IRAN AND THE WORLD OF POWER POLITICS:
A SEARCH FOR SECURITY, 1945-1979

BY

SAEID ZANDI

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This study attempts to identify and analyze the perceived needs and considerations which governed the evolution of Iran's security policies for the period 1945-1979.

Purpose
The study is primarily concerned with 1) An analysis of the Post-WWII transformation of power relationships; the shifts in international politics; balance of power considerations as an historical process; and the formulation of Iranian perspectives with particular reference to that process; and 2) Balance of power as a policy in the Iranian search for security from 1945 to 1979.

Approach
The study utilizes the historical (diplomatic) methodology. Detailed narrative accounts in each of the (central) chapters describe Iran's efforts to accommodate balance of power and alliance considerations into its security needs and perceptions. Analytical evaluation further complement the narrative. The significance of the policies is explained and underlined by the application of power politics.

Findings
The study concludes that Iran's search for security took extraordinary dimensions and drastically changed both in character and in essence. The subordination of balance of power and alliance considerations to Iran's conception of its needs is demonstrated by the balance achieved between Russia and the West. The transformation in Iran's regional and international foreign and security policies is underlined from basically an extension of its alliance policy (through CENTO) in the 1950's to an assertive one, independently tailored to its own needs and perception and conducted with a greater degree of freedom, backed up by powerful armed forces, in the 1970's. These new policies aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Persian Gulf while at the same time expanding Iranian influence within that framework. The study finds that Iran failed in that direction, embarked upon assuming a self-reliance posture and adopted counter-defensive measures.

As a postscript to the study, the implications of the security policies of the self-styled Islamic Republic are examined and contrasted with. The study defines the aims of 1945-1979 policies as the quest for the national interest outside, and the 1979-1986 as the external projection of national moods and concerns. Furthermore, the study concludes that Iran's security has been, and continues to be, inexorably dependent upon the security of the Persian Gulf.
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Introduction:

The primary objective of this study is to analyze the security policies that were pursued and manifested by Iran for the period 1945-1979. The study aims to place Iran within the framework of the Post-war international configurations, to provide an Iranian perspective, and to demonstrate the strains and stresses that were encountered by her in contemporary world affairs.

This single-country approach is not chosen in insolation. The security policies and needs of emerging developing nations are often examined in the context of Superpower rivalry or proxies of one or the other of the developed states. This peripheral understanding contrasts sharply with the changes that have taken place in these countries. The pace of change has rendered them less susceptible to effective manipulation from outside. Furthermore, there has been a reversal in power relationships since these states now influence and to some degree control the behaviour of militarily more powerful states. In short, all attempt to pursue independent foreign and security policies that respond to their perceived needs.

There is, moreover, a scholarly need to examine the subject in some detail. A cursory review of the literature on role and place of Iran as well as the politics of the Middle East, and the Upper Middle East in particular, reveals the devotion of little or no space and/or analysis. The vast literature on the Middle East has understandably tended to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the big-power competition and confrontation, and the politics of oil.

Those rare studies that have focussed on Iran, however, have tended to be empirical general studies. Those which have taken the foreign policy of that country into account are also of a variety that do not fulfill the premise laid out in this study. Some have taken a frankly pro-Iranian stand. Others tend to be hostile. It is not a coincidence, therefore, that
the former are written by Iranians or Irano-philes; and the latter are guided by self interest and ignorance.¹

This study proposes to undertake the examination of the primary objective with particular reference to a context of power politics and use the concept of the balance of power (i.e., a refinement of that general context) as a guiding principle. This is so because the concept is indispensable to the understanding of international relations. The balance of power in the realm of international politics implies two different entities. First, it is a system of foreign policy, or in other words, a set of actions by the actors in international politics aimed at upholding, neglecting, or repudiating that in favour of some other supposed system. Second, it is an historical law or theoretical principle of analysis derived from or applied to one's reflections on international politics.² To use Raymond Aron's terms, the balance of power is thus a model for "strategic-diplomatic behaviour."³

Granted that power is a pivotal concept in the analysis of international relations, a logical corollary is the idea that the maintenance of a "balance" or "equilibrium" of power among nations ought to be a dominant objective of statecraft. This study, therefore, further proposes to give due consideration to the concept of alliance as a logical extension of the


balance of power considerations. This is so because alliances have been a major process by which international power has been "balanced" and order maintained. Formation of alliances have also appeared to be an appropriate strategy through which states could increase their preponderance.

The significance of Iran's search for security, outlined in the above framework for analysis, thus entails the pursuit of two related themes: a) An analysis of the origins and the development of the balance of power considerations as an historical process, with particular reference to the formulation of Iranian perspectives; and b) Balance of power as a policy in Iranian foreign policy from 1945 to 1979. More specifically, the thesis has six objectives:

1. To describe and evaluate the security needs and perspectives of Iran;
2. To examine balance of power and alliance that in themselves have been subordinate to the above needs and perceptions;
3. To investigate the Central Treaty Organization and Iran's bilateral defence agreements;
4. To provide an explanation of the nature of Iran's government and foreign policy;
5. To establish Iran's conception of its security policies toward the Persian Gulf area and beyond in the wake of the 1968 British withdrawal announcement from East of Suez; and
6. An assessment of the emergence of Iran as a regional hegemonical power in the 1970's.

Structure:

Part I of the thesis begins with a conceptual analysis of the balance of power. As was noted earlier, the concept implies two different entities. The significance of these entities can be illustrated by the fact that the Post-war transformation of power relationships and the shifts in the international politics in general are nowhere better demonstrated than in the Upper
Middle East. Moreover, the evolution in Post-war power politics is at its best when applied to Iran since the Iranian search for security took extraordinary dimensions and drastically changed both in character and in essence. The study of the region clearly shows the mechanism of classical balance of power at work. The first chapter, then, is concerned with the clarification and development of the concept.

The survey, under the heading "Theoretical Background and Definitions," establishes the elements of the principle as they have been understood by strategists and power-politicians from the 16th century to the present. Further clarification is sought by developing a framework for analysis. It is maintained here that the balance of power is a refinement of a general system of power politics.

This chapter also explores the different traditions of approaching the subject. The Continental and British perspectives on the balance are given. Furthermore, when put in the context of recent theoretical advances, distinctions are made among the scholarly approaches to the question. The approach adopted in this study, historical (diplomatic), is contrasted with behaviouralism and empirical studies and a juxtaposition is made.

Chapter Two reviews the Post-1945 history of alliance formation. The main purpose of this chapter though is to provide an explanation to the dilemmas encountered by small powers and their motives for joining, adhering, or withdrawing from alliances.

To put the above into perspective, definitions of alliances are made and the study then narrows down to military alliances and the paradigms of "small state." National capabilities are verified against cooperative behaviour. In addition, the contemporary alliances are placed in their perspective of historical antecedents and political developments so as to arrive at an understanding of their nature and mechanism. In this respect, origins and development, structure,
and activities are discussed.

Part II of the study is given to the considerations risen out of the "problems" encountered by a small state such as Iran in accommodating the balance of power and alliance mechanisms into its security needs and perceptions. Furthermore, the "prospects" that are brought about by that process of accommodation are examined. This part, which constitutes the main body of the study, is divided for analytical purposes as well as convenience into three substantive chapters. Chapter Three deals with the nature of conflicts and challenges to alliances. Chapter Four looks at the Central Treaty Organization, and Chapter Five focusses on Iran. A detailed narrative is compounded with analytical evaluation. Significance of the nature of conflicts is demonstrated by the application of power politics.

Chapter Three, in the main, focusses on the experience of the Northern Tier in the Second World War. The chapter is given coherence, however, by illustrating the British and Russian policies toward the region on one hand; and the entry into the politics of the area by the United States on the other. The policy of the containment is analyzed, so are the context and historical background of the pressures on Turkey, Greece, and Iran. The responses of these three Northern Tier countries to these pressures are traced.

The experiences of these countries proved altogether that they had no options open to them but to ally themselves with those states whose interests dictated the maintenance of their sovereignty even if this course of action entailed the acceptance of political and military commitments. The choice was more conclusive for a strategically located country such as Iran, which lacked the military power, inter alia, to conduct independent foreign policy.

Furthermore, the Iranians considered neutrality as futile as it was dangerous. There was an imperative need for meeting the probable danger to the Iranian independence by taking all
possible defensive measures. Neutrality meant inviting Soviet aggression. In dealing with the Soviets, the Iranians never forgot the maxim rule that the invisibility of threat does not justify the ruling out of the possibility of threat.

The policy of third-power strategy, i.e. restraining the most dangerous and threatening power by invoking the assistance of the others, adopted by the three Northern Tier countries in the context of the War and its immediate aftermath, is also examined and given due consideration in Chapter Three.

Chapter Four offers an insight into the principal security organization that grew out of the nature of conflicts: the Central Treaty Organization. Soviet expansionist pressures, the policy of containment, the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines as well as U.S. Secretary of State Dulles's efforts to create a security organization are considered for their relevance to the central theme of the study. The chapter traces the changing interests of the signatories and shows how these led to a gradual redefinition of politics of the Upper Middle East.

CENTO is also put in the regional political context explaining the behaviour and reactions of the Arab countries of the area. The position of the U.S. is analyzed and the criticisms of it by the regional members are evaluated. The concerns of the regional members about clarification of policy are given and their relations are examined.

The study demonstrates that while in an alliance the dominant member (i.e., the U.S.) may be able to define the overriding interest in terms of effecting the policies carried out through the alliance, it cannot prevent the regional members from becoming involved in situations which may necessitate action. This, coupled with the perceived denials of assurances on behalf of the U.S. by the regional members as well as the receding threat of Soviet aggression meant a gradual disenchantment with the alliance by the regional members, precipitating its "redundancy."

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The structure of this chapter broadly follows the chronological order of the alliance: from Cold War considerations to the creation of pre-conditions of (basically) economic compatibilities within CENTO that eventually led to the establishment of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

Taken together, however, Chapters Three and Four offer a general description and an explanation of the attempts by Iran, inter alia, to further the aims of its security policies. They also establish the alliance utilization in the Iranian policy and offer an evaluation of the significance of both balance of power and alliance concepts in early parts of the period under study.

General description and explanation give way to a more specific issue-oriented comprehension of Iran's security policies in Chapter Five. The primary objectives of the study are significantly deal with and addressed to in this chapter. The second part of this chapter, the especial place of the Persian Gulf and beyond, helps to underline certain aspects of the overriding themes of this study in action and further clarify an understanding of the entities of the balance of power.

A fundamental factor in the evolution of Iran's security policies in the period 1968-1979 was the announcement and later withdrawal of Britain from "East of Suez." This move transpired for Iran an unprecedented opportunity to assert itself in the region. Chapter Five looks at this historic move and its ramifications; developments in the relations of Iran with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; the redefinition of Iran's foreign policy; the Nixon Doctrine; and Arab reactions to this new and assertive Iranian posture.

The British withdrawal embodied a fundamental shift in the regional power configurations. In practice this meant that Iran must be able to respond flexibly and rapidly so as to re-establish an adequate balance. It was apparent that Iran's
security was inexorably dependent upon the security of the Persian Gulf. In pursuing its security policy objectives, Iran advocated that the area should be kept free of big-power rivalry. The ramifications of the new and assertive Iranian foreign policy also meant that a power vacuum and a clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the dominance of the Persian Gulf did not occur. If anything, the Shah found the Saudis in complete agreement over his views about the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf also presented a welcome opportunity for Iran capitalizing on the useful harmony between goals of greater independence, power, and influence and the West's declining willingness, and in some cases, ability to act forcefully on behalf of regional allies.

Important elements of a nation's resources and institutions, leadership, elites, political parties, as well as the military dimension are evaluated and applied to Iran. The analysis here concludes and underlines the transformation in the Iranian regional and international foreign and security policies from basically an extension of its alliance policy to the new and assertive role. These new policies aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Persian Gulf while at the same time expanding Iranian influence within that framework.

The study reveals that Iran did not receive support and/or favourable reactions from the regional Arab states towards its policies for the security of the Persian Gulf. This failure in holding the status quo is examined and the study further underlines the counter-defensive policies adopted by Iran; and demonstrates the efforts undertaken to assume a self-reliance posture. Furthermore, when put in the context of the study it is concluded that Iran had little or no options open to her but to prepare militarily in order to reinforce its assertive security and foreign policies.

An assessment, furthermore, is made of the hegemonical ambitions of Iran in the Persian Gulf in Chapter Six, the
concluding part of this study. The causes or conditions which helped Iran to alter its role are examined as well as the economy and domestic political factors. The role and place of the Shah in both domestic and international aspects of formulation of policies are discussed.

With reference to the successes achieved and progress made in the economic field, the study finds that these came from a rare combination of favourable circumstances, some fortuitous, some meritorious. These factors included the oil, political stability, steering a course between a laissez-faire economy and government intervention, and private enterprise assisted by government in numerous ways.

The period of 1945-1979 was, of course, the period that the Shah exercised power in Iran. He was the initiator and the driving force behind most, if not all, major foreign and security policies. This was especially so after his consolidation of royal power beginning with 1953, the year of the oil debacle in Iran, and 1955, the year that Iran adhered to the Baghdad Pact.

The Shah acknowledged the balance of power concept as a guiding principle in international relations. From long practice he achieved a feat of balance between Russia and the West. This study further concludes that Iran's foreign policy was remarkably stable and consistent in the period due to the above long tenure of the Shah and the essential consistency of his views.

As for the hegemonical status of Iran, the study reveals, contrary to universal assumption, that Iran did not attain that status despite the changing of the Middle Eastern power configurations in a direction favourable to Iran's interests. This is attributed to the insufficient technical, educational, and industrial base required to meet that challenge. However, it is stressed that Iran became regionally so powerful that it could not be overlooked or ignored with regard to the affairs xlv.
of the area.

The remainder of Chapter Six is devoted to a kind of a postscript to the period under study. Thus, the fall of the Shah is analyzed from an Iranian perspective. It is argued that the downfall could have been avoided provided that the Shah did not embark upon his liberalization of the political process to the extent that he did. Failing that, it is maintained that the military ought to have taken over so as to sustain the correct security and foreign policy objectives of the Shah's administration. In this context, the role of the armed forces is discussed and conclusions are made to the effect that they were prevented from overruling the Shah due to their overriding loyalties to the historical institution of the monarchy.

In examining the cultural traits of the Iranians, as against Moslem Iranians, a psychological dichotomy of "good" and "evil," borrowed from Zoroastrianism, is identified in this part of the study. Based on this and the fundamental underpinning of the fear of Iranians from being encroached and persecuted by the big powers, similarities and contrasts of the policies of the Shah and those of the self-styled Islamic Republic are given.

It is maintained that the Islamic clergy are basically Iranians at heart. It is, moreover, argued that this dark period in the Iranian history is ruled by a theocratic dynasty in which the ascendancy to the crown is determined by the Shi'i hierarchy as it is practiced in Iran.

Balance of power as a policy was, of course, rejected by the new government in Iran. This is borne out by the observation made by Stanley Hoffmann, as is examined in Chapter 1, who aptly ascribes a deterioration of such magnitude to domestic turmoil or revolution. In this sense the foreign policies

4. S. Hoffmann "Will the Balance Balance at Home?," Foreign Policy, vol. 7, 1972, pp. 60-86.
of the Shah could be described as the quest for the national interest outside, while the Islamic Republic has embarked upon the external projection of national moods and concerns.

It is pointed out that the Shah accepted the existing international order as providing an environment within which Iran could operate and would become more independent and powerful. By contrast, this has been discarded out of hand by the Islamic Republic. Their hostile view of international organizations and regional politics are discussed and attributed to ideology. The similarities include the idea of encroachment on Iran by hostile forces. As was noted earlier, a pervasive anxiety toward "outside forces" is present in Iran and is manifested in the Islamic Republic's pronouncements on security policies.

The study concludes that in the latter part of the period under investigation, the security in the Persian Gulf was indistinguishable from the security of Iran. The leaders of the self-styled Islamic Republic at first attempted to brush aside this significant element. To their costs, and to Iran's cost, they finally reached the same conclusion when confronted by the realities of the (Iran-Iraq) war. The Shah found refuge in a Treischke maxim to the effect of securing peace from a position of strength and self-sufficiency. Iran's prestige was eroded by his downfall. As such, this erosion induced other nations to consider putting pressure on Iran or even attack her.
"There is no balance of power concept except me and my thirty army corps."

Kaiser Wilhelm II
PART I:

THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER ONE: Theoretical Background and Definitions

1.1. Balance of Power: A Review

The concept of the "balance of power" is indispensable to the understanding of international relations, despite the very different meanings and uses of the notion and the equally divergent assessments of the political realities to which it refers. Originally considered as one of the two most prominent offsprings of the European states-system (the other being the international law), it has occupied a position of unusual importance in history. The concept embraces a number of theoretical assumptions and propositions on war, peace, alliance and diplomacy among nations. It is complex, reflecting an accumulated experience in the analysis and practice of international politics for centuries. It has demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in the literature, often serving as a paradigm in analyzing international relations and is still very much with us. It might fade away only with the disappearance of the state-system: an empty prediction, for the ubiquity of the subject and, moreover, because the Machiavellian spirit and the "Princes" are here and will try to shape the world for years to come.

The remarkable versatility of the concept could be traced back in history by the way of the varied considerations given to it. Thus Isaac Browne put it in a verse: "The balance of pow' r ah! till that is restored, what solid delight can retirement afford?"\(^1\) Richard Cobden regarded it as a chimera, proposed to discard it as a fallacious, undescribed, indescribable,

incomprehensive nothing; and urged that it be dismissed from further consideration.² Woodrow Wilson planned to do away with it, to replace it with a community of power, and proclaimed that "the game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power, was abolished."³ Richard Nixon based his entire foreign policy on it and argued: "We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been balance of power ... an even balance."⁴ Henry Kissinger, Nixon's right-hand-man found refuge in Metternich and subscribed in principle and in considerable detail to it as a guide to foreign policy-making and tried to restore the world on that basis as well.⁵ The latter two rose to power at the same time when the specter of Hans Morgenthau's "liberalism" was haunting American scholarly community. He branded a foreign policy based on balance of power as "evil and stupid."⁶ It is perhaps an astonishing irony that the man who replaced them in office, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that "an unrealistic and fundamentally untenable balance of power approach is thus neither


5. While that important era of the US foreign policy and its architects are examined later in this study, it is interesting to note that via his testimony on the ratification of the SALT II treaty in the US Senate, in the week ending 11th Aug. 1979, Henry Kissinger not only caused a major shift in the debate in favour of a massive US arms buildup, but also "delivered a Spenglerian warning of American power on the wane," and added that "Rarely in history a nation so passively accepted a radical change in the military balance." Newsweek, 13th August, 1979.

existentially nor normatively the relevant concept with which to seek a "generation of peace," on the lines advocated by the formers. Lastly, Helmut Schmidt contented that: "Balance of power will continue to be the most important factor affecting global security, because the universal order will continue to be governed by rivalry, competition and the juxtaposition of States, peoples and ideas."

A structural consideration of the evolution of the international society reveals that different intellectual concepts were to be found and applied to the specific interstate problems of the time. One could cite examples such as the concepts of natural law and divine law in the age of classical antiquity, the rise of the Prince during the Renaissance and Reformation, the idea of Progress in the age of Enlightenment, as well as Idealism and Materialism during the "age of the Dialectic;" and on this path one could detect Functionalism, Imperialism, Nationalism, the Federative principle, and so on. However, the above by no means conveys the impression that the use of those concepts was confined to the age of their inception. To avoid such a false impression, it is of prime importance to trace their further developments through the ages. Balance of Power; a by-product of a period after the Renaissance and before the Enlightenment, a period known to us as the age of Absolutism, is indeed one of those truly surviving concepts which its presence on the international scene not only has not diminished but has gathered strength with the passage of time throughout the centuries.

The passing of the Renaissance and Reformation period was poised to set about a rather unfamiliar system of independent states and with it a new context of foreign policy which was in contrast to the instinctive tactics of the ruling princes.


and their immobility to form a broad conception of the nature of the international society at the time. At any rate, the concept of the "balance of power" was eventually appeared and developed by the help of the very structure of that society. Though there was no clear perception of it, let alone of its nature, the concept was nonetheless being sensed and manifest-ed in the context of schemes for the consolidation of that new society of states and the investigations concerning the political prejudices and diplomatic interests of the moment.

The ever-increasing use and reference to a "balance" in international affairs at this period generally shows that a nation or a principle was lacking, "the real appreciation of the doctrine had just been missed or the formulation of it went wrong."\(^9\)

The dominating notion in the sphere of international relations during the sixteenth century was still that of reason of state. This being so, Machiavelli never used the concept directly as it related to Italy or other areas, although in his days a balance of power undoubtedly existed within the peninsula. The closest that Machiavelli came to the notion could have been the occasion of considering the situation where in which neighbours of a state are at war and one of them is gaining preponderance as a result of that war. The topic is thus merely treated by him as a question of the wisdom of

\(^9\) Though some scholars like David Hume and Rousseau have tried to bring into attention examples from the ancient world on the existence of the idea, by the help of Kautilya or Thucydides, among others; Butterfield summarizes the generally held view that "the idea ... not only did not exist in the ancient world, but did not take its rise even from the modern study of ancient history. More than most of our basic political formulas, this one seems to come from the modern world's reflection on its own experience." See Butterfield in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, op.cit., p. 133.

\(^10\) Ibid., p. 137.
remaining or not remaining neutral when one's neighbours are at war. 11

Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), Machiavelli's contemporary, came closer to an appreciation of the balance when he used the term "counterpoise" to indicate the need for international balancing, a term which was also used by Friedrich Gentz in early 19th century. He preached a strategy for the Florence on the basis of a balance. Though viewed from a negative point of view, Guicciardini believed that the way to save one's nation from aggression is to see that the neighbouring nation-states be kept too busily occupied with one another elsewhere. His line of thinking was adequately shown for the time in his Storia d'Italia (1537), in which he gave an account of a system of forces which has been brought to an equilibrium during the reign of Medici's Italy.

Philip de Commynes, a French diplomat, expressed same feelings at the time. Though chapter eight of book V of his Memoirs is said to be "usually credited with being the earliest account in modern European literature of the balance of power, " 12 the picture given by him is more a composition of power rather than a balance. However, for our purposes it was Guicciardini who "ultimately made the crucial advance and gave the first vivid picture of the balance of power." 13

Gradually, as the new pluralist international system became subject of a closer scrutiny, the mode of the concept's operation became the focal point in intense debates. By the turn of the 16th century and into the middle of the next, the references to balance of power increased in number and its

development gained a remarkable momentum. From then onwards the concept, being for so long implicit in the practices of external affairs, was finally made explicit, and in a laborious process of definition raised to the level of a principle of international relations during the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

In laying the formal basis of the new international order, the Treaty of Westphalia not only terminated the wars of religion but also legitimised an international order based on the existence of independent, sovereign states. Due to the lack of clear working principles, the stabilization of the newly developed international system was carried out and concentrated upon a basis of dynastic principles and related practices. Problems of line of succession often led to prudent marriage settlements. What was needed was the effective operation of that international system which they failed to accomplish. Thus royal marriages used as a replacement device were doomed to yield uncertainty and chaos as Spinoza aptly predicted that they would lead to war. The net effect, therefore, was disruption rather than stabilization. This point could well be seen in the form of a series of wars of succession. Those of the Austrian, Bavarian, and Polish being good examples, and the Spanish the most prolonged and destructive.

It was in the course of the Spanish war and the period leading to it that the principle of the balance of power, practiced implicitly before, was rendered increasingly explicit in the diplomatic practices of European states. Having established itself as an idea and/or a political slogan and repeatedly appearing in inter-state documents by then, the war was waged expressly in the name of the "balance" on the part of the anti-French coalition which, by and large, succeeded in imposing its will in the shape of the separation

of the French and Spanish crown.

"... For the end that all care and suspicions may be removed from the minds of men and that the Peace and Tranquility of the Christian World may be ordered and stabilized in a just Balance of Power (which is the best and most solid foundation of mutual friendship and a lasting general concord)."

Read the clause in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) which ended the war and simultaneously elevated the concept to a principle of international order. More important still, the treaty imposed an obligation on its signatories to maintain that balance. Although the use of the words "Christian World" has prompted some scholars to express doubts that "the balance of power" was still deriving its main impulse from the old conception of Europe, but nevertheless the concept used that legal document as a launching pad in order to be acknowledged as a regulator of international relations and attained a status as a diplomatic goal, to be positively sought after, and a prescription for statesmen to follow a conscious and sanguine approach.

The optimistic expectations regarding the principle, mostly expressed through the prevailing theme of the time, i.e., the stabilization of the balance in terms of preserving the peace, were soon to be disappointed as the 18th century turned out to be one of almost continuous, if not invariably ferocious warfare. Thus, it was only during the second half of the century that a deliberate application of the principle could be registered. In direct relationship to this, help was under way in terms of a flood of schemes, all seemingly motivated by the noble desire to create permanent peace and order. However, it should be stated that on closer inspection, it becomes apparent that many, if not all, contained features


17. See ibid., chs. 1 & 2; and related works cited there.
which detracted from their professed purposes. A significant feature of these, and identical in all, was the support given to the creation of international political institutions varying in degree of constitutional sophistication, and were based on the unrealistic assumption that the rulers of Europe, not to speak of extra-European rulers, who had just won their protracted struggle for unrestricted sovereignty, would willingly surrender it to an untried international body of states representatives for the sake of the ideals of international stability.

Most of these schemes, from King of Bohemia's to Saint-Pierre's, offered provisions for various kinds of organs such as an assembly of state representatives and exhibited confederal features usually associated with alliances. It was not always clear to what extent they were meant to be lasting. What is beyond doubt, is that all were concerned with stabilizing the balance in one way or another.

Among the plans offered, those of Duc de Sully, "the Grand Design" attributed to Henry IV of France and published in Sully's memoirs (1638); William Penn's Essays toward Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693); and John Beller's Some Reason for an European State (1710) are the particular ones focusing directly on the principle of the balance of power in pursuance of peace. Perhaps the culminations of their efforts were to come later, and that was Saint-Pierre's Project pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe (1712) which was coincidentally published with the final years of the completion of the Utrecht treaty. His scheme contained notorious features including the renunciation of war, mediation by confederates in a dispute-like situation, majority vote in the international senate and resorting to a peace-keeping force in the event of a failure of a mediation and outbreak of war.

However helpful those schemes were, a true theory of the balance of power had to advance from the sphere of imagination to that of model-building. Scientific concepts of
balance taken from the mechanical sciences proved helpful in this respect. The revolution of the natural sciences in the 17th century thus came to the aid of those enquiring into the nature of the balance of power by the way of analogy, a hitherto unknown facility. It could not have been altogether a historical coincidence that speculation concerning the nature of the balance was taking place together with the progress of the scientific revolution of the 17th century, which had begun with Kepler's publication of the laws of planetary motion in 1619 and was virtually complete with the Newton's discovery of the laws of gravitation in 1687. Ample inspiration for the construction of fruitful analogies was therefore being provided by the help of the centrality of the principle of the "balance" manifested in the realm of astronomy and mechanics.

The heyday of this concept was to be the following century. Thus Fredrick the Great of Prussia expressly compared the system of international relations to that of a fine balance of a clock; Edmund Burke called the balance of power the common law of Europe; and Prince Kaunitz, the modern-minded Hasburg minister, boasted of the arithmetical methods employed in his diplomacy. This important step from using of rhetorical figures to that of analogy is rightly echoed by Butterfield:

"... In any case the theory of the balance of power is to a great degree unachieved so long as people are thinking of a pair of scales (a negative idea in terms of 'neglected opposites') and merely using it as a figure of speech." 18

Butterfield also contends that the "beautiful equipoise" of the "heavenly bodies" sometimes was expressed in "a curiously Baconian ring." 19 However, this great transformation in the evolution of the concept could be summed up by Butterfield's opening of his article on the balance of power. Thus:


19. Ibid., p. 141.
"... The whole order in Europe was a kind of terrestrial counterpart of the Newtonian system of astronomy. All the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers, were poised against one another, each exercising a kind of gravitational pull on all the rest - and the pull of each would be proportionate to its mass, though its effect would be greatly reduced as it acted at a greater distance. When one of these bodies increased its mass, therefore... the rest could recover an equilibrium only by regrouping themselves ... and producing new combinations."

By then, though progress in theorizing had been achieved but the pace was slow in spite, and possibly because of the popularity of the concept. State practices kept ahead of theorizing, making it difficult at times to distinguish theory from ideology. However, the gap between the two was being closed by degrees in the course of the 18th century, during which the conceptualization of the balance of power made some considerable progress in the light of the continental approach towards it.

The continental tradition was developed mainly by historians of Gottingen, the Hanoverian school of thought. This central point of activity had its own reason and merits since Germany was an area prone to manipulation by the powers since the Treaty of Westphalia and, because it was in the centre of Europe, psychologically sensitive to the dimension of territorial contiguity. The continental tradition of the balance developed within the context of a growing intricacy of that equilibrium, especially because in the course of the 18th century, both Prussia and Russia had to be considered integral part of it. The debate on the nature of the balance reflected these conditions on the continent. However, the modern concept of the European states-system was adopted, a step towards more sophistication, though the element of diplomatic partiality was rarely altogether absent. Evidence of this is to be found in the works of Kahle, Anchillon, Heeren, and Ranke, and the response they aroused in the British circles.

20. Ibid., p. 132.
Kahle sought to provide a diagnosis of international society in the mid-eighteenth century by holding that each nation in its natural state must be considered as the enemy of all others, or disposed to be as such. Anchillon maintained that balance of power was an essential condition of international order. Heeren, in praising the European states-system, suggested that this international order might gradually be expanded until it embraced the whole globe. Ranke went on further to the recognition of the operation of force in the resulting order of things. It should be noted, however, that these efforts had one thing in common with previous ones, that is the question of the management of the balance of power poised itself invariably. Rigid international institutions were not a practical proposition, and so new modes of adjustments had to be considered which could ensure flexibility.

The management of the balance of power in operational terms was thought to be rested in several principles of which that of compensation may be regarded as the most prominent and effective one. Kahle argued that the most legitimate rulers must sometimes renounce their rights in order to maintain the balance. Anchillon claimed on a similar line that a state might justifiably be compelled by other states to sacrifice for the common good territory to which it held good legal title, just as by way of a domestic analogy a ruler could compel his subjects to give up part of their wealth for the benefit of the community.

State practices relied largely on the expedient of "territorial compensation" to render the principle of the balance flexible. Thus, the application of this device was implicit in the Treaty of Utrecht, where territories were generously divided among Habsburgs and Bourbons. Newly discovered territories outside Europe, as potentially more or less automatic equalisers among states, were also added to the list, a point that Montesquieu was among the first to draw attention upon. However, it should be stated that stabilizing
the balance by the help of this method is by no means
confined to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{22}

Another means of adjustment, with far-reaching
characteristics, arose out of the practical difficulty of
quantifying the concept of power itself, an awkward aspect of
the principle of the balance since it involved considerations
of domestic developments of states. For a long time it had
been assumed in the continental conception of the balance of
power that it was possible to make reasonably precise compar­
isons of the real strength of various states. The 18th century
thinkers found it difficult to define the concept of power and
a debate ensued as to the exact nature of the ingredients of
which state power was composed. It was soon to be accepted
that the possession of a large army does not necessarily lead
to more strength, an experience that Louis XIV of France was
faced with. Therefore attention was directed on the overall
efficiency of the government to mobilize its resources. As
such substantial changes in the overall efficiency of important

\textsuperscript{22} The continuing scenario contains first and foremost the
"spectacular" and equally "cynical" destructions of Poland
accomplished in four stages. The first three (1772, 1793,
1795), 'which in a sense mark the end of the classic period of the balance
of power,' were merely committed in the name of the balance of
power (Morgenthau, op.cit.,p. 179). The implications of these
compensations were so great that in M. Wight's view: 'Nothing in
European history has done more to discredit the idea of the balance of
power than the belief that it led naturally to such a crime as the
Partition of Poland,' (M. Wight in H. Butterfield and M. Wight,
op.cit., p. 157). Towards the end of the 19th century, the
division of China into spheres of influence was followed aff­
ording equal access to the trade of a handful of great powers
under the device of the 'open door'. The Ottoman Empire was
finally carved up after a century of partition schemes at the
close of the 1st World War in the 20th century. At the end of
the Second World War territorial re-arrangements were affected
at the expense not only of Germany, Japan, and Italy, the
defeated powers, but also of yet another partition of Poland,
and of Czechoslovakia and China, allied states unable to res­
ist the major allied power's determination to compensate each
other in this manner in order to 'preserve' the world balance.
The story continued after the Second World War in the light of
the 'hand off' policy of one's sphere of influence, adopted by
the two Superpowers especially in the Africa and Latin America.
Down to the present time, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
is somehow too great to be missed as a resemblance to that
device as well.
states had to be prohibited if the balance of power were to be maintained effectively. In such an event, a right of intervention would have to be created on the part of the remaining powers to keep the growing capability of any state within acceptable bounds. Thus, the inherent logic of the principle of the balance of power, as then interpreted, carried the paradoxical and equally peculiar implication of provoking foreign intervention against well-governed states—a catastrophic presumption if brought about overtly today.

During that period, however, it was impossible to establish reliable criteria by which the growing power of such a state could be considered too big and out of hand. Thus, it was conceived in the treaty of 1772 between Austria and Prussia that the Polish territories acquired not only shall be completely equal in proportion but bear the same characteristics as the fertility of the soil and number and quality of the population concerned. Carried forward; Congress of Vienna appointed in 1815 "a statistical commission charged with evaluating territories by the standard of number, quality, and type of population." In the latter part of the nineteenth and early 20th centuries the colonial territories overseas were also brought into considerations.

Though the idea of the interrelationship between domestic and international affairs developed out of the question of checking the preponderance and being watchful, but the whole idea not only led to some discussions on the revival of the perils of the concept of the balance of power, as was pointed out by von Justi, but it more importantly opened new dimensions which, being more or less associated with the

measurement of the capabilities, continued to assert influence on the thought about the subject. Thus, Fenelon "... held that the balance of power should be regarded as an over-ruling law. The internal laws of a country ... should give way to the right that so many nations had to security." H. Butterfield, in considering the legitimacy of the pre-emptive action, cites an article published in 1802 in the Edinburgh Review that "... took the line that you should check the potential aggressor before he really emerged." However, the question of power itself was unresolved.

Closely connected with the balance of power itself, several other concepts and properties manifested themselves in the debate. The first two, in partnership with each other, were the sea power and balance of trade. The British school of thought, at the time when the continentals were arguing about the nature of the balance, drew most of their attention to practical terms involving its management. Their cautious approach, having been marked from the beginning by a sense of voluntarism which was in contrast to the somewhat objectivism of that of the continentals, was framed in a context of deliberate and calculated manipulation.

Thus, incorporating the prominent commercial element, it was held that the overall significance of the British trade is an integrated part of the general balance of power. Therefore the control of the marine power and hence being in control of the power distribution in Europe, to say the least, prompted Francis Bacon to the recognition that "a change in trade-relations can alter the balance of power;" a rather sombre view to others since they had to accept the British hegemony. The scrupulous British naval strength was also the factor that nobody could deny it, and with its backing they seemingly

26 Ibid., p. 145.
27 Ibid., p. 141.
shaped the undefended balance at sea and thereby made their weight tacitly present.

The concept of the "balancer" or the "power that holds the balance" was another characteristic of the classical period of evolution of the concept of balance of power itself. Associated with the element of growing British seapower, it was understood that the holder is the power that is in a position to contribute decisive strength to one side or the other in the power conflict of the European states-system. Based on this, Wight argued that the introduction of that notion caused the fullest transformation of the concept of the balance of power thus far.28 As early as the 16th century, the maxim of "cui adhaero praest," that is: "the party I support wins," was laid down and was used to describe the position of Queen Elizabeth in the struggle between France and Spain. But it was in their intense course of rivalry of the second half of the 17th century that the British role as balancer capable of tipping the European balance of power came into its own. Its diplomatic advantages to Britain were stressed by the political philosopher Lord Halifax in 1688,29 who was echoed by the writer and political essayist Jonathan Swift, who enlarged the meaning of the term by emphasising the special advantages accruing to the holder of the balance and its essentiality to the very idea of the balance of power. He maintained that it was not necessary "that Power should be equally divided" between the two principals and the holder, "for the balance may be held by the Weakest, who by his Address and Conduct - removing from either Scale, and adding to his own - may keep the Scales duly poised."30 To further the principle of maintaining the

balance, the true function of the holder would have been precisely to "keep the scales dully poised," as suggested by Swift. While adhering to the idea of the balance of power explicitly from the late 17th century onwards, Britain claimed the right to be the balancer of the system by virtue of her imposing command of the seas. However, Richard Cobden was to claim in 1836 that Britain was playing that role "not with the blindness of the goddess of justice herself, or with a view to the equilibrium of opposite interests, but with a Cyclopean eye to her own aggrandisement." \(^32\)

Cobden's remarks exemplified that not all of the quarters were satisfied with the balancer position being assumed by the British. Indeed, others could detect a policy of "divide and rule" adopted by them to further their claim at the international scene. The maxim, being received as a method in order to adjust the whole system of balance of power, \(^32\) was not hidden from the careful eyes of the continental powers, thus they noticed that:

"While Britain traditionally claimed to hold the balance of Europe with her right hand, with her left hand she was establishing an oceanic hegemony which refused for two centuries to admit any principle of equilibrium." \(^33\)

However, though the holder of the balance was being able to manoeuvre freely, it could do so as long as there was no change in the composition of power in terms of its commitments. Arriving at a new pattern of power almost would have resulted in having another power to hold the balance, and with respect

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33. M. Wight, op.cit., p. 164. It was against such a background that prompted Hitler to conclude that "What Britain called the balance of power was nothing but the disintegration and disorganization of the Continent." The Times, January 31, 1941. Quoted from ibid., p. 168.
to this the role of the balancer was not necessarily assumed only by the British, as was the case with the Tsarist Russia during the reigns of Elizabeth and Catherine the Great. Germany after the creation of the Reich could have also played the role ideally. The role of the balancer was also by no means confined to Great Powers. Quite often a small power might find itself in a position to hold the balance by virtue of its strategic location or its opportunistic sense of leadership, performing the task sometimes on grounds other than sheer might of its military forces.

Under the powerful impact of Napoleon's attempted overthrow of the entire system of the balance, the British pragmatic approach towards that phenomenon tended to fuse with the objective continental one. As a result, the characteristically mechanical conception of the continental type gradually ceded to the voluntarist conception of the balance favoured by Britain. In the course of this transformation, the much more sophisticated notion of a free-wheeling balance employing a multiple balancer emerged; which, it was hoped, would provide ample scope for diplomatic flexibility and manoeuvre. The process was initiated in 1803 by Lord Brougham, who in an essay entitled: "Balance of Power," indicated the prime importance of the concept of balance thus:

"The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing theory, is the systematic form to which it reduces those plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness which it prescribes over every movement in all parts of the system; the subjection in which it tends to place all national passions and antipathies to the views of remote expediency; the uneasing care which it dictates of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves;..."

Three years later, in 1806, Friedrich Gentz, a Prussian

civil servant and secretary of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, made a substantial contribution to the subject through elaborating the concept of the free-wheeling balance, its adjunct the multiple balancer, and evaluating the inter-regional nature of the newly developing historical balance in a fresh context. Vigorously opposed to the Napoleonic expansionism and the hegemony of one single power in Europe, he advocated that the post-war international order should be based on a hierarchial structure, derived from the application of the balance of power in a framework of an over-ruling international law. Pressed by this, or perhaps intended to air the views that would favour other great powers, notably Britain, he even went further and defended a just intervention in the internal affairs of other states to maintain the balance, preferably "counterpoise" in his vocabulary, and war in favour to preserve that status quo.

Thus, as the champion of the status quo and defender of the balance of power, he opened his powerful essay with:

"What is usually termed a balance of power, is that constitution subsisting among neighbouring states more or less connected with one another; by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or the essential rights of another, without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and consequently exposing itself to danger."

The central thesis of Gentz's argument, therefore, was that diversity of power, not equality, was an essential condition for its balance. He maintained that by creating the new notion of free-wheeling equilibrium based on the interplay of both big and small powers, he might give the mechanical continental theories of the balance of power prevailing during the 18th century the dynamic quality they lacked. Having perfected the idea, he might have wished a resumption of the

second half of the 18th century practices in the realm of international system, a period in which the prevailing theme was a tendency to regard the system as stable for the time being, a sort of presumption in favour of keeping things as they were.

Gentz also emphasised the importance of small states, as ideal balancers, in a position to shift their weight from one side to the other, so as to redress any imbalances that might occur. This composition flourished because of the vindication of the existence of the small states by the balance of power system, a process that was corresponded to one of the peculiarities of the European order - "an order in which freedom was more important than tranquility." Thereby, the balancing system provided provisions for small states to ascertain not only their existence but independence in the realm of foreign policy.

Gentz's conception had the great advantage of leaving the definition of what constituted the ingredients of power to the discretion of the states concerned, and would not exclude action on the part of the balancers in the event of the growth of internal strength by any state. Disliking the device of territorial compensation, he also placed heavy emphasis on the mechanism of shifting alliances, a view that was once prompted Richelieu to maintain that "in the existing system, small states had greater freedom of action than larger states - in the case of an alliance it was the larger rather than the smaller power that was likely to be abandoned by its partner." In fact there came a point where the smaller states, by virtue of their manoeuvrability and shifting their allegiance, could mark their impact.

38. Ibid., p. 142.
Gentz also drew attention to the growing regional complexity of the balance of power in Europe and pointed out the necessity of involving small powers. At any rate, his expectation of a free-wheeling equilibrium were thwarted by the advent of the industrial revolution, which he never lived to witness, and which was to show that only major industrial powers would in future be capable of functioning as effective performers and balancers.

Gradually other developments were made in the evolutionary path of the concept. It was established that, however operated, the preservation of the independence of states would be one of the prime targets, as well as that it would not invariably guarantee peace, a shortcoming noted by Edmund Burke as early as 1760, before the partition of Poland. The notion began to gain ground that to be lasting, the balance had to be supported by a political system composed of all European states. Thus Lord Brougham saw in the balance of power a "general union" that it has effected: all the European powers in one connecting system - obeying certain laws, and actuated, for the most part, by a common principle. The idea of the balance of power thus logically led to the notion of a political Concert of Europe, not unlike those suggested during the 17th century in numerous writings but within a different set of historical expectations. To be effective as well as manageable, the balance had to be subjected to central political control. The two basic notions of stabilization and management had to march hand in hand.

The balance of power, therefore, was being interpreted at the time of the Congress of Vienna not only in its rather older conception of a need to combat hegemony, but also that of the newly acquired meaning of expediency. Urged to develop new ways of managing the relations among states after having

39. Annual Register, 1760.
experienced the impact of Napoleon by conveying precise rules, the victorious powers gathered in Vienna in need of a new balance that could achieve stabilization and by the same token could relieve them from the hazards of the past power politics. The Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 committed the signatories to defend the evolving balance, a commitment that was to be spread over a decade and be repeatedly heard of in several other congresses, or what actually became to be known as the Congress system. The settlement in Vienna was followed by the second Treaty of Paris of November 1815 (the Quadruple Alliance), the renewed Treaty of Chaumont, originally signed in March 1814, and the Holy Alliance of 1816.

The Quadruple Alliance (Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia), fixed the frontiers of France and the conditions of peace with her, and bound the four Great Powers to maintain them. The Holy Alliance, inspired by Czar Alexander I of Russia, proclaimed the adherence of all rulers to the principles of Christianity and in that they would regard each other as brothers and conduct the international affairs of all Europe as members of one and the same Christian nation. Above all, the Treaty of Chaumont was more conducive and challenging with regard to avoiding war in the light of the balance of power. The allied powers looked to "draw closer the ties which unite them for the vigorous prosecution of the war," and aimed at:

"Putting an end to the miseries of Europe, of securing its future repose, by re-establishing a just balance of power, and maintaining against every attempt the order of things which shall have been the happy consequence of their efforts."41

The Chaumont Treaty is markedly striking for it suggested a

"coalition equilibrium." As an improved form of the balance strategy, it called for an automatic peace-time coalition of great powers to preserve the balance of power in the European state system. The idea was not new, but the application of that in the European statecraft was no more than the realization of the ideal toward which balance of power theorists had been pointing for more than a century; an army of proponents from Fenelon, Saint-Pierre and Vattel to Brougham and Gentz. The Treaty clearly was an offspring of the balance of power tradition, it was written and signed by balance of power statesmen—men like Metternich and Castlereagh—and contained typical balance of power ingredients and phraseology focussed at a just European distribution of power.

The Congress system, however, did not last for long, as someone as hopeful as Gentz himself had accurately predicted. The prevailing theme among the great powers was to preserve the new system, and thus peace; their behaviour was conducive with that respect, for that they were prepared to relinquish their individual interests in the pursuit of an international system via the recognition of the fact that it was in their interest to do so. The system collapsed out of the differences on these very grounds as well as the revival of their rivalries, that is a combination of rivalries, restrained during the period as a price for maintaining the spirit, and differences of opinion as to how the system should be used. Re-creating a new equilibrium and varied conceptions of Europe in a context of aims and limits of an international system meant that the Congress system would have to fade away.

It has been recorded that the failure of the Congress system did not put an end to the collaboration between the great powers but ironically marked the beginning of a new era initiated by Castlereagh, who became uneasy about putting

43. Ibid., ch. 9.
great emphasis on status quo and was ready to adjust to the existence of differences of interest between the powers. Criticising the Holy Alliance on the grounds of impracticability, he called it a "sublime mysticism and nonsense," along with Metternich who duly rendered his share of labelling it as a "loud sounding nothing."

Whether it was the Chaumont spirit or the reminiscence of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818 - the first conference ever held between states to regulate international affairs in time of peace during that period - a notion gained ground that attempts should have to be made to assume responsibility for the settlement of political issues and containing aggression. These activities were realized by the great powers in a number of conferences dealing with problems endangering the peace, notably the Belgian question of early 1830's, the Eastern question of the 1850s and 1878, and the colonial problems of Africa at the beginning of the 20th century. The conferences, carried out in an ad hoc nature, were to be set up on occasions that demanded concerted action. These uninstitutionalised actions, became known as the Concert of Europe, were more or less successful in preserving general peace during ninety years or so. The Concert, guided and practiced by remarkable diplomatists, came to an unfortunate end sometime before the World War I when rigid alliances appeared on the scene.

The Concert of Europe was in origin and essence a common agreement on the principle of the balance of power. Although there is no doubt that it skilfully contributed to prolong the peace, its loose association was faced with circumstances beyond its control - uncynical and mostly the products of the developments in thought and other aspects of 19th century Europe. This by no means indicates that the balance of power was not affected. Quite the reverse, the tacit nature of these very developments opened new dimensions in the life of the concept.
A combination of written undertakings in terms of alliances - that were to replace the imperfect customary international law of the Concert, as was seen by Bismarck for one, and the passions of status quo as well as the reluctance in collaborations concerning yet other redistribution of power - imperialistic ambitions, arms race, and tariff wars put an end to that feature of past century. However, the underlying reason for almost all of these facts was an amalgamation of not quite unprecedented initiatives, notably legitimacy, the injection of ideology by the French Revolution into the body of politics, and the rise of nation-state and pursuing related objectives in nationalistic contexts.

The principle of legitimacy, existed before the 19th century, came into the foreground of the international affairs from the Congress of Vienna onwards with great importance attached to it. Talleyrand put it in front of the Congress that in order to create an effective balance of power and the new equilibrium, there should be direct ties between them and legitimacy and that it should be used as a device to render stable the units within the equilibrium. Interpreted as a means to that end, he put heavy emphasis on the principle thus: "that sacred principle of legitimacy from which all order and stability spring." This so obvious a principle that was to be shedding new light on the balance during most parts of the 19th century and thereafter, was violated not ironically in 1815 itself, but on other occasions as well - particularly in 1860 when France obtained the cession of Savoy and Nice as compensation for the increase of territory

obtained by Sardinia in Italy, a case that prompted instant British reaction.

The embodiment of the new element of ideology into the general body of politic not only alarmed the balance of power practitioners but also set about a transformation. The states-system felt the impact of the French Revolution in a context of legitimism, the defence of social order, and the determination to stamp out dissidence. Thus Metternich and Castlereagh, professing a belief in the existence of general laws governing the relations among states and who did not admit of any recognition of the prospect of liberal and national advance, were thoroughly alarmed. The ever-increasing law of the balance, as regarded by them, however, transcended the national sympathies and therefore its mechanical workability was more important to them than cultural affinities and national hopes. While Metternich antagonised Britain over the question of ideology, and which the latter eventually became wedded to the principle of non-intervention, his fears regarding the incompatibility of liberalism with the basic principle of the balance of power were unjustified, he was on firmer grounds in being suspicious of the forces of nationalism in this respect. Nationalism and liberalism were neither strong enough nor sufficiently articulate at the time of the Congress, but in time they were to exite and raise passions if a course of territorial re-distribution and compensation was due.

However, more was to come. Particularly, international relations before the French Revolution of 1848 were moderated by expediency, the wise policy of maintaining an equal balance of power, and marked by a common sense of sharing a civilization thought as being conducive to the practices. The growth of near-equality between several leading states, in one way or another, imposed the need for calculation and restraint upon all the individual leading states and therefore destroyed the idea of treating Europe as a whole or a simple
community as well as facilitated the growth of egotism of the individual state and its insistence upon its complete autonomy. In other words, nationalism rooted out the principle of moderation fundamental to those circumstances. The rivalries among the great powers, at the time of the 1848 Revolution, did not subside on the grounds of these new ideological forces, and thus "the revolutions of 1848 had been observed as a 'turning point at which history failed to turn.'" At any rate, nationalist sympathies and aspirations inter alia were not challenging the order but advancing it as well.

The technological progress and ever-increasing accumulation of knowledge implied a necessity of change in the practices of internal affairs of states. These changes together with the improvement of government called for the reconciliation of the momentum of public opinion to the state. As a result, the relations of government and society underwent a distinct alteration towards greater cohesion from about the 1860s in all the more developed countries. This was prominently displayed in the changing character of national sentiment in the form of increasing concentration on the organs and symbols of the state. The heightening of the emotional attachment towards the armed forces as symbols of the national state, for example, was an indication of this process. Loyalty to the nation gave way to loyalty to the state among the general public in most places.

The transformation of cosmopolitanism into nation-state during the latter part of the 19th century was being helped by the emergence of great statesmen, like Bismarck, and equally influential scholars, men like Leopold von Ranke and Heinrich von Treischke, who were basically nation-state oriented and argued vigorously in favour of the raison d'etat. Ranke maintained that the balance of power is capable of accommodation, hence the system in which movement and change were the normal condition would adjust itself accordingly to nationalism. Thus he advocated the reconciliation of the two concepts.

in a way to which Palmerston could hardly have objected. Palmerston was after all a disciple of Castlereagh in giving priority to the "maintainence of the peace of Europe" and the "preservation of the balance of power" in terms of the existing treaty systems over the advance of the liberal and national causes. 47 Ranke also recognised the operation of force in the resulting order of things. 48

The amazing transformation of ideas from the time of Abbe de Saint-Pierre's publication of Project pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe and its ratification by Rousseau to times of Treischke could amply be seen in the latter's article of "The State Idea," in which he not only put forward the argument for the necessity of a strong state in his usual "provocative" and equally powerful manner, but preached that "the appeal to arms will be valid until the end of history, and therein lies the sacredness of war," and thus "the grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations." 49 He assumed that when great states are strong enough to be self-sufficient they are anxious to secure peace, "for the safety of their own existence and the civilization of which they are the guardians," and that "any organized system of States must assume that no one state is so powerful as to be able to permit itself any licence without danger to itself." 50

Charged with this and the strong lobbying of other scholars, Clausewitz for example, and coupled with his "extraordinary superiority in all departments of the game, i.e., practicing subtle balance of power policies; 51 Bismarck

47. Ibid., pp. 222-225.
embarked upon constructing a system of alliances in grandiose style. This system, however, was that of a competing alliances, "it was a Balance, not a Concert, of Power." 52

The First World War caused a line of thinking in Britain and United States that resented all of the above. It was held that the alliances turned rigid and thus the preaches of the aforementioned scholars and the tendency towards militarism were responsible. It gave reasonable grounds to President Wilson, in the quote cited earlier, to blame the cornerstone of them all - the balance of power; as well as the elaboration of another concept, i.e., that of the collective security.

Though the concept of the balance of power was to be repudiated in greater detail later on, but it seemed that this theme was prevailing before the War. Thus General Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote in 1912: "Above all the principle of the European balance of power, which has since the Congress of Vienna led to a somewhat sacrosanct but completely unjustified existence, must be completely crushed." 53 In 1914, when it was realized that war was inevitable, the German Foreign Under-Secretary expressed regret that "Germany, France, and perhaps England," had been drawn in the war, none of whom wanted it in the least and that war came from "this damned system of alliances, which were the curse of modern times." 54

However it was performed, the balance of power worked with great calculation in its pure sense. It brought forward general peace from 1871 to the outbreack of the war, tacit acceptance of the status quo, and self-restraint. In the words of A.J.P. Taylor, the balance of power during these

52. Ibid., p. 322.
years "seemed to be the political equivalent of the laws of economics," and thus self-operating. "Only those who rejected laissez faire rejected the Balance of Power - religious idealists at one extreme, international socialists at the other."55

The aftermath of the First World War urged the great powers, albeit mostly the victors, to try and seek an alternative in the place of the balance of power. In the light of the prevailing theme of "change" and "a new course of action," therefore the League of Nations and its system of so-called collective security was established. This was a system that was believed to encompass all the states, irrelevant to their powers, and that they would commit themselves to the repression of individual attempts to make use of force: in other words, the substitution for the old order in which the individual state's resorts to force was considered legal and in which other states joined in order to stop a troublemaker only if they felt that this was in their interests at the moment.

The idea of the collective security was launched as the basis of a new international system that its proponents argued was no longer based upon the balance of power. They intended to direct it against aggressive policy not against excessive power. Hence it was put forward that in the course of the transformation of a temporary preponderance of a state's power into the permanent preponderance of all law-abiding states against any troublemaker, resort to force could be made in order to secure peace, a point which the Covenant openly justified.

The inter-war period was, however, marked by the failure of collective security and by the absence of any balance of power system; a period which even the "Locarno spirit" or pacts like Briand-Kellog's could not help. The historical record of collective security under the League appeared unhappy for its basic objective assumptions regarding distribution of power, reduction of levels of armaments, and the 55. A.J.P. Taylor, "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. xx.
effectiveness of economic sanctions, all proved invalid; and the elaborate legal and structural apparatus rendered ineffective. Not only did it fail to prevent major war, but it also failed to eradicate alliances and other manifestations of the so-called discredited system.

The "community of power" and its associate variables not only did not replace the balance of power, but also did help the staying power of its naturalistic conception to survive in one way or another. Therefore it was realized during the later years of the League that it cannot replace the Concert of Powers but could be used to perfect it. On the same lines, the principle of collective security was thought of not a replacement for the balance of power but a principle that could improve, regulate and institutionalize the concept. It was "only a more scientific development of the doctrine of the balance of power as laid down by Pitt, Castlereagh and Palmerston." On this basis, collective security could not succeed in throwing away the balance of power; on the other hand, it could be regarded well as one of the spectacles of it, a further refinement in balance practice or a chapter in a legalized Holy Alliance, which as has been observed, shared similarities like the primary concern with status quo, the idea of deterrence, the role of the great powers, the acceptance of "war and peace," and so on with each other.

All the same, the world had to face with yet another war in a matter of just over two decades on a scale not known before. Whatever the underlying reasons behind the sparking off

of World War II, balance of power considerations or otherwise, the system underwent yet other transformations that originally were the extension of previous attempts in adjustments. But it was soon to be revealed that the circumstances were entirely of different nature.

When the dusts of the Second World War settled down, the great powers soon started to revive what was left from the League and coupled with the learned lessons of the War and results of the decisions made at their conferences, created the United Nations. It was hoped that the UN would attempt to avoid the reasons behind the failure of the League by providing for a collective security force capable of applying military sanctions and supplied primarily by Great Powers. This plan, however, was one of the first casualties of the Cold War.

Thwarted by the Soviet vote in the Security Council and assured at the time of a comfortable two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, the US attempted to retain a collective security scheme in a different form as well as its control. Thus came the Uniting for Peace Resolution and its subsequent use in the Korean War. However, the Soviet Union disputed its legality and argued in favour of the Security Council. The scheme was finally buried when the UN was outflanked in the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian uprising. As a result of the failure of collective security in the Suez Crisis, a new initiative was made by the then Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold. Usually referred to as "preventive diplomacy," it was a less ambitious type of the UN intervention based on the acceptance of the situation that the UN was ineffective in major

issues of the Cold War and that, even in other issues, it cannot operate with military contribution drawn from the Superpowers. The outcome of this was the UN Emergency Force sent to the Middle East and later to some other troublespots, notably the Congo and Cyprus. This device was also to be proved futile based on disagreements between the Superpowers. However, its objective was to localize the conflict, to exclude the Great Powers, and to prevent an escalation of the minor conflict into a major one. The position of the Superpowers on the situation in Congo clearly showed the ineffectiveness: the US chose to interpret the action as preventive diplomacy, the Soviet Union considered it as a collective security action against the Belgians.

As such, it has been argued that the UN by its very principles of its Charter negated the whole idea of the collective security. This being done by the voting procedure of the Security Council, i.e., the veto power and other rules assigning a preponderant role to the great powers, and in the absence of working balance of power, it offered "the alternatives of community of power or anarchy."  

The events outlined above are examples that clearly showed the intangibility of the idea of the community of power. Based on this realization, the principle of balance of power which once referred to as obsolete during the interwar period came back into the foreground of international affairs, so much so that the argument ever since has been centred around it.

It should be noted that the US left its position on "entangling alliances" and entered the First World War occupying the traditional role of the British - that of the holder. The Second World War completed this process by making her into what became known as a Superpower. Along with the Soviet Union, a Great Power achieving the same status a short while

later, they both adopted approaches of their own to international problems. The Soviets were determined, justly in a sense, to prevent the reoccurrence of the old order, a point succinctly made by Stalin as early as in 1940:

"The so-called European balance of power had hitherto oppressed ... the Soviet Union. Therefore the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe."  

The Soviet feeling of insecurity, one might say, has not a bit changed from the stand taken above since the World War II. This being so, the American approach, on the other hand, was one of idealism towards the problem, thereby their insecurity stemmed from the failure of that point of view. They had hoped to transfer to an international organization the maintenance of some new system of balance of power and to guarantee security, keep order, by force if necessary, through an organ of that organization. American idealism disappointed against the realities of power and human nature. Doctrinal and ideological conflicts became as threatening as the religious wars; the UN was progressively paralyzed; and Communists took over in China. Instead of seeking security in a new form of balance of power adopted to the needs of a rapidly changing world, the two Superpowers retired into a position of facing each other aggressively in the context of the Cold War.

By mid-1950's the giants had moved into a small-scale nuclear deadlock, a situation that became known as the "balance of terror." First referred to by Lester Pearson in a speech to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the signing of

the UN Charter in June 1955, that "it had replaced the balance of power," the idea was explored in greater detail by A. Wohlstetter in 1959. Based in the context of deterrence and employing the notions of "surprise attack," "assured second strike," and inflicting "retaliatory unacceptable damage," he concluded that the rhetorical balance of terror is a precarious one.61

Fundamentally, the replacement of the multipolar structure by one heavily dominated by the two superpowers, each appearing more or less equal to the other and far ahead from their nearest rivals, was perhaps the most adjustment in the world balance of power. This transformation, achieved in the early years of the nuclear era, manifested clearly not only the end of a homogeneous pool of Great Powers but signalled a departure in terms of a hierarchial one, a system that would be dominated by an Adversary Partnership between the two pre-dominant powers. The transformation has said to be the result of the invention of termonuclear weapons, and that this aspect of post-War period regulates the distribution of power. Thus, a distinction, however, should have to be made about the balance of terror and the balance of power. Therefore:

"The latter consisted of an approximately even distribution of capabilities that included actually mobilized military forces; it involved primarily the power to defend and to seize territory. The balance of terror is based on readily available termonuclear forces - it exists even if the rival quantities are unevenly matched as long as each side has enough of these forces to inflict unacceptable reprisals, for this balance-involved the power to deter or to destroy." 62

The bipolarity reached its height in the 1950's, but its hardening impact on the world balance was to be subsided after


some understanding was reached after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus a change in international politics began to evolve in the 1960's in connection with the confrontations impending in that era. Therefore an "era of negotiation" was begun and it was possible to claim that a "detente" has been achieved in the early Seventies. In other words, it was "possible to do what is necessary in the military field to prevent war without having to forego doing what is possible in the political field to preserve peace."\textsuperscript{63}

Thus it was claimed that the model of the balance of power, prevailed in 1945-1972, was moderated.\textsuperscript{64} This moderation took place in the framework of a drastically changed international system. It was thereafter assumed that analyzing world affairs in bipolar terms might be relevant in a military sense only and would be an obstacle in understanding today's world in general. Furthermore, the unusability of stockpiling, the emergence of new nations' power-politics, the intractability of various conflicts independent from the Cold War, the development of what became to be known as transnational links, and alike helped to present a new context in which the blocs were strained or broken, multiplied the actors and created a new scene with a different scenario. Thus "the delicate balance of terror" entails also the paralysis of power, and this paralysis enhances the role of third parties.\textsuperscript{65} And it was to be remembered also that in addition to the above, two other cardinal precondition of a balance of power policy practiced in the old order or in two-and-a-half decades after the World War II are gone: the distinction between public and private activities and the distinction between internal


\textsuperscript{65} Z. Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 56.
politics and foreign politics. It is possible, therefore, to say that a very stable strategic nuclear stalemate has existed ever since the late 1960s between the USA and the USSR, in spite of endeavours by some scholars to prove it otherwise. The situation has been confined and codified by the SALT I agreement of 1972 and its continuation in the SALT II. Today it has been accepted that this state of affairs is unambiguously satisfactory, productive of confidence on both sides and therefore conducive to an ever-broadening dialogue and that it has been marked by the alternative and burgeoning theme of detente.

As for the principle of the balance of power, it seems fit to cite the remarks of two present-day power politicians: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Helmut Schmidt. The former, in dealing with the present situation, i.e., a combination of a bipolar power world with a multiple state interplay, and that the interaction today is based on manoeuvres rather than a balance of power, gives a Fenelonian picture:

"A balance of power should not be confused with diplomatic manoeuvres designed to offset the power of another state or to increase one's leverage vis-a-vis another party. A balance of power implies something more enduring and stable. At the minimum, it means an approximate equilibrium in actual military power between the principle potential adversaries, as well as the existence of a system of relations in which excessive ambition of one or several parties in the balance are contained by the very existence of these more stable relations."

66. See for example: M. Mackintosh, "Moscow's View of the Balance of Power," World Today, vol. 29, no. 3, 1973, pp. 108-118. Mr. Mackintosh discusses that the balance of power is always precarious for the weaker of the two superpowers. Therefore, the Soviet Union opposes the transformation into multipolarity since it gives the status of "partial super-power" to the rest and that it places the USSR in a permanent minority and would weaken the crisis control arrangements. On this ground, the Soviet Union is strongly opposed to the EEC, especially its enlargement, and to the possibility that it might develop into a political entity, or worse still, that it might move into the field of military integration in the more distant future.

67. Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 54.
And as for the latter:

"The balance of power, governed by a wealth of measurable and immeasurable, objective and subjective factors including military, geographical, economic, political and psychological elements ... will continue to be the most important factor affecting global security, because the universal order will continue to be governed by rivalry, competition and the juxtaposition of States, peoples and ideas." 68

1.2 Recent Theorising

The overthrow of the old order in conjunction with the outbreak of the World War I, in a lesser extent, and subsequently the Second and its aftermaths, in full, provided a reasonable ground and ample opportunity for the scholar to re-examine or rather re-evaluate the doctrine of the balance of power. It was considered that the principle has undoubtedly been a guiding one in the practice of European statecraft and, moreover, it has been used by a great many theorists and commentators as well as statesmen and diplomatic historians as a concept explaining important and often vital aspects of international relations. Furthermore, it was pointed out that classical literature on the subject consisted of vague and more or less ambiguous descriptions of the way the system was supposed to operate, with few attempts to underline the conditions under which the system could have been expected to achieve its objectives and regulate the affairs.

Thus the attention was drawn to the inquiry into the structural workings of the principle in both conceptual and analytical frameworks. As was said earlier, this momentum, however, did not gain much force in the interwar period. During the 1920s there was relatively no sign of fresh attempt since it was thought to be "discredited." Thus, Pollard (1923) sought to bury the idea; and conceived as a theory, he declared that it is not only illogical, but fallacious and harmful.69 Towards the late 1920s, "it became customary to refer to it as an obsolete principle,"70 and was being ridiculed as "that favourite objective of eighteenth century statesmanship."71 In 1932 Cornejo defined the balance in the

context of cooperation, spiritualized social elements seeking a universal rhythm. In the same year de Balla concluded that it was a struggle towards preponderance. Lasswell treated the balance of power in 1935 as a balancing system and that equilibrium is the main theme there. Griswold (1938), Wolfers (1940), and Spykman (1942) devoted their efforts more or less to describe the subject in a context of the then American foreign policy and thus Spykman reached the appreciation of the balance as hegemony. The last major work published in this period was that of Wright (1942). In his "Study of War," he made a distinction between a "static" and a "dynamic" balance of power, the former being equivalent to equilibrium and status quo and the latter the policies adopted to maintain that condition. This period, however, witnessed the publication of several other works on the concept as was thought to be practiced in previous centuries.

Still, it was not until after World War II that international conditions favoured the widespread application of the concept: The matter became acute after 1947 with the

outbreak of the Cold War and the ensuing disenchantment with international political institutions. In 1948, Morgenthau, while reaffirming the traditional function of the balance as a regulator of international relations in lieu of international law, and while himself remaining sceptical as to its ultimate value to international society, held that states were in practice striving not just to maintain the balance, but because of the difficulty of assessing the quantification element of power, to achieve a margin of safety over and above that of other states.\textsuperscript{78}

An extensive exploration of the nature of the concept undertaken by Haas in 1953 was still essentially within the accustomed stream of thinking on the subject.\textsuperscript{79} From then onwards thought on the balance reflected the rapidly spreading alarm at first, the escalation in the strength of nuclear devices and their delivery systems, and, second, the increasing potentialities of violence on the sub-state level. The central questions now being asked were: (1) was stability of the balance, whether politically desirable or not, feasible any longer?; and (2) was the very existence of these new and terrifying weapons, untried and uncontrollable as they seemed, a guarantee for stability, irrespective of whether, in theory, they upset what was now the balance of world power?

A spate of literature began to appear, classified under the term "strategic studies," concerned, as in pre-nuclear centuries, with theorizing on the nature of the new balance. Now that war conducted by nuclear devices seemed inherently irrational, the first concern of theorists had to be the avoidance of war. The basis of these endeavours was the scientific treatise produced by Neumann and Morgenstern on the Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour in 1944.\textsuperscript{80} The way in

\textsuperscript{78} H.J. Morgenthau, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{79} E.B. Hass, \textit{op.cit.}
which psychological considerations were beginning to overshadow the customary logistical ones was reflected in the change of emphasis from balance of power to balance of terror from 1957 onwards. These years also saw the appearance of what were to be two classic works dealing with the strategy of conflict and on fights, games, and debates.

As new aspects to the daunting balance of terror began to present themselves, further fields of enquiry were opened in an effort to achieve fresh theoretical refinements. Such was the case with bargaining theory, which reflected the urgent need to avoid nuclear conflict at almost any cost. This in turn gave rise to thinking on the subject of crisis management. Closely connected with this was the emerging literature on modes of decision-making inaugurated by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1962, the implicit objective here being safe decision-making. There was also no shortage of ultra-realistic assessments of nuclear strategy and war, as presented in one particular imaginative attempt.

Within the mainstream of traditional thought on the


balance, attempts - this time completely disinterested politically - were beginning to be made to elaborate typologies of balances with a view to ascertaining their relative stabilities. Drawing on biological science for inspiration and moving into the fields of systems theory, Kaplan in 1957 employed the comparative method of analysis to great effect in shedding light on problems of system maintenance. The central point of the exercise was to determine which type of polarity of world power could ensure maximum stability, and in this respect Kaplan's findings pointed to a multipolar system, a conclusion shared by Deutsch and Singer. The latter was subsequently able to expand his findings on the basis of work done in his project, "Correlates of War." Waltz, on the other hand, preferred the bipolar system of balance as being the more stable. Since, however, overall stability resting on the great powers, in whatever polarity, was no guarantee that world equilibrium would not be upset by the action of small or middle powers, the role of these states in the balance drew the attention of scholars also.


History was to invalidate some of the basic assumptions still taken for granted by theorists of the balance as late as the mid-1960s. Two developments were responsible for this. First the rapid development of nuclear and allied technologies made it virtually certain that the day was not too distant when nuclear weapons could be turned out with relative ease, with a minimum of technical apparatus, and, above all, in clandestine conditions. Second, it was becoming more and more apparent that the knowledge of nuclear production could not be withheld indefinitely either from states hitherto ignorant in this respect or - a more sinister prospect still - from nonstate actors, and that there was an increasing likelihood that the monopoly of force which sovereign states had enjoyed for half a millenium might be lost.

This rendered much of the work still exclusively focussed on the investigation of the world balance of state power somewhat irrelevant. Even the emotional element reflected in the division of scholars into optimists and pessimists regarding their expectation of the survival of particular balances of state power seemed deposed of any substance. In 1957, Hertz was still able to argue on the historical analogy of the evolution of military technology from the late medieval fortresses, which helped to consolidate the territorial state, to the advent of nuclear weapons that the most important change during that period was the dimension of territorial scale. In the nuclear age, according to him, the state was no longer safe in this respect, and only vast structures covering far-flung geopolitical spaces were territorially impermeable. 

91. F.H. Hinsley, op.cit., (optimist); and S. Hoffman's various stands in the Foreign Affairs, (pessimist).

States, it seemed, were becoming vulnerable in both dimensions and, far from presenting the main threat to the world balance, were themselves presenting the object of attack. If this line of reasoning were taken to its ultimate conclusion, then the centuries of state-centred balances were drawing to a close, as the horizontal, inter-state dimension was being gradually superseded by a highly perplexing, vertical one. The prospects of this disintegration of the world interstate system and the ensuing chaos prompted a swing back to the studies of world order, as evidenced in the establishment of the Institute for World Order in New York.  

The recent theorising - that is, predominantly post-World War II considerations - on the principle of the balance of power, as pointed out earlier, focussed on the structural workings of the balance and thus scholarly endeavours aimed at this have been carried out in conceptual as well as analytical frameworks. The literature on the


95. It is perhaps appropriate at this stage to pay attention to a point here: that of the scholarly stand and thus the approach towards the subject. The question is best exemplified in the comparison between the general approach taken by the British on one hand and the Americans on the other in dealing with the issues in the realm of international politics. The British have probably been more concerned with
balance of power in recent years could well be divided into

the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than
the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological,
with principles than policy. This of course is by no
means a testimony that the British conservatism has abandoned
the current issues at the time when the ever-increasing pop-
ularity of behaviouralism in terms of the application of
quantitative and statistical methods to the traditional
materials of diplomatic history dominated the American
quarters. Most of the recent works published on the prin-ciple
of the balance of power, contributed mainly by the
Americans, bear the mark of this attempt towards operation-
ization. The main stream here is the inconsistency in the
reported results and interpretations, because each study
employs different theoretical specification, data and methods.
It appears to seem that in these endeavours the main pre-
occupation of the scientist is to postulate a set of axioms
to describe the doctrine. In other words: "In attempting to
operationalize the concept there is the understandable temptation to
shrink it to a set of indices which are immediately measurable .... In
doing this, however, there is a danger of losing sight of the suggest-
iveness of the original concept, which depends on the spawning of
multiple affiliations .... This, of course, is unfortunate ...
(A.J. Miller, "Pattern of Cleavage: The Balance of Power
Rerieved," Millennium, vol. 6, no. 1, 1977, p. 27). While
Miller emphasizes an advantage of the concept of the balance
of power that "it belongs to a recognisable intellectual tradition,
ultimately shared by all students of politics," (Ibid., p. 17) and
criticizes the "revisionist" and hawkers of new models of
world politics who fail "to recognize how our theories have the
habit of doubling back on themselves and reappearing like shadows from the
past," (Ibid. The emphasis here is on counter-attacking
the behaviouralists especially the fundamentalists in their
attempts to replace the "redundant" balance of power with transnationalism); Paul Schroeder, a self-confessed diplo-
matic historian, and though deserving some praise for
behaviouralists, receives the conservatist camp as having a
great contempt of the other: "The reaction of diplomatic
historians to these projects has primarily been one of deafening
silence. Whether from ignorance, inability to understand or use the
techniques, preoccupations with other concerns, or the feeling that the
quantitative manipulation of diplomatic documents and events yielded
calculations and generalizations too crude and simple to be of interest
to the historian, they have largely ignored both these studies and the
techniques employed in them." (P.A. Schroeder, "Quantitative
Studies in the Balance of Power," J. of Conflict Resolution,
vol. 21, no. 1. 1977, p. 4). Schroeder maintains that the
patterns sought by operationalists are concealed or
distorted precisely by treating diplomatic events as if they
were separate and detachable when they are not. In
sum, the present author adheres to the conclusions reached
by Maurice Keens-Soper: "I discount those whose interests is
restricted to exploiting the past in search of data relevant to their
models of the international system. This is a fanciful abuse of the
past, though earnestly disguised as scientific endeavours." (M. Keens-
balance of power in recent years could well be divided into four groups. The first, dominated by Haas, Claude, and Wight, is an attempt towards making clear the different usages of the concept, underlining the distinctions and pointing out the confusions. The second is marked by those who have tried to present a model or demonstrate the inadequacy of the concept in application, scholars like Kaplan, Rosenau, Rosecrance, Nye and Keohane. The writings of those who have applied the findings of the second to the historical materials empirically are in the third group, dominated by Singer and Small, Healy and Stein, and Zinnes. This group is also somehow overlapping the second one. And the fourth group is merely of those who have used the concept without reference to the issues raised by the previous three: the everyday usage found in books, articles, and media.


96. E.B. Haas; I.L. Claude, Jr.; and M. Wight. The article by Wight is to be found also in his "Power Politics," (Ed. by H. Bull and C. Holbraad), (Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1979) where he analyzed the concept of power in detail.


Therefore the notable ones are a matter of choice but one can single out Liska, Kissinger, Hoffman, Brzezinski, and Schmidt in general. The main features of the literature to be covered here, however, is more or less following the above order.

Thus Haas received the balance of power as a term which is not free from philological, semantic, and theoretical confusion, and made a distinction between the meaning and the application of the term. In the meaning given to the balance of power, he distinguishes eight different shades; and with regard to the application of the term in the discussion of international affairs, he recognises four areas of intentions. Therefore, according to him the term carries the meanings of: (1) distribution of power: a simple literally connotation; 2) equilibrium: a simple equilibrium of power; 3) hegemony: a simple hegemonial meaning of power; 4) stability and peace: balance of power not as a method for realizing stability and peace but identical with it; 5) instability and war: contrary to 4; 6) power politics: a combination of power, Realpolitik, and balance of power as one concept, that is the state survival in a competitive international world demands the use of power uninhibited by moral considerations; 7) a universal law of history: struggle towards preponderance and resistance.


100. E.B. Haas, op.cit.
against this; and 8) as a system and guide to policy-
making: conscious and deliberate behaviour and decision
making for a just equilibrium.

In applying the term to the real world, he distinguishes
four different areas of intention. Thus, the balance
of power here means: 1) a purely descriptive intent:
depending on the occasion, either a mere distribution of
power, or equilibrium, or even hegemony, or preponderance
of power; 2) as propaganda and ideology: a catchword to
draw attention to peace or war, or used to explain policies
in terms of natural laws, moral rightness, or historical
necessity; 3) used as a tool of analysis, a theory, to mean
power politics, equilibrium, hegemony, and universal law;
and 4) as prescription: a Hobbesian state of nature where it
is used to mean guide-and-system.

While Haas maintains that each meaning and intention
must be considered separately in terms of the immediate
context, even though meanings and intentions may change as
the context changes, either in compliance with the user's
overall scheme or in defiance of his thought; Claude \(^{101}\)
reviewed the balance of power with similar reservations. Its
meaning, according to him, if not shrouded in mystery, is at
least cloaked in ambiguity. And the problem with the balance
of power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has too
many of them.

Claude suggests that the concept is used in the liter-
ature in at least four different ways: 1) as a situation:
that is equilibrium, disequilibrium and the distribution of
power; it is the international order of a period; 2) as an
ambiguous concept: that is a policy of states or a principle
capable of inspiring the policy of states: a policy of
prudence, a means of producing or maintaining a condition, a
policy used to describe a situation of disequilibrium, and
struggle for power; 3) as a system: a certain kind of

\(^{101}\) I.L. Claude, Jr., op.cit.
arrangement for the operation of international relations in a world of many states; and 4) as a symbol: realistic and prudent concern with the problem of power in international relations: that is a harmonious relations among nations. Claude, however, maintained that the balance of power despite of its ambiguities and multiple usages carries an idea which is relevant to the problem of the management of power in international relations.

Martin Wight proceeded with a primary distinction between the pattern of power and balance of power. The former corresponds with the geopolitical configuration, a consideration of strategy; the latter is an idea designed to consider military potential, diplomatic initiative and economic strength. The balance of power, according to him, is notoriously full of confusions arising from: 1) the equivocation and plasticity of the metaphor or "balance" itself: that is in the meaning of the priority of equipoise to preponderance; 2) an overlap between the normative and descriptive senses; and 3) implying an estimate in weighing the balance requiring judicial detachment, the judgement expressed being an adjective one, is necessarily carrying a subjectivism.

The balance of power in the realm of international politics implies two different entities. First, it is a system of foreign policy, or in other words, a set of actions by the actors in international politics aimed at upholding, neglecting, or repudiating that in favour of some other supposed system. Second, it is an historical law or theoretical principle of analysis derived from or applied to the one's reflection on international politics. Wight contends that there are nine different meanings manifested in the context of those two entities. Thus, balance of power comes to mean: 1) an even distribution of power: based on the idea of equipoise, it is a state of affairs in which

no Power is so preponderant that it can endanger the others. This meaning takes the forms of a simple balance or a multiple balance with respect to the number of the actors involved; 2) a necessity of even distribution of power: the implication in terms of the status quo and equilibrium, a normative use of the term; 3) the existing distribution of power: any possible distribution of power without taking into account "equilibrium;" 4) the principle of equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak; pursued in the maintenance of an even distribution of power; 5) margin of safety: policy towards superiority; 6) a special role in maintaining an even distribution of power: as implied by the role of the balancer; 7) a special advantage in the existing distribution of power: in the geopolitical sense; 8) possessing preponderance: or possessing that advantage; and 9) an inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power: a "law" advocating equilibrium. On these varying meanings, Wight maintained that the very idea and language of the balance of power has a mobility that tends, so to speak, to defeat its own original purpose.

P.A. Reynolds, in considering the concept, deals with three different kinds of confusions found in the literature about 'that disturbingly loose and inconsistent notion.' These are referred to as: 1) the usage that slip hazardously between "theoretical" statement and supposed real-world analogues, frequently to the detriment of both theory and practice; 2) the usages explored by Haas, Claude, and Wight in above, that is, in general terms: a) the system which is in balance, and the concern of theorists is with the factors that affect the ability of the system to maintain itself; b) a policy aimed at maintaining the balance of power, or in other words, a policy of intervention by one balancing unit in relation to one contingency only - potential dominance by one power or group of powers. Here, a role is assigned to the balancer; and c) in relation to the safety margin, that

is the policy in a context of a direct corrective action by one of the two parties involved in an unstable situation in response to a perceived power accretion by the other. And 3) the ambiguity surrounding the definition of the concept of power itself.

Balance of power, as Reynolds tells us, delivers the three senses of system, policy, and power: A balance of power system is the one which is enabled to persist through structures and processes that keep within limits changes in the capacities of the units to influence each other's behaviour; a balance of power policy is the one which refers to maintenance of a balance of capabilities; and with regard to power, it is the capacity to bring about a change in the behaviour of another entity, and the attributes or capabilities from which that capacity derives.

A.J. Miller,\(^{104}\) regards the flexibility of the balance of power as its great feature and also its strength. He also asserts that the features of the concept, or in other words, the cornerstones of the balance of power form the basis of its contemporary critic and fuel the impulse to retire the concept. Features are: 1) the state, which is the essential one; 2) a limited conception of polycentrism, that is an exclusive club exists and that membership is restricted to Great Powers upwards; and 3) balance of power as an overarching goal: that is a military security.

Indeed, the search for the cornerstones of the balance of power and their impact on other concepts in international politics is not confined to the above. The doctrine of the balance has said to be in close connection with, inter alia, state, the interaction between domestic and international sides in a policy of a state, the configuration of power relations, and the role of small state.

\(^{104}\) A.J. Miller, \textit{op.cit.}
The essence of the state is so self-evident that in the discussion of alternative models in international relations, heavy emphasis is placed on the tradition of the balance of power, as well as on the out-datedness of the state itself. Thus, what is at stake here is the justification of these models and an attempt at replacing them with the idea of the state.  

James Rosenau and John Burton were among the first to question the appropriateness of the conceptualizations of the balance resting upon the notion of state. Thus Rosenau, through the introduction of the two concepts of "issue-areas" and "the penetrated political system," attempted to change analysts' perception of the discipline of political science - particularly comparative politics and international relations so that they would accord with political configurations as he saw them emerging in world politics. The notion of an issue-area was thought to involve a shift in the angle of perception of international politics. States are locked into clusters of issue-areas and the participants in each are likely to vary. The concept of the penetrated political system, on the other hand, was an attempt to destroy the distinction between national and international political systems. It referred to the phenomenon of non-members of a society taking actions which are accepted and, perhaps, thought legitimate by members of a society. The reference then is to forms of integration across state boundaries.

John Burton held that there are many other transactions in addition to those initiated and regulated by governments that also cut across state boundaries. Better than to drop

105. For discussions on state, see E.V. Gulick; H. Butterfield and M. Donelan; op.cit.

the term "international relations" in favour of the collective embrace of "world society." Thus, a world map which represented all significant transactions in this society:

"would be like a mass of cobwebs superimposed on one another, strands converging at some points more than others, and being concentrated between some points more than between others. The boundaries of states would be hidden from view."  

The state in his view, therefore, becomes one actor among many.

The balance of power in the context of Rosenau and Burton's models is thus treated as otiose and unsatisfactory. To Rosenau, for instance, the idea of a balance of power is difficult to fit with the issues which have been handled simultaneously in the domestic and the external environment processes of a state. For Burton, the ingredient of equilibrium and its maintenance is wholly incompatible with his "world" governed by overlapping behavioural systems in relations to which states perform regulatory roles.

Though the above attempts in the re-conceptualization of world politics viewed the balance of power in a context of a blending milieu between the domestic and international sides of foreign policy from a different angle, it was yet to be debated whether the doctrine is lost somewhere or otherwise. Thus Hoffman 108 maintained that although the "linkage" is present the deterioration or breakdown of the balance of power can indeed often be attributed to domestic turmoil or revolution. Foreign policy today, according to him, is not so much the quest for the national interest outside, as it is the external projection of national moods and concerns. The relevance of balance of power policies and techniques would not turn dubious in this context since the

state remains the major unit of decision. Moreover, it is likely to try to protect itself vigorously against the threat of "penetration," or to promote itself by exploiting the domestic discords of others. Therefore, it is conceivable according to Hoffman, that in a world of security-conscious states, the balance of power not only is not redundant but flourishes in the form of a fluctuating one.

There was a time when a British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was so ignorant of Asian affairs that he hardly knew the Red Sea from the Persian Gulf. This view was also present in the perception that balance of power dominion is in Europe, a point expressed by Lord John Russell on the mechanism of the balance of power and its relation with the small states: "the balance of power in Europe means in effect the independence of smaller states." The subjects of other areas than those governed by Great Powers were supposed to be out of the circle of the power play, a point manifested in the equivocal undertaking of Lord Russell against nationalism, thus: "The Great Powers had not the habit of consulting populations when questions affecting the Balance of Power had to be settled." This was to be repudiated since nationalism was on march and contributed to a process of change that has now become an explosive political force, influencing the world balance.

Though this transformation is also linked with the ever-changing realities of international relations, but there came the time when the small state could not be written off any longer. In fact, a small state today is able to insulate itself against the manoeuvring drifts of the great powers and also in picking up client states in the

interests of its security. Global conditions, moreover, are far more unsettled than the 19th century, and the pace of change in small states is hardly susceptible to effective manipulation from outside, especially from a rather static and traditional balance of power vantage point. The workability of the doctrine for the small states is stressed by Hoffman:

"The small nations would find security, not in submission to a leader, or in a neutralized shelter, but in the balance of power itself, which would allow them to pursue more actively their interests within its less constraining limits."

The changing global conditions not only have had an impact on small states, but also have shaped the pattern of power configuration among nations in general. It is a long time since the debate over bipolarity and multipolarity, and the general assertion is that international affairs are in a new context far from the principles of Cold War. This being shown by the activities among nations in favour of reconciliation. It is therefore evident that in a world which is evolving into this international system, balance and multipolarity will have far more application than they have had in the past. This pattern of course bears the desire to ensure security through a flexible system of alliances and the readiness to accept former enemies as allies.

Indeed, one of the features of the new context of international relations is the fluidity of alliances, or in other words, to do away with the traits of rigid bipolarity in the past that reduced both actors and the range of issues to a minimal so that, in the words of Kissinger:

"every issue seems to involve life and death. Diplomacy turns rigid, for no state can negotiate about what it considered to be requirements of its survival."


As a result, multipolarity in the balance of power system requires the actors, as Hoffman tells us, to pursue two things:

"A) Flexibility of alignments, i.e., the willingness to make alliances with almost anyone in case of need - in particular in order to stop a troublemaker - without any concern for the domestic regime or ideology of the ally and the willingness to abandon or break such alliances whenever the initial circumstances have changed; and B) An acceptance of international hierarchy, i.e., the refusal to envisage such permanent hostility among the major actors that the recruitment of clientele of allies among the smaller states would become imperative and the consideration of occasional common interests of the major states impossible." \[133\]

The bipolarity v.s. multipolarity configuration was but one of the basic questions included in the contribution of Morton Kaplan\[14\] to the field. He is more or less credited as the first one of the so-called modernists, as against the traditionalists, who attempted to make the concept of balance of power operational. In his "System and Process in International Politics," we are told of certain conditions about the international context, that is axioms about the actors, stability, war, and alliances. Thus the pattern of interaction between two or more state actors, which composes a system of action, will be called a balance of power system if the following three conditions hold 1) the system is without a political sub-system that authoritatively regulates the behaviour of system members, such as a fully UN; 2) there are at least five essential actors; and 3) the six rules of actor behaviour are followed: a) act to increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight, b) fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities, c) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor, d) act to oppose a coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of preponderance with respect to the rest of the system, e) act to constrain actors who subscribe to super-


\[14\] M.A. Kaplan, op. cit.
national organizing principles, and f) permit defeated of constrained essential actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.

Thus war and alliances are acceptable behaviour among the essential actors as part of the equilibrating process. And moreover, as Kaplan tells us, alliances are fluid and flexible, they are made for instrumental and not ideological reasons, and actors are indifferent about whom their alliances partners are. These characteristics flow from the operation of the six essential rules of such a system. Kaplan's assertion lies in his prediction that, when viewed from the perspective of the system, alliances are equiprobable and time-independent: "the balance of power" system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations. Moreover, any particular alignment should not predispose the same nations to align themselves with each other at the next opportunity. According to him, therefore, the alliance formation process in a balance of power system is a stochastic process. That is, in a balance of power system alliances occur from time to time, and these events over time are subject to probability laws because the past behaviour of the alliance process has no influence on future behaviour. If we have a process in which "the future is independent from the past," we have a purely random or stochastic process. Kaplan specifically indicates that he is thinking in such probabilistic terms when he uses the metaphor of the behaviour of molecules in a tank of gas to characterize balance of power alliance politics.

Kaplan does not make clear whether his propositions are empirical generalizations or rules he thinks governments would follow if they were rational. He alternates between description and prescription. He states, in a number of
places, that his "balance of power" system has had historical counterparts. He specifically mentions the nineteenth century and states that the term "balance of power" makes intuitive sense if it is applied to the description of the international system that persisted throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, after listing his six rules of the balance of power system, he gives examples for each rule, many of them taken from the Bismarckian period.

This period has been more or less used as the empirical base in other attempts of this kind. Thus A.L. Burns, and Singer and Small,\(^{115}\) in pursuing the hypotheses that the international system is evolving into a multipolar world and that the notion of balance of power is inconsistent and vague in explaining the new global conditions, opted for, on the similar lines introduced by Kaplan, empirically testing some propositions which, in their own view, were exemplifications of refined and narrow notions of balance of power. It should be noted, however, that the major approaches towards the multipolar system, shared by the above scholars as well, are those that have been taken into consideration as a general framework. These approaches are:

1) the rules of a theoretical balance of power system; 2) the functioning of alliances; 3) historical systematic periodization; and 4) the application of structural balance theory to the international system.

Burns' theoretical analysis of the international system focussed initially on that of the classic balance of power system of the 19th century. There is a balance of power in operation if changes in relationships among two states affect a third nation. Therefore it is possible to think of an international system in which mutual arms reduction (alliance) between two powers places a third in a less-secure

position. If two nations reduce their arms jointly, the newly created surplus of weapons and men are now available for use against the third power. The implication is that cooperation created by the alliance is offset by the conflict created between the allies and the third power or group of powers. This principle, if valid, would severely limit the possibilities of drastic conflict resolution in the system.

The balance of power, alliance formation, and general system dynamics were the ingredients of the empirical study of Singer and Small. In their research, they focus on alliance aggregation, a structural variable at the systematic level of analysis, as a predictor of war. They test the hypotheses that: 1) the greater the number of alliance commitments in the system, the more war the system will experience; and 2) the closer to pure bipolarity the system is, the more war it will experience. They operationalize their dependent variable, "more war," by using five measures of conflict and operationalize their independent variable by employing seven measures of alliance aggregation. For the two centuries under analysis, their findings are ambivalent. They find high positive correlation between alliances and war in the twentieth century and consistent negative correlation in the nineteenth century.

Singer and Small discuss what they believe is generally assumed to be the underlying mechanism existing in a balance of power system:

"Central to this notion is the understanding that the invisible or unseen hand will function only to the extent that all nations are free to deal and interact with all others as their national interests dictate. Thus, it is assumed that every dyadic relationship will be a mixture of the cooperative and the conflictual, with political, economic, ideological and other issues all producing different interest configurations for each possible pair of nations. The net effect, it is believed, is such a welter of cross-cutting ties and such a shifting of friendships and hostilities that no single set of interests can create a self-aggravating and self-reinforcing division or cleavage among the nations ... It follows from
61.

this sort of model that anything which restrains or inhibits free or vigorous pursuit of the separate national interests will limit the efficiency of the establishing mechanism. And among those arrangements seen as most likely to so inhibit that pursuit are normal alliances... If alliances commitment reduces to some degree, the normal interaction opportunities available to the total system, and the loss of such interaction opportunities is supposed to inhibit the efficiency of the balance-of-power mechanism, we should find that as the system's interaction opportunities diminish, war will increase in frequency, magnitude, or severity."

Singer, in an earlier essay with Karl Deutsch, elaborated on the concept of the interaction opportunity. In his project with Small, however, he tested whether a decrease in the number of uncommitted nations due to alliance formation prevents the successful operation of cross-pressures on nations, cross-pressures that are assumed to ward off war. These assumptions form a tenuous chain: the greater the percentage of uncommitted nations, the greater the interaction opportunities, the greater the cross-pressures, and, therefore, the greater the chance for peace.

The above empirical hypotheses of Kaplan, and Singer and Small were also put to test by other scholars with varying results. Thus McGowan and Rood applied a probability theory, a Poisson model, to Kaplan's "theory" of the balance of power. They seem to suggest that the major powers in the 19th century have followed fluid and flexible patterns in alliance formation. They showed that the frequency and


duration of alliances among major powers during the period was random, as shown in the Poisson distribution. McGowan and Rood go on to suggest that the balance of power collapsed due to rigidity in alliance some time after the turn of the century.

Zinnes in "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," studied a key quote on the principle derived from various traditional writers and drew a set of six definitions of a balance of power world and tested the propositions of Singer and Small against them. On this, perhaps the first study on the Singer and Small's, Zinnes concluded that their definition was of a considerable different character than any of the traditional definitions. Systems which qualify under traditional definitions are said to be considered by Singer-Small standards to be poor representations of a balance of power, while the better Singer-Small representations are not considered balance of power systems by the traditional writers.

The propositions of Singer and Small were subjected to other empirical tests later on. In a project at Cornell University, USA, a data bank was set up consisting 982 events selected from the period of 1870-1881. Thus Healy and Stein tested the previous works, notably those of Kaplan, Burns, and Singer and Small in the light of what became to be known as the Situational Analysis Project (SAP) there. According to them, the propositions which were put forward by those authors did not hold up well under detailed testing. The rules of the balance of power were violated - in particular, an "ingratiation effect" was found in the place of the balance - restoring mechanism; alliances led to a lessening of cooperation and attention between allies; and historical periodization was found to be inaccurate.

119. D.A. Zinnes, op.cit.
120. B. Healy and A. Stein, op.cit.
The empirical studies, to be followed by other efforts, such as the incorporation of the technique of Optimal Control Theory, were of course of different nature compared to other models presented with relation to the doctrine of the balance of power. Among these are the ideas of transnationalism, on similar line to the notions which were put forward by Rosenau and Burton, and the cross-cutting cleavage.

Transnationalism, in close connection to the linkage theory, is often regarded as an influential example of the drive to break away from the state-centred conception of international politics. The assumption underlying transnationalism is that world politics is changing, but our conceptual paradigms have not kept pace. Into the worn paradigm of a state-centred world, afloat on the "myth" of sovereignty and transfixed on the issue of security, transnationalists wish to inject a touch of realism. They are concerned with incorporating into any future paradigm of world politics the contact, coalition, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments. Nye and Keohane point out the range of phenomena appropriate to this amended conceptualization of world politics - churches, revolutionary organizations, multinational business enterprises, labour movements, charitable foundations, and private international financial transactions. In particular, transnationalism is an attempt to integrate the study of international economics with international politics.

It is integral to this view of world politics that the behaviour of governments are progressively modified by their interface with transnational phenomena, since - as these


122. See, for instance, J.S. Nye, Jr. and R. Keohane, op. cit.
phenomena have a pedigree which precedes that of the govern-
ments of the modern state system - there would otherwise be
no justification for discarding time-worn paradigms of
international relations. In the work of Nye and Keohane
this view is expressed through two assumptions. First, that
national governments and transnational actors will define
their relationships more through bargaining and coalitions
than through win-lose situations. Second, they believe that
the political significance of transnational relations is in
the process of rapid amplification. Taken together, these
convictions amount to a statement of faith in a more moderate
future international system, where political accommodation is
a more likely form of conflict resolution than accommodation
through violence.

Whether transnationalism is believed to be the paradigm
of the future is not only yet to be seen but is very much
disputed as well. What is certain, however, is that balance
of power was dismissed by Cobden. Transnationalism with its
up-dated and futuristic Cobdenian view, attempts to dismiss
balance of power as well, but as diplomatic historians tell
us the doctrine survived successfully without giving in to
concepts being imposed upon it.123

123. For example, K.N. Waltz, "Man, the State and War: A
Theoretical Analysis," (New York: Columbia University Press,
1.3 A Framework for Analysis

We now leave the theories recently developed on the balance of power and turn to ascertain the underlying wisdom implied by the doctrine in international politics. In other words, we try to establish the philosophy of the balance of power as it is prescribed by Helmut Schmidt: "Balance of power will continue to be the most important factor affecting global security, because the universal order will continue to be governed by rivalry, competition and the juxtaposition of States, peoples and ideas."

Furthermore, the following lays down those certain points that might be interpreted as the understanding of the principle in this study.

Looking at the international scene with the eyes of the strategist or the power politician, we postulate that the balance of power is a refinement of a general system of power politics. While the search for power originally implies the desire for self-preservation, a generalized desire for power-seeking over a long period of time converts this process into an end itself. On this ground, the discussion of balance of power is thus identical with that general system. Moreover, power politics is regarded as the only discernible pattern in which balancing is an inherent process. As such, it is not therefore separate from but identical with competitive power struggle.

To use Raymond Aron's terms, the balance of power is a model of "strategic-diplomatic behaviour." The essence of international relations is seen as a contest of states on a chessboard on which the players try to maximize their power at each other's expense, and on which the possibility of war makes military potential and might the chief criteria of power. Seen as a combination of the immutable and universal law of international politics and the policy guidelines which some statesmen have consciously adopted in order to preserve the security and independence of their particular state, the principle of balance of power has rested on the
premise that there exists within the framework of interstate relations an essential dispersion of power, and that this fragmentation feeds the interaction of competing and conflicting wills. Given the permanent tendency towards that international picture, the balance of power policies seek to create a world in which some measure of order and predictability is restored in interstate relations.

According to the doctrine, the most effective method of neutralizing the destructive effects of military might is for all states to engage with vigilance and preservance in a balancing act, thereby preventing any one among them from achieving hegemony through force. States must forever be preoccupied with shifts in the nature and distribution of power, that is, with changes in the capabilities - military and otherwise - of other states. Once shifts in power have been perceived, states must be able to respond flexibly and rapidly so as to re-establish an adequate balance. To achieve this objective, states will need to maintain their military defence preparedness under constant review, and resort to such other balancing techniques as the formation of alliances, agreements on compensation and spheres of influence and, in some cases, military intervention.

Any informed understanding of the principle of the balance of power must be based upon a prior comprehension of the key role of power in the political process. In our approach, it is accepted as axiomatic that nation-states inherently seek to acquire and pursue power. In his Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes discerned a "general inclination of all mankind" toward a "perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that cease only in Death." Added to the belief of many commentators that power conflicts are characteristics of all political relationships - more so perhaps among nation-states than on any other level of political interaction, it can also be argued that the concept of
power is to the realm of political experience what the concept of wealth is to the economic realm. In all, both ideas serve as the principal integrating concept of the discipline.

When it is asserted that nations "pursue" power or are engaged in a perennial "power-struggle," what precisely is meant by such statements? The concept of power possesses a number of significant connotations. Though some commentators believe that the concept of national power is intrinsically issue-oriented, other interpretations provide the ample ground here, that is, the struggle for power is synonymous with life itself; as Hobbes said, the pursuit of power "ceases only in Death." A nation which did not pursue power would be, or soon would become, extinct.

The possession of power is, of course, crucial to the achievement of that goal which many commentators regard as the paramount objective of external policy: the maintenance of national security or self-preservation. Nearly every other goal to which a nation might be committed - peace, justice, a rising of the standard of living, a sense of global community, regional cooperation - presupposes the continued existence of the state as an independent political entity.

Nations also seek to acquire and use power to promote a variety of other goals. Here, it may be useful to think in terms of two broad-categories of cases involving the utilization of power: those entailing cooperative and harmonious relationships among nations, involving the "sharing" or pooling of power for common purposes; and those involving conflict and tension among nations, generating "power struggles" and wars among them. In the judgement of some commentators, the former category of cases does not properly belong to the study of politics at all, since in their conception the political process inherently requires conflict,
produced by some degree of opposition and disagreement, among the nations engaged in it.

This view, however, seems unduly restrictive. There is no inherent or logical reason why the concept of power must always imply conflict. In reality, even ideological and diplomatic adversaries engage in a range of relationships, some admittedly hostile and some reasonably harmonious, perhaps leading to a detente in spheres like nuclear proliferation, trade, and cultural agreements. At minimum, as the history of disarmament negotiations amply illustrates, it should be recognised that international politics may well involve power struggles and conflicts on behalf of ultimate goals shared by most states within the family of nations; not uncommonly, such conflicts may occur as part of a process of arriving at agreements among states on some objectives.

The concept of national power, if construed narrowly, could be equated with the capacity to wage, or threaten, war successfully and, after victory, to impose the national will upon the adversaries. The cornerstone of this meaning is the realization that at the back of diplomatic interchanges is the threat of armed forces, the possibility that policies will be supported by the use of violence. In Kenneth Waltz's succinct expression: "In international politics power has appeared primarily as the power to do harm." 124

Again, however, to confine the concept of power to the application of military force and the capability to impose harm seems unnecessarily restrictive. National power expressed as violence, or threatened violence is, as a matter of fact, infrequently relied upon by nations to realize their goals. Normally, nations employ a wide variety of techniques, ranging from reliance upon friendship and mutual interests, to persuasion and diplomacy, to nonviolent forms of 124. K.N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and the Balance of World Power," in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), "International Politics and Foreign Policy," op.cit., p. 305.
coercion and sanctions - like propaganda and boycotts - to threatened hostilities, to war, for accomplishing their purposes. Thus, national power could be broadly defined as the ability of one nation to induce, by whatever means at its disposal, specified behaviour by another.

Defining the concept of power quite broadly has one fundamental drawback, which is particularly troublesome in the assertion of the balance of power. Such a definition of national power tends to make it almost difficult to measure, or sometimes even accurately estimate, the power of one nation vis-a-vis another in the international system. When power is construed as denoting mainly military force, this approach has the merit of enabling decision-makers to arrive at reasonably accurate estimates of the power of their own and of other nations and to base national policies upon these calculations.

However, it may as well be conceded that, when power is defined in broad terms, attempts to measure or estimate it are, and will remain, highly subjective and impressionistic. Now this qualification does not mean that a broad definition of national power completely lacks the utilization or ought to be discarded. On the contrary, the notion that power is tantamount to influence and status is in some respect more in conformity with what modern nations actually seek to accomplish externally, than is restricting the concept of national power merely to the capacity to inflict harm. More than in any other historical era, present day states are pervasively and routinely engaged in endeavours to influence opinions outside their own borders, to inculcate a favourable "image" for their nation abroad, and to engender a feeling of goodwill and respect in other nations.

Granted that power is a pivotal concept in the analysis of international relations, a logical corollary is the idea that the maintenance of a "balance" or "equilibrium" of power
among the nations of the world ought to be a dominant objective of statecraft. Based on this, it is envisaged that a just equilibrium in power among the members of the family of nations is required as it will prevent hegemonial tendencies. Reminiscing from the classical balance of power period, prevention of the achievement of hegemonial power by any state is a conception underscoring the idea that, for the sake of the continued independence of the members of the international system, global power must always remain decentralised. No single state or coalition of states must be allowed to dominate the system or impose its hegemony upon it.

The contradictory connotations of the balance of power, the notions such as equilibrium and status quo, equilibrium preservation policy, decentralized distribution of power, no hegemony, preponderance of power, etc., are rather immaterial in our approach for these conflicting conceptions are resolved by differentiating between the public assertions of power politicians and their actual operational goals. Ostensibly statesmen nearly everywhere endorse the idea of the balance of power as the status quo. They desire a stable international system, in which threats to national security are minimized and the prospects for peace enhanced. Yet, on the level of operating policies, where goals are often unpublicized and left implicit, most states desire a preponderance of power. In the process of planning their military strategies and defense budgets, therefore, national officials routinely allow for a "margin of safety" in estimating the defence requirements of the state.

States generally do not feel secure unless they establish that margin. However, the very attempt to achieve this superiority increases the feeling of insecurity, for one's margin of security is another's margin of danger. Alliances are thus likely to lead to counteralliances and armaments to counterarmaments. In this sense, the balance of power is said to be aggravating the conflict of competing interests.
The US/USSR Post-World War II relationship, and the subsequent establishment of NATO and Warsaw Pact, for instance, followed this pattern. It is, however, accepted that the new global conditions developed from early 1970s onwards are supposed to provide no grounds for a return to the prevailing themes of the 1950s.

Still, the reciprocal interaction between the emerging patterns of international relations and the new approach towards the issues is also implying a rather different orientation in foreign policy decision making. Of particular interest here, however, is the ingredients of the international postures of the superpowers, especially the Americans. At best, the US ought to follow a realistic approach in the sense that it should break away with the kind of policies pursued in the South-East Asia, or the search for "strong men," "anti-colonialist" "anti-communist," but "pro-American" partners. This was a policy that created an image of the US as a "leading imperialist power," intervening unilaterally in various parts of the globe in pursuit of a policy of sphere of influence.

The corresponding programmes of economic aid, intended to strengthen the basis of a free society in the developing nations, more or less benefitted the extreme right-wing elements; communism instead of being suppressed gained strength. At other places, where aid helped to keep authoritarian regimes in power, independent bases of public opinion for challenging authority suffered. No wonder that the Soviets, with the help of Carterite mandatory human-rights formulations, found successful refuge in an up-dated version of a Lenin's dictum: from "He who is not for me is against me," to "He who is against the US is for the USSR."

Moreover, such descriptive terms as the Third World, Afro-Asian bloc, Non-Aligned nations etc., are not a coherent concept in the analysis of the strategic forces of the balance of power which is approached here, and especially when
received in the context of the new international relations. For in their respective regions the developing nations will continue to present many vexed problems of their own: integration, disintegration, unity in diversity, and so forth. Each will have to determine the price it is willing to pay for its revolution and turmoils and the currency in which it will pay - neo-traditional, democratic, communist, or savagely autheocractic.

The future balance of power may come to mean no more than a kind of holding operation on a world-wide scale. Yesterday's dialectic was that of a central balance between a handful of powers and imperialism, which pushed back the limits of the diplomatic world. Today, the minute of truth is postponed, and all the intangible components of power and all the uses of power short of massive coercion gain in importance - elements and uses that are very widely distributed and hard to evaluate. Tomorrow's dialectic will have to be that of a complex balance, both global and regional, allowing for a fragmentation of the strategic-diplomatic contest under the nuclear stalemate, and an emergent community in which competition will, of course, persist.
CHAPTER TWO: Post-1945 History of Alliance Formation

Since World War II, the complexities of power politics have necessitated the creation of institutions new to world politics: alliances and regional security organizations. These arrangements are different in principle from a traditional alliance because they incorporate a higher degree of coordination between the armed forces of the participating powers than formerly existed, and because they tend to further regional cooperation in many areas that are not strictly defensive in nature.

Alliances have commonly been identified with aspects of international relations that could lead to conflicts, specifically with reference to the balance of power. At one level, alliances could be viewed as a natural mechanism of the international system. At another, the formation of alliances appeared to be an appropriate strategy through which states could increase their preponderance. Accordingly, alliances have been a major process by which international power has been "balanced" and order maintained.

Countervailing alliances have been formed to deter or to defeat nations which have sought to achieve preponderance. As a major contribution to the mechanism of international politics, alliances have sustained continuity of policy and have introduced an important element of predictability into conflicting situations.


An examination of the "Games Nations Play" cannot be complete if due consideration is not given to the important concept of alliance. It is also, for the purposes of this study, a logical extension of the balance of power considerations.

In focussing our attention on alliances here, we first conduct a review of the literature and examine the concept itself. This would help to arrive at the definition of the military alliances which is utilised as the conceptual framework for the study of the Central Treaty Organization in Chapter 4. Second, no examination of the alliance system is complete without a survey of the chief examples. As such, the international political configurations and alliance formation after the Second World War is looked at. Finally, the dilemmas faced by small powers in their search for their security are examined.

2.1 Alliances: A Review

"Alliances are regulators in the equilibrium mechanism. They are as old as spear and as modern as strategic nuclear weapons, and tribes, city-states, peoples, and states have sought various kinds to fulfill their respective security needs. Nowadays entire continents are entrenched in alliances. Yet even the permanent ones seldom last. They fail and fall apart; they are successful but may experience a disintegrative process. Today's ally may be a neutral tomorrow and an adversary the day after."

As the above quotation comprehensively states, alliances constitute one of the most ancient political compacts entered into by nations. And when we speak of international relations we cannot avoid referring to alliances.

Alliances therefore, constitute a universal component of relations between political units irrespective of time and place. Moreover, it can also be said that alliance politics lie at the core of nations foreign policy so that when one speaks of alliances, one actually speaks of foreign policy in general. This makes alliance policy an integral part of foreign policy. This is so because alliances enable states to seek the cooperation of other states in order to enhance their ability to protect and advance their interests. In a negative way, an alliance policy becomes a necessity for some states who actually seek to avoid alliances.


7. Ibid.


So pervasive are alliances in human history that they have compelled the conclusion that they stem from the very nature of man himself:

"If individual man is, in truth, a political or social animal, and by his very nature craves the society of his fellows, it would appear that collective man, the states, is a social creature, if habitual behaviour is any guide. The behaviour of states from the time when they first made their appearance in the world indicates that they starved in need of the society and cooperation of their fellows."  

Alliances may be the most ancient of state practices but they still continue to flourish on the world scene. And yet even if it is quite ubiquitous on the human scene, the concept of alliances cannot be treated as a simple one. In spite of the fact that "the cursory view" of the literature "will quickly reveal that writing on international alliances and conditions has been prolific," most of this research does not meet the scientific standards of explicitness, visibility, and repeatability. So that while there are many histories of the workings of alliances, there remains a lack of any workable theory on the basis of which nations might learn how to "operate alliances better."  

Another relatively unworked field is the membership of small powers in alliances. It is not surprising that one


11. Ibid.


writer has suggested that additional investment of time and energy in the study of alliances as a component of international politics is clearly warranted.\textsuperscript{15}

Concept of Alliance: The ultimate purpose of a state is to protect the people of the state, their culture and their well-being. Because international relations is not governed by one supreme law, each state must therefore depend upon its own implied and applied capabilities.\textsuperscript{16}

National capabilities must also rest on considerations of sufficiency of resources whether economic, political or military. In a world of growing scarcity of resources, a national decision-maker must determine how he can best allocate national resources in order to attain national goals. One alternative is to seek the cooperation of other states in the attainment of material goals. There are several ways by which nations display cooperative behaviour: 1) Formal alliance: A cooperative effort in which the rights and duties of each member are codified in a treaty; 2) Coalition: A cooperative effort formed for the attainment of short-range, issue-oriented objectives; 3) Informal alignment: Learned expectations on the part of the nations as to how much cooperation might be expected from other nations; and 4) Behavioural alignment: Actual efforts of nations to coordinate their behaviours in a similar manner with respect to common objectives.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Friedman, \textit{op.cit.}, p.32.


\textsuperscript{17} M. Haas, "International Systems: A Behavioural Approach," (New York: Chandler Publishing Co., 1974), p. 101. For the strategist view see, John Baylis, et al., \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 176-179 where the "roots of alliances" have been defined in five overlapping categories of: 1) balance of power considerations, 2) coalition theories, 3) national attributes, 4) affiliation theories, and 5) domestic factors.
Typically, an alliance involves a commitment among two or more states, formalised by a legally binding international agreement, to come to one another's aid in the event of a certain specified action by an outside state or states.\textsuperscript{18}

A more detailed definition of the concept of alliance in the traditional sense is as follows:

"... Partnership, or contracted agreement between two or more powers in pursuit of a given object. In contrast to a formal permanent link between states, such as a union or confederation, an alliance has a temporary nature. The contracting powers, who forfeit none of their political independence in favour of the partnership, are termed Allies. The object of an alliance is specific; it entails mutual support in given circumstances for the attainment of given objectives, and not as is the case with a union or confederation, the joint realisation of overall national aims."

The utilization of force is implicit in another definition which considers alliances as a formal agreement that pledges states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally or in conjunction with allies) the use of force, in specific circumstances.\textsuperscript{20}

Alliances have also been considered to be instruments of national security; as such, they are defined as "formal agreements between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."\textsuperscript{21}

The incorporation of these two elements in an alliance,


\textsuperscript{20} Osgood \textit{op.cit.}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{21} Holsti, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 4.
i.e., the use of force and national security, often help to underline and distinguish what is known as a military alliance. Central Treaty Organization was definitely such an alliance. To put CENTO into analytical perspective, therefore, it is important to examine in some detail: a) the nature of a military alliance, its theoretical functions, and its relationship to the establishment of a security community among its members; and b) the requirements for regionalism and regional integration together with the relationship between the establishment of a security community and the requirements for regional integration.

Military alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system. Indeed a military alliance is a contractual instrument which defines an obligation between two or more international parties. Since it is normally negotiated under conditions which permit the parties to exercise some freedom of choice, a military treaty is a document which gives evidence of a consensus between the signatories. It is assumed that the existence of a military alliance is evidence of a legal commitment which binds the parties to the agreement or establishes an obligation that governs the behaviour of one party towards another. A military alliance generally commits the parties to come to the assistance of each other under a given set of conditions. The commitment in the treaty is intended to assure each member that the other members will respond automatically to a threat provoked by a non-member. In essence the function of a military alliance is to establish a degree of predictability in the behaviour of the states which are parties to it, an expectation that a threat to one party will be countered by a joint rather than an individual response. A military alliance, therefore, establishes a greater sense of security among the members as a result of increases in the power available for defensive action against external or internal threats.

A military alliance constitutes a warning to non-members. Ideally it will indicate either that a threat cannot be
successfully implemented, or that the cost of implementa-
tion will surpass any potential gain which might be achieved
from it. In either case the military alliance can
constitute a deterrent against a rational decision to
threaten the parties to the alliance. If the deterrent is
successful, the security of the parties can be achieved
without the actual employment of a response.

Any sense of security provided by a military alliance,
however, depends upon the existence of trust among the
members that the promised aid will be forthcoming when the
need arises. The amount of deterrence provided by a military
alliance partially depends on the degree to which the
potentially hostile states believe in the predictability of
the alliance members. If an alliance commitment is to be
defensive, its members may have to provide material evidence
that they intend to comply with it. This is because trust
and credibility are extremely difficult to establish and
maintain through verbal or written communications alone. One
means by which such trust can be established and cultivated is
through cooperation that extends beyond the military consider-
ations. In this respect the growth of regionalism and regional
integration can play a very important role in developing the
efficiency of a military alliance. An example in this context
is the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which grew
out of CENTO and is examined in this study (Chapter Four).

The degree of consultation within an alliance may also
prove to be a function of the degree of integration between
the members. In order that consultation be meaningful and
create trust among the alliance partners, however, joint
efforts in deciding policy and joint involvements in implement-
ing the decisions are necessary.

The main objectives of a military alliance are to
increase the power of the state and to establish balance or
preponderance of power with respect to the common interest
which motivated the alliance. The minimum increase in power
necessary to make an alliance useful to the individual member would be determined by the political objective of the state. To establish deterrence, for instance, a state must achieve a balance with the opponent. Deterrence, in turn, is inherent in the theory of containment, as was articulated by George Kennan, who advocated the establishment of an equilibrium of power between the West and the Soviet Bloc rather than a preponderance of power. When nations have agreed to participate in a military alliance, a decision maker may be motivated by national issues, as well as international ones. His objectives, therefore, may fall into any one of three categories: a) he may desire to bring about a change in national or international arena. In this case he may be interested in weapons with which he can threaten or coerce his opposition; b) he may desire to deter a transformation in a national context or an international one. In this case he may be interested in acquiring both military and non-military resources with which he can support the status-quo; and c) he may desire a combination of the above two objectives.

The Baghdad Pact was negotiated in circumstances under which the above objectives were prevailing. The objectives of the United States centred around the framework of containment. Those of Iran and Iraq aimed at the preservation of the status-quo. Pakistan's focussed on altering the unfavourable status-quo vis-a-vis India. Turkey was interested in containment and deterrence of aggression.

The Baghdad Pact differed from many traditional alliances, however, because there was a strong disparity of power among its members. The pre-dominant power in an alliance is the state which is the most powerful or which is expected to make the largest contribution of force to the activities of the alliance. If all the members define the dominant interest

identically, they presumably will have little cause for
disagreement on the level of force to be maintained. If
they differ, they may disagree; in which case the pre-
dominant power will be in a position to define the level of
force in accordance with its own evaluation of the dominant
interest. Circumstances may exist which prevent the dominant
power from freely defining the level of force solely in
accordance with its own interest. For instance, the territory
of the weaker powers may have strategic significance; or they
may possess vital natural resources.

On the other hand when the members disagree on the
definition of the dominant interest, they may also disagree
on the method by which the force of the alliance will be
employed. The pre-dominant power may intend to deter an
opponent, while the weaker power may intend to coerce another
opponent. The policy of coercion may be incompatible with
the concept of deterrence held by the dominant power, yet the
level of force necessary to deter may also be sufficient to
coerce. For example, the amount of power necessary for the
members of CENTO to have established a deterrent against the
Soviet Union might have been quite sufficient to constitute an
instrument of coercion against India. If the pre-dominant
power in the alliance is interested only in deterring its
major opponent, it must retain a veto over the utilization of
force and must not permit force to be directed against a third
party, even though it may be desired by an alliance partner.
Therefore, in an alliance the weaker power may have an improved
potential to overwhelm an outsider as a result of the alliance,
but it may find that its ability to initiate it is reduced by
the alliance. If the small power is restrained by the pre-
dominant power and prevented from making a first move, the
smaller power may not have improved its bargaining position
by joining the alliance. Consequently, the principal reason
for which the smaller power joined the alliance may be hind­
ered by the pre-dominant power. The weaker power may, in this
context, find it to its advantage to terminate the alliance
relationship with the major power, and may seek to dissolve
the alliance permanently.

The duration of military organization is usually defined in the terms of the treaty. Whether or not a state will continue to participate in the activity of the alliance for this duration depends upon two considerations: that the alliance continue to be a useful instrument for satisfying the interest of all the partners and that the alliance constitutes a greater asset than liability for each state. If the alliance does not satisfy these conditions, a state either will withdraw or will cease to participate in the activity of the alliance. An alliance may be terminated either if the strength of the threat diminishes, or if the focus of the threat passes from the region. But, it may survive the disappearance of a threat if the attention of the members can be shifted to a secondary interest.

In the event that the dominant interests of the members in an alliance are not identical, two situations exist: a) the course of action chosen by the pre-dominant power in meeting its interests may be irrelevant or harmful to the interests of the smaller member. This smaller partner, then, must attempt to shift the interest of the predominant power to that of his own. In order to achieve this shift, the smaller power may engage in methods of peaceful settlement in order to facilitate consideration of the ally's interest first before his own, or may engage in a form of blackmail with the threat either to withdraw from the organization or to re-align with the source of the threat to the pre-dominant power. This blackmail could occur even though the only solution to the smaller power's problem is through the alliance; b) the situation may exist in which the course of action taken by one power actually furthers the interests of another power, even though their objectives are different. The weaker power may believe that the assistance it is receiving will be continued only so long as the predominant power is involved in the conflict. The weaker power may not find it desirable that the pre-dominant power reach an agreement until its own objectives are achieved; therefore, the smaller power may find it
advantageous to get involved in the course of action taken by the predominant power. The history of CENTO illustrated many examples of these forms of relationship within the framework of an alliance.

Since either the international or domestic opponents of a government may object to a state's participation in a military alliance, such an alliance constitutes a liability in either the international or the domestic political arena. The liabilities may stem from the mere fact that the alliance identifies a political arrangement between states which is visible to the states outside the organization. Furthermore, a state may become involved in the disputes of the partners, whilst it would have remained neutral to the same disputes in the absence of an alliance. An alliance formulated to meet an immediate international crisis may force a member state to collaborate with a government that supports a different political system than the one which the state is trying to promote on the international level. Therefore, to contract an alliance for short-range advantages may delay the long-term objectives. An alliance may associate one state with the government of another state which does not possess broad domestic political support. The subsequent collapse of the weak government may be interpreted both domestically and internationally as a political defeat for the more stable member. Non-member states that have a dispute with an alliance member may create a counter-alliance to offset any advantages accruing from the existence of the first alliance. Counter-alliances, therefore, tend to expand the scope and intensity of the original dispute. The history of Iran's, Iraq's, and to some extend Turkey's involvement with the Baghdad Pact amply illustrates the crisis to a domestic government that an international alliance can bring about.

When the members of an alliance coordinate their policies with those of their allies, they lose some of their freedom to initiate action and to define their own interests. Because of
their subordinate position, the weaker powers, whilst possibly securing the greatest number of assets from the alliance, may also accrue the greatest number of liabilities. The possibility exists that the assistance which one state receives from another by virtue of the arrangements in the alliance will benefit the political or social groups opposing the government more than it will benefit the elite in power. Although the alliance may have been created to strengthen the stability of the state, it may ultimately be a factor which contributes to political and social instability. Finally, an alliance may constitute a liability for the government of a state if it becomes a focal point around which an opposition to the aligned government can rally. This liability has been particularly evident in the post-World War II era. Political activists who have experienced colonial rule or external influence frequently interpret any tie with a former power as the re-establishment of the influence; the charge of selling out to them has been a political slogan frequently used to undermine the political support of a government which has aligned with the West.

In the Cold War era, military organizations established most frequently between states that subscribed to similar ideologies. Ideological differences, though, do not create obstacles to states seeking an alliance with one another when both parties are promoting identical objectives. A corollary to this thesis suggests that ideological similarities will not perpetuate an alliance after it loses its utility for the members. The impact of modern military technology on the strategies adopted by states in defensive alliances tends to bear out this corollary.

In the era before the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the small and middle powers were strategically important to the major powers because their territories constituted a potential for defensive action. The British bases in Egypt, for example, were the centre of Great Britain's defence in the Middle East.
during World War I and World War II. Today, when a nuclear strike against almost any country in the world can be launched from the submarines or the high seas or the territory of the major power, the territory of the small or middle power has lost some of its strategic importance. The territory of the smaller state is no longer an essential for defensive action, although it may still constitute a line of demarcation which, if crossed, would signal the need to launch a retaliatory attack against an enemy. Since major powers have less need for strategic locations, they are less compelled to seek defensive alliances with smaller states. A major power is also less prone to respond to a smaller power's threat to withhold access to its territory if the major power does not come to its defence. Whereas defensive alliances created prior to the nuclear age have survived the technological developments, they are less effective in determining the predictability of states in the nuclear age.

The Baghdad Pact was created during a period when the threat of nuclear war was of major concern; however, the fear of such a war was not a factor which motivated its development. The statesmen who were responsible for the Pact's development appeared to be interested both in the establishment of a "show of force" in the Middle East, and in stopping conventional warfare of a World War II variety. The Soviet threat to the area was perceived as a continuation of the historical pressures that she exerted on the region as against pressure related to her new-found nuclear capability. This supposition can be partially explained by the fact that the first suggestion for a Middle East alliance came in 1951, before the development of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, and at a time when the United States was involved in a conventional war in Korea. Furthermore, the Baghdad Pact represented an attempt to apply techniques to the Middle East that were developed from Europe before the nuclear age.

Ronald Yalem's definition of the term region as a geographic area comprised of a number of independent states sharing
common economic, social, and political values and goals," would, on the face of it, apply to the Upper Middle East as well. The issue here is to see whether or not the tailor-made pattern for the Baghdad Pact would have fitted the region. Scholars of regional integration have used various criteria to define a region. For example, the term has been used to denote a contiguous geographical area, a cultural entity, or an economic unit.

Mere geographical proximity alone does not generate integration, as innumerable examples demonstrate. History is full of examples indicating that the neighbouring countries have fought more than the countries widely separated from each other. Nevertheless, geographical proximity is thought to be a pre-condition for regional integrations. It is apparent that if countries are geographically contiguous they are in a relatively better position to communicate with each other, to respond to each other's needs and messages, and to establish common institutions.

There is also a general agreement that compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of the population of the integrating countries is a necessary condition for regional integration. Thus pluralistic security-community is achieved by sovereign independent nation-states through foregoing the use of violence in settling their disputes.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly the difference between security communities and security organizations. Nation-states constitute a security community when they agree

to resolve their differences by peaceful means. Agreement on the principle of non-violent resolution of conflict may be tacit or explicit. Mutual conflicts may be resolved with or without the help of an institutional structure. The security organization, especially those created after the World War II are basically defence organizations and they are not created for the purpose of resolving conflicts among or between their own members. The major objective of a regional security organization is to protect the region from any outside aggression. Members of a security organization do not necessarily constitute a security community. For instance, Turkey and Greece, in spite of the fact that both are members of NATO, do not constitute a security community, so long as they are unable or unwilling to resolve their conflict over the issue of Cyprus without resorting to physical force. Similarly, membership in a security community does not necessarily mean membership in a security organization.

Regional organizations with closer links and shared institutions at the government level represent a level of integration higher than the level achieved within the framework of a pluralistic security community. In regional organizations greater integration is brought about by a sense of mutual dependence, and a desire for cooperation beyond the boundaries of the nation-states.

Regionalism and regional integration, then, are clearly related to problems of security and to alliance systems. A security alliance may create a favourable environment in which initiatives toward integration might be undertaken. Indeed, this step was taken by CENTO regional members and they began to build on the CENTO alliance the foundations of a non-military regional cooperation. In this way they surpassed the Cold War aspects of the original treaty and created a situation whereby the military alliance became a starting point, not a culmination of diplomatic activity.

The concept of alliance may also be distinguished from
other forms of international cooperation if the following pivotal features are present: a) existence of an enemy or enemies, actual or anticipated; b) contemplation of military engagements and the risk of war; and c) mutuality of interest in either the preservation of the status quo or aggrandizement in regard to territory, population, strategic resources, and so forth.²⁵

Thus, the alliance may be viewed as a relationship between two or more nation-states characterised by: a) pairing or collaboration with one another for a limited duration regarding a mutually perceived problem; b) aggregation of their capabilities for participation in international affairs; c) pursuit of national interests jointly or by parallel courses of action; and d) probability that assistance will be rendered by members to one another.²⁶

For the purpose of this study, alliances are viewed as "regulators in the equilibrium mechanism." As such, the formation of Central Treaty Organisation was based on the balance of power in the Upper Middle East. This alliance may be analysed in the light of theoretical literature involving the use of the equilibrium assumption:

"The actors on the stage of international politics—principally states—are supposed to have the natural tendency to consciously or unconsciously oppose excessive concentrations of power in one nation or group of nations. Under conditions of the possible use of force, the increment in the coercion capacity of one power unit will lead to a more or less proportionate growth of the means of coercion of at least one other unit in the system. Great disturbances in the equilibrium of the system, for instance, through the rise of a hegemonical power, will generally lead the other actors to augment their coercive capacities and/or to join together for the purpose of containment. This leads to equilibriums or stalemate situations which may then be provisional or permanent, partial or total. Change is not possible. Equilibrium may be disturbed and eventually end up in a new equilibrium on a different level."

²⁵ Friedman, op. cit., p. 5.
²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ De Raeymaeker, et al., op. cit., p. 20.
There are two alternatives open to small states in the movement toward equilibrium which can be best achieved by a system of alliances: 1) Alignment: A small state can decide to ally itself with one or more states in order to deter a potential aggressor. This can be done on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis; 2) Non-alignment: A small state may decide to provide its security outside alliance systems. Various kinds of non-alliance policies range from neutralisation or permanent neutrality to neutralism, non-alignment, and non-involvement.

Features of Alliance: The main aspect of an alliance treaty is usually underlined by way of a clause in its preamble. This features a fundamental commitment, shared by the signatories, that in the event of a contingency, the alliance partner(s) will duly respond to each other's aid. Such contingencies have been identified either as "aggression" or "armed attack." This feature of an alliance has been traditionally identified as the "casus foederis:

"casus foederis is the event upon the occurrence of which it becomes the duty of one of the allies to render the promised assistance to the other. Thus, in the case of defensive alliance, the casus foederis occurs when war is declared or commenced against one of the allies. Treaties of alliance often define precisely the event which shall be the casus foederis, and then the latter is less exposed to controversy. But on the other hand, there have been many alliances conducted without such a precise definition, and consequently, disputes have arisen later between the parties as to the casus foederis." 29

Not only in disputes arising from an interpretation of the casus foederis, but alliances treaties, in common with all treaties, have also been subjected to questions with respect to the original power of the signatories to conclude the treaty, the duration and binding effectiveness of the pact, scope of the obligations assumed, and the effect of the treaty upon other treaties and other parties. One particular

28. Ibid., p. 21.
instance of legal questions involving treaties is the existence of national justification upon foreign troops garrisoned in the territory of the host country. Because alliances are constituted by treaties, questions involving alliances so considered have come to be included within the scope of international law.30

Besides armed aggression or armed attack, contemporary treaties of alliance have identified in advance either specifically in the agreement or in broad and general terms, the enemy or the victims against whom the alliance is organised. Thus "communist expansion" or "capital imperialism" have been mentioned as the most common targets of alliances constructed in the existing bipolar cold war.31

Another feature of alliance is that they are limited in scope. The treaty normally mentions the members of the alliance, the territories covered, and the particular geographical area embraced by the alliances is either explicitly or implicitly stated.32

Treaties of alliance are not only aimed at limited purposes of attack or defence in particular geographic areas, they are also ad hoc and decentralized in nature. They are described as ad hoc because: 1) The treaties are for a short and usually specified duration of time; 2) They have a narrow policy-range, because most of them today are either aimed at anti-communism and some anti-capitalism; and 3) Their agencies and institutions usually function on the basis of a decentralized though coordinating agency.33

In sum, the most common features of alliances include:

30. Potter, _op.cit._, pp. 405-406.
33. _Ibid._
restricted membership, they are composed of only like-minded states, with common bonds; limited scope of activity, usually limited to the military goals of attack or defence in defined territory; limited duration and effectiveness, they are organised for a fixed length of time, lacking independent and final authority to decide or act in any manner upon the vagaries of national politics. They are best described therefore as: temporary relationships between two or more states that are joined together on an ad hoc basis through an agreement for the achievement of limited military purposes like prosecution of war or defence against aggression, potential or actual, all in the name of national interest.  

34. Ibid.
2.2 International Political Configuration and Alliance Formation After World War II.

The political map that emerged after the conclusion of the Second World War was indeed very much different from the one existed in 1939 and embodied in the ideas of "collective security" of the League of Nations. Its transformation, the coming developments in late 1940's, and the onset of the Cold war meant the United States and the Soviet Union had effectively emerged as the dominant and competing poles of power in international politics.

To consolidate their power positions and their hold on the system, these two powerful nations, later to be labelled as the Super-powers, embarked upon building a network of alliances round the world. In their efforts, they utilised some elements of the old concept of collective security, but based the new configuration on the traditional and still predominant considerations of the balance of power. The competition for alliance formation after World War II was so fierce that it has been referred to as "pactomania," i.e. "...indiscriminately collecting allies whether they were strategically placed or not, strong or weak, developed or underdeveloped." 35

In 1947, on the basis of an historical tradition of involvement in Latin America for over a century, the United States signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Act) undertaking to assist in meeting an attack against one of the other American states. Two years later it participated in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany and its subsequent re-armament in NATO brought the Soviet's response of initiating an alliance of their own, the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The process further intensified during the Cold War and as a result of the policy of containment. Moreover, alliances appeared that were not specifically related to the

Cold War as well. The League of Arab States, the French Community, and the Commonwealth of Nations are examples of this kind. The Arab League is also the only such organization that does not contain a major Power as a member.

The most important of Post-War alliances, or regional security organizations in the context of this study, are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), and South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Australia, New Zealand, U.S. Treaty Organization (ANZUS), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which is a subject matter of this study. The other regional organizations that have prominent provisions on security arrangements are the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League.

A proper understanding of the nature and mechanism of the contemporary alliances is achieved if they are placed in their proper perspectives of historical antecedents and political developments. The following contains a brief survey of the political facts and the environments that have helped to shape these alliances. Before doing so, however, it is useful to differentiate the fundamental elements present in the major as against the smaller alliances and underline their constitutional distinctions. For these purposes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization are taken into consideration.

Although it is sometimes overlooked, alliances differ in their constitutional purposes to a great extent. As such, NATO is primarily a military organization; CENTO was designed

36. None of the security alliances are fully regional because they do not include every state or territory in the region. Some are regional organizations from the point of view of the location of the home states of the allies and also the treaty area. Others are regional from the standpoint of the treaty area only.

37. The "Gulf Cooperation Council," a relatively new member of the community of alliances, is discussed in Ch. 6, part 3.
to operate in the political, economic, and cultural fields, as well as the military. The former is a collective defence pact, while the latter was considered a collective security arrangement. According to Arnold Wolfers, a collective "defence" arrangement is aimed at a particular known party outside the association. A collective "security" arrangement is designed to oppose any aggressor, known or unknown, within or without the association.

NATO undoubtedly belongs to the first category. The preamble of the treaty announces that the members resolve to "unite their efforts for collective defence." The purpose of the alliance is to oppose Soviet aggression in Europe. The potential military target of the alliance therefore lies outside its boundaries and is clearly identified. Moreover, NATO has never contemplated using all or part of its military machine against a member state.

Central Treaty Organization, on the other hand, met all the qualifications of a collective security arrangement. The Baghdad Pact defined the organization under the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As we will see later (Chapter 4), the signatories of the Pact simply mentioned cooperation for their security needs, and therefore did not pool their defensive resources together as has been the case with NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO came into being on September 17, 1949, as the result of the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. There are fifteen members and they include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States of America. NATO aims to provide a system of collective defence in the event of armed attack against any member; to strengthen

free institutions in the area "by bringing about a better understanding of the principles on which these institutions are founded"; to promote stability and convergence in the members' international economic policies; and to seek solutions to problems affecting modern industrial societies.

Origin and development: The postwar consolidation of Western defence was undertaken in the light of the perceived hostility of the Soviet Union as reflected in such actions as the creation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in October 1947, the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the blockade of West Berlin begun in June 1948. American willingness to join Western Europe in a common defence system was expressed in the Vanderberg Resolution adopted by the US Senate on June 11, 1948, and subsequent negotiations culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The treaty did not prescribe the nature of the organization that was to carry out the obligations of the signatory states, stipulating only that the parties should establish a council which, in turn, would create a defence committee and any necessary subsidiary bodies. The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, accelerated the growth of the alliance and led to the appointment in 1951 of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Emphasis on strengthened military defence of a broad area, reflected in the accession of Greece and Turkey to the Treaty on February 18, 1952, reached a climax at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Portugal, on February 20-25, 1952, when the never-to-be-achieved goal of deploying a defence force of 50 division in Western Europe was enunciated. Subsequent plans to strengthen the alliance by rearming the Federal Republic of Germany (as part of the European Defence Community) collapsed, with the result that the FRG was permitted to
establish its own armed forces and on May 5, 1955, to join NATO.

NATO's gravest problem during the mid-1960's was the estrangement of France over matters of defence. French resistance to military "integration" under NATO reached a climax in 1966 when President de Gaulle announced the removal of French forces from consolidated commands and gave notice that all allied troops not under French command had to be removed from French soil by early 1967. These stipulations necessitated the routing of supply lines for NATO forces in Germany; transfer of the alliance's European command from Paris, France, to Casteau, Belgium; and relocation of other allied commands and military facilities. Since its withdrawal from the integrated military command, France has participated selectively in NATO's activities.

During the 1970's, NATO suffered from additional internal strains. Early in 1976 Iceland threatened to leave the Organization because of a dispute with Britain over fishing rights off the Iceland Coast. Disputes between Greece and Turkey, initially over Cyprus and subsequently over offshore rights in the Aegean Sea, resulted in Greece's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command and a refusal to participate in NATO military exercises. In October 1980, five months after a Greek threat to close down US bases on its territory, efforts resulted in an agreement for Greece to return as a full participant in the Organization. Although details of the accord were not revealed, it appeared to involve expectations that differences between Athens and Ankara would subsequently be resolved.

In 1977 US representatives attempted to convince their European allies to increase defence spending and to expand cooperation in weapons development programmes. As a result, the NATO defence ministers agreed to seek a real increase in defence spending of 3 percent per year, with the commitment
being repeated in 1979 for the period 1980-1985. Much of the distinction within NATO during 1980 focussed on efforts to ensure that members lived up to the agreement, which was viewed as particularly critical in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi-Iranian war, unrest in Poland, and less than wholly satisfactory NATO manoeuvres during the year.

Structure: Nato possesses a dual military-civilian institutional structure that has developed to meet its unique combination of military and civil responsibilities.

The Military Committee, consisting of permanent military representatives from all members except France and Iceland, is the highest military authority, with responsibility for furnishing guidance on military questions both to the Council and to subordinate commands. The NATO military structure embraces three main regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel. Each is responsible for developing defence plans for its area, for determining force requirements, and for the development and exercise of its forces. Except for certain air defence in Europe, however, the forces assigned to the various commands remain under national control in peacetime. The headquarters of Allied Command Europe, known formally as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), is located at Casteau. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur) has traditionally been designated by the United States and serves concurrently as Commander in Chief of US forces in Europe (Cinceur). Allied Command Atlantic, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Saclant), who is also designated by the United States. Allied Command Channel (Acchan), with headquarters at Northwood (Middlesex), England, is directed by the Allied Commander in Chief Channel (Cinchan). The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, originally created in 1940, was incorporated into the NATO command structure in 1949. Its task is to recommend plans for the defence of the US-Canada region.
On the civilian side, the North Atlantic Council is the principal political organ. It normally meets twice a year at the ministerial level to consider major policy issues, usually with the participation of the members states' ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and/or finance. Between ministerial meetings the Council remains in permanent session at NATO headquarters, where the member governments are represented by permanent delegates holding ambassadorial rank. All policy decisions of the Council must be unanimous. The Defence Planning Committee, normally consisting of the alliance's defence ministers, was organised in 1963 primarily to analyse national defence expenditures of NATO members and to coordinate military planning, forces, and weapons with these projections.

Below the level of the Council and the Defence Planning Committee, the work of NATO is conducted by specialised committees organized to deal with political economic, military and a variety of other matters. The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, for example, was formed in response to a proposal made by US President Nixon on the twentieth anniversary of NATO that the alliance should seek solutions to the common problems of advanced industrial countries.

The secretary general, who is designated by the Council, has assumed an important diplomatic role in certain disputes among member states. Along with the International Secretariat, he is responsible for implementing Council decisions and providing it with expert advice.

The North Atlantic Assembly, founded in 1955 as the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, is completely independent of NATO but constitutes an unofficial link between it and parliamentarians of member states. By keeping under constant review the alliance's major political problems and disseminating knowledge of its policies and activities, the Assembly encourages political discussion of NATO matters. It meets each autumn in plenary session.
Activities: While NATO's major responsibility remains the defence of the North Atlantic area, it also serves as a forum for political consultation and conducts or sponsors activities aimed at strengthening the alliance in economic, technological, social, and cultural fields. Thus in December 1978 members agreed to provide financial aid to Greece, Portugal, and Turkey. A first in NATO history, the aid was intended to help preserve "stable democracy" while enabling the three to maintain appropriate levels of defence expenditure. In addition, scientific progress in such areas as oceanographic research, meteorology and radiometry, and computer science has been the object of an extensive science programme established in 1958, while environmental and energy policies have been more recent topics of discussion.

A special study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, undertaken in December 1967, recommended that the alliance also serve as a forum and clearing house for promoting better East-West relations. The pursuit of detente has inspired proposals looking toward mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, although exploratory MBFR talks begun at Vienna, Austria, in 1973 have yet to yield substantive results. In fact, NATO leaders have recently been preoccupied by a perceived strengthening of Warsaw Pact forces. In view of an assessment that the Warsaw Pact was fielding 150,000 unreported troops in Central Europe, the perception was not visibly diminished by a Soviet announcement in October 1979 that some 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks would be withdrawn from East Germany. It was in this context that NATO members agreed to install 108 Pershing-2 launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in the early 1980s.

A major new development in NATO has been the adherence of Spain to the organization. The Spanish government made its application in early 1981. It has been argued that this development has significantly enhanced NATO's defensive capabilities.
Warsaw Treaty Organization

The Warsaw Pact was established on June 5, 1955, as the result of the Treaty of Warsaw, signed on May 14, 1955. Its members are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its stated purpose is the usual preamble of security organizations. Thus "in the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deem necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security."

Origin and Development: The Warsaw Treaty Organization, also known as the Warsaw Pact, was established by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies as a direct response to measures taken by the governments of Western Europe and the United States to bring about the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and its inclusion in the Western European Union and NATO. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed at Warsaw, Poland, on May 14, 1955, was conceived as an Eastern counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty and many of its provisions are patterned on that document.

The eight original signatories were the USSR and all the Communist states of Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia. Albania, however, ceased to participate in 1962 and formally withdrew from membership on September 12, 1968. Romania, while remaining a party to the Treaty, has in recent years
resisted closer integration and has advocated concurrent dissolution of the WTO and NATO.

Structure: Like NATO, the WTO has a dual structure of civilian and military institutions headed by a Political Consultative Committee and a Committee of Defence Ministers, respectively. The former, the Pact's principal political organ, is charged with coordinating all activities apart from purely military matters. In full session the Committee consists of the first secretaries of the Communist parties, heads of government, and foreign and defence ministers of member states. Its joint Secretariat is headed by a Soviet official and composed of a specifically appointed representative from each member, while a Permanent Commission makes recommendations on general questions of foreign policy. Since the 1969 reorganization of the WTO, the non-Soviet ministers of defence are no longer directly subordinate to the commander in chief of the WTO, but form, together with the Soviet minister, the Committee of Defence Ministers.

The Joint Command is required by the Treaty "to strengthen the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in case of war, and to decide on the deployment of troops". The Command consist of a Commander in Chief and a Military Council. The Council which meets under the chairmanship of the commander, includes the chief of staff and permanent military representatives from each of the allied armed forces. The positions of commander in chief and chief of staff have invariably been held by Soviet officers. The Council appears to be the main channel which the WTO's peacetime orders are transmitted to its forces and through which the Eastern European forces are able to express their point of view to the commander in chief.

In the event of war, the forces of the other WTO members would be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command. Among the Soviet military headquarters in the WTO area are the
Northern Group of Forces at Legnica (Poland); the Southern Group of Forces at Budapest (Hungary); the Group of Soviet Forces in the German Democratic Republic at Zossen-Wunsford, near Berlin; and the Central Group of Forces at Milovice, north of Prague (CzechoSlovakia). Soviet tactical air forces are stationed in CzechoSlovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland.

In 1977, the WTO established a Permanent Committee of Foreign Ministers, with a joint secretariat under a Soviet director general. The Committee, the first structural change in the WTO since 1969, serves mainly as a political consultative organ; all decisions are reached by consensus.

Activities: In the absence of military conflict in Europe, the mutual defence provisions of the Warsaw Treaty have never been invoked, and the Pact's main function has appeared to be that of providing a basis for the continued stationing of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Although members of the Pact have frequently held joint military exercises, their only actual joint operation was the occupation of CzechoSlovakia by forces of six members on August 21, 1968. Ostensibly, this concerted move against one of the Pact's own members was dictated by concern for the military security of Eastern Europe, in view of CzechoSlovakia's avowed intention to establish closer ties with the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western states. Of the active members of the alliance, Romania alone refused to participate in the Czech occupation. While the forces of other Eastern European members were soon withdrawn, Soviet forces remained, under a bilateral treaty with CzechoSlovakia concluded October 16, 1968. Romania has since stood out as something of a dissident in the alliance, and the organizational changes of March 1969 were interpreted as a partial concession to Romania's demand for a greater measure of equality among the signatory states.
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Treaty

ANZUS, officially called the Tripartite Security Treaty Between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS Pact), came into existence on April 29, 1952 as the result of the signing of the treaty on September 1, 1951. It has the above states as its members. Its purpose is defined as "Each Party recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Origin and Development: The ANZUS Pact was concluded at the time of the peace settlement with Japan in 1951 as part of a complex of US-supported mutual security arrangements in the Pacific. Despite subsequent realignments in international politics, the signatories of the treaty remain convinced of its utility. Thus in February 1980, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Andrew Peacock, and New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Talboys emphasized its particular importance in view of the new international situation stemming from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Structure: ANZUS lacks both a headquarters and a permanent staff, its only political organ being the ANZUS Council, which consists of the members' foreign ministers or their deputies. The Council considers any matter which a Treaty partner views as relevant to the security of individual members or of the alliance. It normally meets each year at Canberra, Wellington, with most costs borne by the host government. Council meetings are also attended by military advisers, who also meet separately. At its first meeting in 1952, the Council decided that responsibility for coordination between meetings would be given to the member states' representatives in Washington.
Activities: In the absence of a comprehensive Pacific security system, the ANZUS treaty has served primarily as a vehicle for political/strategic consultation. The Council monitors and discusses significant strategic political and economic developments that are considered by the partners to be relevant to their security interests. For example, in July 1979 members discussed the problem of Vietnamese refugees and passed a resolution calling for Hanoi to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.

In response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the ANZUS foreign ministers agreed in February 1980 to increase the alliance's military presence in the Indian Ocean. Recently, however, ANZUS has come under great strains due to the adoption of a no-nuclear policy by the Indian Ocean members.

Organization of American States

OAS was established by a Charter signed at Bogota, Columbia, on April 30, 1948. The organization came into being on December 13, 1959; and was reorganized by a Protocol of amendment in February 1967 which became effective three years later. There are twenty members and fourteen permanent observers. The members are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba (excluded from formal participation in OAS activities since 1962), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Observers are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Guyana, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and Spain. The organization's aim is to achieve "an order of peace and justice, promoting solidarity among the American states; (to strengthen) their collaboration and (defend) their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence ... new objectives and standards for the promotion of the
economic, social, and cultural development of the peoples of the Hemisphere, and to speed the process of economic integration".

Origin and Development: The foundations of the OAS were laid in 1890 at an International Conference of American States at Washington, DC, where it was decided to form an international union of American republics to serve as a permanent secretariat. The name of the Organization was changed in 1910 to Union of American Republics, and the Bureau was renamed the Pan American Union.

The experience of World War II encouraged further development of the still loosely organized "inter-American system". An Inter-American Conference on problems of War and Peace, meeting at Mexico City in February-March 1945, agreed that the American republics should consider concluding a treaty that would involve their mutual defence. By the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which was opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on September 2, 1947, they agreed that an armed attack originating either within or outside the American system would be considered an attack against all of them, and each would assist in meeting such an attack. Organizational streamlining was undertaken by the Ninth International Conference of American States, which met at Bogota, Colombia, in March-May 1948 and established the Organization of American States.

The adoption by Cuba of a Marxist-Leninist ideology generally was viewed by other American governments as incompatible with their fundamental principles, and the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on January 23-31, 1962, determined that Cuba in effect had excluded itself from participation in the inter-American system. Over time, however, several members began to question the value of continued ostracism of the Castro regime. The trade and diplomatic quarantine against Cuba was ultimately lifted at a special consultative meeting on July 29, 1975, at San Jose, Costa Rica,
although the "freedom of action" resolution did not constitute termination of Cuba's exclusion from formal participation in OAS activities.

Subsequently, the United States requested that its financial assessment, two-thirds of the annual OAS budget, be limited to 49 percent, arguing that this would help satisfy those who demanded less dominance of the Organization. Opponents of the proposal contended that while a decreased budget contribution could not dilute US influence, it could be taken as a sign of Washington's disregard for its hemispheric neighbours and might conceivably harm the Organization, which has few alternative sources of revenue. With these arguments clearly in mind, the OAS General Assembly formally rejected the US request at its November 1980 meeting.

Structure: The principal political organ of the OAS, the General Assembly, meets annually to discuss the budget and to supervise the work of the Organization's specialized agencies. Other organs include the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-Ecosoc); the Permanent Council, which serve as the Organ of Consultation, under the Rio Treaty, in cases of aggression; the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture, which, like IA-Ecosoc, is responsible to the General Assembly; and the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, both of whose members are elected for four-year terms by the Assembly. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs discharges the Organization's Security functions and is convened to consider urgent problems.

Activities: Political and security functions, which held the most prominent place in OAS activities during its first decade, have been increasingly supplemented by economic and social concerns, as manifested initially by the adoption of the Act of Bogota (a programme of social development) by a special OAS conference on September 13, 1960. In a more far-reaching step, an Inter-American Economic and Social Conference
on August 17, 1961, adopted the Charter of Punta del Este, which enunciated a comprehensive ten-year programme of economic and social renovation and development to implement the Alliance for Progress.

At the July 1978 summit meeting the OAS approved a code of conduct for transnational corporations. The action was seen as an attempt to bring economic issues to the foreground, some members feeling that the US emphasis on human rights had tended to minimize discussion of economic inequalities. In addition, the summit approved a resolution ruling out OAS involvement in Nicaragua's political crisis. The resolution had been supported by those military regimes that feared the establishment of a precedent. However, Nicaragua was finally censured on October 17 at the insistence of Costa Rica, which threatened to withdraw from the OAS after Nicaraguan planes had violated its airspace. A June 1979 emergency meeting, convened to deal with the Nicaraguan situation, ended without agreement as to what part the OAS should play in the civil war there. Subsequently, members agreed to supply food aid to the post-Somoza regime.

Organization of African Unity

The OAU was established by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity which was adopted at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963. It has a membership of 50 and they include: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The OAU aims to "... promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better
life for the people of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonilism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Origin and Development: The OAU is the most conspicuous result of the search for unity among the emerging states of Africa, a number of whose representatives participated at the first Conference of Independent African States at Accra, Ghana, in April 1958. However, common action has been seriously impaired by the division of the newly independent states into rival groups, notably the "Casablanca group" led by Ghana and Guinea, which stressed left-wing socialism, radical anticolonialism, and Pan Africanism; and the more moderate "Monrovia group", which favoured a cautiously evolutionary and more sub-regional approach to African problems. In an attempt to heal this split, a 20-state summit conference of African leaders met at Addis Ababa on May 22-25, 1963, at the invitation of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. The OAU resulted from that Conference.

Structure: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the principal political organ, meets annually to define overall OAU policy and to supervise the activities of other OAU agencies. Each member state is entitled to one vote, with decisions on all but procedural matters requiring a two-thirds majority.

The Council of Ministers, comprising the foreign ministers or other designated representatives of all member states, meet at least twice a year to confer on preparation for meetings of the Assembly, the implementation of its decision, the OAU budget, and matters of intra-African cooperation and general information policy. Each member has one vote; all decisions are by simple majority.
The commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, which functions under Assembly direction, is composed of 21 professionally qualified members, who act in their private capacities; nominated by member governments, they are elected by the Assembly for five-year terms. The Commission may consider any interstate dispute brought to it by the parties concerned, the Council, or the Assembly. However, a party to a dispute may refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission. In 1977 the Council approved a Nigerian resolution to replace the Commission with a ten-member OAU Disputes Committee, which would be charged with attempting to settle intra-African disputes.

Specialised commissions have been established for defence; economic and social concerns; and educational, scientific, cultural, and health matters. The African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) was designated a specialized agency on May 11, 1978.

Activities: The OAU has long functioned as a sounding board for African opinion on such problems as colonialism and racial discrimination. Thus continuing turmoil within the continent was reflected in the 1980 summit meeting at Freetown. The principal subjects of the meeting were the Western Sahara issue, the continued South African presence in Namibia, South African overflights of Black African states, and the demand by Mauritius for return of British-held Diego Garcia Island. Late in the year, the organization established a committee to investigate the crisis in Chad, particularly with regard to Libyan intervention and the proposed merger of the two countries. On a more positive note, the OAU sponsored its first economic summit in Lagos, Nigeria, in April, agreeing on a plan to establish an African Common Market by the year 2000.

The Arab League

The Arab League, officially known as the League of Arab
States came into being via a Treaty signed at Cairo, Egypt, on March 22, 1945. It lists twenty two members. But for Egypt, a founding member, which was suspended in April 1979 following the Egyptian-Israeli accord signed at Camp David. The members are Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organization, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen People's Democratic Republic. The League purpose is to strengthen relations among member states by coordinating policies in political, cultural, economic, social and related affairs; to mediate disputes between members, or between members and third parties.

Origin and Development: A long-standing project that reached fruition late in World War II, the League was founded primarily on Egyptian initiative following a promise of British support for any Arab organization that commanded general support. In its earlier years the organization focussed mainly on economic, cultural, and social cooperation, but on April 13, 1950, a Convention on Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation, inter-alia, obligated the members in case of attack "immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace." In 1976 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had participated as an observer at all League conferences since September 1964, was admitted to full membership. In 1977 Djibouti was admitted as the 22nd member, but a decision on an application from the Comoro Island has been deferred, reportedly because the latter is not an Arabic-speaking state.

Structure: The principal political organ of the League is the Council, which meets twice a year, normally at the foreign ministers' level. Each member has one vote in the Council: decisions bind only those states which accept them. The Council's main functions are to supervise the execution of agreements between members, to mediate dispute, and to coordinate defence in the event of attack. As provided for by the
Treaty, there are currently 11 permanent committee meeting at least once a year: Political, Cultural, Economic, Social, Military, Legal Affairs, Information, Health, Communications, Solidarity and Arab Human Rights.

Three traditional bodies were established by the 1950 Convention: a Joint Defence Council to function in matters of collective security and to coordinate military resources; a Permanent Military Commission, composed of representatives of the general staffs, to draw up plans for joint defence; and an Economic Council, composed of the ministers of economic affairs, to coordinate Arab economic development. A Council of Arab Information Ministers was also formed in 1964.

The General Secretariat is responsible for internal administration and the execution of Council decisions. It also administers several agencies, including the Bureau for Boycotting Israel with headquarters at Damascus, Syria.

Activities: Spurred by an active secretariat, economic activities by the League have intensified. For example, the Conference of Economic and Foreign Ministers agreed at an April 1976 meeting at Rabat, Morocco, to establish an Abu Dhabi-based fund to provide credits for member states encountering balance-of-payments deficit, while at a June 1977 meeting at Alexandria, Egypt, the names of 12 additional corporations doing business with Israel were added to the League's boycott list. The inclusion of 5 American firms marked the first appearance of US corporations on the list.

The League's political activities have included repeated efforts to promote peace - most visibly in the form of a peacekeeping force dispatched in 1976 to Lebanon - but in the aftermath of Egyptian President Sadat's 1977 peace initiative, an open split manifested itself, with Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria and South Yemen electing to boycott the March 1978 Council meeting. A partial reconciliation appeared to have been achieved at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, at the July 1978
ministrial meeting of nonaligned states, where League members, meeting at the request of their hosts, agreed that questions concerning the future of the Palestinians should be referred to the United Nations in the form of a request for a special UN General Assembly session. Nevertheless, at the four-day Baghdad meeting in November, conflict erupted again, a majority calling for Egypt's rejection of the Camp David peace accords and agreeing to establish a $35 billion fund to enable front-line states to counter the effects of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement. The trend continued throughout 1979 with the formal suspension of Egypt from the League, the consequent decision to move the headquarters from Cairo, and the resignation of Secretary General Mahmud Riad, an Egyptian, who protested that the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty rendered efforts at Arab unity impossible.

Inter-Arab conflicts, however, have recently multiplied and intensified due to continued differences over the Israeli peace accords, the rights of Palestinians, and the Iraqi-Iranian war. As a consequence, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and the PLO boycotted the League's ministerial conference convened at Amman, Jordan, in November, 1980. With so many states absent, little progress could be made on a unified strategy against Israel or on devising a means for obtaining Western recognition of the PLO. Indeed, the focus of discussion appeared to be the possibility of giving King Hussein of Jordan an enhanced role as a spokesman for the Palestinians.  

2.3 The Small Power's Dilemma

An operational framework of analysis developed by Omer De Maeymaeker et. al., is adopted in this study for the purpose of distinguishing the small power's motives for adhering to or withdrawing from alliances. According to this framework, the small power elite making decisions about alignment, non-alignment, and de-alignment, seeks to maintain or improve its position at the international, regional, or domestic level.

Theoretically, such decisions are made with reference to the national interest. Since no abstract criterion exists for defining a state's national interest, reference must be made to concrete conditions, and to particular objectives in matters of security, the status of states and regimes in the international community, domestic stability, economic aid and military assistance, and ideology.

Accordingly, a small power's motives for adhering to or possibly withdrawing from alliances may be underlined as follows:

1. Security in Relation to the Geographical Situation: The first and most vital motive determining a small power's basic strategic choice is the quest of survival as an independent and sovereign entity. To survive, a small power must defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet the security of a small nation depends heavily on variables within the international system and on its geographic and topographic location within the system. Much will also depend on the nation's historical experience, on its perceptions concerning the attitudes of foes and friends alike, on the military capabilities of enemies, on its own industrial-military potential, on the quality of its leaderships, its morale, its political cohesion, and similar characteristics.

2. Prestige in the International Community: A nation's relative rank in the international hierarchy of prestige, thus of its estimation in the eyes of other countries' decision makers, is not altogether insignificant. An alliance or nonalliance policy may enhance or diminish a small power's status. Superior recognition will accord it wider influence in the international community, and by the same token the prestige of its ruling elite will augment or decrease. Prestige is also a kind of first defence line of a country's security. Its erosion may induce other nations to consider pressure or even attack.

3. Domestic Stability: Domestic stability may be threatened by "material and political burdens and strains flowing from alliance" or nonalliance. Whether small states' decision makers decide to join or reject a coalition is very much related to their quest for the security of tenure. Some governments may stay or fall by their identification with a great power or a coalition. Particularly in democratic nations the government's choices may be narrowly limited by pressures from the press, public opinion, various interest groups, or the legislature.

4. Economic Aid and Military Assistance: In the eyes of the ruling elite, even in the eyes of the peoples concerned, alliances may result favourably in the pooling of resources and the material support of allies. As G. Liska argues: "On the economic plane, alliance promotes internal stability most commonly when pooling of resources and division of roles among members enables a regime to stop short of mobilizing disaffected groups and interest beyond that, alliances may entail outright subsidy or other forms of material support."

5. Ideology: Ideology, which may or may not be tied to cultural affinity, is definitely related to the ruling elite's quest for both external and internal security. For instance,

42. Ibid., p. 37.
the fear of Russian expansionism has probably been augmented by the fear of Communist ideology and totalitarian political structure.

Almost certainly, then, the movement toward or away from an alliance is a function of these five motives and any assessment of a basic strategic choice involves a comparison of the hypothetical gains and liabilities of either move.43

Definition of Small Power: Like the concept of alliance, "small power" is an elusive term. While one is forced many times to admit a substantial difference in the respective international positions of nations which are placed in the categories of small power, medium power, and super-power, the difference hardly appears in the scale of rank on quantitative factors. Also when the role of small powers as against the middle powers and the super-powers is compared, the difference is actually found out, in terms of degrees, to be a minute one, and that small powers often play a disproportionate role compared to their attributes of power capability. Even then this observation does not really entitle one to imagine that the small power is a big power in miniature. In the relations between the great powers and the small powers, one might look for international behaviour characterized by extremes such as perfect domination by the great power and complete submission.

43. Similar frameworks of analysis have also been employed in Luc Crollen, "Portugal, The U.S. and NATO." (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1973) and Annette Baker Fox, "The Power of Small States," (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959). Fox bases her analysis on 1) The Political and military relationships between the pertinent state at the moment; 2) The expectations of the participants; 3) The demands upon the small state; 4) The techniques employed by each side; and 5) The resultant effect on the power positions of the small state concerned. See also Donald E. Neuchterlein, "Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, Australia," ORBIS Vol. XIII (Sum. 1969), pp. 600-623. Neuchterlein analyses the reasons of three small states for joining alliances in terms of seven major factors that influenced their foreign policy decisions: 1) historical; 2) geographic; 3) economic; 4) external threat; 5) internal security; 6) military capability; and 7) receptivity to foreign bases.
by the small power. Between these two extremes, all types of combinations between dimension and power become conceivable.

Whatever the distinctions between states in international politics, the study of the foreign policies of small states is considered a neglected aspect of the discipline of international relations.44

Foreign policy here is taken to mean the range of external actions pursued to achieve certain defined objectives or goals of which these may or may not have internal cognizance or approval. The essential elements of foreign policy in that context include 1) capability, e.g., internal human and material resources, organization and political will; 2) purpose; and 3) means, which will range from statements of position, diplomatic negotiations, foreign visits, economic agreements, cultural-technical exchanges, to the threat and use of military force. The foreign policy of a state will be shaped by internal factors and by the interplay between these and external restraints such as the dominance of a more powerful neighbour, limitations arising out of membership of an alliance, and so forth.45


There are some difficulties in defining a small state on the basis of the preceding considerations. First, there is a question of size. In this sense, small states have been characterized by one or more of the following; 1) small land area, 2) small total population, 3) small total GNP, and 4) low level of military capabilities.\(^4\)

Small states are traditionally depicted as exhibiting the following policy behaviour patterns when compared to large states:

a) low level of overall participation in world affairs;
b) high levels of activity in inter-governmental organizations;
c) high levels of support for international legal norms;
d) avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft;
e) avoidance of behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system;
f) a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities; and
g) frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues.\(^5\)

In an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties in defining a small state, Roland P. Barston suggests four possible approaches in defining the term: First, arbitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper limit on, for example, population size; secondly, measuring the "objective" elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale; thirdly, analyzing relative influence; and fourthly, identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiated small states from other classes of states.\(^6\)

Whatever the quantitative results of ranking the size of


\(^{5}\) Ibid.

\(^{6}\) Barston, op. cit., p. 15.
states, it has been pointed out by Arnold Wolfers that 
"... small states can exercise disproportionate power that seems to run counter to traditional power concepts in international relations." Therefore:

"First, a state may be economically weak, have low military strength and be politically unstable; but its weakness can be a source of bargaining power if a great power perceives the territory of the small state to be of strategic importance and is prepared to commit conventional military forces to its assistance;

Second, the bargaining power of small states involved in a military conflict will be increased if there is a clear and overt commitment by both great powers to opposite sides;

Third, a collection of small states which is weakly organized, with disputed leadership and whose members have differing political systems and ideologies, will have a high degree of stress within it over the formulation and implementation of common objectives, when involved in a military conflict;

Fourth, a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a great power. The response of the great power will be determined primarily by the type of threat, the degree of its active involvement, and concern lest any retaliatory action might adversely affect its relations with other states in the region;

Fifth, small states can use international organizations to mobilize support for their policies by widening the arena of debate and criticism; and

Sixth, a small state will be able to resist collective non-military sanctions if it receives support from border states and if the collective sanctions are not universally or equally applied by members of the international organization.

Small states have been able to influence great powers because of the presence of some factors like vitally needed resources, a location dominating some strategic point of transit, the possibility of allying with the great power's


enemy at a crucial stage in the conflict, and a disagreement with the threatening great power or between it and an ally.\textsuperscript{51}

The foreign policy of small states can be seen as purely defensive; therefore, a small state's aims could be construed as withstanding pressure from the great powers, safeguarding their territorial integrity and independence, and insuring the continued adhesion to national values and ideas.\textsuperscript{52} A small power looks to its security.\textsuperscript{53}

What are the dangers and pitfalls encountered by a small state when it operates in a balance-of-power environment and commits itself to an alliance? By definition, a small state, i.e. a weak state, has perceived a threat and therefore resort to the only option open to it, that is to tie itself militarily to a major power.

Small states simply have never had the power to protect themselves from military onslaught of stronger states. However, protection against military threat is not the only reason weak states seek military ties with powers. Some weaker countries seek military assistance not for defensive but for offensive reasons.\textsuperscript{54} When there is a dispute each side usually views its own efforts to obtain big power support as purely defensive (the protection of its population), while it views similar efforts on the other side as purely aggressive


\textsuperscript{52} De Raeymaeker, \textit{et al.}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 18.


\textsuperscript{54} Israelis, for example, consider this the motivation for the Arabs' military ties to the Powers. Conversely, most Arab governments are convinced that the only reason Israel seeks and receive military support is because of aggressive designs on Arab lands.
Another, and probably much more frequent reason why the governments of weaker countries seek military support from the Powers is to maintain themselves in office. Not every ruling elite is sanguine about the possibilities of staying in office without the use of coercion against disaffected segments of its own population. The ruling elites in most of the weaker countries obviously feel that there are even greater danger to their continued rule in not strengthening their military, and, therefore, almost all do. In any case, none of the weak countries (and only a few of the medium-level countries), are capable of producing the equipment themselves; therefore, they have to procure it from one or another of the major Powers.

Whatever the reason, and despite the dangers, both internal and external, of becoming militarily dependent on a major Power, nearly every one of the weaker countries is in some way tied militarily to at least one of the major Powers. Just as with economic ties, some of the weaker countries have come to recognize that they can in some measure lessen their dependence on a particular mentor by tying themselves militarily to more than one Power. Small countries bought weapons from many more countries in the 1960's than they did in the 1950's, and they are acquiring more aid from medium-level states than was previously possible. But it is not always easy for a country to diversify its military suppliers. If one becomes too close to some state that one's major supplier disapproves of, there is always the danger of retaliation by that Power by cutting off support.

The motivations for requesting military protection and/or assistance are rarely the same as the motivations for granting

One might argue that they are the same when both countries perceive a common enemy against whom they recognize a mutual need for protection. This may occasionally be the case. During the 1950's, many of the leaders of the anti-communist countries genuinely perceived the "international communist conspiracy" as a direct threat to the continued existence of their governments, and turned to the United States for military protection. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, for their part, genuinely perceived an international threat from the other Power, directed at them and all like-minded governments everywhere. Thus, military treaties with and military assistance to the weaker countries in the "Free World" or the "Socialist Camp" were perceived by both sides as measures of mutual self defence.

With the demise of the old colonial system and the emergence of independent new states, the power struggles on a world-wide scale among the major Powers did not cease, but rather required new modes of operation. One could no longer legally proclaim an area a "protectorate" or a "sphere of influence" and thereby be assured that competing Powers would stay out. It was necessary to use other means, among them the establishment of military ties. In the place of spheres of influence have come "mutual security agreements" and multi-lateral and bilateral defence treaties. In the place of a small number of troops to train native armies have come military advisers to train independent indigenous armies. Instead of arms supplied free-of-charge, there are arms sales, loan, and grants; instead of salaries to the native armies, have come defence support, budget support, and economic aid. And, in many areas of the world, in the place of the old Powers who once ruled much of the land mass of the globe have come new Powers.

Multilateral security arrangements are concluded among states that perceive a common enemy and recognize the advantages to themselves of "collective security." In actual
practice, however, where a power predominates, that power is usually the one making the decision as to whether an attack has occurred and whether a response is warranted. Under these circumstances, would a small state have been better off if it had entered into a bilateral agreement instead?

Bilateral treaties can range from the sale, loan, or grant of small amounts of outmoded military equipment; through arrangements for advising, training, supplying, and/or commanding the military in question; to sending troops in support of the regime in office against both internal and external threats. Bilateral treaties provide for the establishment of mentor bases and the stationing of mentor troops on the soil of the weaker country; for the equipping of indigenous military with specific kinds of weapons; for the training of an indigenous officer corps in the mentor country; for "special assistance" or "budget support" for a host of military-related functions; and so on.

These treaties, whatever their contents, do not necessarily stem from a neocolonial plot by the Powers to maintain control over the weaker countries. The governments of the weaker countries often simply are not in a position to protect themselves from either internal or external attack. Without the existence of these bilateral treaties, some of them would have no means of self-defence at all, while others would have only the rudimentary and inefficient of military capabilities. Without the existence of some sort of effective military arm, many of these weaker countries could very well be faced with chaos and anarchy. What is more, these states often genuinely do feel threatened by their neighbours. They must have some means of preserving internal order and preventing external attack. A new development here has also been the approach

56. When India seized Goa, Portugal claimed to have been attacked and demanded a NATO response. Similarly, when war broke out between India and Pakistan, Pakistan perceived it as a direct attack and demanded a CENTO response.
followed by some of the weak countries to seek military protection and/or assistance not from the major Powers, but from the medium-level countries.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{57}. It was in this context that, as we will examine later, the Sultanate of Muscat asked for Iranian help during the Dhoffari rebellion in the early 1970's.
PART II:

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
CHAPTER THREE: Nature of Conflicts and Challenges to Alliances

3.1 Introduction

The transformation of power relationships and the shift in the international political system as a whole are nowhere better demonstrated than in the Northern Tier region (or the Upper Middle East) following the end of World War Two. The study of the region clearly shows the mechanism of the balance of power at work. It illustrates how the traditional interests along the region evolved into the overall Post-war conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and also why it superseded the earlier Anglo-Russian rivalry. The diplomatic record of the countries of the region, when put in perspective, shows their efforts to maintain their independence and territorial integrity in the face of attempts by the Great Powers to exert influence over them on one hand; and on the other, points to a balance-of-power-related strategy based on survival, as well as adherence to defensive alliances.

It is for these underlying reasons that in order to arrive at the definition of the Iranian point of view of its "security perimeter more than a quarter of a century later, as well as other inter-related aspects in her foreign policy options, responses, and conducts, the Great Powers' rivalry in the region as part of the Near East power politics ought to be examined first. This is because the emulation in the Near East during the formative years of the Cold War can be traced back to traditional concerns over the balance of power between Britain and Russia along the Northern Tier. This is so not only because these concerns, at once aggressive and defensive, were important factors in the history of the buffer states subject to imperial influence, but also a conception of the Northern Tier region as a whole was crucial historically to the perceptions of most policy-makers responsible for the strategic interests of the Great Powers. This wholistic-particularistic approach is of importance here since it enables
one to arrive at the crux of the matter, i.e., that it is not only that Iran has been insufficiently studied, but that its regional context has been ignored. The emergence of the United States as the dominant power in the region and its replacing of the British influence is of course of paramount importance. Moreover, although the Post-war formulation of American foreign policy in the region, when examined in the context of great power rivalry, emerged from a framework of traditional European power politics, the role of the region in that policy has been little understood.

While there is no agreement among historians about what countries actually comprise the Northern Tier, almost all concede that the countries lying within a broad general area in the Near East, especially Turkey and Iran, have been subjected to the same kind of pressures throughout the last two centuries.\(^1\) Individually, they have been the pawns of Great Powers; collectively, they have constituted a buffer zone between the empires. In this sense, they have served both as a northern tier and as a southern tier. The merit in using the term lies in the function fulfilled by Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, in attempts by the West to maintain its position in the balance of power in the Near East against the Soviet Union.\(^2\) This study limits itself first to Greece, Turkey, and Iran, as the evidence is more vivid than in Afghanistan and also because of space; and, secondly, to Iran, as the evolution in Post-war politics is at its best when applied to Iran since the Iranian search for


2. While the terms "Near East" and "Middle East" are often used interchangeably, the former appears to be more appropriate when Greece is included.
security took extraordinary dimensions and drastically changed both in character and in essence.

The buffer states which were the object of long-standing concerns, the Ottoman Empire (including the Balkans) and Persia, served for centuries as focal points for Great Power rivalry. Together, at least since the 19th century, their positions in international affairs were determined by the conflict between Britain and Russia in the Near East. Russia's expansionist policies and her need for warm-water ports clashed with Britain's equally expansionist policies in terms of her need to maintain her line of communication through the Eastern Mediterranean to India and her desire to protect a vast area which stretched eastward from the Persian Gulf. As a result, both Russia and Britain became heavily involved in Near Eastern affairs.

Urged by the forces of nationalism and resenting Great Power influence in their quarters, the Northern Tier countries attempted to maintain their territorial integrity by playing one power off against the other, or by looking to third powers for succour. Their strategies, while partially successful, nonetheless perpetuated Anglo-Russian rivalry, which remained both a guarantee of, and a threat to, their security. The cardinal task for the leaders of the countries concerned was to create a national identity in order to ensure national survival. The successes of Kemal Ataturk, Ioannis Metaxas, and Reza Shah in forging a common identity among the Turks, the Greeks, and the Iranians respectively, helps to explain some of the difficulties their countries encountered during the Second World War.

The main source of difficulty for the Northern Tier countries, however, was the region's historical instability and the Great Powers' continuing struggle for influence in the Near East - in spite of the fact that the Great Powers themselves occasionally were allied with each other. The "Eastern Question," the "Balkan Problem," and the "Persian
Problem," all of which by-products of the European classical balance of power dating at least from the 19th century, were still prominent during World War Two in the thinking of Churchill and Stalin, both of whose policies illustrated the relevance of historical problems. If after 1943, the Soviets carved out a sphere of influence in the Balkans, supported Bulgarian irredentism in Macedonia and Thrace, asked for a port on the Agean, and sought to control the Straits; if they attempted to acquire Turkey's eastern provinces, attempted to carve out a sphere of influence in Iran, or contemplated a port on the Persian Gulf, every action had a precedent in Czarist policies. That the Soviets were interested in the entire region, from the Balkans to Iran, is evidenced not only by these actions, but also by the failure of Nazi-Soviet discussions in 1940, when Stalin refused to limit himself to a sphere of interest in Iran and eastern Turkey. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheelav Molotov's interest in the Straits and the Balkans made a strong impression on Hitler and was a crucial element in the worsening of German-Soviet relations at the time.

Russia's historical aspirations toward the countries of the Northern Tier resulted in Britain's attempts to restrict them. The diplomacy of 1878 in the Balkans and eastern Turkey is exemplary of Britain's policies, which depended on a strong military and well-chosen allies. Another British policy was to seek a definition of Russia's aspirations through a common understanding over the buffer states. Thus, the two countries divided Persia into spheres of influence in 1907, and partitioned the Ottoman Empire in 1915. They again divided Iran on the same basis in 1941, and did the carving up of the Balkans in 1944. World War Two, however, posed serious problems for the declining British Empire; in the face of Russia's growing might, Britain was forced to turn to the United States to protect her line of communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and her oil interests in the Persian Gulf.

Britain's major problems toward the end of the war was to
get the United States to join her in maintaining the balance of power against the Soviet Union. Churchill, an advocate of the system, had engineered the British Admiralty's acquisition of a majority interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914, and had long been sensitive to the strategic value of the region. Stalin, too, was familiar with such matters. In 1921, for instance, he personally negotiated the Soviet Union's borders with Turkey and, against Lenin's wishes, gave armed support to the so-called Soviet Republic of Gilan in northern Iran (see Map 3). But Roosevelt, in contrast, had little knowledge of, or interest in, the Near East, and in spite of emerging American oil interests - particularly in Saudi Arabia - opposed traditional means of resolving differences there.

However, the American experience in Iran, combined with a growing recognition of American interests in the Near and Middle East, led State Department's officials increasingly to accept and reiterate the British argument about the identity of both British and American interests in the region. Such arguments, which began to emerge with greater clarity as the war progressed, suggested that it was in the American interest to maintain a balance of power along the Northern Tier, and in the process helped to formulate the intellectual framework for subsequent American policies in the Near East.

As a result, the events in the Northern Tier countries and Soviet actions along the borders influenced the policies of the United States, leading the Department of State to adopt a better perspective of the region. In this period, regional events thus served as a learning experience for those in the Department who had not yet begun to appreciate the significance of traditional pressures exercised in the area. More particularly, they served as a learning experience for the new president, Harry S. Truman, whose perceptions and management of foreign policy differed considerably from that of his predecessor. The gradual recognition of American strategic and economic interests in the Near East, accompanied by Truman's
decision to rely more heavily than Roosevelt on an informed State Department, led to drastic changes in American foreign policy. The United States committed itself to the independence and territorial integrity of countries which had been virtually outside of its prewar concern and within Britain's sphere of influence.

Furthermore, the events in Poland during the war reinforced a negative model of international behaviour after World War Two - of how not to act when confronted by a totalitarian adversary. Positive models of how one should act - were created by events along the Northern Tier in 1946-1947. If Eastern Europe served the Truman Administration as an example of how not to deal with the Soviet Union, the countries of the Northern Tier provided a different kind of example, and verified the viability of a firm and determined response to Soviet pressures. In short, the traditional buffer zone between the Russian and British empires came to play the same role between the Soviet Union and the United States, and served as a forge for the latter's policy of containment for the former. Of course, one ought to be reminded that this transformation, as we will see later, did not take place as smoothly as it appears to because British tactfulness was replaced by often incongruous and adventurous American attitudes resulting in occasional debacles.

The policy of containment in the Near East, however, was a realistic and pragmatic policy. The trouble with it was not its conception, but rather its rationalization, and the analogies engendered by the policy's success in the Near East. Subsequent to the Truman Doctrine, the apparent success of American policies in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, led the Truman and later administrations to look to those policies as models of how to deal with the Soviet Union and its apparent satellites elsewhere.

To Iran, the paramount danger after the conclusion of the war was renewed Soviet desire to extend its influence into
the country, through Sovietization or, failing that, through economic and political concessions. Thus it was Iranian policy to rely on whatever external support it could rally to avert this. The emergence of the United States as the dominant external power in the region, replacing Great Britain in the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry which had dominated Iran's foreign policy responses and objectives for more than a century, was, albeit, a welcome factor at this crucial point.

Nonetheless, Iran's desire for a nonaligned posture toward Britain and the Soviet Union had to be subordinated to the broader bipolar Cold-war exigencies in the late 1940's and early 1950's as the alliance with the United States entered into a new form and as the overall American conception of international allegiances meant persistence of Cold-war consideration. Thus Iran's international posture and specific actions in foreign policy began to assume a pronounced pro-Western course especially after the bitter experiences of the 1950-1953 period when the nationalist movement and government of Dr. Mossadegh showed its communist feathers and brought the country down to chaos, political instability and economic bankruptcy. The failure of his "negative equilibrium policy," which required even-handed treatment of Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as the quest for other feasible alternatives in order to cope with security dangers posed by a proximate great power reinforced the case for alliance policy.

Therefore, it was apparent that a policy of neutralism, faithfully adhered to by the late Reza Shah on the eve of the World War, did not keep Iran out of the hostilities. These experiences proved altogether that a strategically located country such as Iran, which lacked the military power, inter alia, to conduct independent foreign policy, had no choice but to ally itself with those states whose interest dictated the maintenance of her sovereignty, even if this entailed the acceptance of political and military commitments. This single point could altogether explain and underline the
thinking behind the formulation of an assertive foreign and security policy by Iran in the 1970's.
3.2 Northern Tier before the Outbreak of World War Two

The Turkish context and its historical background: The historical conflict between Russia and Turkey dates back three centuries, to the first of their thirteen wars. The source of conflict was in essence a question of power which manifested itself in Czarist Russia's territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Since this exchange was not in Britain's interest, Russia's conflict with the Ottomans was never entirely separable from its rivalry with Great Britain. Thus by the time of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in 1774, Czarist Russia's expansion was underway, the Ottoman Empire deterioration had begun, and the Eastern Question - the question of what should take the Ottoman Empire's place - was a matter of international concern.3

The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, which conveniently dates the Eastern Question, recognized Catherine the Great Russian Empire's interests on the Turkish Straits, and guaranteed her merchant ships free passage there. The Treaty offered an international status on the Straits and thus creating the problem of their jurisdiction. This was a direct result of the Russian encroachment. Another factor further complicating the Eastern Question was the awakening of the declining Ottoman Empire's subject nationalities which compounded the already existed problems.

As the 19th century drew to a close, the Eastern Question became increasingly central to the rivalry of the Great Powers, whose interests clashed in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Out of necessity, the Turks developed a broad view of diplomacy and foreign policy which neither the Ottoman Empire, nor its successor, the Turkish Republic, has ever relinquished. Thus throughout the 19th and present centuries, Turkey has been forced to maintain tenuous diplomatic positions built upon a central strategy of inhibiting the most dangerous and threatening power by invoking the assistance of the others. The tensions in Turko-American relations, the position of Turkey in NATO, and her recent friendly relations with the USSR are all testimony of that strategy.

Great Britain and Russia - especially from the 1830's onwards - were the powers chiefly concerned with the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Because Britain feared Russian expansion into the Balkans, the Straits Convention of 1841 can be interpreted as representing the early application of a policy of containment. With the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Britain also feared Russia's potential threat to her newly created lifeline through the Eastern Mediterranean to India.

The question of whether or not Russia required containment depends on one's frame of reference. She had strategic as well as economic interests in the Straits. She also had a strong interest in the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and in the many Orthodox Christians who lived in the Sultan's dominions.

Whatever the motivations behind her foreign policy, Czarist Russia expanded southward, forcing the Ottoman Empire to resort to geopolitics in an effort to contain her. But as the 20th century began, the Turks' tactics became increasingly precarious. The settlement of differences between Russia and Britain in the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, and the subsequent strengthening of that entente by the inclusion of France, sharply narrowed the options of an emerging nationalist
movement in Turkey. After the Young Turks Revolution of 1908, German influence was ascendent too. The Turks, who continued to harbour a traditional hatred and well-founded fear for Russia, were certain that the Triple Entente would partition the Ottoman Empire whether it won or lost. They were also discouraged by their failure to exact any tangible benefits from Britain and France. For these factors and the personal role of Enver Pasha (Turkey's Germanophile minister of War), the Turks cast their lot with Germany. As A.J.P. Taylor has put it:

"This was a supreme blunder, which brought down the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had made up for their internal weakness by a subtle diplomacy playing off one Great Power against another; now they gratuitously involved themselves in the European conflict. Perhaps they had no choice."

After the First World War, Turkey was facing further dismemberment through four secret treaties which pointed to a resolution of the Eastern Question through the Ottoman Empire's partition. Although the new Russian government renounced Russia's part in the treaties, it was alone. The signed armistice (Mudros, October 1918) provided for the loss of fifty percent of Ottoman Empire's territory and population. The Straits were opened to the Allies who now had the right to occupy forts on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, as well as the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatened the security of the Allies (Article 7).

The ensuing occupation of Turkish territories by British, French, and Italians aroused the Turkish nationalist spirit, but was of little consequence compared to the occupation by


the Greeks (at Izmir, May 1919) which had been encouraged by President Wilson and Prime Ministers Clemenceau and Lloyd George, the latter finding legitimation of the act in the Article 7.6

A nationalist movement gathered momentum, under the aegis of Ataturk and as a result of the Greek occupation; leading up to the national congresses drafting and endorsing what became known as the National Pact. The Pact was a declaration that emphasized Turkey's territorial integrity as well as her political, judicial, and financial independence. It also expressed the terms on which Ataturk was prepared to make peace.

When the Sultan's government signed the Treaty of Sevres (Aug. 1920), the nationalist government (provisional, based in Ankara) promptly rejected its terms and rallied a number of regular forces to the nationalist cause. The Treaty of Sevres, together with a Tripartite Agreement on Anatolia, would in effect have extinguished Turkey's independence. But the nationalists never allowed them to be implemented.7 Their time came around in Lausanne.

In the meantime, however, the Turkish nationalists secured their eastern front and composed their differences with the Soviet regime, which was consolidating its position in the Russian Caucasus. The Soviets were concerned with restiveness in Transcaucasia (Georgia, Erivan, and Azerbaijan provinces). Turkey was also in need of friends owing to the British-supported invasion by Greece. Furthermore, in view of the Soviet desire not to diminish Turkish and Persian hostility


toward Britain, it was understandable that Russia should court the two Near Eastern countries at the time. This Russian effort was an early example of successive attempts on the two southern neighbours. Variations of the same theme would appear with regularity in the 1950's and 1960's.

When the Greeks were driven out, the Turks found the drift of the events to be in their favour. They reached an agreement with France, an accord with Italy, and signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviets, all in March 1921. At this time most of the territory claimed in the National Pact was under Turkish control, and military gains had set the stage for nationalist diplomacy. These successes on behalf of the Turks led to the resignation of Lloyd George. His successor, Lord Curzon invited both the Sultans and the provisional government to the peace conference of Lausanne.

Abolishing the sultanate, Ataturk sent his foreign minister, Ismet Pasha (Inonou) to the conference and negotiated freely with Britain's foreign secretary. Other factors also worked to Turkey's advantage. The Hapsburg Empire had disappeared; German influence, at least temporarily, was destroyed; and Russia weakened. As a consequence, the first two countries were not even represented at the conference while the latter was unable to effect its goal of a Straits regime restricted to the riparian powers of the Black Sea. Allied solidarity collapsed. Russia sought closure of the Straits, while Britain sought complete freedom of navigation through them. The Turks, whose territorial objectives were severely limited by the National Pact, were able to manipulate these differences skillfully.

The outcome of Lausanne was a compromise treaty giving Turkey international recognition. Her sovereignty was unquestioned over all her territory except the demilitarized Straits. The Turkish Republic, therefore, grew out of the Lausanne settlement. A spate of changes followed in the

following months: new chamber of deputies, proclamation of the republic and presidency of Mustafa Kemal (29 Oct. 1923), who, in turn, vigorously started his campaign of modernization, the first being the abolition of the caliphate.

Ataturk renounced foreign ambitions and ideologies with internationalistic tendencies (i.e., Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamic ideologies) and limited his aspirations to the reconstruction of Turkish national territory. Turkey, under Ataturk, renounced expansionist, revisionist ventures and concentrated on international transformation. International peace and hence the status quo were prerequisites to her development. Development, in turn, was necessary to assure continued independence. As a small power, Turkey followed a realistic policy which, while careful of international pressures and the global balance of power, remained rooted in her own, national self-interest. As a concrete step toward fulfillment of her foreign policy objectives, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the Soviet Union (Dec. 1925). Each party pledged itself to neutrality in case of military action against the other, undertook to abstain from aggression against the other, and also undertook not to participate in an alliance directed against the other.


10. The Soviets, suspicious of the treaties signed at Locarno, considered friendship with Turkey the key point of their Near Eastern policy and the means by which they hoped to prevent Western (i.e., British) domination of the area. The treaty was ratified in Dec. 1926, broadened in Dec. 1929 and March 1931, prolonged for five years in Oct. 1931 and further for ten years in Nov. 1935. It was denounced by the Soviets in March 1945. See Hurewitz, op. cit.; and Adam Ulam, "Expansion and Co-existence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973," 2nd ed., (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 168.
Other treaties followed: with Yugoslavia (1925); France (1926); Persia (1926, on border disputes and Kurdish risings); Afghanistan (1926); Britain and Iraq (1926, resolving border and Mosul disputes); Hungary (1927); Italy (1928); Bulgaria (1929); and Greece (1930). The treaty with Greece terminated years of conflict that had often invited the interference of the Great Powers; it also confirmed Turkey's intention to support the status quo. To that end, she joined Yugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania in the Balkan Pact (1934), a defensive alliance primarily directed against an irredentist Bulgaria. The core of the Pact was a guarantee of the independence and territorial integrity of each signatory and an obligation to consult other members of the alliance in the event of threats to peace in the Balkans.

Following the Balkan Pact, however, Turkey's attempts to assure the status quo in the Balkans were generally undermined. Germany's rapidly increasing economic influence in the Balkans, her preoccupation of the Rhineland and Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, altered the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe, defeating Turkey's most important foreign policy objectives. The importance of the League and ineffectiveness of Versailles and Locarno treaties forced Turkey to initiate diplomatic discussions to reverse the Straits regime, moves which were supported by most of the powers. As a result of negotiations, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed the Montreux Convention (July 1936) fulfilling Turkey's desires about the Straits: remilitarization, controlling the passage of belligerent warships in times of war, and to exercise jurisdiction over all warships in time of peace if she were under the threat of war.


The control Turkey now exercised over the Straits was a factor that not a single government could disregard. Until World War Two began - and well into the war - Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union all considered good relations with Turkey as an important objective. Meanwhile, Turkey continued to strengthen her diplomatic positions, and in 1937 negotiated the Sa'adabad Pact. This agreement with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan was directed against interference in their affairs by the Soviet Union and Italy.  

Moreover, Turkey's apprehensions of both Italian and German designs on the one hand, and the likewise British concerns on the other, led the two countries to undertake serious negotiations about their common defense. In conjunction with British guarantees to Poland, Rumania, and Greece, the British joined the Turks in an Anglo-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assistance (May 1939). The declaration provided for cooperation and assistance in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, and for the conclusion at a future date of a long-term reciprocal agreement. The French also followed similar lines and offered their support with an identical declaration a month later.

However, the Turks found out later that their relations with the Western Allies and the Soviets were being compromised. This was due to retaliatory threats by the Germans; failure of Britain to meet Turkey's economic and military needs, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact (August 1939). Earlier assumptions that treaties of mutual assistance with Britain and France would fit into a larger frame of reference in which the Soviets would also have a place were now discarded. Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, Turkey once again was subject to the geopolitical forces which, as in World War One, threatened to bring war into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek context and its historical background: The

modern Greek state was established in the first half of the 19th century when they broke away from four centuries of Ottoman domination. The governments after the War of Independence in general were subject to hostile divisions which were only accentuated by rivalries among the Great Powers. These rivalries, evident throughout the 19th century, were reflected in the orientation of Greek political parties toward one or another of the Great Powers—a development which continued into the 20th century. Eventually, the orientation of these parties along Great Power lines resulted in what later became known as the "National Schism."

The problem of the schism was intensified after the exchange of population with Bulgaria and Turkey. This was done after the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The constitutional question created by the National Schism came to be the chief political issue between royalists (or Populists) and Republicans (or Liberals). A negative effect of the exchange of minorities and refugee problems was that it furthered the schism between these two groups. The republic, founded in 1924, had little emotional appeal to those born in Old Greece (pre-Balkan Wars)—the monarchy, on the other hand, had little appeal for the Greeks occupying the new territories which were acquired during the course of the Balkan Wars, and even less for the refugees from Anatolia. From this development can be traced some of the social cleavages which gradually came to replace personal rivalries in Greek politics. In the process, the schism even became social, preventing friendships and marriages across the political lines.


Internal political and economic problems in the early 1930's precipitated a plebiscite which recalled King Constantine I's second son, King George II in 1935. The plebiscite reflected a disillusioned population's hope for political stability. A general election held in the same year gave a realistic indication of the divisions in Greek politics and revealed the split between the royalists (with 143 seats in Parliament) and republicans (with 141 seats). To make the matters even more complicated, the Communist Party (with 15 seats) held the balance of power. 17

In spite of disagreements on reform, the essential difference between the two main parties in the 1930's was that they represented two exclusive systems of patronage. They both opposed the Communist party, whose small following could be explained by the nature of Greek royalties, and by the fact that Comintern resolutions at the time continuously alienated those groups most likely to support them. Comintern policies in the Balkans allowed Bulgarians and Yugoslavia to be both Communist and nationalist, but forced Greeks to choose between the two. 18

The dichotomy between Communist and nationalist in Greece during the 1930's accounts for subsequent events. The problem subsided to a degree by the appointment of General Metaxas as the head of the government with subsequent dictatorial powers. Metaxas adopted drastic unconstitutional measures and inaugurated what became known as the "Fourth of August Regime." 19 He then embarked upon re-shaping the Greek society

on a par with the other reformist leaders in the region. Apart from his development programmes, Metaxas tried to eliminate the system of patronage. Whether he succeeded in this or not is subject to debate.  

It was unfortunate for Metaxas, and for Greece, that during this time international issues changed so rapidly. Frictions with Italy and Bulgaria posed problems. Fortunately for Greece, these problems were not compounded by frictions with Turkey. The Balkan Pact (Entente) of 1934, officially described as a collective guarantee of existing frontiers, was essentially a defensive alliance against Bulgaria.

When Italy occupied Albania in 1939, Metaxas accepted guarantees of Greek territory by France and Great Britain. After war broke out, he approved of the Tripartite Treaty between Turkey, France, and Britain. Greece's neutrality, like that of Turkey, while qualified by commercial dependence on the German market, carefully concealed an ultimate political alignment with the Western Allies. With the fall of France, and as the situation in Greece deteriorated, this alignment became more apparent. Mussolini, anxious to acquire more bases in the Mediterranean began a calculated policy of antagonism toward Greece culminating in an ultimatum which was sent to Metaxas demanding a number of unspecified strategic points in Greek territory. This was against Hitler's wishes, but behind it one could read calculated measures in redefining the balance of power in Europe. The Soviets at this time were prepared to recognize Italy's hegemony in the Mediterranean in exchange for the acceptance of their hegemony in the Black Sea.

The Iranian context and its historical background: In

Iran, as in Turkey and the Balkans, pursuit of national interests by Great Powers was a fundamental issue during the Second World War. This issue was at the heart of the longstanding rivalry in the region between Britain and Russia, and it accounts for their infringement of Iranian territorial integrity throughout the 20th century. In 1941 it led to an arrangement somewhat similar to the October Agreement on the Balkans—the division of Iran into spheres of influence. The immediate result, simultaneous occupation of Iran by British and Russian forces in August 1941, set the stage for a crisis among them in 1945-1946. To comprehend what the Anglo-Soviet occupation did to Iran, and to understand how subsequent crises grew out of that occupation, it is necessary first to examine the antecedents of Great Power rivalry in Iran, and to place that rivalry in the context of the power struggle along the Northern Tier.

Iran, like Turkey, has served for centuries as a focal point for Great Power rivalry; and like Turkey, her position in international affairs has been subjected to, at least since the 19th century, the conflict between Britain and Russia in the Near East. Russia's expansionist policies and her need for warm-water ports clashed with Britain's need to maintain her line of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean and her desire to protect a vast area which stretched from the Persian Gulf to Tibet. The conflict of interests, sometimes

21. Iran, although it was always called "Iran" by the Iranians, was called Persia by Westerners after the Greeks, who called Iran by the name of one of its provinces: Fars, or Persia. This tradition continued until 21 March 1935, when Reza Shah made Iran as the official name. The systematic usage adopted here is for Iran throughout the main body of this study.

referred to in the context of "Persian Problem," naturally led to pervasive influence by both powers in Iran.

Around the turn of the century, Persian nationalists resolved to end their country's subservience to foreign influence. Heartened by Britain's humiliation in the Boer War, Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese, and the intellectual appeal of Western democratic institutions, they turned against their corrupt and autocratic government, convened a National Assembly (Majlis, hereafter referred to as the Parliament) and in 1906 drafted a constitution, the first modern and democratic one in the East and based on ideas taken mostly from Belgian and French constitutions. Unfortunately, foreign influence was even stronger than they realized, and foreign interests were soon deeply involved in the internal struggle for power. When the reigning Shah, backed by Czarist Russia, attempted to subvert the constitution, he found that his opponents enjoyed strong British support. British intervention followed and might have cost him his throne had it not been for the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.23

As in the past, factors which prompted this agreement were beyond Iran's control: the British for years had wanted a compromise, and feared the Germans, who seemed determined to penetrate the Middle East. The Russians were reeling from their defeat by the Japanese. Turning west, they hoped for a new, friendly British attitude toward their ambitions at the Straits. These considerations led the two to bury some of their differences - not only in Iran, but in Afghanistan and Tibet as well. In the resulting division, Iran was partitioned into zones of political and economic influence: a northern

zone, which was Russia's sphere; a southern zone, which was Britain's sphere; and a central zone, which was neutral.\textsuperscript{24} The two powers sanctimoniously agreed to respect Persia's independence and integrity.\textsuperscript{25}

Time, however, revealed that such respect was only minimal, for the two powers continued to view each other's activities in Iran with distrust. This was, in part, a result of oil having been struck in the neutral zone in 1908. The Iranians of course trusted neither power. Disenchanted with their role in the partition, especially that of Britain's, the Iranians sought an ally in Germany and advice from the United States. But during World War One, in spite of its official neutrality, Iran again was a pawn in Great Power politics. In the Secret Treaty of 1915, Britain gave Russia the right to annex the Turkish Straits and the adjacent Ottoman territories; Russia in return conceded control of most of the neutral zone in Iran to Britain.\textsuperscript{26} Balance of power underlined, Britain went ahead with this in order to secure Russian support against Germany in World War One. The pattern would repeat itself in the Second World War, when the lifeline of communications along the Northern Tier came to the fore in 1944. But this time it was up to a point for the crucial factor of oil interests in southern Iran.

The Russian Revolution brought the 1907 agreement between Britain and Russia to an end. However, when the British evacuated Transcaucasia in 1920, the Soviet regime quickly

\textsuperscript{24} A.J.P. Taylor suggests the interesting generalization that "the Anglo-Saxons and perhaps the French believe in buffer states and the Germans and perhaps the Russians believe in partition as the best way to peace between the Great Powers," Op.cit., p. 239. See Map 3.


took control of the Menshevik republics there. In May of that year, the Red Army in hot pursuit of a Menshevik general occupied the Iranian province of Gilan. Unchallenged, they aided a rebel group and installed them as the Soviet Republic of Gilan. Stalin supported the move, but Lenin overruled him, and eventually ordered that Soviet support ease. The Irano-Soviet Treaty of 26 Feb. 1921 (ratified in Oct.), though containing a controversial article, formally renounced Soviet ambitions in Iran, and Bolshevist Russia returned to more conventional diplomacy in the region.

In the meantime, however, Reza Khan, an army officer, rose to prominence and consolidated his position. In 1923 he became prime minister, and by 1925 he had gained control over the army, the police, the Parliament, and the clergy.

27. Sepehr Zabih, "The Communist Movement in Iran," (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1966), pp. 1-42; Ramazani, ibid., pp. 139-167, 186-192. The Republic of Gilan, the first such experiment in Soviet-sponsored Communist rule in Asia, reveals an interesting facet about the intentions of Stalin in so far as it portrays at such an early date his nationalist-imperialist character and attitude toward the countries of the Northern Tier. The controversial article, VI, reserved for Soviet Russia the right to send troops into Iranian territory should the latter become a base for anti-Soviet aggression. From the Iranian point of view, this was an unfortunate clause in the Treaty. The Soviets insisted on its inclusion on the ground that Iran, even against her will, might be occupied by Western imperialists and hence one day serve as a base for counter-revolutionary White forces. No documented evidence has so far been revealed to explain why Iran agreed to this clause, but apart from a weak Shah being on the throne, it is probable that Iran was eager to effect the evacuation of Soviet troops in Gilan and at the same time to oppose any extension of British influence by speedily concluding the Treaty. In the official communication appended to the Treaty, the Soviet envoy in Tehran made it clear, however, that Article VI was intended to "apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia," and that it was "in no sense intended to apply to verbal or written attacks against the Soviet government." This treaty has been repeatedly declared void by successive Iranian governments. For the text of the treaty and its interpretations, see Hurewitz, op.cit.; Lenczowski, op.cit.; and Helen M. Davis, "Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East," 2nd ed., rev., (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1953). See the text in Appendix 1. See also Map 2.
The Parliament, on Oct. 31, 1925, deposed the reigning Shah and proclaimed Reza Khan as the Shah and thus the new Pahlavi dynasty came into existence on 13th December 1925.28

The new Shah, subsequently to be known as the Reza Shah the Great, now turned his attention to the realization of three great objectives: a centralized government; modernization; and freedom from influence. Undaunted by the huge problems that he confronted, he tried to give the country the sense of national unity it lacked. He subdued local tribes, and undertook reforms in industry, agriculture, and education. Constructive political reform, however, was not dealt with wholeheartedly. Numerous political factions were permitted to appear, but they were concerned only with short-term political ends; and having no common doctrine or platform based on the national interest, they failed to develop into genuine political parties.29

Compounding the difficulty of reform, foreign pressures interfered with the Shah's attempts to centralize the government, while foreign interests exercised considerable pressure on the economy. Friction with the Soviet Union, due in part to the Shah's repression of the Communists and their sympathizers and to his resentment of Soviet ideology, was largely a consequence of economic rivalry.30 If Russian influence over Iran was considerable, British influence was even greater as a result of special privileges in the oil industry. They

28. For Reza Shah's ascendency to the throne, see Ramazani, op.cit., pp. 171-205.


exercised significant control on the Iranian affairs through the oil company, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

The situation in Iran between 1925 and 1941 resembled an "armed truce" between the powerful forces of Iranian nationalism, conservative British imperialism, and dynamic Soviet Communism (largely due to their influence over the self-styled, northern Iranian communists in the provinces of Gilan and Azerbaijan). Reza Shah realized that the best course for the country was to balance British and Russian pressures, and that he had to rely on third powers as counterweights against them (a "third-power strategy"). For this reason he first turned to Americans for advice (the Millsapgh Mission, 1922-1927), and then sought economic ties with Germany, which by 1939 became Iran's largest trading partner. In addition he sought friendly relations with his neighbours culminating in signing the Sa'adabad Pact. 31

A great accomplishment of Reza Shah's modernization programmes and a symbol of his economic policies was the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway, paid for by taxes 31. The Sa'adabad Pact of July 1937 between Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey, was another attempt to escape from the traditional rivalries to which Iran, as well as others, had been subjected. The Pact, the first regional international organization of this kind in the area, looked to the creation of a regional grouping strong enough to counter aggression from outside the region. At the same time, it was a treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression between neighbouring states. The Pact did not contain any obligation for collective self-defence. Instead, there was the negative obligation to abstain from any aggressive action, either individually or in concert with outside powers, against any other member. The only positive accomplishment was the agreement to support Iran for election to the semi-permanent "Asiatic" seat on the Council of the League of Nations as Turkey's replacement. Attempts were made, especially by Turkey, to revive the pact following the outbreak of World War Two in Sept. 1939, but these efforts proved futile. Any attempt to revive it would obviously arouse the hostility of both the Axis powers and the USSR, which was now Germany's ally. However, the pact was not formally renounced in accordance with its procedures, and is thus technically in force. See D.C. Watt, "The Sa'adabad Pact of July 9, 1937," in the Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, 49 (July-Oct., 1962), pp. 296-306; and Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 272-275. For the text of this treaty, see Appendix 2.
levied on sugar, tea, and tobacco. Some problems of communications were disposed of but, ironically, the 870-mile track between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf may have led to Great Power intervention in Iran. The existence of the railway not only helped to re-activate traditional Soviet aspirations towards Iran, but more importantly, it was a vital factor in shipment of supplies to the Soviet Union by the Allies. There was no better way to cross the country than the Trans-Iranian Railway.

The presence of a German colony in Iran and the government's strong pro-German sentiments were regarded by both Britain and the Soviet Union with concern. The Shah's reluctance to allow supplies to pass through neutrally-declared Iran, and his flat refusal to allow the passage of foreign troops, led the British and the Soviets to make strong representation to him. When the circumstances changed, they asked the withdrawal of German presence. This had little effect and the two powers suggested that if their demands were not met, they should resort to force. As in 1907, the course of international events again set the stage for the partition of Iran.
3.3 Northern Tier in World War Two.

At the beginning of World War II, Turkey was again subject to outside pressures. Confronted at first with military threats from both Germany and the Soviets, Turkey negotiated a qualified alliance with Britain and France, while maintaining a precarious neutrality. The German invasion of the Soviet Union relieved her of some anxiety about possible aggression from the Soviet Union, and focussed her attention on Germany. This change of direction in Turkey's threat-perceptions was ill-founded as the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad meant that the Turks would have to deal with the same old adversary. Turkey's anxiety over Soviet designs grew throughout the remainder of the conflict. In succeeding conferences between the Allies, and between the Allies and Turkey, two factors stood out as sources of Turkish apprehension: the exigencies of war against the Axis and the historic rivalry between Britain and Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this rivalry between the imperialisms, it was the Soviet Union which the Turks most feared. As Bernard Lewis points out:

"For the Turks the really important part of the imperialist phenomenon was not the maritime expansion, since the 16th century, of Western Europe, which had affected them only indirectly; it was the overland expansion, during the same period, of Eastern Europe, which had brought the old Turkish lands north and east of the Black Sea and the Caspian under Russian rule, and forced the Ottoman Empire to fight a long series of bitter wars, in a rear-guard defence against the Russian advance to the Mediterranean. Thus, while other nationalists looked to Russia for sympathy and support against the West, Turkey looked to the West for help against Russia, and continued, even after many others had turned away, to see in the West and in the Western way of life the best hope for the future."32

After the winter of 1942-43, the Turks again looked to the West. In several conferences with Allied leaders they revealed their not so misplaced apprehensions over Soviet

intentions. The conferences during the war illustrates how Turkey's geopolitical position dictated her strategy of restraining the most dangerous and threatening power by invoking the assistance of the others; third-power strategy, this time displayed by the Turks.

Between the outbreak of the war and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Turkish government had few clear choices. Economically dependent on the Soviet's new ally, Germany, and diplomatically associated with Germany's enemies, Turkey had to consider every move with extreme care. The Nazi-Soviet Pact dictated a reversal in the Soviet attitude toward Turkey's pacts with Britain and France. As a result the Turks tried to strengthen their position and concluded a Mutual Assistance Treaty with Britain and France (Oct. 1939). The effectiveness of the new treaty depended both on the capacity of the Allies to provide Turkey with the means of resistance, and on Turkey's good faith. As it turned out, circumstances were to qualify both variables. The Allies wanted Turkish aid in containing Hitler, and Britain had a secondary concern in safeguarding her lifeline in the Eastern Mediterranean. But it was necessary that in making such a commitment Turkey receive a quid pro quo, and such was not the case.

The flow of Allied supplies to Turkey, therefore, remained inadequate, and Turkey found it increasingly difficult to maintain an independent posture. Italy entered the war and France collapsed. This led to the undermining of the basis of the tripartite alliance. At the time of the Italian invasion, supplies promised had not been delivered, and there was little hope that with France out of the war a beleaguered Britain could do any better on her own.

The Turks refused to declare war by invoking the non-

receipt of the supplies. Their dependency on foreign economies were such that, seeing tough bargaining as necessary for survival, they could not avoid playing the Axis Powers against the Allies. The British, for their part, understood Turkey's position, and describing her as an ally, a Mediterranean Power, the leading state in the Balkans and of the Sa'adabad signatories in political terms, and on the direct route between Europe and Britain's vital spheres of interests in the Middle East in geographical terms, asked for benevolent neutrality, and this Turkey gave.

Hitler, in spite of his Naval staffs' desire to launch an offensive in the Middle East, was determined to adopt a defensive stance in the Balkans. Plans for operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East could wait until Russia was defeated. Under the German pressure and also because of Turkey's strategy for survival, the Turks signed an agreement with Germans like that with the Soviets earlier. Each signatory promised to respect the other's territorial inviolability and integrity and to abstain from action aimed at the other. At Turkey's insistence, however, a reservation respecting existing engagements covered the Anglo-Turkish treaty, which retained precedence. Thus, on the eve of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, Turkey had her bets covered, and awaited with trepidation the next move on the Nazi-Soviet chessboard.

As the German army moved deeper into Russia, the British and Soviet governments— not yet formally allied—began preparations for the occupation of Iran. In order to prevent Turkish suspicions, they issued a declaration of intent to respect the Montreaux Convention and the territorial integrity of Turkey. However, this declaration was purely opportunistic on the part of the Soviets and did not allay Turkish suspicions when the British and the Soviets invaded Iran on 25 August, 1941.

The turning of the tide in the winter of 1942 in the war, Churchill's "Hinge of Fate," also accompanied Allied pressures on the Turks to abandon neutrality, a momentum which continued through the conferences of 1943. Churchill had long sought to open a new route to Russia and to strike at Germany's southern flank. The Turkish Straits and Turkish air bases made Turkey the key to such plans.

The Turks were anxious about their future relations with the Soviets - a fact that Churchill knew and played on. In Adana, he tried to convince them to enter the war. But the Turks had no such inclination. Their alliance with the British, after all, was one of expediency; and some Allied causes were downright threatening to Turkey's long-term interests. What, for instance, would the total defeat of Germany mean but the ascendency of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe? Observing Churchill's statements and promises as recognition of the services their apparent neutrality had rendered to the common cause, they did not feel they had committed themselves as definitely as Churchill hoped. Rather, they thought they had made clear to him why they had to be prudent. The Russians based their political consideration on cold evaluation of facts. If Turkey remained neutral, the Russians would try to take advantage of that position. If Turkey entered the war, the Russians, as they had with the Poles, would exploit Turkish weaknesses resulting from the fortunes of the war. The result was a legacy of misunderstanding and animosity that contributed to Turkey's problems.

At Adana, and in the months that followed, Turkish statesmen warned the Allies that the position of Soviet forces at the end of the war would determine the boundaries of Europe, and as a consequence they looked about for a countervailing force to the Soviet might. The implications of the Casablanca Agreement between the Americans and the British, reflected in

35. Casablanca (Jan.), Adana (Jan.), Quebec (Aug.), Moscow (Oct.), Cairo (Nov.), Tehran (Nov.-Dec.), and Cairo (Dec.)
British control of lend-lease goods sent to Turkey, left the Turks with the impression that the United States had withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean, and that the British were in control in the Near East. Britain's failure to heed Turkish advice about the Soviet Union's postwar intentions left the Turks with still further distrust of Britain, and a continuing fear of her willingness to work out a deal with the Russians - as she had over Iran in 1907 and 1941, and over Turkey in 1915. The doctrine of unconditional surrender - whose success would leave the Soviets dominant in Europe - reinforced Turkish mistrust, as did the British attempt to force Turkey into the war. In August 1941 Stalin had promised to help the Turks if they were invaded. But the Turks knew that the Soviets could use their entry into the war as a pretext for entry into Turkey. The Turks regarded the Soviet actions toward Eastern Europe as past experiences that were indicative of the Soviet intentions toward them. Thus, entry into the war was to be resisted at all costs.

The Turks were much less concerned with global strategy than Churchill, and increasingly anxious about Soviet intentions in the Near East and the Balkans. The Soviets asserted that small states on the border of the Soviet Union (i.e., the Balkan states) were hostile to her, that Turkish neutrality was increasingly favourable toward the Germans, and that Turkey's position secured Germany's southern flank. In countering these attacks, the Turks expressed cordiality toward the Western Allies, and pointed out that Turkey's non-belligerence had been determined in part by the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

However, the Turks resorted to a tactical shift in response to the Allied pressures. Resistance to Allied demands, while still predicted on fears of the Soviets postwar intentions, now took the form of logistical and military-tactical arguments. This new course placed more emphasis on equally real if lesser fears of Germany's military power, and on the Allied weakness - arguments more compatible with
the Allied position and calculated to give greater support to Turkish neutrality.

While the Turks were shifting diplomatic gears, control of their fate continued to be the subject of high-level concern. Throughout the Tehran Conference, Churchill hoped to persuade the Turks to take active participation in the war. Perhaps to encourage Soviet support of those hopes, he bluntly noted Britain's intention to point out to the Turks that their failure to respond to an invitation from the Big Three to enter the war would have serious political and territorial consequences in regard to the future of the Straits. Churchill was hinting at a greater Russian say in the Straits regime. As in 1915, strategic considerations were operative. While Britain's lifeline was important, and had been since the beginning of the war, British oil fields in Iran were of more value than the Straits. Presumably, if the Russians had to have a warm-water outlet, the Straits would be more acceptable to the British than the Persian Gulf. This, as we see later, is borne out by British actions in 1947.

At the second Cairo Conference, Churchill became increasingly impatient with what he called the Turks' circular arguments. He again acknowledged Turkey's preoccupation with Russia. Cooperation with Britain, he asserted, would put their relations with Russia on the best possible footing, since Turkey's only sure course was with the Allies. Not entering into the war meant that, while remaining Britain's friend, Turkey would count for nothing as an effective ally and, as Eden observed, it was inevitable that the spirit of the alliance would be affected. The implicit threat—which Churchill had made clear at Tehran—was that Britain would not stand in Russia's way at war's end. However, as things stood, Turkey could neither characterize her entry into the war as a response to a Soviet request nor ask the Big Three for a declaration similar to that on Iran.
Turkey's refusal to comply with Churchill's demands brought to a climax the diplomacy of 1943. Examination of that diplomacy reveals that Russia, Britain, and Turkey were all pursuing goals which, however rationalized, always conformed with their national interests. The Turks, increasingly fearful of Soviet intentions, and suspicious of Anglo-Soviet deals, kept the Russians at a distance. They dragged their feet in dealing with their British allies, received some moral support from the Americans, and, like both the Russians and the British, acted in accordance with their national interests. A recognition of the interests involved illuminates some of the issues that might otherwise be obscured in their relations; it also illustrates the degree to which arguments based upon historic rivalries were compelling in their strategic thinking.

In early 1944, the Turks under Allied pressures were forced to reassess their tactics. Desiring to alienate neither the British nor the Russians, they attempted to gauge the differences between them in order to find a course of action most likely to safeguard their position in the postwar world. They were increasingly isolated, and now began to modify their position, hoping to appease the Allies by conciliatory policies. If the first phase of their wartime diplomacy had been to meet military threats from Nazis and Soviets alike, they now entered the second: to limit Russia's influence in Eastern Europe at the end of the war.

The Soviets wanted the Turks in the war, but only if they were "mutually assisted" by Russian forces which would never leave the Turkish soil. In the light of Soviet treatment of the Turkish question, the Turks' alarm appears to have been well founded.36

The widening rift in Allied diplomacy over Turkey reveals that it was a strategic issue over which the Soviet Union and

36. Weisband, "Turkish Foreign Policy ...," pp. 228-229.
Britain, supported by the United States, came into conflict. While wartime considerations were important in the formulation of their policies, the essential factor in both Russia's and Britain's policies toward Turkey by July 1944 was a desire to ensure their interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the postwar world.

Soviet desires to bring Turkey into the war lessened when such action was connected to the question of Allied support and they refused to consider whether it was the common interests of the Allies. This insistent, unyielding attitude on their part leads one to the unavoidable conclusion that either they intended to use Turkey's participation in the war to take advantage of her vulnerability, or that they intended to make the price for a voice in postwar matters so high that Turkey could be represented as a moral bankrupt. Either way, the Soviets would benefit, and she would strengthen her position in regard to the Straits. The Turks, on the other hand, believed the Soviets were determined to reserve complete freedom of action over Turco-Soviet problems. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe in the latter part of 1944, while in part dictated by wartime strategy, were also a source of anxiety and gave the Turks little hope for anything other than Soviet domination of the Balkans. 37

Looking to the West, the Turks particular concern was about events in Bulgaria. Turkey in 1934 had joined with Greece and Rumania in a defensive alliance whose primary purpose was to contain Bulgarian irredentism. World War Two, however, had undermined the Balkan Pact as well as its aims, and had seen the realization of precisely what the Pact had sought to prevent. The Turks were also concerned with several related issues. Since Stalingrad, they had feared an Anglo-Soviet deal dividing Europe, like Iran, into spheres of influence - at Turkish expense. They suspected that Russian occupation of Bulgaria was part of the deal; and even more worrying was the possibility that Soviet occupation of Turkey

37. Ulam, op. cit., p. 115.
could be as easily sanctioned as that of Bulgaria.

Greece and the Second World War: The full-scale involvement of Greeks in World War II came about not by their own choice but as a result of the Italian attack. The freshly mobilized Greek forces, the various factions burying their differences under the leadership of Metaxas, quickly repelled the invading Italian army. What they could not overcome was Hitler's anticipation of Italy's humiliation which forced him into intervening in the Balkans and as a result the Greeks found their country under German control and in Axis hands by the end of May 1941.38

The occupation of Greece, from April 1941 until its liberation in October 1944 created intense hardship for its citizens. They emerged from the experience a divided nation, whose problems were only compounded by ideological categories and international politics. The constitutional question, hinged as much on patronage as on principle, sharply affected the debate over the shape of Greece's post-war government. As the occupation continued, social and ideological influences gradually compounded the question. These influences, in turn, grew stronger as a result of a number of inter-related factors, namely the respect and support won by the Communist party (KKE) and its capability to organize guerilla bands into a national resistance movement. However, the complex divisions within the Greek society also meant that other and subsequent resistance movements were formed, often all competing with each other.

38. The Germans occupied Athens and Piraeus, Salonika, and a few islands, limiting their control to large and main lines of communication. Eastern Macedonia and Thrace they left to the Bulgarians, and the remainder of the country to the Italians. The position of Greece's Ionians Islands (which guard the Adriatic), her Aegean Islands (guarding the Turkish Straits), and Crete (which is vital to any Eastern Mediterranean strategy - particularly with regard to the Suez Canal), endowed the Greeks with great strategic value. Crete, however, played a different role. Its defence, even if unsuccessful, perhaps saved Malta. Malta, in turn, was the key to the Mediterranean, control of which would determine control of North Africa.
The government that assumed power after Greece's liberation in October 1944 reflected divisions in the Greek society. This representation resulted from a series of changes in the government-in-exile during the war. As the war progressed, this government, at first largely made up of individuals associated with Metaxas, came to include men with more liberal and republican sympathies, and to reflect concern for the constitutional issue that served as a focus for national passions.

The constitutional question also led to formation of a rival government in Greece itself, the Communist dominated Political Committee of National Liberation. However, under the initiative of the republican prime minister, George Papandreou, a conference convened in Lebanon in May 1944, where representatives of 17 parties and organizations resolved some of their differences and reached a temporary agreement. The "Lebanon Charter" called for an end to the "reign of terror" in Greece, unification of all resistance forces, and formation of a Government of National Unity. It was also declared that the King would not return to Greece pending the results of a plebiscite. 39

British influence, meanwhile, continued to be a factor in Greek politics. Britain had been actively involved in the resistance movement and in the affairs of the Greek government-in-exile, with which it had signed in March 1942 an agreement for close cooperation in prosecuting the war effort. The liberation of Greece and the re-establishment of her freedom and independence had been accepted as a common objective.

The British faced some difficulties in their dealing and thinking about Greece. The rivalry between resistance forces and the subsequent question of allocating British aid and a

Conflict between Britain's immediate and long-range interests, compounded by being mutually exclusive, were notable factors. Churchill and the Foreign Office, looking to the postwar world, placed less emphasis on support of the resistance effort. They were concerned, rather, with support of the King and of the government-in-exile. A constitutional monarchy in Greece would be more likely to bring about stability than a republic, they believed. A stable government, in turn, would help ensure the safety of British sea communications in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Aiding the resistance effort, because it meant giving aid to the KKE-centred National People's Liberation Army (ELAS), also meant less chance of success for the constitutional monarchy. On Anthony Eden's advice, the British favoured the undermining of the resistance and holding a plebiscite on the questions of King's return and the constitution. In the second Conference of Cairo (Dec. 1943), they were, again, as in Turkey, thwarted by Roosevelt who believed that the British were trying to bypass the King. He also adhered to the United States policy of non-interference in Greek affairs. As a result the British fell back on supporting the King and a united resistance front; ideas that gave the anti-monarchists and Communists much fuel. This tenuous situation in Greece led Churchill to initiate a study of the "brute issues" developing between Great Britain and Russia - and took a step toward what became the percentages agreement with Stalin over the Balkans.


41. The acute British fear of Russia came to the foreground once again at this time. An indication of widespread British concern about the Eastern Mediterranean and the Northern Tier is illustrated that at that time they were entertaining the idea of the outbreak of the next war with the likely threatres of either the Danube, or the Dardanelles, or the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, the authority of the Government of National Unity was recognized by all the Greek guerilla forces in the Caserta Agreement (Sept. 1944), which was handled by Harold Macmillan. This government in turn placed all those forces under the command of a British officer, thus explicitly acknowledging the Greek government's reliance on British forces which began to land in Greece at the end of September as the Germans withdrew. Shortly after, the Government of National Unity would be following the British into Athens, signalling the end of the occupation.

Before that, however, the stage had been set for negotiations between Churchill and Stalin - negotiations which began before the Government of National Unity entered Athens, and which were to have a profound effect on Greece.

The British believed that complete concession to Soviet demands would diminish British influence in South-eastern Europe and cause the loss of British credibility in Turkey and Greece. The Turks and Greeks were also worried about Soviet intentions, and when Soviet forces entered Rumania in April 1944, Americans, too, began to worry.

While the United States appeared willing to accept assurances of Soviet benevolence toward Rumania, Churchill grew anxious as the Red Army advanced. He asked Eden to proceed with the drafting of the "brute issues" policy paper. The Americans, however, were not fond of the idea and worried that the arrangement could lead to a division of the Balkans into spheres of influence. The president preferred to rely on consultative machinery whose purpose would be to dispell misunderstanding. Churchill explained to the Americans that the proposal applied only to "war conditions," and insisted that it not be interpreted as sanctioning a division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, or affecting the rights and responsibilities of the Great Powers at the peace settlement. Rather, he regarded it as a convenient arrangement for preventing a divergence of policy between the Allies in the Balkans.
With this, he proposed a three-month period of trial and obtained the approval of the President.

Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, also did not hold favourable views on the idea. His refusal to face this question and his rejection of power politics showed a Wilsonian preference for the principles of the Atlantic Charter. These principles, if adhered to, perhaps were the most likely determinants of respect. Considering the British Empire's decline and the Red Army's march through Eastern Europe, Roosevelt's recommendation of consultative machinery appears to have had little merit. Unless there were prior agreement as to spheres of influence, the British believed that de facto spheres would take their place.

However, as the time went on, it turned out that Stalin had backed down and refused to go ahead with the plan. His reasons are open to speculation. He might not have wanted to antagonize the United States or he had the upper hand in Rumania, Communists were thought to be strong in Greece, and Bulgarian occupation and their active participation in the war on the Soviet's side were pending.

Churchill and Eden saw that the Soviets were attempting to force them out of the Balkans. British weakness was underscored by the rude intrusion of Soviet power. The Red Army was in Rumania and Bulgaria and had reached the borders of Greece and Turkey.

The Americans began to realize that the question of control over South-eastern Europe was urgent to them as well. It became apparent to them that unless the United States took issue with the Soviets, there was every indication that the

Soviet Union would take a belligerent action wherever its interests were involved. Moscow, they observed, was taking the position that it had the right to settle its problems with neighbours unilaterally. For the Soviets the term "friendly governments" meant something quite different from what was understood by others. It often translated into domination and the Soviets intended to have a positive sphere of influence over their neighbours in the Balkans. Penetration of immediate neighbours for security purposes would logically lead from one country to another. The difficulty of limiting the process was frightening as the Soviets were unimpressed by the American policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

So the Americans being unconvinced, the Soviets bent on manipulations, and the British having their own anxieties, Churchill took it upon himself to go to Moscow and talk with Stalin; the talks that changed the map of Europe overnight. What was at stake at these discussions, known subsequently as the "October Agreement" or "Percentages Agreement," was the question of sphere of influences and although it was repeatedly pronounced that the matters were provisional and relevant to the existing conditions of the war, it proved otherwise.

The system of percentages was not intended to prescribe the members sitting on Commissions for the different Balkan countries, but rather to express the interest and sentiment with which the British and Soviet governments approached the question of these countries. Churchill supposedly regarded the system as only a guide, and recognized that such a guide in no way committed the United States - whose President and Secretary of State were informed of the agreement.

43. The indication came from further east, the Soviets were pressuring the Iranian government to grant them exclusive rights to oil concessions in Northern Iran. See pp. 185-187.
The British thought that the agreement provided a rough guide to Allied influence in the Balkans. Allied influence, however, had long-range political implications; and these implications were what led him to seek the agreement in the first place. Stalin, too, recognized what was at stake but with a difference. He understood the predominance of Soviet influence in these countries meant subordination. He would tell Marshall Tito and Milovan Djilas some months later that:

"This War is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."

Meanwhile, different views and contradictory forms of opinions were expressed by the Americans. The State Department favoured adhering to the Atlantic Charter. The explanation behind Roosevelt's position, agreeing with Churchill and going ahead with the agreement and at the same time expressing faith in Atlantic Charter, lies in his character and style. Churchill and Stalin took refuge in the more practical aspects of Roosevelt's diplomacy. The State Department, on the other hand, relied on his public pronouncements: idealistic aspects. Perhaps a larger explanation could be found in the society from which he sprang—a society whose traditions and diplomacy reflected the dualistic qualities of realism and idealism. As

a result, Roosevelt let things slide. Churchill was given a free hand in Greece, Stalin was given tacit approval of his desires to control the rest of Southeastern Europe.  

The Iranian direct experience with the War started with the outright invasion of the country. On 25th August 1941, Soviet and British troops invaded Iran from north and south, respectively. Though there was a three-day resistance, particularly in the south and by the Iranian Navy, the young Iranian armed forces had little to put up against the might of the two powers. In a joint note delivered to the Iranian government, Britain and the Soviet Union cited reasons for the occupation, promised respect for Iran's independence and territorial integrity, and announced the intention of establishing a supply route across the country.

The occupation resulted in the collapse of the Iranian government's control, near-loss of sovereignty, and disruptions. Iran's ports, transportation, oil, capital installations, and currency were now contributing to the Allied cause, but at the cost of extreme hardships to the Iranian people. Disruption of the Iranian administration in turn created both the opportunity and the necessity for control by the occupying powers over many aspects of Iran's internal affairs. Faced with undermining of his power, Reza Shah notified the Parliament of his wishes to resign and abdicated in favour of his heir.

The Soviet and British governments recognized the new monarch and upon the suggestion of the latter, the Americans followed suit too.

Soon after the occupation began President Roosevelt took note of British and Russian assurances that Iran's territorial integrity would be respected. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, however, was dissatisfied with the terms of the occupation and sought a formal statement as a matter of principle. The Iranians, meanwhile, feared Anglo-Soviet intentions and consequently sought guarantees of respect for their territorial integrity. In this, the young Shah found sympathy from the Americans. The formal statement was secured when Britain, the Soviet Union, and Iran signed a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance on 29 Jan. 1942 at Tehran.

The Treaty consisted of nine articles and three annexes, all of which were compatible with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It acknowledged the presence of foreign troops in Iran, but declared that the signatories would undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran (Art. 1), and that Allied forces would be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after an armistice or peace between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates, whichever was the earlier (Art. 5).

Meanwhile, a rebellion broke out in Azerbaijan and it became clear that the Russians were sympathetic to them and even assisting them to become a full separatist movement. The Iranian government sought refuge in the old strategy of relying on a third power as a cornerstone against British and

Russian rivalry and made representation to the United States in order to sign the Tripartite Treaty or take cognizance of it, or give assistance. The Iranians believed that the Atlantic Charter was insignificant to the Soviets and felt that Britain was prepared to sidestep those principles.

The Americans first refused to be drawn into any formal guarantee, but later changed their policies and agreed to send advisors and other forms of aid. The situation in Azerbaijan also subsided to an extent as the Soviets agreed to work with the Iranians in permitting the Iranian troops to enter the province and quell the rebellion. This trend, however, probably resulted from expediency, for the war in Russia was not going well. Germany was still on the offensive, and the Russians needed all their troops. They also desperately needed all the supplies they could secure by way of Iran.

Military necessity dominated Allied activities in Iran. This was more true before and up to the Stalingrad. As a consequence, traditional concerns were of lesser moment and played only a secondary role in the winter of 1942-43. British and Russian actions sometimes contravened their pronouncements endorsing the Atlantic Charter, but justification could be found in the fact that the war was approaching the Caucasus and circumstances dictated accommodation to necessity.

Once the battle was won the situation changed. Cooperation in Iran became less important. As the war moved Westward across the steppes of Russia it became increasingly apparent that Allied actions in Iran were not in accord with the terms of the Tripartite Treaty. The Soviets in particular, in part suspicious of British designs, pursued their own interests with little regard for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, 47. For a general discussion of Iran's initiative in requesting various forms of aid, see Ramazani, op.cit., pp. 72-90.
and political independence envisioned in the Tripartite Treaty. Besides demonstrating a general unwillingness to cooperate, they sealed off their area of occupation and pursued a course that included administrative disruption, fomenting separatism, political intrigue, and propaganda. Britain and the United States behaved differently from Russia, but not for purely altruistic reasons. Rather, the ideals to which they subscribed happened to coincide with their long-range interests in Iran and the region. However, the situation changed drastically toward the end of the war beginning with the oil crisis of 1944.
3.4 The United States involvement in the Northern Tier Politics

American attitudes towards the Northern Tier countries initially seemed to have followed policies adopted for the whole of the Near and Middle East, i.e., those that stemmed from traditional isolationist doctrines; and the notion that these areas were extensions of Eastern Europe and thus in British realm. Practical policies and guidelines were hard to come by and as a result confusion manifested itself time and again. However, it was not until the closing of World War Two that the Americans really got involved in power politics across the Northern Tier and abandoned their earlier idealism. By fortunes of the war or otherwise, it meant that a new actor was in the politics of the region and as active, in years to come, as it could be.

American attitude towards Turkey: Towards the end of the war, the United States remained aloof from matters concerning Turkey. Formal relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire had been established in 1830, but the United States - at least before World War Two - had chosen to regard the Middle East as an extension of Europe. The Monroe Doctrine had indicated the rejection of American involvement in Europe. As a consequence, traditional isolationist policies were manifested in American interests in the Near East. And these interests, unlike those of other foreign powers, were neither strategic nor political; rather, they were missionary, philanthropic, cultural, and economic in nature. For the most part, therefore, American policies were relegated to the protection of these non-political interests.48

The relations between the United States and Turkey, after a lapse of 10 years, were resumed in 1927 establishing on a

solid basis: the new nation's reliance on friendship and non-aggression pacts gradually met with American approval.

As diplomatic relations improved, so did commercial relations. The Turks appreciated the apparent lack of America's political ambitions in the Middle East in general, and in Turkey in particular. Proof of such an interpretation was the fact that the United States had not participated in the Montreux Convention. In short, before World War Two, the State Department continued to see the protection of its non-political interests as its sole task in Turkey.

Between the wars, of course, the United States had acquired important interests in the Middle East, where strategic resources made the arbitrary distinction between political and non-political interests a tenuous concept. Consequently, Britain's traditional sphere of influence in the region, while it continued to be recognized as such even during World War Two for purposes of military strategy, was also the focus of American attempts to oppose both British and French imperialism. These attempts found voice in the principles of the Atlantic Charter which, it was assumed, would be sufficient to protect American interests. 49

Turkey, perhaps because she was not subject to the economic rivalry between Britain and the United States, often apparent elsewhere in the Middle East, and because she was the only Middle Eastern country able to maintain more than a minimal independence during the war, was not regarded as a zone of conflict between the United States and Britain. As one diplomatic historian has observed, she was "the only country in the region in which the United States and Great Britain did not suspect each other's motives." 50 Because of Turkey's adherence to the limited aims of the National Pact, and as a result of her

50. Ibid., p. 115.
skillful diplomacy, she was never occupied by a foreign army. Thus, she was less susceptible to the kinds of pressures exerted by occupation on the states which bordered her. Her sense of community, of nationhood, provided the moral backbone for her army and kept her from the internal divisions which, aggravated by occupation, were so disruptive in Iran, and even more divisive in Greece. As a consequence, it was possible for the United States to avoid active involvement in Turkish affairs, while continuing to view Turkey in the context of principles on which American policymakers intended to build the postwar world.

Roosevelt was never willing to go as far as Churchill or Stalin in exerting pressure on Turkey to take an active part in the war. This is not to say that he was more virtuous; rather, it indicates that Turkey in no way appeared to affect American interests, except in an indirect sense: concentration on Turkey and the Balkans might somehow impede the cross-channel attack; differences over issues in the Eastern Mediterranean might divide the Allies; poor treatment of Turkey would not advance the principles of the Atlantic Charter. In addition, Roosevelt had no intention of getting the United States involved in Eastern Europe let alone the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East.

American attitude towards the Greece and the Balkans: An important element of the negotiations between Churchill and Stalin concerned the role played by Roosevelt in the Balkan affairs. The president's failure to take any initiative in the Balkans, as noted before, resulted in giving jurisdiction over that important strategic area to his two allies. But, the American policymakers were not altogether deprived of able and perceptive men. A notable one was Lincoln MacVeagh, the American ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile, who was quite familiar with the rules of the game and, disappointingly enough, whose advice often met with ignorance. He kept Roosevelt informed of Greece's internal problems. But
when it came to the external context of Greek affairs, he was more assertive. Appreciating his government's policy of non-interference in Greek affairs, MacVeagh nevertheless attempted to persuade the president to change it.

He directed Roosevelt's attention to the traditional rivalry between Russia and Britain, and to the fact that their policies had not changed. Because of Balkan distrust of England and fear of Russia, and in order to keep Russia and Britain from eventually coming into conflict in the region, MacVeagh believed that the United States had a responsibility to undertake the reconstruction of the Balkan states. He understood that British strength was clearly inadequate for this task; if the United States remained aloof, he warned, the area eventually would fall to the Russian hands.

MacVeagh's recommendations to Roosevelt told of Britain's preoccupation with the Eastern Mediterranean and expressed concern about Anglo-Soviet rivalry in the region. Shortly after Churchill had begun to consider coming to terms with Stalin over the "brute issues" in the Balkans, he warned of a renewed diplomatic game not there but also in the rest of the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He sensed the fact and stressed that what goes on in the Balkans and the Near East generally will have to be recognized as of prime importance to the United States despite the fact that the countries involved are small and remote. Again, he discussed the clashing of Soviet and British interests in the area, placing the rivalry in the context of the historical struggles for hegemony in Europe, and noting the security interests of the United States in its outcome.

In short, MacVeagh believed that the British Empire was crumbling - especially in the Balkans and in the Near East, where Soviet strength was most menacing to British interests. It was up to the United States to recognize that its own security interests were in part dependent on Anglo-American
influence along the Northern Tier and in the Balkans. Russia's new influence along her periphery, particularly in South-eastern Europe, resulted from Britain's waning strength, as well as from the devastation of war in that region. MacVeagh feared that the Soviet Union would virtually annex much of the area, or, if British strength could be temporarily sustained, that there would be a conflict between Russia and Britain. In either case, the United States inevitably would become involved. MacVeagh argued, therefore, that American intervention was desirable, especially since the United States was the only country sufficiently trusted by all of the countries concerned.

However, Roosevelt; also influenced by his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who saw unjust consequences in any concept related to the balance of power; characteristically failed to act upon MacVeagh's advice and until Oct. 1944 did not endorse a political initiative. Instead, he reiterated his country's traditional policy of non-interference, non-involvement in the area, consigned the Balkans to Britain's jurisdiction, and focussed on the American government's priorities in the war against Germany and Japan.

American attitude towards Iran: The conflict between the two opposing poles of ideals and self-interests in best demonstrated in the context and formulation of American policy toward Iran. This approach had many of the problems of American policies elsewhere. Reflecting President Roosevelt's attitude and his manner of conducting affairs, they were often misunderstood, and officials charged with their implementation often disagreed as to what they were. For one thing, it was not always clear where ideals left off and practical considerations began. For another, it was equally unclear who was responsible for effecting policy. Since policy was ill-defined to begin with, confusion was inevitable. Because Americans had never before conducted diplomacy on a large scale in the Middle East, experience was in short supply, and confusion settled in. Therefore, the American policy toward
Iran could be at best described having been formulated through a circuitous process. 51

Roosevelt first heard of the situation in Iran from his emissary, General Patrick J. Hurley. 52 He sent Roosevelt a detailed discussion of Iran's problems. Stressing the conflict between British and Russian aspirations, Hurley made the point that the British wanted to retain a monopoly over the oil sources, while the Soviets wanted a warm-water port. Viewing this conflict in terms of Britain's declining influence in the Middle East, he suggested that the United States either play a strong independent role in Iran, or that it coordinates its efforts with those of the British - but under American leadership. Planting a seed that was later to grow in Roosevelt's thoughts, he suggested strong action to encourage development of enlightened governments in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. He believed it essential that the United States uphold the Atlantic Charter, whose principles were necessary for attainment of the proper results in Iran.

The relations between the Soviets and the rest of the Allies were, however, becoming increasingly distant, not because of personality clashes, but, because, as the German threat was pushed back, Soviet policies in Iran changed. As with Turkey, the Soviets grew more aggressive toward Iran when conditions became more favourable to their interests. Starting in January 1943, the Soviets began to negotiate agreements and contracts which consistently exploited the Iranians. They imposed arms, financial, manufacturing, and other agree-

51. One ought to remind oneself that this was the Roosevelt era, not the Carter presidency.

52. He was the first Allied representative to go to Stalingrad and the apparent success of his visit to Stalin led to his rise in Roosevelt's esteem. An Indian by origin, he believed in simplistic answers to complicated international questions. See Russell Buhite, "Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy," (Ithaca, N.Y.; Cornell Univ. Press, 1973).
ments on the Iranians, while the Iranians had no choice but to accept.

At the same time, the Soviets stepped up political activity in Iran. Their fermentation was focussed on a group of Iranians with leftist tendencies, who formed the nucleus of the later Communist Tudeh (Masses) Party, and minority groups especially in Azarbaijan. This north-western province, with its considerable industrialization, large wheat production, and lack of geographic barriers, not only made a good base for Soviet economic penetration, especially when backed by the Red Army and their sympathizers, but was also ideal for political penetration as well. This was particularly true in view of the short-term Soviet policy of supporting autonomous movements among minorities.

The Soviets carried out their penetration in Azarbaijan through trade union infiltration; formation of women's, workers' and peasants' organizations; and dissemination of Communist propaganda. Soviet propaganda also directed against the Allies to the detriment of their unity. Their control on the northern zone prevented anti-Soviet dissension in Azarbaijan, but in Tehran disagreement began to surface between Britain and the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. In short, Allied cooperation in Iran deteriorated and this, one might assume, was a consequence of three factors: a relaxation in the critical situation at the front, a growing Soviet influence in the north, and the Allies mutual suspicions of each other.

The Americans, however, being inexperienced and new to the Near and Middle Eastern diplomacy, tried nevertheless to improve their understanding and overcome their shortcomings. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs was responsible for covering numerous countries in the Near and Middle East, South-West Asia, and Africa. The first Iran desk officer, to be assigned in the winter of 1942-43, was John Jernegan. He was
aided by the head of the Division, Wallace Murray, and these two were in close contact with the American Minister in Iran, Louis Dreyfus. The American mission in Iran would grow from a charge d'affaire ad interim and his employees at the beginning of the war to Dreyfus and three others in 1940 to an ambassador heading a staff of close to one hundred at the end of the war. Against this, the Russians and British envoys were extremely well aware of the history, culture, social and economic structure of the country and yielded immense power to their own advantage and interest. Sir Reader Bullard, head of the British mission, for example, was soft spoken and unemotional in style. His approach, not surprisingly, was "divide and rule."

The Americans, Jernegan, Murray, and Dreyfus, were suspicious of Russian and British ambitions. They believed that the Soviets were pursuing a policy that would lead to annexation, if not of all of Iran, but at least of the northern provinces. Therefore, considerable thought had to be given to protecting Iran from the two traditional rivals by the Americans. American interests in Iran, however, were only vaguely defined until 1943. They hitherto denied any self-interest consideration and directed their policy toward improving the war efforts.

This was of course far short of a statement of policy regarding Iran which was desired by the Iranians. However, at the initiative of Jernegan and Murray, a memorandum bordering on a policy statement was prepared in early 1943. While recognizing Iran's value as a supply route, a strategic location, and a source of petroleum, they pointed out the expediency of American policy in Iran. It advocated the strengthening of Iran's political and economic organizations to ensure her survival vis-a-vis the great powers, something of a test case before the eyes of the other allied small nations. The Soviets near-takeover of the north and the British meddling in Iran's internal affairs made the two
The Iranian leaders based appeals for assistance largely upon such considerations too. Since the United States alone was in a position to help Iran free itself from the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry, there was a vital interest for the United States in ensuring that the post-war United Nations respected the Atlantic Charter. Such respect could be facilitated through an independent, positive programme of economic and professional assistance - a programme whose cost would be high, but insignificant when compared to that of the war and well worth the risks involved. The programme, were it successful, would help prevent postwar friction, and would help make the principles of the Atlantic Charter effective. If, on the other hand, those principles were neglected, the foundations of peace would begin to crumble.

Jernegan and Murray found a sympathetic attitude in Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. The increasingly critical political and economic situation in Iran and the American government's new strategic interest in Middle East oil led Hull to persuade the President on the points expressed. Furthermore, although the United States government once thought it possessed an unselfish, solely altruistic attitude toward Iran, altruism now coincided with self-interest: an independent Iran would serve as a buffer for American oil interests in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, Roosevelt preferred to listen to his personal protege, General Hurley.

Hurley's approach was different from that of State Department's men. He enjoyed direct access to the president and used it. Roosevelt's support was one reason Hurley was able to get results. His recommendations to Roosevelt in May 1943 were all effected within a year: the first on 1st December 1943, with the Declaration Regarding Iran; the second on 9th September 1943, when Iran declared war on Germany, and on 10th September, when Iran signed the United Nations
Declaration; the third on 10th February 1944, when the American (and British) legations became embassies; and the fourth on 21st March 1944, when Dreyfus (whom he considered to be uncooperative) was removed and assigned to Iceland. Leland Morris was appointed ambassador to Iran.

Roosevelt took the Atlantic Charter seriously, but the British saw it as a publicity handout and an answer to German propaganda, while the Soviets were suspicious of it and gave it only grudging, qualified acceptance. It is nonetheless clear that the idealistic pronouncements of the Atlantic Charter conceded serious differences over common goals, and that their relevance to the Soviets were marginal at best. Therefore, the Soviets could have argued that efforts diverted toward maintenance of world order, embodied in the principles of the Charter, merely advanced American prosperity and power. Fearing a threat of capitalist inroads into its desired spheres of influence, it was not illogical for the Soviet Union to resort to force to secure those spheres.

The Soviets, however, were disquiet about further assurances of Allied cooperation in Iran. They argued that...

53. What, after all, were the principles of the Atlantic Charter? The Charter was a statement of fundamental principles for the post-war world issued jointly by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941. It was announced, a month later, that 15 nations fighting the Germans and Italians (including the Soviet Union) had endorsed it. The Charter proclaimed eight principles. The first four (and most important) principles were: 1) that the United States and Britain sought no aggrandizement, territorial or other; 2) that they desired to see no territorial changes not in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; 3) that they respected the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live, and that they wished to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to all those who had been forcibly deprived of them; and 4) that they would further all states access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world. See, John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, "The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War," (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 36-43; and Herz, op. cit., pp. vii-ix.
major decisions were impossible since the Iranians were not represented and that points about Allied cooperation were repetitive of assurances and understandings already made. However, the attitudes changed toward the Tehran Conference, were a Declaration Regarding Iran was agreed to at the suggestion of the Iranians themselves. The declaration, signed on 1st December 1943, recognized Iran's part in the war effort, recognized and affirmed the continuance of economic assistance to Iran, and guaranteed Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity according to the Atlantic Charter's principles.

While there was evidence that the Soviets had not any intention of adhering to the declaration, Roosevelt had agreed to a statement of principle as a means of resolving Allied problems in Iran and obtaining support for the long-range goals of the United States. He had familiarized himself with America's strategic interests in the Middle East, and had been informed of Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Iran, but he had approached the question with little appreciation for the background or the details of the problem. Rather, he was willing to rely on a few principles which, he believed, would establish a framework for future cooperation. Apart from this, the implementation of policies regarding Iran was the crux of the matter.

Policy implementation was a continuing problem for the United States. In spite of all the efforts at formulating a policy in 1943, it was not entirely clear what the goals of American foreign policy really were. The problem was compounded with Roosevelt's and Hurley's perception of Iran. They thought of it as something of a clinic for American postwar policies, one aspect of which was to develop and stabilize underdeveloped areas. Sticking to the Atlantic Charter, they had this vision of United States-Iranian relationship as something of a pattern for American relations will all less-

54. See Ramazani, op. cit., pp. 43-53. See the text in Appendix 3.
favoured nations. If the American pattern of free enterprise and self-government could prevail in Iran, then the general welfare of the Iranian people would be assured. However, these plans were never fully implemented. The reason, of course, was coming from both internal and external factors. Men from the State Department, notably Assistant Dean Acheson, saw in it a grandiose plan whose chief mission would be to "convert the Russians from Communism," and the British from what he called "oppressive imperialism."^55

The conduct of American foreign policy in Iran was marred by confusions. The problem for State Department officials was how to carry out policies which the president endorsed. Their difficulties really began when the Soviets resorted to pressure tactics in Iran. Roosevelt and Hull refused to exert counterpressure to assert the position of the United States. Principle, they hoped, would be respected, and would lead to Soviet restraint. This attitude stemmed from the belief that principles were a necessary element of international politics, that everyone could agree on them, and that American policy toward Iran was unselfish.

A more forceful approach to the abstract principles governing American policy in Iran was thus needed. This approach, however, was not any more characteristic of American policy toward Iran in 1944 than it was of American policies toward Turkey or Greece. The men in the Department of State recognized this fact and tried to alter what they considered an increasing disadvantage in the face of more exacting Soviet policies. The United States' interests were recognized and clarification of policy was required in matters regarding acquiring oil concessions in Iran and securing long-range protection of American oil interests in the Persian Gulf as a whole.

Numerous factors obviously contributed to this determination, but one of the most important elements was the pursuit of United States national interest. It was noted earlier that until World War Two, the religious, cultural, educational, and economic interests of the United States in the Near East evolved independently from political interests. Americans regarded the Near East as an appendage of Europe, where political non-involvement was a tradition, and did not consider the competing imperialisms of Russia and Great Britain as relevant to American policy, which recognized Britain's primacy in the region.

This does not mean that American interests were wholly neglected. One of the lessons of the First World War had been that an adequate supply of oil was essential for national security, and the experience of that war was why Britain and the United States began a rivalry over oil immediately after the war. Burgeoning American business interests throughout the Near East help to explain American recognition of the increasing importance of United States-Iranian relations. The Department of State and President Roosevelt as early as 1943 had recognized Iran's strategic importance as a buffer between the Soviet Union and American interests in the Middle East. It was in the interests of the United States that no great power established itself in the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia. It was desired to assist Iran in creating a strong national entity free from foreign domination. Hopefully, acceptance of the Atlantic Charter had been sincere and would have a restraining effect upon Britain and Russia. Iran would be the testing ground. But there was no question that if the Charter were observed, a strong Iran would serve the purpose of a strategic buffer. While the Department of State never forgot American interests in Iran itself, they consistently conceived of Iran's importance in the context of its strategic links to American interests in the Arabian peninsula. This relationship was a constant concern of which the Department, if not
the President, was clearly conscious.

However, despite the strident notes which sometimes appeared in American communications to the British about Iran and the Middle East, State Department officials were also conscious of the fact that America and Britain had many interests in that area which did not conflict and which in fact required close cooperation. Mutual apprehensions, long-range importance of oil to postwar international security, and economic arrangements necessitated discussions at a high level. As a result the two powers reached an agreement in August 1943 on placing international petroleum trade on an orderly basis.

Subsequent to these understandings, the Anglo-American discussions during the same period also touched upon other topics such as Russian exploitation of Iran, support for the American advisory programme in Iran, and the maintenance of order throughout the Middle East. This was in conjunction with the American understanding that the area was within the British sphere of influence and that they had pursued a hundred years old policy of not allowing any access to the Persian Gulf to the Russians, whether of the Czarist or Soviet variety.

Paradoxically, however, although the United States was Britain's greatest rival for oil in the Middle East, American strategic conceptions of the Northern Tier countries mirrored those of the British. What explains this paradox? Chief factors were Anglo-American mistrust of the Soviet Union in the Near East — a mistrust resulting from tradition, from Soviet actions in Iran following the Battle of Stalingrad, and from the fact that both countries now had important interests to protect. Mutual mistrust of the Soviet Union, accompanied by the decline of Britain's military strength, made possible the Anglo-American agreement of August 1944. The agreement reflects the secondary nature of Anglo-American rivalry over oil in the Middle East, and indicates that by
late 1944 mistrust of the Soviet Union was a basic notion in British strategic thinking.

The British already were thinking of spheres of influence in the Balkans, and of their position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before Britain and the Soviet Union became allies, the British had made it clear to the Soviets that Britain was determined to maintain its position throughout the Middle East, including Iran. This thought was reiterated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. The British stated that while Britain to a very considerable extent was prepared to give in to Russian demands in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, they could not and would not yield in Iran. The State Department, thus, aware of this proceeded on the assumption that along the Northern Tier the interests of the British Empire were similar to those of the United States.

As noted before, American interests in Iran before World War Two, as in the rest of the Middle East, were primarily concerned with religious, cultural, educational, and economic enterprises. The Presbyterian Church founded a mission in Western Iran in 1835, nearly fifty years before the United States established its first diplomatic mission in 1883. The American government did not have the intention of challenging Britain's primacy in the Near East and the American mission in Iran assumed only a passive role. When Iran appealed to Woodrow Wilson for assistance in maintaining neutrality during World War One, the American president offered only what Roosevelt would offer in 1941: sympathy. British influence, on the other hand, was evident on every occasion when Iran was involved in international affairs: for instance, when it opposed the seating of the Iranian delegation to Paris in 1919.

The Iranians, as a consequence of Britain and Russian encroachments on their territory, turned to the United States and Germany in an attempt to bring them on to the scene as countervailing powers to the traditional imperial rivals.
Thus, the W. Morgan Schuster mission in 1911-12 and the first Millspaugh mission in 1922-27, both organized to undertake fiscal and administrative reforms, were looked on as means of curbing Soviet and British ambitions in Iran.

In early 1920's, the Iranians were attracting American interest in Iran by drawing their attention to oil resources. They were anxious to have Americans develop unassigned oil rights in the northern provinces. There was not an outcome to this venture because of disputes over the rights, arrangements, and transportation between Iran, the Soviet Union, and Britain. The matters rested until the battle of Stalingrad, after which the Soviets began to put pressure on Iran; pressures that led to the oil crisis of 1944 and a new chapter in the American involvement in the area.

The oil crisis of 1944 occurred against the background of Allied occupation, Great Power politics, the incipient American interest in Iran, and the long history of oil negotiations. As was the case before, the Iranian government in countering the Soviet pressures approached an American oil company, Standard Vacuum, in Feb 1943 on the subject of oil concessions. Negotiations ensued and another American company, Sinclair Oil, also joined in.

These expressions of interest, coupled with the ongoing discussions between the United States and Britain on the subject of a joint agreement on oil exploitation, aroused deep Soviet's suspicions. Assurances given to them were inconsequential. What was counted in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in Iran was Russia's traditional interests, and Stalin was as aware of these in Iran as in the Balkans or at the Straits. Furthermore, the Soviets were not prepared to accept any challenge toward those interests.

As a result, the Soviets decided to act. They advised the Iranian government that a mission would be sent to Iran to discuss the concessions in northern Iran. Shortly after,
a delegate arrived and almost immediately its head, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs Sergi Ivanovich Kavtaradze, asked the Iranians for exclusive rights and political agreements between the two governments to safeguard concessions. Believing that the Soviets were after more than oil in Iran, and that they would use the legal cover of agreement for infiltration purposes, the Iranian government promptly refused such a proposal and Kavtaradze was told that such matters were for the Cabinet to decide. The cabinet duly did this in a different matter: it postponed all oil concessions until the end of the war. Upon hearing this, Kavtaradze remarked that it would have unhappy consequences for the Irano-Soviet relations. 56

What Kavtaradze meant became apparent as soon as the Moscow Conference between Churchill and Stalin ended. Russian propaganda against the Iranian government, the Shah on one hand, and on the other, Red Army actions and Tudeh Party intrigues were drastically stepped up. Customary build-up of justifiable extreme Soviet pressure was portrayed in branding some elements in the Iranian government as "pro-fascist." Obviously, the Soviets wanted a sphere of influence in northern Iran; but that they did not use much pressure until after the agreement between Churchill and Stalin is interesting. It is also interesting to speculate whether the agreement over spheres of influence in Eastern Europe helped to determine Soviet attitudes regarding the creation of a similar de facto agreement in Iran.

However, this setback for the Soviet Union and the Iranian defiance, manifested in Stalin's views that it was a "resounding diplomatic defeat" for Molotov, 57 earmarked the start of a series of events lasting for nearly two years. In the meantime, a resolution was put to the Iranian Parliament

56. Ramazani, op.cit., p. 99. For the account of this crisis, see Ibid., pp. 96-108.

by Deputy Dr. Mossadegh forbidding oil negotiations between cabinets and foreigners; thereafter, concessions were to be dependent on the Parliament. This was passed and became a law in December 1944.

As there was not a backing up by the third power, the United States, against the Soviet aggression, the possibility of a divergence between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the traditional line adopted by the British, the Iranian government found itself in difficulty. This was to be a problem throughout the next two years. From this time on, the State Department's belief that United States-Iranian relations were of major importance, and its intention to assume a more active and positive policy in Iran, would be put to the test. It was not any longer a question of means and ends, of whether or not the United States should back its advisors when that backing meant a contradiction of principles. The question had become essentially one of power. Protecting America's interests in Iran meant strengthening Iran, and supporting the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the full in that country. Both aims were antithetical to the interests of the Soviet Union in northern Iran. Since there was not an intention of America using force to maintain Iranian independence, and since the credibility of the principles was in doubt, the real question was whether the United States intended to back the Atlantic Charter in more than theory, and if so to what extent.

The question, however, was avoided for the time being. The United States support came in the shape of defending the Declaration Regarding Iran. Direct negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union might be preferable to note writing and protests. This could have been easily construed as an unwillingness to live up to the principles the United States professed. In southeastern Europe principles meant nothing unless one had the capacity and the will to enforce them. As there, it seemed that in Iran the State Department was on the verge of granting the Soviets in fact what it was denying them
in principle. In Iran itself, lack of visible American support diminished the influence of groups opposing the Tudeh Party. Too much restraint and silence on the part of the United States was interpreted as a sign of weakness or as a tendency to compromise principles.

The Soviets, on the contrary, did not have the intention of letting matters drop but intended to take aggressive measures to attain their objectives. The bullying tactics were the sign of Moscow's belief that it had the right to settle problems with its neighbours unilaterally, and its position that friendly governments were those it could dominate. The Iranians had no choice but to reiterate their fears that the Soviets would continue to stimulate agitation in the north, and tried to demonstrate that these fears have a basis and that the situation in Iran should be watched carefully.

It might be assumed that the United States policy in Iran underwent a shift in the Autumn of 1944 from more principled ends to the less lofty, more pragmatic goals of strengthening Iran and maintaining stability there. The new American ambassador in Iran, Leland Morris understood Soviet policy although he had not the slightest sympathy with it. A number of factors might have given the Soviets the idea that the United States intended to secure a permanent position in Iran. These factors included the extensive operations of

58. The organization of a bloc opposed to the Tudeh Party was complicated by the real and effective absence of political parties in Iran. See, "George Leczowski, "Russia and the West in Iran...," op.cit., pp. 276-278; E.P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran," in The Middle East Journal, 3 (Jan. 1949), pp. 51-53.

59. The attitudes and public pronouncements of the then US Administration are not strikingly dissimilar to those expressed by the Carter's Administration 35 years later. The Shah underlined them as the primary contributory factors in his downfall. See, HIM M.R. Pahlavi, "Answer to History," (New York: Stein & Day, 1980). This view is contested in this study (see Chapter 6). For a comparison of US Republican and Democrat administrations, see pp. 248-249, n. 37.
of American advisors, negotiations carried on by American oil companies, and the American government's interest in Iran. Whatever the explanation for Soviet policies, they were true to the tradition of Great Power diplomacy in Iran. They attested to a determination abundantly demonstrated by history, let alone by events of the last three years. The apparent objectives of Soviet diplomacy were to prevent any foreign power from establishing a foothold in northern Iran, and to continue Soviet dominance in the area. Dominance, in turn, would build up an outer defence zone for Russia's southern frontier and at the same time counterbalance other foreign penetration.
3.5 Power Politics and the War-time Northern Tier: A Conclusion.

The picture that one gets from the policies adopted by the Great Powers in the Northern Tier during the War and at its conclusion as well as the role played by the local countries concerned is that of a classic nineteenth century balance of power mechanism with actors poised in creating a favourable balance for themselves and/or maintaining the status quo. The traditional rivalry between Britain and Russia remained virtually unaltered; the small countries were aiming at survival by playing off the two against each other and finding succour in distant third powers; and that the United States was properly initiated into the great game.

Thus, by the Sept. 1944, two issues concerning Turkey began to emerge more clearly: the role of the Straits in the postwar world, and the role of the Balkans and the Northern Tier in the power alignments that were taking shape. These issues, while latent in the early stages of the war, were always present. In the course of World War Two, they gradually manifested themselves and eventually began to overtake the diminishing exigencies of war.

The Turkish fear of the Soviet Union, dominating all other concerns after Stalingrad, was the result of more than traditional suspicions. It was a response to repeated attempts by the Soviet Union to seek advantages at Turkey's expense. In short, the Soviets - for a complex of reasons which were at once defensive and aggressive - appear to have contemplated expanding their sphere of influence in the Near East even before the war began. After Stalingrad, when conditions were more favourable to their interests, evidence seems to confirm that the Soviets hoped to effect such expansion.

The British had misgivings about Soviet intentions in the Near East, and eventually began to contemplate containment of Russia's southern flank. They had in mind their own
interests in the Near East and the safeguarding of Britain's imperial life-line in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the war progressed, these concerns best explain British policies in Greece and Iran. They also, of course, explain Churchill's policies in Turkey. Turkish territory had always constituted the strategic linchpin in Britain's historic policy of containing Russian influence. But certain Turkish rights, notably the Straits, had occasionally been negotiable when Britain was confronted with a choice of satisfying Russian needs either at the Straits or in the Persian Gulf. Thus, when developments in Eastern Europe and the Near East led the British to re-examine the primacy of Britain's imperial life-line, they looked to Greece (at the cost of cutting off the rest of the Balkans) and Turkey as the best means of containing Russian access to and influence in the Mediterranean.

Historical rivalries were clearly in Churchill's and Stalin's thoughts and operative in their diplomacy. If the Soviets were drawn to Turkey and the Straits because of what Turkey represented from a strategic point of view, the British were no less susceptible to the same arguments. If the Straits were the key to British penetration of the Black Sea, they were also the key to Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean. And the Mediterranean was the geographic centre of British imperial strategy. The Mediterranean's centrality, moreover, was due not only to its strategic value, but to the simple fact that the British were there, and the Soviets were not, and the British desired to keep things as they were. The question was that of power. Russia's might was on the rise and British on the wane. The United States, not fully awakened either to its interests, or to the role it would play in maintaining the balance of power in the Near East, relied on principle as a means of safeguarding its interests in that area, and watched as the situation developed.

As with Greece, one could see that the problem consigned to Churchill and Stalin in October 1944 was an extension of Britain's and Russia's historical struggle for power along
the Northern Tier. Just as traditional interests explain Soviet demands on Turkey, so they explain their interest in the Balkans during their negotiations with the Germans in 1940. They also shed light on the Soviet Union's motives in occupying Bulgaria in September 1944.

The designs of any Great Power in the Balkans, because they threatened Britain's strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, made it necessary that she protect them. This logic had been true of the 19th century, and was also true of more recent history, where it applied to the Germans as well as to the Soviets. Balance of power logic accounts for Britain's support of the Balkan Pact in 1930's, and for her unconditional guarantee to Greece in April 1939. It renders intelligible her commitment of a large force to the defence of Greece in 1941 - in spite of the fact that she herself was beleaguered. It illuminates Churchill's desire to invade the Balkans later in the war, and it explains why the British were so intent on effecting a stable government in Greece after the war.

The chronic lack of stability in Greek politics grew out of Greek history - a history plagued by divided loyalties, by Great Power rivalries, by the Greek political parties consequent orientation along Great Power lines, and by divisive political and increasingly social schisms. While some of these factors contributing to Greece's instability were submerged during the Metaxas regime, they surfaced with a vengeance when World War Two swept across the country. First a battleground, then an occupied country, and then scene of a bloody civil war, Greece - except for a brief moment in 1940-41 - was never able to draw upon the cohesive bonds formed by successful opposition to a common adversary. Turkey, it may be remembered, had done just that during and after World War One, and had forged a common identity under Ataturk, who limited the Turks' aspirations and built upon their successful efforts. During World War Two, that identity had served to cement an intangible but unquestionable national will in support of the government's policies, and had made potential aggressors (i.e., Germany and
Russia) wary of the costs of interfering in Turkey. Greece, on the other hand, after the victory over Italy, had been subject to the devastating might of the most powerful army in the world, against whom resistance was futile, as well as demoralizing.

As far as the British were concerned, the forces of war reaffirmed the value of securing sea communications in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, as the war progressed, as the German Army began to fall back, and as the Red Army pushed inexorably westward, the British transferred their preoccupation from German back to Russian intentions in the area. The safeguarding of Britain's imperial lifeline in the Mediterranean remained an axiom of her strategic thinking.

Anxiety over Russian intentions led the British to consider negotiations with Stalin over their spheres of responsibility in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Churchill, in supporting the monarchy in Greece, however, misread the situation in that country. This was perhaps due to his inclination to royalty; perhaps to his deep concern for the salvation of the British Empire - a concern which, under trying circumstances, may have caused him to look to stereotyped solutions that fit in with the long-standing ideology of the political elite to which he belonged. 60

Britain's historical rivalry with Russia in the region, cogent in the strategic thinking of both Churchill and Stalin, had been responsible for Stalin's diverting part of the Red Army to a secondary target in the Balkans, and for Churchill's recognition that an understanding was necessary to safeguard Britain's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Their traditional rivalry had helped create a military situation which had then prefigured the postwar alignments taking shape in Southeastern Europe. Complicating the postwar picture,

however, was a problem of interpretation. While Churchill and Stalin thought their understanding would receive Roosevelt's sanction, the American State Department thought otherwise, and Roosevelt's failure to resolve such differences helped to perpetuate misunderstanding over the matter. Meanwhile, as in Turkey, the State Department relied on principle as a means of safeguarding American interests in the Balkans.

In summing up the case for Iran, it is fair to say that during World War Two the rule was that of the nineteenth century diplomacy. In other words, what was at issue in Iran, and for that matter along the Northern Tier, was the balance of power. The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, because it undermined Rezâ Shah's earlier efforts to consolidate the centrifugal forces in the country had left Iran even more vulnerable than before, inevitably aggravating mutual suspicions, and revived traditional interests. When the United States entered the picture, it, too, looked to its own interests.

The methods of the Allies in exercising influence over the Iranians were strikingly different. While the Americans appealed to principle, the British used the velvet glove, and the Russians their iron fists. But if their methods were different, their ends were all based on conceptions of national interests. Different methods of pursuing these interests derived not so much from varying degrees of benevolence as from the Allies' diverse strengths and weaknesses, and illustrated the bankruptcy of the joint ideals to which they publicly - if not privately - subscribed.

The approach of the Big Three, as noted, was different from each other. The United States because of its position and role in the war could afford to advocate principles. Relatively untouched by the scourge of the war, the United States was never forced to struggle for economic and political
survival to the same degree as its allies. Therefore, Roosevelt was given the luxury of approaching problems in Iran with a condescending internationalism.

Great Britain was not so fortunate. Because of the empire's increasing weakness relative to Russia, it chose to bury differences with the United States over vital oil interests in the Near East in order to protect them. In contrast to the spheres of influence that the British prescribed for the Balkans, the principles of the Atlantic Charter better served the British conception of Iran as a strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and Anglo-American interests to the south.

The Soviet Union undoubtedly would have accepted a division of Iran into spheres of influence. It had accepted a de facto division in 1941, and was interested in consolidating the zone which it occupied. War-time circumstances had made such a move possible; the Soviet view of the Atlantic Charter may have made it appear as necessary. An unquestionable application of the Charter's principles to Iran would have threatened to discriminate against Russia's interests.

The Iranians, of course, trusted neither of the two, regarded American interest and presence in Iran as crucial to the country's salvation, and were pleased when the terms of the Anglo-Soviet occupation reflected ideals which Roosevelt expressed. Iranian desire for an American presence in Iran, and the role played by the United States in the Persian Corridor during the war, meant that Roosevelt and the State Department had a much greater interest in Iran than they did in either Turkey or the Balkans. The unique situation which found all three Allies occupying a single non-hostile country also meant that, unlike the situation in either Turkey or Greece, in Iran the United States could not avoid involvement in Great Power politics.

The conflict between Britain and Russia in Iran during
the war did not surface immediately. While the Soviet's good intentions were always subject to question, this was least true before the Battle of Stalingrad, when cooperation between the Allies was essential. It is also true that in 1921 Stalin, in opposition to Lenin, had supported the so-called Soviet Republic of Gilan in northern Iran, and that in 1941, in negotiations with the Germans, the Soviets had indicated a desire for a sphere of influence in the region which included Iran. Moreover, the Soviet actions in northern Iran had been heavy-handed throughout the occupation. But it was only after the Battle of Stalingrad that Soviet pressures became really serious.

The difference in ideological perspective between the Big Three, when put against the background of war-time Iran, throws more light on the situation. If the source of conflict between Russia and the West along the Northern Tier was the balance of power, and if the Great Powers generally acted according to the necessities of state, they also rationalized their actions according to different philosophical assumptions. Roosevelt, however, appeared naive about conceptual differences between the Allies, and unaware of the issues at stake. He was advised on many occasions about Russia's aims and America's strategic interests, but failed to act constructively on one hand, and appreciate the identity of American and British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and along the Northern Tier on the other. The idealism of Roosevelt is evidenced by his doomed trusteeship proposal for Iran in 1943, and by his retention of the idea as late as December 1944. As in Greece in 1943, or in the Balkans in 1944, in Iran, too, he ignored the State Department's advice. It is true he eventually heeded the State Department's opposition to his plans in Iran. But it is apparent that before 1945 he did not recognize Russia's historical pressure on Iran; or had he understood the balance of power as an operative mechanism in Iran, any more than he understood these factors in the Balkans or at the Straits, where the United States had no deep-rooted traditional interest.
In the State Department, on the other hand, there gradually emerged a perception of America's interest in maintaining the balance of power in the area. That perception derived from close observation of Allied policies, and from increasingly convincing arguments for sustaining the British lifeline. With this understanding of the problem there also emerged a concern for a more realistic assertion of American influence in Iran. If there was any realism to be found coming from the United States, it was indeed from the Department's quarters.

Roosevelt's assertion of principle, in the face of Stalin's constant disrespect for it in northern Iran, made it difficult to deal realistically with Iranian problems. When the question was one of power, and of the willingness to use it, diplomatic protests which did not take these factors into account were of limited value.

Thus, in view of the complications involved, we can see how Iran had indeed become a test case for the good faith of the United Nations and their ability to work out among themselves an adjustment of ambitions, rights, and interests which would be fair not only to the Great Powers but also to the small nations associated with them.
4.1 Development and Formation

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the politics of the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO (designated as the Pact of Mutual Cooperation and originally called the Baghdad Pact) from its Cold War origins to its later role as a focus of increasing regional cooperation among the three Upper-Middle Eastern countries of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The study traces the changing interests of the signatories and aims to demonstrate how these changing interests led to a gradual redefinition of politics in that region.

The study of the nature of the conflicts along the Upper Middle East, underlined in the previous chapter, demonstrated, inter alia, the significant element of the balance of power at work. The regional states often adapted a third-power strategy, designed to ensure their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The historical pressures on them, mostly from the Soviets, meant that they welcomed the American entry onto the scene. Moreover, at the close of the War they found a new, forceful and sympathetic US president who was well versed in the rules of the game.

Accordingly, as was pointed out earlier, the defence of the Middle East and the development of a security system for the preservation of Western interests and the exclusion of rival powers from that region was also a perennial problem to the West. The concern over the Middle East came from the strategic significance of that region, from the vast natural resources it contained, and also from the fact that the states of that region historically were not strong enough to defend their independence against concerted outside powers.

The above factors, when put in the immediate Post-war political configurations, signalled the continuation of the balance of power system and its logical extension, i.e.,
alliances. Thus it was not altogether unexpected of the regional states, notably of Iran, to whole-heartedly endorse the American "pactomania." The post-war endeavours to create a viable security arrangement, therefore, culminated in the creation of CENTO and bilateral defence agreements between the regional states and the US.

The present Chapter covers the background that led to the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, its development and the overriding interests therein, its transformation into an economic entity, and its gradual demise in the 1960's and 1970's. However, before doing so, it is appropriate to briefly survey the interests of the regional members of the alliance and the policies which they promoted through it, American responses, as drawn against the past experiences, as a prelude to the examination of the central theme of this study. The survey illustrates certain fundamental factors concerning the security aspect of the new arrangement:

First, the survey shows that the alignment of states in a security alliance may not result in an alteration of attitudes of the decision makers of the member states. A community interest in the area of security matters did not develop, with the exception of the desire to increase the size and efficiency of the armed forces through the assistance received from the dominant power, the United States. The major problem in the alliance, however, was the lack of agreement among the members on how security forces would be employed. While the desired alteration of attitudes did not occur among the members, the alliance did result in an alteration of attitudes among the non-member states in a manner which was not desired by the members. Each member was identified with the policies of others which frequently worked to its disadvantage; for this reason, membership in the alliance constituted a liability for the members which they would not have borne in its absence.
Second, the failure of each of the members to receive satisfaction from the various processes by which the United States became more closely associated with the alliance, supports the thesis that it is extremely difficult to establish international trust through the written or verbal promise. At least, the continual reaffirmation of the United States' identification with the security of the regional members did not discourage the members from moving towards a policy of gradual de-alignment.

Third, by comparing the interests of the individual members with the singular concern of the United States with international communism, one can conclude that the ambiguity in the wording, both in CENTO and in the commitments of the United States, represented the lack of a genuine consensus among the members on security objectives. The United States did not view the regional crises, in themselves, as major threats to the area covered by the alliance.

Fourth, the survey of the interests of the regional members confirms an underlying aspect of alliance, that is the predominant power will be able to determine the dominant interest of the alliance. The fact that the regional members did not have a free hand to confront many of their interests indicates that the United States frequently determined the policy. In this case, a state outside the alliance contrived the dominant interests of CENTO. However, the conclusion which became clear is that the non-membership of the United States was fictitious; that while it was not a formal member of the organization, the United States was in actuality as much a member as the states who did sign the Treaty.

The study also shows, however, that while the dominant member may be able to define the overriding interest in terms

1. George Liska, "Nations in Alliance: The Limit of Independence," 2nd ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 87-103. See also Chapter Two of this study, pp.81-84.
of affecting the policies carried out through the alliance, it cannot prevent the members from becoming involved in situations which may necessitate action. While the United States could restrain Pakistan and Turkey from utilizing the military hardware supplied by the United States to confront regional issues to some extent, it could not prevent them from becoming involved in regional conflicts.

Finally, the survey of the policies of the regional members illustrates a phenomenon concerning the realignment or dealignment of the members of the alliance. The moves toward dealignment among the CENTO signatories developed after the division in the Sino-Soviet bloc became apparent. Pakistan took advantage of the split and accepted overture from China after the Soviet Union assisted India in Indian-Pakistani conflict. Iran and Turkey did not appear to do the same at first; although they too, like Pakistan, began to adjust their grievances with the Soviet Union and placed their relations with her on a new basis. The timing of the Iranian and Turkish shift in policy coincided with an alteration in American military strategy from massive retaliation to a flexible response to a strategy which did not depend upon the physical usefulness of tripwire states. The factors which facilitated Iran's and Turkey's movement away from the alliance, therefore, may be found in the defense policies of the United States and their effect on the legal and political functions of the alliance itself.

By the mid-1960's, CENTO had undergone a gradual transformation from an alliance to an international organization, and the public image of it had changed as well. Originally, the publicity on the Baghdad Pact emphasised the military aspect of the alliance; by 1966, the economic aspect was receiving the greatest attention. There were several possible explanations for this change in emphasis. The construction of the major economic projects could begin only after several years of planning and preliminary surveying. During this time, the military activity was the clearest evidence of alliance's
efforts. By the mid-1960's, some major projects were either under construction or had already been completed and were visible. On the other hand, during the ten years of alliance, there was no need or opportunity to implement the military plans drafted by the Military Committee except in periodic training exercises. At least there was no need to employ collective action against a threat from the Soviet Union. The regional crises of the 1960's facilitated the dealignment of the regional members, and the creation of nuclear weapons incorporating long range delivery systems, consequently diminished the utility of the Pact for the United States. Although CENTO remained fully in force until the end of the 1970's, its entire emphasis changed since its active functions now focussed primarily on economic and development concerns.

The 1960's, therefore, saw increasing disillusionment by regional members of CENTO. The military arrangements of the Pact had not been fruitful. The common interest in defence against the Soviet Union receded as the Soviet threat became more subdued. The military assistance received by these countries often seemed unrelated to their participation in the Pact. The only significant benefit seemed to come from the Economic Committee of CENTO which helped create a climate that facilitated the growth of closer economic cooperation between the Northern Tier countries in the context of the Regional Cooperation for Development organization.

In the years immediately after World War II, the Middle East situation was characterized by uncertainty and instability. During most of the 20th century the British had been the dominant force in the area and had maintained order, but Britain was greatly weakened by the war. She was no longer able to be the major stabilizing element in the Middle East. France, the other major foreign power with interests in the area also had been weakened considerably. At the same time that the colonial powers were declining, revolutionary nationalist forces were becoming more powerful, struggling
against foreign domination and the status quo. Western rights and Middle Eastern friends who had an interest in preserving those rights were being engendered. In addition to these disrupting factors, the Palestine dispute rapidly approached an explosion.

One fundamental change in the international situation brought about by the war was the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers on the international scene. The instability and conflict so evident in Middle Eastern affairs appeared to make the area particularly susceptible to a Communist takeover. With the decreased capabilities of the European states so apparent, it was evident that only the United States possessed the capacity to counter Soviet pressures successfully.

Prior to World War II the United States had few interests in the Middle East. There were various American cultural, economic, and educational enterprises, but these were not government-related in nature. The official attitude was cordial, but the policy was of non-involvement. With the coming of the war, and more so after it, the situation changed. Though it was generally understood that military activities during the period were related to the war effort, politically, the Middle East was still considered a British sphere. With the reduction of Britain's power, however, the basic stabilizing element in the Middle East was removed, and the United States found herself in a position to fill the vacuum as the Cold War began to unfold.

Middle East oil and the Suez Canal, on the other hand, were not of immediate economic and/or strategic importance to the Soviet Union; but if she could disrupt the use of

2. For a discussion of this period, see Chapter 3.
these two elements, then a blow could be delivered to the United States and her European allies. As a result, when these economic resources were threatened, the United States government became involved in the politics of the region.

American policy makers in the 1940's assumed that the Soviet Union could, if unchecked, expand into the area for two reasons: a) because the Soviet Union, for ideological reasons and Cold War objectives was attempting to expand everywhere, and b) because the Soviets would pursue the traditional goals that had impelled the Russians into the region for centuries.

The active involvement of the United States in the Middle East was preceded by some events in Asia and Europe. By 1948, the Soviet Union had consolidated its control over the countries of Eastern Europe. In the same year, Russia had imposed the Berlin Blockade. By 1949, China had become a communist state; and finally the use of force in Korea to oppose the further expansion of communism was ordered by the United States president in 1950. The Korean War implemented a conviction which had been developing since the Yalta Conference, that the "American presence" was necessary to prevent the expansion of communism and the Soviet influence. Western policy-makers believed that the rate of Soviet expansion was in direct proportion to the rate of American withdrawals and concessions. 4

The line of the argument that developed in the United States consisted of one vital factor which was stressed upon with vigour by President Truman. It involved the declaration by the United States that there must be a geographical line beyond which the United States would not withdraw and that a clear and unmistakable statement of American intentions was necessary to maintain peace in the world. At the conclusion

of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow in 1947, President Truman reported that he had reached a limit beyond which he would no longer concede to Stalin's demands. Accordingly, a defence perimeter was delineated by Secretary of State Acheson in 1950 with the aim that the United States could not allow it to be penetrated whilst still protecting her primary interests.

As was discussed in Chapter Three, the Russian expansionist policies presented a threat to the Upper Middle East states for centuries; a fact that had nothing to do with the Cold War realities. The desire to extend the Russian Empire southward to the Mediterranean and into the Middle East had been a motivation of the Tzarist foreign policy and the statesmen of Turkey and Iran tended to remember their historic difficulties in dealing with the menace to the north.

Peter the Great was the first Tsar to attempt to expand into Persia and failed. He was forced to retreat and let his successors confirm their presence on the Caspian Sea. Between 1826-1828, a Russo-Persian war, fought on the pretext of settling the succession to the Persian throne, resulted in the treaty of Turkmanchay (1828), by which Russia gained more territory. In the years following the Crimean War, Russia acquired extensive economic concessions from the Iranians as well.

Further gains were made in 1907, when the British and the Russians divided Persia into sphere of influence to counteract the growing influence of Germany. Russian physical presence in Persia, however, was withdrawn by the 1917 Russian Revolution. 1920's and 1930's saw no major pressure on Iran, but they resumed their activities in the region during and after the war. Oil also provided a new dimension to traditional geopolitical concerns.

In 1946 Moscow supported a separatist movement in the Iranian north-western province of Azerbaijan and in 1947 they officially demanded from the Iranian government oil concessions in the north for withdrawing their forces from the area. The Red Army also protected the Iranian Communist Party which had been underground and greatly increased its influence throughout the country. The growth of the communist party and its influence among some sections of the army was a major factor in the turmoil that engulfed the domestic political scene in Iran, culminating in the interruption of oil exports by the Premier Mossadegh administration. Though the country returned to normality with the removal of that administration, the chain of events nevertheless demonstrated to the observer that Iran had just barely escaped communist domination.

The Russian expansionist policies aimed at Turkey were not dissimilar to that of Iran. By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774), Catherine the Great acquired for Russia the right of diplomatic representation at Constantinople, and the right of passage for Russian ships through the Turkish straits. During the reign of Alexander II (1881-1884), Russia exerted both ideological and military pressures on the Ottoman Empire. While the Pan-Islamic movement, calling for the unification of all Orthodox Slavs under the Russian monarchy, was threatening the Ottoman Empire, Tsar Alexander's forces marched to within sights of the walls of Constantinople. The last Tsarist effort to acquire control of Turkey occurred during the reign of Nicholas II (1894-1917). This effort culminated in the secret agreements among Russia, Britain, and France during World War I and disappeared with the Romanov Dynasty as a result of the Revolution.


The main purpose of the Russian diplomacy all through the 19th century was to secure control of the Straits. They keenly valued their strategic significance and could not accept their control in the hands of another power. However, the post-revolutionary leaders of Russia broke away from the actual use of force tradition and concluded treaties of friendship with both Iran and Turkey, at a time that the latter countries viewed Britain as a major threat (1921). The inter-war period more or less saw correct diplomatic relations. It was only after the war that Soviet demands and pressures re-asserted themselves precipitating the Truman Doctrine of 1948.

The American reactions to these Russian threats and manipulations were defined in the concept of containment, acting as a single consistent thread running through the United States approach to communism. President Truman proposed the first implementation of containment in an address before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. He requested a programme in which the United States would assume a universal commitment to aid states threatened by communism. In the speech which initiated the Truman Doctrine, he outlined the responsibilities felt by the United States and gave indications of the United States economic and financial help designed to work against poverty and strife and thus create economic stability and orderly political process.

The immediate purpose of the President's speech was a request for the authorization of the Greek-Turkish aid Programme which would counteract both a communist insurrection in Greece, and Soviet diplomatic pressures on Turkey to revise the conventions governing the Turkish Straits. The Programme authorized only the delivery of economic and technical assistance to the threatened states. There was a reluctance to

engage in military confrontation with the Soviet Union. This, however, soon was to be changed.

In the shadow of the events in 1948, the United States Senate passed the Vanderberg Resolution which endorsed the participation of the United States in regional arrangements based on collective self-help and mutual aid. In April, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed in Washington; and in October the Mutual Security Defence Act was enacted by the Congress.

During the American election of 1952, containment underwent a re-interpretation. Patience and restraint were dropped from the concept and suggestions for implementation included strategies for "rolling back the Iron Curtain," and massive retaliations. 9 There followed a fixation with alliances after this re-interpretation. The establishment of visible proof that states were willing to join the Western side seemed necessary. Efforts to create this visible proof were successful in Asia even though the negotiation of a Western-oriented alliance in the Middle East was complicated by the conflicts indigenous to the region.

In the military field, containment was accompanied by a counterpart articulated in a study by the National Security Council in 1950. The study (known as NSC 68) developed some assumptions about the nuclear and conventional capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and advocated the rapid re-building of the de-mobilized American conventional forces and the armies of her allies in order to balance the strength of the conventional arm of Soviet military power. A military effort needed to be made to deter the Soviet Union through the concentration on conventional forces.

The outbreak of the Korean War partly justified the

recommendations of NSC68. The re-armament that followed also contained the creation of active forces to meet the Soviet challenge elsewhere resulting in staffing of overseas bases by the United States. Appropriation for assistance to develop military forces of the allies was forthcoming with ramifications affecting the Middle East. The creation of a Middle East Defence Command was envisaged as a result of these efforts.

The new administration led by Eisenhower, though critical of containment at first, relied upon it but put more emphasis on the nuclear side of the issue with the concept of massive retaliation. This meant, inter alia, that a reduction in US Army's manpower and pulling out of some overseas bases. The emphasis was shifted and this was more so because of the changes in the Soviet leadership at the time with the proclamation of good neighbourly and peaceful co-existence. Consequently, during this period when the Baghdad Pact was being created, there was a resistance to suggestions that the United States should commit more forces abroad.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was primarily created to defend Europe against Soviet aggression. The Allies, however, disagreed on the military strategy to be used by NATO forces to protect the southern flank since Soviet penetration through Greece, Turkey, or even Yugoslavia would have placed the alliance in a vulnerable position. There was also disagreement about whether to create a new organization or to extend NATO in order to protect the southern flank.

The compromise that was reached contained the invitation to join the Organization to Turkey and Greece as full members in September, 1950, and a separate organization, the Allied Middle East Defence Command, was proposed to consist of Britain, France, the United States, and Middle Eastern states willing to cooperate. The membership of friendly Arab countries, and especially that of Egypt, was deemed to be essential. An invitation to participate in the Middle East Command was presented to the Egyptian government which was
rejected because of the underlying differences between Egypt and Britain over the questions of Suez and the Sudan. Moreover, the United States was not in favour of creation of such an organization without the participation of Egypt, which was considered to be setting the lead among the Arabs at the time.

In August 1952, the plan for the Middle East Defence Command was replaced by a new proposal, the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO). This proposal only provided for the establishment of machinery for consultation and planning, whereas the original proposal had provided for a permanent troop command in the Middle East. In the meantime, however, a new regime took over in Egypt led by some hardline army officers. The United States and Britain, expecting a change of hearts by the Egyptians, again sought their participation which again was rejected. MEDO, like its predecessor, was abandoned on the same principles.

A third attempt, and a successful one at that, to create an alliance occurred when the Secretary of State Dulles was visiting the Middle East in 1953. At the suggestion of the Turkish government to go ahead notwithstanding the Arab participation, Dulles indicated that the United States would support the formation of an alliance by the "Northern Tier" states which were aware of the Soviet threat. Shortly after, the United States government announced that it would begin signing bilateral military aid agreements with the Middle East states to strengthen the area against communist penetration. As one of the conditions, the recipients would sign pledges to support the West in any East-West conflict.

The United States and Britain were interested in drawing in the Iranians into the alliance, although they had never been considered a potential member of either the AMEC or the MEDO. The negotiations for these alliance proposals coincided with the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis and anti-Western government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. He was replaced in August, 1953,
by a pro-Western premier and the resulting shift in Iran proved to be an important step in the process that finally led to the Baghdad Pact. After this shift, Pakistan and Turkey were able to initiate a defence agreement which had been untenable before the favourable change in the Iranian government.

The Pakistani-Turkish agreement for friendly cooperation, signed at Karachi on April 2, 1954, was a bilateral defensive agreement but it had the potential for becoming a wider Middle East alliance. \(^{10}\) Article 6 was an invitation to other states to accede to the agreement. At this time, the United States and Pakistan were also negotiating their own bilateral military assistance programme. The favourable change of circumstances and the conducive atmosphere led to the initiation of meetings and extensive negotiations among the leaders of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq between April 1954 and February 1955. The result of this was the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq.

The Turkish-Iraqi Pact (signed on 24th February 1955 and afterwards known as the Baghdad Pact) was a brief document consisting of eight articles. \(^{11}\) The preamble of the pact mentioned the existing friendly relations between the two countries, referred to the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty of 1946, \(^{12}\) and stated that as members of the United Nations, the two countries were concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East.

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12. The 1946 Treaty provided for mutual consultation on foreign affairs and cooperation in regional matters. Jordan, the other Hashemite state, signed a similar treaty of friendship with Turkey. Those treaties were also criticized by other Arab states.
East and they were signing the treaty in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Pact left its doors open to all members of the Arab League and other states who were actively concerned with the security and peace of the region. Iraq, however, imposed one condition for membership in the pact. It was necessary that the state to become a member should be "fully recognized by both the High Contracting Parties." This provision, which was much criticized in Turkey, was meant to bar Israel from membership. The Treaty, however, was stressed upon as purely defensive. It was also made clear that the Pact did not conflict with Turkey's obligation under NATO or with Iraqi's commitment under the Arab League. Pakistan was the next state to join the Baghdad Pact (September 23, 1955). Pakistan's adherence was in a way an innovative step in the field of her foreign policy. She had already signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States in May, 1954, and had also joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in September, 1954. In April, 1954, Pakistan and Turkey had signed the Agreement of Friendly Cooperation. The decision to align herself with the Western Bloc was based on geographical, economic, and political realities. Being a weak and poor country, Pakistan realized the advantages of becoming a member of groupings which she found agreeable in terms of attitudes and traditions.

The Pakistanis saw the membership in the Pact as enhancing their military strength, and helping them to make tougher stands towards India and Afghanistan over the Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan disputes. The Baghdad Pact, however meager they may have been, also generated the feelings of regional consciousness among the people of Pakistan.

Iran, the last country to join the Baghdad Pact, became a member in October, 1955. Though there was persuasion from the Turks and the Americans to join, the Iranians were them-

selves inclined to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy follow­
ing the fall of Premier Mossadegh. An economic aid package
had been negotiated with the United States, diplomatic
relations resumed with Britain, and a new agreement between
the government and the oil consortium had been reached.14

The internal changes in Iran prepared the ground for
her entry into the Western-sponsored regional alliance.
Actually it is doubtful whether the Pact could have been of
any use to other members, particularly to Pakistan, if Iran
had not joined in. The geographical location and size of
Iran made her an indispensible member of the alliance. More­
over, the Iranians considered neutrality as futile as it was
dangerous. There was an imperative need for meeting the
probable danger to the Iranian independence by taking all
possible defence measures. Neutrality meant inviting aggres­sion, while adherence to regional pacts, permissible under the
UN Charter, lessened the dangers of occupation and war.

Iran's decision to join, however, aroused the suspicion
of the Soviet Union and led to the exchanges of a series of
notes between the two countries. The Soviets alleged that
the adherence of Iran to such a pact, which was considered by
Moscow as an extension of NATO, would be a violation of the
Soviet-Iranian "friendship" Treaty of 1921.

Britain's adherence to the Pact was clearly a manoeuer
designed to save her military position in the Middle East.15
In october, 1954, Britain signed an agreement with Egypt by
which she virtually surrendered the right to use her Suez base.
By this agreement, Britain established a precedent for other
Arab states hosting British military installations, especially

14. George Lenczowski, Ibid.
15. See the text of the special agreement between Iraq and
Britain in Hurewitz, Ibid., pp. 391-395.
Iraq, regarding air force bases.

March, 1955, brought British membership of the Pact. The Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, believed that the central theme of the Pact would be close and continuous collaboration between the armed forces of the contracting parties. This would involve joint planning and exercise in peace-time coupled with technical assistance. However, in connection with Britain's interests in the Middle East and adherence to the Pact, membership in it seemed the best available means of protecting the oil supplies so necessary to Britain's economy. Though the decision to join received all-round support in Britain, serious doubts however were raised about its ramifications towards Israel. These were put aside in the end considering that Britain strengthened her influence and voice throughout the Middle East.

The refusal of Egyptian regimes to join the Pact made a negative impact on the politics of the Middle East. American prestige had been high in the Arab world. The United States was popular because she was considered to be the least imperialistic of nations and sympathetic to the cause of Arab nationalism. But after the World War II, the Americans found themselves in a lesser position due to the question of Israel and also because they were seen to be collaborating with France and Britain.

The new regime that came into power in Egypt in 1952 declared itself to be nationalist. Though it was anti-communist, it not only rejected the overtures by the West, but also flirted with the idea of joining the communist camp and actively participated in the politics of neutralism, to the dislike of the United States. The United States, as late as September 1954, hoped to bring about a measure of defensive cooperation between Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq, but talks between Iraq and Egypt failed to convince the Egyptian leaders of the

17. Campbell, Ibid., p. 58.
merits of a pro-Western alliance.

The adherence of Britain to the Pact did not help matters. In various meetings of the Arab League, Egypt also attempted to condemn Iraq, as an Arab country joining such an alliance and succeeded in gaining general support for exclusively Arab defence measures. Its most effective reaction was the organization of a counter-alliance. Egypt, in March 1956, signed agreements in principle with Saudi Arabia and Syria for a unified military command. The agreement, which came to be known as the Arab Collective Security Pact, was promoted as the only legitimate defence apparatus for the Arabs in the region.

Egypt, under Colonel Nasser, was primarily hostile towards the Baghdad Pact because Nasser regarded it, if joined, as a blow to Arab solidarity and the ability of the Arabs to act as a unified third force to achieve Arab objectives in the international arena. Other reasons were historical and the struggle for leadership in the Arab world.

Egyptians did not welcome Turkey and Britain as their counterparts. As for the Americans, Egypt regarded the Pact as part of the Cold War struggle. This required a commitment to one side and thus was in contrast to be declared intentions of non-alignment. Egypt also viewed the new status of Iraq with dismay considering it to be a promotion of Iraq on behalf of the West to challenge Egypt in the region of most immediate concern, the Arab East.

The first plenary meeting of the Pact members was held on November 22-22, 1955. This inaugural meeting was held in Baghdad under the chairmanship of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri-al Said; it was attended by the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and the foreign minister of Great Britain. At this meeting, the Pact was officially named as the Baghdad Pact, and the Iraqi capital was designated as the seat of the organization. It was also at this meeting that
the United States, on invitation from the members, became associated with plenary organ of the alliance.

The basic difference between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact was that the members of the latter simply mentioned cooperation for their security and defence. The signatories of the former pledged that an attack on any of the members would be considered to be an attack on all, whereas, the Baghdad Pact members were not bound to help each other if any of them was attacked. It stated that the contracting parties would refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. They pledged to settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the UN Charter. The Baghdad Pact permitted any of its members to conclude special agreements with one or more fellow-members regarding defence and security.

Article 1 of the Pact read as follows:

"Consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other."

The operative clause of this article was the vague provision "will cooperate for their security and defence." What was meant by "cooperation" was not explicitly defined in the treaty but was to be determined by special agreement among the members. By including the reference to security, the drafters of the treaty may have anticipated taking preventive measures by helping a state develop a strong defensive position against a general rather than a specific threat. In the absence of a special agreement, the nature of the cooperation had to be defined on ad hoc basis, and the drafters provided for it in Article 2:

18. See Chapter 2, pp. 94-95.
"In order to ensure the realization and effective application of the cooperation provided for in Article 1 above the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties."

This article was included in the treaty in anticipation of the special agreements mentioned in Article 1 and of the Pact's machinery which was suggested by Article 6. The last sentence of Article 2 established the relationship between the members and the machinery instituted under the Pact.

The Baghdad Pact demanded nothing more from a member than what was expected of it as a sovereign state in the community of nations and as a member of the United Nations. Indeed the Pact was written to be parallel to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The terms of the treaty were vague and could be given meaning only by the members acting either individually or collectively. Each member retained the freedom to apply individual meaning to the terms of the treaty.

The Pact was more than a traditional alliance since it had a functioning organizational structure instituted at its first plenary session in 1955. This international organization, with a secretariat and permanent staff, became a vehicle for regional cooperation, and a model for joint planning and joint projects in the region. The organization functioned through the Council of Ministers which met annually at the ministerial level and usually bi-weekly on the deputy level. The ministerial sessions were attended by prime ministers, foreign ministers, or by representatives of ministerial ranks from all the member states and by an observer from the United States. The meetings of the Council's deputies were attended by ambassadors from the member states, by an ambassador from the United States who was accredited to the state hosting the organization's headquarters, and by a high-ranking foreign ministry official of the host state.

19. See Appendices 15 and 16 for the organizational charts.
The Council of Ministers was served by four major committees: the Military Committee, the Economic Committee, the Counter-Subversion Committee, and the Liaison Committee. The members of the Pact and the United States were represented on the committees with full power to participate and vote. Action taken in the Council of Ministers, the Council of Deputies, and in the major committees was by unanimous decision of all states, each having one vote. Beneath the committee level, in the sub-committees and the working parties, action was taken through a consensus procedure.

The remaining principal organ of the Pact, the Secretariat was composed of permanent employees recruited from member countries which contributed to the budget which included the United States. It was headed by a secretary general who, along with serving as chief administrator of the organization, was also the chairman of the Council of Deputies and the principal liaison officer between CENTO and other regional organizations, particularly NATO and SEATO. The actions of the secretary general, as the actions of all officials, were subject to review by the Council of Ministers and, consequently, were subjected to the veto.

The budget of the organization was assessed in equal proportions on all the members and on the United States. The United States voluntarily accepted responsibility for one-sixth of the Pact's budget before it formally became a member of any of the committees.

While the Council of Ministers was the supreme organ of the organization, the Council of Deputies exercised considerable initiative. At their first meeting, the Council of Deputies created the Secretariat and selected the first secretary general. This Council received the periodic reports of the Security Organization, a sub-division of the Secretariat responsible for security operations of the alliance. This Council also created the Counter-subversion Committee, and gave preliminary examination of the projects proposed by all the
committees and assigned responsibilities to them. The Council of Deputies was originally chaired by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, but in 1959 the Council of Ministers instructed the Secretary General to act as the permanent chairman.

The organizational pattern of the Council of Ministers was repeated in the structure of the four main Committees. Each one was composed of representatives from relevant agencies within the governments of the members and met periodically, usually just prior to the regular meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Committees, like the Council of Deputies, were also organized on a permanent basis at the Pact's headquarters.

The Military Committee, the first one to be established, consisted of the Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces (or his representative) from each of the member states. Originally, the United States participated in it only as an observer, but at the second meeting of the Council of Ministers (April 19, 1956) the United States offered to establish a military liaison with the Military Committee in the person of a flag or general officer. At the third meeting of the Council of Ministers (June 3, 1957), the United States announced that it would become a full member of the Committee and from then onwards participated in its deliberations with representation and voice equal to that of the full members.

The Military Committee met in bi-annual sessions during which time it approved plans for the defence of the region which, in turn, were incorporated into recommendations referred to the Council of Ministers. At the fourth meeting of the Council (January 27-30, 1957), the charter of a military plans structure was approved and a Combined Military Planning Staff began to function.

The Combined Military Planning Staff was organized into four major divisions which resembled the table of organization
of the traditional military staff. The Intelligence Division and the Logistics Division were responsible to the Chief-of-Staff. The Plans and Organizations Division and the Training Division were responsible to an Assistant Chief-of-Staff. A personnel division, normally found in a military staff organization, was not included in the structure of the Planning Staff. The organization had no military personnel at its disposal. The men employed in the joint military exercises conducted by the Pact remained under the command of their national military structure and were employed in the area only for the purpose of the exercise, not on a permanent basis.

In contrast to the Military Committee, which did not create an elaborate establishment, the Economic Committee developed an extensive structure executing a variety of projects. The Economic Committee was also created at the first Council of Ministers meeting. Representative from the member states and the United States were members of it which usually met annually to approve recommendations of its subordinate organs. Beneath the Economic Committee was a Committee of Economic Experts which was primarily a coordinating body for seven major sub-committees organized according to their functional areas, i.e., scientific development, multilateral technical cooperation, communications and public works, trade, agriculture and animal husbandry, public health, and mineral development. Each of the sub-committees was further organized into working parties which were responsible for directing the construction projects, planning projects, administering technical assistance, and conducting educational programmes.

The Economic Committee worked with a mandate incorporating four general objectives: a) to link the regional countries by means of an efficient transportation and communications system; b) to promote the free movement of goods and persons between the countries of the region; c) to assist in the national development activities for the mutual benefit of all countries of the region; and d) to encourage scientific cooperation
and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. To that end, the member states undertook joint projects for the construction of roads, railroads, port facilities, and an air navigational system. They established training and research facilities to cope with the problems peculiar to the area, and conducted educational programmes for the dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge.

The activities of the last two committees were far less apparent, due to the nature of their work, than the activities of either the Military or Economic Committees. The activities and organization of the Counter-Subversion Committee and the Liaison Committee were not publicised. The responsibility of the former was to advise how the threat of subversion to the member countries in the region can best be countered. The official mandate of the latter was to facilitate the exchange of information between member countries on questions relating to the security of the region. Its activities were also unpublicized.

The organization of the Committees was also reflected in the structure of the Secretariat which was divided into several departments, each having specific functions. First, the Political and Administrative Division was primarily responsible for providing assistance to the Secretary General in arranging meetings of the Council of Ministers and in maintaining liaison with the other international organizations, and with the governments of the members. The Political and Administrative Division advised the Secretary General on political matters affecting the organization, assisted in the planning and execution of administrative and financial services of the organization and provided the necessary services for staffing the meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Deputies as well as the other organs of the Pact. The Economic Division directed the Pact's technical assistance programme, acted as a clearing house for technical exchanges between the members, compiled statistical material, and maintained liaison with inter-governmental agencies, such as the Scientific
Council and the Institute for Nuclear Science. The Public Relations Division was an information-gathering and disseminating organ which publicized the Pact and its activities as an educational function.  

4.2 Objectives and Interests

Defence of the Middle East, seen in the context of the "communist threat," was one of the Eisenhower Administration's major concerns. The new administration recognized that as a part of the American global policy. Observing that "the Middle East does not exist for us in isolation," Secretary of State Dulles argued that: "In our modern world, no nation, however powerful, can find safety in isolation, and security for one is only to be achieved through cooperation with other like-minded nations." 21 In Dulles' opinion, the United States had to play an active role in inducing the states of the Northern Tier to cooperate closely. Eventually this policy led to the emergence of the Baghdad Pact, "in order to close the gap in the line of deterrence from SEATO to NATO." 22

At the first meeting of the Council of Ministers, a formal invitation was extended to the United States, which was accepted, to participate as an observer. While the United States was becoming associated with the deliberations and planning organs of the alliance, it was also becoming involved in the organization's economic activities. First, beginning in 1955, the United States extended grants to the participating countries for military purposes. Between 1955 and 1957, military assistance was the predominant type of aid given to the regional members, although some aid for capital development was granted to Iran in 1953. This early aid, designed to develop or enlarge a modern military force which would play a role in the defence of the region, was extended to the members of the alliance on a bilateral basis. A degree of uniformity among the military forces of the members was provided by the fact that the technicians and the equipment were contributed

by the United States.

Beginning in 1957, the United States began to grant technical and economic assistance for non-military purposes directly through the alliance. Joint projects for which assistance on a multilateral basis could be offered were by then developed and the United States offered its first economic and technical assistance to the Pact in the form of capital, equipment, and personnel for the construction of several major projects: the microwave communications system, the air navigational system, the railway links, and the highway system. The United States, in addition to supporting the major projects, granted aid on a bilateral basis as well even though the project receiving the aid was one which was undertaken as the result of a Pact's initiative. She also sponsored various technical assistance programmes, generally of three types: a) providing top level experts for short periods of time to supervise or give assistance in specific projects, b) under-writing seminars, and c) sponsoring training programmes both inside and outside of the region.

Although the United States supported the projects of the Pact and participated in the deliberations and administrative organs, she maintained an ambiguous association with the Pact and its members. The United States perpetuated the public image of a non-member of the alliance and at the same time assured commitments towards the members which, by comparison, appeared to be more inclusive than were the commitments of the members of the organization. The proliferation of United States commitments to the members coincided with the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in which the regional members found themselves in disagreement with Britain. At home, the United States government was criticized for not having a consistent Middle East policy and refusing to become a fully-fledged member of the alliance.

The United States commitments to the members were clarified, however, in late 1956 when the Department of State issued a
statement suggesting the United States support of the Pact and the principles and objectives of collective security on which it was based. It revealed its readiness to assist in measures to strengthen the security of the regional members and re-affirmed its support for the collective efforts of these nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with utmost concern.

This declaration, however, did not spell out what action the United States would take in the event of a threat. As an unilateral statement, it imposed no legal commitment to meet any demand for assistance on the call of a threatened state. At most, it created a moral commitment, since it implied assistance of some kind; it might perhaps have created a political commitment, since it might have led the states to anticipate American involvement in a Middle East crisis. Since the term "threat" was not qualified, the message could have been directed towards any state, communist or non-communist, contemplating a challenge to the status quo in the Pact area. Viewed in its historical context, the commitment was as ambiguous as the commitment contracted by the members who adhered to the Pact.

The situation soon changed when in early 1957 Congress passed a joint resolution which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, and in 1959 when the United States contracted bilateral agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.

On January 5, 1957, in a message to the Congress, President Eisenhower stressed American support for the territorial independence and political integrity of every Middle Eastern country, discussed the Soviet threat, discussed the veto problem in the United Nations, reviewed foreign policy, and then proposed that the United States should manifest her determination to assist those nations of the Middle East which desire assistance from the United States and should do
so in four areas: a) development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence; b) undertaking programmes of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations desiring such aid; c) employment of United States armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism; and d) procurement of finance, under the mutual Security Act of 1954, for economic and defensive military purposes.

The President's proposals, however, ran into difficulties of interpretations, limitations, and applications in its hearings. The Doctrine incorporated two basic commitments. The first one appeared to be an economic commitment, although the Doctrine neither increased previous appropriations nor authorized new aid. The second commitment, a political one, was not new either. Its essence, however, was re-phrased in a form that, as against the 1956 pronouncements, declared rather than implied the use of force to preserve the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East.

Problems of interpretation presented themselves more so with some of inherent concepts and perceptions of the proposals. They included the meaning of "cooperation" and "desiring such assistance," "groups of nations," "to secure and protect," "overt action," and "aggression by a country controlled by International Communism."

The Eisenhower Doctrine was a unilateral declaration of policy. It imposed a moral obligation on the United States. But unless it was succeeded by agreements with one or more states, and incorporating the desire of states in the Middle East area, it would have been meaningless. The Doctrine restricted actions to those which would be consistent with other commitments by the United States, including the commitments under the United Nations Charter.
The most difficult problem of interpretation concerned the phrase "against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." If the United States was not going to use armed forces until aggression had been committed, the phrase "international communism" did not really affect the President's authority at all, since in the event of armed aggression the United States could assist the victim state under the authority of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The "international communism" phrase limited the guarantee of the Eisenhower Doctrine by announcing to the members of the Baghdad Pact that the United States might not come to their aid in a conflict with a state other than the Soviet Union or her satellites. The members envisaged possible threats from regional sources as well as from the Soviet Bloc; the Doctrine did not extend aid to the members in their regional conflicts. This lack of support on all security issues was a major source of dissatisfaction to the Pact members with the Middle East policy of the United States. The international communism could also be used to justify intervention in a variety of situations. In this context, it could be interpreted to mean assistance given to the opponents of a friendly state by an unfriendly state which, in turn, was receiving aid from the Soviet Bloc.

In summary, it appears that at the time the Eisenhower Doctrine was formulated, those who were to apply it to specific cases were uncertain as to its actual meaning. One thing was certain, that is the only factor keeping the Middle East states from falling under the control of international communism was the belief that the United States would come to their aid. These states were unsure of the intention of the United States, and the Doctrine was designed to give them assurance of support. The Doctrine made it clearly possible

23. Lebanese crisis of 1958. The aid to the Lebanese was believed to be coming from the United Arab Republic who in turn was being assisted by the Soviet Union.
for the states to receive assistance without falling so closely under the supervising control of the United States' aid missions. President Truman, in an effort to underline the above assurances, also sent his Special Assistant, James Richards, to the countries of the region. 24

The Eisenhower Doctrine did not achieve the goal of assuring the Middle East states of US aid if their security were threatened. Regional members of the Baghdad Pact continued to question the United States government on the type of assistance they might expect in the event of a crisis. Therefore, in July 1958 when the crisis had again hit the area in the form of the Iraqi revolt, the United States re-affirmed its commitment to the area. At the London conference of the Council of Ministers in 1958, Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States was willing to enter into bilateral security agreements with the Pact's members. 25

The special Agreements with each of the regional members were finally concluded in Ankara on March 5, 1959. 26 Although these agreements were intended to give the regional members greater cause to expect that the United States would come to their assistance, an interpretation of the six articles of the Agreement indicates that there was little basis for this assumption.

The preamble to the 1959 Agreements included the following: the intention of the states in joining the Baghdad Pact, the past participation by the United States in the work of the Pact, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the subsequent efforts by the United States to strengthen the instruments of security, and finally, the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Article 1 of the 1959 Agreements declared:

24. See Appendix 9.
25. See Appendix 10.
26. For the text, see Appendix 11.
"The government of Iran is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be actually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East (the Eisenhower Doctrine) in order to assist the government of Iran at its request."

The phrase "in case of aggression" posed itself as a major operational problem since it was difficult to define aggression. The lack of a specific agreement about the nature of aggression complicated the implementation of the 1959 Agreements. The decision that an act of aggression had occurred must be made without reference to fixed criteria, but on a case-by-case basis. The state suffering the threat or insecurity has the first opportunity to decide that aggression exists, since assistance can only be legally initiated upon the invitation of the threatened state. The United States, however, also had an opportunity to determine the nature of the threat and act or refrain from acting accordingly, since in Article 1 the phrase "as mutually agreed upon" prevented the agreement from imposing an automatic obligation upon any of the signatories. For the United States, the meaning of aggression was also qualified by the reference in the Agreements to the Eisenhower Doctrine which limited the offer of assistance to incidents of aggression originating from a state controlled by international communism.

At the time the Agreements were adopted, Pakistan and Iran were campaigning for the creation of a Pact's military command with a permanent body of troops stationed in the Middle East. Pressure for the creation of such a force was particularly strong during the London session of the Council of Ministers, and the regional members could have interpreted the United States declarations as an indication of acceptance of the proposal. The Agreements of 1959, however, were a substitute for the troop command. The United States refused to make a body of troops available for deployment in the Middle
East and thereby qualified its commitment to assist in the defence of the region. The United States did not create an arrangement for an automatic response to a request for assistance.

Article 2 of the Agreements pledged continued economic and military aid. Articles 3 and 4 established the "conditions to be met by regional states in utilizing military and economic assistance." Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan pledged to utilize the assistance to preserve their national independence and integrity and to develop cooperative defensive agreements as might be agreed upon later. The conditions also re-affirmed the defensive intent of the aligned states. These two articles were intended to persuade non-member states such as India, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that any additional military gain from the association would not be used for the promotion of offensive objectives.

Article 5 made it clear that the United States did not intend to become a formal member of the organization. The Article indicated that the parties to the agreements did not anticipate any change in the instruments of cooperation contracted between them on previous occasions. It also implied that there would not be an adjustment in economic aid distributed to the regional members as was the case after the adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The 1959 Agreements were another attempt to assure the regional members of the alliance assistance from the United States in the event of a threat to their security. However, the Agreements did not give legal cause for the participating states to expect greater involvement by the United States in matters of regional security.

By contracting the 1959 Agreements, the United States was speaking to three groups that might threaten the stability of the Middle East, i.e., the Soviet Union, the Arab States, and/or domestic opposition to the governments of the regional
members viable to be manipulated by the Soviets to upset the strategy of containment. The Agreements were instruments by which the United States could react to International Communism. This being so, they were not instruments which could be utilized by the regional states to satisfy their international objectives. The Agreements neither gave the regional members access to any instruments of power nor guaranteed an automatic response by an ally to a call for assistance. Moreover, the commitments that the United States assumed towards the members were similar to the commitments the members themselves assumed towards each other.

As noted earlier, the Middle East Defence Command and the Middle East Defence Organization were originally conceived during the Truman Administration when strategy dictated the buildup of effective national forces which could react to local conflicts initiated by the Soviet Union. By the time the Baghdad Pact was created in 1955 however, that strategy was changing. The question remained then, as to what role the alliance had in the new American strategic plans.

In view of the fact that deterrence relied on the threat of retaliation, the alliance constituted a symbolic trip-wire in the defence structure which the United States, in conjunction with her allies, tried to construct around the perimeter of the communist states. Presumably, aggression committed against any of these aligned nations would be sufficient to set off retaliation. A criticism of the alliance system, particularly of the Baghdad Pact concerned the fact that the mechanism could have been created by a United States declaration that the area was of vital concern, as was eventually done in the Eisenhower Doctrine. If this criticism was valid, there would have been no need for the United States to continue promoting the Middle Eastern alliance or participating in its activities after the initiation of the new defence policy by the Eisenhower Administration. Since the move to create the alliance had already been put in motion by the time the massive retaliation concept was enunciated, it may have been politic-
ally impossible to refuse to continue supporting it. By dropping support for the alliance, the United States could have created a situation reminiscent of Korea when she was omitted from areas identified by the United States as vital to her interests. Such a situation, both President Eisenhower and the Secretary of State Dulles wanted to avoid.  

However, a desire to withdraw American troops from Europe, to reduce the size of the American military forces, and to stabilize the economy constituted barriers against supporting the idea of membership in the alliance. The failure to make this fact clear to the Middle East allies, and to clarify the fact that the United States had global commitments but infinite military capabilities, created confusion and uncertainty as to the role the United States would play in the security of the Middle East. While there was an element of truth in the formal explanations by the United States for not joining the alliance, serious examination of the stated reasons raised questions which challenged their validity.

The most recurrent explanation for the hesitation of the United States involved the relationship of the United States with the Arab states. The need to appeal to those of them that opposed the alliance was interpreted as the reason for the reluctance to join the Baghdad Pact.

As an insider, Anthony Eden deplored the ambiguity of American diplomacy with regard to the Arab States and the Pact. In his memoirs he maintained:

27. Samuel P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 436.

"In recent years the United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends, in the hope of being popular with their foes. The practical consequences of this uncertain diplomacy are illustrated by the United States treatment of the Baghdad Pact. Having played a leading part to inspire the project, the United States government held back while Britain alone of the Western powers joined it. Worse still, they tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the Pact. Then by a series of hesitant steps, they drew nearer the Pact, sending an observer and sending money, but still not joining it. An ounce of membership would have been worth more than the wavering and saved a ton of trouble later on."

He went on to evaluate the United States' position:

"A stronger power, rich in resources, once it determines its goal, has a fair chance to reach it, if it holds to its purpose. A devious course is disastrous. It is a borrower and lender in diplomacy and loses both itself and friends. Nobody credited the involved protests produced by the United States government for not joining the Baghdad Pact; they were members, when they wanted to be, of NATO and SEATO. Their repeated hesitations perplexed and harassed our friends in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. They strengthened Russian and Egyptian will to destroy the Pact and overthrow Governments which it supported it. The irony of the business is that in March 1959 the United States made separate defence agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey which, for Iran at least, were more difficult of acceptance than membership in the Baghdad Pact had been."

While the British Prime Minister's retrospective recollections of the United States policy may have been affected by the failure of the United States to support his government in the Suez Crisis of 1956, his evaluations of the credibility of the American excuse for not joining the alliance was supported by the Arab states. Very early in the history of the Pact, the Arab states questioned the position of the United States as a non-member. The alliance was identified as an attempt by Western imperialists to retain their influence in the Arab world. The United States was identified

30. Ibid., p. 375.
as part of the West and as a state bearing as much responsibility for the alliance as Britain. The participation of the United States in the activities of the alliance was a matter of public record and the Arabs made little distinction between participation in the alliance as an observer and as a full member.

A second explanation for the position of the United States vis-a-vis the alliance involved the relationship of the United States with Israel. Israel did not fear concerted action through the alliance as much as she feared the arms which Iraq received by virtue of its membership in the alliance. Israel would have preferred to see the United States in the alliance with the power to veto any action contemplated against her. Moreover, had the United States chosen to join, it could have given the Israeli government assurances that the alliance was purely defensive in nature.

If the United States did not intend to become more closely identified with the defensive machinery of the alliance, why did she negotiate bilateral Agreements in 1959? There are three possible reasons: First, the Agreements were designed to bolster the morale of the alliance members after the defection of Iraq; second, the Agreements were intended to affect the Soviet Union more than the Middle East States. The Agreements were a method of saying that although the United States would not station troops in the region, the Northern Tier still constituted a trip-wire which would trigger retaliation. Finally, the Agreements were instruments by which the United States quelled the expectations of the members themselves. By refusing to join the alliance, the United States was telling the members of the alliance that there was no hope for creation of a Middle Eastern troop command. The line beyond which the United States would not go was perhaps arbitrary. While it could have joined the organization and still rejected the idea of a troop command, the United States' refusal to join the alliance was in keeping with its policy to

31 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
remain within the limits of its strategic capabilities.

The objectives and interests of the regional members at the time of formulation of the Baghdad Pact were not identical to those of the United States and Great Britain on the whole, and differed from each other in parts. Although defence against possible Soviet threats provided the basis for a common interest, each regional member had different goals and objectives at the time it joined the Pact. These divergent interests put strains on the alliance during the late 1950's and 1960's and were the cause of continued re-assessments and re-evaluation by the regional members.

The principal objectives of Iranian policy were defence against the Soviet Union, an assured source of arms from the United States, and domestic stability (to which secure international arrangements would contribute). The most important of these objectives was defence against the Soviet Union. As the Shah recalled:

"The Russians claimed that their policy was one of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. Then why, they asked, had we joined the Baghdad Pact? I told them that they could find the answer to that question in the history of the relations between our two countries. I reminded my hosts that the Russians had for centuries been trying to advance southwards through Persia; that in 1908 they had invaded Iran in an effort to check our rising tide of constitutionalism; and that in the First World War they had again been guilty of aggression against us. I told them not to forget that in the Second World War they had invaded my country in spite of the treaties of friendship which existed between us, and in 1946 they had created a puppet government as a front to try to take over control of Azerbaijan." 32

Iran had been subject to threats from the Soviet Union. These threats, together with political regional threats, were the principal reasons for joining the alliance. As the Iranians perceived it, they had two choices: to adopt a neutral

position and hope that the Soviet Union would respect it; or to persuade another Power to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Thus joining the alliance meant insuring a stronger defence establishment with the assistance of Western Powers participating in it. Iran's past misfortunes were results of its own weakness, and if the state remained weak, not only distant powers, but also the neighbouring countries would take advantage of the situation. Iran joined only after the Pact had been created among Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain. Each of the regional states expected to benefit from the alliance as a result of the military aid granted to the regional members by the United States. Had Iran failed to join the Pact, it would have been geographically isolated and surrounded by the better-equipped armies of the alliance members and the Soviet Union.

The threat to Iraq from the Soviet sources was different from that which confronted the other three regional members. Not sharing a common border with the Soviet Union, Iraq was protected from a direct threat from the Soviet army by the intervening territories of Iran and Turkey. Therefore, the security of Iraq was associated in part with the strength and security of these two states. The pro-Western Premier, Nuri al-Said, saw the major Soviet threat to Iraq as stemming from the vulnerability of the oil facilities to either a conventional or a nuclear attack from the air; he used this vulnerability to justify a continued alliance with the British and by participating in an American strategy of deterrence.

There were two more direct threats to Iraq than that of the Soviet Union itself. The communist party of Iraq was one which had grown in strength during World War II and had been active in campaigning for social reforms. Though the Iraqis felt that the menace of Communism was serious, but it was surpassed by that of Zionism. To Iraqis, there was an alliance between these two forces trying to subvert the Arab
countries. The Arabs, therefore, had an obligation to take every opportunity to strengthen their own forces. The Pact would have been useful in combating Zionism in two ways. First, the alliance between Iraq and Turkey might bring the latter's policy toward Israel closer to that of the Arab countries. Iraq's association with Turkey was also expected to tighten the blockade of Israel and to further isolate her diplomatically.

Though Turkey's responses were favourable, but she did not sever diplomatic relations completely, nor discontinue trade with Israel. The fact that Turkey and later on Iran did not act as Iraq had expected, was one indication of the failure of the alliance to stimulate a change in attitudes of the decision-makers in the states comprising the membership.

The Iraqis believed that the alliance would alter the balance of power between the Arab states and Israel. The support of the members, plus the military assistance which Iraq expected as the fruits of alignment, would eliminate the weakness which Nuri al-Said believed was the cause for the Arab's loss of Palestine. Because of Iraq's preoccupation with Israel and the United States concern with the Soviet Union, the interests of the two states were incompatible from the time the Pact was negotiated. Nuri al-Said was preparing for the second confrontation with Israel while the United States was trying to prevent that which might create a situation inviting Soviet intervention. 33

The case for Pakistan illustrated that regional rather than Soviet threats led to her association with the Baghdad Pact. The factors involved in Pakistan's separation from British India were partially responsible for it. Apart from facing difficulties in supplying her army from her own resources, she was also faced with immediate security problems.

33. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 80-120.
Burma had territorial claims on Eastern Pakistan, Afghanistan on the Western side, and India on both wings of the state.\textsuperscript{34}

Due to Pakistan's disorganization at the time of partition and to the hostilities which broke out almost at once with India, Pakistan had an immediate need for assistance in developing a viable economy and an effective defence mechanism. At this time there were three possible sources of aid for Pakistan, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and the Soviet Union. For the first seven years of existence, Pakistan tried to remain outside of the Cold War and relied on the Commonwealth for assistance in its struggle against India. Britain and the Commonwealth, however, remained neutral in the Pakistani-Indian conflict.

Because Britain refused aid, Pakistan had to become a participant in the Cold War, and the choice of sides was never a question. Ideologically, Pakistan and the Soviet Union had little to offer each other. Pakistan did not have an effective Communist party. The independence of Pakistan came at a time when Stalin was suspicious of national liberation movements and the national bourgeoisie and when he was primarily interested in establishing buffers along the Soviet border. Therefore, even if Pakistan had been interested in looking elsewhere for assistance in building up her defence, the United States was the only source available to her in 1948-55. To that extent, Pakistan's strategic interests coincided with those of the United States.

The interests of Turkey, more than those of any of the other members of the Baghdad Pact coincided with the interests of the United States. This similarity was first apparent in 1947 when the Truman Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish aid programme was initiated. Turkey, like Iran, was subject to Soviet pressures during the post-World War II era. Adherence to the

\textsuperscript{34} Keith Collard, "Pakistan: A Political Study," (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp. 155-159.
Pact was viewed then as part of the protection against the expansionism of Russian communism. To the Turks, membership in the alliance was an indication of their awareness of the danger of neutral blocs which the Soviet Union was trying to create and which would be instruments for depriving the people affected of their freedom. The security of each of the Middle Eastern states was threatened by the Soviet Union, so it was the obligation of all of them to align for their own safety.

In latter parts of 1950's, the Turkish government warned the states of the alliance and particularly the United States that any deterioration of peace in the Middle East facilitated the expansion of Soviet influence. The Soviet ideology anticipated world domination, and that as long as there was no change in that ideology, there would be no basic change in their policy. Any relaxation of tension because of Soviet overtures of peaceful co-existence would only be a shift in tactics and not in substance. Consequently, the retention of strong defences against a potential Soviet threat was necessary. To do otherwise, would constitute an invitation to Soviet attack.

Turkish security, however, was threatened by more than possible aggression from the Soviet Union. The failure to consult Turkey at Yalta over the convention governing the Turkish Straits brought back memories to the Turks of the abuse of them by the Great Powers in their negotiations over the balance of power in Europe. An alliance between Turkey and the West would have strengthened her position. To this end, Turkey sought admission in NATO at the time it was being created. She was admitted in 1951, but felt apprehension in 1954 when the United States refused to underwrite the Turkish economic development plan. By this time, direct Soviet pressure had relaxed in the Middle East, and there was evidence that Turkey was considered to be less significant in Western affairs than she was previously. In the eyes of the Turks, Turkey was again being taken for granted. This con-
sistent sense of insecurity may explain Turkey's role in negotiating the Pact of Mutual Cooperation and her active participation in it.

It should be stressed that even though the four regional members sought military assistance as a means of achieving an end peculiar to their own foreign or domestic political interests, each also believed that an alliance with the West was a necessary precondition for receiving assistance.

In case of Pakistan, military support against India and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, however, was not the only type of assistance she desired; Pakistan also sought political support in the United Nations over the issues concerning the above two countries. By identifying with the West, Pakistan hoped to induce the United States to identify with her position. Pakistan, however, was disappointed on both grounds. She did not get full support from the United States in the United Nations, nor did she receive a free hand to utilize against her principal antagonists the military equipment received as a result of the alliance.

Iran's decision to participate in the alliance, like Pakistan's, was accompanied by a request for military aid. Unlike Pakistan, however, the Iranian government's concern for domestic security matched its concern for aggression from without. In the wake of the turmoil that engulfed Iran due to the communist-backed Mossedagh Administration, the Shah needed to strengthen his most important political base of support, the military and its machinery. Therefore, the receipt of military assistance meant strengthening this base. Because both the Shah and the United States were interested in political stability of Iran, they had, at least, a short range compatibility of interests.

Turkey's decision to join the alliance was also partly motivated by an expectation of economic and military aid. As in the case of Iran, the amount of aid Turkey received had
a relationship to the ability of the governing administration to remain in power. The Turkish and Iranian positions were, however, quite different. Whereas the efficient military establishment created in Iran with the assistance of military grants contributed to the power base for the Shsh, the military in Turkey constituted a base of strength for the opposition. Prime Minister Menderes and his Democratic Party came to power by virtue of the support from the peasant and middle classes which the party attracted partly because of promises for economic development. The measures which ensued stretched the economy and had to be supported by foreign assistance. The perpetual failures that encountered threw the country into chaos and ended with a military coup in 1960. This situation has repeated itself with regularity till today and demonstrated Turkish dependence upon foreign aid and investment.

Iraq's need for aid differed from that of the other regional members. Whereas the other states were seeking both economic and military assistance, Iraq was pressing for aid primarily in the form of military equipment and technical assistance. Iraq was investing heavily in economic development from the revenue derived from her own oil resources, but she was restrained from modernizing her military forces by the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, and by the reluctance to an arms race between the Arab states and Israel. However, from the time the Pact was signed until his death in the 1959 coup, Nuri al-Said repeatedly requested air coverage which he had expected to receive before the Pact was concluded; the package, at last, arrived shortly before the coup that led to the withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact.

The regional criticism of the Pact voiced at and around the turn of the decade, was primarily due to the failure of the alliance to satisfy the expectations of the regional members. The dissatisfaction over the delivery of aid

35. For the text of the Tripartite Agreement, see: Hurewitz, *op.cit.*, pp. 308-311
illustrated this fact. The member countries clearly expected to receive more condition-free aid than they did. Each country, however, had its own objections which indicated the inability of the member states to persuade the United States that affiliation with the alliance warranted preferential consideration by the United States in its aid programmes. Turkey and Pakistan were restrained in the manner which they could utilize the military equipment they received; Iran complained about the slowness of the aid delivery and about the early termination of the aid grant, and the failure to deliver arms to Iraq on time may have been fatal to the regime that signed the Pact.

The Suez Crisis, occurring approximately one year after the signing of the arrangements, provided a dramatic illustration of divergent perspectives and potential strains on the alliance. Each country had to confront the fact that a member state was attacking one of the principal states of the region. Each one had to deal with the legal issues of the Canal seizure, the emotional aspects of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and the political consequences of the British invasion.

In November, 1956, the one-year old Pact was widely believed to have expired. There were days of disappointment, concern, and anxiety for the regional members. The prime ministers of the regional members met several times to discuss the gravity of the situation and to harmonize their policies. They demanded an early settlement to the issue, to restore and respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Egypt. The four regional members demonstrated, to some extent, their capability of taking a joint stand on this major political issue. Their role made it clear that they were not totally under the dominance of their external partners. They formulated their policy independently and tried to exert their joint pressure on Great Britain. However, the leaders of the four regional members did not identify themselves totally with Egypt's point of view and other radical Arab states. They
maintained a middle-of-the-road position. On one hand, they condemned the aggressive role of Israel. On the other hand, they called for restoration of free navigation through the Canal and advocated that the Canal should not be submitted to the political control of any country.

The Pact survived this crisis rather well, considering the range of problems each member state confronted. The basic divergence of interests illustrated by the crisis, however, remained. The regional members became increasingly disillusioned as the organization failed to meet what they considered to be their primary objectives.

The commitment of aid to Pakistan by the United States government, announced in 1954, was conditional upon the fact that it was not be used for anything other than the defence of the free world, and that if this condition was not met, the United States would not hesitate to restrain the use of the aid package. At the same time, assurances were given to India that this assistance was not in any way to be directed against her. The United States' intention, however, did not coincide with the desire of the Pakistani government. While Pakistan did not officially advocate aggression against India, it was clear from statements by the Pakistanis that the purpose of requesting assistance was to defend themselves against India and to facilitate the settlement of the Kashmir issue. Efforts by the United States to appease India's feelings with regard to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, therefore, frustrated the Pakistanis.

The Pakistanis were also irritated by the fact that India was receiving assistance, in greater volumes and speedily, from the West; and after the death of Stalin, from the East as well. The implication drawn by Pakistan from the comparison was that an ally committed to the West should have been given preferential treatment over a state that had fought the idea of alliances and was the principal enemy of one of the members. By 1960, however, Pakistan was also able to sign an
economic agreement with the Soviets. This being so, there was no change in the attitudes and the complained disparity remained.

By 1962, however, Pakistan was reassessing the direction of its policy. The immediate issue which caused the reassessment was the Chinese attack on India in the Himalayas and the consequent assistance in military equipment delivered to India by the United States and Britain. To them, there were three factors which had altered Pakistan-Western relations: disappointment both within the government and among the people of Pakistan, because Britain and the United States had failed to apply pressure on India at opportune moments to reach a settlement on Kashmir; Western arms aid to India which placed Pakistan in a disadvantageous position, because the aid upset the balance of power previously existing in the sub-continent; and the fact that the behaviour of Britain and the United States indicated that they had chosen India over Pakistan as their best friend on the Asian mainland. The political, moral, and physical support which Pakistan had sought by aligning with the West in her struggle against India was not forthcoming. In spite of this disillusionment, she apparently was not ready in 1962 to terminate her membership in the alliance.

During the 1960's, events occurred both inside and outside of the organization which facilitated dealignment and which further challenged the utility of the alliance for Pakistan. First, the unity structure of the communist bloc began to disintegrate, and China and the Soviet Union began to compete for influence in South East Asia. The fact that the Soviet Union was taking the side of India in the Kashmir dispute made it natural, perhaps, for Pakistan and China to view one another as possible allies. In early 1965, Pakistan considered and concluded two trade agreements with China and the pro-Chinese Indonesians, the latter being similar to the agreements existing between the members of the Pact. Second, in 1964, Pakistan cooperated with the other regional members by
establishing a purely functional organization, the Regional Cooperation for Development, which was to assume most, if not all, of the economic functions of the Pact. The new organization would have made it possible for the regional members to terminate the military association with the West but still retain the benefits of economic cooperation.

The incident which ultimately led to Pakistan's termination of her military association with the alliance was the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Foreign Minister Bhutto announced that Pakistan would invoke the alliance commitments and request the members to come to her aid in the war. The reply that Pakistan received was in direct contradiction of the general purpose of Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation. British response was to invoke the spirit of Commonwealth; Iran and Turkey, though supportive in diplomatic terms, did not come to her aid to the extent that Pakistan requested. Turkey was seeking Asian-African support on the Cyprus issue and did not want to alienate India at the time. Iran and Turkey also had to sustain American pressures. The United States placed restrictions on aid going to both India and Pakistan, however.

Pakistan's experience with the security aspect of the Pact illustrated that the member states continued to perceive their national interests in much the same manner as they had before the alliance was formulated. The United States did not give priority to her ally in the 1965 war, nor did Pakistan's decision-makers begin to perceive the threat from international communism any differently than they had before the alliance. The United States, while acknowledging the differences over the interpretations of the obligations of the alliance, nonetheless insisted that commitments were designed purely against the communists. The failure of the alliance to bring about an alteration of attitudes and develop a genuine community interest in the area of military security was a major cause for Pakistan dissatisfaction with the alliance. On the other hand, this episode in the life of the
Pact did not affect the attitude and perception of decision-makers from non-member states. They tended to identify Pakistan with the objectives and policies of the other members of the alliance even though Pakistan herself did not endorse them.

The least dissatisfaction with the alliance was expressed by Turkey. She maintained a continued campaign for the eventual membership of the United States and at the end had to settle for assurances given by the United States and its participation in the committees. Unlike the other regional members, Turkey, however, did not press for the creation of a Middle East troop command or for a body of troops permanently stationed in the area. She did not need further indications of American intentions to come to her assistance in the event of aggression; troops from the United States were already stationed in Turkey as part of NATO. Having a greater guarantee than the other regional members of the United States support in a security crisis, Turkey less rapidly than the others perceived an advantage in reaching accommodations with the Soviet Union. Because aid from the United States increased during periods of East-West tensions, it was to Turkey's advantage to react to international tension as the product of Soviet design.

The Presidential elections in the United States in 1960, however, were a source of concern for the Turkish government. Senator Kennedy was expected to lead in new and uncertain decisions. Considerable importance would be attached to the underdeveloped nations and to the position of neutrality. This conclusion being drawn up, a feeling of anxiety set in Turkey and the other regional countries. The events of 1960 did little to dispel these anxieties as the United States became increasingly involved in Southeast Asia.

For Turkey, like the other members, the alliance with the West did not prove to be of an asset in regional issues.
On the question of Cyprus, the Turks failed to receive British or American support, a fact which led the Turks to question the utility of the alliance. To the Turks, the British assumed the role of the balancer in the dispute. Pakistan's membership of the Pact was also an embarrassment to Turkey whenever the issue came up for discussions in the Council of Ministers. When discussing the Kashmir issue, Turkey and Pakistan had emphasized the role of self-determination and the use of the plebiscites as the proper method for settling the dispute. On the Cyprus issue, however, the opposite position was the preferable one from the standpoint of Turkey. The two states strained to rationalize the obviously contradictory positions on similar issues.

Turkey also failed to receive the support of the United States on the Cyprus issue, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union supported the Greeks. The American line was, as before, not to condone the use of American-supplied weapons in such a dispute. On the issue of Cyprus, Turkey received the strongest moral support from the Arab states who had been most critical of her alliance policies; Turkey received little or no support from the states with whom she was aligned.

By 1965, although the Turks maintained that there was no change in their policy toward the United States, they did respond to Soviet offers to improve trade relations between the two neighbours. In the light of the fact that other Western allies had altered their attitude toward the Soviet Union, the Turks could see little reason why they should not do the same. Consequently, in 1965, Turkey also began to react to the disintegration of the utility of the Pact as an instrument of policy.

The sources of dissatisfaction with the alliance, in the case of Iran, presented themselves almost from the start. Iran complained about the failure of American decision makers to perceive the Iranian dominant interests in their proper
perspective. Dissatisfaction with the volume of aid flowing to the country was expressed as early as late 1955. The Shah himself repeated the complaint that the United States was neither prompt nor generous in meeting the amount of aid needed and requested by his government.36

In July, 1962, the Kennedy Administration, following its new direction in American aid that extended to Iran, began to phase out the programme of direct grants of military equipment and informed the Iranian government that future assistance would be in the form of loans. Arms could still be purchased from the United States but at a price and at an established rate of interest which proved to be a source of complaint by the Iranians. The aid cut had immediate and long range ramifications both for Iran and the Pact. First, the cut resulted in resignation of the Prime Minister, Dr. Amini, who had been meeting with some success in initiating social reforms, and throwing the country into some chaos. Second, Iran began to express disillusionment with the alliance in much the same tone that was being voiced in Pakistan.

The reason given by the United States for the termination of military grants was the unreasonable spending by the Iranian government to maintain a military establishment of excessive size. In fact, however, the termination of military grants reflected a general disinterest and disapproval of the Iranian government by the young Senator.37


37. It should not escape attention that the Shah enjoyed a "Special relationship" with the eight US presidents he dealt with. His associations with various administrations went also further in the sense that he established channels of communications with highly placed individuals in the American society over the years. The Shah's beliefs and perceptions were understood by them and his highly developed personal sense of Iran's interests and needs in conjunction with the US overall global foreign policy was respected across the political spectrum in the United States. However, if there was such a thing as "special", it was reserved more so for the Republicans. Though there were exceptions (like Zbigniew Brezezinski) he nevertheless felt at home with and was a personal friend of
In September 1962, the Iranian government gave the Soviet Union a pledge in the form of an exchange of notes to the effect that no missile bases would be allowed on her territory. This move signalled the lessening of tension between the dominant interests of the United States and Iran.

prominent Republicans. Kennedy's blank refusal to sustain the military grants was not unlike Carter's emphasis on the "human rights" issue. While on the other hand Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford hardly placed restraints of any kind of the relationship between the two countries. The Nixon era was of course the most prominent of all since it coincided with significant developments in the Iranian perceptions and search for security. The question of arms sales to Iran could best demonstrate this "special relationship." The universal view in the United States was that she had a major national interest in supplying the Iranian armed forces, notwithstanding the Iranian's views. However, it was the Democrats who placed brakes on the programme and raised doubts. In contrast, the Republicans seldom did so. The approach of the Nixon and Ford administrations was to supply Iran with anything short of nuclear weapons. This was personally conveyed to the Shah by Nixon during his 1972 visit to Tehran. This point is taken by Henry Kissinger in his memoirs. Nixon ordered that "in the future Iranian requests should not be second-guessed." ("White House Years," (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 1264). A further distinction could be made with reference to the working machinery of the American legislature. The Republicans often made decisions which had the effect of pre-determining subsequent ones. Moreover, the bureaucracy was often by-passed save the routine decisions. Decisions like selling advanced hardware (e.g., F-14, F-15, and Spruance-class destroyers) can be cited in this context. (Andrew J. Pierre, "The Global Politics of Arms Sales," (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), p. 48). The Republicans also occupied office during most of the 38 years of the Shah's rule. They often drastically reversed the major foreign policy decisions of the previous Democrat administrations in early days of resuming power. The best example, however, was to surface after the fall of the Shah, i.e., the Reagan's approach. This late and welcome development was to be greeted by those who believed in the promotion of mutual interests in countering externally supported aggression; in defence of the free world; and in responding to the Soviet challenge. President Reagan made clear the new thrust of his policy through a statement, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," issued on July 9, 1981. The Reagan directive stated that the US would deal with the realities of the world as they were, not as the US would have liked them to be. Furthermore, the US would not "jeopardize its own security through a programme of unilateral restraint" ("Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," The White House, 9 July, 1981; quoted in ibid., p. 63). The Shah, alas, would have had a cordial relationship with Ronald Reagan and his inner circle of advisors had he been in power. For further readings, see Chapters 5 and 6 of this study. To compare public portrayal of attitudes, see Appendices 12 and 14.
in the Middle East. The agreement was also the first step taken by Iran in a search for an alternative source of arms and escape from dependency on the United States.

The Iranians did not indicate a movement toward de-alignment until the termination of the military grants by the United States. By then the external threats had lessened. The termination of military grants, however, affected the instruments which the Shah relied upon as a political base: Iran was affected by domestic political considerations rather than interests in the area of foreign policy.

For Iraq, the alliance as an instrument of national policy was a failure; it did not achieve the objectives which Nuri al-Said expected either in the area of Iraq's relations with Israel or in the area of her relations with other Arab countries. The alliance did not play a role in saving the regime which was responsible for the state becoming a member of it; in fact, partly because of the nature of Iraqi politics, the opposition was able to use the Pact as an issue with which to undermine Nuri al-Said.

Politics in Iraq revolved, for the most part, around leading personalities and their associates. Of these, Nuri al-Said was perhaps the most prominent. His political base came from the landed class, tribal leaders, and the older generation of Western-oriented intelligentsia. He was regarded as an Anglophile and suppressed all opposition. In 1956, however, the opposition political leaders, while not operating under party banners, were associated with an illegal and secretive alignment, the National Union Front. The unifying factor in this alignment was opposition to Nuri al-Said and what he stood for, i.e., his resistance to reform, his feud with the other Arab states, his anti-Soviet posture, and the alliance with the West, the Baghdad Pact.\footnote{Majid Khadduri, "Independent Iraq, 1932-1958," 2nd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 371-372.}
The external propaganda campaign against membership in the alliance strengthened the domestic opposition to Nuri al-Said's government. At the time Iraq joined the alliance, the Soviet Union launched a concerted propaganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact charging that adherence to the alliance would perpetuate the state's status as instruments of the West. Egyptians also joined in. As such, therefore, the Baghdad Pact proved to be a liability to Iraq. Extensive increases in military and technical aid did not materialize rapidly enough to help save the monarchy. The alliance did not improve Iraq's relations and bargaining position against Egypt, the traditional rival. Instead, by becoming a symbol for both the domestic and international opposition to Nuri al-Said, the alliance made it possible for the opposition to expand the scope of the national debate within Iraq and to legitimize the use of the propaganda facilities of Egypt to support the international opposition to the government of Nuri al-Said and the monarchy. Iraq's association with the Pact, instead of being an example of an alliance altering attitudes, is a study of an alliance intensifying already existing attitudes.

One of the most important events in the life of the Baghdad Pact was the Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958. The pro-Western and anti-Soviet government of Nuri al-Said was overthrown and a revolutionary government proclaiming neutrality was set up. The new regime formally withdrew from the membership in the Pact on March 24, 1959. The headquarters were moved to Ankara and the Pact, as pointed out earlier, re-named as the Central Treaty Organization.

4.3 Transformation and Establishment of RCD

The decline of CENTO as a military pact was accompanied by its growth as an integrative arrangement of regional significance. The three regional countries moved cautiously in the direction of integration in the 1960's and 1970's. As discussed earlier, there are a number of background conditions which may influence the integration process. Here three major factors are examined and applied to the three countries. These are common regional values; the formation of a so-called pluralistic security community, and compatible economic structures.

Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey are geographically contiguous and they constitute a geographic region. The Northern Tier of the Middle East which includes these three countries can be identified separately from the valleys and the plains of the Arab core. For centuries, the people living in this area influenced each other's culture and way of life and there are certain traditional cultural bonds which bind them together. The existence of a common cultural heritage within the region has been recognized by the decision-makers of these three countries on numerous occasions.

The compatibility of values held by politically relevant groups of integrating countries has been recognized as one of the necessary conditions for regional integration. In the Northern Tier, four social groups, namely, the military, the secular intelligentsia, the innovating entrepreneurs, and the reactionary traditional elites can be identified as particularly relevant strata of the population. Among these four groups, the first three constitute a modernizing coalition. The influence of these groups on the political system of the

40. See Chapter 2, pp. 86-87.
countries is paramount. In fact, the decision-makers of these three countries are primarily recruited from these social groups. Some of the main values held by the modernizing groups are compatible. They are interested in rapid industrialization, economic growth, increasing social mobility, and the search for an effective and stable political system. The modernizing elites of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey also realized that these goals could be helped to be fully achieved with the help of regional institutions. The establishment of RCD within the protection of CENTO was an institutional manifestation of the desire for regional cooperation.  

Mutual knowledge, as a factor influencing the process of integration, is and has been at a low level among the peoples of these three countries. This is due to the fact that, first, though these countries are geographically contiguous, they lack effective means of communications. Second, in these three countries different languages are spoken, and this fact tends to create barriers for the development of mutual knowledge. Third, economic policies of the RCD countries have been controlled by outside powers for a long period of time. As a result, they have had difficulty in developing mutual trade relations.

However, the level of mutual knowledge among them was gradually improving. Economic and cultural activities and the creation of a regional communication system within the protection of CENTO and RCD provided a very good opportunity for these countries to improve their level of mutual knowledge. Gradually, the English language was becoming the language of the regional decision makers. The official language of both organizations was also English.  

42. Ibid.

Mutual predictability of behaviour and mutual responsiveness are also two variables that affect the above process. The capacity of RCD countries to come to each other's rescue and to respond to needs and requirements was limited. However, there were instances when they acted positively and immediately. The Kashmir and Cyprus disputes, voting patterns in the United Nations, and natural disasters were examples in that respect.

Before joining the Baghdad Pact, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey had already taken many steps towards the formation of a regional pluralistic community. This form of regional system came into existence as they gradually abandoned the use of violence in settling their disputes and decided to cooperate with each other. Their participation in this form of regional arrangements created a necessary psychological infrastructure which facilitated the process of further integration at a regional level. Their desire for mutual cooperation manifested itself in several regional institutions within the framework of CENTO and RCD.

The security-community among these three non-Arab countries of the Middle East remained basically pluralistic. The important functions within the framework of the community were not amalgamated. There were no common defence forces, no common laws, and no common controls over the economic and political system of these three countries. The decision-making apparatus were coordinated for some purposes but not merged in any significant way.

Over the years there were many agreements among Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in which each explicitly accepted the principle of non-violent resolution of conflicts as a basis of their mutual relations. In these agreements they also expressed their desire for cooperation. Renunciation of physical force as a legitimate instrument of national policy - so far as their mutual relations were concerned - and the desire for mutual cooperation were the two basic factors
which over the years transferred Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey into a pluralistic security-community.

On April 22, 1926, Turkey and Iran signed their first Treaty of Friendship at Tehran. The treaty was a turning point in the long history of hostile Irano-Turkish relations. Both countries agreed on the principle of non-violent relations of their mutual conflicts. According to Article 3 of the treaty:

"Each of the Two Contracting Parties undertakes not to engage in any aggression against the other and not to be a party to any alliance or political, economic, or financial agreement concluded by one or more third Powers and directed against the other Part or against the military and naval security of that Party's country. Each of the two Contracting Parties further undertake not to participate in any hostile action whatsoever, directed by one or more Third Powers against the other Party."\(^{44}\)

The agreement also recognized the need for cooperation between Iran and Turkey for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their peoples.

The preamble of the treaty of 1926 was, unlike those of previous treaties, free from any reference to religious injunctions. This realistic and pragmatic approach by the leaders of Iran and Turkey, Reza Shah Pahlavi and Kemal Ataturk, was basically the result of the decline of the influence of religion over the foreign policy decision-making process. Their desire to settle their disputes peacefully and not allow their respective territories to be used by groups of powers intending to attack the other country was a basic departure from their traditional foreign policies. These desires were values which, if held strongly, would have been sufficient for the successful working of a pluralistic security-community. Further events, such as the signing of the Treaty of 1932

on border disputes, and more prominently cooperating with each other to resolve the Kurdish problem,\textsuperscript{45} proved that

45. The Kurds as a homogenous community are divided among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq with small overlaps into the Soviet Union and Syria. Their main separatist demand for a sovereign independent state has been a serious problem for many years and fiercely denied by all countries concerned. In pursuing their demands the Kurds have staged numerous rebellions in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Although in recent times the uprisings have been mostly confined to Iraq, nevertheless the quarrels have spilled over into neighbouring countries and as such have posed an international problem. This is so because dissatisfaction in one country affects other Kurds living in another country. The tribal facet of crossing international boundaries have not helped either. This, in turn, has resulted in perennial frictions among the regional states, Iran and Iraq in particular. In Turkey, where the greater number of them live (over 2m), uprisings occurred in 1925, 1930 and 1937 but after the World War II relations improved. In Iran, with a population of near 1.5 million, the Kurds were more or less assimilated and brought under control by Reza Shah. By the end of 1945 the Kurds were encouraged, supplied with arms, and assisted by the Russians into proclaiming the independent Republic of Mahabad. This was, however, secondary to the aims of the Soviets as their main focus of attention was the Azarbaijan question. This Kurdish movement, by far the most serious in Iran, was finally disintegrated with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran and the collapse of the communist-backed republic in Azarbaijan. The Kurdish question has not been isolated from the big-power rivalry of the British and the Soviet Union. In Iraq the Kurds were promised by the British an autonomous state after the World War I, an idea that was abandoned when the British realized that the Soviets might be the main beneficiary. The balance and stability of the whole region would have been altered had the British gone ahead with the idea. An uprising in the last years of the Second World War under Mullah Mustafa Barzani was defeated by the Iraqis. Barzani and his fighters, the Peshmargan (death-volunteers) crossed the border into Iran, a pattern that would be repeated numerous in subsequent years. The Kurds found some favour in Iraq for the first time after the revolution of 1953. The left-wing tendencies among the Kurds suited the new revolutionary regime in Iraq. However, this did not last, as the communist ideas soon lost ground among the Kurds. Moreover, they also lost the regime's favour. The result was a further rebellion in 1961 which was met by force. The overthrow of the Kassim government gave some breathing ground to the Kurds. The Baath government entered into some discussion with them, giving the Kurds the hope of autonomy. These discussions were futile, however. A truce was negotiated in 1964. It was renewed in 1970 although it was fragile all along. These successive Kurdish rebellions put a strain on Iran-Iraqi relations. The Iranian government would provide military and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds at the time when Iran was formul
proved that Turkey and Iran could hold these values firmly and use them.

On July 8, 1937, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey signed a Treaty of non-aggression at the Sa'dabad Palace, Tehran. The four signatories stated in the preamble that they were "actuated by the common purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Near East by the means of additional guarantee within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

The parties to this agreement, which became known as the Sa'dabad Treaty, undertook to "pursue a policy of complete abstention from interference in each other's internal affairs" (Article 1), "to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers" (Article 2), "to consult together in all internatl-..."
ional disputes affecting their common interest" (Article 3), and "in no event to resort, whether singly or jointly with one or more third Powers, to any act of aggression directed against any other of the Contracting Parties" (Article 4).

Each of the four contracting parties also undertook to: "prevent, within its respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations, or organizations to subvert the established institutions, or to disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another party." The members of the Sa'dabad Pact categorically accepted the principle of non-violent resolution of the conflicts. Article 8 of the treaty declared that, "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise among them, shall never be sought by other than pacific means." The Foreign Ministers who signed the Pact decided on the same day to establish a permanent Council which met once a year and had a Secretariat.

The Sa'dabad Treaty contained all the provisions necessary to create a pluralistic security-community. Its articles, however, were never translated into reality and the Pact faded away. There were many reasons for this in-action. In Iran and Turkey the process of modernization created at least a few necessary background conditions, but Iraq and Afghanistan did not undergo the same process of transformation. Moreover, Afghanistan had serious border disputes with Iran. There were many disputes between Iraq and Iran and also between Iraq and Turkey. Under these circumstances it was only logical that the Pact failed to create a viable pluralistic security-community. Nevertheless, it further improved relations between Iran and Turkey. Even if the Pact did not achieve its objectives, it was a significant step in various respects. It was the first regional agreement of its kind, and it won't be an exaggeration to say that the Sa'dabad Pact marked the beginning of the process of cooperation in the region. Since the date they signed this Treaty, Iran and Turkey have not engaged
in any confrontation.

The friendly relations that have developed over the last four decades among these two countries have been matched by increasingly similar relations between them and Pakistan. One of the strange characteristics of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent was that their focus of identity was always outside the Indian borders. They always considered themselves a part of the Muslim community, a community which extended far beyond the geographical limits of India. The partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 was closely related to this phenomenon. Muslims of India had always viewed the Turks with high regard. It was not only religion, but also the problem of political identity that attracted them towards the Ottoman Empire. After the end of the Mughal Rule in India, it was only the Ottoman Empire with which the Indian Muslims could identify themselves on the political level.

After the creation of Pakistan, she established friendly relations with Turkey. In July, 1951, a formal treaty of friendship was signed between the two countries. This was followed in 1953 by a cultural agreement. These treaties were the first steps toward the strengthening of political and cultural ties between the two countries. On April 2, 1954, they signed an Agreement of Friendly Cooperation. It recognized the "need for consultation and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their peoples."\textsuperscript{47} This agreement was in reality a formal declaration that the contracting parties had established a pluralistic security-community. This treaty also indicated that Pakistan and Turkey were sufficiently oriented towards each other to desire to contribute toward solving some of their social, political, and security problems by joint efforts. On the basis of this agreement, Pakistan and Turkey decided to cooperate in one of the most sensitive areas of their national life, defence. This intention was, to

\textsuperscript{47} See Appendix 6.
a certain extent, an outcome of the consciousness that the major values relevant to the political decision-making processes in Pakistan and Turkey were compatible, and that both nations would respond promptly to each other's messages and needs.

The Turko-Pakistani treaty of 1954 established constant channels of communications between the political elites of these two countries which helped to improve their mutual understanding. Military missions were exchanged to study and determine the ways and extent of mutual military assistance. Relations between Turkey and Pakistan have remained friendly ever since. Both nations have been cooperating with each other and have responded to their mutual needs on various occasions.

The Muslims of the Indian sub-continent also maintained close relations with their counterparts in Persia. From the early sixteenth century to the end of the nineteenth, almost the entire Muslim world was under the domination of three great empires: the Ottoman, the Safavids, and the Mughal. These three empires shared a common Turko-Mongol heritage, noticeable in their systems of administration. But the Shi'it Safavid kings of Persia, in order to counter the pressure from the Sunni Ottoman kings, always tried to keep extremely friendly relations with the Mughal kings of India. As a result of this political detente between the two neighbouring empires, Persian culture heavily influenced the Muslim culture of the Indian sub-continent. The Persian language remained the court language during the entire Mughal rule, and it became the sole vehicle of literary and intellectual activities among the Muslims. For these reasons the Persian language made a very deep impact upon all the modern Muslim languages of the sub-continent such as Urdu, Pushto, and Punjabi. After the end of the Muslim rule on the Indian sub-continent, the Muslims of India, while politically identifying themselves with Turkey, culturally did the same with Iran.
From its establishment in 1947, Pakistan enjoyed extremely cordial relations with Iran. On February 18, 1950, Pakistan and Iran signed a treaty of friendship. In this treaty they resolved to solve their mutual problems through peaceful means and in a friendly atmosphere. The provisions of the treaty also indicated that Pakistan and Iran were sufficiently oriented towards each other to desire to contribute toward solving some of their social, political and economic problems.

After 1950, the leaders of Iran and Pakistan on various occasions made it clear that they were fully conscious of their common problems and equally eager to help each other in solving them. This intention for mutual cooperation was basically the outcome of the feeling that the major values relevant to political decision-making processes in Pakistan and Iran were compatible and that both nations possessed the capacity to respond promptly to each other's requests. In 1953, Iran and Pakistan demarcated their boundaries. This settlement in a region beset by such disputes was a clear testimony that both nations were capable of maintaining their relations within the framework of the pluralistic security-community. Pakistan-Iranian relations have remained free from any serious conflict, a rare political phenomenon in Asia.

In the early 1950's, the process of establishing a pluralistic security-community among Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey reached its culmination. The major factor which led to this process, first, between Turkey and Iran and later among Iran and Pakistan, and Turkey, was the increasing unattractiveness of war and the rising advantages and possibilities of non-violent settlement of mutual disputes. Further progress in regional integration would never have been possible if they had not established this type of relationship.

The process of regional integration and the establishment of regional organizations are not exclusively European phenomena. Decision-makers of many Asian, African, and Latin
American countries have recognized the properties and the utility of regional arrangements in terms of increasing the security and welfare of their countries. Successful operation of the West European regional organizations also provided further incentives toward regionalism. There exists a general realization that regional economic organizations may prove effective tools to accelerate the process of economic development. There are important economic advantages such as increased trade and investment, expanded production, monetary stability, and a better bargaining position as a member of a bloc; to be gained from regional integration among the developing countries.

Though the above advantages are self-apparent, however, only a few countries in the developing world have established successful regional organizations. As pointed out earlier, the establishment of regional organizations is basically a transformation of one system into another. This change takes place as a result of a complex process, and a number of factors influence it. The newly independent nations of Asia and Africa have not been successful in undergoing that process because in large measure they do not possess the necessary background conditions. There are, of course, certain countries which possess these, but they do not constitute a pluralistic security-community; an essential stage for any kind of viable regional integration. Examples of significant regional integration among the developing countries are, therefore, rare. Some, such as the Arab Common Market is stagnant, or in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association had bogged down. The East African Common Market, the most significant example, has declined and the Central American Common Market also has faced difficulties.

It is evident that the developing nations will be in a position to think in terms of mutual cooperation and integration only after they accept explicitly the principle of non-violent resolution of mutual conflicts. A high level of integration is inconceivable so long as they do not agree to
settle their disputes without resorting to physical force.

Among the Asian countries, the first attempt at regional economic cooperation was the establishment of the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961. Thailand, the Philippines, and the Federation of Malaya became the members of ASA. Due to political conflicts and other difficulties among the participants, this organization did not make any significant contribution toward regional integration.48 The second Asian experiment in the field was the RCD.

Meaningful cooperation among the Northern Tier countries started with the setting up of the Baghdad Pact, and then it created the necessary infrastructure for the establishment of RCD. As discussed earlier, CENTO was basically a regional defence organization with inter-governmental institutions. But within the framework of CENTO, the three regional countries also participated in various non-military projects. Perhaps the most important contribution of CENTO was stimulating the habit of working together and coordination among the countries' decision-makers. Indeed CENTO provided a useful regional instrument to achieve the goals of modernization. Within its framework, the three countries undertook a number of economic projects to promote the welfare and prosperity of the region. They recognized and acknowledged the utilitarian value of CENTO as a device for economic development.

The question as to what extent Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan shared common social, political, and economic values and goals during the lifetime of CENTO and RCD deserve some discussion and analysis. These three countries are not modern societies, but the fact remains that they are not traditional ones either. A traditional society enters into the transitional stage when the validity of traditional values and goals and the utility of traditional institutions are challenged by certain segments of society and when conscious efforts are made to embrace modern values and goals and to establish

modern institutions. Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan are in the transitional stage because in each country the validity of traditional values has been challenged and progressive efforts have been attempted. There was a general realization among the political elites of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan that the traditional lifeways no longer satisfied the new needs and new demands. They shared, to a certain extent, common social, political, and economic values and goals. Their traditional past was predominantly under the influence of a common faith. Their social and cultural life had a common base, the Ottoman-Persian culture. Consequently, their partial rupture from the past and their progress almost followed a similar pattern.  

In conclusion, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan's membership in a pluralistic security-community created a climate within which the leaders of these countries realized that if their main values were not identical, they were at least, compatible. It was this understanding which motivated them to contribute their joint efforts towards solving some of their political and economic problems.

1964. In their joint statement, the signatories declared that regional cooperation is an essential factor in accelerating the pace of national development. They also expressed their conviction that the already existed strong ties should be strengthened and furthered in the context and spirit of regional cooperation.

In their joint statement, they recognized and stressed three important facts. First, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan constitute a region and the peoples of these three countries were bound to each other by cultural and historical ties. Second, rapid economic development is not possible without regional cooperation. Third, the benefit of the common peoples of the region should be one of the main objectives of this new collaboration. A 10-point programme was agreed in principle and it was hoped that this would gradually lead to regional integration. 50

The institutional structure of RCD was a simple one. The Ministerial Council, the supreme policy-making body, was composed of the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. When the Council, meeting bi-annually, deemed necessary, it invited other ministers to attend its gatherings. The Chairman of the Council was the head of state or government of the host country. The next important institution was the Regional Planning Council composed of the Heads of the three planning organizations of the respective countries. This council studied the development plans and production potential of the countries of the region. It made proposals regarding the harmonization of the national development plans in the wider interest of accelerated regional collaboration. The recommendations of the Planning Council to the Ministerial Council were based on the information provided by the numerous RCD committees. There were seven permanent committees each of which consisted of representatives of the member countries and thus provided the basic channels of contact between the member

50. For the text, see Appendix 13.
governments in a particular sphere of cooperation. The RCD committees, re-organized in April, 1967, at Islamabad, were: 1) Committee on Industry (Industry and Joint Purpose Enterprises); 2) Committee on Petroleum and Petro-Chemicals; 3) Committee on Trade (promotion of trade, RCD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, tourism, banking, insurance, and RCD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, tourism, banking, insurance, and RCD Insurance Centre); 4) Committee on Transport and Communication (air transportation, RCD shipping services, roads, railways, post and telecommunications); 5) Committee on Technical Cooperation and Public Administration (Technical Assistance Programme, public administration, health, family-planning, agriculture, water resources development); 6) Committee on Social Affairs (cultural cooperation, RCD Cultural Institute, information, media, women's cooperation); and 7) Coordination Committee (coordination of RCD activities, organizational matters, its budget and administration).

The RCD Secretariat was established in 1965. Its responsibilities were to centralize the activities of different institutions of the organization, and to establish a network of communication among all the related agencies of the participating countries. The Secretary General was assisted by six principal assistants, two nominated by each member country, and also an information officer. The entire supporting staff of the Secretariat was recruited from the member countries. Representatives of the Secretariat attended the meetings and also took part in various other important meetings of other international organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank. The RCD institutions were basically inter-governmental ones. Within its framework, the decision-making machinery of the three countries were coordinated for some purposes, but not merged in any significant way.

The RCD faced a great barrier in the course of its development. This was the lack of economic complementarity which
brought about many direct and indirect problems. In order to understand this, it is important to study the economies of these three countries. Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan have mixed economies. Public and private sectors play equally important roles in the economic development. However, economic planning is done by one of the agencies of the government and the execution of the plan is entirely the responsibility of the government. State participation in planning and economic development was, during the lifetime of RCD, based on the principles of free market economy with some government control.

Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan were faced with almost similar economic problems and, in general, were trying to deal with them in essentially similar ways. There were similarities of agricultural production throughout the region, the pattern of foreign trade, and the industrial structure.

In the agricultural sector, there was little possibility that the major exports of the RCD countries could help to increase the intra-regional trade for all the major cash crops were produced by all the countries concerned. The problem was stressed since Pakistan and Turkey were in need of hard currency in order to finance the purchase of foreign investment goods. This element then set the direction of their exports toward the industrialized countries. Development of industrial projects was also another area of similar concern.

The RCD started to achieve some degree of success when the above question of complementarity was tackled with the adoption of joint planning. The accomplishments of RCD and its activities could be then divided into three broad categories. First, a deliberate effort was being made to create a planned industrial complementarity within the region. In this connection the establishment of "joint purpose enterprises" was a significant step. Second, the RCD countries tried to establish necessary infrastructure for the growth of trade within the region. The establishment of the RCD Chamber of
Commerce, agreement of RCD Payments Union, and the improvement of communication systems in the region where some of the steps which might have influenced the growth of intra-regional trade. Third, steps were taken to further improve their cultural relations. The activities of RCD Cultural Centre, academic cooperation, and the encouragement of tourism within the region were some of the important measures.

In November, 1967, the three countries signed an agreement for the promotion and operation of joint purpose enterprises under the protection of RCD. It was a significant step toward widening and strengthening economic collaboration within the region through the instruments of regional planning. The three participants agreed to establish certain projects on a mutually beneficial basis and provided a framework within which the practical problems of investment, remittances, training facilities, supply of machinery, and flow of raw materials could be settled. The rationale was that if the process of industrialization were to move beyond light industries to large and sophisticated ones capable of producing intermediate and capital goods, then the size of markets for these goods would have to be greatly expanded, which would, in turn, impel the process of modernization. Moreover, within the framework of RCD, the joint purpose enterprises were expected to draw on the resources and skill of all the participating countries, even though they might have been located in one country only. The procedure to initiate a project, however, was considered to be fairly long, and therefore results could not be seen in a short period of time.\(^\text{51}\)

The main objective of the joint purposes, as it was pointed out earlier, was to achieve a planned economic complementarity at the regional level. The more the regional economy became reciprocating the greater would have been the flow of goods among the members. Within the protection of RCD, therefore, steps were taken and some institutional...
infrastructures were created which could have been conducive to the growth of the volume of trade in the region.

The formation of the RCD Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1965, may be regarded as one of the important steps taken towards promoting the trade in that region during that period. The Chamber created communication channels and explored avenues of cooperation among the business and industrial communities of the RCD countries. With its assistance, the Trade Committee identified groups of commodities, products, and the like which made increased trade possible. In order to facilitate this, the Chamber proposed the establishment of the RCD Payments Union. The agreement on the RCD Union for Multilateral Payments was signed at Ankara in April 1967. This agreement aimed to facilitate the movement of trade by making additional foreign exchange available in the form of credits for financing imports from the RCD countries. The Union would have eliminated the need for financial dealings through intermediate countries located outside the region and would have served as an instrument to enable the monetary authorities in the region to maintain periodical contact with each other. The Chamber also proposed the establishment of a joint commercial bank and an agreement to avoid double taxation.

Another step taken to further the trade in the region was to create preferential arrangements. A Tripartite Trade Agreement was signed in September 1968 by the Commerce and Economy Ministers. On its basis, the three countries would have lifted their tariff barriers gradually and accorded to each other benefits of most-favoured nation treatment with respect to customs and other duties imposed on import and export of goods as well as all other matters including rules and regulations related to import and export. The agreement also laid down that all necessary measures to promote trade will be taken by the signatories and that they provide all facilities for this purpose. It also decided that in the coming years the imports of certain commodities would be "tied"
by the member countries to each other.

The RCD Committee on Banking and Insurance, at its meeting in Tehran in September, 1964, agreed upon several measures of collaboration in the field of insurance. The main objectives of this venture were to reduce the foreign exchange outgo on insurance and re-insurance services of the region as a whole as well as of the individual countries of the region; and to improve the standard of insurance services in the three countries. These were accepted by the RCD Planning Council and were implemented. Three regional re-insurance pools; Accident, Marine, and Fire, were established and started to accept business in 1967. The pools offered favourable terms to national companies in order to induce them to place their surplus business with them in preference to foreign companies. A year later, two new pools of Aviation and Engineering were also introduced.

Another important factor which influenced the growth of trade among the RCD countries was the development of effective transportation and communication systems within the region. Since the establishment of RCD, great attention was paid to the improvement of these systems. The related problems were studied by the two Committees of Road and Railways and that of the Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications. These committees made a detailed survey of the existing means of communications and gave numerous suggestions for their improvement. Two projects which were given consideration under the protection of CENTO were sponsored by RCD after its creation. These were the RCD Highway and railroad links and as a result of coordinated work done on them, the three countries were linked up with improved and standardized road and railway systems.

Other projects in the field of communications were the reduction of postal, telegraph, and telephone rates in the region. Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, therefore, constituted a single postal territory from 1964. The agreement for
establishing RCD Shipping Services came into operation in May, 1966, and for the first time a direct sea link was established between Turkey and Pakistan. The capitals and cities of the three countries were also linked by air with the introduction of the Tehran-Istanbul route in the same year.

In areas of cultural and technical cooperation, the three countries, drawing on their common links, took various steps to further their ties. The RCD Regional Institute was set up at Tehran in June, 1966, with branches in Istanbul and Lahore. The institute prepared a programme of publications and in its organ, The Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute, covered a wide range of subjects in the fields of culture, history, and literature. Within the framework of RCD, the three countries agreed on the Annual Exchange Programme and establishing Turkish, Persian, and Pakistani Chairs in counterpart universities. One important step taken by the Ministerial Council was the approval of the setting up of the RCD College of Economics and Political Science in Islamabad, Pakistan, which was commissioned in 1971. In the field of technical cooperation, an agreement was signed in 1965 in order to share technical knowledge and experience. The fields of activity constituted education, vocational training, banking, insurance, industries, mines, agriculture, health, rural affairs, and public administration.
4.4 Redundancy

Central Treaty Organization came into existence as a result of the Eisenhower Administration's objectives to try to contain the outward pressure of the Sino-Soviet bloc in Asia by means of a chain of regional defence alliances, formed by local anti-Communist governments in association with the West and backed by the mobile deterrent-retaliatory power of the United States.

An examination of the paradoxes surrounding the CENTO, and the association of the United States with it, may lead to several conclusions concerning the treaty, the organization itself, and defensive alliances in general. The political and legal aspects of the Pact had little impact upon the members of the alliance. An alliance, as defined earlier, is an instrument which at least establishes a degree of predictability in the behaviour of one state towards another. The CENTO treaty, however, did not define the circumstances which could necessitate cooperation within the alliance, nor did it define the pattern cooperation would take place if it were initiated. When cooperation did develop within the CENTO, it did so either as a result of the assistance provided by the United States or initiatives in the context of RCD.

The cooperation of the United States with the alliance was motivated by the desire to create a deterrence against the expansion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East. The establishment of the deterrence depended upon the development of an efficient retaliatory system within the United States rather than an effective defensive force stationed on the soil of the regional members; an analysis of the Pact leads to the conclusion that the regional members intended primarily to rely upon the resources of the United States to deter any Soviet venture which might threaten their security. The treaty did not commit a member to utilize military force outside its own territory, nor did it commit a member to any action other than to vague cooperation in the event of one of them was threatened
by the Soviet Union. The major contribution of the Pact to the security of the regional members against a major Soviet threat was achieved by the association of the regional members with the deterrence mechanism of the United States.

The principal purpose of the United States association with the Middle East alliance was to establish the certainty of a response to Soviet efforts to penetrate the Middle East. The regional members, because they had other security interests, did not perceive the alliance exclusively in the same light. For the regional members, the alliance was intended to guarantee the availability of greater power which each member could use in confronting its regional or domestic interests. The fact that neither the purposes of the United States nor those of the regional members were fulfilled, illustrated several aspects about the nature and function of alliances in the nuclear area.

The historical context of the Pact's creation made it quite clear that the United States intended the alliance to be an instrument for containing the Soviet Union. Repeated references to international communism in the instruments associating the United States with the alliance reinforced this premise. Since the United States, as the dominant power in the alliance, was able to determine alliance policy, the activity within the alliance had an anti-Soviet orientation.

The regional members each sought additional strength through the alliance to confront their dominant interests. The contributions the United States could make in these directions, however, were dependent upon either the direct participation of the United States in the conflict between the regional member and its opponent or the delivery of military aid to the ally. The fact that the United States refused to join the alliance at the time it was created and later refused to support the creation of a troop command in the Middle East caused decision-makers in the member nations to doubt that the desired material assistance would be delivered when requested. The restraint put upon Pakistan and
Turkey in regional conflicts verified the fact that the regional members could not depend upon assistance from the United States and Britain in a non-Soviet conflict.

From the beginning of the Baghdad arrangements, the United States relied upon nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a war with the Soviet Union. In a war between nuclear powers, an alliance with non-nuclear powers would not significantly affect the force available to either of the antagonists. Under these circumstances, therefore, the function of an alliance may be to delineate the locality of conflicts and to serve as an instrument in limited war situations. However, even in a limited theatre, the fact that the potential participants are armed with nuclear weapons may affect the strategy employed by the alliance partners. Because of the possibility that a small conflict may escalate into a nuclear war, there may be a tendency for nuclear nations that are members of an alliance to act as a restraint on the principal adversaries rather than to contribute the force necessary for a rapid victory. Therefore, in conventional war in a nuclear age, the role of alliance in the redistribution of power may be reversed from that which has been traditionally recognized. This hypothesis, which, for a non-nuclear power, questions the utility of a defensive alliance between a nuclear and a non-nuclear power, is supported by the record of Pakistan's and Turkey's association with the United States.

The possession of nuclear weapons may restrict the utility of a defensive alliance for the nuclear power as well, because there is often an inducement for the non-nuclear state to terminate its identification as a trip wire state. The possession of nuclear weapons by a state within an alliance has aggravated an aspect of modern international politics as discussed by George Liska. He pointed out that the attitudes of politically mobilized people in periods of high nationalistic feelings have reversed the function of alliance as previously perceived.52 Whereas the alliances were once

viewed as contributory to a lesser power's prestige, the reverse is true today. Alliances are viewed by sensitive nationalists as evidence that the independence of a state has been compromised. An alliance with a major power has caused them to suspect that their state not only is unable to promote its own interest unaided, but that it is also unable to define its own independent policy. The criticism of Iran's and Iraq's participation in CENTO centred on this theme. In the era of nuclear weapons, there is a greater basis for this suspicion than before. The minor power is placed in the position of promoting the interests of the major power and being restrained in fulfilling its own interests. The politics of an alliance, therefore, constitute a liability for the lesser power and may induce it to de-align, depriving the nuclear power of its trip wire mechanism necessary for nuclear deterrence. Pakistan's termination of military association with the alliance illustrated this point.

The security aspect of CENTO, taken as a whole, did not adequately explain the behaviour of Iran towards the alliance or the United States. The coordination which developed through CENTO, in spite of the ambiguity of the treaty, did so because of the military, economic, and technical assistance which the United States channelled to the regional members. The degree to which this assistance satisfied them depended upon the interests of each state. The sources of Iranian insecurity remained consistent throughout the years covered by the study, however, even Iran began to move towards de-alignment in the 1960's and took advantage of the favourable climate generated by the détente in the 1970's.

The difficulty in explaining Iran's position in CENTO stems from the tendency to separate the international plane of a state's behaviour from the domestic plane. In fact, the two are inseparable. When making an evaluation of the utility of an alliance, attention ought to be paid to the interests of the state as indicated by those in a position to make decisions on the state's behalf. Attention, however,
should be given both to those upon whom the decision-makers are dependent for their continued presence in office, and to those who are challenging the position of the decision-makers. In each category, a significant factor which should be considered is whether or not each group's interest, its position or coveted position, can be best attained and maintained by promoting the status quo or by promoting change. Through international commitments, the Iranian government intended to strengthen its political base and to facilitate the government's efforts to maintain political stability and bring about social change. After the United States terminated military aid in 1962, the alliance no longer served this purpose, and Iran began to pursue a more independent line. 53

While CENTO can be criticized for its failure to obstruct the flow of Soviet influence into the Middle East, it must also be given credit for its achievements. The most significant of them were the projects of the Economic Committee. The greatest visible benefit of the alliance, therefore, was in non-military areas; even though the economic projects had some bearing on the defence of the region. The success of defensive measures taken within the area could have been dependent upon the speed with which military men and material could be delivered to threatened areas. Defence of the region, therefore, was facilitated by the improved communication-transportation system. The main economic projects of CENTO, however, had a more important role to play in the type of war most likely to be fought in the nuclear age. Defence against subversive movements or guerrilla war required the development of a national consensus identified with the government and depended upon the ability of the state to supply the population with essential goods and services. Both aspects of this type of defence were facilitated by the improved and expanded communication and transportation facilities.

Had CENTO, from the time it was established, emphasized the economic instead of the military aspects, the alliance

53. See Chapter 5.
might still have served its security functions without becoming a liability to the regional members. The presence of the United States in the region could also have been established by its identification with the economic aspects of the alliance. The fact that statesmen from the United States, Great Britain, and the regional countries did emphasize the military aspect reflects a phenomenon which is not peculiar to the Middle East alone. At the time the alliance was created, considerable suspicion existed among the groupings within the regional countries. The decision-makers of the different states were able to overcome this suspicion in order to initiate cooperation for military purposes; however, they were insufficiently motivated to transcend it in order to initiate it for purely economic purposes. This decrease in suspicion was an achievement of an alliance which received little attention.

Although CENTO was established in order to strengthen the security of the region, the three regional members participated in numerous development projects within its framework. CENTO's economic activities spilled over and the institutional manifestation of this process was the establishment of RCD. The creation of RCD would have been very different without the infrastructure already established by CENTO. Awareness by the decision-makers of these three nations that they shared many common problems, especially in the economic and social fields was the result of their participation in CENTO.
CHAPTER FIVE: Iran: Government and Foreign Policy

The changing structure of international politics after World War Two, as was underlined in previous pages of this study, demonstrated the position of the Upper Middle Eastern countries and the significant influences that they were subjected to. Moreover, attention was drawn to the security policies that these countries pursued in the course of the events. Notably of Iran, it was argued that those security policies firmly and evitably led Iran to be placed in the Western camp against a background of power politics' objectives and interests while at the same time retaining a degree of her diplomatic manoeuvrabilities.

The primary objective of this chapter is to analyze the security policies that were evolved, developed, adopted, projected, or otherwise manifested by the Iranian government up to the end of 1970's. The study primarily examines the period 1968-1975 in which the Iranian government was striving to assume a predominant position in the Persian Gulf region. The study further focusses on the remainder of the Shah's administration and investigates the universally acknowledged belief that Iran assumed that predominant position.

It could be said of Iran that her post-war foreign policy demonstrates the strains and stresses that are typically encountered by a developing nation in contemporary world affairs. But it is arguably more so. It is indeed remarkable for a country that by general consensus was regarded in the last decade as a major regional power to be reckoned with to achieve such a progress in a matter of thirty years or so. The strategic significance of Iran has been acknowledged by all observers from every quarter. They include every president of the United States since the Second World War. In the words of President Roosevelt, Iran was characterized as the "Bridge to Victory" in the Allied war efforts against the Axis forces. In the words of President Carter, Iran symbolized an "island
of peace and stability" in the region of Middle East. But the continuity of the idea of Iran's strategic significance contrasts sharply with changes that took place in the Iranian society within the period under question, particularly the last two decades. The country could be confidently described at the close of the war as occupied by foreign powers, backward in an economic sense, socially explosive, and politically chaotic. Towards the end of 1970's, the same country was transformed into a nation enjoying one of the world's fastest rates of sustained economic growth, the pre-dominant power in the Persian Gulf, envisaging a security perimeter for itself that would go beyond the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and playing an active role in world affairs, ranging from serving on the Vietnam Truce Commission to administering a newly established foreign aid programme of its own.

The study of the place of Iran in international security considerations could well be defined as an example of a kind of case study of foreign policy in modernizing countries. Until recently, developing states have tended to be treated as clients or proxies of the superpowers or one of the other of the developed states. This perspective has increasingly less relevance to the significant and enlarging security functions these states now discharge. They are often as capable of manipulating other states as they are susceptible to being influenced from abroad. Other developing and developed states are targets of their security policies. The behaviour of militarily more powerful states is subject to more influence and control by these weaker powers than is appreciated. It is misleading to view them exclusively as objects of big-power security and arms-control policies. Some of these states have impressive military establishments relative to their size and resources. Others are building up large and sophisticated forces. None perceive themselves either as totally dependent on other powers or as so constrained that they are without a margin of maneuverability in projecting force abroad. In some measure, all attempts to pursue independent foreign and security policies that respond to their perceived needs.
Notwithstanding the above broader concerns, the subject matter cannot be analyzed in isolation. Through the use of or threat of force, the governments in control of these states can determine favourable outcomes in their conflicts with other states. They exercise a monopoly over the military apparatus internally and command loyalties. In short, designating these modernizing countries as emerging powers contrasts their military growth with their often more limited economic, social, and political development.

It is for these compelling reasons that considerations ought to be given to objectives, economic and military capabilities, strategies, instruments, techniques, tactics, style, and machinery as well as decisions, actions, and consequences of foreign policy. As such, therefore, the present chapter of

1. The developing states that could be described as such possess impressive military establishments measured by spending relative to per capita expenditures or GNP, number of personnel under arms, complexity of their organization or sophistication of military equipment at their disposal. Arms-production, procurement, and transfer policies and the security and foreign policy alignment strategies that they have pursued in the recent past are also overriding factors. The strategies, organizational structures, and national and international processes used by these states to make, buy, or sell arms are elaborate, intricate, and generally multi-national. All are primary states in the regional security systems of which they are a part and many have enjoyed significant positions in conflicts regionally or otherwise. In Middle East, apart from Iran in the period under study, they include Egypt, Israel, Iraq, and Syria. In Asia, Pakistan, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In Africa, Nigeria and South Africa. And in Latin America, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba.

2. The discussion, analysis, and elaboration of some important concepts, inherent as they may be, is beyond the scope of this study. Such concepts include: "foreign policy," "regions," "regionalism," "political modernization," etc. However, for the purposes of this part of the study, foreign policy is defined as "... efforts of optimization of freedom of action in the international system for the attainment of external objectives." This is borrowed from R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations," (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), p. 14.
this study is divided into two sections. Under section one, Government, Social, Political and Military factors the study is organized to examine the nature and effectiveness of Iran's foreign policy, resources and institutions, political leadership, elites, and parties, the examination of the role and responsibilities that Iran assumed for herself (especially with regard to the Persian Gulf affairs) under the banner of Independent National Policy and the thinking behind that, as well as the contemporary political system, economic conditions, resources, capabilities, and military questions.

Section two examines the new and assertive foreign and security policies pursued by Iran with particular reference to the Persian Gulf region and beyond. The implications of the British withdrawal from East of Suez is discussed. The factors behind Iran's increasing attention to the area are analyzed and the relations with the neighbouring states and beyond are looked at.
Government, Social, Political, and Military Factors.

For a state that strives to achieve regional hegemonical status, it must not only possess economic, technological, and military resources, but it needs an effective foreign policy, which rests on effective administrative resources and institutions. In turn all depend on the ability of the political leadership and the elite to direct these resources and generate economic strength and political cohesion and mobilization.

Political leadership and organization are the two main factors which influence willingness to mobilize resources for the conduct of foreign policy, which both are largely under the control of political elite, in case of Iran we will note that they were more so under the control of the Shah himself, especially in the making of foreign policy, in the period under question.

Leadership is a necessary component in mobilizing the resources needed to conduct foreign policy. At the same time there needs to be a trained bureaucracy, involvement in diplomatic negotiations, budgets for cultural and educational activities, military hardware and armies. Regardless of the nature of a political system, in case of mobilization there is a relationship between the political elite and the general public which the leaders in particular address themselves to. An effective political elite is able to induce its constituents to follow them and give them the support necessary for effective decisions.

A population in which the political elite is tuned to modernizing values is able and expected to execute the ideas and commands of the leadership in a competent, comprehensive,

and supportive fashion. In order for the elite to be able to mobilize the citizenry, the educated and the elite must have a vision of the future for the society which they can transmit to the leadership, or vice versa the leadership has a vision or a goal which can effectively transmit and share with the elite, who in turn can transmit it to the public. The public will support a leadership's policy to achieve its goal, to the extent that they imagine that their own future is linked with that of the country or the governing body.

Howard H. Lentner notes that in order to have a high level of the mobilization of resources on behalf of the national goal, political leadership has to be confident of itself and able to articulate ideals. Such inspiration is one of the functions of the leadership. Lentner further views, that another function of the leadership is the "... conceptualization of attainable goals." In any political system, goals must be set in such a way that they can be attained. Otherwise, the elite will lose the confidence of the population who will no longer give their support. Because a political elite cannot analyze and conceptualize all of the problems of a nation's external behaviour alone, it must rely on bureaucracies. Thus, it is the function of leadership to promote morale and confidence in the bureaucracies in order to receive from them the required operational support.

Resources are mobilized through organization. Whatever the aspirations and visions of the elite, it must rely on the organized institutions and the population of its society for the mobilization of resources. The basic organization for the mobilization of resources is the educational system of a country, in both broad and narrow senses Education provides training for the exercise and development of general intellectual skills which enables people to acquire capability of learning more specific skills. Thus these skills will be

utilized for the achievement of foreign policy goals. For example, if the population of Iran had had a higher level of general education, it was much more likely that the Iranians military personnel would have learned to operate ultra-sophisticated military equipment in a shorter time, and as a result would have been less costly for the country.

The expansion of political party organizations, leading to a wider political participation, and the ingress of state machinery, leading to a more involvement of the different strata of the population, will both have an impact on the mobilization of resources. Political organization also provides the link between foreign policy elites and economic organizations, particularly firms and industries. Thus the organization of society influences the mobilization of resources and its concern of political elite.

The foreign policies and external behaviour of a state can be accounted for also in terms of its traditions, self-image, and the beliefs, in addition to its leadership, elite groups, and system of government. One could cite history, culture, and ideology as significant components, in this context.

Like most modernizing societies, Iran has not been immune to the incompatibility of the images and ideals held by its elite and those of the rank and file of the people. As in the past centuries, Iran's more recent past social and political structure make the political culture and political thought of the population less relevant to explaining foreign policy, and external behaviour.

The monarchy throughout its long history, with its many dynasties and differing fortunes, has always been the principal single source and locus of political power, and leadership. Other traditional sources of influence include: landed aristocracy, the clergy (Zoroastrian and Islamic), important tribal leaders, and wealthy urban merchants. A significant shift in the power sources of the traditional groups, however, occurred in the Pahlavi period, especially, since the 1950's. For the purposes of this study, it is as well that we concentrate on this period.

A nation-state's political culture is the pattern of its members individual orientations toward politics. It is a pattern of cognitions, affections, and valuations. Cognitions are empirical beliefs about what the actual state of political life is. Valuations are judgements of what ought to be, judgements about the goals that ought to be pursued in political life, the moral quality of political objects and events. Affections are feelings, often represented verbally by expressive symbols of attachment, involvement, alienation, rejection, identification, amity, or enmity about political objects.

We are interested of course, principally in those aspects of the political culture of the Iranians that bear on foreign policy and its place in international affairs. The particular contents of political culture that are of interest in the study of foreign policy will characteristically include fundamental attitudes and orientations towards the specific political objects of international politics. These objects

include the individual and group incumbents of key national and foreign policy roles, and specific current policies, issues and problems that Iran was faced with in the region and internationally. The more the decision-making machinery is in fact concentrated, the more attention should be paid to the particular political cultures of elite individuals, roles, and institutions. Therefore, it is proper to point out that a political leader's values have more opportunity to influence and overshadow foreign policy when she participates in the decision-making process of a highly centralized system than in a system in which power is diffused. Several studies have been made which demonstrate that where a head of state appoints persons to the high decision-making posts, those persons will reflect the style and views consistent with his own and it will make little difference who actually makes the decision. This is especially characteristic of Iran, regardless of the political shades and opinions, the rightful monarchy or the pseudo-monarchy of Khomeini. Based on the foregoing, it will thus make little difference whether the study examines only the foreign policy events in which the head of state participates or all foreign policy events of the government in power.

7. David O. Wilkinson, Ibid., p. 91


Psychologists and political scientists, when they discuss the common boundary between the two disciplines, often speak of the attitude and beliefs of an individual leader's interpretations of the environment. As O.R. Holsti points out: "A decision-maker acts upon his 'image' of the situation rather than upon 'objective' reality." Therefore, the head of state's personal characteristics are reflected in his government's behaviour. In analyzing the foreign policy behaviour of any country, Wilfred L. Kohl conceives that "... it is essential first to identify the type of its political system and then to understand how political power is distributed within the country."

The external behaviour of the Iranian government under the leadership of the Shah as Leonard Binder and Marvin Zonis have noted, bears strong resemblance in both content and style to that of the past rulers. The reason for this is not hard to find. Iran has been ruled, with the exception of comparatively very short periods of time, under the monarchial system for over 25 centuries. In the past centuries, Iranian rulers have expanded the size of the empire by the right of conquest of neighbouring states and often far away countries,


12. For a discussion of the psychological characteristics of the Iranians in general, see Chapter 6, section 2.

only to lose the country to outsiders due to the shortcomings of the person of the monarch himself or to the failure in mobilization of the national resources. The past history of Iran had an extensive impact on the political attitude of the Shah's political leadership.\footnote{Lentner, op.cit.; Schwartz, "The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors," (Belmont: Dickenson, Inc., 1975), pp.71-79; Holsti, "National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 3, 1970, pp. 233-309.}

The monarchy has had a long history and tradition in Iran, and it may be subjected to a variety of interpretations. Binder has described it as:

"... a national cultural tradition, an Islamic institution, a legal institution defined in the constitution, or as the apex of a highly stratified social pyramid. For most of the population it has always been there. For the elite and favoured classes it is a constant source of reward. For the dissatisfied moderns, however, it is an anachronism acquired by usurpation and maintained by violence, corruption, and foreign intervention."

As might be expected from the history of monarchies elsewhere, the earliest conception of Kingship was not one rooted in absolutism. The ruler was bound at once by obligation to the religious authorities, to the aristocratic families who chose him or acknowledged his leadership, and to the state. Binder contends that

"... the Shah is identified with the state and it is apparent that the primary duty of bureaucracy, judiciary, and the army, is to the Shah..."\footnote{Binder, op.cit., p. 64.}

Political change, as it is understood in the West, was
generated as an aftermath of the constitutionalization of the monarchy in 1906 which permitted new ideological concepts for the politically aware at the time. This change Bayne suggests:

"... involved the constitutionalization of absolute monarchy, in another, the creation of an order no longer rigidly oligarchial which provides a means for expression of countervailing power of the polity as a whole." 17

Bayne suggested that while Reza Shah had only suppressed the traditional power structure, the Shah modified it and became a ruling monarch. 18 The process of modification (carried out mostly through amending the constitution and creating new institutions such as the all-embracing Resurgence Party) was intended to go still further. The system was to be modernized leading up to a parliamentary monarchy, under a ruling king holding ultimate powers.

Throughout history, the socio-political system in Iran has been marked by inequality and divisions. James A. Bill argues that:

"Channels for upward mobility were limited and were scattered sparsely throughout the social structure. They served to drain off pressures for fundamental transformation and thus helped maintain the system by permitting moderate alteration in it." 19

Bill contends that upon close examination of this moderate upward mobility one finds that:

"... not only were mobility channels very specific but also that mobility itself was controlled to an extraordinary degree


18. Ibid.

by the political elites. Entry into the ruling class, for example, was primarily a process of co-option and conquest. Successful take-over by force via internal and external elements changed elites and personalities, but the class structure remained basically unaltered.\(^{20}\)

Despite the present-day rupture in the monarchy, one could argue that the same pattern holds true in Iran today.

Traditionally as well as in modern times the King has been the heart of a web of informality. Persian history is filled with stories that stress the idea that individuals from all orders of society have the right to petition the monarch. In fact, the monarch is surrounded by confidents who serve as channels of access. These confidents include ministers, generals, courtiers, statesmen, senators, etc. They also include relatives, personal friends, old classmates and trusted advisers from all walks of life. These personalities filter and relay information and petitions to the Shah.\(^{21}\) Thus, the Shah as the epicentre of this web stood accused of the legitimization of the system of informality within the social and political system.

Despite its long history as a nation-state, the period of reasonable free and vigorous political parties in Iran has been short. After the abdication of Reza Shah, a brief period of party activity slowly started. This became more intensive and heavily active until August 1953 with the downfall of Dr. Mossadegh.\(^{22}\) The period witnessed patterns of the development of political parties which could be compared to the experience

20. Ibid., p. 21.


of developing states.

In most cases, however, the new political parties were personality-oriented cliques centred on a new leader or influential politician. They also began to show ideological characteristics or they claimed to be representative of certain educational/occupational interests or to be regional in nature. Mostly, these parties had no common denominator, and strived to have an organizational form.

One of the better organized emerging groups was the Communist Party (Tudeh). Founded in 1920 and proclaiming nationalist, democratic goals, in practice, however, it was identified as anti-monarchist (by forceful means if need be), anti-religious, and anti-enterprise. Communism, however, was banned in Iran in 1931, mostly on the above grounds. It revived after the abdication and gathered strength in 1941-1953. Its efforts to develop a base of support at large were never successful. After 1953 with the increasing consolidation of royal power, the party was fragmented and by early 1960's was virtually non-existent.23

During and after World War II some other parties such as the National Will Party emerged. This party, however, did not have full support of the Shah and the army and was strongly opposed by both the communists and the conservative aristocracy. During the period of 1949-1953 various parties emerged which later were formed into the National Front, proclaiming social democratic ideals. Of these various parties, the most important were the Iran Party, the Third Force Arya, Mardom Iran, and the Pan-Iranist. The fervent use of parliamentary activity by a deputy, Dr. Mossadegh, whose only preoccupation in political life was the nationalization of the oil industry, led

to his identification as the leader of National Front rather by default.

The oil controversy and the period 1951-1953 was to have a profound and long-lasting effect on the Iranian political system, the economy, and its relations with foreign governments. Mossadegh skillfully engineered the passage of the oil nationalization bill in March 1951. The bill was given the royal assent by the Shah, who did not have the right of veto. The next month Mossadegh became Prime Minister, and thus bore chief responsibility for implementing the legislation.

For Iran, the most important objective in this crisis was to establish title to her own resources, and in this aim she was eventually successful. Britain took Iran to the International Court of Justice on the seizure, but Iran refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction. The court decided that it did not, in fact, have jurisdiction, and in effect upheld Iran's position.

When Iran won this victory, Mossadegh was at his most popularity. All shades of political opinion that had any claims to the nationalist cause wanted to end the foreign influence as embodied in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Yet such was the recurring Iranian ambivalence that many who favoured the seizure of the AOC were apparently prepared to accept foreign influence as represented by the US, particularly if this country would come to Iran's aid, operate the oil industry, and purchase Iranian production.

The traditional Iranian tactic of third-power diplomacy, playing off foreign powers against each other, may have been another factor in this mix. Some believed that the US would come to Iran's aid in order to complete the expulsion of the British, while others assumed that the US would have to assist Iran to prevent the Iranians from requesting help from the Soviet Union in operating the oil installations. This later consideration was buttressed by the emphasis given in both the
United States and Britain to the importance of Iranian oil to the Western world.

As it was, the United States had to steer a tricky course between Iran and Britain. The U.S. was not unsympathetic with Iran's nationalist aspirations, but Britain was her most important ally and a partner in NATO. Besides, there was always the possibility that Iran's action would start off a chain of nationalization in other oil producing countries. For these reasons the US urged compromise on both parties. Negotiations did go forward and at one point a solution seemed possible, but in the end they failed. In the three years that followed until a settlement was finally reached, the Iranian oil industry was idle for all practical reasons. There were few buyers, and the shortfall in Iranian production was quickly made good by increased production elsewhere. The result was increased suffering for Iran and increased political opposition for Mossadegh.

As his support slipped away, Mossadegh's relations with the United States became increasingly strained. Dissappointed that the US had not sided with him, he appealed to the incoming President, Eisenhower, for support. By this time, it was widely acknowledged by the National Frontists and the communists that if such support were not forthcoming, Iran might go communist.

In playing the communist card, Mossadegh not only overreached himself, he was actually going against his nationalist principles. Moreover, this tactic simply served to ensure U.S. opposition by persuading those in authority that the situation was getting out of control and that if Mossadegh remained in power Iran might indeed fall under Soviet domination. The Soviets themselves were having a field day to no or little cost.

As his power declined, Mossadegh became more dictatorial, thus further shrinking his support. In August, 1953, he
ordered a plebiscite to dissolve the parliament. The Shah then appointed a new prime minister, an army general, but Mossadegh refuse to recognize him. The serious political strife and the shattered economy and shortcomings led to massive demonstrations by the same masses that not long ago were supposed to be his base. An army coup ensued and resulted in both ousting Mossadegh and restoring order.

The United States has often been accused of complicity in the turn of events. But the fact remains that Mossadegh totally failed in his task. This was shown to be the case later on when the Shah shrewdly disintegrated the hold of the oil companies on the Iranian oil and asserted unprecedented rights. The point that whether or not the U.S. did encourage the Iranian military to stage the coup is immaterial.\(^{24}\)

Whatever the facts, however, there is no doubt that from this time until his downfall, U.S. policy in Iran was inextricably linked with the government and policies of the Shah.

As for the party politics, the fall of Mossadegh and the return of the Shah signalled a lull in activity. Even parties friendly to the court were not allowed to operate for four years.

In 1957, at instigation of the Shah, two parties were created from above, the intention being to permit renewed public political activity while retaining control. These were the Mellian Party which was under the leadership of Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, the Prime Minister and later on the head of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC); and the Mardom which was headed by Assadudlah Alam, confident and advisor to the Shah whose untimely death in 1977 was greatly missed by the

\(^{24}\) A generally misleading account of this episode is provided in K. Roosevelt, "Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran," (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
Shah in the coming troubles ahead.

However, to understand the why and the how of the organization, ideological statements, techniques, and political style of these two parties, it is important to note that they:

"... were striving to present images of what had become the generally accepted notion of a political party. At the same time, the new party system was supposed to intrude new Anglo-American political style upon the previous continental practice."

A predominant feature here was the fact that most of the top echeleons had had their higher education in the United States and were greatly influenced by its freedom and the machinery of government.

By 1960, when the new cabinet was formed by Dr. Ali Amini, pro-American but independent-minded and advocate of stringent fiscal policies, some measure of relaxation was temporarily introduced. The events, however, took precedent and by the time the Shah introduced his reform programmes, the White Revolution, the country was deep in financial trouble and the economy was in chaos. The pattern of a lull in political party activities came back full circle with the opposition to the reforms. Yet again a new party duo came into being in 1963-1964 and all this came to an end in March 1975 with the inauguration of the one-party system, the Resurgence (Rastakhis) Party.

With respect to social patterns and mobilization it ought to be said that Iran has been a developing country and a modernizing nation. As such the complexity of the social organization is mostly apparent in cities and large towns. This being so, it should not be assumed that the overwhelming majority of the urban population belong to the arbitrary educated middle class. As Leonard Binder points out, the Iranian middle class is not politically or socially homogenous.

There is a modern middle class, and a traditional middle class, there is a commercial middle class, an intellectual middle class, a national middle class, and a middle class of minorities and foreigners; there is an urban middle and a rural middle class.\textsuperscript{26}

In addition to middle class elements, cities contain class of aristocrats and a majority of unassimilated workers, the ordinary population. It is difficult to discover the political loyalties of these people by their class affiliations, because many identify their interest with either family or their occupation rather than their class.

Loyalty is the possitive effect of citizens for political establishments and governments which leads to a willingness to support the establishment and to obey the government. Herbert C. Kelman argues that:

"... nationalistic loyalty is derived from two sources: instrumental and sentimental sources. That is, people give their loyalty to the nation because it embodies for them the values with which they identify or because it is a means of achieving their values."\textsuperscript{27}

Howard H. Lentner, expresses the point more crudely, "... people are loyal if the nation conforms to what they cherish or if it gives them what they want." On both grounds, there is an important distinction between what Lentner calls, "premobilized and mobilized" political system. Lentner further notes that "... conflict in loyalties are particularly prevalent in a premobilized system, while in a mobilised political system loyalty to the nation is the normal state of affairs."\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{27} Herbert C. Kelman, "Pattern of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in James N. Resenau, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 276-288.

\textsuperscript{28} Howard H. Lentner, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 201.
In premobilized systems, not only are there fewer roles to provide the instrumental source of loyalty, but also the expectations of those citizens who do participate in the political system tend to outrun the capacity of the system to fulfill them. Moreover, there is a lack of an institutionalized means of succession and policy making, with the tradition of loyal opposition which can criticize the government of the day in the context of loyalty. The leadership of premobilized systems cannot normally rely on the loyalty of their masses to concede legitimacy to them. In addition, they cannot normally rely on the basic loyalty of their masses as a foundation for the mobilization of resources to achieve political systems goals.\(^{29}\)

In the case of Iran, Binder contents:

"... the tribesmen are sullenly disloyal to the regime, that the peasants are indifferent, and that the intellectual middle class is actively hostile. Of the casual labourers, bazaar people, artisans, police, the army officers, religious leaders holding official positions, important bureaucrats, government technicians, and the leader of the minority communities are said to be loyal."\(^{30}\)

The military was the most important of all, but as far as the support outside the military was concerned, Marvin Zonis noted that:

"It is generally agreed that the Shah has not located the majoritarian base he has so ardently sought. The general support of the masses exists, but such support is an intangible base for royal strength. The Shah maintains and continues to operate the Iranian political system only by incurring substantial political costs - costs that are largely determined by the relationship of the Shahanshah to his political elite."\(^{31}\)

29. Ibid., p. 42.


31. Marvin Zonis, op.cit., p. 5.
Despite these stereotypical views of the political orientation of the various segments of the Iranian political system, the Shah always desired to bring about changes, and if necessary, by decrees. His chief tool was, of course, the modernization and industrialization of the country with the inherent hope that the political system would improve parallel along democratic lines. The remarkable thing about the Iranians, indeed, is what a homogenous lot they are - despite the numerous different groups with their own languages and cultural background - holding together time and again as a culture and nation in the face of constant buffeting from outside. Under attack, the country has had a knack of breaking into its separate pieces in the past only to coalesce in the end as Persia once more.

The above theme was brought to the fore in the last two decades as a means of mobilizing the population. The Persian Empires' past glories were stressed upon and nationalism was projected as a necessary virtue. In 1971, a project was executed on the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of the Iranian monarchy 2500 years ago. The profound successes of industrialization, modernization, and education was emphasized with the strong leadership and stability. Those days led to promises of a new renaissance ahead. Under the doctrine of "Great Civilization", the Iranians would enjoy, under the Pahlavi dynasty, unprecedented prosperity and advancement in all fronts. Thus, Iran would be the fifth biggest power in the world.

The White Revolution, designed to bring about social and political change in that context, encountered obstacles as well. Binder contends that:

"... Since it emphasizes land reform, electoral reform, economic development, and literacy, it symbolized the Shah's commitment to parliamentarism, to democratic process, and to more effective political participation by the mass."
Considering its consequences, Binder further notes:

"But the Shah's commitment has been expressed through controlled elections, certified party organization, and parliamentary discipline. None of the aspects of a liberal regime has been allowed to interfere with centralized control and bureaucratic domination of Iranian life. Thus the Shah continues to invoke the legitimacy of the constitution of Iran while sustaining an autocratic, paternalistic, and technocratic regime." 32

The Iranian political elite is one of those groups who has been loyal to the system but perhaps, for some, commitment or a sense of national purpose has not always been at the top of their priority list. Before the attitude of the political elite towards the Iranian political process is pointed out, it is appropriate to note that the Iranian political processes under the Shah constituted a system in which the Shah and the political elite were the principal actors. The decisions of the King, the dominant political actor, directly affected the political elite. Zonis views that, "... although unanticipated and frequently undesired by the Shah, the behaviour of the political elite operates as an important influence on him." He further contends that there is a feed-back system at work in which the Shah and the elite, "... interact and together elaborate Iranian politics." 33

In characterizing the attitudes and behaviour of the Iranian political elite, Zonis points to the following:

"Cynicism is a typical response of the Iranian elite to the political process- mistrust, typical of interpersonal relations; exploitation or manipulations of others is another orientation of the elite, as are finally its feelings of insecurity." 34

Joseph M. Upton, states that "this lively and persistent feeling of both national and individual insecurity is perhaps the

32. Leonard Binder, "Factor ...", op.cit., p. 22.
34. Ibid., pp. 13-14; and also for further readings, pp. 251-290.
dominant characteristic of modern Persian history.\textsuperscript{35} Zonis in his study of the Iranian political elite reveals that:

"the younger elites manifest higher levels of cynicism than the older counterparts, and the more active elite - the more occupations they have and the more organizations they have joined - the higher levels of insecurity; finally, the more powerful manifested the highest level of cynicism. In short, the younger elite, are more cynical; the active are more insecure; and the powerful, the least committed."\textsuperscript{36}

Historically, the principal criterion for membership in the Iranian political elite was wealth, "wealth to buy offices and political power."\textsuperscript{37} Under the Shah, wealth remained an important, but no longer, in a direct sense, the most important criterion for membership in the elite. Wealth as a power base was supplemented and increasingly supplanted by education. This expansion in the power of the political centre meant that, "... the centre now has more control than ever before over these bases for elite membership."\textsuperscript{38}

Many different professions were represented among members of the political elite - physicians, engineers, social scientists, and military. Whatever their particular areas of vocational competence, however, one general characteristic is important: they constitute an official, governmental elite.\textsuperscript{39} The majority of the Iranian political elite, therefore, were occupationally dependent on the government in at least one of their positions. Many of the elite in the non-governmental occupations received incomes from the government on the basis of past employment in the form of a pension. Others of the


elite, while primarily occupied with private concerns, served the government as members of ministerial, "high councils," officers of government sponsored and operated professional associations; charities; or a variety of consultative or advisory roles. There is little ground for an analyst to assume that the situation has changed after the fall of the Shah, however.

The overlap between the political elite and government bureaucracies indicates the importance of government service for attaining political power in the Iranian society. Thus, government employment institutionalizes legitimacy of access to bureaucracy. Zonis then conceives that "governmental positions are constantly sought by the vast majority of educated Iranians." In the Iranian society where the role of the government is dominant and comprehensive, attainment of a position that assures participation in the bureaucratic communications net is, and has been, very important.

The elite has sought to hold positions within the bureaucracy as an inclusive, rather than exclusive body. This being so, the position of the elites vis-a-vis the office and responsibilities of holding power increasingly changed due to the outside pressures of the expansion of economy and modernization. The expansion of the bureaucracy meant that the system could satisfy demands of the elite for posts and power.

The role and place of the Shah in the Iranian political system was, of course, paramount. Though the monarchy is an institution, but the Shah is an individual, thus the personality of the incumbent of the throne has an important bearing on the place the monarchy holds in the Iranian political system and upon the manner in which the foreign policy decisions are made. E.A. Baye, considers that:

"Iranian foreign policy is largely personified in the King ... there have been several Iranians in the past whose experience, wisdom, and negotiating ability have been well utilized by the

40. Ibid., p. 188.
Shah and to whom he has given credit. Now, however, the personal nature of Iranian foreign relations is its chief characteristic, and what the monarch believes is of primary significance.\footnote{41}

However, the Iranian Foreign Office was not a non-entity in the management of foreign relations, although it must be regarded as an extension of the Shah's personal direction of policy. Bayne further adds:

\begin{quote}
While the Foreign Office is concerned chiefly with its normal routine of representation and reportage, it also carries forward policies emanating from the power structure of which it is a part and at the apex of which the King sits, maintaining an equilibrium of the pressures that provide the dynamics of the structure. In this sense, the Shah is his own Foreign Minister, his policies deriving from a personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power.\footnote{42}
\end{quote}

In this respect, therefore, the Shah made virtually every major foreign policy decision and most of the minor ones. In so far as the appointments in key positions were concerned, "... no one occupies a public position except at the tolerance of His Majesty, and all are dependent directly or indirectly on the monarch for continuance."\footnote{43} A formal policy-making process, as it is understood in the West, does not exist, nor are any interest groups, lobbies, associated groups, or elements of the mass media allowed to influence the content or conduct of foreign policy. The formal governmental structure has no relevance at all to the content of Iran's foreign policy.\footnote{44}

Zonis in his study of the contemporary political elite of Iran under the Shah, observed that he employed the divide and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[41] E.A. Bayne, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 197-199.
\item[42] Ibid.
\item[44] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
rule tactic. Zonis further notes that among the techniques which the Shah used to support that tactic was:

"... the effort to force communications within the bureaucracy in vertical rather than horizontal lines. Both intra-agency and inter-agency communications are meant to be basically hierarchical - between levels rather than horizontal - between divisions. Even the most petty information, intelligence, and problems are communicated upwards for decision-making while orders are communicated downward for execution."45

The system of informality, as noted before, at levels of society and government agencies existed in a "setting of ubiquitous insecurity ... At all levels of the system there is chronic doubt and apprehension as individuals interact in a climate of uncertainty."46

Such a system, no doubt, diminishes the efficiency of the bureaucracy. In their positions as foreign policy analysts, bureaucrats were composed of persons recruited on the basis of their specialized skills to perform rule-application functions. Their positions did not rest on legitimizing the constituency, but rather on power derived from the regime as a whole and on their qualifications. In so far as a willingness on the part of office holders to assume bureaucratic responsibilities is indispensable to efficiency, the Iranian system could not be viewed as very efficient. Zonis views the system as:

"... highly conducive to the avoidance of assuming responsibility for any bureaucratic act. Conflicts are pushed over higher in the bureaucracy for resolution ... One result is a continued reinforcement of the tendencies of the elite to avoid challenging others and the system."47

The Foreign Ministry, of course, was of primary interest to the Shah. Though the increasing scope, complexity, and

45. Marvin Zonis, op.cit., p. 95.
diversity of Iran's foreign relations demanded and involved an increasing number of ministries, agencies, and individuals, some very able indeed, the tone and direction of policies were set by the Shah himself or trustees. The Ministry, generally speaking and on the whole, did enjoy a concentration of better educated and more experienced personnel.

The process of the decision-making model of Iran, as detailed above and consequently, fits into what Wilfrid L. Kohl called "the Royal-court model ... in which foreign policy is highly centralized in a monarchial mode..." Under this model, the constitutional monarch, with legal and political power to dissolve parliament and to remove premier and ministers or any other government official enjoys ultimate control.

The all-pervasive personal role of the Shah in foreign policy-making could be observed and compared to other modernizing nations. The pressures, strains, and mobilizing patterns are not dissimilar to those of Iran's. One could perhaps point to Nasser and Sadat in Egypt, Peron in Argentina and Castro in Cuba, Bhutto in Pakistan and Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi in India, Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana, and Bourguiba in Tunisia. Of "developed" societies, one could observe the role of General de Gaulle in French political life and foreign policies, a role generally admired in Iran all-round and emulated by the Shah.

The rise in Iran's international military and economic capabilities and greater freedom of action in the international system might or might not have been balanceable by attempts of other impulses of political modernization, but there is little doubt that the twin goals of autonomy abroad and authority at home were the most salient features of interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics in Iran in the last two decades.

During those years, however, Iran's foreign policy was growing with confidence by the direct involvement of the Shah.

48. W.K. Kohl, op.cit., p.3.
There was a noticeable increase in internal stability and a greater increase in the economic prosperity of the country. It is because of these better internal conditions that the Shah had the opportunity to turn his attention more closely and in a more personal way to both the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

In achieving its foreign policy objectives, Iran pursued four main courses in the last fifty years. First, "the third-power strategy" which used mainly by Reza Shah who favoured Germany as a counterweight to Britain or Russia. Second, the "negative equilibrium" policy which was mainly based on questions relating to oil and opposed the Soviet demand for oil concessions since 1944, developed mainly by Mossadegh, and called for the exploration and exploitation of Iranian Oil by Iranians. Third, after the fall of Dr. Mossadegh and the consolidation of the royal power, Iran pursued a policy of "positive nationalism" which meant endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine. A defence agreement was signed with the U.S., but on the other hand positive responses were signalled to the Soviets. Fourth, "independent national policy," which included economic reforms, cooperation with the Soviet Union, more independent policy toward the United States, and a more active policy in the Persian Gulf.

The Independent National Policy, through its evolution and by the Shah's articulation, had its roots in Iran's search for security in the world of power politics. The policy, characterized Iran's foreign policy ever since the early 1960's. Signifying major changes, the policy was at first generally associated with normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and less dependence on the United States. This association, however, is not supported by the turn of events and the facts. Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union meant in practice economic cooperation. Less dependence on the U.S. did not materialize either. As a matter of fact, if anything, the alignment with the U.S. intensified still further.
In his book on the White Revolution, the Shah contended that his foreign policy had its groundwork in the "principles and ideas" that guided his reforms. Arguing that Iran's foreign policy was a product of the White Revolution, he maintained that the land reform and the abolition of the "worst type of feudalism" helped narrow oppressive differences between the poor and the rich and hence contributed to national unity. Therefore, Iran was able to adopt a new foreign policy that was truly "independent" and "national" in nature. 49

The Shah held an optimistic assumption about international politics in the early 1960's. The previous decade's threat (Russian aggression) had receded by this time, and thus he was able to stress social and economic progress as well as the security of Iran. He also emphasized international understanding, cooperation, and interdependence. Pursuit of peace, peaceful coexistence with all nations, and fight against injustice represented other themes of concern for Iran.

International cooperation would start rather close to home. Thus the normalization with the Soviet Union meant and was primarily economic in character. The 1962 pledge to the Soviets of no missile bases on the Iranian territory signalled the beginning of improved relations between the two countries. On the Soviets part, they had always attacked, condemned, and tried to portray the Shah and the government in Iran as unfit. In their propaganda they much emphasized the lack of basic social and economic reforms. So, by 1962 they had to change tack because of the White Revolution and no missile pledge. From then on, they would support the Shah and praise his policies. It is also interesting to note that for the first time in contemporary memory they adopted a conciliatory, almost too friendly attitude towards the Shah in particular and Iran in general. The religious leaders who

participated in the opposition to the reforms were criticized and took the blame for Iran's ills.

On the international front, however, other factors were at work which helped Iran in re-shaping its foreign policy. The detente movement had intensified and favourable changes in Soviet and American strategic policy had taken place. The policies and attitude of the radical Arab countries were of consideration as well.

... This concern with the radical Arabs, of course, was to be intensified with the announcement of the British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1968. From this date until his downfall, the Shah grew more pessimistic about how Iran would fare in international power politics. Thus the alliance with the United States for all practical purposes intensified. In 1965, the experience of Indo-Pakistan war and the failure of CENTO, as the Shah perceived it, brought home the question of one's defence and put the security question prominently on the map. Moreover, the underlying thought behind all this was compatible with the Nixon Doctrine, as the 1950's strategic thought had fitted the Truman Doctrine and the strategies of containment. The British announcement triggered off the issue of subversion in the general area of the Persian Gulf as well. The Iranian initiatives in this respect resulted in forming the main body of the independent national policy.

Iran's relations with the oil companies and the consortium took a dramatic turn in the period of 1971-73. As a result of continued and gradual cultivation of the consortium, the Shah was able to muster a significant development in 1971. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), led by Iran, achieved a spectacular success in reaching a new agreement, and thus increasing the levels of production and payments. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the ensuing boycott by the Arabs, and the Shah's intention not to renew the oil agreements, resulting in Iran taking full control of its oil resources manifested in quadrupled price of the oil.
The importance of oil and petroleum products to Iran has been an all-pervasive one. To that end, Iran has a national strategic interest in maintaining free passage through the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormiz, and on to the Indian Ocean. The requirements for defending a maritime frontier as opposed to a continental one are very different and the shift in the focus of Iran's diplomatic activities was matched by a determination to acquire maritime power. This was not simply a question of creating an Iranian navy, but of enhancing the capacities of the land and air forces to carry out their respective responsibilities.

The development of Iranian foreign policy and the increasing attention paid to the Persian Gulf region could not be dissociated from two vital ingredients: the economic and military factors. In the quest for greater security, a credible deterrent could only be provided if these two factors played decisive roles. Moreover, for a regional state which seeks to dominate the region, it is necessary to possess power.

The concept of power in international relations has been defined by Steven L. Spiegel as "... the present and political ability and willingness on the part of one government to actively affect internal decision-making processes in other countries." To Hans Morgenthau, power represented a goal, and thus, "whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." Other scholars have defined power as a mixture of capacities (e.g. population, resources, industry, armed forces) which a nation possesses and in part they are concerned with the manner in which these possessions are related to other states. Thus, to Bruce A. Russet, in terms of GNP, and to Inis Claude, in terms of capacity, power has a single source


as a property which can be measured. Karl Deutsch's notion of power as "the currency of politics," is a more complex measurable analysis of power and is viewed in terms of capacity. Raymond Aron stresses the factor of "capacity for collective action," which involves immeasurable elements and implies relational aspects of power.\(^5\)

Klaus Knorr defines power as the ability to affect behaviour. He contends that it can be interpreted in two alternative ways, each of which captures a different aspect of reality. One interpretation Knorr claims, equates power with actual influence. In this case power then exists only as influence is achieved, and is measurable only in terms of visible changes in behaviour patterns, which he calls "actualized power." And the second interpretation, is viewed as the ability to coerce in order to exercise influence, and Knorr calls this "putative power." In Knorr's analysis then, "putative power" is a means, and "actualized power" is an effect, the latter simply means nation's military power.\(^5\)

In this part of the study, we turn our attention to the basic fabric of Iran's strength, as they manifested themselves under the Shah and thus deal with those measurable aspects of power that Spiegel calls "material power."\(^5\) These include location, size, quality and structure of population, economy and industrial capacity (especially measured by GNP, or per capita GNP, and energy production and consumption).

The population of Iran has changed considerably in several major aspects in the 20th century. These changes


\(^5\) Klaus Knorr, op.cit., pp. 2-3. See also pp. 383-4 and 390. of this study.

\(^5\) Steven L. Spiegel, op.cit., pp. 41-59.
consist not only in the actual number of inhabitants of the country, but also in the way the population distributes itself between rural and urban areas, the skills and educational level of the labour, and the relationship between its activity rate and the distribution of labour force between economic sectors. 55

The 1956 National Census of Iran, the first of its kind in methodical and comprehensive terms, put the population at 20.4 million. The second, 1966, put it at just over 25 million, and the third at 33 million in 1976. In comparison, the population of Iraq has been put at 11 million and that of Saudi Arabia at 9 million for 1975.

In assessing the strength and weaknesses of a population base, however, much depends on the particular demographic mix - population distribution by age, its cultural and educational level, its technological skills and cohesiveness. If Iran has been able to play a significant role in Persian Gulf politics, it has been by and large to her overwhelming size and population. This advantage enabled her to have a significantly large armed forces in the 1970's equipped with the latest military equipment, but whether they were sufficiently trained to utilize this equipment or not is a factor which could not be disregarded.

Just over half of the population, including over one million nomads live in rural areas. Population is distributed unevenly over the land mass due to its topographical and climatic conditions, it is mostly concentrated in the north and the northeast, the Tehran area, and along the Zagros range of mountains; while the east, southeast, and central desert regions are sparsely populated. This distribution pattern has always created obstacles such as access and labour shortages for the development projects in certain areas.

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The literacy rate is about 55 percent of the total population. While this figure does not represent those who do not have qualifications in modern educational sense (mostly elderly people, those who can read but not write, and those who only received education in Koranic verses), it encompasses about 70 percent of the urban population.

Approximately 125,000 students were enrolled in the universities and higher education institutes in 1974 at home, and about a third of that total at institutions abroad. By the end of the Fifth Development Plan, 1979, the domestic population of higher education was projected to rise by 75,000. This is an impressive issue because it represents the progress made in combating deficiencies in primary and secondary education. Education has been particularly improved in the science and technology curricula. Another area was the increasing attention paid to the expansion and development of vocational and technical schools to train more skilled and semi-skilled labour, greatly needed by Iran.

The rapid economic development and huge investments in infrastructure in the 60's and 70's brought to the fore the question of the shortage of the skilled manpower. The ambitious Fifth Development Plan (which subsequently had to be scaled down in 1977) projected the creation of about two million jobs by 1979, while it was estimated that there will be about 1.4 million qualified Iranians to fill them. That opened up the prospect of importing foreign workers, predominantly from Third World countries like South Korea, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan. It also emphasized the attention directed towards the vocational training and intermediate programmes.

All in all, Iran under the Shah represented a unique example, i.e. that a modernizing nation, fortunate enough to possess a rich fiscal base, would develop its human resources to overcome the dilemma faced in the development process. The efforts put in furthering education and training, virtue
and qualities admired by the Iranians, also helped in advancing administrative and managerial capabilities which are vital resources for economic development in themselves, for future self-sufficiency, and for the achievement of national goals and aspirations. It is interesting to note that the fall of the Shah and the ensuing chaos that engulfed Iran did not end up with the collapse of the economy and basic functioning of the society (as it was widely predicted).

Natural resources can contribute to the industrial development of a country. Archeological artifacts of copper, bronze and iron indicate that there were mining operations in Iran throughout the centuries; an upsurge in the 20th century, particularly since World War II, attests to the presence of a large variety of minerals that have been increasingly explored and exploited. A main difficulty encountered in the exploration and exploitation has been the inaccessibility of the mining areas. The expansion of the transportation system, partly due to initiatives undertaken through CENTO and RCD, effectively tackled this problem.

A comprehensive geological survey, conducted in late 1960's, pinpointed potential areas for exploitation. As a result iron ore, coal, and copper deposits were given priority, and the first two could satisfy the steel mills with almost all of their requirements. Lead, Zinc, and chromite are other minerals under exploitation. Increasing attention was also paid to uranium. Fishing was also another sector, with promising results and prospects, especially in the south.

Iran is overwhelmingly an oil country. She has been the oldest and the leading oil state in the Middle East, and at times has been the largest oil producer in the world. It was estimated in 1973 that Iran holds about 10 percent of total world reserve. At the prevalent rate of production in the 1970's (5.5-6 million barrels per day), the reserves would have run out by the turn of the century.
This forecast and emphasis by the Shah to diversification and development of petroleum by-products led to a new phase of discovering new oil reserves. Oil revenues have always been the backdrop of the governments planning and expenditures. Thus, the increase in government oil revenues, from about $1.4 billion in 1969 to $3.9 billion in 1973 to a generally acknowledged figure of some $20 billion for 1974, led to a revised budget and expenditure plan. Defence expenditure for 1975-1976 were raised by 41 percent to $10.4 billion (28 percent of the total budget expenditure). Educational expenditure was raised by 36 percent to $2 billion. Real industrial growth rate, projected for 1975-1976, was put at 20 percent.

Natural gas exports, it was envisaged, would have been expanded rapidly with the idea of replacing petroleum when it runs out. According to the Fifth Development Plan, Iran's natural gas resources were estimated at around 270,000 billion cubic feet, approximately equivalent to 45 billion barrels of oil.

Until the 1960's, natural gas production was largely a by-product of oil production. Utilization of natural gas was limited to the Shiraz petrochemical plant and small generating plants in the immediate oil fields that provided electrical power for the area. The export of natural gas became a reality when in 1966 Iran could successfully negotiate a barter payment for the first still mill and subsequent industrial plants and machinery with the Soviet Union. By 1970, the Iranian gas trunkline connected some of the southwestern gas fields to the industrial complexes of the southern Soviet Union. Plans were in hand to double the capacity of the trunkline to export the gas to the Soviet Union on a more straightforward basis as well.

The Shah also negotiated with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany for an indirect export programme to send the natural gas through a new pipeline to the Soviet Union,
where it would have replaced the Soviet's supply of natural gas to Europe. A project was under study as well to ship liquid gas to Europe. It was part of Iran's bid to become Europe's dominant energy supplier. If that did materialize, the Iranian government expected that more European industries will establish a second base in Iran and Iranian industries, despite the hostility of the European Commission to the idea, would have gained privileged access (Most-favoured Nation) to the European market.

A strong and accelerating rate of economic growth characterized the Iranian economy in the period 1962-1979. The average annual growth of Iran's real Gross National Product at market prices was about 9 percent in the 60's and over 15 percent in the 70's. Iran's GNP for 1965 was $11 billion, in 1974 it was put at $28 billion, and for 1975 it reached $36 billion.

The spiralling rise in the oil revenues enabled Iran to move gradually from the construction stage to the installation of machines and equipment through gross capital formation; this investment effort accounted for a major share of the increase in the country's imports. While the general volume of imports increased, their prices were exploded at the same time. This was due to the shock that the manufacturing sectors in industrialized countries received as the result in rise in oil prices. Coupled with inflation, this complex process resulted in Iran's overseas payments plunging into a deficit of about $1.7 billion in 1975, a deterioration of nearly $7 billion from the 1974-1975 surplus of $5.2 billion. The increased volume of imports also put a strain on the ports and their handling capacity.

Agriculture is the sector which has not contributed much to Iran's overall economic growth and has remained the least developed of the economic sectors. This has been a crucial factor in the economy of the country since about less than 10 percent of population were economically active in that
sector in 1975. The structure of agriculture remained basically unchanged in the first part of the present century. From then on, there have been many attempts to improve the sector and increase the productivity, and thus meet the growing demand caused by rising expectations. The various development plans, though many successfully carried out in the agricultural sector, could not increase the growth comparable with other sectors. This is, of course, because the industrialization of the country has been the primary objective all throughout these years. Thus, agricultural output grew at rates between 3 and 5 percent.

The land reform of 1962 represented one major attempt to help improve agriculture. It's chief objective was to divide the land between peasants and thereby eliminate social barriers and improve production. Cooperatives, which came into being as a result of land reforms, improved the yield among small farmers. Other plans have included large scale agrobusiness and farm corporations. This was one field of activity that demonstrated close cooperation between the Israelis and the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture.

The breakdown of Iran's economic statistics for the period under study indicates that both its agricultural and services sectors contributed more to its GNP (agriculture 16% and services 43.5%, 1975/76) than oil. It is this factor which distinguishes Iran from the Arab countries in the area whose GNPs rest almost entirely on oil. And there is also the Iran's industrial base and strength.

Manufacturing's contributions to the economic growth as a percentage of the GNP is also an indicator of a country's economic capabilities and modernization. This indicator reveals the country's self-sufficiency and the extent to which resources (particularly military hardware) which are dependent upon manufacturing enterprises are likely to be resources useful to the foreign policy elite. Such data also reveal something about the dependency of a country on imports and,
consequently, their deference to others in their policies.

Large-scale manufacturing industry did not exist in Iran at the turn of the century. Activities were limited to small workshops, and various commodities produced, mainly traditional, were not important in volume or in value terms. Industrialization appears to have progressed and expanded between 1934 and 1938. During these years the growth of new factories accelerated as did the move towards larger factories. The most important new industries were sugar, cotton textiles, matches, and cements. But a series of smaller industries, chemicals, soap and oil processing, glass-works, flour mills, leather works, rice-milling, and tea processing played their part in the general industrial expansion. It is important to note the date, because there was a growing involvement with Germany as counterweight to Britain and Russia during this period. As a result many projects were executed with German cooperation (including the first stages of the first-ever modern still mill, some of the machinery were on the way to Iran when war broke out), but the Second World War put an end to that.

Iran's most spectacular gains in the industrial and the mining sectors of the economy took place rapidly with the advent of the 1960's. In that decade, the sector registered an average annual growth of around 15 percent and it increased to about 20 percent of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) compared with 26 percent of production accounted for by oil.

A new phase of industrialization, with public sector taking a leading role, began with the Irano-Soviet agreement for the establishment of a still mill in return for the export of natural gas. Other barter agreements were also made with some Soviet satellite countries. Prominent among them was a machine tool plant with Czechoslovakia. These agreements, and especially the purchase of some basic military hardware from the Soviets attracted considerable international attention. It was the first time that a country associated with the West through collective and bilateral links of alliance turned to
the Soviets and her allies. The overriding consideration in concluding those agreements was primarily an economic one, but it demonstrated a relaxation in the relations of the two countries as well. Finally, Iran also benefitted from joint schemes with her own traditional allies: numerous projects were carried out with Western participation or in the RCD framework. Included here were the growing car, trucks, and bus manufacturing and assembly operations.

So all in all and in relation to the other countries in the region, Iran is rather a special case because of its higher degree of development and industrialization. Its needs for technical assistance in furthering its development is qualitatively different from those of most of its neighbours.

Rapid urbanization, economic and technological advances, rural land reform and expansion of education and literacy, and widespread exposure to more equalitarian patterns of life altered many traditional ones irrevocably. The roles of institutions such as the bureaucracy, the higher education, and the working machinery of the administration has increased. The extended family system was weakened by increasing social and political mobilization. The increase in revenues from the oil since 1971, and especially from 1974, enabled the oil producing countries in the Middle East to enjoy rapid progress and economic development. The best example was furnished by Iran under the Shah. Moreover, the financial power was also utilized as a lever in foreign policy to create economic influence as the basis of political relations.

The need for economic development was a key concern in Iran during the period under the study. Although many ambitious goals were set, and the Shah criticized for perhaps pushing too fast and too hard ahead, the oil wealth, existence

of other resources, and the manpower made the achievement of those goals feasible. The country entered a stage whereupon growth was self-propelling. It was not simply a matter of multiple opportunities for new exports, new industrial investments, further import substitution, better utilization of natural resources, and a commitment to development by the public sector and further private involvement. It was also a question of attitude, on the part of most people who evidently favoured progress and change. The government's economic policy was based on improvements of the welfare of the population through the expanding of economy among different social groups helping them obtain a larger share of the national product. A solid base for improved standard of living was being established.\(^5^7\)

The recognition of the progress made, targets achieved, and the increasing strength of the economy was not confined to Iranians, as the following quote (made in 1975) shows:

"During the coming 25 years, Iran will almost certainly have the resources which will allow her to multiply the gross national product 16 fold (a ten percent of annual growth rate of real output, doubling the GNP every 7 years), increasing per capita real income eight-fold. To give an idea about orders of magnitude by the year 2000, Iran will probably have a population about the same as the present-day United Kingdom and a per capita income somewhat higher than current levels in Britain.\(^5^8\)


\(^5^8\). Kamal A. Hameed & Margaret N. Bennette, "Iran's Future Economy," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1975; p. 418.
The economic development and the expertise achieved in the oil industry enabled Iran to use these factors as part of its foreign policy. Thus, the Iranian government entered into joint participation and cooperation programmes of its own choosing with India and South Africa, in construction of oil refineries and operations, and Egypt, Algeria, and Israel, in exploration, loans, transfer, and other activities.

Closely related to the above factors, Iran also used part of its oil revenues as financial aid. This new instrument in Iran foreign policy appeared in 1974. Billions of dollars were earmarked for a wide variety of loans, aid, and investment projected. Although many LCD countries such as Egypt, Syria, Senegal, India, Pakistan, Sudan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan benefitted from aid packages, the developed economies were included in it as well. These countries included Germany, France, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

Iran also participated in in-direct aid through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The funds pledged to these organizations helped to increase their lending capacity and thus generated a greater degree of equilibrium in international liquidity. Furthermore, Iran pledged about one billion dollars to the three billion dollars proposed as an initial capital fund as part of a new international fund, to be controlled by the World Bank to help stabilize the balance of payments of those countries affected by the shortage or the rise in the oil prices.59

A nation's strength in economy and its basic industrial capabilities are of course important determinants in assessing its potential power. More important, perhaps, is its military capability. This indicator is often used to pinpoint a country's relative position in the international hierarchy of nations and can provide some answers for its important aspects.

of external behaviour. Moreover, the military capability of a regional emerging power is one of the important factors which contributes to its most distinctive status in the region.

Military power refers obviously and most basically to the strength of the armed forces of a nation state, to the quality and quantity of the weaponry which a country possesses, to the size and quality of its armed forces, and to the skill, morale, organization and quality of leadership of these forces. States do not increase the size of quality of their forces, only in response to threats from another country. They may be interested in increasing prestige, aiding industry, domestic unemployment, or internal security. When there is a competitively rapid increase in armaments, however, an arms race is in progress.

The history of Iran's armed forces reveals that several attempts were made to establish a national army during 1800-1925, but these forces were often under the instruction or command of foreign military officers. A variety of French, Austrian, British, Swedish, and Italian officers came to Iran during that time. In 1879 the Russians organized the Persian Cossack Brigade, 15,000 men based in Tehran and northern Iran. Re-organized as a division in 1918, it remained the most effective fighting force in the country until after World War I. A gendarmerie numbering 84,000 men was also organized in 1911 and stationed throughout the country to ensure the security of the main roads against brigands. It was commanded by Swedish officers. In 1917, the British, to protect their interests in the oil fields of the south, formed the 8,000 man South Persian Rifles with Iranian troops under British officers.

60. Klaus Knorr, op.cit., Chapter 3.

In 1925 Reza Shah, four years after coming to power, formed a national army of 40,000 men, free from foreign domination. The military was given authority over local civil authorities, and a conscription law was passed. To meet the expenses of the army and to support the programme of industrial expansion, higher taxes were levied on consumer goods and some foodstuffs. A significant task for the army during this period, ruthlessly executed, was the unification of the country which was achieved through combatting various tribal and separatist movements and warlords.

The organization of the air force and navy, both as branches of the army, quickly followed. The first core of a fleet was required in 1932. Both (air force and naval command) remained as branches of the army until 1955, the year Iran joined CENTO, when they were made separate services and given equal status with the army.

From the mid 1950's an accelerating programme of military modernization and expansion was put in hand. For this purpose American aid played a significant role, during the first seven years U.S. military assistance amounted to $40 million. During these years the Iranian army grew from 120,000 men to 190,000; the air force doubled to 8,000 and the navy to more than 4,000. This growth slackened off due to the economic crisis of the early 1960's and the decline of American aid which was foreshadowed by President Kennedy's remarks, made during the Shah's visit to the U.S. in March, 1962, that future U.S. aid would emphasize long-term economic development rather than military strength. The Kennedy administration's attitude toward military aid to Iran was revealed in the comments made by Sorenson, a close

63. See Appendix 12. See also n.37, p. 248.
"In Iran, the Shah insisted on our supporting an expensive army too large for border incidents and internal security and of no use in all-out war. His army... resembled the proverbial man who was too heavy to do any light work and too light to do any heavy work." 64

The Kennedy Administration's criticism involved, inter alia, their appraisal of the utility of the American budgetary support to Iran on one hand, and the increased revenues derived from oil after the 1953 interruption. In their view available funds would have been better spent on economic development than on arms. A change of heart in American attitude was evident, when in 1964, the Johnson administration reversed that decision. Perhaps the Americans reached this judgement solely on socio-economic grounds and the reform package contained in the White Revolution and its results met with their expectations. For Iran, of course, the perception of threats from the north had changed, though lessened. An overriding concern now, as noted before, was the threat of radical Arab regimes in the south. Iraq's increasing re-approachement with the Soviet Union made the Soviets appear as the principal and indirect source of threat in the south as well.

President Johnson's reversal of the policy adopted by the Kennedy administration opened the way for Iran's negotiations for arms. The Iranian government was also somewhat reassured by the joint CENTO military manoeuvre "Operation Delawar" in the Persian Gulf during April 1964. Thus, from $217 million dollars spent on defence expenditures in 1965, the trend led to an ever-increasing scale culminating in over $10 billion dollars in 1975-1976. 65


The army is traditionally the most powerful element in the Iranian military hierarchy. Its role came under increasing challenge in the 1970's especially from the air force due to the expansion of combat planes and missiles and to the personal interest of the Shah. The army is still the largest of the major services. Iran's ground troops consisted of 200,000 personnel in 1976 which was composed of over seven divisions, over 1100 tanks, about 100 pieces of artillery and 330 helicopters. At this time, Iran was known to have the largest army personnel and a helicopter force exceeding the combined forces of Iraq and Saudi Arabia; perhaps of even greater significance, however, was the fact that Iran had enough helicopters on order (202 AH-IJ, 326 class 214-AC and 312 Bell) to triple the size of its already impressive fleet.

The new helicopters (AH-IJ known as Sen Cobra), of which 202 were ordered in March 1976, were said to be the "world's only fully integrated helicopter gunships, with stabilized multisensor fire-control systems for day and night delivery of all weapons." The armament capability of the helicopter includes 20 mm cannon and 2.75 inch rockets and anti-tank missiles. In 1973 Iran purchased about 250 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wireguided (TOW), heavy ground to ground (or air to ground) anti-tank missiles as well as other anti-armour weapons. An agreement was concluded to co-produce the missiles and its launchers. This co-production programme could have permitted the Iranian Army to replace the 106mm recoilless rifle with the TOW system in the 1980s.

66. Ibid.
68. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Arms Trade Register, the Arms Trade with the Third World, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975) p.46.
There were plans underway to increase the strength of the ground forces. The army during this period was purchasing some of the latest British and American artillery and missiles. 2250 British chieftain tanks were ordered, of which about 500 were delivered by early 1977, 250 Scorpion light tanks, 312 Bell helicopters, a total of 793 pieces of artillery, to be delivered by 1979, 15,000 TOW, and 10,000 Dragon missiles were on order. The army aviation was intended to expand from the 1975 manpower of an estimated 8,000 men, 406 aircraft to 14,000 and over 800 late model helicopters by the end of the decade. To give a comparison in magnitude, it was estimated that, at least on paper, if the planned expansion of the Iranian army had continued on schedule it will have had by 1979, an army at least twice as large as Britain's in terms of manpower, armour, and army aviation.

The Iranian navy is the smallest of all the services. Its performance in the past has been largely confined to anti-smuggling work and escorting cargo vessels through the Shattel-Arab because of the border conflicts with the Iraqis. The navy is divided into two fleets - one on the Caspian Sea (without combat ships) and the other on the Persian Gulf. The northern bases are located at extreme corners of the sea northwest and east of Tehran, the southern fleet containing the major body of the ships, operates from five naval bases, Khorram Shahr, Bushehr, Bander Abbas, and smaller bases on Kharg Island and Hengam Island.

The navy was growing in the 1970's with the purchase of new major vessels and modern equipment. In 1977-78, the navy forces numbered about 22,000 personnel, 30 ships, and 12 Hovercrafts; 6 fixed wing Alc, and 15 helicopters made up its air sea strike forces. The only modern ships the Iranian navy possessed capable of deep water operations were its four British made Vosper Frigates, and its hovercraft fleet, reported to be the most extensive of its kind in the world. The British made BH7 Hovercraft can carry up to 150 marines at 70 knots - and has the capability of landing a battalion of
troops on the other side of the Persian Gulf in two hours. The Hovercrafts could also be modified for combat to carry surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missiles such as the Exocet Sea Sparrow or the Sistel Sea Killer used on frigates.

The modernization and expansion of the navy included a plan to construct a large base in the Gulf of Oman at the port of Chahbahar. This base would have accommodated the air force, army, and the navy, close to the border of Pakistan. In keeping with this modernization plan an original quota of six Spruance destroyers was ordered, to be reduced to four because of rising costs. Spruance-class destroyers are among the most advanced ships being built for the U.S. Navy. These vessels were to be delivered in mid-1980's. The navy also purchased three second-hand diesel submarines from the U.S., to be overhauled and delivered by late 1979.

The Iranian Air Force was well into its driving modernization programmes under the Shah. Of the three services, the Air Force received the bulk of the funds available for modernization and was technologically advanced. The sudden boost in the expansion programme of the air force was attributed to the anticipation of and the withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf and the Shah's personal interest in air power.

The air force was established in the 1920's as a branch of the army. This sector of the armed forces received its greatest impetus after the separation from the army in 1955. Its main roles have been to provide air defence and to support the ground forces with fire power and reconnaissance. Its inventory, if there was no interruption, would have represented one of the most modern in the world, including the F-14A with the Phoenix missile system, F-4E, F-4D, RF-4, F-5E, P-3F, and C130H aircraft.

In four years alone (1972-1976), the Iranian government ordered 209 F-4 phantom fighter bombers, 169 F-5 fighters, a
fleet of C-130 transports and more than 500 late model helicopters. Iran was negotiating to buy 250 to 300 F-16 or F-18 fighters, the latest planes not yet into operation by the US Air Force at the time. The most important planes, ordered by Iran were 80 F-14 Tomcat interceptors, armed with the computer-guided Phoenix air-to-air missiles, of which about 15 were delivered by 1977-78.

The Imperial Iranian Air Force in-flight refuelling capability also significantly increased the combat radius of its air power. Besides the armaments, two major projects were being carried out in late 1970's, an electronic aerial defence system, the most modern in the area, including air-to-surface and surface-to-air launchers, and a monitoring station which would have allowed the Iranian intelligence to intercept and decode all civil and military communications in a radius extending not only the Persian Gulf, but to neighbouring countries and to the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

All in all, it was believed that Iran's military capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively, had put her in a dominating role in the Persian Gulf, on land, on sea, and in the air by 1978. However, it is appropriate to study the major reasons given by the Iranian government for its unprecedented military expenditure. Iran, usually in the person of the Shah, came under attack almost from all quarters for its efforts in modernizing its armed forces without considerations given to the security aspects of the Iranian policies or the perception of threats. The primary reason here was of course the existence of potential threats. Among Iran's neighbours, Turkey and Pakistan were political and military allies because of their membership in CENTO and RCD. With regard to Pakistan, however, Iran's security concepts unfold in response to the presence of India and in relation to the altered strategic configuration on the subcontinent after the split of Pakistan in 1971. The dismemberment of Pakistan, with Soviet help to Indian military machine drew Iran closer

to Pakistan. The subcontinent balance of power became altered. Pakistan had become potentially vulnerable to its own separatist tendencies in the event of pressure from Afghanistan and/or India. Pakistan security therefore bears directly on Iran's (and as we see later became more apparent when the Soviet's occupied Afghanistan and their presence felt on Pakistan's borders). The potential for a separatist or occupied corridor from the Soviet Asian republics to the Arabian Sea nevertheless constituted a major factor in Iran's perceptions and is still valid today.

Afghanistan and Iran maintained somewhat friendly relations in the period under the study. The overthrow of the monarchy and the coming into power of communists was not, however, welcomed in Iran and sounded alarms. Iran obviously felt threatened in the broadest sense and the military coup in early 1978 could only have confirmed the Shah's commitment.

Iraq and Iran's long time border disputes and the Kurdish uprising were the conditions that sufficiently justified a military build up by Iran. The Shatt el-Arab dispute has been the most actively hostile in the Persian Gulf for years. The role played by ideology has been very significant. A radical Baathist, pro-Marxist Iraq politically and militarily supported by the Soviets confronted a monarchical and capitalist Iran closely allied with the United States. Iraq, with only a third of Iran's population, has been the first country in the region to initiate an arms race as well. It introduced into the area the first supersonic fighter aircraft, the MIG-15 and MIG-17 in 1958 and the first medium-range surface-to-surface missiles, the Styx and Frog, in 1973.

71. Relations further improved with the agreement on the Hirmand River dispute and allocation of its waters, and a financial aid package to the Afghanistan government. See Far Eastern Economic Review, July 16, 1976, pp. 31-32.

72. Iran-Iraq relations after 1979 and the subsequent war is discussed in Chapter 6, section 3.
It should not also be forgotten that apart from the sharing of land frontiers, Iran's deep water Kharg Island terminal, however, is still only slightly over 100 miles from Iraq, Iranian offshore oil rigs are highly vulnerable in the Persian Gulf, and the vital Abadan refinery, the largest in the world, is within mortar range of the Iraqi border.

But in 1975, observers were astonished by the public embrace, at the OPEC summit meeting in Algiers, of the Shah and the "strong man" of Iraq, Saddam Hussain. A regional conflict which had seemed second only to that of the Arab-Israelis was quite unexpectedly resolved by comprehensive diplomatic agreement. While it was not possible to assume from this settlement, with the overriding consideration of economics and the politics of oil, that a perpetual brotherhood and peace between the two deeply antagonistic states would ensue, its subsequent staying power until the fall of the Shah proved the increased Iranian military capability. Considerable Iraqi combat experience, both against the Israelis and during the protracted Kurdish rebellion, must also be included in the equation.

The Shah clearly regarded the Soviet Union its most serious potential adversary because of the history of Soviet-Iranian relations and Iran's pro-Western stance. This view was clearly reiterated in late 1973 by the following statement:

"The Cold War is over. But the question with Soviet Russia will always be the same and, when negotiating with the Russians, Iran must remember the chief dilemma: to become communist or not? There exists what I call the U.S.S.R.'s pincer movement. There exists their dream of reaching the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf."

It could be argued that the relations between the two

countries much improved over the years due to economic transactions and cooperations and exchanged visits; nevertheless the Soviet Union remained the big factor in Iran's strategic calculations concerning the region. The Soviet Union enjoyed the Ummel-Qasr naval base in Iraq, negotiated in April, 1972, and their presence first in Somalia and

74. The Soviet presence in the Middle East has grown, notably in the past 25 years, through opportunistic diplomacy, the deployment of military and especially naval power, and the expansion of influence in certain states through arms deliveries, economic aid, and political support. In general, the Soviets have not been unsuccessful in making inroads into the region, at the expense of positions previously held by Western powers. The Soviets regard the Persian Gulf with utmost interest. To further their influence and improve their access, the Soviets have attempted to establish footholds in the area over the years in the shape of building-up a series of bilateral pacts with the regional states. This has served the useful twofold purposes of countering the West and using their allies as surrogates to further their aims. Notably among these pacts was the 1972 "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" with Iraq, signed in April during Premier Kosygin's visit in Baghdad. This was the culmination of nearly 14 years of Soviet cultivation of relations through sales of arms, trade, and barter agreements. This started after the 1958 coup of Kassem who severed military ties with the West through CENTO and approached the Soviets for assistance. The year of the signing of the treaty is also of importance since the Soviet's relations with Egypt was deteriorating. As such the revolving and opportunistic nature of Soviet foreign policy was once more underlined. The Treaty was signed for fifteen years and is due for renewal. Not a strictly military one, nevertheless Article 9 of the treaty states: "in the interests of security of both countries the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defence capabilities." The agreement signalled to Iran the growing importance of Iraq in the Soviet strategic thinking. The Iraqis themselves of course benefitted from the values attached to it, favourable arms transfers, and most of all as a countervailing point with regards to the assertive posture already under way by Iran. It should be noted, however, that the relations between Moscow and Baghdad have not been as cordial over these years. This is more so due to the nature of the politics in Iraq, the Baath's base of support and the role of the armed forces. Therefore, the Soviet policy towards Iraq has been underlined by caution. Their relations have strained periodically due to the following factors: the place of Israel in regional politics, Soviet support for the Iraqi Communist Party and (at times) suppression of it by the Baath, the Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa (where the Iraqis supported the Arab Somalia against Soviet-backed Ethiopia), and the diversification of arms supplies on behalf of Iraq. The once close ties further deteriorated with the advent of the Iraq-Iran War. With the disintegration of Iran
then in Ethiopia and their involvement with the South Yemen enhanced their naval ability to monitor the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Therefore, it was only prudent to prop up Iran's defences, especially in the south, in as much as the Soviet factor was concerned. Iran faced the probability of encountering the Soviets in the south for the first time in history.

It is plausible to consider the situation under which Iran, standing alone, could withstand a direct Soviet attack. Iran's options for coping with the might of the Soviet armed forces are limited; either she must accept defeat, outright defeat for that matter, or turn to her allies for help, which for the period under study, was provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, formalized in the bilateral agreement of 1959. In dealing with the Soviets, the Iranians, however, never forgot the maxim rule that the invisibility of threat does not justify the ruling out of the possibility of threat.

Perhaps the most tangible threat, perceived by Iran, concerned the vulnerability of the oil fields, installations, and the Strait of Hormuz through which the oil moves en-route to its major consumers. Iran's re-possession of the Greater Tumb, Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa in 1971 decreased this vulnerability. Iran's assistance to the Sultanate of Oman in counter-insurgency operations also prevented the spread of radical movements in the area. These operations demonstrated the military capability of Iran to carry out missions beyond the

Persian Gulf area without any shortcomings as far as the quality and quantity of the armaments were concerned.

A further criticism of the Iranian military expansion programmes under the Shah involved the dependency on the U.S. and the training of Iranian personnel for operating the equipment. Psychologically, the Iranians have never forgotten the superiority in arms that was the main factor behind Iran's defeat at the hands of the Russians and the loss of territory in the 19th century. To the south, superior weapons enabled the vastly outnumbered British to use gun-boat diplomacy and control the waters of the Persian Gulf, and for the most part, the Indian Ocean. The lesson remains deep in the Iranian historical memory.

The Shah, expressing characteristic lack of confidence in U.S. responsiveness to what he regarded as Pakistan's legitimate claims for support under its bilateral and CENTO treaties, remarked time and again that he could not rely on others for the defence of Iran and that the Iranians should "brush up" their own forces. The criticism and its underlying U.S. unreliability to allies became a stimulus and additional justification for Iranian military self-sufficiency. However, one of the ironies for developing nations is that attaining self-sufficiency often entails protracted dependence on the supplier of advanced weaponry. The Shah, appreciating his ultimate dependence on U.S. political and military support against the Soviet threat, had every reason to make a virtue of necessity. Noting the U.S. experience in South-east Asia, coupled with a sharp decline in British power, he was quick to capitalize on the useful harmony between his own goal of greater independence, power, and influence and the West's declining willingness and in some cases, ability to act forcefully on behalf of regional allies.

Although the criticism of training, advisory assistance, and dependency was not unjustifiable, it merely underlined a tradition in Iran of continuity rather than innovation. As
has been noted before, the Iranian armed forces benefitted from a variety of foreign advisors and programmes. The need for Western, primarily American military technicians and instructors intensified when Iran had to prepare herself against the presence of advanced Soviet weapons and training in Iraq. Iran had long since made the decision to go it alone in defence, if necessary, albeit on the basis of having to endure the paradox of a prolonged and substantial dependence on the U.S. for expertise and spare parts.

Extensive equipment involvement had of course the somewhat advantageous "reverse influence" for Iran in relations with the U.S. The effect of this factor was to seriously limit, in political terms, the ability of the U.S. to exercise the policy option of cutting off military support to Iran. While Iran had greater freedom in choosing the weapons it bought, its freedom to operate that equipment was, in the last resort, dependent upon the good graces of the U.S. government. An unfriendly and hostile government in Iran, could impell the U.S. to retaliate by bringing Iran's military machine to a virtual halt.
5.2 Assertive Foreign and Security Policies, the Persian Gulf and Beyond.

A significant development for Iran, intensified in the late 1960's and early 1970's, was the changing of threat perceptions. As was noted in the first part of this chapter, the earliest emphasis upon the threat from the north which governed Iran's relationship with the West and which led to its membership in CENTO, though still valid, gradually lost its poignancy.

This shift of emphasis came about due to a measure of detente with the Soviet Union. As a subsequence, it meant that the Persian Gulf became the natural centre of attention to Iran, and as it was, occupying the centre-stage of Iranian strategic thought. The requirement for defending a maritime frontier as opposed to a continental one, however, are very different and the southern shift in the focus of Iran's diplomatic activities was matched by a determination to acquire maritime power.

The purpose of this part is to study the place of the Persian Gulf in Iran's security policies to 1979. Among the many factors that played a part, there were Iran's relations with the superpowers and the section begins here with an assessment of them as a prelude to this section.

The political and economic stability enjoyed by Iran gave it more freedom in the region to have good relations with the superpowers. For the Soviet Union, Iran became a strong and stable country on its southern borders. For the United States, Iran was considered a friendly and a regional power in the Persian Gulf maintaining responsibility for the flow of oil to the Western countries. The Iranian leaders realized that the Soviet Union could be brought to play a constructive role in the region, and neutralized in the event of regional disputes.

The Soviet-Iranian detente of 1962 was possible not only because of the changed international strategic perspectives involving the ICBM programmes and the subsequent not-so-critical attitude of the United States regarding this new orientation in the Iranian policy, but because of Iran's assurance that it would not permit the installation of American bases in Iran. On their own behalf, the Iranians also extended the argument about detente and that it should go beyond Europe and strategic arms limitation talks. Detente, it was argued, should also be applied to a whole range of subversive activities which were supported by the Soviet Union and other communist regimes.

Though the Soviets never stopped "... wooing Iran away from the West while increasing Soviet influence at Tehran," they endorsed the principle of local security by local powers. This was echoed in the joint communique issued at the end of the visit made by the Shah to the Soviet Union in October, 1972. It re-affirmed their friendship and expressed "... firm belief that matters concerning the Persian Gulf region should be solved by the countries of the region on the basis of the U.N. Charter, and without any outside intervention...".

The changing concept of security on behalf of both the Soviet Union and Iran, therefore, rendered the proximity to Russia an advantage and alliance with the West less attractive. The Soviet desire for tranquility on its borders in turn, encouraged initiative by Iran for a further detente in her relations with Russia. Once convinced of their feasibility and safety, the United States could not validly oppose these developments. The resulting success, prompted the assurance that a policy of "de-facto" non-alignment could best serve the interest of the Iranian government as well as the security of

of the northern region of the Middle East.

The prevailing atmosphere of friendship between the two neighbours did not, of course, always exist. A new period of relations with the USSR began for Iran in 1941 when the Russians, along with the British, invaded Iran on the pretext of German presence in Iran. In order to establish the status between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Iran, an agreement was reached between the three governments that resulted in a "treaty of alliance" on January 29, 1942. The agreement stipulated that the two powers would evacuate the Iranian territory after the conclusion of the war.

In October, 1944, the Soviets asked for exclusive rights over a five-year period for petroleum exploration by the Russian government in an area of northern Iran. The Soviet Union pressed for a reply, but the Iranian government, skillfully announced that the cabinet had agreed to postpone all oil concession negotiations until the end of the hostilities. In the ensuing crisis, the Red Army took two major courses of action: increased obstruction of Iranian troop movements and communications, and outright support of the Iranian communist party and its sponsored demonstrations in Tehran and the provinces against the government. Mass demonstrations were staged demanding the resignation of the government and the granting of the concessions, while Soviet troops protected the demonstrators against the police. Meanwhile, in the north, the Russians captured many Iranian troops and police, disarmed them, and cut the highways, leaving large segments of the population without food and water.

The major problem during and immediately after the war in Iran's relations with the Soviet Union was Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. The Red Army, as an important instrument of Soviet policy, established its own rule in Northern Iran, and supported the Iranian communist party and the establishment of Azeri and Kurdish republics, two separatist groups. By the spring of 1942, Russian forces were interfering with the
movement of Iranian forces in Azerbaijas. The Soviets had obligations under the treaty of 1942 to respect the territorial integrity and political independence. The Soviets' behaviour thus constituted the basis for Iran's initial complaint to the United Nations and also sealed the way for seeking assistance from the United States as a counter-vailing power.

After the war, the Soviet Union refused to evacuate its troops from Iranian soil. The Soviets tried to use the issue of evacuation of troops to extract from Iran what they had failed to gain in 1944, namely an oil concession. Using the oil issue, as a bait to get the Soviet troops out of Iran, the Iranian government announced an agreement with the Soviets to the effect of an oil concessionary ratification by the parliament after the withdrawal of troops, and the recognition of the separatist movements as an internal Iranian matter. Having succeeded this, the new parliament did not approve the concession.

The above questions in the relations with the Soviet Union coupled with the formal adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, meant that Iran's relationships with the USSR required the use of considerable energy to resist Soviet pressure. Though a three-year commercial agreement was signed during a visit by the Shah to the Soviet Union in 1956, the relations were strained again in 1959 when the Iranian government rejected a Soviet proposal for a friendship treaty and non-aggression pact, and signed instead a bilateral defence treaty with the United States.

The period 1962-1979 witnessed steady improvements in relations between the two neighbours. As was pointed out earlier, this was started by the pledge of no missile bases on Iranian territory. The Kennedy administration's refusal to give enough support to the Iranian government also encouraged the Shah to normalize relations with the USSR still further. In 1965 the Shah visited Moscow and his warm reception by the Soviets caused the Iranian leader to improve friendly relations with the northern neighbour. This was in the aftermath of the
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the perceived Iranian disappointment with CENTO and its machinery. The outcome of the visit was welcomed at home, and also provided leverage on the United States regarding the shifts to arms sale. In Tehran, the fence-mending with the USSR was considered important both for its intrinsic and domestic benefits.

Through a series of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, Russia was also involved both in Iran's economic development projects and in her military programmes in the last two decades. The economic and technical aid by the Soviets encompassed an unusual array of activities, including construction of Iran's first steel mill, a machine tool plant and a hydroelectric dam over the border river, Aras, expansion of the Caspian Sea ports and developments of fisheries with the Soviet assistance, and the establishment of another machine-tool plant by Czechoslovakia.

In February, 1967, the conclusion of an arms deal with the Soviet Union was announced. It consisted of $110 million worth of non-sensitive military equipment, armoured troop carriers, trucks and anti-aircraft guns. This agreement was a significant event. It was the first time that a country actively participating in a Western military alliance acquired Soviet arms.

The main effect of Iran's policy toward the Soviet Union in 1962-1979 was the establishment of stable trade and advantageous transit relations with the USSR. The expanding rate of trade between the two countries with diverse political and economic backgrounds was a remarkable achievement. The rate resulted in the Soviet Union becoming one of Iran's major trading partners.78

For the Soviet Union, cooperation in the economic fields

presented them with the opportunity to gain and utilize political points as well. These included the lessening of Western economic influence on Iran and moving Iran away from the Western camp toward a neutral zone in the diplomatic and military realms. These usual undertones of the Soviet foreign policy were successfully resisted by Iran on all accounts. If there was a beneficiary it certainly was Iran since it opened up new politico-military options to Iran. It not only indirectly strengthened Iran vis-a-vis Iraq, but also enabled Iran to contain the local opposition.

The two decades of economic cooperation brought about a somewhat changed Iranian view of Russian aggressiveness. The Iranians believed that Russia could be neutralized in regional conflicts; as it was proved over disputes and conflicts between Iran and Iraq, and also in the case of Iran's claims on Bahrain or the re-possession of the three islands in the Persian Gulf by Iran in 1971.

The foregoing period also saw another improvement in the relations of the two neighbours, that of indulging in direct verbal attacks and criticism and venomous propaganda. There prevailed a total halt in this field with the bonus of the Russians actually praising the Shah and his governments even to the end. It is interesting to cite two kinds of verbal attacks by the Russians aimed in one instance at the person of the Shah, and in another at the country. In 1959, the Soviets were determined to make Iran an ally. When failed and witnessed the signing of bilateral defence agreements between Iran and US, Khruschchev observed that: "He [the Shah] will not succeed through pacts with the United States to save his rotten throne. He treated us as if we were Luxembourg and he will be sorry." The anger

of Khrushchev reached new heights over the wisdom of Iran's choice of the US as a friend. In a rage he confided to the Shah's twin sister that "Iran was like an apple that one day, when it was ripe, would fall into the hands of the Soviets." 81

The improvement in the Irano-Soviet relations and lessening of the tensions meant that from 1967, troop concentrations were moved from either sides of the border, the Iranians moving southward. This being so, the resurrected strategic significance of the Persian Gulf, its importance in Iranian eyes, and the changed international environment directly affecting the area signalled the arrival of a new era: that of facing the Russians in the south for the first time in history.

As a result of the June war, the situation in the Persian Gulf was transformed. The closure of the Suez Canal kept the Soviet navy out for a time when the British were withdrawing and Iran was attempting to fill the vacuum. However, the Russians soon asserted their presence in the area benefitting from the bases in Iraq, along the Red Sea and India. Iran nonetheless followed its objective, that the great powers should be kept out of the area. Iranian acquisition of naval facilities in Mauritius in 1972 signalled the first step for following that principle in the near Indian Ocean.

The relations between Iran and the United States went from strength to strength during the period covered by this study. Various aspects of this alliance and friendship have been examined throughout the study. Suffice to touch upon two salient features of the policy issues that helped and governed the Iranian policy toward the Persian Gulf. First was the overcoming by Iran of traditional U.S. reluctance to provide it with real modern sophisticated weapons. At the height of the Vietnam war, President Johnson agreed to help build up the Iranian defence system and the first measure was the long-sought Phantom II through the U.S. Navy. The scene was set for Iran's determination to achieve a credible deterrent.

81. Ibid., pp. 204-205.
President Nixon's declaration of Guam in June, 1969, was an emphasis on self-help and regional security systems, and acted as the second impetus for the new Iranian policy. Iran, as a potential regional power in the Persian Gulf and an ally of the U.S., became eligible to buy a substantial amount of modern weapons. The declaration, subsequently billed as the Nixon Doctrine, rested on three principles: 1) that the U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments; 2) that it will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of the United States' allies; and 3) that in other types of aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested.

The United States' interests and policy in the Persian Gulf at this time supported the indigenous regional collective security efforts to provide stability and to foster orderly development without outside interference. The Americans believed that the cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a defensive strategy labelled as the Two Pillar Policy, was the important key element of stability in the area. The second American objective was the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes among the Persian Gulf nations. The third was the safeguarding of the petroleum exports.

The United States' interests in the Middle East were derived primarily from global strategic and political considerations. The US has also specific commercial and economic stakes in the region. In 1967-1979, the value of friendship with Iran to the United States rose drastically for the Arab-Israeli conflict underscored the relative stability of Iran and its moderation in international politics. Americans welcomed the increased political stability which Iran believed to have gained without further US involvement as though it were a political windfall. The US was much relieved to see an emerging independent international actor. Iran's relations with the Soviet Union did not warrant anything but tolerance on America's part.
The states of the Persian Gulf region can be divided into two groups: the major ones with populations ranging from eight million to over forty million; and the mini-states with a population of less than one million. As such, the majority of the total population of the Persian Gulf area live in the three major states of the region, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Among these three, Iran by 1979 was by far the most powerful. Its oil production was somewhat less than that of Saudi Arabia, but its population of 39 million was far larger than the 8 million of Saudi Arabia and the 13 million of Iraq. These three are also the primary states in the region based on their economic, military capability, cultural weight and political influence.

The Persian Gulf stretches between the Shatt al-Arab, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the northwest, and the Strait of Hormuz in the south-east where it connects with the Gulf of Oman. The gulf is surrounded by the two great plateaus of Iran and Arabia, and these together with reverine Iraq constitute the Persian Gulf region (Map 5).

Iran at the present time extends over an area of approximately 636,000 square miles (1,648,000 square kilometers), is situated at one of the cross-roads of the Euroasian land masses. On an east-west axis it lies between the Fertile Crescent - now Iraq, Syria and Jordan - and the Mediterranean on the west, and the central Asian Stepps and India to the east. On a north-south axis it lies between Russia and the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This unique geographical position has played an important part, during both strong and weak periods of Iranian history.

To the north of Iran lies the Soviet Union whose borders with Iran extend for 1050 miles of which 425 miles divide the Caspian Sea. Of course the present boundaries of Iran with the Soviet Union are the result of many changes, some as

recently as the 19th century. This proximity to the Soviet Union has caused Iran to become an attractive target of invasion in the time of war, the latest of which occurred during World War II.

Iran's strategic location gives it an importance that will last for some time to come and because of the relationship between the superpowers and the existence of oil in Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf. When in the forthcoming years the area is depleted of this essential natural energy, Iran may lose some of its strategic importance, but for the present and near term future, Iran's economic importance promises to remain significant and its location to remain critical to world politics.

From the east Iran is bounded by Afghanistan whose government was toppled by a military coup d'etat which ended the monarchy in that country. The new government in Afghanistan, communist in nature and dominated by factional in-fightings maintained basically good relations with Iran both before and after the fall of the Shah and the occupation of that country by the Red Army. Another state, Pakistan, a member in CENTO, borders Iran on the east. The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman constitute the southern boundary of Iran. Finally, Iraq, an Arab country which challenged Iran for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, and Turkey, another member in CENTO, form Iran's western frontiers (Map 2).

Geographically the Persian Gulf is a sizeable body of

water 25 miles to 180 miles in width and about 550 miles in length from its opening at the Strait Hormuz to its northern tip at the Iraqi border. It is bounded by Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia on its western littoral and a group of small oil rich shaikhdoms guard the southern approaches. Because of the oil lanes which cross the Indian Ocean the strategic rivalry extends to this area as well. The geographical significance of the region rests with its possession of an estimated over sixty percent of the world's proven oil reserves.

Economically, in 1972, the average production costs of a barrel of oil in the Persian Gulf were "... around 10 to 12 cents per barrel, which in the U.S.A. they were about $1.50 per barrel and in the USSR around $1.00." 84 Therefore, because of the cheapness and efficiency of oil as an energy source it was not surprising that the area assumed significant importance. The drastic price increases in the following years and hence in the revenue of the Persian Gulf states added another economic dimension as an export market to its already existing strategic value.

The oil wealth and the Persian Gulf's proximity to the Soviet Union made the security of the region and of Western access to it so important that the interest of the superpowers in the area sometimes neared a rivalry for supremacy. This strategic significance was recognized as long ago as 1928 when Sir Arnold Wilson asserted that:

"No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater interest, alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian and geographer, the merchant, the statesman, and the student of strategy, than the inland water known as the Persian Gulf." 85

The superpowers rivalry in this area advanced a notch in July 1975, when the U.S. Congress approved a proposal for con-


structuring naval and air support facilities at Diego Garcia, a British atoll 1,000 miles south of the Indian Peninsula. This action was undertaken to match increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean and its outlying pockets: the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea.

An interest of Iran in the Persian Gulf is due to the fact that it has been one of the largest oil producers in the world and it is dependent upon freedom of ingress and egress to the Persian Gulf for its exports.

The two principal ports of Iran are located at the head of the Persian Gulf, Abadan and Khorramshahr. Abadan was originally built and developed by the Anglo Iranian Oil Company Limited in 1910. It is situated on Abadan Island, on the bank of the River Arvand (Shatt al-Arab). Abadan was Iran's most important port for the export of petroleum products, but due to the dispute with Iraq most of its facilities exclusively for export and handling of oil and petroleum products were relocated to Bander Mahshahr and the Kharg Island.

Khorramshahr, formerly called Mohamareh, is Iran's most important and largest general cargo port and handling close to half of all cargo by 1979. It is located at the junction of Shatt al-Arab and the River Karun which flows from the Zagros mountains.

The port of Bandar Shahpour ranks second after Khorramshahr and between them they handle over 80% of Iran's trade by sea - excluding oil. This port is built on the north side of the Khor Masa about 45 miles from the open sea, and due to the deep tidal inlet of Khor Musa can accommodate some large ships at anchor. At this port in 1966, Iran, jointly with Allied Chemical of the United States developed what was then, and still remains the largest fertilizer and petrochemical project outside the developed world.

Bandar Mahshahr about sixty miles east of Khorramshahr, was originally built and developed for a crude oil export
terminal but because of the relocation of the facilities of the oil refinery at Abadan to this port, it became a refined petroleum products terminal that opened in 1970.

Due to the strategic and economic importance of the Persian Gulf to Iran, an expansion programme of military and port facilities got underway in the southern ports. Port of Bandar Abbas is one of those ports which has been vastly expanded and modernized. The importance of this port is due to its geographical location, at the junction of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, which faces the Strait of Hormuz. This strait forms the gateway for the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Oman. Bandar Abbas was being rejuvenated in connection with the construction of a military base and a hard surfaced road joining it to the highway networks further inland. The programme consisted of equipping the port to handle close to two million tons of general cargo, especially mineral ores including copper from Sar Cheshmeh mines.

Several small Iranian islands are located in and around the Strait of Hormuz: Hengam (with a small navy base) and Lask, which lie off Qeshm Island, and the Hormuz Island all of which lie off the main coast east of Bandar Abbas. There are also several other islets located in the proximity of this strait which strategically are very significant; a fact historically demonstrated by acquisition of them by the prevailing power in the Persian Gulf: Iranian, Portuguese or British. These are the Greater and Lesser Tumbs and the Abu Musa islands which Iran repossessed them by landing troops on November 30, 1971. By this action, which took place two days before the British treaty of protection with the Trucial states expired, Iran acquired complete control of the Strait of Hormuz. This strait unlike certain other strategic straits such as the Strait of Tiran leading into the Gulf of Agaba or Bab-el Mandab, would probably be very different to block as well since it is too wide and deep for effective physical obstruction.
Bander Bushehr, 100 miles south east of Abadan, was once a leading port, but it lost much of its importance with the expansion of oil exports contributing to the growth of other Persian Gulf harbours since the early 1920's. Since 1971 this port has been expanded and modernized for the sole purpose of the navy. The bulk of the naval facilities of Khorramshahr was re-located to this port which has become one of the major naval bases in the area. The major storage and loading facilities for Iranian crude oil destined for export are located on the Kharg Island, 150 miles southeast of Abadan and near this naval base at Bushehr. This island will remain an important strategic target - so far as any threat to Iranian oil is concerned, as was evidenced in the Iran-Iraq war, so long as Kharg Island handles the major share of the super-tanker traffic.

There are several other ports along the southern coast which the government had plans to improve upon for coastal trade and also as military bases. These ports include Deyyer about 100 miles southeast of Bushehr and Lengeh 100 miles southwest of Bandar Abbas where the navy has a small base; on the Gulf of Oman are Jask about 100 miles southeast of Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar where the most extensive of all plans to construct a multi-service military complex was at hand of which the Air Force base was at the verge of completion in 1979. Chah Bahar is only 50 nautical miles from the Pakistan border and approximately 800 nautical miles from Bombay, India.

The growing significance of the Persian Gulf, as pointed out earlier, vast modernization, and expansion of ports along with the military build up in the area have been basically due to the following political, economic, and strategic features: progressive enhancement of the Persian Gulf's role in Iran's economic and strategic interests; change in the global power structure as the outcome of change of the bipolar world of the 1960's, to the multipolar power centres of the 1970's; and the British withdrawal from the east of Suez which caused a "politico-military" vacuum, and consequently created and
enhanced an atmosphere of "competitive and conflicting interests and aspirations" among the littoral states of the region. 86

The western side of the Persian Gulf is inhabited by the Arabs. Over ninety percent of the population of this area are Moslem, and in some countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, almost one hundred percent are Moslem. Within Islam, the major division is between the Shi'it and the Sunnis. The majority of the Iranians are Shi'it, except for some tribal groupings. The majority of the Arabs are Sunni. Sunnis, in turn, are divided into four branches according to the legal interpretation of the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad (the Hadeth).

All of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (except Iraq) share two common boundaries. The gulf to the east and Saudi Arabia to the west. Saudi Arabia itself spreads across the Arabian Peninsula from east to west, thereby giving it an opening on the Persian Gulf and a long coast on the Red Sea.

Except for the agricultural areas in Iraq in the north and Oman in the south, all the Persian Gulf Arab states are dry and without exception import all of their foodstuffs, including flour, dairy products and meats. 87 It has only been recently that Saudi Arabia has embarked upon some agricultural projects, mainly the growing of wheat.

The contemporary political regimes of the Persian Gulf Arab states are basically similar, although they can be class-


ified into three types; Saudi Arabia is referred to as a kingdom; Oman as a sultanate; and Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are known as emirates or Shaikhdoms. Iraq officially designate itself as a republic. With the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which are the oldest Arab independent states in the area (1932), all other Arab states of the Persian Gulf have become independent recently, Kuwait gained its independence in 1961; Oman in 1970; Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all gained their independence in 1971. 88

These countries (excluding Iraq) without exception are ruled by families which originate from tribes of the central and northern deserts of Arabia prior to and since the rise of Islam. In the eighteenth century they began to settle in the towns, islands and peninsulas which they presently rule. Most of these states share common characteristics: a) they are all oil producers; b) the majority of the population is Moslem, Arab with a common cultural heritage; c) mostly conservative, and the regimes are basically autocratic; d) most of them depend on foreign imports, finish goods as well as food-stuffs; and e) most of them are involved in unsolved boundary and other territorial disputes. 89


89. The political process in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf came increasingly under pressure during the last two decades. Their historic regional, ethnic, and religious diversity have been compounded with internal factors such as rapid social change and demands for political reforms on one hand; and the external factors of nationalistic and ideological rivalries, and the (more recent) threat of Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism on the other. To take the latter two components, political conflict has been represented by the struggle between Iranian nationalism and Arab nationalism with religious (and racial) undertones. Shi'it Moslems form the majority of the population in some countries such as Iraq and Bahrain, and constitute significant minorities in the rest. It should be noted, however, that the Shi'its have never been fully integrated into the society of these states and they have maintained their own social and political order. Moreover, they have been subjected to discrimination.
In analyzing the regional politics, it is important to note that, the regional Arab states, albeit exhibiting certain cultural, political and economic similarities, represent different, and often opposing ideological trends and interests; because of the dissimilarities in capability (wealth, population, territory), the influence exerted by these states regionally and internationally varies in intensity. This has resulted in a shift of tribal allegiance, which in turn has created jealousies among the emirates. Jealousies hindered the formation of the United Arab Emirates federation in 1971. Their capability has an important impact on the individual state's concept of regional collective security, as does its attitudes and behaviour towards neighbouring states in choosing the policy options concomitant with the influence it expects to exert regionally. The announcement of the British withdrawal in 1968 and their final departure in 1971 added further pressures resulting in a great change in the Persian Gulf's political and military milieux as well as the regional structure.

In January 1968 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw its military presence from East of Suez by the end of 1971, a decision which in effect brought a power vacuum in the region. Shortly after the announcement and experienced limited or no prospects for advancement in government. The Sunni rulers of these countries were confronted with the new force of Iranian fundamentalism upon the fall of the Shah as the self-styled Islamic Republic's leaders turned their attention to them. Incidents like the labour unrest in the late 1979 in Saudi Arabia and the attempted coup in 1981 in Bahrain, linked to Iran, did not allay their fears either. This fear, though lessened, still persists.

90. E.A. Nakhleh, op. cit., p. 28.
the U.S. government declared that the United States had no intention of filling the vacuum left by the British departure and would, instead, depend upon local security arrangements among the regional states to replace the British.

The British presence in the Persian Gulf had its origins in the treaty of 1820, a document which the government of India compelled the rulers of the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms to sign. 91 Between 1880 and 1916 the government of India concluded with each shaikh (Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, the Trucial tribalities in 1892, Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916) a special treaty under which the ruler surrendered external sovereignty to the United Kingdom, and accepted a non-alienation bond pledging not to "cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation" any part of his land except to the British government. This treaty after 1880 was designed, above all, to defend India against possible European encroachment. Britain did not permit even the riparian powers to establish military facilities on the coast or to maintain naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The British system of special treaty relations with the emirates and tribalities along the Arabian coast enforced political stability: at the domestic level, by setting up shaikhly dynastic lines; at the regional level, by inhibiting tribal and inter-shaikhdom warfare; and at the international level by discouraging other interested outside powers from tampering with affairs. The interlocking political and military rights of the treaty, made it possible for Britain to preside over the domestic, regional and international political affairs of the area.


92. J.C. Hurewitz, ibid., p. 19.
As a consequence, the tribal structures of the protectorates were kept as they were, with little or no innovation by the British. The discovery of oil in the 1930's, however, made it possible for Bahrain, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi to launch a limited measure of programmes aimed at development.\(^93\)

The message of January 1968 deprived the shaikhdoms of the director of their external policy and defence. The announcement also gave notice to the major states of the Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and to the superpowers, that the time soon would come for a re-arrangement of influence and power in the region. The British suggested that the trucial shaikhdoms would form a federation that would create an entity large enough to have some hope of survival and economic progress.\(^94\) The nine shaikhdoms\(^95\) which were directly affected by the British decision began serious attempts to form a sort of federation that would come into being immediately following the British withdrawal in 1971. The federation eventually was formed by only seven shaikhdoms, with Bahrain and Qatar choosing a separate course.

Several factors contributed to the failure of the nine


\(^{95}\) Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Uman al-Raywayn', Ra'as al-Khaima and Fujayra. For further information on the background of these emirates, see John Duke Anthony, "The Union of Arab Emirates," \textit{The Middle East Journal}, vol. 36, no. 3 (Summer 1972), pp. 271-287; D. Hawley, \textit{op.cit.}; D. Hopwood, \textit{op.cit.}, and E.A. Nakhleh, \textit{op.cit.}. 
shaikhdoms to unite into a federation: an inability to reach compromise and agreements between the larger more educated emirates and the smaller ones; the border disputes between the emirates and Saudi Arabia and between the emirates themselves; jealousies and suspicions among the ruling families; and finally, Iran's long-standing territorial and sovereignty claims to Bahrain which prevented Bahrain to campaign for the federation. Qatar declared itself independent on September 1, 1971, and the remaining emirates formed the United Arab Emirates on December 2, 1971. Map 6.

Iran's protests to the federation over the proposed inclusion of Bahrain caused all shades of Arab opinion, embracing the polar opposites represented by King Faisal, Nasser, and the ruler of Kuwait to give diplomatic support to the new groupings. Saudi and Kuwaiti support for the creation of the federation was based on the idea of subscribing the support of the United States. In the event, and true to its earlier position, the U.S. remained non-committal.

The opposition of Iran to the federation had its roots in the inherent Iranian-Saudi competition, which became the conventional wisdom of the early 1970's. To some extend this was fed by the Shah's comments. He suggested that "in light of Britain's experience in South Arabia, Nigeria and Rhodesia" sufficient evidence had accumulated to show that "tribalism and federalism were incompatible and the Persian Gulf federation would go the way of Aden and South Arabia." These comments often reflected a low opinion of the character and stability of the Arab regimes and also served as a device to justify the Iranian rationale for a preeminent role in the Persian Gulf.

It is doubtful whether Iran would have persuaded Bahrain to become an Iranian province by means other than the use of

force. However, on January 4, 1969, at a press conference in New Dehli, the Shah declared that "if the people of Bahrain do not want to join my country," Iran would withdraw its territorial claims to the island. He said Iran would accept the will of the people in Bahrain, if this was recognized internationally. A mechanism for settling the dispute was announced in March, 1970. Britain and Iran agreed to allow a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to ascertain the wishes of its people through a referendum. The findings, an outright majority for self-independence, made public in May, 1970, was endorsed by the UN Security Council and was approved by the Iranian parliament on May 14.

An important consequence of the British announcement of withdrawal was the immediate jockeying of the regional states for position, seeking either security through new alliances or augmented power through greater control of contested or hitherto neutral areas of the Persian Gulf. And at the same time the regional states embarked upon extensive arms purchase programmes.

Iran had made clear her concern that the vacuum created by the British departure ought to be filled by the regional states. Towards that goal, the defence budget for 1971-1972


was increased by almost a third. In 1968-69 Iran's military budget was approximately $495 million; by 1979, it reached nearly $10 billion which is a clear indication of Iran's intention to have become the pre-dominant power in the Persian Gulf region.\(^99\)

Iran of course was not alone in the quest for arms in the region. Saudi Arabia ordered a large number of advanced fighter aircraft, light fighters, helicopters and air defence equipment from France, United Kingdom, and the United States.\(^100\) Its defence budget rose from $321 million in 1968-69 to over $14 billion in 1979-80. Saudis' military expansion appeared to be less defined on the basis of external threats than were those mentioned in relation to Iran. Iraq also received a great deal of arms from the Soviet Union. The smaller states of the region have also been buying weapons and building up their defence forces.

The huge increase in oil prices in 1973 provided fuel for expanded arms race in the region. However, the Arab states were unable to absorb the revenue internally. The population and other natural resources necessary for broadly-based economic growth do not exist in these countries, therefore their external expenditures have increased. The external expenditures vary from country to country, according to how much oil it possesses, the size of the population, and the extent of economic development programmes. Part of this expenditure has been directed toward investment in Europe and the United States, but still there was a large amount available for defence procurement.\(^101\)

99. See Table 3.


101. These expenditures came to a sudden halt in 1986 with the sharp slump in oil prices.
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf did also begin to use their financial power politically in the region and to a certain extent internationally. Regionally, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE were able to directly or indirectly influence the political affairs of the Middle East in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute due to their financial contributions to the other Arab countries in the area, the front-line states, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the PLO. Internationally, as the oil bill of the industrial nations climbed, the pressure on them to offset the drain of their foreign exchange by the sale of arms became powerful, as was seen in the arms deal with the French and the British.

The arms deals between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were viewed by some in the U.S. as a possible threat to Israel in the case that they would be utilized by countries that are in direct confrontation with Israel. Despite the domestic opposition in the U.S., arms deals with the Saudis proceeded with no great difficulty as the U.S. were not willing to jeopardise their friendly relationships. The Saudis were strongly opposed to and deeply concerned about possible future intrusion of radical influences, already present to the north and south of them in the Persian Gulf and the Peninsula. This was in addition to perceived threats from Iraq or the South Yemen. The Saudis, like Iran, could not play a significant regional security role without credible military force behind their policy.

The 1973 oil embargo was a clear indication of the newly acquired political power of the Arab oil producing countries. The Saudis realized that their economic strength might provide some political leverage. From then on, and especially after the 1976 assassination of the conservative King Faisal, the Saudis quietly but with increasing self-confidence were emerging as the dominant force in the Arab Middle East politics and probably a key power on the Arab side in negotiations with Israel.
Thus, the Saudi security and diplomatic objectives could be viewed as two-fold: one to prevent the radicalization of any additional Arab state, and secondly, to bring about a favourable conclusion to the major Middle East dispute. These objectives were shared by Iran, as was evidenced in pronouncements after successive visits by the Shah and the Saudi Arabian rulers to each other's country.

The Shah found Saudis in complete agreement over his views about the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. The two countries created a harmonious working relationship which was surprising to those who foresaw a clash between the two states over the dominance of the Persian Gulf affairs after the British withdrawal. Iran's decision regarding Bahrain was an important step toward a closer relationship with the kingdom. In the same context, the outstanding dispute directly affecting the two countries, that of the continental shelf boundaries was resolved amicably in 1968, and they compromised on the sovereignty of the islands of Farsi and Al-Arabi as well. As is observed later (Ch. 6, Part 2), the Saudis supported the Shah, his policies, and his governments even after his fall.

Of one of the countries in the region, Iraq, one could say that Iran in the period under study experienced relationships that could be described as less than cordial. Though the state of the affairs improved after the settlement of the Shatt al-Arab issue during the Algiers Summit of 1975 and persisted until 1979, this single question has often clouded the relationship between the two countries and resulted in border clashes and minor incidents before 1975 and a full-scale war after the fall of the Shah.

The origins of the disputes could be traced back to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and ensuing British administration of lands adjacent to Iran. In 1937, a treaty was concluded with the newly independent Iraq. This agreement sorted out the boundary disputes and in case of the Shatt al-Arab waterway called for the river to remain open on equal terms to the
vessels of all countries, but to the war vessels of the two contracting parties. By this treaty, a commission was to be established for the administration of the river. This never materialized and formed the basis of the Iranian claims that the Iraqis did not comply with the treaty.

Further moves to bring about a change did not succeed because of claims and counter claims. The Iraqi government's insistence of the 1937 treaty as a point of departure and the Iranian view that it was void were the reasons behind this failure. Iran believed that the treaty was invalid because the joint administrations, the preamble to the treaty, had never complied with; that the treaty was imposed by Britain, and that it was contrary to the international law and the principle of thalweg. This last point was to be given as the stumbling block to any future agreement by Iran which clearly could not recognize the Iraqi sovereignty of the river up to low Iranian water-mark as was given under the 1937 treaty.

After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, the new government extended its claim on the waterway to twelve miles. The Iranian government followed suit. In 1959, the Iraqi authorities several times interfered with Iranian ships. When the Iranian government expressed its dissatisfaction with these actions, the Iraqi response was to extend its claim to the entire waterway. Iran's response was military preparation.102

A further development in the relations of the two countries concerned the position of the minorities in Iraq, especially the Kurds. The Kurdish communities actively opposed a military union between Iraq and Egypt which was signed in March, 1964. These oppositions caused the Iraqi authorities to become suspicious of Iran, claiming that Iran was encouraging this opposition. They also proclaimed the south-western Iranian province of Khuzistan as part of the Arab lands calling it Arabistan. The Syrians joined in as well, a move which resulted in Iran closing its embassy in Damascus and recalling

its ambassador.

The relations between the two countries improved and marginal agreements were reached as a result of some goodwill visits by the Iraqi head of state and the Iranian Prime Minister in the period 1966-68. This was in part due to the new realities that would have had to be faced in the region after the announcement of the British withdrawal. However, the basic differences remained. 103

An agreement between the Kurds and the Iraqi government in March, 1970, signalled the change in Baghdad's priorities and somewhat neutralized an Iranian instrument of pressure on Iraq. Relations were further deteriorated when Iraq protested about the repossession of the three Persian Gulf islands by Iran in 1971. Furthermore, Iraq began expelling the Iranian residents in Iraq, and severing diplomatic relations with both Iran and Britain.

In 1973, the border incidents and clashes reached a new peak. Iraq complained to the United Nations Security Council which called for a cease-fire and sent a special representative to investigate the dispute. The ceasefire persisted until the agreement of 1975 which restored Iranian rights, the recognition of the thalweg principle, and led to the resumption of diplomatic activity. 104

In 1975-1979, the main Iraqi preoccupation in the region was to improve their strained relations with the Persian

103. Ibid., pp. 185-186.

Gulf shaikhdoms and Kuwait. The main Kuwait worry is Iraq's claim to a slice of its territory and to two islands at the mouth of the river leading to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. These claims were accompanied by Iranian protestations. In 1961, the situation became serious for Kuwait when a blockade was mounted by Iraq preventing the sale and transportation of food and material goods to that country. This was eased when Iran supplied food to Kuwait by sending daily launches.

With an indigenous population of under one million and her vast oil revenue, Kuwait is a rich country, but she is not strong militarily. As a result their best bet has been to maintain friendly relations with their neighbouring countries. In countering Iraq, the Kuwaitis could seriously doubt the reliability of Arab support in a conflict. The only insurance for them in the past two decades was Iran.

The Kuwaitis increasingly departed from the Saudi line in matters concerning the Arab solidarity. For example, they deferred sharply with the Saudis on the interpretation and application of the 1969 Cairo agreement regarding Lebanon, taking much more pro-Palestinian stand, and they disagreed on the question of raising the oil prices. Among the Persian Gulf states, Kuwait was the only one to ascribe to a non-aligned foreign policy, maintaining diplomatic relations with both Russia and China.

In securing her foreign policy objectives in the Persian Gulf region, Iran, inter alia, devoted much energy toward improving relations with Egypt with the aim of its neutralization. Though there was a degree of competition between the two countries earlier, the relations improved and could be best described as excellent in the 1970's.

After the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the relations between the two countries entered into a new era. There were political disagreements and hostility between the two governments. The main cause for Iranian concern was Nasser's policy in the
Persian Gulf, and his interference in the affairs of the neighbouring Arab countries. Nasser was a vociferous campaigner against the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, the mainstay of the Iranian defensive measures. He encouraged the Kurdish minorities to rise, encouraged the revolution in Iraq, and supported the revolutionary elements in Yemen with an army of 50,000 men. The Iranian government viewed this involvement as "expansionist" and considered it a military threat.

The danger of Nasser's activities in Yemen lay not in a direct attack on the oil fields of the Arabian Peninsula or an invasion of the shaikhdoms, but rather on the tremors of instability his presence might cause in the region, and possibly, on the inadvertent expansion of the conflict. Nasser's encouragement of a Kurdish rebellion elicited him an Iranian note of protest in 1958. His interference in Lebanon was viewed with deep apprehension by the Iranian government.

Iran's relations with Israel also posed a problem in dealing with the Egyptians. This caused a ten-year rupture in relations between the two countries. Iran had extended de facto recognition to Israel in 1950, and had set up a consulate in that country. In July, 1960, the Shah, in answer to a question at a press conference, routinely affirmed that de facto recognition had been granted. President Nasser interpreted this statement as formal recognition of Israel by Iran, and severed diplomatic relations.

Concluding that the Egyptian regime posed a military threat to the region and possibly even the threat of direct invasion, the Iranian reaction was to coordinate support for royalists in Yemen with the Saudi and Jordanian cooperation and to formally denounce Nasser's action in Yemen as an act of aggression.

A change in attitudes came about in 1967-68. Although

the Iranian government was a beneficiary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war politically as well as economically, immediately after the war Iran announced that Israel should evacuate the occupied territories. Iran also provided humanitarian relief aid through the Red Cross. The coup in Baghdad in July, 1968 and Iraq's subsequent activities in opposition to the Egyptian approach to a settlement with Israel, and Iran's policies in the Persian Gulf, all resulted in the two countries finding each other on the same side in opposition to an Arab state, Iraq. In May, 1970, the Shah commented in a press conference upon the changed Egyptian attitudes toward Iran, and the following month special envoys were exchanged by the two states to examine the resumption of diplomatic relations.

In 1970, the diplomatic relations between Iran and Egypt were restored. The Egyptian foreign minister, in a conversation with the Iranian Prime Minister, stated that "the Egyptian government supported the Iranian policy in the Persian Gulf." In 1971 the Egyptian reaction to the seizure of the three islands was moderate. She refused to join some of the Arab countries in complaining to the United Nations, and it did not follow the Iraqi suggestion in the Arab League for rupturing relations with Iran.106

For closer cooperation with Egypt, the Iranian government signed an agreement in 1974 to help Egypt in the reconstruction of Port Said through a financial package. In 1975, the Iranian leader visited Egypt and offered increases in oil deliveries to Israel as an incentive to its withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields. The construction of an oil refinery was also financed by Iranian aid. And in April 1975, when President Sadat visited Iran, the Shah declared Iran in full agreement with the Egyptian President on the Arab-Israeli dispute.107


With regard to Israel, Iran continued its de facto recognition of Israel and maintained friendly relations with that country. The Iranian government and its agencies considered Israel as one model of development for Iran, particularly in the field of agriculture and water resources. Formal and private sector assistance agreements between the two countries were negotiated. The cooperation extended to the fields of petroleum export to Israel, development projects, trade, air transport, military training, technical assistance, the training of co-op managers, and tacit political support in relations with the Arab states.

Iran's relations with Israel gave it more maneuverability in its dealings with the Arab countries. The Iranian government believed that it was in the best interest of Israel to seek an agreement with the Arab states because in the long term, the Jewish state could not sustain the burden of military preparedness which it has had continuously to shoulder. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute would also have given the Soviet Union fewer openings to seek influence in the Arab world, and therefore, less opportunity to try to outflank and encircle Iran strategically and politically.

Iran consistently supported the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, the Iranian government defended Israel's right to take vigorous action against terrorist attacks. But the prevailing Iranian view was that it was in Israel's interest to seek an agreement with her Arab neighbours.

Iran's relations with Pakistan and Turkey, joint members of the Central Treaty Organization and RCD have been examined elsewhere in this study. On Afghanistan, Iran maintained friendly relations coupled with economic aid to that country. An issue of concern was the allocation of water distribution from the border river of Hilmaad and the positions of dams. This question was finally resolved comprehensively in an agreement reached with the Kabul government in March 1973.

108 See Ch. 4, pp. 252. 264.
during the last days of the monarchy in Afghanistan.

On July 17, 1973, the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Mohammad Daoud, aided by elements of loyal army officers staged a coup and ousted King Zahir. Daoud proclaimed Afghanistan as a republic and declared neutrality and non-alignment as his foreign policy goals. True to its tradition, the new Afghanistan remained a neutral country. However, fear was expressed in Iran that Daoud might adopt a pro-Soviet tendency in his neutralism. This fear was compounded by the fact that the young officers were mostly Soviet-trained. This was proved to be unfounded because of the new regimes international behaviour which the Iranians found responsible.

Furthermore, Daoud policy of neutrality began to show a tilt toward Iran and Saudi Arabia and a greater reliance upon economic assistance from the West. It was at this time that a $2 billion aid programme was received from Iran. The new government, to the relief of the Iranians, also honoured the Hilmand agreement.

The friendly relations thus continued until 1979. But in the meantime one of the Shah's greatest preoccupations materialized in the form of a Marxist-oriented coup in April 1978. A few months before his fall, the Shah witnessed the becoming of Afghanistan a Soviet satellite and thus contributing to the Communist encirclement of Iran.

After years of tension due partly to Iran's association with Pakistan in CENTO, the Shah moved for a better relation with India in the early 1970's. In the case of China, he was quick to see that Peking's desire to prevent an extension of Soviet hegemony in Asia may act as a restraining force on Moscow's naval activities in the Indian Ocean.

Both Iran and India found it easy to have mutual economic cooperation, although they had ideological differences. Since the explosion of the oil prices, Iran provided three-fourths
of India's oil needs. The Indo-Iranian cooperation had benefits for Iran, including counterbalancing the rise of Arab Power in the West by India in the East, encouraging India's reorientation toward the United States and reduction of dependence on the Soviet Union, as well as satisfying Iran's own needs for iron and building materials. For Iran, the Indian subcontinent had great importance because it was considered to be an area which impinges directly on Iran's security interests. Only a stable subcontinent could further Iran's efforts toward evolving a security community.

The relations between the two regional powers, rested on mutual security interests. India is secure in the region while Iran was removed from the turmoil in the Middle East. India's claimed preponderance in the subcontinent was not contested by Iran, while during Iran's dispute with Iraq, India remained neutral.

In its policy of keeping the Indian Ocean free of superpower rivalries, Iran was able to achieve the support of China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf area. In 1971, a few months before the British withdrawal from the area, Iran established diplomatic relations with China. The two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors and Iran also accepted the People's Republic of China as the only lawful government of China.

Part of the reason for the Iranian government's recognition of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China in 1971 was to neutralize a potential source of support for the opposition groups. This recognition caused a setback for the Chinese from supporting the South Yemen regime and the Dhofari rebellion against Iran.

A leading Iranian career diplomat, Abbas Aram, was appointed as Iranian ambassador to Peking in March, 1972, and in April, the Chinese envoy arrived in Iran. Since then, both sides tried to expand their relations in trade and communications. Iran Air was the first international airline linking Peking, Tehran and Europe. During the five-day visit of Empress Farah in April, 1973, a trade agreement was concluded which called for exports of chemical fertilizers, agricultural equipment, buses and trucks, to China, and the importation of papers, stationery, tea and fabrics from that country.\textsuperscript{110}

In June, 1973, for the first time, the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a visit to Iran. He publicly endorsed the Iranian policy toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This trip was useful for both sides, the air agreement with Iran provided the Chinese a direct air route to their allies in Eastern Europe. The political relation with Iran was a good opportunity for China to initiate moves to other Middle Eastern countries. For Iran, this relation was fruitful too; it meant that Iran's policy in the Persian Gulf created a safeguard against the Soviet ties with Iraq and other Indian Ocean nations.\textsuperscript{111}

The concern of the Iranian government over the situation in the Persian Gulf was increased, as was pointed out earlier, in the early 1960's. The Egyptian move to the Persian Gulf in 1960 caused the Shah of Iran to realize that any step in the direction of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in the north could pay off in Iran's greater ability to handle the situation in the south. Underlying internal reasons for this assessment were determination to consolidate royal power, to launch basic socio-economic reforms, and to pursue a more independent course in world politics.

\textsuperscript{110} R.K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy," 1975, pp. 430-432.

\textsuperscript{111} Current History, LXVI, no. 390 (Feb. 1974), p. 66.
Since the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the projected Iranian policy was not to agree with a new form of great power rivalry in the area and the Indian Ocean. The costs of maintaining the British forces was a minimal insurance premium for the huge revenues derived by the Western oil companies from their Persian Gulf operations. Without the British presence, the Persian Gulf, it was argued, might become an area of persistent unrest in which local conflicts between rival Arab states and subversive movements, as well as international tensions between Arabs and Persians could erupt and be exploited by the Soviet Union, and thus endangering Western strategic and petroleum interests and supplies.

The British withdrawal contained two important aspects: the first was the military one which involved the recall of almost 6,000 British ground troops stationed in Bahrain and Sharjah, together with their air support units. The second aspect involved the political implication of the decision which formally meant the termination of the old treaties of protection and their replacement by a simple treaty of friendship. 112

It was against this background that the security of the Persian Gulf was perceived in a new light by Iran and a new policy was projected. For Iran, it was natural to assume her historic responsibilities in the region. The Iranian government rejected the concept of a military vacuum which must be filled by an external power, even if it applied to the United States. In Tehran the belief was, long before the Guam

112. It ought to be noted, however, that Britain did not "withdraw" from the region to all intents and purposes. The British retained some of their political influence and have tried to foster good will and invest on their friendly relations with the conservative Arabs. Moreover, they have intensified their commercial links. Military links have also continued in the form of supplying advisors, sales, joint manoeuvres, and patrols of friendly waters.
declarations by President Nixon, that the U.S. could no longer play the role of an international gendarme. Though these views had some correlation with the state of affairs in CENTO and the aired dissatisfaction of Iran with the alliance, nonetheless they suited the new developments as well. Chubin and Zabih believe:

"Iran's opposition to a foreign presence in the Gulf should be viewed in the light of its lack of faith in the benefits of a Western presence and a definite apprehension as to the consequences of non-Western power's presence... The Iranian government doubted that benefits of substituting the United States for the British presence would outweigh the undoubted costs, this would entail in terms of the extension of superpower rivalry into the Gulf."\textsuperscript{113}

The Iranian interest in the Indian Ocean was always closely related to the protection of the sea routes for the transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf against hostile groups. The Shah often elaborated on his view that Iran's vital interest in maintaining her shipments of oil to the rest of the world did not stop at the Strait of Hormuz. To this end Iran tried to obtain stability in the Indian Ocean region through military and economic means. The construction of air bases and naval facilities in Chah Bahar in the Gulf of Oman across the Irano-Pakistani border was a decisive step in that direction. Iran also purchased a squadron of P-3 Orion aircraft which have an anti-submarine warfare capability. These aircraft can remain aloft for fourteen hours, and therefore giving Iran a reconnaissance capability beyond Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.\textsuperscript{114}

Iran's foreign policy aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Persian Gulf while at the same time expanding Iranian influence within that framework. This policy objective included the containment and isolation of radical forces in the

\textsuperscript{113} S. Chubin & S. Zabih, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 247.
\textsuperscript{114} Alvin J. Cottrell, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 34.
area and attempts to weaken them. Political stability in the region was a precondition for opening the area to Iranian goods and security for raw materials supplies, in short for economic penetration which in turn could serve political stability. Moreover, Iran's overall interests in the Arab world were essentially extensions of those in the Persian Gulf area. Protection of the regime against internal subversion sponsored directly or indirectly by hostile Arab states, or groups, or by Soviet proxy considered to be quite important. On par with this were the primary objectives in the general area of the Middle East, i.e., neutralization and curtailment of Soviet power and influence, isolation of radicals, and the outflanking of any rival power. To cite a more specific example, the objective of preserving free transit through the international waters of the Persian Gulf was reflected in Iran's interest in freedom of navigation through the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The regional role projected by Iran clearly rested upon two pillars of its armed forces and its economic strength. The capability and the growth achieved in these two areas enabled her to enforce its position. Thus, Edward Kennedy argued:

"In Tehran there is a firm and definite commitment to turn economic potential into political influence and military power, not just in the Gulf, but also beyond. Leaders of that country now see it as part of the Gulf and West Asia, with wider interests and ambitions, extending into the Indian Ocean. So far, none of the other oil-producing states have yet approached a stage of development where it could seriously hope to rival Iran. While Saudi Arabia and Iraq have sufficient oil resources, their development is bound to proceed slowly ... Saudi Arabia's small population is a built-in constraint and even importing a million or so "government workers," could not give it real chance of rivalling Iran in economic development for years to come."

It was in accordance with these new realities that a new concept evolved in Tehran, i.e., the security perimeter. The Shah elaborated on this in a speech he gave to the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Navy in November 1972. For Iran to be safe, he indicated, it should look far beyond its own immediate region. He admitted that until three or four years before he only had the defence of the Persian Gulf in mind, but:

"then came events that forced us to think of the Gulf of Oman and Iran's coast there. Then other events in the world taught us that the sea contiguous to the Gulf of Oman, and I mean the Indian Ocean, recognizes no frontiers."

Hence, Iran was no longer merely thinking of defending Abadan, Bushehr, or even Hormuz and Bandar Abbas. "We are not even thinking merely of defending Jask and Chah-Bahar," he declared. Furthermore:

"We are thinking of Iran's security perimeter and I am not speaking in terms of a few kilometers. Anyone versed in geographical, strategic matters and especially in possibilities of naval and air forces of today would guess how distant that frontier could be from Chah-Bahar." 116

This projected Iranian move, as we have seen, also brought Chinese endorsement for the Iranian proposals of regional cooperation for security of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. A similar acknowledgement was given by Mrs. Ghandi who endorsed the Iranian leader's proposal to cooperate with the littoral states for the same purpose and she agreed with the Shah's stated aim that the great powers should keep out of the area.

Iran and India enjoyed the status of being the two largest military powers in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. Both agreed in keeping the Indian Ocean free of American-Soviet rivalry, and both backed the UN-sponsored resolution tabled by Sri Lanka on keeping it free as a peace zone. But for Iran,

the superpower rivalry was a fact, deeply rooted in its history. Therefore, Iran was on the side of her ally, the United States, with whom she shared the strategic interest of safeguarding the Persian Gulf from Soviet naval encroachment. The 1972 Treaty of Friendship between Iraq and the Soviet Union and the granting of naval facilities, a base, in Umm Qasr to the Russians delivered a blow to this aspiration and required counter-measures. The local balance in the Persian Gulf ultimately related to the overall strategic balance between the superpowers. For Iran, there were political and practical limits to the country's regional influence; and as such the Iraqi-Soviet move was accompanied by the Iranian desire to see the U.S. flag in the Persian Gulf via the base in Bahrain. 117

In a visit to Southeast Asia (Oct. 1974), the Shah still further elaborated on the Iranian policy objectives with regard to the Indian Ocean. He visited India, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, arguing for an "Asian Common Market." He envisaged a community which would cooperate extensively in economic matters as well as the establishment of a collective security system based on a "military understanding" among the nations of the Indian Ocean. The community would have comprised of Iran, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. 118 This idea never got off the ground due to the political differences and economic incompatibilities of the proposed members. It only underscored an already established fact, i.e., the relentless energy devoted to the promotion of an Indian Ocean free from superpowers by Iran.


In conclusion, one ought to say that, despite Iranian assurances about their objectives in the Persian Gulf, the Arab states did not accept Iran's leadership in the area. Apart from the apparent historical reasons, they even sought to challenge this supremacy through competition in arms. In this context, Edward Kennedy viewed the situation thus:

"A modest challenge already seems to be developing, and it is fed by recurrent speculation around the Gulf about the possibility of Iranian ambitions toward other oil-rich states, as its own oil reserves begin to dwindle. Certainly, despite the Shah's recent approaches to his neighbours, there is still a keen awareness in neighbouring Arab states of Iran's continuing role as Israel's principal source of oil, and memories of Iran's seizure of three Gulf islands, Abu Musa and the Tunbs, in 1971."119

Despite Iran's renounced claim to Bahrain in 1970, Enver Koury pointed out that, "Iran might reassert that claim." He further noted that "such a policy change might be justified on the basis of either the assumption of power by an un-friendly government or the need to protect Bahrain's Iranian minorities."120 Significant Iranian minorities are found in many other Persian Gulf shaikhdoms, and some of these small states were reportedly pressured by Tehran to allow ever increasing immigration of Iranian citizens. Dale R. Tahtinen, commented that such action by Iran "... are tactically important because significant numbers of Iranians in the shaikhdoms would give Tehran an ostensible excuse for intervention at any time." He further concluded that "Indeed, the immigration policy appears to be in line with the Shah's stated intention of guaranteeing the security of the region."121

As it was examined, Iran's regional and international

foreign policy since 1968 was transformed from basically an extension of its alliance policy to a new and assertive role. This transformation was the result of local and international events, and was partly based on the consequence of bargaining between Moscow and Washington following the Cuban missiles crisis after the blockade of Cuba, which led to the superpowers to lower tension at the global level and in the countries of the Middle East notably in Turkey and Iran. Changes in the power structure of the Middle Eastern states, due to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 also decreased the pressure of Nasserism and Arab Nationalism in the Persian Gulf area. Finally the announcement and later departure of the British forces from the area offered a favourable opportunity for the change of the Iranian regional role.

The first indication of Iranian change in foreign policy came after the Cuban missile crisis, when the Shah told President Kennedy that he no longer wished the United States to use its option of placing missile sites in Iran. At little cost to Iran, this one move opened the door finally to talks with the Soviets. This improvement in relations was more visible in the course of the Shah's visits to Moscow and the further economic and cultural exchange agreement that were concluded. The Western countries were alarmed by these ties, but it was soon clear that the Shah remained solidly in their camp.

This diplomatic move by Iran gradually changed its traditional preoccupation with the Soviet Union and consequently enabled it to shift its troop concentration southward to a greater concern for what it perceived to be a more menacing threat of Arab socialism. The Middle Eastern events during the 1960's have moved steadily in Iran's favour. The challenge from the Arab world, was muted when Egypt was defeated in the 1967 war, thereby enhancing the Iranian position in the Persian Gulf region.

The Iranian alliance with Israel, though implicit and not
by treaty, was mutually advantageous. Israeli cooperation gave Iran great political and military manoeuverability in the area, especially against the Arab states.\textsuperscript{122} Iran benefitted economically from the 1967 war, by increasing oil production during the short-lived Arab oil embargo; and after the war, Iran once again became the largest oil producer in the Persian Gulf.

Another favourable factor which cleared the path for Iran to assume a more active role was the 1968 announcement of the British military and political withdrawal from the area which finally took place in 1971. With the Iranian decision to assume responsibility for the security of navigation within the Persian Gulf, and especially through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran embarked upon a military build up and expansion programme, supported by the United States and Britain, with the intention of assuming a regional hegemonical role.

The Shah made no secret that he had earmarked an expansion programme for the armed forces with the intention of becoming the arbiter of Persian Gulf affairs once the British withdrew.\textsuperscript{123} To demonstrate this and to obtain complete physical control over the Strait of Hormuz, a day before the British protectorate was terminated, Iranian troops landed on the strategic islands of Tumbs and Abu Musa. Iran's claim to these islands had a historical basis, but the Shah's pragmatic determination to acquire them resulted from the Iranian belief that they were strategically necessary to Iran, because in unfriendly hands they could provide bases from which Iran's vital shipping routes might be attacked. A recent incident was fresh in the Iranian minds. On June 11, an Israeli tanker, entering the Red


Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb Straits, had been fired upon with rockets from a small boat which appeared to come from the South Yemeni island of Perim. A Palestinian group claimed responsibility for the attack.

Since the announcement of the British withdrawal, the Iranian government paid greater attention to improving its commercial and cultural relations with the Persian Gulf states. In order to promote exports to these states, especially the Trucial States, Iran resorted to a variety of measures in the 1960's. Centralization of export activities, abolition of exchange restrictions on the export of fruits and vegetables, exchange visits of businessmen, facilitation of custom duties, and reduction in the price of a whole range of manufactured goods from cigarettes to white goods were among these measures.

The new Iranian strategy, as seen, called for both a rapid military build-up to create a credible deterrent and the wise use of diplomatic channels. The Iranians argued that their strategy was in tandem with the West and the American interests in particular. The clear indication of U.S. acceptance of such a strategy was aired by a change in U.S. policy after the British announcement. Iran had been receiving considerable economic and military aid from the U.S. The American reliance on the proposed role of Iran broke down the traditional reluctance to sell Iran modern, sophisticated weapons.124

In seeking formal cooperative arrangements with the Persian Gulf states, in January 1968 Iran articulated an interest in playing an active role in the area's defence and announced its support for cooperation between the Persian Gulf states and its readiness to participate in "any form of regional

cooperation for the defence of the area. This initiative would have been the theoretically most useful step on behalf of the collective security in the region. Such a pact or treaty would have defined various threats, provided for a joint defence command and decreased the opportunity for hostile groups to intervene either militarily or by subversion.

In the absence of the necessary political understanding, however, the idea of a formal security agreement did not get off the ground. Moreover, Iran's military development long exceeded that of any other country with the exception of Iraq. But because of the wide ideological schism between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Iraq's virtual state of undeclared war with Iran, Iraq could in no way assume a balancing role vis-a-vis Iran on behalf of the Arab states. Iran's increasingly open support for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq as well as Israeli assistance to the Iraqi Kurds created a joint Iranian-Israeli effort in the eyes of the Arabs. As a result, the Iranian offer was met with a resounding Arab silence.

A second Iranian effort was also rebuffed in June 1969. In his interview with the Times of London, the Shah stated:

"We would be willing, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, to provide protection to the Gulf states. Our paratroops and armoured regiments at Shiraz can give them as much protection as the British forces in the area today which would probably

125. The Times, Jan. 10, 1968, and Daily Telegraph, Jan. 10, 1968. Iranian government from 1968 devoted increased attention to improving commercial and cultural relations with the Persian Gulf states. The Economist (Oct. 31, 1970) in regards to their relations pointed out that, "the Shah may embrace Faisal, he may dine the Shaikhs in Tehran and allow their great hunting parties on his side of the water, he may (and he does) supply them with schools, hospitals, teachers, and doctors, not to mention a few handfuls of workers a day from southern Persia putting to Dubai and other Arab ports. Indeed he has a national interest in getting the Arab Shaikhs to be more enlightened rulers. Yet the scope of anti-Iranian rhetoric in Arabia remains. "His hospitals," says one cynical Arab most unfairly, "are on our side of the Gulf to deal with dead when Iran invades." The ancient suspicion is present everywhere, and it prevents formal defence cooperation as Shah openly concedes."

126. See Ramazani, "Iran's Role," op. cit., p. 91.
not fight anyway if the situation became serious ...
We would like to see a common defence policy established
for the area. We would propose that the Persian Gulf be­
come a closed area, and that the port of Bahrain be used as
a joint base." 

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf never reacted en­
thusiastically to these calls. Iran, after all, was still a
fully-fledged member of CENTO, and, however much the Shah
may censure the impotence of the organization in military terms,
CENTO symbolism in Arab eyes remained a factor. Iran's
special relationship with Israel could, on the Arab side of the
equation, raise the question whether shared military secrets
might be passed from Tehran to Tel Aviv. Moreover, any formal
alliance or security pact with Iran could have been construed
as endorsing various Iranian claims rejected by the Arab
states.

The Iranian government's reaction to the Persian Gulf
states was the modification of its policy and a move toward
adopting a posture of self-reliance and discarding the idea
of formed cooperation in the defence of the area. Therefore,
Iran should waste no time and effort in securing its own posi­
tion by 1971, so that it would be able to maintain the Persian
Gulf's security either in cooperation with regional estates,
or its own capability. In conjunction with this, Iran firmly
asserted its claim to the three islands in the area of the
Strait of Hormuz.

Following this policy modification, the Iranian govern­
ment then expressed its concern over the stability of the
Persian Gulf states and the danger of the radical movements
within the Arabian Peninsula. At the same time its anxiety
was accelerated over the inability of the Persian Gulf states
to contribute meaningfully to the regional defence. Iran as
the Persian Gulf naval power and with a long history of
maritime experience behind her could not count on the probable
future developments and would proceed to assume its responsibil­

This self-reliance manifested itself soon afterwards. To project its willingness for the detention of spread of radical movements in the region, and to underline its leadership capabilities regionally, the small contingent of Iranian advisory involvement in Oman transformed into a full-scale one when Iran complied with the Sultan of Muscat at Oman's request and sent several thousand troops to Oman in Dec. 1973 to combat the Marxist-oriented Dhofari rebellion. The Iranian presence in the Omani war was at first concealed and denied by Muscat. While Iraq and Libya protested at the intervention, the major Arab states tried to avoid commenting, and participated covertly in Tehran-Muscat cooperation.

On a pragmatic and practical level, the conservative Arab states, despite their overt resentment of the Iranian's assertive role in the region, did welcome its defiant counter-insurgency action in the Arabia Peninsula. These Arab states simply lacked the military capability to mount such a campaign. The only state which could perhaps play a part was Iraq which due to its so-called Arab-Socialist ideology found itself on the side of the insurgents and thus had to withdraw behind the scene.

The Iranian government derived concrete benefits from its intervention in Oman, the only direct campaign under the proclaimed Iranian objectives in the Persian Gulf within the period under study. Iran was able to increase its influence on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf at the expense of Saudi Arabia, and was able to train its crack troops - 'Special Forces,' Rangers, utilizing its weaponry; and in its crudest term it facilitated on-the-job training for Iranian armed forces. The Iranian troop deployment also followed a rotation system. A few times a year fresh troops were sent to Oman to replace the existing ones, in order to provide the maximum opportunity to maximum number of troops to have a choice of fighting in such an environment and gain valuable
practical experience. The performance of the Iranian armed forces greatly improved with time, and this large-scale rebellion itself was decisively crushed in just over two and a half years.

The Iranian leadership made no secret of its concern for security in Oman, a manifestation of Tehran's new active role in the region. The Shah himself was direct in his comments upon the radical movements in the area. Thus, in an interview with Newsweek he stated:

"... If it (the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf) even succeeded just try to imagine what we could be faced with in Muscat, the capital, right in front of the Strait of Hormuz. At first a few rifles, and then naval guns and missiles. It's a familiar pattern. I cannot tolerate subversive activities - and by that I mean anything that is imposed from the outside ... they (Omani government) asked for our help and we sent it."

After the collapse of the rebellion, the Iranian troops returned home. This withdrawal proved those quarters in the Arab world wrong when they had claimed that the Dhofar campaign represented the beginning of a permanent Iranian military foothold on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. The Omani war proved to be highly significant for Iran in the context of Iranian-Arab cooperation. While Saudi Arabia clearly would have preferred to have been the intervening power, and undoubtedly viewed Iranian actions with mixed envy and concern, the fact remained that, instead of Iranian-Arab tension and hostility that was to have seriously jeopardized Persian Gulf stability, a successful joint military campaign was mounted against what was clearly recognized as a common threat. Oman's somewhat isolated position within the Arab world did not detract from the new impetus of cooperation in the Persian Gulf that the successful Iranian intervention represented. Earlier examples of a Saudi Arabian and Iranian confluence of military interests should not be overlooked. Both countries cooperated in supporting Yemeni royalists during the 1962-1968 civil war and Iran loaned military equipment to Saudi

Arabia in 1969 when the South Yemeni forces were violating the Saudi borders.

Thus, it must be stressed that Iran's foreign policy in the last two decades, particularly in the period 1968-1979, was formulated and designed to assist in the achievement of the Shah's vision and the government's ambitions for Iran as a regional predominant power. To achieve that goal the Iranian government embarked on an active role in the region in order to demonstrate its intentions. As the study reveals, Iran did not receive support and/or favourable reaction from the regional Arab states towards its policies for the security of the Persian Gulf to the extent that it had to assume a self-reliance posture and go it alone.
PART III:

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 6: Iran and her Security Towards the end of 1970's.

6.1 An Assessment: Emergence as a Regional Hegemonical Power

The changes that occur in a state's material and political basis of power are significant indications of its potential to alter its power position within the region and within the international arena as a whole. The idea that a country has become a regional dominant state logically implies that it has changed its relationship significantly vis-a-vis other states in the region, that it has assumed a distinctively different posture (more assertive and independent) from that which it previously held (passive, or "low-profile"), and that this change has had an effect upon the global system by making either that particular state or the region of which it is a part a more substantial factor in international politics. Or conversely, it can be seen in changes in the attitudes and behaviour of the superpowers and other states toward such a state—in this case Iran.

The purpose of this part of the study is to examine the causes or conditions which helped Iran to alter its role. The role of a regional hegemonical power, or of an aspirant to that role, has been marked by what Leonard Bindercalls, "growing potential for stabilizing or destabilizing international affairs in the Persian Gulf." The period under investigation here is 1968-1979.

The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are of major and growing importance to the developed economic and military powers as well as to the developing and underdeveloped countries. In the period under study, the great powers and their rivalries were being drawn into an area already under a keen arms race between the regional states for the supremacy and control of the Persian Gulf. Even before the energy crisis

of 1973, the problems of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean posed serious threats to economic stability and world peace.

Growing concern about this area could be seen in May 1974's UN Secretary General's report, submitted to the General Assembly, which dealt primarily with the military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of great power rivalry. Its conclusion was that a strategic naval arms race would ensue if the United States upgraded the Diego Garcia facilities into a base. This was, of course, a part of the new American strategic thinking which also touched upon the U.S. allies in different regions of the world and their responsibilities in security matters.

In conjunction with the above, the Persian Gulf region contains more than 60% of the world's proven reserves of oil. The functioning of the present-day industrial society is still dependent on it, though there is evidence that this relationship might not be as vital as it was thought of in the 1970's. However, it can be argued that oil can sustain its significance in the near-term future, as in the past, when it was bound to become the object of rivalry and conflict, giving to the countries possessing it power and influence.

The importance of geography to the national security environments of aspiring regional powers could not be underestimated. So is their location relative to the lines of post-war superpower confrontation. Many of the most heavily armed among them are roughly located along the arc around Eurasia stretching from Turkey to South Korea, first drawn by the United States at the inception of the Cold War. In addition, resource location cannot be overlooked in this context in determining strategic value.

As such, Iran which is located at the head of the Persian Gulf, and a major oil producer, has always had some diplomatic
importance lying as it does between an area of traditional Russian and British sphere of influence. For much of the nineteenth century London viewed Persia as the defensive perimeter of the Indian Empire. Tzarist Russia looked upon Iran as a natural area for expansion. This role as the arena for clashing Russian and British interests was greatly magnified by its new found economic and strategic importance in the clash between the West and the Eastern bloc. This reinforced the political importance, geographical, strategic, and mineral wise, of the area for the world today.²

The outstanding change in the Persian Gulf area has been the discovery and exploitation of oil resources. It is often forgotten just how recent is the growth of the Persian Gulf oil industry. The first discovery was made in Iran at Masjed Sulaiman during the spring of 1908, but oil fields on the Arabian Peninsula were not tapped until the 1930's. In 1939, the Middle East accounted for less than six percent of the total world oil production. This figure had expanded to thirty per cent of the world output by 1971.

On the basis of its new-found wealth and strategic importance, the role of the Persian Gulf and states lying along it have changed immensely. From an underdeveloped country, barely able to defend itself against Portuguese, Russian and British intrusion, Iran acquired a significantly different posture in regional and international politics. The intensification of this role came about in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, when the Shah concluded that Iran must be prepared to defend its interest locally due to the inability of CENTC and US policy in that war which made it clear that Iran could expect no assistance from Washington if she became involved in local hostilities. The announcement and withdrawal of Britain from East of Suez made the task that much easier.

Coupled with the foregoing, the emergence of regions and of regional states to positions of importance in the modern global setting is accounted for in part by changes in the international system. The roots of regional development in international politics could be traced if some features of the present period were to be delineated.

First, international politics have now become globalized. This feature is clearly indicated by Henry Kissinger when he argues that: "... every nation, no matter how insignificant, participates in international affairs, and what used to be considered a domestic event can now have worldwide consequences."\(^3\)

Second, the geographical scope and unity of the field of international politics is matched by the intensity of modern technology. The combination of unprecedented delivery systems in the forms of missiles, which are capable of reaching any point in the world within half an hour, and of thermonuclear weapons, has combined to transform the meaning of warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a consequence of this condition "... the usability of the military has decreased largely because the costs of using force have risen, and this development alone has made the probability that a nation will employ military power smaller and more contingent."\(^4\) The logical consequence of this has been a) to enhance the power potential of lesser states possessing other than military forms of power; and b) to enhance the significance of regions and regional power configurations for the two superpowers.

Third, the global bipolar distribution of power prevalent in the decades following World War II has been giving way to a more diffuse distribution. A consequence of this change is that either of the two superpowers when contemplating the use of military power against another, must consider not just the

intervention of the other great power, but the utility of the employment of military power even against a significantly weaker state. This prospect naturally inhibits resort to military power unless the purposes are very compelling. A further consequence, in conjunction with the second feature is that the inhibition on the resort to military power at the strategic level has resulted in the enhancement of the power potential of those lesser states possessing regional capabilities. This in turn has given states in certain regions a significant status that they would not otherwise have. Yet these states are often dependent on external supply of arms.

Fourth, technological developments have widened the gap between the most rich, powerful, and the weakest states. The independence and division of the Asian and African continents into a number of generally smaller states, both politically and economically underdeveloped, has given rise to forms of domestic and regional conflict that are becoming the principal focus of violence and rivalry in the world today. These states have caused the concentration of international politics to shift somewhat from the Northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere.

The combination of these features have been to enhance the importance of regional international politics focussing on those states which by virtue of their increased political and strategic importance became vital parts of the global balance. An inevitable result of this, and a drawback in some sense, has been to invite the influence and penetration of the superpowers in matters ranging from policy issues to playing host to vast numbers of military advisors.

This new relationship also has given rise to a counter effort by regional powers to assert a greater measure of independence and control over their fate. Consequently an effort by the superpowers to intervene has meshed in with a

growing determination of regional states to secure the assistance of, but to reject the domination by the global powers. They also seek to accomplish this by playing one great power off against the other. 6

Nowhere has the rise of regional politics been more manifest than in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf area. To the traditional clash of great power diplomacy has been added the emergence of Iran, the rise of Arab Nationalism, and the power of oil as factors in world politics. Inevitably the Persian Gulf which floats upon a lake of oil has become the epicentre of regional politics in which Iran, in the period under study, sought to play a leading role. Under Shah's leadership, Iran's awakening to consciousness of the formidable state which oil has given it, gave rise to strivings on her part to exert that leading, if not hegemonic, role in the region. The new Iranian posture, as was examined in the previous chapter, manifested itself in the formulation of Iranian foreign policy for that period. 7 This came about as the result of outstanding achievements in the overall development of the country and the consolidation of the royal power.

The relationship between the domestic politics and foreign policy of any state could not be overlooked however a complicated process it might be. In studying the foreign policy

6. S.L. Spiegel, ibid., p.11.

decisions of a particular country one often encounters difficulties in establishing the facts due to national security, secrecy, inadequate records, faulty memories, and the natural tendency of human beings to colour the facts after the event. 8 This is especially true for a country like Iran, where the Shah made every major foreign policy decision and most of the minor ones, in later years. A formal policy-making process, as the term is understood in the West, was not in operation as such. E.A. Bayne, concluded on the Shah's primacy in Iran's foreign policy:

"As diplomats in Tehran know, Iranian foreign policy is largely personified in the King ... the personal nature of Iranian foreign relations is its chief characteristic, and what the monarch believes is of primary significance. Nevertheless, the Iranian Foreign Office is not a nonentity in the management of foreign relations, although it must be regarded as an extension of the Shah's personal direction of policy ... The Shah is his own foreign minister, his policies deriving from a personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power."

Consequently one expects to be somewhat limited in what one can understand of the connections between internal factors and the foreign policy decisions that reflected the course of Iran's foreign policy over the past decade. Nevertheless, it is still possible to evaluate the policy of a state as a reflection of the motives, values, and priorities adopted by the government. For the case in hand, that is the predominance in the Persian Gulf region, and indeed the overall aim of the government, i.e., safeguarding the realm against communist encroachment, the policy objectives were formulated and


projected in a fashion that underlined the newly-acquired Iranian self-reliance. Thus, Persian Gulf policy was defined by the Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, in London in April 1972, when he said:

"Let me in this respect explain Iran's policy in the Persian Gulf. Two considerations with paramount significance have governed and will continue to govern that policy. Firstly, that the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman constitute our southern border; and secondly, that they form the arteries through which daily over 6 million barrels of Persian oil pass today and more than 10 million barrels will pass by the 1980's but we cannot and we will not tolerate any subversive activity that would endanger the security of the Strait of Hormuz or the freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. This artery must remain open to international commerce and we in Iran have determination and capacity to see that it does. The Indian Ocean which borders the Sea of Oman is also of vital importance to Iran."10

So all in all, and given the importance that particular regions have assumed in the global economy and international politics, and given the position that Iran occupies in the region of the Persian Gulf, was Iran able to achieve or was it in the process of realizing the potential role of a regionally dominant power by the end of 1978? In order to answer that question this study considers a set of criteria, based on the foregoing in this chapter and previously, that are relevant to what would have constituted the basis for that claim. This investigation would make an estimate of Iran's de facto or potential capacity to have achieved the status of a regional dominant power, which in itself would explain the premise of the study in more ways than one.

First, a regional hegemonical state possesses a strategic location, and a relatively large population and resource capability. Our examination reveals that Iran's size, geographic location, and population base do constitute the basis for Iran to potentially play a dominant role in the region. It

is at the head of the Persian Gulf with control of either side of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also possesses by far the largest population of any country in the region. The other geographically significant state in the region, Saudi Arabia, is without the sufficient population resource to provide it with the basis to become a regionally dominant power. The Iranian numerical advantage manifested itself in the ensuing Iran-Iraq war that broke out after the fall of the Shah (see part three of this chapter).

The Iranian government succeeded, to a certain extent, in educating and transforming its sizeable population into an effective element of strength through vast programmes and efforts under its development plans. In areas like illiteracy and public health, the advancement was exemplary. More important, steps were taken to enable the great body of the population to acquire the psychological and cultural requisites necessary for their effective mobilization and employment for the purpose of modernizing and exploiting the power potential of the population. One area that perhaps the attention to expand and develop was not sufficient enough, by the standards set for the development course of the country as a whole, was vocational and technical training and creating new institutions to prepare more skilled and semi-skilled technicians so greatly needed by Iran.

The manpower shortage, in the context of those standards, posed a critical weakness with the effect of dragging upon Iran's accelerated economic growth. This question, common in healthier LDC's in advanced stages of economic development, posed a dilemma for expansion, for future self-sufficiency, and for the achievement of national goals and aspirations. Our examination shows that this shortage was felt and recognized by the government and vigorous moves were made to improve the educational system as a whole. When a nation's manpower

11. To compensate this, the Saudis chose to rely on surrogate (effectively mercenary) forces from population-rich and ideologically-compatible countries, such as Pakistan.
proves inadequate for the tasks ahead, then it will remain in a state of dependence, no matter how rich its fiscal base may be. Consequently, this shortage set limits to the foreign policy independence which Iran sought in the period under study.

Second, a regional hegemonical power ought to enjoy a relatively progressive and developed economy with a growing GNP, growing per capita GNP, and expanding industrial capacity. All in all, it could be argued that Iran met these criteria save the question of "developed economy". Iran's emerging greater capacity for action in the region reflected, in part, the changing internal conditions. A self-propelling growth coupled with new industrial investments, a commitment to development by the public as well as the private sector, and multiple opportunities for new exports underlined those conditions. An unquantifiable issue in economic development, that of the attitudes, manifested itself clearly on the part of a majority of people, who evidently favoured progress and change. In addition, many Iranians were reaping increasingly the benefits involved. As such unprecedented growth in GNP and the growing per capita income were not unknown to Iranians and far ahead of the neighbouring countries.

The principal target of the Iranian government's development programmes was to transform Iran into a modern industrialized nation by the end of the century. It was in this context that comparisons were made with Japan as a model for Iran on this side of the Asian continent. However, this target, or anything else, required a sufficient economic infrastructure. Despite vast expenditure and attention, this area proved to be the bone of contention in the case of Iran since the status of a "developed economy" cannot be achieved overnight.

As in many LDC's development of the industrial sector was perhaps at the expense of the agricultural sector of the economy. Also, the country's financial dependence on oil exports increased parallel with its economic growth. From
1970 oil has been financing the entire development budget, and a good part of the state administration; therefore, any lapse in the oil revenues or any other upsetting moves would have directly affected Iranian development plans with consequences for its regional and international foreign policy.

Oil, with its especial place in the Iranian economy, was also used to advance the security interests of the country. Unlike the Arabs, Iran never participated in embargoes of any kind. Moreover, it was used to influence the international economic levers in the pursuit of security objectives. A case in point was Iranian efforts of nuclear technology transfers through financial participation in European uranium fuel ventures.

Third, military capability is often an indicator of a state's power, and of a country's relative position in the international hierarchy; and military capability can often account for important aspects of its external behaviour. For purposes of this study military capability is an important condition for a state embarked upon regional hegemonical status in the region. Therefore, an emerging hegemonical power must possess a relatively developed and efficient military establishment differentiated by diversified capability. It should enjoy a compelling capacity for self-defence and, to the extent necessary, for undertaking military operations throughout the region.

Militarily Iran has been expanding and modernizing in every respect of its three services: army, navy, and the air-force. Iran was known to have the largest army personnel in the region, and a helicopter force exceeding the combined forces of Iraq and Saudi Arabia; perhaps of even greater significance, however, was the fact that it had enough helicop-

12. For an elaboration of the view that power has become a very elusive and unmeasurable concept, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Power," International Journal, no. 30 (Spring 1975), pp. 183-206.
ters of the latest and most sophisticated type on order to triple the size of its already impressive fleet. The planned military expansion of the armed forces in general involved their equipment with the necessary hardware. As such and for comparisons purposes only, if this growth had continued on schedule Iran would have had by 1980, an army at least twice as large as Britain's on paper in terms of personnel, armour, and army aviation.

The navy was the smallest of the three services. Its actual modernization started in 1970 with the purchase of new major vessels and modern naval equipment. By 1979, Iran's deep water naval capability was limited to one submarine, three destroyers and four frigates as well as its hovercraft fleet, the largest of its kind in the world. Extensive plans for equipping the army included the purchase of two submarines, six fast-attack crafts with missile-launching capacity, and four Spruance-class destroyers. By the mid-1980's, when the destroyers and submarines were due to be delivered, Iran would have been able to extend its range of naval activity into the Indian Ocean.

The air force was the most modern and technologically advanced of the three Iranian services. It had enough fighters, missiles, transport planes, helicopters, etc. in its inventory and on order to make it the most advanced and powerful air power in the region. In-flight refueling capability of the air force also increased the combat radius of its air power significantly.

An electronic aerial defence system project, the most modern in the Middle East, was also underway which included an undetermined number of air-to-surface and surface-to-air launchers. A monitoring station was under construction allowing the Iranian military intelligence services to intercept and decode all civil and military communications in a radius extending not only throughout the Persian Gulf, but to neighbouring countries and to the southern regions of the
Thus all things being equal, Iranian military establishment was the most powerful in the region and its build-up placed it in a dominant position which could not be easily overlooked by the other regional states. It was capable of effectively carrying out missions beyond the Persian Gulf area without any shortcomings as far as the quantity or quality of the armaments were concerned. The production of weapons, either indigenously or under licence, was another factor in the equation which could not be ignored by others. These included aircrafts (mostly Bell helicopters), missiles, small arms and related itinery, and above all electronic defence components.

The only problem facing the Iranian armed forces was the lack of sufficient educational background among the recruits which generally meant a prolonged training programme ultimately boosting the costs. There was also, as pointed out earlier, the shortage of skilled manpower. This shortage led to the creation of an atmosphere of competition between the military and economic sectors in their attempts to attract the more skilled manpower available. Thus, a modernized technologically advanced force structure keyed to hegemonical objectives had to compete with an industrial sector under pressure for more growth.

A final evaluation of Iran's military quality would have only been possible if a war had occurred that would have constituted an effective test with the proviso of all things being equal, i.e. notwithstanding a situation resembling the destruction of the Iranian military machine after the fall of the Shah. How such forces would have succeeded in an all out war with a modern military adversary cannot be arrived at but to all intents and purposes Iranian armed forces would

13. See Tables 1 and 2 for defence-related statistical comparisons.
have given a convincing evidence of their capacity to act effectively as a regional hegemonical power.

The military build up, the allocation of resources to it, and the wisdom behind it were all subjects that raised eyebrows both at home and abroad. It was argued that part of the expenditure ought to have been added to the development programmes for the country as a whole. What those critics omitted to put in the context was the realities facing Iran in the 1970's which were as true at the time as they were on August 25, 1941, the day that a neutral Iran was simultaneously attacked and occupied from the north and the south by Russian and British forces, respectively.\textsuperscript{14} In 1970's threat perception by Iran only Britain had been replaced by Iraqi and Marxist revolutionary movements in the south. This time Iran would be ready, no matter how the cost would be considering the already existing forces amassed against her and the arms race initiated by countries such as Iraq with a population of 10 million of which three million were Kurds and two million of Iranian origin.

In 1970's, one could not help but face the situation. The Soviet Union shared a long border with Iran and however the good relations between the two neighbours neither the Iranians could forget about the Soviet's long-term strategies nor could the Soviets forgive them by standing up to them in an American-sponsored alliance. Moreover the Soviets were deeply involved with the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the Indians; and were finally close to carve up a corridor through

\textsuperscript{14} On August 25, 1941, the total number of Iranian armed forces was some 120,000. Two divisions were located in Tehran and the others scattered around the country in strategic areas. There were also five independent brigades, plus an infantry regiment, an artillery regiment, a few anti-aircraft guns, two to three hundred planes, and a few escort vessels. The Iranian troops hopelessly resisted for forty-eight hours when a cease-fire was ordered. See, Great Britain, Central Office of Information, "Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command, 1941-1946," (London:H.M. Stationery Office, 1948).
Afghanistan and the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Soviet naval activities in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean meant that Iran might one day find itself in action against them in the south. Furthermore, a rebellion was underway in Oman sponsored by the Marxist Mozaffar regime in South Yemen, and the Marxists were close to stage their coup de grace in the Horn of Africa.

It was under those circumstances that after the British announcement of their withdrawal, Iran advocated that the security of the Persian Gulf was the primary responsibility of the regional states and asked the outside powers to keep out of the area. The security aims sought by a state are the basis on which it defines the threats to its security. Military preparation entails military expenditure.

A further point, that of the Iran's commitments under CENTO and bilateral defence agreements with the United States, should not be overlooked as well. As a forward defence area and a member of the alliance Iran maintained responsibilities entered into of its own accord. The Nixon Doctrine underlined the importance of the foreign military sales programmes in U.S. foreign policy. Iran as a recipient of credit through the foreign military sales programme qualified not only as a friendly state able to purchase and search for new and advanced weapons, but also it met the criterion of being willing to undertake its own defence in the region.

Fourth, a regional predominant power must be highly motivated, vigorous and effectively able to exploit a political doctrine and be able to mobilize the population around objectives as a means of enhancing international credibility in pursuit of foreign goals. Our examination shows that the ideological mobilization of the Iranian people was successful because its implementation reflected in part the improving economic conditions of Iranian society as well as drawing back on historical emphasis. Mobilization of the masses on issues such as the Persian Gulf islands, Iran's
rights, and historic responsibilities underlined the motivation of the Iranian government.

The celebration in October 1971 of 2,500 years of the institution of monarchy, the emphasis on the most sophisticated weapons, and vigorous discussions of Iran's responsibilities in the Persian Gulf are further cases in point that helped bolstering the Iranian people into a unified political culture and society despite the complexities of the Iranian social organizations.

Fifth, a regional dominant state would be likely to possess a relatively developed and efficient government capable of providing it with an effective instrument for the realization of its foreign policy objectives. Our examination, limited to the foreign policy decision-making process revealed that the Shah's almost total control of foreign policy was generally acknowledged. However, it does not mean that the Iranian Foreign Office was a nonentity in the management of foreign relations, although it must be regarded as essentially an extension of the Shah's personal direction of policy. Iranian foreign policy decision-making was personalized and it reflected the leader's perceptions, image and values.

However, our examination further reveals that Iran's foreign policy was remarkably stable and consistent due to the long tenure of the Shah and the essential consistency of his views. It was characterized by pragmatism rather than ideological considerations, which was evident in Iran's economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the abandonment of its historical claims over the Bahrain Islands; the settlement of a long standing dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab; the full establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; and negotiations with the oil consortium and direction of OPEC. These policies in fact demonstrated the decisiveness which can be achieved in the absence of serious domestic constraints or of interest groups that need to be appeased.
Fortunately for the regional power aspirations of Iran, the Middle East power configuration changed steadily in a direction favourable to Iran's interests. The 1967 War and the defeat of Egypt enhanced Iran's role in the region. Another factor which favourably cleared the path for Iran to assume a more active role in the Persian Gulf was the 1968 announcement of the British military and political withdrawal from the area which ultimately took place in 1971.

Iran's regional diplomacy was also largely successful in accurately assessing the trend in international politics and manoeuvering accordingly. Indo-Iranian cooperation could become one of the major factors influencing the relaxation of regional tensions and permitting stronger bonds for security in the region.

In the period under study, the value of Iran also grew to both superpowers. For the Soviet Union, Iran represented a stable country on their southern border with clear, long-standing lines of ideology and affinities. As a prosperous state they could also develop further commercial and economic relations. For the U.S., Iran was a strong stable ally in a turbulent region with a powerful military machine to protect mutual interests in the Persian Gulf area.

From long practice the Shah, assisted by some able prime ministers like Ahmad Qavam, Assadullah Alam and notably Amir Abbas Hoveyda, achieved a feat of balance between Russia and the West. Iran exercised a degree of power that could be challenged only by forces engineered from outside the area.

Thus Iran aspired to Persian Gulf hegemony even under the shadow of the Soviet Union. It banked on U.S. deterrent nuclear power to underwrite its regional pretentions. This course of action was undertaken because in the Iranian strategic thinking all possible military contingencies involving regional states and elements were catered for but conceded the necessity for resort to diplomacy where the Soviet Union was involved,
that is, U.S. deterrence.

Superpower efforts to project their nuclear and conventional forces around the world have increased their requirements for an expanding list of access rights to the territory, airspace, and service facilities of friendly states. These include bases for air, sea, and ground forces, overflight and landing rights, supply depots, repair facilities, training sites, command, control and communication stations, satellite tracking and data relay complexes, and port-of-call permissions. In the region of the Persian Gulf these rights might have been acquired for the taking in the past. The record of Great Britain as a predominant power clearly demonstrates this point. However, even in the context of highly friendly U.S.-Iranian relations, proposed privileges granted to the U.S. were subject to negotiations with the Iranian government concerned with its independence and skilled in bargaining for advantage in exchange for strategic assets. Therefore, Iran was able to barter for grants of arms, generous purchase arrangements, access to advanced and highly sophisticated weaponry, economic and technical assistance, diplomatic support, and military-training programmes.

Sixth, when a power vacuum occurs in a region, there ensues a regional competition and rivalry to fill the vacuum. Our study reveals that the announcement of the British withdrawal in 1968 and their ultimate departure in 1971 resulted in the re-arrangement of the influence and power structure in the Persian Gulf region. One of the outcomes was the creation of the federation of the shaikhdoms and finally the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, in which Iran successfully secured the exclusion of Bahrain from it as a condition of its recognition.

Furthermore, an important consequence of the British withdrawal was the immediate manoeuvering of the regional status for position, from which Iran benefitted, seeking either security through new alliances or augmented power through
greater control of contested or hitherto neutral areas of the Persian Gulf. The British withdrawal did not result in the creation of an explosive and dangerous situation. On the contrary, Iran found itself in a position of strength from which it could cooperate effectively with the regional states or could foster cooperation by example such as numerous agreements on trade and commercial activities.

However, in the ensuing arms race after the British withdrawal Iran witnessed its efforts challenged by the lavish arms expenditures and military build-ups occurring in neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Iraq. It was clear that Iran's aspirations to achieve the status of a regional dominant power were not going uncontested.

Finally, the attitudes and the willingness of the regional dominant power in respect to the area's affairs, making commitments, and consequently carrying out such commitments to protect the status quo of the region and to rally regional support for its actions are of paramount significance in an environment conducive to regional hegemony. As such, the regional dominant state perceives special responsibilities for itself in relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies. The interest may also be in uniting nations in the region with a particular issue such as combatting radical movements or policies regarding natural resources such as petroleum.

Given the facts of change in the power structure of the region as noted before, Iran was the beneficiary of such changes and at the same time demonstrated its concerns over the affairs of the region and became actively involved in the area's political and military affairs. Such an assertive foreign policy role was revealed by the Iranians when they decided to assume the full responsibility for the security of navigation within the Persian Gulf, especially, through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran embarked upon a massive military
build-up and expansion programme. To demonstrate its role and to obtain complete physical control over the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian troops landed on three strategically located islands of the Greater Tumb, Lesser Tumb, and Abu Musa. Our examination supports the hypothesis that by asserting the primacy of its role in guaranteeing the security of the area especially of the strategic waterway Iran made good in part at least its pretention to become a regional hegemonical power.

The Iranian leadership also increased its attention to improving its commercial and cultural relation with the Persian Gulf states, though in some quarters these efforts were met by suspicions by those Arab states in the region who opposed its ambitions albeit not overtly.

Iran's aspirations were always at the mercy of Arab radicalism in the region. Concern was frequently expressed for the stability of the weaker shaikhdoms and emirates and the danger of the radical movement within the Arabian Peninsula, and consequently the security of the strategic waterway. To demonstrate its willingness to prevent the spread of radical movements in the region, Iran, at the request of Mucat and Oman's Sultan intervened decisively in the Dhofari rebellion and put an end to it. The Iranian leadership made no secret of its concern for security in Oman, a manifestation of Tehran's new active role in the region.

Our examination further reveals that Iran's foreign policy was formulated and designed to assist in the achievement of a regional dominant role. But the study shows that Iran did not receive support and favourable reaction from the regional Arab states toward its ambitions for a dominant role in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, Iranian security objectives seen to have been directed more towards stability and the maintenance of the status quo. Iranian goal for military dominance in the region was based on the stability of the area rather than territorial expansion. The Iranian military take-
over of the three islands of the Persian Gulf was, therefore, compatible with this overall regional policy.

All in all this study concludes that Iran did not meet all of the criteria set forth here that would characterize it as an effective dominant power in the region of the Persian Gulf for the period 1968-1979. It does show, however, that Iran was regionally so powerful that it could not be overlooked or ignored with regard to the affairs of the area. This conclusion is arrived at because at that junction in time Iran, though enjoying a superior-status compared with the regional countries, lacked the necessary technical, educational, and industrial base to meet that challenge. The government's ability to mobilize the Iranian society by means of economic reforms increased Iran's domestic capacity to the point that it influenced the rise of its international and military capabilities. But ever-increasing dependence on U.S. military hardware and related technology, the democratization of the polity in a highly complex society, and the inadequacy of the infrastructure proved to be the undoings of the objectives outlined by Iran under the Shah.

Iran's recent historical experience reveals that objectives of autonomy and authority displace and overshadow other objectives. Given time, the obstacles noted above would have been overcome. But it was not to be.
6.2 1979 and the Revolution

On January 16, 1979, the Shah of Iran left the country for what was euphemistically called an extended rest, a "vacation". This was a device employed by him and many more before him at times of crisis with the implication of a return. But this time, for him, it was not to be. He died on July 27, 1980, in exile in Egypt, at the age of sixty of terminal cancer, leaving behind his Crown Prince Reza in Morocco and the rest of his family scattered around the world.

The events that led to his departure are described as revolution. As a postscript to this study it would be helpful to examine the contributory factors therein; to see how and why they gathered momentum resulting in the disruption of the status quo and Iranian predominance that the Shah had ardently sought; and whether or not they could have been avoided. Furthermore, an assessment of the security policies adapted by the new Iranian government is made and their implications in contrast to those of the Shah's are analyzed (part 3).

In the period 1962-1978, Iran's economic development, its oil policy in dealing with the Consortium and in OPEC, and its flourishing foreign policy could be called a story of spectacular success. The period started with the change in Irano-American relations regarding arms purchasing policy, the introduction of a massive social and economic reforms programme by the Shah, labelled interchangeably as the White Revolution or the Shah-People's, and the consolidation of the monarch's position after the assertion of the Shah's power over the (mostly clerical) opposition.

15. In its original six-point structure, the programme consisted of an all-embracing land reform (including those controlled by the clergy), the sale of stocks in nationalized industries to finance land reform, universal suffrage, profit-sharing for industrial workers, nationalizations of natural resources (forests, water, etc.), and literacy corps. By 1978, the programme contained 19 different and/or overlapping policies for action.
Much of the above success was due to the strong and brinkmanship-like leadership that the country possessed. While this progress in the economic, social, and foreign policy fields was taking place, the political structure of the country tended to diverge toward greater authoritarianism. Indeed, neither the Shah nor his prominent members of his governments tried to conceal this trend. The basic philosophy was that at this time of rapid and intensive development within the context of a changing and dangerous international situation Iran needed a strong leadership in a country not yet ready for (Western) democratic institutions and processes and to aim at progress in every conceivable human activity.

This philosophy was reflected in the development of party politics in Iran. The Mellium and Mardom parties that came into existence in 1961-62, represented the pro-government and loyal opposition trends and were conceived as instruments for the political education of the Iranians within the framework of loyalty to the Shah and the existing monarchial institutions. The Mellium Party was later replaced by a new party called Iran Novin, which was expected to reflect the opinion of better-educated socially more progressive elements. Hassan Ali Mansour, who was the leader of a progressive circle of technocrats was appointed prime minister in 1964, to be assassinated a few months later.

Mansour's finance minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, was appointed prime minister, to hold this position for over a decade. In the meantime, the position of the loyal opposition was becoming more and more difficult. It was supposed to engage in "constructive criticism" of the government's policies, but the definition of this idea was gradually narrowing due to the favourable economic results achieved by Hoveyda and his team.

The artificiality of this system was finally recognized by the Shah himself in 1975, when he declared that little or no political participation had been achieved as a whole. Instead, he proposed, all Iranians should join together, under a
single political organization to be called Rastakhiz (Resurgence) which would open its door for active participation by members of both previous parties and by any Iranian willing to play a more active role in the political process in Iran. The new party was expected to stress unity rather than the divisions among the people. Above all, however, there was the principle of leadership symbolized in the person of the monarch, which was to be the most vital ingredient of the political process. Whether this was a mechanism for the transfer of power to the Crown Prince is not known because at the time the Shah was very much in charge and there was not any hint of the troubles to come. The only rippling was a jolt in the economic growth rate in that year.

The single party institution, the first of its kind in Iran, however, should be put in the context of the Shah's numerous efforts at liberalization of the political process from above. The toying with this idea had occurred when the Shah felt reasonably confident at home. In 1949-53 and 1960-63 periods some measure of relaxation had been allowed and abandoned. In between, other policies and impetus were pursued like the Rastakhiz, which in effect quickly transpired into the old Iran Novin machinery. What actually then happened was a mere cosmic surgery and change of name.16

The Iranian government sponsored three major events designed to propagate the idea of monarchial continuity and strength of the ruling institution. These were the coronation of the Shah and Empress Farah on October 26, 1967; the ceremonies to commemorate the 2500th anniversary of the Iranian

16. The Iran Novin Party, in terms of machinery, organization, personnel, and physical network, was by far the most extensive one in the history of political parties in Iran. Similar to a West European political party in its effectiveness, it changed into Rastakhiz. It is interesting to note that after the fall of the Shah the Islamic Republican Party took the whole organization over lock, stock and barrel. The headquarters of the party in Tehran was blown up in 1982 by opponents of the regime.
Empire, held in Shiraz (Persepolis) in October 1971, and the celebration of fifty years of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1975-1976. The Shah and the political elite of Iran were consciously reviving the Persian concept of kingship as a traditional institution capable of providing leadership for a programme of modernization, and they expected to lead Iran to a position of strength and prominence in world affairs.

This position, as has been pointed out earlier in this study, required an independent Iran based on a sound industrial base and militarily powerful. Only lack of funds would jeopardize that ideal but Iran was blessed with oil and the revenues derived from oil should do the trick. By the turn of the century Iran would assume the rank of the fifth power in the world and by that time a "Great Civilization" would have dawned on the Iranians. It is in this context that the hegemonical ambitions of Iran in the region can be explained and the apprehension of the Arab neighbours justified. The Shah and his forward policies, therefore, were being contrasted to those of Cyrus II ("the Great") (550-526 B.C.); Shah Abbas the Great (16th century) and Nadir Shah and Kerim Khan Zand (18th century).

The Rastakhiz idea was, therefore, projected as a vehicle to reconcile modernization in the social and economic fields with a lack of corresponding progress in the political process. What it did not achieve, and to the critics of the system could not achieve, was to bring about the "real opposition" into the fold. Never eliminated, they consisted of three main elements: the clergy, the National Front, and various Communist factions. These groups varied in strength and ultimate goals but agreed on the common objective of a radical change in the political system. All also agreed on a return to the 1906 Constitution's provisions, including a free two-tier democratically elected parliamentary system and a reigning monarch. In terms of appeal to the public, the clergy, through regular contact with the praying multitudes in the mosques across the land, had the
highest mobilizing capacity behind them. In terms of skillful clandestine operations, the Communists had the edge. The National Front leaders, on their part, offered the best articulation of demands for democratic freedoms and political participation.

The futile political situation led the Shah to embark upon a further programme of "liberalization" in the summer of 1977. In practice this meant a relaxation on expressions of dissent on the government's part. Opponents suddenly saw a situation in which they could operate freely and took advantage of it to a good measure. In addition, the U.S. president's sloganeering on human rights, instead of focusing on the main violators, namely, the Communist states, in practice chastized those friends and allies of the United States that happened to have authoritarian regimes. In Iran, the tendency was to interpret every utterance by Jimmy Carter as a crusade and thus encouragement to dissent. The liberalization policy of the Shah was his first big mistake and should never have happened.

While all this was going on, the economy was also under strain. To some people, including government officials, the pressures on the economy manifested themselves in increasing inflation and power black-outs. It could be managed and indeed has been managed before. So there was no cause for concern. The situation, however, was more serious than that. To understand it, it would be helpful to trace the symptoms in the recent past.

By the beginning of 1974, Iran was faced with the unprecedented chance of escaping from poverty associated with the economies of the third world. The fourfold price increase in the oil was the hope that could transform the country in a relatively short span of time. For a quarter of a century, Iran's balance of payments, the economic growth of the country and its political security was substantially strengthened by U.S. foreign aid. From 1946 through 1968, Iran received about
$1.2 billion in military aid, compared to Turkey's $3.0 billion and Greece's $2.0 billion, all of these far in excess of other Middle Eastern countries. In economic aid, amounting to $770 million, it received less than Israel and the United Arab Republic and far less than Turkey and Greece, all four of these being non-oil producing countries.\(^{17}\) So it was understandable the government's implementation of long-shelved development plans, a process hitherto restricted due to lack of funds.

1973 was also the year that the Fourth Economic Plan came to an end. The budget for the next plan (1973-1978) was presented to the parliament on a massive scale. To put this into scale, the 1972-73 revenues from oil of $2.25 billion increased to $4.47 billion in 1973-74 and to $18.20 in 1974-75. The government lifted exchange controls, lowered customs duties on a wide range of goods and reduced import registration fees. It also announced that proposed investments (mainly public) under the revised Fifth Plan were to be almost doubled to nearly $70 billion in the five years, with the bulk of the spending to be concentrated towards the end of the period on the type of projects - communications, electricity generation, agriculture, steel and petrochemicals - that take longer to bear fruit.

The world economy, however, did not agree with the Iranian Plan. As a result of the adjustments in the economies of the industrialized countries there appeared a drop in the petroleum export and as such a shortfall in oil revenues followed. This meant that overseas payments (on current and capital accounts) plunged into a deficit of about $1.7 billion from the 1974-75 surplus of $5.2 billion; as well as the fading away of a projected internal budget surplus as expenditure outstripped revenue.\(^{18}\)


Nevertheless, Iran recorded a GNP rise of 17% in 1975-1976 which was 8% lower than the target set for in the fifth development plan when it was revised as the result of the second price rise in oil.

All this was impressive for a country that maintained itself on foreign aid not long ago. The real question was whether Iran could withstand the strains bearing in mind that similar rates of growth was targeted for the rest of the Fifth Plan. The economical/philosophical question was whether such growth rates were dangerously high for a country already overstretched and that having achieved this, the most Iran can bear would be annual growth rates of 10-12% which was the rate before the oil prices explosion.

Iran's economic success, especially since the end of the oil crisis in 1954, came from a rare combination of favourable circumstances, some fortuitous, some meritorious. These factors included the oil, political stability, steering a course between a laissez-faire economy and government intervention, and private enterprise assisted by government in numerous ways. To take but only one of these examples, industrialization through private enterprise was an announced policy of the government implemented by generous supplies of credit. Moreover, industrial investments in the public sector would have been restricted to the expansion of already existed state-owned industries.

The economy grew at an annual rate for the decade of 1958-68 at 9% in real terms. This was remarkable since there was a 3.2% population growth and four years of depression and monetary restrictions of 1960-64. The character of the economic system under which this growth could take place was described by Charles Issawi as "While government was thus laying the infrastructure, private enterprise was building the structure." 19

Perhaps the most striking feature of the economy was the monetary situation which during the years of great expansion, 1965-68, recorded a drop in the index of wholesale prices from 114 to 107 (1958= 100), and the cost of living fell from 132 to 108. The Iranian currency, the Rial, maintained parity with major currencies from then on.\textsuperscript{20}

In preparing the Fifth Plan, the government had estimated that it would receive about $25 billion in oil revenues. The sharp price increase, therefore, meant that in practice this figure was markedly higher. These speculations were ended when the revised plan was unveiled in August 1974 with the above figure increased to about $98 billion. Fixed public and private sector investment had been stepped up by 90\% to $69 billion, and from having to borrow to finance its initial projected expenditure, the government now calculated that it would end up with a surplus of revenue.\textsuperscript{21}

The unprecedented spending that followed yielded some very painful experiences. The inadequacy of the infrastructure demonstrated in the ports and on roads, the waste, inefficiency, black marketeering and corruption, as well as spiraling inflation created an atmosphere of dejection. The


\textsuperscript{21} For details on the Fifth Five-Year Plan, see Plan and Budget Organization, "Iran's Fifth Development Plan 1973-1978. Revised: A Summary," (Tehran, May 1975); see also P.C. Carey and Andrew G. Carey, "Industrial Growth and Development Planning in Iran," Middle East Journal, 29 (Winter 1975); and Economist August 28, 1976.
high inflation particularly hit the low-income families.

The Shah's response in face of these setbacks was to launch further measures, or points in the context of the White Revolution, largely with political as opposed to economic goals in mind. Thus, he promoted worker's participation in factories through the sale of private sector manufacturing industries, an anti-profiteering campaign and a drive against corruption linked to the already announced bureaucratic shake-ups. Efficiency was therefore expected to improve. In the economic field, the government was anxious to return to its former goals of encouraging the private enterprise and reducing the size of the public sector.

In the midst of all these, the question of defence expenditures posed a problem in itself. It was argued that whether or not the defence budget was justifiable on that grand scale and/or the country could afford it. About 14% of GNP was absorbed by this budget in 1975-76 and no less striking was the fact that Iran's spending on defence rose tenfold between 1971 and 1975. The fact that Iran maintained that high level of expenditure could be better demonstrated in the context of pre-1973 budgets. Thus, in 1966 Iran devoted to this purpose the lowest proportion of GNP among 58 countries, at 0.38%. Among 59 countries its military outlays absorbed a below-average share of public expenditure at 23%, lying between the 0-5 percent group of six small nations and the three highest - the U.S. with 42, Turkey with 54, and Burma with 65 percent. Finally, on a dollar per capita expenditure for military purposes, Iran occupied a modest position at $9.67 in 1966 (1979= $25), with 19 other countries between $5-$25. This figure was higher than the lowest group of 20 nations, between $0-$5, but far below the highest group of four which exceeded $100.

It was not unexpected that the government was being increasingly pressurized to return to pre-1973 policies and targets. At stake here was the fate and position of the Shah and his ministers. If they could not get the equation right in curbing inflation, keeping up business confidence, and so on, then the repercussions could be severe. Face-lifting exercises such as cabinet reshuffles or even dismissing the Prime Minister Hoveyda (replaced by Finance Minister and Iran's OPEC negotiator Jamshid Amuzegar in August 1977 in the light of the power cuts), or liberalization policy could not do.

"Iran is a country where economic development is succeeding but where economic planning, as the process is usually understood, has failed." Does this view mean that the failure of planning could be ascribed to the perversities of Iranian culture and important antisocial characteristics of its people? Is corruption inherent or fostered? Was the Shah to be blamed for everything because of his high profile or were it the grave defects of individual conduct and un-ethical behaviour of the population generally? Norman Jacobs believe the latter is more nearer the truth:

"All outsiders agree that the Iranians are masters in their own diabolical, non-constructive way of handling interpersonal relations. But in a society committed to the development of an ever-changing, self-generating economic system, based on trust and flexibility in interpersonal relations, this kind of intellect not only is useless but also an obstacle."

Iranians tend to rationalize political behaviour which stems from deep emotional needs. This is particularly true with regard to extremist views aimed at radical changes in the society. The psychological roots of the Iranians could

be explained in the fact that they are partly Westernized and partly attached to their traditional culture. The result is an inability to adjust to society, and an inability to find security.²⁵

This dual personality manifests itself in not accepting self-fulfillment and success based on traditional values on one hand, and on the other, difficult adjustment to the ideally Western concept of rewarding an individual strictly according to how he performs. As a result, desperation and dissatisfaction set in. The normal Iranian cannot admit of his inadequacy to meet either system. He suspects that he is being persecuted and plotted against, and develops aggressive desires for revenge against "the system".

An Iranian, as against a Moslem Iranian, falls back on some significant concepts in his life derived from the history. As such Zoroastrian values play an important part. All actions, all motives are divisible into "Good" and "Evil". There is an all-pervasive presence of a powerful force of evil in the world constantly at battle with the good forces. It is probable that at any given time the forces of evil are controlling the world. These forces are strong and organised.

When the Arabs defeated the Iranians in the 7th century, the Iranians took on to Islam since it represented values that they could identify with, and turned it around. Therefore, this "Persianization" of Islam transpired into identification with Shi' aism, the persecuted sect. An action by someone else, if one disapproves of it, is an unjust action. Moreover, it is not an isolated injustice, it is part of the above conspiracy by the evil forces.

The Zoroastrian virtues of "Good Behaviour," "Good Speak," and "Good Thought" play a decisive role here. Therefore, if a man has convinced the Iranians that he is on the side of right, then all his behaviour, talk, and thoughts must be on the side

²⁵. See also pp. 299-301, Chapter 5.
of the "good" forces.

The numerous defeats at the hands of far-off enemies and invaders in the long history of Iran coupled with more recent experiences of the British and the Russians, when put in the above context, mean that virtually all political developments are viewed in terms of foreign influence with evil undertones.

When this framework of mind is applied to the situation in Iran in the years 1975-1979, it becomes more clearer as to how the fall of the monarchy came about and what fate is expected of the subsequent regime. The economic problems created as a result of the all-out push for modernization led to a widening gap in increase in living standards. The Shah's solution was an economic one: hard work. The opponents, and especially the clerical ones, were to fall back on the psychological undertones.

The liberalization policy meant that the moderate secular opposition made common cause with significant elements of the clergy. A new political dynamic was emerging in which the prominent religious figures took the leadership in expressing opposition to the government. Thus, by early 1978 the voices of moderate dissent transformed into religious mobs' noise and demonstrations.

The year 1978 also saw significant foreign developments of interest to Iran. Substantial Soviet advances in areas deemed vital to Iran's security started with a further coup in Afghanistan which installed a Marxist-oriented clique in April 1978. A massive Soviet and Cuban assistance to the radical government in Ethiopia against the Somali-backed Ogaden rebellion and the Eritrean liberation front established a menacing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. And to complete the list, a further pro-Soviet coup took place in South Yemen.
In Iran these events were viewed as further encroachment of the country by the Soviets. To go back to the "good" and "evil" theory, it was argued that the country was being prepared for a Communist take over through violent defiance of the government and the disruption of life. The Shah's cool relations with the U.S. Democratic president also played a part in that the in-action of the American administration with regard to Soviet advances was compounded by President Carter's criticism of alleged violations of human rights in Iran.

On the domestic front events took a nasty turn when religious demonstration in the "holy" city of Qum following the appearance of a newspaper editorial attacking the exiled Ayattolah Khomeini turned violent and met with force. Sympathetic demonstrations were followed in most major cities, a chain of events that simply went on and on. The religious demonstrators and their leaders focussed their attention on two cardinal principles of the White Revolution — women emancipation and land reform. The government on their part blamed the violence and the opposition to the White Revolution principles on the "Islamic Marxists," a phrase with the implication of a notional alliance of "black" religious reactionaries and "red" communist-inspired terrorists and revolutionaries.

August 1978 saw the intensification of the violence. Conciliatory moves on behalf of the Shah such as the appointment of a new prime minister with close connections with the religious circles did not bring about the expected results. At this point, Khomeimi had still not emerged as the opposition's unquestioned leader, and many within the clergy, including the highest-ranked Ayattolah Shariat Madari, were willing to settle for far less than the overthrow of the Shah.

The Shah, in anticipation of containing the situation, yielded less than what the opposition had sought. By the late December, when he finally agreed to do so, it was too
late; their demands had escalated.

The proclamation of martial law, though brought a temporary respite, could not contain the rapidly spreading disorders. Massive strikes in all walks of life seriously undermined the functioning of the economy and public administration.

Two external developments, with discouraging effects on the Shah's morale, also took place in late 1978, with negative impacts on the situation. On November 19, the Soviet President, Leonid Berzhev, in a skillful move warned the United States against "interfering in Iranian internal affairs." The weak and lack-lustre American response - a denial and expression of hope on similar action by the Soviets - was further interpreted by the Iranians as the abandonment of a long-standing ally of the United States.

By the close of 1978, the situation had deteriorated to the extent that the Shah's political skills and in-fighting could not muster it anymore. Previously when an upheaval had occurred, the Shah had cracked down hard and then proceeded to separate the moderates from the radicals, winning over some of the former, eliminating the latter. The hopelessness of the dissenters had led the opposition to surrender previously. Now, the hopelessness of the Shah's position caused the fence-sitters to cast their lot with Khomeini, emerging as a charismatic leader who could compete with the Shah for public loyalty.

The Shah's fortunes was also at an end. As it happened, he lost some of his close advisors in the preceding years. His previous Court Minister, Assdulah Alam, and former head of the National Iranian Oil Company, Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal, both former prime ministers and shrewd political analysts had died. Also General Mohammad Khatemi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and a brother-in-law to the Shah, had been killed in a hang-gliding accident. Coupled with this,
a massive exodus of people from all walks of life but mostly professionals as well as capital had been under way out of the country for some time.

In early January 1979 it seemed that the Shah's brinkmanship had finally born fruit when the deputy leader of the National Front, Shahpour Bakhtiar, agreed to form a cabinet. A Social Democrat, he pledged to launch a genuine social democracy and an end to corruption and violence. He also succeeded to wrest considerable powers from the Shah and in effect insured a return to the ideals of the 1906 Constitution.

The clergic opposition lost no time in denouncing this last move. Further violent protests and the deterioration of security in general across the land meant that the Shah had to resort to his very last device: to leave the country on a vacation.

The place of the armed forces, in this context, was also a crucial factor. As was pointed out earlier in this study, the armed forces constituted a major base of support for the Shah. Though their main body were consisted of conscripts, nevertheless their image was one that could easily be identified with the Shah in the eyes of the opposition. They were at the receiving end of the military expansion programmes and considered to be a priviledged class of their own. With officers, it was not a question of loyalty to the Shah alone. Their personal dedication to the throne was reinforced by a strong psychological dependence on the Shah.

The military could have exercised three courses of action in 1978. They could stand by the Shah, advise a hard-line "iron first" policy, or they could have staged a coup d 'etat. The first option, they certainly did. The second, they could not and would not as their loyalty to the Shah was demonstrated time and again. An army with Bismarkian loyalties could not advance an argument against the wishes of its commander-in-chief and patron. The Shah himself genuinely felt responsibility as a symbol of the national unity and, in
his own words, as head of the Iranian family. His reign had been based on a nationalist goal of building Iran into a progressive and respected nation. Such correct sentiments did not allow him to embark upon an "iron fist" policy and thereby setting off the army against the demonstrators in their vast numbers in a serious and decisive manner.

The last alternative, i.e., a coup, did not materialize due to a combination of the first two factors. One would have hoped that the army would resort to this drastic move as a damage-limitation exercise. They could have overcome their fierce loyalty and perhaps put the Shah under "house arrest." Having done that, then they would have effectively put an end to the uncertainties and rode out the troubles with firmness.

As it happened the army commanders urged the Shah to remain. With the Shah's departure the army found less incentives to defend the empty rooms of the imperial palace than they would have had to defend the Shah himself had he stayed put.

The situation became aggravated when, on February 1, Khomeini returned in triumph to Tehran from exile. Following massive demonstrations demanding the Bakhtiar government's resignation, a revolutionary militia launched an attack on the Imperial Guard's headquarters, overcame it, seized key government buildings and the radio and television services. In this decisive moment the army's last chief of staff proclaimed the neutrality of the armed forces. With this the Bakhtiar government gave way and the next day a provisional government was set up by the clergy.

The self-styled Islamic Republic of Iran came into being on March 30, 1979 through a referendum that was carried out without due regards to electoral procedures. As such the people of Iran gave the most reactionary forces seen in their modern history a legal basis. The Rasputin-like terror that these benighted bands of clergy unleashed on Iran decimated the country and has left its scar for years to come.
The turning of the clock back to a period of religious obscurantism and the afflicting of "Islamic Republicanism" on Iran in effect meant the disintegration of the country, factional in-fightings with violent turns, the near collapse of the economy, the loss of Iran to a civilized world, and further miseries brought about by an uncalled-for compulsive intransigence with regard to the war with Iraq.
6.3 Post-1979 and Security Policy Implications

The fall of the Shah signalled a watershed for Iranian security policies. The security policies that the Shah pursued were closely identified with the structure of his Western oriented government. The Islamic leadership makes radically different assumptions about the nature of government and about Iran's position within the existing international order. They also govern a disintegrated state with an unresponsive civilian bureaucracy, an uncertain military, ethnic rebellions, and an economy which is in ruins.

As it was pointed out in the previous section of this chapter, the Islamic clergy, however vigorous in their fervent, are basically Iranians at heart. As such it could be argued that this dark period in the Iranian history is ruled by a theocratic dynasty in which the ascendency to the crown is determined by the Shi'it hierarchy as it is practiced in Iran. As a corollary to this, therefore, the Islamic leadership suffers from the basic and inherent insecurity felt by modern Iranian leaders.

Accordingly, there exist similar significant ingredients in the formulation of security policies by the new government. This is despite the fact that they embarked on a radical departure from the Shah's policies. In this respect one could point out the inevitability of Iran's security within the context of superpower politics, the strategic location and natural resources of the country, the linking of the domestic political stability to international power politics as have been demonstrated on numerous occasions of great-power intervention, the vulnerability of the state in terms of the population composition and the geography, and a deep-rooted

suspicion of superpower collusion.

The point of departure in the Islamic government's security policy, however, was the attempt by the clergy to withdraw from superpower politics and offer a revitalized Islamic society as the basis for security. What distinguished the Shah's mistrust of the superpowers from that of Khomeini was the Shah's acceptance of the existing international order as providing an environment within which Iran could become more powerful. By contrast, Iran's present Islamic leadership sees the existing international order as illegitimate.

The ideological, cultural, and political foundations of the Islamic regime effectively preclude full participation in international organizations like the United Nations, which the clergy and their followers see as dominated by the interests of the superpowers. In keeping with this outlook, Iran rejected the authority of the International Court of Justice and the Security Council to intervene in the U.S.-hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war.

This hostile view of the existing international system includes regional politics. To the Islamic government, Middle Eastern history is governed by a continuing confrontation between Europe and Muslim Asia. To Khomeini and his followers, the Shah's de facto alliance with Israel was a fundamental mistake. Khomeini, who is obsessed with "Palestine" regards the state of Israel as an artificial creation of great powers and a state which is at war with the Moslems. Therefore, one of the first actions by the Islamic government was the severance of relations with Israel and granting a formal recognition to the PLO.

The differences between the monarchy and the Islamic regime over regional politics are primarily ideological. Khomeini, although similar to the Shah in the sense of expressing contempt for some of the Arab rulers in the region, is also
very hostile to them. He rejects a possibility of reaching political accommodations with regional states as long as they are governed by secular regimes. The existence of secular governments pose a threat to Islam, or so what he says. It is in this context that the regional states have expressed concern about the threat of the Khomeini revolution. The fear of the spread of fundamentalist Islam out of Iran thus led to the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a security organization established in January 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (and notably excluding Iraq) for the expedient purpose of containing Shi'it fundamentalism within their states.

A cornerstone of the Shah's security policies was the idea of the encroachment on Iran by hostile forces. This applies equally to the Islamic regime's followers. They see danger everywhere. As such, a pervasive anxiety toward the superpowers, Iran's neighbours, and minorities within the country is therefore a permanent feature of Iranian security policy.

Khomeini's views about anything tend to be absolute. Moreover, the application of the "good" and "evil" dichotomy to his beliefs means that the world is dominated by Imperialists, Zionists, superpower interventionism, and exploitation in all quarters. The Soviets, after some initial hesitation, discovered an acute sense of imperial history in the Islamic Republic when they approached its leaders. The Shah viewed the Soviet's rapprochement with the Iraqis and the 1972 USSR-Iraq Friendship Treaty with extreme anxiety and contempt. To Khomeini, the Soviet Union by invading Afghanistan committed aggression not only on the Afghans but on all Muslim countries.

According to the Shah, the security in the Persian Gulf was indistinguishable from that of Iran's. The Islamic Republic leaders at first attempted to brush aside this significant element. To their cost, and to Iran's cost, they finally came down on the same conclusion when the economic lifeline of the country was being threatened by the Iran-Iraq War. The
necessity of maintaining an Iranian presence in the Persian Gulf meant that the Islamic clergy used their naval presence at the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining lever in the war to deter outside intervention. The three strategic islands of Greater and Lesser Tumbs and Abbu Musa remained in Iranian hands, and in this sense pragmatism triumphed over ideology.

The Shah always underlined Iran's threat perception with the notion of a Soviet pincer movement. The Islamic leaders have dispensed with that altogether and instead pinpointed the place of Iran in the great power rivalry. Without a credible military response in the face of a Soviet onslaught, the Shah sought protection from the United States under the CENTO arrangements and the bilateral defence treaty of 1959. Regionally he envisaged a defensive posture for Iran which contained the progression towards a middle-ranking power at first and then the higher rank of a "fifth power." The Islamic government, again, rejected these concepts in the aftermath of the revolution. But it was not long before they realized the true position in the Persian Gulf when Iraq attacked the country. They came to the conclusion that ultimately Iran has to provide its own security against regional threats, and in doing so they must be prepared.

27. The Shah adhered to the concept of balance of power as a guiding principle in international relations through his 38 years of first-hand involvement. His approach was not dissimilar to Winston Churchill, another disciple. There is a passage in Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech which could have been delivered with the same exact vigour by the Shah: "... there is nothing they (i.e., the Russians) admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness..." Khomeini's approach, on the other hand, is not perhaps far from the experiences of Gandhi and Nehru. On the question of security, and when confronted with the U.S. advice on the need for a strategy of containment in South East Asia and the suggestion that India should join such an arrangement (in the shape of SEATO), Nehru responded thus: "Asian problems, Asian security and Asian peace are not only discussed, but actions are taken and treaties are made in regard to them chiefly by non-Asian countries ... Other countries do not want their protection ... And yet they are told, 'No you must have our protection.'" (The Hindu, 10 September, 1954. Quoted in M.V. Naidu, "Alliances and Balance of Power," (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 89).
Iraq attacked Iran by an initial invasion on September 22, 1980. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein characterized this invasion as "Qadisiyah," in reference to the Arab invasion of Iran in 637 A.D. The Iraqi government cited violations of the 1975 Shatt al-Arab treaty with Iran as unacceptable and embarked upon a campaign to change the situation. The first step taken in Iraq was to abrogate the Treaty on September 17, 1980. After the initial days of the War in which the Iraqis were met by some success, the offensive was soon halted. The Iraqis could not sustain this initial and successful penetration due to a combination of factors including the underestimating of the capability of the Iranian armed forces, especially the Air Force, the general level of resistance in Iran, and the force of Iranian patriotism. By November 1980, it was clear that Iraq had failed to achieve a blitzkrieg. A stalemate developed in the war that continues to date. Both sides claimed to be against any compromise and attempts to end the war, developed into a war of attrition, have met with intransigence.

Saddam Hussein launched his attack on Iran "... primarily for the twofold purpose of containing the perceived threat of Khomeini's Islamic revolution and of asserting Iraqi Ba'hist leadership of the Arab states in the (Persian) Gulf region in the wake of the demise of Pax Iranica." To his cost, it appears that he has discovered that the physical proximity that led the Shah to adapt a strategy ensuring the destruction of the Iraqi oil installations hold water just the same as for the Islamic leadership.

The War also demonstrated some further differences between the Shah's security policies and those of the Islamic government regarding military technology and manpower. The reliance on advanced and sophisticated weaponry by the Shah gave way to a more limited small scale military equipment for the Islamic Republic. Perhaps the nature of the War dictated this.

The regime certainly did emphasize this aspect at first but discovered to their cost that they cannot sustain the campaign on that basis. As such they had limited options open to them in the face of the realities. One thing is clear, the self-styled Islamic leadership reaped the benefits of the Shah's investment in small arms, shells, bullets, and vehicles; the sort of requirements best suited to the needs of the War.

The Islamic government confirmed Bakhtiar's projection of a more limited military posture for Iran. The Shah's ambitious programmes in the military field perhaps percipitated the over-extention of Iran's economic capabilities. Perhaps it also helped to aggravate the political stability of the country as well. After his downfall, the economy slowed to a near standstill. Military expenditures were initially reduced still further. It was only after the realization of the seriousness of the impact of the War that the Islamic leadership stepped-up defence expenditures to levels far exceeding the 1970's prevalent rates. The contributory factors behind this, inter alia, were the arms embargo by the Western Powers and over-the-top prices on the available black market.

A scorched-earth policy was the Shah's last defence against Soviet invasion. Popular resistance has become the first line of defence against superior military power in the Islamic Republic. This politically-motivated doctrine eventually led to the containment of the Iraqi advances and later offensives. The War, with its undoubtable attractions for the Islamic leadership in focussing the attention away from Iran's immense problems, unified Iran rather than divided it. At

29. See Tables 3 and 9.
the time of writing, "Saddam Hussain's Qadisiyah may yet provide to be his Waterloo." In conclusion, it could be argued that, upon the fall of the Shah, Iran was the "Guardian of the Gulf." This came about as the result of the Shah's ambitions and foresight as well as the Two-Pillar Strategy advocated by the Nixon Doctrine. This reality was acknowledged before the Islamic regime took power when Prime Minister Bakhtiar began to cancel Iran's strategic weapons orders. He also announced Iran's withdrawal from CENTO, an act which effectively put an end to that ill-fated alliance.

Appendix 1: Treaty of Friendship: Persia and Russia:  
26th February - 12 December 1921

Art. I. In order to confirm its declarations regarding Russian policy towards the Persian nation, which formed the subject of correspondence on the 14th January, 1918, and the 26th June, 1919, the R.S.F.S.R. formally affirms once again that it definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the colonising Governments of Russia which have been overthrown by the will of the workers and peasants of Russia.

Inspired by this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

II. The R.S.F.S.R. expresses its reprobation of the policy of the Tsarist Governments of Russia, which, on the pretext of ensuring the independence of the peoples of Asia, concluded, without the consent of the latter, treaties with European Powers, the sole object of which was to subjugate those peoples.

This criminal policy, which infringed upon the independence of the countries of Asia and which made the living nations of the East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny of European robbers, is abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia.

Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles I and IV of this Treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country.

III. The two Contracting Powers agree to accept and respect the Russo-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1831.

At the same time, in view of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Government, it renounces all claim to the Achourpadeh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral, and restores to Persia the village of Fironzeh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia in value of the Convention of the 28th May, 1893.

The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhs, or "old" Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River, shall be retained by Russia.

The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak River and the other frontier rivers and waterways. In order finally to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories, a Commission, composed of Russian and Persian representatives, shall be appointed.
IV. In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intervention to the internal affairs of the other.

V. The two High Contracting Parties undertake -
   1. To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.

   They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

   2. Not to allow a third party or any organisation, whatever it be called which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.

   3. To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia, or those of its allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

VII. The considerations set forth in Article VI have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

VIII. Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued in the East by the Tsarist Government, which consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation.

   Federal Russia accordingly renounces its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments. It regards the debts due to it as void, and will not require their repayment. Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question.
IX. In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertakings of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that bank. The Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has been decided that the Russian Socialist Republic may establish consulates, and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate, free of charge.

X. The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilisations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following Russian installations:

(a.) The high-roads from Enzeli to Tehran, and from Kazvin to Hamadan, and all land and installations in connection with these roads.

(b.) The railroad Djoulfa-Tauris-Sofian-Urmia, with all installations, rolling-stock and accessories.

(c.) The landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, and all means of transport of the lake of Urmia.

(d.) All telegraph and telephone lines established in Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all moveable and immovable installations and dependencies.

(e.) The port of Enzeli and the warehouses, with the electrical installations, and other buildings.

XI. In view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomantchai, concluded on the 10th February, 1828 (old style), between Persia and Russia, which forbids Persia, under the terms of Article 8, to have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, is abrogated in accordance with the principles set forth in Article I of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that sea, under their own flags, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty.

XII. The Russian Federal Government, having officially renounced all economic interests obtained by military preponderance, further declares that, apart from the concessions which form the subject of Articles IX and X, the other concessions obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void.

In conformity with which the Russian Federal Government restores, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty, to the Persian Government, as representing the Persian people, all the concessions in question, whether already being worked
or not, together will all land taken over in virtue of those concessions.

Of the lands and properties situated in Persia and belonging to the former Tsarist Government, only the premises of the Russian Legation at Tehran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates, shall be retained by Russia. Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zerguendeh, which was arrogated to itself by the former Tsarist Government.

XIII. The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.

XIV. The Persian Government, recognising the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract.

XV. In accordance with the principle of liberty of conscience proclaimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declares that the religious settlements established in Persia by the former Tsarist Governments are abolished. Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in the future.

Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation represented by the Persian Government the lands, property and buildings belonging to the Orthodox Mission situated at Urmia, together with the other similar establishments. The Persian Government shall use these properties for the construction of schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.

XVI. By virtue of the communication from Soviet Russia dated the 25th June, 1919, with reference to the abolition of consular jurisdictions, it is decided that Russian subjects in Persia and Persian subjects in Russia shall, as from the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local Courts.

XVII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.
XVIII. Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countries, enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nations other than countries allied to them.

XIX. Within a short period after the signature of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organisation of the import and export of goods, methods of payment, and the customs duties to be levied by the Persian Government on goods originating in Russia, shall be determined, under a commercial Convention, by a special Commission consisting of representatives of the two High Contracting Parties.

XX. Each of the two High Contracting Parties grants to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third country.

The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other than countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

XXI. The two High Contracting Parties shall open telegraphic and postal relations between Russia and Persia within the shortest possible period after the signature of the present Treaty.

The conditions of these relations shall be fixed by a postal and telegraphic Convention.

XXII. In order to consolidate the good relations between the two neighbouring Powers and to facilitate the realisation of the friendly intentions of each country towards the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immediately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented in the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Representative, who shall enjoy the rights of extra-territoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by international law and usage and by the regulations and customs of the two countries.

XXIII. In order to develop their mutual relations, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by common agreement.

The rights and duties of the Consuls shall be fixed by a special Agreement to be concluded without delay after the signature of the present Treaty. This Agreement shall conform to the provisions in force in the two countries with regard to consular establishments . . .

XXV. The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian. Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic.

XXVI. The present Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature . . .
EXCHANGE OF NOTES, 12 DECEMBER 1921

1. From the Persian Foreign Minister

The Persian Government and the Mejlis have observed that Articles V and VI of the Treaty concluded between our two countries are worded vaguely - the Mejlis, moreover, desires that the retrocession of Russian concessions to the Persian Government should be made without reserve or condition, and that Article XX should be so worded as to allow the Persian Government full powers for the transit of imports and exports. Conversations have taken place with you on these questions, and you have given explanations with regard to Articles V and VI and promises concerning Articles XIII and XX, to the effect that if the Treaty were passed by the Mejlis you would give all the assistance in your power to ensure that the two Articles in question should be revised on the lines desired by the Mejlis and the Persian Government. The Persian Government and the Mejlis are most desirous that friendly relations should be re-established between our two Governments, and that the Treaty, which is based upon the most amicable sentiments, should be concluded as soon as possible.

I have, therefore, the honour to request you to give in writing your explanations with regard to the interpretation of Articles V and VI, and to repeat the promises of support which you have already given as regards the revision of Articles XIII and XX, in order that the Persian Government may be enabled to secure the passing of the Treaty by the Mejlis.

I also wish to ask you to take the necessary steps to repair the error which has been made in Article III, in which the word "Commission" was written instead of "Treaty", as the only Treaty which was concluded in 1881 was a frontier delimitation Treaty, and this is the Treaty referred to in Article III.

2. From the Russian Diplomatic Representative, Tehran.

In reply to your letter dated the 20th day of Ghows, I have the honour to inform you that Articles V and VI are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign Powers which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics and at the same time to possess themselves, by force or by underhand methods, of part of the Persian territory, thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks - made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces - which they might mediate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her. The Articles referred to are therefore in no sense intended to apply to verbal or written attacks directed against the Soviet Government by the various Persian groups, or even by any Russian emigres in Persia, in so far as such attacks are generally tolerated as between neighbouring Powers animated by sentiments of mutual friendship.
With regard to Articles XIII and XX, and the small error to which you draw attention in Article III with reference to the Convention of 1881, I am in a position to state categorically, as I have always stated, that my Government, whose attitude towards the Persian nation is entirely friendly, has never sought to place any restriction upon the progress and prosperity of Persia. I myself fully share this attitude, and would be prepared, should friendly relations be maintained between the two countries, to promote negotiations with a view to a total or partial revision of these Articles on the lines desired by the Persian Government, as far as the interests of Russia permit.

In view of the preceding statements, I trust that, as you promised me in your letter, your Government and the Mejlis will ratify the Treaty in question as soon as possible.

Appendix 2: Treaty of Nonaggression (Sa'jabad Pact):
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. 8 July, 1937

ART. 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to pursue a policy of complete abstention from any interference in each other's internal affairs.

ART. 2. The High Contracting Parties expressly undertake to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers.

ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties agree to consult together in all international disputes affecting their common interests.

ART. 4. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes in no event to resort, whether singly or jointly with one or more third Powers, to any act of aggression directed against any other of the Contracting Parties.

The following shall be deemed to be acts of aggression:
1. Declaration of war;
2. Invasion of the armed forces of one State, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. An attack by the land, naval or air forces of one State, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Directly or indirectly aiding or assisting an aggressor.

The following shall not constitute acts of aggression:
1. The exercise of the right of legitimate self-defence, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression as defined above;
2. Action in pursuance of a decision of the Assembly or Council of the League of Nations, or under Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided always that in the latter case such action is directed against the State which was the first to attack;
4. Action to assist a State subjected to attack, invasion or recourse to war by another of the High Contracting Parties, in violation of the Treaty for Renunciation of War signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928.

ART. 5. Should one of the High Contracting Parties consider that a breach of Article 4 of the present Treaty has been or is about to be committed, he shall at once bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations.

The foregoing provision shall not affect the right of such High Contracting Party to take any steps which, in the circumstances, he may deem necessary.

ART. 6. Should one of the High Contracting Parties commit an aggression against a third Power, any other High Contracting Party may denounced the present Treaty, without notice, as towards the aggressor.
ART. 7. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within his respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitutional system of such other Party.

ART. 8. The High Contracting Parties, having already recognised, in the General Treaty for Renunciation of War August 27th, 1928, that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, whatever their nature or origin, which may arise among them, shall never be sought by other than pacific means, reaffirm that principle and undertake to rely upon such modes of procedure as have been or shall be established between the High Contracting Parties in that respect.

ART. 9. No Articles of the present Treaty shall be considered as in any way diminishing the obligations assumed by each of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ART. 10. The present Treaty, drawn up in the French language and signed in quadruplicate, one copy having, as they severally recognise, been delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties, the Treaty shall be deemed to be renewed for successive periods of five years, until its denunciation with six months' notice by one or more of the High Contracting Parties. On its denunciation as towards one of the Parties, the Treaty shall nevertheless remain in force as between the others.


The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

Winston S. Churchill
J. Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt


XIV. Iran

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

Appendix 4: Agreement between the United States and Iran on the Establishment of a Postwar American Military Mission in Iran.

October 6, 1947: Agreement signed at Tehran.
October 6, 1947: Entered into force.
December 29, 1948; January 5, 1949; November 28, 1949;
January 10, 1950; April 10, 1961; June 14, 1961; November 12,
December 29, 1943; January 5, 1949; November 28, 1949;
January 10, 1950; September 17, 1950; November 18, 1950;
April 18, 1954; September 22, 1954; November 22, 1954;
February 13, 1956; April 10, 1961; June 14, 1961; November
12, 1961; February 7, 1962; March 19, 1962; December 3, 1967;
December 28, 1967; November 25, 1968; December 14, 1968;

In conformity with the request of the Government of Iran
to the Government of the United States of America, the
President of the United States of America has authorized the
appointment of officers and enlisted men of the United States
Army to constitute a military mission to Iran under the
conditions specified below:

Title I
Purpose and Duration

ARTICLE 1. The purpose of this Mission is to cooperate
with the Ministry of War of Iran and with the personnel of
the Iranian Army with a view to enhancing the efficiency of
the Iranian Army.

ARTICLE 2. This agreement shall be effective from the
date of signing of the agreement by the accredited representa­
tives of the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Iran and shall continue in force until
March 20, 1949, unless sooner terminated or extended as herein-
after provided.

ARTICLE 3. If the Government of Iran should desire that
the services of the Mission be extended beyond the stipulated
period, it shall make a written proposal to that effect prior
to September 21, 1948. The Government of the United States of
America agrees to act upon such proposal prior to December 21,
1948.

ARTICLE 4. This agreement may be terminated prior to
March 20, 1949 in the following manner:
(a) By either government subject to three months notice
in writin writing to the other government;
(b) By either government at any time, upon written notice,
if that government considers it necessary due to domestic
disturbances or foreign hostilities;
(c) By the Government of the United States of America at
any time upon written notice that the present statutory
authority under which this arrangement is concluded has termi­
nated and that Congress has provided no other authority for
the continuation of the Mission;
(d) By the recall of the entire personnel of the Mission
by the Government of the United States of America in the
public interest of the United States of America, without
Title II
Composition and Personnel

ARTICLE 5. Initially the Mission shall consist of such numbers of personnel of the United States Army as may be agreed upon by the Minister of War of Iran through his authorized representative in Washington and by the War Department of the United States of America. The Individuals to be assigned shall be those agreed upon by the Minister of War of Iran or his authorized representative and by the War Department of the United States of America or its authorized representative.

Title III
Duties, Rank, and Precedence

ARTICLE 6. Members of the Mission shall be assigned to the Department of the Ministry of War designated the Advisory Department. The Advisory Department shall be organized under a table of organization prepared with the agreement of the Chief of Mission and approved by the Minister of War of Iran. Members of the Mission shall be assigned to position vacancies shown on this table, and their assignment shall be published in Iranian Army General Orders.

ARTICLE 7. The senior officer of the Mission shall be appointed Chief of the Mission. Other members of the Mission shall be assigned duties by the Chief of Mission as indicated by the table of organization and approved by the Minister of War of Iran, or such other duties as may be agreed upon between the Minister of War of Iran and the Chief of the Mission.

ARTICLE 8. The duties of the Mission shall be to advise and assist the Ministry of War of Iran and its several departments as well as subordinate sections of the General Staff with respect to plans, problems concerning organization, administrative principles and training methods. These duties involve the principles of work of the General Staff and all departments of the Ministry of War in Tehran and their field agencies except tactical and strategical plans or operations against a foreign enemy, which are not related to the duties of the Mission.

ARTICLE 9. Members of the Mission will assume neither command nor staff responsibility in the Iranian Army. They may, however, make such official inspections and investigations as may be necessary and are approved by the Minister of War of Iran and directed by the Chief of the Mission.

ARTICLE 10. Each member of the Mission shall serve in the Mission with the rank he holds in the United States Army but shall have precedence over all Iranian Army officers of the same rank. Each member of the Mission shall be entitled to all benefits and privileges which the regulations of the Iranian Army provide for officers of corresponding rank of the Iranian Army. Members of the Mission shall wear the United States Army uniform with a shoulder sleeve insignia.
indicating service with the Iranian Army.

ARTICLE 11. Members of the Mission in case of violation of the laws and regulations of the Iranian Government, may be separated from the service of the Iranian Army and in such case will have only the right to draw travel expenses back to America.

ARTICLE 12. In the normal execution of their duties as defined in Article 8 and 9, the Chief of the Mission, and other members when so directed by him, are authorized to visit and inspect any part of the Iranian military establishment, and officers in authority shall facilitate such inspections and make available plans, records, reports, and correspondence as required. Members of the Mission will not concern themselves with secret matters except when it is essential to their duties and then only with the approval of the Ministry of War. Each member of the Mission has the obligation not to divulge or in any way to disclose to any foreign government or any person whatsoever any secret or confidential matter of which he may have become cognizant in his capacity as a member of the Mission. This obligation shall continue in force after the termination of the services of the member of the mission and after the expiration or cancellation of this agreement.

Title IV
Compensation and Perquisites

ARTICLE 13. Members of the Mission shall receive from the Government of Iran such fixed annual compensation and emoluments payable in American currency or dollar draft or check, allowances as may be agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran for each member. Such compensation and emoluments shall be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly installments, each due and payable on the last day of the month. The compensation and emoluments shall not be subject to any tax, now or hereafter in effect, of the Government of Iran or of any of its political or administrative subdivisions. Should there, however, at present or while this agreement is in effect, be any taxes that might affect such compensation and emoluments, such taxes shall be borne by the Ministry of War of Iran, in order to comply with the provisions of this Article that the compensation agreed upon shall be met.

ARTICLE 14. The compensation and emoluments indicated in the preceding article shall commence for each member of the Mission upon arrival in Iran and, except as otherwise expressly provided in this agreement, shall continue, following the termination of duty with the Mission, or following the termination of the Mission under Article 4 of this agreement, likewise for the return trip to the United States of America and thereafter for the period of any accumulated leave which may be due the member.

ARTICLE 15. The additional compensation and emoluments due for the period of the return trip and accumulated leave shall be paid to each member of the Mission before his departure from Iran and such compensation and emoluments shall be computed for travel by the shortest route usually travelled to the port of entry in the United States of America, regardless of the route and method of travel used by the member of the Mission.
ARTICLE 16. During the period of the present national emergency in the United States of America, expense of transportation of each member of the Mission and his household effects, baggage and automobile from and to the United States of America shall be paid by the Government of the United States of America. If the period of this agreement extends beyond the date on which the national emergency in the United States of America is terminated, notification of the termination of the national emergency having been communicated to the Government of Iran in writing by the Government of the United States of America, expenses (except in case a member is replaced with less than two years service in the Mission for the convenience of the Government of the United States of America) for transportation of each member of the Mission and his household effects, baggage and automobile shall be paid by the Government of Iran. First-class accommodations for travel will be furnished for members of the Mission via the shortest usually travelled route between the port of embarkation in the United States of America and their official residence in Iran, both for the outward and return journey.

ARTICLE 17. At any time during the period of this agreement, as may be elected by each member, the family of each member of the Mission shall be furnished by the Government of Iran with first-class accommodations for travel, via the shortest usually travelled route between the port of embarkation in the United States of America and the official residence of the member in Iran, both for the outward and for the return journey. Throughout this agreement the term "Family" is limited to mean wife and dependent children.

ARTICLE 18. Compensation for transportation and travel expenses on official business of the Government of Iran shall be provided by the Government of Iran in accordance with the travel regulations of the Iranian Army.

ARTICLE 19. In addition to the United States Government transportation available to the Mission, the Government of Iran shall place other means of transportation (vehicle and aircraft) at the disposal of the Mission, when deemed necessary for the performance of official duties and will provide one third of the gasoline and oils required for the United States Government vehicles at the disposal of the Mission, as determined by the Chief of the Mission. The number of type of United States Government vehicles shall be determined by the War Department of the United States of America and authority is granted for the entry and exit from Iran, in accordance with the existing law, of one United States Army aircraft with crew as considered necessary by the Chief of the Mission, in the performance of official duties, provided that the Chief of the Mission previously informs the Iranian authorities concerned of the matter according to existing rules and regulations of Iran. All the United States Government vehicles placed at the disposal of the Mission for operation within Iran will be subject to the laws of Iran.

ARTICLE 20. The Government of Iran shall provide for members of the Mission suitable office space and facilities such as office equipment, stenographic and clerical help, civilian interpreters and orderlies, as indicated on the table of organization of the Advisory Department, and shall give necessary assistance for the smooth operation and improvement
of the work of the Mission.

ARTICLE 21. If any member of the Mission, or any of his family, should die in Iran, the Government of Iran shall have the body transported to such place in the United States of America as the surviving members of the family may decide, but the cost to the Government of Iran shall not exceed the cost of transporting the remains from the place of decease to New York City. Should the deceased be a member of the Mission, his services with the Mission shall be considered to have terminated fifteen (15) days after his death. Return transportation to New York City for the family of the deceased member and for their baggage, household effects, and automobile shall be provided as prescribed in Article 17. All allowances due the deceased member, including salary for fifteen (15) days subsequent to his death, and reimbursement for expenses and transportation due the deceased member for travel performed on official business of the Government of Iran, shall be paid to the widow of the deceased member or to any other person who may have been designated in writing by the deceased while serving under the terms of this agreement; but such widow or other person shall not be compensated for accrued leave due and not taken by the deceased. All compensations due the widow or other person designated by the deceased, under the provisions of this article, shall be paid within fifteen (15) days of the decease of said member.

ARTICLE 22. If a member of the Mission becomes ill or suffers injury, he shall, at the discretion of the Chief of the Mission, be placed in such hospital as the Chief of the Mission deems suitable, after consultation with the Ministry of War of Iran, and all expenses incurred as the result of such illness or injury while the patient is a member of the Mission and remains in Iran shall be paid by the Government of Iran. If the hospitalized member is a commissioned officer, he shall pay his cost of subsistence. Families will enjoy the same privileges agreed upon in this article for members of the Mission, except that a member of the Mission shall in all cases pay the cost of subsistence incident to hospitalization of a member of his family. Any member of the Mission unable to perform his duties with the Mission by reason of long continued physical disability shall be replaced.

Title V
Stipulations and Conditions

ARTICLE 23. Each member of the Mission shall be entitled to one month's annual leave with pay, or to a proportional part thereof with pay for any fractional part of the year. Unused portions of said leave shall be cumulative from year to year during service as a member of the Mission. This leave may be spent in Iran, in the United States of America, or in other countries, but the expense of travel and transportation not otherwise provided for in this agreement shall be borne by the member of the Mission taking such leave. All travel time on leave shall count as leave. The Government of Iran agrees to grant the leave herein specified according to the written application approved by the Chief of Mission with due consideration for the convenience of the Government of Iran.

ARTICLE 24. So long as this agreement, or any extension thereof, is in effect, the Government of Iran shall not engage
the services of any personnel of any other foreign government for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army, except by mutual agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran.

ARTICLE 25. The Government of Iran shall grant exemption from custom duties or other imports on articles imported into Iran by members of the Mission for their personal use or the use of their families, provided that their request for free entry has received the approval of the Ambassador of the United States of America or the Chargé d'Affaires, ad interim, and from all export duties on articles purchased in Iran for their personal use or the use of their families. The Government of Iran shall grant free and unrestricted passage of mail to and from members of the Mission from and to the United States when transportation of such mail is furnished by the Government of the United States of America. The Chief of the Mission is responsible that no contraband is sent or received by members of the Mission or their families.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Mahmoud Djam, Minister of War of Iran and George V. Allen, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, have signed this agreement in duplicate in the English and Persian Languages, at Tehran, this sixth day of October one thousand nine hundred and forty seven.

Geo. V. Allen
Ambassador of the United States of America

M. Djam

Appendix 5: Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Iran.

May 23, 1950: Entered into force.

The Acting Secretary of State (Webb) to the Iranian Charge d'Affaires ad interim (Aram).

SIR: I refer to the conversations which have recently taken place between the representatives of our two Governments concerning the transfer of military assistance by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of Iran pursuant to Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress of the United States of America, and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations as follows:

1. The Government of the United States of America, recognizing this principle that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority, undertakes to make or continue to make available to the Government of Iran on a grant basis such equipment, materials and services as the Government of the United States of America may authorize. The furnishing of any such assistance as may be authorized pursuant hereto shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and shall be subject to all of the applicable terms and conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and such other applicable laws of the United States of America relating to the transfer of military assistance. The two governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Iran undertakes to make effective use of assistance received pursuant to paragraph 1 for the purposes for which such assistance was furnished and will not devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished in accordance with these understandings.

3. In the common security interest of both governments, the Government of Iran undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such government or to any other nation title to or possession of any equipment, materials or services received on a grant basis pursuant to paragraph 1 without the prior consent of the Government of the United States of America.

4. The Government of Iran, after giving due consideration to reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Iran, which are to be determined by the Iranian Government itself, agrees to facilitate the production, transport, export and transfer to the Government of the United States of America, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as to the value, method of payment, et cetera, as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Iran.
5. (a) The Government of Iran will take appropriate measures which are not inconsistent with security and the interests of the country to keep the public informed of operations pursuant to these understandings.
   (b) Each government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of materials, services or information furnished by the other government pursuant to these understandings.

6. The Government of Iran, except as may otherwise be agreed between the two governments, shall grant duty-free treatment and exemption from internal taxation on importation or exportation to products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this understanding.

7. The Government of Iran agrees to receive technical personnel of the Government of the United States of America who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States of America for implementing the provisions of these understandings and to accord them necessary facilities to observe the progress of assistance furnished pursuant thereto.

8. The two governments will, upon request to either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them respecting responsibility for patent or similar claims based on the use of devices, processes, technological information or other forms of property protected by law in connection with equipment material or services furnished pursuant to paragraph I. In such negotiations, this point shall be considered: that each government will assume the responsibility for all such claims of its nationals and such claims arising in its jurisdiction of nationals of any third country.

9. The two governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application of these understandings or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to these understandings.

10. Nothing herein shall be construed to alter, amend or otherwise modify the agreements between the United States of America and Iran, signed at Tehran November 27, 1943 and October 6, 1947, as amended or extended.

I propose that, if these understandings meet with the approval of the Government of Iran, this note and your note concurring therein will be considered as confirming these understandings, effective on the date of your note and thereafter until one year after the date of receipt by either Government of a notification in writing of the intention of the other Government to terminate these understandings.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

James E. Webb
EXCELLENcy: ... I have the honour to concur in the proposals made in your note and to inform you that the understandings set forth therein meet with the approval of the Government of Iran. That note and the present note, accordingly, are considered as confirming these understandings, effective on this date and thereafter until one year after the date of receipt by either Government of a notification in writing of the intention of the other Government to terminate these understandings.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

G. Aram

Appendix 6: Agreement of Friendly Cooperation: Pakistan and Turkey. 2 April, 1954.

Pakistan and Turkey

Reaffirming their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give effect to these Purposes and Principles,

Desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere friendship happily existing between them,

Recognising the need for consultation and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their peoples.

Being convinced that such cooperation would be to the interest of all peace-loving nations and in particular also to the interest of nations in the region of the Contracting Parties, and would consequently serve to ensure peace and security which are both indivisible,

Have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly Cooperation ...

ART. 1. The Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any way in the internal affairs of each other and from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other.

ART. 2. The Contracting Parties will consult on international matters of mutual interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate between them to the maximum extent.

ART. 3. The Contracting Parties will develop the cooperation, already established between them in the cultural field under a separate Agreement, in the economic and technical fields also by concluding, if necessary, other agreements.

ART. 4. The consultation and cooperation between the Contracting Parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:

a. exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress,

b. endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the Parties in the production of arms and ammunition,

c. studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.

ART. 5. Each Contracting Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement and that this Agreement shall not affect, nor can it be interpreted so as to affect, the aforesaid engagements, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Agreement.

ART. 6. Any State, whose participation is considered by the Contracting parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present Agreement, may accede to the present Agreement under the same conditions and with the same obligations as the Contracting Parties.
Any accession shall have legal effect, after the instrument of accession is duly deposited with the Government of Turkey from the date of an official notification by the Government of Turkey to the Government of Pakistan.

ART. 7. This Agreement, of which the English text is authentic, shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Ankara.

In case no formal notice of denunciation is given by one of the Contracting Parties to the other, one year before the termination of a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, the present Agreement shall automatically continue in force for a further period of five years, and the same procedure will apply for subsequent periods thereafter.


Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims ...

ART. 1. Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ART. 2. In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the cooperation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ART. 4. The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

ART. 5. This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession
shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

ART. 6. A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact. The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ART. 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

ART. 8. This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Appendix 8: Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran.

July 11, 1956     Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America.
September 14, 1956  Ratified by the President of the United States of America.
April 30, 1957    Ratified by Iran.
May 16, 1957      Ratifications exchanged at Tehran.
June 27, 1957    Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America.
July 16, 1957    Entered into force.

By the President of the United States of America
A PROCLAMATION

Whereas a treaty of amity, economic relations, and consular rights between the United States of America and Iran was signed at Tehran on August 15, 1955, the original of which treaty, being in the English and Persian languages, is word for word as follows:

The United States of America and Iran, desirous of emphasizing the friendly relations which have long prevailed between their peoples, of reaffirming the high principles in the regulation of human affairs to which they are committed, of encouraging mutually beneficial trade and investments and closer economic intercourse generally between their peoples, and of regulating consular relations, have resolved to conclude on the basis of reciprocal equality of treatment, a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:
Mr. Selden Chapin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Tehran; and
His Imperial Majesty, the Shah of Iran;
His Excellency Mr. Mostafa Samiy, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I

There shall be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of America and Iran.

ARTICLE II

1. Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall be permitted, upon terms no less favourable than those accorded to nationals of any third country, to enter and remain in the territories of the other High Contracting Party for the purpose of carrying on trade between their own country and the territories of such other High Contracting Party and engaging in related commercial activities, and for the purpose of developing and directing the operations of an enterprise in which they have invested, or in which they are actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital.
2. Nationals of either High Contracting Party within the territories of the other High Contracting Party shall, either individually or through associations, and so long as their activities are not contrary to public order, safety or morals (a) be permitted to travel therein freely and reside at places of their choice; (b) enjoy freedom of conscience and the right to hold religious services; (c) be permitted to engage in philanthropic, educational and scientific activities; and (d) have the right to gather and transmit information for dissemination to the public abroad, and otherwise to communicate with other persons inside and outside such territories. They shall also be permitted to engage in the practice of professions for which they have qualified under the applicable legal provisions governing admission to professions.

3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article shall be subject to the right of either High Contracting Party to apply measures which are necessary to maintain public order, and to protect public health, morals and safety, including the right to expel, to exclude or to limit the movement of aliens on the said grounds.

4. Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party. When any such national is in custody, he shall in every respect receive reasonable and humane treatment; and, on his demand, the diplomatic or consular representative of his country shall without unnecessary delay be notified and accorded full opportunity to safeguard his interests. He shall be promptly informed of the accusations against him, allowed all facilities reasonably necessary to his defense and given a prompt and impartial disposition of his case.

ARTICLE III

1. Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of either High Contracting Party shall have their juridical status recognised within the territories of the other High Contracting Party. It is understood, however, that recognition of juridical status does not of itself confer rights upon companies to engage in the activities for which they are organized. As used in the present Treaty "companies" means corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit.

2. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have freedom of access to the courts of justice and administrative agencies within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in defense and pursuit of their rights, to the end that prompt and impartial justice be done. Such access shall be allowed, in any event, upon terms no less favourable than those applicable to nationals and companies of such other High Contracting Party or of any third country. It is understood that companies not engaged in activities within the country shall enjoy the right of such access without any requirement of registration or domestication.
3. The private settlement of disputes of a civil nature, involving nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, shall not be discouraged within the territories of the other High Contracting Party; and, in cases of such settlement by arbitration, neither the alienage of the arbitrators nor the foreign situs of the arbitration proceedings shall of themselves be a bar to the enforceability of awards duly resulting therefrom.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each High Contracting Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to nationals and companies of the other High Contracting Party, and to their property and enterprises; shall refrain from applying unreasonable or discriminatory measures that would impair their legally acquired rights and interests; and shall assure that their lawful contractual rights are afforded effecting means of enforcement, in conformity with the applicable laws.

2. Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party, including interests in property, shall receive the most constant protection and security within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in no case less than that required by international law. Such property shall not be taken except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination and payment thereof.

3. The dwellings, offices, warehouses, factories and other premises of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party located within the territories of the other High Contracting Party shall not be subject to entry or molestation without just cause. Official searches and examinations of such premises and their contents, shall be made only according to law and with careful regard for the convenience of the occupants and the conduct of business.

4. Enterprises which nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party are permitted to establish or acquire, within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, shall be permitted freely to conduct their activities therein, upon terms no less favourable than other enterprises of whatever nationality engaged in similar activities. Such nationals and companies shall enjoy the right to continued control and management of such enterprises: to engage attorneys, agents, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, interpreters and other specialized employees of their choice; and to do all other things necessary or incidental to the effective conduct of their affairs.

ARTICLE V

1. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be permitted, within the territories of the other High Contracting Party: (a) to lease, for suitable periods of time, real property needed for their residence or for the conduct of activities pursuant to the present Treaty; (b) to purchase or otherwise acquire personal property of all kinds;
and (c) to dispose of property of all kinds by sale, testa-
tament or otherwise. The treatment accorded in these respects
shall in no event be less favourable than that accorded
nationals and companies of any third country.

2. Upon compliance with the applicable laws and regul-
ations respecting registration and other formalities,
nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party
shall be accorded within the territories of the other High
Contracting Party effective protection in the exclusive use
of inventions, trade marks and trade names.

ARTICLE VI

1. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting
Party shall not be subject to the payment of taxes, fees or
charges within the territories of the other High Contracting
Party, or to requirements with respect to the levy and collect-
ion thereof, more burdensome than those borne by nationals,
residents and companies of any third country. In the case of
nationals of either High Contracting Party residing within the
territories of the other High Contracting Party, and of nation-
als and companies of either High Contracting Party engaged in
trade or other gainful pursuit or in non-profit activities
therein, such payments and requirements shall not be more
burdensome than those borne by nationals and companies of such
other High Contracting Party.

2. Each High Contracting Party, however, reserves the
right to: (a) extend specific tax advantages only on the basis
of reciprocity, or pursuant to agreements for the avoidance of
double taxation or the mutual protection of revenue; and (b)
apply special requirements as to the exemptions of a personal
nature allowed to non-residents in connection with income and
inheritance taxes.

3. Companies of either High Contracting Party shall not
be subject, within the territories of the other High Contract-
ing Party, to taxes upon any income, transactions or capital
not attributable to the operations and investment thereof
within such territories.

ARTICLE VII

1. Neither High Contracting Party shall apply restrict-
ions on the making of payments, remittances, and other trans-
fers of funds to or from the territories of the other High
Contracting Party, except (a) to the extent necessary to
assure the availability of foreign exchange for payments for
goods and services essential to the health and welfare of its
people, or (b) in the case of a member of the International
Monetary Fund, restrictions specifically approved by the Fund.

2. If either High Contracting Party applies exchange
restrictions, it shall promptly make reasonable provision for
the withdrawal, in foreign exchange in the currency of the
other High Contracting Party, of: (a) the compensation
referred to in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty,
(b) earnings, whether in the form of salaries, interest,
dividends, commissions, royalties, payments for technical
services, or otherwise, and (c) amounts for amortization of
loans, depreciation of direct investments and capital transfers.
giving consideration to special needs for other transactions. If more than one rate of exchange is in force, the rate applicable to such withdrawals shall be a rate which is specifically approved by the International Monetary Fund for such transactions or, in the absence of a rate so approved, an effective rate which, inclusive of any taxes or surcharges on exchange transfers, is just and reasonable.

3. Either High Contracting Party applying exchange restrictions shall in general administer them in a manner not to influence disadvantageously the competitive position of the commerce, transport or investment of capital of the other High Contracting Party in comparison with the commerce, transport or investment of capital of any third country; and shall afford such other High Contracting Party adequate opportunity for consultation at any time regarding the application of the present Article.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Each High Contracting Party shall accord to products of the other High Contracting Party, from whatever place and by whatever type of carrier arriving, and to products destined for exportation to the territories of such other High Contracting Party, by whatever route and by whatever type of carrier, treatment no less favorable than that accorded like products of or destined for exportation to any third country, in all matters relating to: (a) duties, other charges, regulations and formalities, on or in connection with importation and exportation; and (b) internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use. The same rule shall apply with respect to the international transfer of payments for imports and exports.

2. Neither High Contracting Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any product of the other High Contracting Party or on the exportation of any product to the territories of the other High Contracting Party, unless the importation of the like product of, or the exportation of the like product to, all third countries is similarly restricted or prohibited.

3. If either High Contracting Party imposes quantitative restrictions on the importation or exportation of any product in which the other High Contracting Party has an important interest:
   (a) It shall as a general rule give prior public notice of the total amount of the product, by quantity or value, that may be imported or exported during a specified period, and of any change in such amount or period; and
   (b) If it makes allotments to any third country, it shall afford such other High Contracting Party a share proportionate to the amount of the product, by quantity or value, supplied by or to it during a previous representative period, due consideration being given to any special factors affecting the trade in such product.

4. Either High Contracting Party may impose prohibitions or restrictions on sanitary or other customary grounds of a non-commercial nature, or in the interest of preventing deceptive or unfair practices, provided such prohibitions or restrictions do not arbitrarily discriminate against the commerce of the other High Contracting Party.
5. Either High Contracting Party may adopt measures necessary to assure the utilization of accumulated inconvertible currencies or to deal with a stringency of foreign exchange. However, such measures shall deviate no more than necessary from a policy designed to promote the maximum development of nondiscriminatory multilateral trade and to expedite the attainment of a balance-of-payments position which will obviate the necessity of such measures.

6. Each High Contracting Party reserves the right to accord special advantages: (a) to products of its national fisheries, (b) to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or (c) by virtue of a customs union or free trade area of which either High Contracting Party, after consultation with the other High Contracting Party, may become a member. Each High Contracting Party, moreover, reserves rights and obligations it may have under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and special advantages it may accord pursuant thereto.

ARTICLE IX

1. In the administration of its customs regulations and procedures, each High Contracting Party shall: (a) promptly publish all requirements of general application affecting importation and exportation; (b) apply such requirements in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner; (c) refrain, as a general practice, from enforcing new or more burdensome requirements until after public notice thereof; (d) provide an appeals procedure by which prompt and impartial review of administrative action in customs matters can be obtained; and (e) not impose greater than nominal penalties for infractions resulting from clerical errors or from mistakes made in good faith.

2. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded nationals and companies of the other High Contracting Party, or of any third country, with respect to all matters relating to importation and exportation.

3. Neither High Contracting Party shall impose any measure of a discriminatory nature that hinders or prevents the importer or exporter of products of either country from obtaining marine insurance on such products in companies of either High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE X

1. Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.

2. Vessels under the flag of either High Contracting Party, and carrying the papers required by its law in proof of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels of that High Contracting Party both on the high seas and within the ports, places and waters of the other High Contracting Party.

3. Vessels of either High Contracting Party shall have liberty, on equal terms with vessels of the other High Contracting Party and on equal terms with vessels of any third
country, to come with their cargoes to all ports, places and waters of such other High Contracting Party open to foreign commerce and navigation. Such vessels and cargoes shall in all respects be accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment within the ports, places and waters of such other High Contracting Party; but each High Contracting Party may reserve exclusive rights and privileges to its own vessels with respect to the coasting trade, inland navigation and national fisheries.

4. Vessels of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment by the other High Contracting Party with respect to the right to carry all products that may be carried by vessel to or from the territories of such other High Contracting Party; and such products shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded like products carried in vessels of such other High Contracting Party, with respect to: (a) duties and charges of all kinds, (b) the administration of the customs, and (c) bounties, drawbacks and other privileges of this nature.

5. Vessels of either High Contracting Party that are in distress shall be permitted to take refuge in the nearest port or haven of the other High Contracting Party, and shall receive friendly treatment and assistance.

6. The term "vessels," as used herein, means all types of vessels, whether privately owned or operated, or publicly owned or operated; but this term does not, except with reference to paragraphs 2 and 5 of the present Article, include fishing vessels or vessels of war.

ARTICLE XI

1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes (a) that enterprises owned or controlled by its Government, and that monopolies or agencies granted exclusive or special privileges within its territories, shall make their purchases and sales involving either imports or exports affecting the commerce of the other High Contracting Party solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and (b) that the nationals, companies and commerce of such other High Contracting Party shall be afforded adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases and sales.

2. Each High Contracting Party shall accord to the nationals, companies and commerce of the other High Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment, as compared with that accorded to the nationals, companies and commerce of any third country, with respect to: (a) the governmental purchase of supplies, (b) the awarding of government contracts, and (c) the sale of any service sold by the Government or by any monopoly or agency granted exclusive or special privileges.

3. The High Contracting Parties recognize that conditions of competitive equality should be maintained in situations in which publicly owned or controlled trading or manufacturing enterprises of either High Contracting Party engage
in competition, within the territories thereof, with privately owned and controlled enterprises of nationals and companies of the other High Contracting Party. Accordingly, such private enterprises shall, in such situations, be entitled to the benefit of any special advantages of an economic nature accorded such public enterprises, whether in the nature of subsidies, tax exemptions or otherwise. The foregoing rule shall not apply, however, to special advantages given in connection with: (a) manufacturing goods for government use, or supplying goods and services to the Government for government use- or (b) supplying at prices substantially below competitive prices, the needs of particular population groups for essential goods and services not otherwise practically obtainable by such groups.

4. No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.

ARTICLE XII

Each High Contracting Party shall have the right to send to the other High Contracting Party consular representatives, who, having presented their credentials and having been recognized in a consular capacity, shall be provided, free of charge, with exequaturs or other authorization.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Consular representatives of each High Contracting Party shall be permitted to reside in the territory of the other High Contracting Party at the places where consular officers of any third country are permitted to reside and at other places by consent of the other High Contracting Party. Consular officers and employees shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded to officers and employees of their rank or status by general international usage and shall be permitted to exercise all functions which are in accordance with such usage- in any event they shall be treated, subject to reciprocity, in a manner no less favorable than similar officers and employees of any third country.

2. The consular offices shall not be entered by the police or other local authorities without the consent of the consular officer, except that in the case of fire or other disaster, or if the local authorities have probable cause to believe that a crime of violence has been or is about to be committed in the consular office, consent to entry shall be presumed. In no case shall they examine or seize the papers there deposited.

ARTICLE XIV

1. All furniture, equipment and supplies consigned to or withdrawn from customs custody for a consular or diplomatic
office of either High Contracting Party for official use shall be exempt within the territories of the other High Contracting Party from all customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation.

2. The baggage, effects and other articles imported exclusively for the personal use of consular officers and diplomatic and consular employees and members of their families residing with them, who are nationals of the sending state and are not engaged in any private occupation for gain in the territories of the receiving state, shall be exempt from all customs duties and internal revenue or other taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation. Such exemptions shall be granted with respect to the property accompanying the person entitled thereto on first arrival and on subsequent arrivals, and to that consigned to such officers and employees during the period in which they continue in status.

3. It is understood, however, that: (a) paragraph 2 of the present Article shall apply as to consular officers and diplomatic and consular employees only when their names have been communicated to the appropriate authorities of the receiving state and they have been duly recognized in their official capacity; (b) in the case of consignments, either High Contracting Party may, as a condition to the granting of exemption, require that a notification of any such consignment be given, in a prescribed manner; and (c) nothing herein authorizes importations specifically prohibited by law.

ARTICLE XV

1. The Government of either High Contracting Party may, in the territory of the other, acquire, own, lease for any period of time, or otherwise hold and occupy, such lands, buildings, and appurtenances as may be necessary and appropriate for governmental, other than military, purposes. If under the local law the permission of the local authorities must be obtained as a prerequisite to any such acquiring or holding, such permission shall be given on request.

2. Lands and buildings situated in the territories of either High Contracting Party, of which the other High Contracting Party is the legal or equitable owner, and which are used exclusively for governmental purposes by that owner, shall be exempt from taxation of every kind, national, state, provincial and municipal, other than assessments levied for services or local public improvements by which the premises are benefited.

ARTICLE XVI

1. No tax or other similar charge of any kind, whether of a national, state, provincial, or municipal nature, shall be levied or collected within the territories of the receiving state in respect of the official emoluments, salaries, wages or allowances received (a) by a consular officer of the sending state as compensation for his consular services, or (b) by a consular employee thereof as compensation for his services as a consulate. Likewise, consular officers and employees, who are permanent employees of the sending state and are not engaged in private occupation for gain within the
territories of the receiving state, shall be exempt from all taxes or other similar charges, the legal incidence of which would otherwise fall upon such officers or employees.

2. The preceding paragraph shall not apply in respect of taxes and other similar charges upon: (a) the ownership or occupation of immovable property situated within the territories of the receiving state; (b) income derived from sources within such territories (except the compensation mentioned in the preceding paragraph); or (c) the passing of property at death.

3. The provisions of the present Article shall have like application to diplomatic officers and employees, who shall in addition be accorded all exemptions allowed them under general international usage.

ARTICLE XVII

The exemptions provided for in Articles XIV and XVI shall not apply to nationals of the sending state who are also nationals of the receiving state, or to any other person who is a national of the receiving state, nor to persons having immigrant status who have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the receiving state.

ARTICLE XVIII

Consular officers and employees are not subject to local jurisdiction for acts done in their official character and within the scope of their authority. No consular officer or employee shall be required to present his official files before the courts or to make declaration with respect to their contents.

ARTICLE XIX

A consular officer shall have the right within his district to: (a) interview, communicate with, assist and advise any national of the sending state; (b) inquire into any incidents which have occurred affecting the interests of any such national- and (c) assist any such national in proceedings before or in relations with the authorities of the receiving state and, where necessary, arrange for legal assistance to which he is entitled. A national of the sending state shall have the right at all times to communicate with a consular officer of his country and, unless subject to lawful detention, to visit him at the consular office.

ARTICLE XX

1. The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:
(a) regulating the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(b) relating to fissionable materials, the radio-active by-products thereof, or the sources thereof;
(c) regulating the production of or traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, or traffic in other materials carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; and
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High
Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests.

2. The present Treaty does not accord any rights to engage in political activities.

3. The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not extend to advantages accorded by the United States of America or its Territories and possessions, irrespective of any future change in their political status, to one another, to the Republic of Cuba, to the Republic of the Philippines, to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or to the Panama Canal Zone.

4. The provisions of Article II, Paragraph 1, shall be construed as extending to nationals of either High Contracting Party seeking to enter the territories of the other High Contracting Party solely for the purpose of developing and directing the operations of an enterprise in the territories of such other High Contracting Party in which their employer has invested or is actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of capital: provided that such employer is a national or company of the same nationality as the applicant and that the applicant is employed by such national or company in a responsible capacity.

ARTICLE XXI

1. Each High Contracting Party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as the other High Contracting Party may make with respect to any matter affecting the operation of the present Treaty.

2. Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.

ARTICLE XXII

1. The present Treaty shall replace the following agreements between the United States of America and Iran:
   (a) the provisional agreement relating to commercial and other relations, concluded at Tehran May 14, 1928 and
   (b) the provisional agreement relating to personal status and family law, concluded at Tehran July 11, 1928.

2. Nothing in the present Treaty shall be construed to supersede any provision of the trade agreement and the supplementary exchange of notes between the United States of America and Iran, concluded at Washington April 8, 1943.

ARTICLE XXIII

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Tehran as soon as possible.

2. The present Treaty shall enter into force one month after the day of exchange of ratifications. It shall remain in force for ten years and shall continue in force thereafter until
terminated as provided herein.

3. Either High Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other High Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed hereunto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Persian languages, both equally authentic, at Tehran this fifteenth day of August one thousand nine hundred fifty-five, corresponding with the twenty-third day of Mordad one thousand three hundred and thirty-four.

Selden Chapin
(seal)

Mostafa Samiy
(seal)

Whereas the Senate of the United States of America by their resolution of July 11, 1956, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said treaty;

Whereas the said treaty was ratified by the President of the United States of America on September 14, 1956, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate, and has been duly ratified on the part of Iran;

Whereas the respective instruments of ratification of the said treaty were duly exchanged at Tehran on May 16, 1957;

And whereas it is provided in Article XXIII of the said treaty that the treaty shall enter into force one month after the day of exchange of ratifications;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the said treaty to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith on and after June 16, 1957, one month after the day of exchange of ratification, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this twenty-seventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred fifty-seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred eighty-first.

(seal)

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State

Source: U.S. Department of State, "United States Treaties and Other International Agreements," (1950-), vol. 8, no. 899.
Appendix 9: The Richards Mission to Iran on Behalf of the "Eisenhower Doctrine": Joint Communiqué
Issued at Tahran by the Government of Iran and the Special Assistant to the President: March 27, 1957.

His Excellency Prime Minister Hussein Ala and members of his Cabinet, and Ambassador James P. Richards, Special Representative of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, have met in common cause and interest to discuss the purposes and aims of the American Doctrine, proposed by President Eisenhower and decisively adopted by the American Congress.

During these discussions Prime Minister Ala reaffirmed his Government's endorsement of the purposes of the new American policy to strengthen the national independence and defense the territorial integrity of the countries in the general area of the Middle East against international communism and its imperialistic aims.

Ambassador Richards outlined the philosophy of President Eisenhower's policy, emphasizing that the foremost hope and purpose of the United States was, in company with its like-minded friends, to build peace with justice. He pointed out that the peoples of the Middle Eastern area and the people of America have a common interest in their joint efforts to preserve liberty and freedom through the maintenance of security against enroachments by international communism in the Middle East. International communism is incompatible with the aspirations of the people of the Middle East for political independence, national integrity, religious, cultural and social freedom. It is likewise incompatible with the freedom heritage of the American people. Should international communism succeed in its imperialistic aims, the security, freedom, integrity and independence of all peoples throughout the free world would face extinction.

The two Governments intend to continue their close cooperation to attain their mutual objectives.

Ambassador Richards explained that the President of the United States and the American Government and people have declared it their policy to use, if necessary and appropriate and if requested, the armed forces of the United States in support of any country in the area of the Middle East which is attacked by a country under the control of international communism.

He emphasized that the United States, in accordance with its historical traditions, has no territorial designs in the area, nor is it desirous of creating a so-called sphere of influence. Its desires are solely to assist the nations in the Middle Eastern area to achieve security and economic well-being. It is not seeking to fill a power vacuum. If one exists, the United States believes it should be filled by the increasing strength of the Middle Eastern nations themselves.

The Governments of Iran and the United States, in accordance with their long established policies, continue to oppose any form of intervention or interference in the internal affairs of one state by another. They are determined, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, to cooperate
together in protective measures against the threat of aggression from any source.

Substantial American aid in the form of economic, technical and military assistance is continuing. Because of past experience and Iran's own increasing capabilities, it is anticipated that American aid will accelerate progress in Iran's economic development program and toward the Government's goal of a better standard of living, with full national security, for its people.

The representatives of the Government of Iran and the special Mission of Ambassador Richards have agreed on procedures in which the development of economic and military aid to Iran can serve best to achieve the aims and purposes of the Middle East proposals.

Ambassador Richards stated that the United States was prepared to offer assistance toward several joint regional projects which have been or may be approved by the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact. These would be in addition to the large economic aid programs already in progress in Iran. As further evidence of America's deep interest and belief in the defensive objectives of the countries of the Baghdad Pact, the United States has expressed a willingness to join the Military Committee of the Pact, if invited to do so.

Ambassador Richards agreed that the United States would provide increased financing for an already planned large military construction program to meet the needs of the Imperial Iranian armed forces and would also provide certain additional items of military equipment to those forces.


July 28, 1958 Entered into force.

DECLARATION

1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London have re-examined their position in the light of recent events and conclude that the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever. These members declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been instituted. Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have been promoted. Relationships are being established with other free world nations associated for collective security.

2. The question of whether substantive alterations should be made in the Pact and its organization or whether the Pact will be continued in its present form is under consideration by the Governments concerned. However, the nations represented at the meeting in London reaffirmed their determination to strengthen further their united defence posture in the area.

4. Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955 provides that the parties will cooperate for their security and defence and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to cooperate with the nations making this Declaration for their security and defence, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.

Made and signed at Lancaster House, London, on the twenty-eighth day of July, 1958, in five copies.

For the United States of America: John Foster Dulles
For Iran: M. Eghbal

For Pakistan: Firoz Khan Noon
For Turkey: A. Menderes

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Harold Macmillan

Source: U.S. Department of State, "United States Treaties and Other International Agreements," (1950-), vol. 9, no. 1077.

March 5, 1959 Agreement signed at Ankara.
March 5, 1959 Entered into force.

The Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Iran.

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1959:

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defense, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace, agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defense;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the major committees of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Iran;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East;

Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan, respectively,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Imperial Government of Iran is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such
appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at its request.

ARTICLE II

The Government of the United States of America in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Iran such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran, in order to assist the Government of Iran in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

ARTICLE III

The Imperial Government of Iran undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Iran and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

ARTICLE V

The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

ARTICLE VI

This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

For the Government of the United States of America:  For the Imperial Government of Iran:
Fletcher Warren  General Hassan Arfa
(seal)  (seal)


The President and His Imperial Majesty have had a cordial and useful exchange of views during the past three days. The visit afforded an opportunity for the President and the Shah to become acquainted personally and to discuss matters of mutual interest to their countries.

Their talks included a review of political and military situations in the world; a discussion of the progress which Iran is making in economic and social advancement; a review of defense arrangements in which the two countries are associated; and aspects of United States economic and military aid programs in Iran.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram also participated in the talks.

His Imperial Majesty described the form and goals of the Third Iranian Economic Development Plan, which is scheduled to start later this year. The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed on the necessity for further acceleration of economic development in Iran, and on the need for continued external assistance to Iran to enable that country to pursue the goals of its economic development plans.

They discussed and were in complete agreement on the subject of the nature of the threat to the Middle East and to all free peoples. They reaffirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement of 1959 concerning the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, and agreed on the necessity of collective security arrangements to achieve this end. They also agreed on the necessity of achieving a high level of internal economic development and social well-being in order to continue the internal stability necessary to resist external threats.

The friendly and extensive exchange of views between the President and His Imperial Majesty has been consonant with the close relationship between the two countries and has strengthened the bonds of friendship between them in their quest for common objectives of peace and well-being.

In taking leave of the President, His Imperial Majesty expressed his thanks for the friendly reception accorded him in the United States. Both the President and His Imperial Majesty were gratified by their fruitful discussions and by the spirit of cooperative understanding which marked those discussions.


The Heads of State of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, His Excellency Field Marshal Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, and His Excellency Cemal Gursel, President of the Republic of Turkey, met on July 20 and 21, 1964 in Istanbul.

The Heads of State reaffirmed their belief that regional cooperation is an essential factor in accelerating the pace of national development and in contributing to peace and stability.

They expressed their conviction that the strong cultural and historical ties which bind the peoples of their countries and have already provided them with a solid basis for collaboration should be strengthened further and developed for the common benefit of the peoples of the entire region.

To this end, the Heads of State resolved that appropriate ways and means should be adopted to enlarge and develop further cooperation in their existing relations in all fields.

They unanimously expressed the belief that this new collaboration should be carried out in a spirit of regional cooperation notwithstanding their activities as members of their organizations of a regional character.

The three countries would be pleased to consider the participation of other countries of the region in this cooperation.

Having reviewed the practical steps taken by the Foreign Ministers in the field of cooperation among the three countries, during their meeting on July 3 and 4, 1964 in Ankara, the Heads of State expressed their full appreciation for the progress already achieved in this respect. They endorsed the recommendation made by the Ministerial pre-Summit meeting of the three countries held in Ankara on July 18 and 19, 1964 on subjects of common and regional interest.

The Heads of State noted with approval the creation of a Ministerial Council composed of the Foreign Ministers with the participation of other Ministers of their respective governments in order to take and implement appropriate decisions on matters of common interest.

They noted with satisfaction the decision of the three Heads of Governments to establish a Regional Planning Committee composed of Heads of the three Plan Organizations, dealing with work relating to regional collaboration and harmonization of development plans. To this end, they have agreed to establish secretarial arrangements to serve the Regional Committee and the Ministerial Council.

They agreed in principle:

1. To a free or freer movements of goods through all practical means such as the conclusion of trade agreements;
2. To establish closer collaboration amongst existing chambers of commerce and eventually a joint chamber of commerce;
3. To the formulation and implementation of joint purpose projects;
4. To reduce the postal rates between the three countries to the level of internal rates;
5. To improve the air transport services within the region and the eventual establishment of a strong and competitive international airline among the three countries;
6. To investigate the possibilities of securing a close cooperation in the field of shipping including the establishment of a joint maritime line or "conference" arrangements;
7. To undertake necessary studies for construction and improvement of rail and road links;
8. To sign at an early date an agreement with a view to promoting tourism;
9. To abolish visa formalities among the three countries for travel purposes; and
10. To provide technical assistance to each other in the form of experts and training facilities.

Furthermore, the Heads of State have directed to explore all the possibilities for expanding cooperation in the cultural field among countries of the region. Cultural relations should be particularly oriented towards creating mass consciousness of the common cultural heritage, disseminating information about the history, civilization and culture of the peoples of the region, inter alia, through the establishment of cultural centres and the joint sponsoring of an Institute for initiating studies and research on their common cultural heritage.

The activities planned within the present scheme of collaboration shall be carried out under the name of "Regional Cooperation for Development."

The Heads of State expressed the hope that the spirit of perfect harmony and of regional solidarity which prevailed throughout the deliberation of the Istanbul Conference would ensure the attainment of the objectives formulated at this Conference.

They are confident that the combined efforts of their peoples to this end will open new vistas of hope and opportunity for them and thus contribute to world peace and to the prosperity of the whole region.

Appendix 14: President Nixon and Shah Exchange Remarks upon the Shah's Departure from His Visit to Washington, October 1967

President Nixon

As you leave this Capital after your visit here, I can echo what the Secretary of State just said in reflecting on your visit. He said: "The weather today is like our relations."

And certainly on this beautiful day as we complete our talks, I believe that the relations between Iran and the United States have never been better. That is due to your leadership. It is due also to the fact that we feel a special relationship not only to your country but to you, a relationship which, in my case, goes back many years.

We have had bilateral talks which have been most constructive.

But I, too, want to thank you for giving the Secretary, myself, and our colleagues the benefit of your analysis of the problems in the Mid-east, which are tremendously explosive at the present time, and also the problems in the world; because Iran, in a sense, is a bridge between the East and West, between Asia and Europe, and, for that matter, Africa.

And at that vantage point you are able to see those problems perhaps better than almost any leader in the world.

We thank you for coming to us.

And I can say, in conclusion, that I look forward to visiting Iran again. I have not yet set a date. But you have very cordially invited me to come. I accept the invitation and we will set a date at a later time.

Thank you.

His Imperial Majesty

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I must say once more how honored I was by your hospitality and friendship that you have shown to me once more and how deeply appreciative I am of the frankness and the friendliness in which we have had our talks with you, Mr. President, and your associates.

As you very well mentioned, our relations have never been as good as they are now, because they are based on an absolute trust and mutual interests.

We are defending the same principles, unholding the same moral values that we understand and for which we are living and, if necessary, dying; the interest of your country that the world should be a good place to live in, a free place to live in; that everybody should be given the opportunity of progressing, of living better without fear and in health and happiness.

For these ideals that we respect, we wish you an ever-
growing strength.

We wish you success in all your enterprises and, in addition to this, we hope that you will always feel - maybe sometimes it is a burden - but feel the responsibility that you have toward the human race, because you can provide it. When you can provide it, if I could be bold enough to say, you must provide it.

We shall continue on our part to play whatever constructive role that we can in our part of the world, upholding the same principles, trying to be of any assistance and cooperation for the maintenance of peace, stability, and assistance to all those who would ask for it without any second thought and as liberally as possible.

The state of relationships between our two countries, I hope, will continue in this manner for the better of our two countries, of our region, and I hope maybe even for the world.

As you mentioned, Mr. President, my country is a crossroad between various civilizations and various interests. It will be our duty to be able to honor this task faithfully, with dignity, and, I hope, also in a constructive way.

We will be more able to do it always when we have the moral support, assistance, of our friends, the greatest of them being this great country of yours, and your personal friendship, Mr. President, which I personally, and I am sure my people, value to the greatest possible extent.

Thank you very much.

Chart 1
Central Treaty Organization

Council of Ministers and Deputies

Budget and Administration Committee

The Secretariat

Military Committee

Counter Subversion Committee

Permanent Military Deputies Group

Combined Military Planning Staff

Liaison Committee

Economic Committee

Economic ...Steering Group

Economic Experts

Sub-Committees, Working Parties and other Subordinate bodies responsible for CENTO economic activities in specific fields. See Chart 2.
Chart 2
Central Treaty Organization
The Economic Committee

Economic Committee
  Economic Steering Group
  Economic Experts
    Sub-Committee on Health
    Working Party on Minerals
      Development
    Council for Scientific Education and Research
    Working Party on Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund
    Sub-Committee on Agriculture, Animal Production and Animal Health
    Sub-Committee on Communications and Public Works

Working Parties on:
  Cholera, Communicable Diseases, Etcetera
  Directors' Conference on Coordination of Malaria Programme
  Stratigraphic Working Group
  Cento Scientific Coordinating Board
  Working Parties or Working Groups on: Agricultural Marketing, Arid Zone Research, Etcetera
  Governing Body Cento Agricultural Machinery and Soil Conservation Training Centre
  Cento Agricultural Machinery and Soil Conservation Training Centre

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<td>Armed Forces per 1,000</td>
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1. In constant 1985 million dollars. 2. In thousand million dollars, rounded to nearest one-hundred million.

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<td>21</td>
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<td>21.8</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>164</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>217</td>
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<td>480</td>
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¹ In million. ² In thousands. ³ In million dollars. ⁴ Does not include paramilitary and reserves. N.B. The figure of 300,000 is given as the estimated reservists.

Table 3 (Continued): Population, Force Levels, and Military Expenditures, Iran, 1960-1979

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<th>71-72</th>
<th>72-73</th>
<th>73-74</th>
<th>74-75</th>
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<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>285</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>81.5</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>211.5</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>413</td>
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<td>915</td>
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Table 4 (Appendix 20): US Arms Transfer Programmes to Iran, 1965-1973, (in thousands of dollars)

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<td>Assistance</td>
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<td>1965</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>34,690</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>934</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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Table 5 (Appendix 21): US Loans and Grants, Selected Middle Eastern States, 1946-1968

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<th>Grants</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<td>49.4</td>
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<td>72.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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1. Total less repayments and interests, US Fiscal years, in millions of dollars.

Table 6 (Appendix 22): Arms Imports by Five-Year Averages for Selected Regional States, 1969-1973

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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>255.8</td>
<td>1,093.4</td>
<td>327.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>721.2</td>
<td>252.2</td>
<td>-65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>492.8</td>
<td>705.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>608.8</td>
<td>551.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>336.8</td>
<td>1,013.2</td>
<td>200.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>256.4</td>
<td>381.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>162.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In millions of constant 1977 US dollars.

Table 7 (Appendix 23): 25 Largest Third World Major-Weapon Importing Countries, 1977-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importing Country</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>Percentage of Third World Total</th>
<th>Largest Exporter per Importer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>3,133</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,172</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2,107</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,778</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>F.R. Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5,657</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39,504</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In millions of constant 1975 US dollars.

### Table 8 (Appendix 2b): Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower, Selected Regional States, 1980-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defence Expenditure</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Est. reser-</th>
<th>Para military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E million&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>E per capita</td>
<td>% of government spending&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>% of GDP/GNP&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Size of Armed Forces (000)</td>
<td>reservists&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; (000)</td>
<td>military (000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bahrain</strong></td>
<td>157  281  332</td>
<td>449  802  923</td>
<td>8.7  14.0  15.8</td>
<td>4.2  6.5</td>
<td>2.5  2.8  2.8</td>
<td>- 2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>1,522 2,494 3,043</td>
<td>36  56  66</td>
<td>13.6  12.0  13.1</td>
<td>6.9  8.7</td>
<td>367.0  460.0  445.0</td>
<td>380.0  139.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
<td>5,665 15,550 17,370</td>
<td>148  381  417</td>
<td>17.7  37.8  10.2</td>
<td>6.4  13.3</td>
<td>210.0  555.0  305.0</td>
<td>350.0  2,570.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>3,386 8,043 10,293</td>
<td>256  570  703</td>
<td>n.a.  n.a.  n.a.</td>
<td>7.5  33.7</td>
<td>242.5  612.5  520.0</td>
<td>75.0  654.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>5,178 8,241 4,981</td>
<td>1,338 2,035 1,215</td>
<td>32.6  37.2  24.9</td>
<td>30.2  29.8</td>
<td>169.6  241.0  242.0</td>
<td>370.0  6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>1,60 518 52.0</td>
<td>157 166 166</td>
<td>21.3  27.8  27.3</td>
<td>14.0  13.7</td>
<td>67.2  76.3  70.3</td>
<td>35.0  11.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait</strong></td>
<td>1,334 1,169 1,530</td>
<td>973 745 856</td>
<td>12.8  10.6  13.8</td>
<td>4.9  6.7</td>
<td>14.4  12.5  22.0</td>
<td>-  -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oman</strong></td>
<td>1,178 1,682 1,943</td>
<td>1,202 1,558 1,719</td>
<td>60.1  82.6  80.7</td>
<td>20.8  25.6</td>
<td>11.2  21.5  2.5</td>
<td>n.a.  3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>1,554 2,201 1,986</td>
<td>19 25 22</td>
<td>24.0  26.7  25.8</td>
<td>6.4  6.9</td>
<td>138.6  178.6  182.8</td>
<td>513.0  164.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
<td>603 n.a. 166</td>
<td>2,413 n.a. 593</td>
<td>20.1  n.a.  4.2</td>
<td>9.1  2.6</td>
<td>4.7  6.0  6.0</td>
<td>-  -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S Arabia</strong></td>
<td>17,666 27,062 21,813</td>
<td>1,936 2,706 2,093</td>
<td>24.1  28.0  29.1</td>
<td>15.4  18.2</td>
<td>47.0  51.5  62.5</td>
<td>-  43.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td>2,166 2,518 2,821</td>
<td>211 271 291</td>
<td>27.4  30.0  28.4</td>
<td>16.4  11.3</td>
<td>247.5  362.5  402.5</td>
<td>272.5  11.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>2,203 2,755 2,469</td>
<td>50 59 52</td>
<td>16.6  21.6  19.9</td>
<td>4.3  4.9</td>
<td>567.0  602.0  630.0</td>
<td>936.0  125.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>2,094 2,915 2,422</td>
<td>2,136 2,579 2,002</td>
<td>51.5  51.9  83.3</td>
<td>7.1  8.8</td>
<td>21.2  43.0  43.0</td>
<td>-  -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Current US dollars. 2. Based on local currency. 3. Based on local currency. 4. Countries' systems vary. The figures given may include reservists with recent training, active territorial militia and forces available for later mobilization.

Appendix 27: Map 3– Iran, Spheres of Influences, 1907 and 1941-1946

Appendix 28: Map 4—Present US-USSR Positions in the Persian Gulf Region

Appendix 29: Map 5- The Persian Gulf

Appendix 30: Map 6—Bahrain and the Persian Gulf States

Appendix 31: Map 7- Iran-Iraq Boundary at the Shatt al-Arab

Appendix 32: Map 8 - US-USSR Military Facilities in the Persian Gulf Surrounding Region

Appendix 33: Map 9—Superpowers and the Persian Gulf Oil Fields

Appendix 34: Map 10- General Area of the Indian Ocean


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