulation of the objectives or national interests in pursuit of which capability potential is to be operationalized is the product of a balance between the physical capabilities and psychological perceptions of which policy is the result. This policy, which effectively constitutes a framework for action, is formulated by political leadership which must of practical necessity be reactive to the parameters of capability means and perceived ends. (The ends of policy as perceived by leadership (or the national interest) are a product of the national value hierarchy, of which the leadership elite itself is a product.)

In Nigeria the parameters of this framework for action are set by the positive elements of geographic size, large population and rich oil reserves on the one hand, and the need to balance these elements with the negative elements of an inherent socio-political instability, an insufficient basic food supply, and a relatively narrow mineral resource base. The means and ends of Nigerian external interaction are dominated by these fundamental determinants. Nigeria's primary capability would appear to be economic, in as much as the size of the Nigerian population ensures an almost limitless labour supply and the largest consumer market in Africa (which has been seen to be the most significant motivation for foreign investment in Nigeria). Furthermore, the extent of the Nigerian oil resources provides a rich base to the Nigerian economy, ensuring a degree of resilience and sustained economic growth which outstrips its African counterparts. The capability consequences are two-fold: first, in the significance of Nigeria as an area of foreign investment and secondly, in the significance of Nigeria as a supplier of crude oil. The degree of leverage or capability for action derived from this significance is implicit in the fact that Nigeria is able to exert, an escalating
measure of 'denial control' in pursuit of national objectives; this ranges, for example, from the exclusion of specific foreign investors, a freeze on repatriation of returns from foreign investments, to the nationalization of foreign investment; from the raising of oil prices and royalties to the embargo of oil supply, with the dire consequences which such action would hold for the metropolitan economies which are heavily committed to Nigeria. (The United States and Britain, as the largest investors in Nigeria and the largest importers of Nigerian oil, are the most vulnerable, and to a lesser degree France, West Germany and the Netherlands.) This apparent degree of leverage in international interaction gives Nigeria a logical regional and continental significance.

However, such capability is tempered by the dependence of the Nigerian economy on revenues from the sale of crude oil and dependence on foreign investment to provide the impetus for growth in the economy and most importantly, to subsidize the importation of staple food supply. The Nigerian inability to feed itself is a fundamental capability weakness, due to the fact that political and economic viability depend upon Nigeria's ability to supplement its food supply. The exaggerated capability ascribed to the Nigerian oil resources is much constrained by the Nigerian economic overdependence on this resource and the fact that Nigerian economic (and indeed, political) survival is dependent on the continued exploitation of this resource. Thus the operationalization of Nigerian 'denial control' capability would necessarily have to be weighed against these risks.

Nigeria's secondary capability option is military: the vast size of the Nigerian population has facilitated the creation of the largest standing armed force in Africa, with the further implication that substantial manpower resources are available to fill both the military cadres and maintain the industrie-economic effort implicit in any sustained military operation. The unqualified deterrent effect of this military capability
is of substantial regional and continental significance. However, notions of continentally extended military deterrence are restricted by the domestic economic constraints which such an operation would imply, as well as considerations of internal stability. Military action in pursuit of national objectives is in any scenario an extreme option, but the potential for the realization of the military capability of Nigeria is restricted primarily to regional significance and secondarily, to a limited continental potential.

The guiding values and objectives of all political action of the Nigerian leadership have been constitutionally endorsed as unity, freedom, equality, justice and pan-Africanism, and it is to be assumed that these values will constitute the ends of policy and provide the basic motivation for the actualization of capability. The effectiveness with which Nigerian capability is mobilized in pursuit of national purpose depends largely upon the degree of consensual balance between four divergent constituencies which in themselves, and in their collective influence constitute the variables of political morale and stability. The leadership elite in Nigeria is not sovereign and does not possess sufficient independent authority to commit the country to a national purpose which does not enjoy the sanction of military, political, bureaucratic and unionist contingents, without endangering the notoriously tenuous stability of the Nigerian body politic. The consequence is twofold: on the one hand, consensus implies greater mobilizational capability; on the other hand, disequilibrium in the consensus is conducive to political instability, which in Nigeria has the potential of reactivating primordial loyalties and precipitating the collapse of the authority of the central civil polity. As a result Nigeria may be said to possess an essentially 'potential' capability, actualization of which is subject to numerous physical and psychological constraints.
In the light of the above analysis, we conclude that Nigerian capability in external interaction is fundamentally determined and influenced by:

(a) a degree of economic leverage in the international system; (b) a preponderant regional, and limited continental military capability, in pursuit of constitutionally instituted national objectives within the constraints of a factionalized national consensus. However, whereas national capability potential is considered fundamental to international interaction, it is not exclusive and is actualized in relation to perceived threat and opportunity for realization of the national interest, inherent in the external environment. The assimilation of the means and ends of policy to the realities of the external environment constitutes the national image or the state's perception of its role in international politics.

This ego-role perception is a function of leadership and has been suggested as the second determinant of causation in international interaction. Ego-role perception, in its turn, is dependent upon the recognition, acknowledgement and sanction of the other members of the international system (especially the major powers), in that role perception is relative, as no state can be of significance to itself. This is the third dimension of our analysis of the causal sequence of international interaction, which is basic to the concept of role in the international system. Thus, it is now necessary to consider the nature of Nigerian ego-role perception and the perception of the other members of the external environment of the credibility of Nigeria's international role and its significance to their interests.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN EGO-ROLE PERCEPTION AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

In the preceding chapter we established that national capability (as the most basic dimension of 'role' analysis) represents the means available for the realization of the ends of state policy in international interaction. The decisionmaker, being aware of the ends of policy and the capability means available in pursuit of those ends, must seek to balance these with its image of the external environment. Thus, due to the fact that no state exists in a vacuum, the state leadership (or decisionmaking elite) in seeking to realize the ends of policy is confronted with an array of inputs emanating from the external environment (or operational milieu) with which the state must interact. Such external inputs are assimilated by the leadership into its perceptual image (of capability and environment) in a psychological process which scans the inputs for perceivable threats to, and opportunities for the maximization of policy objectives, according to a spectrum of probability. From this perceptual balance between probability and capability flows the decisionmaker's definition of the state's desirable role in international politics; this is what we mean by ego-role perception (the second operative criterion in 'role' analysis).

While ego-role perception essentially implies a balance between the perception of threat and opportunity in the external environment, it is often convenient (or indeed expedient) for the realization of perceptual objectives and the projection of the ego-role for states to hyper-react in an over-attunement to either the threat or opportunity in any given situation (input). The extent to which policy decisions are based on hyper-reaction will determine the incongruity between systemic reality and the state's ego-role perception. Such incongruity implies discord in the orchestration
of capability resources and the state's perceived ego-role could be largely negated by the perception of the other members of the external environment that the state concerned had not the significance to their interests which the hyper-reactive ego-perception might suggest.

It is necessary, in the light of the above, to consider the nature of the Nigerian ego-role perception as the second dimension of this analysis of the role of Nigeria in the international system.

1. Nigerian ego-role perception

In as much as ego-role perception has been described above as the product of a balance between the spectrum of perceived threats and opportunities confronting the state in its endeavour to actualize policy, it is not surprising that attempts to conceptualize Nigerian role perception have traditionally been largely vague and lacking in conviction. 1) This is because the newly independent Nigeria was a contrived federal balance between ethnically and politically divided factions, the domestic political tension of which precluded both the evolution of any specific 'Nigerian ideology or doctrine' and the emergence of any single charismatic national leader who could be identified as the 'voice of Nigeria'.

The apparent conservatism in Nigerian foreign policy at independence has often been interpreted as weakness or lack of sovereignty (Sulewa was patronisingly referred to as the "golden voice of Africa"), 2) but

Ad'iyemi, AB, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, Ibadan University Press, 1974, P191-201. It was even asserted that since the country's neighbours are weak and possessed neither the desire or capacity to threaten her in any serious way, Nigeria needed no foreign policy. See Ceybode, AB, "Towards a New Policy on Decolonisation", Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Lecture Series No. 19, 1977, P15.

we argue that such conservatism was primarily the result of the uncertainty of the political leadership's domestic political footing.

In formulating foreign policy the leadership elite was faced with the dilemma of internal disunity and a patently contrived and unstable federal political balance. Therefore, in order to bridge the cleavage between internal divisiveness and the wider notion of Nigerialism (or role perception), the lack of any characteristic or cohesive Nigerial nationalism necessitated the leadership's assimilation of Nigeria's external objectives into a wider pan-Africanist objective.

An 'African consciousness' (far stronger than any 'Nigerial consciousness') had been a motivating force of the pre-independence nationalist movement and was thus a major element in the leadership's perceptual and experiential grid. The inability of the leadership to draw upon any national value hierarchy or national objective in the formulation of an international role which could unite the Nigerial nation (and consolidate the domestic political stability), made a close commitment to the more abstract, and less domestically sensitive, continental whole inevitable. Nigeria's role perception is, as a result, scarcely distinguishable from that of Africa as a whole;

... Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country... We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa. 3)

At independence the Nigerial political leadership elite consisted of a conservative alliance, and while there can be little doubt as to the perception of the role which the Nigerial leadership considered the country predestined and ably endowed to play, such perceptions were only asserted

with any measure of conviction in the domestic constituency.

Africa has replaced the Middle East as the mediator between East and West in world affairs. I think ... there will be a vacuum unless it is filled with some idea, and the idea we suggest is militant pan-Africanism, a union of African peoples. People say that leadership is the birthright of this country... 4)

... Nigeria ... is the largest single unit in Africa ... (and so) must lead Africa ... and we are not going to abdicate the (leadership) position in which God Almighty has placed us. 5)

Nigeria is destined to lead Africa ... black Africa as a whole to the total emancipation of all our peoples. 6)

... if we appear well meaning to the countries of Africa, there is no reason why they should not give us our recognised position by virtue of our size and population... 7)

However, statements of foreign policy were vague and unspecific as to Nigeria's aspired role in the external environment and centred on the notion of "pursuit of the national interest" which, although repeatedly referred to as the sole parameter of Nigerian external interaction, remained undefined and intangible.

In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs, the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and of its citizens. We have already declared our intention of applying to join both the Commonwealth and the United Nations ... we shall nevertheless have a free hand to select those policies which we consider to be most advantageous for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in the principles of the United Nations. We shall, of course, endeavour to remain on friendly terms with every nation which respects and recognizes our sovereignty, we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone... We consider

it wrong for the Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. Our policies... will be founded on Nigeria's interests, and will be consistent with the moral and democratic principles on which our constitution is based.8)

The vague and abstract nature of the wider policy objectives may be seen as an attempt to transpose inherently conservative Nigerian nationalist objectives (sovereignty, self-reliance, equality) to the wider African and global plane and thereby formalize the image which the Nigerian leadership elite perceived as being rightfully Nigerian, but lacked the ideological wherewithal to reinforce.

This inability to create an ideological or doctrinal linkage between Nigeria's leadership elite perception of the country's destined leadership role in Africa and its perception of the external environment may be ascribed principally to the constraints of internal instability. However, on a secondary level, we argue first, that the leadership elite perceived their foreign policy options to be limited by a degree of historical determinism, which dictated a strong practical (economic) and psychological commitment to Britain (and by extension, the West). In the post-independence cold war milieu, this fact compromised any doctrinaire devotion to non-alignment. Secondly, that newly independent Nigeria found itself curiously isolated in West African regional terms, in as much as its natural ally, Ghana, under Nkrumah, was politically opposed to the Nigerian Government and in collusion with opposition political factions. Moreover, the Nigerian leadership (being a conservative alliance) was ideologically opposed to, and resented the vociferous recalcitrance of Nkrumah.9) Kwame Nkrumah, and to a lesser degree Mobida Keita of Mali and Sekou Toure of Guinea, through their intrinsinist rhetoric had


effectively usurped the political leadership in Africa, and thus
constrained Nigeria in its foreign policy options. Furthermore, Nigeria
perceived itself to be surrounded by Francoophone states, which presented
a threat to the leadership elite's perception of Nigeria's predestined
leadership role in Africa; first, in that these states formed a cohesive
bloc in their close identification with metropolitan France and secondly,
because France, under de Gaulle, was seeking to carve out a world role
for itself free of British or American influence, and this conflict of
interests between the metropolitan powers evoked a degree of polarization
and antagonism in their African spheres of influence. The perception of
the external environment was one of some considerable threat, both from
the regional and international constituency.

The dictates of the post-independence leadership's perceptual image
were twofold: (a) the need to exert its independence and thus maintain
a modicum of credibility with (if not leadership of) the emergent African
states; and (b) the need to focus the national objective on an issue
which would unite the support of all Nigerians and provide a distraction
from the domestic political rivalry in a singular national purpose and
commitment. The issues of southern Africa in general and apartheid in
particular (dramatized by the March 1960 Sharpeville shootings and the
collapse of the Central African Federation) provided this focus. The
apartheid issue, presented Nigeria with an opportunity to consolidate
the concept of the national interest and the self-image. However, in
perceiving a balance of threat and opportunity in the southern Africa/
apartheid issue, Nigeria was merely expressing the wider African perception.

The issues of southern Africa/apartheid served to create 'tangible'
local for the diplomatic energies of those African states struggling to
come to terms with the realities of their domestic and international
post-colonial predicaments; it served to structure the African continental
value hierarchy and the continental objective, and to internationalize
The "African condition". \(10\) The apartheid issue has permeated every facet of international intercourse, and through the cumulative nature of diplomacy, has become the antithesis of the accepted international morality. The African continent (as the collective victim of the stigma of apartheid) is able to pose as the 'world conscience', as the central focus of the international abhorrence for this moral deviance. The fact that racial policies in South Africa have been of such sustained international salience (as opposed to the relative disregard for other instances of repression around the world) is due to the symbolism of the racially oppressive, anti-libertarian, anti-African image of South Africa in evoking everything which is contrary to African (as a cohesive continental unit) values and objectives.

Africa has projected itself into the world conscience to the extent that human rights and the developed-developing, North-South dichotomies have a generally African connotation, and are perceived as being almost exclusively consonant with the African continent, to the extent that Latin America and South East Asia, for example, are of seemingly second priority. This is due to the fact that historically, Africa has not fallen under the shadow of any single great-power (in the way; for example, that the Americans were preserved from the colonial scramble by the Monroe Doctrine, or that South East Asia was almost exclusively British), and the "scramble for Africa" divided the continent into a multitude of European spheres of influence. Thus there is the almost paradoxical advantage that in the post-independence unity, Africa is far more readily able to project itself into the centre of international politics (than is Latin America, for example) through first, the multiplicity of contemporary European powers which owe some debt of allegiance to Africa for their contemporary

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international status. Secondly, it is the case that until very recently the international socio-political morality has been European oriented. (In more recent times the Carter Presidency shifted the focus to the United States as the progenitor of the international morality.)

The African continent is, therefore, more readily the focus of the Euro-American world conscience (as shaped by international morality) than its equally underdeveloped and deserving of moral justice, Asian and Latin American counterparts. In short, the focus of apartheid has provided a continental unity of values, objectives and purpose over and above communal and nationalist interests, and this degree of superficial cohesiveness has given the African bloc states a degree of influence in international affairs largely inconsonant with their de facto capabilities.

It is, therefore, evident that while the southern Africa dilemma and the system of apartheid was perceived by the emergent African states as a threat to "... the African objective and vision of a new Africa, free and defiant",11) this perceived threat has come to offer some considerable opportunity for manifesting African unity and projecting the African condition into the forefront of international politics, and through this influence, Africa in general, has gained a considerable degree of international leverage in the international system. Paradoxically apartheid has in fact become the instrument of "African freedom and deviance".12)


12) It offers, for example, the opportunity of holding up to the Western states the spectre of bloody civil war eventually embroiling the entire African sub-continent, invoking world wide racial tension, possible Soviet involvement and consequent international instability. In practical terms though, the threat of such a spectre to black Africa is minimal, save in as much as were it to come to pass it might temporarily imperil the continental unity, but the opportunity for political leverage is considerable.
The analysis above is of direct relevance to the Nigerian role perception in that Nigeria is the epitome of the African experience. The linkage between the threat and opportunity of the southern Africa/apartheid issue is the most central and basic tenet of Nigeria's international role perception. This notion can be substantiated by comparative reference to three definitive Nigerian foreign policy statements spanning the period of 20 years since independence:

The improvement of the situation in Africa will be one of the main objectives of my ministers and they intend to continue to pursue the Government declared aims of not identifying itself with any bloc or group but of being, at all times, guided by a sense of realism... Nigeria will continue to be opposed to all forms of aggression and coercion and will continue to respect the territorial integrity of all countries large or small. My Government will give all possible moral support to the legitimate aspirations of dependent peoples seeking their freedom from colonial status and will continue to oppose, most strenuously, apartheid and all other forms of racial discrimination.

Our foreign policy objectives have been identified as follows: firstly, the defence of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; secondly, the creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa, and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the territorial integrity of all African counties while at the same time, fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development; thirdly, the promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the world; fourthly, the promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity especially the dignity of the blackman; and fifthly, the defence and promotion of world peace. These objectives are to be pursued with the realisation that the centre-piece of our foreign policy is Africa. We are committed to the total liberation of all oppressed black people in Africa... whether or not the racist and collaborators like it, Southern Africa must be free... a progressive society and dynamic foreign policy can only be built on foundation of unity and stability. I therefore call on all Nigerians to refrain from acts and words which can undermine that foundation. We must all be vigilant and watch out for those who will like to destroy us and see us destroy ourselves.

In the area of foreign policy... I will continue to advance and defend the cause of our great country before the world

13) His Excellency, Governor General Nnandi Azikiwe, "Speech from the Throne", in Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, 29 March 1964, Col 593.

community of nations. It is our national will that Africa shall remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Also it is our national will that Africa shall be free; free of racial bigotry, free of oppression, and free from the vestiges of colonialism. My Government is determined to see the course of justice and human decency prevail in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. We shall continue to support all forces of progress and oppose all forces of oppression in Africa and elsewhere. I hereby reaffirm our faith and support for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of Organisation of African Unity, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.15)

The traditionally espoused value objectives of freedom, equality, justice and African unity have been brought into sharp focus for the Nigerian leadership by the southern Africa/apartheid issue. The latter has been perceived to pose a sufficiently credible threat to the national objective so as to provide the opportunity for direct linkage between the threat of apartheid and the need for national unity (and on the wider plane, African unity), the instability of which is historically a real threat to national capability. Through a process of cumulative diplomacy, specific points in the evolution of which are represented by the above three quotations, the precepts of Nigerian external interaction have evolved from the abstract and vague to the assertive and specific — the constant focus being southern Africa/apartheid. In structuring and consolidating the national objective, the southern Africa/apartheid perceptual input has developed a moralistic inertia and is absolutely fundamental to the projection of Nigeria's external image.

Over the 20 years since Nigerian independence there have been peripheral changes in the perceptual milieu of the Nigerian decision-making elite (most notably in terms of economic and military capability, for example), but the basic psychological predisposition, which dictates the leadership elite's perceptual image of threat and opportunity, remains fundamentally

15) First National Broadcast by His Excellency President Shehu Shagari, quoted verbatim in Daily Times, Lagos, October 2, 1979, PP16-17.
unchanged. That is to say; (a) the need to manifest and maintain domestic political stability and national unity (most forcefully underlined by the experience of the civil war); and (b) the need to exert its 'predestined' leadership role in Africa, in accord with pan-Africanist sentiments and objectives.

With reference to the diagrammatic illustration of the theoretical exposition of the ego-role perception formulation process set out in Chapter One, the dynamics of Nigerian ego-role perception may be illustrated as follows: (The ensuing analysis of Nigerian ego-role perception should be read in close conjunction with this diagram.)
The psychological environment or experiential grid through which inward and outward directed vectors of threat and opportunity are assimilated into the value hierarchy and practical capabilities of the state, is the product of the cumulative national historical legacy and experience as personified in the leadership or decisionmaking elite. The psychological environment of the Nigerian leadership elite is, therefore, inevitably the product of the experience of historical colonial divisiveness, ethno-regionalism and political instability, and has been seen to be constrained by a tenuous balance between internally politicized elite factions. The perceptual image of the Nigerian leadership elite is of necessity the product of historical precedent, and consciously responsive to the interests of the constituent variables on whose consensus (or consensual balance at the very least) the political stability of Nigeria depends. Therefore, the perceptual image of the Nigerian leadership elite must lie in the assimilation of such psychological or experiential predisposition, into the constitutionally endorsed guiding values and objectives of freedom, equality, justice, African unity and a profound commitment to the liberation of all Africa, and a dedication to the African continent. The Nigerian leadership elite views the external environment through the spectacles of this perceptual predisposition.

We have argued that the most fundamental element in the projection and assertion of this Nigerian self-image lies in the internationalization of the southern Africa/apartheid issue. However, whereas this issue has served to consolidate the self-image, mere vocalization of this national image does not serve to manifest ego-role perception, but merely sets the parameters of the threat/opportunity linear spectrum. Ego-role perception can only manifest itself over a period of time sufficient to allow for the dialectical refutation or confirmation of the perceived ego-role, and manifestation lies in the eye of the beholder (hence the third criterion of the three-dimensional model).
Having established the nature of the Nigerian self-image, it is now necessary to review the practical operationalization of this perceptional image within the milieu in which Nigeria seeks to actualize its image and objectives as an actor in the international system. It is possible to examine Nigeria's perceived ego-role within three spheres of organizational or sub-systemic interaction: continental, regional and global.

1.1 Continental interaction

We have suggested that classification of Nigeria's international role is generally difficult and traditionally lacking in conviction, due to the fact that Nigeria's role in the international system is scarcely distinguishable from that of Africa as a whole. The relevance of this lies in the fact that Nigeria is a microcosm of the African experience. Since independence Nigeria has been engaged in the struggle to come to terms with the legacy of its historical development, colonial circumstance and contemporary socio-political precepts. We have argued further, that in seeking to come to terms with the realities of its predicament, Nigeria has consciously sought to manifest a perceptional image of national unity that concurrently shields the domestic stability from external demands and maximizes the country's importance in African affairs (and by implication, world affairs). The issue of southern Africa/apartheid has been seen to be the most basic tenet of this perceptional image and as such has, since independence, provided the Nigerian leadership elite with a central point of reference and singular focus in seeking to reconcile the dictates of the Nigerian self-image (need to manifest national unity/

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16) Kayali, J, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy" in *African Affairs*, Vol 75, No 3, 1976, P317 suggests; "At first sight Nigerian foreign policy sometimes seems almost invisible. In public pronouncements by Nigerian officials, voting at the United Nations etc, the Nigerian Government is generally careful to endorse policies which have been agreed collectively within the OAU; there are few idiosyncratic Nigerian initiatives and no clear projection of specifically Nigerian, as opposed to African, objectives in the external field".
predestined African leadership/pan-Africanist sentiment) with the demands of the external environment; hence the relevance of the notion that Nigeria's role in international affairs is scarcely distinguishable from the continental whole.

Historically, Nigeria has been intimately involved in the main trends of the 'continental whole'. As Stremlau has suggested:

Nigeria's self-avowed political interests related almost exclusively to the changing conditions in Africa. In the broadest sense, Nigerian leaders viewed their country's international prestige as a function of the extent to which Nigeria was considered a leader of black Africa. 17)

After World War II, while the drive for independence of colonial territories gained momentum, there evolved in Africa a spirit of pan-African unity. In the decades of the 1950's and 1960's pressures for freedom of the colonial territories took understandable priority. After a considerable part of Africa had gained its independence of colonialism, drives for continental unity among the newly independent African states, primarily in an effort to preserve and manifest their independence in an environment characterized by radical super-power polarity, once again gathered momentum.

Pan-Africanist sentiment had been a strong element in the Nigerian pre-independence nationalist movement, and one of Nigeria's first active roles in the pan-African movement was that of sponsor of the so-called Monrovia Conference, held in Liberia during May 1961, to consider the question of African unity. This conference was convened against the background of the civil war in the Congo, war in Algeria (between France and the Algerian Liberation Front), the formation of the Franco-phone bloc (known as the Brazzaville Group) and the publication of the so-called

Casablanca Charter, which had been drawn up at a similar conference held in Casablanca, Morocco during January 1961 and attended by representatives from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The Casablanca Charter proposed eventual African political unification based on a merging of national sovereignties, the development of a common ideology, and the formation of a single African political unit.\(^2\)

The concepts embodied in the Casablanca Charter were strongly rejected by Nigeria, as well as by the various states attending the Monrovia Conference, who favoured the maintenance of individual state sovereignty and a more functional approach to African unity. The Monrovia Charter, adopted by the conference, called for unity without integration and non-acceptance of any individual country's leadership. Other important points included co-operation throughout Africa based on tolerance, state equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and condemnation of subversion abetted by other African states. Although the Monrovia Conference was attended and supported by the Brazzaville Group, they maintained a cohesive bloc unity within the Monrovia Group.\(^3\)

The Nigerian rationale was quite clear; it perceived some considerable threat in the radical Casablanca alliance under the leadership of its hostile neighbour, Ghana, and the formation of the Brazzaville/Francophone group, the advent of which forcefully underlined Nigeria's regional isolation. In the second instance, the Nigerian leadership perceived in


the secessionist civil war in the Congo (Zaire) and the international intervention, a spectre of what could come to pass in Nigeria and feared that African irredentism and secessionist sentiments could become the cutting-edge of the cold war and super-power rivalry. Nigeria sought a role of pragmatic leadership in trying to consolidate a pan-African alliance. Its position was summed up in the principles of the inviolability of sovereignty, equality among states and non-interference in internal affairs.

In a new effort at unity the Nigerian Government called for another conference to be held in Lagos during January 1962. Members of the Casablanca group were also invited, but none attended. This conference drew up a new Charter of the so-called Inter-African and Malagasy Organization, which reaffirmed the Monrovia Charter. Disregarding issues of political integration, the conference emphasized economic, cultural, social, political and diplomatic co-operation and offered proposals leading to the formation of a permanent organization; 20)

... the basic and fundamental task of which will be to furnish the mechanism whereby problems which arise on the continent, and which are of primary interest to the region could in the first instance, be dealt with by Africans, in an African forum free from outside influence and pressure. 21)

This Charter, which in essence embodied the Nigerian position, was never implemented but is most significant in that it served as the model for the Charter of the Organization of African Unity 22) drawn up at a summit of all independent African states (excluding South Africa) held at the


22) Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, August 1, 1963, Col 2455.
instigation of President Sekou Toure of Guinea and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, at Addis Ababa during the latter part of May 1963, and which finally brought the divergent factions together.\(^{23}\)

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) appeared as a comprehensive inter-governmental organization embracing all aspects of inter-state relations, including political and security questions, as well as economic, social and related matters. All independent African states which are members of the United Nations (except South Africa) have been accepted as members of the OAU. The objectives of the OAU are clearly set out in the Charter of the organization; the primary objectives are the promotion of the unity and solidarity of the African states, and the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.\(^{24}\) All states are required to undertake to observe scrupulously the following principles: (a) the sovereign equality of member states; (b) non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; (c) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states; (d) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; (e) unreserved condemnation of subversive activities; (f) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the dependent African territories; (g) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.\(^{25}\)

The OAU operates through four main bodies and a number of ad hoc commissions. The primary organizational forum is the Assembly of Heads of States which convenes annually. A second major grouping, the Council


of Ministers, comprising foreign ministers of member states, deals with fiscal and emergency matters. The third group is that of the General Secretariat, located at Addis Ababa, which is responsible for general administration and liaison. A fourth sector is the Commission of Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration (established in 1965), which seeks to reconcile disputes between OAU member states — other specialized and ad hoc commissions and committees operate in the economic, social, educational, scientific, cultural, health and defence fields. The first of these committees was the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, established under the first resolution adopted by the OAU — the so-called Decolonization Resolution. The main task of the Liberation Committee was broadly defined as being the co-ordination of aid to all liberation movements in Africa and also to manage the Special Fund set up for this purpose.26)

So wide were the terms given to the original committee of nine, consisting of Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, that the Liberation Committee appeared to have been given a blank cheque by the Assembly of Heads of State and subsequently developed a considerable degree of autonomy. The Committee was left to devise different methods to accelerate the process of decolonization in Africa. Some of the major means devised include the recognition of a single liberation movement in each territory, the reconciliation of rival nationalist organizations, the entrusting of the training of freedom fighters into the hands of the neighbouring independent states, and the provision of diplomatic support for the liberation movements.27) Since

its inception, Nigeria has played a consistently positive role in the OAU in general and most particularly the Liberation Committee.

Prior to the Nigerian civil war, Nigeria had been governed by a conservative alliance and it is not therefore surprising that Nigeria's role in external affairs has been projected as one of diplomatic correctness.

Before the civil war there was a general tendency on the part of Nigeria to view the conduct of external policy rather narrowly, in terms of the projection of an image of international good behaviour and diplomatic correctness. However, we have argued that Nigeria was constrained by several factors: historically determined links with Britain (and by extension, the West), internal political instability, a perception of regional isolation and Ghanain hostility, and most significantly, the fact that while Nigeria had considerable apparent potential (in 1963 the population of Nigeria was 22 per cent of that of all Africa), it remained economically and militarily underdeveloped (although this was obviously relative) and dependent on the export of agricultural products, primarily to British markets. Furthermore, Nigeria possessed no characteristic, dynamic leadership, and at a time when 'leadership in Africa' was measured in terms of personalized extrovert recalcitrance, the apparent conservatism in Nigeria's pre-civil war role is understandable. It is borne out by the following outline of Nigeria's African policy as stated by the Nigerian foreign minister;

(a) 'Policies must be clear and practicable, not fatuous or sentimental or designed to soothe people's nerves or for propaganda purposes.' (b) Help would be offered to any African state to solve its problems, but the help must be solicited and unpublicised. (c) Promotion of cultural and economic links


with Africa. (d) Territorial boundaries must be respected to avoid chaos and bloodshed. (e) No interference in the internal affairs of others so as to prevent 'unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future unity of the African continent'...30)

However, while the realities of the Nigerian milieu dictated an image of diplomatic unobtrusiveness, it cannot be said that Nigeria was diplomatically impotent or lacking in initiative. For instance, Nigeria was almost alone in opposing the exclusion of Moise Tshombe, the then Congolese Prime Minister, from the OAU summit in Cairo in 1964, and on a number of further occasions during 1964-65 continued to support the Tshombe government. Nigeria committed two infantry battalions to the United Nations peace-keeping forces in the Congo during 1960, and these were the last to be withdrawn in June 1964.31) During June 1965, when the OAU was very nearly destroyed by an intra-West African dispute over allegations of Ghanaian subversion, Nigeria arranged for an extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers to be held in Lagos, which in settling the dispute upheld the principle (strongly adhered to by Nigeria 'in principle') of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states.32) Similarly, at the meeting of the OAU Defence Commission in Freetown, Sierra Leone during February 1965, Nigeria vehemently opposed the majority of the Commission on the proposal to set up an African Peace Force.33)

Furthermore, Nigeria was an active member of the ad hoc commission of

the OAU set up to settle the border conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, and between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya during the 1963-64 period. When in Accra in 1965, the Assembly of Heads of State set up a 21-member Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, a Nigerian (Justice M.A. Odesanya) was appointed chairman. During 1964, with the sanction of the OAU, Nigeria dispatched troops to Tanzania to maintain stability after the mutiny there, and in 1965 Nigeria convened an extra-ordinary meeting of Commonwealth heads of State in Lagos to consider the Rhodesian UDI issue.

Throughout the civil war the Nigerian leadership clung steadfastly to the principles of inviolability of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (which, very largely at Nigerian initiative, had become basic tenets of the Charter of the OAU) resisting all attempts to refer the matter to the United Nations and submitting reluctantly to mediation attempts by the OAU.

The Nigerian civil war presented continental Africa and the OAU with its most serious challenge since its institution. President Kaunda of Zambia began to assert publicly in June 1967 that Nigeria's difficulties were a legitimate concern to the rest of Africa, and at his instigation a summit of the Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia was convened and requested permission to send a peace mission to Nigeria. Almost simultaneously President Mobutu of the Congo (Kinshasa) (due to the fact the forthcoming OAU summit was scheduled to be held in Kinshasa during September) was dispatching delegations throughout Africa to canvass support for a Congo-led peace initiative. This was followed by offers of mediation

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35) Mndele, RA, op cit, PP56-58. Critics declared that; "Nigeria was using her elephant size to cover the filthy debris of bankrupt British policy in Southern Rhodesia".
from Dahomey (Benin) and a summit of Nigerian military leaders in Ghana. 36

The September OAU summit in Kinshasa, after fierce divisions (led by Zambian), eventually resolved to send a "consultative mission" of six Heads of State (Congo [Zaire], Liberia, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon and Ethiopia) to investigate what role the OAU could play in the resolution of the Nigerian crisis. The fiercest military conflict in Nigeria erupted long before the OAU Consultative Mission eventually met in Lagos on November 23, 1967. After long negotiation with the Federal Government, the OAU Consultative Mission agreed that as a basis for a return to peace and normal conditions in Nigeria, the secessionists should renounce secession and accept the 12 state administrative structure of Federal Nigeria. Together with the most effective propaganda machine of the Biafrans these endeavours had, by the end of 1967, effectively internationalized the Nigerian civil war, which became an issue of international political controversy (including a mediation visit by Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, and initiatives by the Commonwealth Secretariat). 37

As the war continued into 1968 it succeeded in disrupting African solidarity when during April/May 1968 four members of the OAU—Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia—recognized Biafra as a sovereign state (the only non-African state to extend recognition was Haiti). The split effectively negated the credibility of the OAU in dealing with affairs of continental concern and for the first time, in full international gaze, made manifestly clear that the OAU (although its very raison d'être was the resolution of conflicts and disputes) had neither the necessary disciplinary powers or mechanisms, nor the unity of commitment to contain

African disputes. The OAU Consultative Mission reconvened in Monrovia during April 1969, but talks soon collapsed. The Nigerian civil war was eventually resolved by the Soviet MiG 17's which in their strafing presaged the eventual invasion of the Ibo heartland by Federal forces in June/July 1969 and the subsequent Biafran demise.38)

The Nigerian civil war marked the end of the euphoric post-independence phase in African affairs, during which international prestige was measured by levels of diplomatic intransigence and the strong expression of sentiments of doctrinaire pan-African unity. "Sweeping away colonial boundaries" was regarded as the ultimate African objective and African leadership belonged to those who were most vociferous in denouncing the former colonial powers and on the issues of African nationalism. However, the bitter rivalry evoked by the Nigerian civil war dispelled illusions of pan-African unity and the amicable settlement of disputes, thus ushering in a phase of pragmatism in African affairs. During this phase the primacy of national interests, personal diplomacy and the manifest continental leadership vacuum were to be the most salient parameters. The authority and credibility of the OAU had been severely tarnished. Similarly, Nigeria was faced with a crisis of confidence and authority both within (in its ability to maintain political stability and order) and in the external environment. Nigeria had been alarmed by the recognition accorded the secessionists by four members of the OAU and saw the internationalization of the issue as a manifestation of neo-colonialist designs to destroy African unity.39)


In order to consolidate national unity and to regenerate the credibility and cohesiveness of the OAU, the Nigerian leadership embarked on an assertive foreign policy, with Gowon visiting 20 African states between 1970 and 1973— including Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon (the four deviants), and in a reconciliatory gesture to Zambia, which had led the split, sent $750,000 aid to compensate that country for the closing of its border with Rhodesia. \(^{40}\) Gowon warned; "... the enemies of African freedom fighters, particularly Portugal, and the racist minority regimes of South Africa, and Rhodesia..." that Nigeria planned to take the offensive. \(^{41}\)

The Nigerian leadership recognized that the perceived threat of African disunity, would damage Africa's credibility in international affairs and Nigeria's role as leader of the continent. Thus it indulged in forceful rhetoric, the perennial substance of which was southern Africa/apartheid.

Gowon committed his country to:

\[\text{... support all people engaged in the struggle to rid their land of colonialism and racism especially in such parts of Africa as Angola, Mozambique and Namibia...}^{42}\]

Whether Africa will find an effective and independent role to play in the new international relationship, and whether Nigeria can prove its worth so that the blackman is treated with dignity throughout the world: these are the problems that should be engaging our attention...\(^{43}\)

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\(^{43}\) His Excellency Maj General Yakubu Gowon, Text of Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 1972, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1972.
That system of government which has been condemned as a crime against humanity does not seem to abate in its severities, nor are its apostles willing to concede any quarter... History has nothing but shame, disaster and ruin in reserve for such regimes. Those who perceive the disaster in South Africa in terms of ideological conflict are either missing the point or deliberately confusing the issues. For what interest has the generality of African population in hollow ideological terms which have their origins in Europe. It is self-evident that our peoples and their leaders are driven by three main motives: the inalienable right to self-determination; the necessity for a decent life; and the unquestionable demand for human dignity. In the attainment of these objectives, whoever supports Africa would be her friend, but those who for whatever reasons twist and turn our purpose for immediate and selfish gains would not qualify for our respect, least so, our company.44)

In February 1969 the Nigerian delegate had told the OAU Council of Ministers that Nigeria was prepared to increase its financial commitment to the Liberation Committee. Likewise, in June 1971, in seeking a 50 per cent increase in member-states' financial contributions, the Nigerian foreign minister described the budget of the Liberation Committee as "pathetically paltry".45)

The Liberation Committee with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam developed a close identification with Tanzania. The Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee is nominated by the Tanzanian President and has only limited responsibility to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. Thus if any member-state's relationship with Tanzania deteriorates this is quickly reflected in that state's attitude to the Liberation Committee. This was the case during the 1968-70 period when Nigeria refused to make her


45) Aringo, O, Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Statement to the OAU Council of Ministers, 17th Session, June 17, 1974 quoted in Nigerian Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, Vol 1, No 1, 1974, P39. "A few days ago we adopted what to my mind is a pathetically paltry budget for the Liberation Movement. We voted a budget which would cover not more than a day's expenditure for a moderate army to be spent in 12 months."
contribution to the Special Fund, because Nigeria suspected the Tanzanian Government of assisting the Biafran secessionists with money from the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee. As a result, Nigeria chose during 1968-70 to make her contributions direct to the freedom fighters with a top official of the CAU Secretariat assessing the value of aid given in kind (listed as military hardware, medical supplies, clothing and food). 46) Nigeria has made determined attempts to transfer the appointment of the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee to the CAU Assembly of Heads of State, and to decentralise the Secretariat for greater effectiveness, but the CAU summit at Addis Ababa in June 1971 confirmed the existing procedure. 47) (The Nigerian proposal that membership of the Liberation Committee should be increased from 11 to 17 was, however, adopted.) 48)

One of the first opportunities for Nigeria to galvanise the tenuous African unity and to dramatise the threat of neo-colonialism, in the post-civil war phase, was the alleged (and at any rate very short-lived) invasion during December 1970 of Guinea by Portuguese armed forces. At the initiative of Nigeria an extra-ordinary session of the C.U Council of Ministers was convened at Lagos. Simultaneously the Defence Commission convened in Addis Ababa (for only the second time since 1965) and Nigeria supported the renewed call for the establishment of an African High Command and the establishment of regional commands to defend African countries in the front-line of the 'liberation offensives'. However,

46) Aluko, O., Ghana and Nigeria 1957-76, op cit, P139. Also Aluko, O., "Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations", op cit, P149.


even Gowon's willingness to supply manpower for the liberation struggle (so that, as Gowon had suggested, at least one colonial territory might be liberated by the OAU in the next three years) could not overcome the practical obstacles to the establishment of regional commands and later the 1972 OAU summit at Rabat (Morocco) referred the issue of a joint military force back to the Defence Commission for further study. \(^{49}\)

At the June 1971 OAU summit, Nigeria (with Ethiopia) determined to secure, from the Council of Ministers, a declaration condemning South Africa's 'dialogue policy' and forbidding member-states from taking up the South African dialogue initiative so the OAU could present a united opposition front. (Several West African states had been most receptive to the dialogue overtures, notably Ghana (under Busia), and the Ivory Coast. Nigeria saw a very real threat both to itself and to African unity in any degree of South-African influence or sympathy in adjacent states.)

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\text{Nigeria will oppose to the last drop of its blood...that the OAU as an organization of all independent Africa should enter into a dialogue with South Africa as long as the minority regime in South Africa refuses to accept the principle of dialogue with Black leaders in South Africa, we will give support to the freedom fighters in Southern Africa to liberate themselves.}^{50}\]

Similarly, Nigeria led initiatives to reconcile the member-states who were in favour and those who were against the seating of the representative of the Amin regime at the OAU conferences during the first half of 1971. Ironically, Nigeria which itself had been so reluctant to accept OAU mediation endeavours has, since the civil war, actively encouraged continental belligerents to submit to OAU mediation. Nigeria has served

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\(^{50}\) Ariko, G, \textit{Statement to the OAU Council of Ministers, 17th Session, June 16, 1971, op cit, P441}. Liberia and Senegal also reacted positively to the dialogue initiatives and the President of Malawi paid an official visit to South Africa during 1971.
on OAU committees set up to deal with the Guinea-Senegal border disputes and the 1971 Arab-Israeli conflict (Nigeria also cutting diplomatic relations with Israel). Similarly, Nigeria prevailed upon Sudan to accept mediation in the civil war there and likewise intervened in an effort to end the tribal massacres in Burundi, the recurring border clashes between Tanzania and Uganda, and the armed conflict between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (the settlement of which was eventually mediated by Congo (Brazzaville) and Zaire). Nigeria was also active in seeking a solution to the conflict between Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara.\footnote{51}

As Nigeria's economic prosperity began to grow, Nigeria sought to assert itself economically and to consolidate African economic co-operation. (By mid-1972, Nigeria had bilateral trade agreements with 25 African states. The significance of these pacts was more political than economic.)\footnote{52}

Thus, for example, Nigeria was severely critical of the terms of the Yaounde Convention governing terms of trade between Africa and the European Economic Community (EEC), Nigeria saw in the reverse preference granted to EEC countries, and tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on African economic co-operation and development;

...our continued survival will lie in our strength through unity... amongst ourselves for the promotion of a higher level of economic activity on the continent. At present all African countries have a trade direction which negates the basic principles of co-operation, as only 5% of our foreign trade is intra-African. Even in areas where African countries have comparative advantage vis-a-vis developed countries, the old channels of trade continue to be maintained as former colonial trading partnerships die hard.\footnote{53}


\footnote{52} Aluko, O, "Nigerian Role in Inter-African Relations", \textit{op cit}, P154.

Thus prompted by the projected accession of Britain (affecting Nigeria most directly of all), Denmark and Eire to the EEC in January 1973, Nigeria brought together trade ministers from all African, Caribbean and Pacific Island states (ACP) during 1973, to forge a unified position on their relationship with the EEC (meetings were held in Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa and Lagos before unanimity was agreed). Negotiations between the ACP and the EEC were protracted over a two year period and culminated in the signing of the so-called Lome Convention on February 28, 1975. The main objective of the Convention is to promote trade between the contracting parties taking account of their respective developments, and in particular, of the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of ACP states in order to accelerate the rate of growth of their trade and improve the conditions of access of their products to the markets of the EEC. The EEC guarantees access to its markets of a wide range of ACP products (95 per cent of ACP products) in return for "most favoured nation treatment" (although not guaranteed) in EEC trade with the ACP states.

During January 1975 Nigeria hosted the 'Second All Africa Games' at Lagos and Gowon declared that; "Good performance in sports as in other human endeavours will win admiration of African personality... give our people a sense of achievement..." 

54) EEC external tariffs on Nigeria's primary products before British entry, ranged from 5-10 per cent. Commonwealth preference which Nigerian products enjoyed in Britain on a most-favoured-nation basis ranged from between 10 and 15 per cent. On British accession to the EEC, Britain would be bound to impose EEC common external tariffs on Nigerian goods. Concerted diplomatic action to alter the tariffs regulation was an economic imperative. See Okigbo, PMC, Africa and the Common Market, Longmans, London, 1967, P94.


Gowon was elected chairman of the OAU for 1973-74 (the first military ruler to hold the post, the only other being Idi Amin). The most salient features of Gowon's chairmanship of the OAU were his efforts to mediate in all disputes between African states, and these endeavours were often seen as bordering on personal interference rather than legitimate OAU involvement. This period saw the declaration of independence of Guinea-Bissau (the first of the Portuguese colonies to attain OAU membership); the most serious concern of the period, however, was the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the continuing Arab/Israeli dispute. On the initiative of General Gowon, a five-member commission (consisting of Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal) was appointed to seek reconciliation in the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, but failed to find a solution.\(^{57}\)

Nigeria's perceived role and objective was summed up as follows:

Nigeria is effective because African countries believe we do not mean to expand... If we may borrow one of history's terms, we want to be an "honest broker" in Africa, believed to be, as now, disinterested; we want to be surrounded by friendly countries with whom we can co-operate.\(^{58}\)

At the end of his term as OAU Chairman, Gowon lamented the inadequacies of the OAU in achieving its continental objectives:

The time has come for us to do some self-criticism and soul searching. We hold this and other meetings year in year out condemning colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, apartheid and so on and issue threats to enemies but very little happens as a result. Those to whom we address the appeals and warnings are already saying that Africa will again make high-sounding statements and pass pious resolutions but we can carry on as usual. It is up to Africa to prove them wrong... It is not too much to hope... (to) drastically change the machinations of a

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\(^{58}\) quoted in Herskovitz, J, \textit{op cit}, P324.
That Gowon should be deposed while attending the summit of the OAU Heads of State at Kampala in July 1975, is more than coincidental and reflects the leadership's ever greater concern with external affairs as the internal political situation became more unsettled and unmanageable. The foreign minister of the new regime was prompted to declare;

"...to the past regime...our external image was based on two things — the former head of State himself, because he toured extensively, and oil. Those were the two things for which Nigeria was well known in the past few years... I think that as we bring discipline into our national life, as we pursue good economic and political policies, and as the country attains the greatness which is due to it, our external image will improve."

Once again Nigerian continental credibility was in doubt, (most OAU member-states viewed with distaste the fact that Gowon was deposed in absentia) and the new regime sought to redefine the country's role. But a most dramatic turn of events presented the Nigerian leadership with an opportunity to consolidate the national interest and to reassert Nigeria's position in African affairs.

The Nigerian Government had historically, refused to recognize any one


60) Transcript of NBC-TV interview with Col. Joseph Garba, Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, in Oyediran, O, (ed), Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1975, op cit, P171-192. The domestic linkage in this issue is clearly manifest by the following statement: "In an issue like Angola, our national interest has been made quite clear and that is the liberation of Angola and Africa. The Federal Military Government has made a determined effort to pursue what it considers the correct line of action and it is gratifying to see the extent of national consensus and agreement on this subject": Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo, "Nigeria First" in Call to duty: A Collection of Speeches, op cit, P33.
of the three (UNITA/MPLA/MLA) liberation movements engaged in the civil war in Angola in the wake of the withdrawal of the Portuguese authorities. However, during the latter part of 1975, Southern Angola was invaded by South African armed forces (as surrogates of the United States) in support of the UNITA/MPLA forces against the MPLA forces, which were receiving large-scale assistance from Cuba and the USSR. Nigeria almost immediately recognized the MPLA government (and donated N13.5 million in aid) and embarked on a concerted diplomatic effort among African states to evince African support for an MPLA government and the Nigerian stand.

"We in Nigeria are committed to the total liberation of the whole of Africa and we will not fold our hands to see our brothers and sisters in Angola subjugated, exploited and re-colonized by the racists and imperialists in South Africa and their supporters. Never will any liberated African soil be colonized again... we recognize that the MPLA truly represents the interests of the Angolan people and the African interest. We want unity and concord... and we will ask ... Africa to pause awhile, think and see the machinations of the enemies of Africa and the black man in the events (in Angola) and join hands with the forces of progress and unity."

The Nigerian endeavours brought the country into direct confrontation with the United States and evoked intense diplomatic lobbying prior to the extra-ordinary summit of the OAU convened in Addis Ababa to consider the crisis. The summit considered two motions: one sponsored by 20 member-states led by Nigeria, called for the recognition of the MPLA, while the

61) MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
   FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
   UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

The Angolan crisis marked the end of the general dearth of diplomatic initiative characteristic of African affairs during the early seventies. The OAU had been seen to act decisively and abide by its decision (although not supported by a clear majority) in the face of considerable international pressure; it marked a significant shift from the display of continental disunity and organizational incapacity in the Nigerian civil war crisis, and Nigeria took full advantage of the high level of national and continental unity which the Angolan crisis evoked. The leadership unequivocally declared Nigeria's commitment to the emancipation of Africa;

... especially Southern Africa where the entire world is convinced that problems created by racial injustice are fast threatening the peace and shared goodwill of the human race... The style of Nigerian foreign policy today is, therefore, determined largely by these two unambiguously articulated factors: — African solidarity and an unflinching adherence to the principles of non-alignment. Nigeria's new posturing has emerged as a realistic approach to the prevailing structure and condition of the international community. Nigeria has, therefore, come to the conclusion that essential steps must be taken toward creating an African solidarity, an inter-African consensus without which Africa would not overcome its numerous post-colonial and neo-colonial problems, without which social stability and economic viability will continue to elude a greater part of the continent.64)


In pursuit of these objectives, Nigeria (with the backing of the US) mediated between Angola and Zaire in 1977, after incursions into Zaire by Katangese secessionist forces based in Angola. Zaire appealed for international assistance, which was provided by Morocco, Egypt, Syria, France and the United States, but it is generally acknowledged that it was only through the good offices of Nigeria and the country's favour with the Angolan Government that an escalation of the conflict was prevented (the USA does not recognize the Angolan Government).\(^{65}\)

Nigeria was severely critical of Tanzania's invasion of Uganda to overthrow the Amin regime (attributed by some, to the longstanding bitterness in Nigerian-Tanzanian relations). Obasanjo declared at the sixteenth summit of the OAU at Monrovia in August 1979 that; "The principle we should stand by is the principle of non-interference and I believe that as of today Tanzania is on a tiger".\(^{66}\) Nigeria might have felt inadequate in the light of the fact that Nigeria has consistently sought to project itself as black Africa's most powerful state, yet it was Tanzania, poor, but with a respected leader, which had produced a military machine capable of decisive action (almost unaided) in ridding Africa of an offensive regime.

The OAU summit at Monrovia resolved with little difficulty to reject the Muzorewa/Smith internal settlement in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and recognized the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people;\(^{67}\)

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65) See Wayas, J, op cit, PP37-38.

66) Statement by His Excellency Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo at the Sixteenth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the the OAU, Monrovia, August 1979 quoted in Margolis, J, "Dissension and Resolution" in Africa Report, September/October 1979, P52.

67) Ibid, P53-54.
and resolved further, to draw up a declaration of human rights for inclusion in the Charter of the OAU. During April 1980, President William Tolbert, President of Liberia and Chairman of the OAU was assassinated in a coup d'etat. Ironically, Nigeria was the foremost in condemning the coup as an outrage and refused the new leader permission to attend an extra-ordinary summit of the OAU on economic development held in Lagos during April 1980. Nigerian President Shehu Shagari lamented that; "... our capacity to do violence to ourselves has not diminished".

The question of the Western Sahara (whose independence is disputed by Morocco and the Polisario Front) is perhaps one of the best examples of the OAU's inability to implement its own resolutions. Member-states resolved at the 1976 summit of Heads of States in Mauritius to convene an extra-ordinary conference on the Western Sahara, and this was confirmed a year later at Libreville (Gabon). Zambia then offered to host such a summit, but it could not be convened because Morocco, the principal party to the Western Sahara conflict, through political manoeuvring, was able to negate efforts to produce a quorum. In 1978 at the Khartoum Summit, the OAU Heads of State established a five-member mediation committee, including Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, Sudan and Guinea. At Monrovia in 1979 the mandate of the five man committee was extended for another year, suggesting a ceasefire and referendum to be held in the country. These suggestions were rejected by Morocco. At the July 1980 OAU Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the Western Sahara issue precipitated deadlock.

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69) Ibid.

when it became apparent that a majority of member-states had recognized
the independence of the territory (as the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic),
and Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Ivory Coast and Senegal
threatened to resign from the OAU if the Western Sahara was accepted
into OAU membership. The deadlock was eventually broken by Nigerian
intercession and the suggestion that the five-member committee should
further explore the situation through negotiation with the parties to
the dispute. 71)

Due to the fact that ego-role perception and foreign policy initiative
is inextricably linked to political leadership and a relatively limited
decisionmaking elite, three phases in the development of the contemporary
Nigerian role perception are identifiable from the above: (a) the period
of conservative alliance in civilian government; (b) the post-civil war,
Gowon phase; (c) the transitional, Obasanjo/Shagari phase (the latter is
clearly transitional and it may be possible to identify a fourth phase
in time). In keeping, with the concept of threat and opportunity perception
adopted in this study, it is self-evident that the action-response-reaction
sequence in external interaction is inseparable from the influence of the
external environment, and as such, the phases of the threat and opportunity
perception of the Nigerian leadership have been (and will continue to be)
intimately reactive to the trends within the African environment as a
cohesive systemic collectivity.

Africa appears to have emerged from the phase (current during the 1960's
and early 70's) when recalcitrant foreign policies and polemics in
international forums were considered necessary elements of the manifestation
of the sovereignty of the newly independent. The cold war provided the

71) Fadugba, N, op cit, PP18-19.
international atmosphere for diplomatic aggression and the attendant neo-colonialism evoked in the adolescent Africa, a will to unite to survive, which has sustained African unity (as manifest in the OAU) through innumerable continental and international crises for just on two decades.

However, with the passing of the spurious glamour associated with the coming of independence to Africa, and the predominant personalities of the period (often suggested as the cause of post-independence instability as much as they were claimed to be the victims of the colonial legacy and the champions of African unity), the African continent found itself in a political/diplomatic vacuum. The Nigerian civil war finally dispelled illusions of pan-African unity and the amicable settlement of disputes. The OAU found itself unable to carry out its disciplinary resolutions or to manifest a continental morality consonant with the principles of its Charter. An example may be drawn from the acute embarrassment to Africa of the Amin regime in Uganda. The continent (OAU) was unable to find either an appropriate standard for moral condemnation or a consensus of commitment to do anything about it. We may deduce that in the tyranny of Amin in Uganda, African leaders perceived a real threat to African unity and to the perceived role of 'world conscience' in international politics which had been nurtured (to some extent inadvertently) by the African bloc for the opportunity inherent in the emotionalism of the notion. Amin in Uganda (and the many other instances of internal repression and external aggression of which he is the most publicised example) offered no opportunity for the maximisation of continental values or objectives, and the OAU and Africa was paralysed by the over-attunement to the threat. (Save for a few peripheral (extra-OAU) attempts at condemnation, most notably by Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, and of course, the eventual unaided invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian forces to topple the regime, which after ten years, was in a state of mutinous collapse anyhow.)
The vacuum of the 1970's was, however, breached by the Angolan issue and the invasion of that country by South African armed forces as surrogates of the United States (although it cannot be doubted that the South African leadership required little coercing, as evidenced by the insubstantive undertakings offered by the Ford/Kissinger administration). The South African invasion of Angola posed the threat of South Africa extending its influence well beyond its physical boundaries and creating an effective buffer between itself and the rest of the continent. This possibility threatened the very sovereignty and independence which the OAU had fought so hard to establish; but at the same time, it offered the opportunity of a continental diversion from the inertia of the 'Amin psychosis', symbolic of the diplomatically and ideologically moribund state of the continent. Africa was mobilized into a frenzy of diplomatic activity and initiative; creating the need to re-examine and reorder the very core of the African rationale. This is the single issue which has brought the OAU closest to the brink of continental division.

Many African leaders had ideological misgivings about recognizing and supporting the Soviet/Cuban backed MPLA faction, but as these were the forces opposed to the US/South African backed FNLA/UNITA (inherently symbolic of racialism and neo-colonialism), the choice (although in practical terms a choice between Soviet or American neo-colonialism) was perceived in ideological and philosophical terms, as a choice between the forces of racial oppression on the one hand, and those of egalitarianism and African unity on the other.

Africa is presently struggling to throw off the mantle of instability and unpredictability (that political chaos so often referred to as being inherent to political development), which marked the adolescence of the continent's induction into international politics. Africa has passed
from the phase of nascent nationalism to international political maturity in a period of less than 20 years; a transition in which the fledgling states (mostly ill prepared) were forced to assimilate their colonial legacies, indigenous cultures and the circumstances of the international environment (cold war) as they struggled to achieve self-identity, self-image and the preservation of independence and sovereignty (the turning point being the Angolan crisis). The notion of modern political maturity and international responsibility is substantiated by the strong pressures for continental 'democracy' and morality, and a notion of social justice. (Witness, for example, the shift to democratic governments in Ghana and Nigeria, the more enlightened trends in Senegal and Guinea, the ousting of Jum, Bokassa,Nguema, the acute embarrassment of the recent Liberian coup d'état (and the continental snub to its perpetrator), the role of African states in the accord and execution of the Lancaster House agreement on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, and the shift from ideological polemics to hard bargaining on the economic issues raised by the North-South dialogue.)

Nigeria is inextricably part of this wider continental experience, but within the plurality of continental pressures and momentum, Nigeria has sought to perpetrate a specific (individual) role as dictated by the precepts of the Nigerian perceptional image. Nigeria has become as much (and possibly more) the initiator and perpetrator of continental trends and influences as it has been an integral part of the continental milieu — evidenced by the country's activist participation in African affairs described above.

However, the above account of Nigeria's participation in continental interaction represents (as stated at the outset) a resume of the practical operationalization of the Nigerian perceptional image, in pursuit of an idiosyncratically Nigerian ego-role; that is to say, the practical
manifestation of the psychological process of ego-role perception as illustrated by the diagram above. The role which Nigeria has sought to manifest within the African continental milieu may be demonstrated by a schematic resume of the major African issues (inputs) of the last 20 years, which have dictated a Nigerian reaction. (Obviously there are scores of neutralist inputs which constitute neither any great threat or opportunity and constitute the mundane affairs of everyday government; that is to say, that the reaction is perfunctory and not motivated by any perceptual dictates.)
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Earlier we established that: first, whereas there have been peripheral changes in the perceptual milieu of the Nigerian decisionmaking elite over the 20 years since independence, the basic psychological predisposition, which dictates the leadership elite's perceptual image of threat and opportunity, has remained fundamentally unchanged. That is to say: (a) the need to manifest and maintain domestic political stability and national unity; and (b) the need to exert its 'predestined' leadership role in Africa, in accord with pan-Africanist sentiment. Secondly, that the Nigerian perceptual image lies in the balance of this psychological (or perceptual) predisposition with the constitutionally endorsed policy objectives of freedom, equality, justice, African unity and a profound commitment to the liberation of all Africa, and a dedication to the African continent. (Refer to diagram above.)

In reviewing Nigeria's continental role, it is quite evident that the linkage between the domestic constituency (the need to maintain national unity and stability) and the desire to exert a leadership role within Africa, predetermines policy action. However, it is also evident that Nigeria is more likely to take idiosyncratic or 'egoistic' initiatives when the input proffers a greater opportunity to maximize the dictates of the former. (Witness especially the French atomic test, Rhodesian UDI, Portuguese invasion of Guinea, Angola crisis.) So too, when the opportunity to consolidate the domestic constituency is less great, Nigeria has consistently preferred to universalize the threat (African solidarity, neo-colonialism, imperialism etc.) in an endeavour to orchestrate and consolidate the continental reaction and to act in concert with a wider, more abstract constituency (the Congo crisis, the ILO negotiations, the South African dialogue issue, the Zaire invasion bear witness).
It is apparent that the dictates of this psychological or perceptual predisposition are paradoxical, in as much as the greater the perceived threat, the greater is the opportunity for consolidating the internal unity, and similarly, the greater the perceived threat, the better the opportunity for vocalizing 'leadership in Africa'. Thus the universal (continental leader) is perceived as being dependent on the consolidation of the domestic constituency, and the specific (the consolidation of the national unity) in turn, is dependent upon (or at least greatly enhanced by) the manifestation of continental initiative and projected leadership. It may be deduced that the Nigerian leadership elite is consequently (of necessity), psychologically disposed towards hyper-reaction (i.e; deliberate over-attunement to threat or opportunity, which through precedent has gathered a perceptual inertia) in assimilating external inputs into the Nigerian perceptual image (in that the greater the perceived threat, the greater is the manifest opportunity).

The apparent 'see-saw' type paradox between the perceptions of threat and opportunity has the effect of making it convenient (and mostly, politically expedient) for the Nigerian leadership to hyper-react in an over-attunement to the perceived threat in any input, as evidenced by the high level of rhetorical linkage between the perceived external threats on the one hand, and the need for national unity and the capacity to exert African leadership on the other. While there is ample evidence of this notion in the various policy statements quoted above, more recent foreign policy debate does not deviate from this pattern:

The decisive and vigorous policies that Nigeria is playing in the external environment has certainly created a disturbance we all know for imperialism. We know that they have adopted a strategy of choosing the least line of resistance. We do not want them to capitalize on our domestic problems in order to retaliate and really punish us for our role in foreign relations. If Nigeria is divided and we are unable to take concerted action in respect of Africa on liberation struggles and in other forms of international relations we will be unable
to resume the so much talked about leadership role. 72)

The common enemies we have in this world are the world powers. For example, we know that South Africa possesses nuclear weapons sold to them by the West Germans, and in this country West German companies hold a lot of interests... and we allow these people to feed fat, to sell nuclear weapons to South Africa and these people will come here to kill our people. If we have to uphold our leadership in Africa, it is important that this nation do realize that these are threats to us. 73)

Whereas such hyper-reaction is highly rhetorical, it is evident from the schematic resume that the distinction between this declaratory level of ego-role perception and the practical level is marked by a strong measure of pragmatism in projected action (or policy decisions), as evidenced by the strong Nigerian commitment to the continental cause and the projection of Nigeria as an 'honest-broker' in African affairs. This perceptual role of 'Nigeria the honest-broker' is intimately allied to the perceptions of Nigeria's 'predetermined' continental leadership, almost to the extent that the two are scarcely distinguishable. Often too, the image of 'Nigeria the honest-broker' is a facade for the continental maximization of Nigerian principles of action (such as the inviolability of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs), which is essentially reactive to the dictates of the Nigerian perceptual image, but is merely the medium and not the perceptual end.

While the image of the honest-broker as the medium by which the perceived role of continental leader may be consolidated, is manifest in Nigeria's early role in the pan-Africanist manoeuvring which preceded the formation of the O.U, this notion has been vigorously pursued in the post-Nigerian civil war era. Gowon so actively propagated the image of Nigeria the


mediator/negotiator in his endeavour to re-establish Nigeria's credibility as the 'continental leader' that some would say it brought about his demise. (In effect, it may be deduced that Gowon lost sight of the 'see-saw' linkage between the domestic constituency and the manifestation of Nigeria's 'predestined' continental leadership.) Nevertheless, through the cumulative process of diplomatic and political precedent, the notion of Nigeria the 'honest-broker' has become virtually inseparable from Nigeria the 'continental leader'.

Africa remains the cornerstone of Nigeria's Foreign Policy. By Administration is committed to the cause of the total liberation of Africa and the abolition of racism in all its manifestations. We shall neither relax nor relent until all Africans and all blackmen are free. It should be understood that political freedom is not complete without economic and cultural freedom. By Administration's Domestic Policy for peace, unity and stability in Nigeria translates, at the first instance, into being good neighbours... Nigeria stands for African unity.

Let me state in categorical terms that freedom and unity in Africa will contribute to third world solidarity as well as to international peace and co-operation. To this extent, Nigeria will play a more active role in mediating efforts within the international community, always fulfilling its due obligations and responsibilities, within the international system.  

Nigeria has in more recent times consciously sought to project an image of reliability and high political/diplomatic morality (verging on the notion of 'continental matchmaker'), exemplified by the intrusion of Nigerian 'good offices' in the many continental mediation endeavours, particularly the civil war in Chad. Herein lies the linkage with the extra-continental role which Nigeria, as an integral part of the African bloc, seeks to play in global interaction. In projecting this extra-continental or 'bloc' image, the Nigerian role perception is synonymous with the African bloc (as a corporate entity) perception, or vice versa.

The Nigerian/African global role has been consolidated by the issues of

southern Africa/apartheid, which remain absolutely pivotal in the balance of threat and opportunity perception of the Africa/Nigeria global role perception.

1.2 Regional interaction

Earlier we established that the 13 states of the West African region occupy a contiguous geographical area, which is geographically distinguishable from the continental whole. It is, therefore, logical to expect that these states would develop a self-contained regional affinity and cohesiveness. However, the states of the area are separated and alienated from one another as a result of different colonial backgrounds and different historical and accudural experience. Those states of the region which are former colonies of France feel a far greater affinity to metropolitan France and toward one another as a result of the active integrationist endeavours of the French and the objectives of acculturation and assimilation of French colonial administration. (For example, the notion of 'francophonie' as a 'spiritual community' of nations using French as a national, official or customary language.)

British colonial administration on the other hand, tended to be parochial and individualistic (indirect rule), and not the product of any comprehensive integrationist design. Thus, due to the fact that nine of the 13 states of the West African region are former French colonies, the former British territories, of Nigeria and Ghana, found themselves relatively isolated. (Unlike the common historical linkage between the East African and Southern African states who all share a common historical/colonial background and a degree of greater psychological and physical affinity, facilitating regional co-operation.)
We have argued that the dictates of Nigeria's perceptional image, namely the need for national unity and the pursuit of a 'predestined' leadership role in Africa, were, at the time of independence, constrained by a perception (on the part of the Nigerian leadership) of regional isolation. This degree of relative isolation was the result first, of the cohesiveness of the Francophone states (manifest in the Brazzaville Group and the establishment in 1962 of the Union Douaniere d'Etats de l'Affrique Occidentale (UDAO), a joint customs union established by eight Francophone West African states — Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and Togo). This notion of a French Commonwealth was characterized by a degree of suspicion of, and antagonism towards the demographically more predominant Nigeria, fueled by Gaullist France, which saw in Nigeria a British sphere of influence at a time when French policy actively sought to undermine British interests. Secondly, the perception of relative isolation was influenced by the political and ideological animosity between Nigeria and Ghana, under Nkrumah, (the latter looked upon the formation of a regional grouping as detrimental to the advancement of his concept of a politically united Africa) effectively negating the possibility of any alliance with Nigeria's natural regional ally. The consequence of the instability of the domestic constituency and the hostility of the surrounding external environment prescribed Nigeria's commitment to seeking alliance within the wider continental, pan-Africanist whole.

The Nigerian leadership committed the country to the development of programmes that could assist other African states and foster understanding.

76) Akincelo, Rh, op cit, P649-50.
among them; to study and overcome differences in the way of promoting friendly association among independent African states; to develop inter-territorial communications and transport facilities; and to seek to convince other African states to pool together their resources for the development of higher education and scientific research in Africa. 78)  

These integrationist overtures were made within the context of Nigeria's perception of its 'predestined' African leadership role. The inherent implication being, as was succinctly stated, that: "Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others. But if others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear to them in such a union". 79)  

Thus there existed a degree of conflict between the desire to consolidate a measure of intra-regional co-operation and Nigeria's apparent perception of its right to dominate any such alliance.

Nigeria's expressed desire for greater intra-regional co-operation was received with little enthusiasm and it was not until August 1962 that a sub-regional conference, attended by the foreign ministers of Nigeria, Dahomey (now Benin) and Togo was convened. The outcome of the conference included agreement on the establishment of telecommunications contacts between Nigeria, Dahomey and Togo; the abolition of visa requirements for travel between these three states; and the foundations for a comprehensive bilateral treaty with Dahomey, establishing common frontier posts, joint tariff structures and co-operation on the eradication of inter-state smuggling. These initial endeavours were followed by negotiations on co-operation in the fields of health, veterinary services, frontier trade  

79) Quoted in Phillips, CS, op cit, P90.
and trans-frontier movement between Nigeria and Niger, and an agreement in February 1963, on the abolition of visa requirements for travel between Nigeria and Cameroon. \(^{80}\) (The relatively strong socio-cultural ties between these states explain their willingness to take the initiative in inter-state co-operation.)

The most comprehensive endeavour at consolidating regional co-operation was the establishment during 1964 of the Chad Basin Commission (consisting of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger) with the objective of promoting economic development in the area. This was followed by the establishment of the River Niger Commission, intended to harmonize and promote joint economic development along the course of the river, subscribed to by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta. \(^{81}\)

The Nigerian leadership was ever conscious of the tenuous federal structure which held the disparate regions of Nigeria together; of the fact that many of the ethnic groupings of Nigeria found greater socio-cultural affinity with the inhabitants of neighbouring states. They perceived, as well, the direct endeavours of Nkrumah and the more indirect attempts by the French to undermine the federal balance (and so divide the most predominant state of the region). Given these circumstances and the Nigerian perception of its 'right' to regional predominance, the Nigerian leadership perceived scant opportunity for the consolidation of regional integrationist alliances beyond the level of perfunctory co-operation. \(^{82}\)

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\(^{80}\) Ofoegbu, MR, op cit, P31.


The Nigerian leadership religiously evoked the principles of inviolability of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs in the face of provocation from its more radical pan-Africanist neighbour, and rejected any notion of 'political' integration. Indeed, the Chad Basin Commission, although still in existence, failed to convene after 1964, and the River Niger Commission was merely symbolic of a consensus between the participants, and the letter of the agreement was largely stillborn.

However, greater opportunity for the promotion of regional co-operation was advantaged by the overthrow of Nkrumah during February 1966, and the subsequently more amicable alignment of the Nigerian and Ghanaian leadership, which appeared to adopt a common approach to the need for regional co-operation and economic integration in pursuit of economic development.

The initiative came from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), an agency of the United Nations, in the establishment of which Nigeria had been an active participant, and which doubtlessly was viewed by the Nigerian leadership to be a more impartial arbiter than any OAU or African agency, which in investigating the feasibility of a West African community would of necessity have been dominated by the more numerous franco-phone states. The ECA sponsored a series of conferences between 1966 and 1968 aimed at the formation of a West African community comprising Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta.

During November 1966 representatives of 12 of these states (excluding

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84) Aluko, O, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70, op cit, P140.
Gambia and Guinea) met in Niamey (Niger). This initial meeting was followed by a second in Accra, held during April 1967, where the 12 states signed the Articles of Association of a West African Common Market, described as a transitional agreement governing the means of co-operation between the member-states prior to the formal establishment of a West African Community. The member-states undertook to formulate and adopt common policies on trade, industry and agriculture, to jointly operate specific transport and communications services, to develop and use sources of energy in common, and to jointly train and develop manpower. 85)

This initial agreement was followed by meetings at Dakar in November 1967 and Monrovia during early April 1968, and immediately following a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the West African region, set up in accordance with the Articles of Association, the first West African Summit Conference of West African Heads of State and Government (excluding Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Togo and Niger), was convened at Monrovia (Liberia) on April 23, 1968. This conference adopted a Protocol formally establishing the West African Regional Group. The main purpose of the conference was to politically commit West African leaders to economic integration; the nine-station Protocol thus committed the West African Regional Group to the establishment of a customs union, and also made provision for a conference of Heads of State and Government as the supreme authority of the West African region, a Council of Ministers, and an Executive Secretariat empowered to adopt and implement programmes of action for the joint development of the region. 86)

86) Ibid.
The basis for the interest and commitment to economic co-operation in West Africa is primarily economic and bound up with the nature of the economies of the states of the sub-region: small domestic markets, the low volume of regional inter-state trade, a predominantly agricultural production base, low national per capita income levels, sensitivity to international economic pressures.87) However, while Nigeria obviously shared the commitment to regional economic development and stood to benefit economically more than most other member states, the Nigerian leadership perceived, in regional co-operation and integration, the opportunity for the consolidation of political interests. That is to say, Nigeria perceived in a West African community the opportunity to negate francophone co-operation and integration, and to overcome the physical and psychological isolation of its regional environment. At the same time, (due to the country's undeniable economic predominance) the Nigerian decisionmaking elite perceived the inevitability of Nigerian leadership of the projected community (indeed, the leadership was doubtlessly fully conscious of the fact that any regional alliance which excluded Nigeria would be of little more than perfunctory value to the participants), and the consequent broadening of the Nigerian support base in pursuit of the primary role perception of 'predestined' continental leader.

This notion of a primary political objective in the Nigerian perception is substantiated by two developments which took place during the two and a half years of discussion preceding the signing of the Monrovia Protocol: first, the formation between the Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey and Niger of the Conseil de l'Entente — an agreement which sought to co-ordinate the 'political' policies and objectives of the four states; and secondly, the

outbreak of the Nigerian civil war and the Nigerian need to maximise regional support for the federal objective and the isolation of Biafra. The members of the Entente (under the leadership of the Ivory Coast) were perceived to be sympathetic to the Biafran cause, and thus a threat both to the national sovereignty of Nigeria and Nigerian regional predominance. Thus the Nigerian leadership perceived in the formalisation of a West African Regional Grouping the opportunity, at best, of subsuming the Entente within the wider Protocol, or at least isolating the members of the Entente by Nigerian alliance with a wider regional constituency.

As it happened, the members of the Conseil de l'Entente declined to attend the Monrovia Summit; the Ivory Coast and Dahomey lent active support to the Biafran cause; and the leadership of the West African Regional Group fell to President Tubman of Liberia. Furthermore, during December 1969 (barely 20 months after the signing of the Protocol and at a critical stage in the Nigerian war) over 140,000 Nigerian nationals resident in Ghana were deported under the Business Promotion Act and the Aliens Compliance Act of Ghana, in a move universally perceived in Nigeria as a deliberate attempt to undermine the stability of the Nigerian Federal Government (at a time when it was engaged in a crucial military thrust) and to frustrate any notion of regional community.

With the defeat of the Nigerian objectives, the leadership perceived little further advantage in continuing with this strategy and the West African Community remained a theoretical projection. The signatories to the Protocol were inevitably aware that any West African community which excluded the largest proportion of the West African population.


89) Aluko, O, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70, op cit, PP141-142.

90) Ibid.
residence in Nigeria) would be a contradiction in terms, given the regional economic predominance of Nigeria. Thus, whereas the de facto leadership was not allotted to Nigeria, the manifestation of any West African regional community was dependent on Nigerian co-operation. Only the economic 'weight' of Nigeria could effectively counterbalance the collective influence of the francophone states of the region.

After the civil war, the parameters of Nigeria's perceptual image remained unchanged. These were national unity, African leadership, and the consolidation of the regional support base in pursuit of these objectives. (The latter had gained in urgency since Nigeria suspected "neo-colonialist complicity" in seeking to undermine the allegiance of Nigeria's neighbours and Nigerian national sovereignty.) Yet Nigeria's interaction within the regional environment was influenced primarily by the perceived need for Nigeria to re-establish its credibility within the continental system, and the projected entry of Britain (Nigeria's principal trading partner) into the EEC, which was perceived as potentially constituting some considerable threat to Nigerian economic development, in the loss of trading preferences and benefits previously extended Nigeria by Britain. Post-civil war interaction was thus characterized by both political and economic imperatives and was conducted on two levels. First, on the level of unilateral personal diplomacy; between 1970 and 1973 Gowon paid official visits to all Nigeria's immediate neighbours (and several other states across the continent) signing bi-lateral trade and friendship treaties and seeking to establish Nigerian bona fides in the wake of what was perceived by most of Nigeria's neighbours as a brutal war. This was especially true of the francophone states, encouraged by France in defence of its role in the war. During this period Nigeria had mobilized the largest military force on the continent and clearly had no intention of demobilizing it. Added to this new element in regional
interaction was the rapid expansion of Nigerian economic wealth and leverage from the exploitation of its oil resources. Nigeria's demographic, economic and military predominance was overwhelming and in the post-civil war phase, friendly relations with Nigeria became a *sine qua non* for Nigeria's regional neighbours.

Relations between Nigeria and the members of the *Conseil de l'Entente* were secured on a friendly footing, with Gowon visiting the Ivory Coast (which had actually recognized Biafra), visiting Dahomey (which had extended facilities to the International Red Cross operating in Biafra) and signing comprehensive bi-lateral trade agreements with that country (the entire Presidential Council of Dahomey travelled to Lagos for the ratification ceremony).  

He also signed similar agreements with Niger, and nurtured a close affinity with the Togolese leadership, while most of the other states of the region saw the practical, political and economic expediency of good relations with Nigeria at various stages within this period. (Relations with Ghana (under Busia), however, were further strained by the South African dialogue controversy.)

The second level of interaction which characterized Nigeria's immediate post-civil war regional role was in accord with the moralistically inclined, 'honest-broker' image which the Nigerian leadership sought to manifest on the wider continental plane, and was largely 'ideological' in substance. The basic objective was to portray Nigeria as a regional protector, so as to allay regional fears of Nigeria's disproportionate capabilities; in this regard the Nigerian leadership sought to nurture the notion of Nigeria as a 'leader among equals' rather than offensively preponderant. The basis of this philosophy was set out in the Second National Development Plan.


First, Nigeria undertook to use the Monrovia Protocol of 1968 as a base for a series of actions geared towards the establishment of a West African economic community. It was conceded that the immediate preoccupation of the states of West Africa was with 'protection': protection of their domestic economies, protection of domestic employment opportunities and concentration on import-substitution industries. These states, therefore, safeguarded their balance of payments and discharged obligations arising from colonially predetermined economic and monetary ties (most notably the Franco-phone states). In this economic climate it was not possible for them to undertake trade liberalization policies among themselves.  

Secondly, Nigeria began wooing West African states, on the assumption that they could be "socialized" into new ideas, such as the harmonization of economic policies, trade liberalization and the joint co-ordination of economic development. Nigeria believed that West Africa required non-discriminatory duties, rather than the abolition of duties. This approach would retain customs duties as a source of income for the various states of the region and at the same time, eliminate reverse preferences or favours offered to developed countries by some West African states and considered to be discriminatory against other West African states (most notably Nigeria).

In the third instance, Nigeria undertook to promote the expansion of the West African manufacturing base. (Nigeria invested in various regional manufacturing industries during the early 70's.) Nigeria acknowledged that time was required to bring West African states to understand the needs, problems and future prospects of West Africa in the same light as


94) Ibid.
Nigeria and sought to point out desirable changes in favour of co-operation. 95) This projected process of gradual socialization for regional integration gained sudden urgency when the franco-phone states of West Africa (Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta — excluding Togo) met in Barnako during June 1972 to ratify an agreement establishing an economic community of their own — the Communauté Économique de l'Afrique Accidentale (CEAO). (Protocols implementing the CEAO agreement were signed in April 1973 at Abidjan, and it is interesting to note that this meeting was attended by the French Foreign Minister.) 96) Nigeria sought to pre-empt this move, and in April 1972, Gowon and Eyadema of Togo signed a treaty providing for the establishment of what the Togolese President called the "embryo" of a West African economic community. 97) This treaty was followed by a Togolese-Nigerian official summit at Lagos during June 1972, which mandated General Gowon to call a summit conference of all West African leaders to discuss the proposed economic community for the region. Despite the co-opting of Togo, Nigeria could not drive a wedge between the franco-phone alliance, even though the various franco-phone leaders were at pains to point out that the formation of the CEAO was not detrimental to their relations with Nigeria. 98) While the Nigerian leadership felt that the institution of the CEAO did not directly affect the country's good relations with its regional neighbours, the formation of the CEAO merely confirmed Nigeria's perception of its

98) Ibid.
regional isolation: the franco-phone cleavage; the 'neo-colonialist' manoeuvring of the French; and the frustration of its continental leadership aspirations, of which an integrated regional support base was seen to be a necessary part. Furthermore, the CEAO states who were signatories of the Yaounde Convention were perceived to have an unfair advantage in trading with the EEC, and besides creating an obstacle to regional economic co-operation, Nigeria perceived the possibility of the franco-phone bloc (backed by France) undermining attempts (led by Nigeria) to re-negotiate terms of trade with the EEC. Nigeria intensified its efforts to project itself into a leadership role; Gowon convened a summit of Heads of State of the member-states of the Chad Basin Commission during July 1972 (the first meeting since 1964); 99) Nigeria took the initiative in bringing together during 1973, African, Caribbean and Pacific Island States to co-ordinate renegotiation of the EEC conventions; and in concert with Togo, Nigeria sought to formulate the general outlines and guiding principles of a treaty establishing a West African economic community and to nurture the idea of formal co-operation among the various states of the region.

The Nigerian-Togolese initiatives resulted in a meeting of Economic Ministers from 15 West African states (Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta) in Lome during December 1973, at which it was resolved that Nigeria and Togo should, with assistance from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, proceed to draft detailed proposals for the establishment of a new regional grouping. 100) At a subsequent meeting held at Monrovia during January 1975 a draft treaty, with "the creation of a homogeneous economic society" as its ultimate aim,

99) Ibid, P152.
100) Ibid.
was adopted. The "Lagos Treaty", as it subsequently became known, was
generated at Lagos, on May 28, 1975 and by June had been ratified by seven
of the 15 West African states (Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Nigeria, Togo and Upper Volta), thus bringing into being the Economic
Community of West Africa (ECOWAS).

The Community's principal objective was stated as the promotion of co-operation
and development in all fields of economic activity and the gradual economic
integration of the region. The member-states agreed to evolve
gradually common policies in the areas of transport, communications, energy
and the exploitation of mineral resources; and to co-operate in the fields
of research, training, agricultural processing and marketing, forestry,
animal husbandry and fisheries.

There shall be progressively established in the course of a
transitional period of fifteen years from the definitive entry
into force of this Treaty ... a Customs Union among the Member
States. Within this Union customs duties or other charges
with equivalent effect on imports shall be eliminated. Quota,
quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions and
administrative obstacles to trade among the Member States
shall also be removed. Furthermore, a common customs tariff
in respect of all goods imported into the Member States from
third countries shall be established.

The principal governing institution of the Community is vested in an
"Authority of Heads of State and Government". As the ultimate executive
organ, the Authority directs and controls the performance of the executive

101) Keesings Contemporary Archives 1975, Longmans, London, F27218. Also

102) Treaty establishing The Economic Community of West African States,
Lagos, May 1975, Art 2, Para 1 as quoted in UdoKang, O,
"Economic Community of West African States: Theoretical and
Practical Problems of Integration" in Nigerian Journal of International

103) Ibid, Art 40-48 and Art 35.

104) Ibid, Art 12.
functions of the Community for the progressive development of the Community and the achievement of its objectives. A Council of Ministers, consisting of two representatives of each member-state is directly responsible to the Authority. Although the Council of Ministers is empowered to give direction to all subordinate institutions of the Community, its proposals to the Authority, regarding matters of Community policy are advisory and the Authority is apparently under no obligation to accept them. Other institutions include the Executive Secretariat, the Tribunal of the Community, a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development (FCCD), and four Technical and Specialized Commissions grouped as follows: (i) Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission; (ii) Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; (iii) Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission; (iv) Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.

By the time of the first summit meeting of Heads of State of ECO:NAS in November 1976, all 15 West African states had ratified the Lagos Treaty, with the accession during 1977 of the newly independent Cape Verde Islands. (Senegal, in a deliberate attempt to balance the predominance of Nigeria in the Community had sought to make ratification conditional on the inclusion of Zaire in the Community. This was rejected by the majority of member-states on the grounds that it was premature to expand the West African Community to encompass what is essentially a central African state.) It was agreed that the Community's headquarters should be located at Lagos; that the FCCD should be based at Lome; that its first Executive Secretary should come from the Ivory Coast; and that the first managing director of the FCCD should come from Liberia.

105) Ibid, Art 5.

106) See Wayas, J, op cit, PP41-44.

The formation of ECOWAS is of vital significance to Nigerian role perception, due to the fact that ECOWAS is a tangible manifestation of the consolidation of the Nigerian regional constituency, perceived as essential to domestic stability and the projection of a continental leadership role. It represented the eventual success of Nigerian endeavours to embrace the francophone bloc in a comprehensive alliance and thus mitigate Nigerian regional insularity and alleviate Nigerian fears of francophone, French and Ghanaian attempts to undermine Nigerian national sovereignty and thereby negate Nigeria's primary 'leadership' role aspirations. The signing of the Lagos Treaty had been preceded by the ratification of the ACP/ECGLome Convention, which had influenced a measure of confidence between anglophone and francophone Africa during the protracted bargaining process, in that the OAU (Africa) negotiated and was recognized as a collectivity (united above political and historical cleavages). For this Nigeria could claim credit. This atmosphere of co-operation certainly influenced and facilitated the signing and speedy ratification of the ECOWAS accord.

The gradualist/protectionist approach adopted by Nigeria in propagating the community concept in West Africa was in keeping with Nigeria's post-civil war endeavours to project an image of responsibility and reliability (if not stability), as well as the leadership's necessary regard for the domestic stability. The failure of Nigerian integrationist endeavours would not only have negated the image of 'the reliable, responsible, stable, honest-broker', but would certainly have had domestic repercussions at a time when Nigerian domestic stability was tenuously balanced (ie; prior to the overthrow of Gowon). The failure of any Nigerian sponsored regional organization would have reflected on Nigeria's continental diplomatic
capabilities and set back progress made since the civil war in generating continental confidence in Nigeria. It would also have effectively precluded the expression of Nigerian continental leadership aspirations, credibility and authority. Thus, while the formation of ECOWAS, for the first time, bridged (in letter and spirit) the cleavage between Nigeria and its francophone neighbours, the Nigerian leadership had few illusions as to the requisite psychological and perceptual transformation necessary to consolidate Nigerian long-term political interests in bringing the regional states "to understanding future problems and prospects in the same light as Nigeria". (Nigeria is forcibly reminded of this by the continued functioning of the CMAO, permitted in terms of the Lagos Treaty, provided the activities of the CMAO do not conflict with the functions of ECOWAS and the authority of the latter is accepted as absolute.)

The primary objective and raison d'être of ECOWAS is clearly regional economic advancement. From an economic point of view, the development of the smaller and poorer states as well as the larger states within the West African region can best be facilitated within such a co-operative economic union. The immediate advantages are: (a) the larger market for the products of member-states; (b) the extended infra-structural facilities; (c) complimentary raw material access; (d) the stimulation of regional economic activity; (e) the increase in investment potential; (f) an increase in industrial processing and capacity; (g) the raising of levels of national income.\(^{109}\) Nigeria as the predominant economic power in the region stands to benefit more from the increased markets and stimulated economic activity than the other member-states. (This despite the fact that Nigeria contributes 30 per cent of the ECOWAS budget, the contributions being estimated on the basis of GNP and per capita income.\(^{110}\))

\(^{109}\) Udoh, C, op cit, PP11-12.

However, in terms of Nigerian role perception, we argue that ECOWAS is primarily of political significance and that the Nigerian leadership perceives ECOWAS, in the long-term, as a potential continental and international political actor.

Nigerian leadership has, since independence, been afflicted with a perception of regional insecurity and insularity. This was initially manifest in perceptions of French, and French inspired franco-phone hostility and the blatant Ghanaian endeavours to undermine Nigerian national sovereignty during the early years of independence. Such insecurity was realized during the Nigerian civil war, when the possibility of neighbouring states aiding the secessionist forces became a reality. This element of sustained regional insecurity in the perceptual image of the Nigerian leadership was perceived to constitute a direct threat to the maximization of the primary objectives of national unity and predestined continental leadership. Nigeria perceived in its regional environment a threat to its national sovereignty, inspired by a desire ('propagated by neo-colonialists') among its regional neighbours to undermine Nigerian actual and potential influence, both regionally and continentally. The linkage between Nigeria's primary objectives and its perceived regional insecurity has characterized Nigerian regional interaction since independence, and both this linkage, and the need to consolidate the Nigerian regional support/interest base, became increasingly more profound, until they reached crisis proportions in the uncertainties of the civil war period.

Nigeria emerged from the civil war militarily and economically preponderant, but still vulnerable to regional antagonisms and the potential of neighbouring states to undermine Nigerian national unity (the Nigerian Achilles heel) together with the linkage between national unity and aspired continental leadership. The Nigerian leadership was mindful of the role of the concerted Zambian, Tanzanian, Kenyan and Ugandan diplomatic
initiative in internationalizing the Nigerian civil war, as well as the inability of the OAU to manage the crisis in an effective way. The consolidation of the Nigerian regional constituency became imperative, both for the security of Nigerian territorial integrity (in April 1978, ECONAS adopted a Protocol on Non-aggression, recognizing *inter alia*, the inviolability of national borders and guaranteeing the non-aggressive intentions of member-states)\(^{111}\) and the maintenance of national unity, and as a base from which to project Nigerian continental leadership ambitions. In aspiring to the role of continental leader, the Nigerian leadership has perceived the need for the country to be seen to represent a wider constituency and support base within the continent *via a-vis* other continental factions and regional groupings (*de facto* or psychological). The perception of Nigeria as the leader of the largest African regional organization is of self-evident significance to Nigerian continental leadership credentials. Herein lies the primary significance of ECONAS, namely, that the Nigerian leadership perceives in ECONAS a base for the projection of continental role objectives. It is possible to envisage ECONAS forming a cohesive political bloc within the OAU in time, and the pragmatism of the gradualist approach lies herein, since it is evident that the socialization of member-states for a common 'political' purpose is a long-term and subtle process. Similarly, it is conceivable that the Nigerian leadership has perceived the possibility of the emergence of a powerful economic and political regional bloc in the southern African sub-continent once the remaining Namibia/apartheid issues are 'resolved'. The emergence of such a bloc, centred on the mineral wealth of South Africa would radically alter the balance of power in Africa and seriously challenge any notions of Nigerian continental leadership.

It is evident, therefore, that Nigerian 'integrationist' and 'protectionist'

\(^{111}\) "Defence Pact Fears" in *Africa*, No 107, July 1980, P35.
motives are an integral part of the wider Nigerian role perception. Nigerian regional interaction (other than at the perfunctory level) is responsive to the dictates of, and conducted within the parameters of the primary Nigerian perceptual image in pursuit of the Nigerian 'predestined' African leadership role.

1.3 Global interaction

The advent of an 'African presence' in international politics during the early sixties had been preceded almost fifteen years earlier by the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations, in which only four African states (Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and South Africa) had any share. The United Nations Charter, designed to prescribe the parameters of a global restructuring of inter-state relationships, was drafted in the atmosphere of moral penitence which pervaded the international system after the devastation of the Second World War. However, the ending of the Second World War coincided with the advent of the nuclear age, and so the immediate post-war international atmosphere was not merely one of victor/vanquished (the atmosphere which dominated the constitution of the League of Nations, for example), but of bloc alignment and international polarization within the international system. With the coming of nuclear bi-polarity in the international system, the need to prescribe and regulate a new international morality became imperative and the United Nations Charter provided the foundation and structure for the post-Second World War international order. The Charter of the UN effectively constituted the regulatory instrument and provided a set of moral criteria for global interaction.

This international morality was essentially the product of a Euro-American value consensus in which the African states (or colonial territories) had little share, save in as much as the majority of African states were, at
that time, colonial dependencies of the founders of the new international
order. As the subjects of the collective morality (articulated in the UN
Charter) the African colonial dependencies were able to invoke the
prescriptions of the Charter (self-determination for all peoples, human
rights, etc.) in their struggle for independence from their European
colonial overlords. The Charter of the United Nations (and later its
forums) became thus an instrument of the liberation struggle, in as much
as the African colonial territories and newly independent states were able
to stand outside the international moral order. They could invoke the
prescriptions of this code in measuring the morality of global interaction
and the progress of the colonial powers in fulfilling the moral prescriptions
and rights of the subjects of this moral code.\(^{112}\) In short, the African
states became the 'conscience' of the Euro-centric international morality
and were united in pursuit of the common goal of self-determination.

These African states, during the period between the drafting of the UN
Charter and formal accession to membership of the international society
of newly independent African states, were able to play a specific
international role (albeit inadvertently) and to gain a degree of inter-
national political leverage as the moral arbiter of international inter-
action, in the forums of the United Nations.

However, the fulfilment of the right of self-determination for the majority
of African colonial territories, saw the development of a multiplicity of
national sovereignties, individual state interests and nascent nationalism
on the African continent. In the atmosphere of the rigid cold war bi-polarity

\(^{112}\) "International law, as it now stands, seems to be intended to govern
relations between states in general and make no coherent distinction
as between continental locations of States. But in politics African
diplomacy appears to recognise two levels of law. One level is indeed
that of international law to govern relations between nations. The
other level is a kind of Pan-African law to govern relations between
African states themselves." See Hazzri, AH and Patel, Mh, (eds),
Africa: The Next Thirty Years, Julian Freedman Publishers Ltd, London,
1974, P122.
which characterized the international system during the early sixties, the division resulting from conflicting national interests left the African states (in their struggle to come to terms with the realities of their domestic and international post-colonial predicaments) open to great-power exploitation. The African states perceived the need to project a cohesive external image which could concurrently defend 'domestic' continental interests and stability, and maximize the continent's importance in the international system. The United Nations was (and still is) the primary international political arena for the manifestation of African diplomacy and the African member-states sought to co-ordinate their interaction with the international system.

The formation of a unified African-state position in international politics began as early as 1958, when at a Conference of Independent African States a formal agreement was signed by the then nine African members of the United Nations. This affirmed the desire of the states to work together to safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to work for the decolonization of all Africa. United action in the United Nations would assist in the promotion of these goals.

Through fear that other more powerful blocs might try to split the African vote and thus weaken the influence of African states in international affairs, it was decided to create a formal mechanism for co-ordinating their efforts and reconciling differences in approach to United Nations issues.

This bloc formation and its basic objectives were reinforced by the formation of the OAU in May 1963, and have persisted to the present time. The African bloc has consistently perceived its role in the United Nations as being that of 'moral arbiter' and of stimulating a degree of co-operation

and restraint between the big-powers. To achieve this end policies of 'positive neutralism' or 'positive non-alignment' have been pursued. The African bloc emphasized non-participation in the East-West power struggle since the cold war was not considered of primary significance to African interests or development. African leaders consistently expressed their determination to frame their foreign and domestic policies according to African interests and needs. Their leaders maintained that non-aligned states can judge impartially the actions of either power bloc and influence the behaviour of the great-powers by insisting on their interpretation of international morality. 114)

Although the African bloc in the United Nations is apparently united in its objectives, there are few issues on which it maintains de facto unity. One of the unifying factors is the southern African issue. 115) We have noted that the issues of southern Africa/apartheid provided a 'tangible' focus and central point of reference for African global interaction and external cohesion. The issues of southern Africa/apartheid have served to structure and consolidate the African external image, in as much as the African bloc has been able to project African values and perceptions into every area of international organization. Thus the African states are in effect, no longer merely the interpreters of the Euro-American international morality, but serve to shape and manipulate it. Although the Euro-American powers remain the progenitors of the international morality, the African bloc states, through their role as representatives of a 'world conscience' judge great power performance in accordance with


the African interpretation of the international moral order.

In considering the ego-role perception of Nigeria, the salient point to note is that the African bloc has developed a cohesiveness which has institutionalized the continent as a single bloc-actor in the international system. Nigeria is an integral part of this bloc and played a significant role in its formalization. It is therefore difficult to identify any idiosyncratically Nigerian role initiatives in the international system. This is not to suggest that Nigeria's global interaction is perfunctory; on the contrary, Nigeria seeks to play an active role in the global system, and specifically within the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But the role that Nigeria seeks to play in interaction with these global organizations, must of necessity be viewed in the light of the fact that Nigeria is an integral part of the African bloc. However, whether one is considering continental or global interaction the dictates of Nigeria's ego-role perception remain unchanged and it is therefore self-evident, that the Nigerian leadership elite's perceptual image embraces a fundamental linkage between the role which Nigeria seeks to maximize in either continental, global or regional interaction and is thus 'idiosyncratically Nigerian'.

Earlier we argued that the dictates of the Nigerian post-independence leadership's perceptual image were twofold: (a) the need to exert its independence and thus maintain a modicum of 'leadership' credibility with the emergent African states; and (b), the need to focus the national objective on an issue which would evoke the consensus of all Nigerians in an endeavor to secure national stability and unity. In seeking to assimilate these pressures into the perception of the external environment (that is; the factors arising from an historical and colonially determined Western commitment, perceptions of regional isolation and the antagonism
of doctrinaire pan-Africanism) the Nigerian leadership perceived the issue of southern Africa in general, and apartheid in particular, as offering sufficiently credible a threat to evoke a consensus of national support and provide opportunity to maximize the country's importance in external affairs, through the vocalization of Nigerian precepts. Through a process of continuous diplomatic activity these issues have gained a persistent salience in Nigerian (and by extension, African) global diplomacy.

The linkage between the threat and opportunity of the southern Africa/apartheid issue is the central tenet of Nigeria's international role perception and has become the basis of Nigerian self-assertion. This contention can be substantiated both by reference to the comparative table of Nigerian foreign policy statements set out above (which effectively represents the 'declaratory' level of ego-role perception) and by reviewing Nigeria's role at the United Nations with specific reference to the issues of southern Africa/apartheid.

1.3.1 Nigerian participation at the United Nations

In reviewing the role of Nigeria at the United Nations over the 20 year period since the country's accession to UN membership, it is clear that while Nigeria has consistently professed to a profound commitment to the United Nations Organization and has consistently supported the African bloc on the vast majority of issues (notable exceptions being the Congo crisis and the China seating issue), Nigerian diplomacy has undergone significant evolution. The evolution of the perception of Nigeria's role in the United Nations is reactive to the changing leadership perception of threats to, and opportunities for the maximization of Nigeria's primary role perception in accordance with external environmental trends.
It is also apparent that Nigerian participation in the debates of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council are characterized by a consistently high degree of threat articulation. Such threat articulation has tended to take the form of a 'deterrent strategy', that is to say, threatening what might happen (and declaring the outcome in apocalyptic phrases such as 'cold war', 'holocaust' or 'international conflagration') if specific measures, such as the expulsion of South Africa or sanctions against Rhodesia, are not adopted. This strategy of threatening impending global conflagration and of universalizing African issues, is a deliberate tactic intended to influence the major powers in their perception of the significance of African issues to their interests. It is also designed to maximize the importance of African initiatives in the international system. Nigerian diplomatic interaction has been both consistently skilful and increasingly assertive in developing this strategy. Indeed, this form of 'diplomatic deterrence' or 'international induction' has become the principal tool of Nigerian international leverage and an integral part of the manifestation of Nigeria's ego-role perception.

During the early post-independence years the commitment of the Nigerian leadership to the United Nations, stemmed from an emotional appeal based on the leadership's moralistic and legitimist interpretation of international politics.  

Be that as it may, it is clear that as a newly independent actor in the international system, Nigeria perceived in its participation in the United Nations (as have all other emergent states) an opportunity to manifest its long anticipated independence. The Nigerian foreign minister summarised this view as follows:

'We also, by virtue of independence and membership of the United Nations, find ourselves as Members of the community of independent States ... we are most ardent supporters of the United Nations and we would do everything possible to make the continued existence of the organization a reality.'

116) Idang, CJ, op cit, P130.

We ... regard the United Nations as one of the finest institutions that have been created by modern man to bring various States together and to rally international opinion, in order that the world at large might have a centre once a year for exchanging thoughts and for knowing how the various sections of the world are thinking ... I am sure that all the African States are grateful that such an institution does exist, because it helps them steadily to achieve the objectives which the African states ... have set as their target. 118)

In view of the fact that the post-independence leadership elite in Nigeria consisted of a conservative alliance, it is not surprising that Nigeria's role at the United Nations during this initial phase has been described as being characterized by a "spirit of compromise". 119) One example of this, is the fact that whereas the Nigerian leadership had stated categorically that it intended to see to it that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was admitted as a member of the United Nations, when an Albanian resolution proposed the expulsion of Nationalist China as a prerequisite for the seating of the PRC, the Nigerian delegation abstained from voting. 120) Indeed, it is possible, with reference to the nature of later Nigerian initiatives and interaction on the global plane, to discern a strong inclination towards a pacifist, 'keeper of the peace' role in Nigerian actions and statements during this early phase.

Thus, for example, during 1961 and on a General Assembly resolution for a plan of action to eliminate colonialism and to bring the remaining dependent territories to independence, Nigeria proposed that a period of ten years was needed to bring the plan to fruition.

... in introducing this draft resolution, it is the intention of Nigeria that there should be an orderly and peaceful development in Africa ... We want to keep ideological conflicts outside the purview of our continent. That we could not


120) Ibid.
do in the midst of turmoil.\textsuperscript{121}"

Similarly, in a review of Nigerian objectives in participation in the United Nations, the Nigerian representative articulated the Nigerian motivation as follows:

"What we want to avoid is violence. Africa has suffered so much violence and destruction that we do not want any more. We would like Africa to be able to use the abundant resources that it has for the good of its sons and daughters...\textsuperscript{122}\)

Nigeria had assumed the role of the colonialist spokesman\textsuperscript{123}\) and sought to project itself as the guardian of Africa and of the remaining colonial territories, probably drawing satisfaction from its own peaceful transition to independence and casting disparaging glances at strife-ridden Kenya, which in size and wealth represented a potential rival in the leadership stakes and certainly a match in competition for British economic favour.

Such pacifist inclinations as are identifiable should be seen within the context of the perceptional image held by the Nigerian leadership during this phase. Nigeria was primarily concerned with the problem of insecure domestic unity, and any notion of subversion or violent disorder was certainly perceived in the light of violence and upheaval in the national constituency. It could be argued, for example, that Nigeria perceived in the displacing of Nationalist China and the seating of a more powerful compatriot (in the PRC), parallels with, and a possible precedent for, secession from the Nigerian federal polity.

Furthermore, Nigerian notions of leadership in Africa were frustrated at

\textsuperscript{121} United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 16th Session, 1050st Plenary Meeting, November 9, 1961, P609.
\textsuperscript{123} See Oyebode, AB, "Toward a New Policy on Decolonization", op cit, P17.
the time by the radical orientation of Ghana, which not only sought to subvert Nigerian stability and undermine Nigerian capability, but also to radicalize African opinion in support of the ideology of pan-Africanism. Nigerian leadership credentials were perceived to stem from its geographic and demographic size, but the country was unable to offer ideological initiative and perceived some threat in the Ghanaian ideological leadership and its radical emphasis on "sweeping away colonial boundaries". In its pacifist inclination, the Nigerian leadership sought to negate Ghanaian radicalism and to rally support for moderation (the 'Golden voice of Africa' syndrome). The rationale was an endeavour to secure domestic stability on the one hand, and manifest a notion of leadership on the other. Clear manifestation of the linkage between the threat of secession and Ghanaian subversion with the opportunity for exerting leadership is apparent in Nigeria's role in the Congo crisis.

Anxious to be accepted and recognized as a leading actor in the international system, one of Nigeria's earliest positive actions, as a member of the United Nations, was to commit Nigerian troops to the United Nations operation in the Congo. When Nigeria was subsequently appointed to chair the United Nations Conciliation Committee, the Nigerian representative committed the Commission to seeking peace, unity and stability in the Congo and disclaimed any notion of dismemberment or partition as a solution.

I want the Assembly to think of the people of the Congo and not think of personalities. I want the Assembly to have pity on Africa and on the African delegations here ... It would be a sad thing ... if the great States represented here used the position of the Congo as a pretext for starting the cold war again in Africa. (24)

While Nigeria's role in the Congo crisis has often been criticized

(particularly by Ghana), 125) clearly evident in the Nigerian action is a perception that the crisis in the Congo might set a precedent for secessionist movements in Nigeria itself. The desire to limit the international involvement and to 'Africanize' the issue, and the commitment to maintaining the unity of the Congo as a single state, arise from the perceptual dictates of Nigerian national unity and stability. Furthermore, the issue of the Congo, provided the opportunity to negate Ghanaian initiatives (which were at odds with the endeavours of the United Nations and Nigeria), and in uniting the African factions, to gain in prestige, not only in Africa, but internationally. 126) However, the Congo issue was domestically sensitive and the spectre of the 'cold war in Africa' hardly constituted sufficient threat to deter Nigerian secessionist movements. Thus Nigeria's prominently assertive role, during its first session at the United Nations, could justifiably be described as 'emotional hyper-reaction' to the opportunity to manifest Nigerian independence and continental leadership in the international system. Such hyper-reaction may be ascribed to the dilemma faced by the Nigerian leadership in seeking to reconcile the dictates of the post-independence perceptual image with the perceptions of the external environment.

Whereas such actions appear to suggest a Nigerian role of 'voice of moderation' or 'peace-keeper' in global interaction, the Nigerian leadership elite sought instead, to emphasize and evoke recognition for its role in relation to southern African issues. Thus the Nigerian foreign minister told the Nigerian House of Representatives during November 1961:

"If hon. Members examine or record (toward South Africa) within the past twelve months in the light of those who have been there (in the UN) for 15 years, 12 years or even 4 years,"


I think Nigeria will be given credit, and hon. Members will no doubt be proud of our achievements.  

As early as December 1960 the Nigerian foreign minister announced to the United Nations General Assembly that the southern Africa/apartheid issue would become a central element of Nigerian foreign policy, invoking simultaneously the spectre of alternative racial holocaust as the Nigerian perception rationale.  

As far as Nigeria is concerned, the time has come when this subject will no longer be considered an internal affair of any State but indeed as something quite intimately connected with our foreign policy ... I am saying this in relation to South Africa. Today colonialism is not confined to Europe. The Union of South Africa is one of those imperialistic States where a minority of 3 million people decide to subjugate, humiliate and virtually destroy the souls of 11 million others ... in order to avoid (a) holocaust Nigeria takes this opportunity to ask the minority rulers of South Africa to eradicate colonialism and imperialism ... 

Whereas the 'voice of moderation' is discernible in the tone of the above policy statement (especially in comparison with later utterances) Nigeria could claim a year later that it was at her initiative that the proposal that the United Nations Security Council should declare the South African situation a threat to international peace, and that mandatory economic, political and military sanctions should be imposed on South Africa, was submitted as a draft resolution to the General Assembly.  

Speaking during the debate on the draft resolution the Nigerian representative clearly articulated the Nigerian perception;  

Does the situation in South Africa threaten international peace and security? Twenty-five independent States who live on the same continent with South Africa, neighbours of South Africa, ...  


think so and believe so ... I appeal to you ... to realize that Apartheid is a monstrous evil knocking at the conscience of mankind ... Let us act while there is yet time for it may be that by the time the white people of South Africa have learned to love, the majority of the black people would have come to hate ... 130)

Similarly, on the issue of the South African mandate to administer South West Africa/Namibia, Nigeria was vocal during the 1960 debate on a General Assembly resolution (sponsored principally by Liberia and Ethiopia) calling for the recognition of the situation in South-West Africa as a threat to international peace and security, and the territory’s inalienable right to self-determination. Stating that it was the Assembly’s duty to avoid racial conflict, the consequences of which might threaten the human race, the Nigerian delegate declared:

The United Nations, according to the rulings of the International Court of Justice, owes have some obligation ... towards South West Africa ... why should we be stopped from discussing this particular question in order that we may redeem those people from the yoke of the imperialism of these people in South Africa? I am appealing to all representatives in this General Assembly to see ... that we should do everything possible to expedite the redemption of South West Africa and the eradication of oppression and suppression by the Union of South Africa ... 131)

This relatively high level of political invective was not maintained in relation to the Rhodesian issue however. During June 1961, the General Assembly devoted a resolution tabled by 39 Afro-Asian states, calling upon the United Kingdom to convene a conference with the full participation of all political parties, to draw up a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia. The Nigerian delegate, while not condoning the status quo, was at pains to point out that both the British and indigenous inhabitants had a case and that moderation should be exercised. 132)

This difference in perception on the two issues of South Africa/South West Africa and Rhodesia was influenced by the parameters of the perceptual image of the Nigerian leadership elite. That is to say, the leadership elite at independence perceived that Nigerian foreign policy options were limited by historical and economic factors arising from the country's links with Britain. Economic expedience and psychological affinity thus precluded the option of directly censuring Britain. (In short, the issue offered little immediate opportunity for the maximization of perceptual precepts, but held the potential threat of the adverse economic and political repercussions of a confrontation with Britain.) On the other hand, the question of South West Africa/South Africa and apartheid, of all the various issues on the United Nations agenda at this time, offered the singular advantages of minimal de facto threat and maximum opportunity to the Nigerian perceptual image. It is both logical and pragmatic that the Nigerian leadership should seek to emphasize these issues as the central focus of Nigeria's role perception.

Subsequently, Nigerian initiatives at the United Nations were centred almost exclusively on the issues of South West Africa and the elimination of apartheid, while preferring to support as a bloc member, issues which did not offer similar opportunity for the maximization of Nigerian interests. Thus Nigeria showed little idiosyncratic initiative and generally maintained the initially apparent role of moderate 'keeper of the peace'. Thus it was that Nigeria was one of the 11 members of the Special Committee on Apartheid established in terms of a November 1962 resolution of the General Assembly, with the object of keeping the racial policies of South Africa under review and reporting to the Assembly. 133)

Reactivating the question of sanctions against South Africa, 33 Afro-Asian states had jointly sponsored a resolution demanding the imposition of economic, political and military sanctions. Nigeria took the lead in appealing to the Assembly to adopt the measure.

If you find it impossible to go with us, I beg you, in the name of humanity, not to vote against this resolution. I pray that you do not deceive yourselves any longer in thinking that diplomatic approaches are of any value...

Having largely initiated calls for South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations, it was curiously inconsistent that during September 1963, the Nigerian representative should declare that Nigeria would not necessarily support the expulsion of South Africa, but would prefer to have South Africa in the Assembly. However, given that the possible expulsion of South Africa, would have at that time, negated the basic tenet and rationale of Nigerian global interaction, this apparent inconsistency is quite understandable.

Then during December 1965 a resolution was endorsed by the General Assembly, condemning the apartheid policies of the South African Government (the 23th resolution of its kind in 20 years) and reaffirming an earlier resolution of 1962 calling for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, Nigeria took the initiative in introducing a second resolution which was also adopted by the General Assembly. This provided for the establishment of a United Nations Trust Fund, made up of voluntary

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135) See Alimadde, R., op cit., P55. This statement was quickly repudiated by the Minister of State for External Affairs who announced that no matter what was said at the UN; "... it is the determination of the Nigerian Government to pursue consistently its policy of non-fraternization with South Africa".

contributions from member-states, organizations and individuals, to
assist victims of apartheid and their families. In pursuance of the
resolution, the President of the General Assembly nominated Chile,
Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Nigeria as trustees of the United Nations
Trust Fund\(^{137}\) (a position which Nigeria still retains). So too, during
December 1965 at an 'international seminar' on apartheid, attended by
Nigeria and 30 other UN member-states held at Brasilia, apartheid was
declared to be a threat to world peace, and Nigeria was vociferous during
the subsequent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly in seeking
general acceptance for the notion.\(^{138}\)

Similarly, during December 1962 the 'special concern of Africa' in
General Assembly debates which resolved to censure South Africa's
presence in South West Africa and reaffirmed the territories inalienable
right to self-determination, were headed by Nigeria and Guinea.\(^{139}\)
Although Liberia and Ethiopia had been the prime-movers in referring the
issue of South African jurisdiction in South West Africa to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Nigeria was one of 14 member-states (only
four of which were African states, the others being Ethiopia, Senegal and
Egypt) designated by the President of the General Assembly to serve on an
Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa, in recognition of the Nigerian
initiatives and special interest in the South West African issue.\(^{140}\)
The committee was to make recommendations with respect to practical means
of bringing South West Africa to independence in the wake of the termination

\(^{137}\) Yearbook of the United Nations 1966, United Nations Office of Public

\(^{138}\) Ibid, P81.


\(^{140}\) Akpan, BE, African Goals and Diplomatic Strategies in the United Nations,
of the South African mandate over the territory and the placing of South
West Africa under United Nations administration.\textsuperscript{141}) The four African
members of the Ad Hoc Committee subsequently proposed that a United
Nations council should be established for South West Africa, to lead the
territory to independence not later than June 1968 and that South Africa
should be expelled by force if necessary. A draft resolution to this
effect was introduced to the fifth special session of the UN General
Assembly by Nigeria.\textsuperscript{142})

However, during this initial phase Nigeria was consistently moderate (in
comparison with the aggressiveness of other African state action, notably
Tanzania) in its approach to the issue of Southern Rhodesia, preferring
to support bloc initiatives rather than projecting any individual initiative.
While the Nigerian representative referred to the Rhodesian question as
a very important matter with "explosive potential",\textsuperscript{143}) the Nigerian
leadership (prior to 1966) perceived greater opportunity for exerting
leadership on this issue within the Commonwealth grouping rather than
at the United Nations. Thus in June 1964, in consequence of numerous
General Assembly resolutions, appealing for an all party drafting of a new
constitution for Southern Rhodesia, which had been passed during the
preceding years, a five-member United Nations sub-committee delegation
was dispatched to London to discuss the implementation of the various
UN resolutions with the British Government, Nigeria was not part of the
dlegation.\textsuperscript{144}) (This was in direct contrast to the fact that Nigeria

\textsuperscript{141}) Yearbook of the United Nations 1962, op cit, P444.
\textsuperscript{142}) Yearbook of the United Nations 1962, United Nations Office of
Public Information, New York, 1966, P137.
\textsuperscript{143}) Akpan, I., op cit., P52.
\textsuperscript{144}) Ibid, P63. Members were Ethiopia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria and
Yugoslavia.
was a founding member of both the Special Committee on Apartheid and
the Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa and indicative of a far greater
commitment and initiative on the latter issues.)

When in August 1965 the Security Council non-permanent membership was
enlarged from 11 to 15 members, Nigeria (along with Japan, New Zealand
and Uganda) was subsequently elected by the General Assembly to serve
on the Security Council for a two year period. It is significant
that Nigeria's election to the Security Council of the United Nations
should have come at the time when the Nigerian domestic constituency was
on the verge of collapse, for not only did it lend recognition to Nigeria's
role at the United Nations since 1960, but it was to mark a transition
in the nature of Nigerian foreign policy initiatives. It is curiously
ironic that at a time when the Nigerian federal polity was in a state of
collapse, Nigeria should, for the first time, receive manifest opportunity,
as an African member of the Security Council, to project a concrete and
tangible measure of African leadership in the international system. The
consequence of this divergence in perceptional dictates (collapse of
national unity/manifestation of African leadership) was a wide divergence
of threat and opportunity perception: on the one hand, a radicalization
of action (so as to forcefully project leadership) and on the other, a
principled protectionism reactive to the vulnerability of the national
constituency (non-interference, respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity).

Thus, for example, during 1967 Nigeria (in conjunction with Mali and
Uganda) was instrumental in initiating the Security Council resolution
seeking the imposition of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and

deploring the refusal of the United Kingdom to bring about the immediate fall of the UDI regime. 146) This concerted censure of Britain was subsequent to several Nigerian initiatives during 1966 seeking to declare the situation in Southern Rhodesia, a threat to international peace and abhorring the failure of member-states to fully enforce the voluntary embargo (including a Nigerian sponsored Security Council draft resolution of April 1966). 147) However, as regards the other major issue to dominate the debates of the Security Council during Nigeria's two year tenure, the Arab/Israeli dispute and Egyptian allegations of aggression, the Nigerian representative stated:

I am instructed to make it clear that the Nigerian polity will not support any action that tends to impair or encroach upon the right of a legal Government of any country to maintain the integrity of its territory and waters, and to order its affairs according to its own light. 148)

The linkage between the domestic constituency and the nature of Nigerian interaction is clearly evident. The exploitation of Nigerian oil resources was significantly altering the Nigerian economic predicament, and the removal of the conservative post-independence leadership left Nigeria free to radicalise its challenge to Britain in the Security Council and thereby reinforced the notions of African leadership evoked by Nigeria's election to the Security Council. Moreover, the new leadership in Nigeria found it domestically expedient to vocalise external issues and also to challenge the former colonial mentor in an endeavour to throw off the 'conservative' mantle of the civilian government. On the other hand, however, the instability of the Nigerian national unity on the eve of the civil war, dictated the insistence on the principle of inviolability of sovereignty discernible in

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147) Ibid, P95-96.
the Nigerian attitude to the Israeli predicament and is a clear illustration of the distinction between the extremities of threat (ie; international secessionist precedent) and opportunity (ie; strong initiative on Rhodesia, the evocation of the external threat, the need to unite domestic consensus and exert African leadership) in the perceptional spectrum of the Nigerian leadership at this time, and the linkage between the two in dictating global interaction.

The change in style of the Nigerian leadership in the immediate post-civil war period is evident from the following statement by the Nigerian representative at the United Nations during 1969:

South Africa clings defiantly to its criminal usurpation of the sacred rights of the people of Namibia and obstructs the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people. In Zimbabwe, the rebel regime of Ian Smith has recently placed the crowning piece of its dangerous edifice of racial tyranny... The Nigerian delegation fears that we cannot hope to win the race against time in southern Africa as long as the regimes in that region can count on the shelter and protection of their friends who afford them the political, economic and military collaboration aimed at truncating the growth of independent Africa.  

This statement is symptomatic of a resurgence of the Nigerian perceptual role in the wake of the civil war, which had not only tarnished the credibility of the Nigerian polity, but had severely limited the credibility and authority of the African bloc as a cohesive single international political actor. It is also significant because, for the first time at the United Nations, the Nigerian representative drew a direct linkage between the issues of southern Africa and international (Western) economic and strategic interests. This linkage was to become the dominant element of Nigerian (and by extension, African) international political leverage.

During the latter sixties African diplomatic initiatives were in a state  

of diplomatic flux (as already suggested above) and the African resolutions
centred on southern Africa/apartheid had become institutionalized ritual
at the United Nations, merely reiterating sentiments endorsed by resolution
during the early part of the decade. Effective implementation of these
resolutions was consistently forestalled by Western vetoes in the Security
Council because of the primacy of Western economic and strategic interests
in the African sub-continent. The euphoria of independence, of which
accession to the United Nations was a mark of international acceptance,
had dulled and many African states no longer fostered the enthusiasm for
the United Nations of the early sixties. Nigeria, however, perceived that
African effectiveness in the international system was a direct function
of the measure of cohesiveness of the African bloc. Thus the 'power' and
effectiveness of the African continent in international interaction lay in
the size of its bloc vote at the United Nations. Nigeria's commitment to
the United Nations was firmly restated: "...I have come as the Special
Envoy of my Head of State to renew Nigeria's pledge of fidelity to and
support for the United Nations".150)

In concert with the other African states, Nigeria sought to consolidate
organizational interests and effectiveness, and in giving voice to the
African sentiment, clearly demonstrate the perceptual linkage between
the immorality of the South African situation and the threat of inter-
national conflict.

The question of colonialism affects Africa more than any other
part of the world, and the continued existence of colonialism
in Africa is an infraction of our dignity as Africans and a
threat to our national security and sovereignty... Just as
dishheartening as the lack of progress in decolonization is the
continuation of the deplorable policy of apartheid...the United
Nations must look closely into areas in which new initiatives
can be taken... It is imperative that we organize more effectively
... our attitude is determined by our awareness that the
entrenchment of racist minority Government in southern Africa

150) United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 26th Session,
is not only morally wrong but, more importantly...a primary source of international conflict. 151)

While Nigeria was speaking on behalf of, and as a member of the African bloc (evoking notions of Africa's role as 'world conscience') and the epitome of the African experience, its leadership was in fact primarily seeking to reaffirm its ego-role perception in global interaction. The precepts of the Nigerian perceptual image remained constant (the need to manifest national unity and exert African leadership), but Nigeria had emerged from the civil war economically and militarily predominant and sought to assert these imperatives in a radical invocation of the threat of the issues of southern Africa/apartheid. That is to say, the Nigerian leadership perceived the need to concurrently consolidate national (and continental) unity and to exert its claim to continental leadership (enhanced by its military and economic capability), both of which had been fundamentally impaired by the civil war. This reaffirmation of Nigeria's international authority demanded a radicalization of its approach to the fundamental issues of its foreign policy.

Thus, for example, in 1970 the Nigerian foreign minister called upon the General Assembly to establish a liberation fund for the liquidation of imperialism, colonialism and racism in Africa152) and together with Somalia, challenged the validity of the credentials of the South African UN representative (a role formally, almost annually performed by Tanzania).153) Similarly, in 1971 the Nigerian UN delegate, then President of the UN Council for Namibia, reacting to the International Court of Justice opinion that South Africa's administration of South West Africa was illegal,

stated that it would be the role of the Council to challenge every action South Africa might take concerning Namibia. In October 1971, Nigeria voted in favour of the resolution admitting the People's Republic of China to UN membership and unseating the Taiwanese representative, in contrast to previous abstentions. During July 1970, Nigeria spearheaded the Special Committee on Apartheid initiatives, in censuring British proposals to resume arms sales to South Africa, in the chambers of the United Nations, with Nigeria eventually threatening to withdraw from the Commonwealth. During 1972 the Nigerian representative was elected Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid and Nigeria has retained the position ever since. So too, during 1973 Nigeria undertook to annually double its financial contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund.

When during January/February 1972 the UN Security Council met at Addis Ababa, in special session to consider the problems of southern Africa, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs called for the immediate withdrawal of the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, the immediate recall of the Pearce Commission from Rhodesia and compliance with the UN injunction on South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia. He claimed that;

... the racist regime in Pretoria has not relented in the pursuit of its bogus doctrine of apartheid in spite of universal

154) Akpan, I, op cit, P144.
condemnation and the heroic protest of liberation forces struggling to be heard.\textsuperscript{159)}

In subsequent debates on Rhodesia, Nigeria was foremost in seeking an extension of sanctions to South Africa and in condemning US violations of the sanctions against Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{160)} During December 1973, resolutions initiated by the UN Council for Namibia recognized the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) as the authentic representative of the people of South West Africa/Namibia.\textsuperscript{161)}

However, Nigeria's primary role initiative during this period was to endorse and vocalize the African strategy for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. The strategy had originated in the form of a resolution by the Assembly of Heads of State of the OAU, directing the African delegates at the UN to take the necessary steps to expel South Africa from the United Nations.\textsuperscript{162)} The implementation of the resolution came at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly when through the diplomatic efforts of the African states, the Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the Security Council to review the relationship between the UN and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the Principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On September 30, the General Assembly decided not to accept the credentials of the South African representative.\textsuperscript{163)}

When the Security Council convened on October 18, 1974 to consider the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{159} Yearbook of the United Nations 1972, \textit{op cit}, PP75-80.
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid, P127. Also Yearbook of the United Nations 1974, \textit{op cit}, PP140-141.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Yearbook of the United Nations 1973, United Nations Office of Public Information, New York, 1974, P140.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} Akpan, H, \textit{op cit}, P106.
\end{itemize}
South African relationship with the United Nations, African delegates pleaded with other members to support their position. The Nigerian delegate spoke in support of the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations.

Action by the Security Council would enable the United Nations and the specialized agencies to isolate the South African regime and to deprive it of the benefits of international co-operation and recognition. It would serve as a warning to the white minority in South Africa that they must re-think their course and seek their destiny in accordance with the principles of the Charter. It would serve as an encouragement to all in South Africa who had been struggling to defend the Charter principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.164)

However, the resolution was vetoed in the Security Council by the United States, France and Britain, but on November 12, 1974 Tanzania introduced the expulsion resolution in the General Assembly; it was subsequently endorsed and South Africa's representation in the Assembly was suspended by a vote on a resolution of the President of the General Assembly.165)

During 1975, in a major review of Nigeria's role at the United Nations since 1960, the Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs highlighted the central focus which the apartheid issue had constituted in Nigerian interaction with the United Nations Organization.

The Organization and its Special Committee Against Apartheid have been a major source of information on the diabolical policy of apartheid just as it has been the main focus of arousing international consciousness to the evils of the system. We in Nigeria are proud to have played a significant role in the efforts of the United Nations in combating this crime against humanity. It will be recalled that Nigeria continues to be an active member of the United Nations Council for Namibia. We therefore join all freedom-loving people of the world in pledging our continued support, moral as well as material to the peoples of South Africa, who continue to suffer under the oppressive yoke of the racist Government.166)

After the failure of the expulsion resolutions and the veto in the Security Council, during June 1975, of a resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, it was Nigeria who rallied African diplomatic forces. Bolstered by the success of its continental diplomatic initiatives the Obasanjo leadership brought a new drive and assertive leadership. (The linkage between the need for the Obasanjo leadership to demonstrate the ineptness of the deposed Gowon regime and at the same time to secure the activist credentials of the new regime, has already been alluded to above.) Nigerian initiative and leadership on African issues relating to southern Africa/apartheid were to be put beyond dispute by Nigerian impatience with the 'blocking' tactics of the Western powers in the Security Council. Nigeria determined to 'legitimize' the notion of armed liberation struggle in southern Africa;

> With the intrinsically articulation of the odious policy of apartheid the question in South Africa is no longer one of reform, but one of liberation struggle. Liberation movements have the right, therefore, to free themselves, from the shackles of a minority racist and oppressive Government.... We in Nigeria fully endorse it.\(^{167}\)

During March 1977, the Security Council was convened at the request of Nigeria (as chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid) to consider a resolution declaring South Africa to be a threat to international peace, and apartheid, a crime against humanity.

(...) We in Africa are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the outcome of debates and issues which are so dear to our hearts. The resolutions adopted by the Council each time we seek action against the racist regime of Pretoria have always been indecisive ... The time is long overdue for declaring the situation in South Africa a threat to international peace and security and for the Council to take appropriate action... The Government of Nigeria would like to point out that not only are the ingredients of international and racial conflagration present in southern Africa but that a state of war has actually begun to exist.\(^{168}\)


Similarly, the Security Council was convened during the same month to consider a Nigerian resolution rejecting the "Salisbury internal agreement" as both "illegal and unacceptable" and condemning "attempts and manoeuvres" by the white minority to retain power in Rhodesia. The UN Security Council, after seven days of debate endorsed the Nigerian draft resolution on March 14, 1977.\(^\text{169}\)

During May 1977, a conference in support of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia was held at Maputo and during August 1977, representatives from 112 governments, 12 inter-governmental organizations, as well as a number of non-governmental organizations and individuals attended the World Conference for Action against Apartheid at Lagos, organized by the United Nations, in co-operation with the OAU and the Federal Government of Nigeria.\(^\text{170}\) The conference adopted the so-called "Lagos Declaration" which endorsed United Nations support for armed struggle in South Africa.

The World Conference recalls with admiration the valiant efforts of the South African people for many decades for an end to racial discrimination and for the establishment of a non-racial society... The United Nations has solemnly recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for freedom... The World Conference pledges its full support to the legitimate aspirations of the South African people...\(^\text{171}\)

On October 24, 1977 the General Assembly elected Nigeria (along with Bolivia, Gabon, Czechoslovakia and Kuwait) to the Security Council for a two year term as a non-permanent member.\(^\text{172}\) The Security Council was convened during the latter part of October 1977, to once again consider the situation in South Africa and the Nigerian representative pleaded.

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for the imposition of an oil and arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was suggested that all member-states should promptly halt new investment in South Africa and take steps to dismantle their existing investments there. Nigeria, he added, was taking appropriate steps to identify those transnational corporations which were doing business with Nigeria while giving support to the apartheid system in South Africa.¹⁷³) Nigeria had effectively prepared the ground and on November 4, 1977 the UN Security Council endorsed the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.¹⁷⁴) Nigeria could legitimately claim credit for the success of the concerted initiative and positive African bloc leadership which Nigeria had adopted as its style of interaction after 1976.

Nigeria's strategy at the United Nations has evolved from the faltering uncertainties of the immediate post-independence era and the fundamental dilemma faced by an inherently conservative leadership in its inability to create any ideological or doctrinal linkage between the dictates of the perceptual image (national unity/African leadership) and their perception of the external environment. The issue of southern Africa/apartheid offered a threat of sufficiently credible magnitude and within the experiential sphere of all Nigerians (and indeed all Africans), to manifest in its unrelenting invocation, the opportunity to unite the tenuous national consensus in endorsing Nigeria's espoused role and of gaining acceptance for Nigeria in the relatively radical Africa of the sixties.

In focussing the objective of external interaction on the central issue of southern Africa/apartheid, the leadership has consistently sought to

¹⁷³) Ibid, P141.

¹⁷⁴) Ibid, Pp 140-141.
universalize the scope of the threat, invoking the prescriptions of the UN Charter, in a strategy which has sought to affect the conscience of the Western powers and win their support for the African cause, defined as fundamental to the interest of that moral order of which the Euro-American powers are the guardians.

If apartheid is not dismantled it may yet be the cause of the greatest human conflict and tragedy in the world. It is my greatest hope that the world will be spared the great tragedy which can only be the consequence of failure to remove the system of apartheid in South Africa. 175)

... our attitude is determined by our awareness that the entrenchment of racist minority Governments in southern Africa is not only morally wrong but, more importantly... a primary source of international conflict. 176)

...the major preoccupation of my delegation, (is) the problem of southern Africa...the United Nations cannot be a mere bystander when the final push against the last bastion of imperialism and racism in Africa is in progress...We in Africa have faith...that the United Nations will ultimately live up to the ideals of its Charter... 177)

This strategy is an integral and fundamental element of the Nigerian role perception (and by extension, the African role perception) in global interaction. Thus the southern Africa/apartheid issue can justifiably be said to have structured the Nigerian (and African) global interaction in providing a central focus and tangible point of reference, which concurrently consolidates the national (and continental) unity and maximizes Nigeria's (and Africa's) significance in the international system.


The pivotal linkage between the perception of threat and opportunity in the southern Africa/apartheid issue has become the tool of Nigerian self-assertion, as manifest in Nigeria's role on the Special Committee on Apartheid and the UN Council for Namibia, which over the 20 years since Nigeria's accession to UN membership, has maximized the notion of Nigeria as a 'leader' of the African bloc.

In more recent times, Nigeria has sought to extend this role of continental leader to the wider issues of the international system, particularly debates on a new international economic order and nuclear proliferation. It is interesting to note that the strategy of 'diplomatic deterrence' or 'international induction' (first developed in relation to the southern Africa/apartheid issues) has provided for the general character of Nigerian global interaction.

...the greatest threat to world peace and prosperity is the refusal of former colonial powers to recognize the co-relationship between political freedom and economic independence. 178)

Collectively, we must share our various burdens and distribute our benefits... Unfortunately, the present international economic relationship does not reflect the ideals of collective security and responsiveness to the realities of international order based on realistic co-operation in a world divided between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. 179)

We pledge the full co-operation of the Nigerian delegation in the fulfilment of (these) objectives in the over-all interests of world peace, justice and security... It is our ardent hope and desire that Africa shall remain a nuclear-free zone, provided of course that this hope is not rendered naive by the merchants of horror and enemies of humanity. 180)


Thus Nigeria, as an integral member of the African bloc, has played a primary role in manifesting the notion of Africa as the 'world conscience' and arbiter of the international morality in international interaction. The dictates of Nigeria's ego-role perception have remained constant and the Nigerian global interaction is primarily responsive to the need to maintain national unity and to exert its 'rightful', 'predestined' leadership role in Africa. That the issues of southern Africa/apartheid are fundamental to the pursuit of the maximization of these perceptual dictates has been amply substantiated above and is reinforced yet again by the Nigerian UN representative's assessment of Nigeria's current role at the United Nations.

Behind all southern Africa's problems is the racist minority regime of South Africa, whose conduct raises the spectre of racial war... As internal and international opposition to its policies intensify, it is painfully obvious that South Africa intends, through employment of mercenaries and subversion, to threaten the peace and security of the continent.

This resume of Nigeria's role at the United Nations suggests a 'see-saw paradox' in the Nigerian perceptual rationale. That is to say, it is apparent that the measure of Nigerian/African unity and Nigerian/African leadership in continental/global interaction is a function of the level of threat articulation. The Nigerian leadership has consistently perceived the rationale (or expedience) of magnifying and universalizing threat perception so as to maximize the opportunity for fulfilment of the Nigerian ego-role perception.

1.3.2 Subsidiary spheres of global interaction: The Commonwealth, Non-aligned movement and OPEC.

The United Nations is the primary forum in international politics for the enactment or maximization of any state 'role' in the international system.

and as such is logically the primary sphere of Nigerian global interaction. However, measures of historical, economic and ideological determinism have included Nigeria's participation in three 'subsidiary' organizational spheres with global proportions, namely, the Commonwealth, the Non-aligned Movement and OPEC. The significance of these subsidiary spheres of global interaction to Nigerian ego-role perception is akin to the linkage between Nigerian regional interaction and the country's perceived continental aspirations. That is to say, that Nigeria perceived in its interaction with these subsidiary global organizational spheres, a constituency in which to manifest and consolidate Nigerian external role perception.

That Nigeria would become a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations (as it was then known) after independence was never in doubt. As already suggested, one of the primary factors delimiting Nigerian foreign policy options at independence was an overwhelming measure of psychological affinity (on the part of the conservative leadership alliance who were the products of the British colonial system) and an expedient economic linkage with Britain. This was the result as much of historical/colonial determinism, as the realization by the pre-independence nationalist leaders that good relations with Britain (of which commitment to the Commonwealth was a sine qua non) was a prerequisite for self-determination. Thus commitment to the Commonwealth was the second of only two certainties in Nigeria's immediate post-independence foreign policy. The Nigerian foreign minister of the time paraphrased the Nigerian perception of the significance of the Commonwealth.

As a member of the Commonwealth, we have rights and privileges as well as obligations to other members... The Commonwealth is composed of different races and different colours... Naturally, each of them has distinctive characteristics which are peculiarly its own. For this reason, we believe that each unit has got its own unique contribution to make to the common good of the world.

as a whole. No Commonwealth member is subject to the will and caprice of any other one. Even the forms of government in the Commonwealth are not uniform... That does not cause anybody to go to war. What is significant is that certain vital institutions are shared in common. An understanding of the Rule of Law is fundamental to the institutions of all members of the Commonwealth, with one exception. South Africa alone does not believe in Rule of Law. The Commonwealth also represents an experiment in inter-racial relationships. Even when its members are not able to agree, they are still prepared to agree to disagree. This unity amidst diversity is real... Such things would have been impossible, if it were not for this unique institution, the Commonwealth. 183)

This vague and rather naive perception of the significance of the Commonwealth conforms with the rigid legalistic interpretation of international politics which characterized Nigerian leadership perception at independence. It is characteristic of the perceptual vacuum and fluidity of foreign policy that an indefinable notion of the 'national interest' was articulated as the central focus. In practical terms accession to membership of the Commonwealth was perceived as a necessary gradation to confirmation of Nigerian independence in international interaction between states, which might not otherwise have been possible. In addition, Nigeria's unequivocal commitment to the Commonwealth at independence, was certainly influenced by the country's perception of regional isolation. The Commonwealth was perceived as a manifestation of anglophone cohesiveness, and unlike the east and southern African anglophone states who were all more or less geographically contiguous to one another, Nigerian isolation enhanced the perception of the significance of a wider alliance vis-a-vis Nigeria's predominantly francophone neighbours.

By coincidence the primary issue to be considered at Nigeria's first Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, that of March 1961 in London, was an application by South Africa for renewal of membership of the

Commonwealth as a Republic. The initiative in opposing South Africa had previously been dominated by India and Ghana, and in the wake of the March 1960 Sharpeville incident, racial policies in South Africa had become a matter of Nigerian domestic salience. Confronted by these two perceptual dictates — that is, the need to overshadow (or at least equal) Ghana in exerting African leadership on the one hand, and the manifest opportunity of maximizing the Nigerian domestic consensus in its condemnation of apartheid on the other hand, it is hardly surprising that Nigeria perceived the opportunity of consolidating its external image by capitalizing on the apparent opportunity of the 'South African input' and of being seen to exert a leadership role in external affairs.

There is some uncertainty as to Nigeria's precise role in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in March 1961, but the Nigerian Prime Minister claimed that Nigeria had played the leading role in insisting on South Africa's expulsion, apparently threatening Nigerian withdrawal from the Commonwealth. These views were subsequently confirmed by comments of the South African Prime Minister on the crucial role of the Nigerian leader. Be that as it may, Nigeria's undeniable desire to be seen to have played the leading role in opposing South Africa, confirms the suggestion that the Nigerian leadership had perceived an opportunity for the consolidation of Nigerian ego-role perception. The positive political feedback and acclamation for the Nigerian projection of an activist stance on the South African issue started a process which led to the apartheid issue and attendant southern African problems becoming, in time, institutionalized in Nigerian external interaction.

The Commonwealth is a less formal organization than the United Nations and


185) Ibid, PP119-120.
it is consequently difficult to assess Nigeria's precise role in Commonwealth proceedings. However, in reviewing the communiques of the various Conferences of Commonwealth Heads of State and Government since 1960, it is quite apparent that the issues of southern Africa/apartheid have become an institutionalized part of the Commonwealth agenda, as illustrated by the following exerpts: "Prime Ministers were unanimous in calling upon South Africa to bring to an end the practice of apartheid..."\(^1\) "Heads of Government were agreed in their opposition to apartheid and minority rule in Southern Africa."\(^2\) "Heads of Government reaffirmed their total and unequivocal condemnation of apartheid..."\(^3\) It may, therefore, be deduced that since the southern Africa/apartheid issue is the most basic element of Nigerian role perception that the Commonwealth has provided a primary constituency for the consolidation of the wider Nigerian role perception.

The significance of the Commonwealth to the Nigerian perceptual image has been to structure and provide a principled base for Nigerian perceptual values and objectives. From the initial Nigerian confrontation with issues of southern Africa during 1961, when practical political circumstance (ie; domestic and continental controversy over, and criticism of the British/Nigerian Defence Pact) dictated the need to structure Nigerian external objectives so as to ameliorate the domestic and radical continental constituencies, the Commonwealth has provided the forum (far more so than the OAU) for the moral definition and structuring of the parameters of

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external interaction. Historically, Nigeria has been ideologically sterile (due to a combination of historical, colonial and political circumstance, as discussed above) and has, therefore, found it expedient to seek to define the principles of its external interaction in consensus with a wide alliance. It is an inherent feature of Nigerian external interaction to seek to act in concert with a wider constituency; this originates from the fact that action in concert with a wider alliance will evoke greater domestic support for such action, and would give Nigeria the opportunity to project (if not actually play) a leadership role. Thus it is suggested that the Commonwealth has provided an ideological content, which has consistently served to fill the vacuum within the parameters of the Nigerian perceptional image, resulting from the lack of any clearly identifiable Nigerian national value hierarchy.

The Commonwealth functions essentially by means of consensus among its members on the action required to cope with the various issues which have come before Commonwealth Conferences over the years. While the evidence would suggest that the most prominent 'ideological role' on matters relating to southern Africa/apartheid has been played by President Nyerere of Tanzania, the significance of the ideological continuity, which the 'consensus on the principles of action' as the primary operational mechanism of the Commonwealth, has provided in Nigerian role perception, is clear from the nature of the numerous Commonwealth communiques. This is best illustrated by the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, the Gleneagles Agreement on Apartheid in Sport and the Lusaka Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

The Declaration of Commonwealth Principles was approved unanimously at the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Conference at Singapore during January 1971, and reflects a consensus among Commonwealth members on fundamental moral values defining the principles of political action,
rather than a statement of doctrinaire political conviction.

Membership of the Commonwealth is compatible with the freedom of member-Governments to be non-aligned or to belong to any other grouping, association or alliance. Within this diversity all members of the Commonwealth hold certain principles in common. It is by pursuing these principles that the Commonwealth can continue to influence international society for the benefit of mankind... We believe in the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief... We recognize racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness... No country will afford to regimes which practise racial discrimination assistance which in its own judgement directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy. We oppose all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression and are committed to the principles of human dignity and equality...we intend to...expand human understanding and understanding among nations, assist in the elimination of discrimination... maintain and strengthen personal liberty, contribute to the enrichment of life for all, and provide a powerful influence for peace among nations.  

The Gleneagles Agreement was conceived of as a special Commonwealth statement on racial discrimination in sport and sought to define the conditions for sporting contact with South Africa, after African members of the Commonwealth threatened to boycott the Commonwealth Games scheduled to be held in Canada during August 1973, in protest at New Zealand sporting contact with South Africa. (Nigeria, nevertheless, proceeded with the boycott.) Heads of Government pledged to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding support for, and discouraging their nationals from participating in events involving sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organized on the base of race, colour or ethnic origin.  

Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while the country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid.  

Similarly, the August 1979 Conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka sought to rededicate the guiding principles formulated at the start of the decade, in a Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice.

We, the Commonwealth Heads of Government, recalling the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles made at Singapore...and the statement on Apartheid in Sport...have decided to proclaim our desire to work jointly as well as severally for the eradication of all forms of racism and racial prejudice... We reject as inhuman and intolerable all policies designed to perpetuate apartheid, racial segregation or other policies based on theories that racial groups are or may be inherently superior or inferior... We reaffirm that it is the duty of all the peoples of the Commonwealth to work together for the total eradication of the infamous policy of apartheid which is internationally recognized as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and the very existence of which is an affront to humanity... We intend that the Commonwealth, as an international organisation with a fundamental and deep-rooted attachment to principles of freedom and equality, should co-operate with other organisations in the fulfilment of these principles.

In the light of Nigeria's historical inability to structure its national value hierarchy in formulating principles of political action, the significance of the above declarations to Nigerian role perception is prescriptive. Such declarations constitute the foundations of the psychological commitment and philosophical continuity in the rationale for political action; and as far as the manifestation of the Nigerian ego-role perception is concerned, the more widely the foundation is subscribed to, the greater the opportunity for ego-role maximization.

The most publicized Nigerian initiatives within the Commonwealth grouping generally conform to the three phases of evolving political assertiveness in international politics suggested above. Thus for example, during 1965 when Africa and the Commonwealth was faced with the issue of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, the 'conservative' Nigerian leadership declined to support the OAU call for all African states to

sever diplomatic relations with Britain in protest at the British failure to force a resolution of the Rhodesian issue. Nigeria perceived some considerable potential economic and political risk involved in any direct confrontation with Britain, and at the same time, the Nigerian leadership was faced with the critical internal political situation. Thus, in order to maintain a degree of credibility with the rest of Africa, to retain the good favour of Britain and at the same time create a significant diversion from the domestic political impasse, Nigeria convened an extraordinary conference of Commonwealth Heads of Government, which met at Lagos during January 1969, to consider the question of Rhodesian UDI. 193)

Similarly, during the 1971 Commonwealth Conference at Singapore, Nigeria is accredited with spearheading the censure of Britain for its projected intention to resume arms sales to South Africa. Nigerian threats of withdrawal from the Commonwealth heightened the agitation among African members of the Commonwealth and brought the organization to the verge of collapse. Eventually a compromise was agreed, because of British insistence on the strategic value of arms sales to South Africa, to set up a Study Group on the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans to investigate the strategic significance of South Africa in the defence of the ocean areas. Nigeria, along with Britain, Australia, India, Jamaica, Kenya and Malaysia agreed to serve on the Study Group. However, when the Study Group consistently failed to convene and the British declared their intention of going ahead with the sale of helicopters to South Africa, Nigeria withdrew from the Study Group in protest at the British action. 194) Such actions were very


much in line with the fundamental diplomatic frustration felt by the Nigerian leadership in the post-civil war period, in their need to re-establish Nigerian credibility and authority in the African continent, which in itself, had been shattered by the civil war.

More recently, on the eve of the August 1979 Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka, Nigeria nationalized the financial interests of British Petroleum (45 per cent British state-owned) in Nigeria, in reaction to British suggestions that the British Government was considering lifting economic sanctions against Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, in support of the Nuzorewa government. The Nigerian Head of State described the British moves as;

...disparaging to us because they place economic gains above human freedom and justice... What Africa and in particular Nigeria is demanding from the conference is a comprehensive constitution which would be mapped out jointly by all parties involved.\(^{195}\)

Nigeria subsequently joined with a group of five other Commonwealth members (Zambia, Tanzania, Britain, Jamaica and Australia) in drafting a nine point programme for the granting of independence to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia through the holding of an all-party conference, at which the Lancaster House agreement was concluded.\(^{196}\) Nigeria had, for the first time, used its economic leverage in pursuit of directly political objectives and had demonstrated that no agreement was possible without Nigerian support.

The Non-Aligned Movement has a similar significance to Nigerian role perception. Significantly, at independence the Nigerian leadership declined participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and did not attend the 1961 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States, on the grounds that while Nigeria


supported neither power bloc in the international system, Nigeria was a
democracy and held basic values which were pro-Western and anti-Communist.
These historical factors were perceived as operating to preclude
participation in the Non-Aligned Movement.\(^{197}\) However, non-alignment
came to be perceived by the emergent African states as an extension of
African nationalism to the international level and as a general assertion
of an 'African personality' in world affairs.\(^{198}\) The principle of non-
alignment thus came to be incorporated in the Charter of the OAU and all
members of the OAU are members of the Non-Aligned Movement.\(^{199}\)

The significance of the non-aligned movement to Nigerian role perception is
thus one of principle. Participation in the non-aligned movement serves to
structure the political objectives of member-states according to agreed
principles of action. Nigeria's lack of national ideology or doctrine
has effectively precluded the country from playing any ideologically
definitive role in a movement which essentially seeks to restructure the
morality of the international system. However, through formal participation
in the non-aligned movement, Nigeria is able to structure its own value
hierarchy according to its principles, in determining the objectives of
international interaction. The Nigerian foreign minister has suggested
that Nigerian external interaction is influenced by an "unflinching
commitment" to the principle of non-alignment and the significance which
Nigeria attaches to the non-aligned movement is described as follows;

\[\ldots\] by adopting the principles of non-alignment, Nigeria is able to avoid unnecessary conflicts with otherwise potential friends
\[\ldots\] She is also able to avoid being trapped in the web of
ideological trauma. For whatever the merits of these conflicts,

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\(^{197}\) Phillips, CS, *op cit*, PP102-103.

\(^{198}\) Idang, OJ, *op cit*, P22. Also Haastrop, AJ, "Nigeria's Role in
World Affairs" in *African Quarterly*, Vol 4, NO 4, January/March,
1965, PP45.

\(^{199}\) Art 3 (7) OAU Charter.
Nigeria believes that the new nations have neither the economic base nor the military muscle to take sides in them. What the new nations can do is to firmly guard their independence and, from a stronger position, act as foils to the threat posed to human survival by the division of the world into feeding ideological camps.\textsuperscript{200}

However, Nigeria has firmly rejected any "neutralist" implications which might be apparent in the non-aligned principle and we suggest that the principles espoused by the movement serve to clarify and structure Nigerian national values and interests rather than determine action;

A lot has been said about our foreign policy and such labels as non-alignment etc. have been given prominence. This non-alignment, however, has often been criticized as an excuse for not doing anything. Nigeria has often appeared to be sitting on the fence on important issues, much to the detriment of our image and interest especially in Africa. This is more a reflection of... an inability to identify what constitutes our national interest.\textsuperscript{201}

Nigeria is one of only two black-African members (the other being Gabon) of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and while Nigerian membership of OPEC is primarily of economic significance, it helps to maximize the Nigerian ego-role perception in two ways. First, it provides Nigeria with a legitimate linkage between the cultures of Black and Arab Africa. Relations between these cultures have traditionally been marked by mutual suspicion, and this is reflected in Nigerian society itself.

Thus membership of OPEC provides Nigeria with a unique opportunity for participation in Afro-Arab relations and co-operation. Secondly, it provides Nigeria with the undisputed opportunity of leading diplomatic initiatives for inter-African economic co-operation and specifically for...


\textsuperscript{201} His Excellency, Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo, Address to Senior Army Officers' Training Seminar, Ibadan, January 17, 1976, in Call to Duty: A Collection of Speeches, op cit, P32.
economic assistance for African states affected by the escalating import price of petroleum products. However, such advantage is somewhat limited by the fact that a measure of Nigerian economic capability derives from Nigerian membership of OPEC and it is not in the Nigerian economic interest to precipitate a confrontation with the Arab members of OPEC. Therefore, the degree of leverage which Nigeria could exert in pursuit of the maximization of ego-role perception, is closely prescribed by economic realities.

It is evident that such subsidiary spheres of Nigerian global interaction as have been discussed above are of primary significance to Nigerian ego-role perception in the measure of ideological content and principle which the Nigerian ego-role perception has derived from interaction with these spheres of global organization. The fundamental dilemma of the Nigerian leadership has been its inability to evoke any form of 'Nigerian' ideological or doctrinal linkage between the perceptual dictates of national unity and 'predestined' African leadership, and the Nigerian perception of the external environment, due primarily to the lack of any cohesive or definable Nigerian national value hierarchy. The importance of the Commonwealth and Non-Aligned movement is clearly that both provide an ideological and philosophical bridge between this perceptual cleavage. The Nigerian ego-role perception derives spiritual substance, and a defined and tangible moral structure through identification with the principles of action proclaimed by these organizations.

1.4 Conclusion

The notion of ego-role perception has been identified as the second operative

202) Nayas, J, op cit, PP82-83 See also Kayall, J, op cit, P324.
criterion in an assessment of any state's potential role in international politics, as an endeavour to effectively conceptualize the causal sequence of external interaction. We have argued that the state, through the mobilization and manipulation of its capability, may aspire to influence systemic conditions or perceive itself as being of significance to systemic interests and thus fashion its policy accordingly. Furthermore, we have established that just as the leadership or decisionmaking elite is responsible for the formulation of policy, the actualization of this policy in the form of a national strategy is dependent upon this same leadership elite's perception of the opportunities and threats arising from the state's interaction with the international system. The product of this perception of threat and opportunity is what has been termed 'ego-role perception', that is to say, the state's (as embodied in leadership) perception of its role in the international political system. The diagrammatic illustration of the process of Nigerian ego-role perception formulation set out above, demonstrates that Nigerian external interaction has, since independence, consistently sought to maximize a specific Nigerian role perception in the international system — a role which is essentially reactive to two constant perceptual dictates.

The psychological environment of the Nigerian leadership elite is the product of the cumulative national experience of historical colonial divisiveness, ethno-regionalism and political instability. The dictates of the Nigerian perceptual image are inevitably shaped by this psychological and experiential predisposition. Thus the Nigerian perceptual image has been consistently reactive to the dictates of the domestic constituency on the one hand (the need to maintain national unity and to consolidate internal support for external action), and on the other hand, an inherent value perception of Nigeria's right (by virtue of geographic and demographic continental predominance) to a 'leadership' role in Africa. However, the inherent lack of any clearly manifest national value hierarchy and the
concurrent historic Nigerian inability to produce a 'national leader' precipitated a fundamental and enduring dilemma for the Nigerian leadership elite. Hence the inability to draw upon any nationally inspired or motivated ideological prescription in the process of reconciling the dictates of the perceptual image with the leadership perception of threat and opportunity emanating from the external environment — an environment perceived to be inherently adverse to Nigerian ego-role objectives.

The dearth of any national ideological linkage compelled a close identification with, and intimate commitment to the objectives of the wider continental African constituency. In identifying with the more abstract pan-Africanist objective the Nigerian leadership has consciously sought to universalize the constituency and to 'externalize' the rationale of external interaction, so as to divert attention from the instability of the domestic constituency and to seek some tangible focus for external objectives. In seeking to come to terms with the realities of its predicament the Nigerian leadership has consistently sought to manifest a perceptual image of national unity, which concurrently shields the domestic stability from external demands and maximizes the country's importance in the international system.

In short, the consistent objective of the Nigerian leadership has been to manifest Nigerian ego-role perception by focussing the scan of the threat/opportunity perceptual spectrum on issues (inputs) which, in essence, offers very little threat to Nigerian ego-perceptual dictates, but which are of a sufficiently emotive nature as to evoke domestic (and continental) consensus in accord with pan-Africanist sentiment.

We have identified three phases in the development of this perceptual focus, coinciding generally with the changing Nigerian leadership, but
also reactive to the specific domestic political circumstance precipitating the abrupt changes of leadership. These have generally coincided with considerable domestic instability and with the breakdown of national unity thus necessitating an increasingly assertive 'externalization' of the Nigerian national focus.

Policy action is, therefore, largely predetermined by the linkage between the domestic constituency (the need to maintain national unity and stability) and the destined right to exert a leadership role in Africa. Paradoxically the more imperiled is domestic stability the greater the need for assertive external action (whether rhetorical or practical) and consequently the more forceful the projection of Nigerian leadership. Conversely, the more strident the Nigerian reaction to external inputs, the greater the opportunity for consolidating domestic political consensus, resulting in a see-saw effect in the attunement of the Nigerian leadership to threat or opportunity perception. That is to say, the smaller the de facto threat to Nigerian perceptual precepts, the greater the opportunity for role maximisation, and the smaller the opportunity for role maximization, the greater the threat to the perceptual precepts (national unity/African leadership). The result of this imperative to maximize consistently the external threat so as to manifest the perceptual dictates of the ego-role, is an over-attunement on the part of the leadership elite to the threat in any given input, resulting in a high-level of declaratory hyper-reaction. Such hyper-reaction effectively delimits the parameters of the threat/opportunity spectrum, and inputs are canalized through a much narrower perceptual grid than might otherwise be the case (concentrating on the area of 'high probability').

The issues of southern Africa/apartheid have been seen to provide a constant and tangible focus to the Nigerian ego-perceptual imperative to hyper-react. The anti-pan-Africanist symbolism of these issues
constituted minimal *de facto* threat but maximum opportunity, and in
consonance with the notion of 'see-saw' paradox the issues of southern
Africa/apartheid have become the tools and medium of Nigerian self-
assertion. The perennial salience of these issues has facilitated the
evolution of a moralistic standard in Nigerian self-assertion which,
transposed to the universal (and expressed in notions such as "racial
holocaust", "world conflagration", "threat to world peace" etc.), has
become fundamental to the projection of Nigeria's external ego-image.
However, as noted, there is a distinction between the declaratory and
operational (or practical) levels of ego-role perception, and Nigerian
perception has been seen to be operationalized within three interdependent
and mutually reinforcing spheres of external interaction — continental,
regional and global.

While it is evident that Nigeria is an integral element of the African
bloc, and has consciously sought alliance with a wider continental or
regional constituency, the dictates of the Nigerian ego-role perception
have remained constant, and in lending definition to the Nigerian national
interest, constitute the primary and fundamental linkage between the role
which Nigeria might seek to maximize in either continental, global or
regional interaction. That is to say, that external inputs in all three
spheres of external interaction are assimilated within the constant
perceptual dictates of national unity and predestined leadership, and
to that extent, Nigerian external interaction is 'idiosyncratically
Nigerian'. It has been seen that the level of declaratory hyper-reaction
is muted by a degree of pragmatism and considerations of practical
expedience in projected political action. The apparent Nigerian integrationist
designs, the protrusion of Nigerian 'good offices' in continental conflict
situations, the notion of 'leader among equals' and the consistent
invocation of the principles of inviolability of sovereignty and non-
interference in internal affairs, bear ample witness.
An analysis confined to the operational level of Nigerian ego-role perception suggests many apparent roles which it could be said the Nigerian leadership seeks to perpetrate in the international system. However, ego-role perception is essentially a psychological concept and the product of the psychological and experiential predisposition of a limited decision-making elite. Thus, while the analysis of practical interaction might define a multitude of subsidiary roles, the role which the leadership elite perceives in essence to be rightfully Nigerian is vocalized, defined and delineated by the leadership elite on the declaratory level. Ego-role perception is a statement of what ought to be (in terms of the leadership's perceptual image) and not necessarily of what is. It is therefore apparent from the foregoing analysis of Nigerian ego-role perception, that the Nigerian leadership elite has consistently sought to perpetrate the role of 'continental leader', together with a secondary and concomitant role, (which in itself serves as a projection base for the primary role perception) of 'Nigeria the honest-broker'. As has been seen, any number of subsidiary roles which might be apparent are merely means to this primary perceptual end.

The notion of 'role' in international politics with which this study is concerned, has been described above as a concept of three dimensional perception: (a) national capability, as the composite of resources available to support the state's or its leaders' perception of its 'rightful' systemic role; (b) ego-role perception, as the assimilation of the leadership's image of the state's 'rightful' systemic role with perceptions of threat to, and opportunity for, the maximization of such a role perception inherent in inputs emanating from the external environment; and (c) alter-perception, as the perception of the members of the external environment (most especially the major powers) of the real or potential significance and influence of the state's capability and aspired role, to systemic interests and conditions.
We have established that Nigerian capability in external interaction is fundamentally determined and influenced by: (a) a degree of economic leverage in the international system; and (b) preponderant regional and limited continental military capability, in pursuit of constitutionally instituted national objectives, within the constraints of a factionalized national consensus. However, whereas national capability is considered fundamental to international interaction, it is not exclusive and is actualized in relation to the national ego-role perception. We may, therefore, conclude that the Nigerian national capability potential defined above, would be actualized in pursuit of the primary Nigerian perception of its role as 'leader of the African continent'. However, due to the fact that the concept of capability is relative, the validity of the Nigerian perception of its systemic role and Nigerian capability influence, is dependent on the willingness of the major powers (as the primary architects of the parameters of the international system) to accept this perception of Nigerian systemic significance. We must now consider this third operative criterion of the analytical model.

2. The perception of the external environment.

National capability and ego-role perception are essentially relative concepts; that is to say, that the discussion of capabilities always takes place within some framework of policies and/or operational contingencies, either actual or postulated, and similarly, ego-role perception, as the calculation of opportunities and limitations implicit in an external milieu, cannot exist (or be of any relevance) in a vacuum, any more than a state is able to isolate itself from international systemic influence. This 'external milieu' or environment is derived from the composite of state-roles in the international system. That is to say, that just as the individual state seeks to balance the perceptual image of self and environment, this process may be multiplied by the number of individual
states in the international system, who in seeking to actualize policy are each confronted by the perception of the role of the other. In the final instance, therefore, a state's perception of its role in the international system is dependent on the perceptual refutation or confirmation of the other members of the international system, according to their perception of the significance of the individual state's role to their systemic interests.

The congruence or discrepancy between expectations and the operational milieu cannot be conclusively established until after overt interaction with the system has taken place; such interaction results in an infinite and dynamic process of action and reaction which is the lifeblood of the international political system. This constant state of dynamic agitation is restrained within a broad equilibrium (or at least a balance of order) by the dominant world powers, who (in their overwhelming predominance) effectively delimit the parameters of the international political system and the nature of the international political dispensation (balance of power, etc.). The significance of a state's capability or role is, therefore, very largely relative to the interests of the predominant international political alignments in the global system and regional sub-systems (as a regional collectivity of individual global systemic actors). In seeking to examine the nature of the role of Nigeria in the international system, it is necessary to consider the perceived significance of the Nigerian state, its capability and international political aspirations, to the interests of the dominant international systemic actors, as the third tenet of causality in international interaction.

The basic parameters of the contemporary international political system have remained essentially unchanged since the end of the Second World War and are characterized by an ideologically distinguished bi-polarity constrained in a balance of mutual nuclear deterrence. While the United
States and the Soviet Union (as the most dominant powers in the international system) are the two central polar opposites in this contemporary international political dichotomy, this bi-polarity constitutes the most important determinant of general systemic alignments, and the significance of all state roles are primarily interpreted in terms of their relevance to the ideological/systemic interests of US-USSR bi-polar international alignment. The broadest and most arbitrary international systemic alignment is the division of the actors of the international system in terms of their allegiance (through either physical or ideological/psychological alliance) to either the Soviet Union, as the 'gravitational pole' of the Eastern bloc, or the United States and the Western bloc.

However, within this arbitrary division of international actors according to their allegiance to Eastern or Western blocs, there exists a plurality of states of varying economic and military capability (and hence, of varying international influence and predominance), maintaining varying degrees of commitment to either of the major ideological/power blocs in the international system. The consequence has been the evolution of a plurality of polarities within the broad East-West dichotomy. Thus, for example, while the Peoples' Republic of China is generally part of the Eastern bloc in the international system, it is of sufficient capability (due to the fact that it has an independent nuclear deterrent) and has exerted sufficient ideological independence of the Soviet Union to constitute (in its own right) a predominant centre of influence in the international system. Similarly, (but somewhat less fervently) France has been energetic in seeking to reassert a united Western Europe (particularly in alliance with the United Kingdom and West Germany) as a predominant influence in world politics, more or less 'independent' of the United States. In short, therefore, on a level secondary to the basic bi-polarity in the international system, there exists a multi-polarity of major powers of more or less balanced (although not equal) economic and political
predominance among themselves, but all of lesser predominance than the
two super-powers. Any state's role in the international system is largely
dependent on the perceptions of these major powers of the significance of
the state concerned to their individual international systemic interests,
as all these major powers, for reasons of economic and/or political or
ideological expedience, need to maintain a plethora of 'lesser' states in
a 'gravitational orbit' around their polarity of capability and influence,
in order to substantiate and sustain the very notion of poly-centrism
in the contemporary global system, and so as to maximize their individual
systemic interests.

Furthermore, the contemporary international political system is characterized
by regionally oriented alignments which may effectively constitute sub-
systems within the all encompassing global system, and comprise states
which occupy a common continental or regional land area and which
through the contrivance of a balance of interests (not necessarily a
balance of power) form a cohesive regional bloc in the international
system. In as much as the 'balance of interests' in a regional bloc are
invariably defined and restrained by regional (or continental) covenant
or supra-national organization (thus delimiting the parameters of the
association), such regional blocs may be assumed to form self-reinforcing
sub-systems within the global system. The significance of a state's ego-
role must, therefore, also be considered within such regional alignments
as may be identifiable.

Such is the general nature of the contemporary international system; that
is to say, the external environment or milieu in which any state must seek
to manifest the dictates of its ego-role perception. Therefore, in seeking
to substantiate the perceived ego-role of Nigeria in the international
system, it is necessary to consider the significance of Nigeria to the
systemic interests of the predominant global powers which effectively
determine the nature of the international systemic dispensation (the influence of which escapes no state), and the African sub-system, of which Nigeria is an integral part.

2.1 The significance of Nigeria to the interests of the principal international actors.

In as much as the broad bi-polarity of the contemporary international system is structured by nuclear deterrence, the prime variables within this structure are those states who through comparable industrial and nuclear/military capability, have the capability of weighting or restraining the bi-polar balance, either individually or through collective alliances. These states are generally designated as the major powers of the international system, due to the fact that collectively or individually they have the capability to influence the basic parameters of the contemporary international systemic order. As such they are the architects of the external international milieu, environment or 'atmosphere' in which all actors in the international system must seek to manifest their perceived ego-role (be it one of perfunctory self-interest or international aggrandizement).

It is therefore quite logical, that in seeking to analyze a state's role in the international system it is insufficient to suggest that the national ego is the unqualified determinant of a state's systemic role, as all such systemic roles are actualized within the milieu of the prevailing international order of which the major powers are the guardians or patriarchs. The confirmation or refutation of a state's ego-role, therefore, lies primarily with the major powers, who in their very day-to-day systemic interaction are consolidating that prevailing international dispensation of which they are the progenitors. The significance of a state in the international system is ultimately manifest by that state's significance.
(both in terms of latent capability potential and/or the design of the state's external interaction in fulfilment of an ego-role perception) to the political/strategic/economic interests of the major international powers in maintaining, restraining or weighting the international systemic balance.

Nigeria has been the focus of a significant degree of attention by those states classified as major powers, on either side of the international bi-polar cleavage. While it is self-evident that the interests of individual members of both blocs in interaction with any state coincide in many instances (economic self-interest, for example), a fundamental motivation of such interaction is the consolidation of wider international systemic interests vis-a-vis the ideologically opposite bloc. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the nature of the interests of the principal international powers in their interaction with Nigeria and the perceived significance of Nigeria in terms of divergent global systemic interests. Further, it has been emphasized that Nigeria is an integral and inseparable part of the African continental sub-system, and it is therefore self-evidently essential, that the significance of Nigeria to the international systemic interests of the major powers, be considered within the context of the wider African continental interests and objectives of these primary global actors.

2.1.1 The Soviet Union

Black Africa did not become a serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until late in the 1950's. For the first 40 years of Soviet history, a period marked by the most sweeping revolutionary expectations, this area was peripheral to Soviet policy. Nowhere in Africa, outside of Egypt, the Maghreb and South Africa, had there appeared national organizations strong enough to guide the anti-imperialist movement. The Soviet Union's
focus on the Third World in the late 1950's marked a shift from a continental to a global strategy in Soviet doctrine. The Soviet Union's prime interest in the Third World is declared to be, the fulfilment of its ambition of becoming the dominating power in the constellation of world forces thus ensuring that no question of any importance in the international system may be resolved without participation of the Soviet Union and without consideration of Soviet economic and military might. To this end Soviet doctrine makes no secret of the ambition of the Soviet Union to establish a constellation of pro-Soviet, Marxist states throughout Africa. In the long-run, from the Soviet perception, the critical question for any African state turns on its choice between capitalism and socialism.203)

Our foreign policy grew out of the socialist revolution. It has been and remains an instrument of revolutionary transformation in our country. Our foreign policy is instrumental in, for the interests of the Soviet people coincide with those of working people in all countries of the world. It is imbued with the spirit of solidarity with revolutionary, progressive forces throughout the world and is a vigorous factor in the class struggle on the world scene.204)

A further objective of Soviet penetration of Africa is the enormous mineral wealth of the continent which the Soviets hope to secure for their own use and possibly to the exclusion of all other powers.205) These objectives are a product of the ideological 'world revolutionary' process, which according to Soviet doctrine is irreversible and which encompasses the notion of a triple alliance of the socialist states, the proletariat of the developed capitalist states and progressive elements within the


Third World. This doctrine was based on the assumption that the emergent states were rejecting the capitalist alternative and following another, more 'progressive' path of development; that they had been profoundly alienated from the West and now felt seriously imperiled by the forces of neo-colonialism; and that increasingly these states would close ranks with the socialist countries. Soviet tactics and actions, however, are well designed to maintain the momentum of the process. Thus Soviet leaders generally refer to the struggle between the "socialist camp" and the "capitalist" or "imperialist" world. However, Soviet tactics seek not only to eliminate Western leverage and influence in the developing areas of the world, but also to check Communist Chinese encroachment. Beyond the objective of expelling Western and Chinese influence and presence, the Soviet Union obviously seeks the positive goal of expanding its own position and influence in Africa.206)

Legvold has suggested that the Soviet Union's stake in Africa is extremely complex, diverse and multi-dimensional, and may be subdivided into several categories of "national" and "strategic" concern. First, defensive "national" concerns, revolving around the imperative of protecting; (a) the Soviet fishing fleet, and (b) the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean connecting "Soviet Europe" and "Soviet Asia". Secondly, the Soviet Union is said to have defensive "strategic" concerns in the area, namely; (a) coping with the American submarine based nuclear deterrent; (b) monitoring American, British and French naval movements and if need be, interposing Soviet naval power; (c) averting the expansion of American or Western bases and facilities, particularly in southern Africa. Thirdly, it is suggested that the Soviet Union has offensive "national" concerns in Africa, relating to the Cape sea-route and lesser interests in menacing Western hydrographic, oceanographic and satellite tracking activities. A fourth offensive "strategic" concerns lies in the possibility of the Soviet Union wanting to deploy its own submarines, bearing long-range underwater launched

206) Ibid.
ballistic missiles, in the South Atlantic, for which facilities on the West Coast of Africa would be indispensable. 207)

The Soviets justify their strategic intervention in Africa ideologically by invoking the doctrine of the "national liberation struggle". Lenin saw the "national revolutionary movement" as a transitional device pending the emergence of Soviet-line communist regimes, which would promote Soviet interests and serve as surrogates in promoting anti-Western activities by providing, for example, bases for the Soviet military and transit facilities for Soviet materials. Contemporary Soviet doctrine, however, encompasses a broader group of states whose support in terms of the endorsement of Soviet policies at the United Nations and other international forums, the Soviets woo with strong verbal commitment to the aspirations of these states, coupled with offers of military aid and economic assistance. 208)

The Soviet Union's African policy may, therefore, be described as being conducted on two levels. On one level there is Soviet pressure on African governments to make them oppose Western policies and support those of the Soviet Union. There is also large-scale Soviet economic and military aid to ensure their enduring indebtedness to the Soviet Union. On another level, there is the appeal to the African public, and in particular to disaffected and consciously submerged political elements. 209)

Vast supplies of military equipment and the provision of military instructors


are the most tangible features of the military and strategic link between Africa and the USSR. The Soviet Union exports weapons to the Third World for political purposes, since it receives few identifiable economic returns. The number of weapons involved are comparatively insignificant in relation to those produced for the USSR itself and its Warsaw Pact allies, and thus probably has little effect on production costs. 210)

Nigeria, at independence, was hardly inspired by ideological or revolutionary fervour, and the Soviet Union perceived the new unequivocally 'conservative', pro-capitalist, pro-Western state to be an obstacle to the progress of the 'world revolutionary process', which in the Soviet perception had manifest itself in Ghana, Mali, Guinea and the handful of 'progressive' sub-Saharan states with which the Soviet Union had to deal prior to 1960.

There is a good deal of evidence that Nigeria's new coalition government was reluctant to become involved with the Soviet Union; that it delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations; that it subsequently restricted the size of the Soviet mission in Lagos; that it obstructed travel to the Soviet bloc, particularly for study purposes; that it refused to permit academicians from East European countries to teach in Nigerian institutions; that it frustrated attempts to make use of Soviet-bloc aid or trade; and that it blocked the importation of Communist materials. 211)

These conditions were not favourable for the realization of the Soviet primary systemic interest of international ideological support and advancement. The Soviet Union, nevertheless, perceived it to be in

its long-term interests to establish diplomatic relations with Nigeria at independence.

Besides the obvious imperative of diplomatic contact with so large an emergent state (the largest proletariat in Africa), occupying a regionally dominant geographic area and location vis-a-vis tropical Africa and the North Atlantic, and possessing a significant economic potential, the Soviet Union undoubtedly perceived some considerable long-term opportunity for the advance of Soviet international political objectives. The USSR had gained a firm foothold in Ghana and some considerable influence over Nkrumah, and perceived in the volatile Nigerian domestic milieu and the ideological cleavage and antagonism between the Ghanaian and Nigerian leaderships the potential for subversion and exploitation of conflict. The corrupt and exclusive nature of the ruling Nigerian elite 'aristocracy', the enlightened and educated, but small bourgeois, and the sheer mass of the Nigerian proletariat represented the ideal textbook revolutionary scenario. (The 1964 general strike, for example, was described by the Soviets as the largest mass organized outburst by the workers, Nigeria or Africa had ever known.)

Subversion of the Nigerian polity would have effectively undermined British/American influence in this sphere and the Soviets perceived, furthermore, the concurrent opportunity of undermining French influence in West Africa at a time when France was in the process of developing an independent nuclear capability and was seeking to reassert itself in the international system. Thus quite logically, the Soviets lauded the Nigerian reaction to the French atomic explosion in the Sahara and the abrogation of the British/Nigerian Defence Pact, but were severely critical of the Nigerian role in consolidating the Brazzaville and Monrovia groups,

212) Ibid, P225.
remarkng that the absence of the "most consistently anti-imperialist countries" (Casablanca group) determined the bias of the Monrovia bloc and guaranteed an agenda "evading the most acute problems in the struggle against imperialism". 213)

Nigeria had permitted the establishment of a NATO radio station and an American Mercury tracking station in the country, and had declined to attend the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference. Similarly, Nigerian support for Soviet interests at the United Nations was unpredictable as manifestly illustrated by the Nigerian role in the Congo-crisis. The conflict among African states over the Congo destroyed any ideological aspirations about Africa unifying against imperialism and neo-colonialism. Nigeria was perceived as an "imperialist collaborator" by the Soviets. Moreover, Nigeria had expressed a negative view of the Soviet proposal to reorganize the UN Secretariat on a 'troika' basis; they rejected Khrushchev's suggestion to the United Nations to hold a summit meeting on the issue of disarmament, but had voted to include the Chinese issue on the agenda of the General Assembly and had voiced recognition of Algerian independence. 214) Long-term expectations, however, restrained short-run impatience and Nigeria's mediatory role in consolidating African unity, distinguished the country as a leading African state of some influence (albeit conservative and very largely counter to Soviet interests) and, therefore, not to be ignored.

Soviet policymakers sought to fashion and maintain an amicable working relationship with the Nigerians and determined to emphasize the economic potential of Soviet-Nigerian relations. Although Nigerians publicly declared their willingness to accept Soviet aid and consolidate economic

214) Ibid, P100 and P108.
relations, evidence suggests that offers of aid from the Soviet bloc remained unutilized by the Nigerian leadership.215)

The collapse of the Ballew government and the January 1966 coup were applauded by Soviet commentators, who were delighted to see a regime destroyed, which they considered thoroughly subservient to British and American interests, corrupt and unwilling to embark upon a substantial reform of its country's administrative and economic structures. They wrote that the success of the coup had demonstrated the precariousness and unpopularity of the former regime, which had been pictured by Western states as the "Golden voice of Africa" and "governmental wisdom":

On balance the progressive forces of the country support the new regime and hope that, beyond replacing former leaders, it will promote real changes in Nigerian policy, liberating it from the yoke of neocolonialism.216)

Soviet optimism and ideological theories were to be confounded by subsequent developments as the Ironsi regime was overthrown and Nigeria slipped progressively toward civil war. The Soviets attributed the second coup and the ethnic carnage to the connivance of Western imperialism, accusing the capitalist countries of doing in Africa what the United States had done countless times in the Central American "banana republics".217) Nigerian developments confused Soviet ideological perceptions and the Soviet leaders found it difficult to perceive the inter-ethnic strife in Nigeria as being of any significance or benefit to Soviet strategic or ideological/revolutionary interests and tended to adopt a neutralist attitude to the deteriorating Nigerian domestic situation, publicly


217) Ibid, P274.
attributing all blame for the trouble to the United States and Britain. 218)

Behind the scenes, however, the Soviet Union moved cautiously to secure its interests in Lagos under the new military rulers. In early 1967 the Soviet Union sent a five-man team of economists, metallurgists and engineers to Nigeria to undertake feasibility studies for a long-planned iron and steel industry in Nigeria. The two countries at this time agreed to establish an air-service between Moscow and Lagos. Nigeria also announced that it was now ready to accept Soviet loan offers, and during March 1967 the two states concluded a cultural exchange agreement. These initial moves marked a significant measure of rapprochement in Soviet-Nigerian relations and thus, when both Britain and the United States declined to supply Nigeria with the fighter aircraft which the Nigerian Federal Government claimed it needed to counter the Biafran acquisition of two B-26 bombers in Europe, General Gowon approached the Soviet Union "as a last resort". 219) There was apparently never any suggestion of outright Soviet assistance, and the Nigerians resisted the established Soviet diplomatic tactic of long-term bartering arrangements and paid cash or exported, *quid pro quo*, quantities of cocoa and groundnuts. 220)

The Nigerian foreign minister travelled to Moscow during July 1967, ostensibly to ratify the March cultural agreement, but also to conclude negotiations for arms purchases. During mid-August, Soviet MiG 17's and Czech L-29 Delphin trainers began arriving at Kano airport, together with Soviet technicians to assemble, test and later maintain them. 221)

218) Ibid, PP316-322.
Thus, when Western states resisted selling arms to the Federal Government, the Soviet Union promptly filled the void. When the United States and Great Britain had manifest reluctance to undertake new aid projects in Nigeria until the turmoil had stopped, Soviet officials had pointedly assured the Nigerians that the Soviet Union stood ready to assist in any way possible. When others (particularly the US) had kept aloof from the conflict, the Soviet Union had underscored an undivided commitment to the Nigerian Federal Government.

The Soviet people fully understand the desire of the Nigerian Federal Government to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state to prevent the country from being dismembered. The Soviet Union has tried to help African states in every way in their noble desire to strengthen their political and economic independence.

Legvold has suggested four reasons why the Soviet Union perceived it to be in its interest to assist the Nigerian Federal Government. First, the Soviets concluded that the war would be over quickly and this time they wanted to be on a winning side (having been recently embarrassed in the Middle East). Early reports emphasizing the easy, swift victories of Federal troops reflected this confidence, as did the attention given the Nigerian leadership's confident predictions that the war would be over in three months. Secondly, the reluctance of the United States and Britain to supply the Federal Military Government with the arms it sought gave the Soviet Union an irresistible opportunity to improve its standing in Lagos. Thirdly, Soviet leaders probably believed quite genuinely that Western, particularly American influence would grow in a break-away Biafra. When the issue of Eastern secession was first discussed the Soviets attributed the primary impetus for the dissolution of the federation to American and British oil interests. Finally it is suggested, that Soviet leaders were keenly aware that most African leaders condemned the Biafran

section and would be critical of any great power which lent it support.223)

While the Soviets doubtlessly felt a far closer affinity with the more 'progressive' forces in the Nigerian Federal Government after 1966, the fragility of the regime must have cast doubts as to its permanence. It is apparent, however, that the Federal Government attracted Soviet interest because it controlled one of Africa's most intrinsically significant states, not because it was one of the continent's most 'progressive' regimes. Morison suggests that the absence of significant relations with the most populous state in Africa had long been an anomaly in Soviet foreign relations, and behind the Soviet agreement to supply arms to Nigeria was a political calculation that this Soviet commitment to the Federal cause would make the Soviet Union a "most favoured nation" in Lagos.224) In ideological terms the Soviet Union insisted that support for the Federal cause was based on the principle of support for African unity against imperialism and "imperialist agents" whereas British support for Lagos was based on selfish considerations, oil interests and rivalry with other Western powers. The ideological rationale suggested further, that whereas unity is the prerequisite of any future orientation towards socialism, separatism is the chosen instrument of capitalism for maintaining its hegemony.225)

In the wider context though, Soviet policy in Africa had not been conspicuously successful. With the overthrow of Nkrumah, (the most radical government in West Africa on whose allegiance the Soviet Union had relied


225) Ibid.
for influence within the region) the new Ghanaian regime adopted an openly hostile policy towards the Soviet Union, thus effectively negating Soviet influence in a primary Soviet sphere of influence in Africa. In East Africa, Soviet influence was being seriously challenged by China, which was at this time negotiating the construction of the Tan-Zam railway. The left-wing coups in Somalia and the Sudan had not yet taken place. Most other African states south of the Sahara were too small to offer much incentive to the Soviets in their aim to establish themselves as a power of political consequence. Strategically, it would undoubtedly have been an advantage to have a base in West Africa, especially in the light of the idea mooted by South Africa, Portugal and the Western Allies to extend the operational sphere of NATO into the South Atlantic for the protection of the Cape sea route. A Soviet foothold in Lagos would seriously have challenged the success of any such venture. Further, the Soviets might well have perceived economic interests in Nigeria, as well. Ghana had been the sole supplier of Soviet cocoa requirements and after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the Soviet Union had to find an alternative source for its projected cocoa needs. Nigeria was a large-scale exporter of cocoa and might have been interested in long-term co-operation plans. Moreover, a united Nigeria opened up perspectives of a cohesive working class and the creation of a powerful movement for social reform in Nigeria. 226) The Soviet leaders perceived the need to re-establish Soviet influence in West Africa and secure the Soviet presence in Africa, and the Nigerian impasse appeared to offer the best opportunity.

However, by the end of 1969, with the resurgence of Western support for Federal Nigeria manifest in Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Lagos, and IMF and US investment programmes, Soviet influence had reached a peak and was to lapse into a stable pattern of sound 'working relations' between

Nigeria and the Soviet Union, based primarily on agreements of technical co-operation, which has endured for the last decade. When the Nigerian civil war was over there was a feeling of gratitude for the assistance which the Soviet Union had provided. Nigeria's Ambassador in Moscow announced that there would be no limit on future economic and technical co-operation between the two countries. 227) During November 1968 (while the war was still in progress), an agreement on economic and technical assistance had been signed, providing inter alia for £14.0 million credit for the building of an iron and steel project in Nigeria, 228) although this agreement was not confirmed until 1974. This was followed, during 1970, by a protocol on Soviet-Nigerian co-operation in metallurgical prospecting and on the establishment of training centres to provide skilled workers for industry; a cultural and scientific agreement; a delegation of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress to Moscow during April; and in August of that year, the Soviet Government awarded 145 scholarships to Nigerian students for study in Moscow. 229)

These agreements established the future pattern of Soviet-Nigerian relations which reached a high point with the visit of General Gowon to the Soviet Union during May 1974. The joint communique on the talks finally confirmed that the Soviet Union would aid Nigeria in the construction of the long discussed steelworks project; and co-operation agreements included geological prospecting, the oil industry, agricultural development, technical education and public health. The Soviet programme of co-operation eventually included the establishment of an educational


centre at Warri for 500 students for training in the oil industry; the
construction of a new hospital at Enugu; Soviet participation in the
construction of a network of oil distribution pipelines to be built across
the country; and a construction training centre for 2000 students at
Abeokuta. 230) During November 1975, an official Soviet naval visit to
Lagos took place. This was followed by the visit of a Nigerian military
deligation to Moscow during October 1976. The Soviet Union has continued
to equip the Nigerian Air Force and in March 1978, Nigeria and the Soviet
Union signed a six-year bilateral trade agreement, whereby the two states
agreed to establish trade missions in each other's capitals. 231) Nigerian-
Soviet relations have settled into a consistent pattern of amicable
'neutral' co-operation.

It is clear that Nigeria is of enduring significance to the international
systemic interests of the Soviet Union within two primary spheres; (a)
diplomatic, and (b) strategic. The two spheres are mutually reinforcing
and scarcely distinguishable, in that Soviet objectives in the international
system have shifted from the primary pursuit of ideological expansionism
to the consolidation of diplomatic-political and strategic interests.

The Nigerian civil war and the concurrent African nationalistic wrangling
served to dispel finally Soviet optimism about the ideological revolutionary
potential of black Africa. By the 1970's most of the first generation of
Soviet nurtured 'revolutionary democrats' in Africa had been removed from
leadership or disillusioned by Soviet policies; the Soviet Union could

230) See Federal Republic of Nigeria: Third National Development Plan
1975-80, op cit, PP156-157. Also Recurrent and Capital Estimates
of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979-80, op cit,
PP497-498.

muster a sufficiently wide spectrum of international support on such
issues as Vietnam and the Middle East and was no longer so dependent
upon African bloc support at the United Nations; the Chinese influence
in Africa had largely lost its impetus; and Soviet policy in Africa was
reoriented toward reinforcing immediate Soviet strategic interests rather
than long-term ideological projections. Soviet analysts have suggested
that during the early seventies the Soviet Union determined upon a global
role for its military and naval forces, so as to secure, for the
Soviet Union, such military and naval facilities as are deemed necessary
to maintain the Soviet world presence, to deny such facilities to the
United States and the Western allies and thus to secure Soviet domestic
and international strategic concerns.

In Africa such strategic concerns are twofold and are seen as determining
first, who will exert greater influence over the course of change in
Africa and secondly, who will dominate the ocean-ways to the east and
west of the continent. A reflection of contemporary Soviet attitudes
to Africa may be gleaned from the following Soviet Government statement
on Africa:

A number of African countries have embarked on the road of
progressive social development, making their choice in favour
of a socialist orientation. The role and significance of the
African countries in the world arena is growing... The Soviet
Union is profoundly sympathetic towards these changes. The
USSR and other countries of the socialist community have
vigorously supported and continue to support the just struggle
of the African peoples... The development of relations between
our state and the African countries is determined by the
objective convergence of interests in connection with the
fundamental problems of our time. In its relations with the
states of Africa, the Soviet Union invariably adheres to the
principles of solidarity with the people's struggle for
independence and freedom, national and social progress, genuine


233) See Legvold, R, "The Soviet Unions Strategic Stake in Africa" in
Whitaker, JS, (ed), op cit, P153.
equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and mutually advantageous co-operation. This principled foundation of our relations is of lasting significance.\(^{234}\)

Thus Soviet relations with African states were to be governed by 'principle' rather than the ideological 'one worldism' of the fifties and sixties. Although the 'principle' obviously underscores the 'ideology' and vice-versa, the practical implication was a shift in priority to states which not only had an established 'progressive' inclination and were ideologically compatible with Soviet interests, but which were inherently significant to Soviet global/national strategic interests.

It is evident that there could not have been a more 'objective convergence of interests' than that presented by the Angolan civil war. In Soviet perceptions Angola possessed the most strategically significant deepwater harbour facilities (at Lobito and Luanda) in the south Atlantic; strategically located vis-a-vis the Cape sea route and the wider south Atlantic ocean region. Angola also occupied a strategic geographic location vis-a-vis the conflict in Namibia and ultimately South Africa and offered easy access to Zaire at the heart of central Africa (and a Sino/Franco sphere of influence furthermore). There was also the attraction of the mineral wealth of both Zaire and Namibia. Finally, the ideological orientation of the MPLA coincided neatly with Soviet perceptions of the "people's struggle for independence and freedom, and national and social progress". The scale of the Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war in ensuring the security of an MPLA regime, with the assistance of Cuban troops, is well known.\(^{235}\)


Similarly, the Soviet Union had established a sophisticated naval facility at Berbera on the Somali coast in the strategically significant Horn of Africa, in return for which the USSR extended military assistance, of a scale unprecedented in black African history, to the Somali armed forces. The long Somali coast line jutting eastward into the Indian Ocean, south of the entrance to and exit from the Red Sea, has strategic significance in that it dominates the oil 'life-lines' from the Persian Gulf, not only to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, but also to Europe and the United States around the Cape. Secondly, it protects Soviet access to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Thirdly, it controls the north-west quadrant of the Indian Ocean to which, for over a century, Imperial Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union have sought access and over which the USSR still seeks control (in securing the sealink between 'Soviet Europe' and 'Soviet Asia').

The left-wing revolution in Ethiopia in September 1974 provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to expand and consolidate its foothold in the Horn of Africa, through the projected establishment of a federation of the states of the Horn. However, Somalia has historical irredentist claims to Ethiopian territory and the Somalis, taking advantage of the confusion of the Ethiopian revolution, engaged in a full-scale invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The Soviet Union was forced to choose between supporting either Somalia or Ethiopia in the conflict, and eventually opted to back the more 'progressive' Ethiopian regime with much the same type of assistance which it had extended the MPLA in Angola — Cuban combat troops, Soviet technicians, strategic advisors and vast supplies of military hardware. 236)

Such is the contemporary nature of the Soviet policy orientation in Africa: that is to say, a focus on areas of 'progressive conflict' which are concurrently perceived as being significant to Soviet strategic interests. Thus, whereas the Soviet Union doubtlessly perceives the geographic location of Nigeria vis-a-vis the North Atlantic and the central African continent as having potential significance to Soviet strategic interests, hopes of a characteristically 'progressive' or left-wing conflict in Nigeria must be perceived as extremely unlikely. Nigeria is, therefore, of peripheral significance for contemporary Soviet interests in Africa. However, the fact that Nigeria is a major supplier of petroleum to the United States and Western Europe, and is a primary area of Euro-American trade and investment must of necessity distinguish Nigeria from other African states in Soviet perception. Apart from the fact that it is the enduring Soviet objective to negate Western influence wherever possible, were the USSR ever to attempt to implement the mooted 'denial control' strategy of petroleum and raw material supplies to the Western industrialized states, Nigeria would be of prime significance.

In more practical terms though, Nigeria is indirectly significant to Soviet interests in Africa (and by extension Soviet global systemic interests) because of the substantial continental diplomatic influence of Nigeria, as clearly manifest in the success of the Nigerian initiatives in the wake of the Angolan crisis. Nigerian success in generating continental diplomatic support for, and recognition of the MPLA regime, served to 'legitimate' Soviet/Cuban intervention in the sub-continent and to facilitate continental acquiescence in subsequent Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Ethiopian revolution and the Ogaden War, and by extension future Soviet involvement in southern Africa. Inevitably the Soviet Union perceives the diplomatic weight of Nigeria as having substantial influence in determining the attitude of other African states to Soviet interaction with the African continent (especially in the light of the continental
rebuke received by the United States at the time of the Angolan crisis).

In the second instance, Nigeria is perceived to have diplomatic significance for the interests of the Soviet Union in the 'unliberated' areas of southern Africa. Both South Africa and Namibia are of fundamental significance to wider Soviet global systemic objectives, both in terms of geographic significance vis-a-vis the Cape route, the south Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the vast mineral wealth of the territory on which the Western powers are greatly dependent, both in terms of capital and strategic supply. Nigeria's significance to Soviet interests in this sphere accrues from its role as chairman of the UN Committee on Apartheid and its membership of the UN Council for Namibia. Self-evidently, no internationally satisfactory solution to the South African and Namibian issues would be possible without the sanction (or at least tacit acquiescence) of Nigeria, and it is therefore, in the Soviet interest to maintain a measure of Soviet influence in Nigeria.

It may, therefore, be concluded that Nigeria is perceived to be of significance to the international systemic interests of the Soviet Union in three areas: first, in relation to Nigeria's perceived diplomatic influence vis-a-vis black Africa and particularly Nigeria's domination of international diplomatic action and discussion on the issues of South Africa and Namibia; secondly, in relation to Nigeria's latent strategic potential, both in terms of naval facilities and the country's potential as a factor of Soviet 'denial control' strategy vis-a-vis the Western powers; and in the third instance, Nigeria must inevitably be distinguished in Soviet ideological perceptions (which remain instinctive) in as much as Nigeria encompasses the largest proletariat in Africa.

2.1.2 The United States

The interest of the United States of America in Africa is a comparatively
recent phenomenon and has little historical basis. Traditionally the American interest in Africa has been primarily of a humanitarian and religious nature. However, with the advent of the Cold War and emergence of the African bloc in the international system, Africa came to have increasingly important strategic, political and economic significance to the global interests of the United States. It became clear that an amicable Africa, particularly North Africa, was of vital significance to the defence of Europe and the NATO southern flank; that the United States had a vested political interest in Africa as a link in the ring of alliances designed to contain international communism; that the United States was increasingly dependent upon Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, for most of its essential raw material imports; that African support was necessary for American views on resolutions at the United Nations; and that Africa had important spiritual and psychological connotations for the newly 'emancipated' American black electorate which was gaining influence in domestic American politics.237)

Africa has become a region of increasing geo-political/strategic importance to the international systemic interests of the United States primarily because the continent is geographically positioned between two areas vital to American/Western global strategic-defence contingencies and of potential super-power conflict, namely, the North Atlantic and the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Thus in terms of global strategic interests, Africa is significant because Soviet control or access to the ports, airfields, and support facilities in the bulge of West Africa, in the Horn of Africa and/or southern Africa is perceived as threatening the sea

lines of communication between North America and Western Europe to and
from the Persian Gulf region from which about 70 per cent of Western
oil imports are shipped. Historically, there is nothing new in the thesis
that the geographic location of sub-Saharan Africa, especially West Africa,
the Horn and the Cape route is strategically important to the West.
Throughout World War II, control of these areas was considered essential
to the Allies and attempts were made by Germany and Italy to deny the
Allies this control. However, in recent times the significance of these
African regions has been underscored by the Soviet Union's apparent
determination to supplement political influence with an infrastructure of
military and naval facilities along the African littoral.

In the second instance, Africa is important to US global interests because
Soviet control of the raw material resources of the continent might lead
to a Soviet 'denial control' strategy over these regions. This could be
done by limiting world exports of raw materials and forming cartels of
artificial scarcity, thus keeping the prices of such resources at
impossibly high levels, undermining Western economies. In extreme circum­
stances Western access to the vital raw materials of the continent could
be denied altogether. In the third place, (and obviously intimately
related to the former two factors) Africa is of significance to US
international systemic interests in as much as it is a prime target for
Soviet ideological ambitions. These are inherently contrary to American
interests, (in as much as the basic tenet of such ideology is the negation
of American and Western influence) and is manifest in African bloc voting
patterns at the United Nations and other international forums. This limits
the ability of the United States to maximize American attitudes and
objectives in the international system.

In terms of purely American political interests, Africa is of some
considerable domestic significance in as much as approximately ten per cent
of the American population can trace their 'roots' to Africa, particularly
West and Central Africa. Thus contemporary American administrations have
found it politically expedient to at least pay lip service to African
attitudes and interests. Black Americans feel a close affinity and common
brotherhood with Africans, and seek to use their political leverage in the
American polity to maximize black African aspirations.

In terms of American economic interests, apart from the obvious linkage
with the strategically vital raw material resources of the continent,
Africa is an area of substantial American foreign investment and an
important export market with vast potential for the future expansion of
such interests. The American investment in Africa represents only about
three per cent of all direct American overseas investment. The major share
of US foreign investment is spread out across black Africa, with 37 per
cent of the total investment of the continent being concentrated in South
Africa (representing an investment almost 30 per cent greater than the
American investment in any other single African state).238) American
investment in Africa is traditionally concentrated in the extractive
industries, and two thirds of investments is still concentrated in that
sector (focused on the securing of fuel and scarce raw material resources),
the remainder being predominantly in the manufacturing sector. In 1976
American merchandise trade with Africa was about 7.6 per cent of the total
of American world trade. American imports from Africa outnumber exports
by more than two to one and consist primarily of petroleum, raw materials
and agricultural commodities.239)

238) Bertolin, G, "US Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade and

239) Ibid, P32. Also Spiro, HJ, in Arkhurst, FS, (ed), US Policy Toward
Kitchen, H, (ed), Africa From Mystery to Maze, DC, Heath and Co,
Lexington, 1976, PP346-347. Also Spiro, HJ, The American Response
to Africa's Participation in the International System, An address to
the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association,
American policy towards Africa has tended to vary little with the different American Presidential administrations. It has evolved from the concept of 'minimal engagement' of the late fifties through periods of 'benign neglect' and 'confrontation' during the early seventies, to the concepts of 'international liberalism' synonymous with the moralistic African policy attitudes of the Carter administration. It was long contended that there was no such thing as an exclusive American policy towards Africa and that the United States had only 'global' and 'aid' policies consistently governed by three inter-related principles: first, support for self-determination; secondly, support for peaceful change (that is to say, a preference for diplomatic over military means); and thirdly, a willingness to provide the maximum amount of development assistance possible. President Nixon paraphrased these principles:

Our policy goals in Africa are unchanged: political stability, freedom from great power intervention, and peaceful economic and social development. We seek positive bilateral relations with African nations founded on their self-reliance and independence, and on forms of support which we can sustain over the long term. The principal role America can play in the continent's future is that of support for economic development...

Although relations between Nigeria and the United States have passed through several low troughs since Nigerian independence, the basic commitment between the two states has been consistently high. The attitudes of the Nigerian ruling elite toward the United States at independence was predetermined in many instances by the influences of personal education in the United States; the generally favourable


predisposition of the Nigerian Government leaders towards Britain and her NATO allies, and Nigeria's need for economic aid in launching the First National Development Plan (widely perceived, at the time, as the key to domestic integration and stability). Thus one of the Nigerian Prime Minister's first state visits after Nigerian independence was to Washington, during July 1961. This visit had been preceded in May 1961, by a US Government Economic Mission to Nigeria, and the subsequent communique confirmed the commitment of the United States to the economic and social development of Nigeria.\(^{243}\)

Throughout the period preceding the January 1966 coup d'état in Nigeria, the United States (apart from the World Bank), was the largest single provider of aid to Nigeria, amounting to about $200 million. The US participated in various capital and infrastructural projects, and extended technical assistance as part of the First National Development Plan.\(^{244}\) While the United States doubtlessly perceived the inherent economic potential of Nigeria, the country's significance to the interests of the United States was not, at this stage, based upon projections as to the export potential of the largest consumer market in Africa or the investment potential in an hospitable capitalist economy, but based rather on Nigeria's strategic location \textit{vis-a-vis} the southern flank of NATO. The cold war, Vietnam, rising tension in the Middle East, uncertainty as to French commitment to NATO, as well as Ghanain animosity towards the United States and the substitution of a formerly predominant US influence in Ghana by Soviet influence, all combined to make Nigeria (as an unabashedly pro-Western state) appear to be the only secure strategic alternative (along with Liberia, a state of less inherent strategic potential)


\(^{244}\) Aluko, O, \textit{Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70}, op cit, P190.
to the franco-phone states and pro-Soviet Ghana.

During the early 1960's Nigeria supported the United States in the Congo crisis and in debates on the China issue at the United Nations. It sympathised with US views on Cuba, Vietnam and disarmament, and although vociferous on southern Africa, Nigeria maintained a preference for non-violent solutions in keeping with US attitudes, as opposed to the more aggressive stance of Ghana, for example. It was thus primarily in the strategic interests of the United States to seek to consolidate the Nigerian polity, and this explains why the United States was permitted to set up a satellite tracking station and NATO communications centre at Kano.245)

However, US relations with Nigeria were severely tarnished when the United States refused to comply with a request from the Nigerian Federal Government for weapons (and particularly fighter aircraft) on the eve of the Nigerian civil war, despite the fact that the United States had become an established source of weapons supply. The United States sought to distance itself from the imminent conflict and declared that Nigeria was a British responsibility. An American State Department spokesman stated that American policy was opposed to the balkanization of Africa, but should Biafra become a "going concern" accepted by the OAU, its neighbours and Britain, the United States would then extend recognition "with reluctance".246) The primary focus of American international systemic interest was concerned with the escalation of the Vietnam War, the Six day war in the Middle-East, attempts at consolidating detente initiatives with the Soviet Union and the closing of the Suez Canal.

246) Quoted in Stremlau, J, op cit, PP64-65.
Clearly, the interests of the United States would not benefit from any conflict situation in Africa and it is not surprising that the impending Nigerian catastrophe was perceived, at the outset, to be of minimal interest to prevailing American systemic concerns. The United States subsequently expressed alarm when it became public knowledge that the Soviet Union had filled the breech, but in practical terms the United States perceived parallels with the Congo crisis and because of the primacy of other global systemic interests (most especially the war in Vietnam) could not perceive itself becoming successfully involved in a second Congo-type situation in the event of the escalation of the Nigerian conflict. The Nigerian issue was certainly peripheral to the global interests of the US and the American administration sought to parochialize the conflict by maintaining an aloof neutrality.\textsuperscript{247)}

The American stand was interpreted by the Nigerians as indirect support for the secessionist cause (especially in the light of the considerable public sympathy for the suffering of the Biafrans which was evoked in the US); in terms of Nigerian leadership perceptions, the United States had identified itself with the 'neo-colonialists', 'imperialists' and racists who had directly or indirectly sustained the secessionists.\textsuperscript{248)} Post-civil war US-Nigerian relations were generally tense and were further strained by the endeavours of the Nigerian leadership to establish Nigerian credibility as an African spokesman, and the attendant imperative of asserting a Nigerian commitment to non-alignment. This was in contrast to the Western bias of the civilian government. Nigerian leaders voiced their dissatisfaction with the nature of American aid and the attendant publicity, and were vociferously critical of the American invasion of

\textsuperscript{247) Cronje, S, \textit{op cit}, PP225-251.}

\textsuperscript{248) Aluko, O, \textit{Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70, op cit, P212.}
Cambodia in 1970. They bitterly attacked the American decision to reallow
the importation of chrome from Rhodesia in defiance of UN sanctions
and at the UN in 1971, voted against the American two-China policy.
Indeed, when the American President sent an emissary to Lagos in January
1970, with proposals for a massive US relief programme in the former war
zones, the Nigerian Government refused to receive him. 249)

During the first half of the 1970's, the United States found itself in
confrontation with African member-states at the United Nations, on most
major issues relating to the continent and specifically southern Africa.
US representatives at the UN General Assembly repeatedly voted in opposition
to its allies in Africa and Western Europe on resolutions antagonistic to
apartheid and colonialism. The United States vetoed a Security Council
resolution condemning Britain for failing to overthrow by force the illegal
white minority regime in Rhodesia. In 1972 it joined with the United
Kingdom, Portugal and South Africa to vote against a resolution calling on
all states to implement fully the UN arms embargo against South Africa, and
the following year joined with Portugal, South Africa, France and the
United Kingdom to oppose a General Assembly resolution seeking to legitimize
armed struggle in non-independent territories. Again in 1974 the United
States voted against a strengthening of the arms embargo against South
Africa. 250)

However, despite the difficulties for US diplomacy, American trade with
Nigeria during the period 1970-1975 increased rapidly. American imports
showed an increase of almost 5000 per cent and by 1976, 40 per cent of all
American imports from Africa came from Nigeria, making it the second most

249) Yearbook of the United Nations 1971, op cit, PP64-70 and PP126-132,
op cit, P B423.

250) Yearbook of the United Nations 1970, op cit, PP124- , 1971, PP64-
important trading partner of the United States on the African continent.\textsuperscript{251)}

The scale of the increased American economic commitment to Africa during the early seventies and the significance of Nigeria in this regard is illustrated by the following table.

**U.S. FOREIGN TRADE WITH AFRICA**

\begin{tabular}{lrrrrr}
\hline
 & \textbf{1970} & \textbf{1975} & \textbf{1976} \\
\hline
\textbf{SOUTH AFRICA} & 563 & 288 & 1302 & 841 & 1348 & 925 \\
\textbf{NIGERIA} & 129 & 71 & 536 & 3282 & 770 & 4938 \\
\textbf{ALGERIA} & 62 & 10 & 632 & 1359 & 487 & 2209 \\
\textbf{LIBYA} & 104 & 39 & 232 & 1046 & 277 & 2243 \\
\textbf{ANGOLA} & 38 & 68 & 53 & 426 & 35 & 264 \\
\textbf{EGYPT} & 81 & 23 & 683 & 28 & 810 & 93 \\
\textbf{GABON} & 7 & 9 & 59 & 197 & 46 & 190 \\
\textbf{GHANA} & 59 & 91 & 100 & 150 & 133 & 155 \\
\textbf{IVORY COAST} & 36 & 92 & 78 & 160 & 64 & 248 \\
\textbf{ZAIRE} & 62 & 41 & 188 & 67 & 99 & 189 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


In 1977 American imports from Nigeria reached a peak of \$6,150 million, but fell off to \$4,710 million during 1978. However, it will be noted from the above table that South Africa is a more important export market for the US than Nigeria; the former imports almost twice the value of its exports to the US, while the American trade balance with Nigeria indicates a large American deficit (totalling \$5,570 million in 1977

\textsuperscript{251}) Rothchild, D, in Whitaker, JS, (ed) \textit{op cit}, PP30-32.
and $3,860 million in 1978). The United States imports 17 per cent of its total petroleum requirement from Nigeria (48 per cent of Nigerian production), making Nigeria the largest single African supplier (an African total of one third being supplemented by Gabon, Angola, Libya and Algeria) and since 1974 and the Arab oil embargo, the second largest overall supplier of petroleum to the United States (between 1972-73 American imports of Nigerian oil increased by 84 per cent). The United States also imports 10 per cent of its columbium from Nigeria.

American capital investment in Nigeria as of 1978 stood at approximately $1 billion, as compared to $1.5 billion in South Africa, the largest area of American foreign investment in the African continent.

American political/strategic interests in Africa appear to have been eclipsed by a series of events during the mid-seventies, initiated by the overthrow of the government of Portugal and the subsequent collapse and withdrawal of Portuguese authority from its territories in Africa (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola). The collapse of the Portuguese metropolitan authority confounded a basic premise of American policy toward Africa, namely that 'white rule' would be a long-term political feature in southern Africa. The American confrontation with Africa

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254) Ibid. P44.


256) Contained in National Security Study Memorandum NO 39 as quoted in El-Khawas, MA and Cohen, B, (eds), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, Lawrence Hill and Co, Westport, 1976, P105 this document is said to have been the basis for the Nixon/Ford policy toward southern Africa.
could no longer be confined to the United Nations when it became apparent during late 1975, that the Soviet Union was providing military support on an unprecedented scale to the MPLA faction in the Angolan civil war (estimated at $200 million in military equipment and 11,000 Cuban troops at the height of the conflict). The United States perceived its global security interests as being directly challenged and subsequently extended tacit support to the South African military intervention in the Angolan conflict in support of the 'moderate' UNITA/FNLA factions. However, the US Senate refused to authorize funds for any overt US military undertakings in Angola and the South African forces were forced to withdraw. Not only were perceived American global strategic and political interests seen to be compromised, but the African repercussions of the Angolan debacle which have been described above, served to 'legitimize' the Soviet/Cuban involvement in Angola and place the United States in direct confrontation with an African continental consensus, rallied and consolidated by Nigeria.

257) Hahn, W, and Cottrell, AJ, op cit, P60. The MPLA has always maintained that Cuban assistance was requested only after the South African intervention. While the scale of the Cuban presence in Angola reached a peak after November 1975, there is uncertainty about the date of initial Cuban involvement. The Soviet press agency PRAVDA proclaimed the sole legitimacy of the MPLA (without mentioning Soviet/Cuban intervention) for the first time at the end of November 1975. See in this regard "War in Angola presented in Soviet press as struggle against two groups of imperialist forces" in The Times, London, November 29, 1976, P6.

258) The US representative at the United Nations (Daniel Moynihan) described US support for South African actions in Angola as follows: "...there is a convergence of policy, we are doing the same thing sort of (SIC)." quoted in "South Africa's Mistake in Angola" in The Times, London, December 18, 1975. The thrust of US perception of its interests in the conflict appear in Kissinger, H, "Implication of Angola for Future US Foreign Policy", Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, January 29, 1976, Dept of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, 1976. Kissinger argued that restraint between America and the Soviet Union would be achieved only if Soviet lack of restraint carried the risk of United States counteraction, and there would inevitably be a chain reaction if one of the great powers attempted to obtain special positions of influence based on military intervention.
The eclipse of American interests in Africa was further underscored by
the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia during September 1974,
and the subsequent socialist revolution, during which the Americans were
expelled from what had previously been a traditional American sphere
of influence. This vacuum was soon filled by the Soviet Union. Subsequent
Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia
revealed the extent of the Soviet military and naval infrastructure in
the Horn of Africa — an area of direct significance to American strategic
interests due to its geographic position vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf and the
Middle East. The United States' interests in southern Africa assumed
greater significance with the intrusion of large-scale Soviet/Cuban
involvement in two of the major conflict zones on the continent. The
US sought to negotiate a resolution to the Rhodesian conflict, in the
process of which it became manifestly apparent that no such solution could
be arrived at without the acquiescence of the frontline states and of
Nigeria, whose continental diplomatic influence had been crucial during
the Angolan crisis. The American Secretary of State paraphrased the new
American attitude to Africa;

I have come to Africa because in so many ways, the challenges of
Africa are the challenges of the modern era... My journey is
intended to...usher in a new era in American policy... America's
responsibilities as a global power give us a strong interest today
in the independence, peace and wellbeing of this vast continent
comprising a fifth of the world's land surface. For without
peace, racial justice and growing prosperity in Africa, we
cannot speak of a just international order.260)

259) Spencer, J H, Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa and US policy, Institute
for Foreign Affairs Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, PP60-70
in particular.

260) Text of Statement on US Policy in Africa by US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, Lusaka, April 27, 1976 in Legum, C, (ed), Africa
Contemporary Record 1976-77, op cit, P C159. See also "Dr. Kissinger
puts US firmly behind African majority rule" in The Times, London,
April 28, 1976, Pt. Kissinger committed the US to support "...self-
determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all
the peoples of southern Africa..." within the framework of the 1969
Lusaka Manifesto. He also announced that the US intended to triple
its aid programme to the states of the region over the next three years.
However, Nigeria unilaterally cancelled a scheduled visit of the American Secretary of State to Lagos during May 1976, an act symptomatic of the extraordinarily low ebb of American credibility in Africa, and the American initiatives in southern Africa were shortlived.

This series of events marked a watershed in American policy toward Africa, and compounded with a profound domestic political disenchantment among the American electorate with the 'immorality' of government (in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal), American policymakers were forced to reconcile their perception of new strategic realities in the African continent and the rapidly expanding US economic interest in black Africa with notions of liberal morality and humanitarianism; perceived to be the most fundamental traditional values of American society. The linkage between American international systemic interests and the American domestic constituency was basic to US perceptions of Africa at the advent of the Carter administration;

...our interest in Africa, of course, comes from the fact that it is a continent of enormous potential in resources and human talent. It is in our interest to have good relations with Africa in years to come. However, there are other good reasons beyond the traditional narrow definition of national self-interest for adopting a more committed and more active policy toward Africa. We believe, for example, that our attitude toward questions such as majority rule and racial justice has a direct bearing on the strength of American society, which will be reinforced if our policy abroad is consistent with our own standards on these questions here at home. We also believe that our overall conduct of foreign relations will be strengthened by the moral premise inherent in our stance on these questions...

Our interest in Africa is natural since more than 11% of our people trace their roots back to that continent, and have become increasingly conscious of their African heritage and of events in Africa... "Superpower" rivalry in Africa is something we hope to avoid. One fundamental objective is to help Africans create a strong prosperous Africa at peace with itself and with the world, not to gain some advantage over the Soviets or Cubans or any other power.
The United States perceived vested strategic, economic and political interests in a new accommodation with Africa, a sine qua non of which was a sympathetic attitude toward demands from black Africa on white dominated southern Africa, and the central focus of this initiative was Nigeria. Barely a year after the Nigerian Government had refused to receive the American Secretary of State, the Nigerian Head of State, Lt. General Obasanjo, paid an official visit to the United States during October 1977, and the American President voiced American perceptions of the significance of Nigeria to US interests;

...there is no doubt that this is a most important nation economically in Africa... Nigeria is a nation of great pride and also great leadership, not only among the nations of Africa, but throughout the developing world and indeed throughout all nations on earth.262)

The new awareness of the significance of Nigeria to American interests was put beyond all doubt when in April 1978, Nigeria became the first and only (other than Liberia) black African state ever to be officially visited by an incumbent President of the United States. While the tangible outcome of the visit was a strengthening of the positive relations between Nigeria and the United States during the Carter Presidency, in the form of agreements of co-operation and assistance in agro-industrial development, joint investment, transfer of technology and technical training, the less tangible objective had been the re-establishment of American credibility in black Africa in the wake of the Angolan embarrassment and the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa. While publicly committing the United States to finding a solution to the southern African issues in accord with African demands, the President failed to obtain any condemnation from Nigeria of the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Africa, as the hoped for quid pro quo.263) American influence in Nigeria was further consolidated during


July 1980, when a four day visit to Nigeria by the American vice-President at the head of a team of 72 'experts' culminated in a formal agreement to increase co-operation in agriculture and technology, and to increase US trade with, and direct investment in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{264)} The most significant aspect of the agreement was the American undertaking to supplement the efforts of the World Bank and FAO to attain the Nigerian Government's target of self-sufficiency in food-supply by 1983. The Nigerian Agriculture Minister stated at the time of the signing of the agreement;

\begin{quote}
We want the Western world to see our problem... We feel that a friend in need is a friend indeed, and fighting and famine should not have to break out before we get help. Fortunately the Americans are now realising our need.\textsuperscript{265)}
\end{quote}

Whereas US trade and investment in Nigeria had been steadily increasing in significance since the early seventies, it was only after the Angolan crisis and the expansion of Soviet influence in that country and the Horn of Africa that the US perceived Africa to be of significance, as the contemporary arena in which the international systemic equilibrium was to be tested. The United States was compromised in its lack of credibility in, and commitment to black Africa and Nigeria, as a supplier of petroleum and an area of significant American foreign investment and considerable economic potential was an obvious area in which to maximize the new US interest in Africa. Moreover, the United States could hardly discount the fact that Nigeria had initiated and orchestrated the continental rebuke which American interests and policies in Africa had received after the American sanctioned invasion of Angola by South African forces. Nigeria came to be perceived by the United States as primarily, of considerable diplomatic influence in Africa and, therefore, the key to the re-establish-


\textsuperscript{265)} \textit{Ibid.} In September 1978, 1000 Nigerian students began technical training courses in the US as part of the largest programme ever provided for an African state. See Legum, C, (ed), \textit{Africa Contemporary Record 1978-79}, op cit, P B744.
ment of American credibility in that continent in which the bi-polar rivalry of the international systemic order is held in balance; and secondly, in that Nigeria had become a significant (although not irreplaceable) supplier of oil to the United States and represented the second most significant area of American investment in Africa (other than South Africa).

Although Nigerian criticism of the United States for the lack of progress toward independence in Namibia and the ending of white-rule in South Africa has not abated, it is debatable as to what extent the degree of political leverage, which Nigeria apparently gained from its rise to prominence as an American oil supplier and region of lucrative investment, has been compromised by the degree of direct American Government assistance to Nigeria, particularly the programme of agricultural development which is Nigeria's primary capability weakness. It is clear though, that the United States has perceived it to be a basic strategic imperative to regain a measure of influence in black Africa and the perceived significance of Nigeria in this regard, has clearly manifest Nigeria as the most influential state in black Africa.

2.1.3 The People's Republic of China

The basic tenet of Chinese peasant-revolutionary strategy is the notion of the encirclement of the cities by the peasantry of the rural areas, and it is in accord with this notion that the People's Republic of China (PRC) perceives the Asian, African, Latin American complex as constituting

266) During October 1980 President Shagari told the UN General Assembly on the eve of Nigerian discussions with the US government, that "(Nigeria) would no longer tolerate the provocations by South Africa or the dilatory tactics of her allies in the Western bloc with regard to self-determination and majority rule for Namibia..." The Times, London, October 8, 1980, P8.
the so-called 'rural areas' of the world, as opposed to North America and Western Europe which are perceived of as the 'cities of the world'.

Thus China seeks to universalize its revolutionary and ideological precepts. The summons to the 'world proletariat' of Asia, Africa and Latin America to engage in revolutionary struggles has long been a hallmark of Chinese policy; it seeks, in essence, to promote the idea of a world revolutionary movement in which the primary enemies are the 'American imperialists' and the 'Soviet social imperialists' and revisionists.

A secondary traditional tenet of Chinese foreign policy is the goal of uniting small and medium sized states against the Soviet Union and the United States. (Recent interaction between the PRC and the US may cast doubt on this statement, but it seems to be generally accepted that the PRC has not altered its long-term policy objectives.) The Chinese ideologues stress that there will obviously be differences among states, but that the important point is to seek common ground; combating imperialism and classical neo-colonialism; opposing foreign aggression and intervention; demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases; supporting the national liberation movements; and at the same time maintaining a mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The primary interests of the PRC in interaction with the African sub-system


have historically been ideologically identified with notions of world revolution and third world unity, but in reality are of a more pragmatic dimension and undoubtedly motivated by the Chinese national interest. China's primary traditional interest in Africa and throughout the Third World is to manifest the viability of the Chinese model for achieving liberation, and thus to establish the PRC as the ideological 'patriarch' of the Communist world. (This has been referred to as the contest for the "papacy of international communism").\(^{270}\) In the second instance, (intimately related to the first) China seeks to negate the influence of its primary adversaries in the international system, namely, the Soviet Union and the United States (although reference to the US as an adversary has been muted since the rapprochment in US-PRC relations). The Chinese have traditionally sought to identify the Soviet Union and the United States as the prime movers against the liberation movements and as the ultimate forces opposing change in Africa; the objective is to prove the ideological morality of the Chinese\(^{\text{vis-a-vis}}\) the Soviet version, and to concurrently undermine Soviet and American influence in Africa. In the third instance, Africa has traditionally been perceived by the Chinese as a major constituency of support in the Communist Chinese endeavour for international diplomatic recognition, and in the long struggle for acceptance into United Nations membership.\(^{271}\) This perception was validated in October 1971, when 26 African states supported the General Assembly resolution admitting the PRC to the UN and expelling Nationalist China (Taiwan).

In the fourth instance, the Chinese seek to identify with both 'North' and 'South' in the modern world system. Political parity with the major powers of the 'developed' world has numerous rewards, both psychological


and tangible. For example, Chinese leaders offer counsel on European
security matters, meeting their French, British and American counterparts
as equals; the PRC trades with Western Europe, Japan and the US; taps
the technology and markets of the 'Capitalist' Western states; and the
Chinese leaders derive a measure of psychological support from these
multilateral contacts in their persistent opposition to the Soviet Union.
At the same time the PRC seeks to maintain its ability to identify with
the 'South' on the grounds of a common level of economic development
and allegedly similar heritage of foreign exploitation; a nurtured racial
affinity; and a united struggle against the super-powers. 272) Thus the
international role of the PRC is traditionally directed, as far as
possible, at extending and propagating Chinese influence in the global
system; the Third World in general and African states in particular, are
essential instruments of such systemic objectives.

The PRC has traditionally sought to present itself as the leader of the
countries of the world that are poor, economically underdeveloped and
disadvantaged in the wake of European colonialism. The Chinese perspective
of the emergent Nigerian state could hardly have been the perception of a
revolutionary ally, but rather that of an inherently significant (by virtue
of population and area) member of the plethora of newly independent
international actors of the early sixties. Nigeria was thus a potential
ally at the UN, an element in the Sino-Soviet contest to win the favour
of the newly independent governments, a potential West African sphere of
influence, and an area of economic opportunity. China sought at an early
stage to engage Nigerian diplomatic support and during April 1961, the
Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade brought a delegation to Lagos to
explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations and improving
economic and cultural relations between the two countries. Two months

272) Whiting, AS and Dernberger, RF, op cit, P71.
later the Nigerian Government dispatched a 25 member economic delegation to China. A subsequent joint communique by the two states agreed that the establishment of diplomatic relations would promote co-operation and friendship, and that trade and cultural relations should be developed. However, the Nigerians did nothing to follow up these initial contacts, either to increase economic co-operation or establish formal diplomatic relations. Moreover, throughout the sixties the Nigerians abstained from voting on the various UN resolutions calling for Communist Chinese admission to the United Nations.

The Chinese succeeded in manifesting their influence in West Africa in Mali, Guinea and Ghana, cementing the relationship in each case with generous long-term aid packages, but did little to negate the strong Soviet influence in these same states. Thus pre-civil war Nigeria was of little more than perfunctory significance to the international ideological aspirations of the PRC. Yet, despite the lack of 'revolutionary' potential and the reluctance of Nigeria to establish diplomatic relations, during the 1960's, the latter became one of the PRC's primary export markets.

The Nigerian civil war marked not only a watershed in African diplomacy, but was of some considerable significance to international powers who were forced to define their national interests in the conflict and take sides accordingly. Thus the Chinese found it politically expedient to back the Biafran secessionist regime. China was engaged in the construction of the Tan-Zam railway connecting Zambia and Tanzania (the largest single aid project ever undertaken in Africa) and of obvious diplomatic and prestigious significance to the Chinese. In the second instance, the

Soviet Union supported the Nigerian Federal Government and the Chinese could not resist the opportunity (and the ideological imperative) to oppose the Soviets. However, practical Sino-interests in the Nigerian conflict were minimal, (a reflection of Nigerian ranking in the Chinese hierarchy of international significance) and the Chinese commitment did not extend beyond the verbal. It was directed primarily at discrediting the Soviet Union in the eyes of the rest of Africa, rather than in support of Biafra. Furthermore, the Chinese were deeply engaged in the Cultural Revolution, limiting any Chinese altruism, and such Chinese arms as were supplied to the Biafrans were obtained via Tanzania.  

It has been suggested that China ultimately perceived of the Nigerian civil war in the context of the triangular competition with the Soviet Union and America, concluding that if Biafra succeeded, the international position of the PRC would not be harmed as the Nigerian Government had not accorded diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and so could not damage China's diplomatic standing. On balance, the Chinese decided to discount their favourable trade balance with Nigeria. (Nigeria subsequently deliberately cut down on imports from the PRC.) The end of the war was not reported in the Chinese press. The Chinese hoped that, given time, they could re-establish their position with the Nigerian Government and these hopes were boosted by the reconciliation between Nigeria and the four African states which had recognized Biafra (including Tanzania and Zambia).


By 1971 Nigeria was prepared to justify its diplomatic recognition of
the Peoples' Republic by stating:

China's new leadership defeated events. They conquered fate.
This is an important lesson for those of us in the poor nations
of Africa and Asia who prefer to remain poor imitators of some
developed nations.278)

This period, during which Nigeria sought to re-establish its credibility
in the international system, coincided with the re-emergence of the PRC
after the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, to an unprecedented
level of international diplomatic recognition. China's main concern was
to consolidate this level of support among the African states and thus
sought access to a wider range of African states, moving from the small
or 'progressive' to the more intrinsically important 'conservative' countries
such as Nigeria and Zaire. This strategy of consolidation was ideologically
justified in terms of the notion of mobilizing the countries of the Third
World into a united front, so as to bring economic and political pressure
to bear on the medium sized industrial powers (i.e.; the "struggle against
imperialism") and co-opt these states in the struggle against the two
super-powers (i.e.; the "struggle against hegemony"). Chinese policy stressed
the need to "give full play to national sovereignty", encouraging the
nationalization of foreign-owned interests and the formation of cartels
and regional economic groupings (such as ECOWAS), so as to manifest a
form of Third World 'denial control' (akin to the Arab oil embargo) over
the industrialized states.279)

The Soviet Union was presented as the primary focus of the unchanging
Chinese ideological hostility in the African context;

The Africa of today is no longer what it was a century ago when
colonialism and imperialism began carving up the continent.
Chairman Mao pointed out: "That frantic struggles of the
imperialists and reactionaries will only stimulate peoples of

278) Quoted in Hutchinson, A, op cit, P71.

279) Adie, WC, "China's Year in Africa" in Legum, C, (ed), Africa
Contemporary Record 1975-76, op cit, P A99.
African countries to sharper vigilance and stronger
determination in the fight against imperialism and old
and new colonialism and for the defence of national independence
and the prosperity and the progress of their countries". Having summed up both the positive and negative experience,
the awakening African people are becoming increasingly aware
of the ferocious features and insatiable ambitions of Soviet
social imperialism which is making disturbances here today and
plotting invasion there tomorrow ... Sharp, complex struggles
are being waged on the continent of Africa — the African countries
and people versus the racists, the African countries and people
versus super-power hegemonism; the two super-powers, the Soviet
Union and the US versus each other. Within these contradictions,
the decisive factor is still the African people who, united as
one, dare to struggle...280)

The significance of Nigeria in this perspective lay first, in the
recognition by the Chinese of the role of the Nigerian leadership in
consolidating African unity in the wake of the civil war; secondly, in
the Chinese perception of Nigeria as a primary area of Western (particularly
US) economic significance; and thirdly, as a sphere of positive Soviet
influence (both the latter being contrary to Chinese interests). However,
Nigeria differed from the other spheres of Sino-influence in Africa
(Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire) and was not susceptible to Chinese long-term
aid agreements or indeed to ideological appeal. Furthermore, the Chinese
have no tradition of affinity with the Nigerians (especially since the
PRC supported the Biafrans during the civil war) and subsequent consolidation
of the perceived Sino-interests in Nigeria has necessarily been gradual
and generally low-key. Sino-Nigerian relations during the last decade
have remained consistently sound and are characterized by agreements on
economic, technical and agricultural co-operation.

Thus, for example, the visit of a Nigerian delegation, headed by the
Commissioner for External Affairs, to China during April 1973, was
reciprocated with the dispatch of a Chinese agricultural survey team to

280) Ku-Ping, J, "China's Policy in Africa" in Legum,C, (ed), Africa
Contemporary Record 1977-78, op cit, P C16.
Nigeria during January 1974. During September 1974, General Gowon paid an official visit to Peking and in January 1976, Nigeria concluded two agreements with China, one for the development of three rice cultivation projects in Nigeria and a second, on the construction of boreholes in the Chad Basin. Similarly, during the latter part of 1977, a two-year technical assistance agreement was signed, in terms of which the Chinese provided personnel and training programmes to assist in training Nigerians for technical and industrial development. The significance of Nigeria to Chinese international systemic interests was confirmed by an official visit during October 1978 of Keng Piao, one of China's Vice Premiers, to Nigeria. The Vice Premier stated that the primary objective of his visit was to strengthen existing friendly relations between China and Nigeria so as to serve the Third World's common cause of unity against hegemonism, and praised Nigeria as a bastion of African unity.

China perceives Nigeria as a champion of continental unity and this fits well with the former's aspirant role in Africa and the international system in general. This was clearly underlined in the Chinese perception of the Nigerian role in the Angolan crisis (in which the PRC had backed the FNLA) and the Nigerian reconciliation diplomacy between Zaire (a principal Sino-sphere of influence) and Angola (a Soviet sphere of influence) after the Shaba incursions into Zaire from Angola. However, the functional nature of the commitment between China and Nigeria arises from a mutual perception based on expediency; Nigeria seeks to manifest itself as a continental leader and needs obviously, therefore, to be able to claim equal standing with the major powers, and sound relations with China (as indeed with all other major powers) is a sine qua non in terms of such


ego-role ambitions. Similarly, maintaining amicable accord with the Chinese gives Nigeria the opportunity of using the threat of increased Sino-influence as a lever of some effect against the Soviet Union and the United States. Sino-Nigerian intimacy serves to substantiate Nigeria's 'revolutionary', 'libertarian' and non-aligned credentials, particularly in the sphere of southern African issues.

Similarly, the Chinese, while perceiving relatively little tangible advantage in their relations with Nigeria (it is most unlikely that Nigeria will ever become a pillar of the Chinese ideological struggle, for example, ideological support and propaganda being the primary Chinese systemic interest), must of necessity maintain a foot in Nigeria, which merely by the measure of Western and Soviet commitment is of international political significance to the People's Republic. Chinese foreign policy has, historically, been directed against isolationism, both ideological and physical (political and economic) and is thus logically directed at the inclusion of at least a minimal measure of Chinese influence, and at best, the undermining and exclusion of Soviet/US influence in all spheres of general Third World and specifically African significance. China seeks not only to maintain its standing and bona fides in Africa by patronising Nigeria (which in itself is undeniable recognition of Nigerian continental influence), but through close 'public' alliance with Nigeria ('in the interest of the struggle against world hegemony'), China is able to maintain its revolutionary credentials and entree to southern African liberation movements through the medium of the Nigerian chair of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid and UN Council for Namibia. (It is suggested that Sino-Tanzanian intimacy is similarly motivated by Tanzanian influence over the OAU Liberation Committee.) However, Chinese theoretical ideological fervour is largely compromised in practice by economic realities. Thus on a secondary, but more practical level, the People's Republic is ever conscious of the need to expand Chinese trade so as to maintain an
economic growth rate apace with the growth in Chinese population, and the significance of the largest consumer market in Africa is self-evident.

2.1.4 The United Kingdom

The African continent is significant in the perceptions of the United Kingdom of its interests in the international system, in that it constitutes a major part of the old imperial constituency and as such, is the historical basis of British influence in the international system. British interests in Africa have traditionally been primarily economic, dictated by the historical need to import vast quantities of raw materials to maintain British industrial capacity; British political entanglement is subordinate to this primary motivation. Contemporary Britain, therefore, essentially has only economic interests in Africa, and such political or strategic interests as may be identified are an integral part of maintaining and protecting economic access. (This in the sense that the British economy is based upon the processing of raw materials and the export of manufactured goods; thus British political influence is principally a measure of British economic capacity.)

The United Kingdom is no longer an independent power in the international system (having minimal independent military and naval capabilities and heavily inter-related economic dependencies), but has, perforce, to act in concert with several larger alliances and support constituencies — most specifically NATO, the EEC and the Commonwealth; British political, strategic and economic interests are co-ordinated by allegiance to such alliances. The latter organization is a loose alliance between the British metropolitan power and its former colonial dependencies, and it could be suggested that modern Britain is far more dependent upon the former colonies than the other way round. In truth though, the dependency is obviously mutually reinforcing. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth provides
Britain with a support base in the international system and special access to the Third World in general, and Africa in particular, which would otherwise be beyond Britain's independent influence. Primarily, the Commonwealth cements the colonial/historically determined economic interests which are fundamental to British ego-influence in world politics.

It is within this context that independent Nigeria has traditionally been perceived as being of significance to the systemic interests of the United Kingdom; that is to say, first, as the largest consumer market in Africa (with the implicit potential for British exports and investment) and secondly, as an element of the British international political support base, which is the Commonwealth. Shortly before Nigerian independence, the British Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan), addressing the Nigerian House of Representatives, spoke of Nigeria's great size and population, and of her playing a leading role in Africa and in the Commonwealth.283) Indeed, it was in the systemic interests of Britain to nurture the aspirations of the Nigerian ruling elite to continental leadership: South Africa, the area of greatest British economic and political significance in Africa (and the natural continental leader), had become an embarrassment to Britain in British relations with Third World members of the Commonwealth, and South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth was imminent; so too, Ghana, a former British colony and the only other primary sphere of British influence in West Africa (the Gambia being historically of little significance) was perceived to be inherently antagonistic toward Britain (manifest in sharp disagreements over the Congo-crisis, colonial and racial issues in southern Africa and the subsequent Ghanain alignment with the Soviet Union). Nigeria was perceived as having the potential to fill the African leadership vacuum and provide a pro-British, conservative voice in Africa and the Commonwealth, thus consolidating British systemic interests. 284)

Besides the common factors of language, education and administrative institutions linking metropolitan Britain and its former West African colony, commitment to Nigeria between 1960 and 1966 was intimate, and reflected the very favourable attitude of the Nigerian leadership towards Britain. Thus, for example, the United Kingdom concluded a Defence Pact with Nigeria, providing the British with naval and military support and training facilities. Although Nigerian domestic political expedience forced the mutual abrogation of the formal treaty two years later, Nigeria continued until nearly five years after independence, to retain a large number of British officers in the Nigerian army and navy, and until 1965 the Officer Commanding the Nigerian Armed Forces was a seconded British General. British firms received preferential treatment in Nigeria and a British, Shell-BP consortium was the sole producer and exporter of crude oil from Nigeria until 1965. Nigeria refrained from directly censuring Britain or cutting off diplomatic relations, as demanded by the OAU, over the British failure to prevent the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, preferring instead to convene an extra-ordinary meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in Lagos. Indeed, from independence to the fall of the civilian government, it is difficult to find any public criticism of the United Kingdom by any members of the Federal cabinet. This was chiefly because Balewa, the Nigerian Prime Minister, till the end of his regime, did not regard Britain as a 'foreign country', but as a member of the same Commonwealth 'family', criticism of whom should be confined within it. Thus Nigeria became firmly established in British perceptions as a voice of influence and moderation, and a strong advocate of British interests.

However, Britain looked with disfavour upon the advent of military rule in Nigeria. Apart from the fact that the notion of military government was totally counter to British traditions and signalled the dismantling of

the British constructed constitutional mechanisms, the instability of
the Nigerian polity threatened the considerable British economic interests,
and the promised revision of Nigerian foreign policy objectives threatened
to contradict British perceptions of the moderate 'pacifist' role of
Nigeria.

When the Nigerian civil war broke out and Nigeria appealed to its
traditional ally and source of arms supply for assistance, the British
Government was faced with the dilemma that on the one hand, Nigeria was
a member of the Commonwealth and its armed forces had been trained and
equipped by Britain, and Nigeria, therefore, had a right to expect a
continuity of supply; on the other hand, refusal to supply arms would have
implied tacit British support for the secessionists and would also have
seriously impaired British credibility as an ally among the African members
of the Commonwealth. Britain declined to sell Nigeria the requested
squadron of fighter aircraft, but determined that it would maintain its
'traditional' supplies of infantry and artillery weapons, and ammunition. 286)

A protracted war was not in the British interest (and probably not in the
British expectation) primarily due to the fact that the major oil fields
(dominated by British investment) were located in Biafra and secondly,
because British public opinion would not long abide a sustained war fought
with British arms. Thus Britain urgently sought to arrange conciliatory
talks between the Nigerian Federal Government and the Biafran secessionists,
initially under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat. But as the
impasse continued and the British domestic demand for a ban on arms sales
became more vociferous during April/May 1968, Harold Wilson, the British
Prime Minister embarked on personal efforts to bring about a ceasefire. 287)

286) Stremlau, J, op cit, PP76-79.
287) Cronje, S, op cit, PP40-42.
By the end of 1968, the intensity of public hostility in Britain to official policies toward Nigeria was considerable: during repeated debates on the issue in the British parliament, members of the House of Commons petitioned the government to halt all further arms sales; the Prime Minister was the object of public demonstrations, petitions and vociferous lectures from the pulpit; trade with Nigeria was threatened by British dockers who refused to handle cargo bound for Lagos. 288) However, the pressures facing the British Government were not all domestic. Britain's international prestige, to a greater extent than that of any other external power, had become tied to the outcome of the civil war. The international community, particularly the United States, reluctant themselves to become embroiled in the conflict, insisted that Nigeria was a British responsibility and urged Britain to take a more decisive lead in promoting a negotiated settlement. However, Britain's options for engineering a peaceful settlement were rather limited.

With Nigeria in control of nearly 90 per cent of the territory of the former Eastern Region by the end of 1968, and preparing for another military offensive, halting the sale of arms was out of the question. The Nigerian economy was in surprisingly good shape, with sufficient funds to buy arms elsewhere if the Nigerian Government wished; the Soviets particularly, were perceived as being ready to make up any shortage created by Britain's withdrawal; Shell-BP had resumed production which was soon expected to surpass the pre-war levels. The Wilson Government was resigned to continue its policy of selling military equipment to Nigeria while simultaneously calling for a ceasefire, and tried to persuade critics that in so doing the British Government retained a measure of leverage over the Nigerian Federal Government on matters related to humanitarian intervention and a negotiated settlement. 289)

After a Soviet naval squadron, consisting of two missile destroyers, one submarine and a fleet oiler paid a goodwill visit to Lagos during early March 1969, the British Prime Minister announced that he would visit Lagos. The efforts of Harold Wilson to serve as a negotiator between the two sides failed, and the Federal Government prepared its final offensive which ended the Biafran secession. British perceptions of its policy options in the Nigerian conflict were aptly summed up by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons during March 1969:

(Those who say)...that we should have cut off arms, must look at what the results would have been. There would certainly have been a profound estrangement of ourselves from Nigeria and from Africa as a whole. It would have involved a great increase of Russian influence in Nigeria, and it would have involved a great risk to British people and British interests in Nigeria...there are circumstances in which it is entirely right for a country to say, 'We must push our economic interests aside because there are overwhelming moral considerations'... But in this case, who can say that it is axiomatic that it is morally right to cut off arms supplies from a country facing a rebellion of this disastrous character?

The British Government thus perceived its economic and strategic imperatives as being served by a united Nigeria, and the eventual collapse of Biafra and the generous reconciliation efforts of the victors secured these British interests and convinced the British Government that it had taken the right course of action.

Britain remained Nigeria's largest single trading partner and two British trade delegations lost no time in visiting Lagos after the cessation of hostilities. Despite this, however, the Wilson Government was defeated in the general election of 1970 and the new Conservative Government found itself, almost immediately, in direct confrontation with the Nigerian Government over Britain's announced intention to resume arms sales to

290) Stremlau, J, op cit, P304.
South Africa, despite United Nations resolutions imposing an embargo on such sales. The Nigerian Government threatened to impose an embargo on British economic activities in Nigeria, to withdraw from the Commonwealth and hinted at a closer alliance with the communist bloc; thus pinpointing and threatening to undermine the most fundamental international systemic interests of Britain in Nigeria.  

Whereas none of these contingencies came to pass, the threat of a Nigerian embargo on British economic interests over issues of British policy in southern Africa, became an established precedent and characterized Anglo-Nigerian relations throughout the seventies. While British political relations with Nigeria fluctuated between levels of tension, conditional to British policy toward southern Africa, economic relations expanded at a considerable rate. As the British economy slipped into steady decline, British economic interests in Nigeria became of ever greater significance (ironically though, for the same reason, British economic investment in South Africa prescribed the action (or the lack of it) which Britain could take against South Africa, and thus in turn, precluded an improvement in political relations between Britain and Nigeria). The growth in British economic commitment to Nigeria at this time is illustrated by the following comparative statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.K. TRADE WITH SELECTED AFRICAN STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXORTS (£'000)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENYA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
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<td>UGANDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAIRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
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</table>


DIRECT NET INVESTMENT OF UK COMPANIES IN AFRICA* (million £)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Africa (excl. SA) of which:</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Rhodesia</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>117.5</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>152.7</td>
<td>133.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>135.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Oil company investment excluded.


British exports to Commonwealth Africa (collectively) exceeded exports to South Africa for the first time in 1972, and Britain perceived it to be increasingly economically expedient to pay lip service to African attitudes towards southern Africa. The British Foreign Secretary visited Lagos during February 1973, and recognition of a more 'positive' attitude in British African policy was manifest by the subsequent official visit of General Gowon to London during June 1973. This served to heal the rift between Britain and Nigeria over the South African arms issue.293)

Britain perceived it to be in its systemic interest to consolidate relations with Nigeria at this time for two reasons. First, because Nigeria was seen not only as one of the most influential states in Africa, but since the expansion of the Nigerian oil industry, one of Britain's most important trading partners. Secondly, Gowon was recognised in 'Whitehall' as one of the most 'commanding' figures in Africa. Although Gowon's militant attitudes to colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa and over French

policy in franco-phone Africa were well understood by British officials, they believed him to be more pragmatic, flexible and moderate than either Presidents Nyerere or Kaunda (the leading 'frontline states' and spokesmen on southern Africa). "Gowon might, therefore, be persuaded to play a useful mediating role in Africa and in the Commonwealth between Britain and some of her more militant critics."  

Indeed, as has been recorded, in the post-war phase General Gowon engaged in propagating the image of Nigeria as an 'honest-broker/mediator, with some considerable energy and the British overtures served to substantiate Nigeria's role perception and to bolster significantly Nigeria's tarnished credibility in the international system in the wake of the civil war. Britain, in the ensuing months, set about consolidating its perceived interests in black Africa: the British Foreign Secretary paid an official visit to Nigeria in January 1975, followed by the British Trade Secretary in February; during April 1975, General Gowon again visited Britain for 'top-level' discussions with the British Prime Minister on the latest developments in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia; Britain abrogated the Simonstown naval agreement with South Africa; it accepted the United Nations' position that South Africa's administration of South West Africa/Namibia was illegal; and made a firm public commitment not to negotiate with the Rhodesian regime except with the co-operation of Africans and the OAU. Consequently Anglo-Nigerian relations briefly attained a high degree of accord.

However, Anglo-Nigerian relations were once again complicated during the latter part of 1975 and early 1976, when Britain refused to submit to the Nigerian request for the extradition of General Gowon (who had taken up

294) Ibid.

residence in exile in Britain), on charges of corruption, after the overthrow of his regime. Nigeria requested the withdrawal of the British High Commissioner in Lagos, and diplomatic relations between the two states were not restored until December 1976.296)

Britain's strategic interests in Africa are obviously inextricably linked with the fortunes of the United States in that continent, and Britain was equally as alarmed by the reduction of American/Western manoeuvrability in Africa in the wake of the Angolan Civil war. Perceiving the possibility of similar international (Soviet/Cuban) involvement in the Rhodesian conflict, Britain joined with the United States during 1976, in seeking solutions to the long outstanding issues of southern Africa, most specifically Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and Namibia. However, a more specific determinant of the changing British perception of the priority of its interests in black Africa was the fact that by 1976 Nigeria was overtaking South Africa as Britain's biggest trading partner of the continent; thus in 1976, Nigeria absorbed one-sixth of Britain's total exports to Africa. In addition, the new Nigerian regime determined to use its economic importance to compel its trading partners to change their relations with South Africa. The Nigerian Government gave foreign firms the choice of either trading in Nigeria or with South Africa.297) (Barclays Bank investments in South African Defence Bonds provided a test case.) In the past, a powerful determinant of British African policy had been the


value of South Africa as a trading partner and area of British investment; henceforth, it was realized, a choice would have to be made between balancing sets of trading interests. The British Foreign Secretary paraphrased this changing British perception;

...ambiguity persists...in British policy towards Africa in the post-colonial era... The challenge...is to point the way unswervingly to where the future of Africa must lie. This is not only a moral obligation: it is the assertion of our long-term national interest. Last year, trade in each direction with South Africa was worth more than £600 million. Black Africa took more than £1.3 billion of British exports, twice as much as South Africa. Nigeria has now replaced South Africa as our single largest trading partner on that continent. A universal ban on trade with South Africa would cause major problems and higher unemployment in British exporting industries. It would also disrupt industries at present dependent on imports of South African raw materials... We are living in a real world and this is a harsh fact that we, more than any other Western European country, have to take into account. Yet with the passage of time the overall balance of advantage must lie with black Africa. 298)

The new British policy orientation, of according black Africa primacy in British relations with, and long-term interests on the continent, was well received in Africa although there was no lessening of African pressure on British attitudes towards South Africa and the continuing Rhodesian crisis; and when the United Kingdom (along with the United States) vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions against South Africa, African spokesmen cast doubts on the sincerity of the British commitment. 299) Doubts were transformed into direct confrontation yet again, when the newly elected Conservative British Government suggested during early 1979, that it would not renew the economic sanctions order against Rhodesia when it was scheduled to come up for debate in the House

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298) Statement by Dr. David Owen, British Foreign Secretary, to the Young Fabians, Brighton, October 1977 in Legum, C, (ed), *Africa Contemporary Record* 1977-78, op cit, P C19. This statement was made at the time when the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia still held promise of a settlement. See also report in *The Times*, London, October 3, 1977, P1.

of Commons during November 1979. The antagonism which this attitude produced in Anglo-Nigerian relations reached crisis point on the eve of the August 1979 Commonwealth Conference, when the Nigerian Government implemented its long threatened embargo on British interests in the event of Britain failing to take cognizance of African attitudes on southern African issues, and nationalized the Nigerian interests of the British Petroleum Company and ordered the exclusion of all British firms from bidding on Government contracts for the "foreseeable future". (Immediate direct British losses were calculated at £250 million.)

It is debatable whether the Nigerian action influenced the subsequently amicable outcome of the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference in any positive way, save in as much as it forceably underscored British perceptions of the vulnerability of British interests in Nigeria, as well as the depth of the Nigerian commitment to progress on southern African issues.

Nigerian doubts as to British impartiality and integrity persisted throughout the negotiations preceding the Lancaster House Agreement on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and the subsequent period of implementation of the agreement, and this muted mistrust continues to characterize Anglo-Nigerian relations. The Nigerian Foreign Minister paid an official visit to Britain during August 1980, and said that Nigerians were "fed up" with being taken for granted by the British. The Minister cited the imbalance in Anglo-Nigerian trade; a "suspicious softness" in British dealings with South Africa; and the reluctance of the British Government to take a positive stand on the Brandt Commission Report on the North-South dialogue as specific instances of contradiction in present Anglo-Nigerian relations.


There can be little doubt as to Britain's perception of the significance of Nigeria to British systemic interests: Nigeria imports twice as much from Britain as South Africa; twice as much as Japan; Britain sells more to Nigeria than to Canada, Australia or the whole of Latin America. With such manifest economic significance goes an implicit political significance, that is to say that Nigeria's economic potential distinguishes the country as the central consideration in British policy options in Africa and is, therefore, of undoubted leading continental significance. This degree of British economic dependence appears to endow Nigeria with a significant measure of political leverage over British interaction with the African continent. Since Nigeria is the only state in Africa which has the capability to influence British policy options, and thus ultimately affect the success of Britain's aspired role in the international system, Nigeria has an unsurpassed significance to specific British interests in Africa and the international system in general. Furthermore, the United Kingdom derives a considerable measure of significance and influence in the international system from its role as leader or patron of the Commonwealth (a role determined more by tradition than pragmatism) and the significance of the Commonwealth in contemporary international politics is based upon the consensus and co-ordinated actions of its member-states in the international system. The significance of Nigeria to British economic interests and the consequent Nigerian influence in the political affairs of Africa, makes Nigeria an indispensable member of the Commonwealth, of equal, if not greater significance to the international credibility of the Commonwealth (and hence of the United Kingdom) than Canada, Australia and India, the traditionally most influential members.

2.1.5 France

The French perception of the international systemic interests of France, and the nature of French foreign policy is more deeply influenced by
tradition and historical determinism than any other of the major actors in the contemporary global system. The French traditionally have a deep sense of history, and over the years the French leadership and policy-making elite has been no less reactive to the pinacles and depressions in French history. The result is a foreign policy which is primarily concerned with securing international status and presence for France in the global system; international interaction is weighed in terms of prestige value. This is certainly true of French foreign policy since the Second World War, which has been characterized by a determination to be independent of the United States and Britain (the victors of World War II) and to establish France as one of the major modern powers, not irrevocably allied to either super-power. It has been suggested, that the basic anti-Americanism which exists in France, has given rise to a nostalgia for a bygone era, which translates into a form of neutralism, neither pro-communist nor anti-liberal, but a reaction against domination by more powerful states.\(^\text{302}\)

French interests in Africa have been historically influenced by such notions of French national prestige and cultural cohesiveness, which on the one hand led to a form of French 'cultural imperialism', or franco-centrism, among the African colonial dependencies of France, and on the other, an abiding antagonism towards the anglo-phone states of Africa. This originated from an historic French conviction that they had been cheated by the British at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference and in the subsequent 'scramble' for Africa. Strongly centralized, 'direct' relationships between the French metropole and the colonial dependencies characterized the pre-independence period. There were no parliaments in the colonies, but there were black parliamentarians, senators and Ministers in Paris.

When this system of 'direct rule' came to an end there was no intermediary institution (akin to the British Commonwealth) where the former colonizers and their former colonial subjects could meet on equal terms. In an attempt to keep pace with the new nature of relationships between France and her former dependencies, de Gaulle nurtured the notion of the 'special relationship'. This did not just imply a paternal obligation on the part of France to guide, assist and maintain a sense of responsibility toward her former colonies, it was also intended to apply among members of the 'family' who were required to support each other in the face of the hostile (anglo-phone) outside world. It is equally important to note that the 'special relationship' was not directly imposed upon the African francophone community, but that most francophone African leaders of the 1960's insisted on keeping the 'family' together, even though they did not all conceive of their ties in quite the same way.  

This prologue is pertinent to the present analysis first, because it serves to illustrate the basic tenets of contemporary French perceptions of its international systemic interests in, and policy towards Africa; and secondly, because French perceptions of the significance of Nigeria to French systemic interests have traditionally been shaped by, and reactive to these historical conceptions. France has traditionally perceived Nigeria as a redoubt of British influence in the predominantly francophone West Africa, and thus, in its demographic and potential economic preponderance, a threat to French interests in the unity and loyalty of the francophone states. France has traditionally nurtured the perception among Nigeria's francophone neighbours, of Nigeria as an overbearingly predominant state with expansionist designs, in an endeavour

to regionally isolate Nigeria and so, undermine British influence. Such perceptions were particularly encouraged by de Gaulle during the late fifties and the sixties, when France was endeavouring to consolidate its international role free from NATO. In this context the franco-phone states of Africa were an increasingly important part of the 'independent' French support base. French policy options at this time were perceived to be poised between the dilemma of either giving priority to a global policy based on a 'commonwealth' of former French colonial possessions, or a continental policy determined by the balance of power in a united Western Europe and the world. Nigeria was perceived to be an obstacle to both options: it was on the one hand, an impediment to any possible French African community and on the other, an important element in British international prestige (thus weighting the European balance of power).

The tension latent in such invidious mutual threat perception has characterized Franco-Nigerian relations since 1960. The most dramatic illustration of the antagonism between the two states followed the French atomic bomb tests in the Sahara during January 1961, when the Nigerian Government ordered the French Ambassador in Lagos and his entire staff out of the country within 48 hours, and the placing of a complete embargo on French shipping and air traffic. Nigeria was the only African state to take such radical action, the traditionally more militant members of the continent being satisfied with verbal condemnation. Such uncharacteristic Nigerian radicalism may be largely ascribed to Nigerian hyper-reaction to the perception of threat in the French attitude towards Nigeria. (There was also a Nigerian desire to pose as 'non-aligned' and so provide a distraction for its domestic constituency — already mentioned above.) Following representations from Niger and Dahomey, the embargo on French shipping and air traffic was lifted toward the end of 1961, but diplomatic relations
between France and Nigeria were not restored until 1965. Even then, France retaliated by persistently refusing to ratify an agreement of association with the EEC signed by Nigeria in July 1966; this was in keeping with de Gaulle's steadfast veto of the British application for membership of the EEC.

However, relations were soon complicated by the Nigerian civil war. In July 1968, the French Secretary of State for Information announced that France supported the right of self-determination of all peoples and claimed that Biafran endeavours to secure their self-determination deserved international support. In September, de Gaulle publicly declared his country's support for Biafra, suggesting that diplomatic recognition would follow as a matter of course once Biafra had established its viability. By October reports were reaching the outside world of massive supplies of French armaments being airlifted into Biafra via the Ivory Coast and Gabon. While such reports were liable to exaggeration the impression of very considerable French assistance to Biafra has persisted.

The French affinity with the Biafran cause was self-evidently manifest in the rationale repeatedly advanced by Biafra, that the very size of the Nigerian Federation made plans for development co-operation in West Africa difficult to carry out, since Nigeria would dominate any such grouping. The Nigerian federal structure was thus regarded as the fundamental impediment to ultimate West African integration. The Biafran argument (as the Biafrans were doubtlessly aware) coincided precisely with French perceptions and interests. France was accused of being primarily interested

304) Idang, GJ, op cit, P136 and Akindele, RA, op cit, P49.
in the Biafran oilfields, but this is improbable, since by the time de Gaulle declared French support for Biafra the oilfields were already in Federal hands. Rather it is suggested that France perceived a direct opportunity to advance its interests in West Africa by supporting Biafra: first, because most francophone states in West Africa were in sympathy with the Biafrans (particularly the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Dahomey); secondly, because it was in French interests to consolidate French influence in West Africa (in pursuit of international prestige and an 'independent' systemic role) to undermine the Nigerian unity and British influence.

Despite an apparent consensus that the French assistance to Biafra had merely prolonged and sustained the war, while being insufficient to offer the Biafrans the hope of victory, at the end of the war, General Gowun stated that Nigeria would maintain diplomatic relations with France if the latter so wished. Despite this assurance that there would be no Nigerian retribution against France for its wartime support of the secessionists, the Federal Military Government withheld its permission for French oil operations in Nigeria until 1971, long after other foreign oil companies had resumed production — a measure interpreted as subtle retaliation.

In early 1971, the French Ambassador in Nigeria made a plea for the restoration of "solid", "effective" relations between the two countries, a statement indicating the perfunctory nature of the interaction between the two states at this time. It was not until 1973 that the French Foreign Minister was able to make a visit of reconciliation to Lagos, in an endeavour to end the historically uneasy relations between the two countries.

309) Ibid.
France had, in the interim, become the fourth largest investor in Nigeria, and French trade with Nigeria was rapidly overtaking its trade with its other African trading partners. For this reason a consolidation of French relations with Nigeria had become of importance to French interests. So too, on a secondary level, Nigeria had become of enhanced significance to French perceptions, because on the eve of Britain's accession to membership of the EEC, Nigeria had grasped the economic imperative of uniting African, Carribbean and Pacific Island states in renegotiating EEC terms of trade with the states encompassed in the ACP grouping. While the West African franco-phone states had, during the latter sixties, been opposed to Nigerian 'associate' status with the EEC, for fear of unfair competition, the new integrationist spirit in West Africa and the imperative of African unity so actively propagated by Nigeria, had served to bridge at least the psychological cleavage between anglo-phone and franco-phone states. The French were thus confronted with an Africa negotiating for the first time as a cohesive bloc for the collective benefit of the African 'purpose' in international politics. France could hardly ignore the inherent economic and cultivated political predominance of Nigeria in this bloc. It had certainly become an economic and political imperative for France to mend its fences with Nigeria. What is more, France perceived that Nigeria was presenting a challenge to French influence in West Africa which France could no longer effectively negate.

The post-civil war military and economic regional predominance of Nigeria had made amicable relations with Nigeria a practical imperative for the states of the West African region. Despite French attempts to consolidate the franco-phone states of the region in an exclusive French West African Economic Community (CEAO), to counterbalance the disproportionate Nigerian

economic and political presence, the Nigerian integrationist drive cut right across French interests and purpose, and left the franco-phone states divided between their historical loyalty to the metropole and the overwhelming economic and political imperative of co-operation with Nigeria. The divided loyalty of the franco-phone states was clearly underscored by the exclusion of Togo (which had agreed to establish a regional organization together with Nigeria) from the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique Occidentale (CEAO), and the careful assurances given by the signatories to the agreement that membership of the CEAO would not affect their relationship with Nigeria. While Gowon could not drive a wedge between the franco-phone states, France perceived that it could no longer command the sole loyalty of the West African franco-phone grouping in the face of the predominant regional economic and political influence of Nigeria. It was, therefore, self-evidently in the French interest to be seen to settle its notoriously indifferent relations with Nigeria, so as to (rather ironically) secure French regional political interests and to consolidate expanding French economic interests.

Thus in November 1974, the Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs reciprocated the 1973 Nigerian visit of the French envoy, and extended an invitation to French firms to invest in Nigeria. 311) As a direct result Peugeot subsequently invested £5.9 million in an assembly plant at Kaduna, which came into production during March 1975. 312) After the commissioning of the plant by General Gowon (attended by the French Minister of Industry, on an official visit to Nigeria) the French Ambassador summed up the nature of the improved Franco-Nigerian relations as follows:

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I think that now co-operation is desired by both sides and will be to the benefit of both countries. In the past, Nigerian-French relations suffered from insufficiency of mutual knowledge. We had not enough opportunities to meet each other to exchange views and to study our respective frames of mind and positions. So we have every reason to increase our communications now... a happy and cordial co-operation characterizes our bilateral relations. 313)

While relations might have been 'cordial', they could not remain 'happy' for long, due primarily to deep Nigerian indignation at French attitudes towards South Africa. (Besides repeatedly vetoing anti-South African resolutions in the UN Security Council, the French continued to supply South Africa with military equipment and in December 1976, announced the sale of a nuclear power station to that country.) The Nigerian Foreign Minister issued a stern public warning to France to weigh its "short-term economic interests in South Africa" against its interests in the rest of the continent, noting that there were over 60 French companies operating in Nigeria alone. 314) Franco-Nigerian relations were further troubled by the military intervention of France in three African conflict areas during the first half of 1977, notably, the French airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaire in April to counter an invasion of the Shaba province by Katangese rebels from Angola. (France imports a third of her copper from the Shaba mines.) In July the French supplied aircraft and support equipment to the Chadian Army faced with a civil war; and France decided to assist the Mauritanian Army against the Polisario guerillas in the Western Sahara. These French actions were severely criticized by the Nigerian representative at the United Nations. 315) France also supported


the FNLA faction in Angola, and incurred the wrath of Nigeria over French policy on the granting of independence to Djibouti, the Afars and Issars, and the Mayotte Islands.

Nevertheless, by 1977 French trade with Nigeria exceeded that with both the Ivory Coast and South Africa (formerly France's principal African trading partners) as illustrated by the following statistics.

### VALUE OF FRENCH TRADE WITH PRINCIPAL AFRICAN STATES 1977

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<th>EXPORTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2,470,243</td>
<td>2,437,551</td>
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<td><strong>NIGERIA</strong></td>
<td>4,613,959</td>
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<td><strong>IVORY COAST</strong></td>
<td>3,790,372</td>
<td>3,236,795</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GABON</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ALGERIA</strong></td>
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<td>8,786,099</td>
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During May 1977, a 29-member French Trade mission visited Nigeria and despite Nigerian remonstrances about the insensitivity of French economic and foreign policies, extensive trade, technical and education exchange agreements were concluded with France during August. In February 1978, Nigeria intervened on behalf of France to try and secure the release of a French student kidnapped by rebels in Chad, and in March the French Foreign Minister made an official visit to Lagos. Franco-Nigerian relations thus assumed an established pattern which still persists: Nigeria uses the threat of economic restrictions to persuade France to co-ordinate its African policy with African (particularly Nigerian) attitudes. France perceives it to be in its economic and political interest to pay lip service to Nigerian remonstrations while concurrently pursuing the 'independent' French ego-role in the international system.

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France has since the latter sixties, sought to combine the perceived French policy options of the post World War II era, namely, a continental European role based on the balance of power in Europe on the one hand, with a global role based on a loose alliance of former French colonial possessions, on the other. The French objective, as a major power in the international system, is to manifest an idiosyncratically French presence in international politics, exclusively allied to neither East nor West, but committed to maintenance of French historical prestige and traditional French interests. The traditional 'special relationship' between the French metropole and franco-phone African states is seen as having the same implications for French role perception as the development of a French nuclear deterrent. The French 'commonwealth' in Africa is a fundamental constituency for the projection of French international influence, and the more so in the wake of contemporary American impotence as a super-power in Africa in the face of Soviet expansionism. France seeks to project an image of itself as the 'humanizing' power par excellence, intimately concerned with African social welfare, in contrast to the image presented by the hegemonic objectives of the two super-powers in African perception. The primary French objective is to perpetuate French prestige and influence, not only in Africa but also in the wider global system.

Only the pragmatism of economic imperatives in a depressed international economy, restrain the historical French perception of Nigeria as an overpowerful Anglo-oriented regional antagonist, and an inherent threat to French interests in consolidating the French constituency in West Africa, and indeed to French interests in the continent at large. The very fact that France perceives of Nigeria as sufficiently significant to constitute a threat to French systemic interests, distinguishes Nigeria from other African states in the French spectrum of threat and opportunity perception, and therefore, rather paradoxically, substantiates the Nigerian ego-perception of continental leadership. While it is generally contrary to French interests
to acknowledge Nigeria as in fact the leader of the African continent (due simply to the fact that Nigeria's only commitment to the French cause is a tenuous economic one) and France has a self-evident preference for, and affinity with the franco-phone states, the French can scarcely deny the predominance of Nigeria. (ECOWAS has effectively bridged the franco-phone/anglo-phone cleavage in West Africa and projected Nigerian predominance into a primary French sphere of influence.) The phase of consolidation in Franco-Nigerian relations underscores the French perception of Nigeria as being of considerable economic significance to French interests and of sufficient continental political influence to affect French political interests in the international system.

2.1.6 West Germany

After the Second World War, the interests of West Germany in the international systemic dispensation were closely constrained by German dependence on the military defence and nuclear umbrella of the United States on the one hand, and the imperatives of German economic reconstruction and 'rehabilitation' in Europe and the international system at large, on the other. While West Germany, poised as it is on the edge of the 'Iron Curtain', has a vested interest in the maintenance of the international systemic balance, West German systemic commitments have tended to vacillate between loyalty to Washington as the protector of the Western bloc, and an instinctive attraction to the French drive for a united Western Europe with a standing more independent of the United States. However, the most basic tenet of German interaction with the international system has been the maintenance of the "miracle of German economic reconstruction". 318)

Thus prior to 1973, West German attitudes towards Africa were almost exclusively business oriented, with such political interests as existed being directed principally at preventing African states from extending diplomatic recognition to East Germany. However, on November 8, 1972 representatives of both East and West Germany initialled the so-called Grundvertrag which effectively set the legality, in international law, of the two German states and cleared the way for the admission of both states to United Nations membership in September 1973. Since West Germany had not been represented at the United Nations prior to 1973 and had been dispossessed of its colonial possessions after the First World War, Germany, unlike its Western allies, was able to evade African hostility voiced in international forums on the general issues of decolonization and the more specific one of southern African. Thus Germany was not required to respond diplomatcally to this criticism. However, when West Germany was admitted to the UN it was suddenly confronted with a range of African issues to which it had to respond.

While the thrust of German African policy after 1973 was a commitment to the independence and basic social and economic needs of the poorer African states, with a view to preventing the creation of 'spheres of influence', a group of nine African states (most of which hardly fit the German policy proscription) have consistently headed the list of German aid recipients.

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*1 DM = APPROX. £1


This table suggests that while German African policy is perhaps based upon socialist and humanitarian considerations, German economic needs require the maintenance of an export-based policy. Precedence is, therefore, given to those states with apparent economic and investment potential. German policy-makers have defended the rationale of the West German African policy by coining the truism that "development policy is a means to protect the German worker against unemployment" and thus, German political, economic and 'aid' relations tend to be influenced primarily by perceived opportunities for profit.321)

West Germany's rise to prominence as a 'major power' in the international system in the post-Second World War year, may be attributed to the economic prowess and industrial expertise of its people. Thus the degree of political influence which West Germany has in the contemporary international system (specifically Western Europe) is economically based. Thus it is quite logical and inevitable that the West German perception of the significance of any state to German international systemic interests is based primarily upon that state's potential as an export market and area of German investment (particularly in the Third World). Nigeria, as the largest consumer market on the African continent was self-evidently distinguished in the German perception as being of inherent significance to German interests, and German-Nigerian relations have been consistently stable and unmarked by controversy since Nigerian independence. Indeed, West Germany maintained a policy of strict neutrality during the Nigerian civil war.

While West Germany has consistently maintained its position as the second largest exporter of goods to Nigeria and as the third largest investor in that country (approximately 16 per cent of all foreign investment in Nigeria is West German capital),322) Nigeria is only third in significance

321) Cervenka, Z and Dederichs, MR, op cit, P A92. Also Merkl, PH, op cit, PP188-191.
on the African continent as an area of German trade and investment.

**WEST GERMAN INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 1977**

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<td>LIBYA</td>
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<td>KENYA</td>
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<td>ALGERIA</td>
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<td>LEBANON</td>
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The extent of West German investment in South Africa is three times greater than that in Nigeria and Germany is, therefore, less susceptible (than its Western allies) to Nigerian 'denial control' threats as retribution for non-compliance with African demands on South Africa. West Germany has been accused of supplying South Africa with nuclear technology, and during an official visit to Lagos in June 1978, the West German Chancellor was at pains to deny that there was any nuclear co-operation between West Germany and South Africa. However, the Chancellor also defended German trade and investment in South Africa by referring to the large number of German jobs which would be sacrificed were West Germany to boycott the South African market. 323)

It is evident that the significance of Nigeria to the interests of West Germany is determined almost exclusively by Nigeria's economic significance in the African continent. West Germany's international political and strategic interests are subordinate to those of the United States, and Western Europe in general and, therefore, Germany has no direct political interests in Africa (other than the obvious linkage between economic and political interests) comparable with those of the US, Britain or France. Yet West Germany is a vital partner in the EEC and NATO, and therefore shares the interests of these organizations in Africa and so too, must

share the perceptions of the other principal member-states of the Western alliance of the political influence of Nigeria.

While Nigeria has a significant measure of interaction with many other members of the international system (outside of the African sub-system, that is), aligned with both the Eastern or Western blocs (most notably Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Netherlands, Hungary), it is not within the capability of such states to alter the prevailing international systemic bi-polarity. These states might individually or in alliance be of some significance to the international systemic balance, but they do not constitute major foci of international political alignment (or potential alignment) in the international system. Their perceptions of the significance of Nigeria to their international systemic interests, therefore, are not significant to an analysis seeking to describe the role of Nigeria in the international system. These states, like Nigeria, act within the same systemic milieu as determined by the alignment of the major powers, and are, therefore, essentially in competition with Nigeria. Whereas the degree of significance which these less predominant states accord the role of Nigeria in the international system would obviously serve to substantiate Nigeria's ego-role perception, these states do not have the influence in the international system to either decisively refute or confirm Nigerian (or any other state's) ego-role aspirations. That is to say, that it would be of little consequence were these states to withhold their recognition of Nigeria's significance in the international system, simply because they do not have the capability or predominance of influence to orchestrate the international political systemic order, that international environment or milieu from which no state can isolate itself.

Those states classified as 'major powers', however, either individually or collectively have the power through comparable industrial/economic
and nuclear/military capability to weight or restrain the international systemic balance and, therefore, through collective alliance are capable of changing the basic parameters, framework or milieu in which international political interaction must of necessity be conducted. The relativity of the notion of 'role' in the international system is essentially measured against the interests of these progenitors of the international order. Thus, the significance of any state *per se*, or the ego-role of any state in the international system is relative to the significance of the state concerned to the inherent rivalry between the international political alignments (that is to say, the conflicting interests of predominance) which set the global systemic polarity. Those states which we have described as major powers, albeit in terms of the rather arbitrary and general criteria of international predominance, ultimately 'legitimize' a state's international systemic ego-role, through the simple coincidence of ego- and alter-perception. This enables us to verify the significance of the state's perceived role to the interests of the predominant manipulators of that international systemic environment which is external to all states.

The states of most predominant influence in the contemporary international political system have all been seen to have a significant measure of interaction with Nigeria, but the rationale (or perceived significance) of such interaction appears to diverge according to the predominance of economic/political motives on the part of Western bloc states on the one hand, and the predominantly ideological/political nature of Sino-Soviet objectives, on the other. Whereas such perceptions may differ as to the priority accorded either predominantly economic or ideological interests, they coincide to the extent that Nigeria is perceived by both blocs to be of significance in the context of the rivalry between the global political alignments for international systemic predominance (or preponderance). Such perceived significance arises first, from Nigeria's
sizeable demographic and geographic proportions; secondly, from Nigeria's geographic location on the West African coast vis-a-vis the southern flank of NATO, the South Atlantic, the Cape route and the hinterland states of tropical and central Africa; and thirdly, from an apparent perception of a significant Nigerian diplomatic influence on the African continent.

This perception was confirmed in the repercussions of the super-power engagement in Angola and the subsequently apparent weighting of the systemic balance in favour of the Soviet Union, at the expense of the United States and its Western allies. This confirmed not only Africa as a contemporary arena of super-power rivalry, but also the significance of Nigeria in influencing the continental standing of the super-powers, which had previously tended to take the subservience of African states to super-power predominance more or less for granted.

In the context of the perceived economic significance of Nigerian interaction, it is a fact that the highly industrialised economies of the predominant Western bloc states are fundamentally dependent upon the continuing expansion of export markets for Western manufactured goods, to ensure the viability of their national economic/industrial capability (upon which, to a greater or lesser degree, the international predominance of these states depends). Similarly, the welfare of an industrialized economy necessarily relies upon the expansion of the capital and technological investment. The singular distinction of Nigeria in the context of such interests is the size of the country's population, which constitutes the largest consumer/export market in the African continent. The fact that Nigeria is a producer of crude oil heightens its significance in the perception of Western states seeking to maximize economic opportunity. This fact is significant first, because all these states must necessarily import oil, which is a commodity most basic to the viability of their economies and all have developed varying degrees of dependence upon the
Nigerian supply of crude oil (most particularly the United States).

In the second instance, Nigeria's resource endowment ensures, through the inflow of foreign exchange primarily from the sale of oil, the growth of the Nigerian economy and thus in turn, the growth in Nigerian purchasing power and the continued growth of investment opportunities in Nigeria as the Nigerian economic base expands.

The Sino-Soviet bloc perceives their interaction with Nigeria in ideological terms, in that Nigeria is seen as pertinent to the Soviet and Chinese doctrine of internationalizing and ultimately universalizing the socialist revolution. The Third World in general, and Africa in particular are perceived as the key to world revolution. Whereas Nigeria obviously has a general significance in the context of the perceived ideological significance of the Third World, Nigeria has little ideological 'aptitude' or tradition of revolutionary fervour and is, therefore, an unlikely ally in propagating world revolution. However, these ideological progenitors of the socialist world revolution are in bitter confrontation with one another in the "contest for the papacy of international communism". Thus it has been seen, that the Chinese perceive Nigeria to be of significance, not only as an African state with the largest 'peasantry' on the continent and, therefore, of apparently inherent ideological/revolutionary potential, but as an area of greater Soviet than Sino influence and thus, of heightened significance in the contest for ideological supremacy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, doubtlessly holds minimal ideological expectations of Nigeria, for while the USSR has established a sound footing in Nigeria, the Soviets must, in purely practical terms, be aware of the far greater Euro-American influence in Nigeria and the less than 'progressive' nature of the Nigerian leadership, which render a pro-Soviet socialist revolution in Nigeria unlikely. However, it would be unrealistic to doubt that the size of the Nigerian 'proletariat' and the latent conflict potential and inherent instability of the Nigerian
polity does not hold some significance for Soviet ideological instincts.

However, all these projected interests — economic, ideological, political and strategic — of both East and West converge on the southern African issue. Nigeria's aspiration to continental leadership is based on the need to capitalize on the black African attitude to the issues of southern Africa/apartheid. Thus, the interests of the major powers in South Africa are regarded as contradicting their interests in Nigeria (and the rest of black Africa). The increasing economic/political significance of Nigeria to the international systemic interests of the major Western powers, is compromised by the historical economic/political commitment of these states to South Africa. It has thus become increasingly politically and economically expedient for these Western bloc states to weigh their perceived international systemic interests and practical economic and political interests in South Africa against those in black Africa as a whole, united and marshalled by Nigeria, as the only state in black Africa in which the scale of interests of the major Western states in South Africa is paralleled.

The southern Africa/apartheid issue is the most basic tool of Nigerian self-assertion in the international system, and in as much as Western interests in South Africa are consequently placed in opposition to the concurrent Western interests in Nigeria, and by extension the rest of Africa, Nigeria clearly acquires a definite measure of pre-eminence in the perception of the major Western powers. The Sino-Soviet bloc, on the other hand, have vested ideological/political interests in the conflict in Namibia and South Africa, not the least of which is the displacement of Western influence in the region, and the extent to which Nigeria is able to hold the South African interests of the Western powers in the balance, gives Nigeria a self-evidently enhanced degree of significance to the international systemic interests of these states.
Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that Nigeria is an integral part of the African sub-system and it is, therefore, necessary to consider the perceived significance of Nigeria in the sub-systemic environment.

2.2 The significance of Nigeria to the interests of sub-systemic actors

In the same way that the major powers, in their interaction with each other and the other less predominant systemic actors, delimit the parameters of the prevailing international political systemic order, the states of the African continent (excluding South Africa and Namibia), through a contrived balance of interest (as embodied in the Charter of the OAU) seek to co-ordinate and regulate interaction between member-states themselves and with extra-sub-systemic actors, thus delimiting the nature of the sub-systemic order and collective sub-systemic objective vis-a-vis the global system. The cohesion of the African sub-systemic order is dependent upon agreement among sub-systemic actors, on the nature and objective of external interaction. Thus the nature of any African state's role in the international political system is fundamentally dependent upon the perception of the other members of the sub-system of the significance of the state concerned to their collective sub-systemic and individual interests. It is quite obvious that the Nigerian claim to continental leadership depends primarily upon at least the acquiescence, if not the sanction of those states over which Nigeria aspires to be predominant. Furthermore, it is logical that the perception of the continental actors of the sub-systemic predominance of Nigeria would serve to heighten or substantiate the perception of the major powers of the global system of the significance of Nigeria to their international systemic interests. In short, the nature of the international role to which any African state may aspire is relative to the sub-systemic credibility of that role.
Several basic facts combine to make the African sub-system unique in international politics. The first of these features, is the continental geographic base encompassed by the sub-system, which although it has not yet attained its maximum geographic limits, includes the remaining white ruled areas of Namibia and South Africa: first, in as much as these areas are inextricably and logically an integral part of the continental sub-system and African leaders aspire to the extension of the system to the entire continent; and secondly, because through the participation of southern African liberation movements at the conferences of the OAU (and many other international organizations) these regions are already accepted into provisional sub-systemic membership pending their liberation from white rule.

A second characteristic of the African sub-system, is the relatively egalitarian distribution of power in the system. The configuration of power in the African sub-system is highly diffused. Since power (as the ability to exert influence) is based upon the classical elements of national capability, and while some African states may possess a degree of capability advantage over others (invariably economic), there is no predominant state or central core. Rather the more tangible levels of national capability or power are relatively equally underdeveloped. Individual African states generally, therefore, have little capability in influencing the decisions of other African or non-African states and one of the most basic tenets of the sub-systemic cohesion is the imperative of collective systemic action in maximizing international interests and objectives.

In the third instance, the African sub-system does not fall under the shadow of either one of the super-powers as in the Middle East, Western Europe or Latin America for example, and consequently, African states are free to pursue any type of policy or ideological orientation without
specific allegiance to either of the two major power blocs, within the limits of their economic and military dependence of course. However, a degree of historical/colonial determinism influences the nature and extent of interaction of many African states with the former colonial metropoles, and of course, all sub-systemic actors are individually and collectively subject to the influences of the global systemic dispensation. Other sub-systems may possess some of these characteristics but no other possesses them all. 324)

As a consequence of this continental exclusivity, the relatively egalitarian distribution of power (or weakness) and the freedom from external domination, intra-systemic relations are generally highly fluid and competitive, and revolve around individually dominant personalities, rather than states as such. Thus it was that at the time of the formalization of the sub-system in 1963, the continent was divided between the radicalism of Nkrumah, Keita, Sekou Toure and the Casablanca group on the one hand, and the moderation of the Monrovia group under the leadership of the likes of Balewa, Haile Selassie, Senghor and Tubman on the other. While the Charter of the OAU purported to represent a 'balance of interest', it undoubtedly reflected a Monrovia bias. The principles of national sovereignty, national equality and non-interference in national affairs were enshrined in the Charter of the OAU as providing a legitimate basis for sub-systemic interaction and order. The primacy of the nation-state

as reflected in the OAU Charter, effectively confirmed the permanence of
the arbitrary colonial state boundaries, negated notions of pan-nationalism
(previously so widely espoused) and ensconced in statute the supremacy of
the interests of individual systemic actors. This is underscored by the
fact that, despite many attempts, there has been no successful amalgamation
of individual African states (save for the federation of Tanganyika and
Zanzibar, which at any rate was dictated by practical expedience and not
any pan-nationalist desire), nor has there been any successful secession.
On the face of it, furthermore, all states were to be regarded as equal,
irrespective of vast discrepancies in basic geographic and demographic
size, or economic considerations. Thus individual personalities seeking
to maximize national interests, are able to exert most influence in the
sub-system, largely beyond the scope of de facto national capability or
power. Hence the historically high degree of fluidity and competitiveness
in intra-systemic relations.

What arises from the essentially state-centric, individualistic nature of
the African sub-system and the lack of any systemic core, is a tendency
towards the formation of formal or informal ideological alignments and
alliances of sub-regional co-operation. That is to say, that the most
militantly articulate ideological spokesmen of either the left or the
right of the African political spectrum act as a gravitational pole for
formal or informal alignments based primarily on the personal coincidence
of ideological conviction of individual state leaders and secondarily,
on the coincidence of personal historical/colonial experience. (This is
exemplified by the common alignment among franco-phone leaders, or the
support for the 'radical option' on the liberation struggle common to
those states most recently liberated or most nearly affected by the conflict.)

Continental policy differences (military versus diplomatic means in ending
South African white rule, for example) are the primary tools of ego-assertion
for the exploitation of sub-systemic leadership rivalries. In the same
way that systemic actors tend to align themselves around common ideological/political poles so as to weight the 'egalitarian' systemic balance, the realities of differing economic and political capability, as these have developed since independence, have given rise to a series of states, which in their predominance over regional neighbours are crucial for the creation of sub-regional alignments and alliances of co-operation (Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, potentially Zaire and ultimately South Africa, for example). Whereas such sub-regional alignments are primarily economically based and dictated by practical economic and developmental imperatives, they are obviously founded upon a mutual political animus of co-operation. (The collapse of the East African Community is an example of the imperatives of economic co-operation being subordinated to political divergences. Similarly, the projected formation of a southern African regional economic grouping which excludes South Africa, illustrates the deviance between practical politics and practical economics. So also, ECOWAS provides adequate illustration of the importance of political animus, in the 15 year projection for West African sub-regional consolidation.)

The projected ego-role of any African state, as an integral element of this sub-systemic environment is, therefore, perceived in sub-systemic terms first, in relation to its significance to continental systemic political/ideological alignments and secondly, in terms of the significance of its sub-regional alignment. To establish the perception of the actors of the African sub-system on the issue of whether the significance of Nigeria to their systemic interests refutes or substantiates the Nigerian ego-role perception, it is necessary to relate such sub-systemic environmental perceptions to the above constituencies.

The most fundamental dictate of intra-systemic perception in the African sub-system is the coincidence or commonality of colonial/historical experience. Thus a measure of emphasis has been placed upon the broad
division of the African continent into franco-phone and anglo-phone blocs or groupings. This division remains significant because in the first instance, it is the oldest and probably the widest (and most generalistic) alignment of African states, and in the second place, because the historical basis of the division perpetuates a general socio-cultural distinction between African states which gravitate towards the French metropole and those aligned in the Commonwealth, which to a large extent is quite unnatural and militates against sub-systemic cohesion.

Nigeria, as an anglo-phone state, was at the time of independence perceived by the franco-phone states which surrounded it as being inherently hostile to their regional and continental interests, because the Nigerian nation-state encompassed more people than the rest of the West African region collectively (and was, therefore, presumably of greater economic potential) and as such, represented a regionally predominant British sphere of influence. This antagonism in the perceptual dispositions between Nigeria and franco-phone West Africa was essentially a reflection of an historical antagonism between France and the United Kingdom, and was not necessarily the result of any inherent conflict of interests between the states themselves, other than the fact of a divergence in the socio-cultural orientation of the respective state elites (and Gaullist conivance in nurturing distrust between the opposing groupings). While Nigeria very much wanted to strengthen ties with these states, so as to encourage them to come to the voluntary conclusion that their economic and political destiny lay with Nigeria, it was realized that it would be many years before Nigeria possessed the economic strength to provide an alternative to dependence on France. Thus if Nigeria appeared too ambitious, this would prove counterproductive.

326) Stremlau, J, op cit, P19.
The advent of Nigerian independence was perceived by the anglo-phone territories (most of whom were on the verge of independence) as an event of considerable significance for several reasons: first, because they anticipated that Nigeria would play a leading role in championing their own self-determination; secondly, because Nigerian independence served to substantiate British bona-fides in regard to self-rule for the remaining dependencies, which was doubted by many; and thirdly, Ghana specifically welcomed Nigeria's accession to the international stage as an ally in the struggle against South Africa and apartheid (which had been gaining momentum since 1948). However, the conservatism of the Nigerian elite contrasted sharply with the radicalism of Nkrumah, (not that this undermined Nigeria's anti-South African role, but Nigerian activism on this issue was dictated by wider factors already discussed above) and it was inevitable that ideologically fired conflict between Ghana and Nigeria would arise. The inevitability of conflict between Nigeria and Ghana was underscored by the fact that both states believed themselves to have been pre-ordained to lead black Africa. Ghana based its claim largely on the fact that it had been the first to be independent in black Africa. By contrast the Nigerians perceived their claim to leadership to be based on tangible geographic and demographic preponderance. Ghana, however, claimed superiority over Nigeria based on the assumption that it was, at that time, a more stable polity and more economically prosperous. However, the struggle for leadership between Ghana and Nigeria centred on the question of who should be Africa's spokesman in international affairs on such things as anti-apartheid, anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism, African unity and African ideology. 327)

The antagonistic apperception between the two states was exacerbated by the blatant British preference for the more pragmatic Nigerian line (especially in regard to Rhodesia, as opposed to the pan-Africanist ideological radicalism

327) Aluko, O, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70, op cit, P75.
associated with Nkrumah and Ghana. Furthermore, Nigeria was geographically distant from the main body of African anglo-phone states which encompass an almost contiguous geographic area stretching through southern, central and eastern Africa. These states felt remote from any notion of Nigerian leadership either physical or ideological, and Nigeria, in turn, was confined in regional isolation.

Whereas the anglo-phone and franco-phone alignments were founded upon colonially determined socio-cultural affinity, ideological and political divergences gave rise to the alignment of African states along conservative/pragmatic and radical lines, formalized initially in the exclusively franco-phone Brazzaville group and the radical Casablanca group, drawn from both franco-phone and anglo-phone states. Nigeria played a leading role in subsuming the Brazzaville group within the wider, conservative Monrovia alignment, and ultimately uniting the Monrovia and Casablanca groups under the Charter of the OAU. In as much as the Charter of the OAU incorporated the pragmatic principles characteristic of the Nigerian approach to intra-systemic relations, Nigeria had succeeded in outstripping Ghana in the ideological and African continental leadership stakes, and the original Casablanca radicals found themselves isolated in the new 'consensual' continental alignment. However, Nigeria's leadership aspirations suffered a setback when the members of the OAU voted that the headquarters of the organization should be founded at Addis Ababa and not in Lagos as many Nigerians thought it rightfully should have been.

Traditionally lacking philosophical or ideological zeal and devoid of charismatic 'father-figure' leadership, pre-civil war Nigeria was largely

328) Ibid, P85.
330) Aluko, O "Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations", op cit, P145.
overshadowed by the more vociferous ideologues of the continent — thus, for example, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* doctrine of African socialism and his outspokenness on African self-reliance and unity, free from big power intervention, gave Tanzania a far more substantive claim to continental leadership than the ideologically moribund and generally conservative, but physically impressive Nigeria. Furthermore, the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee were sited in Dar-es-Salaam and the Tanzanian leader gained considerable influence over the control of the secretariat and funding of the Liberation Committee, to the point where it was difficult to conceive of the Liberation Committee as distinct from the Tanzanian polity. (This was much criticized by Nigeria.) Nyerere was generally perceived as the champion of the liberation struggle in Africa and Tanzania as the 'frontline state by proxy', the Mecca of the politically exiled and dispossessed. Tanzania thus gained a measure of sub-systemic significance and Nyerere a degree of diplomatic prestige and influence, incommensurate with its impoverished *de facto* capability. Similarly, the individualistic and personalized nature of intra-systemic relations projected the more dynamic and charismatic leaders to the forefront of the African stage and thus Kaunda, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Milton Obote were able to dominate the anglo-phone group; thus Senghor became the spiritual leader of the franco-phone bloc, and Haile Selassie an African elder statesman.331)

At a time when the primary concern of the sub-system was the consolidation of the tenuous unity among member-states and secondly, the liberation of the remaining colonial dependencies (most particularly Rhodesia) and the elimination of apartheid, the continental alignment was dominated by those factions most vociferously radical in their attitude to these issues. Whereas Nigeria had sought to focus her external objective on the apartheid issue, the country was generally perceived to be in opposition to those radical factions which, in their high level of visibility and articulation,

331) Austin, D, *op cit*, PP61-82. Also Wayas, J, *op cit*, PP45-47 Aluko, O, "The OAU Liberation Committee After a Decade", *op cit*, PP63-68.
were seen to be of most influence in the sub-system at this time. We have noted, for example, the initial Nigerian attitude to Rhodesian UDI, and the Nigerian suggestion of a ten year decolonization programme.) Such relative conservatism certainly found favour for Nigeria with the United Kingdom and its Western allies, but placed Nigeria on the periphery of the mainstream of the sub-systemic momentum, and the majority of African states (most particularly Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana) criticized the country for being more concerned with appeasement of the Western powers than with the African sub-systemic objective.

The collapse of the domestic authority of the Balewa government in Nigeria and the subsequent coups d'etat were doubtlessly of grave concern to those African governments similarly poised, and the fact that secessionist and irredentist tendencies were to be found in every African state made the Nigerian dilemma of paramount sub-systemic significance. For this reason, all sub-systemic members had a vested interest in ending the Nigerian civil war as soon as possible, but the member-states aligned themselves around a divergence of opinion as to the appropriate collective role which the other members of the sub-system should play in bringing about a settlement of the conflict. Thus Zambia and Tanzania adopted a boldly interventionist attitude, arising from the conviction that African unity was a primary systemic responsibility and that the Nigerian conflict threatened continental stability and the individual sovereignty of the members of the African sub-system. Nyerere made plain that he was intent on preventing the United Nations or the big powers from intervening in Nigeria, and with the co-operation of Zambia's Kaunda, sought alliance with Kenya and Uganda (its East African anglo-phone allies) in advocating direct African intervention in the conflict to mediate a settlement. However, Kenya had enjoyed firm and friendly relations with the Nigerian Federal Government, and Obote in Uganda faced a very real threat of secession from the Buganda. Both were, therefore, reluctant to support whole-
heartedly the Zambian/Tanzanian initiative (neither of which had any real interests in Nigeria as such). 332)

President Mobutu of Zaire, in turn, anxious to establish a measure of diplomatic prestige for himself and an aura of statesmanship on the eve of the September 1967 OAU summit conference in Zaire, actively canvassed support for a Zaire-led peace initiative of the OAU. The lobbying of the different factions subsequently divided the OAU summit on the measures to be taken, and eventually six states (Zaire, Liberia, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, and Ethiopia) were delegated to investigate what role the OAU could play in the resolution of the conflict. Emperor Haile Selassie assumed a leading role in the OAU Consultative Mission to Nigeria and appropriately summed up the perception of the majority of African states of the sub-systemic interests stake in the conflict;

...the situation in Nigeria is of concern to all of us. It concerns us because secessionist tendencies are to be found in almost all African states. This is the legacy we have inherited from the colonialists who tried ruling Africans by dividing them. We know that secession, if it were to be tolerated on our continent would lead to the destruction of what Africans hold in high esteem — their independence and their progress. 333)

The Ivory Coast (and to a lesser extent Gabon, Dahomey and Cameroon) had an interest, in terms of long-term influence in francophone West Africa, in dividing the Nigerian federal structure and thus conived with France in supporting Biafra. Furthermore, Houphet Boigny of the Ivory Coast remained uncommitted to the OAU (having been a champion of the Brazzaville group) and therefore, did not share the sentiments of those concerned with continental unity. Thus as the conflict dragged on and international involvement escalated, four members of the OAU (Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia) extended diplomatic recognition to Biafra during April/May 1968.

332) Stremlau, J, op cit, PP82-85.
333) Ibid, P100.
Stremlau has suggested that the four recognitions were directed against the Federal Government's policy of military repression, in the hope that this would weaken Nigeria's resolve to prosecute the war and inspire greater international support for an immediate ceasefire. Further, that since this form of diplomatic protest is so extreme, the timing and defence of the four recognitions appear to have been well co-ordinated to have maximum impact. Recognition was portrayed by those responsible, as an act of last resort, in the light of the dire human conditions inside Biafra, and as a means of pushing Nigeria into direct negotiations with the Biafran regime.334)

The eventual defeat of the Biafran secessionists by the Nigerian Federal Forces was of considerable prestige value to the Nigerian Federal Government. Nigeria's smaller neighbours (Dahomey, Togo, Cameroon, Upper Volta, for example) perceived with trepidation the enormity, not only in regional terms, but by continental standards, of the military force which Nigeria had built up during the three years of the civil war and which the Federal Military Government now seemed both unwilling and unable to disband. Furthermore, the Nigerian economy had emerged from the civil war in a remarkably sound condition and immediately upon the cessation of hostilities the growth in foreign investment and trade exceeded all previous levels, making Nigeria the most significant area of West European trade and investment on the continent, outside of South Africa, and presaging the so-called "petro-naira boom". Motivated by the political imperative of re-establishing Nigerian credibility and authority in the sub-system the Nigerian leadership, in contrast to the pre-civil war era, sought to project the Nigerian presence in all intra-systemic interaction. It indulged in forceful rhetoric, backed by the confidence of a battle-trained military force, of a size unparalleled on the continent, and relative economic wealth which freed the country from dependency on foreign

334) Ibid, P128.
aid. The latter enabled Nigeria to distribute limited economic largess on an ad hoc basis among sub-systemic members for primarily political ends. Thus its ruling elite sought to shape continental alignments, and was no longer content to be merely peripheral to the principal sub-systemic trends.\textsuperscript{335)

No member of the African sub-system was left untouched by the new energy of the Nigerian sub-systemic presence as established during the first half of the 1970's. There was, for example, the Nigerian initiative in convening an extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers over the invasion of Guinea; also we have noted Gowon's extended campaign of personal diplomatic contact for reconciliation and consolidation of intra-systemic relations; and finally, there was the Nigerian leadership of the ACP countries in negotiations with the EEC. Furthermore, Nigeria doubled its financial contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, extended its hospitality to many of the freedom movements (notably Cabral of the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, Tambo of the ANC of South Africa and Muzorewa of the Rhodesian ANC\textsuperscript{336}) and pledged Nigerian physical, and undivided spiritual and moral support for the liberation of the entire continent. At this time, the African sub-system was in a state of some flux, and disillusionment arose with the systemic rationale in the wake of the collective impotence of the sub-system in finding a settlement to the Nigerian civil war or even of maintaining a facade of continental unity. Thus Nigeria came to be perceived as the marshall of the prevailing systemic order. It, for example, organized the OAU majority against the pro-South African detente faction; it reconciled the pro and anti-Amin factions; prevailed upon all sub-systemic belligerrents to submit to OAU mediation; and committed Nigeria to regional economic integration. The


\textsuperscript{336}) Aluko, O, "Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations" \textit{op cit}, P149.
sub-systemic leadership credentials of Nigeria were eventually endorsed by the other members of the sub-system when Gowon was elected chairman of the OAU in 1973, in advance of Tanzania's established candidature.\(^{337}\)

Nigeria increasingly came to be perceived by its continental counterparts as the only African state with an economic and military capability sufficient to lend a measure of credibility to African rhetoric on the issues of southern Africa — the primary stumbling-block to continental unity. The double standards of the major Western powers, in paying lip-service to African attitudes while increasing trade and investment in South Africa, combined with the economic dependence and military weakness of the majority of the African states to frustrate the attainment of the African objective in southern Africa and to largely negate African initiatives at the United Nations. While most African states acknowledged the significance of Nigeria's role in presenting the African case at the United Nations, Nigeria was criticized for not taking more direct action, and even accused of double dealing in the expansion of Nigerian relations with France and the intimate nature of Anglo-Nigerian relations after 1973. A latent antagonism towards Nigeria on the part of Zambia and Tanzania persisted despite the much publicized post-war reconciliation between these states; both Zambia and Tanzania perceived Nigeria to be somewhat hypocritical in its commitment to southern African liberation, in as much as Nigeria was apparently not prepared to make any real economic sacrifice (and on the contrary was enjoying an economic boom) while the frontline states bore the brunt of the economic side-effects of the southern African conflict. Nigeria resented the Tanzanian monopoly of the OAU Liberation Committee; Tanzania and Zambia opposed Nigeria in its support of Amin in Uganda, but Nyerere gracefully sacrificed his rightful claim to the OAU

chairmanship in 1973 to the greater "weight" of Nigeria.

On the other hand, West African franco-phone states remained suspicious of Nigerian sub-regional integrationist endeavours, Senegal and the Ivory Coast specifically, perceiving the Nigerian initiatives as a threat to franco-phone cohesion and an endeavour to subordinate the region to Nigerian predominance. The smaller West African states on the other hand, (particularly Togo and Dahomey) perceived co-operation with Nigeria to be a political and economic necessity. The choice of Nigeria in 1973 to head the OAU in advance of Tanzania, whose president was an esteemed sub-systemic leader, awakened suspicions among the smaller African states and those less favourably disposed toward Nigeria, of the country's continental ambitions. With the tacit alliance of Gabon and Cameroon, which harboured an historic antagonism towards Nigeria marked by frequent border clashes — President Mobutu of Zaire sought to reassert his personal leadership in the sub-system and thus, pursued a consistently abrasive policy toward Nigeria. Zaire is an important sphere of French and Chinese influence and on the grounds of the geographic predominance of Zaire, the country was perceived as an alternate focus for sub-regional and systemic alignment, more favourable to Sino-French interests than the growing Nigerian predominance. It was in the interests of Zaire to exploit and substantiate this perception.

Intra-systemic perceptions are most markedly influenced by personal relationships, and the energy with which Gowon pursued his personal diplomacy in the continent was indeed the primary reason for Nigerian

338) Ibid.
sub-systemic influence prior to 1975. However, Nigeria remained
geographically isolated from major sub-regional alliances, such as the
East African Community (now defunct), the southern African frontline
states and most pertinently of all, the OCEA. Thus the signing of the
protocol establishing the Economic Community of West Africa in 1975 was
not only of major sub-regional significance to Nigeria, but also
fundamental to the consolidation of Nigeria's continental status.

ECOWAS represents the largest sub-regional alignment of African states
ever created in the continent. It collectively represents the most
important area of foreign trade and investment in the continent
(concentrated particularly in the Ivory Coast and Nigeria), and ultimately
is of political significance, in that it represents a mutual political
commitment between the member-states (however basic at this stage).
As such, it provides Nigeria with a constituency from which to project
its leadership ambitions, quite beyond the finite bounds of Nigerian
geographic area or the influence of personal diplomacy. There can be
little doubt, that while ECOWAS has been initiated as a primarily
economic co-operative, Nigeria will be most concerned to consolidate the
co-operative animus which the organization represents. Ultimately it is
hoped ECOWAS (if it endures) will take on the role of a predominant sub-
 systemic political alignment.

At the outset we contended that the projected ego-role of any African
state, as an integral element of the African sub-systemic environment, is
significant in relation to the principal continental systemic political
alignments and that specific state's sub-regional standing. Nigeria as
the essential hub of ECOWAS, both in the organization's sub-regional
ramifications and in terms of a political entente of self-evident
continental predominance, has consolidated a measure of unparalleled sub-
 systemic significance. It is difficult to conceive of any other sub-
regional alignment of comparable economic and political significance emerging in the continent (other than a southern African sub-regional organization dominated by South Africa, which until the termination of white rule in that country, is most unlikely). Nigeria, in bridging the franco-phone/anglo-phone cleavage in West Africa and in consolidating so large a regional constituency, has altered the historic sub-systemic configuration and succeeded in weighting the sub-systemic 'balance' to the point where Nigerian acquiescence in the prevailing sub-systemic order, or any projected deviation from the prevailing systemic dispensation, is a sine qua non. The perception of the other members of the African sub-system, in seeking to manifest their sub-systemic ego-roles, is influenced accordingly.

The perception of the African states of the predominant significance of Nigeria in intra-systemic affairs has been particularly underscored in recent times by Nigeria's initiative in rebounding the United States and in marshalling the sub-systemic acceptance of the Nigerian backed MPLA government in Angola. We must also acknowledge Nigeria's diplomatic mediation in the Shaba — Angola/Zaire conflict and the Nigerian role in bringing about the Lancaster House constitutional negotiations between the warring factions in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and the British Government. Indeed there can be little doubt that Nigeria has weighted the sub-systemic balance in its favour and is credibly perceived as a sub-systemic 'heavy-weight'. (Nigeria even successfully opposed the nomination by the OAU member-states of Niger as one of the African group UN Security Council members in 1978 and was itself subsequently elected to the Security Council.)

The nature of intra-systemic relations, however, remains fundamentally unchanged. Thus while Nigeria might have effectively bridged the franco-phone/anglo-phone cleavage (the most basic sub-systemic alignment) and consolidated a sub-regional support base which endows the state with a sub-systemic significance quite beyond physical and leadership capabilities,
personal affinity between state leaders, remains the singularly most significant perceptual dictate of intra-systemic relations in Africa.

It is contrary to the egalitarian, ego-centric nature of the African subsystemic dispensation for sub-systemic members to acknowledge the preponderance or leadership of any particular sub-systemic actor, regardless of vast discrepancies in de facto capability. Nigeria has maximized its role in systemic relations through such means as extended personal diplomacy, honest-broker/mediation forays in every continental conflict, and the creation of ECOWAS. These actualities have consolidated linkage between Nigeria's perceived influence in the international system (that is to say, outside the African sub-system, vis-a-vis the major global powers) and its ability to maximize collective sub-systemic objectives on the one hand, and the country's perceived sub-systemic significance, on the other.

The issues of southern Africa/apartheid have remained the most persistently predominant and salient features of sub-systemic concern since the inception of the African sub-system. The Nigerians have focussed their external objective on the South African/apartheid issue, and in the same way that this focus has become the most fundamental element of Nigerian self-assertion in the international system, Nigeria has succeeded in setting herself up in direct juxta-position to South Africa in the perceptual scan of the other members of the external environment (both international and sub-systemic). The world powers are forced to seek to balance their interests in South Africa, with those in the rest of black Africa, in as much as Nigeria has personified and articulated the attitudes of the rest of black Africa, and most importantly, because Nigeria is the only state in black Africa which, at least in theory, could exert any measure of economic/political retribution on world powers for non-compliance with African demands on southern African issues. To this extent,
the remaining sub-systemic members have little option (given their inability to match Nigerian capability) but to acquiesce in the perception of the world powers of Nigeria as the leader of the African continent.

The nationalization of British petroleum interests in Nigeria in August 1979, as an act of direct political 'trade-off' for British compliance with African demands for an all-party conference on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, operationalized a long-standing threat. However, in practical terms this 'denial control' leverage, upon which much of Nigeria's perceived sub-systemic influence and predominance is based, is of extremely limited credibility. It is an obvious truism that Nigeria is far more dependent upon the income derived from the sale of 48 per cent of its crude oil production to the United States than the United States is dependent upon the importation of 17 per cent of its domestic petroleum requirement from Nigeria. Similarly, Britain exports far more to Nigeria than she imports. While so large an export market is of manifest significance to the United Kingdom, a Nigerian embargo on British imports would produce catastrophic side-effects in the Nigerian industrial and consumer economy, and would inevitably imperil the exceptionally tenuous Nigerian domestic political balance. With a population growth of substantial 'positive' proportions and a shortage of basic food supply of almost equally substantial 'negative' proportions, the viability of the Nigerian state is absolutely dependent upon foreign investment and the uninterrupted sale of Nigerian petroleum resources. These are required to maintain Nigerian economic growth and development ahead of (or at least in keeping with) population growth and to generate sufficient foreign capital to enable Nigerians to supplement the shortfall in their subsistent food supply.

Far more fundamental, is the fact that the African continent, has in recent years, become the primary arena in which the international systemic equilibrium is weighted to either West or East, left or right. The Western powers have been compromised in their endeavours to win favour
in black Africa (to counter Soviet influence) by their historical economic stratégic interest in, and commitment to South Africa, and so have found it expedient in terms of global strategic interests to pay lip service to the attitudes of Africa. Nigeria has long established itself as the primary continental spokesman on South African issues (as manifest particularly in Nigeria's role in the UN Committee on Apartheid and Council for Namibia). Given the economic potential of Nigeria, the major Western powers have perceived it to be in their interest to elevate Nigeria publicly to a position of continental leadership. However, these same Western states, while proclaiming Nigerian leadership and winning the favour of Africa for their 'positive' attitude to black African interests, continue to reap economic advantages in both Nigeria and South Africa.

Nigeria is obviously aware of the inherent contradiction in the exultation of the Western powers of Nigerian leadership in the continent and the very limited de facto leverage which Nigeria has over these powers. Thus we conclude that Nigeria appreciates the linkage between this international acclaim and the African sub-systemic environment. The high degree of public significance accorded Nigeria by the Western powers establishes Nigeria firmly in the sub-systemic perception as the only African state which can effectively counter established Western interests in South Africa. Therefore, the remaining African sub-systemic actors, through their acquiescence, in effect substantiate the Western perception and concurrently elevate Nigeria to the African sub-systemic leadership pedestal in their own perceptions. This despite the inherently egoistic and nationalistic nature of intra-systemic African relations, which makes such perception fundamentally contradictory to the 'egalitarian' balance of the African sub-systemic alignment.
2.3 Conclusion

A basic tenet of this study, as established at the outset, has been the argument that the interaction between the multiplicity of states in the contemporary world may be seen to take place within a defineable international political system. The concept of an identifiable system in international political interaction implies that such interaction takes place within defineable parameters, that there is a recognizable order to such interactions which is accepted as the systemic norm, and that such interaction is dynamic, continuous and free flowing within the confines of the parametric structure of the system. However, because all state interaction is inherently ego-centric and designed to maximize the interests of the nation-state, more often than not at the expense of any other, the parameters of the system are defined by a balance of interests (forces or power) between the actors so as to maintain the prevailing systemic dispensation, order or norm. Because the states of the world have widely varying national capabilities, those states with greater means at their disposal for the maximization of their national objective in international interaction, through their predominance over all other state-actors, are able to determine the nature of the systemic order. Thus in effect, the parameters of the international political system are defined by the balance (or disequilibrium) of interests among those states with the capability to dominate all other systemic interaction. All international interaction consequently takes place within the prevailing systemic order, which constitutes that external environment or milieu in which all states must seek to maximize their national objective or ego-role.

No state can feasibly isolate itself from the influence of the international system and all states, whether active or passive in their interaction with the system, are part of the dynamic whole, a dynamism which is sustained by the ego-centric competitiveness among states in their endeavour to
maximize national interests. All states, therefore, pattern the nature or inclination of their international systemic interaction (or role) according to their perception of the opportunities for, or threats to the maximization of their national objective. Thus it has been suggested, that just as the individual state seeks to balance the perceptual image of self and environment, this process may be multiplied by the number of individual states in the international system, which in seeking to actualize policy are each confronted by the perception of the role of the other.

Assessments of capability, and hence any state's perception of its systemic role, are determined essentially in relation to overall influence on, and contribution to regional or global systemic circumstances and conditions. Indeed, the entire credibility of a particular state's perception of its systemic role is dependent upon the other members of the regional or global interests. That is to say, that a state's role in international politics is subject to the confirmation or refutation of the members of the international system with which the state interacts, according to their perception of the significance of the individual state's role to their systemic interests.

Thus it has been seen that Nigeria has a significant measure of interaction with those states, which in their international systemic predominance, are classified as the primary architects of the contemporary international system. The variation in the measure of interaction between Nigeria and the major powers is determined by the primarily economic orientation of the Western bloc alignments on the one hand, and the primarily ideological motivation of the Sino-Soviet bloc on the other. However, in recent years the contemporary global bi-polarity has been weighted by the established predominance and influence of the super-powers in Africa, and the interests of both blocs converge in their perception of the significance of Nigerian
continental diplomatic/political influence. The Western bloc states have found their economic/political interests in Nigeria and the rest of the continent to be compromised by the parallel economic/political commitment of the Western alliance to South Africa, opposition to which, is the primary tool of Nigerian self-assertion.

The fact that the historical Western bloc interests in South Africa are held in direct juxta-position to their interests in Nigeria and the rest of black Africa implies that the degree of Western influence in Africa, and thus the global systemic equilibrium, is held in the balance by the measure of Western compliance with Nigerian demands on southern African issues. So too, in the Sino-Soviet bloc contest to exclude Western influence, Nigeria is self-evidently distinguished in the perceptions of the Sino-Soviet states. The implication of a degree of Nigerian leverage over Western interests (however limited the practicality) has elevated Nigeria to the continental leadership pedestal in the perception of the other members of the African sub-system and thus in turn, substantiated and underscored the perception of the Western bloc states of the significance of Nigeria to their international systemic interests. This degree of mutual perceptual affirmation between the sub-system and the international system lends credence to Nigeria's continental leadership ego-role perception.

The external environment (or alter-perception) has been identified as the third criterion fundamental to the analysis of any state's role in international politics. Thus we have established that Nigerian capability (as the primary criterion) in external interaction is fundamentally influenced by: (a) a degree of economic leverage in the international system; and (b) a preponderant regional and limited continental military capability. It was established as the second criterion of Nigerian external interaction, that Nigeria has consistently sought to manifest a continental leadership ego-role, and in the third instance, the collective
perception of the external environment serves as an affirmation of
the Nigerian leadership's preconceived African leadership role in the
international system. These three criteria are mutually influential,
interdependent and dynamically variable, and each is only of relevance
in relation to the other. In conclusion, therefore, it is necessary
to examine the dynamic interaction of these three criteria in determining
international interaction.
The subject area of international politics may be said to be generally concerned with the study of the mechanics and processes governing the interaction between individual, 'sovereign' political units organized as states. Such general definition assumes first, a degree of continuity in such interaction and secondly, that such interaction takes place within some prevailing context or specific framework of reference and which lends a degree of order to the manifold and continuous interactions which constitute the process of international politics. Assumptions of continuity and order have given rise to numerous theoretical constructions and concepts seeking to simplify and facilitate understanding of the motives for, and patterns of international political interaction. However, in so far as such constructs and concepts invariably seek to identify and categorize the multiplicity of nuances and variables operative in determining the nature of international politics and yet fail to establish the relationship between them, reality is distorted and the categorization becomes arbitrary and an abstraction from reality. Categorization is not conceptualization.

The notion that individual states may pattern their continuum of action and response in accordance with the objectives of a preconceived role in international politics is an example of such simplification intended to facilitate the comprehension and predictability of international political interaction. The basic premise underlying the designation of a role perspective in foreign policy was the notion that, all things being equal, one could assume the nature and direction of the particular state's policy on any future international issue. However, the traditional conception of the notion of role in international politics was based upon the ex post facto analysis of external interaction, which while contributing in some degree to the search for patterns of regularity in the complexity of international
politics, contributed little to the understanding of the causal rationale of international political interaction. Similarly, any predictive value which might have been ascribed to the concept of role designation was largely abstract and arbitrary.

To suggest that the traditional conception of 'role' in international politics is simplistic and arbitrary, is not to deny the analytical value of the notion that states, as actors in international politics, may pattern their external interactions so as to fulfil some preconceived international role. However, if the designation of a particular role perspective is to rise above its vague and abstract historical usage and to be of realistic contemporary relevance, then it is necessary to seek to conceptualize the causal explanation or determinants of international interaction. The purpose of this study, therefore, has been to develop an analytical model in which the correlation between the principal variables, events and procedures, which in their combined interaction and influence serve to determine and regulate the nature of a state's external behaviour, is illustrated in causal sequence. This model, in this specific instance, provides the theoretical framework for an analysis of the actual or potential role of Nigeria in international politics. However, before Nigerian content can be introduced into the research design it is necessary to make a resume of the premises upon which this model is founded.

The notion of a series of interactions, or mutually influential interacting variables suggests a degree of dynamic systemic order and continuity. Consequently the model seeks to conceptualize the sequential process of causation in international interaction as a dynamic free-flow system. The model does not seek to examine individual levels of decisionmaking, but rather to establish the causal sequence in which these variables interact in determining external interaction. Thus it is essentially concerned with the principal mechanisms of international interaction. It is within
the parameters of this objective that the notion of 'role' in international politics has been described as a basically three dimensional concept; that is to say, there are three criteria which are fundamental to any comprehension of a state's motivation for action. These three criteria are mutually influential, interdependent and dynamically variable, and each is only of relevance in relation to the other.

The first, and most basic element in any consideration of a state's international status, is the criterion of national capability. The spectrum of national capability resources represents the physical and non-physical characteristics of a state, the very essence of the state's being. A state's basic power capability, or the lack of it, is determined by the interaction of the elements of the capability spectrum. Capability is essentially concerned with the means aspect of the ends-means continuum (that is to say, potential for action); the possession of a significant capability or the lack of it is fundamental to the perception and definition of attainable ends. In order to aspire to a position of systemic significance a state needs to be endowed with a certain capability potential; it is argued that the state, through the mobilization and manipulation of the total spectrum of its national capability resources, is the architect of its world role.

A state which lacks capability in one sphere must seek to augment such weakness by manipulation of strength (or capability) in another sphere (or range of spheres). Capability has been described as a total concept and thus, while the elements of capability may be individually identified and considered in their separate influence on overall national capability potential, any assessment of capability as a causal determinant of international interaction must of necessity consider the total spectrum of capability elements in their combined effect on the overall national capability. National capability has therefore been described, as a
balance between negative and positive capability resources; the effectiveness with which the balance is contrived and maintained depends upon the leadership's ability to actualize the resources at the state's disposal (or overcome the lack of them) in pursuit of the ends of policy. This direct asymmetry between state capability and state action underscores the contention that the criterion of national capability is the most basic determinant of a state's real or potential international influence or role.

The notion of ego-role perception has been identified as the second criterion required for an assessment of any state's potential role in international politics, in the endeavour to effectively conceptualize the causal sequence of international interaction. It has been suggested above that the state, through the mobilization and manipulation of the totality of its capability, may aspire to influence systemic conditions, or perceive itself as being of significance to systemic interests and thus fashion its policy accordingly. However, it has been further established, that just as the leadership or decisionmaking elite is responsible for the formulation of policy, the actualization of this policy in the form of a national strategy is dependent upon this same leadership elite's perception of the opportunities and threats arising from the state's interaction with the international system (bearing in mind that the international system is not exclusive and that no state can be isolated from systemic influence). The product of this perception of threat and opportunity is what has been termed "ego-role perception", that is to say, the state's (as embodied in leadership) perception of its role in the regional or global system.

The determinants of the image or perception of the decisionmaker are manifold and have been subsumed, for the purposes of this explanation, in the notion of policy. Policy is loosely described as a composite of historical legacy, societal values, national capability and objectives.
The decisionmaker's perceptions (and logically also his decisions) are thus essentially the product of these influences. In confronting the systemic environment in which policy must be actualized, therefore, the decisionmaker analyzes the 'objective' systemic reality within the framework of this image or perception and perceives, within a linear spectrum of probability, threats to, and opportunities for the maximization of policy. The nature of the role which the decisionmaker or leadership perceives the state capable of playing depends on what degree the systemic threats and opportunities are attuned to an equilibrium.

Ego-role perception, therefore, essentially implies a balance between the perception of threat and opportunity in the external environment. However, it is often convenient (or politically expedient) for states to hyper-react to either threat or opportunity in any given situation. The extent to which policy decisions are based on hyper-reaction will determine the incongruity between systemic reality and the state's perceived ego-role. Such incongruity would imply discord in the orchestration of capability resources, and the state's ego-role would be liable to negation by the perception of the other members of the external environment, that the state concerned had not the significance which the hyper-reactive ego-perception might imply.

Ego-role perception then, refers to the state's perceived identity, but it is a fact that identity can only manifest itself through overt action over a period of time and manifestation thus lies in the eye of the beholder. Such overt state action is deliberate and purposeful, and responsive to conditions and events. The interactions that characterize international political systems (global or regional) originate usually as demands or claims and responses thereto on the part of the authorized spokesmen of the member states. Statesmen implement or back up their demands by various strategies, or patterns of action over time, utilizing
a spectrum of varied tactics as orchestrated in a national strategy. These tactics are, likewise, operationalized to resist adverse demands, pressures and attacks from abroad. All such operations are undertaken and carried out within a milieu or set of circumstances, that may affect both what is attempted and what is accomplished.

National capability, and ego-role perception, as the calculation of the opportunities and limitations implicit in the milieu, cannot exist in a vacuum, anymore than any state is able to isolate itself from international systemic influence. No state can feasibly be of significance to itself, and assessments of capability, and hence the state's perception of its systemic role, are determined essentially in relation to systemic circumstances and conditions. Indeed, the entire credibility of a particular state's perception of its systemic role is dependent upon the other members of the regional or global system perceiving the state concerned as in fact fulfilling (or having the capability of fulfilling) a role of relevance (or irrelevance) to their regional or global interests. This element of external sanction or alter-perception has been identified as the third operative criterion basic to the proposed model.

The international political system gains its dynamism from the individual member-states of the system and any change in the system will find its expression in modifications in the way states conceive of their international roles. On this basis, it is argued that the environment of international interaction is derived from the composite of roles in the international system; that is to say, just as the individual state seeks to balance the perceptual image of self and environment, this process (to a lesser or greater degree) may be multiplied by the number of individual members of the international system, who in seeking to actualize policy are each confronted by the perception of the role of the other, resulting in an infinite and dynamic process of action and reaction. The
external environment may, therefore, be described as comprising a composite of perceptual 'role images'. This composite is far from homogeneous, as each unit relies upon its own definitions of interests as standards for action, states being inherently ego-centric. It is this dynamic process of adjustment-readjustment, action-reaction between individual states which determines the systemic equilibrium. We conclude, therefore, that a state's role in international politics is subject to the confirmation or refutation of the members of the international system with which the state interacts, according to their perception of the significance of the individual state's role to their systemic interests (the super-powers obviously being the most significant owing to their domination of the system).

It is true that any attempt at conceptualization is by definition an abstraction from reality. But if the suggested research design (as an attempt at conceptualizing the sequential process of causation in international political interaction) is to rise above the deficiencies of the historical conception of the notion of role in international politics and represent the cause-effect relationship of the variables in international interaction with any measure of practical reality, the notion of dynamic systemic continuity must be seen as fundamental. It must, therefore, of necessity illustrate systematic flow, dynamic movement and continuous feedback in the interaction of the causal variables. All modern states are forced by their mere existence as states in the contemporary international system to reconcile a continuum of inputs emanating from the external environment with national (state) objectives, in an infinite process of action-response-reaction, which represents the lifeblood of international politics. The identified variables or criteria are of little real significance in isolation, but must be viewed in their dynamic systemic interaction.
The analysis in the preceding chapters has been concerned with examination of the nature and relevance of the three identified criteria (national capability, ego-role perception and alter-perception) and their application to a case study of the actual or potential role of Nigeria in the international system. It now remains to view these elements in their combined systemic interaction. By adaptation of the original diagrammatic illustration of the research design it is possible to illustrate the interaction of the variables in determining the role of Nigeria in the international system as follows:

The nature of the three criteria identified as those elements basic to an assessment of a state's actual or potential international role finds its genesis in the course of historical development, the cumulative national historical experience, legacy and precedent. Consequently, in
seeking to analyze the rationale for contemporary Nigerian international interaction it is necessary to place the modern state in historical perspective, so as to distinguish those basic recurring influences which remain fundamental in the modern Nigeria. The course of historical development in Nigeria is detailed and diverse, but it is apparent that three perennial influences operate throughout Nigerian history and are still of fundamental contemporary relevance.

In the first instance, West Africa was largely peripheral to the main trends of history at the time of the European discovery of the 'new world' and (despite being subject to the plunders of the trans-Atlantic slave trade) was able to evade colonial occupation until the latter stages of the nineteenth century. As a result, the civilizations of the hinterland were able to develop a high level of indigenous socio/political sophistication and administrative organization, which served to entrench ethnic and tribal loyalties and cohesiveness among the inhabitants of the area. This was eventually to be annexed by the British for economic and diplomatic reasons. However, the nature of the geographic and topographical characteristics of this vast territory resulted in the division of the country, for colonial administrative purposes, into North and South along rigid, geographically defined lines. These factors led to the uneven penetration and influence of modernizing forces, and served to complicate the many ethnic cleavages, resulting in the country being divided, not only physically and ethnically, but religiously and psychologically; the South was exposed to more progressive Christian education and the North retained traditional Koranic teachings and customs. These cleavages were politicized with the emergence of Southern dominated nationalist movements, and eventually institutionalized and effectively polarized in a federal constitutional dispensation. The result was ethnic heterogeneity and regional parochialism, complicated by religious division and a divergence in Westernizing experience.
Secondly, the above factors combined with the peculiarities of a colonial system of indirect rule (which sought to preserve indigenous political structures in the regions as an adjunct to the process of political modernization at the centre of administration) to preclude the natural development of indigenous national political values and the broadening of parochial loyalties and identifications. The cleavage between the thrust of central modernization and the inertia of regional traditionalism diverted the process of political development from the national to the parochial, and the loyalty of the evolving national politicians was ethnically divided. The result was that Nigeria entered the phase of constitutional negotiation within the framework of regionalism/federalism as the legacy of indirect rule and not as the product of indigenous social pressures or clearly defined political values. Thus there developed an inherent instability in the national/federal unity, which was not a response to any clearly articulated national sentiment, but largely a means (and indeed, a precondition) to self-government. We have argued that the legacy of indirect rule is one of truncated indigenous political development and the evolution of formal political institutions, without regard to social evolution and value commitments, customarily acknowledged as essential prerequisites for the stability of the federal polity. This resulted in an enduring instability in the Nigerian polity, in its endeavour to reconcile indigenous political values with Western convention.

The third contemporary influence operating upon the course of Nigerian historical development, is to be found in the unwitting evolution of a military elite with an authority independent of the disputed authority of the central polity. As a result of the nature of the historical development and formation of the Nigerian Armed Forces, they came to constitute a self-contained organization with a legitimate authority and the resources to enforce such authority, providing for a 'corporate' and disciplined nationalism which set the military apart from the political
nationalists. Yet this was a force characterized by inherently decisive structural weaknesses, which could only with difficulty be divorced from the political, tribal and regional antagonisms.

Nigeria's composite historical legacy is one of political instability and national disunity. The socio-political realities, obscured by British constitutional preconceptions, could not support the high premiums which had been placed on national unity and the federal balance. The ethno-regional political polarizations, nurtured through the peculiarities of colonial policy and administrative expedience, reached crisis proportions in the collapse of the central political authority, military government and civil war, the result of which was a sublimation of the conventional open-ended socialization processes to the interest of praetorian civic order, stability and national unity. The interaction of these prime variables and the influence of the numerous subsidiary historically formative factors, is of contemporary relevance in as much as this composite of socio-political influence and national experience has served to perpetuate a notorious instability in the Nigerian polity. This in turn, has given rise to the characteristic anomaly between potentiality and actuality discernible in the contemporary capability resources of Nigeria.

The capability resources of Nigeria are varied and diverse and generally defy unqualified categorization as to their negative or positive contribution to national capability (as the composite of resources available for the pursuit of policy). Nigerian capability is self-evidently based upon the geographic area encompassed by the Nigerian state entity and its physical attributes. The Nigerian state comprises a land-area, which through historical circumstance is politically delimited from the larger geographically contiguous West African region, and in terms of which Nigeria is neither geographically distinguishable nor preponderant. Nigeria
is a politically contrived entity, lacking in geographic definition, encompassing a topographically diverse terrain and three geographically distinguishable and politically defined regions. Whereas the physical dimensions of the Nigerian state present a positive capability aspect, such capability potential must necessarily be subordinate to consideration of the negative capability connotations of the lack of geographic cohesiveness or homogeneous geographic definition.

Nigerian political geography is complicated, and the regional distinctiveness entrenched, by the inclusion within the bounds of the Nigerian state of a culturally diverse and ethnically heterogeneous population, dominated by three separate ethnic groups, each traditionally inhabiting one of the three separately definable land areas. Thus, while the de facto size of the Nigerian population represents the singular capability of a large supply of human resources, such capability potential is complicated by considerations of traditional ethno-regional communalism, primordial patronage and the consequent lack of national loyalty, cohesiveness or political stability.

The extent and diversity of the Nigerian land area results in a diversity of climate and soil types, conducive to a rich and varied agricultural capability. However, agricultural productivity is retarded by a politically sensitive, traditional practice and custom, to the extent that Nigeria needs to import more than half of its staple food requirements for mere subsistence. The natural resource endowment of Nigeria is completely dominated by the rich resources of oil to be found in the country, almost to the point where the relative quantitative and qualitative weakness of the wider mineral endowment is of negligible consequence. Yet the combined capability weakness of an insufficient food supply and a relatively weak mineral resource base, creates an industrial and economic overdependence on a wasting resource, heavily dependent on the vicissitudes of foreign
markets and international pressures. Nigeria's failure to broaden its capability structure with the wealth derived from oil suggests that the balance between resource impoverishment and present capability rests upon the income from crude oil, thus substantiating the notion of a tenuous and vulnerable capability.

The socio-economic actualities of Nigeria's basic physical capability attributes (due to the closely interdependent and mutually influential nature of the elements of the capability resource spectrum) permeate every facet of Nigerian national capability potential. Thus the capability significance of a developing import-substitution industrial base is subordinated to the negative capability of an ailing agricultural sector, upon which the majority of Nigerians are dependent both for economic well being and subsistent food supply. Similarly, the very considerable capability potential of the largest military force in Africa is complicated by enduring ethno-political considerations, and the causal relationship linking the nature of the resource endowment, industrial capability and political will inhibits economic development and capability. The socio-political consequences of the characteristic ethno-regional cleavages, in turn, dominate the social determinants of Nigerian national capability potential. The fear of reactivating primordial ties and communal loyalties has inhibited the conventional patterns of socialization, resulting in a contrived process of socio-cultural transformation being the central feature of the spectrum of social determinants of potential Nigerian capability.

The socio-political stability, and hence the mobilizing capacity of the social determinants of Nigerian capability is subject to the interaction and mutual influence of several independent elite factions — military, political, bureaucratic and trade unionist. The extent to which there is consensus among these constituencies helps determine Nigeria's capacity
for action. Moreover, consensus facilitates greater national commitment
to projected action and thus an extraordinary capability potential, but
equally we note that disequilibrium will result in socio-political
instability sufficient to negate the effectiveness of political action
and severely inhibit actualization of the country's capability potential.
The national character, morale and political leadership are shaped by, and
responsive to these influences, to the extent that political action must
necessarily represent an aggregation of their specific interests. The
lack of a national value commitment, charismatic leadership or mass
political association, which might unite the Nigerian nation over and
above political parochialism and primary primordial loyalties, has
resulted in institutional weakness and political factionalism within those
very groups upon which the civic order depends, and which are the vehicles
for the realization of capability potential. The inherent socio-political
instability of the Nigerian national polity has effectively prevented and
complicated the mobilization of Nigeria's full capability potential.

National capability has been described above as a balance between negative
and positive capability resources (means) for the pursuit of the ends of
policy. This is what is meant by a framework for action. In Nigeria the
parameters of this framework for action are set by the positive elements
of geographic size, large population and rich oil reserves on the one hand,
and the need to balance these elements with the negative elements of an
inherent socio-political instability, an insufficient basic food supply,
and a relatively narrow mineral resource base. The means and ends of
Nigerian external interaction, or Nigeria's national capability, is
dominated by these fundamental determinants.

The geographic proportions of Nigeria are of self-evident significance,
in that they effectively delimit the physical dimensions of Nigerian
capability. But in terms of the relativity of capability means for
political action, the vast size of the population encompassed by the Nigerian national state entity transcends the regionally less than significant de facto geographical area of the Nigerian state entity. It also serves to establish Nigeria as an undisputed focus of regional significance because of Nigeria's regional and continental demographic preponderance. The positive capability attributes of a large population have been clearly established above: in the first instance, it ensures an almost limitless labour supply and concomitantly distinguishes Nigeria as the largest potential consumer market on the continent; and in the second place, the size of the Nigerian population represents a very substantial potential and actual military manpower resource. Oil, in its turn, is designated as the most strategically important resource of contemporary times and consequently, the sale of this strategically valuable resource provides a rich base and potential to the Nigerian economy and ensures a degree of resilience and sustained economic growth which outstrips the country's African counterparts.

The mutual interaction of the positive capability attributes of labour supply and consumer market together with the positive economic potential of an oil-based economy, endow Nigeria with an apparent degree of economic leverage which may be actualized as a capability means in pursuit of the ends of policy. This degree of economic leverage (or capability for action) derives from the fact first, that Nigeria is a most significant area of foreign investment (motivated by cheap labour supply, consumer market and oil based economy) and secondly, from the significance of Nigeria as a supplier of crude oil (per se). Consequently, Nigeria is able to exert an escalating measure of 'denial control' in pursuit of national objectives; that is to say, Nigeria may threaten a degree of economic retribution in the event of its policy objectives being denied. Such retribution may range from the denial of the right of specific investors to invest in Nigeria, a freeze on the repatriation of financial returns from foreign
investments, to the nationalization of foreign investments; and from the
raising of oil prices and royalties to the embargo of oil supply, with
the dire consequences which such action would hold for the metropolitan
economies which are heavily committed to Nigeria.

Nigeria's secondary capability option is military; the vast size of the
Nigerian population has facilitated the creation of the largest standing
armed force in Africa, with the further implication of substantial manpower
resources to fill both the military cadres and maintain the industrioeconomic effort implicit in any sustained military operation. However
the actualization of the military capability of Nigeria in pursuit of
national objectives (which is an extreme option) is restricted by
considerations of domestic economic, political and logistical constraints,
to a primarily regional significance and secondarily, to only a limited
continental potential.

It is apparent that Nigeria's capability for action or means for the
implementation of national objectives is founded upon three principal
elements: Nigerian continental demographic preponderance, a degree of
economic leverage, and a substantial regional and limited continental
military capability. However, it has been emphasized above that capability,
as the means available for the pursuit of the ends of policy, derives
essentially from a balance between positive and negative capability
attributes; that policy (or the so-called "framework for action"), if it
is to be both successful and enduring, must necessarily take cognisance
of this notion. Thus it is that Nigerian capability is liable to
exaggeration, and is necessarily tempered by considerations of socio-
political instability and the overdependence of the Nigerian economy on
revenues from the sale of crude oil and dependence on foreign investment
to provide the impetus for growth in the economy and most importantly,
to subsidize the importation of staple food supply.
Policy in the context of this model has been described as a composite of those norms, values and objectives which constitute what is known as the national interest as translated into a framework of action by political leadership. The leadership elite in Nigeria is not sovereign, in as much as it does not possess sufficient independent authority to commit the country to a national purpose which does not enjoy the sanction of military, political, bureaucratic and unionist contingents (or at very least a consensual balance between the four divergent constituencies), without endangering the perilously tenuous stability of the Nigerian polity. Consequently, the guiding values and objectives of all political action of the Nigerian leadership have been constitutionally endorsed as unity, freedom, equality, justice and pan-Africanism. These national objectives are deemed to represent a summation of national values and interests, and it must, therefore, be assumed that these objectives will constitute the ends of policy and provide the basic rationale for the actualization of capability.

However, it has been established that in confronting the systemic environment in which policy must be actualized, leadership analyzes the 'objective' systemic reality within the framework of a perceptual image or psychological predisposition, which is the cumulative product of historical legacy, national capability, societal values and objectives. Thus, the psychological environment of the Nigerian leadership elite has been described as the product of the cumulative national experience of historical colonial divisiveness, ethno-regionalism and political instability. The dictates of the Nigerian perceptual image are inevitably shaped by this psychological and experiential predisposition.

The Nigerian perceptual image has been seen to have been consistently reactive to the dictates of the domestic constituency on the one hand (that is, the need to maintain national unity and to consolidate internal
support for external action), and on the other hand, an inherent and enduring value perception of Nigeria's right (by virtue of geographic and demographic continental predominance) to a 'leadership' role in Africa. However, the inherent lack of any clearly manifest Nigerian national value hierarchy and the historic Nigerian inability to produce a 'national leader', has created a fundamental and enduring dilemma for the Nigerian leadership elite. The latter cannot draw upon any nationally inspired or motivated ideological prescription in the process of reconciling the dictates of the perceptual image with the leadership perception of threat and opportunity emanating from the external environment.

The dearth of any national ideological linkage prescribed a close identification with, and intimate commitment to the wider continental African constituency. The Nigerian leadership has consciously sought to universalize the constituency and to 'externalize' the rationale for interaction, so as both to divert attention from the instability of the domestic constituency and to seek some tangible focus for external objectives. In seeking to come to terms with the realities of its predicament, the Nigerian leadership has consistently sought to manifest a perceptual image of national unity, that concurrently shields the domestic stability from external demands and maximizes the country's importance in the international system. Policy action is, therefore, largely predetermined by the linkage between the domestic constituency (the need to maintain national unity and stability) and the predestined right to exert a leadership role in Africa.

This linkage between domestic unity and continental/international political leadership has given rise to the imperative, on the part of the Nigerian leadership, to maximize consistently the perceived external threat, resulting in a high-level of declaratory hyper-reaction. (This arises from the paradox that the more imperiled the Nigerian domestic stability, the greater the need for assertive external action, either practical or rhetorical,
and consequently the more manifest the projection of Nigerian continental/international leadership.) It has been seen that the issues of southern Africa/apartheid have provided a constant and tangible focus to the Nigerian ego-perceptual imperative to hyper-react. Indeed, the perennial salience of these issues has facilitated the evolution of a degree of moralistic inertia in Nigerian self-assertion, which is transposed to the universal (the "threat to world peace") and has become fundamental to the projection of Nigeria's external ego-image.

It has been noted that there is a distinction between the declaratory and practical (or operational) levels of ego-role perception, and it is evident that the level of Nigerian declaratory hyper-reaction is muted by a degree of pragmatism and considerations of practical expedience in projected political action. However, while the analysis of practical interaction might define a multitude of subsidiary roles, the role which the Nigerian leadership elite perceives in essence, to be rightfully Nigerian is vocalized, defined and delineated by the leadership elite on the declaratory level. Ego-role perception is a statement of what ought to be (in terms of the leadership's perceptual image) and not necessarily of what is, and analysis has established that the Nigerian leadership elite has consistently sought to perpetrate the role of 'continental leader', together with the secondary and supporting role (which in itself serves as a medium for the projection of the primary role perception) of 'Nigeria the honest-broker'.

It is evident, therefore, that Nigerian interaction with the external environment is predetermined by the balance between negative and positive capability means (structured by the national policy objectives of unity, freedom, equality, justice and pan-Africanism) and the aspired ego-role of continental leader/honest-broker as orchestrated by the national strategy. The national strategy effectively incorporates domestic, foreign
and national security policy in a broad concept, and represents the actualization of the interaction between the national capability and the ego-role perception in a state's mobilization for external action. The national strategy (as has been noted above) makes provision for various patterns of action, utilizing a varied array of operational tactics ranged in a linear continuum of activity and passivity.

Nigerian ego-role perception has been seen to be operationalized within three interdependent and mutually reinforcing spheres of external interaction (continental, regional and global), and it is evident that diplomacy is the primary instrument for the maximization of Nigerian role perception in interaction with the international system. (This is shown, for example by Nigeria's negotiation and mediation endeavours in Africa, the projection of Nigerian 'good offices' in continental disputes, the sustained diplomatic efforts preceding the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria's highly visible and vociferous role at the United Nations and specific Nigerian involvement in the UN Committee on Apartheid and UN Council for Namibia.) However, it is also evident that diplomacy does not operate in a vacuum: it is reinforced by the implicit threat that military or economic instruments will be invoked in its support. This is illustrated by the repeated threat of military intervention in the southern African conflict region and the threat of economic sanction and retribution against Western powers for failure to comply with Nigerian demands on policy towards South Africa/Namibia.) It is therefore evident, that while diplomacy is the primary instrument for the maximization of Nigeria's role in the international system, the threat of military and/or economic action is an essential and integral adjunct to Nigerian diplomatic influence.

It has been argued that the relativity of the notion of 'role' in the international system is essentially measured against the interests of the progenitors of the international order and international systemic status
and that ego-role perception is consequently subject to confirmation or refutation in the perceptions of those states of the global or regional environment with which the specific state concerned interacts, and which collectively constitute the alter-perception. The states of most predominant influence in the contemporary bi-polar global political system have all been seen to have a significant measure of interaction with Nigeria, but the rationale (or perceived significance) of such interaction appears to diverge according to the predominance of economic/political motives on the part of Western bloc states on the one hand, and the predominantly ideological/political nature of Sino-Soviet objectives on the other.

The highly industrialized economies of the major Western bloc states are dependent upon the continuing expansion of the capital and technological base of their economies through foreign capital and technological investment. The singular distinction of Nigeria in the context of such interests is first, the size of the country's population (which constitutes the largest consumer/export market on the African continent) and secondly, the fact that Nigeria is a crude oil producer (which ensures a rich base to the Nigerian economy and, therefore, lucrative investment opportunities and furthermore, endows the country with a significance as a supplier of a strategic material upon which the Western states are dependent in varying degrees). On the other hand, the ideological significance which the Sino-Soviet bloc perceive in their interaction with Nigeria may be ascribed to the ideological imperative of internationalizing the socialist revolution (the key to which is the Third World) and the Sino-Soviet confrontation in the contest for ideological supremacy. Nigeria, as a Third World state encompassing the largest 'proletariat' in Africa, is of self-evident significance in this context.

Whereas perceptions may differ as to the priority accorded either
predominantly economic or ideological interests, they coincide to the extent that Nigeria is perceived by both blocs to be of significance in the context of the rivalry between global political alignments for international systemic predominance. Such perceived significance arises first, from Nigeria's sizeable demographic and geographic proportions; secondly, from Nigeria's geographic location on the West African coast vis-à-vis the southern flank of NATO, the South Atlantic, the Cape route and the hinterland states of tropical and central Africa; and thirdly, from the apparent perception of a significant Nigerian diplomatic influence. In recent years the contemporary global bi-polarity has come to be held in the balance by the established predominance and influence of the super-powers in Africa, and the interests of both blocs converge in their perception of Nigerian continental diplomatic/political influence.

The Western bloc states have found their economic/political interests in Nigeria and the rest of Africa to be compromised by the parallel economic/political commitment of the Western alliance to South Africa. Nigeria's aspiration to African continental leadership has been seen to be projected from the base of the implacable opposition of black Africa to the issues of southern Africa/apartheid, consequently, the interests of the major powers in Nigeria are held in direct juxta-position to the interests of these same powers in South Africa. It has become increasingly politically and economically expedient for these Western bloc states to weigh their perceived international systemic interests and practical economic and political interests in South Africa against those in black Africa as a whole. As the only state in black Africa in which the scale of the South African interests of the major Western states is paralleled, Nigeria clearly acquires a definite measure of pre-eminence in the perception of the major Western powers. The Sino-Soviet bloc, on the other hand, has vested ideological/political interests in the conflict in Namibia and South Africa, not least of which is the displacement of Western influence.
in the region, and the extent to which Nigeria is able to hold the South African interests of the Western powers in the balance, gives Nigeria a self-evidently enhanced degree of significance to the international systemic interests of these states.

In a regional context, the cohesion of the African sub-systemic order is dependent upon the mutual approval by other sub-systemic actors, of the nature and objective of that external interaction. Thus the nature of any African state's role in the international political system is fundamentally dependent upon the perception of the other members of the sub-system of the significance of the state concerned to their collective sub-systemic, and individual interests. It is quite obvious that the Nigerian claim to continental leadership depends primarily upon at least the acquiescence, if not the sanction, of those states over which Nigeria aspires to be predominant.

Since the civil war, Nigeria has increasingly come to be perceived by its continental counterparts as the only African state with an economic and military capability sufficient to lend a measure of credibility to African rhetoric on southern Africa. This perception has been entrenched by the measure of predominance in intra-systemic relations which the Nigerian leadership has nurtured through such means as extended personal diplomacy and the Nigerian 'honest-broker'/mediation forays in every continental conflict, the consolidation of the West African regional constituency in ECOWAS and the high degree of public significance accorded Nigeria by the Western powers, in their endeavour to balance their interests in black Africa with their historical commitments to South Africa. Nigeria has succeeded in weighting the 'egalitarian' balance of the African sub-systemic alignment, and is viewed by the other sub-systemic members as a continental 'heavyweight'. In so far as Nigeria is the only state in black Africa which could threaten economic or political retribution on
world powers for non-compliance with African attitudes and demands, Nigeria is elevated to the African sub-systemic leadership pedestal in the perceptions of the other members of the sub-system. Thus the significance of Nigeria to the international systemic interests of the major powers is substantiated. The degree of mutual perceptual affirmation between the regional sub-system and the global system would indeed appear to lend credibility to Nigeria's aspiration to continental leadership.

It is therefore evident, that the rationale of Nigerian interaction with the international system is derived from the sequential interaction of these mutually influential variables, which in their composite whole are projected to represent the causal determinants of Nigerian external interaction. That is to say, that Nigerian action in the international system (remembering that action over time constitutes role) is the product of the interaction between the capability means of demographic preponderance, economic leverage and military capability as structured by the constitutionally endorsed national political values of unity, freedom, equality, justice and pan-Africanism and mobilized in pursuit of the ego-role objectives of honest-broker/continental leader, and the concomitant maximization of national unity and stability. Such ego-role objectives are actualized in the international system primarily by diplomatic means, substantiated by threats of economic retribution and military action. The pattern of this national strategy for interaction with the international system has, over time, established an affirmative perception in the scan of the major global systemic members and members of the African sub-system of the significance of Nigeria to their respective international systemic interests. The contemporary role of Nigeria in the international political system would thus appear to be confirmed as one of continental leadership and sub-systemic predominance.
It is in the nature of contemporary international politics that such a role designation cannot be static, but is necessarily subject to constant reappraisal, in the infinite and dynamic action-response-reaction causal sequence of international interaction. It is suggested that the future credibility of Nigeria's role in the international system will depend on several inter-related factors. Thus, for example, the maximization of Nigeria's actual and potential role as continental leader is inextricably linked to the stability of the national polity and the maintenance of domestic unity. The potential for national disunity and political instability will remain an inherent characteristic until such times as a generation has arisen which has not experienced ethno-regional antagonism and bitter political rivalry. Nigeria's leadership credentials will depend on the extent to which the Nigerian political leadership is successful in maintaining the tenuous balance between rival political factions and constituencies.

Similarly, Nigeria's future role credibility is subject to the extent to which Nigeria is successful in overcoming the large shortfall in staple food supply. Nigeria's present inability to maintain a self-sufficiency in the most basic food requirements of its population may compromise Nigeria's international role in several ways. The most fundamental consideration is the linkage between domestic political stability and the availability of staple food supply, as a consequence of which, it is imperative that Nigeria continue to exploit and sell its oil resources, the income from which provides the finance for foreign food purchases, thus limiting Nigeria's economic and development options, and also inhibiting the practicalities of any notion of economic leverage. Similarly, Nigeria's freedom of action must inevitably be inhibited in some degree by the country's relative dependence on certain states as sources of foreign food supply and agricultural assistance (most notably the US). The vicissitudes of the international oil market, together with the vagaries of climate
and rainfall in the West African region (in the ever present possibility of prolonged drought) could feasibly combine to imperil seriously Nigerian capability.

Furthermore, Nigeria's long-term role credibility must depend on the willingness of the political leadership to actualize the threat of economic retribution or military intervention in pursuit of the maximization of policy attitudes on the issues of southern Africa. The sincerity with which policy attitudes are held and the conviction with which threats of retribution are made is necessarily perceived in direct proportion to both the country's willingness to make real economic sacrifice and to suffer economic hardship, and the active military commitment of Nigerian armed forces to the southern Africa conflict arena. Nigeria has in the past been the subject of muted criticism for its apparent reluctance to make any real economic sacrifice (commensurate with that of the frontline states, for example) and the country's continuing failure to actualize the threat of military/economic action is bound, in time, to cast aspersion upon Nigerian role credibility. So too, the duration of the South Africa/Namibia impasse is on the one hand, likely to reflect more seriously in time, upon the Nigerian ability, as continental leader, to maximize African policy objectives in interaction with the international system, while on the other hand, a short-term solution to the southern African issues could confront Nigeria with the dilemma of having to realign its strategy and objectives in international interaction. (Such a realignment could be of traumatic domestic political consequence, since the issues of southern Africa have been central to Nigerian and indeed, African policy objectives for over 20 years.) The definition of current Nigerian role objectives is heavily influenced by the salience of the southern Africa dilemma, which if negated, would create a vacuum in Nigerian and African diplomacy in its inability to externalize the focus of continental objectives, inevitably precipitating a major rearrangement of sub-systemic
alignments, which could imperil continental unity.

Nigerian international role credentials are also likely to be influenced by such considerations as the deftness with which Nigerian leaders are able to consolidate the Economic Community of West Africa and transform its current, primarily economic, objective into one of continental political significance; the extent to which Nigeria is able to maintain its moderate 'honest-broker' image in the characteristic rivalry between sub-systemic alignments in Africa and the extent to which the characteristic Nigerian reluctance to take idiosyncratic initiatives in intra-continental affairs comes to be interpreted as weakness; and perhaps most significantly of all, the individual personality traits of the Nigerian political leadership.

Earlier we argued that a mere retrospective examination of a series of Nigerian foreign policy actions would be of little more than historical value and that such ex post facto analysis would fail to reflect the inherently dynamic nature of state interaction and would consequently contribute little to the understanding of the rationale for contemporary Nigerian external interaction or to the validity of assessments as to the actual or potential, present or future significance of Nigeria's role in the international system. As a consequence, efforts were made to conceptualize the causal explanation of international interaction; the rationale stemming from the assumption that if one is able to effectively identify, locate or 'capture' the core of motivation for state action in international politics then, all things being equal, one would be able to accurately anticipate the nature and likely pattern of future external action by the state concerned. (This would help maximize a state's actual or potential role in the international system, facilitating contingency planning and introducing notions of patterned regularity and predictability into international politics.) Indeed, by examining the interaction of variables, which when ranged in causal sequence were deemed to represent
the determinants of international interaction, we were able to reach a conclusion on the actual and potential role of Nigeria in the international system. However, in reflecting on the results of the analysis of substantial empirical data within the framework of the theoretical research design, limitations in the original expectation of the theoretical assumption are evident (and indeed, perhaps inevitable).

Thus it is evident, for example, that very rarely (if ever) are 'all things equal', which leads to the inevitable conclusion that each action of a state in the international system (excluding the multiplicity of interactions in normal day-to-day diplomatic intercourse) is more or less unique. That is to say, that it is very unlikely that the same circumstances will prevail in the exact same ratio or proportion in initiating any one state action. If one then considers that the concept of role in international politics seeks to represent a pattern of the continuum of past and projected individually unique actions of a particular state, then the degree of abstraction in the nature of this study is self-evident. The proposed model has been concerned with the macro-dimensional analysis of the interaction of variables in determining the nature of the international role of a state, whereas the notion of role is concerned with a series of essentially individual 'micro-dimensional' actions over a delimited time span; it could be argued that the study should perhaps have limited the application of the research design (which would be equally as appropriate for the micro-dimensional analysis or the comprehension of the causal rationale for any one specific external undertaking) to the analysis of a selection of specific Nigerian foreign policy actions over a specifically delimited time span.

However, contradictions are immediately apparent: by what criteria would one select the foreign policy actions to be analyzed or delimit the time span, in order to rise above the historical limitations of the traditional ex post facto connotations of role analysis, rejected at the outset? How
much validity would attach to assertions about the potential and likely
future foreign actions of the state were they to be made on the basis
of analysis restricted by the blinkers necessarily imposed by micro-
dimensional perception? What value would such 'micro-dimensionally'
derived assertions have for contingency planning in the essentially
'macro-dimensional' international system? Indeed, the questions which
arise are manifold. They are symptomatic of the dilemma which arises when
one seeks to bridge the division between the micro-dimensional (action by
the individual state) and the macro-dimensional (action arising from the
international system as a whole) while simultaneously elevating the analysis
above historical generality to transcend, as far as possible, the
limitations of time, in the enduring quest for predictability in state
interaction.

Theorists have generally given much attention to the nature of the foreign
policy formulation process per se, and have been concerned with relating
domestic influences to foreign policy outputs, or the input-output
relationship between the decisionmaker and his environment. However,
there is a dearth of theory which seeks to analyze the state in inter-
national politics as an inclusive, ego-centric political unit seeking to
maximize its interests, the most predominant of which is survival, through
a national strategy (rarely set out in a single policy document, and which
incorporates the totality of domestic, foreign, military and national
security policies and instruments). This they must do in competition
with a multitude of similarly motivated, individual, ego-centric political
units within the parameters of an international system. That is not neces-
sarily to subscribe to the once fashionable notion that states are motivated
solely by the quest for power, but rather to suggest that since the Second
World War and now probably more than ever, international politics (or
international state interaction) has been essentially motivated by the
quest for survival. The threats to survival are many and various: nuclear
attack, economic recession, communist invasion, big-power imperialism, neo-colonialism, natural resource depletion, racism, etc. These may at different times be perceived as threatening the sovereignty, independence, national interest and hence, survival of the state concerned. Thus arises the dilemma for the theorist, in that one is confronted with the totality (including every facet of the state's being) of the response which notions of survival evoke, and the inherently individual, variable and intangible factor of human perception and psychological image, activated on two different levels; the single state (micro-dimensional) level and the multi-state (macro-dimensional) level of the international environment. Perhaps then, lapses into generalization should be considered inevitable and such efforts at conceptualization as indeed being merely over-simplified abstractions from reality.
APPENDIX I: NIGERIA IN AFRICA

APPENDIX II: REGIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVINCES OF NIGERIA AT INDEPENDENCE

APPENDIX III: NIGERIAN FOUR STATE DIVISION 1963-67

APPENDIX IV: NIGERIAN TWELVE STATE DIVISION

APPENDIX V: NIGERIAN NINETEEN STATE DIVISION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
Showing the States and their Capitals

SOURCE: Keesings Contemporary Archives 1980,
APPENDIX VI: NIGERIA; GEOGRAPIC REGIONS


APPENDIX VII: NIGERIA; ANNUAL RAINFALL

APPENDIX VIII: NIGERIA; VEGETATION ZONES

Nigeria, US Government Printing Office,
APPENDIX IX : NIGERIA; PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

APPENDIX X: NIGERIA; DISTRIBUTION OF OILFIELDS

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THE ROLE OF NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

by

MICHAEL R. SINCLAIR

This study proposes a framework for analysis in which the correlation between the principal variables, events and procedures, which in their combined interaction serve to determine a state's international role, is illustrated in causal sequence. This model then provides the theoretical framework for the analysis of the role of Nigeria in international politics.

Three criteria are identified as fundamental in determining a state's external behaviour: first, the spectrum of national capability resources, which constitute the physical and non-physical characteristics of the state; secondly, the notion of ego-role perception, which is the product of the perception of state leadership of the threats and opportunities arising from the state's interaction with the international environment in which the objectives of policy must be realized; and thirdly, the notion of alter-perception, which arises from the premise that the first two criteria are essentially relative to the perception of the major world powers.

Nigerian behaviour in the international system is the product of the interaction between the capability means of population size, economic leverage and military capability. These capability means are mobilized in pursuit of certain ego-role objectives (namely the aspiration to be both an honest-broker and a continental leader) and the maintenance of national unity and stability. These ego-role objectives are realized in the international system primarily by diplomatic means, supported by threats of economic retribution or military action. The pattern of this national strategy for interaction has, over time, established a positive perception of the significance of Nigeria for the members of the global system and the African sub-system. Nigeria has created a role which combines continental leadership with sub-systemic predominance.